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		<title>Library:Materialism and the Dialectical Method</title>
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		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Redirect to Dialectical Materialism: An Introduction&lt;/p&gt;
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		<title>Library:Materialism and the Dialectical Method</title>
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		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Turn &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;&amp;#039;s into Mediawiki italics&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Materialism and the Dialectical Method|author=Maurice Cornforth|published_date=1953|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/cornforth1953/|pdf=https://redstarpublishers.org/cornforth1953.pdf}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Dedication ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Memory of David Guest&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who Died in Spain&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
in the Struggle&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Against Fascism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First printed in the U.S.A. in 1953&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reprinted in 2015&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Foreword ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The present volume deals with the basic ideas of Marxist materialism and the dialectical method. A second volume will deal with the further development of these ideas in their application to society and the growth of human consciousness—historical materialism and the theory of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have tried to confine myself to a straightforward exposition of the leading ideas of dialectical materialism, so far as I myself have succeeded in understanding them, without burdening the exposition with digressions into more technical questions of philosophy, or with discussions about and polemics against any of the more abstruse philosophical theories, past and present, or with much of the argumentation about particular points which might be necessary to defend them against philosophical opponents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have done my best to limit the use of technical terms to the minimum, and to give an explanation of the meaning of all such terms as and when they occur&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Maurice Cornforth&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
London&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART ONE: MATERIALISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 1. Party Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Every philosophy expresses a class outlook. But in contrast to the exploiting classes, which have always sought to uphold and justify their class position by various disguises and falsifications, the working class, from its very class position and aims, is concerned to know and understand things just as they are, without disguise or falsification.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The party of the working class needs a philosophy which expresses a revolutionary class outlook. The alternative is to embrace ideas hostile to the working class and to socialism.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;This determines the materialist character of our philosophy.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Party Philosophy and Class Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism has been defined as: “The world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist Party.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &#039;&#039;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&#039;&#039;, N. Y., 1940.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This definition must appear a strange one, both to many politicians and to many philosophers. But we will not begin to understand dialectical materialism unless we can grasp the thought which lies behind this definition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us ask, first of all, what conception of philosophy lies behind the idea expressed in this definition of party or—since a party is always the political representative of a class—class philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By philosophy is usually meant our most general account of the nature of the world and of mankind’s place and destiny in it—our world outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That being understood, it is evident that everybody has some kind of philosophy, even though he has never learned to discuss it. Everybody is influenced by philosophical views, even though he has not thought them out for himself and cannot formulate them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some people, for example, think that this world is nothing but “a vale of tears” and that our life in it is the preparation for a better life in another and better world. They accordingly believe that we should suffer whatever befalls us with fortitude, not struggling against it, but trying to do whatever good we can to our fellow creatures. This is one kind of philosophy, one kind of world outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other people think that the world is a place to grow rich in, and that each should look out for himself. This is another kind of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But granted that our philosophy is our world outlook, the task arises of working out this world outlook systematically and in detail, turning it into a well-formulated and coherent theory, turning vaguely held popular beliefs and attitudes into more or less systematic doctrines. This is what the philosophers do.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the time the philosophers have worked out their theories, they have often produced something very complicated, very abstract and very hard to understand. But even though only a comparatively few people may read and digest the actual productions of philosophers, these productions may and do have a very wide influence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the fact that philosophers have systematized certain beliefs reinforces those beliefs, and helps to impose them upon wide masses of ordinary people. Hence, everyone is influenced in one way or another by philosophers, even though they have never read the works of those philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And if this is the case, then we cannot regard the systems of the philosophers as being wholly original, as being wholly the products of the brain-work of the individual philosophers. Of course, the formulation of views, the peculiar ways in which they are worked out and written down, is the work of the particular philosopher. But the views themselves, in their most general aspect, have a social basis in ideas which reflect the social activities and social relations of the time, and which, therefore, do not spring ready-made out of the heads of philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this we may proceed a step further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When society is divided into classes—and society always has been divided into classes ever since the dissolution of the primitive communes, that is to say, throughout the entire historical period to which the history of philosophy belongs—then the various views which are current in society always express the outlooks of various classes. We may conclude, therefore, that the various systems of the philosophers also always express a class outlook. They are, in fact, nothing but the systematic working out and theoretical formulation of a class outlook, or, if you prefer, of the ideology of definite classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Philosophy is and always has been class philosophy. Philosophers may pretend it is not, but that does not alter the fact.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For people do not and cannot think in isolation from society, and therefore from the class interests and class struggles which pervade society, any more than they can live and act in such isolation. A philosophy is a world outlook, an attempt to understand the world, mankind and man’s place in the world. Such an outlook cannot be anything but the outlook of a class, and the philosopher functions as the thinking representative of a class. How can it be otherwise? Philosophies are not imported from some other planet, but are produced here on earth, by people involved, whether they like it or not, in existing class relations and class struggles. Therefore, whatever philosophers say about themselves, there is no philosophy which does not embody a class outlook, or which is impartial, as opposed to partisan, in relation to class struggles. Search as we may, we shall not find any impartial, non-partisan, non-class philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bearing this in mind, then, we shall find that the philosophies of the past have all, in one way or another, expressed the outlook of the so-called “educated” classes, that is to say, of the exploiting classes. In general, it is the leaders of society who express and propagate their ideas in the form of systematic philosophies. And up to the appearance of the modern working class, which is the peculiar product of capitalism, these leaders have always been the exploiting classes. It is their outlook which has dominated philosophy, just as they have dominated society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can only conclude from this that the working class, if today it intends to take over leadership of society, needs to express its own class outlook in philosophical form, and to oppose this philosophy to the philosophies which express the outlook and defend the interests of the exploiters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The services rendered by Marx and Engels to the working class may be expressed in a few words thus: they taught the working class to know itself and be conscious of itself, and they substituted science for dreams,” wrote Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Lenin on Engels&#039;&#039;, N. Y., 1935.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It is the great and historic merit of Marx and Engels that they proved by scientific analysis the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and its transition to communism, under which there will be no more exploitation of man by man… that they indicated to the proletarians of all countries their role, their task, their mission, namely, to be the first to rally around themselves in this struggle all the toilers and exploited.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Teaching the working class “to know itself and be conscious of itself,” and to rally around itself “all the toilers and exploited,” Marx and Engels founded and established the revolutionary theory of working-class struggle, which illumines the road by which the working class can throw off capitalist exploitation, can take the leadership of all the masses of the people, and so free the whole of society once and for all of all oppression and exploitation of man by man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels wrote in the period when capitalism was still in the ascendant and when the forces of the working class were first being rallied and organized. Their theory was further continued by Lenin, in the period when capitalism had reached its final stage of monopoly capitalism or imperialism, and when the proletarian socialist revolution had begun. It was further continued by Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels taught that, without its own party, the working class certainly could not win victory over capitalism, could not lead the whole of society forward to the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. The working class must have its own party, independent of all bourgeois parties. Further developing the Marxist teachings about the party, Lenin showed that the party must act as the vanguard of its class, the most conscious section of its class, and that it is the instrument for winning and wielding political power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To fulfill such a role, the party must evidently have knowledge, understanding and vision; in other words, it must be equipped with revolutionary theory, on which its policies are based and by which its activities are guided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This theory is the theory of Marxism-Leninism. And it is not just an economic theory, nor yet exclusively a political theory, but a world outlook—a philosophy. Economic and political views are not and never can be independent of a general world outlook. Specific economic and political views express the world outlook of those who hold such views, and conversely, philosophical views find expression in views on economics and politics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recognizing all this, the revolutionary party of the working class cannot but formulate, and having formulated, hold fast to, develop and treasure its party philosophy. In this philosophy—dialectical materialism—are embodied the general ideas by means of which the party understands the world which it is seeking to change and in terms of which it defines its aims and works out how to fight for them. In this philosophy are embodied the general ideas by means of which the party seeks to enlighten and organize the whole class, and to influence, guide and win over all the masses of working people, showing the conclusions which must be drawn from each stage of the struggle, helping people to learn from their own experience how to go forward towards socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so we see why it is that in our times a philosophy has arisen which expresses the revolutionary world outlook of the working class, and that this philosophy—dialectical materialism—is defined as “the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist Party.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Experience itself has taught the party the need for philosophy. For experience shows that if we do not have our own revolutionary socialist philosophy, then inevitably we borrow our ideas from hostile, anti-socialist sources. If we do not adopt today the outlook of the working class and of the struggle for socialism, then we adopt—or slip into, without meaning to do so—that of the capitalists and of the struggle against socialism. This is why the working class party—if it is to be the genuine revolutionary leadership of its class, and is not to mislead its class by the importation of hostile capitalist ideas, and of policies corresponding to such ideas—must be concerned to formulate, defend and propagate its own revolutionary philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Class Philosophy and Truth ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Against what has just been said about a class and party philosophy, the objection is bound to be raised that such a conception is a complete travesty of the whole idea of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Class interests may incline us to believe one thing rather than another, some will say, but should not philosophy be above this? Should not philosophy be objective and impartial, and teach us to set class and party interests aside, and to seek only for the truth? For surely what is true is true, whether this suits some or other class interests or not? If philosophy is partisan—party philosophy—how can it be objective, how can it be true philosophy?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In reply to such objections, we may say that the working class standpoint in philosophy is very far indeed from having no concern for truth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is there no such thing as truth? Of course there is—and men are getting nearer to it. For different outlooks, partisan as they may be, are not on a level so far as nearness to truth is concerned. Every philosophy embodies a class outlook. Yes, but just as one class differs from another class in its social role and in its contribution to the development of society, so one philosophy embodies positive achievements in comparison with another in the working out of the truth about the world and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
People are prone to believe that if we adopt a partisan, class standpoint, then we turn our backs on truth; and that, on the other hand, if we genuinely seek for truth, then we must be strictly impartial and non-partisan. But the contrary is the case. It is only when we adopt the partisan standpoint of historically the most progressive class that we are able to get nearer to truth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The definition of dialectical materialism, therefore, as the philosophy of the revolutionary working-class party, is in no way incompatible with the claim of dialectical materialism to express truth, and to be a means of arriving at truth. On the contrary. We have every right to make this claim, in view of the actual historical position and role of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Except for the working class, all other classes which have aspired to take the leadership of society have been exploiting classes. But every exploiting class, whatever its achievements, has always to find some way of disguising its real position and aims, both from itself and from the exploited, and of making out that its rule is just and permanent. For such a class can never recognize its real position and aims as an exploiting class, or the temporary character of its own system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, in ancient slave society, Aristotle, the greatest philosopher of antiquity, made out that the institution of slavery was decreed by nature, since some men were by nature slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the heyday of feudal society the greatest philosopher of the middle ages, Thomas Aquinas, represented the entire universe as being a kind of feudal system. Everything was arranged in a feudal hierarchy,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A hierarchy is an order in which the things at the top rule over the things below them. Thus the serfs were at the bottom of the feudal hierarchy and the king was at the top. Similarly, the Pope is the head of the “Catholic hierarchy.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with God surrounded by the chief archangels at the top. Everything depended on what was next above it in the system, and nothing could exist without God.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for capitalism, it dissolves all feudal ties and, as Marx and Engels observed, “has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous cash payment.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;The Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, Chapter I, N. Y., 1948.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was reflected in the beginnings of capitalist philosophy, especially in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This philosophy saw the world as consisting of independent atoms, each complete in itself, concerned only with itself, and all interacting. This was a mirror of capitalist society, as seen by the rising bourgeoisie. And by means of such ideas they succeeded, too, in disguising their own aims of domination and profit. Worker and capitalist were “on a level,” each was a free human atom, and they entered into a free contract, the one to work, the other to provide capital and pay wages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the working class does not need any such “false consciousness” as is contained in such philosophies. It does not want to set up a new system of exploitation, but to abolish all exploitation of man by man. For this reason, it has no interest whatever in disguising anything, but rather in understanding things just as they really are. For the better it understands the truth, the more is it strengthened in its struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, other classes have always wanted to perpetuate themselves and to last out for as long as they could. And so they have favored philosophical “systems” which give themselves a permanent place in the universe. Such systems attempt to define the nature of the universe so as to represent certain things and certain relations as being necessary, eternal and unchangeable. And then they make it appear that a particular social system is a necessary part of the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the working class does not want to perpetuate itself. On the contrary, it wants to do away with its own existence as a class as quickly as possible, and to establish a classless society. Therefore, the working class has no use at all for any philosophical “system” which establishes any false permanence. Its class position and aims are such that it can afford to and needs to recognize and trace out the change, coming into being and ceasing to be of everything in existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Party philosophy, then, has a right to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they are, in all their manifold changes and interconnections, without disguises and without fantasy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== A Revolution in Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Marxian doctrine is omnipotent because it is true,” wrote Lenin. “It is complete and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world conception which is irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction or defense of bourgeois oppression.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, V. I. Lenin, Joseph Stalin, &#039;&#039;On the Theory of Marxism&#039;&#039;, Lenin, “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism,” N. Y., 1948.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And he further wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“There is nothing resembling ‘sectarianism’ in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the highroad of development of world civilization. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in the fact that he furnished answers to questions the foremost minds of mankind had already raised. His teachings arose as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism is a revolution in philosophy. This revolution appears as the culmination of a whole great development of philosophical thought, in which the problems of philosophy were posed and took shape in the course of a series of revolutions, the highest point being reached in the classical German philosophy of the early nineteenth century. Marxism is thus the continuation and culmination of the past achievements of philosophy. And it is a continuation which puts an end to an epoch and constitutes a new point of departure. In comparison with past philosophies, it launches out on new lines. It puts an end to the “systems” of the past, and is a philosophy of an entirely new kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism-Leninism is no longer a philosophy which expresses the world outlook of an exploiting class, of a minority, striving to impose its rule and its ideas upon the masses of the people, in order to keep them in subjection; but it is a philosophy which serves the common people in their struggle to throw off all exploitation and to build a classless society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism-Leninism is a philosophy which seeks to understand the world in order to change it. “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways,” wrote Marx. “The point, however, is to change it.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Appendices, Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” XI, N. Y., 1941.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore, if we could say of past philosophy that it has been an attempt to understand the world and man’s place and destiny in it—an attempt necessarily conditioned by the class outlook, prejudices and illusions of the various exploiting class philosophers—we have to say of Marxist-Leninist philosophy that it is an attempt to understand the world in order to change the world and to shape and realize man’s destiny in it. Dialectical materialism is a theoretical instrument in the hands of the people for use in changing the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism-Leninism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a “system,” as previous philosophies have done, and then try to make everything fit into it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus dialectical materialism is in the truest sense a popular philosophy, a scientific philosophy and a philosophy of practice. “The discovery of Marx and Engels represents the end of the old philosophy, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; the end of that philosophy which claimed to give a universal explanation of the world,” said A. A. Zhdanov. “With the appearance of Marxism as the scientific world outlook of the proletariat there ends the old period in the history of philosophy, when philosophy was the occupation of isolated individuals, the possession of philosophical schools consisting of a small number of philosophers and their disciples, detached from life and the people, and alien to the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Marxism is not such a philosophical school. On the contrary, it supersedes the old philosophy—the philosophy that was the property of a small elite, the aristocracy of the intellect. It marked the beginning of a completely new period in the history of philosophy, when it became a scientific weapon in the hands of the proletarian masses in their struggle for emancipation from capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Marxist philosophy, as distinguished from preceding philosophical systems, is not a science above other sciences; rather, it is an instrument of scientific investigation, a method, penetrating all natural and social sciences, enriching itself with their attainments in the course of their development. In this sense, Marxist philosophy is the most complete and decisive negation of all preceding philosophy. But to negate, as Engels emphasized, does not mean merely to say ‘no’. Negation includes continuity, signifies absorption, the critical reforming and unification in a new and higher synthesis of everything advanced and progressive that has been achieved in the history of human thought.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Andrei A. Zhdanov, &#039;&#039;Essays on Literature, Philosophy, and Music&#039;&#039;, Chapter II, N. Y., 1950.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The revolutionary characteristics of dialectical materialism are embodied in the two features of Marxist-Leninist philosophy which give it its name—dialectics and materialism. In order to understand things so as to change them we must study them, not according to the dictates of any abstract system, but in their real changes and interconnections—and that is what is meant by dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We must set aside preconceived ideas and fancies about things, and strive to make our theories correspond to the real conditions of material existence—and that means that our outlook and theory are materialist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In dialectical materialism, wrote Engels, “the materialist world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently….” For “it was resolved to comprehend the real world—nature and history—just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist fancies. It was decided relentlessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic connection. And materialism means nothing more than this.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 2. Materialism and Idealism ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Materialism is opposed to idealism since, while idealism holds that the spiritual or ideal is prior to the material, materialism holds that matter is prior. This difference manifests itself in opposed ways of interpreting and understanding every question, and so in opposed attitudes in practice.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;While idealism takes many subtle forms in the writings of philosophers, it is at bottom a continuation of belief in the supernatural. It involves belief in two worlds, in the ideal or supernatural world over against the real material world.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;In essence idealism is a conservative, reactionary force; and its reactionary influence is demonstrated in practice. Marxism adopts a consistent standpoint of militant materialism.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Materialism, and Idealism—Opposed Ways of Interpreting Every Question ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our philosophy is called Dialectical Materialism, said Stalin, “because its approach to the phenomena&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A &#039;&#039;phenomenon&#039;&#039;, plural &#039;&#039;phenomena&#039;&#039;, is anything which we observe.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is dialectical, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is materialistic.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Materialism is not a dogmatic system. It is rather a way of interpreting, conceiving of, explaining every question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist way of interpreting events, of conceiving of things and their interconnections, is opposed to the idealist way of interpreting and conceiving of them. Materialism is opposed to idealism. With every question, there are materialist and idealist ways of interpreting it, materialist and idealist ways of trying to understand it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus materialism and idealism are not two opposed abstract theories about the nature of the world, of small concern to ordinary practical folk. They are opposed ways of interpreting and understanding every question, and, consequently, they express opposite approaches in practice and lead to very different conclusions in terms of practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor are they, as some use the terms, opposite moral attitudes— the one high-minded, the other base and self-seeking. If we use the terms like this, we will never understand the opposition between capitalist and materialist conceptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this way of speaking is, as Engels said, nothing but “an unpardonable concession to the traditional philistine prejudice against the word materialism resulting from the long-continued defamation by the priests. By the word materialism the philistine understands gluttony, drunkenness, lust of the eye, lust of the flesh, arrogance, cupidity, miserliness, profit-hunting and stock-exchange swindling—in short, all the filthy vices in which he himself indulges in private. By the word idealism he understands the belief in virtue, universal philanthropy and in a general way a ‘better world’, of which he boasts before others.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before trying to define materialism and idealism in general terms, let us consider how these two ways of understanding things are expressed in relation to certain simple and familiar questions. This will help us to grasp the significance of the distinction between a materialist and an idealist interpretation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First let us consider a very familiar natural phenomenon—a thunderstorm. What causes thunderstorms?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An idealist way of answering this question is to say that thunderstorms are due to the anger of God. Being angry, he arranges for lightning and thunderbolts to descend upon mankind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist way of understanding thunderstorms is opposed to this. The materialist will try to explain and understand thunderstorms as being solely due to what we call natural forces. For example, ancient materialists suggested that far from thunderstorms being due to the anger of the gods, they were caused by material particles in the clouds banging against one another. That this particular explanation was wrong, is not the point: the point is that it was an attempt at materialist as opposed to idealist explanation. Nowadays a great deal more is known about thunderstorms arising from the scientific investigation of the natural forces involved. Knowledge remains very incomplete, but at all events enough is known to make it quite clear that the explanation must be on materialist lines, so that the idealist explanation has become thoroughly discredited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It will be seen that while the idealist explanation tries to relate the phenomenon to be explained to some &#039;&#039;spiritual&#039;&#039; cause—in this case the anger of God—the materialist explanation relates it to &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; causes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this example, most educated people today would agree in accepting the materialist interpretation. This is because they generally accept the &#039;&#039;scientific&#039;&#039; explanation of natural phenomena, and every advance of natural science is an advance in the &#039;&#039;materialist&#039;&#039; understanding of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us take a second example, this time one arising out of social life. For instance: Why are there rich and poor? This is a question which many people ask, especially poor people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most straightforward idealist answer to this question is to say simply—It is because God made them so. It is the will of God that some should be rich and others poor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But other less straightforward idealist explanations are more in vogue. For example: it is because some men are careful and farsighted, and these husband their resources and grow rich, while others are thriftless and stupid, and these remain poor. Those who favor this type of explanation say that it is all due to eternal “human nature.” The nature of man and of society is such that the distinction of rich and poor necessarily arises.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as in the case of the thunderstorm, so in the case of the rich and poor, the idealist seeks for some spiritual cause—if not in the will of God, the divine mind, then in certain innate characteristics of the human mind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist, on the other hand, seeks the reason in the material, economic conditions of social life. If society is divided into rich and poor, it is because the production of the material means of life is so ordered that some have possession of the land and other means of production while the rest have to work for them. However hard they may work and however much they may scrape and save, the non-possessors will remain poor, while the possessors grow rich on the fruits of their labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On such questions, therefore, the difference between a materialist and an idealist conception can be very important. And the difference is important not merely in a theoretical but in a practical sense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A materialist conception of thunderstorms, for example, helps us to take precautions against them, such as fitting buildings with lightning conductors. But if our explanation of thunderstorms is idealist, all we can do is to watch and pray. If we accept an idealist account of the existence of rich and poor, all we can do is to accept the existing state of affairs—rejoicing in our superior status and bestowing a little charity if we are rich, and cursing our fate if we are poor. But armed with a materialist understanding of society we can begin to see the way to change society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear, therefore, that while some may have a vested interest in idealism, it is in the interests of the great majority to learn to think and to understand things in the materialist way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How, then, can we define materialism and idealism, and the difference between them, in general terms, so as to define the essence of the question? This was done by Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being…. The answers which the philosophers have given to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and therefore in the last instance assumed world creation in some form or another… comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Idealism is the way of interpreting things which regards the spiritual as prior to the material, whereas materialism regards the material as prior. Idealism supposes that everything material is dependent on and determined by something spiritual, whereas materialism recognizes that everything spiritual is dependent on and determined by something material. And this difference manifests itself both in general philosophical conceptions of the world as a whole, and in conceptions of particular things and events.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Idealism and the Supernatural ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At bottom, idealism is religion, theology. “Idealism is clericalism,” wrote Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 11, “On Dialectics,” N. Y., 1943.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; All idealism is a continuation of the religious approach to questions, even though particular idealist theories have shed their religious skin. Idealism is inseparable from superstition, belief in the supernatural, the mysterious and unknowable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Materialism, on the other hand, seeks for explanations in terms belonging to the material world, in terms of factors which we can verify, understand and control.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The roots of the idealist conception of things are, then, the same as those of religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To believers, the conceptions of religion, that is to say, conceptions of supernatural spiritual beings, generally seem to have their justification, not, of course, in any evidence of the senses, but in something which lies deep within the spiritual nature of man. And, indeed, it is true that these conceptions do have very deep roots in the historical development of human consciousness. But what is their origin, how did such conceptions arise in the first place? We can certainly not regard such conceptions as being the products, as religion itself tells us, of divine revelation, or as arising from any other supernatural cause, if we find that they themselves have a natural origin. And such an origin can in fact be traced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conceptions of the supernatural, and religious ideas in general, owe their origin first of all to the helplessness and ignorance of men in face of the forces of nature. Forces which men cannot understand are personified—they are represented as manifestations of the activity of spirits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, such alarming events as thunderstorms were, as we have seen, explained fantastically as due to the anger of gods. Again, such important phenomena as the growth of crops were put down to the activity of a spirit: it was believed that it was the corn spirit that made the corn grow.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the most primitive times men personified natural forces in this way. With the birth of class society, when men were impelled to act by social relations which dominated them and which they did not understand, they further invented supernatural agencies doubling, as it were, the state of society. The gods were invented superior to mankind, just as the kings and lords were superior to the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All religion, and all idealism, has at its heart this kind of &#039;&#039;doubling of the world&#039;&#039;. It is dualistic, and invents a dominating ideal or supernatural world over against the real material world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Very characteristic of idealism are such antitheses as: soul and body; god and man; the heavenly kingdom and the earthly kingdom; the forms and ideas of things, grasped by the intellect, and the world of material reality, perceptible by the senses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This “doubling” of the world is carried to its furthest limits in subjective idealism, which ends by regarding the material world as a mere illusion and asserts that only the non-material world is real. The dualistic character of all idealism is most marked in subjective idealism, which posits a complete antithesis between the mechanistic system of the illusory material world and the “freedom” of the higher, non-material reality. This antithesis, disguised as it often is behind allegedly “scientific” and “empiricist” theorizing, characterizes all subjective idealist philosophies, from Berkeley to John Dewey.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For idealism, there is always a higher, more real, non-material world—which is prior to the material world, is its ultimate source and cause, and to which the material world is subject. For materialism, on the other hand, there is &#039;&#039;one&#039;&#039; world, the material world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By idealism in philosophy we mean any doctrine which says that beyond material reality there is a higher, spiritual reality, in terms of which the material reality is in the last analysis to be explained.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Some Varieties of Modern Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point a few observations may be useful concerning some characteristic doctrines of modern bourgeois philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For nearly three hundred years there has been put forward a variety of philosophy known as “subjective idealism.” This teaches that the material world does not exist at all. Nothing exists but the sensations and ideas in our minds, and there is no external material reality corresponding to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And then again, this subjective idealism is put forward in the form of a doctrine concerning knowledge: it denies that we can know anything about objective reality outside ourselves, and says that we can have knowledge of appearances only and not of “things in themselves.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This sort of idealism has become very fashionable today. It even parades as extremely “scientific.” When capitalism was still a progressive force, bourgeois thinkers used to believe that we could know more and more about the real world, and so control natural forces and improve the lot of mankind indefinitely. Now they are saying that the real world is unknowable, the arena of mysterious forces which pass our comprehension. It is not difficult to see that the fashion for such doctrines is just a symptom of the decay of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that, at bottom, idealism always believes in &#039;&#039;two worlds&#039;&#039;, the ideal and the material, and it places the ideal prior to and above the material. Materialism, on the other hand, knows one world only, the material world, and refuses to invent a second, imaginary, superior ideal world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Materialism and idealism are irreconcilably opposed. But this does not stop many philosophers from trying to reconcile and combine them. In philosophy there are also various attempted compromises between idealism and materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One such attempted compromise is often known as “dualism.” Such a compromise philosophy asserts the existence of the spiritual as separate and distinct from the material—but it tries to place the two on a level. Thus it treats the world of non-living matter in a thoroughly materialist way: this, it says, is the sphere of activity of natural forces, and spiritual factors do not enter into it and have nothing to do with it in any way. But when it comes to mind and society, here, says this philosophy, is the sphere of activity of spirit. Here, it maintains, we must seek explanations in idealist and not in materialist terms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a compromise between materialism and idealism, therefore, amounts to this—that with regard to all the most important questions concerning men, society and history we are to continue to adopt idealist conceptions and to oppose materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another compromise philosophy is known as “realism.” In its modern form, this philosophy has arisen in opposition to subjective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The “realist” philosophers say that the external material world really exists independent of our perceptions and is in some way reflected by our perceptions. In this the “realists” agree with the materialists in opposition to &#039;&#039;subjective&#039;&#039; idealism; indeed, you cannot be a materialist unless you are a thorough-going realist on the question of the real existence of the material world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But merely to assert that the external world exists independent of our perceiving it, is not to be a materialist. For example, the great Catholic philosopher of the middle ages, Thomas Aquinas, was in this sense a “realist.” And to this day most Catholic theologians regard it as a heresy to be anything but a “realist” in philosophy. But at the same time they assert that the material world, which really exists, was created by God, and is sustained and ruled all the time by the power of God, by a spiritual power. So, far from being materialists, they are idealists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for modern “realism,” it concedes to materialism the bare existence of matter and, for the rest, is ready to concede everything to idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, the word “realism” is much abused by philosophers. So long as you believe that something or other is “real,” you may call yourself a “realist.” Some philosophers think that not only is the world of material things real, but that there is also, outside space and time, a real world of “universals,” of the abstract essences of things: so these call themselves “realists.” Others say that, although nothing exists but the perceptions in our minds, nevertheless these perceptions are real: so these call themselves “realists” too. All of which goes to show that some philosophers are very tricky in their use of words.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Basic Teachings of Materialism in Opposition to Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In opposition to all the forms of idealism, and of tricky compromises between materialism and idealism, the basic teachings of materialism can be formulated very simply and clearly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To grasp the essence of these teachings we should also understand what are the main assertions made in every form of idealism. There are three such main assertions of idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Idealism asserts that the material world is dependent on the spiritual.&lt;br /&gt;
# Idealism asserts that spirit, or mind, or idea, can and does exist in separation from matter. (The most extreme form of this assertion is subjective idealism, which asserts that matter does not exist at all but is pure illusion.)&lt;br /&gt;
# Idealism asserts that there exists a realm of the mysterious and unknowable, “above,” or “beyond,” or “behind” what can be ascertained and known by perception, experience and science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The basic teachings of materialism stand in opposition to these three assertions of idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Materialism teaches that the world is by its very nature material, that everything which exists comes into being on the basis of material causes, arises and develops in accordance with the laws of motion of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
# Materialism teaches that matter is objective reality existing outside and independent of the mind; and that far from the mental existing in separation from the material, everything mental or spiritual is a product of material processes.&lt;br /&gt;
# Materialism teaches that the world and its laws are fully knowable, and that while much may not be known there is nothing which is by nature unknowable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Marxist-Leninist philosophy is characterized by its absolutely consistent materialism all along the line, by its making no concessions whatever at any point to idealism. Thus Stalin points out:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(a) Contrary to idealism, which regards the world as the embodiment of an ‘absolute idea,’ a ‘universal spirit,’ ‘consciousness,’ Marx’s philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature material, that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion… and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a ‘universal spirit.’&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(b) Contrary to idealism, which asserts that only our mind really exists… the Marxist materialist philosophy holds that matter, nature, being is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our mind; that matter is primary, since it is the source of sensations, ideas, mind, and that mind is secondary, derivative, since it is a reflection of matter, a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in its development has reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought; and that, therefore, one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(c) Contrary to idealism, which denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws… Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are still not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Materialism and Idealism in Practice ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As was pointed out above, the opposition of materialism and idealism—which has now been stated in its most general terms—is not an opposition between abstract theories of the nature of the world, but is an opposition between different ways of understanding and interpreting every question. That is why it is of such profound importance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us consider some of the very practical ways in which the opposition of materialism and idealism is manifested.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Idealists tell us, for example, not to place “too much” reliance on science. They tell us that the most important truths are beyond the reach of science. Hence they encourage us not to believe things on the basis of evidence, experience, practice, but to take them on trust from those who pretend to know best and to have some “higher” source of information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way idealism is a very good friend and standby of every form of reactionary propaganda. It is the philosophy of the capitalist press and the radio. It favors superstitions of all sorts, prevents us from thinking for ourselves and taking a scientific approach to moral and social problems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, idealists tell us that what is most important for us all is the inner life of the soul. They tell us that we shall never solve our human problems except by some inner regeneration. This is a favorite theme in the speeches of well-fed persons. But many workers fall for it too—in factories, for example, where a “Moral Rearmament” group is active. They tell you not to fight for better conditions, but to improve your soul. They do not tell you that the best way to improve yourself both materially and morally is to join in the fight for peace and socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, an idealist approach is common amongst many socialists. Many sincere socialists, for example, think that what is essentially wrong with capitalism is that goods are unfairly distributed, and that if only we could get everyone, including the capitalists, to accept a new conception of fairness and justice, then we could do away with the evils of capitalism. Socialism to them is nothing but the realization of an abstract idea of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idealism of this belief lies in its assumption that it is simply the &#039;&#039;ideas&#039;&#039; which we hold that determine the way we live and the way society is organized. Those who think in this way forget to look for the &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; causes. For what in fact determines the way goods are distributed in capitalist society—the wealth enjoyed by one part of society, while the other and greater part lives in poverty—is not the ideas which men hold about the distribution of wealth, but the material fact that the mode of production rests on the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist. So long as this mode of production remains in existence, so long will extremes of wealth and poverty remain, and so long will socialist ideas of justice be opposed by capitalist ideas of justice. The task of socialists, therefore, is to organize and lead the struggle of the working class against the capitalist class to the point where the working class takes power from the capitalist class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we do not understand this, then we cannot find the way to fight effectively for socialism. We shall find that our socialist ideals are constantly disappointed and betrayed. Such, indeed, has been the experience of British socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen from these examples how idealism serves as a weapon of reaction; and how when socialists embrace idealism they are being influenced by the ideology of the capitalists. We can no more take over and use capitalist ideas for the purposes of socialist theory than we can take over and use the capitalist state machine, with all its institutions and officials, for the purposes of building socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Right through history, indeed, idealism has been a weapon of reaction. Whatever fine systems of philosophy have been invented, idealism has been used as a means of justifying the rule of an exploiting class and deceiving the exploited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not to say that truths have not been expressed in an idealist guise. Of course they have. For idealism has very deep roots in our ways of thinking, and so men often clothe their thoughts and aspirations in idealist dress. But the idealist form is always an impediment, a hindrance in the expression of truth—a source of confusion and error.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, progressive movements in the past have adopted and fought under an idealist theory. But this has shown only that they contained in themselves the seeds of future reaction (inasmuch as they represented the striving of a new exploiting class to come to power) or that they were themselves influenced by ideas of reaction; or it has been a mark of their weakness and immaturity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, the great revolutionary movement of the English bourgeoisie in the seventeenth century fought under idealist, religious slogans. But the same appeal to God which justified Cromwell in the execution of the King justified him also in stamping out the Levelers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Early democrats and socialists had many idealist notions. But in their case this demonstrated the &#039;&#039;immaturity&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;weakness&#039;&#039; of the movement. The idealist illusions had to be overcome if the revolutionary working-class movement was to arise and triumph. As the movement grew strong, the continuance within it of idealist notions represented an alien, reactionary influence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can truly say that idealism is essentially a conservative force—an ideology helping the defense of things as they are, and the preservation of illusions in men’s minds about their true condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, every real social advance—every increase in the productive forces, every advance of science—generates materialism and is helped along by materialist ideas. And the whole history of human thought has been the history of the fight of materialism against idealism, of the overcoming of idealist illusions and fantasies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Fight for Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxists, as the organized vanguard of the working class fighting to end all exploitation of man by man and to establish communism, have no use for idealism in any form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, for example, are some of the ways in which Lenin expressed himself on this question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The genius of Marx and Engels consisted in the very fact that in the course of a long period, nearly half a century, they developed materialism, that they further advanced one fundamental trend in philosophy….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Take the various philosophical utterances by Marx… and you will find an invariable basic motif, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;. insistence upon materialism and contemptuous derision of all obscurantism, of all confusion and all deviations towards idealism….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Marx and Engels were partisans in philosophy from start to finish; they were able to detect the deviations from materialism and concessions to idealism… in each and every ‘new’ tendency….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The realists etc., including the positivists, are all a wretched mush; they are a contemptible middle party in philosophy, who confuse the materialist and idealist trends on every question. The attempt to escape these two basic trends in philosophy is nothing but conciliatory quackery.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 11, “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,” Chapter VI, Section 4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On every issue we are partisans of materialism against idealism. This is because we know that it is in the light of materialist theory, which studies things as they are, without idealist fantasies about them, that we can understand the forces in nature and society so as to be able to transform society and to master the forces of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And because of this, too, materialism teaches us to have confidence in ourselves, in the working class—in people. It teaches us that there are no mysteries beyond our understanding, that we need not accept that which is as being the will of God, that we should contemptuously reject the “authoritative” teachings of those who set up to be our masters, and that we can ourselves understand nature and society so as to be able to change them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We hate idealism, because under cover of high-sounding talk it preaches the subjection of man to man and belittles the power of humanity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was the materialist confidence in humanity which was expressed by Maxim Gorky when he wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“For me, there are no ideas beyond man; for me, man and only man is the miracle worker and the future master of all forces of nature. The most beautiful things in this our world are the things made by labor, made by skilled human hands, and all our ideas are born out of the process of labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“And if it is thought necessary to speak of sacred things, then the one sacred thing is the dissatisfaction of man with himself and his striving to be better than he is; sacred is his hatred of all the trivial rubbish which he himself has created; sacred is his desire to do away with greed, envy, crime, disease, war and all enmity between men on earth; and sacred is his labor.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Maxim Gorky, &#039;&#039;Literature and Life&#039;&#039;, “How I Learned to Write,” London, 1946.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 3. Mechanistic Materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The type of materialism produced in the past by the revolutionary bourgeoisie was mechanistic materialism. This took over the ancient materialist conception that the world consisted of unchanging material particles (atoms), whose interactions produced all the phenomena of nature, and further strove to understand the workings of nature on the model of the workings of a machine.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It was in its time a progressive and revolutionary doctrine. But it has three grave weaknesses. (1) It requires the conception of a Supreme Being who started the world up; (2) it seeks to reduce all processes to the same cycle of mechanistic interactions and so cannot account for development, for the emergence of new qualities, new types of processes in nature; (3) it cannot account for social development, can give no account of human social activity and leads to an abstract conception of human nature.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Changing World and How to Understand It ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before Marx, materialism was predominantly &#039;&#039;mechanistic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We often hear people complain that the materialists seek to reduce everything in the world, including life and mind, to a system of soulless mechanism, to a mere mechanical interaction of bodies. This refers to mechanistic materialism. Marxist materialism is, however, not mechanistic but dialectical. To understand what this means we need first to understand something about mechanistic materialism itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can approach this problem by asking how materialists have sought to understand the various processes of change which are observed everywhere in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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The world is full of change. Night follows day and day night; the seasons succeed each other; people are born, grow old and die. Every philosophy recognizes that change is an omnipresent fact. The question is: how are we to understand the change which we observe everywhere?&lt;br /&gt;
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Change may be understood, in the first place, in an idealist way or in a materialist way.&lt;br /&gt;
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Idealism traces back all change to some idea or intention—if not human, then divine. Thus for idealism, changes in the material world are, in the last analysis, initiated and brought about by something outside matter, not material, not subject to the laws of the material world.&lt;br /&gt;
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But materialism traces back all change to material causes. In other words, it seeks to explain what happens in the material world from the material world itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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But while the occurrence of change has been recognized by everyone, since none can ignore it, philosophers have nevertheless sought to find something which does not change—something permanent, something changeless, behind or within the change.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is generally an essential part of the ideology of an exploiting class. They are afraid of change, because they are afraid that they, too, may be swept away. So they always seek for something fixed and stable, not subject to change. They try to hitch themselves on to this, as it were.&lt;br /&gt;
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The earlier materialists, too, sought for this. Behind all the changing appearances they looked for something which never changes. But while idealists looked for the eternal and changeless in the realm of spirit, these materialists looked for it in the material world itself. And they found it in the ultimate material particle—the eternal and indestructible atom. (“Atom” is a Greek word meaning “unbreakable.”)&lt;br /&gt;
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For such materialists, then, all &#039;&#039;changes&#039;&#039; were produced by the movement and interaction of &#039;&#039;unchanging&#039;&#039; atoms.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is a very ancient theory, put forward over two thousand years ago in Greece, and earlier still in India.&lt;br /&gt;
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In its day it was a very progressive theory, a great weapon against idealism and superstition. The Roman poet Lucretius, for example, explained in his philosophical poem &#039;&#039;On the Nature of Things&#039;&#039; that the purpose of the atomistic theory of the Greek philosopher Epicurus was to demonstrate “what are the elements out of which everything is formed, and how everything comes to pass without the intervention of the gods.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus there was born a materialism which saw the world as consisting of hard, impenetrable material particles, and which understood all change as arising from nothing but the motion and interaction of such particles.&lt;br /&gt;
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This theory was revived in modern times. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries philosophers and scientists turned to it in their fight against feudal, Catholic philosophy. But this modern materialism proved to be much richer in content than the ancient. For it tried to work out what were the laws of interaction of material particles, and so to present a picture of how all phenomena, from merely physical changes to the life of man, resulted from the motion and interaction of the separate parts of matter. In this way, by the eighteenth century, there had appeared the characteristic modern theories of mechanistic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== A Bourgeois Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
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Mechanistic materialism was in essence an ideology, a mode of theorizing, of the rising bourgeoisie. In order to understand it we must understand, first of all, that it arose and developed in opposition to feudal ideology—that its critical edge was directed against feudal ideas, that it was in fact the most radical of all bourgeois forms of opposition against the feudal outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the period of the rise of the bourgeoisie, the feudal social relations were shattered, and so were the feudal ideas, embodied in the Catholic philosophy, in which those social relations were enshrined.&lt;br /&gt;
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The feudal system, whose economic basis lay in the exploitation of the serfs by the feudal proprietors, involved complex social relationships of dependence, subordination and allegiance. All this was reflected, not only in social and political philosophy, but also in the philosophy of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was typical of the natural philosophy of the feudal period that everything in nature was explained in terms of its proper place in the system of the universe, in terms of its supposed position of dependence and subordination in that system, and of the end or purpose which it existed to serve.&lt;br /&gt;
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The bourgeois philosophers and scientists destroyed these feudal ideas about nature. They regarded nature as a system of bodies in interaction, and, rejecting all the feudal dogmas, they called for the investigation of nature in order to discover how nature really worked.&lt;br /&gt;
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The investigation of nature advanced hand in hand with the geographical discoveries, the development of trade and transport, the improvement of machinery and manufactures. The greatest strides were made in the mechanical sciences, closely connected as they were with the needs of technology. So it came about that materialist theory was enriched as the result of the scientific investigation of nature, and in particular by the mechanical sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
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This determined at once the strength and the weakness, the achievement and the limitation, of the materialist theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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What pushed that theory forward was, so Engels writes, “the powerful and ever more rapidly onrushing progress of science and industry.” But it remained “predominantly mechanical,” because only the mechanical sciences had attained any high degree of development. Its “specific, but at that time inevitable limitation” was its “exclusive application of the standards of mechanics.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The mechanistic way of understanding nature did not arise, however, simply from the fact that at that time it was only the mechanical sciences which had made any great progress. It was deeply rooted in the class outlook of the most progressive bourgeois philosophers, and this led to their turning exclusively to the mechanical sciences for their inspiration.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as the bourgeoisie, overthrowing feudal society, stood for individual liberty, equality and the development of a free market, so the most progressive philosophers of the bourgeoisie—the materialists—overthrowing the feudal ideas, proclaimed that the world consisted of separate material particles interacting with one another in accordance with the laws of mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
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This theory of nature reflected bourgeois social relations no less than the theories it replaced had reflected feudal social relations. But just as the new bourgeois social relations broke the feudal fetters and enabled a great new development of the forces of production to begin, so the corresponding bourgeois theory of nature broke down the barriers which feudal ideas had placed in the way of scientific research and enabled a great new development of scientific research to begin.&lt;br /&gt;
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The philosophical outlook seemed to find its confirmation in science, and science provided materials for the development and working out in detail of the philosophical outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== The World and the Machine ====&lt;br /&gt;
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The world—so thought the mechanistic materialists—consists of nothing but particles of matter in interaction. Each particle has an existence separate and distinct from every other; in their totality they form the world; the totality of their interactions forms the totality of everything that happens in the world; and these interactions are of the mechanical type, that is to say, they consist simply of the external influence of one particle upon another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a theory is equivalent to regarding the whole world as nothing but a complex piece of machinery, a mechanism.&lt;br /&gt;
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From this standpoint, the question always posed about any part of nature is the question we ask about a machine: what is its mechanism, how does it work?&lt;br /&gt;
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This was exemplified in Newton’s account of the solar system. Newton adopted the same general view as the Greek materialist, Epicurus, inasmuch as he thought that the material world consisted of particles moving about in empty space. But faced with any particular natural phenomenon, such as the movements of the sun and planets, Epicurus was not in the least concerned to give any exact account of it. With regard to the apparent movement of the sun across the heavens from east to west, for example, Epicurus said that the important thing was to understand that the sun was not a god but was simply a collection of atoms: no account of the actual machinery of its motions was necessary. Perhaps, he said, the sun goes round and round the earth; but perhaps it disintegrates and its atoms separate every night, so that it is “a new sun” which we see the next morning: to him such questions were simply unimportant. Newton, on the other hand, was concerned to show exactly how the solar system worked, to demonstrate the mechanics of it, in terms of gravity and mechanical forces.&lt;br /&gt;
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But just as Epicurus was not interested in how the solar system worked, so Newton was not interested in how it originated and developed. He took it for granted as a stable piece of machinery— created, presumably, by God. Not how it originated, not how it developed, but how it worked, was the question which he dealt with.&lt;br /&gt;
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The same mechanistic approach was manifested in Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood. The essence of his discovery was that he demonstrated the mechanism of circulation, regarding the heart as a pump, which pumps the blood out along the arteries so that it flows back through the veins, the whole system being regulated by a series of valves.&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand the mechanistic outlook better, let us ask: what is a mechanism? what is characteristic of a mechanism?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;ol style=&amp;quot;list-style-type:lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;A mechanism consists of permanent parts, which fit together.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;It requires a motive force to set it going.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Once set going, the parts interact and results are produced according to laws which can be exactly stated.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Consider, for example, such a mechanism as a watch. (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) It consists of a number of different parts—cogs, levers and so on— fitted neatly together. (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) It has to be wound up. (c) Then, as the spring uncoils, the parts interact according to laws exactly known to watchmakers, resulting in the regular movements of the hands on the dial.&lt;br /&gt;
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Further, to know how a mechanism, such as a watch, works, you must take it to bits, find out what its parts are, how they fit together and how, by their interactions, once the mechanism is set in motion by the application of the required motive force, they produce the total motion characteristic of the mechanism in working order.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is just how the mechanistic materialists regarded nature. They sought to take nature to bits, to find its ultimate component parts, how they fitted together and how their interactions produced all the changes we perceive, all the phenomena of the world. And moreover, finding out how the mechanism worked, they sought to find out how to repair it, how to improve it, how to change it and to make it produce new results corresponding lo the requirements of man.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== The Strength and Achievement of Mechanistic Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
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Mechanistic materialism was an important milestone in our understanding of nature. And it was a great progressive step of bourgeois thinkers, a blow against idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The mechanists were thorough-going in their materialism. For they waged a progressive fight against idealism and clericalism by trying to extend to the realm of mind and society the same mechanistic conceptions which were used in the scientific investigation of nature. They sought to include man and all his spiritual activities in the mechanistic system of the natural world.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most radical mechanists regarded not merely physical processes, and not merely plant and animal life, but man himself as a machine. Already in the seventeenth century the great French philosopher Descartes had said that all animals were complicated machines—automata: but man was different, since he had a soul. But in the eighteenth century a follower of Descartes, the physician LaMettrie, wrote a book with the provocative title &#039;&#039;Man a Machine.&#039;&#039; Men, too, were machines, he said, though very complicated ones.&lt;br /&gt;
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This doctrine was looked upon as exceptionally shocking, and as a terrible insult to human nature, not to mention God. Yet it was in its time a progressive view of man. The view that men are machines was an advance in the understanding of human nature as compared with the view that they are wretched pieces of clay inhabited by immortal souls. And it was, comparatively speaking, a more humane view.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, the great English materialist and utopian socialist Robert Owen told the pious industrialists of his time:&lt;br /&gt;
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“Experience has shown you the difference of the results between mechanism which is neat, clean, well-arranged and always in a high state of repair, and that which is allowed to be dirty, in disorder, and which therefore becomes much out of repair…. If, then, due care as to the state of your inanimate machines can produce such beneficial results, what may not be expected if you devote equal attention to your &#039;&#039;vital&#039;&#039; machines, which are far more wonderfully constructed?”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Robert Owen, &#039;&#039;New View of Society&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This humanitarianism was, however, at the best bourgeois humanitarianism. Like all mechanistic materialism, it was rooted in the class outlook of the bourgeoisie. The view that man is a machine is rooted in the view that in production man is a mere appendage of the machine. And if on the one hand this implies that the human machine ought to be well tended and kept in good condition, on the other hand it equally implies that no more should be expended for this purpose than is strictly necessary to keep the human machine in bare working order.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== The Weakness and Limitations of Mechanistic Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
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Mechanistic materialism had grave weaknesses.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) It could not sustain the materialist standpoint consistently and all the way.&lt;br /&gt;
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For if the world is like a machine, who made it, who started it up? There was necessary, in any system of mechanistic materialism, a “Supreme Being,” outside the material world—even if he no longer continuously interfered in the world and kept things moving, but did no more than start things up and then watch what happened.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a “Supreme Being” was postulated by nearly all the mechanistic materialists; for example, by Voltaire and Tom Paine. But this opens the door to idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) Mechanistic materialism sees change everywhere. Yet because it always tries to &#039;&#039;reduce&#039;&#039; all phenomena to the same system of mechanical interactions, it sees this change as nothing but the eternal &#039;&#039;repetition&#039;&#039; of the same kinds of mechanical processes, an eternal cycle of the same changes.&lt;br /&gt;
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This limitation is inseparable from the view of the world as a machine. For just as a machine has to be started up, so it can never do anything except what it was made to do. It cannot change itself or produce anything radically new. Mechanistic theory, therefore, always breaks down when it is a question of accounting for the emergence of &#039;&#039;new quality.&#039;&#039; It sees change everywhere—but nothing &#039;&#039;new,&#039;&#039; no &#039;&#039;development.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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The various processes of nature—chemical processes and the processes of living matter, for example—cannot in fact be all reduced to one and the same kind of mechanical interaction of material particles.&lt;br /&gt;
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Chemical interactions differ from mechanical interactions inasmuch as the changes which take place as a result of chemical Interaction involve a change of quality. For example, if we consider the mechanical interaction of two particles which collide, then their qualitative characteristics are irrelevant and the result is expressed as a change in the quantity and direction of motion of each. But if two chemical substances come together and combine chemically, then there results a new substance qualitatively different from either. Similarly, from the point of view of mechanics heat is nothing but an increase in the quantity of motion of the particles of matter. But in chemistry, the application of heat leads to qualitative changes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor do the processes of nature consist in the repetition of the same cycle of mechanical interactions, but in nature there is continual development and evolution, producing ever new forms of the existence or, what is the same thing, motion of matter. Hence the more widely and consistently the mechanistic categories are applied in the interpretation of nature, the more is their essential limitation exposed.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) Still less can mechanistic materialism explain &#039;&#039;social&#039;&#039; development.&lt;br /&gt;
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Mechanistic materialism expresses the radical bourgeois conception of society as consisting of social atoms, interacting together. The real economic and social causes of the development of society cannot be discovered from this point of view. And so great social changes seem to spring from quite accidental causes. Human activity itself appears to be either the mechanical result of external causes, or else it is treated—and here mechanistic materialism collapses into idealism—as purely spontaneous and uncaused.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a word, mechanistic materialism cannot give an account of men’s social activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Mechanistic Materialism and Utopian Socialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
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The mechanistic view treated men quite abstractly, each man being regarded as a social atom endowed by nature with certain inherent properties, attributes and rights.&lt;br /&gt;
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This was expressed in the bourgeois conception of “the rights of man,” and in the bourgeois revolutionary slogan: “All men are equal.”&lt;br /&gt;
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But the conception of human rights cannot be deduced from the abstract nature of man, but is determined by the stage of society in which men are living. Nor are men what they are “by nature,” but they become what they are, and change, as a result of their social activity. Nor are all men “by nature” equal. In opposition to the bourgeois conception of abstract equality, which amounted to mere formal equality of rights as citizens, equality before the law, Marx and Engels declared:&lt;br /&gt;
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“The real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the abolition of classes. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that of necessity passes into absurdity.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Part I, Chapter X, N. Y., 1939.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Adopting their abstract, mechanistic view of men as social atoms, the progressive mechanists tried to work out, in an abstract way, what form of society would be best for mankind—what would best suit abstract human nature, as they conceived of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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This way of thinking was taken over by the socialist thinkers who immediately preceded Marx, the utopian socialists. The utopian socialists were mechanistic materialists. They put forward socialism as an ideal society. They did not see it as necessitated by the development of the contradictions of capitalism—it could have been put forward and realized at any time, if only men had had the wit to do so. They did not see it as having to be won by working-class struggle against capitalism—it would be realized when everyone was convinced that it was just and best adapted to the requirements of human nature. (For this reason Robert Owen appealed to both the Archbishop of Canterbury and Queen Victoria to support his socialist program.)&lt;br /&gt;
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Again, the mechanistic materialists—and this applied above all to the utopian socialists—thought that what a man was, his character and his activities, was determined by his environment and education. Therefore they proclaimed that to make men better, happier and more rational it was simply necessary to place them in better conditions and to give them a better education.&lt;br /&gt;
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But to this Marx replied:&lt;br /&gt;
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“The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing and that, therefore, changed men are produced by changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that circumstances are changed precisely by men and that the educator must himself be educated.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Appendices, Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach, III.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If men are simply the products of circumstances, then they are at the mercy of circumstances. But on the contrary, men can themselves change their circumstances. And men themselves are changed, not as a mechanical result of changed circumstances, but in the course of and as a result of their own activity in changing their circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
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So what are the real material social causes at work in human society, which give rise to new activities, new ideas and therefore to changed circumstances and changed men?&lt;br /&gt;
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Mechanistic materialism could not answer this question. It could not explain the laws of social development nor show how to change society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore while it was a progressive and revolutionary doctrine in its time, it could not serve to guide the struggle of the working class in striving to change society.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 4. From Mechanistic to Dialectical Materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Mechanistic materialism makes certain dogmatic assumptions: (1) That the world consists of permanent and stable things or particles, with definite, fixed properties; (2) that the particles of matter are by nature inert and no change ever happens except by the action of some external cause; (3) that all motion, all change can be reduced to the mechanical interaction of the separate particles of matter; (4) that each particle has its own fixed nature independent of everything else, and that the relationships between separate things are merely external relationships.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Overcoming and passing beyond the dogmatic standpoint of mechanism, dialectical materialism holds that the world is not a complex of things but of processes, that matter is inseparable from motion, that the motion of matter comprehends an infinite diversity of forms which arise one from another and pass into one another, and that things exist not as separate individual units but in essential relation and interconnection.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Things and Processes ====&lt;br /&gt;
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In order to find how the limitations of the mechanist approach can be overcome we may consider first of all certain extremely dogmatic assumptions which are made by mechanistic materialism. These mechanistic assumptions are none of them justified. And by bringing them to the light of day and pointing out what is wrong with them, we can see how to advance beyond mechanistic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) Mechanism sees all change as having at its basis permanent and stable things with definite, fixed properties.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus for the mechanists the world consists of indivisible, indestructible material particles, which in their interaction manifest such properties as position, mass, velocity.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to mechanism, if you could state the position, mass and velocity of every particle at a given instant of time, then you would have said everything that could be said about the world at that time, and could, by applying the laws of mechanics, predict everything that was going to happen afterwards.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the first dogmatic assumption of mechanism. But we need to reject it. For the world does not consist of &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; but of &#039;&#039;processes,&#039;&#039; in which things come into being and pass away.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things,” wrote Engels, “but as a complex of processes, in which things apparently stable, no less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This, indeed, is what science in its latest developments teaches us. Thus the atom, once thought to be eternal and indivisible, has been dissolved into electrons, protons and neutrons; and these themselves are not “fundamental particles” in any absolute sense, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; they are not eternal and indestructible, any more than the atom; but science more and more shows that they, too, come into being, pass away and go through many transformations.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is fundamental is not the “thing,” the “particle,” but the unending &#039;&#039;processes&#039;&#039; of nature, in which &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; go through “an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away.” And nature’s process is, moreover, infinite: there will always be fresh aspects to be revealed, and it cannot be reduced to any &#039;&#039;ultimate&#039;&#039; constituents. “The electron is as inexhaustible as the atom, nature is infinite,” wrote Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 11, “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,” Chapter V, Section 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Just so in considering society, we cannot understand a given society simply in terms of some set of institutions in and through which individual men and women are organized, but we must study the social processes which are going on, in the course of which both institutions and people are transformed.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Matter and Motion ====&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The second dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that no change can ever happen except by the action of some external cause.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as no part of a machine moves unless another part acts on it and makes it move, so mechanism sees matter as being inert— without motion, or rather without self-motion. For mechanism, nothing ever moves unless something else pushes or pulls it, it never changes unless something else interferes with it.&lt;br /&gt;
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No wonder that, regarding matter in this way, the mechanists had to believe in a Supreme Being to give the “initial impulse.” But we need to reject this lifeless, dead theory about matter. This theory separates matter and motion: it thinks of matter as just a dead mass, so that motion always has to be impressed on matter from outside. But, on the contrary, you cannot separate matter and motion. Motion, said Engels, is the mode of existence of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. Motion in cosmic space, mechanical motion of smaller masses on the various celestial bodies, the motion of molecules as heat or as electrical or magnetic currents, chemical combination or disintegration, organic life—at each given moment each individual atom of matter in the world is in one or other of these forms of motion, or in several forms of them at once. All rest, all equilibrium is only relative, and only has meaning in relation to one or other definite form of motion. A body, for example, may be on the ground in mechanical equilibrium, may be mechanically at rest; but this in no way prevents it from participating in the motion of the earth and in that of the whole solar system, just as little as it prevents its most minute parts from carrying out the oscillations determined by its temperature, or its atoms from passing through a chemical process. Matter without motion is Just as unthinkable as motion without matter.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Part I, Chapter VI.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Far from being dead, lifeless, inert, it is the very nature of matter to be in process of continual change, of motion. Once we realize this, then there is an end of appeal to the “initial impulse.” Motion, like matter, never had a beginning.&lt;br /&gt;
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The conception of the inseparability of matter and motion, the understanding that “motion is the mode of existence of matter,” provides the way to answering a number of perplexing questions which usually haunt people’s minds when they think about materialism and which lead them to desert materialism and to run to the priests for an explanation of the “ultimate” truth about the universe.&lt;br /&gt;
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Was the world created by a Supreme Being? What was the origin of matter? What was the origin of motion? What was the very beginning of everything? What was the first cause? These are the sort of questions which puzzle people.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is possible to answer these questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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No, the world was not created by a Supreme Being. Any particular organization of matter, any particular process of matter in motion, has an origin and a beginning—it originated out of some previous organization of matter, out of some previous process of matter in motion. But matter in motion had no origin, no beginning.&lt;br /&gt;
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Science teaches us the inseparability of matter and motion. However static some things may seem to be, there is in them continual motion. The atom, for instance, maintains itself as the same only by means of a continual movement of its parts.&lt;br /&gt;
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So in studying the causes of change, we should not merely seek for external causes of change, but should above all seek for the source of the change within the process itself, in its own self-movement, in the inner impulses to development contained within things themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in seeking the causes of social development and its laws, we should not see social changes as being brought about by the actions of great men, who impressed their superior ideas and will on the inert mass of society—nor as being brought about by accidents and external factors—but as being brought about by the development of the internal forces of society itself; and that means, by the development of the social forces of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus unlike the utopians, we see socialism as the result, not of the dreams of reformers, but of the development of capitalist society itself—which contains within itself causes which must inevitably bring it to an end and lead to the socialist revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Forms of Motion of Matter ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The third dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that the mechanical motion of particles, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; the simple change of place of particles as the result of the action on them of external forces, is the ultimate, basic form of motion of matter; and that all changes, all happenings whatsoever can be reduced to and explained by such mechanical motion of particles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus all the motion of matter is reduced to simple mechanical motion. All the changing qualities which we recognize in matter are nothing but the appearances of the basic mechanical motion of matter. However varied the appearances may be, whatever new and higher forms of development may appear to arise, they are all to be reduced to one and the same thing—the eternal repetition of the mechanical interaction of the separate parts of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is difficult to find any justification for such an assumption. In the material world there are many different types of process, which all constitute different forms of the motion of matter. But they can by no means be all reduced to one and the same form of (mechanical) motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Motion in the most general sense,” wrote Engels, “conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right to thinking. The investigation of the nature of motion had as a matter of course to start from the lowest, simplest forms of this motion and to learn to grasp these before it could achieve anything in the way of explanation of the higher and more complicated forms.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Dialectics of Nature&#039;&#039;, Chapter III, N. Y., 1940.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The simplest form of motion is the simple change of place of bodies, the laws of which are studied by mechanics. But that does not mean that all motion can be reduced to this simplest form of motion. It rather means that we need to study how, from the simplest form of motion, all the higher forms of motion arise and develop—“from mere change of place right to thinking.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One form of motion is transformed into another and arises from another. The higher, more complex form of motion cannot exist without the lower and simpler form: but that is not to say that it can be reduced to that simpler form. It is inseparable from the simpler form, but its nature is not exhausted thereby. For example, the thinking which goes on in our heads is inseparable from the chemical, electrical etc. motion which goes on in the gray matter of the brain; but it cannot be reduced to that motion, its nature is not exhausted thereby.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;materialist&#039;&#039; standpoint, however, which rejects the mechanistic idea that all forms of motion of matter can be reduced to mechanical motion, must not be confused with the &#039;&#039;idealist&#039;&#039; notion that the higher forms of motion cannot be explained as arising from the lower forms. For example, idealists assert that life, as a form of motion of matter, cannot possibly be derived from any processes characteristic of non-living matter. For them, life can only arise through the introduction into a material system of a mysterious something from outside—a “vital force.” But to say that a higher form of motion cannot be reduced to a lower form is not to say that it cannot be derived from the lower form in the course of the latter’s development. Thus materialists will always affirm that life, for example, appears at a certain stage in the development of more complex forms of non-living matter, and arises as a result of that development, not as a result of the introduction into non-living matter of a mysterious “vital force.” The task of science in this sphere remains to demonstrate experimentally how the transition from non-living to living matter takes place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the mechanistic program of reducing all the motion of matter to simple, mechanical motion must be rejected. We need rather to study all the infinitely various forms of motion of matter, in their transformations one into another, and as they arise one from another, the complex from the simple, the higher from the lower.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of society, no one has yet tried to show how social changes can be explained by the mechanical interactions of the atoms composing the bodies of the various members of society— though to do so would be the logical culmination of the mechanistic program. But the next best thing is attempted by the mechanistic theory known as “economic determinism.” According to this theory, the whole motion of society is to be explained by the economic changes taking place in society, all the determinants of social change have been exhausted when the economic process has been described. This is an example of the mechanistic program of reducing a complex motion to a simple form—the process of social change, including all the political, cultural and ideological developments, to a simple economic process. But the task of explaining social development cannot be fulfilled by trying to reduce the whole development to an economic process. The task is rather to show how, on the basis of the economic process, all the various forms of social activity arise and play their part in the complex movement of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Things and Their Interconnection ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) The last dogmatic assumption of mechanism to be mentioned is that each of the things or particles, whose interactions are said to make up the totality of events in the universe, has its own fixed nature quite independent of everything else. In other words, each thing can be considered as existing in separation from other things, as an independent unit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Proceeding on this assumption it follows that all relations between things are merely external relations. That is to say, things enter into various relationships one with another, but these relationships are accidental and make no difference to the nature of the things related.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And regarding each thing as a separate unit entering into external relations with other things, it further follows that mechanism regards the whole as no more than the sum of its separate parts. According to this view, the properties and laws of development of the whole are uniquely determined by the properties of all its parts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not one of these assumptions is correct. Nothing exists or can exist in splendid isolation, separate from its conditions of existence, independent of its relationships with other things. Things come into being, exist and cease to exist, not each independent of all other things, but each in its relationship with other things. The very nature of a thing is modified and transformed by its relationships with other things. When things enter into such relationships that they become parts of a whole, the whole cannot be regarded as nothing more than the sum total of the parts. True, the whole is nothing apart from and independent of its parts. But the mutual relations which the parts enter into in constituting the whole modify their own properties, so that while it may be said that the whole is determined by the parts it may equally be said that the parts are determined by the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, the development of science itself shows the inadmissibility of the old mechanistic assumptions. These assumptions have force only in the very limited sphere of the study of the mechanical interactions of discrete particles. In physics they were already shattered with the development of the study of the electromagnetic field. Still less are they admissible in biology, in the study of living matter, and still less in the study of men and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Correction of Mechanistic Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we bring into the open and reject these assumptions of mechanistic materialism, then we begin to see the need for a materialist doctrine of a different, of a new type—a materialism which overcomes the weaknesses and narrow, dogmatic assumptions of mechanism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism understands the world, not as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which all things go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism considers that matter is always in motion, that motion is the mode of existence of matter, so that there can no more be matter without motion than motion without matter. Motion does not have to be impressed upon matter by some outside force, but above all it is necessary to look for the inner impulses of development, the self-motion, inherent in all processes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism understands the motion of matter as comprehending all changes and processes in the universe, from mere change of place right to thinking. It recognizes, therefore, the infinite diversity of the forms of motion of matter, the transformation of one form into another, the development of the forms of motion of matter from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism considers that, in the manifold processes taking place in the universe, things come into being, change and pass out of being, not as separate individual units, but in essential relation and interconnection, so that they cannot be understood each separately and by itself but only in their relation and interconnection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In dialectical materialism, therefore, there is established a materialist conception far richer in content and more comprehensive than the former mechanistic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=== 5. The Dialectical Conception of Development ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Whereas the older philosophies considered that the universe always remained much the same, a perpetual cycle of the same processes, science has demonstrated the fact of evolution. But while recognizing the fact of evolutionary development, bourgeois thinkers have tried to understand and explain it in fantastic, idealist terms. And they have conceived of development as being always a smooth, continuous process, not recognizing the occurrence of abrupt breaks in continuity, the leap from one stage to another.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Following up the ideas of Hegel by taking up the revolutionary side of his philosophy while freeing it of its idealist trammels, Marx and Engels established the dialectical materialist conception of development. The key to understanding development in nature and society and the leaps and breaks in continuity which characterize all real development—lies in the recognition of the inner contradictions and opposite conflicting tendencies which are in operation in all processes.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;This discovery by Marx and Engels was a revolution in philosophy and made of it a revolutionary weapon of the working people, a method for understanding the world so as to change it.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Idea of Evolution ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that the corrections of the mechanistic standpoint made by dialectical materialism are fully justified by and have a basis in the advance of science. Indeed, the advance of science itself has shattered the whole conception of the universe held by the older, mechanistic materialists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to that conception, the universe always remained much the same. It was a huge machine which always did the same things, kept grinding out the same products, went on and on in a perpetual cycle of the same processes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus it used to be thought that the stars and the solar system always remained the same—and that the earth, with its continents and oceans and the plants and animals inhabiting them, likewise always remained the same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this conception has given way to the conception of evolution, which has invaded all spheres of investigation without exception. Nor was it scientific investigation alone which produced the idea of evolution. Science does not advance in isolation from society as a whole. The idea of evolution was generated out of the rise of industrial capitalism itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence of all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;The Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, Chapter I.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The industrial capitalists saw themselves as the bearers of progress. And as they thought progress was the law of capitalism, so they saw it as the law of the whole universe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So there was made possible a great advance in the scientific picture of the universe. We find developing a picture of the universe, not as static, as always the same, but as in continual progressive development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The stars did not always exist—they were formed out of masses of dispersed gas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once formed, the whole stellar system, with all the stars in it, goes through an evolutionary process, stage by stage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some stars, like our sun, acquire planets—a solar system. Thus the earth was born. As its surface cooled, so chemical compounds were formed, impossible in the high temperatures of the stars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus matter began to manifest new properties, nonexistent before—the properties of chemical combination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then organic compounds were formed out of the complex linking of carbon atoms. And from organic matter the first bodies arose which began to manifest the properties of life, of living matter. Still new properties of matter emerged—the properties of living matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Living organisms went through a long evolution, leading eventually to man. With man, human society was born. And still new processes, with new laws, arose—the laws of society, and the laws of thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What comes next?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalist science can go no further. Here it ends, since capitalist science cannot contemplate the ending of capitalism. But socialist science shows that man himself is about to embark on a new phase of evolution—communist society, in which the whole social process will be brought under his own conscious, planned direction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this is the evolutionary history of the material universe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Apart from the last point, it may be said this is all common knowledge. Bourgeois thinkers know this as well as Marxists, though they often forget it. But Marxism does not only stress the fact that everything in the world goes through a process of development. What Marxism found out was how to understand and explain this development in a materialist way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The discovery of Marxism was the discovery of the laws of materialist dialectics. And that is why Marxism alone is able to give a fully scientific account of development and to point out the future path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the meaning of Marx’s great discovery—how to understand change and development in a materialist way, and therefore how to become masters of the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Idealist Conceptions of Change and Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How did bourgeois thinkers try to account for the universal change and development which they discovered?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us consider what some of them have had to say over a period of more than a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel said that the whole process of development taking place in history was due to the Absolute Idea realizing itself in history. Herbert Spencer said that all development was a process of increasing “integration of matter,” and he put this down to what he called an “Incomprehensible and Omnipresent Power.” Henri Bergson said that everything was in process of evolution, due to the activity of “the Life Force.” Fairly recently, a school of British philosophers has coined the phrase “emergent evolution.” They pointed out that in the course of development new qualities of matter are continually emerging, one after the other. But as to why this should happen, one of the leaders of this school, Professor Samuel Alexander, said that it was inexplicable and must be accepted “with natural piety,” while another of its leaders, Professor C. Lloyd Morgan, said that it must be due to some immanent force at work in the world, which he identified with God.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in every case some fantasy, something inexplicable and unpredictable, was conjured up to explain development. And so,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
when they thought about the future, all these bourgeois philosophers of evolution either thought, like Hegel, that development had now finished (Hegel taught that the Absolute Idea was fully realized in the Prussian State of which he was a distinguished employee), or else regarded the future as unfathomable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nowadays they begin to give up hope altogether and regard everything—past, present and future—as incomprehensible, the result of forces no one can ever understand or control.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the same story in the sciences. The cosmogonists, who study the evolution of the stars, appeal to a mysterious creation to start the process off. The biologists who study the evolution of organic life appeal to a series of unpredictable accidents (the random mutations of genes) as the basis for the whole process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such ideas are, however, unscientific. Why? Because they assert that the processes they are supposed to be investigating take place without any cause. True, the assertion is often made under a cloak of “scientific” objectivity and humility: it is not positively stated that no cause exists, but only that we have at present no clue as to what the cause, if any, may be. But such reservations do not materially alter the nature of the theories in question. For the fact remains that to say that matter was created, to say that “mutations” occur spontaneously, is to say that something happens for no reason, without any discoverable cause. Such statements do not deserve to be called even provisional scientific hypotheses but are simply idealist inventions, fantasies. Science may not yet know why something happens, but to say that it happens for no reason is to abandon science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A second defect in the evolutionary ideas of most bourgeois thinkers is that they regard the process of evolution as a smooth, continuous and unbroken process. They see the process of transition from one evolutionary stage to another as taking place through a series of gradations, without conflict and without any break in continuity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But continuity is not the law of development. On the contrary, periods of smooth, continuous evolutionary development are interrupted by sudden and abrupt changes. The emergence of the new stage in development takes place, when the conditions for it have matured, by a break in continuity, by the leap from one state to another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel was the first to point this out.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With every period of transition, he observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It is as in the case of the birth of a child; after a long period of nutrition in silence, the continuity of the gradual growth in size, of quantitative change, is suddenly cut short by the first breath drawn—there is a break in the process, a qualitative change—and the child is born.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;G. W. F. Hegel, &#039;&#039;Phenomenology of Mind&#039;&#039;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But Marx alone followed up this profound observation of Hegel. As for the ensuing bourgeois thinkers, although the investigations of science, and common experience itself, clearly demonstrate that development cannot take place without discontinuity, without abrupt transitions and the leap from one state to another, they have nevertheless in their general theories tried to make unbroken continuity the law of evolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This prejudice in favor of a smooth line of evolution has gone hand in hand with the liberal belief that capitalist society will evolve smoothly—through orderly bourgeois progress broadening down “from precedent to precedent,” as Tennyson once expressed it. To have thought differently about evolution in general would have implied that we would have to think differently about social evolution in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Dialectical Materialist Conception of Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of understanding and explaining development in a materialist way—that is, “in harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic connection”—is answered by dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism considers the universe, not as static, not as unchanging, but as in continual process of development. It considers this development, not as a smooth, continuous and unbroken process, but as a process in which phases of gradual evolutionary change are interrupted by breaks in continuity, by the sudden leap from one state to another. And it seeks for the explanation, the driving force, of this universal movement, not in inventions of idealist fantasy, but within material processes themselves—in the inner contradictions, the opposite conflicting tendencies, which are in operation in every process of nature and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main ideas of materialist dialectics, which are applied in dealing with the laws of development of the real material world, including society, will be the subject of the following chapters. But this is how Lenin summed them up:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essential idea of materialist dialectics is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The recognition of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. This alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything in existence. It alone furnishes the key to the leaps, to the break in continuity, to the transformation into the opposite, to the destruction of the old and emergence of the new….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In its proper meaning, dialectics is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Development is the struggle of opposites.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &#039;&#039;Philosophical Notebooks&#039;&#039;, Russian Edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== From Hegel to Marx ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where contradiction is at work, there is the force of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This profound conception was first put forward by Hegel. But he worked it out in an idealist way. According to Hegel, the whole process in the material world, in space and time, is nothing but the realization of the Absolute Idea, outside space and time. The Idea develops through a series of contradictions, and it is this ideal development which manifests itself in the material world. If things in space and time are forced to go through a series of transformations and to arise and pass away one after the other, that is because they are nothing but the embodiment of a self-contradictory phase of the Absolute Idea. For Hegel, the development of real things was due to the self-contradictoriness of their concepts: where the concept was self-contradictory, the thing which realized that concept could not be stable but must eventually negate itself and turn into something else. Thus instead of the concepts of things being regarded as the reflections of those things in our minds, the things were themselves regarded as nothing but the realizations of their concepts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is how Engels summed up the materialist criticism of Hegel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, one started out from his revolutionary side… from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form this method was unusable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist—where unknown—from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zig-zag movements and temporary setbacks, is only a miserable copy of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“This ideological reversal had to be done away with. We comprehended the concepts in our heads once more materialistically— as images of real things instead of regarding the real things as images of this or that stage of development of the absolute concept.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of human thought—two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously in the form of external necessity in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Thereby the dialectic of the concept itself became merely the conscious reflection of the dialectical motion of the real world and the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing before, and placed on its feet again….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trammels which in Hegel’s hands had prevented its consistent execution.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This materialist understanding of dialectics is the key to understanding the forces of development within the material world itself, without recourse to outside causes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This discovery arises from the whole advance of science and philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But above all it arises from the investigation of the laws of society, an investigation made imperative thanks to the very development of society—from the discovery of the contradictions of capitalism, explaining the forces of social development, and thereby showing the way forward from capitalism to socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why bourgeois thinkers could not answer the problem of explaining the real material forces of development in nature and society. To answer this problem was to condemn the capitalist system. And here they had a blind spot. Only the revolutionary philosophy of the vanguard of the revolutionary class, the working class, could do it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx’s discovery of the laws of materialist dialectics showed us how to understand the dialectical development of nature. But above all it showed us how to understand social change and how to wage the working-class struggle for socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This discovery revolutionized philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It signalized the triumph of materialism over idealism, by doing away with the limitations of the merely mechanistic materialism of the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It likewise spelled the end of all “systems” of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It made philosophy into a revolutionary weapon of the working people, an instrument, a method for understanding the world so as to change it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Summing up the essential ideas of materialist dialectics Stalin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Life always contains the new and the old, the growing and the dying, the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“That in life which is born and grows day after day is invincible, its progress cannot be checked. That is to say, if, for example, the proletariat as a class is born and grows day after day, no matter how weak it may be today, in the long run it must conquer. Why? Because it is growing, gaining strength and marching forward. On the other hand, that in life which grows old and is advancing to its grave, must inevitably sustain defeat, even if today it represents a titanic force. That is to say, if, for example, the ground is gradually slipping further and further back from under the feet of the bourgeoisie, and the latter is slipping further and further back every day, no matter how strong it may be today, it must, in the long run, sustain defeat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &#039;&#039;Anarchism or Socialism?&#039;&#039; Chapter I, Moscow, 1950.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the materialist dialectics of Marx shows us the way forward and gives us unshakable confidence in our cause.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART TWO: DIALECTICS ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 6. Dialectics and Metaphysics ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Dialectics, as a method of investigation, a method of thinking, is opposed to metaphysics. The metaphysical way of thinking deals with abstractions. It considers things each by itself, in abstraction from their real conditions of existence and interconnections; and it considers things as fixed and frozen, in abstraction from their real change and development. Consequently it invents rigid formulas and is always posing hard and fast antitheses—“either-or.” It fails to comprehend the unity and struggle of opposite processes and tendencies manifested in all phenomena of nature and society.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;In contrast to metaphysics, the aim of dialectics is to trace the real changes and interconnection in the world and to think of things always in their real motion and interconnection.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism, the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist Party, is materialist in its theory, its interpretation and explanation of everything, dialectical in its method.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen how materialist explanation is opposed to idealist explanation. And then we saw how materialists formerly interpreted things in a mechanist way, but how mechanistic materialism proved inadequate to explain real processes of change and development. For this we need materialist dialectics. We need to study and understand things dialectically.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectical method is, indeed, nothing but the method of studying and understanding things in their real change and development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As such, it stands opposed to &#039;&#039;metaphysics.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is metaphysics? Or more exactly, what is the metaphysical way of thinking, which is opposed by the dialectical way of thinking?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics is essentially an abstract way of thinking. In a sense all thinking is “abstract,” since it works with general concepts and cannot but disregard a great deal of particular and unessential detail. For example, if we say that “men have two legs,” we are thinking of the two-leggedness of men in abstraction from their other properties, such as having a head, two arms and so on; and similarly we are thinking of all men in general, disregarding the individuality of particular men, of Peter, Paul and so on. But there is abstraction and abstraction. Metaphysics is distinguished by the fact that it makes false, misleading abstractions. As Engels once pointed out, “the art of working with concepts is not inborn… but requires real thought”;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the art of right thinking involves learning how to avoid metaphysical abstraction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Suppose, for example, we are thinking about men, about “human nature.” Then we should think about human nature in such a way that we recognize that men live in society and that their human nature cannot be independent of their living in society but develops and changes with the development of society. We shall then form ideas about human nature which correspond to the actual conditions of men’s existence and to their change and development. But yet people often think about “human nature” in a very different way, as though there were such a thing as “human nature” which manifested itself quite independent of the actual conditions of human existence and which was always and everywhere exactly the same. To think in such a way is obviously to make a false, misleading abstraction. And it is just such an abstract way of thinking that we call “metaphysics.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The concept of fixed, unchanging “human nature” is an example of metaphysical abstraction, of the metaphysical way of thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The metaphysician does not think in terms of real &#039;&#039;men,&#039;&#039; but of “Man” in the abstract.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics, or the metaphysical way of thinking, is, then, that way of thinking which thinks of things (1) in abstraction from their conditions of existence, and (2) in abstraction from their change and development. It thinks of things (1) in separation one from another, ignoring their interconnections, and (2) as fixed and frozen, ignoring their change and development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One example of metaphysics has already been given. It is not difficult to find plenty more. Indeed, the metaphysical way of thinking is so widespread, and has become so much part and parcel of current bourgeois ideology, that there is hardly an article in a journal, a talk on the radio, or a book by a learned professor, in which examples of metaphysical fallacy are not to be found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A good deal is said and written, for example, about democracy. But the speakers and writers usually refer to some pure or absolute democracy, which they seek to define in abstraction from the actual development of society, of classes and of class struggle. But there can be no such pure democracy; it is a metaphysical abstraction. If we want to understand democracy we have always to ask: democracy for whom, for the exploiters or the exploited? We have to understand that since democracy is a form of government, there is no democracy which is not associated with the rule of some particular class, and that the democracy which is established when the working class is the ruling class is a higher form of democracy than capitalist democracy, just as capitalist democracy is a higher form of democracy than, say, the slave-owners’ democracy of ancient Greece. In other words, we should not try to think of democracy in abstraction from real social relations and from the real change and development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, pacifists try to base their opposition to war on the idea that “all wars are wrong.” They think of war in the abstract, without reflecting that the character of each particular war is determined according to the historical epoch, the aims of the war and the classes in whose interests it is fought. Consequently they fail to distinguish between imperialist wars and wars of liberation, between unjust war and just war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In most British schools today the children are regularly subjected to “intelligence tests.” It is alleged that each child possesses a certain fixed quantity of “intelligence,” which can be estimated without regard to the actual conditions of the child’s existence and which determines his capabilities throughout the whole of his life regardless of whatever conditions for change and development may subsequently come in his way. This is another example of metaphysics. In this case the metaphysical conception of “intelligence” is used as an excuse for denying educational opportunities to the majority of children on the grounds that their intelligence is too low for them to benefit from such opportunities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In general, metaphysics is a way of thinking which tries to fix the nature, properties and potentialities of everything it considers once and for all. Consequently it presupposes that each thing has a fixed nature and fixed properties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And it thinks in terms of “things” rather than “processes.” It tries to sum up everything in a formula, which says that the whole world, or any part of the world which is under consideration, consists of just such and such things with such and such properties. Such a formula we may call a “metaphysical” formula.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Engels refers to “the old method of investigation and thought which Hegel calls ‘metaphysical,’ which preferred to investigate &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; as given, as fixed and stable.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In philosophy, metaphysics often means the search for the “ultimate constituents of the universe.” Thus the materialists who said that the ultimate constituents were small, solid, material particles were just as much metaphysicians as the idealists who said that the ultimate constituents were spirits. All such philosophers thought they could sum up “the ultimate nature of the universe” in some formula. Some have held this formula, some that, but all have been metaphysicians. Yet it has been a hopeless quest. We cannot sum up the whole infinite changing universe in any such formula. And the more we find out about it, the more is this evident.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should now be clear that the mechanistic materialism which we discussed in the preceding chapters can equally well be called &#039;&#039;metaphysical&#039;&#039; materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We may also note, in passing, that certain philosophers today, the so-called positivists,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The &#039;&#039;positivists&#039;&#039; say we have no right to assert that anything exists except our own sense-perceptions. They say that to assert anything else is “metaphysics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; claim to be against “metaphysics” because they claim to reject any philosophy which seeks for “the ultimate constituents of the universe.” For them, “metaphysics” means any theory which deals with “ultimates” not verifiable in sense-experience. By using the term in this way, they conceal the fact that they themselves are, if anything, more metaphysical than any other philosophers. For their own mode of thinking reaches extremes of metaphysical abstraction. What could be more metaphysical than to imagine, as the positivist philosophers do, that our sense-experience exists in abstraction from the real material world outside us? Indeed, they themselves make “sense-experience” into a metaphysical “ultimate.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In opposition to the abstract, metaphysical way of thinking, dialectics teaches us to think of things in their real changes and interconnections. To think dialectically is to think concretely, and to think concretely is to think dialectically. When we oppose the dialectical method to metaphysics, then we show up the inadequacy, one-sidedness or falsity of the abstractions of metaphysics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This consideration enables us to understand the original meaning of the term “dialectics.” The word is derived from the Greek &#039;&#039;dialego,&#039;&#039; meaning to discuss or debate. It was considered that to discuss a question from all sides, and from all angles, allowing different one-sided points of view to oppose and contradict each other during the debate, was the best method of arriving at the truth. Such was the dialectics employed, for example, by Socrates. When anyone claimed to have a formula which answered some questions once and for all, Socrates would enter into discussion with him and, by forcing him to consider the question from different angles, would compel him to contradict himself and so to admit that his formula was false. By this method Socrates considered that it was possible to arrive at more adequate ideas about things.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Marxist dialectical method develops from and includes dialectics in the sense in which it was understood by the Greeks. But it is far richer in content, far wider in its scope. As a result, it becomes something qualitatively &#039;&#039;new&#039;&#039; as compared with pre-Marxist dialectics—a new revolutionary method. For it is combined with a consistent materialism and ceases to be a mere method of argument, becoming a method of investigation applicable to both nature and society, a method of materialist understanding of the world which grows out of and guides the activity of changing the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Metaphysical “Either-Or” ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics presupposes that each thing has its own fixed nature, its own fixed properties, and considers each thing by itself, in isolation. It tries to settle the nature and properties of each thing as a given, separate object of investigation, not considering things in their interconnection and in their change and development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because of this, metaphysics thinks of things in terms of hard and fast antitheses. It opposes things of one sort to things of another sort: if a thing is of one sort, it has one set of properties; if of another sort, it has another set of properties; the one excludes the other, and each is thought of in separation from the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Engels writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“To the metaphysician, things and their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered one after the other, apart from each other, rigid fixed objects of investigation given once and for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. ‘His communication is Yea, yea, Nay, nay, for whatever is more than these cometh of evil.’ For him a thing either exists or it does not exist; it is equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Philosophers have expressed the essence of this metaphysical way of thinking in the formula: “Each thing is what it is, and not another thing.” This may sound no more than plain common sense. But that only shows that so-called common sense itself conceals misleading ideas which need to be brought into the open. This way of thinking prevents us from studying things in their real changes and interconnections—in all their contradictory aspects and relationships, in their process of changing from “one thing” into “another thing.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not only philosophers who are metaphysicians.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are left-wing trade unionists, for example, who are as metaphysical as any school of philosophers. For them everyone at their trade union local meeting is either a class-conscious militant or else he is a right-wing opportunist. Everyone must fit into one or other category, and once he is down as “right wing” he is finished so far as they are concerned. That some worker who has been their opponent in the past and on some issues may yet prove an ally in the future and on other issues is not allowed for in their metaphysical outlook on life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In one of Moliere’s plays there is a man who learns for the first time about prose. When they explain to him what prose is, he exclaims: “Why, I’ve been speaking prose all my life!”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, there are many workers who may well say: “Why, I’ve been a metaphysician all my life!”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The metaphysician has his formula ready for everything. He says—Either this formula fits or it does not. If it does, that settles it. If it does not, then he has some alternative formula ready. “Either-or, but not both” is his motto. A thing is either this or that; it has either this set of properties or that set of properties; two things stand to one another either in this relationship or in that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The use of the metaphysical “either-or” leads people into countless difficulties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, difficulties are felt in understanding the relations between American and British imperialism today. For it is argued: Either they are working together, or else they are not. If they are working together, then there is no rift between them; if there is a rift between them, then they are not working together. But on the contrary, they are working together and yet there are rifts between them; and we cannot understand the way they work together nor fight them effectively unless we understand the rifts which divide them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, difficulties are felt in understanding the possibility of the peaceful co-existence of capitalist and socialist states. For it is argued: Either they can co-exist peacefully, in which case antagonism between capitalism and socialism must cease; or else the antagonism remains, in which case they cannot co-exist peacefully. But on the contrary, the antagonism remains, and yet the striving of the socialist states and of millions of people in all countries for peace can prevent a war between capitalist and socialist states.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is often difficult to avoid a metaphysical way of thinking. And this is because, misleading as it is, it yet has its roots in something very necessary and useful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is necessary for us to classify things—to have some system of classifying them and assigning their properties and relations. That is a prerequisite of clear thinking. We have to work out what different kinds of things there are in the world, to say that these have these properties as distinct from those which have those other properties, and to say what are their relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But when we go on to consider these things and properties and relations each in isolation, as fixed constants, as mutually exclusive terms, then we begin to go wrong. For everything in the world has many different and indeed contradictory aspects, exists in intimate relationship with other things and not in isolation, and is subject to change. And so it frequently happens that when we classify something as “A” and not “B,” then this formula is upset by its changing from “A” into “B,” or by its being “A” in some relationships and “B” in others, or by its having a contradictory nature, part “A” and part “B.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, we all know the difference between birds and mammals, and that while birds lay eggs mammals, in general, produce their young alive and suckle them. Naturalists used to believe that mammals were rigidly distinguished from birds because, among other things, mammals do not lay eggs. But this formula was completely upset when an animal called the platypus was discovered, for while the platypus is undoubtedly a mammal, it is a mammal which lays eggs. What is the explanation of this irregular behavior of the platypus? It is to be found in the evolutionary relationship of birds and mammals, which are both descended from original egg-laying animals. The birds have continued to lay eggs while the mammals stopped doing so—except for a few conservative animals like the platypus. If we think of animals in their evolution, their development, this appears very natural. But if we try, as the older naturalists tried, to make them fit into some rigid, fixed scheme of classification, then the products of evolution upset that classification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, an idea or a theory which was progressive in one set of circumstances, when it first arose, cannot for that reason be labeled “progressive” in an absolute sense, since it may later become reactionary in new circumstances. For instance, mechanistic materialism when it first arose was a progressive theory. But we cannot say that it is still progressive today. On the contrary, under the new circumstances which have arisen mechanistic theory has become retrograde, reactionary. Mechanism, which was progressive in the rising phase of capitalism, goes hand in hand with idealism as part of the ideology of capitalism in decay.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Common sense, too recognizes the limitation of the metaphysical way of thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example: When is a man bald? Common sense recognizes that though we can distinguish bald men from non-bald men, nevertheless baldness develops through a process of losing one’s hair, and therefore men in the midst of this process enter into a phase in which we cannot say absolutely either that they are bald or that they are not: they are in process of becoming bald. The metaphysical “either-or” breaks down.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all these examples we are confronted with the distinction between an &#039;&#039;objective process,&#039;&#039; in which something undergoes change, and the &#039;&#039;concepts&#039;&#039; in terms of which we try to sum up the characteristics of the things involved in the process. Such concepts never do and never can always and in all respects correspond to their objects, precisely because the objects are undergoing change. Thus Engels writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Are the concepts that prevail in natural science fictions because they by no means always coincide with reality? From the moment we accept the theory of evolution all our concepts of organic life correspond only approximately to reality. Otherwise there would be no change; on the day that concept and reality absolutely coincide in the organic world, development is at an end.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Correspondence&#039;&#039;, Engels to Schmidt, March 12, 1895, N. Y., 1942.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And he pointed out that similar considerations apply to all concepts without exception.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Unity and Struggle of Opposites ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we think of the properties of things, their relationships, their modes of action and interaction, the processes into which they enter, then we find that, generally speaking, all these properties, relationships, interactions and processes divide into &#039;&#039;fundamental opposites.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, if we think of the simplest ways in which two bodies can act on one another, then we find that this action is either repulsion or attraction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we consider the electrical properties of bodies, then there is positive and negative electricity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In organic life, there is the building up of organic compounds and the breaking down of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, in mathematics, there is addition and subtraction, plus and minus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And in general, whatever sphere of inquiry we may be considering, we find that it involves such fundamental opposites. We find ourselves considering, not just a number of &#039;&#039;different&#039;&#039; things, &#039;&#039;different&#039;&#039; properties, &#039;&#039;different&#039;&#039; relations, &#039;&#039;different&#039;&#039; processes, but pairs of &#039;&#039;opposites,&#039;&#039; fundamental &#039;&#039;oppositions.&#039;&#039; As Hegel put it: “In opposition, the different is not confronted by any other, but by &#039;&#039;its&#039;&#039; other.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hegel, &#039;&#039;Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences&#039;&#039;: Logic, Section 119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus if we think of the forces acting between two bodies, there are not just a number of different forces, but they divide into attractive and repulsive forces; if we think of electric charges, there are not just a number of different charges, but they divide into positive and negative; and so on. Attraction stands opposed to repulsion, positive electricity to negative electricity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such fundamental oppositions are not understood by the metaphysical way of thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place, the metaphysical way of thinking tries to ignore and discount opposition. It seeks to understand a given subject-matter simply in terms of a whole number of different properties and different relations of things, ignoring the fundamental oppositions which are manifested in these properties and relations. Thus those who think in metaphysical terms about class-divided societies, for example, try to understand society as consisting merely of a large number of different individuals connected together by all kinds of different social relations—but they ignore the fundamental opposition of exploiters and exploited, manifested in all those social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the second place, when the metaphysical way of thinking does nevertheless come upon the fundamental oppositions and cannot ignore them, then—true to its habit of thinking of each thing in isolation, as a fixed constant—it considers these opposites each in isolation from the other, understands them separately and as each excluding the other. Thus, for example, the older physicists used to think of positive and negative electricity just simply as two different “electrical fluids.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But contrary to metaphysics, not only are fundamental opposites involved in every subject-matter, but these opposites mutually imply each other, are inseparably connected together, and, far from being exclusive, neither can exist or be understood except in relation to the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This characteristic of opposition is known as polarity: Fundamental opposites are polar opposites. A magnet, for example, has two poles, a north pole and a south pole. But these poles, opposite and distinct, cannot exist in separation. If the magnet is cut in two, there is not a north pole in one half and a south pole in the other, but north and south poles recur in each half. The north pole exists only as the opposite of the south, and vice versa; the one can be defined only as the opposite of the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In general, fundamental opposition has to be understood as polar opposition, and every subject-matter has to be understood in terms of the polar opposition involved in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in physics we find that attraction and repulsion are involved in every physical process in such a way that they cannot be separated or isolated the one from the other. In considering living bodies, we do not find in some cases the building up of organic compounds and in other cases their breaking down, but every life process involves both the building up and the breaking down of organic compounds. In capitalist society the increasing socialization of labor is inseparable from its opposite, the increasing centralization of capital.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This unity of opposites—the fact that opposites cannot be understood in separation one from another, but only in their inseparable connection in every field of investigation—is strikingly exemplified in mathematics. Here the fundamental operations are the two opposites, addition and subtraction. And so far is it from being the case that addition and subtraction can be understood each apart from the other, that addition can be represented as subtraction and vice versa; thus the operation of subtraction (a — b) can be represented as an addition (— b + a). Similarly a division a/b can be represented as a multiplication a x (1/b).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Dialectics of Nature&#039;&#039;, Chapter 7, “Note on Mathematics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unity of opposites, their inseparable connection, is by no means to be understood as a harmonious and stable relationship, as a state of equilibrium. On the contrary, “The unity of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 11, “On Dialectics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The existence of fundamental polar oppositions, manifesting themselves in every department of nature and society, expresses itself in the &#039;&#039;conflict&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039; of opposed tendencies, which, despite phases of temporary equilibrium, lead to continual motion and development, to a perpetual coming into being and passing away of everything in existence, to sharp changes of state and transformations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, for example, the equilibrium of attractive and repulsive forces in the physical world is never more than conditional and temporary; the conflict and struggle of attraction and repulsion always asserts itself, issuing in physical changes and transformations, whether transformations on an atomic scale, chemical changes or, on a grand scale, in the explosion of stars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Dialectics and Metaphysics ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics thinks in terms of “ready-made” things, whose properties and potentialities it seeks to fix and determine once and for all. It considers each thing by itself, in isolation from every other, in terms of irreconcilable antitheses—“either-or.” It contrasts one thing to another, one property to another, one relationship to another, not considering things in their real movement and interconnection, and not considering that every subject-matter represents a unity of opposites—opposed but inseparably connected together.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics refuses to think of things each by itself, as having a fixed nature and fixed properties— “either-or”—but it recognizes that things come into being, exist and cease to be, in a process of unending change and development, in a process of complicated and ever-changing interrelationship, in which each thing exists only in its connection with other things and goes through a series of transformations, and in which is always manifested the unity, inseparable interconnection and struggle of the opposite properties, aspects, tendencies characteristic of every phenomenon of nature and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Contrary to metaphysics, the aim of dialectics is to trace the real changes and interconnections in the world and to think of things always in their motion and interconnection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Engels writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes…. One no longer permits oneself to be imposed upon by the antitheses insuperable for the old metaphysics.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The old rigid antitheses, the sharp impassable dividing lines are more and more disappearing…. The recognition that these antagonisms and distinctions are in fact to be found in nature but only with relative validity, and that on the other hand their imagined rigidity and absoluteness have been introduced into nature only by our minds—this recognition is the kernel of the dialectical conception of nature.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Dialectics… grasps things and their images, ideas, essentially in their inter-connection, in their sequence, their movement, their birth and death.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;, Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote that the understanding of the “contradictory parts” of every phenomenon was “the essence of dialectics.” It consists in “the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature, including mind and society.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 11, “On Dialectics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, Marx wrote that: “dialectic… in its rational form is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;, Vol. I, Preface to second edition, N. Y., 1947.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 7. Change and Interconnection ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The Marxist dialectical method demands that we must always consider things, not in isolation, but in their interconnection with other things, in relation to the actual conditions and circumstances of each case; and that we must consider things in their change and movement, their coming into being and going out of being, always taking particularly into account what is new, what is rising and developing.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It follows that the Marxist dialectical method forbids the employment of “ready-made schemes” and abstract formulas, but demands the thorough, detailed analysis of a process in all its concreteness, basing its conclusions only on such an analysis.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== Four Principal Features of the Marxist Dialectical Method ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his &#039;&#039;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&#039;&#039; Stalin said that there are four principal features of the Marxist dialectical method.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as just an agglomeration of things, each existing independently of the others, but it considers things as “connected with, dependent on and determined by each other.” Hence it considers that nothing can be understood taken by itself, in isolation, but must always be understood “in its inseparable connection with other things, and as conditioned by them.”&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics considers everything as in “a state of continuous movement and change, of renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing and something always disintegrating and dying away.” Hence it considers things “not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being.”&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the: process of development as “a simple process of growth,” but as “a development which passes from… quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes,” which occur “abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another.” Hence it considers development as “an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher.”&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics “holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place… as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things… as a struggle of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.”&lt;br /&gt;
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We shall postpone until the next chapter consideration of the latter two features, which concern the process of development from one qualitative state to another, from the lower to the higher. In this chapter we shall consider the first two features of the dialectical method, namely, that it considers things always in their interconnection and in their movement and change.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Considering Things in Their Interconnection and Circumstances ====&lt;br /&gt;
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The dialectical method demands, first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but always in their interconnection with other things.&lt;br /&gt;
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This sounds “obvious.” Nevertheless it is an “obvious” principle which is very often ignored and is extremely important to remember. We have already considered it and some examples of its application in discussing metaphysics, since the very essence of metaphysics is to think of things in an abstract way, isolated from their relations with other things and from the concrete circumstances in which they exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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The principle of considering things in relation to actual conditions and circumstances, and not apart from those actual conditions and circumstances, is always of fundamental importance for the working-class movement in deciding the most elementary questions of policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, there was a time when the British workers were fighting for a ten-hour day. They were right at that time not to make their immediate demand an eight-hour day, since this was not yet a realizable demand. They were equally right, when they got a ten-hour day, not to be satisfied with it.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are times when it is correct for a section of workers to come out on strike, and there are times when it is not correct. Such matters have to be judged according to the actual circumstances of the case. Similarly there are times when it is correct to go on prolonging and extending a strike, and there are times when it is correct to call it off.&lt;br /&gt;
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No working-class leader can be of very much value if he tries to decide questions of policy in terms of “general principle” alone, without taking into account the actual circumstances in relation to which policy has to be operated, without understanding that the same policy can be right in one case and wrong in another, depending on the concrete circumstances of each case.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
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“Of course, in politics, in which sometimes extremely complicated—national and international—relationships between classes and parties have to be dealt with… it would be absurd to concoct a recipe, or general rule… that would serve in all cases. One must have the brains to analyze the situation in each separate case.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Left-wing Communism&#039;&#039;, Chapter VIII, N. Y., 1934.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This readiness on the part of Marxists to adapt policy to circumstances and to change policy with circumstances is sometimes called Communist “opportunism.” But it is nothing of the kind—or rather, it is the very opposite. It is the application in practice of the science of the strategy and tactics of working-class struggle. Indeed, what is meant by opportunism in relation to working-class policy? It means subordinating the long-term interests of the working class as a whole to the temporary interests of a section, sacrificing the interests of the class to defense of the temporary privileges of some particular group. Communists are guided by Marx’s principle that “they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;The Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And this requires that, in the interests of the movement as a whole, one must analyze the situation in each separate case, deciding what policy to pursue in each case in the light of the concrete circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
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On general questions, too, the greatest confusion can arise from forgetting the dialectical principle that things must not be considered in isolation but in their inseparable inter-connection.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, the British Labor leaders once said, and many members of the Labor Party continue to say, that nationalization is an installment of socialism. They consider nationalization by itself, in isolation, out of connection with the state and with the social structure in relation to which nationalization measures are introduced. They overlook the fact that if the public power, the state, remains in the hands of the exploiters, and if their representatives sit on and control the boards of the nationalized industries, which continue to be run on the basis of exploiting the labor of one class for the profit of another class, then nationalization is not socialism. Socialist nationalization can come into being only when the public power, the state, is in the hands of the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again, in political arguments people very often appeal to a concept of “fairness” which leads them to judge events without the slightest consideration of the real meaning of those events, of the circumstances in which they occur. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: that is the principle employed in such arguments.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus it is argued that if we defend the democratic right of the workers in a capitalist country to agitate for the ending of capitalism and the introduction of socialism, then we cannot deny to others in a socialist country the right to agitate for the ending of socialism and the reintroduction of capitalism. Those who argue like this throw up their hands in horror when they find that counter-revolutionary groupings in the U.S.S.R., who sought to restore capitalism in that country, were deprived of the possibility of carrying out their aims. Why, they exclaim, this is undemocratic, this is tyranny! Such an argument overlooks the difference between fighting in the interests of the vast majority of the people to end exploitation, and fighting in the interests of a small section to preserve or reintroduce exploitation; it overlooks the difference between defending the right of the vast majority to run their affairs in their own interests, and defending the right of a small minority to keep the majority in bondage; in other words, it overlooks the difference between moving forward and backward, between putting the clock ahead and putting it back, between revolution and counter-revolution. Of course, if we fight to achieve socialism, and if we achieve it, then we shall defend what we have achieved and shall not allow the slightest possibility of any group destroying that achievement. Let the capitalists and their hangers-on shout about democracy “in general.” If, as Lenin said, we “have the brains to analyze the situation,” we shall not be deceived by them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The “liberal” concept of “fairness” has, indeed, become a favorite weapon of reaction lately. In 1949 and again in 1950, when the fascists decided to hold a demonstration in London on May Day, the Home Secretary promptly banned the workers’ May Day demonstration. If I ban one, I must ban the other, he blandly explained. How scrupulously “fair” he was!&lt;br /&gt;
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The principle of understanding things in their circumstances and interconnections is likewise a very important principle in science. Yet scientists, who take things to bits and consider their various properties, very often forget that things which they may consider in isolation do not exist in isolation. And this leads to serious misunderstandings.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet biologists, for example, guided by this first principle of dialectics, have stressed the unity of the organism and its environment. They have pointed out that you cannot consider the organism as having a nature of its own, isolated from its environment: that is metaphysics. Thus there is no such thing as a plant, for instance, isolated from its environment: such a plant is a mere museum piece, a dead plant artificially preserved. Living plants grow in a soil, in a climate, in an environment, and they grow and develop by assimilating that environment. Thus Lysenko defined the heredity, or nature, of an organism as its requirement of certain conditions for its life and development, and its responding to various conditions in a certain way. This understanding of the unity of organism and environment had important consequences. For it led to the expectation that by compelling an organism to adapt itself to and assimilate changed conditions, its nature could be changed. And this expectation has been verified in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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The biologists of the Mendel-Morgan school, on the other hand, treat the organism abstractly, metaphysically, as isolated from its real conditions of life. They conceive of the “nature” of the organism as quite independent of its conditions of life. Hence they conclude, in true metaphysical style, that the heredity of an organism “is what is,” and that it is no use trying to change it in the ways in which Soviet biologists &#039;&#039;have&#039;&#039; changed the heredity of organisms.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Considering Things in Their Movement, Their Coming into Being and Going Out of Being ====&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us now consider some examples of the second principle of dialectics, which demands that we should consider things in their movement, their change, their coming into being and going out of being.&lt;br /&gt;
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This principle, too, is of great importance in science.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet biologists, for example, guided by this principle of dialectics, have considered the organism in its growth and development. Thus at a certain stage of growth, the nature of the organism is still plastic; if you can modify it at that stage, you can often change its nature, give it a changed heredity. Something is newly coming into being in the organism, and that is the time to foster it and to give it a desired direction. But if that stage is passed, then its nature becomes fixed and you cannot change it. You must find just the right stage of growth if you wish to modify the heredity of the organism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The biologists of the Mendel-Morgan school, on the other hand, consider the nature of the organism as given and fixed from the very start.&lt;br /&gt;
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This second principle of dialectics teaches us always to pay attention to what is new, to what is rising and growing—not just to what exists at the moment, but to what is coming into being.&lt;br /&gt;
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This principle is of paramount importance for revolutionary understanding, for revolutionary practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Russian Bolsheviks, for example, saw from the very beginning how Russian society was moving—what was new in it, what was coming into being. They looked for what was rising and growing, though it was still weak—the working class. While others discounted the importance of the working class and finished by entering into compromises with the forces of the old society, the Bolsheviks concluded that the working class was the new, rising force, and led it to victory.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just this same understanding of what was rising and growing and of what was disintegrating and dying away, was exemplified in Stalin’s leadership during the war, 1941-45. When the Germans were before Moscow in November 1941, and all the “allied military strategists” outside the Soviet Union considered that Russia’s defeat was certain, Stalin said that while the Germans were at the peak of their military power the Soviet forces, on the other hand, were still mobilizing and increasing. Therefore the defeat of the German fascists was certain.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Germany, whose reserves of manpower are already being exhausted, has been considerably more weakened than the Soviet Union, whose reserves are only now being mobilized to the full…. Can there be any doubt that we can, and are bound to, defeat the German invaders? The German invaders are straining their last efforts. There is no doubt that Germany cannot sustain such a strain for long.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union&#039;&#039;, Speeches of November 6 and 7, 1941, N. Y., 1945.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly today, when press and radio are full of the boasts and threats of the American imperialists and their henchmen, we stress that which is rising and growing all over the world, the people’s camp of peace, which is bound to continue to grow and to overwhelm the imperialists in shameful disaster.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again, in the fight for unity of the working-class movement, in relation to the British Labor Party and the affiliated trade unions, we pay attention above all to that which is arising and growing in the movement. Therefore we see a great deal more than the policy of the right-wing leaders and their influence. The right wing has its basis in the past, though it is still strong and dominant. But there are arising the forces of the future, determined to fight against capitalism and war.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly in relation to individual people—we should foster and build on what is coming to birth in them, what is rising and moving ahead. This is what a good secretary or organizer does.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such examples as these show that the basis of the dialectical method, its most essential principle, is to study and understand things in their concrete interconnection and movement.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Against “Ready-made Schemes”—“Truth Is Always Concrete” ====&lt;br /&gt;
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Sometimes people imagine that dialectics is a preconceived scheme, into the pattern of which everything is supposed to fit. This is the very opposite of the truth about dialectics. The employment of the Marxist dialectical method does not mean that we apply a preconceived scheme and try to make everything fit into it. No, it means that we study things as they really are, in their real interconnection and movement.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is something which Lenin insisted on again and again. Indeed, he proclaimed it as “the fundamental thesis of dialectics.” “Genuine dialectics,” Lenin wrote, proceeds “by means of a thorough, detailed analysis of a process in all its concreteness. The fundamental thesis of dialectics is: there is no such thing as abstract truth, truth is always concrete.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 2, &#039;&#039;One Step Forward, Two Steps Back&#039;&#039;, Section R, “Something about Dialectics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What did he mean by “truth is always concrete”? Just that we will not get at the truth about things, about either nature or society, by thinking up some general scheme, some abstract formula; but only by trying to work out as regards each process just what are the forces at work, how they are related, which are rising and growing and which are decaying and dying away, and on this basis reaching an estimate of the process as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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So Engels said: “There could be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it…. Nature is the test of dialectics.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Preface and Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As regards the study of society, and the estimate we make of real social changes on which we base our political strategy, Lenin ridiculed those who took some abstract, preconceived scheme as their guide.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to some “authorities,” the Marxist dialectics laid it down that all development must proceed through “triads”—thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Lenin ridiculed this.&lt;br /&gt;
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“It is clear to everybody that the main burden of Engels’ argument is that materialists must depict the historical process correctly and accurately, and that insistence on… selection of examples which demonstrate the correctness of the triad is nothing but a relic of Hegelianism…. And, indeed, once it has been categorically declared that to attempt to ‘prove’ anything by triads is absurd, what significance can examples of ‘dialectical’ process have?… Anyone who reads the definition and description of the dialectical method given by Engels will see that the Hegelian triads are not even mentioned, and that it all amounts to regarding social evolution as a natural-historical process of development….&lt;br /&gt;
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“What Marx and Engels called the dialectical method… is nothing more nor less than the scientific method in sociology, which consists in regarding society as a living organism in a constant state of development… the study of which requires an objective analysis of the relations of production that constitute the given social formation and an investigation of its laws of functioning and development.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 1, “What the Friends of the People Are and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats,” Part I.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us consider some examples of what the “analysis of a process in all its concreteness” and the principle that “truth is always concrete” mean, in contrast to the method of trying to lay down some preconceived scheme of social development and of appealing to such a scheme as a basis for policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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In tsarist Russia the Mensheviks used to say: “We must have capitalism before socialism.” First capitalism must go through its full development, then socialism will follow: that was their scheme. Consequently they supported the liberals in politics and enjoined the workers to do no more than fight for better conditions in the capitalist factories.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lenin repudiated this silly scheme. He showed that the liberals, frightened by the workers, would compromise with the tsar; but that the alliance of workers with peasants could take the lead from them, overthrow the tsar, and then go on to overthrow the capitalists and build socialism before ever capitalism was able to develop fully.&lt;br /&gt;
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After the proletarian revolution was successful, another scheme was propounded—this time by Trotsky. “You can’t build socialism in one country. Unless the revolution takes place in the advanced capitalist countries, socialism cannot come in Russia.” Lenin and Stalin showed that this scheme, too, was false. For even if the revolution did not take place in the advanced capitalist countries, the alliance of workers and peasants in the Soviet Union had still the forces to build socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Western European countries it used often to be said: “We must have fascism before communism.” First the capitalists will abandon democracy and introduce the fascist dictatorship, and then the workers will overthrow the fascist dictatorship. But the Communists replied, no, we will fight together with all the democratic forces to preserve bourgeois democracy and to defeat the fascists, and that will create the best conditions for going forward to win working-class power and to commence to build socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, today we sometimes hear the argument: “Capitalism means war, therefore war is inevitable.” True enough, so long as capitalism, which has long ago entered its last (imperialist) phase, persists, there must inevitably be conflicts between the rival powers, and these conflicts are such as to entail the inevitability of imperialist wars. But the imperialists cannot make war without the people. The more they prepare war, the more open their aggressiveness becomes, the more one power attempts to impose its domination on another, and the more hardships they impose on the people, the more can the people be rallied to oppose their war. Therefore in any instance when war threatens, that war can be prevented and postponed. And by fighting to preserve peace, we can lay the basis for ending the conditions which pose the inevitability of war. Imperialist war plans can be defeated; they can be defeated if the working class rallies all the peace-loving forces around itself. And imperialism itself, with the consequent inevitability of war, can be ended. If we defeat the imperialist war plans, that will be the best road towards the ending of capitalism itself and the building of socialism. Imperialism will not be ended by waiting for it to wreck itself in inevitable wars, but by uniting to prevent the realization of its war plans.&lt;br /&gt;
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In all these examples it will be seen that the acceptance of some ready-made scheme, some abstract formula, means passivity, support for capitalism, betrayal of the working class and of socialism. But the dialectical approach which understands things in their concrete interconnection and movement, shows us how to forge ahead—how to fight, what allies to draw in. That is the inestimable value of the Marxist dialectical method to the working-class movement.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 8. The Laws of Development ===&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;To understand development we must understand the distinction between quantitative change—increase and decrease—and qualitative change—the passing into a new state, the emergence of something new.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Quantitative change always leads at a certain critical point to qualitative change. And similarly qualitative differences and qualitative changes always rest on quantitative differences and quantitative changes.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Development must be understood, therefore, not as a simple process of growth but as a process which passes from quantitative changes to open, fundamental qualitative changes.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Further, this transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes takes place as a result of the conflict or struggle of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of the contradictions inherent in all things and processes.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;The Marxist dialectical method, therefore, teaches us to understand processes of development in terms of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes, and to seek the grounds and the explanation of such development in the unity and struggle of opposites.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== What Do We Mean by “Development”? ====&lt;br /&gt;
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In stressing the need to study real processes in their movement and in all their interconnections, Stalin pointed out that in the processes of nature and history there is always “renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing and something always disintegrating and dying away.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When that which is arising and developing comes to fruition, and that which is disintegrating and dying away finally disappears, there emerges something &#039;&#039;new.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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For as we saw in criticizing mechanistic materialism, processes do not always keep repeating the same cycle of changes, but advance from stage to stage as something new continually emerges.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the real meaning of the word “development.” We speak of “development” where stage by stage something new keeps emerging.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus there is a difference between mere &#039;&#039;change&#039;&#039; and development. Development is change proceeding according to its own internal laws from stage to stage.&lt;br /&gt;
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And there is equally a difference between &#039;&#039;growth&#039;&#039; and development. This difference is familiar to biologists, for example. Thus growth means getting bigger—merely quantitative change. But development means, not getting bigger, but passing into a qualitatively new stage, becoming qualitatively different. For example, a caterpillar grows longer and fatter; then it spins itself a cocoon, and finally emerges as a butterfly. This is development. A caterpillar &#039;&#039;grows&#039;&#039; into a bigger caterpillar; it &#039;&#039;develops&#039;&#039; into a butterfly.&lt;br /&gt;
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Processes of nature and history exemplify, not merely change, not merely growth, but development. Can we, then, reach any conclusions about the general laws of development? This is the further task of materialist dialectics—to find what general laws are manifested in all development, and to give us, therefore, the &#039;&#039;method of approach&#039;&#039; for understanding, explaining and controlling development.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Quantity and Quality: The Law of the Transformation of Quantitative into Qualitative Changes ====&lt;br /&gt;
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This brings us to the two latter features of the Marxist dialectical method, as explained by Stalin. The first of these may be called “the law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change.” What does this mean?&lt;br /&gt;
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All change has a quantitative aspect, that is, an aspect of mere increase or decrease which does not alter the nature of that which changes. But quantitative change, increase or decrease, cannot go on indefinitely. At a certain point it always leads to a qualitative change; and at that critical point (or “nodal point,” as Hegel called it) the qualitative change takes place relatively suddenly, by a leap, as it were.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, if water is being heated, it does not go on getting hotter and hotter indefinitely; at a certain critical temperature, it begins to turn into steam, undergoing a qualitative change from liquid to gas. A cord used to lift a weight may have a greater and greater load attached to it, but no cord can lift a load indefinitely great: at a certain point, the cord is bound to break. A boiler may withstand a greater and greater pressure of steam—up to the point where it bursts. A variety of plant may be subjected to a series of changes in its conditions of growth for a number of generations—for instance, to colder temperatures; the variety continues unchanged, until a point is reached when suddenly a qualitative change is induced, a change in the heredity of the plant. In this way spring wheats have been transformed into winter wheats, and vice versa, as a result of the accumulation of a series of quantitative changes.&lt;br /&gt;
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This law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change is also met with in society. Thus before the system of industrial capitalism comes into being there takes place a process of the accumulation of wealth in money form in a few private hands (largely by colonial plunder), and of the formation of a propertyless proletariat (by enclosures and the driving of peasants off the land). At a certain point in this process, when &#039;&#039;enough&#039;&#039; money is accumulated to provide capital for industrial undertakings, when &#039;&#039;enough&#039;&#039; people have been proletarianized to provide the labor required, the conditions have matured for the development of industrial capitalism. At this point an accumulation of quantitative changes gives rise to a new qualitative stage in the development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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In general, qualitative changes happen with relative suddenness—by a leap. Something new is suddenly born, though its potentiality was already contained in the gradual evolutionary process of continuous quantitative change which went before.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus we find that continuous, gradual quantitative change leads at a certain point to discontinuous, sudden qualitative change. We have already remarked in an earlier chapter that most of those who have considered the laws of development in nature and society have conceived of this development only in its continuous aspect. This means that they have considered it only from the aspect of a process of growth, of quantitative change, and have not considered its qualitative aspect, the fact that at a certain point in the gradual process of growth a new quality suddenly arises, a transformation takes place.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet this is what always happens. If you are boiling a kettle, the water suddenly begins to boil when boiling point is reached. If you are scrambling eggs, the mixture in the pan suddenly “scrambles.” And it is the same if you are engaged in changing society. We will only change capitalist society into socialist society when the rule of one class is replaced by the rule of another class—and this is a radical transformation, a leap to a new state of society, a revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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If, on the other hand, we consider quality itself, then qualitative change always arises as a result of an accumulation of quantitative changes, and differences in quality have their basis in differences of quantity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus just as quantitative change must at a certain point give rise to qualitative change, so if we wish to bring about qualitative change we must study its quantitative basis, and know what must be increased and what diminished if the required change is to be brought about.&lt;br /&gt;
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Natural science teaches us how purely quantitative difference—addition or subtraction—makes a qualitative difference in nature. For example, the addition of one proton in the nucleus of an atom makes the transition from one element to another.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a simple account of the physical phenomena referred to in this and in our next example see &#039;&#039;The Challenge of Atomic Energy&#039;&#039;, by E. H. S. Burhop, London, 1951.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The atoms of all the elements are formed out of combinations of the same protons and electrons, but a purely quantitative difference between the numbers combined in the atom gives different kinds of atoms, atoms of different elements with different chemical properties. Thus an atom consisting of one proton and one electron is a hydrogen atom, but if another proton and another electron are added it is an atom of helium, and so on. Similarly in chemical compounds, the addition of one atom to a molecule makes the difference between substances with different chemical properties. In general, different qualities have their basis in quantitative difference.&lt;br /&gt;
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As Engels put it:&lt;br /&gt;
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“In nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion….&lt;br /&gt;
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“All qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical composition or on different quantities or forms of motion or, as is almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; without quantitative alteration of the body concerned.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Dialectics of Nature&#039;&#039;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This feature of the dialectical law connecting quality and quantity is familiar to readers of the popular literature about atomic bombs. To make a uranium bomb it is necessary to have the isotope, uranium-235; the more common isotope, uranium-238, will not do. The difference between these two is merely quantitative, a difference in atomic weight, depending on the number of neutrons present in each case. But this quantitative difference of atomic weight, 235 and 238, makes the qualitative difference between a substance with the properties required for the bomb and a substance without those properties. Further, having got a quantity of uranium-235, a certain “critical mass” of it is required before it will explode. If there is not enough, the chain reaction which constitutes the explosion will not occur; when the “critical mass” is reached, the reaction does occur.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we see that quantitative changes are transformed at a certain point into qualitative changes, and qualitative differences rest on quantitative differences. This is a universal feature of development. What makes such development happen?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Development Takes Place Through the Unity and Struggle of Opposites ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In general, the reason why in any particular case a quantitative change leads to a qualitative change lies in the very nature, in the content, of the particular processes involved. Therefore in each case we can, if we only know enough, explain just why a qualitative change is inevitable, and why it takes place at the point it does.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To explain this we have to study the facts of the case. We cannot invent an explanation with the aid of dialectics alone; where an understanding of dialectics helps is that it gives us the clue as to where to look. In a particular case we may not yet know how and why the change takes place. In that case we have the task of finding out, by investigating the facts of the case. For there is nothing unknowable, no essential mystery or secret of development, of the emergence of the qualitatively new.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us consider, for example, the case of the qualitative change which takes place when water boils.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When heat is applied to a mass of water contained in a kettle, then the effect is to increase the motion of the molecules composing the water. So long as the water remains in its liquid state, the forces of attraction between the molecules are sufficient to insure that, though some of the surface molecules are continually escaping, the whole mass coheres together as a mass of water inside the kettle. At boiling point, however, the motion of the molecules has become sufficiently violent for large numbers of them to begin jumping clear of the mass. A qualitative change is therefore observed. The water begins to bubble and the whole mass is rapidly transformed into steam. This change evidently occurs as a result of the oppositions operating within the mass of water—the tendency of the molecules to move apart and jump free versus the forces of attraction between them. The former tendency is reinforced to the point where it overcomes the latter as a result, in this case, of the external application of heat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another example we have considered is that of a cord which breaks when its load becomes too great. Here again, the qualitative change takes place as a result of the opposition set up between the tensile strength of the cord and the pull of the load. Again, when a spring wheat is transformed into a winter wheat, this is a result of the opposition between the plant’s “conservatism” and the changing conditions of growth and development to which it is subjected; at a certain point, the influence of the latter overcomes the former.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These examples prepare us for the general conclusion that, as Stalin puts it, “the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes” consists in the struggle of opposites— opposite tendencies, opposite forces—within the things and process concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the law that quantitative changes are transformed into qualitative changes, and that differences in quality are based on differences in quantity, leads us to the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is the way Stalin formulates this law of dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a ‘struggle’ of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand development, to understand how and why quantitative changes lead to qualitative changes, to understand how and why the transition takes place from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, we have to understand the contradictions inherent in each thing and process we are considering, and how a “struggle” of opposite tendencies arises on the basis of these contradictions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have to understand this concretely, in each case, bearing in mind Lenin’s warning that “the fundamental thesis of dialectics is: truth is always concrete.” We cannot deduce the laws of development in the concrete case from the general principles of dialectics: we have to discover them by actual investigation in each case. But dialectics tells us what to look for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Dialectics of Social Development—The Contradictions of Capitalism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectics of development—the unity and struggle of opposites—has been most thoroughly worked out in the Marxist science of society. Here, from the standpoint of the working-class struggle, on the basis of working-class experience, we can work out the dialectic of the contradictions of capitalism and of their development very exactly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the principles involved in the development of society are not opposed to but are in essence the same as those involved in the development of nature, though different in their form of manifestation in each case. Thus Engels said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“I was not in doubt—that amid the welter of innumerable changes taking place in nature the same dialectical laws of motion are in operation as those which in history govern the apparent fortuitousness of events.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How Marxism understands the contradictions of capitalism and their development, this crowning triumph of the dialectical method, was explained in general terms by Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The basic contradiction of capitalism is not simply the conflict of two classes, which confront one another as two external forces which come into conflict. No, it is the contradiction within the social system itself, on the basis of which the class conflict arises and operates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalism brought about:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The concentration of the means of production in large workshops and manufactories, their transformation into means of production which were in fact social. But the social means of production and the social products were treated as if they were still, as they had been before, the means of production and the products of individuals. Hitherto, the owner of the instruments of labor had appropriated the product because it was as a rule his own product, the auxiliary labor of other persons being the exception; now, the owner of the instruments of production continued to appropriate the product, although it was no longer &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; product, but exclusively the product of &#039;&#039;others’ labor.&#039;&#039; Thus, therefore, the products, now socially produced, were not appropriated by those who had really set the means of production in motion and really produced the products, but by the &#039;&#039;capitalists&#039;&#039;.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Part III, Chapter II; or &#039;&#039;Socialism, Utopian and Scientific&#039;&#039;, Chapter III, N. Y., 1935.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The basic contradiction of capitalism is, therefore, the contradiction between socialized production and capitalist appropriation. It is on the basis of this contradiction that the struggle between the classes develops.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In this contradiction… the whole conflict of today is already present in germ…. The contradiction between social production and capitalist appropriation became manifest as the antagonism between proletariat and bourgeoisie.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the contradiction can only be resolved by the victory of the working class, when the working class sets up its own dictatorship and initiates social ownership and appropriation to correspond to social production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This example very exactly illustrates the point of what Stalin said about “struggle of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.” The class struggle exists and operates on the basis of the contradictions inherent in the social system itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is from the struggle of opposite tendencies, opposing forces, arising on the basis of the contradictions inherent in the social system, that social transformation, the leap to a qualitatively new stage of social development, takes place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This process has its quantitative aspect. The working class increases in numbers and organization. Capital becomes more concentrated, more centralized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital… grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;, Vol. I, Chapter XXXII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With this quantitative process of increase and decrease, the basic contradiction of socialized labor and private appropriation becomes intensified—for the social character of labor is magnified while capital accumulates and is concentrated in the hands of a diminishing number of great “magnates of capital”—and the tension between the opposing forces becomes intensified, too. At length quantitative change gives rise to qualitative change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The expropriators are expropriated.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way the laws of dialectical development, summarized in the principles of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change and of the unity and struggle of opposites, are found at work in the development of society; this development is to be understood in terms of the operation of those laws; and this dialectical understanding, once it has become the theoretical possession of the working class, serves as an indispensable instrument of the working class in carrying into effect the socialist transformation of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 9. The New and the Old ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The struggle of opposed forces which constitutes the driving force of development does not take place accidentally but on the basis of internal contradictions inherent in the very nature of the processes concerned. There arises a contradiction between the new and the old; that which is arising and growing contradicts that which is dying away and disappearing. And this fact is strikingly exemplified in the development of society.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;In the process of development the new grows strong and overpowers the old, and this leads to the forward movement of development, in which each stage is an advance to something new, not a falling back to some stage already passed.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Since development proceeds by the overcoming and supplanting of the old by the new it follows that development can only proceed by the negation of the old and not by its preservation.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== Contradictions Inherent in Things and Processes—Internal Contradictions ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the last chapter we considered how qualitative change is brought about by the struggle of opposed forces. This was exemplified equally in the change of state of a body, from liquid to solid or gas, and in the change of society from capitalism to socialism. In each case there are “opposite tendencies” at work, whose “struggle” eventuates in some fundamental transformation, a qualitative change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This “struggle” is not external and accidental. It is not adequately understood if we suppose that it is a question of forces or tendencies arising quite independently the one of the other, which happen to meet, to bump up against each other, so to speak, and to come into conflict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No. The struggle is internal and necessary; for it arises and follows from the contradictory nature of the process as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single contradictory whole, and they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the opposed tendencies which operate in the course of the change of state of a body operate on the basis of the contradictory unity of attractive and repulsive forces inherent in all physical phenomena. And the class struggle which operates in capitalist society operates on the basis of the contradictory unity of socialized labor and private appropriation inherent in that society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This dialectical understanding of the internal necessity of the struggle of opposed forces, and of its outcome, based on the contradictions inherent in the process as a whole, is no mere refinement of philosophical analysis. It is of very great practical importance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bourgeois theorists, for example, are well able to recognize the fact of class conflicts in capitalist society. What they do not recognize is the necessity of this conflict; that it is based on contradictions inherent in the very nature of the capitalist system and that, therefore, the struggle can only culminate in and end with the destruction of the system itself and its replacement by a new, higher system of society. So they seek to mitigate the class conflict, to tone it down and reconcile the opposing classes, or to stamp it out, and so to preserve the system intact. And precisely this bourgeois understanding of the class conflict is brought into the labor movement by Social Democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is in opposition to such a shallow, metaphysical way of understanding class conflict that Lenin points out:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The main point in the teaching of Marx is the class struggle. This has very often been said and written. But this is not true. Out of this error, here and there, springs an opportunist distortion of Marxism, such a falsification of it as to make it acceptable to the bourgeoisie. The theory of the class struggle was &#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;created by Marx, but by the bourgeoisie &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; Marx and is, generally speaking, &#039;&#039;acceptable&#039;&#039; to the bourgeoisie. He who recognizes &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; the class struggle is not yet a Marxist; he may be found not to have gone beyond the boundaries of bourgeois reasoning and politics. To limit Marxism to the teaching of the class struggle means to curtail Marxism—to distort it, to reduce it to something which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. A Marxist is one who &#039;&#039;extends&#039;&#039; the acceptance of the class struggle to the acceptance of the &#039;&#039;dictatorship of the proletariat.&#039;&#039; Herein lies the deepest difference between a Marxist and an ordinary petty or big bourgeois. On this touchstone it is necessary to test a &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039;understanding and acceptance of Marxism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &#039;&#039;The State and Revolution&#039;&#039;, Chapter II, Section 3, N. Y., 1932.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In general, we understand contradiction as inherent in, belonging to the very essence of, a given system or process; the struggle through which development takes place is not an external clash of accidentally opposed factors, but is based on contradictions in the very essence of things; and thus is determined the necessary outcome, the necessary solution of the contradiction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, conflicts of an external, accidental character also occur in nature and society. But these are not of decisive importance in determining the course of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Contradiction Between Old and New, Past and Future ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we consider a process of development as a whole, as, in Stalin’s words, “an onward and upward movement” involving at each stage “a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state,” then it reveals itself as the continuous posing and solution of a series of contradictions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new stage of development comes into being from the working out of the contradiction and struggle inherent in the old. And the new stage itself contains the germ of a new contradiction. For it comes into being containing something of the past from which it springs and something of the future to which it leads. It has, therefore, its “negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing.” On this basis there once again arises within it “the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence development continually drives forward to fresh development; the whole process at each stage is in essence the struggle between the old and the new, that which is dying and that which is being born.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This dialectical character of development is strikingly exemplified in social development—in, for example, the stage of development with which we ourselves are specially concerned, the development from capitalism to socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The basic contradiction of capitalism is that between socialized production and capitalist appropriation. This itself is the contradiction between the new and the old in society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalist appropriation carries on the old institution of private property in the implements of production, under which the owner of the implements of production appropriated the product. The artisan owned his tools and his product. This private ownership of the implements of production and of the product by the individual producer is carried over and transformed into the ownership and appropriation by the capitalist. But while private ownership and appropriation is carried on from the former state of society, what is quite new, what is newly born, arising and advancing in capitalist society, is the socialization of production. The old, petty individual production is destroyed; production is carried on in a new socialized way in great workshops by hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of workers. The old individual producer is expropriated from his means of production (the peasant is turned off his bit of land, the artisan loses his little workshop), yet the means of production are still privately owned and the product still appropriated—by the individual capitalist or capitalist concern. What the capitalist appropriates, however, is no longer the product of his own labor, but the social product of the social labor of others. Hence this private capitalist appropriation now contradicts the new socialized character of production. In this way, as capitalist society comes into being and develops, the old contradicts the new.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At first capitalism continues to expand, bringing all aspects of economy under its sway and extending its sway over the whole world. But then begins its process of decline. The contradictions reach a breaking point. Capitalism enters into its period of death throes, the general crisis of capitalism. A handful of great monopolists stands opposed to the working class in the capitalist countries; and not only to the working class in the capitalist countries but to the millions of oppressed peoples in the colonial territories. The old masters of the world stand opposed to its future masters—the past to the future. Moreover, rival groups of monopolists stand opposed to one another, as new imperialist claimants to world domination rise and confront the older-established powers. The system begins to break at its weakest points; first in one country, then in a series of countries, the capitalists are overpowered and the new system of socialism begins to arise, so that a new socialist power building up in part of the world confronts the old capitalist power dying but fighting for life in the rest of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the old goes down, fighting against the new. The new grows strong, overpowers and supplants the old. Such is the pattern of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Forward Movement of Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This pattern of development is the dialectic of forward movement—“in which,” as Engels said, “in spite of all seeming accidents and all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The process moves forward from stage to stage, each stage being a genuine advance to something new, not a falling back to some stage already past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this process of development there are processes of advance, the birth and surging forward of the new, and processes of decay, the decline and fall of the old. Of course, there are times and occasions when the process of decay may become paramount, and when the forces of advance are not sufficiently strong to overcome the old and to supplant it. This has occurred in the past, for instance, in the history of society, when civilizations have disintegrated and disappeared, because they decayed and the forces of advance were not strongly enough developed in them to carry them forward. No matter. Despite such “temporary retrogression,” the “progressive development asserts itself in the end.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the present day there are people who talk about the likelihood of “the end of civilization.” If we considered only the capitalist forces, such an end might well be expected. If there were no Soviet Union, if there were no People’s China, if there were no organized working-class movement, no national liberation movement, no peace movement, then the capitalists would quite certainly destroy their own civilization. But in fact there have already risen and grown tens of millions strong the new forces which will carry civilization forward from capitalism to socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The overall, long-term, forward-moving process of development takes place, not in a straight line, but in a series of zig-zags, of particular and seemingly accidental occurrences, of temporary setbacks; for the development as a whole is but the summation of an entire complex of infinitely various changes and interrelations. If, then, we want to understand how the development proceeds in the concrete case, we have to see it as taking its course through a series of particular, concrete events. On the other hand, if we want to understand these particular events themselves, we should understand them, not in isolation, but in their context within the process of development as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As concerns particular changes of particular things which take part in the process of development, they do not, of course, all fall into a single pattern of “forward movement.” There are manifold comings and goings and interactions of particular things, changes of form and changes of state, changes of one thing into another and destruction of one thing by another, cycles of change which revert again to the original starting point, and so on. Dialectics, as the study of processes in all their concreteness, in all their manifold changes and interconnections, is concerned with all these processes. Here, however, we are concerned with the general laws of the overall process of development, as an “onward and upward movement” manifested in a series of “transitions from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Role of Negation in Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This general forward movement, as we have seen, infinitely complex as it is in detail, takes place through the struggle of the new and the old and the overcoming of the old and dying by the new and rising.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This dialectical conception of development is opposed to the older liberal conception favored by bourgeois theoreticians. The bourgeois liberals recognize development and assert that progress is a universal law of nature and society. But they see development as a gradual and smooth process, proceeding through a series of easy and imperceptible changes. They may recognize struggle where they cannot help but notice it; but to them it seems an unfortunate interruption of orderly progress, more likely to impede development than to help it forward. For them, what exists has not to be supplanted by what is coming into existence, the old has not to be overcome by the new, but it has to be &#039;&#039;preserved,&#039;&#039; so that it can gradually improve itself and become a higher existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
True to this philosophy, which they took over from the capitalists, the Social Democrats strove to preserve capitalism, with the idea that it could imperceptibly grow into socialism; and thus striving to preserve capitalism, they end by fighting, not for socialism, but against it. When the struggle is on, these exponents of social peace and class collaboration cannot avoid struggle: they simply enter into it on the other side.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comparing the dialectical materialist, or revolutionary, conception of development with this liberal, reformist conception of development, we may say that the one recognizes and embraces, while the other fails to recognize and shrinks from, the role of &#039;&#039;negation&#039;&#039; in development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, we cannot assert that the transition from the old state to the new, from one quality to another, must always take place in exactly the same way. For, as we have already seen, dialectics does not mean applying some preconceived scheme to every process, but, on the contrary, every process has its own dialectic, which must be deduced from the study of the process itself. Thus while dialectics teaches us to recognize how the old supplants the new in a sudden, revolutionary way, by a blow in which the old is abolished and the new established in its place, we must also take into account how the transition to a new quality takes place in a different way—not by a sudden blow, but “by the gradual and prolonged accumulation of the elements of the new quality… and the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &#039;&#039;Marxism and Linguistics&#039;&#039;, Chapter I, N. Y., 1951.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Both types of transition are exemplified in nature, and also in society. The gradual process is manifested, for example, as Stalin has recently pointed out, in the development of languages. And again, while fundamental changes in society take place through revolutionary upheavals so long as antagonistic classes exist, such revolutions are no longer necessary after antagonistic classes have been finally abolished in socialist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal’s mistake lies, not in recognizing the occurrence of gradual changes, but in recognizing nothing else and failing to comprehend the role of negation in development. Dialectics teaches us to understand that the new must struggle with and overcome the old, that the old must give way to and be supplanted by the new—in other words, that the old must be &#039;&#039;negated.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal, who thinks metaphysically, understands negation simply as saying: “No.” To him negation is merely the end to something. Far from meaning advance, it means retreat; far from meaning gain, it means loss. Dialectics, on the other hand, teaches us not to be afraid of negation, but to understand how it becomes a condition of progress, a means to positive advance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 10. The Negation of Negation ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The dialectical conception of development through negation is opposed to the liberal conception of development. For the liberal, negation is simply a blow which destroys something. But on the contrary, negation is the condition for positive advance, in which the old is abolished only after it has already produced the conditions for the transition to the new, and in which all the positive achievement belonging to the old stage is carried forward into the new.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Moreover, a stage already passed can be re-created on a higher level as a result of double negation, the negation of the negation. According to the liberal conception of development, if a given stage of development is to be raised to a higher level this must take place gradually and peacefully, without the process of negation. But on the contrary, it is only through a double negation that the higher stage can be reached.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The repetition of the old stage on a higher level taking place through the negation of negation is a comprehensive and important law of development, the operation of which is exemplified in many processes of nature, history and thought.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Positive Character of Negation ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no,” wrote Engels.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Part I, Chapter XIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When in the process of development the old stage is negated by the new, then, in the first place, that new stage could not have come about except as arising from and in opposition to the old. The conditions for the existence of the new arose and matured within the old. The negation is a positive advance, brought about only by the development of that which is negated. The old is not simply abolished, leaving things as though it had never existed: it is abolished only after it has itself given rise to the conditions for the new stage of advance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the second place, the old stage, which is negated, itself constitutes a stage of advance in the forward-moving process of development as a whole. It is negated, but the advance which took place in it is not negated. On the contrary, this advance is carried forward to the new stage, which takes into itself and carries forward all the past achievement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example: socialism replaces capitalism—it negates it. But the conditions for the rise and victory of socialism were born of capitalism, and socialism comes into existence as the next stage of social development after capitalism. Every achievement, every advance in the forces of production, and likewise every cultural achievement, which took place under capitalism, is not destroyed when capitalism is destroyed, but, on the contrary, is preserved and carried further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This positive content of negation is not understood by liberals, for whom negation is “simply saying no.” Moreover, they think of negation as coming only from outside, externally. Something is developing very well, and then something else comes from outside and negates it—destroys it. That is their conception. That something by its own development leads to its own negation, and thereby to a higher stage of development—lies outside their comprehension.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the liberals conceive of social revolution not only as a catastrophe, as an end to ordered progress, but they believe that such a catastrophe can be brought about only by outside forces. If a revolution threatens to upset the capitalist system, that is not because of the development of the contradictions of that system itself, but is due to “agitators.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, there &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; negation which takes the form simply of a blow from outside which destroys something. For instance, if I am walking along the road and am knocked down by a car, I suffer negation of a purely negative sort. Such occurrences are frequent both in nature and in society. But this is not how we must understand negation if we are to understand the positive role of negation in the process of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At each stage in the process of development there arises the struggle of the new with the old. The new arises and grows strong within the old conditions, and when it is strong enough it overcomes and destroys the old. This is the negation of the past stage of development, of the old qualitative state; and it means the coming into being of the new and higher stage of development, the new qualitative state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Negation of Negation ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This brings us to a further dialectical feature of development— the negation of negation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the liberal idea that negation “means simply saying no,” if the negation is negated, then the original position is restored once more without change. According to this idea, negation is simply a negative, a taking away. Hence if the negation, the taking away, is itself negated, that merely means putting back again what was taken away. If a thief takes my watch, and then I take it away from him, we are back where we started—I have the watch again. Similarly, if I say, “It’s going to be a fine day,” and you say, “No, it’s going to be a wet day,” to which I reply, “No, it’s not going to be a wet day,” I have simply, by negating your negation, restated my original proposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is enshrined in the principle of formal logic, “not not-A equals A.” According to this principle, negation of negation is a fruitless proceeding. It just takes you back where you started.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us, however, consider a real process of development and the dialectical negation which takes place in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Society develops from primitive communism to the slave system. The next stage is feudalism. The next stage is capitalism. Each stage arises from the previous one, and negates it. So far we have simply a succession of stages, each following as the negation of the other and constituting a higher stage of development. But what comes next? Communism. Here there is a return to the beginning, but at a higher level of development. In place of primitive communism, based on extremely primitive forces of production, comes communism based on extremely advanced forces of production and containing within itself tremendous new potentialities of development. The old, primitive classless society has become the new and higher classless society. It has been raised, as it were, to a higher power, has reappeared on a higher level. But this has happened only because the old classless society was negated by the appearance of classes and the development of class society, and because finally class society, when it had gone through its whole development, was itself negated by the working class taking power, ending exploitation of man by man, and establishing a new classless society on the foundation of all the achievements of the whole previous development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the negation of negation. But it does not take us back to the original starting point. It takes us forward to a new starting point, which is the original one raised, through its negation and the negation of the negation, to a higher level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we see that in the course of development, as a result of a double negation, a later stage can repeat an earlier stage, but repeat it on a higher level of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is “a development that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise (in a new way), on a higher basis… a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &#039;&#039;The Teachings of Karl Marx&#039;&#039;, N. Y., 1930.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is a conception of development, like that of dialectical negation in general, which the liberal outlook cannot stomach. To the liberal outlook development seems to be a smooth, upward course proceeding through a series of small changes. If a given stage of development is to be raised to a higher level, then this must take place gradually and peacefully, through the “harmonious unfolding” of all the higher potentialities latent in the original stage. But on the contrary, the facts show that it is only through struggle and through negation that the higher stage is won. The development takes place not as “a harmonious unfolding” but as “a disclosure of contradictions,” in which the lower stage is negated—destroyed; in which the development which follows its negation is itself negated; and in which the higher stage is reached only as a result of that double negation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As Hegel put it, the higher end of development is reached only through “the suffering, the patience and the labor of the negative.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hegel, &#039;&#039;The Phenomenology of Mind&#039;&#039;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== A Comprehensive and Important Law of Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In discussing the negation of negation we must again stress what was said earlier, namely, that the essence of dialectics is to study a process “in all its concreteness,” to work out how it actually takes place, and not to impose on it some preconceived scheme and then try to “prove” the necessity of the real process reproducing the ideal scheme. We do not say in advance that every process will exemplify the negation of negation. Still less do we use this conception to try to “prove” anything.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Referring to Marx’s demonstration of the occurrence of the negation of negation in history, Engels said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In characterizing the process as the negation of the negation, therefore, Marx does not dream of attempting to prove by this that the process was historically necessary. On the contrary: after he has proved from history that in fact the process has partially already occurred, and partially must occur in the future, he then also characterizes it as a process which develops in accordance with a definite historical law. That is all.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Part I, Chapter XIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Dialectics teaches us that we shall understand the laws of development of each particular process by studying that process itself, in its development. But when we do that, we shall discover the repetition of the old stage on a higher level taking place through the negation of negation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What, therefore, is the negation of the negation?” wrote Engels. “An extremely general—and for this reason extremely comprehensive and important—law of development of nature, history and thought…. It is obvious that in describing any evolutionary process as the negation of the negation I do not say anything concerning the &#039;&#039;particular&#039;&#039; process of development…. When I say that all these processes are the negation of negation, I bring them all together under this one law of motion, and for this very reason I leave out of account the peculiarities of each separate process. Dialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How “extremely comprehensive and important” is this law of development can be shown in numerous examples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen how the negation of the negation occurs in history in the development from primitive communism to communism. It occurs again in the development of individual property. Marx pointed out that the pre-capitalist “individual private property founded on the labors of the proprietor” is negated—destroyed—by capitalist private property. For capitalist private property arises only on the ruin and expropriation of the pre-capitalist individual producers. The individual producer used to own his instruments of production and his product—both were taken away from him by the capitalists. But when capitalist private property is itself negated—when “the expropriators are expropriated”—then the individual property of the producers is restored once more, but in a new form, on a higher level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;, Vol. I, Chapter XXXII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The producer, as a participant in socialized production, then enjoys, as his individual property, a share of the social product— “according to his labor,” in the first stage of communist society, and “according to his needs” in the fully developed communist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When capitalism arose, the only way forward was through this negation of negation. Some of the British Chartists put forward in their land policy demands aimed at arresting the new capitalist process and at restoring the &#039;&#039;old&#039;&#039; private property of the producer. This was vain. The only road forward for the producers was by the struggle against capitalism and for socialism—not to restore the &#039;&#039;old&#039;&#039; individual property which capitalism had destroyed, but to destroy capitalism and so create individual property again on a &#039;&#039;new,&#039;&#039; socialist basis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, in the history of thought, the “primitive, natural materialism” of the earliest philosophers is negated by philosophical idealism, and modern materialism arises as the negation of that idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“This modern materialism, the negation of negation, is not the mere re-establishment of the old, but adds to the permanent foundations of this old materialism the whole thought content of two thousand years of development of philosophy and natural science.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Part I, Chapter XIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The negation of negation, as Engels also pointed out, is a very familiar phenomenon to the plant breeder. If he has some seed and wants to get from it some better seed, then he has to grow the seed under definite conditions for its development—which means bringing about the negation of the seed by its growing into a plant and then controlling the conditions of development of the plant until it brings about its own negation in the production of more seed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some experts, it is true, have lately advocated going another and more direct way about it, namely, changing the seed directly by treating it with chemicals or X-rays. The result of this, however, is simply a number of haphazard changes in the properties of the seed, and not a controlled process of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Furthermore, the whole of geology is a series of negated negations,” wrote Engels, “a series arising from the successive shattering of old and the depositing of new rock formations…. But the result of this process has been a very positive one: the creation, out of the most varied chemical elements, of a mixed and mechanically pulverized soil which makes possible the most abundant and diverse vegetation.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It is the same in mathematics,” he continued. If you want to raise a number &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; to a higher power, then this can be done by first operating on &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; so as to get —&#039;&#039;-a,&#039;&#039; and then making the additional operation of multiplying &#039;&#039;2&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;2&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;—a&#039;&#039; by itself, which results in &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039; Thus &#039;&#039;a,&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the second power of &#039;&#039;a,&#039;&#039; is reached by a negation of negation. In this case it is also possible to get 2 &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; from &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; by a single process, namely, multiplying &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; by &#039;&#039;a.&#039;&#039; Nevertheless, as Engels pointed out, “the negated negation is so securely entrenched in &#039;&#039;2&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; that the latter always has two square roots, namely &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; and — &#039;&#039;a.&#039;&#039;”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The negation of negation is found in the series of chemical elements, in which properties of elements of lower atomic weight disappear and then reappear again in elements of higher atomic weight.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the development of life itself obeys the law of negation of negation. The most primitive living organisms are comparatively speaking immortal, continuing themselves in being by continually dividing. The development of higher organisms, with sexual reproduction, was possible only at the cost of death. The organism becomes mortal. The higher development of life takes place through its negation, death.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And after that, these mortal organisms advance further. The process of the evolution of species of plants and animals begins. With the birth of man, social evolution begins, the whole process of social development from primitive communism, through its negation, class society, to the classless society of communism. Moreover, man begins to master nature. And when, with communism, he brings his own social organization under his own conscious control, then an entirely new epoch in the evolution of life opens up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 11. Criticism and Self-Criticism ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Development through contradiction, the struggle between the new and the old, will continue to be the rule in the future development of communist society. But with the ending of all exploitation of man by man, this development will no longer take place through violent social conflicts and upheavals but through the rational method of criticism and self-criticism, which will become the new level of development.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;From the whole discussion of the Marxist dialectical method the conclusion follows that Marxism is a creative science which must continually advance in application to new conditions of development. Criticism and self-criticism lies at the very heart of the Marxist dialectical method.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== A New Type of Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, now, of the future development of society, after the stage of communism has been reached? Are we to suppose that the same dialectical laws of development will continue to operate? Or that development will cease?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Development will not cease. On the contrary, it is only with the achievement of communism that human development in the proper sense, that is to say, a development consciously planned and controlled by men themselves, really begins; all the rest was only the painful preparation for it, the birth-pangs of the human race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When all the means of production are brought fully under planned social direction, then it may be expected that men’s mastery over nature will enormously increase, and the conquest and transformation of nature by man will in turn mean profound changes in men’s mode of life. For instance, ability to produce an absolute abundance of products with a minimum expenditure of human labor, abolition of the antithesis between town and countryside, abolition of the antithesis between manual and intellectual labor, clearly imply profound changes in social organization, in outlook, in habits, in mode of life generally. But the effecting of such changes cannot but involve, at each stage, the overcoming of forms of social organization, of outlooks and habits, belonging to the past. Development, therefore, will continue to take place through the disclosure of contradictions, the struggle between the new and the old, the future and the past. How else can we expect things to move forward? New tendencies will arise out of the existing conditions at each stage, which will come into contradiction with the existing conditions and hence lead to their passing and giving way to new conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is no reason to expect that this development will take place, as hitherto, through violent conflicts and social upheavals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the contrary, with communism there will have taken place, as Engels expressed it, “humanity’s leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.” And that means that the elemental conflicts characteristic of the “realm of necessity” will give place to changes controlled and planned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The laws of his own social activity, which have hitherto confronted him as external, dominating laws of nature, will then be applied by man with complete understanding, and hence will be dominated by man. Men’s own social organization which has hitherto stood in opposition to them as if arbitrarily decreed by nature and history, will then become the voluntary act of men themselves… men with full consciousness will fashion their own history.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Part III, Chapter II; &#039;&#039;Socialism, Utopian and Scientific&#039;&#039;, Chapter III.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When men understand the laws of their own social organization and have it under their own co-operative control, when there is no exploitation of man by man, when what is new and rising and its contradiction with the old is fully understood, then it is possible to do away with old conditions and create new conditions in a deliberate and planned way, without conflict or upheaval. Contradiction and the overcoming of the old by the new remain; but the element of antagonism and conflict as between men in society disappears and gives way to the properly human method of deciding affairs by rational discussion—criticism and self-criticism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This mode of social development is already beginning in the Soviet Union today.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In our Soviet society,” said A. A. Zhdanov, “where antagonistic classes have been liquidated, the struggle between the old and the new, and consequently the development from the lower to the higher, proceeds not in the form of struggle between antagonistic classes and of cataclysms, as is the case under capitalism, but in the form of criticism and self-criticism, which is the real motive force of our development, a powerful instrument in the hands of the Communist Party. This is incontestably a new aspect of movement, a new type of development, a new dialectical law.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Zhdanov, &#039;&#039;Essays on Literature, Philosophy, and Music&#039;&#039;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Human Perspectives ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first phase of the transition from socialism to communism, development takes place through continued struggle against the old heritage of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What will happen when the last traces of old class society have been obliterated throughout the world? We can at all events predict certain initial features of the development of world communist society—associated humanity. Thus the organization of the state and of a government party will become outmoded, and state and party will disappear. This was already foreseen by Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, Stalin has pointed out that the fullest development of national cultures and national languages, which is the task first arising from the abolition of the national oppression of capitalism, will provide the basis for an eventual universal human culture and human language. When “socialism has become part and parcel of the life of the peoples, and when practice has convinced the nations of the superiority of a common language over national languages,” then “national differences and languages will begin to die away and make room for a world language, common to all nations.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &#039;&#039;The National Question and Leninism&#039;&#039;, N. Y., 1951.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the more remote future, we have no data on which to base predictions—though we can be quite sure that vast changes will take place, and that the people of the future, masters of nature and knowing no oppression of man by man, will be well able to look after the destinies of the human race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bernard Shaw, in his &#039;&#039;Back to Methuselah,&#039;&#039; speculated on the possibility of the span of human life being greatly extended, and eventually extended indefinitely. True, he thought this would happen through the mysterious operation of “the life force.” Yet it was a profound speculation, for such a result may well be brought about through the development of physiological knowledge and medical science. And Shaw was quite right in supposing that such a development would make a tremendous difference in the whole mode of human life and in all social institutions. This is, indeed, one of the ways in which the advance of science and of men’s mastery over nature (our own nature, in this case) could lead to developments of vast, transforming significance for human life and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At all events, we cannot set limits to the powers of human achievement. And bearing this in mind, we may well believe that our descendants a few hundred generations hence will in their manner of life resemble us far less than we resemble our own ancestors among the primitive savages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Creative Marxism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With this, we may try to sum up the main conclusions about dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectics is concerned with interconnection, change and development. Understood in the materialist way, dialectics is “the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectical method is the method of approach by the application of which we advance our materialist understanding of nature and history, and all particular processes of nature and history. It is a &#039;&#039;method&#039;&#039;—not a general formula, and not an abstract philosophical system. It guides us in understanding things so as to change them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such being the nature of dialectics and of the dialectical method, it should be clear that the science of dialectics itself grows and develops, and that the method is enhanced and enriched with each further application. Every new social development and every new advance of the sciences and the arts provides the basis for enriching and extending the understanding of dialectics and of the dialectical method. We cannot understand and master new material simply by repeating what has already been learned, but on the contrary, we learn more, and extend, correct and enrich our ideas in the light of new problems and new experiences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Marxism is a developing, progressive science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand by the latter,” said Stalin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&#039;&#039;, Chapter VII, Section 4, N. Y., 1939.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Creative Marxism:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Concentrates its attention upon… the path and means of realizing Marxism for various situations, changing the path and means when the situation changes…. It takes its directives and guiding lines not from historical analogies and parallels, but from the study of surrounding conditions. In its activities it relies, not on quotations and aphorisms but on practical experience, testing every step it takes by experience, learning from its mistakes and teaching others to build a new life.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &#039;&#039;Lenin&#039;&#039;, “Lenin as Organizer and Leader of the Communist Party,” N. Y., 1934.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory means assimilating &#039;&#039;the substance&#039;&#039; of this theory and learning to use it in the solution of the practical problems of the revolutionary movement under the varying conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory means being able to enrich this theory with the new experience of the revolutionary movement, with new propositions and conclusions, it means being able &#039;&#039;to develop it and advance it&#039;&#039; without hesitating to replace—in accordance with the substance of the theory—such of its propositions and conclusions as have become antiquated by the new ones corresponding to the new historical situation.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&#039;&#039;, Conclusion.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Creative Marxism is the very opposite of revisionism. This must be stressed, because revisionism usually begins by announcing that Marxism “must not become a dogma.” Revisionism means going backward from Marxism: in the name of opposing dogmas, it abandons Marxism in favor of the dogmas of bourgeois theory. Creative Marxism preserves and cherishes the substance of the Marxist materialist theory. Thus Stalin said of Lenin:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Lenin was, and remains, the most loyal and consistent pupil of Marx and Engels, and he wholly and entirely based himself on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin did not merely carry out the doctrines of Marx and Engels. He was also the continuator of these doctrines…. He developed the doctrines of Marx and Engels still further in application to the new conditions of development.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Interview with the First American Labor Delegation&#039;&#039;, 1927.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Criticism and Self-Criticism, a Lever of Progress ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order, then, to master the method of Marxism-Leninism, the method of dialectics, we must use it and develop it in use. And this demands criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of theoretical and practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism and self-criticism, which belongs at the very heart of the Marxist dialectical method, means that theory and practice must always be matched up one with the other. Theory must not be allowed to lag behind practice; theory must keep not only level with practice but in advance of it, so as to serve as a true and reliable guide. Practice must not be allowed to grope in the dark without the light of theory, nor to be distorted by wrong and antiquated theory. And this matching up of theory and practice can only be achieved by constant alertness, by constant readiness to criticize and to learn, by continuous check-up of ideas and actions both from above and from below, by readiness to recognize what is new and to correct or cast aside what is old and no longer applicable, by frank recognition of mistakes. Mistakes are inevitable. But by the check up which recognizes mistakes in time, by examining critically the roots of those mistakes and correcting them, by learning from mistakes, we advance to new successes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“A party is invincible,” wrote Stalin, “if it does not fear criticism and self-criticism, if it does not gloss over the mistakes and defects in its work, if it teaches and educates its cadres by drawing the lessons from the mistakes in party work, and if it knows how to correct its mistakes in time.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&#039;&#039;, Conclusion.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mistakes are seldom mere accidental errors of judgment. Most often mistakes arise because we cling to old habits and old formulations which have become antiquated and inapplicable to new conditions and new tasks. When this happens, and when, as a result, things do not turn out as anticipated, then, if we are ready critically to examine what has gone wrong, we learn something new and grow in strength, stature and experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We are advancing in the process of struggle, in the process of the development of contradictions, in the process of overcoming these contradictions, in the process of bringing these contradictions to light and liquidating them,” said Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Something in life is always dying. But that which is dying refuses to die quietly; it fights for its existence, defends its moribund cause.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Something new in life is always being born. But that which is being born does not come into the world quietly; it comes in squealing and screaming, defending its right to existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The struggle between the old and the new, between the dying and the nascent—such is the foundation of development. By failing openly and honestly, as befits Bolsheviks, to point to, to bring to light, the defects and mistakes in our work, we close our road to progress. But we want to go forward. And precisely because we want to go forward, we must make honest and revolutionary self-criticism of our most important tasks. Without this there is no progress. Without this there is no development.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &#039;&#039;Report to Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 12. Dialectical Materialism and Science ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Dialectical materialism is a scientific world outlook. Its scientific character is manifested especially in that it turns socialism into a science and, by developing the science of society, shows how the whole of science can be developed in the service of mankind. In general, dialectical materialism is a scientific world outlook in that it does not seek to establish any philosophy “above science” but bases its conception of the world on the discoveries of the sciences.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The entire advance of the sciences is an advance of materialism against idealism; and further, science shows that our materialist conception of the world must be dialectical. Such great past discoveries as the law of the transformation of energy, the Darwinian theory of evolution and the theory of the cell have demonstrated the dialectic of nature.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Nevertheless science in the capitalist world has entered into a state of crisis, due primarily to (1) the subjugation of scientific research to the capitalist monopolies and to military purposes, and (2) the conflict between new discoveries and old idealist and metaphysical ideas. Dialectical materialism is not only a generalization of the achievements of science, but a weapon for the self-criticism and for the advancement of science.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== A Scientific World Outlook ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism, the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party, is a truly scientific world outlook. For it is based on considering things as they are, without arbitrary, preconceived assumptions (idealist fantasies); it insists that our conceptions of things must be based on actual investigation and experience, and must be constantly tested and re-tested in the light of practice and further experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, “dialectical materialism” means: understanding things just as they are (“materialism”), in their actual interconnection and movement (“dialectics”).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same cannot be said about other philosophies. They all make arbitrary assumptions of one kind or another, and try to erect a “system” on the basis of those assumptions. But such assumptions are arbitrary only in appearance; in fact they express the various prejudices and illusions of definite classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The scientific character of Marxism is manifested especially in this, that it makes &#039;&#039;socialism&#039;&#039; into a &#039;&#039;science.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We do not base our socialism, as the utopians did, on a conception of abstract human nature. The utopians worked out schemes for an ideal society, but could not show how to achieve socialism in practice. Marxism made socialism into a science by basing it on an analysis of the actual movement of history, of the economic law of motion of capitalist society in particular, thus showing how socialism arises as the necessary next stage in the evolution of society, and how it can come about only by the waging of the working-class struggle, through the defeat of the capitalist class and the institution of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Marxism treats man himself, society and history, scientifically.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Socialism, having become a science, demands the same treatment as every other science—it must be studied. The task of the leaders will be to bring understanding, thus acquired and clarified, to the working masses, to spread it with increased enthusiasm, to close the ranks of the party organizations and of the labor unions with even greater energy.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Peasant War in Germany&#039;&#039;, Preface to second edition, N. Y., 1926.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific study of society shows that human history develops from stage to stage according to definite laws. Men themselves are the active force in this development. By understanding the laws of development of society, therefore, we can guide our own struggles and create our own socialist future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus scientific socialism is the greatest and most important of all the sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The practitioners of the natural sciences are now getting worried because they feel that governments do not know how to put their discoveries to proper use. They have good cause to worry about this. Science is discovering the secrets of atomic energy, for example; but its discoveries are being used to create weapons of destruction. Many people are even coming to believe that it would be better if we had no science, since its discoveries open up such terrifying possibilities of disaster.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How can we insure that the discoveries of science are put to proper use for the benefit of mankind? It is scientific socialism, Marxism-Leninism, alone which answers this problem. It teaches us what are the forces which make history and thereby shows us how we can make our own history today, change society and determine our own future. It teaches us, therefore, how to develop the sciences in the service of mankind, how to carry them forward in today’s crisis. Physics can teach us how to release atomic energy, it cannot teach us how to control the social use of that energy. For this there is required, not the science of the atom, but the science of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Science and Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism is in no sense a philosophy “above science.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Others have set philosophy “above science,” in the sense that they have thought they could discover what the world was like just by thinking about it, without relying on the data of the sciences, on practice and experience. And then, from this lofty standpoint, they have tried to dictate to the scientists, to tell them where they were wrong, what their discoveries “really meant,” and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But Marxism makes an end of the old philosophy which claimed to stand above science and to explain “the world as a whole.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Modern materialism… no longer needs any philosophy standing above the sciences,” wrote Engels. “As soon as each separate science is required to get clarity as to its position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of things a special science dealing with this totality is superfluous.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Introduction, I.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism, he further wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Is in fact no longer a philosophy, but a simple world outlook which has to establish its validity and be applied not in a science of sciences standing apart, but within the positive sciences…. Philosophy is therefore… ‘both overcome and preserved’; overcome as regards its form, and preserved as regards its real content.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;, Part I, Chapter XIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our picture of the world about us, of nature, of natural objects and processes, their interconnections and laws of motion, is not to be derived from philosophical speculation, but from the investigations of the natural sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The scientific picture of the world and its development is not complete, and never will be. But it has advanced far enough for us to realize that philosophical speculation is superfluous. And we refuse to fill in gaps in scientific knowledge by speculation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For instance, we do know that life is the mode of existence of certain types of organic bodies—proteins; but we do not yet know exactly how such bodies, how life, originated. It is no use speculating about this; we will have to find out, the hard way, by intensive scientific investigation. Only so will we come to understand “the mystery of life.” Thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Science is already able to control life, can control living and dead protein. But science cannot yet say definitely what protein is, what life is, as to the derivation of it. Why? Engels in his day put it excellently when he said that ‘in order to gain an exhaustive knowledge of what life is, we should have to go through all the forms in which it appears, from the lowest to the highest.’ Consequently, in order to understand and learn what protein is, it is also necessary to go through all the forms of manifestation, from the lowest to the highest. And for this we need &#039;&#039;experiment, experiment and again experiment&#039;&#039;.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;T. D. Lysenko and others, &#039;&#039;The Situation in Biological Science&#039;&#039;, Speech of S. G. Petrov, August 2, 1948, N. Y., 1949. The quotation from Engels is from &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Part I, Chapter VIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The growing picture of the world which natural science unfolds is a materialist picture—despite the many efforts of bourgeois philosophers to make out the contrary. For step by step as science advances it shows how the rich variety of things and processes and changes to be found in the real world can be explained and understood in terms of material causes, without bringing in God or spirit or any supernatural agency.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every advance of science is an advance of materialism against idealism, a conquest for materialism—although when driven out of one position idealism has always taken up another position and manifested itself again in new forms, so that in the past the sciences have never been consistently materialist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For every advance of science means showing the order and development of the material world “from the material world itself.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Science and Dialectics ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As science has advanced, not only has this materialist picture of the world become less shadowy, more definite and more convincing, but Engels pointed out: “With each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science materialism has to change its form.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The discoveries of the natural sciences over the past hundred years or more have this significance—that the materialist picture which they unfold is a dialectical one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Engels wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The revolution which is being forced on theoretical natural science by the mere need to set in order the purely empirical discoveries… is of such a kind that it must bring the dialectical character of natural events more and more to the consciousness even of those… who are most opposed to it.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Nature is the test of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature’s process is dialectical.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;, Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three great discoveries of science in the nineteenth century above all contributed to this result, Engels pointed out.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These were:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The discovery that the cell is the unit from whose multiplication and division the whole plant or animal body develops (announced by Schwann in 1839).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The law of the transformation of energy (announced by Mayer in 1845).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Darwinian theory of evolution (announced in 1859).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us briefly consider the dialectical significance of these discoveries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, the transformation of energy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It used to be thought that heat, for example, was a “substance,” which passed in and out of bodies; and that electricity, magnetism and so on were separate “forces,” acting on bodies. In this way different types of physical processes were considered each separate from the other, in isolation. Each was placed in a separate compartment as the manifestation of a separate “substance” or “force” and their essential interconnection wan not understood.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But science in the nineteenth century, with the principle of the conservation and transformation of energy, discovered that: “mechanical force… heat, radiation (light or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical energy are different forum of manifestation of universal motion, which pass into one another in definite proportions so that in place of a certain quantity of one which disappears a certain quantity of another makes its appearance, and thus the whole motion of nature is reduced to this incessant process of transformation from one form into another.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The clue to this discovery was not found in any abstract philosophy, by any process of pure thought. No, it was closely related to the development of steam engines and to the working out of their principles of operation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a steam engine the burning of coal releases heat energy, which heats up steam, which is then forced through a cylinder where it drives the piston forward and turns the wheels of the engine. Heat is transformed into mechanical motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where did the energy released from the coal come from? We now know that it came from the sun’s radiations, was stored up in the plants which formed the coal seams, and was finally released when the coal was burned. A lot of it came from the solar atoms in the process of building heavier elements from hydrogen in the interior of the sun.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This discovery was first formulated as a conservation law— energy cannot be created or destroyed, the quantity which disappears in one form reappears in another form. But it is fundamentally, as Engels pointed out, a transformation law—one form of motion of matter is transformed into another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus physics becomes a science of transformations—no longer studying the different types of physical processes, or forms of motion, each in isolation, but studying their interconnections and how one is transformed into another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Transformation laws are laws of motion and interconnection, concerning the interconnection of the forms of motion of matter and their passage one into the other; they are not laws of the transformation of quantity into quality. Knowledge of the transformation laws is essential for understanding the passage from quantity to quality in particular cases. For example, knowledge of the laws of the transformation of heat into mechanical motion will show how much heat energy must be released before enough steam-pressure is generated to drive the piston.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Darwinian theory of evolution is in the same way dialectical and materialist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In place of separate species, each created by God, Darwin showed us a picture of the evolutionary development of species by means of natural selection. The sharp divisions were broken down, it was shown how species are inter-related and how living nature is transformed. For instance, the swimming-bladder of the fish becomes the lung of the land animal, the scales of the reptile become the feathers of the bird, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Closely related to this was the development of geology, which also became an evolutionary science, studying the evolution of the earth’s crust.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the discovery that the cell was the unit from whose multiplication and division the whole plant or animal body developed replaced the older conception of the body as made up of separate tissues. The cell theory was also a theory of motion and interconnection, showing how all the tissues and organs arose by differentiation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we see how natural science, step by step, unfolds a picture of nature’s dialectic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we say “a picture,” we must add that it is a picture in the sense that, so far as it goes, it is a faithful image. But we did not make it by just observing nature and writing down what we observed, nor does it serve as something which we merely admire, an object of contemplation and intellectual enjoyment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is sometimes said that the essential feature of science is that it is based on observations. Of course, science is based on observations; but this is not its most essential feature. The basis of science is not mere observation, but experiment. Science is based on an activity of interfering with nature, changing it—and we learn about things, not just by observing them, but by changing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus science would never have found out the secrets of the transformation of heat into mechanical motion solely by observing nature. They were found out as a result of building steam engines; we learned the secrets of the process in proportion as we ourselves learned how to reproduce that process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor could Darwin have written &#039;&#039;The Origin of Species&#039;&#039; on the sole basis of the observations he made on the voyage of the &#039;&#039;Beagle.&#039;&#039; He made use of the practical experience and results of English animal breeders and plant breeders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The scientific picture is based, not just on observing things, but on changing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And we test it, develop it and use it also in changing nature. Science is not a dogma, but a guide to action. On the other hand, if it becomes divorced from practice, it degenerates into a dogma.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Natural science, then, proves that nature’s process is dialectical, and gives us an ever more concrete, detailed picture of the real dialectical motion and interconnection in nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Crisis of Science in the Capitalist World ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, while pointing this out, Engels also pointed to the very great confusion which exists in the sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The scientists who have learned to think dialectically are still few and far between, and hence the conflict between the discoveries made and the old traditional mode of thought is the explanation of the boundless confusion which now reigns in theoretical natural science and reduces both teachers and students, writers and readers to despair.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This confusion has become very much worse today. In fact, as the general crisis of capitalism has developed and become more acute, so has the confusion in scientific theory and the distortion of scientific practice developed and increased with it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science which by its discoveries lays bare the true dialectics of nature is nevertheless in a state of crisis in the capitalist world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the nature of this crisis? It has a double nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place, science is an activity of research and discovery. In capitalist society it has grown enormously, along with the other forces of production. Scientific research can no longer be carried out by individuals on their own: it requires great institutes, vast equipment, elaborate organization, big financial expenditure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the more scientific research expands and the greater these requirements become, the more it falls under the control of the monopolies and of their governments, and particularly of the military.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science has to contribute to profits and to war. Such science as does not so contribute is increasingly starved of the resources necessary to carry on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“For example, the whole important field of plant physiology remains relatively undeveloped. This is, to put it crudely, because there is no money in it. The state of agriculture under capitalism is such that the conditions are not created for fundamental researches in this field…. It is interesting to note, too, that while some fields of science are neglected because there is no money in them, others suffer because there is too much. Thus geo-chemistry is hampered, for instance, because the very powerful oil interests impose conditions of secrecy on such researches. Science is called upon to answer just those particular problems in which the capitalist monopolies are interested, which is by no means the same as answering the problems which are bound up with the further development of science and with the interests of the people. This warps the whole development of science.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;J. D. Bernal and Maurice Cornforth, &#039;&#039;Science for Peace and Socialism&#039;&#039;, London, 1948.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus science becomes more and more commercialized—and militarized. And as a result science is more and more disorganized and distorted. This is what is happening to science in the capitalist world. Science can contribute mightily, not only to giving us knowledge, but through that knowledge to human welfare, to developing our powers of production, to conquering disease. Yet it is not being developed as it could be toward these ends.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How can the disorganization and distortion of science be overcome?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can and must resist the misuse of science here and now. But only the advance to socialism can ensure the full development and use of science in the service of mankind. Just as socialism means that the development of all the forces of production can be planned and organized in the service of man, not for profit and war, so it means the same for science in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second aspect is that of theory—the crisis of scientific ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does this arise?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The primary role of science is to discover the interconnections and laws operating in the world, so as to equip men with the knowledge necessary to improve their production and live better and more fully.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But to develop research and formulate discovery, ideas are necessary. To work out and guide the strategy of advance of science, theory is necessary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And in this sphere of ideas and theory, the great achievements of science in capitalist society come into collision with the traditional forms of bourgeois ideology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As Engels stated, there develops “the conflict between the discoveries made and the old traditional modes of thought.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In two words, the &#039;&#039;idealism&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;metaphysics&#039;&#039; characteristic of and ingrained in bourgeois ideology have penetrated deeply into the ideas and theories of the sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to the way in which, in field after field, scientific discovery reveals the real dialectic of nature, it follows that, as Engels put it, the further development of scientific discovery demands “the dialectical synthesis.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But this would carry theory far beyond the limits imposed on it by the bourgeois outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The New Against the Old in Science ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So it is that we find that in field after field bourgeois science turns back from its own achievements, gives up vantage grounds won, and instead of going forward suffers a theoretical collapse. Here, indeed, is a case of the struggle of the new against the old—of advancing scientific discovery against the old ideas in terms of which scientific theory is formulated. Understanding it thus, we can be quite sure that the retrogressive trend will be but temporary, and that the advance of science will break through the barriers of old ideas and outworn dogmas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In biology, it was the fate of the Darwinian theory to have a dogma imposed on it—the theory of the gene. The same thing happened to the cell theory, with Virchow’s dogma that the cell comes only from the cell. In each case a dialectical theory of development had imposed on it a metaphysical dogma which denied development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In physics, the great discoveries about the electron, the atomic nucleus, the quantum of action—about physical transformations— were interpreted, and not by idealist philosophers alone but by theoretical physicists, as meaning that matter had disappeared and that the limits of investigation had been reached. In the allied science of cosmology, scientists, having found out so much about the universe and its development, began to have recourse to ideas of creation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all these cases, a dogma is imposed upon science, strangling its further development. Hence the crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The “crime” of Soviet science is that it is successfully challenging and removing such dogmas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union scientists have followed Stalin’s wise advice, when he called for the progress of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Science whose devotees, while understanding the power and significance of the established scientific traditions and ably utilizing them in the interests of science, are nevertheless not willing to be slaves of these traditions; the science which has the courage and determination to smash the old traditions, standards and views when they become antiquated and begin to act as a fetter on progress, and which is able to create new traditions, new standards and new views.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, Speech to Higher Educational Workers, delivered in 1938.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Conclusions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have now briefly surveyed the principal features of the Marxist materialist conception of the world and of the Marxist dialectical method. What conclusions can we draw at this stage?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The world outlook of dialectical materialism is a consistent and reasoned outlook, which derives its strength from the fact that it arises directly from the attempt to solve the outstanding problems of our time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The epoch of capitalism is an epoch of stormy development in society. It is marked by revolutionary advances of the forces of production and of scientific discovery, and by consequent uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions. This sets one theoretical task above all, and that is to arrive at an adequate conception of the laws of change and development in nature and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To this theoretical task dialectical materialism addresses itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) This is not the task of working out a philosophical system, in the old sense. What is required is not any system of ideas spun out of the heads of philosophers, which we can then admire and contemplate as a system of “absolute truth.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalist society is a society rent with contradictions, and the more it has developed, the more menacing and intolerable for the working people have the consequences of these contradictions become. The new powers of production are not utilized for the benefit of society as a whole but for the profit of an exploiting minority. Instead of leading to universal plenty, the growth of the powers of production leads to recurrent economic crises, to unemployment, to poverty and to hideously destructive wars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore the philosophical problem of arriving at a true conception of the laws of change and development in nature and society becomes, for the working people, a practical political problem of finding how to change society, so that the vast new forces of production can be used in the service of humanity. For the first time in history the possibility of a full and rich life for everyone exists. The task is to find how to make that possibility a reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is to the solution of this practical task that the theory of dialectical materialism is devoted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Addressing itself to this task, dialectical materialism is and can only be a partisan philosophy, the philosophy of a party, namely, of the party of the working class, whose object is to lead the millions of working people to the socialist revolution and the building of communist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Dialectical materialism cannot but stand out in sharp contrast to the various contemporary schools of bourgeois philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What have these various schools of philosophy to offer at the present time? Systems and arguments by the bucketful—none of them either original or cogent, if one takes the trouble to analyze them closely. But no solution to the problems pressing upon the people of the capitalist countries and the colonies. How to end poverty? How to end war? How to utilize production for the benefit of all? How to end the oppression of one nation by another? How to end the exploitation of man by man? How to establish the brotherhood of men? These are our problems. We must judge philosophies by whether or not they show how to solve them. By that criterion, the philosophical schools of capitalism must one and all be judged—“weighed in the balance and found wanting.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prevailing bourgeois philosophies, with all their differences, have in common a retreat from the great positive ideas which inspired progressive movements in the past. They emphasize men’s helplessness and limitations; they speak of a mysterious universe; and they counsel either trust in God or else hopeless resignation to fate or blind chance. Why is this? It is because all these philosophies are rooted in acceptance of capitalism and cannot see beyond capitalism. From start to finish they reflect the insoluble crisis of the capitalist world. And their function is to help entangle the people “in a web of lies.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Dialectical materialism asks to be judged and will be judged by whether it serves as an effective instrument to show the way out of capitalist crisis and war, to show the way for the working people to win and wield political power, to show the way to build a socialist society in which there is no more exploitation of man by man and in which men win increasing mastery over nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism is a philosophy of practice, indissolubly united with the practice of the struggle for socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the philosophy born out of the great movement of our times—the movement of the people who labor, who “create all the good things of life and feed and clothe the world,” to rise at last to their full stature. It is wholly, entirely dedicated to the service of that movement. This is the source of all its teachings, and in that service its conclusions are continually tried, tested and developed. Without such a philosophy, the movement cannot achieve consciousness of itself and of its tasks, cannot achieve unity, cannot win its battles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the greatest task facing us is that of ending capitalist society and building socialism, it follows that the chief problem to which dialectical materialism addresses itself, and on the solution of which the whole philosophy of dialectical materialism turns, is the problem of understanding the forces of development of society. The chief problem is to reach such an understanding of society, of men’s social activity and of the development of human consciousness, as will show us how to achieve and build the new socialist society and the new socialist consciousness. The materialist conception and dialectical method with which we have been concerned in this volume are applied to this task in the materialist conception of history and in the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. These will form the subject matter of the second volume.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Bibliography ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We mention here only works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in which the general underlying principles of dialectical materialism are expounded and developed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The best general introduction is contained in Engels’ &#039;&#039;Socialism, Utopian and Scientific&#039;&#039; and in Stalin’s &#039;&#039;Anarchism or Socialism?&#039;&#039; After these it is necessary to study the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, by Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is advisable to become acquainted with these three works before studying the two short books in which the basic ideas of dialectical materialism are brought together and summarized—Lenin’s &#039;&#039;The Teachings of Karl Marx&#039;&#039; and Stalin’s &#039;&#039;Dialectical and Historical Materialism.&#039;&#039; The latter is of absolutely fundamental importance for the student, containing as it does a systematic exposition of the principal features of the Marxist dialectical method, Marxist philosophical materialism and the Marxist science of history, generalizing the conclusions of the whole experience of the application and development of Marxist theory in the course of the working-class struggle for socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The place occupied by dialectical materialism in the whole theory and practice of Marxism is dealt with in Lenin’s “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism,” in connection with which should also be read his “Marxism and Revisionism” (both in Lenin, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 11).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The creative, developing character of Marxism, and the role of history in the working-class movement are dealt with in the “Conclusion” of Stalin’s &#039;&#039;History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essential difference between materialism and idealism, between dialectical and mechanistic materialism, and between the Marxist and Hegelian dialectics is to be found in Engels’ &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;, with its appendix, Marx’s “Eleven Theses on Feuerbach.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with this we may draw attention to Engels’ “Introduction” to &#039;&#039;Dialectics of Nature&#039;&#039;, and to Lenin’s “The Attitude of the Workers’ Party toward Religion” (&#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 11).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of fundamental importance then are three longer and more difficult works: Engels’ &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, especially Part I; Engels’ &#039;&#039;Dialectics of Nature&#039;&#039;; Lenin’s &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A part of Lenin’s &#039;&#039;Philosophical Notebooks&#039;&#039; is translated into English under the title “On Dialectics”; and he deals with the fight for materialism in “On the Significance of Militant Materialism” (both in &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 11). Important statements summarizing the essentials of the dialectical method are contained in Lenin’s “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,” Section R, “Something About Dialectics” (&#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 2), and “Once Again on the Trade Unions,” section on “Dialectics and Eclecticism” (&#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 9). See also Lenin’s “What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are and How They Fight for the Social Democrats” (&#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. 11), which is concerned mainly with historical materialism, the subject of the next volume.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Materialism and the Dialectical Method|author=Maurice Cornforth|published_date=1953|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/cornforth1953/|pdf=https://redstarpublishers.org/cornforth1953.pdf}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Dedication ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Memory of David Guest&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who Died in Spain&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
in the Struggle&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Against Fascism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First printed in the U.S.A. in 1953&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reprinted in 2015&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Foreword ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The present volume deals with the basic ideas of Marxist materialism and the dialectical method. A second volume will deal with the further development of these ideas in their application to society and the growth of human consciousness—historical materialism and the theory of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have tried to confine myself to a straightforward exposition of the leading ideas of dialectical materialism, so far as I myself have succeeded in understanding them, without burdening the exposition with digressions into more technical questions of philosophy, or with discussions about and polemics against any of the more abstruse philosophical theories, past and present, or with much of the argumentation about particular points which might be necessary to defend them against philosophical opponents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have done my best to limit the use of technical terms to the minimum, and to give an explanation of the meaning of all such terms as and when they occur&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Maurice Cornforth&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
London&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART ONE: MATERIALISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 1. Party Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Every philosophy expresses a class outlook. But in contrast to the exploiting classes, which have always sought to uphold and justify their class position by various disguises and falsifications, the working class, from its very class position and aims, is concerned to know and understand things just as they are, without disguise or falsification.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The party of the working class needs a philosophy which expresses a revolutionary class outlook. The alternative is to embrace ideas hostile to the working class and to socialism.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;This determines the materialist character of our philosophy.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Party Philosophy and Class Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism has been defined as: “The world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist Party.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, N. Y., 1940.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This definition must appear a strange one, both to many politicians and to many philosophers. But we will not begin to understand dialectical materialism unless we can grasp the thought which lies behind this definition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us ask, first of all, what conception of philosophy lies behind the idea expressed in this definition of party or—since a party is always the political representative of a class—class philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By philosophy is usually meant our most general account of the nature of the world and of mankind’s place and destiny in it—our world outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That being understood, it is evident that everybody has some kind of philosophy, even though he has never learned to discuss it. Everybody is influenced by philosophical views, even though he has not thought them out for himself and cannot formulate them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some people, for example, think that this world is nothing but “a vale of tears” and that our life in it is the preparation for a better life in another and better world. They accordingly believe that we should suffer whatever befalls us with fortitude, not struggling against it, but trying to do whatever good we can to our fellow creatures. This is one kind of philosophy, one kind of world outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other people think that the world is a place to grow rich in, and that each should look out for himself. This is another kind of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But granted that our philosophy is our world outlook, the task arises of working out this world outlook systematically and in detail, turning it into a well-formulated and coherent theory, turning vaguely held popular beliefs and attitudes into more or less systematic doctrines. This is what the philosophers do.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the time the philosophers have worked out their theories, they have often produced something very complicated, very abstract and very hard to understand. But even though only a comparatively few people may read and digest the actual productions of philosophers, these productions may and do have a very wide influence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the fact that philosophers have systematized certain beliefs reinforces those beliefs, and helps to impose them upon wide masses of ordinary people. Hence, everyone is influenced in one way or another by philosophers, even though they have never read the works of those philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And if this is the case, then we cannot regard the systems of the philosophers as being wholly original, as being wholly the products of the brain-work of the individual philosophers. Of course, the formulation of views, the peculiar ways in which they are worked out and written down, is the work of the particular philosopher. But the views themselves, in their most general aspect, have a social basis in ideas which reflect the social activities and social relations of the time, and which, therefore, do not spring ready-made out of the heads of philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this we may proceed a step further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When society is divided into classes—and society always has been divided into classes ever since the dissolution of the primitive communes, that is to say, throughout the entire historical period to which the history of philosophy belongs—then the various views which are current in society always express the outlooks of various classes. We may conclude, therefore, that the various systems of the philosophers also always express a class outlook. They are, in fact, nothing but the systematic working out and theoretical formulation of a class outlook, or, if you prefer, of the ideology of definite classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Philosophy is and always has been class philosophy. Philosophers may pretend it is not, but that does not alter the fact.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For people do not and cannot think in isolation from society, and therefore from the class interests and class struggles which pervade society, any more than they can live and act in such isolation. A philosophy is a world outlook, an attempt to understand the world, mankind and man’s place in the world. Such an outlook cannot be anything but the outlook of a class, and the philosopher functions as the thinking representative of a class. How can it be otherwise? Philosophies are not imported from some other planet, but are produced here on earth, by people involved, whether they like it or not, in existing class relations and class struggles. Therefore, whatever philosophers say about themselves, there is no philosophy which does not embody a class outlook, or which is impartial, as opposed to partisan, in relation to class struggles. Search as we may, we shall not find any impartial, non-partisan, non-class philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bearing this in mind, then, we shall find that the philosophies of the past have all, in one way or another, expressed the outlook of the so-called “educated” classes, that is to say, of the exploiting classes. In general, it is the leaders of society who express and propagate their ideas in the form of systematic philosophies. And up to the appearance of the modern working class, which is the peculiar product of capitalism, these leaders have always been the exploiting classes. It is their outlook which has dominated philosophy, just as they have dominated society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can only conclude from this that the working class, if today it intends to take over leadership of society, needs to express its own class outlook in philosophical form, and to oppose this philosophy to the philosophies which express the outlook and defend the interests of the exploiters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The services rendered by Marx and Engels to the working class may be expressed in a few words thus: they taught the working class to know itself and be conscious of itself, and they substituted science for dreams,” wrote Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Lenin on Engels&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, N. Y., 1935.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It is the great and historic merit of Marx and Engels that they proved by scientific analysis the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and its transition to communism, under which there will be no more exploitation of man by man… that they indicated to the proletarians of all countries their role, their task, their mission, namely, to be the first to rally around themselves in this struggle all the toilers and exploited.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Teaching the working class “to know itself and be conscious of itself,” and to rally around itself “all the toilers and exploited,” Marx and Engels founded and established the revolutionary theory of working-class struggle, which illumines the road by which the working class can throw off capitalist exploitation, can take the leadership of all the masses of the people, and so free the whole of society once and for all of all oppression and exploitation of man by man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels wrote in the period when capitalism was still in the ascendant and when the forces of the working class were first being rallied and organized. Their theory was further continued by Lenin, in the period when capitalism had reached its final stage of monopoly capitalism or imperialism, and when the proletarian socialist revolution had begun. It was further continued by Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels taught that, without its own party, the working class certainly could not win victory over capitalism, could not lead the whole of society forward to the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. The working class must have its own party, independent of all bourgeois parties. Further developing the Marxist teachings about the party, Lenin showed that the party must act as the vanguard of its class, the most conscious section of its class, and that it is the instrument for winning and wielding political power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To fulfill such a role, the party must evidently have knowledge, understanding and vision; in other words, it must be equipped with revolutionary theory, on which its policies are based and by which its activities are guided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This theory is the theory of Marxism-Leninism. And it is not just an economic theory, nor yet exclusively a political theory, but a world outlook—a philosophy. Economic and political views are not and never can be independent of a general world outlook. Specific economic and political views express the world outlook of those who hold such views, and conversely, philosophical views find expression in views on economics and politics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recognizing all this, the revolutionary party of the working class cannot but formulate, and having formulated, hold fast to, develop and treasure its party philosophy. In this philosophy—dialectical materialism—are embodied the general ideas by means of which the party understands the world which it is seeking to change and in terms of which it defines its aims and works out how to fight for them. In this philosophy are embodied the general ideas by means of which the party seeks to enlighten and organize the whole class, and to influence, guide and win over all the masses of working people, showing the conclusions which must be drawn from each stage of the struggle, helping people to learn from their own experience how to go forward towards socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so we see why it is that in our times a philosophy has arisen which expresses the revolutionary world outlook of the working class, and that this philosophy—dialectical materialism—is defined as “the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist Party.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Experience itself has taught the party the need for philosophy. For experience shows that if we do not have our own revolutionary socialist philosophy, then inevitably we borrow our ideas from hostile, anti-socialist sources. If we do not adopt today the outlook of the working class and of the struggle for socialism, then we adopt—or slip into, without meaning to do so—that of the capitalists and of the struggle against socialism. This is why the working class party—if it is to be the genuine revolutionary leadership of its class, and is not to mislead its class by the importation of hostile capitalist ideas, and of policies corresponding to such ideas—must be concerned to formulate, defend and propagate its own revolutionary philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Class Philosophy and Truth ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Against what has just been said about a class and party philosophy, the objection is bound to be raised that such a conception is a complete travesty of the whole idea of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Class interests may incline us to believe one thing rather than another, some will say, but should not philosophy be above this? Should not philosophy be objective and impartial, and teach us to set class and party interests aside, and to seek only for the truth? For surely what is true is true, whether this suits some or other class interests or not? If philosophy is partisan—party philosophy—how can it be objective, how can it be true philosophy?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In reply to such objections, we may say that the working class standpoint in philosophy is very far indeed from having no concern for truth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is there no such thing as truth? Of course there is—and men are getting nearer to it. For different outlooks, partisan as they may be, are not on a level so far as nearness to truth is concerned. Every philosophy embodies a class outlook. Yes, but just as one class differs from another class in its social role and in its contribution to the development of society, so one philosophy embodies positive achievements in comparison with another in the working out of the truth about the world and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
People are prone to believe that if we adopt a partisan, class standpoint, then we turn our backs on truth; and that, on the other hand, if we genuinely seek for truth, then we must be strictly impartial and non-partisan. But the contrary is the case. It is only when we adopt the partisan standpoint of historically the most progressive class that we are able to get nearer to truth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The definition of dialectical materialism, therefore, as the philosophy of the revolutionary working-class party, is in no way incompatible with the claim of dialectical materialism to express truth, and to be a means of arriving at truth. On the contrary. We have every right to make this claim, in view of the actual historical position and role of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Except for the working class, all other classes which have aspired to take the leadership of society have been exploiting classes. But every exploiting class, whatever its achievements, has always to find some way of disguising its real position and aims, both from itself and from the exploited, and of making out that its rule is just and permanent. For such a class can never recognize its real position and aims as an exploiting class, or the temporary character of its own system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, in ancient slave society, Aristotle, the greatest philosopher of antiquity, made out that the institution of slavery was decreed by nature, since some men were by nature slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the heyday of feudal society the greatest philosopher of the middle ages, Thomas Aquinas, represented the entire universe as being a kind of feudal system. Everything was arranged in a feudal hierarchy,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A hierarchy is an order in which the things at the top rule over the things below them. Thus the serfs were at the bottom of the feudal hierarchy and the king was at the top. Similarly, the Pope is the head of the “Catholic hierarchy.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with God surrounded by the chief archangels at the top. Everything depended on what was next above it in the system, and nothing could exist without God.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for capitalism, it dissolves all feudal ties and, as Marx and Engels observed, “has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous cash payment.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Communist Manifesto&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter I, N. Y., 1948.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was reflected in the beginnings of capitalist philosophy, especially in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This philosophy saw the world as consisting of independent atoms, each complete in itself, concerned only with itself, and all interacting. This was a mirror of capitalist society, as seen by the rising bourgeoisie. And by means of such ideas they succeeded, too, in disguising their own aims of domination and profit. Worker and capitalist were “on a level,” each was a free human atom, and they entered into a free contract, the one to work, the other to provide capital and pay wages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the working class does not need any such “false consciousness” as is contained in such philosophies. It does not want to set up a new system of exploitation, but to abolish all exploitation of man by man. For this reason, it has no interest whatever in disguising anything, but rather in understanding things just as they really are. For the better it understands the truth, the more is it strengthened in its struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, other classes have always wanted to perpetuate themselves and to last out for as long as they could. And so they have favored philosophical “systems” which give themselves a permanent place in the universe. Such systems attempt to define the nature of the universe so as to represent certain things and certain relations as being necessary, eternal and unchangeable. And then they make it appear that a particular social system is a necessary part of the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the working class does not want to perpetuate itself. On the contrary, it wants to do away with its own existence as a class as quickly as possible, and to establish a classless society. Therefore, the working class has no use at all for any philosophical “system” which establishes any false permanence. Its class position and aims are such that it can afford to and needs to recognize and trace out the change, coming into being and ceasing to be of everything in existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Party philosophy, then, has a right to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they are, in all their manifold changes and interconnections, without disguises and without fantasy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== A Revolution in Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Marxian doctrine is omnipotent because it is true,” wrote Lenin. “It is complete and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world conception which is irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction or defense of bourgeois oppression.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, V. I. Lenin, Joseph Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;On the Theory of Marxism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Lenin, “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism,” N. Y., 1948.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And he further wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“There is nothing resembling ‘sectarianism’ in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the highroad of development of world civilization. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in the fact that he furnished answers to questions the foremost minds of mankind had already raised. His teachings arose as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism is a revolution in philosophy. This revolution appears as the culmination of a whole great development of philosophical thought, in which the problems of philosophy were posed and took shape in the course of a series of revolutions, the highest point being reached in the classical German philosophy of the early nineteenth century. Marxism is thus the continuation and culmination of the past achievements of philosophy. And it is a continuation which puts an end to an epoch and constitutes a new point of departure. In comparison with past philosophies, it launches out on new lines. It puts an end to the “systems” of the past, and is a philosophy of an entirely new kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism-Leninism is no longer a philosophy which expresses the world outlook of an exploiting class, of a minority, striving to impose its rule and its ideas upon the masses of the people, in order to keep them in subjection; but it is a philosophy which serves the common people in their struggle to throw off all exploitation and to build a classless society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism-Leninism is a philosophy which seeks to understand the world in order to change it. “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways,” wrote Marx. “The point, however, is to change it.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Appendices, Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” XI, N. Y., 1941.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore, if we could say of past philosophy that it has been an attempt to understand the world and man’s place and destiny in it—an attempt necessarily conditioned by the class outlook, prejudices and illusions of the various exploiting class philosophers—we have to say of Marxist-Leninist philosophy that it is an attempt to understand the world in order to change the world and to shape and realize man’s destiny in it. Dialectical materialism is a theoretical instrument in the hands of the people for use in changing the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism-Leninism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a “system,” as previous philosophies have done, and then try to make everything fit into it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus dialectical materialism is in the truest sense a popular philosophy, a scientific philosophy and a philosophy of practice. “The discovery of Marx and Engels represents the end of the old philosophy, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; the end of that philosophy which claimed to give a universal explanation of the world,” said A. A. Zhdanov. “With the appearance of Marxism as the scientific world outlook of the proletariat there ends the old period in the history of philosophy, when philosophy was the occupation of isolated individuals, the possession of philosophical schools consisting of a small number of philosophers and their disciples, detached from life and the people, and alien to the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Marxism is not such a philosophical school. On the contrary, it supersedes the old philosophy—the philosophy that was the property of a small elite, the aristocracy of the intellect. It marked the beginning of a completely new period in the history of philosophy, when it became a scientific weapon in the hands of the proletarian masses in their struggle for emancipation from capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Marxist philosophy, as distinguished from preceding philosophical systems, is not a science above other sciences; rather, it is an instrument of scientific investigation, a method, penetrating all natural and social sciences, enriching itself with their attainments in the course of their development. In this sense, Marxist philosophy is the most complete and decisive negation of all preceding philosophy. But to negate, as Engels emphasized, does not mean merely to say ‘no’. Negation includes continuity, signifies absorption, the critical reforming and unification in a new and higher synthesis of everything advanced and progressive that has been achieved in the history of human thought.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Andrei A. Zhdanov, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Essays on Literature, Philosophy, and Music&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter II, N. Y., 1950.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The revolutionary characteristics of dialectical materialism are embodied in the two features of Marxist-Leninist philosophy which give it its name—dialectics and materialism. In order to understand things so as to change them we must study them, not according to the dictates of any abstract system, but in their real changes and interconnections—and that is what is meant by dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We must set aside preconceived ideas and fancies about things, and strive to make our theories correspond to the real conditions of material existence—and that means that our outlook and theory are materialist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In dialectical materialism, wrote Engels, “the materialist world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently….” For “it was resolved to comprehend the real world—nature and history—just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist fancies. It was decided relentlessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic connection. And materialism means nothing more than this.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 2. Materialism and Idealism ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Materialism is opposed to idealism since, while idealism holds that the spiritual or ideal is prior to the material, materialism holds that matter is prior. This difference manifests itself in opposed ways of interpreting and understanding every question, and so in opposed attitudes in practice.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;While idealism takes many subtle forms in the writings of philosophers, it is at bottom a continuation of belief in the supernatural. It involves belief in two worlds, in the ideal or supernatural world over against the real material world.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;In essence idealism is a conservative, reactionary force; and its reactionary influence is demonstrated in practice. Marxism adopts a consistent standpoint of militant materialism.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Materialism, and Idealism—Opposed Ways of Interpreting Every Question ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our philosophy is called Dialectical Materialism, said Stalin, “because its approach to the phenomena&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A &#039;&#039;phenomenon&#039;&#039;, plural &#039;&#039;phenomena&#039;&#039;, is anything which we observe.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is dialectical, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is materialistic.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Materialism is not a dogmatic system. It is rather a way of interpreting, conceiving of, explaining every question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist way of interpreting events, of conceiving of things and their interconnections, is opposed to the idealist way of interpreting and conceiving of them. Materialism is opposed to idealism. With every question, there are materialist and idealist ways of interpreting it, materialist and idealist ways of trying to understand it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus materialism and idealism are not two opposed abstract theories about the nature of the world, of small concern to ordinary practical folk. They are opposed ways of interpreting and understanding every question, and, consequently, they express opposite approaches in practice and lead to very different conclusions in terms of practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor are they, as some use the terms, opposite moral attitudes— the one high-minded, the other base and self-seeking. If we use the terms like this, we will never understand the opposition between capitalist and materialist conceptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this way of speaking is, as Engels said, nothing but “an unpardonable concession to the traditional philistine prejudice against the word materialism resulting from the long-continued defamation by the priests. By the word materialism the philistine understands gluttony, drunkenness, lust of the eye, lust of the flesh, arrogance, cupidity, miserliness, profit-hunting and stock-exchange swindling—in short, all the filthy vices in which he himself indulges in private. By the word idealism he understands the belief in virtue, universal philanthropy and in a general way a ‘better world’, of which he boasts before others.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before trying to define materialism and idealism in general terms, let us consider how these two ways of understanding things are expressed in relation to certain simple and familiar questions. This will help us to grasp the significance of the distinction between a materialist and an idealist interpretation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First let us consider a very familiar natural phenomenon—a thunderstorm. What causes thunderstorms?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An idealist way of answering this question is to say that thunderstorms are due to the anger of God. Being angry, he arranges for lightning and thunderbolts to descend upon mankind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist way of understanding thunderstorms is opposed to this. The materialist will try to explain and understand thunderstorms as being solely due to what we call natural forces. For example, ancient materialists suggested that far from thunderstorms being due to the anger of the gods, they were caused by material particles in the clouds banging against one another. That this particular explanation was wrong, is not the point: the point is that it was an attempt at materialist as opposed to idealist explanation. Nowadays a great deal more is known about thunderstorms arising from the scientific investigation of the natural forces involved. Knowledge remains very incomplete, but at all events enough is known to make it quite clear that the explanation must be on materialist lines, so that the idealist explanation has become thoroughly discredited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It will be seen that while the idealist explanation tries to relate the phenomenon to be explained to some &#039;&#039;spiritual&#039;&#039; cause—in this case the anger of God—the materialist explanation relates it to &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; causes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this example, most educated people today would agree in accepting the materialist interpretation. This is because they generally accept the &#039;&#039;scientific&#039;&#039; explanation of natural phenomena, and every advance of natural science is an advance in the &#039;&#039;materialist&#039;&#039; understanding of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us take a second example, this time one arising out of social life. For instance: Why are there rich and poor? This is a question which many people ask, especially poor people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most straightforward idealist answer to this question is to say simply—It is because God made them so. It is the will of God that some should be rich and others poor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But other less straightforward idealist explanations are more in vogue. For example: it is because some men are careful and farsighted, and these husband their resources and grow rich, while others are thriftless and stupid, and these remain poor. Those who favor this type of explanation say that it is all due to eternal “human nature.” The nature of man and of society is such that the distinction of rich and poor necessarily arises.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as in the case of the thunderstorm, so in the case of the rich and poor, the idealist seeks for some spiritual cause—if not in the will of God, the divine mind, then in certain innate characteristics of the human mind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist, on the other hand, seeks the reason in the material, economic conditions of social life. If society is divided into rich and poor, it is because the production of the material means of life is so ordered that some have possession of the land and other means of production while the rest have to work for them. However hard they may work and however much they may scrape and save, the non-possessors will remain poor, while the possessors grow rich on the fruits of their labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On such questions, therefore, the difference between a materialist and an idealist conception can be very important. And the difference is important not merely in a theoretical but in a practical sense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A materialist conception of thunderstorms, for example, helps us to take precautions against them, such as fitting buildings with lightning conductors. But if our explanation of thunderstorms is idealist, all we can do is to watch and pray. If we accept an idealist account of the existence of rich and poor, all we can do is to accept the existing state of affairs—rejoicing in our superior status and bestowing a little charity if we are rich, and cursing our fate if we are poor. But armed with a materialist understanding of society we can begin to see the way to change society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear, therefore, that while some may have a vested interest in idealism, it is in the interests of the great majority to learn to think and to understand things in the materialist way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How, then, can we define materialism and idealism, and the difference between them, in general terms, so as to define the essence of the question? This was done by Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being…. The answers which the philosophers have given to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and therefore in the last instance assumed world creation in some form or another… comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Idealism is the way of interpreting things which regards the spiritual as prior to the material, whereas materialism regards the material as prior. Idealism supposes that everything material is dependent on and determined by something spiritual, whereas materialism recognizes that everything spiritual is dependent on and determined by something material. And this difference manifests itself both in general philosophical conceptions of the world as a whole, and in conceptions of particular things and events.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Idealism and the Supernatural ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At bottom, idealism is religion, theology. “Idealism is clericalism,” wrote Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 11, “On Dialectics,” N. Y., 1943.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; All idealism is a continuation of the religious approach to questions, even though particular idealist theories have shed their religious skin. Idealism is inseparable from superstition, belief in the supernatural, the mysterious and unknowable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Materialism, on the other hand, seeks for explanations in terms belonging to the material world, in terms of factors which we can verify, understand and control.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The roots of the idealist conception of things are, then, the same as those of religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To believers, the conceptions of religion, that is to say, conceptions of supernatural spiritual beings, generally seem to have their justification, not, of course, in any evidence of the senses, but in something which lies deep within the spiritual nature of man. And, indeed, it is true that these conceptions do have very deep roots in the historical development of human consciousness. But what is their origin, how did such conceptions arise in the first place? We can certainly not regard such conceptions as being the products, as religion itself tells us, of divine revelation, or as arising from any other supernatural cause, if we find that they themselves have a natural origin. And such an origin can in fact be traced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conceptions of the supernatural, and religious ideas in general, owe their origin first of all to the helplessness and ignorance of men in face of the forces of nature. Forces which men cannot understand are personified—they are represented as manifestations of the activity of spirits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, such alarming events as thunderstorms were, as we have seen, explained fantastically as due to the anger of gods. Again, such important phenomena as the growth of crops were put down to the activity of a spirit: it was believed that it was the corn spirit that made the corn grow.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the most primitive times men personified natural forces in this way. With the birth of class society, when men were impelled to act by social relations which dominated them and which they did not understand, they further invented supernatural agencies doubling, as it were, the state of society. The gods were invented superior to mankind, just as the kings and lords were superior to the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All religion, and all idealism, has at its heart this kind of &#039;&#039;doubling of the world&#039;&#039;. It is dualistic, and invents a dominating ideal or supernatural world over against the real material world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Very characteristic of idealism are such antitheses as: soul and body; god and man; the heavenly kingdom and the earthly kingdom; the forms and ideas of things, grasped by the intellect, and the world of material reality, perceptible by the senses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This “doubling” of the world is carried to its furthest limits in subjective idealism, which ends by regarding the material world as a mere illusion and asserts that only the non-material world is real. The dualistic character of all idealism is most marked in subjective idealism, which posits a complete antithesis between the mechanistic system of the illusory material world and the “freedom” of the higher, non-material reality. This antithesis, disguised as it often is behind allegedly “scientific” and “empiricist” theorizing, characterizes all subjective idealist philosophies, from Berkeley to John Dewey.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For idealism, there is always a higher, more real, non-material world—which is prior to the material world, is its ultimate source and cause, and to which the material world is subject. For materialism, on the other hand, there is &#039;&#039;one&#039;&#039; world, the material world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By idealism in philosophy we mean any doctrine which says that beyond material reality there is a higher, spiritual reality, in terms of which the material reality is in the last analysis to be explained.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Some Varieties of Modern Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point a few observations may be useful concerning some characteristic doctrines of modern bourgeois philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For nearly three hundred years there has been put forward a variety of philosophy known as “subjective idealism.” This teaches that the material world does not exist at all. Nothing exists but the sensations and ideas in our minds, and there is no external material reality corresponding to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And then again, this subjective idealism is put forward in the form of a doctrine concerning knowledge: it denies that we can know anything about objective reality outside ourselves, and says that we can have knowledge of appearances only and not of “things in themselves.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This sort of idealism has become very fashionable today. It even parades as extremely “scientific.” When capitalism was still a progressive force, bourgeois thinkers used to believe that we could know more and more about the real world, and so control natural forces and improve the lot of mankind indefinitely. Now they are saying that the real world is unknowable, the arena of mysterious forces which pass our comprehension. It is not difficult to see that the fashion for such doctrines is just a symptom of the decay of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that, at bottom, idealism always believes in &#039;&#039;two worlds&#039;&#039;, the ideal and the material, and it places the ideal prior to and above the material. Materialism, on the other hand, knows one world only, the material world, and refuses to invent a second, imaginary, superior ideal world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Materialism and idealism are irreconcilably opposed. But this does not stop many philosophers from trying to reconcile and combine them. In philosophy there are also various attempted compromises between idealism and materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One such attempted compromise is often known as “dualism.” Such a compromise philosophy asserts the existence of the spiritual as separate and distinct from the material—but it tries to place the two on a level. Thus it treats the world of non-living matter in a thoroughly materialist way: this, it says, is the sphere of activity of natural forces, and spiritual factors do not enter into it and have nothing to do with it in any way. But when it comes to mind and society, here, says this philosophy, is the sphere of activity of spirit. Here, it maintains, we must seek explanations in idealist and not in materialist terms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a compromise between materialism and idealism, therefore, amounts to this—that with regard to all the most important questions concerning men, society and history we are to continue to adopt idealist conceptions and to oppose materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another compromise philosophy is known as “realism.” In its modern form, this philosophy has arisen in opposition to subjective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The “realist” philosophers say that the external material world really exists independent of our perceptions and is in some way reflected by our perceptions. In this the “realists” agree with the materialists in opposition to &#039;&#039;subjective&#039;&#039; idealism; indeed, you cannot be a materialist unless you are a thorough-going realist on the question of the real existence of the material world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But merely to assert that the external world exists independent of our perceiving it, is not to be a materialist. For example, the great Catholic philosopher of the middle ages, Thomas Aquinas, was in this sense a “realist.” And to this day most Catholic theologians regard it as a heresy to be anything but a “realist” in philosophy. But at the same time they assert that the material world, which really exists, was created by God, and is sustained and ruled all the time by the power of God, by a spiritual power. So, far from being materialists, they are idealists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for modern “realism,” it concedes to materialism the bare existence of matter and, for the rest, is ready to concede everything to idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, the word “realism” is much abused by philosophers. So long as you believe that something or other is “real,” you may call yourself a “realist.” Some philosophers think that not only is the world of material things real, but that there is also, outside space and time, a real world of “universals,” of the abstract essences of things: so these call themselves “realists.” Others say that, although nothing exists but the perceptions in our minds, nevertheless these perceptions are real: so these call themselves “realists” too. All of which goes to show that some philosophers are very tricky in their use of words.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Basic Teachings of Materialism in Opposition to Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In opposition to all the forms of idealism, and of tricky compromises between materialism and idealism, the basic teachings of materialism can be formulated very simply and clearly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To grasp the essence of these teachings we should also understand what are the main assertions made in every form of idealism. There are three such main assertions of idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Idealism asserts that the material world is dependent on the spiritual.&lt;br /&gt;
# Idealism asserts that spirit, or mind, or idea, can and does exist in separation from matter. (The most extreme form of this assertion is subjective idealism, which asserts that matter does not exist at all but is pure illusion.)&lt;br /&gt;
# Idealism asserts that there exists a realm of the mysterious and unknowable, “above,” or “beyond,” or “behind” what can be ascertained and known by perception, experience and science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The basic teachings of materialism stand in opposition to these three assertions of idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Materialism teaches that the world is by its very nature material, that everything which exists comes into being on the basis of material causes, arises and develops in accordance with the laws of motion of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
# Materialism teaches that matter is objective reality existing outside and independent of the mind; and that far from the mental existing in separation from the material, everything mental or spiritual is a product of material processes.&lt;br /&gt;
# Materialism teaches that the world and its laws are fully knowable, and that while much may not be known there is nothing which is by nature unknowable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Marxist-Leninist philosophy is characterized by its absolutely consistent materialism all along the line, by its making no concessions whatever at any point to idealism. Thus Stalin points out:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(a) Contrary to idealism, which regards the world as the embodiment of an ‘absolute idea,’ a ‘universal spirit,’ ‘consciousness,’ Marx’s philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature material, that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion… and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a ‘universal spirit.’&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(b) Contrary to idealism, which asserts that only our mind really exists… the Marxist materialist philosophy holds that matter, nature, being is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our mind; that matter is primary, since it is the source of sensations, ideas, mind, and that mind is secondary, derivative, since it is a reflection of matter, a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in its development has reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought; and that, therefore, one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(c) Contrary to idealism, which denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws… Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are still not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Materialism and Idealism in Practice ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As was pointed out above, the opposition of materialism and idealism—which has now been stated in its most general terms—is not an opposition between abstract theories of the nature of the world, but is an opposition between different ways of understanding and interpreting every question. That is why it is of such profound importance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us consider some of the very practical ways in which the opposition of materialism and idealism is manifested.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Idealists tell us, for example, not to place “too much” reliance on science. They tell us that the most important truths are beyond the reach of science. Hence they encourage us not to believe things on the basis of evidence, experience, practice, but to take them on trust from those who pretend to know best and to have some “higher” source of information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way idealism is a very good friend and standby of every form of reactionary propaganda. It is the philosophy of the capitalist press and the radio. It favors superstitions of all sorts, prevents us from thinking for ourselves and taking a scientific approach to moral and social problems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, idealists tell us that what is most important for us all is the inner life of the soul. They tell us that we shall never solve our human problems except by some inner regeneration. This is a favorite theme in the speeches of well-fed persons. But many workers fall for it too—in factories, for example, where a “Moral Rearmament” group is active. They tell you not to fight for better conditions, but to improve your soul. They do not tell you that the best way to improve yourself both materially and morally is to join in the fight for peace and socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, an idealist approach is common amongst many socialists. Many sincere socialists, for example, think that what is essentially wrong with capitalism is that goods are unfairly distributed, and that if only we could get everyone, including the capitalists, to accept a new conception of fairness and justice, then we could do away with the evils of capitalism. Socialism to them is nothing but the realization of an abstract idea of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idealism of this belief lies in its assumption that it is simply the &#039;&#039;ideas&#039;&#039; which we hold that determine the way we live and the way society is organized. Those who think in this way forget to look for the &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; causes. For what in fact determines the way goods are distributed in capitalist society—the wealth enjoyed by one part of society, while the other and greater part lives in poverty—is not the ideas which men hold about the distribution of wealth, but the material fact that the mode of production rests on the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist. So long as this mode of production remains in existence, so long will extremes of wealth and poverty remain, and so long will socialist ideas of justice be opposed by capitalist ideas of justice. The task of socialists, therefore, is to organize and lead the struggle of the working class against the capitalist class to the point where the working class takes power from the capitalist class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we do not understand this, then we cannot find the way to fight effectively for socialism. We shall find that our socialist ideals are constantly disappointed and betrayed. Such, indeed, has been the experience of British socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen from these examples how idealism serves as a weapon of reaction; and how when socialists embrace idealism they are being influenced by the ideology of the capitalists. We can no more take over and use capitalist ideas for the purposes of socialist theory than we can take over and use the capitalist state machine, with all its institutions and officials, for the purposes of building socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Right through history, indeed, idealism has been a weapon of reaction. Whatever fine systems of philosophy have been invented, idealism has been used as a means of justifying the rule of an exploiting class and deceiving the exploited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not to say that truths have not been expressed in an idealist guise. Of course they have. For idealism has very deep roots in our ways of thinking, and so men often clothe their thoughts and aspirations in idealist dress. But the idealist form is always an impediment, a hindrance in the expression of truth—a source of confusion and error.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, progressive movements in the past have adopted and fought under an idealist theory. But this has shown only that they contained in themselves the seeds of future reaction (inasmuch as they represented the striving of a new exploiting class to come to power) or that they were themselves influenced by ideas of reaction; or it has been a mark of their weakness and immaturity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, the great revolutionary movement of the English bourgeoisie in the seventeenth century fought under idealist, religious slogans. But the same appeal to God which justified Cromwell in the execution of the King justified him also in stamping out the Levelers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Early democrats and socialists had many idealist notions. But in their case this demonstrated the &#039;&#039;immaturity&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;weakness&#039;&#039; of the movement. The idealist illusions had to be overcome if the revolutionary working-class movement was to arise and triumph. As the movement grew strong, the continuance within it of idealist notions represented an alien, reactionary influence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can truly say that idealism is essentially a conservative force—an ideology helping the defense of things as they are, and the preservation of illusions in men’s minds about their true condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, every real social advance—every increase in the productive forces, every advance of science—generates materialism and is helped along by materialist ideas. And the whole history of human thought has been the history of the fight of materialism against idealism, of the overcoming of idealist illusions and fantasies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Fight for Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxists, as the organized vanguard of the working class fighting to end all exploitation of man by man and to establish communism, have no use for idealism in any form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, for example, are some of the ways in which Lenin expressed himself on this question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The genius of Marx and Engels consisted in the very fact that in the course of a long period, nearly half a century, they developed materialism, that they further advanced one fundamental trend in philosophy….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Take the various philosophical utterances by Marx… and you will find an invariable basic motif, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;. insistence upon materialism and contemptuous derision of all obscurantism, of all confusion and all deviations towards idealism….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Marx and Engels were partisans in philosophy from start to finish; they were able to detect the deviations from materialism and concessions to idealism… in each and every ‘new’ tendency….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The realists etc., including the positivists, are all a wretched mush; they are a contemptible middle party in philosophy, who confuse the materialist and idealist trends on every question. The attempt to escape these two basic trends in philosophy is nothing but conciliatory quackery.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 11, “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,” Chapter VI, Section 4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On every issue we are partisans of materialism against idealism. This is because we know that it is in the light of materialist theory, which studies things as they are, without idealist fantasies about them, that we can understand the forces in nature and society so as to be able to transform society and to master the forces of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And because of this, too, materialism teaches us to have confidence in ourselves, in the working class—in people. It teaches us that there are no mysteries beyond our understanding, that we need not accept that which is as being the will of God, that we should contemptuously reject the “authoritative” teachings of those who set up to be our masters, and that we can ourselves understand nature and society so as to be able to change them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We hate idealism, because under cover of high-sounding talk it preaches the subjection of man to man and belittles the power of humanity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was the materialist confidence in humanity which was expressed by Maxim Gorky when he wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“For me, there are no ideas beyond man; for me, man and only man is the miracle worker and the future master of all forces of nature. The most beautiful things in this our world are the things made by labor, made by skilled human hands, and all our ideas are born out of the process of labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“And if it is thought necessary to speak of sacred things, then the one sacred thing is the dissatisfaction of man with himself and his striving to be better than he is; sacred is his hatred of all the trivial rubbish which he himself has created; sacred is his desire to do away with greed, envy, crime, disease, war and all enmity between men on earth; and sacred is his labor.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Maxim Gorky, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Literature and Life&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, “How I Learned to Write,” London, 1946.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 3. Mechanistic Materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The type of materialism produced in the past by the revolutionary bourgeoisie was mechanistic materialism. This took over the ancient materialist conception that the world consisted of unchanging material particles (atoms), whose interactions produced all the phenomena of nature, and further strove to understand the workings of nature on the model of the workings of a machine.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It was in its time a progressive and revolutionary doctrine. But it has three grave weaknesses. (1) It requires the conception of a Supreme Being who started the world up; (2) it seeks to reduce all processes to the same cycle of mechanistic interactions and so cannot account for development, for the emergence of new qualities, new types of processes in nature; (3) it cannot account for social development, can give no account of human social activity and leads to an abstract conception of human nature.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Changing World and How to Understand It ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before Marx, materialism was predominantly &#039;&#039;mechanistic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We often hear people complain that the materialists seek to reduce everything in the world, including life and mind, to a system of soulless mechanism, to a mere mechanical interaction of bodies. This refers to mechanistic materialism. Marxist materialism is, however, not mechanistic but dialectical. To understand what this means we need first to understand something about mechanistic materialism itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can approach this problem by asking how materialists have sought to understand the various processes of change which are observed everywhere in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The world is full of change. Night follows day and day night; the seasons succeed each other; people are born, grow old and die. Every philosophy recognizes that change is an omnipresent fact. The question is: how are we to understand the change which we observe everywhere?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Change may be understood, in the first place, in an idealist way or in a materialist way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Idealism traces back all change to some idea or intention—if not human, then divine. Thus for idealism, changes in the material world are, in the last analysis, initiated and brought about by something outside matter, not material, not subject to the laws of the material world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But materialism traces back all change to material causes. In other words, it seeks to explain what happens in the material world from the material world itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But while the occurrence of change has been recognized by everyone, since none can ignore it, philosophers have nevertheless sought to find something which does not change—something permanent, something changeless, behind or within the change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is generally an essential part of the ideology of an exploiting class. They are afraid of change, because they are afraid that they, too, may be swept away. So they always seek for something fixed and stable, not subject to change. They try to hitch themselves on to this, as it were.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The earlier materialists, too, sought for this. Behind all the changing appearances they looked for something which never changes. But while idealists looked for the eternal and changeless in the realm of spirit, these materialists looked for it in the material world itself. And they found it in the ultimate material particle—the eternal and indestructible atom. (“Atom” is a Greek word meaning “unbreakable.”)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For such materialists, then, all &#039;&#039;changes&#039;&#039; were produced by the movement and interaction of &#039;&#039;unchanging&#039;&#039; atoms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is a very ancient theory, put forward over two thousand years ago in Greece, and earlier still in India.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its day it was a very progressive theory, a great weapon against idealism and superstition. The Roman poet Lucretius, for example, explained in his philosophical poem &#039;&#039;On the Nature of Things&#039;&#039; that the purpose of the atomistic theory of the Greek philosopher Epicurus was to demonstrate “what are the elements out of which everything is formed, and how everything comes to pass without the intervention of the gods.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus there was born a materialism which saw the world as consisting of hard, impenetrable material particles, and which understood all change as arising from nothing but the motion and interaction of such particles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This theory was revived in modern times. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries philosophers and scientists turned to it in their fight against feudal, Catholic philosophy. But this modern materialism proved to be much richer in content than the ancient. For it tried to work out what were the laws of interaction of material particles, and so to present a picture of how all phenomena, from merely physical changes to the life of man, resulted from the motion and interaction of the separate parts of matter. In this way, by the eighteenth century, there had appeared the characteristic modern theories of mechanistic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== A Bourgeois Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mechanistic materialism was in essence an ideology, a mode of theorizing, of the rising bourgeoisie. In order to understand it we must understand, first of all, that it arose and developed in opposition to feudal ideology—that its critical edge was directed against feudal ideas, that it was in fact the most radical of all bourgeois forms of opposition against the feudal outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the period of the rise of the bourgeoisie, the feudal social relations were shattered, and so were the feudal ideas, embodied in the Catholic philosophy, in which those social relations were enshrined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The feudal system, whose economic basis lay in the exploitation of the serfs by the feudal proprietors, involved complex social relationships of dependence, subordination and allegiance. All this was reflected, not only in social and political philosophy, but also in the philosophy of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was typical of the natural philosophy of the feudal period that everything in nature was explained in terms of its proper place in the system of the universe, in terms of its supposed position of dependence and subordination in that system, and of the end or purpose which it existed to serve.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The bourgeois philosophers and scientists destroyed these feudal ideas about nature. They regarded nature as a system of bodies in interaction, and, rejecting all the feudal dogmas, they called for the investigation of nature in order to discover how nature really worked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The investigation of nature advanced hand in hand with the geographical discoveries, the development of trade and transport, the improvement of machinery and manufactures. The greatest strides were made in the mechanical sciences, closely connected as they were with the needs of technology. So it came about that materialist theory was enriched as the result of the scientific investigation of nature, and in particular by the mechanical sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This determined at once the strength and the weakness, the achievement and the limitation, of the materialist theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What pushed that theory forward was, so Engels writes, “the powerful and ever more rapidly onrushing progress of science and industry.” But it remained “predominantly mechanical,” because only the mechanical sciences had attained any high degree of development. Its “specific, but at that time inevitable limitation” was its “exclusive application of the standards of mechanics.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The mechanistic way of understanding nature did not arise, however, simply from the fact that at that time it was only the mechanical sciences which had made any great progress. It was deeply rooted in the class outlook of the most progressive bourgeois philosophers, and this led to their turning exclusively to the mechanical sciences for their inspiration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as the bourgeoisie, overthrowing feudal society, stood for individual liberty, equality and the development of a free market, so the most progressive philosophers of the bourgeoisie—the materialists—overthrowing the feudal ideas, proclaimed that the world consisted of separate material particles interacting with one another in accordance with the laws of mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This theory of nature reflected bourgeois social relations no less than the theories it replaced had reflected feudal social relations. But just as the new bourgeois social relations broke the feudal fetters and enabled a great new development of the forces of production to begin, so the corresponding bourgeois theory of nature broke down the barriers which feudal ideas had placed in the way of scientific research and enabled a great new development of scientific research to begin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The philosophical outlook seemed to find its confirmation in science, and science provided materials for the development and working out in detail of the philosophical outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The World and the Machine ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The world—so thought the mechanistic materialists—consists of nothing but particles of matter in interaction. Each particle has an existence separate and distinct from every other; in their totality they form the world; the totality of their interactions forms the totality of everything that happens in the world; and these interactions are of the mechanical type, that is to say, they consist simply of the external influence of one particle upon another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a theory is equivalent to regarding the whole world as nothing but a complex piece of machinery, a mechanism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this standpoint, the question always posed about any part of nature is the question we ask about a machine: what is its mechanism, how does it work?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was exemplified in Newton’s account of the solar system. Newton adopted the same general view as the Greek materialist, Epicurus, inasmuch as he thought that the material world consisted of particles moving about in empty space. But faced with any particular natural phenomenon, such as the movements of the sun and planets, Epicurus was not in the least concerned to give any exact account of it. With regard to the apparent movement of the sun across the heavens from east to west, for example, Epicurus said that the important thing was to understand that the sun was not a god but was simply a collection of atoms: no account of the actual machinery of its motions was necessary. Perhaps, he said, the sun goes round and round the earth; but perhaps it disintegrates and its atoms separate every night, so that it is “a new sun” which we see the next morning: to him such questions were simply unimportant. Newton, on the other hand, was concerned to show exactly how the solar system worked, to demonstrate the mechanics of it, in terms of gravity and mechanical forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But just as Epicurus was not interested in how the solar system worked, so Newton was not interested in how it originated and developed. He took it for granted as a stable piece of machinery— created, presumably, by God. Not how it originated, not how it developed, but how it worked, was the question which he dealt with.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same mechanistic approach was manifested in Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood. The essence of his discovery was that he demonstrated the mechanism of circulation, regarding the heart as a pump, which pumps the blood out along the arteries so that it flows back through the veins, the whole system being regulated by a series of valves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the mechanistic outlook better, let us ask: what is a mechanism? what is characteristic of a mechanism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol style=&amp;quot;list-style-type:lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;A mechanism consists of permanent parts, which fit together.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;It requires a motive force to set it going.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Once set going, the parts interact and results are produced according to laws which can be exactly stated.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consider, for example, such a mechanism as a watch. (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) It consists of a number of different parts—cogs, levers and so on— fitted neatly together. (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) It has to be wound up. (c) Then, as the spring uncoils, the parts interact according to laws exactly known to watchmakers, resulting in the regular movements of the hands on the dial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further, to know how a mechanism, such as a watch, works, you must take it to bits, find out what its parts are, how they fit together and how, by their interactions, once the mechanism is set in motion by the application of the required motive force, they produce the total motion characteristic of the mechanism in working order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is just how the mechanistic materialists regarded nature. They sought to take nature to bits, to find its ultimate component parts, how they fitted together and how their interactions produced all the changes we perceive, all the phenomena of the world. And moreover, finding out how the mechanism worked, they sought to find out how to repair it, how to improve it, how to change it and to make it produce new results corresponding lo the requirements of man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Strength and Achievement of Mechanistic Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mechanistic materialism was an important milestone in our understanding of nature. And it was a great progressive step of bourgeois thinkers, a blow against idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The mechanists were thorough-going in their materialism. For they waged a progressive fight against idealism and clericalism by trying to extend to the realm of mind and society the same mechanistic conceptions which were used in the scientific investigation of nature. They sought to include man and all his spiritual activities in the mechanistic system of the natural world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most radical mechanists regarded not merely physical processes, and not merely plant and animal life, but man himself as a machine. Already in the seventeenth century the great French philosopher Descartes had said that all animals were complicated machines—automata: but man was different, since he had a soul. But in the eighteenth century a follower of Descartes, the physician LaMettrie, wrote a book with the provocative title &#039;&#039;Man a Machine.&#039;&#039; Men, too, were machines, he said, though very complicated ones.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This doctrine was looked upon as exceptionally shocking, and as a terrible insult to human nature, not to mention God. Yet it was in its time a progressive view of man. The view that men are machines was an advance in the understanding of human nature as compared with the view that they are wretched pieces of clay inhabited by immortal souls. And it was, comparatively speaking, a more humane view.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, the great English materialist and utopian socialist Robert Owen told the pious industrialists of his time:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Experience has shown you the difference of the results between mechanism which is neat, clean, well-arranged and always in a high state of repair, and that which is allowed to be dirty, in disorder, and which therefore becomes much out of repair…. If, then, due care as to the state of your inanimate machines can produce such beneficial results, what may not be expected if you devote equal attention to your &#039;&#039;vital&#039;&#039; machines, which are far more wonderfully constructed?”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Robert Owen, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;New View of Society&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This humanitarianism was, however, at the best bourgeois humanitarianism. Like all mechanistic materialism, it was rooted in the class outlook of the bourgeoisie. The view that man is a machine is rooted in the view that in production man is a mere appendage of the machine. And if on the one hand this implies that the human machine ought to be well tended and kept in good condition, on the other hand it equally implies that no more should be expended for this purpose than is strictly necessary to keep the human machine in bare working order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Weakness and Limitations of Mechanistic Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mechanistic materialism had grave weaknesses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) It could not sustain the materialist standpoint consistently and all the way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For if the world is like a machine, who made it, who started it up? There was necessary, in any system of mechanistic materialism, a “Supreme Being,” outside the material world—even if he no longer continuously interfered in the world and kept things moving, but did no more than start things up and then watch what happened.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a “Supreme Being” was postulated by nearly all the mechanistic materialists; for example, by Voltaire and Tom Paine. But this opens the door to idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Mechanistic materialism sees change everywhere. Yet because it always tries to &#039;&#039;reduce&#039;&#039; all phenomena to the same system of mechanical interactions, it sees this change as nothing but the eternal &#039;&#039;repetition&#039;&#039; of the same kinds of mechanical processes, an eternal cycle of the same changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This limitation is inseparable from the view of the world as a machine. For just as a machine has to be started up, so it can never do anything except what it was made to do. It cannot change itself or produce anything radically new. Mechanistic theory, therefore, always breaks down when it is a question of accounting for the emergence of &#039;&#039;new quality.&#039;&#039; It sees change everywhere—but nothing &#039;&#039;new,&#039;&#039; no &#039;&#039;development.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The various processes of nature—chemical processes and the processes of living matter, for example—cannot in fact be all reduced to one and the same kind of mechanical interaction of material particles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chemical interactions differ from mechanical interactions inasmuch as the changes which take place as a result of chemical Interaction involve a change of quality. For example, if we consider the mechanical interaction of two particles which collide, then their qualitative characteristics are irrelevant and the result is expressed as a change in the quantity and direction of motion of each. But if two chemical substances come together and combine chemically, then there results a new substance qualitatively different from either. Similarly, from the point of view of mechanics heat is nothing but an increase in the quantity of motion of the particles of matter. But in chemistry, the application of heat leads to qualitative changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor do the processes of nature consist in the repetition of the same cycle of mechanical interactions, but in nature there is continual development and evolution, producing ever new forms of the existence or, what is the same thing, motion of matter. Hence the more widely and consistently the mechanistic categories are applied in the interpretation of nature, the more is their essential limitation exposed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Still less can mechanistic materialism explain &#039;&#039;social&#039;&#039; development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mechanistic materialism expresses the radical bourgeois conception of society as consisting of social atoms, interacting together. The real economic and social causes of the development of society cannot be discovered from this point of view. And so great social changes seem to spring from quite accidental causes. Human activity itself appears to be either the mechanical result of external causes, or else it is treated—and here mechanistic materialism collapses into idealism—as purely spontaneous and uncaused.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a word, mechanistic materialism cannot give an account of men’s social activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Mechanistic Materialism and Utopian Socialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The mechanistic view treated men quite abstractly, each man being regarded as a social atom endowed by nature with certain inherent properties, attributes and rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was expressed in the bourgeois conception of “the rights of man,” and in the bourgeois revolutionary slogan: “All men are equal.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the conception of human rights cannot be deduced from the abstract nature of man, but is determined by the stage of society in which men are living. Nor are men what they are “by nature,” but they become what they are, and change, as a result of their social activity. Nor are all men “by nature” equal. In opposition to the bourgeois conception of abstract equality, which amounted to mere formal equality of rights as citizens, equality before the law, Marx and Engels declared:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the abolition of classes. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that of necessity passes into absurdity.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Part I, Chapter X, N. Y., 1939.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Adopting their abstract, mechanistic view of men as social atoms, the progressive mechanists tried to work out, in an abstract way, what form of society would be best for mankind—what would best suit abstract human nature, as they conceived of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This way of thinking was taken over by the socialist thinkers who immediately preceded Marx, the utopian socialists. The utopian socialists were mechanistic materialists. They put forward socialism as an ideal society. They did not see it as necessitated by the development of the contradictions of capitalism—it could have been put forward and realized at any time, if only men had had the wit to do so. They did not see it as having to be won by working-class struggle against capitalism—it would be realized when everyone was convinced that it was just and best adapted to the requirements of human nature. (For this reason Robert Owen appealed to both the Archbishop of Canterbury and Queen Victoria to support his socialist program.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, the mechanistic materialists—and this applied above all to the utopian socialists—thought that what a man was, his character and his activities, was determined by his environment and education. Therefore they proclaimed that to make men better, happier and more rational it was simply necessary to place them in better conditions and to give them a better education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But to this Marx replied:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing and that, therefore, changed men are produced by changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that circumstances are changed precisely by men and that the educator must himself be educated.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Appendices, Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach, III.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If men are simply the products of circumstances, then they are at the mercy of circumstances. But on the contrary, men can themselves change their circumstances. And men themselves are changed, not as a mechanical result of changed circumstances, but in the course of and as a result of their own activity in changing their circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So what are the real material social causes at work in human society, which give rise to new activities, new ideas and therefore to changed circumstances and changed men?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mechanistic materialism could not answer this question. It could not explain the laws of social development nor show how to change society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore while it was a progressive and revolutionary doctrine in its time, it could not serve to guide the struggle of the working class in striving to change society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 4. From Mechanistic to Dialectical Materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Mechanistic materialism makes certain dogmatic assumptions: (1) That the world consists of permanent and stable things or particles, with definite, fixed properties; (2) that the particles of matter are by nature inert and no change ever happens except by the action of some external cause; (3) that all motion, all change can be reduced to the mechanical interaction of the separate particles of matter; (4) that each particle has its own fixed nature independent of everything else, and that the relationships between separate things are merely external relationships.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Overcoming and passing beyond the dogmatic standpoint of mechanism, dialectical materialism holds that the world is not a complex of things but of processes, that matter is inseparable from motion, that the motion of matter comprehends an infinite diversity of forms which arise one from another and pass into one another, and that things exist not as separate individual units but in essential relation and interconnection.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== Things and Processes ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to find how the limitations of the mechanist approach can be overcome we may consider first of all certain extremely dogmatic assumptions which are made by mechanistic materialism. These mechanistic assumptions are none of them justified. And by bringing them to the light of day and pointing out what is wrong with them, we can see how to advance beyond mechanistic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) Mechanism sees all change as having at its basis permanent and stable things with definite, fixed properties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus for the mechanists the world consists of indivisible, indestructible material particles, which in their interaction manifest such properties as position, mass, velocity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to mechanism, if you could state the position, mass and velocity of every particle at a given instant of time, then you would have said everything that could be said about the world at that time, and could, by applying the laws of mechanics, predict everything that was going to happen afterwards.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the first dogmatic assumption of mechanism. But we need to reject it. For the world does not consist of &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; but of &#039;&#039;processes,&#039;&#039; in which things come into being and pass away.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things,” wrote Engels, “but as a complex of processes, in which things apparently stable, no less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This, indeed, is what science in its latest developments teaches us. Thus the atom, once thought to be eternal and indivisible, has been dissolved into electrons, protons and neutrons; and these themselves are not “fundamental particles” in any absolute sense, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; they are not eternal and indestructible, any more than the atom; but science more and more shows that they, too, come into being, pass away and go through many transformations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is fundamental is not the “thing,” the “particle,” but the unending &#039;&#039;processes&#039;&#039; of nature, in which &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; go through “an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away.” And nature’s process is, moreover, infinite: there will always be fresh aspects to be revealed, and it cannot be reduced to any &#039;&#039;ultimate&#039;&#039; constituents. “The electron is as inexhaustible as the atom, nature is infinite,” wrote Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 11, “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,” Chapter V, Section 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just so in considering society, we cannot understand a given society simply in terms of some set of institutions in and through which individual men and women are organized, but we must study the social processes which are going on, in the course of which both institutions and people are transformed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Matter and Motion ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The second dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that no change can ever happen except by the action of some external cause.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as no part of a machine moves unless another part acts on it and makes it move, so mechanism sees matter as being inert— without motion, or rather without self-motion. For mechanism, nothing ever moves unless something else pushes or pulls it, it never changes unless something else interferes with it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No wonder that, regarding matter in this way, the mechanists had to believe in a Supreme Being to give the “initial impulse.” But we need to reject this lifeless, dead theory about matter. This theory separates matter and motion: it thinks of matter as just a dead mass, so that motion always has to be impressed on matter from outside. But, on the contrary, you cannot separate matter and motion. Motion, said Engels, is the mode of existence of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. Motion in cosmic space, mechanical motion of smaller masses on the various celestial bodies, the motion of molecules as heat or as electrical or magnetic currents, chemical combination or disintegration, organic life—at each given moment each individual atom of matter in the world is in one or other of these forms of motion, or in several forms of them at once. All rest, all equilibrium is only relative, and only has meaning in relation to one or other definite form of motion. A body, for example, may be on the ground in mechanical equilibrium, may be mechanically at rest; but this in no way prevents it from participating in the motion of the earth and in that of the whole solar system, just as little as it prevents its most minute parts from carrying out the oscillations determined by its temperature, or its atoms from passing through a chemical process. Matter without motion is Just as unthinkable as motion without matter.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Part I, Chapter VI.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Far from being dead, lifeless, inert, it is the very nature of matter to be in process of continual change, of motion. Once we realize this, then there is an end of appeal to the “initial impulse.” Motion, like matter, never had a beginning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The conception of the inseparability of matter and motion, the understanding that “motion is the mode of existence of matter,” provides the way to answering a number of perplexing questions which usually haunt people’s minds when they think about materialism and which lead them to desert materialism and to run to the priests for an explanation of the “ultimate” truth about the universe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was the world created by a Supreme Being? What was the origin of matter? What was the origin of motion? What was the very beginning of everything? What was the first cause? These are the sort of questions which puzzle people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is possible to answer these questions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, the world was not created by a Supreme Being. Any particular organization of matter, any particular process of matter in motion, has an origin and a beginning—it originated out of some previous organization of matter, out of some previous process of matter in motion. But matter in motion had no origin, no beginning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science teaches us the inseparability of matter and motion. However static some things may seem to be, there is in them continual motion. The atom, for instance, maintains itself as the same only by means of a continual movement of its parts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So in studying the causes of change, we should not merely seek for external causes of change, but should above all seek for the source of the change within the process itself, in its own self-movement, in the inner impulses to development contained within things themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in seeking the causes of social development and its laws, we should not see social changes as being brought about by the actions of great men, who impressed their superior ideas and will on the inert mass of society—nor as being brought about by accidents and external factors—but as being brought about by the development of the internal forces of society itself; and that means, by the development of the social forces of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus unlike the utopians, we see socialism as the result, not of the dreams of reformers, but of the development of capitalist society itself—which contains within itself causes which must inevitably bring it to an end and lead to the socialist revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Forms of Motion of Matter ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The third dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that the mechanical motion of particles, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; the simple change of place of particles as the result of the action on them of external forces, is the ultimate, basic form of motion of matter; and that all changes, all happenings whatsoever can be reduced to and explained by such mechanical motion of particles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus all the motion of matter is reduced to simple mechanical motion. All the changing qualities which we recognize in matter are nothing but the appearances of the basic mechanical motion of matter. However varied the appearances may be, whatever new and higher forms of development may appear to arise, they are all to be reduced to one and the same thing—the eternal repetition of the mechanical interaction of the separate parts of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is difficult to find any justification for such an assumption. In the material world there are many different types of process, which all constitute different forms of the motion of matter. But they can by no means be all reduced to one and the same form of (mechanical) motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Motion in the most general sense,” wrote Engels, “conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right to thinking. The investigation of the nature of motion had as a matter of course to start from the lowest, simplest forms of this motion and to learn to grasp these before it could achieve anything in the way of explanation of the higher and more complicated forms.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectics of Nature&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter III, N. Y., 1940.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The simplest form of motion is the simple change of place of bodies, the laws of which are studied by mechanics. But that does not mean that all motion can be reduced to this simplest form of motion. It rather means that we need to study how, from the simplest form of motion, all the higher forms of motion arise and develop—“from mere change of place right to thinking.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One form of motion is transformed into another and arises from another. The higher, more complex form of motion cannot exist without the lower and simpler form: but that is not to say that it can be reduced to that simpler form. It is inseparable from the simpler form, but its nature is not exhausted thereby. For example, the thinking which goes on in our heads is inseparable from the chemical, electrical etc. motion which goes on in the gray matter of the brain; but it cannot be reduced to that motion, its nature is not exhausted thereby.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;materialist&#039;&#039; standpoint, however, which rejects the mechanistic idea that all forms of motion of matter can be reduced to mechanical motion, must not be confused with the &#039;&#039;idealist&#039;&#039; notion that the higher forms of motion cannot be explained as arising from the lower forms. For example, idealists assert that life, as a form of motion of matter, cannot possibly be derived from any processes characteristic of non-living matter. For them, life can only arise through the introduction into a material system of a mysterious something from outside—a “vital force.” But to say that a higher form of motion cannot be reduced to a lower form is not to say that it cannot be derived from the lower form in the course of the latter’s development. Thus materialists will always affirm that life, for example, appears at a certain stage in the development of more complex forms of non-living matter, and arises as a result of that development, not as a result of the introduction into non-living matter of a mysterious “vital force.” The task of science in this sphere remains to demonstrate experimentally how the transition from non-living to living matter takes place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the mechanistic program of reducing all the motion of matter to simple, mechanical motion must be rejected. We need rather to study all the infinitely various forms of motion of matter, in their transformations one into another, and as they arise one from another, the complex from the simple, the higher from the lower.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of society, no one has yet tried to show how social changes can be explained by the mechanical interactions of the atoms composing the bodies of the various members of society— though to do so would be the logical culmination of the mechanistic program. But the next best thing is attempted by the mechanistic theory known as “economic determinism.” According to this theory, the whole motion of society is to be explained by the economic changes taking place in society, all the determinants of social change have been exhausted when the economic process has been described. This is an example of the mechanistic program of reducing a complex motion to a simple form—the process of social change, including all the political, cultural and ideological developments, to a simple economic process. But the task of explaining social development cannot be fulfilled by trying to reduce the whole development to an economic process. The task is rather to show how, on the basis of the economic process, all the various forms of social activity arise and play their part in the complex movement of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Things and Their Interconnection ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) The last dogmatic assumption of mechanism to be mentioned is that each of the things or particles, whose interactions are said to make up the totality of events in the universe, has its own fixed nature quite independent of everything else. In other words, each thing can be considered as existing in separation from other things, as an independent unit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Proceeding on this assumption it follows that all relations between things are merely external relations. That is to say, things enter into various relationships one with another, but these relationships are accidental and make no difference to the nature of the things related.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And regarding each thing as a separate unit entering into external relations with other things, it further follows that mechanism regards the whole as no more than the sum of its separate parts. According to this view, the properties and laws of development of the whole are uniquely determined by the properties of all its parts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not one of these assumptions is correct. Nothing exists or can exist in splendid isolation, separate from its conditions of existence, independent of its relationships with other things. Things come into being, exist and cease to exist, not each independent of all other things, but each in its relationship with other things. The very nature of a thing is modified and transformed by its relationships with other things. When things enter into such relationships that they become parts of a whole, the whole cannot be regarded as nothing more than the sum total of the parts. True, the whole is nothing apart from and independent of its parts. But the mutual relations which the parts enter into in constituting the whole modify their own properties, so that while it may be said that the whole is determined by the parts it may equally be said that the parts are determined by the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, the development of science itself shows the inadmissibility of the old mechanistic assumptions. These assumptions have force only in the very limited sphere of the study of the mechanical interactions of discrete particles. In physics they were already shattered with the development of the study of the electromagnetic field. Still less are they admissible in biology, in the study of living matter, and still less in the study of men and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Correction of Mechanistic Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we bring into the open and reject these assumptions of mechanistic materialism, then we begin to see the need for a materialist doctrine of a different, of a new type—a materialism which overcomes the weaknesses and narrow, dogmatic assumptions of mechanism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism understands the world, not as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which all things go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism considers that matter is always in motion, that motion is the mode of existence of matter, so that there can no more be matter without motion than motion without matter. Motion does not have to be impressed upon matter by some outside force, but above all it is necessary to look for the inner impulses of development, the self-motion, inherent in all processes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism understands the motion of matter as comprehending all changes and processes in the universe, from mere change of place right to thinking. It recognizes, therefore, the infinite diversity of the forms of motion of matter, the transformation of one form into another, the development of the forms of motion of matter from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism considers that, in the manifold processes taking place in the universe, things come into being, change and pass out of being, not as separate individual units, but in essential relation and interconnection, so that they cannot be understood each separately and by itself but only in their relation and interconnection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In dialectical materialism, therefore, there is established a materialist conception far richer in content and more comprehensive than the former mechanistic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=== 5. The Dialectical Conception of Development ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Whereas the older philosophies considered that the universe always remained much the same, a perpetual cycle of the same processes, science has demonstrated the fact of evolution. But while recognizing the fact of evolutionary development, bourgeois thinkers have tried to understand and explain it in fantastic, idealist terms. And they have conceived of development as being always a smooth, continuous process, not recognizing the occurrence of abrupt breaks in continuity, the leap from one stage to another.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Following up the ideas of Hegel by taking up the revolutionary side of his philosophy while freeing it of its idealist trammels, Marx and Engels established the dialectical materialist conception of development. The key to understanding development in nature and society and the leaps and breaks in continuity which characterize all real development—lies in the recognition of the inner contradictions and opposite conflicting tendencies which are in operation in all processes.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;This discovery by Marx and Engels was a revolution in philosophy and made of it a revolutionary weapon of the working people, a method for understanding the world so as to change it.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Idea of Evolution ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that the corrections of the mechanistic standpoint made by dialectical materialism are fully justified by and have a basis in the advance of science. Indeed, the advance of science itself has shattered the whole conception of the universe held by the older, mechanistic materialists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to that conception, the universe always remained much the same. It was a huge machine which always did the same things, kept grinding out the same products, went on and on in a perpetual cycle of the same processes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus it used to be thought that the stars and the solar system always remained the same—and that the earth, with its continents and oceans and the plants and animals inhabiting them, likewise always remained the same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this conception has given way to the conception of evolution, which has invaded all spheres of investigation without exception. Nor was it scientific investigation alone which produced the idea of evolution. Science does not advance in isolation from society as a whole. The idea of evolution was generated out of the rise of industrial capitalism itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence of all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx and Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Communist Manifesto&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter I.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The industrial capitalists saw themselves as the bearers of progress. And as they thought progress was the law of capitalism, so they saw it as the law of the whole universe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So there was made possible a great advance in the scientific picture of the universe. We find developing a picture of the universe, not as static, as always the same, but as in continual progressive development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The stars did not always exist—they were formed out of masses of dispersed gas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once formed, the whole stellar system, with all the stars in it, goes through an evolutionary process, stage by stage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some stars, like our sun, acquire planets—a solar system. Thus the earth was born. As its surface cooled, so chemical compounds were formed, impossible in the high temperatures of the stars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus matter began to manifest new properties, nonexistent before—the properties of chemical combination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then organic compounds were formed out of the complex linking of carbon atoms. And from organic matter the first bodies arose which began to manifest the properties of life, of living matter. Still new properties of matter emerged—the properties of living matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Living organisms went through a long evolution, leading eventually to man. With man, human society was born. And still new processes, with new laws, arose—the laws of society, and the laws of thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What comes next?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalist science can go no further. Here it ends, since capitalist science cannot contemplate the ending of capitalism. But socialist science shows that man himself is about to embark on a new phase of evolution—communist society, in which the whole social process will be brought under his own conscious, planned direction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this is the evolutionary history of the material universe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Apart from the last point, it may be said this is all common knowledge. Bourgeois thinkers know this as well as Marxists, though they often forget it. But Marxism does not only stress the fact that everything in the world goes through a process of development. What Marxism found out was how to understand and explain this development in a materialist way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The discovery of Marxism was the discovery of the laws of materialist dialectics. And that is why Marxism alone is able to give a fully scientific account of development and to point out the future path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the meaning of Marx’s great discovery—how to understand change and development in a materialist way, and therefore how to become masters of the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Idealist Conceptions of Change and Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How did bourgeois thinkers try to account for the universal change and development which they discovered?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us consider what some of them have had to say over a period of more than a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel said that the whole process of development taking place in history was due to the Absolute Idea realizing itself in history. Herbert Spencer said that all development was a process of increasing “integration of matter,” and he put this down to what he called an “Incomprehensible and Omnipresent Power.” Henri Bergson said that everything was in process of evolution, due to the activity of “the Life Force.” Fairly recently, a school of British philosophers has coined the phrase “emergent evolution.” They pointed out that in the course of development new qualities of matter are continually emerging, one after the other. But as to why this should happen, one of the leaders of this school, Professor Samuel Alexander, said that it was inexplicable and must be accepted “with natural piety,” while another of its leaders, Professor C. Lloyd Morgan, said that it must be due to some immanent force at work in the world, which he identified with God.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in every case some fantasy, something inexplicable and unpredictable, was conjured up to explain development. And so,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
when they thought about the future, all these bourgeois philosophers of evolution either thought, like Hegel, that development had now finished (Hegel taught that the Absolute Idea was fully realized in the Prussian State of which he was a distinguished employee), or else regarded the future as unfathomable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nowadays they begin to give up hope altogether and regard everything—past, present and future—as incomprehensible, the result of forces no one can ever understand or control.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the same story in the sciences. The cosmogonists, who study the evolution of the stars, appeal to a mysterious creation to start the process off. The biologists who study the evolution of organic life appeal to a series of unpredictable accidents (the random mutations of genes) as the basis for the whole process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such ideas are, however, unscientific. Why? Because they assert that the processes they are supposed to be investigating take place without any cause. True, the assertion is often made under a cloak of “scientific” objectivity and humility: it is not positively stated that no cause exists, but only that we have at present no clue as to what the cause, if any, may be. But such reservations do not materially alter the nature of the theories in question. For the fact remains that to say that matter was created, to say that “mutations” occur spontaneously, is to say that something happens for no reason, without any discoverable cause. Such statements do not deserve to be called even provisional scientific hypotheses but are simply idealist inventions, fantasies. Science may not yet know why something happens, but to say that it happens for no reason is to abandon science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A second defect in the evolutionary ideas of most bourgeois thinkers is that they regard the process of evolution as a smooth, continuous and unbroken process. They see the process of transition from one evolutionary stage to another as taking place through a series of gradations, without conflict and without any break in continuity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But continuity is not the law of development. On the contrary, periods of smooth, continuous evolutionary development are interrupted by sudden and abrupt changes. The emergence of the new stage in development takes place, when the conditions for it have matured, by a break in continuity, by the leap from one state to another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel was the first to point this out.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With every period of transition, he observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It is as in the case of the birth of a child; after a long period of nutrition in silence, the continuity of the gradual growth in size, of quantitative change, is suddenly cut short by the first breath drawn—there is a break in the process, a qualitative change—and the child is born.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;G. W. F. Hegel, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Phenomenology of Mind&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But Marx alone followed up this profound observation of Hegel. As for the ensuing bourgeois thinkers, although the investigations of science, and common experience itself, clearly demonstrate that development cannot take place without discontinuity, without abrupt transitions and the leap from one state to another, they have nevertheless in their general theories tried to make unbroken continuity the law of evolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This prejudice in favor of a smooth line of evolution has gone hand in hand with the liberal belief that capitalist society will evolve smoothly—through orderly bourgeois progress broadening down “from precedent to precedent,” as Tennyson once expressed it. To have thought differently about evolution in general would have implied that we would have to think differently about social evolution in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Dialectical Materialist Conception of Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of understanding and explaining development in a materialist way—that is, “in harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic connection”—is answered by dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism considers the universe, not as static, not as unchanging, but as in continual process of development. It considers this development, not as a smooth, continuous and unbroken process, but as a process in which phases of gradual evolutionary change are interrupted by breaks in continuity, by the sudden leap from one state to another. And it seeks for the explanation, the driving force, of this universal movement, not in inventions of idealist fantasy, but within material processes themselves—in the inner contradictions, the opposite conflicting tendencies, which are in operation in every process of nature and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main ideas of materialist dialectics, which are applied in dealing with the laws of development of the real material world, including society, will be the subject of the following chapters. But this is how Lenin summed them up:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essential idea of materialist dialectics is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The recognition of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. This alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything in existence. It alone furnishes the key to the leaps, to the break in continuity, to the transformation into the opposite, to the destruction of the old and emergence of the new….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In its proper meaning, dialectics is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Development is the struggle of opposites.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Philosophical Notebooks&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Russian Edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== From Hegel to Marx ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where contradiction is at work, there is the force of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This profound conception was first put forward by Hegel. But he worked it out in an idealist way. According to Hegel, the whole process in the material world, in space and time, is nothing but the realization of the Absolute Idea, outside space and time. The Idea develops through a series of contradictions, and it is this ideal development which manifests itself in the material world. If things in space and time are forced to go through a series of transformations and to arise and pass away one after the other, that is because they are nothing but the embodiment of a self-contradictory phase of the Absolute Idea. For Hegel, the development of real things was due to the self-contradictoriness of their concepts: where the concept was self-contradictory, the thing which realized that concept could not be stable but must eventually negate itself and turn into something else. Thus instead of the concepts of things being regarded as the reflections of those things in our minds, the things were themselves regarded as nothing but the realizations of their concepts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is how Engels summed up the materialist criticism of Hegel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, one started out from his revolutionary side… from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form this method was unusable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist—where unknown—from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zig-zag movements and temporary setbacks, is only a miserable copy of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“This ideological reversal had to be done away with. We comprehended the concepts in our heads once more materialistically— as images of real things instead of regarding the real things as images of this or that stage of development of the absolute concept.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of human thought—two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously in the form of external necessity in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Thereby the dialectic of the concept itself became merely the conscious reflection of the dialectical motion of the real world and the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing before, and placed on its feet again….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trammels which in Hegel’s hands had prevented its consistent execution.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This materialist understanding of dialectics is the key to understanding the forces of development within the material world itself, without recourse to outside causes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This discovery arises from the whole advance of science and philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But above all it arises from the investigation of the laws of society, an investigation made imperative thanks to the very development of society—from the discovery of the contradictions of capitalism, explaining the forces of social development, and thereby showing the way forward from capitalism to socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why bourgeois thinkers could not answer the problem of explaining the real material forces of development in nature and society. To answer this problem was to condemn the capitalist system. And here they had a blind spot. Only the revolutionary philosophy of the vanguard of the revolutionary class, the working class, could do it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx’s discovery of the laws of materialist dialectics showed us how to understand the dialectical development of nature. But above all it showed us how to understand social change and how to wage the working-class struggle for socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This discovery revolutionized philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It signalized the triumph of materialism over idealism, by doing away with the limitations of the merely mechanistic materialism of the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It likewise spelled the end of all “systems” of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It made philosophy into a revolutionary weapon of the working people, an instrument, a method for understanding the world so as to change it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Summing up the essential ideas of materialist dialectics Stalin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Life always contains the new and the old, the growing and the dying, the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“That in life which is born and grows day after day is invincible, its progress cannot be checked. That is to say, if, for example, the proletariat as a class is born and grows day after day, no matter how weak it may be today, in the long run it must conquer. Why? Because it is growing, gaining strength and marching forward. On the other hand, that in life which grows old and is advancing to its grave, must inevitably sustain defeat, even if today it represents a titanic force. That is to say, if, for example, the ground is gradually slipping further and further back from under the feet of the bourgeoisie, and the latter is slipping further and further back every day, no matter how strong it may be today, it must, in the long run, sustain defeat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anarchism or Socialism?&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; Chapter I, Moscow, 1950.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the materialist dialectics of Marx shows us the way forward and gives us unshakable confidence in our cause.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART TWO: DIALECTICS ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 6. Dialectics and Metaphysics ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Dialectics, as a method of investigation, a method of thinking, is opposed to metaphysics. The metaphysical way of thinking deals with abstractions. It considers things each by itself, in abstraction from their real conditions of existence and interconnections; and it considers things as fixed and frozen, in abstraction from their real change and development. Consequently it invents rigid formulas and is always posing hard and fast antitheses—“either-or.” It fails to comprehend the unity and struggle of opposite processes and tendencies manifested in all phenomena of nature and society.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;In contrast to metaphysics, the aim of dialectics is to trace the real changes and interconnection in the world and to think of things always in their real motion and interconnection.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism, the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist Party, is materialist in its theory, its interpretation and explanation of everything, dialectical in its method.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen how materialist explanation is opposed to idealist explanation. And then we saw how materialists formerly interpreted things in a mechanist way, but how mechanistic materialism proved inadequate to explain real processes of change and development. For this we need materialist dialectics. We need to study and understand things dialectically.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectical method is, indeed, nothing but the method of studying and understanding things in their real change and development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As such, it stands opposed to &#039;&#039;metaphysics.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is metaphysics? Or more exactly, what is the metaphysical way of thinking, which is opposed by the dialectical way of thinking?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics is essentially an abstract way of thinking. In a sense all thinking is “abstract,” since it works with general concepts and cannot but disregard a great deal of particular and unessential detail. For example, if we say that “men have two legs,” we are thinking of the two-leggedness of men in abstraction from their other properties, such as having a head, two arms and so on; and similarly we are thinking of all men in general, disregarding the individuality of particular men, of Peter, Paul and so on. But there is abstraction and abstraction. Metaphysics is distinguished by the fact that it makes false, misleading abstractions. As Engels once pointed out, “the art of working with concepts is not inborn… but requires real thought”;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the art of right thinking involves learning how to avoid metaphysical abstraction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Suppose, for example, we are thinking about men, about “human nature.” Then we should think about human nature in such a way that we recognize that men live in society and that their human nature cannot be independent of their living in society but develops and changes with the development of society. We shall then form ideas about human nature which correspond to the actual conditions of men’s existence and to their change and development. But yet people often think about “human nature” in a very different way, as though there were such a thing as “human nature” which manifested itself quite independent of the actual conditions of human existence and which was always and everywhere exactly the same. To think in such a way is obviously to make a false, misleading abstraction. And it is just such an abstract way of thinking that we call “metaphysics.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The concept of fixed, unchanging “human nature” is an example of metaphysical abstraction, of the metaphysical way of thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The metaphysician does not think in terms of real &#039;&#039;men,&#039;&#039; but of “Man” in the abstract.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics, or the metaphysical way of thinking, is, then, that way of thinking which thinks of things (1) in abstraction from their conditions of existence, and (2) in abstraction from their change and development. It thinks of things (1) in separation one from another, ignoring their interconnections, and (2) as fixed and frozen, ignoring their change and development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One example of metaphysics has already been given. It is not difficult to find plenty more. Indeed, the metaphysical way of thinking is so widespread, and has become so much part and parcel of current bourgeois ideology, that there is hardly an article in a journal, a talk on the radio, or a book by a learned professor, in which examples of metaphysical fallacy are not to be found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A good deal is said and written, for example, about democracy. But the speakers and writers usually refer to some pure or absolute democracy, which they seek to define in abstraction from the actual development of society, of classes and of class struggle. But there can be no such pure democracy; it is a metaphysical abstraction. If we want to understand democracy we have always to ask: democracy for whom, for the exploiters or the exploited? We have to understand that since democracy is a form of government, there is no democracy which is not associated with the rule of some particular class, and that the democracy which is established when the working class is the ruling class is a higher form of democracy than capitalist democracy, just as capitalist democracy is a higher form of democracy than, say, the slave-owners’ democracy of ancient Greece. In other words, we should not try to think of democracy in abstraction from real social relations and from the real change and development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, pacifists try to base their opposition to war on the idea that “all wars are wrong.” They think of war in the abstract, without reflecting that the character of each particular war is determined according to the historical epoch, the aims of the war and the classes in whose interests it is fought. Consequently they fail to distinguish between imperialist wars and wars of liberation, between unjust war and just war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In most British schools today the children are regularly subjected to “intelligence tests.” It is alleged that each child possesses a certain fixed quantity of “intelligence,” which can be estimated without regard to the actual conditions of the child’s existence and which determines his capabilities throughout the whole of his life regardless of whatever conditions for change and development may subsequently come in his way. This is another example of metaphysics. In this case the metaphysical conception of “intelligence” is used as an excuse for denying educational opportunities to the majority of children on the grounds that their intelligence is too low for them to benefit from such opportunities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In general, metaphysics is a way of thinking which tries to fix the nature, properties and potentialities of everything it considers once and for all. Consequently it presupposes that each thing has a fixed nature and fixed properties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And it thinks in terms of “things” rather than “processes.” It tries to sum up everything in a formula, which says that the whole world, or any part of the world which is under consideration, consists of just such and such things with such and such properties. Such a formula we may call a “metaphysical” formula.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Engels refers to “the old method of investigation and thought which Hegel calls ‘metaphysical,’ which preferred to investigate &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; as given, as fixed and stable.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In philosophy, metaphysics often means the search for the “ultimate constituents of the universe.” Thus the materialists who said that the ultimate constituents were small, solid, material particles were just as much metaphysicians as the idealists who said that the ultimate constituents were spirits. All such philosophers thought they could sum up “the ultimate nature of the universe” in some formula. Some have held this formula, some that, but all have been metaphysicians. Yet it has been a hopeless quest. We cannot sum up the whole infinite changing universe in any such formula. And the more we find out about it, the more is this evident.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should now be clear that the mechanistic materialism which we discussed in the preceding chapters can equally well be called &#039;&#039;metaphysical&#039;&#039; materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We may also note, in passing, that certain philosophers today, the so-called positivists,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The &#039;&#039;positivists&#039;&#039; say we have no right to assert that anything exists except our own sense-perceptions. They say that to assert anything else is “metaphysics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; claim to be against “metaphysics” because they claim to reject any philosophy which seeks for “the ultimate constituents of the universe.” For them, “metaphysics” means any theory which deals with “ultimates” not verifiable in sense-experience. By using the term in this way, they conceal the fact that they themselves are, if anything, more metaphysical than any other philosophers. For their own mode of thinking reaches extremes of metaphysical abstraction. What could be more metaphysical than to imagine, as the positivist philosophers do, that our sense-experience exists in abstraction from the real material world outside us? Indeed, they themselves make “sense-experience” into a metaphysical “ultimate.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In opposition to the abstract, metaphysical way of thinking, dialectics teaches us to think of things in their real changes and interconnections. To think dialectically is to think concretely, and to think concretely is to think dialectically. When we oppose the dialectical method to metaphysics, then we show up the inadequacy, one-sidedness or falsity of the abstractions of metaphysics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This consideration enables us to understand the original meaning of the term “dialectics.” The word is derived from the Greek &#039;&#039;dialego,&#039;&#039; meaning to discuss or debate. It was considered that to discuss a question from all sides, and from all angles, allowing different one-sided points of view to oppose and contradict each other during the debate, was the best method of arriving at the truth. Such was the dialectics employed, for example, by Socrates. When anyone claimed to have a formula which answered some questions once and for all, Socrates would enter into discussion with him and, by forcing him to consider the question from different angles, would compel him to contradict himself and so to admit that his formula was false. By this method Socrates considered that it was possible to arrive at more adequate ideas about things.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Marxist dialectical method develops from and includes dialectics in the sense in which it was understood by the Greeks. But it is far richer in content, far wider in its scope. As a result, it becomes something qualitatively &#039;&#039;new&#039;&#039; as compared with pre-Marxist dialectics—a new revolutionary method. For it is combined with a consistent materialism and ceases to be a mere method of argument, becoming a method of investigation applicable to both nature and society, a method of materialist understanding of the world which grows out of and guides the activity of changing the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Metaphysical “Either-Or” ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics presupposes that each thing has its own fixed nature, its own fixed properties, and considers each thing by itself, in isolation. It tries to settle the nature and properties of each thing as a given, separate object of investigation, not considering things in their interconnection and in their change and development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because of this, metaphysics thinks of things in terms of hard and fast antitheses. It opposes things of one sort to things of another sort: if a thing is of one sort, it has one set of properties; if of another sort, it has another set of properties; the one excludes the other, and each is thought of in separation from the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Engels writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“To the metaphysician, things and their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered one after the other, apart from each other, rigid fixed objects of investigation given once and for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. ‘His communication is Yea, yea, Nay, nay, for whatever is more than these cometh of evil.’ For him a thing either exists or it does not exist; it is equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Philosophers have expressed the essence of this metaphysical way of thinking in the formula: “Each thing is what it is, and not another thing.” This may sound no more than plain common sense. But that only shows that so-called common sense itself conceals misleading ideas which need to be brought into the open. This way of thinking prevents us from studying things in their real changes and interconnections—in all their contradictory aspects and relationships, in their process of changing from “one thing” into “another thing.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not only philosophers who are metaphysicians.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are left-wing trade unionists, for example, who are as metaphysical as any school of philosophers. For them everyone at their trade union local meeting is either a class-conscious militant or else he is a right-wing opportunist. Everyone must fit into one or other category, and once he is down as “right wing” he is finished so far as they are concerned. That some worker who has been their opponent in the past and on some issues may yet prove an ally in the future and on other issues is not allowed for in their metaphysical outlook on life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In one of Moliere’s plays there is a man who learns for the first time about prose. When they explain to him what prose is, he exclaims: “Why, I’ve been speaking prose all my life!”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, there are many workers who may well say: “Why, I’ve been a metaphysician all my life!”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The metaphysician has his formula ready for everything. He says—Either this formula fits or it does not. If it does, that settles it. If it does not, then he has some alternative formula ready. “Either-or, but not both” is his motto. A thing is either this or that; it has either this set of properties or that set of properties; two things stand to one another either in this relationship or in that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The use of the metaphysical “either-or” leads people into countless difficulties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, difficulties are felt in understanding the relations between American and British imperialism today. For it is argued: Either they are working together, or else they are not. If they are working together, then there is no rift between them; if there is a rift between them, then they are not working together. But on the contrary, they are working together and yet there are rifts between them; and we cannot understand the way they work together nor fight them effectively unless we understand the rifts which divide them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, difficulties are felt in understanding the possibility of the peaceful co-existence of capitalist and socialist states. For it is argued: Either they can co-exist peacefully, in which case antagonism between capitalism and socialism must cease; or else the antagonism remains, in which case they cannot co-exist peacefully. But on the contrary, the antagonism remains, and yet the striving of the socialist states and of millions of people in all countries for peace can prevent a war between capitalist and socialist states.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is often difficult to avoid a metaphysical way of thinking. And this is because, misleading as it is, it yet has its roots in something very necessary and useful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is necessary for us to classify things—to have some system of classifying them and assigning their properties and relations. That is a prerequisite of clear thinking. We have to work out what different kinds of things there are in the world, to say that these have these properties as distinct from those which have those other properties, and to say what are their relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But when we go on to consider these things and properties and relations each in isolation, as fixed constants, as mutually exclusive terms, then we begin to go wrong. For everything in the world has many different and indeed contradictory aspects, exists in intimate relationship with other things and not in isolation, and is subject to change. And so it frequently happens that when we classify something as “A” and not “B,” then this formula is upset by its changing from “A” into “B,” or by its being “A” in some relationships and “B” in others, or by its having a contradictory nature, part “A” and part “B.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, we all know the difference between birds and mammals, and that while birds lay eggs mammals, in general, produce their young alive and suckle them. Naturalists used to believe that mammals were rigidly distinguished from birds because, among other things, mammals do not lay eggs. But this formula was completely upset when an animal called the platypus was discovered, for while the platypus is undoubtedly a mammal, it is a mammal which lays eggs. What is the explanation of this irregular behavior of the platypus? It is to be found in the evolutionary relationship of birds and mammals, which are both descended from original egg-laying animals. The birds have continued to lay eggs while the mammals stopped doing so—except for a few conservative animals like the platypus. If we think of animals in their evolution, their development, this appears very natural. But if we try, as the older naturalists tried, to make them fit into some rigid, fixed scheme of classification, then the products of evolution upset that classification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, an idea or a theory which was progressive in one set of circumstances, when it first arose, cannot for that reason be labeled “progressive” in an absolute sense, since it may later become reactionary in new circumstances. For instance, mechanistic materialism when it first arose was a progressive theory. But we cannot say that it is still progressive today. On the contrary, under the new circumstances which have arisen mechanistic theory has become retrograde, reactionary. Mechanism, which was progressive in the rising phase of capitalism, goes hand in hand with idealism as part of the ideology of capitalism in decay.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Common sense, too recognizes the limitation of the metaphysical way of thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example: When is a man bald? Common sense recognizes that though we can distinguish bald men from non-bald men, nevertheless baldness develops through a process of losing one’s hair, and therefore men in the midst of this process enter into a phase in which we cannot say absolutely either that they are bald or that they are not: they are in process of becoming bald. The metaphysical “either-or” breaks down.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all these examples we are confronted with the distinction between an &#039;&#039;objective process,&#039;&#039; in which something undergoes change, and the &#039;&#039;concepts&#039;&#039; in terms of which we try to sum up the characteristics of the things involved in the process. Such concepts never do and never can always and in all respects correspond to their objects, precisely because the objects are undergoing change. Thus Engels writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Are the concepts that prevail in natural science fictions because they by no means always coincide with reality? From the moment we accept the theory of evolution all our concepts of organic life correspond only approximately to reality. Otherwise there would be no change; on the day that concept and reality absolutely coincide in the organic world, development is at an end.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Correspondence&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Engels to Schmidt, March 12, 1895, N. Y., 1942.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And he pointed out that similar considerations apply to all concepts without exception.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Unity and Struggle of Opposites ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we think of the properties of things, their relationships, their modes of action and interaction, the processes into which they enter, then we find that, generally speaking, all these properties, relationships, interactions and processes divide into &#039;&#039;fundamental opposites.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, if we think of the simplest ways in which two bodies can act on one another, then we find that this action is either repulsion or attraction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we consider the electrical properties of bodies, then there is positive and negative electricity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In organic life, there is the building up of organic compounds and the breaking down of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, in mathematics, there is addition and subtraction, plus and minus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And in general, whatever sphere of inquiry we may be considering, we find that it involves such fundamental opposites. We find ourselves considering, not just a number of &#039;&#039;different&#039;&#039; things, &#039;&#039;different&#039;&#039; properties, &#039;&#039;different&#039;&#039; relations, &#039;&#039;different&#039;&#039; processes, but pairs of &#039;&#039;opposites,&#039;&#039; fundamental &#039;&#039;oppositions.&#039;&#039; As Hegel put it: “In opposition, the different is not confronted by any other, but by &#039;&#039;its&#039;&#039; other.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hegel, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;: Logic, Section 119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus if we think of the forces acting between two bodies, there are not just a number of different forces, but they divide into attractive and repulsive forces; if we think of electric charges, there are not just a number of different charges, but they divide into positive and negative; and so on. Attraction stands opposed to repulsion, positive electricity to negative electricity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such fundamental oppositions are not understood by the metaphysical way of thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place, the metaphysical way of thinking tries to ignore and discount opposition. It seeks to understand a given subject-matter simply in terms of a whole number of different properties and different relations of things, ignoring the fundamental oppositions which are manifested in these properties and relations. Thus those who think in metaphysical terms about class-divided societies, for example, try to understand society as consisting merely of a large number of different individuals connected together by all kinds of different social relations—but they ignore the fundamental opposition of exploiters and exploited, manifested in all those social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the second place, when the metaphysical way of thinking does nevertheless come upon the fundamental oppositions and cannot ignore them, then—true to its habit of thinking of each thing in isolation, as a fixed constant—it considers these opposites each in isolation from the other, understands them separately and as each excluding the other. Thus, for example, the older physicists used to think of positive and negative electricity just simply as two different “electrical fluids.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But contrary to metaphysics, not only are fundamental opposites involved in every subject-matter, but these opposites mutually imply each other, are inseparably connected together, and, far from being exclusive, neither can exist or be understood except in relation to the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This characteristic of opposition is known as polarity: Fundamental opposites are polar opposites. A magnet, for example, has two poles, a north pole and a south pole. But these poles, opposite and distinct, cannot exist in separation. If the magnet is cut in two, there is not a north pole in one half and a south pole in the other, but north and south poles recur in each half. The north pole exists only as the opposite of the south, and vice versa; the one can be defined only as the opposite of the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In general, fundamental opposition has to be understood as polar opposition, and every subject-matter has to be understood in terms of the polar opposition involved in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in physics we find that attraction and repulsion are involved in every physical process in such a way that they cannot be separated or isolated the one from the other. In considering living bodies, we do not find in some cases the building up of organic compounds and in other cases their breaking down, but every life process involves both the building up and the breaking down of organic compounds. In capitalist society the increasing socialization of labor is inseparable from its opposite, the increasing centralization of capital.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This unity of opposites—the fact that opposites cannot be understood in separation one from another, but only in their inseparable connection in every field of investigation—is strikingly exemplified in mathematics. Here the fundamental operations are the two opposites, addition and subtraction. And so far is it from being the case that addition and subtraction can be understood each apart from the other, that addition can be represented as subtraction and vice versa; thus the operation of subtraction (a — b) can be represented as an addition (— b + a). Similarly a division a/b can be represented as a multiplication a x (1/b).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectics of Nature&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter 7, “Note on Mathematics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unity of opposites, their inseparable connection, is by no means to be understood as a harmonious and stable relationship, as a state of equilibrium. On the contrary, “The unity of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 11, “On Dialectics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The existence of fundamental polar oppositions, manifesting themselves in every department of nature and society, expresses itself in the &#039;&#039;conflict&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039; of opposed tendencies, which, despite phases of temporary equilibrium, lead to continual motion and development, to a perpetual coming into being and passing away of everything in existence, to sharp changes of state and transformations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, for example, the equilibrium of attractive and repulsive forces in the physical world is never more than conditional and temporary; the conflict and struggle of attraction and repulsion always asserts itself, issuing in physical changes and transformations, whether transformations on an atomic scale, chemical changes or, on a grand scale, in the explosion of stars.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Dialectics and Metaphysics ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics thinks in terms of “ready-made” things, whose properties and potentialities it seeks to fix and determine once and for all. It considers each thing by itself, in isolation from every other, in terms of irreconcilable antitheses—“either-or.” It contrasts one thing to another, one property to another, one relationship to another, not considering things in their real movement and interconnection, and not considering that every subject-matter represents a unity of opposites—opposed but inseparably connected together.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics refuses to think of things each by itself, as having a fixed nature and fixed properties— “either-or”—but it recognizes that things come into being, exist and cease to be, in a process of unending change and development, in a process of complicated and ever-changing interrelationship, in which each thing exists only in its connection with other things and goes through a series of transformations, and in which is always manifested the unity, inseparable interconnection and struggle of the opposite properties, aspects, tendencies characteristic of every phenomenon of nature and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Contrary to metaphysics, the aim of dialectics is to trace the real changes and interconnections in the world and to think of things always in their motion and interconnection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Engels writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes…. One no longer permits oneself to be imposed upon by the antitheses insuperable for the old metaphysics.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The old rigid antitheses, the sharp impassable dividing lines are more and more disappearing…. The recognition that these antagonisms and distinctions are in fact to be found in nature but only with relative validity, and that on the other hand their imagined rigidity and absoluteness have been introduced into nature only by our minds—this recognition is the kernel of the dialectical conception of nature.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Dialectics… grasps things and their images, ideas, essentially in their inter-connection, in their sequence, their movement, their birth and death.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote that the understanding of the “contradictory parts” of every phenomenon was “the essence of dialectics.” It consists in “the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature, including mind and society.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 11, “On Dialectics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, Marx wrote that: “dialectic… in its rational form is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. I, Preface to second edition, N. Y., 1947.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 7. Change and Interconnection ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The Marxist dialectical method demands that we must always consider things, not in isolation, but in their interconnection with other things, in relation to the actual conditions and circumstances of each case; and that we must consider things in their change and movement, their coming into being and going out of being, always taking particularly into account what is new, what is rising and developing.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It follows that the Marxist dialectical method forbids the employment of “ready-made schemes” and abstract formulas, but demands the thorough, detailed analysis of a process in all its concreteness, basing its conclusions only on such an analysis.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== Four Principal Features of the Marxist Dialectical Method ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; Stalin said that there are four principal features of the Marxist dialectical method.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as just an agglomeration of things, each existing independently of the others, but it considers things as “connected with, dependent on and determined by each other.” Hence it considers that nothing can be understood taken by itself, in isolation, but must always be understood “in its inseparable connection with other things, and as conditioned by them.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics considers everything as in “a state of continuous movement and change, of renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing and something always disintegrating and dying away.” Hence it considers things “not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the: process of development as “a simple process of growth,” but as “a development which passes from… quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes,” which occur “abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another.” Hence it considers development as “an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics “holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place… as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things… as a struggle of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall postpone until the next chapter consideration of the latter two features, which concern the process of development from one qualitative state to another, from the lower to the higher. In this chapter we shall consider the first two features of the dialectical method, namely, that it considers things always in their interconnection and in their movement and change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Considering Things in Their Interconnection and Circumstances ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectical method demands, first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but always in their interconnection with other things.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This sounds “obvious.” Nevertheless it is an “obvious” principle which is very often ignored and is extremely important to remember. We have already considered it and some examples of its application in discussing metaphysics, since the very essence of metaphysics is to think of things in an abstract way, isolated from their relations with other things and from the concrete circumstances in which they exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle of considering things in relation to actual conditions and circumstances, and not apart from those actual conditions and circumstances, is always of fundamental importance for the working-class movement in deciding the most elementary questions of policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, there was a time when the British workers were fighting for a ten-hour day. They were right at that time not to make their immediate demand an eight-hour day, since this was not yet a realizable demand. They were equally right, when they got a ten-hour day, not to be satisfied with it.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are times when it is correct for a section of workers to come out on strike, and there are times when it is not correct. Such matters have to be judged according to the actual circumstances of the case. Similarly there are times when it is correct to go on prolonging and extending a strike, and there are times when it is correct to call it off.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No working-class leader can be of very much value if he tries to decide questions of policy in terms of “general principle” alone, without taking into account the actual circumstances in relation to which policy has to be operated, without understanding that the same policy can be right in one case and wrong in another, depending on the concrete circumstances of each case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Of course, in politics, in which sometimes extremely complicated—national and international—relationships between classes and parties have to be dealt with… it would be absurd to concoct a recipe, or general rule… that would serve in all cases. One must have the brains to analyze the situation in each separate case.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Left-wing Communism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter VIII, N. Y., 1934.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This readiness on the part of Marxists to adapt policy to circumstances and to change policy with circumstances is sometimes called Communist “opportunism.” But it is nothing of the kind—or rather, it is the very opposite. It is the application in practice of the science of the strategy and tactics of working-class struggle. Indeed, what is meant by opportunism in relation to working-class policy? It means subordinating the long-term interests of the working class as a whole to the temporary interests of a section, sacrificing the interests of the class to defense of the temporary privileges of some particular group. Communists are guided by Marx’s principle that “they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx and Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Communist Manifesto&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And this requires that, in the interests of the movement as a whole, one must analyze the situation in each separate case, deciding what policy to pursue in each case in the light of the concrete circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On general questions, too, the greatest confusion can arise from forgetting the dialectical principle that things must not be considered in isolation but in their inseparable inter-connection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, the British Labor leaders once said, and many members of the Labor Party continue to say, that nationalization is an installment of socialism. They consider nationalization by itself, in isolation, out of connection with the state and with the social structure in relation to which nationalization measures are introduced. They overlook the fact that if the public power, the state, remains in the hands of the exploiters, and if their representatives sit on and control the boards of the nationalized industries, which continue to be run on the basis of exploiting the labor of one class for the profit of another class, then nationalization is not socialism. Socialist nationalization can come into being only when the public power, the state, is in the hands of the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, in political arguments people very often appeal to a concept of “fairness” which leads them to judge events without the slightest consideration of the real meaning of those events, of the circumstances in which they occur. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: that is the principle employed in such arguments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus it is argued that if we defend the democratic right of the workers in a capitalist country to agitate for the ending of capitalism and the introduction of socialism, then we cannot deny to others in a socialist country the right to agitate for the ending of socialism and the reintroduction of capitalism. Those who argue like this throw up their hands in horror when they find that counter-revolutionary groupings in the U.S.S.R., who sought to restore capitalism in that country, were deprived of the possibility of carrying out their aims. Why, they exclaim, this is undemocratic, this is tyranny! Such an argument overlooks the difference between fighting in the interests of the vast majority of the people to end exploitation, and fighting in the interests of a small section to preserve or reintroduce exploitation; it overlooks the difference between defending the right of the vast majority to run their affairs in their own interests, and defending the right of a small minority to keep the majority in bondage; in other words, it overlooks the difference between moving forward and backward, between putting the clock ahead and putting it back, between revolution and counter-revolution. Of course, if we fight to achieve socialism, and if we achieve it, then we shall defend what we have achieved and shall not allow the slightest possibility of any group destroying that achievement. Let the capitalists and their hangers-on shout about democracy “in general.” If, as Lenin said, we “have the brains to analyze the situation,” we shall not be deceived by them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The “liberal” concept of “fairness” has, indeed, become a favorite weapon of reaction lately. In 1949 and again in 1950, when the fascists decided to hold a demonstration in London on May Day, the Home Secretary promptly banned the workers’ May Day demonstration. If I ban one, I must ban the other, he blandly explained. How scrupulously “fair” he was!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle of understanding things in their circumstances and interconnections is likewise a very important principle in science. Yet scientists, who take things to bits and consider their various properties, very often forget that things which they may consider in isolation do not exist in isolation. And this leads to serious misunderstandings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet biologists, for example, guided by this first principle of dialectics, have stressed the unity of the organism and its environment. They have pointed out that you cannot consider the organism as having a nature of its own, isolated from its environment: that is metaphysics. Thus there is no such thing as a plant, for instance, isolated from its environment: such a plant is a mere museum piece, a dead plant artificially preserved. Living plants grow in a soil, in a climate, in an environment, and they grow and develop by assimilating that environment. Thus Lysenko defined the heredity, or nature, of an organism as its requirement of certain conditions for its life and development, and its responding to various conditions in a certain way. This understanding of the unity of organism and environment had important consequences. For it led to the expectation that by compelling an organism to adapt itself to and assimilate changed conditions, its nature could be changed. And this expectation has been verified in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The biologists of the Mendel-Morgan school, on the other hand, treat the organism abstractly, metaphysically, as isolated from its real conditions of life. They conceive of the “nature” of the organism as quite independent of its conditions of life. Hence they conclude, in true metaphysical style, that the heredity of an organism “is what is,” and that it is no use trying to change it in the ways in which Soviet biologists &#039;&#039;have&#039;&#039; changed the heredity of organisms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Considering Things in Their Movement, Their Coming into Being and Going Out of Being ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now consider some examples of the second principle of dialectics, which demands that we should consider things in their movement, their change, their coming into being and going out of being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This principle, too, is of great importance in science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet biologists, for example, guided by this principle of dialectics, have considered the organism in its growth and development. Thus at a certain stage of growth, the nature of the organism is still plastic; if you can modify it at that stage, you can often change its nature, give it a changed heredity. Something is newly coming into being in the organism, and that is the time to foster it and to give it a desired direction. But if that stage is passed, then its nature becomes fixed and you cannot change it. You must find just the right stage of growth if you wish to modify the heredity of the organism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The biologists of the Mendel-Morgan school, on the other hand, consider the nature of the organism as given and fixed from the very start.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This second principle of dialectics teaches us always to pay attention to what is new, to what is rising and growing—not just to what exists at the moment, but to what is coming into being.&lt;br /&gt;
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This principle is of paramount importance for revolutionary understanding, for revolutionary practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Russian Bolsheviks, for example, saw from the very beginning how Russian society was moving—what was new in it, what was coming into being. They looked for what was rising and growing, though it was still weak—the working class. While others discounted the importance of the working class and finished by entering into compromises with the forces of the old society, the Bolsheviks concluded that the working class was the new, rising force, and led it to victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just this same understanding of what was rising and growing and of what was disintegrating and dying away, was exemplified in Stalin’s leadership during the war, 1941-45. When the Germans were before Moscow in November 1941, and all the “allied military strategists” outside the Soviet Union considered that Russia’s defeat was certain, Stalin said that while the Germans were at the peak of their military power the Soviet forces, on the other hand, were still mobilizing and increasing. Therefore the defeat of the German fascists was certain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Germany, whose reserves of manpower are already being exhausted, has been considerably more weakened than the Soviet Union, whose reserves are only now being mobilized to the full…. Can there be any doubt that we can, and are bound to, defeat the German invaders? The German invaders are straining their last efforts. There is no doubt that Germany cannot sustain such a strain for long.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Speeches of November 6 and 7, 1941, N. Y., 1945.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly today, when press and radio are full of the boasts and threats of the American imperialists and their henchmen, we stress that which is rising and growing all over the world, the people’s camp of peace, which is bound to continue to grow and to overwhelm the imperialists in shameful disaster.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again, in the fight for unity of the working-class movement, in relation to the British Labor Party and the affiliated trade unions, we pay attention above all to that which is arising and growing in the movement. Therefore we see a great deal more than the policy of the right-wing leaders and their influence. The right wing has its basis in the past, though it is still strong and dominant. But there are arising the forces of the future, determined to fight against capitalism and war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly in relation to individual people—we should foster and build on what is coming to birth in them, what is rising and moving ahead. This is what a good secretary or organizer does.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such examples as these show that the basis of the dialectical method, its most essential principle, is to study and understand things in their concrete interconnection and movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Against “Ready-made Schemes”—“Truth Is Always Concrete” ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sometimes people imagine that dialectics is a preconceived scheme, into the pattern of which everything is supposed to fit. This is the very opposite of the truth about dialectics. The employment of the Marxist dialectical method does not mean that we apply a preconceived scheme and try to make everything fit into it. No, it means that we study things as they really are, in their real interconnection and movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is something which Lenin insisted on again and again. Indeed, he proclaimed it as “the fundamental thesis of dialectics.” “Genuine dialectics,” Lenin wrote, proceeds “by means of a thorough, detailed analysis of a process in all its concreteness. The fundamental thesis of dialectics is: there is no such thing as abstract truth, truth is always concrete.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 2, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;One Step Forward, Two Steps Back&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Section R, “Something about Dialectics.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What did he mean by “truth is always concrete”? Just that we will not get at the truth about things, about either nature or society, by thinking up some general scheme, some abstract formula; but only by trying to work out as regards each process just what are the forces at work, how they are related, which are rising and growing and which are decaying and dying away, and on this basis reaching an estimate of the process as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So Engels said: “There could be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it…. Nature is the test of dialectics.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Preface and Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As regards the study of society, and the estimate we make of real social changes on which we base our political strategy, Lenin ridiculed those who took some abstract, preconceived scheme as their guide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to some “authorities,” the Marxist dialectics laid it down that all development must proceed through “triads”—thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Lenin ridiculed this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It is clear to everybody that the main burden of Engels’ argument is that materialists must depict the historical process correctly and accurately, and that insistence on… selection of examples which demonstrate the correctness of the triad is nothing but a relic of Hegelianism…. And, indeed, once it has been categorically declared that to attempt to ‘prove’ anything by triads is absurd, what significance can examples of ‘dialectical’ process have?… Anyone who reads the definition and description of the dialectical method given by Engels will see that the Hegelian triads are not even mentioned, and that it all amounts to regarding social evolution as a natural-historical process of development….&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What Marx and Engels called the dialectical method… is nothing more nor less than the scientific method in sociology, which consists in regarding society as a living organism in a constant state of development… the study of which requires an objective analysis of the relations of production that constitute the given social formation and an investigation of its laws of functioning and development.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 1, “What the Friends of the People Are and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats,” Part I.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us consider some examples of what the “analysis of a process in all its concreteness” and the principle that “truth is always concrete” mean, in contrast to the method of trying to lay down some preconceived scheme of social development and of appealing to such a scheme as a basis for policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In tsarist Russia the Mensheviks used to say: “We must have capitalism before socialism.” First capitalism must go through its full development, then socialism will follow: that was their scheme. Consequently they supported the liberals in politics and enjoined the workers to do no more than fight for better conditions in the capitalist factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin repudiated this silly scheme. He showed that the liberals, frightened by the workers, would compromise with the tsar; but that the alliance of workers with peasants could take the lead from them, overthrow the tsar, and then go on to overthrow the capitalists and build socialism before ever capitalism was able to develop fully.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the proletarian revolution was successful, another scheme was propounded—this time by Trotsky. “You can’t build socialism in one country. Unless the revolution takes place in the advanced capitalist countries, socialism cannot come in Russia.” Lenin and Stalin showed that this scheme, too, was false. For even if the revolution did not take place in the advanced capitalist countries, the alliance of workers and peasants in the Soviet Union had still the forces to build socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Western European countries it used often to be said: “We must have fascism before communism.” First the capitalists will abandon democracy and introduce the fascist dictatorship, and then the workers will overthrow the fascist dictatorship. But the Communists replied, no, we will fight together with all the democratic forces to preserve bourgeois democracy and to defeat the fascists, and that will create the best conditions for going forward to win working-class power and to commence to build socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, today we sometimes hear the argument: “Capitalism means war, therefore war is inevitable.” True enough, so long as capitalism, which has long ago entered its last (imperialist) phase, persists, there must inevitably be conflicts between the rival powers, and these conflicts are such as to entail the inevitability of imperialist wars. But the imperialists cannot make war without the people. The more they prepare war, the more open their aggressiveness becomes, the more one power attempts to impose its domination on another, and the more hardships they impose on the people, the more can the people be rallied to oppose their war. Therefore in any instance when war threatens, that war can be prevented and postponed. And by fighting to preserve peace, we can lay the basis for ending the conditions which pose the inevitability of war. Imperialist war plans can be defeated; they can be defeated if the working class rallies all the peace-loving forces around itself. And imperialism itself, with the consequent inevitability of war, can be ended. If we defeat the imperialist war plans, that will be the best road towards the ending of capitalism itself and the building of socialism. Imperialism will not be ended by waiting for it to wreck itself in inevitable wars, but by uniting to prevent the realization of its war plans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all these examples it will be seen that the acceptance of some ready-made scheme, some abstract formula, means passivity, support for capitalism, betrayal of the working class and of socialism. But the dialectical approach which understands things in their concrete interconnection and movement, shows us how to forge ahead—how to fight, what allies to draw in. That is the inestimable value of the Marxist dialectical method to the working-class movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 8. The Laws of Development ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;To understand development we must understand the distinction between quantitative change—increase and decrease—and qualitative change—the passing into a new state, the emergence of something new.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Quantitative change always leads at a certain critical point to qualitative change. And similarly qualitative differences and qualitative changes always rest on quantitative differences and quantitative changes.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Development must be understood, therefore, not as a simple process of growth but as a process which passes from quantitative changes to open, fundamental qualitative changes.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Further, this transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes takes place as a result of the conflict or struggle of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of the contradictions inherent in all things and processes.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Marxist dialectical method, therefore, teaches us to understand processes of development in terms of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes, and to seek the grounds and the explanation of such development in the unity and struggle of opposites.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== What Do We Mean by “Development”? ====&lt;br /&gt;
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In stressing the need to study real processes in their movement and in all their interconnections, Stalin pointed out that in the processes of nature and history there is always “renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing and something always disintegrating and dying away.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When that which is arising and developing comes to fruition, and that which is disintegrating and dying away finally disappears, there emerges something &#039;&#039;new.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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For as we saw in criticizing mechanistic materialism, processes do not always keep repeating the same cycle of changes, but advance from stage to stage as something new continually emerges.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the real meaning of the word “development.” We speak of “development” where stage by stage something new keeps emerging.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus there is a difference between mere &#039;&#039;change&#039;&#039; and development. Development is change proceeding according to its own internal laws from stage to stage.&lt;br /&gt;
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And there is equally a difference between &#039;&#039;growth&#039;&#039; and development. This difference is familiar to biologists, for example. Thus growth means getting bigger—merely quantitative change. But development means, not getting bigger, but passing into a qualitatively new stage, becoming qualitatively different. For example, a caterpillar grows longer and fatter; then it spins itself a cocoon, and finally emerges as a butterfly. This is development. A caterpillar &#039;&#039;grows&#039;&#039; into a bigger caterpillar; it &#039;&#039;develops&#039;&#039; into a butterfly.&lt;br /&gt;
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Processes of nature and history exemplify, not merely change, not merely growth, but development. Can we, then, reach any conclusions about the general laws of development? This is the further task of materialist dialectics—to find what general laws are manifested in all development, and to give us, therefore, the &#039;&#039;method of approach&#039;&#039; for understanding, explaining and controlling development.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Quantity and Quality: The Law of the Transformation of Quantitative into Qualitative Changes ====&lt;br /&gt;
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This brings us to the two latter features of the Marxist dialectical method, as explained by Stalin. The first of these may be called “the law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change.” What does this mean?&lt;br /&gt;
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All change has a quantitative aspect, that is, an aspect of mere increase or decrease which does not alter the nature of that which changes. But quantitative change, increase or decrease, cannot go on indefinitely. At a certain point it always leads to a qualitative change; and at that critical point (or “nodal point,” as Hegel called it) the qualitative change takes place relatively suddenly, by a leap, as it were.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, if water is being heated, it does not go on getting hotter and hotter indefinitely; at a certain critical temperature, it begins to turn into steam, undergoing a qualitative change from liquid to gas. A cord used to lift a weight may have a greater and greater load attached to it, but no cord can lift a load indefinitely great: at a certain point, the cord is bound to break. A boiler may withstand a greater and greater pressure of steam—up to the point where it bursts. A variety of plant may be subjected to a series of changes in its conditions of growth for a number of generations—for instance, to colder temperatures; the variety continues unchanged, until a point is reached when suddenly a qualitative change is induced, a change in the heredity of the plant. In this way spring wheats have been transformed into winter wheats, and vice versa, as a result of the accumulation of a series of quantitative changes.&lt;br /&gt;
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This law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change is also met with in society. Thus before the system of industrial capitalism comes into being there takes place a process of the accumulation of wealth in money form in a few private hands (largely by colonial plunder), and of the formation of a propertyless proletariat (by enclosures and the driving of peasants off the land). At a certain point in this process, when &#039;&#039;enough&#039;&#039; money is accumulated to provide capital for industrial undertakings, when &#039;&#039;enough&#039;&#039; people have been proletarianized to provide the labor required, the conditions have matured for the development of industrial capitalism. At this point an accumulation of quantitative changes gives rise to a new qualitative stage in the development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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In general, qualitative changes happen with relative suddenness—by a leap. Something new is suddenly born, though its potentiality was already contained in the gradual evolutionary process of continuous quantitative change which went before.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus we find that continuous, gradual quantitative change leads at a certain point to discontinuous, sudden qualitative change. We have already remarked in an earlier chapter that most of those who have considered the laws of development in nature and society have conceived of this development only in its continuous aspect. This means that they have considered it only from the aspect of a process of growth, of quantitative change, and have not considered its qualitative aspect, the fact that at a certain point in the gradual process of growth a new quality suddenly arises, a transformation takes place.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet this is what always happens. If you are boiling a kettle, the water suddenly begins to boil when boiling point is reached. If you are scrambling eggs, the mixture in the pan suddenly “scrambles.” And it is the same if you are engaged in changing society. We will only change capitalist society into socialist society when the rule of one class is replaced by the rule of another class—and this is a radical transformation, a leap to a new state of society, a revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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If, on the other hand, we consider quality itself, then qualitative change always arises as a result of an accumulation of quantitative changes, and differences in quality have their basis in differences of quantity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus just as quantitative change must at a certain point give rise to qualitative change, so if we wish to bring about qualitative change we must study its quantitative basis, and know what must be increased and what diminished if the required change is to be brought about.&lt;br /&gt;
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Natural science teaches us how purely quantitative difference—addition or subtraction—makes a qualitative difference in nature. For example, the addition of one proton in the nucleus of an atom makes the transition from one element to another.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a simple account of the physical phenomena referred to in this and in our next example see &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Challenge of Atomic Energy&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, by E. H. S. Burhop, London, 1951.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The atoms of all the elements are formed out of combinations of the same protons and electrons, but a purely quantitative difference between the numbers combined in the atom gives different kinds of atoms, atoms of different elements with different chemical properties. Thus an atom consisting of one proton and one electron is a hydrogen atom, but if another proton and another electron are added it is an atom of helium, and so on. Similarly in chemical compounds, the addition of one atom to a molecule makes the difference between substances with different chemical properties. In general, different qualities have their basis in quantitative difference.&lt;br /&gt;
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As Engels put it:&lt;br /&gt;
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“In nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion….&lt;br /&gt;
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“All qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical composition or on different quantities or forms of motion or, as is almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; without quantitative alteration of the body concerned.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectics of Nature&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This feature of the dialectical law connecting quality and quantity is familiar to readers of the popular literature about atomic bombs. To make a uranium bomb it is necessary to have the isotope, uranium-235; the more common isotope, uranium-238, will not do. The difference between these two is merely quantitative, a difference in atomic weight, depending on the number of neutrons present in each case. But this quantitative difference of atomic weight, 235 and 238, makes the qualitative difference between a substance with the properties required for the bomb and a substance without those properties. Further, having got a quantity of uranium-235, a certain “critical mass” of it is required before it will explode. If there is not enough, the chain reaction which constitutes the explosion will not occur; when the “critical mass” is reached, the reaction does occur.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus we see that quantitative changes are transformed at a certain point into qualitative changes, and qualitative differences rest on quantitative differences. This is a universal feature of development. What makes such development happen?&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Development Takes Place Through the Unity and Struggle of Opposites ====&lt;br /&gt;
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In general, the reason why in any particular case a quantitative change leads to a qualitative change lies in the very nature, in the content, of the particular processes involved. Therefore in each case we can, if we only know enough, explain just why a qualitative change is inevitable, and why it takes place at the point it does.&lt;br /&gt;
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To explain this we have to study the facts of the case. We cannot invent an explanation with the aid of dialectics alone; where an understanding of dialectics helps is that it gives us the clue as to where to look. In a particular case we may not yet know how and why the change takes place. In that case we have the task of finding out, by investigating the facts of the case. For there is nothing unknowable, no essential mystery or secret of development, of the emergence of the qualitatively new.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us consider, for example, the case of the qualitative change which takes place when water boils.&lt;br /&gt;
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When heat is applied to a mass of water contained in a kettle, then the effect is to increase the motion of the molecules composing the water. So long as the water remains in its liquid state, the forces of attraction between the molecules are sufficient to insure that, though some of the surface molecules are continually escaping, the whole mass coheres together as a mass of water inside the kettle. At boiling point, however, the motion of the molecules has become sufficiently violent for large numbers of them to begin jumping clear of the mass. A qualitative change is therefore observed. The water begins to bubble and the whole mass is rapidly transformed into steam. This change evidently occurs as a result of the oppositions operating within the mass of water—the tendency of the molecules to move apart and jump free versus the forces of attraction between them. The former tendency is reinforced to the point where it overcomes the latter as a result, in this case, of the external application of heat.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another example we have considered is that of a cord which breaks when its load becomes too great. Here again, the qualitative change takes place as a result of the opposition set up between the tensile strength of the cord and the pull of the load. Again, when a spring wheat is transformed into a winter wheat, this is a result of the opposition between the plant’s “conservatism” and the changing conditions of growth and development to which it is subjected; at a certain point, the influence of the latter overcomes the former.&lt;br /&gt;
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These examples prepare us for the general conclusion that, as Stalin puts it, “the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes” consists in the struggle of opposites— opposite tendencies, opposite forces—within the things and process concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the law that quantitative changes are transformed into qualitative changes, and that differences in quality are based on differences in quantity, leads us to the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here is the way Stalin formulates this law of dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a ‘struggle’ of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectical and Historical Materialism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand development, to understand how and why quantitative changes lead to qualitative changes, to understand how and why the transition takes place from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, we have to understand the contradictions inherent in each thing and process we are considering, and how a “struggle” of opposite tendencies arises on the basis of these contradictions.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have to understand this concretely, in each case, bearing in mind Lenin’s warning that “the fundamental thesis of dialectics is: truth is always concrete.” We cannot deduce the laws of development in the concrete case from the general principles of dialectics: we have to discover them by actual investigation in each case. But dialectics tells us what to look for.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Dialectics of Social Development—The Contradictions of Capitalism ====&lt;br /&gt;
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The dialectics of development—the unity and struggle of opposites—has been most thoroughly worked out in the Marxist science of society. Here, from the standpoint of the working-class struggle, on the basis of working-class experience, we can work out the dialectic of the contradictions of capitalism and of their development very exactly.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the principles involved in the development of society are not opposed to but are in essence the same as those involved in the development of nature, though different in their form of manifestation in each case. Thus Engels said:&lt;br /&gt;
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“I was not in doubt—that amid the welter of innumerable changes taking place in nature the same dialectical laws of motion are in operation as those which in history govern the apparent fortuitousness of events.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How Marxism understands the contradictions of capitalism and their development, this crowning triumph of the dialectical method, was explained in general terms by Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic contradiction of capitalism is not simply the conflict of two classes, which confront one another as two external forces which come into conflict. No, it is the contradiction within the social system itself, on the basis of which the class conflict arises and operates.&lt;br /&gt;
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Capitalism brought about:&lt;br /&gt;
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“The concentration of the means of production in large workshops and manufactories, their transformation into means of production which were in fact social. But the social means of production and the social products were treated as if they were still, as they had been before, the means of production and the products of individuals. Hitherto, the owner of the instruments of labor had appropriated the product because it was as a rule his own product, the auxiliary labor of other persons being the exception; now, the owner of the instruments of production continued to appropriate the product, although it was no longer &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; product, but exclusively the product of &#039;&#039;others’ labor.&#039;&#039; Thus, therefore, the products, now socially produced, were not appropriated by those who had really set the means of production in motion and really produced the products, but by the &#039;&#039;capitalists&#039;&#039;.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Part III, Chapter II; or &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Socialism, Utopian and Scientific&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter III, N. Y., 1935.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic contradiction of capitalism is, therefore, the contradiction between socialized production and capitalist appropriation. It is on the basis of this contradiction that the struggle between the classes develops.&lt;br /&gt;
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“In this contradiction… the whole conflict of today is already present in germ…. The contradiction between social production and capitalist appropriation became manifest as the antagonism between proletariat and bourgeoisie.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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And the contradiction can only be resolved by the victory of the working class, when the working class sets up its own dictatorship and initiates social ownership and appropriation to correspond to social production.&lt;br /&gt;
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This example very exactly illustrates the point of what Stalin said about “struggle of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.” The class struggle exists and operates on the basis of the contradictions inherent in the social system itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is from the struggle of opposite tendencies, opposing forces, arising on the basis of the contradictions inherent in the social system, that social transformation, the leap to a qualitatively new stage of social development, takes place.&lt;br /&gt;
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This process has its quantitative aspect. The working class increases in numbers and organization. Capital becomes more concentrated, more centralized.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital… grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. I, Chapter XXXII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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With this quantitative process of increase and decrease, the basic contradiction of socialized labor and private appropriation becomes intensified—for the social character of labor is magnified while capital accumulates and is concentrated in the hands of a diminishing number of great “magnates of capital”—and the tension between the opposing forces becomes intensified, too. At length quantitative change gives rise to qualitative change.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The expropriators are expropriated.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In this way the laws of dialectical development, summarized in the principles of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change and of the unity and struggle of opposites, are found at work in the development of society; this development is to be understood in terms of the operation of those laws; and this dialectical understanding, once it has become the theoretical possession of the working class, serves as an indispensable instrument of the working class in carrying into effect the socialist transformation of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 9. The New and the Old ===&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The struggle of opposed forces which constitutes the driving force of development does not take place accidentally but on the basis of internal contradictions inherent in the very nature of the processes concerned. There arises a contradiction between the new and the old; that which is arising and growing contradicts that which is dying away and disappearing. And this fact is strikingly exemplified in the development of society.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;In the process of development the new grows strong and overpowers the old, and this leads to the forward movement of development, in which each stage is an advance to something new, not a falling back to some stage already passed.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Since development proceeds by the overcoming and supplanting of the old by the new it follows that development can only proceed by the negation of the old and not by its preservation.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Contradictions Inherent in Things and Processes—Internal Contradictions ====&lt;br /&gt;
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In the last chapter we considered how qualitative change is brought about by the struggle of opposed forces. This was exemplified equally in the change of state of a body, from liquid to solid or gas, and in the change of society from capitalism to socialism. In each case there are “opposite tendencies” at work, whose “struggle” eventuates in some fundamental transformation, a qualitative change.&lt;br /&gt;
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This “struggle” is not external and accidental. It is not adequately understood if we suppose that it is a question of forces or tendencies arising quite independently the one of the other, which happen to meet, to bump up against each other, so to speak, and to come into conflict.&lt;br /&gt;
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No. The struggle is internal and necessary; for it arises and follows from the contradictory nature of the process as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other&lt;br /&gt;
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but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single contradictory whole, and they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the opposed tendencies which operate in the course of the change of state of a body operate on the basis of the contradictory unity of attractive and repulsive forces inherent in all physical phenomena. And the class struggle which operates in capitalist society operates on the basis of the contradictory unity of socialized labor and private appropriation inherent in that society.&lt;br /&gt;
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This dialectical understanding of the internal necessity of the struggle of opposed forces, and of its outcome, based on the contradictions inherent in the process as a whole, is no mere refinement of philosophical analysis. It is of very great practical importance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Bourgeois theorists, for example, are well able to recognize the fact of class conflicts in capitalist society. What they do not recognize is the necessity of this conflict; that it is based on contradictions inherent in the very nature of the capitalist system and that, therefore, the struggle can only culminate in and end with the destruction of the system itself and its replacement by a new, higher system of society. So they seek to mitigate the class conflict, to tone it down and reconcile the opposing classes, or to stamp it out, and so to preserve the system intact. And precisely this bourgeois understanding of the class conflict is brought into the labor movement by Social Democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is in opposition to such a shallow, metaphysical way of understanding class conflict that Lenin points out:&lt;br /&gt;
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“The main point in the teaching of Marx is the class struggle. This has very often been said and written. But this is not true. Out of this error, here and there, springs an opportunist distortion of Marxism, such a falsification of it as to make it acceptable to the bourgeoisie. The theory of the class struggle was &#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;created by Marx, but by the bourgeoisie &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; Marx and is, generally speaking, &#039;&#039;acceptable&#039;&#039; to the bourgeoisie. He who recognizes &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; the class struggle is not yet a Marxist; he may be found not to have gone beyond the boundaries of bourgeois reasoning and politics. To limit Marxism to the teaching of the class struggle means to curtail Marxism—to distort it, to reduce it to something which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. A Marxist is one who &#039;&#039;extends&#039;&#039; the acceptance of the class struggle to the acceptance of the &#039;&#039;dictatorship of the proletariat.&#039;&#039; Herein lies the deepest difference between a Marxist and an ordinary petty or big bourgeois. On this touchstone it is necessary to test a &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039;understanding and acceptance of Marxism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The State and Revolution&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter II, Section 3, N. Y., 1932.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In general, we understand contradiction as inherent in, belonging to the very essence of, a given system or process; the struggle through which development takes place is not an external clash of accidentally opposed factors, but is based on contradictions in the very essence of things; and thus is determined the necessary outcome, the necessary solution of the contradiction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, conflicts of an external, accidental character also occur in nature and society. But these are not of decisive importance in determining the course of development.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== The Contradiction Between Old and New, Past and Future ====&lt;br /&gt;
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If we consider a process of development as a whole, as, in Stalin’s words, “an onward and upward movement” involving at each stage “a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state,” then it reveals itself as the continuous posing and solution of a series of contradictions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new stage of development comes into being from the working out of the contradiction and struggle inherent in the old. And the new stage itself contains the germ of a new contradiction. For it comes into being containing something of the past from which it springs and something of the future to which it leads. It has, therefore, its “negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing.” On this basis there once again arises within it “the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Hence development continually drives forward to fresh development; the whole process at each stage is in essence the struggle between the old and the new, that which is dying and that which is being born.&lt;br /&gt;
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This dialectical character of development is strikingly exemplified in social development—in, for example, the stage of development with which we ourselves are specially concerned, the development from capitalism to socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic contradiction of capitalism is that between socialized production and capitalist appropriation. This itself is the contradiction between the new and the old in society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Capitalist appropriation carries on the old institution of private property in the implements of production, under which the owner of the implements of production appropriated the product. The artisan owned his tools and his product. This private ownership of the implements of production and of the product by the individual producer is carried over and transformed into the ownership and appropriation by the capitalist. But while private ownership and appropriation is carried on from the former state of society, what is quite new, what is newly born, arising and advancing in capitalist society, is the socialization of production. The old, petty individual production is destroyed; production is carried on in a new socialized way in great workshops by hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of workers. The old individual producer is expropriated from his means of production (the peasant is turned off his bit of land, the artisan loses his little workshop), yet the means of production are still privately owned and the product still appropriated—by the individual capitalist or capitalist concern. What the capitalist appropriates, however, is no longer the product of his own labor, but the social product of the social labor of others. Hence this private capitalist appropriation now contradicts the new socialized character of production. In this way, as capitalist society comes into being and develops, the old contradicts the new.&lt;br /&gt;
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At first capitalism continues to expand, bringing all aspects of economy under its sway and extending its sway over the whole world. But then begins its process of decline. The contradictions reach a breaking point. Capitalism enters into its period of death throes, the general crisis of capitalism. A handful of great monopolists stands opposed to the working class in the capitalist countries; and not only to the working class in the capitalist countries but to the millions of oppressed peoples in the colonial territories. The old masters of the world stand opposed to its future masters—the past to the future. Moreover, rival groups of monopolists stand opposed to one another, as new imperialist claimants to world domination rise and confront the older-established powers. The system begins to break at its weakest points; first in one country, then in a series of countries, the capitalists are overpowered and the new system of socialism begins to arise, so that a new socialist power building up in part of the world confronts the old capitalist power dying but fighting for life in the rest of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the old goes down, fighting against the new. The new grows strong, overpowers and supplants the old. Such is the pattern of development.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== The Forward Movement of Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
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This pattern of development is the dialectic of forward movement—“in which,” as Engels said, “in spite of all seeming accidents and all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The process moves forward from stage to stage, each stage being a genuine advance to something new, not a falling back to some stage already past.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this process of development there are processes of advance, the birth and surging forward of the new, and processes of decay, the decline and fall of the old. Of course, there are times and occasions when the process of decay may become paramount, and when the forces of advance are not sufficiently strong to overcome the old and to supplant it. This has occurred in the past, for instance, in the history of society, when civilizations have disintegrated and disappeared, because they decayed and the forces of advance were not strongly enough developed in them to carry them forward. No matter. Despite such “temporary retrogression,” the “progressive development asserts itself in the end.”&lt;br /&gt;
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At the present day there are people who talk about the likelihood of “the end of civilization.” If we considered only the capitalist forces, such an end might well be expected. If there were no Soviet Union, if there were no People’s China, if there were no organized working-class movement, no national liberation movement, no peace movement, then the capitalists would quite certainly destroy their own civilization. But in fact there have already risen and grown tens of millions strong the new forces which will carry civilization forward from capitalism to socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The overall, long-term, forward-moving process of development takes place, not in a straight line, but in a series of zig-zags, of particular and seemingly accidental occurrences, of temporary setbacks; for the development as a whole is but the summation of an entire complex of infinitely various changes and interrelations. If, then, we want to understand how the development proceeds in the concrete case, we have to see it as taking its course through a series of particular, concrete events. On the other hand, if we want to understand these particular events themselves, we should understand them, not in isolation, but in their context within the process of development as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As concerns particular changes of particular things which take part in the process of development, they do not, of course, all fall into a single pattern of “forward movement.” There are manifold comings and goings and interactions of particular things, changes of form and changes of state, changes of one thing into another and destruction of one thing by another, cycles of change which revert again to the original starting point, and so on. Dialectics, as the study of processes in all their concreteness, in all their manifold changes and interconnections, is concerned with all these processes. Here, however, we are concerned with the general laws of the overall process of development, as an “onward and upward movement” manifested in a series of “transitions from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Role of Negation in Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This general forward movement, as we have seen, infinitely complex as it is in detail, takes place through the struggle of the new and the old and the overcoming of the old and dying by the new and rising.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This dialectical conception of development is opposed to the older liberal conception favored by bourgeois theoreticians. The bourgeois liberals recognize development and assert that progress is a universal law of nature and society. But they see development as a gradual and smooth process, proceeding through a series of easy and imperceptible changes. They may recognize struggle where they cannot help but notice it; but to them it seems an unfortunate interruption of orderly progress, more likely to impede development than to help it forward. For them, what exists has not to be supplanted by what is coming into existence, the old has not to be overcome by the new, but it has to be &#039;&#039;preserved,&#039;&#039; so that it can gradually improve itself and become a higher existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
True to this philosophy, which they took over from the capitalists, the Social Democrats strove to preserve capitalism, with the idea that it could imperceptibly grow into socialism; and thus striving to preserve capitalism, they end by fighting, not for socialism, but against it. When the struggle is on, these exponents of social peace and class collaboration cannot avoid struggle: they simply enter into it on the other side.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comparing the dialectical materialist, or revolutionary, conception of development with this liberal, reformist conception of development, we may say that the one recognizes and embraces, while the other fails to recognize and shrinks from, the role of &#039;&#039;negation&#039;&#039; in development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, we cannot assert that the transition from the old state to the new, from one quality to another, must always take place in exactly the same way. For, as we have already seen, dialectics does not mean applying some preconceived scheme to every process, but, on the contrary, every process has its own dialectic, which must be deduced from the study of the process itself. Thus while dialectics teaches us to recognize how the old supplants the new in a sudden, revolutionary way, by a blow in which the old is abolished and the new established in its place, we must also take into account how the transition to a new quality takes place in a different way—not by a sudden blow, but “by the gradual and prolonged accumulation of the elements of the new quality… and the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Marxism and Linguistics&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter I, N. Y., 1951.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Both types of transition are exemplified in nature, and also in society. The gradual process is manifested, for example, as Stalin has recently pointed out, in the development of languages. And again, while fundamental changes in society take place through revolutionary upheavals so long as antagonistic classes exist, such revolutions are no longer necessary after antagonistic classes have been finally abolished in socialist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal’s mistake lies, not in recognizing the occurrence of gradual changes, but in recognizing nothing else and failing to comprehend the role of negation in development. Dialectics teaches us to understand that the new must struggle with and overcome the old, that the old must give way to and be supplanted by the new—in other words, that the old must be &#039;&#039;negated.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal, who thinks metaphysically, understands negation simply as saying: “No.” To him negation is merely the end to something. Far from meaning advance, it means retreat; far from meaning gain, it means loss. Dialectics, on the other hand, teaches us not to be afraid of negation, but to understand how it becomes a condition of progress, a means to positive advance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 10. The Negation of Negation ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The dialectical conception of development through negation is opposed to the liberal conception of development. For the liberal, negation is simply a blow which destroys something. But on the contrary, negation is the condition for positive advance, in which the old is abolished only after it has already produced the conditions for the transition to the new, and in which all the positive achievement belonging to the old stage is carried forward into the new.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Moreover, a stage already passed can be re-created on a higher level as a result of double negation, the negation of the negation. According to the liberal conception of development, if a given stage of development is to be raised to a higher level this must take place gradually and peacefully, without the process of negation. But on the contrary, it is only through a double negation that the higher stage can be reached.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The repetition of the old stage on a higher level taking place through the negation of negation is a comprehensive and important law of development, the operation of which is exemplified in many processes of nature, history and thought.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Positive Character of Negation ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no,” wrote Engels.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Part I, Chapter XIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When in the process of development the old stage is negated by the new, then, in the first place, that new stage could not have come about except as arising from and in opposition to the old. The conditions for the existence of the new arose and matured within the old. The negation is a positive advance, brought about only by the development of that which is negated. The old is not simply abolished, leaving things as though it had never existed: it is abolished only after it has itself given rise to the conditions for the new stage of advance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the second place, the old stage, which is negated, itself constitutes a stage of advance in the forward-moving process of development as a whole. It is negated, but the advance which took place in it is not negated. On the contrary, this advance is carried forward to the new stage, which takes into itself and carries forward all the past achievement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example: socialism replaces capitalism—it negates it. But the conditions for the rise and victory of socialism were born of capitalism, and socialism comes into existence as the next stage of social development after capitalism. Every achievement, every advance in the forces of production, and likewise every cultural achievement, which took place under capitalism, is not destroyed when capitalism is destroyed, but, on the contrary, is preserved and carried further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This positive content of negation is not understood by liberals, for whom negation is “simply saying no.” Moreover, they think of negation as coming only from outside, externally. Something is developing very well, and then something else comes from outside and negates it—destroys it. That is their conception. That something by its own development leads to its own negation, and thereby to a higher stage of development—lies outside their comprehension.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the liberals conceive of social revolution not only as a catastrophe, as an end to ordered progress, but they believe that such a catastrophe can be brought about only by outside forces. If a revolution threatens to upset the capitalist system, that is not because of the development of the contradictions of that system itself, but is due to “agitators.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, there &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; negation which takes the form simply of a blow from outside which destroys something. For instance, if I am walking along the road and am knocked down by a car, I suffer negation of a purely negative sort. Such occurrences are frequent both in nature and in society. But this is not how we must understand negation if we are to understand the positive role of negation in the process of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At each stage in the process of development there arises the struggle of the new with the old. The new arises and grows strong within the old conditions, and when it is strong enough it overcomes and destroys the old. This is the negation of the past stage of development, of the old qualitative state; and it means the coming into being of the new and higher stage of development, the new qualitative state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Negation of Negation ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This brings us to a further dialectical feature of development— the negation of negation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the liberal idea that negation “means simply saying no,” if the negation is negated, then the original position is restored once more without change. According to this idea, negation is simply a negative, a taking away. Hence if the negation, the taking away, is itself negated, that merely means putting back again what was taken away. If a thief takes my watch, and then I take it away from him, we are back where we started—I have the watch again. Similarly, if I say, “It’s going to be a fine day,” and you say, “No, it’s going to be a wet day,” to which I reply, “No, it’s not going to be a wet day,” I have simply, by negating your negation, restated my original proposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is enshrined in the principle of formal logic, “not not-A equals A.” According to this principle, negation of negation is a fruitless proceeding. It just takes you back where you started.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us, however, consider a real process of development and the dialectical negation which takes place in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Society develops from primitive communism to the slave system. The next stage is feudalism. The next stage is capitalism. Each stage arises from the previous one, and negates it. So far we have simply a succession of stages, each following as the negation of the other and constituting a higher stage of development. But what comes next? Communism. Here there is a return to the beginning, but at a higher level of development. In place of primitive communism, based on extremely primitive forces of production, comes communism based on extremely advanced forces of production and containing within itself tremendous new potentialities of development. The old, primitive classless society has become the new and higher classless society. It has been raised, as it were, to a higher power, has reappeared on a higher level. But this has happened only because the old classless society was negated by the appearance of classes and the development of class society, and because finally class society, when it had gone through its whole development, was itself negated by the working class taking power, ending exploitation of man by man, and establishing a new classless society on the foundation of all the achievements of the whole previous development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the negation of negation. But it does not take us back to the original starting point. It takes us forward to a new starting point, which is the original one raised, through its negation and the negation of the negation, to a higher level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we see that in the course of development, as a result of a double negation, a later stage can repeat an earlier stage, but repeat it on a higher level of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is “a development that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise (in a new way), on a higher basis… a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. I. Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Teachings of Karl Marx&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, N. Y., 1930.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is a conception of development, like that of dialectical negation in general, which the liberal outlook cannot stomach. To the liberal outlook development seems to be a smooth, upward course proceeding through a series of small changes. If a given stage of development is to be raised to a higher level, then this must take place gradually and peacefully, through the “harmonious unfolding” of all the higher potentialities latent in the original stage. But on the contrary, the facts show that it is only through struggle and through negation that the higher stage is won. The development takes place not as “a harmonious unfolding” but as “a disclosure of contradictions,” in which the lower stage is negated—destroyed; in which the development which follows its negation is itself negated; and in which the higher stage is reached only as a result of that double negation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As Hegel put it, the higher end of development is reached only through “the suffering, the patience and the labor of the negative.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hegel, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Phenomenology of Mind&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== A Comprehensive and Important Law of Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In discussing the negation of negation we must again stress what was said earlier, namely, that the essence of dialectics is to study a process “in all its concreteness,” to work out how it actually takes place, and not to impose on it some preconceived scheme and then try to “prove” the necessity of the real process reproducing the ideal scheme. We do not say in advance that every process will exemplify the negation of negation. Still less do we use this conception to try to “prove” anything.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Referring to Marx’s demonstration of the occurrence of the negation of negation in history, Engels said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In characterizing the process as the negation of the negation, therefore, Marx does not dream of attempting to prove by this that the process was historically necessary. On the contrary: after he has proved from history that in fact the process has partially already occurred, and partially must occur in the future, he then also characterizes it as a process which develops in accordance with a definite historical law. That is all.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Part I, Chapter XIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Dialectics teaches us that we shall understand the laws of development of each particular process by studying that process itself, in its development. But when we do that, we shall discover the repetition of the old stage on a higher level taking place through the negation of negation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What, therefore, is the negation of the negation?” wrote Engels. “An extremely general—and for this reason extremely comprehensive and important—law of development of nature, history and thought…. It is obvious that in describing any evolutionary process as the negation of the negation I do not say anything concerning the &#039;&#039;particular&#039;&#039; process of development…. When I say that all these processes are the negation of negation, I bring them all together under this one law of motion, and for this very reason I leave out of account the peculiarities of each separate process. Dialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How “extremely comprehensive and important” is this law of development can be shown in numerous examples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen how the negation of the negation occurs in history in the development from primitive communism to communism. It occurs again in the development of individual property. Marx pointed out that the pre-capitalist “individual private property founded on the labors of the proprietor” is negated—destroyed—by capitalist private property. For capitalist private property arises only on the ruin and expropriation of the pre-capitalist individual producers. The individual producer used to own his instruments of production and his product—both were taken away from him by the capitalists. But when capitalist private property is itself negated—when “the expropriators are expropriated”—then the individual property of the producers is restored once more, but in a new form, on a higher level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039; on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. I, Chapter XXXII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The producer, as a participant in socialized production, then enjoys, as his individual property, a share of the social product— “according to his labor,” in the first stage of communist society, and “according to his needs” in the fully developed communist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When capitalism arose, the only way forward was through this negation of negation. Some of the British Chartists put forward in their land policy demands aimed at arresting the new capitalist process and at restoring the &#039;&#039;old&#039;&#039; private property of the producer. This was vain. The only road forward for the producers was by the struggle against capitalism and for socialism—not to restore the &#039;&#039;old&#039;&#039; individual property which capitalism had destroyed, but to destroy capitalism and so create individual property again on a &#039;&#039;new,&#039;&#039; socialist basis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, in the history of thought, the “primitive, natural materialism” of the earliest philosophers is negated by philosophical idealism, and modern materialism arises as the negation of that idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“This modern materialism, the negation of negation, is not the mere re-establishment of the old, but adds to the permanent foundations of this old materialism the whole thought content of two thousand years of development of philosophy and natural science.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Part I, Chapter XIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The negation of negation, as Engels also pointed out, is a very familiar phenomenon to the plant breeder. If he has some seed and wants to get from it some better seed, then he has to grow the seed under definite conditions for its development—which means bringing about the negation of the seed by its growing into a plant and then controlling the conditions of development of the plant until it brings about its own negation in the production of more seed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some experts, it is true, have lately advocated going another and more direct way about it, namely, changing the seed directly by treating it with chemicals or X-rays. The result of this, however, is simply a number of haphazard changes in the properties of the seed, and not a controlled process of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Furthermore, the whole of geology is a series of negated negations,” wrote Engels, “a series arising from the successive shattering of old and the depositing of new rock formations…. But the result of this process has been a very positive one: the creation, out of the most varied chemical elements, of a mixed and mechanically pulverized soil which makes possible the most abundant and diverse vegetation.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It is the same in mathematics,” he continued. If you want to raise a number &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; to a higher power, then this can be done by first operating on &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; so as to get —&#039;&#039;-a,&#039;&#039; and then making the additional operation of multiplying &#039;&#039;2&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;2&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;—a&#039;&#039; by itself, which results in &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039; Thus &#039;&#039;a,&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the second power of &#039;&#039;a,&#039;&#039; is reached by a negation of negation. In this case it is also possible to get 2 &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; from &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; by a single process, namely, multiplying &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; by &#039;&#039;a.&#039;&#039; Nevertheless, as Engels pointed out, “the negated negation is so securely entrenched in &#039;&#039;2&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; that the latter always has two square roots, namely &#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039; and — &#039;&#039;a.&#039;&#039;”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The negation of negation is found in the series of chemical elements, in which properties of elements of lower atomic weight disappear and then reappear again in elements of higher atomic weight.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the development of life itself obeys the law of negation of negation. The most primitive living organisms are comparatively speaking immortal, continuing themselves in being by continually dividing. The development of higher organisms, with sexual reproduction, was possible only at the cost of death. The organism becomes mortal. The higher development of life takes place through its negation, death.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And after that, these mortal organisms advance further. The process of the evolution of species of plants and animals begins. With the birth of man, social evolution begins, the whole process of social development from primitive communism, through its negation, class society, to the classless society of communism. Moreover, man begins to master nature. And when, with communism, he brings his own social organization under his own conscious control, then an entirely new epoch in the evolution of life opens up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 11. Criticism and Self-Criticism ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Development through contradiction, the struggle between the new and the old, will continue to be the rule in the future development of communist society. But with the ending of all exploitation of man by man, this development will no longer take place through violent social conflicts and upheavals but through the rational method of criticism and self-criticism, which will become the new level of development.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;From the whole discussion of the Marxist dialectical method the conclusion follows that Marxism is a creative science which must continually advance in application to new conditions of development. Criticism and self-criticism lies at the very heart of the Marxist dialectical method.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== A New Type of Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, now, of the future development of society, after the stage of communism has been reached? Are we to suppose that the same dialectical laws of development will continue to operate? Or that development will cease?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Development will not cease. On the contrary, it is only with the achievement of communism that human development in the proper sense, that is to say, a development consciously planned and controlled by men themselves, really begins; all the rest was only the painful preparation for it, the birth-pangs of the human race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When all the means of production are brought fully under planned social direction, then it may be expected that men’s mastery over nature will enormously increase, and the conquest and transformation of nature by man will in turn mean profound changes in men’s mode of life. For instance, ability to produce an absolute abundance of products with a minimum expenditure of human labor, abolition of the antithesis between town and countryside, abolition of the antithesis between manual and intellectual labor, clearly imply profound changes in social organization, in outlook, in habits, in mode of life generally. But the effecting of such changes cannot but involve, at each stage, the overcoming of forms of social organization, of outlooks and habits, belonging to the past. Development, therefore, will continue to take place through the disclosure of contradictions, the struggle between the new and the old, the future and the past. How else can we expect things to move forward? New tendencies will arise out of the existing conditions at each stage, which will come into contradiction with the existing conditions and hence lead to their passing and giving way to new conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is no reason to expect that this development will take place, as hitherto, through violent conflicts and social upheavals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the contrary, with communism there will have taken place, as Engels expressed it, “humanity’s leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.” And that means that the elemental conflicts characteristic of the “realm of necessity” will give place to changes controlled and planned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The laws of his own social activity, which have hitherto confronted him as external, dominating laws of nature, will then be applied by man with complete understanding, and hence will be dominated by man. Men’s own social organization which has hitherto stood in opposition to them as if arbitrarily decreed by nature and history, will then become the voluntary act of men themselves… men with full consciousness will fashion their own history.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Part III, Chapter II; &#039;&#039;Socialism, Utopian and Scientific&#039;&#039;, Chapter III.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When men understand the laws of their own social organization and have it under their own co-operative control, when there is no exploitation of man by man, when what is new and rising and its contradiction with the old is fully understood, then it is possible to do away with old conditions and create new conditions in a deliberate and planned way, without conflict or upheaval. Contradiction and the overcoming of the old by the new remain; but the element of antagonism and conflict as between men in society disappears and gives way to the properly human method of deciding affairs by rational discussion—criticism and self-criticism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This mode of social development is already beginning in the Soviet Union today.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In our Soviet society,” said A. A. Zhdanov, “where antagonistic classes have been liquidated, the struggle between the old and the new, and consequently the development from the lower to the higher, proceeds not in the form of struggle between antagonistic classes and of cataclysms, as is the case under capitalism, but in the form of criticism and self-criticism, which is the real motive force of our development, a powerful instrument in the hands of the Communist Party. This is incontestably a new aspect of movement, a new type of development, a new dialectical law.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Zhdanov, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Essays on Literature, Philosophy, and Music&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Human Perspectives ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first phase of the transition from socialism to communism, development takes place through continued struggle against the old heritage of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What will happen when the last traces of old class society have been obliterated throughout the world? We can at all events predict certain initial features of the development of world communist society—associated humanity. Thus the organization of the state and of a government party will become outmoded, and state and party will disappear. This was already foreseen by Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, Stalin has pointed out that the fullest development of national cultures and national languages, which is the task first arising from the abolition of the national oppression of capitalism, will provide the basis for an eventual universal human culture and human language. When “socialism has become part and parcel of the life of the peoples, and when practice has convinced the nations of the superiority of a common language over national languages,” then “national differences and languages will begin to die away and make room for a world language, common to all nations.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The National Question and Leninism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, N. Y., 1951.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the more remote future, we have no data on which to base predictions—though we can be quite sure that vast changes will take place, and that the people of the future, masters of nature and knowing no oppression of man by man, will be well able to look after the destinies of the human race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bernard Shaw, in his &#039;&#039;Back to Methuselah,&#039;&#039; speculated on the possibility of the span of human life being greatly extended, and eventually extended indefinitely. True, he thought this would happen through the mysterious operation of “the life force.” Yet it was a profound speculation, for such a result may well be brought about through the development of physiological knowledge and medical science. And Shaw was quite right in supposing that such a development would make a tremendous difference in the whole mode of human life and in all social institutions. This is, indeed, one of the ways in which the advance of science and of men’s mastery over nature (our own nature, in this case) could lead to developments of vast, transforming significance for human life and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At all events, we cannot set limits to the powers of human achievement. And bearing this in mind, we may well believe that our descendants a few hundred generations hence will in their manner of life resemble us far less than we resemble our own ancestors among the primitive savages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Creative Marxism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With this, we may try to sum up the main conclusions about dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectics is concerned with interconnection, change and development. Understood in the materialist way, dialectics is “the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectical method is the method of approach by the application of which we advance our materialist understanding of nature and history, and all particular processes of nature and history. It is a &#039;&#039;method&#039;&#039;—not a general formula, and not an abstract philosophical system. It guides us in understanding things so as to change them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such being the nature of dialectics and of the dialectical method, it should be clear that the science of dialectics itself grows and develops, and that the method is enhanced and enriched with each further application. Every new social development and every new advance of the sciences and the arts provides the basis for enriching and extending the understanding of dialectics and of the dialectical method. We cannot understand and master new material simply by repeating what has already been learned, but on the contrary, we learn more, and extend, correct and enrich our ideas in the light of new problems and new experiences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Marxism is a developing, progressive science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand by the latter,” said Stalin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter VII, Section 4, N. Y., 1939.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Creative Marxism:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Concentrates its attention upon… the path and means of realizing Marxism for various situations, changing the path and means when the situation changes…. It takes its directives and guiding lines not from historical analogies and parallels, but from the study of surrounding conditions. In its activities it relies, not on quotations and aphorisms but on practical experience, testing every step it takes by experience, learning from its mistakes and teaching others to build a new life.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Lenin&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, “Lenin as Organizer and Leader of the Communist Party,” N. Y., 1934.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory means assimilating &#039;&#039;the substance&#039;&#039; of this theory and learning to use it in the solution of the practical problems of the revolutionary movement under the varying conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory means being able to enrich this theory with the new experience of the revolutionary movement, with new propositions and conclusions, it means being able &#039;&#039;to develop it and advance it&#039;&#039; without hesitating to replace—in accordance with the substance of the theory—such of its propositions and conclusions as have become antiquated by the new ones corresponding to the new historical situation.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Conclusion.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Creative Marxism is the very opposite of revisionism. This must be stressed, because revisionism usually begins by announcing that Marxism “must not become a dogma.” Revisionism means going backward from Marxism: in the name of opposing dogmas, it abandons Marxism in favor of the dogmas of bourgeois theory. Creative Marxism preserves and cherishes the substance of the Marxist materialist theory. Thus Stalin said of Lenin:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Lenin was, and remains, the most loyal and consistent pupil of Marx and Engels, and he wholly and entirely based himself on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin did not merely carry out the doctrines of Marx and Engels. He was also the continuator of these doctrines…. He developed the doctrines of Marx and Engels still further in application to the new conditions of development.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Interview with the First American Labor Delegation&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, 1927.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Criticism and Self-Criticism, a Lever of Progress ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order, then, to master the method of Marxism-Leninism, the method of dialectics, we must use it and develop it in use. And this demands criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of theoretical and practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism and self-criticism, which belongs at the very heart of the Marxist dialectical method, means that theory and practice must always be matched up one with the other. Theory must not be allowed to lag behind practice; theory must keep not only level with practice but in advance of it, so as to serve as a true and reliable guide. Practice must not be allowed to grope in the dark without the light of theory, nor to be distorted by wrong and antiquated theory. And this matching up of theory and practice can only be achieved by constant alertness, by constant readiness to criticize and to learn, by continuous check-up of ideas and actions both from above and from below, by readiness to recognize what is new and to correct or cast aside what is old and no longer applicable, by frank recognition of mistakes. Mistakes are inevitable. But by the check up which recognizes mistakes in time, by examining critically the roots of those mistakes and correcting them, by learning from mistakes, we advance to new successes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“A party is invincible,” wrote Stalin, “if it does not fear criticism and self-criticism, if it does not gloss over the mistakes and defects in its work, if it teaches and educates its cadres by drawing the lessons from the mistakes in party work, and if it knows how to correct its mistakes in time.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Conclusion.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mistakes are seldom mere accidental errors of judgment. Most often mistakes arise because we cling to old habits and old formulations which have become antiquated and inapplicable to new conditions and new tasks. When this happens, and when, as a result, things do not turn out as anticipated, then, if we are ready critically to examine what has gone wrong, we learn something new and grow in strength, stature and experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We are advancing in the process of struggle, in the process of the development of contradictions, in the process of overcoming these contradictions, in the process of bringing these contradictions to light and liquidating them,” said Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Something in life is always dying. But that which is dying refuses to die quietly; it fights for its existence, defends its moribund cause.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Something new in life is always being born. But that which is being born does not come into the world quietly; it comes in squealing and screaming, defending its right to existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The struggle between the old and the new, between the dying and the nascent—such is the foundation of development. By failing openly and honestly, as befits Bolsheviks, to point to, to bring to light, the defects and mistakes in our work, we close our road to progress. But we want to go forward. And precisely because we want to go forward, we must make honest and revolutionary self-criticism of our most important tasks. Without this there is no progress. Without this there is no development.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Report to Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 12. Dialectical Materialism and Science ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Dialectical materialism is a scientific world outlook. Its scientific character is manifested especially in that it turns socialism into a science and, by developing the science of society, shows how the whole of science can be developed in the service of mankind. In general, dialectical materialism is a scientific world outlook in that it does not seek to establish any philosophy “above science” but bases its conception of the world on the discoveries of the sciences.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The entire advance of the sciences is an advance of materialism against idealism; and further, science shows that our materialist conception of the world must be dialectical. Such great past discoveries as the law of the transformation of energy, the Darwinian theory of evolution and the theory of the cell have demonstrated the dialectic of nature.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Nevertheless science in the capitalist world has entered into a state of crisis, due primarily to (1) the subjugation of scientific research to the capitalist monopolies and to military purposes, and (2) the conflict between new discoveries and old idealist and metaphysical ideas. Dialectical materialism is not only a generalization of the achievements of science, but a weapon for the self-criticism and for the advancement of science.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
==== A Scientific World Outlook ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism, the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party, is a truly scientific world outlook. For it is based on considering things as they are, without arbitrary, preconceived assumptions (idealist fantasies); it insists that our conceptions of things must be based on actual investigation and experience, and must be constantly tested and re-tested in the light of practice and further experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, “dialectical materialism” means: understanding things just as they are (“materialism”), in their actual interconnection and movement (“dialectics”).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same cannot be said about other philosophies. They all make arbitrary assumptions of one kind or another, and try to erect a “system” on the basis of those assumptions. But such assumptions are arbitrary only in appearance; in fact they express the various prejudices and illusions of definite classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The scientific character of Marxism is manifested especially in this, that it makes &#039;&#039;socialism&#039;&#039; into a &#039;&#039;science.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We do not base our socialism, as the utopians did, on a conception of abstract human nature. The utopians worked out schemes for an ideal society, but could not show how to achieve socialism in practice. Marxism made socialism into a science by basing it on an analysis of the actual movement of history, of the economic law of motion of capitalist society in particular, thus showing how socialism arises as the necessary next stage in the evolution of society, and how it can come about only by the waging of the working-class struggle, through the defeat of the capitalist class and the institution of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Marxism treats man himself, society and history, scientifically.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Socialism, having become a science, demands the same treatment as every other science—it must be studied. The task of the leaders will be to bring understanding, thus acquired and clarified, to the working masses, to spread it with increased enthusiasm, to close the ranks of the party organizations and of the labor unions with even greater energy.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Peasant War in Germany&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Preface to second edition, N. Y., 1926.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific study of society shows that human history develops from stage to stage according to definite laws. Men themselves are the active force in this development. By understanding the laws of development of society, therefore, we can guide our own struggles and create our own socialist future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus scientific socialism is the greatest and most important of all the sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The practitioners of the natural sciences are now getting worried because they feel that governments do not know how to put their discoveries to proper use. They have good cause to worry about this. Science is discovering the secrets of atomic energy, for example; but its discoveries are being used to create weapons of destruction. Many people are even coming to believe that it would be better if we had no science, since its discoveries open up such terrifying possibilities of disaster.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How can we insure that the discoveries of science are put to proper use for the benefit of mankind? It is scientific socialism, Marxism-Leninism, alone which answers this problem. It teaches us what are the forces which make history and thereby shows us how we can make our own history today, change society and determine our own future. It teaches us, therefore, how to develop the sciences in the service of mankind, how to carry them forward in today’s crisis. Physics can teach us how to release atomic energy, it cannot teach us how to control the social use of that energy. For this there is required, not the science of the atom, but the science of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Science and Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism is in no sense a philosophy “above science.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Others have set philosophy “above science,” in the sense that they have thought they could discover what the world was like just by thinking about it, without relying on the data of the sciences, on practice and experience. And then, from this lofty standpoint, they have tried to dictate to the scientists, to tell them where they were wrong, what their discoveries “really meant,” and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But Marxism makes an end of the old philosophy which claimed to stand above science and to explain “the world as a whole.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Modern materialism… no longer needs any philosophy standing above the sciences,” wrote Engels. “As soon as each separate science is required to get clarity as to its position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of things a special science dealing with this totality is superfluous.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Introduction, I.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism, he further wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Is in fact no longer a philosophy, but a simple world outlook which has to establish its validity and be applied not in a science of sciences standing apart, but within the positive sciences…. Philosophy is therefore… ‘both overcome and preserved’; overcome as regards its form, and preserved as regards its real content.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Part I, Chapter XIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our picture of the world about us, of nature, of natural objects and processes, their interconnections and laws of motion, is not to be derived from philosophical speculation, but from the investigations of the natural sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The scientific picture of the world and its development is not complete, and never will be. But it has advanced far enough for us to realize that philosophical speculation is superfluous. And we refuse to fill in gaps in scientific knowledge by speculation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For instance, we do know that life is the mode of existence of certain types of organic bodies—proteins; but we do not yet know exactly how such bodies, how life, originated. It is no use speculating about this; we will have to find out, the hard way, by intensive scientific investigation. Only so will we come to understand “the mystery of life.” Thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Science is already able to control life, can control living and dead protein. But science cannot yet say definitely what protein is, what life is, as to the derivation of it. Why? Engels in his day put it excellently when he said that ‘in order to gain an exhaustive knowledge of what life is, we should have to go through all the forms in which it appears, from the lowest to the highest.’ Consequently, in order to understand and learn what protein is, it is also necessary to go through all the forms of manifestation, from the lowest to the highest. And for this we need &#039;&#039;experiment, experiment and again experiment&#039;&#039;.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;T. D. Lysenko and others, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Situation in Biological Science&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Speech of S. G. Petrov, August 2, 1948, N. Y., 1949. The quotation from Engels is from &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, Part I, Chapter VIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The growing picture of the world which natural science unfolds is a materialist picture—despite the many efforts of bourgeois philosophers to make out the contrary. For step by step as science advances it shows how the rich variety of things and processes and changes to be found in the real world can be explained and understood in terms of material causes, without bringing in God or spirit or any supernatural agency.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every advance of science is an advance of materialism against idealism, a conquest for materialism—although when driven out of one position idealism has always taken up another position and manifested itself again in new forms, so that in the past the sciences have never been consistently materialist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For every advance of science means showing the order and development of the material world “from the material world itself.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Science and Dialectics ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As science has advanced, not only has this materialist picture of the world become less shadowy, more definite and more convincing, but Engels pointed out: “With each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science materialism has to change its form.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter II.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The discoveries of the natural sciences over the past hundred years or more have this significance—that the materialist picture which they unfold is a dialectical one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus Engels wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The revolution which is being forced on theoretical natural science by the mere need to set in order the purely empirical discoveries… is of such a kind that it must bring the dialectical character of natural events more and more to the consciousness even of those… who are most opposed to it.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Nature is the test of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature’s process is dialectical.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three great discoveries of science in the nineteenth century above all contributed to this result, Engels pointed out.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter IV.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These were:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The discovery that the cell is the unit from whose multiplication and division the whole plant or animal body develops (announced by Schwann in 1839).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The law of the transformation of energy (announced by Mayer in 1845).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Darwinian theory of evolution (announced in 1859).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us briefly consider the dialectical significance of these discoveries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, the transformation of energy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It used to be thought that heat, for example, was a “substance,” which passed in and out of bodies; and that electricity, magnetism and so on were separate “forces,” acting on bodies. In this way different types of physical processes were considered each separate from the other, in isolation. Each was placed in a separate compartment as the manifestation of a separate “substance” or “force” and their essential interconnection wan not understood.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But science in the nineteenth century, with the principle of the conservation and transformation of energy, discovered that: “mechanical force… heat, radiation (light or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical energy are different forum of manifestation of universal motion, which pass into one another in definite proportions so that in place of a certain quantity of one which disappears a certain quantity of another makes its appearance, and thus the whole motion of nature is reduced to this incessant process of transformation from one form into another.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The clue to this discovery was not found in any abstract philosophy, by any process of pure thought. No, it was closely related to the development of steam engines and to the working out of their principles of operation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a steam engine the burning of coal releases heat energy, which heats up steam, which is then forced through a cylinder where it drives the piston forward and turns the wheels of the engine. Heat is transformed into mechanical motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where did the energy released from the coal come from? We now know that it came from the sun’s radiations, was stored up in the plants which formed the coal seams, and was finally released when the coal was burned. A lot of it came from the solar atoms in the process of building heavier elements from hydrogen in the interior of the sun.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This discovery was first formulated as a conservation law— energy cannot be created or destroyed, the quantity which disappears in one form reappears in another form. But it is fundamentally, as Engels pointed out, a transformation law—one form of motion of matter is transformed into another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus physics becomes a science of transformations—no longer studying the different types of physical processes, or forms of motion, each in isolation, but studying their interconnections and how one is transformed into another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Transformation laws are laws of motion and interconnection, concerning the interconnection of the forms of motion of matter and their passage one into the other; they are not laws of the transformation of quantity into quality. Knowledge of the transformation laws is essential for understanding the passage from quantity to quality in particular cases. For example, knowledge of the laws of the transformation of heat into mechanical motion will show how much heat energy must be released before enough steam-pressure is generated to drive the piston.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Darwinian theory of evolution is in the same way dialectical and materialist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In place of separate species, each created by God, Darwin showed us a picture of the evolutionary development of species by means of natural selection. The sharp divisions were broken down, it was shown how species are inter-related and how living nature is transformed. For instance, the swimming-bladder of the fish becomes the lung of the land animal, the scales of the reptile become the feathers of the bird, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Closely related to this was the development of geology, which also became an evolutionary science, studying the evolution of the earth’s crust.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the discovery that the cell was the unit from whose multiplication and division the whole plant or animal body developed replaced the older conception of the body as made up of separate tissues. The cell theory was also a theory of motion and interconnection, showing how all the tissues and organs arose by differentiation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we see how natural science, step by step, unfolds a picture of nature’s dialectic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we say “a picture,” we must add that it is a picture in the sense that, so far as it goes, it is a faithful image. But we did not make it by just observing nature and writing down what we observed, nor does it serve as something which we merely admire, an object of contemplation and intellectual enjoyment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is sometimes said that the essential feature of science is that it is based on observations. Of course, science is based on observations; but this is not its most essential feature. The basis of science is not mere observation, but experiment. Science is based on an activity of interfering with nature, changing it—and we learn about things, not just by observing them, but by changing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus science would never have found out the secrets of the transformation of heat into mechanical motion solely by observing nature. They were found out as a result of building steam engines; we learned the secrets of the process in proportion as we ourselves learned how to reproduce that process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor could Darwin have written &#039;&#039;The Origin of Species&#039;&#039; on the sole basis of the observations he made on the voyage of the &#039;&#039;Beagle.&#039;&#039; He made use of the practical experience and results of English animal breeders and plant breeders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The scientific picture is based, not just on observing things, but on changing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And we test it, develop it and use it also in changing nature. Science is not a dogma, but a guide to action. On the other hand, if it becomes divorced from practice, it degenerates into a dogma.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Natural science, then, proves that nature’s process is dialectical, and gives us an ever more concrete, detailed picture of the real dialectical motion and interconnection in nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The Crisis of Science in the Capitalist World ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, while pointing this out, Engels also pointed to the very great confusion which exists in the sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The scientists who have learned to think dialectically are still few and far between, and hence the conflict between the discoveries made and the old traditional mode of thought is the explanation of the boundless confusion which now reigns in theoretical natural science and reduces both teachers and students, writers and readers to despair.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Introduction.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This confusion has become very much worse today. In fact, as the general crisis of capitalism has developed and become more acute, so has the confusion in scientific theory and the distortion of scientific practice developed and increased with it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science which by its discoveries lays bare the true dialectics of nature is nevertheless in a state of crisis in the capitalist world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the nature of this crisis? It has a double nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place, science is an activity of research and discovery. In capitalist society it has grown enormously, along with the other forces of production. Scientific research can no longer be carried out by individuals on their own: it requires great institutes, vast equipment, elaborate organization, big financial expenditure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the more scientific research expands and the greater these requirements become, the more it falls under the control of the monopolies and of their governments, and particularly of the military.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science has to contribute to profits and to war. Such science as does not so contribute is increasingly starved of the resources necessary to carry on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“For example, the whole important field of plant physiology remains relatively undeveloped. This is, to put it crudely, because there is no money in it. The state of agriculture under capitalism is such that the conditions are not created for fundamental researches in this field…. It is interesting to note, too, that while some fields of science are neglected because there is no money in them, others suffer because there is too much. Thus geo-chemistry is hampered, for instance, because the very powerful oil interests impose conditions of secrecy on such researches. Science is called upon to answer just those particular problems in which the capitalist monopolies are interested, which is by no means the same as answering the problems which are bound up with the further development of science and with the interests of the people. This warps the whole development of science.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;J. D. Bernal and Maurice Cornforth, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Science for Peace and Socialism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, London, 1948.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus science becomes more and more commercialized—and militarized. And as a result science is more and more disorganized and distorted. This is what is happening to science in the capitalist world. Science can contribute mightily, not only to giving us knowledge, but through that knowledge to human welfare, to developing our powers of production, to conquering disease. Yet it is not being developed as it could be toward these ends.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How can the disorganization and distortion of science be overcome?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can and must resist the misuse of science here and now. But only the advance to socialism can ensure the full development and use of science in the service of mankind. Just as socialism means that the development of all the forces of production can be planned and organized in the service of man, not for profit and war, so it means the same for science in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second aspect is that of theory—the crisis of scientific ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does this arise?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The primary role of science is to discover the interconnections and laws operating in the world, so as to equip men with the knowledge necessary to improve their production and live better and more fully.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But to develop research and formulate discovery, ideas are necessary. To work out and guide the strategy of advance of science, theory is necessary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And in this sphere of ideas and theory, the great achievements of science in capitalist society come into collision with the traditional forms of bourgeois ideology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As Engels stated, there develops “the conflict between the discoveries made and the old traditional modes of thought.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In two words, the &#039;&#039;idealism&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;metaphysics&#039;&#039; characteristic of and ingrained in bourgeois ideology have penetrated deeply into the ideas and theories of the sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to the way in which, in field after field, scientific discovery reveals the real dialectic of nature, it follows that, as Engels put it, the further development of scientific discovery demands “the dialectical synthesis.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Preface.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But this would carry theory far beyond the limits imposed on it by the bourgeois outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The New Against the Old in Science ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So it is that we find that in field after field bourgeois science turns back from its own achievements, gives up vantage grounds won, and instead of going forward suffers a theoretical collapse. Here, indeed, is a case of the struggle of the new against the old—of advancing scientific discovery against the old ideas in terms of which scientific theory is formulated. Understanding it thus, we can be quite sure that the retrogressive trend will be but temporary, and that the advance of science will break through the barriers of old ideas and outworn dogmas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In biology, it was the fate of the Darwinian theory to have a dogma imposed on it—the theory of the gene. The same thing happened to the cell theory, with Virchow’s dogma that the cell comes only from the cell. In each case a dialectical theory of development had imposed on it a metaphysical dogma which denied development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In physics, the great discoveries about the electron, the atomic nucleus, the quantum of action—about physical transformations— were interpreted, and not by idealist philosophers alone but by theoretical physicists, as meaning that matter had disappeared and that the limits of investigation had been reached. In the allied science of cosmology, scientists, having found out so much about the universe and its development, began to have recourse to ideas of creation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all these cases, a dogma is imposed upon science, strangling its further development. Hence the crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The “crime” of Soviet science is that it is successfully challenging and removing such dogmas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union scientists have followed Stalin’s wise advice, when he called for the progress of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Science whose devotees, while understanding the power and significance of the established scientific traditions and ably utilizing them in the interests of science, are nevertheless not willing to be slaves of these traditions; the science which has the courage and determination to smash the old traditions, standards and views when they become antiquated and begin to act as a fetter on progress, and which is able to create new traditions, new standards and new views.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin, Speech to Higher Educational Workers, delivered in 1938.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Conclusions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have now briefly surveyed the principal features of the Marxist materialist conception of the world and of the Marxist dialectical method. What conclusions can we draw at this stage?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The world outlook of dialectical materialism is a consistent and reasoned outlook, which derives its strength from the fact that it arises directly from the attempt to solve the outstanding problems of our time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The epoch of capitalism is an epoch of stormy development in society. It is marked by revolutionary advances of the forces of production and of scientific discovery, and by consequent uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions. This sets one theoretical task above all, and that is to arrive at an adequate conception of the laws of change and development in nature and society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To this theoretical task dialectical materialism addresses itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) This is not the task of working out a philosophical system, in the old sense. What is required is not any system of ideas spun out of the heads of philosophers, which we can then admire and contemplate as a system of “absolute truth.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalist society is a society rent with contradictions, and the more it has developed, the more menacing and intolerable for the working people have the consequences of these contradictions become. The new powers of production are not utilized for the benefit of society as a whole but for the profit of an exploiting minority. Instead of leading to universal plenty, the growth of the powers of production leads to recurrent economic crises, to unemployment, to poverty and to hideously destructive wars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore the philosophical problem of arriving at a true conception of the laws of change and development in nature and society becomes, for the working people, a practical political problem of finding how to change society, so that the vast new forces of production can be used in the service of humanity. For the first time in history the possibility of a full and rich life for everyone exists. The task is to find how to make that possibility a reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is to the solution of this practical task that the theory of dialectical materialism is devoted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Addressing itself to this task, dialectical materialism is and can only be a partisan philosophy, the philosophy of a party, namely, of the party of the working class, whose object is to lead the millions of working people to the socialist revolution and the building of communist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Dialectical materialism cannot but stand out in sharp contrast to the various contemporary schools of bourgeois philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What have these various schools of philosophy to offer at the present time? Systems and arguments by the bucketful—none of them either original or cogent, if one takes the trouble to analyze them closely. But no solution to the problems pressing upon the people of the capitalist countries and the colonies. How to end poverty? How to end war? How to utilize production for the benefit of all? How to end the oppression of one nation by another? How to end the exploitation of man by man? How to establish the brotherhood of men? These are our problems. We must judge philosophies by whether or not they show how to solve them. By that criterion, the philosophical schools of capitalism must one and all be judged—“weighed in the balance and found wanting.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prevailing bourgeois philosophies, with all their differences, have in common a retreat from the great positive ideas which inspired progressive movements in the past. They emphasize men’s helplessness and limitations; they speak of a mysterious universe; and they counsel either trust in God or else hopeless resignation to fate or blind chance. Why is this? It is because all these philosophies are rooted in acceptance of capitalism and cannot see beyond capitalism. From start to finish they reflect the insoluble crisis of the capitalist world. And their function is to help entangle the people “in a web of lies.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Dialectical materialism asks to be judged and will be judged by whether it serves as an effective instrument to show the way out of capitalist crisis and war, to show the way for the working people to win and wield political power, to show the way to build a socialist society in which there is no more exploitation of man by man and in which men win increasing mastery over nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism is a philosophy of practice, indissolubly united with the practice of the struggle for socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the philosophy born out of the great movement of our times—the movement of the people who labor, who “create all the good things of life and feed and clothe the world,” to rise at last to their full stature. It is wholly, entirely dedicated to the service of that movement. This is the source of all its teachings, and in that service its conclusions are continually tried, tested and developed. Without such a philosophy, the movement cannot achieve consciousness of itself and of its tasks, cannot achieve unity, cannot win its battles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the greatest task facing us is that of ending capitalist society and building socialism, it follows that the chief problem to which dialectical materialism addresses itself, and on the solution of which the whole philosophy of dialectical materialism turns, is the problem of understanding the forces of development of society. The chief problem is to reach such an understanding of society, of men’s social activity and of the development of human consciousness, as will show us how to achieve and build the new socialist society and the new socialist consciousness. The materialist conception and dialectical method with which we have been concerned in this volume are applied to this task in the materialist conception of history and in the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. These will form the subject matter of the second volume.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Bibliography ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We mention here only works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in which the general underlying principles of dialectical materialism are expounded and developed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The best general introduction is contained in Engels’ &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Socialism, Utopian and Scientific&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; and in Stalin’s &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anarchism or Socialism?&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; After these it is necessary to study the &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Communist Manifesto&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, by Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is advisable to become acquainted with these three works before studying the two short books in which the basic ideas of dialectical materialism are brought together and summarized—Lenin’s &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Teachings of Karl Marx&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; and Stalin’s &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectical and Historical Materialism.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; The latter is of absolutely fundamental importance for the student, containing as it does a systematic exposition of the principal features of the Marxist dialectical method, Marxist philosophical materialism and the Marxist science of history, generalizing the conclusions of the whole experience of the application and development of Marxist theory in the course of the working-class struggle for socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The place occupied by dialectical materialism in the whole theory and practice of Marxism is dealt with in Lenin’s “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism,” in connection with which should also be read his “Marxism and Revisionism” (both in Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 11).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The creative, developing character of Marxism, and the role of history in the working-class movement are dealt with in the “Conclusion” of Stalin’s &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essential difference between materialism and idealism, between dialectical and mechanistic materialism, and between the Marxist and Hegelian dialectics is to be found in Engels’ &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ludwig Feuerbach&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, with its appendix, Marx’s “Eleven Theses on Feuerbach.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with this we may draw attention to Engels’ “Introduction” to &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectics of Nature&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, and to Lenin’s “The Attitude of the Workers’ Party toward Religion” (&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 11).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of fundamental importance then are three longer and more difficult works: Engels’ &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, especially Part I; Engels’ &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Dialectics of Nature&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;; Lenin’s &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A part of Lenin’s &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Philosophical Notebooks&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; is translated into English under the title “On Dialectics”; and he deals with the fight for materialism in “On the Significance of Militant Materialism” (both in &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 11). Important statements summarizing the essentials of the dialectical method are contained in Lenin’s “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,” Section R, “Something About Dialectics” (&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 2), and “Once Again on the Trade Unions,” section on “Dialectics and Eclecticism” (&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 9). See also Lenin’s “What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are and How They Fight for the Social Democrats” (&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. 11), which is concerned mainly with historical materialism, the subject of the next volume.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
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	<entry>
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		<title>Library:Dialectical Materialism: The Theoretical Foundation of Marxism-Leninism</title>
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		<updated>2025-12-07T02:47:38Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Import notes and cleanup pandoc leftovers&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Dialectical Materialism|author=Vladimir Adoratsky|published_date=1934|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/adoratsky/|pdf=https://redstarpublishers.org/adoratsky.pdf}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== MARXISM AS THE THEORY AND TACTICS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin defined Marxism as the revolutionary theory and tactics of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The task of the proletariat is “to take a conscious part in the historical process of the transformation of society that is going on under our eyes.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Herr Vogt&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, 1860.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because of the position it occupies in production and society the proletariat must act as the leader and organiser of all the oppressed and exploited in the struggle for communism. In 1846 Marx wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We do not regard communism as a &#039;&#039;state of affairs&#039;&#039; that has to be brought about; nor as an ideal to which reality must conform. By communism we mean an &#039;&#039;actual&#039;&#039; movement that will sweep away the present state of affairs. The conditions for that movement arise out of already existing premises.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;All quotations are taken from English editions unless otherwise indicated in the reference notes at the back of this book.—&#039;&#039;Ed&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
By these postulates Marx meant: the growth of the working class (both in numbers and in class consciousness), large-scale industry and socialised production developed by capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The development of the productive forces of social labour is the historical task and privilege of capital. It is precisely in this way that it unconsciously creates the material requirements of a higher mode of production.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. III, p. 304, Kerr edition, Chicago.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
But private property in the means of production—which is the very foundation of capitalism—hampers and fetters the further development of the productive forces. The proletariat alone can break those fetters; after it has established its dictatorship the proletariat must smash the machinery of the bourgeois state; it must defend its own state power in civil war and crush the opposition of the bourgeoisie; it must take over large-scale industry and transform the means of production into social property, in order to reshape production on socialist lines, and, on the ruins of capitalism and using the material left over from capitalism, give the widest possible development to socialist production with all possible speed. The proletariat assumes the leadership of the non-proletarian sections of society that are oppressed and exploited by capitalism. Under the guidance of the industrial proletariat, and with the help of its dictatorship, a complete transformation of production takes place and the small producers are turned into members of a socialist society. The proletariat thereby creates a new material basis for human relationships. By means of the class struggle, and with the help of its dictatorship, it abolishes classes and achieves a classless society. Such is the historical mission of the proletariat throughout the whole world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; V. I. Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;State and Revolution&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; (International Publishers).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Revolutionary theory, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, scientific deductions and generalisations based on the experience of revolution and of the working class movement in all countries, is of vital importance to the revolutionary struggle of the working class at the present time. “Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement,” Lenin said. The foundations of this theory were laid down by Marx and Engels and further developed by Lenin. During the course of several decades the proletariat has had the opportunity to test this theory by their own experience in the class struggle. This theory has played, and continues to play, a tremendous part in the struggle of the working class. For instance, in Russia, we could neither have seized, nor retained power, nor could we have correctly tackled the problems of building up socialism, were it not for the firm hand and consistent leadership of the Communist Party, based on the revolutionary theory of Marxism, and were it not for the fact that the working class realised that this leadership was the right one. If the working class is guided in its struggles by the theory of Marxism and Leninism, it will defeat the bourgeoisie all over the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism provides no ready-made recipes, that can be applied uniformly in any and every circumstance without further reflection. The Marxian theory “is not a dogma, but a guide to action.” It gives the general line as to how the fight of the working class should be conducted. Having studied all the social phenomena of the time, having himself led the working-class movement, Marx made certain deductions, indicated the general trend of development and pointed out what must be the inevitable course of future events. He showed that the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a communist society was inevitable, that the proletariat would take the leading part in this transformation, that a transition period from capitalism to communism was unavoidable and that the form of state during that transition period would be the dictatorship of the proletariat. But Marx, of course, could not forecast, and never attempted to forecast, the detailed events of the progress of the world revolution. Marx thought that in order to decide what should be done at a given historical moment, in a given country and under given conditions, one must carefully study (with the help of the method of scientific communism) all the specific features of the given situation (which is constantly changing) and the situation existing not only within the given country itself, but in all the other countries of the world. Marxism considers that only by such a study can the&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;...thinking representatives of the given class [acquire] the necessary knowledge, the necessary experience—and, apart from all knowledge and experience—the necessary political instinct for the quick and correct solution of intricate political problems.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;“Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; (International Publishers).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism draws its ideas from the actual struggle of the masses. The Marxian theory is worked out in close conjunction with the mass revolutionary movement. It is not based on ideas “invented or discovered by this or that would-be universal reformer” but represents “...merely... in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Manifesto of the Communist Party&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; (International Publishers), p. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The theory of Marxism helps the proletariat to understand “the conditions and nature of its own actions.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Herr Eugene Dühring’s Revolution in Science&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; [&#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;] (International Publishers).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duty of the proletarian theoretician is not to create socialist plans out of his own head; his duty is to discover the conditions for emancipation from exploitation that are created in the very process of social and economic development; he must find in the very progress of events the path that leads to the solution of the problems of the exploited masses; he must help the latter in their fight for communism and guide them in the struggle, so that society based on exploitation may be destroyed as rapidly as possible and with the least sacrifice on the part of the proletariat and the toiling classes in general. As we have said, owing to the position it occupies in production and society, the proletariat can, and must, take upon itself the duty of organising a communist society. The theory of Marxism should help the proletariat in the task of exterminating all forms of exploitation as rapidly and as easily as possible. General postulates are not enough, precise solutions of the daily problems of the political struggle and the building up of socialism are required. That implies a scientific leadership and foresight based on the study of the actual state of affairs, using for this purpose the Marxist-Leninist theory. As Comrade Stalin said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Theory... alone, can give to the movement confidence, guidance, strength and understanding of the inner relations between events; it alone can help practice to clarify the process and direction of class movements in the present and near future.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;J. Stalin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Foundations of Leninism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, p. 27 (International Publishers).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In the article “Our Immediate Task,” written in 1899, Lenin pointed out that the duty of a revolutionary party&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;does not consist merely in serving the working class movement; its duty is to &#039;&#039;link up socialism with the working class movement&#039;&#039;... to introduce definite socialist ideals into the spontaneous movement, to link it up with socialist convictions consistent with the level of modern science, and connect it with the systematic political struggle for democracy [this was written six years before the Revolution of 1905, &#039;&#039;V.A.&#039;&#039;], as a means for the realisation of socialism—in a word, to fuse this spontaneous movement with the activities of the &#039;&#039;revolutionary party&#039;&#039;, into a single indivisible whole. The history of socialism and democracy in Western Europe, the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia, and the experience of our working class movement—such is the &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; that must be studied and mastered in order to work out the correct forms of organisation and the correct tactics of our party.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. II, pp. 496-497, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In the same article Lenin says that ready-made formulas must not be automatically applied to new and specific conditions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The material must be analysed... independently, for we shall not find ready-made samples.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, p. 497.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin points out that “the conditions of the Russian working-class movement are entirely different from those of the Western European movement.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor could the earlier revolutionary parties in Russia be taken as examples in every respect. While recognising “the necessity of learning revolutionary and conspirative technique from the old Russian leaders,” Lenin pointed out, that “by no means relieves us of the duty of examining them critically and of working out our own form of organisation.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, p. 497.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is how Lenin, scrupulously observing the Marxian method, defines the scope of theory, and indicates the necessity of independently studying every fresh experience and of making use of all that was valuable in past development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already stated that, according to Marx, the proletarian theoretician must give expression to the revolutionary aims of the mass movement; he must guide that movement, yet at the same time learn from it and avail himself of the experience of the whole international revolution. This was the spirit in which Lenin wrote and acted. He valued very highly theoreticians who kept in close touch with the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1918 he wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;... a revolutionary Marxist is distinguished from the ordinary philistine by his ability and willingness to preach to the still ignorant masses the necessity of the approaching revolution, to prove that it is inevitable, to explain its advantage to the people, and to prepare the proletariat and all the toiling and exploited masses for it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; (International Publishers).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this passage Lenin emphasised the importance of the ability to maintain contact with the unenlightened masses, the ability to draw them into the movement and to lead them into revolutionary positions, so that “the masses by their own experience may convince themselves of the correctness of the Party line.” That is one of the fundamental principles of Leninism. It is embodied in the Programme of the Communist International and is one of the characteristic and distinguishing features of the activities of both Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;For the whole task of the Communists—said Lenin—is to be able to &#039;&#039;convince&#039;&#039; the backward, to work among them, and not to &#039;&#039;fence themselves off&#039;&#039; from them by means of fantastic, childishly “Left” slogans.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;“Left-Wing” Communism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In 1914 the liberal newspaper &#039;&#039;Rech&#039;&#039;, discussing the fight the Bolsheviks were waging against the Liquidators,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Reformist Socialists—Mensheviks—who proposed liquidation of the underground party organisation and instead favoured legal activities exclusively.—&#039;&#039;Ed&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; bewailed the “carrying of the dissension into the ranks of the workers.” Lenin in an article entitled “The Methods Used by the Bourgeois Intellectuals in the Fight Against the Workers,” wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We &#039;&#039;welcome&#039;&#039; the “carrying of dissension into the ranks of the workers,” for it is the workers, and the workers alone, who will distinguish dissensions from differences, from disagreements on principle, who will understand the significance of these disagreements and form their own opinion and decide not “with whom” to go, but where to go, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, decide on a definite, clear, well-considered and tested line of action.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This line of action can be worked out and the political enlightenment of the masses of the workers can be accomplished only in the course of “a consistent and stubborn fight to a finish, of proletarian influences and strivings directed against the bourgeoisie.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XVII, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, it must never be forgotten that the masses learn by their own experience, from events, and not only from books. In his preface to the 1890 German edition of &#039;&#039;The Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, Engels wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;For Marx, the sole guarantee of the ultimate triumph of the theories contained in the &#039;&#039;Manifesto&#039;&#039; was the intellectual development of the working class that would result from joint action and discussion. The events and fluctuations of fortune in the struggle against capitalism, their victories, and still more their defeats, would reveal to the combatants the ineffectiveness of the panaceas they had hitherto believed in, and would make their minds more receptive for the thorough understanding of the real conditions of working class emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is out of the actual mass struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the conscious leadership of the struggle on the part of the vanguard of the proletariat—the Communist Party—that scientific communism arises, differing fundamentally from utopian and petty-bourgeois reformist socialism. Scientific communism is not based on good intentions, but on the class struggle of the proletariat and the recognition of the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The theoretical statement of the principles of scientific communism is Marxism and Leninism, the latter being an elaboration of Marxism in the light of new conditions. This theory embraces general questions of philosophy and method as well as their concrete application. It is essential to the proletariat in its struggles: it imparts consciousness, self-assurance, and decision to the movement. Those who are able to wield it are saved from aberrations and uncertainties; it enables us to determine the correct path to follow and renders the achievement and the consolidation of victory easier and surer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LENINISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because of the intimate relation that exists between theory and reality, the great changes that have occurred since the death of Marx and Engels had to find their reflections in theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The theoretical basis that Lenin took over from Marx, namely, dialectical materialism, was further developed by him independently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin lived and acted in new and different conditions and a number of questions had to be considered afresh. Using the method of Marx, he solved the difficult problem of how the fight for revolutionary Marxism must be conducted in the new and complex conditions created by the era of imperialism and the beginnings of the world proletarian revolution. Since the death of Marx none of the important theoreticians and leaders of the Second International has been able to cope with this problem. Lenin was able to solve it because he maintained the closest contact with the mass movement of the proletariat and had mastered the Marxist theory as no one else had. Lenin, himself, was the truest expression of the world-wide and historical mission of the proletariat. Having himself led the struggle in the course of three revolutions, he was able to advance and develop the Marxist theory in all its component parts. We are therefore quite justified in describing Leninism as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The epoch of Lenin differed from the epoch of Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels lived and developed their theory at a time when the proletariat was just beginning to come out definitely as an independent force, as a result of which the bourgeoisie became more and more inclined to come to terms with the forces of reaction. In his book, &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, written in 1852, Marx stated that the nineteenth century saw the beginning of the proletarian revolution. He based his statement on the theoretical conclusions he had arrived at as a result of the Revolution of 1848. In a speech delivered in the spring of 1852 on the occasion of the anniversary of the &#039;&#039;People’s Paper&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A Chartist paper.—&#039;&#039;Ed&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; he said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The so-called revolutions of 1848 were but poor incidents, small fractures and fissures in the dry crust of European society. But they revealed an abyss. Beneath the apparently solid surface they betrayed oceans of liquid matter only needing expansion to rend into fragments continents of hard rock. Noisily and confusedly they proclaimed the emancipation of the proletariat, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, the secret of the nineteenth century and of the revolution of that century.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And in concluding his speech he said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;...the English working men are the firstborn sons of modern industry. Certainly, then, they will not be the last to aid the social revolution produced by that industry—a revolution which means the emancipation of their class all over the world, which is as universal as capital—rule and wage slavery.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;“The Revolution of 1848 and the Proletariat,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Karl Marx, Man, Thinker and Revolutionist&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; (International Publishers), p. 74.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Marx proclaimed the inevitability of the proletarian revolution, but it had not yet fully begun during the lifetime of Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx foresaw that the course of events was bound to lead to the monopoly of big capital. But it was only after the death of Marx and Engels that the extension of the rule of monopoly capitalism throughout the whole world really took place, leading in its turn to the rule of finance capital and to imperialism. In the ’sixties England was the centre of the development and rule of big capital (and of the plundering of the colonies). But by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth capitalism had developed in a number of other countries (particularly in Germany and the United States) much more powerfully than in England. All the colonies had already been seized. And so, at the end of the nineteenth century, a desperate struggle broke out among the big predatory imperialist powers, not for the division of the world, but for its redivision. There began the epoch of imperialism—the fusion of usurious banking capital with industrial capital to form finance capital. What Lenin called “decaying, moribund capitalism” set in. For the peculiarities of this condition and for the main features of the economics of imperialism—the latest and last stage of the development of capitalism—consult Lenin’s great work &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, and his article, “Imperialism and the Split in the Socialist Movement.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XIX (International Publishers).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior even to the imperialist war, but particularly on its outbreak, a revolutionary situation was created in the countries where capitalism was most highly developed as a result of the extreme aggravation of the contradictions of capitalism, the high cost of living, increased oppression and general deterioration of the condition of the working class. The revolution began to spread even before the war. In the East, the revolution followed on the heels of the 1905 Revolution in Russia; in 1906 it broke out in Persia, in 1908 in Turkey and in 1911 in China. In the European countries the approach of revolution was heralded by big strikes in England (the general strike on the railways in 1911, the miners’ strike in 1912), the struggles of the workers in Germany (the demonstrations in favour of universal suffrage in Prussia in 1910), and working class demonstrations in Russia (the protest strikes against the Lena shootings in 1912, the strikes in Baku and other cities in the summer of 1914, the demonstrations in St. Petersburg, accompanied by armed clashes and the erection of barricades, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proletarian revolution loomed in all capitalist countries. The fundamental conditions for the transition to socialism had ripened; a proletarian revolution had become an objective necessity. The dictatorship of the bourgeoisie had to be replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat, since of all the classes in modern society the proletariat alone was capable of leading the toilers out of the &#039;&#039;impasse&#039;&#039; to which the bourgeoisie had brought it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of all the workers’ parties of the world, however, the Russian Bolsheviks alone, headed by Lenin, proved to be actually prepared to assume the leadership of the proletarian revolution. In the West European countries, in the long period of reaction that followed the suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871, the workers’ parties had grown accustomed to pursue only legal forms of the class struggle. Opportunism was rife: a good deal of “opportunist garbage,” as Lenin called it, had accumulated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the chief reasons for the strength of opportunism was the fact that in all imperialist countries the capitalist class bribed the upper stratum of the working class (the numerically small labour aristocracy) out of the super-profits obtained from the plunder of the colonies and semi-colonies. Thus, there was a section, a numerically small section, it is true, of the working class, that sided with the bourgeoisie and served as the vehicle of its influence to the proletariat. But the situation completely changed with the outbreak of the imperialist war. Then in the Western countries, in the “free” constitutional monarchies and republics, armed revolt and the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war became an urgent necessity, for there was no way of escaping from exploitation except by bitter struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of all the European parties, the Russian Bolshevik Party, alone, had made serious preparation for this struggle, owing to the fact that in Russia a revolutionary situation had been developing since the middle of the nineteenth century. The Russian revolutionary movement was the most powerful in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Russia all the contradictions of the modern period of imperialism were prevalent: the oppression of enslaved nationalities by a dominant nation, the military-feudal oppression of tsarism, which was the most brutal form of political oppression then existing. The landowning nobility still survived in Russia and there were many survivals of serfdom in economic life (particularly that of the peasants), habits and customs and in political institutions. At the same time capitalism was developing rapidly: large-scale industry grew apace and became concentrated in a few centres; this was accompanied by the growth of the working class. Bank capital, syndicates and trusts, those highest forms of imperialist finance capital, developed also, particularly after 1905. The proletarian class war against the bourgeoisie spread and this was accompanied by the growth of the peasants’ war against the landowning nobility. In other words, we had a combination of two class wars, which Marx viewed as unusually favourable for proletarian victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels had pointed out in their time the approach of the revolution in Russia, the extremely rapid development of capitalism in that vast country, and the unbearable yoke of tsarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They had understood: 1, the complexity of the social structure in Russia, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the existence of the most primitive together with the most modern forms (“every stage of social development is represented from the primitive commune to modern large-scale industry and high finance,” as Engels wrote to V. I. Zasulich in 1885); 2, they took into account the existence of a revolutionary situation; they saw that the revolution required only a jolt to bring vast masses of people into action; 3, they foresaw that the revolutionary explosion would be of tremendous power and that it would inevitably assume a most violent and bitter character (“Russia is heading towards a most violent revolution,” Marx wrote to Engels in 1870); 4, they foresaw that in this &#039;&#039;last&#039;&#039; of the great European countries to pass through the capitalist industrial revolution, the conflict would assume unprecedented dimensions. “This time the crash will beat anything known before; all the factors are there: intensity, universal extension, entanglement of all possessing and ruling social elements,” so Engels wrote to Marx on April 14, 1856; 5, they realised the tremendous significance of the Russian revolution for the world revolution. That the latter would be a socialist revolution Marx and Engels never doubted.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Marx’s letters to Engels, Nov. 13, 1859; Feb. 13, 1863; Sept. 27, 1877, etc.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of enormous importance for the Russian revolution and for the development of the Leninist theory was the fact that quite an extensive experience in revolution and working class organisation had already been accumulated, and that the theory of Marx and Engels had been worked out in detail and adopted and tested by the revolutionary proletarian party and by the masses. The Bolshevik Party grew and gained strength in the course of a long struggle and the experience of a number of revolutions. It accumulated the experience of the international working-class movement and of West European revolutions and conveyed this experience to the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his “&#039;&#039;Left-Wing’ Communism&#039;&#039;, Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Russia achieved Marxism, as the only correct revolutionary theory, virtually through &#039;&#039;suffering&#039;&#039;, by a half century of unprecedented torments and sacrifice, of unprecedented revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, painstaking search and study, testing in practice, disappointments, checking, and comparison with European experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin also emphasised the value and significance of the direct experience gained by the Bolshevik Party in the long struggle against the autocracy, the liberal bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeois wavering and uncertain revolutionaries (such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Anarchists, and so forth), and against the various tendencies and deviations within its own ranks. These deviations and bourgeois influences were overcome in the struggle waged against the various forms of opportunism that successively manifested themselves: Economism,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A tendency in Russian Social-Democracy which advocated “pure and simple” trade unionism.—&#039;&#039;Ed&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Menshevism, the Liquidationist movement, social-patriotism and the tendencies that disguised themselves by “Left” phraseology, such as “&#039;&#039;Otzovism&#039;&#039;,” “&#039;&#039;Vperyodism&#039;&#039;,”&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Otzovism&#039;&#039;—from, the Russian, meaning a tendency favoring the &#039;&#039;recall&#039;&#039; of the Socialist deputies from the Duma; &#039;&#039;Vperyodism&#039;&#039;—a tendency represented by Socialists grouped around the newspaper &#039;&#039;Vperyod&#039;&#039; (Forward).—&#039;&#039;Ed&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Left Communism,” etc., as well as against conciliationism, a disguised and therefore particularly dangerous form of opportunism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin subjected the Russian revolution and the development of Bolshevism to a detailed analysis in a number of his writings, &#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, “The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats,” “Speech on the Revolution of 1905,” “The Stages, the Trend and Prospects of the Revolution,” “Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers,” “Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution,” “Our Revolution,” especially “Left-Wing” Communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have dealt particularly with the Russian revolution, because it was in Russia that the Bolshevik Party developed. But it would be a mistake to assume that Bolshevism (in other words, Leninism) is based only on the experiences of Russia and that it is a purely Russian phenomenon. Leninism was drawn from international experience and its significance is international. Only by a proletarian revolution can the revolutionary proletariat and the oppressed masses who are struggling against imperialism throughout the world, achieve their emancipation. Leninism is the theory of the proletariat, it sums up and explains this experience, it teaches the working class how to conduct its fight and how to secure victory, seize power, consolidate its gains and lead the toilers in their struggle against exploitation. It also teaches us how socialism is to be built.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his pamphlet &#039;&#039;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&#039;&#039;, Lenin says that the popularity of Bolshevism throughout the world is due to the profound sympathy the masses have for genuinely revolutionary tactics, because the revolution has begun to mature all over the world. He enumerates the achievements of Bolshevism and declares that Bolshevik tactics were based on a correct appreciation of the revolutionary situation that had arisen all over Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolshevism exposed and routed the old, putrid international of social-traitors. It laid down the ideological and tactical foundations of the Third International, which took into account the gains achieved in the epoch of peace as well as the experience of the epoch of revolution which had commenced. The example of the Soviet state showed that the workers and poor peasants are capable of taking political power, of defending it against attacks of the world bourgeoisie, and of building socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Russia as an example, the masses throughout the world were in a position to convince themselves that Bolshevism had indicated “the true path of salvation from the horrors of the war and of imperialism and that Bolshevism &#039;&#039;could serve as an example in tactics to all&#039;&#039;” (Lenin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The long training and hardening that the Bolshevik Party had obtained in the struggle guaranteed it an important place in the international struggle against opportunism and for the creation of the Third, Communist, International. While crystallising the rich experience of the Russian revolution, Bolshevism at the same time reflected the experience of the international working-class movement (particularly the European) which had entered the era of the socialist revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before the war, during the war, and after the war, Lenin in his writings constantly bore in mind the experience of the whole international struggle. Under his leadership, a bitter struggle was waged against opportunism wherever it was found. It was in this spirit, the spirit of revolutionary Marxism, that the Communist Parties in every European country were trained. Lenin wrote letters to workers in various countries on questions of the international revolution, pointing out that the urgent and essential task in the present period of history was to fight for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat all over the world. It was under Lenin’s leadership that the Communist International was created and the fundamental principles of its programme, organisation and tactics laid down.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leninism, therefore, is Marxism in the epoch of imperialism and of the proletarian revolution. In this epoch, the proletarian movement reaches new, higher, levels. The proletariat has grown numerically; it has become better organised and more class conscious; its historical activity has increased; it has learned to employ new methods in the struggle, for it has now conquered power and established its dictatorship in a vast country. In his activities and in his writings, Lenin expressed and analysed the new phenomena of the new epoch. Leading the struggle of the proletariat in these new conditions, Lenin advanced and developed Marxist theory and introduced fresh elements into all its phases. Hence Leninism is a new stage in the development of Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== MATERIALIST DIALECTICS AS THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF MARXISM-LENINISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essence of Marxism is materialist dialectics. Lenin called materialist dialectics “the living soul of Marxism,” “its fundamental theoretical root.” The importance of mastering the dialectical method will therefore be obvious. It is needed in the study of nature and of society, in the theoretical struggle, in the practical leadership of the proletariat and its constructive work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The articles collected in Volume XI of the &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;To be published in English Translation—&#039;&#039;Ed&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; provide a general exposition of materialist dialectics and its application to the study of nature and of the history of human society and of human thought. We must learn how to apply this method by studying the works of Marx and Engels and the masterly application of materialist dialectics by Lenin. All his life Lenin was a diligent student of the works of Marx and Engels; he read them over and over again, and turned to them particularly at every turn of history and at every new stage of the revolution, when new problems arose for solution. Lenin took his revolutionary materialist dialectics from Marx and Engels, he repeatedly advocated the necessity of studying their works for this purpose. But to say that Lenin mastered the Marxist method is not enough; he developed it and raised it to a still higher level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What do we mean by dialectics? By dialectics Hegel meant the progress of ideas (thought) by means of contradiction, the process of its development toward a supreme and absolute spirit. Hegel emphasised that such progress, such development is self-motion. He considered that every phenomenon had its own motion, its own process of development, and that this self-motion is the result of an inherent impulse to development. In ancient Greece, dialectics was the name given to the art of disputation. It was considered that in the course of an argument, rich in fertile ideas, the opinions of the disputing parties underwent a change and that something new and of a higher nature resulted. By analogy, all motion by means of contradiction came to be called dialectics. This was the sense in which Hegel used the term. He believed that motion was universally produced in this way, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, by a conflict of contradictions, the negation of the old and the creation of the new. That is how development takes place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the dialectics of Hegel are idealistic. It is the movement of thought that lies at the root of his whole philosophy. Marx, on the contrary, employed dialectics materialistically. He created dialectic materialism. &#039;&#039;Materialist dialectics&#039;&#039; is the general movement and development caused by the conflict of contradictions that takes place throughout the universe both in nature and in society, and which is reflected in human thought. &#039;&#039;Dialectic materialism&#039;&#039; is the philosophy and method of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, an instrument for the study and transformation of everything that exists. Dialectic materialism is not confined merely to theoretical study: it involves practical revolutionary action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectic thought strives to achieve a complete and all-embracing conception of phenomena. Every expressed opinion is more or less one-sided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin, after conversing with an individual who had attended the “&#039;&#039;Vperyod&#039;&#039;” school at Capri conducted by A. Bogdanov, who politically was a follower of the “Otzovist” faction, wrote a letter to Maxim Gorky dated November 29, 1909, in which he stated that his (Lenin’s) previous conception of the Capri school had been one-sided. He wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;By gad, the philosopher Hegel was right—life does progress by contradictions; and living contradictions are much richer, more varied and pithier than the mind of man originally conceived. I thought that the school was &#039;&#039;merely&#039;&#039; the centre of a new faction. It turns out not to be so: not in the sense that the school was not the centre of a new faction (it was, and is so to-day), but in the sense that this is not the whole truth. Subjectively, certain individuals made the school such a centre; objectively, it was such a centre, and, moreover, the school drew from real working-class surroundings genuine and advanced workers. And so it turned out that at Capri, beside the contradictions between the old and new factions, a contradiction developed between a section of the Social-Democratic intellectuals and the Russian workers, who are bound, &#039;&#039;whatever happens&#039;&#039;, to bring the Social-Democracy out on the true path, and will do so in spite of all the intrigues, “brawls and incidents,” etc., etc., that go on abroad.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
From this example we see that there are several sides to every object and to every phenomenon. When considering certain phases, we must not forget those that are temporarily overshadowed and forced into the background, but which may assume prime importance in the further development of the conflict of contradictions. One must be able to view the development of a given phenomenon in its perspective, to see the interrelation of all its component parts, and at the same time distinguish the “main link” of each given concrete situation and historical moment. The complexity of the phenomena of reality, their contradictory nature and their constant flux and change are reflected in our judgment of them, which also cannot help but be contradictory and in a constant state of flux. That, however, does not exclude, but, on the contrary, imposes the necessity for finding clear and definite answers to the problems that arise at any given moment. Dialectic materialism teaches us to distinguish the contradictions of reality, to understand their significance and to study their development (objective dialectics). Correspondingly, the progress of concepts (subjective dialectics), by properly reflecting reality, must conform to what is proceeding in the external (objective) world and must not allow itself to be severed from its base. Consciousness must strive to adapt itself to the (dialectical) progress of the reflected object.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of the works of Hegel lies in the fact that he was the first to create a philosophy that attempted (and to a certain extent successfully) to study the general laws of dialectics. The great merit of Hegel consists in the fact that he made dialectics the basis of his philosophy. As Marx said, Hegel was the “first to give a complete and conscious picture of the general forms of motion” [&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, of dialectics.—&#039;&#039;V. A.&#039;&#039;]. It would, however, be a mistake to believe that one can simply take and use the Hegelian dialectics without first radically re-shaping it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx himself declared that his method not only differed fundamentally from that of Hegel “but is its direct opposite.” Marx said, that to Hegel&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;the process of thinking, which under the name of “the idea” he even transformed into an independent subject, is the &#039;&#039;demiurge&#039;&#039; of the world, and the real world is only the extreme phenomenal form of “the idea.” With me the idea is nothing else than the material reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Hegelian dialectics, accordingly, requires thorough overhauling. It must be “turned right side up again” in order to reveal “the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Engels also dwelt on the same theme and treated it in a similar spirit. To the question, wherein lies the error of Hegel, he replies: in the fact that the laws of dialectics “are not drawn from nature and history, but imposed on the latter as laws of thought.” Hence the nonsensical concept that “the world must conform to a logical system, which is itself only the product of definite stages of development of human thought.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Engels declares that “this relationship must be reversed,” whereupon everything will appear normal and plain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The dialectical laws, which in the idealistic philosophy are extremely mysterious, will then immediately become simple and clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
On another occasion Engels stated that the mysticism of Hegel consisted in the fact that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;the category [&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, concept—&#039;&#039;V.A.&#039;&#039;] was to him something antecedent, while the dialectics of the real universe was its mere reflection. Actually the opposite is true: the dialectics of the mind is only the reflection of the real world both of nature and of history.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;F. Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Dialectics of Nature&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (&#039;&#039;The Dialectics of Nature&#039;&#039;.)&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin, like Marx, completely remoulded Hegel, reversed his theses, put them right side up and interpreted them materialistically.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Hegel’s logic, he wrote, cannot be applied in its present form: it cannot be &#039;&#039;taken for granted&#039;&#039;. We must select from it its logical (gnosiological) shades and purge it of &#039;&#039;mystical ideas&#039;&#039;; that is still a big task.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
A valuable guide to the study of Hegel are his synopses: &#039;&#039;The Science of Logic&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;The History of Philosophy&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throughout the universe, development proceeds not as the result of any external cause (God), not because of any “purpose” inherent in events, but because of the inherent contradictions that are contained in all things and in all phenomena. “Contradiction is the root of all motion and of all life,” Hegel wrote. “It is only because a thing contains a contradiction within itself, that it moves and acquires impulse and activity. That is the process of all motion and all development.”&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Such a conception was essentially inimical to belief in God. The shrewd priests who controlled religious education in Russia very soon realised (in the ’sixties) that the theories of Hegel contained certain very dangerous elements. Accordingly the study of Hegel was prohibited in theological seminaries and academies in spite of the fact that the Hegelian philosophy is an idealistic philosophy and preserves God under the guise of the absolute idea.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin in his article &#039;&#039;On Dialectics&#039;&#039; points out that contradictions exist universally: repulsion and attraction, positive and negative electricity, the division into parts, and the union of the parts to form a whole, etc. In all the phenomena and processes of nature and society there are contradictory, opposite, mutually exclusive, and at the same time associated, tendencies. Dialectics, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, the contradictions, union and conflict of opposites, prevails in the material world and is reflected in consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The general laws of dialectics are universal: they are to be found in the movement and development of the immeasurably vast luminous nebulae from which in the spaces of the universe the stellar systems are formed (these spaces are measured by light years, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, the distance through which light travels in one year, moving at a speed of 300,000 kilometres per second), in the internal structure of molecules and atoms and in the movement of electrons and protons; the latter are also opposite and mutually connected and undergo transformation, change and development, in other words, they also reveal the laws of dialectics in their existence and in their movements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The development of the animal kingdom also proceeds by contradictions and the conflict of opposites (the struggle for existence, procreation by sex, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In human society the driving force of development is the class struggle. In the conditions of contemporary society, the struggle of the revolutionary class, the proletariat, causes the transition from one form of society to another—the transition from capitalism to communism. (We shall deal with this in somewhat greater detail below.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is this dialectical movement of the material universe that forms the subject matter of materialist dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin said that “contradiction” is the salt of dialectics; its “kernel” is unity and the conflict of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectics emphasises not only contradiction and opposites, but also unity. Lenin thus explains the formula “unity of opposites”:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We are unable to imagine, express, measure or depict motion without interrupting that which is continuous, without simplifying, approximating, separating and petrifying that which is alive. The depiction of the movement of thought is always an approximation, an act of petrification—and not merely of thought, but also of sensation, and not merely of motion, but of all conceptions. Therein lies the essence of dialectics. And it is this essence that is expressed in the formula, the unity, the identity of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Greek eclectic philosopher Zeno (fifth century B.C.), known as the father of the dialectical method, was the first to give clear expression to the idea of the contradictoriness of motion. Certain of his arguments have come down to us and these show that thought is bound to arrive at an &#039;&#039;impasse&#039;&#039; if dialectical methods are not employed and if the unity of opposites is not understood. Here is one of his arguments. An arrow in the course of its flight is bound to be at some definite point of its path and occupy some definite place. If that be so, then at each given moment it is at a definite point in a state of rest, that is, motionless; hence, it is not moving at all. We therefore see that motion cannot be expressed without resorting to contradictory statements. The arrow is in a given place, yet at the same time is not in that place. It is only by expressing both these contradictory affirmations coincidentally that we can depict motion. If we were to rest on only half of a phrase, either motion would disappear, or the object itself. And that is true of any judgment, for a judgment expresses only one or a few sides of an object, whereas the object has innumerable sides and innumerable contacts with the surrounding world. Hence, a contrary judgment may be made regarding any thing or phenomenon and yet to a certain extent it will be correct. Explosive substances employed in war cause tremendous destruction. But employed in industry they serve the cause of culture. Because of the antagonism of classes all things and phenomena assume opposite significance for each of the combatant sides: for the proletariat, the Soviet state means victory; for the capitalists it means defeat and the end of their rule, and so forth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The formula “unity of opposites” is particularly important because it expresses the principal distinguishing feature of dialectic motion, the most fundamental property of all phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to avoid misunderstanding it should be stated here, that the application of the dialectical method does not mean arbitrarily combining all and every contradictory assertion. The unity of opposites must not be taken to mean the simple repetition of arbitrarily chosen postulates and opposite assertions; it is the combination and conflict of opposites as they exist in reality and the discovery of the contradictions in reality that are the driving forces and bases of motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order that the specific features of dialectical thinking may be better understood it will be useful to compare and contrast it with other, non-dialectical methods and forms of thinking. This will help to bring out more clearly the fundamental features of materialist dialectics and to give a more precise idea of its laws, particularly its basic law: motion is the result of contradiction, the unity and conflict of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
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Opposed to dialectics are metaphysics, eclectics, sophistry, and the puerile “evolutionary” conception of development. Materialist dialectics does not tolerate the use of stereotyped and ready-made schemes. It demands the profound study of concrete circumstances, the precise formulation of the real process of development; it also demands revolutionary action.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dialectical thinking is the opposite of metaphysics, which regards things and phenomena, not in their unity and interrelationship, but each separate from the other, &#039;&#039;outside&#039;&#039; of the grand, &#039;&#039;general&#039;&#039; relationship, and consequently, not in motion, but in a state of rest, frozen, unchanging and lifeless. Metaphysical thinking is incapable of depicting the real inter-relations and development of phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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How, for instance, is one to regard capitalist, bourgeois democracy? To approach this phenomenon with a ready-made answer would be metaphysics. It would be untrue to say that capitalism is an evil at all times and under all conditions. Compared with the serf system, capitalism was beneficial: to a certain extent it freed the toilers and placed them in more favourable conditions for their development and their struggle for emancipation. The serf system, on the other hand, was beneficial compared with slavery. As long as the serf system exists, as long as it predominates, the movement towards capitalism is a progressive movement. But when the serf system is abolished, the workers are left facing one main enemy—capitalism. In relation to the past, capitalism is beneficial; in relation to the future, in relation to the more perfect system, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, socialism, capitalism is an evil that must be destroyed.&lt;br /&gt;
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For the proletariat, bourgeois democracy is, of course, preferable to a tsarist autocracy. The proletariat cannot but strive to overthrow autocracy. But even a democratic republic is one of the forms of the class rule of the exploiters, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, the bourgeois dictatorship, which must be replaced by a Soviet state—by proletarian democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Slavery is abominable. But slavery was necessary at a given phase of the historical development of humanity, in the remote past, at a given level of development of productive forces. At that time it represented a necessary stage of development, a definite advance. At a particular stage of development of productive forces, enemies, instead of being killed, were turned into slaves and their labour power was thus preserved and put to use.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we are asked, what interest has the past to us, we reply that development throughout the world takes place unevenly. In one place (the U.S.S.R.) bourgeois democracy is a thing of the past; in other places (outside the U.S.S.R.) it is a thing of the present. Moreover, feudal relations, and even slave relations (at least survivals of them) continue to exist in Asia and Africa and even in Europe and America. At the present time all these are dominated by the fundamental contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between wage slavery and the struggle against wage slavery, between the system of capitalist states and the U.S.S.R. Yet at the same time, old forms of oppression continue to exist. Only by its own efforts, without the aid of God (who we do know does not exist) can mankind escape from its bestial existence, its semi-barbaric conditions of life, and from the grip of poverty, oppression and ignorance. In this struggle for emancipation the proletariat takes the lead. Its fight is against the fundamental and dominating relations of wage slavery; but parallel with this form of exploitation there remain the survivals of preceding forms of oppression, against which the proletariat must also wage a bitter war.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dialectic materialism is the theory that guides the proletariat in its struggles. The proletariat wages war on the bourgeoisie and in time will overthrow it; it will abolish the rule of the bourgeoisie and destroy the relations of exploitation; but at the same time it must take over and still further develop the cultural achievements that were amassed under the rule of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
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The bourgeois, the capitalist, is our enemy. But having defeated the enemy and broken his resistance, we must take advantage of his knowledge and experience. We must make use of the cultural and scientific developments achieved under the bourgeoisie and compel the bourgeois specialists to work for the cause of communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the process of development all things give way to others, all things are negated. But the characteristic feature of dialectical negation is that it does not merely throw to one side, it abolishes by first overcoming. Socialism cannot be brought about without mastering and remoulding all that which was accumulated in the preceding stage of historical development and all that which was taken over from the past and developed by the bourgeoisie. Such a dialectic negation of the bourgeoisie can be accomplished only by the proletariat, the class most closely associated with modern large-scale industry, which is the most valuable product of bourgeois development.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus see that nothing is immutable; everything changes, everything passes from one state to another. For this reason metaphysical thought, which regards things in isolation and treats them as immutable, cannot correctly reflect the ceaseless process of motion and the inter- relationship of all phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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As we have stated, development arises out of inherent contradictions. For instance, the capitalist system is a unity of opposites: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The dialectics of this contradiction was brilliantly set forth by Marx in &#039;&#039;The Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, “Karl Marx,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XVIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and in &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;. The bourgeoisie and the proletariat are opposites; but at the same time they comprise a definite unity: they are the classes of a single social and economic formation—capitalism—in a state of irreconcilable contradiction. This contradiction will be logically solved dialectically by the internal struggle, the proletarian revolution. The logic arises out of the mass struggle. In the process of revolution, the proletariat becomes transformed, it becomes trained for the performance of its historic mission. In 1846 Marx wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The revolution is essential not merely because the dominant class cannot be overthrown by any other means, but also because only in the course of the revolution can the class which overthrows cleanse itself of the mire of the old society and become fit to create a new society.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This is one of the fundamental ideas of Marxism. Marx returned to it time and again. Thus, in 1850 in his speech to the Communist League, Marx said, addressing himself to the workers:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;You must pass through fifteen, twenty, perhaps fifty years of civil war and national conflict, not merely in order to change the system, but also to change yourselves and to render yourselves fit for political rule.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And again in 1871, in his pamphlet, &#039;&#039;The Civil War in France&#039;&#039;, repeating the same thought, Marx said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;They [the working class] know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending, by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Civil War in France&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; (International Publishers), p. 44.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Here we discern the same unity of opposites, the mutual conflict of these opposites and the inevitable solution of the conflicts by a transition to a new form of society. Without the long and severe training obtained in its struggles the proletariat cannot fit itself to perform its historical mission.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is the task of materialist dialectics to study the conflict of opposites proceeding in the world around us and to reveal it in its true form. It must seek the dialectic foundations of the contradictions and not select symptoms and phases of phenomena casually and eclectically (that is, arbitrarily and independently of their essential inter-relationship). It must seek to discover the driving forces of development. At the same time it must actively participate in the struggle on the side of the revolutionary class and lead the mass struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;My ideals for the upbuilding of new Russia will not be chimerical only if they express the interests of an actually existing class that is compelled by conditions to act in a definite direction. In adopting the viewpoint of the objectivity of the class struggle I do not thereby justify reality; on the contrary, I point to the profound (if at a first glance invisible) sources and forces that exist within that reality and make for its transformation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, “The Political Line,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XVI, pp. 143-144, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Eclecticism employs methods repugnant to dialectic materialism. Dialectics is opposed to the habit of the eclectics of arbitrarily selecting isolated phases, and their inability to grasp an object or a phenomenon as a whole, in its totality, and in its systematic and inevitable interrelationships and development as they exist in reality. Instead of taking the phenomenon as a whole in all its complexity, but at the same time in its unity and totality, they one-sidedly exaggerate isolated features, component parts and phases. Materialist dialectics demands that the important factor should be singled out, but that at the same time attention should be devoted to those phases that are brought to the forefront by circumstances. It also demands that the phenomenon as a whole should not be lost sight of. Ideas must represent the interrelation of the various phases of phenomena as they exist in reality and emphasise the fundamental contradictions (the “main link,” as Lenin expressed it, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, that which is essential to the practical leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat). As one of many examples of the manner in which Lenin attacked eclecticism, one may mention his criticism of Comrade Bukharin in the discussion on the trade union question.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, “Once More on the Trade Unions,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XXVI, pp. 109-145, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As an example of his ability to single out the “main link,” and of the value of this ability to the proletarian revolution, we may refer to the change to the New Economic Policy effected by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Lenin’s leadership and to Lenin’s explanation and analysis of the circumstances that attended this measure.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, “The Significance of Gold, Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XXVII, pp. 79-85, Russian edition; also various articles in the same volume.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In contradistinction to the eclectic conception, dialectics teaches the doctrine of &#039;&#039;The Concreteness of Truth&#039;&#039;. In his Introduction to the &#039;&#039;Critique of Political Economy&#039;&#039; Marx explained that the concrete is concrete by virtue of the fact that it combines within itself a multiformity of definitions, because it is “unity in multiformity.” The concrete is the whole of nature, the whole of reality, surrounding us: it embraces, combines and coalesces all contradictions. Our knowledge moves towards an ever more complete and more profound reflection of this complete (concrete) reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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While realising the limitation and provisional nature of abstract postulates, dialectical thought employs abstractions within certain limits. An abstraction singles out a certain phase, concentrates on it and studies it. In his &#039;&#039;Foreword&#039;&#039; to the first volume of &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;, Marx declares that in the study of social, and particularly economic forms, neither microscope nor chemical reagents are of any use. “The forces of abstraction must replace both.” And in Volume I, Chapter 1 of &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;, in which he analyses the principal phenomena of bourgeois exchange society (commodity, value and money) Marx gives us an example of how to use abstractions and of the limits which they are invaluable to scientific research.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin’s article “Karl Marx” and his Preface to Marx’s &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Letters to Kugelmann&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (&#039;&#039;Cf&#039;&#039;. Lenin’s article, “Karl Marx,” and his Preface to Marx’s &#039;&#039;Letters to Kugelmann&#039;&#039;.)&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, when Marx undertook to present a general picture of the laws of capitalist society he did not confine himself to this alone. When investigating reality in all its complexity we must endeavour to create a picture that most faithfully reflects that reality and to discover the concrete truths that reflect the real situation in all its totality and in the unity of its contradictions and opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the notes Lenin made on his reading of Hegel, he declares that “concreteness... is the spirit and essence of dialectics.” And in his popular exposition of the nature of dialectics,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, “Once More on the Trade Unions,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XXVI, pp. 109-145, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; he states that one of the fundamentals of dialectical logic is that “there is no abstract truth, truth is concrete.” This means that one must not be content with general arguments: it means that reality demands clear and precise replies to the concrete problems that arise in the course of historical development and the struggle of the working class, and it means further, that if one wants to express an opinion with a full knowledge of the subject, one’s mind must be able to reflect all the relationships and the full complexity of the concrete conditions of the given phenomena and to express the general laws of development of those phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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In contrast to the &#039;&#039;dialectic&#039;&#039; conception of development, which reveals the full complexity of a process, we have the puerile and superficial conception of “peaceful” development, “&#039;&#039;evolution&#039;&#039;” without contradictions and without leaps, upheavals and revolution. This conception is impotent in the face of the actual process of development. As a matter of fact a genuine conception of evolution, answering actual reality, must embrace not only gradual changes, but also sudden changes, “leaps,” breaks in continuity. Without such leaps no phenomenon can be explained, for it would be necessary to assume that nothing new can arise, that everything already exists in an imperceptibly minute form liable to subsequent growth. As a matter of fact, however, we continually meet with breaks in continuity and with the appearance of new qualities that formerly did not exist. Changes of form always take place in reality by means of revolution, leaps. In the process of development old forms are negated and new forms take their place which in their turn are negated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The act of birth is an act of revolution. Yet the period during which the child is carried in the womb of the mother is one of slow and gradual change. Social development proceeds by the struggle of classes and by revolution. Dialectics gives a true and profound theory of development; it represents it as pursuing a complex, not a direct path, and as comprising, not merely the accumulation of slow and gradual changes, but also periods of cataclysm, sudden change, leaps, revolutions, reverse movements (as though taking a run for a sudden leap forward), ebb and flow, and so forth; evolution as represented by the bourgeois ideologists is a simple, &#039;&#039;smooth&#039;&#039; and tranquil process. The dialectic is difficult and complex, “cunning” as Hegel expressed it; it is very hard to understand and master. But what would you have, when the world of reality and the process of its development are themselves complex, and not the simple processes the good, respectable citizen would have them be.&lt;br /&gt;
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The dying of the old and the birth of the new is a complicated and difficult process. In all development it is the process as a whole that is important, and not merely the result.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is sheer self-deception to believe that fruits may be gathered without long and arduous labour. Those who fear revolution, who shrink from the methods of struggle that reality imposes, are, in practice, supporters of the exploiters and traitors to the cause of emancipating the working class from wage slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1918 Lenin explained the meaning and importance of the class struggle that was taking place at that time as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;When the bourgeoisie, and the government officials, clerks, doctors, engineers, etc., who are accustomed to serve it, resort to extreme measures of resistance, the intellectuals are horrified. They tremble in fear and whine pitifully about the necessity of a return to “compromise.” We, on the contrary, like all true friends of the oppressed classes, only rejoice at the extreme resistance offered by the exploiters; for we expect the proletariat to grow to manhood and to mature for power not by persuasion and pleading, not in the school of dulcet preaching and edifying declamations, but in the school of life, the school of struggle. The proletariat must &#039;&#039;learn&#039;&#039; how to become the ruling class and how to gain complete victory over the bourgeoisie, for it cannot obtain this knowledge ready-made. It must learn by struggle. And it is only serious, bitter and desperate struggle that teaches anything. The more extreme the resistance of the exploiters is the more energetically, firmly, mercilessly and successfully will they be suppressed by the exploited. The more varied the efforts and pains the exploiters take to defend the old, the sooner will the proletariat learn to drive its class enemies out of their last hiding places, tear out the roots of their domination and remove the very soil on which wage slavery, mass poverty, and the profits and the insolence of the moneybags could (and, indeed, had to) spring up.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the growing resistance of the bourgeoisie and its hangers-on, the strength of the proletariat and of the peasantry which ally themselves with it also grows. The exploited gain in strength and manhood, they grow and learn to throw off the “old Adam” of wage slavery in proportion as the resistance of their enemies, the exploiters, increases. Victory is bound to be on the side of the exploited, for on their side is life itself, the strength of numbers, the strength of the masses, the strength of the inexhaustible springs of self- sacrifice and of the idealistic and honest reserves of energy and talent of the so-called “common” people, the workers and peasants, awakened and eager to build up a new order. Victory is on their side.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XXII, p. 157, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
These lines describing the dialectics of the class struggle, although written in 1918, still preserve their force. As long as classes and class society exist, the class struggle of the proletariat is essential for the development of society and for its progress to a higher form of organisation, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., communism. Those who fail to understand this, who refuse to understand the necessity for treading the difficult path to communism, who are terrified at the difficulties and anxious to escape them by endeavouring to create peace between the exploited and the exploiters, in practice are enemies of communism; for they are hindering the cause of the exploited masses and diverting them from the only path of escape from an exploiting, slave society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another serious violation of dialectics is the refusal to reckon with actual and inevitable causes, and the intellectual evasion of stages that must be passed through in reality. Those who thus evade and anticipate tend to become isolated from the masses in practical politics and cease to lead the revolutionary struggle of the masses, thereby playing into the hands of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dialectics demands that the successive stages of transition should be clearly defined.&lt;br /&gt;
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Innumerable instances may be cited of Lenin’s ability to define transitions. Here we will only mention the transition (transformation) of the imperialist war into civil war, a transition of world historical importance, which Lenin not only studied in all its details, but in which he directly took part. The basis of this transition is the development of the proletarian revolution, which, by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat, brings about the transition from capitalism to communism. He calculated the course of this development in all its complexity. In 1916 he wrote that the impending socialist revolution would be&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;an outburst of mass struggle on the part of all the various oppressed and discontented elements. Sections of the petty bourgeoisie and of the backward workers will inevitably participate in it—without such participation &#039;&#039;mass&#039;&#039; struggle is &#039;&#039;impossible&#039;&#039;, without it no revolution is possible—and just as inevitably will they bring into the movement their prejudices, their reactionary phantasies, their weaknesses and errors. But &#039;&#039;objectively&#039;&#039; they will attack &#039;&#039;capitalism&#039;&#039;, and the class conscious vanguard of the revolution, the advanced proletariat expressing this objective truth for a heterogeneous and discordant, motley and outwardly uncohesive mass struggle, will be able to unify and direct it, to gain power, to seize the banks, to expropriate the trusts, which are hated by all (though for different reasons) and introduce other dictatorial measures which will amount to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the victory of socialism, but which will by no means immediately be “purged” of petty bourgeois slag.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, “The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XIX.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The scientific forecast contained in this passage was subsequently fully corroborated. Lenin’s works written in the period 1917-23 deal with a number of questions connected with the leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat in the transition period from the capitalist exploiting system to a classless, communist society. In a series of articles he analysed the various stages of the revolution, and the various phases of the transition period itself. He picks out the fundamental features of current phenomena and shows whence and whither the transition is proceeding. This is necessary in order that every effort be made to extend and deepen the proletarian revolution and to secure the triumph of its cause.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, “New Times and New Errors in a New Guise,” and &amp;amp;quot;The Significance of Gold, Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Only thanks to its theoretical grasp of the meaning of revolutionary struggle was the leadership of the Party of Lenin able to secure the victory of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the subsequent development of socialist construction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As has been stated, the ability to distinguish the logical sequence of the stages of transition is not only of theoretical importance; it is also of great practical importance in the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat and in determining its strategy and tactics.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Lenin, “Letters on Tactics,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XX, pp. 118-129.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin possessed the faculty of discerning the conflict of contradictions and of opposites as they took place in actual reality. We have already said that dialectic materialism demands the expression and formulation of the actual process of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Genuine (objective) &#039;&#039;dialectics&#039;&#039; is distinguished from &#039;&#039;sophistry&#039;&#039;, which does not study the actual process of development in its totality, but indulges in an arbitrary play of ideas (&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, subjective dialectics, applied arbitrarily and severed from the dialectic movement of the external world).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many examples of sophistry can be found in the war waged by the opportunists against revolutionary Marxism and particularly in the utterances of Kautsky and Plekhanov after they had become traitors to revolutionary Marxism. An examination of the sophisms of the opportunists is given by Lenin in his “Collapse of the Second International,” where he states that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The dialectic method demands a many-sided investigation of a given social phenomenon in its development; it demands that we proceed from the exterior, from the apparent, to the fundamental moving forces, to the development of productive forces and to the class struggle.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XVIII (International Publishers), p. 283.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The sophist, however, picks out a postulate which is only correct under certain conditions, instead of undertaking an all-sided investigation, and ignores the most important point, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., that the conditions under which the given postulate is correct soon cease to exist, that the whole environment changes and that, as a result, everything else radically changes. For instance, Marx and Engels spoke of the legitimacy of the wars for national emancipation that took place in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century, &#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, in Prussia in 1813. Kautsky takes these words of Marx and Engels and applies them in a different epoch, namely, to the wars of the twentieth century, which are essentially imperialistic and predatory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It is the method of all the sophists of all times to quote examples obviously relating to basically dissimilar cases.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, p. 285.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The whole article, “Collapse of the Second International,” is a brilliant example of materialist dialectics. The article gives a detailed and precise explanation of the nature of the sophistry of the opportunists. In Lenin’s works we find innumerable examples of how to apply materialist dialectics and how to combat the false, truth-distorting views of the opportunists. We find it in his polemical writings against the Populists—“Who are the Friends of the People and How They Fight against Social-Democracy”; against Struve—“The Economic Content of Populism and the Criticism of it in Mr. Struve’s Book”; against the Economists—&#039;&#039;What Is To Be Done?&#039;&#039; against the Mensheviks, the Liquidationists, the “Otzovists” and against Trotsky—“Two Tactics,” “Notes of a Publicist,” “Debatable Questions,” “Violation of Unity under Pretence of Unity.” We also find it in his philosophical polemic against the Machists—&#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;. The true dialectical method of overcoming the opposition argument is the only correct method, namely, not to brush it aside (that is not difficult), but to make a detailed analysis, a conscientious investigation of the question in all its detail, based on a profound study of the object of dispute as a whole (at the same time not sacrificing the general grasp of the whole subject to details). The result is a profound and all-round conception; things become revealed in the relationships in which they stand to each other in reality. We thus arrive at a concrete truth approximating to a complete and exhaustive comprehension of the subject as a unity of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot understand capitalism unless we grasp the unity of opposites made up of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and unless we realise the inevitability of the transition from capitalism to communism by means of the class struggle of the proletariat. We cannot understand the unity of the opposites: ether and matter, negative and positive electricity, attraction and repulsion.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin’s note “On Dialectics,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; (&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;), Vol. XIII, p. 321.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A struggle of opposites, a perpetual succession of forms, transitions from state to state, from form to form—such is the dialectics of the world that surrounds us.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In our description of dialectics so far we have dwelt only on its basic law, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., on the unity of opposites. We did this because this law is the most important of all and the one that has been least dealt with in popular literature. This law, as well as the other laws, “the transformation of quantity into quality” and the “negation of negations” is brilliantly explained in Engels’ &#039;&#039;Anti- Dühring&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Section 1, Chap. 12, “Dialectics: Quantity,&amp;amp;quot; and Chap. 13, “Dialectics: The Negation of the Negation.” A very good explanation of the dialectical method is given by Engels in his brochure &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Socialism, Utopian and Scientific&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, compiled from three chapters of &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Anti-Dühring&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;. The second chapter of this pamphlet deals with the nature of the dialectical method.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the next chapter we shall have to deal with the dialectical law of the “transformation of quantity into quality.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== THE FIGHT FOR DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that dialectic materialism demands the study of phenomena in their totality (concretely) just as they occur in reality. It also demands of those who desire to be guided by the Marxist theory in the study of the driving forces of development that they take a conscious part in the process of development on the side of the revolutionary class, organising it and directing its forces. Such a philosophy is acceptable only to a revolutionary class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only real revolutionary class in present-day society is the proletariat, the class that “has nothing to lose but its chains.” Contemporary dialectic materialism is the theoretical reflection of the proletarian revolution of the present day.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only by organisation and struggle can the proletariat defend its interests, achieve its aims and throw off the yoke of exploitation. And it must conduct an organised and irreconcilable struggle for its revolutionary philosophy also. The theoretical struggle is an important and inseparable part of the class struggle of the proletariat.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;What Is To Be Done?&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt; (International Publishers).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; We have referred above to the tremendous importance of revolutionary theory. The importance of the fight for dialectic materialism must be particularly emphasised.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two main forces are in constantly increasing conflict in the class struggle of the present day, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Correspondingly, we have the conflict of two systems of state organisation, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, which protects the system of wage slavery and is based on the brutal suppression of the proletarian revolution (at the present time, chiefly by fascist methods) and on the other hand, the dictatorship of the proletariat, which overthrows the bourgeoisie and suppresses the exploiters and the task of which is to raise the level of the toiling masses, to develop socialist production and create a classless society. In modern philosophy we correspondingly find two main tendencies, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., dialectic materialism, the philosophy of the revolutionary proletariat, and philosophical tendencies hostile to revolutionary Marxism, which are anti-materialist and anti-dialectical and which in various forms defend reactionary views, clericalism and so forth, their ultimate aim being to keep the proletariat under the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Philosophy in general is closely connected with politics. In one of his letters to C. Schmidt (October 27, 1890), Engels wrote that “political, legal and moral reflexes... exercise the greatest direct influence upon philosophy,” &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, philosophy is inseparably bound up with politics. The predominance of any particular line in a philosophy has an overwhelming effect on the conduct of those who have come under the influence of that philosophy. That, for instance, explains why the bourgeoisie so zealously support religion and the belief in God, using them in furtherance of their political aims, and why, as the capitalist system more and more approaches its decline, they increasingly support reactionary idealism and clericalism in philosophy. The defence of any particular philosophic view is intimately connected with the class struggle, for philosophy is essentially party philosophy.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Philosophy is not—“impartial,” or “non-political”; every school of philosophy represents a certain set of political views, the views of a political party. On the subject of parties in philosophy, see Lenin’s &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039; (International Publishers), p. 290.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The direct interests of the bourgeoisie compel it “to perpetuate theoretical confusion” and to strive to keep the proletariat under its intellectual influence. It is in the interests of the proletariat to resist all attempts to distort materialist dialectics, which is its own theoretical weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin himself, during the whole course of his active life, fought bourgeois philosophy and idealism in all their forms and manifestations. He also fought that crude, non-dialectic and mechanical materialism which is absolutely impotent and helpless in face of idealism. In the ’nineties, Lenin fought professorial objectivism, as represented by Struve, the subjectivism of the Populist,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Economic Content of Populism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve&#039;s Book&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chapter 2, entitled “Criticism of the Sociology of the Populists.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and neo-Kantism, as advocated by the revisionists headed by Bernstein in Germany and by Struve in Russia (neo-Kantism today is the official philosophy of the German Social- Democrats, or social-fascists). In the beginning of this century Lenin fought the idealist philosophy of Mach and Avenarius and their followers, who in Russia were headed by A. Bogdanov. The philosophical views of Bogdanov were at one time fairly popular in our Party (just as were the views of E. Dühring among the German Social-Democrats in the ’seventies) and it became urgently necessary to fight them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin persistently fought the philosophy of Bogdanov and from 1906 to 1908 he subjected Bogdanov’s idealism and eclecticism to merciless criticism. In his letters to Bogdanov (unfortunately they were not published at the time and have not been found since, and so they have remained unstudied) and in his book &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;, which appeared in 1909, Lenin explains and criticises the essence of Bogdanov’s philosophy. In 1914 Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The sum total of the literary activities of A. Bogdanov may be reduced to an attempt to inoculate the mind of the proletariat with camouflaged idealistic conceptions of the bourgeois philosophers.... For many years A. Bogdanov has been an opponent of the philosophy of Marxism and a supporter of bourgeois idealistic views hostile to the materialism of Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin attached great importance to philosophic questions and carefully studied the literature on philosophy, and on a number of occasions he subjected the reactionary views of the bourgeois philosophers and their various henchmen to devastating criticism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, “The Importance of Militant Materialism,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XXVII, pp. 180-190, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the whole course of his active life Lenin studied materialist dialectics, applied it, fought for it and explained the necessity of studying and applying this theoretical weapon of Marxism. See, for example, his pamphlet “Once More on the Trade Unions,” “The Present Situation and the Errors of Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin,” which appeared in 1921, and his article “The Importance of Militant Materialism,” dated March 12, 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the years 1913 to 1916 Lenin collected material apparently with the intention of writing a special work on materialist dialectics. Preoccupation with more urgent matters and the approach of the revolution prevented him from writing this book, but the material he collected is very rich and voluminous. Extracts and notes have been preserved in philosophical notebooks that are of extreme theoretical value.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;These notebooks have now been published in Vols. IX and XII of the &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Lenin Miscellany&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such, in general, was the fight that Lenin conducted on behalf of dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Apart from the main enemy of dialectic materialism—its opponents at the present day are represented by the revisionist tendencies in philosophy, against which an irreconcilable war must be waged. Anti-Marxian and anti-Leninist tendencies are to be found in the mechanistic revision of Marxism (Comrade Bukharin, for example, has been guilty of mechanistic errors), which is the chief danger, and in Menshevist idealism (Comrade Deborin and his group).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The mechanistic outlook is hostile to dialectics; it repudiates it, considers it as scholastic, metaphysical, etc. The mechanists regard themselves as materialists; but, in fact, because of their inability to think dialectically, they are impotent in the face of idealism and are themselves forced to abandon the materialist position. As an example, one may cite the inability of the mechanists to deal with the question of quantity and quality. This is one of the questions on which the limitations and shortcomings and the metaphysical nature of the mechanistic philosophy are particularly revealed. We shall therefore dwell on this question in a little more detail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the mechanist conception, the explanation of all phenomena must be sought in the mechanical motion of qualitatively identical and unchanging units (atoms, electrons). All qualitative differences between things are due to the difference in the composition of these units and to the difference in their simple mechanical motion (transplacement in space). Hence, quality does not exist in actual reality but depends entirely on our subjective perceptions. Objectively there exists only the mechanical motion of atoms and their quantitative relations. In the note he made during his study of natural science Engels referred to the tendency to reduce everything to mechanical motion and to regard that as the sole aim of science, and said that “It ignored the specific nature of other forms of motion.” While considering it erroneous to explain everything in mechanical motion alone, Engels nevertheless did not deny that mechanical motion is universal and is associated, in one way or another, with every phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Every higher form of movement is always essentially associated with real mechanical (external or molecular) motion, just as higher forms of motion simultaneously cause other forms of motion: chemical reaction is impossible without changes in temperature and electricity; organic life is impossible without mechanical, molecular, chemical, thermal, electrical and other changes. But the presence of these supplementary forms does not in any given case exhaust the essential nature of the main form. Some day we shall undoubtedly “reduce” thought experimentally to molecular and chemical motion in the brain; but will this exhaust the essential nature of thinking?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Engels, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Dialectics of Nature&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Engels declares that although there can be no thought unaccompanied by mechanical and chemical processes within the brain, these alone do not explain the specific nature of thinking. Thinking must be regarded as a whole; its internal, subjective side must be considered together with all the qualities and conditions that determine and produce it, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, in its concrete reality, and not merely from the point of view of mechanical motion. This example clearly illustrates the attitude of dialectic materialism to every specific “quality,” particularly to so popular a phenomenon as our processes of thinking. It explains the difference between the conceptions of dialectic materialism and of mechanistic conceptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist dialectician declares that mind cannot be separated from matter; our mind (“spirit”) is a property of specifically organised matter, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the brain of man, who is a member of a specific historically developed society. This qualitatively specific phenomenon actually exists in objective reality. We ourselves are the best proof of this, for we are thinking beings, performing intellectual labour. We do actually think, it does not merely seem to us that we do. Even imagination is, in a manner of speaking, thought. The external world is reflected in the mind of man. Thought is not the object itself reflected in the mind; it is but the reflection of the object. The theory that the external world is “reflected” in the mind is fundamental to the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism. The movement of atoms takes place both in a cobblestone and in a man’s head and both the cobblestone and the head reflect the action of the external world; but it is perfectly obvious that the movement and the reflection are qualitatively different in each case. In the next chapter we shall deal in greater detail with the question of our knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mechanical materialism denies the reality of a specific quality of thinking; it regards it merely as mechanical motion of atoms (electrons) and considers matter and mind as being equal, identical. This materialism, which denies the reality of higher forms of motion and reduces everything to gross and simple mechanical motion, to transplacement, proves to be absolutely helpless before idealism. For idealism also asserts that thought and the objective world are identical.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Introduction, in which is outlined the views of Berkeley, who reduces the whole world to our sensations.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Mechanical materialism, therefore, paves the way for idealism of the most subjective kind. It leads to the inevitable conclusion that the only reality is one’s own sensations, for however much theoretical thinking may be denied, this reality cannot be denied. Moreover, mechanical materialism cannot resist the idealistic belief in a creator, in some force external to the world, for the reason that mechanical materialism cannot explain what it is that sets in motion the gigantic mechanism that the world appears to him to be. The world machine of mechanical materialism requires some external impulse, the universal clock requires somebody to wind it up. There is no way out of this dilemma except to acknowledge the existence of God.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, true dialectics acknowledges the reality (actual existence) of qualities as specific forms, as the sum of the properties and peculiarities of things. Within the limits of a definite quality, quantitative changes may occur without affecting that quality, without changing it; but only within definite limits. When quantitative changes go beyond a definite limit they result in a leap and a change in quality; there occurs what Hegel termed the transformation of quantity into quality and which we meet with in the surrounding world of nature and society at every step. Within the limits of from 0° to 100° C. under ordinary terrestrial conditions (atmospheric pressure, etc.) water remains a liquid, preserves this quality. One hundred degrees is the boiling point; water becomes transformed from a liquid into a gas. Zero is freezing point, water becomes transformed into ice, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, into a solid. Thus arise new qualities, formerly non-existent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the appearance of a new quality, new quantitative relations come into effect, so that we may also speak of the transformation of quality into quantity. The high quality of class consciousness, discipline, organisation and firmness of principle of the Communist Party, which at first represented the numerically small, but actually most advanced section of the proletariat, subsequently resulted in the Bolshevik Party’s being able to assume the leadership of the movement of millions and to obtain a following of tens of millions. Thus, in the course of time, quality was transformed into quantity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another example, which strikingly illustrates the transformation of quantity into quality and the rise of new quantitative relations on the basis of the new quality, is the process that is now taking place in the Soviet Union of the mass transition of the middle individual peasant to collectivisation. A new social stratum is being created, new qualities are arising. The middle peasant was the ally of the Soviet state, but the collective farm peasant is now becoming the bulwark of the Soviet state. We would here mention the fact referred to by Comrade Stalin in one of his speeches, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., that the pooling of the farm implements of the individual peasants results in a far greater productivity of labour in the collective farms than the same quantity of implements and forces represent in the individual farms. Collectivisation creates a new quality of social relationships, expressing itself in an enhanced productivity of labour and in better results of labour, both qualitatively and quantitatively.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Examples of the transformation of quantity into quality, and &#039;&#039;vice versa&#039;&#039;, may be cited without end. They demonstrate the correctness of dialectic materialism, which teaches that these two aspects of phenomena are closely associated, become transformed one into the other, but that both are real. The confusion of the mechanists arises from the fact that they deny the objective existence of qualities, that they regard quantitative factors as the only reality and do not see the peculiarities or, as it is scientifically called, the specific nature of phenomena. The inability to use the dialectic method also leads the mechanists to rely on the conclusions of a single science (mechanics) and to ignore the experience of the other sciences, with the result that they regard the conclusions of that science as the sole and ultimate truth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As far back as 1908, Lenin advanced important and fundamental arguments against mechanical materialism. “The recognition of unchanging elements, of the unchanging essence of things is not materialism, but metaphysics, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, anti-dialectic materialism,” he declares in &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;, and goes on to state that dialectic materialism insists on the approximate and relative character of all scientific theories regarding the structure of matter and its properties, on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another, seemingly incompatible state, and so forth. In conclusion, Lenin declares himself to be in complete agreement with Engels’ statement to the effect that from the point of view of dialectic materialism, only one thing is immutable, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the recognition of a world existing outside of us and reflected in our minds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;From the point of view of Engels, only one thing is immutable, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the reflection in the human mind (when there is a human mind) of the external world that exists and develops independently of that mind. For Marx and Engels there is no “immutability,” no other “essence,” no other “absolute substance” in the sense that this concept has been depicted by futile professorial philosophy. The “essence” of things or “substance” are also relative: they represent only the deepening of the human knowledge of objects. Yesterday the deepening of human knowledge took in the atom, today electrons and the ether, but dialectic materialism insists on the temporary, relative and approximate character of all knowledge of nature obtained by the advancing science of man. The electron is as &#039;&#039;inexhaustible&#039;&#039; as the atom, nature is infinite, but it infinitely &#039;&#039;exists&#039;&#039;. And it is this single, categorical and only absolute recognition of the &#039;&#039;existence&#039;&#039; of nature outside of human consciousness and sensation that distinguishes dialectic materialism from relative agnosticism and idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the recognition of this “relativity and approximateness” of the picture of the world created on the basis of our knowledge, which becomes ever deeper, but which is never completed and never exhausts the multiform content of the objective world, dialectic materialism differs from metaphysical, mechanical materialism in its ability to handle flexible concepts and to rest content with results achieved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should here be pointed out that mechanistic materialism is essentially the methodology of the Right deviationists. Theoretically, it expresses and justifies the class interests of the last of the capitalist classes remaining in the Soviet Union and therefore represents the chief danger on the theoretical front.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such anti-dialectical, counter-revolutionary theories, as, for instance, the conception of opposites as being only an external, and not internal, property of phenomena, are, in the conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union, theoretical expressions of the interests of the bourgeoisie. They provide a theoretical justification for the denial of class contradictions and the class war (of the proletariat) and support the advocacy of class peace (between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat). One such theory is the mechanistic theory of equilibrium, of the correlation between a system and its environment. This provides a theoretical basis for the theory that the kulak enterprises will grow into socialism through the medium of the cooperative societies. According to the arguments of the Right theoreticians, the “kulak system” should merge with the socialist “environment” and they claim that there are “scientific” grounds for this. Obviously this is a very useful theory for a class that is being completely liquidated. It justifies and corroborates the policy of the Rights, who consider that the kulak should not be disturbed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, the mechanistic philosophy is essentially bourgeois and anti-proletarian. Its general traits are that it underestimates the value of theory, it fails to understand dialectics and is hostile to it. This theoretical nihilism and failure to understand the necessity for the study of dialectic materialism in practice lead to the surrender of the materialist position to idealism and to a general submission to the ideology of the bourgeoisie. Mechanistic materialism is impotent in the face of idealism; it connives at and assists idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is yet another danger, namely, of falling, in company with the idealists (Hegel), under the influence of abstractions, of losing contact with concrete reality, of confining oneself to dialectic conceptions without connecting those conceptions with the development of the objective world, of not distinguishing categories from the material relationships of the objective world—in a word, the danger of straying onto the path of idealism and of forgetting the requirements of materialism. This danger is threatened by the Menshevistic idealism of the Deborin group, who conceal idealistic and anti-Marxian views under the guise of Marxian phraseology and the pretence of fighting for dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the mechanist theory has no profound social roots in our midst, Menshevistic idealism is nevertheless a real and serious danger. Clothed in the garb of orthodox Marxism, it acts as a channel of bourgeois influences to the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some of the distinguishing features characteristic of certain representatives of this tendency, and which in fact are common to the whole school of Menshevistic idealism are: the severance of theory from practice; the denial of the party nature of philosophy; professorial, contemplative “objectivism”; failure to appreciate Lenin as a materialist and dialectician; failure to appreciate Lenin’s contribution to the development of dialectic materialism; the disguise of non-Marxian and idealistic views by Marxian phraseology; priggish “scholarliness” which is totally unjustified because this ostensible “scholarliness” is not backed by any practical work or by a positive study of the subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idealistic revision of Marxism effected by the Menshevistic idealists is clearly illustrated by the fact that this tendency makes the materialist dialectics of Marx identical with the dialectics of Hegel. Hence, their revisionism is essentially of a Hegelian character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The founders of scientific socialism always emphasised the importance of studying the method of dialectic materialism. They even pointed out how this should be done, namely, by studying the history of philosophy, and in particular, Hegel. In one of his Forewords to &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039; (1878) Engels wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Theoretical thinking is an inborn property only in the form of capability. It must be developed and perfected, and for this no other method has so far been found except the study of the history of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
By studying the history of philosophy we learn the experience of scientific thinking accumulated over a period of more than two thousand years. In his letters to Conrad Schmidt, Engels recommended that in studying the history of philosophy, particular attention should be paid to Hegel. Hegel is extremely difficult to study. Those who undertake to study him require assistance and this assistance is given by Marx, Engels and Lenin (particularly valuable are the latter’s philosophical notebooks to which we referred above).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Menshevistic idealism distorts the views of Marx, Engels and Lenin and regards the logic of Hegel as identical with the logic of Marx. As we have seen, Hegel and Marx approach the question of the relation of mind to existence from fundamentally different points of view.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his article, “Hegel and Dialectical Materialism,” Deborin declares that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Hegelian logic should serve as the starting point for the development or structure of materialist dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And he concludes by saying:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;At any rate, the need for a theory of materialist dialectics has long been felt. Hegelian logic cannot fully satisfy this need, but it should serve as the starting point for materialist dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This school not only regards Hegel’s logic as the starting point, but also considers that its structure requires no radical alteration. Marx put Hegel’s logic “right side up,” &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, he reconstructed it and endowed it with new principles. Deborin, on the contrary, asserts that “in general, the Hegelian structure must be considered as correct even from the materialist point of view.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idealist view of dialectics is further revealed in the conception and application of the laws of dialectics. Take for instance the fundamental law of the unity of opposites. Engels and Lenin consider that this law expresses the very essence, the “kernel” of dialectics. Lenin says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Unity (coincidence, identity, interaction) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory and relative. The conflict of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Lenin Miscellany&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XII, p. 324, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And according to Lenin this dialectical law signifies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The recognition (discovery) of contradictory, &#039;&#039;mutually&#039;&#039; exclusive and opposite tendencies in &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; manifestations and processes of nature (&#039;&#039;including&#039;&#039; spirit and society).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, according to Lenin (and Lenin expresses the point of view of dialectic materialism), the conflict of opposites is absolute and inherent in all phenomena of the external world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Deborin treats the question entirely differently. In his article, “Marx and Engels” (which, by the way, is thoroughly idealist), he completely adopts the Hegelian idealist scheme: he asserts that at first there are &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; differences, which then pass into contradictions, and the latter pass into opposites. Hence, Deborin admits the possibility of opposites and the conflict of opposites not existing at certain stages. For him, accordingly, contradiction is not the starting point. He thus falls a victim to the very mechanists, against whom he has written so much, who also repudiate the existence of opposites that are inherent in absolutely every form of motion of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we have repeatedly pointed out, one of the fundamental and distinguishing features of the dialectic materialism of Marx is the prominence it gives to the necessity for practical revolutionary activity. Marx criticised the contemplative character of the materialists that preceded him. Deborin, on the other hand, in his Foreword to the &#039;&#039;Works of Hegel&#039;&#039;, does not say a word about this feature of dialectic materialism, but, on the contrary, emphasises its passive and contemplative character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The task of the dialectic... method is not to introduce anything of its own into an object, but to observe the process of its development. In this sense the dialectic method is indeed the only real scientific and objective method. The dialectic method merely reproduces the process of development of an object.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
During the whole course of this long article the author says not a single word about the most important component part of materialist dialectics, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., practical revolutionary work. That is not a mere accident.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most obvious features of Menshevik idealism, which reveals its anti-proletarian character, is the severance of theory from practice. In a speech delivered in 1920 to the Third All-Russian Congress of the Russian Young Communist League, Lenin declared:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Without work and without struggle, book knowledge of Communism derived from communist pamphlets and books is worth exactly nothing at all, since it but perpetuates the old severance of theory from practice, which was the most objectionable feature of the old bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The separation of theory from practice is characteristic of Menshevik idealism. The representatives of this school occupied themselves with philosophy completely isolated from the tasks of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and from the international working class movement. They separated philosophy from politics, instead of placing it at the service of the proletarian party. It is no mere accident that practically all the writers of this school were unwilling to participate in the fight against Trotskyism and to expose the methodological errors of the factionalists who were opposing the general line of the Party. By divorcing philosophy from proletarian Marxism and Leninist politics, Menshevistic idealism in practice places its service at the disposal of bourgeois politics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The whole standpoint of Menshevistic idealism was bound to lead to the separation of theory from practice. This was clearly revealed in all the activities of the representatives of this school. The bulk of their literature consists of “writing about other people’s writing.”&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;This expression was used by Engels in one of his letters written in the ’eighties in which he gave characterisations of the writers who contributed to the &#039;&#039;Neue Zeit&#039;&#039;. The majority of these writers were opportunists. These “people,” Engels wrote, “who refuse to study questions of principle and who create a literature on literature and litterateurs (nine-tenths of present-day German writing is writing about other people’s writing), will, of course, produce a far greater number of printed pages in a year than those who seriously study a certain thing and who desire to write about other books only, firstly, if they have themselves mastered these books and, secondly, if the books contain anything worth writing about.” This description most aptly fits the representatives of present-day opportunist and Menshevistic idealism and the petty-bourgeois radicals of the Trotskyist type who masquerade in the garb of orthodox Marxism.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not a single problem of historical materialism is treated by the Menshevistic idealists from the standpoint of the new experiences of the revolutionary period. They have ignored Lenin’s instructions as to how dialectics should be studied. In his article, “The Significance of Militant Materialism,” Lenin states that dialectics must be studied from the materialist point of view, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, one must study the dialectics that “Marx applied practically in his &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;” and in his historical and political works, and, also, that dialectics must be studied on the basis of the examples of dialectics “in the sphere of economic and political relations which modern history, particularly the present imperialist war and the revolution, provide in great abundance.” The representatives of Menshevik idealism were incapable of making such a study. The whole line they adopted prevented them from doing so; prevented them from understanding Lenin as a philosopher and from appreciating and fulfilling his instructions. They were hampered by their idealistic, abstract and formal point of view and their class position as petty-bourgeois radicals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a number of writings, notes and utterances, Lenin declared that abstractness, the severance of theory from reality, the use of schemes and formalism, were contrary to materialist dialectics. For instance in the notes he wrote on the margins of his copy of Bukharin’s &#039;&#039;Economics of the Transition Period&#039;&#039;, opposite the passage in which Bukharin says that in the pre-war period “the so-called ‘national state’ was already a &#039;&#039;pure&#039;&#039; (Lenin’s italics) fiction,” Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Not a &#039;&#039;pure fiction&#039;&#039;, but an impure form. The violation of “dialectical materialism” consists in the logical (not material) &#039;&#039;leap&#039;&#039; over &#039;&#039;several&#039;&#039; concrete stages.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Lenin Miscellany&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XI, p. 399, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Opposite the passage in which Bukharin speaks of “dialectic negation,” but fails to give a concrete explanation of the nature of negation and to support the formula by facts, Lenin makes the note:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;the author abuses &#039;&#039;the phrase&#039;&#039; “dialectic negation”: it must not be used without &#039;&#039;first&#039;&#039; demonstrating it by facts, it must be used &#039;&#039;cautiously&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, p. 378.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In his notebook of excerpts, &#039;&#039;Marxism on the State&#039;&#039;, Lenin copied out the following critical remark directed by Engels against the opportunists. Engels stated that the opportunists&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;give prominence to generalised and abstract political questions, thereby concealing the immediate concrete problems, which automatically arise at the first outbreak of events, and at the first political crisis. The only thing that can result from this is that at the critical moment the Party will suddenly find itself impotent and that uncertainty and lack of unity will reign within the Party on important questions, owing to the fact that these questions &#039;&#039;were never discussed&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Against this passage Lenin makes the marginal note:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Prominence to the abstract, the concrete obscured!! Excellent! That is the main point!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Lenin Miscellany&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XIV, pp. 227-229, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Many similar notes could be cited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin, therefore, condemns the application of ready-made schemes, the inability, or lack of desire, to formulate theoretically the actual situation, with all its contradictions and complexity, and the inability to think concretely. Lenin untiringly exposed and condemned every departure from this fundamental demand of dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not possible here to give a complete analysis of the whole system of false views and misguided utterances of the Menshevistic idealists. Much space would be required for a historical, not dogmatic, approach to the study of the theory of knowledge. In studying the problems of knowledge, the whole of human experience must be taken into account; it must be made sure that the theory of knowledge shall be a really materialistic one; that there shall be no rupture with the cognised object and finally, that the materialist path shall be selected, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., from things to concepts, and not from concepts to things. The fact that dialectics is made identical with the theory of knowledge is a guarantee against the creation of some special sphere isolated from concrete reality, a system of abstractions and eternal categories &#039;&#039;a la&#039;&#039; Hegel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As an instance of the erroneousness of such methods, Marx, in a letter to Annenkov, cites the doctrinaires, who on the eve of the Great French Revolution endeavoured to preserve the throne, the Chamber of Deputies and the Upper Chamber as essential components of social life and as eternal categories. Marx says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;...In the eighteenth century, a number of mediocre minds were busy finding the true formula which would bring the social order, king, nobility, parliament, etc., into equilibrium, and they woke up one morning to find that there was in fact no longer any king, nobility or parliament. The true equilibrium in this antagonism was the overthrow of all the social conditions which served as a basis for these feudal existences and their antagonisms.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
“Mediocre minds” do not link up their knowledge with constantly changing material and objective reality, or do so only in words.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that dialectics, which demands concrete thinking and a grasp of objective reality as one whole, is the theory of knowledge, serves as a guarantee that those who are guided by dialectics will not find themselves in the unpleasant and ludicrous position in which the doctrinaires found themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Revolutionary Marxism, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, dialectic materialism, teaches us to approach questions of knowledge dialectically, to study the transition from not knowing to knowing. Dialectics is a property of human knowledge, since our knowledge reflects the dialectic motion of the objective world (nature and society). Dialectic materialism does not regard the results of knowledge as final; at the same time, however, it does not doubt the vitality, fertility, integrity and objectivity of human knowledge, and of its ability to overcome all obstacles in the process of social development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The development of human thought is based on the development of social productive labour. Lenin declared that “the continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the &#039;&#039;dialectic&#039;&#039; study of the history of human thought, science, and technology.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Lenin Miscellany&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. IX, p. 139, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is on this basis that we must study the unity of opposites, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the theory and practice of the actual relations existing in the surrounding world and of the abstract conceptions that arise in the human brain as a reflection of these actual relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We must be guided by Leninism in the study of materialist dialectics and combat the mechanistic repudiation of dialectics and its mutilation at the hands of the idealistic and Menshevistic idealists. We must expose the errors of both these schools and correct them. Theory must be placed at the service of the proletarian revolution and adapted to the practical class struggle. Philosophy must be completely party philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In class society, and as long as classes exist, Marxism and Leninism can exist and develop only by combating all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois tendencies, influences and ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== THE DIALECTICS OF NATURE AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we have said, materialist dialectics is an invaluable instrument for the study of the surrounding world, nature and human society. Marx and Engels were keenly interested in every sphere of natural science. Engels did a great deal in this sphere. He set forth the conclusions drawn from his studies in Part I of &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;. In addition, he wrote a large work on &#039;&#039;The Dialectics of Nature&#039;&#039;, which unfortunately he never succeeded in publishing (the manuscript however was preserved and has been published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute). The conclusion Engels arrived at, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, that development in nature takes place in accordance with dialectical, and not metaphysical laws, is strikingly borne out by modern science. This has been pointed out by Lenin, who, after Engels, was the first of the Marxian theoreticians to study one of the most important branches of modern science, namely, physics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science has made considerable strides since Engels pursued his studies in the ’seventies. Lenin examined the new material from the standpoint of a materialist dialectician. He explained the crisis in modern physics from the Marxian standpoint and indicated the path that must be pursued by scientific research.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his criticism of modern theory he attacks the clericalism (idealism) that refuses to seek a scientific explanation of phenomena and which evades recognition of what is actually proceeding in nature, thus leading to stagnation of thought and intellectual reaction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we have stated, in connection with the disputes that arose among Marxian writers after the 1905 Revolution, Lenin carefully worked out the dialectic materialist theory of knowledge. He showed that there were two lines of philosophy—idealism and materialism—on every one of the questions in dispute: matter and experience, sensation and knowledge, space and time, cause and effect, absolute and relative truth, etc. Idealism considers that a spiritual principle (&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, God) lies at the basis of everything and is identical, or akin to our mind (which latter the idealists sever from its actual contact with matter). Lenin analyses the philosophy of the Englishman, Bishop Berkeley, as typical of the idealist philosophy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, and Note 23 in Vol. XI of &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Materialism considers it wrong to place spirit at the base of all phenomena. It regards matter as the basis of everything and asserts that matter exists independently, and outside of our mind. The external material world reacts on our mind, is reflected in it and determines it. Matter is the primary, the fundamental; mind is secondary and derivative. Mind is inseparably associated with matter; it is a property of matter organised in a special way, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, our brain, and is a product of the latter’s activity. Mind reflects the external world. There can be no mind or thought without brain. The idealists, on the other hand, sever thought from the brain and consider that spirit is the beginning of all things. The idealists turn the whole course of things upside down. In their opinion matter is derived from spirit. Materialism declares that there is no “spirit world,” there is no “transcendental” world; the world is unitary, and its unity lies, as Engels says, in its materialness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Through our sense organs we receive impressions of the material world existing outside of us (human society and nature). These sense perceptions provide the material for our knowledge. The world is reflected in our mind because we ourselves are part of that world. Such is the conception of knowledge proclaimed by dialectic materialism. A material object and our minds comprise the unity of opposites, with which we are familiar. We must not, as idealists like Berkeley do, confuse the external world with our consciousness of the external world and make them identical. External objects and our consciousness of them are opposites, not identical things. But the opposite is not absolute: the external world and our consciousness are not isolated from each other. The unity we have here is unity in the sense that without a material world and without the brain of man, consciousness of the world cannot exist. It is unity also in the sense that our consciousness, in general, faithfully reflects the objective world. This is very well explained by Lenin in the sections on “Absolute and Relative Truth” and “The Criterion of Practice in the Theory of Knowledge” in Chap. II of his philosophical work &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essence of the explanation given by Engels and Lenin is that, while we must realise that at any given stage of its development our knowledge is relative, conditional and approximate, nevertheless, in every scientific theory, in spite of its shortcomings, we must discern the grain of objective truth, the fragment that correctly reflects the surrounding world. We must learn how to assimilate and develop this truth, although our knowledge is historical and transitory. In the works of Hegel there is much that is mystical, idealistic and clericalist, but they contain the fundamentals of the dialectical method. We must be able to select that which is true and the product of a brilliant mind from that which is untrue, fantastic and antiquated. That is what the great masters of materialist dialectics, Marx, Engels and Lenin, did.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our knowledge contains an absolute (unconditional and unquestionable) truth, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, that it reflects the external world. The truth of our knowledge is tested and confirmed by practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither the old metaphysical materialists nor Hegel were able properly to apply the dialectical method to the process of development of our knowledge. This was done by Marx and Engels, and subsequently by Lenin. In one of his philosophic notebooks Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The approach of the mind (of man) to a particular thing, the taking of a cast of it (in other words, an impression) is not a simple, direct act; a lifeless mirror reflection, but a complex, twofold and zig-zag act, which harbours the possibility that the phantasy may entirely fly away from reality; what is more, it harbours the possibility that the abstract conception, the idea, may be transformed (imperceptibly and unwittingly on the part of man) into phantasy (and in the long run, into God). For even the simplest generalisation and the most elementary general idea is a fragment of phantasy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Lenin Miscellany&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XII, p. 399; &#039;&#039;cf.&#039;&#039; also “On Dialectics,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XI.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The creation of phantasies (&#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, regarding the power of the dead, demons, god, disincarnate powers, etc.) is due to various complex causes, chief of which is the dependence of man on circumstances which enslave him, such as natural and social forces, and which appear to him to be external and alien. This also explains the various religions and faiths.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XI.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Properly applied to our knowledge, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, if it is realised that the mind of man is determined by the development of the material world which proceeds independently of the mind, and of which thinking man is himself a part, materialist dialectics is the best weapon against clericalism, against stultification of thought and against the substitution of the living work of the mind by lifeless abstractions that end in intellectual stagnation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The old theory of matter was that it consisted of indivisible and simple particles—atoms. Recent discoveries have shown that the atoms are not simple, but extremely complex. Atoms have been divided into still more minute particles, electrons.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Chapter 5, Part 1, “The Crisis in Modern Physics,&amp;amp;quot; &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, p. 213.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Science has revealed that the laws of motion of these particles differ from the laws governing the incomparably slower motion of large masses of matter. Not being acquainted with dialectic materialism, scientists began to draw the conclusion that with the disappearance of the atom, matter also disappears, that our knowledge is impotent and that we are not destined to know the real world; in other words, they began to adopt the standpoint of idealism and agnosticism. (“We are not fated to know!”)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, pp. 259-269.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin, however, showed that the new discoveries, while compelling us to reject the old theories of science, deepen our knowledge of matter and confirm the correctness of dialectic materialism, which teaches us to regard scientific truths not as unshakable dogmas, but as approximately true reflections of objective processes; reflections that are bound to be corrected and perfected by every new development of science. The new discoveries do not shake the basic standpoint, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, that which we know as matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chapter Five of Lenin’s &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;, entitled “The Latest Revolution in Natural Science and Philosophic Idealism,” shows that the recent discoveries of physics serve as striking corroborations of dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to his genius for mastering materialist dialectics, Lenin was able to contribute something also to the study of natural phenomena. He gave precise indications of the nature of the errors of the natural scientists—who are materialists rather by instinct—and showed wherein they deviated from materialism because of their lack of knowledge of dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin criticised their theory dialectically, separating that which was true and correcting that which was untrue, and showed how research should be conducted. As an example we cite his analysis of the address of the English physicist, A. W. Rücker,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, pp. 233 et seq.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; who represented “the instinctive materialist point of view” and whose errors were due to his ignorance of dialectic materialism. Or take his criticism of the works of Duhem and Stallo&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, pp. 265-269.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in which, for instance, he points out where Duhem comes close to dialectic materialism and wherein lies his weakness, and also shows how he descends to a reactionary philosophy because of his inability to raise himself from metaphysical materialism to dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the subject of the dialectics of nature, Engels in 1885 wrote in his Foreword to the second edition of &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It is possible to reach this standpoint because the accumulating facts of natural science compel us to do so.... Natural science has now advanced so far that it can no longer escape the dialectical synthesis. But it will make this process easier for itself if it does not lose sight of the fact that the results in which its experiences are summarised are ideas; but that the art of working with ideas is not inborn and also is not given with ordinary everyday consciousness, but requires real thought, and that this thought similarly has a long empirical history, not more and not less than empirical natural science. Only by learning to assimilate results of the development of philosophy during the past two and a half thousand years will it be able to rid itself on the one hand, of any isolated natural philosophy standing apart from it, outside it and above it and, on the other hand, also of its own limited method of thought, which was its inheritance from English empiricism.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We conceive nature as the sum total of all bodies (from the stars to the atoms, electrons and the ether), which are in a constant state of interaction and motion, constantly changing their forms and qualities and passing from one into the other. It is impossible to understand their movement and the transformation of one form into another (&#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, inorganic matter into organic matter) without using the dialectic method.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, it is necessary to grasp the difference between the philosophic and the physical conception of matter. It is absolutely correct to recognise the existence of matter and the objective world, independently and outside of our mind. The external world reacts on our senses and is reflected in our mind. The recognition of the objective reality of the external world is an absolute truth, confirmed every minute by fact and by practice. This is the foundation of the materialist philosophy. The material world is essentially cognisable, since the “cognising apparatus,” if we may so express ourselves, does not exist outside of the world, but is a part of the world. This “cognising apparatus,” &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, thinking people and human society, is the fruit of a long development. The existence and development of humanity is the best proof of its strength and vitality, and also of the strength and vitality of the human mind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Theories of physics, as well as other scientific theories, are but relative truths. They are ever approaching closer to an understanding of the objective world, for instance, of the physical structure of matter; their knowledge becomes progressively deeper; but they can never result in final and exhaustive knowledge, in ultimate truth. In his &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039; (p. 152) Lenin says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The scientific doctrine of the structure of substance, the chemical composition of food, and the electron may become antiquated with time; but the truth that man is unable to subsist on thoughts and beget children by platonic love alone can never become antiquated!&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== THE DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The development of society also proceeds by contradiction. Here, too, materialist dialectics is essential not only for the study of social phenomena, but also in order to lead the struggle of the proletariat and to guide historical activity. History is made by men. But hitherto there could be no conscious guidance of the development of history. Mankind can become the master of its development only after the complete triumph of communism. Engels in &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039; says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The seizure of the means of production by society puts an end to commodity production, and therewith to the domination of the product over the producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by conscious organisation on a planned basis. The struggle for individual existence comes to an end. And at this point, in a certain sense, man finally cuts himself off from the animal world, leaves the conditions of animal existence behind him and enters conditions which are really human. The conditions of existence forming man’s environment, which up to now have dominated man, at this point pass under the dominion and control of man, who now for the first time becomes the real conscious master of nature, because and in so far as he has become master of his own social organisation. The laws of his own social activity, which have hitherto confronted him as external, dominating laws of nature, will then be consciously applied by man with complete understanding, and hence will be dominated by man.... It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly, and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity’s leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, it must not be thought that this “leap” will take place in a single instant; for it represents a “change which marks a turning point in world history,” a transition to a new type of society. Such leaps, as Marx, Engels and Lenin pointed out, may extend over ten or more years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, “Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XXII, p. 466; Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In the Soviet Union the “leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom” is being accomplished by the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the Party of Lenin and armed with revolutionary theory. The advantages of planning in economic life and the rapidity of development of socialist economy are already apparent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the sphere of social development, the law of the unity of opposites and of motion by contradiction manifests itself in the productive activities of society and in the class struggle. In modern society, large-scale production predominates and the fundamental contradiction is between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. As has been stated, Marx, Engels and Lenin attached the greatest significance to the struggle of the proletariat. They considered it their prime duty to lead the class struggle of the proletariat, and to subordinate everything to its interests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Applying dialectic materialism to the study of society, Marx discovered that the basis of social development is the development of production. Material production is the foundation of social life because on it depends man’s very existence. In order to exist men must eat, drink, clothe themselves, and provide themselves with dwellings; only then can they occupy themselves with politics, science, art and so forth (Engels). Labour is required to create the material things necessary for men’s existence. The productive activities of human society consist in extracting things from nature, in working them up and in adapting them to the needs of man. Human labour, which is essential to man’s existence, exercises decisive influence on the whole structure of human society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The application of dialectic materialism to the history of human society is very clearly illustrated in Marx’s theory of the class struggle. Marx showed that development in class society arises out of the class struggle, which attains maximum intensity during the period of revolution. Revolution is the result of the contradictions created between the productive forces of human society and the productive relations within which they operate and develop.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Lenin, “Karl Marx,” Section, “Materialist Conception of History and the Class Struggle.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Under capitalism the contradiction between the old productive relations and the productive forces that have outgrown and can no longer develop freely within these relations, manifests itself in the struggle of the revolutionary class, the proletariat, against the exploiting class, the bourgeoisie. Thus, the struggles of the revolutionary class advance the development of society. Marx called the class struggle “the battles of developing production.” (Letter to Weydemeyer, March 5, 1852.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx was not the first to discover the existence of classes and the class war, as he himself states in the letter to his friend Weydemeyer. But Marx was the first to give an exhaustive explanation of the basis of class divisions (namely, a definite stage of development of production). He was the first to give a complete explanation of the meaning and significance of the struggle of the modern proletariat and the part it plays. He pointed out how and under what conditions the abolition of classes and the transition to a classless society would be accomplished with the help of a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx was the first to discover the general law of social development and thereby transformed socialism from utopian to scientific.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In an article written in 1899 Lenin stated that Marx’s theory&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;transformed socialism from utopian to scientific; it laid firm foundations for the science and indicated the path of its further development and the elaboration of its parts. It has exposed the essential nature of modern capitalist economy by explaining how the hiring of workers and the purchase of labour power conceals the enslavement of millions of propertyless people by a handful of capitalists and owners of land, factories, mines, etc. It has shown how the whole development of modern capitalism tends to the squeezing out of small-scale production by large-scale production and creates conditions that render a socialist order of society both possible and essential. Beneath the layer of ingrained customs, political intrigues, astute laws and subtle doctrines it has taught us to discern the class war, the struggle between the various propertied classes and the propertyless masses and the proletariat that leads them. It has revealed the real task of a revolutionary socialist party, namely, not to invent plans for the reconstruction of society, not to plead with the capitalists and their hangers-on to improve the condition of the workers, not to plot conspiracies, but to organise the class struggle of the proletariat and to lead that struggle, the ultimate aim of which is to win political power for the proletariat and to organise socialist society.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, “Our Programme,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. II, p. 481, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It would be a serious error to imagine that social production and social development takes place, like natural phenomena (change of seasons, the breaking of the ice on the river, eclipse of the sun, etc.) independently of the conscious efforts of men. History is made of men, by their productive activities, by their mass actions and by their class struggles. Men themselves build up their material and spiritual culture, using the foundations inherited from preceding generations. Historical development pursues an extremely complex path. Conflict arises between the productive forces of men and productive relations that no longer correspond to these productive forces. Once society has broken up into classes, development proceeds by the conflicts of those classes expressed in various forms: ideologically (in the sphere of philosophy), scientifically, politically, etc., as well as in purely physical forms—wars between classes and between nations. The inherent contradictions of social development are solved “by the practical and violent action of the masses.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, “Letter to Annenkov,” 1846.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Order” and oppression in class society are maintained by violence, by the organised state power of the exploiters. This “order” can be destroyed and replaced by a new kind of order only with the aid of the organised violence of the revolutionary class. In our times this must take the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, established by revolution with the aim of creating a classless communist society.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, “The State,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XXIV, pp. 362-377, Russian edition; see also &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;State and Revolution&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Marx and Lenin, revolutions are the most vital and decisive factors in the history of human society. “Revolutions are the locomotives of history,” Marx said. This aphorism was quoted by Lenin in his pamphlet, &#039;&#039;Two Tactics of the Social-Democrats in the Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, in which he also referred to revolution as “the festival of the oppressed and exploited.” He wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;At no other time are the masses of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order as during the time of revolution.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Selected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. VIII.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In another article he writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Marxism differs from all other socialist theories by its admirable combination of sober scientific analysis of objective conditions and the objective process of evolution with the most emphatic recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy, the revolutionary creative power and the revolutionary initiative of the masses, as well as, of course, of individuals, groups, organisations and parties that are able to establish contact with the masses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XII, p. 32, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This leads us to an extremely important phase of dialectic materialism, namely, its insistence on the importance of active revolutionary work. History is made by men. Historical science studies how this is done, what class forces participate in historical actions and how historical development is brought about. But mere study is not enough. We must not only study history, but make history; the “making” of history is much more important and much more interesting than studying it (although that, of course, is essential). Both Marx and Lenin considered that one of the defects of the old materialism was its inability “to understand the conditions and appreciate the significance of practical revolutionary activity,” without which materialism, in their opinion, was incomplete, one-sided and inanimate.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Revolutionary Marxism does not suffer from this defect. In all his activities Lenin (like Marx) was a prominent exponent of revolutionary materialist dialectics and a theoretician of the proletariat, who fully combined “sober, scientific analysis of the objective state of affairs” with “revolutionary initiative and energy.” He was a leader of the proletarian revolution, a strategist and tactician of the class struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reader will find a brilliant appreciation and description of the works of Marx and Engels and their activities from this point of view in the Preface to the Russian translation of Marx’s &#039;&#039;Letters to Kugelmann&#039;&#039;, and in the Introduction to the Russian translation of &#039;&#039;The Letters of J. P. Becker, J. Dietzgen, F. Engels, K. Marx and Others to F. A. Sorge and Others&#039;&#039;. This side of Lenin’s activities should be carefully studied. It is precisely this factor that makes Marxism a real revolutionary theory, for, as Lenin frequently emphasised, unless revolutionary theory is combined with revolutionary practice it is not Marxism, but opportunism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The works of Lenin were inspired by revolutionary policy and were closely associated with the class struggle of the proletariat. The most complete summary of the basic principles of the strategy and tactics of Leninism will be found in the pamphlet, &#039;&#039;“Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder&#039;&#039;, while valuable indications will be found in &#039;&#039;What Is To Be Done?&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Two Tactics&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;State and Revolution&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To give a complete description of the great and complex work Lenin performed in leading the class struggle of the proletariat is a tremendous task that still remains to be done. Many phases of Lenin’s work as a leader and theoretician of the proletariat have still been barely studied (&#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, his part in the leadership of the Civil War and his work in organising and directing the dictatorship of the proletariat; even his significance as the leader and theoretician of the Party has not yet been fully brought out and properly appreciated). This cannot be done in a single article, it would require a whole volume, or several volumes. In this article we can only deal with some of the most important postulates of the revolutionary tactics of Leninism and show how tremendously important the consistent and firm Leninist Party leadership, based upon a strictly scientific analysis of objective conditions, was for the success of the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should first be noted that Leninism, while faithfully following the Marxian conception of the Party and of its role as the &#039;&#039;vanguard of the working class&#039;&#039;, developed this conception still further on the basis of the new experience gained in the revolutionary struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to lead the class struggle of the proletariat, an organisation of its vanguard is necessary in the shape of a Communist Party, which “acts as a driving force,” which “comprehends the conditions, course and general results of the working-class movement,” which can champion those general interests of the movement as a whole at every stage of the struggle and which can estimate the movement “not only from the point of view of the past, but also from the point of view of the future.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Communist Manifesto&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Party must be trained and steeled in consistency of principles by prolonged participation in the struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Apparently—Engels wrote to Bernstein in 1882—a workers’ party in any large country can develop only by internal conflict, which indeed is, in general, consistent with the dialectic laws of development. The German party became what it is in the struggle of the Eisenachers against the Lassalians, a struggle in which the fight itself was the most important factor. Infantile disorders cannot be cured by moral precepts; under present conditions these disorders have to be gone through once.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, does not mean that various shades of opinion are always to be permitted in the Party. The strength of the Party lies in its unity, a unity based upon consistency of programme and tactics. This unity is achieved by fighting every deviation from revolutionary Marxism: Right opportunism, which minimises the significance of the class struggle and strives to bring the proletariat under bourgeois influence and leadership (as instanced by Menshevism), and the virtual rejection of the class struggle which masquerades under Leftist slogans and phrases (instances of which were the “Left” Liquidators, the Otzovists, the Ultimatumists and the &#039;&#039;Vperyod-ists&#039;&#039; during the years of reaction 1908-10 and Trotskyism during the years 1924-26). Extremely important also is the fight against the conciliators, who act as a shield for opportunism: while verbally recognising the correctness of revolutionary Marxism, in practice the conciliators make no attempt to combat distortions of revolutionary Marxism. Conciliationism is therefore an extremely dangerous form of opportunism. Under present conditions the chief danger is Right opportunism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin always insisted on the necessity of waging a consistent and merciless fight against all forms of opportunism and he himself showed us how this fight should be conducted. He persistently fought against Right opportunism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;What Is To Be Done?&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;One Step Forward, Two Steps Back&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, and “The Collapse of the Second International.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet at the same time he conducted war on the “Left” doctrinarism, which is particularly important for the purpose of winning the masses; for the masses are inexperienced, unorganised, have not yet sufficiently abandoned petty-bourgeois prejudices, and when driven to desperation and rage by the hopelessness of their position are, as a rule, greatly influenced by anarchist phrases, and “Left” demagogy (which is the reverse side of Right opportunism, “a punishment for its sins,” as Lenin expressed it). A general review of the Party’s fight for Bolshevism on two fronts is given by Lenin in his pamphlet, &#039;&#039;“Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder&#039;&#039;, in which he writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;While the first historical task (&#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, that of winning over the class conscious vanguard of the proletariat to the side of the Soviet power and the dictatorship of the working class) could not be accomplished without a complete ideological and political victory over opportunism and social-chauvinism, the second task, which now becomes the immediate task, and which is to lead the &#039;&#039;masses&#039;&#039; to the new position that will assure the victory of the vanguard in the revolution, this immediate task cannot be accomplished without the liquidation of Left doctrinarism, without completely overcoming and getting rid of its mistakes.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
What are the distinguishing features of the Marxist-Leninist tactics? As we have pointed out, Marxist-Leninist theory, policy and tactics are based on &#039;&#039;contact with the masses&#039;&#039;, on the ability to guide the struggle of the masses toward communism, and to increase the conscious purpose and organisation of the masses. The Communist Party lends consciousness, organisation and invincibility to the mass movement. It draws its ideas from the experience of the revolutionary mass struggle in all countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin said that the fundamental law of all great revolutions was the experience gained by the masses. He frequently referred to the great importance that Marx attached to “the historical initiative of the masses.” What Marx and Engels criticised most in English and American socialism was exactly this isolation from the working-class movement.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Cf.&#039;&#039; Introduction to the Russian translation of &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Letters of J. P. Becker, J. Dietzgen, F. Engels, K. Marx and Others to F. A. Sorge and Others&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The victory of the revolution can be assured only if the initiative and energy of the masses is widely developed and if their instinctive struggle is given conscious leadership and organisation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Success of revolutionary tactics can be assured if the profound sympathy of the masses is gained. This sympathy must be gained by prolonged and stubborn struggle, both before the proletariat gains power and after it has set up its dictatorship.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The proletarian revolution is impossible unless the vast majority of the toilers sympathise with and support their vanguard—the proletariat. This sympathy, however, is not given immediately and is not decided by vote, but must be &#039;&#039;won&#039;&#039; in the process of long, arduous and bitter class struggle. The class struggle of the proletariat to win the sympathy and support of the majority of the toilers does not end with the conquest of political power by the proletariat. The struggle &#039;&#039;continues&#039;&#039; after the conquest of power but in &#039;&#039;other forms&#039;&#039;. In the Russian revolution circumstances proved to be exceptionally favourable for the proletariat (its struggle for dictatorship), for the proletarian revolution took place at a time when the whole people was armed and when the whole of the peasantry was anxious for the overthrow of the power of the landlords and was outraged by the “Kautskyian” policy of the social-traitors, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But even in Russia, where at the moment of the proletarian revolution circumstances proved to be exceptionally favourable, where remarkable unity between the whole proletariat, the whole army and the whole of the peasantry was immediately established, even in Russia the struggle of the proletariat for the sympathy and support of the majority of the toilers took months and years after it had set up its dictatorship.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, “Greetings to the Italian, French and German Communists,” &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XXIV, pp. 481-483, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The long and persistent fight for the sympathy of the masses must be carried on systematically. The sympathy of the masses must be won by the tactical methods and by the aims and purposes for which the Communist Party is striving.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its tactical leadership of the revolutionary struggle the proletariat must be guided by two basic postulates. &#039;&#039;First&#039;&#039;, Leninism does not prescribe any particular form of struggle to the proletarian movement, but strives to master all forms, for example: demonstrations, the parliamentary struggle, the revolutionary use of parliament when the situation dictates it, as well as higher forms of struggle, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, armed insurrection, civil war and the dictatorship of the proletariat. &#039;&#039;Secondly&#039;&#039;, Leninism adopts a historical approach to the question as to what particular form of struggle is to be selected at any moment, taking into account the concrete circumstance of the given situation. Maximum flexibility must be displayed in the selection of means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In an article entitled “Guerilla Warfare,” written in September, 1906, Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Marxism is distinguished from all primitive forms of socialism by the fact that it does not impose on the movement any one particular form of struggle. It admits the most varied forms of struggle. Moreover, it does not “invent” them, but only generalises, organises and lends conscious form to the methods of struggle practiced by the revolutionary classes and which arise spontaneously in the course of the movement itself. Uncompromisingly hostile to all abstract formulas and doctrinaire recipes, Marxism demands that the most careful attention be paid to the mass struggle of the moment, which, as the movement develops, as the consciousness of the masses grows and the economic and political crisis becomes increasingly acute, creates ever new and varied methods of defence and attack. Marxism, therefore, absolutely does not reject any form of struggle. Marxism cannot confine itself to the forms of struggle that are practiced and are possible at the given moment, but recognises the &#039;&#039;inevitable&#039;&#039; appearance of new forms of struggle, that are still unknown to those who are taking part in the struggle at the given period and which arrive with the change in circumstances. If one may so express it, Marxism learns from the practice of the masses and does not in the least claim to teach the masses the “systematic” forms of struggle, invented in the study.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. X, p. 80, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In &#039;&#039;“Left-Wing” Communism&#039;&#039;, also, Lenin pointed to the necessity of learning and mastering every form of struggle and of being able to apply every one of them with equal facility, so as to be prepared for the changes of circumstances that occur so rapidly and unexpectedly during a period of revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;History generally, and the history of revolutions in particular—writes Lenin—is always richer in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively and “subtle” than some of the best parties and some of the most class conscious vanguards of the most advanced class imagine. This is understandable because the best vanguards express the class consciousness, the will, the passion, the phantasy of tens of thousands, while the revolution is made at the moment of its climax and the exertion of &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; human capabilities by the class consciousness, the will, the passion, and the phantasy of tens of millions who are urged on by the very acutest class struggle. From this follow two very important practical conclusions: first, that the revolutionary class in order to fulfil its task must be able to master &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; forms or sides of social activity without exception (and complete after the capture of political power, sometimes with great risk and amidst very great dangers, what they did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be ready to pass from one form to another in the quickest and most unexpected manner.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;“Left-Wing” Communism&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Communist Party must absolutely master every form of struggle: for the struggle of the proletariat and of the toiling masses will become a real class struggle and will lead to the goal of creating a communist society only when the organising and guiding influence of the vanguard that is consciously striving toward communism will be guaranteed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the article, “Guerilla Warfare,” Lenin pointed out that all forms of struggle may become distorted if they are not applied in a certain relationship one to another under the leadership of the Communist Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It is said that guerilla warfare reduces the class conscious proletariat to the level of degraded drunkards and tramps. That is true. But this only proves that the Party of the proletariat can never regard partisan warfare as the only, or even the principal method of struggle, and that this method must be subordinated and properly co-ordinated with the main methods of struggle, that are ennobled by the enlightening and organising influence of socialism. Without this latter condition every method of struggle in bourgeois society, without exception, will bring the proletariat to the level of the various non-proletarian strata above or below it, and being left to the mercy of the spontaneous course of events, will become bedraggled, corrupted and prostituted. Strikes, when left to the mercy of the spontaneous course of events, become transformed into “alliances” between the workers and employers against the consumers. Parliament becomes a brothel in which a gang of bourgeois politicians carry on wholesale and retail trade in the “freedom of the people,” “liberalism,” “democracy,” “republicanism,” “anti-clericalism,” “socialism” and in all kinds of popular merchandise. The newspapers become procurers, whom anybody can purchase, a means of debauching the masses and of pandering to the base instincts of the crowd, and so forth. No universal methods of struggle are known to Social-Democracy that would set up a Chinese wall between the proletariat and the social strata that are situated either a little above or below it. In different epochs, Social-Democracy applies different methods; but it applies them strictly in accordance with definite, ideological and organising conditions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. X, pp. 85-87, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The selections of the methods of struggle must be determined by the concrete objective conditions. This leads us to the second basic principle we have referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this same article Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Marxism insists that the question of the methods of struggle shall be investigated from an absolutely historical standpoint. Those who would treat this question apart from the concrete historical circumstances simply fail to understand the very elements of dialectic materialism. In the various periods of economic evolution and depending on the varying, political, national and cultural, social and other conditions, various methods of struggle assume prominence and become the chief methods of struggle, and accordingly the secondary and supplementary methods of struggle also change in their turn. To attempt to express a definite opinion, yes, or no, regarding any particular method of struggle, without subjecting the concrete circumstances of the given moment and the given stage of its development to careful analysis, simply means abandoning the standpoint of Marxism completely.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary tactics are based on an examination of the concrete circumstances of the given situation. The purpose of this is to prevent us from becoming separated from the masses, to enable us to move forward together with the masses, to lead them and help them to rise to a higher level. We must not retreat in face of difficulties, but strive to overcome them by drawing new forces into the fight. We must encourage the activity of the masses, improve their organisation and stimulate their class consciousness. The attack must be conducted systematically and consistently, avoiding in our leadership “&#039;&#039;logical&#039;&#039; (that is, mental) &#039;&#039;leaps&#039;&#039; over &#039;&#039;several&#039;&#039; concrete stages,” as Lenin once expressed it, considering this to be a grievous sin against dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given such a leadership, the masses will rise to a higher level of political consciousness in the very course of events, learning from their own actions, mistakes, defeats and victories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essence of Marxist-Leninist tactics was brilliantly explained by Lenin in his article “Karl Marx,”&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;6.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Published in pamphlet form under the title, &#039;&#039;Teachings of Karl Marx&#039;&#039;, Little Lenin Library, No. 1.—&#039;&#039;Ed&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in which he wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The fundamental task of proletarian tactics was defined by Marx in strict conformity with all the premises of his materialist-dialectical world outlook. Nothing but an objective calculation of the sum total of all the mutual relationships of all the classes of a given society without exception and consequently a calculation of the objective stage of development of this society as well as a calculation of the mutual relationship between it and other societies, can serve as the basis for the correct tactics of the class that forms the vanguard.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XVIII, Section, “Tactics of the Class Struggle of the Proletariat.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Valuable material on this subject will also be found in &#039;&#039;“Left-Wing” Communism&#039;&#039;. To be a materialist dialectician it is not enough to reiterate the principles of Marxism in general form. We must study the experience of the class struggle of the proletariat and learn to give expression to the concrete circumstances of that struggle, to emphasise the main tasks and advance proper slogans to lead the proletarian struggle and be able to find the main link that will enable us to hold the whole chain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== HOW TO STUDY LENIN ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A few words should be said in conclusion as to how to study the works of Lenin. It should be borne in mind that Lenin was a leader of the proletariat. A study of his literary works must be closely combined with a study of his activities and of the conditions in which he worked. Only in this way will the works of Lenin be properly understood and appreciated. This study, however, must be linked up with the present-day struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The manner in which Lenin studied the works of Marx and Engels is an example of how the works of Lenin should be studied. From a number of his articles, particularly those articles dealing with Marxism and with the works and correspondence of Marx and Engels, we see how he was able to draw the lessons of materialist dialectics from his study of Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin drew particular attention to the following formula contained in one of the letters of Engels: “Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action.” None of the Marxists who had studied the works of Marx and Engels had paid proper attention to this aphorism; but Lenin quite rightly pointed out that it gives a succinct and excellent description of the very essence of the Marxian theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin pointed out that an outstanding feature of the method of Marx and Engels was the living contact they themselves maintained with the mass movement. In spite of their knowledge and tremendous erudition, they were free from the slightest tinge of pedantry or bookishness. As Engels said, the &#039;&#039;moment&#039;&#039; socialism was transformed from utopia to a science it became necessary to treat it as a science, namely, to study it. The valuable knowledge inherited from the past must be mastered. But that is not enough. We must be able to draw lessons from the experience of the current struggles of the masses and at the same time take an active part in it, lead it and lift it to higher levels. Marx and Engels possessed this capacity in a very high degree; and it was this that Lenin considered to be exceptionally valuable and worthy of imitation. In his Preface to the Russian translation of Marx’s &#039;&#039;Letters to Kugelmann&#039;&#039;, Lenin says that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Above everything else&#039;&#039; he [&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, Marx—&#039;&#039;V.A&#039;&#039;.] put the fact that the working class heroically, self-sacrificingly and taking the initiative itself &#039;&#039;makes&#039;&#039; world history.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels attached the greatest importance to the “historical initiative” of the masses and were not dismayed by the fact that the activity of the masses might be accompanied by errors. Indeed, whenever something new is being created and the old ruts abandoned errors are inevitable. The most vital revolutionary cause may be marred by mistakes, but the mass movement, the new experience gained, the creative spirit displayed and the new institutions initiated compensate for any mistakes that may be committed. In fact, there is no way the broad masses can be taught except by their own actions and by their own experiences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels never dogmatically thrust upon the masses views which they held to be correct, but which the masses could understand as a result of their own experience and not merely as a result of verbal precepts and preaching. But this cautious attitude in respect of the education of the masses was accompanied by the most exacting demands in matters of theory. In his Introduction to the Russian translation of &#039;&#039;The Letters of J. P. Becker, J. Dietzgen, F. Engels, K. Marx and Others to F. A. Sorge and Others&#039;&#039;, Lenin speaks of the merciless, even “ferocious” war that Marx waged against opportunism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Previously expressed postulates must not be treated in a stereotyped way as universal precepts applicable to all times and all conditions without taking into consideration the changes that have taken place since those postulates were enunciated, and without a careful study of the new factors that have arisen and which the most penetrating minds formerly could not possibly foresee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When studying the works of Marx and Lenin we must constantly bear in mind the circumstances in which they lived and acted, the conditions that gave rise to a particular slogan, or the persons against whom a particular polemic was directed: that is to say, their works must be studied with due appreciation of the concrete time and place in which they were written. The lessons drawn from the study must be applied to the present-day struggle of the proletariat, while the closest contact must be maintained with the movement and tasks of the class struggle of our time. Only in this way will the basic demand of Marxism-Leninism be observed, namely, that theory shall not be “a dogma, but a guide to action,” not a mere subject for academic study, but a science and a valuable weapon in the class struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin’s attitude towards science, the working-class movement and the mass struggle was exactly the same as that of Marx and Engels. Like Marx, Lenin prized in the revolutionary class its “ability to create the future.” He knew how to lead the mass struggle and to combat “ferociously” every distortion of revolutionary Marxism, in whatever sphere it might manifest itself and under whatever flag it might proclaim itself. Lenin was able to appreciate the peculiarities of concrete circumstances, to study the works of the founders of scientific communism and to apply them to the new conditions of the working class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In our own study of Lenin’s works, we must strive to adopt the methods he used. We must acquire the ability to fight for revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. For there have been many opportunist distortions of Lenin’s teachings since his death, and we shall encounter such distortions again in the future. We all know the efforts the Trotskyist opposition made to effect a revisionist distortion of Leninism, while similar attempts were made by the Right opposition and the semi-Trotskyist “Leftists” in the years 1928-29, and 1930.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An example of the way Lenin studied the works of Marx will be found in his article “Marx on the American ‘Black Redistribution’.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. VII, pp. 319-221, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In this article, after describing the circumstances in which Marx wrote his article in opposition to H. Kriege (whose views closely resembled those of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries at the beginning of this century) and comparing the farmer’s movement in America in the middle of the nineteenth century with the peasant movement in Russia at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, Lenin shows how Marx combated the petty-bourgeois illusions of the peasantry, while appreciating the revolutionary democratic character of the peasant movement. Lenin used this example from Marx in order to strengthen his own hand in the fight against the Mensheviks, who entirely failed to understand the significance of the peasant movement and to realise that the peasantry was the principal ally of the working class in the struggle against tsarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another example is Lenin’s work on the question of the state. Having studied everything that Marx and Engels ever wrote on the subject, Lenin was able to establish their real views, which had been completely mutilated by the opportunists. This alone was a tremendous service to the cause of revolutionary Marxism. But he did more than that. Basing himself on the theoretical views of Marx and Engels and applying their methods, Lenin used the experience provided by the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in 1905 and 1917 to further develop the theory of Marx. He created the theory of the Soviet state, which arises with the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Studying the works of Lenin on this subject,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;State and Revolution&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, “Theses and Speeches on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” etc.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; we are able to follow step by step the manner in which Lenin used the Marxian method in order to solve one of the fundamental problems of the revolution—the organisation of the state power of the revolutionary proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A perusal of the fundamental work written by Lenin on this question, &#039;&#039;State and Revolution&#039;&#039;, reveals how carefully he studied the works of Marx and Engels, how painstakingly he transcribed individual thoughts and even fleeting remarks the theoretical value of which, in spite of their brevity, is tremendous. In Lenin’s popular lecture on “The State,”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XXIV, pp. 362-377, Russian edition.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; which gives a general review of the question of the state and represents a valuable addition to the works above enumerated and an introduction to a more profound study of the question, we find several practical suggestions as to how the works of Marx and Engels should be studied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are only two examples of many that might be quoted. In the works of Lenin the three component parts of the Marxian theory: philosophy, political economy and socialism are dealt with. Lenin mastered the material in all three spheres, developing the theory of Marx and elaborating a number of important questions in the light of the facts provided, by the latest development of the proletarian revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;In the sphere of philosophy&#039;&#039; he threw light on the problem of materialist dialectics: he elaborated the theory of knowledge of dialectic materialism,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Collected Works&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Vol. XIII, pp. 326 and. 21-201.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; studied and explained the crisis of contemporary natural science,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;cite&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/cite&amp;gt;, Chap. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and treated the problems of historical materialism in a new way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;In the sphere of economics&#039;&#039; attention should be drawn to his works on capitalism in Russia— “The Development of Capitalism in Russia,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. I; on imperialism— “Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. V; on the agrarian question—“The Agrarian Programme of the Social-Democrats in the First Russian Revolution,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. XII; “The Agrarian Question at the End of the Nineteenth Century,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. I, and, finally, his work dealing with the economics of the transition period—“State and Revolution,” “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” “Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” all in &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. VII; “The Tax in Kind,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. IX, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039; much space is devoted to Lenin’s writings on the problems of socialism. The policy and tactics of the class struggle of the proletariat, the Party, its programme and organisation, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet state and the building up of socialism. Here, too, Lenin bases himself on the theories of Marx and Engels, while at the same time making a concrete study of the complex factors of the class struggle of his own day.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin mastered the very essence of these problems, painstakingly collecting all that could be found in Marx and Engels on the subject he was examining. Our aim should be to make a similar study and a similar application of the works of Lenin. The writings of Lenin are a storehouse of knowledge, essential to the proletariat and invaluable in the leadership of its fight for communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By studying the works of Lenin we shall learn to realise the significance and importance of revolutionary theory, we shall see how theory must be associated with the actual class movement and the struggle of the millions who are exploited and oppressed by capitalism. We shall learn what is meant by the Communist Party’s leading the proletarian revolution and under what conditions the revolution can triumph. And, following the example of Lenin, we must learn how to participate in the struggle ourselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was formed under Lenin’s guidance and trained in the spirit of revolutionary Marxism, is carrying on and developing the socialist construction begun under Lenin’s leadership and along the lines he indicated. Tens of millions of proletarians and toilers are participating in this gigantic task. Learning from the experience of the struggles and constructive work of the masses of proletarians and collective farmers, who are working for the establishment of communism, the Leninist Central Committee, headed by Comrade Stalin—best able to continue the cause of Lenin—and the whole of the Party, is developing the policy, the tactics and the theory of Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For an understanding of Leninism it is important to study the present work of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the socialist construction now in progress under its guidance, as well as the international revolutionary movement and the fight of the Communist International, which was also founded under the direct leadership of Lenin. The full profundity of the theoretical works of Lenin becomes revealed only when they are associated with the struggle that is now proceeding. For they were written with the purpose of guiding the great struggle of the proletariat to victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An excellent guide for those undertaking a systematic study of Lenin’s writings is Comrade Stalin’s book, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, and this should serve as the principal guide to those who desire to obtain a thorough knowledge of the problems that Lenin so brilliantly expounded and solved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comrade Stalin, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is the most outstanding Leninist theoretician. It was under his leadership that, since the death of Lenin, the fight against Trotskyism, the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition and the Right Opportunists was conducted. Alike in practical politics and in theory (and the two are intimately associated), Comrade Stalin is brilliantly carrying out the Leninist line.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The works of Lenin are of the utmost importance to the class struggle of the proletariat. Leninism generalises the experiences of the world proletarian revolution and studies all forms of the class struggle in order to make the best use of them and in order to develop the science that is essential to the proletariat as the vanguard of the struggle for emancipation from all forms of oppression and exploitation. This science must be made accessible to the vast proletarian army, for it will help it to achieve increased unity of action and consciousness of purpose. The better organised the vast numbers of proletarians and toilers are, and the more energetically and purposefully they wage the struggle against the domination of capitalism, the sooner the yoke of age-long slavery will be shattered.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== FOOTNOTES ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;6.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== REFERENCE NOTES ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Dialectical_Materialism:_The_Theoretical_Foundation_of_Marxism-Leninism&amp;diff=88553</id>
		<title>Library:Dialectical Materialism: The Theoretical Foundation of Marxism-Leninism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Dialectical_Materialism:_The_Theoretical_Foundation_of_Marxism-Leninism&amp;diff=88553"/>
		<updated>2025-12-07T02:15:36Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Initial import from EPUB. Still need notes.&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Dialectical Materialism|author=Vladimir Adoratsky|published_date=1934|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/adoratsky/|pdf=https://redstarpublishers.org/adoratsky.pdf}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== MARXISM AS THE THEORY AND TACTICS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin defined Marxism as the revolutionary theory and tactics of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The task of the proletariat is “to take a conscious part in the historical process of the transformation of society that is going on under our eyes.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en1|[1]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because of the position it occupies in production and society the proletariat must act as the leader and organiser of all the oppressed and exploited in the struggle for communism. In 1846 Marx wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We do not regard communism as a &#039;&#039;state of affairs&#039;&#039; that has to be brought about; nor as an ideal to which reality must conform. By communism we mean an &#039;&#039;actual&#039;&#039; movement that will sweep away the present state of affairs. The conditions for that movement arise out of already existing premises.[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch1_fn1|*]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
By these postulates Marx meant: the growth of the working class (both in numbers and in class consciousness), large-scale industry and socialised production developed by capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The development of the productive forces of social labour is the historical task and privilege of capital. It is precisely in this way that it unconsciously creates the material requirements of a higher mode of production.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en2|[2]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
But private property in the means of production—which is the very foundation of capitalism—hampers and fetters the further development of the productive forces. The proletariat alone can break those fetters; after it has established its dictatorship the proletariat must smash the machinery of the bourgeois state; it must defend its own state power in civil war and crush the opposition of the bourgeoisie; it must take over large-scale industry and transform the means of production into social property, in order to reshape production on socialist lines, and, on the ruins of capitalism and using the material left over from capitalism, give the widest possible development to socialist production with all possible speed. The proletariat assumes the leadership of the non-proletarian sections of society that are oppressed and exploited by capitalism. Under the guidance of the industrial proletariat, and with the help of its dictatorship, a complete transformation of production takes place and the small producers are turned into members of a socialist society. The proletariat thereby creates a new material basis for human relationships. By means of the class struggle, and with the help of its dictatorship, it abolishes classes and achieves a classless society. Such is the historical mission of the proletariat throughout the whole world.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en3|[3]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Revolutionary theory, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, scientific deductions and generalisations based on the experience of revolution and of the working class movement in all countries, is of vital importance to the revolutionary struggle of the working class at the present time. “Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement,” Lenin said. The foundations of this theory were laid down by Marx and Engels and further developed by Lenin. During the course of several decades the proletariat has had the opportunity to test this theory by their own experience in the class struggle. This theory has played, and continues to play, a tremendous part in the struggle of the working class. For instance, in Russia, we could neither have seized, nor retained power, nor could we have correctly tackled the problems of building up socialism, were it not for the firm hand and consistent leadership of the Communist Party, based on the revolutionary theory of Marxism, and were it not for the fact that the working class realised that this leadership was the right one. If the working class is guided in its struggles by the theory of Marxism and Leninism, it will defeat the bourgeoisie all over the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism provides no ready-made recipes, that can be applied uniformly in any and every circumstance without further reflection. The Marxian theory “is not a dogma, but a guide to action.” It gives the general line as to how the fight of the working class should be conducted. Having studied all the social phenomena of the time, having himself led the working-class movement, Marx made certain deductions, indicated the general trend of development and pointed out what must be the inevitable course of future events. He showed that the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a communist society was inevitable, that the proletariat would take the leading part in this transformation, that a transition period from capitalism to communism was unavoidable and that the form of state during that transition period would be the dictatorship of the proletariat. But Marx, of course, could not forecast, and never attempted to forecast, the detailed events of the progress of the world revolution. Marx thought that in order to decide what should be done at a given historical moment, in a given country and under given conditions, one must carefully study (with the help of the method of scientific communism) all the specific features of the given situation (which is constantly changing) and the situation existing not only within the given country itself, but in all the other countries of the world. Marxism considers that only by such a study can the&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;...thinking representatives of the given class [acquire] the necessary knowledge, the necessary experience—and, apart from all knowledge and experience—the necessary political instinct for the quick and correct solution of intricate political problems.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en4|[4]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism draws its ideas from the actual struggle of the masses. The Marxian theory is worked out in close conjunction with the mass revolutionary movement. It is not based on ideas “invented or discovered by this or that would-be universal reformer” but represents “...merely... in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en5|[5]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The theory of Marxism helps the proletariat to understand “the conditions and nature of its own actions.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en6|[6]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duty of the proletarian theoretician is not to create socialist plans out of his own head; his duty is to discover the conditions for emancipation from exploitation that are created in the very process of social and economic development; he must find in the very progress of events the path that leads to the solution of the problems of the exploited masses; he must help the latter in their fight for communism and guide them in the struggle, so that society based on exploitation may be destroyed as rapidly as possible and with the least sacrifice on the part of the proletariat and the toiling classes in general. As we have said, owing to the position it occupies in production and society, the proletariat can, and must, take upon itself the duty of organising a communist society. The theory of Marxism should help the proletariat in the task of exterminating all forms of exploitation as rapidly and as easily as possible. General postulates are not enough, precise solutions of the daily problems of the political struggle and the building up of socialism are required. That implies a scientific leadership and foresight based on the study of the actual state of affairs, using for this purpose the Marxist-Leninist theory. As Comrade Stalin said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Theory... alone, can give to the movement confidence, guidance, strength and understanding of the inner relations between events; it alone can help practice to clarify the process and direction of class movements in the present and near future.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en7|[7]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In the article “Our Immediate Task,” written in 1899, Lenin pointed out that the duty of a revolutionary party&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;does not consist merely in serving the working class movement; its duty is to &#039;&#039;link up socialism with the working class movement&#039;&#039;... to introduce definite socialist ideals into the spontaneous movement, to link it up with socialist convictions consistent with the level of modern science, and connect it with the systematic political struggle for democracy [this was written six years before the Revolution of 1905, &#039;&#039;V.A.&#039;&#039;], as a means for the realisation of socialism—in a word, to fuse this spontaneous movement with the activities of the &#039;&#039;revolutionary party&#039;&#039;, into a single indivisible whole. The history of socialism and democracy in Western Europe, the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia, and the experience of our working class movement—such is the &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; that must be studied and mastered in order to work out the correct forms of organisation and the correct tactics of our party.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en8|[8]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In the same article Lenin says that ready-made formulas must not be automatically applied to new and specific conditions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The material must be analysed... independently, for we shall not find ready-made samples.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en9|[9]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin points out that “the conditions of the Russian working-class movement are entirely different from those of the Western European movement.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor could the earlier revolutionary parties in Russia be taken as examples in every respect. While recognising “the necessity of learning revolutionary and conspirative technique from the old Russian leaders,” Lenin pointed out, that “by no means relieves us of the duty of examining them critically and of working out our own form of organisation.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en10|[10]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is how Lenin, scrupulously observing the Marxian method, defines the scope of theory, and indicates the necessity of independently studying every fresh experience and of making use of all that was valuable in past development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already stated that, according to Marx, the proletarian theoretician must give expression to the revolutionary aims of the mass movement; he must guide that movement, yet at the same time learn from it and avail himself of the experience of the whole international revolution. This was the spirit in which Lenin wrote and acted. He valued very highly theoreticians who kept in close touch with the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1918 he wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;... a revolutionary Marxist is distinguished from the ordinary philistine by his ability and willingness to preach to the still ignorant masses the necessity of the approaching revolution, to prove that it is inevitable, to explain its advantage to the people, and to prepare the proletariat and all the toiling and exploited masses for it.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en11|[11]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this passage Lenin emphasised the importance of the ability to maintain contact with the unenlightened masses, the ability to draw them into the movement and to lead them into revolutionary positions, so that “the masses by their own experience may convince themselves of the correctness of the Party line.” That is one of the fundamental principles of Leninism. It is embodied in the Programme of the Communist International and is one of the characteristic and distinguishing features of the activities of both Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;For the whole task of the Communists—said Lenin—is to be able to &#039;&#039;convince&#039;&#039; the backward, to work among them, and not to &#039;&#039;fence themselves off&#039;&#039; from them by means of fantastic, childishly “Left” slogans.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en12|[12]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In 1914 the liberal newspaper &#039;&#039;Rech&#039;&#039;, discussing the fight the Bolsheviks were waging against the Liquidators,[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch1_fn2|*]] bewailed the “carrying of the dissension into the ranks of the workers.” Lenin in an article entitled “The Methods Used by the Bourgeois Intellectuals in the Fight Against the Workers,” wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We &#039;&#039;welcome&#039;&#039; the “carrying of dissension into the ranks of the workers,” for it is the workers, and the workers alone, who will distinguish dissensions from differences, from disagreements on principle, who will understand the significance of these disagreements and form their own opinion and decide not “with whom” to go, but where to go, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, decide on a definite, clear, well-considered and tested line of action.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This line of action can be worked out and the political enlightenment of the masses of the workers can be accomplished only in the course of “a consistent and stubborn fight to a finish, of proletarian influences and strivings directed against the bourgeoisie.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en13|[13]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, it must never be forgotten that the masses learn by their own experience, from events, and not only from books. In his preface to the 1890 German edition of &#039;&#039;The Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, Engels wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;For Marx, the sole guarantee of the ultimate triumph of the theories contained in the &#039;&#039;Manifesto&#039;&#039; was the intellectual development of the working class that would result from joint action and discussion. The events and fluctuations of fortune in the struggle against capitalism, their victories, and still more their defeats, would reveal to the combatants the ineffectiveness of the panaceas they had hitherto believed in, and would make their minds more receptive for the thorough understanding of the real conditions of working class emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, it is out of the actual mass struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the conscious leadership of the struggle on the part of the vanguard of the proletariat—the Communist Party—that scientific communism arises, differing fundamentally from utopian and petty-bourgeois reformist socialism. Scientific communism is not based on good intentions, but on the class struggle of the proletariat and the recognition of the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The theoretical statement of the principles of scientific communism is Marxism and Leninism, the latter being an elaboration of Marxism in the light of new conditions. This theory embraces general questions of philosophy and method as well as their concrete application. It is essential to the proletariat in its struggles: it imparts consciousness, self-assurance, and decision to the movement. Those who are able to wield it are saved from aberrations and uncertainties; it enables us to determine the correct path to follow and renders the achievement and the consolidation of victory easier and surer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter2.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter2.xhtml_heading1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LENINISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because of the intimate relation that exists between theory and reality, the great changes that have occurred since the death of Marx and Engels had to find their reflections in theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The theoretical basis that Lenin took over from Marx, namely, dialectical materialism, was further developed by him independently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin lived and acted in new and different conditions and a number of questions had to be considered afresh. Using the method of Marx, he solved the difficult problem of how the fight for revolutionary Marxism must be conducted in the new and complex conditions created by the era of imperialism and the beginnings of the world proletarian revolution. Since the death of Marx none of the important theoreticians and leaders of the Second International has been able to cope with this problem. Lenin was able to solve it because he maintained the closest contact with the mass movement of the proletariat and had mastered the Marxist theory as no one else had. Lenin, himself, was the truest expression of the world-wide and historical mission of the proletariat. Having himself led the struggle in the course of three revolutions, he was able to advance and develop the Marxist theory in all its component parts. We are therefore quite justified in describing Leninism as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The epoch of Lenin differed from the epoch of Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels lived and developed their theory at a time when the proletariat was just beginning to come out definitely as an independent force, as a result of which the bourgeoisie became more and more inclined to come to terms with the forces of reaction. In his book, &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, written in 1852, Marx stated that the nineteenth century saw the beginning of the proletarian revolution. He based his statement on the theoretical conclusions he had arrived at as a result of the Revolution of 1848. In a speech delivered in the spring of 1852 on the occasion of the anniversary of the &#039;&#039;People’s Paper&#039;&#039;[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch2_fn1|*]] he said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The so-called revolutions of 1848 were but poor incidents, small fractures and fissures in the dry crust of European society. But they revealed an abyss. Beneath the apparently solid surface they betrayed oceans of liquid matter only needing expansion to rend into fragments continents of hard rock. Noisily and confusedly they proclaimed the emancipation of the proletariat, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, the secret of the nineteenth century and of the revolution of that century.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And in concluding his speech he said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;...the English working men are the firstborn sons of modern industry. Certainly, then, they will not be the last to aid the social revolution produced by that industry—a revolution which means the emancipation of their class all over the world, which is as universal as capital—rule and wage slavery.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en14|[14]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Marx proclaimed the inevitability of the proletarian revolution, but it had not yet fully begun during the lifetime of Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx foresaw that the course of events was bound to lead to the monopoly of big capital. But it was only after the death of Marx and Engels that the extension of the rule of monopoly capitalism throughout the whole world really took place, leading in its turn to the rule of finance capital and to imperialism. In the ’sixties England was the centre of the development and rule of big capital (and of the plundering of the colonies). But by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth capitalism had developed in a number of other countries (particularly in Germany and the United States) much more powerfully than in England. All the colonies had already been seized. And so, at the end of the nineteenth century, a desperate struggle broke out among the big predatory imperialist powers, not for the division of the world, but for its redivision. There began the epoch of imperialism—the fusion of usurious banking capital with industrial capital to form finance capital. What Lenin called “decaying, moribund capitalism” set in. For the peculiarities of this condition and for the main features of the economics of imperialism—the latest and last stage of the development of capitalism—consult Lenin’s great work &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, and his article, “Imperialism and the Split in the Socialist Movement.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en15|[15]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior even to the imperialist war, but particularly on its outbreak, a revolutionary situation was created in the countries where capitalism was most highly developed as a result of the extreme aggravation of the contradictions of capitalism, the high cost of living, increased oppression and general deterioration of the condition of the working class. The revolution began to spread even before the war. In the East, the revolution followed on the heels of the 1905 Revolution in Russia; in 1906 it broke out in Persia, in 1908 in Turkey and in 1911 in China. In the European countries the approach of revolution was heralded by big strikes in England (the general strike on the railways in 1911, the miners’ strike in 1912), the struggles of the workers in Germany (the demonstrations in favour of universal suffrage in Prussia in 1910), and working class demonstrations in Russia (the protest strikes against the Lena shootings in 1912, the strikes in Baku and other cities in the summer of 1914, the demonstrations in St. Petersburg, accompanied by armed clashes and the erection of barricades, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proletarian revolution loomed in all capitalist countries. The fundamental conditions for the transition to socialism had ripened; a proletarian revolution had become an objective necessity. The dictatorship of the bourgeoisie had to be replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat, since of all the classes in modern society the proletariat alone was capable of leading the toilers out of the &#039;&#039;impasse&#039;&#039; to which the bourgeoisie had brought it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of all the workers’ parties of the world, however, the Russian Bolsheviks alone, headed by Lenin, proved to be actually prepared to assume the leadership of the proletarian revolution. In the West European countries, in the long period of reaction that followed the suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871, the workers’ parties had grown accustomed to pursue only legal forms of the class struggle. Opportunism was rife: a good deal of “opportunist garbage,” as Lenin called it, had accumulated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the chief reasons for the strength of opportunism was the fact that in all imperialist countries the capitalist class bribed the upper stratum of the working class (the numerically small labour aristocracy) out of the super-profits obtained from the plunder of the colonies and semi-colonies. Thus, there was a section, a numerically small section, it is true, of the working class, that sided with the bourgeoisie and served as the vehicle of its influence to the proletariat. But the situation completely changed with the outbreak of the imperialist war. Then in the Western countries, in the “free” constitutional monarchies and republics, armed revolt and the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war became an urgent necessity, for there was no way of escaping from exploitation except by bitter struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of all the European parties, the Russian Bolshevik Party, alone, had made serious preparation for this struggle, owing to the fact that in Russia a revolutionary situation had been developing since the middle of the nineteenth century. The Russian revolutionary movement was the most powerful in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Russia all the contradictions of the modern period of imperialism were prevalent: the oppression of enslaved nationalities by a dominant nation, the military-feudal oppression of tsarism, which was the most brutal form of political oppression then existing. The landowning nobility still survived in Russia and there were many survivals of serfdom in economic life (particularly that of the peasants), habits and customs and in political institutions. At the same time capitalism was developing rapidly: large-scale industry grew apace and became concentrated in a few centres; this was accompanied by the growth of the working class. Bank capital, syndicates and trusts, those highest forms of imperialist finance capital, developed also, particularly after 1905. The proletarian class war against the bourgeoisie spread and this was accompanied by the growth of the peasants’ war against the landowning nobility. In other words, we had a combination of two class wars, which Marx viewed as unusually favourable for proletarian victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels had pointed out in their time the approach of the revolution in Russia, the extremely rapid development of capitalism in that vast country, and the unbearable yoke of tsarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They had understood: 1, the complexity of the social structure in Russia, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the existence of the most primitive together with the most modern forms (“every stage of social development is represented from the primitive commune to modern large-scale industry and high finance,” as Engels wrote to V. I. Zasulich in 1885); 2, they took into account the existence of a revolutionary situation; they saw that the revolution required only a jolt to bring vast masses of people into action; 3, they foresaw that the revolutionary explosion would be of tremendous power and that it would inevitably assume a most violent and bitter character (“Russia is heading towards a most violent revolution,” Marx wrote to Engels in 1870); 4, they foresaw that in this &#039;&#039;last&#039;&#039; of the great European countries to pass through the capitalist industrial revolution, the conflict would assume unprecedented dimensions. “This time the crash will beat anything known before; all the factors are there: intensity, universal extension, entanglement of all possessing and ruling social elements,” so Engels wrote to Marx on April 14, 1856; 5, they realised the tremendous significance of the Russian revolution for the world revolution. That the latter would be a socialist revolution Marx and Engels never doubted.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en16|[16]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of enormous importance for the Russian revolution and for the development of the Leninist theory was the fact that quite an extensive experience in revolution and working class organisation had already been accumulated, and that the theory of Marx and Engels had been worked out in detail and adopted and tested by the revolutionary proletarian party and by the masses. The Bolshevik Party grew and gained strength in the course of a long struggle and the experience of a number of revolutions. It accumulated the experience of the international working-class movement and of West European revolutions and conveyed this experience to the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his “&#039;&#039;Left-Wing’ Communism&#039;&#039;, Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Russia achieved Marxism, as the only correct revolutionary theory, virtually through &#039;&#039;suffering&#039;&#039;, by a half century of unprecedented torments and sacrifice, of unprecedented revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, painstaking search and study, testing in practice, disappointments, checking, and comparison with European experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin also emphasised the value and significance of the direct experience gained by the Bolshevik Party in the long struggle against the autocracy, the liberal bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeois wavering and uncertain revolutionaries (such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Anarchists, and so forth), and against the various tendencies and deviations within its own ranks. These deviations and bourgeois influences were overcome in the struggle waged against the various forms of opportunism that successively manifested themselves: Economism,[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch2_fn2|*]] Menshevism, the Liquidationist movement, social-patriotism and the tendencies that disguised themselves by “Left” phraseology, such as “&#039;&#039;Otzovism&#039;&#039;,” “&#039;&#039;Vperyodism&#039;&#039;,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch2_fn3|†]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; “Left Communism,” etc., as well as against conciliationism, a disguised and therefore particularly dangerous form of opportunism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin subjected the Russian revolution and the development of Bolshevism to a detailed analysis in a number of his writings, &#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, “The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats,” “Speech on the Revolution of 1905,” “The Stages, the Trend and Prospects of the Revolution,” “Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers,” “Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution,” “Our Revolution,” especially “Left-Wing” Communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have dealt particularly with the Russian revolution, because it was in Russia that the Bolshevik Party developed. But it would be a mistake to assume that Bolshevism (in other words, Leninism) is based only on the experiences of Russia and that it is a purely Russian phenomenon. Leninism was drawn from international experience and its significance is international. Only by a proletarian revolution can the revolutionary proletariat and the oppressed masses who are struggling against imperialism throughout the world, achieve their emancipation. Leninism is the theory of the proletariat, it sums up and explains this experience, it teaches the working class how to conduct its fight and how to secure victory, seize power, consolidate its gains and lead the toilers in their struggle against exploitation. It also teaches us how socialism is to be built.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his pamphlet &#039;&#039;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&#039;&#039;, Lenin says that the popularity of Bolshevism throughout the world is due to the profound sympathy the masses have for genuinely revolutionary tactics, because the revolution has begun to mature all over the world. He enumerates the achievements of Bolshevism and declares that Bolshevik tactics were based on a correct appreciation of the revolutionary situation that had arisen all over Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolshevism exposed and routed the old, putrid international of social-traitors. It laid down the ideological and tactical foundations of the Third International, which took into account the gains achieved in the epoch of peace as well as the experience of the epoch of revolution which had commenced. The example of the Soviet state showed that the workers and poor peasants are capable of taking political power, of defending it against attacks of the world bourgeoisie, and of building socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Russia as an example, the masses throughout the world were in a position to convince themselves that Bolshevism had indicated “the true path of salvation from the horrors of the war and of imperialism and that Bolshevism &#039;&#039;could serve as an example in tactics to all&#039;&#039;” (Lenin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The long training and hardening that the Bolshevik Party had obtained in the struggle guaranteed it an important place in the international struggle against opportunism and for the creation of the Third, Communist, International. While crystallising the rich experience of the Russian revolution, Bolshevism at the same time reflected the experience of the international working-class movement (particularly the European) which had entered the era of the socialist revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before the war, during the war, and after the war, Lenin in his writings constantly bore in mind the experience of the whole international struggle. Under his leadership, a bitter struggle was waged against opportunism wherever it was found. It was in this spirit, the spirit of revolutionary Marxism, that the Communist Parties in every European country were trained. Lenin wrote letters to workers in various countries on questions of the international revolution, pointing out that the urgent and essential task in the present period of history was to fight for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat all over the world. It was under Lenin’s leadership that the Communist International was created and the fundamental principles of its programme, organisation and tactics laid down.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leninism, therefore, is Marxism in the epoch of imperialism and of the proletarian revolution. In this epoch, the proletarian movement reaches new, higher, levels. The proletariat has grown numerically; it has become better organised and more class conscious; its historical activity has increased; it has learned to employ new methods in the struggle, for it has now conquered power and established its dictatorship in a vast country. In his activities and in his writings, Lenin expressed and analysed the new phenomena of the new epoch. Leading the struggle of the proletariat in these new conditions, Lenin advanced and developed Marxist theory and introduced fresh elements into all its phases. Hence Leninism is a new stage in the development of Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
III&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter3.xhtml_heading1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== MATERIALIST DIALECTICS AS THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF MARXISM-LENINISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essence of Marxism is materialist dialectics. Lenin called materialist dialectics “the living soul of Marxism,” “its fundamental theoretical root.” The importance of mastering the dialectical method will therefore be obvious. It is needed in the study of nature and of society, in the theoretical struggle, in the practical leadership of the proletariat and its constructive work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The articles collected in Volume XI of the &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch3_fn1|*]] provide a general exposition of materialist dialectics and its application to the study of nature and of the history of human society and of human thought. We must learn how to apply this method by studying the works of Marx and Engels and the masterly application of materialist dialectics by Lenin. All his life Lenin was a diligent student of the works of Marx and Engels; he read them over and over again, and turned to them particularly at every turn of history and at every new stage of the revolution, when new problems arose for solution. Lenin took his revolutionary materialist dialectics from Marx and Engels, he repeatedly advocated the necessity of studying their works for this purpose. But to say that Lenin mastered the Marxist method is not enough; he developed it and raised it to a still higher level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What do we mean by dialectics? By dialectics Hegel meant the progress of ideas (thought) by means of contradiction, the process of its development toward a supreme and absolute spirit. Hegel emphasised that such progress, such development is self-motion. He considered that every phenomenon had its own motion, its own process of development, and that this self-motion is the result of an inherent impulse to development. In ancient Greece, dialectics was the name given to the art of disputation. It was considered that in the course of an argument, rich in fertile ideas, the opinions of the disputing parties underwent a change and that something new and of a higher nature resulted. By analogy, all motion by means of contradiction came to be called dialectics. This was the sense in which Hegel used the term. He believed that motion was universally produced in this way, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, by a conflict of contradictions, the negation of the old and the creation of the new. That is how development takes place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the dialectics of Hegel are idealistic. It is the movement of thought that lies at the root of his whole philosophy. Marx, on the contrary, employed dialectics materialistically. He created dialectic materialism. &#039;&#039;Materialist dialectics&#039;&#039; is the general movement and development caused by the conflict of contradictions that takes place throughout the universe both in nature and in society, and which is reflected in human thought. &#039;&#039;Dialectic materialism&#039;&#039; is the philosophy and method of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, an instrument for the study and transformation of everything that exists. Dialectic materialism is not confined merely to theoretical study: it involves practical revolutionary action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectic thought strives to achieve a complete and all-embracing conception of phenomena. Every expressed opinion is more or less one-sided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin, after conversing with an individual who had attended the “&#039;&#039;Vperyod&#039;&#039;” school at Capri conducted by A. Bogdanov, who politically was a follower of the “Otzovist” faction, wrote a letter to Maxim Gorky dated November 29, 1909, in which he stated that his (Lenin’s) previous conception of the Capri school had been one-sided. He wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;By gad, the philosopher Hegel was right—life does progress by contradictions; and living contradictions are much richer, more varied and pithier than the mind of man originally conceived. I thought that the school was &#039;&#039;merely&#039;&#039; the centre of a new faction. It turns out not to be so: not in the sense that the school was not the centre of a new faction (it was, and is so to-day), but in the sense that this is not the whole truth. Subjectively, certain individuals made the school such a centre; objectively, it was such a centre, and, moreover, the school drew from real working-class surroundings genuine and advanced workers. And so it turned out that at Capri, beside the contradictions between the old and new factions, a contradiction developed between a section of the Social-Democratic intellectuals and the Russian workers, who are bound, &#039;&#039;whatever happens&#039;&#039;, to bring the Social-Democracy out on the true path, and will do so in spite of all the intrigues, “brawls and incidents,” etc., etc., that go on abroad.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
From this example we see that there are several sides to every object and to every phenomenon. When considering certain phases, we must not forget those that are temporarily overshadowed and forced into the background, but which may assume prime importance in the further development of the conflict of contradictions. One must be able to view the development of a given phenomenon in its perspective, to see the interrelation of all its component parts, and at the same time distinguish the “main link” of each given concrete situation and historical moment. The complexity of the phenomena of reality, their contradictory nature and their constant flux and change are reflected in our judgment of them, which also cannot help but be contradictory and in a constant state of flux. That, however, does not exclude, but, on the contrary, imposes the necessity for finding clear and definite answers to the problems that arise at any given moment. Dialectic materialism teaches us to distinguish the contradictions of reality, to understand their significance and to study their development (objective dialectics). Correspondingly, the progress of concepts (subjective dialectics), by properly reflecting reality, must conform to what is proceeding in the external (objective) world and must not allow itself to be severed from its base. Consciousness must strive to adapt itself to the (dialectical) progress of the reflected object.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The importance of the works of Hegel lies in the fact that he was the first to create a philosophy that attempted (and to a certain extent successfully) to study the general laws of dialectics. The great merit of Hegel consists in the fact that he made dialectics the basis of his philosophy. As Marx said, Hegel was the “first to give a complete and conscious picture of the general forms of motion” [&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, of dialectics.—&#039;&#039;V. A.&#039;&#039;]. It would, however, be a mistake to believe that one can simply take and use the Hegelian dialectics without first radically re-shaping it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx himself declared that his method not only differed fundamentally from that of Hegel “but is its direct opposite.” Marx said, that to Hegel&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;the process of thinking, which under the name of “the idea” he even transformed into an independent subject, is the &#039;&#039;demiurge&#039;&#039; of the world, and the real world is only the extreme phenomenal form of “the idea.” With me the idea is nothing else than the material reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Hegelian dialectics, accordingly, requires thorough overhauling. It must be “turned right side up again” in order to reveal “the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Engels also dwelt on the same theme and treated it in a similar spirit. To the question, wherein lies the error of Hegel, he replies: in the fact that the laws of dialectics “are not drawn from nature and history, but imposed on the latter as laws of thought.” Hence the nonsensical concept that “the world must conform to a logical system, which is itself only the product of definite stages of development of human thought.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Engels declares that “this relationship must be reversed,” whereupon everything will appear normal and plain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The dialectical laws, which in the idealistic philosophy are extremely mysterious, will then immediately become simple and clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
On another occasion Engels stated that the mysticism of Hegel consisted in the fact that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;the category [&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, concept—&#039;&#039;V.A.&#039;&#039;] was to him something antecedent, while the dialectics of the real universe was its mere reflection. Actually the opposite is true: the dialectics of the mind is only the reflection of the real world both of nature and of history.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en17|[17]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; (&#039;&#039;The Dialectics of Nature&#039;&#039;.)&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin, like Marx, completely remoulded Hegel, reversed his theses, put them right side up and interpreted them materialistically.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Hegel’s logic, he wrote, cannot be applied in its present form: it cannot be &#039;&#039;taken for granted&#039;&#039;. We must select from it its logical (gnosiological) shades and purge it of &#039;&#039;mystical ideas&#039;&#039;; that is still a big task.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
A valuable guide to the study of Hegel are his synopses: &#039;&#039;The Science of Logic&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;The History of Philosophy&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throughout the universe, development proceeds not as the result of any external cause (God), not because of any “purpose” inherent in events, but because of the inherent contradictions that are contained in all things and in all phenomena. “Contradiction is the root of all motion and of all life,” Hegel wrote. “It is only because a thing contains a contradiction within itself, that it moves and acquires impulse and activity. That is the process of all motion and all development.”[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch3_fn2|*]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin in his article &#039;&#039;On Dialectics&#039;&#039; points out that contradictions exist universally: repulsion and attraction, positive and negative electricity, the division into parts, and the union of the parts to form a whole, etc. In all the phenomena and processes of nature and society there are contradictory, opposite, mutually exclusive, and at the same time associated, tendencies. Dialectics, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, the contradictions, union and conflict of opposites, prevails in the material world and is reflected in consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The general laws of dialectics are universal: they are to be found in the movement and development of the immeasurably vast luminous nebulae from which in the spaces of the universe the stellar systems are formed (these spaces are measured by light years, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, the distance through which light travels in one year, moving at a speed of 300,000 kilometres per second), in the internal structure of molecules and atoms and in the movement of electrons and protons; the latter are also opposite and mutually connected and undergo transformation, change and development, in other words, they also reveal the laws of dialectics in their existence and in their movements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The development of the animal kingdom also proceeds by contradictions and the conflict of opposites (the struggle for existence, procreation by sex, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In human society the driving force of development is the class struggle. In the conditions of contemporary society, the struggle of the revolutionary class, the proletariat, causes the transition from one form of society to another—the transition from capitalism to communism. (We shall deal with this in somewhat greater detail below.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is this dialectical movement of the material universe that forms the subject matter of materialist dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin said that “contradiction” is the salt of dialectics; its “kernel” is unity and the conflict of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectics emphasises not only contradiction and opposites, but also unity. Lenin thus explains the formula “unity of opposites”:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We are unable to imagine, express, measure or depict motion without interrupting that which is continuous, without simplifying, approximating, separating and petrifying that which is alive. The depiction of the movement of thought is always an approximation, an act of petrification—and not merely of thought, but also of sensation, and not merely of motion, but of all conceptions. Therein lies the essence of dialectics. And it is this essence that is expressed in the formula, the unity, the identity of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Greek eclectic philosopher Zeno (fifth century B.C.), known as the father of the dialectical method, was the first to give clear expression to the idea of the contradictoriness of motion. Certain of his arguments have come down to us and these show that thought is bound to arrive at an &#039;&#039;impasse&#039;&#039; if dialectical methods are not employed and if the unity of opposites is not understood. Here is one of his arguments. An arrow in the course of its flight is bound to be at some definite point of its path and occupy some definite place. If that be so, then at each given moment it is at a definite point in a state of rest, that is, motionless; hence, it is not moving at all. We therefore see that motion cannot be expressed without resorting to contradictory statements. The arrow is in a given place, yet at the same time is not in that place. It is only by expressing both these contradictory affirmations coincidentally that we can depict motion. If we were to rest on only half of a phrase, either motion would disappear, or the object itself. And that is true of any judgment, for a judgment expresses only one or a few sides of an object, whereas the object has innumerable sides and innumerable contacts with the surrounding world. Hence, a contrary judgment may be made regarding any thing or phenomenon and yet to a certain extent it will be correct. Explosive substances employed in war cause tremendous destruction. But employed in industry they serve the cause of culture. Because of the antagonism of classes all things and phenomena assume opposite significance for each of the combatant sides: for the proletariat, the Soviet state means victory; for the capitalists it means defeat and the end of their rule, and so forth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The formula “unity of opposites” is particularly important because it expresses the principal distinguishing feature of dialectic motion, the most fundamental property of all phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to avoid misunderstanding it should be stated here, that the application of the dialectical method does not mean arbitrarily combining all and every contradictory assertion. The unity of opposites must not be taken to mean the simple repetition of arbitrarily chosen postulates and opposite assertions; it is the combination and conflict of opposites as they exist in reality and the discovery of the contradictions in reality that are the driving forces and bases of motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order that the specific features of dialectical thinking may be better understood it will be useful to compare and contrast it with other, non-dialectical methods and forms of thinking. This will help to bring out more clearly the fundamental features of materialist dialectics and to give a more precise idea of its laws, particularly its basic law: motion is the result of contradiction, the unity and conflict of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Opposed to dialectics are metaphysics, eclectics, sophistry, and the puerile “evolutionary” conception of development. Materialist dialectics does not tolerate the use of stereotyped and ready-made schemes. It demands the profound study of concrete circumstances, the precise formulation of the real process of development; it also demands revolutionary action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical thinking is the opposite of metaphysics, which regards things and phenomena, not in their unity and interrelationship, but each separate from the other, &#039;&#039;outside&#039;&#039; of the grand, &#039;&#039;general&#039;&#039; relationship, and consequently, not in motion, but in a state of rest, frozen, unchanging and lifeless. Metaphysical thinking is incapable of depicting the real inter-relations and development of phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How, for instance, is one to regard capitalist, bourgeois democracy? To approach this phenomenon with a ready-made answer would be metaphysics. It would be untrue to say that capitalism is an evil at all times and under all conditions. Compared with the serf system, capitalism was beneficial: to a certain extent it freed the toilers and placed them in more favourable conditions for their development and their struggle for emancipation. The serf system, on the other hand, was beneficial compared with slavery. As long as the serf system exists, as long as it predominates, the movement towards capitalism is a progressive movement. But when the serf system is abolished, the workers are left facing one main enemy—capitalism. In relation to the past, capitalism is beneficial; in relation to the future, in relation to the more perfect system, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, socialism, capitalism is an evil that must be destroyed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the proletariat, bourgeois democracy is, of course, preferable to a tsarist autocracy. The proletariat cannot but strive to overthrow autocracy. But even a democratic republic is one of the forms of the class rule of the exploiters, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, the bourgeois dictatorship, which must be replaced by a Soviet state—by proletarian democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Slavery is abominable. But slavery was necessary at a given phase of the historical development of humanity, in the remote past, at a given level of development of productive forces. At that time it represented a necessary stage of development, a definite advance. At a particular stage of development of productive forces, enemies, instead of being killed, were turned into slaves and their labour power was thus preserved and put to use.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we are asked, what interest has the past to us, we reply that development throughout the world takes place unevenly. In one place (the U.S.S.R.) bourgeois democracy is a thing of the past; in other places (outside the U.S.S.R.) it is a thing of the present. Moreover, feudal relations, and even slave relations (at least survivals of them) continue to exist in Asia and Africa and even in Europe and America. At the present time all these are dominated by the fundamental contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between wage slavery and the struggle against wage slavery, between the system of capitalist states and the U.S.S.R. Yet at the same time, old forms of oppression continue to exist. Only by its own efforts, without the aid of God (who we do know does not exist) can mankind escape from its bestial existence, its semi-barbaric conditions of life, and from the grip of poverty, oppression and ignorance. In this struggle for emancipation the proletariat takes the lead. Its fight is against the fundamental and dominating relations of wage slavery; but parallel with this form of exploitation there remain the survivals of preceding forms of oppression, against which the proletariat must also wage a bitter war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectic materialism is the theory that guides the proletariat in its struggles. The proletariat wages war on the bourgeoisie and in time will overthrow it; it will abolish the rule of the bourgeoisie and destroy the relations of exploitation; but at the same time it must take over and still further develop the cultural achievements that were amassed under the rule of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The bourgeois, the capitalist, is our enemy. But having defeated the enemy and broken his resistance, we must take advantage of his knowledge and experience. We must make use of the cultural and scientific developments achieved under the bourgeoisie and compel the bourgeois specialists to work for the cause of communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the process of development all things give way to others, all things are negated. But the characteristic feature of dialectical negation is that it does not merely throw to one side, it abolishes by first overcoming. Socialism cannot be brought about without mastering and remoulding all that which was accumulated in the preceding stage of historical development and all that which was taken over from the past and developed by the bourgeoisie. Such a dialectic negation of the bourgeoisie can be accomplished only by the proletariat, the class most closely associated with modern large-scale industry, which is the most valuable product of bourgeois development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We thus see that nothing is immutable; everything changes, everything passes from one state to another. For this reason metaphysical thought, which regards things in isolation and treats them as immutable, cannot correctly reflect the ceaseless process of motion and the inter- relationship of all phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we have stated, development arises out of inherent contradictions. For instance, the capitalist system is a unity of opposites: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The dialectics of this contradiction was brilliantly set forth by Marx in &#039;&#039;The Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en18|[18]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and in &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;. The bourgeoisie and the proletariat are opposites; but at the same time they comprise a definite unity: they are the classes of a single social and economic formation—capitalism—in a state of irreconcilable contradiction. This contradiction will be logically solved dialectically by the internal struggle, the proletarian revolution. The logic arises out of the mass struggle. In the process of revolution, the proletariat becomes transformed, it becomes trained for the performance of its historic mission. In 1846 Marx wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The revolution is essential not merely because the dominant class cannot be overthrown by any other means, but also because only in the course of the revolution can the class which overthrows cleanse itself of the mire of the old society and become fit to create a new society.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This is one of the fundamental ideas of Marxism. Marx returned to it time and again. Thus, in 1850 in his speech to the Communist League, Marx said, addressing himself to the workers:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;You must pass through fifteen, twenty, perhaps fifty years of civil war and national conflict, not merely in order to change the system, but also to change yourselves and to render yourselves fit for political rule.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And again in 1871, in his pamphlet, &#039;&#039;The Civil War in France&#039;&#039;, repeating the same thought, Marx said:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;They [the working class] know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending, by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en19|[19]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Here we discern the same unity of opposites, the mutual conflict of these opposites and the inevitable solution of the conflicts by a transition to a new form of society. Without the long and severe training obtained in its struggles the proletariat cannot fit itself to perform its historical mission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the task of materialist dialectics to study the conflict of opposites proceeding in the world around us and to reveal it in its true form. It must seek the dialectic foundations of the contradictions and not select symptoms and phases of phenomena casually and eclectically (that is, arbitrarily and independently of their essential inter-relationship). It must seek to discover the driving forces of development. At the same time it must actively participate in the struggle on the side of the revolutionary class and lead the mass struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;My ideals for the upbuilding of new Russia will not be chimerical only if they express the interests of an actually existing class that is compelled by conditions to act in a definite direction. In adopting the viewpoint of the objectivity of the class struggle I do not thereby justify reality; on the contrary, I point to the profound (if at a first glance invisible) sources and forces that exist within that reality and make for its transformation.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en20|[20]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Eclecticism employs methods repugnant to dialectic materialism. Dialectics is opposed to the habit of the eclectics of arbitrarily selecting isolated phases, and their inability to grasp an object or a phenomenon as a whole, in its totality, and in its systematic and inevitable interrelationships and development as they exist in reality. Instead of taking the phenomenon as a whole in all its complexity, but at the same time in its unity and totality, they one-sidedly exaggerate isolated features, component parts and phases. Materialist dialectics demands that the important factor should be singled out, but that at the same time attention should be devoted to those phases that are brought to the forefront by circumstances. It also demands that the phenomenon as a whole should not be lost sight of. Ideas must represent the interrelation of the various phases of phenomena as they exist in reality and emphasise the fundamental contradictions (the “main link,” as Lenin expressed it, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, that which is essential to the practical leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat). As one of many examples of the manner in which Lenin attacked eclecticism, one may mention his criticism of Comrade Bukharin in the discussion on the trade union question.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en21|[21]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; As an example of his ability to single out the “main link,” and of the value of this ability to the proletarian revolution, we may refer to the change to the New Economic Policy effected by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Lenin’s leadership and to Lenin’s explanation and analysis of the circumstances that attended this measure.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en22|[22]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In contradistinction to the eclectic conception, dialectics teaches the doctrine of &#039;&#039;The Concreteness of Truth&#039;&#039;. In his Introduction to the &#039;&#039;Critique of Political Economy&#039;&#039; Marx explained that the concrete is concrete by virtue of the fact that it combines within itself a multiformity of definitions, because it is “unity in multiformity.” The concrete is the whole of nature, the whole of reality, surrounding us: it embraces, combines and coalesces all contradictions. Our knowledge moves towards an ever more complete and more profound reflection of this complete (concrete) reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While realising the limitation and provisional nature of abstract postulates, dialectical thought employs abstractions within certain limits. An abstraction singles out a certain phase, concentrates on it and studies it. In his &#039;&#039;Foreword&#039;&#039; to the first volume of &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;, Marx declares that in the study of social, and particularly economic forms, neither microscope nor chemical reagents are of any use. “The forces of abstraction must replace both.” And in Volume I, Chapter 1 of &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;, in which he analyses the principal phenomena of bourgeois exchange society (commodity, value and money) Marx gives us an example of how to use abstractions and of the limits which they are invaluable to scientific research.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en23|[23]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; (&#039;&#039;Cf&#039;&#039;. Lenin’s article, “Karl Marx,” and his Preface to Marx’s &#039;&#039;Letters to Kugelmann&#039;&#039;.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, when Marx undertook to present a general picture of the laws of capitalist society he did not confine himself to this alone. When investigating reality in all its complexity we must endeavour to create a picture that most faithfully reflects that reality and to discover the concrete truths that reflect the real situation in all its totality and in the unity of its contradictions and opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the notes Lenin made on his reading of Hegel, he declares that “concreteness... is the spirit and essence of dialectics.” And in his popular exposition of the nature of dialectics,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en24|[24]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; he states that one of the fundamentals of dialectical logic is that “there is no abstract truth, truth is concrete.” This means that one must not be content with general arguments: it means that reality demands clear and precise replies to the concrete problems that arise in the course of historical development and the struggle of the working class, and it means further, that if one wants to express an opinion with a full knowledge of the subject, one’s mind must be able to reflect all the relationships and the full complexity of the concrete conditions of the given phenomena and to express the general laws of development of those phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In contrast to the &#039;&#039;dialectic&#039;&#039; conception of development, which reveals the full complexity of a process, we have the puerile and superficial conception of “peaceful” development, “&#039;&#039;evolution&#039;&#039;” without contradictions and without leaps, upheavals and revolution. This conception is impotent in the face of the actual process of development. As a matter of fact a genuine conception of evolution, answering actual reality, must embrace not only gradual changes, but also sudden changes, “leaps,” breaks in continuity. Without such leaps no phenomenon can be explained, for it would be necessary to assume that nothing new can arise, that everything already exists in an imperceptibly minute form liable to subsequent growth. As a matter of fact, however, we continually meet with breaks in continuity and with the appearance of new qualities that formerly did not exist. Changes of form always take place in reality by means of revolution, leaps. In the process of development old forms are negated and new forms take their place which in their turn are negated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The act of birth is an act of revolution. Yet the period during which the child is carried in the womb of the mother is one of slow and gradual change. Social development proceeds by the struggle of classes and by revolution. Dialectics gives a true and profound theory of development; it represents it as pursuing a complex, not a direct path, and as comprising, not merely the accumulation of slow and gradual changes, but also periods of cataclysm, sudden change, leaps, revolutions, reverse movements (as though taking a run for a sudden leap forward), ebb and flow, and so forth; evolution as represented by the bourgeois ideologists is a simple, &#039;&#039;smooth&#039;&#039; and tranquil process. The dialectic is difficult and complex, “cunning” as Hegel expressed it; it is very hard to understand and master. But what would you have, when the world of reality and the process of its development are themselves complex, and not the simple processes the good, respectable citizen would have them be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dying of the old and the birth of the new is a complicated and difficult process. In all development it is the process as a whole that is important, and not merely the result.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is sheer self-deception to believe that fruits may be gathered without long and arduous labour. Those who fear revolution, who shrink from the methods of struggle that reality imposes, are, in practice, supporters of the exploiters and traitors to the cause of emancipating the working class from wage slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1918 Lenin explained the meaning and importance of the class struggle that was taking place at that time as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;When the bourgeoisie, and the government officials, clerks, doctors, engineers, etc., who are accustomed to serve it, resort to extreme measures of resistance, the intellectuals are horrified. They tremble in fear and whine pitifully about the necessity of a return to “compromise.” We, on the contrary, like all true friends of the oppressed classes, only rejoice at the extreme resistance offered by the exploiters; for we expect the proletariat to grow to manhood and to mature for power not by persuasion and pleading, not in the school of dulcet preaching and edifying declamations, but in the school of life, the school of struggle. The proletariat must &#039;&#039;learn&#039;&#039; how to become the ruling class and how to gain complete victory over the bourgeoisie, for it cannot obtain this knowledge ready-made. It must learn by struggle. And it is only serious, bitter and desperate struggle that teaches anything. The more extreme the resistance of the exploiters is the more energetically, firmly, mercilessly and successfully will they be suppressed by the exploited. The more varied the efforts and pains the exploiters take to defend the old, the sooner will the proletariat learn to drive its class enemies out of their last hiding places, tear out the roots of their domination and remove the very soil on which wage slavery, mass poverty, and the profits and the insolence of the moneybags could (and, indeed, had to) spring up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the growing resistance of the bourgeoisie and its hangers-on, the strength of the proletariat and of the peasantry which ally themselves with it also grows. The exploited gain in strength and manhood, they grow and learn to throw off the “old Adam” of wage slavery in proportion as the resistance of their enemies, the exploiters, increases. Victory is bound to be on the side of the exploited, for on their side is life itself, the strength of numbers, the strength of the masses, the strength of the inexhaustible springs of self- sacrifice and of the idealistic and honest reserves of energy and talent of the so-called “common” people, the workers and peasants, awakened and eager to build up a new order. Victory is on their side.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en25|[25]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
These lines describing the dialectics of the class struggle, although written in 1918, still preserve their force. As long as classes and class society exist, the class struggle of the proletariat is essential for the development of society and for its progress to a higher form of organisation, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., communism. Those who fail to understand this, who refuse to understand the necessity for treading the difficult path to communism, who are terrified at the difficulties and anxious to escape them by endeavouring to create peace between the exploited and the exploiters, in practice are enemies of communism; for they are hindering the cause of the exploited masses and diverting them from the only path of escape from an exploiting, slave society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another serious violation of dialectics is the refusal to reckon with actual and inevitable causes, and the intellectual evasion of stages that must be passed through in reality. Those who thus evade and anticipate tend to become isolated from the masses in practical politics and cease to lead the revolutionary struggle of the masses, thereby playing into the hands of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectics demands that the successive stages of transition should be clearly defined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Innumerable instances may be cited of Lenin’s ability to define transitions. Here we will only mention the transition (transformation) of the imperialist war into civil war, a transition of world historical importance, which Lenin not only studied in all its details, but in which he directly took part. The basis of this transition is the development of the proletarian revolution, which, by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat, brings about the transition from capitalism to communism. He calculated the course of this development in all its complexity. In 1916 he wrote that the impending socialist revolution would be&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;an outburst of mass struggle on the part of all the various oppressed and discontented elements. Sections of the petty bourgeoisie and of the backward workers will inevitably participate in it—without such participation &#039;&#039;mass&#039;&#039; struggle is &#039;&#039;impossible&#039;&#039;, without it no revolution is possible—and just as inevitably will they bring into the movement their prejudices, their reactionary phantasies, their weaknesses and errors. But &#039;&#039;objectively&#039;&#039; they will attack &#039;&#039;capitalism&#039;&#039;, and the class conscious vanguard of the revolution, the advanced proletariat expressing this objective truth for a heterogeneous and discordant, motley and outwardly uncohesive mass struggle, will be able to unify and direct it, to gain power, to seize the banks, to expropriate the trusts, which are hated by all (though for different reasons) and introduce other dictatorial measures which will amount to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the victory of socialism, but which will by no means immediately be “purged” of petty bourgeois slag.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en26|[26]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The scientific forecast contained in this passage was subsequently fully corroborated. Lenin’s works written in the period 1917-23 deal with a number of questions connected with the leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat in the transition period from the capitalist exploiting system to a classless, communist society. In a series of articles he analysed the various stages of the revolution, and the various phases of the transition period itself. He picks out the fundamental features of current phenomena and shows whence and whither the transition is proceeding. This is necessary in order that every effort be made to extend and deepen the proletarian revolution and to secure the triumph of its cause.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en27|[27]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Only thanks to its theoretical grasp of the meaning of revolutionary struggle was the leadership of the Party of Lenin able to secure the victory of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the subsequent development of socialist construction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As has been stated, the ability to distinguish the logical sequence of the stages of transition is not only of theoretical importance; it is also of great practical importance in the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat and in determining its strategy and tactics.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en28|[28]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin possessed the faculty of discerning the conflict of contradictions and of opposites as they took place in actual reality. We have already said that dialectic materialism demands the expression and formulation of the actual process of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Genuine (objective) &#039;&#039;dialectics&#039;&#039; is distinguished from &#039;&#039;sophistry&#039;&#039;, which does not study the actual process of development in its totality, but indulges in an arbitrary play of ideas (&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, subjective dialectics, applied arbitrarily and severed from the dialectic movement of the external world).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many examples of sophistry can be found in the war waged by the opportunists against revolutionary Marxism and particularly in the utterances of Kautsky and Plekhanov after they had become traitors to revolutionary Marxism. An examination of the sophisms of the opportunists is given by Lenin in his “Collapse of the Second International,” where he states that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The dialectic method demands a many-sided investigation of a given social phenomenon in its development; it demands that we proceed from the exterior, from the apparent, to the fundamental moving forces, to the development of productive forces and to the class struggle.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en29|[29]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The sophist, however, picks out a postulate which is only correct under certain conditions, instead of undertaking an all-sided investigation, and ignores the most important point, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., that the conditions under which the given postulate is correct soon cease to exist, that the whole environment changes and that, as a result, everything else radically changes. For instance, Marx and Engels spoke of the legitimacy of the wars for national emancipation that took place in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century, &#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, in Prussia in 1813. Kautsky takes these words of Marx and Engels and applies them in a different epoch, namely, to the wars of the twentieth century, which are essentially imperialistic and predatory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It is the method of all the sophists of all times to quote examples obviously relating to basically dissimilar cases.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en30|[30]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The whole article, “Collapse of the Second International,” is a brilliant example of materialist dialectics. The article gives a detailed and precise explanation of the nature of the sophistry of the opportunists. In Lenin’s works we find innumerable examples of how to apply materialist dialectics and how to combat the false, truth-distorting views of the opportunists. We find it in his polemical writings against the Populists—“Who are the Friends of the People and How They Fight against Social-Democracy”; against Struve—“The Economic Content of Populism and the Criticism of it in Mr. Struve’s Book”; against the Economists—&#039;&#039;What Is To Be Done?&#039;&#039; against the Mensheviks, the Liquidationists, the “Otzovists” and against Trotsky—“Two Tactics,” “Notes of a Publicist,” “Debatable Questions,” “Violation of Unity under Pretence of Unity.” We also find it in his philosophical polemic against the Machists—&#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;. The true dialectical method of overcoming the opposition argument is the only correct method, namely, not to brush it aside (that is not difficult), but to make a detailed analysis, a conscientious investigation of the question in all its detail, based on a profound study of the object of dispute as a whole (at the same time not sacrificing the general grasp of the whole subject to details). The result is a profound and all-round conception; things become revealed in the relationships in which they stand to each other in reality. We thus arrive at a concrete truth approximating to a complete and exhaustive comprehension of the subject as a unity of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot understand capitalism unless we grasp the unity of opposites made up of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and unless we realise the inevitability of the transition from capitalism to communism by means of the class struggle of the proletariat. We cannot understand the unity of the opposites: ether and matter, negative and positive electricity, attraction and repulsion.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en31|[31]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; A struggle of opposites, a perpetual succession of forms, transitions from state to state, from form to form—such is the dialectics of the world that surrounds us.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In our description of dialectics so far we have dwelt only on its basic law, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., on the unity of opposites. We did this because this law is the most important of all and the one that has been least dealt with in popular literature. This law, as well as the other laws, “the transformation of quantity into quality” and the “negation of negations” is brilliantly explained in Engels’ &#039;&#039;Anti- Dühring&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en32|[32]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the next chapter we shall have to deal with the dialectical law of the “transformation of quantity into quality.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter4.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
IV&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter4.xhtml_heading1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== THE FIGHT FOR DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that dialectic materialism demands the study of phenomena in their totality (concretely) just as they occur in reality. It also demands of those who desire to be guided by the Marxist theory in the study of the driving forces of development that they take a conscious part in the process of development on the side of the revolutionary class, organising it and directing its forces. Such a philosophy is acceptable only to a revolutionary class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only real revolutionary class in present-day society is the proletariat, the class that “has nothing to lose but its chains.” Contemporary dialectic materialism is the theoretical reflection of the proletarian revolution of the present day.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only by organisation and struggle can the proletariat defend its interests, achieve its aims and throw off the yoke of exploitation. And it must conduct an organised and irreconcilable struggle for its revolutionary philosophy also. The theoretical struggle is an important and inseparable part of the class struggle of the proletariat.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en33|[33]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; We have referred above to the tremendous importance of revolutionary theory. The importance of the fight for dialectic materialism must be particularly emphasised.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two main forces are in constantly increasing conflict in the class struggle of the present day, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Correspondingly, we have the conflict of two systems of state organisation, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, which protects the system of wage slavery and is based on the brutal suppression of the proletarian revolution (at the present time, chiefly by fascist methods) and on the other hand, the dictatorship of the proletariat, which overthrows the bourgeoisie and suppresses the exploiters and the task of which is to raise the level of the toiling masses, to develop socialist production and create a classless society. In modern philosophy we correspondingly find two main tendencies, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., dialectic materialism, the philosophy of the revolutionary proletariat, and philosophical tendencies hostile to revolutionary Marxism, which are anti-materialist and anti-dialectical and which in various forms defend reactionary views, clericalism and so forth, their ultimate aim being to keep the proletariat under the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Philosophy in general is closely connected with politics. In one of his letters to C. Schmidt (October 27, 1890), Engels wrote that “political, legal and moral reflexes... exercise the greatest direct influence upon philosophy,” &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, philosophy is inseparably bound up with politics. The predominance of any particular line in a philosophy has an overwhelming effect on the conduct of those who have come under the influence of that philosophy. That, for instance, explains why the bourgeoisie so zealously support religion and the belief in God, using them in furtherance of their political aims, and why, as the capitalist system more and more approaches its decline, they increasingly support reactionary idealism and clericalism in philosophy. The defence of any particular philosophic view is intimately connected with the class struggle, for philosophy is essentially party philosophy.[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch4_fn1|*]] The direct interests of the bourgeoisie compel it “to perpetuate theoretical confusion” and to strive to keep the proletariat under its intellectual influence. It is in the interests of the proletariat to resist all attempts to distort materialist dialectics, which is its own theoretical weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin himself, during the whole course of his active life, fought bourgeois philosophy and idealism in all their forms and manifestations. He also fought that crude, non-dialectic and mechanical materialism which is absolutely impotent and helpless in face of idealism. In the ’nineties, Lenin fought professorial objectivism, as represented by Struve, the subjectivism of the Populist,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en34|[34]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and neo-Kantism, as advocated by the revisionists headed by Bernstein in Germany and by Struve in Russia (neo-Kantism today is the official philosophy of the German Social- Democrats, or social-fascists). In the beginning of this century Lenin fought the idealist philosophy of Mach and Avenarius and their followers, who in Russia were headed by A. Bogdanov. The philosophical views of Bogdanov were at one time fairly popular in our Party (just as were the views of E. Dühring among the German Social-Democrats in the ’seventies) and it became urgently necessary to fight them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin persistently fought the philosophy of Bogdanov and from 1906 to 1908 he subjected Bogdanov’s idealism and eclecticism to merciless criticism. In his letters to Bogdanov (unfortunately they were not published at the time and have not been found since, and so they have remained unstudied) and in his book &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;, which appeared in 1909, Lenin explains and criticises the essence of Bogdanov’s philosophy. In 1914 Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The sum total of the literary activities of A. Bogdanov may be reduced to an attempt to inoculate the mind of the proletariat with camouflaged idealistic conceptions of the bourgeois philosophers.... For many years A. Bogdanov has been an opponent of the philosophy of Marxism and a supporter of bourgeois idealistic views hostile to the materialism of Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin attached great importance to philosophic questions and carefully studied the literature on philosophy, and on a number of occasions he subjected the reactionary views of the bourgeois philosophers and their various henchmen to devastating criticism.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en35|[35]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the whole course of his active life Lenin studied materialist dialectics, applied it, fought for it and explained the necessity of studying and applying this theoretical weapon of Marxism. See, for example, his pamphlet “Once More on the Trade Unions,” “The Present Situation and the Errors of Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin,” which appeared in 1921, and his article “The Importance of Militant Materialism,” dated March 12, 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the years 1913 to 1916 Lenin collected material apparently with the intention of writing a special work on materialist dialectics. Preoccupation with more urgent matters and the approach of the revolution prevented him from writing this book, but the material he collected is very rich and voluminous. Extracts and notes have been preserved in philosophical notebooks that are of extreme theoretical value.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en36|[36]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such, in general, was the fight that Lenin conducted on behalf of dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Apart from the main enemy of dialectic materialism—its opponents at the present day are represented by the revisionist tendencies in philosophy, against which an irreconcilable war must be waged. Anti-Marxian and anti-Leninist tendencies are to be found in the mechanistic revision of Marxism (Comrade Bukharin, for example, has been guilty of mechanistic errors), which is the chief danger, and in Menshevist idealism (Comrade Deborin and his group).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The mechanistic outlook is hostile to dialectics; it repudiates it, considers it as scholastic, metaphysical, etc. The mechanists regard themselves as materialists; but, in fact, because of their inability to think dialectically, they are impotent in the face of idealism and are themselves forced to abandon the materialist position. As an example, one may cite the inability of the mechanists to deal with the question of quantity and quality. This is one of the questions on which the limitations and shortcomings and the metaphysical nature of the mechanistic philosophy are particularly revealed. We shall therefore dwell on this question in a little more detail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the mechanist conception, the explanation of all phenomena must be sought in the mechanical motion of qualitatively identical and unchanging units (atoms, electrons). All qualitative differences between things are due to the difference in the composition of these units and to the difference in their simple mechanical motion (transplacement in space). Hence, quality does not exist in actual reality but depends entirely on our subjective perceptions. Objectively there exists only the mechanical motion of atoms and their quantitative relations. In the note he made during his study of natural science Engels referred to the tendency to reduce everything to mechanical motion and to regard that as the sole aim of science, and said that “It ignored the specific nature of other forms of motion.” While considering it erroneous to explain everything in mechanical motion alone, Engels nevertheless did not deny that mechanical motion is universal and is associated, in one way or another, with every phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Every higher form of movement is always essentially associated with real mechanical (external or molecular) motion, just as higher forms of motion simultaneously cause other forms of motion: chemical reaction is impossible without changes in temperature and electricity; organic life is impossible without mechanical, molecular, chemical, thermal, electrical and other changes. But the presence of these supplementary forms does not in any given case exhaust the essential nature of the main form. Some day we shall undoubtedly “reduce” thought experimentally to molecular and chemical motion in the brain; but will this exhaust the essential nature of thinking?&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en37|[37]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Engels declares that although there can be no thought unaccompanied by mechanical and chemical processes within the brain, these alone do not explain the specific nature of thinking. Thinking must be regarded as a whole; its internal, subjective side must be considered together with all the qualities and conditions that determine and produce it, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, in its concrete reality, and not merely from the point of view of mechanical motion. This example clearly illustrates the attitude of dialectic materialism to every specific “quality,” particularly to so popular a phenomenon as our processes of thinking. It explains the difference between the conceptions of dialectic materialism and of mechanistic conceptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist dialectician declares that mind cannot be separated from matter; our mind (“spirit”) is a property of specifically organised matter, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the brain of man, who is a member of a specific historically developed society. This qualitatively specific phenomenon actually exists in objective reality. We ourselves are the best proof of this, for we are thinking beings, performing intellectual labour. We do actually think, it does not merely seem to us that we do. Even imagination is, in a manner of speaking, thought. The external world is reflected in the mind of man. Thought is not the object itself reflected in the mind; it is but the reflection of the object. The theory that the external world is “reflected” in the mind is fundamental to the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism. The movement of atoms takes place both in a cobblestone and in a man’s head and both the cobblestone and the head reflect the action of the external world; but it is perfectly obvious that the movement and the reflection are qualitatively different in each case. In the next chapter we shall deal in greater detail with the question of our knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mechanical materialism denies the reality of a specific quality of thinking; it regards it merely as mechanical motion of atoms (electrons) and considers matter and mind as being equal, identical. This materialism, which denies the reality of higher forms of motion and reduces everything to gross and simple mechanical motion, to transplacement, proves to be absolutely helpless before idealism. For idealism also asserts that thought and the objective world are identical.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en38|[38]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Mechanical materialism, therefore, paves the way for idealism of the most subjective kind. It leads to the inevitable conclusion that the only reality is one’s own sensations, for however much theoretical thinking may be denied, this reality cannot be denied. Moreover, mechanical materialism cannot resist the idealistic belief in a creator, in some force external to the world, for the reason that mechanical materialism cannot explain what it is that sets in motion the gigantic mechanism that the world appears to him to be. The world machine of mechanical materialism requires some external impulse, the universal clock requires somebody to wind it up. There is no way out of this dilemma except to acknowledge the existence of God.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, true dialectics acknowledges the reality (actual existence) of qualities as specific forms, as the sum of the properties and peculiarities of things. Within the limits of a definite quality, quantitative changes may occur without affecting that quality, without changing it; but only within definite limits. When quantitative changes go beyond a definite limit they result in a leap and a change in quality; there occurs what Hegel termed the transformation of quantity into quality and which we meet with in the surrounding world of nature and society at every step. Within the limits of from 0° to 100° C. under ordinary terrestrial conditions (atmospheric pressure, etc.) water remains a liquid, preserves this quality. One hundred degrees is the boiling point; water becomes transformed from a liquid into a gas. Zero is freezing point, water becomes transformed into ice, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, into a solid. Thus arise new qualities, formerly non-existent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the appearance of a new quality, new quantitative relations come into effect, so that we may also speak of the transformation of quality into quantity. The high quality of class consciousness, discipline, organisation and firmness of principle of the Communist Party, which at first represented the numerically small, but actually most advanced section of the proletariat, subsequently resulted in the Bolshevik Party’s being able to assume the leadership of the movement of millions and to obtain a following of tens of millions. Thus, in the course of time, quality was transformed into quantity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another example, which strikingly illustrates the transformation of quantity into quality and the rise of new quantitative relations on the basis of the new quality, is the process that is now taking place in the Soviet Union of the mass transition of the middle individual peasant to collectivisation. A new social stratum is being created, new qualities are arising. The middle peasant was the ally of the Soviet state, but the collective farm peasant is now becoming the bulwark of the Soviet state. We would here mention the fact referred to by Comrade Stalin in one of his speeches, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., that the pooling of the farm implements of the individual peasants results in a far greater productivity of labour in the collective farms than the same quantity of implements and forces represent in the individual farms. Collectivisation creates a new quality of social relationships, expressing itself in an enhanced productivity of labour and in better results of labour, both qualitatively and quantitatively.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Examples of the transformation of quantity into quality, and &#039;&#039;vice versa&#039;&#039;, may be cited without end. They demonstrate the correctness of dialectic materialism, which teaches that these two aspects of phenomena are closely associated, become transformed one into the other, but that both are real. The confusion of the mechanists arises from the fact that they deny the objective existence of qualities, that they regard quantitative factors as the only reality and do not see the peculiarities or, as it is scientifically called, the specific nature of phenomena. The inability to use the dialectic method also leads the mechanists to rely on the conclusions of a single science (mechanics) and to ignore the experience of the other sciences, with the result that they regard the conclusions of that science as the sole and ultimate truth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As far back as 1908, Lenin advanced important and fundamental arguments against mechanical materialism. “The recognition of unchanging elements, of the unchanging essence of things is not materialism, but metaphysics, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, anti-dialectic materialism,” he declares in &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;, and goes on to state that dialectic materialism insists on the approximate and relative character of all scientific theories regarding the structure of matter and its properties, on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another, seemingly incompatible state, and so forth. In conclusion, Lenin declares himself to be in complete agreement with Engels’ statement to the effect that from the point of view of dialectic materialism, only one thing is immutable, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the recognition of a world existing outside of us and reflected in our minds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;From the point of view of Engels, only one thing is immutable, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the reflection in the human mind (when there is a human mind) of the external world that exists and develops independently of that mind. For Marx and Engels there is no “immutability,” no other “essence,” no other “absolute substance” in the sense that this concept has been depicted by futile professorial philosophy. The “essence” of things or “substance” are also relative: they represent only the deepening of the human knowledge of objects. Yesterday the deepening of human knowledge took in the atom, today electrons and the ether, but dialectic materialism insists on the temporary, relative and approximate character of all knowledge of nature obtained by the advancing science of man. The electron is as &#039;&#039;inexhaustible&#039;&#039; as the atom, nature is infinite, but it infinitely &#039;&#039;exists&#039;&#039;. And it is this single, categorical and only absolute recognition of the &#039;&#039;existence&#039;&#039; of nature outside of human consciousness and sensation that distinguishes dialectic materialism from relative agnosticism and idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the recognition of this “relativity and approximateness” of the picture of the world created on the basis of our knowledge, which becomes ever deeper, but which is never completed and never exhausts the multiform content of the objective world, dialectic materialism differs from metaphysical, mechanical materialism in its ability to handle flexible concepts and to rest content with results achieved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should here be pointed out that mechanistic materialism is essentially the methodology of the Right deviationists. Theoretically, it expresses and justifies the class interests of the last of the capitalist classes remaining in the Soviet Union and therefore represents the chief danger on the theoretical front.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such anti-dialectical, counter-revolutionary theories, as, for instance, the conception of opposites as being only an external, and not internal, property of phenomena, are, in the conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union, theoretical expressions of the interests of the bourgeoisie. They provide a theoretical justification for the denial of class contradictions and the class war (of the proletariat) and support the advocacy of class peace (between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat). One such theory is the mechanistic theory of equilibrium, of the correlation between a system and its environment. This provides a theoretical basis for the theory that the kulak enterprises will grow into socialism through the medium of the cooperative societies. According to the arguments of the Right theoreticians, the “kulak system” should merge with the socialist “environment” and they claim that there are “scientific” grounds for this. Obviously this is a very useful theory for a class that is being completely liquidated. It justifies and corroborates the policy of the Rights, who consider that the kulak should not be disturbed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, the mechanistic philosophy is essentially bourgeois and anti-proletarian. Its general traits are that it underestimates the value of theory, it fails to understand dialectics and is hostile to it. This theoretical nihilism and failure to understand the necessity for the study of dialectic materialism in practice lead to the surrender of the materialist position to idealism and to a general submission to the ideology of the bourgeoisie. Mechanistic materialism is impotent in the face of idealism; it connives at and assists idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is yet another danger, namely, of falling, in company with the idealists (Hegel), under the influence of abstractions, of losing contact with concrete reality, of confining oneself to dialectic conceptions without connecting those conceptions with the development of the objective world, of not distinguishing categories from the material relationships of the objective world—in a word, the danger of straying onto the path of idealism and of forgetting the requirements of materialism. This danger is threatened by the Menshevistic idealism of the Deborin group, who conceal idealistic and anti-Marxian views under the guise of Marxian phraseology and the pretence of fighting for dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the mechanist theory has no profound social roots in our midst, Menshevistic idealism is nevertheless a real and serious danger. Clothed in the garb of orthodox Marxism, it acts as a channel of bourgeois influences to the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some of the distinguishing features characteristic of certain representatives of this tendency, and which in fact are common to the whole school of Menshevistic idealism are: the severance of theory from practice; the denial of the party nature of philosophy; professorial, contemplative “objectivism”; failure to appreciate Lenin as a materialist and dialectician; failure to appreciate Lenin’s contribution to the development of dialectic materialism; the disguise of non-Marxian and idealistic views by Marxian phraseology; priggish “scholarliness” which is totally unjustified because this ostensible “scholarliness” is not backed by any practical work or by a positive study of the subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idealistic revision of Marxism effected by the Menshevistic idealists is clearly illustrated by the fact that this tendency makes the materialist dialectics of Marx identical with the dialectics of Hegel. Hence, their revisionism is essentially of a Hegelian character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The founders of scientific socialism always emphasised the importance of studying the method of dialectic materialism. They even pointed out how this should be done, namely, by studying the history of philosophy, and in particular, Hegel. In one of his Forewords to &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039; (1878) Engels wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Theoretical thinking is an inborn property only in the form of capability. It must be developed and perfected, and for this no other method has so far been found except the study of the history of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
By studying the history of philosophy we learn the experience of scientific thinking accumulated over a period of more than two thousand years. In his letters to Conrad Schmidt, Engels recommended that in studying the history of philosophy, particular attention should be paid to Hegel. Hegel is extremely difficult to study. Those who undertake to study him require assistance and this assistance is given by Marx, Engels and Lenin (particularly valuable are the latter’s philosophical notebooks to which we referred above).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Menshevistic idealism distorts the views of Marx, Engels and Lenin and regards the logic of Hegel as identical with the logic of Marx. As we have seen, Hegel and Marx approach the question of the relation of mind to existence from fundamentally different points of view.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his article, “Hegel and Dialectical Materialism,” Deborin declares that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Hegelian logic should serve as the starting point for the development or structure of materialist dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And he concludes by saying:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;At any rate, the need for a theory of materialist dialectics has long been felt. Hegelian logic cannot fully satisfy this need, but it should serve as the starting point for materialist dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This school not only regards Hegel’s logic as the starting point, but also considers that its structure requires no radical alteration. Marx put Hegel’s logic “right side up,” &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, he reconstructed it and endowed it with new principles. Deborin, on the contrary, asserts that “in general, the Hegelian structure must be considered as correct even from the materialist point of view.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idealist view of dialectics is further revealed in the conception and application of the laws of dialectics. Take for instance the fundamental law of the unity of opposites. Engels and Lenin consider that this law expresses the very essence, the “kernel” of dialectics. Lenin says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Unity (coincidence, identity, interaction) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory and relative. The conflict of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en39|[39]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And according to Lenin this dialectical law signifies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The recognition (discovery) of contradictory, &#039;&#039;mutually&#039;&#039; exclusive and opposite tendencies in &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; manifestations and processes of nature (&#039;&#039;including&#039;&#039; spirit and society).&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en40|[40]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, according to Lenin (and Lenin expresses the point of view of dialectic materialism), the conflict of opposites is absolute and inherent in all phenomena of the external world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Deborin treats the question entirely differently. In his article, “Marx and Engels” (which, by the way, is thoroughly idealist), he completely adopts the Hegelian idealist scheme: he asserts that at first there are &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; differences, which then pass into contradictions, and the latter pass into opposites. Hence, Deborin admits the possibility of opposites and the conflict of opposites not existing at certain stages. For him, accordingly, contradiction is not the starting point. He thus falls a victim to the very mechanists, against whom he has written so much, who also repudiate the existence of opposites that are inherent in absolutely every form of motion of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we have repeatedly pointed out, one of the fundamental and distinguishing features of the dialectic materialism of Marx is the prominence it gives to the necessity for practical revolutionary activity. Marx criticised the contemplative character of the materialists that preceded him. Deborin, on the other hand, in his Foreword to the &#039;&#039;Works of Hegel&#039;&#039;, does not say a word about this feature of dialectic materialism, but, on the contrary, emphasises its passive and contemplative character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The task of the dialectic... method is not to introduce anything of its own into an object, but to observe the process of its development. In this sense the dialectic method is indeed the only real scientific and objective method. The dialectic method merely reproduces the process of development of an object.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
During the whole course of this long article the author says not a single word about the most important component part of materialist dialectics, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., practical revolutionary work. That is not a mere accident.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most obvious features of Menshevik idealism, which reveals its anti-proletarian character, is the severance of theory from practice. In a speech delivered in 1920 to the Third All-Russian Congress of the Russian Young Communist League, Lenin declared:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Without work and without struggle, book knowledge of Communism derived from communist pamphlets and books is worth exactly nothing at all, since it but perpetuates the old severance of theory from practice, which was the most objectionable feature of the old bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The separation of theory from practice is characteristic of Menshevik idealism. The representatives of this school occupied themselves with philosophy completely isolated from the tasks of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and from the international working class movement. They separated philosophy from politics, instead of placing it at the service of the proletarian party. It is no mere accident that practically all the writers of this school were unwilling to participate in the fight against Trotskyism and to expose the methodological errors of the factionalists who were opposing the general line of the Party. By divorcing philosophy from proletarian Marxism and Leninist politics, Menshevistic idealism in practice places its service at the disposal of bourgeois politics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The whole standpoint of Menshevistic idealism was bound to lead to the separation of theory from practice. This was clearly revealed in all the activities of the representatives of this school. The bulk of their literature consists of “writing about other people’s writing.”[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch4_fn2|*]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not a single problem of historical materialism is treated by the Menshevistic idealists from the standpoint of the new experiences of the revolutionary period. They have ignored Lenin’s instructions as to how dialectics should be studied. In his article, “The Significance of Militant Materialism,” Lenin states that dialectics must be studied from the materialist point of view, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, one must study the dialectics that “Marx applied practically in his &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;” and in his historical and political works, and, also, that dialectics must be studied on the basis of the examples of dialectics “in the sphere of economic and political relations which modern history, particularly the present imperialist war and the revolution, provide in great abundance.” The representatives of Menshevik idealism were incapable of making such a study. The whole line they adopted prevented them from doing so; prevented them from understanding Lenin as a philosopher and from appreciating and fulfilling his instructions. They were hampered by their idealistic, abstract and formal point of view and their class position as petty-bourgeois radicals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a number of writings, notes and utterances, Lenin declared that abstractness, the severance of theory from reality, the use of schemes and formalism, were contrary to materialist dialectics. For instance in the notes he wrote on the margins of his copy of Bukharin’s &#039;&#039;Economics of the Transition Period&#039;&#039;, opposite the passage in which Bukharin says that in the pre-war period “the so-called ‘national state’ was already a &#039;&#039;pure&#039;&#039; (Lenin’s italics) fiction,” Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Not a &#039;&#039;pure fiction&#039;&#039;, but an impure form. The violation of “dialectical materialism” consists in the logical (not material) &#039;&#039;leap&#039;&#039; over &#039;&#039;several&#039;&#039; concrete stages.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en41|[41]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Opposite the passage in which Bukharin speaks of “dialectic negation,” but fails to give a concrete explanation of the nature of negation and to support the formula by facts, Lenin makes the note:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;the author abuses &#039;&#039;the phrase&#039;&#039; “dialectic negation”: it must not be used without &#039;&#039;first&#039;&#039; demonstrating it by facts, it must be used &#039;&#039;cautiously&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en42|[42]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In his notebook of excerpts, &#039;&#039;Marxism on the State&#039;&#039;, Lenin copied out the following critical remark directed by Engels against the opportunists. Engels stated that the opportunists&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;give prominence to generalised and abstract political questions, thereby concealing the immediate concrete problems, which automatically arise at the first outbreak of events, and at the first political crisis. The only thing that can result from this is that at the critical moment the Party will suddenly find itself impotent and that uncertainty and lack of unity will reign within the Party on important questions, owing to the fact that these questions &#039;&#039;were never discussed&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Against this passage Lenin makes the marginal note:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Prominence to the abstract, the concrete obscured!! Excellent! That is the main point!&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en43|[43]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Many similar notes could be cited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin, therefore, condemns the application of ready-made schemes, the inability, or lack of desire, to formulate theoretically the actual situation, with all its contradictions and complexity, and the inability to think concretely. Lenin untiringly exposed and condemned every departure from this fundamental demand of dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not possible here to give a complete analysis of the whole system of false views and misguided utterances of the Menshevistic idealists. Much space would be required for a historical, not dogmatic, approach to the study of the theory of knowledge. In studying the problems of knowledge, the whole of human experience must be taken into account; it must be made sure that the theory of knowledge shall be a really materialistic one; that there shall be no rupture with the cognised object and finally, that the materialist path shall be selected, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., from things to concepts, and not from concepts to things. The fact that dialectics is made identical with the theory of knowledge is a guarantee against the creation of some special sphere isolated from concrete reality, a system of abstractions and eternal categories &#039;&#039;a la&#039;&#039; Hegel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As an instance of the erroneousness of such methods, Marx, in a letter to Annenkov, cites the doctrinaires, who on the eve of the Great French Revolution endeavoured to preserve the throne, the Chamber of Deputies and the Upper Chamber as essential components of social life and as eternal categories. Marx says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;...In the eighteenth century, a number of mediocre minds were busy finding the true formula which would bring the social order, king, nobility, parliament, etc., into equilibrium, and they woke up one morning to find that there was in fact no longer any king, nobility or parliament. The true equilibrium in this antagonism was the overthrow of all the social conditions which served as a basis for these feudal existences and their antagonisms.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
“Mediocre minds” do not link up their knowledge with constantly changing material and objective reality, or do so only in words.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that dialectics, which demands concrete thinking and a grasp of objective reality as one whole, is the theory of knowledge, serves as a guarantee that those who are guided by dialectics will not find themselves in the unpleasant and ludicrous position in which the doctrinaires found themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Revolutionary Marxism, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, dialectic materialism, teaches us to approach questions of knowledge dialectically, to study the transition from not knowing to knowing. Dialectics is a property of human knowledge, since our knowledge reflects the dialectic motion of the objective world (nature and society). Dialectic materialism does not regard the results of knowledge as final; at the same time, however, it does not doubt the vitality, fertility, integrity and objectivity of human knowledge, and of its ability to overcome all obstacles in the process of social development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The development of human thought is based on the development of social productive labour. Lenin declared that “the continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the &#039;&#039;dialectic&#039;&#039; study of the history of human thought, science, and technology.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en44|[44]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is on this basis that we must study the unity of opposites, &#039;&#039;viz&#039;&#039;., the theory and practice of the actual relations existing in the surrounding world and of the abstract conceptions that arise in the human brain as a reflection of these actual relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We must be guided by Leninism in the study of materialist dialectics and combat the mechanistic repudiation of dialectics and its mutilation at the hands of the idealistic and Menshevistic idealists. We must expose the errors of both these schools and correct them. Theory must be placed at the service of the proletarian revolution and adapted to the practical class struggle. Philosophy must be completely party philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In class society, and as long as classes exist, Marxism and Leninism can exist and develop only by combating all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois tendencies, influences and ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter5.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
V&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter5.xhtml_heading1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== THE DIALECTICS OF NATURE AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we have said, materialist dialectics is an invaluable instrument for the study of the surrounding world, nature and human society. Marx and Engels were keenly interested in every sphere of natural science. Engels did a great deal in this sphere. He set forth the conclusions drawn from his studies in Part I of &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;. In addition, he wrote a large work on &#039;&#039;The Dialectics of Nature&#039;&#039;, which unfortunately he never succeeded in publishing (the manuscript however was preserved and has been published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute). The conclusion Engels arrived at, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, that development in nature takes place in accordance with dialectical, and not metaphysical laws, is strikingly borne out by modern science. This has been pointed out by Lenin, who, after Engels, was the first of the Marxian theoreticians to study one of the most important branches of modern science, namely, physics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science has made considerable strides since Engels pursued his studies in the ’seventies. Lenin examined the new material from the standpoint of a materialist dialectician. He explained the crisis in modern physics from the Marxian standpoint and indicated the path that must be pursued by scientific research.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his criticism of modern theory he attacks the clericalism (idealism) that refuses to seek a scientific explanation of phenomena and which evades recognition of what is actually proceeding in nature, thus leading to stagnation of thought and intellectual reaction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we have stated, in connection with the disputes that arose among Marxian writers after the 1905 Revolution, Lenin carefully worked out the dialectic materialist theory of knowledge. He showed that there were two lines of philosophy—idealism and materialism—on every one of the questions in dispute: matter and experience, sensation and knowledge, space and time, cause and effect, absolute and relative truth, etc. Idealism considers that a spiritual principle (&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, God) lies at the basis of everything and is identical, or akin to our mind (which latter the idealists sever from its actual contact with matter). Lenin analyses the philosophy of the Englishman, Bishop Berkeley, as typical of the idealist philosophy.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en45|[45]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Materialism considers it wrong to place spirit at the base of all phenomena. It regards matter as the basis of everything and asserts that matter exists independently, and outside of our mind. The external material world reacts on our mind, is reflected in it and determines it. Matter is the primary, the fundamental; mind is secondary and derivative. Mind is inseparably associated with matter; it is a property of matter organised in a special way, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, our brain, and is a product of the latter’s activity. Mind reflects the external world. There can be no mind or thought without brain. The idealists, on the other hand, sever thought from the brain and consider that spirit is the beginning of all things. The idealists turn the whole course of things upside down. In their opinion matter is derived from spirit. Materialism declares that there is no “spirit world,” there is no “transcendental” world; the world is unitary, and its unity lies, as Engels says, in its materialness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Through our sense organs we receive impressions of the material world existing outside of us (human society and nature). These sense perceptions provide the material for our knowledge. The world is reflected in our mind because we ourselves are part of that world. Such is the conception of knowledge proclaimed by dialectic materialism. A material object and our minds comprise the unity of opposites, with which we are familiar. We must not, as idealists like Berkeley do, confuse the external world with our consciousness of the external world and make them identical. External objects and our consciousness of them are opposites, not identical things. But the opposite is not absolute: the external world and our consciousness are not isolated from each other. The unity we have here is unity in the sense that without a material world and without the brain of man, consciousness of the world cannot exist. It is unity also in the sense that our consciousness, in general, faithfully reflects the objective world. This is very well explained by Lenin in the sections on “Absolute and Relative Truth” and “The Criterion of Practice in the Theory of Knowledge” in Chap. II of his philosophical work &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en46|[46]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essence of the explanation given by Engels and Lenin is that, while we must realise that at any given stage of its development our knowledge is relative, conditional and approximate, nevertheless, in every scientific theory, in spite of its shortcomings, we must discern the grain of objective truth, the fragment that correctly reflects the surrounding world. We must learn how to assimilate and develop this truth, although our knowledge is historical and transitory. In the works of Hegel there is much that is mystical, idealistic and clericalist, but they contain the fundamentals of the dialectical method. We must be able to select that which is true and the product of a brilliant mind from that which is untrue, fantastic and antiquated. That is what the great masters of materialist dialectics, Marx, Engels and Lenin, did.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our knowledge contains an absolute (unconditional and unquestionable) truth, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, that it reflects the external world. The truth of our knowledge is tested and confirmed by practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither the old metaphysical materialists nor Hegel were able properly to apply the dialectical method to the process of development of our knowledge. This was done by Marx and Engels, and subsequently by Lenin. In one of his philosophic notebooks Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The approach of the mind (of man) to a particular thing, the taking of a cast of it (in other words, an impression) is not a simple, direct act; a lifeless mirror reflection, but a complex, twofold and zig-zag act, which harbours the possibility that the phantasy may entirely fly away from reality; what is more, it harbours the possibility that the abstract conception, the idea, may be transformed (imperceptibly and unwittingly on the part of man) into phantasy (and in the long run, into God). For even the simplest generalisation and the most elementary general idea is a fragment of phantasy.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en47|[47]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The creation of phantasies (&#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, regarding the power of the dead, demons, god, disincarnate powers, etc.) is due to various complex causes, chief of which is the dependence of man on circumstances which enslave him, such as natural and social forces, and which appear to him to be external and alien. This also explains the various religions and faiths.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en48|[48]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Properly applied to our knowledge, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, if it is realised that the mind of man is determined by the development of the material world which proceeds independently of the mind, and of which thinking man is himself a part, materialist dialectics is the best weapon against clericalism, against stultification of thought and against the substitution of the living work of the mind by lifeless abstractions that end in intellectual stagnation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The old theory of matter was that it consisted of indivisible and simple particles—atoms. Recent discoveries have shown that the atoms are not simple, but extremely complex. Atoms have been divided into still more minute particles, electrons.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en49|[49]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Science has revealed that the laws of motion of these particles differ from the laws governing the incomparably slower motion of large masses of matter. Not being acquainted with dialectic materialism, scientists began to draw the conclusion that with the disappearance of the atom, matter also disappears, that our knowledge is impotent and that we are not destined to know the real world; in other words, they began to adopt the standpoint of idealism and agnosticism. (“We are not fated to know!”)&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en50|[50]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin, however, showed that the new discoveries, while compelling us to reject the old theories of science, deepen our knowledge of matter and confirm the correctness of dialectic materialism, which teaches us to regard scientific truths not as unshakable dogmas, but as approximately true reflections of objective processes; reflections that are bound to be corrected and perfected by every new development of science. The new discoveries do not shake the basic standpoint, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, that which we know as matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chapter Five of Lenin’s &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039;, entitled “The Latest Revolution in Natural Science and Philosophic Idealism,” shows that the recent discoveries of physics serve as striking corroborations of dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to his genius for mastering materialist dialectics, Lenin was able to contribute something also to the study of natural phenomena. He gave precise indications of the nature of the errors of the natural scientists—who are materialists rather by instinct—and showed wherein they deviated from materialism because of their lack of knowledge of dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin criticised their theory dialectically, separating that which was true and correcting that which was untrue, and showed how research should be conducted. As an example we cite his analysis of the address of the English physicist, A. W. Rücker,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en51|[51]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; who represented “the instinctive materialist point of view” and whose errors were due to his ignorance of dialectic materialism. Or take his criticism of the works of Duhem and Stallo&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en52|[52]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; in which, for instance, he points out where Duhem comes close to dialectic materialism and wherein lies his weakness, and also shows how he descends to a reactionary philosophy because of his inability to raise himself from metaphysical materialism to dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the subject of the dialectics of nature, Engels in 1885 wrote in his Foreword to the second edition of &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It is possible to reach this standpoint because the accumulating facts of natural science compel us to do so.... Natural science has now advanced so far that it can no longer escape the dialectical synthesis. But it will make this process easier for itself if it does not lose sight of the fact that the results in which its experiences are summarised are ideas; but that the art of working with ideas is not inborn and also is not given with ordinary everyday consciousness, but requires real thought, and that this thought similarly has a long empirical history, not more and not less than empirical natural science. Only by learning to assimilate results of the development of philosophy during the past two and a half thousand years will it be able to rid itself on the one hand, of any isolated natural philosophy standing apart from it, outside it and above it and, on the other hand, also of its own limited method of thought, which was its inheritance from English empiricism.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We conceive nature as the sum total of all bodies (from the stars to the atoms, electrons and the ether), which are in a constant state of interaction and motion, constantly changing their forms and qualities and passing from one into the other. It is impossible to understand their movement and the transformation of one form into another (&#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, inorganic matter into organic matter) without using the dialectic method.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, it is necessary to grasp the difference between the philosophic and the physical conception of matter. It is absolutely correct to recognise the existence of matter and the objective world, independently and outside of our mind. The external world reacts on our senses and is reflected in our mind. The recognition of the objective reality of the external world is an absolute truth, confirmed every minute by fact and by practice. This is the foundation of the materialist philosophy. The material world is essentially cognisable, since the “cognising apparatus,” if we may so express ourselves, does not exist outside of the world, but is a part of the world. This “cognising apparatus,” &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, thinking people and human society, is the fruit of a long development. The existence and development of humanity is the best proof of its strength and vitality, and also of the strength and vitality of the human mind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Theories of physics, as well as other scientific theories, are but relative truths. They are ever approaching closer to an understanding of the objective world, for instance, of the physical structure of matter; their knowledge becomes progressively deeper; but they can never result in final and exhaustive knowledge, in ultimate truth. In his &#039;&#039;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&#039;&#039; (p. 152) Lenin says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The scientific doctrine of the structure of substance, the chemical composition of food, and the electron may become antiquated with time; but the truth that man is unable to subsist on thoughts and beget children by platonic love alone can never become antiquated!&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter6.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
VI&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter6.xhtml_heading1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== THE DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The development of society also proceeds by contradiction. Here, too, materialist dialectics is essential not only for the study of social phenomena, but also in order to lead the struggle of the proletariat and to guide historical activity. History is made by men. But hitherto there could be no conscious guidance of the development of history. Mankind can become the master of its development only after the complete triumph of communism. Engels in &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039; says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The seizure of the means of production by society puts an end to commodity production, and therewith to the domination of the product over the producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by conscious organisation on a planned basis. The struggle for individual existence comes to an end. And at this point, in a certain sense, man finally cuts himself off from the animal world, leaves the conditions of animal existence behind him and enters conditions which are really human. The conditions of existence forming man’s environment, which up to now have dominated man, at this point pass under the dominion and control of man, who now for the first time becomes the real conscious master of nature, because and in so far as he has become master of his own social organisation. The laws of his own social activity, which have hitherto confronted him as external, dominating laws of nature, will then be consciously applied by man with complete understanding, and hence will be dominated by man.... It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly, and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity’s leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, it must not be thought that this “leap” will take place in a single instant; for it represents a “change which marks a turning point in world history,” a transition to a new type of society. Such leaps, as Marx, Engels and Lenin pointed out, may extend over ten or more years.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en53|[53]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; In the Soviet Union the “leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom” is being accomplished by the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the Party of Lenin and armed with revolutionary theory. The advantages of planning in economic life and the rapidity of development of socialist economy are already apparent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the sphere of social development, the law of the unity of opposites and of motion by contradiction manifests itself in the productive activities of society and in the class struggle. In modern society, large-scale production predominates and the fundamental contradiction is between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. As has been stated, Marx, Engels and Lenin attached the greatest significance to the struggle of the proletariat. They considered it their prime duty to lead the class struggle of the proletariat, and to subordinate everything to its interests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Applying dialectic materialism to the study of society, Marx discovered that the basis of social development is the development of production. Material production is the foundation of social life because on it depends man’s very existence. In order to exist men must eat, drink, clothe themselves, and provide themselves with dwellings; only then can they occupy themselves with politics, science, art and so forth (Engels). Labour is required to create the material things necessary for men’s existence. The productive activities of human society consist in extracting things from nature, in working them up and in adapting them to the needs of man. Human labour, which is essential to man’s existence, exercises decisive influence on the whole structure of human society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The application of dialectic materialism to the history of human society is very clearly illustrated in Marx’s theory of the class struggle. Marx showed that development in class society arises out of the class struggle, which attains maximum intensity during the period of revolution. Revolution is the result of the contradictions created between the productive forces of human society and the productive relations within which they operate and develop.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en54|[54]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Under capitalism the contradiction between the old productive relations and the productive forces that have outgrown and can no longer develop freely within these relations, manifests itself in the struggle of the revolutionary class, the proletariat, against the exploiting class, the bourgeoisie. Thus, the struggles of the revolutionary class advance the development of society. Marx called the class struggle “the battles of developing production.” (Letter to Weydemeyer, March 5, 1852.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx was not the first to discover the existence of classes and the class war, as he himself states in the letter to his friend Weydemeyer. But Marx was the first to give an exhaustive explanation of the basis of class divisions (namely, a definite stage of development of production). He was the first to give a complete explanation of the meaning and significance of the struggle of the modern proletariat and the part it plays. He pointed out how and under what conditions the abolition of classes and the transition to a classless society would be accomplished with the help of a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx was the first to discover the general law of social development and thereby transformed socialism from utopian to scientific.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In an article written in 1899 Lenin stated that Marx’s theory&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;transformed socialism from utopian to scientific; it laid firm foundations for the science and indicated the path of its further development and the elaboration of its parts. It has exposed the essential nature of modern capitalist economy by explaining how the hiring of workers and the purchase of labour power conceals the enslavement of millions of propertyless people by a handful of capitalists and owners of land, factories, mines, etc. It has shown how the whole development of modern capitalism tends to the squeezing out of small-scale production by large-scale production and creates conditions that render a socialist order of society both possible and essential. Beneath the layer of ingrained customs, political intrigues, astute laws and subtle doctrines it has taught us to discern the class war, the struggle between the various propertied classes and the propertyless masses and the proletariat that leads them. It has revealed the real task of a revolutionary socialist party, namely, not to invent plans for the reconstruction of society, not to plead with the capitalists and their hangers-on to improve the condition of the workers, not to plot conspiracies, but to organise the class struggle of the proletariat and to lead that struggle, the ultimate aim of which is to win political power for the proletariat and to organise socialist society.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en55|[55]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It would be a serious error to imagine that social production and social development takes place, like natural phenomena (change of seasons, the breaking of the ice on the river, eclipse of the sun, etc.) independently of the conscious efforts of men. History is made of men, by their productive activities, by their mass actions and by their class struggles. Men themselves build up their material and spiritual culture, using the foundations inherited from preceding generations. Historical development pursues an extremely complex path. Conflict arises between the productive forces of men and productive relations that no longer correspond to these productive forces. Once society has broken up into classes, development proceeds by the conflicts of those classes expressed in various forms: ideologically (in the sphere of philosophy), scientifically, politically, etc., as well as in purely physical forms—wars between classes and between nations. The inherent contradictions of social development are solved “by the practical and violent action of the masses.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en56|[56]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Order” and oppression in class society are maintained by violence, by the organised state power of the exploiters. This “order” can be destroyed and replaced by a new kind of order only with the aid of the organised violence of the revolutionary class. In our times this must take the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, established by revolution with the aim of creating a classless communist society.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en57|[57]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Marx and Lenin, revolutions are the most vital and decisive factors in the history of human society. “Revolutions are the locomotives of history,” Marx said. This aphorism was quoted by Lenin in his pamphlet, &#039;&#039;Two Tactics of the Social-Democrats in the Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, in which he also referred to revolution as “the festival of the oppressed and exploited.” He wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;At no other time are the masses of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order as during the time of revolution.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en58|[58]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In another article he writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Marxism differs from all other socialist theories by its admirable combination of sober scientific analysis of objective conditions and the objective process of evolution with the most emphatic recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy, the revolutionary creative power and the revolutionary initiative of the masses, as well as, of course, of individuals, groups, organisations and parties that are able to establish contact with the masses.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en59|[59]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This leads us to an extremely important phase of dialectic materialism, namely, its insistence on the importance of active revolutionary work. History is made by men. Historical science studies how this is done, what class forces participate in historical actions and how historical development is brought about. But mere study is not enough. We must not only study history, but make history; the “making” of history is much more important and much more interesting than studying it (although that, of course, is essential). Both Marx and Lenin considered that one of the defects of the old materialism was its inability “to understand the conditions and appreciate the significance of practical revolutionary activity,” without which materialism, in their opinion, was incomplete, one-sided and inanimate.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Revolutionary Marxism does not suffer from this defect. In all his activities Lenin (like Marx) was a prominent exponent of revolutionary materialist dialectics and a theoretician of the proletariat, who fully combined “sober, scientific analysis of the objective state of affairs” with “revolutionary initiative and energy.” He was a leader of the proletarian revolution, a strategist and tactician of the class struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reader will find a brilliant appreciation and description of the works of Marx and Engels and their activities from this point of view in the Preface to the Russian translation of Marx’s &#039;&#039;Letters to Kugelmann&#039;&#039;, and in the Introduction to the Russian translation of &#039;&#039;The Letters of J. P. Becker, J. Dietzgen, F. Engels, K. Marx and Others to F. A. Sorge and Others&#039;&#039;. This side of Lenin’s activities should be carefully studied. It is precisely this factor that makes Marxism a real revolutionary theory, for, as Lenin frequently emphasised, unless revolutionary theory is combined with revolutionary practice it is not Marxism, but opportunism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The works of Lenin were inspired by revolutionary policy and were closely associated with the class struggle of the proletariat. The most complete summary of the basic principles of the strategy and tactics of Leninism will be found in the pamphlet, &#039;&#039;“Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder&#039;&#039;, while valuable indications will be found in &#039;&#039;What Is To Be Done?&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Two Tactics&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;State and Revolution&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To give a complete description of the great and complex work Lenin performed in leading the class struggle of the proletariat is a tremendous task that still remains to be done. Many phases of Lenin’s work as a leader and theoretician of the proletariat have still been barely studied (&#039;&#039;e.g.&#039;&#039;, his part in the leadership of the Civil War and his work in organising and directing the dictatorship of the proletariat; even his significance as the leader and theoretician of the Party has not yet been fully brought out and properly appreciated). This cannot be done in a single article, it would require a whole volume, or several volumes. In this article we can only deal with some of the most important postulates of the revolutionary tactics of Leninism and show how tremendously important the consistent and firm Leninist Party leadership, based upon a strictly scientific analysis of objective conditions, was for the success of the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should first be noted that Leninism, while faithfully following the Marxian conception of the Party and of its role as the &#039;&#039;vanguard of the working class&#039;&#039;, developed this conception still further on the basis of the new experience gained in the revolutionary struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to lead the class struggle of the proletariat, an organisation of its vanguard is necessary in the shape of a Communist Party, which “acts as a driving force,” which “comprehends the conditions, course and general results of the working-class movement,” which can champion those general interests of the movement as a whole at every stage of the struggle and which can estimate the movement “not only from the point of view of the past, but also from the point of view of the future.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en60|[60]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Party must be trained and steeled in consistency of principles by prolonged participation in the struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Apparently—Engels wrote to Bernstein in 1882—a workers’ party in any large country can develop only by internal conflict, which indeed is, in general, consistent with the dialectic laws of development. The German party became what it is in the struggle of the Eisenachers against the Lassalians, a struggle in which the fight itself was the most important factor. Infantile disorders cannot be cured by moral precepts; under present conditions these disorders have to be gone through once.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, does not mean that various shades of opinion are always to be permitted in the Party. The strength of the Party lies in its unity, a unity based upon consistency of programme and tactics. This unity is achieved by fighting every deviation from revolutionary Marxism: Right opportunism, which minimises the significance of the class struggle and strives to bring the proletariat under bourgeois influence and leadership (as instanced by Menshevism), and the virtual rejection of the class struggle which masquerades under Leftist slogans and phrases (instances of which were the “Left” Liquidators, the Otzovists, the Ultimatumists and the &#039;&#039;Vperyod-ists&#039;&#039; during the years of reaction 1908-10 and Trotskyism during the years 1924-26). Extremely important also is the fight against the conciliators, who act as a shield for opportunism: while verbally recognising the correctness of revolutionary Marxism, in practice the conciliators make no attempt to combat distortions of revolutionary Marxism. Conciliationism is therefore an extremely dangerous form of opportunism. Under present conditions the chief danger is Right opportunism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin always insisted on the necessity of waging a consistent and merciless fight against all forms of opportunism and he himself showed us how this fight should be conducted. He persistently fought against Right opportunism.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en61|[61]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Yet at the same time he conducted war on the “Left” doctrinarism, which is particularly important for the purpose of winning the masses; for the masses are inexperienced, unorganised, have not yet sufficiently abandoned petty-bourgeois prejudices, and when driven to desperation and rage by the hopelessness of their position are, as a rule, greatly influenced by anarchist phrases, and “Left” demagogy (which is the reverse side of Right opportunism, “a punishment for its sins,” as Lenin expressed it). A general review of the Party’s fight for Bolshevism on two fronts is given by Lenin in his pamphlet, &#039;&#039;“Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder&#039;&#039;, in which he writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;While the first historical task (&#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, that of winning over the class conscious vanguard of the proletariat to the side of the Soviet power and the dictatorship of the working class) could not be accomplished without a complete ideological and political victory over opportunism and social-chauvinism, the second task, which now becomes the immediate task, and which is to lead the &#039;&#039;masses&#039;&#039; to the new position that will assure the victory of the vanguard in the revolution, this immediate task cannot be accomplished without the liquidation of Left doctrinarism, without completely overcoming and getting rid of its mistakes.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
What are the distinguishing features of the Marxist-Leninist tactics? As we have pointed out, Marxist-Leninist theory, policy and tactics are based on &#039;&#039;contact with the masses&#039;&#039;, on the ability to guide the struggle of the masses toward communism, and to increase the conscious purpose and organisation of the masses. The Communist Party lends consciousness, organisation and invincibility to the mass movement. It draws its ideas from the experience of the revolutionary mass struggle in all countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin said that the fundamental law of all great revolutions was the experience gained by the masses. He frequently referred to the great importance that Marx attached to “the historical initiative of the masses.” What Marx and Engels criticised most in English and American socialism was exactly this isolation from the working-class movement.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en62|[62]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The victory of the revolution can be assured only if the initiative and energy of the masses is widely developed and if their instinctive struggle is given conscious leadership and organisation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Success of revolutionary tactics can be assured if the profound sympathy of the masses is gained. This sympathy must be gained by prolonged and stubborn struggle, both before the proletariat gains power and after it has set up its dictatorship.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The proletarian revolution is impossible unless the vast majority of the toilers sympathise with and support their vanguard—the proletariat. This sympathy, however, is not given immediately and is not decided by vote, but must be &#039;&#039;won&#039;&#039; in the process of long, arduous and bitter class struggle. The class struggle of the proletariat to win the sympathy and support of the majority of the toilers does not end with the conquest of political power by the proletariat. The struggle &#039;&#039;continues&#039;&#039; after the conquest of power but in &#039;&#039;other forms&#039;&#039;. In the Russian revolution circumstances proved to be exceptionally favourable for the proletariat (its struggle for dictatorship), for the proletarian revolution took place at a time when the whole people was armed and when the whole of the peasantry was anxious for the overthrow of the power of the landlords and was outraged by the “Kautskyian” policy of the social-traitors, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But even in Russia, where at the moment of the proletarian revolution circumstances proved to be exceptionally favourable, where remarkable unity between the whole proletariat, the whole army and the whole of the peasantry was immediately established, even in Russia the struggle of the proletariat for the sympathy and support of the majority of the toilers took months and years after it had set up its dictatorship.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en63|[63]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The long and persistent fight for the sympathy of the masses must be carried on systematically. The sympathy of the masses must be won by the tactical methods and by the aims and purposes for which the Communist Party is striving.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its tactical leadership of the revolutionary struggle the proletariat must be guided by two basic postulates. &#039;&#039;First&#039;&#039;, Leninism does not prescribe any particular form of struggle to the proletarian movement, but strives to master all forms, for example: demonstrations, the parliamentary struggle, the revolutionary use of parliament when the situation dictates it, as well as higher forms of struggle, &#039;&#039;viz.&#039;&#039;, armed insurrection, civil war and the dictatorship of the proletariat. &#039;&#039;Secondly&#039;&#039;, Leninism adopts a historical approach to the question as to what particular form of struggle is to be selected at any moment, taking into account the concrete circumstance of the given situation. Maximum flexibility must be displayed in the selection of means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In an article entitled “Guerilla Warfare,” written in September, 1906, Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Marxism is distinguished from all primitive forms of socialism by the fact that it does not impose on the movement any one particular form of struggle. It admits the most varied forms of struggle. Moreover, it does not “invent” them, but only generalises, organises and lends conscious form to the methods of struggle practiced by the revolutionary classes and which arise spontaneously in the course of the movement itself. Uncompromisingly hostile to all abstract formulas and doctrinaire recipes, Marxism demands that the most careful attention be paid to the mass struggle of the moment, which, as the movement develops, as the consciousness of the masses grows and the economic and political crisis becomes increasingly acute, creates ever new and varied methods of defence and attack. Marxism, therefore, absolutely does not reject any form of struggle. Marxism cannot confine itself to the forms of struggle that are practiced and are possible at the given moment, but recognises the &#039;&#039;inevitable&#039;&#039; appearance of new forms of struggle, that are still unknown to those who are taking part in the struggle at the given period and which arrive with the change in circumstances. If one may so express it, Marxism learns from the practice of the masses and does not in the least claim to teach the masses the “systematic” forms of struggle, invented in the study.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en64|[64]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In &#039;&#039;“Left-Wing” Communism&#039;&#039;, also, Lenin pointed to the necessity of learning and mastering every form of struggle and of being able to apply every one of them with equal facility, so as to be prepared for the changes of circumstances that occur so rapidly and unexpectedly during a period of revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;History generally, and the history of revolutions in particular—writes Lenin—is always richer in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively and “subtle” than some of the best parties and some of the most class conscious vanguards of the most advanced class imagine. This is understandable because the best vanguards express the class consciousness, the will, the passion, the phantasy of tens of thousands, while the revolution is made at the moment of its climax and the exertion of &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; human capabilities by the class consciousness, the will, the passion, and the phantasy of tens of millions who are urged on by the very acutest class struggle. From this follow two very important practical conclusions: first, that the revolutionary class in order to fulfil its task must be able to master &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; forms or sides of social activity without exception (and complete after the capture of political power, sometimes with great risk and amidst very great dangers, what they did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be ready to pass from one form to another in the quickest and most unexpected manner.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en65|[65]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Communist Party must absolutely master every form of struggle: for the struggle of the proletariat and of the toiling masses will become a real class struggle and will lead to the goal of creating a communist society only when the organising and guiding influence of the vanguard that is consciously striving toward communism will be guaranteed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the article, “Guerilla Warfare,” Lenin pointed out that all forms of struggle may become distorted if they are not applied in a certain relationship one to another under the leadership of the Communist Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It is said that guerilla warfare reduces the class conscious proletariat to the level of degraded drunkards and tramps. That is true. But this only proves that the Party of the proletariat can never regard partisan warfare as the only, or even the principal method of struggle, and that this method must be subordinated and properly co-ordinated with the main methods of struggle, that are ennobled by the enlightening and organising influence of socialism. Without this latter condition every method of struggle in bourgeois society, without exception, will bring the proletariat to the level of the various non-proletarian strata above or below it, and being left to the mercy of the spontaneous course of events, will become bedraggled, corrupted and prostituted. Strikes, when left to the mercy of the spontaneous course of events, become transformed into “alliances” between the workers and employers against the consumers. Parliament becomes a brothel in which a gang of bourgeois politicians carry on wholesale and retail trade in the “freedom of the people,” “liberalism,” “democracy,” “republicanism,” “anti-clericalism,” “socialism” and in all kinds of popular merchandise. The newspapers become procurers, whom anybody can purchase, a means of debauching the masses and of pandering to the base instincts of the crowd, and so forth. No universal methods of struggle are known to Social-Democracy that would set up a Chinese wall between the proletariat and the social strata that are situated either a little above or below it. In different epochs, Social-Democracy applies different methods; but it applies them strictly in accordance with definite, ideological and organising conditions.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en66|[66]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The selections of the methods of struggle must be determined by the concrete objective conditions. This leads us to the second basic principle we have referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this same article Lenin wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Marxism insists that the question of the methods of struggle shall be investigated from an absolutely historical standpoint. Those who would treat this question apart from the concrete historical circumstances simply fail to understand the very elements of dialectic materialism. In the various periods of economic evolution and depending on the varying, political, national and cultural, social and other conditions, various methods of struggle assume prominence and become the chief methods of struggle, and accordingly the secondary and supplementary methods of struggle also change in their turn. To attempt to express a definite opinion, yes, or no, regarding any particular method of struggle, without subjecting the concrete circumstances of the given moment and the given stage of its development to careful analysis, simply means abandoning the standpoint of Marxism completely.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary tactics are based on an examination of the concrete circumstances of the given situation. The purpose of this is to prevent us from becoming separated from the masses, to enable us to move forward together with the masses, to lead them and help them to rise to a higher level. We must not retreat in face of difficulties, but strive to overcome them by drawing new forces into the fight. We must encourage the activity of the masses, improve their organisation and stimulate their class consciousness. The attack must be conducted systematically and consistently, avoiding in our leadership “&#039;&#039;logical&#039;&#039; (that is, mental) &#039;&#039;leaps&#039;&#039; over &#039;&#039;several&#039;&#039; concrete stages,” as Lenin once expressed it, considering this to be a grievous sin against dialectic materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given such a leadership, the masses will rise to a higher level of political consciousness in the very course of events, learning from their own actions, mistakes, defeats and victories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essence of Marxist-Leninist tactics was brilliantly explained by Lenin in his article “Karl Marx,”[[#footnotes.xhtml_ch6_fn1|*]] in which he wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The fundamental task of proletarian tactics was defined by Marx in strict conformity with all the premises of his materialist-dialectical world outlook. Nothing but an objective calculation of the sum total of all the mutual relationships of all the classes of a given society without exception and consequently a calculation of the objective stage of development of this society as well as a calculation of the mutual relationship between it and other societies, can serve as the basis for the correct tactics of the class that forms the vanguard.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en67|[67]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Valuable material on this subject will also be found in &#039;&#039;“Left-Wing” Communism&#039;&#039;. To be a materialist dialectician it is not enough to reiterate the principles of Marxism in general form. We must study the experience of the class struggle of the proletariat and learn to give expression to the concrete circumstances of that struggle, to emphasise the main tasks and advance proper slogans to lead the proletarian struggle and be able to find the main link that will enable us to hold the whole chain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter7.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
VII&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;chapter7.xhtml_heading1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== HOW TO STUDY LENIN ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A few words should be said in conclusion as to how to study the works of Lenin. It should be borne in mind that Lenin was a leader of the proletariat. A study of his literary works must be closely combined with a study of his activities and of the conditions in which he worked. Only in this way will the works of Lenin be properly understood and appreciated. This study, however, must be linked up with the present-day struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The manner in which Lenin studied the works of Marx and Engels is an example of how the works of Lenin should be studied. From a number of his articles, particularly those articles dealing with Marxism and with the works and correspondence of Marx and Engels, we see how he was able to draw the lessons of materialist dialectics from his study of Marx and Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin drew particular attention to the following formula contained in one of the letters of Engels: “Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action.” None of the Marxists who had studied the works of Marx and Engels had paid proper attention to this aphorism; but Lenin quite rightly pointed out that it gives a succinct and excellent description of the very essence of the Marxian theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin pointed out that an outstanding feature of the method of Marx and Engels was the living contact they themselves maintained with the mass movement. In spite of their knowledge and tremendous erudition, they were free from the slightest tinge of pedantry or bookishness. As Engels said, the &#039;&#039;moment&#039;&#039; socialism was transformed from utopia to a science it became necessary to treat it as a science, namely, to study it. The valuable knowledge inherited from the past must be mastered. But that is not enough. We must be able to draw lessons from the experience of the current struggles of the masses and at the same time take an active part in it, lead it and lift it to higher levels. Marx and Engels possessed this capacity in a very high degree; and it was this that Lenin considered to be exceptionally valuable and worthy of imitation. In his Preface to the Russian translation of Marx’s &#039;&#039;Letters to Kugelmann&#039;&#039;, Lenin says that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Above everything else&#039;&#039; he [&#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, Marx—&#039;&#039;V.A&#039;&#039;.] put the fact that the working class heroically, self-sacrificingly and taking the initiative itself &#039;&#039;makes&#039;&#039; world history.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels attached the greatest importance to the “historical initiative” of the masses and were not dismayed by the fact that the activity of the masses might be accompanied by errors. Indeed, whenever something new is being created and the old ruts abandoned errors are inevitable. The most vital revolutionary cause may be marred by mistakes, but the mass movement, the new experience gained, the creative spirit displayed and the new institutions initiated compensate for any mistakes that may be committed. In fact, there is no way the broad masses can be taught except by their own actions and by their own experiences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels never dogmatically thrust upon the masses views which they held to be correct, but which the masses could understand as a result of their own experience and not merely as a result of verbal precepts and preaching. But this cautious attitude in respect of the education of the masses was accompanied by the most exacting demands in matters of theory. In his Introduction to the Russian translation of &#039;&#039;The Letters of J. P. Becker, J. Dietzgen, F. Engels, K. Marx and Others to F. A. Sorge and Others&#039;&#039;, Lenin speaks of the merciless, even “ferocious” war that Marx waged against opportunism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Previously expressed postulates must not be treated in a stereotyped way as universal precepts applicable to all times and all conditions without taking into consideration the changes that have taken place since those postulates were enunciated, and without a careful study of the new factors that have arisen and which the most penetrating minds formerly could not possibly foresee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When studying the works of Marx and Lenin we must constantly bear in mind the circumstances in which they lived and acted, the conditions that gave rise to a particular slogan, or the persons against whom a particular polemic was directed: that is to say, their works must be studied with due appreciation of the concrete time and place in which they were written. The lessons drawn from the study must be applied to the present-day struggle of the proletariat, while the closest contact must be maintained with the movement and tasks of the class struggle of our time. Only in this way will the basic demand of Marxism-Leninism be observed, namely, that theory shall not be “a dogma, but a guide to action,” not a mere subject for academic study, but a science and a valuable weapon in the class struggle of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin’s attitude towards science, the working-class movement and the mass struggle was exactly the same as that of Marx and Engels. Like Marx, Lenin prized in the revolutionary class its “ability to create the future.” He knew how to lead the mass struggle and to combat “ferociously” every distortion of revolutionary Marxism, in whatever sphere it might manifest itself and under whatever flag it might proclaim itself. Lenin was able to appreciate the peculiarities of concrete circumstances, to study the works of the founders of scientific communism and to apply them to the new conditions of the working class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In our own study of Lenin’s works, we must strive to adopt the methods he used. We must acquire the ability to fight for revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. For there have been many opportunist distortions of Lenin’s teachings since his death, and we shall encounter such distortions again in the future. We all know the efforts the Trotskyist opposition made to effect a revisionist distortion of Leninism, while similar attempts were made by the Right opposition and the semi-Trotskyist “Leftists” in the years 1928-29, and 1930.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An example of the way Lenin studied the works of Marx will be found in his article “Marx on the American ‘Black Redistribution’.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en68|[68]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; In this article, after describing the circumstances in which Marx wrote his article in opposition to H. Kriege (whose views closely resembled those of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries at the beginning of this century) and comparing the farmer’s movement in America in the middle of the nineteenth century with the peasant movement in Russia at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, Lenin shows how Marx combated the petty-bourgeois illusions of the peasantry, while appreciating the revolutionary democratic character of the peasant movement. Lenin used this example from Marx in order to strengthen his own hand in the fight against the Mensheviks, who entirely failed to understand the significance of the peasant movement and to realise that the peasantry was the principal ally of the working class in the struggle against tsarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another example is Lenin’s work on the question of the state. Having studied everything that Marx and Engels ever wrote on the subject, Lenin was able to establish their real views, which had been completely mutilated by the opportunists. This alone was a tremendous service to the cause of revolutionary Marxism. But he did more than that. Basing himself on the theoretical views of Marx and Engels and applying their methods, Lenin used the experience provided by the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in 1905 and 1917 to further develop the theory of Marx. He created the theory of the Soviet state, which arises with the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Studying the works of Lenin on this subject,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en69|[69]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; we are able to follow step by step the manner in which Lenin used the Marxian method in order to solve one of the fundamental problems of the revolution—the organisation of the state power of the revolutionary proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A perusal of the fundamental work written by Lenin on this question, &#039;&#039;State and Revolution&#039;&#039;, reveals how carefully he studied the works of Marx and Engels, how painstakingly he transcribed individual thoughts and even fleeting remarks the theoretical value of which, in spite of their brevity, is tremendous. In Lenin’s popular lecture on “The State,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en70|[70]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; which gives a general review of the question of the state and represents a valuable addition to the works above enumerated and an introduction to a more profound study of the question, we find several practical suggestions as to how the works of Marx and Engels should be studied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are only two examples of many that might be quoted. In the works of Lenin the three component parts of the Marxian theory: philosophy, political economy and socialism are dealt with. Lenin mastered the material in all three spheres, developing the theory of Marx and elaborating a number of important questions in the light of the facts provided, by the latest development of the proletarian revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;In the sphere of philosophy&#039;&#039; he threw light on the problem of materialist dialectics: he elaborated the theory of knowledge of dialectic materialism,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en71|[71]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; studied and explained the crisis of contemporary natural science,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#endnotes.xhtml_en72|[72]]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and treated the problems of historical materialism in a new way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;In the sphere of economics&#039;&#039; attention should be drawn to his works on capitalism in Russia— “The Development of Capitalism in Russia,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. I; on imperialism— “Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. V; on the agrarian question—“The Agrarian Programme of the Social-Democrats in the First Russian Revolution,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. XII; “The Agrarian Question at the End of the Nineteenth Century,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. I, and, finally, his work dealing with the economics of the transition period—“State and Revolution,” “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” “Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” all in &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. VII; “The Tax in Kind,” &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Vol. IX, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039; much space is devoted to Lenin’s writings on the problems of socialism. The policy and tactics of the class struggle of the proletariat, the Party, its programme and organisation, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet state and the building up of socialism. Here, too, Lenin bases himself on the theories of Marx and Engels, while at the same time making a concrete study of the complex factors of the class struggle of his own day.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin mastered the very essence of these problems, painstakingly collecting all that could be found in Marx and Engels on the subject he was examining. Our aim should be to make a similar study and a similar application of the works of Lenin. The writings of Lenin are a storehouse of knowledge, essential to the proletariat and invaluable in the leadership of its fight for communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By studying the works of Lenin we shall learn to realise the significance and importance of revolutionary theory, we shall see how theory must be associated with the actual class movement and the struggle of the millions who are exploited and oppressed by capitalism. We shall learn what is meant by the Communist Party’s leading the proletarian revolution and under what conditions the revolution can triumph. And, following the example of Lenin, we must learn how to participate in the struggle ourselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was formed under Lenin’s guidance and trained in the spirit of revolutionary Marxism, is carrying on and developing the socialist construction begun under Lenin’s leadership and along the lines he indicated. Tens of millions of proletarians and toilers are participating in this gigantic task. Learning from the experience of the struggles and constructive work of the masses of proletarians and collective farmers, who are working for the establishment of communism, the Leninist Central Committee, headed by Comrade Stalin—best able to continue the cause of Lenin—and the whole of the Party, is developing the policy, the tactics and the theory of Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For an understanding of Leninism it is important to study the present work of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the socialist construction now in progress under its guidance, as well as the international revolutionary movement and the fight of the Communist International, which was also founded under the direct leadership of Lenin. The full profundity of the theoretical works of Lenin becomes revealed only when they are associated with the struggle that is now proceeding. For they were written with the purpose of guiding the great struggle of the proletariat to victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An excellent guide for those undertaking a systematic study of Lenin’s writings is Comrade Stalin’s book, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, and this should serve as the principal guide to those who desire to obtain a thorough knowledge of the problems that Lenin so brilliantly expounded and solved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comrade Stalin, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is the most outstanding Leninist theoretician. It was under his leadership that, since the death of Lenin, the fight against Trotskyism, the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition and the Right Opportunists was conducted. Alike in practical politics and in theory (and the two are intimately associated), Comrade Stalin is brilliantly carrying out the Leninist line.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The works of Lenin are of the utmost importance to the class struggle of the proletariat. Leninism generalises the experiences of the world proletarian revolution and studies all forms of the class struggle in order to make the best use of them and in order to develop the science that is essential to the proletariat as the vanguard of the struggle for emancipation from all forms of oppression and exploitation. This science must be made accessible to the vast proletarian army, for it will help it to achieve increased unity of action and consciousness of purpose. The better organised the vast numbers of proletarians and toilers are, and the more energetically and purposefully they wage the struggle against the domination of capitalism, the sooner the yoke of age-long slavery will be shattered.&lt;br /&gt;
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== REFERENCE NOTES ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
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		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:This_Soviet_World&amp;diff=88092</id>
		<title>Library:This Soviet World</title>
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		<updated>2025-11-08T16:19:02Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Change written in to published date&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=This Soviet World|author=Anna Louise Strong|published_date=1936|publisher=Henry Holt and Company, Inc.|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/this-soviet-world/|pdf=https://annas-archive.org/md5/3c2da922ea78b91c28c2b81b5c2da556}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== ON INTERPRETING A WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A leading Russian Communist said to me a year ago “The mind of our people is changing so fast under the conditions of socialism that it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to speak to the rest of the world. We find it harder to understand them, and they us.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We who go back and forth between the Soviet world and the world of capitalism—not only in space from New York to Moscow but also in spirit from intimate life with Soviet people to intimate life in America—feel keenly this difficulty. Important words like freedom, democracy, dictatorship have different meanings on different sides of the border. The Soviet world is sharply conscious of planning its future; the capitalist world is always arriving where it hadn’t intended. And Soviet officials are not always helpful in making their acts intelligible; they often assume that only deliberate malice can doubt them and that the only needed explanation is the appropriate citation from Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To explain the swiftly growing Soviet world to that other world out of which it was born is a task that becomes steadily more complex. For if its outer achievements are every year more able to speak for themselves, its inner life more and diverges from that of capitalism in a hundred subtle ways.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Berlin station a giant sign greets me with three-foot letters: “Think of your hair!” My mind flashes back to the world I have left. What are Soviet people thinking of? The Stakhanov drive, the Moscow city plan, Marie and her sugar beets, the conquest of the north. And hair and perfume, O yes, of course. Everyone knows of the rising standard of living and firmly believes in a cultural life—more bath-tubs, radios, books and dramatic clubs and doubtless more hair. But their individuality is expressed not by possessions and polish but by the various ways in which men create. Dynamic is the word; their civilization is dynamic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The regimentation of life by property is my next shock in the capitalist world. The obscene phrases “damages for alienation of affections” or “a $50,000 man” or the remark: “I do it only for the money that is in it”—what degradation they imply of human life and work! I see able engineers spending creative power on little models in a government relief job just to keep alive. I see a journal of high standard, the life-work of an able editor submerged by a new owner’s wish for quick profit. Lives are conditioned in the Soviet world also, by trends and sages of organization, but not by the profits of a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference appears in the use of pronouns. People under capitalism are contrasting “I” and “they.” “Too bad it couldn’t have been on my land,” a man remarks of a California oil-strike. Soviet folk would be hailing “our new oil-wells”; to them the idea of a private oil-well is already as quaint as a private postal system. I note a remark about American unemployment: “If it gets any worse, they’ll have to do something.” Who is this ultimate, uncontrollable “they”? The term betrays the class society of which the speakers are unconscious; they are waiting for some boss to act. To hear a debate: “Is America going fascist?” and think how much less passively Soviet folk would word it. “Shall we go fascist? No. Then exactly how shall we prevent it?” Soviet folk say “we” of one-sixth of the earth’s surface. Uzbek cotton-pickers, toiling under the sun of Central Asia, say: “We are conquering the Arctic; we rescued the Chelyuskinites.” Ukrainian farmers who never went up in an airplane talk of “our stratosphere records” and “the loss of our Maxim Gorky airplane” as they take up collections to build ten new ones. But even Mrs. Roosevelt asks me: “Are Russian peasants getting more reconciled to accepting direction?” I feel the hopelessness of language as I answer: “No, they are learning better to organize and direct themselves.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Americans often ask me whether Russians are not naturally more altruistic than Americans, more fit for communism, they imply. No, it is something quite different. Russians at the time of Revolution were more medieval than Americans, which means “naturally” more petty, unreliable, inefficient, given to bargaining and cheating. Traits of the Asiatic market-place were widespread and occasionally still annoy the visitor. But these traits are disappearing under the fact of joint ownership, which brings identity of individual with community good.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Joint possession of the country’s resources and productive mechanism is the economic reality which unifies Soviet life and makes it dynamic. It is this that washes out the antagonism between personal and public good, that makes men say “we.” It is this that makes men conscious planners of the future; for owners plan but non-owners can only fight or drift. The chief quality of Soviet civilization is the sense that the world is “ours,” to seize, understand and make over.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This Soviet world is my theme; I give scant space to those fast disintegrating forces that fought it. I tell not the “whole truth,” for truth is never “whole”; there are always at least two truths in conflict: the truth that is dying and the truth that is coming into existence. American Tories who intrigued for King George had their truth also, but it remains only as piquant sauce to romance; the truth of the Continental armies remained to build the modern republic. They themselves recalled the frozen feet of Valley Forge less as suffering than as heroism; their raids on hungry farms passed into memory not as banditry but as necessity and daring. History’s greatest gift to victors is that not only they, but their truth survives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet I do no injustice to those many lives which in greater or less degree were wrenched or broken by the coming of the new Soviet order. Even for them the new years obliterate the past. They also change to seek their new future in the new system; Lives broken in terms of property are being remade in terms of work. Saboteurs reform and win posts of honor; kulaks come back from exile to factories and farms; children have an equal start now regardless of fathers. For this war differs from other battles in that all men, even the conquered foes, are absorbed into the ranks of the conquerors—joint heirs to all the fruits of victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A. L. S.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART I: MEN MAKE THE SOVIET WORLD ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER I: THE PLAN FOR REMAKING THE WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“The philosophers have only interpreted the world; our business is to change it.”|Karl Marx|Theses on Feuerbach}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whenever I ask myself what brings increasing visitors to Moscow, what they want here and what they find, and why the eyes of the world turn more and more to the Soviet Union with a questing hope that hardly yet dares call itself belief, there flashes into my mind the remark made to me in 1930 at Dnieprostroy by the young and disillusioned son of a Wall Street millionaire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dnieprostroy in those days was the first of the famous giants of the new Soviet Russia, “the largest power dam in the world.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Since then surpassed by the Boulder Dam.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hour after hour we climbed the cliffs and ravines of its mighty construction. We fled from screaming sirens that warned of blasting rock. We saw great stone-crushing plants, saw-mills, locomotive repair shops, temporary power station—all sizable works harnessed to the task of making a greater power station which should in turn serve plants a hundred times their scope. We visited the “socialist city” where discussion raged between advocates of individual cottages or big apartment houses for the future town. We saw hurriedly constructed club houses where thousands of workers busily grabbed knowledge—reading, writing, political economy and the technique of their new job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Night fell. We stood on the shore of the yet unharnessed river, destined to rise to bury those high banks beneath a man-impounded lake. We far down at the great sweep of electric brilliance that had already shattered the age-old darkness of the Ukrainian steppe. It was then that my companion said: “I think that Dnieprostroy has answered the question that brought me to Russia.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What question?” I asked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Whether the world is to be changed by trying one at a time to improve human beings or by changing the social environment that makes human beings.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the pause that followed the sounds of construction came to us incessantly, rising from the bowels of earth and filling the horizon. The short, sharp puffs of engines, the roar of cliffs torn asunder, the ceaseless beat of mills grinding stone into concrete, the rasp of drills eating down into river granite. Sharpened by night and softened by distance, they blended into a mighty symphony—music of man, the builder, subduing, the earth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dark beyond the circling lights lay Hortitz Island, in ancient days the last stand of free-booting bandit chieftains against oppressors. We remembered the husky peasant girl from the island whom we had seen in overalls that morning, gang-boss over twelve men who excavated rock by explosions of liquid air. Dnieprostroy had changed her in a few months from a farm servant to a “brigadier.” We remembered the blacksmith whom we had asked in the glare of foundry fires how he liked his work and who burst forth with fiery will: “You know, we’re going to finish her in 1932”—a simple workman pushing ahead by one year the estimate of Hugh L. Cooper’s world-experienced engineers.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The workman’s estimate won out. The dam was finished in 1932 a year ahead of schedule.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We recalled how competitions between workers of right and left bank drove the dam ahead, doubling the concrete-laying estimates of the Americans by force of newly awakened will. Signals night by night across the raging torrent told in red and green lights the day’s total, celebrated over-fulfillment of plan by a great red star. Night by night, week by week each bank fought to keep its red star shining. We remembered motion pictures, dramas, concerts, lectures which brought the city’s culture to these thousands who had come from the scattered farms of the Ukraine. The fine new polytechnic institute where workers chosen from the river-gangs were being turned in forty classrooms into engineers. We saw on the high bank the homes of the American consultants, who understood better than the Russians the technique of the great job but were eternally puzzled by its spirit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yes, Dnieprostroy gave the answer to my companion’s question. Dnieprostroy was a new form of production under a new social system. It was remaking individuals by wholesale.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Increasingly in the past five years Americans have come to the Soviet Union, scientists, engineers, artists, economists all bent on their own pursuits, dogmatic or bewildered tourists, seeking proof of an old belief or material for a new one. Especially since the crash of 1929 smashed the world which was “inevitably getting better,” they have come, fleeing from the ruins of that earthquake to learn what, if anything, the Soviet Union offers. By no means all of them put their question as clearly as did my young companion; by no means all interpret so swiftly the essence of the first construction job they see. But the question he asked is basically what brings most of them, an ancient quest of man which has troubled philosophers no less than baffled tourists: “Can our world be remade? And how to remake it?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problem is especially pressing upon the American middle class of today, which has seen its old world taken from it in ways that it hardly understands. The independent small property owners, mostly farmers, who formed a hundred years ago 80 per cent of the American people except in the slave South, bequeathed to their descendants ideals of democracy and freedom, the “liberty and equality of men owning their own means of livelihood.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Lewis Corey: “Crisis of the Middle Class” &#039;&#039;The Nation&#039;&#039;, Aug. 14, 1935.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But large scale industry, developing through a century, wiped out the small enterprisers, increased the number of salaried employees and made the farmer dependent on banks and markets, thus changing America to a “nation of hired workers.” Only 12 per cent of the people live by ownership of their own property, in place of 80 per cent a century ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The myth of property remained long after the reality had vanished. Millions of these salaried people still felt hat they owned something—no longer a store, a small workshop, an unencumbered farm, but savings in stocks, bonds, insurance—which lifted them somewhat above the ranks of laboring hands. Crashingly the world economic crisis destroyed this illusion. As if to emphasize how little control these small people had over their own property, the value of their liquid wealth shrank from twenty-seven billion dollars in 1929 to four billion in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Figures from Robers R. Doane on liquid wealth of persons with incomes under $5,000. Quoted by Corey.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of the middle class were thrown into the same abyss of ruin with millions of wage-workers; they wait together on bread-lines, study together the government relief programs, hunt together for a boss. For all of them alike, as long as the capitalist world remains, most put their trust in bosses, someone who owns and will give them access to the means of production and of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Their situation is the more distressing because for most of our Western world the past hundred years has been what John Strachey aptly calls the “century of the great hope.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;John Strachey, &#039;&#039;The Menace of Fascism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of men became better fed, better housed, better clothed through the industrial revolution which took production out of the home workshop into the factory and knit together the ends of earth by railroad, steamship, telegraph. Especially America—where the arrival of the new machines and technical methods coincided with a continent-wide expansion into lands of vast wealth, developed by energetic oilers from all nations for the first time unhampered by any remnants of feudalism the belief in inevitable progress and increasing prosperity was both a conscious and unconscious national faith. The little red schoolhouse bade every boy aspire to be president. “Go west, young man.” . . . “Don’t be a bear on America,” said successful plutocrats. But far deeper than these conscious preachings spread the atmosphere of determined optimism which made every man who was not a good booster seem subtly immoral to his friends. Did not the great lands of America, the efficient industries of America, the productive energy of America, offer the basis for a good standard of life for everyone—an “American standard”? It was easy to prove that they did—and do!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What happened to that faith in inevitable progress? If it still survives in some circles as a despairing habit, elsewhere it has been replaced by belief in inevitable doom. “Inevitable drift to fascism,” “inevitable twilight of the West,” “the old standard of prosperity can never return,” are phrases common on lips that not long since hailed inevitable advance. Others begin a frenzied search into the faiths of past ages, to know if elsewhere than with us abides the truth. These learn that belief in the inevitability of progress has never been a universal faith. It has been confined to definite periods of economic advancement, and to certain nations within those periods or certain classes within nations. Did not whole centuries of the Middle Ages view the world as an essentially unchanging garden of human souls from which religion culled a few for heaven, leaving the rest for hell? Even today do not hundreds of millions of people—those great suppressed races of the East—find life’s processes so fundamentally evil that their essential faith is Buddhism in which Nothingness is bliss?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even in our West, as capitalism decays into fascism, there arise new denials of the inevitability of progress. Ideals of the past—the Roman Empire, the Germanic gods, the feudal Britain featured by fascist-striving novels—gild with emotional glamor the tenets of fascism: that science and machine production are evil, that democracy, peace and the conquest of poverty are futile dreams of a decadent society, that murderous war is man’s noblest end. For fascism is the last stand of a desperate capitalism which can no longer use the fruits of science and machine production, which dare no longer permit either peace or democracy, since it must brutally refuse to its victims that abolition of poverty which is already technically possible in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Can human reason find a way to reorganize human society—a way which human wills can follow? Must we go backing blindly into the future, cheered now by faith in inevitable progress, damned now by faith in inevitable doom, and claiming from some supernatural world a just and rational balancing of the unjust, irrational chaos found in this? Or can that continuous, collective application of human thought known as science, which we have learned to take as our best, though still unperfected guide in rationalizing and controlling subhuman phenomena, be expanded to rationalize and control our human destiny? Can man master the machines he has made which today threaten increasingly to enslave him? Can he subdue to his will those tremendously productive forces which his science and technical knowledge have released, and which seem adequate to abolish poverty, yet which at present give increasing unemployment, economic crises, wars?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are asking, in other words, can men master destiny? Are all those gleams of human reason which have given us increasing dominion over material phenomena but will-o’-the-wisps, luring to a swamp which will engulf us the more blackly for the false, brief light they gave? Or are they gleams of dawn that may brighten into an ever-increasing daylight, in which not only a few isolated phenomena but the whole of man’s own nature and his organized society can be planned by human reason and carried through by human wills?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No less than this is the search that brings men over the seas to the Soviet Union. For if to millions in our Western world the century now passing was the century of the great hope, there are other millions in two great half-continents uniting Europe and Asia, who look upon it rather as the century of the great plan. The reference is not to that Five-Year Plan which the Soviet Union made famous, but to a plan far more comprehensive which prepares and includes all five-year plans in all lands and all the future. A plan for remaking the world drawn up eighty-eight years ago on instructions from a London congress of working-men of many nations, and issued in 1848 under the title &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the work of the German economists Frederick Engels and Karl Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; is usually thought of as the defiance flung at the world by an illegal revolutionary party of hunted people. So it was. But it was also man’s first attempt to apply science to the analysis of human society in order to draw up a plan for remaking the world. Previous attempts to analyze the world were exercises of philosophers, not directed towards change. Previous attempts to change the world were confined to threats or exhortations to secure specific conversions or reforms. Many Utopian pictures had existed of how beautiful society might be when once made over. But the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; tried to answer the question: How can the thing be done? Born in the middle years of that century in which the scientific method was consciously remaking the material world, it sought to analyze the elements of human society, the nature and cause of the changes we see in history, for the purpose of producing social change in a desired direction. That is why it claims to be Scientific Socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The followers of Marx see in him the genius who combined the three chief currents of thought of the nineteenth century—classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and French revolutionary doctrines. The philosophic basis of Marxism is “dialectics,” which views every reality, whether of nature, the mind, or society, as in process of continual change through the development and clash of “inner contradictions.” This theory applied to the study of history shows how economic, political and social systems are constantly changing, at times slowly, at times by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions. American capitalism of the Civil War period is not the capitalism of today. The democracy of the New England town-meeting is not the democracy of the modern imperial nation. They may be called by the same but names deceive; the thing changes even while you look at it to disdain or admire. Even your disdain and admiration changes, the meaning of your words and concepts. What was true, right, desirable yesterday may not be true, right, desirable tomorrow. Systems have their day and cease to be.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is there any law in this change? Is there in this constant interaction and conflict of systems and ideas anything basic, changing which will change the rest? “The economic structure,” says Marx, is “the real foundation. . . . The mode of production . . . determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Preface to a &#039;&#039;Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Marx the fundamental thing about any human society is not its system of ideas or religions, nor the form of government nor the nature of its family life. These things are important but derivative. They are determined by the ways in which human beings get food, clothing, shelter, by the stage of their advance and the tools they use in these fundamental operations. In a world whose economic structure fails to reward honesty and altruism, a Marxist would not spend his efforts preaching these virtues, but in creating an economic system where honesty really prospered, where each man’s success must be build on the success, rather than the ruin, of others. The new economic system would make new people; under it, education in the new ideals would be swift and hopeful.&lt;br /&gt;
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How then do economic systems change? Marx finds the key in his theory of “class struggle.” Man’s science and invention create new ways of production, and these in turn create new “classes” of human beings, i.e., groups of people who have different and conflicting relations to production. Between these classes a struggle goes on around the ownership of the process of production, which is the means of life. “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 10-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus at different stages of human history new classes arise from new ways of working and the struggle between them produces social change. Modern capitalism has not done away with class antagonisms, but it has this distinctive feature—it has simplified them. “Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into . . . two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat,”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; those who live by owning and those who can live only by selling their labor power, by seeking a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between these two remain for a time the middle classes, distraught survivors of those small property owners and independent craftsmen who once embodied the demand for private property against a feudal past. They suffer deeply under advancing capitalism which dislodges them steadily and painfully into the ranks of hired hands. They struggle against their fate, but their strivings are confused, for their instinctive desire is to go back to small scale property. Their cry is to “share the wealth,” to start over again that old society of small owners which led to the present-day monopolies and which would lead to them again if it could be revived. The right to private property was once revolutionary pledge of freedom, but this also has changed with the passing of history. Private property in farm plots and hand tools freed serfs from feudal masters; private property in steel mills creates a new slavery. Even small ownership today, wherever it survives or comes into being, is at the mercy of large scale finance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who owns the world? That is the basic question conditioning all hopes of social change. What is wrong with the world today, according to Marxists, is private ownership of the great productive processes which are socially operated. The way out is not backward to subsistence farms and handicrafts it is forward to social ownership. Not “share the wealth,” but jointly owned wealth, jointly organized by and for all who work. Only thus can the great machines be subjugated; only thus can science and modern technique produce plenty for all mankind. Only thus can the present vision of men into owners and workers be abolished, a division which is wrecking the world by social strife and international war. It must be superseded by one united class of people—joint worker-owners of the world. From this economic equality, all other forms of equality will grow. First a stage of socialism where men have equal access to labor and receive according to their work. Then when the habits of human beings have been changed by joint ownership, will come the stage of communism in which men freely co-operate in work according to their abilities and receive according to their needs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who will bring about this change of ownership? Clearly not the present private owners: their interests lie the other way. Nor can the disintegrating middle classes achieve it, except insofar as they come to understand that their future lies with the workers. Only one class of people can develop the will to carry through this difficult long epoch of change—the working class which is bound to the mighty mechanism of modern production, mastering it yet enslaved by it. Joint ownership is their only path to freedom; when they understand this, they will accomplish it. They are thus the “really revolutionary class,” in whom social ownership of modern production is a living need and can become a flaming passion carrying humanity forward to a higher stage.&lt;br /&gt;
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The task of every Marxist is to help them understand, to make them “class-conscious,” aware of their power and function as creators of social progress. Millions of Americans resent the very idea of classes, and are indignant at “inflaming class-consciousness” where it does not yet exist. But Marxian classes are not epithets inciting to riot; they are categories in a scientific analysis. Marxists say that unless human society is to go down in a catastrophe of slavery, war and ruin, men must own their tools and the wealth which these create; that tools and wealth have grown too complexly social to be owned individually and must therefore be socially owned; and that only the working class can develop the fighting will to seize the power of ownership and through it remake society. The less the workers are organized, the less conscious they are of their power and function, the more will the coming changes in human society be protracted, painful and blind. The more conscious the workers are of their great task in history, the better they are organized, the more they are able to rally around them the middle classes, the swifter will be the change and the less will be the human suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two generations of economists in many countries developed the Marxian theory. Lenin built on it the Bolshevik Party which in 1917 carried through the Russian Revolution. Stalin is honored today by Bolsheviks not only as statesman and organizer, but as the far-seeing analyst and guider of social change, who continues and develops the scientific method of Marx, Engels, Lenin. One-sixth of the world today is being remade according to the Marxian program—the first consciously devised pattern that men ever applied to society as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER II: THE PARTY OF REVOLUTION ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“To distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident did the first socialist revolution take place in Russia. The World War imposed great strains on many countries and the chain of world imperialism broke at its weakest link.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hillquit called the Russian revolution an “historical accident,” since it occurred in a backward peasant land. Norman Thomas on the contrary holds it occurred just because the Russians were so backward that they would endure a dictatorship such as no other people would stand. &amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;  Stalin says: “The objective conditions for the revolution exist throughout the whole system of imperialist world economy, which is an integral unit.” Answering the theory that the revolution must come first “where the proletariat forms the majority, where culture is more advanced, where there is more democracy,” he says: “No, not necessarily where industry is most developed; it will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the of world imperialism at its weakest link.” From Stalin’s Lectures to Sverdlov Students.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; More than any other land, Russia was tormented by war and ravenous for peace. Tsardom, that hideous hangover from the Middle Ages, had lost all moral authority and was hated by the entire people. For decades revolution had been brewing in Russia.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx noted this as far back as 1877 in his Letter to Zorge. See &#039;&#039;Letters of Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The World War added the last unbearable pressure and the explosion came.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not least among the factors which made the revolution possible and helped determine its form was the existence of the Bolshevik Party.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Today called Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was no spontaneous creation, born at the moment of revolt; for fourteen years it had been consciously welded by painstaking thought and desperate struggle. Its traditions indeed went back much further. The whole last half of the nineteenth century advanced thinkers in Russia, under the oppression of tsardom, had sought eagerly for the effective revolutionary path. Through fifty years of torment, sacrifice, heroism, incredible energy, careful study, they had tested many methods. They had tried to educate and organize the peasantry; they had tried the terrorist assassination of tyrants. They had failed. They had checked their failures by the history of other nations and a section of them had come to Marxism as the correct program for remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Marx furnished the general program, it was Lenin who developed the theory and tactics, proletarian revolution, and built the organization for the seizure of power. Bolshevism, as a trend of political thought and a political party, exists since 1903, when the Social-Democratic Party of Russia split into groups known as Bolsheviks (majority) and Mensheviks (minority), which correspond to Communists and Social-Democrats today in other countries. The older leaders wanted to “widen” the Party, to take in all “supporters” and give them all a voice in determining the Party’s program. Lenin, though recognizing that any social change must rely on wide masses, not only of workers but of many other “allies,” insisted that membership in the Party itself “must be given a narrow definition to distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin’s Account of Second Congress, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, II&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To organize and train the Party of Revolution became thenceforth the central task and the greatest achievement of that world-renowned leader, Lenin, who gave his whole life to the study and practice of the science of political power. Power was to him no mere personal achievement of office; it was the organized lifting of the human race one stage forward in history. He studied how to ride the turbulent upheaval which the conflicts in modern society would inevitably produce, how to prepare and lead men for the seizure of the state and the creation of a new order, how at last to organize them for the conquest of nature and of their own destiny. This was to Lenin the science of power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting with the Marxian thesis that the working class is the group in modern society which can be organized to take power and to build a new order, Lenin created for this class a “vanguard” of leaders. They must be men of intelligence, will, daring; yet they must act in a disciplined manner, reinforcing a common direction. They must make the revolution a life-long profession, steadily studying the economic, political and social forces of the society in which they live. They must apply this knowledge in action. They must take active part not only in elections and political movements, but in strikes, trade union work, demonstrations, distribution of literature and all the other prosaic or dangerous activities through which the working class becomes organized and conscious of its power. They must keep close to the workers, learning from them and assisting them, and win the right to lead by the confidence they inspire.&lt;br /&gt;
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How are such leaders to be found among the great hordes of the dispossessed and discontented? How, if found, are they to be welded into a disciplined, fighting force? Lenin had no illusions; he knew that the mass of exploited men who are squeezed out by the dislocations of capitalism, and who turn in hope or despair towards communism, contains many fools, knaves, fanatics and self-pitying failures as well as men of intelligence and will. He foresaw a long period of difficult struggle, in which men fit to lead would be tested by fire, men capable of learning would be trained by experience, and others would weed themselves out by their follies. Lenin himself gave most of his years to the slow work of building up and training a not very large but thoroughly tested Party, which could give leadership when the hour of revolution came. I have met simple workers to whom Lenin devoted hours of individual teaching, and who remember today the exact phrases he used with them forty years ago. The making of real Communists able to lead the masses is a long and costly process.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nothing could be more absurd than the two contradictory views of Communists promulgated today by their opponents. They are usually pictured as planless inciters to violence and riot, people who have a crazy desire for chaos, in the hope that something vaguely called communism may somehow ensue. A more sophisticated view, to which no less a person than Sinclair Lewis falls victim in &#039;&#039;It Can’t Happen Here&#039;&#039;, portrays them as brainless sheep required to act in blind obedience to the orders of their superiors for the sake of discipline. Neither of these types could possibly lead a successful strike, much less a revolution. A communist who increased risks by recklessness would be early eliminated; a man who only took orders would be useless as a leader. Communists must learn the difficult combination of intelligence with daring; they must learn to act together but they must all know why.&lt;br /&gt;
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“What we build cannot be built by passive people,” said one of the secretaries of the Russian Communist Party to me. “We all had strong convictions; we fought for them and went to jail for them,” said another veteran Bolshevik. “Then in jail we fought with our imprisoned comrades over details of past policies, studying and learning from past errors. Often we found that the mistake of a few words in our theory had cost us a year in prison.” Again and again groups which could not agree split off from the others. Lenin made no effort to detain them; he distinguished sharply between those allies with whom co-operation was possible for a longer or shorter period, and the smaller group which would stick through everything. Thus was built up that Party of men who had placed their lives in each other’s hands so often that they could rely on each other with absolute assurance, not through blind submission but through a habit of mutual consultation and swift acceptance of joint decisions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most famous picture of the ideal Communist is given by Krupskaia, widow of Lenin, in an article entitled: “What a Communist Should Be Like.” “First of all a Communist is a social person, with strongly developed social instincts, who desires that all people should be well and be happy. Second, he must understand what is happening about him in the world—the mechanism of the existing régime, the history of the growth of human society, the history of economic development, of the growth of property, the division of classes, the growth of state forms. He must clearly picture whither society is developing—to a régime where the happiness of some will not be based on the slavery of others and where there will be no compulsion except strongly developed social instincts. And the Communists must clear the road, as you clear a path in the wilderness, to hasten its coming.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Third, the Communist must know how to organize creatively. If he is a medical worker, for instance, he must know medicine, then the history of medicine in Russia and other lands, then the Communist approach to the problem of medicine, i.e., how to organize wide masses to create from the ranks of the toilers a powerful sanitary organization in the cause of health. He must know not only what Communism is and what is coming, what his own job in it may be and his approach to the masses. Fourthly, his personal life must be submitted to and guided by the interests of Communism. No matter how much he regrets giving up the comforts and ties of home, he must if necessary cast all aside and go into danger wherever assigned. . . . Body and soul he must be devoted to the interests of the toiling masses, of Communism.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who have risen high in the Communist Party are characterized by these qualities listed by Krupskaia. They are usually reticent about their deepest motives; it is not the thing to gush one’s devotion. One learns of their qualities chiefly through others. Krupskaia, speaking to intimate Party friends at the funeral of her husband Lenin, found the completest expression in the words: “Lenin deeply loved the people.” Radek tells how Stalin, answering greetings sent him by the Party on his fiftieth birthday, “said something which, in the mouth of such a reserved man, sounded as though it came from the very depths of his being. Stalin said that he was ready to shed his blood ‘drop by drop’ for the proletariat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Radek, &#039;&#039;Problems of Soviet Literature&#039;&#039;, 144.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki&amp;quot;&amp;gt;This seems to refer to Radeks speech at the Soviet Writers Congress in August 1934. A copy is available on [https://www.marxists.org/archive/radek/1934/sovietwritercongress.htm marxists.org]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who would lead the masses in changing the world by the Marxian method must obviously strive for constant growth in two directions: in ever-deepening understanding of social and economic forces and in ever-widening participation in workers’ struggles. Perhaps the first thing that strikes an outsider is the amount of time which all Communists devote to the study of Marxian theory. Managers of great steel plants and busy county officials under the pressure of harvest will find time, at unearthly hours like eleven at night or seven in the morning, for their study of Marxism or their class in current events, deeming these things as essential as their other pressing work.&lt;br /&gt;
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Visitors to the Soviet Union are not infrequently amazed to find that a Party secretary in a rural township can discuss international affairs with an assurance and abundance of detail which few foreign editors of an American metropolitan news-paper can show, and will handle statistics and history with a good deal more ease than the “Brain Trust.” A prominent American politician once expressed to me doubts of the accuracy of the published interview of H. G. Wells with Stalin. Stalin’s references to the Cromwellian revolution seemed to him too detailed to have been available for conversation. “People,” he said, “don’t talk that way” But any Communist in the Soviet Union who did not know the essentials of Cromwellian revolution, and of other historic revolutions from which he is expected to learn, would join a class to “raise his ideological level.” A Communist who allowed himself to become as ignorant of world affairs as is the average American politician would be ruthlessly “cleaned out” of the Party, or told to join the group of “sympathizers” to learn what he has to know.&lt;br /&gt;
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The emotional vagueness which is a feature of all capitalist political platforms, and which is indeed desired in order to win wide support without being too definite, is the exact opposite of Communist statement. The Communists even seem to be painfully definite, to “take refuge in formulæ,” or to split hairs over the exact interpretation of phrases. All science and technical knowledge, however, advance by just this splitting of hairs to find the exact chemical formula which produces the alloy or the mathematical relation which strengthens the arch of the bridge; discussions in any congress of physiologists or electricians are full of this “dull theory” without which no scientific progress can be attained. Communists take Marxism as such a science; to rise to eminence among them demands years, even decades, of close and penetrating study of social forces. This is no dogma to be learned once for all; it is a developing body of thought, constantly applied to and affected by new conditions. By the very theory of dialectics, these forces are changing. The speeches of Lenin and Stalin and other Party leaders never deal in stirring oratory or spell-binding generalities but in close and careful analysis. Stalin would no more attempt to sway a Communist congress by “force of personality” expressed in brilliant oratory and colorful phrasing, than Edison would have expected to convince a group of American engineers of the reliability of some new formula by emotional words. One such attempt would ruin either an Edison or a Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Communists must not only be scientific; they must also learn to work with the masses. In this they face a special difficulty; the man who has thought for years in Marxian categories may find it as hard to explain them to simple people as an electrical engineer would find it to explain the theory of turbines to men in a candle-lighted world. This is more serious for the Communist than for the engineer; for the latter can build his turbines without help from the candle-lighted individuals, but the Communist cannot make a revolution without the people. Fortunately actions may speak as well as words, and all Communists are required to do active work which brings them in touch with the masses. When intellectuals apply for Party membership, it is a common practice to give them some tasks around a factory, such as teaching night classes in Russian language, civics or Marxism, or practical assistance in trade union work. After a year or two of such testing, the opinion of the workers is taken as to whether the candidate is fit to be a Party member.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any Communist Party at any stage in its development in any country considers persons who cannot co-operate with workers’ movements as unfit for Party membership. In the Soviet Union where the rank and file of non-Party workers have already considerable knowledge of the Party’s ideals, it has become a common thing for them to assist in helping the Party in its selection of members. Two hundred thousand workers who joined the Party some two years ago were actually nominated by the non-Party workers, through repeated meetings and discussions as to what persons in their ranks should be recommended for Party membership. From time to time the Party “cleans out” its membership, and this is always done at open meetings to which all workers of the given institution are invited. Each Communist in the institution must give before this public an extended account of his life and activities, submit to and answer all criticism, and prove before the assembled workers his fitness to remain in the “leading Party.” Members may be cleaned out not only as “hostile elements, double-dealers, violators of discipline, degenerates, career-seekers, self-seekers, morally degraded persons” but even for being merely “passive,” for having failed to keep learning and growing in knowledge and authority among the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
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People admitted to the Communist Party—this admission demands a period of study and probation—must give considerable time to unpaid “Party work” i.e., the various tasks of strengthening the organization and organizing the masses around it. Having chosen as the chief purpose of their life the achievement of the socialist revolution, they must learn how to build a joint program. They take part in the discussions from which arise the decisions of the Party and they are expected to carry out these decisions energetically but never blindly. For they must know why the decisions are made; they must understand the Party Line and be able to promote it without bothering other people for orders. They must have strong opinions and fight for them; but they must know when to fight and when to yield. If they cannot learn this, they will find themselves outside the Party, thrown out either as “passive” or as “opposition.” It is not an easy lesson; there have been many political mortalities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Party members must learn to decide and act collectively, not only in determining the general line, but also in deciding their own work in it. They must consult and accept their comrades’ judgment as to where they themselves can be of most use. In the Civil War Communists were expected to be the first to volunteer for every battle-front. In the Soviet Union today they are first to be sent to difficult posts in industry and farming. They may be torn from jobs in which they are successful and sent to work which they hate; they must there-upon cease to hate it and do it well as an important task. I know of a high official who was taken from a train by a telegram sent through an obscure local secretary in a town through which he passed, and ordered to return for a different assignment. But no order is ever the command of a superior officer; it is the decision of a group of comrades with whom one has chosen to work. This is the famous Party discipline; known as “iron” discipline but also as “conscious” discipline, for it is based not on passive submission but on understanding participation and collective choice. The reward for this discipline is conscious participation in the making of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communists expect not only to lead the masses, but to learn from them in a constant interaction. They must “organize the proletariat”; they must “guide it in its class struggle.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They must “see ahead of the working class,” and be the “experienced general staff” which “every army at war must have if it is to avoid certain defeat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 88-89, Cooperative Publishers, Moscow.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But they do not consider themselves a separate caste of leaders, but a “vanguard” intimately a part of the working class they lead. They modify their program to grant temporarily some “backward” demand of the masses, or to include permanently some new form or method which the masses invent. An example of the first was Lenin’s response to the peasants’ demands for splitting up the land, a backward step taken to secure peasant support and “in order that they may educate themselves by fulfilling their desires.” An example of the second was the adoption of “soviets” in government and “artels” in farming, neither of which forms had been foreseen by the Party until they arose. It is the working class which must dictate and not the Party; in 1925 when Zinoviev argued for dictatorship by the Party, Stalin fought against this “narrow point of view,” saying that the confidence between the masses of the people and the Party must not be destroyed by any peculiar Party rights, “because in the first place, the Party might be mistaken, and even if it were not, the masses might take some time to see that it was right.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 51.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How can three million Communists lead one hundred and seventy million people? Because they are not alien to those millions, but are the most energetic part of them, whose capacity to lead has been repeatedly tested and recognized by the others. Millions of non-Party people today in the Soviet Union work loyally, even enthusiastically under Party direction, yet do not venture to call themselves Communists. One of my best friends was a woman who gave her life to the care of homeless children, and who said to me once: “My life began with the Soviet Power; it alone gave me the chance to fight for children. . . . I care more for the Party’s success than for anything in life.” Yet when her fellow-workers voted her “worthy of being a Communist,” she declined the honor, knowing she could not honestly join while she disagreed on one or two points in the Party program.&lt;br /&gt;
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A fifty-two-year-old wheelwright, Rosenberg, whom I met in the Jewish Autonomous Territory of Birobidjan, had courageously dismantled his home in the Ukraine and taken his family of ten to pioneer in the Far East. He had fought through incredible hardships to build a collective industry which made carts; he was now a member of the city government giving much unpaid time to civic work. “When the Party decided to develop Birobidjan,” he explained, “I knew it would be a great future. It goes higher and higher to the building of socialism. I myself can’t build it, but if I work and others work, we’ll build it.” Few could have expressed the Communist goal more sincerely than Rosenberg, yet he did not think of joining the Party. “I don’t know enough,” he said. “I am just studying the first political courses. Serious reading is not so easy for me. I am fifty-two years old.”&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Far North fourteen years ago I met Rimpalle, who had risked his life to run the Finnish border and “help the Revolution.” He organized the first quarries and mines in a hungry Arctic land; he created a trade union, a co-operative and a night-school for illiterate natives of the forests. He made $100,000 for the state that first summer and got for himself—it was the time of War Communism—only “rations of potatoes and good, fat gravy and one resoling of my boots.” Rimpalle said to me: “It’s a useful job. Up here so near the border and the propaganda of the White Finns, we needed to have an industry to give food to the people.” He was already a candidate for the Communist Party, expecting to be admitted to full membership in a few months.&lt;br /&gt;
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These examples show what is required of Communists. Devoted activity under Communist direction, such as the Jewish wheelwright gave, is not enough. Ninety per cent allegiance, such as the social worker offered, is not enough. Nor was it enough for Rimpalle to work self-sacrificingly to increase socially owned wealth; he must understand consciously the political purpose of his work. I have in the course of fifteen years in the Soviet Union met an occasional Communist who was a grafter, and many more who were stubborn bureaucrats and unenlightened fanatics. But I have also seen how the Party throws out dead wood—not always accurately—and renews itself from the working class it leads.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such is the organized Party which carried through the Revolution and which today welds into shape the great masses of the Soviet Union, with its vast distances, its once backward populations, its hundred and eighty-two nationalities, its foes on all borders. It succeeds by choosing its members with discrimination, by keeping them firmly organized, forever studying and continuously on the job.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communist Party does not expect to last forever. “When classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat dies out, the Party also will die out.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It sees its task as belonging to a definite stage in human society, with a beginning, a development and an end. No other political party in the world has this type of historic consciousness, this supreme confidence; all others live from election to election, and make no long time plans. The Communist Party considers that it has a specific job in history and confidently expects to stay in power for the time required to carry it through.&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER III: THE DICTATORSHIP ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The conquest by the proletariat of such political power as will enable it to suppress all resistance on the part of the exploiters.”|Program of Russian Communist Party}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself. . . . (It) is a means, a path leading to socialism”|Stalin in Address to Sverdlov Students, June 1925}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Most Americans shrink from the word “dictatorship.” “I don’t want to be dictated to,” they say. Neither, in fact, does anyone. But why do they instinctively take the word in its passive meaning, and see themselves as the recipients of orders? Why do they never think that they might be the dictators? Is that such an impossible idea? Is it because they have been so long hammered by the subtly misleading propaganda about personal dictatorships, or is it because they have been so long accustomed to seek the right to life through a boss who hires them, that the word dictatorship arouses for them the utterly incredible picture of one man giving everybody orders?&lt;br /&gt;
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No country is ruled by one man. This assumption is a favorite red herring to disguise the real rule. Power resides in ownership of the means of production—by private capitalists in Italy, Germany and also in America, by all workers jointly in the USSR. This is the real difference which today divides the world into two systems, in respect to the ultimate location of power. When a Marxist uses the word “dictatorship,” he is not alluding to personal rulers or to methods of voting; he is contrasting rule by property with rule by workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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The heads of government in America are not the real rulers. I have talked with many of them from the President down. Some of them would really like to use power for the people. They feel baffled by their inability to do so; they blame other branches of government, legislatures, courts. But they haven’t analyzed the real reason. The difficulty is that they haven’t power to use. Neither the President nor Congress nor the common people, under any form of organization whatever, can legally dispose of the oil of Rockefeller or the gold in the vaults of Morgan. If they try, they will be checked by other branches of government, which was designed as a system of checks and balances precisely to prevent such “usurpation of power.” Private capitalists own the means of production and thus rule the lives of millions. Government, however chosen, is limited to the function of making regulations which will help capitalism run more easily by adjusting relations between property and protecting it against the “lawless” demands of non-owners. This constitutes what Marxists call the dictatorship of property. “The talk about pure democracy is but a bourgeois screen,” says Stalin, “to conceal the fact that equality between exploiters and exploited is impossible. . . . It was invented to hide the sores of capitalism . . . and lend it moral strength.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Power over the means of production—that gives rule. Men who have it are dictators. This is the power the workers of the Soviet Union seized in the October Revolution. They abolished the previously sacred right of men to live by ownership of private property. They substituted the rule: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What characteristics of the new régime most obviously showed its dictatorial character? They were the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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First, the Bolsheviks took power without waiting for a majority vote—in the elections to the Constituent Assembly they had just received nine million out of thirty-six million ballots—but relying on their overwhelming majority among the industrial workers, and an overwhelming superiority in that part of the army near the capital cities. They maintained power by a shrewd analysis of social classes, and by satisfying the demands of the sections of the population whose support they needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Second, they organized the new government on the basis of the workers’ organizations, thus dis-franchising those classes which lived by private ownership, and giving a greater proportionate representation in the higher government bodies to workers than to peasants during the first eighteen years when equal voting by great masses of illiterate small owners would have wrecked policies of social ownership.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This difference is commonly stated as a five to one proportion, but such was not the case. Industrial districts had in the higher organs one representative for 25,000 &#039;&#039;electors&#039;&#039;, while rural districts had one for 125,000 &#039;&#039;population&#039;&#039;, which included children. The proportion is thus nearer two to one, a much less disproportion than exists (in the reverse direction) between rural and city votes for many state legislatures in America. This disproportion in the Soviet Union was abolished when the rural districts reached literacy and large-scale farming. See next chapter.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Third, they took control of schools, press and all means of expression, and while encouraging the widest latitude of criticism by workers interested in augmenting or improving the public properties, suppressed any expressions which seemed to the government likely to strengthen the rights of private property or injure the efficiency of socially owned production. At certain periods when they felt their social ownership of production threatened, whether by sabotage, graft, or the strengthening of private owners, they suppressed these dangers as drastically as they thought necessary by means which varied from economic discrimination to deportation or shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are real characteristics which constitute dictatorship rather than any personal prestige of Stalin. Great men attain leadership under all forms of government; the technical forms through which Stalin leads are fully as democratic as those by which an American president governs, and infinitely more democratic than the dominance of a Morgan. Nor is the existence of a single Party necessarily a bar to democratic self-expression, which can find its way as well through one party as a dozen, as later chapters will show. But the above characteristics are definite indications of dictatorship, a rule to which not all men have equal access. They are the tactics of all owners in all countries and all periods of history when they feel themselves threatened. They are the tactics to which owners of private property resorted in Italy and Germany when the rising votes of communist and socialist workers threatened their ownership. They are resorted to today in sections of America where property feels threatened, whether by farmhands in Imperial Valley or sharecroppers in Arkansas and Alabama. They will be resorted to on a wider scale if American capitalism really feels itself slipping. Nothing in Soviet history indicates that the Bolsheviks were any more “dictatorial” or ruthless than owners of property anywhere under similar stresses. Certainly they were far less bloody and oppressive than any of the “dictatorships of the right”—whether in Hungary, Finland, China, Italy or Germany—established in retaliation or prevention by private ownership which really felt itself in danger.&lt;br /&gt;
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What were the conditions which made the Bolsheviks establish a dictatorship? Why could they not wait until they were voted into power, and then take over one by one, by government decree or by taxation, the large-scale properties which they believed must be socially owned? The history of fascist seizures of power in face of the threat of socialist voting is beginning to give the world the answer to this question. The Bolsheviks knew the answer from their Marxian analysis of history. No owning class ever gave up ownership without struggle. The holding of government office is not itself power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The power of ownership over the means of life is the day-by-day power which works incessantly, buying brains, corrupting or confusing governments, persistently re-establishing itself against any “will of the people.” Anyone who has experienced in a single American city, as I have in Seattle, the intensity and variety of methods which the capitalists use to fight so mild a thing as public ownership of street-cars, anyone who knows what they did to the war-time government-owned railroads, or today to the Tennessee Valley Corporation, must realize the resources possessed by capitalism against anything so mild as a popular vote. When they can no longer prevent a municipally owned utility, they corrupt it. They make it inefficient through graft or sabotage; they subordinate it to control by private banks. Meantime they continue to play through all the arts of high-paid propaganda on the minds of the electors, who waver and turn to other cures.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The change from capitalism to communism is a whole epoch of history,” said Lenin. “Till it is ended, the exploiters inevitably have the hope of restoration.” Even after capitalists are overthrown on a local scale or on the scale of a single country, they remain for some time “stronger than the workers who overthrew them.” Their strength lies in their foreign connections with international capital, in the money and movable property which they still possess, in their organizing and administrative ability, their superior education, their knowledge of all the secrets of administration, their superiority in the art of war. They are furthermore helped by the force of habit and traditional ways of thinking which remain even in the minds of workers and especially in large sections of the middle classes for a considerable period after capitalism is overthrown.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted and condensed from Lenin, &#039;&#039;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&#039;&#039;, Chap. 3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxists therefore hold that the working class must maintain a dictatorial power for an “entire epoch of history” both to prevent attempts at restoration of capitalism and to re-educate the entire population in habits suited to socially owned production. “You will have to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil wars and international wars,” said Marx to the workers, “not only to change external conditions, but in order to change yourselves and to make yourselves fit for the exercise of political power.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &#039;&#039;Revelations on the Communist Trial in Cologne&#039;&#039;, 1851.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The tactics used by the dictatorship in the Soviet Union were conditioned by the economic development of the land and its international relations. In the first years they were affected by foreign intervention and civil war; in later, years they conformed to and created the rapid economic advance and increasing international prestige of the country. Four chief epochs may be noted: the period of Workers’ Control in the first year of the Revolution; War Communism for the two and a half years of intervention; the New Economic Policy from 1921 to 1928; and the final offensive against capitalism ushered in by the first Five-Year Plan.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new workers’ state inherited a country economically broken by the strain of World War. Peasants were seizing lands of landlords; factories had closed and their workers were hungry; banking was demoralized by the rapid fall of the currency; soldiers without food or munitions were fleeing home from the front. “Peace, land and bread,” was the cry of the country. The capitalists could not satisfy it and this brought the Bolsheviks to power. They at once gave land to the peasants, repudiated all state debts, nationalized banks and transport and created a state monopoly of foreign trade. Industry was left in private hands, but “workers’ control” committees were established from the workers in each industry. These examined all accounts, studied the source of raw materials and fought to keep up production against the attempt of private capitalists to close down the factories as unprofitable. Internal trade remained private; on the second day of the Revolution a proclamation urged traders to continue business as usual. A policy however was announced for the gradual combining of factories into large-scale trusts, which should then be nationalized, and for the gradual socializing of internal trade through co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
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These policies—the normal reaction of a workers’ government wishing to rebuild the economic life of a ruined country with as little upheaval and disruption as possible, for the sake not of profit but of human welfare—united around the government the overwhelming majority of the population, including both workers and peasants. Opposition came from landlords, capitalists and the upper strata of engineers, civil servants and professional people; but if these used violence or sabotage against the new policy, they were suppressed by governing organizations composed of great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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A vivid example of dictatorship in this period is given by Lenin, in a contrast drawn between dictatorship by property and dictatorship by workers. “The state has forcibly to evict a family from a house. This is done time and again by the capitalist state and will be done by our proletarian state. . . . The capitalist state evicts the workers’ family which has lost its breadwinner and is unable to pay rent.” After describing the enforcement by a squad of police of the rights of property against poor people, Lenin continues with the picture of the dispossession of a rich man by the workers’ state.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Our detachment of workers’ militia consists, let us say, of fifteen people—two sailors, two soldiers, two class-conscious workers (of whom only one, let us assume, is a member of our Party or a sympathizer), one intellectual, and eight members of the toiling poor; at least five are necessarily women, domestic servants, unskilled workers, and so on. They come to the rich man’s house, inspect it, and find that there are five rooms occupied by two men and two women. “This winter, citizens, you must confine yourselves to two rooms and place two rooms at the disposal of two families that are now living in cellars. For the time being, until with the help of engineers (you are an engineer, I think?) we build good dwellings for all, you will have to put yourselves to inconvenience. Your telephone will serve ten families. This will save about a hundred hours’ work in running to the stores and so forth. The student citizen in our detachment will write out two copies of the text of this state order and you will be kind enough to give us a signed declaration that you undertake to abide by it faithfully.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Will the Bolsheviks Retain Power?&#039;&#039; published October, 1917.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This is a vivid example of a dictatorship over property enforced by great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under pressure of foreign intervention and civil war, the limited nationalization of “Workers’ Control” merged into the period of “War Communism.” Attacking armies separated Soviet Russia for two and a half years from her chief food and fuel bases. The granary of the Ukraine, the cotton of Turkestan, the coal of the Donetz, the oil of Baku, the mines of the Urals were in enemy hands. The dictatorship adopted “War Communism,” the tactics of a besieged land. It requisitioned all grain and necessities of life, and rationed them under direct government control; it seized all factories and used the broken machines of one as spares to repair the scarcely less broken machines of another. This policy alienated large sections of the peasantry by crop requisition. It ruined industry more thoroughly than any modern industry has ever been ruined, being an efficient device for using up the last ounce of raw material and the last spare bolt. But the policy of “War Communism” enabled an already exhausted land to carry on for two and a half more years against the attacking armies of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet power survived. With the coming of peace Lenin at once introduced the New Economic Policy, an attempt to build up the country’s economic life as rapidly as possible by a “two-sided process of the development of capitalism and the development of socialism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 314.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Grain requisitions were replaced by limited taxes with permission for free trade. Private capitalists were allowed to enter both trade and industry, the state retaining the “commanding heights” of land, finance, heavy industry, transport, and foreign trade. This policy brought the peasant, small enterpriser and professional classes back to loyalty—a wavering loyalty, for if some had been won to socialism, others now hoped to grow personally rich. Capitalist nations abroad echoed the belief that Russia was swinging back to the ancient order. But the Soviet workers, led by the Communists, gave time on holidays to great collective drives for repairing factories, making street-cars and new equipment as donations to their country. During “War Communism” they had worked for rations; now they worked for low but steadily increasing wages, building up out of their own sacrifice the first socialist accumulation which should give them economic power for the final offensive against capitalism. Thus industry which in 1921 produced one-fifth the pre-war standard was driven by fivefold increase in 1928 to “normalcy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia in 1928 was only half socialist. Most of industry was socially owned but farming was in the hands of peasant proprietors, the stronger of whom were petty capitalists, struggling not only to survive but to grow. Class strife went on between these emerging rural capitalists and the impoverished farmhands. Youth was leaving the farms and flooding the cities with unemployment. Discussion had racked the Communist Party as to whether socialism could be built in a single country, particularly a backward peasant land. Following the analysis of Stalin, the Party decided that it could be done by swiftly creating modern heavy industry and simultaneously industrializing farming. The Soviet Union plunged into that now famous struggle known as the Five-Year Plan, and emerged with large-scale industry and the largest scale farming in the world, both of them socially owned.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a bitter fight, carried through against the upper sections of the peasantry and part of the middle class. An epidemic of sabotage broke out in the industries among the higher engineering staff, who had consciously or half-consciously expected to advance towards privilege and wealth. Men high in the canning industry put broken glass, animal hair and fish tails into food destined for workers. A township veterinary who hated collectivization inoculated six thousand horses with plague. An irrigation engineer tried to discourage the policy of settling yellow-skinned nomads on the soil by using antiquated surveys which he knew would not deliver the water. These cases and thousands more are taken from confessions of men who were later repentant. The dictatorship fought back, shooting the most serious offenders, imprisoning and exiling others. The energy of loyal workers and engineers carried through the Five-Year Plan. Its success won over many earlier saboteurs so that by 1931 Stalin was able to announce that the intellectuals were turning towards the Soviet Government, and should be met by a policy of co-operation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Speech delivered at Conference of Leaders of Industry, June 23, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The most spectacular act of ruthlessness which occurred in those years was the exiling of several hundred thousand kulaks—rural property-owners who lived by trade, money-lending or by exploiting small mills, threshers, and hired labor—from farm homes in European Russia and the Ukraine to Siberia or the northern woods. The usual assumption outside the Soviet Union is that this exiling occurred through arbitrary action by a mystically omnipotent G.P.U. That organization did of Course organize the deportation and final place of settlement in labor camps or on new land. But the listing of kulaks who “impede our farming by force and violence” was done by village meetings of poor peasants and farmhands who were feverishly and not too efficiently organizing collectively owned farms with government loans of machinery and credits. The meetings I personally attended were as seriously judicial as a court trial in America. One by one there came before the people the “best families,” who had grabbed the best lands, exploited labor by owning the tools of production as best families normally and historically do, and who were fighting the rise of the collective farm—which had the right to take the best lands away from them—by every means up to arson, cattle-killing and murder. Obviously the situation offered chances for wreaking private grudges. Obviously the occasional agitator from the city was unconcerned with kulak “rights.” The meeting of farmhands and poor peasants discussed each case in turn, questioned the kulaks, allowed most of them to remain but asked the government to deport some as “trouble-makers.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a harsh, bitter and by no means bloodless conflict, but not one peculiar to Russia. I was reminded of it again in 1933 by the cotton-pickers’ strike in San Joaquin Valley of California. California local authorities deported pickets who interfered with the farming of ranchers; Soviet authorities deported kulaks who interfered with the collectively owned farming of the poor. In both cases central governments sent commissions to guard against the worst excesses. But the “property” which could count on government support was in California that of the wealthy rancher; in the USSR it was the collective property of the poor.&lt;br /&gt;
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Through all these struggles of eighteen years in the Soviet Union the Marxists had guessed right—one class held firm. Steadily the industrial workers supported and fought for their socialist state. Theirs was the dictatorship, the ownership, the rule. Led by Communist analysis, they made alliances with other parts of the population—with the great mass of the people to overthrow big landlords and capitalists and later with the poorer peasants to overthrow the richer. The middle classes changed back and forth in their loyalty; but the workers held through.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today the chief fight of the dictatorship is against corruption and bureaucracy. The workers, in other words, struggle with their own government, not to overthrow it but to improve it by weeding out inefficiency. A vivid example of this was given by a letter from three railway-workers published in &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;. They told how the workers of their station, hearing that Sizran station was considered a model, chose three delegates to go and study it. “The election fell on us. However, to our great regret, we convinced ourselves that Sizran is no model.” The letter proceeds to expose fictitious bookkeeping which compelled engineers to list repeated repairs as new in order to protect the reputation of the repair shops, and other false entries which hid inefficiencies. They noted employees who had been demoted for calling too open attention to troubles. They did a thorough and technically accurate job of debunking Sizran, a station on a different railroad to which they had gone in search of good methods. Imagine workers from a station on the Erie giving this attention to study, analyze and reform a station on the Pennsylvania! Imagine their securing ready access to all the records of an alien line! Imagine this as routine news in a metropolitan daily paper, leading to check-up and reprimands of railway superintendents for inaccuracy in reporting their work!&lt;br /&gt;
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This is today’s routine in the Soviet Union. Scores of letters like this appear daily in the press throughout the land. Some of them are ironic, some statistical, some outraged. But all of them express men who know themselves owners, and through ownership dictators of the land in which they live.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER IV: THE GROWING DEMOCRACY ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Soviet Power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Step by step the Soviet Union fights forward towards that complete democracy which has never yet existed anywhere on earth. For democracy is neither absolute nor static. It varies in type, extent and intensity. It may grow or diminish. In the Soviet Union it grows.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are the functions of government in the Soviet Union? How wide is the participation of the people? How much of their life can they control? Whence come the ideas that are followed in the land? What initiative and creative energy is expressed? Who rises to high posts and by what means? All these questions must be considered in determining what kind of democracy exists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take first the formal facts of voting, though this is far from exhausting in the Soviet citizen’s participation in government. The Soviet Union has today the largest body of voters any where in the world. Moreover a larger percentage of them come out to elections than in any other country; they give more time to their elections and decide a greater variety of questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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All “toilers” over the age of eighteen may elect and be elected; the word is interpreted to include students, housewives, old people who have passed the age of work as well as those more formally known as workers. Voting thus extends to a younger age than is common elsewhere, and there are no disqualifications for transient residents, paupers, migratory workers, soldiers, sailors, such as exist in most countries; even non-citizens may vote if they work in a Soviet industry. There are no restrictions for sex, creed or color, nor even for illiteracy. The only significant restriction relates to “exploiting elements,” but the steady decrease of privately owned enterprises has cut the disfranchised to 2.5 per cent of the population in the 1934 elections; by 1937 it is expected that all will have the vote. In the 1934 elections 91,000,000 people were entitled to vote, and of these 77,000,000, or 85 per cent, actually participated, which is double the proportion found in most countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take a motion picture of a Soviet election. In December 1934 the Moscow streets were thronged with processions, continuing for several days. Special street-cars, gay with banners, carried people to meetings. Men and women gathered in side streets, formed in line with merry chatter and went with bands and flags to the building secured for their election meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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All over the country for more than a month elections had been going on in far-away factories and villages. Soviet elections do not take place on a single day but are determined by local convenience within a period of several weeks prior to the convening of an All-Union Congress. Localities choose dates which will enable their outgoing governments to finish their business, and give the incoming governments time to prepare demands for the All-Union Congress. These candidates and demands had been subjects of much discussion. But the attitude to the elections expressed itself rather in action than in talk. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were joining collective farms “to break with the past and enter the elections as collective farmers.” Factory workers were energetically completing new models of locomotives, turbines, inventions, to send as presents to the coming congress. There were, in fact, so many of these presents that the sending of most of them was ordered confined to reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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In wooded mountains of Siberia the dark-skinned Oirots announced proudly: “We have abandoned the wandering life of wigwams; we have raised our literacy rate from 6 to 89 per cent; we enter these elections as educated farmers, settled on our own soil.” From the Turkoman Republic they were matching this claim with another: “Our once suppressed women have increased the proportion who turn out to elections from 2.5 per cent to 73 per cent in these eight years.” The historic city of Kiev was boasting: “Half our elected deputies are women. We lead the Soviet Union in the proportion of women elected to office; this means that we lead the world.” But their boast was matched by the textile city Tver, now renamed Kalinin, which has fully as many.&lt;br /&gt;
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Young Pioneers were reciting poems to urge on their elders:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;That we may build more firmly,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Advancing more confidently to victory,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;We choose to our Soviets firm, tested fighters,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Close-welded, the best of our best.&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On the southern Kazak steppe an aged yellow-skinned herdsman, dying, sent a last message to his son who had been village president and who was now elected delegate to the All-Union Congress: “All the years of my life were dark with toil and hunger. But I lived to see the new day. Take care of the Soviet power, my son; it is our power, our happiness.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Along the Arctic coast the autumn herring run began a few days before the date set for local elections. The fishermen went to sea. Some of the election commissioners held elections in the absence of a considerable number of voters and were roundly denounced for it by &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, central organ of the Communist Party. “A gross violation of Soviet democracy! What right have commissioners to hold elections when workers cannot come? We are glad to note that many of the ﬁshermen had a better sense of their obligations. Many crews held their own meetings and sent deputies ashore with their instructions. But they should not have been forced to this irregularity. The proper course was found by those commissioners who held regular election meetings on the boats and thus combined enthusiastic work for a good herring catch with the collective decision of what to do with it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this, taken together and multiplied by millions, makes plain the essence of the Soviet election. It is an act of joint owners deciding what to do with their production, how to build a good life on the proceeds. The task of officials is not to enforce some precedent but to find ways of adjusting election machinery to voters. “The hottest elections we ever had,” they bragged of the 1934 elections, proud of the increasing popular participation in government, which is relied on to check bureaucracy and make state enterprises efficient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic unit for government is the working institution, the factory or office; in rural districts it is the village. Deputies are chosen to the local government, the village or city soviet.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The word “soviet” means “council.” City soviet is city council.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The basis of representation and size of the local soviet depends on the size of the community: Gulin village, whose election I visited, has one deputy for every forty voters and a village soviet of thirteen members. Moscow city elects one deputy for fifteen hundred voters and has more than two thousand members in its city soviet. These local deputies meet soon after election to form the new government. They divide among themselves the various departments, which range from the five sections of Gulin village—farming, livestock, culture, roads and finance—to twenty-eight sections, each with over forty deputies, through which Moscow city does business. Besides the more commonly known functions, these local governments own and manage local industry, which in a large city like Moscow includes many municipally owned factories, the street-cars, subway, lights, water, and housing. They receive revenue from public properties, but their budgets may also be augmented by taxes and state loans. Some cities actually bring in revenue—it will be remembered that they get all the house rents; others need help from the higher governments.&lt;br /&gt;
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On these local governments is built up the whole structure of central government.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A new constitution is in preparation which will change many details, but it will hardly change the principle of close connection between local, state and central bodies in one system.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Local soviets elect deputies to a congress of soviets; the township congress elects to the province, and so on up to the All-Union Congress of Soviets, the highest body in the country. Each of these congresses elects its executive committee and the heads of its various departments; for the highest government these are the great Commissariats of heavy and light industry, finance, health, and so forth. Local departments are both horizontally and vertically controlled, by local governments and by the corresponding department in the higher government. Thus a township health department is responsible both to the township executive committee and to the provincial health department. If orders clash, if a local soviet takes the hospital for some other use, its health department appeals to the provincial health department which brings pressure on the local soviet through the provincial government in the interests of public health.&lt;br /&gt;
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The greater part of this intricate yet unified system of government is carried on by unpaid work. Elected deputies, whether to village or the All-Union Congress, receive no salaries of office. They draw their usual wages from the factory or institution which sends them and in which they keep on working, except insofar as they may be “released from production” for the needs of government; this varies with the importance of the work they do. There is thus no hard and fast line between the citizen and the man in office. Deputies are a link between the collective life of the factory and the larger collective life of the country. Any worker may approach them conveniently any day in their place of work to ask about the fulfillment of instructions given by the voters. They may be recalled by their constituents at any time simply through a factory meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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If voters thus constantly call on their deputies, the deputies are equally entitled to call on the voters for help in carrying out the election program they have voted. A deputy is no substitute for the people, no ruler; he is the representative who organizes them in their own tasks of voluntary government work. Millions of citizens take active part in the sections of the government—housing commissions, school commissions, taxing commissions, labor inspection and so on. Those who develop a taste for running public affairs will be chosen at some election for more continuous and responsible work. Those who specialize in some field, such as health, courts, housing, may be sent on pay for some months or years of study and become full-time civil servants in these departments.&lt;br /&gt;
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The growth of democracy in the Soviet Union thus depends directly on the extent to which citizens can be interested in taking part in operations of government. This interest is in part assured by the fact that government is so clearly the direct organizing of all aspects of the citizen’s life. In a million matters the citizens give direct instructions during the election. They order the increase of school-houses or sound films, the improvement in the quality of bread, the increase of retail stores, the transport of goods in big cities by night; they demand the breaking-up of housing trusts into smaller co-operatives, or the introduction of a less specialized education in the schools. All of these were part of some 48,000 instructions issued directly by Moscow voters to their city government, which reported within three months on the fulfillment of many hundred demands and on the disposition made of all. When instructions clash, as when some citizens want an odorous industrial plant removed from their neighborhood while others want it to stay, commissions are formed which try to satisfy not merely the majority, but as nearly as possible everybody, not through a showing of hands in opposition, but through various adjustments to the suggestions made by all. Capitalist ownership of private property limits the citizen’s participation, in government to an approval or rejection—expressed in conflict—of general policies. Socialist ownership causes government policies to grow directly and naturally from the correlated demands of millions of people, all of whom are interested in improving the country’s wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The interest of citizens in government is also consciously promoted by the Communist Party which stirs up wide competitions between factories, villages, cities, as to the extent and energy of their participation. An industrial plant where less than 95 per cent of the workers come to the election hangs its head in shame as an institution lacking in civic consciousness. Candidates never make speeches or election promises; this would be considered highly indelicate. But the voters pride themselves on picking deputies whose previous work has been notable and who therefore give promise of being widely useful. They select a fellow worker, not an outside politician. Students choose a student, auto-workers choose an auto-worker, the Moscow Grand Opera elects a famous singer. The future task of these deputies is to extend on a wider scale the type of work for which they are already known. The opera singer will organize connections between the Moscow Grand Opera and the villages, sending out artists to help rural singing classes. The printer on the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; who mechanized its mailing list of two million subscribers was elected to the Moscow city soviet with instructions to help mechanize all the newspapers of the city. A textile worker who helps organize a good day nursery in her factory will be elected by her fellow workers to help improve the city’s day nurseries, and will choose to work on the health section of the local government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The operation of Soviet democracy is thus so intimate, continuous and organic that the observer fresh from capitalist politics hardly recognizes it as government. Where is the debate? Who determines general policies? Can the people throw out the upper officials? Can they throw out Stalin? The Communist Party? The Soviet voter, when asked these last questions, replies in a puzzled way: “Why should we want to?” The questioner thinks he has been evaded. But all elections presuppose an existing economic system, which voting is powerless to change. Voters in America cannot change Rockefeller’s method of operating oil companies for private profit. Similarly no Soviet election raises the issue of returning public properties to private hands: this was settled by the Revolution, and forms the foundation beneath the whole government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Barring that question, there is nothing whatever that Soviet voters cannot change. They actually do change thousands of officials at every election, and as their acquaintance with the wider problems of the country grows, the forms of democracy are being widened to include direct control of the highest officials. Stalin’s chief post is not in the government, but as general secretary of the Communist Party, which would certainly remove him if his policy and actions should ever discredit him with the people; at present he is by far the most popular man in the country. To throw out the Communist Party bodily would be to throw out all the leading and organizing elements in all factories, farms, schools and enterprises; it could clearly be done only by upheaval leading to chaos. But the citizens are constantly at work changing the very membership of the Party, any member of which may be “cleaned out” on protest of his non-Party associates that he is too dictatorial, too rough towards workers, or merely not a fit leader.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This is discussed in Chaps. 1 and 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Several elections which I attended will show concretely how soviet democracy functions. Four election meetings were held simultaneously in different hamlets of Gulin village, which had no assembly hall big enough for all. One of these meetings threw out the Party candidate, Borisov, because they felt that he neglected their instructions; they elected a non-Party woman who had displayed energy in improving the village and were praised by the election commissioner—himself a Party member—for having discovered good government timber which the Party had neglected. The central meeting in Gulin expected 235 voters; 227 appeared and were duly checked off by name at the door. There ensued personal discussion of every one of nine candidates, of whom seven were chosen. Mihailov “did good work on the roads.” The most enthusiasm developed over Menshina, a woman who “does everything assigned her energetically; checks farm property, tests seeds, collects state loans.” Dr. Sharkova, head of the Mothers’ Consultation, was pushed by the women: “We need a sanitary expert to clean up our village.” The incoming soviet was instructed to “increase harvest yield within two years to thirty bushels per acre, to organize a stud farm, get electricity and radio for every home, organize adult education courses, football and skiing teams, and satisfy a score of other needs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Moscow Architectural Institute where 1,500 men and women are qualifying to become architects, every class in the school held three sessions on the elections, discussing first the shortcomings of the outgoing government, then instructions to the new government, and lastly candidates. The fourteen hundred instructions sent in by the students included more and better draughting pencils, evening schools in drawing, more money for students’ excursions to see new architecture, more exhibitions of foreign architecture, fruit trees to beautify Moscow, artists to be held responsible for designs of state-made texiles, township architects to be appointed to advise the new construction on farms. Similarly the 1,500 voters of the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; turned in 1,500 proposals, which were carefully worked over by committees, published in a special newspaper issued for the voters, and given to their deputy to put through with their help. These included adequate textbooks for all pupils in the schools, an increase in the number of children’s theaters, strengthening the fight against hooliganism, closing the sale of liquor on Suchevski Street opposite school Twenty-two—the latter being the common form of the fight against alcohol.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instructions thus adopted become the program of incoming governments, which they use as a weapon to get what they require from provincial and central authorities. Some of the demands can be put through by the electors themselves with the help of their deputy; others need central assistance. When the All-Union Congress meets it knows how many villages are demanding air-dromes, sound films, textbooks, electrification. These demands, correlated by engineers and economists, form the content for future development of the life of the country in the direction its citizens choose. But the citizens themselves expect to work to accomplish it. If villagers ask for a seven-room school or a landing field for farm airplanes, they expect deputies to investigate possible fields, make recommendations, get the needed machines from some central authority; but they themselves expect to haul the timber or pay the men who haul it with labor days credited against the joint harvest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Democracy in Soviet life is not confined to government. Trade unions organize many aspects of workers’ life; collective farms and co-operatives organize production and distribution for the farmers. Their organization is separate from that of government; it is also democratically controlled. In the past two years democracy has become more intimate and decentralized in both these directions. The administration of social insurance, which in 1936 will have eight billion rubles for hospitals, day nurseries, diet kitchens, invalid benefits, old-age pensions and the like, was two years ago given over to the trade unions, as was also the inspection of factories and of workers’ food stores. Similarly the whole organization of collective farming, including the relation between fields operated jointly and plots individually worked by farm members, is today in the hands of the farmers themselves, decided by the general meeting at which not less than two-thirds are present. Thus democracy grows more flexible, the intermediate apparatus is lessened, and the various functions of government are handled by those whom they most directly concern.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The extension of social ownership into the farms and the growth in the intelligence of the entire electorate has made possible a third extension of democracy. A new constitution is being drafted by the collective labor of thousands of people in all parts of the land. Economists and historians are studying the constitutions of all countries and considering every detail of democratic technique; their reports will be further discussed in every factory and farm of the country before the constitution takes final form. It is known, however, that it will include direct election, secret ballot, and equal representation for all citizens, replacing the inequality which hitherto obtained between city workers and peasants. At is also expected to abolish all disfranchised classes, since by 1937 social ownership will be universal and all citizens will belong to one toiling-owning class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty,” was said once of the democracy of capitalist society whereby small private owners protected their rights. But socialism demands more than vigilance. Eternally co-operating human energy is the price of socialism and of that complete democracy which operates jointly owned means of production for the expanding life of all. This is the final stage towards which the present Soviet democracy struggles and grows.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER V: THE UNION OF NATIONS ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Soviet power is to toiling Kazaks like rain in the desert.”|Letter of Kazak peasant to Peasants’ Gazette.}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the All-Union Congress of Soviets meets in Moscow, it presents a vivid and colorful assembly. Flat-faced Tartars from old Kazan, yellow-skinned Uzbeks and Tajiks from the hills and irrigated valleys in the heart of Asia, slant-eyed Tunguz from the Far Northeast over against Alaska, mix with many score nationalities from the Caucasus to pass the laws which shall govern all these peoples. Many of them are dark-skinned peoples, formerly exploited by the Russians, but equal citizens now under the Soviets. It is as if Congress in Washington contained a score of southern Negroes, half a dozen Mexican farmers from Arizona and California, scattered representatives of the surviving tribes of Indians, an Eskimo, a Hawaiian, an Indian from Porto Rico, a mixed-blood from Panama, all legislating on equal terms with auto-workers from Detroit, steel-workers and miners from the Pittsburgh valley, and American farmers from the great west, A British governing assembly similarly formed would show an overwhelming majority from the dark-skinned peoples of Asia and Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tsarist Russia was known as the “prison of nations.” No imperialist power has a history of more brutal racial and national oppression, Nation after nation of the proud mountaineers in the Caucasus was literally driven into the Black Sea by the conquering Russians. The Tartars of Crimea perished by tens of thousands in their flight across the Black Sea to Turkey. The tribes of the great plains and the primitive peoples of the Arctic were debauched in the time-honored imperialist way by the vodka of their conqueror and subdued in soul by the emissaries of his religion, that they might be more easily robbed of lands and furs. Even more bitter, perhaps, than the robbery was the insulting “superiority of the conquerors. “They cheated us and afterwards despised us,” said a flashing-eyed woman Tunguz from the Arctic. &amp;quot;Eh, but it was bad in the old days; all my life I hated Russians.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The country which fell to the Soviet power to organize was seething with national hates, incited and nurtured by the oppression of centuries. Tsarist imperialism, like all imperialisms, not only oppressed directly, but also set one nation against another. Turks massacred Armenians, Armenians massacred Turks, Ukrainian peasants, stirred up by Russian gendarmes, murdered Jews. The Soviet Government faced in all its intensity that “national problem&amp;quot; which made Austria and the Balkans for generations the tinder box of Europe and has added bitterness to the great conflicts of the modern world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Communist policy on nationality was developed over a period of decades by applying the Marxian analysis to the history of nations. Stalin, a Georgian, member of a proud nation which had for centuries been decimated by the wars of its greater neighbors in that hotbed of national hates, the Caucasus, was one of the ablest theoreticians. We find him in the years before the World War developing the exact definition of “nation” as a “historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Marxism and the National Question&#039;&#039;, 1913.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and defending this conception against those who viewed a nation as a matter of &amp;quot;race,” the precursors of today’s fascists, Capitalism both combines nations and drives them asunder. It knits together peoples of earth by the railroad, the steamboat, the rapid mail, the newspaper. It creates the material basis for the brotherhood of all nations but the methods of its expansion brutally thwart that hope It advances into the backward lands of earth by plunder and annexation. The “civilized” people rob the &amp;quot;uncivilized&amp;quot; ones and finally war among themselves for the right to rob. Imperialism steadily increases both the economic unity of the earth, and the national hates which tear the unity asunder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The national policy adopted on the basis of the analysis by the Social-Democratic Party of Russia in the years before the war repudiated every form of compulsion of nationalities, recognized the right of each people to determine its destiny, and stated that a durable union of peoples could be accomplished only by voluntary consent and was possible only through the overthrow of capitalism. The first practical test of this principle came in May of 1917, when the Kerensky government of Russia refused the demand of Finland to secede. Lenin declared at the conference of the Social-Democratic Party on May 12: “We say to the Russian people: don’t dare rape Finland; no nation can be free that oppresses other nations.” Stalin expressed the belief that, “now after the overthrow of tsardom nine-tenths of the peoples will not desire secession,” but that those who did wish to, must if course be allowed to secede, while a system of regional economy should be set up for the peoples which decided to remain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the October Revolution brought the Bolsheviks into power, they at once renounced all rights to Finland, evacuated the Russian troops from northern Persia and canceled the claims of the Russian imperialists in Mongolia and China. The breaking up of tsarist Russia gave an opportunity to the imperialist powers of the world to fish in troubled waters. England, France, and Germany backed the aspirations of various border nationalities with funds. Yet it was the Bolsheviks and not those imperialist backers who first recognized Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania as separate states. The Soviets, however, did not only recognize nations; they recognized the right of the workers and peasants to revolt. The Ukrainian workers and peasants overthrew the Ukrainian bourgeois Rada; the poor peasants of Turkestan threw out their so-called autonomous government; the “national councils” of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were supported by foreign money but not by their own masses. Peasants’ and workers’ uprisings in these countries were assisted by the Bolsheviks as part of the October Revolution. The newly rising governments of workers and peasants were given military and economic and drawn into a socialist “federation.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This federation at first was loosely organized. Regional autonomy expressed itself in a variety of flexible forms. Some of these local governments retained their own foreign offices; others issued their own money. Each nationality received the amount of freedom which its workers and peasants demanded. The Communists relied on the pressure of mutual common interests to bring and hold these peoples together, once capitalist exploitation, the source of their bitterness, was removed. Meanwhile, they paved the way by abolishing all the special privileges of the &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“colonizers,” i.e., those Russian and Cossack groups which had received special lands and privileges from the tsar in return for their services in suppressing their neighbors. The Communists also pushed the policy of recruiting local governments from local people, established schools, courts, administrations, in the native languages, and rapidly trained from formerly illiterate and suppressed natives the future teachers and leaders of their people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fruits of this policy were seen on December 30, 1922, when, on the initiative of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, later joined by the Ukraine and White Russia, the amalgamation of all the Soviet Republics into a union took place at the very time when the states if post-war Europe were increasingly dividing into hostile camps. Thus was formed the Soviet Union, a union of nations. The name “Russian&amp;quot; was dropped from the official title of the country which is known as the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, of which the Russian republic is only one.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There are seven constituent republics, the Russian, the Ukrainian, the White Russian, the Transcaucasian, the Uzbek, the Turkoman, the Tajik. Many of these, and especially the Russian, which is by far the largest, contain smaller autonomous republics within them. The number of nations represented by delegates in the All-Union Council of Nationalities is forty-two.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Nearly half of its 170 million people belong to nationalities other than Russian. The number of these nationalities is variously given; the census of December, 1926, showed 182 different nationalities with 149 languages. They are people of different races and colors. They range from the reindeer keeping Eskimo of the north, to the Kazak sheep herder of southern deserts, from the flax growers of White Russian swamps through the many-nationed Volga wheat lands to the cotton producers of Central Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The classic statement of the contrast between the national policy of capitalism and that of socialism was given in the preamble to the Constitution of the new union: “There in the camp of capitalism we have national animosity and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist brutalities and wars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Here, in the camp of socialism, we have mutual confidence and peace, national freedom and equality, the peaceful co-existence and fraternal collaboration of peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The attempts made by the capitalist world during the course of decades to solve the problem of nationalities by combining the free development of peoples with the system of exploitation of man by man have proved fruitless.... The bourgeoisie has proved itself utterly incapable of bringing about the collaboration of peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Only in the camp of the Soviets... has it proved possible to abolish national oppression root and branch, to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, and to lay the foundations for the fraternal collaboration of peoples.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The preamble mentioned, as reasons for a closer union, the economic needs of the war-ruined land, the need of a joint foreign and military policy in the midst of encircling foes, and said that “the very structure of Soviet government, which is internationalist in its class character, impels the toiling masses of the Soviet republics to unite into one socialist family.” It concluded with a guarantee of equal status for all people, the right of secession for each republic and the right of admission for “all Soviet Republics, whether now existing or hereafter to arise.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bolsheviks did not rest content with the formal act of union. The Central Congress, elected on the basis of population, which put the Russian nationality in a dominant position, was supplemented by a “council of nationalities.&amp;quot; It is one of the two chambers of the legislative and administrative government of the country, no legislation involving national rights may be passed without it. Besides this legal status of equality, a policy was adopted assisting the more backward nationalities in their economic and cultural development, which alone could give them actual equality with the more developed nationalities. New industrial centers were established, modern methods of agriculture and irrigation introduced, peasant and handicraft co-operatives organized. Every national republic was encouraged in the fullest development of a culture, “national in form, socialist in content.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The meaning of that phrase, &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;national in form and socialist in content,” was vividly expressed for me by a Jew of Birobidjan, the autonomous Jewish territory rising in the Soviet Far East. “We distinguish between nationalism and nationality,” he said. &amp;quot;If we should claim that the Jews are a chosen people, the best and brainiest in the world, that’s nationalism. It’s dangerous nonsense, the kind of murderous nonsense that leads Turks to attack Armenians or white Americans to lynch Negroes. The assertion of the right of one culture to dominate another, or even to pre-eminence—that is the capitalist wish to exploit, and it leads to war. We have no right to exploit or to claim pre-eminence; but we have the same rights as others to develop our own characteristic culture in peace. The free development of all kinds of national culture adds to the variety and significance of the world. Our policy in this matter is part of the Soviet respect for human individuality—which again is different from individualism. We have no respect for the individuals who hold back history; but all those individuals who help push history forward—workers, writers, all productive elements—must be helped to fullest expression. Hence the Soviet Union has respect for even the smallest national culture, since each of them enriches all human culture and each of them is unique. Eventually, we shall no doubt all merge in one nation and one language, but the road to it is not by suppression and impoverishment, but by the fullest development of all variety.”&lt;br /&gt;
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National prejudices still exist in the minds of some Russians, due to their past privilege of superiority. National grudges still remain in the minds of formerly suppressed peoples, who long learned to distrust the Russians. These form the final problem. If they lead to even minor conflicts based on nationality, they are firmly dealt with. Ordinary drunken brawls between Russians may be lightly handled as misdemeanors, but let a brawl occur between a Russian and a Jew in which national names are used in a way insulting to national dignity, and this becomes a serious political offense. Usually, the remnants of national antagonisms require no such drastic methods; they yield to education. But the American workers who helped build the Stalingrad Tractor Plant will long remember the clash which Lewis and Brown had with the Soviet courts after their fight with the Negro Robinson, in the course of which they called him “damn low-down nigger.&amp;quot; The two white men went back to America, disgraced in Soviet eyes by a serious political offense; the Negro remained and is now a member of the Moscow City Government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What has been the result of this national policy of the Communists, applied to people in all stages of development from the nomads of the great plains to the proudly cultured Georgians? It &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
has welded the strength of scores of formerly subject peoples around the Revolution and enabled the Russian workers to beat back their enemies. It has abolished age-long hates with unbelievable speed. It has released tremendous energy of devotion which gave a great economic and cultural impetus. It has dealt a mortal blow to that legend of “inferior” and “superior&amp;quot; races into which capitalism divided the earth, the former of which are the doomed objects of exploitation, while the latter bear “the white man’s burden,”—the mission to exploit. Over against this legend, exalted today by fascism into a religion, stands the whole experience of the USSR. The liberated non-European nations, once drawn into the channel of Soviet development, are no less capable than Europeans of truly progressive civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New centers of industry have risen m the national republics more rapidly than in the rest of the Soviet Union, as part of the Communist policy to ‘equalize the backward districts with the center.’ During the first Five-Year Plan, when the industrial output of the entire country doubled, it increased 3.5 times in the national republics. The progress was most rapid in the most backward; the great plains of Kazakstan saw a 4.5 times increase in industrial output, which the Central Asian Republics attained a sixfold growth. Based on these economic achievements was the growth in education and culture. Seventy nationalities adopted the Latin alphabet during the first Five-Year Plan. Many nationalities had no alphabet at all before the Revolution; they received their written language as a gift from the Soviet power. Among all the nations spectacular increases had been made in literacy, in the growth of books and in the arts. The first All-Union Theatrical Olympiad held some years ago showed that many nations have developed a truly national theater, which in some cases has already reached the level of high art.&lt;br /&gt;
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An important chapter in Soviet national policy is the story of how ten million nomads are being transformed into stable fanners. The Kirghiz, the Kalmyk, the Gypsy, the reindeer herders of the Far North and the mountain people of Central Asia and the Caucasus—tribes which for centuries led a semi-barbaric existence under the threefold oppression of the tsars’ officials, their native chieftains and the medicine men—arc already developing collective farms. Seven million of those who roamed the plains and hills and tundra have already settled, it is planned to settle the remaining three million by the end of the second Five-Year Plan. The Soviet Government gave them land for tilling and pasture, irrigated their fields; provided money and building materials for barns and blacksmith shops, homes and bath-houses, for the purchase of livestock and seed. Soviet farm experts taught them methods of farm cultivation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Especially picturesque are the peoples of the Arctic tundra. Twenty-six nations have been listed in this vast region, the most populous of which, that of the Tunguz, numbers only 60,000. Before the Revolution none of these peoples had an alphabet, a written language or a school. Today most of them have received a written language, and printed books. Several hundred schools in the native tongue have pushed their way along the Arctic coast, some traveling with the reindeer herds of the nomads, others building dormitories where children spend the winter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Once they looked upon us as wild beasts,&amp;quot; wrote a member of the Nentsi people, reindeer herders of the North. &amp;quot;There are still Nentsi living who were exhibited in the tsarist time in zoological gardens of Russia and foreign lands. They called us &#039;Samoyeds’ (cannibals) and the tsar&#039;s government legalized this as our shameful name—but now we begin to sing new songs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For our tundra is new. An experimental farm center has risen beyond the Arctic circle; we have raised vegetables! On the Pechora meadows has appeared the first tractor. When the first radio came, how it frightened us Nentsi. But now every day the number of literate people grows.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the past year many of the national republics celebrated their fifteenth anniversary. Briefly they flamed across the columns of the Soviet press—Daghestan with its thirty languages; Kazakstan, largest and most arid of all the republics; northern Karelia of forests and marble mountains, “where every fisherman has a lake of his own&amp;quot;; far-south Armenia, centuries old in civilization and suffering; each of them told its achievements under Soviet power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To Alma-Ata, new capital of the yellow-skinned, once nomad, Kazaks, who, as late as 1919 were believed by one of their own nationalist leaders to be “doomed to a slow death,&amp;quot; came a congress of 748 scientific and cultural workers to report on the country&#039;s educational growth. Before the Revolution there were 13,000 children in the schools of this vast area; now there are half a million. A national theater, an opera, a symphony orchestra, seventeen institutions of higher learning are counted among the cultural achievements. They arise on the industrial basis of Karaganda copper, the Turksib railroad, the great mines at Ridder, the Emba-Orsk oil pipeline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the borders of Afghanistan the youngest Soviet republic, the Tajiks, celebrated ten years of existence. Soviet power has meant to them 100 million rubles’ worth of irrigation, the erection of great textile plants, the sinking of mines, the creation of a network of technical schools. Scientific excursions have mapped their high Pamirs, finding gold and precious minerals on the slopes. Tens of thousands of tractors, plows, harrows and modern farm implements have come to the cotton fields where once the camel pulled the wooden plow. On the site of an ancient village has grown the new capital, Stalinabad, an industrial center. Airplanes land in mountain villages whose inhabitants before the Revolution never saw a wheeled cart. Soviet power found only half of one per cent of the Tajiks literate; today nine-tenths of the children attend public school.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One by one the list unrolls of 182 nationalities, which have created industries, modern farming, schools and a national culture under Soviet power. Nor are the nationalities mere recipients of blessings from the more advanced Russians. Creative energy pours increasingly from them all to enrich their common Soviet life. Some of the smaller nationalities have already made records which place them in the vanguard of the Soviet Union. Armenia, once ravaged by national massacres, us today a model republic of the Transcaucasus, celebrated for  its thriving industries. Kabardino-Balkaria, a district of two Mohammedan peoples on the northern slopes of the Caucasus, has created the most famous collective farms of the USSR. It developed the idea of “socialist farm cities” designed by architects, which is spreading through the whole Soviet Union, and the policy of making older farmers inspectors of quality, which brought happiness and self-respect to hundreds of thousands of aged men in the Soviet land.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The devotion of suppressed peoples, both within and without its borders, is the prize which the Soviet national policy has won. ‘Soviet power is toiling Kazaks like rain in the desert,” is a proverb of the Kazak old men quoted in the Soviet press by Kliumov, eighteen-year-old president of a Kazak village. “The Party of Lenin and Stalin has resurrected peoples from the dead, peoples who less than dust. Now these peoples have themselves conquered the earth and have come to report their victory to their leader,&amp;quot; said the Tajik poet Lahuti, arriving in Moscow with a delegation of triumphant record-making cotton-pickers. “The past is a stairway of years carpeted with pain and beggary,&amp;quot; said Arith Shakirov, one of the cotton-pickers. “The Uzbeks feared to go along the road of the Arabs, the Tajiks carried sticks when they walked through the Uzbek quarter. Hardly anyone could read. The past is gone. On its ruins we build a bright new life. Woe unto anyone who tries to take it away from us.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When Turkoman horsemen made a spectacular run from their capital, Ashkhabad, to Moscow, in August, 1935, the cities through which they passed on their 4,300-kilometer way were decorated to meet them. “From beyond the boundless expanse of our great fatherland, across the hot sands of the Kara-Kum, the Ust-Urta steppes and the limitless collective fields,&amp;quot; thus ran their greeting. They spoke of the “invincible brotherhood of nations replacing the prison of nations—tsarist Russia—which has gone into the past never to return.” One of the group, Chary Kary, had been in Moscow before. “But then,&amp;quot; he said, “it was the city of my enemy and every person in it seemed my personal foe. Now Moscow is the heart of my great fatherland and every nationality in it is my nation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;The friendship between the peoples of the USSR is a great and signal victory,&amp;quot; said Stalin to one of those many delegations of Central Asiatic workers who stormed the Kremlin with their exploits in late 1935. “As long as this friendship exists the people of our country shall be free and invincible.&amp;quot; But the influence of the Soviet national policy goes far beyond its borders. More than any other Soviet policy it has undermined the imperialisms of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER VI: THE TECHNIQUE OF LEADERSHIP ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Among the masses of people, we are but drops in the ocean, and we will be able to govern only when we properly express that which the people appreciate. Without this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not take the lead of the masses, and the whole machine will fall to pieces.”|Lenin at Eleventh Party Congress}}&lt;br /&gt;
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If by some cataclysm of war a section of the Soviet Union should be cut off from Moscow and compelled for a time to exist alone, government in these isolated areas would continue unchanged except insofar as it was crushed by invading armies. A picturesque example of this was given me by a Yakut woman, who boasted that her district of forests and tundra a thousand miles north of the Trans-Siberian Railway had had “Soviet Power” continuously since 1917. The years of civil war that raged along the railway had never penetrated so far north. To my query how this backward bit of territory knew what policies to follow she replied that a few Bolshevik exiles had remained among them and they got occasional news from Moscow over the Great Northern Telegraph which traversed their region. Many other sections of the country were isolated during the Civil War for considerable periods, yet continued to follow a common policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For eighteen years the authority of the Communist Party in the life of the Soviet Union has grown steadily stronger; it has kept power now for a considerably longer time than any Party in any other country in the world. The accumulating discontents which in other lands throw out governments do not seem to worry it. The Party itself organizes discontent for the sake of progress. In spite of exposures of graft, inefficiency, bureaucracy, and stupid excesses—indeed through these very exposures—the hold of the Communist Party increases.&lt;br /&gt;
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To manage the state affairs of the most extensive republic on earth—covering one-sixth of the world’s land surface—might be considered enough for a political party. But to run the state is only one of the Communists’ tasks. For their plan of remaking the world the apparatus of government is insufficient. Great popular organizations like trade unions, co-operatives, physical culture societies and scores of voluntary social agencies must also move in a common, yet flexible plan. But the action of these organizations must be voluntary, arousing the initiative of their members, or their energy and life will die.&lt;br /&gt;
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How then does the Communist Party lead the country? By the energy and discipline of its members, their contact with all organizations in the land, and by the authority of repeated success. In all government bodies and voluntary organizations the Communists belonging to them act together to induce them to follow the “Party Line.” This line, however, while firm, is not rigid; Party policy itself grows from the discussions and active struggles of its members, each of whom is in touch with some aspect of the country’s life. The members serve as a living conscious bridge between the Party and all the other organizations. They explain to the Party the desires of the people with whom they are associated, and explain to the people the policies developed by the Party in regard to their demands.&lt;br /&gt;
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The primary Party organizations are set up in factories, offices, state farms, red army units, universities, villages, in any institution which has three Party members or more. In a typical iron and steel plant in the Ukraine, for instance, where 1,600 persons—workers, engineers, office staff—work in the rolling mill, 55 are Party members, 85 belong to the Young Communist League and 30 are enrolled as “sympathizers,” an organized group which is studying Communism with the presumable intent to join the Party. One Communist is paid a salary by the Party as full time organizer; the others are scattered in ordinary jobs through all the working gangs of the factory. Each of them has his assigned “Party work.” Some are editors of the sixteen “wall newspapers” which are posted in every working gang of the mill, filled with news and discussions of the gang’s successes and failures. Others read regular newspapers aloud during lunch hour and conduct discussions on current events. Others stir up “socialist competition” between different working gangs so that skill and production may increase. Others are active in the trade union or help promote sports. Every Communist, Young Communist and sympathizer does some unpaid public work of this kind; those who had none or failed to do it would be dropped from the Party as “passive.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Some years ago I visited an open meeting of a Party organization in a factory near Moscow. Not only the Communists but many non-members had gathered to hear the semi-annual report of the Party secretary of the plant. As he sat down a storm of questions arose. “Why have we no report about the Young Pioneers? . . . Has the Party looked into the question of our workers’ club building and observed that we have no summer playground? Why haven’t we a sanitary organization? Why haven’t we a ‘Friends of Aviation’? Does the co-operative housing organization report regularly to the Party, and if so, when are we going to get the houses?” From the secretary’s answers it became clear that this factory had many voluntary organizations among its members: a “Friends for Children,” an “International Labor Defense,” an organization to “Increase Production,” a “Society for Contacts with Rural Districts,” and many more. All of these had been launched with Party co-operation, usually first as small committees, and had then grown into larger organizations by the influx of people who were not Communists. The number of organizations that would be started would depend partly on popular demand and partly on the capacity of Party members to stimulate and organize interest. It would be difficult for an organization to start without Party sanction; it would not be precisely forbidden, but a score of difficulties would discourage it. On the other hand, if a popular demand arose for any new kind of organization—from a drama club to an Anti-Tuberculosis Society—some Party members would take part in it either on their own initiative or by request of the workers or the Party, and would be expected by everyone to keep the organization in touch with any Party policies which affected it.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were several ironic remarks and cat-calls in the meeting during a report by the plant’s director, who was clearly not popular with the workers. I happened to know that the Party secretary had recently recommended to the higher organizations that the director be removed to some other plant where he could profit by the mistakes he had made in this one and start without the accumulated friction. The manager also knew that his transfer had been recommended, and quite possibly concurred. At the meeting, however, the Party secretary said no word of this recommendation but put himself in the unenviable position of explaining the manager’s actions to a group which was almost howling him down. Both he and the manager were disciplined Communists, who did not wish to increase dissension but to work together for the good of the plant.&lt;br /&gt;
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The proportion of Communists in rural districts is very much less than in factories, as might be expected from the fact that the factory workers were the most active elements in the Revolution and also more literate than the peasants. A typical Party organization in a village of two hundred families—I take here the collective farm “Postishev” in the Ukraine—has five Party members, ten “sympathizers,” and twenty-seven members of the Young Communist League. The latter organization is nearly always much larger than the Party in the villages, since it is the youth on the farms which is progressive.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of the five Party members in this village, one of them, Povlichenko, is organizer, giving full time to Party work. He was born in the village, worked some years in a city factory, and was sent back in 1931 on Party order to help organize collectivization. From comments of peasant women I judge he was high-handed in that period and stirred up some antagonisms which he has not lived down. He is, however, a very energetic person, a once half-starved, half-educated farmhand with a passion for schooling which the Revolution enabled him to realize. He runs the Party school where members study Party history and current politics, teaches an elementary course in Leninism and the Soviet Constitution for the sympathizers, and organizes talks and discussions on special events, such as Party congresses, or new decrees affecting the farms. At the time of my visit these remote villagers were studying, more or less assiduously, the reports of Dimitroff and others at the recent congress of the Communist International. Povlichenko also takes active part in pushing the local school, the village club, the motion pictures, the local newspaper and all forms of education and culture.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second Communist is a local peasant, president of the collective farm since 1931, but now leaving for a three-year course in an agricultural school. His salary comes from the farm, not from the Party. The third is an electrician sent to this village because “we needed a Communist in every field brigade.” When he came he was entirely ignorant of farming, but his craft made him useful in a village just beginning to import electricity from the great power plant on the Dnieper. Recently the Party planned to transfer him to township work, but the local farmers checked this by electing him president of the village. “The Party,” he said, “always considers the desires of the masses.” He may or may not have helped organize those desires. For Party work he is attached to the third field brigade and is also adviser of the Young Communist League. The fourth party member is a woman who earns her living as saleswoman in the co-operative store, and whose Party assignment is to help the village women organize a day nursery, a first-aid society and get vacation on pay from the collective farm at time of childbirth. This right is automatic in state-owned enterprises, but not all the farmers’ organizations give it yet. The fifth Party member is manager of the local co-operative store, who, since he makes twenty or more trips to the city every month, is used by the Party for city contacts rather than for regular village work.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is plain that these five Party members have their hands on the whole life of the village. Besides their general work, the first three each keep in touch with a different field brigade of forty or more workers whom they are expected to know personally. “I must know what they want, their economic conditions and working abilities. This is called political watchfulness. If we did not know this, it would be bad for us. We could not possibly lead the masses,” said Povlichenko.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Party organization of this village is open to criticism from strict Party principles in that its members hold too many local government jobs. They are supposed to keep a better balance between office-holders and members “in production,” and to stimulate and train non-Party people for some of the government work. Hogging the offices by Party members is considered a bad sign; it means that they have not stirred up wide enough interest. The Postishev organization is trying to do this through their work with the ten sympathizers and the Young Communists, each of whom has also Party work of a less responsible character. They read and discuss the newspapers in the field brigades, organize traveling libraries, chess games, football teams, initiate competitions in reaping and threshing, help start the musical or dramatic circle, or assist in the “cottage laboratory” where sixty farmers are studying scientific methods.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These primary Party organizations are correlated by the township&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rayon, a district about equivalent to a township.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; organization which in turn comes under the larger regions up to the All-Union organization. The lower bodies elect the higher but are in turn subordinate to their decisions; the system is known as “democratic centralism.” The highest power within each organization is vested in its general meeting or congress which elects a standing committee to serve between sessions. The highest power of the entire Party is the All-Union Party Congress and between its sessions the Central Committee. The Central Committee organizes a political bureau for the day-by-day determination of political policy, an organizational bureau for general guidance of organizational work, and a secretariat. Stalin is general secretary of the Party, but there are several other secretaries who share this work.&lt;br /&gt;
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Some years ago I saw a district congress of the Communist Party in action in the city of Red Lugansk of the Donetz Basin, the valley of coal and steel. Four or five hundred men and women gathered for a two day session—miners and mine managers, employees and head of the locomotive works, some teachers and health department officials—Communists all, sent as delegates from the local Party organizations of the factories and mines of the district. The problems for discussion were the policy for heavy industry and for minor nationalities. They had been announced by the Central Committee as the immediate pressing problems; “theses” on them had been published by the leading authorities and every local Party organization had discussed them for weeks.&lt;br /&gt;
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The delegates wasted no time in preliminaries and compliments. Man after man spoke hotly and strongly on the concrete difficulties of heavy industry in the mines and factories they knew. They prepared reports based on the industry of their district and elected delegates to carry their hottest criticisms to the regional Party Congress in the coal center, Bakhmut, where delegates were again chosen to the All-Ukrainian Party Congress. Then all over the Soviet Union the special trains began running. From Kharkov, from Tiflis, from Minsk, from Central Asia and Siberia, they bore the chosen delegates to Moscow where two weeks’ discussion in the All-Union Party Congress hammered out the “Party Line.” Thence the results rolled back again to the Donetz, the Caucasus, the Far East to Vladivostok, borne by returning delegates whose first duty was to explain and carry through the decisions through trade unions, cooperatives, farms, government, whatever organizations they influenced.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the most widely organized thinking ever attempted in history. It is actually the energetic thinking of three million men and women, gathering up the ideas of tens of millions of their neighbors, which beats upon the All-Union Party Congress and affects its decisions. The ideas are worked over by the ablest economists of the Party, familiar with the experience of the revolutionary movement in all countries. The decisions reached are explained to the country through every channel of organized publicity; they are discussed and studied in every field brigade and factory and put into action simultaneously throughout the land. For the test of organized thinking is organized action.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communists do not merely reflect the will of the masses, as a ballot might, or a showing of hands. They do not merely analyze what the “majority want” and hand it out. It is their job to lead, to organize the people’s will. No group of unurged soldiers would ever vote to storm a trench. Certainly the workers of the Soviet Union would not have voted, unurged, unled, for the hardships of the Five-Year Plan of rapid industrialization taken out of their own food and comforts, for the painful speed of farm collectivization without adequate machines or organizers. But when the Communist Party analyzed, urged and demanded, showing the world situation and the need of making the USSR well prepared industrially and for defense, showing the enemy classes which must be abolished to attain the goal of a socialist state, they were able to find, organize and create, deep in the heart of the masses, a will that carried through. Without that will in tens of millions, the three million could have done little. “To bring about a revolution, a leading revolutionary minority is required,” Stalin told H. G. Wells. “But the most talented, devoted and energetic minority would be helpless if it did not rely upon the at least passive support of millions.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. G. Wells’ Interview with Joseph Stalin, July 23, 1934&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As an example of the interrelation of Party, government and voluntary workers in action, let me take the “mobilization” of automobiles and mechanics in the spring of 1931 to save flax sowing in Moscow province. Collective farming came that year to the province in a great drive of organization and propaganda backed by hundreds of new tractors, which were being used chiefly to increase the area of flax. In the first week of sowing, telegrams from the newly organized tractor stations poured into Moscow, announcing that there was a “break.” Tractors all over the province stood in the fields, not moving, for causes yet to be analyzed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who moves in such a case? The Moscow Committee of the Party moves. Sorting over in its office the reports of all Moscow’s daily emergencies, it decides that the break in flax is serious and calls for a “mobilization” of mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The call goes out to Party organizations in a hundred shops and factories. It is announced by trade-union shop committees and factory newspapers. Not a single mechanic is compelled to answer, but any mechanic willing to give a day or two for tractor repair to help the sowing will be helped by foreman and fellow workers to arrange his job. He may work at this sanctioned public task without forfeiting wages, while others fill in the gap in his regular work. What is the motive? The fun of participating in saving the sowing, of helping the country, of living a varied, useful life. Automobiles also are “mobilized” to carry the mechanics to the farms, and those who lend machines for such public work may hope for a cut in automobile taxes. I volunteered for a two-day trip.&lt;br /&gt;
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One hundred and fifty miles north of Moscow we came to the tractor station to which we were assigned. Of thirty-three new tractors from Putiloff Works, eleven could not move out of the railway station. The rest were breaking down in the fields, under the hands of worried peasant boys and girls who had seen their first machine one month before. All night our volunteer mechanics repaired tractors. All night the local tractor drivers stood up to watch in their eagerness to learn. The following day I drove my car to Moscow with sleeping mechanics in the seats. They had worked twenty hours on end in a public emergency about which they would report next morning to their interested fellow workers in Moscow factories. They had also prepared a technical report charging the Putiloff tractor with certain grave defects. It was printed within two days in the Industrial Gazette, the organ of heavy industry, and led to a conference of industrial leaders on improving the Putiloff tractor. Three weeks later the flax sowing of Moscow province, which in early season threatened to lag at 50 per cent of plan, went over the top 108 per cent, the best flax record in the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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“It was the work of the social organizations that saved us,” said the Moscow Tractor Center. What were the organizations concerned? The state, the Party, the trade unions, the automobile association had all taken part. The state owned the Putiloff Works, financed the tractor stations, and also owned, through the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the Industrial Gazette which exposed the defects. The trade unions organized the volunteers and took care of their jobs during absence. The automobile association organized autos. But the driving will that saved the situation was the will of thousands of Moscow workers organized and assigned to their tasks by the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, of which most of the mechanics were not even members.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even on vacations Communists are supposed to be always watchfully aware of their responsibility for organizing the life of the country. I was slipping down the mighty Volga on a large passenger steamer when I saw a sign asking members of the Party who might be traveling to register with the secretary of the boat organization. I learned that any Communist traveling on the boat was likely to be drafted into speaking at a meeting on deck among the peasants, or at a political school for Communists of the crew. Some of the city Communists used the occasion to criticize hotly the boat Communists for lack of attention to sanitation. The river Communists, mostly untrained sailors, thus got their first lesson in modern hygiene.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ultimate destination towards which the Soviet ship of state is steering was fixed by the Revolution. The rate of speed and the daily and early course is charted by the Central Committee of the Party to take advantage of varying winds and tides. Yet it is a course which every active worker or farmer may take part in fixing. It arises from the experience of three million Party members, each keeping in touch with some section of the people, all of them interacting, discussing, comparing results. Communists of longest experience and best records have the greatest authority; but, be it noted, they do not call it “power.” “Power” resides in the will of the working masses; “authority” is that prestige of character and insight which enables its possessor to organize and release this power.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is authority rather than power that Stalin possesses. Though his standing is far higher than that of any man in the Soviet Union, though he is cheered and quoted at all congresses as high authority, men never speak of “Stalin’s will” or “Stalin’s power,” but of the “Party Line” which Stalin reports but does not make. The Party Line is accessible to all to study, to know and to help formulate. The greatness of the man is known by the range over which he can do this. “I can plan with the workers of one plant for a year,” said a factory manager to me. “Others much wiser than I, like the men in our Central Committee, can plan with wider masses for years. Stalin in this is our ablest. He sees the inter-relation of our path with world events, and the order of each step, as a man sees the earth from the stratosphere.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“The earth from the stratosphere”—the man who said this was himself an aviation engineer. Men in the Soviet Union tend to see Stalin in terms of their craft. Railway workers call him “locomotive driver of the Revolution.” An economist said to me, speaking of the leaders of Party and government in the Red Square on May-day: “Our brains are there in the tribune.” Harvester-combine operators addressed Stalin as “friend and teacher”; managers of industry say informally “the boss.” Yellow-skinned Kazaks of the desert on the fifteenth anniversary of their republic hailed him “great leader of toiling humanity.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Millions of simple folk in all callings have felt the direct impact of Stalin’s analysis, giving a solution for the chief problem of their lives. It was sometimes a way that was harsh to follow, but it was the one clear path to the goal that the millions desired. There have been statements by Stalin that ushered in great changes, as when he told the agrarian Marxist conference that the time had come to “abolish kulaks as a class.” Yet he only announced the time for a process which every Marxist knew was on the program. His famous article “Dizziness from Success” which called sudden halt on March 2, 1930, to widespread excesses of Communists in rural regions, was regarded by foreign correspondents and peasants alike as an “order from Stalin.” Stalin at once disclaimed any personal prestige therefrom accruing, stating in the press: “Some people think that the article is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin. That of course is nonsense. The Central Committee does not exist to permit personal initiative of anybody in matters of this kind. It was a reconnaissance undertaken by the Central Committee.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin does not rule personally. To a lifelong habit of collective action he adds his personal genius, that of supreme analyst of situations, personalities, tendencies. He leads as supreme combiner of many minds and wills, When Emil Ludwig asked him who really made decisions, he answered: “Single persons cannot decide. . . . Experience of three revolutions has shown us that out of a hundred individual decisions which have not been tested and corrected collectively, ninety are biased. The leadership of our Party in the Central Committee, which directs all the Soviet and Communist organizations, consists of about seventy people. Among those seventy members of our Central Committee there are to be found the best of our industrial leaders, our cleverest specialists and the men who best understand every branch of our activities. It is in this Supreme Council that the whole wisdom of our Party is concentrated. Each man is entitled to challenge his neighbor’s opinion or suggestion. Each man may give the benefit of his own experience. If it were otherwise, if individual decisions were admitted, there would be serious mistakes in our work.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin’s Interview with Emil Ludwig, Dec. 13, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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“The art of leadership is a serious matter,” said Stalin earlier, in concluding his article “Dizziness from Success.” “One must not lag behind a movement because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But one must not rush ahead, for this is to lose contact with the masses. . . . Our Party is strong and invincible because, while leading a movement, it knows how to maintain and multiply its contacts with the millions of the workers and peasant masses.” This may be taken as Stalin’s analysis of leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are plenty of stupidities and violences in the Soviet Union, yes-men and careerists, hardship and injustice, wastage of youth and life. All man’s essential progress costs heavily in human suffering; the Soviet Union has not escaped this law. What makes it endurable is just this fact that it is caused not by behest of one man or even of three million, but is part of the slow process—history will not call it slow—whereby the tens of millions achieve the organized and conscious planning of their lives.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER VII: BUILDING THE NEW ECONOMY ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Either perish or overtake the advanced countries and surpass them. . . . This is how history has put the question.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Millions make the plan.”|Stalin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the most striking characteristics of Soviet life to a new arrival is the passionate interest which citizens show in new industries, modern equipment, figures of carloadings, economic statistics generally. The “romantic passion” of the Russians for machinery, the visitor is apt to call it. He himself is long since bored by machinery which has recently put him out of work; he finds it difficult to understand this passion. He has come to see “the revolution,” to study the characteristics of planned economy or the amazing change in human concepts. He finds the revolutionary background taken for granted by Soviet citizens; they want to show him factories.&lt;br /&gt;
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The mood of the Soviet Union today is a mood of tremendous struggle and incredible conquest in which individual values and problems pale before the brightness of one great problem whose solution is told off by the ever-rising curve of production, the opening of steel mills, the successful mastery of tractor plants, machine building works, textile factories. It is a mood in which a newly literate servant girl will hail the rain running into her leaky shoes if that rain means harvest. Harvest somewhere far off on farms she never sees.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not surprising that economic facts have a vital interest for Soviet citizens. The changes in the country’s economic life since the Revolution have been stupendous and the results are felt in every person’s daily living. Fifteen years ago when first I entered the Soviet Union, the country was ravaged by famine and pestilence. Civil war and foreign intervention had ruined farming, industry, transport. Street-cars were not running in Moscow, street lights had long since burned out without replacements, and two fuelless winters had so destroyed the entire city’s plumbing that water pressure could not rise above the second floors. In the best hospital of Samara, where I lay ill in 1921 with typhus, there were but two clinical thermometers for hundreds of patients. Thermometers, light bulbs, water pipes were only a few of the million articles which long war and blockade kept out of the Soviet Union and which could not be manufactured in the few and backward factories of that vast agricultural land.&lt;br /&gt;
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I have lived through fifteen years of incredibly rapid progress which have almost wiped out all memory of the past. To dwellers in the Soviet Union, the pre-war period seems already pre-historic, and even 1921 seems a century ago. We have seen in these fifteen years a more than ten-fold increase in industrial production; we have seen a leap in farming from the sixteenth century into the twenty-first. We have lived through a series of epochs sharply distinct from each other in the regulations affecting our daily existence, but all these periods have been characterized by one continuous fury of energetic endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
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The reasons for energetic endeavor were very plain to the people of a land just emerging from foreign intervention and long blockade. “War is implacable,” said Lenin. “It puts the question with merciless sharpness. Either perish or overtake the advanced countries and surpass them. . . . Either full steam ahead or perish. This is how history has put the question.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by Stalin in Report on &#039;&#039;Results of the First Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; All Communists hold that in the present epoch of worldwide imperialist expansion, it is the fate of economically backward lands to be parceled out among the imperial nations. Soviet Russia, unless she could make herself economically independent, had to fear the fate which has overtaken China, “a military field of operations of foreign enemies and pecked at by everybody who cares to do so.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Results of the First Five-Year Flan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If a rapid rate of economic development was necessary to preserve even the independence of the country, it was still more necessary as a prerequisite for a socialist commonwealth. The abundant life for every toiler which socialism implies demands lavish production; it cannot be attained in a country where the means of production is the individually owned tool. The material conditions for a prosperous socialist commonwealth exist today in America far more than they ever existed in Russia. Sharing the wealth cannot take place until there is really wealth to share. Socially owned wealth must be based on socially owned factories. Russia had the problem of first building the factories.&lt;br /&gt;
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The rapid development of Soviet Russia’s economic wealth was considered of crucial importance by Lenin, not only for the welfare of the Russian people, but even for the future of world-wide socialism. Faced by the handicap of a backward, semi-feudal land, the workers of the new revolutionary country had nonetheless one advantage—they were the joint owners of their country and all of its productive wealth. They must prove to the world that even against great difficulties this one advantage was decisive. Even in 1921 in the depths of economic ruin Lenin said: “We are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian republic. . . . If we solve this problem, then we shall have won on an international scale for certain and finally. That is why questions of economic construction assume for us absolutely exceptional significance.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 28, 1921. &#039;&#039;All-Russian Conference of the Communist Party&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a strange paradox in the economic development of the Soviet Union which even foreign resident must notice. It is that every slight achievement costs infinite effort, yet mighty achievements are won in an incredibly short time. The penalty for Russia’s ancient backwardness is to be found in an inefficiency which hampers every movement—taking a tramway, buying a spool of thread, securing a room. The difficulty of making even one blast furnace function properly arouses frantic despair in the hearts of foreign specialists. Yet in spite of these difficulties, the Soviet Union advances at a speed unknown even to the most efficient capitalist countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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This speed is due to the tremendous energy and initiative of millions of workers and farmers who are conscious owners now of their own means of production, and who know that whatever they create will be their own permanent gain. Their initiative is correlated by a system of social planning. Thus arises that paradoxical combination of individual inefficiency with tremendous social momentum. In the most developed capitalist countries the efficiencies of ten million individuals pull in conflicting directions, giving small gain to society. But each new achievement in the Soviet planned structure, attained with such painful difficulty, reinforces the sum total of a million gains.&lt;br /&gt;
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So obvious and so widely known are these benefits of social planning in the Soviet Union that in recent years it has become a common dream in many countries to transfer painlessly the technique of planning to the capitalist system, thus gaining the blessings of socialism without the harsh shock of revolution. In America especially, where the highly developed processes of production could so obviously produce plenty for all, the illusion arises that somehow some genius, some group of super-brains sitting in New York or in Washington, ought to be able to find the magic secret of putting those processes to work. It is clear that an individual owner can plan his factory and bring it to a relatively high state of efficiency as compared with the days of handicraft. But can a government brain trust, however brilliant, plan the disposal of Rockefeller’s oil wells, or the internal organization of U. S. Steel? To ask this question is to answer it, if it has not been answered already by the history of the NRA. Only owners can plan an industry and dispose of its products. Under capitalism plans of different owners clash.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For a socialist state, the simplest and most basic act of government is the planning by worker-owners of the expansion and improvement of their jointly owned properties. Planning of this type takes place not only in those central institutions of Moscow where the foreign visitor habitually looks for it; it begins simultaneously at the workers’ bench. Production meetings after work discuss shop problems, what holds back production, how much it can be increased, and by what means. These discussions are enlarged on a factory scale; they go from the factory to the central offices of the industrial trusts. Word comes back from the central organizations to the shop that the country needs certain new machines. “Can we make them in our plant?” Delegates from other industries which need the machines arrive, explain, mutually consult. The inventions and suggestions of the local workers thus widen into a nation’s plan.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The plan is, however, no mere blueprint to be fulfilled with exactness. In the absolute and technical sense, one cannot speak of it as a final “plan” at all. For although every factory, farm, school and government institution checks its monthly and annual achievements by its plan, yet the proudest boast is always to have overfulfilled it, i.e., broken the plan by doing more than intended. The plan is therefore a standard of what is expected, a flag of challenge, but in no sense a limit. There is no limit set in the Soviet Union. The aim is the fullest development of the creative and productive powers of the country. The more production, the better. It will be seen at once how impossible such a conception of planning becomes under capitalism. It is based on the assumption that the worker-owners of the nation’s production will be able to use everything that they care to make.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Socialism is not created in a day; it is not achieved by voting and not even by seizure of power. Seizure of power is only a prerequisite. Socialism involves the expansion and organization of the collectively owned properties of the country and the building of a good life for everyone thereon. This was the purpose of the October Revolution, and in spite of all the accounts in the press of the world for eighteen years about Soviet “changes of policy,” this purpose has never changed in the slightest degree. The tactics used have, however, been conditioned by both internal strength and international relations. Not until 1921, when the new workers’ state had beaten back the armies of intervention, was it possible to begin the building of the national economy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the wars of invasion were over, industry had sunk to one-fifth of pre-war, the production of cotton goods was only 7 per cent of normal, iron and steel production had almost entirely ceased. Grain reserves were exhausted, and the drought of 1921 led directly to the greatest famine in Russian history. The New Economic Policy, adopted at that time, encouraged all forms of economic development, both those of capitalism and those of socialism. Meantime each year the Communists led the working class of the country to concentrate a desperate, organized struggle for victory in one important field after another—victories often achieved at the expense of heavy temporary sacrifices elsewhere.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The year 1922 saw the successful fight to establish a state bank and a partially stable currency by high banking charges which ruthlessly exploited all the industries of the country. In 1923 emphasis turned to the hard-pressed industries; for the first time since the revolution, their balance sheets reached “self-support,” at the expense of excessively high prices to the consumer. There followed a two years’ effort to cut prices; consumers’ co-operatives were widely developed as a link between the state factories and the peasants. By 1926 co-operative and government trade had increased threefold, successfully passing the private middle-man who had previously controlled over 80 per cent of the rural turnover. During the next two years, emphasis turned again to the restoration of industry, which reached by 1928 the pre-war standard of production. The Soviet workers had rebuilt their war-devastated country without the aid of the foreign credits which flowed to help all the war-injured capitalist lands of Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet this attainment was still of low standard, the pre-war production of backward tsarist Russia. The ancient plants were working to full capacity, but they could not begin to supply the needs of workers and farmers who expected a higher standard of life than before the Revolution. Each year the shortage of goods increased. Soviet industry could not expand further except by extension of basic capital, new buildings, more machines. Any threatening war would still find the country lacking not only in commodities, but in that heavy industry on which, in our modern mechanized world, is based the means of production in peace and of defense in war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Could Soviet Russia develop her industries rapidly and make herself economically independent, or must she live, as tsarist Russia did, by export of farm products, chancing her future on a hostile capitalist world? This problem set sharply the still more fundamental problem whether socialism could be built in one country and if so, by what means. Russia’s basic industry was state-owned but this industry was insufficient to supply the people with goods. The primitive farming system, made still more primitive by the splitting up of the former landlords’ estates into small subsistence farms, which partly consumed and partly wasted much formerly marketed grain, was increasingly failing to feed the growing cities. In 1927 the Russian farms attained the pre-war sown area of 280,000,000 acres and the pre-war grain production of somewhat over 80,000,000 tons, but only about half of the pre-war marketed grain was reaching the market. Socialized industry was like an island in an ocean of medieval agriculture, whose tides constantly threatened to undermine the base of socialism. “As long as we live in a small peasant country,” Lenin had said, “there will be a more solid economic basis for capitalism than for Communism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, Russian edition, XXVI, 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Farming must be brought out of the Middle Ages, modernized and made efficient. For this two roads of development were possible. The employing peasants, known as kulaks, who already owned the best of the rural means of production, better plows, more horses, occasional threshers, creameries and flour mills, might be allowed to expand, to acquire tractors, combines, and the additional land which these machines could cultivate, dispossessing more and more landless peasants into the ranks of unemployed. Thus capitalist farming grew in other countries out of the feudal ages. The price of such growth for Soviet Russia under the world conditions of the modern era would be not only continued class war in rural districts, not only swiftly increasing unemployment, not only the steady submergence of all socialist industry by an expanding capitalism, but the complete dependence of this young Russian capitalism on the financial oligarchs of the imperialist world. Such, at least, was the analysis made by Stalin and the Communist Party in adopting in 1928 the now famous Five-Year Plan.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Five-Year Plan proposed the rapid industrialization of the country, more rapid than any industrialization known in the world before. Heavy industry must first be built, the machines that make machines for other industry and for farming. Lighter industries to raise the standard of living must rapidly follow. Farming must be industrialized, not by strengthening a class of rural capitalists, but by the voluntary uniting of all non-exploiting peasants, beginning with the poorest, into collective groups farming their lands jointly with machinery which the developing state industry would supply. This was necessary to make farming modern, while giving the benefits of its modernization to all farmers. It was necessary to make Russia socialist, or even to preserve the half-socialism which the city workers had begun. It was necessary for the independence of the country and the very existence of the Soviet government. “We could not refrain,” said Stalin, “from whipping up a country which was a hundred years behind and which owing to its backwardness was faced with mortal danger.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Report to Joint Plenum of Central Committee and Central Control Commission on &#039;&#039;Results of Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;, 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In less than five years—for the Five-Year Plan was 96 per cent completed in four and a quarter years from October 1928 through December 1932—Stalin was able to announce that the former backward agricultural Russia had become the second industrial country in the world. The number employed in industry doubled from eleven million to twenty-two million. The volume of industrial output also doubled, from 15.7 billion rubles in 1928 to 34.3 billion in 1932 (calculated at prices prevailing in 1926-7); it was three times the pre-war production. At the same time a rapid industrialization of farming combined some twenty million tiny, uneconomic subsistence farms into 200,000 large collectively operated farms (by 1936 there were 250,000) based on machine power, scientific methods, division of labor. The relative proportion of industrial to agricultural output grew from 48 per cent at the beginning of the plan to 70 per cent at the end of 1932, thus changing Russia from an agricultural to a predominantly industrial country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Formerly we did not have an iron and steel industry. Now we have such an industry,” reported Stalin in January 1933 at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We did not have an automobile industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We did not have an engineering industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We did not have a big and modern chemical industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We did not have a real solid industry for the production of modern farm machinery. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We did not have an aviation industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In production of electric power we were last in the list. Now we are among the first in the list...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“And we have achieved these enormous new branches of industry on a scale that makes the scale of European industry pale into insignificance. . . .” Such was only part of the success reported.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Five-Year Plan cost heavily in dislocation of populations, exhaustion of youth, disorganization of harvests and many privations which attended the rationing of food and other commodities. But never in history was such an advance gained at less cost and certainly never so swiftly; and it was gained unprecedentedly without long-term credits or foreign loans. Had the pace been less swift, had the Communists postponed this breathless drive towards full industrialization, they believe that Soviet Russia would already have had “not pacts of non-aggression, but war.” “We would have been unarmed in the midst of a capitalist environment which is armed with modern technique.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Results of the First Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The advance of Japan into Manchuria in 1931 and the stated intention of Nazi Germany to expand into Soviet Ukraine are warnings today which anyone may read of the fate which might already have overtaken the Soviet Union but for its swiftly rising economic and military strength.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the conclusion of the first Five-Year Plan at the end of 1932, the Soviet Union plunged into the second. “We have already laid the foundations of a socialist society . . . and all we have to do now is to erect the edifice—a task which undoubtedly is easier,” said Stalin at the Seventeenth Party Congress in early 1934. Industry and trade were already 99 per cent socialized; three-fourths of agricultural production was socialized. On the base thus established, the second Five-Year Plan proposed to abolish “all private property in the means of production, all class distinctions, all exploitation of man by man.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Molotov, &#039;&#039;Tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It proposed three times as much new construction as had been achieved in the first Five-Year Plan. It proposed a doubling and tripling of the standard of living through the final technical reconstruction of the whole national economy, the mastery of the most modern methods and the most complex machines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Already as the year 1936 opens, it is clear that the second Five-Year Plan can be accomplished in less than five years. In the last months of 1935 the total monthly output of heavy industry was already five times as high as in 1928.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;From 404.9 million rubles, average monthly output in 1928 to 2,180.6 million in Nov. 1935, stable rubles of 1926-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Grain production has known three record harvests surpassing all pre-collectivization years. Rapid increase in the standard of living—more food, better clothing, expanding art and science—is evident in all parts of the country. Cotton pickers, sugar-beet growers, combined-harvester operators, timber workers, machinists and miners are descending triumphantly on Moscow to celebrate their achievements in production and win the plaudits of the land.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With hammer blows the figures of the 1935 achievements were given by Molotov in January 1936 to the Central Executive Committee. A 20.4 per cent increase in industrial production over 1934, in place of the 16 per cent planned; 23 per cent increase in freight car loadings, 45 per cent in raw cotton, and 43 per cent in sugar beets. A grain harvest running close to one hundred million tons, nearly ten million above the highest previous harvest; horses up 5 per cent, cattle 18 per cent, sheep and goats 25 per cent, hogs 38 per cent—all increases of a single year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The abolition of the card system of rationing, reported Grinko, Commissar of Finance, had lifted the trade turnover from 60 to 80 billion rubles; the profits from socialist economy were 7.8 billion rubles; the planned state budget receipts had been exceeded and the planned expenditures cut, leaving a surplus for expansion. But the most important result of the year, said Molotov, was the Stakhanov movement “which leads to an entire revolution in industry and transport, and opens the first page of the great advance in socialist productivity of labor.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then, with confidence born of experience, Valery Meshlauk, head of the State Planning Commission, gave page after page of the carefully plotted future. “The 1936 plan provides for a further and accelerated upsurge of the whole national economy.” The increase set for large-scale industry is 23 per cent, a 15 billion ruble advance, which is greater than the entire output of this industry in 1927. The increase set for agriculture is 24 per cent, for commodity circulation 25, railway transport 19.8, capital construction 34.8. The financial income of the population is to rise from 101 to 118 billion rubles, in the face of steadily dropping prices. Social and cultural services in the central and local budgets are to rise from 16 to 21 billion, the social insurance alone from 6.7 to 8 billion. But darkly across this shining future run figures of army expansion, from the 6.5 billion planned to 8.2 billion actually spent in 1935 and 14.8 billion planned for 1936. For beyond the borders of the triumphantly planned growth of Soviet national economy lie the unpredictable dangers of the chaotic capitalist world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If a map of the Soviet world could be drawn pictorially and changed with each changing year, it would show countless new cities arising on formerly barren land. It would show tens of millions of tiny, uneconomic farm plots merging into a rhythm of horizon-touching fields. It would show thousands of geological expeditions penetrating uncharted wildernesses to discover and chart nationally owned wealth. Following these there would flash across the scene surveyors, engineers, new railroads, steel plants, textile mills. New timber areas open, new coal and oil fields. If the map had a sound film attachment one would hear the summons sent forth to young Communists, to workers in the older, better-organized factories, demanding heroic personnel for the conquest of the wastes. The conquering march of man reaches northward to settle the Arctic and eastward to the wild coasts opposite Alaska. And a long green strip of a million and a half acres of new forest-zone moves steadily southward across treeless plains of Kazakstan as a mighty screen to protect the grain lands of South Russia from the desert winds of Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the past two years the Communist leaders have begun to speak of socialism as “victorious”; its economic base is secure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER VIII: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“The Soviet Union needs no foreign wars for transforming the world.”|Manuilski at Congress of Communist International, 1935}}&lt;br /&gt;
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A socialist country craves peace for development. As the life of the Soviet people grows richer and more varied, the one great dread which hangs above it is the threat of war. Soviet citizens are never subject to the illusion—most diabolical of all the contradictions of capitalism—that war may bring a feverish, blood-bought prosperity and eliminate unemployment by turning men into the pursuits of destruction. The prosperity of socialism is based on harmonious correlation of production and needs, and there is no unemployment. The Soviet world sees war as naked destruction of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Even the need of preparing for war it sees as a waste of resources which might otherwise go in direct benefits to the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the eighteen years of its existence, the Soviet Union has been widely recognized as a champion of peace. Even its foes admit that the USSR does not want war for the present. Yet so confused is the world’s thinking on the subject of war and peace—a confusion promoted by diplomats and statesmen—so instinctive under capitalism has become the assumption that every advancing nation must seek in the end the test of war, that the Soviet hunger for peace is at times confused either with cowardice or hypocrisy. Are they not perhaps just watchfully waiting until their economic building is accomplished, and their strength is sure? What are they doing in the League of Nations? Why are they increasing the Red Army? Do they not after all want world revolution, which world war presumably might usher in? How permanent is the Soviet wish for peace? And, even if sincere, can it be effective?&lt;br /&gt;
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There are two ways to approach this question: by the detailed examination of Soviet history and by understanding the theory behind every Soviet action. We shall take each of these methods in turn.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Behind all Soviet action is the Marxian theory that the cause of war is neither permanent in human nature, as militarists claim, nor to be found in lack of goodwill and in the character of rulers, as idealist pacifists think. Marxists hold that war arises from class conflicts. Wars in the present period of world history, according to this analysis, arise from the struggle of capitalism to survive and grow by investment in new markets. This leads the major nations to engage first in small wars of colonial oppression, the forcing of their goods and investment upon undeveloped peoples; these lead to wars between the imperialist nations over the territories which both sides wish to exploit. A socialist commonwealth where the people own jointly their means of production and receive all the fruits of their toil, wants no expanding market for surplus profits but only equal interchange of goods which encourages peace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A socialist world would thus attain peace permanently. But a single socialist country lives in a world of foes. Can peace be attained under these conditions? Not permanently and not with assurance, as long as capitalism survives. The capitalist world system from its nature breeds war. None the less, each specific war has specific causes, which may be studied, analyzed, hampered and delayed. Peace may be won from month to month and year to year by specific, well-considered actions, as an able engineer postpones collapse inherent in a faulty structure by accurate balancing of specific strains and stresses. This is an unstable peace, but better than none, for every curtailment of war prevents human suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
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In applying this analysis to our present period of history, Soviet policy holds that the economic world today is one and indivisible, and that every war must affect the whole world. No fair words of politicians can keep a nation out of it; no policy of isolation can be a guarantee. For behind all those words and beneath all such policies the economic pressures inexorably act. Trade in goods of war begins to flow towards even a minor conflict and steadily the traders are drawn further in. Thus was America drawn into the World War by increasing financial commitments, till at last an American ambassador cabled from London that a panic would shake the whole United States unless American boys followed American dollars into the battles of Britain and France. When that stage occurs, no country keeps out of it; the president who “kept us out of war” turns about and marches in.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even those nations which are technically neutral—the number of these decreases with the seriousness of the war—are involved only slightly less than those who battle. “Any war,” says Litvinoff, “sooner or later, will bring distress to all countries, both to the combatants and the non-participants. We must never forget the lesson of the World War, the consequences of which are felt to this day by combatants and neutral countries alike. The impoverishment of the whole world, the lowering of the living standards of all categories of labor, both physical and mental, unemployment when no one is sure of tomorrow, to say nothing of the collapse of cultural values, the reversion of certain countries to medieval ideas—these are the consequences of the World War which are clearly felt sixteen years after its end.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To maintain peace is therefore a permanent policy for the Soviet Union. To maintain peace not only for itself but in the world. But peace is not to be had by expecting it. It may not even be won by refusing to fight. China refuses to fight, but gets no peace. Neither preparedness nor unpreparedness is a safeguard; unarmed and well-armed folk have alike gone to war. The only safeguard for even that partial peace possible under capitalism is clear, sincere study of the whole world situation, the choosing of a policy which prevents war or lessens it, and the backing of that policy by all available power. One must struggle for peace; it will not come otherwise. The methods change as the situations change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For eighteen years the Soviet Union has made this struggle. “Peace, land and bread” was the slogan of the October Revolution. The hunger for peace of a war-exhausted people brought the Bolsheviks to power. Their first official act on November 8, 1917, was to propose “to all warring peoples and their governments to begin immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace.” As an attack upon the war and to remove causes of future war, the new revolutionary government exposed and denounced the secret treaties by which England, France and Russia had agreed to redivide the world. They annulled oppressive tsarist treaties which had been enforced on Persia and Turkey, and withdrew the Russian army from Persia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The strength of the new government was not equal to its understanding. The Entente Powers—England, France and the United States—denounced the Bolsheviks for daring to speak of peace and left their former ally to the mercy of Germany. The German general staff marched onward into a prostrate country offering the Bolsheviks “robber terms.” The position of the Soviet state was further weakened by Trotsky’s attempt to deal with advancing troops by clever phrases. He refused to sign terms but protested in the formmula: “Neither war nor peace”—an appeal to the conscience of the German people. But general staffs are not expected to have a conscience, and no Germans acted to save the Russians. The invading army marched far into the Ukraine and took possession, giving in the end worse terms than those originally offered. Trotsky’s appeal reached the consciences of idealists; I recall that it thrilled me far out in Seattle. But it was Ukrainian peasants and workers who suffered; idealist gestures are dangerous tactics in war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If Germany offered the Bolsheviks only a robbers’ peace, their former allies gave them no peace at all. On April 5, 1918, the Japanese landed in Vladivostok; following them the English, French and American armies invaded Siberia. Allied armies landed on the Arctic coast to seize the northern part of Russia; the British grabbed Baku, oil capital of the south. Agents of the Entente incited and participated in armed uprisings of Czechoslovak prisoners of war along the Volga, leading them against the Bolshevik government. From east and west and north and south the armies of all the major capitalist powers surrounded the Revolution with an iron ring of war and blockade.&lt;br /&gt;
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Across this iron ring the starving people of the new state sent appeal after appeal to all those governments which refused to deal with them but especially to President Wilson. Beginning on November 24, 1918, and repeating their query through Raymond Robins, head of the American Red Cross in Russia, and also by direct cables to the State Department, they offered to consider any peace terms whatever: recognition of debts, concessions of territory, control of mines and natural resources. Rather than deal in any way with Bolsheviks, Wilson and the Allied governments sitting in Versailles issued a call to all the “organized groups in Russia” to meet at the Principo Islands, a proposal which clearly presaged the dividing of Russia into spheres of influence after the style of China. The Bolsheviks were not invited, but they accepted; the other governments refused and the scheme fell through. There followed the famous trip of William Christian Bullitt to Moscow in March 1919 as President Wilson’s semi-official representative. The hard-pressed Soviet government was ready to agree to Bullitt’s proposal that it accept all financial obligations of all past Russian governments, and divide the territory of Russia among all those governments which should be in armed possession when the treaty should be signed. But the treaty was never signed; President Wilson refused to receive the report of his own envoy. Bolsheviks were made to realize that no peace can be had from the imperialist powers of earth by any backward nation. Not even the price of slavish submission buys peace for China; nor could the offer of territory and gold buy it for Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not by appeals for peace and not by offers of concessions, but by the desperate struggle and courage of the Revolutionary Red Army was peace and independence finally won. It was secured in slow stages, first cessation of battle, then trade agreements, then, much more slowly, diplomatic recognition. At each stage the strength of the new state was again and again probed and tested by a capitalist world unwilling to yield it the right to exist. Under such conditions the Soviet government stabilized its borders by granting swift recognition to the new Baltic States. Then, in the first international conference to which it was admitted, in April 1922 in Genoa, the Soviet delegate proposed a plan for strengthening general peace in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The forces directed towards restoration of world economy will be strangled as long as above Europe and above the world hangs the threat of new wars,” said Chicherin. “The Russian delegation intends to propose a general limitation of armaments and to support any proposition which has the aim of lightening the burdens of militarism.” The Soviet representatives again agreed to recognize debts of past Russian governments but now demanded in return the right to compensation for the destruction caused to Russia by unprovoked intervention. Failing to get response to either proposal, Soviet Russia signed with Germany the famous Rapallo agreement, whereby both nations canceled the debts of the other and renewed relations on the basis of equality. This was the first gesture made by any nation to cure the wounds of the World War and to deal with vanquished Germany on a basis which set foundations for peace. Had the other nations followed this example the bitter history of Europe of the past thirteen years might have been different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the Genoa Conference, the Soviet struggle for peace was marked by slow but steady establishment of diplomatic relations with the major powers of the world. This in itself was an element of stability in Europe, but normal relations were still much shaken by frequent raids on Soviet embassies and consulates in many countries, conducted on shallow pretexts and accompanied by forged letters and provocatory accusations unprecedented in diplomatic history.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Such as the assassination of Vorovsky during the Lausanne conference, which coincided with an ultimatum from the British Foreign Office; the raid on the Soviet Embassy in Peking, April 1927, followed by the execution of many of its Chinese staff; the raid on the Soviet trading agency in London May 12, 1927; the forged “Zinoviev letter” which swayed a British election. These were only the most spectacular of a whole series of raids, attacks and attempted assassinations which made being a Soviet ambassador a hazardous occupation.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Similar attacks on nations in the past have counted as causes of war. The Soviet Union responded to these attacks by steadily widening its pacts of non-aggression with minor or hard-pressed nations—Turkey first in December 1925, followed by Germany, Lithuania, Persia, Latvia, Afghanistan and others. Unlike all previous alliances and ententes, these pacts were non-exclusive. They were offered to all nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament of the League of Nations held its fourth session on November 30, 1927, the newly invited Soviet delegation startled the world by proposing to disarm. Five years earlier Chicherin had made a similar proposition at Genoa; it went unnoticed and was soon forgotten. But Litvinoff’s statement in 1927 came from a nation which had proved its economic and political stability over a term of years. It came moreover at a time when the peoples of the world were beginning to be disillusioned by the ever-repeated fruitless conferences with which European governments sought to hide from their peoples the chaos which followed the World War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Litvinoff broke the polite façade by suggesting actual disarmament, stating that the Soviet Government was ready to agree to total disarmament or any percentage of disarmament which the other powers would accept. He made this challenge time after time in the sight of the peoples of the world, until the constant evasion of the militarists made it apparent that no capitalist power was willing even to reduce armaments, and that the Disarmament Conference itself was little more than a mask for the old rearmament race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As armaments grew, the Soviet Union steadily extended pacts of non-aggression and began to press for an internationally accepted “definition of the aggressor,” designed to mobilize world opinion against the provokers of war. None of the major imperialist powers was willing to accept Litvinoff’s definition, which denounced as aggression the sending of any armed forces into any other nation. A dozen or more of the smaller countries signed it; the Soviet Union began to win the post of champion of the rights of smaller powers, which it was later to expand by its participation in the League of Nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The will to peace of the Soviet Union and its intelligence in maneuvering to keep out of war was soon severely tested by the growing tensions in the Far East. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria has been recognized by the whole world as a violation of the League of Nations Covenant, the Washington Nine-Power Pact and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to all of which Japan was signatory. It carried her troops to the Soviet borders and occasionally across them in forays by armed patrols which killed Soviet border guards and peasants. The most serious source of contention was the possession by the Soviet Government of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which crosses Manchuria as the shortest route to Vladivostok. Attacks by alleged bandits and arrests by Japanese military authorities put Soviet railway employees in peril hardly less than that of war. A report by the Soviet director of the road related over 3,000 cases of armed attack which had resulted in the murder of 56 people, the wounding of 825, the destruction of four kilometers of main line track and of hundreds of passenger and freight cars. On October 9, 1933, the USSR was able to publish four Japanese secret documents which discussed the “great necessity for assimilating the railway,” and made it plain that most of the attacks were inspired by Japanese military forces.&lt;br /&gt;
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The answer of the USSR to these provocations was neither that of the strong capitalist nation which would long since have “protected its interests and citizens” by declaring war, nor was it that of a defenseless colonial nation like China, which continually submits. The Soviet Union built strong fortifications on its entire Far Eastern border, obviously of a defensive nature; and simultaneously removed a source of conflict by selling the railroad to Manchukuo at a price hardly one-fifth of the sum originally invested by the Russians. I was present in Tokyo when the sale occurred and noted the lessening of tension. “The Japanese people are for the time being convinced of our peaceful purposes; it will be some months before their militarists will be able to inflame them against us,” said a Soviet diplomat to me, making the distinction which Communists always make between people and governments. The Japanese militarists were even then laying a basis for further provocation by suggesting the purchase of Soviet Saghalin. Yet for even a temporary lessening of tension, the USSR thought it worth while to make concessions.&lt;br /&gt;
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In September 1934 the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations, an act which startled both friend and foe. Yet it was the logical consequence of the changing conditions of Europe and the growing strength of the USSR. The Soviet Union views the League analytically rather than emotionally. What is it? What has it to give? The League is not a territory nor a state nor a super-power; still less is it an ideal or a formula which will somehow miraculously bring peace. The League is a diplomatic instrument through which a group of powers meet and come to an agreement. Its policy is decided by the powers that are in it and by the relative strength and courage of those powers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Behind the idealistic phrases with which at different stages each participating power has veiled its use of the League, the purpose of the League changes. Wilson started it as the organization of Europe on a basis of nationality; his plan involved also “freedom of the seas.” But “freedom of the seas” meant to Britain the domination of the world by American gold instead of by the British fleet; and Europe on a basis of nationality appalled Clemenceau, who knew quite well that there are twice as many Germans as French in Europe, and that “the interests of France” demand the splitting up of the Germans into minorities among many nations. The League, with America out, became the arena where Britain and France struggled for control of Europe, France wishing to crush Germany utterly and Britain willing to help Germany expand slightly. as a balance against France. Wall Street helped Britain by the Dawes and Young plans of reparations, scaling them down to “Germany’s capacity to pay,” i.e., the amount which it was thought German capitalists could squeeze from industrious German workers for several generations without revolt. Germany came into the League, hailed by phrases on the “United States of Europe,” which meant to the Soviet Union the united attempt of world capitalism to placate Germany for the Versailles deprivations by financing her in a drive to the East.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But Dawes guessed wrong. The world economic crisis broke Germany’s “capacity to pay” and ability to wait. Japan and Germany both left the League to seek expansion by their own armed might. The war danger increased but the League itself became, by their disaffection, an organization of powers which had more to lose than to gain from immediate war. “The League might become a hindrance to warlike tendencies,” said Stalin. It still contained robber powers who exploited colonial peoples, and small unstable states built up on the loot of Versailles. The Soviet Union admits the justice of the German grievance, but never the right of war to enforce those claims. “Injustices perpetrated by one war,” said Litvinoff, “can never be rectified by a new one, which only perpetrates worse injustices.” The Soviet Union entered the League to strengthen it against the tendency of Germany, Japan and now Italy to throw a torch into the powder magazine of the world. She thus upholds territorial gains of robber nations in order to increase the chances of world peace.&lt;br /&gt;
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She even goes further. By pacts of mutual assistance concluded with France and Czechoslovakia, she has placed the might of her increasing Red Army behind the status quo of Europe. She joins with these “robber powers” to blockade Italy, herself the first to agree to the sanctions. Yet when oil sanctions are not agreed to, she continues to sell this commodity to Italy,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In steadily decreasing amounts, in spite of American headlines to the contrary. It is America’s sales that increase.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; bewildering the idealists of many nations. Why? Because no high example can check Italians in Abyssinia or stop the spread of the war infection through the trade channels of the world. Because idealist gestures are dangerous tactics against general staffs of armies: that lesson was learned at Brest-Litovsk. Because isolated action might turn against the Soviet Union a fascist drive from a disintegrating Europe, helped to disintegration by her choice of an individual stand. Only the threat of might may possibly halt the explosive drive towards war of a desperate fascism—the might of Europe organized through the League. The Soviet Union throws herself into the task of organizing it&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;She tried first to organize an “Eastern Locarno,” a pact of many nations against anyone who started an aggression. It failed through the refusal of Poland and Germany. Soviet policy is still to expand security pacts to all possible nations, including Germany and Poland, not even the present pacts being exclusive in nature.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; through security pacts which she seeks to widen. For the status quo is evil, but war is worse.&lt;br /&gt;
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To strengthen this might the Soviet Union increases her Red Army, the only armed force on which she can really depend. Britain and France are camps of conflicting interests; on this the Communists have no illusions. In both these countries are strong popular forces supporting the USSR and the League of Nations in the policy of collective security against aggressors, and other strong reactionary forces which would prefer to support Nazi Germany in the looting of Russia. This would launch world war with all the gigantic means of modern destruction. Hence the struggle against world war today becomes inextricably linked with the struggle against fascist tendencies in the major imperialist countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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This war, if it comes, will be no mere war between nations. It will arouse class conflicts throughout the world. Not at first perhaps, but in the end in every country. This the Red Army understands thoroughly; its loyalty is not alone to Russia but to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, wherever they exist or come into being. But not unless invaded will the Soviet Union intervene in any other country, either by war or by interference in its affairs. Marxian analysis tells them that this would hamper the revolutionary development of the other country; it would turn workers towards the capitalists of their own country under the name of patriotism. If the world war starts, the Red Army will advance with a rifle in one hand and pamphlets in the other It has shells to distribute tens of thousands of leaflets calling on the brotherhood of all workers; it has also the means of effective war. As the world’s most politically conscious, most mechanized army, trained in many languages, it is able to lead and equip partisan war on the territory of foes. It is told to get results with a minimum of suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
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I well remember a talk in Moscow with a high Soviet authority on the subject of Japan in the tense winter of 1933. It was clear to us both that the Soviet air fleet was superior and in easy reach of Tokyo. We looked from high windows on the ice in Moscow river and discussed the chances of war.&lt;br /&gt;
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“A good, industrious folk, the Japanese,” he said slowly. “It would be a pity to bomb them. Do you think any Communist likes to set aflame whole towns of toiling folk? . . . If war should come in the East between us and Japan, we have not the slightest doubt that it would be the end of capitalist Japan. Revolution would start in Manchukuo and spread southward through China, till all Asia was Communist. Every imperialist power in the world would fight this, till at last revolt flamed up in their own lands. The world revolution might thus be accomplished, but the world that survived would be badly ruined. It would cost the lives of tens of millions of toiling folk; it would mean famine and pestilence sweeping all Asia. The world revolution will be secured with much less suffering, if peace can be maintained.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“The Soviet Union needs no foreign wars for transforming the world,” said Manuilski in 1935 at the Congress of the Communist International. Her struggle for peace is no temporary slogan. With every year of peace the Soviet Union strengthens, not only as a nation, but as a shining example which the world will follow. As socialism advances in the Soviet Union, it begins to attract scientists, engineers, artists; it draws away from allegiance to capitalism wider and wider hosts. With every year of peace—granted the steadily advancing Soviet Union—the international relation of world forces shifts to the side of the Soviet world and to the disadvantage of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Capitalism breeds war, yet world war is not inevitable. For capitalism itself is no longer inevitable in the world. If the struggle for peace can avail month by month and year by year, to check, delay and hamper the forces that drive towards war, capitalism itself may collapse in one war-inciting country after another on a sufficient scale to prevent world war altogether. Or world war, if it comes, may be greatly shortened by the revolt of all those people who suffer unbearably from war.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the hope behind the Soviet struggle for peace. But whether in peace or in war, the growing strength and prosperity of the Soviet Union, achieved through two Five-Year Plans, insures the direction and is the pledge of the whole world’s future. The only question now is how deep and bitter will be the struggle—even the wars—before the far-flung peoples know and copy. But nothing any longer can stop the advance of their worldwide forces. They have both strength and knowledge and a conscience about the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART II: THE SOVIET WORLD MAKES MEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER IX: THE FACTORY COLLECTIVE ===&lt;br /&gt;
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In all the recent congresses in Moscow, when miners, auto-workers, weavers, engineers and lathe-hands come up to celebrate their latest achievements in production and to receive honors for increasing a nation’s wealth, a phrase recurs which has no counterpart under capitalism, because the reality which it expresses could not exist there. Even in the Soviet Union the widening use of the phrase is recent, an instinctive expression of a new and growing reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I bring you greetings from our factory collective.” “Our factory collective pledges its full support.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The factory collective is not the plant administration. Nor is it the trade union, the shop committee or even the Party organization of the factory. All these organizations are a part of it, having their well-defined functions in its vivid life. The factory collective is the sum total of all the people in the plant in all their organized functions, the basic living cell of Soviet society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The concept of the factory collective did not spring into being full grown. It derives steadily from the joint ownership of the means of production which has now existed for eighteen years. This is the economic reality which is steadily determining the minds of men and the forms of their social life. A worker attached to a machine must be either its slave or its owner; under capitalism he is its slave. In the Soviet Union he knows himself owner of the machine but not the sole owner. It is entrusted to him to master, to get from it all that modern technical skill can give. The product belongs to him and his fellows; through his work in the plant he connects with all society. This gives back to man the old unity of life around the process of production which was riven in twain when the tools by which men created passed into alien hands. It returns on a wider scale and at a higher level by as much as the modern machine is more powerful than the ancient tool.&lt;br /&gt;
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An American who had worked for some years in a Soviet factory told me that two things especially impressed him: the relation of workers to administration and the cultural life around the factory. “The foreman always asks the workers’ advice in all problems; the relations are those of two friends instead of a boss. In America my factory was just a place to make a living, just another day to get through as soon as you could. Here it is your club, your center of culture, the thing that is closest in life.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The life of the factory collective has three main aspects: production, workers’ life, and relation to the rest of the country. Each of these aspects has its own control. The director and his assistants are responsible for organizing production. The trade union is responsible for organizing the workers’ life, including factory conditions, insurance, education and social activities. The Party organization is responsible for the political training of the workers, for widening their knowledge of the country’s policies and of their plant’s function in the building of socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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These three together—director, trade union organizer, and Party secretary—form the “triangle,” the highest authority in the plant. Each has his clearly defined function; all three together consult on questions affecting the fundamental life of the factory. Orders of the director must be taken without question in production, and he is held responsible for everything that happens in the plant. But any director who failed to get on with the Party and trade union organization wouldn’t last long. As a Russian worker explained it: “If the factory collective doesn’t like the director you may be sure the Commissariat of Heavy Industry won’t leave him there.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chap. 6 for an example of this.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The relation between workers and management was thus described to me by the American worker: “The whole working gang is interested in production. The program for next month is discussed with all of us. The foreman calls a meeting and tells us that the administration wants us to put out 3,000 milling tools next month. How shall we do it? We discuss in detail; each of us says what he can do. It all adds up to 4,000. So the foreman goes to the administration and raises the plan to 4,000. If we fulfill or surpass our plan, we get a premium which we divide among the workers on the basis of what each has done. To help us estimate this, the shop economist gives us each month a list of each worker’s production, spoilage, idle time, breakdown of machines. Naturally we give the most of the premium to the best workers because they helped the whole gang win. The factory honors the winning brigade not only with a premium but with a red banner which waves each month among the lathes for everyone who passes to see. The best factories get honor and premiums from the whole country because everyone knows that the more we produce the more everyone will have.”&lt;br /&gt;
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When conflicts occur in a factory between the management and the trade union, there are various ways in which they may be resolved. Often the Party organization of the plant can settle it by discussion within this wider group to which members both of administration and trade union belong. Serious disagreements are appealed by the shop committee to its central trade union, or even to the All-Union Council of Trade Unions which has governmental powers to enforce the rights of workers. For individual cases of injustice appeal is often made direct to the courts. These struggles may be time-consuming, but men who feel convinced enough of their case to fight it through rarely fail of satisfaction. The head of the Nijni Auto Works was removed in 1932 after an investigation by the trade unions which began with a fight over living conditions started by the foreign workers. In another case that I know, an engineer who sharply criticized the plant’s manager in the factory newspaper was later fired on grounds that he thought insufficient. Failing to interest the shop committee in his case he took it to the city organization of the Party, which ordered an investigation that resulted in his reinstatement, with wages paid for all time lost. The director was reprimanded, and the reprimand printed on the front page of the factory newspaper, in order, as one worker expressed it, that “the director may know he is not God.”&lt;br /&gt;
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More common are the conflicts in which local management and trade union unite to compel action by the central offices of the trust. The shop committee demands certain safety appliances or new construction for the health of the workers. The manager replies that his budget does not allow it. He has no objection, however, to the shop committee making the strongest possible case through the trade union to the central organization which supplies the budget. Since the manager has no personal profit to make by cutting out improvements, but advances in reputation and position rather through his ability to maintain an enthusiastic organization of productive workers, his interest lies on the side of supplying their demands.&lt;br /&gt;
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Workers, on the other hand, do not want a boss who is soft and sentimental. They want one who can efficiently organize their work. They know that their prosperity depends directly on the success of their factory. They themselves will ask to have workers transferred who make much spoilage, or even expelled if they steal or persistently disorganize production. They consider it desertion for a worker to shift jobs without reason or without training someone to take his place. If health or family matters require a change, or if a factory cannot use his highest skill or give him a chance to develop, he applies for and gets “release.” But to shift merely because another factory, better organized, can give him higher wages and better conditions is considered cowardly.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Somebody has to make this factory a good one. Why shouldn’t he? His going makes it that much harder for the rest of us; we have to break in a green man. Why should he run off to another place that other folks organized because he finds things difficult here?” Here is an attitude similar to that of partners in a business.&lt;br /&gt;
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Production, however, is only part of existence. Around this center of jointly owned production is built the whole unity of the worker’s life. Through his factory collective he enters into the duties and privileges of citizenship; it is the primary organization which elects deputies to the local Soviets. Through his shop committee he receives his social insurance, his opportunities for education, his excursions, sports and vacations, and takes part in a score of voluntary social activities from government commissions to parachute clubs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take an example of the internal organization of a factory collective, the Red Proletarian Plant in Moscow. The smallest unit in the plant is the production brigade which may have thirty to fifty workers. There are one hundred and fifty brigades in the plant, under one shop committee. These brigades not only compete in production records, rewarded by red banners and premiums, but also in social activity. Homiakov’s brigade, for instance, has twenty-nine workers, Every one of them does some social work. Some check the norms of production and standards of piece-work; some watch over the social insurance; three edit the wall newspaper which criticizes the shortcomings of the plant and of the workers. One middle-aged man was inactive socially and this was a great shame to the group, which tried to locate some tasks to interest him. They finally elected him president of the Red Aid Branch; within a month he signed up a big membership and had an active circle going.&lt;br /&gt;
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The brigade decides the list of “udarniks,” champion workers who get special privileges; but its list will be further checked by the trade union if it is too large or if there are complaints. Does a worker need a free vacation at a sanatorium? The brigade discusses it and sends a recommendation to the shop committee, which has a definite quota of places, and can fight for more. Safety devices on machinery, raising the technical knowledge of each operator, financial help to workers who are in straits, are matters which start with the brigade and are sent with their recommendation to the trade union. The union itself as a whole is actively pushing the completion of the new model dining-room, the expansion of the day nursery and clinic facilities—all these on demands which originally start in the brigades. All this work is democratically initiated, organized, carried through and checked by the rank and file members.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not the least important aspect of factory life is the cultural activity. Educational opportunities range from simple classes in reading and writing for newly arrived peasants, which characterized the earlier years of Soviet power, to the present university courses and institutions of scientific research. “You come to your factory to study, to attend a university,” said a worker to me. “You think, ‘My factory is going to make an engineer of me.’ After work you take a hot shower and go to the library or gliding club. Artists and singers come from the theaters to sing for us during the dinner hour. Famous authors come to discuss their books with us. If you want to write or act, you join the dramatic club or literary circle. Maybe some day you may go away to enter a theater or a newspaper, but even then you will sometimes come back to your factory.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The intimate sense of possession which a Soviet worker feels in his factory was strikingly shown to me by my step-daughter Ducia, who worked in a large electric plant near Moscow. I accompanied her on her return to the factory after she had been ill at home with grippe. As we approached the plant she grew excited; a vividness came into her gestures which had been lacking during her two weeks at home. She insisted that I notice and admire the factory laboratory where she worked, the power plant, the restaurant, the big workers’ club building; she pointed out the pathway between the shops that led to the park and stadium. I suddenly realized that Ducia had been positively homesick for her factory.&lt;br /&gt;
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Her reason for having chosen this particular factory to work in had little to do with wages. She chose it because it had a good reputation as an educational and social center, with a strong organization of Communist youth and a first class university. This offered her the well-rounded life which she demanded from her labor. Her working day was only six hours long, but she not infrequently spent twelve hours or more in and around the factory. She would go half an hour before her work began, drop into the Red Corner to get her newspaper or to discuss with the other girls the work of the political courses; she would come home late in the evening after her skiing club, German class or musical circle, or perhaps still later from a group party at the theater.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Ducia’s set it is the accepted view, which she does not even stop to formulate, that every human being should engage in three kinds of serious activity: productive work whereby he justifies his right to a share in the commonly produced goods of the country; voluntary social work, which holds together the whole apparatus of society; and study which improves individual capacities. Besides this serious activity there are recreations. All this many-sided life Ducia finds in her factory.&lt;br /&gt;
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The study takes different forms from year to year. In addition to courses in physics, German and political science which she takes regularly, various campaigns urge special study upon her. It may be her Young Communist League which makes a drive to have all members study the history of the Communist movement of youth. One year it was the drive for “technical minimum,” to raise the skill of all workers in the country. Ducia’s technical minimum was fixed for her by a committee of engineers who visited her laboratory, and discussed with each employee separately the special subjects needed for his work. She studied these subjects for several months, assisted by a voluntary teacher, one of the engineers of the plant who agreed to help several girls as his form of social work. “The whole laboratory is like a university,” said Ducia, “with the six hours’ work like practice on our subjects. When girls meet on the stairs, they are always asking whether you have finished such a formula.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Like most of her associates, Ducia also does social work; in her case it is the organization of the twelve current-events’ courses for young people in the various shops of the factory She takes much pride in keeping these running well. Not all social work is as serious as Ducia’s. One of the girls organizes a group for parachute jumping, another gets up theater parties, a third helps to plan excursions. Social work is not something that an individual does “for others”; it is the extension of his own interests, the organization in a social manner of what he himself most likes to do. It is also of value to the community and a direct preparation for participation in government. In a sense it is already taking part in government, which is increasingly built up from these voluntary social activities. A man whose financial ability is shown as dues collector for his union, may rise to full or part-time work as assistant chief of the city taxes. A woman who shows interest and efficiency in organizing the factory day nursery may later become chief of the city’s motherhood and infancy bureau.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is in fact the normal path to political office in the Soviet Union. I recall, for instance, Gribkova, who ten years ago was a young, illiterate farm servant. Wishing to better herself, she got a job as longshoreman on the Volga, thus entering the public services where, as she put it, “the road lay open to all life.” Working downstream she reached a textile mill and took employment as unskilled worker. Here she found the natural center for education and advancement. She learned to read and write, took technical courses and to handle a machine, took political courses and became an “active one” in her factory. From this point her specialization was possible in two directions: through technical training to higher posts in industry, or through social work and political training to posts in government. Gribkova chose the latter; she became interested in the voluntary tasks of factory inspection, and was later chosen by her fellow workers as part of their quota for a two-year training course which prepared professional factory inspectors. She is now a full-time official, head of inspection for a township. Hundreds of thousands have followed a similar path; this is the typical relation between factory life and the public activities of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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The life of a great factory is continuous. Just as its productive life goes on for three shifts, so its social life continues nearly twenty-four hours a day. If one chances to come at six-thirty in the morning to the great Stalin Auto Works in Moscow, he may see in Day Nursery No. 41 the beginning of the day’s life. Mothers bring their children to the nursery before reporting to work. Each child receives a swift medical examination as he enters; if this indicates illness, the mother is excused from work to care for her child or to take it to the hospital. In the case of nurslings, the mother is given an hour off at the end of every three hours’ work to nurse her child. These day nurseries are considered as essential a public service as public schools of other countries. But whereas education is compulsory, day nurseries are not. The picture spread abroad of a stern Soviet government forcibly taking children from their mothers would arouse incredulous laughter in any Soviet home. The Soviet mother regards a day nursery as a facility which relieves her of the child certain hours of the day, and as a center of scientific information, whose employees can assist her in its proper care. She demands the day nursery and fights for its quality. If any factory administration fails to supply adequate funds to enlarge and improve its day nursery, the working women will see that the director is reminded.&lt;br /&gt;
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About the time that the mothers are saying good-by to their children in the nursery, the newspaper office inside the plant begins to bustle with activity. Six thousand copies of Moscow daily papers and 8,500 copies of the four-page daily of the plant, &#039;&#039;Overtake and Surpass&#039;&#039;, must be delivered by eight or nine o’clock to subscribers in various shops. The plant newspaper is full of the daily life of the 35,000 workers. It organizes campaigns for production, for quality, for good housing, co-operative stores, clubs, schools, day nurseries; it contains complaints by workers about all these facilities; it is the organ through which these thousands of workers communicate with each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the midst of the great shops of the auto works, a small green square contains both the central dining room and the central polyclinic. The latter is maintained by the Moscow Board of Health, but its connection with the factory collective is very intimate. The health record of every worker is kept on file in a smaller dispensary in the shop where a doctor, medical assistant and statistician are constantly on hand for first aid and general care of this particular group of workers. For all special services the worker goes to the central polyclinic where a medical personnel of 300 includes specialists in all diseases. One interesting feature of this polyclinic is its direct connection with the diet kitchen of the factory which immediately gives the workers without extra charge the particular diet which the doctor prescribes.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is no sentimental glorification of manual labor which causes the grouping of Soviet institutions around the factory. It derives naturally from the unity of man as owner, creator and user, which under socialism replaces the capitalist division of men into bosses, hands, and buyers of goods. Even under capitalism men feel a deep human joy in creation and mastery, a mastery which may be widened and deepened by the machine. But capitalism poisons this joy at its source. A crane man in Seattle once told me that when he sat aloft picking up great loads with power and deftness, he felt “like one of those Greek giants or ancient gods.” Then he suddenly realized that he had no claim to that crane, but might face any morning, at the owner’s whim, the sign: “Closed down,” and he felt himself degraded from a god to a slave.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under capitalism the association of men in production is made hateful by a clash of interests; they seek their real life elsewhere, building it from disjointed fragments. Under socialism this association is strengthened by a thousand ties of mutual interest and becomes the solid foundation on which the whole structure of political and social life is frankly and realistically built. Life becomes unified; from worker to manager, to scientist, to artist there is at no point a break. A worker studies and becomes an engineer; he is active in the factory committee on inventions, and becomes a scientist; he shows talent in the dramatic circle and becomes an actor; he devotes himself to social work and rises in the government. Any of these interests may become professional and take him out of the factory into a wider or more specialized life. But the factory remains the social home from which he launched into life, and to which he often returns, either actually or emotionally.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER X: FARMING A CONTINENT ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Among the many flaming words which poured from the hearts of two hundred combined-harvester operators meeting in December 1935 in Moscow with the heads of Party and government, amid jubilation over present success and promises to make the future even more victorious, there was one poignant phrase of contrast with the past.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We sons and daughters of peasants—had there been no Soviet power, no Party of Lenin-Stalin, our lot would have been slavery to kulaks, or dawnless poverty in the mire of small peasant farming.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These words illumine with a piercing ray the tremendous changes that have taken place in the Soviet rural districts in a span of years so brief that the past still remains vivid in the minds of men not yet thirty years old. “When I worked as a fourteen-year-old farmhand under the tsar,” said the combine operator Kapusta, “I never saw the leaders of the government, never saw even the boss for whom I worked. . . . I never expected from life such happiness, such joy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Five years ago Kapusta was an unskilled worker. But not Kapusta alone; so were they all. What else but unskilled workers were there on the backward individual farms of peasant Russia, where fifteen years ago the tractor was stoned as a “devil machine?” Even five years ago, who among Russian peasants had ever seen a combine-harvester? Today not only are millions of peasants acquainted by sight with the most modern farm machinery, but hundreds of thousands have mastered its operation and make a more continuous use of it than is possible on the private farms of America, which are too small to utilize profitably this modern machine. The combine is already a machine too good for capitalism. The American average harvesting record per combine is 578 acres, while the Soviet average secured in 1935 was 643. The champion operators who met in Moscow spurned this average. They had made records of a thousand, two thousand and even twenty-five hundred acres for the harvest season, and were swearing a solemn oath to train before next harvest many more operators like themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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The time of this great advance has been so short that they can all look back as if to yesterday and recall the days of ignorance and poverty, when they slaved for wealthier farmers or wasted nine-tenths of their labor trudging from strip to strip of their medieval peasant fields. Today the very word “peasant” is passing from their vocabulary. They speak of themselves as “kolhozniks,” members of the collective economy, joint owners and users of the large-scale farm on which they work. They know quite well that if there had been no collectivization of farming, their slavery and darkness would have continued. For if modern machines had come to the Russian soil under capitalist conditions, a minority of successful farmers would have gained the means of production and risen to a brief wealth on the impoverishment of millions—brief until they in turn were robbed by the big banks of the cities, as farmers are under capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The years 1930 to 1933 will go down in mankind’s story as the turning point in the farm history of the world. No other events of those years will be so long remembered—not the struggles of the League of Nations, nor the American New Deal; not even the world-wide economic crisis which was but one more, the worst, of many crises. Even the rise of the Chinese Soviets and the turning of Central Europe to fascism may receive less space in future history books than the collectivization of Soviet farming, whereby men won the dream of centuries, security on the soil.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Security on the soil! Security from drought, from floods, from mortgages, from the chances of nature and the exploitations of man! Even to attain fragments of such security, if not for themselves then for their children, men of all ages have struggled and died. American families left the comforts of settled regions to homestead in dugouts, for the security promised by land ownership. Then drought or the foreclosure of mortgages showed that security based on private property in land is illusion. Markets collapsed and land was taken away for bare taxes. Soviet farmers today are winning not only security against taxes and mortgages and markets but even against drought and floods. Farming is industrialized on the basis of modern machinery and division of labor. Crop losses through “acts of God” are minimized by better tillage, crop insurance, and assistance from the more fortunate areas. The control of the joint farm is democratically organized; the general meeting not only elects the management, but decides the plan of the farm and the division of work. Security on the land thus co-exists with free initiative.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This change has occurred among people whose farming was formerly notoriously backward. Ten years ago in the central grain-growing regions of Russia, there were three homemade wooden plows for every metal plow. One-third of the peasants had no horse at all but labored for others to pay for the plowing of their own soil. Lands were divided according to a medieval system; the twenty acres of a single family might be divided into a dozen strips scattered miles apart. Scientific crop rotation and seed selection were unknown. The primitive methods of tillage steadily exhausted the soil. A typical study of grain crops in the Kirsanov district showed a steady decline of average yield from thirteen bushels per acre in 1896-1905 to ten and a half bushels in the five years preceding the World War. On this same land since the collective farm was organized in 1930 the yield rose by better tillage to an average of seventeen bushels in 1930-33, and twenty bushels in 1934-35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In four earth-shaking years, the Soviet Union changed from a country of tiny, badly tilled holdings, worked with wooden plow and hand sickle, to the largest scale farms in the world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In the United States farms of a thousand acres or more comprise only 7.5 per cent of the total tilled area; in the USSR in 1935, nine-tenths of the tilled area was made up of farms averaging thirteen hundred acres.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The initiative was taken by the poorer peasants and farm hands, urged and organized by the Communists, and assisted by government credits and machines. When the Five-Year Plan swiftly increased the farm machinery available, the new collective farm proved able to attract ever wider and wider groups of farmers. The movement was bitterly fought by the small rural capitalists known as kulaks, who farmed with hired labor, lived by money-lending, or owned small mills, threshers and other means of production and used these facilities to exploit their neighbors.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Writers unacquainted with Russian rural life often confuse kulaks with peasants generally, which leads them to describe the whole collectivization movement as an attack on the peasants. But for half a century students of Russian rural districts have spoken of kulaks. In 1895 Stepniak wrote that “hard unflinching cruelty” was their main characteristic; in 1904 Wolf von Schierhand wrote of the kulak as a “usurer and oppressor in a peasant’s blouse.” In 1918 Dr. E. J. Dillon, in &#039;&#039;The Eclipse of Russia&#039;&#039;, said: “Of all the human monsters I have ever met in my travels, I cannot recall any so malignant and odious as the Russian kulak.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The state’s donation to farming and the technical help supplied by city workers proved decisive. During the years from 1930 to 1935, the Soviet government issued more than a billion dollars of direct credits to the farms for livestock and implements and spent an additional three billion for farm machinery loaned through the tractor stations;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For tractor stations 5.5 billion rubles, for direct loans 1. billion; these were “hard rubles” whose value may be estimated as fifty cents.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; it also gave food and seed loans of 157 million bushels of grain to farms in distress. At the call of the Communist Party tens of thousands of skilled workers, bookkeepers, machine repairmen, teachers and organizers, poured into the rural districts to help organize the farms. The most difficult period was from the 1932 to the 1933 harvest when kulak sabotage, added to difficulties of inefficient organization, caused a grain shortage that put the whole country on short rations. Success was won by the 1933 harvest which reached nearly 90 million tons of grain, the largest harvest ever known in the Russian land; it was succeeded by an equal or larger grain crop in 1934 and 1935. These harvest successes helped create a government budget surplus in 1934 of 437 million rubles, which was at once applied to cancel debts owed to the state by the farmers for early expenses of organizing and equipping the collectives. This wiped out 53 per cent of the still outstanding indebtedness, including all debts incurred prior to 1933.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The economic results of collectivization have been an increase in the sown area of 30 million acres, from 293 to 323 million; a grain crop which for three years has been 15 to 20 million tons higher than the average for the five years before the collectives were formed;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The average before collectivization was 78 to 80 million tons; in 1933 and 1934, 90 million; in 1935 nearly 100 million tons. Cotton area 688,700 hectares in 1913; 802,000 in 1927, and 2,051,000 in 1933. Sugar-beet area 648,700 in 1913; 665,000 in 1927, and 1,212,000 in 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an area sown to sugar beets which is double the pre-war or any previous record; and an area sown to cotton which is two and a half times either the pre-war or the re-collectivization area. Livestock suffered catastrophically during the early years of collectivization but has been climbing rapidly back in the past three years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chap. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The indications for the future are even brighter, since the rapidly improving methods of tillage and increase of fertilizer are counted upon to increase harvest yield year by year.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;As an example 46 per cent of all spring seeding in 1935 was done on winter-fallowed land, as compared with 25 per cent in 1930, and three-fourths of the autumn sowing in 1935 was done on summer-fallowed land as compared with 30 per cent in 1930. Similar increases have occurred in the use of selected seed, of fertilizer, scientifically planned crop rotations, and so forth.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the end of 1935 Stalin in conference with the harvester-combine operators announced that “in the very near future, in three or four years,” 120 to 130 million tons of grain would be expected from the farms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By 1935, the new forms of collective farming were sufficiently stabilized for the permanent fixing of boundaries. For at least two years practically no members had wished to leave the collective farms to return to individual farming; crop rotations and the location of fields were becoming settled. The Soviet Government thereupon issued a decree granting “perpetual use of land” to the farm collectives. All over the country today rapid surveying of boundaries goes on followed by village celebrations which record the deed for perpetual use. Speakers celebrate the change of recent years, recalling days when most of the land was owned by landlords and tenant peasants worked in the slavery of debt, when freehold peasants sold their land bit by bit to pay taxes. “From perpetual debt to perpetual ownership is the change we have made,” said a Tartar farmer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In place of the old disused boundary posts with the tsarist eagle and the inscription “Each for his own,” there arise new boundary posts with the sickle and hammer and the letters, “USSR.” All the land is unitedly owned by the whole country of workers and farmers, say these symbols; its use is granted perpetually to specific organizations of working farmers. As Soviet citizen, the farmer is ultimate owner, as working farmer, he is permanent user. Both ownership and use are democratically organized and the relation of the smaller group to the whole country is fixed in part by permanent law and in part by annual contracts designed to encourage efficient production and to guarantee right to the fruits of toil. Security is gained by the permanent use of land which cannot be alienated by sale, lease, or mortgage. Freedom is secured by the democratic organization of both farm and country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is this group which thus becomes permanent user? The model constitution adopted by the Congress of “Farm Udarniks”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A delegate congress from the farms that have made the best records; their recommendations have weight as expressing the best farm practice.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and ratified by the Soviet Government February 17, 1935, states that it is a “voluntary union of working farmers” who unite “in order to build with joint means of production and jointly organized labor a collective, i.e., a social husbandry, to secure full victory over the kulak and over all exploiters, to secure full victory over need and darkness, over the backwardness of small individual husbandry, to create high productivity of labor and thus insure a better life for the members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“All boundaries formerly dividing the fields of the members are abolished. . . .&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“All draft animals, farm implements, seed reserves, fodder for the collective livestock, and buildings necessary to carry on the joint farming and the processing of the farm products are socialized. . . .&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Living quarters, family cattle and fowls and the buildings necessary for their use are not socialized but remain for the private use of the members’ family.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Up to two head of milch cattle, one brood sow and her brood, ten sheep and goats, unlimited rabbits and chickens and twenty bee-hives in the grain, cotton, and beet regions; larger numbers are allowed for individual use in the regions devoted to livestock.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All persons over sixteen who toil on the farm have equal vote. The general meeting elects the management, accepts or expels members, decides in conference with state experts the plan for farm production, crop rotation and new improvements and sets aside within certain limits private family garden plots ranging from half to one and a half acres for the individual use of members. It also contracts for the use of machinery from the Machine Tractor Station, a service center which supplies machines and expert knowledge over about a fifteen mile radius. These stations were originally organized and financed by the state but are becoming in part co-operatively owned through shares taken by the collective farms they serve. The farm must make certain deliveries of crops to the state at low prices fixed by a state commission; it must also pay the tractor station in kind. These two payments amount to about one-fourth of the average Crop; as tractor station service increases and with it the payments for machinery, the direct deliveries to the state somewhat diminish, moving towards a time when the state will receive its quota as direct payment for machinery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When these deliveries are made, and the seed and fodder fund set aside, the rest of the harvest may be divided among the members in proportion to the work they have done. The “work-day” is the unit for payment, but work-days are of different value according to the quantity and quality of work done. A tractor driver’s day may count as two ordinary work-days, a night watchman’s as three-quarters of a day. When possible, work-days are related to a definite amount of labor done—an area plowed or harvested—and additions or subtractions are made for work above or below the norm. The general meeting also sets aside part of the income for expansion and common uses such as field kitchens and day nurseries. This at first led to abuses by over-zealous farm officials wishing to build up central funds, but these amounts are now limited. In the past two years, the increased harvests have led to an increasing surplus above the government deliveries and the food required by the members. This may be freely sold, either individually or collectively, and either in town markets or through the village co-operatives, which have been greatly strengthened during the past year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some fifty miles from the railway, in a northern flax and rye district, the Kalinin Collective Farm showed me its “Farm Plan,” a document of eighteen long pages, neatly stitched into a pamphlet. It was a printed form issued by the Commissariat of Agriculture, with details filled out by the local organization. Acreage, meadows, arable land, orchards, crop rotations, farm implements, draft animals, cows, pigs and chickens—everything you could wish to know about the Kalinin farm is here recorded. Not only are all people listed but allowance is made for babies yet unborn; an estimated 2 per cent annual increase of population must be provided with a growing standard of living. The farm plans to provide food for people and animals, produce the marketable crops recommended for the district, erect new buildings, reclaim new fields and create an increasingly prosperous life for its members. To this end work must be assigned to use as far as possible the entire working-time of the hundred able-bodied members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The farmer-members have discussed this plan for months before they adopted it. The township surveyor helped them plot the fields; the township land office and the Soviet newspapers have informed them that the country’s standard of living is to double by 1937, and that they must do their share. This involves increasing wheat at the expense of rye, doubling the oat ration of their horses, increasing fats and meats. They know that the state expects from them a certain amount of flax, the chief marketable crop of their district. On the basis of all this knowledge they plan for the coming year, counting on a constantly increasing crop yield through more machines and fertilizer and better methods, and on a constantly increasing prosperity through the rational assignment of work to the members. The plan includes the labor organization, with the number of total work-days needed for sowing and harvest, and the amount of labor left over for building a new library, equipping a playground and stadium or installing electricity and radios. No one need be out of a job, for all labor can be utilized to increase in various ways the prosperity and culture of the village; all will be paid by shares in the joint harvest, according to the quantity and quality of work done.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the entire plan is accepted by the general meeting, it is registered with the township office and becomes part of the economic plan of the whole country, which is derived from and in turn controls all lesser plans. Sowing and harvest are not the affair of the individual farmer only; they are the great annual rhythm on which the nation’s life depends. The whole country knows this and relates itself consciously to the plans of the farmers. Scientific conferences consider questions of insect pests and seed selection; heavy industry makes plans to manufacture more tractors. Government and Party congresses outline the changing demands which the growing life of the land makes on farming—increase of area or yield, or a change in the proportion of crops. Congresses of farmers meet by township, province and on national scale to discuss problems of tillage and farm organization. The Russian winter which in former days was a season of hibernation in snow-bound villages, is today a season of active farm-planning on a nationwide scale. Not even the farthest farm is isolated; visits of experts and newspaper campaigns keep it in touch with the life of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When spring begins in the south, hundreds of press correspondents pour forth to cover the sowing. &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039; alone sends a dozen staff correspondents and tells sixty local correspondents to concentrate on farm news. The &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; keeps several small airplanes busy, each as the center of a group of a dozen persons covering the farms. The news-gathering organization which some of the Soviet newspapers put on the sowing or harvest is beyond the scope of the biggest dailies in the capitalist world. Every provincial paper adds its reporters. The story is the world’s biggest annual story with more reporters than covered the World War!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These reporters are not mere observers; their reporting is planned to help the harvest. One journalist of my acquaintance spent forty-four days in an airplane covering harvest in the North Caucasus; he visited one hundred farms and forty Tractor Stations, and slept in the fields without one night in a bed. His reporting was for a concrete purpose; he would drop in a field, apply his yardstick and count the grain ears lost on a square yard of harvested ground; he compared various farms, discovered which ones harvested best and how they did it. Within three days he was meeting with other journalists who made similar surveys; they discussed the chief harvest problems of the season and the best ways in which these were being met. These results were at once radioed to all the farms and published through the press of the country for the benefit of other farmers as the harvest traveled north. Every season hundreds of new ideas are thus culled from the experience of the farmers and broadcast by press and radio for the use of other farms.&lt;br /&gt;
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“A characteristic trait of the collective farm system,” says Vaviloff, chief of the Plant Institute. of Leningrad, “is its ability to assimilate new technical methods and make new scientific experiments.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most striking example of the organization of great masses of farmers under the leadership of science was shown by the united fight of 1934 against the great drought which affected the whole southern half of Europe, including large areas in the Ukraine and Crimea. In many places no rain fell from April till harvest. In days of individual peasant farming, the peasants would have killed cattle for food and gone to the cities for work, putting back agriculture for several years. The collective farmers met swiftly in delegate congresses to declare “War Against Drought.” They took stock of all resources and made plans to suit each region. Near the Dnieper river they seeded the overflow meadows. On the slopes of the Caucasus the Kabardinians dug thousands of miles of irrigation ditches, declaring: “We have mountains; we don’t need rain.” Other farms organized continuous hauling of water by fire-department wagons, or planted swamps and forest glades. Children stormed the fields in organized detachments to pull up every moisture-sucking weed. Scientists busily determined for each district what second crops could best grow where winter wheat had failed. The press gave directions about this second planting; the government shot in by fast freight the necessary seed. The USSR secured a crop equal to the bumper harvest of 1933, and even most farms in the drought-stricken regions came through with food for man and beast, and with organization strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet farmer has come out of his old isolation; he stands on the highways of the world. Through his collective farm, like the industrial worker through the factory collective, he connects with the wider life of science and art. Seven thousand farms in the Ukraine have established during the past two years their “laboratory cottages,” where the farmers carry on scientific experiments based on their own fields. In a typical one I found exhibits of wheat grown under varying conditions, samples of new crops, collections of insect pests, instruments for weather recording. “Sixty farmers take part in our experiments,” they told me. “We exchange data with the Zaporozhe Experimental Station.” These not long since illiterate peasants who grubbed the soil blindly are farmer-scientists now, collecting nationally useful data for the conquest of harvest yields.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than a hundred thousand drama circles for self-expression have sprung up on Sovict farms. Sport and recreation of all types grow also with tremendous speed. Farmers learn gliding, parachute jumping, even aviation. The small farm airplane which can land on a harvested field is a not infrequent visitor in farm campaigns. Extra-early sowing done by air into the mud of melting snow is a recognized means of combating drought in many regions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By no means all Soviet farms are yet well organized, but efficiency steadily increases. By no means all of them are prosperous, but prosperity steadily grows. The change which is most apparent is in the faces of the farmers. They have lost the dull, unresponsive stare of the peasant; they are more vivid, alert. “Formerly even the peasant with the best income lived like a pig,” said a Soviet farmer to me. “His only use for his surplus was to get drunk. Today he has a reading-room, a hospital, a school, a laboratory; he reads the newspapers and knows about the world. His children go from the village to build factories, to discover minerals, to conquer the Arctic, to become ‘heroes of the Soviet Union.’”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than two million letters 2 year from farmers pour into the offices of the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; in Moscow, a high-piled mountain covering many tables. I asked an editor how their contents revealed the changing life of the farm. “When our paper began its existence,” he said, “in the years before collectivization, we got chiefly individual complaints and requests for simple information on farm technique. ‘My taxes are too high!’ ‘How shall I care for my cow?’ Such were the letters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What do they write about now? The education of children, the position of women, the farm theater, the economic crisis in foreign lands. We got five hundred original poems on the death of Kirov and seventy on the disaster to the Maxim Gorky airplane. They comment on world affairs, on China and Italy. You can’t compare them with what they were ten years ago. Instead of ‘my horse and cow,’ their interest is wide as the world.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the northern slopes of the Caucasus mountains, a small district of once suppressed non-Russians, known as Kabardinia, prides itself on creating “the farms of tomorrow.” Its collective farmers have been known to vote the greater part of a harvest surplus to add to the government’s school fund and build for their own village “the best school in the valley.” They bring architects from Moscow to help them plan “farm-cities,” settlements which shall combine expert farming with the culture of the town, high schools, laboratories, libraries, sound-film theaters. A forty-mile highway runs through the Kabardinian valley. Last summer travelers passing, on foot or by cart, found seven rest-stations at five-mile intervals. Brightly painted, tile-roofed pavilions were furnished with wash-basins and beds with fresh linen; large plates of watermelon were placed on the table to quench the visitor’s thirst. An old man attendant refused all payment for the refreshment, saying: “This is the farm ‘Dawn of Socialism’; we planted two extra acres of melons for the traveler.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XI: THE FREEING OF WOMEN ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“Every kitchen maid must learn to rule the state.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Throughout the world a struggle goes on for women’s equality and freedom, with varying methods and varying success. The methods most commonly known are those of different women’s organizations which fight, decade after decade, for new specific increases in women’s “rights.” They count their victories by the number of women who one by one attain high office, by the number of rights slowly secured, the right to vote, to enter industry, to inherit property, to divorce, to some individual status after marriage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Undoubted gains they have known, and also many disillusions. A tireless woman in New England recently told me that she had fought for thirty years to get “a decent inspection of women’s labor in our state” and that they would “probably lose it at the next election.” Nor does the elevation of the occasional woman to high position necessarily improve the lot of women generally. From Cleopatra down to America’s women officials, exceptional women have occasionally been permitted to rule; it is not recorded that the mass of women gained more consideration from them than from men rulers. Women the world over are still unequal to men, bound by a thousand discriminations. In the backward lands of the East hundreds of millions of women are still a subject sex. Not even in the most advanced capitalist countries are they quite equal with men; the long list of disabilities against which the National Women’s Party protests in America is evidence of that. Nowhere in capitalist lands have they equal access to all universities, equal pay for equal work in all industry, equal right to advance in all professions, equal rights in marriage and in the care and custody of children. Even those rights which they have attained are today under attack by fascism, which under the phrases of chivalry drives women back to the Middle Ages.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is therefore the more amazing that Soviet women should have gained so swiftly an equality unknown elsewhere in the world. They receive equal pay for equal work and no jobs are closed to them. They have equal opportunity in education and in government. They have equal rights and duties in marriage; they are free to have or not to have children. They have full political, economic, legal and social equality, as human beings and citizens. This has been attained in eighteen years in a country where women were once suppressed not only in the European but also in the Asiatic manner. Tsarist law made Russian wives the property of their husbands “in duty bound to render him love, respect and in all things obedience to his wishes.” They had no right to separate passports; if they ran away, the police returned them to their husbands. This law was reinforced by brutal peasant customs; Gorky relates the sight of an unfaithful wife bound naked to a cart and flogged by her peasant husband into unconsciousness in the midst of a jeering, applauding crowd. In tsarist Central Asia millions of dark-skinned Mohammedan women lived in the seclusion of harems and behind black veils.&lt;br /&gt;
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The freeing of women takes place in the Soviet Union swiftly because it is not a woman’s fight alone. It comes as part of the freeing of human beings by giving them joint ownership over the country’s means of production, irrespective of sex, color or race. . . . “The emancipation of women is not only the work of women Communists but of men Communists also, just as the fight for socialism is a mutual fight,” said Krupskaia, widow of Lenin. The Communists hold that the gains in women’s freedom made through centuries have been chiefly due to change in methods of production. The modern factory freed women from the patriarchal home, but imposed its own form of slavery; it used women to cut down wages, thus increasing the antagonism of the sexes. Economic slavery is the basis of all other inequalities, the key-log in the jam which must first be loosed that all others may rush free.&lt;br /&gt;
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No freedom comes without battle. The October Revolution created the economic, legal and political basis of woman’s equality. The industrialization of the country was the consciously applied weapon for making woman equal with man. Yet in every village and factory women still had to fight their way over the traditional habits of centuries, which lingered in their own souls and in the souls of men. But these barriers of the past were no longer buttressed by ancient law and by the need of private industry for cheap woman’s labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first women to establish their freedom were the workers in the factories who took part with their men in the Revolution. I recall Dunia, who was once an illiterate textile worker, living with husband and children in the same room with another family, nine people in all. Dunia was one of those who in the first year of Revolution seized the manager’s house for a day nursery so that her children might have space to grow. She learned to read and began to rise in political and social work, as did simultaneously millions of others. She said to me: “Once life went on without us workers, still more without us women. The father gave her to the husband; she was slave to her man and her factory. Now I am slave to no one. The road is open to all life.” This phrase of the “open road to life” I have heard hundreds of times from working women.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emancipation of peasant women came more slowly. Scores of women presidents of villages have told me of their difficulties with the peasant men who jeered at “petticoat rule.” “They laughed at the first woman we elected to the village Soviet so much that she could do nothing; at the next election we put in six women and now it is we who laugh.” This was a typical statement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The widespread collectivization of farming in 1930 gave women’s freedom in the rural districts its needed economic base. Farm women everywhere in the collective farms are awakening to the implications of their independent income. Drunken husbands are no longer masters in the home. “I got for myself a warm new coat, a dress and shoes; I got clothes for the children,” said a farm woman displaying her purchases in the local market. “But my man spent his money on drink and I’ll buy him nothing. I’ve told him if he gets drunk again I’ll throw him out of the house and not even feed him. The farm will back me up, unless he quits drinking and loafing. I can get along without him in the collective farm.” Some thirty million farm women from Leningrad to Vladivostok are awakening to the amazing fact that they can get along economically without their husbands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most cruel and bloody of all was the fight for women’s freedom in those lands of Central Asia where for centuries veiled women had been sold like chattels to the harems. Here local religion and custom supported men who murdered their wives for the crime of unveiling. When young folks in Tashkent schools spent vacations agitating for women’s freedom, one girl’s body was sent back in a cart. Accompanying the hacked pieces were the words: “This is your women’s freedom.” In another locality of Central Asia, nine murders of women occurred before any were discovered by central authority; every attempt of a woman to get justice was met by local vengeance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the women of Central Asia, led by the hope which the new government gave them and the new industries encouraged, fought their way into freedom. The blood of martyrs stirred them to greater struggle; fifty thousand women marched at the funeral of the Tashkent girl student. In Bokhara, citadel of Mohammedan orthodoxy, a spectacular unveiling of women in great meetings and processions took place on International Women’s Day, March 8, 1928. Amid indescribable enthusiasm they tore off veils, stamped on them, threw them on the streets and at the feet of speakers. When one woman was murdered by her husband for this unveiling, a public trial was held in a great mass meeting; the murderer was swiftly condemned and executed. From that time women walked unveiled in holiest Bokhara. Today a woman, Abidova, who at the age of twelve was sold in marriage to pay a fifteen-ruble debt of her father, is vice-president of the Uzbek Republic, and its permanent representative in Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
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These women of the East are quite aware of the relation of their new freedom to the socially owned means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The roar of the factory is in me.&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;It gives me rhythm,&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;It gives me energy,&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
sing the Uzbek girls of the state silk mill which brought them out of the harems. Another song makes the application wider:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Flower of the East,&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;the time has come To cast off the veil and the paranja. . . .&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;For a thousand years you slept in darkness under the yoke.&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;When you awake, when you arise from deep sleep,&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;The workers of the world await you!&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Steadily the share of Soviet women in industry and in public life has climbed upward. The percentage of women among industrial workers has risen by a steady 3 per cent a year during the Five-Year Plan, and is now (1935) 42 per cent of all persons gainfully employed. In technical higher schools 36 per cent of the students are women, in medical schools 75 per cent; in no institution of learning is there any discrimination against women. The percentage of women who took part in elections rose from 28 per cent of all eligible women in 1926 to 80.3 per cent in 1934. Women constituted 18.2 per cent of the membership of city soviets in 1926; this rose to 32.1 per cent in 1934. The change in the rural districts was greater; a 9.9 percentage of women in 1926 in village soviets rose to 26.4 per cent in 1934. Only 0.6 per cent of the villages had women presidents in 1926, though even this figure testified to the successful fight of thousands of women; by 1934 the figure was over 8 per cent. More than a million women today hold some form of public office in the soviets, including 400,000 elected members of soviets, 400,000 members of local government commissions, 112,000 “co-judges” in the courts, a function similar to but somewhat more specialized than that of our jurors, and 100,000 members of managing boards of co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The city of Tver, now renamed Kalinin, gives an example of the varied kinds of work done by women. As a textile town, its population included a large proportion of women textile workers before the Revolution, a fact which explains its present status as a progressive city, boasting itself among the first Soviet cities in which women attained their full half of the seats in the city government. (Other cities are steadily following, as women through initiative and education take advantage of their legal right to equality.) Tver’s two most important women are Anna Kaligina, city secretary of the Communist Party, than which no higher post in the city exists, and Feodorova, who held till recently the prize of “best weaver” for the USSR. Thousands of others follow in the footsteps of these leaders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Policeman Lily travels fearlessly through dark woods about the city to round up criminal gangs. On one occasion, when she was convoying a prisoner caught setting fire to turf fields, she was set upon in the woods by two of his accomplices and brought back to jail not one criminal but three. That same evening she played the part of fragile heroine in lilac gown in the local dramatic club, for Lily is an ardent amateur actress specializing in dainty feminine parts. Black-eyed Katya is a street-car conductor, with the best record among the twenty-seven woman conductors of Tver. She is also in the second year of the workers’ college, where she studies Turgenieff and geometry. Morosov, the motorman, writes poems about her.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All the young men admire Nina, eighteen-year-old glider pilot, who three days a week sails through the air on light wings. Her regular job is in the car Works, making valves for railway cars. But her pastime is the aviation club and she expects some day to be an aviator. Zoya is champion motor mechanic in a clothing factory and also chairman of its shop committee, handling trade union affairs for five hundred and sixty women; in her spare time she is an enthusiastic ski runner, who took second place in a contest held by the clothing workers of five provinces. Marusia is studying to be a doctor; Tonia is a former spinner who did such good work on the wall newspaper that she is now a full time writer. Dusia was the first woman chauffeur in the city; the boys used to run after her yelling, “girl driver.” One by one the girls of Tver have conquered every trade and profession. So have the women throughout the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foreign visitors are occasionally shocked to find women taking part in heavy and dirty labor, field work, street-cleaning, even digging the subway. But Soviet women are still of the generation of peasants, who worked in the fields. They know that in all ages women have done heavy labor; it is the skilled work from which they have been barred. They know that equal share in labor means in the USSR equal share in ruling and in all opportunities of life. So young girls fought for the right to equal work on the subway, against engineers and miners who didn’t want to let the women underground. They worked knee-deep in water alongside experienced men, challenged them to records and often beat them. “The subway was the richest experience of my life,” said a prize-winning girl.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are, however, regulations governing women’s labor, which prohibit work proved by experience more dangerous to women than to men. Women may not engage in trades involving danger of lead poisoning, may not lift weights above a certain amount. Special regulations, reinforced by medical observation, surround the whole period of pregnancy, and the last six to eight weeks women may not work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Six weeks before and six weeks after childbirth for office jobs; eight weeks before and eight weeks after for physical labor; longer periods may be ordered at any time by the doctor, and are given without loss of wages.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Many labor processes are constantly under investigation to determine whether or not they are injurious to women; when experiment shows that they are, they are prohibited. This is no sex discrimination but part of the ordinary routine of the public health service, which steadily investigates the effect of occupations and bars from them those groups of the population which might be injured. Thus sand-blasting trades are prohibited to youth, which is more susceptible than older people are to tuberculosis from sand-blasting. No trade or profession is prohibited in advance as “unwomanly”; any trade may be barred after investigation to any group or individual on grounds of public health.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not access to heavy labor but to skilled professions distinguishes Soviet women from those of other lands. Anna Kofanova won fame as operator of a combined-harvester, harvesting 1,500 acres in one season, the township record. Natalia Mikhailova is director of a machine tractor station entirely manned by women which services the 15,000 acres of thirty-two collective farms. Shchetinina, a ship captain, navigates the ocean. The envelopes of Soviet stratostats were designed by a woman chemist. Irene Rousinova was the first woman polar explorer, wintering several seasons in the north; she has been followed by hosts of others, including Nina Demme, who for two years has managed the scientific station on North Land. Galina Medovnik weeded tobacco in tsarist days as a girl of eight, fought in the Red Army during the civil war and was several times condemned to death; she escaped to become today a representative of housewives in the Moscow Soviet, where she superintends the building of apartment houses for workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality in work has given to women equality in every field of life: education, politics, marriage. The assumption behind the Soviet marriage code is the equal human dignity of both parties in deciding their intimate relations—a decision with which the state has no right to interfere. State action is limited to protection of children and prevention of force or fraud. Young couples appearing at the Marriage Registry Bureau are therefore required to give name, residence, occupation, past marital history, any children, and the future name which each intends to take. Questions to each are identical. The same name is often taken but not always. A person who infects another with disease is criminally liable. Property owned before marriage remains individual; that later acquired is jointly owned. Any married person who desires a divorce gets it, nor has the state the right to ask the reason. Both parties are responsible for the care and support of children up to eighteen and for giving the other partner any needed temporary economic aid to establish the independent relation. Recent much publicized changes in the divorce code were only a better bookkeeping, insuring that both persons actually knew of the divorce and were actually held for the support of children.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recent comments of Soviet leaders that more time should be given to family life are similarly part of the general emphasis on richer human relations now possible through increasing leisure rather than any belated recognition of the family. Casual attitudes toward marriage have been discouraged from the beginning; no one was more emphatic on this than Lenin. But the pressure is social rather than legal. Trade unions, collective farms and Party organizations will penalize, even to the point of expulsion, persons who cause social havoc through their sexual instability. But they consider concrete situations, not traditions. The continuous and open living together of two people is respected, whether or not they are “registered”; it constitutes marriage in both the social and legal sense. Taking advantage of another person is penalized, through whatever forms accomplished. Peasants who took advantage of the marriage code to secure brief brides for harvest work soon stopped when they found this gave the woman equal right to the harvest. One notorious case some years ago was that of a man who seduced a girl by marriage and threw her out next morning; he was convicted of rape, which is legally defined as sex relations obtained through force or fraud, and was punished by imprisonment. The fact of the marriage registration was rather an aggravation than otherwise; he had used a Soviet office to assist fraud.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems occasionally arise in marriage from the fact that both partners have jobs. I met a girl tractor-driver in Siberia who married a tractor-driver on another field brigade. They spent their honeymoon some miles apart; once each week the young man walked ten or twelve miles on his free day to stay with his bride. The girl never met him half-way; she was boss of the winning brigade and took no chances. To my casual query why they did not get into the same field-gang, both exclaimed: “Desert my brigade in sowing-time!”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A woman’s relation to the state is always individual; it is never through her husband. Not even the wives of great men may live by reflected glory. When Stalin’s wife died, the black-bordered announcements in the press gave her own name and occupation in the artificial silk industry, and only after this mentioned that she was the “close friend and companion of Stalin.” Kalinin’s wife wins recognition by creating a state farm and center of culture in the Altai Mountains, where they call her by her own name, not by the name of the president.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tradition that love is “woman’s whole existence” is challenged by a new assumption, a refusal to admit that any human being’s happiness can be completely dependent on one other human being. When Salima, a young woman of Turkestan, accepted a scholarship to study in Tashkent, her husband ordered her to return, and, on her refusal, divorced her, boasting by letter that he had taken another wife “obedient and illiterate.” Salima showed her quality by replying: “I received your letter telling me that you have another wife. I will have my revenge. When I finish my studies I will come back to the village and teach your second wife to read and write.” The older generation may be horrified by the flippant Salima, but the new Soviet generation will applaud her as free and self-reliant citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The freedom of every woman to dispose of her own body, to marry or not to marry, to have children or not to have them, irrespective of marriage, is taken for granted by Soviet law, and is restrained only by social opinion, not by legal penalry. Dr. Milashkevich, head of the Gynecological section of the great polyclinic, where a medical personnel of three hundred serves the thirty-five thousand workers of Stalin Auto Works, told me that all women working in the plant come to her as part of their routine health examination. “If they are married I ask them: ‘Do you want children?’ Then I give them medical advice according to their intentions. If they do not want children, the poly-clinic supplies the means of prevention.” She further informed me that every attempt was made to discourage abortion, by urging grounds of health, and by sending nurses and even neighbors to reason with the wife and husband, but never by absolute refusal. “To compel a woman either to have or not to have children we would consider an infringement of human rights,” said Dr. Milashkevich. “If she decides to have them, the state gives every assistance, through free medical and hospital care, special funds for milk and children’s clothing and the use of day nurseries to care for children during her working hours.” That the women are deciding to have children is clear from the average increase of population of three million annually—in the past two years of growing prosperity three and a half million&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Figures from Soviet Statistical Dept. 1936.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;—an increase unparalleled in any other land.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every year the Soviet Union produces its crop of national heroes, who spring into fame for some notable achievement and whose methods are widely copied. In 1935 the names most heard were those of Stakhanov, a miner, and Marie Demchenko, a farm woman. A former farm servant of the sugar beet districts, Marie had risen through collectivization of farming, and the knowledge she gained in the laboratory cottage, to challenge in spring of 1935 all the beet growers of the land. Let us flood the land with sugar. My brigade will get twenty tons of beets per acre.” Hundreds of letters accepted; hundreds of visitors came to inspect the fields which Marie’s determined brigade of women nine times hoed, and eight times cleared of moths by setting fires at night. They conquered a rainless August by the local fire-fighting apparatus, pouring twenty thousand buckets of water on their fields. They won twenty-one tons per acre and came to the November celebrations in Moscow to receive the Order of Lenin amid the plaudits of the entire country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who were these women singled out for honor? They were women who got down in the dirt to dig sugar beets, who soiled their hands with slimy insects that a beet crop might be improved. What made their achievement honored? This—that their beets were no commodity for private profit, but sugar for the workers of a nation. They were leaders in the public task of farming a continent. This made of the hitherto unregarded toil of farm women a heroic collective epic, worthy to be classed with the work of explorers who raid the Arctic or scientists who storm the stratosphere.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XII: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF SCIENCE ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Russian is now recognized in American universities as a scientific language,” said a young Californian who was visiting with me the Leningrad Institute for Plant Protection. “Four years ago the universities wouldn’t take it as one of the two languages required for a scientific degree. But now my professors tell me that for my specialty of farm pests, it is the most important language of all. More original work is appearing in it than in any other language. German and French research is older and was translated some years ago. But our universities haven’t funds today to translate all this new research appearing in Russian.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This American youth hardly connected in his mind the decline in German and French research and the lack of American university funds for translation with the world-wide economic crisis. He knew little of the collectivization of Soviet farming and the stimulus it had given to his branch of science. But across two seas and two continents the results of these causes had reached the aloof halls of a university in California, interpreted thus “Russian—a scientific language—original research not yet found in translation.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Visiting scientists at the Fifteenth International Physiology Congress which met in Leningrad in August 1935, expressed an appreciation not untinged with amazement at the high respect paid science by the Soviet government and the rapid strides made by Soviet science in recent years. “No government ever ‘took up’ science as has this government. . . .” “Even the Americans are startled by the amount of resources which can be placed at the disposal of science by a government planning on a national scale. . . .” Such were some of the comments which found their way into the press of New York. Professor Walter B. Cannon, of the Harvard Medical School, told the Congress how science suffers today in all the capitalist countries, and added: “In the Soviet Union, where the social importance of science is appreciated, the funds made available for the development and prosecution of science are greater than in any country in the world.” The report of the Congress later given in &#039;&#039;Science&#039;&#039;, official organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, noted “the respect with which scientists are treated,” “the important position which science, pure as well as applied, occupies in the national economy,” and the “ardor of the army of young scientific workers.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet citizens take it for granted—Marxists in fact have taken it for granted ever since the days of Marx—that science must naturally reach a much freer and fuller development under socialism than is possible under capitalism. Capitalism, whose early expansion a century or more ago encouraged and boasted its science, has already reached the stage where science is an embarrassment, since the possibilities of human development which it reveals are unrealizable under private ownership. Science itself under capitalism suffers from a lack of aim. In England the head of the oldest agricultural experiment station in the world told a visiting Russian scientist that he hardly knew what to investigate since the declining condition of farming in England and the antagonisms in Egypt and India prevented the application of everything he discovered. In America the hostility between science and capitalism is only in its first stages, and is marked by increasing suppression of new knowledge which would interfere with profit. In Germany where a collapsing capitalism has taken the form of fascism, there is already a deep distrust of human reason and a propaganda against the very existence of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union science is rapidly expanding. Communism demands the thorough-going application of science to remake all human life; it assumes that the intellect of man can progressively understand and subdue nature to his collective will. “A new historical epoch will begin,” said Engels, “when men and their work will improve to such an extent that all previous achievements will seem as but a feeble shadow.” “We are confident that in our epoch we are entering an era of unparalleled progress in science,” is a typical editorial comment today in 2 Moscow newspaper. President Karpinsky, of the All-Union Academy of Science, spoke of the USSR as “the country where science is given a place of honor,” when he greeted the visiting physiologists “on behalf of hundreds of research institutes.” Even the famous physiologist, L. P. Pavlov, who was always antagonistic to Bolshevik ideas, said recently that he wanted to live to be a hundred because “the Soviet government has given millions for my scientific work and my laboratories flourish as never before.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those doubters who fear that state subsidies for science interfere more with scientific freedom than do the subsidies of individual millionaires, and who promote abroad the idea that the Soviets “persecute scientists,” ignore the fact that a high esteem for science is quite consistent with a deep suspicion of individual scientists. Conflicts did persist between the Soviet government and certain scientists who used their knowledge to fight the Revolution. That sabotage by scientists and engineers occurred on a very wide scale during the early years of the first Five-Year Plan has been acknowledged by thousands of former saboteurs. Only when the victory of the Five-Year Plan was assured beyond question did these waverers finally come over to find that socialism gives far greater opportunities for their science than capitalism ever did or could.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See details in Chap. 3, page 52-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Academy of Science has been greatly expanded from the three departments, mathematics, natural sciences, and historical philology, which it comprised before the Revolution. It is the center for planning and co-ordinating the scientific activity of the entire country through its twenty-one large departments and its frequent inter-departmental sessions. It works hand in hand with the State Planning Commission which indicates to it the requests for widespread scientific research in particular fields needed for the development of the country. It is also the court of appeal for all scientists who disagree with government departments or research institutes on questions of their work, or who want to do research for which no appropriation yet exists. In all conflicts on the objectives of research the Academy decides, being liberally financed directly under the All-Union government. The city of Moscow has recently assigned to the Academy 1,250 acres on the Moscow River, where the first of forty-two projected buildings are now being built.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than one thousand scientific research institutes in the USSR, employing 41,000 scientific workers, were claimed at the Physiology Congress by Akulov, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the government. Many of these institutes are of monumental size and scope. The All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine, for instance, is the organizing center of all medical research in the USSR. Scientists, doctors and engineers worked for two years on the construction plan of its new home where 5,500 employees are to study “the biology and pathology of the human being from every aspect.” Hospitals of the institute make continuous study of typical cases of various diseases and healthy people are also studied as “controls.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the largest of the scientific institutions is the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, which correlates the work of nearly sixty institutes for research in soil chemistry, plant protection, livestock breeding, microbiology, agrometeorology and similar branches of science. The work of the agricultural institutes is based upon material obtained in 200 experiment stations and more than 1,500 smaller research stations in state and collective farms. Each of the subordinate institutes is an important organization in itself; the Institute for Plant Protection, for instance, has a central staff of 250 scientific workers and dozens of branches all over the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The expansion of Soviet science arises not only from the need of socialism for scientific planning, but from the wide interest and co-operation on the part of the people. The Academy of Science is no secluded institution of the aristocracy; it is the unity of the scientific brains of the country with the masses. Science in the Soviet Union is dear to all the people, for every citizen knows that its discoveries will become his own possession and not the property of a small privileged group. “We scientists used to feel ourselves rather unimportant, since we had already discovered so much more than people were able to apply, but now that the collective farms demand our science, we see our work for several thousand years,” said Vaviloff, Vice-Chairman of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and world-famous discoverer and creator of new plants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The wide interest of the Soviet population in science expresses itself not only in honor to scientists but in active participation in scientific work by great numbers of people. Every scientific institution receives much popular co-operation, from workers, farmers, even from children. When the All-Union geological survey sent some two thousand annual expeditions with seventy to eighty thousand participants to explore and map the resources of the Soviet Union during the first Five-Year Plan, these official expeditions became the correlating center of a still broader popular movement. Thousands of grammar school children became “discoverers of our country,” going with their teachers to study geological outcroppings. Tens of thousands of hikers learned from geologists what to look for on cliffs and mountain slopes and occasionally made discoveries of significance. One of the stimulating causes of the first great Pamir expedition came from a Khirghiz nomad who carried a gold nugget several days journey to Samarkand and fought his way through many bureaucratic offices because he “thought the government ought to know about the gold in the Pamirs.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every large factory has its bureau of workers’ inventions through which inventive genius of workers finds connection with the wider world. Workers and farmers who make practical discoveries are often asked to report them in their own non-technical words at scientific congresses. Scientists in turn give frequent lectures in factories on subjects applicable to the work of the plant. Analysis of steel by the spectrum method will be reported to a machine-building plant, and discussions on organic chemistry will be given by scientists at a rubber works to a large attendance of interested workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So deep and thorough is the interest taken by workers in science that the cleavage between workingmen and scientists already lessens, presaging that time predicted by Marx when the distinction between mental and manual labor will disappear. At a banquet held by the Academy of Science in the Neskuchny Palace in Moscow, a number of leading factory workers were present as guests. A foreign newspaperman, wishing to interview Professor Bach, a well-known member of the Academy, approached a man who was pointed out to him from 2 distance. They chatted half an hour about the revolution in culture, the creation of a new life, and the new type of human being now appearing under socialism. In parting, the correspondent asked for the Academician’s autograph. The man to whom he was speaking started in surprise. “My name Is Ivanov; Bach is the person sitting next to me,” he said, pointing to a man who had been attentively listening. “I myself am a locksmith from the ball-bearing plant.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most striking examples of the democratization of science is the “laboratory cottage,” which has developed in the last two years on the collective farms. Seven thousand of these centers of experiment are reported in the Ukraine alone. The head of the laboratory is sometimes a teacher of the village school, but more often a self-educated farmer who has the scientific instinct and whose enthusiasm has organized other farmers to make experiments in their fields and correspond with scientific stations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“This scientific tendency in human beings takes such varied forms,” said an editor, “that one cannot even classify them. In the past these scientific instincts often died stillborn because of poverty. Today we seek them out through many agencies; one of these is our &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039;. Today a new type of experimenter is developing who does not experiment secretly but organizes the masses around him to discover and carry out new ideas. There is often some waste of time and destruction of machinery in these experiments. But this does not worry us. What is important and valuable is that the human being is striving to change, to improve. Waste of time and destruction of materials matters nothing, if thereby we add even one drop of knowledge which enables man to increase his understanding and control of nature.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One such natural scientist was Akulov, a peasant of the Genichesk district. As a World War prisoner in Austria, he saw one head of grain much bigger than the surrounding heads. He kept it and eventually brought it home to his own garden to breed new giant heads. When the collective farm was formed in his village in 1930, Akulov had four bushels of this special grain to give them. The big heads were planted and cherished until there were several score acres of them. The samples were then sent to the All-Union Institute of Plants and found to be a new variety existing nowhere else in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Seventy-five-year-old illiterate Barashev was another such natural scientist. For nearly twenty years he worked to produce a frost-resistant flax; the collective fields of his farm are harvesting it this year. Pechtilief, in the Leningrad district, stirred up such an interest among his neighbors in discovering why two fields on the same farm gave such different yields, that the whole village became one vast experimental farm, planting several thousand acres in various ways and comparing the results of different types of tillage. Pechtilief appeared before the Congress of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences to demand that scientists find a way to produce a new variety of wheat which should combine the high milling quality of one variety with the non-shattering characteristics of a second. Kolosev, another collective farmer, has challenged the scientists to work out types of seeds and tillage which will insure different ripening times for the various crops and thus get an even load of work through a maximum period for the harvesting machine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The assimilation of new scientific ideas proceeds far faster under the new collective farm system than under the old individual farming. Some entire districts have already become agricultural experiment stations. In Zhadryansk district, near Cheliabinsk, several thousand experiments were carried on in a single summer with oats, wheat, green peas, sunflower seeds and other crops. Special conferences were held attended by two hundred or more delegates from the various laboratory cottages. All these popular experiments are in constant touch with the scientific organizations of the Commissariat of Agriculture, and are protected against undue loss by a government policy of crop insurance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Several achievements of Soviet agricultural science are already of world significance. The method of “vernalization,” which changes winter wheat to spring wheat, late cotton to early cotton and biennial to annual plants, has made it possible to grow Algerian wheat beyond the Polar circle, at 67.4 degrees of latitude in Khibiny. The northernmost botanical gardens in the world are on the Kola Peninsula, where experiments with six hundred plants found twenty-five that could be adapted to the Arctic. The Soviet Union has developed its own rubber industry from the newly discovered “rubber” plants, tau-sagiz and kok-sagiz, found in the mountains of Turkestan and cultivated later as far north as the Ukraine. The brilliant work of Michurin in developing frost-resistant varieties of fruits made him famous not only among scientists of the world but among millions of Soviet farmers, tens of thousands of whom journey annually to his plant-breeding station to report on their use of his varieties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New machines have been developed, a machine for retching flax which is revolutionizing the flax industry, a “northern” combined-harvester suitable for grain of high moisture content. Even the ordinary combine first imported from America has undergone sixty improvements and is said by experts to be the best in the world. Research into soil microbiology has made, according to Vaviloff, “the role of micro-organisms in the soil a calculable factor.” The artificial fertilization of livestock, in which the spermatozoa are sent by mail or airplane from experimental stations to the laboratory cottages, is today applied to half the country’s livestock, insuring rapid improvement of stock from pure-bred males. Under the constant co-operation of collective farmers with scientific centers, the agricultural map of the country is rapidly changing. Sugar beets expand towards the Urals, cotton appears in South Ukraine, irrigation and tree-planting begins to reclaim the wastes beyond the Volga, and wheat marches steadily towards the Arctic. Thousands of acres are today successfully farmed in the Murmansk district on the Arctic Ocean, in place of a scant twelve acres a few years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most spectacular example of the planned advance of man under the leadership of science is the conquest of the Polar regions, which has stirred the imagination and enthusiasm of the whole Soviet land. Scientists of the All-Union Arctic Institute first seriously broached the idea of a Great Northern Sea Route in 1930, though other scientists declared that traffic along the northern coast of Europe and Asia was “impracticable during the present glacial epoch.” The Soviet government backed its bolder scientists, established the Central Administration of the Northern Sea Route and gave it ships and funds. Step by step the rapid advance was made, first by dozens of expeditions which mapped coasts and charted waters, then by thirty-nine Polar scientific stations, equipped with radio and airplane service, then by trading fleets led by ice-breakers first from the west, then from the east, and then along the whole Polar coast from Atlantic to Pacific.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The whole world remembers the epic of the Chelyushkin, its tragic wreck northwest of Bering Straits, the skillful landing on ice which was crashing around them, the two months of heroic organization of “normal life” in their floating home on the ice-floe, where Professor Schmidt, dressed in deer-skin coat and fur cap, delivered lectures on dialectic materialism or the Freudian theory, and found time to edit the galleys of the &#039;&#039;Unabridged Soviet Encyclopedia&#039;&#039; which he had brought from Moscow, and to write a preface to a book on higher mathematics. The history of Polar expeditions has known many examples of daring, but never such courageously casual organization of normal routine under abnormal conditions as this “Soviet Republic on the Ice” which got out its “wall newspaper” with cartoons and self-criticism, and comments on the Communist Party Congress then taking place in Moscow, received by the Chelyushkinites by radio.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today special ships are built in Soviet shipyards, embodying the experience of the Chelyushkin for the conquest of the northern seas. Steadily the designs of airplanes and clothing have been adapted to Arctic weather and the plane is now the “eyes of the north.” Four ordinary freighters in the summer of 1935 made the whole trip around the north of Europe and Asia, and scores will follow in 1936. The network of heroic scientists, wintering in thirty-nine stations, begins to be supplemented by miners, timber-workers, even farmers. Extensive prospecting has been done for minerals, especially coal and oil to serve the northern trade route. A new type of man is following the explorers and scientists—engineers, technicians, builders of the Arctic. And science pushes farther north in the expedition of the Sadko, to discover, at latitude 82° 40’—the farthest north ever reached in free sailing—the re-emergence of a warm section of the Gulf Stream which may make the northern sea route practicable for more months of the year. Of all the world’s eight ships which have reached during the past half century the latitudes around 80°, two were American, two Scandinavian and four were Soviet ships of the past few years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the support of the whole Soviet country which strengthens these men of the north in their conquests. The entire Soviet population regards these Arctic subduers as their representatives and champions. It shares their lives by radio hook-ups Moscow talks through the six months’ night with Dixon Island, which issues the Arctic Radio News. All Russia thrilled when a young ex-criminal, sent to the far north to “make himself over,” was reassured across three thousand frozen miles by the voice of his factory sweetheart urging him to make good. When a winter childbirth in a distant Arctic station developed complications, the neighbors got the Dixon Island surgeon on the radio and for more than three hours he directed over the air every detail while the whole of a much-worried Arctic listened in. When the child and mother were safe, congratulations poured in from thousands of miles of icebound waterfront.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even under capitalism science breaks the boundaries of nations, steadily to lift the power of man. Under socialism it becomes the consciously applied and swiftly expanding strength of the whole population, conquering for man his world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XIII: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF ART ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Heroic people call into being heroic artists.”|Editorial in Soviet &#039;&#039;Literary Critic&#039;&#039;}}&lt;br /&gt;
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If science is the instrument of man’s dominance over nature, art is the means of his self-expression. Tens of millions of people from earth’s most backward races have awakened in the Soviet Union from long slumber. They are seeking self expression. They themselves write, sing and paint; they push up from their ranks novelists, poets and dramatists. They love these poets and dramatists; they criticize them and make serious demands from them. Soviet art is not private property, it is the wealth of the nation, and the nation is jealous and proud of its wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the first All-Union Congress of Soviet writers met in Moscow in August, 1934, thousands of letters poured in from all corners of the union, congratulating, greeting, giving practical suggestions and advice. Workers, collective farmers, students, Young Pioneers, scientists, engineers and artists thus expressed their interest in the Congress. In Moscow alone, more than two hundred factory conferences were held between readers and authors. Delegations representing millions of readers came to speak at the Congress. Each day after the meetings, authors found throngs of workers who had been unable to enter the crowded hall waiting outside to hail their favorite writers with applause. Throughout the country, millions of people concentrated their attention on questions of esthetics, the function of poetry, the form of literature best suiting the present age, subjects reported in detail in the press. Literary work in the land of the Soviets is becoming the affair of all the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are no bounds to the desire for every variety of culture. Soviet Russia in its first fifteen years published five billion books, as contrasted with two billion in the last thirty years of tsardom. The number keeps growing. At the end of the first Five-Year Plan, book production in the USSR was greater than that of England, Germany and France together. Especially amazing is the growth of literature among the national minorities whose self-expression was suppressed under tsardom. Every year since 1929 has seen the publication of more books in the Ukrainian language than were published in the whole 118 years before the Revolution. One publishing house alone, the Moscow International Book House, publishes books in eighty-five languages, some of which had formerly no alphabet—novels, textbooks, folk tales, technical works, translations of classics, short stories and dictionaries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet world feels itself the heir of the ages. Anniversaries of poets, scientists and artists of all countries are widely celebrated. The ancient Persian poet Firdousi, the English Shakespeare, the German Goethe, the famous French writers, are honored by mass meetings and columns in the press. The best works of Flaubert, Mérimée, Maupassant, Victor Hugo, Mark Twain and Jack London appear by the hundreds of thousands of copies and disappear almost as quickly from the shelves of bookstores which never expect to retain volumes more than a few weeks. Russian classics are even more popular. Lermontov, Nekrassov, Korolenko, Gogol, Turgenev, Chekhov appear in editions of seventy to a hundred thousand. The favorite poet Pushkin has been issued for several years in repeated editions of two hundred thousand copies, and his collected works in six volumes now face a subscription demand of three hundred thousand copies, exclusive of sales to the shops. Tolstoy is the most popular of all; eleven and a half million copies of his works have been sold since the Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet reader demands not only the art of the past but the art of today. The most popular novels are those like Sholokhov’s &#039;&#039;Quiet Don&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Soil Upturned&#039;&#039;, which paint on a wide canvas the personalities, difficulties, struggles and victories of the present. “No artist of the past had such material at his disposal as is given by the earth-shaking events occurring in the USSR in the last eighteen years,” said the Soviet writer Panferov speaking at a Paris congress. “The working class built a dam on the surging Dnieper and made its unruly waters serve man. It transformed the misty Urals into an industrial center, mastered the wild and distant Kuzbas. . . . In remaking the country the working class at the same time remade itself. . . . The outcast dweller of the mountains, the illiterate, solitary Yakut, the northern Nentsi, the wild Bashkir, the Mordvin with his trachoma, the persecuted Kalmyk—tens of millions of peoples in scores of scattered nationalities went into the furnace of civil war and are energetically rebuilding the country, conquering the strongholds of culture, bringing new life to the whole world. . . . Socialist realism was the inevitable phenomenon of the proletarian era—active, cheerful, bold and daring, like the era of the proletarian revolution itself.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These tens of millions of people are not only the subjects for art, they are also the artists, readers and audience. They show a wide interest in all forms of artistic expression. Theaters are constantly crowded; art museums are packed with visitors; popular exhibitions sometimes have lines before the museum entrances waiting until there is room to go in. Nor are the factory workers and collective farmers at all backward in expressing their opinion on the products of brush and pen. Are they not all also writers, artists, musicians and actors, if and when the mood seizes them? They are not only consumers of art, millions of them are amateur producers of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than one hundred thousand “circles for self-expression” have grown up in the past two years in the USSR. The drama circles alone have 1,200,000 members, while the total number in the singing, music, dancing and graphic art circles exceeds five million. Writers, cartoonists and photographers for the local press or wall newspapers are probably as many more. A chief characteristic of the new type of person now emerging in the Soviet Union is his dynamic energy in self-expression, usually in some collective form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first and most direct self-expression of large numbers takes the form of participation in the press. They write their opinions about corrupt officials or inefficient farm management for the hand-lettered sheet posted on a factory wall or a village tree-trunk; more important communications they send, often with several signatures, to the great metropolitan &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039; with their million and a half subscribers. Two million letters a year pour into the office of the &#039;&#039;Peasents’ Gazette&#039;&#039; in Moscow, reflecting the life and problems of the farm; only part of them can be published but all of them are answered, filed, and carefully studied as material for novels, for history, and for the lawmaking of the state.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a northern township, fifty miles from the railroad, where before the Revolution only six people subscribed to any newspaper at all, I visited a congress of some two hundred rural press correspondents preparing for a sowing campaign. These were only part of the energetic writers of this township. Its collective farms had 470 field brigades, every one of which during the sowing campaign posted up a wall newspaper. One picturesque seventeen-year-old boy in a vivid shirt of old rose sateen under a black jacket proudly reported the overthrow of the corrupt management of his collective farm by his articles and editorials. “We got out nine numbers,” he explained to the meeting, “then we stopped for want of paper. But we had already aroused the farmers, and the general meeting removed the president and two members of the management.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Nine single sheets of crude newsprint stuck in successive weeks on a tree, protected from the rain by an overhanging board, had deposed the management of a farm, shamed idlers, carried the sowing through to success, finished the hoeing and brought the brigade on record time to the haying season. The number of these collective farm wall-newspapers throughout the country is estimated by the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; as half a million, with at least ten village correspondents for each. There are more than three thousand factory newspapers; these range from weeklies of a few hundred copies to dailies with a circulation of twenty thousand and more in the larger plants. These newspapers are both an organizing center for factory and farm life and a training school for young writers. With such a writing and reading public, it is not surprising that there are more than eleven thousand printed newspapers in the Soviet Union with a circulation of more than thirty-six million copies—thirteen times as great as before the Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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An ever-growing stream of writers enters literature through the gateway of the factory and farm newspapers, which make modest but insistent demands on the humblest worker able to use a pen. Literary groups arise in centers like the Urals and the Donetz basin, or around some tractor station which serves the nearby villages. Many of the Donbas group of writers embarked on their literary careers when through with their day’s work of furnishing coal. Their magazine &#039;&#039;Literary Donbas&#039;&#039; has produced a noteworthy crop of stories and poems widely popular among miners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The literary society of collective farmers at the machine tractor station in Voronovo village had as members two stablemen, a blacksmith, a reaper, a tractor-driver, a bookkeeper, a warehouseman, four day-nursery attendants, three teachers, two presidents of collective farms, one village president, three editors of field newspapers and sixteen farm women. In one year the members published through their own printshop two books of verses, the play &#039;&#039;Miscalculated&#039;&#039;, and 2 book of character sketches, &#039;&#039;Bolsheviks of the Politodels&#039;&#039;. They announced for the following year a play, &#039;&#039;According to Merit&#039;&#039;, a novel &#039;&#039;Quiet Subversion&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;The Diary of a Tractor Driver&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;The History of the Machine Tractor Station&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is difficult to conceive of the wide extent of amateur art activities of all kinds. Thousands of short-line popular stanzas known as &#039;&#039;chastyshki&#039;&#039; appear in the most distant parts of the Soviet Union celebrating the freedom of woman, the heroism of tractor-drivers, the growing prosperity of collective life. They vary in merit from mere doggerel giving rhymed technical guidance for reapers and cattle herders to verse of real beauty. The Donetz coal region alone reports more than eight hundred brass bands, three hundred orchestras, two hundred and fifty choruses, thousands of dramatic circles and even forty-two ballet schools. Some of the Soviet dancers who attracted attention at a recent London dance festival came from these “self-expression groups.” Amateur circles in drawing and painting also exist all over the country, and give local exhibitions which often unearth talent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constant interchange of ideas and personnel goes on between professional and non-professional groups. The Soviet press takes active part in establishing these connections. The newspaper &#039;&#039;Culture and Sport&#039;&#039; publishes reproductions of the best art from famous galleries. It encourages would-be artists to correspond and send in their work to be judged by well-known artists; those who show talent are sent to art schools. The magazine &#039;&#039;Collective Farm Theater&#039;&#039; every month issues eight or ten special supplements containing plans of caravan theaters, rural pageants and festivals, choral programs, texts of one-act plays. It connects the self-expression groups with the nearest professional theater which can help them in their technique. There are today one hundred rural theaters of professional standing.&lt;br /&gt;
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One among many movements which swept the farms in the summer of 1935 was a campaign to discover musical talent among children. Hundreds of local musical festivals were held to many of which professors from the Moscow Conservatory came by airplane to act as judges. As a result, 715 of the most talented children are being sent to special musical schools; the twenty-five best ones were brought to a specially created branch in the Moscow Conservatory of Music.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only in music but in poetry, drama and dancing, nation-wide “Olympiads were held in the summer of 1935. In Leningrad, for instance, juries of artists visited the factories to select eleven hundred contestants for the district Olympiad from fifteen thousand amateur musicians, singers, dancers, acrobats, orators, accordion players and even jugglers. On a collective farm in Smolensk, an illiterate peasant woman of sixty-four years wrote a play, dictating it to a younger woman; the young folks of the farm produced it at the Olympiad in Smolensk. Besides the Olympiads, many “culture expeditions” of both scholars and composers penetrate the wilderness where live Khirgiz, Buryat-Mongols, Tajiks, Uzbeks, to seek and preserve the music and poems which shed light on early culture. A symphony orchestra recently organized made its first tour, playing old Cossack melodies in modern style, across what not so long ago was the steppe of half-savage nomads. Collective farms sent delegations hundreds of miles to insist that the orchestra visit them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out of this artistic ferment in the lives of millions, arises the vigor of Soviet art, which feels itself called upon to find adequate expression for the awakening genius of the people. Soviet writers today, if they would be popular, must not confine themselves to delving in the depths of a single human soul; they must depict the vast variety of changing social relations. They spend much time in deepening their contacts with intimate details of factory or of farm; Sholokhov, for instance, makes his permanent residence in the village whose changing life is the subject of a whole series of novels.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor is the artist’s human material passive; the human material talks back. The Vakhtangov Theater invites the audience to discuss plays between the scenes and at the end with the actors; witty and fruitful discussions occur. Meetings between writers and readers have become a popular feature of factory life. Authors like Sholokhov and Tretyakov have long adopted the custom of reading drafts of semi-finished manuscripts to audiences of workers and farmers. Frequently a worker is able to give sound advice on the handling of an industrial character. “Our reader, while a friend, is also a very severe critic,” says the Soviet writer, Vsevolod-Ivanov. “Intercourse with him is the best and most precious school.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet readers demand simplicity and vividness of writing. They are not interested in complex analysis of burdened souls. Their whole life faces outward. Their interest is in people who do things, who change the relations of society. In the first decade after the Revolution, a typical theme in literature and drama was the hero who died in the moment of victory while the collective achievement marched on. The hero might be a Chapayev shot down before his victorious comrades appear on the scene, or a village organizer killed by a kulak and drawn to his grave in triumphal procession by the newly-arrived tractor which his labor had secured. The victory was collective, attained through the sacrifice of the heroic individual. Thus was the natural expression of the period of revolution and civil war.&lt;br /&gt;
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New themes begin to dominate Soviet literature and drama of recent years. The hero no longer dies; he struggles, achieves, learns, and is himself made over, not by introspection but by the clash of action. He is the optimist—builder type creating a glorious and happy future. What the people demand of writers, they demand also of the graphic arts: an art that is inspired by and in torn inspires the great moods of the day. The workers of Stalingrad sent a famous open letter to the artists: “Don’t give us colored photographs, we are tired of them. We expect from you an art that is stirring and inspiring.”&lt;br /&gt;
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If the responsive demand of a great new public is a constant stimulus to Soviet artists, a second stimulus is found in co-operation with members of their craft. Writers, actors, painters—all have their organizations. They maintain club houses for social contacts, discussions and exhibitions; they have country retreats to which members withdraw for rest and creative work. They assist beginners with loans and subsidies; they foster high standards; they assist members in the sale of their work. The writers’ organization issues literary journals, organizes courses, consultations and criticisms for new writers and runs a literary university for workers. The actors’ club holds special midnight performances where its members meet famous visiting artists and see the season’s best in music, dance and drama.&lt;br /&gt;
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Four thousand artists belong to a co—operative which not only handles exhibitions all over the country, but also owns numerous factories producing artists’ supplies, workshops for stone-cutting, metal-casting and frame-making and studios for lithography and engraving. This co-operative has a yearly turnover of forty-two million rubles. It accepts on behalf of its members orders from city soviets, large industries, and workers’ clubs which wish decorations and paintings; some of these orders run over the million-ruble mark. When the ten-year reconstruction plan of Moscow creates a demand for architecture, sculpture, landscaping and monumental art, the artists’ organizations arrange discussions and excursions of sculptors and architects and initiate experimental fresco work on a large scale. Instead of being an isolated craftsman, the Soviet artist is part of a rich and influential organization which connects him with the government planning departments and the organized life of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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From this close association of artists with their fellow craftsmen and with their public has arisen a method of collective production which is becoming increasingly popular; it extends to the collective writing of books by a score of writers and even by whole factories. Thirty professional writers combined to produce &#039;&#039;Belomor&#039;&#039;, the famous tale of the building of the Baltic-White Sea Canal. “We tried to tell how a canal was built in a far, cold and rocky place and how the chekists made new men out of prisoners,” said Vsevolod-Ivanov. “We were authors entirely different in taste and in age, but we all tried to make that book united, wide-horizoned and mighty. That book is dear to me even today. In writing it, I learned that we writers are really not such individualists as we like to call ourselves.” The Events of the High Mountain, which told the history of an iron mine in the Urals, was written by more than one hundred miners. The miners consulted, wrote and improved it in common, as together they created and improved their mine. The book is a great political and artistic document, energetic, fresh and vital.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;The History of the Civil War&#039;&#039;, the &#039;&#039;History of Factories&#039;&#039; and the now projected &#039;&#039;History of the Russian Village&#039;&#039; contain whole series of books, each of which compiles the experiences of hundreds or even thousands of people. The characters are not described by others; they describe themselves, each seeking in consultation with the others a significant artistic form. The meeting of two hundred village correspondents which I attended, decided to issue a book giving artistic form to the history of the township. They selected the best writers from each of twenty-five villages to work with two professional authors who had come from Moscow. Each local writer chose with the help of his village some vivid and significant episode or character whose story illumined the changes made by the Revolution. One contrasted the intimate family relations in his father’s household with those in his own Soviet home. Another described the people who had successively looked out of the windows of a certain ancient building—once a school for the daughters of the nobility and now the central club of the collective farm. The result was a book which was lacking in style and finish but vivid and unforgettable with actual life. It was not yet art, but it made part of the rich soil out of which great art may well grow in the next few decades.&lt;br /&gt;
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Great art movements in the past have followed periods of economic expansion which gave stimulus to new creative life. “We are already in the great epoch; artistic values of permanent worth are already appearing but not yet the great masterpieces. Where else in the world are there even high artistic values?” said a Soviet writer to me. In literature Ostrovski’s &#039;&#039;How Steel is Welded&#039;&#039;, Sholokhov’s &#039;&#039;Quiet Don&#039;&#039;; in motion pictures, &#039;&#039;Potemkin&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Chapayev&#039;&#039;, the &#039;&#039;Youth of Maxim&#039;&#039;, are among the many lasting contributions which the Soviets have already made to art. The Moscow subway is one of the first significant expressions of the epoch in architecture. As forums and temples expressed the spirit of ancient Rome, cathedrals and castles the Middle Ages, and skyscrapers the power of centralized finance, so this beautiful subway expresses the rhythm of millions of workers in efficient motion. The Lenin library in Moscow and the House of State Industry in Kharkov, and some of the new factories, children’s centers, and sanitoriums, also foreshadow the new architecture.&lt;br /&gt;
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Are Soviet artists “in uniform?” Only in so far as they lack intelligence to respond to their social environment and the will to fight their way through to expression. Artists whose souls were formed by an old world felt the coming of the new as a thwarting of impulses. They had to find their way about among new publishers and new officials, who were trying more or less intelligently to protect the new order. Often groups of rising artists hogged the Revolution and organized to lord it over their fellows. Thus the RAPP (Association of Revolutionary Writers) succeeded in imposing its narrow standards for a considerable period, till other authors learned the new environment and smashed the RAPP. The social environment also changes; when that excellent play, &#039;&#039;Days of the Turbines&#039;&#039;, featured a tsarist officer as hero before post-war audiences where budding capitalists cheered him, Young Communist organizations fresh from fighting those officers protested wrathfully and had the play suppressed. When Nepmen followed the civil war into the past, the play revived to more tolerant audiences.&lt;br /&gt;
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All authors everywhere adjust themselves to editors, publishers and readers; these are necessary media no less than words or paint. Not even in America could “proletarian authors” come into being, until there were new readers who pushed them up. Soviet society also presses in various ways on artists. We authors deal with publishers who are worried by their paper quota; their criterion is “importance” rather than profit, since any half-good book is sure to sell. They rely in part on “political editors,” officials of the Commissariat of Education, whose function is to give advice on the demands of the educational field and the political significance of the work. My own conversations with these political editors—they dislike the name censors—are singularly like those with publishers’ readers in America. They make suggestions, some extremely valuable, some moderately useful and some of which I protest; they themselves yield to reason and prefer authors who know what they do. Only crude authors take them as enemies; through mutual discussion the product is improved. If differences lie too deep, one seeks another publisher; in the Soviet Union there is also the wider appeal. No one autocrat censors everything. Political editors more and more become highly educated specialists. Important plays are usually previewed by selected audiences of leading critics and persons familiar with their theme, both children and educators previewing a drama or motion picture destined for children. Only on military matters and material likely to injure the Soviets’ international relations is the censor absolute;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The most striking recent example was the suppression of information during the difficult year of 1932, a suppression which turned several American journalists permanently against the Soviets. The Soviets believed with some reason that derailed knowledge of their difficulties would provoke the threatened Japanese invasion.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and these matters are hardly the realm of art.&lt;br /&gt;
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If art survived the censoring by the whims of princelings in the feudal ages, and by the profit-motives of American publishers, why should it not survive the decisions of educational authorities and experienced critics who estimate its importance for a socialist society? To the artist now growing up in a Soviet environment, art is the natural expression of the collective life of millions given significant form by his own special talent or genius. Such an artist feels no repression in this new environment; he feels its great creative urge. Millions of rural journalists, thousands of dramatic clubs, tens of thousands of farm and factory orchestras furnish an alert and appreciative public. The leisure made possible by the social ownership of great modern machines is already widely used in the Soviet Union for pursuits of science and art. The barriers thus begin to wear thin between manual and mental labor; the same person does both. Genius, wherever it arises, finds ready access to widening expression. From such a soil, watered by the artistic strivings of millions, great art must grow. More than great art—a people to whom art becomes man’s natural self-expression, which no longer flames and dies.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER XIV: REMAKING HUMAN BEINGS ===&lt;br /&gt;
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When the All-Union Song and Dance Olympiad was held in the summer of 1935 in Moscow, the first prize for dance groups was won by a troupe who would be classed in the capitalist world as convicts. They were sentenced criminals who were still living in Labor Commune Number Two, to which they had been sent for reformation. Their performance of an Ukrainian folk-dance “The Snowstorm” took first place against fifty thousand entrants. To anyone unfamiliar with the Soviet technique for handling criminals, the dancing of the group was less amazing than their free association with other groups of artists in all the local and provincial dance festivals, which brought them at last to Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
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The remaking of criminals is only one specialized form of the process of remaking human beings which goes on consciously today in the Soviet Union. Unlike those who justify ancient abuses with the formula, “You can’t change human nature,” the Marxist knows that human nature is constantly changing. The serf of the Middle Ages was a different human being from the highly skilled industrial worker of today, not only in methods of work but in mental outlook, nervous reactions, and even physical motions. Today a remaking of people in greater or less degree takes place across the entire Soviet Union. Illiterate, slow-moving peasants become attuned to rapid work in a collective labor process. Scientists, artists, engineers, doctors, once accustomed to depend upon capitalists for their living, adjust themselves to the new controls of a socialist state as employer. Some welcome the change, others resent it, but in all men the habits derived from the past are at war with the demands imposed by the present, and this struggle changes both the human beings and their environment.&lt;br /&gt;
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To some the process of change is only half conscious, and therefore bewildering and painful. To the happiest it is a consciously welcomed process. For men in all ages have desired to change, to become in some direction “better.” Moral teachers have urged them to effect this by an emotional decision to be good, honest, industrious. But this is a struggle in the dark with forces which the human being does not understand. His emotional conversion lasts as long as he can focus will and attention. But if the old environment continues, the old habits reassert themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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To a limited extent a human being may change himself under any social system, not by efforts of will but by calmly analyzing himself and his environment and placing himself under the impact of other forces which will change him. So much free will man has. But these individual efforts are limited by the social possibilities. Can a prostitute change her environment so that street-walking will become unnecessary? Only if an honest job is somewhere accessible. Can gangsters reform? Only if honesty is really the best policy; for him who would prosper under capitalism there is a time to be honest and a time to steal, and the criminal is the unlucky or stupid person who stole at the wrong time and in the unaccepted manner. Only a social system which insures to ordinary honest labor greater rewards than can be obtained by even the luckiest dishonesty will produce instinctively honest men.&lt;br /&gt;
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A remarkable tale of the change in social standards is written by a newspaper correspondent from the Ural gold fields. Formerly, according to the writer, everybody admired clever miners who were able to steal nuggets which legally belonged to the private owners of the fields. This attitude persisted long after the mines were owned by the government. But recently at a party given to celebrate a betrothal, the young man in the heat of dancing pulled out his handkerchief and with it a gold nugget which fell to the floor. There was a sudden silence and the party broke up without comment, even the girl turning away from the man thus revealed. “Everyone knew him for an enemy,” wrote the correspondent.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sharpest test of conscious remaking of human character is found in the Soviet policy for handling law-breakers. The Soviet criminologist holds neither of the theories on which the prevalent systems of prison régime in capitalist countries are based. He does not believe in the existence of “born criminals” whose will must be broken by brutal suppression nor does he rely on emotional appeals to the “better nature” of the criminal, for he knows that this better nature exists as yet only in rudimentary form. “We don’t assume that a man of anti-social habits will be at once reclaimed by gifts of chocolate, nice bathrooms, and soft words,” a leading Soviet penologist told me. “Men are made over by a new social environment and especially by their work done collectively.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet law aims to make over social misfits while protecting society from their attacks. Punishment as vengeance has no place in such an aim: revenge merely incites revenge in return. To make prisoners sit in solitude and think of their sins produces a fixation on crime. To “break a man’s will” or lessen his human dignity in any way injures him material for a creative socialist society. Soviet justice therefore aims to give the criminal a new environment in which he will begin to act in a normal way as a responsible Soviet citizen. The less confinement the better; the less he feels himself in prison the better. Soviet justice began to fight crime under the harsh conditions of civil war, replying with ruthless measures to counter-revolutionary plots. “We have a double approach” said Attorney-General Vishinsky in an interview. “Active, confirmed enemies of our Soviet power who stick at nothing to injure us must be ruthlessly crushed. But even among these alien elements, among nobles, landlords, tsarist officers, capitalists, whom we had robbed of their private property, we had to be able even there to find those individuals who could be made over into useful workers. We cannot begin with clean hands and fresh bricks to build socialism; we must use even old bricks for the new building. But if we had tried to apply the idea of absolute humanitarianism to bitter enemies we wouldn’t be here today.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Many social offenses are handled without bringing them into ordinary courts at all. A whole series of “comradely courts,” in factories, schools and apartment houses, try informally people who disturb their neighbors. These courts have the right to fix small fines for the benefit of the local club or library; they refer cases which they cannot handle to the public courts. There are even “children’s courts” in which children judge each other in the presence of interested adults. One such children’s court in an apartment house tried a boy for cruelty in killing a cat, and came finally to the conclusion that the real culprit was the superintendent of the apartment house who persistently failed to provide a place to play. The superintendent, who was present, accepted the decision, and organized with the children a committee to make good the shortcoming.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Not only in the court but out of the court my job is social protection,” a rural judge told me. “I must prevent court cases when I can.” He told how he had prevented crime at a recent saints’ festival. “Men always drink hard on such occasions; they fight and knife each other. So I called together the presidents of collective farms an the Party members, and we went through the crowd before drinking began and took away the knives and canes. They got drunk later, but nobody was badly hurt.”&lt;br /&gt;
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I sat in the court session which this judge held under the village trees and heard a dozen cases—stealing hay, bootlegging and the like—disposed of in an afternoon. The commonest sentence was “compulsory labor” which did not remove the offender from his home but required him to do without pay some socially useful work, such as road-building, school-construction or even office work in the village soviet. Only one serious case appeared: more than half the calves in a collective dairy had died under circumstances which seemed to implicate the dairy manager of something worse than the criminal negligence charge which had been brought. The judge found that he was “guilty of negligence at least,” but held the case over for further investigation to see whether he was guilty of “something more,” i.e., intentional conspiracy to smash the farm. In that case he would be “sent away” from the village to a labor camp for a period of perhaps three years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The labor camp is the prevalent method for handling serious offenders of all kinds, whether criminal or political. Most of the old prisons have been abolished; I have found them in rural districts converted into schools. The labor camps have won high reputation throughout the Soviet Union as places where tens of thousands of men have been reclaimed. They have, however, been the center of some of the most spectacular attacks on the Soviet Union in recent years. Allegations of brutal treatment and even of torture have found their way widely into the foreign press. While it is clearly impossible to check every one of these accusations, they are contradicted by every competent observer who has ever seen the camps. Dr. Mary Stevens Callcott, the American penologist who has studied prisons all over the world and who has had the unique experience of visiting the larger part of the Soviet camps, including those for the worst—and for political—offenders, has commented both in her book &#039;&#039;Soviet justice&#039;&#039; and in conversations with me personally, on the “amazingly normal” life that differentiates these camps from prisons in any other part of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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She notes the freedom of movement over large areas of territory, the very small amount of guarding, the work done under normal conditions—seven hours for ordinary labor to ten for men whose tasks, such as driving a truck, permitted frequent rests during work. She could find no speed-up; laws of labor protection operated as in factories. Wages were the same as those outside, with deductions for living expenses; all above this could be sent by the prisoner to his family, saved or spent as he chose. “No uniforms with their psychological implications, no physical abuse; isolation only in extreme instances. Privileges and special rewards replace the system of special penalties.” Among these special rewards are the two weeks’ vacation in which the prisoner may leave the camp, and the opportunities given for his family not only to visit him but even to live with him for extended periods. Normal human association goes on; men and women meet and may even marry while serving sentence, in which case they are given separate quarters.&lt;br /&gt;
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What most impressed Dr. Callcott, however, was the type of men in charge of these camps, and the relation they had to the prisoners. She tells of going through the Moscow-Volga Canal camp with its director. Prisoners hailed him with obvious pleasure and informality. A girl rushed up to detain him by seizing the belt of his uniform lest he get away before she could tell him something. A teacher whose term was about to expire expressed a wish to stay on and work under him. There were only five officials in the central administration office of this camp of many thousand prisoners; all the work, including most of the guarding, was done by the convicted men themselves. “In fact,” said Dr. Callcott, “I could never see what kept men in this camp unless they wanted to stay there. No convicts I have known would have any difficulty if they wanted to break away.” Both prisoners and officials, of whom Dr. Callcott asked this question—she talked with prisoners freely without the presence of officials—replied they didn’t run away because if they did, “nobody in my working gang would speak to me when I came back. They would say I disgraced them.” There are, however, a certain number of incorrigibles who run away repeatedly, and these are given somewhat closer guarding for a time. Political prisoners, she noted, were treated like everyone else, except that those who had been persistent and dangerous in their attacks on the government were sent further away from the possibility of connection with their past associates. In all her conversations with these “politicals,” she was unable to find one who had been sentenced merely for expressing anti-Soviet views. All were charged with definite action against the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“I did everything I could to destroy this government,” one such man frankly told her, “sabotage of the most serious kind. But the way they have treated me here has convinced me that they are right.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another prisoner, who had been in Sing Sing, San Quentin, as well as in jails of England, Spain and Germany, before he was picked up by the Soviets for grand larceny, had been reclaimed by the Baltic-White Sea Canal. He had done a bit of engineering in his youth, and was promptly given a chance to work at this specialty. He won a medal, pursued his studies further, and was doing brilliant work on the Moscow-Volga Canal when Dr. Callcott met him. To her query about his reformation he replied:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In the other countries they treated me like a prisoner, clapped me in jail and taught me my place. Here they clapped me on the back and said ‘What can we do to make you into a useful citizen?’” Dr. Callcott conversed with many men now high in Soviet industry who had previously been reclaimed by the labor camps. Nothing in their attitude or that of those about them showed any stigma remaining from their prison life. “Of course, when it’s over, it’s forgotten,” one of them said to her. “That,” says Dr. Callcott, “is real restoration.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Information from many other sources and from my own observation corroborates Dr. Callcott. In August 1935 I visited the town of Bear Mountain, center of the administration of the Baltic-White Sea Canal, which is widely known in the USSR not only as a great construction job but as the place where tens of thousands of men won new lives for old. It is still the distributing center for the labor camps of this district.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chauffeur who drove me over twenty miles of wilderness without a guard in sight was one of the prisoners. He talked quite freely and said that he didn’t like the north but at least he had a chance to study a trade or become an engineer. A dozen types of industry had been established to utilize and train all kinds of workers. They took pride in their modern equipment and the high quality of goods produced. In the holiday celebration going on in the public square during my visit, one could not always tell who were prisoners, who were free workers and who were “guards.” The atmosphere was that of any new construction job in the country. Such, indeed, was the intention—to establish the atmosphere of normal constructive life, with certain old associations shut out.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What most interested me was the splendid theater, whose director boasted of his production of the opera &#039;&#039;Eugene Onegin&#039;&#039;, the &#039;&#039;Red Poppy&#039;&#039; ballet, and many of the latest Moscow plays. We learned later that he was a well-known Moscow producer, sent north for a serious crime. The camp authorities at once decided to build a theater, in order to utilize his abilities to the full. The theater cast itself consisted of lawbreakers, government officials, free workers and the families of all of them, mixing in the democratic intimacy of a dramatic performance. One wonders which of all his achievements this director will most boast of in old age, his work in Moscow or the northern theater created in Bear Mountain.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many former prisoners from the Baltic-White Sea Canal, after receiving freedom together with special prizes and high honors for their good work, went of free choice to help build the Moscow-Volga Canal, another convict-labor job. Here they were especially valued because through their own experience they understood the process through which new prisoners had to go and were especially skilled in helping them make themselves over. As in other Soviet construction camps, the workers on this canal had their art studio under professional direction, their musical circle and literary magazine, and their bureau of inventions through which four thousand proposals to improve the work of the canal have been offered by the prisoners themselves. Several prisoners, given their freedom because of inventions, refused to leave until the canal should be finished.&lt;br /&gt;
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So well known and effective is the Soviet method of remaking human beings that criminals occasionally now apply to be admitted. I met one such man in Gulin village. Notorious locally as thief and drunkard, he had a dozen convictions to his discredit, till at last he went to the authorities saying: “I’m a man destroyed, but I want to be made over.” They sent him to a labor camp whence he returned a qualified worker. Bolshevo Commune, the most famous “cure” for criminals, can be entered only by application approved by the general meeting of members. Its waiting list is so long that it accepts only the most hardened cases, priding itself on being able to make over persons who cannot become cured in any other institution. Its strength lies in its large membership of intelligent former criminals, who apply to new entrants their intimate knowledge of the criminal mind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Crime today is rapidly diminishing in the Soviet Union. From 1929 to 1934 sentences for murder decreased by one-half while sex crimes fell off to one-fourth. The cause is found in the growing strength of the Soviet environment to remake human beings; the penal policy is only a supplementary force. A striking example of the play of both causes may be found in the figures of prostitution. Pre-war Moscow had 25,000 to 30,000 prostitutes; these sank by 1928 to about 3,000,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Material from Dr. V. Bronner, head of Institute of Venereal Diseases, Commissariat of Health.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; diminution clearly due to economic causes. In 1931, after the Five-Year Plan -had abolished unemployment, the number sank still further to about eight hundred. To reclaim the more habituated, prophylactoria were established. These rose to the number of thirty-four in the whole USSR in 1934, and then swiftly declined to nineteen as their work was done. They are still declining for want of inmates; only one of the original five is left in Moscow. No woman was ever compelled to go to a prophylactorium; the chief punishment for breaking rules was to be put out. Nine-tenths of those who entered left cured both of physical disease and of old habits and were accepted without comment into the normal working life of the city.&lt;br /&gt;
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An eventual disappearance of crime is expected by Soviet authorities as the mental habits produced by a socialist system become established in Soviet life. For crime, in the Marxian view, arises from the conflicts of a class-exploiting society and will follow classes and exploitation into oblivion. In the first years of the new system, the sharp conflict with classes from whom it took privileges led to a decided increase both in crimes and in the repressive measures used by the state. Kulaks committed arson, cattle-killing, murder, and were exiled in large numbers; anti-Soviet engineers and officials sabotaged and were sent to labor camps. Today the kulaks have been amnestied, not only because many of them have recovered their civil status by honest labor, but also because the collective farms in the villages are strong enough to withstand their attack and absorb them. The labor camps which supplanted prisons are themselves diminishing, partly because they have “cured” their inmates, and still more because the normal free life of Soviet society is becoming strong and prosperous enough to have a direct regenerative influence on those social misfits that remain.&lt;br /&gt;
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In unforgettably lyric language the Soviet writer Avdeyenko, who a few years ago was by his own confession 2 “two-legged beast of prey,” told the Congress of Soviets, to which in 1934 he was a delegate, the story of the degrading of a youth into a criminal and the subsequent remaking of the criminal into an honorable and famous man. “In 1926,” he said, “under one of the cars of the Moscow-Tashkent express, lay two little passengers, myself and my comrade, voyagers making our way closer to the sun, searching for good people who would not be offended when we robbed them.” He tells how the conductor threw them out on the damp earth, how they wandered in rain and sleet, seeking warmth and light, thrown out everywhere till exhaustion turned to anger, anger to despair, despair to a great hatred for mankind. In this hatred they fired a haystack set against a house. “A warm, calm feeling filled my heart. Tears of joy and vengeance came into our eyes. We embraced, laughing and crying, and spent the rest of the night in a public toilet, pressing against the warm wall to warm first our backs and then our chests till we fell asleep standing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“I was destined to live many years—one—fifth of my life—with the feelings of hatred, malice, revenge that were born in me at that station. After that I robbed and threatened without remorse.” He tells how he stole fur coats and jars of butter, robbed drunkards in dark alleys, hooked vagrants off freight cars to steal their clothing, till he gradually became “a human beast, that most fearful two-legged blood-thirsty species without love or goodness or feeling or pity. Today it is frightful for me even to remember such a person.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Today in this historic hall, I stand on the tribune, a member of government. I am a citizen with full rights. I am strong. I cherish the best human feelings: love, devotion, honesty, self-sacrifice, heroism. I write books. I dream of creating an unforgettable production. I love a girl unselfishly. I am continuing my race—it will be a happy one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I am happy, full of the joy of life, unshakably exuberant. I go to sleep with regret, I awake with joy. I shall live a hundred years. I can fly to the moon, go to the Arctic, make a new discovery, for my creative energy is not trod on by anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Today I recall my past for the last time. In filling out my application blank, under ‘places of work,’ I wrote: “Till 1931 socially harmful activity. I begin the story of life from 1931’ And they answered: ‘So be it.’ So you see I am four years old, the youngest here.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Avdeyenko gives the stories of other former law-breakers who have been made over. He traces the source of their anti-social past to the heritage of capitalist exploitation; he finds the force that redeemed them in the new socialist industries and the life that arises around them. “All of you know the institutions where such people are re-educated. But our whole Soviet system is one big workshop for re-educating men. I know people of two generations whose lives were no better than mine. We are engineers, writers, aviators, journalists, machinists, administrators of cities, scientists, Arctic explorers. The industries of our country remade us, and the industries were established by the Stalinist policy of industrializing the country. Comrade Molotov spoke of the newly created factories, cities and whole industrial regions, but he did not refer to the giving of life, human life, to the two-legged beasts of prey I have described.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XV: YOUTH SET FREE ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“The generation which is now fifteen years old will see Communism and will itself build it.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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“Life is good and to live is good—in such a land, in such an epoch! . . . We, young owners of our country, called upon to conquer space and time. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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In June of 1935 these words of Anna Mlynek, young valedictorian of the first Moscow class to complete the new ten-year school, awakened in thousands of hearts the world over a realization of what youth’s outlook might be in a socialist land. To youth in capitalist countries the outlook is gloomy. They look outward and see unemployment; they look inward and find confusion. They are developing, rational beings propelled into a world whose irrationality even their parents and teachers cannot explain to them. Those who love them best offer only a host of illusions; they are taught to look at the past and go backing into the future. So there goes on within them what the well-known psychiatrist, Dr. Frankwood Williams, calls a “mighty struggle in the dark . . . with all the emotional complexities and uncertainties that home, school, community have woven into their being.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet youth have not escaped struggle. Their birth was in the flames of civil war. Their childhood endured the famine years. Their adolescence was strained by great tasks of constructing a country. Many young lives were cut short or crippled in heart or lung or nerve in those years of battle and building. Even today they see across the future the dark threat of world war which may be launched at any time by the capitalist chaos beyond their borders, and in which they know that many of them must perish.&lt;br /&gt;
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What then is the source of the explosive joy which becomes increasingly plain in the words, the sports, the celebrations of Soviet youth? It lies in those words “young owners.” Men in the past have been subjects of kings or even proud citizens of democracies. Never till socialism dared they call themselves owners of the land in which they live. Ownership brings freedom in planning, clearness of goal, harmony of intellect and will in expanding life. Joint ownership brings comradeship reinforcing freedom, and a new, widened will to conquer space and time.&lt;br /&gt;
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A letter sent by thirty-one young men and girls from a collective farm to Moscow to greet the assembling of congress in early 1935 expresses it: “We go a road that is rich with life. We know our goal. What we are doing we do with clear consciousness. We know that what we do is important, necessary, great and glorious. We know the aim of our collective farm tasks. We know what will be tomorrow for we ourselves create it. Today is good, tomorrow will be better, the day after tomorrow immeasurably better. We often think of the glorious future of our farm, our township, our dear district, all our beloved land. We think of the bright future of all mankind which will be freed by the world-wide proletarian revolution.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Not on any mystic faith do these thirty-one young people base their hope for the future, but on homely details of daily fact that seem at first sight quite inadequate to explain their joy. They relate the changing of poor soil to good soil. “Our village never knew wheat till the Bolsheviks pushed it to the north!” They tell the expansion of music, drama, sport and science built on the firm economic foundation of their increasing harvest. They see the clear connection between their farm’s success and the success of their country, and base on this their expectation of international revolution. Their life is an integrated whole from the farm to the world. They have grown up and been formed by a new social order.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are the qualities demanded of joint owners, which the Soviet schools seek consciously to develop? Neither the combativeness nor the submission which are the contradictory demands of capitalism, but a high degree of initiative and scientific interest, a high development of individual variety combined with highly developed social instincts. The aim of the Soviet school is not to create standardized people, suited to the demands of some undefined future boss, but to help youth discover and develop its own desires and capacities. In a hundred ways the schools are constantly asking: What do you most like to do? In a hundred ways they help this developing choice relate itself to the equally developing choice of others.&lt;br /&gt;
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An American teacher who has taught for years in Soviet schools tells me that the approach to the child is far more individual than in America. Persistent efforts are made to find the child’s particular aptitudes and interests. In the elementary grades there are two types of teachers:—group teachers remain with one group of children for several years, visiting their homes, becoming thoroughly acquainted with them and relating them to the special teachers who develop special aptitudes. By the seventh grade, which is roughly equivalent to second year of high school in America, psychological tests help the child decide what he can do best; they tell him his capacities but impose no compulsion on his choice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Summer camps and excursions are also planned to help children discover their special interests and widen the field of their choice. The best camps, such as the famous Artek in the Crimea, maintain amateur work of a high order in geology, botany, care of animals, study of sea-life and construction of airplane and automobile models. Children spending their summer in such camps discover and develop hobbies which may, or may not, develop into their life’s work. Newspaper discussions also draw out the self-expression of children; a special newspaper, the Pioneer Pravda, is written almost entirely by children.&lt;br /&gt;
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Last summer I met twenty young “Arctic explorers” under sixteen years of age on the Murmansk train bound for Polar regions. Their energetic study of maps, Arctic cruises, Northern peoples had been sufficient to win from their teachers a recommendation which included them in an organized cruise of the north. They would meet adult Arctic explorers who would treat them smilingly but courteously as possible future colleagues. Ten of the best pupils in botany were similarly allowed to make an expedition at government expense to the Altai mountains, where they hiked two thousand kilometers and found twenty-seven new varieties of black currants and a type of onion which resists 45° of frost. Two of these young explorers went as delegates to deliver the plants to the aged plant-creator Michurin: When he asked: “Weren’t you afraid to cross wild rivers and sleep at night in the woods?” they answered: “Sometimes we were afraid. We feared that our expedition would fail to find any new plants and we would disgrace ourselves as Michurin’s grandchildren.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Such trips are the reward of marked aptitude, but all children take some part in the “grown—up” activities of the country. In Molvitino township the farm children told me proudly of scores of tons of bird droppings and wood ashes collected to fertilize the exhausted fields. In the 1934 “war with drought,” when a chief harvest problem in the south was the low, dry stand of easily broken grain, children’s groups of gleaners followed the reapers and competed to save great piles of grain heads. Every Soviet child knows the heroism of Mitia who caught three harvest thieves red-handed. In Artek Camp I met a child who had prevented a train wreck by reporting a loose rail and another who saved an aviator by lighting a bonfire at night to guide the errant plane: these children won wide renown among other children and were rewarded by a summer at Artek. Children of railway workers in Tiflis built and operate a half-mile railroad in the Park of Culture and Rest; it is a serious enterprise which carries passengers, takes in a thousand rubles each holiday and spends the money in proper Soviet style to “expand the road.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These out-of-school activities of children became at one time so absorbing that they threatened health and education. Young Pioneers “saved the harvest,” reclaimed drunken parents, denounced village grafters and debated whether their first duty was to the school or to “help the country.” Today children are reminded that “learn, learn, learn” is Lenin’s statement of the three most necessary things for young humans to do. School dominates and organizes all other child activities. But it never excludes them. In all their learning many forms of activity have part.&lt;br /&gt;
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The early discipline of children is largely through mass pressure, highly effectively organized by the children themselves. Children often come to a teacher with suggestions about the best way to handle difficult cases. They inform the teacher of home conditions which have made certain children backward in study or in comradeliness. They organize committees to go with the teacher to the homes. Children will themselves expose violations of child labor laws, or write to the papers about parents who beat other children. The highest honor given to able children is to be asked to help more backward ones with their studies in a spirit not of condescension but of good team-work, like that of a basket-ball player who helps his team excel. The strongest penalty in any school is given when children ask to have a child excluded on the round that his conduct disturbs their work.&lt;br /&gt;
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All these activities of children directly reflect and prepare for their coming adult life. The encouragement of individual variety harmonized by regard for the rights of others expands into the more definite yet wider interests of youth. By the end of the ten-year school, which is roughly equivalent to a combination of the American elementary grades and high school, the boy or girl usually has some interest which he wants to test in serious work. Some young folks go to work even earlier, spending part of the years between fourteen and eighteen in a factory trade school with part-time work. Some go direct from the secondary school to the university. But the commonly encouraged procedure is to finish ten years of school and then go to work in the late teens for a period of self-testing before deciding on specialization.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are not odd jobs to earn one’s way through college, such as are known in American life. They are part of a youth’s conscious self-education in the actual world of production. They are related to his already appearing interests, which they test and develop. I know a boy of nineteen who chose to work on a farm in the summer. Since he already knew that he wanted to become an entomologist, the farm was expected to give him scientific work. He sorted apples for diseases, staked cabbages to count the bugs in sample areas, and otherwise used his special interest for farm production, improving his scientific technique while he worked. If an emergency had occurred, he would have helped in other ways, but emergencies which waste the time of young people in blind alley tasks are a blot on the reputation of any Soviet industry. When four girls of my acquaintance went to work in a chemical laboratory in Siberia and found it so disorganized that there was nothing really useful to do, they protested to the Party against this waste of their time, and the organization which was employing and paying them was censured and ordered to release them for other work. The time of youth is a precious treasure of the community. The most accepted reason which any youth can give for leaving a job is that it offers nothing more for him to learn.&lt;br /&gt;
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At no time in life is there any gap between work and schooling. Education is not a commodity purchased by money and consumed in childhood or in four charmed years of isolated university life. It is a personal and public necessity, without limits, freely available from childhood to old age. Courses of general culture are not crammed into a special period; they are taken after work in any quantity desired. They are paid for by state or trade union; any group of workers anywhere may decide to study chemistry, music or parachute-jumping and call on their trade union to pay the teachers. When young people feel that they have chosen a permanent specialty, for which they need some years of concentrated study, they apply to enter a university or a research institute. For these institutions their ability and seriousness is tested by severe entrance examinations. If they pass, study becomes their regular work, paid for as such by the state. It is fully as strenuous as the factory; they spend six or seven hours a day in class rooms and laboratories in courses chosen on a broad basis, but all consciously directed towards preparation for their profession.&lt;br /&gt;
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I visited the dormitory attached to three institutions of higher education in mining, metallurgy and non-ferrous metals. A pretty girl was specializing in blast furnaces, a former book-binder was studying mining engineering, a factory-worker was becoming a geologist for Central Asia, a broad-faced yellow Kazak was preparing to work in copper in the newly opened mines of Kazakstan. All of them were paid for their study by the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Their stipends ranged from one to two hundred rubles monthly, the higher pay rewarding the best students. Every summer they chose their “practice work” from a dozen localities which offered, and as soon as they found some place where they wished to sign up for a job after graduation, they got additional wages from their chosen industry. The majority decided by the third or fourth year of the five-year course. Thereafter they felt themselves bound to work, for at least a time after they finished the university, for the institution which had paid for their education. This was not felt by them as compulsion but as the intelligent specializing of their own choice on the basis of a wide range of opportunities. Any good reason, such as personal health or the demand of some national emergency, would be recognized by them and their fellows as grounds for release. But a frivolous change of occupation without reason would brand a youth as undependable, while to give up a job because conditions proved difficult would be stigmatized as cowardly. For what was he trained if not to make the conditions better? Has he not at his disposal for this all the resources of the land?&lt;br /&gt;
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What jobs does youth choose? By no means the easy ones. When has youth, when free to choose, ever asked for the easy way? Youth wants conquest. Youth is explosive energy, so explosive that under capitalism it must be befogged with illusions, lest it wreck the world’s ancient ways. Soviet youth is encouraged to make the world over; it responds to the call. In every difficult struggle faced by the Soviet state from its beginning, a mighty host of youth has volunteered.&lt;br /&gt;
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Youth does not wait to be asked; it takes the initiative. Through its organization, the Young Communist League, it repeatedly demands the right to battle on each new important “front.” I know young women who fought in the civil war, divorcing the husbands who would have prevented their going. The Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the first Soviet conveyor, was built and manned by young folks coming from every part of the country. “We give our youth to this struggle,” they said to me six years ago. “We do not spend it in ease or amusement. We shall not stop till we have built the socialist city of Stalingrad.” I have vivid memory of the boat that came at eleven o’clock one night for a long-expected boat-ride after a hot day and was turned down by young voices, with-out a word from their elders, as too late. “Got to go home; got to be fresh for the line tomorrow,” they said as they turned away.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus was launched in the far northeast of Asia the new ship-building port Comsomolsk on the shores of the Ohotsk Sea, a city proudly carved from mosquito-ridden forests by the forces of youth alone. Thus was built the Moscow subway in a titanic drive by youth to create “the most beautiful subway in the world.” Moscow’s Young Communists left office jobs, postponed university courses and requalified as underground ditch-diggers to build it. Every great construction job has its special tasks seized by youth; they take over the building of a blast furnace in competition with one raised alongside by their elders. They organize special farms which make proud records. They pour into the new industries, master the new technique, form the new staff of engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like young folks everywhere, Soviet youths have the problem of the relation between work and marriage. This is never a question of whether they can afford to get married; that is taken for granted. The problem is to find time for a satisfying family life. One troubled youth writes to the &#039;&#039;Komsomolskaya Pravda&#039;&#039; in the discussion recently held on this question: “I am a turner. I am also a Young Communist. Besides that I am working on an invention. My days are so full that I don’t have time to breathe. I see my wife only at night and then I&#039;m so dead tired that I fall down and sleep like a corpse. Lydia weeps. I am not a beast; I am sorry about Lydia. But I try to organize my time and I can’t even find an hour for my class on planning, much less for my family.”&lt;br /&gt;
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This is an extreme case; it is balanced by young Kuznetsova who lays down her specifications for a husband: “I wouldn’t have a man who was not a good social worker. But neither will I live with one who is interested only in his factory. I don’t want a one-sided man. I want a husband who will play volley ball with me, do skiing, appreciate the theater, music, general culture, read a book with me and argue about it afterwards. All these things have place in a well-rounded life.” These are the problems of a rich, abundant existence, which needs only to be organized. Soviet youth never feels that it must renounce any of these satisfactions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Each year when September First brings the International Youth celebration, hundreds of telegrams pour into the offices of &#039;&#039;Komsomolskaya Pravda&#039;&#039;, organ of Communist Youth, announcing achievements of youth and the gifts which it offers the country. A group of young steel men wire that they have dismantled and reassembled an open hearth furnace in six days instead of the usual ten; a group of young miners sends an extra train of coal manned by a train crew especially chosen from scores who competed for the honor. Other groups announce the organization of “cultured field camps” where music, drama and books enliven the evening’s work on the farm. Still other groups blazon sport records on floats in the great demonstration which storms the Red Square. Young Communists of the Red Dawn Telephone Factory hiked to the Mongolian border, 5,400 miles in 180 days. Another group is back from climbing the Altai, covering 1,200 miles on foot. They celebrate the Baikal-Murmansk ski-run across half Asia and half northern Europe; they announce Alpine and parachute records made by youth. Nor is there any sharp line between records in sport and in steel-mills. All are one unified, advancing life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not in conflict with work but around it in the social life of the factory collective, Soviet youth develops activities of sport and recreation which make up a well-rounded life. Tsarist Russia possessed thirty thousand members of sport and athletic clubs; there are six million today. Tens of thousands of cheering spectators turn out to soccer matches between Moscow, Leningrad, Central Asia, Turkey and Spain. Soviet sportsmen begin to invade world records. But the characteristic of Soviet sport is not the straining for records in one field at the expense of all round physical fitness; its symbol is the GTO badge—“Ready for Labor and Defense”—to receive which one must pass certain standards in walking, running, swimming, rowing, skiing, jumping and every kind of summer and winter sport. Two and a half million persons have qualified for this symbol, and a second degree of GTO is now established, requiring high diving, parachute jumping and other difficult tests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Parachute jumping has become almost a national sport in the Soviet Union, typical of its sky-storming youth. Flying, gliding, jumping, youth fills the heavens above Tushino field several times each summer with its aviation festivals. One hundred and fifty at a time they leap from great carrier airplanes and come sailing down under canopies of many-colored silk—red, white, blue, orange, lilac—covering the sky with rainbow hues. Week after week they make new records, young men and girls in individual or group jumps. Nina Kameneva, descending from icy space nearly twice the height of Mount Blanc and breaking a world’s record, made the remark which was seized by Soviet youth as a new slogan: “The sky of our country is the highest sky in the world.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XVI: NEW MEN EMERGE ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emergence of new people has been noted with growing frequency in recent years by the Soviet press. Editorial writers have tried to analyze their qualities; novelists have attempted to portray them. A Russian author suggested a year ago to the Moscow News a series of half-column novelettes, each containing the snapshot of a life. To the editor’s query how many of these stories he had, he answered casually: “About a thousand.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“A thousand!” exclaimed our editor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“That’s not so many,” replied the author, “to describe the great variety of people now appearing in our world.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lincoln Steffens told me of meeting one of these new people, a Soviet youth in Hollywood, “so new that he could not understand these United States. . . . He was a unit; he thought and acted together. He was constantly puzzled by the tactics of American capitalists, considered from the standpoint of their own survival.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Increasingly I also meet new people in the Soviet Union. Not infrequently I have misunderstood them; their approach to life was different from anything I had known. Their respect for my will, their unwillingness to use their personality to convince my intellect, I mistook for aloofness, so accustomed was I to the salesman’s method of putting himself over. On another occasion, traveling on a Siberian train, I made the opposite mistake and took for promiscuous flirtation the expansive joy of a high official whose deft approaches to every person he met drew forth answering flashes of life. Then I saw him evade a kiss from “Little Slant-Eyes,” a Tartar girl with whom for two days he had been joking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Kissing is for the beloved one,” he said, smiling. “But the joy of life is to be shared with everybody.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Do you know what they have thought of you on this train?” I asked him then.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What they think affects them, not me. They will also learn if it is in them.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Never had I seen a more poised personality. Later he remarked, “We Bolsheviks, as Kirov always said, must be the happiest people in the world. But I must be one of the happiest even among Bolsheviks. Our older men are marked by too many years of combat. Our younger men can hardly appreciate the grimness of what they have never known. But I spent my childhood in oppression and my youth fighting for freedom; I am old enough to know the conquered past, yet young enough for a whole new life.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it possible yet to say in what direction this new humanity is developing? Are there any characteristics common to these millions of people who are becoming subtly differentiated from the past? Many attempts are being made to analyze them. When the Turkoman horsemen descended on Moscow after their amazing 4,300 kilometer run across the deserts, Stalin said: “Only clearness of goal, perseverance in attaining the goal, and firmness of character breaking through every hindrance can achieve such a glorious victory.” Pravda elaborated this theme into an editorial on the Soviet ideal of character, declaring it to be the exact opposite of that “unquestioning obedience” which Hitler had previously demanded in an impassioned speech to fascist youth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Strong and original individuality,” was claimed by Pravda as the basic quality of a Soviet citizen. Not the “rugged individualism” which capitalism in its early stages glorifies for its upper classes, and which sinks into gangsterism in the fascist decline. Not conforming obedience responding under all conditions to “God and country,” the capitalist ideal which under fascism becomes blinder submission for men whose destiny it is to be bossed. Not that ability to look on both sides of the question which intellectuals under capitalism prize as a sign of high intelligence, but which Pravda disdains as “division of personality and double-mindedness, Hamletism in romantic colors.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Not submission and blind faith does the Communist Party implant, but consciousness, daring, decision. It is just from the clear goal, seen by millions, from fighting perseverance and firmness that there grows that remarkable voluntary discipline which bourgeois society cannot even imagine. . . . Clearness of aim, perseverance and firmness won the victory in the civil war, restored our ruined economy and created socialist industry and collective farming. Clearness of aim, perseverance and firmness made way through the ice of the Arctic, lifted our heroes of the air into the stratosphere and brought close to the Communist Party many of the great representatives of science, literature and art. . . . The Communist Party draws out from all the toilers of our great fatherland the quality of strong individuality, inseparably connected with the strong collective of the toilers. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To many persons in capitalist countries these words will be only partly intelligible. They have been so accustomed to considering that their own life is “free” and Soviet life “regimented” that they cannot at once grasp a viewpoint which holds the exact opposite. Yet even the casual observer of human beings today in the Soviet Union notices that while they have certain characteristics in common they are by no means regimented into uniformity, but show a vivid individuality at least as great as is found anywhere in the world. A business man in Chicago who had never seen Moscow but who was something of an art critic, told me that he was especially impressed in all Soviet photographs, whether of demonstrations in the Red Square or of athletes and factory workers, by the quality of will in the faces. “Utterly different from the sheepish or brutal faces of Nazi pictures,” he added. It is clear to anyone who talks with Soviet workers or the more advanced of the collective farmers that they feel themselves possessed not only of freedom, but of a peculiar type of reinforced and collectively supported freedom which is strong enough to conquer all the obstacles in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Freedom is never absolute; it is concrete and specific. It means different things to different classes and generations of men. The American pioneer faced the wilderness ax in hand with the mood of a free creator, saying: “What shall I build?” His freedom was conditioned by the loans he made or failed to make for his migration, by the railroad that came or failed to come, and by the subtler limitations of his own skill and character, yet with ax in hand, he felt free. His ownership of his primitive means of production was the source and guarantee of his sense of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the means of production became the factory, the meaning of freedom slowly changed. Freedom became to the owner the right to fix prices and wages, to the worker the right to drift from job to job, seeking an easier boss. Freedom in government became the “right to choose one’s rulers,” not the right to own and rule. Freedom of thought and speech became the right to complain, to voice transient shifts of opinion, not the right to drive one firm consistent thought into life. As capitalism advanced, men became diversified in their work and capacities, but standardized in their instinctive reference to a boss. Soviet workers notice this quality in Americans who come to their factories. “They know how to complain and make suggestions, but not how to desire and will.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Desire and will” is the form which freedom takes when men are owners. When they are joint owners, a form of will develops—not unlike that in a family, a partnership or a committee—which determines itself by consultation. “He does not make individual decisions,” is already a compliment in the Soviet Union; it is applied to Stalin. It is as if one said of a scientist that he refuses to base conclusions on a single experiment. Men always have made up what they call their own minds through the influence of other minds as well; but now they grow conscious of these sources of their choice; they organize even these sources. They criticize, but from within, not from aloof isolation. Workers express discontent not by strikes against an alien owner, but by joint fights against bureaucracy to improve the organization of the land. Freedom becomes less a protest and more a steadily burning choice; not a fight, but a seeking. It is seen not as absence of restraint, but as conscious selection of one particular, individual place in a living complex mechanism whereby a thousand similar freedoms are welded into flame and power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the latter half of 1935 the Stakhanovites began to shake the country. People compared it to an explosion, an earthquake. The movement appeared simultaneously in a hundred places and a score of industries. Despite the great variety of its people, the fundamental characteristics were the same. Workmen operating new machines began to shatter past standards of production often against the indifference or opposition of engineers and managers but accompanied by the strained attention of their fellow workers. Each of them had to fight his way against old concepts and habits; one or two of them were killed by angry workers, outraged by this sudden burst of speed. But overwhelming public opinion hailed and copied the innovators. Swiftly, in the midst of their local elation, they found themselves acclaimed across the land as heroes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within two months every country in the world was forced to take notice, disguising the information as best they could under the name “speed-up.” For this was no mere routine news from Russia. This was a storming of the world frontiers of productivity and science. Miners in the Donbas were doubling Ruhr production. Blacksmiths in Gorky Auto Works broke standards set by Ford. Shoemakers in Leningrad made records 50 per cent higher than the world record held by the Bata factories of Czechoslovakia. Young girl weavers ran far ahead of America’s best achievements. Swedish saw-mill machinery, standardized to cut ninety-six cubic meters of lumber, was impertinently pushed to nearly three hundred by woodsmen in Archangel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hundreds of American engineers and workers, who tried five years ago to “teach the Russians,” and who today are scattered in jobs and out of jobs all over the world, must have grumbled glumly when they heard of it: “Why couldn’t they do it when we showed them how?” For the events which have happened are externally obvious. The Soviet Union equipped itself throughout with modern machinery and methods, and drew eleven million greenhorns into industry to operate them. The greenhorns broke machines, wasted material and learned. They could not learn at once when their teachers told them; it had to grow in their nervous systems. But what they have learned is not only the technical skill of America. It is all that skill with the pride of ownership added. Ownership of the whole great mechanized process that makes the modern world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
People who were allowed to attend the first All-Union Congress of Stakhanovites—and everyone in Moscow wanted to go—told of the indescribable enthusiasm, the irrepressible, thundering cheers. The Soviet press grew lyric over “taming the fiery steed of science,” “washing out the barriers between manual and mental labor,” “preparing the way from socialism to communism where each shall receive according to his needs.” Stalin was saying to the assembled delegates: “We leaders of the government have learned much from you. Thanks, comrades, for the lesson, many thanks.” Those men in the Congress believed—and the country believed with them—that the plan made by Marx was coming true. They had established a new economic system. They had painfully equipped it with modern methods. They had slowly learned to manage it jointly, and now the predicted results appeared. Socialism was beating capitalist production, just as capitalism beat feudalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What are the characteristics of these Stakhanovites? A joyously dynamic initiative, a pride in mastery of complex technical processes, a conscious co-operation with society, a hunger to learn. Every phrase dropped in their discussions shows exultant power in creation and desire to share the new skill with others. Busygin, the blacksmith who made the crankshaft record in the forge of the Gorky Auto Works, declares, “There’s nothing I dream of so much as studying. I want to be not only a smith but to know how hammers are made and to make them. . . .” Marie Demchenko who made the sugar-beet record asked as a reward a course at an agricultural college—and got it. Stakhanov himself went down in the mines to make his record as the chosen representative of his fellows. “International Youth Day was approaching and I wanted to mark the day with a record in productivity. For some time my comrades and I had been thinking how to break the shackles of the norm, give the miners free play, force the drills to work a full shift.” When Slavnikova wanted to beat the record on a machine she had carefully studied but never yet used, the foreman opposed her. “I&#039;m a fearless parachute jumper; that norm doesn’t scare me; I&#039;ll upset it,” she replied. She drove the machine to a five-fold record. She relates the sequel: “At four in the afternoon we had a meeting and they gave us flowers for our good work.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bobilev, the steel smelter, wants you to know that he is a scientist: “We are no sportsmen. We tested out our open hearth; we repaired her and asked how much she could give. She told us 11.33 tons.” Vasiliev, the blacksmith who holds the record for forging connecting-rods, uses the words “boiled up” and “exploded” to describe his feelings about his forge. When his 1934 record was beaten by Andrianov, he “boiled up” and went back to the works with four days left of his vacation. I beat Sam Andrianov but I saw in a newspaper that a Kharkov smith had made more than a thousand. Then I exploded! I made 945 in one shift. The smith Stadnik also exploded and made 975. I consulted my gang how to organize our work-place; we got 1,036. We talked it over with the foreman and told him how to change the furnace; with true Stakhanov zeal he gave us in four days a furnace that could heat 1,500 in a shift. What stops us now? We talked it over and placed the metal in such order that it would be easier to take up. On October 27 I made an all-Union record 1,101 in a single shift. Comrades, I haven’t yet got out of that hammer all she’ll give, but I&#039;m going to get it out to the very bottom.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Characteristic of the Stakhanovites is their disdain for overtime work as a confession of inefficiency; their insistence that a rhythm shall be found which shall not be physically exhausting—“if the work is done right you feel better and stronger”; and their zeal in teaching the new skill to their fellows. The locomotive engineer Omelianov, demands the “worst engineer” as a pupil, and makes him also a beater of records. Slavnikova is asked by an inefficient woman: “You’re a Young Communist; why don’t you teach me?” She gives time to instruct the older woman, who also begins to improve.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Life in the new factories is by no means ease and harmony. It is more like an explosion or a battle. An engineer of my acquaintance finds the Stakhanovites frankly terrifying. “They put up signals over their lathes when out of material. These signals pop up everywhere and I have to keep them satisfied, or they’ll say I sabotage. You can lose your reputation. You can be cleaned out of the Party. I&#039;m sitting up nights to plan the flow of work.” The demands of these new men are breaking the old technical processes. For “every worker knows,” says the weaver Lisakova, “that over-fulfillment of the norm will not only improve labor conditions in the factory, but also the kindergartens, nurseries, dining-rooms. All this depends on the efficiency of organization, the spirit of solidarity, the fulfillment of the plan.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It no longer even occurs to these joint owners that a rise in productivity might throw men out of work. Shifts of workers there will be from one job to another; but industry bears the expense of retraining workers. Conflicts there will be, harsh problems and many, but they feel quite sure that they can plan and achieve. They have won through civil war, pestilence, famine; they tightened their belts to build the first Five-Year Plan. They are driving rapidly through a second, which increases food, clothing, housing visibly each year. They haven’t the faintest doubt that as owners of their country they will always have worthwhile things to do.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Ten years hence,” said a Stakhanovite to me, “farming and industry may cease to be our main occupations. But there are other occupations when once we produce all the goods we need. Human development, exploration, science—to these there are no limits!”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whatever kind of world will be made by these new builders, one thing is certain: it will be built on conscious planning and will. Not regimentation but choice will make it, a choice that develops its own social guidance. If more people want geology, there will be more geology; if more want medicine, there will be more medicine. More comforts or more leisure, more music or more exploration of the Arctic? Our new world will be what we choose to make it. And if excess of choice in one direction leaves any fields unfilled, the social ways of influencing choice are clear and conscious. A combination of material rewards with social recognition, is already the method of attracting volunteers. The announcement in January, 1933, that agriculture was the most important front, brought hosts of recruits from the ablest people of the country. Calls for help through the League of Communist Youth supplied the driving personnel for Stalingrad Tractor Plant and the Moscow subway. Increased wages and shortened hours have supplemented statements of public need to attract more people into fields as diverse as medicine and mining.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are there any bounds whatever to man’s advance? These new men recognize none. “If in so short a time and with so backward folk we owners of one-sixth of earth have done so much, what shall we men not do when we own the resources of our planet, unhindered by the fear of wars? If the earth grows old, shall we not remake it to suit us? If the solar system runs down, shall we not find ways to give heat to our sun? Need we fix any limit to attainment, when the earth is our jointly owned workshop and home?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such is their confident philosophy. So they answer, when they take time to discuss at all. A new religion? No, that is a word disdained. A widening science, they would say. Their approach to ultimate reality is not one of faith and submission, on which all religions have been based. It is one of defiance and conquest through intellect and will. When the conflicts between slave and master, serf and baron, worker and capitalist are ended, and the classless society is attained, there begins the titanic conflict of conscious men with unconscious nature. Not by faith but by analysis, not by submission but by defiance shall we rise in that unending battle. Unending? Relatively only, not absolutely. But that end is beyond our present power even to imagine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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		<title>Library:Trotskyism: Counter-Revolution in Disguise</title>
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library_work|title=Trotskyism: Counter-Revolution in Disguise|author=Moissaye Joseph Olgin}}&lt;br /&gt;
== The Danger of Trotskyism ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Nobody dares speak aloud in Russia.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Russian workers have bad dwellings, bad clothes, bad food. In consequence of malnutrition and bad hygienic conditions, epidemics are spreading among them.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Instead of proclaimed beautiful perspectives and particularly beneficial privileges, the workers of heavy industry have obtained an official eight-hour workday plus two hours overtime—shock-brigader and super-shock-brigader work under conditions where there is a constant lack of materials and instruments, where the machines and apparatus are continually out of order, the work rooms are not heated and ventilation is absent.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The system of ‘dekulakization’ and large-scale collectivization has turned Russia from a country of booming agriculture into a country of widespread ruin. Instead of the advantages promised to follow from collective creativeness and large-scale application of machines, the peasants have remained exhausted. Hard forced labor in the collective farms has led to a situation where the peasant cannot be the creator of the most necessary products.”&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;WHO are the authors of these statements? Do they emanate from the Trotskyite camp? They sound very much like Trotskyite declarations. Remember what Trotsky wrote about “bureaucratism” in Russia, about democracy being stifled, about absence of elementary rights under the “Stalinist regime”. Does it not resemble the statement that “nobody dares speak aloud in Russia”?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now about the economic situation. Remember what Trotsky wrote about the conditions of the workers.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Economic tasks are being set without any account being taken of the actual means. An increasingly inhuman load is being dumped on the shoulders of the workers. . . . Malnutrition plus forced exertions. The combination of these two conditions is enough to do away with the equipment and to exhaust the producers themselves. . . . One cannot believe one’s eyes. . . . Poor nourishment and nervous fatigue engender an apathy to the surrounding environment. As a result not only the old factories. but also the new ones that have been built according to the last word in technology fall quickly into a moribund state.” (Leon Trotsky, &#039;&#039;Soviet Economy in Danger&#039;&#039;, p. 21.)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;And this is what Trotsky wrote about the situation of the peasants:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The headlong chase after breaking records in collectivization, without taking any account of the economic and cultural potentialities of the rural economy, has led in actuality to ruinous consequences. It has destroyed the stimuli of the small commodity producer long before it was able to supplant them by other and much higher economic stimuli. The administrative pressure, which exhausts itself quickly in industry, turns out to be absolutely powerless in the sphere of rural economy. . . . One hundred per cent collectivization has resulted in one hundred per cent overgrowth of weeds on the fields.” (&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;, p. 23.)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Is there any material difference between the last two quotations and the quotations at the beginning of this chapter? It is difficult to detect any. The spirit is the same. The substance is the same. Yet the first four quotations are taken from a publication called &#039;&#039;The Russian Fascist&#039;&#039; appearing in the United States of America in the Russian language (the magazine is published in Putnam, Connecticut, by a man named A. Vonsyatsky).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Russian Fascists and the former leader of the October Revolution, Leon Trotsky, speak the same language.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the difference between them? One would be inclined to think that the fascists speak in the name of the dictatorship of capital whereas Trotsky speaks in the name of the Russian workers and peasants. But the fascists, too, profess to speak in the name of the masses. They appear in their publications as the great champions of the downtrodden and exploited—the oppressors and exploiters being, in their presentation, the Bolsheviks with Stalin at their head. The fascists, too, appeal in the name of democracy. They even say they are not against the Soviets. They only want “freedom of unhampered voting and the right to elect non-partisans into the Soviets”—a Trotskyite demand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are the fascists friends of the Russian masses? We do not think any enlightened person would believe that. Is Trotsky a friend of the Russian masses? Some people think so, but the fact that his statements so closely resemble those of the fascists should make them doubtful as to Trotsky’s real objective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference between the fascists and the Trotskyites is this—that the fascist deception is easily detected by every thinking person whereas the Trotskyite deception is not so easily detected because it is covered with “revolutionary”, “Marxian”, even “Leninist” phrases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therein lies the danger of Trotskyism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One great world-wide victory was achieved by the world proletariat in October, 1917: the Bolshevik Revolution which established the dictatorship of the proletariat. For over 17 years the dictatorship of the proletariat has been ruling in a gigantic country. Successes which could not have been dreamt of under the old régime have been achieved in the comparatively brief span of time after the end of the civil war. Progress of industry which made the U.S.S.R., as far as heavy metallurgy is concerned, the first country in Europe and the second in the world, has actually transfigured the vast land, opening before it still greater and more staggering possibilities. Progress of agriculture, which transformed a country of twenty million small backward individual peasant holdings into a country of the most modern large-scale collectivized agriculture, put the U.S.S.R. on a firm foundation as regards the production of foodstuffs and raw materials and made it to a large extent, independent of the caprices of weather conditions. Heights of culture have been achieved which in many respects place the country far ahead of anything known in the capitalist world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this was accomplished not without struggles. Struggles against the former owners of wealth. Struggle against the White forces of the landlords and capitalists. Struggles against the imperialist armies of intervention. Struggles against the enemies that penetrated into every crevice of Soviet life in order to damage and wreck. Struggle against the village exploiters, the kulaks. Struggle against the intellectual saboteurs who offered every possible resistance to the workers’ rule. Struggle against the inefficiency, the lack of education, the lack of training on the part of the workers. Struggle against the backwardness of the peasantry. Struggle against old habits, centuries-old customs, prejudices, superstitions. Struggle against alien elements within the Communist Party who threatened to destroy its unity and impede therefore the progress of the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, with Lenin and Stalin and then Stalin at its head, all these difficulties have been overcome, most of the battles won, the foundations of socialism laid, the edifice of socialism nearly completed. The toilers of the Soviet Union are entering a new era, an era of abundance, of higher culture, of a more beautiful and colorful life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For what is this economic progress if not a foundation for more and better goods to satisfy the masses? What is this cultural progress if not a means of raising Soviet humanity to a higher, more human level? What is the entire system if not the open road to still greater, still more marvelous progress?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Compare this with the downfall of industry and agriculture in the capitalist world, with factories shut down, cottonfields and wheatfields ploughed under, wheat burned, milk spilled into the rivers, tens of millions of workers thrown out into hunger and misery, thousands upon thousands dying, children destitute, young boys and girls roaming the roads, schools and colleges curtailed, teachers and technicians, high specialists and artists swelling the ranks of the unemployed and unable to produce culture. Compare the Soviet achievements with this huge waste of human energy, human talent, human possibilities—and the importance of the Soviet Union will stand out in a sharp light.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet Union is a beacon light for all the oppressed and exploited of the world. The Soviet Union has done away with the exploitation of man by man. It has done away with the oppression of minority nationalities, of colonies and semi-colonies. It has made the formerly oppressed sections of Russia inhabited by non-Russians into veritable gardens of national freedom where national culture blossoms—culture that is national in form and proletarian in content. It has developed the formerly backward regions to make them reach the level of the most highly developed regions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet Union stands out as the example for the masses of the world. It shows how capitalist slavery and national oppression can be abolished. The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. stands as the example of how the Parties of the proletariat in every country must be organized and how they must conduct their struggles in order to achieve the victory of the working class and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Communist International is the organization which unites all the Communist Parties and makes them into one great Bolshevik world party, leader of the world revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is not a single revolutionary group among the workers and oppressed nationalities in the world that is not stimulated by the example of the Soviet Union. There is not a single expression of revolt among the masses that is not heightened and made more conscious and more decisive in consequence of the existence of the Communist Parties and the Communist International. Remove the Soviet Union from the political scene, destroy the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., crush the Communist International—and you bring about the greatest defeat of the exploited, and the greatest triumph for the exploiters.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is why world capitalism hates the Soviet Union. This is why the world imperialist powers are always conspiring against the Soviet Union. This is why they are assiduously preparing for war against the Soviet Union. They know their enemy. They know the danger that threatens their domination and their very existence. They are bent on crushing, wrecking, destroying, wiping out the hated dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
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He who helps them is an enemy of the working class and of all the oppressed. Trotsky and the Trotskyites belong to this camp.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are soft-hearted and “fair-minded” intellectuals who think that Trotsky did not get a square deal. Those champions of “fair play” forget that it is Trotsky who did not give the Soviet Union a square deal. It is he that never was fair to the Russian workers and to their Communist Party. It is he who never came with a fair and square attitude but always kept skeletons in his closet. It is Trotsky who, while a member of the Central Committee and of its Political Bureau, plotted against the Party and therefore against the Soviet Union, against the very rule of the proletariat. When the Communist Party finally was forced to expel him, it was because he turned traitor to the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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The stamp of renegade is burning on his forehead.&lt;br /&gt;
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Those intellectuals who seem to be fascinated by the false glitter of his literary output should think a moment of what his activities actually amount to. He is supposed to be the champion of inner-Party democracy—he says so himself—but when it came to the trade unions of the U.S.S.R. he wanted to change them into a purely bureaucratic apparatus which ides from above, and for this purpose he proposed to give them “a severe shakeup”, to “rub them strongly with sand”. He was supposed to be the champion of rapid industrialization—for which he advanced unsound and essentially destructive measures—but when, under the leadership of the Communist Party and Stalin, industrialization did make phenomenal progress, he demands a halt, he laments the “break-neck” speed. He was supposed to be the champion of collectivization of the peasant holdings—if need be by force, which would have ruined the relationship between the workers and the poor and middle peasants and wrecked the revolution—but when collectivization finally did make rapid progress, he decries it as ruining agriculture and ruining the peasants. He was supposed to be “ultra revolutionary”, a &#039;&#039;Left&#039;&#039; oppositionist—by which he means a better Communist than all the other Commonists—but his activities have one aim: to undermine, to shatter, to weaken and consequently to destroy the Communist Party of the Soviet Union &#039;&#039;without which there can be no socialist construction and no Soviet Union either&#039;&#039;. He is supposed to be against “bureaucratism” in the Party and in the State apparatus—a danger which the Party and the Soviet State themselves fight against and mitigate, and which he, Trotsky, exaggerates a million times—but what he is organizing is tiny &#039;&#039;cliques&#039;&#039; of disgruntled bureaucrats, renegades with small capabilities and tremendous ambitions, thwarted individuals who could not achieve leadership in real Communist Parties, creatures poisoned by all the vices of capitalist politicians and having nothing to do with the masses. He is supposed to be dissatisfied with the policies of the Communist International and the Communist Parties in the various countries because—to him, he says—they are not radical enough, but whenever his followers engage in any kind of activities among the workers they follow faithfully and obediently in the footsteps of the William Greens, Matthew Wolls, John Lewises and other misleaders of labor. He is supposed to be the great advocate of the united front, accusing the Communist International of having ruined the German revolution by not proposing a united front—which is an accusation based on his own fabrications—but when a united front is developing, like that in France and in the United States, his grouplets join with the reformists &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; the united front, thus trying to put a monkey wrench into the machinery of uniting the workers for common struggle. He is supposed to be displeased with the Communist International because, he says, it is not advancing the revolution rapidly enough, but he himself is creating that abortive contraption, the fourth international, which is meant to fight not for the socialist revolution but for bourgeois democracy, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, for the perpetuation of exploitation and oppression. He covers himself with the name of Lenin—whom he fought most of his life and with whom he never fully agreed—he boasts of carrying forward the traditions of Lenin, but he does it in order to abuse the great genius who is continuing the work of Lenin at the present epoch and who is leading the Soviet masses from victory to victory, Joseph Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let no one think that Trotskyism is mere disagreement with one or the other policy of the Soviet government, that it is mere propaganda. To be sure, Trotskyism uses the weapon of propaganda, the “arms of criticism”, but only to pass to “criticism by arms”, to the attempts at overthrowing the Soviet system by armed force. The murdering of Kirov is only an instance of what methods of struggle Trotskyism would like to develop, to assume gigantic proportions.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is precisely for the purpose of bringing about such “developments” that the “Fourth International” is being attempted. “Is it possible to remove the bureaucracy ‘peacefully’?” asks Trotsky in &#039;&#039;The Soviet Union and the Fourth International&#039;&#039;(Pioneer Publishers, N.Y., English edition, 1934)—and the answer is negative. Of course Trotsky does not say that he wishes to destroy the Soviet Union. The Trotskyites speak about the “bureaucracy” only, &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, about the Communist Party and the apparatus of the Soviet State. But it is quite clear from the outset that when these are removed, the Soviet system is overthrown. Trotsky advocates the formation in the U.S.S.R. of a party to accomplish this task. “The fundamental historic task,” he says, “is to create the revolutionary party in the U.S.S.R. from among the healthy elements of the old party and from among the youth.” (&#039;&#039;Ibid.&#039;&#039;, p. 24.) This party, which Trotsky calls “revolutionary” and composed of “healthy elements” in the same way as Hitler calls &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039;party “revolutionary” and “full of Germanic vigor”, is to wrest power &#039;&#039;not by the instrumentality of the existing Communist Party or the Soviet State institutions&#039;&#039;. “After the experiences of the last few years, it would be childish to suppose that the Stalinist bureaucracy can be removed by means of a Party or Soviet congress,” says Trotsky (p. 24). “No normal ‘constitutional’ ways remain to remove the ruling clique” (p. 25), &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, to remove the organization of power of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky advances his thesis frankly: “The bureaucracy [State organization of the proletariat and the collective peasantry.—M. J. O.] can be compelled to yield power into the hands of the proletarian vanguard [the counter-revolutionary plotters and murderers of the Nikolaiev type.—M. J. O.] only by &#039;&#039;force&#039;&#039;.” (p. 25, emphasis by Trotsky.)&lt;br /&gt;
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Does Trotsky envisage civil war? He prefers to call it by another name. He prefers to fire his followers by picturing a situation where they are so strong that “the Stalinist [Party and State] apparatus will remain suspended in mid-air”,—but he is at the same time very explicit. “Should it (the apparatus) still attempt to resist, it will then be necessary to apply against it not the measure of civil war, but rather measures of police character;” &#039;&#039;i.e.&#039;&#039;, clubs, guns, gas bombs. But do not think that Trotsky shrinks before an armed uprising against the Soviet government. He says that an armed uprising is justified. “In any case what would be involved is not an armed insurrection against the dictatorship of the proletariat but the removal of a malignant growth upon it” (p. 25). Trotsky would have us believe that an uprising of counter-revolutionists—which by the nature of things must be assisted by the former landlords, manufacturers, kulaks and the officials of the tsar’s government—would not be an uprising against the dictatorship of the proletariat but the removal of what he chooses to call “a malignant growth” (he called &#039;&#039;Lenin&#039;&#039; “the leader of the reactionary wing” of the Social-Democratic Party). But not much acumen is needed to understand that an armed uprising against the Communist Party and the Soviet State would return the former exploiters to power. The Russian fascists in America also say that they want to preserve the Soviet system. They deserve as much credence as Trotsky.&lt;br /&gt;
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A lurid light is thrown on Trotskyism by its open admission that it hopes for &#039;&#039;war&#039;&#039; to facilitate the overthrow of the Soviets. Which is closer, asks Trotsky in a delirium of wish-fulfillment: the collapse of the Soviet system by itself, &#039;&#039;without&#039;&#039; the action of the new party, or the emergence of such a party? Neither, would a reasonable human being say, because there is no danger of a collapse of the Soviet system and no prospect of the counter-revolution ever having a chance to build a mass party in the U.S.S.R. But here Trotsky reveals another angle of his outlook: “A major historical test—&#039;&#039;which may be a war&#039;&#039;—will determine the relation of forces” (p. 26). So this is it. The Trotskyites hope for an imperialist war to help the counter-revolution overthrow the Soviet system. They try to organize the “Fourth International” to “await a clear call” for an attack on the Soviet Union. War may be the occasion.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nowhere have the Trotskyites revealed themselves to such an extent.&lt;br /&gt;
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Trotskyism does the same work as the open counter-revolutionists. In substance there is no difference between Trotskyism and Hearstism. But Trotskyism represents that peculiar danger that it is cloaked as “Left” Communism and that it emits phrases about “world revolution”.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capitalists need various classes of agents to delude the workers, to destroy their unity, to divert them from the path of revolutionary struggle. The capitalists have their Roosevelts with New-Deal phraseology and “social-security” demagogy. Where the workers are no more willing to accept the Roosevelt demagogy, the capitalists have another agent, the union bureaucracy which pretends to speak in the name of labor while delivering the workers to their exploiters. Where the workers have advanced still further, there are the Socialist leaders, who, in the name of “democracy” (bourgeois-democracy, exploiters’ democracy), keep the workers from joining the Communist Party and engaging in revolutionary struggles against capitalism for Soviet Power. Whenever the workers are so radicalized that even the socialist deception can no more keep them chained to the chariot of capitalism, the latter has another agent—Trotsky and the Trotskyites. These come in the name of “Left” Communism. They come as the “true Leninists”. But the effect of their activities is the same—aid to capitalism by undermining all that is really revolutionary, by disheartening the workers, by spreading among them a panic in relation to the Soviet Union, by making them join the Musteites and similar elements—under the banner of the counter-revolutionary “fourth international”.&lt;br /&gt;
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Trotskyism does not sink roots into the masses of the proletariat, but its danger for the Communist Party, and particularly for those petty-bourgeois intellectuals who are moving towards the Communist Party in the capitalist countries, must not be underestimated. It is the petty bourgeoisie that is, through Trotskyism, trying to disorganize and demoralize the revolutionary forces that are mobilizing against capitalism. The petty-bourgeois elements, says Lenin, “surround the proletariat on all sides . . . . they saturate it . . . . they demoralize it, they continually make it relapse into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disruption, individualism, transition from enthusiasm to dismay”. This is true about the capitalist countries no less than it was true about the Soviet Republic in 1920. The petty bourgeoisie is surrounding the proletariat on every side, and Trotskyism is being continually regenerated as the expression of this particular brand of counter-revolution. It is only natural that the intellectuals, hailing from the petty bourgeoisie, should be particularly exposed to the danger of Trotskyism. The lot of the intellectuals in the present crisis is far from enviable. Hundreds of thousands have been thrown out of work. Scientific, educational and cultural activities have been crippled. The intellectual youth has almost no hope of getting work that would enable it to develop its talents and to lead a comfortable existence. The intellectuals are becoming radicalized. But, being petty-bourgeois, many of them have an aversion for the Communist Party, for its theory and practice. Here Trotskyism comes in handy. It gives the intellectuals of this kind a “way out”. It makes it possible for them to pose as Communists without participating in the class struggle. It gives them the opportunity to pose as “critics” of the Communist Party “from the Left” and thus satisfy their desire to appear “radical”. It gives them a platform from which to &#039;&#039;fight&#039;&#039; the Communist Party and thus satisfy their petty-bourgeois inclinations—without at the same time appearing reactionary. It supplies them with material for the mouthing of phrases about Lenin and Stalin, the Communist International and the world revolution while sticking deeply in the petty-bourgeois mud. It makes them believe they are “Communists” while it caters to all their petty-bourgeois hatred for proletarian discipline and proletarian straightforward revolutionary action.&lt;br /&gt;
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And this is precisely the reason why Trotskyism must be branded as the enemy of the working class, why Trotskyism should be shunned by anybody who has sympathy for the revolutionary movement of the exploited and oppressed the world over.&lt;br /&gt;
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It must be the supreme task of the toilers in every country to build the Communist Party, as section of the Communist International, and to follow its line of struggle against capitalism and for the Soviet System.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Moissaye Joseph Olgin]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about revisionism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
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		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Fundamental_problems_of_marxism&amp;diff=76694</id>
		<title>Library:Fundamental problems of marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Fundamental_problems_of_marxism&amp;diff=76694"/>
		<updated>2024-10-16T14:52:42Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Fix title being with uppercase T&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library_work|title=Fundamental Problems of Marxism|author=Georgi Plekhanov|source=https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1907/fundamental-problems.htm}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxism is an integral world-outlook. Expressed in a nutshell, it is &#039;&#039;contemporary materialism&#039;&#039;, at present the highest stage in the development of that &#039;&#039;view upon the world&#039;&#039; whose foundations were laid down in ancient Greece by Democritus, &amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[1]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and in part by the Ionian thinkers who preceded that philosopher. What was known as &#039;&#039;hylozoism&#039;&#039; was nothing but a naive &#039;&#039;materialism&#039;&#039;. It is to Karl Marx and his friend Frederick Engels that the main credit for the development of present-day materialism must no doubt go. The historical and economic aspects of this world-outlook, that is, what is known as &#039;&#039;historical materialism&#039;&#039; and the closely related sum of views on the &#039;&#039;tasks, method and categories of political economy, and on the economic development of society, especially capitalist society&#039;&#039;, are in their fundamentals almost entirely the work of Marx and Engels. That which was introduced into these fields by their &#039;&#039;precursors&#039;&#039; should be regarded merely as the preparatory work of amassing material, often copious and valuable, but not as yet systematized or illuminated by a single fundamental idea, and therefore not appraised or utilized in its real significance. What Marx and Engels’ &#039;&#039;followers&#039;&#039; in Europe and America have done in these fields is merely a more or less successful elaboration of specific problems, sometimes, it is true, of the utmost importance. That is why the term ‘Marxism’ is often used to signify only these two aspects of the present-day materialist world-outlook not only among the ‘general public’, who have not yet achieved a deep understanding of philosophical theories, but even among people, both in Russia and the entire civilized world, who consider themselves faithful followers of Marx and Engels. In such cases these two aspects are looked upon as something independent of ‘philosophical materialism’, and at times as something almost opposed to it. &amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[2]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; And since these two aspects cannot but hang in mid-air when they are torn out of the general context of cognate views constituting their theoretical foundation, those who perform that tearing-out operation naturally feel an urge to ‘substantiate Marxism’ anew by joining it – again quite arbitrarily and most frequently under the influence of philosophical moods prevalent at the time among &#039;&#039;ideologists of the bourgeoisie –&#039;&#039; with some philosopher or another: with Kant, Mach, Avenarius or Ostwald, and of late with Joseph Dietzgen. &amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[3]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; True, the philosophical views of J Dietzgen have arisen quite independently of bourgeois influences and are in considerable measure related to the philosophical views of Marx and Engels. The latter views, however, possess an incomparably more consistent and rich content, and for that reason alone cannot be &#039;&#039;supplemented&#039;&#039; by Dietzgen’s teachings but can only be &#039;&#039;popularized&#039;&#039; by them. No attempts have yet been made to ‘supplement Marx’ with Thomas Aquinas. It is however quite feasible that, despite the Pope’s recent encyclical against the Modernists, the Catholic world will at some time produce from its midst a thinker capable of performing this feat in the sphere of theory. &amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[4]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== I. Philosophical writings of Marx and Engels ==&lt;br /&gt;
The excuse ordinarily put forward for “supplementing” Marxism by one philosophy or another is that Marx and Engels never expounded their own philosophical views. This is not a very convincing reason, and even if the statement were well-founded, that would not be a justification for replacing the philosophical views of Marx and Engels by those of the first-comer, who in many respects regards matters from an entirely different angle. But the actual fact is that we have at our disposal data entirely sufficient to give us an accurate notion of Marx’s and Engels’ philosophical views.* &lt;br /&gt;
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The definitive form assumed by these views was fully expounded, although in a somewhat polemical way, in the first part of Engel’s book, &#039;&#039;Herrn Eugen Duhrings Umwalzung der Wissenchaft&#039;&#039; (known for short as &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;), of which several Russian translations exist. In the same author’s famous essay, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der \lassichen deutschen Philosophie&#039;&#039; (which I have myself translated into Russian, supplying a preface and explanatory notes), the ideas that form the philosophical basis of Marxism are set forth in a categorical manner. A short but brilliant account of the same views, as related to agnosticism, is given by Engels in his preface to the English translation of part of Anti-Duhring entitled Socialism Utopian and Scientific, As regards Marx, I may mention as of great importance to the understanding of the philosophical aspects of his teaching: first of all, his description of dialectical materialism as contrasted with Hegel’s dialectic idealism in the preface to the second edition of the first volume of Capital^ secondly, to various remarks made in the course of the same volume. Certain pages of Marx’s &#039;&#039;Misère de la philosophie&#039;&#039; are also of great importance in this connection.^ Finally, the general development of the philosophical ideas of Marx and Engels can be clearly deduced from a study of their early writings, which have recently been published by F. Mehring under the tide Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle (Stuttgart, 1902). &lt;br /&gt;
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In his doctorial dissertation, entitled &#039;&#039;Differenz der demokritischen und epifureischen Naturphilosophie&#039;&#039;, written when he was twenty-three years of age, Marx still discloses himself as an idealist of the Hegelian school; and the same remark applies to some of the articles reproduced by Mehring in the first volume of the &#039;&#039;Nachlass&#039;&#039;. But in the articles from the “Deutsch- Französische Jahrbücher” reproduced in the same volume, Marx has already adopted Feuerbach’s humanist standpoint. So, at this date, has Engels, who collaborates with Marx in the “Jahrbücher.” In the work entided Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der hritischen Kritik, published in 1845, and re-issued in the second volume of the Nachlass, Marx and Engels have made some important strides in the development of Feuerbach’s philosophy. The direction in which they have been moving is shown by the eleven &#039;&#039;Theses on Feuerbach&#039;&#039; drafted by Marx in the spring of 1845 and published by Engels as an appendix to the before-mentioned essay on &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;. In a word, there is no lack of materials to throw light upon Marx’s and Engels’ philosophy, but those who want to use them must know how to do so, must be able to understand them. Now, present-day readers are not in a position to understand them, and, therefore, cannot make use of them. &lt;br /&gt;
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Why is this? For various reasons. One of the chief reasons is that nowadays people are ill-informed : first, concerning the Hegelian philosophy, without a knowledge of which it is difficult to grasp Marx’s method; and, secondly, concerning the history of materialism, in default of a knowledge of which it is impossible to understand Feuerbach’s teachings clearly. Feuerbach, however, was in philosophy the immediate predecessor of Marx; and from Feuerbach was derived, in great measure, the philosophical foundation of Marx’s and Engels’ conception of the universe. &lt;br /&gt;
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Generally speaking, Feuerbach’s “humanism” is portrayed as a very confused and vague doctrine. F. A. Lange, who has done so much to spread among the general public and the scientific world a completely erroneous idea of the essence of materialism and its history, refuses to regard Feuerbach’s humanism as a materialist doctrine. Lange’s example has been fob lowed by almost all subsequent writers on Feuerbach, whether in Russia or elsewhere. P. A. Berlin, who describes Feuerbach’s humanism as a sort of “bastard” materialism, has obviously been influenced by Lange. I must admit that I do not clearly understand what F. Mehring thinks about this question, although Mehring is the chief and perhaps the only expert in philosophy among the German social democrats. On the other hand, it is obvious that Marx and Engels regarded Feuerbach as a materialist. It is true that Engels drew attention to Feuerbach’s inconsistencies; but this did not prevent Engels from recognizing that the basic principles of Feuerbach’s philosophy were purely materialist. Nor could any one who has taken the trouble to make a careful study of Feuerbach’s teachings fail to hold that view.&lt;br /&gt;
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== II. Feuerbach and Marx ==&lt;br /&gt;
When I say this, I am aware that I am likely to surprise many of my readers. I shall not let that probability alarm me, for I agree with the ancient thinker who said that astonishment was the mother of philosophy. But to help my readers to overcome their astonishment and to advance a stage, I shall recommend them, above all, to ask themselves what it was that Feuerbach meant when, giving a short but characteristic sketch of his philosophical curriculum vitae, he wrote: “God was my first thought; reason, my second; and man, my third and last.” I contend that, beyond question, the problem is solved by three very significant utterances by Feuerbach. To begin with, he writes : “In the controversy between materialism and spiritualism, the affair turns . . . upon the human head. . . . As soon as we have ascertained the nature of the matter out of which the brain is made, we shall speedily attain clear views, likewise, as to all other kinds of matter, as to matter in general.” Elsewhere, he declares that his anthropology, that is to say his humanism, means only this, that man regards his own essence, his own mind, as God. He goes on to say that Descartes himself was not alien to such an anthropological outlook. What does all this mean? It means that Feuerbach took “man” as the starting point of his philosophical reasoning solely because he hoped, by setting out from man, to reach his goal sooner; and his goal was to give a sound idea of matter in general and of the relations between matter and “spirit.” Here, then, we have to do with a methodological procedure whose value was conditioned by the circumstances of time and place, that is to say by the methods of reasoning in vogue among the savants and the educated Germans, of that epoch; but its value did not in any way depend upon a particular conception of the universe. &lt;br /&gt;
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The previously quoted words concerning the “human head” show that for Feuerbach, at the time when he wrote, the question as to the nature of the substance out of which the brain is made had been settled in a purely materialist sense. The same solution of the question had been adopted by Marx and Engels. It became the foundation of their own philosophy, as can be seen clearly in the before-mentioned works by Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and Anti-Dühring, Let us proceed, therefore, to study this solution more closely, for in doing so we shall study the philosophical aspect of marxism. &lt;br /&gt;
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In an article published in 1842, entitled Vorlaufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie (an article which, as we have seen, exercised a great deal of influence upon Marx), Feuerbach declared that : “the true relation between thought and being may be expressed as follows : being is the subject, and thought the predicate. Thought is conditioned by being, not being by thought. Being is conditioned by itself, has its basis in itself.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Here we have a view of the relations between being and thought which was adopted by Marx and Engels and was by them made the foundation of their materialist conception of history. It was the most important outcome of the criticism of Hegelian idealism which, in its broad lines, had been made by Feuerbach himself. The general conclusions of that criticism can be summarised as follows: Feuerbach considered that the Hegelian philosophy had suppressed the contradiction between being and thought, a contradiction brought into striking relief by Kant. But, in Feuerbach’s opinion, it had only suppressed this contradiction by transferring the contradiction into the interior of one of the primary elements, namely thought. According to Hegel, thought is also being: “Thought is the subject; being is the predicate.” It follows that Hegel, and the idealists in general, only suppressed the contradiction by suppressing one of its constituent elements, by suppressing the being or the existence of matter, of nature. But the suppression of one of the constituent elements of the contradiction does not mean that the contradiction is solved. “Hegel’s doctrine that nature ‘is postulated’ by the idea, is nothing more than a translation into philosophical language of the theological doctrine according to which nature is created by God, material being by abstract or immaterial being.”t This does not apply only to the absolute idealism of Hegel. Kant’s transcendental idealism, according to which the outer world receives its laws from reason, instead of reason receiving its laws from the outer world, is closely akin to the theological conception according to which the divine reason dictates to the world the laws which regulate it.+ Idealism does not and cannot establish the unity of being and thought; on the con- trary, it ruptures that unity. The starting-point of the idealist philosophy (the ego as the basic philosophical principle) is utterly false. The starting-point of a true philosophy must not be the ego, but the ego and the tu, the “I” and the “you.” Only from this starting- point can we arrive at a sound understanding of the relations between thought and being, between subject and object. I am “I” for myself and simultaneously “you” for another person. I am at the same time subject and object. Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that “I” am not the abstract ego, the abstract being with which the idealist philosophy operates. I am a real being; my body is part of my essence; nay more, my body, considered as a whole, is my actual “self,” my true entity. What thinks is not the abstract being, but this real being, this body. Hence, in contradistinction to what the idealists contend, the real material being is the subject, and thought is the predicate. Herein we find the only possible solution of that contradiction between being and thought against which the waves of idealism beat in vain. This solution is not arrived at by suppressing one of the elements of the contradiction. Both elements are preserved and their true unity is made manifest. “That which for me, subjectively, is a purely spiritual, immaterial, non-sensible action, is in itself, objectively, a material, sensible action.” &lt;br /&gt;
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The reader should note that Feuerbach, when he says this, is drawing near to the outlook of Spinoza, whose philosophy he already regarded with considerable sympathy at a time when he himself had scarcely begun to break away from idealism, at the time, that is to say, when he wrote his history of modern philosophy. In 1843, in his Grundsdtze, he remarked with much acuteness that pantheism is a theological materialism, is a negation of theology, but a negation which still professes a theological standpoint. Spinoza’s inconsistency is manifested by the way in which he mixes up materialism with theology; but, this inconsistency notwithstanding, Spinoza was able to give “a sound exposition, subject to the limitations of his day, of the materialist conceptions of the modern age.” Thus Feuerbach calls Spinoza “the Moses of the modern free-thinkers and materialists.”* In 1847, Feuerbach asks : “What does Spinoza mean when he speaks (logically or metaphysically) of substance and (theologically) of God?” To this question Feuerbach answers, categorically : “Nothing else but nature.” According to Feuerbach, the main fault of Spinozism is tliat “in this philosophy the sensible, anti-theological essence of nature assumes the aspect of an abstract metaphysical being.” Spinoza has suppressed the dualism of God and nature, for he regards natural phenomena as the actions of God. But, for the very reason that in his view natural phenomena are the actions of God, God becomes for him a kind of being distinct from nature and one on which nature rests. God is for him subject, and nature is predicate. Philosophy, now that it has at length definitely emancipated itself from theological traditions, must rid itself of this grave defect in the Spinozist doctrine, sound though that doctrine is at bottom. “Away with this contradiction!” exclaims Feuerbach. “Not Deus sive natura, but Aut Deus aut natura. That is where the truth lies.”t &lt;br /&gt;
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Thus Feuerbach’s humanism is seen to be nothing else than Spinozism which has shed its theological lumber. This Spinozism, freed from its theological lumber by Feuerbach, was the philosophy which Marx and Engels adopted when they broke away from idealism. &lt;br /&gt;
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But the freeing of Spinozism from its theological lumber implied the disclosure of the true materialist content of Spinoza’s philosophy. Consequently, the Spinozism of Marx and Engels is materialism in its most modern form.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor is this all. Thought is not the cause of being, but its consequence, or, to put the matter more precisely, its property or quality. Feuerbach said, “Folge und Eigenschaft” — its consequence and its property or quality. I feel and I think, not as a subject opposed to an object, but as a subject-object, as a real material being. And for me the object is, not only the thing which I perceive, but also the foundation, the indispensable prerequisite, of my perception. The outer world, the objective world, does not exist only outside me, but also within me, inside my own skin.&#039;^ Man is only a part of nature, a part of being; that is why there can be no contradiction between his thought and his being. Space and time do not exist only as forms of thought. They are just as much forms of being. They arc forms of my contemplation. But they are this solely for the reason that I am myself a being that lives in time and space, and because I only perceive and feel in so far as I am such a being. Speaking generally, the laws of being are also the laws of thought. That was how Feuerbach put the matter.* Engels said the same thing, though in other words, in his polemic against Diihring.*’ It is already obvious how much of Feuerbach’s philosophy enters into the constitution of the philosophy of Marx and Engels. &lt;br /&gt;
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If Marx began the elaboration of his materialist conception of history by a criticism of the Hegelian philosophy of right, he was only able to do so because Feuerbach had already completed his criticism of Hegel’s speculative philosophy. &lt;br /&gt;
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Even when criticising Feuerbach in the before-mentioned theses, Marx often enough develops and amplifies Feuerbach’s ideas. Here is an instance from the domain of “gnosiology” (epistemology, the theory of cognition). According to Feuerbach, man, before thinking about the object, experiences its action on himself, contemplates it, feels it. &lt;br /&gt;
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Marx has in view this idea of Feuerbach’s when he says : “The main defect of materialism, Feuerbach’s included, has hitherto been that it has only considered reality, the objective and sensible world, under the form of object, or under the form of contemplation, not as concrete human activity, not as a practical exercise, not subjectively.” It is this defect of materialism, says Marx, further, which explains why Feuerbach, in his book on the Essence of Christianity, regards only theoretical activity as genuinely human activity. In other words, Feuerbach emphasises the view that our ego cognises an object solely by exposing itself to the action of that object;* but Marx says that our ego cognises an object by reacting upon it. Marx’s view is absolutely sound. As Faust said: “In the beginning was the Deed.” No doubt, in defence of Feuerbach we may point out that, even in the process of our action upon objects, we only know their qualities in proportion as they, in their turn, act on us. In both cases, thought is preceded by sensation; in both cases, we begin by becoming aware of the qualities of objects, and not until after that do we think about them. Marx never denied this. For him, what was at issue was, not the undeniable fact that sensation precedes thought, but the fact that man is led to thought mainly by the sensations which he experiences in the course of his own action on the outer world. Since this action on the outer world is forced on him by the struggle for existence, the theory of cognition is, in Marx’s philosophical outlook, intimately connected with his materialist conception of history. It was with good reason that this same thinker who had formulated in opposition to Feuerbach the thesis we have just been discussing, wrote in the first volume of Capital : ‘&#039;By acting on nature outside himself, and changing it, man changes his own nature.” The innermost significance of this utterance is only disclosed in the light of the theory of cognition formulated by Marx. We shall see by-and-by how admirably that theory is confirmed by the history of civilisation, and also by linguistic science. It must, however, be admitted that Marx’s theory of cognition is directly derived from Feuerbach’s. If you like, we can even say that, strictly speaking, it is Feuerbach’s theory, brilliantly rectified and given a profounder meaning by Marx. &lt;br /&gt;
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Let me add, in passing, that this brilliant rectification was suggested by the spirit of the time. The inclination to contemplate the action and reaction between the object and the subject primarily from the point of view of the active part played by the subject, was the reflexion of the state of mind which animated society in the days when Marx and Engels were forming their outlook on the universe. The revolution of 1848 was close at hand. &lt;br /&gt;
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== III. Thinking and being in Feuerbach ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== IV. Emergence of historical materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== V. The materialist dialectic as method ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== VI. Productive forces and geography ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== VII. Role of relations of production ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== VIII. Base and culture ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== IX. Interaction of base and superstructure ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== X. Man and necessity in history ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== XI. Economic base and ideology ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== XII. Against one-sidedness and schematism ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== XIII. Psychology of the epoch ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== XIV. Class struggle and ideas ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== XV. Necessity and freedom ==&lt;br /&gt;
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== XVI. Necessity and revolution ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Georgi Plekhanov]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about philosophy]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Incomplete library works]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Fundamental_problems_of_marxism&amp;diff=76693</id>
		<title>Library:Fundamental problems of marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Fundamental_problems_of_marxism&amp;diff=76693"/>
		<updated>2024-10-16T14:52:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Add Library_work and Incomplete_library_works&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library_work|Title=Fundamental Problems of Marxism|author=Georgi Plekhanov|source=https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1907/fundamental-problems.htm}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxism is an integral world-outlook. Expressed in a nutshell, it is &#039;&#039;contemporary materialism&#039;&#039;, at present the highest stage in the development of that &#039;&#039;view upon the world&#039;&#039; whose foundations were laid down in ancient Greece by Democritus, &amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[1]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and in part by the Ionian thinkers who preceded that philosopher. What was known as &#039;&#039;hylozoism&#039;&#039; was nothing but a naive &#039;&#039;materialism&#039;&#039;. It is to Karl Marx and his friend Frederick Engels that the main credit for the development of present-day materialism must no doubt go. The historical and economic aspects of this world-outlook, that is, what is known as &#039;&#039;historical materialism&#039;&#039; and the closely related sum of views on the &#039;&#039;tasks, method and categories of political economy, and on the economic development of society, especially capitalist society&#039;&#039;, are in their fundamentals almost entirely the work of Marx and Engels. That which was introduced into these fields by their &#039;&#039;precursors&#039;&#039; should be regarded merely as the preparatory work of amassing material, often copious and valuable, but not as yet systematized or illuminated by a single fundamental idea, and therefore not appraised or utilized in its real significance. What Marx and Engels’ &#039;&#039;followers&#039;&#039; in Europe and America have done in these fields is merely a more or less successful elaboration of specific problems, sometimes, it is true, of the utmost importance. That is why the term ‘Marxism’ is often used to signify only these two aspects of the present-day materialist world-outlook not only among the ‘general public’, who have not yet achieved a deep understanding of philosophical theories, but even among people, both in Russia and the entire civilized world, who consider themselves faithful followers of Marx and Engels. In such cases these two aspects are looked upon as something independent of ‘philosophical materialism’, and at times as something almost opposed to it. &amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[2]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; And since these two aspects cannot but hang in mid-air when they are torn out of the general context of cognate views constituting their theoretical foundation, those who perform that tearing-out operation naturally feel an urge to ‘substantiate Marxism’ anew by joining it – again quite arbitrarily and most frequently under the influence of philosophical moods prevalent at the time among &#039;&#039;ideologists of the bourgeoisie –&#039;&#039; with some philosopher or another: with Kant, Mach, Avenarius or Ostwald, and of late with Joseph Dietzgen. &amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[3]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; True, the philosophical views of J Dietzgen have arisen quite independently of bourgeois influences and are in considerable measure related to the philosophical views of Marx and Engels. The latter views, however, possess an incomparably more consistent and rich content, and for that reason alone cannot be &#039;&#039;supplemented&#039;&#039; by Dietzgen’s teachings but can only be &#039;&#039;popularized&#039;&#039; by them. No attempts have yet been made to ‘supplement Marx’ with Thomas Aquinas. It is however quite feasible that, despite the Pope’s recent encyclical against the Modernists, the Catholic world will at some time produce from its midst a thinker capable of performing this feat in the sphere of theory. &amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[4]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== I. Philosophical writings of Marx and Engels ==&lt;br /&gt;
The excuse ordinarily put forward for “supplementing” Marxism by one philosophy or another is that Marx and Engels never expounded their own philosophical views. This is not a very convincing reason, and even if the statement were well-founded, that would not be a justification for replacing the philosophical views of Marx and Engels by those of the first-comer, who in many respects regards matters from an entirely different angle. But the actual fact is that we have at our disposal data entirely sufficient to give us an accurate notion of Marx’s and Engels’ philosophical views.* &lt;br /&gt;
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The definitive form assumed by these views was fully expounded, although in a somewhat polemical way, in the first part of Engel’s book, &#039;&#039;Herrn Eugen Duhrings Umwalzung der Wissenchaft&#039;&#039; (known for short as &#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;), of which several Russian translations exist. In the same author’s famous essay, &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der \lassichen deutschen Philosophie&#039;&#039; (which I have myself translated into Russian, supplying a preface and explanatory notes), the ideas that form the philosophical basis of Marxism are set forth in a categorical manner. A short but brilliant account of the same views, as related to agnosticism, is given by Engels in his preface to the English translation of part of Anti-Duhring entitled Socialism Utopian and Scientific, As regards Marx, I may mention as of great importance to the understanding of the philosophical aspects of his teaching: first of all, his description of dialectical materialism as contrasted with Hegel’s dialectic idealism in the preface to the second edition of the first volume of Capital^ secondly, to various remarks made in the course of the same volume. Certain pages of Marx’s &#039;&#039;Misère de la philosophie&#039;&#039; are also of great importance in this connection.^ Finally, the general development of the philosophical ideas of Marx and Engels can be clearly deduced from a study of their early writings, which have recently been published by F. Mehring under the tide Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle (Stuttgart, 1902). &lt;br /&gt;
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In his doctorial dissertation, entitled &#039;&#039;Differenz der demokritischen und epifureischen Naturphilosophie&#039;&#039;, written when he was twenty-three years of age, Marx still discloses himself as an idealist of the Hegelian school; and the same remark applies to some of the articles reproduced by Mehring in the first volume of the &#039;&#039;Nachlass&#039;&#039;. But in the articles from the “Deutsch- Französische Jahrbücher” reproduced in the same volume, Marx has already adopted Feuerbach’s humanist standpoint. So, at this date, has Engels, who collaborates with Marx in the “Jahrbücher.” In the work entided Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der hritischen Kritik, published in 1845, and re-issued in the second volume of the Nachlass, Marx and Engels have made some important strides in the development of Feuerbach’s philosophy. The direction in which they have been moving is shown by the eleven &#039;&#039;Theses on Feuerbach&#039;&#039; drafted by Marx in the spring of 1845 and published by Engels as an appendix to the before-mentioned essay on &#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach&#039;&#039;. In a word, there is no lack of materials to throw light upon Marx’s and Engels’ philosophy, but those who want to use them must know how to do so, must be able to understand them. Now, present-day readers are not in a position to understand them, and, therefore, cannot make use of them. &lt;br /&gt;
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Why is this? For various reasons. One of the chief reasons is that nowadays people are ill-informed : first, concerning the Hegelian philosophy, without a knowledge of which it is difficult to grasp Marx’s method; and, secondly, concerning the history of materialism, in default of a knowledge of which it is impossible to understand Feuerbach’s teachings clearly. Feuerbach, however, was in philosophy the immediate predecessor of Marx; and from Feuerbach was derived, in great measure, the philosophical foundation of Marx’s and Engels’ conception of the universe. &lt;br /&gt;
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Generally speaking, Feuerbach’s “humanism” is portrayed as a very confused and vague doctrine. F. A. Lange, who has done so much to spread among the general public and the scientific world a completely erroneous idea of the essence of materialism and its history, refuses to regard Feuerbach’s humanism as a materialist doctrine. Lange’s example has been fob lowed by almost all subsequent writers on Feuerbach, whether in Russia or elsewhere. P. A. Berlin, who describes Feuerbach’s humanism as a sort of “bastard” materialism, has obviously been influenced by Lange. I must admit that I do not clearly understand what F. Mehring thinks about this question, although Mehring is the chief and perhaps the only expert in philosophy among the German social democrats. On the other hand, it is obvious that Marx and Engels regarded Feuerbach as a materialist. It is true that Engels drew attention to Feuerbach’s inconsistencies; but this did not prevent Engels from recognizing that the basic principles of Feuerbach’s philosophy were purely materialist. Nor could any one who has taken the trouble to make a careful study of Feuerbach’s teachings fail to hold that view.&lt;br /&gt;
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== II. Feuerbach and Marx ==&lt;br /&gt;
When I say this, I am aware that I am likely to surprise many of my readers. I shall not let that probability alarm me, for I agree with the ancient thinker who said that astonishment was the mother of philosophy. But to help my readers to overcome their astonishment and to advance a stage, I shall recommend them, above all, to ask themselves what it was that Feuerbach meant when, giving a short but characteristic sketch of his philosophical curriculum vitae, he wrote: “God was my first thought; reason, my second; and man, my third and last.” I contend that, beyond question, the problem is solved by three very significant utterances by Feuerbach. To begin with, he writes : “In the controversy between materialism and spiritualism, the affair turns . . . upon the human head. . . . As soon as we have ascertained the nature of the matter out of which the brain is made, we shall speedily attain clear views, likewise, as to all other kinds of matter, as to matter in general.” Elsewhere, he declares that his anthropology, that is to say his humanism, means only this, that man regards his own essence, his own mind, as God. He goes on to say that Descartes himself was not alien to such an anthropological outlook. What does all this mean? It means that Feuerbach took “man” as the starting point of his philosophical reasoning solely because he hoped, by setting out from man, to reach his goal sooner; and his goal was to give a sound idea of matter in general and of the relations between matter and “spirit.” Here, then, we have to do with a methodological procedure whose value was conditioned by the circumstances of time and place, that is to say by the methods of reasoning in vogue among the savants and the educated Germans, of that epoch; but its value did not in any way depend upon a particular conception of the universe. &lt;br /&gt;
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The previously quoted words concerning the “human head” show that for Feuerbach, at the time when he wrote, the question as to the nature of the substance out of which the brain is made had been settled in a purely materialist sense. The same solution of the question had been adopted by Marx and Engels. It became the foundation of their own philosophy, as can be seen clearly in the before-mentioned works by Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and Anti-Dühring, Let us proceed, therefore, to study this solution more closely, for in doing so we shall study the philosophical aspect of marxism. &lt;br /&gt;
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In an article published in 1842, entitled Vorlaufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie (an article which, as we have seen, exercised a great deal of influence upon Marx), Feuerbach declared that : “the true relation between thought and being may be expressed as follows : being is the subject, and thought the predicate. Thought is conditioned by being, not being by thought. Being is conditioned by itself, has its basis in itself.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Here we have a view of the relations between being and thought which was adopted by Marx and Engels and was by them made the foundation of their materialist conception of history. It was the most important outcome of the criticism of Hegelian idealism which, in its broad lines, had been made by Feuerbach himself. The general conclusions of that criticism can be summarised as follows: Feuerbach considered that the Hegelian philosophy had suppressed the contradiction between being and thought, a contradiction brought into striking relief by Kant. But, in Feuerbach’s opinion, it had only suppressed this contradiction by transferring the contradiction into the interior of one of the primary elements, namely thought. According to Hegel, thought is also being: “Thought is the subject; being is the predicate.” It follows that Hegel, and the idealists in general, only suppressed the contradiction by suppressing one of its constituent elements, by suppressing the being or the existence of matter, of nature. But the suppression of one of the constituent elements of the contradiction does not mean that the contradiction is solved. “Hegel’s doctrine that nature ‘is postulated’ by the idea, is nothing more than a translation into philosophical language of the theological doctrine according to which nature is created by God, material being by abstract or immaterial being.”t This does not apply only to the absolute idealism of Hegel. Kant’s transcendental idealism, according to which the outer world receives its laws from reason, instead of reason receiving its laws from the outer world, is closely akin to the theological conception according to which the divine reason dictates to the world the laws which regulate it.+ Idealism does not and cannot establish the unity of being and thought; on the con- trary, it ruptures that unity. The starting-point of the idealist philosophy (the ego as the basic philosophical principle) is utterly false. The starting-point of a true philosophy must not be the ego, but the ego and the tu, the “I” and the “you.” Only from this starting- point can we arrive at a sound understanding of the relations between thought and being, between subject and object. I am “I” for myself and simultaneously “you” for another person. I am at the same time subject and object. Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that “I” am not the abstract ego, the abstract being with which the idealist philosophy operates. I am a real being; my body is part of my essence; nay more, my body, considered as a whole, is my actual “self,” my true entity. What thinks is not the abstract being, but this real being, this body. Hence, in contradistinction to what the idealists contend, the real material being is the subject, and thought is the predicate. Herein we find the only possible solution of that contradiction between being and thought against which the waves of idealism beat in vain. This solution is not arrived at by suppressing one of the elements of the contradiction. Both elements are preserved and their true unity is made manifest. “That which for me, subjectively, is a purely spiritual, immaterial, non-sensible action, is in itself, objectively, a material, sensible action.” &lt;br /&gt;
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The reader should note that Feuerbach, when he says this, is drawing near to the outlook of Spinoza, whose philosophy he already regarded with considerable sympathy at a time when he himself had scarcely begun to break away from idealism, at the time, that is to say, when he wrote his history of modern philosophy. In 1843, in his Grundsdtze, he remarked with much acuteness that pantheism is a theological materialism, is a negation of theology, but a negation which still professes a theological standpoint. Spinoza’s inconsistency is manifested by the way in which he mixes up materialism with theology; but, this inconsistency notwithstanding, Spinoza was able to give “a sound exposition, subject to the limitations of his day, of the materialist conceptions of the modern age.” Thus Feuerbach calls Spinoza “the Moses of the modern free-thinkers and materialists.”* In 1847, Feuerbach asks : “What does Spinoza mean when he speaks (logically or metaphysically) of substance and (theologically) of God?” To this question Feuerbach answers, categorically : “Nothing else but nature.” According to Feuerbach, the main fault of Spinozism is tliat “in this philosophy the sensible, anti-theological essence of nature assumes the aspect of an abstract metaphysical being.” Spinoza has suppressed the dualism of God and nature, for he regards natural phenomena as the actions of God. But, for the very reason that in his view natural phenomena are the actions of God, God becomes for him a kind of being distinct from nature and one on which nature rests. God is for him subject, and nature is predicate. Philosophy, now that it has at length definitely emancipated itself from theological traditions, must rid itself of this grave defect in the Spinozist doctrine, sound though that doctrine is at bottom. “Away with this contradiction!” exclaims Feuerbach. “Not Deus sive natura, but Aut Deus aut natura. That is where the truth lies.”t &lt;br /&gt;
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Thus Feuerbach’s humanism is seen to be nothing else than Spinozism which has shed its theological lumber. This Spinozism, freed from its theological lumber by Feuerbach, was the philosophy which Marx and Engels adopted when they broke away from idealism. &lt;br /&gt;
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But the freeing of Spinozism from its theological lumber implied the disclosure of the true materialist content of Spinoza’s philosophy. Consequently, the Spinozism of Marx and Engels is materialism in its most modern form.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor is this all. Thought is not the cause of being, but its consequence, or, to put the matter more precisely, its property or quality. Feuerbach said, “Folge und Eigenschaft” — its consequence and its property or quality. I feel and I think, not as a subject opposed to an object, but as a subject-object, as a real material being. And for me the object is, not only the thing which I perceive, but also the foundation, the indispensable prerequisite, of my perception. The outer world, the objective world, does not exist only outside me, but also within me, inside my own skin.&#039;^ Man is only a part of nature, a part of being; that is why there can be no contradiction between his thought and his being. Space and time do not exist only as forms of thought. They are just as much forms of being. They arc forms of my contemplation. But they are this solely for the reason that I am myself a being that lives in time and space, and because I only perceive and feel in so far as I am such a being. Speaking generally, the laws of being are also the laws of thought. That was how Feuerbach put the matter.* Engels said the same thing, though in other words, in his polemic against Diihring.*’ It is already obvious how much of Feuerbach’s philosophy enters into the constitution of the philosophy of Marx and Engels. &lt;br /&gt;
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If Marx began the elaboration of his materialist conception of history by a criticism of the Hegelian philosophy of right, he was only able to do so because Feuerbach had already completed his criticism of Hegel’s speculative philosophy. &lt;br /&gt;
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Even when criticising Feuerbach in the before-mentioned theses, Marx often enough develops and amplifies Feuerbach’s ideas. Here is an instance from the domain of “gnosiology” (epistemology, the theory of cognition). According to Feuerbach, man, before thinking about the object, experiences its action on himself, contemplates it, feels it. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx has in view this idea of Feuerbach’s when he says : “The main defect of materialism, Feuerbach’s included, has hitherto been that it has only considered reality, the objective and sensible world, under the form of object, or under the form of contemplation, not as concrete human activity, not as a practical exercise, not subjectively.” It is this defect of materialism, says Marx, further, which explains why Feuerbach, in his book on the Essence of Christianity, regards only theoretical activity as genuinely human activity. In other words, Feuerbach emphasises the view that our ego cognises an object solely by exposing itself to the action of that object;* but Marx says that our ego cognises an object by reacting upon it. Marx’s view is absolutely sound. As Faust said: “In the beginning was the Deed.” No doubt, in defence of Feuerbach we may point out that, even in the process of our action upon objects, we only know their qualities in proportion as they, in their turn, act on us. In both cases, thought is preceded by sensation; in both cases, we begin by becoming aware of the qualities of objects, and not until after that do we think about them. Marx never denied this. For him, what was at issue was, not the undeniable fact that sensation precedes thought, but the fact that man is led to thought mainly by the sensations which he experiences in the course of his own action on the outer world. Since this action on the outer world is forced on him by the struggle for existence, the theory of cognition is, in Marx’s philosophical outlook, intimately connected with his materialist conception of history. It was with good reason that this same thinker who had formulated in opposition to Feuerbach the thesis we have just been discussing, wrote in the first volume of Capital : ‘&#039;By acting on nature outside himself, and changing it, man changes his own nature.” The innermost significance of this utterance is only disclosed in the light of the theory of cognition formulated by Marx. We shall see by-and-by how admirably that theory is confirmed by the history of civilisation, and also by linguistic science. It must, however, be admitted that Marx’s theory of cognition is directly derived from Feuerbach’s. If you like, we can even say that, strictly speaking, it is Feuerbach’s theory, brilliantly rectified and given a profounder meaning by Marx. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let me add, in passing, that this brilliant rectification was suggested by the spirit of the time. The inclination to contemplate the action and reaction between the object and the subject primarily from the point of view of the active part played by the subject, was the reflexion of the state of mind which animated society in the days when Marx and Engels were forming their outlook on the universe. The revolution of 1848 was close at hand. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== III. Thinking and being in Feuerbach ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== IV. Emergence of historical materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== V. The materialist dialectic as method ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VI. Productive forces and geography ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VII. Role of relations of production ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VIII. Base and culture ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== IX. Interaction of base and superstructure ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== X. Man and necessity in history ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== XI. Economic base and ideology ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== XII. Against one-sidedness and schematism ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== XIII. Psychology of the epoch ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== XIV. Class struggle and ideas ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== XV. Necessity and freedom ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== XVI. Necessity and revolution ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Georgi Plekhanov]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about philosophy]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Incomplete library works]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Soviet_Democracy&amp;diff=76609</id>
		<title>Library:Soviet Democracy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Soviet_Democracy&amp;diff=76609"/>
		<updated>2024-10-12T17:32:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Import changes from EPUB&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox library work|title=Soviet Democracy|author=Pat Sloan|published_date=1937|type=Book|source=|pdf=https://ia601903.us.archive.org/34/items/sovietdemocracy1937/sovietdemocracy1937.pdf}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Introduction: Democracy and Dictatorship ==&lt;br /&gt;
A very great deal is being said and written nowadays about democracy and dictatorship. We repeatedly hear it said that democracy must be defended; and as an example of the kind of dictatorship of which we must beware the Soviet Union is often quoted. And yet, at the same time as this Soviet Union is described as a dictatorship, well-known people of different political views make statements which suggest that, in the Soviet Union to-day, there exists a system of government which possesses all the essential features of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perhaps the most popular definition of democracy is that of Abraham Lincoln, who described it as “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” And this is how the well-known students of public administration, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, write about the Soviet Union:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consist of a Government and a people confronting each other, as all other great societies have hitherto been . . . the U.S.S.R. is a Government instrumented by all the adult inhabitants, organized in a varied array of collectives, having their several distinct functions, and among them carrying on, with a strangely new ‘political economy,’ nearly the whole wealth production the country” (&#039;&#039;Soviet Communism&#039;&#039;, p. 450).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If this description is correct, then the Soviet Union would appear to conform to the commonly accepted definition of democracy. But Sidney and Beatrice Webb are well-known Socialists, and therefore their description and conclusions might be prejudiced. It is, therefore, all the more significant that another writer, who has never had any sympathy with Socialism, but who knew Tsarist Russia, has recently confirmed the impression given by the Webbs. This is Sir Bernard Pares.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sir Bernard Pares lived in Tsarist Russia. After the setting up of the Soviet Government in November 1917 he worked in Russia for the British Government, which spent at that time about 00,000,000 on armed intervention in the hope of suppressing the Soviets. In 1919 Sir Bernard returned to England and set himself “to counter the propaganda for an application of the Bolshevist principles and program in this country” by giving “public lectures in almost every county of England” (&#039;&#039;Moscow Admits a Critic&#039;&#039;, p. 10).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only at the end of 1935 did Sir Bernard Pares again visit Russia, now the largest unit in a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On his return home he wrote a little book on his impressions, and in it he asked: “To what extent was the Government a foreigner to the people?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is his answer: “In the times of Tsardom I never failed to feel it’s almost complete isolation. The Ministers of those times, and more especially in the last days of Tsardom, were for the most part obviously haphazard choices from a very narrow and by no means distinguished circle. I was, of course, one of those who longed to see the Russian public, as a whole, make its way into the precincts of government, and in 1917 for a short time I had that satisfaction. But even then there was the much less definable barrier, though a very real one, which separated the Russian intelligentsia from the great mass of the Russian public. . . . I have to say that in Moscow to-day this frontier seems to have disappeared altogether, and in my visits to public offices and great institutions Government and people were of the same stock” (ibid., p. 35).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The contention of the Webbs, then, that “the U.S.S.R. is a Government instrumented by all the adult inhabitants” is confirmed by the observations of Sir Bernard Pares. Both these authorities agree that the Government of the U.S.S.R. is a Government of the people. Both agree, then, that the Government of the U.S.S.R. contains features which we associate, not with dictatorship, but with democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are sometimes inclined, I think unwisely, to treat democracy and dictatorship as two mutually exclusive terms, when in actual fact they may often represent two aspects of the same system of government. For example, if we turn to the &#039;&#039;Encyclopedia Britannica&#039;&#039;, to the article dealing with “Democracy,” we read: “Democracy is that form of government in which the people rules itself, either directly, as in the small city-states of Greece, or through representatives.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the same writer goes on to say this: “All the people in the city-state did not have the right to participate in government, but only those who were citizens, in the legal and original sense. Outside this charmed circle of the privileged were the slaves, who had no voice whatever in the making of the laws under which they toiled. They had no political and hardly any civil rights; they were not ‘people.’ Thus the democracy of the Greek city-state was in the strict sense no democracy at all.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Greek city-state has been cited time and again by historians as the birthplace of democracy. And yet, on reading the &#039;&#039;Encyclopedia Britannica&#039;&#039;, we find that in fact this was a democracy only for a “charmed circle of the privileged,” while the slaves, who did the work of the community, “had no voice whatever in the making of the laws under which they toiled.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The classical example of democracy was, then, a democracy only for certain people. For others, for those who did the hard work of the community, it was a dictatorship. At the very birthplace of democracy itself we find that democracy and dictatorship went hand in hand as two aspects of the same political system. To refer to the “democracy” of the Greek city-state without saying for whom this democracy existed is misleading. To describe the democracy of the Greek city-state without pointing out that it could only exist as a result of the toil of the slaves who “had no political and hardly any civil rights” falsifies the real history of the origin of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Democracy, then, from its origin, has not precluded the simultaneous existence of dictatorship. The essential question which must be asked, when social systems appear to include elements both of democracy and dictatorship, is, “for whom is there democracy?” and “over whom is there a dictatorship?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us turn to the modern world. The Soviet Union, we have said, is often described as a dictatorship. Yet eminent authorities, describing the Soviet system of government, ascribe to it characteristics which we generally associate with democracy. Can it be that here, too, there is democracy for one section of the community, but dictatorship over another?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The answer to this question is found in the first Soviet Constitution of 1918. In this Constitution the purpose of the Soviet State was described as being “the establishment (in the form of a strong Soviet Government) of the dictatorship of the urban and rural workers, combined with the poorer peasantry, to secure . . . the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and the establishment of Socialism.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The urban and rural workers, together with the poorer peasantry, made up over 95 percent of the population of Russia; so that this “dictatorship” was to be a government by the vast majority of the people—those who worked. In this way the Soviet State was the exact opposite of the Greek city-state, in which those who worked had no say in the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State introduced universal suffrage for working citizens, without property or residential qualifications, and irrespective of sex, nationality, or religion. The right to vote and to stand for election was made available to all such citizens from the age of eighteen upwards. But those who employed labour for profit were deprived of electoral rights. The Soviet State in this way provided a degree of democracy for the working people such as they do not enjoy in any other country even at the present time; but over the employers this democratic power exercised a dictatorship. The small circle of the employers of labour had no voice whatever in the making of the laws to which they were subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From its origin the Soviet State consciously embodied features of democracy and features of dictatorship. But the democracy was enjoyed by the vast majority of the population, and the dictatorship was over a small minority. At present I do not wish to go into the whys and wherefores of this, or into its rights and wrongs, but I just want to make one point absolutely clear: it is that democracy and dictatorship have never necessarily been mutually exclusive terms. To speak of “democracy” without saying for whom may be misleading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer to dictatorship without specifying who dictates to whom is also liable to cause misunderstanding. The Soviet State, set up in October 1917, professed to give full democratic rights to the vast majority of the people. Did it do this? In Part I of this book I shall give my answer to this question by describing the organization of Soviet life as I have lived it, from 1931 to 1936. Soviet life, to one who has been brought up in a country where the factories and the land, the mines and the shops, are private property, is a new life, a life which differs in a vast number of ways from that of other countries. And, having lived this life, I find I can only agree with the Webbs and with Sir Bernard Pares, and refer to it as essentially democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if this life is so different, what is it that makes it differ? In what way is the Soviet State organized so that it can give, to visitors from democratic Britain, this impression of unity between Government and people, of real democracy? In Part II we shall see how the Soviet State came into existence, we shall analyse its structure, and note how it has developed together with changes in social relationships within the country. The new life described in Part I is the essential product of the new State described in Part II.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if the Soviet State has provided democracy for the whole people, and democracy of a kind which even impresses those who come from democratic Britain, there may be something deficient, perhaps, in our own conceptions of democracy. For to us in Britain to-day it is hard to reconcile the idea of democracy with a dictatorship against any class, however small such a class may be. But perhaps our attitude to democracy is a little old-fashioned! Perhaps we overestimate the extent to which democracy exists in Britain to-day. Let us see in Part III!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, first of all, let us visit the Soviet Union as it exists to-day and see the new life that they are building. Then let us examine the framework within which this new life is developing, a framework which itself has to be altered as life demands. Then, when we know the Soviet Union, let us come back to our own country, to make comparisons, and to draw conclusions!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== A New Life ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Equality of Opportunity ===&lt;br /&gt;
A foreigner who takes up work in the U.S.S.R. is struck by many things. But, for an all-round view of what everyday life is like, few occupations could be better than that of a teacher. The foreign worker in the Soviet factory has the experience of being a wage-earner in a Soviet enterprise. But the worker in a Soviet school not only has this important experience, but also constant contact with the younger generation, with those who form the youngest and freshest ranks of Soviet citizens. For this reason I am glad that my first occupation in the U.S.S.R. was that of a teacher in a technical college, where I was able to see the working of a really democratic educational system at first hand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are two features of Soviet education which must strike every person who has taught outside the U.S.S.R. The first is that the students themselves appear to be drawn from people of every walk of life, who are always enabled to study if they have the necessary ability, without any economic burden through not earning a living while studying. The second feature is the extent to which the Soviet student, in school, technical college, and university, is trained to participate in the running of public affairs, starting in the school or university itself, and extending over every aspect of Soviet life. In the present chapter we shall deal with the first of these features of Soviet education. In the next chapter we shall consider the second.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A first decree of the Russian Soviet Government, adopted shortly after the seizure of power in 1917, dealt with education: “Every genuinely democratic power must, in the domain of education, in a country where ignorance and illiteracy reign supreme, make its first aim the struggle against this darkness . . . it must introduce universal, obligatory, and free tuition for all.” And, in the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in December 1936, we find the Right to Education being guaranteed to every citizen by “universal compulsory elementary education, free of charge, including higher education, by a system of State stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in higher schools, instruction in schools in the native language, and organization of free vocational, technical, and agronomic education for the toilers of the factories, State farms, machine and tractor stations, and collective farms.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The significance of these two declarations of Soviet educational policy can only be appreciated when certain basic facts are known. In pre-revolutionary Russia well over 80 percent of the adult population could not read or write. To-day the percentage of adult illiterates has been reduced to less than 10 percent. In the years before the Revolution the number of children attending school was round about 8 million, of whom only half a million received any secondary education. By 1934 the number of children attending school had reached 25 million—more than half the population of Great Britain, and over three times the pre-revolutionary figure. By the end of 1937 the number of children attending school is planned to reach 30 million.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This rapid extension of education has not taken place without the greatest difficulties. I remember how, between 1931 and 1934, there was the most acute shortage of accommodation for all educational institutions. In the towns the school-leaving age was being rapidly raised to seventeen and eighteen. But there were not enough schools: so the school buildings were used by two shifts of children, the younger ones in the first half of the day, the older ones in the later half. And as far as the higher educational institutions were concerned, I have taught university classes in the offices of State departments from six o’clock in the evening onwards because there was no accommodation available earlier in the day.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But that difficulty was temporary. In 1935 Moscow built over 70 new schools and another 120 in 1936. The shift system has now been abolished. Similar programs of school-building in other centres have put an end to the shift system there also. And to-day in the Soviet towns every child has schooling from the age of seven to the age of seventeen or eighteen, while an increasing number are attending kindergartens before they go to school, and attending the university or other higher educational institutions when they finish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet educational system is not yet complete. At present every town child has compulsory education from the age of seven to the age of seventeen. This is an achievement of the past few years. In the villages the school-leaving age is still round about fourteen, but certain villages have already advanced ahead of this. In Yasnaya Polyana, the one-time home of Tolstoy, a school has been established in his memory which provides secondary education for the children up to the age of seventeen. In Chapaevka, in the Ukraine, the collective farm has provided the necessary funds for the raising of the school-leaving age to seventeen. In the latter case all the children of the village continue their schooling to seventeen, and some children from neighbouring villages also obtain a secondary education there. I mention these two villages because I happen to have visited them. There are a continually growing number of such village secondary schools.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From a Soviet secondary school any pupil who has achieved the necessary standard can enter a university. And, as a university student, he or she receives a maintenance allowance from the State while studying. The Soviet student is paid, and higher education is open to all without being a financial burden. All students who finish a Soviet secondary education have the opportunity, according to their abilities, to proceed to a higher educational institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But all children in the U.S.S.R. do not yet enjoy a compulsory secondary education. If they finish a village school at fourteen, they may then go to some industrial training school in the town, or start to work in the collective farms. Also, in industry itself, there are many workers, many of them still in their twenties, who have never had schooling after the age of fourteen. The school-leaving age has been raised very rapidly in the past few years, and certain children have finished school at fourteen only to find that if they had been born two years later they would have had the opportunity to continue until the age of seventeen. Have they missed their chance?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In no country of the world are so many facilities available for those who have, for some reason or other, missed the opportunity for a secondary school education. Sometime before I left Moscow I remember reading that, in certain villages where the school-leaving age was being raised, those who had left schools at fourteen, three or four years before, wanted to continue their education and to obtain the secondary education which had just been introduced. So the schools readmitted these students, who were now able to benefit from the raising of the school-leaving age, though they had left school several years previously. In these particular villages certain individuals who had left school at fourteen returned at the age of seventeen and eighteen for another three or four years’ study!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But that is not all. For the system of adult education in the U.S.S.R. is to-day so widespread that it is possible for almost every working citizen to qualify, by means of free evening classes, for entry to the university. In the cases of older workers, who finished school at fourteen and then had a purely industrial training, it is possible to obtain a secondary education free of charge at evening classes at their place of work, and then to become full-time university students, drawing the usual State allowance while studying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I found that many of the students of English whom I was teaching in Moscow in 1932 had been recruited in this way. Young peasants from the villages, and young workers from the factories, who had left school at fourteen, had then continued to study in evening classes, had qualified for entrance to technical schools and universities, and were now full-time students, training to become teachers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I say that it is possible for “almost” every working citizen to qualify for a higher education in the U.S.S.R. to-day. The word “almost” is used because there still are, in certain exceptional cases, technical difficulties which may prevent certain individuals from obtaining the kind of training that they would like. I have in mind one particular example. This was a young-dining-car attendant on the Trans-Siberian Railway.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He was particularly interested in the theatre, and wanted to become an actor. But since his work was on a dining-car, and he was travelling for ten days at a time, and then having several days off, he was not in a position to attend regular evening classes. He had left school at fourteen, and therefore could not, without such classes, qualify for entrance to one of the drama institutes or universities. Actually, he considered himself to be an unfortunate exception to the general Soviet rule that every working person can enter the university.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So far we have been considering equality of opportunity in the purely educational sphere. But equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R. extends far beyond the realms of education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perhaps another of the most interesting features of Soviet life to a foreign visitor is the close link which exists between all kinds of amateur and professional activities. This starts in the school, in the form of an intimate connection between the children’s studies and their hobbies. The Soviet schoolchild has the opportunity, in the school buildings, or in other institutions specially created for the purpose, of being a young naturalist or photographer, scientist, engineer, or inventor, in his or her spare time. Equipment is supplied free of charge, and instructors are available.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many Soviet children to-day go on to the university to specialize in that very subject which they found to be their most interesting hobby when at school.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet factories and collective farms much of the leisure time of the people—and this leisure time is ample since the working day averages less than seven hours throughout Soviet industry—is spent on amateur activities such as dramatics, literature, sport, photography, art, and so on. But these amateur activities are not, as is usual in other countries, left to the care of the local enthusiasts, without professional assistance. For, in all Soviet amateur activities, the professional people in that particular sphere render organized assistance, so that the general level of the amateurs is raised so as rapidly to approach a professional standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A typical example of this is theatrical work. Practically every industrial enterprise in the U.S.S.R. has its workers’ dramatics circle. Agreements are made through the trade unions with professional theatres, and these promise to give assistance to such circles in the form of voluntary or paid help by trained actors and producers. The result is that the amateur group has the benefit of professional assistance, and can raise its standard of excellence considerably above that which in this country we term “amateur,” meaning inferior to “professional.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such an “amateur” dramatics group in the U.S.S.R. may at any time, having reached a certain standard, be offered by the authorities the opportunity of taking over a professional theatre as a full-time job. I have been present at a competition of village theatres in Moscow and seen a performance by a young theatrical group which was certainly up to the best British repertory standard. The whole company consisted of young working men and women who had previously been members of the dramatics club of the automobile plant in Gorky. They had received professional guidance from the Vachtangov Theatre in Moscow, and, at a certain stage, had been offered facilities by the Commissariat of Education to become a full-time theatrical company. They now had their own theatre in a Russian village. In this way workers in the factory had become professional actors and actresses, through their amateur theatricals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as in the sphere of the theatre there is an opportunity for the ordinary amateur to become a professional, so, too, in painting and writing, in sport and in science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A reference to sport in this connection may raise a query in the minds of certain readers. Does this mean that there is professionalism in Soviet sport? The answer is that in the U.S.S.R. to-day the facilities for sport are rapidly growing all over the country. New sports grounds are being laid out, and factories and collective farms, towns, and villages, have their teams, which compete against each other in separate matches and league competitions. But these teams require trainers. And the trainers are the “professionals” in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any Soviet worker can participate in sport free of charge. Those who are good enough to play in their town or factory teams have their expenses paid when away from home, and draw the equivalent of their wages from the sports club when away for matches or training. Those who are outstanding at any sport become eligible for the whole-time work of instructor to other teams. In this way the road is open for the amateur sportsman to become a full-time professional instructor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have so far considered two aspects of equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R.: first, the equal availability of education to all citizens; secondly, the possibility of development through amateur activities to professional activities, quite apart from the ordinary educational system of the country. Certain other aspects of equality of opportunity remain to be considered.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not every worker in the Soviet factory or collective farm who wants either to go to a university, or to convert some amateur activity into a full-time profession. There are hundreds of thousands of workers greatly interested in the particular jobs which they are at present doing, but who want advancement to more skilled or more responsible branches of the same work. Such advancement is possible in all Soviet enterprises.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A characteristic of every Soviet institution is the stress which is laid on the desirability for every working man and woman to raise their qualifications at their work. Whether it is a case of teachers in an elementary school or university, or workers at machines in a factory, or typists in an office, there are always available the means of further education, through evening classes free of charge. And in all this a leading part is played by the best workers in the enterprise, who often undertake voluntarily to train other workers up to their own level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When, in 1935, the coal-miner Stakhanov became famous all over the world as the young man who in a six-hour shift had doubled output and had at the same time received a tremendous rise in earnings as a result, many people outside the U.S.S.R. asked the question: “Does this not mean that a new privileged category of workers will arise, having a monopoly of the jobs which earn high wages?” To those who were living in the U.S.S.R. at the time, this question appeared singularly divorced from real life, for in his spare time this same coal-miner Stakhanov was going round his own and other pits training the workers there to use his methods and to become more efficient organizers of their work, raising earnings accordingly. In this way leading workers in the U.S.S.R. train others up to their own level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the point of view of the ordinary worker this means that, in every sphere of work, the most highly skilled are willing helpers and trainers. Every working man and woman has the opportunity to learn to improve technique at the job, with the expert assistance of those who are best at that kind of work. Obviously, such a system is itself dependent on certain economic conditions! Leading workers in the U.S.S.R. would not be so willing to train others up to their own level of efficiency if, as in Britain to-day, they thought they might be replaced by these other workers as soon as they had trained them. Full co-operation on the part of all the skilled workers in a community in training others to their own level of skill can only be obtained in a society in which there is no unemployment, and where every sort of skilled work is in demand. In the U.S.S.R. there has been no unemployment since 1931, and there is a demand for every kind of qualified worker. It is in such circumstances that the skilled worker knows that by training others he is not endangering his own security, and that the community as a whole, and he as a member of it, will gain from a greater supply of skilled workers and the products of their labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There still remains one sphere of equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R. which has not yet been discussed. This is public administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first Soviet Constitution of 1918 the vast majority of the population obtained electoral rights on a wider scale than have existed at any previous time in Russia or, with the exception of Soviet China, in any other country to this day. But it would be a great mistake to think that, under Soviet conditions, participation in public administration depended simply on the electoral rights of the population. It must be realized that in the U.S.S.R. to-day there no longer exists that distinction between “civil service” and other occupations which is typical of every other country. The reason for this is that since all industry and trade are in the hands of the State, the relation of the manager of a factory to a factory worker is no different in essentials from that of a director of a State clinic to a doctor working there, or of a headmaster of a State school to one of the teachers. All Soviet citizens are, in a sense, civil servants. And it follows from this that the opportunity to rise in any particular occupation to the most skilled and most responsible posts means, in effect, the possibility to rise to the highest posts in the public administration of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a further feature of Soviet administration which must here be mentioned. While we have considered the case of the amateur actor, we have not yet mentioned the “amateur” administrator, the voluntary worker in various municipal and State departments, who is an essential part of the Soviet apparatus of State. Not only is it customary in Soviet elections to return members to the Soviets, or Councils, in whose hands lies the authority to govern the country ; but, in addition to this, it is the usual thing for the electors to nominate further additional representatives to work for the Soviets, in their various departments, voluntarily in their spare time. In this way voluntary public workers play a considerable part in the Soviet health, housing, educational, and other services; as also in the work of the militia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sphere, as in the sphere of amateur activities in the factories, such voluntary work is a recruiting-ground for able administrators. The factory workers, men and women, who in their spare time do good work for the Soviet in one of its departments, may at any time be called upon to turn such work into a permanent job, and to transfer from their factory to some administrative position in the Soviet for which they have shown their aptitude as voluntary workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R., then, may be said to exist in education, and in the opportunities available both to youth and to adults for obtaining education. It may be said to exist in every profession, through the availability of the necessary training-facilities for all citizens to improve their skill. In the sphere of administration there are paths to the leading administrative positions, through election, through promotion, and by way of voluntary work in the various administrative bodies of the State. And, in cases where working people show ability at some amateur activity, there is the opportunity to turn their amateur activity into a profession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a system not only gives every citizen an opportunity to qualify for every occupation, but the “square pegs in the round holes” can re-qualify for some other occupation if an earlier choice has proved unsuitable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This system, the result of nineteen years’ development, is still far from complete. There are still a few dining-car attendants who would like to become actors (but who, because of the mobile location of their present jobs, cannot immediately qualify for the other occupation). But already the inequalities of opportunity are the exceptions, whereas elsewhere they are still the rule.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion, a word must be said on two kinds of equality which have existed since the Soviet State was set up, and which further contribute to make equality of opportunity effective for all citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, it must be realized that in the U.S.S.R. to-day every citizen enjoys the rights of citizenship irrespective of nationality. In 1918, in the first Soviet Constitution, it was declared “contrary to the fundamental laws of the Republic to institute or tolerate privileges, or any prerogative whatever, founded on such grounds, or to repress national minorities, or in any way to limit their rights.” And, in the new Constitution of 1936, the same point is stated with even more emphasis: “The equality of the rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all fields of economic. State, cultural, social, and political life, is an irrevocable law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Any direct or indirect restriction of these rights, or conversely, the establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on account of the race or nationality to which they belong, as well as any propagation of racial or national exceptionalism or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Citizens of every nationality are treated as equals. A Tartar may live and work in his own republic, or he may choose to live and work in one or other of the national republics of the Union, but wherever he goes he will have the same treatment as everyone else. Further, as far as education is concerned, every citizen has the right to education in his own language, provided only that there are sufficient fellow-nationals in the locality to make such education practicable in an organized way. In the U.S.S.R. no student is forced, as students are compelled, for example, in Wales to-day, to sit for examinations in their own national universities in a language which is strange to them. The advantage of this may not easily be appreciated by Englishmen, but I have known plenty of students in North Wales, many of whom found the English language extremely difficult, who will appreciate what this means to the students of all the nations of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The effect of the Soviet attitude to nationality has been a vast increase in national pride throughout Soviet territory at the same time as national antagonism has been eliminated. Particularly does this show itself among the Jewish population, who were as ruthlessly persecuted under Tsarism as they are in Nazi Germany to-day. In Tsarist Russia they did not have their own territory. To-day, to give them complete equality with other nationalities the Soviet Government has put Birobidjan at their disposal, and Jews, like citizens of all other nationalities of the Union, may settle in their own national territory or elsewhere, according to choice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his &#039;&#039;Russian Sketchbook&#039;&#039;, David Low has a cartoon which is supposed to illustrate the Soviet solution of the Jewish problem. A foreigner, obviously Mr. Low himself, is interviewing a group of men with very large noses. Their nationality cannot be doubted. The Foreign Enquirer asks: “How do the Jews get on?” and a Comrade replies; “Well, you see, there aren’t Jews here any more. Jews is just Russians like ourthelvth.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I quote this because as a rule Low showed very great insight into Soviet life. But this cartoon is an exception, for in this portrayal of the Soviet solution of the Jewish problem Low shows precisely the reverse of the truth. Contrary to Low’s conception, the U.S.S.R. is the one country in the world to-day where no Jew will be found who will not proudly state that he is a Jew. The Soviet Jew is a Jew and is proud of it, just as the Soviet Russian is Russian and proud of it. It is not the Soviet Jew, but the German and the Hungarian, the American and the English, the Jew of every other country of the world outside the U.S.S.R. who, at some time or another, feels it is in his interest to pretend he is just a German or Hungarian, American or Englishman, like everybody else. It is only in the U.S.S.R. that this feeling no longer exists. Low portrays the elimination of the Jewish problem as the negation of nationality, whereas in fact it lies in the full expression of national consciousness and the most extensive development of national pride.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, equality of opportunity between the sexes in the U.S.S.R. must be mentioned. You do not hear in the U.S.S.R. references to “women’s jobs” as opposed to the jobs of men. Admission to all occupations is based on merit, irrespective of sex, and payment in all occupations is also based on merit, irrespective of sex. And, in so far as the role of women in society is complicated by their functions as mothers, this side of their lives is being increasingly cared for by the rapid development of social insurance and communal centers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R., then, exists irrespective of the nationality or the sex of citizens. It exists in education, in every occupation, and in opportunities to change from one occupation to another. To say that exceptions do not occur would be fantastic, but the really significant feature of equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R. To-day is that these words no longer express something to be vaguely attained at some future date, but a fact of Soviet life at the present time. In the U.S.S.R. every case of absence of equality of opportunity is now regarded as an exception, and as a serious fault in the working of the system. As faults, the people combat the existence of such exceptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so we come to another aspect of Soviet democracy, the combating of faults in the system. How is this done? We begin to answer this question in the next chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Education for Citizenship ===&lt;br /&gt;
Equality of opportunity to receive an education in the U.S.S.R. really exists to-day. This is important. But so is the kind of education that there is equality of opportunity to receive. While, in such a book as this, it is not appropriate to make a detailed study of the whole of the Soviet educational system, it is extremely important to examine it further, in so far as it provides the youth of the country not only with qualifications as future workers, but with the ability to fulfil the tasks of citizenship, to participate in running those concerns in which they are employed, to combat faults in the social organization of the community, and, in fact, to govern the country in which they live.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The young Soviet citizen, finishing his education, becomes a wage-earner in a State enterprise, or a member of a co-operative organization. For, at the present time, there are no longer private concerns which employ the labour of others. The young Soviet citizen, in either of these forms of organization, will be called upon to participate in running them. But he will participate in running these organizations in co-operation with others. He must, therefore, learn to accept responsibility— but responsibility to a group, to a collective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If citizens are to participate effectively in running the country in which they dwell, they must have an appropriate education. Therefore, even in the elementary school in the Soviet Union the visitor is struck by the extent to which the student is treated as a citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Corporal punishment is forbidden by law in the Soviet schools, and other punishment in any form is practically non-existent. The children are taught to look upon the teachers, not as vested with an almost supernatural authority, but as human beings like themselves, who have more experience. The headmaster or headmistress of a Soviet school is a senior comrade, who holds a position of such authority only by virtue of ability and good leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Everything possible is done in the Soviet schools to bring the children into contact with the everyday life of the country. Their lessons include knowledge of current political questions and of industry and agriculture. In their spare time, facilities are provided in the schools and other institutions for hobbies such as natural history or engineering, literature or sport. The important fact in this connection is that the Soviet child is encouraged to take his hobbies seriously, and is given the possibility of doing useful work which may have positive value. Thus, groups of “Young Inventors” attached to Soviet schools, turn out some hundreds of inventions annually. And in the Moscow Zoo a group of child helpers participates in the research work that is being carried on there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And once, on May and, a public holiday, the direction of traffic in the city of Kiev was in the hands of the children of the city. And the children in all the larger towns have their own theatres and cinemas, run by the Commissariat of Education in conjunction with the local school authorities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the children’s theatres the children are expected not only to be spectators but to criticize the performances and to make suggestions for their improvement. The Moscow children’s theatres arrange meetings between children and writers, at which writers read their latest children’s stories, and discuss their merits with the children prior to publication. The children learn to play a part in determining the kind of books that are going to be published for them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These examples, taken at random from the life of Soviet children to-day, serve to emphasize the fact that the Soviet child is a citizen from his earliest days, receiving the respect of other citizens, and with the opportunity to utilize his or her spare time in some useful hobby which may be of actual scientific or artistic value.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But how is the life of the school itself organized?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To many teachers and parents in other countries it seems inconceivable that schools should be run throughout a vast country without the use of punishment and all the other devices for preserving the authority of the teacher to which we are accustomed in the rest of the world. But Soviet experience has proved conclusively, in a period of twenty years’ trial, that if children are treated as fellow citizens, and not as a kind of inferior being, they will behave as citizens. If an appeal is made to them as serious human beings, then they will answer by showing a sense of responsibility which can never be inculcated by the cane or by other forcible displays of the teacher’s authority and power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If I were to draw a comparison between the typical Soviet school and the school in Britain, I would say from my own experience that the atmosphere of the Soviet classroom can only be compared with that of the British playing-field. All that voluntary discipline which is obtained in England, even among quite young children, in the sphere of games is obtained, in the U.S.S.R., in the actual work of learning. And when we ask how this comes about, I think we are bound to realize that in the British school, in general, it is only in the sports activities that the children are treated as citizens voluntarily carrying on certain social activities for their mutual benefit, whereas, in contrast to this, the ordinary school work is treated as a necessary &#039;evil’ enforced upon them by some higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet school the greatest incentive is given to individual achievement, but only in such a way as is consistent with the developing of a team spirit. The marking of Soviet students does not consist of arranging them in order from first to last, but in classifying them into groups, marked “excellent,” “good,” “medium,” and “weak.” It is theoretically possible in any class for 100 percent of the students to obtain the mark of “excellent.” The good student is not prevented from obtaining the mark of “excellent” if someone else also does well, whereas, under the more antiquated system so common still in Britain, only one child can be first in the class, only one can be second, and so on. To the English child, marked in this way, it is of advantage not to help the others to do well; but the Soviet child gains no advantage whatever from other children in the class being marked “medium” or “weak.” In the U.S.S.R. there is not the individualistic system in which the success of one is obtained by displacing another from a leading position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to this, in the Soviet school collective competitions are regularly arranged between the different groups of students, for the best possible results in each class. While all the pupils in one class try to attain the individual achievement of “excellent,” the whole class competes with the other classes in the school for the maximum number of “excellents” and “goods” and for a minimum of “weaks.” This “Socialist Competition,” as it is called, emphasizes the Soviet class of children with something of the zeal for their studies as the English football team has for its game. And the result is that the best students voluntarily assist the weaker ones, in order that the best results may be obtained by the class as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is these two features of the Soviet school system—the treating of all pupils as citizens, and giving them the opportunity to do useful work if they wish to do it—together with the organization of their work so as to introduce into it some of the fun that in Britain is associated purely with leisure, with activities rigidly separated from work, that lay the foundation for quite a different system of discipline in Soviet schools from that which exists in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet child, as a responsible citizen, and keen on the success of his or her work because it also means the success of the team in competition with other teams, is interested in having good results as an individual, and for the whole group. As a result, the desire to work has not to be enforced by punishment from above, any more than punishment proves necessary to make the boys of an English school take their football seriously.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the English school, even where the use of the cane is common, it is not usually found necessary to employ it in order to stimulate concentration on such matters as football. The collective enthusiasm of the children themselves proves to be an adequate stimulus to each individual to exert the necessary energy. The slacker is reformed by the collective pressure of the other players, and the good player, in the interests of the team, coaches the weaker.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is precisely this spirit which prevails in the Soviet school, not only within the limited sphere of sport, but throughout. And it is in such conditions that the relations of teacher to pupil are those of experienced adviser to willing learner, and that discipline is enforced almost entirely by the students themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet classroom is a scene of collective team activity. The students elect their own leader, who is responsible for checking such matters as attendance and general discipline. A students’ committee decides matters of general importance to the class, and for the school as a whole there is an elected committee which is the recognized representative body of the students.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under the leadership of this body groups of students, in their spare time, undertake various kinds of work in connection with the administration of the school. It is a common thing, in a Soviet school, to find a children’s sanitary commission that brings recommendations to the administration and to the other pupils concerning questions of cleanliness, and a kitchen committee that passes regular comment on the food supplied in the school dining-room. It is also common for the merits of teachers to be openly discussed at meetings, at which not only teachers have the right to criticize students, but students have the right to criticize the work of their teachers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet teacher is also a member of the team—holding the office of “coach.” Here, too, the only apt comparison is with the sports activities in an English school. Whereas, on the one hand, we would find much scepticism in this country as to the advisability of pupils choosing their teachers, on the ground that they would choose those that gave them the least work, it would hardly be maintained that the boys in a school would not be capable of passing judgment on the question of which master was the best football coach.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the latter case it would probably be generally agreed that the boys concerned would be good judges; whereas, in the former, it would be suggested that their judgment was quite unreliable. The only reason for this distinction, of course, lies in the justifiable assumption that, in general, in the English school, the children are not so interested in their academic learning as they are in their football. But in the U.S.S.R., with the status of children as described, and the competitive system in academic work having been developed along lines comparable only with sport activities in Britain, the spirit of the British playing-fields has been brought into the Soviet schools. If the playing-fields of Britain have been responsible for bringing up a race of Empire rulers, then the classrooms of the Soviet Union, by introducing that same spirit of collective sport into the work of the whole younger generation, is bringing up a race of people really capable of ruling, not an Empire, but themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Socialist competition between the classes of a Soviet school has been mentioned. It is important to note that, in this Socialist competition, the teachers are also participants. The children of the different classes compete against each other for the highest number of “excellents,” and the teachers of these classes compete against each other also for achieving the greatest number of “excellents” in the classes under their charge. In this way the children and teachers have the same common aim as is shared between the football team and its coach in an English school.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to check the results of this Socialist competition, regular meetings take place between teachers and pupils, together and separately, to discuss how the work is progressing. In such discussions the teachers’ methods may be discussed and criticized by the children. Further, in the Press, edited by the staff and children in Soviet schools, there is a vehicle for the written word. No Soviet schoolroom is complete without its wall-newspaper, a glorified notice-board, on which are pasted articles on school activities, and on matters of general local and national importance. Such newspapers are edited by the students and by the teachers, and contain full discussion of all problems facing the school.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A group of children, for example, may visit another school where the dining facilities are superior to their own. They return, and the wall-newspaper contains an article demanding that the school administration at once take steps to make the dining facilities as good as in the other school. Or members of the sanitary commission may find that the washing facilities in another school are better, and so, in meetings and in the wall newspaper, the demand is put forward that the administration take the necessary steps in their own school to improve conditions accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is these children, and these students, trained to participate in the running of their schools and universities, who later go on to work in Soviet institutions of every kind. Clearly, such people would be intolerable employees for any ordinary employer of labour. Children, who, at school, have had their own representative committees which demanded that the administration improve the sanitary or feeding conditions, or supply better teachers, are not going to be docile wage-earners. They will tend to be disturbing elements, trade unionists always agitating for better conditions. Similarly, university students who, from the age of eighteen onwards become members of trade unions, and whose trade union committee puts forward all kinds of demands on the part of the students, are not, given their university training is over, going to be docile employees.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The type of person created by the Soviet educational system, then, is an intolerable type from the standpoint of any private employer. Such people, to use a common term, “would simply make a revolution.” And that is why, only in the U.S.S.R., and after the Revolution, an educational system has been developed which creates such people. For, in the U.S.S.R., the new system of production, where the power of the private employer has been first restricted, and then finally eliminated altogether, requires a type of citizen altogether different from the wage-earner of capitalist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This new type of citizen can only be understood when we know how he lives, and the conditions under which he works. Therefore, from the Soviet educational institutions let us now go with our young citizen to his first job, whether in a State institution or in a cooperative organization. We shall then see that the education of the Soviet school is a preparation for responsible citizenship in Soviet society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Rights of the Wage-Earner ===&lt;br /&gt;
Some time ago, when a certain well-known American business man was visiting the Soviet Union, he happened to boast to his guide that he employed several thousands of men in his various enterprises. The guide, not accustomed to such a situation, was unable to hide her dismay. “People get ten years for that in this country,” she said!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is possible to-day to travel from Moscow to Vladivostok or from Archangel to Tiflis, and nowhere to find a landlord, an owner of a factory, or an employer of labour. People abound everywhere, but ask them how they gain a living and you will find that, without exception, they either work in some publicly owned institution, such as a factory or a coal-mine, a school or a clinic, or they are working members of a cooperative organization. About a tenth of the people of the U.S.S.R. do not fall into these two categories; these are individual peasants and individual handicraftsmen, who work for themselves, but do not employ the labour of others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we look at Soviet industry, education, entertainment, or scientific institutions, we find that they are to-day completely owned and controlled by public bodies, whether the Government of the U.S.S.R., one of the national republics, or a local authority. And, as a result of this, we find that practically every adult citizen in a Soviet town to-day is a wage-earner, or someone who, by domestic work, enables others to work for a wage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Tsarist Russia, as in Britain to-day, practically the whole of industry and agriculture was in private hands. In the towns of those days you would meet rich employers, owning the factories and the coal-mines and living on the profits of these enterprises. You would meet rich foreigners with capital invested in Russian industry, who drew each year a share of the profits; and, on the other hand, you would meet large numbers of people, the vast majority of the town dwellers, who worked for a living in all these enterprises which were owned by somebody else.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
to-day in the Soviet Union the employers are extinct. Citizens are wage-earners or co-operators, and a large section of them are wage-earners. Every Soviet citizen, according to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., enjoys the right to work, to leisure, and to security. The abolition of unemployment guarantees that all may work. Leisure is guaranteed by a working day which averages less than seven hours and by paid holidays for all workers. Security is safeguarded by social insurance against illness, by which wages are drawn during ill health; and by non-contributory pensions for the aged at sixty for men, fifty-five for women and at still lower ages in occupations considered particularly arduous or harmful to health. But, in addition to these rights, which workers in other countries may well envy their Soviet comrades, the Soviet worker has the right to participate in running the concern in which he works, for he, as a citizen of the Soviet State, is a partner in the ownership of this concern.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State was set up in October 1917. One of its first decrees dealt with “Workers’ Control” in industry, and laid down that in every enterprise elected committees of the employees were to be set up, to express the will of the workers in that enterprise, and to supervise the running of it in the interests of the workers. At the same time such elected committees were to share responsibility with the employer “for the strictest order, discipline, and preservation of property.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In January 1918, four months later, it was decided, rather than perpetuate a system varying from factory to factory, each with its own methods of electing the workers’ committee, that the work of controlling the management was to be henceforth in the hands of the elected committee of the trade union. In this way the Soviet Government gave a very great stimulus to trade union membership, for only by joining the trade union could the workers now play a part in electing the factory committee which was to represent them and control the management of the plant in their own interests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The young Soviet State, however, not only enforced the representation of the workers on the management of privately owned factories; it also proceeded to take over the management of many of the large concerns, and also of those concerns which the employers refused any longer to operate. As this happened, a new problem arose; what was to be the relationship between the workers in these State enterprises and the management?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This question was discussed in 1921 at a special conference. It has decided that in, all socialized enterprises the trade unions were to safeguard the interests of the workers against what were termed “bureaucratic perversions” on the part of the management; while at the same time, as in the earlier decree, the unions were still responsible—together with the administration, which now represented the State—for the preservation of labour discipline and the protection of property. In this way the trade union committee became the officially recognized representative body of the workers in a Soviet factory, and, as such, had the right to participate with the management in all discussions of policy affecting the lives of the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A foreigner, starting to work for the first time in the U.S.S.R., is at once struck by the relations between the managerial staff and the rank-and-file workers. The most significant fact that faces him is that the manager of a Soviet factory, as part of his duties, is under the obligation to improve the general living conditions of the workers, to increase the social amenities attached to the factory, to provide satisfactory service in the restaurant and medical centre, and to see that good care is given to the workers’ children in nursery and kindergarten. The Soviet factory manager is responsible to the State, not only for raising the output of the factory in his charge, and for lowering its costs of production, but for raising the welfare of the workers in his factory, and devoting a considerable amount of time and energy to this work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I well remember how, a year or two ago, there took place in Moscow a conference of “industrial leaders”—managers of Soviet factories. One of the subjects of discussion was the question of housing. And in this conference of factory managers it was emphatically stated that it was the duty of every factory manager to take steps to put an end to the existence of bed-bugs in the dwellings of the workers in the factory under his care. Every factory manager was responsible for seeing that the workers had decent living-quarters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some readers, possibly, may think that such an example is ill chosen, only serving to show the backwardness of Soviet housing. I would draw the attention of such readers to a report which appeared in &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039; of June 24th, 1936, in which the following statement is made: “It is estimated that 4,000,300 people suffer from the bed-bug in London alone”; but the fact is little known owing to “the public’s reticence in the matter, and their refusal to admit that bugs were in their homes even when they knew of their presence.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So it is not the existence of bed-bugs in the workers’ dwellings that distinguishes the U.S.S.R. from Britain, or Moscow from London; it is the fact that the Soviet factory manager is under a definite obligation to help to exterminate the pest, thus improving the living conditions of the workers under his leadership—a duty not shared by the factory managers of Great Britain, whose responsibility is only to the owners of the factories and not to the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is one example of the responsibility of the Soviet factory administration for the welfare of its workers. Here is another. In the autumn of 1932 I travelled in the Caucasus with a group of workers on holiday. In the group there were two girls, workers in a chemical factory. At their jobs they had a six-hour day, as their work was considered arduous. They received six weeks’ holiday on full pay. I was then amazed to hear that, in addition to this, they had each received a grant from the administration of their factory to help them to travel during their holiday. Later on, after more experience, I found that every Soviet organization has considerable funds which are used exclusively for the welfare of the workers, and contributions for holiday purposes may be made out of such funds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A matter which has some bearing on the relationship between the workers in a Soviet enterprise and the administrative staff is the fact that, on such an administrative staff to-day, the vast majority of people are themselves workers who have been promoted. A visit to any Soviet factory shows that in almost every case the manager of that factory was once an ordinary manual worker, and, very often, was a worker in that same factory. The fact that the personnel of the managerial staff is drawn from the rank and file of the workers themselves prevents that difference in attitude which arises when managers and workers are drawn from different classes in society, each with its own traditions and conventions, and even with separate educational systems, is the case in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as, under Soviet conditions, factory managers are obliged to pay attention to the welfare of the workers as well as to problems of production and costs, it must be pointed out that the Soviet workers are interested in raising production as well as in increasing their immediate welfare. Since 1928 the whole of Soviet industry has been publicly owned and controlled, and production has been subject to a general plan for the purpose of meeting the growing needs of the community. In 1931 unemployment was completely eliminated, and it has not recurred since.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is under these conditions that the Soviet workers find no reason whatever to restrict production. Further, they have definite reasons for increasing production as rapidly as possible, for this is the only way of raising the general standard of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under capitalism, where part of the value of every product goes to the employer as profit, the workers in any single enterprise, or in a whole industry, can force the employers to raise their wages or otherwise to improve their conditions by direct action. If strikes are successful, wages rise at the expense of profits, which is satisfactory to the workers though unsatisfactory to the employers. When, however, as in the U.S.S.R. to-day, the whole of the means of production are owned and controlled by public bodies in the public interest, a strike by the workers in any factory or industry for higher wages can only react to the disadvantage of the working population itself. For, by a strike, production is restricted. And this is contrary to the public interest in a community in which every extra product is required and is utilized. A strike, therefore, is to the disadvantage of the workers of the Soviet community as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The method of fixing wages by means of strikes in a Socialist country is highly undesirable, for it is no longer possible for any workers to raise their wages at the expense of employers’ profits. If, as a result of a strike, higher wages are won, then they are won at the expense of the general fund which goes to paying the wages of all citizens. If the coalminers of the U.S.S.R. strike to-day for more wages, they are in fact fighting to force the Government to give to them what otherwise it would be dividing up among other workers. Strikes, then, in such conditions, can only represent sectional demands against the whole community, and in themselves are contrary to the general interest because they restrict production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a diary of a visit of a few weeks’ duration to the U.S.S.R., Sir Walter Citrine has said that “it was too much to assume a complete identity of interest between the director and the workers. The director was concerned with efficiency and output, and the worker with the amount he could earn, and the conditions under which it was earned” (&#039;&#039;I Search for Truth in Russia&#039;&#039;, p. 129). And, in a later passage, he says that “liberty of association and the right to strike are the essential features of legitimate trade unionism” (p. 361).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear, from what has been said here, that Sir Walter’s estimation of the relations between director and worker in the Soviet factory is based on a lack of understanding of the situation. Sir Walter ignores the unique fact that the Soviet director, as part of his job, is responsible for increasing the welfare of the workers. He ignores the fact that the workers, no longer working for an employer who takes part of their product in the form of profit, know that everything they produce is distributed to the community—that is, to themselves. Finally, he ignores the also important fact that, under such conditions as these, a strike is an attack by a small minority on the economic resources of the whole community; and at the same time, by holding up production, reacts to the disadvantage of all citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As to the other matter—freedom of association—no other State in the world has ever given the encouragement to trade unionism which has been given in the U.S.S.R. We have already seen how the young Soviet State, in its first months of existence, made the trade union committees the official representative bodies of the workers in all industrial enterprises, with powers of control over the management. This was a tremendous stimulus to trade union development, as is shown by the figures of trade union membership. In October 1917, at the time when the Soviets seized power, there were 2 million trade unionists. By 1928 this figure had increased to 11 million, and was 18 million in 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No other country can show such figures, and it is absurd to suggest that the U.S.S.R. has ever done anything but encourage, to the greatest possible extent, the organization of the workers in trade unions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time, however, as a result of the changes in the relations between worker and administration which have followed the socialization of industry, the position of the trade unions in the Soviet State is certainly different from their position under capitalism. This matter will concern us more deeply in the following chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A question which will be in the mind of many readers is this: If, in the U.S.S.R., production is organized to-day in the common interest, so that strikes are contrary to the general interest and so that the aims of factory managers and workers coincide, how do these changes show themselves in the organization of the factory ? Is there not a danger that the workers may be even worse exploited by the State than they previously were by their private employers?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The answer to this question lies in the organization of the Soviet factory, and, indeed, of every Soviet institution. And this organization is very different from the factory under capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No worker in a Soviet factory can go long without becoming aware of the existence of what is known as the “Triangle,” and he will find that decisions of the Triangle are made on all kinds of matters which, under capitalism, would lie within the realm of the employer and manager and nobody else. What is this “Triangle”?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen how, when the factories of Russia were taken over by the Soviet State, their managers became responsible to the State for the organization of production and for improving the welfare of the workers. We have also seen how the trade union committee became the official body entitled to represent the workers, and to fight “bureaucratic perversions” on the part of the management. At a very early stage in the history of Soviet industry the device was evolved of joint discussion between manager and trade union representative on all important matters affecting the welfare of the factory and of its workers. Decisions would be issued over the signature of manager and trade union representative together, showing that they had been discussed, both from the point of view of the State and of the workers in the enterprise itself, before a decision had been reached. But a triangle has three angles, not two. Where is the third angle to our triangle?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It may surprise British readers to know that, in the Triangle, which is the supreme authority in every Soviet enterprise, the third angle is the representative of a political party. In the Soviet factory the body which discusses all questions affecting the interests of the workers is the Triangle; consisting of the manager, appointed by a State department and responsible to it; the representative of the trade union, elected by the workers in the factory, and responsible to them; and a representative of the “Party”—that is, of the organization in the factory of the Bolshevik or Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it may be clear that the manager represents the State, and that the trade unionist represents the workers in the factory, it may well not be clear to the reader exactly whose interests are represented by the Party. This question will occupy us in detail in Chapter XV. It is important, however, here and now, to state the impression of a foreign worker, taking up a position in the Soviet Union for the first time, on this question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In every Soviet enterprise I found that the relationship between fellow workers was a friendly one. The status of the manager was that of a human being like every other worker. It was the status of the leading personality in the institution, a fellow-worker but a good one, the person most equipped to take the responsibility for running it. In the average Soviet enterprise to-day over 80 percent of the workers are members of a trade union. Those who are not members are usually new arrivals, or people who have lapsed from membership, or in a small minority of cases, individuals who have been actually expelled for some offence against union discipline. The elected representative of the trade unionists, then, can be taken as being the most popular figure among the workers of those considered suitable effectively to represent their interests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, quite apart from their official position, their job, or their status as members of the trade union committee, a certain number of persons are “Party members.” These people are members of the Party, which is a voluntary political organization. In general, I always found that the Party members tended to be the most respected workers, whatever their skill or position, and the Party organization was looked upon as being a kind of organized group of leading personalities, of people who were more devoted than the average to work of social usefulness. The workers as a whole looked to the Party members for leadership, and, in the majority of cases, when asked why they were not themselves “in the Party,” the answer was that they had enough to do already, without taking on extra responsibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I say this now because it is important to realize that in the Soviet factory the representation of the Party, along with administration and trade union, on the Triangle, is looked upon as something absolutely natural. The Party is considered as a sort of organization of the best and most responsible citizens, and the Triangle thus becomes a body representing the State, the rank-and-file worker, and the organized leadership of the working people as expressed in the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would entirely misrepresent the situation if the impression were given that control by this Triangle was the only feature which distinguished the Soviet enterprise from similar enterprises in other countries. Actually, while the presence of the elected representative of the trade union causes all important decisions to be made with the co-operation of the workers’ representative, it is possible for disputes to arise between the different persons composing the Triangle, and differences may arise between the workers and the administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such cases of “industrial disputes” in the U.S.S.R. there is an elaborate machinery of negotiation and arbitration. Actually, if there is disagreement in the factory itself, it is usual for the trade union or Party representatives to take the question to a higher authority. If the factory trade union committee cannot obtain satisfaction from the administration, then the matter may be carried to the district committee of the union, which will then negotiate with the State organization which controls the factory concerned. As a rule such matters are settled in this way. But, if necessary, the Central Council of the Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R. may take up the matter with the Government if the dispute reaches that length without a settlement being reached. However, under present-day conditions the relations between employing organizations and the trade unions are so amicable that disputes are not likely to get so far before some sort of reasonable settlement is reached.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it is realized that both the elected representatives of the workers and the appointed representatives of the State have the same common aims—to raise the general standard of life by increasing production and the welfare, of the workers concerned as rapidly as possible—it is clear that major industrial disputes are extremely unlikely to arise.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are disputes of another kind, however, which cannot be settled by simple processes of negotiation. These are disputes in connection with the infringement of the law, as, for example, in cases where factory managers do not enforce the safety measures laid down by law, or do not pay the correct wages to a discharged worker, and so on. In the case of legal disputes, the question can either be referred to a higher authority—in which case the latter may bring pressure to bear on the factory manager to fulfil his obligations—or, if the case is in doubt, then it may be taken to the courts for a decision. These courts, as will be shown in Chapter VII, also represent the working people of the country, and administer the law with a good measure of working-class common sense.&lt;br /&gt;
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So far we have considered what we may call the “formal” structure of the administration of a Soviet factory. But, quite apart from this, there is a wide range of questions which are decided by the Triangle, not in isolation from the rest of the workers, but in public discussion with these workers. For example, every year the manager of a Soviet factory addresses a general meeting of the workers, just as the chairman of a British joint-stock company addresses a general meeting of the shareholders. At such a meeting the Soviet manager reports on the past year, and on the fulfilment of the plan of production, and of the plan for improving the general living conditions of the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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This report is followed by a general discussion, in which every worker can participate, and in which serious criticisms may be made of the work of individuals and groups of individuals, the members of the administrative staff being not immune from criticism by the rank and file. As a result of such discussions certain workers may be moved to other posts, either upwards or downwards in the scale of responsibilities. The manager of a Soviet factory, in order to fulfil his tasks satisfactorily, must be able, in such meetings, to prove his leadership of those working under him. If, at such meetings, the workers show that they have no faith in their manager, the organization in charge of the factory will replace him. For a Soviet factory director must be able to lead; he must be recognized as the best representative of all the workers in the factory, or the rank and file will be against him, and there will be continual friction, resulting in inefficiency.&lt;br /&gt;
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The manager’s report on past activity is followed by an outline of the plan for the coming year. This plan is submitted to the manager of the factory from above, from the trust or the local authority to which the factory is responsible. This plan forms part of a general plan for the industry concerned, and for the locality where the factory is placed, and such plans are drawn up from year to year by the State Planning Commission, subject to instructions given by the Government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The plan submitted to each, separate factory is based on the estimated resources and needs of the community as seen by the State Planning Commission. But it may neglect certain local characteristics, or features of the particular factory. Therefore a discussion of all such plans by all the workers in a Soviet factory is considered essential. For this purpose there are not only general meetings of all workers, but in each workshop discussions take place, and suggestions are made for improving the details of the plan.&lt;br /&gt;
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It may happen, for example, that a certain shop in a certain factory has been held up for raw materials during the past year. When the workers of such a shop point this out in the meeting, they may suggest that, if only the supply of materials is guaranteed, they will be able to increase output by twice the amount suggested in the plan. Or, to take another example, the workers of a particular workshop may state that if they could have one more machine of a particular kind, they would be able to perform a certain process, now performed by six men, with the use of only one worker. The remaining five would then be available for work where there is at present a shortage of labour, and thus output would be considerably raised.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such general discussions, in which the plan is considered in detail by all those whose work it is to carry it out, are a feature of all Soviet industry. But discussion of this kind is not all, for throughout the year meetings are held, often monthly, to check up how the plan, once adopted, is being fulfilled. There are many working people who, though not vociferous at meetings, have opinions to which they want to give expression. Such workers might say in writing what they would not say in meetings. And we find that in every Soviet enterprise there exists a “Press,” in order that such people may air their views.&lt;br /&gt;
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Few visitors to the Soviet Union return without mentioning the wall-newspaper, prominent in every Soviet organization, from the Government offices on the Red Square to the workshop in the factory, the classroom in the school, and the cow-shed in the collective farm. The wall-newspaper has already been mentioned in our discussion of education. The young worker leaves school, having written in the wall-newspaper there, to work in a Soviet enterprise, where again the wall-newspaper is a means of expression. And from week to week, and month to month, the newspaper on the wall of the Soviet factory’s workshops is a thermometer of public opinion, in which the workers express their views of their own work, of the work of other people, and in which they do not neglect to criticize managers and administrators, if they feel that their administration is at fault.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now who, it may be asked, edits these wall-newspapers in the Soviet factory? Is it the manager? Or perhaps the Communist Party? Or is it just an ordinary working man or woman?&lt;br /&gt;
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The answer is that the editor of the wall-newspaper in a Soviet factory is appointed by the elected trade union committee, and is responsible to that committee. The wall-newspaper is an organ of the workers, through their trade union. Similarly, it may be asked who organizes these meetings of the workers, to discuss the plans of production, and to watch over their fulfilment. Again the answer is: The trade union committee is responsible for organizing these meetings.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are beginning to find that, in the Soviet factory, in whatever direction we turn, we cannot discuss the rights of the workers without coining up against the activities of the trade union committee. The trade union representative sits with the manager; the trade union committee organizes mass meetings to discuss the work of the factory; it controls the Press. The conditions of the Soviet wage-earner cannot be considered without, all the time, references being made to the trade unions. For this reason any further discussion of the rights of the Soviet wage-earner brings us to a consideration of the activities of the trade unions in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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Note.—Since going to press a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has been held, at which questions were discussed arising out of the new Constitution. At this meeting the work of the factory Triangles was severely criticized as &#039;&#039;limiting&#039;&#039; democracy at the present time. Zhdanov referred to them as tending to become a “family compact, a conspiracy to make it more difficult to criticize. And once these three are in agreement, just go and try to criticize them!”&lt;br /&gt;
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While, from the standpoint of the worker under capitalism, a situation in which the elected trade union representative participates in running the factory is a giant stride forward, already in the U.S.S.R. they are looking for more effective means of democratic control and criticism. We may expect modifications in the future which will lead to greater independence of administration, party, and trade union leadership, combined with still greater discussion of policy throughout the rank and file of the party and trade union organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Power of the Trade Unions ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic, adopted in 1918, we read that freedom of association is guaranteed to all citizens, and that the Soviet State “lends to the workers all its material and moral assistance to help them to unite and to organize themselves.” Lenin referred to the trade unions as a “school of Communism” in which the ordinary working people were able to learn the art of administering their own affairs. And, in my own experience, soon after I had started working in the Soviet Union I was urgently asked to join the trade union, membership of which means a great deal to the working man and woman in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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The trade union in every Soviet enterprise makes it its duty to draw all workers into active participation in the work of running the enterprise, and in the social and political life of the country. I remember how, when the question of my trade union membership was first discussed in Moscow, I was asked what “social work” I did. I had already, in my spare time, given a lecture on England. This was “social work”; I was admitted to the trade union.&lt;br /&gt;
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This term “social work” has a very different meaning in the U.S.S.R. from what it has in Britain. Every Soviet trade unionist—which means eight out of every ten wage-earners in the U.S.S.R.—is expected to perform some socially useful activity, however small, in addition to his paid work. If you are on your trade union committee, or on the local Soviet, or an organizer of a dramatics group or a sports club, this is social work. If you give a course of lectures in your spare time, or take a study-group, or do voluntary work for the local Soviet or for the trade union committee, this is social work. The Soviet trade unions try to stimulate every citizen to be an active member of society, not only on his paid job, but, in addition to this, to do something of social use, in his spare time.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet trade unions are represented on the management of the factories, and, higher up, on the boards of the State trusts. In each factory the trade union mobilizes the workers for participation in the management. It organizes meetings to discuss the welfare of the workers and problems of production; and it runs a Press in which expression is given to the opinions of the workers. But such discussion, in words and in writing, has a purpose; the purpose is the raising of the standard of life of the whole population as rapidly as possible. And this, as we have seen, depends on increasing production. Therefore, on the one hand, the Soviet trade unions are interested in increasing production as the only way in which the standard of life of all the workers may be raised; while, on the other hand, in every Soviet enterprise the trade union is interested in immediately improving the living conditions of the workers, in improving their conditions of work, and, in general, in seeing that the increased production effectively reflects itself in a higher standard of life for the workers concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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In considering education we have already made our acquaintance with “Socialist competition,” that competition between individual and individual, group and group, for the best results. The young Soviet citizen is trained to compete with others in obtaining the best results. The Soviet worker, in his factory, competes with his fellow worker on the same principle. And it is the trade unions in the U.S.S.R. that are responsible, in the various productive enterprises, for the organization of this “Socialist competition,” which, during the first Five Year Plan, gave rise to the famous “shock-brigade” movement, and, in more recent times, to the movement called after the coal-miner Stakhanov.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is often said, by those who identify their interests with the survival of capitalism, that Socialism restricts initiative. But they rarely stop to ask: The initiative of whom?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is certainly a fact that in the U.S.S.R. to-day, no person’s initiative may express itself by setting up in business on his own. Furthermore, it cannot express itself by a person running a business so successfully that other businesses in the same line are ruined as a result of this successful competition. Also, it is not possible in the U.S.S.R. to show initiative in the private employment or discharging of workers, in dictating to them on what terms they shall work, and so on. And, for the managerial staff of factories, it is not possible to show initiative in a way so common in a capitalist concern—in browbeating the wretched employees, in degrading them, and in using every method, gentle and brutal, to get more work out of them during the working day. Such forms of individual initiative are suppressed in the U.S.S.R.; but these are only very limited examples of personal initiative; they are simply examples taken from capitalism. On the other hand, as far as concerns the initiative of working people to improve their methods of work and their conditions of work, the Soviet system gives the maximum of opportunity. And, since the whole population to-day consists of working people, this means that personal initiative is not thwarted, but encouraged, in all those activities in which the people of the country spend their time.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the main channels of personal initiative in the Soviet Union is Socialist competition. And the trade unions are the organisers of this. Socialist competition first began to be widely organised in 1928. Factories signed contracts with factories for the best fulfilment of their plans. These contracts were drawn up at general meetings of the workers. The Press published weekly accounts of how the competitors were faring, and the winners received banners and prizes. In each separate factory different groups of workers competed against each other for the best results, the factory Press reported the competition, and the winners were rewarded. But this competition was very different from the competition between capitalist firms, or even between groups of workers in capitalist industry. For whereas, under capitalist conditions the winning factory is that which manages to obtain the orders and put the other out of business, and the successful worker replaces the less successful, in the U.S.S.R. no successful factory puts another out of business, and no successful group of workers causes another group to lose their job. On the contrary, when a round of Socialist competition comes to an end, the best workers are often sent from the winning factory to help the more backward one; and, as between groups of workers, those in the best group help the others to raise their production to the same level. In this way, in the factory as in the school, Socialist competition is a means of stimulating production by introducing the spirit of the playground into the factory, and then ensuring the co-operation of winner and loser for the general benefit.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was on the course of this Socialist competition that there developed the shock-brigades. These were groups of workers who, in their Socialist competition, achieved outstanding results. The title of “shock-worker” first began to be conferred on those workers who showed the best results in their Socialist competition. But these titles were not simply awarded from above by the manager of the factory, nor were they awarded by the Triangle. The workers themselves, at a trade union meeting, would elect a commission to check up the results of the competition. The commission would then report to the Triangle. The Triangle would make recommendations as to which workers deserved the title of shock-worker, and the meeting would then decide.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this way, too, workers would be premiumed. There is no doubt that, for the British reader, reports that in the U.S.S.R. certain factory workers are premiumed with money or useful presents sometimes come rather as a shock. Does not this savour of the benevolent boss, who, at Christmas or at other times, presents the most faithful workers with a stimulus to further devotion—a carrot before the noses of all the rest?&lt;br /&gt;
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And yet such a comparison, to anyone who has worked in a Soviet organization, is utterly remote from real life. In my work in Moscow I had plenty of opportunity to participate in Socialist competition. We ourselves drew up the contract, which included such things as quantity and quality of work, punctuality, tidiness at work, and the fulfilling of certain jobs within a certain period of time. When the time was up, we elected our own commissions to check up our fulfilment. Usually, on May 1st and November 7th, the two great revolutionary holidays, Soviet enterprises give premiums to the best workers. It was our elected commission that recommended who should be premiumed. The Triangle, in my own experience, always accepted the decision of the elected commission. The general meeting then endorsed the recommendation, in this way, if any one of us received a month’s extra pay as a premium for good work; it was we ourselves who had awarded it, because we felt it was deserved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During 1935 and 1936 a new form of shock-work has developed in the form of “Stakhanovism.” In essence it is a very simple story. A certain coal-miner, by the name of Stakhanov, working in a pit in the Donets Basin in the Ukraine, reorganized the work of the group of which he was leader, so that output was greatly increased. His pit newspaper gave the matter publicity, it was taken up as a “scoop” by other newspapers—for the U.S.S.R. needs coal—and the rationalization proposals of Stakhanov became known throughout the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many managers and engineers did not approve of Stakhanovism, for two main reasons. First, they felt that the wholesale reorganization of methods of work was their job, not that of the rank-and-file miners. The Soviet Government Press, however, immediately attacked such a view, pointing out that the welfare of the U.S.S.R. depends on the maximum expression of personal initiative by all workers. Secondly, in certain cases the managers and technicians objected to workers reorganizing their methods of work, because their wages then rose considerably above those of the technical and managerial staff! This attitude was also attacked in the Press, and the Stakhanov movement has spread throughout the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Stakhanov movement, and the publicity and encouragement given to Stakhanov and his followers, stimulates every worker, however unskilled, to become a rationalizer, an organizer of his or her own labour. In this way every worker feels encouraged to utilize brain as well as hand. Large numbers of workers become more skilled and earn higher wages. There is a general rise in both material and cultural standards as a result. Further, the leading Stakhanov workers themselves are asked to become teachers of their methods. Stakhanov has been invited back to his native village, to use his organizing power to raise production in the collective farm. He also spends much time visiting different coal-mines, teaching the workers there how to reorganize their work for greater efficiency. A rank-and-file miner has become a technical expert and an engineer. And this is happening all the time in the Soviet Union to-day, affecting hundreds of thousands of workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been mentioned that the Stakhanovite workers raised their wages as a result of their greater output. How are wages paid in the U.S.S.R.? The answer is: Democratically, on the general principle, “To each according to his work.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Every year, in every Soviet enterprise, a “collective agreement” is signed between the trade union and the administration. This agreement states the obligations of the administration towards the workers in the form of cultural and other services, and also includes detailed wage-scales for the enterprise. The general principles underlying such wage-scales are determined by the central committees of the unions in the various industries, in co-operation with the corresponding administrative State organization. The details, with adjustments for local conditions, are worked out in each enterprise separately. In this way, once a year at least, every working man or woman, on every job, has the chance to participate in a general discussion of the existing wage-rates. These are reviewed from top to bottom, and every worker has the opportunity to discuss the wage he is getting. At such discussions every anomaly is considered, so that the workers come to a general agreement as to what rate of wages is fair. The collective agreement is drawn up on the basis of such discussions. The result is that, while wages vary considerably, everyone knows the reason for each particular wage. They know, therefore, how they can raise their own earnings; and in our discussion of equality of opportunity we have already seen that there is a chance for practically all workers to raise their qualifications if they wish to do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if earnings are unequal, some must live better than others. Is this Socialism? And, again, it is said that in the U.S.S.R. people may save, and that interest is actually paid by the State on savings, is this so? And may not a leisured class arise in the future as a result?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As far as saving is concerned, to take the latter question first, the Soviet Government actually paid interest on savings, at the rate of 7 and 8 percent until 1936. This was done during a period when every effort was being made throughout the country to build up the means of production. During such a period every voluntary economy in consumption was of value to the community, for it enabled more resources to be devoted to production. During the year 1936, however, by Government decree, the rate of interest was halved overnight. Savings had been increasing, and the urgency to encourage economy in consumption was declining. In the future, when the urgency to expand the means of production has fallen still further as compared with consumers’ goods, a further decree will abolish interest entirely.&lt;br /&gt;
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Interest, in the Soviet State, is a purely temporary phenomenon. In no way do the people who receive interest thereby control the general planning of the economic life of the country. They are not employers, and they cannot decide what shall be produced or who shall work, and under what conditions. They do not participate in planning the economic life of the country except as workers and wage-earners. And, as will be seen later, they have no political rights whatever, except as workers. Further, it is the law of the U.S.S.R. that “work is an obligation on all citizens.” So it is illegal for them to become a leisured section of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
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And now as to the question of unequal earnings. This inequality is a feature of Soviet society which has a definite and immediate purpose. This purpose is to achieve the greatest possible development of the forces of production as the only means of raising the general standard of life. And, right from the time of the Revolution, unequal wages have been paid in order to give the greatest stimulus to the best work. It is sometimes stated that the Soviet Union has “returned to” unequal wages comparatively recently. This is not true. Piece-wages have been paid since the Revolution; but, especially during the first Five Year Plan, there were a number of serious anomalies in wage-rates, so that certain skilled workers were paid less than unskilled, and good workers received no encouragement for their efforts. For that reason, during the first Five Year Plan, stress was laid on the need to work out rational wage-scales in all industries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is this Socialism? Karl Marx, the founder of the Communist Movement, considered that unequal earnings would be an essential feature of the first stage of Communist society. In 1875 he wrote that “as &#039;&#039;it emerges from capitalist society&#039;&#039;, which is thus tainted economically, morally, and intellectually with the hereditary diseases of the old society from whose womb it is emerging,” individuals will have to receive from society shares in the total product according to their work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“But one man will excel another physically or intellectually, and so contributes in the same time more labour, or can labour for a longer time.” Already, however, this first stage of Communism “recognizes no class differences, because every worker ranks as a worker like his fellows, but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus capacity for production, as natural privileges.” As soon as the means of production have been taken out of the hands of private employers, and are socially controlled by public organizations, whether the State, local authorities, or co-operatives, we have Socialism. Under this Socialist system all are workers, whether factory managers or unskilled labourers. But each earns according to his work, the rates of wages being fixed by the people themselves in the collective agreements between their trade unions and the employing organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that wages are not equal in the Soviet Union to-day must on no account be taken to imply that the workers do not receive more according to their needs than anywhere else. For, as compared with other countries in the world, the Soviet worker already receives many things according to his need. For example, in the case of housing, rent is charged at approximately 10 percent of earnings, so that he who earns most pays most. Similarly, when a worker is away from work owing to sickness, or because it is necessary to care for another sick person in the family, wages are paid out of the social insurance fund. Wages are paid to women for two months before and two months after childbirth, even though they are not called upon to work during this period. And if, by doctor’s orders, they must cease work sooner or return later, then they are relieved of work on full pay for a still longer period. Accommodation for children in nurseries, kindergartens, and meals for children at schools, are provided at prices which vary according to the means of the parents. Again, at holiday time, workers are given assistance, both by the factory administrations and by the trade unions, to enable them to have the best kind of holiday, both as recreation and for the benefit of their own health.&lt;br /&gt;
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The administering of social insurance, a vast task which affects the lives of over 20 million wage-earners, is completely in the hands of the Soviet trade unions. In every factory, and in every workshop, a member of the union has the “social work” of “insurance delegate,” and is responsible for visiting those who are ill, for seeing that they receive their insurance money, and, wherever necessary, for ensuring that extra help is obtained from the administration and from the social insurance funds. In needy cases it is the duty of this comrade to obtain passes for rest-homes and sanatoria.&lt;br /&gt;
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While such an insurance delegate is charged with the work of assisting those who are ill, it is also the work of such a delegate, representing the trade union, to prevent malingering. If a worker is off work through a street accident, and the insurance delegate finds that drunkenness was the cause, then that case will not receive great sympathy, and part of the insurance money may, in such a case, be withheld. Such a worker, of course, may appeal to the general meeting of the union, but his claim in such a case will probably not receive much sympathy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first decree of the Soviet Government dealing with social insurance was passed in 1917. All contributions to the social insurance fund were to be paid by the employers, and no contributions were to be lent from the workers. Where the State was the employer, it was responsible for making the necessary contributions. Benefit for absence from work through sickness or involuntary unemployment was to be at approximately average wages. The decree provided for “complete workers’ self-government of all insurance institutions.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The control of social insurance until 1933 was in the hands of the Commissariat of Labour, the department of State most able to deal with it. Then, in 1933, it was handed over completely to the trade unions, together with the work of factory inspection and the enforcing of the laws relating to the protection of labour. Sir Walter Citrine, commenting on this growth in the power of the trade unions, remarks that they “were not comparable to any other trade unions in the world. They were, so far as I could see, entrusted with functions which in other countries were carried out by the State itself. They were, in fact State organizations, and I could not see that they had really any separate existence” (op. cit., p. 185).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, on the other hand, after an exhaustive study of the internal administration of the U.S.S.R. such as Sir Walter Citrine could not begin to attempt in his tour of a few weeks, write as follows on this matter; “This vast addition to the work and influence of the Soviet trade unions has been curiously misunderstood in some quarters, as a degradation of their position to nothing more than friendly societies! But the trade unions retain and continue to exercise all the influence and authority in the administration of the factory and in the settlement of wages that they have possessed for the past fifteen years. The new control over social insurance, and the entire administration of funds and services of such magnitude, can hardly fail to strengthen the trade unions in their work of raising the standard of life of the workers, and even to knit more closely together their far-flung membership.”&lt;br /&gt;
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However, “the constitutional change, important as it is, will not make so much difference in the administration of social insurance as might be imagined by those conversant only with the constitutions of Western Europe or America. It is not, for instance, in any way comparable to the abolition in the United Kingdom of the Minister of Labour, and the transfer of his functions, with regard to unemployment insurance and wages boards, to the British Trades Union Congress and its General Council!” (op. cit., p. 203). For, as the Webbs point out, the Commissar of Labour had always been appointed in the U.S.S.R. from a panel submitted by the trade unions themselves! Sir Walter Citrine refers to the trade unions as State organizations, because they control factory inspection and social insurance. But the question is: Is it not a feature of a democratic State, that the trade unions, and not the State, should control such matters? Would it be to the benefit of the workers—75 percent of the population—or to their disadvantage, if their elected trade union representatives administered the social insurance system in Britain?&lt;br /&gt;
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The experience of the U.S.S.R. has shown that, even in a Socialist State, the official administrator of social insurances may become bureaucratic, and not pay sufficient attention to the individual needs of each case that comes before him. It was to prevent this that the administration of social insurance was turned over to the trade unions, so that to-day in the U.S.S.R. it is the directly elected representatives of the workers, and not employees of State departments, who administer the funds which the factories provide for the insurance of the workers against illness, disability, and old age; and in the case of women; pregnancy and childbirth.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly with regard to the protection of labour, at one time, in the U.S.S.R., the inspection of factories was controlled by a State department—the Commissariat of Labour. The trade unions, if dissatisfied with conditions in any particular place of work, were obliged to call in the expert from the Commissariat. To-day, however, a member of the trade union, elected at a meeting of the members, performs the social work of factory inspection. This “labour protection delegate” is responsible for seeing that the laws are observed and that workers shall receive their full rights.&lt;br /&gt;
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When I was working in a Soviet office, one of the typists complained that her table was too high. At that tine I was trade union organizer. On investigation, I found that the height of tables for typists in the U.S.S.R. is fixed by law. I called upon the labour protection delegate, and she insisted that the administration provide the typists with new tables. This was done within a few days.&lt;br /&gt;
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It has already been seen how the factory administration is responsible for the welfare of its workers. According to Soviet law, every organization must provide meeting and feeding facilities for its workers, accommodation for the trade union office, and nurseries and kindergartens for the children. It is for the trade union committee to see that the management carries out its obligations in these respects, and for this purpose special delegates are elected, to deal with communal feeding, with the care of children, and so on. It is the work of such delegates, out of the social insurance funds, to give assistance to large families with low wages, to arrange for the children of such families to spend their holidays in camps free of charge, and also to deal with such problems as overcrowded housing conditions. Such workers are also responsible for supervising the quality of service provided in the nurseries, kindergartens, and camps.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this way a low-paid worker with a family will receive considerable free services, provided out of State funds, and administered by elected trade union officials. In this way, too, families in overcrowded conditions may be found other accommodation, the trade union’s recommendations being taken into consideration by the administration whenever new accommodation becomes available.&lt;br /&gt;
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A further word is appropriate here about education. It has already been described how the workers in Soviet institutions have the opportunity for free training in various spheres. It remains to be added here that the suspension of such training, and the task of seeing that it is universally provided, rests with the trade union members themselves. Thus, during 1934 a campaign was started for classes in all Soviet enterprises for the raising of the qualifications of workers. The cost of the classes was to be borne by the administration, and students were to study half in their own time, and half in their working time. The actual organizing of the classes, the determination of what subjects should be studied, and who should be the teachers, were in the hands of the “cultural organizers” appointed by the trade union committees.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such cultural organizers, responsible to the trade union, are also responsible for all forms of leisure-time activity, such as amateur dramatics and sports. Funds for such activities come partly from the budget of the unions, partly from the “cultural fund” of the administration, to which a certain part of its income is devoted. In this way, while wages are strictly adjusted year by year in order to ensure that each worker shall earn according to his work, the social insurance fund, and other funds to which the various State organizations contribute, provide vast resources to be distributed almost entirely by the trade unions, to meet those needs of the workers that cannot be conveniently met out of their wages. In this way the needs of large families, the need for higher education, cultural life, and sport are satisfied on a scale which is quite out of proportion to the actual money wages.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another feature of Soviet trade union activity which must be mentioned, since it leads to the linking up of the trade unionists of the U.S.S.R. with members of other unions, with workers in other enterprises, and with citizens whom, otherwise, they might not meet at all, is the institution known as “patronage.” It has been described already how, when a group of workers in Socialist competition happen to surpass another group, or a factory beats another factory, the winner frequently in an organized way gives assistance to the loser. Such assistance is sometimes termed “patronage.”&lt;br /&gt;
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But such “patronage” also exists as a form of social co-operation between organizations of the most varied types; a factory trade union committee may conclude a “patronage agreement” with a regiment in the Red Army, or with a collective farm. By such an agreement the factory will send help to the collective farm during the harvest, and will supply it with certain industrial products throughout the year. The collective farm, in its turn, will supply the factory with agricultural products. In addition, social contact will be preserved between the parties to the agreement, and groups of workers and collective farmers will visit each other socially. Similarly, in the case of the Red Army, the regiment concerned will, among other things, teach the workers and collective farmers to use a rifle, the art of parachute jumping, and so on. In addition, it will come to the assistance of the factory in case of a breakdown, and to the assistance of the farm at harvest time. The members of the Red Army will attend social functions at the factory or farm, and workers and collective farmers will attend the functions of the Red Army, The workers in the factory will undertake certain technical jobs for their regiment; the collective farmers will send it agricultural produce. In this way the main sections of the Soviet population, workers, peasants, and soldiers, are brought into close social and practical contact with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again, we have referred to arrangements by which, under Soviet conditions, the amateur dramatics club at the factory obtains the assistance of professional theatrical workers. This, as a rule, is also arranged by the trade union. Sometimes they pay professional instructors, but on other occasions a “patronage” agreement is concluded with some theatre. In such a case as this the theatre workers undertake to give assistance to the factory dramatic group in their spare time, and the workers, in return, may undertake certain technical services for the theatre. Similarly, a well-known writer may take patronage over one or two workers’ literary circles. He will instruct them in their work. And he may try out his new books on them, and they will make their criticisms. In such a way the “intellectual” is brought into contact with the working masses of the population. How many first-class British writers to-day know the effect of their writings on the majority of the people—the 75 percent of wage-earners? Do they even imagine that the majority of the people—the wage-earners—might one day read their books?&lt;br /&gt;
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This brings us to another aspect of “patronage”—the connection between trade union and State. So far, in considering the trade union as representing the working people, as distinct from the administration appointee by the State, we have not dealt at all with the positive part played by the trade unions in administering the Soviet State itself. Actually, this question will be dealt with more fully in Chapter XIII, after we have described the basic structure of the Soviet State.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is important here to record the fact that the Soviet trade union organizes patronage, not only between collective farms and factories, factories and Red Army regiments, but also between factories and Government departments, Such as the Commissariats of Finance, of Health, of Education, and even over the office of the President of the U.S.S.R. himself, Comrade Kalinin. Thus, when working hours are over, a number of workers from the most important Moscow factories proceed to the offices of the Government, there to do important administrative work. And, locally, thousands of workers, when working hours are over, proceed to the offices of their local Soviet, there to work in its various departments. But this subject deserves almost a whole chapter to itself, and it shall have it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet enterprise, we find, is a complex community in which the organization of the working people, the trade union, plays a leading part. Personal responsibility on the part of everyone for his own job, together with collective responsibility for the work as a whole, is the characteristic of the Soviet enterprise. And collective responsibility means collective discussion and criticism; it means that the people must run their own affairs. Under such conditions, with a reasonable working day and reasonable holidays, the worker even on a conveyor retrieves something of the joy of the craftsman. The factory is his, and he and his fellows benefit from more efficient and increasing production. He can always plan improvements in the productive processes, and knows that they will be adopted. Even on what, in itself, is the least interesting work, a certain standard of excellence can be obtained, and Socialist competition introduces even into the sweeping of a floor some of the thrill of a game of football. Under these conditions the Soviet worker feels that he is working for himself and for all, and he takes a pride in even the simplest work, a pride which it is hard to feel when the result is entirely to the benefit of somebody else, and when the greater the result, the nearer is brought the spectre of unemployment in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Co-operatives in a Co-operative Commonwealth ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union the land and the factories, the mines and the dwelling-houses, are owned either by the State or by co-operative societies. And the State, as we shall see in detail in Part II, represents the people who work. It seems fair, then, to give to the Soviet State the title of “Co-operative Commonwealth.” But, once the State itself is a co-operative organization of the people, there is no longer a conflict in principle between State organizations and co-operative societies. In some spheres the State may perform functions more effectively; in others, the co-operatives. It is in this light that we must approach the problem of co-operation in the U.S.S.R. at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consumers’ co-operation was encouraged in Tsarist Russia as one of the few working-class activities which the police considered “safe.” The people who ran the co-operatives under such conditions were not the types that, in 1917, were likely to support the Revolution. However, as co-operation was an extremely important means of combating the private trader in the interests of the working-class consumers, the Soviet State gave every encouragement to the development of co-operative societies of consumers. These did not pay dividends, but supplied goods at lower prices than the private traders. When the private traders put a new product on the market, the co-operatives sold it cheaper, and the community gained as a result. By 1934 there were about 73 million members of consumers’ co-operative societies in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet co-operators elect their management committees. The various committees hold congresses, and a federal union of all consumers’ co-operative organizations, Centrosoyuz, co-ordinates all the co-operative trading in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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But co-operative trade has certain disadvantages. The most important of these, particularly to the town dweller, is the need to purchase in special shops, often some way from home. In a village, where distances anyway are not great, such an inconvenience is reduced to a minimum.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soon after the beginning of the first Five Year Plan in 1928 the opening of co-operative shops at factories and other places of work began to take place on a large scale. At the same time, during the years 1926 to 1939, private trade was practically extinguished by heavy taxation on all private traders. The co-operatives were left with an almost complete monopoly of trade.&lt;br /&gt;
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During this period, owing to the rapid growth of the town population, leading to a great increase in the demand for all products consumed by the working people, and owing to the reorganization of agriculture on a co-operative basis, which caused a temporary fall in the supply of foodstuffs, rationing of all food products and many industrial products was introduced as a temporary measure. Through the co-operatives, rationed quantities of goods could be obtained at comparatively low prices. Extra quantities could be obtained at State shops, but much higher prices were charged.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, in 1931, I started to work in the U.S.S.R., the former importance of co-operatives as a means of carrying on trade in the interests of the consumer, in competition with private traders who traded for profit, had more or less dwindled to nothing. Since there were no longer private traders, it was possible to purchase rationed goods at low prices in the cooperatives, or unrationed goods in co-operative or other shops at high prices. The quantity of the rations allowed, and the general level of prices were already being fixed by the State. It was no surprise to me, or to others who were working in the Soviet Union when, in 1932, the co-operatives which were attached to the factories were transferred to the control of the factory administration.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a result of this change, the manager of the factory shop, instead of being appointed by a committee elected by the customers, was appointed by the administration of the factory. At first sight this suggests that the control over the shop by the workers was slackened, but this was not the case. For, as we have shown, the representatives of the trade union participate in the management of the Soviet factories. When, in 1932, the co-operatives were transferred to the factory management, this simply meant the replacing of one form of workers’ control by another. Previously, the co-operators had elected a special committee to run the shop. Now the trade union committee appointed a delegate to supervise the running of the shop in the interests of all the workers. But the director of the factory was now responsible for seeing that the shop obtained adequate supplies. In this way the shop, like the dining-room and housing, became one of the responsibilities of the factory management, controlled by the trade union committee.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since there was no longer private trade, this question of the status of co-operative trade and State trade no longer was a matter of principle, but of expediency. Whether the State controlled trade, or co-operative societies, in either case it was the people themselves. It was necessary simply to procure the best system of organization. And it proved that the director, together with the trade union committee of a factory, was more capable of controlling the work of the shop than a co-operative committee had been; for they represented the same people, but formed a more powerful body. The factory administration, it was found, was more able to supply the needs of the workers, for it was more influential in getting supplies than a committee whose only justification for existence was the running of a single shop.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outside the factory, until 1935, the co-operatives had their own shops. However, with the growth of State trade the decisive factor in price-fixing became the State. As a result, all difference between co-operative prices and State prices disappeared. With the abolition of rationing, which rapidly followed the record harvest of 1933, it became no longer expedient for workers to be attached to particular shops where they drew their rations. As a result, all shops were thrown open to the public, and all goods were sold at uniform prices. This led, in 1935, to a Government decree which transferred all the co-operatives in the towns to the Commissariat of Home Trade. At the same time it was pointed out that in the villages the main distributing apparatus was still in the hands of the co-operatives, and that these were not adequately meeting the rising demands of the villagers. It was, therefore, decreed that all their resources should thenceforth be devoted to the supplying of the needs of the villages.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the winter of 1935 and 1936 I visited certain villages a considerable distance from Moscow. The co-operative shops were well stocked with goods. Turnover had greatly increased since the decree had abolished co-operative trade in the towns. Nobody that I met looked upon the change as anything but an improvement, both in town and country. In the country, the co-operatives supplied goods which had previously gone to the town shops. In the towns, the Commissariat of Home Trade redecorated the shops of the co-operatives and re-stocked them with those increasing supplies of goods which industry was making available. At the same time prices continued to fall, while the quality of goods improved.&lt;br /&gt;
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But such a change, it may be suggested, while it may have improved supplies, was an attack on the self-government of consumers. The answer to this is that, under Soviet conditions, it would be quite incorrect to suggest that the State shop is not subject to the control of the consumer. As a State concern, there is Socialist competition between the State shops, as there is between the State factories. The workers in the shops are interested in giving good service, just as the workers in the factories are interested in turning out good products. But, secondly, the consumer is invited to participate in judging such Socialist competition. No Soviet shop is without a “complaints book,” in which customers write their comments. Bad service may be reported, not only to the Commissariat of Home Trade, or to the local Soviet, but to the Press, and, as will be shown in the next chapter, the Soviet Press is one of the main ways of ventilating criticism. Finally, the State shops organize from time to time conferences of consumers, to discuss what goods should be supplied, and how the shops should be run.&lt;br /&gt;
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Returning from Moscow to London in 1936, I discovered that, whereas three years previously I had found London bearing an aspect of a land of plenty in comparison with Moscow, in 1936 no such contrast was visible. And when I went to buy some luscious fruit in a London shop and was given goods which were about half the size of those displayed in the window, I realized what it was to be once more in a land of private trade! For in the U.S.S.R., both in the State shops in the towns and in the co-operatives in the villages, the goods supplied are the goods which are displayed. Since trade is not for profit and since the plan of every co-operative and State shop includes the supply of given &#039;&#039;quantities&#039;&#039; of goods of given &#039;&#039;quality&#039;&#039;, there is no motive for adulteration, or for the sale of inferior goods. Of course, it still sometimes happens that a worker in a Soviet shop may try to make a small personal profit by selling inferior goods at the price of superior ones. But in the U.S.S.R. this is a criminal offence, while in Britain it is good business!&lt;br /&gt;
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Consumers’ co-operation in the U.S.S.R. to-day continues in the Soviet villages, where there are about 40,000 co-operative shops. In the future, the question of whether the co-operative or the State shop will be the final centre of village trade will be decided, not as a matter of principle, but as a matter of expediency. If, with the growth of the production of consumers’ goods, the Commissariat of Home Trade opens shops in the villages, and if, as a result of its centralization and vast economic resources, it is able to give better service than the co-operatives, then State trade will replace co-operative trade. If, on the other hand, the efficiency of co-operative trade exceeds that of State trade, then the co-operatives will remain supreme. Essentially, no matter of principle is now involved, for in the U.S.S.R. the State itself is a vast co-operative commonwealth, and the existence of co-operatives within co-operatives, a complex structure of wheels within wheels, is only justified in so far as better service is provided as a result.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another example of co-operation, of considerable importance in the Soviet town, is the housing cooperative. One of the first decrees of the Soviet Government in 1917 transferred all existing housing accommodation to the local Soviets, to be distributed according to the needs of the population. They were also empowered to build houses. But at that time there were vast demands on the resources of all Soviet authorities, both local and national. The Soviet State, therefore, also encouraged the formation of housing cooperatives, societies of individuals who desired to obtain better accommodation and who subscribed to the cooperative a certain portion of their income towards the building of blocks of flats. Such co-operatives were run by the members, who elected their boards of management and paid their own officials. At the present time a substantial portion of the housing accommodation in Soviet cities belongs to such co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet housing co-operative an elected committee of the members is responsible for supervising the building of the houses. As each building is completed, the members who are first on the list move into the flats. For the administration of the house they elect their own house committee, which employs a paid manager to carry on the work of administration. The manager is responsible for collecting rent, which is fixed at about 10 percent of the earnings of each householder.&lt;br /&gt;
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This rent goes entirely to the upkeep of the house, central heating and water supply, repairs and the decoration of the flats. Out of this 10 percent the manager is paid, and the house committee is responsible for seeing that the funds are wisely expended. Sometimes, of course, there may be a gross act of mismanagement. In a house where I lived for over a year in Moscow the manager absconded, with a balance of 6,000 roubles! An emergency meeting of the inhabitants was called and a new committee was elected, instructed to be more vigilant in their appointment of a new manager. I do not know whether the militia caught the thief, and whether the money was recovered, as I left Moscow soon after.&lt;br /&gt;
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I do not tell of this incident as being in any way typical. But it is essential for the reader always to remember that Soviet citizens are human beings like everybody else, with their merits and their frailties. So long as there exist individualists in Soviet Society, putting their immediate private interests before those of the community, there will be cases of persons in positions of trust betraying this trust. Such cases are dealt with by the Soviet courts of law as criminal offences; they have not yet been completely stamped out.&lt;br /&gt;
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With regard to housing, then, we find a widespread system of co-operation, in which the dwellers in blocks of flats govern their own affairs. In cases where houses are owned by the local Soviet, as is the case with the greater part of town housing, or by industrial enterprises, as occurs in certain cases, the system of management is in general similar to that of the co-operatives. In these cases the house manager, however, is appointed by the local housing trust, subject to the authority of the Soviet, or by the administration of the factory, subject to the co-operation of the union, instead of by the elected committee of the inhabitants. At the same time, however, a house committee is also elected by the inhabitants in all State-owned houses, and the manager must work in co-operation with this committee, spending the money collected in rents on repairs and renewals, and in the general interest of the occupants.&lt;br /&gt;
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The elected house committee is the Soviet, substitute for the private landlord; the actual owner of Soviet houses is either the State or a co-operative of the occupants. Ultimately, it is clear, as in the case of consumers’ co-operation, the system of housing control will develop according to expediency. If administration by the committees of co-operatives proves less efficient than administration by the State housing trusts, the latter will replace the former. If otherwise, the cooperative houses will develop in relation to the State houses. This is a matter which the future will decide.&lt;br /&gt;
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So far we have been concerned with those forms of co-operative organization of which the ordinary wage-earners are members. But not all producers in the U.S.S.R. are wage-earners; a vast number of them are members of producers’ co-operatives. In industry, a very small part of total production is carried on by co-operatives of producers. In agriculture, by far the greatest part of the total output is produced in cooperatives of peasants, collective farms. Since, in principle, the organization of an industrial co-operative in no way differs from that of agriculture, and since agricultural co-operation is by far the most important form of producers’ co-operation in the U.S.S.R., we shall examine in detail the organization of the collective agriculture, bearing in mind that, in the towns, on a small scale, similar organizations of industrial producers also exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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From the very foundation of the Soviet State encouragement was given to the peasants, small individual producers, to pool their land and instruments of production, and to farm on a large scale. It was emphasized that the peasants themselves must organize such co-operative farms on their own initiative, and that such a system, if enforced from above, would not work because it would not have the support of the people who, in the nature of things, had to run it. But so long as the actual method of cultivation was limited to the wooden plough there was little to be gained from cultivating the land in large areas rather than in small strips. Therefore collectivization did not take place on a large scale during the first decade of the Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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But so long as agriculture continued to be carried on by the individual peasant households, each working on its own little strip of land, it was bound to be inefficient. Therefore the supply of food to the people of the country was bound to be constantly menaced as a result of a bad harvest. For this reason alone it was essential to introduce large-scale farming. And this could only be done in one of two ways. On the one hand, the same method could have been adopted as had been adopted everywhere else in the world—the subsidizing of every farmer who was better off than the majority, helping him to become a large-scale farmer with many possessions and many labourers. But this, it will be noted, would have meant capitalism in the village, and the employment of labour by private individuals for profit.&lt;br /&gt;
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This system was turned down by the Soviet Government, as giving rise to a new powerful capitalist class controlling the main food supplies of the country, and thus a menace to the very existence of the Soviet State itself. The remedy for the backwardness of Soviet agriculture had to be a Socialist remedy, and must be, as Stalin pointed out in 1928, “in a transition from small, backward, and scattered peasant farming to concentrated, large-scale social farms, equipped with machinery, armed with the knowledge of science, and capable of producing the maximum quantity of marketable grain. The solution lies in the transition in agriculture from individual peasant farming to collective and communal farming” (Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, Vol. II, p. 102).&lt;br /&gt;
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This transition was not easy. It was necessary to persuade the peasants to undertake the new methods. But that could only be done by making available for them the modern machinery which is essential to efficient large-scale production. Again, it was essential to show them that this increased production would enable them to obtain larger quantities of industrial products and to raise their standard of life. As Stalin put it in 1928; “We must maintain the present rate of development of industry, and, at the first opportunity, still more accelerate it, in order to pour cheap goods into the rural districts and obtain from them the maximum amount of grain; in order to supply machines to agriculture, particularly to the collective and Soviet farms, and in order to industrialize agriculture and increase its marketable surplus” (ibid., p. 108).&lt;br /&gt;
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From 1928 onwards a widespread campaign was started to draw the peasants into collective farms. They were offered agricultural machinery and modern fertilizers, together with the assistance of trained experts, if they would pool their land and their instruments of production, elect their own boards of management, and farm the land co-operatively. For four years the countryside was in a state of turmoil. The peasants had no experience of large-scale agriculture, or of co-operative and disciplined large-scale production. Through the Soviets they had administered education and health services, and had built roads. But they had not had any experience at collectively managing the complicated processes of production, and they were not acquainted with modern methods.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new system was violently opposed in the village by those few peasants who had larger farms, and who were small employers. They knew that they would lose their power in the new collectives, and used every method to prevent the success of the new co-operative system. As a result, the level of agricultural production sharply fell, and only began to recover with the record harvest of 1933, a record for the whole of Russian history.&lt;br /&gt;
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Naturally the details of the best form of organization for the collective farms had to be worked out as a result of experience. Many changes were made as work proceeded, and only in 1935 was a special congress called, of the best collective farmers elected from all over the U.S.S.R., to adopt a “model constitution” for all the collective farms throughout the country. This congress discussed in detail a project submitted by the Government, a number of alterations were made, and then the model constitution was finally adopted by the congress. The Government accepted the draft which the congress put forward, and this has since become the basic structure of every collective farm.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the collective farm all the land is cultivated collectively with the exception of small plots surrounding the houses of the members, which may be used by the peasant families for their own purposes as gardens and orchards and grazing-ground for small livestock. All instruments of cultivation, with the exception of simple gardening tools, are owned by the collective. All livestock, with the exception of a few animals for household use, is also owned by the collective.&lt;br /&gt;
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The management of the collective farm is in the hands of an elected committee of the members. The management is allowed to appoint members to different jobs throughout the collective. The work is done in “brigades,” each with its own responsibilities, and competing with each other for the best results, just like groups of factory workers. The members of the collective farm do not draw wages, since they are not employees but joint owners. Each year, after the harvest, the total year’s income is calculated, in terms of revenue from the sale of products during the year together with all unsold produce in hand. After all debts have been paid, a certain quota is set aside for the following year’s seed fund, for the extension of the farm, and for social services to members. According to the model statutes, not more than 10 percent of the total revenue goes to this latter purpose. The rest is divided among the inhabitants, “to each according to his work.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The unit by which work is measured in the collective farm is the “work-day.” This is roughly the amount of work which an ordinary unskilled worker can do in an eight-hour day. More than eight hours of ordinary unskilled work, or eight hours of skilled work, count as more than one work-day. A tractor driver in eight hours may be credited with, say, two work-days, as a skilled worker. The actual rates, like the actual rates of wages in the factory, are determined at general meetings.&lt;br /&gt;
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I remember, in a village near Moscow, listening to an indignant old peasant woman, very rheumatic, who was furious because, during twelve hours’ work in the fields, she had not earned credit for one work-day. When I realized, however, that she was over seventy, and was already in receipt of an invalid pension, this fact hardly reacted to the discredit of the collective. If pensioned invalids of seventy were estimated to be only 30 percent less efficient than the healthy collective farmer, this would not say much either, for the average collective farmer or the system! I calmed the old lady by telling her that she should bring up the matter at the next meeting, and she showed signs of anticipating a really good row when the next general meeting was held!&lt;br /&gt;
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In another collective farm, run by German peasants in the Ukraine, a large notice-board in the office displayed the names of all the members of the collective, with their earnings in terms of work-days every month. The manager received a regular 40 work-days a month, whereas the skilled workers, tractor drivers, milkmaids, and so on, received up to 60 and 70 work-days. In this farm, as a result of careful accounting, every member received an advance every month on the estimated year’s income. The manager told me with pride that neighbouring farms were now going to copy this method.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet factory, as we have seen, and also in the State farms which cultivate a small proportion of the total area of the U.S.S.R., the administrative staff is appointed by the public authorities, and the trade union is the representative organization of the working people. In the collective farm the managerial staff is elected by the members, and must organize production in the general interest, and also supervise the social services and the raising of the general cultural life of the community. The collective farm, as a self-governing organization of citizens, is similar in status to a trade union. Its functions include, however, the organization of production, as well as the provision of insurance for its members against sickness and old age, communal feeding establishments, nurseries and kindergartens, and opportunities for higher education on the part of its members. Part of its funds, according to the decisions of general meetings, are devoted also to cultural and sport activities, the building of clubs and theatres and rest-homes for the members.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is common nowadays in the U.S.S.R. to meet peasant students in the universities, sent there by their collective farms. In such cases maintenance allowances are often paid by the collective farms themselves to their members who are studying. There are collective farms which have their own theatres, built out of their own funds together with grants from the State, and which have permanent repertory companies.&lt;br /&gt;
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And in the collective farm, as in the factory, Socialist competition and the wall-newspaper are universal features. Even the Stakhanov Movement, originating in a coal-mine, has spread through the collective farms of the U.S.S.R., The cultivator of sugar-beet, Maria Demchenko, has won fame throughout the country for the results which have been obtained under her leadership in a collective farm in the Ukraine. And not only do we read of Maria Demchenko on her farm, but also of how she, together with leading Stakhanov workers from all over the U.S.S.R., has visited Moscow and attended conferences with the Government. At such a conference Maria Demchenko promised Stalin that she would obtain a certain yield of sugar-beets on her land, and fulfilled that promise. The Soviet Government frequently summons conferences of the leading workers in all branches of Soviet life, Stakhanov and Maria Demchenko meet Kalinin, Molotov, and Stalin, discuss their problems, and their plans for the future. In this relationship with the working people the Soviet Government is simply repeating what every Government has always done in relation to the ruling class; it holds conferences with them to discuss policy. In the Soviet Constitution there is nothing to say that the Government shall hold conferences of workers to discuss policy with them, but, as a workers’ Government, it does hold such conferences. In Britain there is no law staling that the Government shall discuss matters behind the scenes with big business and the bankers, but we know that on the quiet it does hold such discussions, and the opinions of these people go a very long way towards determining the essentials of Government policy. In the U.S.S.R., however, such conferences take place in the open, as part of the recognized working of Soviet democracy, whereas, in the British system, conferences between Government and bankers are more often than not held on the quiet, since it is not considered expedient to advertise the extent to which a small plutocracy influences policy in our kind of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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While co-operatives both of consumers and producers in the Soviet town are to-day of comparatively small importance, in the village they exist on a vast scale, both for consumption and production. The collective farm is the main form of productive organization in the Soviet countryside, and will continue to be so as long as co-operative production proves to be more efficient than State farming.&lt;br /&gt;
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And why, it may be asked, has collective farming proved more popular than working in State farms? Is it that the material conditions are superior?&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, up to the present, it cannot be said that in general the material conditions of collective farmers are necessarily better than those of workers doing similar work on a State farm. Where a collective farm reaps a good harvest, the members perhaps receive more than workers on the State farms doing similar work for a regular wage. But if the harvest is poor, then the collective farmers receive less than those who, on a State farm, are guaranteed a fixed wage for a given amount of work, whatever the harvest may be like.&lt;br /&gt;
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No, it is not the actual material standard which determines the attitude of the Soviet peasantry to collective farming. The peasant for centuries, however poor he has been, has cultivated his own land, and has owned his own means of production, however primitive. Only when economic conditions became intolerable was it usual for the peasants to leave their plots of land, and to trek to the towns in search of work as wage-earners. Certainly, the rise in the status of the wage-earner which has taken place since the Soviets seized power has made wage-earning more attractive to the peasantry, but they still like to exercise direct ownership over their means of production, rather than indirect, through the State.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a result of this attitude the peasants of the U.S.S.R. have shown an enthusiasm for forming their own producers’ co-operative organizations and running them themselves, which they never showed for becoming wage-earners in State farms. It is as a result of this preference of the people for a particular form of organization that this form has become widespread throughout the countryside. In the future, according to the desires of the people themselves, collective farms may, or may not, change their form, and may, or may not, become indistinguishable, as regards their organization, from the State farms and other enterprises which are run by the State at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A People&#039;s Press ===&lt;br /&gt;
In Tsarist Russia, 80 percent of the population was unable to read or write. In the first decree of the Commissar of Education, after October 1917, it was stated, as has been already pointed out, that “every democratic power must, in the domain of education, in a country where illiteracy and ignorance reign supreme, make its first aim the struggle against this darkness. It must acquire in the shortest time &#039;&#039;universal literacy&#039;&#039;”. The people, under the Soviets, began to learn to read and write, to read the newspapers and to write in them. For, as we have also already seen, the newspaper has been introduced into every organization in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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The making of the Press really available to the people was not something which could be done without procuring the necessary supplies of paper and ink, and the printing presses with which newspapers are printed. But in 1917, when the Soviets seized State power, these things were practically all in the hands of the well-to-do—of those who were rich enough to own newspapers, the employers of labour. Therefore it is not surprising to find, in the first Soviet Constitution of 1918, the following clause: “To ensure for the workers effective liberty of opinion, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic puts an end to the dependence of the Press upon capital; transfers to the working class and to the peasants all technical and material resources necessary for the publication of newspapers, pamphlets, books, and other printed matter: and guarantees their unobstructed circulation throughout the country.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet Government realized that freedom of the Press could only exist together with the ownership of the printing presses and the other means for publishing newspapers. Therefore, so long as the printing presses and stocks of paper were in the hands of the well-to-do, there was only freedom of the Press for the well-to-do. Effective freedom of the Press for the working people could only be guaranteed by giving the ownership of the newspapers to these same working people. Hence the abolition of the private Press in the early days of the Revolution; its place being taken by the Press of the people themselves, from their wall-newspapers in the factories to the newspapers of the Soviet State itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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The policy of putting an end to illiteracy, together with the transferring of the printing presses to the organizations of the working people, caused a tremendous development of the Press. The percentage of adult citizens who can read and write in the Soviet Union to-day is about 90. The daily circulation of newspapers has increased from 2·7 million in 1913 to 36·4 million in 1934, and the planned circulation for 1937 is 66 million. The only limit to the circulation of a Soviet newspaper to-day is the amount of paper available, so that we see how such a cultural question as the availability of literature has its economic foundation. Any evening in Moscow to-day, queues are visible about five o’clock, waiting for the evening paper. After an hour or, so all copies may be sold out. But this is not due to a shortage of papers compared with old Russia, for the circulation has greatly increased. It is due to the fact that the demand is now so great that limited resources of paper prevent enough being printed.&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be a mistake to consider the large printed papers, whose daily circulation has been stated, to be fully representative of the Press in the Soviet Union. For, in addition to national and local papers, there are the factory papers and news-sheets, and the wall-newspapers which are everywhere. In considering the Press we must remember all these, from the wall-newspaper in the factory to the greatest national newspapers, &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039;, organ of the Government; &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, the newspaper of the Party; and &#039;&#039;Trud&#039;&#039;, the paper of the trade unions.&lt;br /&gt;
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For some months, while working in Moscow, I was the editor of a wall-newspaper. Compared with the editorship of any kind of newspaper or magazine in Britain, work on a Soviet publication is particularly onerous, for the editor, whether of the wall-newspaper in a workshop or of one of the national papers, has certain obligations which do not exist for the newspaper editor under capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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We all read, from time to time, the correspondence columns of our newspapers. We know how readers express their views on every subject under the sun. We also know that, as far as the editor is concerned, his only job is to see that the most interesting letters are printed, and, when heated controversies show signs of becoming out of hand, to terminate them abruptly with the short note in italics: “&#039;&#039;This correspondence is now closed&#039;&#039;”.&lt;br /&gt;
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The editorial committee of a Soviet newspaper, whether of a factory wall-newspaper or of the Government’s newspaper &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039;, does not deal with its correspondence in this light-handed way. For on every Soviet newspaper, from the very smallest to the very largest, there are members of the editorial staff whose entire work is to deal with the complaints of readers, to investigate these complaints, and to see what can be done to remedy their grievances, if any real grievances exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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To the wall-newspaper, for example, a worker may write to say that, after being off work owing to illness, he did not receive the full amount due to him. Another may write to say that a certain foreman appeared at work with the signs of drink on him, and such a writer may include a cartoon of the foreman concerned! Another may say that the safety devices on certain machines are inadequate; and another may write that, in spite of continual complaints, the administration continues to delay in the supplying of materials, and as a result the workers are being held up at their job.&lt;br /&gt;
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The editorial staff of the wall-newspaper, receiving these topical comments on the life of the factory, is under an obligation, not merely to publish them, but to investigate the complaints; and to publish the letters with a statement of what has been done to redress the grievances expressed. In the case of the inadequate insurance money, the social insurance delegate must be asked to investigate. If he considers that there has been no injustice, he will be asked to write a short reply. If there has been an injustice, then the editorial board will announce that the matter has been set right. In the case of the foreman, if the facts are as stated, the article and cartoon will most certainly appear, with still more caustic remarks by the editorial staff, and possibly an appeal to the administration to take disciplinary measures. In the case of safety devices, this is a matter for the labour protection delegate of the trade union, who will be asked to make a statement on the matter. And, finally, where the administration holds up the supplies of materials it is the job of the editorial board itself to move heaven and earth to make the administration take the necessary steps to supply materials on time, and thus to avoid the delays.&lt;br /&gt;
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The work of the editorial board of a wall-newspaper, then, is not simply the publication of a newspaper. It is also the investigation of complaints and the removal of grievances; so that the Press becomes an effective weapon of the people in the fight for better conditions in every respect. The national Press of the U.S.S.R. in no way differs from the local Press in this matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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It will be remembered by many readers how, during the years of the first Five Year Plan, the most harrowing stories appeared in our Press in Britain about the failure of one large Soviet factory after another to achieve the planned output. And, to the confusion of the British reader who was sympathetic to the Soviet Union, Soviet sources would usually be quoted as the basis for these stories. We would read how at Stalingrad, for example, two tractors would come off the conveyor on one day, thirty the next, then a hundred, and then down to two again as some process in the production went wrong and held up the whole job. And editorial comments in the British Press would ruthlessly point out that “these Russians” would never learn to run machinery, and the whole Five Year Plan was therefore a giant fiasco.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in spite of this adverse comment, and in spite of, or perhaps because of, the fact that it was the Soviet Press which gave full publicity to the difficulties of Stalingrad and other vast new enterprises, they have pulled through. And when we look more closely at the kind of facts which received such loud publicity at that time we find that all these difficulties and disorders which accompanied the first Five Year Plan were not necessarily peculiar to Soviet conditions, but operate in one form or another in every new large industrial enterprise anywhere. The fundamental difference between such enterprises in the U.S.S.R. and similar ones in capitalist countries is that in the Soviet Union their every difficulty was publicized in the Press, whereas, in the conditions of capitalism, the same difficulties are completely hushed up!&lt;br /&gt;
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Suppose that a new Ford plant, after it has started working, for a few weeks turns out only half the planned output. Suppose that this story leaks into the Press. Down go the shares of Ford Ltd.; the credit of the firm seriously suffers; panic results. Such a panic, in certain cases, is all that is necessary to ruin a new firm which is just starting to operate its first factory.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in the Soviet Union every one of those same difficulties, hushed up under capitalism because they damage the reputation of a firm, are given the fullest publicity in the Press. For, by interesting the whole of the people in those things which are unsatisfactory as well as in those which are satisfactory, the Soviet Press stimulates citizens to improve matters, and as a result the whole community is benefited.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is as a result of this policy that, in the Soviet Press, the most appalling stories of all kinds of public abuses are given publicity. I remember how, a few years ago, a certain anti-Soviet propagandist organization in this country issued a leaflet containing parallel quotations from the British publication &#039;&#039;Russia To-day&#039;&#039; and from the Soviet Trade Union newspaper &#039;&#039;Trud&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;Labour&#039;&#039;). In &#039;&#039;Russia To-day&#039;&#039; it was stated, for example, that 1,000 new nurseries had been opened for the working-class mothers. And, from &#039;&#039;Trud&#039;&#039;, there was quoted a horrifying story of how, in the town of, say, Minsk, at the “Hammer and Sickle” Factory, a new crèche had been opened where the floors were damp, and where, in the near neighbourhood, there was a pig-sty, the smell of which infected the whole establishment. By taking a whole series of such monstrosities, quoted in &#039;&#039;Trud&#039;&#039; as examples of disgraceful work on the part of one or another trade union organization, or on the part of the administration of one or another factory, the leaflet was able to offset each statement from &#039;&#039;Russia To-day&#039;&#039; about vast developments affecting the lives of 170 million people with a story of one fiasco, affecting the lives of some 1,000 people at the most, quoted in the Soviet Press in order to reduce such disorders to a minimum.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet citizen, writing to a newspaper in the Soviet Union, is aware of the fact that in expressing his opinion he is starting a sequence of actions which will, if his complaints are justified, lead to the removal of the grievance. In this way the Soviet citizen enjoys effective expression of opinion of a twofold nature. First, he can complain in the Press about things which, in other countries, it is impossible for the ordinary worker to criticize at all. Second, he knows that, when he has spoken, the authorities concerned will take action to see that the grievance is dealt with.&lt;br /&gt;
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When I say that similar people, in other countries, cannot give public expression to the kind of very vital complaints which find their way in thousands into the Soviet Press, I have in mind the fact that, in Britain to-day, if I wish to express dissatisfaction about the service rendered by a firm or by an organization, or with the work of an individual, I have no right to call the attention of public opinion to the matter. For, in Britain, the airing of any grievance, however justifiable, against a person, or against an organization, if it is likely to damage their business or their reputation is libellous, and the person airing such a grievance may be sued for it. Not only do private firms hush up the kind of difficulties to which the Soviet Press gave publicity in the case of Stalingrad, but ordinary citizens, with grievances against all kinds of organizations and officials, are not permitted to direct public opinion to such grievances through the Press. The only form of action which is possible is litigation, and the cost of this is such that only major grievances of the well-to-do can be adequately settled in this way.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet Press, then, gives voice to two lands of criticism which are more or less non-existent in the Press of Britain: criticism of the working of all kinds of public institutions; and criticism of the working of responsible persons. Both these kinds of criticism, in a country of private enterprise, would be damaging to the firms concerned, also to the authority of employers over workers, and are therefore taboo.&lt;br /&gt;
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In discussing the wall-newspaper in the factory, at an earlier stage, we raised the question of control and editorship. And we saw that the editor of the wall-newspaper was appointed by the trade union committee elected by, and responsible to, the workers. How are the national newspapers controlled?&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no difference in principle between the control of the wall-newspaper in the factory, which is the organ of the participation in that factory, and the control of &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, or &#039;&#039;Trud&#039;&#039;, the three main newspapers of the U.S.S.R. For in the Soviet Union all the Press is in the hands of the organizations of the working people, from their factory trade union committee on the one hand, to their national Trade Union General Council, their Government, and the Central Committee of their Party on the other. In the factory, the editor of the wall-newspaper is appointed by and responsible to the trade union in that factory. On an All-Union scale, the editor of &#039;&#039;Trud&#039;&#039;, the central organ of the Soviet trade unions, is appointed by and responsible to the General Council of the Trade Unions. The Moscow evening paper is edited by a person appointed by and responsible to the Moscow Soviet. The All-Union Government newspaper, &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039;, is edited by someone who is appointed by and responsible to the Government of the U.S.S.R. &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, the newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., is edited by someone appointed by and responsible to the Central Committee of the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to the myriads of publications of the trade unions, the local Soviets and the All-Union Government, together with the various State departments and the Party, there are a number of further publications—weekly and monthly magazines—which are issued by the State Publishing House, and children’s periodicals, issued by the Children’s Publishing House.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a vast variety of publications, published by different organizations. But all these organizations have one feature in common—they are organizations responsible to the people, and not private firms owned by well-to-do individuals and working for profit.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is only when the nature of the control of the Soviet Press is understood that we see that there is an absolutely fundamental difference between the “freedom of the press” which is guaranteed in the Soviet Constitutions—and always has been—and the “freedom of the press” which exists in Britain at the present time. If we look at the circulation of newspapers in Britain to-day, we find that an overwhelming majority of the daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers and magazines are private property, run for profit, and owned by those who are sufficiently wealthy to own newspapers. The &#039;&#039;Daily Herald&#039;&#039;, incidentally, in which a majority of the shares is owned by a joint-stock company, must be included in this category. In contrast with this there stand out the &#039;&#039;Daily Worker&#039;&#039;, the publication of the Communist Party, and &#039;&#039;Reynolds&#039;s Newspaper&#039;&#039;, published by the Co-operative Movement, as the only national newspapers in the country which can even profess to represent working-class organizations. And yet 75 percent of the people of Britain are wage-earners. Then there are the various smaller weeklies and monthlies, among which the trade union and co-operative journals amount to a small proportion of the total. And, if we look at any bookstall in any railway station, or go into any newsagent’s, we again find that the overwhelming majority of the publications for sale are those, not of organizations of the working people, who are 75 percent of the population, but of the small minority, amounting to about 1 percent of the population of Britain, who in effect own the Press of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is absolutely true, of course, that in Britain, as compared with a Fascist country, working-class organizations have the right to publish their own newspapers and magazines, on condition that they have the necessary funds to do so. To this extent they are better off than they would be under Fascism. But a glance at the average bookstall, or at a list of the newspapers published in this country to-day, is sufficient to show that the freedom of the Press that actually does exist to-day operates in favour of the owners of property and against the organizations of the majority of the population, the wage-earners.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Soviet Russia, “in the interests of effective freedom of expression for the working people,” the Press was transferred from private hands to the organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. We have surveyed the results of this transfer of the ownership of the Press. And we have seen that the working citizen of the U.S.S.R. enjoys an effective freedom of expression, in two ways, which is not enjoyed by him in other countries. First, the material in the newspapers is what he writes, and not what a privileged few write for his consumption. Secondly, what he writes is effective in the sense that it leads to concrete action being taken against abuses, bad practices, inefficiency, and injustice. Compared with other countries, freedom of expression for the Soviet working citizen is a doubly effective weapon, a two-edged sword against all those who, through malice or laziness, negligence or simple inefficiency, obstruct the rapid raising of the general material and cultural level of the people. The Soviet Press can truly claim to be democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Certain readers may, at this point, interject with the words: “Ah, but is this democratic, so long as there is no opposition Press in the U.S.S.R.?” The answer to this is another question: “What is opposition?” If, by opposition, you mean the public exposure of every land of injustice, abuse, and inefficiency, and of individuals who fail to fulfil their duties, then we see that such criticism exists in the Soviet Press to an extent unequalled anywhere else in the world. But if, on the other hand, you mean the right to express in Soviet newspapers anti-Soviet ideas, or in Soviet trade union newspapers anti-trade union views, then such opposition is not allowed by the editors of the Press of the U.S.S.R. But such “opposition” is not allowed in the official organs of any democratic body anywhere. No newspaper which is the organ of a particular social organization is going to be allowed by its owners to pursue a policy contrary to the interests of the organization that runs it; just as no privately owned paper can go contrary to the will of its proprietor. The Press lord will not allow his paper to oppose his policy, and the trade union journal in Britain will voice the views of the organization that publishes it, not oppose them. To ask that the Soviet Press should oppose the policy of the Soviets is to ask something that is never asked anywhere, of any newspaper, whether privately or democratically owned. It is the absurd request to oppose the policy of its owners instead of expressing that policy. The only serious question is: Who, in the U.S.S.R., are the owners? And the answer is: The people of the U.S.S.R. themselves, through their own organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Justice among Comrades ===&lt;br /&gt;
It is frequently said that a system of society can be judged by the way in which it looks after its children. The Soviet Union passes an examination on this matter with high honours. But it would probably be just as true to say that a social system can be judged by the way in which it treats its criminals, those who offend against its laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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A visitor to a Soviet court of law, accustomed to the courts of Britain, receives a general impression of informality. Such a room and such a gathering might be a trade union meeting, or just a small public lecture, to judge by the appearance of the people sitting in the body of the hall and on the platform. At one end of the room, on a raised dais, sit three people. The hall is fairly crowded. A discussion is going on between one of the people on the platform and someone on the floor. It appears to be a heated argument. The person on the platform is one of the judges; the speaker from the floor is a criminal facing judgment!&lt;br /&gt;
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The informality, the heated discussion between criminal and judge, the essentially human atmosphere of the whole proceedings—these are characteristic of working-class meetings all over the world. And the Soviet court is, in fact, a working-class meeting for a particular purpose—the passing of judgment on a comrade who has committed an offence.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that the administration of justice has become one of the ordinary activities of the working people in the Soviet Union has led to the breaking down of the barriers between what we may call “formal” justice on the one hand and informal justice on the other. I remember one night in Moscow returning home about ten o’clock and finding an enormous gathering on the staircase, with people arguing in loud voices, “What is it?” I asked. “A comradely court,” was the reply, “What has happened?” was my next rather obvious question. And I was at once told the whole story by a woman neighbour who seemed just as interested in relating the whole scandalous affair to me as she was in listening to the proceedings themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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The man in the flat below had assaulted a neighbour when drunk. The neighbour had complained to the house committee. There were witnesses. The house committee decided to hold a “comradely court” to try the case, and here on the stairs, at 10 p.m., the case was being tried. The judge was a member of the house committee; the jury was made up of the other inhabitants of the block of flats. The accused was proved guilty. The sentence was a public reprimand in front of all the neighbours. And at that the matter ended.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is such a method of dealing with petty acts of assault, of negligence at work, of drunkenness, effective? Soviet experience shows that, in many cases which might take a person to the courts in Britain, such a comradely court, with a public reprimand, is quite an effective deterrent. If, however, the comradely court comes to the decision that a misdemeanour has been committed which merits more than a public reprimand, then it turns the case over to the People’s Court, the lowest rung in the ladder of “formal” justice in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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The People’s Court would correspond to the magistrate’s court in Britain. Hitherto, until the new Constitution of 1936, the judges were appointed from a panel submitted by the trade unions of the locality. Each judge then had a short legal training, lasting about six months, before taking up his position. Now, under the new Constitution, the judges will be elected by universal secret ballot, nominations being made by the trade unions, the Party, and other organizations of the working people. Together with the judge there sit two assistant judges, without any legal training, also appointed from panels drawn up by the trade unions in the district under the old system. They now will also be elected directly by the population.&lt;br /&gt;
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The hearing of cases takes place in an atmosphere of the greatest informality. Criminal cases may alternate with applications for alimony against fathers who refuse to recognize their paternity, or, having recognized it, refuse to meet the financial obligations which follow. In every case the accused and the judges carry on lively back-chat, as there is no such “crime” as contempt of court. I remember a case where a young man was up on a charge of drunkenness. Late at night he had apparently demanded money while drunk from a passer-by. The judge, a woman, summed up the case with a reference to the “campaign against hooliganism,” and referred to the disgraceful behaviour of the young man in creating a disturbance in the middle of the night. The young man interjected: “It wasn’t the middle of the night, it was only twelve o’clock!” “Yes, it was the middle of the night,” said the judge, and continued with her homily on the fight against hooliganism. The young man was sentenced to several months “forced labour.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Sentences in Soviet courts are usually to terms of “forced labour” or to imprisonment. Forced labour, terrifying as it may sound, is the lighter sentence, and in foot is the imposition of a fine, on the instalment system. The person who is sentenced to forced labour continues to work at his job, but every month there is a deduction from his pay which goes to the local authority. At the same time the fact that he is serving a term of forced labour is made known to the employing authority and to his trade union, and the latter is expected to pay special attention to that person, to see that he improves his ways and becomes a more satisfactory and conscientious citizen. The criminal, serving his sentence of forced labour, will not be immune from comment in the wall-newspaper of his place of work and general social disapproval, as well as exhortation to better work and citizenship in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
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In more serious cases, the People’s Court imposes sentences of imprisonment. But here too, as compared with the significance of that term in Britain, Soviet imprisonment stands out as an almost enjoyable experience. For the essence of Soviet imprisonment is isolation from the rest of the community, together with other persons similarly isolated, with the possibility to do useful work at the place of isolation, to earn a wage for this work, and to participate in running the isolation settlement or “prison” in the same way as the children participate in running their school, or the workers their factory. The essential difference between Soviet imprisonment and freedom lies in: (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) The fact that the prisoners are bound to live where they are sent; (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) The fact that they get considerably lower wages than when free. Both these features are a sufficient deterrent to the ordinary citizen, but they make prison life comfortable as compared to the conditions normally prevailing elsewhere.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet penal settlements are now usually situated in places where large-scale construction work is in progress. The Baltic-White Sea Canal was built to a great extent by penal labour, and the building of the Moscow-Volga canal is being undertaken in a similar way. An essential feature of such large construction enterprises is that they provide work for people of all specialities. Therefore it is unusual, when serving a sentence in the U.S.S.R., for people not to be able to practice their own speciality. And since, on such construction jobs, as on construction jobs all over the U.S.S.R., there is a continual need for skilled personnel, the unskilled prisoner may learn a trade during his sentence, and be finally released with considerably higher qualifications than he had when arrested!&lt;br /&gt;
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Within the penal settlements themselves the prisoners earn wages according to their work. But these wages are considerably below trade union rates. Those who, in recent years, have been disappointed to find a change made in this direction (for at one time trade union rates were paid to all those serving sentences) must realize that in the U.S.S.R. since 1931 there has been no unemployment. Until that year, so long as there were workers out of work, it was correctly held that if prisoners of any kind did any form of work, this would be keeping other workers out of jobs, unless the prisoners received trade union conditions. This argument, incidentally, applies also to Britain to-day. It is often stated that prisoners in His Majesty’s prisons “only sew mailbags” as proof that their prison labour is not keeping others out of employment. But if they did not sew these mailbags gratis, then unemployed workers would be employed sewing them for a living, so that in Britain to-day the existing system of prison labour, and any system other than one in which prisoners receive trade union conditions, does contribute towards unemployment. This was also true in the U.S.S.R. till 1931, and till then the prisoners received trade union wages. To-day it is no longer the case, and therefore, though paid, they do not receive as good pay as if they were free.&lt;br /&gt;
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The extent of self-government in the Soviet penal settlement is very considerable. The wall-newspaper is a means of expression for those serving time, just as it is a means of expression for those at liberty. Amateur social activities are carried on in various spheres, and the good workers receive rapid promotion to jobs of responsibility. The accountant who has embezzled funds while at liberty may become accountant to the penal settlement if he works well, and the leader of a gang of thieves may become the leader of a brigade of workers on a construction job.&lt;br /&gt;
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The settlement near Moscow—Bolshevo—has received fame throughout the world. This settlement was started for the homeless children who, after the war which was forced on the Soviets from 1918 to 1922, and on which Britain spent £100,000,000, were wandering about the country living by crime. At Bolshevo they were encouraged to govern themselves in a commune, with their own elected committee of management. They built factories and learnt a trade. To-day, long after the sentences of the original inhabitants are completed, many of them remain living in the village of Bolshevo, working in its factories, and assisting new arrivals to become useful citizens also. The head of the commune is one of the original homeless children.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we are to make a comparison between the Soviet penal system and any other aspect of Soviet life, we must consider it as a form of education. The regime in the Soviet school, giving the maximum incentive to the child to develop its sense of citizenship, is copied in the treatment of criminals, to give them, too, the greatest sense of social responsibility through the experience of constructive labour and the democratic running of their own affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
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And, just as in the factory Socialist competition is combined with the material incentive of wages, so, too, in the penal settlement there is Socialist competition; the prisoners are paid, and the best workers are given reductions in their sentences which usually amount to the lopping of one-third off their time if they work well. In this way, if we can call Soviet education “education for citizenship,” then the Soviet penal system can only be termed “re-education for citizenship.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A word must be said, in conclusion, of that side of the Soviet penal system which gets so much dark publicity in the world Press, that aspect of it which concerns the treatment, not of comrades who have gone wrong, but of those who act in a way which shows deliberate hostility to Soviet society. For there are individuals even to-day who are ready to take violent measures, and to co-operate with foreign Powers to overthrow the existing Soviet system.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are many sympathizers of the Soviet regime who cannot understand how, twenty years after the Russian Revolution, there can really be enemies of the regime in the U.S.S.R. to-day. I think these people forget that open armed warfare against the Soviets was only finally defeated in 1922. Since then more than one attempt has been made to provoke cause for a new attack. And at the present time the avowed policy of the leading Fascist States is to launch an attack on the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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In preparation for that war, Hitler is not going to refrain from attempting to inject agents into the U.S.S.R., just as he is injecting them into other countries. If he finds it to his advantage to have agents in Spain and France, in North and South America, he will find it more necessary, not less so, to place them also in the U.S.S.R., the country an attack against which he has openly stated to be his main objective.&lt;br /&gt;
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And, when we consider the internal position of the U.S.S.R. itself, it would be wildly Utopian to assume that to-day there are not still some persons who, for some reason or other, may have some grudge against the Soviet Government, and want to overthrow it. If these circumstances are recognized, then we see that there are definite reasons why the discovery of anti-Soviet plots in co-operation with Fascist States is likely to take place in the U.S.S.R. in the future just as it has occurred in the past.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whereas, among comrades, justice in the U.S.S.R. is administered as a means of re-education for citizenship, the Soviet State treats those crimes which are in fact acts of war by the law of war. In the U.S.S.R. to-day the side of the system of justice which represents the future is the justice among comrades which has been described in detail. The law of war, applied to political enemies of the system—spies, saboteurs, and terrorists—will only continue so long as there are States in the world interested in fomenting war against the U.S.S.R. and in stirring up internal difficulties.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the great Moscow trials which have taken place in 1936 and 1937 considerable confusion has been caused by the suggestion that these trials showed the undemocratic nature of the Soviet system. “If men like Radek and Zinoviev have to resort to armed terror,” it is said, “this can only be because they had no other means of expressing their views.” That statement, in essence, is true. But there are two possible reasons for this situation. First, it might be that the State authorities allowed no criticism or discussion whatever, and simply prevented the men concerned from expressing legitimate criticisms of policy. Secondly, it might be that these individuals had already, time and again, expressed their views until the whole of the democratic institutions of the country had finally decided by a vast majority that the propagation of such views was not in accordance with the interests of the community, In the latter case, the fact that these people could no longer speak their views would be because the people no longer wanted to hear them; in which case this fact illustrates, not the undemocratic, but the democratic character of such a prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
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So long as the threat of war hangs over the U.S.S.R. the laws of war will be enforced in those cases where, objectively speaking, citizens are in collaboration with the avowed enemies of the Soviet State. It is in these spheres that we may still find the death-penalty—“the highest measure of social defence”—being imposed on “enemies of the Republic.” At the same time, however, comradely justice, for the re-education of erring citizens, is applied to the overwhelming majority of cases tried in the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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Comradely justice and the law of war are applied side by side and simultaneously in the U.S.S.R. to-day. They must on no account be confused, for they represent two opposing tendencies—the struggle for security necessitated by the existing world situation, and the ordinary means operated by friends to regulate their relationships to the mutual interest of all. The law of war must still be applied in the U.S.S.R. to-day because of the external forces, identifying themselves with the mediæval past, which threatens the security of the Soviets. The other—the law of comrades, the law of future human society—is being applied more and more as an everyday activity of the working people themselves, for the purpose of preserving law and order for their own mutual benefit.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Is Woman&#039;s Place in the Home? ===&lt;br /&gt;
“Kirche, Kuche und Kinder”–“Church, Kitchen, and Children”–so runs a German saying which has received great official popularity since the coming of Hitler to power in 1933. These are the three spheres of social life to which women are allotted in the Third Reich. And in the English language, too, there is the old saying, “Woman’s place is in the home,” which still finds currency in many quarters, particularly so long as the country is racked by unemployment, and able-bodied men are out of work or in constant fear of being so. In the Russian language there are a host of old proverbs degrading woman to the level of something subhuman, and it is therefore all the more striking that in the U.S.S.R. to-day there is no occupation and no position which women may not occupy on the basis of complete equality with men.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in 1936 it is written: “Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in all fields of economic, Stale, cultural, social, and political life&lt;br /&gt;
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“The realization of these rights of women is ensured by affording women equally with men the right to work, payment for work, rest, social insurance and education, state protection of the interests of mother and child, granting pregnancy leave with pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries, and kindergartens.”&lt;br /&gt;
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As a teacher in a Soviet university I have had some opportunity of observing this equality of the sexes at first hand. As a graduate of Cambridge, I could make comparisons between the complete equality in the Soviet university lecture-room and the procedure in Cambridge by which, whenever the women students enter a room, it is the convention for the men to stamp, as if something out of the ordinary was occurring. At least, that was the convention eight years ago. I presume it still is, as things move slowly in our older universities. I also had the opportunity of seeing the amusement of Soviet women students, when I said that their counterpart in England would probably accept a job until marriage, and then retire from such employment. The idea that a job was an alternative to marriage was looked upon as some sort of archaic survival by these young Soviet women, who considered it absolutely practicable to have a career, a husband, and a family into the bargain.&lt;br /&gt;
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Among the students themselves, on the teaching staff, and throughout the Soviet organizations that I have visited during the past five years, I have hardly ever seen or heard anything which suggests that woman is considered either an inferior or weaker sex. In one case, on the construction of the Moscow underground, when a certain job was made available only to the male workers for reasons of health, a group of young women insisted that they should also do the work, formed a woman’s brigade, and competed with the men for the best results. If, at any time or in any place in the U.S.S.R. to-day, it is suggested that any job is not suitable for women, that is all that is necessary to ensure that within a short time women will be proving that such a job can be done by them as efficiently as by men, and that’s that.&lt;br /&gt;
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I think we in Britain find it hard to realize the extent to which the idea of woman as a “weaker sex” is a product of industrial capitalism. In any country of the world where there is a large peasant population, whatever may be said of the social inferiority of women, the term “weaker sex” is unknown, because it is so patently untrue. We in Britain tend to assume that the physical inferiority of women in our own country to-day is considerably greater than it actually is. And, where such physical inferiority does exist, we are inclined to neglect the degree to which this is due to social causes. It is unlikely that the women of feudal Britain were any weaker physically than the men; and it seems to be to a great extent the responsibility of capitalist industrialism that their physique has deteriorated. A comparison of the physique of British townswomen to-day with that of peasant women in all countries bears this out.&lt;br /&gt;
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Capitalist industrialism has made labour such a strain on the physique that on the one hand women have had to be excluded from many occupations because of their function as mothers. Socialist industry, by organizing all occupations in such a way as to develop the health and strength of the workers, makes it no longer necessary, except in rare cases, to exclude women from occupations on the grounds of health. In this way jobs which definitely develop the physique of the worker are available to women as well as to men in the U.S.S.R. In Britain, the woman’s “inferiority” is now used as a reason for exclusion, even where health conditions are adequate to permit of women’s work.&lt;br /&gt;
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But, on the other hand, capitalism has reduced women to the position of a cheap reserve of labour by means of low wages. In this way the employment of women has been increasingly concentrated on the worst paid jobs, which are often the most unhealthy and the most degrading. This, too, has caused deterioration in women’s physique as compared, with that of men.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, by combining household drudgery with every other occupation that a woman might undertake, capitalism has added one further burden to its women-folk, with disastrous effects on the physique of the women as compared with the men. As a result of these factors, the term “weaker sex” is not a misnomer in Britain to-day, though it must have been as unreal in the Britain of two hundred years ago as it is to-day in every country of the world where there is a large peasant population and where women do a more than full share in the general physical labour of the community. It is the aim of a Socialist country to preserve this physical equality, and to prevent the deterioration of women into the position of a “weaker sex.” At the same time, however, real equality demands that woman should be relieved of all the extra burdens imposed upon her in more primitive societies. This means that while, economically, she must receive equal pay and equal opportunities with man, she must be specially cared for socially in so far as she has additional social functions to perform.&lt;br /&gt;
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Economic equality between women and men must be provided in two main ways. First, equality of opportunity and of wages must be provided. Secondly, women must be equally able with men to have a career. But this means that they must be relieved of certain burdens which they have to bear in capitalist countries, such as housework and the care of children. And, since only women can fulfil the function of bearing children, and since this necessitates an interruption of every woman’s work, special provision must be made for women in this respect. Once children have been born, it is essential to ensure that any economic burden connected with the upbringing of such children shall be as far as possible equally shared by the two parents.&lt;br /&gt;
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In order to make equality of opportunity effective in the U.S.S.R., a great deal has already been done to provide socially those services which, in other countries, women must perform themselves as their regular household duties. Most important is the matter of feeding, and in the U.S.S.R. to-day a vast network of restaurants makes it possible for the people to feed at or near their places of work, and the communal kitchen replaces the work of the housewife.&lt;br /&gt;
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But, in addition to cooking meals, the housewife under capitalism spends endless time on the care of her children. In this respect the Soviet Union has provided various means of relief. By a vast development of nurseries and kindergartens, by providing playgrounds for children in every public square or park, by providing out-of-school activities for children in the school buildings and children’s rooms in blocks of flats, the Soviet authorities have already to a great extent removed the burden of the care of children from the shoulders of the mothers. Recently, returning to London from Moscow, I was impressed by the number of dirty children playing in the streets, and by the number of infants seen in the care of children just a few years older than themselves. These sights are symptoms of the utter failure of the British community to cope with the problems of the working-class mother. Such problems in the U.S.S.R. are already solved in principle, and the detailed solution is being further worked out in practice from year to year.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is sometimes suggested that the vast development of nurseries and kindergartens is likely to break down family affections. Such a view, in my experience, is absolutely unjustified. Is a working mother going to be less affectionate towards her child if she can have it fed and washed in a well-run nursery while she is occupied on other things? Is she going to love her child less if she has it with her only during those hours when she is free from other activities? It is an ironic fact, but well worthy of mention, that those who are most insistent in this country on the joys of family life are usually those who, owing to their fortunate economic position, can afford to pay trained nurses to look after their children for twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four, and who, during the remaining hour, are able to enjoy to the full the blessing of parentage without its labour!&lt;br /&gt;
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While it is possible for society to relieve women of housework, and of the burden of the care of children, it is physically impossible to relieve women of the function of bearing children. Therefore, in this respect, equality of the sexes necessitates special privileges for the women. In the U.S.S.R. to-day the woman who is having a child is relieved from work on full pay for a period of four months. If the doctor considers it advisable, she may be put on lighter work, or completely relieved of work, without reduction of pay, at any time during pregnancy. The nursing mother, after returning to work, is allowed a special reduction in her working day. All medical attention and a layette for the child are provided free of charge.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question of family relations arises in a particularly acute form in the case of responsibility for children. Right from the early years of the Revolution the State put an end to all distinction between the married and the unmarried mother. In this way the age-long distinction between ethical standards for men and for women was brought to an end. Also, no child started out in life with the social stigma of illegitimacy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet State took further steps to ensure that marriage should be a voluntary contract, and the family a voluntary social unit. Whereas a marriage and a family based on mutual love and respect has always been encouraged in the U.S.S.R., the holding of people unwillingly together, by force of law or by economic compulsion, has always been opposed. Divorce has been made easy, subject to one condition—that there is equal parental responsibility for the upbringing of every child. Whether marriage is registered or not, according to Soviet law every parent has an economic responsibility for his or her children. As a rule it is the mother who brings up a child if parents are living separately, and therefore, as a rule, it is the father who is bound to meet his responsibilities financially. And these responsibilities are not small. For, to ensure that a Soviet woman shall not have to bear the economic burden of bringing up children alone, every father, if not living with the mother of his children, must pay to her 30 percent of his earnings for one, 40 percent for two, and 50 percent for three children or more until they are of working age. In this way real economic equality of the sexes is established with regard to parental responsibility, while, at the same time, people are not forced to live together if they have no longer any further natural affection for one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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A matter which has raised considerable doubts in the minds of many protagonists of sex-equality in this country is the law, passed in 1936, making abortion illegal except in cases where it is justified by consideration for a woman’s health or the danger of hereditary disease. This change in the law has been treated as an attack on sex-equality.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is of the greatest importance, in this connection, to refer back to the text of the original law which legalized abortion in Soviet Russia in 1921. It is important to note that in this law not a word was said about sex-equality, and the right to have an abortion was never put forward as a fundamental right of the Soviet woman. On the contrary, abortion was treated as a social evil, but an evil which was likely to be less harmful when practised legally than when carried out under conditions of secrecy. Here is part of the text of the original law permitting abortion:&lt;br /&gt;
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“During the past decades the number of women resorting to artificial discontinuation of pregnancy has grown both in the West and in this country. The legislation of all countries combats this evil by punishing the woman who chooses to have an abortion and the doctor who performs it. Without leading to favourable results, this method of combating abortion has driven the operation underground and made the woman a victim of mercenary and often ignorant quacks who make a profession of secret operations. As a result, up to 50 percent of such women are infected in the course of the operation, and up to 4 percent of them die.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The Workers’ and Peasants’ Government is conscious of this serious evil to the community. It combats this evil by propaganda against abortions among working women. By working for Socialism, and by introducing the protection of maternity and infancy on an extensive scale, it feels assured of achieving the gradual disappearance of this evil. But as moral survivals of the past and the difficult economic conditions of the present still compel many women to resort to this operation . . .” it is allowed in State hospitals.&lt;br /&gt;
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The essential feature of this law is that it was based on “difficult economic conditions,” and was of a temporary nature. The right to abortion was never introduced as one of the rights of Soviet women, to be enjoyed in all circumstances. It was considered an “evil,” and was introduced as a makeshift to combat the serious mortality rate from illegal abortions carried out under unsatisfactory conditions. There is evidence that, at the present time, owing to the increased knowledge of contraceptives on the one hand and the growing sense of economic security on the other, women will not now practice abortion in this way, and that therefore the permissive law is no longer necessary in the interests of health. Abortion in Soviet legislation has always been regarded primarily as a question of health, not of equality. Since thousands of women have been neglecting the use of contraceptives because they could obtain an abortion, the legality of the less satisfactory method of discontinuing pregnancy has actually to some extent prevented more satisfactory methods from being used of avoiding pregnancy altogether.&lt;br /&gt;
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A fact that must be fully realized in this connection is that the whole formulation of sex-equality in the U.S.S.R. has always tended to be different from its formulation among feminists in capitalist countries. The stress in the U.S.S.R. has always been; Equal economic and social rights and opportunities, with special privileges to compensate for any burden arising from the bearing of children. On the other hand, in countries such as Britain, where years of unemployment have given rise to all sorts of theories of “over-population,” the emphasis is usually placed on the right of women not to have children as an essential aspect of sex-equality. In the U.S.S.R., where there is no illegitimacy and where unemployment was finally wiped out in 1931 and shows no signs of ever again recurring, “over-population” is an impossibility, since the whole of the economic planning of the country is based on the number of workers available, and the more workers there are the better for the welfare of all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such a community there is no social reason for artificially limiting population. Therefore the formulation of sex-equality will have a different emphasis: instead of pressing the right of women not to have children because men do not have to bear children, the whole emphasis will be on providing such conditions that every woman may bear as many children as is consistent with her health without at the same time suffering any greater economic or social burden than men as a result. This is the emphasis given in Soviet society to this matter, and is, I think, the likely formulation for every progressive Socialist community once unemployment has been finally abolished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the U.S.S.R., then, the woman’s place is not in the home. But this does not mean disrespect either for maternity or for the family, so long as the latter is in no way a unit preserved by force and economic compulsion as opposed to the free will of the parties to a marriage. By giving equal opportunities to workers of both sexes, by making social insurance cover all incapacity for work due to pregnancy and childbirth, by ensuring the equal responsibility of both parents for their children whether they are married or not, and, finally, by socializing those services which, under capitalism, have to be performed by the energy of the individual housewife, the Soviet Union has gone a long way towards the freeing of women as citizens from bondage as housewives, wives, and mothers. But this does not mean that the role of women as wives and mothers is abolished; it means that wife and husband, mother and father, are equal citizens in every respect, with equal opportunities for a career, with effective equality of rights in every sphere of social, economic, and political life, and with equal moral, social, and economic responsibilities to society, to each other, and to their children.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== A New State ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== What Are Soviets? ===&lt;br /&gt;
We have now reached a point where the fact that a new life is developing in the U.S.S.R. for the vast majority of the people is already established. The Soviet Union is a country where every citizen, irrespective of sex or nationality, has an opportunity to develop his abilities to the full, and, having developed them, to utilize them in the interests of society. Every citizen has an opportunity to participate in the economic, social, and political life of the country, not only as a subordinate, but as a responsible person. Personal initiative in everything that benefits society is encouraged. The trade unions and the co-operatives exist on a scale, and have powers, unknown elsewhere; though in the case of the latter the fact that the community itself bears now the main features of a co-operative commonwealth makes the organization of co-operative societies as such no longer a matter of principle, but one of expediency. The Press is owned and controlled by the organizations of the people, from the collective farm, or factory trade union committee to the Government itself and the General Council of Trade Unions. Women play an equal part with men in economic, social, and political life, and are compensated in so far as they suffer disabilities due to their natural function of bearing children. All these are features of the new life that is growing up in the Soviet Union. And this new life has grown up within the framework of a new kind of State, without which it could not have developed at all. This is the Soviet State, and, in order fully to understand the new life of the U.S.S.R., we must also understand something about this new State framework within which it has been created.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the origin of the word “Soviet” in its present-day sense we must go back to the year 1905. Until that time the word “soviet” was used frequently in Russian to denote any kind of “council.” A “council of war” or a “council of ministers” were both “soviets,” and there were many other kinds of councils for which this word was used. Early in the year 1905 the workers of the textile town of Ivanovo-Vosnesensk set up a committee to co-ordinate strike action and to force the employers to bargain collectively. This committee consisted of delegates elected by show of hands at general meetings of the workers in the various factories of that town.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the year 1905 went on, and the workers all over Russia were striking and demonstrating for better conditions, they copied the example of Ivanovo, and set up their own delegate committees or councils in their towns to lead the struggle. These councils came to be known as Soviets of Workers’ Delegates. In each case they consisted of elected delegates from the workers in the factories, led the struggle against the employers by organizing strikes, and put forward political demands for freedom of speech, the Press, and assembly. They were fighting organizations, led demonstrations, and in certain cases actually seized complete municipal power and passed laws to the disadvantage of the employers in their territory. They became a new form of municipal authority, passing decrees in the exclusive interests of the working people, the majority of the town dwellers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the Revolution of 1905 was suppressed. For more than ten years the working-class movement of Russia had no legal opportunity to express itself. Only towards the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917, with the growing disgust at the way in which the Tsarist Government was conducting the war, the workers, peasants, and soldiers, together with many of the employers and even the allied Governments, began to express open opposition to the Government of the Tsar.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In February 1917 the Tsar abdicated and a new Government was set up by the employers. Side by side with this “Provisional Government” the workers of Petrograd once more organized a Soviet, and their example was followed in other cities. So great was the activity of the working-class movement at this time that the Provisional Government was forced to respect the existence of the Soviets and did not dare to try to suppress them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1917, unlike 1905, the setting up of Soviets was not confined to the workers in the towns. In the villages the peasants elected their own councils, or Soviets, through which they demanded the immediate confiscation of the landed estates and their division among the peasantry. And in the army the soldiers in the ranks elected their own committees, in certain cases arrested their officers, and proceeded to govern themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, between February and October 1917, there were set up by the people of Russia—by the workers, peasants, and soldiers—a vast network of elected councils or committees, called Soviets, which led their struggle for better conditions of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So powerful were these Soviets that the Government itself was obliged to grant many of their demands. For example, on the very day that the Provisional Government came into existence, the Petrograd Soviet issued an order stating that committees of the ranks in the army should be set up everywhere, and that they were to elect representatives to the Soviet. In this way the elected representatives of workers and soldiers combined their political activities. “In all matters of policy,” said this order, “the military should submit to the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and to their own committees.” The Government agreed to this order of the Soviet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the end of March 1917 a conference was held in Petrograd, attended by over 400 delegates from local Soviets throughout the country. It was decided that an All-Russian Congress should be called in the near future, and the elected Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, together with ten delegates elected at the conference, was made responsible for the calling of this Congress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was as a result of this decision that in June 1917 an All-Russian Congress of Soviets was held, at which there were nearly 800 delegates from Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviets all over Russia. The Congress elected an Executive Committee to co-ordinate and lead the work of the Soviets until the next Congress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us pause a moment and examine what had happened in Russia during this short period of five months, A Completely new form of organization had come into being, covering the whole country and representing the working people, the peasants, and the soldiers— the vast majority of the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its structure this network of Soviets bore a striking resemblance to democratic working-class organizations all over the world. Locally, there were the directly elected Soviets. Nationally, the supreme authority was a Congress of delegates from all the local Soviets. And to co-ordinate the work of these Soviets between Congresses, and to carry out its general instructions, the Congress elected an Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviets had developed in a period of a few months into a nation-wide organization. The structure of this organization was like that of working-class organizations all over the world. There were local elected committees, which sent delegates to Congresses, and the Congress elected an Executive Committee to lead the organization between Congresses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this Soviet system was broader than the usual working-class organization in one very important respect. It not only represented the industrial workers: it represented both the industrial workers and the soldiers. And, at the same time, the peasants in the villages were electing their own delegates to Soviets of peasants. In this way the new Soviet organization embraced practically the whole of the people of the country; only the landlords, employers of labour, high officials of the Government, and people associated with these categories, did not take part in their activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Between June 1917, when the first Congress of Soviets met in Petrograd, and October 1917, the Provisional Government of Russia continued to carry on the war. But the people became increasingly opposed to its continuation, and the demand for peace was more and more put forward at the election of delegates to the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time the Government was becoming increasingly disturbed at the growing demands of the people, and at the political activity of the workers and peasants. This resulted in a danger that, as soon as it was in a position to do so, the Government might impose a military dictatorship and smash the rapidly growing democratic organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, including the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was in this situation, when the people of Russia were faced with the imminent suppression of their own organizations and the deprival of that freedom of discussion which the Soviets had given them, that, in October 1917, an armed uprising, led by the Bolsheviks took place in Petrograd; and, on the following day, at the Second Congress of Soviets, a new Government was set up, responsible to the Soviets themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A few extracts from the resolution of this Congress, setting up the new form of government, may be of interest:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies has opened. The enormous majority of the Soviets are represented in it. A number of delegates from the Peasants’ Soviets are present at the Congress. . . . The Congress takes power into its hands, relying on the will of the enormous majority of the workers, soldiers, and peasants, supported by the victorious uprising of the workers and the garrison which has taken place in Petrograd . . .&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Congress decrees: all power throughout the country passes into the hands of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new Government consisted of a Council of People’s Commissars, a People’s Commissar being the head of a State Department. These Commissars were directly responsible to the Congress, and, between Congresses, to the Executive Committee which the Congress elected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the Second Congress of Soviets, however, while the workers and soldiers were well represented, there were present only a comparatively small number of delegates from the Peasants’ Soviets, which had their own Executive Committee, and which were preparing for their own separate Congress a week later. At this Congress of Peasants’ Soviets, after Lenin had explained the reasons for the seizure of power ten days previously and the decree which had been already adopted on the land question, it was decided that the Peasants’ Congress should elect a number of representatives to the Central Executive Committee, and that thus a united Government should be formed representing the workers, peasants, and soldiers. It was this united Executive Committee which now became the supreme authority, and which summoned the Third Congress of Soviets in January 1918 at which there were over 700 delegates, representing workers, peasants, and soldiers from all over Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a period of a few weeks there had come into being in Russia a new kind of State. In structure this new State corresponded to democratic organizations of working people all over the world. But whereas a trade union represents only the wage-earners in particular occupations, the Soviet State embraced all working citizens, in industry, on the land, and in the army. Only a very small percentage—less than 5 percent of the Russian population—did not participate in the work of the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sometimes, I think, the reason why certain types of citizen did not participate in the Soviets is misunderstood. And the misunderstanding arises from the fact that the essential nature of the Soviet State, as a State of a new type, is not fully appreciated. When, however, we watch the historical development of the Soviets, it should be quite clear that, as fighting organizations of the working people against the employers, they naturally excluded the employers from participation in running them; just as trade unions in Britain to-day, as organizations of the workers against the employers, exclude the employers from the right to participate in their affairs. Similarly, in the country, where the Soviets were used by the peasants for confiscating and dividing-up the landlords’ estates, they were not going to invite the landlords to join with them in the work of these Soviets!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is as a fighting organization of the vast majority of the population against the small minority of landlords and employers and their officials that the Soviet State came into being in 1917. It is, therefore, not surprising that, in the Declaration of Rights of the Labouring and Exploited Masses which was adopted at the Third Congress, it is expressly stated that “now, at the decisive moment in the struggle between the workers and their exploiters, there can be no place for the latter on any organ of government.” The Soviet State was a democratic organization of the vast majority of the people, but it deprived the small minority of property-owners of political rights. For the working people, for all but the small minority of employers, together with certain sections of the population closely allied to them, universal suffrage was introduced for men and women alike, at the age of eighteen, irrespective of sex, nationality, or religion. All working citizens, and housewives who made it possible for others to work, had the right to vote, and to stand for election without property or residential qualifications, so long as they had reached eighteen years of age. In this way a degree of democracy for over 95 percent of the population was introduced, such as they had never previously enjoyed. On the other hand, for less than 5 percent of the population—those who lived on unearned incomes—there no longer existed the right to participate in government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, with regard to the Press, steps were taken by the Soviet Government which has already been described, and which, from the standpoint of the overwhelming majority of the people of Russia, can only be regarded as democratic. But, from the point of view of the private Press lords, these steps were an outrageous attack on their rights! For, in the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic, adopted at the Fifth Congress of Soviets in July 1918, we find “effective liberty of opinion” for the working population being ensured by putting “an end to the dependence of the Press upon capital.” Freedom to own the Press passed from the Press lords to the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, at the beginning of May 1926, just before the General Strike, the workers on the &#039;&#039;Daily Mail&#039;&#039; refused to print certain articles with which they disagreed. In an official statement from Downing Street this was described as a “gross interference with the freedom of the Press.” The men that produced the paper had claimed a say in what they printed! The Soviet Government, early in 1918, went far further than the workers on the &#039;&#039;Daily Mail&#039;&#039;. It confiscated all the privately owned printing presses and transferred them in their entirely to the organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. From the point of view of the private owners of newspapers, the young Soviet Government was guilty of the most outrageous interference with the freedom of the Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But look at the same situation from the standpoint, not of the small minority of people in Russia who were rich enough to own newspapers, but of the overwhelming majority of the people who had never before had at their disposal the columns of the Press! For these people—for practically the whole of the people of Russia—the newspapers became their own, collectively controlled through the Soviets and other organizations. To these people the Soviet Government had given a freedom of the Press such as they had never before dreamt of possessing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In our Introduction we saw that the Soviet State, from its very inception, combined features both of democracy and dictatorship. We are now in a position to see why it combined these features. It combined them because, as a democratic fighting organization of the working people—of the overwhelming majority of the people of Russia—it took steps to put an end to the power of the employing class, a small minority. While granting universal suffrage to all citizens, men and women alike, that worked for a living, it deprived of political rights that small minority that lived by employing others. Similarly, in granting the use of the printing presses to the organizations of the overwhelming majority of the people, it withdrew the use of these presses from those who, hitherto, had owned them only because they had been rich enough to do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State is fundamentally different from other States in the world to-day. It is in essence an organization of the working people, of the vast majority of the population, in their struggle for better conditions. Many of the steps which it took, democratic when considered from the point of view of the vast majority of the people, were sheer outrages to the owners of property, against whom such measures were taken.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why, from 1918 to 1922, the new Soviet State had to fight for its very existence against the combined forces of more than ten foreign Powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== A Workers&#039; State ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviets were built up in Russia over a period of seven months before they seized power and became the new State. Clearly, during such a period, with continuous conflict between the workers and the employers, with periods of advance and periods of temporary defeat for the working people, it was not possible for anyone to sit down and theoretically work out, according to plan, the general form of organization into which the Soviets were evolving. But, in spite of this fact, we find that the actual form which developed was almost exactly similar to the form of other working-class organizations, in other parts of the world, even at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The structure of democratic working-class organizations is almost always on the same general lines. Members join branches which elect local committees. On territories which cover a number of branches, either delegate committees, or conferences which elect a coordinating committee, are the supreme authority. And, nationally, the supreme authority is usually a congress, with a committee elected at the congress taking its place as the supreme authority between congresses. This form of working-class organization is universal because it is the most satisfactory form for working-class purposes. By means of delegate congresses the supreme authority mainly represents the rank and file of the members, who give their delegates instructions. By means of a small executive committee elected at the congress the number of permanent officers is reduced to a minimum, so that most of the delegates can return to their regular jobs in their localities. Such a system will be more or less satisfactory according as the delegates really represent those who elect them. The Soviets, from their very origin, made all members of the Soviets subject to recall if they ceased to give their electors satisfaction. In this way the Soviets were more democratic than many democratic organizations of the working people in other countries even at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the first months of its existence the new Soviet Government was occupied with passing legislation in the interests of the working people, the vast majority of the population. An immediate decision was passed on the necessity for concluding a “democratic peace, without indemnities or annexations,” and an appeal was broadcast to the peoples of the world to do likewise. In January 1918, at the Third Congress of Soviets, the Declaration of Rights already mentioned was adopted. In this declaration “Russia is declared a Republic of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies. All central and local authority is vested in these Soviets. . . . The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of national Soviet Republics.” And, in order to ensure that this federation should be really voluntary, the Congress leaves “to the workers and peasants of each nationality the right to decide freely, at their own national Congress of Soviets, whether they desire to participate in the federal Government and in other federal Soviet institutions.” When Finland and Armenia declared their independence, this declaration was welcomed by the Congress of Soviets, together with the policy of the Soviet Government of withdrawing Russian troops from Persia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another of the first decrees of the Soviet Government was on the nationalization of the land. The local Soviets were empowered to confiscate the landed estates, and to distribute this land to the peasants according to their needs. A little later, in the towns, all housing accommodation was nationalized, and the towns Soviets were given authority to distribute this housing according to the needs of the population. This meant that workers from the most overcrowded quarters were brought to the centre of the town, the houses of the well-to-do were divided into flats, and, while the original owner was allowed one of these flats, the rest were put at the disposal of workers from the worst slums. Similarly, where houses were empty, workers were moved into them from the most overcrowded areas. From that day to this it has been impossible in Soviet territory to see what is such a common sight in Britain—houses standing empty, or partly used, while in basements in the same street whole families are living in one room.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Programmes of universal education, social insurance, and the nationalization of the banks and large-scale industry were decided on during the first months of Soviet rule. The eight-hour working day was introduced, and paid holidays of at least two weeks annually were granted to all workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Declaration of Rights the purpose of the Soviet State was described as the “fundamental aim of suppressing all exploitation of man by man, of abolishing the division, of society into classes . . . of bringing about the Socialist organization of society. . . .” With this end in view, “work useful to the community is made compulsory upon all.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not, however, until the Fifth Congress of Soviets, in July 1918, that a Constitution was adopted for the first Soviet Republic. This Constitution was a composite document, including the Declaration of Rights, and adding to it a number of provisions to ensure democracy for the working population at the same time as it deprived the employing class of all political power. The Constitution also included a description of the organization of the Soviet State.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen how the Press was turned over from private hands to the organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Similarly, with regard to the meeting-halls, measures were taken to ensure that all premises “suitable for public gatherings, together with lighting, heating, and furniture,” should be at the disposal of the working people. It is according to this original law of the Soviet Republic that the administration of the Soviet factory to-day is bound to allow the workers to use the factory buildings as a meeting-place out of working hours, and to allow accommodation there for the trade union offices. At the same time, with regard to freedom of association, the new State “lends to the workers all its material and moral assistance to help them unite and to organize themselves.” We have already seen how this attitude to trade unionism led to a phenomenal growth both in trade union membership and in the powers of the trade unions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly important were the early decrees of the Soviet Government on the question of military service. In one such decree it was stated that “one of the basic aims of Socialism is to liberate humanity from the burden of militarism and from the barbarism of sanguinary clashes between peoples. The objective of Socialism is general disarmament, perpetual peace, and brotherly co-operation of all the peoples which inhabit the earth.” But “in all countries the imperialist bourgeoisie is in power. Its policy is directed towards the suppression of the Communist Revolution and the enslavement of all weak peoples.” Therefore the Soviet Republic “must create its own powerful army.” But “to arm the bourgeoisie would mean the bringing of continual strife into the army and would therefore paralyse its strength in the struggle against foreign enemies.” Therefore “the parasitic and exploiting elements in society, which do not wish to assume equal rights and obligations with others, cannot be permitted to bear arms. The Workers’ and Peasants’ Government will seek out means to impose on the bourgeoisie in some form part of the burden of the defence of the Republic.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We now come to the description, in the Constitution of 1918, of the structure of the Soviet State. For the first time in history universal suffrage was introduced for every citizen, from the age of eighteen upwards, irrespective of religion, sex, or nationality, and without residential or property qualifications. Every such person could vote at elections, and stand for election. But because, as has already been pointed out, the Soviet State was an organization of the working population for defending their interests against the property-owners, the latter had no political rights in the Soviet State. Universal suffrage was enjoyed by all who lived by their own labour, those who by performing domestic duties enabled others to carry on productive work, those working people who through invalidity were unable to work, and those who were in the army or navy defending the Soviet Republic. On the other hand, however, employee and those who lived on unearned income, agents and middlemen, monies and priests, agents of the former police, members of the former royal family, and the mentally deranged, were not allowed the right to participate in elections.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some surprise may be felt that the priests and monks were deprived of the right to vote and to stand for election. It must be remembered, however, that the Church in Tsarist Russia was the largest single land-owner, and when the landed estates were confiscated the priests and monks, together with the other land-lords, almost without exception, joined forces with the armed counter-revolution. Religious freedom was guaranteed from the first days of the Revolution, and “freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda” was assured to every citizen by the Constitution. At the same time, however, the Church was disestablished, and deprived of its income from land and industry, and the schools were completely taken over by the State. In this way religion became a private, as opposed to a State, concern; religious groups had now to pay their own priests without any form of State subsidy or unearned income from property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Universal suffrage was established in 1918 for the vast majority of the population of Russia at a lower age than in any other country. At the same time, for a small minority the right to vote and to stand for election was not permitted. Writing in 1919, Lenin pointed out that this was a temporary measure, in the interest of the working people at a time when every means was being used by the property-owners, nationally and internationally, to overthrow the Soviet State. Here are his words:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Russian Communist Party must explain to the toiling masses, in order to avoid a wrong generalization from transient historical needs, that the disfranchisement of a section of citizens does not in the Soviet Republic affect, as was the case in the majority of bourgeois-democratic republics, a definite category of citizens disfranchised for life, but applies only to the exploiters, only to those who, in violation of the fundamental laws of the Socialist Soviet Republic, persist in defending their position as exploiters, in pre-serving capitalist relationships. Consequently, in the Soviet Republic, on the one hand, every day of added strength to Socialism and diminution in the number of those who have objective possibilities of remaining exploiters or of preserving capitalist relationships, automatically reduces the percentage of disfranchised persons. In Russia at the present time this percentage is hardly more than 2 or 3. On the other hand, in the not distant future, the cessation of foreign invasion and the completion of the expropriation of the expropriators may, under certain conditions, create a situation in which the proletarian State power will choose other methods of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and will introduce universal suffrage &#039;&#039;without any restrictions&#039;&#039;.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The structure of the Soviet State, as described in the Constitution of 1918, was not evolved by a group of politicians and lawyers sitting in conference and drawing up a Constitution. It was a description of the existing Soviet State as it had come into existence during the preceding year. The local Soviets, as we have seen, were simply councils of delegates, elected by the workers at their factory meetings, and by the peasants at meetings in the villages. At these meetings the workers and peasants discussed the merits of the various candidates proposed, and then voted in the simplest and most straightforward way, by show of hands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, in the Constitution itself, we find that the basic unit of the Soviet State is the town and village Soviet, directly elected by the whole working population of the age of eighteen and upwards. In the village, on the consent of the local authority, the voting age could be lowered to sixteen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For areas larger than the town or village, such as counties, provinces, and national territories covering a number of towns and villages, the supreme authority was a Congress of Soviets for that area, to which delegates were sent from all the local Soviets. Such Congresses elected their own Executive Committees, which carried on the work of government between Congresses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the Russian Soviet Republic as a whole the supreme authority was an All-Russian Congress of Soviets. According to the Constitution, this “All-Russian Congress of Soviets is composed of representatives of town Soviets, on the basis of one deputy for every 25,000 electors, and representatives of provincial Congresses of Soviets, on the basis of one deputy for every 125,000 inhabitants.” At first sight this form of representation gave great over-representation to the town population, but this view is somewhat illusory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be noted that the representation of the towns is stated in terms of the number of electors, of the provinces in terms of inhabitants. Now the electors were all working citizens over the age of eighteen whereas the number of inhabitants included the non-voters, whether employers of labour or juveniles. Therefore one representative for every 25,000 voters was not very much greater than one for every 125,000 inhabitants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As against this, however, must be set the fact that in the provincial Congresses, the towns as well as the villages of the province were represented. Therefore in the election of the provincial delegates the representatives of the town workers also participated. In this respect there was a certain element of dual representation of the town electors. The citizens of Moscow sent delegates to the All-Russian Congress from the Moscow Soviet. But the Moscow Soviet was also represented at the Moscow Provincial Congress of Soviets. And this Congress also sent delegates to the All-Russian Congress. In this way the representation of the towns was definitely greater, in proportion to population, than the representation of the villages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How did this inequality of representation arise? The answer is that the detailed structure of the Soviet State developed between February 1917 and the seizure of power in October, and between October 1917 and the adoption of the Constitution in June 1918, not as a result of a conscious and premeditated plan, but as a result of the direct political activity of the people. It has been mentioned already that until after the seizure of power in October 1917 the Peasants’ Congress met separately. While the first two Congresses of Soviets, representing the workers and soldiers, were attended by delegates elected in proportion to the number of voters, at the Peasants’ Congress the representation happened to be according to village population. When, after the Second Congress, the peasants joined the workers and soldiers in the Central Executive Committee, the dual system of election was continued.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It also happened that the most active section of the people in building up the Soviets was the working class of the towns. This led to a large representation of the town workers at the early Congresses. Similarly, in the provincial Congresses the workers played an active part. And in this way there evolved the system of dual representation which has been mentioned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now it would have been possible, at the Fifth Congress of Soviets, when the Constitution was adopted, to have eliminated the inequality in representation between town and country, but this was not done, and quite consciously. The reason was that the working class of Russia had so far played a leading part in the building up of the Soviets, and it was because of this practical leadership that its representation was large in proportion to its numbers. Was it desirable that the most active section of the community in the new State should be deprived of part of its representation in the name of an abstract “Equality”? Or, alternatively, was it desirable that the class which had shown the initiative in setting up the Soviet State should for the time being continued to enjoy greater representation than the other main class in society, which had proved less active? The Congress decided to preserve the predominance of working-class representation, of that leadership which had given rise to the Soviet State, the leadership of the class which had shown the greatest energy in defending the Soviets against attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three outstanding features of the Soviet elections should here be mentioned. First, all delegates to the Soviets, to Congresses, and members of Executive Committees were made subject to recall if their electors were dissatisfied with their work. In this way the permanency of every official’s post depended on the agreement of his electors. Secondly, every elected delegate to any Soviet body was bound, not only to sit on the Soviet as a committee member, but also to participate in the day-to-day work of the Soviet. In this way every member not only passed laws, but was one of those responsible for carrying them out. There was thus no divorce between legislature and executive, between those who made the laws and those who enforced them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thirdly, a word must be said as to the nature of the elections. In the Soviet State, as in working-class organizations in this country to-day, the system of election was based on the desire to return to the organs of government those who were best suited to represent their fellows. At every election meeting a discussion took place on the work of the Soviet authorities, and general instructions were adopted as to the policy to be pursued in the future. Each delegate who was elected was instructed to pursue the policy agreed upon at the meeting. And at intervals he had to report back to the electors on how he was carrying out this policy on the Soviet. Members of the Soviets were delegates with a mandate from their electors, and subject to recall if they did not carry out this mandate to the satisfaction of their supporters. This system stands in sharp contrast to the parliamentary system, where candidates come forward with a cut-and-dried statement of policy, the electors choose the program which they think they prefer, and the candidate who is returned then proceeds to carry it out or not, as the spirit moves him. The system of election in the Soviet Union is only comparable with that which prevails in democratic working-class organizations in the capitalist world, with the right of recall making it even more democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The All-Russian Congress of Soviets elected a Central Executive Committee. This Executive Committee was the supreme authority between Congresses. The Executive Committee was responsible for appointing the “Government,” or Council of People’s Commissars, which consisted of the heads of all the different State departments. The People’s Commissars were responsible to the Central Executive Committee for their work. The Council of People’s Commissars could meet together and issue decrees, and each Commissar, individually, could issue decrees in his own department. Any such decrees were subject to the approval of the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way we see that the structure of the Soviet State combined the elective principle, through the Soviets, while at the same time, leadership and appointment, through the State departments. The Central Executive Committee was responsible to the Congress; the Congress consisted of delegates from the local Soviets, and these were responsible to the people. On the other hand, the Executive Committee appointed the People’s Commissars, who appointed their various departmental officials, who were responsible for appointing the workers in the various State organizations right down to the smallest State factory or workshop. But here again, side by side with the managers appointed from above, and who are ultimately responsible to the Commissar, sit the representatives of the workers, in the person of elected trade union officials. So that throughout the Soviet system there is a most intricate combination of election and appointment, responsibility to the rank and file and responsibility to a higher authority, the election and recall of representatives by the electors, and the appointment and dismissal of workers by the authorities. Every Soviet organization is controlled by representatives of the people. The factory manager is responsible to some trust, which is responsible to one of the State Commissariats. The Commissar is responsible to the Central Executive Committee, which, indirectly, is responsible to the electors. The trade union representative is responsible to the workers, who are also electors to the Soviets. It is this complex system of government, combining the maximum of rank-and-file responsibility with the elective principle, and with appointment by higher authorities of lower officials, that is responsible for the status of all Soviet citizens as masters as well as servants, as described in Part I.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was this new kind of State, too, which inspired Lenin, in reply to Kautsky’s accusation that the Soviet Government was undemocratic, enthusiastically to exclaim:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Is there a single country in the world, even among the most democratic bourgeois countries, in which the &#039;&#039;average rank-and-file&#039;&#039; worker, the average rank-and-file &#039;&#039;village labourer&#039;&#039; . . . enjoys anything approaching such &#039;&#039;liberty&#039;&#039; to hold meetings in the best buildings, such &#039;&#039;liberty&#039;&#039; to use the best printing works and the largest stocks of paper, to express his ideas and to protect his interests, such liberty to promote men and women of his own class to administer and to ‘run’ the State as in Soviet Russia?” (&#039;&#039;Proletarian Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 31)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Democratic Defence—The Red Army ===&lt;br /&gt;
In 1931, when I first went to the U.S.S.R., I had certain pacifist sympathies. It was not encouraging, therefore, to see factory workers sometimes marching through the streets carrying rifles, and to find that military training of some kind was available in practically every Soviet institution. Since then, however, my personal experiences while living in the U.S.S.R., together with certain events that have taken place in the rest of the world, have convinced me that effective democracy is something which must be defended by arms against those who, at the present time, are doing their utmost to smash it by force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And, once this need to defend the achievements of the Revolution by force against armed intervention is realized, then the extent to which the people of the U.S.S.R. receive military training is to be appreciated as one of the greatest proofs of real democracy. To make a comparison with Britain I would put it this way: In Britain, in the “public schools” where the sons of the well-to-do receive their expensive education, the “Officers’ Training Corps” is a voluntary organization of which practically 100 percent of the boys are members. In the universities such corps also flourish. But I have yet to find the industrial enterprises in Britain, where the breadwinners of some 75 percent of the population earn their living, where there are Officers’ Training Corps, so that the people may become skilled in the art of defence. By contrast, it just happens in the U.S.S.R. to be in the factories and in the collective farms, as well as in the universities and scientific institutions, that citizens may receive the elements of military knowledge, and are thus trained to defend themselves against any enemy. In this way the military training which in Britain is confined to a small section of the population is at the disposal of the whole community. Every Soviet citizen has the opportunity to be trained as a military leader.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This relationship between the people of the U.S.S.R. and the army is nothing new. It has existed since the setting up of the Soviet State in 1917. In January 1918 it was declared by the Third Congress of Soviets that “in order to secure the supremacy of the labouring masses, and to guard against any possibility of the exploiters regaining power, the Congress decrees the arming of the workers, the formation of a Socialist Red Army of workers and peasants, and the complete disarmament of the propertied classes.” At the same time it was declared “the duty of all citizens to defend the Socialist fatherland” and “the honour of bearing arms in defence of the Revolution is granted only to the workers. The leisured section of the population will fulfil other military duties.” In this way the “public school class” of Russia was deprived of the right to participate in defence, because the working people distrusted this class in the defence of the Revolution; while the military training of the people, which in Britain is confined within the walls of the “public schools” and universities, was extended to the whole population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the early days of the Revolution the Soviet Government issued a decree for the arming of the whole people. The arsenals of the State were thrown open to the workers and peasants, and the authorities were instructed that the people were to be allowed arms for the defence of the Revolution. When, in 1918, a war broke out which was to last for four years, the exigencies of war ‘taught the same lesson as Spain has learned during 1936. This was that the “armed people” were defenceless against a well-organized trained army unless they, too, achieved first-class organization and discipline. And a disciplined and well-organized army is impossible without centralized command.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a result of the necessities of the war itself, the unorganized arming of the people and the defence of the Revolution by badly trained groups of armed workers could not be allowed to continue. The necessary steps were therefore taken by the Soviet Government to build up a regular army, with a centralized command and the enforcement of the necessary discipline, even though this meant the elimination of certain features which were defended by some as being necessary to a democratic army. It must not be imagined that such a reorganization was easy, for the Revolution itself had been made possible only as a result of the complete breakdown of the old army discipline, the seizure of power by the rank-and-file soldiers and their elected committees, and the replacing of the old army officers by elected commanders. It took time to persuade the rank-and-file soldiers, once the commanders were really drawn from the ranks and there was an equal opportunity for all to rise to the highest positions of command, that a disciplined subordination to the commanders was still essential while in action, whatever might be the relationship of the men in the ranks to the commanders when off duty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The experience of Soviet Russia in fighting against the armed intervention of ten foreign Powers was that the arming of the people must be followed at once by the organizing of a strong people’s army, with a centralized command, and well disciplined. While the old relationship between soldier and officer was completely abandoned, and all ranks mixed together as equals when off duty, the behaviour of every soldier when on duty had to conform to the necessary military discipline. The fact, however, that in the new army which was being built up the commanders themselves were drawn from the best elements in the ranks meant that the old antagonism between officer and soldier, reflecting the class relationships in society, no longer existed. In this way the Red Army was built up, an army which to-day is officered to the extent of some 95 percent by men drawn from the working class and the collective farm peasantry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The structure of the Red Army and its administration is in general similar to that of other organizations of the Soviet State. The supreme authority is vested in the Commissar of Defence, who is appointed by the supreme authority of the State. Officers are appointed from above, but at the same time committees of the rank and file play a large part in the management of the barracks and in all matters immediately affecting the welfare of the soldiers, their social and political life, their education, feeding, housing conditions, and so on. In this way the Soviet barracks has its wall-newspaper like the factory, and the commander who does not treat the men with the necessary politeness may be criticized for his uncomradely attitude in the same way as a factory foreman may be criticized by the rank and file.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as, in the factory, there are opportunities for every worker to study and to obtain promotion, so, too, in the Red Army, every facility is available for free study and so for promotion. Any rank-and-file soldier may apply for admission to one of the military academies, and will be accepted as soon as he has the necessary qualifications.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Military service in the U.S.S.R. is an obligation on all citizens. So long, however, as there was an employing class, it was expressly stated that the employing class was not to be given military work for the defence of the country. To-day, however, now that the employers no longer exist as a class of the Soviet population, the new Constitution simply states; “Universal military service is the law. Military service in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army represents the honourable duty of the citizens of the U.S.S.R.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has already been shown, when we were considering trade unions in the Soviet State, how the regiments of the Red Army freely mix with the workers and peasants in social and cultural activities of various kinds, as well as giving them active assistance in production in times of emergency. Similarly, when we discussed the setting up of the Soviet State, we saw that the soldiers, like the other citizens, had the full right to vote and to participate in elections. In the army of the U.S.S.R.—and this is a feature of every really democratic army—politics have always played an important part, for the Soviet Government has nothing to hide from its soldiers, and it is to the greatest advantage that they should know for what they are fighting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In discussing the Soviet factory we saw how the work of the factory manager included, in addition to responsibility for production, the work of caring for the welfare of the workers employed. So, too, in the Red Army, the duty of the commander, not only to his superior staff but to the men under him, is stressed in the official field regulations which state: “Care for the Red Army man is the first obligation of the commander, and is his direct duty.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An interesting feature of the field regulations of the Red Army is a paragraph which deals with the treatment of prisoners of war. We have already seen how, in general, prisoners in the Soviet Union are treated as deserving of education rather than punishment. However, with regard to deliberate enemies of the State, the law is applied as between enemies and not as between comrades. In preparing the Red Army for action, however, we find the following paragraph in the field regulations: “The troops of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army are generous to prisoners of war, and render them all kind of help for the purpose of preserving their lives.” This, at a time when the aeroplanes of Hitler and Mussolini were bombing the defenceless women and children fleeing from Malaga, was one of the field regulations issued by the Soviet Government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I remember how, when working in Moscow, I happened to see a letter sent to the U.S.S.R. from an English worker. During the period of British intervention he had been sent to the north of Russia, and had been taken prisoner. In his letter he recalled his experiences—how he had been given work to do, was paid for this work, and allowed to spend his free time wandering about the town in the evenings just as he wished. This was no accidental treatment; it was typical of the treatment of prisoners during the last war against the U.S.S.R.; and, from the field regulations quoted, we see that it will probably be true of the next.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the explanation of this leniency, of this friendliness, to the prospective prisoners of the Red Army in a war? The answer is that the leaders of the Red Army look upon it, not simply as a military machine, but as a political organization capable of winning to its side the workers and peasants, the vast majority of the people, in any territory which it may enter. For this reason the regulations definitely state: “The winning over to the side of the proletarian revolution of the working and peasant masses of the enemy army as well as the population of the field of action is the principal condition for victory.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Fascists, in their attack on Spain, bomb defenceless women and children who are fleeing from a captured town. The Red Army, when there was a serious dispute with the Chinese in Manchuria a few years ago, entered Manchurian territory. When it entered a town or village the first thing it did was to hand over all stores of food and clothing to the most impoverished of the population, thus endearing itself to the women and children instead of murdering them. Such a policy is consistent only with a democratic army, not interested in the preservation, but with the destruction, of the power of private property. And it is for this reason that in a war against Fascism the Red Army has not only its own morale in its favour, but the opportunity to gain very rapidly the sympathy of all the democratic forces in the country with whose Government it happens to be at war. The Red Army, at a time when the whole world is menaced by ever more flagrant acts of Fascist aggression, stands out as a bulwark of democracy, as a political as well as a military organization, rooted in, and recruited from, the rank and file of the people, a people’s army which will respect the people of any territory which it may ever have cause to enter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such an army, however, representing a people so organized that they have no unemployment—and there are among them no citizens who can gain anything from war—is not likely to enter foreign territory unless absolutely compelled to do so by an act of aggression, either against the Soviet State itself, or against a State with which it has a pact of mutual assistance. In 1917 one of the main slogans of the, Congress of Soviets was “Peace.” To-day, twenty years later, no citizen of the U.S.S.R. wants war. Therefore we find that Voroshilov, Commissar for Defence of the U.S.S.R., recently made the following public statement:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We are proud of our army, its organization, its military training, its splendid equipment, but without hesitation we would send this army back to the factories and the collective farm fields, we would disarm it completely if the capitalist countries would accept our disarmament proposals.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Only the U.S.S.R. could contemplate such demobilization without fearing unemployment. Only the U.S.S.R. has jobs waiting for every ex-soldier, and only in the U.S.S.R.—a country where not one citizen can gain anything from war—can such a demobilization be looked upon as highly desirable, if only the security of the country could be guaranteed in other ways.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== A Union of Nations ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Russian Soviet Republic, in January 1918, was declared “a free union of free nations,” a federation of national republics. Every nationality within the territory covered by the Soviets was given the right to decide, at its own Congress of Soviets, the conditions under which it would join this federation. And when certain nations which had previously been part of the former Russian Empire declared their complete independence, this was welcomed by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But though, from its birth, the Soviet Republic recognized the rights of nations to determine their own fate, the surrounding States did not recognize the right of the Russian people to determine theirs. The result was that the actual seizure of power, which had been almost bloodless, was followed by four years of devastating “civil war,” when at least ten foreign armies co-operated in an attempt to suppress the Soviets. Finally, as a result of the united struggle of the Russian people, and the support which they received from the workers of other countries, peace was restored in the West in 1921, and in the Far East in the following year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this war the Russian Soviet Government again had an opportunity to state its position in relation to other nations. For, in 1920, urged on by France, the Polish Government was preparing openly to declare war on the Soviets. At that time the Soviet Government issued a manifesto which was reprinted throughout the world, and was widely circulated in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is an extract from this manifesto: “Your enemies, who are ours, speak falsely when they tell you that the Russian Soviet Government intends to force Communism on the Polish people with the help of the bayonets of the Red Army. Communism is only possible in countries where the vast majority of the working people have the will to secure it by their own initiative. . . . The reorganization of Poland in accordance with the interests of the Polish masses must be the work of these working masses themselves.” The essence of this manifesto was repeated by Stalin in 1936 in his interview with Roy Howard: “Every country will make its own revolution if it wants to, and if it does not there will be no revolution. For example, our country wanted to make a revolution and made it, and now we are building a new, classless society. But to assert that we want to make a revolution in other countries, to interfere in their lives, means saying what is untrue, and what we have never advocated.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These two passages are extremely important, the one from 1920 and the other from 1936. For if the Soviet Government really recognized the right of nations to self-determination, and then it essentially had to hold this democratic view of the revolution in other countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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The restoration of peace in 1921 and 1922 found the territory covered by the Soviets considerably extended. For in the process of the struggle there had been set up additional Soviet Republics in the Ukraine and White Russia, in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. At the same time, however, the economic position of all these territories was far worse than it had been in 1917, for the retreating armies of intervention had done their utmost to wreck everything which they left behind them. Railways were blown up and factories burnt to the ground. The Soviet Republics were faced with the problem of economic reconstruction at the same time as they knew that at any moment another attack might be launched against them, perhaps by one State, or perhaps by all the members of the League of Nations together; for, in the eyes of its founder, this institution was to act as a “bulwark against Bolshevism.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The experience of the war itself, and the economic problems which it created, brought the different Soviet Republics into the closest contact with each other. Experience showed that still closer union was essential to future security. Therefore, in December 1922, a Treaty of Union was signed between the Soviet Republics; and the U.S.S.R.—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—was in this way brought into being.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this treaty it was pointed out that the world was now divided into two camps, capitalist and Socialist. “Only in the camp of the Soviets,” it goes on, “has it been found possible to root out national persecution, to create conditions of mutual trust, and to lay the foundations of fraternal co-operation. . . .&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“But the years of war were not without their heritage. The ruined fields and idle factories, the breakdown of production and the exhaustion of economic resources which follow from the war, render the isolated efforts of the separate Republics towards economic reconstruction inadequate. The revival of the economic life of the country has proved impossible so long as the Republics lead a divided existence. Furthermore, the unsettled state of international relations, and the danger of new attacks, render imperative the creation of a common front by the Soviet Republics against capitalist encirclement.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Finally, the very structure of the Soviet power, which is international in its class character, urges the working masses of the Soviet Republics along the path of union into one Socialist family.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the Treaty of Union, a central federal Government was to be formed which would control defence and foreign affairs—including the establishment of one form of Soviet citizenship to cover the whole union, and also including the admission of new republics. The Government of the Union would also be responsible for introducing a general economic plan for the whole territory; for regulating trade, currency, and taxation; for deciding on the best methods of utilizing the land; and for controlling transport and communications, weights and measures. In addition, the Government of the Union was to lay down the general principles governing such matters as education and health protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Governments of the republics which joined the Union were to have complete self-government on every matter that was not included in the treaty, and every republic had the right to secede from the Union if it wished to do so. On the other hand, however, if a republic passed any law which was contrary to the terms of the treaty, then this law could be annulled by the Government of the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Treaty of Union was signed in 1922, and ratified by the first All-Union Congress of Soviets, which was elected in the same way as the All-Russian Congress. Delegates were elected from all the territory now covered by the Union, in the proportion of one to every 25,000 town electors, and one to every 125,000 inhabitants of the provinces. The Congress elected a Central Executive Committee, which started to draw up a Constitution for the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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The original conception of the structure of the Union Government was that it should be an almost exact copy of the Russian Soviet Republic, but covering all the territory now within the Union. However, it was mainly as a result of the initiative of Stalin personally, himself a Georgian and an expert on the national question, that special features were incorporated in the Constitution of the Union in order to protect the rights of all the national republics from a possible domination by the Russians, who formed an overwhelming majority of the total population of the Union, and who thus would hold a majority of the votes in the Congress of Soviets. The Constitution was adopted in its final form at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1924.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The supreme authority in the U.S.S.R., as in each republic, was to be the Congress of Soviets. Delegates were to be sent to this Congress elected in the same proportion to population as the delegates to the Russian Congress. But the Central Executive Committee was to be given a special structure, peculiar to its position as Government of a Union of independent and equal national republics. Instead of being, as in the separate republics, a single body elected at the Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive Committee was to be divided into two separate councils, with completely equal powers in every respect. Each could introduce new legislation, but no law could be passed without being accepted by a majority in each of these councils separately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How were these councils to be elected?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the one hand, the Council of the Union was to be elected in precisely the same way as the Central Executive Committee had previously been; that is, by direct election at the Congress of Soviets. The Council of the Union would represent the delegates at the Congress, and, since an absolute majority of these delegates came from the Russian Soviet Republic, the Council of the Union would have a Russian majority. But this Council of the Union could do nothing without the agreement of a majority of the members of the Council of Nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Council of Nationalities was to consist of representatives of the different republican Governments appointed in equal numbers. In the Council of Nationalities the Russians would, therefore, be a small minority, quite out-voted by the Ukrainians and the Georgians, the White Russians and the Armenians, together with the Uzbeks and Tadjiks and Turkmenians who had joined the Union later.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Government of the U.S.S.R., then, was a unique compromise between the representation of the people, as individual voters irrespective of their nationality, and of the nations of the Union, as equal nations. Only in extreme cases was it likely that the two councils would not reach agreement on any particular question; while the scheme gave the smaller nations of the Union, though a minority of the total population, a large say in determining policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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In case of disagreement, and if no attempt at conciliation proved successful, disputes were to be referred to a Congress of Soviets specially called for the purpose. However, no occasion has arisen where this was necessary, for the two councils have been able to work in complete harmony.&lt;br /&gt;
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The problems involved in setting up this multinational State were difficult ones. In his speech to the Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets, where the new Constitution of 1936 was adopted, Stalin says on this matter; “The Constitution now in operation, adopted in 1924, was the first Constitution of the U.S.S.R. That was a period when the relations between the peoples had not yet been properly adjusted, when survivals of distrust towards the Great Russians had not yet disappeared, and when centrifugal forces still continued to operate. Under these conditions it was necessary to establish fraternal co-operation between the peoples on the basis of economic, political, and military mutual aid by uniting them in a single, federated, multi-national State. The Soviet Government could not but realize the difficulties of this task. It had before it the unsuccessful experiments of multinational states in bourgeois countries. It had before it the failure of the experiment of the old Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, it resolved to make the experiment of creating a multi-national State, for it knew that a multi-national State which has arisen on the basis of Socialism is bound to stand every test.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Since then fourteen years have elapsed, a period long enough to test the experiment. And what do we find? This period has shown beyond doubt that the experiment of forming a multi-national State based on Socialism has been completely successful. This is the undoubted victory of Lenin’s national policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“How is this victory to be explained?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“By the absence of exploiting classes, which are the principal organizers of strife between nations; the absence of exploitation, which cultivates mutual distrust and kindles nationalist passions; the fact that power is in the hands of the working class, which is an enemy of all enslavement and the true vehicle of the ideas of internationalism; the actual practice of mutual aid among the peoples in all spheres of economic and social life; and, finally, the flourishing national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., culture which is national in form and Socialist in content—all these and similar factors have brought about a radical change in the aspect of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.; their feeling of mutual distrust has disappeared, a feeling of mutual friendship has developed among them, and thus real fraternal co-operation between the peoples has been established within the system of a single federated State.”&lt;br /&gt;
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And within this great federation, as we have already seen, the treatment of all nations as equals, and of all citizens as equals, irrespective of their nationality, has led to a great growth of national pride. In the U.S.S.R. to-day no citizen, Jew or German, Abyssinian or Italian, Negro or American, Indian or English, is ashamed of his nationality, is privileged because of his nationality, or, because of his nationality or colour, and is deprived of any privilege due to him as a working-citizen of the U.S.S.R. Such a country can indeed be called a Union of Nations, and many of the peoples of the British Empire will envy a unity based upon such an equality of peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Electors and Administrators ===&lt;br /&gt;
For those who worked, the young Soviet State gave its citizens the right to vote and to stand for election at an earlier age than in any other country. The representatives that the people elected, if they proved unsatisfactory, were subject to recall by their electors. And, when elected, every representative of the people was bound, not only to participate in the making of decisions, but also in their execution. In addition, so as to draw into the work of administration a vast number of working people—far more than could actually be elected to membership of the Soviets—a system was early evolved by which working men and women, in their spare time, should represent their fellows in the various organs of State administration, national and local, and participate in their work.&lt;br /&gt;
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The result is that, whether we take a local Soviet or the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., we find in its offices three categories of workers. First, elected members of the Soviet or Executive Committee, who are bound to participate in the work of one of the departments of the public authority to which they have been elected. Secondly, there are paid employees, appointed by, and responsible to, the elected body. And thirdly, voluntary workers, not bound by any law to do this work, but who have been elected in their trade union meetings to participate in the work of the Soviets, or of an Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
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I have, while working in the Soviet Union, participated in an election. I, too, had a right to vote, as I was a working member of the community, and nationality and citizenship is no bar to electoral rights. The procedure was extremely simple. A general meeting of all the workers in our organization was called by the trade union committee, candidates were discussed, and a vote was taken by show of hands. Anybody present had the right to propose a candidate, and the one who was elected was not personally a member of the Party. In considering the claims of the candidates their past activities were discussed, they themselves had to answer questions as to their qualifications, anybody could express an opinion, for or against them, and the basis of all the discussion was: What justification had the candidates to represent their comrades on the local Soviet?&lt;br /&gt;
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As far as the elections in the villages were concerned, these took place at open village meetings, all peasants of voting age, other than those who employed labour, having the right to vote and to stand for election. As in the towns, any organization or individual could put forward candidates, anyone could ask the candidate questions, and anybody could support or oppose the candidature. It is usual for the Communist Party to put forward a candidate, trade unions and other organizations can also do so, and there is nothing to prevent the Party’s candidate from not being elected, if he has not sufficient prestige among the voters.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the towns the “electoral district” has hitherto consisted of a factory, or a group of small factories sufficient to form a constituency. But there was one section of the town population which has always had to vote geographically, since they did not work together in one organization. This was the housewives. As a result, the housewives met separately in each district, had their own constituencies, and elected their own representatives to the Soviet. Here, too, vital interest has always been shown in the personality of every candidate. Why should this woman be elected? What right had she to represent her fellow housewives on the local Soviet? In the district next to my own at the last election the housewife who was elected was well known as an organizer of a communal dining-room in the district. This was the land of person that the housewives wanted to represent them on the Soviet. Another candidate, a Communist, proposed by the local organization of the Party, was turned down in her favour.&lt;br /&gt;
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It will be clear from this description that a Soviet election has, up to the present, been a most simple and informal affair, for the purpose of sending forward the best representatives of the people to sit on the local and national organs of government. Organizations and individuals have both been able to put forward candidates, and in cases where the Communist Party has supported candidates they have not always necessarily been members of the Party itself, and, whether they have been members or not, there has never been any guarantee of their election, other than their desirability as candidates to a majority of those present at the meeting. If since November 1917 the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. has continued to have its members as a majority of the delegates to the Congresses of Soviets, this is purely due to the fact that the Communist Party has put up for election those very people that the electors were likely to respect, and has not as a rule put up people whom the electors were likely to reject.&lt;br /&gt;
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The election of delegates to the local Soviet is not the only function of voters in the Soviet Union, It is not a question here of various parties presenting candidates to the electorate, each with his own policy to offer. The Soviet electorate has to select a personality from its midst to represent it, and instruct this person in the policy which is to be followed when elected. At a Soviet election meeting, therefore, as much or more time may be spent on discussion of the instructions to the delegate as is spent on discussing the personality of the candidates.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the last election to the Soviets, in which I personally participated, we must have spent three or four times as much time on the working out of instructions as we did on the selection of our candidate. About three weeks before the election was to take place the trade union secretary in every department of our organization was told by the committee that it was time to start to prepare our instructions to the delegate. Every worker was asked to make suggestions concerning policy which he felt should be brought to the notice of the new personnel of the Moscow Soviet. As a result, about forty proposals concerning the general government of Moscow were handed in from a group of about twenty people. We then held a meeting in our department at which we discussed the proposals, and adopted some and rejected others. We then handed our list of proposals to a commission, appointed by the trade union committee, and representing all the workers in our organization. This Commission coordinated the proposals received, placed them in order according to the various departments of the Soviet, and this coordinated list was read at the election meeting itself, again discussed, and adopted in its final form.&lt;br /&gt;
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The proposals which were made were of an extremely practical character. For when we set out as citizens to make constructive proposals for our local authority to carry out, the general atmosphere of practicability is very much greater than it can ever possibly be in an election carried out on the basis of party antagonism, where each side will throw exorbitant challenges at the other, hoping to make electoral capital as a result, but having no illusions as to the ultimate practicability of the suggested policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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To take a concrete example, let us compare the L.C.C. elections of March 1937 with the elections to the Moscow Soviet which took place in 1935, and in which I participated personally. In the former we notice that the Labour Party made great and justifiable play with the increase in housing construction since it came to power. On the other hand, the “moderate” and other candidates tended to centre their anti-Labour propaganda on the so-called “extravagance,” not of building so many more houses, but in spending in certain isolated cases of more on individual buildings than was necessary. In this way the issue was put to the electorate as: Labour—More Houses; Anti-Labour—Less Extravagance. The accusation of extravagance might quite well cause people who wanted more houses to vote “anti-Labour,” to discover afterwards that the real meaning of less extravagance was to cut down the housing program to what it had been before Labour was elected! And, in elections on a party basis, such a false contrasting of issues is bound to arise continuously, to the utter confusion of electors.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let us return to the election in Moscow. Here we found no spectacular demands for more houses, since the Moscow Soviet was already building increasing numbers of houses each year. But we did have very strong comments suggesting that the new Soviet should be particularly careful not to build any more large blocks without having a universal store included, that hot water should always be laid on, and that in future the approach to new blocks should be completed together with the houses, instead of having an approach of mud for three months or more after the houses themselves were already inhabited. The question of housing was raised in the Moscow election as well as in the London one, but in the former it took the shape of citizens’ definite instructions; in the latter, it was a propaganda weapon which could easily be made a luxurious cloak for a policy that could not command support among the voters at all if it had been fully revealed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since, in the U.S.S.R., practically the whole of trade is now controlled by public authorities, a number of instructions dealt with the shops. Those who lived in outlying areas stated the sites where they felt that the Soviet should place shops in the immediate future, and so on. Then there was a question dealing with the manners of the militia! Several years ago the Moscow Soviet opened a series of enquiry bureaus scattered about the city. Since these were opened, several of us had found that the militia, instead of answering enquiries as to where various places were, would always refer the questioner to the nearest enquiry office. We recommended that this be stopped, and I am glad to find that before I left this had been done.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not only questions of local importance, however, which are discussed by Soviet citizens. The Central Executive Committee, in considering legislation of major importance, has often called conferences or congresses of those particularly concerned, for consultative purposes, before such legislation is adopted. Or, in cases where it is considered that the proposed legislation affects the personal interests of the whole population, then it may be submitted to the whole country for consideration.&lt;br /&gt;
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As an example of the former, we may mention the model statutes for the collective farm, which were adopted in 1935. The Central Executive Committee, two years after the record harvest of 1933 had conclusively proved the effectiveness of collective farming, decided that the time had come when an official model set of statutes for the collective farms should be adopted. It therefore drew up a project, based on the experience of the most successful collectives. It then called the Congress of Collective Farm shock-workers. This meant that the collective farmers were asked to appoint their best shock-workers as delegates, and these elected delegates came to Moscow to discuss the new statutes. Then, after the congress had adopted what it considered the ideal statutes, the Central Executive Committee endorsed these statutes and they became law. In this way a new law was passed only after the fullest consultation with those whom it intimately affected.&lt;br /&gt;
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Examples of the other procedure, of submitting laws to the whole population for discussion, are more frequent in the case of matters which relate to the personal lives of the population. Thus, between 1917 and 1920 there were conferences and discussions throughout Soviet Russia on the subject of abortion. Finally, in spite of considerable opposition, the law was passed, which has already been quoted, making abortion legal in State clinics. In 1925, when a number of changes were proposed in the marriage law, a discussion took place for a whole year before the law was altered. And again, in 1936, when the Government considered that the time had come when legal abortion was no longer justified by circumstances, there was a general discussion in factories and collective farms, and in the pages of the Press, before the altered law was finally adopted. Again, in 1936, after the Seventh Congress of Soviets had decided to bring up to date the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., a special committee elected at the Congress drew up the draft, and it was then submitted to the whole population for almost six months’ discussion before it was finally amended and ratified at the Eighth Congress. As a result of this discussion, and of the discussion in the Congresses of Soviets in each of the constituent republics, the final draft contained over forty amendments to that which had been originally submitted.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as, in the sphere of discussion, the elected authorities of the U.S.S.R. refer to the general public for their opinion, so, too, in the sphere of action, they draw into the administration of the State large numbers of ordinary citizens. The meetings of workers in the factories, and villagers in the country, not only elect their delegates to the Soviets, but also put forward thousands of voluntary workers who are then attached to the different sections of the Soviets. These form the third category mentioned at the beginning of this chapter—workers who voluntarily participate in the various administrative bodies, both local and national. Already, in discussing equality of opportunity, we pointed out how, in this way, many “amateur” administrators find their way into the State apparatus as permanent workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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The work of every Soviet is divided into departments, such as health, housing, transport, industry, trade, education, and so on. In each of these sections there is ample scope for voluntary workers, as inspectors of existing conditions, to see that laws are enforced, and to report where improvements should be made and money should be spent. In Moscow alone, hundreds of volunteers do work for the housing department, inspecting dwellings and recommending improvements or demolition; finding suitable building sites; and discovering suitable positions for the creation of open spaces and playgrounds.&lt;br /&gt;
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Workers for the health department organize campaigns against epidemics, and run meetings and lectures on all subjects of importance to health. Such workers may become professional lecturers if they show ability, thus joining the ever-growing health service of the U.S.S.R. In the case of the education department, section workers become acquainted with the work of the schools, get to know the children personally, and attend the meetings of teachers and of students. By going from school to school they are able to make suggestions for better work, on each occasion describing how the best school in each particular sphere organizes its activities. The experience of all such voluntary workers, reported back to the Soviet, is a basis for new legislation.&lt;br /&gt;
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But voluntary work for the Soviets does not stop at such matters as health, housing, and education. The militia, the organization for preserving law and order, is also assisted by voluntary workers, usually young enthusiasts from the big factories. We may say, in fact, if the comparison is permissible, that the Soviet “Special” is the young man who, at a trade union meeting, is selected as one who is suited to do voluntary work in the department of the militia, dealing with cases of drunkenness, theft, or other disorders, when a uniformed militiaman is not in sight!&lt;br /&gt;
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The work of volunteers in the Soviet State is not, however, limited to local government. It also extends upwards throughout the Soviet State, right to the offices of the Central Executive Committee itself. Here, for example, in the Complaints Bureau of the President, Kalinin, there work a number of volunteers from Moscow’s largest factories, sent there by their trade unions, and dealing with letters addressed to the President from all parts of the U.S.S.R. For the Soviet citizen not only has his Press to which to write, but also his President; and letters to Kalinin play an important part in exposing abuses by local authorities and the administration of factories when the complainant is unable locally to obtain redress.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is only when the Soviet State is considered in detail, with its elected deputies, its voluntary workers, and its paid workers promoted according to merit from the rank and file of the population that we see how, in the words of Sir Bernard Pares, “Government and people are of the same stock.” This has happened because it is the people who have built up the Government of the U.S.S.R., republic by republic, institution by institution, as the demands of the welfare of the community have necessitated. The working people themselves participate in running the State; there are no longer, as the Webbs put it, “a Government and a people confronting each other.”&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A Socialist Constitution ===&lt;br /&gt;
According to the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic, adopted in the heat of the struggle of the Russian people for liberty, the fundamental aim of the Republic was stated to be “suppressing all exploitation of man by man, abolishing forever the division of society into classes, bringing about the Socialist organization of society.” With this end in view, “work useful to the community is made compulsory upon all,” and “now, at the decisive moment in the struggle between the workers and their exploiters, there can be no place for the latter on any organ of government.” There follow, as we have already seen, a number of concrete measures, increasing the freedom of the vast majority of the population and giving them democratic rights that they had never previously enjoyed; but, on the other hand, the employers of labour, the property-owners, were deprived of all political rights, of the ownership of the meeting halls and the printing presses, and, as the State was able to take them over, of all other means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
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These essential features of the Russian Soviet Constitution were later made part of the Constitutions of other Soviet republics: both those which later joined the Union, and those which were formed in Hungary, in China, and in Bavaria. When, in 1922, the Union was formed, each of the constituent republics included the same fundamental ideas in its Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now it is clear that if the Constitution of any State, or of any other kind of organization, includes a statement of aims, and measures directed towards the achievement of these aims, a time may come when, the aims having been fulfilled, the old Constitution is out of date. When, therefore, from about 1933 onwards, it has been possible in the U.S.S.R. to say that capitalism no longer exists, and that there are no longer employers of labour; when it has become possible to refer to the U.S.S.R. as a society in which everyone either works for himself or for the community, and nobody works for the profit of an employer—under these conditions it can be said that the main aims expressed in the earlier Constitutions have been accomplished, and a revised Constitution is required to establish this fact.&lt;br /&gt;
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That is why, at the Seventh Congress of Soviets in 1935, it was decided to introduce a new Constitution for the U.S.S.R. On December 5th, 1936, this Constitution was adopted in its final form at the Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets. What are the essential features of this new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.?&lt;br /&gt;
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First, the Soviets remain, as before, the supreme authority in the country. But the Soviet State is now described as a “Socialist State of workers and peasants,” whereas, in the original Constitution of 1918, we only read of the “fundamental aim” of establishing Socialism. Second, there follows a definition of public and of private property, all the means of production being now publicly owned; but citizens are allowed the private ownership of their earnings, savings, and the necessities of human comfort. The small independent producer, working on his own, but not employing others for profit, is allowed to possess his necessary materials and means of production. Third, reference is made to the existence of an economic plan, whereas, in the first Constitution of the Union of 1924, reference was only made to the future establishment of such a plan by the Government of the Union. According to the Constitution of 1936, “The economic life of the U.S.S.R. is determined and directed by the national economic State plan for the purpose of increasing public wealth, of a steady rise in the material and cultural level of the toilers, of strengthening the independence of the U.S.S.R. and its defence capacity.” An important part of the new Constitution deals with the structure of the State, in which certain major changes are made. Finally, a section is included which deals with the Rights and Obligations of Citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main changes in the structure of the State which have been adopted in the Constitution of 1936 are: the making of suffrage universal without any exceptions; the introduction of equality of representation of town and village; the introduction of secret ballot in place of voting by show of hands; and the provision that henceforth every governing authority, not only the local one, shall be directly elected by the people. These changes, it will be noted, all introduce features, hitherto absent, which are generally accepted as democratic in character. They ensure still closer contact between the higher organs of Government and the ranks of the people. And they make the whole apparatus of the State considerably less complicated, by wiping out the intricate system of election by steps or stages.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is impossible to understand the significance of the changes which have been introduced in the Soviet Constitution of 1936 without recalling the reason why, in the earlier Constitutions, the particular system then prevailing was adopted. We know that the Soviets were set up throughout Russia as fighting organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers against the employing classes and their Government. The Soviets, therefore, naturally excluded from participation in their activity persons and officials against whom they were fighting. It was natural that when the Soviets seized the reins of government, the “exploiters” were not allowed to participate in the running of the country. Universal suffrage was adopted, with exceptions. In 1936, when the employers of labour as a class were extinct in the Soviet Union, and when former employees and former officials of the Tsarist State were either dead, abroad, or peacefully working in Soviet institutions, the franchise had already become practically universal, with the exception of some 50,000 priests. As it is not considered likely that these 50,000 priests, given full political rights, will in any way be able to obstruct the progress of the Soviet Union, they are not any longer deprived of the right to vote. Universal suffrage for all citizens of the age of eighteen and over, &#039;&#039;with exceptions&#039;&#039;, has simply become universal suffrage for all citizens of the age of eighteen and over. The half-witted, it should be noted, are, however, still deprived of the right to vote; and the courts may deprive citizens of this right as a result of a misdemeanour.&lt;br /&gt;
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The unequal representation of town and village arose as a result of the leading part which the town workers played in the organization of the Soviets and of the Soviet State. At the time of the drawing up of the first Constitution it was considered desirable that the workers, who were introducing Socialism in industry, should continue to play a leading part in the Soviet Government. But with the final wiping out of capitalist enterprise in the villages, and the triumph of collective farming, it can no longer be said that the leadership of the workers in the towns must be specially safeguarded in the interests of Socialism, or that any discrimination in their favour can now be justified. Therefore, by 1936, the inequalities between town and country have been removed, and there is now completely equal representation of all citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
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Voting by show of hands, we have seen, took place in the factories and at village meetings, because it was the most simple way in which a vote could be taken. And this method of voting had also its very definite utility at a time when a fierce struggle was being carried on between the working people and their employers. For, though the employers were deprived of all voting rights, there was no means of preventing them, if they so wished, from persuading or bribing certain of those who had full political rights to put up and to support candidates who would be sympathetic to them. In the factories, the office staff had the right to participate in the elections. In outlook they were often close to the employers. If, when the vote was taken, those who were known to be close to the employer were seen to be supporting a particular candidate, this was a warning that the candidate was likely to be a “bosses’ man,” an undesirable candidate! And if this was true of the town, it was still more true of the village, where the petty employer, the local usurer, the “kulak,” often had many people over whom he could exert influence. The “kulak vote” could be detected at an open meeting, which meant that the rest of the people were warned where lay the interests of property.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the U.S.S.R. to-day, now that there is no longer an employing class at all, the system of open voting by show of hands no longer has the positive value which it used to have. At the same time, it still retains those negative features which it has always had, and which centre on the fact that, if candidates know who votes for whom, the way is open for various methods of personal pressure and persuasion, even in the conditions of Socialist society. Even in the U.S.S.R. to-day there may be people who are not above cadging for votes. But these people are disarmed if there is secret ballot. So we find the introduction of secret ballot in the new Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
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We come now to the change which has perhaps aroused the greatest comment outside the Soviet Union. It has even been suggested that the replacing of indirect election by direct election means the end of all that was essential in the Soviet system! Up to the present the structure of the Soviet State has been modelled on the lines of a working-class organization. Now, it appears, it is to be reconstructed along the lines of a capitalist republic. Is not this a retreat from the essentials of the Soviet system?&lt;br /&gt;
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It should first be said quite emphatically that never, at any time, has particular stress been laid, inside the U.S.S.R., on the structure of the Soviet State as being something permanent and unalterable. The point that has been emphasized, again and again, is the fact that power in the Soviet State is in the hands of the working population. And, as we have seen in Part I, there is no tendency at the present time to make this power of the workers any less effective than it has hitherto been. As far as the structure of the State is concerned, this has always been regarded as something which would be altered to suit changing circumstances, and so, as early, as 1917, we find Lenin writing these words: “The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly bring a great variety and abundance of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be only one: &#039;&#039;the dictatorship of the proletariat&#039;&#039;.” And, as we saw in our short Introduction, these words simply mean that the Government shall be in the hands of the urban and rural workers, combined with the poorer peasantry; that is, to-day, the whole population of workers, collective farmers, and small individual producers.&lt;br /&gt;
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When we examined the formation of the Soviet State we saw that it was never built up according to a preconceived plan, but grew up in the way in which, in their struggle for better conditions, the working people happened to build it. It naturally took the form of an ordinary working-class organization, with authority centred in a Congress, and an Executive Committee between Congresses. Such a system, as has already been pointed out, is economical; because many people can attend a Congress that lasts a few days who, because they are working as producers, could not sit for a great part of the year on a more permanent body. On the other hand, however, every organization which is governed by periodical congresses, and by an executive committee between these congresses, is in danger of an isolation of the executive committee at the top from the membership at the bottom.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we examine the development of the Congresses of Soviets of the Russian Soviet Republic, we find that at first they were called very often, four being held in 1918 alone; whereas they were later held only once a year. As far as concerns the U.S.S.R., we find that the first and second Congresses met in 1922 and 1924, three more were held before the end of 1929, the sixth in 1931, the seventh in 1935, and the eighth, to deal exclusively with the amendment of the Constitution, in 1936. Thus there has been a tendency, with the passage of time, for rather greater periods to elapse between the Congresses, and for more time to be spent between them on carrying out the policy which they have decided upon.&lt;br /&gt;
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This tendency, at first sight, might seem alarming to the democrat. But it is in fact an inevitable tendency in a community in which the problems of Government are becoming increasingly bound up with the day-to-day management of affairs, and less and less a matter of deciding general principles. In all working-class organizations the function of a congress is to establish the general principles on which the organization is to work. The principles having been decided, the delegates return to their localities, and it is for the executive committee to see that they are carried out. Congresses, because of their very nature, are unable to exercise a detailed control of day-to-day work, for they only meet for short periods, whereas the work of any organization or government goes on continuously. It follows from this that the more the work of government becomes the detailed carrying out of a generally agreed policy, the less work is there for a congress to do; and the greater the need for some more permanent executive body directly controlling the activities of the various organs of administration.&lt;br /&gt;
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That is why, in the history of the Soviet State, we find that at first the Congresses of Soviets met frequently, and, later on, less often. At first there were numerous questions of principle to be settled—the rights of the working people as against those of the employers, the organization of defense by arming the people, the position of the Soviet State as regards the rights of nationalities ; all these matters had to be decided in principle. After 1922, with the defeat of the armed intervention, the question of economic development became the main problem. When, in 1928 and 1929, it was decided finally to eliminate capitalism from the countryside and to launch a general plan of economic development to cover the whole life of the country, a final question of principle was decided. It now had to be worked out.&lt;br /&gt;
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The weakness of the Congress of Soviets as a means of effectively controlling the day-to-day activity of the many organs of Government has been well expressed by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in Soviet Communism. They describe the All-Union Congress of Soviets in these terms: “This huge assembly, made up of delegates of scores of races speaking different tongues, might meet only for a week or so and then ‘surrender their mandates,’ and do not even know in advance each other’s names, cannot, of course, develop the corporate life of a Parliament, or deal adequately with the details of legislation or administration. The Congress has been described, in fact, as little better than a picturesque ‘biennial picnic’ in Moscow for locally elected visitors from all parts of the U.S.S.R., whose expenses are provided from U.S.S.R. funds. Even if this were true, it would not imply that the Congress is of no political importance. . . . The mere fact that no delegate is ’denied the floor,’ even if there is no effective voting, makes so representative a gathering of real political importance” (p. 83).&lt;br /&gt;
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In these words Sidney and Beatrice Webb make crystal clear, at the present stage of Soviet development, when the basic questions of principle are to-day settled and opening Congresses to discuss matters of principle are no longer required, the need for some more permanent body, having a “corporate life,” and dealing with the day-to-day details of legislation and administration. What is required is a representative body which sits for longer periods, and which has direct contact with those people whose interests it represents. This is the new form of supreme authority which has been set up by the Constitution of 1936.&lt;br /&gt;
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Instead of a Congress of delegates electing an Executive Committee, the supreme authority of every territory in the U.S.S.R. will now be a directly elected Supreme Soviet or Council. The citizens will directly elect their deputies not only to the local Soviet, but to the provincial and district Soviets, to the Supreme Council of their Republic, and to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., which will replace the Congress of Soviets and the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the same time, in the Government of the U.S.S.R. the two Councils, formerly parts of the Central Executive Committee, will remain. The Council of the Union will consist of delegates, each of whom represents 300,000 inhabitants, from all over the U.S.S.R. The Council of Nationalities will consist of the same number of delegates as the Council of the Union, directly elected by the population in such a way that there will be an equal number of delegates from each main national republic of the Union, and smaller numbers of delegates from each of the smaller republics within them and other smaller national territories. In this way there is a “two-chamber” system, in which each chamber has absolutely equal powers in every respect, one chamber representing the people as a whole, the other representing the people organized as equal nations.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the new Constitution, then, the supreme authority of the U.S.S.R. will be directly responsible to the people as individuals, and to the people as nations. The Supreme Council will sit for about four months each year, and, between sessions, its elected Presidium will exercise very limited powers in its absence. Such a matter of importance to the people as the declaration of war, a matter which is usually in the hands of the “cabinets” of other countries, can now only be decided by the directly elected Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. However, an exception is made in the case of honoring treaties of mutual assistance, which the Presidium may fulfill without calling a session of the Supreme Council.&lt;br /&gt;
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Should a situation arise in which the two chambers of the Soviet Government cannot agree, there is provision for the setting up of a joint conciliation committee. If this is ineffective, then the matter can only be referred to the whole country for decision, by means of new elections. If, after that, a majority in the Council of Nationalities and a majority in the Council of the Union disagreed, the contentious piece of legislation would have to be buried! It is hard to imagine, however, at the present time, so serious a dispute arising between the two Councils of the Soviet Government. On what could the representatives of the nations of the Union so disagree with the representatives of the people as a whole as to necessitate a new election? Perhaps small disagreements may arise as to the placing of new industries: shall they be on the territory of the Russian Soviet Republic, or in the smaller republics of the Union? Or a budgetary question might arise: the Russians in the Council of the Union, representing a majority of the population of the U.S.S.R., might want more centralization of funds in the Commissariat of Finance of the U.S.S.R. The smaller republics might oppose this, and turn down such a proposition in the Council of Nationalities. But could such a dispute prove to be irreconcilable without a new election? This seems unlikely, so that the provisions for such a dispute, while necessary on paper, may never actually have to be applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The last section of the new Constitution which is of interest here is that which deals with the Rights and Obligations of Citizens. The striking feature of this chapter is the small number of obligations, and the large number of rights, of the Soviet citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Work in the U.S.S.R. is the obligation of each citizen capable of working, according to the principle; ‘He who does not work shall not eat.’ In the U.S.S.R. the principle of Socialism is being realized: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.’” Further, every Soviet citizen must abide by the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and obey its laws. Finally, every citizen is under the obligation to defend the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To the working man and woman in other countries these obligations of citizens will not seem unduly arduous. To those who live on rent and interest, however, who spend their lives on the Lido and the Riviera, and appear regularly each year at Ascot and spend thousands of pounds during each “season” in London—to these, and to poorer people who imitate them in a smaller way, the idea that work should be an obligation on all may well seem an unjustifiable interference with individual liberty. But to such people, for this very reason, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably be distasteful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State imposes the obligation to work. But it makes it possible to fulfill this obligation by granting the right to work to all citizens. This right, until 1931, could not have appeared in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., for, until then, the Soviet State had still to face the problem of unemployment. To-day, as a result of the replacing of capitalist by Socialist production, economic crises have been made impossible in the U.S.S.R. Production is planned for use, and the only brake on increasing production is the number of people available for work. It can never be to the interest of the Soviet State to allow people to be out of work, for by employing them the general welfare must necessarily be increased.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Work without leisure is a doubtful blessing. So, by the guarantee of leisure, the new Soviet Constitution ensures that work shall not be excessive. The seven-hour day in practically the whole of industry, and paid holidays for all workers, make this right a reality at the present time. But work and leisure are not enough. In addition, the worker wants security. And this, too, is guaranteed in the new Soviet Constitution by a social insurance system which pays wages during illness, and pensions at sixty for men, fifty-five for women, and at an earlier age in dangerous occupations or in cases of invalidity. The control of the social insurance funds, as we have seen, is in the hands of the people’s own elected representatives in the trade unions. Further rights, the enjoyment of which has been fully described in earlier chapters, are national equality, sex equality, and education. All these things, guaranteed in the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R., are not promises for some distant future, but accomplished facts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. as adopted in 1924 a special chapter was devoted to the United State Political Department, or O.G.P.U., an organization which was created “for the purpose of combining the revolutionary efforts of the United Republics to combat political and economic counter-revolution, espionage, and banditry.” In the new Constitution no mention is made of this organization, now incorporated in the Commissariat of Home Affairs. On the other hand, provisions are included which provide for the inviolability of the person and the home, and for the secrecy of correspondence. This does not mean, of course, that at a time when certain of the most aggressively inclined Fascist States are openly preparing for an attack on the U.S.S.R., and are undoubtedly sending their agents there to prepare the way for armies at a later date, they will meet with no resistance. But whereas in 1924 one of the primary tasks of the united Government was to defend the Union against capitalist influences, both inside and outside the country, to-day the internal struggle is no longer of such importance. On the other hand, however, defense against foreign aggression is even more important than before. Hence a Commissariat of Defense Industries has been set up in the new Constitution of 1936.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In concluding this chapter, two general points should be mentioned. First, it has been said in many quarters that the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. represents a “weakening” of the dictatorship of the proletariat; that this dictatorship is now coming to an end. Such a view can only arise as a result of a misunderstanding of the term “dictatorship of the proletariat.” In our Introduction we showed how the Soviet State was set up to ensure the power of the working people of town and village—that is, the power of the vast majority of the population. This power was guaranteed by giving unprecedented democratic rights to the vast majority, while the rights of the small minority of employers were ruthlessly curtailed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is this form of government which is termed the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” But if this is what the term means, then the new Constitution, which reflects the complete extinction of the employing class, can only be termed a strengthening of this “dictatorship,” not its weakening. For to strengthen the democracy of the working people, now the whole population, is synonymous with strengthening the “dictatorship of the proletariat”—democracy for the whole working population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the second point is this. Throughout Part I there were described institutions and customs, methods of discussion and of government, which are hardly referred to at all in the Constitution, either before 1936 or after. Similarly, when we discussed the system of election, the part played by section workers in the Soviets and by public discussion, we were describing features of Soviet procedure which are not included in any Constitution. In all that we say and read about the Soviet Constitution, therefore, the following words of the Webbs must be seriously borne in mind: “In the Soviet Union, what the Western jurist is tempted to regard as the constitutional structure, namely, the pyramid of Soviets, is plainly only a fragment of it, and, as some may say, not the most important fragment. Whether by statutory enactment or accepted practice, the constitution of the U.S.S.R. provides for the active participation of the people in the work of government in more than one way” (p. 3).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that the Soviet Constitution does not cover every aspect of the work of government is not a feature that distinguishes it from the Constitutions of other countries. In no capitalist country does the Constitution express the relationship between the Treasury and the big bankers, or the War Ministry and the armament firms; and yet we know that the latter play an important part in molding Government decisions. Similarly, in Britain, an ordinary text-book description of the system of government does not usually explain how it is that only “public schoolboys” find their way to the higher posts in the Civil Service. In every country there are facts about the control of the Government which are not described in detail in the Constitution or in text-books of political science. The facts in the U.S.S.R. have been explored by us in detail, and we can only conclude in this case that if, on paper, the Soviet system provides for the representation of the people in all organs of government, in practice this representation is far greater than any written Constitution could ever show.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== State and Party ===&lt;br /&gt;
“The new Soviet Constitution is really not democratic at all, for in the U.S.S.R. there is only one political party.” How often, in speeches and articles in this country, have such phrases been used by those who wished to prove that the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. was not really democratic! But a vital question in this connection is never asked: Do the people of the U.S.S.R. want more than one political party? Is it by the will of the vast majority, or against their will, that a situation has arisen in which there is only one lawful political party in the Soviet Union? It is on the answer to this question that the reality of Soviet Democracy stands or falls.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How did it come about that in Soviet Russia and in the Soviet Union there is only one political party? That is the first question to be answered. Secondly, what is the relationship between this one political party and the people of the country? That is the second conclusion. Thirdly, what is the part played by this particular party in the running of the Soviet State; the position of its leader Stalin, for example, in relation to the government of the country? And, finally, is there not a danger to democracy in the fact that in the Soviet Union to-day only one political party is allowed by law? This last question will occupy us in the next chapter; the first three we shall examine here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the year 1905, when the first Soviets were set up by the workers of Russia, some of the most active members of these Soviets were “Bolsheviks”—that is, members of the section, of the Social Democratic Party of Russia that followed the leadership of Lenin, and that obtained a majority at the Second Congress of the Social Democratic Party in 1903, The Russian word &#039;&#039;bolshinstvo&#039;&#039; means majority, and, when the minority at this Congress split off from the majority, the two fractions became known as “Bolshevik” and “Menshevik” respectively, the majority and minority groups. The “Bolsheviks,” led by Lenin, were the majority at this Congress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bolsheviks in Russia based their political activity on the teachings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. They worked for the continual improvement of the conditions of the working class, for the transfer of the landed estates to the peasants, and for the self-determination of all the nations which formed the Russian Empire. Their ultimate aim was the revolutionary overthrow, not only of Tsarism, but of capitalist production, and the social ownership and control of the productive forces of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Writing in 1903, in a book which became the basic statement of Bolshevik policy at that time, Lenin wrote: “It would be a grievous error indeed to build up the party organization in the expectation only of outbreaks of street fighting, or only upon the ‘forward march of the drab, everyday struggle.’ We must &#039;&#039;always&#039;&#039; carry on our everyday work, and always be prepared for everything. And the Revolution itself must not by any means be regarded as a single act . . . but as a series of more or less powerful outbreaks rapidly alternating with more or less intense calm. For that reason the principal content of the activity of our party organization . . . should be, to carry on work that is possible and necessary both in the period of the most powerful outbreaks as well as in periods of complete calm; that is to say: work of political agitation linked up over the whole of Russia, that will enlighten all aspects of life and will be carried on among the broadest possible strata of the masses. But this work &#039;&#039;cannot possibly be carried on&#039;&#039; in contemporary Russia without an All-Russian newspaper, issued very frequently. An organization that is built up round this newspaper . . . will be ready &#039;&#039;for everything&#039;&#039;, from protecting the honor, the prestige, and continuity of the party in our periods of acute revolutionary ‘depression’ to preparing for, commencing, and carrying out the &#039;&#039;national armed insurrection&#039;&#039;” (&#039;&#039;What Is To Be Done?&#039;&#039; p. 131).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main feature of such a political party lay in the fact that it was to lead the working people in every one of their activities for improving their conditions of life. It was to be a leader and organizer of the working people and peasants in a fight for improved conditions. Therefore, such a party must demand that every one of its members play an active part in the organization; and, while the leading bodies were elected at congresses of delegates from the branches, between congresses there must be a disciplined carrying out of their decisions, and disciplined obedience to the instructions of the leading bodies in the party. The election of leaders must be accompanied by an “almost military discipline” in the execution of instructions, for the struggle that this party had to lead would be, in certain circumstances, a military struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Towards the end of 1916, when the people of Russia were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the policy of the Tsarist Government, the Bolsheviks played a prominent part, particularly in the towns and in the army, in leading strikes and demonstrations, and in carrying on propaganda for peace among the soldiers. When, in February 1917, as a result of strikes, mass demonstrations, and the refusal of the ranks in the army to continue to obey the orders of officers whom they did not respect, the Bolsheviks played a leading part in directing this unrest into channels which would force the Tsarist Government to resign. Immediately after the abdication, when the workers set up Soviets in one town after another, the Bolsheviks were among the most active participants in these Soviets, At the end of March, returning to Petrograd from exile in Siberia, Stalin wrote: “The more compact these Soviets, and the more strongly they are organized, the more genuinely do they express the revolutionary power of the revolutionary people, and the more certain is the guarantee provided against counter-revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Revolutionary Social Democrats must work to strengthen these Soviets, to make them universal, to establish contact between them under a Central Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies as the organ of the revolutionary power of the people.”&lt;br /&gt;
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And when, in April, Lenin returned from exile in Switzerland, he at once put forward the slogan, “All Power to the Soviets,” and the Party proceeded everywhere to carry on propaganda for the Soviets to seize State power, to put an end to the war, to confiscate the landlords’ estates, and to nationalize the main industrial enterprises. In June 1917 there took place the first Congress of Soviets. The Bolsheviks had 100 delegates out of a total of 781. Their demands were turned down by the Congress. They continued their propaganda among the people; they continued to organize the workers in trade unions and to mobilize the peasants round the village Soviets. They continued their propaganda against the war.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between April and October 1917 a number of leading Bolsheviks were arrested by the Provisional Government. But, in spite of this, their influence grew by leaps and bounds. When, at the beginning of November, it was clear that at any time the Government might set up a military dictatorship and suppress all organizations of the workers and peasants, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd organized an armed uprising. On the following day the second Congress of Soviets met in Petrograd. A majority of the delegates were Bolsheviks, there being 390 Bolsheviks out of a total of 649 delegates. Now that they were in a majority in the Congress of Soviets the Bolsheviks proceeded to put their policy into practice. At once a manifesto was issued on peace, the land was socialized and the big estates handed over to the peasants’ Soviets, and the workers in the factories were given those powers of control over the employers which have been described earlier in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this stage there were two other political parties represented in the Soviets. One, the Menshevik Party, had opposed the seizure of power by the Soviets and demanded the calling of a “Constituent Assembly” or All-Russian Parliament. But this demand received but little support from the population, who already had power in their own hands through the Soviets, and found that the Soviet Government was pursuing a policy which was completely in their interests. The other party was that of the Social Revolutionaries, a party of the peasantry, whose main demand had been the socialization of the land. As soon as the Second Congress had declared the transfer of the landed estates to the peasantry, the main item in the Social Revolutionary program was fulfilled, and from then on the Social Revolutionaries had no really important matters of policy on which they could appeal to the mass of the people against the Bolsheviks. As a result, a large section of the Social Revolutionaries joined the Central Executive Committee and worked in co-operation with the Bolsheviks. And, as the prestige of the Bolshevik Party grew, many of the members from the ranks of the other parties came over to them and joined the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the new Soviet Government was in existence it was possible to support it and be represented in it, or to work against it and try to overthrow it. The landlords deprived of their estates, the big financiers and employers of labor, and all those who, in principle, were opposed to a workers’ State organized like any other working-class organization, prepared to unite their forces for an armed attack on the Soviet State. It so came about that the Mensheviks lined up with the employers, and proceeded to armed action against the Soviets. And, at a later stage, the core of that part of the Social Revolutionary Party that still preserved its independence, and which was ready to oppose the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets by every means within its power, democratic or otherwise, attempted to organize an armed uprising against the Soviet Government. Recognizing the impossibility of being returned to the Soviets in a majority by the democratic votes of the people, these parties attempted to seize power by armed force. The State, therefore, used armed force against them, and they were deprived of their legality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It so came about that the party which had a majority of delegates in the Soviets became the only political party. Of the other parties, some of the members joined the Bolsheviks, and others tried to organize an armed uprising against the Soviet State. The former went to increase the membership of the Party, which already was supported by the vast majority of the population, and the others joined the armed counter-revolutionary forces, and were suppressed as a result.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this way, as a result of the fact that their policy appealed to a majority of the whole people, the Bolsheviks won control of the Soviets between February and October 1917. And, when they already had a majority and their prestige was increasing from day to day, they were still ready to work together with any other party that supported the Soviet State and was ready to work peacefully within it. As, however, the other parties split into those who supported the Soviets and came increasingly close to the Bolsheviks, and those who opposed the Soviets and tried to overthrow them by force, the latter were suppressed by force by the Soviet State, which had the support of the vast majority of the people. The Bolshevik Party, which had caused the Soviets to seize power, was in the end left as the only party faithful to the Soviet State that it had brought into being, but it was now an organization with great prestige throughout the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as the Bolshevik Party was left as the only political party in the Soviet State, a danger arose that this organization, because it was in power, might draw to itself careerists, unscrupulous individualists, and individuals who had not the welfare of the people at heart, but merely their own personal advancement. In 1920, in face of this danger, Lenin wrote: “We are afraid of too wide a growth of the Party, as place-seekers and adventurers, who deserve only to be shot, do their utmost to get into the ruling Party. The last time we opened wide the doors of the Party for work-men and peasants only was . . . when the Soviet Republic was in mortal danger, and when the adventurers, place-seekers, charlatans, and unreliable persons generally could in no way rely upon making a profitable career (in fact could sooner expect the gallows and torture) by joining the Communists” (&#039;&#039;Left-Wing Communism&#039;&#039;). In fact, the Party, in order effectively to represent the very best elements in the working population, must restrict its membership. Party membership must not become cheap!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And how, it may be asked, was it to be ensured that those who were in the Party should not become divorced from the rest of the population? Were there not dangers that a small political organization, holding great power in its hands, might become isolated from the people whom it professed to represent? It was precisely in order to combat this danger that Lenin took the initiative in organizing what has come to be known as the “Party Cleansing,” which consists of public meetings, in town, village, and the army, where, every few years. Party members must in public justify their membership of this Party which claims to be the “organized vanguard of the working people.”&lt;br /&gt;
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At such cleansings, which I have personally attended, every Party member must give an account of his or her life, of the part they have played in the struggle for improved conditions of the working people, and of the work they are doing to-day. Any person present may put questions. Any person present may speak. And so the merits of each Party member are fully discussed. If, at such meetings, certain people prove not to command the respect of their fellows, not to be considered worthy of membership of an organization made up of the best elements in the population; they are expelled from the Party. It is thus a fact, in a way which can be said of no other political party in the world, that there is democratic control by the people over the membership of the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union. And, with this control actually in force, it may be truly said that this Party will represent the best elements of the working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sir Walter Citrine, in his “&#039;&#039;Search for Truth in Russia&#039;&#039;”, describes the process of the Party Cleansing in these words: “A Commission is sent to the factory. The members of the Party are called up before them in front of the workers, both Party and non-Party. He is required to tell his life’s history, especially what he has done and is doing for the Revolution. Anyone can question him regarding both private and public matters, and, after he has been turned inside out, the Commission makes its decision.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I remarked that this system made a spy of every man on his neighbour, and my companion again admitted that it was the duty of every worker to keep an eye on the actions and words of his fellows, and to report anything which seemed hostile to the interests of the working class ” (p. 255).&lt;br /&gt;
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Sir Walter called it “spying” if every worker watched his comrade in the Party to see that his words and actions were never hostile to the interests of the working class! And yet what could be more in the interests of the working people, and of democracy for the working people, than that every member of the Party which professed to represent them should be subject to such supervision, and to public criticism if he did not fulfil all the conditions generally considered necessary to a member of the “organized vanguard”?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is this particular relationship between the Party in the U.S.S.R. and the people which causes the people to look upon the Party members, in general, as their best representatives. For they themselves play a part in seeing that only their best representatives shall be members of the Party! Under such conditions it is not surprising that, more often than not, at elections to the Soviets, to the committees of trade unions, and, to the boards of management of collective farms, members of the Party are elected! It is in this way, and in this way only, that the Bolshevik Party dominates the Soviet Union at the present time. But, since it has the status of the recognized leadership of the whole people, the Bolshevik Party dominates the policy of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In &#039;&#039;Left-Wing Communism&#039;&#039;, written as early as 1920, Lenin said: “Not a single important political or organizational question is decided by any State institution in our Republic without the guiding instructions of the Central Committee of the Party.” But this power of the Party, Lenin goes on to show, rests on the will of the working people themselves: “In carrying out its work, the Party rests directly on the trade unions. . . . Without the closest connection with the trade unions, without their hearty support and self-sacrificing work, not only in the economic, but also in military organization, it would have been, of course, impossible to govern the country and to maintain the dictatorship for two and a half years, or even for two and a half months.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Actually, the formal relationship between the Party and the State in the Soviet Union is not fundamentally different from that of, say, the Conservative Party in Britain to-day and the British State. The policy of the patty which has a majority in the British Parliament becomes the policy of the Government. So, in the U.S.S.R., the decisions of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, since the Bolsheviks are an absolute majority in the Government, become decisions of the Government.&lt;br /&gt;
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But under the conditions of Socialism every member of the ruling Party is also usually a worker in some State or other collective organization. Therefore he receives instructions as a Party member from the Central Committee at the same time as he receives State instructions as a State employee. When in the U.S.S.R. to-day the Central Committee of the Party decides that a new decree is necessary, it circulates its decision to its members; and those who are in the Government see that it becomes law; those that are working throughout the U.S.S.R. in every kind of occupation see that, locally, this Party decision and State law is carried out. Purely as a matter of convenience, the informing of Party members of decisions of their Central Committee which are also made law by the Government, and the publication of the law itself, are often telescoped together into one act. It happens that a new decree of the Soviet Government may appear signed by the representative of the Government, and by Stalin, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. Actually this simply means that a certain decision of the Party, signed by Stalin, has been adopted as a decree of the Government, signed by the representative of the Government. Publication over the two signatures simultaneously, for the two organizations, merely saves time and space. It does not mean that Stalin or the Party have any right to sign Government documents, or vice versa.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is often asked: What is the position of Stalin in the Soviet State? Constitutionally, the answer is that Stalin’s position in the U.S.S.R. is similar to that of Mr. Baldwin in Britain to-day. He is the recognized and elected leader of the ruling party. On the other hand, there is this difference—that whereas Mr. Baldwin chooses, as is the British convention, to be Prime Minister as well, Stalin prefers, as leader of his party, not to accept an important Government position as well, since he has enough to do already. In actual practice, whereas Mr. Baldwin can only claim to represent a certain section of the population of Britain, Stalin can claim that he and his party have the support of the overwhelming majority of the people of the country. Therefore, in the U.S.S.R., Stalin, as the leader of a very popular ruling party, is acclaimed as the leader of the whole people, a thing which even the most sycophantic Press would hardly try to claim for Mr. Baldwin in Britain to-day!&lt;br /&gt;
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In connection with the status of Stalin in the U.S.S.R. I feel I must refer to one point of criticism which is raised in common by the Webbs, by Andre Gide, and by Sir Walter Citrine. This is the phenomenon described by the Webbs in their book as “the adulation of Stalin.” Any reader of the Soviet Press, with an eye and ear trained to the English language, is likely to be sometimes shocked by references to “our dearly beloved Stalin,” “our glorious leader,” and so on. This matter has often struck foreign observers, and is cited time and again as evidence of a servile attitude on the part of the population towards Stalin, and thus as symptomatic of a lack of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Personally, I must frankly admit that for at least three years in the U.S.S.R. I was often unfavourably impressed by the lavish way in which love and praise of Stalin was expressed in public utterances of all types of Soviet citizens. To the English ear such words seemed to be more appropriate to religion than to modern politics, and there is no doubt that I, too, was at first affected in the same way as the Webbs by this. But my feelings on this matter were completely changed when I happened one day to see a letter from a young worker to his brother. It began: “Honoured Beloved Brother!” These were the same words, or words closely similar to, those which had been thoroughly unpleasing to me when addressed to Stalin, because in English they suggested degradation and servility! But the young Russian used them to his brother. And when I suggested that he should simply write “Dear Brother” he was literally shocked. The English have a reputation for being a cold-blooded nation!&lt;br /&gt;
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When André Gide began a letter to Stalin in the same words which he would have used in French, his guide suggested that a little verbal embroidery was necessary. Gide was shocked. But if I wrote to André Gide in French to-morrow, and finished up “yours sincerely,” Gide would certainly consider that I did not know French, or that I was being rude. The French, you see, happen to conclude their letters with a rigmarole which, to the English, seems artificial and somewhat servile.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the Webbs discover a “deliberate exploitation by the governing junta of the emotion of hero-worship, of the traditional reverence of the Russian people for a personal autocrat,” they substantiate this view by examples of an apparent extravagance of language such as we have mentioned, which in English appears utterly ridiculous. And, while it is obviously not going to be the policy of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. to try to stimulate hatred of its leaders, but the opposite, I feel that the translation of the language used gives an utterly unreal picture of the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the people of the U.S.S.R. wish to express their loyalty to their recognized leader they can only do it in their own language. Actually, the language of the oriental peoples of the U.S.S.R. is even more flowery than Russian. If the Russian worker writes to his brother as “dearly beloved,” we must not consider these words to be servile when coming from a group of collective farmers and addressed to Stalin. On the contrary, they are fraternal words, brotherly words, and not servile words. When these facts are taken into account I think it is true to say that not one example of the “adulation of Stalin” which the Webbs give contains any example of adulation greater than the words expressed by millions of British workers about Dimitrov at the time of the Leipzig trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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All people when in foreign countries tend to assume that they understand the language better than they do, and are happy if they can translate sentences phrase by phrase without a dictionary. Both the Webbs and André Gide, cultured people as they are, have not absorbed the &#039;&#039;idiom&#039;&#039; of the Russian language. By mechanical translation they have made errors of interpretation which can have serious political repercussions; for the question of whether the Russian workers address Stalin in the way that Lady Houston wrote about the late King or as the Archbishop of Canterbury addresses God, or as one workman addresses his brother, is a question of vital importance in considering the degree of democracy which exists to-day in the U.S.S.R. Actually, as I discovered after three years, the workers of the U.S.S.R. use the same words in writing to Stalin as in writing to a much admired brother.&lt;br /&gt;
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The relations between the Soviet State and the Communist International have also aroused curiosity. But there should be no mystery about this matter. In Brussels there is located the Labour land Socialist International. If, in Belgium, the people return the Socialist Party to power, a situation would exist in which the ruling party was a member of the Socialist International located on Belgian territory. But that would not make the Belgian Government and the International synonymous organizations. Now it unfortunately happens that only a country where the Communist Party is in power will allow the Communist International the right to be located on its territory. Therefore the Communist International is situated in Moscow, on Soviet territory. But the connection goes no further than this. It is true, of course, that Stalin is a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. But so is Harry Pollitt. And, in Belgium, the leader of the Socialist Party is a member of the Executive of the Labour and Socialist International.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is one final aspect of the status of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. which may raise questions in the minds of many readers. We have already mentioned, in dealing with factory management in the U.S.S.R., that on the Triangle, which virtually controls the affairs of a Soviet factory, there sits a representative of the Party organization in the factory. To those who look upon political parties as &#039;&#039;parliamentary&#039;&#039; parties, such a state of affairs suggests something abnormal—that a political party should enjoy the same status as the appointed representative of the State, the manager; or the elected representative of the workers, the trade union organizer.&lt;br /&gt;
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But it should now be clear that the Party in the U.S.S.R. is not a parliamentary party. It is the organized political leadership of the people; the organization of their best political representatives. As such, the Party holds the respect of the people, and they are absolutely willing that this organization of theirs should be represented on such bodies as the Triangle in the factory. The democratic importance of political representation of the working people, as distinct from their mass representation through the State and trade unions, is being clearly demonstrated at the present time in Spain. As soon as the armed struggle began between the Fascist rebels and the elected Government, the parties of the Workers’ Alliance, which together formed the recognized leadership of the people, just as the Communist Party does in the U.S.S.R. to-day, began to undertake all kinds of activities which previously had been activities of the State. They undertook these activities because the people supported such action, and the Workers’ Alliance continued to be, not merely a parliamentary combination of forces, but a leader and organizer of the working people in their fight for democracy. As a result of this, it is reported from Spain that, attached to every regiment, there are “political commissars,” representing the parties of the Workers’ Alliance. So, alongside the organizations of State, such as the army and the organs of administration, there is a political leadership, consisting of “political commissars,” representatives of those parties who form the organized vanguard of the people in their struggle. Such political leadership no doubt also exists to-day in all the factories that have been taken over by the State.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet Union, in the course of the transfer of the factories from private hands to the State, this same political leadership became necessary, just as it did in the army during the fight against foreign intervention. The Party began in this way to play a leading part in the administration, together with the appointed official of the State, and the elected representative of the trade unions. While, if a party that did not command the support of the vast majority of the population acted in this way, the people would resent such action and oppose it; when it is done by a party of a new kind, consisting only of the recognized best elements drawn from the ranks of the people themselves, they give it their full support.&lt;br /&gt;
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The one-party system in the U.S.S.R. has developed as a result of the will of the people. Having once returned to power a party which immediately passed a number of laws, basically changing the relations between worker and employer, peasant and landlord, to the advantage of the working people, they found that this party was their very own in a way in which no political organization had ever previously been. Finding that they were able to exercise control over the membership of this party by cleaning out all elements which they considered hostile to their interests, they found that they could really ensure that this party contained all that was best among them. In this way, at every election, the members of the party tended to be returned in a majority; and the idea of allowing other parties to be organized, trying to oust this party from power, was rejected by the people as being a means by which the enemies of the working people might try to return to power.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet State there has developed a one-party system. It arose as a result of the operation of the will of the vast majority of the people. It occurred democratically.&lt;br /&gt;
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But now, to-day, when the Soviet system is securely on its feet, does not this one-party system prove a limitation to real democracy? This is the question which must now be answered.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Is a “Party System” Necessary ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State, we have seen, was set up as an organization of the whole working population of the country, for the purpose of pursuing their common interests, and for improving their own conditions at the expense of the employing class. The Soviet State has always had the structure of a workers’ organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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But does anyone ever suggest that a “party system” is necessary to democracy in an organization of the working people for a common purpose? Has anyone ever criticized trade unions as being undemocratic on the grounds that there is no system of political parties within them? And the same question may be asked concerning the myriads of other democratic organizations that exist in the capitalist world to-day, from trade unions to the businessmen’s West End clubs, from the League of Nations Union to table-tennis societies. In all these organizations the officers are elected by the members to carry out the will of the members. These organizations may differ in the degree of their democracy, but nobody attacks them as undemocratic because, at their elections of officers, rival parties do not put up rival candidates.&lt;br /&gt;
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The essential fact about democratic organizations is this: in every organisation of people for pursuing a &#039;&#039;common&#039;&#039; purpose there is no question of a system of parties being associated with democracy. Elections of officers take place on their merits, just as, in the U.S.S.R., the election of delegates to the Soviets has always taken place. When, on the other hand, we find that there is some form of a “party system” in operation, as occurs only in the parliamentary State, we find that, instead of elections being held in order to return the best representatives, they take place in order to return one or another party with a majority, in order to carry our a particular type of policy. But these conflicting policies can only exist with any degree of continuity on the basis of continuous conflicts of interest among the population. And these continuous conflicts can only be based on rival—as opposed to common—interests among the people themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we look back at the historical development of the British Parliament we find that it arose as a means, not for uniting the community in a common interest, but for reconciling conflicting interests. In its origin Parliament was an institution in which the conflicting interests of the two classes, landowners and industrialists, were reconciled. The Tory Party in its early days was the direct instrument of the landowners, the Whig Party—of the capitalists. Each party, at elections, tried to include within its program sufficient promises to win a majority of the electorate, in order to be returned to office and to pursue a policy consistent with the interests of the class which it represented.&lt;br /&gt;
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As time went on, the landlords of Britain became increasingly fused with the industrialists. The landlords went into business, and the business men acquired land by purchase or marriage. The landlord and capitalist classes in Britain became fused into one; and the development of Whig and Tory Parties into Liberal and Conservative reflected this uniting of the two classes. The two parties now began to represent rival factions in the one ruling class of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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But such a system, in which the political parties represented conflicting tendencies within one class, only continued for the very short historical period when the power of the landowner-capitalists was uncontested. Soon the working class forced its way into politics, and a new alignment began to develop a Conservative-Liberal Coalition against Labour. To-day the property-owning class in Britain is almost completely united behind a single political party—the so-called “National” Coalition. As far as the employers are concerned, we have the operation, with only a small minority of dissentients, of the principle “One class, one party.” The Labour Movement, in so far as it does not also realize this principle, is unable to put forward an effective challenge to the ruling “National” Government of the employers, so that we see that the Party system is closely bound up with the existence of classes in society and their conflicting interests.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is completely misleading to refer to a “party system” as in any way typical of democratic institutions. The “party system” is a very particular form of democracy, of an exceptional character, which has arisen only in the parliamentary State as a means by which conflicting classes could reconcile their differences without resort to arms. As we have seen from examples of working-class organizations and peaceful clubs of business men, when a society exists for pursuing the common aims of its members there is no place within it for a “party system.”&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Soviet State was set up by the people of Russia for pursuing their common interests. The system of election, adopted from the very start, was that of discussing each candidate, his merits and shortcomings, with a view to deciding whether he was suitable to represent the electors on the public authorities of the country. Would this delegate be the best representative of the electors? Would he be the best equipped of them to see that their instructions were carried out on the Soviet to which he was elected? Clearly, where elections took the form of sending delegates to the public authorities, with instructions as to the policy they were to pursue, there was no longer any place for “parties” presenting opposing programs to the people.&lt;br /&gt;
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So a “party system” became out of place in the Soviet State, just as a “party system” is quite out of place in a working-class organization in any capitalist country at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Other questions are sometimes raised in this connection: Surely in the U.S.S.R. everyone does not agree? Surely there must be discussion on various questions ? Certainly there is disagreement and there is discussion. And, as most foreign observers are bound to admit, there is, if anything, too much discussion, rather than too little, from the standpoint of efficient execution. But disagreement and discussion are no basis for the formation of political parties unless there are groups of people, with certain continuous common interests, who are ready to unite together for a continuous period on a number of basic issues.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, to take recent legislation in the U.S.S.R., many people did not approve of the law prohibiting abortion; many had amendments to propose to the draft of the new Constitution; many may not have approved of the model statutes for the collective farms; and many may not have liked the reduction of interest on State loans from 8 and 7 to 4 and 3 percent overnight! But an opposition political party could hardly have been organized out of these individuals, because there was no definite group of citizens affected by all these issues in the same way. There is no reason why the same person that disliked certain clauses in the abortion law should have opposed any of the other measures. There is no reason why the person who disliked the reduction in rates of interest should also have been a strong supporter of legal abortion. There is no reason why a person who did not like the model statutes for the collective farm should have opposed the new Constitution of the Soviet State. In this way, since there exist no longer permanently conflicting group interests in the Soviet State, where all are working for the general improvement in the living conditions of the whole community, there can be no basis for a political “party system” such as exists in the parliamentary State in a class society.&lt;br /&gt;
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But say; there is one recruiting-ground for an “opposition party.” There are still people—disgruntled individuals; ex-employers or Tsarist officials; deposed leaders from the working-class movement itself; people who are constitutionally “counter-suggestible” and for whom Soviet psychologists have not yet evolved a cure; people with personal grievances against certain Government officials; people who oppose every measure of the Soviet Government, not on its merits, but because it is a measure passed by the Government; and others like them—who may be “against the Government,” though having no alternative positive program to propose. Such types of citizens exist in the Soviet Union to-day. It is only they who have anything in common that would bring them together continually as a permanent opposition party.&lt;br /&gt;
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But such elements are well known to the working-class movement, and to every democratic organization throughout the world. They are the people who, in every democratic organization, do not command respect, and therefore resort to every form of obstruction in order to draw attention to themselves or to avenge themselves for being ignored. Is the Soviet State to encourage such people to form a political party, to carry on purely negative propaganda on every issue, attacking each measure of the Government, not on its merits, but on principle? The people of the U.S.S.R. do not want such a party, and they support the Government in seeing that such disruptive organizations shall not come into existence.&lt;br /&gt;
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For what would the effect of such a party be under existing conditions in the U.S.S.R.? It would be a resort of every remnant of opposition to the working-class movement of the Soviet Union. Ex-employers and ex-opponents of the system, agents of foreign Powers and people who were under their influence—all the social undesirables would flock round such an organization in order to discredit the Soviet Government and to impede the progress which it is making. Thus, an “opposition party” would be the means by which all that is hostile to the Soviet system would find expression and a means of organizing itself. This is a procedure which the people of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the types already mentioned, are unanimous in preventing.&lt;br /&gt;
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We come to the conclusion that in the Soviet Union to-day a party system would be as incongruous as a party system within, say, a British trade union. In a community or an organization where the members have common interests there is no place for a party system. In so far as, in the British trade unions, something approaching party disputes has developed, this is a weakness of the movement, and not its strength. Anything approaching conflicting parties in the trade unions can only arise as a result of serious conflicts within the working class. Not much investigation is necessary to discover that such disputes invariably centre round one question: Shall the trade unions be fighting organizations against the employers or not? The faction that answers “No” to this question can be looked upon as an employers’ “party” within the trade unions, the existence of which causes the trade unions to be less effective as a democratic organization of the workers &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; the employers. Really effective trade unionism would include no employers’ “party,” and would be united on the basis of militant struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the case against the existence of a “party system” is not necessarily a justification for the continued existence of a single political party. Therefore we must now consider further the role of the single party in the U.S.S.R. to-day, and whether its existence is consistent with democracy or not.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us imagine that at some future date, in Britain, a Labour Party was returned to power, pledged to a radical program of change in the interests of the hand-and-brain workers of Britain, who amount to over 90 percent of the population of the country. Suppose that, to meet the opposition of the property-owners, emergency measures had to be taken, which received the support of the vast majority of the people of the country, who organized strikes and demonstrations of support. Suppose that the property-owners then organized armed opposition, and that the people took up arms on behalf of their own Government. Suppose that, in the course of the struggle, all that was best in the other political organizations of the country came over to the support of the Government, as representing the will of the democracy of Britain. And suppose that what remained of other political organizations, representing the interests of private property at all costs, supported the taking up of arms against the State. In such conditions would not the prestige of the party in power grow? Would not the people, as they fought for the Government of this party which represented their interests, come to the conclusion that this party, which represented them against the attacks of the property-owners, should never again go out of office?&lt;br /&gt;
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Suppose, moreover, that this party of the working-people, finding itself in a position in which it was called upon to lead its supporters, not only by appealing to them at elections, but in organizing their struggle against the counter-attack of the employers in every locality and in every factory, decided only to admit as members those who played an active part in its work, and abolished such offices as that of “subscribing member.” Suppose, too, that in order to prevent careerists creeping into its ranks, it started to hold public cleansings, in which all workers would report on the actions and speeches of the party members, with a view to eliminating all that did not loyally represent the working people: would not the introduction of such features strengthen this one party, so that the people would become determined to improve its personnel more and more, but never to let this party, as such, be put out of office again?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is by regarding the question of a single party in this light—as a possible line of future development in our own country—that I think the question can be most clearly seen in its correct perspective. We can see that in certain conditions, the people might democratically support a “one-party” system. They would do this in conditions similar to the experience of the Russian Revolution, when a serious conflict occurred between the people and their party on the one hand and the property-owners on the other, and when the party of the people in such circumstances led their struggle for democratic rights against the attempts of property to suppress them. A party that led the people in such a struggle would gain enormously in prestige. When, at the victorious conclusion of the struggle, a situation arose in which this one party now combined all the most active fighters for the liberty of the people, is it likely that the people would ask that the other parties, the parties of their enemies, should once more be given an opportunity to rule? Is it likely that the people would want the political organizations that had taken up arms against them to be again afforded legal rights as soon as they had been defeated in the military struggle? Obviously the reverse is the case. At the end of such a struggle the people would not ask that the other parties be allowed to operate again, but, on the contrary, they would do everything to strengthen the one party that had shown itself to be their leader in the struggle. The people would choose in the future to have a one-party system, since now the one party would be the only one that they could absolutely trust.&lt;br /&gt;
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But might they not ask that this party be disbanded, and that a system without any political party be introduced? Here, I think, the answer is in the negative. For, in the course of the struggle, the party would have established itself, not as a parliamentary party of the old type, but as the organized leadership of the people. And it is as such, not as a parliamentary organization, that they would want it to continue to exist. Lenin, writing in 1920, made the following illuminating comment on the position of the party after the workers have established a system of real democracy:&lt;br /&gt;
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“Classes remain, and will remain for years, everywhere after the proletarian conquest of power. Perhaps in England, where there is no peasantry, the period will be shorter, but even there the small proprietors, holders of property, exist. . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat is a resolute persistent struggle, sanguinary and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative, against the forces and traditions of the old society. . . . Without an iron party, hardened in fight, without a party possessing the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of observing the disposition of the masses and of influencing it successfully, to conduct such a struggle is impossible. . . . Whoever in the least weakens the iron discipline of the party of the proletariat (especially during its dictatorship) aids in reality the bourgeoisie against the proletariat” (&#039;&#039;Left-Wing Communism&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
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In the view of Lenin, the party, as the organized leadership of the mass of the people, must not be disbanded after the seizure of power, but, on the contrary, must be strengthened, in order to ensure that the real democracy achieved should not again be overthrown by the armed forces of the property-owners. And in dealing with this one party Lenin stresses the essential need for discipline in a period of historic struggle between the working people on the one hand and the owners of property on the other. In the next chapter we shall discuss this question of discipline further, for it is the greatest of errors to assume, as is sometimes done, that democracy and discipline are mutually exclusive terms. Actually, the only effective democracy of the people must be a disciplined democracy, for “democracy” of the people without discipline is sheer anarchy, and no anarchy has ever been able to preserve its independence against the opposition of an organized enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
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And now, in conclusion, a few words must be said about one more problem. Criticism is often raised that in the U.S.S.R. to-day the ruling party consists of only about 2 million members out of a total population of 170 million. It is maintained that this organization is so small that its domination in the State cannot be anything but undemocratic. First, as a matter of information, it is worth pointing out that not only are there 2 million members of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R., but an additional 5 or 6 million members of the Communist Youth, from which the best representatives later join the Party. However, this is a minor point, and the actual criticism can be faced even if we take the critic’s minimum figure of 2 million Party members in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two facts must be borne in mind about the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. First, it is a party of active workers; there are no “paying members” who do no work. Every member is an active member. Secondly, as stressed by Lenin, the Party must not be allowed to grow too rapidly, for that would mean deterioration in quality, and deterioration in the quality of a body which forms the “organized leadership” of the community would have disastrous results. Finally, in order to appreciate the size of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in comparison with the political parties of Britain we must have our facts clear, and not misrepresent them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The individual membership of the Labour Party in Britain to-day amounts to between 300,000 and 400,000. But it would probably not be going too far to estimate that less than one in 20 of these are active members. So that the proportion of the Labour Party membership which is strictly comparable to the membership of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.—all of which is active—is about 5 percent. The membership of the British Labour Party that is active in doing the party’s work among the people of Britain can be put at about 15,000 or 20,000. This is about one in every 3,200 of population at the minimum, and at the most about one in every 2,400 of the population. And yet, if a Labour Government were returned to power, I cannot imagine anyone complaining that the party did not represent the people “because it is so small.” Yet, as compared with the U.S.S.R., a ruling party that comprised only one person in every 2,000 or 3,000 of the population would be regarded as a very small party. For the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. includes 2 million members—one in every 85 citizens! So, while the Labour Party in Britain may boast of its size, and claim one active worker for every 2,000 or 3,000 of the people, in the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party is criticized as being unrepresentative because one in every 85 citizens is an active member!&lt;br /&gt;
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But the argument does not finish here. For, if it is true that the Labour Party in Britain can claim one in every 2,000 or 3,000 inhabitants as its active members, the other political parties certainly each have less active members than the Labour Party. Therefore, taking all the political parties in Britain together their combined active membership cannot amount to more than one in every 1,000 of the population. So that, taking the whole of our parliamentary system, the political parties that are the only organizations putting up candidates at elections comprise about one active member for every thousand of the people of the country. Dictatorship by a small minority? Yes, indeed, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party claims one in every 85 of the population, and can thus claim to be comparatively representative!&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, let me again remind you of the Party Cleansing in the U.S.S.R., by which the ordinary citizen exercises control over the membership of his Party. What control have we poor British citizens over the one thousandth of our population that makes itself active in politics? If I do not like the type of people who become politicians in this country, I have no opportunity of seeing that others take their place. We have no cleansing of our political parties at public meetings to ensure that they shall only represent the very best elements of the people! No wonder, then, that in disgust many British citizens never exercise their right to vote at all, disliking all the politicians who are thrust at them by the one-thousandth of the population organized as active members of our great political parties!&lt;br /&gt;
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No; the criticism that the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R, is too small to represent the people is nonsense. It is the greatest political party in any country of the world. It is also the greatest in proportion to population. It is greater in proportion to the total population that it represents than all the active members of political parties in Britain put together. And it is subject to democratic control by the people themselves in the institution of the Party Cleansing. It is not incomprehensible that such an organization commands the respect of the whole population, and that Soviet democrats demand that this form of leadership shall be preserved, and that rival organizations aiming at disuniting the people shall not be permitted.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Democratic Discipline and Freedom of Opposition ===&lt;br /&gt;
We come now to a question which has been very frequently raised during the past year, a matter which has been brought once more into the limelight by the trials of opposition groups which have taken place in Moscow. This is the question of “freedom of opposition” under Soviet conditions, and the extent to which such freedom is justifiably limited in the interests of democratic discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now, if we consider any kind of democratic organization in any part of the world, we find that it has to be concerned, not only with preserving its members’ freedom of individual expression, but also with preserving the majority of members from individuals and minorities who occupy hours of valuable time with unpopular speeches, and who thus obstruct action in the interests of the majority. If we take a business men’s club with its proverbial bore, a shareholders’ meeting with the usual shareholder with a grievance, or the trade union branch with the member who is consistently a nuisance, we find that every organization, professing to be run in the interests of the majority, must take steps to protect this majority against undisciplined minorities. Democracy, therefore, does not mean simply giving individuals the opportunity to voice their personal views, but also it means that the people shall have the opportunity to refuse to hear those whose views are antagonistic to them, and the expression of which is an obstruction to the carrying out of a generally accepted policy. In democratic societies functioning within the capitalist State, such persons may be simply expelled from their organizations. But the Soviet State cannot simply expel recalcitrant “members,” for two principal reasons. First, the surrounding States might not accept the persons expelled; and secondly, such persons, once expelled, might be far more use to the enemies of the community than if kept within its frontiers. Trotsky was simply expelled from the Workers’ State—and his activities since have confirmed the view that less harm would have been done if he had been isolated in Siberia.&lt;br /&gt;
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Once the problems of a democratic organization become those of a State as well, and of a State surrounded by hostile States, simple expulsion of minorities that obstruct the common business is no longer practicable. In dealing with such cases the Soviet State is forced by circumstances to remove such persons from society, while keeping them within its frontiers. This is why, in the U.S.S.R., certain offenders against the will of the majority may be sent into exile.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is only when this question of political exile is seen as the Soviet equivalent of expulsion, as practised by democratic organizations elsewhere, that it can be fully understood. The Soviet State is a workers’ organization. Workers’ organizations expel obstructionists, and, however democratic they are, they will still have to face the problem of so dealing with such people. The Soviet State has the same problem, but it cannot expel these people from its territory as a rule, simply because they are not acceptable to the rulers of the territory outside the U.S.S.R. Further, the expulsion of people who are enemies of the majority of the people of the U.S.S.R. would be in general unwise, for it would be giving them an opportunity to carry on their activity from outside, thus strengthening the enemies of the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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Some readers may be a little disturbed at this somewhat brutal statement of the case, under Soviet conditions, for exiling political opponents. But nobody must be misled by what I have said into thinking that anyone who disagrees with any person in authority is exiled in the U.S.S.R. On the contrary, there is a phenomenal amount of discussion in the U.S.S.R. by the general public on all vital issues. The Soviet citizen who is exiled is not a person who has simply disagreed. It is the person who, having made proposals and having been defeated, continues to obstruct all constructive business by repeatedly putting forward again and again the rejected point of view, and who thus becomes a thorn in the flesh of the whole of society. Such was Trotsky, who for years was putting forward his minority views at every popular gathering in opposition to the leaders of the Soviet Government, and who was finally exiled because he was organizing secret groups to oppose the policy democratically adopted by the whole people. He was thus obstructing the further development of the country in the direction decided upon by the people, and was expelled.&lt;br /&gt;
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The extent to which the Soviet Government must be vigilant on such questions as discipline is determined, not by the structure of the Soviet State alone, but by the fact that it is surrounded by a hostile world. It is quite impossible to realize the full implications of discipline in the U.S.S.R. by simply comparing, as we have so far done, the Soviet State with democratic organizations elsewhere. In order to obtain a true picture we must make our comparison with other democratic organizations at a time when they are waging a struggle for their existence, when they are carrying on some great militant campaign in the interests of their members and are being subjected to every kind of attack. The Soviet State surrounded by a capitalist and partly Fascist world cannot be compared with a trade union in a period of industrial peace. It must be compared with a trade union during an industrial dispute. And we all know that, in an industrial dispute, a union will exercise disciplinary pressure on its members of a kind that will not be considered necessary in time of peace.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since it was first created, the Soviet State has been waging a struggle against enemies both inside and outside its territory. Being a democratic State of the working people, it came into conflict with the landowners and employers from the very beginning of its existence. These enemies, with foreign help, took up arms against the Soviet State. The State had to wage a war for its freedom. Later it had to wage a war against the small capitalist minority in the villages, and, all along, it has had to build up its defences and consolidate itself against a possible further attack from outside repeating the experiences of 1918 to 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
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During a strike the members of a trade union have to fight a battle with the employers. Force is used on both sides—the workers try to force the employers to capitulate for fear of loss of profits, and the employers try to coerce the workers from sheer hunger. The workers may resort to putting machinery out of order, to the picketing of factories, and so on. The employers will undoubtedly call in the police on the side of themselves to “protect their property.” What is the attitude of the workers in such circumstances to recalcitrant minorities?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In every strike the employer usually finds some individual or group of individuals among the workers who, out of a desire for immediate personal gain, or simply through a lack of knowledge of the issues at stake, is ready to go on working or to persuade fellow workers to accept the bosses’ terms. The employer can find allies among such people, against their own comrades. In every strike the workers picket such deserters, and “peaceful picketing” may be carried, relatively speaking, quite as far as “exile to Siberia,” if we look at the two types of struggle in perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The truth of the matter is that under all conditions a struggle by a democratic organization for its freedom is a limitation on the democratic rights of the opponents of that freedom. And once, in a critical situation, a minority continues to oppose the interests of the majority, such a minority becomes, consciously or not, a weapon of the enemy against the democracy concerned. Here again we only repeat what was said in our Introduction—that democracy and dictatorship are not mutually exclusive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union the application of all decisions by the Soviet authorities is the direct responsibility of every citizen, for every citizen is a worker in some State organization, and every member of a Soviet does work in one of the departments of that Soviet. In Britain, with its parliamentary system, there is no reason why, within certain limits, continual opposition in Parliament to the policy of the Government should obstruct the carrying out of that policy. If a majority in the British Parliament passes a certain law to-morrow, the opponents of the law may continue verbally to oppose it. But the Civil Service will have to carry it out all the same, and will have no right of criticism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the U.S.S.R. the Civil Service includes the people who oppose the policy decided upon as well as those who support it. In such circumstances it is clear that to continue actively to oppose a decision arrived at by a majority would, in practice, mean sabotaging its execution. So, from a purely organizational standpoint, we see the absolute necessity for the disciplined execution of democratic decisions in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idea that majority decisions should be binding on minorities is generally accepted in Britain as far as the practical execution of these decisions is concerned. But there often remains the idea that while the minority should carry out the decision in practice, it should have the right to oppose its execution in theory at the same time. Such a view, however, is invariably abandoned whenever there is some urgent problem on hand, such as a war, involving the country as a whole, or a strike, involving a trade union. For even in Britain it has been found that concerted action can be obstructed, not only by people refusing to act, but by their encouraging others not to act. Propaganda against carrying out a majority decision may be an even more effective form of sabotage of that decision than a direct refusal to carry it out personally.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the U.S.S.R., where the whole community is in constant action for the general improvement of conditions and for strengthening itself against attack, it is clear that minority opposition to majority decisions might well become a serious obstruction to the carrying out of these decisions, and thus play directly into the hands of the enemies of the U.S.S.R. whose main requirement is to obstruct its internal development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The recognition of the need for discipline in a democratic organization does not necessarily mean, however, any curtailment of the freedom of the ordinary citizen. For, if the ordinary citizen considers such discipline necessary to the common interest, he will personally be an enforcer of such discipline, not a violator, and the discipline will thus be an expression and a defence of his freedom, not a violation of it. This point is of particular importance in discussing such a question as freedom of speech in the U.S.S.R. to-day.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have often been asked, since returning from the Soviet Union, whether a citizen in Moscow can get up in a park and attack the Government as he can in Hyde Park in this country. My first reply usually is, “God forbid that he should want to!”—for it is hard to imagine a more ineffective freedom than the ability to address a handful of regular Hyde Park listeners on a Sunday afternoon; that is, if one is interested in effective speech that influences people to act, and not simply in exercising one’s lungs, which can be equally well done in a bedroom with the window open.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, it is worth mentioning that the Soviet workers, able to hold their meetings in the assembly rooms of the country free of charge, and being able to meet in their factories to discuss all matters of interest to them, do not need to go to a park to air their views.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But a far more important point than these is the question: Do Soviet workers want to get up and attack their Government in public meetings? And, if certain individuals do want to do this, do the majority of workers want to listen to such speakers? The whole question of freedom of speech is fundamentally answered in the reply to these two questions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, it is only a supposition of the Englishman, two thousand miles away, that the workers in the U.S.S.R. want to get up and attack the Government. Actually, they are no more likely to want to attack the Soviet Government than trade unionists in Britain are likely to attack trade unionism. The Soviet State has been built up by the organized activity of the people themselves; it is &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; State, and as such they are interested in defending, not attacking it. Of course, a small minority of people might want to attack the Soviet State, and this was particularly true in the early days when the property-owning class still held considerable influence, and still could command a limited number of spokesmen among the workers and peasants themselves. But these people were a small minority, and cannot be described typical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During five years in the U.S.S.R. I have invariably had the impression that the people have no desire to attack the Government, because they look upon it as their own, and as serving their own interests. Of course, I do not wish to say that there are no persons at all who would like to criticize the Government. There obviously are such people. But if these people are exceptions, and not the rule, then we must take it that there is freedom for the vast majority of the people to express themselves, but that a small minority does not enjoy such freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is a second aspect to the matter. Freedom does not only consist in the freedom of the individual to harangue the masses, but in the freedom of the masses to choose who shall harangue them. No democratic organization in the world claims to give absolute freedom to every member to put forward indefinitely an unpopular point of view. For obviously such a person at a certain point obstructs the whole work of his democratic organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, during the period from 1924 to 1928, after the death of Lenin, and when Trotsky was repeatedly challenging the policy of the Government, opposition was openly expressed by Trotsky and his followers. But at last, exasperated by the continued attempts of small minorities of Trotskyists to obstruct all business in order to popularize a thoroughly unpopular point of view, the State finally took the step of suppressing this opposition. And this suppression received the general approval of the people, because this form of opposition had become a public nuisance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union to-day the freedom of workers to criticize their superiors and Government institutions does not extend to freedom to attack the Government as such, because the people as a whole support this Government and to not oppose it. If a foreigner visiting the U.S.S.R. tries, as sometimes happens, to criticize the Soviet Government in the Moscow Park of Culture and Rest—the nearest thing to, though very far from, our Hyde Park—he will have a whole mass of people arguing with him in defence of what they call “our Government.” They will defend this Government by argument, while probably respecting his person as a foreigner to a sufficient extent not to take violent measures. But if the enemy of the Government were a Soviet citizen, the people concerned in the argument might well call the militia to arrest this counter-revolutionary, just as, in Spain to-day, the people in Government territory would act towards a person who was chalking the walls with swastikas, or carrying on still more pernicious activity in the interests of Hitler and Franco, enemies of Spanish democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essential fact which must be appreciated is that in the U.S.S.R. to-day citizens are not interested in attacking the State or the Government; what concerns them is to improve its work. And every kind of discussion, and of criticism, calculated to improve the working of the Soviet State in the interests of the population is, as we have seen, not only allowed, but actively encouraged.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the trials of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Radek and Sokolnikov, took place in Moscow, reference was made in many British newspapers to the significance of these trials as evidence of widespread opposition to the “Stalin régime,” and the impossibility of expressing this opposition by legal means. This interpretation of the facts is the reverse of the truth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If, in the U.S.S.R. to-day, there were widespread opposition to the Government, there would be the same symptoms as in Fascist Germany: illegally printed leaflets would circulate in the factories, there would be organized discontent among the people throughout the country, occasionally showing itself in some lightning strike or demonstration against the authorities, and batches of workers would be arrested in groups of thirty and forty. But none of these things happen. And since, in Tsarist Russia, such things did occur, it cannot be said to be for lack of experience that they do not occur to-day. Therefore we can only conclude that such widespread opposition to the Government does not exist, and, whatever the trials do denote, it is not this widespread discontent that some newspaper editors would welcome.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if the Moscow trials do not denote the existence of mass discontent, they do denote the existence of a number of cases of individual discontent so great as to lead to the most dastardly conspiracies against the community. What is the explanation of such cases of personal discontent? Is their existence a serious flaw in the Soviet system of democracy?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the experience of the working-class movement in all countries that persons who, at one time or another have played a leading part, have at other times had to be expelled from the movement in which they once fought, and have become its avowed enemies. Sir Oswald Mosley can claim to be an old member of the Labour Party, and Mussolini of the Socialist Party of Italy. J. H. Thomas and Ramsay MacDonald were once admired Labour leaders, and Doriot, now one of the most active pro-Fascists in France, was in the Communist Party. Why, in this respect, should the U.S.S.R. differ from all other countries?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the U.S.S.R., as I have shown, the “expulsion” of members means, in fact, exile. It is therefore more usual than elsewhere that any leading personality rather than accept “expulsion” and retire from activity into exile, will accept majority decisions against himself, and promise henceforth to carry out these decisions as a loyal worker in the Soviet State. But if such loyalty is not genuine, and if the individual concerned is not ready whole-heartedly to accept a decision against himself, he may continue his opposition. How can this be done?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once a majority decision has been arrived at in the U.S.S.R. the people are not going to tolerate continual propaganda against this decision. Therefore, any sponsor of an unpopular policy knows that, after democratic defeat, he will have to cease publicly to propagate his policy. Having no mass support, such a person may start loyally to work for the accepted policy or, determined to put his own leadership and policy across, whether the people want it or not, he may resort to underground means of trying to displace the existing leadership, and thus altering policy. In this way underground opposition activity by rejected leading personalities, people whom the democracy has turned down, is as possible in the U.S.S.R. as such open opposition is possible under capitalism by the expelled Socialists or Communists who become Fascist. It is also clear, I think, that any really democratic State must be ruthless in its treatment of such opposition by people who are rejected by the democracy, and therefore resort to other means of obtaining power in spite of the will of the people which has rejected them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The vital fact which many people are unable to grasp about the U.S.S.R. to-day, whether they are spokesmen of the Press, the Government, or well-known trade union leaders like Sir Walter Citrine, is that in the U.S.S.R. the Government has the full support of the people. In capitalist countries the idea of a Government with the whole people behind it seems so strange that people are inclined to believe that such a thing is impossible. In the British trade union movement to-day, also, we can understand Sir Walter Citrine imagining that such a tiling as a Labour movement in which leaders and rank and file are united is impossible. But let us have no illusions on this score. So long as the trade union movement is divided, it will be weak. And, once it is united on the basis of a real working-class policy, it too will have to fight its enemy minorities and to use means of putting an end to their anti-working-class activities. The U.S.S.R. to-day stands out in the world as a country where people and Government are at one with each other; this is the great strength of the U.S.S.R.; but it is one of the things hardest to understand in a country torn by class antagonisms, and in a labour movement into which the influence of the possessing class has, crept and dug itself well in.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Democracy, contrary to many illusory views, does not mean freedom of every kind. It means the rule of the people, and this means the suppression of the enemies of the people. Democracy, therefore, is also dictatorship, as far as concerns those who reject the decisions of the people and combat these decisions by every possible means. Soviet democracy, without discipline, would have led to the complete defeat of the Soviet State in 1918 to 1922. Democracy without discipline would have made the building up of the Red Army impossible. Democracy without discipline would have made the Five Year Plan an impossibility, for no great industrial progress could have been undertaken in conditions of anarchy. The U.S.S.R. to-day combines the features of real democracy for the people with the disciplined enforcement by the people of the decisions of this democracy. To the minority of property-owners such a system has always been a ruthless dictatorship, but this dictatorship has been in the interests of the vast majority of the people. It has, therefore, been essentially democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“You say that in order to build our Socialist society we sacrificed personal liberty and suffered privation,” said Stalin to the American correspondent Roy Howard. “But we did not build this society in order to restrict personal liberty, but in order that the human individual may feel really free. We built it for the sake of real personal liberty, liberty without quotation marks. It is difficult for me to imagine what ‘personal liberty’ is enjoyed by an unemployed person who goes about hungry, and cannot find employment. Real liberty can exist only where exploitation has been abolished, where there is no oppression of some by others, where there is no unemployment and poverty, where a man is not haunted by the fear of being to-morrow deprived of work, of home, and of bread, only in such a society is real, and not paper, personal and every other liberty possible.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a liberty as described here by Stalin has had to be fought for, won, and has to be defended. But the defence of liberty is the suppression of its enemies. The defence of democracy, therefore, necessitates discipline over its opponents. Democracy for the people means discipline among the people and dictatorship over the enemies of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== A New Democracy ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== What Is Democracy? ===&lt;br /&gt;
We have defined democracy as government of the people, by the people, for the people. We must now ask what these words imply if a democratic system is to be really effective. What are the conditions in which it can be said that there really is government of, by, and for the people?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost, the people themselves must actively participate in the work of government, for only if they do this can any state really be a government of the people, and not a government over the people carried on by somebody else. Therefore, if government of the people by the people is really to exist, the people must be admitted to every branch of State administration, for otherwise there will automatically arise a separation of the governing authorities from the people which means that democracy will not be fully operative.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the administration of any State is to be really accessible to the whole people, every administrative post must be open to all according only to the qualifications of citizens for fulfilling any particular job. But the qualifications of citizens are not something rigidly predetermined, but depend on the opportunities available for education and on the extent to which every citizen may qualify for responsible posts even though, in the first instance, he was not qualified at all. In the interest of democracy, then, every citizen must have equal opportunities for education, and to qualify for all positions in the running of the State. All citizens must have the opportunity to develop their natural abilities to the full, and to use them in the most responsible positions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If, in any society, certain citizens are barred from the right to participate in the work of government, as a result of such peculiarities as sex or nationality, then this is a limitation of democracy. A really effective democracy will make no distinction between its citizens on the ground of nationality or sex, and every one of them will have an equal right to participate in government according only to his qualifications for the job, qualifications which he will have an opportunity to develop if he has the necessary ability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since, in every present-day community, the use of force may be necessary in the interests of the majority and against the interests of antagonistic minorities or external enemies, it is likely, in every present-day democracy, that some form of army and police force will be inevitable. But if this army is to be representative of the people themselves, and not become isolated from the people whom it is supposed to defend, it must essentially be recruited from their own ranks, and its commanders as well as its ordinary soldiers must be really representative of the people of the democracy. For, if the officers of an army do not represent the people that this army is supposed to defend, there is absolutely no guarantee that the same thing may not occur as has occurred in Spain, that the generals of such an army will not revolt against the government of the people, and co-operate with the most anti-democratic foreign States to suppress their own people and their own people’s democratic government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the preservation of law and order within the country, also, a real democracy would ensure that the police and the judges were drawn from the people themselves, in order to be truly representative, for only then can the people be guaranteed justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every real democracy will always give freedom to every nation to determine its own fate and its own form of government. The oppression of individuals because of their nationality, or of whole nations because they are in a minority in the territory of any State—or even in spite of the fact that they are the majority of the people coming under a particular Government—as happens in certain empires, cannot be justified on any democratic grounds whatever. A real democracy will not only give to majority nations within its territory the right to self-determination, but will secure for small nations also the right of self-government so long as such a right is not abused to the disadvantage of the community of nations as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The governing of the people by themselves necessitates, among other things, the complete equality of freedom of expression on the part of citizens. Not only must there be equality of opportunity to participate in the work of administration, but also in the expression of opinions about the work of government. Therefore the Press and the meeting-halls must be equally at the disposal of all citizens in a real democracy, and any limitation of the control of such things to the hands of a small class is a restriction of the democratic rights of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are very much inclined, particularly in Great Britain, to discuss questions of democracy as if they concerned only the running of the State, without referring to the very important other activities in which the overwhelming majority of the people spend the greater part of their lives. In Britain the breadwinners of 90 percent of the population make their livelihood by working for somebody else in institutions and firms owned by somebody else. In such places of work the employee is subject to the dictates of the employer from morning to night, and even the question of whether he shall continue in the same job to-morrow is something which the employer may decide without any reference whatever to the will of the worker concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, in the economic life of this country to-day there is not the slightest pretence at democracy. Every employer has the right to run his own concern as he wishes, to take on and to discharge workers, and to impose such conditions of work as prove profitable to him. In his own factory every employer is boss, and the people who print the newspapers and run the railways, who work in the factories and toil in the mines, have not the slightest say in the way in which these organizations shall be run, or the workers treated. In their daily lives the vast majority of our people spend their time under the dictatorship of an employer, of a man who happens to possess the means of production with which others must work in order to make a living.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any real democracy, quite apart from the control of the State itself, would have to give to the people the right to run all those organizations in which they spend their time and earn their living. This would mean that, so long as there were privately owned factories, the workers would have to be represented as well as the owner on the board of management; and, for economic democracy to be really effective, the whole of the Economic concerns of the country would have to be taken over by the democratic State or by co-operatives. In such circumstances it could be ensured that the people who worked in a concern would be directly represented on its management as workers, while, at the same time, responsibility for general administration would rest with a manager appointed by the State, and responsible to the democratic Government of the people themselves. Only in this way could democracy be introduced in economic life, and without democracy in economic life any talk of real democracy is to a great extent illusory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I think that most readers will agree that the essential characteristics of a real democracy which are described here do not exist in Britain to-day. I think that, if they have read Parts I and II and not skipped to this part first, they will agree with me that such a democratic system does already exist in the U.S.S.R. But how does it come about that people who refer to Britain as a democracy often refer to the U.S.S.R. as a dictatorship, when we find that the real essentials of democracy exist in the U.S.S.R. and not in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is true, of course, that in Britain to-day we enjoy very valuable democratic rights as compared with the peoples of Fascist countries. We may make speeches in any meeting-halls that we can afford to hire and that the owners will let us have, or in any streets where the police do not decide that we are causing an obstruction—other, that is, than outside a labour exchange, where such meetings have been banned by Lord Trenchard; we may publish literature if we can afford a printing press, so long as the police and the courts do not consider such matter to be obscene or seditious, libellous or blasphemous; and we may form organizations as wage-earners, to force the employers to improve the conditions of their employees, though we may also get the sack for doing so. Further, when political parties whose active membership comprises about one-thousandth part of the population of the country offer us candidates at elections, we may choose between them or not choose at all. And, if we can persuade one of these political parties to put us up as a candidate at an election, and to finance our campaign for us, or if we are rich enough to finance ourselves and stand as “independents,” we may stand for election to Parliament or local government. If, when elected, we decide not to fulfil the policy for which we were elected, this matter is our own affair until the next election! All these rights, it will be noted, include an element of democracy, and a non-democratic element. In so far as they represent democracy, such rights are to be defended and extended; in so far as they are limited, they fall short of the really effective democracy which we have outlined. The U.S.S.R. has introduced something new into democracy, because it has made democracy really effective in one respect after another in which, in other countries, it is still narrowly limited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does it come about that so many of the most loud-voiced supporters of democracy in Britain to-day, quite irrespective of their political affiliations, can denounce the U.S.S.R. and the Fascist States in one breath, while Britain alone, it would seem, stands proudly as the standard-bearer of democracy in a distracted world? How can we explain the fact that when examining the U.S.S.R. we found that from bottom to top, from the management of a factory or a block of flats to the administration of the President’s office itself, the people themselves are taking part in government, and yet such a system is condemned from 2,000 miles away as a dictatorship only rivalled in its viciousness by Fascism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The answer lies in the existence of different conceptions of democracy itself. One conception, defining democracy in terms of certain traditional institutions which exist to-day, attacks all other systems as contrary to democratic principles. This is the orthodox defence of the British system at the present time. The other conception starts out with a study of the actual economic and social position of the people in society, and then asks to what extent they can or cannot be said to be governing themselves. And it must be admitted that, when the British system is approached in this way, though much preferable to a Fascist dictatorship, it appears to be anything but a system of effective democracy when compared with the situation existing in the Soviet Union. To take the economic life of the people alone, in Britain they play no part in running the concerns in which they spend a major part of their lives. They have to work under the dictates of a master, and the masters taken together only amount to a minute proportion of the total population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why, then, if in the economic life of the country there is such a dictatorship, do the people tolerate this state of affairs, having, as they do, a variety of democratic means of expressing opposition at their disposal? If the British State is democratic, then the people must have chosen to work daily for other people for wages and under conditions over which they have no control. Or is it, perhaps, that the extent of democracy is really so limited that the people have no opportunity through the State of effectively limiting the power of the owners of the means of production? Certainly, so long as they believe that a highly limited democracy is really an effective system of democracy, they will not try to extend their democratic rights, but will be passive victims to every kind of encroachment. Therefore, it is essential that the people appreciate the role of the property-owners in British democracy, a matter which we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In general, so long as the factories and the mines, the newspapers and the meeting-halls, are privately owned, to such an extent also are the working people subject to a certain degree of dictatorship. The work-man is told by the employer when he may earn a living, and under what conditions. And the working people as a whole, who cannot afford to own large newspapers and meeting-halls, are at the mercy of the continual propaganda of those who can. The extent of democracy is in this way limited in every community by the degree to which there exists the private ownership of the means of production, thus subjecting the working citizen to the dictatorship of an employer; and by the extent to which there is private ownership of the means of propaganda, thus subjecting the ordinary citizen to a perpetual bombardment of those ideas which the property-owners desire to propagate. Finally, as will be shown in the next chapter, in a a democratic State in which the means of production and propaganda are still in private hands, the State, too, is subject to the control of these property-owners to an overwhelming degree.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we survey the world to-day we find that the extent to which effective democracy is enjoyed by the people varies from country to country. In Fascist countries, where there is an open terroristic dictatorship, and the property-owners retain their power, we find that the Workers and peasants who form the majority of the population are not allowed to combine their forces at all in order to fight for better conditions; they are forbidden to have their own newspapers or to hold their own meetings. The workers play absolutely no part in the running of the concerns in which they are employed, and they cannot even organize themselves in order to ensure that they will be paid a living minimum wage. To express their opinion, either of the employer or of the State, in a way which offends either of these, is a crime. Fascism thus completely destroys all vestiges of democracy. The democratic organizations of the people for improving their conditions of life are driven into illegality, and forced to take on a revolutionary form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fascist States combine an open dictatorship with the existence of private ownership of property concentrated in a few hands. In contrast to these countries, we have the democratic States in which, though the means of production are in private hands, and the means of propaganda are mainly so, the working people have the right to organize in trade unions, to hold meetings, and to publish their own newspapers in so far as they can afford to do so. If, in such countries, the workers can sufficiently well organize themselves, they can force the employers and the State to grant them better conditions of life: While such a system as this is vastly superior to Fascism, it still suffers very great short-comings, for there is still nothing approaching real equality of rights for all citizens. Even under conditions of democratic government, so long as the means of production and propaganda are privately owned, the owners have always reserves of property which the workers have not, and these reserves give an economic power in bargaining with the workers and a political power in propaganda, education, and in running the State, that can hardly be over-estimated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only when, as in the U.S.S.R. to-day, the means of production and propaganda are socially owned and controlled, is there no longer the domination of society by a small class that owns the property. In the U.S.S.R. no man owns a factory, and therefore no man can dictate to another man at will whether or not he shall have a job, and, if so, on what conditions. And, together with this, the socialization of the meeting-halls and the newspapers has made the means of expression equally available to all, instead of being only at the disposal of private owners. In addition, in the running of the Soviet State the ordinary citizens are drawn into the work of administration, while universal suffrage is enjoyed by all without such things as property and residential qualifications which elsewhere favour the owners of property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Democracy is not something absolute. A Fascist State may, in particular circumstances, make some concession to public opinion which gives an opportunity for the people to express their views on some matter which intimately affects them. Such a measure would be of value to the people as a step in the direction of democracy. It would be to their interest to use such a concession as a means for obtaining further concessions and further democratic rights. A democratic capitalist State may impose limitations of certain kinds on the power of the property-owners by laying down legislation for the protection of the working people, by setting limits to the amount of money which may be spent in elections, and so on. But a democratic State may also curtail democracy, as, for example, in Britain, when Lord Trenchard banned the holding of meetings outside labour exchanges, or when, after the General Strike in 1926, the Government placed a number of restrictions on the rights of the working people to organize themselves and to unite their forces in a struggle for better conditions against the dictates of private property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every Fascist State includes in its population a majority of people who live by their own labour, and who will use every opportunity to wring better conditions of life from the property-owners. Because Fascism cannot kill the people who work, it cannot pluck out from its State those forces which continually demand expression—the democratic forces of the working people. The organizations of the people may be forced underground by a Fascist dictatorship, but they cannot be wiped out, for the people who make such a movement are the vast majority of the population, and the employers cannot live without them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the democratic State in which the power of the property-owners remains intact, tendencies towards greater or lesser democracy are both possible, according to the organized strength of the majority of the people on the one hand, and of the property-owning minority on the other. To the great property-owners the ideal State would be one in which the political rights of the workers were no more than their economic rights when working in the factory. For in such a State the property-owners could pursue whatever policy they desired without fear of opposition. Therefore the interests of the great property-owners are always bound up with the curtailment of democratic rights and with a tendency towards Fascism.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, to the working people in every capitalist democracy any curtailment for the rights of the property-owners in favour of the workers represents a growth in democratic freedom. The extension of the right to hold street meetings and demonstrations can only benefit the working people, those who are least able to hire meeting-halls. The limitation of the rights of private individuals to use their newspapers for political purposes by greater working-class control over the Press can only benefit the working people—the majority of the population—and is, therefore, democratic. The replacing of property-owners by working men and women in the Civil Service, army, and law courts leads to a greater representation of the working people in the running of the State, and is a democratic measure. So, from the standpoint of the working people, the prospects of increasing their democratic rights are always present. The extent to which these opportunities are utilized depends on the degree to which the working people are aware of their position and organized to improve it. In the last analysis it is the relative strength of these two sections of the population that decides whether Fascism or democracy shall triumph, and, if democracy, the extent to which this democracy shall be made real by the limitation, and finally the complete annihilation, of the powers of property, economically and politically.&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be a great error, however, to assume that any capitalist country consists only of workers and big employers. Actually, there is in most countries a considerable middle-class, consisting of small employers. These small employers, under present-day conditions, are continually menaced by the growth of monopoly, and are increasingly desirous of utilizing all democratic means of controlling the operations of the great property-owners. As a result, the small capitalists find themselves lining up with the democratic forces, with the working people, against the great monopolies and Fascism. In this fact of the present day lies the economic basis for a Popular Front, for Democracy and the small man, against Fascism and monopoly.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the greatest danger, in Britain to-day, which faces the democratic forces, the vast majority of the population of the country, lies in the fact that the power of property in the British democratic system is grossly under-estimated in practically all public utterances on the matter. Therefore, bearing in mind all that we now know about the democracy of the U.S.S.R. let us turn to a short study of democracy in Britain to-day. Nowhere in the world could a better example be found of the power of property to utilize democracy for its own ends, thus rendering it almost ineffective as a weapon of the people of the country. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of democracy creates an acute danger of open dictatorship. For the less the people of the country realize the extent to which their democratic rights are already seriously limited, and threatened with still further limitations in the future, the more easily they may be induced to believe that democracy itself, rather than the imperfections of that democracy, is at fault when the system does not work satisfactorily for their interests.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Democracy and Property ===&lt;br /&gt;
In order to examine the relationship between democracy and property, no better example could be taken than Great Britain. For in Britain we possess a much-vaunted democratic system, and at the same time practically the whole of the property of the country is in the hands of a few people who live by employing labour, whilst the vast majority of the population have to work for someone else in order to make a livelihood. According to census figures, about 90 percent of the people of Britain work for somebody else. The question of whether they shall be allowed to work or not is decided by an employer. The question of the conditions under which they work is decided by an employer. The rate of wages which they are paid is finally decided by an employer. And the employers in Britain to-day only amount to some 850,000 people. They and their families make up about 4 percent of the population. So that, in their everyday working life, in everything which determines the security of their livelihood and their standard of life, about 90 percent of the population of Britain are dependent on the will of about 4 percent. Since the majority must work to live, they must accept work when it is going. And, as the owners of property have reserves at their disposal, they can always postpone taking on workers in order to obtain terms which satisfy them. In so far as the workers organize in trade unions they can to some extent build up reserves and bargain for better conditions, but always, fundamentally, the owner of property has the advantage over the man who lives by his labour; for he has reserves of property on which to live, while the worker has very little on which to live unless he is drawing an income from selling his labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the economic sphere in Britain to-day, 4 percent of the population are masters or dictators, 90 percent are servants. And the fact that the relationship of master to servant is also the relationship of property to poverty is illustrated by the figures of the distribution of the national income. The 90 percent of the population that is dependent on its wages receives about 64 percent of the national income. The 4 percent of property-owners, plus about 6 percent of independent workers, absorb annually about 36 percent of the total national income. And, of these property-owners, a very few receive a tremendous income. It is estimated by Professor Bowley that just over 1 percent of the population, the richest property-owners, received, in 1910, 30 percent of the national income. On the other hand, 94½ percent of the population received only 50 percent of the national income.&lt;br /&gt;
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The conclusion which we arrive at, after reading these figures, is that the class of the population that owns the factories and the coal-mines, the shops, and so on, is a small minority—but a wealthy minority. The majority of the population, on the other hand, work for this minority for a small income. The minority dictate to the majority when, where, and under what conditions they shall make a living. How does this affect the whole system of government of the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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The supreme authority in Britain—which, by the way, unlike the U.S.S.R. has no written Constitution—is Parliament. The British Parliament consists of two Houses. The so-called “Upper House,” the House of Lords, is not an elected body. It consists of the Peers of the Realm, who are appointed by the Crown, or happen to be the descendants of people who were at one time so appointed. It also includes the bishops. It represents, in fact, the wealthy section of the population, since working men do not become peers, while big landlords and employers do. The House of Lords is drawn from the small section of the community that owns property and employs labour, and not from the vast majority who own nothing and work for somebody else.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that the House of Lords is not a democratic institution is generally admitted. It is even a thing which certain property-owners boast about. Professor Laski shows how, for example, “as early as 1906 Lord Balfour had told his supporters that it was their bounden duty to see that ‘the great Unionist Party should still control, whether in power or in opposition, the destinies of this great Empire.’ What he meant he revealed to the House of Commons three months later, when, on the third reading of the Liberal Government’s abortive Educational Bill of 1906, he declared that ‘the real discussion must be elsewhere’. It was an explicit claim for the right of property to rule the country whatever the will of the people, and no one who reads the utterances of eminent peers about that Budget can doubt that in their minds they felt entitled to safeguard themselves against any measure they might choose to regard as confiscatory. Mr. Asquith was right when he warned the electorate that implicit in the claim of the Lords was the threat of revolution. . . .&lt;br /&gt;
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“There has been no essential change in the last twenty-five years. For the claim is still made that it in the function of the House of Lords to safeguard the country against a Labour Government which should seek to translate Socialist principles into terms of legislation; and all proposals made by the Conservative Party for the reform of the House of Lords have no end in view but to hinder such a Government, from legislating in the way that is open to its rivals” (Laski, &#039;&#039;The State in Theory and Practice&#039;&#039;, pp. 275-6). The House of Lords exists to defend property against the majority of the population. The House of Lords, representing a small minority of the people, is a non-democratic; and its policy, because of the interests which it represents, is anti-democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let us now consider the “Lower House,” or House of Commons. This is the elected part of Parliament, and is often claimed to be an effective means of expressing the will of the people. Now, if the House of Commons is to express the will of the people effectively, there must exist in the country an equal right for all citizens to vote, to stand for election, to support their candidates effectively, and an equal right for all citizens, on the basis of merit only, to participate in the work of administration, of carrying out the decisions arrived at by the elected Parliament. Actually, as will be shown, not one of these conditions for a really democratic parliamentary system exists in Britain at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
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The right to be an elector in Britain to-day is enjoyed by every man and woman over the age of twenty-one, as contrasted with eighteen in the U.S.S.R., on condition that they can claim residence in a constituency for a period of not less than six months. If a citizen can claim occupation of premises in two constituencies, he can enjoy a vote in each. A property-owner, therefore, has the right to two votes if he has property in two constituencies. Further, graduates of the Universities, who are in the main drawn from the employing class and highly paid salaried workers, have two votes at elections.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are a number of constituencies where the majority of the inhabitants are wage-earners, and yet a majority of the votes can be obtained by the property-owners because they have factories and offices in those areas in sufficient numbers to out-vote the wage-earners living there. In local government, registration as a voter goes with the ownership or renting of residential or office property, and &#039;&#039;there is no limit to the number of votes which one person may exercise in a series of constituencies&#039;&#039;. To be considered an occupier, for local government elections, persons must furnish the premises which they occupy. As a result, those who live on premises furnished by someone else have no vote. These people, in general, are wage-earners.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true, as far as numbers are concerned, that the total extra votes going to the propertied classes in this way is not large, and cannot outweigh the working-class influence in the country as a while. &#039;&#039;On the other hand, it is of significance&#039;&#039; as a matter of principle, for it brings out vividly the fact that the existing system of election is based, not on citizenship as in the U.S.S.R., but on the ownership of property.&lt;br /&gt;
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In theory, every person who has the right to vote also has the right to stand for election, if nominated by eight electors. The right of anybody to stand for election, however, is deceptive, for two reasons. First, in the case of parliamentary elections every candidate must deposit £150, which is forfeited if he does not obtain a certain number of votes. Secondly, to stand for election necessitates an election campaign—that is, the effective supporting of candidates by propaganda. The Labour Party, which is not likely to make extravagant estimates on this score, considers that, in addition to the £150 deposit, which may be returned to the candidate, an additional expenditure of at least £500 is necessary to contest a parliamentary seat. A total of £650 must be laid out. It is clear that a small number of rich citizens are in a position to put up candidates in all the parliamentary seats in the country without any great material sacrifice. The vast majority of the population, however, consists of wage-earners, who must pool their meagre resources at considerable sacrifice in order to run candidates.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are about 600 seats in the House of Commons. There are about 100,000 super-tax payers in the country, with an income of over £2,000 a year. Each one of these people could finance a candidate out of his annual income, and still have £1,200 to live on. Each of these individuals could afford, at his own expense, to contest a constituency. On the other hand, of the 19 million wage-earners, the average wage is not more than £2 5&#039;&#039;s&#039;&#039;. a week, or, £117 a year. It would, therefore, take a working man—one of the 19 million wage-earners—the total earnings of four years to finance himself, or someone else, as a parliamentary candidate. So the right to stand for election, and to carry out the necessary publicity campaign for a candidate, is enjoyed by the small class of property-owners &#039;&#039;to an enormous degree&#039;&#039; compared with the majority of the population, the wage-earners.&lt;br /&gt;
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But it must not for one moment be thought that the work of moulding public opinion, and of preparing a state of mind that is likely to support a particular type of parliamentary or municipal candidate, is created simply by means of an election campaign. The creation of this public opinion goes on, day by day, in every public expression of opinion that reaches the eyes and ears of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Britain we still enjoy freedom of speech. But freedom of speech, to mean anything, must be effective freedom—&#039;&#039;of speech that reaches the people&#039;&#039;. The degree of freedom of effective speech in Britain to-day depends entirely on the possession of wealth. The most powerful means of influencing public opinion is the Press. In Britain, “anyone” can start a newspaper, so long as it is not “obscene,” “blasphemous,” “seditious,” or “libellous.” But the cost of printing and publishing a newspaper is vastly greater than the cost of running an election campaign. It is so great that only the very richest individuals and groups of individuals as a rule can afford to own newspapers. It is so great that no ordinary daily paper could support itself without its revenue from advertisements, which are supplied by firms which have sufficient capital to be able to advertise. Our freedom of the Press is, therefore, mainly freedom of property-owners who are rich enough to finance the newspapers, and in this way to influence the thought of the whole population of the country. Taken as a whole, the Press represents the property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must not, however, leave the matter at this point without drawing the necessary distinction between British conditions to-day and those of a Fascist State. In a Fascist State the workers are not permitted to run newspapers even if they can afford it. In Britain they are permitted to do so, and do so to a small degree. But shortage of capital, the fact that capitalist firms are unwilling to support workers’ papers with advertisements—the main source of revenue to the ordinary Press—and a boycott of the sale and distribution of working-class literature, make the difficulties of the workers’ Press extremely great as compared with the Press of the well-to-do. Only in 1926, when the workers throughout the country practically ceased to print the capitalist newspapers, and at the same time the Trades Councils and other workers’ organizations published their own bulletins, were there a few days when the Press of Britain was almost entirely a Press controlled by the organizations of the working class, the majority of the population. But even then the radio remained in Government hands, and was fully utilized on the side of the employers.&lt;br /&gt;
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As with the Press, so with the ownership of the great meeting-halls of the country, and with the control of the radio. The trustees of the Albert Hall do not let it to everyone who can pay the rent. Even if a workers’ organization is able to pay, it may not be allowed the use of the hall if the owners do not approve of the purpose of the meeting. Sir Oswald Mosley could on one occasion obtain the use of the hall, while it was refused to a working-class organization shortly afterwards.&lt;br /&gt;
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And now, having seen how the means of influencing public opinion, the means of effective propaganda, are in the hands of the minority of property-owners, let us come to the further problem— that of an elected Government which really represents the will of the wage-earners, if all the other obstacles have been overcome and such a majority has been returned to Parliament.&lt;br /&gt;
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It should be clear that, whatever the majority in Parliament may be, any decisions of Parliament under the present system must be carried out by the Civil Service. Unless, therefore, this Civil Service is organically connected with the wage-earning majority of the population, it may show reluctance, and actually be guilty of sabotage, in carrying out the decisions of such a parliamentary majority.&lt;br /&gt;
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But, before considering the Civil Service, one other point should be touched upon. This is the question of Education. For we have seen that a real equality between citizens, to vote and to be elected, to hold responsibility in every walk of life, and to rule themselves, depends on their having equal opportunities to develop their abilities to the full. In Britain to-day, however, they have not got this equality. For, according to R. H. Tawney, “the proportion of children leaving the elementary schools, who enter what have hitherto been known as secondary schools, is, in England and Wales as a whole, less than one-seventh, and in some areas less than one-tenth, while some three-quarters of them have hitherto entered full-time wage-earning employment at the age of fourteen” (&#039;&#039;Equality&#039;&#039;, p. 90). About 90 percent of the workers have no schooling over the age of fourteen. On the other hand, the children of the well-to-do do not go to the ordinary State elementary or secondary schools at all, but pass through an entirely different and very expensive system of private education, known, ironically enough, as the “public schools.” And we find that it is this small minority that passes through the “public schools” that commands practically all the leading positions in the social and economic life of the country and in the Civil Service.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The evidence presented by Mr. Nightingale, who has made a statistical analysis of the social antecedents of the personnel of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service between 1851 and 1929, suggests that this statement is true of a more recent period. Sixty percent of it, he shows, has been drawn from the eleven most exclusive public schools, while of the remaining 40 percent, well over one half attended the lesser public schools, received a military or naval education, or were educated privately or abroad.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The unchallengeable conclusion that emerges . . . is that the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service have been a preserve for the sons of the aristocratic, &#039;&#039;rentier&#039;&#039;, and professional classes’” (op. cit., pp. 93-4). And, though possibly not quite so marked, this selection for the Civil Service from the small minority of the population that owns property, those who can afford an expensive “public school” education, is universal throughout. Remember that Lord Trenchard’s famous “reform” of the police force included the recruiting of more ex-public-school boys for its leading ranks. Similar efforts have been made to build up a public-school air force in recent years; and the “defence of the country” (and possibly of the rights of property against the people of the country) is also in the hands, not of representatives of the people, but of the products of Wellington and Sandhurst, the sons of those who can afford a “public school” education.&lt;br /&gt;
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The whole Civil Service is so recruited that we have government, not by the people, but by the property-owners and their relatives. In addition, all those professions which are of particular importance to the security of property, we find, are recruited from the same small section of the population. “In the year 1926, 71 out of 80 bishops and deans for whom information is available, 139 out of 181 members of the judicial profession, 152 out of 210 highly placed members of public departments, 63 out of 88 members of the Indian Civil Service and Governors of Dominions, and 99 out of 132 directors of banks and railways, had been educated at public schools” (op. cit., pp. 94-5). The Civil Service, which has to carry out the decisions of Parliament; the bishops, who, like the Press, influence the opinion of the public; the judges; the railway directors and bank directors, together with the members of the legal profession,—are almost entirely drawn from one small class of the population. Not only, then, do the owners of the factories and mines run their own factories and mines, but they and their class may well be said to run the whole country as well.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the property-owners running the Civil Service and the professions, having all the means at their disposal for broadcasting their ideas to the whole population, and the wealth necessary to hire or own the meeting-halls and newspapers, it is not surprising to find that the work of Government itself remains in the hands of these people. R. H. Tawney writes: “The association of political leadership with birth and wealth is a commonplace of English history; but it is not always realized how little that association was weakened after the advent of what is usually regarded as the age of democracy. Professor Laski, in his instructive analysis of British Cabinets between 1801 and 1924, has shown that, for nearly two generations after the Act of 1867 had enfranchised the urban working classes, the greater part of the business of government continued, nevertheless, to be conducted by a small group of owners of great properties, who were enabled by their economic advantages and social connections to step into the exercise of political power with a facility impossible to ordinary men. Of 69 Ministers who held office between 1885 and 1905, 40 were sons of nobility, 52 were educated at Oxford and Cambridge, and 46 were educated at public schools; while, even between 1906 and 1916, 25 out of 51 Ministers were sons of nobility” (op. cit., p. 92).&lt;br /&gt;
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A further limitation of British democracy must now be mentioned. It has already been shown how a small class of property-owners dominates elections, dominates Governments, and dominates the Civil Service. Figures have also been cited to show how the directors of the banks, the railways, and, of course, the armament firms, are also all drawn from the same small class of the community. Therefore, any Government that is ever elected under existing conditions is likely, as a result of all the political influence of property, to represent only to a comparatively small degree the real interests of the majority of the population of the country, the working people. If, in any situation, such a Government is returned to Parliament, pledged to a policy in the interests of the working people, of socialism, and real democracy, then numerically this representation will not do justice to the real interests which it represents, since all the propaganda and social influences are working for the under-representation of such interests.&lt;br /&gt;
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Once in power, such a Government would have to face up to the fact that the leading ranks of the Civil Service were against it. And sabotage by the Civil Service, even to the point of armed rebellion by the military leaders, as in Spain, is no small menace. But, in addition, such a Government would have to face the active opposition of the property-owning-class, as personified in the bank directors, railway directors, and factory-owners throughout the country. And the power of these people over any Government is tremendous, because they can threaten completely to hold up the economic life of the country if their demands are not satisfied. The bankers in the world to-day, though competing amongst themselves, can combine their forces to bring pressure to bear upon the most important Governments. They can move funds from one country to another, and cause financial crises. They can force elected Governments to resign.&lt;br /&gt;
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In our discussion of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. we saw that the Supreme Council, directly elected by the people, is being given increased powers, whereas the powers of its Presidium are very strictly limited. It should be noted here that in Britain precisely the opposite tendency is operating—a tendency for Parliament, dominated by the parties representing the property-interests, to delegate its authority to small groups who become directors in their own sphere. In this respect “Orders in Council” play an important part.&lt;br /&gt;
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In his &#039;&#039;General Strike&#039;&#039;, R. Page Arnot writes:&lt;br /&gt;
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“Let us turn to the form of government known as King in Council. Its origin and history are still a subject of investigation, but at one time the King in his Privy Council appeared to be about to supplant the Parliament. . . . During the Napoleonic Wars, the Privy Council was once more used as a formidable engine of government, and, by the famous Orders in Council, Pitt and his successors were able to meet Napoleon with swift and arbitrary decrees. After the Napoleonic Wars, the position of the form of government known as the King in Council had been clearly defined, and it was possible to regard it as a reserve instrument to meet great occasions.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Of these, the greatest occasion was the outbreak of war in 1914. The declaration of war was followed by the passing of the Defence of the Realm Act, by the first clause of which power was given to His Majesty in Council to take the necessary measures to secure the safety of the realm. These powers, primarily exercised through the Privy Council in the shape of Orders in Council, were transferable to each Government Department; which thus acquired the power to legislate by the simple method of publishing its regulation in the &#039;&#039;London Gazette&#039;&#039;” (p, 12).&lt;br /&gt;
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After the war the Defence of the Realm Act was replaced by an Emergency Powers Act by which, in a “state of emergency,” Orders in Council would automatically become law. In this way any parliamentary majority can in fact institute an open dictatorship if it wishes to do so—that is, if it ever finds it expedient to declare a “state of emergency.” Such a state is likely to be declared primarily in connection with labour difficulties.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not often realized by the ordinary person that in Britain laws can be made also by the judges. There are two kinds of law in Britain: Statute Law—consisting of Acts of Parliament; and Case Law, consisting of all the decisions of the judges on the interpretation of these laws in actual cases that have arisen. If, in a particular case, a judge interprets the law in a particular way, this case then becomes a precedent, and the interpretation itself becomes law. Since the judges are, as has been seen, drawn from the ranks of the small minority of property-owners, such “interpretations” of the law naturally tend to operate in the interests of property in any circumstance that arises.&lt;br /&gt;
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In concluding this examination of the power of the property-owners in the British State—and Britain is not untypical of those democratic States where the private ownership of the means of production and of propaganda remains unchecked— it is worth pointing out that for the British Empire as a whole the degree of democracy existing in Britain is far from typical. In describing the Soviet State, we saw how every nation enjoys the right to self-determination, and how there is complete equality of every nation within the Union. In the British Empire, on the contrary, the democratic rights of the inhabitants of Great Britain are not shared by the far greater population of India. Not only within the British Empire have we not got the rule of the nation which has a majority of the population, which is India; but we have the actual subjection of that nation so that its people enjoy no greater democracy than did the people of Tsarist Russia. When, therefore, we draw comparisons between the power of property in Britain and the new democracy of the U.S.S.R., let us not forget that property behalves comparatively democratically in Britain itself and the situation of the Indian and other peoples under British rule is far more akin to the lot of the peoples of the Tsarist Empire.&lt;br /&gt;
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Enough has now been said to establish the relationship between private property and democracy. When we recall the situation existing in the U.S.S.R. at the present time, and compare it with Britain, we see that every democratic feature of the Soviet system that would be new to Britain is a derivative of one fact—the abolition of the power of property.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, in early 1918, the Russian printing presses were transferred from the hands of their private owners to the organizations of the working people, this act symbolized all that the Soviet system stands for in opposition to the democracy of capitalism. But even under capitalism the limit to the enjoyment of democratic rights by the people is not rigidly fixed. In 1926 for a few days during the General Strike the British printing workers refused to issue the main newspapers of the country, while the Trades Councils and other workers’ organizations poured out news bulletins on a scale never exceeded before or since. In those few days Britain had a Press which predominantly represented the working people, and which, for a short and exceptional period, did not represent the views of a handful of rich Press lords.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the year 1920, when the British Government was preparing to declare open war on the Soviet Government of Russia, the workers set up Councils of Action throughout the country with the slogan “Hands off Russia!” The democratic demands of the working people were put forward so forcibly that the Government, though utterly unsympathetic, was forced to take notice, and armed intervention against the Soviets was brought to an end. In the same year, in a speech in Russia, Lenin said: “The whole of the English bourgeois Press wrote that the Councils of Action were Soviets. And it was right. They were not called Soviets, but in actual fact they were.”&lt;br /&gt;
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In Britain, as in Russia, the workers have always the possibility, by uniting their forces and fighting for better conditions, to restrict the disproportionate might of the property-owners, and thus to introduce more and more effective democracy. If we look back at the Russian Revolution we find that the Soviets actually seized power only when they were faced with two clear alternatives: either a military dictatorship, instituted by the owners of the land, the factories, and the mines; or the seizure of power by the most powerful organizations of the people, the Soviets, and the suppressing of the power of the property-owners in the interests of real democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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While, in Britain to-day, it is perfectly true that any elected Government of the people may be blackmailed by the bankers and sabotaged by the Civil Service if these representatives of the property-owners do not approve of its policy, it is equally true that any Government which represents the interests of the property-owners may be prevented from carrying out an anti-working-class policy by the direct action of the working-people themselves. The fact that the bankers and Civil Servants operate to-day behind the scenes to ensure that official policy shall be in the interests of property is all the more reason why the working people must act in an organized way to force the Government and the bankers and the Civil Servants to act more favourably to the people. And, so soon as the working people of the country are organized in such a way as to force their will on a property-owners’ Government, or on property-owners that oppose a people’s Government, they are beginning to make democracy more real and more effective.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; Marx says: “The first step in the workers’ revolution is to make the proletariat the ruling class, to establish democracy.” This was the task which the Soviet Revolution in Russia set out to fulfil, and it has not been unsuccessful. But the democracy of to-day has only been won as a result of a united struggle by the whole people. The new democracy only survived because it had the united support of the workers and peasants of the various nationalities within the country, coupled with the support of the working people of other countries. The fact that it has survived for twenty years means that others can learn from its example. To-day the actual experience of the 170 million people that inhabit one-sixth of the earth has shown how real democracy can be, once the power of private property is finally broken. The inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. are proving in practice that the workers can rule themselves, and raise their living standards, without the help of the employers, whereas, on the other hand, the property-owners can never live without the forces of the working people, the forces making for real democracy and liberty. In this lies the guarantee of the ultimate victory of democracy over property.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Defending and Extending Democracy ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the year 1922, when the Treaty of Union was signed between the Soviet Republics as a means of mutual support and defence against a hostile world, the following declaration was issued by the Governments concerned:&lt;br /&gt;
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“Since the formation of the Soviet Republics the world has been divided into two camps—the capitalist and the Socialist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In the capitalist camp reigns national hostility and inequality, colonial slavery, chauvinism, national suppression, pogroms, and imperialist brutality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Here, in the Socialist camp, is to be found mutual confidence and peace, national freedom and equality, and the tranquil community and fraternal co-operation of peoples. The attempt of the capitalist world through long decades to settle the problem of nationalities by the joint methods of the free development of peoples, and the exploitation of man by man has proved to be fruitless. On the contrary, the skein of nationalist contradictions is becoming more and more entangled, and threatens to overwhelm capitalism itself. The bourgeoisie has proved incapable of bringing about the co-operation of nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Only in the camp of the Soviets, and under the proletarian dictatorship round which is rallied the majority of the population, has it been found possible to root out national persecution, to create conditions for mutual trust, and to lay the foundations of fraternal co-operation.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These words were written in 1922, but how true they prove to be to-day! The Soviets came to power in Russia in 1917, when it had become clear to the people that this was the only way to peace and democracy. It was the only way to prevent a military dictatorship and the continuation of an imperialist war. “Peace, Bread, and Land,” was the main slogan of the Russian Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When, at the present time, we survey the world, we find that it is still divided into two camps. But the tremendous growth of the power of the country of Socialism on the one hand, and the seizure of power by Fascist dictatorships representing the most reactionary property interests on the other, has modified the frontier between these camps. Peace and democracy were the main aims of the Soviet Revolution. To-day, in the capitalist world itself, two camps have been formed, for peace and democracy on the one hand and for Fascism and war on the other. In the present world situation all the forces of peace and democracy are centring their attention on an alliance with the U.S.S.R. and Socialism; the forces of Fascism look upon the U.S.S.R. as the maintenance to their continued existence, because its example can never be effectively hidden for long from the people of all countries, and this is a stimulus to renewed activity in the interests of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main dividing-line, then, in the present world situation, is between the forces of democracy and those of Fascism. What are the reasons for this change in emphasis which has taken place in the post-war period? The important feature of post-war capitalism, long ago foreseen as inevitable by Marx in the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, has been the growing power of the great financial and industrial monopolies and the concentration of wealth in the hands of these monopolists. Such a tendency in economic organization causes an ever-increasing number of the small producers, whether or not they employ a few workers, to feel themselves at the mercy of the great trusts, and to desire to use every political means to control these great organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a result, sections of the middle class that at one time considered themselves superior to the workers, tend to become willing to co-operate with the working people in limiting the power of the great trusts. Thus, the forces of democracy on the one hand are numerically increased, while, on the other, the great trusts and monopolies use every means of increasing their control of the State, if necessary, by even putting an end to every legal form of democratic expression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fascism, then, appears as the expression in politics of the growing tendency to monopoly in economics. Those of the employing class who find themselves being impoverished and increasingly insecure as a result of the operations of the great monopolies tend to move in the direction of the working class, both economically and politically. In this way the great monopolies and their fascist tendencies are opposed by the working people and a growing section of the middle class, the main constituents of a Popular Front.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Spain these forces are to-day in open conflict. The cause of this conflict is that the people, as a result of uniting their forces in the cause of democracy, succeeded in electing a really democratic Government to power, a Government pledged to take a number of democratic measures against the interests of property, and in the interests of the people. The big property-owners, together with the generals in the army drawn from the propertied class, and with the support of foreign Fascism, launched their offensive on the Spanish people in a last desperate attempt to prevent the democratic forces from becoming effective. The result has been the “civil war,” a war of international Fascism against the Spanish people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When, in relation to Spain, it is claimed that the Government did not really represent the people because it only received a minority of the votes at the last election, this is sheer deception. First, it is untrue that the parties fighting for the Spanish Government against the rebels received a minority of the votes. They received a majority. But General Franco still insists on referring to the Basque Nationalists as a party of the Right, though it has actually consistently supported the Government. But, secondly, even if there had been a minority of votes for the parties of the Right, this does not for one moment , mean that there was a majority for the armed uprising of General Franco and his foreign Fascist supporters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second point, however, which is relevant, is the fact that, as in Britain to-day, the last election in Spain took place in a country where the main means of production and propaganda were still privately owned. Therefore the property-owners had all those advantages which we have shown to be inconsistent with really effective democracy. In such conditions the votes for the popular front were bound to understate, not to overstate, the real interests which this group of parties represented. When, in addition, it is realized that the elections took place with considerable pressure from the Government, which then consisted of the parties of the Right, against the Popular Front, we see that all the forces operating in Spain, other than the demands of the people themselves, militated to minimize the Popular Front vote.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Spanish Popular Front Government was returned in spite of all these disabilities of the people in the elections. If there had been real equality of propaganda, the votes for the Government would have been more, not less. Then came the Franco rebellion, backed by foreign Fascist States, The Spanish Government, though at that time consisting of Liberal republicans, armed the whole people. The fight for democracy in Spain caused a Liberal Government to do what only the Soviets had done in Russia—to take the vitally democratic step of putting arms into the hands of the people themselves. From that moment onwards on Government territory the scales were tipped in favour of real democracy; for, once the people themselves have arms, they can express their will more effectively than ever before. The example of Spain shows that, in the present world situation, the fight to defend democracy is also the fight to extend it. Democracy cannot be defended to-day without being extended. And, in every country, a development is taking place either towards greater democracy and the limitation of the rights of property, or to less democracy and Fascist dictatorship.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this situation the Soviet Union stands out as a beacon. It shows the logical conclusion of the struggle to make democracy effective. At first, in this struggle, concrete steps had to be taken to limit the rights of the property owners in order to make democracy real for the vast majority of the people. And then the people started to plan production and produce without the mines and land being any longer privately owned. They could, in fact, only introduce a planned system when the land and means of production were already public property. They have established real democracy by completely abolishing class relationships, so that every citizen is a servant of the community, and, as a citizen, also a master.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To-day in the Soviet Union there is work for all, and equality of opportunity for all. Every adult citizen has the same economic and political rights, and no citizen, however much personal property he may own, can regulate the lives and livelihoods of others as a result of this ownership. I may have money in the U.S.S.R. to-day if I have earned it, but I cannot own a factory as a result, and I cannot tell people whether or not they shall have work, and at what wages, and for what hours, because I happen to own some money. My money cannot be used to give me any kind of say in the economic life of the country. And, though I may possess money, I cannot use it for propaganda purposes. I cannot own a newspaper or a meeting-hall, and I cannot even hire a meeting-hall for private political purposes. Therefore my money does not give me any political power whatever. As a result of this, power in the U.S.S.R., economically and politically, is vested in the citizens as such, according only to their abilities, and with no relationship whatever to their material possessions. In this way democracy has become real, and really effective. This is something new in the history of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be absolutely incorrect, however, to assume, because in the U.S.S.R. to-day a degree of democracy has been achieved such as exists nowhere else in the world, that there is no further democratic development possible for the U.S.S.R. For the Soviet Union is continually developing, and there are no limits to the way in which, in the future, Soviet democracy may not be further and further extended. Even to-day, Soviet citizens still receive wages according to their work. There are, therefore, highly and lowly paid workers. Even to-day, workers must to some extent still specialize on particular jobs, so that there are cultural workers, administrative workers, technical workers, and unskilled workers. While there is equal opportunity for all citizens to advance from any of these categories to a higher one, there is still the need for a certain degree of specialization, and for a certain material encouragement to each citizen to work according to his ability, and to develop his abilities to the full.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The present state of Soviet society—Socialism—is not regarded in the U.S.S.R. as any land of Utopia or final achievement. It is considered only as a stage in development towards Communist society, which will be a still more real democracy for the whole people. Writing in the 1870’s, Karl Marx, on whose studies of human society Bolshevik doctrine is based, wrote of the future:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In a higher phase of Communist society, after the tyrannical subordination of individuals according to the distribution of labour, and therefore also the distinction between manual and intellectual work, have disappeared, after labour has become not only a means to live, but is itself the first necessity of living. after the powers of production have also increased and all the springs of co-operative wealth are gushing more freely together with the all-round development of the individual, then, and then only, can the narrow bourgeois horizon of rights be left far behind, and society will inscribe on its banner ‘From each according to his capacity, to each according to his need’” (&#039;&#039;Critique of the Gotha Program&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these words Marx showed that beyond the democracy of Soviet society to-day there is a perspective of still further development and still greater personal freedom, until needs and not work will determine what share every citizen shall receive of the total production. And the process by which such a state of society will be reached includes the emancipation of every worker, not only by making him the equal of his neighbour, but by making work itself so interesting that it is voluntarily undertaken by all, so that no longer the compulsion of law and material want will be necessary in order that every citizen do his share. “Productive labour,” wrote Engels in 1878, “will become a means to their emancipation, by giving each individual the opportunity to develop and exercise all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions; in which, therefore, productive labour will be a pleasure instead of a burden” (&#039;&#039;Anti-Dühring&#039;&#039;, p. 328).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a system of society will be run like a well-organized household. People will work as producers voluntarily, and they will help themselves from the common product. Shops will take the form of depots, from which people will take what they need, and, when the general poverty. of capitalism no longer exists, and a love of labour has developed, there is no reason to suppose that, under such conditions, anyone would want to appropriate more than was necessary for a reasonable standard of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once such conditions have been established internationally, the State as such—as a means of guaranteeing security to the people who have power against class enemies within the community or warlike enemies outside—will no longer be necessary. For, once the people are governing their own institutions from top to bottom, and there are no enemies of the people trying to destroy such a free self-governing community, there is no need to defend such a system by organized force, by the State. Under such conditions the whole apparatus of the State, with its armed forces, will, as Marx put it, “wither away.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State as it exists to-day is, therefore, by no means the final form which democracy will take when the power of property is once and for all abolished, not only in one great country, but throughout the world. So long as the Soviet State stands alone, and is continually threatened by Fascist States outside and agents of Fascism within—and the Soviet State cannot build such a Chinese Wall of isolation to prevent some of them getting in—it will continue to be a fighting organization of the people, it will be armed, and it will have to use every means of securing its own defence. As a democratic organization that may at any time have to fight for its existence, the Soviet State must be highly disciplined, like a trade union in a strike, and the majority will use every necessary means of enforcing such a discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But as, in the rest of the world, the forces of democracy triumph over the concentrated power of the great owners of property, the danger to Soviet democracy will be reduced and the whole world will move nearer to a State in which real democracy will be freed from the danger of aggression. In such circumstances we may look towards a world democratic community, in which the people who work shall rule, and in which, because all shall do their share of work, all shall do their share of ruling.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1919 the workers of Hungary set up a Soviet State which survived for several months in the face of almost overwhelming opposition. But finally, as a result of armed intervention from outside, the Hungarian Soviet Republic was suppressed and Fascist terror took its place. The Republic had lasted for four months. The Hungarian democratic writer, Jaszi, summing up the results of the experience of the Soviet Republic, wrote these words:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The most important effect of the proletarian dictatorship will certainly be found in the radical change of outlook produced among the proletarian masses. It had the character of a violent moral explosion in the Hungarian social order. It planted in the minds of the great mass of semi-brutalized slaves perhaps the first seeds of faith and hope of liberation. To this day there lives in the hearts of millions the sense of the rights of the workers and of their superiority to the drones and killers. Above all, the dictatorship shook out of their age-long apathy the unhappy helots of Hungarian society, the agricultural workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“No less important was the service of the Soviet Revolution to the idea of internationalism, made livid and real in the minds of the people by the memory of hard and bloody conflicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Finally, through the spirit of the Soviet constitution, despite much childish naiveté and many violent outbursts, the Republic did pioneer work for the ideals of more advanced types of democracy and self-government. It did this by its exposure of the defective organization, the shortcomings and hypocrisies of the bourgeois democracies of to-day, and its proclamation for all time of the ideal of the State, in which only those who work and produce shall have the right to control and govern society” (&#039;&#039;Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary&#039;&#039;, p. 151).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This epitaph was written of the Hungarian Soviet Republic by one who was a democrat but not a Communist. It was written of the Hungarian Soviet Republic that only lived for four months. How much greater, then, is the significance to democracy of the Soviet State that has lived for twenty years, and in which the democratic rights of the people are constantly being extended. Finally, what a prospect for the world as a whole opens up before us, when the people of every country, as a result of an organized struggle for democratic rights in countries where they are deprived of them to-day, and through the defence and extension of these rights where they are already to some extent enjoyed, have established in every country a society in which all citizens have equal rights as citizens, and economic and political power no longer to the slightest extent depend on the possession of property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The way to such a society, the world commonwealth of the future, is indicated by the U.S.S.R. And in that society the State itself, and even the word democracy, will become historical terms with no longer any significance. “For,” as Lenin puts it, “when &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; have learned to manage, and independently are actually managing by themselves, social production, keeping accounts, controlling the idlers, the gentlefolk, the swindlers, and similar ‘guardians of capitalist traditions’ then the escape from this national accounting and control was inevitably become so increasingly difficult, and such a rare exception, and will probably be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for the armed workers are men of practical life, not sentimental intellectuals, and they will scarcely allow anyone to trifle with them), that very soon the &#039;&#039;necessity&#039;&#039; of observing the simple, fundamental rules of everyday social life in common will have become a &#039;&#039;habit&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The door will then be open for the transition from the first phase of Communist society to its higher phase, and along with it to the complete withering away of the State. . . . The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment when it begins to be unnecessary. The more democratic the ‘State’ consisting of armed workers, which is ‘no longer a State in the proper sense of the word,’ the more rapidly does &#039;&#039;every&#039;&#039; State begin to wither away” (&#039;&#039;State and Revolution&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these words Lenin outlines the future of Soviet democracy—a community of citizens, governing themselves in every branch of social activity, and using the necessary measures to preserve discipline in the common interest. Democracy and written Constitutions in such a society will probably be as unnecessary as is the ordinary family, and the citizens will run their community peacefully and in the common interest, creating all the necessary means of livelihood with their common labor, and having, ever greater resources available for the arts and sciences, for the complete mastery of nature in the interests of humanity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Will this new civilization,” write Sidney and Beatrice Webb, of the U.S.S.R. to-day, “with its abandonment of the incentive of profit-making, its extinction of unemployment, its planned production for community consumption, and the consequent liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, spread to other countries? Our own reply is: ‘Yes, it will.’ But how, when, where, with what modifications, and whether through violent revolution or by peaceful penetration, or even by conscious imitation, are questions we cannot answer” (&#039;&#039;Soviet Communism&#039;&#039;, p. 1143).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the answer to these final questions is not a difficult one. We have seen that the essential feature of the Soviet system is the abolition of the power of the landlord and capitalist, the owner of property, to rule the productive life of the country and thus to dominate the State. But this is but the extension of democracy so as to wipe out all privileges of the great property-owners as against the ordinary citizen, the small producer, the ordinary working man or woman. The united struggle of all the forces in the world interested in defending democratic liberties against encroachment, and in extending these liberties beyond the limits set by the great property-owners at the present time, is the only way in which democracy and democratic peace can be preserved in face of the growing danger of Fascism and Fascist aggression. The logical process of such a struggle, at a certain point, will necessitate the complete expropriation of the property-owners and the replacement of capitalism by Socialism, the only final guarantee that the anti-democratic forces of property can never again rear their heads. Whether or not, in Britain or France or Spain, such a struggle takes the actual form of the getting up of Soviets, it is in essence the same struggle as that which the Russian people successfully fought in 1917, defending and extending democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Peace, Bread, and Land” was the slogan of the Russian Revolution; and a really democratic Government was the only way by which these aims could be achieved. The Soviets were, in Russia, the democratic organ of the people. When, in November 1917, the whole of the democratic liberties of the Russian people were threatened with suppression, and with the imposition from above of a military dictatorship, the workers and peasants of Russia seized complete power through their own organizations, the Soviets. Democracy was triumphant, and the military dictators and their foreign allies were driven from the country, he seizure of power by the Russian Soviets was a landmark in the history of democracy, for it has proved for all time the practicability of the principle that only those who work and produce shall have the right to govern society. And it has shown that in a really democratic society it is possible to ensure that every citizen shall work and produce.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We began this book with a few remarks on the nature of democracy and dictatorship. At that stage we were interested in making clear one thing only—that democracy and dictatorship are not mutually, exclusive terms. Any democracy for one group of people may simultaneously be a dictatorship over another. The shareholders’ meeting of a joint-stock company is democratic for the shareholders, but it is a dictatorship over the employees of the firm, who usually vastly outnumber the shareholders. So, too, in the capitalist State, the democratic rights which exist are in practice available to the few owners of property to a great extent as compared with the majority of the people—the people who work. Thus, as in the Greek city-state, though to a lesser degree, we may say that even in Britain to-day the really effective part in the running of the country is played by a “charmed circle of the privileged,” while the rest of the community—the people who do the work—“have no voice whatever in the making of the laws under which they toil.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Democracy and dictatorship are not mutually exclusive. They are not absolutes. Therefore, in facing the practical problems of the people of the world as a whole, or of any single country, it is essential in every concrete instance to consider the actual situation, not from the standpoint of law only, but of everyday practice, in order to know to what extent the people are governing themselves, and to what extent they are not. On this basis, every measure which curtails the power of the people must be fought by every means that they can command, and every method of increasing their democratic rights, of making democracy more effective, must be constantly utilized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defence of democracy against Fascism means the extension of existing democratic rights against those limitations imposed by the property relationships in existing society. And every extension of democratic rights for the people brings nearer the time when, faced as the Spanish people are to-day, with the alternatives of making democracy real or submitting to military dictatorship, the people will be in a position of such unity and organizational strength that they will be able to defend their democracy and make it ever more real, as the people succeeded in doing in Russia some twenty years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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		<title>Library:This Soviet World</title>
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=This Soviet World|author=Anna Louise Strong|written in=1936|publisher=Henry Holt and Company, Inc.|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/this-soviet-world/|pdf=https://annas-archive.org/md5/3c2da922ea78b91c28c2b81b5c2da556}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== ON INTERPRETING A WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A leading Russian Communist said to me a year ago “The mind of our people is changing so fast under the conditions of socialism that it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to speak to the rest of the world. We find it harder to understand them, and they us.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We who go back and forth between the Soviet world and the world of capitalism—not only in space from New York to Moscow but also in spirit from intimate life with Soviet people to intimate life in America—feel keenly this difficulty. Important words like freedom, democracy, dictatorship have different meanings on different sides of the border. The Soviet world is sharply conscious of planning its future; the capitalist world is always arriving where it hadn’t intended. And Soviet officials are not always helpful in making their acts intelligible; they often assume that only deliberate malice can doubt them and that the only needed explanation is the appropriate citation from Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To explain the swiftly growing Soviet world to that other world out of which it was born is a task that becomes steadily more complex. For if its outer achievements are every year more able to speak for themselves, its inner life more and diverges from that of capitalism in a hundred subtle ways.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Berlin station a giant sign greets me with three-foot letters: “Think of your hair!” My mind flashes back to the world I have left. What are Soviet people thinking of? The Stakhanov drive, the Moscow city plan, Marie and her sugar beets, the conquest of the north. And hair and perfume, O yes, of course. Everyone knows of the rising standard of living and firmly believes in a cultural life—more bath-tubs, radios, books and dramatic clubs and doubtless more hair. But their individuality is expressed not by possessions and polish but by the various ways in which men create. Dynamic is the word; their civilization is dynamic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The regimentation of life by property is my next shock in the capitalist world. The obscene phrases “damages for alienation of affections” or “a $50,000 man” or the remark: “I do it only for the money that is in it”—what degradation they imply of human life and work! I see able engineers spending creative power on little models in a government relief job just to keep alive. I see a journal of high standard, the life-work of an able editor submerged by a new owner’s wish for quick profit. Lives are conditioned in the Soviet world also, by trends and sages of organization, but not by the profits of a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference appears in the use of pronouns. People under capitalism are contrasting “I” and “they.” “Too bad it couldn’t have been on my land,” a man remarks of a California oil-strike. Soviet folk would be hailing “our new oil-wells”; to them the idea of a private oil-well is already as quaint as a private postal system. I note a remark about American unemployment: “If it gets any worse, they’ll have to do something.” Who is this ultimate, uncontrollable “they”? The term betrays the class society of which the speakers are unconscious; they are waiting for some boss to act. To hear a debate: “Is America going fascist?” and think how much less passively Soviet folk would word it. “Shall we go fascist? No. Then exactly how shall we prevent it?” Soviet folk say “we” of one-sixth of the earth’s surface. Uzbek cotton-pickers, toiling under the sun of Central Asia, say: “We are conquering the Arctic; we rescued the Chelyuskinites.” Ukrainian farmers who never went up in an airplane talk of “our stratosphere records” and “the loss of our Maxim Gorky airplane” as they take up collections to build ten new ones. But even Mrs. Roosevelt asks me: “Are Russian peasants getting more reconciled to accepting direction?” I feel the hopelessness of language as I answer: “No, they are learning better to organize and direct themselves.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Americans often ask me whether Russians are not naturally more altruistic than Americans, more fit for communism, they imply. No, it is something quite different. Russians at the time of Revolution were more medieval than Americans, which means “naturally” more petty, unreliable, inefficient, given to bargaining and cheating. Traits of the Asiatic market-place were widespread and occasionally still annoy the visitor. But these traits are disappearing under the fact of joint ownership, which brings identity of individual with community good.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Joint possession of the country’s resources and productive mechanism is the economic reality which unifies Soviet life and makes it dynamic. It is this that washes out the antagonism between personal and public good, that makes men say “we.” It is this that makes men conscious planners of the future; for owners plan but non-owners can only fight or drift. The chief quality of Soviet civilization is the sense that the world is “ours,” to seize, understand and make over.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This Soviet world is my theme; I give scant space to those fast disintegrating forces that fought it. I tell not the “whole truth,” for truth is never “whole”; there are always at least two truths in conflict: the truth that is dying and the truth that is coming into existence. American Tories who intrigued for King George had their truth also, but it remains only as piquant sauce to romance; the truth of the Continental armies remained to build the modern republic. They themselves recalled the frozen feet of Valley Forge less as suffering than as heroism; their raids on hungry farms passed into memory not as banditry but as necessity and daring. History’s greatest gift to victors is that not only they, but their truth survives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet I do no injustice to those many lives which in greater or less degree were wrenched or broken by the coming of the new Soviet order. Even for them the new years obliterate the past. They also change to seek their new future in the new system; Lives broken in terms of property are being remade in terms of work. Saboteurs reform and win posts of honor; kulaks come back from exile to factories and farms; children have an equal start now regardless of fathers. For this war differs from other battles in that all men, even the conquered foes, are absorbed into the ranks of the conquerors—joint heirs to all the fruits of victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A. L. S.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART I: MEN MAKE THE SOVIET WORLD ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER I: THE PLAN FOR REMAKING THE WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“The philosophers have only interpreted the world; our business is to change it.”|Karl Marx|Theses on Feuerbach}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whenever I ask myself what brings increasing visitors to Moscow, what they want here and what they find, and why the eyes of the world turn more and more to the Soviet Union with a questing hope that hardly yet dares call itself belief, there flashes into my mind the remark made to me in 1930 at Dnieprostroy by the young and disillusioned son of a Wall Street millionaire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dnieprostroy in those days was the first of the famous giants of the new Soviet Russia, “the largest power dam in the world.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Since then surpassed by the Boulder Dam.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hour after hour we climbed the cliffs and ravines of its mighty construction. We fled from screaming sirens that warned of blasting rock. We saw great stone-crushing plants, saw-mills, locomotive repair shops, temporary power station—all sizable works harnessed to the task of making a greater power station which should in turn serve plants a hundred times their scope. We visited the “socialist city” where discussion raged between advocates of individual cottages or big apartment houses for the future town. We saw hurriedly constructed club houses where thousands of workers busily grabbed knowledge—reading, writing, political economy and the technique of their new job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Night fell. We stood on the shore of the yet unharnessed river, destined to rise to bury those high banks beneath a man-impounded lake. We far down at the great sweep of electric brilliance that had already shattered the age-old darkness of the Ukrainian steppe. It was then that my companion said: “I think that Dnieprostroy has answered the question that brought me to Russia.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“What question?” I asked.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Whether the world is to be changed by trying one at a time to improve human beings or by changing the social environment that makes human beings.”&lt;br /&gt;
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In the pause that followed the sounds of construction came to us incessantly, rising from the bowels of earth and filling the horizon. The short, sharp puffs of engines, the roar of cliffs torn asunder, the ceaseless beat of mills grinding stone into concrete, the rasp of drills eating down into river granite. Sharpened by night and softened by distance, they blended into a mighty symphony—music of man, the builder, subduing, the earth.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dark beyond the circling lights lay Hortitz Island, in ancient days the last stand of free-booting bandit chieftains against oppressors. We remembered the husky peasant girl from the island whom we had seen in overalls that morning, gang-boss over twelve men who excavated rock by explosions of liquid air. Dnieprostroy had changed her in a few months from a farm servant to a “brigadier.” We remembered the blacksmith whom we had asked in the glare of foundry fires how he liked his work and who burst forth with fiery will: “You know, we’re going to finish her in 1932”—a simple workman pushing ahead by one year the estimate of Hugh L. Cooper’s world-experienced engineers.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The workman’s estimate won out. The dam was finished in 1932 a year ahead of schedule.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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We recalled how competitions between workers of right and left bank drove the dam ahead, doubling the concrete-laying estimates of the Americans by force of newly awakened will. Signals night by night across the raging torrent told in red and green lights the day’s total, celebrated over-fulfillment of plan by a great red star. Night by night, week by week each bank fought to keep its red star shining. We remembered motion pictures, dramas, concerts, lectures which brought the city’s culture to these thousands who had come from the scattered farms of the Ukraine. The fine new polytechnic institute where workers chosen from the river-gangs were being turned in forty classrooms into engineers. We saw on the high bank the homes of the American consultants, who understood better than the Russians the technique of the great job but were eternally puzzled by its spirit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yes, Dnieprostroy gave the answer to my companion’s question. Dnieprostroy was a new form of production under a new social system. It was remaking individuals by wholesale.&lt;br /&gt;
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Increasingly in the past five years Americans have come to the Soviet Union, scientists, engineers, artists, economists all bent on their own pursuits, dogmatic or bewildered tourists, seeking proof of an old belief or material for a new one. Especially since the crash of 1929 smashed the world which was “inevitably getting better,” they have come, fleeing from the ruins of that earthquake to learn what, if anything, the Soviet Union offers. By no means all of them put their question as clearly as did my young companion; by no means all interpret so swiftly the essence of the first construction job they see. But the question he asked is basically what brings most of them, an ancient quest of man which has troubled philosophers no less than baffled tourists: “Can our world be remade? And how to remake it?”&lt;br /&gt;
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The problem is especially pressing upon the American middle class of today, which has seen its old world taken from it in ways that it hardly understands. The independent small property owners, mostly farmers, who formed a hundred years ago 80 per cent of the American people except in the slave South, bequeathed to their descendants ideals of democracy and freedom, the “liberty and equality of men owning their own means of livelihood.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Lewis Corey: “Crisis of the Middle Class” &#039;&#039;The Nation&#039;&#039;, Aug. 14, 1935.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But large scale industry, developing through a century, wiped out the small enterprisers, increased the number of salaried employees and made the farmer dependent on banks and markets, thus changing America to a “nation of hired workers.” Only 12 per cent of the people live by ownership of their own property, in place of 80 per cent a century ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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The myth of property remained long after the reality had vanished. Millions of these salaried people still felt hat they owned something—no longer a store, a small workshop, an unencumbered farm, but savings in stocks, bonds, insurance—which lifted them somewhat above the ranks of laboring hands. Crashingly the world economic crisis destroyed this illusion. As if to emphasize how little control these small people had over their own property, the value of their liquid wealth shrank from twenty-seven billion dollars in 1929 to four billion in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Figures from Robers R. Doane on liquid wealth of persons with incomes under $5,000. Quoted by Corey.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of the middle class were thrown into the same abyss of ruin with millions of wage-workers; they wait together on bread-lines, study together the government relief programs, hunt together for a boss. For all of them alike, as long as the capitalist world remains, most put their trust in bosses, someone who owns and will give them access to the means of production and of life.&lt;br /&gt;
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Their situation is the more distressing because for most of our Western world the past hundred years has been what John Strachey aptly calls the “century of the great hope.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;John Strachey, &#039;&#039;The Menace of Fascism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of men became better fed, better housed, better clothed through the industrial revolution which took production out of the home workshop into the factory and knit together the ends of earth by railroad, steamship, telegraph. Especially America—where the arrival of the new machines and technical methods coincided with a continent-wide expansion into lands of vast wealth, developed by energetic oilers from all nations for the first time unhampered by any remnants of feudalism the belief in inevitable progress and increasing prosperity was both a conscious and unconscious national faith. The little red schoolhouse bade every boy aspire to be president. “Go west, young man.” . . . “Don’t be a bear on America,” said successful plutocrats. But far deeper than these conscious preachings spread the atmosphere of determined optimism which made every man who was not a good booster seem subtly immoral to his friends. Did not the great lands of America, the efficient industries of America, the productive energy of America, offer the basis for a good standard of life for everyone—an “American standard”? It was easy to prove that they did—and do!&lt;br /&gt;
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What happened to that faith in inevitable progress? If it still survives in some circles as a despairing habit, elsewhere it has been replaced by belief in inevitable doom. “Inevitable drift to fascism,” “inevitable twilight of the West,” “the old standard of prosperity can never return,” are phrases common on lips that not long since hailed inevitable advance. Others begin a frenzied search into the faiths of past ages, to know if elsewhere than with us abides the truth. These learn that belief in the inevitability of progress has never been a universal faith. It has been confined to definite periods of economic advancement, and to certain nations within those periods or certain classes within nations. Did not whole centuries of the Middle Ages view the world as an essentially unchanging garden of human souls from which religion culled a few for heaven, leaving the rest for hell? Even today do not hundreds of millions of people—those great suppressed races of the East—find life’s processes so fundamentally evil that their essential faith is Buddhism in which Nothingness is bliss?&lt;br /&gt;
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Even in our West, as capitalism decays into fascism, there arise new denials of the inevitability of progress. Ideals of the past—the Roman Empire, the Germanic gods, the feudal Britain featured by fascist-striving novels—gild with emotional glamor the tenets of fascism: that science and machine production are evil, that democracy, peace and the conquest of poverty are futile dreams of a decadent society, that murderous war is man’s noblest end. For fascism is the last stand of a desperate capitalism which can no longer use the fruits of science and machine production, which dare no longer permit either peace or democracy, since it must brutally refuse to its victims that abolition of poverty which is already technically possible in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can human reason find a way to reorganize human society—a way which human wills can follow? Must we go backing blindly into the future, cheered now by faith in inevitable progress, damned now by faith in inevitable doom, and claiming from some supernatural world a just and rational balancing of the unjust, irrational chaos found in this? Or can that continuous, collective application of human thought known as science, which we have learned to take as our best, though still unperfected guide in rationalizing and controlling subhuman phenomena, be expanded to rationalize and control our human destiny? Can man master the machines he has made which today threaten increasingly to enslave him? Can he subdue to his will those tremendously productive forces which his science and technical knowledge have released, and which seem adequate to abolish poverty, yet which at present give increasing unemployment, economic crises, wars?&lt;br /&gt;
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We are asking, in other words, can men master destiny? Are all those gleams of human reason which have given us increasing dominion over material phenomena but will-o’-the-wisps, luring to a swamp which will engulf us the more blackly for the false, brief light they gave? Or are they gleams of dawn that may brighten into an ever-increasing daylight, in which not only a few isolated phenomena but the whole of man’s own nature and his organized society can be planned by human reason and carried through by human wills?&lt;br /&gt;
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No less than this is the search that brings men over the seas to the Soviet Union. For if to millions in our Western world the century now passing was the century of the great hope, there are other millions in two great half-continents uniting Europe and Asia, who look upon it rather as the century of the great plan. The reference is not to that Five-Year Plan which the Soviet Union made famous, but to a plan far more comprehensive which prepares and includes all five-year plans in all lands and all the future. A plan for remaking the world drawn up eighty-eight years ago on instructions from a London congress of working-men of many nations, and issued in 1848 under the title &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the work of the German economists Frederick Engels and Karl Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; is usually thought of as the defiance flung at the world by an illegal revolutionary party of hunted people. So it was. But it was also man’s first attempt to apply science to the analysis of human society in order to draw up a plan for remaking the world. Previous attempts to analyze the world were exercises of philosophers, not directed towards change. Previous attempts to change the world were confined to threats or exhortations to secure specific conversions or reforms. Many Utopian pictures had existed of how beautiful society might be when once made over. But the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; tried to answer the question: How can the thing be done? Born in the middle years of that century in which the scientific method was consciously remaking the material world, it sought to analyze the elements of human society, the nature and cause of the changes we see in history, for the purpose of producing social change in a desired direction. That is why it claims to be Scientific Socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The followers of Marx see in him the genius who combined the three chief currents of thought of the nineteenth century—classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and French revolutionary doctrines. The philosophic basis of Marxism is “dialectics,” which views every reality, whether of nature, the mind, or society, as in process of continual change through the development and clash of “inner contradictions.” This theory applied to the study of history shows how economic, political and social systems are constantly changing, at times slowly, at times by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions. American capitalism of the Civil War period is not the capitalism of today. The democracy of the New England town-meeting is not the democracy of the modern imperial nation. They may be called by the same but names deceive; the thing changes even while you look at it to disdain or admire. Even your disdain and admiration changes, the meaning of your words and concepts. What was true, right, desirable yesterday may not be true, right, desirable tomorrow. Systems have their day and cease to be.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is there any law in this change? Is there in this constant interaction and conflict of systems and ideas anything basic, changing which will change the rest? “The economic structure,” says Marx, is “the real foundation. . . . The mode of production . . . determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Preface to a &#039;&#039;Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Marx the fundamental thing about any human society is not its system of ideas or religions, nor the form of government nor the nature of its family life. These things are important but derivative. They are determined by the ways in which human beings get food, clothing, shelter, by the stage of their advance and the tools they use in these fundamental operations. In a world whose economic structure fails to reward honesty and altruism, a Marxist would not spend his efforts preaching these virtues, but in creating an economic system where honesty really prospered, where each man’s success must be build on the success, rather than the ruin, of others. The new economic system would make new people; under it, education in the new ideals would be swift and hopeful.&lt;br /&gt;
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How then do economic systems change? Marx finds the key in his theory of “class struggle.” Man’s science and invention create new ways of production, and these in turn create new “classes” of human beings, i.e., groups of people who have different and conflicting relations to production. Between these classes a struggle goes on around the ownership of the process of production, which is the means of life. “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 10-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus at different stages of human history new classes arise from new ways of working and the struggle between them produces social change. Modern capitalism has not done away with class antagonisms, but it has this distinctive feature—it has simplified them. “Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into . . . two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat,”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; those who live by owning and those who can live only by selling their labor power, by seeking a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between these two remain for a time the middle classes, distraught survivors of those small property owners and independent craftsmen who once embodied the demand for private property against a feudal past. They suffer deeply under advancing capitalism which dislodges them steadily and painfully into the ranks of hired hands. They struggle against their fate, but their strivings are confused, for their instinctive desire is to go back to small scale property. Their cry is to “share the wealth,” to start over again that old society of small owners which led to the present-day monopolies and which would lead to them again if it could be revived. The right to private property was once revolutionary pledge of freedom, but this also has changed with the passing of history. Private property in farm plots and hand tools freed serfs from feudal masters; private property in steel mills creates a new slavery. Even small ownership today, wherever it survives or comes into being, is at the mercy of large scale finance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who owns the world? That is the basic question conditioning all hopes of social change. What is wrong with the world today, according to Marxists, is private ownership of the great productive processes which are socially operated. The way out is not backward to subsistence farms and handicrafts it is forward to social ownership. Not “share the wealth,” but jointly owned wealth, jointly organized by and for all who work. Only thus can the great machines be subjugated; only thus can science and modern technique produce plenty for all mankind. Only thus can the present vision of men into owners and workers be abolished, a division which is wrecking the world by social strife and international war. It must be superseded by one united class of people—joint worker-owners of the world. From this economic equality, all other forms of equality will grow. First a stage of socialism where men have equal access to labor and receive according to their work. Then when the habits of human beings have been changed by joint ownership, will come the stage of communism in which men freely co-operate in work according to their abilities and receive according to their needs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who will bring about this change of ownership? Clearly not the present private owners: their interests lie the other way. Nor can the disintegrating middle classes achieve it, except insofar as they come to understand that their future lies with the workers. Only one class of people can develop the will to carry through this difficult long epoch of change—the working class which is bound to the mighty mechanism of modern production, mastering it yet enslaved by it. Joint ownership is their only path to freedom; when they understand this, they will accomplish it. They are thus the “really revolutionary class,” in whom social ownership of modern production is a living need and can become a flaming passion carrying humanity forward to a higher stage.&lt;br /&gt;
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The task of every Marxist is to help them understand, to make them “class-conscious,” aware of their power and function as creators of social progress. Millions of Americans resent the very idea of classes, and are indignant at “inflaming class-consciousness” where it does not yet exist. But Marxian classes are not epithets inciting to riot; they are categories in a scientific analysis. Marxists say that unless human society is to go down in a catastrophe of slavery, war and ruin, men must own their tools and the wealth which these create; that tools and wealth have grown too complexly social to be owned individually and must therefore be socially owned; and that only the working class can develop the fighting will to seize the power of ownership and through it remake society. The less the workers are organized, the less conscious they are of their power and function, the more will the coming changes in human society be protracted, painful and blind. The more conscious the workers are of their great task in history, the better they are organized, the more they are able to rally around them the middle classes, the swifter will be the change and the less will be the human suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two generations of economists in many countries developed the Marxian theory. Lenin built on it the Bolshevik Party which in 1917 carried through the Russian Revolution. Stalin is honored today by Bolsheviks not only as statesman and organizer, but as the far-seeing analyst and guider of social change, who continues and develops the scientific method of Marx, Engels, Lenin. One-sixth of the world today is being remade according to the Marxian program—the first consciously devised pattern that men ever applied to society as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER II: THE PARTY OF REVOLUTION ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“To distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident did the first socialist revolution take place in Russia. The World War imposed great strains on many countries and the chain of world imperialism broke at its weakest link.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hillquit called the Russian revolution an “historical accident,” since it occurred in a backward peasant land. Norman Thomas on the contrary holds it occurred just because the Russians were so backward that they would endure a dictatorship such as no other people would stand. &amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;  Stalin says: “The objective conditions for the revolution exist throughout the whole system of imperialist world economy, which is an integral unit.” Answering the theory that the revolution must come first “where the proletariat forms the majority, where culture is more advanced, where there is more democracy,” he says: “No, not necessarily where industry is most developed; it will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the of world imperialism at its weakest link.” From Stalin’s Lectures to Sverdlov Students.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; More than any other land, Russia was tormented by war and ravenous for peace. Tsardom, that hideous hangover from the Middle Ages, had lost all moral authority and was hated by the entire people. For decades revolution had been brewing in Russia.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx noted this as far back as 1877 in his Letter to Zorge. See &#039;&#039;Letters of Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The World War added the last unbearable pressure and the explosion came.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not least among the factors which made the revolution possible and helped determine its form was the existence of the Bolshevik Party.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Today called Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was no spontaneous creation, born at the moment of revolt; for fourteen years it had been consciously welded by painstaking thought and desperate struggle. Its traditions indeed went back much further. The whole last half of the nineteenth century advanced thinkers in Russia, under the oppression of tsardom, had sought eagerly for the effective revolutionary path. Through fifty years of torment, sacrifice, heroism, incredible energy, careful study, they had tested many methods. They had tried to educate and organize the peasantry; they had tried the terrorist assassination of tyrants. They had failed. They had checked their failures by the history of other nations and a section of them had come to Marxism as the correct program for remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Marx furnished the general program, it was Lenin who developed the theory and tactics, proletarian revolution, and built the organization for the seizure of power. Bolshevism, as a trend of political thought and a political party, exists since 1903, when the Social-Democratic Party of Russia split into groups known as Bolsheviks (majority) and Mensheviks (minority), which correspond to Communists and Social-Democrats today in other countries. The older leaders wanted to “widen” the Party, to take in all “supporters” and give them all a voice in determining the Party’s program. Lenin, though recognizing that any social change must rely on wide masses, not only of workers but of many other “allies,” insisted that membership in the Party itself “must be given a narrow definition to distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin’s Account of Second Congress, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, II&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To organize and train the Party of Revolution became thenceforth the central task and the greatest achievement of that world-renowned leader, Lenin, who gave his whole life to the study and practice of the science of political power. Power was to him no mere personal achievement of office; it was the organized lifting of the human race one stage forward in history. He studied how to ride the turbulent upheaval which the conflicts in modern society would inevitably produce, how to prepare and lead men for the seizure of the state and the creation of a new order, how at last to organize them for the conquest of nature and of their own destiny. This was to Lenin the science of power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting with the Marxian thesis that the working class is the group in modern society which can be organized to take power and to build a new order, Lenin created for this class a “vanguard” of leaders. They must be men of intelligence, will, daring; yet they must act in a disciplined manner, reinforcing a common direction. They must make the revolution a life-long profession, steadily studying the economic, political and social forces of the society in which they live. They must apply this knowledge in action. They must take active part not only in elections and political movements, but in strikes, trade union work, demonstrations, distribution of literature and all the other prosaic or dangerous activities through which the working class becomes organized and conscious of its power. They must keep close to the workers, learning from them and assisting them, and win the right to lead by the confidence they inspire.&lt;br /&gt;
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How are such leaders to be found among the great hordes of the dispossessed and discontented? How, if found, are they to be welded into a disciplined, fighting force? Lenin had no illusions; he knew that the mass of exploited men who are squeezed out by the dislocations of capitalism, and who turn in hope or despair towards communism, contains many fools, knaves, fanatics and self-pitying failures as well as men of intelligence and will. He foresaw a long period of difficult struggle, in which men fit to lead would be tested by fire, men capable of learning would be trained by experience, and others would weed themselves out by their follies. Lenin himself gave most of his years to the slow work of building up and training a not very large but thoroughly tested Party, which could give leadership when the hour of revolution came. I have met simple workers to whom Lenin devoted hours of individual teaching, and who remember today the exact phrases he used with them forty years ago. The making of real Communists able to lead the masses is a long and costly process.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nothing could be more absurd than the two contradictory views of Communists promulgated today by their opponents. They are usually pictured as planless inciters to violence and riot, people who have a crazy desire for chaos, in the hope that something vaguely called communism may somehow ensue. A more sophisticated view, to which no less a person than Sinclair Lewis falls victim in &#039;&#039;It Can’t Happen Here&#039;&#039;, portrays them as brainless sheep required to act in blind obedience to the orders of their superiors for the sake of discipline. Neither of these types could possibly lead a successful strike, much less a revolution. A communist who increased risks by recklessness would be early eliminated; a man who only took orders would be useless as a leader. Communists must learn the difficult combination of intelligence with daring; they must learn to act together but they must all know why.&lt;br /&gt;
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“What we build cannot be built by passive people,” said one of the secretaries of the Russian Communist Party to me. “We all had strong convictions; we fought for them and went to jail for them,” said another veteran Bolshevik. “Then in jail we fought with our imprisoned comrades over details of past policies, studying and learning from past errors. Often we found that the mistake of a few words in our theory had cost us a year in prison.” Again and again groups which could not agree split off from the others. Lenin made no effort to detain them; he distinguished sharply between those allies with whom co-operation was possible for a longer or shorter period, and the smaller group which would stick through everything. Thus was built up that Party of men who had placed their lives in each other’s hands so often that they could rely on each other with absolute assurance, not through blind submission but through a habit of mutual consultation and swift acceptance of joint decisions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most famous picture of the ideal Communist is given by Krupskaia, widow of Lenin, in an article entitled: “What a Communist Should Be Like.” “First of all a Communist is a social person, with strongly developed social instincts, who desires that all people should be well and be happy. Second, he must understand what is happening about him in the world—the mechanism of the existing régime, the history of the growth of human society, the history of economic development, of the growth of property, the division of classes, the growth of state forms. He must clearly picture whither society is developing—to a régime where the happiness of some will not be based on the slavery of others and where there will be no compulsion except strongly developed social instincts. And the Communists must clear the road, as you clear a path in the wilderness, to hasten its coming.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Third, the Communist must know how to organize creatively. If he is a medical worker, for instance, he must know medicine, then the history of medicine in Russia and other lands, then the Communist approach to the problem of medicine, i.e., how to organize wide masses to create from the ranks of the toilers a powerful sanitary organization in the cause of health. He must know not only what Communism is and what is coming, what his own job in it may be and his approach to the masses. Fourthly, his personal life must be submitted to and guided by the interests of Communism. No matter how much he regrets giving up the comforts and ties of home, he must if necessary cast all aside and go into danger wherever assigned. . . . Body and soul he must be devoted to the interests of the toiling masses, of Communism.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who have risen high in the Communist Party are characterized by these qualities listed by Krupskaia. They are usually reticent about their deepest motives; it is not the thing to gush one’s devotion. One learns of their qualities chiefly through others. Krupskaia, speaking to intimate Party friends at the funeral of her husband Lenin, found the completest expression in the words: “Lenin deeply loved the people.” Radek tells how Stalin, answering greetings sent him by the Party on his fiftieth birthday, “said something which, in the mouth of such a reserved man, sounded as though it came from the very depths of his being. Stalin said that he was ready to shed his blood ‘drop by drop’ for the proletariat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Radek, &#039;&#039;Problems of Soviet Literature&#039;&#039;, 144.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki&amp;quot;&amp;gt;This seems to refer to Radeks speech at the Soviet Writers Congress in August 1934. A copy is available on [https://www.marxists.org/archive/radek/1934/sovietwritercongress.htm marxists.org]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who would lead the masses in changing the world by the Marxian method must obviously strive for constant growth in two directions: in ever-deepening understanding of social and economic forces and in ever-widening participation in workers’ struggles. Perhaps the first thing that strikes an outsider is the amount of time which all Communists devote to the study of Marxian theory. Managers of great steel plants and busy county officials under the pressure of harvest will find time, at unearthly hours like eleven at night or seven in the morning, for their study of Marxism or their class in current events, deeming these things as essential as their other pressing work.&lt;br /&gt;
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Visitors to the Soviet Union are not infrequently amazed to find that a Party secretary in a rural township can discuss international affairs with an assurance and abundance of detail which few foreign editors of an American metropolitan news-paper can show, and will handle statistics and history with a good deal more ease than the “Brain Trust.” A prominent American politician once expressed to me doubts of the accuracy of the published interview of H. G. Wells with Stalin. Stalin’s references to the Cromwellian revolution seemed to him too detailed to have been available for conversation. “People,” he said, “don’t talk that way” But any Communist in the Soviet Union who did not know the essentials of Cromwellian revolution, and of other historic revolutions from which he is expected to learn, would join a class to “raise his ideological level.” A Communist who allowed himself to become as ignorant of world affairs as is the average American politician would be ruthlessly “cleaned out” of the Party, or told to join the group of “sympathizers” to learn what he has to know.&lt;br /&gt;
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The emotional vagueness which is a feature of all capitalist political platforms, and which is indeed desired in order to win wide support without being too definite, is the exact opposite of Communist statement. The Communists even seem to be painfully definite, to “take refuge in formulæ,” or to split hairs over the exact interpretation of phrases. All science and technical knowledge, however, advance by just this splitting of hairs to find the exact chemical formula which produces the alloy or the mathematical relation which strengthens the arch of the bridge; discussions in any congress of physiologists or electricians are full of this “dull theory” without which no scientific progress can be attained. Communists take Marxism as such a science; to rise to eminence among them demands years, even decades, of close and penetrating study of social forces. This is no dogma to be learned once for all; it is a developing body of thought, constantly applied to and affected by new conditions. By the very theory of dialectics, these forces are changing. The speeches of Lenin and Stalin and other Party leaders never deal in stirring oratory or spell-binding generalities but in close and careful analysis. Stalin would no more attempt to sway a Communist congress by “force of personality” expressed in brilliant oratory and colorful phrasing, than Edison would have expected to convince a group of American engineers of the reliability of some new formula by emotional words. One such attempt would ruin either an Edison or a Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Communists must not only be scientific; they must also learn to work with the masses. In this they face a special difficulty; the man who has thought for years in Marxian categories may find it as hard to explain them to simple people as an electrical engineer would find it to explain the theory of turbines to men in a candle-lighted world. This is more serious for the Communist than for the engineer; for the latter can build his turbines without help from the candle-lighted individuals, but the Communist cannot make a revolution without the people. Fortunately actions may speak as well as words, and all Communists are required to do active work which brings them in touch with the masses. When intellectuals apply for Party membership, it is a common practice to give them some tasks around a factory, such as teaching night classes in Russian language, civics or Marxism, or practical assistance in trade union work. After a year or two of such testing, the opinion of the workers is taken as to whether the candidate is fit to be a Party member.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any Communist Party at any stage in its development in any country considers persons who cannot co-operate with workers’ movements as unfit for Party membership. In the Soviet Union where the rank and file of non-Party workers have already considerable knowledge of the Party’s ideals, it has become a common thing for them to assist in helping the Party in its selection of members. Two hundred thousand workers who joined the Party some two years ago were actually nominated by the non-Party workers, through repeated meetings and discussions as to what persons in their ranks should be recommended for Party membership. From time to time the Party “cleans out” its membership, and this is always done at open meetings to which all workers of the given institution are invited. Each Communist in the institution must give before this public an extended account of his life and activities, submit to and answer all criticism, and prove before the assembled workers his fitness to remain in the “leading Party.” Members may be cleaned out not only as “hostile elements, double-dealers, violators of discipline, degenerates, career-seekers, self-seekers, morally degraded persons” but even for being merely “passive,” for having failed to keep learning and growing in knowledge and authority among the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
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People admitted to the Communist Party—this admission demands a period of study and probation—must give considerable time to unpaid “Party work” i.e., the various tasks of strengthening the organization and organizing the masses around it. Having chosen as the chief purpose of their life the achievement of the socialist revolution, they must learn how to build a joint program. They take part in the discussions from which arise the decisions of the Party and they are expected to carry out these decisions energetically but never blindly. For they must know why the decisions are made; they must understand the Party Line and be able to promote it without bothering other people for orders. They must have strong opinions and fight for them; but they must know when to fight and when to yield. If they cannot learn this, they will find themselves outside the Party, thrown out either as “passive” or as “opposition.” It is not an easy lesson; there have been many political mortalities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Party members must learn to decide and act collectively, not only in determining the general line, but also in deciding their own work in it. They must consult and accept their comrades’ judgment as to where they themselves can be of most use. In the Civil War Communists were expected to be the first to volunteer for every battle-front. In the Soviet Union today they are first to be sent to difficult posts in industry and farming. They may be torn from jobs in which they are successful and sent to work which they hate; they must there-upon cease to hate it and do it well as an important task. I know of a high official who was taken from a train by a telegram sent through an obscure local secretary in a town through which he passed, and ordered to return for a different assignment. But no order is ever the command of a superior officer; it is the decision of a group of comrades with whom one has chosen to work. This is the famous Party discipline; known as “iron” discipline but also as “conscious” discipline, for it is based not on passive submission but on understanding participation and collective choice. The reward for this discipline is conscious participation in the making of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communists expect not only to lead the masses, but to learn from them in a constant interaction. They must “organize the proletariat”; they must “guide it in its class struggle.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They must “see ahead of the working class,” and be the “experienced general staff” which “every army at war must have if it is to avoid certain defeat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 88-89, Cooperative Publishers, Moscow.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But they do not consider themselves a separate caste of leaders, but a “vanguard” intimately a part of the working class they lead. They modify their program to grant temporarily some “backward” demand of the masses, or to include permanently some new form or method which the masses invent. An example of the first was Lenin’s response to the peasants’ demands for splitting up the land, a backward step taken to secure peasant support and “in order that they may educate themselves by fulfilling their desires.” An example of the second was the adoption of “soviets” in government and “artels” in farming, neither of which forms had been foreseen by the Party until they arose. It is the working class which must dictate and not the Party; in 1925 when Zinoviev argued for dictatorship by the Party, Stalin fought against this “narrow point of view,” saying that the confidence between the masses of the people and the Party must not be destroyed by any peculiar Party rights, “because in the first place, the Party might be mistaken, and even if it were not, the masses might take some time to see that it was right.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 51.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How can three million Communists lead one hundred and seventy million people? Because they are not alien to those millions, but are the most energetic part of them, whose capacity to lead has been repeatedly tested and recognized by the others. Millions of non-Party people today in the Soviet Union work loyally, even enthusiastically under Party direction, yet do not venture to call themselves Communists. One of my best friends was a woman who gave her life to the care of homeless children, and who said to me once: “My life began with the Soviet Power; it alone gave me the chance to fight for children. . . . I care more for the Party’s success than for anything in life.” Yet when her fellow-workers voted her “worthy of being a Communist,” she declined the honor, knowing she could not honestly join while she disagreed on one or two points in the Party program.&lt;br /&gt;
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A fifty-two-year-old wheelwright, Rosenberg, whom I met in the Jewish Autonomous Territory of Birobidjan, had courageously dismantled his home in the Ukraine and taken his family of ten to pioneer in the Far East. He had fought through incredible hardships to build a collective industry which made carts; he was now a member of the city government giving much unpaid time to civic work. “When the Party decided to develop Birobidjan,” he explained, “I knew it would be a great future. It goes higher and higher to the building of socialism. I myself can’t build it, but if I work and others work, we’ll build it.” Few could have expressed the Communist goal more sincerely than Rosenberg, yet he did not think of joining the Party. “I don’t know enough,” he said. “I am just studying the first political courses. Serious reading is not so easy for me. I am fifty-two years old.”&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Far North fourteen years ago I met Rimpalle, who had risked his life to run the Finnish border and “help the Revolution.” He organized the first quarries and mines in a hungry Arctic land; he created a trade union, a co-operative and a night-school for illiterate natives of the forests. He made $100,000 for the state that first summer and got for himself—it was the time of War Communism—only “rations of potatoes and good, fat gravy and one resoling of my boots.” Rimpalle said to me: “It’s a useful job. Up here so near the border and the propaganda of the White Finns, we needed to have an industry to give food to the people.” He was already a candidate for the Communist Party, expecting to be admitted to full membership in a few months.&lt;br /&gt;
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These examples show what is required of Communists. Devoted activity under Communist direction, such as the Jewish wheelwright gave, is not enough. Ninety per cent allegiance, such as the social worker offered, is not enough. Nor was it enough for Rimpalle to work self-sacrificingly to increase socially owned wealth; he must understand consciously the political purpose of his work. I have in the course of fifteen years in the Soviet Union met an occasional Communist who was a grafter, and many more who were stubborn bureaucrats and unenlightened fanatics. But I have also seen how the Party throws out dead wood—not always accurately—and renews itself from the working class it leads.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such is the organized Party which carried through the Revolution and which today welds into shape the great masses of the Soviet Union, with its vast distances, its once backward populations, its hundred and eighty-two nationalities, its foes on all borders. It succeeds by choosing its members with discrimination, by keeping them firmly organized, forever studying and continuously on the job.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communist Party does not expect to last forever. “When classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat dies out, the Party also will die out.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It sees its task as belonging to a definite stage in human society, with a beginning, a development and an end. No other political party in the world has this type of historic consciousness, this supreme confidence; all others live from election to election, and make no long time plans. The Communist Party considers that it has a specific job in history and confidently expects to stay in power for the time required to carry it through.&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER III: THE DICTATORSHIP ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The conquest by the proletariat of such political power as will enable it to suppress all resistance on the part of the exploiters.”|Program of Russian Communist Party}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself. . . . (It) is a means, a path leading to socialism”|Stalin in Address to Sverdlov Students, June 1925}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Most Americans shrink from the word “dictatorship.” “I don’t want to be dictated to,” they say. Neither, in fact, does anyone. But why do they instinctively take the word in its passive meaning, and see themselves as the recipients of orders? Why do they never think that they might be the dictators? Is that such an impossible idea? Is it because they have been so long hammered by the subtly misleading propaganda about personal dictatorships, or is it because they have been so long accustomed to seek the right to life through a boss who hires them, that the word dictatorship arouses for them the utterly incredible picture of one man giving everybody orders?&lt;br /&gt;
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No country is ruled by one man. This assumption is a favorite red herring to disguise the real rule. Power resides in ownership of the means of production—by private capitalists in Italy, Germany and also in America, by all workers jointly in the USSR. This is the real difference which today divides the world into two systems, in respect to the ultimate location of power. When a Marxist uses the word “dictatorship,” he is not alluding to personal rulers or to methods of voting; he is contrasting rule by property with rule by workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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The heads of government in America are not the real rulers. I have talked with many of them from the President down. Some of them would really like to use power for the people. They feel baffled by their inability to do so; they blame other branches of government, legislatures, courts. But they haven’t analyzed the real reason. The difficulty is that they haven’t power to use. Neither the President nor Congress nor the common people, under any form of organization whatever, can legally dispose of the oil of Rockefeller or the gold in the vaults of Morgan. If they try, they will be checked by other branches of government, which was designed as a system of checks and balances precisely to prevent such “usurpation of power.” Private capitalists own the means of production and thus rule the lives of millions. Government, however chosen, is limited to the function of making regulations which will help capitalism run more easily by adjusting relations between property and protecting it against the “lawless” demands of non-owners. This constitutes what Marxists call the dictatorship of property. “The talk about pure democracy is but a bourgeois screen,” says Stalin, “to conceal the fact that equality between exploiters and exploited is impossible. . . . It was invented to hide the sores of capitalism . . . and lend it moral strength.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Power over the means of production—that gives rule. Men who have it are dictators. This is the power the workers of the Soviet Union seized in the October Revolution. They abolished the previously sacred right of men to live by ownership of private property. They substituted the rule: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What characteristics of the new régime most obviously showed its dictatorial character? They were the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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First, the Bolsheviks took power without waiting for a majority vote—in the elections to the Constituent Assembly they had just received nine million out of thirty-six million ballots—but relying on their overwhelming majority among the industrial workers, and an overwhelming superiority in that part of the army near the capital cities. They maintained power by a shrewd analysis of social classes, and by satisfying the demands of the sections of the population whose support they needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Second, they organized the new government on the basis of the workers’ organizations, thus dis-franchising those classes which lived by private ownership, and giving a greater proportionate representation in the higher government bodies to workers than to peasants during the first eighteen years when equal voting by great masses of illiterate small owners would have wrecked policies of social ownership.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This difference is commonly stated as a five to one proportion, but such was not the case. Industrial districts had in the higher organs one representative for 25,000 &#039;&#039;electors&#039;&#039;, while rural districts had one for 125,000 &#039;&#039;population&#039;&#039;, which included children. The proportion is thus nearer two to one, a much less disproportion than exists (in the reverse direction) between rural and city votes for many state legislatures in America. This disproportion in the Soviet Union was abolished when the rural districts reached literacy and large-scale farming. See next chapter.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Third, they took control of schools, press and all means of expression, and while encouraging the widest latitude of criticism by workers interested in augmenting or improving the public properties, suppressed any expressions which seemed to the government likely to strengthen the rights of private property or injure the efficiency of socially owned production. At certain periods when they felt their social ownership of production threatened, whether by sabotage, graft, or the strengthening of private owners, they suppressed these dangers as drastically as they thought necessary by means which varied from economic discrimination to deportation or shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are real characteristics which constitute dictatorship rather than any personal prestige of Stalin. Great men attain leadership under all forms of government; the technical forms through which Stalin leads are fully as democratic as those by which an American president governs, and infinitely more democratic than the dominance of a Morgan. Nor is the existence of a single Party necessarily a bar to democratic self-expression, which can find its way as well through one party as a dozen, as later chapters will show. But the above characteristics are definite indications of dictatorship, a rule to which not all men have equal access. They are the tactics of all owners in all countries and all periods of history when they feel themselves threatened. They are the tactics to which owners of private property resorted in Italy and Germany when the rising votes of communist and socialist workers threatened their ownership. They are resorted to today in sections of America where property feels threatened, whether by farmhands in Imperial Valley or sharecroppers in Arkansas and Alabama. They will be resorted to on a wider scale if American capitalism really feels itself slipping. Nothing in Soviet history indicates that the Bolsheviks were any more “dictatorial” or ruthless than owners of property anywhere under similar stresses. Certainly they were far less bloody and oppressive than any of the “dictatorships of the right”—whether in Hungary, Finland, China, Italy or Germany—established in retaliation or prevention by private ownership which really felt itself in danger.&lt;br /&gt;
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What were the conditions which made the Bolsheviks establish a dictatorship? Why could they not wait until they were voted into power, and then take over one by one, by government decree or by taxation, the large-scale properties which they believed must be socially owned? The history of fascist seizures of power in face of the threat of socialist voting is beginning to give the world the answer to this question. The Bolsheviks knew the answer from their Marxian analysis of history. No owning class ever gave up ownership without struggle. The holding of government office is not itself power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The power of ownership over the means of life is the day-by-day power which works incessantly, buying brains, corrupting or confusing governments, persistently re-establishing itself against any “will of the people.” Anyone who has experienced in a single American city, as I have in Seattle, the intensity and variety of methods which the capitalists use to fight so mild a thing as public ownership of street-cars, anyone who knows what they did to the war-time government-owned railroads, or today to the Tennessee Valley Corporation, must realize the resources possessed by capitalism against anything so mild as a popular vote. When they can no longer prevent a municipally owned utility, they corrupt it. They make it inefficient through graft or sabotage; they subordinate it to control by private banks. Meantime they continue to play through all the arts of high-paid propaganda on the minds of the electors, who waver and turn to other cures.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The change from capitalism to communism is a whole epoch of history,” said Lenin. “Till it is ended, the exploiters inevitably have the hope of restoration.” Even after capitalists are overthrown on a local scale or on the scale of a single country, they remain for some time “stronger than the workers who overthrew them.” Their strength lies in their foreign connections with international capital, in the money and movable property which they still possess, in their organizing and administrative ability, their superior education, their knowledge of all the secrets of administration, their superiority in the art of war. They are furthermore helped by the force of habit and traditional ways of thinking which remain even in the minds of workers and especially in large sections of the middle classes for a considerable period after capitalism is overthrown.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted and condensed from Lenin, &#039;&#039;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&#039;&#039;, Chap. 3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxists therefore hold that the working class must maintain a dictatorial power for an “entire epoch of history” both to prevent attempts at restoration of capitalism and to re-educate the entire population in habits suited to socially owned production. “You will have to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil wars and international wars,” said Marx to the workers, “not only to change external conditions, but in order to change yourselves and to make yourselves fit for the exercise of political power.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &#039;&#039;Revelations on the Communist Trial in Cologne&#039;&#039;, 1851.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The tactics used by the dictatorship in the Soviet Union were conditioned by the economic development of the land and its international relations. In the first years they were affected by foreign intervention and civil war; in later, years they conformed to and created the rapid economic advance and increasing international prestige of the country. Four chief epochs may be noted: the period of Workers’ Control in the first year of the Revolution; War Communism for the two and a half years of intervention; the New Economic Policy from 1921 to 1928; and the final offensive against capitalism ushered in by the first Five-Year Plan.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new workers’ state inherited a country economically broken by the strain of World War. Peasants were seizing lands of landlords; factories had closed and their workers were hungry; banking was demoralized by the rapid fall of the currency; soldiers without food or munitions were fleeing home from the front. “Peace, land and bread,” was the cry of the country. The capitalists could not satisfy it and this brought the Bolsheviks to power. They at once gave land to the peasants, repudiated all state debts, nationalized banks and transport and created a state monopoly of foreign trade. Industry was left in private hands, but “workers’ control” committees were established from the workers in each industry. These examined all accounts, studied the source of raw materials and fought to keep up production against the attempt of private capitalists to close down the factories as unprofitable. Internal trade remained private; on the second day of the Revolution a proclamation urged traders to continue business as usual. A policy however was announced for the gradual combining of factories into large-scale trusts, which should then be nationalized, and for the gradual socializing of internal trade through co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
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These policies—the normal reaction of a workers’ government wishing to rebuild the economic life of a ruined country with as little upheaval and disruption as possible, for the sake not of profit but of human welfare—united around the government the overwhelming majority of the population, including both workers and peasants. Opposition came from landlords, capitalists and the upper strata of engineers, civil servants and professional people; but if these used violence or sabotage against the new policy, they were suppressed by governing organizations composed of great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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A vivid example of dictatorship in this period is given by Lenin, in a contrast drawn between dictatorship by property and dictatorship by workers. “The state has forcibly to evict a family from a house. This is done time and again by the capitalist state and will be done by our proletarian state. . . . The capitalist state evicts the workers’ family which has lost its breadwinner and is unable to pay rent.” After describing the enforcement by a squad of police of the rights of property against poor people, Lenin continues with the picture of the dispossession of a rich man by the workers’ state.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Our detachment of workers’ militia consists, let us say, of fifteen people—two sailors, two soldiers, two class-conscious workers (of whom only one, let us assume, is a member of our Party or a sympathizer), one intellectual, and eight members of the toiling poor; at least five are necessarily women, domestic servants, unskilled workers, and so on. They come to the rich man’s house, inspect it, and find that there are five rooms occupied by two men and two women. “This winter, citizens, you must confine yourselves to two rooms and place two rooms at the disposal of two families that are now living in cellars. For the time being, until with the help of engineers (you are an engineer, I think?) we build good dwellings for all, you will have to put yourselves to inconvenience. Your telephone will serve ten families. This will save about a hundred hours’ work in running to the stores and so forth. The student citizen in our detachment will write out two copies of the text of this state order and you will be kind enough to give us a signed declaration that you undertake to abide by it faithfully.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Will the Bolsheviks Retain Power?&#039;&#039; published October, 1917.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This is a vivid example of a dictatorship over property enforced by great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under pressure of foreign intervention and civil war, the limited nationalization of “Workers’ Control” merged into the period of “War Communism.” Attacking armies separated Soviet Russia for two and a half years from her chief food and fuel bases. The granary of the Ukraine, the cotton of Turkestan, the coal of the Donetz, the oil of Baku, the mines of the Urals were in enemy hands. The dictatorship adopted “War Communism,” the tactics of a besieged land. It requisitioned all grain and necessities of life, and rationed them under direct government control; it seized all factories and used the broken machines of one as spares to repair the scarcely less broken machines of another. This policy alienated large sections of the peasantry by crop requisition. It ruined industry more thoroughly than any modern industry has ever been ruined, being an efficient device for using up the last ounce of raw material and the last spare bolt. But the policy of “War Communism” enabled an already exhausted land to carry on for two and a half more years against the attacking armies of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet power survived. With the coming of peace Lenin at once introduced the New Economic Policy, an attempt to build up the country’s economic life as rapidly as possible by a “two-sided process of the development of capitalism and the development of socialism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 314.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Grain requisitions were replaced by limited taxes with permission for free trade. Private capitalists were allowed to enter both trade and industry, the state retaining the “commanding heights” of land, finance, heavy industry, transport, and foreign trade. This policy brought the peasant, small enterpriser and professional classes back to loyalty—a wavering loyalty, for if some had been won to socialism, others now hoped to grow personally rich. Capitalist nations abroad echoed the belief that Russia was swinging back to the ancient order. But the Soviet workers, led by the Communists, gave time on holidays to great collective drives for repairing factories, making street-cars and new equipment as donations to their country. During “War Communism” they had worked for rations; now they worked for low but steadily increasing wages, building up out of their own sacrifice the first socialist accumulation which should give them economic power for the final offensive against capitalism. Thus industry which in 1921 produced one-fifth the pre-war standard was driven by fivefold increase in 1928 to “normalcy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia in 1928 was only half socialist. Most of industry was socially owned but farming was in the hands of peasant proprietors, the stronger of whom were petty capitalists, struggling not only to survive but to grow. Class strife went on between these emerging rural capitalists and the impoverished farmhands. Youth was leaving the farms and flooding the cities with unemployment. Discussion had racked the Communist Party as to whether socialism could be built in a single country, particularly a backward peasant land. Following the analysis of Stalin, the Party decided that it could be done by swiftly creating modern heavy industry and simultaneously industrializing farming. The Soviet Union plunged into that now famous struggle known as the Five-Year Plan, and emerged with large-scale industry and the largest scale farming in the world, both of them socially owned.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a bitter fight, carried through against the upper sections of the peasantry and part of the middle class. An epidemic of sabotage broke out in the industries among the higher engineering staff, who had consciously or half-consciously expected to advance towards privilege and wealth. Men high in the canning industry put broken glass, animal hair and fish tails into food destined for workers. A township veterinary who hated collectivization inoculated six thousand horses with plague. An irrigation engineer tried to discourage the policy of settling yellow-skinned nomads on the soil by using antiquated surveys which he knew would not deliver the water. These cases and thousands more are taken from confessions of men who were later repentant. The dictatorship fought back, shooting the most serious offenders, imprisoning and exiling others. The energy of loyal workers and engineers carried through the Five-Year Plan. Its success won over many earlier saboteurs so that by 1931 Stalin was able to announce that the intellectuals were turning towards the Soviet Government, and should be met by a policy of co-operation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Speech delivered at Conference of Leaders of Industry, June 23, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The most spectacular act of ruthlessness which occurred in those years was the exiling of several hundred thousand kulaks—rural property-owners who lived by trade, money-lending or by exploiting small mills, threshers, and hired labor—from farm homes in European Russia and the Ukraine to Siberia or the northern woods. The usual assumption outside the Soviet Union is that this exiling occurred through arbitrary action by a mystically omnipotent G.P.U. That organization did of Course organize the deportation and final place of settlement in labor camps or on new land. But the listing of kulaks who “impede our farming by force and violence” was done by village meetings of poor peasants and farmhands who were feverishly and not too efficiently organizing collectively owned farms with government loans of machinery and credits. The meetings I personally attended were as seriously judicial as a court trial in America. One by one there came before the people the “best families,” who had grabbed the best lands, exploited labor by owning the tools of production as best families normally and historically do, and who were fighting the rise of the collective farm—which had the right to take the best lands away from them—by every means up to arson, cattle-killing and murder. Obviously the situation offered chances for wreaking private grudges. Obviously the occasional agitator from the city was unconcerned with kulak “rights.” The meeting of farmhands and poor peasants discussed each case in turn, questioned the kulaks, allowed most of them to remain but asked the government to deport some as “trouble-makers.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a harsh, bitter and by no means bloodless conflict, but not one peculiar to Russia. I was reminded of it again in 1933 by the cotton-pickers’ strike in San Joaquin Valley of California. California local authorities deported pickets who interfered with the farming of ranchers; Soviet authorities deported kulaks who interfered with the collectively owned farming of the poor. In both cases central governments sent commissions to guard against the worst excesses. But the “property” which could count on government support was in California that of the wealthy rancher; in the USSR it was the collective property of the poor.&lt;br /&gt;
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Through all these struggles of eighteen years in the Soviet Union the Marxists had guessed right—one class held firm. Steadily the industrial workers supported and fought for their socialist state. Theirs was the dictatorship, the ownership, the rule. Led by Communist analysis, they made alliances with other parts of the population—with the great mass of the people to overthrow big landlords and capitalists and later with the poorer peasants to overthrow the richer. The middle classes changed back and forth in their loyalty; but the workers held through.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today the chief fight of the dictatorship is against corruption and bureaucracy. The workers, in other words, struggle with their own government, not to overthrow it but to improve it by weeding out inefficiency. A vivid example of this was given by a letter from three railway-workers published in &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;. They told how the workers of their station, hearing that Sizran station was considered a model, chose three delegates to go and study it. “The election fell on us. However, to our great regret, we convinced ourselves that Sizran is no model.” The letter proceeds to expose fictitious bookkeeping which compelled engineers to list repeated repairs as new in order to protect the reputation of the repair shops, and other false entries which hid inefficiencies. They noted employees who had been demoted for calling too open attention to troubles. They did a thorough and technically accurate job of debunking Sizran, a station on a different railroad to which they had gone in search of good methods. Imagine workers from a station on the Erie giving this attention to study, analyze and reform a station on the Pennsylvania! Imagine their securing ready access to all the records of an alien line! Imagine this as routine news in a metropolitan daily paper, leading to check-up and reprimands of railway superintendents for inaccuracy in reporting their work!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is today’s routine in the Soviet Union. Scores of letters like this appear daily in the press throughout the land. Some of them are ironic, some statistical, some outraged. But all of them express men who know themselves owners, and through ownership dictators of the land in which they live.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER IV: THE GROWING DEMOCRACY ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“Soviet Power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Step by step the Soviet Union fights forward towards that complete democracy which has never yet existed anywhere on earth. For democracy is neither absolute nor static. It varies in type, extent and intensity. It may grow or diminish. In the Soviet Union it grows.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What are the functions of government in the Soviet Union? How wide is the participation of the people? How much of their life can they control? Whence come the ideas that are followed in the land? What initiative and creative energy is expressed? Who rises to high posts and by what means? All these questions must be considered in determining what kind of democracy exists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us take first the formal facts of voting, though this is far from exhausting in the Soviet citizen’s participation in government. The Soviet Union has today the largest body of voters any where in the world. Moreover a larger percentage of them come out to elections than in any other country; they give more time to their elections and decide a greater variety of questions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All “toilers” over the age of eighteen may elect and be elected; the word is interpreted to include students, housewives, old people who have passed the age of work as well as those more formally known as workers. Voting thus extends to a younger age than is common elsewhere, and there are no disqualifications for transient residents, paupers, migratory workers, soldiers, sailors, such as exist in most countries; even non-citizens may vote if they work in a Soviet industry. There are no restrictions for sex, creed or color, nor even for illiteracy. The only significant restriction relates to “exploiting elements,” but the steady decrease of privately owned enterprises has cut the disfranchised to 2.5 per cent of the population in the 1934 elections; by 1937 it is expected that all will have the vote. In the 1934 elections 91,000,000 people were entitled to vote, and of these 77,000,000, or 85 per cent, actually participated, which is double the proportion found in most countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us take a motion picture of a Soviet election. In December 1934 the Moscow streets were thronged with processions, continuing for several days. Special street-cars, gay with banners, carried people to meetings. Men and women gathered in side streets, formed in line with merry chatter and went with bands and flags to the building secured for their election meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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All over the country for more than a month elections had been going on in far-away factories and villages. Soviet elections do not take place on a single day but are determined by local convenience within a period of several weeks prior to the convening of an All-Union Congress. Localities choose dates which will enable their outgoing governments to finish their business, and give the incoming governments time to prepare demands for the All-Union Congress. These candidates and demands had been subjects of much discussion. But the attitude to the elections expressed itself rather in action than in talk. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were joining collective farms “to break with the past and enter the elections as collective farmers.” Factory workers were energetically completing new models of locomotives, turbines, inventions, to send as presents to the coming congress. There were, in fact, so many of these presents that the sending of most of them was ordered confined to reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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In wooded mountains of Siberia the dark-skinned Oirots announced proudly: “We have abandoned the wandering life of wigwams; we have raised our literacy rate from 6 to 89 per cent; we enter these elections as educated farmers, settled on our own soil.” From the Turkoman Republic they were matching this claim with another: “Our once suppressed women have increased the proportion who turn out to elections from 2.5 per cent to 73 per cent in these eight years.” The historic city of Kiev was boasting: “Half our elected deputies are women. We lead the Soviet Union in the proportion of women elected to office; this means that we lead the world.” But their boast was matched by the textile city Tver, now renamed Kalinin, which has fully as many.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Young Pioneers were reciting poems to urge on their elders:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;That we may build more firmly,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Advancing more confidently to victory,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;We choose to our Soviets firm, tested fighters,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Close-welded, the best of our best.&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the southern Kazak steppe an aged yellow-skinned herdsman, dying, sent a last message to his son who had been village president and who was now elected delegate to the All-Union Congress: “All the years of my life were dark with toil and hunger. But I lived to see the new day. Take care of the Soviet power, my son; it is our power, our happiness.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along the Arctic coast the autumn herring run began a few days before the date set for local elections. The fishermen went to sea. Some of the election commissioners held elections in the absence of a considerable number of voters and were roundly denounced for it by &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, central organ of the Communist Party. “A gross violation of Soviet democracy! What right have commissioners to hold elections when workers cannot come? We are glad to note that many of the ﬁshermen had a better sense of their obligations. Many crews held their own meetings and sent deputies ashore with their instructions. But they should not have been forced to this irregularity. The proper course was found by those commissioners who held regular election meetings on the boats and thus combined enthusiastic work for a good herring catch with the collective decision of what to do with it.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of this, taken together and multiplied by millions, makes plain the essence of the Soviet election. It is an act of joint owners deciding what to do with their production, how to build a good life on the proceeds. The task of officials is not to enforce some precedent but to find ways of adjusting election machinery to voters. “The hottest elections we ever had,” they bragged of the 1934 elections, proud of the increasing popular participation in government, which is relied on to check bureaucracy and make state enterprises efficient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The basic unit for government is the working institution, the factory or office; in rural districts it is the village. Deputies are chosen to the local government, the village or city soviet.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The word “soviet” means “council.” City soviet is city council.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The basis of representation and size of the local soviet depends on the size of the community: Gulin village, whose election I visited, has one deputy for every forty voters and a village soviet of thirteen members. Moscow city elects one deputy for fifteen hundred voters and has more than two thousand members in its city soviet. These local deputies meet soon after election to form the new government. They divide among themselves the various departments, which range from the five sections of Gulin village—farming, livestock, culture, roads and finance—to twenty-eight sections, each with over forty deputies, through which Moscow city does business. Besides the more commonly known functions, these local governments own and manage local industry, which in a large city like Moscow includes many municipally owned factories, the street-cars, subway, lights, water, and housing. They receive revenue from public properties, but their budgets may also be augmented by taxes and state loans. Some cities actually bring in revenue—it will be remembered that they get all the house rents; others need help from the higher governments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On these local governments is built up the whole structure of central government.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A new constitution is in preparation which will change many details, but it will hardly change the principle of close connection between local, state and central bodies in one system.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Local soviets elect deputies to a congress of soviets; the township congress elects to the province, and so on up to the All-Union Congress of Soviets, the highest body in the country. Each of these congresses elects its executive committee and the heads of its various departments; for the highest government these are the great Commissariats of heavy and light industry, finance, health, and so forth. Local departments are both horizontally and vertically controlled, by local governments and by the corresponding department in the higher government. Thus a township health department is responsible both to the township executive committee and to the provincial health department. If orders clash, if a local soviet takes the hospital for some other use, its health department appeals to the provincial health department which brings pressure on the local soviet through the provincial government in the interests of public health.&lt;br /&gt;
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The greater part of this intricate yet unified system of government is carried on by unpaid work. Elected deputies, whether to village or the All-Union Congress, receive no salaries of office. They draw their usual wages from the factory or institution which sends them and in which they keep on working, except insofar as they may be “released from production” for the needs of government; this varies with the importance of the work they do. There is thus no hard and fast line between the citizen and the man in office. Deputies are a link between the collective life of the factory and the larger collective life of the country. Any worker may approach them conveniently any day in their place of work to ask about the fulfillment of instructions given by the voters. They may be recalled by their constituents at any time simply through a factory meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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If voters thus constantly call on their deputies, the deputies are equally entitled to call on the voters for help in carrying out the election program they have voted. A deputy is no substitute for the people, no ruler; he is the representative who organizes them in their own tasks of voluntary government work. Millions of citizens take active part in the sections of the government—housing commissions, school commissions, taxing commissions, labor inspection and so on. Those who develop a taste for running public affairs will be chosen at some election for more continuous and responsible work. Those who specialize in some field, such as health, courts, housing, may be sent on pay for some months or years of study and become full-time civil servants in these departments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The growth of democracy in the Soviet Union thus depends directly on the extent to which citizens can be interested in taking part in operations of government. This interest is in part assured by the fact that government is so clearly the direct organizing of all aspects of the citizen’s life. In a million matters the citizens give direct instructions during the election. They order the increase of school-houses or sound films, the improvement in the quality of bread, the increase of retail stores, the transport of goods in big cities by night; they demand the breaking-up of housing trusts into smaller co-operatives, or the introduction of a less specialized education in the schools. All of these were part of some 48,000 instructions issued directly by Moscow voters to their city government, which reported within three months on the fulfillment of many hundred demands and on the disposition made of all. When instructions clash, as when some citizens want an odorous industrial plant removed from their neighborhood while others want it to stay, commissions are formed which try to satisfy not merely the majority, but as nearly as possible everybody, not through a showing of hands in opposition, but through various adjustments to the suggestions made by all. Capitalist ownership of private property limits the citizen’s participation, in government to an approval or rejection—expressed in conflict—of general policies. Socialist ownership causes government policies to grow directly and naturally from the correlated demands of millions of people, all of whom are interested in improving the country’s wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interest of citizens in government is also consciously promoted by the Communist Party which stirs up wide competitions between factories, villages, cities, as to the extent and energy of their participation. An industrial plant where less than 95 per cent of the workers come to the election hangs its head in shame as an institution lacking in civic consciousness. Candidates never make speeches or election promises; this would be considered highly indelicate. But the voters pride themselves on picking deputies whose previous work has been notable and who therefore give promise of being widely useful. They select a fellow worker, not an outside politician. Students choose a student, auto-workers choose an auto-worker, the Moscow Grand Opera elects a famous singer. The future task of these deputies is to extend on a wider scale the type of work for which they are already known. The opera singer will organize connections between the Moscow Grand Opera and the villages, sending out artists to help rural singing classes. The printer on the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; who mechanized its mailing list of two million subscribers was elected to the Moscow city soviet with instructions to help mechanize all the newspapers of the city. A textile worker who helps organize a good day nursery in her factory will be elected by her fellow workers to help improve the city’s day nurseries, and will choose to work on the health section of the local government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The operation of Soviet democracy is thus so intimate, continuous and organic that the observer fresh from capitalist politics hardly recognizes it as government. Where is the debate? Who determines general policies? Can the people throw out the upper officials? Can they throw out Stalin? The Communist Party? The Soviet voter, when asked these last questions, replies in a puzzled way: “Why should we want to?” The questioner thinks he has been evaded. But all elections presuppose an existing economic system, which voting is powerless to change. Voters in America cannot change Rockefeller’s method of operating oil companies for private profit. Similarly no Soviet election raises the issue of returning public properties to private hands: this was settled by the Revolution, and forms the foundation beneath the whole government.&lt;br /&gt;
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Barring that question, there is nothing whatever that Soviet voters cannot change. They actually do change thousands of officials at every election, and as their acquaintance with the wider problems of the country grows, the forms of democracy are being widened to include direct control of the highest officials. Stalin’s chief post is not in the government, but as general secretary of the Communist Party, which would certainly remove him if his policy and actions should ever discredit him with the people; at present he is by far the most popular man in the country. To throw out the Communist Party bodily would be to throw out all the leading and organizing elements in all factories, farms, schools and enterprises; it could clearly be done only by upheaval leading to chaos. But the citizens are constantly at work changing the very membership of the Party, any member of which may be “cleaned out” on protest of his non-Party associates that he is too dictatorial, too rough towards workers, or merely not a fit leader.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This is discussed in Chaps. 1 and 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Several elections which I attended will show concretely how soviet democracy functions. Four election meetings were held simultaneously in different hamlets of Gulin village, which had no assembly hall big enough for all. One of these meetings threw out the Party candidate, Borisov, because they felt that he neglected their instructions; they elected a non-Party woman who had displayed energy in improving the village and were praised by the election commissioner—himself a Party member—for having discovered good government timber which the Party had neglected. The central meeting in Gulin expected 235 voters; 227 appeared and were duly checked off by name at the door. There ensued personal discussion of every one of nine candidates, of whom seven were chosen. Mihailov “did good work on the roads.” The most enthusiasm developed over Menshina, a woman who “does everything assigned her energetically; checks farm property, tests seeds, collects state loans.” Dr. Sharkova, head of the Mothers’ Consultation, was pushed by the women: “We need a sanitary expert to clean up our village.” The incoming soviet was instructed to “increase harvest yield within two years to thirty bushels per acre, to organize a stud farm, get electricity and radio for every home, organize adult education courses, football and skiing teams, and satisfy a score of other needs.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Moscow Architectural Institute where 1,500 men and women are qualifying to become architects, every class in the school held three sessions on the elections, discussing first the shortcomings of the outgoing government, then instructions to the new government, and lastly candidates. The fourteen hundred instructions sent in by the students included more and better draughting pencils, evening schools in drawing, more money for students’ excursions to see new architecture, more exhibitions of foreign architecture, fruit trees to beautify Moscow, artists to be held responsible for designs of state-made texiles, township architects to be appointed to advise the new construction on farms. Similarly the 1,500 voters of the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; turned in 1,500 proposals, which were carefully worked over by committees, published in a special newspaper issued for the voters, and given to their deputy to put through with their help. These included adequate textbooks for all pupils in the schools, an increase in the number of children’s theaters, strengthening the fight against hooliganism, closing the sale of liquor on Suchevski Street opposite school Twenty-two—the latter being the common form of the fight against alcohol.&lt;br /&gt;
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Instructions thus adopted become the program of incoming governments, which they use as a weapon to get what they require from provincial and central authorities. Some of the demands can be put through by the electors themselves with the help of their deputy; others need central assistance. When the All-Union Congress meets it knows how many villages are demanding air-dromes, sound films, textbooks, electrification. These demands, correlated by engineers and economists, form the content for future development of the life of the country in the direction its citizens choose. But the citizens themselves expect to work to accomplish it. If villagers ask for a seven-room school or a landing field for farm airplanes, they expect deputies to investigate possible fields, make recommendations, get the needed machines from some central authority; but they themselves expect to haul the timber or pay the men who haul it with labor days credited against the joint harvest.&lt;br /&gt;
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Democracy in Soviet life is not confined to government. Trade unions organize many aspects of workers’ life; collective farms and co-operatives organize production and distribution for the farmers. Their organization is separate from that of government; it is also democratically controlled. In the past two years democracy has become more intimate and decentralized in both these directions. The administration of social insurance, which in 1936 will have eight billion rubles for hospitals, day nurseries, diet kitchens, invalid benefits, old-age pensions and the like, was two years ago given over to the trade unions, as was also the inspection of factories and of workers’ food stores. Similarly the whole organization of collective farming, including the relation between fields operated jointly and plots individually worked by farm members, is today in the hands of the farmers themselves, decided by the general meeting at which not less than two-thirds are present. Thus democracy grows more flexible, the intermediate apparatus is lessened, and the various functions of government are handled by those whom they most directly concern.&lt;br /&gt;
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The extension of social ownership into the farms and the growth in the intelligence of the entire electorate has made possible a third extension of democracy. A new constitution is being drafted by the collective labor of thousands of people in all parts of the land. Economists and historians are studying the constitutions of all countries and considering every detail of democratic technique; their reports will be further discussed in every factory and farm of the country before the constitution takes final form. It is known, however, that it will include direct election, secret ballot, and equal representation for all citizens, replacing the inequality which hitherto obtained between city workers and peasants. At is also expected to abolish all disfranchised classes, since by 1937 social ownership will be universal and all citizens will belong to one toiling-owning class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty,” was said once of the democracy of capitalist society whereby small private owners protected their rights. But socialism demands more than vigilance. Eternally co-operating human energy is the price of socialism and of that complete democracy which operates jointly owned means of production for the expanding life of all. This is the final stage towards which the present Soviet democracy struggles and grows.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER V: THE UNION OF NATIONS ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Soviet power is to toiling Kazaks like rain in the desert.”|Letter of Kazak peasant to Peasants’ Gazette.}}&lt;br /&gt;
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When the All-Union Congress of Soviets meets in Moscow, it presents a vivid and colorful assembly. Flat-faced Tartars from old Kazan, yellow-skinned Uzbeks and Tajiks from the hills and irrigated valleys in the heart of Asia, slant-eyed Tunguz from the Far Northeast over against Alaska, mix with many score nationalities from the Caucasus to pass the laws which shall govern all these peoples. Many of them are dark-skinned peoples, formerly exploited by the Russians, but equal citizens now under the Soviets. It is as if Congress in Washington contained a score of southern Negroes, half a dozen Mexican farmers from Arizona and California, scattered representatives of the surviving tribes of Indians, an Eskimo, a Hawaiian, an Indian from Porto Rico, a mixed-blood from Panama, all legislating on equal terms with auto-workers from Detroit, steel-workers and miners from the Pittsburgh valley, and American farmers from the great west, A British governing assembly similarly formed would show an overwhelming majority from the dark-skinned peoples of Asia and Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
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Tsarist Russia was known as the “prison of nations.” No imperialist power has a history of more brutal racial and national oppression, Nation after nation of the proud mountaineers in the Caucasus was literally driven into the Black Sea by the conquering Russians. The Tartars of Crimea perished by tens of thousands in their flight across the Black Sea to Turkey. The tribes of the great plains and the primitive peoples of the Arctic were debauched in the time-honored imperialist way by the vodka of their conqueror and subdued in soul by the emissaries of his religion, that they might be more easily robbed of lands and furs. Even more bitter, perhaps, than the robbery was the insulting “superiority of the conquerors. “They cheated us and afterwards despised us,” said a flashing-eyed woman Tunguz from the Arctic. &amp;quot;Eh, but it was bad in the old days; all my life I hated Russians.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The country which fell to the Soviet power to organize was seething with national hates, incited and nurtured by the oppression of centuries. Tsarist imperialism, like all imperialisms, not only oppressed directly, but also set one nation against another. Turks massacred Armenians, Armenians massacred Turks, Ukrainian peasants, stirred up by Russian gendarmes, murdered Jews. The Soviet Government faced in all its intensity that “national problem&amp;quot; which made Austria and the Balkans for generations the tinder box of Europe and has added bitterness to the great conflicts of the modern world.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communist policy on nationality was developed over a period of decades by applying the Marxian analysis to the history of nations. Stalin, a Georgian, member of a proud nation which had for centuries been decimated by the wars of its greater neighbors in that hotbed of national hates, the Caucasus, was one of the ablest theoreticians. We find him in the years before the World War developing the exact definition of “nation” as a “historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Marxism and the National Question&#039;&#039;, 1913.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and defending this conception against those who viewed a nation as a matter of &amp;quot;race,” the precursors of today’s fascists, Capitalism both combines nations and drives them asunder. It knits together peoples of earth by the railroad, the steamboat, the rapid mail, the newspaper. It creates the material basis for the brotherhood of all nations but the methods of its expansion brutally thwart that hope It advances into the backward lands of earth by plunder and annexation. The “civilized” people rob the &amp;quot;uncivilized&amp;quot; ones and finally war among themselves for the right to rob. Imperialism steadily increases both the economic unity of the earth, and the national hates which tear the unity asunder.&lt;br /&gt;
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The national policy adopted on the basis of the analysis by the Social-Democratic Party of Russia in the years before the war repudiated every form of compulsion of nationalities, recognized the right of each people to determine its destiny, and stated that a durable union of peoples could be accomplished only by voluntary consent and was possible only through the overthrow of capitalism. The first practical test of this principle came in May of 1917, when the Kerensky government of Russia refused the demand of Finland to secede. Lenin declared at the conference of the Social-Democratic Party on May 12: “We say to the Russian people: don’t dare rape Finland; no nation can be free that oppresses other nations.” Stalin expressed the belief that, “now after the overthrow of tsardom nine-tenths of the peoples will not desire secession,” but that those who did wish to, must if course be allowed to secede, while a system of regional economy should be set up for the peoples which decided to remain.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the October Revolution brought the Bolsheviks into power, they at once renounced all rights to Finland, evacuated the Russian troops from northern Persia and canceled the claims of the Russian imperialists in Mongolia and China. The breaking up of tsarist Russia gave an opportunity to the imperialist powers of the world to fish in troubled waters. England, France, and Germany backed the aspirations of various border nationalities with funds. Yet it was the Bolsheviks and not those imperialist backers who first recognized Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania as separate states. The Soviets, however, did not only recognize nations; they recognized the right of the workers and peasants to revolt. The Ukrainian workers and peasants overthrew the Ukrainian bourgeois Rada; the poor peasants of Turkestan threw out their so-called autonomous government; the “national councils” of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were supported by foreign money but not by their own masses. Peasants’ and workers’ uprisings in these countries were assisted by the Bolsheviks as part of the October Revolution. The newly rising governments of workers and peasants were given military and economic and drawn into a socialist “federation.”&lt;br /&gt;
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This federation at first was loosely organized. Regional autonomy expressed itself in a variety of flexible forms. Some of these local governments retained their own foreign offices; others issued their own money. Each nationality received the amount of freedom which its workers and peasants demanded. The Communists relied on the pressure of mutual common interests to bring and hold these peoples together, once capitalist exploitation, the source of their bitterness, was removed. Meanwhile, they paved the way by abolishing all the special privileges of the &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“colonizers,” i.e., those Russian and Cossack groups which had received special lands and privileges from the tsar in return for their services in suppressing their neighbors. The Communists also pushed the policy of recruiting local governments from local people, established schools, courts, administrations, in the native languages, and rapidly trained from formerly illiterate and suppressed natives the future teachers and leaders of their people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fruits of this policy were seen on December 30, 1922, when, on the initiative of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, later joined by the Ukraine and White Russia, the amalgamation of all the Soviet Republics into a union took place at the very time when the states if post-war Europe were increasingly dividing into hostile camps. Thus was formed the Soviet Union, a union of nations. The name “Russian&amp;quot; was dropped from the official title of the country which is known as the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, of which the Russian republic is only one.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There are seven constituent republics, the Russian, the Ukrainian, the White Russian, the Transcaucasian, the Uzbek, the Turkoman, the Tajik. Many of these, and especially the Russian, which is by far the largest, contain smaller autonomous republics within them. The number of nations represented by delegates in the All-Union Council of Nationalities is forty-two.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Nearly half of its 170 million people belong to nationalities other than Russian. The number of these nationalities is variously given; the census of December, 1926, showed 182 different nationalities with 149 languages. They are people of different races and colors. They range from the reindeer keeping Eskimo of the north, to the Kazak sheep herder of southern deserts, from the flax growers of White Russian swamps through the many-nationed Volga wheat lands to the cotton producers of Central Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
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The classic statement of the contrast between the national policy of capitalism and that of socialism was given in the preamble to the Constitution of the new union: “There in the camp of capitalism we have national animosity and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist brutalities and wars.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Here, in the camp of socialism, we have mutual confidence and peace, national freedom and equality, the peaceful co-existence and fraternal collaboration of peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;The attempts made by the capitalist world during the course of decades to solve the problem of nationalities by combining the free development of peoples with the system of exploitation of man by man have proved fruitless.... The bourgeoisie has proved itself utterly incapable of bringing about the collaboration of peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Only in the camp of the Soviets... has it proved possible to abolish national oppression root and branch, to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, and to lay the foundations for the fraternal collaboration of peoples.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The preamble mentioned, as reasons for a closer union, the economic needs of the war-ruined land, the need of a joint foreign and military policy in the midst of encircling foes, and said that “the very structure of Soviet government, which is internationalist in its class character, impels the toiling masses of the Soviet republics to unite into one socialist family.” It concluded with a guarantee of equal status for all people, the right of secession for each republic and the right of admission for “all Soviet Republics, whether now existing or hereafter to arise.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bolsheviks did not rest content with the formal act of union. The Central Congress, elected on the basis of population, which put the Russian nationality in a dominant position, was supplemented by a “council of nationalities.&amp;quot; It is one of the two chambers of the legislative and administrative government of the country, no legislation involving national rights may be passed without it. Besides this legal status of equality, a policy was adopted assisting the more backward nationalities in their economic and cultural development, which alone could give them actual equality with the more developed nationalities. New industrial centers were established, modern methods of agriculture and irrigation introduced, peasant and handicraft co-operatives organized. Every national republic was encouraged in the fullest development of a culture, “national in form, socialist in content.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The meaning of that phrase, &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;national in form and socialist in content,” was vividly expressed for me by a Jew of Birobidjan, the autonomous Jewish territory rising in the Soviet Far East. “We distinguish between nationalism and nationality,” he said. &amp;quot;If we should claim that the Jews are a chosen people, the best and brainiest in the world, that’s nationalism. It’s dangerous nonsense, the kind of murderous nonsense that leads Turks to attack Armenians or white Americans to lynch Negroes. The assertion of the right of one culture to dominate another, or even to pre-eminence—that is the capitalist wish to exploit, and it leads to war. We have no right to exploit or to claim pre-eminence; but we have the same rights as others to develop our own characteristic culture in peace. The free development of all kinds of national culture adds to the variety and significance of the world. Our policy in this matter is part of the Soviet respect for human individuality—which again is different from individualism. We have no respect for the individuals who hold back history; but all those individuals who help push history forward—workers, writers, all productive elements—must be helped to fullest expression. Hence the Soviet Union has respect for even the smallest national culture, since each of them enriches all human culture and each of them is unique. Eventually, we shall no doubt all merge in one nation and one language, but the road to it is not by suppression and impoverishment, but by the fullest development of all variety.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
National prejudices still exist in the minds of some Russians, due to their past privilege of superiority. National grudges still remain in the minds of formerly suppressed peoples, who long learned to distrust the Russians. These form the final problem. If they lead to even minor conflicts based on nationality, they are firmly dealt with. Ordinary drunken brawls between Russians may be lightly handled as misdemeanors, but let a brawl occur between a Russian and a Jew in which national names are used in a way insulting to national dignity, and this becomes a serious political offense. Usually, the remnants of national antagonisms require no such drastic methods; they yield to education. But the American workers who helped build the Stalingrad Tractor Plant will long remember the clash which Lewis and Brown had with the Soviet courts after their fight with the Negro Robinson, in the course of which they called him “damn low-down nigger.&amp;quot; The two white men went back to America, disgraced in Soviet eyes by a serious political offense; the Negro remained and is now a member of the Moscow City Government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What has been the result of this national policy of the Communists, applied to people in all stages of development from the nomads of the great plains to the proudly cultured Georgians? It &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
has welded the strength of scores of formerly subject peoples around the Revolution and enabled the Russian workers to beat back their enemies. It has abolished age-long hates with unbelievable speed. It has released tremendous energy of devotion which gave a great economic and cultural impetus. It has dealt a mortal blow to that legend of “inferior” and “superior&amp;quot; races into which capitalism divided the earth, the former of which are the doomed objects of exploitation, while the latter bear “the white man’s burden,”—the mission to exploit. Over against this legend, exalted today by fascism into a religion, stands the whole experience of the USSR. The liberated non-European nations, once drawn into the channel of Soviet development, are no less capable than Europeans of truly progressive civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New centers of industry have risen m the national republics more rapidly than in the rest of the Soviet Union, as part of the Communist policy to ‘equalize the backward districts with the center.’ During the first Five-Year Plan, when the industrial output of the entire country doubled, it increased 3.5 times in the national republics. The progress was most rapid in the most backward; the great plains of Kazakstan saw a 4.5 times increase in industrial output, which the Central Asian Republics attained a sixfold growth. Based on these economic achievements was the growth in education and culture. Seventy nationalities adopted the Latin alphabet during the first Five-Year Plan. Many nationalities had no alphabet at all before the Revolution; they received their written language as a gift from the Soviet power. Among all the nations spectacular increases had been made in literacy, in the growth of books and in the arts. The first All-Union Theatrical Olympiad held some years ago showed that many nations have developed a truly national theater, which in some cases has already reached the level of high art.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An important chapter in Soviet national policy is the story of how ten million nomads are being transformed into stable fanners. The Kirghiz, the Kalmyk, the Gypsy, the reindeer herders of the Far North and the mountain people of Central Asia and the Caucasus—tribes which for centuries led a semi-barbaric existence under the threefold oppression of the tsars’ officials, their native chieftains and the medicine men—arc already developing collective farms. Seven million of those who roamed the plains and hills and tundra have already settled, it is planned to settle the remaining three million by the end of the second Five-Year Plan. The Soviet Government gave them land for tilling and pasture, irrigated their fields; provided money and building materials for barns and blacksmith shops, homes and bath-houses, for the purchase of livestock and seed. Soviet farm experts taught them methods of farm cultivation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Especially picturesque are the peoples of the Arctic tundra. Twenty-six nations have been listed in this vast region, the most populous of which, that of the Tunguz, numbers only 60,000. Before the Revolution none of these peoples had an alphabet, a written language or a school. Today most of them have received a written language, and printed books. Several hundred schools in the native tongue have pushed their way along the Arctic coast, some traveling with the reindeer herds of the nomads, others building dormitories where children spend the winter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Once they looked upon us as wild beasts,&amp;quot; wrote a member of the Nentsi people, reindeer herders of the North. &amp;quot;There are still Nentsi living who were exhibited in the tsarist time in zoological gardens of Russia and foreign lands. They called us &#039;Samoyeds’ (cannibals) and the tsar&#039;s government legalized this as our shameful name—but now we begin to sing new songs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For our tundra is new. An experimental farm center has risen beyond the Arctic circle; we have raised vegetables! On the Pechora meadows has appeared the first tractor. When the first radio came, how it frightened us Nentsi. But now every day the number of literate people grows.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the past year many of the national republics celebrated their fifteenth anniversary. Briefly they flamed across the columns of the Soviet press—Daghestan with its thirty languages; Kazakstan, largest and most arid of all the republics; northern Karelia of forests and marble mountains, “where every fisherman has a lake of his own&amp;quot;; far-south Armenia, centuries old in civilization and suffering; each of them told its achievements under Soviet power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To Alma-Ata, new capital of the yellow-skinned, once nomad, Kazaks, who, as late as 1919 were believed by one of their own nationalist leaders to be “doomed to a slow death,&amp;quot; came a congress of 748 scientific and cultural workers to report on the country&#039;s educational growth. Before the Revolution there were 13,000 children in the schools of this vast area; now there are half a million. A national theater, an opera, a symphony orchestra, seventeen institutions of higher learning are counted among the cultural achievements. They arise on the industrial basis of Karaganda copper, the Turksib railroad, the great mines at Ridder, the Emba-Orsk oil pipeline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the borders of Afghanistan the youngest Soviet republic, the Tajiks, celebrated ten years of existence. Soviet power has meant to them 100 million rubles’ worth of irrigation, the erection of great textile plants, the sinking of mines, the creation of a network of technical schools. Scientific excursions have mapped their high Pamirs, finding gold and precious minerals on the slopes. Tens of thousands of tractors, plows, harrows and modern farm implements have come to the cotton fields where once the camel pulled the wooden plow. On the site of an ancient village has grown the new capital, Stalinabad, an industrial center. Airplanes land in mountain villages whose inhabitants before the Revolution never saw a wheeled cart. Soviet power found only half of one per cent of the Tajiks literate; today nine-tenths of the children attend public school.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One by one the list unrolls of 182 nationalities, which have created industries, modern farming, schools and a national culture under Soviet power. Nor are the nationalities mere recipients of blessings from the more advanced Russians. Creative energy pours increasingly from them all to enrich their common Soviet life. Some of the smaller nationalities have already made records which place them in the vanguard of the Soviet Union. Armenia, once ravaged by national massacres, us today a model republic of the Transcaucasus, celebrated for  its thriving industries. Kabardino-Balkaria, a district of two Mohammedan peoples on the northern slopes of the Caucasus, has created the most famous collective farms of the USSR. It developed the idea of “socialist farm cities” designed by architects, which is spreading through the whole Soviet Union, and the policy of making older farmers inspectors of quality, which brought happiness and self-respect to hundreds of thousands of aged men in the Soviet land.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The devotion of suppressed peoples, both within and without its borders, is the prize which the Soviet national policy has won. ‘Soviet power is toiling Kazaks like rain in the desert,” is a proverb of the Kazak old men quoted in the Soviet press by Kliumov, eighteen-year-old president of a Kazak village. “The Party of Lenin and Stalin has resurrected peoples from the dead, peoples who less than dust. Now these peoples have themselves conquered the earth and have come to report their victory to their leader,&amp;quot; said the Tajik poet Lahuti, arriving in Moscow with a delegation of triumphant record-making cotton-pickers. “The past is a stairway of years carpeted with pain and beggary,&amp;quot; said Arith Shakirov, one of the cotton-pickers. “The Uzbeks feared to go along the road of the Arabs, the Tajiks carried sticks when they walked through the Uzbek quarter. Hardly anyone could read. The past is gone. On its ruins we build a bright new life. Woe unto anyone who tries to take it away from us.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When Turkoman horsemen made a spectacular run from their capital, Ashkhabad, to Moscow, in August, 1935, the cities through which they passed on their 4,300-kilometer way were decorated to meet them. “From beyond the boundless expanse of our great fatherland, across the hot sands of the Kara-Kum, the Ust-Urta steppes and the limitless collective fields,&amp;quot; thus ran their greeting. They spoke of the “invincible brotherhood of nations replacing the prison of nations—tsarist Russia—which has gone into the past never to return.” One of the group, Chary Kary, had been in Moscow before. “But then,&amp;quot; he said, “it was the city of my enemy and every person in it seemed my personal foe. Now Moscow is the heart of my great fatherland and every nationality in it is my nation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The friendship between the peoples of the USSR is a great and signal victory,&amp;quot; said Stalin to one of those many delegations of Central Asiatic workers who stormed the Kremlin with their exploits in late 1935. “As long as this friendship exists the people of our country shall be free and invincible.&amp;quot; But the influence of the Soviet national policy goes far beyond its borders. More than any other Soviet policy it has undermined the imperialisms of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER VI: THE TECHNIQUE OF LEADERSHIP ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“Among the masses of people, we are but drops in the ocean, and we will be able to govern only when we properly express that which the people appreciate. Without this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not take the lead of the masses, and the whole machine will fall to pieces.”|Lenin at Eleventh Party Congress}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If by some cataclysm of war a section of the Soviet Union should be cut off from Moscow and compelled for a time to exist alone, government in these isolated areas would continue unchanged except insofar as it was crushed by invading armies. A picturesque example of this was given me by a Yakut woman, who boasted that her district of forests and tundra a thousand miles north of the Trans-Siberian Railway had had “Soviet Power” continuously since 1917. The years of civil war that raged along the railway had never penetrated so far north. To my query how this backward bit of territory knew what policies to follow she replied that a few Bolshevik exiles had remained among them and they got occasional news from Moscow over the Great Northern Telegraph which traversed their region. Many other sections of the country were isolated during the Civil War for considerable periods, yet continued to follow a common policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For eighteen years the authority of the Communist Party in the life of the Soviet Union has grown steadily stronger; it has kept power now for a considerably longer time than any Party in any other country in the world. The accumulating discontents which in other lands throw out governments do not seem to worry it. The Party itself organizes discontent for the sake of progress. In spite of exposures of graft, inefficiency, bureaucracy, and stupid excesses—indeed through these very exposures—the hold of the Communist Party increases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To manage the state affairs of the most extensive republic on earth—covering one-sixth of the world’s land surface—might be considered enough for a political party. But to run the state is only one of the Communists’ tasks. For their plan of remaking the world the apparatus of government is insufficient. Great popular organizations like trade unions, co-operatives, physical culture societies and scores of voluntary social agencies must also move in a common, yet flexible plan. But the action of these organizations must be voluntary, arousing the initiative of their members, or their energy and life will die.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How then does the Communist Party lead the country? By the energy and discipline of its members, their contact with all organizations in the land, and by the authority of repeated success. In all government bodies and voluntary organizations the Communists belonging to them act together to induce them to follow the “Party Line.” This line, however, while firm, is not rigid; Party policy itself grows from the discussions and active struggles of its members, each of whom is in touch with some aspect of the country’s life. The members serve as a living conscious bridge between the Party and all the other organizations. They explain to the Party the desires of the people with whom they are associated, and explain to the people the policies developed by the Party in regard to their demands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The primary Party organizations are set up in factories, offices, state farms, red army units, universities, villages, in any institution which has three Party members or more. In a typical iron and steel plant in the Ukraine, for instance, where 1,600 persons—workers, engineers, office staff—work in the rolling mill, 55 are Party members, 85 belong to the Young Communist League and 30 are enrolled as “sympathizers,” an organized group which is studying Communism with the presumable intent to join the Party. One Communist is paid a salary by the Party as full time organizer; the others are scattered in ordinary jobs through all the working gangs of the factory. Each of them has his assigned “Party work.” Some are editors of the sixteen “wall newspapers” which are posted in every working gang of the mill, filled with news and discussions of the gang’s successes and failures. Others read regular newspapers aloud during lunch hour and conduct discussions on current events. Others stir up “socialist competition” between different working gangs so that skill and production may increase. Others are active in the trade union or help promote sports. Every Communist, Young Communist and sympathizer does some unpaid public work of this kind; those who had none or failed to do it would be dropped from the Party as “passive.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years ago I visited an open meeting of a Party organization in a factory near Moscow. Not only the Communists but many non-members had gathered to hear the semi-annual report of the Party secretary of the plant. As he sat down a storm of questions arose. “Why have we no report about the Young Pioneers? . . . Has the Party looked into the question of our workers’ club building and observed that we have no summer playground? Why haven’t we a sanitary organization? Why haven’t we a ‘Friends of Aviation’? Does the co-operative housing organization report regularly to the Party, and if so, when are we going to get the houses?” From the secretary’s answers it became clear that this factory had many voluntary organizations among its members: a “Friends for Children,” an “International Labor Defense,” an organization to “Increase Production,” a “Society for Contacts with Rural Districts,” and many more. All of these had been launched with Party co-operation, usually first as small committees, and had then grown into larger organizations by the influx of people who were not Communists. The number of organizations that would be started would depend partly on popular demand and partly on the capacity of Party members to stimulate and organize interest. It would be difficult for an organization to start without Party sanction; it would not be precisely forbidden, but a score of difficulties would discourage it. On the other hand, if a popular demand arose for any new kind of organization—from a drama club to an Anti-Tuberculosis Society—some Party members would take part in it either on their own initiative or by request of the workers or the Party, and would be expected by everyone to keep the organization in touch with any Party policies which affected it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were several ironic remarks and cat-calls in the meeting during a report by the plant’s director, who was clearly not popular with the workers. I happened to know that the Party secretary had recently recommended to the higher organizations that the director be removed to some other plant where he could profit by the mistakes he had made in this one and start without the accumulated friction. The manager also knew that his transfer had been recommended, and quite possibly concurred. At the meeting, however, the Party secretary said no word of this recommendation but put himself in the unenviable position of explaining the manager’s actions to a group which was almost howling him down. Both he and the manager were disciplined Communists, who did not wish to increase dissension but to work together for the good of the plant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proportion of Communists in rural districts is very much less than in factories, as might be expected from the fact that the factory workers were the most active elements in the Revolution and also more literate than the peasants. A typical Party organization in a village of two hundred families—I take here the collective farm “Postishev” in the Ukraine—has five Party members, ten “sympathizers,” and twenty-seven members of the Young Communist League. The latter organization is nearly always much larger than the Party in the villages, since it is the youth on the farms which is progressive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the five Party members in this village, one of them, Povlichenko, is organizer, giving full time to Party work. He was born in the village, worked some years in a city factory, and was sent back in 1931 on Party order to help organize collectivization. From comments of peasant women I judge he was high-handed in that period and stirred up some antagonisms which he has not lived down. He is, however, a very energetic person, a once half-starved, half-educated farmhand with a passion for schooling which the Revolution enabled him to realize. He runs the Party school where members study Party history and current politics, teaches an elementary course in Leninism and the Soviet Constitution for the sympathizers, and organizes talks and discussions on special events, such as Party congresses, or new decrees affecting the farms. At the time of my visit these remote villagers were studying, more or less assiduously, the reports of Dimitroff and others at the recent congress of the Communist International. Povlichenko also takes active part in pushing the local school, the village club, the motion pictures, the local newspaper and all forms of education and culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second Communist is a local peasant, president of the collective farm since 1931, but now leaving for a three-year course in an agricultural school. His salary comes from the farm, not from the Party. The third is an electrician sent to this village because “we needed a Communist in every field brigade.” When he came he was entirely ignorant of farming, but his craft made him useful in a village just beginning to import electricity from the great power plant on the Dnieper. Recently the Party planned to transfer him to township work, but the local farmers checked this by electing him president of the village. “The Party,” he said, “always considers the desires of the masses.” He may or may not have helped organize those desires. For Party work he is attached to the third field brigade and is also adviser of the Young Communist League. The fourth party member is a woman who earns her living as saleswoman in the co-operative store, and whose Party assignment is to help the village women organize a day nursery, a first-aid society and get vacation on pay from the collective farm at time of childbirth. This right is automatic in state-owned enterprises, but not all the farmers’ organizations give it yet. The fifth Party member is manager of the local co-operative store, who, since he makes twenty or more trips to the city every month, is used by the Party for city contacts rather than for regular village work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is plain that these five Party members have their hands on the whole life of the village. Besides their general work, the first three each keep in touch with a different field brigade of forty or more workers whom they are expected to know personally. “I must know what they want, their economic conditions and working abilities. This is called political watchfulness. If we did not know this, it would be bad for us. We could not possibly lead the masses,” said Povlichenko.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Party organization of this village is open to criticism from strict Party principles in that its members hold too many local government jobs. They are supposed to keep a better balance between office-holders and members “in production,” and to stimulate and train non-Party people for some of the government work. Hogging the offices by Party members is considered a bad sign; it means that they have not stirred up wide enough interest. The Postishev organization is trying to do this through their work with the ten sympathizers and the Young Communists, each of whom has also Party work of a less responsible character. They read and discuss the newspapers in the field brigades, organize traveling libraries, chess games, football teams, initiate competitions in reaping and threshing, help start the musical or dramatic circle, or assist in the “cottage laboratory” where sixty farmers are studying scientific methods.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These primary Party organizations are correlated by the township&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rayon, a district about equivalent to a township.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; organization which in turn comes under the larger regions up to the All-Union organization. The lower bodies elect the higher but are in turn subordinate to their decisions; the system is known as “democratic centralism.” The highest power within each organization is vested in its general meeting or congress which elects a standing committee to serve between sessions. The highest power of the entire Party is the All-Union Party Congress and between its sessions the Central Committee. The Central Committee organizes a political bureau for the day-by-day determination of political policy, an organizational bureau for general guidance of organizational work, and a secretariat. Stalin is general secretary of the Party, but there are several other secretaries who share this work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years ago I saw a district congress of the Communist Party in action in the city of Red Lugansk of the Donetz Basin, the valley of coal and steel. Four or five hundred men and women gathered for a two day session—miners and mine managers, employees and head of the locomotive works, some teachers and health department officials—Communists all, sent as delegates from the local Party organizations of the factories and mines of the district. The problems for discussion were the policy for heavy industry and for minor nationalities. They had been announced by the Central Committee as the immediate pressing problems; “theses” on them had been published by the leading authorities and every local Party organization had discussed them for weeks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The delegates wasted no time in preliminaries and compliments. Man after man spoke hotly and strongly on the concrete difficulties of heavy industry in the mines and factories they knew. They prepared reports based on the industry of their district and elected delegates to carry their hottest criticisms to the regional Party Congress in the coal center, Bakhmut, where delegates were again chosen to the All-Ukrainian Party Congress. Then all over the Soviet Union the special trains began running. From Kharkov, from Tiflis, from Minsk, from Central Asia and Siberia, they bore the chosen delegates to Moscow where two weeks’ discussion in the All-Union Party Congress hammered out the “Party Line.” Thence the results rolled back again to the Donetz, the Caucasus, the Far East to Vladivostok, borne by returning delegates whose first duty was to explain and carry through the decisions through trade unions, cooperatives, farms, government, whatever organizations they influenced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the most widely organized thinking ever attempted in history. It is actually the energetic thinking of three million men and women, gathering up the ideas of tens of millions of their neighbors, which beats upon the All-Union Party Congress and affects its decisions. The ideas are worked over by the ablest economists of the Party, familiar with the experience of the revolutionary movement in all countries. The decisions reached are explained to the country through every channel of organized publicity; they are discussed and studied in every field brigade and factory and put into action simultaneously throughout the land. For the test of organized thinking is organized action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Communists do not merely reflect the will of the masses, as a ballot might, or a showing of hands. They do not merely analyze what the “majority want” and hand it out. It is their job to lead, to organize the people’s will. No group of unurged soldiers would ever vote to storm a trench. Certainly the workers of the Soviet Union would not have voted, unurged, unled, for the hardships of the Five-Year Plan of rapid industrialization taken out of their own food and comforts, for the painful speed of farm collectivization without adequate machines or organizers. But when the Communist Party analyzed, urged and demanded, showing the world situation and the need of making the USSR well prepared industrially and for defense, showing the enemy classes which must be abolished to attain the goal of a socialist state, they were able to find, organize and create, deep in the heart of the masses, a will that carried through. Without that will in tens of millions, the three million could have done little. “To bring about a revolution, a leading revolutionary minority is required,” Stalin told H. G. Wells. “But the most talented, devoted and energetic minority would be helpless if it did not rely upon the at least passive support of millions.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. G. Wells’ Interview with Joseph Stalin, July 23, 1934&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As an example of the interrelation of Party, government and voluntary workers in action, let me take the “mobilization” of automobiles and mechanics in the spring of 1931 to save flax sowing in Moscow province. Collective farming came that year to the province in a great drive of organization and propaganda backed by hundreds of new tractors, which were being used chiefly to increase the area of flax. In the first week of sowing, telegrams from the newly organized tractor stations poured into Moscow, announcing that there was a “break.” Tractors all over the province stood in the fields, not moving, for causes yet to be analyzed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who moves in such a case? The Moscow Committee of the Party moves. Sorting over in its office the reports of all Moscow’s daily emergencies, it decides that the break in flax is serious and calls for a “mobilization” of mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The call goes out to Party organizations in a hundred shops and factories. It is announced by trade-union shop committees and factory newspapers. Not a single mechanic is compelled to answer, but any mechanic willing to give a day or two for tractor repair to help the sowing will be helped by foreman and fellow workers to arrange his job. He may work at this sanctioned public task without forfeiting wages, while others fill in the gap in his regular work. What is the motive? The fun of participating in saving the sowing, of helping the country, of living a varied, useful life. Automobiles also are “mobilized” to carry the mechanics to the farms, and those who lend machines for such public work may hope for a cut in automobile taxes. I volunteered for a two-day trip.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One hundred and fifty miles north of Moscow we came to the tractor station to which we were assigned. Of thirty-three new tractors from Putiloff Works, eleven could not move out of the railway station. The rest were breaking down in the fields, under the hands of worried peasant boys and girls who had seen their first machine one month before. All night our volunteer mechanics repaired tractors. All night the local tractor drivers stood up to watch in their eagerness to learn. The following day I drove my car to Moscow with sleeping mechanics in the seats. They had worked twenty hours on end in a public emergency about which they would report next morning to their interested fellow workers in Moscow factories. They had also prepared a technical report charging the Putiloff tractor with certain grave defects. It was printed within two days in the Industrial Gazette, the organ of heavy industry, and led to a conference of industrial leaders on improving the Putiloff tractor. Three weeks later the flax sowing of Moscow province, which in early season threatened to lag at 50 per cent of plan, went over the top 108 per cent, the best flax record in the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It was the work of the social organizations that saved us,” said the Moscow Tractor Center. What were the organizations concerned? The state, the Party, the trade unions, the automobile association had all taken part. The state owned the Putiloff Works, financed the tractor stations, and also owned, through the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the Industrial Gazette which exposed the defects. The trade unions organized the volunteers and took care of their jobs during absence. The automobile association organized autos. But the driving will that saved the situation was the will of thousands of Moscow workers organized and assigned to their tasks by the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, of which most of the mechanics were not even members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even on vacations Communists are supposed to be always watchfully aware of their responsibility for organizing the life of the country. I was slipping down the mighty Volga on a large passenger steamer when I saw a sign asking members of the Party who might be traveling to register with the secretary of the boat organization. I learned that any Communist traveling on the boat was likely to be drafted into speaking at a meeting on deck among the peasants, or at a political school for Communists of the crew. Some of the city Communists used the occasion to criticize hotly the boat Communists for lack of attention to sanitation. The river Communists, mostly untrained sailors, thus got their first lesson in modern hygiene.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ultimate destination towards which the Soviet ship of state is steering was fixed by the Revolution. The rate of speed and the daily and early course is charted by the Central Committee of the Party to take advantage of varying winds and tides. Yet it is a course which every active worker or farmer may take part in fixing. It arises from the experience of three million Party members, each keeping in touch with some section of the people, all of them interacting, discussing, comparing results. Communists of longest experience and best records have the greatest authority; but, be it noted, they do not call it “power.” “Power” resides in the will of the working masses; “authority” is that prestige of character and insight which enables its possessor to organize and release this power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is authority rather than power that Stalin possesses. Though his standing is far higher than that of any man in the Soviet Union, though he is cheered and quoted at all congresses as high authority, men never speak of “Stalin’s will” or “Stalin’s power,” but of the “Party Line” which Stalin reports but does not make. The Party Line is accessible to all to study, to know and to help formulate. The greatness of the man is known by the range over which he can do this. “I can plan with the workers of one plant for a year,” said a factory manager to me. “Others much wiser than I, like the men in our Central Committee, can plan with wider masses for years. Stalin in this is our ablest. He sees the inter-relation of our path with world events, and the order of each step, as a man sees the earth from the stratosphere.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The earth from the stratosphere”—the man who said this was himself an aviation engineer. Men in the Soviet Union tend to see Stalin in terms of their craft. Railway workers call him “locomotive driver of the Revolution.” An economist said to me, speaking of the leaders of Party and government in the Red Square on May-day: “Our brains are there in the tribune.” Harvester-combine operators addressed Stalin as “friend and teacher”; managers of industry say informally “the boss.” Yellow-skinned Kazaks of the desert on the fifteenth anniversary of their republic hailed him “great leader of toiling humanity.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Millions of simple folk in all callings have felt the direct impact of Stalin’s analysis, giving a solution for the chief problem of their lives. It was sometimes a way that was harsh to follow, but it was the one clear path to the goal that the millions desired. There have been statements by Stalin that ushered in great changes, as when he told the agrarian Marxist conference that the time had come to “abolish kulaks as a class.” Yet he only announced the time for a process which every Marxist knew was on the program. His famous article “Dizziness from Success” which called sudden halt on March 2, 1930, to widespread excesses of Communists in rural regions, was regarded by foreign correspondents and peasants alike as an “order from Stalin.” Stalin at once disclaimed any personal prestige therefrom accruing, stating in the press: “Some people think that the article is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin. That of course is nonsense. The Central Committee does not exist to permit personal initiative of anybody in matters of this kind. It was a reconnaissance undertaken by the Central Committee.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin does not rule personally. To a lifelong habit of collective action he adds his personal genius, that of supreme analyst of situations, personalities, tendencies. He leads as supreme combiner of many minds and wills, When Emil Ludwig asked him who really made decisions, he answered: “Single persons cannot decide. . . . Experience of three revolutions has shown us that out of a hundred individual decisions which have not been tested and corrected collectively, ninety are biased. The leadership of our Party in the Central Committee, which directs all the Soviet and Communist organizations, consists of about seventy people. Among those seventy members of our Central Committee there are to be found the best of our industrial leaders, our cleverest specialists and the men who best understand every branch of our activities. It is in this Supreme Council that the whole wisdom of our Party is concentrated. Each man is entitled to challenge his neighbor’s opinion or suggestion. Each man may give the benefit of his own experience. If it were otherwise, if individual decisions were admitted, there would be serious mistakes in our work.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin’s Interview with Emil Ludwig, Dec. 13, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The art of leadership is a serious matter,” said Stalin earlier, in concluding his article “Dizziness from Success.” “One must not lag behind a movement because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But one must not rush ahead, for this is to lose contact with the masses. . . . Our Party is strong and invincible because, while leading a movement, it knows how to maintain and multiply its contacts with the millions of the workers and peasant masses.” This may be taken as Stalin’s analysis of leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are plenty of stupidities and violences in the Soviet Union, yes-men and careerists, hardship and injustice, wastage of youth and life. All man’s essential progress costs heavily in human suffering; the Soviet Union has not escaped this law. What makes it endurable is just this fact that it is caused not by behest of one man or even of three million, but is part of the slow process—history will not call it slow—whereby the tens of millions achieve the organized and conscious planning of their lives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER VII: BUILDING THE NEW ECONOMY ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“Either perish or overtake the advanced countries and surpass them. . . . This is how history has put the question.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“Millions make the plan.”|Stalin}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most striking characteristics of Soviet life to a new arrival is the passionate interest which citizens show in new industries, modern equipment, figures of carloadings, economic statistics generally. The “romantic passion” of the Russians for machinery, the visitor is apt to call it. He himself is long since bored by machinery which has recently put him out of work; he finds it difficult to understand this passion. He has come to see “the revolution,” to study the characteristics of planned economy or the amazing change in human concepts. He finds the revolutionary background taken for granted by Soviet citizens; they want to show him factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The mood of the Soviet Union today is a mood of tremendous struggle and incredible conquest in which individual values and problems pale before the brightness of one great problem whose solution is told off by the ever-rising curve of production, the opening of steel mills, the successful mastery of tractor plants, machine building works, textile factories. It is a mood in which a newly literate servant girl will hail the rain running into her leaky shoes if that rain means harvest. Harvest somewhere far off on farms she never sees.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not surprising that economic facts have a vital interest for Soviet citizens. The changes in the country’s economic life since the Revolution have been stupendous and the results are felt in every person’s daily living. Fifteen years ago when first I entered the Soviet Union, the country was ravaged by famine and pestilence. Civil war and foreign intervention had ruined farming, industry, transport. Street-cars were not running in Moscow, street lights had long since burned out without replacements, and two fuelless winters had so destroyed the entire city’s plumbing that water pressure could not rise above the second floors. In the best hospital of Samara, where I lay ill in 1921 with typhus, there were but two clinical thermometers for hundreds of patients. Thermometers, light bulbs, water pipes were only a few of the million articles which long war and blockade kept out of the Soviet Union and which could not be manufactured in the few and backward factories of that vast agricultural land.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have lived through fifteen years of incredibly rapid progress which have almost wiped out all memory of the past. To dwellers in the Soviet Union, the pre-war period seems already pre-historic, and even 1921 seems a century ago. We have seen in these fifteen years a more than ten-fold increase in industrial production; we have seen a leap in farming from the sixteenth century into the twenty-first. We have lived through a series of epochs sharply distinct from each other in the regulations affecting our daily existence, but all these periods have been characterized by one continuous fury of energetic endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reasons for energetic endeavor were very plain to the people of a land just emerging from foreign intervention and long blockade. “War is implacable,” said Lenin. “It puts the question with merciless sharpness. Either perish or overtake the advanced countries and surpass them. . . . Either full steam ahead or perish. This is how history has put the question.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by Stalin in Report on &#039;&#039;Results of the First Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; All Communists hold that in the present epoch of worldwide imperialist expansion, it is the fate of economically backward lands to be parceled out among the imperial nations. Soviet Russia, unless she could make herself economically independent, had to fear the fate which has overtaken China, “a military field of operations of foreign enemies and pecked at by everybody who cares to do so.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Results of the First Five-Year Flan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If a rapid rate of economic development was necessary to preserve even the independence of the country, it was still more necessary as a prerequisite for a socialist commonwealth. The abundant life for every toiler which socialism implies demands lavish production; it cannot be attained in a country where the means of production is the individually owned tool. The material conditions for a prosperous socialist commonwealth exist today in America far more than they ever existed in Russia. Sharing the wealth cannot take place until there is really wealth to share. Socially owned wealth must be based on socially owned factories. Russia had the problem of first building the factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The rapid development of Soviet Russia’s economic wealth was considered of crucial importance by Lenin, not only for the welfare of the Russian people, but even for the future of world-wide socialism. Faced by the handicap of a backward, semi-feudal land, the workers of the new revolutionary country had nonetheless one advantage—they were the joint owners of their country and all of its productive wealth. They must prove to the world that even against great difficulties this one advantage was decisive. Even in 1921 in the depths of economic ruin Lenin said: “We are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian republic. . . . If we solve this problem, then we shall have won on an international scale for certain and finally. That is why questions of economic construction assume for us absolutely exceptional significance.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 28, 1921. &#039;&#039;All-Russian Conference of the Communist Party&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a strange paradox in the economic development of the Soviet Union which even foreign resident must notice. It is that every slight achievement costs infinite effort, yet mighty achievements are won in an incredibly short time. The penalty for Russia’s ancient backwardness is to be found in an inefficiency which hampers every movement—taking a tramway, buying a spool of thread, securing a room. The difficulty of making even one blast furnace function properly arouses frantic despair in the hearts of foreign specialists. Yet in spite of these difficulties, the Soviet Union advances at a speed unknown even to the most efficient capitalist countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This speed is due to the tremendous energy and initiative of millions of workers and farmers who are conscious owners now of their own means of production, and who know that whatever they create will be their own permanent gain. Their initiative is correlated by a system of social planning. Thus arises that paradoxical combination of individual inefficiency with tremendous social momentum. In the most developed capitalist countries the efficiencies of ten million individuals pull in conflicting directions, giving small gain to society. But each new achievement in the Soviet planned structure, attained with such painful difficulty, reinforces the sum total of a million gains.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So obvious and so widely known are these benefits of social planning in the Soviet Union that in recent years it has become a common dream in many countries to transfer painlessly the technique of planning to the capitalist system, thus gaining the blessings of socialism without the harsh shock of revolution. In America especially, where the highly developed processes of production could so obviously produce plenty for all, the illusion arises that somehow some genius, some group of super-brains sitting in New York or in Washington, ought to be able to find the magic secret of putting those processes to work. It is clear that an individual owner can plan his factory and bring it to a relatively high state of efficiency as compared with the days of handicraft. But can a government brain trust, however brilliant, plan the disposal of Rockefeller’s oil wells, or the internal organization of U. S. Steel? To ask this question is to answer it, if it has not been answered already by the history of the NRA. Only owners can plan an industry and dispose of its products. Under capitalism plans of different owners clash.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For a socialist state, the simplest and most basic act of government is the planning by worker-owners of the expansion and improvement of their jointly owned properties. Planning of this type takes place not only in those central institutions of Moscow where the foreign visitor habitually looks for it; it begins simultaneously at the workers’ bench. Production meetings after work discuss shop problems, what holds back production, how much it can be increased, and by what means. These discussions are enlarged on a factory scale; they go from the factory to the central offices of the industrial trusts. Word comes back from the central organizations to the shop that the country needs certain new machines. “Can we make them in our plant?” Delegates from other industries which need the machines arrive, explain, mutually consult. The inventions and suggestions of the local workers thus widen into a nation’s plan.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The plan is, however, no mere blueprint to be fulfilled with exactness. In the absolute and technical sense, one cannot speak of it as a final “plan” at all. For although every factory, farm, school and government institution checks its monthly and annual achievements by its plan, yet the proudest boast is always to have overfulfilled it, i.e., broken the plan by doing more than intended. The plan is therefore a standard of what is expected, a flag of challenge, but in no sense a limit. There is no limit set in the Soviet Union. The aim is the fullest development of the creative and productive powers of the country. The more production, the better. It will be seen at once how impossible such a conception of planning becomes under capitalism. It is based on the assumption that the worker-owners of the nation’s production will be able to use everything that they care to make.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Socialism is not created in a day; it is not achieved by voting and not even by seizure of power. Seizure of power is only a prerequisite. Socialism involves the expansion and organization of the collectively owned properties of the country and the building of a good life for everyone thereon. This was the purpose of the October Revolution, and in spite of all the accounts in the press of the world for eighteen years about Soviet “changes of policy,” this purpose has never changed in the slightest degree. The tactics used have, however, been conditioned by both internal strength and international relations. Not until 1921, when the new workers’ state had beaten back the armies of intervention, was it possible to begin the building of the national economy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the wars of invasion were over, industry had sunk to one-fifth of pre-war, the production of cotton goods was only 7 per cent of normal, iron and steel production had almost entirely ceased. Grain reserves were exhausted, and the drought of 1921 led directly to the greatest famine in Russian history. The New Economic Policy, adopted at that time, encouraged all forms of economic development, both those of capitalism and those of socialism. Meantime each year the Communists led the working class of the country to concentrate a desperate, organized struggle for victory in one important field after another—victories often achieved at the expense of heavy temporary sacrifices elsewhere.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The year 1922 saw the successful fight to establish a state bank and a partially stable currency by high banking charges which ruthlessly exploited all the industries of the country. In 1923 emphasis turned to the hard-pressed industries; for the first time since the revolution, their balance sheets reached “self-support,” at the expense of excessively high prices to the consumer. There followed a two years’ effort to cut prices; consumers’ co-operatives were widely developed as a link between the state factories and the peasants. By 1926 co-operative and government trade had increased threefold, successfully passing the private middle-man who had previously controlled over 80 per cent of the rural turnover. During the next two years, emphasis turned again to the restoration of industry, which reached by 1928 the pre-war standard of production. The Soviet workers had rebuilt their war-devastated country without the aid of the foreign credits which flowed to help all the war-injured capitalist lands of Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet this attainment was still of low standard, the pre-war production of backward tsarist Russia. The ancient plants were working to full capacity, but they could not begin to supply the needs of workers and farmers who expected a higher standard of life than before the Revolution. Each year the shortage of goods increased. Soviet industry could not expand further except by extension of basic capital, new buildings, more machines. Any threatening war would still find the country lacking not only in commodities, but in that heavy industry on which, in our modern mechanized world, is based the means of production in peace and of defense in war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Could Soviet Russia develop her industries rapidly and make herself economically independent, or must she live, as tsarist Russia did, by export of farm products, chancing her future on a hostile capitalist world? This problem set sharply the still more fundamental problem whether socialism could be built in one country and if so, by what means. Russia’s basic industry was state-owned but this industry was insufficient to supply the people with goods. The primitive farming system, made still more primitive by the splitting up of the former landlords’ estates into small subsistence farms, which partly consumed and partly wasted much formerly marketed grain, was increasingly failing to feed the growing cities. In 1927 the Russian farms attained the pre-war sown area of 280,000,000 acres and the pre-war grain production of somewhat over 80,000,000 tons, but only about half of the pre-war marketed grain was reaching the market. Socialized industry was like an island in an ocean of medieval agriculture, whose tides constantly threatened to undermine the base of socialism. “As long as we live in a small peasant country,” Lenin had said, “there will be a more solid economic basis for capitalism than for Communism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, Russian edition, XXVI, 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Farming must be brought out of the Middle Ages, modernized and made efficient. For this two roads of development were possible. The employing peasants, known as kulaks, who already owned the best of the rural means of production, better plows, more horses, occasional threshers, creameries and flour mills, might be allowed to expand, to acquire tractors, combines, and the additional land which these machines could cultivate, dispossessing more and more landless peasants into the ranks of unemployed. Thus capitalist farming grew in other countries out of the feudal ages. The price of such growth for Soviet Russia under the world conditions of the modern era would be not only continued class war in rural districts, not only swiftly increasing unemployment, not only the steady submergence of all socialist industry by an expanding capitalism, but the complete dependence of this young Russian capitalism on the financial oligarchs of the imperialist world. Such, at least, was the analysis made by Stalin and the Communist Party in adopting in 1928 the now famous Five-Year Plan.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Five-Year Plan proposed the rapid industrialization of the country, more rapid than any industrialization known in the world before. Heavy industry must first be built, the machines that make machines for other industry and for farming. Lighter industries to raise the standard of living must rapidly follow. Farming must be industrialized, not by strengthening a class of rural capitalists, but by the voluntary uniting of all non-exploiting peasants, beginning with the poorest, into collective groups farming their lands jointly with machinery which the developing state industry would supply. This was necessary to make farming modern, while giving the benefits of its modernization to all farmers. It was necessary to make Russia socialist, or even to preserve the half-socialism which the city workers had begun. It was necessary for the independence of the country and the very existence of the Soviet government. “We could not refrain,” said Stalin, “from whipping up a country which was a hundred years behind and which owing to its backwardness was faced with mortal danger.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Report to Joint Plenum of Central Committee and Central Control Commission on &#039;&#039;Results of Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;, 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In less than five years—for the Five-Year Plan was 96 per cent completed in four and a quarter years from October 1928 through December 1932—Stalin was able to announce that the former backward agricultural Russia had become the second industrial country in the world. The number employed in industry doubled from eleven million to twenty-two million. The volume of industrial output also doubled, from 15.7 billion rubles in 1928 to 34.3 billion in 1932 (calculated at prices prevailing in 1926-7); it was three times the pre-war production. At the same time a rapid industrialization of farming combined some twenty million tiny, uneconomic subsistence farms into 200,000 large collectively operated farms (by 1936 there were 250,000) based on machine power, scientific methods, division of labor. The relative proportion of industrial to agricultural output grew from 48 per cent at the beginning of the plan to 70 per cent at the end of 1932, thus changing Russia from an agricultural to a predominantly industrial country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Formerly we did not have an iron and steel industry. Now we have such an industry,” reported Stalin in January 1933 at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have an automobile industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have an engineering industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have a big and modern chemical industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“We did not have a real solid industry for the production of modern farm machinery. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have an aviation industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In production of electric power we were last in the list. Now we are among the first in the list...&lt;br /&gt;
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“And we have achieved these enormous new branches of industry on a scale that makes the scale of European industry pale into insignificance. . . .” Such was only part of the success reported.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Five-Year Plan cost heavily in dislocation of populations, exhaustion of youth, disorganization of harvests and many privations which attended the rationing of food and other commodities. But never in history was such an advance gained at less cost and certainly never so swiftly; and it was gained unprecedentedly without long-term credits or foreign loans. Had the pace been less swift, had the Communists postponed this breathless drive towards full industrialization, they believe that Soviet Russia would already have had “not pacts of non-aggression, but war.” “We would have been unarmed in the midst of a capitalist environment which is armed with modern technique.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Results of the First Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The advance of Japan into Manchuria in 1931 and the stated intention of Nazi Germany to expand into Soviet Ukraine are warnings today which anyone may read of the fate which might already have overtaken the Soviet Union but for its swiftly rising economic and military strength.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the conclusion of the first Five-Year Plan at the end of 1932, the Soviet Union plunged into the second. “We have already laid the foundations of a socialist society . . . and all we have to do now is to erect the edifice—a task which undoubtedly is easier,” said Stalin at the Seventeenth Party Congress in early 1934. Industry and trade were already 99 per cent socialized; three-fourths of agricultural production was socialized. On the base thus established, the second Five-Year Plan proposed to abolish “all private property in the means of production, all class distinctions, all exploitation of man by man.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Molotov, &#039;&#039;Tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It proposed three times as much new construction as had been achieved in the first Five-Year Plan. It proposed a doubling and tripling of the standard of living through the final technical reconstruction of the whole national economy, the mastery of the most modern methods and the most complex machines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Already as the year 1936 opens, it is clear that the second Five-Year Plan can be accomplished in less than five years. In the last months of 1935 the total monthly output of heavy industry was already five times as high as in 1928.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;From 404.9 million rubles, average monthly output in 1928 to 2,180.6 million in Nov. 1935, stable rubles of 1926-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Grain production has known three record harvests surpassing all pre-collectivization years. Rapid increase in the standard of living—more food, better clothing, expanding art and science—is evident in all parts of the country. Cotton pickers, sugar-beet growers, combined-harvester operators, timber workers, machinists and miners are descending triumphantly on Moscow to celebrate their achievements in production and win the plaudits of the land.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With hammer blows the figures of the 1935 achievements were given by Molotov in January 1936 to the Central Executive Committee. A 20.4 per cent increase in industrial production over 1934, in place of the 16 per cent planned; 23 per cent increase in freight car loadings, 45 per cent in raw cotton, and 43 per cent in sugar beets. A grain harvest running close to one hundred million tons, nearly ten million above the highest previous harvest; horses up 5 per cent, cattle 18 per cent, sheep and goats 25 per cent, hogs 38 per cent—all increases of a single year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The abolition of the card system of rationing, reported Grinko, Commissar of Finance, had lifted the trade turnover from 60 to 80 billion rubles; the profits from socialist economy were 7.8 billion rubles; the planned state budget receipts had been exceeded and the planned expenditures cut, leaving a surplus for expansion. But the most important result of the year, said Molotov, was the Stakhanov movement “which leads to an entire revolution in industry and transport, and opens the first page of the great advance in socialist productivity of labor.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then, with confidence born of experience, Valery Meshlauk, head of the State Planning Commission, gave page after page of the carefully plotted future. “The 1936 plan provides for a further and accelerated upsurge of the whole national economy.” The increase set for large-scale industry is 23 per cent, a 15 billion ruble advance, which is greater than the entire output of this industry in 1927. The increase set for agriculture is 24 per cent, for commodity circulation 25, railway transport 19.8, capital construction 34.8. The financial income of the population is to rise from 101 to 118 billion rubles, in the face of steadily dropping prices. Social and cultural services in the central and local budgets are to rise from 16 to 21 billion, the social insurance alone from 6.7 to 8 billion. But darkly across this shining future run figures of army expansion, from the 6.5 billion planned to 8.2 billion actually spent in 1935 and 14.8 billion planned for 1936. For beyond the borders of the triumphantly planned growth of Soviet national economy lie the unpredictable dangers of the chaotic capitalist world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If a map of the Soviet world could be drawn pictorially and changed with each changing year, it would show countless new cities arising on formerly barren land. It would show tens of millions of tiny, uneconomic farm plots merging into a rhythm of horizon-touching fields. It would show thousands of geological expeditions penetrating uncharted wildernesses to discover and chart nationally owned wealth. Following these there would flash across the scene surveyors, engineers, new railroads, steel plants, textile mills. New timber areas open, new coal and oil fields. If the map had a sound film attachment one would hear the summons sent forth to young Communists, to workers in the older, better-organized factories, demanding heroic personnel for the conquest of the wastes. The conquering march of man reaches northward to settle the Arctic and eastward to the wild coasts opposite Alaska. And a long green strip of a million and a half acres of new forest-zone moves steadily southward across treeless plains of Kazakstan as a mighty screen to protect the grain lands of South Russia from the desert winds of Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the past two years the Communist leaders have begun to speak of socialism as “victorious”; its economic base is secure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER VIII: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The Soviet Union needs no foreign wars for transforming the world.”|Manuilski at Congress of Communist International, 1935}}&lt;br /&gt;
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A socialist country craves peace for development. As the life of the Soviet people grows richer and more varied, the one great dread which hangs above it is the threat of war. Soviet citizens are never subject to the illusion—most diabolical of all the contradictions of capitalism—that war may bring a feverish, blood-bought prosperity and eliminate unemployment by turning men into the pursuits of destruction. The prosperity of socialism is based on harmonious correlation of production and needs, and there is no unemployment. The Soviet world sees war as naked destruction of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Even the need of preparing for war it sees as a waste of resources which might otherwise go in direct benefits to the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the eighteen years of its existence, the Soviet Union has been widely recognized as a champion of peace. Even its foes admit that the USSR does not want war for the present. Yet so confused is the world’s thinking on the subject of war and peace—a confusion promoted by diplomats and statesmen—so instinctive under capitalism has become the assumption that every advancing nation must seek in the end the test of war, that the Soviet hunger for peace is at times confused either with cowardice or hypocrisy. Are they not perhaps just watchfully waiting until their economic building is accomplished, and their strength is sure? What are they doing in the League of Nations? Why are they increasing the Red Army? Do they not after all want world revolution, which world war presumably might usher in? How permanent is the Soviet wish for peace? And, even if sincere, can it be effective?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are two ways to approach this question: by the detailed examination of Soviet history and by understanding the theory behind every Soviet action. We shall take each of these methods in turn.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Behind all Soviet action is the Marxian theory that the cause of war is neither permanent in human nature, as militarists claim, nor to be found in lack of goodwill and in the character of rulers, as idealist pacifists think. Marxists hold that war arises from class conflicts. Wars in the present period of world history, according to this analysis, arise from the struggle of capitalism to survive and grow by investment in new markets. This leads the major nations to engage first in small wars of colonial oppression, the forcing of their goods and investment upon undeveloped peoples; these lead to wars between the imperialist nations over the territories which both sides wish to exploit. A socialist commonwealth where the people own jointly their means of production and receive all the fruits of their toil, wants no expanding market for surplus profits but only equal interchange of goods which encourages peace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A socialist world would thus attain peace permanently. But a single socialist country lives in a world of foes. Can peace be attained under these conditions? Not permanently and not with assurance, as long as capitalism survives. The capitalist world system from its nature breeds war. None the less, each specific war has specific causes, which may be studied, analyzed, hampered and delayed. Peace may be won from month to month and year to year by specific, well-considered actions, as an able engineer postpones collapse inherent in a faulty structure by accurate balancing of specific strains and stresses. This is an unstable peace, but better than none, for every curtailment of war prevents human suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In applying this analysis to our present period of history, Soviet policy holds that the economic world today is one and indivisible, and that every war must affect the whole world. No fair words of politicians can keep a nation out of it; no policy of isolation can be a guarantee. For behind all those words and beneath all such policies the economic pressures inexorably act. Trade in goods of war begins to flow towards even a minor conflict and steadily the traders are drawn further in. Thus was America drawn into the World War by increasing financial commitments, till at last an American ambassador cabled from London that a panic would shake the whole United States unless American boys followed American dollars into the battles of Britain and France. When that stage occurs, no country keeps out of it; the president who “kept us out of war” turns about and marches in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even those nations which are technically neutral—the number of these decreases with the seriousness of the war—are involved only slightly less than those who battle. “Any war,” says Litvinoff, “sooner or later, will bring distress to all countries, both to the combatants and the non-participants. We must never forget the lesson of the World War, the consequences of which are felt to this day by combatants and neutral countries alike. The impoverishment of the whole world, the lowering of the living standards of all categories of labor, both physical and mental, unemployment when no one is sure of tomorrow, to say nothing of the collapse of cultural values, the reversion of certain countries to medieval ideas—these are the consequences of the World War which are clearly felt sixteen years after its end.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To maintain peace is therefore a permanent policy for the Soviet Union. To maintain peace not only for itself but in the world. But peace is not to be had by expecting it. It may not even be won by refusing to fight. China refuses to fight, but gets no peace. Neither preparedness nor unpreparedness is a safeguard; unarmed and well-armed folk have alike gone to war. The only safeguard for even that partial peace possible under capitalism is clear, sincere study of the whole world situation, the choosing of a policy which prevents war or lessens it, and the backing of that policy by all available power. One must struggle for peace; it will not come otherwise. The methods change as the situations change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For eighteen years the Soviet Union has made this struggle. “Peace, land and bread” was the slogan of the October Revolution. The hunger for peace of a war-exhausted people brought the Bolsheviks to power. Their first official act on November 8, 1917, was to propose “to all warring peoples and their governments to begin immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace.” As an attack upon the war and to remove causes of future war, the new revolutionary government exposed and denounced the secret treaties by which England, France and Russia had agreed to redivide the world. They annulled oppressive tsarist treaties which had been enforced on Persia and Turkey, and withdrew the Russian army from Persia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The strength of the new government was not equal to its understanding. The Entente Powers—England, France and the United States—denounced the Bolsheviks for daring to speak of peace and left their former ally to the mercy of Germany. The German general staff marched onward into a prostrate country offering the Bolsheviks “robber terms.” The position of the Soviet state was further weakened by Trotsky’s attempt to deal with advancing troops by clever phrases. He refused to sign terms but protested in the formmula: “Neither war nor peace”—an appeal to the conscience of the German people. But general staffs are not expected to have a conscience, and no Germans acted to save the Russians. The invading army marched far into the Ukraine and took possession, giving in the end worse terms than those originally offered. Trotsky’s appeal reached the consciences of idealists; I recall that it thrilled me far out in Seattle. But it was Ukrainian peasants and workers who suffered; idealist gestures are dangerous tactics in war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If Germany offered the Bolsheviks only a robbers’ peace, their former allies gave them no peace at all. On April 5, 1918, the Japanese landed in Vladivostok; following them the English, French and American armies invaded Siberia. Allied armies landed on the Arctic coast to seize the northern part of Russia; the British grabbed Baku, oil capital of the south. Agents of the Entente incited and participated in armed uprisings of Czechoslovak prisoners of war along the Volga, leading them against the Bolshevik government. From east and west and north and south the armies of all the major capitalist powers surrounded the Revolution with an iron ring of war and blockade.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Across this iron ring the starving people of the new state sent appeal after appeal to all those governments which refused to deal with them but especially to President Wilson. Beginning on November 24, 1918, and repeating their query through Raymond Robins, head of the American Red Cross in Russia, and also by direct cables to the State Department, they offered to consider any peace terms whatever: recognition of debts, concessions of territory, control of mines and natural resources. Rather than deal in any way with Bolsheviks, Wilson and the Allied governments sitting in Versailles issued a call to all the “organized groups in Russia” to meet at the Principo Islands, a proposal which clearly presaged the dividing of Russia into spheres of influence after the style of China. The Bolsheviks were not invited, but they accepted; the other governments refused and the scheme fell through. There followed the famous trip of William Christian Bullitt to Moscow in March 1919 as President Wilson’s semi-official representative. The hard-pressed Soviet government was ready to agree to Bullitt’s proposal that it accept all financial obligations of all past Russian governments, and divide the territory of Russia among all those governments which should be in armed possession when the treaty should be signed. But the treaty was never signed; President Wilson refused to receive the report of his own envoy. Bolsheviks were made to realize that no peace can be had from the imperialist powers of earth by any backward nation. Not even the price of slavish submission buys peace for China; nor could the offer of territory and gold buy it for Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not by appeals for peace and not by offers of concessions, but by the desperate struggle and courage of the Revolutionary Red Army was peace and independence finally won. It was secured in slow stages, first cessation of battle, then trade agreements, then, much more slowly, diplomatic recognition. At each stage the strength of the new state was again and again probed and tested by a capitalist world unwilling to yield it the right to exist. Under such conditions the Soviet government stabilized its borders by granting swift recognition to the new Baltic States. Then, in the first international conference to which it was admitted, in April 1922 in Genoa, the Soviet delegate proposed a plan for strengthening general peace in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The forces directed towards restoration of world economy will be strangled as long as above Europe and above the world hangs the threat of new wars,” said Chicherin. “The Russian delegation intends to propose a general limitation of armaments and to support any proposition which has the aim of lightening the burdens of militarism.” The Soviet representatives again agreed to recognize debts of past Russian governments but now demanded in return the right to compensation for the destruction caused to Russia by unprovoked intervention. Failing to get response to either proposal, Soviet Russia signed with Germany the famous Rapallo agreement, whereby both nations canceled the debts of the other and renewed relations on the basis of equality. This was the first gesture made by any nation to cure the wounds of the World War and to deal with vanquished Germany on a basis which set foundations for peace. Had the other nations followed this example the bitter history of Europe of the past thirteen years might have been different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the Genoa Conference, the Soviet struggle for peace was marked by slow but steady establishment of diplomatic relations with the major powers of the world. This in itself was an element of stability in Europe, but normal relations were still much shaken by frequent raids on Soviet embassies and consulates in many countries, conducted on shallow pretexts and accompanied by forged letters and provocatory accusations unprecedented in diplomatic history.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Such as the assassination of Vorovsky during the Lausanne conference, which coincided with an ultimatum from the British Foreign Office; the raid on the Soviet Embassy in Peking, April 1927, followed by the execution of many of its Chinese staff; the raid on the Soviet trading agency in London May 12, 1927; the forged “Zinoviev letter” which swayed a British election. These were only the most spectacular of a whole series of raids, attacks and attempted assassinations which made being a Soviet ambassador a hazardous occupation.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Similar attacks on nations in the past have counted as causes of war. The Soviet Union responded to these attacks by steadily widening its pacts of non-aggression with minor or hard-pressed nations—Turkey first in December 1925, followed by Germany, Lithuania, Persia, Latvia, Afghanistan and others. Unlike all previous alliances and ententes, these pacts were non-exclusive. They were offered to all nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament of the League of Nations held its fourth session on November 30, 1927, the newly invited Soviet delegation startled the world by proposing to disarm. Five years earlier Chicherin had made a similar proposition at Genoa; it went unnoticed and was soon forgotten. But Litvinoff’s statement in 1927 came from a nation which had proved its economic and political stability over a term of years. It came moreover at a time when the peoples of the world were beginning to be disillusioned by the ever-repeated fruitless conferences with which European governments sought to hide from their peoples the chaos which followed the World War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Litvinoff broke the polite façade by suggesting actual disarmament, stating that the Soviet Government was ready to agree to total disarmament or any percentage of disarmament which the other powers would accept. He made this challenge time after time in the sight of the peoples of the world, until the constant evasion of the militarists made it apparent that no capitalist power was willing even to reduce armaments, and that the Disarmament Conference itself was little more than a mask for the old rearmament race.&lt;br /&gt;
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As armaments grew, the Soviet Union steadily extended pacts of non-aggression and began to press for an internationally accepted “definition of the aggressor,” designed to mobilize world opinion against the provokers of war. None of the major imperialist powers was willing to accept Litvinoff’s definition, which denounced as aggression the sending of any armed forces into any other nation. A dozen or more of the smaller countries signed it; the Soviet Union began to win the post of champion of the rights of smaller powers, which it was later to expand by its participation in the League of Nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The will to peace of the Soviet Union and its intelligence in maneuvering to keep out of war was soon severely tested by the growing tensions in the Far East. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria has been recognized by the whole world as a violation of the League of Nations Covenant, the Washington Nine-Power Pact and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to all of which Japan was signatory. It carried her troops to the Soviet borders and occasionally across them in forays by armed patrols which killed Soviet border guards and peasants. The most serious source of contention was the possession by the Soviet Government of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which crosses Manchuria as the shortest route to Vladivostok. Attacks by alleged bandits and arrests by Japanese military authorities put Soviet railway employees in peril hardly less than that of war. A report by the Soviet director of the road related over 3,000 cases of armed attack which had resulted in the murder of 56 people, the wounding of 825, the destruction of four kilometers of main line track and of hundreds of passenger and freight cars. On October 9, 1933, the USSR was able to publish four Japanese secret documents which discussed the “great necessity for assimilating the railway,” and made it plain that most of the attacks were inspired by Japanese military forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The answer of the USSR to these provocations was neither that of the strong capitalist nation which would long since have “protected its interests and citizens” by declaring war, nor was it that of a defenseless colonial nation like China, which continually submits. The Soviet Union built strong fortifications on its entire Far Eastern border, obviously of a defensive nature; and simultaneously removed a source of conflict by selling the railroad to Manchukuo at a price hardly one-fifth of the sum originally invested by the Russians. I was present in Tokyo when the sale occurred and noted the lessening of tension. “The Japanese people are for the time being convinced of our peaceful purposes; it will be some months before their militarists will be able to inflame them against us,” said a Soviet diplomat to me, making the distinction which Communists always make between people and governments. The Japanese militarists were even then laying a basis for further provocation by suggesting the purchase of Soviet Saghalin. Yet for even a temporary lessening of tension, the USSR thought it worth while to make concessions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In September 1934 the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations, an act which startled both friend and foe. Yet it was the logical consequence of the changing conditions of Europe and the growing strength of the USSR. The Soviet Union views the League analytically rather than emotionally. What is it? What has it to give? The League is not a territory nor a state nor a super-power; still less is it an ideal or a formula which will somehow miraculously bring peace. The League is a diplomatic instrument through which a group of powers meet and come to an agreement. Its policy is decided by the powers that are in it and by the relative strength and courage of those powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Behind the idealistic phrases with which at different stages each participating power has veiled its use of the League, the purpose of the League changes. Wilson started it as the organization of Europe on a basis of nationality; his plan involved also “freedom of the seas.” But “freedom of the seas” meant to Britain the domination of the world by American gold instead of by the British fleet; and Europe on a basis of nationality appalled Clemenceau, who knew quite well that there are twice as many Germans as French in Europe, and that “the interests of France” demand the splitting up of the Germans into minorities among many nations. The League, with America out, became the arena where Britain and France struggled for control of Europe, France wishing to crush Germany utterly and Britain willing to help Germany expand slightly. as a balance against France. Wall Street helped Britain by the Dawes and Young plans of reparations, scaling them down to “Germany’s capacity to pay,” i.e., the amount which it was thought German capitalists could squeeze from industrious German workers for several generations without revolt. Germany came into the League, hailed by phrases on the “United States of Europe,” which meant to the Soviet Union the united attempt of world capitalism to placate Germany for the Versailles deprivations by financing her in a drive to the East.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But Dawes guessed wrong. The world economic crisis broke Germany’s “capacity to pay” and ability to wait. Japan and Germany both left the League to seek expansion by their own armed might. The war danger increased but the League itself became, by their disaffection, an organization of powers which had more to lose than to gain from immediate war. “The League might become a hindrance to warlike tendencies,” said Stalin. It still contained robber powers who exploited colonial peoples, and small unstable states built up on the loot of Versailles. The Soviet Union admits the justice of the German grievance, but never the right of war to enforce those claims. “Injustices perpetrated by one war,” said Litvinoff, “can never be rectified by a new one, which only perpetrates worse injustices.” The Soviet Union entered the League to strengthen it against the tendency of Germany, Japan and now Italy to throw a torch into the powder magazine of the world. She thus upholds territorial gains of robber nations in order to increase the chances of world peace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
She even goes further. By pacts of mutual assistance concluded with France and Czechoslovakia, she has placed the might of her increasing Red Army behind the status quo of Europe. She joins with these “robber powers” to blockade Italy, herself the first to agree to the sanctions. Yet when oil sanctions are not agreed to, she continues to sell this commodity to Italy,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In steadily decreasing amounts, in spite of American headlines to the contrary. It is America’s sales that increase.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; bewildering the idealists of many nations. Why? Because no high example can check Italians in Abyssinia or stop the spread of the war infection through the trade channels of the world. Because idealist gestures are dangerous tactics against general staffs of armies: that lesson was learned at Brest-Litovsk. Because isolated action might turn against the Soviet Union a fascist drive from a disintegrating Europe, helped to disintegration by her choice of an individual stand. Only the threat of might may possibly halt the explosive drive towards war of a desperate fascism—the might of Europe organized through the League. The Soviet Union throws herself into the task of organizing it&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;She tried first to organize an “Eastern Locarno,” a pact of many nations against anyone who started an aggression. It failed through the refusal of Poland and Germany. Soviet policy is still to expand security pacts to all possible nations, including Germany and Poland, not even the present pacts being exclusive in nature.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; through security pacts which she seeks to widen. For the status quo is evil, but war is worse.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To strengthen this might the Soviet Union increases her Red Army, the only armed force on which she can really depend. Britain and France are camps of conflicting interests; on this the Communists have no illusions. In both these countries are strong popular forces supporting the USSR and the League of Nations in the policy of collective security against aggressors, and other strong reactionary forces which would prefer to support Nazi Germany in the looting of Russia. This would launch world war with all the gigantic means of modern destruction. Hence the struggle against world war today becomes inextricably linked with the struggle against fascist tendencies in the major imperialist countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This war, if it comes, will be no mere war between nations. It will arouse class conflicts throughout the world. Not at first perhaps, but in the end in every country. This the Red Army understands thoroughly; its loyalty is not alone to Russia but to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, wherever they exist or come into being. But not unless invaded will the Soviet Union intervene in any other country, either by war or by interference in its affairs. Marxian analysis tells them that this would hamper the revolutionary development of the other country; it would turn workers towards the capitalists of their own country under the name of patriotism. If the world war starts, the Red Army will advance with a rifle in one hand and pamphlets in the other It has shells to distribute tens of thousands of leaflets calling on the brotherhood of all workers; it has also the means of effective war. As the world’s most politically conscious, most mechanized army, trained in many languages, it is able to lead and equip partisan war on the territory of foes. It is told to get results with a minimum of suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I well remember a talk in Moscow with a high Soviet authority on the subject of Japan in the tense winter of 1933. It was clear to us both that the Soviet air fleet was superior and in easy reach of Tokyo. We looked from high windows on the ice in Moscow river and discussed the chances of war.&lt;br /&gt;
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“A good, industrious folk, the Japanese,” he said slowly. “It would be a pity to bomb them. Do you think any Communist likes to set aflame whole towns of toiling folk? . . . If war should come in the East between us and Japan, we have not the slightest doubt that it would be the end of capitalist Japan. Revolution would start in Manchukuo and spread southward through China, till all Asia was Communist. Every imperialist power in the world would fight this, till at last revolt flamed up in their own lands. The world revolution might thus be accomplished, but the world that survived would be badly ruined. It would cost the lives of tens of millions of toiling folk; it would mean famine and pestilence sweeping all Asia. The world revolution will be secured with much less suffering, if peace can be maintained.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“The Soviet Union needs no foreign wars for transforming the world,” said Manuilski in 1935 at the Congress of the Communist International. Her struggle for peace is no temporary slogan. With every year of peace the Soviet Union strengthens, not only as a nation, but as a shining example which the world will follow. As socialism advances in the Soviet Union, it begins to attract scientists, engineers, artists; it draws away from allegiance to capitalism wider and wider hosts. With every year of peace—granted the steadily advancing Soviet Union—the international relation of world forces shifts to the side of the Soviet world and to the disadvantage of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Capitalism breeds war, yet world war is not inevitable. For capitalism itself is no longer inevitable in the world. If the struggle for peace can avail month by month and year by year, to check, delay and hamper the forces that drive towards war, capitalism itself may collapse in one war-inciting country after another on a sufficient scale to prevent world war altogether. Or world war, if it comes, may be greatly shortened by the revolt of all those people who suffer unbearably from war.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the hope behind the Soviet struggle for peace. But whether in peace or in war, the growing strength and prosperity of the Soviet Union, achieved through two Five-Year Plans, insures the direction and is the pledge of the whole world’s future. The only question now is how deep and bitter will be the struggle—even the wars—before the far-flung peoples know and copy. But nothing any longer can stop the advance of their worldwide forces. They have both strength and knowledge and a conscience about the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART II: THE SOVIET WORLD MAKES MEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER IX: THE FACTORY COLLECTIVE ===&lt;br /&gt;
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In all the recent congresses in Moscow, when miners, auto-workers, weavers, engineers and lathe-hands come up to celebrate their latest achievements in production and to receive honors for increasing a nation’s wealth, a phrase recurs which has no counterpart under capitalism, because the reality which it expresses could not exist there. Even in the Soviet Union the widening use of the phrase is recent, an instinctive expression of a new and growing reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I bring you greetings from our factory collective.” “Our factory collective pledges its full support.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The factory collective is not the plant administration. Nor is it the trade union, the shop committee or even the Party organization of the factory. All these organizations are a part of it, having their well-defined functions in its vivid life. The factory collective is the sum total of all the people in the plant in all their organized functions, the basic living cell of Soviet society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The concept of the factory collective did not spring into being full grown. It derives steadily from the joint ownership of the means of production which has now existed for eighteen years. This is the economic reality which is steadily determining the minds of men and the forms of their social life. A worker attached to a machine must be either its slave or its owner; under capitalism he is its slave. In the Soviet Union he knows himself owner of the machine but not the sole owner. It is entrusted to him to master, to get from it all that modern technical skill can give. The product belongs to him and his fellows; through his work in the plant he connects with all society. This gives back to man the old unity of life around the process of production which was riven in twain when the tools by which men created passed into alien hands. It returns on a wider scale and at a higher level by as much as the modern machine is more powerful than the ancient tool.&lt;br /&gt;
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An American who had worked for some years in a Soviet factory told me that two things especially impressed him: the relation of workers to administration and the cultural life around the factory. “The foreman always asks the workers’ advice in all problems; the relations are those of two friends instead of a boss. In America my factory was just a place to make a living, just another day to get through as soon as you could. Here it is your club, your center of culture, the thing that is closest in life.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The life of the factory collective has three main aspects: production, workers’ life, and relation to the rest of the country. Each of these aspects has its own control. The director and his assistants are responsible for organizing production. The trade union is responsible for organizing the workers’ life, including factory conditions, insurance, education and social activities. The Party organization is responsible for the political training of the workers, for widening their knowledge of the country’s policies and of their plant’s function in the building of socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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These three together—director, trade union organizer, and Party secretary—form the “triangle,” the highest authority in the plant. Each has his clearly defined function; all three together consult on questions affecting the fundamental life of the factory. Orders of the director must be taken without question in production, and he is held responsible for everything that happens in the plant. But any director who failed to get on with the Party and trade union organization wouldn’t last long. As a Russian worker explained it: “If the factory collective doesn’t like the director you may be sure the Commissariat of Heavy Industry won’t leave him there.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chap. 6 for an example of this.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The relation between workers and management was thus described to me by the American worker: “The whole working gang is interested in production. The program for next month is discussed with all of us. The foreman calls a meeting and tells us that the administration wants us to put out 3,000 milling tools next month. How shall we do it? We discuss in detail; each of us says what he can do. It all adds up to 4,000. So the foreman goes to the administration and raises the plan to 4,000. If we fulfill or surpass our plan, we get a premium which we divide among the workers on the basis of what each has done. To help us estimate this, the shop economist gives us each month a list of each worker’s production, spoilage, idle time, breakdown of machines. Naturally we give the most of the premium to the best workers because they helped the whole gang win. The factory honors the winning brigade not only with a premium but with a red banner which waves each month among the lathes for everyone who passes to see. The best factories get honor and premiums from the whole country because everyone knows that the more we produce the more everyone will have.”&lt;br /&gt;
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When conflicts occur in a factory between the management and the trade union, there are various ways in which they may be resolved. Often the Party organization of the plant can settle it by discussion within this wider group to which members both of administration and trade union belong. Serious disagreements are appealed by the shop committee to its central trade union, or even to the All-Union Council of Trade Unions which has governmental powers to enforce the rights of workers. For individual cases of injustice appeal is often made direct to the courts. These struggles may be time-consuming, but men who feel convinced enough of their case to fight it through rarely fail of satisfaction. The head of the Nijni Auto Works was removed in 1932 after an investigation by the trade unions which began with a fight over living conditions started by the foreign workers. In another case that I know, an engineer who sharply criticized the plant’s manager in the factory newspaper was later fired on grounds that he thought insufficient. Failing to interest the shop committee in his case he took it to the city organization of the Party, which ordered an investigation that resulted in his reinstatement, with wages paid for all time lost. The director was reprimanded, and the reprimand printed on the front page of the factory newspaper, in order, as one worker expressed it, that “the director may know he is not God.”&lt;br /&gt;
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More common are the conflicts in which local management and trade union unite to compel action by the central offices of the trust. The shop committee demands certain safety appliances or new construction for the health of the workers. The manager replies that his budget does not allow it. He has no objection, however, to the shop committee making the strongest possible case through the trade union to the central organization which supplies the budget. Since the manager has no personal profit to make by cutting out improvements, but advances in reputation and position rather through his ability to maintain an enthusiastic organization of productive workers, his interest lies on the side of supplying their demands.&lt;br /&gt;
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Workers, on the other hand, do not want a boss who is soft and sentimental. They want one who can efficiently organize their work. They know that their prosperity depends directly on the success of their factory. They themselves will ask to have workers transferred who make much spoilage, or even expelled if they steal or persistently disorganize production. They consider it desertion for a worker to shift jobs without reason or without training someone to take his place. If health or family matters require a change, or if a factory cannot use his highest skill or give him a chance to develop, he applies for and gets “release.” But to shift merely because another factory, better organized, can give him higher wages and better conditions is considered cowardly.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Somebody has to make this factory a good one. Why shouldn’t he? His going makes it that much harder for the rest of us; we have to break in a green man. Why should he run off to another place that other folks organized because he finds things difficult here?” Here is an attitude similar to that of partners in a business.&lt;br /&gt;
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Production, however, is only part of existence. Around this center of jointly owned production is built the whole unity of the worker’s life. Through his factory collective he enters into the duties and privileges of citizenship; it is the primary organization which elects deputies to the local Soviets. Through his shop committee he receives his social insurance, his opportunities for education, his excursions, sports and vacations, and takes part in a score of voluntary social activities from government commissions to parachute clubs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take an example of the internal organization of a factory collective, the Red Proletarian Plant in Moscow. The smallest unit in the plant is the production brigade which may have thirty to fifty workers. There are one hundred and fifty brigades in the plant, under one shop committee. These brigades not only compete in production records, rewarded by red banners and premiums, but also in social activity. Homiakov’s brigade, for instance, has twenty-nine workers, Every one of them does some social work. Some check the norms of production and standards of piece-work; some watch over the social insurance; three edit the wall newspaper which criticizes the shortcomings of the plant and of the workers. One middle-aged man was inactive socially and this was a great shame to the group, which tried to locate some tasks to interest him. They finally elected him president of the Red Aid Branch; within a month he signed up a big membership and had an active circle going.&lt;br /&gt;
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The brigade decides the list of “udarniks,” champion workers who get special privileges; but its list will be further checked by the trade union if it is too large or if there are complaints. Does a worker need a free vacation at a sanatorium? The brigade discusses it and sends a recommendation to the shop committee, which has a definite quota of places, and can fight for more. Safety devices on machinery, raising the technical knowledge of each operator, financial help to workers who are in straits, are matters which start with the brigade and are sent with their recommendation to the trade union. The union itself as a whole is actively pushing the completion of the new model dining-room, the expansion of the day nursery and clinic facilities—all these on demands which originally start in the brigades. All this work is democratically initiated, organized, carried through and checked by the rank and file members.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not the least important aspect of factory life is the cultural activity. Educational opportunities range from simple classes in reading and writing for newly arrived peasants, which characterized the earlier years of Soviet power, to the present university courses and institutions of scientific research. “You come to your factory to study, to attend a university,” said a worker to me. “You think, ‘My factory is going to make an engineer of me.’ After work you take a hot shower and go to the library or gliding club. Artists and singers come from the theaters to sing for us during the dinner hour. Famous authors come to discuss their books with us. If you want to write or act, you join the dramatic club or literary circle. Maybe some day you may go away to enter a theater or a newspaper, but even then you will sometimes come back to your factory.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The intimate sense of possession which a Soviet worker feels in his factory was strikingly shown to me by my step-daughter Ducia, who worked in a large electric plant near Moscow. I accompanied her on her return to the factory after she had been ill at home with grippe. As we approached the plant she grew excited; a vividness came into her gestures which had been lacking during her two weeks at home. She insisted that I notice and admire the factory laboratory where she worked, the power plant, the restaurant, the big workers’ club building; she pointed out the pathway between the shops that led to the park and stadium. I suddenly realized that Ducia had been positively homesick for her factory.&lt;br /&gt;
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Her reason for having chosen this particular factory to work in had little to do with wages. She chose it because it had a good reputation as an educational and social center, with a strong organization of Communist youth and a first class university. This offered her the well-rounded life which she demanded from her labor. Her working day was only six hours long, but she not infrequently spent twelve hours or more in and around the factory. She would go half an hour before her work began, drop into the Red Corner to get her newspaper or to discuss with the other girls the work of the political courses; she would come home late in the evening after her skiing club, German class or musical circle, or perhaps still later from a group party at the theater.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Ducia’s set it is the accepted view, which she does not even stop to formulate, that every human being should engage in three kinds of serious activity: productive work whereby he justifies his right to a share in the commonly produced goods of the country; voluntary social work, which holds together the whole apparatus of society; and study which improves individual capacities. Besides this serious activity there are recreations. All this many-sided life Ducia finds in her factory.&lt;br /&gt;
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The study takes different forms from year to year. In addition to courses in physics, German and political science which she takes regularly, various campaigns urge special study upon her. It may be her Young Communist League which makes a drive to have all members study the history of the Communist movement of youth. One year it was the drive for “technical minimum,” to raise the skill of all workers in the country. Ducia’s technical minimum was fixed for her by a committee of engineers who visited her laboratory, and discussed with each employee separately the special subjects needed for his work. She studied these subjects for several months, assisted by a voluntary teacher, one of the engineers of the plant who agreed to help several girls as his form of social work. “The whole laboratory is like a university,” said Ducia, “with the six hours’ work like practice on our subjects. When girls meet on the stairs, they are always asking whether you have finished such a formula.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Like most of her associates, Ducia also does social work; in her case it is the organization of the twelve current-events’ courses for young people in the various shops of the factory She takes much pride in keeping these running well. Not all social work is as serious as Ducia’s. One of the girls organizes a group for parachute jumping, another gets up theater parties, a third helps to plan excursions. Social work is not something that an individual does “for others”; it is the extension of his own interests, the organization in a social manner of what he himself most likes to do. It is also of value to the community and a direct preparation for participation in government. In a sense it is already taking part in government, which is increasingly built up from these voluntary social activities. A man whose financial ability is shown as dues collector for his union, may rise to full or part-time work as assistant chief of the city taxes. A woman who shows interest and efficiency in organizing the factory day nursery may later become chief of the city’s motherhood and infancy bureau.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is in fact the normal path to political office in the Soviet Union. I recall, for instance, Gribkova, who ten years ago was a young, illiterate farm servant. Wishing to better herself, she got a job as longshoreman on the Volga, thus entering the public services where, as she put it, “the road lay open to all life.” Working downstream she reached a textile mill and took employment as unskilled worker. Here she found the natural center for education and advancement. She learned to read and write, took technical courses and to handle a machine, took political courses and became an “active one” in her factory. From this point her specialization was possible in two directions: through technical training to higher posts in industry, or through social work and political training to posts in government. Gribkova chose the latter; she became interested in the voluntary tasks of factory inspection, and was later chosen by her fellow workers as part of their quota for a two-year training course which prepared professional factory inspectors. She is now a full-time official, head of inspection for a township. Hundreds of thousands have followed a similar path; this is the typical relation between factory life and the public activities of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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The life of a great factory is continuous. Just as its productive life goes on for three shifts, so its social life continues nearly twenty-four hours a day. If one chances to come at six-thirty in the morning to the great Stalin Auto Works in Moscow, he may see in Day Nursery No. 41 the beginning of the day’s life. Mothers bring their children to the nursery before reporting to work. Each child receives a swift medical examination as he enters; if this indicates illness, the mother is excused from work to care for her child or to take it to the hospital. In the case of nurslings, the mother is given an hour off at the end of every three hours’ work to nurse her child. These day nurseries are considered as essential a public service as public schools of other countries. But whereas education is compulsory, day nurseries are not. The picture spread abroad of a stern Soviet government forcibly taking children from their mothers would arouse incredulous laughter in any Soviet home. The Soviet mother regards a day nursery as a facility which relieves her of the child certain hours of the day, and as a center of scientific information, whose employees can assist her in its proper care. She demands the day nursery and fights for its quality. If any factory administration fails to supply adequate funds to enlarge and improve its day nursery, the working women will see that the director is reminded.&lt;br /&gt;
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About the time that the mothers are saying good-by to their children in the nursery, the newspaper office inside the plant begins to bustle with activity. Six thousand copies of Moscow daily papers and 8,500 copies of the four-page daily of the plant, &#039;&#039;Overtake and Surpass&#039;&#039;, must be delivered by eight or nine o’clock to subscribers in various shops. The plant newspaper is full of the daily life of the 35,000 workers. It organizes campaigns for production, for quality, for good housing, co-operative stores, clubs, schools, day nurseries; it contains complaints by workers about all these facilities; it is the organ through which these thousands of workers communicate with each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the midst of the great shops of the auto works, a small green square contains both the central dining room and the central polyclinic. The latter is maintained by the Moscow Board of Health, but its connection with the factory collective is very intimate. The health record of every worker is kept on file in a smaller dispensary in the shop where a doctor, medical assistant and statistician are constantly on hand for first aid and general care of this particular group of workers. For all special services the worker goes to the central polyclinic where a medical personnel of 300 includes specialists in all diseases. One interesting feature of this polyclinic is its direct connection with the diet kitchen of the factory which immediately gives the workers without extra charge the particular diet which the doctor prescribes.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is no sentimental glorification of manual labor which causes the grouping of Soviet institutions around the factory. It derives naturally from the unity of man as owner, creator and user, which under socialism replaces the capitalist division of men into bosses, hands, and buyers of goods. Even under capitalism men feel a deep human joy in creation and mastery, a mastery which may be widened and deepened by the machine. But capitalism poisons this joy at its source. A crane man in Seattle once told me that when he sat aloft picking up great loads with power and deftness, he felt “like one of those Greek giants or ancient gods.” Then he suddenly realized that he had no claim to that crane, but might face any morning, at the owner’s whim, the sign: “Closed down,” and he felt himself degraded from a god to a slave.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under capitalism the association of men in production is made hateful by a clash of interests; they seek their real life elsewhere, building it from disjointed fragments. Under socialism this association is strengthened by a thousand ties of mutual interest and becomes the solid foundation on which the whole structure of political and social life is frankly and realistically built. Life becomes unified; from worker to manager, to scientist, to artist there is at no point a break. A worker studies and becomes an engineer; he is active in the factory committee on inventions, and becomes a scientist; he shows talent in the dramatic circle and becomes an actor; he devotes himself to social work and rises in the government. Any of these interests may become professional and take him out of the factory into a wider or more specialized life. But the factory remains the social home from which he launched into life, and to which he often returns, either actually or emotionally.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER X: FARMING A CONTINENT ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Among the many flaming words which poured from the hearts of two hundred combined-harvester operators meeting in December 1935 in Moscow with the heads of Party and government, amid jubilation over present success and promises to make the future even more victorious, there was one poignant phrase of contrast with the past.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We sons and daughters of peasants—had there been no Soviet power, no Party of Lenin-Stalin, our lot would have been slavery to kulaks, or dawnless poverty in the mire of small peasant farming.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These words illumine with a piercing ray the tremendous changes that have taken place in the Soviet rural districts in a span of years so brief that the past still remains vivid in the minds of men not yet thirty years old. “When I worked as a fourteen-year-old farmhand under the tsar,” said the combine operator Kapusta, “I never saw the leaders of the government, never saw even the boss for whom I worked. . . . I never expected from life such happiness, such joy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Five years ago Kapusta was an unskilled worker. But not Kapusta alone; so were they all. What else but unskilled workers were there on the backward individual farms of peasant Russia, where fifteen years ago the tractor was stoned as a “devil machine?” Even five years ago, who among Russian peasants had ever seen a combine-harvester? Today not only are millions of peasants acquainted by sight with the most modern farm machinery, but hundreds of thousands have mastered its operation and make a more continuous use of it than is possible on the private farms of America, which are too small to utilize profitably this modern machine. The combine is already a machine too good for capitalism. The American average harvesting record per combine is 578 acres, while the Soviet average secured in 1935 was 643. The champion operators who met in Moscow spurned this average. They had made records of a thousand, two thousand and even twenty-five hundred acres for the harvest season, and were swearing a solemn oath to train before next harvest many more operators like themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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The time of this great advance has been so short that they can all look back as if to yesterday and recall the days of ignorance and poverty, when they slaved for wealthier farmers or wasted nine-tenths of their labor trudging from strip to strip of their medieval peasant fields. Today the very word “peasant” is passing from their vocabulary. They speak of themselves as “kolhozniks,” members of the collective economy, joint owners and users of the large-scale farm on which they work. They know quite well that if there had been no collectivization of farming, their slavery and darkness would have continued. For if modern machines had come to the Russian soil under capitalist conditions, a minority of successful farmers would have gained the means of production and risen to a brief wealth on the impoverishment of millions—brief until they in turn were robbed by the big banks of the cities, as farmers are under capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The years 1930 to 1933 will go down in mankind’s story as the turning point in the farm history of the world. No other events of those years will be so long remembered—not the struggles of the League of Nations, nor the American New Deal; not even the world-wide economic crisis which was but one more, the worst, of many crises. Even the rise of the Chinese Soviets and the turning of Central Europe to fascism may receive less space in future history books than the collectivization of Soviet farming, whereby men won the dream of centuries, security on the soil.&lt;br /&gt;
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Security on the soil! Security from drought, from floods, from mortgages, from the chances of nature and the exploitations of man! Even to attain fragments of such security, if not for themselves then for their children, men of all ages have struggled and died. American families left the comforts of settled regions to homestead in dugouts, for the security promised by land ownership. Then drought or the foreclosure of mortgages showed that security based on private property in land is illusion. Markets collapsed and land was taken away for bare taxes. Soviet farmers today are winning not only security against taxes and mortgages and markets but even against drought and floods. Farming is industrialized on the basis of modern machinery and division of labor. Crop losses through “acts of God” are minimized by better tillage, crop insurance, and assistance from the more fortunate areas. The control of the joint farm is democratically organized; the general meeting not only elects the management, but decides the plan of the farm and the division of work. Security on the land thus co-exists with free initiative.&lt;br /&gt;
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This change has occurred among people whose farming was formerly notoriously backward. Ten years ago in the central grain-growing regions of Russia, there were three homemade wooden plows for every metal plow. One-third of the peasants had no horse at all but labored for others to pay for the plowing of their own soil. Lands were divided according to a medieval system; the twenty acres of a single family might be divided into a dozen strips scattered miles apart. Scientific crop rotation and seed selection were unknown. The primitive methods of tillage steadily exhausted the soil. A typical study of grain crops in the Kirsanov district showed a steady decline of average yield from thirteen bushels per acre in 1896-1905 to ten and a half bushels in the five years preceding the World War. On this same land since the collective farm was organized in 1930 the yield rose by better tillage to an average of seventeen bushels in 1930-33, and twenty bushels in 1934-35.&lt;br /&gt;
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In four earth-shaking years, the Soviet Union changed from a country of tiny, badly tilled holdings, worked with wooden plow and hand sickle, to the largest scale farms in the world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In the United States farms of a thousand acres or more comprise only 7.5 per cent of the total tilled area; in the USSR in 1935, nine-tenths of the tilled area was made up of farms averaging thirteen hundred acres.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The initiative was taken by the poorer peasants and farm hands, urged and organized by the Communists, and assisted by government credits and machines. When the Five-Year Plan swiftly increased the farm machinery available, the new collective farm proved able to attract ever wider and wider groups of farmers. The movement was bitterly fought by the small rural capitalists known as kulaks, who farmed with hired labor, lived by money-lending, or owned small mills, threshers and other means of production and used these facilities to exploit their neighbors.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Writers unacquainted with Russian rural life often confuse kulaks with peasants generally, which leads them to describe the whole collectivization movement as an attack on the peasants. But for half a century students of Russian rural districts have spoken of kulaks. In 1895 Stepniak wrote that “hard unflinching cruelty” was their main characteristic; in 1904 Wolf von Schierhand wrote of the kulak as a “usurer and oppressor in a peasant’s blouse.” In 1918 Dr. E. J. Dillon, in &#039;&#039;The Eclipse of Russia&#039;&#039;, said: “Of all the human monsters I have ever met in my travels, I cannot recall any so malignant and odious as the Russian kulak.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The state’s donation to farming and the technical help supplied by city workers proved decisive. During the years from 1930 to 1935, the Soviet government issued more than a billion dollars of direct credits to the farms for livestock and implements and spent an additional three billion for farm machinery loaned through the tractor stations;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For tractor stations 5.5 billion rubles, for direct loans 1. billion; these were “hard rubles” whose value may be estimated as fifty cents.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; it also gave food and seed loans of 157 million bushels of grain to farms in distress. At the call of the Communist Party tens of thousands of skilled workers, bookkeepers, machine repairmen, teachers and organizers, poured into the rural districts to help organize the farms. The most difficult period was from the 1932 to the 1933 harvest when kulak sabotage, added to difficulties of inefficient organization, caused a grain shortage that put the whole country on short rations. Success was won by the 1933 harvest which reached nearly 90 million tons of grain, the largest harvest ever known in the Russian land; it was succeeded by an equal or larger grain crop in 1934 and 1935. These harvest successes helped create a government budget surplus in 1934 of 437 million rubles, which was at once applied to cancel debts owed to the state by the farmers for early expenses of organizing and equipping the collectives. This wiped out 53 per cent of the still outstanding indebtedness, including all debts incurred prior to 1933.&lt;br /&gt;
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The economic results of collectivization have been an increase in the sown area of 30 million acres, from 293 to 323 million; a grain crop which for three years has been 15 to 20 million tons higher than the average for the five years before the collectives were formed;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The average before collectivization was 78 to 80 million tons; in 1933 and 1934, 90 million; in 1935 nearly 100 million tons. Cotton area 688,700 hectares in 1913; 802,000 in 1927, and 2,051,000 in 1933. Sugar-beet area 648,700 in 1913; 665,000 in 1927, and 1,212,000 in 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an area sown to sugar beets which is double the pre-war or any previous record; and an area sown to cotton which is two and a half times either the pre-war or the re-collectivization area. Livestock suffered catastrophically during the early years of collectivization but has been climbing rapidly back in the past three years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chap. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The indications for the future are even brighter, since the rapidly improving methods of tillage and increase of fertilizer are counted upon to increase harvest yield year by year.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;As an example 46 per cent of all spring seeding in 1935 was done on winter-fallowed land, as compared with 25 per cent in 1930, and three-fourths of the autumn sowing in 1935 was done on summer-fallowed land as compared with 30 per cent in 1930. Similar increases have occurred in the use of selected seed, of fertilizer, scientifically planned crop rotations, and so forth.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the end of 1935 Stalin in conference with the harvester-combine operators announced that “in the very near future, in three or four years,” 120 to 130 million tons of grain would be expected from the farms.&lt;br /&gt;
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By 1935, the new forms of collective farming were sufficiently stabilized for the permanent fixing of boundaries. For at least two years practically no members had wished to leave the collective farms to return to individual farming; crop rotations and the location of fields were becoming settled. The Soviet Government thereupon issued a decree granting “perpetual use of land” to the farm collectives. All over the country today rapid surveying of boundaries goes on followed by village celebrations which record the deed for perpetual use. Speakers celebrate the change of recent years, recalling days when most of the land was owned by landlords and tenant peasants worked in the slavery of debt, when freehold peasants sold their land bit by bit to pay taxes. “From perpetual debt to perpetual ownership is the change we have made,” said a Tartar farmer.&lt;br /&gt;
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In place of the old disused boundary posts with the tsarist eagle and the inscription “Each for his own,” there arise new boundary posts with the sickle and hammer and the letters, “USSR.” All the land is unitedly owned by the whole country of workers and farmers, say these symbols; its use is granted perpetually to specific organizations of working farmers. As Soviet citizen, the farmer is ultimate owner, as working farmer, he is permanent user. Both ownership and use are democratically organized and the relation of the smaller group to the whole country is fixed in part by permanent law and in part by annual contracts designed to encourage efficient production and to guarantee right to the fruits of toil. Security is gained by the permanent use of land which cannot be alienated by sale, lease, or mortgage. Freedom is secured by the democratic organization of both farm and country.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is this group which thus becomes permanent user? The model constitution adopted by the Congress of “Farm Udarniks”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A delegate congress from the farms that have made the best records; their recommendations have weight as expressing the best farm practice.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and ratified by the Soviet Government February 17, 1935, states that it is a “voluntary union of working farmers” who unite “in order to build with joint means of production and jointly organized labor a collective, i.e., a social husbandry, to secure full victory over the kulak and over all exploiters, to secure full victory over need and darkness, over the backwardness of small individual husbandry, to create high productivity of labor and thus insure a better life for the members.&lt;br /&gt;
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“All boundaries formerly dividing the fields of the members are abolished. . . .&lt;br /&gt;
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“All draft animals, farm implements, seed reserves, fodder for the collective livestock, and buildings necessary to carry on the joint farming and the processing of the farm products are socialized. . . .&lt;br /&gt;
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“Living quarters, family cattle and fowls and the buildings necessary for their use are not socialized but remain for the private use of the members’ family.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Up to two head of milch cattle, one brood sow and her brood, ten sheep and goats, unlimited rabbits and chickens and twenty bee-hives in the grain, cotton, and beet regions; larger numbers are allowed for individual use in the regions devoted to livestock.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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All persons over sixteen who toil on the farm have equal vote. The general meeting elects the management, accepts or expels members, decides in conference with state experts the plan for farm production, crop rotation and new improvements and sets aside within certain limits private family garden plots ranging from half to one and a half acres for the individual use of members. It also contracts for the use of machinery from the Machine Tractor Station, a service center which supplies machines and expert knowledge over about a fifteen mile radius. These stations were originally organized and financed by the state but are becoming in part co-operatively owned through shares taken by the collective farms they serve. The farm must make certain deliveries of crops to the state at low prices fixed by a state commission; it must also pay the tractor station in kind. These two payments amount to about one-fourth of the average Crop; as tractor station service increases and with it the payments for machinery, the direct deliveries to the state somewhat diminish, moving towards a time when the state will receive its quota as direct payment for machinery.&lt;br /&gt;
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When these deliveries are made, and the seed and fodder fund set aside, the rest of the harvest may be divided among the members in proportion to the work they have done. The “work-day” is the unit for payment, but work-days are of different value according to the quantity and quality of work done. A tractor driver’s day may count as two ordinary work-days, a night watchman’s as three-quarters of a day. When possible, work-days are related to a definite amount of labor done—an area plowed or harvested—and additions or subtractions are made for work above or below the norm. The general meeting also sets aside part of the income for expansion and common uses such as field kitchens and day nurseries. This at first led to abuses by over-zealous farm officials wishing to build up central funds, but these amounts are now limited. In the past two years, the increased harvests have led to an increasing surplus above the government deliveries and the food required by the members. This may be freely sold, either individually or collectively, and either in town markets or through the village co-operatives, which have been greatly strengthened during the past year.&lt;br /&gt;
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Some fifty miles from the railway, in a northern flax and rye district, the Kalinin Collective Farm showed me its “Farm Plan,” a document of eighteen long pages, neatly stitched into a pamphlet. It was a printed form issued by the Commissariat of Agriculture, with details filled out by the local organization. Acreage, meadows, arable land, orchards, crop rotations, farm implements, draft animals, cows, pigs and chickens—everything you could wish to know about the Kalinin farm is here recorded. Not only are all people listed but allowance is made for babies yet unborn; an estimated 2 per cent annual increase of population must be provided with a growing standard of living. The farm plans to provide food for people and animals, produce the marketable crops recommended for the district, erect new buildings, reclaim new fields and create an increasingly prosperous life for its members. To this end work must be assigned to use as far as possible the entire working-time of the hundred able-bodied members.&lt;br /&gt;
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The farmer-members have discussed this plan for months before they adopted it. The township surveyor helped them plot the fields; the township land office and the Soviet newspapers have informed them that the country’s standard of living is to double by 1937, and that they must do their share. This involves increasing wheat at the expense of rye, doubling the oat ration of their horses, increasing fats and meats. They know that the state expects from them a certain amount of flax, the chief marketable crop of their district. On the basis of all this knowledge they plan for the coming year, counting on a constantly increasing crop yield through more machines and fertilizer and better methods, and on a constantly increasing prosperity through the rational assignment of work to the members. The plan includes the labor organization, with the number of total work-days needed for sowing and harvest, and the amount of labor left over for building a new library, equipping a playground and stadium or installing electricity and radios. No one need be out of a job, for all labor can be utilized to increase in various ways the prosperity and culture of the village; all will be paid by shares in the joint harvest, according to the quantity and quality of work done.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the entire plan is accepted by the general meeting, it is registered with the township office and becomes part of the economic plan of the whole country, which is derived from and in turn controls all lesser plans. Sowing and harvest are not the affair of the individual farmer only; they are the great annual rhythm on which the nation’s life depends. The whole country knows this and relates itself consciously to the plans of the farmers. Scientific conferences consider questions of insect pests and seed selection; heavy industry makes plans to manufacture more tractors. Government and Party congresses outline the changing demands which the growing life of the land makes on farming—increase of area or yield, or a change in the proportion of crops. Congresses of farmers meet by township, province and on national scale to discuss problems of tillage and farm organization. The Russian winter which in former days was a season of hibernation in snow-bound villages, is today a season of active farm-planning on a nationwide scale. Not even the farthest farm is isolated; visits of experts and newspaper campaigns keep it in touch with the life of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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When spring begins in the south, hundreds of press correspondents pour forth to cover the sowing. &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039; alone sends a dozen staff correspondents and tells sixty local correspondents to concentrate on farm news. The &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; keeps several small airplanes busy, each as the center of a group of a dozen persons covering the farms. The news-gathering organization which some of the Soviet newspapers put on the sowing or harvest is beyond the scope of the biggest dailies in the capitalist world. Every provincial paper adds its reporters. The story is the world’s biggest annual story with more reporters than covered the World War!&lt;br /&gt;
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These reporters are not mere observers; their reporting is planned to help the harvest. One journalist of my acquaintance spent forty-four days in an airplane covering harvest in the North Caucasus; he visited one hundred farms and forty Tractor Stations, and slept in the fields without one night in a bed. His reporting was for a concrete purpose; he would drop in a field, apply his yardstick and count the grain ears lost on a square yard of harvested ground; he compared various farms, discovered which ones harvested best and how they did it. Within three days he was meeting with other journalists who made similar surveys; they discussed the chief harvest problems of the season and the best ways in which these were being met. These results were at once radioed to all the farms and published through the press of the country for the benefit of other farmers as the harvest traveled north. Every season hundreds of new ideas are thus culled from the experience of the farmers and broadcast by press and radio for the use of other farms.&lt;br /&gt;
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“A characteristic trait of the collective farm system,” says Vaviloff, chief of the Plant Institute. of Leningrad, “is its ability to assimilate new technical methods and make new scientific experiments.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The most striking example of the organization of great masses of farmers under the leadership of science was shown by the united fight of 1934 against the great drought which affected the whole southern half of Europe, including large areas in the Ukraine and Crimea. In many places no rain fell from April till harvest. In days of individual peasant farming, the peasants would have killed cattle for food and gone to the cities for work, putting back agriculture for several years. The collective farmers met swiftly in delegate congresses to declare “War Against Drought.” They took stock of all resources and made plans to suit each region. Near the Dnieper river they seeded the overflow meadows. On the slopes of the Caucasus the Kabardinians dug thousands of miles of irrigation ditches, declaring: “We have mountains; we don’t need rain.” Other farms organized continuous hauling of water by fire-department wagons, or planted swamps and forest glades. Children stormed the fields in organized detachments to pull up every moisture-sucking weed. Scientists busily determined for each district what second crops could best grow where winter wheat had failed. The press gave directions about this second planting; the government shot in by fast freight the necessary seed. The USSR secured a crop equal to the bumper harvest of 1933, and even most farms in the drought-stricken regions came through with food for man and beast, and with organization strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet farmer has come out of his old isolation; he stands on the highways of the world. Through his collective farm, like the industrial worker through the factory collective, he connects with the wider life of science and art. Seven thousand farms in the Ukraine have established during the past two years their “laboratory cottages,” where the farmers carry on scientific experiments based on their own fields. In a typical one I found exhibits of wheat grown under varying conditions, samples of new crops, collections of insect pests, instruments for weather recording. “Sixty farmers take part in our experiments,” they told me. “We exchange data with the Zaporozhe Experimental Station.” These not long since illiterate peasants who grubbed the soil blindly are farmer-scientists now, collecting nationally useful data for the conquest of harvest yields.&lt;br /&gt;
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More than a hundred thousand drama circles for self-expression have sprung up on Sovict farms. Sport and recreation of all types grow also with tremendous speed. Farmers learn gliding, parachute jumping, even aviation. The small farm airplane which can land on a harvested field is a not infrequent visitor in farm campaigns. Extra-early sowing done by air into the mud of melting snow is a recognized means of combating drought in many regions.&lt;br /&gt;
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By no means all Soviet farms are yet well organized, but efficiency steadily increases. By no means all of them are prosperous, but prosperity steadily grows. The change which is most apparent is in the faces of the farmers. They have lost the dull, unresponsive stare of the peasant; they are more vivid, alert. “Formerly even the peasant with the best income lived like a pig,” said a Soviet farmer to me. “His only use for his surplus was to get drunk. Today he has a reading-room, a hospital, a school, a laboratory; he reads the newspapers and knows about the world. His children go from the village to build factories, to discover minerals, to conquer the Arctic, to become ‘heroes of the Soviet Union.’”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than two million letters 2 year from farmers pour into the offices of the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; in Moscow, a high-piled mountain covering many tables. I asked an editor how their contents revealed the changing life of the farm. “When our paper began its existence,” he said, “in the years before collectivization, we got chiefly individual complaints and requests for simple information on farm technique. ‘My taxes are too high!’ ‘How shall I care for my cow?’ Such were the letters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What do they write about now? The education of children, the position of women, the farm theater, the economic crisis in foreign lands. We got five hundred original poems on the death of Kirov and seventy on the disaster to the Maxim Gorky airplane. They comment on world affairs, on China and Italy. You can’t compare them with what they were ten years ago. Instead of ‘my horse and cow,’ their interest is wide as the world.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the northern slopes of the Caucasus mountains, a small district of once suppressed non-Russians, known as Kabardinia, prides itself on creating “the farms of tomorrow.” Its collective farmers have been known to vote the greater part of a harvest surplus to add to the government’s school fund and build for their own village “the best school in the valley.” They bring architects from Moscow to help them plan “farm-cities,” settlements which shall combine expert farming with the culture of the town, high schools, laboratories, libraries, sound-film theaters. A forty-mile highway runs through the Kabardinian valley. Last summer travelers passing, on foot or by cart, found seven rest-stations at five-mile intervals. Brightly painted, tile-roofed pavilions were furnished with wash-basins and beds with fresh linen; large plates of watermelon were placed on the table to quench the visitor’s thirst. An old man attendant refused all payment for the refreshment, saying: “This is the farm ‘Dawn of Socialism’; we planted two extra acres of melons for the traveler.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XI: THE FREEING OF WOMEN ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“Every kitchen maid must learn to rule the state.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throughout the world a struggle goes on for women’s equality and freedom, with varying methods and varying success. The methods most commonly known are those of different women’s organizations which fight, decade after decade, for new specific increases in women’s “rights.” They count their victories by the number of women who one by one attain high office, by the number of rights slowly secured, the right to vote, to enter industry, to inherit property, to divorce, to some individual status after marriage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Undoubted gains they have known, and also many disillusions. A tireless woman in New England recently told me that she had fought for thirty years to get “a decent inspection of women’s labor in our state” and that they would “probably lose it at the next election.” Nor does the elevation of the occasional woman to high position necessarily improve the lot of women generally. From Cleopatra down to America’s women officials, exceptional women have occasionally been permitted to rule; it is not recorded that the mass of women gained more consideration from them than from men rulers. Women the world over are still unequal to men, bound by a thousand discriminations. In the backward lands of the East hundreds of millions of women are still a subject sex. Not even in the most advanced capitalist countries are they quite equal with men; the long list of disabilities against which the National Women’s Party protests in America is evidence of that. Nowhere in capitalist lands have they equal access to all universities, equal pay for equal work in all industry, equal right to advance in all professions, equal rights in marriage and in the care and custody of children. Even those rights which they have attained are today under attack by fascism, which under the phrases of chivalry drives women back to the Middle Ages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is therefore the more amazing that Soviet women should have gained so swiftly an equality unknown elsewhere in the world. They receive equal pay for equal work and no jobs are closed to them. They have equal opportunity in education and in government. They have equal rights and duties in marriage; they are free to have or not to have children. They have full political, economic, legal and social equality, as human beings and citizens. This has been attained in eighteen years in a country where women were once suppressed not only in the European but also in the Asiatic manner. Tsarist law made Russian wives the property of their husbands “in duty bound to render him love, respect and in all things obedience to his wishes.” They had no right to separate passports; if they ran away, the police returned them to their husbands. This law was reinforced by brutal peasant customs; Gorky relates the sight of an unfaithful wife bound naked to a cart and flogged by her peasant husband into unconsciousness in the midst of a jeering, applauding crowd. In tsarist Central Asia millions of dark-skinned Mohammedan women lived in the seclusion of harems and behind black veils.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The freeing of women takes place in the Soviet Union swiftly because it is not a woman’s fight alone. It comes as part of the freeing of human beings by giving them joint ownership over the country’s means of production, irrespective of sex, color or race. . . . “The emancipation of women is not only the work of women Communists but of men Communists also, just as the fight for socialism is a mutual fight,” said Krupskaia, widow of Lenin. The Communists hold that the gains in women’s freedom made through centuries have been chiefly due to change in methods of production. The modern factory freed women from the patriarchal home, but imposed its own form of slavery; it used women to cut down wages, thus increasing the antagonism of the sexes. Economic slavery is the basis of all other inequalities, the key-log in the jam which must first be loosed that all others may rush free.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No freedom comes without battle. The October Revolution created the economic, legal and political basis of woman’s equality. The industrialization of the country was the consciously applied weapon for making woman equal with man. Yet in every village and factory women still had to fight their way over the traditional habits of centuries, which lingered in their own souls and in the souls of men. But these barriers of the past were no longer buttressed by ancient law and by the need of private industry for cheap woman’s labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first women to establish their freedom were the workers in the factories who took part with their men in the Revolution. I recall Dunia, who was once an illiterate textile worker, living with husband and children in the same room with another family, nine people in all. Dunia was one of those who in the first year of Revolution seized the manager’s house for a day nursery so that her children might have space to grow. She learned to read and began to rise in political and social work, as did simultaneously millions of others. She said to me: “Once life went on without us workers, still more without us women. The father gave her to the husband; she was slave to her man and her factory. Now I am slave to no one. The road is open to all life.” This phrase of the “open road to life” I have heard hundreds of times from working women.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emancipation of peasant women came more slowly. Scores of women presidents of villages have told me of their difficulties with the peasant men who jeered at “petticoat rule.” “They laughed at the first woman we elected to the village Soviet so much that she could do nothing; at the next election we put in six women and now it is we who laugh.” This was a typical statement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The widespread collectivization of farming in 1930 gave women’s freedom in the rural districts its needed economic base. Farm women everywhere in the collective farms are awakening to the implications of their independent income. Drunken husbands are no longer masters in the home. “I got for myself a warm new coat, a dress and shoes; I got clothes for the children,” said a farm woman displaying her purchases in the local market. “But my man spent his money on drink and I’ll buy him nothing. I’ve told him if he gets drunk again I’ll throw him out of the house and not even feed him. The farm will back me up, unless he quits drinking and loafing. I can get along without him in the collective farm.” Some thirty million farm women from Leningrad to Vladivostok are awakening to the amazing fact that they can get along economically without their husbands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most cruel and bloody of all was the fight for women’s freedom in those lands of Central Asia where for centuries veiled women had been sold like chattels to the harems. Here local religion and custom supported men who murdered their wives for the crime of unveiling. When young folks in Tashkent schools spent vacations agitating for women’s freedom, one girl’s body was sent back in a cart. Accompanying the hacked pieces were the words: “This is your women’s freedom.” In another locality of Central Asia, nine murders of women occurred before any were discovered by central authority; every attempt of a woman to get justice was met by local vengeance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the women of Central Asia, led by the hope which the new government gave them and the new industries encouraged, fought their way into freedom. The blood of martyrs stirred them to greater struggle; fifty thousand women marched at the funeral of the Tashkent girl student. In Bokhara, citadel of Mohammedan orthodoxy, a spectacular unveiling of women in great meetings and processions took place on International Women’s Day, March 8, 1928. Amid indescribable enthusiasm they tore off veils, stamped on them, threw them on the streets and at the feet of speakers. When one woman was murdered by her husband for this unveiling, a public trial was held in a great mass meeting; the murderer was swiftly condemned and executed. From that time women walked unveiled in holiest Bokhara. Today a woman, Abidova, who at the age of twelve was sold in marriage to pay a fifteen-ruble debt of her father, is vice-president of the Uzbek Republic, and its permanent representative in Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These women of the East are quite aware of the relation of their new freedom to the socially owned means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The roar of the factory is in me.&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;It gives me rhythm,&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;It gives me energy,&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
sing the Uzbek girls of the state silk mill which brought them out of the harems. Another song makes the application wider:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Flower of the East,&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;the time has come To cast off the veil and the paranja. . . .&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;For a thousand years you slept in darkness under the yoke.&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;When you awake, when you arise from deep sleep,&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;The workers of the world await you!&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Steadily the share of Soviet women in industry and in public life has climbed upward. The percentage of women among industrial workers has risen by a steady 3 per cent a year during the Five-Year Plan, and is now (1935) 42 per cent of all persons gainfully employed. In technical higher schools 36 per cent of the students are women, in medical schools 75 per cent; in no institution of learning is there any discrimination against women. The percentage of women who took part in elections rose from 28 per cent of all eligible women in 1926 to 80.3 per cent in 1934. Women constituted 18.2 per cent of the membership of city soviets in 1926; this rose to 32.1 per cent in 1934. The change in the rural districts was greater; a 9.9 percentage of women in 1926 in village soviets rose to 26.4 per cent in 1934. Only 0.6 per cent of the villages had women presidents in 1926, though even this figure testified to the successful fight of thousands of women; by 1934 the figure was over 8 per cent. More than a million women today hold some form of public office in the soviets, including 400,000 elected members of soviets, 400,000 members of local government commissions, 112,000 “co-judges” in the courts, a function similar to but somewhat more specialized than that of our jurors, and 100,000 members of managing boards of co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The city of Tver, now renamed Kalinin, gives an example of the varied kinds of work done by women. As a textile town, its population included a large proportion of women textile workers before the Revolution, a fact which explains its present status as a progressive city, boasting itself among the first Soviet cities in which women attained their full half of the seats in the city government. (Other cities are steadily following, as women through initiative and education take advantage of their legal right to equality.) Tver’s two most important women are Anna Kaligina, city secretary of the Communist Party, than which no higher post in the city exists, and Feodorova, who held till recently the prize of “best weaver” for the USSR. Thousands of others follow in the footsteps of these leaders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Policeman Lily travels fearlessly through dark woods about the city to round up criminal gangs. On one occasion, when she was convoying a prisoner caught setting fire to turf fields, she was set upon in the woods by two of his accomplices and brought back to jail not one criminal but three. That same evening she played the part of fragile heroine in lilac gown in the local dramatic club, for Lily is an ardent amateur actress specializing in dainty feminine parts. Black-eyed Katya is a street-car conductor, with the best record among the twenty-seven woman conductors of Tver. She is also in the second year of the workers’ college, where she studies Turgenieff and geometry. Morosov, the motorman, writes poems about her.&lt;br /&gt;
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All the young men admire Nina, eighteen-year-old glider pilot, who three days a week sails through the air on light wings. Her regular job is in the car Works, making valves for railway cars. But her pastime is the aviation club and she expects some day to be an aviator. Zoya is champion motor mechanic in a clothing factory and also chairman of its shop committee, handling trade union affairs for five hundred and sixty women; in her spare time she is an enthusiastic ski runner, who took second place in a contest held by the clothing workers of five provinces. Marusia is studying to be a doctor; Tonia is a former spinner who did such good work on the wall newspaper that she is now a full time writer. Dusia was the first woman chauffeur in the city; the boys used to run after her yelling, “girl driver.” One by one the girls of Tver have conquered every trade and profession. So have the women throughout the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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Foreign visitors are occasionally shocked to find women taking part in heavy and dirty labor, field work, street-cleaning, even digging the subway. But Soviet women are still of the generation of peasants, who worked in the fields. They know that in all ages women have done heavy labor; it is the skilled work from which they have been barred. They know that equal share in labor means in the USSR equal share in ruling and in all opportunities of life. So young girls fought for the right to equal work on the subway, against engineers and miners who didn’t want to let the women underground. They worked knee-deep in water alongside experienced men, challenged them to records and often beat them. “The subway was the richest experience of my life,” said a prize-winning girl.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are, however, regulations governing women’s labor, which prohibit work proved by experience more dangerous to women than to men. Women may not engage in trades involving danger of lead poisoning, may not lift weights above a certain amount. Special regulations, reinforced by medical observation, surround the whole period of pregnancy, and the last six to eight weeks women may not work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Six weeks before and six weeks after childbirth for office jobs; eight weeks before and eight weeks after for physical labor; longer periods may be ordered at any time by the doctor, and are given without loss of wages.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Many labor processes are constantly under investigation to determine whether or not they are injurious to women; when experiment shows that they are, they are prohibited. This is no sex discrimination but part of the ordinary routine of the public health service, which steadily investigates the effect of occupations and bars from them those groups of the population which might be injured. Thus sand-blasting trades are prohibited to youth, which is more susceptible than older people are to tuberculosis from sand-blasting. No trade or profession is prohibited in advance as “unwomanly”; any trade may be barred after investigation to any group or individual on grounds of public health.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not access to heavy labor but to skilled professions distinguishes Soviet women from those of other lands. Anna Kofanova won fame as operator of a combined-harvester, harvesting 1,500 acres in one season, the township record. Natalia Mikhailova is director of a machine tractor station entirely manned by women which services the 15,000 acres of thirty-two collective farms. Shchetinina, a ship captain, navigates the ocean. The envelopes of Soviet stratostats were designed by a woman chemist. Irene Rousinova was the first woman polar explorer, wintering several seasons in the north; she has been followed by hosts of others, including Nina Demme, who for two years has managed the scientific station on North Land. Galina Medovnik weeded tobacco in tsarist days as a girl of eight, fought in the Red Army during the civil war and was several times condemned to death; she escaped to become today a representative of housewives in the Moscow Soviet, where she superintends the building of apartment houses for workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Equality in work has given to women equality in every field of life: education, politics, marriage. The assumption behind the Soviet marriage code is the equal human dignity of both parties in deciding their intimate relations—a decision with which the state has no right to interfere. State action is limited to protection of children and prevention of force or fraud. Young couples appearing at the Marriage Registry Bureau are therefore required to give name, residence, occupation, past marital history, any children, and the future name which each intends to take. Questions to each are identical. The same name is often taken but not always. A person who infects another with disease is criminally liable. Property owned before marriage remains individual; that later acquired is jointly owned. Any married person who desires a divorce gets it, nor has the state the right to ask the reason. Both parties are responsible for the care and support of children up to eighteen and for giving the other partner any needed temporary economic aid to establish the independent relation. Recent much publicized changes in the divorce code were only a better bookkeeping, insuring that both persons actually knew of the divorce and were actually held for the support of children.&lt;br /&gt;
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Recent comments of Soviet leaders that more time should be given to family life are similarly part of the general emphasis on richer human relations now possible through increasing leisure rather than any belated recognition of the family. Casual attitudes toward marriage have been discouraged from the beginning; no one was more emphatic on this than Lenin. But the pressure is social rather than legal. Trade unions, collective farms and Party organizations will penalize, even to the point of expulsion, persons who cause social havoc through their sexual instability. But they consider concrete situations, not traditions. The continuous and open living together of two people is respected, whether or not they are “registered”; it constitutes marriage in both the social and legal sense. Taking advantage of another person is penalized, through whatever forms accomplished. Peasants who took advantage of the marriage code to secure brief brides for harvest work soon stopped when they found this gave the woman equal right to the harvest. One notorious case some years ago was that of a man who seduced a girl by marriage and threw her out next morning; he was convicted of rape, which is legally defined as sex relations obtained through force or fraud, and was punished by imprisonment. The fact of the marriage registration was rather an aggravation than otherwise; he had used a Soviet office to assist fraud.&lt;br /&gt;
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Problems occasionally arise in marriage from the fact that both partners have jobs. I met a girl tractor-driver in Siberia who married a tractor-driver on another field brigade. They spent their honeymoon some miles apart; once each week the young man walked ten or twelve miles on his free day to stay with his bride. The girl never met him half-way; she was boss of the winning brigade and took no chances. To my casual query why they did not get into the same field-gang, both exclaimed: “Desert my brigade in sowing-time!”&lt;br /&gt;
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A woman’s relation to the state is always individual; it is never through her husband. Not even the wives of great men may live by reflected glory. When Stalin’s wife died, the black-bordered announcements in the press gave her own name and occupation in the artificial silk industry, and only after this mentioned that she was the “close friend and companion of Stalin.” Kalinin’s wife wins recognition by creating a state farm and center of culture in the Altai Mountains, where they call her by her own name, not by the name of the president.&lt;br /&gt;
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The tradition that love is “woman’s whole existence” is challenged by a new assumption, a refusal to admit that any human being’s happiness can be completely dependent on one other human being. When Salima, a young woman of Turkestan, accepted a scholarship to study in Tashkent, her husband ordered her to return, and, on her refusal, divorced her, boasting by letter that he had taken another wife “obedient and illiterate.” Salima showed her quality by replying: “I received your letter telling me that you have another wife. I will have my revenge. When I finish my studies I will come back to the village and teach your second wife to read and write.” The older generation may be horrified by the flippant Salima, but the new Soviet generation will applaud her as free and self-reliant citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The freedom of every woman to dispose of her own body, to marry or not to marry, to have children or not to have them, irrespective of marriage, is taken for granted by Soviet law, and is restrained only by social opinion, not by legal penalry. Dr. Milashkevich, head of the Gynecological section of the great polyclinic, where a medical personnel of three hundred serves the thirty-five thousand workers of Stalin Auto Works, told me that all women working in the plant come to her as part of their routine health examination. “If they are married I ask them: ‘Do you want children?’ Then I give them medical advice according to their intentions. If they do not want children, the poly-clinic supplies the means of prevention.” She further informed me that every attempt was made to discourage abortion, by urging grounds of health, and by sending nurses and even neighbors to reason with the wife and husband, but never by absolute refusal. “To compel a woman either to have or not to have children we would consider an infringement of human rights,” said Dr. Milashkevich. “If she decides to have them, the state gives every assistance, through free medical and hospital care, special funds for milk and children’s clothing and the use of day nurseries to care for children during her working hours.” That the women are deciding to have children is clear from the average increase of population of three million annually—in the past two years of growing prosperity three and a half million&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Figures from Soviet Statistical Dept. 1936.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;—an increase unparalleled in any other land.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every year the Soviet Union produces its crop of national heroes, who spring into fame for some notable achievement and whose methods are widely copied. In 1935 the names most heard were those of Stakhanov, a miner, and Marie Demchenko, a farm woman. A former farm servant of the sugar beet districts, Marie had risen through collectivization of farming, and the knowledge she gained in the laboratory cottage, to challenge in spring of 1935 all the beet growers of the land. Let us flood the land with sugar. My brigade will get twenty tons of beets per acre.” Hundreds of letters accepted; hundreds of visitors came to inspect the fields which Marie’s determined brigade of women nine times hoed, and eight times cleared of moths by setting fires at night. They conquered a rainless August by the local fire-fighting apparatus, pouring twenty thousand buckets of water on their fields. They won twenty-one tons per acre and came to the November celebrations in Moscow to receive the Order of Lenin amid the plaudits of the entire country.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who were these women singled out for honor? They were women who got down in the dirt to dig sugar beets, who soiled their hands with slimy insects that a beet crop might be improved. What made their achievement honored? This—that their beets were no commodity for private profit, but sugar for the workers of a nation. They were leaders in the public task of farming a continent. This made of the hitherto unregarded toil of farm women a heroic collective epic, worthy to be classed with the work of explorers who raid the Arctic or scientists who storm the stratosphere.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER XII: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF SCIENCE ===&lt;br /&gt;
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“Russian is now recognized in American universities as a scientific language,” said a young Californian who was visiting with me the Leningrad Institute for Plant Protection. “Four years ago the universities wouldn’t take it as one of the two languages required for a scientific degree. But now my professors tell me that for my specialty of farm pests, it is the most important language of all. More original work is appearing in it than in any other language. German and French research is older and was translated some years ago. But our universities haven’t funds today to translate all this new research appearing in Russian.”&lt;br /&gt;
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This American youth hardly connected in his mind the decline in German and French research and the lack of American university funds for translation with the world-wide economic crisis. He knew little of the collectivization of Soviet farming and the stimulus it had given to his branch of science. But across two seas and two continents the results of these causes had reached the aloof halls of a university in California, interpreted thus “Russian—a scientific language—original research not yet found in translation.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Visiting scientists at the Fifteenth International Physiology Congress which met in Leningrad in August 1935, expressed an appreciation not untinged with amazement at the high respect paid science by the Soviet government and the rapid strides made by Soviet science in recent years. “No government ever ‘took up’ science as has this government. . . .” “Even the Americans are startled by the amount of resources which can be placed at the disposal of science by a government planning on a national scale. . . .” Such were some of the comments which found their way into the press of New York. Professor Walter B. Cannon, of the Harvard Medical School, told the Congress how science suffers today in all the capitalist countries, and added: “In the Soviet Union, where the social importance of science is appreciated, the funds made available for the development and prosecution of science are greater than in any country in the world.” The report of the Congress later given in &#039;&#039;Science&#039;&#039;, official organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, noted “the respect with which scientists are treated,” “the important position which science, pure as well as applied, occupies in the national economy,” and the “ardor of the army of young scientific workers.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet citizens take it for granted—Marxists in fact have taken it for granted ever since the days of Marx—that science must naturally reach a much freer and fuller development under socialism than is possible under capitalism. Capitalism, whose early expansion a century or more ago encouraged and boasted its science, has already reached the stage where science is an embarrassment, since the possibilities of human development which it reveals are unrealizable under private ownership. Science itself under capitalism suffers from a lack of aim. In England the head of the oldest agricultural experiment station in the world told a visiting Russian scientist that he hardly knew what to investigate since the declining condition of farming in England and the antagonisms in Egypt and India prevented the application of everything he discovered. In America the hostility between science and capitalism is only in its first stages, and is marked by increasing suppression of new knowledge which would interfere with profit. In Germany where a collapsing capitalism has taken the form of fascism, there is already a deep distrust of human reason and a propaganda against the very existence of science.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet Union science is rapidly expanding. Communism demands the thorough-going application of science to remake all human life; it assumes that the intellect of man can progressively understand and subdue nature to his collective will. “A new historical epoch will begin,” said Engels, “when men and their work will improve to such an extent that all previous achievements will seem as but a feeble shadow.” “We are confident that in our epoch we are entering an era of unparalleled progress in science,” is a typical editorial comment today in 2 Moscow newspaper. President Karpinsky, of the All-Union Academy of Science, spoke of the USSR as “the country where science is given a place of honor,” when he greeted the visiting physiologists “on behalf of hundreds of research institutes.” Even the famous physiologist, L. P. Pavlov, who was always antagonistic to Bolshevik ideas, said recently that he wanted to live to be a hundred because “the Soviet government has given millions for my scientific work and my laboratories flourish as never before.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Those doubters who fear that state subsidies for science interfere more with scientific freedom than do the subsidies of individual millionaires, and who promote abroad the idea that the Soviets “persecute scientists,” ignore the fact that a high esteem for science is quite consistent with a deep suspicion of individual scientists. Conflicts did persist between the Soviet government and certain scientists who used their knowledge to fight the Revolution. That sabotage by scientists and engineers occurred on a very wide scale during the early years of the first Five-Year Plan has been acknowledged by thousands of former saboteurs. Only when the victory of the Five-Year Plan was assured beyond question did these waverers finally come over to find that socialism gives far greater opportunities for their science than capitalism ever did or could.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See details in Chap. 3, page 52-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Academy of Science has been greatly expanded from the three departments, mathematics, natural sciences, and historical philology, which it comprised before the Revolution. It is the center for planning and co-ordinating the scientific activity of the entire country through its twenty-one large departments and its frequent inter-departmental sessions. It works hand in hand with the State Planning Commission which indicates to it the requests for widespread scientific research in particular fields needed for the development of the country. It is also the court of appeal for all scientists who disagree with government departments or research institutes on questions of their work, or who want to do research for which no appropriation yet exists. In all conflicts on the objectives of research the Academy decides, being liberally financed directly under the All-Union government. The city of Moscow has recently assigned to the Academy 1,250 acres on the Moscow River, where the first of forty-two projected buildings are now being built.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than one thousand scientific research institutes in the USSR, employing 41,000 scientific workers, were claimed at the Physiology Congress by Akulov, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the government. Many of these institutes are of monumental size and scope. The All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine, for instance, is the organizing center of all medical research in the USSR. Scientists, doctors and engineers worked for two years on the construction plan of its new home where 5,500 employees are to study “the biology and pathology of the human being from every aspect.” Hospitals of the institute make continuous study of typical cases of various diseases and healthy people are also studied as “controls.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the largest of the scientific institutions is the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, which correlates the work of nearly sixty institutes for research in soil chemistry, plant protection, livestock breeding, microbiology, agrometeorology and similar branches of science. The work of the agricultural institutes is based upon material obtained in 200 experiment stations and more than 1,500 smaller research stations in state and collective farms. Each of the subordinate institutes is an important organization in itself; the Institute for Plant Protection, for instance, has a central staff of 250 scientific workers and dozens of branches all over the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The expansion of Soviet science arises not only from the need of socialism for scientific planning, but from the wide interest and co-operation on the part of the people. The Academy of Science is no secluded institution of the aristocracy; it is the unity of the scientific brains of the country with the masses. Science in the Soviet Union is dear to all the people, for every citizen knows that its discoveries will become his own possession and not the property of a small privileged group. “We scientists used to feel ourselves rather unimportant, since we had already discovered so much more than people were able to apply, but now that the collective farms demand our science, we see our work for several thousand years,” said Vaviloff, Vice-Chairman of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and world-famous discoverer and creator of new plants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The wide interest of the Soviet population in science expresses itself not only in honor to scientists but in active participation in scientific work by great numbers of people. Every scientific institution receives much popular co-operation, from workers, farmers, even from children. When the All-Union geological survey sent some two thousand annual expeditions with seventy to eighty thousand participants to explore and map the resources of the Soviet Union during the first Five-Year Plan, these official expeditions became the correlating center of a still broader popular movement. Thousands of grammar school children became “discoverers of our country,” going with their teachers to study geological outcroppings. Tens of thousands of hikers learned from geologists what to look for on cliffs and mountain slopes and occasionally made discoveries of significance. One of the stimulating causes of the first great Pamir expedition came from a Khirghiz nomad who carried a gold nugget several days journey to Samarkand and fought his way through many bureaucratic offices because he “thought the government ought to know about the gold in the Pamirs.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every large factory has its bureau of workers’ inventions through which inventive genius of workers finds connection with the wider world. Workers and farmers who make practical discoveries are often asked to report them in their own non-technical words at scientific congresses. Scientists in turn give frequent lectures in factories on subjects applicable to the work of the plant. Analysis of steel by the spectrum method will be reported to a machine-building plant, and discussions on organic chemistry will be given by scientists at a rubber works to a large attendance of interested workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So deep and thorough is the interest taken by workers in science that the cleavage between workingmen and scientists already lessens, presaging that time predicted by Marx when the distinction between mental and manual labor will disappear. At a banquet held by the Academy of Science in the Neskuchny Palace in Moscow, a number of leading factory workers were present as guests. A foreign newspaperman, wishing to interview Professor Bach, a well-known member of the Academy, approached a man who was pointed out to him from 2 distance. They chatted half an hour about the revolution in culture, the creation of a new life, and the new type of human being now appearing under socialism. In parting, the correspondent asked for the Academician’s autograph. The man to whom he was speaking started in surprise. “My name Is Ivanov; Bach is the person sitting next to me,” he said, pointing to a man who had been attentively listening. “I myself am a locksmith from the ball-bearing plant.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most striking examples of the democratization of science is the “laboratory cottage,” which has developed in the last two years on the collective farms. Seven thousand of these centers of experiment are reported in the Ukraine alone. The head of the laboratory is sometimes a teacher of the village school, but more often a self-educated farmer who has the scientific instinct and whose enthusiasm has organized other farmers to make experiments in their fields and correspond with scientific stations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“This scientific tendency in human beings takes such varied forms,” said an editor, “that one cannot even classify them. In the past these scientific instincts often died stillborn because of poverty. Today we seek them out through many agencies; one of these is our &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039;. Today a new type of experimenter is developing who does not experiment secretly but organizes the masses around him to discover and carry out new ideas. There is often some waste of time and destruction of machinery in these experiments. But this does not worry us. What is important and valuable is that the human being is striving to change, to improve. Waste of time and destruction of materials matters nothing, if thereby we add even one drop of knowledge which enables man to increase his understanding and control of nature.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One such natural scientist was Akulov, a peasant of the Genichesk district. As a World War prisoner in Austria, he saw one head of grain much bigger than the surrounding heads. He kept it and eventually brought it home to his own garden to breed new giant heads. When the collective farm was formed in his village in 1930, Akulov had four bushels of this special grain to give them. The big heads were planted and cherished until there were several score acres of them. The samples were then sent to the All-Union Institute of Plants and found to be a new variety existing nowhere else in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Seventy-five-year-old illiterate Barashev was another such natural scientist. For nearly twenty years he worked to produce a frost-resistant flax; the collective fields of his farm are harvesting it this year. Pechtilief, in the Leningrad district, stirred up such an interest among his neighbors in discovering why two fields on the same farm gave such different yields, that the whole village became one vast experimental farm, planting several thousand acres in various ways and comparing the results of different types of tillage. Pechtilief appeared before the Congress of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences to demand that scientists find a way to produce a new variety of wheat which should combine the high milling quality of one variety with the non-shattering characteristics of a second. Kolosev, another collective farmer, has challenged the scientists to work out types of seeds and tillage which will insure different ripening times for the various crops and thus get an even load of work through a maximum period for the harvesting machine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The assimilation of new scientific ideas proceeds far faster under the new collective farm system than under the old individual farming. Some entire districts have already become agricultural experiment stations. In Zhadryansk district, near Cheliabinsk, several thousand experiments were carried on in a single summer with oats, wheat, green peas, sunflower seeds and other crops. Special conferences were held attended by two hundred or more delegates from the various laboratory cottages. All these popular experiments are in constant touch with the scientific organizations of the Commissariat of Agriculture, and are protected against undue loss by a government policy of crop insurance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Several achievements of Soviet agricultural science are already of world significance. The method of “vernalization,” which changes winter wheat to spring wheat, late cotton to early cotton and biennial to annual plants, has made it possible to grow Algerian wheat beyond the Polar circle, at 67.4 degrees of latitude in Khibiny. The northernmost botanical gardens in the world are on the Kola Peninsula, where experiments with six hundred plants found twenty-five that could be adapted to the Arctic. The Soviet Union has developed its own rubber industry from the newly discovered “rubber” plants, tau-sagiz and kok-sagiz, found in the mountains of Turkestan and cultivated later as far north as the Ukraine. The brilliant work of Michurin in developing frost-resistant varieties of fruits made him famous not only among scientists of the world but among millions of Soviet farmers, tens of thousands of whom journey annually to his plant-breeding station to report on their use of his varieties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New machines have been developed, a machine for retching flax which is revolutionizing the flax industry, a “northern” combined-harvester suitable for grain of high moisture content. Even the ordinary combine first imported from America has undergone sixty improvements and is said by experts to be the best in the world. Research into soil microbiology has made, according to Vaviloff, “the role of micro-organisms in the soil a calculable factor.” The artificial fertilization of livestock, in which the spermatozoa are sent by mail or airplane from experimental stations to the laboratory cottages, is today applied to half the country’s livestock, insuring rapid improvement of stock from pure-bred males. Under the constant co-operation of collective farmers with scientific centers, the agricultural map of the country is rapidly changing. Sugar beets expand towards the Urals, cotton appears in South Ukraine, irrigation and tree-planting begins to reclaim the wastes beyond the Volga, and wheat marches steadily towards the Arctic. Thousands of acres are today successfully farmed in the Murmansk district on the Arctic Ocean, in place of a scant twelve acres a few years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most spectacular example of the planned advance of man under the leadership of science is the conquest of the Polar regions, which has stirred the imagination and enthusiasm of the whole Soviet land. Scientists of the All-Union Arctic Institute first seriously broached the idea of a Great Northern Sea Route in 1930, though other scientists declared that traffic along the northern coast of Europe and Asia was “impracticable during the present glacial epoch.” The Soviet government backed its bolder scientists, established the Central Administration of the Northern Sea Route and gave it ships and funds. Step by step the rapid advance was made, first by dozens of expeditions which mapped coasts and charted waters, then by thirty-nine Polar scientific stations, equipped with radio and airplane service, then by trading fleets led by ice-breakers first from the west, then from the east, and then along the whole Polar coast from Atlantic to Pacific.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The whole world remembers the epic of the Chelyushkin, its tragic wreck northwest of Bering Straits, the skillful landing on ice which was crashing around them, the two months of heroic organization of “normal life” in their floating home on the ice-floe, where Professor Schmidt, dressed in deer-skin coat and fur cap, delivered lectures on dialectic materialism or the Freudian theory, and found time to edit the galleys of the &#039;&#039;Unabridged Soviet Encyclopedia&#039;&#039; which he had brought from Moscow, and to write a preface to a book on higher mathematics. The history of Polar expeditions has known many examples of daring, but never such courageously casual organization of normal routine under abnormal conditions as this “Soviet Republic on the Ice” which got out its “wall newspaper” with cartoons and self-criticism, and comments on the Communist Party Congress then taking place in Moscow, received by the Chelyushkinites by radio.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today special ships are built in Soviet shipyards, embodying the experience of the Chelyushkin for the conquest of the northern seas. Steadily the designs of airplanes and clothing have been adapted to Arctic weather and the plane is now the “eyes of the north.” Four ordinary freighters in the summer of 1935 made the whole trip around the north of Europe and Asia, and scores will follow in 1936. The network of heroic scientists, wintering in thirty-nine stations, begins to be supplemented by miners, timber-workers, even farmers. Extensive prospecting has been done for minerals, especially coal and oil to serve the northern trade route. A new type of man is following the explorers and scientists—engineers, technicians, builders of the Arctic. And science pushes farther north in the expedition of the Sadko, to discover, at latitude 82° 40’—the farthest north ever reached in free sailing—the re-emergence of a warm section of the Gulf Stream which may make the northern sea route practicable for more months of the year. Of all the world’s eight ships which have reached during the past half century the latitudes around 80°, two were American, two Scandinavian and four were Soviet ships of the past few years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the support of the whole Soviet country which strengthens these men of the north in their conquests. The entire Soviet population regards these Arctic subduers as their representatives and champions. It shares their lives by radio hook-ups Moscow talks through the six months’ night with Dixon Island, which issues the Arctic Radio News. All Russia thrilled when a young ex-criminal, sent to the far north to “make himself over,” was reassured across three thousand frozen miles by the voice of his factory sweetheart urging him to make good. When a winter childbirth in a distant Arctic station developed complications, the neighbors got the Dixon Island surgeon on the radio and for more than three hours he directed over the air every detail while the whole of a much-worried Arctic listened in. When the child and mother were safe, congratulations poured in from thousands of miles of icebound waterfront.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even under capitalism science breaks the boundaries of nations, steadily to lift the power of man. Under socialism it becomes the consciously applied and swiftly expanding strength of the whole population, conquering for man his world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XIII: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF ART ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Heroic people call into being heroic artists.”|Editorial in Soviet &#039;&#039;Literary Critic&#039;&#039;}}&lt;br /&gt;
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If science is the instrument of man’s dominance over nature, art is the means of his self-expression. Tens of millions of people from earth’s most backward races have awakened in the Soviet Union from long slumber. They are seeking self expression. They themselves write, sing and paint; they push up from their ranks novelists, poets and dramatists. They love these poets and dramatists; they criticize them and make serious demands from them. Soviet art is not private property, it is the wealth of the nation, and the nation is jealous and proud of its wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the first All-Union Congress of Soviet writers met in Moscow in August, 1934, thousands of letters poured in from all corners of the union, congratulating, greeting, giving practical suggestions and advice. Workers, collective farmers, students, Young Pioneers, scientists, engineers and artists thus expressed their interest in the Congress. In Moscow alone, more than two hundred factory conferences were held between readers and authors. Delegations representing millions of readers came to speak at the Congress. Each day after the meetings, authors found throngs of workers who had been unable to enter the crowded hall waiting outside to hail their favorite writers with applause. Throughout the country, millions of people concentrated their attention on questions of esthetics, the function of poetry, the form of literature best suiting the present age, subjects reported in detail in the press. Literary work in the land of the Soviets is becoming the affair of all the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are no bounds to the desire for every variety of culture. Soviet Russia in its first fifteen years published five billion books, as contrasted with two billion in the last thirty years of tsardom. The number keeps growing. At the end of the first Five-Year Plan, book production in the USSR was greater than that of England, Germany and France together. Especially amazing is the growth of literature among the national minorities whose self-expression was suppressed under tsardom. Every year since 1929 has seen the publication of more books in the Ukrainian language than were published in the whole 118 years before the Revolution. One publishing house alone, the Moscow International Book House, publishes books in eighty-five languages, some of which had formerly no alphabet—novels, textbooks, folk tales, technical works, translations of classics, short stories and dictionaries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet world feels itself the heir of the ages. Anniversaries of poets, scientists and artists of all countries are widely celebrated. The ancient Persian poet Firdousi, the English Shakespeare, the German Goethe, the famous French writers, are honored by mass meetings and columns in the press. The best works of Flaubert, Mérimée, Maupassant, Victor Hugo, Mark Twain and Jack London appear by the hundreds of thousands of copies and disappear almost as quickly from the shelves of bookstores which never expect to retain volumes more than a few weeks. Russian classics are even more popular. Lermontov, Nekrassov, Korolenko, Gogol, Turgenev, Chekhov appear in editions of seventy to a hundred thousand. The favorite poet Pushkin has been issued for several years in repeated editions of two hundred thousand copies, and his collected works in six volumes now face a subscription demand of three hundred thousand copies, exclusive of sales to the shops. Tolstoy is the most popular of all; eleven and a half million copies of his works have been sold since the Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet reader demands not only the art of the past but the art of today. The most popular novels are those like Sholokhov’s &#039;&#039;Quiet Don&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Soil Upturned&#039;&#039;, which paint on a wide canvas the personalities, difficulties, struggles and victories of the present. “No artist of the past had such material at his disposal as is given by the earth-shaking events occurring in the USSR in the last eighteen years,” said the Soviet writer Panferov speaking at a Paris congress. “The working class built a dam on the surging Dnieper and made its unruly waters serve man. It transformed the misty Urals into an industrial center, mastered the wild and distant Kuzbas. . . . In remaking the country the working class at the same time remade itself. . . . The outcast dweller of the mountains, the illiterate, solitary Yakut, the northern Nentsi, the wild Bashkir, the Mordvin with his trachoma, the persecuted Kalmyk—tens of millions of peoples in scores of scattered nationalities went into the furnace of civil war and are energetically rebuilding the country, conquering the strongholds of culture, bringing new life to the whole world. . . . Socialist realism was the inevitable phenomenon of the proletarian era—active, cheerful, bold and daring, like the era of the proletarian revolution itself.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These tens of millions of people are not only the subjects for art, they are also the artists, readers and audience. They show a wide interest in all forms of artistic expression. Theaters are constantly crowded; art museums are packed with visitors; popular exhibitions sometimes have lines before the museum entrances waiting until there is room to go in. Nor are the factory workers and collective farmers at all backward in expressing their opinion on the products of brush and pen. Are they not all also writers, artists, musicians and actors, if and when the mood seizes them? They are not only consumers of art, millions of them are amateur producers of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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More than one hundred thousand “circles for self-expression” have grown up in the past two years in the USSR. The drama circles alone have 1,200,000 members, while the total number in the singing, music, dancing and graphic art circles exceeds five million. Writers, cartoonists and photographers for the local press or wall newspapers are probably as many more. A chief characteristic of the new type of person now emerging in the Soviet Union is his dynamic energy in self-expression, usually in some collective form.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first and most direct self-expression of large numbers takes the form of participation in the press. They write their opinions about corrupt officials or inefficient farm management for the hand-lettered sheet posted on a factory wall or a village tree-trunk; more important communications they send, often with several signatures, to the great metropolitan &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039; with their million and a half subscribers. Two million letters a year pour into the office of the &#039;&#039;Peasents’ Gazette&#039;&#039; in Moscow, reflecting the life and problems of the farm; only part of them can be published but all of them are answered, filed, and carefully studied as material for novels, for history, and for the lawmaking of the state.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a northern township, fifty miles from the railroad, where before the Revolution only six people subscribed to any newspaper at all, I visited a congress of some two hundred rural press correspondents preparing for a sowing campaign. These were only part of the energetic writers of this township. Its collective farms had 470 field brigades, every one of which during the sowing campaign posted up a wall newspaper. One picturesque seventeen-year-old boy in a vivid shirt of old rose sateen under a black jacket proudly reported the overthrow of the corrupt management of his collective farm by his articles and editorials. “We got out nine numbers,” he explained to the meeting, “then we stopped for want of paper. But we had already aroused the farmers, and the general meeting removed the president and two members of the management.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Nine single sheets of crude newsprint stuck in successive weeks on a tree, protected from the rain by an overhanging board, had deposed the management of a farm, shamed idlers, carried the sowing through to success, finished the hoeing and brought the brigade on record time to the haying season. The number of these collective farm wall-newspapers throughout the country is estimated by the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; as half a million, with at least ten village correspondents for each. There are more than three thousand factory newspapers; these range from weeklies of a few hundred copies to dailies with a circulation of twenty thousand and more in the larger plants. These newspapers are both an organizing center for factory and farm life and a training school for young writers. With such a writing and reading public, it is not surprising that there are more than eleven thousand printed newspapers in the Soviet Union with a circulation of more than thirty-six million copies—thirteen times as great as before the Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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An ever-growing stream of writers enters literature through the gateway of the factory and farm newspapers, which make modest but insistent demands on the humblest worker able to use a pen. Literary groups arise in centers like the Urals and the Donetz basin, or around some tractor station which serves the nearby villages. Many of the Donbas group of writers embarked on their literary careers when through with their day’s work of furnishing coal. Their magazine &#039;&#039;Literary Donbas&#039;&#039; has produced a noteworthy crop of stories and poems widely popular among miners.&lt;br /&gt;
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The literary society of collective farmers at the machine tractor station in Voronovo village had as members two stablemen, a blacksmith, a reaper, a tractor-driver, a bookkeeper, a warehouseman, four day-nursery attendants, three teachers, two presidents of collective farms, one village president, three editors of field newspapers and sixteen farm women. In one year the members published through their own printshop two books of verses, the play &#039;&#039;Miscalculated&#039;&#039;, and 2 book of character sketches, &#039;&#039;Bolsheviks of the Politodels&#039;&#039;. They announced for the following year a play, &#039;&#039;According to Merit&#039;&#039;, a novel &#039;&#039;Quiet Subversion&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;The Diary of a Tractor Driver&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;The History of the Machine Tractor Station&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is difficult to conceive of the wide extent of amateur art activities of all kinds. Thousands of short-line popular stanzas known as &#039;&#039;chastyshki&#039;&#039; appear in the most distant parts of the Soviet Union celebrating the freedom of woman, the heroism of tractor-drivers, the growing prosperity of collective life. They vary in merit from mere doggerel giving rhymed technical guidance for reapers and cattle herders to verse of real beauty. The Donetz coal region alone reports more than eight hundred brass bands, three hundred orchestras, two hundred and fifty choruses, thousands of dramatic circles and even forty-two ballet schools. Some of the Soviet dancers who attracted attention at a recent London dance festival came from these “self-expression groups.” Amateur circles in drawing and painting also exist all over the country, and give local exhibitions which often unearth talent.&lt;br /&gt;
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A constant interchange of ideas and personnel goes on between professional and non-professional groups. The Soviet press takes active part in establishing these connections. The newspaper &#039;&#039;Culture and Sport&#039;&#039; publishes reproductions of the best art from famous galleries. It encourages would-be artists to correspond and send in their work to be judged by well-known artists; those who show talent are sent to art schools. The magazine &#039;&#039;Collective Farm Theater&#039;&#039; every month issues eight or ten special supplements containing plans of caravan theaters, rural pageants and festivals, choral programs, texts of one-act plays. It connects the self-expression groups with the nearest professional theater which can help them in their technique. There are today one hundred rural theaters of professional standing.&lt;br /&gt;
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One among many movements which swept the farms in the summer of 1935 was a campaign to discover musical talent among children. Hundreds of local musical festivals were held to many of which professors from the Moscow Conservatory came by airplane to act as judges. As a result, 715 of the most talented children are being sent to special musical schools; the twenty-five best ones were brought to a specially created branch in the Moscow Conservatory of Music.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only in music but in poetry, drama and dancing, nation-wide “Olympiads were held in the summer of 1935. In Leningrad, for instance, juries of artists visited the factories to select eleven hundred contestants for the district Olympiad from fifteen thousand amateur musicians, singers, dancers, acrobats, orators, accordion players and even jugglers. On a collective farm in Smolensk, an illiterate peasant woman of sixty-four years wrote a play, dictating it to a younger woman; the young folks of the farm produced it at the Olympiad in Smolensk. Besides the Olympiads, many “culture expeditions” of both scholars and composers penetrate the wilderness where live Khirgiz, Buryat-Mongols, Tajiks, Uzbeks, to seek and preserve the music and poems which shed light on early culture. A symphony orchestra recently organized made its first tour, playing old Cossack melodies in modern style, across what not so long ago was the steppe of half-savage nomads. Collective farms sent delegations hundreds of miles to insist that the orchestra visit them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out of this artistic ferment in the lives of millions, arises the vigor of Soviet art, which feels itself called upon to find adequate expression for the awakening genius of the people. Soviet writers today, if they would be popular, must not confine themselves to delving in the depths of a single human soul; they must depict the vast variety of changing social relations. They spend much time in deepening their contacts with intimate details of factory or of farm; Sholokhov, for instance, makes his permanent residence in the village whose changing life is the subject of a whole series of novels.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor is the artist’s human material passive; the human material talks back. The Vakhtangov Theater invites the audience to discuss plays between the scenes and at the end with the actors; witty and fruitful discussions occur. Meetings between writers and readers have become a popular feature of factory life. Authors like Sholokhov and Tretyakov have long adopted the custom of reading drafts of semi-finished manuscripts to audiences of workers and farmers. Frequently a worker is able to give sound advice on the handling of an industrial character. “Our reader, while a friend, is also a very severe critic,” says the Soviet writer, Vsevolod-Ivanov. “Intercourse with him is the best and most precious school.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet readers demand simplicity and vividness of writing. They are not interested in complex analysis of burdened souls. Their whole life faces outward. Their interest is in people who do things, who change the relations of society. In the first decade after the Revolution, a typical theme in literature and drama was the hero who died in the moment of victory while the collective achievement marched on. The hero might be a Chapayev shot down before his victorious comrades appear on the scene, or a village organizer killed by a kulak and drawn to his grave in triumphal procession by the newly-arrived tractor which his labor had secured. The victory was collective, attained through the sacrifice of the heroic individual. Thus was the natural expression of the period of revolution and civil war.&lt;br /&gt;
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New themes begin to dominate Soviet literature and drama of recent years. The hero no longer dies; he struggles, achieves, learns, and is himself made over, not by introspection but by the clash of action. He is the optimist—builder type creating a glorious and happy future. What the people demand of writers, they demand also of the graphic arts: an art that is inspired by and in torn inspires the great moods of the day. The workers of Stalingrad sent a famous open letter to the artists: “Don’t give us colored photographs, we are tired of them. We expect from you an art that is stirring and inspiring.”&lt;br /&gt;
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If the responsive demand of a great new public is a constant stimulus to Soviet artists, a second stimulus is found in co-operation with members of their craft. Writers, actors, painters—all have their organizations. They maintain club houses for social contacts, discussions and exhibitions; they have country retreats to which members withdraw for rest and creative work. They assist beginners with loans and subsidies; they foster high standards; they assist members in the sale of their work. The writers’ organization issues literary journals, organizes courses, consultations and criticisms for new writers and runs a literary university for workers. The actors’ club holds special midnight performances where its members meet famous visiting artists and see the season’s best in music, dance and drama.&lt;br /&gt;
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Four thousand artists belong to a co—operative which not only handles exhibitions all over the country, but also owns numerous factories producing artists’ supplies, workshops for stone-cutting, metal-casting and frame-making and studios for lithography and engraving. This co-operative has a yearly turnover of forty-two million rubles. It accepts on behalf of its members orders from city soviets, large industries, and workers’ clubs which wish decorations and paintings; some of these orders run over the million-ruble mark. When the ten-year reconstruction plan of Moscow creates a demand for architecture, sculpture, landscaping and monumental art, the artists’ organizations arrange discussions and excursions of sculptors and architects and initiate experimental fresco work on a large scale. Instead of being an isolated craftsman, the Soviet artist is part of a rich and influential organization which connects him with the government planning departments and the organized life of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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From this close association of artists with their fellow craftsmen and with their public has arisen a method of collective production which is becoming increasingly popular; it extends to the collective writing of books by a score of writers and even by whole factories. Thirty professional writers combined to produce &#039;&#039;Belomor&#039;&#039;, the famous tale of the building of the Baltic-White Sea Canal. “We tried to tell how a canal was built in a far, cold and rocky place and how the chekists made new men out of prisoners,” said Vsevolod-Ivanov. “We were authors entirely different in taste and in age, but we all tried to make that book united, wide-horizoned and mighty. That book is dear to me even today. In writing it, I learned that we writers are really not such individualists as we like to call ourselves.” The Events of the High Mountain, which told the history of an iron mine in the Urals, was written by more than one hundred miners. The miners consulted, wrote and improved it in common, as together they created and improved their mine. The book is a great political and artistic document, energetic, fresh and vital.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;The History of the Civil War&#039;&#039;, the &#039;&#039;History of Factories&#039;&#039; and the now projected &#039;&#039;History of the Russian Village&#039;&#039; contain whole series of books, each of which compiles the experiences of hundreds or even thousands of people. The characters are not described by others; they describe themselves, each seeking in consultation with the others a significant artistic form. The meeting of two hundred village correspondents which I attended, decided to issue a book giving artistic form to the history of the township. They selected the best writers from each of twenty-five villages to work with two professional authors who had come from Moscow. Each local writer chose with the help of his village some vivid and significant episode or character whose story illumined the changes made by the Revolution. One contrasted the intimate family relations in his father’s household with those in his own Soviet home. Another described the people who had successively looked out of the windows of a certain ancient building—once a school for the daughters of the nobility and now the central club of the collective farm. The result was a book which was lacking in style and finish but vivid and unforgettable with actual life. It was not yet art, but it made part of the rich soil out of which great art may well grow in the next few decades.&lt;br /&gt;
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Great art movements in the past have followed periods of economic expansion which gave stimulus to new creative life. “We are already in the great epoch; artistic values of permanent worth are already appearing but not yet the great masterpieces. Where else in the world are there even high artistic values?” said a Soviet writer to me. In literature Ostrovski’s &#039;&#039;How Steel is Welded&#039;&#039;, Sholokhov’s &#039;&#039;Quiet Don&#039;&#039;; in motion pictures, &#039;&#039;Potemkin&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Chapayev&#039;&#039;, the &#039;&#039;Youth of Maxim&#039;&#039;, are among the many lasting contributions which the Soviets have already made to art. The Moscow subway is one of the first significant expressions of the epoch in architecture. As forums and temples expressed the spirit of ancient Rome, cathedrals and castles the Middle Ages, and skyscrapers the power of centralized finance, so this beautiful subway expresses the rhythm of millions of workers in efficient motion. The Lenin library in Moscow and the House of State Industry in Kharkov, and some of the new factories, children’s centers, and sanitoriums, also foreshadow the new architecture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are Soviet artists “in uniform?” Only in so far as they lack intelligence to respond to their social environment and the will to fight their way through to expression. Artists whose souls were formed by an old world felt the coming of the new as a thwarting of impulses. They had to find their way about among new publishers and new officials, who were trying more or less intelligently to protect the new order. Often groups of rising artists hogged the Revolution and organized to lord it over their fellows. Thus the RAPP (Association of Revolutionary Writers) succeeded in imposing its narrow standards for a considerable period, till other authors learned the new environment and smashed the RAPP. The social environment also changes; when that excellent play, &#039;&#039;Days of the Turbines&#039;&#039;, featured a tsarist officer as hero before post-war audiences where budding capitalists cheered him, Young Communist organizations fresh from fighting those officers protested wrathfully and had the play suppressed. When Nepmen followed the civil war into the past, the play revived to more tolerant audiences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All authors everywhere adjust themselves to editors, publishers and readers; these are necessary media no less than words or paint. Not even in America could “proletarian authors” come into being, until there were new readers who pushed them up. Soviet society also presses in various ways on artists. We authors deal with publishers who are worried by their paper quota; their criterion is “importance” rather than profit, since any half-good book is sure to sell. They rely in part on “political editors,” officials of the Commissariat of Education, whose function is to give advice on the demands of the educational field and the political significance of the work. My own conversations with these political editors—they dislike the name censors—are singularly like those with publishers’ readers in America. They make suggestions, some extremely valuable, some moderately useful and some of which I protest; they themselves yield to reason and prefer authors who know what they do. Only crude authors take them as enemies; through mutual discussion the product is improved. If differences lie too deep, one seeks another publisher; in the Soviet Union there is also the wider appeal. No one autocrat censors everything. Political editors more and more become highly educated specialists. Important plays are usually previewed by selected audiences of leading critics and persons familiar with their theme, both children and educators previewing a drama or motion picture destined for children. Only on military matters and material likely to injure the Soviets’ international relations is the censor absolute;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The most striking recent example was the suppression of information during the difficult year of 1932, a suppression which turned several American journalists permanently against the Soviets. The Soviets believed with some reason that derailed knowledge of their difficulties would provoke the threatened Japanese invasion.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and these matters are hardly the realm of art.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If art survived the censoring by the whims of princelings in the feudal ages, and by the profit-motives of American publishers, why should it not survive the decisions of educational authorities and experienced critics who estimate its importance for a socialist society? To the artist now growing up in a Soviet environment, art is the natural expression of the collective life of millions given significant form by his own special talent or genius. Such an artist feels no repression in this new environment; he feels its great creative urge. Millions of rural journalists, thousands of dramatic clubs, tens of thousands of farm and factory orchestras furnish an alert and appreciative public. The leisure made possible by the social ownership of great modern machines is already widely used in the Soviet Union for pursuits of science and art. The barriers thus begin to wear thin between manual and mental labor; the same person does both. Genius, wherever it arises, finds ready access to widening expression. From such a soil, watered by the artistic strivings of millions, great art must grow. More than great art—a people to whom art becomes man’s natural self-expression, which no longer flames and dies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XIV: REMAKING HUMAN BEINGS ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the All-Union Song and Dance Olympiad was held in the summer of 1935 in Moscow, the first prize for dance groups was won by a troupe who would be classed in the capitalist world as convicts. They were sentenced criminals who were still living in Labor Commune Number Two, to which they had been sent for reformation. Their performance of an Ukrainian folk-dance “The Snowstorm” took first place against fifty thousand entrants. To anyone unfamiliar with the Soviet technique for handling criminals, the dancing of the group was less amazing than their free association with other groups of artists in all the local and provincial dance festivals, which brought them at last to Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
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The remaking of criminals is only one specialized form of the process of remaking human beings which goes on consciously today in the Soviet Union. Unlike those who justify ancient abuses with the formula, “You can’t change human nature,” the Marxist knows that human nature is constantly changing. The serf of the Middle Ages was a different human being from the highly skilled industrial worker of today, not only in methods of work but in mental outlook, nervous reactions, and even physical motions. Today a remaking of people in greater or less degree takes place across the entire Soviet Union. Illiterate, slow-moving peasants become attuned to rapid work in a collective labor process. Scientists, artists, engineers, doctors, once accustomed to depend upon capitalists for their living, adjust themselves to the new controls of a socialist state as employer. Some welcome the change, others resent it, but in all men the habits derived from the past are at war with the demands imposed by the present, and this struggle changes both the human beings and their environment.&lt;br /&gt;
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To some the process of change is only half conscious, and therefore bewildering and painful. To the happiest it is a consciously welcomed process. For men in all ages have desired to change, to become in some direction “better.” Moral teachers have urged them to effect this by an emotional decision to be good, honest, industrious. But this is a struggle in the dark with forces which the human being does not understand. His emotional conversion lasts as long as he can focus will and attention. But if the old environment continues, the old habits reassert themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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To a limited extent a human being may change himself under any social system, not by efforts of will but by calmly analyzing himself and his environment and placing himself under the impact of other forces which will change him. So much free will man has. But these individual efforts are limited by the social possibilities. Can a prostitute change her environment so that street-walking will become unnecessary? Only if an honest job is somewhere accessible. Can gangsters reform? Only if honesty is really the best policy; for him who would prosper under capitalism there is a time to be honest and a time to steal, and the criminal is the unlucky or stupid person who stole at the wrong time and in the unaccepted manner. Only a social system which insures to ordinary honest labor greater rewards than can be obtained by even the luckiest dishonesty will produce instinctively honest men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A remarkable tale of the change in social standards is written by a newspaper correspondent from the Ural gold fields. Formerly, according to the writer, everybody admired clever miners who were able to steal nuggets which legally belonged to the private owners of the fields. This attitude persisted long after the mines were owned by the government. But recently at a party given to celebrate a betrothal, the young man in the heat of dancing pulled out his handkerchief and with it a gold nugget which fell to the floor. There was a sudden silence and the party broke up without comment, even the girl turning away from the man thus revealed. “Everyone knew him for an enemy,” wrote the correspondent.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sharpest test of conscious remaking of human character is found in the Soviet policy for handling law-breakers. The Soviet criminologist holds neither of the theories on which the prevalent systems of prison régime in capitalist countries are based. He does not believe in the existence of “born criminals” whose will must be broken by brutal suppression nor does he rely on emotional appeals to the “better nature” of the criminal, for he knows that this better nature exists as yet only in rudimentary form. “We don’t assume that a man of anti-social habits will be at once reclaimed by gifts of chocolate, nice bathrooms, and soft words,” a leading Soviet penologist told me. “Men are made over by a new social environment and especially by their work done collectively.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet law aims to make over social misfits while protecting society from their attacks. Punishment as vengeance has no place in such an aim: revenge merely incites revenge in return. To make prisoners sit in solitude and think of their sins produces a fixation on crime. To “break a man’s will” or lessen his human dignity in any way injures him material for a creative socialist society. Soviet justice therefore aims to give the criminal a new environment in which he will begin to act in a normal way as a responsible Soviet citizen. The less confinement the better; the less he feels himself in prison the better. Soviet justice began to fight crime under the harsh conditions of civil war, replying with ruthless measures to counter-revolutionary plots. “We have a double approach” said Attorney-General Vishinsky in an interview. “Active, confirmed enemies of our Soviet power who stick at nothing to injure us must be ruthlessly crushed. But even among these alien elements, among nobles, landlords, tsarist officers, capitalists, whom we had robbed of their private property, we had to be able even there to find those individuals who could be made over into useful workers. We cannot begin with clean hands and fresh bricks to build socialism; we must use even old bricks for the new building. But if we had tried to apply the idea of absolute humanitarianism to bitter enemies we wouldn’t be here today.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Many social offenses are handled without bringing them into ordinary courts at all. A whole series of “comradely courts,” in factories, schools and apartment houses, try informally people who disturb their neighbors. These courts have the right to fix small fines for the benefit of the local club or library; they refer cases which they cannot handle to the public courts. There are even “children’s courts” in which children judge each other in the presence of interested adults. One such children’s court in an apartment house tried a boy for cruelty in killing a cat, and came finally to the conclusion that the real culprit was the superintendent of the apartment house who persistently failed to provide a place to play. The superintendent, who was present, accepted the decision, and organized with the children a committee to make good the shortcoming.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Not only in the court but out of the court my job is social protection,” a rural judge told me. “I must prevent court cases when I can.” He told how he had prevented crime at a recent saints’ festival. “Men always drink hard on such occasions; they fight and knife each other. So I called together the presidents of collective farms an the Party members, and we went through the crowd before drinking began and took away the knives and canes. They got drunk later, but nobody was badly hurt.”&lt;br /&gt;
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I sat in the court session which this judge held under the village trees and heard a dozen cases—stealing hay, bootlegging and the like—disposed of in an afternoon. The commonest sentence was “compulsory labor” which did not remove the offender from his home but required him to do without pay some socially useful work, such as road-building, school-construction or even office work in the village soviet. Only one serious case appeared: more than half the calves in a collective dairy had died under circumstances which seemed to implicate the dairy manager of something worse than the criminal negligence charge which had been brought. The judge found that he was “guilty of negligence at least,” but held the case over for further investigation to see whether he was guilty of “something more,” i.e., intentional conspiracy to smash the farm. In that case he would be “sent away” from the village to a labor camp for a period of perhaps three years.&lt;br /&gt;
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The labor camp is the prevalent method for handling serious offenders of all kinds, whether criminal or political. Most of the old prisons have been abolished; I have found them in rural districts converted into schools. The labor camps have won high reputation throughout the Soviet Union as places where tens of thousands of men have been reclaimed. They have, however, been the center of some of the most spectacular attacks on the Soviet Union in recent years. Allegations of brutal treatment and even of torture have found their way widely into the foreign press. While it is clearly impossible to check every one of these accusations, they are contradicted by every competent observer who has ever seen the camps. Dr. Mary Stevens Callcott, the American penologist who has studied prisons all over the world and who has had the unique experience of visiting the larger part of the Soviet camps, including those for the worst—and for political—offenders, has commented both in her book &#039;&#039;Soviet justice&#039;&#039; and in conversations with me personally, on the “amazingly normal” life that differentiates these camps from prisons in any other part of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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She notes the freedom of movement over large areas of territory, the very small amount of guarding, the work done under normal conditions—seven hours for ordinary labor to ten for men whose tasks, such as driving a truck, permitted frequent rests during work. She could find no speed-up; laws of labor protection operated as in factories. Wages were the same as those outside, with deductions for living expenses; all above this could be sent by the prisoner to his family, saved or spent as he chose. “No uniforms with their psychological implications, no physical abuse; isolation only in extreme instances. Privileges and special rewards replace the system of special penalties.” Among these special rewards are the two weeks’ vacation in which the prisoner may leave the camp, and the opportunities given for his family not only to visit him but even to live with him for extended periods. Normal human association goes on; men and women meet and may even marry while serving sentence, in which case they are given separate quarters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What most impressed Dr. Callcott, however, was the type of men in charge of these camps, and the relation they had to the prisoners. She tells of going through the Moscow-Volga Canal camp with its director. Prisoners hailed him with obvious pleasure and informality. A girl rushed up to detain him by seizing the belt of his uniform lest he get away before she could tell him something. A teacher whose term was about to expire expressed a wish to stay on and work under him. There were only five officials in the central administration office of this camp of many thousand prisoners; all the work, including most of the guarding, was done by the convicted men themselves. “In fact,” said Dr. Callcott, “I could never see what kept men in this camp unless they wanted to stay there. No convicts I have known would have any difficulty if they wanted to break away.” Both prisoners and officials, of whom Dr. Callcott asked this question—she talked with prisoners freely without the presence of officials—replied they didn’t run away because if they did, “nobody in my working gang would speak to me when I came back. They would say I disgraced them.” There are, however, a certain number of incorrigibles who run away repeatedly, and these are given somewhat closer guarding for a time. Political prisoners, she noted, were treated like everyone else, except that those who had been persistent and dangerous in their attacks on the government were sent further away from the possibility of connection with their past associates. In all her conversations with these “politicals,” she was unable to find one who had been sentenced merely for expressing anti-Soviet views. All were charged with definite action against the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“I did everything I could to destroy this government,” one such man frankly told her, “sabotage of the most serious kind. But the way they have treated me here has convinced me that they are right.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Another prisoner, who had been in Sing Sing, San Quentin, as well as in jails of England, Spain and Germany, before he was picked up by the Soviets for grand larceny, had been reclaimed by the Baltic-White Sea Canal. He had done a bit of engineering in his youth, and was promptly given a chance to work at this specialty. He won a medal, pursued his studies further, and was doing brilliant work on the Moscow-Volga Canal when Dr. Callcott met him. To her query about his reformation he replied:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In the other countries they treated me like a prisoner, clapped me in jail and taught me my place. Here they clapped me on the back and said ‘What can we do to make you into a useful citizen?’” Dr. Callcott conversed with many men now high in Soviet industry who had previously been reclaimed by the labor camps. Nothing in their attitude or that of those about them showed any stigma remaining from their prison life. “Of course, when it’s over, it’s forgotten,” one of them said to her. “That,” says Dr. Callcott, “is real restoration.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Information from many other sources and from my own observation corroborates Dr. Callcott. In August 1935 I visited the town of Bear Mountain, center of the administration of the Baltic-White Sea Canal, which is widely known in the USSR not only as a great construction job but as the place where tens of thousands of men won new lives for old. It is still the distributing center for the labor camps of this district.&lt;br /&gt;
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The chauffeur who drove me over twenty miles of wilderness without a guard in sight was one of the prisoners. He talked quite freely and said that he didn’t like the north but at least he had a chance to study a trade or become an engineer. A dozen types of industry had been established to utilize and train all kinds of workers. They took pride in their modern equipment and the high quality of goods produced. In the holiday celebration going on in the public square during my visit, one could not always tell who were prisoners, who were free workers and who were “guards.” The atmosphere was that of any new construction job in the country. Such, indeed, was the intention—to establish the atmosphere of normal constructive life, with certain old associations shut out.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What most interested me was the splendid theater, whose director boasted of his production of the opera &#039;&#039;Eugene Onegin&#039;&#039;, the &#039;&#039;Red Poppy&#039;&#039; ballet, and many of the latest Moscow plays. We learned later that he was a well-known Moscow producer, sent north for a serious crime. The camp authorities at once decided to build a theater, in order to utilize his abilities to the full. The theater cast itself consisted of lawbreakers, government officials, free workers and the families of all of them, mixing in the democratic intimacy of a dramatic performance. One wonders which of all his achievements this director will most boast of in old age, his work in Moscow or the northern theater created in Bear Mountain.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many former prisoners from the Baltic-White Sea Canal, after receiving freedom together with special prizes and high honors for their good work, went of free choice to help build the Moscow-Volga Canal, another convict-labor job. Here they were especially valued because through their own experience they understood the process through which new prisoners had to go and were especially skilled in helping them make themselves over. As in other Soviet construction camps, the workers on this canal had their art studio under professional direction, their musical circle and literary magazine, and their bureau of inventions through which four thousand proposals to improve the work of the canal have been offered by the prisoners themselves. Several prisoners, given their freedom because of inventions, refused to leave until the canal should be finished.&lt;br /&gt;
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So well known and effective is the Soviet method of remaking human beings that criminals occasionally now apply to be admitted. I met one such man in Gulin village. Notorious locally as thief and drunkard, he had a dozen convictions to his discredit, till at last he went to the authorities saying: “I’m a man destroyed, but I want to be made over.” They sent him to a labor camp whence he returned a qualified worker. Bolshevo Commune, the most famous “cure” for criminals, can be entered only by application approved by the general meeting of members. Its waiting list is so long that it accepts only the most hardened cases, priding itself on being able to make over persons who cannot become cured in any other institution. Its strength lies in its large membership of intelligent former criminals, who apply to new entrants their intimate knowledge of the criminal mind.&lt;br /&gt;
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Crime today is rapidly diminishing in the Soviet Union. From 1929 to 1934 sentences for murder decreased by one-half while sex crimes fell off to one-fourth. The cause is found in the growing strength of the Soviet environment to remake human beings; the penal policy is only a supplementary force. A striking example of the play of both causes may be found in the figures of prostitution. Pre-war Moscow had 25,000 to 30,000 prostitutes; these sank by 1928 to about 3,000,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Material from Dr. V. Bronner, head of Institute of Venereal Diseases, Commissariat of Health.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; diminution clearly due to economic causes. In 1931, after the Five-Year Plan -had abolished unemployment, the number sank still further to about eight hundred. To reclaim the more habituated, prophylactoria were established. These rose to the number of thirty-four in the whole USSR in 1934, and then swiftly declined to nineteen as their work was done. They are still declining for want of inmates; only one of the original five is left in Moscow. No woman was ever compelled to go to a prophylactorium; the chief punishment for breaking rules was to be put out. Nine-tenths of those who entered left cured both of physical disease and of old habits and were accepted without comment into the normal working life of the city.&lt;br /&gt;
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An eventual disappearance of crime is expected by Soviet authorities as the mental habits produced by a socialist system become established in Soviet life. For crime, in the Marxian view, arises from the conflicts of a class-exploiting society and will follow classes and exploitation into oblivion. In the first years of the new system, the sharp conflict with classes from whom it took privileges led to a decided increase both in crimes and in the repressive measures used by the state. Kulaks committed arson, cattle-killing, murder, and were exiled in large numbers; anti-Soviet engineers and officials sabotaged and were sent to labor camps. Today the kulaks have been amnestied, not only because many of them have recovered their civil status by honest labor, but also because the collective farms in the villages are strong enough to withstand their attack and absorb them. The labor camps which supplanted prisons are themselves diminishing, partly because they have “cured” their inmates, and still more because the normal free life of Soviet society is becoming strong and prosperous enough to have a direct regenerative influence on those social misfits that remain.&lt;br /&gt;
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In unforgettably lyric language the Soviet writer Avdeyenko, who a few years ago was by his own confession 2 “two-legged beast of prey,” told the Congress of Soviets, to which in 1934 he was a delegate, the story of the degrading of a youth into a criminal and the subsequent remaking of the criminal into an honorable and famous man. “In 1926,” he said, “under one of the cars of the Moscow-Tashkent express, lay two little passengers, myself and my comrade, voyagers making our way closer to the sun, searching for good people who would not be offended when we robbed them.” He tells how the conductor threw them out on the damp earth, how they wandered in rain and sleet, seeking warmth and light, thrown out everywhere till exhaustion turned to anger, anger to despair, despair to a great hatred for mankind. In this hatred they fired a haystack set against a house. “A warm, calm feeling filled my heart. Tears of joy and vengeance came into our eyes. We embraced, laughing and crying, and spent the rest of the night in a public toilet, pressing against the warm wall to warm first our backs and then our chests till we fell asleep standing.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I was destined to live many years—one—fifth of my life—with the feelings of hatred, malice, revenge that were born in me at that station. After that I robbed and threatened without remorse.” He tells how he stole fur coats and jars of butter, robbed drunkards in dark alleys, hooked vagrants off freight cars to steal their clothing, till he gradually became “a human beast, that most fearful two-legged blood-thirsty species without love or goodness or feeling or pity. Today it is frightful for me even to remember such a person.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Today in this historic hall, I stand on the tribune, a member of government. I am a citizen with full rights. I am strong. I cherish the best human feelings: love, devotion, honesty, self-sacrifice, heroism. I write books. I dream of creating an unforgettable production. I love a girl unselfishly. I am continuing my race—it will be a happy one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I am happy, full of the joy of life, unshakably exuberant. I go to sleep with regret, I awake with joy. I shall live a hundred years. I can fly to the moon, go to the Arctic, make a new discovery, for my creative energy is not trod on by anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Today I recall my past for the last time. In filling out my application blank, under ‘places of work,’ I wrote: “Till 1931 socially harmful activity. I begin the story of life from 1931’ And they answered: ‘So be it.’ So you see I am four years old, the youngest here.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Avdeyenko gives the stories of other former law-breakers who have been made over. He traces the source of their anti-social past to the heritage of capitalist exploitation; he finds the force that redeemed them in the new socialist industries and the life that arises around them. “All of you know the institutions where such people are re-educated. But our whole Soviet system is one big workshop for re-educating men. I know people of two generations whose lives were no better than mine. We are engineers, writers, aviators, journalists, machinists, administrators of cities, scientists, Arctic explorers. The industries of our country remade us, and the industries were established by the Stalinist policy of industrializing the country. Comrade Molotov spoke of the newly created factories, cities and whole industrial regions, but he did not refer to the giving of life, human life, to the two-legged beasts of prey I have described.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XV: YOUTH SET FREE ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“The generation which is now fifteen years old will see Communism and will itself build it.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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“Life is good and to live is good—in such a land, in such an epoch! . . . We, young owners of our country, called upon to conquer space and time. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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In June of 1935 these words of Anna Mlynek, young valedictorian of the first Moscow class to complete the new ten-year school, awakened in thousands of hearts the world over a realization of what youth’s outlook might be in a socialist land. To youth in capitalist countries the outlook is gloomy. They look outward and see unemployment; they look inward and find confusion. They are developing, rational beings propelled into a world whose irrationality even their parents and teachers cannot explain to them. Those who love them best offer only a host of illusions; they are taught to look at the past and go backing into the future. So there goes on within them what the well-known psychiatrist, Dr. Frankwood Williams, calls a “mighty struggle in the dark . . . with all the emotional complexities and uncertainties that home, school, community have woven into their being.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet youth have not escaped struggle. Their birth was in the flames of civil war. Their childhood endured the famine years. Their adolescence was strained by great tasks of constructing a country. Many young lives were cut short or crippled in heart or lung or nerve in those years of battle and building. Even today they see across the future the dark threat of world war which may be launched at any time by the capitalist chaos beyond their borders, and in which they know that many of them must perish.&lt;br /&gt;
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What then is the source of the explosive joy which becomes increasingly plain in the words, the sports, the celebrations of Soviet youth? It lies in those words “young owners.” Men in the past have been subjects of kings or even proud citizens of democracies. Never till socialism dared they call themselves owners of the land in which they live. Ownership brings freedom in planning, clearness of goal, harmony of intellect and will in expanding life. Joint ownership brings comradeship reinforcing freedom, and a new, widened will to conquer space and time.&lt;br /&gt;
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A letter sent by thirty-one young men and girls from a collective farm to Moscow to greet the assembling of congress in early 1935 expresses it: “We go a road that is rich with life. We know our goal. What we are doing we do with clear consciousness. We know that what we do is important, necessary, great and glorious. We know the aim of our collective farm tasks. We know what will be tomorrow for we ourselves create it. Today is good, tomorrow will be better, the day after tomorrow immeasurably better. We often think of the glorious future of our farm, our township, our dear district, all our beloved land. We think of the bright future of all mankind which will be freed by the world-wide proletarian revolution.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Not on any mystic faith do these thirty-one young people base their hope for the future, but on homely details of daily fact that seem at first sight quite inadequate to explain their joy. They relate the changing of poor soil to good soil. “Our village never knew wheat till the Bolsheviks pushed it to the north!” They tell the expansion of music, drama, sport and science built on the firm economic foundation of their increasing harvest. They see the clear connection between their farm’s success and the success of their country, and base on this their expectation of international revolution. Their life is an integrated whole from the farm to the world. They have grown up and been formed by a new social order.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are the qualities demanded of joint owners, which the Soviet schools seek consciously to develop? Neither the combativeness nor the submission which are the contradictory demands of capitalism, but a high degree of initiative and scientific interest, a high development of individual variety combined with highly developed social instincts. The aim of the Soviet school is not to create standardized people, suited to the demands of some undefined future boss, but to help youth discover and develop its own desires and capacities. In a hundred ways the schools are constantly asking: What do you most like to do? In a hundred ways they help this developing choice relate itself to the equally developing choice of others.&lt;br /&gt;
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An American teacher who has taught for years in Soviet schools tells me that the approach to the child is far more individual than in America. Persistent efforts are made to find the child’s particular aptitudes and interests. In the elementary grades there are two types of teachers:—group teachers remain with one group of children for several years, visiting their homes, becoming thoroughly acquainted with them and relating them to the special teachers who develop special aptitudes. By the seventh grade, which is roughly equivalent to second year of high school in America, psychological tests help the child decide what he can do best; they tell him his capacities but impose no compulsion on his choice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Summer camps and excursions are also planned to help children discover their special interests and widen the field of their choice. The best camps, such as the famous Artek in the Crimea, maintain amateur work of a high order in geology, botany, care of animals, study of sea-life and construction of airplane and automobile models. Children spending their summer in such camps discover and develop hobbies which may, or may not, develop into their life’s work. Newspaper discussions also draw out the self-expression of children; a special newspaper, the Pioneer Pravda, is written almost entirely by children.&lt;br /&gt;
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Last summer I met twenty young “Arctic explorers” under sixteen years of age on the Murmansk train bound for Polar regions. Their energetic study of maps, Arctic cruises, Northern peoples had been sufficient to win from their teachers a recommendation which included them in an organized cruise of the north. They would meet adult Arctic explorers who would treat them smilingly but courteously as possible future colleagues. Ten of the best pupils in botany were similarly allowed to make an expedition at government expense to the Altai mountains, where they hiked two thousand kilometers and found twenty-seven new varieties of black currants and a type of onion which resists 45° of frost. Two of these young explorers went as delegates to deliver the plants to the aged plant-creator Michurin: When he asked: “Weren’t you afraid to cross wild rivers and sleep at night in the woods?” they answered: “Sometimes we were afraid. We feared that our expedition would fail to find any new plants and we would disgrace ourselves as Michurin’s grandchildren.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Such trips are the reward of marked aptitude, but all children take some part in the “grown—up” activities of the country. In Molvitino township the farm children told me proudly of scores of tons of bird droppings and wood ashes collected to fertilize the exhausted fields. In the 1934 “war with drought,” when a chief harvest problem in the south was the low, dry stand of easily broken grain, children’s groups of gleaners followed the reapers and competed to save great piles of grain heads. Every Soviet child knows the heroism of Mitia who caught three harvest thieves red-handed. In Artek Camp I met a child who had prevented a train wreck by reporting a loose rail and another who saved an aviator by lighting a bonfire at night to guide the errant plane: these children won wide renown among other children and were rewarded by a summer at Artek. Children of railway workers in Tiflis built and operate a half-mile railroad in the Park of Culture and Rest; it is a serious enterprise which carries passengers, takes in a thousand rubles each holiday and spends the money in proper Soviet style to “expand the road.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These out-of-school activities of children became at one time so absorbing that they threatened health and education. Young Pioneers “saved the harvest,” reclaimed drunken parents, denounced village grafters and debated whether their first duty was to the school or to “help the country.” Today children are reminded that “learn, learn, learn” is Lenin’s statement of the three most necessary things for young humans to do. School dominates and organizes all other child activities. But it never excludes them. In all their learning many forms of activity have part.&lt;br /&gt;
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The early discipline of children is largely through mass pressure, highly effectively organized by the children themselves. Children often come to a teacher with suggestions about the best way to handle difficult cases. They inform the teacher of home conditions which have made certain children backward in study or in comradeliness. They organize committees to go with the teacher to the homes. Children will themselves expose violations of child labor laws, or write to the papers about parents who beat other children. The highest honor given to able children is to be asked to help more backward ones with their studies in a spirit not of condescension but of good team-work, like that of a basket-ball player who helps his team excel. The strongest penalty in any school is given when children ask to have a child excluded on the round that his conduct disturbs their work.&lt;br /&gt;
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All these activities of children directly reflect and prepare for their coming adult life. The encouragement of individual variety harmonized by regard for the rights of others expands into the more definite yet wider interests of youth. By the end of the ten-year school, which is roughly equivalent to a combination of the American elementary grades and high school, the boy or girl usually has some interest which he wants to test in serious work. Some young folks go to work even earlier, spending part of the years between fourteen and eighteen in a factory trade school with part-time work. Some go direct from the secondary school to the university. But the commonly encouraged procedure is to finish ten years of school and then go to work in the late teens for a period of self-testing before deciding on specialization.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are not odd jobs to earn one’s way through college, such as are known in American life. They are part of a youth’s conscious self-education in the actual world of production. They are related to his already appearing interests, which they test and develop. I know a boy of nineteen who chose to work on a farm in the summer. Since he already knew that he wanted to become an entomologist, the farm was expected to give him scientific work. He sorted apples for diseases, staked cabbages to count the bugs in sample areas, and otherwise used his special interest for farm production, improving his scientific technique while he worked. If an emergency had occurred, he would have helped in other ways, but emergencies which waste the time of young people in blind alley tasks are a blot on the reputation of any Soviet industry. When four girls of my acquaintance went to work in a chemical laboratory in Siberia and found it so disorganized that there was nothing really useful to do, they protested to the Party against this waste of their time, and the organization which was employing and paying them was censured and ordered to release them for other work. The time of youth is a precious treasure of the community. The most accepted reason which any youth can give for leaving a job is that it offers nothing more for him to learn.&lt;br /&gt;
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At no time in life is there any gap between work and schooling. Education is not a commodity purchased by money and consumed in childhood or in four charmed years of isolated university life. It is a personal and public necessity, without limits, freely available from childhood to old age. Courses of general culture are not crammed into a special period; they are taken after work in any quantity desired. They are paid for by state or trade union; any group of workers anywhere may decide to study chemistry, music or parachute-jumping and call on their trade union to pay the teachers. When young people feel that they have chosen a permanent specialty, for which they need some years of concentrated study, they apply to enter a university or a research institute. For these institutions their ability and seriousness is tested by severe entrance examinations. If they pass, study becomes their regular work, paid for as such by the state. It is fully as strenuous as the factory; they spend six or seven hours a day in class rooms and laboratories in courses chosen on a broad basis, but all consciously directed towards preparation for their profession.&lt;br /&gt;
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I visited the dormitory attached to three institutions of higher education in mining, metallurgy and non-ferrous metals. A pretty girl was specializing in blast furnaces, a former book-binder was studying mining engineering, a factory-worker was becoming a geologist for Central Asia, a broad-faced yellow Kazak was preparing to work in copper in the newly opened mines of Kazakstan. All of them were paid for their study by the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Their stipends ranged from one to two hundred rubles monthly, the higher pay rewarding the best students. Every summer they chose their “practice work” from a dozen localities which offered, and as soon as they found some place where they wished to sign up for a job after graduation, they got additional wages from their chosen industry. The majority decided by the third or fourth year of the five-year course. Thereafter they felt themselves bound to work, for at least a time after they finished the university, for the institution which had paid for their education. This was not felt by them as compulsion but as the intelligent specializing of their own choice on the basis of a wide range of opportunities. Any good reason, such as personal health or the demand of some national emergency, would be recognized by them and their fellows as grounds for release. But a frivolous change of occupation without reason would brand a youth as undependable, while to give up a job because conditions proved difficult would be stigmatized as cowardly. For what was he trained if not to make the conditions better? Has he not at his disposal for this all the resources of the land?&lt;br /&gt;
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What jobs does youth choose? By no means the easy ones. When has youth, when free to choose, ever asked for the easy way? Youth wants conquest. Youth is explosive energy, so explosive that under capitalism it must be befogged with illusions, lest it wreck the world’s ancient ways. Soviet youth is encouraged to make the world over; it responds to the call. In every difficult struggle faced by the Soviet state from its beginning, a mighty host of youth has volunteered.&lt;br /&gt;
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Youth does not wait to be asked; it takes the initiative. Through its organization, the Young Communist League, it repeatedly demands the right to battle on each new important “front.” I know young women who fought in the civil war, divorcing the husbands who would have prevented their going. The Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the first Soviet conveyor, was built and manned by young folks coming from every part of the country. “We give our youth to this struggle,” they said to me six years ago. “We do not spend it in ease or amusement. We shall not stop till we have built the socialist city of Stalingrad.” I have vivid memory of the boat that came at eleven o’clock one night for a long-expected boat-ride after a hot day and was turned down by young voices, with-out a word from their elders, as too late. “Got to go home; got to be fresh for the line tomorrow,” they said as they turned away.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus was launched in the far northeast of Asia the new ship-building port Comsomolsk on the shores of the Ohotsk Sea, a city proudly carved from mosquito-ridden forests by the forces of youth alone. Thus was built the Moscow subway in a titanic drive by youth to create “the most beautiful subway in the world.” Moscow’s Young Communists left office jobs, postponed university courses and requalified as underground ditch-diggers to build it. Every great construction job has its special tasks seized by youth; they take over the building of a blast furnace in competition with one raised alongside by their elders. They organize special farms which make proud records. They pour into the new industries, master the new technique, form the new staff of engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like young folks everywhere, Soviet youths have the problem of the relation between work and marriage. This is never a question of whether they can afford to get married; that is taken for granted. The problem is to find time for a satisfying family life. One troubled youth writes to the &#039;&#039;Komsomolskaya Pravda&#039;&#039; in the discussion recently held on this question: “I am a turner. I am also a Young Communist. Besides that I am working on an invention. My days are so full that I don’t have time to breathe. I see my wife only at night and then I&#039;m so dead tired that I fall down and sleep like a corpse. Lydia weeps. I am not a beast; I am sorry about Lydia. But I try to organize my time and I can’t even find an hour for my class on planning, much less for my family.”&lt;br /&gt;
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This is an extreme case; it is balanced by young Kuznetsova who lays down her specifications for a husband: “I wouldn’t have a man who was not a good social worker. But neither will I live with one who is interested only in his factory. I don’t want a one-sided man. I want a husband who will play volley ball with me, do skiing, appreciate the theater, music, general culture, read a book with me and argue about it afterwards. All these things have place in a well-rounded life.” These are the problems of a rich, abundant existence, which needs only to be organized. Soviet youth never feels that it must renounce any of these satisfactions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Each year when September First brings the International Youth celebration, hundreds of telegrams pour into the offices of &#039;&#039;Komsomolskaya Pravda&#039;&#039;, organ of Communist Youth, announcing achievements of youth and the gifts which it offers the country. A group of young steel men wire that they have dismantled and reassembled an open hearth furnace in six days instead of the usual ten; a group of young miners sends an extra train of coal manned by a train crew especially chosen from scores who competed for the honor. Other groups announce the organization of “cultured field camps” where music, drama and books enliven the evening’s work on the farm. Still other groups blazon sport records on floats in the great demonstration which storms the Red Square. Young Communists of the Red Dawn Telephone Factory hiked to the Mongolian border, 5,400 miles in 180 days. Another group is back from climbing the Altai, covering 1,200 miles on foot. They celebrate the Baikal-Murmansk ski-run across half Asia and half northern Europe; they announce Alpine and parachute records made by youth. Nor is there any sharp line between records in sport and in steel-mills. All are one unified, advancing life.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not in conflict with work but around it in the social life of the factory collective, Soviet youth develops activities of sport and recreation which make up a well-rounded life. Tsarist Russia possessed thirty thousand members of sport and athletic clubs; there are six million today. Tens of thousands of cheering spectators turn out to soccer matches between Moscow, Leningrad, Central Asia, Turkey and Spain. Soviet sportsmen begin to invade world records. But the characteristic of Soviet sport is not the straining for records in one field at the expense of all round physical fitness; its symbol is the GTO badge—“Ready for Labor and Defense”—to receive which one must pass certain standards in walking, running, swimming, rowing, skiing, jumping and every kind of summer and winter sport. Two and a half million persons have qualified for this symbol, and a second degree of GTO is now established, requiring high diving, parachute jumping and other difficult tests.&lt;br /&gt;
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Parachute jumping has become almost a national sport in the Soviet Union, typical of its sky-storming youth. Flying, gliding, jumping, youth fills the heavens above Tushino field several times each summer with its aviation festivals. One hundred and fifty at a time they leap from great carrier airplanes and come sailing down under canopies of many-colored silk—red, white, blue, orange, lilac—covering the sky with rainbow hues. Week after week they make new records, young men and girls in individual or group jumps. Nina Kameneva, descending from icy space nearly twice the height of Mount Blanc and breaking a world’s record, made the remark which was seized by Soviet youth as a new slogan: “The sky of our country is the highest sky in the world.”&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER XVI: NEW MEN EMERGE ===&lt;br /&gt;
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The emergence of new people has been noted with growing frequency in recent years by the Soviet press. Editorial writers have tried to analyze their qualities; novelists have attempted to portray them. A Russian author suggested a year ago to the Moscow News a series of half-column novelettes, each containing the snapshot of a life. To the editor’s query how many of these stories he had, he answered casually: “About a thousand.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“A thousand!” exclaimed our editor.&lt;br /&gt;
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“That’s not so many,” replied the author, “to describe the great variety of people now appearing in our world.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Lincoln Steffens told me of meeting one of these new people, a Soviet youth in Hollywood, “so new that he could not understand these United States. . . . He was a unit; he thought and acted together. He was constantly puzzled by the tactics of American capitalists, considered from the standpoint of their own survival.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Increasingly I also meet new people in the Soviet Union. Not infrequently I have misunderstood them; their approach to life was different from anything I had known. Their respect for my will, their unwillingness to use their personality to convince my intellect, I mistook for aloofness, so accustomed was I to the salesman’s method of putting himself over. On another occasion, traveling on a Siberian train, I made the opposite mistake and took for promiscuous flirtation the expansive joy of a high official whose deft approaches to every person he met drew forth answering flashes of life. Then I saw him evade a kiss from “Little Slant-Eyes,” a Tartar girl with whom for two days he had been joking.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Kissing is for the beloved one,” he said, smiling. “But the joy of life is to be shared with everybody.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“Do you know what they have thought of you on this train?” I asked him then.&lt;br /&gt;
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“What they think affects them, not me. They will also learn if it is in them.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Never had I seen a more poised personality. Later he remarked, “We Bolsheviks, as Kirov always said, must be the happiest people in the world. But I must be one of the happiest even among Bolsheviks. Our older men are marked by too many years of combat. Our younger men can hardly appreciate the grimness of what they have never known. But I spent my childhood in oppression and my youth fighting for freedom; I am old enough to know the conquered past, yet young enough for a whole new life.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Is it possible yet to say in what direction this new humanity is developing? Are there any characteristics common to these millions of people who are becoming subtly differentiated from the past? Many attempts are being made to analyze them. When the Turkoman horsemen descended on Moscow after their amazing 4,300 kilometer run across the deserts, Stalin said: “Only clearness of goal, perseverance in attaining the goal, and firmness of character breaking through every hindrance can achieve such a glorious victory.” Pravda elaborated this theme into an editorial on the Soviet ideal of character, declaring it to be the exact opposite of that “unquestioning obedience” which Hitler had previously demanded in an impassioned speech to fascist youth.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Strong and original individuality,” was claimed by Pravda as the basic quality of a Soviet citizen. Not the “rugged individualism” which capitalism in its early stages glorifies for its upper classes, and which sinks into gangsterism in the fascist decline. Not conforming obedience responding under all conditions to “God and country,” the capitalist ideal which under fascism becomes blinder submission for men whose destiny it is to be bossed. Not that ability to look on both sides of the question which intellectuals under capitalism prize as a sign of high intelligence, but which Pravda disdains as “division of personality and double-mindedness, Hamletism in romantic colors.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“Not submission and blind faith does the Communist Party implant, but consciousness, daring, decision. It is just from the clear goal, seen by millions, from fighting perseverance and firmness that there grows that remarkable voluntary discipline which bourgeois society cannot even imagine. . . . Clearness of aim, perseverance and firmness won the victory in the civil war, restored our ruined economy and created socialist industry and collective farming. Clearness of aim, perseverance and firmness made way through the ice of the Arctic, lifted our heroes of the air into the stratosphere and brought close to the Communist Party many of the great representatives of science, literature and art. . . . The Communist Party draws out from all the toilers of our great fatherland the quality of strong individuality, inseparably connected with the strong collective of the toilers. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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To many persons in capitalist countries these words will be only partly intelligible. They have been so accustomed to considering that their own life is “free” and Soviet life “regimented” that they cannot at once grasp a viewpoint which holds the exact opposite. Yet even the casual observer of human beings today in the Soviet Union notices that while they have certain characteristics in common they are by no means regimented into uniformity, but show a vivid individuality at least as great as is found anywhere in the world. A business man in Chicago who had never seen Moscow but who was something of an art critic, told me that he was especially impressed in all Soviet photographs, whether of demonstrations in the Red Square or of athletes and factory workers, by the quality of will in the faces. “Utterly different from the sheepish or brutal faces of Nazi pictures,” he added. It is clear to anyone who talks with Soviet workers or the more advanced of the collective farmers that they feel themselves possessed not only of freedom, but of a peculiar type of reinforced and collectively supported freedom which is strong enough to conquer all the obstacles in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Freedom is never absolute; it is concrete and specific. It means different things to different classes and generations of men. The American pioneer faced the wilderness ax in hand with the mood of a free creator, saying: “What shall I build?” His freedom was conditioned by the loans he made or failed to make for his migration, by the railroad that came or failed to come, and by the subtler limitations of his own skill and character, yet with ax in hand, he felt free. His ownership of his primitive means of production was the source and guarantee of his sense of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the means of production became the factory, the meaning of freedom slowly changed. Freedom became to the owner the right to fix prices and wages, to the worker the right to drift from job to job, seeking an easier boss. Freedom in government became the “right to choose one’s rulers,” not the right to own and rule. Freedom of thought and speech became the right to complain, to voice transient shifts of opinion, not the right to drive one firm consistent thought into life. As capitalism advanced, men became diversified in their work and capacities, but standardized in their instinctive reference to a boss. Soviet workers notice this quality in Americans who come to their factories. “They know how to complain and make suggestions, but not how to desire and will.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“Desire and will” is the form which freedom takes when men are owners. When they are joint owners, a form of will develops—not unlike that in a family, a partnership or a committee—which determines itself by consultation. “He does not make individual decisions,” is already a compliment in the Soviet Union; it is applied to Stalin. It is as if one said of a scientist that he refuses to base conclusions on a single experiment. Men always have made up what they call their own minds through the influence of other minds as well; but now they grow conscious of these sources of their choice; they organize even these sources. They criticize, but from within, not from aloof isolation. Workers express discontent not by strikes against an alien owner, but by joint fights against bureaucracy to improve the organization of the land. Freedom becomes less a protest and more a steadily burning choice; not a fight, but a seeking. It is seen not as absence of restraint, but as conscious selection of one particular, individual place in a living complex mechanism whereby a thousand similar freedoms are welded into flame and power.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the latter half of 1935 the Stakhanovites began to shake the country. People compared it to an explosion, an earthquake. The movement appeared simultaneously in a hundred places and a score of industries. Despite the great variety of its people, the fundamental characteristics were the same. Workmen operating new machines began to shatter past standards of production often against the indifference or opposition of engineers and managers but accompanied by the strained attention of their fellow workers. Each of them had to fight his way against old concepts and habits; one or two of them were killed by angry workers, outraged by this sudden burst of speed. But overwhelming public opinion hailed and copied the innovators. Swiftly, in the midst of their local elation, they found themselves acclaimed across the land as heroes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Within two months every country in the world was forced to take notice, disguising the information as best they could under the name “speed-up.” For this was no mere routine news from Russia. This was a storming of the world frontiers of productivity and science. Miners in the Donbas were doubling Ruhr production. Blacksmiths in Gorky Auto Works broke standards set by Ford. Shoemakers in Leningrad made records 50 per cent higher than the world record held by the Bata factories of Czechoslovakia. Young girl weavers ran far ahead of America’s best achievements. Swedish saw-mill machinery, standardized to cut ninety-six cubic meters of lumber, was impertinently pushed to nearly three hundred by woodsmen in Archangel.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hundreds of American engineers and workers, who tried five years ago to “teach the Russians,” and who today are scattered in jobs and out of jobs all over the world, must have grumbled glumly when they heard of it: “Why couldn’t they do it when we showed them how?” For the events which have happened are externally obvious. The Soviet Union equipped itself throughout with modern machinery and methods, and drew eleven million greenhorns into industry to operate them. The greenhorns broke machines, wasted material and learned. They could not learn at once when their teachers told them; it had to grow in their nervous systems. But what they have learned is not only the technical skill of America. It is all that skill with the pride of ownership added. Ownership of the whole great mechanized process that makes the modern world.&lt;br /&gt;
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People who were allowed to attend the first All-Union Congress of Stakhanovites—and everyone in Moscow wanted to go—told of the indescribable enthusiasm, the irrepressible, thundering cheers. The Soviet press grew lyric over “taming the fiery steed of science,” “washing out the barriers between manual and mental labor,” “preparing the way from socialism to communism where each shall receive according to his needs.” Stalin was saying to the assembled delegates: “We leaders of the government have learned much from you. Thanks, comrades, for the lesson, many thanks.” Those men in the Congress believed—and the country believed with them—that the plan made by Marx was coming true. They had established a new economic system. They had painfully equipped it with modern methods. They had slowly learned to manage it jointly, and now the predicted results appeared. Socialism was beating capitalist production, just as capitalism beat feudalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are the characteristics of these Stakhanovites? A joyously dynamic initiative, a pride in mastery of complex technical processes, a conscious co-operation with society, a hunger to learn. Every phrase dropped in their discussions shows exultant power in creation and desire to share the new skill with others. Busygin, the blacksmith who made the crankshaft record in the forge of the Gorky Auto Works, declares, “There’s nothing I dream of so much as studying. I want to be not only a smith but to know how hammers are made and to make them. . . .” Marie Demchenko who made the sugar-beet record asked as a reward a course at an agricultural college—and got it. Stakhanov himself went down in the mines to make his record as the chosen representative of his fellows. “International Youth Day was approaching and I wanted to mark the day with a record in productivity. For some time my comrades and I had been thinking how to break the shackles of the norm, give the miners free play, force the drills to work a full shift.” When Slavnikova wanted to beat the record on a machine she had carefully studied but never yet used, the foreman opposed her. “I&#039;m a fearless parachute jumper; that norm doesn’t scare me; I&#039;ll upset it,” she replied. She drove the machine to a five-fold record. She relates the sequel: “At four in the afternoon we had a meeting and they gave us flowers for our good work.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Bobilev, the steel smelter, wants you to know that he is a scientist: “We are no sportsmen. We tested out our open hearth; we repaired her and asked how much she could give. She told us 11.33 tons.” Vasiliev, the blacksmith who holds the record for forging connecting-rods, uses the words “boiled up” and “exploded” to describe his feelings about his forge. When his 1934 record was beaten by Andrianov, he “boiled up” and went back to the works with four days left of his vacation. I beat Sam Andrianov but I saw in a newspaper that a Kharkov smith had made more than a thousand. Then I exploded! I made 945 in one shift. The smith Stadnik also exploded and made 975. I consulted my gang how to organize our work-place; we got 1,036. We talked it over with the foreman and told him how to change the furnace; with true Stakhanov zeal he gave us in four days a furnace that could heat 1,500 in a shift. What stops us now? We talked it over and placed the metal in such order that it would be easier to take up. On October 27 I made an all-Union record 1,101 in a single shift. Comrades, I haven’t yet got out of that hammer all she’ll give, but I&#039;m going to get it out to the very bottom.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Characteristic of the Stakhanovites is their disdain for overtime work as a confession of inefficiency; their insistence that a rhythm shall be found which shall not be physically exhausting—“if the work is done right you feel better and stronger”; and their zeal in teaching the new skill to their fellows. The locomotive engineer Omelianov, demands the “worst engineer” as a pupil, and makes him also a beater of records. Slavnikova is asked by an inefficient woman: “You’re a Young Communist; why don’t you teach me?” She gives time to instruct the older woman, who also begins to improve.&lt;br /&gt;
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Life in the new factories is by no means ease and harmony. It is more like an explosion or a battle. An engineer of my acquaintance finds the Stakhanovites frankly terrifying. “They put up signals over their lathes when out of material. These signals pop up everywhere and I have to keep them satisfied, or they’ll say I sabotage. You can lose your reputation. You can be cleaned out of the Party. I&#039;m sitting up nights to plan the flow of work.” The demands of these new men are breaking the old technical processes. For “every worker knows,” says the weaver Lisakova, “that over-fulfillment of the norm will not only improve labor conditions in the factory, but also the kindergartens, nurseries, dining-rooms. All this depends on the efficiency of organization, the spirit of solidarity, the fulfillment of the plan.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It no longer even occurs to these joint owners that a rise in productivity might throw men out of work. Shifts of workers there will be from one job to another; but industry bears the expense of retraining workers. Conflicts there will be, harsh problems and many, but they feel quite sure that they can plan and achieve. They have won through civil war, pestilence, famine; they tightened their belts to build the first Five-Year Plan. They are driving rapidly through a second, which increases food, clothing, housing visibly each year. They haven’t the faintest doubt that as owners of their country they will always have worthwhile things to do.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Ten years hence,” said a Stakhanovite to me, “farming and industry may cease to be our main occupations. But there are other occupations when once we produce all the goods we need. Human development, exploration, science—to these there are no limits!”&lt;br /&gt;
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Whatever kind of world will be made by these new builders, one thing is certain: it will be built on conscious planning and will. Not regimentation but choice will make it, a choice that develops its own social guidance. If more people want geology, there will be more geology; if more want medicine, there will be more medicine. More comforts or more leisure, more music or more exploration of the Arctic? Our new world will be what we choose to make it. And if excess of choice in one direction leaves any fields unfilled, the social ways of influencing choice are clear and conscious. A combination of material rewards with social recognition, is already the method of attracting volunteers. The announcement in January, 1933, that agriculture was the most important front, brought hosts of recruits from the ablest people of the country. Calls for help through the League of Communist Youth supplied the driving personnel for Stalingrad Tractor Plant and the Moscow subway. Increased wages and shortened hours have supplemented statements of public need to attract more people into fields as diverse as medicine and mining.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are there any bounds whatever to man’s advance? These new men recognize none. “If in so short a time and with so backward folk we owners of one-sixth of earth have done so much, what shall we men not do when we own the resources of our planet, unhindered by the fear of wars? If the earth grows old, shall we not remake it to suit us? If the solar system runs down, shall we not find ways to give heat to our sun? Need we fix any limit to attainment, when the earth is our jointly owned workshop and home?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such is their confident philosophy. So they answer, when they take time to discuss at all. A new religion? No, that is a word disdained. A widening science, they would say. Their approach to ultimate reality is not one of faith and submission, on which all religions have been based. It is one of defiance and conquest through intellect and will. When the conflicts between slave and master, serf and baron, worker and capitalist are ended, and the classless society is attained, there begins the titanic conflict of conscious men with unconscious nature. Not by faith but by analysis, not by submission but by defiance shall we rise in that unending battle. Unending? Relatively only, not absolutely. But that end is beyond our present power even to imagine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Anna Louise Strong]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Is_the_Red_Flag_Flying%3F&amp;diff=72428</id>
		<title>Library:Is the Red Flag Flying?</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Is_the_Red_Flag_Flying%3F&amp;diff=72428"/>
		<updated>2024-09-24T14:52:57Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Add Library works by Albert Szymanski as a test&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Is the Red Flag Flying? The Political Economy of the Soviet Union Today|author=Albert Szymanski|publisher=Zed Press|published_date=1979|published_location=London|type=Book|source=https://archive.org/details/IsTheRedFlagFlying/mode/1up|pdf=https://ia800506.us.archive.org/5/items/IsTheRedFlagFlying/Is%20the%20Red%20Flag%20Flying.pdf}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Empty library pages]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Albert Szymanski]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Soviet_Democracy&amp;diff=72119</id>
		<title>Library:Soviet Democracy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Soviet_Democracy&amp;diff=72119"/>
		<updated>2024-09-18T13:39:57Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Fix a stray &amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox library work|title=Soviet Democracy|author=Pat Sloan|published_date=1937|type=Book|source=|pdf=https://ia601903.us.archive.org/34/items/sovietdemocracy1937/sovietdemocracy1937.pdf}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Introduction: Democracy and Dictatorship ==&lt;br /&gt;
A very great deal is being said and written nowadays about democracy and dictatorship. We repeatedly hear it said that democracy must be defended; and as an example of the kind of dictatorship of which we must beware the Soviet Union is often quoted. And yet, at the same time as this Soviet Union is described as a dictatorship, well-known people of different political views make statements which suggest that, in the Soviet Union today, there exists a system of government which possesses all the essential features of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perhaps the most popular definition of democracy is that of Abraham Lincoln, who described it as &amp;quot;government of the people, by the people, for the people.&amp;quot; And this is how the well-known students of public administration, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, write about the Soviet Union:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consist of a Government and a people confronting each other, as all other great societies have hitherto been […] the U.S.S.R. is a Government instrumented by all the adult inhabitants, organized in a varied array of collectives, having their several distinct functions, and among them carrying on, with a strangely new ‘political economy,’ nearly the whole wealth production the country&amp;quot; (Soviet Communism, p. 450).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If this description is correct, then the Soviet Union would appear to conform to the commonly accepted definition of democracy. But Sidney and Beatrice Webb are well-known Socialists, and therefore their description and conclusions might be prejudiced. It is, therefore, all the more significant that another writer, who has never had any sympathy with Socialism, but who knew Tsarist Russia, has recently confirmed the impression given by the Webbs. This is Sir Bernard Pares.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sir Bernard Pares lived in Tsarist Russia. After the setting up of the Soviet Government in November 1917 he worked in Russia for the British Government, which spent at that time about 00,000,000 on armed intervention in the hope of suppressing the Soviets. In 1919 Sir Bernard returned to England and set himself &amp;quot;to counter the propaganda for an application of the Bolshevist principles and program in this country&amp;quot; by giving &amp;quot;public lectures in almost every county of England&amp;quot; (Moscow Admits a Critic, p. 10).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only at the end of 1935 did Sir Bernard Pares again visit Russia, now the largest unit in a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On his return home he wrote a little book on his impressions, and in it he asked: &amp;quot;To what extent was the Government a foreigner to the people?&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is his answer: &amp;quot;In the times of Tsardom I never failed to feel it’s almost complete isolation. The Ministers of those times, and more especially in the last days of Tsardom, were for the most part obviously haphazard choices from a very narrow and by no means distinguished circle. I was, of course, one of those who longed to see the Russian public, as a whole, make its way into the precincts of government, and in 1917 for a short time I had that satisfaction. But even then there was the much less definable barrier, though a very real one, which separated the Russian intelligentsia from the great mass of the Russian public. ... I have to say that in Moscow today this frontier seems to have disappeared altogether, and in my visits to public offices and great institutions Government and people were of the same stock&amp;quot; (ibid., p. 35).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The contention of the Webbs, then, that &amp;quot;the U.S.S.R. is a Government instrumented by all the adult inhabitants&amp;quot; is confirmed by the observations of Sir Bernard Pares. Both these authorities agree that the Government of the U.S.S.R. is a Government of the people. Both agree, then, that the Government of the U.S.S.R. contains features which we associate, not with dictatorship, but with democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are sometimes inclined, I think unwisely, to treat democracy and dictatorship as two mutually exclusive terms, when in actual fact they may often represent two aspects of the same system of government. For example, if we turn to the Encyclopedia Britannica, to the article dealing with &amp;quot;Democracy,&amp;quot; we read: &amp;quot;Democracy is that form of government in which the people rules itself, either directly, as in the small city-states of Greece, or through representatives.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the same writer goes on to say this: &amp;quot;All the people in the city-state did not have the right to participate in government, but only those who were citizens, in the legal and original sense. Outside this charmed circle of the privileged were the slaves, who had no voice whatever in the making of the laws under which they toiled. They had no political and hardly any civil rights; they were not ‘people.’ Thus the democracy of the Greek city-state was in the strict sense no democracy at all.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Greek city-state has been cited time and again by historians as the birthplace of democracy. And yet, on reading the Encyclopedia Britannica, we find that in fact this was a democracy only for a &amp;quot;charmed circle of the privileged,&amp;quot; while the slaves, who did the work of the community, &amp;quot;had no voice whatever in the making of the laws under which they toiled.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The classical example of democracy was, then, a democracy only for certain people. For others, for those who did the hard work of the community, it was a dictatorship. At the very birthplace of democracy itself we find that democracy and dictatorship went hand in hand as two aspects of the same political system. To refer to the &amp;quot;democracy&amp;quot; of the Greek city-state without saying for whom this democracy existed is misleading. To describe the democracy of the Greek city-state without pointing out that it could only exist as a result of the toil of the slaves who &amp;quot;had no political and hardly any civil rights&amp;quot; falsifies the real history of the origin of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Democracy, then, from its origin, has not precluded the simultaneous existence of dictatorship. The essential question which must be asked, when social systems appear to include elements both of democracy and dictatorship, is, &amp;quot;for whom is there democracy?&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;over whom is there a dictatorship?&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us turn to the modern world. The Soviet Union, we have said, is often described as a dictatorship. Yet eminent authorities, describing the Soviet system of government, ascribe to it characteristics which we generally associate with democracy. Can it be that here, too, there is democracy for one section of the community, but dictatorship over another?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The answer to this question is found in the first Soviet Constitution of 1918. In this Constitution the purpose of the Soviet State was described as being &amp;quot;the establishment (in the form of a strong Soviet Government) of the dictatorship of the urban and rural workers, combined with the poorer peasantry, to secure […] the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and the establishment of Socialism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The urban and rural workers, together with the poorer peasantry, made up over 95 percent of the population of Russia; so that this &amp;quot;dictatorship&amp;quot; was to be a government by the vast majority of the people - those who worked. In this way the Soviet State was the exact opposite of the Greek city-state, in which those who worked had no say in the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State introduced universal suffrage for working citizens, without property or residential qualifications, and irrespective of sex, nationality, or religion. The right to vote and to stand for election was made available to all such citizens from the age of eighteen upwards. But those who employed labor for profit were deprived of electoral rights. The Soviet State in this way provided a degree of democracy for the working people such as they do not enjoy in any other country even at the present time; but over the employers this democratic power exercised a dictatorship. The small circle of the employers of labor had no voice whatever in the making of the laws to which they were subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From its origin the Soviet State consciously embodied features of democracy and features of dictatorship. But the democracy was enjoyed by the vast majority of the population, and the dictatorship was over a small minority. At present I do not wish to go into the whys and wherefores of this, or into its rights and wrongs, but I just want to make one point absolutely clear: it is that democracy and dictatorship have never necessarily been mutually exclusive terms. To speak of &amp;quot;democracy&amp;quot; without saying for whom may be misleading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer to dictatorship without specifying who dictates to whom is also liable to cause misunderstanding. The Soviet State, set up in October 1917, professed to give full democratic rights to the vast majority of the people. Did it do this? In Part I of this book I shall give my answer to this question by describing the organization of Soviet life as I have lived it, from 1931 to 1936. Soviet life, to one who has been brought up in a country where the factories and the land, the mines and the shops, are private property, is a new life, a life which differs in a vast number of ways from that of other countries. And, having lived this life, I find I can only agree with the Webbs and with Sir Bernard Pares, and refer to it as essentially democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if this life is so different, what is it that makes it differ? In what way is the Soviet State organized so that it can give, to visitors from democratic Britain, this impression of unity between Government and people, of real democracy? In Part II we shall see how the Soviet State came into existence, we shall analyze its structure, and note how it has developed together with changes in social relationships within the country. The new life described in Part I is the essential product of the new State described in Part II.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if the Soviet State has provided democracy for the whole people, and democracy of a kind which even impresses those who come from democratic Britain, there may be something deficient, perhaps, in our own conceptions of democracy. For to us in Britain today it is hard to reconcile the idea of democracy with a dictatorship against any class, however small such a class may be. But perhaps our attitude to democracy is a little old-fashioned! Perhaps we overestimate the extent to which democracy exists in Britain today. Let us see in Part III!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, first of all, let us visit the Soviet Union as it exists today and see the new life that they are building. Then let us examine the framework within which this new life is developing, a framework which itself has to be altered as life demands. Then, when we know the Soviet Union, let us come back to our own country, to make comparisons, and to draw conclusions!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== A New Life ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Equality of Opportunity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A foreigner who takes up work in the U.S.S.R. is struck by many things. But, for an all-round view of what everyday life is like, few occupations could be better than that of a teacher. The foreign worker in the Soviet factory has the experience of being a wage-earner in a Soviet enterprise. But the worker in a Soviet school not only has this important experience, but also constant contact with the younger generation, with those who form the youngest and freshest ranks of Soviet citizens. For this reason I am glad that my first occupation in the U.S.S.R. was that of a teacher in a technical college, where I was able to see the working of a really democratic educational system at first hand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are two features of Soviet education which must strike every person who has taught outside the U.S.S.R. The first is that the students themselves appear to be drawn from people of every walk of life, who are always enabled to study if they have the necessary ability, without any economic burden through not earning a living while studying. The second feature is the extent to which the Soviet student, in school, technical college, and university, is trained to participate in the running of public affairs, starting in the school or university itself, and extending over every aspect of Soviet life. In the present chapter we shall deal with the first of these features of Soviet education. In the next chapter we shall consider the second.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A first decree of the Russian Soviet Government, adopted shortly after the seizure of power in 1917, dealt with education: &amp;quot;Every genuinely democratic power must, in the domain of education, in a country where ignorance and illiteracy reign supreme, make its first aim the struggle against this darkness ... it must introduce universal, obligatory, and free tuition for all.&amp;quot; And, in the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in December 1936, we find the Right to Education being guaranteed to every citizen by &amp;quot; universal compulsory elementary education, free of charge, including higher education, by a system of State stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in higher schools, instruction in schools in the native language, and organization of free vocational, technical, and agronomic education for the toilers of the factories, State farms, machine and tractor stations, and collective farms.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The significance of these two declarations of Soviet educational policy can only be appreciated when certain basic facts are known. In pre-revolutionary Russia well over 80 percent of the adult population could not read or write. Today the percentage of adult illiterates has been reduced to less than 10 percent. In the years before the Revolution the number of children attending school was round about 8 million, of whom only half a million received any secondary education. By 1934 the number of children attending school had reached 25 million—more than half the population of Great Britain, and over three times the pre-revolutionary figure. By the end of 1937 the number of children attending school is planned to reach 30 million.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This rapid extension of education has not taken place without the greatest difficulties. I remember how, between 1931 and 1934, there was the most acute shortage of accommodation for all educational institutions. In the towns the school-leaving age was being rapidly raised to seventeen and eighteen. But there were not enough schools: so the school buildings were used by two shifts of children, the younger ones in the first half of the day, the older ones in the later half. And as far as the higher educational institutions were concerned, I have taught university classes in the offices of State departments from six o’clock in the evening onwards because there was no accommodation available earlier in the day.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But that difficulty was temporary. In 1935 Moscow built over 70 new schools and another 120 in 1936. The shift system has now been abolished. Similar programs of school-building in other centers have put an end to the shift system there also. And today in the Soviet towns every child has schooling from the age of seven to the age of seventeen or eighteen, while an increasing number are attending kindergartens before they go to school, and attending the university or other higher educational institutions when they finish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet educational system is not yet complete. At present every town child has compulsory education from the age of seven to the age of seventeen. This is an achievement of the past few years. In the villages the school-leaving age is still round about fourteen, but certain villages have already advanced ahead of this. In Yasnaya Polyana, the one-time home of Tolstoy, a school has been established in his memory which provides secondary education for the children up to the age of seventeen. In Chapaeva, in the Ukraine, the collective farm has provided the necessary funds for the raising of the school-leaving age to seventeen. In the latter case all the children of the village continue their schooling to seventeen, and some children from neighboring villages also obtain a secondary education there. I mention these two villages because I happen to have visited them. There are a continually growing number of such village secondary schools.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From a Soviet secondary school any pupil who has achieved the necessary standard can enter a university. And, as a university student, he or she receives a maintenance allowance from the State while studying. The Soviet student is paid, and higher education is open to all without being a financial burden. All students who finish a Soviet secondary education have the opportunity, according to their abilities, to proceed to a higher educational institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But all children in the U.S.S.R. do not yet enjoy a compulsory secondary education. If they finish a village school at fourteen, they may then go to some industrial training school in the town, or start to work in the collective farms. Also, in industry itself, there are many workers, many of them still in their twenties, who have never had schooling after the age of fourteen. The school-leaving age has been raised very rapidly in the past few years, and certain children have finished school at fourteen only to find that if they had been born two years later they would have had the opportunity to continue until the age of seventeen. Have they missed their chance?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In no country of the world are so many facilities available for those who have, for some reason or other, missed the opportunity for a secondary school education. Sometime before I left Moscow I remember reading that, in certain villages where the school-leaving age was being raised, those who had left schools at fourteen, three or four years before, wanted to continue their education and to obtain the secondary education which had just been introduced. So the schools readmitted these students, who were now able to benefit from the raising of the school-leaving age, though they had left school several years previously. In these particular villages certain individuals who had left school at fourteen returned at the age of seventeen and eighteen for another three or four years’ study!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But that is not all. For the system of adult education in the U.S.S.R. is today so widespread that it is possible for almost every working citizen to qualify, by means of free evening classes, for entry to the university. In the cases of older workers, who finished school at fourteen and then had a purely industrial training, it is possible to obtain a secondary education free of charge at evening classes at their place of work, and then to become full-time university students, drawing the usual State allowance while studying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I found that many of the students of English whom I was teaching in Moscow in 1932 had been recruited in this way. Young peasants from the villages, and young workers from the factories, who had left school at fourteen, had then continued to study in evening classes, had qualified for entrance to technical schools and universities, and were now full-time students, training to become teachers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I say that it is possible for &amp;quot;almost&amp;quot; every working citizen to qualify for a higher education in the U.S.S.R. today. The word &amp;quot;almost&amp;quot; is used because there still are, in certain exceptional cases, technical difficulties which may prevent certain individuals from obtaining the kind of training that they would like. I have in mind one particular example. This was a young-dining-car attendant on the Trans-Siberian Railway.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He was particularly interested in the theatre, and wanted to become an actor. But since his work was on a dining-car, and he was travelling for ten days at a time, and then having several days off, he was not in a position to attend regular evening classes. He had left school at fourteen, and therefore could not, without such classes, qualify for entrance to one of the drama institutes or universities. Actually, he considered himself to be an unfortunate exception to the general Soviet rule that every working person can enter the university.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So far we have been considering equality of opportunity in the purely educational sphere. But equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R. extends far beyond the realms of education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perhaps another of the most interesting features of Soviet life to a foreign visitor is the close link which exists between all kinds of amateur and professional activities. This starts in the school, in the form of an intimate connection between the children’s studies and their hobbies. The Soviet schoolchild has the opportunity, in the school buildings, or in other institutions specially created for the purpose, of being a young naturalist or photographer, scientist, engineer, or inventor, in his or her spare time. Equipment is supplied free of charge, and instructors are available.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many Soviet children today go on to the university to specialize in that very subject which they found to be their most interesting hobby when at school.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet factories and collective firms much of the leisure time of the people—and this leisure time is ample since the working day averages less than seven hours throughout Soviet industry—is spent on amateur activities such as dramatics, literature, sport, photography, art, and so on. But these amateur activities are not, as is usual in other countries, left to the care of the local enthusiasts, without professional assistance. For, in all Soviet amateur activities, the professional people in that particular sphere render organized assistance, so that the general level of the amateurs is raised so as rapidly to approach a professional standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A typical example of this is theatrical work. Practically every industrial enterprise in the U.S.S.R. has its workers’ dramatics circle. Agreements are made through the trade unions with professional theaters, and these promise to give assistance to such circles in the form of voluntary or paid help by trained actors and producers. The result is that the amateur group has the benefit of professional assistance, and can raise its standard of excellence considerably above that which in this country we term &amp;quot;amateur,&amp;quot; meaning inferior to &amp;quot;professional.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such an &amp;quot;amateur&amp;quot; dramatics group in the U.S.S.R. may at any time, having reached a certain standard, be offered by the authorities the opportunity of taking over a professional theatre as a full-time job. I have been present at a competition of village theaters in Moscow and seen a performance by a young theatrical group which was certainly up to the best British repertory standard. The whole company consisted of young working men and women who had previously been members of the dramatics club of the automobile plant in Gorky. They had received professional guidance from the Vachtangov Theatre in Moscow, and, at a certain stage, had been offered facilities by the Commissariat of Education to become a full-time theatrical company. They now had their own theatre in a Russian village. In this way workers in the factory had become professional actors and actresses, through their amateur theatricals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as in the sphere of the theatre there is an opportunity for the ordinary amateur to become a professional, so, too, in painting and writing, in sport and in science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A reference to sport in this connection may raise a query in the minds of certain readers. Does this mean that there is professionalism in Soviet sport? The answer is that in the U.S.S.R. today the facilities for sport are rapidly growing all over the country. New sports grounds are being laid out, and factories and collective farms, towns, and villages, have their teams, which compete against each other in separate matches and league competitions. But these teams require trainers. And the trainers are the &amp;quot;professionals&amp;quot; in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any Soviet worker can participate in sport free of charge. Those who are good enough to play in their town or factory teams have their expenses paid when away from home, and draw the equivalent of their wages from the sports club when away for matches or training. Those who are outstanding at any sport become eligible for the whole-time work of instructor to other teams. In this way the road is open for the amateur sportsman to become a full-time professional instructor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have so far considered two aspects of equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R.: first, the equal availability of education to all citizens; secondly, the possibility of development through amateur activities to professional activities, quite apart from the ordinary educational system of the country. Certain other aspects of equality of opportunity remain to be considered.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not every worker in the Soviet factory or collective farm who wants either to go to a university, or to convert some amateur activity into a full-time profession. There are hundreds of thousands of workers greatly interested in the particular jobs which they are at present doing, but who want advancement to more skilled or more responsible branches of the same work. Such advancement is possible in all Soviet enterprises.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A characteristic of every Soviet institution is the stress which is laid on the desirability for every working man and woman to raise their qualifications at their work. Whether it is a case of teachers in an elementary school or university, or workers at machines in a factory, or typists in an office, there are always available the means of further education, through evening classes free of charge. And in all this a leading part is played by the best workers in the enterprise, who often undertake voluntarily to train other workers up to their own level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When, in 1935, the coal-miner Stakhanov became famous all over the world as the young man who in a six-hour shift had doubled output and had at the same time received a tremendous rise in earnings as a result, many people outside the U.S.S.R. asked the question: &amp;quot;Does this not mean that a new privileged category of workers will arise, having a monopoly of the jobs which earn high wages?&amp;quot; To those who were living in the U.S.S.R. at the time, this question appeared singularly divorced from real life, for in his spare time this same coal-miner Stakhanov was going round his own and other pits training the workers there to use his methods and to become more efficient organizers of their work, raising earnings accordingly. In this way leading workers in the U.S.S.R. train others up to their own level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the point of view of the ordinary worker this means that, in every sphere of work, the most highly skilled are willing helpers and trainers. Every working man and woman has the opportunity to learn to improve technique at the job, with the expert assistance of those who are best at that kind of work. Obviously, such a system is itself dependent on certain economic conditions! Leading workers in the U.S.S.R. would not be so willing to train others up to their own level of efficiency if, as in Britain today, they thought they might be replaced by these other workers as soon as they had trained them. Full co-operation on the part of all the skilled workers in a community in training others to their own level of skill can only be obtained in a society in which there is no unemployment, and where every sort of skilled work is in demand. In the U.S.S.R. there has been no unemployment since 1931, and there is a demand for every kind of qualified worker. It is in such circumstances that the skilled worker knows that by training others he is not endangering his own security, and that the community as a whole, and he as a member of it, will gain from a greater supply of skilled workers and the products of their labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There still remains one sphere of equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R. which has not yet been discussed. This is public administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first Soviet Constitution of 1918 the vast majority of the population obtained electoral rights on a wider scale than have existed at any previous time in Russia or, with the exception of Soviet China, in any other country to this day. But it would be a great mistake to think that, under Soviet conditions, participation in public administration depended simply on the electoral rights of the population. It must be realized that in the U.S.S.R. today there no longer exists that distinction between &amp;quot;civil service&amp;quot; and other occupations which is typical of every other country. The reason for this is that since all industry and trade are in the hands of the State, the relation of the manager of a factory to a factory worker is no different in essentials from that of a director of a State clinic to a doctor working there, or of a headmaster of a State school to one of the teachers. All Soviet citizens are, in a sense, civil servants. And it follows from this that the opportunity to rise in any particular occupation to the most skilled and most responsible posts means, in effect, the possibility to rise to the highest posts in the public administration of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a further feature of Soviet administration which must here be mentioned. While we have considered the case of the amateur actor, we have not yet mentioned the &amp;quot;amateur&amp;quot; administrator, the voluntary worker in various municipal and State departments, who is an essential part of the Soviet apparatus of State. Not only is it customary in Soviet elections to return members to the Soviets, or Councils, in whose hands lies the authority to govern the country ; but, in addition to this, it is the usual thing for the electors to nominate further additional representatives to work for the Soviets, in their various departments, voluntarily in their spare time. In this way voluntary public workers play a considerable part in the Soviet health, housing, educational, and other services; as also in the work of the militia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sphere, as in the sphere of amateur activities in the factories, such voluntary work is a recruiting-ground for able administrators. The factory workers, men and women, who in their spare time do good work for the Soviet in one of its departments, may at any time be called upon to turn such work into a permanent job, and to transfer from their factory to some administrative position in the Soviet for which they have shown their aptitude as voluntary workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R., then, may be said to exist in education, and in the opportunities available both to youth and to adults for obtaining education. It may be said to exist in every profession, through the availability of the necessary training-facilities for all citizens to improve their skill. In the sphere of administration there are paths to the leading administrative positions, through election, through promotion, and by way of voluntary work in the various administrative bodies of the State. And, in cases where working people show ability at some amateur activity, there is the opportunity to turn their amateur activity into a profession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a system not only gives every citizen an opportunity to qualify for every occupation, but the &amp;quot;square pegs in the round holes&amp;quot; can re-qualify for some other occupation if an earlier choice has proved unsuitable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This system, the result of nineteen years’ development, is still far from complete. There are still a few dining-car attendants who would like to become actors (but who, because of the mobile location of their present jobs, cannot immediately qualify for the other occupation). But already the inequalities of opportunity are the exceptions, whereas elsewhere they are still the rule.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion, a word must be said on two kinds of equality which have existed since the Soviet State was set up, and which further contribute to make equality of opportunity effective for all citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, it must be realized that in the U.S.S.R. today every citizen enjoys the rights of citizenship irrespective of nationality. In 1918, in the first Soviet Constitution, it was declared &amp;quot;contrary to the fundamental laws of the Republic to institute or tolerate privileges, or any prerogative whatever, founded on such grounds, or to repress national minorities, or in any way to limit their rights.&amp;quot; And, in the new Constitution of 1936, the same point is stated with even more emphasis: &amp;quot;The equality of the rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all fields of economic. State, cultural, social, and political life, is an irrevocable law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Any direct or indirect restriction of these rights, or conversely, the establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on account of the race or nationality to which they belong, as well as any propagation of racial or national exceptionalism or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Citizens of every nationality are treated as equals. A Tartar may live and work in his own republic, or he may choose to live and work in one or other of the national republics of the Union, but wherever he goes he will have the same treatment as everyone else. Further, as far as education is concerned, every citizen has the right to education in his own language, provided only that there are sufficient fellow-nationals in the locality to make such education practicable in an organized way. In the U.S.S.R. no student is forced, as students are compelled, for example, in Wales today, to sit for examinations in their own national universities in a language which is strange to them. The advantage of this may not easily be appreciated by Englishmen, but I have known plenty of students in North Wales, many of whom found the English language extremely difficult, who will appreciate what this means to the students of all the nations of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The effect of the Soviet attitude to nationality has been a vast increase in national pride throughout Soviet territory at the same time as national antagonism has been eliminated. Particularly does this show itself among the Jewish population, who were as ruthlessly persecuted under Tsarism as they are in Nazi Germany today. In Tsarist Russia they did not have their own territory. Today, to give them complete equality with other nationalities the Soviet Government has put Birobidjan at their disposal, and Jews, like citizens of all other nationalities of the Union, may settle in their own national territory or elsewhere, according to choice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his Russian Sketchbook, David Low has a cartoon which is supposed to illustrate the Soviet solution of the Jewish problem. A foreigner, obviously Mr. Low himself, is interviewing a group of men with very large noses. Their nationality cannot be doubted. The Foreign Enquirer asks: &amp;quot;How do the Jews get on?&amp;quot; and a Comrade replies; &amp;quot;Well, you see, there aren’t Jews here anymore. Jews is just Russians like ourselves.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I quote this because as a rule Low showed very great insight into Soviet life. But this cartoon is an exception, for in this portrayal of the Soviet solution of the Jewish problem Low shows precisely the reverse of the truth. Contrary to Low’s conception, the U.S.S.R. is the one country in the world today where no Jew will be found who will not proudly state that he is a Jew. The Soviet Jew is a Jew and is proud of it, just as the Soviet Russian is Russian and proud of it. It is not the Soviet Jew, but the German and the Hungarian, the American and the English, the Jew of every other country of the world outside the U.S.S.R. who, at some time or another, feels it is in his interest to pretend he is just a German or Hungarian, American or English- man, like everybody else. It is only in the U.S.S.R. that this feeling no longer exists. Low portrays the elimination of the Jewish problem as the negation of nationality, whereas in fact it lies in the full expression of national consciousness and the most extensive development of national pride.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, equality of opportunity between the sexes in the U.S.S.R. must be mentioned. You do not hear in the U.S.S.R. references to &amp;quot;women’s jobs&amp;quot; as opposed to the jobs of men. Admission to all occupations is based on merit, irrespective of sex, and payment in all occupations is also based on merit, irrespective of sex. And, in so far as the role of women in society is complicated by their functions as mothers, this side of their lives is being increasingly cared for by the rapid development of social insurance and communal centers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality of opportunity in. the U.S.S.R., then, exists irrespective of the nationality or the sex of citizens. It exists in education, in every occupation, and in opportunities to change from one occupation to another. To say that exceptions do not occur would be fantastic, but the really significant feature of equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R. today is that these words no longer express something to be vaguely attained at some future date, but a fact of Soviet life at the present time. In the U.S.S.R. every case of absence of equality of opportunity is now regarded as an exception, and as a serious fault in the working of the system. As faults, the people combat the existence of such exceptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so we come to another aspect of Soviet democracy, the combating of faults in the system. How is this done? We begin to answer this question in the next chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Education for Citizenship ===&lt;br /&gt;
Equality of opportunity to receive an education in the U.S.S.R. really exists today. This is important. But so is the kind of education where there is equality of opportunity to receive. While, in such a book as this, it is not appropriate to make a detailed study of the whole of the Soviet educational system, it is extremely important to examine it further, in so far as it provides the youth of the country not only with qualifications as future workers, but with the ability to fulfill the tasks of citizenship, to participate in running those concerns in which they are employed, to combat faults in the social organization of the community, and, in fact, to govern the country in which they live.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The young Soviet citizen, finishing his education, becomes a wage-earner in a State enterprise, or a member of a co-operative organization. For, at the present time, there are no longer private concerns which employ the labor of others. The young Soviet citizen, in either of these forms of organization, will be called upon to participate in running them. But he will participate in running these organizations in co-operation with others. He must, therefore, learn to accept responsibility- but responsibility to a group, to a collective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If citizens are to participate effectively in running the country in which they dwell, they must have an appropriate education. Therefore, even in the elementary school in the Soviet Union the visitor is struck by the extent to which the student is treated as a citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Corporal punishment is forbidden by law in the Soviet schools, and other punishment in any form is practically non-existent. The children are taught to look upon the teachers, not as vested with an almost supernatural authority, but as human beings like themselves, who have more experience. The headmaster or headmistress of a Soviet school is a senior comrade, who holds a position of such authority only by virtue of ability and good leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Everything possible is done in the Soviet schools to bring the children into contact with the everyday life of the country. Their lessons include knowledge of current political questions and of industry and agriculture. In their spare time, facilities are provided in the schools and other institutions for hobbies such as natural history or engineering, literature or sport. The important fact in this connection is that the Soviet child is encouraged to take his hobbies seriously, and is given the possibility of doing useful work which may have positive value. Thus, groups of &amp;quot;Young Inventors&amp;quot; attached to Soviet schools, turn out some hundreds of inventions annually. And in the Moscow Zoo a group of child helpers participates in the research work that is being carried on there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And once, on May and, a public holiday, the direction of traffic in the city of Kiev was in the hands of the children of the city. And the children in all the larger towns have their own theaters and cinemas, fun by the Commissariat of Education in conjunction with the local school authorities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the children’s theaters the children are expected not only to be spectators but to criticize the performances and to make suggestions for their improvement. The Moscow children’s theaters arrange meetings between children and writers, at which writers read their latest children’s stories, and discuss their merits with the children prior to publication. The children learn to play a part in determining the kind of books that are going to be published for them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These examples, taken at random from the life of Soviet children today, serve to emphasize the fact that the Soviet child is a citizen from his earliest days, receiving the respect of other citizens, and with the opportunity to utilize his or her spare time in some useful hobby which may be of actual scientific or artistic value.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But how is the life of the school itself organized? To many teachers and parents in other countries it seems inconceivable that schools should be run throughout a vast country without the use of punishment and ail the other devices for preserving the authority of the teacher to which we are accustomed in the rest of the world. But Soviet experience has proved conclusively, in a period of twenty years’ trial, that if children are treated as fellow citizens, and not as a kind of inferior being, they will behave as citizens. If an appeal is made to them as serious human beings, then they will answer by showing a sense of responsibility which can never be inculcated by the cane or by other forcible displays of the teacher’s authority and power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If I were to draw a comparison between the typical Soviet school and the school in Britain, I would say from my own experience that the atmosphere of the Soviet classroom can only be compared with that of the British playing-field. All that voluntary discipline which is obtained in England, even among quite young children, in the sphere of games is obtained, in the U.S.S.R., in the actual work of learning. And when we ask how this comes about, I think we are bound to realize that in the British school, in general, it is only in the sports activities that the children are treated as citizens voluntarily carrying on certain social activities for their mutual benefit, whereas, in contrast to this, the ordinary school work is treated as a necessary &#039;evil’ enforced upon them by some higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet school the greatest incentive is given to individual achievement, but only in such a way as is consistent with the developing of a team spirit. The marking of Soviet students does not consist of arranging them in order from first to last, but in classifying them into groups, marked &amp;quot;excellent,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;good,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;medium,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;weak.&amp;quot; It is theoretically possible in any class for l00 percent of the students to obtain the mark of &amp;quot;excellent.&amp;quot; The good student is not prevented from obtaining the mark of &amp;quot; excellent&amp;quot; if someone else also does well, whereas, under the more antiquated system so common still in Britain, only one child can be first in the class, only one can be second, and so on. To the English child, marked in this way, it is of advantage not to help the others to do well; but the Soviet child gains no advantage whatever from other children in the class being marked &amp;quot;medium&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;weak.&amp;quot; In the U.S.S.R. there is not the individualistic system in which the success of one is obtained by displacing another from a leading position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to this, in the Soviet school collective competitions are regularly arranged between the different groups of students, for the best possible results in each class. While all the pupils in one class try to attain the individual achievement of &amp;quot;excellent,&amp;quot; the whole class competes with the other classes in the school for the maximum number of &amp;quot;excellents&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;goods&amp;quot; and for a minimum of &amp;quot;weaks.&amp;quot; This &amp;quot;Socialist Competition,&amp;quot; as it is called, emphasizes the Soviet class of children with something of the zeal for their studies as the English football team has for its game. And the result is that the best students voluntarily assist the weaker ones, in order that the best results may be obtained by the class as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is these two features of the Soviet school system— the treating of all pupils as citizens, and giving them the opportunity to do useful work if they wish to do it—together with the organization of their work so as to introduce into it some of the fun that in Britain is associated purely with leisure, with activities rigidly separated from work, that lay the foundation for quite a different system of discipline in Soviet schools from that which exists in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet child, as a responsible citizen, and keen on the success of his or her work because it also means the success of the team in competition with other teams, is interested in having good results as an individual, and for the whole group. As a result, the desire to work has not to be enforced by punishment from above, any more than punishment proves necessary to make the boys of an English school take their football seriously.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the English school, even where the use of the cane is common, it is not usually found necessary to employ it in order to stimulate concentration on such matters as football. The collective enthusiasm of the children themselves proves to be an adequate stimulus to each individual to exert the necessary energy. The slacker is reformed by the collective pressure of the other players, and the good player, in the interests of the team, coaches the weaker.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is precisely this spirit which prevails in the Soviet school, not only within the limited sphere of sport, but throughout. And it is in such conditions that the relations of teacher to pupil are those of experienced adviser to willing learner, and that discipline is enforced almost entirely by the students themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet classroom is a scene of collective team activity. The students elect their own leader, who is responsible for checking such matters as attendance and general discipline. A students’ committee decides matters of general importance to the class, and for the school as a whole there is an elected committee which is the recognized representative body of the students.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under the leadership of this body groups of students, in their spare time, undertake various kinds of work in connection with the administration of the school. It is a common thing, in a Soviet school, to find a children’s sanitary commission that brings recommendations to the administration and to the other pupils concerning questions of cleanliness, and a kitchen committee that passes regular comment on the food supplied in the school dining-room. It is also common for the merits of teachers to be openly discussed at meetings, at which not only teachers have the right to criticize students, but students have the right to criticize the work of their teachers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet teacher is also a member of the team—holding the office of &amp;quot;coach.&amp;quot; Here, too, the only apt comparison is with the sports activities in an English school. Whereas, on the one hand, we would find much skepticism in this country as to the advisability of pupils choosing their teachers, on the ground that they would choose those that gave them the least work, it would hardly be maintained that the boys in a school would not be capable of passing judgment on the question of which master was the best football coach.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the latter case it would probably be generally agreed that the boys concerned would be good judges; whereas, in the former, it would be suggested that their judgment was quite unreliable. The only reason for this distinction, of course, lies in the justifiable assumption that, in general, in the English school, the children are not so interested in their academic learning as they are in their football. But in the U.S.S.R., with the status of children as described, and the competitive system in academic work having been developed along lines comparable only with sport activities in Britain, the spirit of the British playing-fields has been brought into the Soviet schools. If the playing-fields of Britain have been responsible for bringing up a race of Empire rulers, then the classrooms of the Soviet Union, by introducing that same spirit of collective sport into the work of the whole younger generation, is bringing up a race of people really capable of ruling, not an Empire, but themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Socialist competition between the classes of a Soviet school has been mentioned. It is important to note that, in this Socialist competition, the teachers are also participants. The children of the different classes compete against each other for the highest number of &amp;quot;excellents,&amp;quot; and the teachers of these classes compete against each other also for achieving the greatest number of &amp;quot;excellents&amp;quot; in the classes under their charge. In this way the children and teachers have the same common aim as is shared between the football team and its coach in an English school.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to check the results of this Socialist com- petition, regular meetings take place between teachers and pupils, together and separately, to discuss how the work is progressing. In such discussions the teachers’ methods may be discussed and criticized by the children. Further, in the Press, edited by the staff and children in Soviet schools, there is a vehicle for the written word. No Soviet schoolroom is complete without its wall-newspaper, a glorified notice-board, on which are pasted articles on school activities, and on matters of general local and national importance. Such newspapers are edited by the students and by the teachers, and contain full discussion of all problems facing the school.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A group of children, for example, may visit another school where the dining facilities are superior to their own. They return, and the wall-newspaper contains an article demanding that the school administration at once take steps to make the dining facilities as good as in the other school. Or members of the sanitary commission may find that the washing facilities in another school are better, and so, in meetings and in the wall newspaper, the demand is put forward that the administration take the necessary steps in their own school to improve conditions accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is these children, and these students, trained to participate in the running of their schools and universities, who later go on to work in Soviet institutions of every kind. Clearly, such people would be intolerable employees for any ordinary employer of labor. Children, who, at school, have had their own representative committees which demanded that the administration improve the sanitary or feeding conditions, or supply better teachers, are not going to be docile wage-earners. They will tend to be disturbing elements, trade unionists always agitating for better conditions. Similarly, university students who, from the age of eighteen onwards become members of trade unions, and whose trade union committee puts forward all kinds of demands on the part of the students, are not, given their university training is over, going to be docile employees.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The type of person created by the Soviet educational system, then, is an intolerable type from the standpoint of any private employer. Such people, to use a common term, &amp;quot;would simply make a revolution.&amp;quot; And that is why, only in the U.S.S.R., and after the Revolution, an educational system has been developed which creates such people. For, in the U.S.S.R., the new system of production, where the power of the private employer has been first restricted, and then finally eliminated altogether, requires a type of citizen altogether different from the wage-earner of capitalist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This new type of citizen can only be understood when we know how he lives, and the conditions under which he works. Therefore, from the Soviet educational institutions let us now go with our young citizen to his first job, whether in a State institution or in a cooperative organization. We shall then see that the education of the Soviet school is a preparation for responsible citizenship in Soviet society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Rights of the Wage-Earner ===&lt;br /&gt;
Some time ago, when a certain well-known American business man was visiting the Soviet Union, he happened to boast to his guide that he employed several thousands of men in his various enterprises. The guide, not accustomed to such a situation, was unable to hide her dismay. &amp;quot;People get ten years for that in this country,&amp;quot; she said!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is possible today to travel from Moscow to Vladivostok or from Archangel to Tiflis, and nowhere to find a landlord, an owner of a factory, or an employer of labor. People abound everywhere, but ask them how they gain a living and you will find that, without exception, they either work in some publicly owned institution, such as a factory or a coal-mine, a school or a clinic, or they are working members of a cooperative organization. About a tenth of the people of the U.S.S.R. do not fall into these two categories; these are individual peasants and individual handicraftsmen, who work for themselves, but do not employ the labor of others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we look at Soviet industry, education, entertainment, or scientific institutions, we find that they are today completely owned and controlled by public bodies, whether the Government of the U.S.S.R., one of the national republics, or a local authority. And, as a result of this, we find that practically every adult citizen in a Soviet town today is a wage-earner, or someone who, by domestic work, enables others to work for a wage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Tsarist Russia, as in Britain today, practically the whole of industry and agriculture was in private hands. In the towns of those days you would meet rich employers, owning the factories and the coal-mines and living on the profits of these enterprises. You would meet rich foreigners with capital invested in Russian industry, who drew each year a share of the profits; and, on the other hand, you would meet large numbers of people, the vast majority of the town dwellers, who worked for a living in all these enterprises which were owned by somebody else.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today in the Soviet Union the employers are extinct. Citizens are wage-earners or co-operators, and a large section of them are wage-earners. Every Soviet citizen, according to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., enjoys the right to work, to leisure, and to security. The abolition of unemployment guarantees that all may work. Leisure is guaranteed by a working day which averages less than seven hours and by paid holidays for all workers. Security is safeguarded by social insurance against illness, by which wages are drawn during ill health; and by non-contributory pensions for the aged at sixty for men, fifty-five for women and at still lower ages in occupations considered particularly arduous or harmful to health. But, in addition to these rights, which workers in other countries may well envy their Soviet comrades, the Soviet worker has the right to participate in running the concern in which he works, for he, as a citizen of the Soviet State, is a partner in the ownership of this concern.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State was set up in October 1917. One of its first decrees dealt with &amp;quot;Workers’ Control&amp;quot; in industry, and laid down that in every enterprise elected committees of the employees were to be set up, to express the will of the workers in that enterprise, and to supervise the running of it in the interests of the workers. At the same time such elected committees were to share responsibility with the employer &amp;quot;for the strictest order, discipline, and preservation of property.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In January 1918, four months later, it was decided, rather than perpetuate a system varying from factory to factory, each with its own methods of electing the workers’ committee, that the work of controlling the management was to be henceforth in the hands of the elected committee of the trade union. In this way the Soviet Government gave a very great stimulus to trade union membership, for only by joining the trade union could the workers now play a part in electing the factory committee which was to represent them and control the management of the plant in their own interests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The young Soviet State, however, not only enforced the representation of the workers on the management of privately owned factories; it also proceeded to take over the management of many of the large concerns, and also of those concerns which the employers refused any longer to operate. As this happened, a new problem arose; what was to be the relationship between the workers in these State enterprises and the management?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This question was discussed in 1921 at a special conference. It has decided that in, all socialized enterprises the trade unions were to safeguard the interests of the workers against what were termed &amp;quot;bureaucratic perversions&amp;quot; on the part of the management; while at the same time, as in the earlier decree, the unions were still responsible—together with the administration, which now represented the State—for the preservation of labor discipline and the protection of property. In this way the trade union committee became the officially recognized representative body of the workers in a Soviet factory, and, as such, had the right to participate with the management in all discussions of policy affecting the lives of the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A foreigner, starting to work for the first time in the U.S.S.R., is at once struck by the relations between the managerial staff and the rank-and-file workers. The most significant fact that faces him is that the manager of a Soviet factory, as part of his duties, is under the obligation to improve the general living conditions of the workers, to increase the social amenities attached to the factory, to provide satisfactory service in the restaurant and medical center, and to see that good care is given to the workers’ children in nursery and kindergarten. The Soviet factory manager is responsible to the State, not only for raising the output of the factory in his charge, and for lowering its costs of production, but for raising the welfare of the workers in his factory, and devoting a considerable amount of time and energy to this work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I well remember how, a year or two ago, there took place in Moscow a conference of &amp;quot;industrial leaders&amp;quot;—managers of Soviet factories. One of the subjects of discussion was the question of housing. And in this conference of factory managers it was emphatically stated that it was the duty of every factory manager to take steps to put an end to the existence of bed-bugs in the dwellings of the workers in the factory under his care. Every factory manager was responsible for seeing that the workers had decent living-quarters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some readers, possibly, may think that such an example is ill chosen, only serving to show the backwardness of Soviet housing. I would draw the attention of such readers to a report which appeared in The Times of June 24th, 1936, in which the following statement is made: &amp;quot;It is estimated that 4,000,300 people suffer from the bed-bug in London alone&amp;quot;; but the fact is little known owing to &amp;quot;the public’s reticence in the matter, and their refusal to admit that bugs were in their homes even when they knew of their presence.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So it is not the existence of bed-bugs in the workers’ dwellings that distinguishes the U.S.S.R. from Britain, or Moscow from London; it is the fact that the Soviet factory manager is under a definite obligation to help to exterminate the pest, thus improving the living conditions of the workers under his leadership—a duty not shared by the factory managers of Great Britain, whose responsibility is only to the owners of the factories and not to the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is one example of the responsibility of the Soviet factory administration for the welfare of its workers. Here is another. In the autumn of 1932 I travelled in the Caucasus with a group of workers on holiday. In the group there were two girls, workers in a chemical factory. At their jobs they had a six-hour day, as their work was considered arduous. They received six weeks’ holiday on full pay. I was then amazed to hear that, in addition to this, they had each received a grant from the administration of their factory to help them to travel during their holiday. Later on, after more experience, I found that every Soviet organization has considerable funds which are used exclusively for the welfare of the workers, and contributions for holiday purposes may be made out of such funds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A matter which has some bearing on the relationship between the workers in a Soviet enterprise and the administrative staff is the fact that, on such an administrative staff today, the vast majority of people are themselves workers who have been promoted. A visit to any Soviet factory shows that in almost every case the manager of that factory was once an ordinary manual worker, and, very often, was a worker in that same factory. The fact that the personnel of the managerial staff is drawn from the rank and file of the workers themselves prevents that difference in attitude which arises when managers and workers are drawn from different classes in society, each with its own traditions and conventions, and even with separate educational systems, is the case in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as, under Soviet conditions, factory managers are obliged to pay attention to the welfare of the workers as well as to problems of production and costs, it must be pointed out that the Soviet workers are interested in raising production as well as in increasing their immediate welfare. Since 1928 the whole of Soviet industry has been publicly owned and controlled, and production has been subject to a general plan for the purpose of meeting the growing needs of the community. In 1931 unemployment was completely eliminated, and it has not recurred since.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is under these conditions that the Soviet workers find no reason whatever to restrict production. Further, they have definite reasons for increasing production as rapidly as possible, for this is the only way of raising the general standard of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under capitalism, where part of the value of every product goes to the employer as profit, the workers in any single enterprise, or in a whole industry, can force the employers to raise their wages or otherwise to improve their conditions by direct action. If strikes are successful, wages rise at the expense of profits, which is satisfactory to the workers though unsatisfactory to the employers. When, however, as in the U.S.S.R. today, the whole of the means of production are owned and controlled by public bodies in the public interest, a strike by the workers in any factory or industry for higher wages can only react to the disadvantage of the working population itself. For, by a strike, production is restricted. And this is contrary to the public interest in a community in which every extra product is required and is utilized. A strike, therefore, is to the disadvantage of the workers of the Soviet community as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The method of fixing wages by means of strikes in a Socialist country is highly undesirable, for it is no longer possible for any workers to raise their wages at the expense of employers’ profits. If, as a result of a strike, higher wages are won, then they are won at the expense of the general fund which goes to paying the wages of all citizens. If the coalminers of the U.S.S.R. strike today for more wages, they are in fact fighting to force the Government to give to them what otherwise it would be dividing up among other workers. Strikes, then, in such conditions, can only represent sectional demands against the whole community, and in themselves are contrary to the general interest because they restrict production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a diary of a visit of a few weeks’ duration to the U.S.S.R., Sir Walter Citrine has said that &amp;quot;it was too much to assume a complete identity of interest between the director and the workers. The director was concerned with efficiency and output, and the worker with the amount he could earn, and the conditions under which it was earned&amp;quot; (Search for Truth in Russia, p. 129). And, in a later passage, he says that &amp;quot;liberty of association and the right to strike are the essential features of legitimate trade unionism&amp;quot; (p. 361).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear, from what has been said here, that Sir Walter’s estimation of the relations between director and worker in the Soviet factory is based on a lack of understanding of the situation. Sir Walter ignores the unique fact that the Soviet director, as part of his job, is responsible for increasing the welfare of the workers. He ignores the fact that the workers, no longer working for an employer who takes part of their product in the form of profit, know that everything they produce is distributed to the community—that is, to themselves. Finally, he ignores the also important fact that, under such conditions as these, a strike is an attack by a small minority on the economic resources of the whole community; and at the same time, by holding up production, reacts to the disadvantage of all citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As to the other matter—freedom of association—no other State in the world has ever given the encouragement to trade unionism which has been given in the U.S.S.R. We have already seen how the young Soviet State, in its first months of existence, made the trade union committees the official representative bodies of the workers in all industrial enterprises, with powers of control over the management. This was a tremendous stimulus to trade union development, as is shown by the figures of trade union membership. In October 1917, at the time when the Soviets seized power, there were 2 million trade unionists. By 1928 this figure had increased to 11 million, and was 18 million in 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No other country can show such figures, and it is absurd to suggest that the U.S.S.R. has ever done anything but encourage, to the greatest possible extent, the organization of the workers in trade unions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time, however, as a result of the changes in the relations between worker and administration which have followed the socialization of industry, the position of the trade unions in the Soviet State is certainly different from their position under capitalism. This matter will concern us more deeply in the following chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A question which will be in the mind of many readers is this : If, in the U.S.S.R., production is organized today in the common interest, so that strikes are contrary to the general interest and so that the aims of factory managers and workers coincide, how do these changes show themselves in the organization of the factory ? Is there not a danger that the workers may be even worse exploited by the State than they previously were by their private employers?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The answer to this question lies in the organization of the Soviet factory, and, indeed, of every Soviet institution. And this organization is very different from the factory under capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No worker in a Soviet factory can go long without becoming aware of the existence of what is known as the &amp;quot;Triangle,&amp;quot; and he will find that decisions of the Triangle are made on all kinds of matters which, under capitalism, would lie within the realm of the employer and manager and nobody else. What is this &amp;quot;Triangle&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen how, when the factories of Russia were taken over by the Soviet State, their managers became responsible to the State for the organization of production and for improving the welfare of the workers. We have also seen how the trade union committee became the official body entitled to represent the workers, and to fight &amp;quot;bureaucratic per- versions&amp;quot; on the part of the management. At a very early stage in the history of Soviet industry the device was evolved of joint discussion between manager and trade union representative on all important matters affecting the welfare of the factory and of its workers. Decisions would be issued over the signature of manager and trade union representative together, showing that they had been discussed, both from the point of view of the State and of the workers in the enterprise itself, before a decision had been reached. But a triangle has three angles, not two. Where is the third angle to our triangle?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It may surprise British readers to know that, in the Triangle, which is the supreme authority in every Soviet enterprise, the third angle is the representative of a political party. In the Soviet factory the body which discusses all questions affecting the interests of the workers is the Triangle; consisting of the manager, appointed by a State department and responsible to it; the representative of the trade union, elected by the workers in the factory, and responsible to them; and a representative of the &amp;quot;Party&amp;quot;—that is, of the organization in the factory of the Bolshevik or Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it may be clear that the manager represents the State, and that the trade unionist represents the workers in the factory, it may well not be clear to the reader exactly whose interests are represented by the Party. This question will occupy us in detail in Chapter XV. It is important, however, here and now, to state the impression of a foreign worker, taking up a position in the Soviet Union for the first time, on this question.&lt;br /&gt;
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In every Soviet enterprise I found that the relationship between fellow workers was a friendly one. The status of the manager was that of a human being like every other worker. It was the status of the leading personality in the institution, a fellow-worker but a good one, the person most equipped to take the responsibility for running it. In the average Soviet enterprise today over 8o percent of the workers are members of a trade union. Those who are not members are usually new arrivals, or people who have lapsed from membership, or in a small minority of cases, individuals who have been actually expelled for some offence against union discipline. The elected representative of the trade unionists, then, can be taken as being the most popular figure among the workers of those considered suitable effectively to represent their interests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, quite apart from their official position, their job, or their status as members of the trade union committee, a certain number of persons are &amp;quot;Party members.&amp;quot; These people are members of the Party, which is a voluntary political organization. In general, I always found that the Party members tended to be the most respected workers, whatever their skill or position, and the Party organization was looked upon as being a kind of organized group of leading personalities, of people who were more devoted than the average to work of social usefulness. The workers as a whole looked to the Party members for leadership, and, in the majority of cases, when asked why they were not themselves &amp;quot;in the Party,&amp;quot; the answer was that they had enough to do already, without taking on extra responsibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I say this now because it is important to realize that in the Soviet factory the representation of the Party, along with administration and trade union, on the Triangle, is looked upon as something absolutely natural. The Party is considered as a sort of organization of the best and most responsible citizens, and the Triangle thus becomes a body representing the State, the rank-and-file worker, and the organized leadership of the working people as expressed in the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would entirely misrepresent the situation if the impression were given that control by this Triangle was the only feature which distinguished the Soviet enterprise from similar enterprises in other countries. Actually, while the presence of the elected representative of the trade union causes all important decisions to be made with the co-operation of the workers’ representative, it is possible for disputes to arise between the different persons composing the Triangle, and differences may arise between the workers and the administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such cases of &amp;quot;industrial disputes&amp;quot; in the U.S.S.R. there is an elaborate machinery of negotiation and arbitration. Actually, if there is disagreement in the factory itself, it is usual for the trade union or Party representatives to take the question to a higher authority. If the factory trade union committee cannot obtain satisfaction from the administration, then the matter may be carried to the district committee of the union, which will then negotiate with the State organization which controls the factory concerned. As a rule such matters are settled in this way. But, if necessary, the Central Council of the Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R. may take up the matter with the Government if the dispute reaches that length without a settlement being reached. However, under present-day conditions the relations between employing organizations and the trade unions are so amicable that disputes are not likely to get so far before some sort of reasonable settlement is reached.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it is realized that both the elected representatives of the workers and the appointed representatives of the State have the same common aims—to raise the general standard of life by increasing production and the welfare, of the workers concerned as rapidly as possible—it is clear that major industrial disputes are extremely unlikely to arise.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are disputes of another kind, however, which cannot be settled by simple processes of negotiation. These are disputes in connection with the infringement of the law, as, for example, in cases where factory managers do not enforce the safety measures laid down by law, or do not pay the correct wages to a discharged worker, and so on. In the case of legal disputes, the question can either be referred to a higher authority—in which case the latter may bring pressure to bear on the factory manager to fulfill his obligations—or, if the case is in doubt, then it may be taken to the courts for a decision. These courts, as will be shown in Chapter VII, also represent the working people of the country, and administer the law with a good measure of working-class common sense.&lt;br /&gt;
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So far we have considered what we may call the &amp;quot;formal&amp;quot; structure of the administration of a Soviet factory. But, quite apart from this, there is a wide range of questions which are decided by the Triangle, not in isolation from the rest of the workers, but in public discussion with these workers. For example, every year the manager of a Soviet factory addresses a general meeting of the workers, just as the chairman of a British joint-stock company addresses a general meeting of the shareholders. At such a meeting the Soviet manager reports on the past year, and on the fulfillment of the plan of production, and of the plan for improving the general living conditions of the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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This report is followed by a general discussion, in which every worker can participate, and in which serious criticisms may be made of the work of individuals and groups of individuals, the members of the administrative staff being not immune from, criticism by the rank and file. As a result of such discussions certain workers may be moved to other posts, either upwards or downwards in the scale of responsibilities. The manager of a Soviet factory, in order to fulfill his tasks satisfactorily, must be able, in such meetings, to prove his leadership of those working under him. If, at such meetings, the workers show that they have no faith in their manager, the organization in charge of the factory will replace him. For a Soviet factory director must be able to lead; he must be recognized as the best representative of all the workers in the factory, or the rank and file will be against him, and there will be continual friction, resulting in inefficiency.&lt;br /&gt;
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The manager’s report on past activity is followed by an outline of the plan for the coming year. This plan is submitted to the manager of the factory from above, from the trust or the local authority to which the factory is responsible. This plan forms part of a general plan for the industry concerned, and for the locality where the factory is placed, and such plans are drawn up from year to year by the State Planning Commission, subject to instructions given by the Government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The plan submitted to each, separate factory is based on the estimated resources and needs of the community as seen by the State Planning Commission. But it may neglect certain local characteristics, or features of the particular factory. Therefore a discussion of all such plans by all the workers in a Soviet factory is considered essential. For this purpose there are not only general meetings of all workers, but in each workshop discussions take place, and suggestions are made for improving the details of the plan.&lt;br /&gt;
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It may happen, for example, that a certain shop in a certain factory has been held up for raw materials during the past year. When the workers of such a shop point this out in the meeting, they may suggest that, if only the supply of materials is guaranteed, they will be able to increase output by twice the amount suggested in the plan. Or, to take another example, the workers of a particular workshop may state that if they could have one more machine of a particular kind, they would be able to perform a certain process, now performed by six men, with the use of only one worker. The remaining five would then be available for work where there is at present a shortage of labor, and thus output would be considerably raised.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such general discussions, in which the plan is considered in detail by all those whose work it is to carry it out, are a feature of all Soviet industry. But discussion of this kind is not all, for throughout the year meetings are held, often monthly, to check up how the plan, once adopted, is being fulfilled. There are many working people who, though not vociferous at meetings, have opinions to which they want to give expression. Such workers might say in writing what they would not say in meetings. And we find that in every Soviet enterprise there exists a &amp;quot;Press,&amp;quot; in order that such people may air their views.&lt;br /&gt;
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Few visitors to the Soviet Union return without mentioning the wall-newspaper, prominent in every Soviet organization, from the Government offices on the Red Square to the workshop in the factory, the classroom in the school, and the cow-shed in the collective farm. The wall-newspaper has already been mentioned in our discussion of education. The young worker leaves school, having written in the wall-newspaper there, to work in a Soviet enterprise, where again the wall-newspaper is a means of expression. And from week to week, and month to month, the newspaper on the wall of the Soviet factory’s workshops is a thermometer of public opinion, in which the workers express their views of their own work, of the work of other people, and in which they do not neglect to criticize managers and administrators, if they feel that their administration is at fault.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now who, it may be asked, edits these wall-newspapers in the Soviet factory? Is it the manager? Or perhaps the Communist Party? Or is it just an ordinary working man or woman?&lt;br /&gt;
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The answer is that the editor of the wall-newspaper in a Soviet factory is appointed by the elected trade union committee, and is responsible to that committee. The wall-newspaper is an organ of the workers, through their trade union. Similarly, it may be asked who organizes these meetings of the workers, to discuss the plans of production, and to watch over their fulfillment. Again the answer is: The trade union committee is responsible for organizing these meetings.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are beginning to find that, in the Soviet factory, in whatever direction we turn, we cannot discuss the rights of the workers without coining up against the activities of the trade union committee. The trade union representative sits with the manager; the trade union committee organizes mass meetings to discuss the work of the factory; it controls the Press. The conditions of the Soviet wage-earner cannot be considered without, all the time, references being made to the trade unions. For this reason any further discussion of the rights of the Soviet wage-earner brings us to a consideration of the activities of the trade unions in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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Note.—Since going to press a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has been held, at which questions were discussed arising out of the new Constitution. At this meeting the work of the factory Triangles was severely criticized as limiting democracy at the present time. Zhdanov referred to them as tending to become a &amp;quot;family compact, a conspiracy to make it more difficult to criticize. And once these three are in agreement, just go and try to criticize them!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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While, from the standpoint of the worker under capitalism, a situation in which the elected trade union representative participates in running the factory is a giant stride forward, already in the U.S.S.R. they are looking for more effective means of democratic control and criticism. We may expect modifications in the future which will lead to greater independence of administration, party, and trade union leadership, combined with still greater discussion of policy throughout the rank and file of the party and trade union organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Power of the Trade Unions ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic, adopted in 1918, we read that freedom of association is guaranteed to all citizens, and that the Soviet State &amp;quot;lends to the workers all its material and moral assistance to help them to unite and to organize themselves.&amp;quot; Lenin referred to the trade unions as a &amp;quot;school of Communism&amp;quot; in which the ordinary working people were able to learn the art of administering their own affairs. And, in my own experience, soon after I had started working in the Soviet Union I was urgently asked to join the trade union, membership of which means a great deal to the working man and woman in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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The trade union in every Soviet enterprise makes it its duty to draw all workers into active participation in the work of running the enterprise, and in the social and political life of the country. I remember how, when the question of my trade union membership was first discussed in Moscow, I was asked what &amp;quot;social work&amp;quot; I did. I had already, in my spare time, given a lecture on England. This was &amp;quot;social work&amp;quot;; I was admitted to the trade union.&lt;br /&gt;
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This term &amp;quot;social work&amp;quot; has a very different meaning in the U.S.S.R. from what it has in Britain. Every Soviet trade unionist—which means eight out of every ten wage-earners in the U.S.S.R.—is expected to perform some socially useful activity, however small, in addition to his paid work. If you are on your trade union committee, or on the local Soviet, or an organizer of a dramatics group or a sports club, this is social work. If you give a course of lectures in your spare time, or take a study-group, or do voluntary work for the local Soviet or for the trade union committee, this is social work. The Soviet trade unions try to stimulate every citizen to be an active member of society, not only on his paid job, but, in addition to this, to do something of social use, in his spare time.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet trade unions are represented on the management of the factories, and, higher up, on the boards of the State trusts. In each factory the trade union mobilizes the workers for participation in the management. It organizes meetings to discuss the welfare of the workers and problems of production; and it runs a Press in which expression is given to the opinions of the workers. But such discussion, in words and in writing, has a purpose; the purpose is the raising of the standard of life of the whole population as rapidly as possible. And this, as we have seen, depends on increasing production. Therefore, on the one hand, the Soviet trade unions are interested in increasing production as the only way in which the standard of life of all the workers may be raised; while, on the other hand, in every Soviet enterprise the trade union is interested in immediately improving the living conditions of the workers, in improving their conditions of work, and, in general, in seeing that the increased production effectively reflects itself in a higher standard of life for the workers concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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In considering education we have already made our acquaintance with &amp;quot;Socialist competition,&amp;quot; that competition between individual and individual, group and group, for the best results. The young Soviet citizen is trained to compete with others in obtaining the best results. The Soviet worker, in his factory, competes with his fellow worker on the same principle. And it is the trade unions in the U.S.S.R. that are responsible, in the various productive enterprises, for the organization of this &amp;quot;Socialist competition,&amp;quot; which, during the first Five Year Plan, gave rise to the famous &amp;quot;shock- brigade&amp;quot; movement, and, in more recent times, to the movement called after the coal-miner Stakhanov.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is often said, by those who identify their interests with the survival of capitalism, that Socialism restricts initiative. But they rarely stop to ask: The initiative of whom?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is certainly a fact that in the U.S.S.R today, no person’s initiative may express itself by setting up in business on his own. Furthermore, it cannot express itself by a person running a business so successfully that other businesses in the same line are ruined as a result of this successful competition. Also, it is not possible in the U.S.S.R. to show initiative in the private employment or discharging of workers, in dictating to them on what terms they shall work, and so on. And, for the managerial staff of factories, it is not possible to show initiative in a way so common in a capitalist concern—in browbeating the wretched employees, in degrading them, and in using every method, gentle and brutal, to get more work out of them during the working day. Such forms of individual initiative are suppressed in the U.S.S.R.; but these are only very limited examples of personal prizes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In each separate factory different groups of workers competed against each other for the best results, the factory Press reported the competition, and the winners were rewarded. But this competition was very different from the competition between capitalist firms, or even between groups of workers in capitalist industry. For whereas, under capitalist conditions the winning factory is that which manages to obtain the orders and put the other out of business, and the successful worker replaces the less successful, in the U.S.S.R. no successful factory puts another out of business, and no successful group of workers causes another group to lose their job. On the contrary, when, a round of Socialist competition comes to an end, the best workers are often sent from the winning factory to help the more backward one; and, as between groups of workers, those in the best group help the others to raise their production to the same level. In this way, in the factory as in the school, Socialist competition is a means of stimulating production by introducing the spirit of the playground into the factory, and then ensuring the co-operation of winner and loser for the general benefit.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was on the course of this Socialist competition that there developed the shock-brigades. These were groups of workers who, in their Socialist competition, achieved outstanding results. The title of &amp;quot;shock-worker&amp;quot; first began to be conferred on those workers who showed the best results in their Socialist competition. But these titles were not simply awarded from above by the manager of the factory, nor were they awarded by the Triangle. The workers themselves, at a trade union meeting, would elect a commission to check up the results of the competition. The commission would then report to the Triangle. The Triangle would make recommendations as to which workers deserved the title of shock-worker, and the meeting would then decide.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this way, too, workers would be premiumed. There is no doubt that, for the British reader, reports that in the U.S.S.R. certain factory workers are premiumed with money or useful presents sometimes come rather as a shock. Does not this savoir of the benevolent boss, who, at Christmas or at other times, presents the most faithful workers with a stimulus to further devotion— a carrot before the noses of all the rest?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And yet such a comparison, to anyone who has worked in a Soviet organization, is utterly remote from real life. In my work in Moscow I had plenty of opportunity to participate in Socialist competition. We ourselves drew up the contract, which included such things as quantity and quality of work, punctuality, tidiness at work, and the fulfilling of certain jobs within a certain period of time. When the time was up, we elected our own commissions to check up our fulfillment. Usually, on May 1st and November 7th, the two great revolutionary holidays, Soviet enterprises give premiums to the best workers. It was our elected commission that recommended who should be premiumed. The Triangle, in my own experience, always accepted the decision of the elected commission. The general meeting then endorsed the recommendation, in this way, if any one of us received a month’s extra pay as a premium for good work; it was we ourselves who had awarded it, because we felt it was deserved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During 1935 and 1936 a new form of shock-work has developed in the form of &amp;quot;Stakhanovism.&amp;quot; In essence it is a very simple story. A certain coal-miner, by the name of Stakhanov, working in a pit in the Donets Basin in the Ukraine, reorganized the work of the group of which he was leader, so that output was greatly increased. His pit newspaper gave the matter publicity, it was taken up as a &amp;quot;scoop&amp;quot; by other newspapers—for the U.S.S.R. needs coal—and the rationalization proposals of Stakhanov became known throughout the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many managers and engineers did not approve of Stakhanovism, for two main reasons. First, they felt that the wholesale reorganization of methods of work was their job, not that of the rank-and-file miners. The Soviet Government Press, however, immediately attacked such a view, pointing out that the welfare of the U.S.S.R. depends on the maximum expression of personal initiative by all workers. Secondly, in certain cases the managers and technicians objected to workers reorganizing their methods of work, because their wages then rose considerably above those of the technical and managerial staff! This attitude was also attacked in the Press, and the Stakhanov movement has spread throughout the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Stakhanov movement, and the publicity and encouragement given to Stakhanov and his followers, stimulates every worker, however unskilled, to become a rationalizer, an organizer of his or her own labor. In this way every worker feels encouraged to utilize brain as well as hand. Large numbers of workers become more skilled and earn higher wages. There is a general rise in both material and cultural standards as a result. Further, the leading Stakhanov workers themselves are asked to become teachers of their methods. Stakhanov has been invited back to his native village, to use his organizing power to raise production in the collective farm. He also spends much time visiting different coal-mines, teaching the workers there how to reorganize their work for greater efficiency. A rank-and-file miner has become a technical expert and an engineer. And this is happening all the time in the Soviet Union today, affecting hundreds of thousands of workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been mentioned that the Stakhanovite workers raised their wages as a result of their greater output. How are wages paid in the U.S.S.R.? The answer is: Democratically, on the general principle, &amp;quot;To each according to his work.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Every year, in every Soviet enterprise, a &amp;quot;collective agreement&amp;quot; is signed between the trade union and the administration. This agreement states the obligations of the administration towards the workers in the form of cultural and other services, and also includes detailed wage-scales for the enterprise. The general principles underlying such wage-scales are determined by the central committees of the unions in the various industries, in co-operation with the corresponding administrative State organization. The details, with adjustments for local conditions, are worked out in each enterprise separately. In this way, once a year at least, every working man or woman, on every job, has the chance to participate in a general discussion of the existing wage-rates. These are reviewed from top to bottom, and every worker has the opportunity to discuss the wage he is getting. At such discussions every anomaly is considered, so that the workers come to a general agreement as to what rate of wages is fair. The collective agreement is drawn up on the basis of such discussions. The result is that, while wages vary considerably, everyone knows the reason for each particular wage. They know, therefore, how they can raise their own earnings; and in our discussion of equality of opportunity we have already seen that there is a chance for practically all workers to raise their qualifications if they wish to do so.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if earnings are unequal, some must live better than others. Is this Socialism? And, again, it is said that in the U.S.S.R. people may save, and that interest is actually paid by the State on savings, is this so? And may not a leisured class arise in the future as a result?&lt;br /&gt;
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As far as saving is concerned, to take the latter question first, the Soviet Government actually paid interest on savings, at the rate of 7 and 8 percent until 1936. This was done during a period when every effort was being made throughout the country to build up the means of production. During such a period every voluntary economy in consumption was of value to the community, for it enabled more resources to be devoted to production. During the year 1936, however, by Government decree, the rate of interest was halved overnight. Savings had been increasing, and the urgency to encourage economy in consumption was declining. In the future, when the urgency to expand the means of production has fallen still further as compared with consumers’ goods, a further decree will abolish interest entirely.&lt;br /&gt;
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Interest, in the Soviet State, is a purely temporary phenomenon. In no way do the people who receive interest thereby control the general planning of the economic life of the country. They are not employers, and they cannot decide what shall be produced or who shall work, and under what conditions. They do not participate in planning the economic life of the country except as workers and wage-earners. And, as will be seen later, they have no political rights whatever, except as workers. Further, it is the law of the U.S.S.R. that &amp;quot;work is an obligation on all citizens.&amp;quot; So it is illegal for them to become a leisured section of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
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And now as to the question of unequal earnings. This inequality is a feature of Soviet society which has a definite and immediate purpose. This purpose is to achieve the greatest possible development of the forces of production as the only means of raising the general standard of life. And, right from the time of the Revolution, unequal wages have been paid in order to give the greatest stimulus to the best work. It is sometimes stated that the Soviet Union has &amp;quot;returned to&amp;quot; unequal wages comparatively recently. This is not true. Piece-wages have been paid since the Revolution; but, especially during the first Five Year Plan, there were a number of serious anomalies in wage-rates, so that certain skilled workers were paid less than unskilled, and good workers received no encouragement for their efforts. For that reason, during the first Five Year Plan, stress was laid on the need to work out rational wage-scales in all industries.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is this Socialism? Karl Marx, the founder of the Communist Movement, considered that unequal earnings would be an essential feature of the first stage of Communist society. In 1875 he wrote that &amp;quot;as it emerges from capitalist society, which is thus tainted economically, morally, and intellectually with the hereditary diseases of the old society from whose womb it is emerging,&amp;quot; individuals will have to receive from society shares in the total product according to their work.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;But one man will excel another physically or intellectually, and so contributes in the same time more labor, or can labor for a longer time.&amp;quot; Already, however, this first stage of Communism &amp;quot;recognizes no class differences, because every worker ranks as a worker like his fellows, but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus capacity for production, as natural privileges.&amp;quot; As soon as the means of production have been taken out of the hands of private employers, and are socially controlled by public organizations, whether the State, local authorities, or co-operatives, we have Socialism. Under this Socialist system all are workers, whether factory managers or unskilled laborers. But each earns according to his work, the rates of wages being fixed by the people themselves in the collective agreements between their trade unions and the employing organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that wages are not equal in the Soviet Union today must on no account be taken to imply that the workers do not receive more according to their needs than anywhere else. For, as compared with other countries in the world, the Soviet worker already receives many things according to his need. For example, in the case of housing, rent is charged at approximately l0 percent of earnings, so that he who earns most pays most. Similarly, when a worker is away from work owing to sickness, or because it is necessary to care for another sick person in the family, wages are paid out of the social insurance fund. Wages are paid to women for two months before and two months after childbirth, even though they are not called upon to work during this period. And if, by doctor’s orders, they must cease work sooner or return later, then they are relieved of work on full pay for a still longer period. Accommodation for children in nurseries, kindergartens, and meals for children at schools, are provided at prices which vary according to the means of the parents. Again, at holiday time, workers are given assistance, both by the factory administrations and by the trade unions, to enable them to have the best kind of holiday, both as recreation and for the benefit of their own health.&lt;br /&gt;
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The administering of social insurance, a vast task which affects the lives of over 20 million wage-earners, is completely in the hands of the Soviet trade unions. In every factory, and in every workshop, a member of the union has the &amp;quot;social work&amp;quot; of &amp;quot; insurance delegate,&amp;quot; and is responsible for visiting those who are ill, for seeing that they receive their insurance money, and, wherever necessary, for ensuring that extra help is obtained from the administration and from the social insurance funds. In needy cases it is the duty of this comrade to obtain passes for rest-homes and sanatoria.&lt;br /&gt;
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While such an insurance delegate is charged with the work of assisting those who are ill, it is also the work of such a delegate, representing the trade union, to prevent malingering. If a worker is off work through a street accident, and the insurance delegate finds that drunkenness was the cause, then that case will not receive great sympathy, and part of the insurance money may, in such a case, be withheld. Such a worker, of course, may appeal to the general meeting of the union, but his claim in such a case will probably not receive much sympathy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first decree of the Soviet Government dealing with social insurance was passed in 1917. All contributions to the social insurance fund were to be paid by the employers, and no contributions were to be lent from the workers. Where the State was the employer, it was responsible for making the necessary contributions. Benefit for absence from work through sickness or involuntary unemployment was to be at approximately average wages. The decree provided for &amp;quot;complete workers’ self-government of all insurance institutions.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The control of social insurance until 1933 was in the hands of the Commissariat of Labor, the department of State most able to deal with it. Then, in 1933, it was handed over completely to the trade unions, together with the work of factory inspection and the enforcing of the laws relating to the protection of labor. Sir Walter Citrine, commenting on this growth in the power of the trade unions, remarks that they &amp;quot;were not comparable to any other trade unions in the world. They were, so far as I could see, entrusted with functions which in other countries were carried out by the State itself. They were, in fact State organizations, and I could not see that they had really any separate existence&amp;quot; (op. cit, p. 185).&lt;br /&gt;
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Sidney and Beatrice Webb, on the other hand, after an exhaustive study of the internal administration of the U.S.S.R. such as Sir Walter Citrine could not begin to attempt in his tour of a few weeks, write as follows on this matter; &amp;quot;This vast addition to the work and influence of the Soviet trade unions has been curiously misunderstood in some quarters, as a degradation of their position to nothing more than friendly societies! But the trade unions retain and continue to exercise all the influence and authority in the administration of the factory and in the settlement of wages that they have possessed for the past fifteen years. The new control over social insurance, and the entire administration of funds and services of such magnitude, can hardly fail to strengthen the trade unions in their work of raising the standard of life of the workers, and even to knit more closely together their far-flung membership.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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However, &amp;quot;the constitutional change, important as it is, will not make so much difference in the administration of social insurance as might be imagined by those conversant only with the constitutions of Western Europe or America. It is not, for instance, in any way comparable to the abolition in the United Kingdom of the Minister of Labor, and the transfer of his functions, with regard to unemployment insurance and wages boards, to the British Trades Union Congress and its General Council!&amp;quot; (op. cit, p. 203). For, as the Webbs point out, the Commissar of Labor had always been appointed in the U.S.S.R. from a panel submitted by the trade unions themselves! Sir Walter Citrine refers to the trade unions as State organizations, because they control factory inspection and social insurance. But the question is: Is it not a feature of a democratic State, that the trade unions, and not the State, should control such matters? Would it be to the benefit of the workers—75 percent of the population—or to their disadvantage, if their elected trade union representatives administered the social insurance system in Britain?&lt;br /&gt;
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The experience of the U.S.S.R. has shown that, even in a Socialist State, the official administrator of social insurances may become bureaucratic, and not pay sufficient attention to the individual needs of each case that comes before him. It was to prevent this that the administration of social insurance was turned over to the trade unions, so that today in the U.S.S.R. it is the directly elected representatives of the workers, and not employees of State departments, who administer the funds which the factories provide for the insurance of the workers against illness, disability, and old age; and in the case of women; pregnancy and childbirth.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly with regard to the protection of labor, at one time, in the U.S.S.R., the inspection of factories was controlled by a State department—the Commissariat of Labor. The trade unions, if dissatisfied with conditions in any particular place of work, were obliged to call in the expert from the Commissariat.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today, however, a member of the trade union, elected at a meeting of the members, performs the social work of factory inspection. This &amp;quot;labor protection delegate&amp;quot; is responsible for seeing that the laws are observed and that workers shall receive their full rights.&lt;br /&gt;
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When I was working in a Soviet office, one of the typists complained that her table was too high. At that dine I was trade union organizer. On investigation, I found that the height of tables for typists in the U.S.S.R. is fixed by law. I called upon the labor protection delegate, and she insisted that the administration provide the typists with new tables. This was done within a few days.&lt;br /&gt;
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It has already been seen how the factory administration is responsible for the welfare of its workers. According to Soviet law, every organization must provide meeting and feeding facilities for its workers, accommodation for the trade union office, and nurseries and kindergartens for the children. It is for the trade union committee to see that the management carries out its obligations in these respects, and for this purpose special delegates are elected, to deal with communal feeding, with the care of children, and so on. It is the work of such delegates, out of the social insurance funds, to give assistance to large families with low wages, to arrange for the children of such families to spend their holidays in camps free of charge, and also to deal with such problems as overcrowded housing conditions. Such workers are also responsible for supervising the quality of service provided in the nurseries, kindergartens, and camps.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this way a low-paid worker with a family will receive considerable free services, provided out of State funds, and administered by elected trade union officials. In this way, too, families in overcrowded conditions may be found other accommodation, the trade union’s recommendations being taken into consideration by the administration whenever new accommodation becomes available.&lt;br /&gt;
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A further word is appropriate here about education. It has already been described how the workers in Soviet institutions have the opportunity for free training in various spheres. It remains to be added here that the suspension of such training, and the task of seeing that it is universally provided, rests with the trade union members themselves. Thus, during 1934 a campaign was started for classes in all Soviet enterprises for the raising of the qualifications of workers. The cost of the classes was to be borne by the administration, and students were to study half in their own time, and half in their working time. The actual organizing of the classes, the determination of what subjects should be studied, and who should be the teachers, were in the hands of the &amp;quot;cultural organizers&amp;quot; appointed by the trade union committees.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such cultural organizers, responsible to the trade union, are also responsible for all forms of leisure-time activity, such as amateur dramatics and sports. Funds for such activities come partly from the budget of the unions, partly from the &amp;quot;cultural fund&amp;quot; of the administration, to which a certain part of its income is devoted. In this way, while wages are strictly adjusted year by year in order to ensure that each worker shall earn according to his work, the social insurance fund, and other funds to which the various State organizations contribute, provide vast resources to be distributed almost entirely by the trade unions, to meet those needs of the workers that cannot be conveniently met out of their wages. In this way the needs of large families, the need for higher education, cultural life, and sport are satisfied on a scale which is quite out of proportion to the actual money wages.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another feature of Soviet trade union activity which must be mentioned, since it leads to the linking up of the trade unionists of the U.S.S.R. with members of other unions, with workers in other enterprises, and with citizens whom, otherwise, they might not meet at all, is the institution known as &amp;quot;patronage.&amp;quot; It has been described already how, when a group of workers in Socialist competition happen to surpass another group, or a factory beats another factory, the winner frequently in an organized way gives assistance to the loser. Such assistance is sometimes termed &amp;quot;patronage.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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But such &amp;quot;patronage&amp;quot; also exists as a form of social co-operation between organizations of the most varied types; a factory trade union committee may conclude a &amp;quot;patronage agreement&amp;quot; with a regiment in the Red Army, or with a collective farm. By such an agreement the factory will send help to the collective farm during the harvest, and will supply it with certain industrial products throughout the year. The collective farm, in its turn, will supply the factory with agricultural products. In addition, social contact will be preserved between the parties to the agreement, and groups of workers and collective farmers will visit each other socially. Similarly, in the case of the Red Army, the regiment concerned will, among other things, teach the workers and collective farmers to use a rifle, the art of parachute jumping, and so on. In addition, it will come to the assistance of the factory in case of a breakdown, and to the assistance of the farm at harvest time. The members of the Red Army will attend social functions at the factory or farm, and workers and collective farmers will attend the functions of the Red Army, The workers in the factory will undertake certain technical jobs for their regiment; the collective farmers will send it agricultural produce. In this way the main sections of the Soviet population, workers, peasants, and soldiers, are brought into close social and practical contact with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again, we have referred to arrangements fay which, under Soviet conditions, the amateur dramatics dull at the factory obtains the assistance of professional theatrical workers. This, as a rule, is also arranged by the trade union. Sometimes they pay professional instructors, but on other occasions a &amp;quot;patronage&amp;quot; agreement is concluded with some theatre. In such a case as this the theatre workers undertake to give assistance to the factory dramatic group in their spare time, and the workers, in return, may undertake certain technical services for the theatre. Similarly, a well-known writer may take patronage over one or two workers’ literary circles. He will instruct them in their work. And he may try out his new books on them, and they will make their criticisms. In such a way the &amp;quot;intellectual&amp;quot; is brought into contact with the working masses of the population. How many first-class British writers today know the effect of their writings on the majority of the people—the 75 percent of wage- earners? Do they even imagine that the majority of the people—the wage-earners—might one day read their books?&lt;br /&gt;
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This brings us to another aspect of &amp;quot;patronage&amp;quot;—the connection between trade union and State. So far, in considering the trade union as representing the working people, as distinct from the administration appointee by the State, we have not dealt at all with the positive part played by the trade unions in administering the Soviet State itself. Actually, this question will be dealt with more fully in Chapter XIII, after we have described the basic .structure of the Soviet State.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is important here to record the fact that the Soviet trade union organizes patronage, not only between collective farms and factories, factories and Red Army regiments, but also between factories and Government departments, Such as the Commissariats of Finance, of Health, of Education, and even over the office of the President of the U.S.S.R. himself, Comrade Kalinin. Thus, when working hours are over, a number of workers from the most important Moscow factories proceed to the offices of the Government, there to do important administrative work. And, locally, thousands of workers, when working hours are over, proceed to the offices of their local Soviet, there to work in its various departments. But this subject deserves almost a whole chapter to itself, and it shall have it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet enterprise, we find, is a complex com-munity in which the organization of the working people, the trade union, plays a leading part. Personal responsibility on the part of everyone for his own job, together with collective responsibility for the work as a whole, is the characteristic of the Soviet enterprise. And collective responsibility means collective discussion and criticism; it means that die people must run their own affairs. Under such conditions, with a reasonable working day and reasonable holidays, the worker even on a conveyor relieves something of the joy of the craftsman. The factory is his, and he and his fellows benefit from more efficient and increasing production. He can always plan improvements in the productive processes, and knows that they will be adopted. Even on what, in itself, is the least interesting work, a certain standard of excellence can be obtained, and Socialist competition introduces even into the sweeping of a floor some of the thrill of a game of football. Under these conditions the Soviet worker feels that he is working for himself and for all, and he takes a pride in even the simplest work, a pride which it is hard to feel when the result is entirely to the benefit of somebody else, and when the greater the result, the nearer is brought the specter of unemployment in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Co-operatives in a Co-operative Commonwealth ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union, the land and the factories, the mines and the dwelling-houses, are owned either by the State or by co-operative societies. And the State, as we shall see in detail in Part II, represents the people who work. It seems fair, then, to give to the Soviet State the title of &amp;quot;Co-operative Commonwealth.&amp;quot; But, once the State itself is a co-operative organization of the people, there is no longer a conflict in principle between State organizations and co-operative societies. In some spheres the State may perform functions more effectively; in others, the co-operatives. It is in this light that we must approach the problem of co-operation in the U.S.S.R. at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consumers’ co-operation was encouraged in Tsarist Russia as one of the few working-class activities which the police considered &amp;quot;safe.&amp;quot; The people who ran the co-operatives under such conditions were not the types that, in 1917, were likely to support the Revolution. However, as co-operation was an extremely important means of combating the private trader in the interests of the working-class consumers, the Soviet State gave every encouragement to the development of co-operative societies of consumers. These did not pay dividends, but supplied goods at lower prices than the private traders. When the private traders put a new product on the market, the co-operatives sold it cheaper, and the community gained as a result. By 1934 there were about 73 million members of consumers’ co-operative societies in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet co-operators elect their management committees. The various committees hold congresses, and a federal union of all consumers’ co-operative organizations, Centrosoyuz, co-ordinates all the co- operative trading in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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But co-operative trade has certain disadvantages. The most important of these, particularly to the town dweller, is the need to purchase in special shops, often some way from home. In a village, where distances anyway are not great, such an inconvenience is reduced to a minimum.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soon after the beginning of the first Five Year Plan in 1928 the opening of co-operative shops at factories and other places of work began to take place on a large scale. At the same time, during the years 1926 to 1939, private trade was practically extinguished by heavy taxation on all private traders. The co-operatives were left with an almost complete monopoly of trade.&lt;br /&gt;
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During this period, owing to the rapid growth of the town population, leading to a great increase in the demand for ail products consumed by the working people, and owing to the reorganization of agriculture on a co-operative basis, which caused a temporary fell in the supply of foodstuffs, rationing of all food products and many industrial products was introduced as a temporary measure. Through the co-operatives, rationed quantities of goods could be obtained at comparatively low prices. Extra quantities could be obtained at State shops, but much higher prices were charged.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, in 1931, I started to work in the U.S.S.R., the former importance of co-operatives as a means of carrying on trade in the interests of the consumer, in competition with private traders who traded for profit, had more or less dwindled to nothing. Since there were no longer private traders, it was possible to purchase rationed goods at low prices in the cooperatives, or unrationed goods in co-operative or other shops at high prices. The quantity of the rations allowed, and the general level of prices were already being fixed by the State. It was no surprise to me, or to others who were working in the Soviet Union when, in 1932, the to-operatives which were attached to the factories were transferred to the control of the factory administration.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a result of this change, the manager of the factory shop, instead of being appointed by a committee elected by the customers, was appointed by the administration of the factory. At first sight this suggests that the control over the shop by the workers was slackened, but this was not the case. For, as we have shown, the representatives of the trade union participate in the management of the Soviet factories. When, in 1932, the co-operatives were transferred to the factory management, this simply meant the replacing of one form of workers’ control by another. Previously, the co-operators had elected a special committee to run the shop. Now the trade union committee appointed a delegate to supervise the running of the shop in the interests of all the workers. But the director of the factory was now responsible for seeing that the shop obtained adequate supplies. In this way the shop, like the dining-room and housing, became one of the responsibilities of the factory management, controlled by the trade union committee.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since there was no longer private trade, this question of the status of co-operative trade and State trade no longer was a matter of principle, but of expediency. Whether the State controlled trade, or co-operative societies, in either case it was the people themselves. It was necessary simply to procure the best system of organization. And it proved that the director, together with the trade union committee of a factory, was more capable of controlling the work of the shop than a co-operative committee had been; for they represented the same people, but formed a more powerful body. The factory administration, it was found, was more able to supply the needs of the workers, for it was more influential in getting supplies than a committee whose only justification for existence was the running of a single shop.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outside the factory, until 1935, the co-operatives had their own shops. However, with the growth of State trade the decisive factor in price-fixing became the State. As a result, all difference between co-operative prices and State prices disappeared. With the abolition of rationing, which rapidly followed the record harvest of 1933, it became no longer expedient for workers to be attached to particular shops where they drew their rations. As a result, all shops were thrown open to the public, and all goods were sold at uniform prices. This led, in 1935, to a Government decree which transferred all the co-operatives in the towns to the Commissariat of Home Trade. At the same time it was pointed out that in the villages the main distributing apparatus was still in the hands of the co-operatives, and that these were not adequately meeting the rising demands of the villagers. It was, therefore, decreed that all their resources should thenceforth be devoted to the supplying of the needs of the villages.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the winter of 1935 and 1936 I visited certain villages a considerable distance from Moscow. The co-operative shops were well stocked with goods. Turnover had greatly increased since the decree had abolished co-operative trade in the towns. Nobody that I met looked upon the change as anything but an improvement, both in town and country. In the country, the co-operatives supplied goods which had previously gone to the town shops. In the towns, the Commissariat of Home Trade redecorated the shops of the co-operatives and re-stocked them with those increasing supplies of goods which industry was making available. At the same time prices continued to fall, while the quality of goods improved.&lt;br /&gt;
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But such a change, it may be suggested, while it may have improved supplies, was an attack on the self-government of consumers. The answer to this is that, under Soviet conditions, it would be quite incorrect to suggest that the State shop is not subject to the control of the consumer. As a State concern, there is Socialist competition between the State shops, as there is between the State factories. The workers in the shops are interested in giving good service, just as the workers in the factories are interested in turning out good products. But, secondly, the consumer is invited to participate in judging such Socialist competition. No Soviet shop is without a &amp;quot;complaints book,&amp;quot; in which customers write their comments. Bad service may be reported, not only to the Commissariat of Home Trade, or to the local Soviet, but to the Press, and, as will be shown in the next chapter, the Soviet Press is one of the main ways of ventilating criticism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, the State shops organize from time to time conferences of consumers, to discuss what goods should be supplied, and how the shops should be run.&lt;br /&gt;
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Returning from Moscow to London in 1936, I discovered that, whereas three years previously I had found London bearing an aspect of a land of plenty in comparison with Moscow, in 1936 no such contrast was visible. And when I went to buy some luscious fruit in a London shop and was given goods which were about half the size of those displayed in the window, I realized what it was to be once more in a land of private trade! For in the U.S.S.R., both in the State shops in the towns and in the co-operatives in the villages, the goods supplied are the goods which are displayed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since trade is not for profit and since the plan of every co-operative and State shop includes the supply of given quantities of goods of given quality, there is no motive for adulteration, or for the sale of inferior goods. Of course, it still sometimes happens that a worker in a Soviet shop may try to make a small personal profit by selling inferior goods at the price of superior ones. But in the U.S.S.R. this is a criminal offence, while in Britain it is good business!&lt;br /&gt;
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Consumers’ co-operation in the U.S.S.R. today continues in the Soviet villages, where there are about 40,000 co-operative shops. In the future, the question of whether the co-operative or the State shop will be the final center of village trade will be decided, not as a matter of principle, but as a matter of expediency. If, with the growth of the production of consumers’ goods, the Commissariat of Home Trade opens shops in the villages, and if, as a result of its centralization and vast economic resources, it is able to give better service than the co-operatives, then State trade will replace co-operative trade. If, on the other hand, the efficiency of co-operative trade exceeds that of State trade, then the co-operatives will remain supreme. Essentially, no matter of principle is now involved, for in the U.S.S.R. the State itself is a vast co-operative commonwealth, and the existence of co-operatives within co-operatives, a complex structure of wheels within wheels, is only justified in so far as better service is provided as a result.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another example of co-operation, of considerable importance in the Soviet town, is the housing cooperative. One of the first decrees of the Soviet Government in 1917 transferred all existing housing accommodation to the local Soviets, to be distributed according to the needs of the population. They were also empowered to build houses. But at that time there were vast demands on the resources of all Soviet authorities, both local and national. The Soviet State, therefore, also encouraged the formation of housing cooperatives, societies of individuals who desired to obtain better accommodation and who subscribed to the cooperative a certain portion of their income towards the building of blocks of fiats. Such co-operatives were run by the members, who elected their boards of management and paid their own officials. At the present time a substantial portion of the housing accommodation in Soviet cities belongs to such co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet housing co-operative an elected committee of the members is responsible for supervising the building of the houses. As each building is completed, the members who are first on the list move into the flats. For the administration of the house they elect their own house committee, which employs a paid manager to carry on the work of administration. The manager is responsible for collecting rent, which is fixed at about 10 percent of the earnings of each householder.&lt;br /&gt;
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This rent goes entirely to the upkeep of the house, central heating and water supply, repairs and the decoration of the flats. Out of this lo percent the manager is paid, and the house committee is responsible for seeing that the funds are wisely ex- pended. Sometimes, of course, there may be a gross act of mismanagement. In a house where I lived for over a year in Moscow the manager absconded, with a balance of 6,000 rubles! An emergency meeting of the inhabitants was called and a new committee was elected, instructed to be more vigilant in their appointment of a new manager. I do not know whether the militia caught the thief, and whether the money was recovered, as I left Moscow soon after.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I do not tell of this incident as being in any way typical. But it is essential for the reader always to remember that Soviet citizens are human beings like everybody else, with their merits and their frailties. So long as there exist individualists in Soviet Society, putting their immediate private interests before those of the community, there will be cases of persons in positions of trust betraying this trust. Such cases are dealt with by the Soviet courts of law as criminal offences; they have not yet been completely stamped out.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to housing, then, we find a widespread system of co-operation, in which the dwellers in blocks of flats govern their own affairs. In cases where houses are owned by the local Soviet, as is the case with the greater part of town housing, or by industrial enterprises, as occurs in certain cases, the system of management is in general similar to that of the co-operatives. In these cases the house manager, however, is appointed by the local housing trust, subject to the authority of the Soviet, or by the administration of the factory, subject to the co-operation of the union, instead of by the elected committee of the inhabitants. At the same time, however, a house committee is also elected by the inhabitants in all State-owned houses, and the manager must work in co-operation with this committee, spending the money collected in rents on repairs and renewals, and in the general interest of the occupants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The elected house committee is the Soviet, substitute for the private landlord; the actual owner of Soviet houses is either the State or a co-operative of the occupants. Ultimately, it is clear, as in the case of consumers’ co-operation, the system of housing control will develop according to expediency. If administration by the committees of co-operatives proves less efficient than administration by the State housing trusts, the latter will replace the former. If otherwise, the cooperative houses will develop in relation to the State houses. This is a matter which the future will decide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So far we have been concerned with those forms of co-operative organization of which the ordinary wage-earners are members. But not all producers in the U.S.S.R. are wage-earners; a vast number of them are members of producers’ co-operatives. In industry, a very small part of total production is carried on by co-operatives of producers. In agriculture, by far the greatest part of the total output is produced in cooperatives of peasants, collective farms. Since, in principle, the organization of an industrial co-operative in no way differs from that of agriculture, and since agricultural co-operation is by far the most important form of producers’ co-operation in the U.S.S.R., we shall examine in detail the organization of the collective agriculture, bearing in mind that, in the towns, on a small scale, similar organizations of industrial producers also exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the very foundation of the Soviet State encouragement was given to the peasants, small individual producers, to pool their land and instruments of production, and to farm on a large scale. It was emphasized that the peasants themselves must organize such co-operative farms on their own initiative, and that such a system, if enforced from above, would not work because it would not have the support of the people who, in the nature of things, had to run it. But so long as the actual method of cultivation was limited to the wooden plough there was little to be gained from cultivating the land in large areas rather than in small strips. Therefore collectivization did not take place on a large scale during the first decade of the Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But so long as agriculture continued to be carried on by the individual peasant households, each working on its own little strip of land, it was bound to be inefficient. Therefore the supply of food to the people of the country was bound to be constantly menaced as a result of a bad harvest. For this reason alone it was essential to introduce large-scale farming. And tins could only be done in one of two ways. On the one hand, the same method could have been adopted as had been adopted everywhere else in the world—the subsidizing of every farmer who was better off than the majority, helping him to become a large-scale farmer with many possessions and many laborers. But this, it will be noted, would have meant capitalism in the village, and the employment of labor by private individuals for profit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This system was turned down by the Soviet Government, as giving rise to a new powerful capitalist class controlling the main food supplies of the country, and thus a menace to the very existence of the Soviet State itself. The remedy for the backwardness of Soviet agriculture had to be a Socialist remedy, and must be, as Stalin pointed out in 1928, &amp;quot;in a transition from small, backward, and scattered peasant farming to concentrated, large-scale social farms, equipped with machinery, armed with the knowledge of science, and capable of producing the maximum quantity of marketable grain. The solution lies in the transition in agriculture from individual peasant farming to collective and communal farming&amp;quot; (Stalin, Leninism, Vol. II, p. 102).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This transition was not easy. It was necessary to persuade the peasants to undertake the new methods. But that could only be done by making available for them the modern machinery which is essential to efficient large-scale production. Again, it was essential to show them that this increased production would enable them to obtain larger quantities of industrial products and to raise their standard of life. As Stalin put it in 1928; &amp;quot;We must maintain the present rate of development of industry, and, at the first opportunity, still more accelerate it, in order to pour cheap goods into the rural districts and obtain from them the maximum amount of grain; in order to supply machines to agriculture, particularly to the collective and Soviet farms, and in order to industrialize agriculture and increase its marketable surplus&amp;quot; (ibid., p. 108).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From 1928 onwards a widespread campaign was started to draw the peasants into collective farms. They were offered agricultural machinery and modern fertilizers, together with the assistance of trained experts, if they would pool their land and their instruments of production, elect their own boards of management, and farm the land co-operatively. For four years the countryside was in a state of turmoil. The peasants had no experience of large-scale agriculture, or of co-operative and disciplined large-scale production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Through the Soviets they had administered education and health services, and had built roads. But they had not had any experience at collectively managing the complicated processes of production, and they were not acquainted with modern methods.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new system was violently opposed in the village by those few peasants who had larger farms, and who were small employers. They knew that they would lose their power in the new collectives, and used every method to prevent the success of the new co-operative system. As a result, the level of agricultural production sharply fell, and only began to recover with the record harvest of 1933, a record for the whole of Russian history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally the details of the best form of organization for the collective farms had to be worked out as a result of experience. Many changes were made as work proceeded, and only in 1935 was a special congress called, of the best collective farmers elected from all over the U.S.S.R., to adopt a &amp;quot;model constitution&amp;quot; for all the collective farms throughout the country. This congress discussed in detail a project submitted by the Government, a number of alterations were made, and then the model constitution was finally adopted by the congress. The Government accepted the draft which the congress put forward, and this has since become the basic structure of every collective farm.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the collective farm all the land is cultivated collectively with the exception of small plots surrounding the houses of the members, which may be used by the peasant families for their own purposes as gardens and orchards and grazing-ground for small livestock. All instruments of cultivation, with the exception of simple gardening tools, are owned by the collective. All livestock, with the exception of a few animals for household use, is also owned by the collective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The management of the collective farm is in the hands of an elected committee of the members. The management is allowed to appoint members to different jobs throughout the collective. The work is done in &amp;quot;brigades,&amp;quot; each with its own responsibilities, and competing with each other for the best results, just like groups of factory workers. The members of the collective farm do not draw wages, since they are not employees but joint owners. Each year, after the harvest, the total year’s income is calculated, in terms of revenue from the sale of products during the year together with all unsold produce in hand. After all debts have been paid, a certain quota is set aside for the following year’s seed fund, for the extension of the farm, and for social services to members. According to the model statutes, not more than lo percent of the total revenue goes to this latter purpose. The rest is divided among the inhabitants, &amp;quot;to each according to his work.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unit by which work is measured in the collective farm is the &amp;quot;work-day.&amp;quot; This is roughly the amount of work which an ordinary unskilled worker can do in an eight-hour day. More than eight hours of ordinary unskilled work, or eight hours of skilled work, count as more than one work-day. A tractor driver in eight hours may be credited with, say, two work-days, as a skilled worker. The actual rates, like the actual rates of wages in the factory, are determined at general meetings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I remember, in a village near Moscow, listening to an indignant old peasant woman, very rheumatic, who was furious because, during twelve hours’ work in the fields, she had not earned credit for one work-day. When I realized, however, that she was over seventy, and was already in receipt of an invalid pension, this fact hardly reacted to the discredit of the collective. If pensioned invalids of seventy were estimated to be only 30 percent less efficient than the healthy collective farmer, this would not say much either, for the average collective farmer or the system! I calmed the old lady by telling her that she should bring up the matter at the next meeting, and she showed signs of anticipating a really good row when the next general meeting was held!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In another collective farm, run by German peasants in the Ukraine, a large notice-board in the office displayed the names of all the members of the collective, with their earnings in terms of work-days every month. The manager received a regular 40 work-days a month, whereas the skilled workers, tractor drivers, milkmaids, and so on, received up to 60 and 70 work-days. In this farm, as a result of careful accounting, every member received an advance every month on the estimated year’s income. The manager told me with pride that neighboring farms were now going to copy this method.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet factory, as we have seen, and also in the State farms which cultivate a small proportion of the total area of the U.S.S.R., the administrative staff is appointed by the public authorities, and the trade union is the representative organization of the working people. In the collective farm the managerial staff is elected by the members, and must organize production in the general interest, and also supervise the social services and the raising of the general cultural life of the community. The collective farm, as a self-governing organization of citizens, is similar in status to a trade union. Its functions include, however, the organization of production, as well as the provision of insurance for its members against sickness and old age, communal feeding establishments, nurseries and kindergartens, and opportunities for higher education on the part of its members. Part of its funds, according to the decisions of general meetings, are devoted also to cultural and sport activities, the building of clubs and theaters and rest-homes for the members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is common nowadays in the U.S.S.R. to meet peasant students in the universities, sent there by their collective farms. In such cases maintenance allowances are often paid by the collective farms themselves to their members who are studying. There are collective farms which have their own theaters, built out of their own funds together with grants from the State, and which have permanent repertory companies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And in the collective farm, as in the factory, Socialist competition and the wall-newspaper are universal features. Even the Stakhanov Movement, originating in a coal-mine, has spread through the collective farms of the U.S.S.R, The cultivator of sugar-beet, Maria Demchenko, has won fame throughout the country for the results which have been obtained under her leadership in a collective farm in the Ukraine. And not only do we read of Maria Demchenko on her farm, but also of how she, together with leading Stakhanov workers from all over the U.S.S.R., has visited Moscow and attended conferences with the Government. At such a conference Maria Demchenko promised Stalin that she would obtain a certain yield of sugar-beets on her land, and fulfilled that promise. The Soviet Government frequently summons conferences of the leading workers in all branches of Soviet life, Staklianov and Maria Demchenko meet Kalinin, Molotov, and Stalin, discuss their problems, and their plans for the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this relationship with the working people the Soviet and was already in receipt of an invalid pension, tins fact hardly reacted to the discredit of the collective. If pensioned invalids of seventy were estimated to be only 30 percent less efficient than the healthy collective farmer, this would not say much either, for the average collective farmer or the system! I calmed the old lady by telling her that she should bring up the matter at the nest meeting, and she showed signs of anticipating a really good row when the next general meeting was held!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In another collective farm, run by German peasants in the Ukraine, a large notice-board in the office displayed the names of all the members of the collective, with their earnings in terms of work-days every month. The manager received a regular 40 work-clays a month, whereas the skilled workers, tractor drivers, milkmaids, and so on, received up to 60 and 70 work-days. In this farm, as a result of careful accounting, every member received an advance every month on the estimated year’s income. The manager told me with pride that neighboring farms were now going to copy this method.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet factory, as we have seen, and also in the State farms which cultivate a small proportion of the total area of the U.S.S.R., the administrative staff is appointed by the public authorities, and the trade union is the representative organization of the working people. In the collective farm the managerial staff is elected by the members, and must organize production in the general interest, and also supervise the social services and the raising of the general cultural life of the community. The collective farm, as a self-governing organization of citizens, is similar in status to a trade union. Its functions include, however, the organization of production, as well as the provision of insurance for its members against sickness and old age, communal feeding establishments, nurseries and kindergartens, and opportunities for higher education on the part of its members. Part of its funds, according to the decisions of general meetings, are devoted also to cultural and sport activities, the building of clubs and theaters and rest-homes for the members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is common nowadays in the U.S.S.R. to meet peasant students in the universities, sent there-by their collective farms. In such cases maintenance allowances are often paid by the collective farms themselves to their members who are studying. There are collective farms which have their own theaters, built out of their own funds together with grants from the State, and which have permanent repertory companies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And in the collective farm, as in the factory, Socialist competition and the wall-newspaper are universal features. Even the Stakhanov Movement, originating in a coal-mine, has spread through the collective farms of the U.S.S.R. The cultivator of sugar-beet, Maria Demchenko, has won fame throughout the country for the results which have been obtained under her leadership in a collective farm in the Ukraine. And not only do we read of Maria Demchenko on her farm, but also of how she, together with leading Stakhanov workers from all over the U.S.S.R,, has visited Moscow and attended conferences with the Government. At such a conference Maria Demchenko promised Stalin that she would obtain a certain yield of sugar-beets on her land, and fulfilled that promise. The Soviet Government frequently summons conferences of the leading workers in all branches of Soviet life; Stakhanov and Maria Demchenko meet Kalinin, Molotov, and Stalin, discuss their problems, and their plans for the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this relationship with the working people the Soviet Government is simply repeating what every Government has always done in relation to the ruling class; it holds conferences with them to discuss policy. In the Soviet Constitution there is nothing to say that the Government shall hold conferences of workers to discuss policy with them, but, as a workers’ Government, it does hold such conferences. In Britain there is no law staling that the Government shall discuss matters behind the scenes with big business and the bankers, but we know that on the quiet it does hold such discussions, and the opinions of these people go a very long way towards determining the essentials of Government policy. In the U.S.S.R., however, such conferences take place in the open, as part of the recognized working of Soviet democracy, whereas, in the British system, conferences between Government and bankers are more often than not held on the quiet, since it is not considered expedient to advertise the extent to which a small plutocracy influences policy in our kind of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While co-operatives both of consumers and producers in the Soviet town are today of comparatively small importance, in the village they exist on a vast scale, both for consumption and production. The collective farm is the main form of productive organization in the Soviet countryside, and will continue to be so as long as co-operative production proves to be more efficient than State farming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And why, it may be asked, has collective farming proved more popular than working in State farms? Is it that the material conditions are superior?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, up to the present, it cannot be said that in general the material conditions of collective farmers are necessarily better than those of workers doing similar work on a State farm. Where a collective farm reaps a good harvest, the members perhaps receive more than workers on the State farms doing similar work for a regular wage. But if the harvest is poor, then the collective farmers receive less than those who, on a State farm, are guaranteed a fixed wage for a given amount of work, whatever the harvest may be like.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, it is not the actual material standard which deter- mines the attitude of the Soviet peasantry to collective farming. The peasant for centuries, however poor he has been, has cultivated his own land, and has owned his own means of production, however primitive. Only when economic conditions became intolerable was it usual for the peasants to leave their plots of land, and to trek to the towns in search of work as wage-earners. Certainly, the rise in the status of the wage-earner which has taken place since the Soviets seized power has made wage-earning more attractive to the peasantry, but they still like to exercise direct ownership over their means of production, rather than indirect, through the State.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a result of this attitude the peasants of the U.S.S.R. have shown an enthusiasm for forming their own producers’ co-operative organizations and running them themselves, which they never showed for becoming wage-earners in State farms. It is as a result of this preference of the people for a particular form of organization that this form has become widespread throughout the countryside. In the future, according to the desires of the people themselves, collective farms may, or may not, change their form, and may, or may not, become indistinguishable, as regards their organization, from the State farms and other enterprises which are run by the State at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== A People&#039;s Press ===&lt;br /&gt;
In Tsarist Russia, 80 percent of the population was unable to read or write. In the first decree of the Commissar of Education, after October 1917, it was stated, as has been already pointed out, that &amp;quot;every democratic power must, in the domain of education, in a country where illiteracy and ignorance reign supreme, make its first aim the struggle against this darkness. It must acquire in the shortest time universal literacy&amp;quot;. The people, under the Soviets, began to learn to read and write, to read the newspapers and to write in them. For, as we have also already seen, the newspaper has been introduced into every organization in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The making of the Press really available to the people was not something which could be done without procuring the necessary supplies of paper and ink, and the printing presses with which newspapers are printed. But in 1917, when the Soviets seized State power, these things were practically all in the hands of the well-to-do—of those who were rich enough to own newspapers, the employers of labor. Therefore it is not surprising to find, in the first Soviet Constitution of 1918, the following clause: &amp;quot;To ensure for the workers effective liberty of opinion, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic puts an end to the dependence of the Press upon capital; transfers to the working class and to the peasants all technical and material resources necessary for the publication of newspapers, pamphlets, books, and other printed matter: and guarantees their unobstructed circulation throughout the country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet Government realized that freedom of the Press could only exist together with the ownership of the printing presses and the other means for publishing newspapers. Therefore, so long as the printing presses and stocks of paper were in the hands of the well-to-do, there was only freedom of the Press for the well-to-do. Effective freedom of the Press for the working people could only be guaranteed by giving the ownership of the newspapers to these same working people. Hence the abolition of the private Press in the early days of the Revolution; its place being taken by the Press of the people themselves, from their wall-newspapers in the factories to the newspapers of the Soviet State itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of putting an end to illiteracy, together with the transferring of the printing presses to the organizations of the working people, caused a tremendous development of the Press. The percentage of adult citizens who can read and write in the Soviet Union today is about go. The daily circulation of newspapers has increased from 2-7 million in 1913 to 36-4 million in 1934, and the planned circulation for 1937 is 66 million. The only limit to the circulation of a Soviet newspaper today is the amount of paper available, so that we see how such a cultural question as the avail- ability of literature has its economic foundation. Any evening in Moscow today, queues are visible about five o’clock, waiting for the evening paper. After an hour or, so all copies may be sold out. But this is not due to a shortage of papers compared with old Russia, for the circulation has greatly increased. It is due to the fact that the demand is now so great that limited resources of paper prevent enough being printed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be a mistake to consider the large printed papers, whose daily circulation has been stated, to be fully representative of the Press in the Soviet Union. For, in addition to national and local papers, there are the factory papers and news-sheets, and the wall-newspapers which are everywhere. In considering the Press we must remember all these, from the wall-newspaper in the factory to the greatest national newspapers, Izvestia, organ of the Government; Pravda, the newspaper of the Party; and Trud, the paper of the trade unions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For some months, while working in Moscow, I was the editor of a wall-newspaper. Compared with the editorship of any kind of newspaper or magazine in Britain, work on a Soviet publication is particularly onerous, for the editor, whether of the wall-newspaper in a workshop or of one of the national papers, has certain obligations which do not exist for the newspaper editor under capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We all read, from time to time, the correspondence columns of our newspapers. We know how readers express their views on every subject under the sun. We also know that, as far as the editor is concerned, his only job is to see that the most interesting letters are printed, and, when heated controversies show signs of becoming out of hand, to terminate them abruptly with the short note in italics: &amp;quot;This correspondence is now closed&amp;quot;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The editorial committee of a Soviet newspaper, whether of a factory wall-newspaper or of the Government’s newspaper Izvestia, does not deal with its correspondence in this light-handed way. For on every Soviet newspaper, from the very smallest to the very largest, there are members of the editorial staff whose entire work is to deal with the complaints of readers, to investigate these complaints, and to see what can be done to remedy their grievances, if any real grievances exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To the wall-newspaper, for example, a worker may write to say that, after being off work owing to illness, he did not receive the full amount due to him. Another may write to say that a certain foreman appeared at work with the signs of drink on him, and such a writer may include a cartoon of the foreman concerned! Another may say that the safety devices on certain machines are inadequate; and another may write that, in spite of continual complaints, the administration continues to delay in the supplying of materials, and as a result the workers are being held up at their job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The editorial staff of the wall-newspaper, receiving these topical comments on the life of the factory, is under an obligation, not merely to publish them, but to investigate the complaints; and to publish the letters with a statement of what has been done to redress the grievances expressed. In the case of the inadequate insurance money, the social insurance delegate must be asked to investigate. If he considers that there has been no injustice, he will be asked to write a short reply. If there has been an injustice, then the editorial board will announce that the matter has been set right. In the case of the foreman, if the facts are as stated, the article and cartoon will most certainly appear, with still more caustic remarks by the editorial staff, and possibly an appeal to the administration to take disciplinary measures. In the case of safety devices, this is a matter for the labor protection delegate of the trade union, who will be asked to make a statement on the matter. And, finally, where the administration holds up the supplies of materials it is the job of the editorial board itself to move heaven and earth to make the administration take the necessary steps to supply materials on time, and thus to avoid the delays.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The work of the editorial board of a wall-newspaper, then, is not simply the publication of a newspaper. It is also the investigation of complaints and the removal of grievances; so that the Press becomes an effective weapon of the people in the fight for better conditions in every respect. The national Press of the U.S.S.R. in no way differs from the local Press in this matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It will be remembered by many readers how, during the years of the first Five Year Plan, the most harrowing stories appeared in our Press in Britain about the failure of one large Soviet factory after another to achieve the planned output. And, to the confusion of the British reader who was sympathetic to the Soviet Union, Soviet sources would usually be quoted as the basis for these stories. We would read how at Stalingrad, for example, two tractors would come off the conveyor on one day, thirty the next, then a hundred, and then down to two again as some process in the production went wrong and held up the whole job. And editorial comments in the British Press would ruthlessly point out that &amp;quot;these Russians&amp;quot; would never learn to run machinery, and the whole Five Year Plan was therefore a giant fiasco.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in spite of this adverse comment, and in spite of, or perhaps because of, the fact that it was the Soviet Press which gave full publicity to the difficulties of Stalingrad and other vast new enterprises, they have pulled through. And when we look more closely at the kind of facts which received such loud publicity at that time we find that all these difficulties and disorders which accompanied the first Five Year Plan were not necessarily peculiar to Soviet conditions, but operate in one form or another in every new large industrial enterprise anywhere. The fundamental difference between such enterprises in the U.S.S.R. and similar ones in capitalist countries is that in the Soviet Union their every difficulty was publicized in the Press, whereas, in the conditions of capitalism, the same difficulties are completely hushed up!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Suppose that a new Ford plant, after it has started working, for a few weeks turns out only half the planned output. Suppose that this story leaks into the Press. Down go the shares of Ford Ltd.; the credit of the firm seriously suffers; panic results. Such a panic, in certain cases, is all that is necessary to ruin a new firm which is just starting to operate its first factory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in the Soviet Union every one of those same difficulties, hushed up under capitalism because they damage the reputation of a firm, are given the fullest publicity in the Press. For, by interesting the whole of the people in those things which are unsatisfactory as well as in those which are satisfactory, the Soviet Press stimulates citizens to improve matters, and as a result the whole community is benefited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is as a result of this policy that, in the Soviet Press, the most appalling stories of all kinds of public abuses are given publicity. I remember how, a few years ago, a certain anti-Soviet propagandist organization in this country issued a leaflet containing parallel quotations from the British publication Russia Today and from the Soviet Trade Union newspaper Trud (Labor). In Russia Today it was stated, for example, that 11,000 new nurseries had been opened for the working-class mothers. And, from Trud, there was quoted a horrifying story of how, in the town of, say, Minsk, at the &amp;quot;Hammer and Sickle&amp;quot; Factory, a new crèche had been opened where the floors were damp, and where, in the near neighborhood, there was a pig-sty, the smell of which infected the whole establishment. By taking a whole series of such monstrosities, quoted in Trud as examples of disgraceful work on the part of one or another trade union organization, or on the part of the administration of one or another factory, the leaflet was able to offset each statement from Russia Today about vast developments affecting the lives of 170 million people with a story of one fiasco, affecting the lives of some 1,000 people at the most, quoted in the Soviet Press in order to reduce such disorders to a minimum.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet citizen, writing to a newspaper in the Soviet Union, is aware of the fact that in expressing his opinion he is starting a sequence of actions which will, if his complaints are justified, lead to the removal of the grievance. In this way the Soviet citizen enjoys effective expression of opinion of a twofold nature. First, he can complain in the Press about things which, in other countries, it is impossible for the ordinary worker to criticize at all. Second, he knows that, when he has spoken, the authorities concerned will take action to see that the grievance is dealt with.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When I say that similar people, in other countries, cannot give public expression to the kind of very vital complaints which find their way in thousands into the Soviet Press, I have in mind the fact that, in Britain today, if I wish to express dissatisfaction about the service rendered by a firm or by an organization, or with the work of an individual, I have no right to call the attention of public opinion to the matter. For, in Britain, the airing of any grievance, however justifiable, against a person, or against an organization, if it is likely to damage their business or their reputation is libelous, and the person airing such a grievance may be sued for it. Not only do private firms hush up the kind of difficulties to which the Soviet Press gave publicity in the case of Stalingrad, but ordinary citizens, with grievances against all kinds of organizations and officials, are not permitted to direct public opinion to such grievances through the Press. The only form of action which is possible is litigation, and the cost of this is such that only major grievances of the well-to-do can be adequately settled in this way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet Press, then, gives voice to two lands of criticism which are more or less non-existent in the Press of Britain: criticism of the working of all kinds of public institutions; and criticism of the working of responsible persons. Both these kinds of criticism, in a country of private enterprise, would be damaging to the firms concerned, also to the authority of employers over workers, and are therefore taboo.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In discussing the wall-newspaper in the factory, at an earlier stage, we raised the question of control and editorship. And we saw that the editor of the wall- newspaper was appointed by the trade union committee elected by, and responsible to, the workers. How are the national newspapers controlled?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no difference in principle between the control of the wall-newspaper in the factory, which is the organ of the participation in that factory, and the control of Ixsoestia, Pravda, or Trud, the three main newspapers of the U.S.S.R. For in the Soviet Union all the Press is in the hands of the organizations of the working people, from their factory trade union committee on the one hand, to their national Trade Union General Council, their Government, and the Central Committee of their Party on the other. In the factory, the editor of the wall-newspaper is appointed by and responsible to the trade union in that factory. On an All-Union scale, the editor of Trud, the central organ of the Soviet trade unions, is appointed by and responsible to the General Council of the Trade Unions. The Moscow evening paper is edited by a person appointed by and responsible to the Moscow Soviet. The All-Union Government newspaper, Izvestia, is edited by someone who is appointed by and responsible to the Government of the U.S.S.R. Pravda, the newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., is edited by someone appointed by and responsible to the Central Committee of the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the myriads of publications of the trade unions, the local Soviets and the All-Union Government, together with the various State departments and the Party, there are a number of further publications—^weekly and monthly magazines—which are issued by the State Publishing House, and children’s periodicals, issued by the Children’s Publishing House.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a vast variety of publications^ published by different organizations. But all these organizations have one feature in common—they are organizations responsible to the people, and not private firms owned by well-to-do individuals and working for profit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is only when the nature of the control of the Soviet Press is understood that we see that there is an absolutely fundamental difference between the &amp;quot;freedom of the press&amp;quot; which is guaranteed in the Soviet Constitutions— and always has been— and the &amp;quot;freedom of the press&amp;quot; which exists in Britain at the present time. If we look at the circulation of newspapers in Britain today, -we find that an overwhelming majority of the daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers and magazines are private property, run for profit, and owned by those who are sufficiently wealthy to own newspapers. The Daily Herald, incidentally, in which a majority of the shares is owned by a joint-stock company, must be included in this category. In contrast with this there stand out the Daily Worker, the publication of the Communist Party, and Reynolds&#039;s Newspaper, published by the Co-operative Movement, as the only national newspapers in the country which can even profess to represent working-class organizations. And yet 75 percent of the people of Britain are wage-earners. Then there are the various smaller weeklies and monthlies, among which the trade union and co-operative journals amount to a small proportion of the total. And, if we look at any bookstall in any railway station, or go into any newsagent’s, we again find that the overwhelming majority of the publications for sale are those, not of organizations of the working people, who are 75 percent of the population, but of the small minority, amounting to about 1 percent of the population of Britain, who in effect own the Press of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is absolutely true, of course, that in Britain, as compared with a Fascist country, working-class organizations have the right to publish their own newspapers and magazines, on condition that they have the necessary funds to do so. To this extent they are better off than ‘they would be under Fascism, But a glance at the average bookstall, or at a list of the newspapers published in this country today, is sufficient to show that the freedom of the Press that actually does exist today operates in favor of the owners of property and against the organizations of the majority of the population, the wage-earners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Soviet Russia, &amp;quot;in the interests of effective freedom of expression for the working people,&amp;quot; the Press was transferred from private hands to the organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. We have surveyed the results of this transfer of the ownership of the Press. And we have seen that the working citizen of the U.S.S.R. enjoys an effective freedom of expression, in two ways, which is not enjoyed by him in other countries. First, the material in the newspapers is what he writes, and not what a privileged few write for&#039; his consumption. Secondly, what he writes is effective in the sense that it leads to concrete action being taken against abuses, bad practices, inefficiency, and injustice. Compared with other countries, freedom of expression for the Soviet working citizen is a doubly effective weapon, a two-edged sword against all those who, through malice or laziness, negligence or simple inefficiency, obstruct the rapid raising of the general material and cultural level of the people. The Soviet Press can truly claim to be democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certain readers may, at this point, interject with the words: &amp;quot;Ah, but is this democratic, so long as there is no opposition Press in the U.S.S.R.?&amp;quot; The answer to this is another question: &amp;quot;What is opposition?&amp;quot; If, by opposition, you mean the public exposure of every land of injustice, abuse, and inefficiency, and of individuals who fail to fulfill their duties, then we see that such criticism exists in the Soviet Press to an extent unequalled anywhere else in the world. But if, on the other hand, you mean the right to express in Soviet newspapers anti-Soviet ideas, or in Soviet trade union newspapers anti-trade union views, then such opposition is not allowed by the editors of the Press of the U.S.S.R. But such &amp;quot;opposition&amp;quot; is not allowed in the official organs of any democratic body anywhere. No newspaper which is the organ of a particular social organization is going to be allowed by its owners to pursue a policy contrary to the interests of the organization that runs it; just as no privately owned paper can go contrary to the will of its proprietor. The Press lord will not allow his paper to oppose his policy, and the trade union journal in Britain will voice the views of the organization that publishes it, not oppose them. To ask that the Soviet Press should oppose the policy of the Soviets is to ask something that is never asked anywhere, of any newspaper, whether privately or democratically owned. It is the absurd request to oppose the policy of its owners instead of expressing that policy. The only serious question is: Who, in the U.S.S.R., are the owners?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the answer is: The people of the U.S.S.R. themselves, through their own organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Justice among Comrades ===&lt;br /&gt;
It is frequently said that a system of society can be judged by the way in which it looks after its children. The Soviet Union passes an examination on this matter with high honors. But it would probably be just as true to say that a social system can be judged by the way in which it treats its criminals, those who offend against its laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A visitor to a Soviet court of law, accustomed to the courts of Britain, receives a general impression of informality. Such a room and such a gathering might be a trade union meeting, or just a small public lecture, to judge by the appearance of the people sitting in the body of the hall and on the platform. At one end of the room, on a raised dais, sit three people. The hall is fairly crowded. A discussion is going on between one of the people on the platform and someone on the floor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It appears to be a heated argument. The person on the platform is one of the judges; the speaker from the floor is a criminal facing judgment!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The informality, the heated discussion between criminal and judge, the essentially human atmosphere of the whole proceedings—these are characteristic of working-class meetings all over the world. And the Soviet court is, in fact, a working-class meeting for a particular purpose—the passing of judgment on a comrade who has committed an offence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that the administration of justice has become one of the ordinary activities of the working people in the Soviet Union has led to the breaking down of the barriers between what we may call &amp;quot;formal&amp;quot; justice on the one hand and informal justice on the other. I remember one night in Moscow returning home about ten o’clock and finding an enormous gathering on the staircase, with people arguing in loud voices, &amp;quot;What is it?&amp;quot; I asked. &amp;quot;A comradely court,&amp;quot; was the reply, &amp;quot;What has happened?&amp;quot; was my next rather obvious question. And I was at once told the whole story by a woman neighbor who seemed just as interested in relating the whole scandalous affair to me as she was in listening to the proceedings themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The man in the flat below had assaulted a neighbor when drunk. The neighbor had complained to the house committee. There were witnesses. The house committee decided to hold a &amp;quot;comradely court&amp;quot; to try the case, and here on the stairs, at 10 p.m., the case was being tried. The judge was a member of the house committee; the jury was made up of the other inhabitants of the block of flats. The accused was proved guilty. The sentence was a public reprimand in front of all the neighbors. And at that the matter ended.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is such a method of dealing with petty acts of assault, of negligence at work, of drunkenness, effective? Soviet experience shows that, in many cases which might take a person to the courts in Britain, such a comradely court, with a public reprimand, is quite an effective deterrent. If, however, the comradely court comes to the decision that a misdemeanor has been committed which merits more than a public reprimand, then it turns the case over to the People’s Court, the lowest rung in the ladder of &amp;quot;formal &amp;quot; justice in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The People’s Court would correspond to the magistrate’s court in Britain. Hitherto, until the new Constitution of 1936, the judges were appointed from a panel submitted by the trade unions of the locality. Each judge then had a short legal training, lasting about six months, before taking up his position. Now, under the new Constitution, the judges will be elected by universal secret ballot, nominations being made by the trade unions, the Party, and other organizations of the working people. Together with the judge there sit two assistant judges, without any legal training, also appointed from panels drawn up by the trade unions in the district under the old system. They now will also be elected directly by the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The hearing of cases takes place in an atmosphere of the greatest informality. Criminal cases may alternate with applications for alimony against fathers who refuse to recognize their paternity, or, having recognized it, refuse to meet the financial obligations which follow. In every case the accused and the judges carry on lively back-chat, as there is no such &amp;quot;crime&amp;quot; as contempt of court. I remember a case where a young man was up on a charge of drunkenness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Late at night he had apparently demanded money while drunk from a passer-by. The judge, a woman, summed up the case with a reference to the &amp;quot;campaign against hooliganism,&amp;quot; and referred to the disgraceful behavior of the young man in creating a disturbance in the middle of the night. The young man interjected: &amp;quot;It wasn’t the middle of the night, it was only twelve o’clock!&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Yes, it was the middle of the night,&amp;quot; said the judge, and continued with her homily on the fight against hooliganism. The young man was sentenced to several months &amp;quot;forced labor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sentences in Soviet courts are usually to terms of &amp;quot;forced labor&amp;quot; or to imprisonment. Forced labor, terrifying as it may sound, is the lighter sentence, and in foot is the imposition of a fine, on the installment system. The person who is sentenced to forced labor continues to work at his job, but every month there is a deduction from his pay which goes to the local authority. At the same time the fact that he is serving a term of forced labor is made known to the employing authority and to his trade union, and the latter is expected to pay special attention to that person, to see that he improves his ways and becomes a more satisfactory and conscientious citizen. The criminal, serving his sentence of forced labor, will not be immune from comment in the wall-newspaper of his place of work and general social disapproval, as well as exhortation to better work and citizenship in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In more serious cases, the People’s Court imposes sentences of imprisonment. But here too, as compared with the significance of that term in Britain, Soviet imprisonment stands out as an almost enjoyable experience. For the essence of Soviet imprisonment is isolation from the rest of the community, together with other persons similarly isolated, with the possibility to do useful work at the place of isolation, to earn a wage for this work, and to participate in running the isolation settlement or &amp;quot;prison&amp;quot; in the same way as the children participate in running their school, or the workers their factory. The essential difference between Soviet imprisonment and freedom lies in: (a) The fact that the prisoners are bound to live where they are sent; (b) The fact that they get considerably lower wages than when free. Both these features are a sufficient deterrent to the ordinary citizen, but they make prison life comfortable as compared to the conditions normally prevailing elsewhere.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet penal settlements are now usually situated in places where large-scale construction work is in progress. The Baltic-White Sea Canal was built to a great extent by penal labor, and the building of the Moscow-Volga canal is being undertaken in a similar way. An essential feature of such large construction enterprises is that they provide work for people of all specialties. Therefore it is unusual, when serving a sentence in the U.S.S.R., for people not to be able to practice their own specialty. And since, on such construction jobs, as on construction jobs all over the U.S.S.R., there is a continual need for skilled personnel, the unskilled prisoner may learn a trade during his sentence, and be finally released with considerably higher qualifications than he had when arrested!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within the penal settlements themselves the prisoners earn wages according to their work. But these wages are considerably below trade union rates. Those who, in recent years, have been disappointed to find a change made in this direction (for at one time trade union rates were paid to all those serving sentences) must realize that in the U.S.S.R. since 1931 there has been no unemployment. Until that year, so long as there were workers out of work, it was correctly held that if prisoners of any kind did any form of work, this would be keeping other workers out of jobs, unless the prisoners received trade union conditions. This argument, incidentally, applies also to Britain today. It is often stated that prisoners in His Majesty’s prisons &amp;quot;only sew mailbags&amp;quot; as proof that their prison labor is not keeping others out of employment. But if they did not sew these mailbags gratis, then unemployed workers would be employed sewing them for a living, so that in Britain today the existing system of prison labor, and any system other than one in which prisoners receive trade union conditions, does contribute towards unemployment. This was also true in the U.S.S.R. till 1931, and till then the prisoners received trade union wages. Today it is no longer the case, and therefore, though paid, they do not receive as good pay as if they were free.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The extent of self-government in the Soviet penal settlement is very considerable. The wall-newspaper is a means of expression for those serving time, just as it is a means of expression for those at liberty. Amateur social activities are carried on in various spheres, and the good workers receive rapid promotion to jobs of responsibility. The accountant who has embezzled funds while at liberty may become accountant to the penal settlement if he works well, and the leader of a gang of thieves may become the leader of a brigade of workers on a construction job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The settlement near Moscow—Bolshevo—has received fame throughout the world. This settlement was started for the homeless children who, after the war which was forced on the Soviets from 1918 to 1922, and on which Britain spent 100,000,000, were wandering about the country living by crime. At Bolshevo they were encouraged to govern themselves in a commune, with their own elected committee of management. They built factories and learnt a trade. Today, long after the sentences of the original inhabitants are completed, many of them remain living in the village of Bolshevo, working in its factories, and assisting new arrivals to become useful citizens also. The head of the commune is one of the original homeless children.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we are to make a comparison between the Soviet penal system and any other aspect of Soviet life, we must consider it as a form of education. The regime in the Soviet school, giving the maximum incentive to the child to develop its sense of citizenship, is copied in the treatment of criminals, to give them, too, the greatest sense of social responsibility through the experience of constructive labor and the democratic running of their own affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And, just as in the factory Socialist competition is combined with the material incentive of wages, so, too, in the penal settlement there is Socialist competition; the prisoners are paid, and the best workers are given reductions in their sentences which usually amount to the lopping of one-third off their time if they work well. In this way, if we can call Soviet education &amp;quot;education for citizenship,&amp;quot; then the Soviet penal system can only be termed &amp;quot;re-education for citizenship.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A word must be said, in conclusion, of that side of the Soviet penal system which gets so much dark publicity in the world Press, that aspect of it which concerns the treatment, not of comrades who have gone wrong, but of those who act in a way which shows deliberate hostility to Soviet society. For there are individuals even today who are ready to take violent measures, and to co-operate with foreign Powers to overthrow the existing Soviet system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are many sympathizers of the Soviet regime who cannot understand how, twenty years after the Russian Revolution, there can really be enemies of the regime in the U.S.S.R. today. I think these people forget that open armed warfare against the Soviets was only finally defeated in 1922. Since then more than one attempt has been made to provoke cause for a new attack. And at the present time the avowed policy of the leading Fascist States is to launch an attack on the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In preparation for that war, Hitler is not going to refrain from attempting to inject agents into the U.S.S.R., just as he is injecting them into other countries. If he finds it to his advantage to have agents in Spain and France, in North and South America, he will find it more necessary, not less so, to place them also in the U.S.S.R., the country an attack against which he has openly stated to be his main objective.&lt;br /&gt;
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And, when we consider the internal position of the U.S.S.R. itself, it would be wildly Utopian to assume that today there are not still some persons who, for some reason or other, may have some grudge against the Soviet Government, and want to overthrow it. If these circumstances are recognized, then we see that there are definite reasons why the discovery of anti-Soviet plots in co-operation with Fascist States is likely to take place in the U.S.S.R. in the future just as it has occurred in the past.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whereas, among comrades, justice in the U.S.S.R. is administered as a means of re-education for citizenship, the Soviet State treats those crimes which are in fact acts of war by the law of war. In the U.S.S.R. today the side of the system of justice which represents the future is the justice among comrades which has been described in detail. The law of war, applied to political enemies of the system—spies, saboteurs, and terrorists—will only continue so long as there are States in the world interested in fomenting war against the U.S.S.R. and in stirring up internal difficulties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the great Moscow trials which have taken place in 1936 and 1937 considerable confusion has been caused by the suggestion that these trials showed the undemocratic nature of the Soviet system. &amp;quot;If men like Radek and Zinoviev have to resort to armed terror,&amp;quot; it is said, &amp;quot;this can only be because they had no other means of expressing their views.&amp;quot; That statement, in essence, is true. But there are two possible reasons for this situation. First, it might be that the State authorities allowed no criticism or discussion whatever, and simply prevented the men concerned from expressing legitimate criticisms of policy. Secondly, it might be that these individuals had already, time and again, expressed their views until the whole of the democratic institutions of the country had finally decided by a vast majority that the propagation of such views was not in accordance with the interests of the community, In the latter case, the fact that these people could no longer speak their views would be because the people no longer wanted to hear them; in which case this fact illustrates, not the undemocratic, but the democratic character of such a prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So long as the threat of war hangs over the U.S.S.R. the laws of war will be enforced in those cases where, objectively speaking, citizens are in collaboration with the avowed enemies of the Soviet State. It is in these spheres that we may still find the death-penalty—&amp;quot;the highest measure of social defense&amp;quot;—being imposed on &amp;quot;enemies of the Republic.&amp;quot; At the same time, however, comradely justice, for the re-education of erring citizens, is applied to the overwhelming majority of cases tried in the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comradely justice and the law of war are applied side by side and simultaneously in the U.S.S.R. today. They must on no account be confused, for they represent two opposing tendencies—the struggle for security necessitated by the existing world situation, and the ordinary means operated by friends to regulate their relationships to the mutual interest of all. The law of war must still be applied in the U.S.S.R. today because of the external forces, identifying themselves with the mediaeval past, which threatens the security of the Soviets. The other—the law of comrades, the law of future human society—is being applied more and more as an everyday activity of the working people themselves, for the purpose of preserving law and order for their own mutual benefit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Is Woman&#039;s Place in the Home ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Kirche, Kuche und Kinder&amp;quot; – &amp;quot;Church, Kitchen, and Children&amp;quot; - so runs a German saying which has received great official popularity since the coming of Hitler to power in 1933. These are the three spheres of social life to which women are allotted in the Third Reich. And in the English language, too, there is the old saying, &amp;quot;Woman’s place is in the home,&amp;quot; which still finds currency in many quarters, particularly so long as the country is racked by unemployment, and able-bodied men are out of work or in constant fear of being so. In the Russian language there are a host of old proverbs degrading woman to the level of something subhuman, and it is therefore all the more striking that in the U.S.S.R. today there is no occupation and no position which women may not occupy on the basis of complete equality with men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in 1936 it is written: &amp;quot;Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in all fields of economic, Stale, cultural, social, and political life… The realization of these rights of women is ensured by affording women equally with men the right to work, payment for work, rest, social insurance and education, state protection of the interests of mother and child, granting pregnancy leave with pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries, and kindergartens.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a teacher in a Soviet university I have had some opportunity of observing this equality of the sexes at first hand. As a graduate of Cambridge, I could make comparisons between the complete equality in the Soviet university lecture-room and the procedure in Cambridge by which, whenever the women students enter a room, it is the convention for the men to stamp, as if something out of the ordinary was occurring. At least, that was the convention eight years ago. I presume it still is, as things move slowly in our older universities. I also had the opportunity of seeing the amusement of Soviet women students, when I said that their counterpart in England would probably accept a job until marriage, and then retire from such employment. The idea that a job was an alternative to marriage was looked upon as some sort of archaic survival by these young Soviet women, who considered it absolutely practicable to have a career, a husband, and a family into the bargain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Among the students themselves, on the teaching staff, and throughout the Soviet organizations that I have visited during the past five years, I have hardly ever seen or heard anything which suggests that woman is considered either an inferior or weaker sex.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In one case, on the construction of the Moscow underground, when a certain job was made available only to the male workers for reasons of health, a group of young women insisted that they should also do the work, formed a woman’s brigade, and competed with the men for the best results. If, at any time or in any place in the U.S.S.R. today, it is suggested that any job is not suitable for women, that is all that is necessary to ensure that within a short time women will be proving that such a job can be done by them as efficiently as by men, and that’s that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I think we in Britain find it hard to realize the extent to which the idea of woman as a &amp;quot;weaker sex&amp;quot; is a product of industrial capitalism. In any country of the world where there is a large peasant population, whatever may be said of the social inferiority of women, the term &amp;quot;weaker sex&amp;quot; is unknown, because it is so patently untrue. We in Britain tend to assume that the physical inferiority of women in our own country today is considerably greater than it actually is. And, where such physical inferiority does exist, we are inclined to neglect the degree to which this is due to social causes. It is unlikely that the women of feudal Britain were any weaker physically than the men; and it seems to be to a great extent the responsibility of capitalist industrialism that their physique has deteriorated. A comparison of the physique of British townswomen today with that of peasant women in all countries bears this out.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalist industrialism has made labor such a strain on the physique that on the one hand women have had to be excluded from many occupations because of their function as mothers. Socialist industry, by organizing all occupations in such a way as to develop the health and strength of the workers, makes it no longer necessary, except in rare cases, to exclude women from occupations on the grounds of health. In this way jobs which definitely develop the physique of the worker are available to women as well as to men in the U.S.S.R. In Britain, the woman’s &amp;quot;inferiority&amp;quot; is now used as a reason for exclusion, even where health conditions are adequate to permit of women’s work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, on the other hand, capitalism has reduced women to the position of a cheap reserve of labor by means of low wages. In this way the employment of women has been increasingly concentrated on the worst paid jobs, which are often the most unhealthy and the most degrading. This, too, has caused deterioration in women’s physique as compared, with that of men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, by combining household drudgery with every other occupation that a woman might undertake, capitalism has added one further burden to its women-folk, with disastrous effects on the physique of the women as compared with the men. As a result of these factors, the term &amp;quot;weaker sex&amp;quot; is not a misnomer in Britain today, though it must have been as unreal in the Britain of two hundred years ago as it is today in every country of the world where there is a large peasant population and where women do a more than full share in the general physical labor of the community. It is the aim of a Socialist country to preserve this physical equality, and to prevent the deterioration of women into the position of a &amp;quot;weaker sex.&amp;quot; At the same time, however, real equality demands that woman should be relieved of all the extra burdens imposed upon her in more primitive societies. This means that while, economically, she must receive equal pay and equal opportunities with man, she must be specially cared for socially in so far as she has additional social functions to perform.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Economic equality between women and men must be provided in two main ways. First, equality of opportunity and of wages must be provided. Secondly, women must be equally able with men to have a career. But this means that they must be relieved of certain burdens which they have to bear in capitalist countries, such as housework and the care of children. And, since only women can fulfill the function of bearing children, and since this necessitates an interruption of every woman’s work, special provision must be made for women in this respect. Once children have been born, it is essential to ensure that any economic burden connected with the upbringing of such children shall be as far as possible equally shared by the two parents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to make equality of opportunity effective in the U.S.S.R., a great deal has already been done to provide socially those services which, in other countries, women must perform themselves as their regular household duties. Most important is the matter of feeding, and in the U.S.S.R. today a vast network of restaurants makes it possible for the people to feed at or near their places of work, and the communal kitchen replaces the work of the housewife.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, in addition to cooking meals, the housewife under capitalism spends endless time on the care of her children. In this respect the Soviet Union has provided various means of relief. By a vast development of nurseries and kindergartens, by providing playgrounds for children in every public square or park, by providing out-of-school activities for children in the school buildings and children’s rooms in blocks of flats, the Soviet authorities have already to a great extent removed the burden of the care of children from the shoulders of the mothers. Recently, returning to London from Moscow, I was impressed by the number of dirty children playing in the streets, and by the number of infants seen in the care of children just a few years older than themselves. These sights are symptoms of the utter failure of the British community to cope with the problems of the working-class mother. Such problems in the U.S.S.R. are already solved in principle, and the detailed solution is being further worked out in practice from year to year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is sometimes suggested that the vast development of nurseries and kindergartens is likely to break down family affections. Such a view, in my experience, is absolutely unjustified. Is a working mother going to be less affectionate towards her child if she can have it fed and washed in a well-run nursery while she is occupied on other things ? Is she going to love her child less if she has it with her only during those hours when she is free from other activities? It is an ironic fact, but well worthy of mention, that those who are most insistent in this country on the joys of family life are usually those who, owing to their fortunate economic position, can afford to pay trained nurses to look after their children for twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four, and who, during the remaining hour, are able to enjoy to the full the blessing of parentage without its labor!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it is possible for society to relieve women of housework, and of the burden of the care of children, it is physically impossible to relieve women of the function of bearing children. Therefore, in this respect, equality of the sexes necessitates special privileges for the women. In the U.S.S.R. today the woman who is having a child is relieved from work on full pay for a period of four months. If the doctor considers it advisable, she may be put on lighter work, or completely relieved of work, without reduction of pay, at any time during pregnancy. The nursing mother, after returning to work, is allowed a special reduction in her working day. All medical attention and a layette for the child are provided free of charge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question of family relations arises in a particularly acute form in the case of responsibility for children. Right from the early years of the Revolution the State put an end to all distinction between the married and the unmarried mother. In this way the age-long distinction between ethical standards for men and for women was brought to an end. Also, no child started out in life with the social stigma of illegitimacy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State took further steps to ensure that marriage should be a voluntary contract, and the family a voluntary social unit. Whereas a marriage and a family based on mutual love and respect has always been encouraged in the U.S.S.R., the holding of people unwillingly together, by force of law or by economic compulsion, has always been opposed. Divorce has been made easy, subject to one condition—that there is equal parental responsibility for the upbringing of every child. Whether marriage is registered or not, according to Soviet law every parent has an economic responsibility for his or her children. As a rule it is the mother who brings up a child if parents are living separately, and therefore, as a rule, it is the father who is bound to meet his responsibilities financially. And these responsibilities are not small. For, to ensure that a Soviet woman shall not have to bear the economic burden of bringing up children alone, every father, if not living with the mother of his children, must pay to her 30 percent of his earnings for one, 40 percent for two, and 50 percent for three children or more until they are of working age. In this way real economic equality of the sexes is established with regard to parental responsibility, while, at the same time, people are not forced to live together if they have no longer any further natural affection for one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A matter which has raised considerable doubts in the minds of many protagonists of sex-equality in this country is the law, passed in 1936, making abortion illegal except in cases where it is justified by consideration for a woman’s health or the danger of hereditary disease. This change in the law has been treated as an attack on sex-equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is of the greatest importance, in this connection, to refer back to the text of the original law which legalized abortion in Soviet Russia in 1921. It is important to note that in this law not a word was said about sex-equality, and the right to have an abortion was never put forward as a fundamental right of the Soviet woman. On the contrary, abortion was treated as a social evil, but an evil which was likely to be less harmful when practiced legally than when carried out under conditions of secrecy. Here is part of the text of the original law permitting abortion:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;During the past decades the number of women resorting to artificial discontinuation of pregnancy has grown both in the West and in this country. The legislation of all countries combats this evil by punishing the woman who chooses to have an abortion and the doctor who performs it. Without leading to favorable results, this method of combating abortion has driven the operation underground and made the woman a victim of mercenary and often ignorant quacks who make a profession of secret operations. As a result, up to 50 percent of such women are infected in the course of the operation, and up to 4 percent of them die.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The Workers’ and Peasants’ Government is conscious of this serious evil to the community. It combats this evil by propaganda against abortions among working women. By working for Socialism, and by introducing the protection of maternity and infancy on an extensive scale, it feels assured of achieving the gradual disappearance of this evil. But as moral survivals of the past and the difficult economic conditions of the present still compel many women to resort to this operation . . it is allowed in State hospitals.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The essential feature of this law is that it was based on &amp;quot;difficult economic conditions,&amp;quot; and was of a temporary nature. The right to abortion was never introduced as one of the rights of Soviet women, to be enjoyed in all circumstances. It was considered an &amp;quot;evil,&amp;quot; and was introduced as a makeshift to combat the serious mortality rate from illegal abortions carried out under unsatisfactory conditions. There is evidence that, at the present time, owing to the increased knowledge of contraceptives on the one hand and the growing sense of economic security on the other, women will not now practice abortion in this way, and that therefore the permissive law is no longer necessary in the interests of health. Abortion in Soviet legislation has always been regarded primarily as a question of health, not of equality. Since thousands of women have been neglecting the use of contraceptives because they could obtain an abortion, the legality of the less satisfactory method of discontinuing pregnancy has actually to some extent prevented more satisfactory methods from being used of avoiding pregnancy altogether.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A fact that must be fully realized in this connection is that the whole formulation of sex-equality in the U.S.S.R. has always tended to be different from its formulation among feminists in capitalist countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The stress in the U.S.S.R. has always been; Equal economic and social rights and opportunities, with special privileges to compensate for any burden arising from the bearing of children. On the other hand, in countries such as Britain, where years of unemployment have given rise to all sorts of theories of &amp;quot;over-population,&amp;quot; the emphasis is usually placed on the right of women not to have children as an essential aspect of sex-equality. In the U.S.S.R., where there is no illegitimacy and where unemployment was finally wiped out in 1931 and shows no signs of ever again recurring, &amp;quot;over-population&amp;quot; is an impossibility, since the whole of the economic planning of the country is based on the number of workers available, and the more workers there are the better for the welfare of all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such a community there is no social reason for artificially limiting population. Therefore the formulation of sex-equality will have a different emphasis: instead of pressing the right of women not to have children because men do not have to bear children, the whole emphasis will be on providing such conditions that every woman may bear as many children as is consistent with her health without at the same time suffering any greater economic or social burden than men as a result. This is the emphasis given in Soviet society to this matter, and is, I think, the likely formulation for every progressive Socialist community once unemployment has been finally abolished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the U.S.S.R., then, the woman’s place is not in the home. But this does not mean disrespect either for maternity or for the family, so long as the latter is in no way a unit preserved by force and economic compulsion as opposed to the free mil of the parties to a marriage. By giving equal opportunities to workers of both sexes, by making social insurance cover all incapacity for work due to pregnancy and childbirth, by ensuring the equal responsibility of both parents for their children whether they are married or not, and, finally, by socializing those services which, under capitalism, have to be performed by the energy of the individual housewife, the Soviet Union has gone a long way towards the freeing of women as citizens from bondage as housewives, wives, and mothers. But this does not mean that the role of women as wives and mothers is abolished; it means that wife and husband, mother and father, are equal citizens in every respect, with equal opportunities for a career, with effective equality of rights in every sphere of social, economic, and political life, and with equal moral, social, and economic responsibilities to society, to each other, and to their children.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== A New State ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== What Are Soviets? ===&lt;br /&gt;
We have now reached a point where the fact that a new life is developing in the U.S.S.R. for the vast majority of the people is already established. The Soviet Union is a country where every citizen, irrespective of sex or nationality, has an opportunity to develop his abilities to the full, and, having developed them, to utilize them in the interests of society. Every citizen has an opportunity to participate in the economic, social, and political life of the country, not only as a subordinate, but as a responsible person. Personal initiative in everything that benefits society is encouraged. The trade unions and the co-operatives exist on a scale, and have powers, unknown elsewhere; though in the case of the latter the fact that the community itself bears now the main features of a co-operative commonwealth makes the organization of co-operative societies as such no longer a matter of principle, but one of expediency. The Press is owned and controlled by the organizations of the people, from the collective farm, or factory trade union committee to the Government itself and the General Council of Trade Unions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Women play an equal part with men in economic, social, and political life, and are compensated in so far as they suffer disabilities due to their natural function of bearing children. All these are features of the new life that is growing up in the Soviet Union. And this new life has grown up within the framework of a new kind of State, without which it could not have developed at all. This is the Soviet State, and, in order fully to understand the new life of the U.S.S.R., we must also understand something about this new State framework within which it has been created.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the origin of the word &amp;quot;Soviet&amp;quot; in its present-day sense we must go back to the year 1905. Until that time the word &amp;quot;soviet&amp;quot; was used frequently in Russian to denote any kind of &amp;quot;council.&amp;quot; A &amp;quot;council of war&amp;quot; or a &amp;quot;council of ministers&amp;quot; were both &amp;quot;soviets,&amp;quot; and there were many other kinds of councils for which this word was used. Early in the year 1905 the workers of the textile town of Ivanovo-Voznesenski set up a committee to co-ordinate strike action and to force the employers to bargain collectively. This committee consisted of delegates elected by show of hands at general meetings of the workers in the various factories of that town.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the year 1905 went on, and the workers all over Russia were striking and demonstrating for better conditions, they copied the example of Ivanovo, and set up their own delegate committees or councils in their towns to lead the struggle. These councils came to be known as Soviets of Workers’ Delegates. In each case they consisted of elected delegates from the workers in the factories, led the struggle against the employers by organizing strikes, and put forward political demands for freedom of speech, the Press, and assembly. They were fighting organizations, led demonstrations, and in certain cases actually seized complete municipal power and passed laws to the disadvantage of the employers in their territory. They became a new form of municipal authority, passing decrees in the exclusive interests of the working people, the majority of the town dwellers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the Revolution of 1905 was suppressed. For more than ten years the working-class movement of Russia had no legal opportunity to express itself. Only towards the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917, with the growing disgust at the way in which the Tsarist Government was conducting the war, the workers, peasants, and soldiers, together with many of the employers and even the allied Governments, began to express open opposition to the Government of the Tsar.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In February 1917 the Tsar abdicated and a new Government was set up by the employers. Side by side with this &amp;quot;Provisional Government&amp;quot; the workers of Petrograd once more organized a Soviet, and their example was followed in other cities. So great was the activity of the working-class movement at this time that the Provisional Government was forced to respect the existence of the Soviets and did not dare to try to suppress them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1917, unlike 1905, the setting up of Soviets was not confined to the workers in the towns. In the villages the peasants elected their own councils, or Soviets, through which they demanded the immediate confiscation of the landed estates and their division among the peasantry. And in the army the soldiers in the ranks elected their own committees, in certain cases arrested their officers, and proceeded to govern themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, between February and October 1917, there were set up by the people of Russia—by the workers, peasants, and soldiers—a vast network of elected councils or committees, called Soviets, which led their struggle for better conditions of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So powerful were these Soviets that the Government itself was obliged to grant many of their demands. For example, on the very day that the Provisional Government came into existence, the Petrograd Soviet issued an order stating that committees of the ranks in the army should be set up everywhere, and that they were to elect representatives to the Soviet. In this way the elected representatives of workers and soldiers combined their political activities. &amp;quot;In all matters of policy,&amp;quot; said this order, &amp;quot;the military should submit to the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and to their own committees.&amp;quot; The Government agreed to this order of the Soviet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the end of March 1917 a conference was held in Petrograd, attended by over 400 delegates from local Soviets throughout the country. It was decided that an All-Russian Congress should be called in the near future, and the elected Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, together with ten delegates elected at the conference, was made responsible for the calling of this Congress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was as a result of this decision that in June 1917 an All-Russian Congress of Soviets was held, at which there were nearly 800 delegates from Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviets all over Russia. The Congress elected an Executive Committee to co-ordinate and lead the work of the Soviets until the next Congress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us pause a moment and examine what had happened in Russia during this short period of five months, A Completely new form of organization had come into being, covering the whole country and representing the working people, the peasants, and the soldiers— the vast majority of the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its structure this network of Soviets bore a striking- resemblance to democratic working-class organizations ail over the world. Locally, there were the directly elected Soviets. Nationally, the supreme authority was a Congress of delegates from all the local Soviets. And to co-ordinate the work of these Soviets between Congresses, and to carry- out its general instructions, the Congress elected an Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviets had developed in a period of a few months into a nation-wide organization. The structure of this organization was like that of working-class organizations all over the world. There were local elected committees, which sent delegates to Congresses, and the Congress elected an Executive Committee to lead the organization between Congresses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this Soviet system was broader than the usual working-class organization in one very important respect. It not only represented the industrial workers: it represented both the industrial workers and the soldiers. And, at the same time, the peasants in the villages were electing their own delegates to Soviets of peasants. In this way the new Soviet organization embraced practically the whole of the people of the country ; only the landlords, employers of labor, high officials of the Government, and people associated with these categories, did not take part in their activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Between June 1917, when the first Congress of Soviets met in Petrograd, and October 1917, the Provisional Government of Russia continued to carry on the war. But the people became increasingly opposed to its continuation, and the demand for peace was more and more put forward at the election of delegates to the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time the Government was becoming increasingly disturbed at the growing demands of the people, and at the political activity of the workers and peasants. This resulted in a danger that, as soon as it was in a position to do so, the Government might impose a military dictatorship and smash the rapidly growing democratic organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, including the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was in this situation, when the people of Russia were faced with the imminent suppression of their own organizations and the deprival of that freedom of discussion which the Soviets had given them, that, in October 1917, an armed uprising, led by the Bolsheviks took place in Petrograd ; and, on the following day, at the Second Congress of Soviets, a new Government was set up, responsible to the Soviets themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A few extracts from the resolution of this Congress, setting up the new form of government, may be of interest:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies has opened. The enormous majority of the Soviets are represented in it. A number of delegates from the Peasants’ Soviets are present at the Congress. . . . The Congress takes power into its hands, relying on the will of the enormous majority of the workers, soldiers, and peasants, supported by the victorious uprising of die workers and the garrison which has taken place in Petrograd […] The Congress decrees: all power throughout the country passes into the hands of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new Government consisted of a Council of People’s Commissars, a People’s Commissar being the head of a State Department. These Commissars were directly responsible to the Congress, and, between Congresses, to the Executive Committee which the Congress elected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the Second Congress of Soviets, however, while the workers and soldiers were well represented, there were present only a comparatively small number of delegates from the Peasants’ Soviets, which had their own Executive Committee, and which were preparing for their own separate Congress a week later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this Congress of Peasants’ Soviets, after Lenin had explained the reasons for the seizure of power ten days previously and die decree which had been already adopted on the land question, it was decided that the Peasants’ Congress should elect a number of representatives to the Central Executive Committee, and that thus a united Government should be formed representing the workers, peasants, and soldiers. It was this united Executive Committee which now became the supreme authority, and which summoned the Third Congress of Soviets in January 1918 at which there were over 700 delegates, representing workers, peasants, and soldiers from all over Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a period of a few weeks there had come into being in Russia a new kind of State. In structure this new State corresponded to democratic organizations of working people all over the world. But whereas a trade union represents only the wage-earners in particular occupations, the Soviet State embraced all working citizens, in industry, on the land, and in the army. Only a very small percentage—less than 5 percent of the Russian population—did not participate in the work of the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sometimes, I think, the reason why certain types of citizen did not participate in the Soviets is misunderstood. And the misunderstanding arises from the fact that the essential nature of the Soviet State, as a State of a new type, is not fully appreciated. When, however, we watch the historical development of the Soviets, it should be quite clear that, as fighting organizations of the working people against the employers, they naturally excluded the employers from participation in running them; just as trade unions in Britain today, as organizations of the workers against the employers, exclude the employers from the right to participate in their affairs. Similarly, in the country, where the Soviets were used by the peasants for&#039; confiscating and dividing-up the landlords’ estates, they were not going to invite the landlords to join with them in the work of these Soviets!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is as a fighting organization of the vast majority of the population against the small minority of landlords and employers and their officials that the Soviet State came into being in 1917. It is, therefore, not surprising that, in the Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and Exploited Masses which was adopted at the Third Congress, it is expressly stated that &amp;quot;now, at the decisive moment in the struggle between the workers and their exploiters, there can be no place for the latter on any organ of government.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State was a democratic organization of the vast majority of the people, but it deprived the small minority of property-owners of political rights. For the working people, for all but the small minority of employers, together with certain sections of the population closely allied to them, universal suffrage was introduced for men and women alike, at the age of eighteen, irrespective of sex, nationality, or religion. All working citizens, and housewives who made it possible for others to work, had the right to vote, and to stand for election without property or residential qualifications, so long as they had reached eighteen years of age. In this way a degree of democracy for over 95 percent of the population was introduced, such as they had never previously enjoyed. On the other hand, for less than 5 percent of the population—those who lived on unearned incomes—there no longer existed the right to participate in government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, with regard to the Press, steps were taken by the Soviet Government which has already been described, and which, from the standpoint of the overwhelming majority of the people of Russia, can only be regarded as democratic. But, from the point of view of the private Press lords, these steps were an outrageous attack on their rights! For, in the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic, adopted at the Fifth Congress of Soviets in July 1918, we find &amp;quot;effective liberty of opinion&amp;quot; for the working population being ensured by putting &amp;quot;an end to the dependence of the Press upon capital.&amp;quot; Freedom to own the Press passed from the Press lords to the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, at the beginning of May 1926, just before the General Strike, the workers on the Daily Mail refused to print certain articles with which they disagreed. In an official statement from Downing Street this was described as a &amp;quot;gross interference with the freedom of the Press.&amp;quot; The men that produced the paper had claimed a say in what they printed! The Soviet Government, early in 1918, went far further than the workers on the Daily Mail. It confiscated all the privately owned printing presses and transferred them in their entirely to the organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. From the point of view of the private owners of newspapers, the young Soviet Government was guilty of the most outrageous interference with the freedom of the Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But look at the same situation from the standpoint, not of the small minority of people in Russia who were rich enough to own newspapers, but of the over- whelming majority of the people who had never before had at their disposal the columns of the Press! For these people—for practically the whole of the people of Russia—the newspapers became their own, collectively controlled through the Soviets and other organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To these people the Soviet Government had given a freedom of the Press such as they had never before dreamt of possessing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In our Introduction we saw that the Soviet State, from its very inception, combined features both of democracy and dictatorship. We are now in a position to see why it combined these features. It combined them because, as a democratic fighting organization of the working people—of the overwhelming majority of the people of Russia—it took steps to put an end to the power of the employing class, a small minority. While granting universal suffrage to all citizens, men and women alike, that worked for a living, it deprived of political rights that small minority that lived by employing others. Similarly, in granting the use of the printing presses to the organizations of the overwhelming majority of the people, it withdrew the use of these presses from those who, hitherto, had owned them only because they had been rich enough to do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State is fundamentally different from other States in the world today. It is in essence an organization of the working people, of the vast majority of the population, in their struggle for better conditions. Many of the steps which it took, democratic when considered from the point of view of the vast majority of the people, were sheer outrages to the owners of property, against whom such measures were taken.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why, from 1918 to 1922, the new Soviet State had to fight for its very existence against the combined forces of more than ten foreign Powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== A Workers&#039; State ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviets were built up in Russia over a period of seven months before they seized power and became the new State. Clearly, during such a period, with continuous conflict between the workers and the employers, with periods of advance and periods of temporary defeat for the working people, it was not possible for anyone to sit down and theoretically work out, according to plan, the general form of organization into which the Soviets were evolving. But, in spite of this fact, we find that the actual form which developed was almost exactly similar to the form of other working-class organizations, in other parts of the world, even at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The structure of democratic working-class organizations is almost always on the same general lines. Members join branches which elect local committees. On territories which cover a number of branches, either delegate committees, or conferences which elect a coordinating committee, are the supreme authority. And, nationally, the supreme authority is usually a congress, with a committee elected at the congress taking its place as the supreme authority between congresses. This form of working-class organization is universal because it is the most satisfactory form for working-class purposes. By means of delegate congresses the supreme authority mainly represents the rank and file of the members, who give their delegates instructions. By means of a small executive committee elected at the congress the number of permanent officers is reduced to a minimum, so that most of the delegates can return to their regular jobs in their localities. Such a system will be more or less satisfactory according as the delegates really represent those who elect them. The Soviets, from their very origin, made all members of the Soviets subject to recall if they ceased to give their electors satisfaction. In this way the Soviets were more democratic than many democratic organizations of the working people in other countries even at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the first months of its existence the new Soviet Government was occupied with passing legislation in the interests of the working people, the vast majority of the population. An immediate decision was passed on the necessity for concluding a &amp;quot;democratic peace, without indemnities or annexations,&amp;quot; and an appeal was broadcast to the peoples of the world to do likewise. In January 1918, at the Third Congress of Soviets, the Declaration of Rights already mentioned was adopted. In this declaration &amp;quot;Russia is declared a Republic of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies. All central and local authority is vested in these Soviets. […] The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of national Soviet Republics.&amp;quot; And, in order to ensure that this federation should be really voluntary, the Congress leaves &amp;quot;to the workers and peasants of each nationality the right to decide freely, at their own national Congress of Soviets, whether they desire to participate in the federal Government and in other federal Soviet institutions.&amp;quot; When Finland and Armenia declared their independence, this declaration was welcomed by the Congress of Soviets, together with the policy of the Soviet Government of withdrawing Russian troops from Persia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another of the first decrees of the Soviet Government was on the nationalization of the land. The local Soviets were empowered to confiscate the landed estates, and to distribute this land to the peasants according to their needs. A little later, in the towns, all housing accommodation was nationalized, and the towns Soviets were given authority to distribute this housing according to the needs of the population. This meant that workers from the most overcrowded quarters were brought to the center of the town, the houses of the well-to-do were divided into flats, and, while the original owner was allowed one of these flats, the rest were put at the disposal of workers from the worst slums. Similarly, where houses were empty, workers were moved into them from the most over-crowded areas. From that day to this it has been impossible in Soviet territory to see what is such a common sight in Britain—houses standing empty, or partly used, while in basements in the same street whole families are living in one room.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Programs of universal education, social insurance, and the nationalization of the banks and large-scale industry were decided on during the first months of Soviet rule. The eight-hour working day was introduced, and paid holidays of at least two weeks annually were granted to all workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Declaration of Rights the purpose of the Soviet State was described as the &amp;quot;fundamental aim of suppressing all exploitation of man by man, of abolishing the division, of society into classes [...] of bringing about the Socialist organization of society.&amp;quot; With this end in view, &amp;quot;work useful to the community is made compulsory upon all.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not, however, until the Fifth Congress of Soviets, in July 1918, that a Constitution was adopted for the first Soviet Republic. This Constitution was a composite document, including the Declaration of Rights, and adding to it a number of provisions to ensure democracy for the working population at the same time as it deprived the employing class of all political power. The Constitution also included a description of the organization of the Soviet State.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen how the Press was turned over from private hands to the organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Similarly, with regard to the meeting-halls, measures were taken to ensure that all premises &amp;quot;suitable for public gatherings, together with lighting, heating, and furniture,&amp;quot; should be at the disposal of the working people. It is according to this original law of the Soviet Republic that the administration of the Soviet factory today is bound to allow the workers to use the factory buildings as a meeting-place out of working hours, and to allow accommodation there for the trade union offices. At the same time, with regard to freedom of association, the new State &amp;quot;lends to the workers all its material and moral assistance to help them unite and to organize themselves.&amp;quot; We have already seen how this attitude to trade unionism led to a phenomenal growth both in trade union membership and in the powers of the trade unions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly important were the early decrees of the Soviet Government on the question of military service. In one such decree it was stated that &amp;quot;one of the basic aims of Socialism is to liberate humanity from the burden of militarism and from the barbarism of sanguinary clashes between peoples. The objective of Socialism is general disarmament, perpetual peace, and brotherly co-operation of all the peoples which inhabit the earth.&amp;quot; But &amp;quot;in all countries the imperialist bourgeoisie is in power. Its policy is directed -towards the suppression of the Communist Revolution and the enslavement of all weak peoples.&amp;quot; Therefore the Soviet Republic &amp;quot;must create its own powerful army.&amp;quot; But &amp;quot;to arm the bourgeoisie would mean the bringing of continual strife into the army and would therefore paralyze its strength in the struggle against foreign enemies.&amp;quot; Therefore &amp;quot;the parasitic and exploiting elements in society, which do not wish to assume equal rights and obligations with others, cannot be permitted to bear arms. The Workers’ and Peasants’ Government will seek out means to impose on the bourgeoisie in some form part of the burden of the defense of the Republic.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We now come to the description, in the Constitution of 1918, of the structure of the Soviet State. For the first time in history universal suffrage was introduced for every citizen, from the age of eighteen upwards, irrespective of religion, sex, or nationality, and without residential or property qualifications. Every such person could vote at elections, and stand for election. But because, as has already been pointed out, the Soviet State was an organization of the working population for defending their interests against the property-owners, the latter had no political rights in the Soviet State. Universal suffrage was enjoyed by all who lived by their own labor, those who by performing domestic duties enabled others to carry on productive work, those working people who through invalidity were unable to work, and those who were in the army or navy defending the Soviet Republic. On the other hand, however, employee and those who lived on unearned income, agents and middlemen, monies and priests, agents of the former police, members of the former royal family, and the mentally deranged, were not allowed the right to participate in elections.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some surprise may be felt that the priests and monks were deprived of the right to vote and to stand for election. It must be remembered, however, that the Church in Tsarist Russia was the largest single land-owner, and when the landed estates were confiscated the priests and monks, together with the other land-lords, almost without exception, joined forces with the armed counter-revolution. Religious freedom was guaranteed from the first days of the Revolution, and &amp;quot;freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda&amp;quot; was assured to every citizen by the Constitution. At the same time, however, the Church was disestablished, and deprived of its income from land and industry, and the schools were completely taken over by the State. In this way religion became a private, as opposed to a State, concern; religious groups had now to pay their own priests without any form of State subsidy or unearned income from property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Universal suffrage was established in 1918 for the vast majority of the population of Russia at a lower age than in any other country. At the same time, for a small minority the right to vote and to stand for election was not permitted. Writing in 1919, Lenin pointed out that this was a temporary measure, in the interest of the working people at a time when every means was being used by the property-owners, nationally and internationally, to overthrow the Soviet State. Here are his words:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The Russian Communist Party must explain to the toiling masses, in order to avoid a wrong generalization from transient historical needs, that the disfranchisement of a section of citizens does not in the Soviet Republic affect, as was the case in the majority of bourgeois-democratic republics, a definite category of citizens disfranchised for life, but applies only to the exploiters, only to those who, in violation of the fundamental laws of the Socialist Soviet Republic, persist in defending their position as exploiters, in pre-serving capitalist relationships. Consequently, in the Soviet Republic, on the one hand, every day of added strength to Socialism and diminution in the number of those who have objective possibilities of remaining exploiters or of preserving capitalist relationships, automatically reduces the percentage of disfranchised persons. In Russia at the present time this percentage is hardly more than 2 or 3. On the other hand, in the not distant future, the cessation of foreign invasion and the completion of the expropriation of the expropriators may, under certain conditions, create a situation in which the proletarian State power will choose other methods of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and will introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The structure of the Soviet State, as described in the Constitution of 1918, was not evolved by a group of politicians and lawyers sitting in conference and drawing up a Constitution. It was a description of the existing Soviet State as it had come into existence during the preceding year. The local Soviets, as we have seen, were simply councils of delegates, elected by the workers at their factory meetings, and by the peasants at meetings in the villages. At these meetings the workers and peasants discussed the merits of the various candidates proposed, a d then voted in the simplest and most straightforward way, by show of hands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, in the Constitution itself, we find that the basic unit of the Soviet State is the town and village Soviet, directly elected by the whole working population of the age of eighteen and upwards. In the village, on the consent of the local authority, the voting age could be lowered to sixteen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For areas larger than the town or village, such as counties, provinces, and national territories covering a number of towns and villages, the supreme authority was a Congress of Soviets for that area, to which delegates were sent from all the local Soviets. Such Congresses elected their own Executive Committees, which carried on the work of government between Congresses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the Russian Soviet Republic as a whole the supreme authority was an All-Russian Congress of Soviets. According to the Constitution, this &amp;quot;All- Russian Congress of Soviets is composed of representatives of town Soviets, on the basis of one deputy for every 25,000 electors, and representatives of provincial Congresses of Soviets, on the basis of one deputy for every 125,000 inhabitants.&amp;quot; At first sight this form of representation gave great over-representation to the town population, but this view is somewhat illusory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be noted that the representation of the towns is stated in terms of the number of electors, of the provinces in terms of inhabitants. Now the electors were all working citizens over the age of eighteen whereas the number of inhabitants included the non-voters, whether employers of labor or juveniles. Therefore one representative for every 25,000 voters was not very much greater than one for every 125,000 inhabitants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As against this, however, must be set the fact that in the provincial Congresses, the towns as well as the villages of the province were represented. Therefore in the election of the provincial delegates the representatives of the town workers also participated. In this respect there was a certain element of dual representation of the town electors. The citizens of Moscow sent delegates to the All-Russian Congress from the Moscow Soviet. But the Moscow Soviet was also represented at the Moscow Provincial Congress of Soviets. And this Congress also sent delegates to the All-Russian Congress. In this way the representation of the towns was definitely greater, in proportion to population, than the representation of the villages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How did this inequality of representation arise? The answer is that the detailed structure of the Soviet State developed between February 1917 and the seizure of power in October, and between October 1917 and the adoption of the Constitution in June 1918, not as a result of a conscious and premeditated plan, but as a result of the direct political activity of the people. It has been mentioned already that until after the seizure of power in October 1917 the Peasants’ Congress met separately. While the first two Congresses of Soviets, representing the workers and soldiers, were attended by delegates elected in proportion to the number of voters, at the Peasants’ Congress the representation happened to be according to village population. When, after the Second Congress, the peasants joined the workers and soldiers in the Central Executive Committee, the dual system of election was continued.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It also happened that the most active section of the people in building up the Soviets was the working class of the towns. This led to a large representation of the town workers at the early Congresses. Similarly, in the provincial Congresses the workers played an active part. And in this way there evolved the system of dual representation which has been mentioned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now it would have been possible, at the Fifth Congress of Soviets, when the Constitution was adopted, to have eliminated the inequality in representation between town and country, but this was not done, and quite consciously. The reason was that the working class of Russia had so far played a leading part in the building up of the Soviets, and it was because of this practical leadership that its representation was large in proportion to its numbers. Was it desirable that the most active section of the community in the new State should be deprived of part of its -representation in the name of an abstract &amp;quot;Equality&amp;quot;? Or, alternatively, was it desirable that the class which had shown the initiative in setting up the Soviet State should for the time being continued to enjoy greater representation than the other main class in society, which had proved less active? The Congress decided to preserve the predominance of working-class representation, of that leadership which had given rise to the Soviet State, the leadership of the class which had shown the greatest energy in defending the Soviets against attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three outstanding features of the Soviet elections should here be mentioned. First, all delegates to the Soviets, to Congresses, and members of Executive Committees were made subject to recall if their electors were dissatisfied with their work. In this way the permanency of every official’s post depended on the agreement of his electors. Secondly, every elected delegate to any Soviet body was bound, not only to sit on the Soviet as a committee member, but also to participate in the day-today work of the Soviet. In this way every member not only passed laws, but was one of those responsible for carrying them out. There was thus no divorce between legislature and executive, between those who made the laws and those who enforced them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thirdly, a word must be said as to the nature of the elections. In the Soviet State, as in working-class organizations in this country today, the system of election was based on the desire to return to the organs of government those who were best suited to represent their fellows. At every election meeting a discussion took place on the work of the Soviet authorities, and general instructions were adopted as to the policy to be pursued in the future. Each delegate who was elected was instructed to pursue the policy agreed upon at the meeting. And at intervals he had to report back to the electors on how he was carrying out this policy on the Soviet. Members of the Soviets were delegates with a mandate from their electors, and subject to recall if they did not carry out this mandate to the satisfaction of their supporters. This system stands in sharp contrast to the parliamentary system, where candidates come forward with a cut-and-dried statement of policy, the electors choose the program which they think they prefer, and the candidate who is returned then proceeds to carry it out or not, as the spirit moves him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The system of election in the Soviet Union is only comparable with that which prevails in democratic working-class organizations in the capitalist world, with the right of recall making it even more democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The All-Russian Congress of Soviets elected a Central Executive Committee. This Executive Committee was the supreme authority between Congresses. The Executive Committee was responsible for appointing the &amp;quot;Government,&amp;quot; or Council of People’s Commissars, which consisted of the heads of all the different State departments. The People’s Commissars were responsible to the Central Executive Committee for their work. The Council of People’s Commissars could meet together and issue decrees, and each Commissar, individually, could issue decrees in his own department. Any such decrees were subject to the approval of the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way we see that the structure of the Soviet State combined the elective principle, through the Soviets, while at the same time, leadership and appointment, through the State departments. The Central Executive Committee was responsible to the Congress; the Congress consisted of delegates from the local Soviets, and these were responsible to the people. On the other hand, the Executive Committee appointed the People’s Commissars, who appointed their various departmental officials, who were responsible for appointing the workers in the various State organizations right down to the smallest State factory or workshop. But here again, side by side with the managers appointed from above, and who are ultimately responsible to the Commissar, sit the representatives of the workers, in the person of elected trade union officials. So that throughout the Soviet system there is a most intricate combination of election and appointment, responsibility to the rank and file and responsibility to a higher authority, the election and recall of representatives by the electors, and the appointment and dismissal of workers by the authorities. Every Soviet organization is controlled by representatives of the people. The factory manager is responsible to some trust, which is responsible to one of the State Commissariats. The Commissar is responsible to the Central Executive Committee, winch, indirectly, is responsible to the electors. The trade union representative is responsible to the workers, who are also electors to the Soviets. It is this complex system of government, combining the maximum of rank-and-file responsibility with the elective principle, and with appointment by higher authorities of lower officials, that is responsible for the status of all Soviet citizens as masters as well as servants, as described in Part I.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was this new kind of State, too, which inspired Lenin, in reply to Kautsky’s accusation that the Soviet Government was undemocratic, enthusiastically to exclaim:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Is there a single country in the world, even among the most democratic bourgeois countries, in which the average rank-and-file worker, the average rank-and-file village laborer […] enjoys anything approaching such liberty to hold meetings in the best buildings, such liberty to use the best printing works and the largest stocks of paper, to express his ideas and to protect his interests, such liberty to promote men and women of his own class to administer and to ‘run’ the State as in Soviet Russia?&amp;quot; (Proletarian Revolution, p. 31)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Democratic Defence—The Red Army ===&lt;br /&gt;
In 1931, when I first went to the U.S.S.R., I had certain pacifist sympathies. It was not encouraging, therefore, to see factory workers sometimes inarching through the streets carrying rifles, and to find that military training of some kind was available in practically every Soviet institution. Since then, however, my personal experiences while living in the U.S.S.R., together with certain events that have taken place in the rest of the world, have convinced me that effective democracy is something which must be defended by arms against those who, at the present time, are doing their utmost to smash it by force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And, once this need to defend the achievements of the Revolution by force against armed intervention is realized, then the extent to which the people of the U.S.S.R. receive military training is to be appreciated as one of the greatest proofs of real democracy. To make a comparison with Britain I would put it this way: In Britain, in the &amp;quot;public schools&amp;quot; where the sons of the well-to-do receive their expensive education, the &amp;quot;Officers’ Training Corps&amp;quot; is a voluntary organization of which practically 100 percent of the boys are members. In the universities such corps also flourish. But I have yet to find the industrial enterprises in Britain, where the breadwinners of some 75 percent of the population earn their living, where there are Officers’ Training Corps, so that the people may become skilled in the art of defense. By contrast, it just happens in the U.S.S.R. to be in the factories and in the collective farms, as well as in the universities and scientific institutions, that citizens may receive the elements of military knowledge, and are thus* trained to defend themselves against any enemy. In this way the military training which in Britain is confined to a small section of the population is at the disposal of the whole community. Every Soviet citizen has the opportunity to be trained as a military leader.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This relationship between the people of the U.S.S.R. and the army is nothing new. It has existed since the setting up of the Soviet State in 1917. In January 1918 it was declared by the Third Congress of Soviets that &amp;quot;in order to secure the supremacy of the laboring masses, and to guard against any possibility of the exploiters regaining power, the Congress decrees the arming of the workers, the formation of a Socialist Red Army of workers and peasants, and the complete disarmament of the propertied classes.&amp;quot; At the same time it was declared &amp;quot;the duty of all citizens to defend the Socialist fatherland&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;the honor of bearing arms in defense of the Revolution is granted only to the workers. The leisured section of the population will fulfill other military duties.&amp;quot; In this way the &amp;quot;public school class&amp;quot; of Russia was deprived of the right to participate in defense, because the working people distrusted this class in the defense of the Revolution; while the military training of the people, which in Britain is confined within the walls of the &amp;quot;public schools&amp;quot; and universities, was extended to the whole population.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the early days of the Revolution the Soviet Government issued a decree for the arming of the whole people. The arsenals of the State were thrown open to the workers and peasants, and the authorities were instructed that the people were to be allowed arms for the defense of the Revolution. When, in 1918, a war broke out which was to last for four years, the exigencies of war ‘taught the same lesson as Spain has learned during 1936. This was that the &amp;quot;armed people&amp;quot; were defenseless against a well-organized trained army unless they, too, achieved first-class organization and discipline. And a disciplined and well-organized army is impossible without centralized command.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a result of the necessities of the war itself, the unorganized arming of the people and the defense of the Revolution by badly trained groups of armed workers could not be allowed to continue. The necessary steps were therefore taken by the Soviet Government to build up a regular army, with a centralized command and the enforcement of the necessary discipline, even though this meant the elimination of certain features which were defended by some as being necessary to a democratic army. It must not be imagined that such a reorganization was easy, for the Revolution itself had been made possible only as a result of the complete breakdown of the old army discipline, the seizure of power by the rank-and-file soldiers and their elected committees, and the replacing of the old army officers by elected commanders. It took time to persuade the rank-and-file soldiers, once the commanders were really drawn from the ranks and there was an equal opportunity for all to rise to the highest positions of command, that a disciplined subordination to the commanders was still essential while in action, whatever might be the relationship of the men in the ranks to the commanders when off duty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The experience of Soviet Russia in fighting against the armed intervention of ten foreign Powers was that the arming of the people must be followed at once by the organizing of a strong people’s army, with a centralized command, and well disciplined. While the old relationship between soldier and officer was completely abandoned, and all ranks mixed together as equals when off duty, the behavior of every soldier when on duty had to conform to the necessary military discipline. The fact, however, that in the new army which was being built up the commanders themselves were drawn from the best elements in the ranks meant that the old antagonism between officer and soldier, reflecting the class relationships in society, no longer existed. In this way the Red Army was built up, an army which today is officered to the extent of some 95 percent by men drawn from the working class and the collective farm peasantry.&lt;br /&gt;
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The structure of the Red Army and its administration is in general similar to that of other organizations of the Soviet State. The supreme authority is vested in the Commissar of Defense, who is appointed by the supreme authority of the State. Officers are appointed from above, but at the same time committees of the rank and file play a large part in the management of the barracks and in all matters immediately affecting the welfare of the soldiers, their social and political life, their education, feeding, housing conditions, and so on. In this way the Soviet barracks has its wall-newspaper like the factory, and the commander who does not treat the men with the necessary politeness may be criticized for his uncomradely attitude in the same way as a factory foreman may be criticized by the rank and file.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as, in the factory, there are opportunities for every worker to study and to obtain promotion, so, too, in the Red Army, every facility is available for free study and so for promotion. Any rank-and-file soldier may apply for admission to one of the military academies, and will be accepted as soon as he has the necessary&#039;- qualifications.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Military service in the U.S.S.R. is an obligation on ail citizens. So long, however, as there was an employing class, it was expressly stated that the employing class was not to be given military work for the defense of the country. Today, however, now that the employers no longer exist as a class of the Soviet population, the new Constitution simply states; &amp;quot;Universal military service is the law. Military service in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Ai-ray represents the honorable duty of the citizens of the U.S.S.R.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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It has already been shown, when we were considering trade unions in the Soviet State, how the regiments of the Red Army freely mix with the workers and peasants in social and cultural activities of various kinds, as well as giving them active assistance in production in times of emergency. Similarly, when we discussed the setting up of tile Soviet State, we saw that the soldiers, like the other citizens, had the full right to vote and to participate in elections. In the army of the U.S.S.R.—and this is a feature of every really democratic army—politics have always played an important part, for the Soviet Government has nothing to hide from its soldiers, and it is to the greatest advantage that they should know for what they are fighting.&lt;br /&gt;
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In discussing the Soviet factory we saw how the work of the factory manager included, in addition to responsibility for production, the work of caring for the welfare of the workers employed. So, too, in the Red Army, the duty of the commander, not only to his superior staff but to the men under him, is stressed in the official field regulations which state: &amp;quot;Care for the Red Army man is the first obligation of the commander, and is his direct duty.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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An interesting feature of the field regulations of the Red Army is a paragraph which deals with the treatment of prisoners of war. We have already seen how, in general, prisoners in the Soviet Union are treated as deserving of education rather than punishment. However, with regard to deliberate enemies of the State, the law is applied as between enemies and not as between comrades. In preparing the Red Army for action, however, we find the following paragraph in the field regulations: &amp;quot;The troops of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army are generous to prisoners of war, and render them ail kind of help for the purpose of preserving their lives.&amp;quot; This, at a time when the airplanes of Hitler and Mussolini were bombing the defenseless women and children fleeing from Malaga, was one of the field regulations issued by the Soviet Government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I remember how, when working in Moscow, I happened to see a letter sent to the U.S.S.R. from an English worker. During the period of British intervention he had been sent to the north of Russia, and had been taken prisoner. In his letter he recalled his experiences—how he had been given work to do, was paid for this work, and allowed to spend his free time wandering about the town in the evenings just as he wished. This was no accidental treatment; it was typical of the treatment of prisoners during the last war against the U.S.S.R.; and, from the field regulations quoted, we see that it will probably be true of the next.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the explanation of this leniency, of this friendliness, to the prospective prisoners of the Red Army in a war? The answer is that the leaders of the Red Army look upon it, not simply as a military machine, but as a political organization capable of winning to its side the workers and peasants, the vast majority of the people, in any territory which it may enter. For this reason the regulations definitely state: &amp;quot;The winning over to the side of the proletarian revolution of the working and peasant masses of the enemy army as well as the population of the field of action is the principal condition for victory.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Fascists, in their attack on Spain, bomb defenseless women and children who are fleeing from a captured town. The Red Army, when there was a serious dispute with the Chinese in Manchuria a few years ago, entered Manchurian territory. When it entered a town or village the first thing it did was to hand over all stores of food and clothing to the most impoverished of the population, thus endearing itself to the women and children instead of murdering them. Such a policy is consistent only with a democratic army, not interested in the preservation, but with the destruction, of the power of private property. And it is for this reason that in a war against Fascism the Red Army has not only its own morale in its favor, but the opportunity to gain very rapidly the sympathy of all the democratic forces in the country with whose Government it happens to be at war. The Red Army, at a time when the whole world is menaced by ever more flagrant acts of Fascist aggression, stands out as a bulwark of democracy, as a political as well as a military organization, rooted in, and recruited from, the rank and file of the people, a people’s army which will respect the people of any territory which it may ever have cause to enter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such an army, however, representing a people so organized that they have no unemployment—and there are among them no citizens who can gain anything from war—is not likely to enter foreign territory unless absolutely compelled to do so by an act of aggression, either against the Soviet State itself, or against a State with which it has a pact of mutual assistance. In 1917 one of the main slogans of the, Congress of Soviets was &amp;quot;Peace.&amp;quot; Today, twenty years later, no citizen of the U.S.S.R. wants war. Therefore we find that Voroshilov, Commissar for Defense of the U.S.S.R., recently made the following public statement:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;We are proud of our army, its organization, its military training, its splendid equipment, but without hesitation we would send this army back to the factories and the collective farm fields, we would disarm it completely if the capitalist countries would accept our disarmament proposals.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only the U.S.S.R. could contemplate such demobilization without fearing unemployment. Only the U.S.S.R. has jobs waiting for every ex-soldier, and only in the U.S.S.R.—a country where not one citizen can gain anything from war—can such a demobilization be looked upon as highly desirable, if only the security of the country could be guaranteed in other ways.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== A Union of Nations ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Russian Soviet Republic, in January 18, was declared &amp;quot;a free union of free nations,&amp;quot; a federation of national republics. Every nationality within the territory covered by the Soviets was given the right to decide, at its own Congress of Soviets, the conditions under which it would join this federation. And when certain nations which had previously been part of the former Russian Empire declared their complete independence, this was welcomed by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But though, from its birth, the Soviet Republic recognized the rights of nations to determine their own fate, the surrounding States did not recognize the right of the Russian people to determine theirs. The result was that the actual seizure of power, which had been almost bloodless, was followed by four years of devastating &amp;quot;civil war,&amp;quot; when at least ten foreign armies co-operated in an attempt to suppress the Soviets. Finally, as a result of the united struggle of the Russian people, and the support which they received from the workers of other countries, peace was restored in the West in 1921, and in the Far East in the following year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this war the Russian Soviet Government again had an opportunity to state its position in relation to other nations. For, in 1920, urged on by France, the Polish Government was preparing openly to declare war on the Soviets. At that time the Soviet Government issued a manifesto which was reprinted throughout the world, and was widely circulated in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is an extract from this manifesto: &amp;quot;Your enemies, who are ours, speak falsely when they tell you that the Russian Soviet Government intends to force Communism on the Polish people with the help of the bayonets of the Red Army. Communism is only possible in countries where the vast majority of the working people have the will to secure it by their own initiative. […] The reorganization of Poland in accordance with the interests of the Polish masses must be the work of these working masses themselves.&amp;quot; The essence of this manifesto was repeated by Stalin in 1936 in his interview with Roy Howard: &amp;quot;Every country will make its own revolution if it wants to, and if it does not there will be no revolution. For example, our country wanted to make a revolution and made it, and now we are building a new, classless society. But to assert that we want to make a revolution in other countries, to interfere in their lives, means saying what is untrue, and what we have never advocated.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These two passages are extremely important, the one from 1920 and the other from 1936. For if the Soviet Government really recognized the right of nations to self-determination, and then it essentially had to hold this democratic view of the revolution in other countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The restoration of peace in 1921 and 1922 found the territory covered by the Soviets considerably extended. For in the process of the struggle there had been set up additional Soviet Republics in the Ukraine and White Russia, in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. At the same time, however, the economic position of all these territories was far worse than it had been in 1917, for the retreating armies of intervention had done their utmost to wreck everything which they left behind them. Railways were blown up and factories burnt to the ground. The Soviet Republics were faced with the problem of economic reconstruction at the same time as they knew that at any moment another attack might be launched against them, perhaps by one State, or perhaps by all the members of the League of Nations together; for, in the eyes of its founder, this institution was to act as a &amp;quot;bulwark against Bolshevism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The experience of the war itself, and the economic problems which it created, brought the different Soviet Republics into the closest contact with each other. Experience showed that still closer union was essential to future security. Therefore, in December 1922, a Treaty of Union was signed between the Soviet Republics; and the U.S.S.R.—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—was in this way brought into being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this treaty it was pointed out that the world was now divided into two camps, capitalist and Socialist. &amp;quot;Only in the camp of the Soviets,&amp;quot; it goes on, &amp;quot;has it been found possible to root out national persecution, to create conditions of mutual trust, and to lay the foundations of fraternal co-operation. […]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;But the years of war were not without their heritage. The ruined fields and idle factories, the breakdown of production and the exhaustion of economic resources which follow from the war, render the isolated efforts of the separate Republics towards economic reconstruction inadequate. The revival of the economic life of the country has proved impossible so long as the Republics lead a divided existence. Furthermore, the unsettled state of international relations, and the danger of new attacks, render imperative the creation of a common front by die Soviet Republics against capitalist encirclement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Finally, the very structure of the Soviet power, which is international in its class character, urges the working masses of the Soviet Republics along the path of union into one Socialist family.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the Treaty of Union, a central federal Government was to be formed which would control defense and foreign affairs—including the establishment of one form of Soviet citizenship to cover the whole union, and also including the admission of new republics. The Government of the Union would also be responsible for introducing a general economic plan for the whole territory; for regulating trade, currency, and taxation; for deciding on the best methods of utilizing the land; and for controlling transport and communications, weights and measures. In addition, the Government of the Union was to lay down the general principles governing such matters as education and health protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Governments of the republics which joined the Union were to have complete self-government on every matter that was not included in the treaty, and every republic had the right to secede from the Union if it wished to do so. On the other hand, however, if a republic passed any law which was contrary to the terms of the treaty, then this law could be annulled by the Government of the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Treaty of Union was signed in 1922, and ratified by the first All-Union Congress of Soviets, which was elected in the same way as the All-Russian Congress. Delegates were elected from all the territory now covered by die Union, in the proportion of one to every 25,000 town electors, and one to every 125,000 inhabitants of the provinces. The Congress elected a Central Executive Committee, which started to draw up a Constitution for the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The original conception of the structure of the Union Government was that it should be an almost exact copy of the Russian Soviet Republic, but covering all the territory now within the Union. However, it was mainly as a result of the initiative of Stalin personally, himself a Georgian and an expert on the national question, that special features were incorporated in the Constitution of the Union in order to protect the rights of all the national republics from a possible domination by the Russians, who formed an overwhelming majority of the total population of the Union, and who thus would hold a majority of the votes in the Congress of Soviets. The Constitution was adopted in its final form at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1924.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The supreme authority in the U.S.S.R., as in each republic, was to be the Congress of Soviets. Delegates were to be sent to this Congress elected in the same proportion to population as the delegates to the Russian Congress. But the Central Executive Committee was to be given a special structure, peculiar to its position as Government of a Union of independent and equal national republics. Instead of being, as in the separate republics, a single body elected at the Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive Committee was to be divided into two separate councils, with completely equal powers in every respect. Each could introduce new legislation, but no law could be passed without being accepted by a majority in each of these councils separately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How were these councils to be elected?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the one hand, the Council of die Union was to be elected in precisely the same way as the Central Executive Committee had previously been; that is, by direct election at the Congress of Soviets. The Council of the Union would represent the delegates at the Congress, and, since an absolute majority of these delegates came from the Russian Soviet Republic, the Council of the Union would have a Russian majority. But this Council of the Union could do nothing without the agreement of a majority of the members of the Council of Nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Council of Nationalities was to consist of representatives of the different republican Governments appointed in equal numbers. In the Council of Nationalities the Russians would, therefore, be a small minority, quite out-voted by the Ukrainians and the Georgians, the White Russians and the Armenians, together with the Uzbeks and Tajiks and Turkmenians who had joined the Union later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Government of the U.S.S.R., then, was a unique compromise between the representation of the people, as individual voters irrespective of their nationality, and of the nations of the Union, as equal nations. Only in extreme cases was it likely that the two councils would not reach agreement on any particular question; while the scheme gave the smaller nations of the Union, though a minority of the total population, a large say in determining policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case of disagreement, and if no attempt at conciliation proved successful, disputes were to be referred to a Congress of Soviets specially called for the purpose. However, no occasion has arisen where this was necessary, for the two councils have been able to work in complete harmony.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problems involved in setting up this multinational State were difficult ones. In his speech to the Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets, where the new Constitution of 1936 was adopted, Stalin says on this matter; &amp;quot;The Constitution now in operation, adopted in 1924, was the first Constitution of the U.S.S.R. That was a period when the relations between the peoples had not yet been properly adjusted, when survivals of distrust towards the Great Russians had not yet disappeared, and when centrifugal forces still continued to operate. Under these conditions it was necessary to establish fraternal co-operation between the peoples on the basis of economic, political, and military mutual aid by uniting them in a single, federated, multi-national State. The Soviet Government could not but realize the difficulties of this task. It had before it the unsuccessful experiments of multinational states in bourgeois countries. It had before it the failure of the experiment of the old Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, it resolved to make the experiment of creating a multi-national State, for it knew that a multi-national State which has arisen on the basis of Socialism is bound to stand every test.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Since then fourteen years have elapsed, a period long enough to test the experiment. And what do we find? This period has shown beyond doubt that the experiment of forming a multi-national State based on Socialism has been completely successful. This is the undoubted victory of Lenin’s national policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;How is this victory to be explained?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;By the absence of exploiting classes, which are the principal organizers of strife between nations ; the absence of exploitation, which cultivates mutual distrust and kindles nationalist passions; the fact that power is in the hands of the working class, which is an enemy of all enslavement and the true vehicle of the ideas of internationalism ; the actual practice of mutual aid among the peoples in all spheres of economic and social life ; and, finally, the flourishing national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., culture which is national in form and Socialist in content—all these and similar factors have brought about a radical change in the aspect of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.; their feeling of mutual distrust has disappeared, a feeling of mutual friendship has developed among them, and thus real fraternal co-operation between the peoples has been established within the system of a single federated State.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And within this great federation, as we have already seen, the treatment of all nations as equals, and of all citizens as equals, irrespective of their nationality, has led to a great growth of national pride. In the U.S.S.R. today no citizen, Jew or German, Abyssinian or Italian, Negro or American, Indian or English, is ashamed of his nationality, is privileged because of his nationality, or, because of his nationality or color, and is deprived of any privilege due to him as a working-citizen of the U.S.S.R. Such a country can indeed be called a Union of Nations, and many of the peoples of the British Empire will envy a unity based upon such an equality of peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Electors and Administrators ===&lt;br /&gt;
For those who worked, the young Soviet State gave its citizens the right to vote and to stand for election at an earlier age than in any other country. The representatives that the people elected, if they proved unsatisfactory, were subject to recall by their electors. And, when elected, every representative of the people was bound, not only to participate in the making of decisions, but also in their execution. In addition, so as to draw into the work of administration a vast number of working people—far more than could actually be elected to membership of the Soviets—a system was early evolved by which working men and women, in their spare time, should represent their fellows in the various organs of State administration, national and local, and participate in their work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The result is that, whether we take a local Soviet or the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., we find in its offices three categories of workers. First, elected members of the Soviet or Executive Committee, who are bound to participate in the work of one of the departments of the public authority to which they have been elected. Secondly, there are paid employees, appointed by, and responsible to, the elected body. And thirdly, voluntary workers, not bound by any law to do this work, but who have been elected in their trade union meetings to participate in the work of the Soviets, or of an Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have, while working in the Soviet Union, participated in an election. I, too, had a right to vote, as I was a working member of the community, and nationality and citizenship is no bar to electoral rights. The procedure was extremely simple. A general meeting of all the workers in our organization was called by the trade union committee, candidates were discussed, and a vote was taken by show of hands. Anybody present had the right to propose a candidate, and the one who was elected was not personally a member of the Party. In considering the claims of the candidates their past activities were discussed, they themselves had to answer questions as to their qualifications, anybody could express an opinion, for or against them, and the basis of all the discussion was: What justification had the candidates to represent their comrades on the local Soviet?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As far as the elections in the villages were concerned, these took place at open village meetings, all peasants of voting age, other than those who employed labor, having the right to vote and to stand for election. As in the towns, any organization or individual could put forward candidates, anyone could ask the candidate questions, and anybody could support or oppose the candidature. It is usual for the Communist Party to put forward a candidate, trade unions and other organizations can also do so, and there is nothing to prevent the Party’s candidate from not being elected, if he has not sufficient prestige among the voters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the towns the &amp;quot;electoral district&amp;quot; has hitherto consisted of a factory, or a group of small factories sufficient to form a constituency. But there was one section of the town population which has always had to vote geographically, since they did not work together in one organization. This was the housewives. As a result, the housewives met separately in each district, had their own constituencies, and elected their own representatives to the Soviet. Here, too, vital interest has always been shown in the personality of every candidate. Why should this woman be elected? What right had she to represent her fellow housewives on the local Soviet? In the district next to my own at the last election the housewife who was elected was well known as an organizer of a communal dining-room in the district. This was the land of person that the housewives wanted to represent them on the Soviet. Another candidate, a Communist, proposed by the local organization of the Party, was turned down in her favor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It will be clear from this description that a Soviet election has, up to the present, been a most simple and informal affair, for the purpose of sending forward the best representatives of the people to sit on the local and national organs of government. Organizations and individuals have both been able to put forward candidates, and in cases where the Communist Party has supported candidates they have not always necessarily been members of the Party itself, and, whether they have been members or not, there has never been any guarantee of their election, other than their desirability as candidates to a majority of those present at the meeting. If since November 1917 the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. has continued to have its members as a majority of the delegates to the Congresses of Soviets, this is purely due to the fact that the Communist Party has put up for election those very people that the electors were likely to respect, and has not as a rule put up people whom the electors were likely to reject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The election of delegates to the local Soviet is not the only function of voters in the Soviet Union, It is not a question here of various parties presenting candidates to the electorate, each with his own policy to offer. The Soviet electorate has to select a personality from its midst to represent it, and instruct this person in the policy which is to be followed when elected. At a Soviet election meeting, therefore, as much or more time may be spent on discussion of the instructions to the delegate as is spent on discussing the personality of the candidates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the last election to the Soviets, in which I personally participated, we must have spent three or four times as much time on the working out of instructions as we did on the selection of our candidate. About three weeks before the election was to take place the trade union secretary in every department of our organization was told by the committee that it was time to start to prepare our instructions to the delegate. Every worker was asked to make suggestions concerning policy which he felt should be brought to the notice of the new personnel of the Moscow Soviet. As a result, about forty proposals concerning the general government of Moscow were handed in from a group of about twenty people. We then held a meeting in our department at which we discussed the proposals, and adopted some and rejected others. We then handed our list of proposals to a commission, appointed by the trade union committee, and representing all the workers in our organization. This Commission coordinated the proposals received, placed them in order according to the various departments of the Soviet, and this coordinated list was read at the election meeting itself, again discussed, and adopted in its final form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proposals which were made were of an extremely practical character. For when we set out as citizens to make constructive proposals for our local authority to carry out, the general atmosphere of practicability is very much greater than it can ever possibly be in an election carried out on the basis of party antagonism, where each side will throw exorbitant challenges at the other, hoping to make electoral capital as a result, but having no illusions as to the ultimate practicability of the suggested policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To take a concrete example, let us compare the L.C.G. elections of March 1937 with the elections to the Moscow Soviet which took place in 1935, and in which I participated personally. In the former we notice that the Labor Party made great and justifiable play with the increase in housing construction since it came to power. On the other hand, the &amp;quot;moderate&amp;quot; and other candidates tended to center their anti-Labor propaganda on the so-called &amp;quot;extravagance,&amp;quot; not of building so many more houses, but in spending in certain isolated cases of more on individual buildings than was necessary. In this way the issue was put to the electorate as: Labor—More Houses; Anti-Labor—Less Extravagance. The accusation of extravagance might quite well cause people who wanted more houses to vote &amp;quot;anti-Labor,&amp;quot; to discover afterwards that the real meaning of less extravagance was to cut down the housing program to what it had been before Labor was elected! And, in elections on a party basis, such a false contrasting of issues is bound to arise continuously, to the utter confusion of electors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us return to the election in Moscow. Here we found no spectacular demands for more houses, since the Moscow Soviet was already building increasing numbers of houses each year. But we did have very strong comments suggesting that the new Soviet should be particularly careful not to build any more large blocks without having a universal store included, that hot water should always be laid on, and that in future the approach to new blocks should be completed together with the houses, instead of having an approach of mud for three months or more after the houses themselves were already inhabited. The question of housing was raised in the Moscow election as well as in the London one, but in the former it took the shape of citizens’ definite instructions; in the latter, it was a propaganda weapon which could easily be made a luxurious cloak for a policy that could not command support among the voters at all if it had been fully revealed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since, in the U.S.S.R., practically the whole of trade is now controlled by public authorities, a number of instructions dealt with the shops. Those who lived in outlying areas stated the sites where they felt that the Soviet should place shops in the immediate future, and so on. Then there was a question dealing with the manners of the militia! Several years ago the Moscow Soviet opened a series of enquiry bureaus scattered about the city. Since these were opened, several of us had found that the militia, instead of answering enquiries as to where various places were, would always refer the questioner to the nearest enquiry office. We recommended that this be stopped, and I am glad to find that before I left this had been done.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not only questions of local importance, however, which are discussed by Soviet citizens. The Central Executive Committee, in considering legislation of major importance, has often called conferences or congresses of those particularly concerned, for consultative purposes, before such legislation is adopted. Or, in cases where it is considered that the proposed legislation affects the personal interests of the whole population, then it may be submitted to the whole country for consideration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As an example of the former, we may mention the model statutes for the collective farm, which were adopted in 1935. The Central Executive Committee, two years after the record harvest of 1933 had conclusively proved the effectiveness of collective farming, decided that the time had come when an official model set of statutes for the collective farms should be adopted. It therefore drew up a project, based on the experience of the most successful collectives. It then called the Congress of Collective Farm shock-workers. This meant that the collective farmers were asked to appoint their best shock-workers as delegates, and these elected delegates came to Moscow to discuss the new statutes. Then, after the congress had adopted what it considered the ideal statutes, the Central Executive Committee endorsed these statutes and they became law. In this way a new law was passed only after the fullest consultation with those whom it intimately affected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Examples of the other procedure, of submitting laws to the whole population for discussion, are more frequent in the case of matters which relate to the personal lives of the population. Thus, between 1917 and 1920 there were conferences and discussions throughout Soviet Russia on the subject of abortion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, in spite of considerable opposition, the law was passed, which has already been quoted, making abortion legal in State clinics. In 1925, when a number of changes were proposed in the marriage law, a discussion took place for a whole year before the law was altered. And again, in 1936, when the Government considered that the time had come when legal abortion was no longer justified by circumstances, there was a general discussion in factories and collective farms, and in the pages of the Press, before the altered law was finally adopted. Again, in 1936, after the Seventh Congress of Soviets had decided to bring up to date the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., a special committee elected at the Congress drew up the draft, and it was then submitted to the whole population for almost six months’ discussion before it was finally amended and ratified at the Eighth Congress. As a result of this discussion, and of the discussion in the Congresses of Soviets in each of the constituent republics, the final draft contained over forty amendments to that which had been originally submitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as, in the sphere of discussion, the elected authorities of the U.S.S.R. refer to the general public for their opinion, so, too, in the sphere of action, they draw into the administration of the State large numbers of ordinary citizens. The meetings of workers in the factories, and villagers in the country, not only elect their delegates to the Soviets, but also put forward thousands of voluntary workers who arc then attached to the different sections of the Soviets. These form the third category mentioned at the beginning of this chapter—workers who voluntarily participate in the various administrative bodies, both local and national. Already, in discussing equality of opportunity, we pointed out how, in this way, many &amp;quot;amateur&amp;quot; administrators find their way into the State apparatus as permanent workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The work of every Soviet is divided into departments, such as health, housing, transport, industry, trade, education, and so on. In each of these sections there is ample scope for voluntary workers, as inspectors of existing conditions, to see that laws are enforced, and to report where improvements should be made and money should be spent. In Moscow alone, hundreds of volunteers do work for the housing department, inspecting dwellings and recommending improvements or demolition; finding suitable building sites; and discovering suitable positions for the creation of open spaces and playgrounds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Workers for the health department organize campaigns against epidemics, and run meetings and lectures on all subjects of importance to health. Such workers may become professional lecturers if they show ability, thus joining the ever-growing health service of the U.S.S.R. In the case of the education department, section workers become acquainted with the work of the schools, get to know the children personally, and attend the meetings of teachers and of students. By going from school to school they are able to make suggestions for better work, on each occasion describing how tile best school in each particular sphere organizes its activities. The experience of all such voluntary workers, reported back to the Soviet, is a basis for new legislation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But voluntary work for the Soviets does not stop at such matters as health, housing, and education. The militia, the organization for preserving law and order, is also assisted by voluntary workers, usually young enthusiasts from the big factories. We may say, in fact, if the comparison is permissible, that the Soviet &amp;quot;Special&amp;quot; is the young man who, at a trade union meeting, is selected as one who is suited to do voluntary work in the department of the militia, dealing with cases of drunkenness, theft, or other disorders, when a uniformed militiaman is not in sight!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The work of volunteers in the Soviet State is not, however, limited to local government. It also extends upwards throughout the Soviet State, right to the offices of the Central Executive Committee itself. Here, for example, in the Complaints Bureau of the President, Kalinin, there work a number of volunteers from Moscow’s largest factories, sent there by their trade unions, and dealing with letters addressed to the President from all parts of the U.S.S.R. For the Soviet citizen not only has his Press to which to write, but also his President; and letters to Kalinin play an important part in exposing abuses by local authorities and the administration of factories when the complainant is unable locally to obtain redress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is only when the Soviet State is considered in detail, with its elected deputies, its voluntary workers, and its paid workers promoted according to merit from the rank and file of the population that we see how, in the words of Sir Bernard Pares, &amp;quot;Government and people are of the same stock.&amp;quot; This has happened because it is the people who have built up the Government of the U.S.S.R., republic by republic, institution by institution, as the demands of the welfare of the community have necessitated. The working people themselves participate in running the State; there are no longer, as the Webbs put it, &amp;quot;a Government and a people confronting each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== A Socialist Constitution ===&lt;br /&gt;
According to the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic, adopted in the heat of the struggle of the Russian people for liberty, the fundamental aim of the Republic was stated to be &amp;quot;suppressing all exploitation of man by man, abolishing forever the division of society into classes, bringing about the Socialist organization of society.&amp;quot; With this end in view, &amp;quot;work useful to the community is made compulsory upon all,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;now, at the decisive moment in the struggle between the workers and their exploiters, there can be no place for the latter on any organ of government.&amp;quot; There follow, as we have already seen, a number of concrete measures, increasing the freedom of the vast majority of the population and giving them democratic rights that they had never previously enjoyed; but, on the other hand, the employers of labor, the property-owners, were deprived of all political rights, of the ownership of the meeting halls and the printing presses, and, as the State was able to take them over, of all other means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These essential features of the Russian Soviet Constitution were later made part of the Constitutions of other Soviet republics: both those which later joined the Union, and those which were formed in Hungary, in China, and in Bavaria. When, in 1922, the Union was formed, each of the constituent republics included the same fundamental ideas in its Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now it is clear that if the Constitution of any State, or of any other kind of organization, includes a statement of aims, and measures directed towards the achievement of these aims, a time may come when, the aims having been fulfilled, the old Constitution is out of date. When, therefore, from about 1933 onwards, it has been possible in the U.S.S.R. to say that capitalism no longer exists, and that there are no longer employers of labor; when it has become possible to refer to the U.S.S.R. as a society in which everyone either works for himself or for the community, and nobody works for the profit of an employer— under these conditions it can be said that the main aims expressed in the earlier Constitutions have been accomplished, and a revised Constitution is required to establish this fact.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why, at the Seventh Congress of Soviets in 1935, it was decided to introduce a new Constitution for the U.S.S.R. On December 5th, 1936, this Constitution was adopted in its final form at the Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets. What are the essential features of this new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, the Soviets remain, as before, the supreme authority in the country. But the Soviet State is now described as a &amp;quot;Socialist State of workers and peasants,&amp;quot; whereas, in the original Constitution of 1918, we only read of the &amp;quot;fundamental aim&amp;quot; of establishing Socialism. Second, there follows a definition of public and of private property, all the means of production being now publicly owned; but citizens are allowed the private ownership of their earnings, savings, and the necessities of human comfort. The small independent&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic, adopted in the heat of the struggle of the Russian people for liberty, the fundamental aim of the Republic was stated to be &amp;quot;suppressing all exploitation of man by man, abolishing forever the division of society into classes, bringing about the Socialist organization of society.&amp;quot; With this end in view, &amp;quot;work useful to the community is made compulsory upon all,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;now, at the decisive moment in the struggle between the workers and their exploiters, there can be no place for the latter on any organ of government.&amp;quot; There follow, as we have already seen, a number of concrete measures, increasing the freedom of the vast majority of the population and giving them democratic rights that they had never previously enjoyed; but, on the other hand, the employers of labor, the property-owners, were deprived of all political rights, of the ownership of the meeting halls and the printing presses, and, as the State was able to take them over, of all other means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These essential features of the Russian Soviet Constitution were later made part of the Constitutions of other Soviet republics: both those which later joined the Union, and those which were formed in Hungary, in China, and in Bavaria. When, in 1922, the Union was formed, each of the constituent republics included the same fundamental ideas in its Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now it is clear that if the Constitution of any State, or of any other kind of organization, includes a statement of aims, and measures directed towards the achievement of these aims, a time may come when, the aims having been fulfilled, the old Constitution is out of date. When, therefore, from about 1933 onwards, it has been possible in the U.S.S.R. to say that capitalism no longer exists, and that there are no longer employers of labor; when it has become possible to refer to the U.S.S.R. as a society in which everyone either works for himself or for the community, and nobody works for the profit of an employer—under these conditions it can be said that the main aims expressed in the earlier Constitutions have been accomplished, and a revised Constitution is required to establish this fact.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why, at the Seventh Congress of Soviets in 1935, it was decided to introduce a new Constitution for the U.S.S.R. On December 5th, 1936, this Constitution was adopted in its final form at the Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets. What are the essential features of this new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, the Soviets remain, as before, the supreme authority in the country. But the Soviet State is now described as a &amp;quot;Socialist State of workers and peasants,&amp;quot; whereas, in the original Constitution of 1918, we only read of the &amp;quot;fundamental aim&amp;quot; of establishing Socialism. Second, there follows a definition of public and of private property, all the means of production being now publicly owned; but citizens are allowed the private ownership of their earnings, savings, and the necessities of human comfort. The small independent producer, working on his own (but not employing others for profit) is allowed to possess his necessary materials and means of production. Third, reference is made to the existence of an economic plan, whereas, in the first Constitution of the Union of 1924, reference was only made to the future establishment of such a plan by the Government of the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the Constitution of 1936, &amp;quot;The economic life of the U.S.S.R. is determined and directed by the national economic State plan for the purpose of increasing public wealth, of a steady rise in the material and cultural level of the toilers, of strengthening the independence of the U.S.S.R. and its defense capacity.&amp;quot; An important part of the new Constitution deals with the structure of the State, in which certain major changes are made. Finally, a section is included which deals with the Rights and Obligations of Citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main changes in the structure of the State which have been adopted in the Constitution of 1936 are: the making of suffrage universal without any exceptions; the introduction of equality of representation of town and village; the introduction of secret ballot in place of voting by show of hands; and the provision that henceforth every governing authority, not only the local one, shall be directly elected by the people. These changes, it will be noted, all introduce features, hitherto absent, which are generally accepted as democratic in character. They ensure still closer contact between the higher organs of Government and the ranks of the people. And they make the whole apparatus of the State considerably less complicated, by wiping out the intricate system of election by steps or stages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is impossible to understand the significance of the changes which have been introduced in the Soviet Constitution of 1936 without recalling the reason why, in the earlier Constitutions, the particular system then prevailing was adopted. We know that the Soviets were set up throughout Russia as fighting organizations of the workers, peasants, and soldiers against the employing classes and their Government. The Soviets, therefore, naturally excluded from participation in their activity persons and officials against whom they were fighting. It was natural that when the Soviets seized the reins of government, the &amp;quot;exploiters&amp;quot; were not allowed to participate in the running of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Universal suffrage was adopted, with exceptions. In 1936, when the employers of labor as a class were extinct in the Soviet Union, and when former employees and former officials of the Tsarist State were either dead, abroad, or peacefully working in Soviet institutions, the franchise had already become practically universal, with the exception of some 50,000 priests. As it is not considered likely that these 50,000 priests, given full political rights, will in any way be able to obstruct the progress of the Soviet Union, they are not any longer deprived of the right to vote. Universal suffrage for all citizens of the age of eighteen and over, with exceptions, has simply become universal suffrage for all citizens of the age of eighteen and over. The half-witted, it should be noted, are, however, still deprived of the right to vote; and the courts may deprive citizens of this right as a result of a misdemeanor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unequal representation of town and village arose as a result of the leading part which the town workers played in the organization of the Soviets and of the Soviet State. At the time of the drawing up of the first Constitution it was considered desirable that the workers, who were introducing Socialism in industry, should continue to play a leading part in the Soviet Government. But with the final wiping out of capitalist enterprise in the villages, and the triumph of collective farming, it can no longer be said that the leadership of the workers in the towns must be specially safeguarded in the interests of Socialism, or that any discrimination in their favor can now be justified. Therefore, by 1936, the inequalities between town and country have been removed, and there is now completely equal representation of all citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Voting by show of hands, we have seen, took place in the factories and at village meetings, because it was the most simple way in which a vote could be taken. And this method of voting had also its very definite utility at a time when a fierce struggle was being carried on between the working people and their employers. For, though the employers were deprived of all voting rights, there was no means of preventing them, if they so wished, from persuading or bribing certain of those who had full political rights to put up and to support candidates who would be sympathetic to them. In the factories, the office staff had the right to participate in the elections. In outlook they were often close to the employers. If, when the vote was taken, those who were known to be close to the employer were seen to be supporting a particular candidate, this was a warning that the candidate was likely to be a &amp;quot;bosses’ man,&amp;quot; an undesirable candidate! And if this was true of the town, it was still more true of the village, where the petty employer, the local usurer, the &amp;quot;kulak,&amp;quot; often had many people over whom he could exert influence. The &amp;quot;kulak vote&amp;quot; could be detected at an open meeting, which meant that the rest of the people were warned where lay the interests of property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the U.S.S.R. today, now that there is no longer an employing class at all, the system of open voting by show of hands no longer has the positive value which it used to have. At the same time, it still retains those negative features which it has always had, and which center on the fact that, if candidates know who votes for whom, the way is open for various methods of personal pressure and persuasion, even in the conditions of Socialist society. Even in the U.S.S.R. today there may be people who are not above cadging for votes. But these people are disarmed if there is secret ballot. So we find the introduction of secret ballot in the new Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We come now to the change which has perhaps aroused the greatest comment outside the Soviet Union. It has even been suggested that the replacing of indirect election by direct election means the end of all that was essential in the Soviet system! Up to the present the structure of the Soviet State has been modeled on the lines of a working-class organization. Now, it appears, it is to be reconstructed along the lines of a capitalist republic. Is not this a retreat from the essentials of the Soviet system?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should first be said quite emphatically that never, at any time, has particular stress been laid, inside the U.S.S.R., on the structure of the Soviet State as being something permanent and unalterable. The point that has been emphasized, again and again, is the fact that power in the Soviet State is in the hands of the working population. And, as we have seen in Part I, there is no tendency at the present time to make this power of the workers any less effective than it has hitherto been. As far as the structure of the State is concerned, this has always been regarded as something which would be altered to suit changing circumstances, and so, as early, as 1917, we find Lenin writing these words: &amp;quot;The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly bring a great variety and abundance of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be only one: the dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;quot; And, as we saw in our short Introduction, these words simply mean that the Government shall be in the hands of the urban and rural workers, combined with the poorer peasantry; that is, today, the whole population of workers, collective farmers, and small individual producers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When we examined the formation of the Soviet State we saw that it was never built up according to a preconceived plan, but grew up in the way in which, in their struggle for better conditions, the working people happened to build it. It naturally took the form of an ordinary working-class organization, with authority centered in a Congress, and an Executive Committee between Congresses. Such a system, as has already been pointed out, is economical ; because many people can attend a Congress that lasts a few days who, because they are working as producers, could not sit for a great part of the year on a more permanent body. On the other hand, however, every organization which is governed by periodical congresses, and by an executive committee between these congresses, is in danger of an isolation of the executive committee at the top from the membership at the bottom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we examine the development of the Congresses of Soviets of the Russian Soviet Republic, we find that at first they were called very often, four being held in 1918 alone; whereas they were later held only once a year. As far as concerns the U.S.S.R., we find that the first and second Congresses met in 1922 and 1924, three more were held before the end of 1929, the sixth in 1931, the seventh in 1935, and the eighth, to deal exclusively with the amendment of the Constitution, in 1936. Thus there has been a tendency, with the passage of time, for rather greater periods to elapse between the Congresses, and for more time to be spent between them on carrying out the policy which they have decided upon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This tendency, at first sight, might seem alarming to the democrat. But it is in fact an inevitable tendency in a community in which the problems of Government are becoming increasingly bound up with the day-today management of affairs, and less and less a matter of deciding general principles. In all working-class organizations the function of a congress is to establish the general principles on which the organization is to work. The principles having been decided, the delegates return to their localities, and it is for the executive committee to see that they are carried out. Congresses, because of their very nature, are unable to exercise a detailed control of day-today work, for they only meet for short periods, whereas the work of any organization or government goes on continuously. It follows from this that the more the work of government becomes the detailed carrying out of a generally agreed policy, the less work is there for a congress to do ; and the greater the need for some more permanent executive body directly controlling the activities of the various organs of administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why, in the history of the Soviet State, we find that at first the Congresses of Soviets met frequently, and, later on, less often. At first there were numerous questions of principle to be settled—the rights of the working people as against those of the employers, the organization of defense by arming the people, the position of the Soviet State as regards the rights of nationalities ; all these matters had to be decided in principle. After 1922, with the defeat of the armed intervention, the question of economic development became the main problem. When, in 1928 and 1929, it was decided finally to eliminate capitalism from the countryside and to launch a general plan of economic development to cover the whole life of the country, a final question of principle was decided. It now had to be worked out.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The weakness of the Congress of Soviets as a means of effectively controlling the day-today activity of the many organs of Government has been well expressed by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in Soviet Communism. They describe the All-Union Congress of Soviets in these terms : &amp;quot; This huge assembly, made up of delegates of scores of races speaking different tongues, might meet only for a week or so and then ‘surrender their mandates,’ and do not even know in advance each other’s names, cannot, of course, develop the corporate life of a Parliament, or deal adequately with the details of legislation or administration. The Congress has been described, in fact, as little better than a picturesque ‘biennial picnic’ in Moscow for locally elected visitors from all parts of the U.S.S.R., whose expenses are provided from U.S.S.R. funds. Even if this were true, it would not imply that the Congress is of no political importance. […] The mere fact that no delegate is ’denied the floor,’ even if there is no effective voting, makes so representative a gathering of real political importance&amp;quot; (p. 83).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these words Sidney and Beatrice Webb make crystal clear, at the present stage of Soviet development, when the basic questions of principle are today settled and opening Congresses to discuss matters of principle are no longer required, the need for some more permanent body, having a &amp;quot;corporate life,&amp;quot; and dealing with the day-to-day details of legislation and administration. What is required is a representative body which sits for longer periods, and which has direct contact with those people whose interests it represents. This is the new form of supreme authority which has been set up by the Constitution of 1936.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instead of a Congress of delegates electing an Executive Committee, the supreme authority of every territory in the U.S.S.R. will now be a directly elected Supreme Soviet or Council. The citizens will directly elect their deputies not only to the local Soviet, but to the provincial and district Soviets, to the Supreme Council of their Republic, and to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., which will replace the Congress of Soviets and the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time, in the Government of the U.S.S.R. the two Councils, formerly parts of the Central Executive Committee, will remain. The Council of the Union will consist of delegates, each of whom represents 300,000 inhabitants, from all over the U.S.S.R. The Council of Nationalities will consist of the same number of delegates as the Council of the Union, directly elected by the population in such a way that there will be an equal number of delegates from each main national republic of the Union, and smaller numbers of delegates from each of the smaller republics within them and other smaller national territories. In this way there is a &amp;quot;two-chamber&amp;quot; system, in which each chamber has absolutely equal powers in every respect, one chamber representing the people as a whole, the other representing the people organized as equal nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the new Constitution, then, the supreme authority of the U.S.S.R. will be directly responsible to the people as individuals, and to the people as nations. The Supreme Council will sit for about four months each year, and, between sessions, its elected Presidium will exercise very limited powers in its absence. Such a matter of importance to the people as the declaration of war, a matter which is usually in the hands of the &amp;quot; cabinets &amp;quot; of other countries, can now only be decided by the directly elected Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. However, an exception is made in the case of honoring treaties of mutual assistance, which the Presidium may fulfill without calling a session of the Supreme Council.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Should a situation arise in which the two chambers of the Soviet Government cannot agree, there is provision for the setting up of a joint conciliation committee. If this is ineffective, then the matter can only be referred to the whole country for decision, by means of new elections. If, after that, a majority in the Council of Nationalities and a majority in the Council of the Union disagreed, the contentious piece of legislation would have to be buried ! It is hard to imagine, however, at the present time, so serious a dispute arising between the two Councils of the Soviet Government. On what could the representatives of the nations of the Union so disagree with the representatives of the people as a whole as to necessitate a new election ? Perhaps small disagreements may arise as to the placing of new industries: shall they be on the territory of the Russian Soviet Republic, or in the smaller republics of the Union? Or a budgetary question might arise: the Russians in the Council of the Union, representing a majority of the population of the U.S.S.R., might want more centralization of funds in the Commissariat of Finance of the U.S.S.R. The smaller republics might oppose this, and turn down such a proposition in the Council of Nationalities. But could such a dispute prove to be irreconcilable without a new election? This seems unlikely, so that the provisions for such a dispute, while necessary on paper, may never actually have to be applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The last section of the new Constitution which is of interest here is that which deals with the Rights and Obligations of Citizens. The striking feature of this chapter is the small number of obligations, and the large number of rights, of the Soviet citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Work in the U.S.S.R. is the obligation of each citizen capable of working, according to the principle; ‘He who does not work shall not eat.’ In the U.S.S.R. the principle of Socialism is being realized: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.’&amp;quot; Further, every Soviet citizen must abide by the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and obey its laws. Finally, every citizen is under the obligation to defend the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To the working man and woman in other countries these obligations of citizens will not seem unduly arduous. To those who live on rent and interest, however, who spend their lives on the Lido and the Riviera, and appear regularly each year at Ascot and spend thousands of pounds during each &amp;quot; season &amp;quot; in London—to these, and to poorer people who imitate them in a smaller way, the idea that work should be an obligation on all may well seem an unjustifiable interference with individual liberty. But to such people, for this very reason, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably be distasteful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State imposes the obligation to work. But it makes it possible to fulfill this obligation by granting the right to work to all citizens. This right, until 1931, could not have appeared in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., for, until then, the Soviet State had still to face the problem of unemployment. Today, as a result of the replacing of capitalist by Socialist production, economic crises have been made impossible in the U.S.S.R. Production is planned for use, and the only brake on increasing production is the number of people available for work. It can never be to the interest of the Soviet State to allow people to be out of work, for by employing them the general- welfare must necessarily be increased.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Work without leisure is a doubtful blessing. So, by the guarantee of leisure, the new Soviet Constitution ensures that work shall not be excessive. The seven-hour day in practically the whole of industry, and paid holidays for all workers, make this right a reality at the present time. But work and leisure are not enough. In addition, the worker wants security. And this, too, is guaranteed in the new Soviet Constitution by a social insurance system which pays wages during illness, and pensions at sixty for men, fifty-five for women, and at an earlier age in dangerous occupations or in cases of invalidity. The control of the social insurance funds, as we have seen, is in the hands of the people’s own elected representatives in the trade unions. Further rights, the enjoyment of which has been fully described in earlier chapters, are national equality, sex equality, and education. All these things, guaranteed in the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R., are not promises for some distant future, but accomplished facts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. as adopted in 1924 a special chapter was devoted to the United State Political Department, or O.G.P.U., an organization which was created &amp;quot; for the purpose of combining the revolutionary efforts of the United Republics to combat political and economic counter-revolution, espionage, and banditry.&amp;quot; In the new Constitution no mention is made of this organization, now incorporated in the Commissariat of Home Affairs. On the other hand, provisions are included which provide for the inviolability of the person and the home, and for the secrecy of correspondence. This does not mean, of course, that at a time when certain of the most aggressively inclined Fascist States are openly preparing for an attack on the U.S.S.R., and are undoubtedly sending their agents there to prepare the way for armies at a later date, they will meet with no resistance. But whereas in 1924 one of the primary tasks of the united Government was to defend the Union against capitalist influences, both inside and outside the country, today the internal struggle is no longer of such importance. On the other hand, however, defense against foreign aggression is even more important than before. Hence a Commissariat of Defense Industries has been set up in the new Constitution of 1936.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In concluding this chapter, two general points should be mentioned. First, it has been said in many quarters that the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. represents a &amp;quot;weakening&amp;quot; of the dictatorship of the proletariat; that this dictatorship is now coming to an end. Such a view can only arise as a result of a misunderstanding of the term &amp;quot;dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;quot; In our Introduction we showed how the Soviet State was set up to ensure the power of the working people of town and village—that is, the power of the vast majority of the population. This power was guaranteed by giving unprecedented democratic rights to the vast majority, while the rights of the small minority of employers were ruthlessly curtailed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is this form of government which is termed the &amp;quot;dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;quot; But if this is what the term means, then the new Constitution, which reflects the complete extinction of the employing class, can only be termed a strengthening of this &amp;quot;dictatorship,&amp;quot; not its weakening. For to strengthen the democracy of the working people, now the whole population, is synonymous with strengthening the &amp;quot; dictatorship of the proletariat&amp;quot;—democracy for the whole working population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the second point is this. Throughout Part I there were described institutions and customs, methods of discussion and of government, which are hardly referred to at all in the Constitution, either before 1936 or after. Similarly, when we discussed the system of election, the part played by section workers in the Soviets and by public discussion, we were describing features of Soviet procedure which are not included in any Constitution. In all that we say and read about the Soviet Constitution, therefore, the following words of the Webbs must be seriously borne in mind: &amp;quot;In the Soviet Union, what the Western jurist is tempted to regard as the constitutional structure, namely, the pyramid of Soviets, is plainly only a fragment of it, and, as some may say, not the most important fragment. Whether by statutory enactment or accepted practice, the constitution of the U.S.S.R. provides for the active participation of the people in the work of government in more than one way&amp;quot; (p. 3).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that the Soviet Constitution does not cover every aspect of the work of government is not a feature that distinguishes it from the Constitutions of other countries. In no capitalist country does the Constitution express the relationship between the Treasury and the big bankers, or the War Ministry and the armament firms ; and yet we know that the latter play an important part in molding Government decisions. Similarly, in Britain, an ordinary text-book description of the system of government does not usually explain how it is that only &amp;quot; public schoolboys &amp;quot; find their way to the higher posts in the Civil Service. In every country there are facts about the control of the Government which are not described in detail in the Constitution or in text-books of political science. The facts in the U.S.S.R. have been explored by us in detail, and we can only conclude in this case that if, on paper, the Soviet system provides for the representation of the people in all organs of government, in practice this representation is far greater than any written Constitution could ever show.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== State and Party ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The new Soviet Constitution is really not democratic at all, for in the U.S.S.R. there is only one political party.&amp;quot; How often, in speeches and articles in this country, have such phrases been used by those who wished to prove that the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. was not really democratic! But a vital question in this connection is never asked: Do the people of the U.S.S.R. want more than one political party? Is it by the will of the vast majority, or against their will, that a situation has arisen in which there is only one lawful political party in the Soviet Union? It is on the answer to this question that the reality of Soviet Democracy stands or falls.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How did it come about that in Soviet Russia and in the Soviet Union there is only one political party? That is the first question to be answered. Secondly, what is the relationship between this one political party and the people of the country ? That is the second conclusion. Thirdly, what is the part played by this particular party in the running of the Soviet State; the position of its leader Stalin, for example, in relation to the government of the country? And, finally, is there not a danger to democracy in the fact that in the Soviet Union today only one political party is allowed by law? This last question will occupy us in the next chapter; the first three we shall examine here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the year 1905, when the first Soviets were set up by the workers of Russia, some of the most active members of these Soviets were &amp;quot;Bolsheviks&amp;quot;—that is, members of the section, of the Social Democratic Party of Russia that followed the leadership of Lenin, and that obtained a majority at the Second Congress of the Social Democratic Party in 1903, The Russian word bolshinstvo means majority, and, when the minority at this Congress split off from the majority, the two fractions became known as &amp;quot;Bolshevik &amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Menshevik&amp;quot; respectively, the majority and minority groups. The &amp;quot;Bolsheviks,&amp;quot; led by Lenin, were the majority at this Congress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bolsheviks in Russia based their political activity on the teachings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. They worked for the continual improvement of the conditions of the working class, for the transfer of the landed estates to the peasants, and for the self-determination of all the nations which formed the Russian Empire. Their ultimate aim was the revolutionary overthrow, not only of Tsarism, but of capitalist production, and the social ownership and control of the productive forces of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Writing in 1903, in a book which became the basic statement of Bolshevik policy at that time, Lenin wrote: &amp;quot;It would be a grievous error indeed to build up the party organization in the expectation only of outbreaks of street fighting, or only upon the ‘forward march of the drab, everyday struggle.’ We must always carry on our everyday work, and always be prepared for everything. And the Revolution itself must not by any means be regarded as a single act […] but as a series of more or less powerful outbreaks rapidly alternating with more or less intense calm. For that reason the principal content of the activity of our party organization […] should be, to carry on work that is possible and necessary both in the period of the most powerful outbreaks as well as in periods of complete calm; that is to say: work of political agitation linked up over the whole of Russia, that will enlighten all aspects of life and will be carried on among the broadest possible strata of the masses. But this work cannot possibly be carried on in contemporary Russia without an All-Russian newspaper, issued very frequently. An organization that is built up round this newspaper […] will be ready for everything, from protecting the honor, the prestige, and continuity of the party in our periods of acute revolutionary ‘depression’ to preparing for, commencing, and carrying out the national armed insurrection &amp;quot; (What Is To Be Done? p. 131).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main feature of such a political party lay in the fact that it was to lead the working people in every one of their activities for improving their conditions of life. It was to be a leader and organizer of the working people and peasants in a fight for improved conditions. Therefore, such a party must demand that every one of its members play an active part in the organization; and, while the leading bodies were elected at congresses of delegates from the branches, between congresses there must be a disciplined carrying out of their decisions, and disciplined obedience to the instructions of the leading bodies in the party. The election of leaders must be accompanied by an &amp;quot; almost military discipline &amp;quot;in the execution of instructions, for the struggle that this party had to lead would be, in certain circumstances, a military struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Towards the end of 1916, when the people of Russia were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the policy of the Tsarist Government, the Bolsheviks played a prominent part, particularly in the towns and in the army, in leading strikes and demonstrations, and in carrying on propaganda for peace among the soldiers. When, in February 1917, as a result of strikes, mass demonstrations, and the refusal of the ranks in the army to continue to obey the orders of officers whom they did not respect, the Bolsheviks played a leading part in directing this unrest into channels which would force the Tsarist Government to resign. Immediately after the abdication, when the workers set up Soviets in one town after another, the Bolsheviks were among the most active participants in these Soviets, At the end of March, returning to Petrograd from exile in Siberia, Stalin wrote: &amp;quot;The more compact these Soviets, and the more strongly they are organized, the more genuinely do they express the revolutionary power of the revolutionary people, and the more certain is the guarantee provided against counter-revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Revolutionary Social Democrats must work to strengthen these Soviets, to make them universal, to establish contact between them under a Central Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies as the organ of the revolutionary power of the people.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And when, in April, Lenin returned from exile in Switzerland, he at once put forward the slogan, &amp;quot;All Power to the Soviets,&amp;quot; and the Party proceeded everywhere to carry on propaganda for the Soviets to seize State power, to put an end to the war, to confiscate the landlords’ estates, and to nationalize the main industrial enterprises. In June 1917 there took place the first Congress of Soviets. The Bolsheviks had 100 delegates out of a total of 781. Their demands were turned down by the Congress. They continued their propaganda among the people; they continued to organize the workers in trade unions and to mobilize the peasants round the village Soviets. They continued their propaganda against the war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Between April and October 1917 a number of leading Bolsheviks were arrested by the Provisional Government. But, in spite of this, their influence grew by leaps and bounds. When, at the beginning of November, it was clear that at any time the Government might set up a military dictatorship and suppress all organizations of the workers and peasants, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd organized an armed uprising. On the following day the second Congress of Soviets met in Petrograd. A majority of the delegates were Bolsheviks, there being 390 Bolsheviks out of a total of 649 delegates. Now that they were in a majority in the Congress of Soviets the Bolsheviks proceeded to put their policy into practice. At once a manifesto was issued on peace, the land was socialized and the big estates handed over to the peasants’ Soviets, and the workers in the factories were given those powers of control over the employers which have been described earlier in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this stage there were two other political parties represented in the Soviets. One, the Menshevik Party, had opposed the seizure of power by the Soviets and demanded the calling of a &amp;quot;Constituent Assembly&amp;quot; or All-Russian Parliament. But this demand received but little support from the population, who already had power in their own hands through the Soviets, and found that the Soviet Government was pursuing a policy which was completely in their interests. The other party was that of the Social Revolutionaries, a party of the peasantry, whose main demand had been the socialization of the land. As soon as the Second Congress had declared the transfer of the landed estates to the peasantry, the main item in the Social Revolutionary program was fulfilled, and from then on the Social Revolutionaries had no really important matters of policy on which they could appeal to the mass of the people against the Bolsheviks. As a result, a large section of the Social Revolutionaries joined the Central Executive Committee and worked in co-operation with the Bolsheviks. And, as the prestige of the Bolshevik Party grew, many of the members from the ranks of the other parties came over to them and joined the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the new Soviet Government was in existence it was possible to support it and be represented in it, or to work against it and try to overthrow it. The landlords deprived of their estates, the big financiers and employers of labor, and all those who, in principle, were opposed to a workers’ State organized like any other working-class organization, prepared to unite their forces for an armed attack on the Soviet State. It so came about that the Mensheviks lined up with the employers, and proceeded to armed action against the Soviets. And, at a later stage, the core of that part of the Social Revolutionary Party that still preserved its independence, and which was ready to oppose the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets by every means within its power, democratic or otherwise, attempted to organize an armed uprising against the Soviet Government. Recognizing the impossibility of being returned to the Soviets in a majority by the democratic votes of the people, these parties attempted to seize power by armed force. The State, therefore, used armed force against them, and they were deprived of their legality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It so came about that the party which had a majority of delegates in the Soviets became the only political party. Of the other parties, some of the members joined the Bolsheviks, and others tried to organize an armed uprising against the Soviet State. The former went to increase the membership of the Party, which already was supported by the vast majority of the population, and the others joined the armed counter-revolutionary forces, and were suppressed as a result.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, as a result of the fact that their policy appealed to a majority of the whole people, the Bolsheviks won control of the Soviets between February and October 1917. And, when they already had a majority and their prestige was increasing from day to day, they were still ready to work together with any other party that supported the Soviet State and was ready to work peacefully within it. As, however, the other parties split into those who supported the Soviets and came increasingly close to the Bolsheviks, and those who opposed the Soviets and tried to overthrow them by force, the latter were suppressed by force by the Soviet State, which had the support of the vast majority of the people. The Bolshevik Party, which had caused the Soviets to seize power, was in the end left as the only party faithful to the Soviet State that it had brought into being, but it was now an organization with great prestige throughout the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as the Bolshevik Party was left as the only political party in the Soviet State, a danger arose that this organization, because it was in power, might draw to itself careerists, unscrupulous individualists, and individuals who had not the welfare of the people at heart, but merely their own personal advancement. In 1920, in face of this danger, Lenin wrote: &amp;quot;We are afraid of too wide a growth of the Party, as place-seekers and adventurers, who deserve only to be shot, do their utmost to get into the ruling Party. The last time we opened wide the doors of the Party for work-men and peasants only was […] when the Soviet Republic was in mortal danger, and when the adventurers, place-seekers, charlatans, and unreliable persons generally could in no way rely upon making a profitable career (in fact could sooner expect the gallows and torture) by joining the Communists &amp;quot; (Left-Wing Communism). In fact, the Party, in order effectively to represent the very best elements in the working population, must restrict its membership. Party membership must not become cheap !&lt;br /&gt;
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And how, it may be asked, was it to be ensured that those who were in the Party should not become divorced from the rest of the population? Were there not dangers that a small political organization, holding great power in its hands, might become isolated from the people whom it professed to represent? It was precisely in order to combat this danger that Lenin took the initiative in organizing what has come to be known as the &amp;quot;Party Cleansing,&amp;quot; which consists of public meetings, in town, village, and the army, where, every few years. Party members must in public justify their membership of this Party which claims to be the &amp;quot;organized vanguard of the working people.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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At such cleansings, which I have personally attended, every Party member must give an account of his or her life, of the part they have played in the struggle for improved conditions of the working people, and of the work they are doing today. Any person present may put questions. Any person present may speak. And so the merits of each Party member are fully discussed. If, at such meetings, certain people prove not to command the respect of their fellows, not to be considered worthy of membership of an organization made up of the best elements in the population; they are expelled from die Party. It is thus a fact, in a way which can be said of no other political party in the world, that there is democratic control by the people over the membership of the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union. And, with this control actually in force, it may be truly said that this Party will represent the best elements of the working people.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sir Walter Citrine, in his &amp;quot;Search for Truth in Russia&amp;quot;, describes the process of the Party Cleansing in these words: &amp;quot;A Commission is sent to the factory. The members of the Party are called up before them in front of the workers, both Party and non-Party. He is required to tell his life’s history, especially what he has done and is doing for the Revolution. Anyone can question him regarding both private and public matters, and, after he has been turned inside out, the Commission makes its decision.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;I remarked that this system made a spy of every man on his neighbor, and my companion again admitted that it was the duty of every worker to keep an eye on the actions and words of his fellows, and to report anything which seemed hostile to the interests of the working class &amp;quot; (p. 255).&lt;br /&gt;
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Sir Walter called it &amp;quot;spying&amp;quot; if every worker watched his comrade in the Party to see that his words and actions were never hostile to the interests of the working class! And yet what could be more in the interests of the working people, and of democracy for the working people, than that every member of the Party which professed to represent them should be subject to such supervision, and to public criticism if he did not fulfill all the conditions generally considered necessary to a member of the &amp;quot;organized vanguard&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is this particular relationship between the Party in the U.S.S.R. and the people which causes the people to look upon the Party members, in general, as their best representatives. For they themselves play a part in seeing that only their best representatives shall be members of the Party! Under such conditions it is not surprising that, more often than not, at elections to the Soviets, to the committees of trade unions, and, to the boards of management of collective farms, members of the Party are elected! It is in this way, and in this way only, that the Bolshevik Party dominates the Soviet Union at the present time. But, since it has the status of the recognized leadership of the whole people, the Bolshevik Party dominates the policy of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Left-Wing Communism, written as early as 1920, Lenin said: &amp;quot;Not a single important political or organizational question is decided by any State institution in our Republic without the guiding instructions of the Central Committee of the Party.&amp;quot; But this power of the Party, Lenin goes on to show, rests on the will of the working people themselves: &amp;quot;In carrying out its work, the Party rests directly on the trade unions. […] Without the closest connection with the trade unions, without their hearty support and self-sacrificing work, not only in the economic, but also in military organization, it would have been, of course, impossible to govern the country and to maintain the dictatorship for two and a half years, or even for two and a half months.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Actually, the formal relationship between the Party and the State in the Soviet Union is not fundamentally different from that of, say, the Conservative Party in Britain today and the British State. The policy of the patty which has a majority in the British Parliament becomes the policy of the Government. So, in the U.S.S.R., the decisions of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, since the Bolsheviks are an absolute majority in the Government, become decisions of the Government.&lt;br /&gt;
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But under the conditions of Socialism every member of the ruling Party is also usually a worker in some State or other collective organization. Therefore he receives instructions as a Party member from the Central Committee at the same time as he receives State instructions as a State employee. When in the U.S.S.R. today the Central Committee of the Party decides that a new decree is necessary, it circulates its decision to its members; and those who are in the Government see that it becomes law; those that are working throughout the U.S.S.R. in every kind of occupation see that, locally, this Party decision and State law is carried out. Purely as a matter of convenience, the informing of Party members of decisions of their Central Committee which are also made law by the Government, and the publication of the law itself, are often telescoped together into one act. It happens that a new decree of the Soviet Government may appear signed by the representative of the Government, and by Stalin, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. Actually this simply means that a certain decision of the Party, signed by Stalin, has been adopted as a decree of the Government, signed by the representative of the Government.&lt;br /&gt;
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Publication over the two signatures simultaneously, for the two organizations, merely saves time and space. It does not mean that Stalin or the Party have any right to sign Government documents, or vice versa.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is often asked: What is the position of Stalin in the Soviet State? Constitutionally, the answer is that Stalin’s position in the U.S.S.R. is similar to that of Mr. Baldwin in Britain today. He is the recognized and elected leader of the ruling party. On the other hand, there is this difference—that whereas Mr. Baldwin chooses, as is the British convention, to be Prime Minister as well, Stalin prefers, as leader of his party, not to accept an important Government position as well, since he has enough to do already. In actual practice, whereas Mr. Baldwin can only claim to represent a certain section of the population of Britain, Stalin can claim that he and his party have the support of the overwhelming majority of the people of the country. Therefore, in the U.S.S.R., Stalin, as the leader of a very popular ruling party, is acclaimed as the leader of the whole people, a thing which even the most sycophantic Press would hardly try to claim for Mr. Baldwin in Britain today!&lt;br /&gt;
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In connection with the status of Stalin in the U.S.S.R. I feel I must refer to one point of criticism which is raised in common by the Webbs, by Andre Gide, and by Sir Walter Citrine. This is the phenomenon described by the Webbs in their book as &amp;quot;the adulation of Stalin.&amp;quot; Any reader of the Soviet Press, with an eye and ear trained to the English language, is likely to be sometimes shocked by references to &amp;quot;our dearly beloved Stalin,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;our glorious leader,&amp;quot; and so on. This matter has often struck foreign observers, and is cited time and again as evidence of a servile attitude on the part of the population towards Stalin, and thus as symptomatic of a lack of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Personally, I must frankly admit that for at least three years in the U.S.S.R. I was often unfavorably impressed by the lavish way in which love and praise of Stalin was expressed in public utterances of all types of Soviet citizens. To the English ear such words seemed to be more appropriate to religion than to modern politics, and there is no doubt that I, too, was at first affected in the same way as the Webbs by this. But my feelings on this matter were completely changed when I happened one day to see a letter from a young worker to his brother. It began: &amp;quot;Honored Beloved Brother&amp;quot; These were the same words, or words closely similar to, those which had been thoroughly unpleasing to me when addressed to Stalin, because in English they suggested degradation and servility! But the young Russian used them to his brother. And when I suggested that he should simply write &amp;quot; Dear Brother &amp;quot; he was literally shocked. The English have a reputation for being a cold-blooded nation!&lt;br /&gt;
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When Andre Gide began a letter to Stalin in the same words which he would have used in French, his guide suggested that a little verbal embroidery was necessary. Gide was shocked. But if I wrote to Andre Gide in French tomorrow, and finished up &amp;quot;yours sincerely,&amp;quot; Gide would certainly consider that I did not know French, or that I was being rude. The French, you see, happen to conclude their letters with a rigmarole which, to the English, seems artificial and somewhat servile.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the Webbs discover a &amp;quot;deliberate exploitation by the governing junta of the emotion of hero-worship, of the traditional reverence of the Russian people for a personal autocrat,&amp;quot; they substantiate this view by examples of an apparent extravagance of language such as we have mentioned, which in English appears utterly ridiculous. And, while it is obviously not going to be the policy of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. to try to stimulate hatred of its leaders, but the opposite, I feel that the translation of the language used gives an utterly unreal picture of the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the people of the U.S.S.R. wish to express their loyalty to their recognized leader they can only do it in their own language. Actually, the language of the oriental peoples of the U.S.S.R. is even more flowery than Russian. If the Russian worker writes to his brother as &amp;quot;dearly beloved,&amp;quot; we must not consider these words to be servile when coming from a group of collective farmers and addressed to Stalin. On the contrary, they are fraternal words, brotherly words, and not servile words. When these facts are taken into account I think it is true to say that not one example of the &amp;quot;adulation of Stalin&amp;quot; which the Webbs give contains any example of adulation greater than the words expressed by millions of British workers about Dimitrov at the time of the Leipzig trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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All people when in foreign countries tend to assume that they understand the language better than they do, and are happy if they can translate sentences phrase by phrase without a dictionary. Both the Webbs and Andre Gide, cultured people as they are, have not absorbed the idiom of the Russian language. By mechanical translation they have made errors of interpretation which can have serious political repercussions; for the question of whether the Russian workers address Stalin in the way that Lady Houston wrote about the late King or as the Archbishop of Canterbury addresses God, or as one workman addresses his brother, is a question of vital importance in considering the degree of democracy which exists today in the U.S.S.R. Actually, as I discovered after three years, the workers of the U.S.S.R. use the same words in writing to Stalin as in writing to a much admired brother.&lt;br /&gt;
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The relations between the Soviet State and the Communist International have also aroused curiosity. But there should be no mystery about this matter. In Brussels there is located the Labor land Socialist International. If, in Belgium, the people return the Socialist Party to power, a situation would exist in which the ruling party was a member of the Socialist International located on Belgian territory. But that would not make the Belgian Government and the International synonymous organizations. Now it unfortunately happens that only a country where the Communist Party is in power will allow the Communist International the right to be located on its territory. Therefore the Communist International is situated in Moscow, on Soviet territory. But the connection goes no further than this. It is true, of course, that Stalin is a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. But so is Harry Pollitt. And, in Belgium, the leader of the Socialist Party is a member of the Executive of the Labor and Socialist International.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is one final aspect of the status of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. which may raise questions in the minds of many readers. We have already mentioned, in dealing with factory management in the U.S.S.R., that on the Triangle, which virtually controls the affairs of a Soviet factory, there sits a representative of the Party organization in the factory. To those who look upon political parties as parliamentary parties, such a state of affairs suggests something abnormal—that a political party should enjoy the same status as the appointed representative of the State, the manager; or the elected representative of the workers, the trade union organizer.&lt;br /&gt;
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But it should now be clear that the Party in the U.S.S.R. is hot a parliamentary party. It is the organized political leadership of the people; the organization of their best political representatives. As such, the Party holds the respect of the people, and they are absolutely willing that this organization of theirs should be represented on such bodies as the Triangle in the factory. The democratic importance of political representation of the working people, as distinct from their mass representation through the State and trade unions, is being clearly demonstrated at the present time in Spain. As soon as the armed struggle began between the Fascist rebels and the elected Government, the parties of the Workers’ Alliance, which together formed the recognized leadership of the people, just as the Communist Party does in the U.S.S.R. today, began to undertake all kinds of activities which previously had been activities of the State. They undertook these activities because the people supported such action, and the Workers’ Alliance continued to be, not merely a parliamentary combination of forces, but a leader and organizer of the working people in their fight for democracy. As a result of this, it is reported from Spain that, attached to every regiment, there are &amp;quot;political commissars,&amp;quot; representing the parties of the Workers’ Alliance. So, alongside the organizations of State, such as the army and the organs of administration, there is a political leadership, consisting of &amp;quot;political commissars,&amp;quot; representatives of those parties who form the organized vanguard of the people in their struggle. Such political leadership no doubt also exists today in all the factories that have been taken over by the State.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet Union, in the course of the transfer of the factories from private hands to the State, this same political leadership became necessary, just as it did in the army during the fight against foreign intervention. The Party began in this way to play a leading part in the administration, together with the appointed official of the State, and the elected representative of the trade unions. While, if a party that did not command the support of the vast majority of the population acted in this way, the people would resent such action and oppose it; when it is done by a party of a new kind, consisting only of the recognized best elements drawn from the ranks of the people themselves, they give it their full support.&lt;br /&gt;
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The one-party system in the U.S.S.R. has developed as a result of the will of the people. Having once returned to power a party which immediately passed a number of laws, basically changing the relations between worker and employer, peasant and landlord, to the advantage of the working people, they found that this party was their very own in a way in which no political organization had ever previously been, Finding that they were able to exercise control over the membership of tins party by cleaning out all elements which they considered hostile to their interests, they found that they could really ensure that this party contained all that was best among them. In this way, at every election, the members of the party tended to be returned in a majority; and the idea of allowing other parties to be organized, trying to oust this party from power, was rejected by the people as being a means by which the enemies of the working people might try to return to power.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet State there has developed a one-party system. It arose as a result of the operation of the will of the vast majority of the people. It occurred democratically.&lt;br /&gt;
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But now, today, when the Soviet system is securely on its feet, does not this one-party system prove a limitation to real democracy? This is the question which must now be answered.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Is a &amp;quot;Party System&amp;quot; Necessary ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State, we have seen, was set up as an organization of the whole working population of the country, for the purpose of pursuing their common interests, and for improving their own conditions at the expense of the employing class. The Soviet State has always had the structure of a workers’ organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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But does anyone ever suggest that a &amp;quot;party system&amp;quot; is necessary to democracy in an organization of the working people for a common purpose? Has anyone ever criticized trade unions as being undemocratic on the grounds that there is no system of political parties within them? And the same question may be asked concerning the myriads of other democratic organizations that exist in the capitalist world today, from trade unions to the businessmen’s West End clubs, from the League of Nations Union to table-tennis societies. In all these organizations the officers are elected by the members to carry out the will of the members. These organizations may differ in the degree of their democracy, but nobody attacks them as undemocratic because, at their elections of officers, rival parties do not put up rival candidates.&lt;br /&gt;
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The essential fact about democratic organizations is population. And these continuous conflicts can only be based on rival—as opposed to common—interests among the people themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we look back at the historical development of the British Parliament we find that it arose as a means, not for uniting the community in a common interest, but for reconciling conflicting interests. In its origin Parliament was an institution in which the conflicting interests of the two classes, landowners and industrialists, were reconciled. The Tory Party in its early days was the direct instrument of the landowners, the Whig Party—of the capitalists. Each party, at elections, tried to include within its program sufficient promises to win a majority of the electorate, in order to be returned to office and to pursue a policy consistent with the interests of the class which it represented.&lt;br /&gt;
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As time went on, the landlords of Britain became increasingly fused with the industrialists. The landlords went into business, and the business men acquired land by purchase or marriage. The landlord and capitalist classes in Britain became fused into one; and the development of Whig and Tory Parties into Liberal and Conservative reflected this uniting of the two classes. The two parties now began to represent rival factions in the one ruling class of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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But such a system, in which the political parties represented conflicting tendencies within one class, only continued for the very short historical period when the power of the landowner-capitalists was uncontested. Soon the working class forced its way into politics, and a new alignment began to develop a Conservative-Liberal Coalition against Labor. Today the property-owning class in Britain is almost completely united behind a single political party—the so-called &amp;quot;National &amp;quot; Coalition. As far as the employers are concerned, we have the operation, with only a small minority of dissentients, of the principle &amp;quot;One class, one party.&amp;quot; The Labor Movement, in so far as it does not also realize this principle, is unable to put forward an effective challenge to the ruling &amp;quot;National&amp;quot; Government of the employers, so that we see that the Party system is closely bound up with the existence of classes in society and their conflicting interests.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is completely misleading to refer to a &amp;quot;party system&amp;quot; as in any way typical of democratic institutions. The &amp;quot;party system&amp;quot; is a very particular form of democracy, of an exceptional character, which has arisen only in the parliamentary State as a means by which conflicting classes could reconcile their differences without resort to arms. As we have seen from examples of working-class organizations and peaceful clubs of business men, when a society exists for pursuing the common aims of its members there is no place within it for a &amp;quot;party system.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Soviet State was set up by the people of Russia for pursuing their common interests. The system of election, adopted from the very start, was that of discussing each candidate, his merits and shortcomings, with a view to deciding whether he was suitable to represent the electors on the public authorities of the country. Would this delegate be the best representative of the electors? Would he be the best equipped of them to see that their instructions were carried out on the Soviet to which he was elected? Clearly, where elections took the form of sending delegates to the public authorities, with instructions as to the policy they were to pursue, there was no longer any place for &amp;quot;parties &amp;quot; presenting opposing programs to the people.&lt;br /&gt;
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So a &amp;quot;party system&amp;quot; became out of place in the Soviet State, just as a &amp;quot;party system&amp;quot; is quite out of place in a working-class organization in any capitalist country at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Other questions are sometimes raised in this connection: Surely in the U.S.S.R. everyone does not agree? Surely there must be discussion on various questions ? Certainly there is disagreement and there is discussion. And, as most foreign observers are bound to admit, there is, if anything, too much discussion, rather than too little, from the standpoint of efficient execution. But disagreement and discussion are no basis for the formation of political parties unless there are groups of people, with certain continuous common interests, who are ready to unite together for a continuous period on a number of basic issues.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, to take recent legislation in the U.S.S.R., many people did not approve of the law prohibiting abortion; many had amendments to propose to the draft of the new Constitution; many may not have approved of the model statutes for the collective farms; and many may not have liked the reduction of interest on State loans from 8 arid 7 to 4 and 3 percent overnight! But an opposition political party could hardly have been organized out of these individuals, because there was no definite group of citizens affected by all these issues in the same way. There is no reason why the same person that disliked certain clauses in the abortion law should have opposed any of the other measures. There is no reason why the person who disliked the reduction in rates of interest should also have been a strong supporter of legal abortion. There is no reason why a person who did not like the model statutes for the collective farm should have opposed the new Constitution of the Soviet State. In this way, since there exist no longer permanently conflicting group interests in the Soviet State, where all are working for the general improvement in the living conditions of the whole community, there can be no basis for a political &amp;quot;party system&amp;quot; such as exists in the parliamentary State in a class society.&lt;br /&gt;
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But say; there is one recruiting-ground for an &amp;quot;opposition party.&amp;quot; There are still people—disgruntled individuals; ex-employers or Tsarist officials; deposed leaders from the working-class movement itself; people who are constitutionally &amp;quot;counter-suggestible&amp;quot; and for whom Soviet psychologists have not yet evolved a cure; people with personal grievances against certain Government officials; people who oppose every measure of the Soviet Government, not on its merits, but because it is a measure passed by the Government; and others like them—who may be &amp;quot;against the Government,&amp;quot; though having no alternative positive program to propose. Such types of citizens exist in the Soviet Union today. It is only they who have anything in common that would bring them together continually as a permanent opposition party.&lt;br /&gt;
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But such elements are well known to the working-class movement, and to every democratic organization throughout the world. They are the people who, in every democratic organization, do not command respect, and therefore resort to every form of obstruction in order to draw attention to themselves or to avenge themselves for being ignored. Is the Soviet State to encourage such people to form a political party, to carry on purely negative propaganda on every issue, attacking each measure of the Government, not on its merits, but on principle? The people of the U.S.S.R. do not want such a party, and they support the Government in seeing that such disruptive organizations shall not come into existence.&lt;br /&gt;
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For what would the effect of such a party be under existing conditions in the U.S.S.R.? It would be a resort of every remnant of opposition to the working-class movement of the Soviet Union. Ex-employers and ex-opponents of the system, agents of foreign Powers and people who were under their influence—all the social undesirables would flock round such an organization in order to discredit the Soviet Government and to impede the progress which it is making.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, an &amp;quot;opposition party&amp;quot; would be the means by which all that is hostile to the Soviet system would find expression and a means of organizing itself. This is a procedure which the people of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the types already mentioned, are unanimous in preventing.&lt;br /&gt;
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We come to the conclusion that in the Soviet Union today a party system would be as incongruous as a party system within, say, a British trade union. In a community or an organization where the members have common interests there is no place for a party system.&lt;br /&gt;
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In so far as, in the British trade unions, something approaching party disputes has developed, this is a weakness of the movement, and not its strength. Anything approaching conflicting parties in the trade unions can only arise as a result of serious conflicts within the working class. Not much investigation is necessary to discover that such disputes invariably center round one question: Shall the trade unions be fighting organizations against the employers or not?&lt;br /&gt;
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The faction that answers &amp;quot;No&amp;quot; to this question can be looked upon as an employers’ &amp;quot;party&amp;quot; within the trade unions, the existence of which causes the trade unions to be less effective as a democratic organization of the workers against the employers. Really effective trade unionism would include no employers’ &amp;quot;party,&amp;quot; and would be united on the basis of militant struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the case against the existence of a &amp;quot;party system&amp;quot; is not necessarily a justification for the continued existence of a single political party. Therefore we must now consider further the role of the single party in the U.S.S.R. today, and whether its existence is consistent with democracy or not.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us imagine that at some future date, in Britain, a Labor Party was returned to power, pledged to a radical program of change in the interests of the hand-and-brain workers of Britain, who amount to over 80 percent of the population of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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Suppose that, to meet the opposition of the property-owners, emergency measures had to be taken, which received the support of the vast majority of the people of the country, who organized strikes and demonstrations of support. Suppose that the property-owners then organized armed opposition, and that the people took up arms on behalf of their own Government. Suppose that, in the course of the struggle, all that was best in the other political organizations of the country came over to the support of the Government, as representing the will of the democracy of Britain. And suppose that what remained of other political organizations, representing the interests of private property at all costs, supported the taking up of arms against the State. In such conditions would not the prestige of the party in power grow? Would not the people, as they fought for the Government of this party which represented their interests, come to the conclusion that this party, which represented them against the attacks of the property-owners, should never again go out of office?&lt;br /&gt;
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Suppose, moreover, that this party of the working-people, finding itself in a position in which it was called upon to lead its supporters, not only by appealing to them at elections, but in organizing their struggle against the counter-attack of the employers in every locality and in every factory, decided only to admit as members those who played an active part in its work, and abolished such offices as that of subscribing member.&amp;quot; Suppose, too, that in order to prevent careerists creeping into its ranks, it started to hold public cleansings, in which all workers would report on the actions and speeches of the party members, with a view to eliminating all that did not loyally represent the working people: would not the introduction of such features strengthen this one party, so that the people would become determined to improve its personnel more and more, but never to let this party, as such, be put out of office again?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is by regarding the question of a single party in this light—as a possible line of future development in our own country—that I think the question can be most clearly seen in its correct perspective. We can see that in certain conditions, the people might democratically support a &amp;quot;one-party&amp;quot; system. They would do this in conditions similar to the experience of the Russian Revolution, when a serious conflict occurred between the people and their party on the one hand and the property-owners on the other, and when the party of the people in such circumstances led their struggle for democratic rights against the attempts of property to suppress them. A party that led the people in such a struggle would gain enormously in prestige.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, at the victorious conclusion of the struggle, a situation arose in which this one party now combined all the most active fighters for the liberty of the people, is it likely that the people would ask that the other parties, the parties of their enemies, should once more be given an opportunity to rule? Is it likely that the people would want the political organizations that had taken up arms against them to be again afforded legal rights as soon as they had been defeated in the military struggle? Obviously the reverse is the case. At the end of such a struggle the people would not ask that the other parties be allowed to operate again, but, on the contrary, they would do everything to strengthen the one party that had shown itself to be their leader in the struggle. The people would choose in the future to have a one-party system, since now the one party would be the only one that they could absolutely trust.&lt;br /&gt;
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But might they not ask that this party be disbanded, and that a system without any political party be introduced ? Here, I think, the answer is in the negative. For, in the course of the struggle, the party would have established itself, not as a parliamentary party of the old type, but as the organized leadership of the people. And it is as such, not as a parliamentary organization, that they would want it to continue to exist. Lenin, writing in 1920, made the following illuminating comment on the position of the party after the workers have established a system of real democracy:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Classes remain, and will remain for years, everywhere after the proletarian conquest of power. Perhaps in England, where there is no peasantry, the period will be shorter, but even there the small proprietors, holders of property, exist. […] The dictatorship of the proletariat is a resolute persistent struggle, sanguinary and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative, against the forces and traditions of the old society. . . . Without an iron party, hardened in fight, without a party possessing the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of observing the disposition of the masses and of influencing it successfully, to conduct such a struggle is impossible. [...] Whoever in the least weakens the iron discipline of the party of the proletariat (especially during its dictatorship) aids in reality the bourgeoisie against the proletariat&amp;quot; (Left-Wing Communism).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the view of Lenin, the party, as the organized leadership of the mass of the people, must not be disbanded after the seizure of power, but, on the contrary. must be strengthened, in order to ensure that the real democracy achieved should not again be overthrown by the armed forces of the property-owners. And in dealing with this one party Lenin stresses the essential need for discipline in a period of historic struggle between the working people on the one hand and the owners of property on the other. In the next chapter we shall discuss this question of discipline further;, for it is the greatest of errors to assume, as is sometimes done, that democracy and discipline are mutually exclusive terms. Actually, the only effective democracy of the people must be a disciplined democracy, for &amp;quot;democracy&amp;quot; of the people without discipline is sheer anarchy, and no anarchy has ever been able to preserve its independence against the opposition of an organized enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now, in conclusion, a few words must be said about one more problem. Criticism is often raised that in the U.S.S.R. today the ruling party consists of only about 2 million members out of a total population of 170 million. It is maintained that this organization is so small that its domination in the State cannot be anything but undemocratic. First, as a matter of information, it is worth pointing out that not only are there 2 million members of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R., but an additional 5 or 6 million members of the Communist Youth, from which the best representatives later join the Party. However, this is a minor point, and the actual criticism can be faced even if we take the critic’s minimum figure of 2 million Party members in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two facts must be borne in mind about the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. First, it is a party of active workers; there are no &amp;quot;paying members&amp;quot; who do no work. Every member is an active member. Secondly, as stressed by Lenin, the Party must not be allowed to grow too rapidly, for that would mean deterioration in quality, and deterioration in the quality of a body which forms the &amp;quot;organized leadership&amp;quot; of the community would have disastrous results. Finally, in order to appreciate the size of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in comparison with the political parties of Britain we must have our facts clear, and not misrepresent them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The individual membership of the Labor Party in Britain today amounts to between 300,000 and 400,000. But it would probably not be going too far to estimate that less than one in 20 of these are active members. So that the proportion of the Labor Party membership which is strictly comparable to the membership of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.—all of which is active—is about 5 percent. The membership of the British Labor Party that is active in doing the party’s work among the people of Britain can be put at about 15,000 or 20,000. This is about one in every 3,200 of population at the minimum, and at the most about one in every 2,400 of the population. And yet, if a Labor Government were returned to power, I cannot imagine anyone complaining that the party did not represent the people &amp;quot;because it is so small.&amp;quot; Yet, as compared with the U.S.S.R., a ruling party that comprised only one person in every 2,000 or 3,000 of the population would be regarded as a very small party. For the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. includes 2 million members—one in every 85 citizens! So, while the Labor Party in Britain may boast of its size, and claim one active worker for every 2,000 or 3,000 of the people, in the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party is criticized as being unrepresentative because one in every 85 citizens is an active member!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the argument does not finish here. For, if it is true that the Labor Party in Britain can claim one in every 2,000 or 3,000 inhabitants as its active members, the other political parties certainly each have less active members than the Labor Party. Therefore, taking all the political parties in Britain together their combined active membership cannot amount to more than one in every 1,000 of the population. So that, taking the whole of our parliamentary system, the political parties that are the only organizations putting up candidates at elections comprise about one active member for every thousand of the people of the country. Dictatorship by a small minority ? Yes, indeed, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party claims one in every 85 of the population, and can thus claim to be comparatively representative!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, let me again remind you of the Party Cleansing in the U.S.S.R., by which the ordinary citizen exercises control over the membership of his Party. What control have we poor British citizens over the one thousandth of our population that makes itself active in politics? If I do not like the type of people who become politicians in this country, I have no opportunity of seeing that others take their place. We have no cleansing of our political parties at public meetings to ensure that they shall only represent the very best elements of the people! No wonder, then, that in disgust many British citizens never exercise their right to vote at all, disliking all the politicians who are thrust at them by the one-thousandth of the population organized as active members of our great political parties!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No; the criticism that the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R, is too small to represent the people is nonsense. It is the greatest political party in any country of the world. It is also the greatest in proportion to population. It is greater in proportion to the total population that it represents than all the active members of political parties in Britain put together. And it is subject to democratic control by the people themselves in the institution of the Party Cleansing. It is not incomprehensible that such an organization commands the respect of the whole population, and that Soviet democrats demand that this form of leadership shall be preserved, and that rival organizations aiming at disuniting the people shall not be permitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Democratic Discipline and Freedom of Opposition ===&lt;br /&gt;
We come now to a question which has been very frequently raised during the past year, a matter which has been brought once more into the limelight by the trials of opposition groups which have taken place in Moscow. This is the question of &amp;quot;freedom of opposition&amp;quot; under Soviet conditions, and the extent to which such freedom is justifiably limited in the interests of democratic discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, if we consider any kind of democratic organization in any part of the world, we find that it has to be concerned, not only with preserving its members’ freedom of individual expression, but also with preserving the majority of members from individuals and minorities who occupy hours of valuable time with unpopular speeches, and who thus obstruct action in the interests of the majority. If we take a business men’s club with its proverbial bore, a shareholders’ meeting with the usual shareholder with a grievance, or the trade union branch with the member who is consistently a nuisance, we find that every organization, professing to be run in the interests of the majority, must take steps to protect this majority against undisciplined minorities. Democracy, therefore, does not mean simply giving individuals the opportunity to voice their personal views, but also it means that the people shall have the opportunity to refuse to hear those whose views are antagonistic to them, and the expression of which is an obstruction to the carrying out of a generally accepted policy. In democratic societies functioning within the capitalist State, such persons may be simply expelled from their organizations. But the Soviet State cannot simply expel recalcitrant &amp;quot;members,&amp;quot; for two principal reasons. First, the surrounding States might not accept the persons expelled; and secondly, such persons, once expelled, might be far more use to the enemies of the community than if kept within its frontiers. Trotsky was simply expelled from the Workers’ State—and his activities since have confirmed the Mew that less harm would have been done if he had been isolated in Siberia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the problems of a democratic organization become those of a State as well, and of a State surrounded by hostile States, simple expulsion of minorities that obstruct the common business is no longer practicable. In dealing with such cases the Soviet State is forced by circumstances to remove such persons from society, while keeping them within its frontiers. This is why, in the U.S.S.R., certain offenders against the will of the majority may be sent into exile.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is only when this question of political exile is seen as the Soviet equivalent of expulsion, as practiced by democratic organizations elsewhere, that it can be fully understood. The Soviet State is a workers’ organization. Workers’ organizations expel obstructionists, and, however democratic they are, they will still have to face the problem of so dealing with such people. The Soviet State has the same problem, but it cannot expel these people from its territory as a rule, simply because they are not acceptable to the rulers of the territory outside the U.S.S.R. Further, the expulsion of people who are enemies of the majority of the people of the U.S.S.R. would be in general unwise, for it would be giving them an opportunity to carry on their activity from outside, thus strengthening the enemies of the U.S.S.R..&lt;br /&gt;
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Some readers may be a little disturbed at this somewhat brutal statement of the case, under Soviet conditions, for exiling political opponents. But nobody must be misled by what I have said into thinking that anyone who disagrees with any person in authority is exiled in the U.S.S.R.. On the contrary, there is a phenomenal amount of discussion in the U.S.S.R. by the general public on all vital issues. The Soviet citizen who is exiled is not a person who has simply disagreed. It is the person who, having made proposals and having been defeated, continues to obstruct all constructive business by repeatedly putting forward again and again the rejected point of view, and who thus becomes a thorn in the flesh of the whole of society. Such was Trotsky, who for years was putting forward his minority views at every popular gathering in opposition to the leaders of the Soviet Government, and who was finally exiled because he was organizing secret groups to oppose the policy democratically adopted by the whole people. He was thus obstructing the further development of the country in the direction decided upon by the people, and was expelled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The extent to which the Soviet Government must be vigilant on such questions as discipline is determined, not by the structure of the Soviet State alone, but by the fact that it is surrounded by a hostile world. It is quite impossible to realize the full implications of discipline in the U.S.S.R. by simply comparing, as we have so far done, the Soviet State with democratic organizations elsewhere. In order to obtain a true picture we must make our comparison with other democratic organizations at a time when they are waging a struggle for their existence, when they are carrying on some great militant campaign in the interests of their members and are being subjected to every kind of attack. The Soviet State surrounded by a capitalist and partly Fascist world cannot be compared with a trade union in a period of industrial peace. It must be compared with a trade union during an industrial dispute. And we all know that, in an industrial dispute, a union will exercise disciplinary pressure on its members of a kind that will not be considered necessary in time of peace.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since it was first created, the Soviet State has been waging a struggle against enemies both inside and outside its territory. Being a democratic State of the working people, it came into conflict with the landowners and employers from the very beginning of its existence. These enemies, with foreign help, took up arms against the Soviet State. The State had to wage a war for its freedom. Later it had to wage a war against the small capitalist minority in the villages, and, all along, it has had to build up its defenses and consolidate itself against a possible further attack from outside repeating the experiences of 1918 to 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During a strike the members of a trade union have to fight a battle with the employers. Force is used on both sides—the workers try to force the employers to capitulate for fear of loss of profits, and the employers try to coerce the workers from sheer hunger. The workers may resort to putting machinery out of order, to the picketing of factories, and so on. The employers will undoubtedly call in the police on the side of themselves to &amp;quot;protect their property.&amp;quot; What is the attitude of the workers in such circumstances to recalcitrant minorities?&lt;br /&gt;
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In every strike the employer usually finds some individual or group of individuals among the workers who, out of a desire for immediate personal gain, or simply through a lack of knowledge of the issues at stake, is ready to go on working or to persuade fellow workers to accept the bosses’ terms. The employer can find allies among such people, against their own comrades. In every strike the workers picket such deserters, and &amp;quot;peaceful picketing&amp;quot; may be carried, relatively speaking, quite as far as &amp;quot;exile to Siberia,&amp;quot; if we look at the two types of struggle in perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The truth of the matter is that under all conditions a struggle by a democratic organization for its freedom is a limitation on the democratic rights of the opponents of that freedom. And once, in a critical situation, a minority continues to oppose the interests of the majority, such a minority becomes, consciously or not, a weapon of the enemy against the democracy concerned. Here again we only repeat what was said in our Introduction—that democracy and dictatorship are not mutually exclusive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union the application of all decisions by the Soviet authorities is the direct responsibility of every citizen, for every citizen is a worker in some State organization, and every member of a Soviet docs work in one of the departments of that Soviet. In Britain, with its parliamentary system, there is no reason why, within certain limits, continual opposition in Parliament to the policy of the Government should obstruct the carrying out of that policy. If a majority in the British Parliament passes a certain law to-morrow, the opponents of the law may continue verbally to oppose it. But the Civil Service will have to carry it out all the same, and will have no right of criticism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the U.S.S.R. the Civil Service includes the people who oppose the policy decided upon as well as those who support it. In such circumstances it is clear that to continue actively to oppose a decision arrived at by a majority would, in practice, mean sabotaging its execution. So, from a purely organizational standpoint, we see the absolute necessity for the disciplined execution of democratic decisions in the U.S.S.R.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idea that majority decisions should be binding on minorities is generally accepted in Britain as far as the practical execution of these decisions is concerned. But there often remains the idea that while the minority should carry out the decision in practice, it should have the right to oppose its execution in theory at the same time. Such a view, however, is invariably abandoned whenever there is some urgent problem on hand, such as a war, involving the country as a whole, or a strike, involving a trade union. For even in Britain it has been found that concerted action can be obstructed, not only by people refusing to act, but by their encouraging others not to act. Propaganda against carrying out a majority decision may be an even more effective form of sabotage of that decision than a direct refusal to carry it out personally.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the U.S.S.R., where the whole community is in constant action for the general improvement of conditions and for strengthening itself against attack, it is clear that minority opposition to majority decisions might well become a serious obstruction to the carrying out of these decisions, and thus play directly into the hands of the enemies of the U.S.S.R. whose main requirement is to obstruct its internal development.&lt;br /&gt;
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The recognition of the need for discipline in a democratic organization does not necessarily mean, however, any curtailment of the freedom of the ordinary citizen. For, if the ordinary citizen considers such discipline necessary to the common interest, he will personally be an enforcer of such discipline, not a violator, and the discipline will thus be an expression and a defense of his freedom, not a violation of it. This point is of particular importance in discussing such a question as freedom of speech in the U.S.S.R. today.&lt;br /&gt;
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I have often been asked, since returning from the Soviet Union, whether a citizen in Moscow can get up in a park and attack the Government as he can in Hyde Park in this country. My first reply usually is, &amp;quot;God forbid that he should want to!&amp;quot;—for it is hard to imagine a more ineffective freedom than the ability to address a handful of regular Hyde Park listeners on a Sunday afternoon; that is, if one is interested in effective speech that influences people to act, and not simply in exercising one’s lungs, which can be equally well done in a bedroom with the window open.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, it is worth mentioning that the Soviet workers, able to hold their meetings in the assembly rooms of the country free of charge, and being able to meet in their factories to discuss all matters of interest to them, do not need to go to a park to air their views.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But a far more important point than these is the question: Do Soviet workers want to get up and attack their Government in public meetings? And, if certain individuals do want to do this, do the majority of workers want to listen to such speakers? The whole question of freedom of speech is fundamentally answered in the reply to these two questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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First, it is only a supposition of the Englishman, two thousand miles away, that the workers in the U.S.S.R. want to get up and attack the Government. Actually, they are no more likely to want to attack the Soviet Government than trade unionists in Britain are likely to attack trade unionism. The Soviet State has been built up by the organized activity of the people themselves; it is their State, and as such they are interested in defending, not attacking it. Of course, a small minority of people might want to attack the Soviet State, and this was particularly true in the early days when the property-owning class still held considerable influence, and still could command a limited number of spokesmen among the workers and peasants themselves. But these people were a small minority, and cannot be described typical.&lt;br /&gt;
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During five years in the U.S.S.R. I have invariably had the impression that the people have no desire to attack the Government, because they look upon it as their own, and as serving their own interests. Of course, I do not wish to say that there are no persons at all who would like to criticize the Government. There obviously are such people. But if these people are exceptions, and not the rule, then we must take it that there is freedom for the vast majority of the people to express themselves, but that a small minority does not enjoy such freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there is a second aspect to the matter. Freedom does not only consist in the freedom of the individual to harangue the masses, but in the freedom of the masses to choose who shall harangue them. No democratic organization in the world claims to give absolute freedom to every member to put forward indefinitely an unpopular point of view. For obviously such a person at a certain point obstructs the whole work of his democratic organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, during the period from 1924 to 1928, after the death of Lenin, and when Trotsky was repeatedly challenging the policy of the Government, opposition was openly expressed by Trotsky and his followers. But at last, exasperated by the continued attempts of small minorities of Trotskyists to obstruct all business in order to popularize a thoroughly unpopular point of view, the State finally took the step of suppressing this opposition. And this suppression received the general approval of the people, because this form of opposition had become a public nuisance.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet Union today the freedom of workers to criticize their superiors and Government institutions does not extend to freedom to attack the Government as such, because the people as a whole support this Government and to not oppose it. If a foreigner visiting the U.S.S.R. tries, as sometimes happens, to criticize the Soviet Government in the Moscow Park of Culture and Rest—the nearest thing to, though very far from, our Hyde Park—he will have a whole mass of people arguing with him in defense of what they call &amp;quot;our Government.&amp;quot; They will defend this Government by argument, while probably respecting his person as a foreigner to a sufficient extent not to take violent measures. But if the enemy of the Government were a Soviet citizen, the people concerned in the argument might well call the militia to arrest this counter-revolutionary, just as, in Spain today, the people in Government territory would act towards a person who was chalking the walls with swastikas. Would workers want to listen to such speakers? The whole question of freedom of speech is fundamentally answered in the reply to these two questions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, it is only a supposition of the Englishman, two thousand miles away, that the workers in the U.S.S.R. want to get up and attack the Government. Actually, they are no more likely to want to attack the Soviet Government than trade unionists in Britain are likely to attack trade unionism. The Soviet State has been built up by the organized activity of the people themselves; it is their State, and as such they are interested in defending, not attacking it. Of course, a small minority of people might want to attack the Soviet State, and this was particularly true in the early days when the property-owning class still held considerable influence, and still could command a limited number of spokesmen among the workers and peasants themselves. But these people were a small minority, and cannot be described as typical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During five years in the U.S.S.R. I have invariably had the impression that the people have no desire to attack the Government, because they look upon it as their own, and as serving their own interests. Of course, I do not wish to say that there are no persons at all who would like to criticize the Government. There obviously are such people. But if these people are exceptions, and not the rule, then we must take it that there is freedom for the vast majority of the people to express themselves, but that a small minority does not enjoy such freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is a second aspect to the matter. Freedom does not only consist in the freedom of the individual to harangue the masses, but in the freedom of the masses to choose who shall harangue them. No democratic organization in the world claims to give absolute freedom to every member to put forward indefinitely an unpopular point of view. For obviously such a person at certain point obstructs the whole work of his democratic organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, during the period from 1924 to 1928, after the death of Lenin, and when Trotsky was repeatedly challenging the policy of the Government, opposition was openly expressed by Trotsky and his followers. But at last, exasperated by the continued attempts of small minorities of Trotskyists to obstruct all business in order to popularize a thoroughly unpopular point of view, the State finally took the step of suppressing this opposition. And this suppression received the general approval of the people, because this form of opposition had become a public nuisance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union today the freedom of workers to criticize their superiors and Government institutions does not extend to freedom to attack the Government as such, because the people as a whole support this Government and to not oppose it. If a foreigner visiting the U.S.S.R. tries, as sometimes happens, to criticize the Soviet Government in the Moscow Park of Culture and Rest—the nearest thing to, though very far from, our Hyde Park—he will have a whole mass of people arguing with him in defense of what they call &amp;quot;our Government.&amp;quot; They will defend this Government by argument, while probably respecting his person as a foreigner to a sufficient extent not to take violent measures. But if the enemy of the Government were a Soviet citizen, the people concerned in the argument might well call the militia to arrest this counter-revolutionary, just as, in Spain today, the people in Government territory would act towards a person who was chalking the walls with swastikas, or carrying on still more pernicious activity in the interests of Hitler and Franco, enemies of Spanish democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The essential fact which must be appreciated is that in the U.S.S.R. today citizens are not interested in attacking the State or the Government; what concerns them is to improve its work. And every land of discussion, and of criticism, calculated to improve the working of the Soviet State in the interests of the population is, as we have seen, not only allowed, but actively encouraged.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the trials of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Radek and Sokolnikov, took place in Moscow, reference was made in many British newspapers to the significance of these trials as evidence of widespread opposition to the &amp;quot;Stalin regime,&amp;quot; and the impossibility of expressing this opposition by legal means. This interpretation of the facts is the reverse of the truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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If, in the U.S.S.R. today, there were widespread opposition to the Government, there would be the same symptoms as in Fascist Germany: illegally printed leaflets would circulate in the factories, there would be organized discontent among the people throughout the country, occasionally showing itself in some lightning strike or demonstration against the authorities, and batches of workers would be arrested in groups of thirty and forty. But none of these things happen. And since, in Tsarist Russia, such things did occur, it cannot be said to be for lack of experience that they do not occur today. Therefore we can only conclude that such widespread opposition to the Government does not exist, and, whatever the trials do denote, it is not this widespread discontent that some newspaper editors would welcome.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if the Moscow trials do not denote the existence of mass discontent, they do denote the existence of a number of cases of individual discontent so great as to lead to the most dastardly conspiracies against the community. What is the explanation of such cases of personal discontent? Is their existence a serious flaw in the Soviet system of democracy?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is the experience of the working-class movement in all countries that persons who, at one time or another have played a leading part, have at other times had to be expelled from the movement in which they once fought, and have become its avowed enemies. Sir Oswald Mosley can claim to be an old member of the Labor Party, and Mussolini of the Socialist Party of Italy. J. H. Thomas and Ramsay MacDonald were once admired Labor leaders, and Doriot, now one of the most active pro-Fascists in France, was in the Communist Party. Why, in this respect, should the U.S.S.R. differ from all other countries ?&lt;br /&gt;
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In the U.S.S.R., as I have shown, the &amp;quot;expulsion&amp;quot; of members means, in fact, exile. It is therefore more usual than elsewhere that any leading personality rather than accept &amp;quot;expulsion&amp;quot; and retire from activity into exile, will accept majority decisions against himself, and promise henceforth to carry out these decisions as a loyal worker in the Soviet State. But if such loyalty is not genuine, and if the individual concerned is not ready whole-heartedly to accept a decision against himself, he may continue his opposition. How can this be done?&lt;br /&gt;
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Once a majority decision has been arrived at in the U.S.S.R. the people are not going to tolerate continual propaganda against this decision. Therefore, any sponsor of an unpopular policy knows that, after democratic defeat, he will have to cease publicly to propagate his policy. Having no mass support, such a person may start loyally to work for the accepted policy or, determined to put his own leadership and policy across, whether the people want it or not, he may resort to underground means of trying to displace the existing leadership, and thus altering policy. In this way underground opposition activity by rejected leading personalities, people whom the democracy has turned down, is as possible in the U.S.S.R. as such open opposition is possible under capitalism by the expelled Socialists or Communists who become Fascist. It is also clear, I think, that any really democratic State must be ruthless in its treatment of such opposition by people who are rejected by the democracy, and therefore resort to other means of obtaining power in spite of the will of the people which has rejected them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The vital fact which many people are unable to grasp about the U.S.S.R. today, whether they are spokesmen of the Press, the Government, or well-known trade union leaders like Sir Walter Citrine, is that in the U.S.S.R. the Government has the full support of the people. In capitalist countries the idea of a Government with the whole people behind it seems so strange that people are inclined to believe that such a thing is impossible. In the British trade union movement today, also, we can understand Sir Walter Citrine imagining that such a tiling as a Labor movement in which leaders and rank and file are united is impossible. But let us have no illusions on this score. So long as the trade union movement is divided, it will be weak. And, once it is united on the basis of a real working-class policy, it too will have to fight its enemy minorities and to use means of putting an end to their anti-working-class activities. The U.S.S.R. today stands out in the world as a country where people and Government are at one with each other; this is the great strength of the U.S.S.R.; but it is one of the things hardest to understand in a country torn by class antagonisms, and in a labor movement into which the influence of the possessing class has, crept and dug itself well in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Democracy, contrary to many illusory views, does not mean freedom of every kind. It means the rule of the people, and this means the suppression of the enemies of the people. Democracy, therefore, is also dictatorship, as far as concerns those who reject the decisions of the people and combat these decisions by every possible means. Soviet democracy, without discipline, would have led to the complete defeat of the Soviet State in 1918 to 1922. Democracy without discipline would have made the building up of the Red Army impossible. Democracy without discipline would have made the Five Year Plan an impossibility, for no great industrial progress could have been undertaken in conditions of anarchy. The U.S.S.R. today combines the features of real democracy for the people with the disciplined enforcement by the people of the decisions of this democracy. To the minority of property-owners such a system has always been a ruthless dictatorship, but this dictatorship has been in the interests of the vast majority of the people. It has, therefore, been essentially democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;You say that in order to build our Socialist society we sacrificed personal liberty and suffered privation,&amp;quot; said Stalin to the American correspondent Roy Howard. &amp;quot;But we did not build this society in order to restrict personal liberty, but in order that the human individual may feel really free. We built it for the sake of real personal liberty, liberty without quotation marks. It is difficult for me to imagine what ‘personal liberty’ is enjoyed by an unemployed person who goes about hungry, and cannot find employment. Real liberty can exist only where exploitation has been abolished, where there is no oppression of some by others, where there is no unemployment and poverty, where a man is not haunted by the fear of being tomorrow deprived of work, of home, and of bread, only in such a society is real, and not paper, personal and every other liberty possible.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a liberty as described here by Stalin has had to be fought for, won, and has to be defended. But the defense of liberty is the suppression of its enemies. The defense of democracy, therefore, necessitates discipline over its opponents. Democracy for the people means discipline among the people and dictatorship over the enemies of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
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== A New Democracy ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== What Is Democracy? ===&lt;br /&gt;
We have defined democracy as government of the people, by the people, for the people. We must now ask what these words imply if a democratic system is to be really effective. What are the conditions in which it can be said that there really is government of, by, and for the people?&lt;br /&gt;
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First and foremost, the people themselves must actively participate in the work of government, for only if they do this can any state really be a government of the people, and not a government over the people carried on by somebody else. Therefore, if government of the people by the people is really to exist, the people must be admitted to every branch of State administration, for otherwise there will automatically arise a separation of the governing authorities from the people which means that democracy will not be fully operative.&lt;br /&gt;
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If the administration of any State is to be really accessible to the’ whole people, every administrative post must be open to all according only to the qualifications of citizens for fulfilling any particular job. But the qualifications of citizens are not something rigidly predetermined, but depend on the opportunities available for education and on the extent to which every citizen may qualify for responsible posts even though, in the first instance, he was not qualified at all. In the interest of democracy, then, every citizen must have equal opportunities for education, and to qualify for all positions in the running of the State. All citizens must have the opportunity to develop their natural abilities to the full, and to use them in the most responsible positions.&lt;br /&gt;
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If, in any society, certain citizens are barred from the right to participate in the work of government, as a result of such peculiarities as sex or nationality, then this is a limitation of democracy. A really effective democracy will make no distinction between its citizens on the ground of nationality or sex, and every one of them will have an equal right to participate in government according only to his qualifications for the job, qualifications which he will have an opportunity to develop if he has the necessary ability.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since, in every present-day community, the use of force may be necessary in the interests of the majority and against the interests of antagonistic minorities or external enemies, it is likely, in every present-day democracy, that some form of army and police force will be inevitable. But if this army is to be representative of the people themselves, and not become isolated from the people whom it is supposed to defend, it must essentially be recruited from their own ranks, and its commanders as well as its ordinary soldiers must be really representative of the people of the democracy. For, if the officers of an army do not represent the people that this army is supposed to defend, there is absolutely no guarantee that the same thing may not occur as has occurred in Spain, that the generals of such an army will not revolt against the government of the people, and co-operate with the most anti-democratic foreign States to suppress their own people and their own people’s democratic government. &lt;br /&gt;
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In the preservation of law and order within the country, also, a real democracy would ensure that the police and the judges were drawn from the people themselves, in order to be truly representative, for only then can the people be guaranteed justice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every real democracy will always give freedom to every nation to determine its own fate and its own form of government. The oppression of individuals because of their nationality, or of whole nations because they are in a minority in the territory of any State—or even in spite of the fact that they are the majority of the people coming under a particular Government—as happens in certain empires, cannot be justified on any democratic grounds whatever. A real democracy will not only give to majority nations within its territory the right to self-determination, but will secure for small nations also the right of self-government so long as such a right is not abused to the disadvantage of the community of nations as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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The governing of the people by themselves necessitates, among other things, the complete equality of freedom of expression on the part of citizens. Not only must there be equality of opportunity to participate in the work of administration, but also in the expression of opinions about the work of government. Therefore the Press and the meeting-halls must be equally at the disposal of all citizens in a real democracy, and any limitation of the control of such things to the hands of a small class is a restriction of the democratic rights of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are very much inclined, particularly in Great Britain, to discuss questions of democracy as if they concerned only the running of the State, without referring to the very important other activities in which the overwhelming majority of the people spend the greater part of their lives. In Britain the breadwinners of 90 percent of the population make their livelihood by working for somebody else in institutions and firms owned by somebody else. In such places of work the employee is subject to the dictates of the employer from morning to night, and even the question of whether he shall continue in the same job to-morrow is something which the employer may decide without any reference whatever to the will of the worker concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, in the economic life of this country today there is not the slightest pretense at democracy. Every employer has the right to run his own concern as he wishes, to take on and to discharge workers, and to impose such conditions of work as prove profitable to him. In his own factory every employer is boss, and the people who print the newspapers and run the railways, who work in the factories and toil in the mines, have not the slightest say in the way in which these organizations shall be run, or the workers treated. In their daily lives the vast majority of our people spend their time under the dictatorship of an employer, of a man who happens to possess the means of production with which others must work in order to make a living.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any real democracy, quite apart from the control of the State itself, would have to give to the people the right to run all those organizations in which they spend their time and earn their living. This would mean that, so long as there were privately owned factories, the workers would have to be represented as well as the owner on the board of management; and, for economic democracy to be really effective, the whole of the Economic concerns of -the country would have to be taken over by the democratic State or by co-operatives. In such circumstances it could be ensured that the people who worked in a concern would be directly represented on its management as workers, while, at the same time, responsibility for general administration would rest with a manager appointed by the State, and responsible to the democratic Government of the people themselves. Only in this way could democracy be introduced in economic life, and without democracy in economic life any talk of real democracy is to a great extent illusory.&lt;br /&gt;
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I think that most readers will agree that the essential characteristics of a real democracy which are described here do not exist in Britain today. I think that, if they have read Parts I and II and not skipped to this part first, they will agree with me that such a democratic system does already exist in the U.S.S.R. But how does it come about that people who refer to Britain as a democracy often refer to the U.S.S.R. as a dictatorship, when we find that the real essentials of democracy exist in the U.S.S.R. and not in Britain.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true, of course, that in Britain today we enjoy very valuable democratic rights as compared with the peoples of Fascist countries. We may make speeches in any meeting-halls that we can afford to hire and that the owners will let us have, or in any streets where the police do not decide that we are causing an obstruction—other, that is, than outside a labor exchange, where such meetings have been banned by Lord Trenchard; we may publish literature if we can afford a printing press, so long as the police and the courts do not consider such matter to be obscene or seditious, libelous or blasphemous; and we may form organizations as wage-earners, to force the employers to improve the conditions of their employees, though we may also get the sack for doing so. Further, when political parties whose active membership comprises about one-thousandth part of the population of the country offer us candidates at elections, we may choose between them or not choose at all. And, if we can persuade one of these political parties to put us up as a candidate at an election, and to finance our campaign for us, or if we are rich enough to finance ourselves and stand as &amp;quot;independents,&amp;quot; we may stand for election to Parliament or local government. If, when elected, we decide not to fulfill the policy for which we were elected, this matter is our own affair until the next election!&lt;br /&gt;
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All these rights, it will be noted, include an element of democracy, and a non-democratic element. In so far as they represent democracy, such rights are to be defended and extended; in so far as they are limited, they fall short of the really effective democracy which we have outlined. The U.S.S.R. has introduced something new into democracy, because it has made democracy really effective in one respect after another in which, in other countries, it is still narrowly limited.&lt;br /&gt;
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How does it come about that so many of the most loud-voiced supporters of democracy in Britain today, quite irrespective of their political affiliations, can denounce the U.S.S.R. and the Fascist States in one breath, while Britain alone, it would seem, stands proudly as the standard-bearer of democracy in a distracted world? How can we explain the fact that when examining the U.S.S.R. we found that from bottom to top, from the management of a factory or a block of flats to the administration of the President’s office itself, the people themselves are taking part in government, and yet such a system is condemned from 2,000 miles away as a dictatorship only rivaled in its viciousness by Fascism?&lt;br /&gt;
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The answer lies in the existence of different conceptions of democracy itself. One conception, defining democracy in terms of certain traditional institutions which exist today, attacks all other systems as contrary to democratic principles. This is the orthodox defense of the British system at the present time. The other conception starts out with a study of the actual economic and social position of the people in society, and then asks to what extent they can or cannot be said to be governing themselves. And it must be admitted that, when the British system is approached in this way, though much preferable to a Fascist dictatorship, it appears to be anything but a system of effective democracy when compared with the situation existing in the Soviet Union. To take the economic life of the people alone, in Britain they play no part in running the concerns in which they spend a major part of their lives. They have to work under the dictates of a master, and the masters taken together only amount to a minute proportion of the total population.&lt;br /&gt;
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Why, then, if in the economic life of the country there is such a dictatorship, do the people tolerate this state of affairs, having, as they do, a variety of democratic means of expressing opposition at their disposal? If the British State is democratic, then the people must have chosen to work daily for other people for wages and under conditions over which they have no control.&lt;br /&gt;
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Or is it, perhaps, that the extent of democracy is really so limited that the people have no opportunity through the State of effectively limiting the power of the owners of the means of production? Certainly, so long as they believe that a highly limited democracy is really an effective system of democracy, they will not try to extend their democratic rights, but will be passive victims to every kind of encroachment. Therefore, it is essential that the people appreciate the role of the property-owners in British democracy, a matter which we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
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In general, so long as the factories and the mines, the newspapers and the meeting-halls, are privately owned, to such an extent also are the working people subject to a certain degree of dictatorship. The work-man is told by the employer when he may earn a living, and under what conditions. And the working people as a whole, who cannot afford to own large newspapers and meeting-halls, are at the mercy of the continual propaganda of those who can. The extent of democracy is in this way limited in every community by the degree to which there exists the private owner-ship of the means of production, thus subjecting the working citizen to the dictatorship of an employer; and by the extent to which there is private ownership of the means of propaganda, thus subjecting the ordinary citizen to a perpetual bombardment of those ideas which the property-owners desire to propagate. Finally, as will be shown in the next chapter, in a a democratic State in which the means of production and propaganda are still in private hands, the State, too, is subject to the control of these property-owners to an overwhelming degree.&lt;br /&gt;
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When we survey the world today we find that the extent to which effective democracy is enjoyed by the people varies from country to country. In Fascist countries, where there is an open terroristic dictatorship, and the property-owners retain their power, we find that the Workers and peasants who form the majority of the population are not allowed to combine their forces at all in order to fight for better conditions; they are forbidden to have their own newspapers or to hold their own meetings. The workers play absolutely no part in the running of the concerns in which they are employed, and they cannot even organize themselves in order to ensure that they will be paid a living minimum wage. To express their opinion, either of the employer or of the State, in a way which offends either of these, is a crime. Fascism thus completely destroys all vestiges of democracy. The democratic organizations of the people for improving their conditions of life are driven into illegality, and forced to take on a revolutionary form.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fascist States combine an open dictatorship with the existence of private ownership of property concentrated in a few hands. In contrast to these countries, we have the democratic States in which, though the means of production are in private hands, and the means of propaganda are mainly so, the working people have the right to organize in trade unions, to hold meetings, and to publish their own newspapers in so far as they can afford to do so. If, in such countries, the workers can sufficiently well organize themselves, they can force the employers and the State to grant them better conditions of life: While such a system as this is vastly superior to Fascism, it still suffers very great short-comings, for there is still nothing approaching real equality of rights for all citizens. Even under conditions of democratic government, so long as the means of production and propaganda are privately owned, the owners have always reserves of property which the workers have not, and these reserves give an economic power in bargaining with the workers and a political power in propaganda, education, and in running the State, that can hardly be over-estimated.&lt;br /&gt;
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Only when, as in the U.S.S.R. today, the means of production and propaganda are socially owned and controlled, is there no longer the domination of society by a small class that owns the property. In the U.S.S.R. no man owns a factory, and therefore no man can dictate to another man at will whether or not he shall have a job, and, if so, on what conditions. And, together with this, the socialization of the meeting-halls and the newspapers has made the means of expression equally available to all, instead of being only at the disposal of private owners. In addition, in the running of the Soviet State the ordinary citizens are drawn into the work of administration, while universal suffrage is enjoyed by all without such things as property and residential qualifications which elsewhere favor the owners of property.&lt;br /&gt;
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Democracy is not something absolute. A Fascist State may, in particular circumstances, make some concession to public opinion which gives an opportunity for the people to express their views on some matter which intimately affects them. Such a measure would be of value to the people as a step in the direction of democracy. It would be to their interest to use such a concession as a means for obtaining further concessions and further democratic rights. A democratic capitalist State may impose limitations of certain kinds on the power of the property-owners by laying down legislation for the protection of the working people, by setting limits to the amount of money which may be spent in elections, and so on. But a democratic State may also curtail democracy, as, for example, in Britain, when Lord Trenchard banned the holding of meetings outside labor exchanges, or when, after the General Strike in 1926, the Government placed a number of restrictions on the rights of the working people to organize themselves and to unite their forces in a struggle for better conditions against the dictates of private property.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every Fascist State includes in its population a majority of people who live by their own labor, and who will use every opportunity to wring better conditions of life from the property-owners. Because Fascism cannot kill the people who work, it cannot pluck out from its State those forces which continually demand expression—the democratic forces of the working people. The organizations of the people may be forced underground by a Fascist dictatorship, but they cannot be wiped out, for the people who make such a movement are the vast majority of the population, and the employers cannot live without them.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the democratic State in which the power of the property-owners remains intact, tendencies towards greater or lesser democracy are both possible, according to the organized strength of the majority of the people on the one hand, and of the property-owning minority on the other. To the great property-owners the ideal State would be one in which the political rights of the workers were no more than their economic rights when working in the factory. For in such a State the property-owners could pursue whatever policy they desired without fear of opposition. Therefore the interests of the great property-owners are always bound up with the curtailment of democratic rights and with a tendency towards Fascism.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, to the working people in every capitalist democracy any curtailment for the rights of the property-owners in favor of the workers represents a growth in democratic freedom. The extension of the right to hold street meetings and demonstrations can only benefit the working people, those who are least able to hire meeting-halls. The limitation of the rights of private individuals to use their newspapers for political purposes by greater working-class control over the Press can only benefit the working people—the majority of the population—and is, therefore, democratic. The replacing of property-owners by working men and women in the Civil Service, army, and law courts leads to a greater representation of the working people in the running of the State, and is a democratic measure. So, from the standpoint of the working people, the prospects of increasing their democratic rights are always present. The extent to which these opportunities are utilized depends on the degree to which the working people are aware of their position and organized to improve it. In the last analysis it is the relative strength of these two sections of the population that decides whether Fascism or democracy shall triumph, and, if democracy, the extent to which this democracy shall be made real by the limitation, and finally the complete annihilation, of the powers of property, economically and politically.&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be a great error, however, to assume that any capitalist country consists only of workers and big employers. Actually, there is in most countries a considerable middle-class, consisting of small employers. These small employers, under present-day conditions, are continually menaced by the growth of monopoly, and are increasingly desirous of utilizing all democratic means of controlling the operations of the great property-owners. As a result, the small capitalists find themselves lining up with the democratic forces, with the working people, against the great monopolies and Fascism. In this fact of the present day lies the economic basis for a Popular Front, for Democracy and the small man, against Fascism and monopoly.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the greatest danger, in Britain today, which faces the democratic forces, the vast majority of the population of the country, lies in the fact that the power of property in the British democratic system is grossly under-estimated in practically all public utterances on the matter. Therefore, bearing in mind all that we now know about the democracy of the U.S.S.R. let us turn to a short study of democracy in Britain today. Nowhere in the world could a better example be found of the power of property to utilize democracy for its own ends, thus rendering it almost ineffective as a weapon of the people of the country. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of democracy creates an acute danger of open dictatorship. For the less the people of the country realize the extent to which their democratic rights are already seriously limited, and threatened with still further limitations in the future, the more easily they may be induced to believe that democracy itself, rather than the imperfections of that democracy, is at fault when the system does not work satisfactorily for their interests.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Democracy and Property ===&lt;br /&gt;
In order to examine the relationship between democracy and property, no better example could be taken than Great Britain. For in Britain we possess a much-vaunted democratic system, and at the same time practically the whole of the property of the country is in the hands of a few people who live by employing labor, whilst the vast majority of the population have to work for someone else in order to make a livelihood.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to census figures, about 80 percent of the people of Britain work for somebody else. The question of whether they shall be allowed to work or not is decided by an employer. The question of the conditions under which they work is decided by an employer. The rate of wages which they are paid is finally decided by an employer. And the employers in Britain today only amount to some 850,000 people. They and their families make up about 4 percent of the population. So that, in their everyday working life, in everything which determines the security of their livelihood and their standard of life, about 90 percent of the population of Britain are dependent on the will of about 4 percent. Since the majority must work to live, they must accept work when it is going. And, as the owners of property have reserves at their disposal, they can always postpone taking on workers in order to obtain terms which satisfy them. In so far as the workers organize in trade unions they can to some extent build up reserves and bargain for better conditions, but always, fundamentally, the owner of property has the advantage over the man who lives by his labor; for he has reserves of property on which to live, while the worker has very little on which to live unless he is drawing an income from selling his labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the economic sphere in Britain today, 4 percent of the population are masters or dictators, 90 percent are servants. And the fact that the relationship of master to servant is also the relationship of property to poverty is illustrated by the figures of the distribution of the national income. The 80 percent of the population that is dependent on its wages receives about 64 percent of the national income. The 4 percent of property-owners, plus about 6 percent of independent workers, absorb annually about 36 percent of the total national income. And, of these property-owners, a very few receive a tremendous income. It is estimated by Professor Bowley that just over I percent of the population, the richest property-owners, received, in 1910, 30 percent of the national income. On the other hand, 94I percent of the population received only 50 percent of the national income.&lt;br /&gt;
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The conclusion which we arrive at, after reading these figures, is that the class of the population that owns the factories and the coal-mines, the shops, and so on, is a small minority—but a wealthy minority. The majority of the population, on the other hand, work for this minority for a small income. The minority dictate to the majority when, where, and under what conditions they shall make a living. How does this affect the whole system of government of the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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The supreme authority in Britain—which, by the way, unlike the U.S.S.R. has no written Constitution—is Parliament. The British Parliament consists of two Houses. The so-called &amp;quot;Upper House,&amp;quot; the House of Lords, is not an elected body. It consists of the Peers of the Realm, who are appointed by the Crown, or happen to be the descendants of people who were at one time so appointed. It also includes the bishops. It represents, in fact, the wealthy section of the population, since working men do not become peers, while big landlords and employers do. The House of Lords is drawn from the small section of the community that owns property and employs labor, and hot from the vast majority who own nothing and work for somebody else. The fact that the House of Lords is not a democratic institution is generally admitted. It is even a thing which certain property-owners boast about. Professor Laski shows how, for example,&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;as early as 1906 Lord Balfour had told his supporters that it was their bounden duty to see that ‘the great Unionist Party should still control, whether in power or in opposition, the destinies of this great Empire.’ What he meant he revealed to the House of Commons three months later, when, on the third reading of the Liberal Government’s abortive Educational Bill of 1906, he declared that the real discussion must be elsewhere. It was an explicit claim for the right of property to rule the country whatever the will of tile people, and no one who reads the utterances of eminent peers about that Budget can doubt that in their minds they felt entitled to safeguard themselves against any measure they might choose to regard as confiscatory. Mr. Asquith was right when he warned the electorate that implicit in the claim of the Lords was the threat of revolution. [...]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;There has been no essential change in the last twenty-five years. For the claim is still made that it in the function of the House of Lords to safeguard the country against a Labor Government which should seek to translate Socialist principles into terms of legislation; and all proposals made by the Conservative Party for the reform of the House of Lords have no end in view but to hinder such a Government, from legislating in the way that is open to its rivals &amp;quot; (Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, pp. 275-6). The House of Lords exists to defend property against the majority of the population. The House of Lords, representing a small minority of the people, is a non-democratic; and its policy, because of the interests which it represents, is anti-democratic.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let us now consider the &amp;quot;Lower House,&amp;quot; or House of Commons. This is the elected part of Parliament, and is often claimed to be an effective means of expressing the will of the people. Now, if the House of Commons is to express the will of the people effectively, there must exist in the country an equal right for all citizens to vote, to stand for election, to support their candidates effectively, and an equal right for all citizens, on the basis of merit only, to participate in the work of administration, of carrying out the decisions arrived at by the elected Parliament. Actually, as will be shown, not one of these conditions for a really democratic parliamentary system exists in Britain at the present time.&lt;br /&gt;
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The right to be an elector in Britain today is enjoyed by every man and woman over the age of twenty-one, as contrasted with eighteen in the U.S.S.R., on condition that they can claim residence in a constituency for a period of not less than six months. If a citizen can claim occupation of premises in two constituencies, he can enjoy a vote in each. A property-owner, therefore, has the right to two votes if he has property in two constituencies. Further, graduates of the Universities, who are in the main drawn from the employing class and highly paid salaried workers, have two votes at elections.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are a number of constituencies where the majority of the inhabitants are wage-earners, and yet a majority of the votes can be obtained by the property-owners because they have factories and offices in those areas in sufficient numbers to out-vote the wage-earners living there. In local government, registration as a voter goes with the ownership or renting of residential or office property, and there is no limit to the number of votes which one person may exercise in a series of constituencies. To be considered an occupier, for local government elections, persons must furnish the premises which they occupy. As a result, those who live on premises furnished by someone else have no vote. These people, in general, are wage-earners.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true, as far as numbers are concerned, that the total extra votes going to the propertied classes in this way is not large, and cannot outweigh the working-class influence in the country as a while. On the other hand, it is of significance as a matter of principle, for it brings out vividly the fact that the existing system of election is based, not on citizenship as in the U.S.S.R., but on the ownership of property.&lt;br /&gt;
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In theory, every person who has the right to vote also has the right to stand for election, if nominated by eight electors. The right of anybody to stand for election, however, is deceptive, for two reasons. First, in the case of parliamentary elections every candidate must deposit £150, which is forfeited if he does not obtain a certain number of votes. Secondly, to stand for election necessitates an election campaign—that is, the effective supporting of candidates by propaganda. The Labor Party, which is not likely to make extravagant estimates on this score, considers that, in addition to the deposit, which may be returned to the candidate, additional expenditures is necessary to contest a parliamentary seat. It is clear that a small number of rich citizens are in a position to put up candidates in all the parliamentary seats in the country without any great material sacrifice. The vast majority of the population, however, consists of wage-earners, who must pool their meager resources at considerable sacrifice in order to run candidates.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are about 600 seats in the House of Commons. There are about 100,000 super-tax payers in the country, with an income of over £2,000 a year. Each one of these people could finance a candidate out of his annual income, and still have £1,200 to live on. Each of these individuals could afford, at his own expense, to contest a constituency. On the other hand, of the 19 million wage-earners, the average wage is not more than £2.5s a week, or, £117 a year. It would, therefore, take a working man—one of the 19 million wage-earners—the total earnings of four years to finance himself, or someone else, as a parliamentary candidate. So the right to stand for election, and to carry out the necessary publicity campaign for a candidate, is enjoyed by the small class of property-owners to an enormous degree compared with the majority of the population, the wage-earners.&lt;br /&gt;
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But it must not for one moment be thought that the work of molding public opinion, and of preparing a state of mind that is likely to support a particular type of parliamentary or municipal candidate, is created simply by means of an election campaign. The creation of this public opinion goes on, day by day, in every public expression of opinion that reaches the eyes and ears of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Britain we still enjoy freedom of speech. But freedom of speech, to mean anything, must be effective freedom—of speech that reaches the people. The degree of freedom of effective speech in Britain today depends entirely on the possession of wealth. The most powerful means of influencing public opinion is the Press. In Britain, &amp;quot;anyone&amp;quot; can start a newspaper, so long as it is not &amp;quot;obscene,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;blasphemous,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;seditious,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;libelous.&amp;quot; But the cost of printing and publishing a newspaper is vastly greater than the cost of running an election campaign. It is so great that only the very richest individuals and groups of individuals as a rule can afford to own newspapers. It is so great that no ordinary daily paper could support itself without its revenue from advertisements, which are supplied by firms which have sufficient capital to be able to advertise. Our freedom of the Press is, therefore, mainly freedom of property-owners who are rich enough to finance the newspapers, and in this way to influence the thought of the whole population of the country. Taken as a whole, the Press represents the property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must not, however, leave the matter at this point without drawing the necessary distinction between British conditions today and those of a Fascist State. In a Fascist State the workers are not permitted to run newspapers even if they can afford it. In Britain they are permitted to do so, and do so to a small degree. But shortage is a product capital, the fact that capitalist firms are unwilling to support workers’ papers with advertisements—the main source of revenue to the ordinary Press—and a boycott of the sale and distribution of working-class literature, make the difficulties of the workers’ Press extremely great as compared with the Press of the well-to-do. Only in 1926, when the workers throughout the country practically ceased to print the capitalist newspapers, and at the same time the Trades Councils and other workers’ organizations published their own bulletins, were there a few days when the Press of Britain was almost entirely a Press controlled by the organizations of the working class, the majority of the population. But even then the radio remained in Government hands, and was fully utilized on the side of the employers.&lt;br /&gt;
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As with the Press, so with the ownership of the great meeting-halls of the country, and with the control of the radio. The trustees of the Albert Hall do not let it to everyone who can pay the rent. Even if a workers’ organization is able to pay, it may not be allowed the use of the hall if the owners do not approve of the purpose of the meeting. Sir Oswald Mosley could on one occasion obtain the use of the hall, while it was refused to a working-class organization shortly afterwards.&lt;br /&gt;
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And now, having seen how the means of influencing public opinion, the means of effective propaganda, are in the hands of the minority of property-owners, let us come to the further problem— that of an elected Government which really represents the will of the wage-earners, if all the other obstacles have been overcome and such a majority has been returned to Parliament.&lt;br /&gt;
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It should be clear that, whatever the majority in Parliament may be, any decisions of Parliament under the present system must be carried out by the Civil Service. Unless, therefore, this Civil Service is organically connected with the wage-earning majority of the population, it may show reluctance, and actually be guilty of sabotage, in carrying out the decisions of such a parliamentary majority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, before considering the Civil Service, one other point should be touched upon. This is the question of Education. For we have seen that a real equality between citizens, to vote and to be elected, to hold responsibility in every walk of life, and to rule themselves, depends on their having equal opportunities to develop their abilities to the full. In Britain today, however, they have not got this equality. For, according to R. H. Tawney, &amp;quot;the proportion of children leaving the elementary schools, who enter what have hitherto been known as secondary schools, is, in England and Wales as a whole, less than one-seventh, and in some areas less than one-tenth, while some three-quarters of them have hitherto entered full-time wage-earning employment at the age of fourteen&amp;quot; (Equality, p. 90).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
About 90 percent of the workers have no schooling over the age of fourteen. On the other hand, the children of the well-to-do do not go to the ordinary State elementary or secondary schools at all, but pass through an entirely different and very expensive system of private education, known, ironically enough, as the &amp;quot;public schools.&amp;quot; And we find that it is this small minority that passes through the &amp;quot;public schools &amp;quot; that commands practically all the leading positions in the social and economic life of the country and in the Civil Service.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The evidence presented by Mr. Nightingale, who has made a statistical analysis of the social antecedents of the personnel of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service between 1851 and 1929, suggests that this statement is true of a more recent period. Sixty percent of it, he shows, has been drawn from the eleven most exclusive public schools, while of the remaining 40 percent, well over one half attended the lesser public schools, received a military or naval education, or were educated privately or abroad.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The unchallengeable conclusion that emerges […] is that the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service have been a preserve for the sons of the aristocratic, rentier, and professional classes’&amp;quot; (op. cit., pp. 93-4). And, though possibly not quite so marked, this selection for the Civil Service from the small minority of the population that owns property, those who can afford an expensive &amp;quot;public school&amp;quot; education, is universal throughout. Remember that Lord Trenchard’s famous &amp;quot;reform&amp;quot; of the police force included the recruiting of more ex-public-school boys for its leading ranks. Similar efforts have been made to build up a public-school air force in recent years; and the &amp;quot;defense of the country&amp;quot; (and possibly of the rights of property against the people of the country) is also in the hands, not of representatives of the people, but of the products of Wellington and Sandhurst, the sons of those who can afford a &amp;quot;public school&amp;quot; education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The whole Civil Service is so recruited that we have government, not by the people, but by the property-owners and their relatives. In addition, all those professions which are of particular importance to the security of property, we find, are recruited from the same small section of the population. &amp;quot;In the year 1926, 71 out of 80 bishops and deans for whom information is available, 139 out of 181 members of the judicial profession, 152 out of 210 highly placed members of public departments, 63 out of 88 members of the Indian Civil Service and Governors of Dominions, and 99 out of 132 directors of banks and railways, had been educated at public schools&amp;quot; (op. cit., pp. 94-5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Civil Service, which has to carry out the decisions of Parliament; the bishops, who, like the Press, influence the opinion of the public; the judges; the railway directors and bank directors, together with the members of the legal profession,—are almost entirely drawn from one small class of the population. Not only, then, do the owners of the factories and mines run their own factories and mines, but they and their class may well be said to run the whole country as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the property-owners running the Civil Service and the professions, having ail the means at their disposal for broadcasting their ideas to the whole population, and the wealth necessary to hire or own the meeting-halls and newspapers, it is not surprising to find that the work of Government itself remains in the hands of these people. R. H. Tawney writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The association of political leadership with birth and wealth is a commonplace of English history; but it is not always realized how little that association was weakened after the advent of what is usually regarded as the age of democracy. Professor Lasid, in his instructive analysis of British Cabinets between 1801 and 1924, has shown that, for nearly two generations after the Act of 1867 had enfranchised the urban working classes, the greater part of the business of government continued, nevertheless, to be conducted by a small group of owners of great properties, who were enabled by their economic advantages and social connections to step into the exercise of political power with a facility impossible to ordinary men. Of 69 Ministers who held office between 1885 and 1905, 40 were sons of nobility, 5a were educated at Oxford and Cambridge, and 46 were educated at public schools ; while, even between 1906 and 1916, 25 out of 51 Ministers were sons of nobility&amp;quot; (op. cit., p. 92).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A further limitation of British democracy must now be mentioned. It has already been shown how a small class of property-owners dominates elections, dominates Governments, and dominates the Civil Service. Figures have also been cited to show how the directors of the banks, the railways, and, of course, the armament firms, are also all drawn from the same small class of the community. Therefore, any Government that is ever elected under existing conditions is likely, as a result of all the political influence of property, to represent only to a comparatively small degree the real interests of the majority of the population of the country, the working people. If, in any situation, such a Government is returned to Parliament, pledged to a policy in the interests of the working people, of socialism, and real democracy, then numerically this representation will not do justice to the real interests which it represents, since all the propaganda and social influences are working for the under-representation of such interests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once in power, such a Government would have to face up to the fact that the leading ranks of the Civil Service were against it. And sabotage by the Civil Service, even to the point of armed rebellion by the military leaders, as in Spain, is no small menace. But, in addition, such a Government would have to face the active opposition of the property-owning-class, as personified in the bank directors, railway directors, and factory-owners throughout the country. And the power of these people over any Government is tremendous, because they can threaten completely to hold up the economic life of the country if their demands are not satisfied. The bankers in the world today, though competing amongst themselves, can combine their forces to bring pressure to bear upon the most important Governments. They can move funds from one country to another, and cause financial crises. They can force elected Governments to resign.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In our discussion of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. we saw that the Supreme Council, directly elected by the people, is being given increased powers, whereas the powers of its Presidium are very strictly limited. It should be noted here that in Britain precisely the opposite tendency is operating—a tendency for Parliament, dominated by the parties representing the property-interests, to delegate its authority to small groups who become directors in their own sphere. In this respect &amp;quot;Orders in Council&amp;quot; play an important part.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his General Strike, R. Page Arnot writes :&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Let us turn to the form of government known as King in Council. Its origin and history are still a subject of investigation, but at one time the King in his Privy Council appeared to be about to&#039; supplant the Parliament. […] During the Napoleonic Wars, the Privy Council was once more used as a formidable engine of government, and, by the famous Orders in Council, Pitt and his successors were able to meet Napoleon with swift and arbitrary decrees. After the Napoleonic Wars, the position of the form of government known as the King in Council had been clearly defined, and it was possible to regard it as a reserve instrument to meet great occasions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Of these, the greatest occasion was the outbreak of war in 1914. The declaration of war was followed by the passing of the Defense of the Realm Act, by the first clause of which power was given to His Majesty in Council to take the necessary measures to secure the safety of the realm. These powers, primarily exercised through the Privy Council in the shape of Orders in Council, were transferable to each Government Department; which thus acquired the power to legislate by the simple method of publishing its regulation in the London Gazette &amp;quot; (p, 12).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the war the Defense of the Realm Act was replaced by an Emergency Powers Act by which, in a &amp;quot;state of emergency,&amp;quot; Orders in Council would automatically become law. In this way any parliamentary majority can in fact institute an open dictatorship if it wishes to do so—that is, if it ever finds it expedient to declare a &amp;quot;state of emergency.&amp;quot; Such a state is likely to be declared primarily in connection with labor difficulties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not often realized by the ordinary person that in Britain laws can be made also by the judges. There are two kinds of law in Britain: Statute Law—consisting of Acts of Parliament; and Case Law, consisting of all the decisions of the judges on the interpretation of these laws in actual cases that have arisen. If, in a particular case, a judge interprets the law in a particular way, this case then becomes a precedent, and the interpretation itself becomes law. Since the judges are, as has been seen, drawn from the ranks of the small minority of property-owners, such &amp;quot;interpretations &amp;quot; of the law naturally tend to operate in the interests of property in any circumstance that arises.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In concluding this examination of the power of the property-owners in the British State—and Britain is not untypical of those democratic States where the private ownership of the means of production and of propaganda remains unchecked— it is worth pointing out that for the British Empire as a whole the degree of democracy existing in Britain is far from typical. In describing the Soviet State, we saw how every nation enjoys the right to self-determination, and how there is complete equality of every nation within the Union. In the British Empire, on the contrary, the democratic rights of the inhabitants of Great Britain are not shared by the far greater population of India.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only within the British Empire have we not got the rule of the nation which has a majority of the population, which is India; but we have the actual subjection of that nation so that its people enjoy no greater democracy than did the people of Tsarist Russia. When, therefore, we draw comparisons between the power of property in Britain and the new democracy of the U.S.S.R., let us not forget that property behalves comparatively democratically in Britain itself and the situation of the Indian and other peoples under British rule is far more akin to the lot of the peoples of the Tsarist Empire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Enough has now been said to establish the relationship between private property and democracy. When we recall the situation existing in the U.S.S.R. at the present time, and compare it with Britain, we see that every democratic feature of the Soviet system that would be new to Britain is a derivative of one fact—the abolition of the power of property.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, in early 1918, the Russian printing presses were transferred from the hands of their private owners to the organizations of the working people, this act symbolized all that the Soviet system stands for in opposition to the democracy of capitalism. But even under capitalism the limit to the enjoyment of democratic rights by the people is not rigidly fixed. In 1926 for a few days during the General Strike the British printing workers refused to issue the main newspapers of the country, while the Trades Councils and other workers’ organizations poured out news bulletins on a scale never exceeded before or since. In those few days Britain had a Press which predominantly represented the working people, and which, for a short and exceptional period, did not represent the views of a handful of rich Press lords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the year 1920, when the British Government was preparing to declare open war on the Soviet Government of Russia, the workers set up Councils of Action throughout the country with the slogan &amp;quot;Hands off Russia!&amp;quot; The democratic demands of the working people were put forward so forcibly that the Government, though utterly unsympathetic, was forced to take notice, and armed intervention against the Soviets was brought to an end. In the same year, in a speech in Russia, Lenin said: &amp;quot;The whole of the English bourgeois Press wrote that the Councils of Action were Soviets. And it was right. They were not called Soviets, but in actual fact they were.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain, as in Russia, the workers have always the possibility, by uniting their forces and fighting for better conditions, to restrict the disproportionate might of the property-owners, and thus to introduce more and more effective democracy. If we look back at the Russian Revolution we find that the Soviets actually seized power only when they were faced with two clear alternatives : either a military dictatorship, instituted by the owners of the land, the factories, and the mines; or the seizure of power by the most powerful organizations of the people, the Soviets, and the suppressing of the power of the property-owners in the interests of real democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While, in Britain today, it is perfectly true that any elected Government of the people may be blackmailed by the bankers and sabotaged by the Civil Service if these representatives of the property-owners do not approve of its policy, it is equally true that any Government which represents the interests of the property-owners may be prevented from carrying out an anti-working-class policy by the direct action of the working-people themselves. The fact that the bankers and Civil Servants operate today behind the scenes to ensure that official policy shall be in the interests of property is all the more reason why the working people must act in an organized way to force the Government and the bankers and the Civil Servants to act more favorably to the people. And, so soon as the working people of the country are organized in such a way as to force their will on a property-owners’ Government, or on property-owners that oppose a people’s Government, they are beginning to make democracy more real and more effective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Communist Manifesto Marx says: &amp;quot;The first step in the workers’ revolution is to make the proletariat the ruling class, to establish democracy.&amp;quot; This was the task which the Soviet Revolution in Russia set out to fulfill, and it has not been unsuccessful. But the democracy of today has only been won as a result of a united struggle by the whole people. The new democracy only survived because it had the united support of the workers and peasants of the various nationalities within the country, coupled with the support of the working people of other countries. The fact that it has survived for twenty years means that others can learn from its example. Today the actual experience of the 170 million people that inhabit one-sixth of the earth has shown how real democracy can be, once the power of private property is finally broken. The inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. are proving in practice that the workers can rule themselves, and raise their living standards, without the help of the employers, whereas, on the other hand, the property-owners can never live without the forces of the working people, the forces making for real democracy and liberty. In this lies the guarantee of the ultimate victory of democracy over property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Defending and Extending Democracy ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the year 1922, when the Treaty of Union was signed between the Soviet Republics as a means of mutual support and defense against a hostile world, the following declaration was issued by the Governments concerned:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Since the formation of the Soviet Republics the world has been divided into two camps—the capitalist and the Socialist. In the capitalist camp reigns national hostility and inequality, colonial slavery, chauvinism, national suppression, pogroms, and imperialist brutality.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Here, in the Socialist camp, is to be found mutual confidence and peace, national freedom and equality, and the tranquil community and fraternal co-operation of peoples. The attempt of the capitalist world through long decades to settle the problem of nationalities by the joint methods of the free development of peoples, and the exploitation of man by man has proved to be fruitless. On the contrary, the skein of nationalist contradictions is becoming more and more entangled, and threatens to overwhelm capitalism itself. The bourgeoisie has proved incapable of bringing about the co-operation of nations.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Only in the camp of the Soviets, and under the proletarian dictatorship round which is rallied the majority of the population, has it been found possible to root out national persecution, to create conditions for mutual trust, and to lay the foundations of fraternal co-operation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These words were written in 1922, but how true they prove to be today! The Soviets came to power in Russia in 1917, when it had become clear to the people that this was the only way to peace and democracy. It was the only way to prevent a military dictatorship and the continuation of an imperialist war. &amp;quot;Peace, Bread, and Land,&amp;quot; was the main slogan of the Russian Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, at the present time, we survey the world, we find that it is still divided into two camps. But the tremendous growth of the power of the country of Socialism on the one hand, and the seizure of power by Fascist dictatorships representing the most reactionary property interests on the other, has modified the frontier between these camps. Peace and democracy were the main aims of the Soviet Revolution. Today, in the capitalist world itself, two camps have been formed, for peace and democracy on the one hand and for Fascism and war on the other. In the present world situation all the forces of peace and democracy are centering their attention on an alliance with the U.S.S.R. and Socialism; the forces of Fascism look upon the U.S.S.R. as the maintenance to their continued existence, because its example can never be effectively hidden for long from the people of all countries, and this is a stimulus to renewed activity in the interests of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main dividing-line, then, in the present world situation, is between the forces of democracy and those of Fascism. What are the reasons for this change in emphasis which has taken place in the post-war period? The important feature of post-war capitalism, long ago foreseen as inevitable by Marx in the Communist Manifesto, has been the growing power of the great financial and industrial monopolies and the concentration of wealth in the hands of these monopolists. Such a tendency in economic organization causes an ever-increasing number of the small producers, whether or not they employ a few workers, to feel themselves at the mercy of the great trusts, and to desire to use every political means to control these great organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a result, sections of the middle class that at one time considered themselves superior to the workers, tend to become willing to co-operate with the working people in limiting the power of the great trusts. Thus, the forces of democracy on the one hand are numerically increased, while, on the other, the great trusts and monopolies use every means of increasing their control of the State, if necessary, by even putting an end to every legal form of democratic expression.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fascism, then, appears as the expression in politics of the growing tendency to monopoly in economics. Those of the employing class who find themselves being impoverished and increasingly insecure as a result of the operations of the great monopolies tend to move in the direction of the working class, both economically and politically. In this way the great monopolies and their fascist tendencies are opposed by the working people and a growing section of the middle class, the main constituents of a Popular Front.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Spain these forces are today in open conflict. The cause of this conflict is that the people, as a result of uniting their forces in the cause of democracy, succeeded in electing a really democratic Government to power, a Government pledged to take a number of democratic measures against the interests of property, and in the interests of the people. The big property- owners, together with the generals in the army drawn from the propertied class, and with the support of foreign Fascism, launched their offensive on the Spanish people in a last desperate attempt to prevent the democratic forces from becoming effective. The result has been the &amp;quot;civil war,&amp;quot; a war of international Fascism against the Spanish people.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, in relation to Spain, it is claimed that the Government did not really represent the people because it only received a minority of the votes at the last election, this is sheer deception. First, it is untrue that the parties fighting for the Spanish Government against the rebels received a minority of the votes. They received a majority. But General Franco still insists on referring to the Basque Nationalists as a party of the Right, though it has actually consistently supported the Government. But, secondly, even if there had been a minority of votes for the parties of the Right, this does not for one moment , mean that there was a majority for the armed uprising of General Franco and his foreign Fascist supporters.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second point, however, which is relevant, is the fact that, as in Britain today, the last election in Spain took place in a country where the main means of production and propaganda were still privately owned. Therefore the property-owners had all those advantages which we have shown to be inconsistent with really effective democracy. In such conditions the votes for the popular front were bound to understate, not to overstate, the real interests which this group of parties represented. When, in addition, it is realized that the elections took place with considerable pressure from the Government, which then consisted of the parties of the Right, against the Popular Front, we see that all the forces operating in Spain, other than the demands of the people themselves, militated to minimize the Popular Front vote.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Spanish Popular Front Government was returned in spite of all these disabilities of the people in the elections. If there had been real equality of propaganda, the votes for the Government would have been more, not less. Then came the Franco rebellion, backed by foreign Fascist States, The Spanish Government, though at that time consisting of Liberal republicans, armed the whole people. The fight for democracy in Spain caused a Liberal Government to do what only the Soviets had done in Russia—to take the vitally democratic step of putting arms into the hands of the people themselves. From that moment onwards on Government territory the scales were tipped in favor of real democracy; for, once the people themselves have arms, they can express their will more effectively than ever before. The example of Spain shows that, in the present world situation, the fight to defend democracy is also the fight to extend it. Democracy cannot be defended today without being extended. And, in every country, a development is taking place either towards greater democracy and the limitation of the rights of property, or to less democracy and Fascist dictatorship.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this situation the Soviet Union stands out as a beacon. It shows the logical conclusion of the struggle to make democracy effective. At first, in this struggle, concrete steps had to be taken to limit the rights of the property owners in order to make democracy real for the vast majority of the people. And then the people started to plan production and produce without the mines and land being any longer privately owned. They could, in fact, only introduce a planned system when the land and means of production were already public property. They have established real democracy by completely abolishing class relationships, so that every citizen is a servant of the community, and, as a citizen, also a master.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today in the Soviet Union there is work for all, and equality of opportunity for all. Every adult citizen has the same economic and political rights, and no citizen, however much personal property he may own, can regulate the lives and livelihoods of others as a result of this ownership. I may have money in the U.S.S.R. today if I have earned it, but I cannot own a factory as a result, and I cannot tell people whether or not they shall have work, and at what wages, and for what hours, because I happen to own some money. My money cannot be used to give me any kind of say in the economic life of the country. And, though I may possess money, I cannot use it for propaganda purposes. I cannot own a newspaper or a meeting-hall, and I cannot even hire a meeting-hall for private political purposes. Therefore my money does not give me any political power whatever. As a result of this, power in the U.S.S.R., economically and politically, is vested in the citizens as such, according only to their abilities, and with no relationship whatever to their material possessions. In this way democracy has become real, and really effective. This is something new in the history of democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be absolutely incorrect, however, to assume, because in the U.S.S.R. today a degree of democracy has been achieved such as exists nowhere else in the world, that there is no further democratic development possible for the U.S.S.R. For the Soviet Union is continually developing, and there are no limits to the way in which, in the future, Soviet democracy may not .be further and further extended. Even today, Soviet citizens still receive wages according to their work. There are, therefore, highly and lowly paid workers. Even today, workers must to some extent still specialize on particular jobs, so that there are cultural workers, administrative workers, technical workers, and unskilled workers. While there is equal opportunity for all citizens to advance from any of these categories to a higher one, there is still the need for a certain degree of specialization, and for a certain material encouragement to each citizen to work according to his ability, and to develop his abilities to the full.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The present state of Soviet society—Socialism—is not regarded in the U.S.S.R. as any land of Utopia or final achievement. It is considered only as a stage in development towards Communist society, which will be a still more real democracy for the whole people. Writing in the 1870’s, Karl Marx, on whose studies of human society Bolshevik doctrine is based, wrote of the future:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;In a higher phase of Communist society, after the tyrannical subordination of individuals according to the distribution of labor, and therefore also the distinction between manual and intellectual work, have disappeared, after labor has become not only a means to live, but is itself the first necessity of living. after the powers of production have also increased and all the springs of co-operative wealth are gushing more freely together with the all-round development of the individual, then, and then only, can the narrow bourgeois horizon of rights be left far behind, and society will inscribe on its banner ‘From each according to his capacity, to each according to his need ’&amp;quot; (Critique of the Gotha Program).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these words Marx showed that beyond the democracy of Soviet society today there is a perspective of still further development and still greater personal freedom, until needs and not work will determine what share every citizen shall receive of the total production. And the process by which such a state of society will be reached includes the emancipation of every worker, not only by making him the equal of his neighbour, but by making work itself so interesting that it is voluntarily undertaken by all, so that no longer the compulsion of law and material want will be necessary in order that every citizen do his share. &amp;quot;Productive labor,&amp;quot; wrote Engels in 1878, &amp;quot;will become a means to their emancipation, by giving each individual the opportunity to develop and exercise all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions; in which, therefore, productive labor will be a pleasure instead of a burden&amp;quot; (Anti-Dühring, p. 328).&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a system of society will be run like a well-organized household. People will work as producers voluntarily, and they will help themselves from the common product. Shops will take the form of depots, from which people will take what they need, and, when the general poverty. of capitalism no longer exists, and a love of labor has developed, there is no reason to suppose that, under such conditions, anyone would want to appropriate more than was necessary for a reasonable standard of life.&lt;br /&gt;
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Once such conditions have been established internationally, the State as such—as a means of guaranteeing security to the people who have power against class enemies within the community or warlike enemies outside—will no longer be necessary. For, once the people are governing their own institutions from top to bottom, and there are no enemies of the people trying to destroy such a free self-governing community, there is no need to defend such a system by organized force, by the State. Under such conditions the whole apparatus of the State, with its armed forces, will, as Marx put it, &amp;quot;wither away.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet State as it exists today is, therefore, by no means the final form which democracy will take when the power of property is once and for all abolished, not only in one great country, but throughout the world. So long as the Soviet State stands alone, and is continually threatened by Fascist States outside and agents of Fascism within—and the Soviet State cannot build such a Chinese Wall of isolation to prevent some of them getting in—it will continue to be a fighting organization of the people, it will be armed, and it will have to use every means of securing its own defense. As a democratic organization that may at any time have to fight for its existence, the Soviet State must be highly disciplined, like a trade union in a strike, and the majority will use every necessary means of enforcing such a discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But as, in the rest of the world, the forces of democracy triumph over the concentrated power of the great owners of property, the danger to Soviet democracy will be reduced and the whole world will move nearer to a State in which real democracy will be freed from the danger of aggression. In such circumstances we may look towards a world democratic community, in which the people who work shall rule, and in which, because all shall do their share of work, all shall do their share of ruling.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1919 the workers of Hungary set up a Soviet State which survived for several months in the face of almost overwhelming opposition. But finally, as a result of armed intervention from outside, the Hungarian Soviet Republic was suppressed and Fascist terror took its place. The Republic had lasted for four months. The Hungarian democratic writer, Jaszi, summing up the results of the experience of the Soviet Republic, wrote these words:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The most important effect of the proletarian dictatorship will certainly be found in the radical change of outlook produced among the proletarian masses. It had the character of a violent moral explosion in the Hungarian social order. It planted in the minds of the great mass of semi-brutalized slaves perhaps the first seeds of faith and hope of liberation. To this day there lives in the hearts of millions the sense of the rights of the workers and of their superiority to the drones and killers. Above all, the dictatorship shook out of their age-long apathy the unhappy helots of Hungarian society, the agricultural workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;No less important was the service of the Soviet Revolution to the idea of internationalism, made livid and real in the minds of the people by the memory of hard and bloody conflicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Finally, through the spirit of the Soviet constitution, despite much childish naiveté and many violent outbursts, the Republic did pioneer work for the ideals of more advanced types of democracy and self- government. It did this by its exposure of the defective organization, the shortcomings and hypocrisies of the bourgeois democracies of today, and its proclamation for all time of the ideal of the State, in which only those who work and produce shall have the right to control and govern society&amp;quot; (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, p. 151).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This epitaph was written of the Hungarian Soviet Republic by one who was a democrat but not a Communist. It was written of the Hungarian Soviet Republic that only lived for four months. How much greater, then, is the significance to democracy of the Soviet State that has lived for twenty years, and in which the democratic rights of the people are constantly being extended. Finally, what a prospect for the world as a whole opens up before us, when the people of every country, as a result of an organized struggle for democratic rights in countries where they are deprived of them today, and through the defense and extension of these rights where they are already to some extent enjoyed, have established in every country a society in which all citizens have equal rights as citizens, and economic and political power no longer to the slightest extent depend on the possession of property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The way to such a society, the world commonwealth of the future, is indicated by the U.S.S.R. And in that society the State itself, and even the word democracy, will become historical terms with no longer any significance. &amp;quot;For,&amp;quot; as Lenin puts it, &amp;quot;when having learned to manage, and independently are actually managing by themselves, social production, keeping accounts, controlling the idlers, the gentlefolk, the swindlers, and similar ‘guardians of capitalist traditions’ then the escape from this national accounting and control was inevitably become so increasingly difficult, and such a rare exception, and will probably be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for the armed workers are men of practical life, not sentimental intellectuals, and they will scarcely allow anyone to trifle with them), that very soon the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of everyday social life in common will have become a habit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The door will then be open for the transition from the first phase of Communist society to its higher phase, and along with it to the complete withering away of the State. […] The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment when it begins to be unnecessary. The more democratic the ‘State’ consisting of armed workers, which is ‘no longer a State in the proper sense of the word,’ the more rapidly does every State begin to wither away&amp;quot; (State and Revolution).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these words Lenin outlines the future of Soviet democracy—a community of citizens, governing themselves in every branch of social activity, and using the necessary measures to preserve discipline in the common interest. Democracy and written Constitutions in such a society will probably be as unnecessary as is the ordinary family, and the citizens will run their community peacefully and in the common interest, creating all the necessary means of livelihood with their common labor, and having, ever greater resources available for the arts and sciences, for the complete mastery of nature in the interests of humanity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Will this new civilization,&amp;quot; write Sidney and Beatrice Webb, of the U.S.S.R. today, &amp;quot;with its abandonment of the incentive of profit-making, its extinction of unemployment, its planned production for community consumption, and the consequent liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, spread to other countries? Our own reply is: ‘Yes, it will.’ But how, when, where, with what modifications, and whether through violent revolution or by peaceful penetration, or even by conscious imitation, are questions we cannot answer&amp;quot; (Soviet Communism, p. 1143).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the answer to these final questions is not a difficult one. We have seen that the essential feature of the Soviet system is the abolition of the power of the landlord and capitalist, the owner of property, to rule the productive life of the country and thus to dominate the State. But this is but the extension of democracy so as to wipe out all privileges of the great property-owners as against the ordinary citizen, the small producer, the ordinary working man or woman. The united struggle of all the forces in the world interested in defending democratic liberties against encroachment, and in extending these liberties beyond the limits set by the great property-owners at the present time, is the only way in which democracy and democratic peace can be preserved in face of the growing danger of Fascism and Fascist aggression. The logical process of such a struggle, at a certain point, will necessitate the complete expropriation of the property-owners and the replacement of capitalism by Socialism, the only final guarantee that the anti-democratic forces of property can never again rear their heads. Whether or not, in Britain or France or Spain, such a struggle takes the actual form of the getting up of Soviets, it is in essence the same struggle as that which the Russian people successfully fought in 1917, defending and extending democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Peace, Bread, and Land&amp;quot; was the slogan of the Russian Revolution; and a really democratic Government was the only way by which these aims could be achieved. The Soviets were, in Russia, the democratic organ of the people. When, in November 1917, the whole of the democratic liberties of the Russian people were threatened with suppression, and with the imposition from above of a military dictatorship, the workers and peasants of Russia seized complete power through their own organizations, the Soviets. Democracy was triumphant, and the military dictators and their foreign allies were driven from the country, he seizure of power by the Russian Soviets was a landmark in the history of democracy, for it has proved for all time the practicability of the principle that only those who work and produce shall have the right to govern society. And it has shown that in a really democratic society it is possible to ensure that every citizen shall work and produce.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We began this book with a few remarks on the nature of democracy and dictatorship. At that stage we were interested in making clear one thing only - that democracy and dictatorship are not mutually, exclusive terms. Any democracy for one group of people may simultaneously be a dictatorship over another. The shareholders’ meeting of a joint-stock company is democratic for the shareholders, but it is a dictatorship over the employees of the firm, who usually vastly outnumber the shareholders. So, too, in the capitalist State, the democratic rights which exist are in practice available to the few owners of property to a great extent as compared with the majority of the people—the people who work. Thus, as in the Greek city-state, though to a lesser degree, we may say that even m Britain today the really effective part in the running of the country is played by a &amp;quot;charmed circle of the privileged,&amp;quot; while the rest of the community—the people who do the work—&amp;quot;have no voice whatever in the making of the laws under which they toil.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Democracy and dictatorship are not mutually exclusive. They are not absolutes. Therefore, in facing the practical problems of the people of the world as a whole, or of any single country, it is essential in every concrete instance to consider the actual situation, not from the standpoint of law only, but of everyday practice, in order to know to what extent the people are governing themselves, and to what extent they are not. On this basis, every measure which curtails the power of the people must be fought by every means that they can command, and every method of increasing their democratic rights, of making democracy more effective, must be constantly utilized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense of democracy against Fascism means the extension of existing democratic rights against those limitations imposed by the property relationships in existing society. And every extension of democratic rights for the people brings nearer the time when, faced as the Spanish people are today, with the alternatives of making democracy real or submitting to military dictatorship, the people will be in a position of such unity and organizational strength that they will be able to defend their democracy and make it ever more real, as the people succeeded in doing in Russia some twenty years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
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	<entry>
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		<title>Library:Marxism and the National Question</title>
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		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Fix a missing ref (MIA is at fault)&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Marxism and the National Question|author=Joseph Stalin|published_date=1913|source=[https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm Marxists Internet Archive]|audiobook=[https://youtu.be/MY-WDTkvtIc Tankie Talk]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The period of counter-revolution in Russia brought not only &amp;quot;thunder and lightning&amp;quot; in its train, but also disillusionment in the movement and lack of faith in common forces. As long as people believed in &amp;quot;a bright future,&amp;quot; they fought side by side irrespective of nationality – common questions first and foremost! But when doubt crept into people&#039;s hearts, they began to depart, each to his own national tent – let every man count only upon himself! The &amp;quot;national question&amp;quot; first and foremost!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time a profound upheaval was taking place in the economic life of the country. The year 1905 had not been in vain: one more blow had been struck at the survivals of serfdom in the countryside. The series of good harvests which succeeded the famine years, and the industrial boom which followed, furthered the progress of capitalism. Class differentiation in the countryside, the growth of the towns, the development of trade and means of communication all took a big stride forward. This applied particularly to the border regions. And it could not but hasten the process of economic consolidation of the nationalities of Russia. They were bound to be stirred into movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;quot;constitutional regime&amp;quot; established at that time also acted in the same direction of awakening the nationalities. The spread of newspapers and of literature generally, a certain freedom of the press and cultural institutions, an increase in the number of national theatres, and so forth, all unquestionably helped to strengthen &amp;quot;national sentiments.&amp;quot; The Duma, with its election campaign and political groups, gave fresh opportunities for greater activity of the nations and provided a new and wide arena for their mobilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the mounting wave of militant nationalism above and the series of repressive measures taken by the &amp;quot;powers that be&amp;quot; in vengeance on the border regions for their &amp;quot;love of freedom,&amp;quot; evoked an answering wave of nationalism below, which at times took the form of crude chauvinism. The spread of Zionism &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Zionism&#039;&#039; &amp;amp;#8211; A reactionary nationalist trend of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which had followers along the intellectuals and the more backward sections of the Jewish workers. The Zionists endeavoured to isolate the Jewish working-class masses from the general struggle of the proletariat.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; among the Jews, the increase of chauvinism in Poland, Pan-Islamism among the Tatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians, Georgians and Ukrainians, the general swing of the philistine towards anti-Semitism – all these are generally known facts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The wave of nationalism swept onwards with increasing force, threatening to engulf the mass of the workers. And the more the movement for emancipation declined, the more plentifully nationalism pushed forth its blossoms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this difficult time Social-Democracy had a high mission – to resist nationalism and to protect the masses from the general &amp;quot;epidemic.&amp;quot; For Social-Democracy, and Social-Democracy alone, could do this, by countering nationalism with the tried weapon of internationalism, with the unity and indivisibility of the class struggle. And the more powerfully the wave of nationalism advanced, the louder had to be the call of Social-Democracy for fraternity and unity among the proletarians of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this connection particular firmness was demanded of the Social-Democrats of the border regions, who came into direct contact with the nationalist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But not all Social-Democrats proved equal to the task – and this applies particularly to the Social-Democrats of the border regions. The Bund, which had previously laid stress on the common tasks, now began to give prominence to its own specific, purely nationalist aims: it went to the length of declaring &amp;quot;observance of the Sabbath&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;recognition of Yiddish&amp;quot; a fighting issue in its election campaign. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &amp;quot;Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Bund was followed by the Caucasus; one section of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, which, like the rest of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, had formerly rejected &amp;quot;cultural-national autonomy,&amp;quot; are now making it an immediate demand. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &amp;quot;Announcement of the August Conference.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This is without mentioning the conference of the Liquidators, which in a diplomatic way gave its sanction to nationalist vacillations. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &amp;quot;Announcement of the August Conference.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But from this it follows that the views of Russian Social-Democracy on the national question are not yet clear to all Social-Democrats.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is evident that a serious and comprehensive discussion of the national question is required. Consistent Social-Democrats must work solidly and indefatigably against the fog of nationalism, no matter from what quarter it proceeds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== I. THE NATION ==&lt;br /&gt;
What is a nation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A nation is primarily a community, a definite community of people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This community is not racial, nor is it tribal. The modern Italian nation was formed from Romans, Teutons, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs, and so forth. The French nation was formed from Gauls, Romans, Britons, Teutons, and so on. The same must be said of the British, the Germans and others, who were formed into nations from people of diverse races and tribes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, a nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, it is unquestionable that the great empires of Cyrus and Alexander could not be called nations, although they came to be constituted historically and were formed out of different tribes and races. They were not nations, but casual and loosely-connected conglomerations of groups, which fell apart or joined together according to the victories or defeats of this or that conqueror.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, a nation is not a casual or ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But not every stable community constitutes a nation. Austria and Russia are also stable communities, but nobody calls them nations. What distinguishes a national community from a state community? The fact, among others, that a national community is inconceivable without a common language, while a state need not have a common language. The Czech nation in Austria and the Polish in Russia would be impossible if each did not have a common language, whereas the integrity of Russia and Austria is not affected by the fact that there are a number of different languages within their borders. We are referring, of course, to the spoken languages of the people and not to the official governmental languages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;a common language&#039;&#039; is one of the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, does not mean that different nations always and everywhere speak different languages, or that all who speak one language necessarily constitute one nation. A &#039;&#039;common&#039;&#039;language for every nation, but not necessarily different languages for different nations! There is no nation which at one and the same time speaks several languages, but this does not mean that there cannot be two nations speaking the same language! Englishmen and Americans speak one language, but they do not constitute one nation. The same is true of the Norwegians and the Danes, the English and the Irish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But why, for instance, do the English and the Americans not constitute one nation in spite of their common language?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, because they do not live together, but inhabit different territories. A nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people living together generation after generation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But people cannot live together, for lengthy periods unless they have a common territory. Englishmen and Americans originally inhabited the same territory, England, and constituted one nation. Later, one section of the English emigrated from England to a new territory, America, and there, in the new territory, in the course of time, came to form the new American nation. Difference of. territory led to the formation of different nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;a common territory&#039;&#039; is one of the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this is not all. Common territory does not by itself create a nation. This requires, in addition, an internal economic bond to weld the various parts of the nation into a single whole. There is no such bond between England and America, and so they constitute two different nations. But the Americans themselves would not deserve to be called a nation were not the different parts of America bound together into an economic whole, as a result of division of labour between them, the development of means of communication, and so forth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Take the Georgians, for instance. The Georgians before the Reform inhabited a common territory and spoke one language. Nevertheless, they did not, strictly speaking, constitute one nation, for, being split up into a number of disconnected principalities, they could not share a common economic life; for centuries they waged war against each other and pillaged each other, each inciting the Persians and Turks against the other. The ephemeral and casual union of the principalities which some successful king sometimes managed to bring about embraced at best a superficial administrative sphere, and rapidly disintegrated owing to the caprices of the princes and the indifference of the peasants. Nor could it be otherwise in economically disunited Georgia ... Georgia came on the scene as a nation only in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the fall of serfdom and the growth of the economic life of the country, the development of means of communication and the rise of capitalism, introduced division of labour between the various districts of Georgia, completely shattered the economic isolation of the principalities and bound them together into a single whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same must be said of the other nations which have passed through the stage of feudalism and have developed capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;a common economic life, economic cohesion, is&#039;&#039; one of the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But even this is not all. Apart from the foregoing, one must take into consideration the specific spiritual complexion of the people constituting a nation. Nations differ not only in their conditions of life, but also in spiritual complexion, which manifests itself in peculiarities of national culture. If England, America and Ireland, which speak one language, nevertheless constitute three distinct nations, it is in no small measure due to the peculiar psychological make-up which they developed from generation to generation as a result of dissimilar conditions of existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, by itself, psychological make-up or, as it is otherwise called, &amp;quot;national character,&amp;quot; is something intangible for the observer, but in so far as it manifests itself in a distinctive culture common to the nation it is something tangible and cannot be ignored.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Needless to say, &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot; is not a thing that is fixed once and for all, but is modified by changes in the conditions of life; but since it exists at every given moment, it leaves its impress on the physiognomy of the nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;a common psychological make-up&#039;&#039;, which manifests itself in a common culture, is one of the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have now exhausted the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It goes without saying that a nation, like every historical phenomenon, is subject to the law of change, has its history, its beginning and end.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be emphasized that none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is possible to conceive of people possessing a common &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot; who, nevertheless, cannot be said to constitute a single nation if they are economically disunited, inhabit different territories, speak different languages, and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician, American, Georgian and Caucasian Highland &#039;&#039;Jews&#039;&#039;, who, in our opinion, do not constitute a single nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is possible to conceive of people with a common territory and economic life who nevertheless would not constitute a single nation because they have no common language and no common &amp;quot;national character.&amp;quot; Such, for instance, are the Germans and Letts in the Baltic region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the Norwegians and the Danes speak one language, but they do not constitute a single nation owing to the absence of the other characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is only when all these characteristics are present together that we have a nation.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It might appear that &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot; is not one of the characteristics but the &#039;&#039;sole&#039;&#039; essential characteristic of a nation, and that all the other characteristics are, properly speaking, only &#039;&#039;conditions&#039;&#039; for the development of a nation, rather than its characteristics. Such, for instance, is the view held by R. Springer, and more particularly by O. Bauer, who are Social-Democratic theoreticians on the national question well known in Austria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us examine their theory of the nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Springer, &amp;quot;a nation is a union of similarly thinking and similarly speaking persons.&amp;quot; It is &amp;quot;a cultural community of modern people &#039;&#039;no longer tied to the &#039;soil.&#039;&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See R. Springer, &#039;&#039;The National Problem&#039;&#039;, Obshchestvennaya Polza Publishing House, 1909, p. 43.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;(our italics).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, a &amp;quot;union&amp;quot; of similarly thinking and similarly speaking people, no matter how disconnected they may be, no matter where they live, is a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer goes even further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;What is a nation?&amp;quot; he asks. &amp;quot;Is it a common language which makes people a nation? But the English and the Irish ... speak the same language without, however, being one people; the Jews have no common language and yet are a nation.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See O. Bauer, &#039;&#039;The National Question and Social-Democracy&#039;&#039;, Serp Publishing House, 1909.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, is a nation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;A nation is a relative community of character.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what is character, in this case national character?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
National character is &amp;quot;the sum total of characteristics which distinguish the people of one nationality from the people of another nationality – the complex of physical and spiritual characteristics which distinguish one nation from another.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer knows, of course, that national character does not drop from the skies, and he therefore adds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The character of people is determined by nothing so much as by their destiny.... A nation is nothing but a community with a common destiny&amp;quot; which, in turn, is determined &amp;quot;by the conditions under which people produce their means of subsistence and distribute the products of their labour.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We thus arrive at the most &amp;quot;complete,&amp;quot; as Bauer calls it, definition of a nation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;A nation is an aggregate of people bound into a community of character by a common destiny.&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We thus have common national character based on a common destiny, but not necessarily connected with a common territory, language or economic life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what in that case remains of the nation? What common nationality can there be among people who are economically disconnected, inhabit different territories and from generation to generation speak different languages?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation, although they &amp;quot;have no common language&amp;quot;; but what &amp;quot;common destiny&amp;quot; and national cohesion is there, for instance, between the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who are completely separated from one another, inhabit different territories and speak different languages?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above-mentioned Jews undoubtedly lead their economic and political life in common with the Georgians, Daghestanians, Russians and Americans respectively, and they live in the same cultural atmosphere as these; this is bound to leave a definite impress on their national character; if there is anything common to them left, it is their religion, their common origin and certain relics of the national character. All this is beyond question. But how can it be seriously maintained that petrified religious rites and fading psychological relics affect the &amp;quot;destiny&amp;quot; of these Jews more powerfully than the living social, economic and cultural environment that surrounds them? And it is only on this assumption that it is possible to speak of the Jews as a single nation at all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, distinguishes Bauer&#039;s nation from the mystical and self-sufficient &amp;quot;national spirit&amp;quot; of the spiritualists?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer sets up an impassable barrier between the &amp;quot;distinctive feature&amp;quot; of nations (national character) and the &amp;quot;conditions&amp;quot; of their life, divorcing the one from the other. But what is national character if not a reflection of the conditions of life, a coagulation of impressions derived from environment? How can one limit the matter to national character alone, isolating and divorcing it from the soil that gave rise to it?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further, what indeed distinguished the English nation from the American nation at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when America was still known as New England? Not national character, of course; for the Americans had originated from England and had brought with them to America not only the English language, but also the English national character, which, of course, they could not lose so soon; although, under the influence of the new conditions, they would naturally be developing their own specific character. Yet, despite their more or less common character, they at that time already constituted a nation distinct from England! Obviously, New England as a nation differed then from England as a nation not by its specific national character, or not so much by its national character, as by its environment and conditions of life, which were distinct from those of England.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is therefore clear that there is in fact no &#039;&#039;single&#039;&#039; distinguishing characteristic of a nation. There is only a sum total of characteristics, of which, when nations are compared, sometimes one characteristic (national character), sometimes another (language), or sometimes a third (territory, economic conditions), stands out in sharper relief. A nation constitutes the combination of all these characteristics taken together.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer&#039;s point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character, divorces the nation from its soil and converts it into an invisible, self-contained force. The result is not a living and active nation, but something mystical, intangible and supernatural. For, I repeat, what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of which do not understand each other (since they speak different languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time of war?!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, it is not for such paper &amp;quot;nations&amp;quot; that Social-Democracy draws up its national programme. It can reckon only with real nations, which act and move, and therefore insist on being reckoned with.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer is obviously confusing &#039;&#039;nation&#039;&#039;, which is a historical category, with &#039;&#039;tribe&#039;&#039;, which is an ethnographical category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, Bauer himself apparently feels the weakness of his position. While in the beginning of his book he definitely declares the Jews to be a nation, he corrects himself at the end of the book and states that &amp;quot;in general capitalist society makes it impossible for them (the Jews) to continue as a nation,&amp;quot; by causing them to assimilate with other nations. The reason, it appears, is that &amp;quot;the Jews have no closed territory of settlement,&amp;quot; whereas the Czechs, for instance, have such a territory and, according to Bauer, will survive as a nation. In short, the reason lies in the absence of a territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By arguing thus, Bauer wanted to prove that the Jewish workers cannot demand national autonomy, but he thereby inadvertently refuted his own theory, which denies that a common territory is one of the characteristics of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But Bauer goes further. In the beginning of his book he definitely declares that &amp;quot;the Jews have no &#039;&#039;common&#039;&#039; language, and yet are a nation.&amp;quot; But hardly has he reached p. 130 than he effects a change of front and just as definitely declares that &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;unquestionably, no nation is possible without a common language&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (our italics).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer wanted to prove that &amp;quot;language is the most important instrument of human intercourse,&amp;quot; but at the same time he inadvertently proved something he did not mean to prove, namely, the unsoundness of his own theory of nations, which denies the significance of a common language.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus this theory, stitched together by idealistic threads, refutes itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== II. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT ==&lt;br /&gt;
A nation is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development of capitalism is at the same time a process of the constitution of people into nations. Such, for instance, was the case in Western Europe. The British, French, Germans, Italians and others were formed into nations at the time of the victorious advance of capitalism and its triumph over feudal disunity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the formation of nations in those instances at the same time signified their conversion into independent national states. The British, French and other nations are at the same time British, etc., states. Ireland, which did not participate in this process, does not alter the general picture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Matters proceeded somewhat differently in Eastern Europe. Whereas in the West nations developed into states, in the East multi-national states were formed, states consisting of several nationalities. Such are Austria-Hungary and Russia. In Austria, the Germans proved to be politically the most developed, and they took it upon themselves to unite the Austrian nationalities into a state. In Hungary, the most adapted for state organization were the Magyars – the core of the Hungarian nationalities – and it was they who united Hungary. In Russia, the uniting of the nationalities was undertaken by the Great Russians, who were headed by a historically formed, powerful and well-organized aristocratic military bureaucracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That was how matters proceeded in the East.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This special method of formation of states could take place only where feudalism had not yet been eliminated, where capitalism was feebly&#039; developed, where the nationalities which had been forced into the background had not yet been able to consolidate themselves economically into integral nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But capitalism also began to develop in the Eastern states. Trade and means of communication were developing. Large towns were springing up. The nations were becoming economically consolidated. Capitalism, erupting into the tranquil life of the nationalities which had been pushed into the background, was arousing them and stirring them into action. The development of the press and the theatre, the activity of the Reichsrat (Austria) and of the Duma (Russia) were helping to strengthen &amp;quot;national sentiments.&amp;quot; The intelligentsia that had arisen was being imbued with &amp;quot;the national idea&amp;quot; and was acting in the same direction....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the nations which had been pushed into the background and had now awakened to independent life, could no longer form themselves into independent national states; they encountered on their -path the very powerful resistance of the ruling strata of the dominant nations, which had long ago assumed the control of the state. They were too late!...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way the Czechs, Poles, etc., formed themselves into nations in Austria; the Croats, etc., in Hungary; the Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, etc., in Russia. What had been an exception in Western Europe (Ireland) became the rule in the East.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the West, Ireland responded to its exceptional position by a national movement. In the East, the awakened nations were bound to respond in the same fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus arose the circumstances which impelled the young nations of Eastern Europe on to the path of struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The struggle began and flared up, to be sure, not between nations as a whole, but between the ruling classes of the dominant nations and of those that had been pushed into the background. The struggle is usually conducted by the urban petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the big bourgeoisie of the dominant nation (Czechs and Germans), or by the rural bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the landlords of the dominant nation (Ukrainians in Poland), or by the whole &amp;quot;national&amp;quot; bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations against the ruling nobility of the dominant nation (Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine in Russia).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The bourgeoisie plays the leading role.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its goods and to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie of a different nationality. Hence its desire to secure its &amp;quot;own,&amp;quot; its &amp;quot;home&amp;quot; market. The market is the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But matters are usually not confined to the market. The semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois bureaucracy of the dominant nation intervenes in the struggle with its own methods of &amp;quot;arresting and preventing.&amp;quot; The bourgeoisie – whether big or small – of the dominant nation is able to deal more &amp;quot;swiftly&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;decisively&amp;quot; with its competitor. &amp;quot;Forces&amp;quot; are united and a series of restrictive measures is put into operation against the &amp;quot;alien&amp;quot; bourgeoisie, measures passing into acts of repression. The struggle spreads from the economic sphere to the political sphere. Restriction of freedom of movement, repression of language, restriction of franchise, closing of schools, religious restrictions, and so on, are piled upon the head of the &amp;quot;competitor.&amp;quot; Of course, such measures are designed not only in the interest of the bourgeois classes of the dominant nation, but also in furtherance of the specifically caste aims, so to speak, of the ruling bureaucracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But from the point of view of the results achieved this is quite immaterial; the bourgeois classes and the bureaucracy in this matter go hand in hand – whether it be in Austria-Hungary or in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation, repressed on every hand, is naturally stirred into movement. It appeals to its &amp;quot;native folk&amp;quot; and begins to shout about the &amp;quot;fatherland,&#039;; claiming that its own cause is the cause of the nation as a whole. It recruits itself an army from among its &amp;quot;countrymen&amp;quot; in the interests of ... the &amp;quot;fatherland.&amp;quot; Nor do the &amp;quot;folk&amp;quot; always remain unresponsive to its appeals; they rally around its banner: the repression from above affects them too and provokes their discontent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the national movement begins.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The strength of the national movement is determined by the degree to which the wide strata of the nation, the proletariat and peasantry, participate in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whether the proletariat rallies to the banner of bourgeois nationalism depends on the degree of development of class antagonisms, on the class consciousness and degree of organization of the proletariat. The class-conscious proletariat has its own tried banner, and has no need to rally to the banner of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As far as the peasants are concerned, their participation in the national movement depends primarily on the character of the repressions. If the repressions affect the &amp;quot;land,&amp;quot; as was the case in Ireland, then the mass of the peasants immediately rally to the banner of the national movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, if, for example, there is no seri&#039;&#039;ous anti-Russian&#039;&#039; nationalism in Georgia, it is primarily because there are neither Russian landlords nor a Russian big bourgeoisie there to supply the fuel for such nationalism among the masses. In Georgia there &#039;&#039;is anti-Armenian&#039;&#039;nationalism; but this is because there is still an Armenian big bourgeoisie there which, by getting the better of the small and still unconsolidated Georgian bourgeoisie, drives the latter to anti-Armenian nationalism. .&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on these factors, the national movement either assumes a mass character and steadily grows (as in Ireland and Galicia), or is converted into a series of petty collisions, degenerating into squabbles and &amp;quot;fights&amp;quot; over signboards (as in some of the small towns of Bohemia).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The content of the national movement, of course, cannot everywhere be the same: it is wholly determined by the diverse demands made by the movement. In Ireland the movement bears an agrarian character; in Bohemia it bears a &amp;quot;language&amp;quot; character; in one place the demand is for civil equality and religious freedom, in another for the nation&#039;s &amp;quot;own&amp;quot; officials, or its own Diet. The diversity of demands not infrequently reveals the diverse features which characterize a nation in general (language, territory, etc.). It is worthy of note that we never meet with a demand based on Bauer&#039;s all-embracing &amp;quot;national character.&amp;quot; And this is natural: &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;in itself is&#039;&#039; something intangible, and, as was correctly remarked by J. Strasser, &amp;quot;a politician can&#039;t do anything with it.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See his &#039;&#039;Der Arbeiter und die Nation&#039;&#039;, 1912.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such, in general, are the forms and character of the national movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From what has been said it will be clear that the national struggle under the conditions of &#039;&#039;rising&#039;&#039; capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves. Sometimes the bourgeoisie succeeds in drawing the proletariat into the national movement, and then the national struggle &#039;&#039;externally&#039;&#039; assumes a &amp;quot;nation-wide&amp;quot; character. But this is so only externally. &#039;&#039;In its essence it is&#039;&#039; always a bourgeois struggle, one that is to the advantage and profit mainly of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it does not by any means follow that the proletariat should not put up a fight against the policy of national oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Restriction of freedom of movement, disfranchisement, repression of language, closing of schools, and other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if not more, than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs can only serve to retard the free development of the intellectual forces of the proletariat of subject nations. One cannot speak seriously of a full development of the intellectual faculties of the Tatar or Jewish worker if he is not allowed to use his native language at meetings and lectures, and if his schools are closed down.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the policy of nationalist persecution is dangerous to the cause of the proletariat also on another account. It diverts the attention of large strata from social questions, questions of the class struggle, to national questions, questions &amp;quot;common&amp;quot; to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And this creates a favourable soil for lying propaganda about &amp;quot;harmony of interests,&amp;quot; for glossing over the class interests of the proletariat and for the intellectual enslavement of the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This creates a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all nationalities. If a considerable proportion of the Polish workers are still in intellectual bondage to the bourgeois nationalists, if they still stand aloof from the international labour movement, it is chiefly because the age-old anti-Polish policy of the &amp;quot;powers that be&amp;quot; creates the soil for this bondage and hinders the emancipation of the workers from it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the policy of persecution does not stop there. It not infrequently passes from a &amp;quot;system&amp;quot; of &#039;&#039;oppression&#039;&#039; to a &amp;quot;system&amp;quot; of &#039;&#039;inciting&#039;&#039; nations against each other, to a &amp;quot;system&amp;quot; of massacres and pogroms. Of course, the latter system is not everywhere and always possible, but where it is possible – in the absence of elementary civil rights – it frequently assumes horrifying proportions and threatens to drown the cause of unity of the workers in blood and tears. The Caucasus and south Russia furnish numerous examples. &amp;quot;Divide and rule&amp;quot; – such is the purpose of the policy of incitement. And where such a policy succeeds, it is a tremendous evil for the proletariat and a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all the nationalities in the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the workers are interested in the complete amalgamation of all their fellow-workers into a single international army, in their speedy and final emancipation from intellectual bondage to the bourgeoisie, and in the full and free development of the intellectual forces of their brothers, whatever nation they may belong to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The workers therefore combat and will continue to combat the policy of national oppression in all its forms, from the most subtle to the most crude, as well as the policy of inciting nations against each other in all its forms&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social-Democracy in all countries therefore proclaims the right of nations to self-determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The right of self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the right &#039;&#039;forcibly&#039;&#039; to interfere in the life of the nation, to &#039;&#039;destroy&#039;&#039; its schools and other institutions, to &#039;&#039;violate&#039;&#039; its habits and customs, to &#039;&#039;repress&#039;&#039; its language, or &#039;&#039;curtail&#039;&#039; its rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy will support every custom and institution of a nation. While combating the coercion of any nation, it will uphold only the right of the &#039;&#039;nation&#039;&#039; itself to determine its own destiny, at the same time agitating against harmful customs and institutions of that nation in order to enable the toiling strata of the nation to emancipate themselves from them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The right of self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equal rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy will support every demand of a nation. A nation has the right even to return to the old order of things; but this does not mean that Social-Democracy will subscribe to such a decision if taken by some institution of a particular nation. The obligations of Social-Democracy, which defends the interests of the proletariat, and the rights of a nation, which consists of various classes, are two different things.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, the aim of Social-Democracy is to put an end to the policy of national oppression, to render it impossible, and thereby to remove the grounds of strife between nations, to take the edge off that strife and reduce it to a minimum.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is what essentially distinguishes the policy of the class-conscious proletariat from the policy of the bourgeoisie, which attempts to aggravate and fan the national struggle and to prolong and sharpen the national movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And that is why the class-conscious proletariat cannot rally under the &amp;quot;national&amp;quot; flag of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why the so-called &amp;quot;evolutionary national&amp;quot; policy advocated by Bauer cannot become the policy of the proletariat. Bauer&#039;s attempt to identify his &amp;quot;evolutionary national&amp;quot; policy with the policy of the &amp;quot;modern working class&amp;quot; is an attempt to adapt the class struggle of the workers to the struggle of the nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fate of a national movement, which is essentially a bourgeois movement, is naturally bound up with the fate of the bourgeoisie. The -final disappearance of a national movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Only under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established. But even within the framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the national struggle to a minimum, to undermine it at the root, to render it as harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne out, for example, by Switzerland and America. It requires that the country should be democratized and the nations be given the opportunity of free development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== III. PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
A nation has the right freely to determine its own destiny. It has the right to arrange its life as it sees fit, without, of course, trampling on the rights of other nations. That is beyond dispute.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; exactly should it arrange its own life, &#039;&#039;what forms&#039;&#039; should its future constitution take, if the interests of the majority of the nation and, above all, of the proletariat are to be borne in mind?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A nation has the right to arrange its life on autonomous lines. It even has the right to secede. But this does not mean that it should do so under all circumstances, that autonomy, or separation, will everywhere and always be advantageous for a nation, i.e., for its majority, i.e., for the toiling strata. The Transcaucasian Tatars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in their Diet and, succumbing to the influence of their beys and mullahs, decide to restore the old order of things and to secede from the state. According to the meaning of the clause on self-determination they are fully entitled to do so. But will this be in the interest of the toiling strata of the Tatar nation? Can Social-Democracy look on indifferently when the beys and mullahs assume the leadership of the masses in the solution of the national question?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Should not Social-Democracy interfere in the matter and influence the will of the nation in a definite way? Should it not come forward with a definite plan for the solution of the question, a plan which would be most advantageous for the Tatar masses?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what solution would be most compatible with the interests of the toiling masses? Autonomy, federation or separation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these are problems the solution of which will depend on the concrete historical conditions in which the given nation finds itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than that; conditions, like everything else, change, and a decision which is correct at one particular time may prove to be entirely unsuitable at another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the middle of the nineteenth century Marx was in favour of the secession of Russian Poland; and he was right, for it was then a question of emancipating a higher culture from a lower culture that was destroying it. And the question at that time was not only a theoretical one, an academic question, but a practical one, a question of actual reality....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the end of the nineteenth century the Polish Marxists were already declaring against the secession of Poland; and they too were right, for during the fifty years that had elapsed profound changes had taken place, bringing Russia and Poland closer economically and culturally. Moreover, during that period the question of secession had been converted from a practical matter into a matter of academic dispute, which excited nobody except perhaps intellectuals abroad.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, by no means precludes the possibility that certain internal and external conditions may arise in which the question of the secession of Poland may again come on the order of the day.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The solution of the national question is possible only in connection with the historical conditions taken in their development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The economic, political and cultural conditions of a given nation constitute the only key to the question &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; a particular nation ought to arrange its life and &#039;&#039;what forms&#039;&#039; its future constitution ought to take. It is possible that a specific solution of the question will be required for each nation. If the dialectical approach to a question is required anywhere it is required here, in the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In view of this we must declare our decided opposition to a certain very widespread, but very summary manner of &amp;quot;solving&amp;quot; the national question, which owes its inception to the Bund. We have in mind the easy method of referring to Austrian and South-Slav &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;South-Slav Social-Democracy operates in the Southern part of Austria.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Social-Democracy, which has supposedly already solved the national question and whose solution the Russian Social-Democrats should simply borrow. It is assumed that whatever, say, is right for Austria is also right for Russia. The most important and decisive factor is lost sight of here, namely, the concrete historical conditions in Russia as a whole and in the life of each of the nations inhabiting Russia in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Listen, for example, to what the well-known Bundist, V. Kossovsky, says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;When at the Fourth Congress of the Bund the principles of the question (i.e., the national question – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) were discussed, the proposal made by one of the members of the congress to settle the question in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party met with general approval.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See V. Kossovsky, &#039;&#039;Problems of Nationality&#039;&#039;, 1907.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the result was that &amp;quot;the congress unanimously adopted&amp;quot; ... national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And that was all! No analysis of the actual conditions in Russia, no investigation of the condition of the Jews in Russia. They first borrowed the solution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party, then they &amp;quot;approved&amp;quot; it, and finally they &amp;quot;unanimously adopted&amp;quot; it! This is the way the Bundists present and &amp;quot;solve&amp;quot; the national question in Russia....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a matter of fact, Austria and Russia represent entirely different conditions. This explains why the Social-Democrats in Austria, when they adopted their national programme at Brünn (1899) &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The Br&amp;amp;uuml;nn Parteitag, or Congress, of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held on September 24-29, 1899. The resolution on the national question adopted by this congress is quoted by J. V. Stalin in the chapter IV, &amp;quot;Cultural-National Autonomy.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party (with certain insignificant amendments, it is true), approached the question in an entirely non-Russian way, so to speak, and, of course, solved it in a non-Russian way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, as to the presentation of the question. How is the question presented by the Austrian theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, the interpreters of the Brünn national programme and the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party, Springer and Bauer?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Whether a multi-national state is possible,&amp;quot; says Springer, &amp;quot;and whether, in particular, the Austrian nationalities are obliged to form a single political entity, is a question we shall not answer here but shall assume to be settled. For anyone who will not concede this possibility and necessity, our investigation will, of course, be purposeless. Our theme is as follows: inasmuch as these nations are &#039;&#039;obliged&#039;&#039; to live together, what &#039;&#039;legal forms&#039;&#039; will enable them &#039;&#039;to live together in the best possible way?&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (Springer&#039;s italics). &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Springer, &#039;&#039;The National Problem&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the starting point is the state integrity of Austria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer says the same thing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;We therefore start from the assumption that the Austrian nations will remain in the same state union in which they exist at present and inquire how the nations within this union will arrange their relations among themselves and to the state.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Bauer, &#039;&#039;The National Question and Social-Democracy&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here again the first thing is the integrity of Austria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Can Russian Social-Democracy present the question &#039;&#039;in this way?&#039;&#039; No, it cannot. And it cannot because from the very outset it holds the view of the right of nations to self-determination, by virtue of which a nation has the right of secession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even the Bundist Goldblatt admitted at the Second Congress of Russian Social-Democracy that the latter could not abandon the standpoint of self-determination. Here is what Goldblatt said on that occasion:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Nothing can be said against the right of self-determination. If any nation is striving for independence, we must not oppose it. If Poland does not wish to enter into lawful wedlock with Russia, it is not for us to interfere with her.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this is true. But it follows that the starting points of the Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats, far from being identical, are diametrically opposite. After this, can there be any question of borrowing the national programme of the Austrians?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Furthermore, the Austrians hope to achieve the &amp;quot;freedom of nationalities&amp;quot; by means of petty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national autonomy as a practical measure, they do not count on any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, which they do not even contemplate. The Russian Marxists, on the other hand, associate the &amp;quot;freedom of nationalities&amp;quot; with a probable radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation, having no grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters matters in regard to the probable fate of the nations of Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Of course,&amp;quot; says Bauer, &amp;quot;there is little probability that national autonomy will be the result of a great decision, of a bold action. Austria will develop towards national autonomy step by step, by a slow process of development, in the course of a severe struggle, as a consequence of which legislation and administration will be in a state of chronic paralysis. The new constitution will not be created by a great legislative act, but by a multitude of separate enactments for individual provinces and individual communities.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Springer says the same thing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;I am very well aware,&amp;quot; he writes, &amp;quot;that institutions of this kind (i.e., organs of national autonomy – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) are not created in a single year or a single decade. The reorganization of the Prussian administration alone took considerable time.... It took the Prussians two decades finally to establish their basic administrative institutions. Let nobody think that I harbour any illusions as to the time required and the difficulties to be overcome in Austria.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this is very definite. But can the Russian Marxists avoid associating the national question with &amp;quot;bold actions&amp;quot;? Can they count on partial reforms, on &amp;quot;a multitude of separate enactments&amp;quot; as a means for achieving the &amp;quot;freedom of nationalities&amp;quot;? But if they cannot and must not do so, is it not clear that the methods of struggle of the Austrians and the Russians and their prospects must be entirely different? How in such a state of affairs can they confine themselves to the one-sided, milk-and-water cultural-national autonomy of the Austrians? One or the other: either those who are in favour of borrowing do not count on &amp;quot;bold actions&amp;quot; in Russia, or they do count on such actions but &amp;quot;know not what they do.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the immediate tasks facing Russia and Austria are entirely different and consequently dictate different methods of solving the national question. In Austria parliamentarism prevails, and under present conditions no development in Austria is possible without parliament. But parliamentary life and legislation in Austria are frequently brought to a complete standstill by severe conflicts between the national parties. That explains the chronic political crisis from which Austria has for a long time been suffering. Hence, in Austria the national question is the very hub of political life; it is the vital question. It is therefore not surprising that the Austrian Social-Democratic politicians should first of all try in one way or another to find a solution for the national conflicts – of course on the basis of the existing parliamentary system, by parliamentary methods....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not so with Russia. In the first place, in Russia &amp;quot;there is no parliament, thank God.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Thank God we have no parliament here&amp;quot; &amp;amp;#8211; the words uttered by V. Kokovtsev, tsarist Minister of Finance (later Prime Minister), in the State Duma on April 24 1908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In the second place – and this is the main point – the hub of the political life of Russia is not the national but the agrarian question. Consequently, the fate of the Russian problem, and, accordingly, the &amp;quot;liberation&amp;quot; of the nations too, is bound up in Russia with the solution of the agrarian question, i.e., with the destruction of the relics of feudalism, i.e., with the democratization of the country. That explains why in Russia the national question is not an independent and decisive one, but a part of the general and more important question of the emancipation of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The barrenness of the Austrian parliament,&amp;quot; writes Springer, &amp;quot;is due precisely to the fact that every reform gives rise to antagonisms within the national parties which may affect their unity. The leaders of the parties, therefore, avoid everything that smacks of reform. Progress in Austria is generally conceivable only if the nations are granted indefeasible legal rights which will relieve them of the necessity of constantly maintaining national militant groups in parliament and will enable them to turn their attention to the solution of economic and social problems.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer says the same thing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;National peace is indispensable first of all for the state. The state cannot permit legislation to be brought to a standstill by the very stupid question of language or by every quarrel between excited people on a linguistic frontier, or over every new school.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this is clear. But it is no less clear that the national question in Russia is on an entirely different plane. It is not the national, but the agrarian question , that decides the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinate one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so we have different presentations of the question, different prospects and methods of struggle, different immediate tasks. Is it not clear that, such being the state of affairs, only pedants who &amp;quot;solve&amp;quot; the national question without reference to space and time can think of adopting examples from Austria and of borrowing a programme?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To repeat: the concrete historical conditions as the starting point, and the dialectical presentation of the question as the only correct way of presenting it – such is the key to solving the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== IV. CULTURAL-NATIONAL AUTONOMY ==&lt;br /&gt;
We spoke above of the formal aspect of the Austrian national programme and of the methodological grounds which make it impossible for the Russian Marxists simply to adopt the example of Austrian Social-Democracy and make the latter&#039;s programme their own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now examine the essence of the programme itself&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What then is the national programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is expressed in two words: cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This means, firstly, that autonomy would be granted, let us say, not to Bohemia or Poland, which are inhabited mainly by Czechs and Poles, but to Czechs and Poles generally, irrespective of territory, no matter what part of Austria they inhabit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why this autonomy is called &#039;&#039;national&#039;&#039; and not territorial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It means, secondly, that the Czechs, Poles, Germans, and so on, scattered over the various parts of Austria, taken personally, as individuals, are to be organized into integral nations, and are as such to form part of the Austrian state. In this way Austria would represent not a union of autonomous regions, but a union of autonomous nationalities, constituted irrespective of territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It means, thirdly, that the national institutions which are to be created for this purpose for the Poles, Czechs, and so forth, are to have jurisdiction only over &amp;quot;cultural,&amp;quot; not &amp;quot;political&amp;quot; questions. Specifically political questions would be reserved for the Austrian parliament (the Reichsrat).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why this autonomy is also called &#039;&#039;cultural&#039;&#039;, cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And here is the text of the programme adopted by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party at the Brünn Congress in 1899. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The representatives of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party also voted for it. See &#039;&#039;Discussion of the National Question at the Br&amp;amp;uuml;nn Congress&#039;&#039;, 1906.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having referred to the fact that &amp;quot;national dissension in Austria is hindering political progress,&amp;quot; that &amp;quot;the final solution of the national question... is primarily a cultural necessity,&amp;quot; and that &amp;quot;the solution is possible only in a genuinely democratic society, constructed on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage,&amp;quot; the programme goes on to say:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;The preservation and development of the national peculiarities&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In M. Panin&#039;s Russian translation (see his translation of Bauer&#039;s book), &amp;quot;national individualities&amp;quot; is given in place of &amp;quot;national peculiarities.&amp;quot; Panin translated this passage incorrectly. The word &amp;quot;individuality&amp;quot; is not in the German text, which speaks of &#039;&#039;nationalen Eigenart&#039;&#039;, i.e., &#039;&#039;peculiarities&#039;&#039;, which is far from being the same thing.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; of the peoples of Austria is possible only on the basis of equal rights and by avoiding all oppression. Hence, all bureaucratic state centralism and the feudal privileges of individual provinces must first of all be rejected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Under these conditions, and only under these conditions, will it be possible to establish national order in Austria in place of national dissension, namely, on the following principles:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;1. Austria must be transformed into a democratic state federation of nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;2. The historical crown provinces must be replaced by nationally delimited self-governing corporations, in each of which legislation and administration shall be entrusted to national parliaments elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;3. All the self-governing regions of one and the same nation must jointly form a single national union, which shall manage its national affairs on an absolutely autonomous basis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;4. The rights of national minorities must be guaranteed by a special law passed by the Imperial Parliament.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The programme ends with an appeal for the solidarity of all the nations of Austria. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; Verhandlungen des Gesamtparteitages&#039;&#039; in Br&amp;amp;uuml;nn, 1899.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not difficult to see that this programme retains certain traces of &amp;quot;territorialism,&amp;quot; but that in general it gives a formulation of national autonomy. It is not without good reason that Springer, the first agitator on behalf of cultural-national autonomy, greets it with enthusiasm; Bauer also supports this programme, calling it a &amp;quot;theoretical victory&amp;quot; for national autonomy; only, in the interests of greater clarity, he proposes that Point 4 be replaced by a more definite formulation, which would declare the necessity of &amp;quot;constituting the national minority within each self-governing region into a public corporation&amp;quot; for the management of educational and other cultural affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such is the national programme of Austrian Social-Democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us examine its scientific foundations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us see how the Austrian Social-Democratic Party justifies the cultural-national autonomy it advocates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us turn to the theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, Springer and Bauer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The starting point of national autonomy is the conception of a nation as a union of individuals without regard to a definite territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Nationality,&amp;quot; according to Springer, &amp;quot;is not essentially connected with territory&amp;quot;; nations are &amp;quot;autonomous unions of persons.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer also speaks of a nation as a &amp;quot;community of persons&amp;quot; which does not enjoy &amp;quot;exclusive sovereignty in any particular region.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the persons constituting a nation do not always live in one compact mass; they are frequently divided into groups, and in that form are interspersed among alien national organisms. It is capitalism which drives them into various regions and cities in search of a livelihood. But when they enter foreign national territories and there form minorities, these groups are made to suffer by the local national majorities in the way of restrictions on their language, schools, etc. Hence national conflicts. Hence the &amp;quot;unsuitability&amp;quot; of territorial autonomy. The only solution to such a situation, according to Springer and Bauer, is to organize the minorities of the given nationality dispersed over various parts of the state into a single, general, inter-class national union. Such a union alone, in their opinion, can protect the cultural interests of national minorities, and it alone is capable of putting an end to national discord.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Hence the necessity,&amp;quot; says Springer, &amp;quot;to organize the nationalities, to invest them with rights and responsibilities....&amp;quot; Of course, &amp;quot;a law is easily drafted, but will it be effective? &amp;quot;... &amp;quot;If one wants to make a law for nations, one must first create the nations...&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Unless the nationalities are constituted it is impossible to create national rights and eliminate national dissension.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer expressed himself in the same spirit when he proposed, as &amp;quot;a demand of the working class,&amp;quot; that &amp;quot;the minorities should be constituted into public corporations based on the personal principle.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But how is a nation to be organized? How is one to determine to what nation any given individual belongs?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Nationality,&amp;quot; says Springer, &amp;quot;will be determined by certificates; every individual domiciled in a given region must declare his affiliation to one of the nationalities of that region.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The personal principle,&amp;quot; says Bauer, &amp;quot;presumes that the population will be divided into nationalities.... On the basis of the free declaration of the adult citizens national registers must be drawn up.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;All the Germans in nationally homogeneous districts,&amp;quot; says Bauer, &amp;quot;and all the Germans entered in the national registers in the dual districts will constitute the German nation and elect a &#039;&#039;National Council&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same applies to the Czechs, Poles, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The &#039;&#039;National Council,&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; according to Springer, &amp;quot;is the cultural parliament of the nation, empowered to establish the principles and to grant funds, thereby assuming guardianship over national education, national literature, art and science, the formation of academies, museums, galleries, theatres,&amp;quot; etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such will be the organization of a nation and its central institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bauer, the Austrian Social-Democratic Party is striving, by the creation of these inter-class institutions &amp;quot;to make national culture ... the possession of the whole people and thereby &#039;&#039;unite all the members of the nation into a national-cultural community.&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (our italics).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One might think that all this concerns Austria alone. But Bauer does not agree. He emphatically declares that national autonomy is essential also for other states which, like Austria, consist of several nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;In the multi-national state,&amp;quot; according to Bauer, &amp;quot;the working class of all the nations opposes the national power policy of the propertied classes with the demand for national autonomy.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then, imperceptibly substituting national autonomy for the self-determination of nations, he continues:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Thus, national autonomy, the self-determination of nations, will necessarily become the constitutional programme of the proletariat of all the nations in a multi-national state.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But he goes still further. He profoundly believes that the inter-class &amp;quot;national unions&amp;quot; &amp;quot;constituted&amp;quot; by him and Springer will serve as a sort of prototype of the future socialist society. For he knows that &amp;quot;the socialist system of society... will divide humanity into nationally delimited communities&amp;quot;; that under socialism there will take place &amp;quot;a grouping of humanity into autonomous national communities,&amp;quot; that thus, &amp;quot;socialist society will undoubtedly present a checkered picture of national unions of persons and territorial corporations, and that accordingly &amp;quot;the socialist principle of nationality is a higher synthesis of the national principle and national autonomy.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Enough, it would seem..&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are the arguments for cultural-national autonomy as given in the works of Bauer and Springer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first thing that strikes the eye is the entirely inexplicable and absolutely unjustifiable substitution of national autonomy for self-determination of nations. One or the other: either Bauer failed to understand the meaning of self-determination, or he did understand it but for some reason or other deliberately narrowed its meaning. For there is no doubt a) that cultural-national autonomy presupposes the integrity of the multi-national state, whereas self-determination goes outside the framework of this integrity, and b) that self-determination endows a nation with complete rights, whereas national autonomy endows it only with &amp;quot;cultural&amp;quot; rights. That in the first place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the second place, a combination of internal and external conditions is fully possible at some future time by virtue of which one or another of the nationalities may decide to secede from a multi-national state, say from Austria. Did not the Ruthenian Social-Democrats at the Brünn Party Congress announce their readiness to unite the &amp;quot;two parts&amp;quot; of their people into one whole? &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Proceedings of the Br&amp;amp;uuml;nn Social-Democratic Party Congress&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What, in such a case, becomes of national autonomy, which is &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;inevitable for the proletariat of all the nations&amp;quot;?&#039;&#039; What sort of &amp;quot;solution&amp;quot; of the problem is it that mechanically squeezes nations into the Procrustean bed of an integral state?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further: National autonomy is contrary to the whole course of development of nations. It calls for the organization of nations; but can they be artificially welded together if life, if economic development tears whole groups from them and disperses these groups over various regions? There is no doubt that in the early stages of capitalism nations become welded together. But there is also no doubt that in the higher stages of capitalism a process of dispersion of nations sets in, a process whereby a whole number of groups separate off from the nations, going off in search of a livelihood and subsequently settling permanently in other regions of the state; in the course of this these settlers lose their old connections and acquire new ones in their new domicile, and from generation to generation acquire new habits and new tastes, and possibly a new language. The question arises: is it possible to unite into a single national union groups that have grown so distinct? Where are the magic links to unite what cannot be united? Is it conceivable that, for instance, the Germans of the Baltic Provinces and the Germans of Transcaucasia can be &amp;quot;united into a single nation&amp;quot;? But if it is not conceivable and not possible, wherein does national autonomy differ from the utopia of the old nationalists, who endeavoured to turn back the wheel of history?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the unity of a nation diminishes not only as a result of migration. It diminishes also from internal causes, owing to the growing acuteness of the class struggle. In the early stages of capitalism one can still speak of a &amp;quot;common culture&amp;quot; of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But as large-scale industry develops and the class struggle becomes more and more acute, this &amp;quot;common culture&amp;quot; begins to melt away. One cannot seriously speak of the &amp;quot;common culture&amp;quot; of a nation when employers and workers of one and the same nation cease to understand each other. What &amp;quot;common destiny&amp;quot; can there be when the bourgeoisie thirsts for war, and the proletariat declares &amp;quot;war on war&amp;quot;? Can a single inter-class national union be formed from such opposed elements? And, after this, can one speak of the &amp;quot;union of all the members of the nation into a national-cultural community&amp;quot;? Is it not obvious that national autonomy is contrary to the whole course of the class struggle?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us assume for a moment that the slogan &amp;quot;organize the nation&amp;quot; is practicable. One might understand bourgeois-nationalist parliamentarians endeavouring to &amp;quot;organize&amp;quot; a nation for the purpose of securing additional votes. But since when have Social-Democrats begun to occupy themselves with &amp;quot;organizing&amp;quot; nations, &amp;quot;constituting&amp;quot; nations, &amp;quot;creating&amp;quot; nations?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What sort of Social-Democrats are they who in the epoch of extreme intensification of the class struggle organize inter-class national unions? Until now the Austrian, as well as every other, Social-Democratic party, had one task before it: namely, to organize the proletariat. That task has apparently become &amp;quot;antiquated.&amp;quot; Springer and Bauer are now setting a &amp;quot;new&amp;quot; task, a more absorbing task, namely, to &amp;quot;create,&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;organize&amp;quot; a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, logic has its obligations: he who adopts national autonomy must also adopt this &amp;quot;new&amp;quot; task;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
but to adopt the latter means to abandon the class position and to take the path of nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Springer&#039;s and Bauer&#039;s cultural-national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And it is by no means fortuitous that the national programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats enjoins a concern for the &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;preservation&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;development&#039;&#039; of the national peculiarities of the peoples.&amp;quot; Just think: to &amp;quot;preserve&amp;quot; such &amp;quot;national peculiarities&amp;quot; of the Transcaucasian Tatars as self-flagellation at the festival of &#039;&#039;Shakhsei-Vakhsei&#039;&#039;; or to &amp;quot;develop&amp;quot; such &amp;quot;national peculiarities&amp;quot; of the Georgians as the vendetta! ...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A demand of this character is in place in an outright bourgeois nationalist programme; and if it appears in the programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats it is because national autonomy tolerates such demands, it does not contradict them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if national autonomy is unsuitable now, it will be still more unsuitable in the future, socialist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer&#039;s prophecy regarding the &amp;quot;division of humanity into nationally delimited communities&amp;quot; is refuted by the whole course of development of modern human society. National barriers are being demolished and are falling, rather than becoming firmer. As early as the &#039;forties Marx declared that &amp;quot;national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing&amp;quot; and that &amp;quot;the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chapter II of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;The subsequent development of mankind, accompanied as it was by the colossal growth of capitalist production, the reshuffling of nationalities and the union of people within ever larger territories, emphatically confirms Marx&#039;s thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer&#039;s desire to represent socialist society as a &amp;quot;checkered picture of national unions of persons and territorial corporations&amp;quot; is a timid attempt to substitute for Marx&#039;s conception of socialism a revised version of Bakunin&#039;s conception. The history of socialism proves that every such attempt contains the elements of inevitable failure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no need to mention the kind of &amp;quot;socialist principle of nationality&amp;quot; glorified by Bauer, which, in our opinion, substitutes for the socialist principle of the &#039;&#039;class struggle&#039;&#039; the bourgeois&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;principle of nationality.&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; If national autonomy is based on such a dubious principle, it must be admitted that it can only cause harm to the working-class movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
True, such nationalism is not so transparent, for it is skilfully masked by socialist phrases, but it is all the more harmful to the proletariat for that reason. We can always cope with open nationalism, for it can easily be discerned. It is much more difficult to combat nationalism when it is masked and unrecognizable beneath its mask. Protected by the armour of socialism, it is less vulnerable and more tenacious. Implanted among the workers, it poisons the atmosphere and spreads harmful ideas of mutual distrust and segregation among the workers of the different nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this does not exhaust the harm caused by national autonomy. It prepares the ground not only for the segregation of nations, but also for breaking up the united labour movement. The idea of national autonomy creates the psychological conditions for the division of the united workers&#039; party into separate parties built on national lines. The breakup of the party is followed by the breakup of the trade unions, and complete segregation is the result. In this way the united class movement is broken up into separate national rivulets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Austria, the home of &amp;quot;national autonomy,&amp;quot; provides the most deplorable examples of this. As early as 1897 (the Wimberg Party Congress &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The Vienna Congress (or &#039;&#039;Wimberg&#039;&#039; Congress &amp;amp;#8211; after the name of the hotel in which it met) of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held June 6-12 1897.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) the once united Austrian Social-Democratic Party began to break up into separate parties. The breakup became still more marked after the Brünn Party Congress (1899), which adopted national autonomy. Matters have finally come to such a pass that in place of a united international party there are now six national parties, of which the Czech Social-Democratic Party will not even have anything to do with the German Social-Democratic Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But with the parties are associated the trade unions. In Austria, both in the parties and in the trade unions, the main brunt of the work is borne by the same Social-Democratic workers. There was therefore reason to fear that separatism in the party would lead to separatism in the trade unions and that the trade unions would also break up. That, in fact, is what happened: the trade unions have also divided according to nationality. Now things frequently go so far that the Czech workers will even break a strike of German workers, or will unite at municipal elections with the Czech bourgeois against the German workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It will be seen from the foregoing that cultural-national autonomy is no solution of the national question. Not only that, it serves to aggravate and confuse the question by creating a situation which favours the destruction of the unity of the labour movement, fosters the segregation of the workers according to nationality and intensifies friction among them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such is the harvest of national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== V. THE BUND, ITS NATIONALISM, ITS SEPARATISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
We said above that Bauer, while granting the necessity of national autonomy for the Czechs, Poles, and so on, nevertheless opposes similar autonomy for the Jews. In answer to the question, &amp;quot;Should the working class demand autonomy for the Jewish people?&amp;quot; Bauer says that &amp;quot;national autonomy cannot be demanded by the Jewish workers.&amp;quot; According to Bauer, the reason is that &amp;quot;capitalist society makes it impossible for them (the Jews – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) to continue as a nation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In brief, the Jewish nation is coming to an end, and hence there is nobody to demand national autonomy for. The Jews are being assimilated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This view of the fate of the Jews as a nation is not a new one. It was expressed by Marx as early as the &#039;forties, &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See K. Marx, &amp;quot;The Jewish Question,&amp;quot; 1906.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The reference is to an article by Karl Marx entitled &amp;quot;Zur Judenfrage&amp;quot; (&amp;quot;The Jewish Question&amp;quot;), published in 1844 in the &#039;&#039;Deutsch-Franz&amp;amp;ouml;sische Jahrb&amp;amp;uuml;cher&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in reference chiefly to the German Jews. It was repeated by Kautsky in 1903, &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See K. Kautsky, &amp;quot;The Kishinev Pogrom and the Jewish Question,&amp;quot; 1903.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in reference to the Russian Jews. It is now being repeated by Bauer in reference to the Austrian Jews, with the difference, however, that he denies not the present but the future of the Jewish nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer explains the impossibility of preserving the existence of the Jews as a nation by the fact that &amp;quot;the Jews have no closed territory of settlement.&amp;quot; This explanation, in the main a correct one, does not however express the whole truth. The fact of the matter is primarily that among the Jews there is no large and stable stratum connected with the land, which would naturally rivet the nation together, serving not only as its framework but also as a &amp;quot;national&amp;quot; market. Of the five or six million Russian Jews, only three to four per cent are connected with agriculture in any way. The remaining ninety-six per cent are employed in trade, industry, in urban institutions, and in general are town dwellers; moreover, they are spread all over Russia and do not constitute a majority in a single gubernia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, interspersed as national minorities in areas inhabited by other nationalities, the Jews as a rule serve &amp;quot;foreign&amp;quot; nations as manufacturers and traders and as members of the liberal professions, naturally adapting themselves to the &amp;quot;foreign nations&amp;quot; in respect to language and so forth. All this, taken together with the increasing re-shuffling of nationalities characteristic of developed forms of capitalism, leads to the assimilation of the Jews. The abolition of the &amp;quot;Pale of Settlement&amp;quot; would only serve to hasten this process of assimilation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question of national autonomy for the Russian Jews consequently assumes a somewhat curious character: autonomy is being proposed for a nation whose future is denied and whose existence has still to be proved!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, this was the curious and shaky position taken up by the Bund when at its Sixth Congress (1905) it adopted a &amp;quot;national programme&amp;quot; on the fines of national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two circumstances impelled the Bund to take this step.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first circumstance is the existence of the Bund as an organization of Jewish, and only Jewish, Social-Democratic workers. Even before 1897 the Social-Democratic groups active among the Jewish workers set themselves the aim of creating &amp;quot;a special Jewish workers&#039; organization.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Forms of the National Movement&#039;&#039;, etc., edited by Kastelyansky.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They founded such an organization in 1897 by uniting to form the Bund. That was at a time when Russian Social-Democracy as an integral body virtually did not yet exist. The Bund steadily grew and spread, and stood out more and more vividly against the background of the bleak days of Russian Social-Democracy.... Then came the 1900&#039;s. A &#039;&#039;mass&#039;&#039; labour movement came into being. Polish Social-Democracy grew and drew the Jewish workers into the mass struggle. Russian Social-Democracy grew and attracted the &amp;quot;Bund&amp;quot; workers. Lacking a territorial basis, the national framework of the Bund became too restrictive. The Bund was faced with the problem of either merging with the general international tide, or of upholding its independent existence as an extra-territorial organization. The Bund chose the latter course.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus grew up the &amp;quot;theory&amp;quot; that the Bund is &amp;quot;the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But to justify this strange &amp;quot;theory&amp;quot; in any &amp;quot;simple&amp;quot; way became impossible. Some kind of foundation &amp;quot;on principle,&amp;quot; some justification &amp;quot;on principle,&amp;quot; was needed. Cultural-national autonomy provided such a foundation. The Bund seized upon it, borrowing it from the Austrian Social-Democrats. If the Austrians had not had such a programme the Bund would have invented it in order to justify its independent existence &amp;quot;on principle.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, after a timid attempt in 1901 (the Fourth Congress), the Bund definitely adopted a &amp;quot;national programme&amp;quot; in 1905 (the Sixth Congress).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second circumstance is the peculiar position of the Jews as separate national minorities within compact majorities of other nationalities in integral regions. We have already said that this position is undermining the existence of the Jews as a nation and puts them on the road to assimilation. But this is an objective process. Subjectively, in the minds of the Jews, it provokes a reaction and gives rise to the demand for a guarantee of the rights of a national minority, for a guarantee against assimilation. Preaching as it does the vitality of the Jewish &amp;quot;nationality,&amp;quot; the Bund could not avoid being in favour of a &amp;quot;guarantee.&amp;quot; And, having taken up this position, it could not but accept national autonomy. For if the Bund could seize upon any autonomy at all, it could only be national autonomy, i.e., &#039;&#039;cultural-national&#039;&#039; autonomy; there could be no question of territorial-political autonomy for the Jews, since the Jews have no definite integral territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is noteworthy that the Bund from the outset stressed the character of national autonomy as a guarantee of the rights of national minorities, as a guarantee of the &amp;quot;free development&amp;quot; of nations. Nor was it fortuitous that the representative of the Bund at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, Goldblatt, defined national autonomy as &amp;quot;institutions which &#039;&#039;guarantee&#039;&#039; them (i.e., nations – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) complete freedom of cultural development.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Minutes of the Second Congress&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A similar proposal was made by supporters of the ideas of the Bund to the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way the Bund adopted the curious position of national autonomy for the Jews.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have examined above national autonomy in general. The examination showed that national autonomy leads to nationalism. We shall see later that the Bund has arrived at the same end point. But the Bund also regards national autonomy from a special aspect, namely, from the aspect of &#039;&#039;guarantees&#039;&#039; of the rights of national minorities. Let us also examine the question from this special aspect. It is all the more necessary since the problem of national minorities – and not of the Jewish minorities alone – is one of serious moment for Social-Democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, it is a question of &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;institutions which guarantee&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; nations &amp;quot;complete freedom of cultural development&amp;quot; (our italics – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what are these &amp;quot;institutions which guarantee,&amp;quot; etc.?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They are primarily the &amp;quot;National Council&amp;quot; of Springer and Bauer, something in the nature of a Diet for cultural affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But can these institutions guarantee a nation &amp;quot;complete freedom of cultural development&amp;quot;? Can a Diet for cultural affairs guarantee a nation against nationalist persecution?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bund believes it can.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But history proves the contrary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At one time a Diet existed in Russian Poland. It was a political Diet and, of course, endeavoured to guarantee freedom of &amp;quot;cultural development&amp;quot; for the Poles. But, far from succeeding in doing so, it itself succumbed in the unequal struggle against the political conditions generally prevailing in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A Diet has been in existence for a long time in Finland, and it too endeavours to protect the Finnish nationality from &amp;quot;encroachments,&amp;quot; but how far it succeeds in doing so everybody can see.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, there are Diets and Diets, and it is not so easy to cope with the democratically organized Finnish Diet as it was with the aristocratic Polish Diet. But the &#039;&#039;decisive&#039;&#039; factor, nevertheless, is not the Diet, but the general regime in Russia. If such a grossly Asiatic social and political regime existed in Russia now as in the past, at the time the Polish Diet was abolished, things would go much harder with the Finnish Diet. Moreover, the policy of &amp;quot;encroachments&amp;quot; upon Finland is growing, and it cannot be said that it has met with defeat....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If such is the case with old, historically evolved institutions – political Diets – still less will young Diets, young institutions, especially such feeble institutions as &amp;quot;cultural&amp;quot; Diets, be able to guarantee the free development of nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, it is not a question of &amp;quot;institutions,&amp;quot; but of the general regime prevailing in the country. If there is no democracy in the country there can be no guarantees of &amp;quot;complete freedom for cultural development&amp;quot; of nationalities. One may say with certainty that the more democratic a country is the fewer are the &amp;quot;encroachments&amp;quot; made on the &amp;quot;freedom of nationalities,&amp;quot; and the greater are the guarantees against such &amp;quot;encroachments.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Russia is a semi-Asiatic country, and therefore in Russia the policy of &amp;quot;encroachments&amp;quot; not infrequently assumes the grossest form, the form of pogroms. It need hardly be said that in Russia &amp;quot;guarantees&amp;quot; have been reduced to the very minimum.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Germany is, however, European, and she enjoys a measure of political freedom. It is not surprising that the policy of &amp;quot;encroachments&amp;quot; there never takes the form of pogroms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In France, of course, there are still more &amp;quot;guarantees,&amp;quot; for France is more democratic than Germany.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no need to mention Switzerland, where, thanks to her highly developed, although bourgeois democracy, nationalities live in freedom, whether they are a minority or a majority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the Bund adopts a false position when it asserts that &amp;quot;institutions&amp;quot; by themselves are able to guarantee complete cultural development for nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It may be said that the Bund itself regards the establishment of democracy in Russia as a &#039;&#039;preliminary&#039;&#039; condition for the &amp;quot;creation of institutions&amp;quot; and guarantees of freedom. But this is not the case. From the report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The Eighth Congress of the Bund was held in September 1910 in Lvov.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; it will be seen that the Bund thinks it can secure &amp;quot;institutions&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;on the basis of&#039;&#039; the present system in Russia, by &amp;quot;reforming&amp;quot; the &#039;&#039;Jewish community&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The community,&amp;quot; one of the leaders of the Bund said at this conference, &amp;quot;may become the nucleus of future cultural-national autonomy. Cultural-national autonomy is a form of self-service on the part of nations, a form of satisfying national needs. The community form conceals within itself a similar content. They are links in the same chain, stages in the same evolution.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund&#039;&#039;, 1911, p. 62.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On this basis, the conference decided that it was necessary to strive &amp;quot;for &#039;&#039;reforming&#039;&#039; the Jewish community and transforming it by &#039;&#039;legislative means&#039;&#039; into a secular institution,&amp;quot; democratically organized (our italics – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is evident that the Bund considers as the condition and guarantee not the democratization of Russia, but some future &amp;quot;secular institution&amp;quot; of the Jews, obtained by &amp;quot;reforming the Jewish community,&amp;quot; so to speak, by &amp;quot;legislative&amp;quot; means, through the Duma:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But we have already seen that &amp;quot;institutions&amp;quot; in themselves cannot serve as &amp;quot;guarantees&amp;quot; if the regime in the state generally is not a democratic one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what, it may be asked, will be - the position under a future democratic system? Will not special &amp;quot;cultural institutions which guarantee,&amp;quot; etc., be required even under democracy? What is the position in this respect in democratic Switzerland, for example? Are there special cultural institutions in Switzerland on the pattern of Springer&#039;s &amp;quot;National Council&amp;quot;? No, there are &#039;&#039;not.&#039;&#039; But do not the cultural interests of, for instance, the Italians, who constitute a minority there, suffer for that reason? One does not seem to hear that they do. And that is quite natural: in Switzerland all special cultural &amp;quot;institutions,&amp;quot; which supposedly &amp;quot;guarantee,&amp;quot; etc., are rendered superfluous by democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, impotent in the present and superfluous in the future – such are the &#039;&#039;institutions&#039;&#039; of cultural-national autonomy, and such is national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it becomes still more harmful when it is thrust upon a &amp;quot;nation&amp;quot; whose existence and future are open to doubt. In such cases the advocates of national autonomy are obliged to protect and preserve all the peculiar features of the &amp;quot;nation,&amp;quot; the bad as well as the good, just for the sake of &amp;quot;saving the nation&amp;quot; from assimilation, just for the sake of &amp;quot;preserving&amp;quot; it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That the Bund should take this dangerous path was inevitable. And it did take it. We are referring to the resolutions of recent conferences of the Bund on the question of the &amp;quot;Sabbath,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Yiddish,&amp;quot; etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social-Democracy strives to secure &#039;&#039;for all nations&#039;&#039; the right to use their own language. But that does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that &amp;quot;the rights of the &#039;&#039;Jewish&#039;&#039; language&amp;quot; (our italics – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) be championed with &amp;quot;exceptional persistence,&amp;quot; and the Bund itself in the elections to the Fourth Duma declared that it would give &amp;quot;preference to those of them (i.e., electors) who undertake to defend the rights of the Jewish language.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not the &#039;&#039;general&#039;&#039; right of all nations to use their own language, but the &#039;&#039;particular&#039;&#039; right of the Jewish language, Yiddish! Let the workers of the various nationalities fight &#039;&#039;primarily&#039;&#039; for their own language: the Jews for Jewish, the Georgians for Georgian, and so forth. The struggle for the general right of all nations is a secondary matter. You do not have to recognize the right of all oppressed nationalities to use their own language; but if you have recognized the right of Yiddish, know that the Bund will vote for you, the Bund will &amp;quot;prefer&amp;quot; you.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in what way then does the Bund differ from the bourgeois nationalists?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social-Democracy strives to secure the establishment of a compulsory weekly rest day. But that does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that &amp;quot;by legislative means&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the Jewish proletariat should be guaranteed the right to observe their Sabbath and be relieved of the obligation to observe another day. &amp;quot;*&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is to be expected that the Bund will take another &amp;quot;step forward&amp;quot; and demand the right to observe all the ancient Hebrew holidays. And if, to the misfortune of the Bund, the Jewish workers have discarded religious prejudices and do not want to observe these holidays, the Bund with its agitation for &amp;quot;the right to the Sabbath,&amp;quot; will remind them of the Sabbath, it will, so to speak, cultivate among them &amp;quot;the Sabbatarian spirit. &amp;quot;...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Quite comprehensible, therefore, are the &amp;quot;passionate speeches&amp;quot; delivered at the Eighth Conference of the Bund demanding &amp;quot;Jewish hospitals,&amp;quot; a demand that was based on the argument that &amp;quot;a patient feels more at home among his own people,&amp;quot; that &amp;quot;the Jewish worker will not feel at ease among Polish workers, but will feel at ease among Jewish shopkeepers.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Preservation of everything Jewish, conservation of &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; the national peculiarities of the Jews, even those that are patently harmful to the proletariat, isolation of the Jews from everything non-Jewish, even the establishment of special hospitals – that is the level to which the Bund has sunk!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comrade Plekhanov was right a thousand times over when he said that the Bund &amp;quot;is adapting socialism to nationalism.&amp;quot; Of course, V. Kossovsky and Bundists like him may denounce Plekhanov as a &amp;quot;demagogue&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Nasha Zarya&#039;&#039;, No. 9-10, 1912, p. 120.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In an article entitled &amp;quot;Another Splitters&#039; Conference,&amp;quot; published in the newspaper &#039;&#039;Za Partiyu&#039;&#039;, October 2 (15) 1912, G. V. Plekhanov condemned the &amp;quot;August&amp;quot; Conference of the Liquidators and described the stand of the Bundists and Caucasian Social-Democrats as an adaptation of socialism to nationalism. Kossovsky, leader of the Bundists, criticized Plekhanov in a letter to the Liquidators&#039; magazine &#039;&#039;Nasha Zarya&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; – paper will put up with anything that is written on it – but those who are familiar with the activities of the Bund will easily realize that these brave fellows are simply afraid to tell the truth about themselves and are hiding behind strong language about &amp;quot;demagogy. &amp;quot;...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But since it holds such a position on the national question, the Bund was naturally obliged, in the matter of organization also, to take the path of segregating the Jewish workers, the path of formation of national curiae within Social-Democracy. Such is the logic of national autonomy!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And, in fact, the Bund did pass from the theory of &amp;quot;sole representation&amp;quot; to the theory of &amp;quot;national demarcation&amp;quot; of workers. The Bund demands that Russian Social-Democracy should &amp;quot;in its organizational structure introduce demarcation according to nationalities.&amp;quot; From &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; it made a &amp;quot;step forward&amp;quot; to the theory of &amp;quot;segregation.&amp;quot; It is not for nothing that speeches were made at the Eighth Conference of the Bund declaring that &amp;quot;national existence lies in segregation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Organizational federalism harbours the elements of disintegration and separatism. The Bund is heading for separatism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And, indeed, there is nothing else it can head for. Its very existence as an extra-territorial organization drives it to separatism. The Bund does not possess a definite integral territory; it operates on &amp;quot;foreign&amp;quot; territories, whereas the neighbouring Polish, Lettish and Russian Social-Democracies are international territorial collective bodies. But the result is that every extension of these collective bodies means a &amp;quot;loss&amp;quot; to the Bund and a restriction of its field of action. There are two alternatives: either Russian Social-Democracy as a whole must be reconstructed on the basis of national federalism – which will enable the Bund to &amp;quot;secure&amp;quot; the Jewish proletariat for itself; or the territorial-international principle of these collective bodies remains in force – in which case the Bund must be reconstructed on the basis of internationalism, as is the case with the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This explains why the Bund from the very beginning demanded &amp;quot;the reorganization of Russian Social-Democracy on a federal basis.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Concerning National Autonomy and the Reorganizatzon of Russian Social-Democracy on a Federal Basis&#039;&#039;, 1902, published by the Bund.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1906, yielding to the pressure from below in favour of unity, the Bund chose a middle path and joined Russian Social-Democracy. But how did it join? Whereas the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies joined for the purpose of peaceable joint action, the Bund joined for the purpose of waging war for a federation. That is exactly what Medem, the leader of the Bundists, said at the time:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;We are joining not for the sake of an idyll, but in order to fight. There is no idyll, and only Manilovs could hope for one in the near future. The Bund must join the Party armed from head to foot.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Nashe Slovo&#039;&#039;, No. 3, Vilno, 1906, p. 24.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be wrong to regard this as an expression of evil intent on Medem&#039;s part. It is not a matter of evil intent, but of the peculiar position of the Bund, which compels it to fight Russian Social-Democracy, which is built on the basis of internationalism. And in fighting it the Bund naturally violated the interests of unity. Finally, matters went so far that the Bund formally broke with Russian Social-Democracy, violating its statutes, and in the elections to the Fourth Duma joining forces with the Polish nationalists against the Polish Social-Democrats.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bund has apparently found that a rupture is the best guarantee for independent activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so the &amp;quot;principle&amp;quot; of organizational &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; led to separatism and to a complete rupture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a controversy with the old &#039;&#039;Iskra&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Iskra (The Spark)&#039;&#039; &amp;amp;#8211; The first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper founded by V. I. Lenin in 1900.&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; on the question of federalism, the Bund once wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;Iskra&#039;&#039; wants to assure us that federal relations between the Bund and Russian Social-Democracy are bound to weaken the ties between them. We cannot refute this opinion by referring to practice in Russia, for the simple reason that Russian Social-Democracy does not exist as a federal body. But we can refer to the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria, which assumed a federal character by virtue of the decision of the Party Congress of 1897.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That was written in 1902.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But we are now in the year 1913. We now have both Russian &amp;quot;practice&amp;quot; and the &amp;quot;experience of Social-Democracy in Austria.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What do they tell us?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us begin with &amp;quot;the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria.&amp;quot; Up to 1896 there was a united Social-Democratic Party in Austria. In that year the Czechs at the International Congress in London for the first time demanded separate representation, and were given it. In 1897, at the Vienna (Wimberg) Party Congress, the united party was formally Liquidated and in its place a federal league of six national &amp;quot;Social-Democratic groups&amp;quot; was set up. Subsequently these &amp;quot;groups&amp;quot; were converted into independent parties, which gradually severed contact with one another. Following the parties, the parliamentary group broke up – national &amp;quot;clubs&amp;quot; were formed. Next came the trade unions, which also split according to nationalities. Even the co-operative societies were affected, the Czech separatists calling upon the workers to split them up. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the words quoted from a brochure by Karl Vanek in &#039;&#039;Dokumente des Separatismus, p. 29&#039;&#039;. Karl Vanek was a Czech Social-Democrat who took an openly chauvinist and separatist stand.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; We will not dwell on the fact that separatist agitation weakens the workers&#039; sense of solidarity and frequently drives them to strike-breaking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus &amp;quot;the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria&amp;quot; speaks &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; the Bund and for the old &#039;&#039;Iskra.&#039;&#039; Federalism in the Austrian party has led to the most outrageous separatism, to the destruction of the unity of the labour movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen above that &amp;quot;practical experience in Russia&amp;quot; also bears this out. Like the Czech separatists, the Bundist separatists have broken with the general Russian Social-Democratic Party. As for the trade unions, the Bundist trade unions, from the outset they were organized on national lines, that is to say, they were cut off from the workers of other nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete segregation and complete rupture – that is what is revealed by the &amp;quot;Russian practical experience&amp;quot; of federalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not surprising that the effect of this state of affairs upon the workers is to weaken their sense of solidarity and to demoralize them; and the latter process is also penetrating the Bund. We are referring to the increasing collisions between Jewish and Polish workers in connection with unemployment. Here is the kind of speech that was made on this subject at the Ninth Conference of the Bund:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;... We regard the Polish workers, who are ousting us, as pogromists, as scabs; we do not support their strikes, we break them. Secondly, we reply to being ousted by ousting in our turn: we reply to Jewish workers not being allowed into the factories by not allowing Polish workers near the benches.... &#039;&#039;If we do not take this matter into our own hands the workers will follow others&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (our italics – &#039;&#039;J. St.)&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is the way they talk about solidarity at a Bundist conference.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You cannot go further than that in the way of &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;segregation.&amp;quot; The Bund has achieved its aim: it is carrying its demarcation between the workers of different nationalities to the point of conflicts and strike-breaking. And there is no other course: &amp;quot;If we do not take this matter into our own hands &#039;&#039;the workers will follow others....&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disorganization of the labour movement, demoralization of the Social-Democratic ranks – that is what the federalism of the Bund leads to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the idea of cultural-national autonomy, the atmosphere it creates, has proved to be even more harmful in Russia than in Austria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VI. THE CAUCASIANS, THE CONFERENCE OF THE LIQUIDATORS ==&lt;br /&gt;
We spoke above of the waverings of one section of the Caucasian Social-Democrats who were unable to withstand the nationalist &amp;quot;epidemic.&amp;quot; These waverings were revealed in the fact that, strange as it may seem, the above-mentioned Social-Democrats followed in the footsteps of the Bund and proclaimed cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regional autonomy for the Caucasus as a whole and cultural-national autonomy for the nations forming the Caucasus – that is the way these Social-Democrats, who, incidentally, are linked with the Russian Liquidators, formulate their demand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Listen to their acknowledged leader, the not unknown &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Everybody knows that the Caucasus differs profoundly from the central gubernias, both as regards the racial composition of its population and as regards its territory and agricultural development. The exploitation and material development of such a region require local workers acquainted with local peculiarities and accustomed to the local climate and culture. All laws designed to further the exploitation of the local territory should be issued locally and put into effect by local forces. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the central organ of Caucasian self-government should extend to legislation on local questions.... Hence, the functions of the Caucasian centre should consist in the passing of laws designed to further the economic exploitation of the local territory and the material prosperity of the region.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the Georgian newspaper &#039;&#039;Chveni Tskhovreba (Our Life)&#039;&#039;, No. 12, 1912. &#039;&#039;Chveni Tskhovreba&#039;&#039; was a daily paper published by the Georgian Mensheviks in Kutais from July 1 to 22 1912.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus – regional autonomy for the Caucasus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we abstract ourselves from the rather confused and incoherent arguments of &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039;, it must be admitted that his conclusion is correct. Regional autonomy for the Caucasus, within the framework of a general state constitution, which &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039; does not deny, is indeed essential because of the peculiarities of its composition and its conditions of life. This was also acknowledged by the Russian Social-Democratic Party, which at its Second Congress proclaimed &amp;quot;regional self-government for those border regions which in respect of their conditions of life and the composition of their population differ from the regions of Russia proper.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When Martov submitted this point for discussion at the Second Congress, he justified it on the grounds that &amp;quot;the vast extent of Russia and the experience of our centralized administration point to the necessity and expediency of regional self-government for such large units as Finland, Poland, Lithuania and the Caucasus.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it follows that regional &#039;&#039;self-government is&#039;&#039; to be interpreted as regional &#039;&#039;autonomy.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039; goes further. According to him, regional autonomy for the Caucasus covers &amp;quot;only one aspect of the question.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;So far we have spoken only of the material development of local life. But the economic development of a region is facilitated not only by economic activity but also by spiritual, cultural activity.&amp;quot;... &amp;quot;A culturally strong nation is strong also in the economic sphere. &amp;quot;... &amp;quot;But the cultural development of nations is possible only in the national languages.&amp;quot;... &amp;quot;Consequently, all questions connected with the native language are questions of national culture. Such are the questions of education! the judicature, the church, literature, art, science, the theatre, etc. If the material development of a region unites nations, matters of national culture disunite them and place each in a separate sphere. Activities of the former kind are associated with a definite territory.&amp;quot;... &amp;quot;This is not the case with matters of national culture. These are associated not with a definite territory but with the existence of a definite nation. The fate of the Georgian language interests a Georgian, no matter where he lives. It would be a sign of profound ignorance to say that Georgian culture concerns only the Georgians who live in Georgia. Take, for instance, the Armenian church. Armenians of various localities and states take part in the administration of its affairs. Territory plays no part here. Or, for instance, the creation of a Georgian museum interests not only the Georgians of Tiflis, but also the Georgians of Baku, Kutais, St. Petersburg, etc. Hence, the administration and control of all affairs of national culture must be left to the nations concerned. we proclaim in favour of cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nationalities.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the Georgian newspaper &#039;&#039;Chveni Tskhovreba&#039;&#039;, No. 12, 1912.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In short, since culture is not territory, and territory is not culture, cultural-national autonomy is required. That is all &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039; can say in the latter&#039;s favour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall not stop to discuss again national-cultural autonomy in general; we have already spoken of its objectionable character. We should like to point out only that, while being unsuitable in general, cultural-national autonomy is also meaningless and nonsensical in relation to Caucasian conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And for the following reason:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cultural-national autonomy presumes more or less developed nationalities, with a developed culture and literature. Failing these conditions, autonomy loses all sense and becomes an absurdity. But in the Caucasus there are a number of nationalities each possessing a primitive culture, a separate language, but without its own literature; nationalities, moreover, which are in a state of transition, partly becoming assimilated and partly continuing to develop. How is cultural-national autonomy to be applied to them? What is to be done with such nationalities? How are they to be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot; into separate cultural-national unions, as is undoubtedly implied by cultural-national autonomy?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is to be done with the Mingrelians, the Abkhasians, the Adjarians, the Svanetians, the Lesghians, and so on, who speak different languages but do not possess a literature of their own? To what nations are they to be attached? Can they be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot; into national unions? Around what &amp;quot;cultural affairs&amp;quot; are they to be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is to be done with the Ossetians, of whom the Transcaucasian Ossetians are becoming assimilated (but are as yet by no means wholly assimilated) by the Georgians, while the Cis-Caucasian Ossetians are partly being assimilated by the Russians and partly continuing to develop and are creating their own literature? How are they to be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot; into a single national union?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To what national union should one attach the Adjarians, who speak the Georgian language, but whose culture is Turkish and who profess the religion of Islam? Shall they be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot; separately from the Georgians &#039;&#039;with regard to religious affairs&#039;&#039; and together with the Georgians&#039;&#039;with regard to other cultural affairs?&#039;&#039; And what about the Kobuletians, the Ingushes, the Inghilois?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What kind of autonomy is that which excludes a whole number of nationalities from the list?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, that is not a solution of the national question, but the fruit of idle fancy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us grant the impossible and assume that our &#039;&#039;N.&#039;s&#039;&#039; national-cultural autonomy has been put into effect. Where would it lead to, what would be its results? Take, for instance, the Transcaucasian Tatars, with their minimum percentage of literates, their schools controlled by the omnipotent mullahs and their culture permeated by the religious spirit.... It is not difficult to understand that to &amp;quot;organize&amp;quot; them into a cultural national union would mean to place them under the control of the mullahs, to deliver them over to the tender mercies of the reactionary mullahs, to create a new stronghold of spiritual enslavement of the Tatar masses to their worst enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But since when have Social-Democrats made it a practice to bring grist to the mill of the reactionaries?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Could the Caucasian Liquidators really find nothing better to &amp;quot;proclaim&amp;quot; than the isolation of the Transcaucasian Tatars within a cultural-national union which would place the masses under the thraldom of vicious reactionaries?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, that is no solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The national question in the Caucasus can be solved only &#039;&#039;by drawing the belated nations and nationalities into the common stream of a higher culture.&#039;&#039; It is the only progressive solution and the only solution acceptable to Social-Democracy. Regional autonomy in the Caucasus is acceptable because it would draw the belated nations into the common cultural development; it would help them to cast off the shell of small nation insularity; it would impel them forward and facilitate access to the benefits of higher culture. Cultural-national autonomy, however, acts in a diametrically opposite direction, because it shuts up the nations within their old shells, binds them to the lower stages of cultural development and prevents them from rising to the higher stages of culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way national autonomy counteracts the beneficial aspects of regional autonomy and nullifies it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why the mixed type of autonomy which combines national-cultural autonomy and regional autonomy as proposed by &#039;&#039;N&#039;&#039;. is also unsuitable. This unnatural combination does not improve matters but makes them worse, because in addition to retarding the development of the belated nations it transforms regional autonomy into an arena of conflict between the nations organized in the national unions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus cultural-national autonomy, which is unsuitable generally, would be a senseless, reactionary undertaking in the Caucasus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So much for the cultural-national autonomy of &#039;&#039;N&#039;&#039;. and his Caucasian fellow-thinkers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whether the Caucasian Liquidators will take &amp;quot;a step forward&amp;quot; and follow in the footsteps of the Bund on the question of organization also, the future will show. So far, in the history of Social-Democracy federalism in organization always preceded national autonomy in programme. The Austrian Social-Democrats introduced organizational federalism as far back as 1897, and it was only two years later (1899) that they adopted national autonomy. The Bundists spoke distinctly of national autonomy for the first time in 1901, whereas organizational federalism had been practiced by them since 1897.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Caucasian Liquidators have begun from the end, from national autonomy. If they continue to follow in the footsteps of the Bund they will first have to demolish the whole existing organizational edifice, which was erected at the end of the &#039;nineties on the basis of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, easy though it was to adopt national autonomy, which is still not understood by the workers, it will be difficult to demolish an edifice which it has taken years to build and which has been raised and cherished by the workers of all the nationalities of the Caucasus. This Herostratian undertaking has only to be begun and the eyes of the workers will be opened to the nationalist character of cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== * * * ===&lt;br /&gt;
While the Caucasians are settling the national question in the usual manner, by means of verbal and written discussion, the All-Russian Conference of the Liquidators has invented a most unusual method. It is a simple and easy method. Listen to this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Having heard the communication of the Caucasian delegation to the effect that... it is necessary to demand national-cultural autonomy, this conference, while expressing no opinion on the merits of this demand, declares that such an interpretation of the clause of the programme which recognizes the right of every nationality to self-determination does not contradict the precise meaning of the programme.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, first of all they &amp;quot;express no opinion on the merits&amp;quot; of the question, and then they &amp;quot;declare.&amp;quot; An original method....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And what does this original conference &amp;quot;declare&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That the &amp;quot;demand&amp;quot; for national-cultural autonomy &amp;quot;does not contradict the precise meaning &amp;quot;of the programme, which recognizes the right of nations to self-determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us examine this proposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The clause on self-determination speaks of the rights of nations. According to this clause, nations have the right not only of autonomy but also of secession. It is a question of &#039;&#039;political&#039;&#039; self-determination. Whom did the Liquidators want to fool when they endeavoured to misinterpret this right of nations to political self-determination, which has long been recognized by the whole of international Social-Democracy?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Or perhaps the Liquidators will try to wriggle out of the situation and defend themselves by the sophism that cultural-national autonomy &amp;quot;does not contradict&amp;quot; the rights of nations? That is to say, if all the nations in a given state agree to arrange their affairs on the basis of cultural-national autonomy, they, the given sum of nations, are fully entitled to do so and nobody may &#039;&#039;forcibly impose&#039;&#039; a different form of political life on them. This is both new and clever. Should it not be added that, speaking generally, a nation has the right to abolish its own constitution, replace it by a system of tyranny and revert to the old order on the grounds that the nation, and the nation alone, has the right to determine its own destiny? We repeat: in this sense, neither cultural-national autonomy nor any other kind of nationalist reaction &amp;quot;contradicts&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;the rights of nations.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is that what the esteemed conference wanted to say?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, not that. It specifically says that cultural-national autonomy &amp;quot;does not contradict,&amp;quot; not the rights of nations, but &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme&#039;&#039;. The point here is the programme and not the rights of nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And that is quite understandable. If it were some nation that addressed itself to the conference of Liquidators, the conference might have directly declared that the nation has a right to cultural-national autonomy. But it was not a nation that addressed itself to the conference, but a &amp;quot;delegation&amp;quot; of Caucasian Social-Democrats – bad Social-Democrats, it is true, but Social-Democrats nevertheless. And they inquired not about the rights of nations, but whether cultural-national autonomy contradicted the &#039;&#039;principles of Social-Democracy&#039;&#039;, whether it did not &amp;quot;contradict&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme of Social-Democracy.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;the rights of nations and &amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme of Social-Democracy&#039;&#039;are not one and the same thing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Evidently, there are demands which, while they do not contradict the rights of nations, may yet contradict &amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example. The programme of the Social-Democrats contains a clause on freedom of religion. According to this clause any group of persons &#039;&#039;have the right&#039;&#039; to profess any religion they please: Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox Church, etc. Social-Democrats will combat all forms of religious persecution, be it of members of the Orthodox Church, Catholics or Protestants. Does this mean that Catholicism, Protestantism, etc., &amp;quot;do not contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme? No, it does not. Social-Democrats will always protest against persecution of Catholicism or Protestantism; they will always defend the right of nations to profess any religion they please; but at the same time, on the basis of a correct understanding of the interests of the proletariat, they will carry on agitation against Catholicism, Protestantism and the religion of the Orthodox Church in order to achieve the triumph of the socialist world outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And they will do so just because there is no doubt that Protestantism, Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox Church, etc., &amp;quot;contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme, i.e., the correctly understood interests of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same must be said of self-determination. Nations have a right to arrange their affairs as they please; they have a right to preserve any of their national institutions, whether beneficial or harmful – nobody can (nobody has a right to!) &#039;&#039;forcibly&#039;&#039; interfere in the life of a nation. But that does not mean that Social-Democracy will not combat and agitate against the harmful institutions of nations and against the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary, it is the duty of Social-Democracy to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that the nations may arrange their affairs in the way that will best correspond to the interests of the proletariat. For this reason Social-Democracy, while fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, will at the same time agitate, for instance, against the secession of the Tatars, or against cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nations; for both, while not contradicting the &#039;&#039;rights&#039;&#039; of these nations, do contradict &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme&#039;&#039;, i.e., the interests of the Caucasian proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, &amp;quot;the rights of nations&amp;quot; and the &amp;quot;precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme are on two entirely different planes. Whereas the &amp;quot;precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme expresses the interests of the proletariat, as scientifically formulated in the programme of the latter, the rights of nations may express the interests of any class – bourgeoisie, aristocracy, clergy, etc. – depending on the strength and influence of these classes. On the one hand are the &#039;&#039;duties&#039;&#039; of Marxists, on the other the &#039;&#039;rights&#039;&#039; of nations, which consist of various classes. The rights of nations and the principles of Social-Democracy may or may not &amp;quot;contradict&amp;quot; each other, just as, say, the pyramid of Cheops may or may not contradict the famous conference of the Liquidators. They are simply not comparable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it follows that the esteemed conference most unpardonably muddled two entirely different things. The result obtained was not a solution of the national question but an absurdity, according to which the rights of nations and the principles of Social-Democracy &amp;quot;do not contradict&amp;quot; each other, and, consequently; every demand of a nation may be made compatible with the interests of the proletariat; consequently, no demand of a nation which is striving for self-determination will &amp;quot;contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They pay no heed to logic....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was this absurdity that gave rise to the now famous resolution of the conference of the Liquidators which declares that the demand for national-cultural autonomy &amp;quot;does not contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it was not only the laws of logic that were violated by the conference of the Liquidators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By sanctioning cultural-national autonomy it also violated its duty to Russian Social-Democracy. It most definitely did violate &amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme, for it is well known that the Second Congress, which adopted the programme, &#039;&#039;emphatically repudiated&#039;&#039;cultural-national autonomy. Here is what was said at the congress in this connection:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Goldblatt&#039;&#039; (Bundist): ...1 deem it necessary that special institutions be set up to protect the freedom of cultural development of nationalities, and I therefore propose that the following words be added to § 8: &#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;and the creation of institutions which will guarantee them complete freedom of cultural development.&#039;&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (This, as we know, is the Bund&#039;s definition of cultural-national autonomy. – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Martynov&#039;&#039; pointed out that general institutions must be so constituted as to protect particular interests also. It is impossible to create a &#039;&#039;special&#039;&#039; institution to guarantee freedom for cultural development of the nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Yegorov:&#039;&#039; On the question of nationality we can adopt only negative proposals, i.e., we are opposed to all restrictions upon nationality. But we, as Social-Democrats, are not concerned with whether any particular nationality will develop as such. That is a spontaneous process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Koltsov:&#039;&#039; The delegates from the Bund are always offended when their nationalism is referred to. Yet the amendment proposed by the delegate from the Bund is of a purely nationalist character. We are asked to take purely offensive measures in order to support even nationalities that are dying out.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the end &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Goldblatt&#039;s amendment was rejected by the majority, only three votes being cast for it.&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus it is clear that the conference of the Liquidators did &amp;quot;contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme. It violated the programme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Liquidators are now trying to justify themselves by referring to the Stockholm Congress, which they allege sanctioned cultural-national autonomy. Thus, V. Kossovsky writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;As we know, according to the agreement adopted by the Stockholm Congress, the Bund was allowed to preserve its national programme (pending a decision on the national question by a general Party congress). This congress recorded that national-cultural autonomy at any rate does not contradict the general Party programme.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Nasha Zarya&#039;&#039;, No. 9-10, 1912, p. 120.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the efforts of the Liquidators are in vain. The Stockholm Congress never thought of sanctioning the programme of the Bund – it merely agreed to leave the question open for the time being. The brave Kossovsky did not have enough courage to tell the whole truth. But the facts speak for themselves. Here they are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;An amendment was moved by Galin: &#039;The question of the national programme &#039;&#039;is left open in view of the fact that it is not being examined&#039;&#039; by the congress.&#039; (&#039;&#039;For&#039;&#039; – 50 votes, &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; – 32.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Voice:&#039;&#039; What does that mean – open?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Chairman:&#039;&#039; When we say that the national question is left open, it means that the Bund may maintain its decision on this question until the next congress&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Nashe SIovo&#039;&#039;, No. 8, 1906, p. 53.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (our italics. – &#039;&#039;J. St&#039;&#039;.).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As you see, the congress even did &amp;quot;not examine&amp;quot; the question of the national programme of the Bund – it simply left it &amp;quot;open,&amp;quot; leaving the Bund itself to decide the fate of its programme until the next general congress met. In other words, the Stockholm Congress avoided the question, expressing no opinion on cultural-national autonomy one way or another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The conference of the Liquidators, however, most definitely undertakes to give an opinion on the matter, declares cultural-national autonomy to be acceptable, and endorses it in the name of the Party programme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference is only too evident.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, in spite of all its artifices, the conference of the Liquidators did not advance the national question a single step.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All it could do was to squirm before the Bund and the Caucasian national-Liquidators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VII. THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN RUSSIA ==&lt;br /&gt;
It remains for us to suggest a positive solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We take as our starting point that the question can be solved only in intimate connection with the present situation in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Russia is in a transitional period, when &amp;quot;normal,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;constitutional&amp;quot; life has not yet been established and when the political crisis has not yet been settled. Days of storm and &amp;quot;complications&amp;quot; are ahead. And this gives rise to the movement, the present and the future movement, the aim of which is to achieve complete democratization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is in connection with this movement that the national question must be examined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the complete democratization of the country is the &#039;&#039;basis&#039;&#039; and condition for the solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When seeking a solution of the question we must take into account not only the situation at home but also the situation abroad. Russia is situated between Europe and Asia, between Austria and China. The growth of democracy in Asia is inevitable. The growth of imperialism in Europe is not fortuitous. In Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out towards foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap labour and new fields of investment. But this leads to external complications and to war. No one can assert that the Balkan War &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The reference is to the first Balkan War, which broke out in October 1912 between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro on the one hand, and Turkey on the other.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is the end and not the beginning of the complications. It is quite possible, therefore, that a combination of internal and external conditions may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia may find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create obstacles in such cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it follows that Russian Marxists cannot dispense with the right of nations to self-determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;the right of self-determination is an essential element&#039;&#039; in the solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further. What must be our attitude towards nations which for one reason or another will prefer to remain within the framework of the whole?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that cultural-national autonomy is unsuitable. Firstly, it is artificial and impracticable, for it proposes artificially to draw into a single nation people whom the march of events, real events, is disuniting and dispersing to every corner of the country. Secondly, it stimulates nationalism, because it leads to the viewpoint in favour of the &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; of people according to national curiae, the &amp;quot;organization&amp;quot; of nations, the &amp;quot;preservation&amp;quot; and cultivation of &amp;quot;national peculiarities&amp;quot; – all of which are entirely incompatible with Social-Democracy. It is not fortuitous that the Moravian separatists in the Reichsrat, having severed themselves from the German Social-Democratic deputies, have united with the Moravian bourgeois deputies to form a single, so to speak, Moravian &amp;quot;kolo.&amp;quot; Nor is it fortuitous that the separatists of the Bund have got themselves involved in nationalism by acclaiming the &amp;quot;Sabbath&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Yiddish.&amp;quot; There are no Bundist deputies yet in the Duma, but in the Bund area there is a clerical-reactionary Jewish community, in the &amp;quot;controlling institutions&amp;quot; of which the Bund is arranging, for a beginning, a &amp;quot;get-together&amp;quot; of the Jewish workers and bourgeois. Such is the logic of cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;national&#039;&#039; autonomy does not solve the problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, is the way out?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only correct solution is &#039;&#039;regional&#039;&#039; autonomy, autonomy for such crystallized units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The advantage of regional autonomy consists, first of all, in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction bereft of territory, but with a definite population inhabiting a definite territory. Next, it does not divide people according to nations, it does not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary, it breaks down these barriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind, division according to classes. Finally; it makes it possible to utilize the natural wealth of the region and to develop its productive forces in the best possible way without awaiting the decisions of a common centre – functions which are not inherent features of cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;regional autonomy is an essential element&#039;&#039; in the solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, not one of the regions constitutes a compact, homogeneous nation, for each is interspersed with national minorities. Such are the Jews in Poland, the Letts in Lithuania, the Russians in the Caucasus, the Poles in the Ukraine, and so on. It may be feared, therefore, that the minorities will be oppressed by the national majorities. But there will be grounds for fear only if the old order continues to prevail in the country. Give the country complete democracy and all grounds for fear will vanish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is proposed to bind the dispersed minorities into a single national union. But what the minorities want is not an artificial union, but real rights in the localities they inhabit. What can such a union give them &#039;&#039;without&#039;&#039; complete democratization? On the other hand, what need is there for a national union &#039;&#039;when there is&#039;&#039; complete democratization?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is it that particularly agitates a national minority?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A minority is discontented not because there is no national union but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass of itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A minority is discontented not because there is no artificial union but because it does not possess its own schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A minority is discontented not because there is no national union, but because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;equal rights of nations in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential element&#039;&#039; in the solution of the national question. Consequently, a state law based on complete democratization of the country is required, prohibiting all national privileges without exception and every kind of disability or restriction on the rights of national minorities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That, and that alone, is the real, not a paper guarantee of the rights of a minority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One may or may not dispute the existence of a logical connection between organizational federalism and cultural-national autonomy. But one cannot dispute the fact that the latter creates an atmosphere favouring unlimited federalism, developing into complete rupture, into separatism. If the Czechs in Austria and the Bundists in Russia began with autonomy, passed to federation and ended in separatism, there can be no doubt that an important part in this was played by the nationalist atmosphere that is naturally generated by cultural-national autonomy. It is not fortuitous that national autonomy and organizational federalism go hand in hand. It is quite. understandable. Both demand demarcation according to nationalities. Both presume organization according to nationalities. The similarity is beyond question. The only difference is that in one case the population as a whole is divided, while in the other it is the Social-Democratic workers who are divided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know where the demarcation of workers according to nationalities leads to. The disintegration of a united workers&#039; party, the splitting of trade unions according to nationalities, aggravation of national friction, national strikebreaking, complete demoralization within the ranks of Social-Democracy – such are the results of organizational federalism. This is eloquently borne out by the history of Social-Democracy in Austria and the activities of the Bund in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only cure for &#039;this is organization on the basis of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To unite locally the workers of all nationalities of Russia into &#039;&#039;single, integral&#039;&#039; collective bodies, to unite these collective bodies into a &#039;&#039;single&#039;&#039; party – such is the task.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It goes without saying that a party structure of this kind does not preclude, but on the contrary presumes, wide autonomy for the &#039;&#039;regions&#039;&#039; within the single integral party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The experience of the Caucasus proves the expediency of this type of organization. If the Caucasians have succeeded in overcoming the national friction between the Armenian and Tatar workers; if they have succeeded in safeguarding the population against the possibility of massacres and shooting affrays; if in Baku, that kaleidoscope of national groups, national conflicts are now no longer possible, and if it has been possible to draw the workers there into the single current of a powerful movement, then the international structure of the Caucasian Social-Democracy was not the least factor in bringing this about.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The type of organization influences not only practical work. It stamps an indelible impress on the whole mental life of the worker. The worker lives the life of his organization, which stimulates his intellectual growth and educates him. And thus, acting within his organization and continually meeting there comrades from other nationalities, and side by side with them waging a common struggle under the leadership of a common collective body, he becomes deeply imbued with the idea that workers are &#039;&#039;primarily&#039;&#039; members of one class family, members of the united army of socialism. And this cannot but have a tremendous educational value for large sections of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the international type of organization serves as a school of fraternal sentiments and is a tremendous agitational factor on behalf of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this is not the case with an organization on the basis of nationalities. When the workers are organized according to nationality they isolate themselves within their national shells, fenced off from each other by organizational barriers. The stress is laid not on what is &#039;&#039;common&#039;&#039; to the workers but on what distinguishes them from each other. In this type of organization the worker &#039;&#039;is primarily&#039;&#039; a member of his nation: a Jew, a Pole, and so on. It is not surprising that &#039;&#039;national&#039;&#039;federalism in organization inculcates in the workers a spirit of national seclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the national type of organization is a school of national narrow-mindedness and stagnation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we are confronted by two &#039;&#039;fundamentally&#039;&#039; different types of organization: the type based on international solidarity and the type based on the organizational &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; of the workers according to nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Attempts to reconcile these two types have so far been vain. The compromise rules of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party drawn up in Wimberg in 1897 were left hanging in the air. The Austrian party fell to pieces and dragged the trade unions with it. &amp;quot;Compromise&amp;quot; proved to be not only utopian, but harmful. Strasser is right when he says that &amp;quot;separatism achieved its first triumph at the Wimberg Party Congress.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See his &#039;&#039;Der Arbeiter und die Nation&#039;&#039;, 1912.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The same is true in Russia. The &amp;quot;compromise&amp;quot; with the federalism of the Bund which took place at the Stockholm Congress ended in a complete fiasco. The Bund violated the Stockholm compromise. Ever since the Stockholm Congress the Bund has been an obstacle in the way of union of the workers locally in a &#039;&#039;single&#039;&#039; organization, which would include workers of all nationalities. And the Bund has obstinately persisted in its separatist tactics in spite of the fact that in 1907 and in 1908 Russian Social-Democracy repeatedly demanded that unity should at last be established. from below among the workers of all nationalities. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the resolutions of the Fourth (the &amp;quot;Third All-Russian&amp;quot;) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., held November 5-12 1907, and of the Fifth (the &amp;quot;All-Russian 1908&amp;quot;) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., held December 21-27 1908 (January 3-9 1909). (See &#039;&#039;Resolutions and Decisions of the C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums&#039;&#039;, Vol. 1, 6th Russ. ed., 1940, pp. 118-31.)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Bund, which began with organizational national autonomy, in fact passed to federalism, only to end in complete rupture, separatism. And by breaking with the Russian Social-Democratic Party it caused disharmony and disorganization in the ranks of the latter. Let us recall the Jagiello affair, &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;E. J. Jagiello &amp;amp;#8211; A member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.) was elected to the Fourth State Duma for Warsaw as a result of a bloc formed by the Bund, the Polish Socialist Party and the bourgeois nationalists against the Polish Social-Democrats. By a vote of the seven Menshevik Liquidators against the six Bolsheviks, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma adopted a resolution that Jagiello be accepted as a member of the group.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; for instance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The path of &amp;quot;compromise&amp;quot; must therefore be discarded as utopian and harmful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One thing or the other: &#039;&#039;either&#039;&#039; the federalism of the Bund, in which case the Russian Social-Democratic Party must re-form itself on a basis of &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; of the workers according to nationalities; &#039;&#039;or&#039;&#039; an international type of organization, in which case the Bund must reform itself on a basis of territorial autonomy after the pattern of the Caucasian, Lettish and Polish Social-Democracies, and thus make possible the direct union of the Jewish workers with the workers of the other nationalities of Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no middle course: principles triumph, they do not &amp;quot;compromise.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;the principle of international solidarity of the workers is an essential element&#039;&#039; in the solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Vienna,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
January 1913&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
K. Stalin&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Joseph Stalin]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Marxism_and_the_National_Question&amp;diff=65710</id>
		<title>Library:Marxism and the National Question</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Marxism_and_the_National_Question&amp;diff=65710"/>
		<updated>2024-04-21T14:32:19Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Import references&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Marxism and the National Question|author=Joseph Stalin|published_date=1913|source=[https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm Marxists Internet Archive]|audiobook=[https://youtu.be/MY-WDTkvtIc Tankie Talk]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The period of counter-revolution in Russia brought not only &amp;quot;thunder and lightning&amp;quot; in its train, but also disillusionment in the movement and lack of faith in common forces. As long as people believed in &amp;quot;a bright future,&amp;quot; they fought side by side irrespective of nationality – common questions first and foremost! But when doubt crept into people&#039;s hearts, they began to depart, each to his own national tent – let every man count only upon himself! The &amp;quot;national question&amp;quot; first and foremost!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time a profound upheaval was taking place in the economic life of the country. The year 1905 had not been in vain: one more blow had been struck at the survivals of serfdom in the countryside. The series of good harvests which succeeded the famine years, and the industrial boom which followed, furthered the progress of capitalism. Class differentiation in the countryside, the growth of the towns, the development of trade and means of communication all took a big stride forward. This applied particularly to the border regions. And it could not but hasten the process of economic consolidation of the nationalities of Russia. They were bound to be stirred into movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;quot;constitutional regime&amp;quot; established at that time also acted in the same direction of awakening the nationalities. The spread of newspapers and of literature generally, a certain freedom of the press and cultural institutions, an increase in the number of national theatres, and so forth, all unquestionably helped to strengthen &amp;quot;national sentiments.&amp;quot; The Duma, with its election campaign and political groups, gave fresh opportunities for greater activity of the nations and provided a new and wide arena for their mobilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the mounting wave of militant nationalism above and the series of repressive measures taken by the &amp;quot;powers that be&amp;quot; in vengeance on the border regions for their &amp;quot;love of freedom,&amp;quot; evoked an answering wave of nationalism below, which at times took the form of crude chauvinism. The spread of Zionism &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Zionism&#039;&#039; &amp;amp;#8211; A reactionary nationalist trend of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which had followers along the intellectuals and the more backward sections of the Jewish workers. The Zionists endeavoured to isolate the Jewish working-class masses from the general struggle of the proletariat.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; among the Jews, the increase of chauvinism in Poland, Pan-Islamism among the Tatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians, Georgians and Ukrainians, the general swing of the philistine towards anti-Semitism – all these are generally known facts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The wave of nationalism swept onwards with increasing force, threatening to engulf the mass of the workers. And the more the movement for emancipation declined, the more plentifully nationalism pushed forth its blossoms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this difficult time Social-Democracy had a high mission – to resist nationalism and to protect the masses from the general &amp;quot;epidemic.&amp;quot; For Social-Democracy, and Social-Democracy alone, could do this, by countering nationalism with the tried weapon of internationalism, with the unity and indivisibility of the class struggle. And the more powerfully the wave of nationalism advanced, the louder had to be the call of Social-Democracy for fraternity and unity among the proletarians of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this connection particular firmness was demanded of the Social-Democrats of the border regions, who came into direct contact with the nationalist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But not all Social-Democrats proved equal to the task – and this applies particularly to the Social-Democrats of the border regions. The Bund, which had previously laid stress on the common tasks, now began to give prominence to its own specific, purely nationalist aims: it went to the length of declaring &amp;quot;observance of the Sabbath&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;recognition of Yiddish&amp;quot; a fighting issue in its election campaign. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &amp;quot;Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Bund was followed by the Caucasus; one section of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, which, like the rest of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, had formerly rejected &amp;quot;cultural-national autonomy,&amp;quot; are now making it an immediate demand. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &amp;quot;Announcement of the August Conference.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This is without mentioning the conference of the Liquidators, which in a diplomatic way gave its sanction to nationalist vacillations. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &amp;quot;Announcement of the August Conference.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But from this it follows that the views of Russian Social-Democracy on the national question are not yet clear to all Social-Democrats.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is evident that a serious and comprehensive discussion of the national question is required. Consistent Social-Democrats must work solidly and indefatigably against the fog of nationalism, no matter from what quarter it proceeds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== I. THE NATION ==&lt;br /&gt;
What is a nation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A nation is primarily a community, a definite community of people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This community is not racial, nor is it tribal. The modern Italian nation was formed from Romans, Teutons, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs, and so forth. The French nation was formed from Gauls, Romans, Britons, Teutons, and so on. The same must be said of the British, the Germans and others, who were formed into nations from people of diverse races and tribes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, a nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, it is unquestionable that the great empires of Cyrus and Alexander could not be called nations, although they came to be constituted historically and were formed out of different tribes and races. They were not nations, but casual and loosely-connected conglomerations of groups, which fell apart or joined together according to the victories or defeats of this or that conqueror.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, a nation is not a casual or ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But not every stable community constitutes a nation. Austria and Russia are also stable communities, but nobody calls them nations. What distinguishes a national community from a state community? The fact, among others, that a national community is inconceivable without a common language, while a state need not have a common language. The Czech nation in Austria and the Polish in Russia would be impossible if each did not have a common language, whereas the integrity of Russia and Austria is not affected by the fact that there are a number of different languages within their borders. We are referring, of course, to the spoken languages of the people and not to the official governmental languages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;a common language&#039;&#039; is one of the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, does not mean that different nations always and everywhere speak different languages, or that all who speak one language necessarily constitute one nation. A &#039;&#039;common&#039;&#039;language for every nation, but not necessarily different languages for different nations! There is no nation which at one and the same time speaks several languages, but this does not mean that there cannot be two nations speaking the same language! Englishmen and Americans speak one language, but they do not constitute one nation. The same is true of the Norwegians and the Danes, the English and the Irish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But why, for instance, do the English and the Americans not constitute one nation in spite of their common language?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, because they do not live together, but inhabit different territories. A nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people living together generation after generation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But people cannot live together, for lengthy periods unless they have a common territory. Englishmen and Americans originally inhabited the same territory, England, and constituted one nation. Later, one section of the English emigrated from England to a new territory, America, and there, in the new territory, in the course of time, came to form the new American nation. Difference of. territory led to the formation of different nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;a common territory&#039;&#039; is one of the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this is not all. Common territory does not by itself create a nation. This requires, in addition, an internal economic bond to weld the various parts of the nation into a single whole. There is no such bond between England and America, and so they constitute two different nations. But the Americans themselves would not deserve to be called a nation were not the different parts of America bound together into an economic whole, as a result of division of labour between them, the development of means of communication, and so forth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Take the Georgians, for instance. The Georgians before the Reform inhabited a common territory and spoke one language. Nevertheless, they did not, strictly speaking, constitute one nation, for, being split up into a number of disconnected principalities, they could not share a common economic life; for centuries they waged war against each other and pillaged each other, each inciting the Persians and Turks against the other. The ephemeral and casual union of the principalities which some successful king sometimes managed to bring about embraced at best a superficial administrative sphere, and rapidly disintegrated owing to the caprices of the princes and the indifference of the peasants. Nor could it be otherwise in economically disunited Georgia ... Georgia came on the scene as a nation only in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the fall of serfdom and the growth of the economic life of the country, the development of means of communication and the rise of capitalism, introduced division of labour between the various districts of Georgia, completely shattered the economic isolation of the principalities and bound them together into a single whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same must be said of the other nations which have passed through the stage of feudalism and have developed capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;a common economic life, economic cohesion, is&#039;&#039; one of the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But even this is not all. Apart from the foregoing, one must take into consideration the specific spiritual complexion of the people constituting a nation. Nations differ not only in their conditions of life, but also in spiritual complexion, which manifests itself in peculiarities of national culture. If England, America and Ireland, which speak one language, nevertheless constitute three distinct nations, it is in no small measure due to the peculiar psychological make-up which they developed from generation to generation as a result of dissimilar conditions of existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, by itself, psychological make-up or, as it is otherwise called, &amp;quot;national character,&amp;quot; is something intangible for the observer, but in so far as it manifests itself in a distinctive culture common to the nation it is something tangible and cannot be ignored.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Needless to say, &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot; is not a thing that is fixed once and for all, but is modified by changes in the conditions of life; but since it exists at every given moment, it leaves its impress on the physiognomy of the nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;a common psychological make-up&#039;&#039;, which manifests itself in a common culture, is one of the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have now exhausted the characteristic features of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It goes without saying that a nation, like every historical phenomenon, is subject to the law of change, has its history, its beginning and end.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be emphasized that none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is possible to conceive of people possessing a common &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot; who, nevertheless, cannot be said to constitute a single nation if they are economically disunited, inhabit different territories, speak different languages, and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician, American, Georgian and Caucasian Highland &#039;&#039;Jews&#039;&#039;, who, in our opinion, do not constitute a single nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is possible to conceive of people with a common territory and economic life who nevertheless would not constitute a single nation because they have no common language and no common &amp;quot;national character.&amp;quot; Such, for instance, are the Germans and Letts in the Baltic region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the Norwegians and the Danes speak one language, but they do not constitute a single nation owing to the absence of the other characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is only when all these characteristics are present together that we have a nation.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It might appear that &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot; is not one of the characteristics but the &#039;&#039;sole&#039;&#039; essential characteristic of a nation, and that all the other characteristics are, properly speaking, only &#039;&#039;conditions&#039;&#039; for the development of a nation, rather than its characteristics. Such, for instance, is the view held by R. Springer, and more particularly by O. Bauer, who are Social-Democratic theoreticians on the national question well known in Austria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us examine their theory of the nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Springer, &amp;quot;a nation is a union of similarly thinking and similarly speaking persons.&amp;quot; It is &amp;quot;a cultural community of modern people &#039;&#039;no longer tied to the &#039;soil.&#039;&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See R. Springer, &#039;&#039;The National Problem&#039;&#039;, Obshchestvennaya Polza Publishing House, 1909, p. 43.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;(our italics).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, a &amp;quot;union&amp;quot; of similarly thinking and similarly speaking people, no matter how disconnected they may be, no matter where they live, is a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer goes even further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;What is a nation?&amp;quot; he asks. &amp;quot;Is it a common language which makes people a nation? But the English and the Irish ... speak the same language without, however, being one people; the Jews have no common language and yet are a nation.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See O. Bauer, &#039;&#039;The National Question and Social-Democracy&#039;&#039;, Serp Publishing House, 1909.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, is a nation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;A nation is a relative community of character.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what is character, in this case national character?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
National character is &amp;quot;the sum total of characteristics which distinguish the people of one nationality from the people of another nationality – the complex of physical and spiritual characteristics which distinguish one nation from another.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer knows, of course, that national character does not drop from the skies, and he therefore adds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The character of people is determined by nothing so much as by their destiny.... A nation is nothing but a community with a common destiny&amp;quot; which, in turn, is determined &amp;quot;by the conditions under which people produce their means of subsistence and distribute the products of their labour.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We thus arrive at the most &amp;quot;complete,&amp;quot; as Bauer calls it, definition of a nation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;A nation is an aggregate of people bound into a community of character by a common destiny.&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We thus have common national character based on a common destiny, but not necessarily connected with a common territory, language or economic life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what in that case remains of the nation? What common nationality can there be among people who are economically disconnected, inhabit different territories and from generation to generation speak different languages?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation, although they &amp;quot;have no common language&amp;quot;; but what &amp;quot;common destiny&amp;quot; and national cohesion is there, for instance, between the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who are completely separated from one another, inhabit different territories and speak different languages?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above-mentioned Jews undoubtedly lead their economic and political life in common with the Georgians, Daghestanians, Russians and Americans respectively, and they live in the same cultural atmosphere as these; this is bound to leave a definite impress on their national character; if there is anything common to them left, it is their religion, their common origin and certain relics of the national character. All this is beyond question. But how can it be seriously maintained that petrified religious rites and fading psychological relics affect the &amp;quot;destiny&amp;quot; of these Jews more powerfully than the living social, economic and cultural environment that surrounds them? And it is only on this assumption that it is possible to speak of the Jews as a single nation at all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, distinguishes Bauer&#039;s nation from the mystical and self-sufficient &amp;quot;national spirit&amp;quot; of the spiritualists?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer sets up an impassable barrier between the &amp;quot;distinctive feature&amp;quot; of nations (national character) and the &amp;quot;conditions&amp;quot; of their life, divorcing the one from the other. But what is national character if not a reflection of the conditions of life, a coagulation of impressions derived from environment? How can one limit the matter to national character alone, isolating and divorcing it from the soil that gave rise to it?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further, what indeed distinguished the English nation from the American nation at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when America was still known as New England? Not national character, of course; for the Americans had originated from England and had brought with them to America not only the English language, but also the English national character, which, of course, they could not lose so soon; although, under the influence of the new conditions, they would naturally be developing their own specific character. Yet, despite their more or less common character, they at that time already constituted a nation distinct from England! Obviously, New England as a nation differed then from England as a nation not by its specific national character, or not so much by its national character, as by its environment and conditions of life, which were distinct from those of England.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is therefore clear that there is in fact no &#039;&#039;single&#039;&#039; distinguishing characteristic of a nation. There is only a sum total of characteristics, of which, when nations are compared, sometimes one characteristic (national character), sometimes another (language), or sometimes a third (territory, economic conditions), stands out in sharper relief. A nation constitutes the combination of all these characteristics taken together.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer&#039;s point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character, divorces the nation from its soil and converts it into an invisible, self-contained force. The result is not a living and active nation, but something mystical, intangible and supernatural. For, I repeat, what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of which do not understand each other (since they speak different languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time of war?!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, it is not for such paper &amp;quot;nations&amp;quot; that Social-Democracy draws up its national programme. It can reckon only with real nations, which act and move, and therefore insist on being reckoned with.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer is obviously confusing &#039;&#039;nation&#039;&#039;, which is a historical category, with &#039;&#039;tribe&#039;&#039;, which is an ethnographical category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, Bauer himself apparently feels the weakness of his position. While in the beginning of his book he definitely declares the Jews to be a nation, he corrects himself at the end of the book and states that &amp;quot;in general capitalist society makes it impossible for them (the Jews) to continue as a nation,&amp;quot; by causing them to assimilate with other nations. The reason, it appears, is that &amp;quot;the Jews have no closed territory of settlement,&amp;quot; whereas the Czechs, for instance, have such a territory and, according to Bauer, will survive as a nation. In short, the reason lies in the absence of a territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By arguing thus, Bauer wanted to prove that the Jewish workers cannot demand national autonomy, but he thereby inadvertently refuted his own theory, which denies that a common territory is one of the characteristics of a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But Bauer goes further. In the beginning of his book he definitely declares that &amp;quot;the Jews have no &#039;&#039;common&#039;&#039; language, and yet are a nation.&amp;quot; But hardly has he reached p. 130 than he effects a change of front and just as definitely declares that &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;unquestionably, no nation is possible without a common language&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (our italics).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer wanted to prove that &amp;quot;language is the most important instrument of human intercourse,&amp;quot; but at the same time he inadvertently proved something he did not mean to prove, namely, the unsoundness of his own theory of nations, which denies the significance of a common language.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus this theory, stitched together by idealistic threads, refutes itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== II. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT ==&lt;br /&gt;
A nation is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development of capitalism is at the same time a process of the constitution of people into nations. Such, for instance, was the case in Western Europe. The British, French, Germans, Italians and others were formed into nations at the time of the victorious advance of capitalism and its triumph over feudal disunity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the formation of nations in those instances at the same time signified their conversion into independent national states. The British, French and other nations are at the same time British, etc., states. Ireland, which did not participate in this process, does not alter the general picture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Matters proceeded somewhat differently in Eastern Europe. Whereas in the West nations developed into states, in the East multi-national states were formed, states consisting of several nationalities. Such are Austria-Hungary and Russia. In Austria, the Germans proved to be politically the most developed, and they took it upon themselves to unite the Austrian nationalities into a state. In Hungary, the most adapted for state organization were the Magyars – the core of the Hungarian nationalities – and it was they who united Hungary. In Russia, the uniting of the nationalities was undertaken by the Great Russians, who were headed by a historically formed, powerful and well-organized aristocratic military bureaucracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That was how matters proceeded in the East.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This special method of formation of states could take place only where feudalism had not yet been eliminated, where capitalism was feebly&#039; developed, where the nationalities which had been forced into the background had not yet been able to consolidate themselves economically into integral nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But capitalism also began to develop in the Eastern states. Trade and means of communication were developing. Large towns were springing up. The nations were becoming economically consolidated. Capitalism, erupting into the tranquil life of the nationalities which had been pushed into the background, was arousing them and stirring them into action. The development of the press and the theatre, the activity of the Reichsrat (Austria) and of the Duma (Russia) were helping to strengthen &amp;quot;national sentiments.&amp;quot; The intelligentsia that had arisen was being imbued with &amp;quot;the national idea&amp;quot; and was acting in the same direction....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the nations which had been pushed into the background and had now awakened to independent life, could no longer form themselves into independent national states; they encountered on their -path the very powerful resistance of the ruling strata of the dominant nations, which had long ago assumed the control of the state. They were too late!...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way the Czechs, Poles, etc., formed themselves into nations in Austria; the Croats, etc., in Hungary; the Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, etc., in Russia. What had been an exception in Western Europe (Ireland) became the rule in the East.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the West, Ireland responded to its exceptional position by a national movement. In the East, the awakened nations were bound to respond in the same fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus arose the circumstances which impelled the young nations of Eastern Europe on to the path of struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The struggle began and flared up, to be sure, not between nations as a whole, but between the ruling classes of the dominant nations and of those that had been pushed into the background. The struggle is usually conducted by the urban petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the big bourgeoisie of the dominant nation (Czechs and Germans), or by the rural bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the landlords of the dominant nation (Ukrainians in Poland), or by the whole &amp;quot;national&amp;quot; bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations against the ruling nobility of the dominant nation (Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine in Russia).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The bourgeoisie plays the leading role.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its goods and to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie of a different nationality. Hence its desire to secure its &amp;quot;own,&amp;quot; its &amp;quot;home&amp;quot; market. The market is the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But matters are usually not confined to the market. The semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois bureaucracy of the dominant nation intervenes in the struggle with its own methods of &amp;quot;arresting and preventing.&amp;quot; The bourgeoisie – whether big or small – of the dominant nation is able to deal more &amp;quot;swiftly&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;decisively&amp;quot; with its competitor. &amp;quot;Forces&amp;quot; are united and a series of restrictive measures is put into operation against the &amp;quot;alien&amp;quot; bourgeoisie, measures passing into acts of repression. The struggle spreads from the economic sphere to the political sphere. Restriction of freedom of movement, repression of language, restriction of franchise, closing of schools, religious restrictions, and so on, are piled upon the head of the &amp;quot;competitor.&amp;quot; Of course, such measures are designed not only in the interest of the bourgeois classes of the dominant nation, but also in furtherance of the specifically caste aims, so to speak, of the ruling bureaucracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But from the point of view of the results achieved this is quite immaterial; the bourgeois classes and the bureaucracy in this matter go hand in hand – whether it be in Austria-Hungary or in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation, repressed on every hand, is naturally stirred into movement. It appeals to its &amp;quot;native folk&amp;quot; and begins to shout about the &amp;quot;fatherland,&#039;; claiming that its own cause is the cause of the nation as a whole. It recruits itself an army from among its &amp;quot;countrymen&amp;quot; in the interests of ... the &amp;quot;fatherland.&amp;quot; Nor do the &amp;quot;folk&amp;quot; always remain unresponsive to its appeals; they rally around its banner: the repression from above affects them too and provokes their discontent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the national movement begins.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The strength of the national movement is determined by the degree to which the wide strata of the nation, the proletariat and peasantry, participate in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whether the proletariat rallies to the banner of bourgeois nationalism depends on the degree of development of class antagonisms, on the class consciousness and degree of organization of the proletariat. The class-conscious proletariat has its own tried banner, and has no need to rally to the banner of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As far as the peasants are concerned, their participation in the national movement depends primarily on the character of the repressions. If the repressions affect the &amp;quot;land,&amp;quot; as was the case in Ireland, then the mass of the peasants immediately rally to the banner of the national movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, if, for example, there is no seri&#039;&#039;ous anti-Russian&#039;&#039; nationalism in Georgia, it is primarily because there are neither Russian landlords nor a Russian big bourgeoisie there to supply the fuel for such nationalism among the masses. In Georgia there &#039;&#039;is anti-Armenian&#039;&#039;nationalism; but this is because there is still an Armenian big bourgeoisie there which, by getting the better of the small and still unconsolidated Georgian bourgeoisie, drives the latter to anti-Armenian nationalism. .&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on these factors, the national movement either assumes a mass character and steadily grows (as in Ireland and Galicia), or is converted into a series of petty collisions, degenerating into squabbles and &amp;quot;fights&amp;quot; over signboards (as in some of the small towns of Bohemia).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The content of the national movement, of course, cannot everywhere be the same: it is wholly determined by the diverse demands made by the movement. In Ireland the movement bears an agrarian character; in Bohemia it bears a &amp;quot;language&amp;quot; character; in one place the demand is for civil equality and religious freedom, in another for the nation&#039;s &amp;quot;own&amp;quot; officials, or its own Diet. The diversity of demands not infrequently reveals the diverse features which characterize a nation in general (language, territory, etc.). It is worthy of note that we never meet with a demand based on Bauer&#039;s all-embracing &amp;quot;national character.&amp;quot; And this is natural: &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;in itself is&#039;&#039; something intangible, and, as was correctly remarked by J. Strasser, &amp;quot;a politician can&#039;t do anything with it.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See his &#039;&#039;Der Arbeiter und die Nation&#039;&#039;, 1912.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such, in general, are the forms and character of the national movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From what has been said it will be clear that the national struggle under the conditions of &#039;&#039;rising&#039;&#039; capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves. Sometimes the bourgeoisie succeeds in drawing the proletariat into the national movement, and then the national struggle &#039;&#039;externally&#039;&#039; assumes a &amp;quot;nation-wide&amp;quot; character. But this is so only externally. &#039;&#039;In its essence it is&#039;&#039; always a bourgeois struggle, one that is to the advantage and profit mainly of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it does not by any means follow that the proletariat should not put up a fight against the policy of national oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Restriction of freedom of movement, disfranchisement, repression of language, closing of schools, and other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if not more, than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs can only serve to retard the free development of the intellectual forces of the proletariat of subject nations. One cannot speak seriously of a full development of the intellectual faculties of the Tatar or Jewish worker if he is not allowed to use his native language at meetings and lectures, and if his schools are closed down.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the policy of nationalist persecution is dangerous to the cause of the proletariat also on another account. It diverts the attention of large strata from social questions, questions of the class struggle, to national questions, questions &amp;quot;common&amp;quot; to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And this creates a favourable soil for lying propaganda about &amp;quot;harmony of interests,&amp;quot; for glossing over the class interests of the proletariat and for the intellectual enslavement of the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This creates a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all nationalities. If a considerable proportion of the Polish workers are still in intellectual bondage to the bourgeois nationalists, if they still stand aloof from the international labour movement, it is chiefly because the age-old anti-Polish policy of the &amp;quot;powers that be&amp;quot; creates the soil for this bondage and hinders the emancipation of the workers from it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the policy of persecution does not stop there. It not infrequently passes from a &amp;quot;system&amp;quot; of &#039;&#039;oppression&#039;&#039; to a &amp;quot;system&amp;quot; of &#039;&#039;inciting&#039;&#039; nations against each other, to a &amp;quot;system&amp;quot; of massacres and pogroms. Of course, the latter system is not everywhere and always possible, but where it is possible – in the absence of elementary civil rights – it frequently assumes horrifying proportions and threatens to drown the cause of unity of the workers in blood and tears. The Caucasus and south Russia furnish numerous examples. &amp;quot;Divide and rule&amp;quot; – such is the purpose of the policy of incitement. And where such a policy succeeds, it is a tremendous evil for the proletariat and a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all the nationalities in the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the workers are interested in the complete amalgamation of all their fellow-workers into a single international army, in their speedy and final emancipation from intellectual bondage to the bourgeoisie, and in the full and free development of the intellectual forces of their brothers, whatever nation they may belong to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The workers therefore combat and will continue to combat the policy of national oppression in all its forms, from the most subtle to the most crude, as well as the policy of inciting nations against each other in all its forms&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social-Democracy in all countries therefore proclaims the right of nations to self-determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The right of self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the right &#039;&#039;forcibly&#039;&#039; to interfere in the life of the nation, to &#039;&#039;destroy&#039;&#039; its schools and other institutions, to &#039;&#039;violate&#039;&#039; its habits and customs, to &#039;&#039;repress&#039;&#039; its language, or &#039;&#039;curtail&#039;&#039; its rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy will support every custom and institution of a nation. While combating the coercion of any nation, it will uphold only the right of the &#039;&#039;nation&#039;&#039; itself to determine its own destiny, at the same time agitating against harmful customs and institutions of that nation in order to enable the toiling strata of the nation to emancipate themselves from them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The right of self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equal rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy will support every demand of a nation. A nation has the right even to return to the old order of things; but this does not mean that Social-Democracy will subscribe to such a decision if taken by some institution of a particular nation. The obligations of Social-Democracy, which defends the interests of the proletariat, and the rights of a nation, which consists of various classes, are two different things.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, the aim of Social-Democracy is to put an end to the policy of national oppression, to render it impossible, and thereby to remove the grounds of strife between nations, to take the edge off that strife and reduce it to a minimum.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is what essentially distinguishes the policy of the class-conscious proletariat from the policy of the bourgeoisie, which attempts to aggravate and fan the national struggle and to prolong and sharpen the national movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And that is why the class-conscious proletariat cannot rally under the &amp;quot;national&amp;quot; flag of the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why the so-called &amp;quot;evolutionary national&amp;quot; policy advocated by Bauer cannot become the policy of the proletariat. Bauer&#039;s attempt to identify his &amp;quot;evolutionary national&amp;quot; policy with the policy of the &amp;quot;modern working class&amp;quot; is an attempt to adapt the class struggle of the workers to the struggle of the nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fate of a national movement, which is essentially a bourgeois movement, is naturally bound up with the fate of the bourgeoisie. The -final disappearance of a national movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Only under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established. But even within the framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the national struggle to a minimum, to undermine it at the root, to render it as harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne out, for example, by Switzerland and America. It requires that the country should be democratized and the nations be given the opportunity of free development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== III. PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
A nation has the right freely to determine its own destiny. It has the right to arrange its life as it sees fit, without, of course, trampling on the rights of other nations. That is beyond dispute.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; exactly should it arrange its own life, &#039;&#039;what forms&#039;&#039; should its future constitution take, if the interests of the majority of the nation and, above all, of the proletariat are to be borne in mind?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A nation has the right to arrange its life on autonomous lines. It even has the right to secede. But this does not mean that it should do so under all circumstances, that autonomy, or separation, will everywhere and always be advantageous for a nation, i.e., for its majority, i.e., for the toiling strata. The Transcaucasian Tatars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in their Diet and, succumbing to the influence of their beys and mullahs, decide to restore the old order of things and to secede from the state. According to the meaning of the clause on self-determination they are fully entitled to do so. But will this be in the interest of the toiling strata of the Tatar nation? Can Social-Democracy look on indifferently when the beys and mullahs assume the leadership of the masses in the solution of the national question?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Should not Social-Democracy interfere in the matter and influence the will of the nation in a definite way? Should it not come forward with a definite plan for the solution of the question, a plan which would be most advantageous for the Tatar masses?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what solution would be most compatible with the interests of the toiling masses? Autonomy, federation or separation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these are problems the solution of which will depend on the concrete historical conditions in which the given nation finds itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than that; conditions, like everything else, change, and a decision which is correct at one particular time may prove to be entirely unsuitable at another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the middle of the nineteenth century Marx was in favour of the secession of Russian Poland; and he was right, for it was then a question of emancipating a higher culture from a lower culture that was destroying it. And the question at that time was not only a theoretical one, an academic question, but a practical one, a question of actual reality....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the end of the nineteenth century the Polish Marxists were already declaring against the secession of Poland; and they too were right, for during the fifty years that had elapsed profound changes had taken place, bringing Russia and Poland closer economically and culturally. Moreover, during that period the question of secession had been converted from a practical matter into a matter of academic dispute, which excited nobody except perhaps intellectuals abroad.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This, of course, by no means precludes the possibility that certain internal and external conditions may arise in which the question of the secession of Poland may again come on the order of the day.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The solution of the national question is possible only in connection with the historical conditions taken in their development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The economic, political and cultural conditions of a given nation constitute the only key to the question &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; a particular nation ought to arrange its life and &#039;&#039;what forms&#039;&#039; its future constitution ought to take. It is possible that a specific solution of the question will be required for each nation. If the dialectical approach to a question is required anywhere it is required here, in the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In view of this we must declare our decided opposition to a certain very widespread, but very summary manner of &amp;quot;solving&amp;quot; the national question, which owes its inception to the Bund. We have in mind the easy method of referring to Austrian and South-Slav &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;South-Slav Social-Democracy operates in the Southern part of Austria.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Social-Democracy, which has supposedly already solved the national question and whose solution the Russian Social-Democrats should simply borrow. It is assumed that whatever, say, is right for Austria is also right for Russia. The most important and decisive factor is lost sight of here, namely, the concrete historical conditions in Russia as a whole and in the life of each of the nations inhabiting Russia in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Listen, for example, to what the well-known Bundist, V. Kossovsky, says:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;When at the Fourth Congress of the Bund the principles of the question (i.e., the national question – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) were discussed, the proposal made by one of the members of the congress to settle the question in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party met with general approval.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See V. Kossovsky, &#039;&#039;Problems of Nationality&#039;&#039;, 1907.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And the result was that &amp;quot;the congress unanimously adopted&amp;quot; ... national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And that was all! No analysis of the actual conditions in Russia, no investigation of the condition of the Jews in Russia. They first borrowed the solution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party, then they &amp;quot;approved&amp;quot; it, and finally they &amp;quot;unanimously adopted&amp;quot; it! This is the way the Bundists present and &amp;quot;solve&amp;quot; the national question in Russia....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a matter of fact, Austria and Russia represent entirely different conditions. This explains why the Social-Democrats in Austria, when they adopted their national programme at Brünn (1899) &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The Br&amp;amp;uuml;nn Parteitag, or Congress, of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held on September 24-29, 1899. The resolution on the national question adopted by this congress is quoted by J. V. Stalin in the chapter IV, &amp;quot;Cultural-National Autonomy.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party (with certain insignificant amendments, it is true), approached the question in an entirely non-Russian way, so to speak, and, of course, solved it in a non-Russian way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, as to the presentation of the question. How is the question presented by the Austrian theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, the interpreters of the Brünn national programme and the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party, Springer and Bauer?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Whether a multi-national state is possible,&amp;quot; says Springer, &amp;quot;and whether, in particular, the Austrian nationalities are obliged to form a single political entity, is a question we shall not answer here but shall assume to be settled. For anyone who will not concede this possibility and necessity, our investigation will, of course, be purposeless. Our theme is as follows: inasmuch as these nations are &#039;&#039;obliged&#039;&#039; to live together, what &#039;&#039;legal forms&#039;&#039; will enable them &#039;&#039;to live together in the best possible way?&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (Springer&#039;s italics). &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Springer, &#039;&#039;The National Problem&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the starting point is the state integrity of Austria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer says the same thing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;We therefore start from the assumption that the Austrian nations will remain in the same state union in which they exist at present and inquire how the nations within this union will arrange their relations among themselves and to the state.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here again the first thing is the integrity of Austria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Can Russian Social-Democracy present the question &#039;&#039;in this way?&#039;&#039; No, it cannot. And it cannot because from the very outset it holds the view of the right of nations to self-determination, by virtue of which a nation has the right of secession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even the Bundist Goldblatt admitted at the Second Congress of Russian Social-Democracy that the latter could not abandon the standpoint of self-determination. Here is what Goldblatt said on that occasion:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Nothing can be said against the right of self-determination. If any nation is striving for independence, we must not oppose it. If Poland does not wish to enter into lawful wedlock with Russia, it is not for us to interfere with her.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this is true. But it follows that the starting points of the Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats, far from being identical, are diametrically opposite. After this, can there be any question of borrowing the national programme of the Austrians?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Furthermore, the Austrians hope to achieve the &amp;quot;freedom of nationalities&amp;quot; by means of petty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national autonomy as a practical measure, they do not count on any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, which they do not even contemplate. The Russian Marxists, on the other hand, associate the &amp;quot;freedom of nationalities&amp;quot; with a probable radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation, having no grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters matters in regard to the probable fate of the nations of Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Of course,&amp;quot; says Bauer, &amp;quot;there is little probability that national autonomy will be the result of a great decision, of a bold action. Austria will develop towards national autonomy step by step, by a slow process of development, in the course of a severe struggle, as a consequence of which legislation and administration will be in a state of chronic paralysis. The new constitution will not be created by a great legislative act, but by a multitude of separate enactments for individual provinces and individual communities.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Springer says the same thing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;I am very well aware,&amp;quot; he writes, &amp;quot;that institutions of this kind (i.e., organs of national autonomy – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) are not created in a single year or a single decade. The reorganization of the Prussian administration alone took considerable time.... It took the Prussians two decades finally to establish their basic administrative institutions. Let nobody think that I harbour any illusions as to the time required and the difficulties to be overcome in Austria.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this is very definite. But can the Russian Marxists avoid associating the national question with &amp;quot;bold actions&amp;quot;? Can they count on partial reforms, on &amp;quot;a multitude of separate enactments&amp;quot; as a means for achieving the &amp;quot;freedom of nationalities&amp;quot;? But if they cannot and must not do so, is it not clear that the methods of struggle of the Austrians and the Russians and their prospects must be entirely different? How in such a state of affairs can they confine themselves to the one-sided, milk-and-water cultural-national autonomy of the Austrians? One or the other: either those who are in favour of borrowing do not count on &amp;quot;bold actions&amp;quot; in Russia, or they do count on such actions but &amp;quot;know not what they do.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the immediate tasks facing Russia and Austria are entirely different and consequently dictate different methods of solving the national question. In Austria parliamentarism prevails, and under present conditions no development in Austria is possible without parliament. But parliamentary life and legislation in Austria are frequently brought to a complete standstill by severe conflicts between the national parties. That explains the chronic political crisis from which Austria has for a long time been suffering. Hence, in Austria the national question is the very hub of political life; it is the vital question. It is therefore not surprising that the Austrian Social-Democratic politicians should first of all try in one way or another to find a solution for the national conflicts – of course on the basis of the existing parliamentary system, by parliamentary methods....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not so with Russia. In the first place, in Russia &amp;quot;there is no parliament, thank God.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Thank God we have no parliament here&amp;quot; &amp;amp;#8211; the words uttered by V. Kokovtsev, tsarist Minister of Finance (later Prime Minister), in the State Duma on April 24 1908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In the second place – and this is the main point – the hub of the political life of Russia is not the national but the agrarian question. Consequently, the fate of the Russian problem, and, accordingly, the &amp;quot;liberation&amp;quot; of the nations too, is bound up in Russia with the solution of the agrarian question, i.e., with the destruction of the relics of feudalism, i.e., with the democratization of the country. That explains why in Russia the national question is not an independent and decisive one, but a part of the general and more important question of the emancipation of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The barrenness of the Austrian parliament,&amp;quot; writes Springer, &amp;quot;is due precisely to the fact that every reform gives rise to antagonisms within the national parties which may affect their unity. The leaders of the parties, therefore, avoid everything that smacks of reform. Progress in Austria is generally conceivable only if the nations are granted indefeasible legal rights which will relieve them of the necessity of constantly maintaining national militant groups in parliament and will enable them to turn their attention to the solution of economic and social problems.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer says the same thing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;National peace is indispensable first of all for the state. The state cannot permit legislation to be brought to a standstill by the very stupid question of language or by every quarrel between excited people on a linguistic frontier, or over every new school.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this is clear. But it is no less clear that the national question in Russia is on an entirely different plane. It is not the national, but the agrarian question , that decides the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinate one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so we have different presentations of the question, different prospects and methods of struggle, different immediate tasks. Is it not clear that, such being the state of affairs, only pedants who &amp;quot;solve&amp;quot; the national question without reference to space and time can think of adopting examples from Austria and of borrowing a programme?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To repeat: the concrete historical conditions as the starting point, and the dialectical presentation of the question as the only correct way of presenting it – such is the key to solving the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== IV. CULTURAL-NATIONAL AUTONOMY ==&lt;br /&gt;
We spoke above of the formal aspect of the Austrian national programme and of the methodological grounds which make it impossible for the Russian Marxists simply to adopt the example of Austrian Social-Democracy and make the latter&#039;s programme their own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now examine the essence of the programme itself&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What then is the national programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is expressed in two words: cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This means, firstly, that autonomy would be granted, let us say, not to Bohemia or Poland, which are inhabited mainly by Czechs and Poles, but to Czechs and Poles generally, irrespective of territory, no matter what part of Austria they inhabit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why this autonomy is called &#039;&#039;national&#039;&#039; and not territorial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It means, secondly, that the Czechs, Poles, Germans, and so on, scattered over the various parts of Austria, taken personally, as individuals, are to be organized into integral nations, and are as such to form part of the Austrian state. In this way Austria would represent not a union of autonomous regions, but a union of autonomous nationalities, constituted irrespective of territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It means, thirdly, that the national institutions which are to be created for this purpose for the Poles, Czechs, and so forth, are to have jurisdiction only over &amp;quot;cultural,&amp;quot; not &amp;quot;political&amp;quot; questions. Specifically political questions would be reserved for the Austrian parliament (the Reichsrat).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why this autonomy is also called &#039;&#039;cultural&#039;&#039;, cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And here is the text of the programme adopted by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party at the Brünn Congress in 1899. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The representatives of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party also voted for it. See &#039;&#039;Discussion of the National Question at the Br&amp;amp;uuml;nn Congress&#039;&#039;, 1906.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having referred to the fact that &amp;quot;national dissension in Austria is hindering political progress,&amp;quot; that &amp;quot;the final solution of the national question... is primarily a cultural necessity,&amp;quot; and that &amp;quot;the solution is possible only in a genuinely democratic society, constructed on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage,&amp;quot; the programme goes on to say:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;The preservation and development of the national peculiarities&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In M. Panin&#039;s Russian translation (see his translation of Bauer&#039;s book), &amp;quot;national individualities&amp;quot; is given in place of &amp;quot;national peculiarities.&amp;quot; Panin translated this passage incorrectly. The word &amp;quot;individuality&amp;quot; is not in the German text, which speaks of &#039;&#039;nationalen Eigenart&#039;&#039;, i.e., &#039;&#039;peculiarities&#039;&#039;, which is far from being the same thing.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; of the peoples of Austria is possible only on the basis of equal rights and by avoiding all oppression. Hence, all bureaucratic state centralism and the feudal privileges of individual provinces must first of all be rejected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Under these conditions, and only under these conditions, will it be possible to establish national order in Austria in place of national dissension, namely, on the following principles:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;1. Austria must be transformed into a democratic state federation of nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;2. The historical crown provinces must be replaced by nationally delimited self-governing corporations, in each of which legislation and administration shall be entrusted to national parliaments elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;3. All the self-governing regions of one and the same nation must jointly form a single national union, which shall manage its national affairs on an absolutely autonomous basis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;4. The rights of national minorities must be guaranteed by a special law passed by the Imperial Parliament.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The programme ends with an appeal for the solidarity of all the nations of Austria. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; Verhandlungen des Gesamtparteitages&#039;&#039; in Br&amp;amp;uuml;nn, 1899.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not difficult to see that this programme retains certain traces of &amp;quot;territorialism,&amp;quot; but that in general it gives a formulation of national autonomy. It is not without good reason that Springer, the first agitator on behalf of cultural-national autonomy, greets it with enthusiasm; Bauer also supports this programme, calling it a &amp;quot;theoretical victory&amp;quot; for national autonomy; only, in the interests of greater clarity, he proposes that Point 4 be replaced by a more definite formulation, which would declare the necessity of &amp;quot;constituting the national minority within each self-governing region into a public corporation&amp;quot; for the management of educational and other cultural affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such is the national programme of Austrian Social-Democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us examine its scientific foundations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us see how the Austrian Social-Democratic Party justifies the cultural-national autonomy it advocates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us turn to the theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, Springer and Bauer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The starting point of national autonomy is the conception of a nation as a union of individuals without regard to a definite territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Nationality,&amp;quot; according to Springer, &amp;quot;is not essentially connected with territory&amp;quot;; nations are &amp;quot;autonomous unions of persons.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer also speaks of a nation as a &amp;quot;community of persons&amp;quot; which does not enjoy &amp;quot;exclusive sovereignty in any particular region.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the persons constituting a nation do not always live in one compact mass; they are frequently divided into groups, and in that form are interspersed among alien national organisms. It is capitalism which drives them into various regions and cities in search of a livelihood. But when they enter foreign national territories and there form minorities, these groups are made to suffer by the local national majorities in the way of restrictions on their language, schools, etc. Hence national conflicts. Hence the &amp;quot;unsuitability&amp;quot; of territorial autonomy. The only solution to such a situation, according to Springer and Bauer, is to organize the minorities of the given nationality dispersed over various parts of the state into a single, general, inter-class national union. Such a union alone, in their opinion, can protect the cultural interests of national minorities, and it alone is capable of putting an end to national discord.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Hence the necessity,&amp;quot; says Springer, &amp;quot;to organize the nationalities, to invest them with rights and responsibilities....&amp;quot; Of course, &amp;quot;a law is easily drafted, but will it be effective? &amp;quot;... &amp;quot;If one wants to make a law for nations, one must first create the nations...&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Unless the nationalities are constituted it is impossible to create national rights and eliminate national dissension.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer expressed himself in the same spirit when he proposed, as &amp;quot;a demand of the working class,&amp;quot; that &amp;quot;the minorities should be constituted into public corporations based on the personal principle.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But how is a nation to be organized? How is one to determine to what nation any given individual belongs?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Nationality,&amp;quot; says Springer, &amp;quot;will be determined by certificates; every individual domiciled in a given region must declare his affiliation to one of the nationalities of that region.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The personal principle,&amp;quot; says Bauer, &amp;quot;presumes that the population will be divided into nationalities.... On the basis of the free declaration of the adult citizens national registers must be drawn up.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;All the Germans in nationally homogeneous districts,&amp;quot; says Bauer, &amp;quot;and all the Germans entered in the national registers in the dual districts will constitute the German nation and elect a &#039;&#039;National Council&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same applies to the Czechs, Poles, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The &#039;&#039;National Council,&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; according to Springer, &amp;quot;is the cultural parliament of the nation, empowered to establish the principles and to grant funds, thereby assuming guardianship over national education, national literature, art and science, the formation of academies, museums, galleries, theatres,&amp;quot; etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such will be the organization of a nation and its central institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bauer, the Austrian Social-Democratic Party is striving, by the creation of these inter-class institutions &amp;quot;to make national culture ... the possession of the whole people and thereby &#039;&#039;unite all the members of the nation into a national-cultural community.&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (our italics).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One might think that all this concerns Austria alone. But Bauer does not agree. He emphatically declares that national autonomy is essential also for other states which, like Austria, consist of several nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;In the multi-national state,&amp;quot; according to Bauer, &amp;quot;the working class of all the nations opposes the national power policy of the propertied classes with the demand for national autonomy.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then, imperceptibly substituting national autonomy for the self-determination of nations, he continues:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Thus, national autonomy, the self-determination of nations, will necessarily become the constitutional programme of the proletariat of all the nations in a multi-national state.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But he goes still further. He profoundly believes that the inter-class &amp;quot;national unions&amp;quot; &amp;quot;constituted&amp;quot; by him and Springer will serve as a sort of prototype of the future socialist society. For he knows that &amp;quot;the socialist system of society... will divide humanity into nationally delimited communities&amp;quot;; that under socialism there will take place &amp;quot;a grouping of humanity into autonomous national communities,&amp;quot; that thus, &amp;quot;socialist society will undoubtedly present a checkered picture of national unions of persons and territorial corporations, and that accordingly &amp;quot;the socialist principle of nationality is a higher synthesis of the national principle and national autonomy.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Enough, it would seem..&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are the arguments for cultural-national autonomy as given in the works of Bauer and Springer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first thing that strikes the eye is the entirely inexplicable and absolutely unjustifiable substitution of national autonomy for self-determination of nations. One or the other: either Bauer failed to understand the meaning of self-determination, or he did understand it but for some reason or other deliberately narrowed its meaning. For there is no doubt a) that cultural-national autonomy presupposes the integrity of the multi-national state, whereas self-determination goes outside the framework of this integrity, and b) that self-determination endows a nation with complete rights, whereas national autonomy endows it only with &amp;quot;cultural&amp;quot; rights. That in the first place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the second place, a combination of internal and external conditions is fully possible at some future time by virtue of which one or another of the nationalities may decide to secede from a multi-national state, say from Austria. Did not the Ruthenian Social-Democrats at the Brünn Party Congress announce their readiness to unite the &amp;quot;two parts&amp;quot; of their people into one whole? &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Proceedings of the Br&amp;amp;uuml;nn Social-Democratic Party Congress&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What, in such a case, becomes of national autonomy, which is &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;inevitable for the proletariat of all the nations&amp;quot;?&#039;&#039; What sort of &amp;quot;solution&amp;quot; of the problem is it that mechanically squeezes nations into the Procrustean bed of an integral state?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further: National autonomy is contrary to the whole course of development of nations. It calls for the organization of nations; but can they be artificially welded together if life, if economic development tears whole groups from them and disperses these groups over various regions? There is no doubt that in the early stages of capitalism nations become welded together. But there is also no doubt that in the higher stages of capitalism a process of dispersion of nations sets in, a process whereby a whole number of groups separate off from the nations, going off in search of a livelihood and subsequently settling permanently in other regions of the state; in the course of this these settlers lose their old connections and acquire new ones in their new domicile, and from generation to generation acquire new habits and new tastes, and possibly a new language. The question arises: is it possible to unite into a single national union groups that have grown so distinct? Where are the magic links to unite what cannot be united? Is it conceivable that, for instance, the Germans of the Baltic Provinces and the Germans of Transcaucasia can be &amp;quot;united into a single nation&amp;quot;? But if it is not conceivable and not possible, wherein does national autonomy differ from the utopia of the old nationalists, who endeavoured to turn back the wheel of history?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the unity of a nation diminishes not only as a result of migration. It diminishes also from internal causes, owing to the growing acuteness of the class struggle. In the early stages of capitalism one can still speak of a &amp;quot;common culture&amp;quot; of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But as large-scale industry develops and the class struggle becomes more and more acute, this &amp;quot;common culture&amp;quot; begins to melt away. One cannot seriously speak of the &amp;quot;common culture&amp;quot; of a nation when employers and workers of one and the same nation cease to understand each other. What &amp;quot;common destiny&amp;quot; can there be when the bourgeoisie thirsts for war, and the proletariat declares &amp;quot;war on war&amp;quot;? Can a single inter-class national union be formed from such opposed elements? And, after this, can one speak of the &amp;quot;union of all the members of the nation into a national-cultural community&amp;quot;? Is it not obvious that national autonomy is contrary to the whole course of the class struggle?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us assume for a moment that the slogan &amp;quot;organize the nation&amp;quot; is practicable. One might understand bourgeois-nationalist parliamentarians endeavouring to &amp;quot;organize&amp;quot; a nation for the purpose of securing additional votes. But since when have Social-Democrats begun to occupy themselves with &amp;quot;organizing&amp;quot; nations, &amp;quot;constituting&amp;quot; nations, &amp;quot;creating&amp;quot; nations?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What sort of Social-Democrats are they who in the epoch of extreme intensification of the class struggle organize inter-class national unions? Until now the Austrian, as well as every other, Social-Democratic party, had one task before it: namely, to organize the proletariat. That task has apparently become &amp;quot;antiquated.&amp;quot; Springer and Bauer are now setting a &amp;quot;new&amp;quot; task, a more absorbing task, namely, to &amp;quot;create,&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;organize&amp;quot; a nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, logic has its obligations: he who adopts national autonomy must also adopt this &amp;quot;new&amp;quot; task;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
but to adopt the latter means to abandon the class position and to take the path of nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Springer&#039;s and Bauer&#039;s cultural-national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And it is by no means fortuitous that the national programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats enjoins a concern for the &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;preservation&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;development&#039;&#039; of the national peculiarities of the peoples.&amp;quot; Just think: to &amp;quot;preserve&amp;quot; such &amp;quot;national peculiarities&amp;quot; of the Transcaucasian Tatars as self-flagellation at the festival of &#039;&#039;Shakhsei-Vakhsei&#039;&#039;; or to &amp;quot;develop&amp;quot; such &amp;quot;national peculiarities&amp;quot; of the Georgians as the vendetta! ...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A demand of this character is in place in an outright bourgeois nationalist programme; and if it appears in the programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats it is because national autonomy tolerates such demands, it does not contradict them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if national autonomy is unsuitable now, it will be still more unsuitable in the future, socialist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer&#039;s prophecy regarding the &amp;quot;division of humanity into nationally delimited communities&amp;quot; is refuted by the whole course of development of modern human society. National barriers are being demolished and are falling, rather than becoming firmer. As early as the &#039;forties Marx declared that &amp;quot;national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing&amp;quot; and that &amp;quot;the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chapter II of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;The subsequent development of mankind, accompanied as it was by the colossal growth of capitalist production, the reshuffling of nationalities and the union of people within ever larger territories, emphatically confirms Marx&#039;s thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer&#039;s desire to represent socialist society as a &amp;quot;checkered picture of national unions of persons and territorial corporations&amp;quot; is a timid attempt to substitute for Marx&#039;s conception of socialism a revised version of Bakunin&#039;s conception. The history of socialism proves that every such attempt contains the elements of inevitable failure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no need to mention the kind of &amp;quot;socialist principle of nationality&amp;quot; glorified by Bauer, which, in our opinion, substitutes for the socialist principle of the &#039;&#039;class struggle&#039;&#039; the bourgeois&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;principle of nationality.&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; If national autonomy is based on such a dubious principle, it must be admitted that it can only cause harm to the working-class movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
True, such nationalism is not so transparent, for it is skilfully masked by socialist phrases, but it is all the more harmful to the proletariat for that reason. We can always cope with open nationalism, for it can easily be discerned. It is much more difficult to combat nationalism when it is masked and unrecognizable beneath its mask. Protected by the armour of socialism, it is less vulnerable and more tenacious. Implanted among the workers, it poisons the atmosphere and spreads harmful ideas of mutual distrust and segregation among the workers of the different nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this does not exhaust the harm caused by national autonomy. It prepares the ground not only for the segregation of nations, but also for breaking up the united labour movement. The idea of national autonomy creates the psychological conditions for the division of the united workers&#039; party into separate parties built on national lines. The breakup of the party is followed by the breakup of the trade unions, and complete segregation is the result. In this way the united class movement is broken up into separate national rivulets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Austria, the home of &amp;quot;national autonomy,&amp;quot; provides the most deplorable examples of this. As early as 1897 (the Wimberg Party Congress &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The Vienna Congress (or &#039;&#039;Wimberg&#039;&#039; Congress &amp;amp;#8211; after the name of the hotel in which it met) of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held June 6-12 1897.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) the once united Austrian Social-Democratic Party began to break up into separate parties. The breakup became still more marked after the Brünn Party Congress (1899), which adopted national autonomy. Matters have finally come to such a pass that in place of a united international party there are now six national parties, of which the Czech Social-Democratic Party will not even have anything to do with the German Social-Democratic Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But with the parties are associated the trade unions. In Austria, both in the parties and in the trade unions, the main brunt of the work is borne by the same Social-Democratic workers. There was therefore reason to fear that separatism in the party would lead to separatism in the trade unions and that the trade unions would also break up. That, in fact, is what happened: the trade unions have also divided according to nationality. Now things frequently go so far that the Czech workers will even break a strike of German workers, or will unite at municipal elections with the Czech bourgeois against the German workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It will be seen from the foregoing that cultural-national autonomy is no solution of the national question. Not only that, it serves to aggravate and confuse the question by creating a situation which favours the destruction of the unity of the labour movement, fosters the segregation of the workers according to nationality and intensifies friction among them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such is the harvest of national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== V. THE BUND, ITS NATIONALISM, ITS SEPARATISM ==&lt;br /&gt;
We said above that Bauer, while granting the necessity of national autonomy for the Czechs, Poles, and so on, nevertheless opposes similar autonomy for the Jews. In answer to the question, &amp;quot;Should the working class demand autonomy for the Jewish people?&amp;quot; Bauer says that &amp;quot;national autonomy cannot be demanded by the Jewish workers.&amp;quot; According to Bauer, the reason is that &amp;quot;capitalist society makes it impossible for them (the Jews – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) to continue as a nation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In brief, the Jewish nation is coming to an end, and hence there is nobody to demand national autonomy for. The Jews are being assimilated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This view of the fate of the Jews as a nation is not a new one. It was expressed by Marx as early as the &#039;forties, &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See K. Marx, &amp;quot;The Jewish Question,&amp;quot; 1906.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The reference is to an article by Karl Marx entitled &amp;quot;Zur Judenfrage&amp;quot; (&amp;quot;The Jewish Question&amp;quot;), published in 1844 in the &#039;&#039;Deutsch-Franz&amp;amp;ouml;sische Jahrb&amp;amp;uuml;cher&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in reference chiefly to the German Jews. It was repeated by Kautsky in 1903, &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See K. Kautsky, &amp;quot;The Kishinev Pogrom and the Jewish Question,&amp;quot; 1903.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in reference to the Russian Jews. It is now being repeated by Bauer in reference to the Austrian Jews, with the difference, however, that he denies not the present but the future of the Jewish nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bauer explains the impossibility of preserving the existence of the Jews as a nation by the fact that &amp;quot;the Jews have no closed territory of settlement.&amp;quot; This explanation, in the main a correct one, does not however express the whole truth. The fact of the matter is primarily that among the Jews there is no large and stable stratum connected with the land, which would naturally rivet the nation together, serving not only as its framework but also as a &amp;quot;national&amp;quot; market. Of the five or six million Russian Jews, only three to four per cent are connected with agriculture in any way. The remaining ninety-six per cent are employed in trade, industry, in urban institutions, and in general are town dwellers; moreover, they are spread all over Russia and do not constitute a majority in a single gubernia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, interspersed as national minorities in areas inhabited by other nationalities, the Jews as a rule serve &amp;quot;foreign&amp;quot; nations as manufacturers and traders and as members of the liberal professions, naturally adapting themselves to the &amp;quot;foreign nations&amp;quot; in respect to language and so forth. All this, taken together with the increasing re-shuffling of nationalities characteristic of developed forms of capitalism, leads to the assimilation of the Jews. The abolition of the &amp;quot;Pale of Settlement&amp;quot; would only serve to hasten this process of assimilation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question of national autonomy for the Russian Jews consequently assumes a somewhat curious character: autonomy is being proposed for a nation whose future is denied and whose existence has still to be proved!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, this was the curious and shaky position taken up by the Bund when at its Sixth Congress (1905) it adopted a &amp;quot;national programme&amp;quot; on the fines of national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two circumstances impelled the Bund to take this step.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first circumstance is the existence of the Bund as an organization of Jewish, and only Jewish, Social-Democratic workers. Even before 1897 the Social-Democratic groups active among the Jewish workers set themselves the aim of creating &amp;quot;a special Jewish workers&#039; organization.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Forms of the National Movement&#039;&#039;, etc., edited by Kastelyansky.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They founded such an organization in 1897 by uniting to form the Bund. That was at a time when Russian Social-Democracy as an integral body virtually did not yet exist. The Bund steadily grew and spread, and stood out more and more vividly against the background of the bleak days of Russian Social-Democracy.... Then came the 1900&#039;s. A &#039;&#039;mass&#039;&#039; labour movement came into being. Polish Social-Democracy grew and drew the Jewish workers into the mass struggle. Russian Social-Democracy grew and attracted the &amp;quot;Bund&amp;quot; workers. Lacking a territorial basis, the national framework of the Bund became too restrictive. The Bund was faced with the problem of either merging with the general international tide, or of upholding its independent existence as an extra-territorial organization. The Bund chose the latter course.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus grew up the &amp;quot;theory&amp;quot; that the Bund is &amp;quot;the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But to justify this strange &amp;quot;theory&amp;quot; in any &amp;quot;simple&amp;quot; way became impossible. Some kind of foundation &amp;quot;on principle,&amp;quot; some justification &amp;quot;on principle,&amp;quot; was needed. Cultural-national autonomy provided such a foundation. The Bund seized upon it, borrowing it from the Austrian Social-Democrats. If the Austrians had not had such a programme the Bund would have invented it in order to justify its independent existence &amp;quot;on principle.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, after a timid attempt in 1901 (the Fourth Congress), the Bund definitely adopted a &amp;quot;national programme&amp;quot; in 1905 (the Sixth Congress).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second circumstance is the peculiar position of the Jews as separate national minorities within compact majorities of other nationalities in integral regions. We have already said that this position is undermining the existence of the Jews as a nation and puts them on the road to assimilation. But this is an objective process. Subjectively, in the minds of the Jews, it provokes a reaction and gives rise to the demand for a guarantee of the rights of a national minority, for a guarantee against assimilation. Preaching as it does the vitality of the Jewish &amp;quot;nationality,&amp;quot; the Bund could not avoid being in favour of a &amp;quot;guarantee.&amp;quot; And, having taken up this position, it could not but accept national autonomy. For if the Bund could seize upon any autonomy at all, it could only be national autonomy, i.e., &#039;&#039;cultural-national&#039;&#039; autonomy; there could be no question of territorial-political autonomy for the Jews, since the Jews have no definite integral territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is noteworthy that the Bund from the outset stressed the character of national autonomy as a guarantee of the rights of national minorities, as a guarantee of the &amp;quot;free development&amp;quot; of nations. Nor was it fortuitous that the representative of the Bund at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, Goldblatt, defined national autonomy as &amp;quot;institutions which &#039;&#039;guarantee&#039;&#039; them (i.e., nations – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) complete freedom of cultural development.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Minutes of the Second Congress&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A similar proposal was made by supporters of the ideas of the Bund to the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way the Bund adopted the curious position of national autonomy for the Jews.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have examined above national autonomy in general. The examination showed that national autonomy leads to nationalism. We shall see later that the Bund has arrived at the same end point. But the Bund also regards national autonomy from a special aspect, namely, from the aspect of &#039;&#039;guarantees&#039;&#039; of the rights of national minorities. Let us also examine the question from this special aspect. It is all the more necessary since the problem of national minorities – and not of the Jewish minorities alone – is one of serious moment for Social-Democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, it is a question of &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;institutions which guarantee&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; nations &amp;quot;complete freedom of cultural development&amp;quot; (our italics – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what are these &amp;quot;institutions which guarantee,&amp;quot; etc.?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They are primarily the &amp;quot;National Council&amp;quot; of Springer and Bauer, something in the nature of a Diet for cultural affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But can these institutions guarantee a nation &amp;quot;complete freedom of cultural development&amp;quot;? Can a Diet for cultural affairs guarantee a nation against nationalist persecution?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bund believes it can.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But history proves the contrary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At one time a Diet existed in Russian Poland. It was a political Diet and, of course, endeavoured to guarantee freedom of &amp;quot;cultural development&amp;quot; for the Poles. But, far from succeeding in doing so, it itself succumbed in the unequal struggle against the political conditions generally prevailing in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A Diet has been in existence for a long time in Finland, and it too endeavours to protect the Finnish nationality from &amp;quot;encroachments,&amp;quot; but how far it succeeds in doing so everybody can see.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, there are Diets and Diets, and it is not so easy to cope with the democratically organized Finnish Diet as it was with the aristocratic Polish Diet. But the &#039;&#039;decisive&#039;&#039; factor, nevertheless, is not the Diet, but the general regime in Russia. If such a grossly Asiatic social and political regime existed in Russia now as in the past, at the time the Polish Diet was abolished, things would go much harder with the Finnish Diet. Moreover, the policy of &amp;quot;encroachments&amp;quot; upon Finland is growing, and it cannot be said that it has met with defeat....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If such is the case with old, historically evolved institutions – political Diets – still less will young Diets, young institutions, especially such feeble institutions as &amp;quot;cultural&amp;quot; Diets, be able to guarantee the free development of nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, it is not a question of &amp;quot;institutions,&amp;quot; but of the general regime prevailing in the country. If there is no democracy in the country there can be no guarantees of &amp;quot;complete freedom for cultural development&amp;quot; of nationalities. One may say with certainty that the more democratic a country is the fewer are the &amp;quot;encroachments&amp;quot; made on the &amp;quot;freedom of nationalities,&amp;quot; and the greater are the guarantees against such &amp;quot;encroachments.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Russia is a semi-Asiatic country, and therefore in Russia the policy of &amp;quot;encroachments&amp;quot; not infrequently assumes the grossest form, the form of pogroms. It need hardly be said that in Russia &amp;quot;guarantees&amp;quot; have been reduced to the very minimum.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Germany is, however, European, and she enjoys a measure of political freedom. It is not surprising that the policy of &amp;quot;encroachments&amp;quot; there never takes the form of pogroms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In France, of course, there are still more &amp;quot;guarantees,&amp;quot; for France is more democratic than Germany.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no need to mention Switzerland, where, thanks to her highly developed, although bourgeois democracy, nationalities live in freedom, whether they are a minority or a majority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the Bund adopts a false position when it asserts that &amp;quot;institutions&amp;quot; by themselves are able to guarantee complete cultural development for nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It may be said that the Bund itself regards the establishment of democracy in Russia as a &#039;&#039;preliminary&#039;&#039; condition for the &amp;quot;creation of institutions&amp;quot; and guarantees of freedom. But this is not the case. From the report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The Eighth Congress of the Bund was held in September 1910 in Lvov.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; it will be seen that the Bund thinks it can secure &amp;quot;institutions&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;on the basis of&#039;&#039; the present system in Russia, by &amp;quot;reforming&amp;quot; the &#039;&#039;Jewish community&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The community,&amp;quot; one of the leaders of the Bund said at this conference, &amp;quot;may become the nucleus of future cultural-national autonomy. Cultural-national autonomy is a form of self-service on the part of nations, a form of satisfying national needs. The community form conceals within itself a similar content. They are links in the same chain, stages in the same evolution.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund&#039;&#039;, 1911, p. 62.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On this basis, the conference decided that it was necessary to strive &amp;quot;for &#039;&#039;reforming&#039;&#039; the Jewish community and transforming it by &#039;&#039;legislative means&#039;&#039; into a secular institution,&amp;quot; democratically organized (our italics – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is evident that the Bund considers as the condition and guarantee not the democratization of Russia, but some future &amp;quot;secular institution&amp;quot; of the Jews, obtained by &amp;quot;reforming the Jewish community,&amp;quot; so to speak, by &amp;quot;legislative&amp;quot; means, through the Duma:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But we have already seen that &amp;quot;institutions&amp;quot; in themselves cannot serve as &amp;quot;guarantees&amp;quot; if the regime in the state generally is not a democratic one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what, it may be asked, will be - the position under a future democratic system? Will not special &amp;quot;cultural institutions which guarantee,&amp;quot; etc., be required even under democracy? What is the position in this respect in democratic Switzerland, for example? Are there special cultural institutions in Switzerland on the pattern of Springer&#039;s &amp;quot;National Council&amp;quot;? No, there are &#039;&#039;not.&#039;&#039; But do not the cultural interests of, for instance, the Italians, who constitute a minority there, suffer for that reason? One does not seem to hear that they do. And that is quite natural: in Switzerland all special cultural &amp;quot;institutions,&amp;quot; which supposedly &amp;quot;guarantee,&amp;quot; etc., are rendered superfluous by democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, impotent in the present and superfluous in the future – such are the &#039;&#039;institutions&#039;&#039; of cultural-national autonomy, and such is national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it becomes still more harmful when it is thrust upon a &amp;quot;nation&amp;quot; whose existence and future are open to doubt. In such cases the advocates of national autonomy are obliged to protect and preserve all the peculiar features of the &amp;quot;nation,&amp;quot; the bad as well as the good, just for the sake of &amp;quot;saving the nation&amp;quot; from assimilation, just for the sake of &amp;quot;preserving&amp;quot; it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That the Bund should take this dangerous path was inevitable. And it did take it. We are referring to the resolutions of recent conferences of the Bund on the question of the &amp;quot;Sabbath,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Yiddish,&amp;quot; etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social-Democracy strives to secure &#039;&#039;for all nations&#039;&#039; the right to use their own language. But that does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that &amp;quot;the rights of the &#039;&#039;Jewish&#039;&#039; language&amp;quot; (our italics – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;) be championed with &amp;quot;exceptional persistence,&amp;quot; and the Bund itself in the elections to the Fourth Duma declared that it would give &amp;quot;preference to those of them (i.e., electors) who undertake to defend the rights of the Jewish language.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not the &#039;&#039;general&#039;&#039; right of all nations to use their own language, but the &#039;&#039;particular&#039;&#039; right of the Jewish language, Yiddish! Let the workers of the various nationalities fight &#039;&#039;primarily&#039;&#039; for their own language: the Jews for Jewish, the Georgians for Georgian, and so forth. The struggle for the general right of all nations is a secondary matter. You do not have to recognize the right of all oppressed nationalities to use their own language; but if you have recognized the right of Yiddish, know that the Bund will vote for you, the Bund will &amp;quot;prefer&amp;quot; you.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in what way then does the Bund differ from the bourgeois nationalists?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social-Democracy strives to secure the establishment of a compulsory weekly rest day. But that does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that &amp;quot;by legislative means&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the Jewish proletariat should be guaranteed the right to observe their Sabbath and be relieved of the obligation to observe another day. &amp;quot;*&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is to be expected that the Bund will take another &amp;quot;step forward&amp;quot; and demand the right to observe all the ancient Hebrew holidays. And if, to the misfortune of the Bund, the Jewish workers have discarded religious prejudices and do not want to observe these holidays, the Bund with its agitation for &amp;quot;the right to the Sabbath,&amp;quot; will remind them of the Sabbath, it will, so to speak, cultivate among them &amp;quot;the Sabbatarian spirit. &amp;quot;...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Quite comprehensible, therefore, are the &amp;quot;passionate speeches&amp;quot; delivered at the Eighth Conference of the Bund demanding &amp;quot;Jewish hospitals,&amp;quot; a demand that was based on the argument that &amp;quot;a patient feels more at home among his own people,&amp;quot; that &amp;quot;the Jewish worker will not feel at ease among Polish workers, but will feel at ease among Jewish shopkeepers.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Preservation of everything Jewish, conservation of &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; the national peculiarities of the Jews, even those that are patently harmful to the proletariat, isolation of the Jews from everything non-Jewish, even the establishment of special hospitals – that is the level to which the Bund has sunk!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comrade Plekhanov was right a thousand times over when he said that the Bund &amp;quot;is adapting socialism to nationalism.&amp;quot; Of course, V. Kossovsky and Bundists like him may denounce Plekhanov as a &amp;quot;demagogue&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Nasha Zarya&#039;&#039;, No. 9-10, 1912, p. 120.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In an article entitled &amp;quot;Another Splitters&#039; Conference,&amp;quot; published in the newspaper &#039;&#039;Za Partiyu&#039;&#039;, October 2 (15) 1912, G. V. Plekhanov condemned the &amp;quot;August&amp;quot; Conference of the Liquidators and described the stand of the Bundists and Caucasian Social-Democrats as an adaptation of socialism to nationalism. Kossovsky, leader of the Bundists, criticized Plekhanov in a letter to the Liquidators&#039; magazine &#039;&#039;Nasha Zarya&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; – paper will put up with anything that is written on it – but those who are familiar with the activities of the Bund will easily realize that these brave fellows are simply afraid to tell the truth about themselves and are hiding behind strong language about &amp;quot;demagogy. &amp;quot;...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But since it holds such a position on the national question, the Bund was naturally obliged, in the matter of organization also, to take the path of segregating the Jewish workers, the path of formation of national curiae within Social-Democracy. Such is the logic of national autonomy!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And, in fact, the Bund did pass from the theory of &amp;quot;sole representation&amp;quot; to the theory of &amp;quot;national demarcation&amp;quot; of workers. The Bund demands that Russian Social-Democracy should &amp;quot;in its organizational structure introduce demarcation according to nationalities.&amp;quot; From &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; it made a &amp;quot;step forward&amp;quot; to the theory of &amp;quot;segregation.&amp;quot; It is not for nothing that speeches were made at the Eighth Conference of the Bund declaring that &amp;quot;national existence lies in segregation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Organizational federalism harbours the elements of disintegration and separatism. The Bund is heading for separatism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And, indeed, there is nothing else it can head for. Its very existence as an extra-territorial organization drives it to separatism. The Bund does not possess a definite integral territory; it operates on &amp;quot;foreign&amp;quot; territories, whereas the neighbouring Polish, Lettish and Russian Social-Democracies are international territorial collective bodies. But the result is that every extension of these collective bodies means a &amp;quot;loss&amp;quot; to the Bund and a restriction of its field of action. There are two alternatives: either Russian Social-Democracy as a whole must be reconstructed on the basis of national federalism – which will enable the Bund to &amp;quot;secure&amp;quot; the Jewish proletariat for itself; or the territorial-international principle of these collective bodies remains in force – in which case the Bund must be reconstructed on the basis of internationalism, as is the case with the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This explains why the Bund from the very beginning demanded &amp;quot;the reorganization of Russian Social-Democracy on a federal basis.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Concerning National Autonomy and the Reorganizatzon of Russian Social-Democracy on a Federal Basis&#039;&#039;, 1902, published by the Bund.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1906, yielding to the pressure from below in favour of unity, the Bund chose a middle path and joined Russian Social-Democracy. But how did it join? Whereas the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies joined for the purpose of peaceable joint action, the Bund joined for the purpose of waging war for a federation. That is exactly what Medem, the leader of the Bundists, said at the time:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;We are joining not for the sake of an idyll, but in order to fight. There is no idyll, and only Manilovs could hope for one in the near future. The Bund must join the Party armed from head to foot.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Nashe Slovo&#039;&#039;, No. 3, Vilno, 1906, p. 24.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be wrong to regard this as an expression of evil intent on Medem&#039;s part. It is not a matter of evil intent, but of the peculiar position of the Bund, which compels it to fight Russian Social-Democracy, which is built on the basis of internationalism. And in fighting it the Bund naturally violated the interests of unity. Finally, matters went so far that the Bund formally broke with Russian Social-Democracy, violating its statutes, and in the elections to the Fourth Duma joining forces with the Polish nationalists against the Polish Social-Democrats.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bund has apparently found that a rupture is the best guarantee for independent activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so the &amp;quot;principle&amp;quot; of organizational &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; led to separatism and to a complete rupture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a controversy with the old &#039;&#039;Iskra&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Iskra (The Spark)&#039;&#039; &amp;amp;#8211; The first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper founded by V. I. Lenin in 1900.&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; on the question of federalism, the Bund once wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;Iskra&#039;&#039; wants to assure us that federal relations between the Bund and Russian Social-Democracy are bound to weaken the ties between them. We cannot refute this opinion by referring to practice in Russia, for the simple reason that Russian Social-Democracy does not exist as a federal body. But we can refer to the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria, which assumed a federal character by virtue of the decision of the Party Congress of 1897.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That was written in 1902.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But we are now in the year 1913. We now have both Russian &amp;quot;practice&amp;quot; and the &amp;quot;experience of Social-Democracy in Austria.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What do they tell us?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us begin with &amp;quot;the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria.&amp;quot; Up to 1896 there was a united Social-Democratic Party in Austria. In that year the Czechs at the International Congress in London for the first time demanded separate representation, and were given it. In 1897, at the Vienna (Wimberg) Party Congress, the united party was formally Liquidated and in its place a federal league of six national &amp;quot;Social-Democratic groups&amp;quot; was set up. Subsequently these &amp;quot;groups&amp;quot; were converted into independent parties, which gradually severed contact with one another. Following the parties, the parliamentary group broke up – national &amp;quot;clubs&amp;quot; were formed. Next came the trade unions, which also split according to nationalities. Even the co-operative societies were affected, the Czech separatists calling upon the workers to split them up. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the words quoted from a brochure by Karl Vanek in &#039;&#039;Dokumente des Separatismus, p. 29&#039;&#039;. Karl Vanek was a Czech Social-Democrat who took an openly chauvinist and separatist stand.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; We will not dwell on the fact that separatist agitation weakens the workers&#039; sense of solidarity and frequently drives them to strike-breaking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus &amp;quot;the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria&amp;quot; speaks &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; the Bund and for the old &#039;&#039;Iskra.&#039;&#039; Federalism in the Austrian party has led to the most outrageous separatism, to the destruction of the unity of the labour movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen above that &amp;quot;practical experience in Russia&amp;quot; also bears this out. Like the Czech separatists, the Bundist separatists have broken with the general Russian Social-Democratic Party. As for the trade unions, the Bundist trade unions, from the outset they were organized on national lines, that is to say, they were cut off from the workers of other nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Complete segregation and complete rupture – that is what is revealed by the &amp;quot;Russian practical experience&amp;quot; of federalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not surprising that the effect of this state of affairs upon the workers is to weaken their sense of solidarity and to demoralize them; and the latter process is also penetrating the Bund. We are referring to the increasing collisions between Jewish and Polish workers in connection with unemployment. Here is the kind of speech that was made on this subject at the Ninth Conference of the Bund:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;... We regard the Polish workers, who are ousting us, as pogromists, as scabs; we do not support their strikes, we break them. Secondly, we reply to being ousted by ousting in our turn: we reply to Jewish workers not being allowed into the factories by not allowing Polish workers near the benches.... &#039;&#039;If we do not take this matter into our own hands the workers will follow others&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (our italics – &#039;&#039;J. St.)&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is the way they talk about solidarity at a Bundist conference.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You cannot go further than that in the way of &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;segregation.&amp;quot; The Bund has achieved its aim: it is carrying its demarcation between the workers of different nationalities to the point of conflicts and strike-breaking. And there is no other course: &amp;quot;If we do not take this matter into our own hands &#039;&#039;the workers will follow others....&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disorganization of the labour movement, demoralization of the Social-Democratic ranks – that is what the federalism of the Bund leads to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the idea of cultural-national autonomy, the atmosphere it creates, has proved to be even more harmful in Russia than in Austria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VI. THE CAUCASIANS, THE CONFERENCE OF THE LIQUIDATORS ==&lt;br /&gt;
We spoke above of the waverings of one section of the Caucasian Social-Democrats who were unable to withstand the nationalist &amp;quot;epidemic.&amp;quot; These waverings were revealed in the fact that, strange as it may seem, the above-mentioned Social-Democrats followed in the footsteps of the Bund and proclaimed cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regional autonomy for the Caucasus as a whole and cultural-national autonomy for the nations forming the Caucasus – that is the way these Social-Democrats, who, incidentally, are linked with the Russian Liquidators, formulate their demand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Listen to their acknowledged leader, the not unknown &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Everybody knows that the Caucasus differs profoundly from the central gubernias, both as regards the racial composition of its population and as regards its territory and agricultural development. The exploitation and material development of such a region require local workers acquainted with local peculiarities and accustomed to the local climate and culture. All laws designed to further the exploitation of the local territory should be issued locally and put into effect by local forces. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the central organ of Caucasian self-government should extend to legislation on local questions.... Hence, the functions of the Caucasian centre should consist in the passing of laws designed to further the economic exploitation of the local territory and the material prosperity of the region.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the Georgian newspaper &#039;&#039;Chveni Tskhovreba (Our Life)&#039;&#039;, No. 12, 1912. &#039;&#039;Chveni Tskhovreba&#039;&#039; was a daily paper published by the Georgian Mensheviks in Kutais from July 1 to 22 1912.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus – regional autonomy for the Caucasus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we abstract ourselves from the rather confused and incoherent arguments of &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039;, it must be admitted that his conclusion is correct. Regional autonomy for the Caucasus, within the framework of a general state constitution, which &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039; does not deny, is indeed essential because of the peculiarities of its composition and its conditions of life. This was also acknowledged by the Russian Social-Democratic Party, which at its Second Congress proclaimed &amp;quot;regional self-government for those border regions which in respect of their conditions of life and the composition of their population differ from the regions of Russia proper.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When Martov submitted this point for discussion at the Second Congress, he justified it on the grounds that &amp;quot;the vast extent of Russia and the experience of our centralized administration point to the necessity and expediency of regional self-government for such large units as Finland, Poland, Lithuania and the Caucasus.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it follows that regional &#039;&#039;self-government is&#039;&#039; to be interpreted as regional &#039;&#039;autonomy.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039; goes further. According to him, regional autonomy for the Caucasus covers &amp;quot;only one aspect of the question.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;So far we have spoken only of the material development of local life. But the economic development of a region is facilitated not only by economic activity but also by spiritual, cultural activity.&amp;quot;... &amp;quot;A culturally strong nation is strong also in the economic sphere. &amp;quot;... &amp;quot;But the cultural development of nations is possible only in the national languages.&amp;quot;... &amp;quot;Consequently, all questions connected with the native language are questions of national culture. Such are the questions of education! the judicature, the church, literature, art, science, the theatre, etc. If the material development of a region unites nations, matters of national culture disunite them and place each in a separate sphere. Activities of the former kind are associated with a definite territory.&amp;quot;... &amp;quot;This is not the case with matters of national culture. These are associated not with a definite territory but with the existence of a definite nation. The fate of the Georgian language interests a Georgian, no matter where he lives. It would be a sign of profound ignorance to say that Georgian culture concerns only the Georgians who live in Georgia. Take, for instance, the Armenian church. Armenians of various localities and states take part in the administration of its affairs. Territory plays no part here. Or, for instance, the creation of a Georgian museum interests not only the Georgians of Tiflis, but also the Georgians of Baku, Kutais, St. Petersburg, etc. Hence, the administration and control of all affairs of national culture must be left to the nations concerned. we proclaim in favour of cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nationalities.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the Georgian newspaper &#039;&#039;Chveni Tskhovreba&#039;&#039;, No. 12, 1912.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In short, since culture is not territory, and territory is not culture, cultural-national autonomy is required. That is all &#039;&#039;N.&#039;&#039; can say in the latter&#039;s favour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall not stop to discuss again national-cultural autonomy in general; we have already spoken of its objectionable character. We should like to point out only that, while being unsuitable in general, cultural-national autonomy is also meaningless and nonsensical in relation to Caucasian conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And for the following reason:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cultural-national autonomy presumes more or less developed nationalities, with a developed culture and literature. Failing these conditions, autonomy loses all sense and becomes an absurdity. But in the Caucasus there are a number of nationalities each possessing a primitive culture, a separate language, but without its own literature; nationalities, moreover, which are in a state of transition, partly becoming assimilated and partly continuing to develop. How is cultural-national autonomy to be applied to them? What is to be done with such nationalities? How are they to be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot; into separate cultural-national unions, as is undoubtedly implied by cultural-national autonomy?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is to be done with the Mingrelians, the Abkhasians, the Adjarians, the Svanetians, the Lesghians, and so on, who speak different languages but do not possess a literature of their own? To what nations are they to be attached? Can they be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot; into national unions? Around what &amp;quot;cultural affairs&amp;quot; are they to be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is to be done with the Ossetians, of whom the Transcaucasian Ossetians are becoming assimilated (but are as yet by no means wholly assimilated) by the Georgians, while the Cis-Caucasian Ossetians are partly being assimilated by the Russians and partly continuing to develop and are creating their own literature? How are they to be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot; into a single national union?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To what national union should one attach the Adjarians, who speak the Georgian language, but whose culture is Turkish and who profess the religion of Islam? Shall they be &amp;quot;organized&amp;quot; separately from the Georgians &#039;&#039;with regard to religious affairs&#039;&#039; and together with the Georgians&#039;&#039;with regard to other cultural affairs?&#039;&#039; And what about the Kobuletians, the Ingushes, the Inghilois?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What kind of autonomy is that which excludes a whole number of nationalities from the list?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, that is not a solution of the national question, but the fruit of idle fancy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us grant the impossible and assume that our &#039;&#039;N.&#039;s&#039;&#039; national-cultural autonomy has been put into effect. Where would it lead to, what would be its results? Take, for instance, the Transcaucasian Tatars, with their minimum percentage of literates, their schools controlled by the omnipotent mullahs and their culture permeated by the religious spirit.... It is not difficult to understand that to &amp;quot;organize&amp;quot; them into a cultural national union would mean to place them under the control of the mullahs, to deliver them over to the tender mercies of the reactionary mullahs, to create a new stronghold of spiritual enslavement of the Tatar masses to their worst enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But since when have Social-Democrats made it a practice to bring grist to the mill of the reactionaries?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Could the Caucasian Liquidators really find nothing better to &amp;quot;proclaim&amp;quot; than the isolation of the Transcaucasian Tatars within a cultural-national union which would place the masses under the thraldom of vicious reactionaries?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, that is no solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The national question in the Caucasus can be solved only &#039;&#039;by drawing the belated nations and nationalities into the common stream of a higher culture.&#039;&#039; It is the only progressive solution and the only solution acceptable to Social-Democracy. Regional autonomy in the Caucasus is acceptable because it would draw the belated nations into the common cultural development; it would help them to cast off the shell of small nation insularity; it would impel them forward and facilitate access to the benefits of higher culture. Cultural-national autonomy, however, acts in a diametrically opposite direction, because it shuts up the nations within their old shells, binds them to the lower stages of cultural development and prevents them from rising to the higher stages of culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way national autonomy counteracts the beneficial aspects of regional autonomy and nullifies it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is why the mixed type of autonomy which combines national-cultural autonomy and regional autonomy as proposed by &#039;&#039;N&#039;&#039;. is also unsuitable. This unnatural combination does not improve matters but makes them worse, because in addition to retarding the development of the belated nations it transforms regional autonomy into an arena of conflict between the nations organized in the national unions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus cultural-national autonomy, which is unsuitable generally, would be a senseless, reactionary undertaking in the Caucasus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So much for the cultural-national autonomy of &#039;&#039;N&#039;&#039;. and his Caucasian fellow-thinkers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whether the Caucasian Liquidators will take &amp;quot;a step forward&amp;quot; and follow in the footsteps of the Bund on the question of organization also, the future will show. So far, in the history of Social-Democracy federalism in organization always preceded national autonomy in programme. The Austrian Social-Democrats introduced organizational federalism as far back as 1897, and it was only two years later (1899) that they adopted national autonomy. The Bundists spoke distinctly of national autonomy for the first time in 1901, whereas organizational federalism had been practiced by them since 1897.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Caucasian Liquidators have begun from the end, from national autonomy. If they continue to follow in the footsteps of the Bund they will first have to demolish the whole existing organizational edifice, which was erected at the end of the &#039;nineties on the basis of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, easy though it was to adopt national autonomy, which is still not understood by the workers, it will be difficult to demolish an edifice which it has taken years to build and which has been raised and cherished by the workers of all the nationalities of the Caucasus. This Herostratian undertaking has only to be begun and the eyes of the workers will be opened to the nationalist character of cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== * * * ===&lt;br /&gt;
While the Caucasians are settling the national question in the usual manner, by means of verbal and written discussion, the All-Russian Conference of the Liquidators has invented a most unusual method. It is a simple and easy method. Listen to this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Having heard the communication of the Caucasian delegation to the effect that... it is necessary to demand national-cultural autonomy, this conference, while expressing no opinion on the merits of this demand, declares that such an interpretation of the clause of the programme which recognizes the right of every nationality to self-determination does not contradict the precise meaning of the programme.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, first of all they &amp;quot;express no opinion on the merits&amp;quot; of the question, and then they &amp;quot;declare.&amp;quot; An original method....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And what does this original conference &amp;quot;declare&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That the &amp;quot;demand&amp;quot; for national-cultural autonomy &amp;quot;does not contradict the precise meaning &amp;quot;of the programme, which recognizes the right of nations to self-determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us examine this proposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The clause on self-determination speaks of the rights of nations. According to this clause, nations have the right not only of autonomy but also of secession. It is a question of &#039;&#039;political&#039;&#039; self-determination. Whom did the Liquidators want to fool when they endeavoured to misinterpret this right of nations to political self-determination, which has long been recognized by the whole of international Social-Democracy?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Or perhaps the Liquidators will try to wriggle out of the situation and defend themselves by the sophism that cultural-national autonomy &amp;quot;does not contradict&amp;quot; the rights of nations? That is to say, if all the nations in a given state agree to arrange their affairs on the basis of cultural-national autonomy, they, the given sum of nations, are fully entitled to do so and nobody may &#039;&#039;forcibly impose&#039;&#039; a different form of political life on them. This is both new and clever. Should it not be added that, speaking generally, a nation has the right to abolish its own constitution, replace it by a system of tyranny and revert to the old order on the grounds that the nation, and the nation alone, has the right to determine its own destiny? We repeat: in this sense, neither cultural-national autonomy nor any other kind of nationalist reaction &amp;quot;contradicts&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;the rights of nations.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is that what the esteemed conference wanted to say?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, not that. It specifically says that cultural-national autonomy &amp;quot;does not contradict,&amp;quot; not the rights of nations, but &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme&#039;&#039;. The point here is the programme and not the rights of nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And that is quite understandable. If it were some nation that addressed itself to the conference of Liquidators, the conference might have directly declared that the nation has a right to cultural-national autonomy. But it was not a nation that addressed itself to the conference, but a &amp;quot;delegation&amp;quot; of Caucasian Social-Democrats – bad Social-Democrats, it is true, but Social-Democrats nevertheless. And they inquired not about the rights of nations, but whether cultural-national autonomy contradicted the &#039;&#039;principles of Social-Democracy&#039;&#039;, whether it did not &amp;quot;contradict&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme of Social-Democracy.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;the rights of nations and &amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme of Social-Democracy&#039;&#039;are not one and the same thing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Evidently, there are demands which, while they do not contradict the rights of nations, may yet contradict &amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example. The programme of the Social-Democrats contains a clause on freedom of religion. According to this clause any group of persons &#039;&#039;have the right&#039;&#039; to profess any religion they please: Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox Church, etc. Social-Democrats will combat all forms of religious persecution, be it of members of the Orthodox Church, Catholics or Protestants. Does this mean that Catholicism, Protestantism, etc., &amp;quot;do not contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme? No, it does not. Social-Democrats will always protest against persecution of Catholicism or Protestantism; they will always defend the right of nations to profess any religion they please; but at the same time, on the basis of a correct understanding of the interests of the proletariat, they will carry on agitation against Catholicism, Protestantism and the religion of the Orthodox Church in order to achieve the triumph of the socialist world outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And they will do so just because there is no doubt that Protestantism, Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox Church, etc., &amp;quot;contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme, i.e., the correctly understood interests of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same must be said of self-determination. Nations have a right to arrange their affairs as they please; they have a right to preserve any of their national institutions, whether beneficial or harmful – nobody can (nobody has a right to!) &#039;&#039;forcibly&#039;&#039; interfere in the life of a nation. But that does not mean that Social-Democracy will not combat and agitate against the harmful institutions of nations and against the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary, it is the duty of Social-Democracy to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that the nations may arrange their affairs in the way that will best correspond to the interests of the proletariat. For this reason Social-Democracy, while fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, will at the same time agitate, for instance, against the secession of the Tatars, or against cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nations; for both, while not contradicting the &#039;&#039;rights&#039;&#039; of these nations, do contradict &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme&#039;&#039;, i.e., the interests of the Caucasian proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, &amp;quot;the rights of nations&amp;quot; and the &amp;quot;precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme are on two entirely different planes. Whereas the &amp;quot;precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme expresses the interests of the proletariat, as scientifically formulated in the programme of the latter, the rights of nations may express the interests of any class – bourgeoisie, aristocracy, clergy, etc. – depending on the strength and influence of these classes. On the one hand are the &#039;&#039;duties&#039;&#039; of Marxists, on the other the &#039;&#039;rights&#039;&#039; of nations, which consist of various classes. The rights of nations and the principles of Social-Democracy may or may not &amp;quot;contradict&amp;quot; each other, just as, say, the pyramid of Cheops may or may not contradict the famous conference of the Liquidators. They are simply not comparable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it follows that the esteemed conference most unpardonably muddled two entirely different things. The result obtained was not a solution of the national question but an absurdity, according to which the rights of nations and the principles of Social-Democracy &amp;quot;do not contradict&amp;quot; each other, and, consequently; every demand of a nation may be made compatible with the interests of the proletariat; consequently, no demand of a nation which is striving for self-determination will &amp;quot;contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They pay no heed to logic....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was this absurdity that gave rise to the now famous resolution of the conference of the Liquidators which declares that the demand for national-cultural autonomy &amp;quot;does not contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it was not only the laws of logic that were violated by the conference of the Liquidators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By sanctioning cultural-national autonomy it also violated its duty to Russian Social-Democracy. It most definitely did violate &amp;quot;the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme, for it is well known that the Second Congress, which adopted the programme, &#039;&#039;emphatically repudiated&#039;&#039;cultural-national autonomy. Here is what was said at the congress in this connection:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Goldblatt&#039;&#039; (Bundist): ...1 deem it necessary that special institutions be set up to protect the freedom of cultural development of nationalities, and I therefore propose that the following words be added to § 8: &#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;and the creation of institutions which will guarantee them complete freedom of cultural development.&#039;&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (This, as we know, is the Bund&#039;s definition of cultural-national autonomy. – &#039;&#039;J. St.&#039;&#039;)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Martynov&#039;&#039; pointed out that general institutions must be so constituted as to protect particular interests also. It is impossible to create a &#039;&#039;special&#039;&#039; institution to guarantee freedom for cultural development of the nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Yegorov:&#039;&#039; On the question of nationality we can adopt only negative proposals, i.e., we are opposed to all restrictions upon nationality. But we, as Social-Democrats, are not concerned with whether any particular nationality will develop as such. That is a spontaneous process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Koltsov:&#039;&#039; The delegates from the Bund are always offended when their nationalism is referred to. Yet the amendment proposed by the delegate from the Bund is of a purely nationalist character. We are asked to take purely offensive measures in order to support even nationalities that are dying out.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the end &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Goldblatt&#039;s amendment was rejected by the majority, only three votes being cast for it.&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus it is clear that the conference of the Liquidators did &amp;quot;contradict the precise meaning&amp;quot; of the programme. It violated the programme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Liquidators are now trying to justify themselves by referring to the Stockholm Congress, which they allege sanctioned cultural-national autonomy. Thus, V. Kossovsky writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;As we know, according to the agreement adopted by the Stockholm Congress, the Bund was allowed to preserve its national programme (pending a decision on the national question by a general Party congress). This congress recorded that national-cultural autonomy at any rate does not contradict the general Party programme.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Nasha Zarya&#039;&#039;, No. 9-10, 1912, p. 120.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the efforts of the Liquidators are in vain. The Stockholm Congress never thought of sanctioning the programme of the Bund – it merely agreed to leave the question open for the time being. The brave Kossovsky did not have enough courage to tell the whole truth. But the facts speak for themselves. Here they are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;An amendment was moved by Galin: &#039;The question of the national programme &#039;&#039;is left open in view of the fact that it is not being examined&#039;&#039; by the congress.&#039; (&#039;&#039;For&#039;&#039; – 50 votes, &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; – 32.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Voice:&#039;&#039; What does that mean – open?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Chairman:&#039;&#039; When we say that the national question is left open, it means that the Bund may maintain its decision on this question until the next congress&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Nashe SIovo&#039;&#039;, No. 8, 1906, p. 53.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (our italics. – &#039;&#039;J. St&#039;&#039;.).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As you see, the congress even did &amp;quot;not examine&amp;quot; the question of the national programme of the Bund – it simply left it &amp;quot;open,&amp;quot; leaving the Bund itself to decide the fate of its programme until the next general congress met. In other words, the Stockholm Congress avoided the question, expressing no opinion on cultural-national autonomy one way or another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The conference of the Liquidators, however, most definitely undertakes to give an opinion on the matter, declares cultural-national autonomy to be acceptable, and endorses it in the name of the Party programme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference is only too evident.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, in spite of all its artifices, the conference of the Liquidators did not advance the national question a single step.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All it could do was to squirm before the Bund and the Caucasian national-Liquidators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VII. THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN RUSSIA ==&lt;br /&gt;
It remains for us to suggest a positive solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We take as our starting point that the question can be solved only in intimate connection with the present situation in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Russia is in a transitional period, when &amp;quot;normal,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;constitutional&amp;quot; life has not yet been established and when the political crisis has not yet been settled. Days of storm and &amp;quot;complications&amp;quot; are ahead. And this gives rise to the movement, the present and the future movement, the aim of which is to achieve complete democratization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is in connection with this movement that the national question must be examined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the complete democratization of the country is the &#039;&#039;basis&#039;&#039; and condition for the solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When seeking a solution of the question we must take into account not only the situation at home but also the situation abroad. Russia is situated between Europe and Asia, between Austria and China. The growth of democracy in Asia is inevitable. The growth of imperialism in Europe is not fortuitous. In Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out towards foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap labour and new fields of investment. But this leads to external complications and to war. No one can assert that the Balkan War &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The reference is to the first Balkan War, which broke out in October 1912 between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro on the one hand, and Turkey on the other.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is the end and not the beginning of the complications. It is quite possible, therefore, that a combination of internal and external conditions may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia may find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create obstacles in such cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it follows that Russian Marxists cannot dispense with the right of nations to self-determination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;the right of self-determination is an essential element&#039;&#039; in the solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further. What must be our attitude towards nations which for one reason or another will prefer to remain within the framework of the whole?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that cultural-national autonomy is unsuitable. Firstly, it is artificial and impracticable, for it proposes artificially to draw into a single nation people whom the march of events, real events, is disuniting and dispersing to every corner of the country. Secondly, it stimulates nationalism, because it leads to the viewpoint in favour of the &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; of people according to national curiae, the &amp;quot;organization&amp;quot; of nations, the &amp;quot;preservation&amp;quot; and cultivation of &amp;quot;national peculiarities&amp;quot; – all of which are entirely incompatible with Social-Democracy. It is not fortuitous that the Moravian separatists in the Reichsrat, having severed themselves from the German Social-Democratic deputies, have united with the Moravian bourgeois deputies to form a single, so to speak, Moravian &amp;quot;kolo.&amp;quot; Nor is it fortuitous that the separatists of the Bund have got themselves involved in nationalism by acclaiming the &amp;quot;Sabbath&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Yiddish.&amp;quot; There are no Bundist deputies yet in the Duma, but in the Bund area there is a clerical-reactionary Jewish community, in the &amp;quot;controlling institutions&amp;quot; of which the Bund is arranging, for a beginning, a &amp;quot;get-together&amp;quot; of the Jewish workers and bourgeois. Such is the logic of cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;national&#039;&#039; autonomy does not solve the problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, is the way out?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only correct solution is &#039;&#039;regional&#039;&#039; autonomy, autonomy for such crystallized units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The advantage of regional autonomy consists, first of all, in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction bereft of territory, but with a definite population inhabiting a definite territory. Next, it does not divide people according to nations, it does not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary, it breaks down these barriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind, division according to classes. Finally; it makes it possible to utilize the natural wealth of the region and to develop its productive forces in the best possible way without awaiting the decisions of a common centre – functions which are not inherent features of cultural-national autonomy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;regional autonomy is an essential element&#039;&#039; in the solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, not one of the regions constitutes a compact, homogeneous nation, for each is interspersed with national minorities. Such are the Jews in Poland, the Letts in Lithuania, the Russians in the Caucasus, the Poles in the Ukraine, and so on. It may be feared, therefore, that the minorities will be oppressed by the national majorities. But there will be grounds for fear only if the old order continues to prevail in the country. Give the country complete democracy and all grounds for fear will vanish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is proposed to bind the dispersed minorities into a single national union. But what the minorities want is not an artificial union, but real rights in the localities they inhabit. What can such a union give them &#039;&#039;without&#039;&#039; complete democratization? On the other hand, what need is there for a national union &#039;&#039;when there is&#039;&#039; complete democratization?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is it that particularly agitates a national minority?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A minority is discontented not because there is no national union but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass of itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A minority is discontented not because there is no artificial union but because it does not possess its own schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A minority is discontented not because there is no national union, but because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;equal rights of nations in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential element&#039;&#039; in the solution of the national question. Consequently, a state law based on complete democratization of the country is required, prohibiting all national privileges without exception and every kind of disability or restriction on the rights of national minorities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That, and that alone, is the real, not a paper guarantee of the rights of a minority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One may or may not dispute the existence of a logical connection between organizational federalism and cultural-national autonomy. But one cannot dispute the fact that the latter creates an atmosphere favouring unlimited federalism, developing into complete rupture, into separatism. If the Czechs in Austria and the Bundists in Russia began with autonomy, passed to federation and ended in separatism, there can be no doubt that an important part in this was played by the nationalist atmosphere that is naturally generated by cultural-national autonomy. It is not fortuitous that national autonomy and organizational federalism go hand in hand. It is quite. understandable. Both demand demarcation according to nationalities. Both presume organization according to nationalities. The similarity is beyond question. The only difference is that in one case the population as a whole is divided, while in the other it is the Social-Democratic workers who are divided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know where the demarcation of workers according to nationalities leads to. The disintegration of a united workers&#039; party, the splitting of trade unions according to nationalities, aggravation of national friction, national strikebreaking, complete demoralization within the ranks of Social-Democracy – such are the results of organizational federalism. This is eloquently borne out by the history of Social-Democracy in Austria and the activities of the Bund in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only cure for &#039;this is organization on the basis of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To unite locally the workers of all nationalities of Russia into &#039;&#039;single, integral&#039;&#039; collective bodies, to unite these collective bodies into a &#039;&#039;single&#039;&#039; party – such is the task.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It goes without saying that a party structure of this kind does not preclude, but on the contrary presumes, wide autonomy for the &#039;&#039;regions&#039;&#039; within the single integral party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The experience of the Caucasus proves the expediency of this type of organization. If the Caucasians have succeeded in overcoming the national friction between the Armenian and Tatar workers; if they have succeeded in safeguarding the population against the possibility of massacres and shooting affrays; if in Baku, that kaleidoscope of national groups, national conflicts are now no longer possible, and if it has been possible to draw the workers there into the single current of a powerful movement, then the international structure of the Caucasian Social-Democracy was not the least factor in bringing this about.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The type of organization influences not only practical work. It stamps an indelible impress on the whole mental life of the worker. The worker lives the life of his organization, which stimulates his intellectual growth and educates him. And thus, acting within his organization and continually meeting there comrades from other nationalities, and side by side with them waging a common struggle under the leadership of a common collective body, he becomes deeply imbued with the idea that workers are &#039;&#039;primarily&#039;&#039; members of one class family, members of the united army of socialism. And this cannot but have a tremendous educational value for large sections of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the international type of organization serves as a school of fraternal sentiments and is a tremendous agitational factor on behalf of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this is not the case with an organization on the basis of nationalities. When the workers are organized according to nationality they isolate themselves within their national shells, fenced off from each other by organizational barriers. The stress is laid not on what is &#039;&#039;common&#039;&#039; to the workers but on what distinguishes them from each other. In this type of organization the worker &#039;&#039;is primarily&#039;&#039; a member of his nation: a Jew, a Pole, and so on. It is not surprising that &#039;&#039;national&#039;&#039;federalism in organization inculcates in the workers a spirit of national seclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the national type of organization is a school of national narrow-mindedness and stagnation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we are confronted by two &#039;&#039;fundamentally&#039;&#039; different types of organization: the type based on international solidarity and the type based on the organizational &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; of the workers according to nationalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Attempts to reconcile these two types have so far been vain. The compromise rules of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party drawn up in Wimberg in 1897 were left hanging in the air. The Austrian party fell to pieces and dragged the trade unions with it. &amp;quot;Compromise&amp;quot; proved to be not only utopian, but harmful. Strasser is right when he says that &amp;quot;separatism achieved its first triumph at the Wimberg Party Congress.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See his &#039;&#039;Der Arbeiter und die Nation&#039;&#039;, 1912.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The same is true in Russia. The &amp;quot;compromise&amp;quot; with the federalism of the Bund which took place at the Stockholm Congress ended in a complete fiasco. The Bund violated the Stockholm compromise. Ever since the Stockholm Congress the Bund has been an obstacle in the way of union of the workers locally in a &#039;&#039;single&#039;&#039; organization, which would include workers of all nationalities. And the Bund has obstinately persisted in its separatist tactics in spite of the fact that in 1907 and in 1908 Russian Social-Democracy repeatedly demanded that unity should at last be established. from below among the workers of all nationalities. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the resolutions of the Fourth (the &amp;quot;Third All-Russian&amp;quot;) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., held November 5-12 1907, and of the Fifth (the &amp;quot;All-Russian 1908&amp;quot;) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., held December 21-27 1908 (January 3-9 1909). (See &#039;&#039;Resolutions and Decisions of the C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums&#039;&#039;, Vol. 1, 6th Russ. ed., 1940, pp. 118-31.)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Bund, which began with organizational national autonomy, in fact passed to federalism, only to end in complete rupture, separatism. And by breaking with the Russian Social-Democratic Party it caused disharmony and disorganization in the ranks of the latter. Let us recall the Jagiello affair, &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;E. J. Jagiello &amp;amp;#8211; A member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.) was elected to the Fourth State Duma for Warsaw as a result of a bloc formed by the Bund, the Polish Socialist Party and the bourgeois nationalists against the Polish Social-Democrats. By a vote of the seven Menshevik Liquidators against the six Bolsheviks, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma adopted a resolution that Jagiello be accepted as a member of the group.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; for instance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The path of &amp;quot;compromise&amp;quot; must therefore be discarded as utopian and harmful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One thing or the other: &#039;&#039;either&#039;&#039; the federalism of the Bund, in which case the Russian Social-Democratic Party must re-form itself on a basis of &amp;quot;demarcation&amp;quot; of the workers according to nationalities; &#039;&#039;or&#039;&#039; an international type of organization, in which case the Bund must reform itself on a basis of territorial autonomy after the pattern of the Caucasian, Lettish and Polish Social-Democracies, and thus make possible the direct union of the Jewish workers with the workers of the other nationalities of Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no middle course: principles triumph, they do not &amp;quot;compromise.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, &#039;&#039;the principle of international solidarity of the workers is an essential element&#039;&#039; in the solution of the national question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Vienna,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
January 1913&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
K. Stalin&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Joseph Stalin]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:This_Soviet_World&amp;diff=65668</id>
		<title>Library:This Soviet World</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:This_Soviet_World&amp;diff=65668"/>
		<updated>2024-04-19T23:40:30Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Import the rest of the book&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=This Soviet World|author=Anna Louise Strong|written in=1936|publisher=Henry Holt and Company, Inc.|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/this-soviet-world/}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== ON INTERPRETING A WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A leading Russian Communist said to me a year ago “The mind of our people is changing so fast under the conditions of socialism that it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to speak to the rest of the world. We find it harder to understand them, and they us.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We who go back and forth between the Soviet world and the world of capitalism—not only in space from New York to Moscow but also in spirit from intimate life with Soviet people to intimate life in America—feel keenly this difficulty. Important words like freedom, democracy, dictatorship have different meanings on different sides of the border. The Soviet world is sharply conscious of planning its future; the capitalist world is always arriving where it hadn’t intended. And Soviet officials are not always helpful in making their acts intelligible; they often assume that only deliberate malice can doubt them and that the only needed explanation is the appropriate citation from Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To explain the swiftly growing Soviet world to that other world out of which it was born is a task that becomes steadily more complex. For if its outer achievements are every year more able to speak for themselves, its inner life more and diverges from that of capitalism in a hundred subtle ways.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Berlin station a giant sign greets me with three-foot letters: “Think of your hair!” My mind flashes back to the world I have left. What are Soviet people thinking of? The Stakhanov drive, the Moscow city plan, Marie and her sugar beets, the conquest of the north. And hair and perfume, O yes, of course. Everyone knows of the rising standard of living and firmly believes in a cultural life—more bath-tubs, radios, books and dramatic clubs and doubtless more hair. But their individuality is expressed not by possessions and polish but by the various ways in which men create. Dynamic is the word; their civilization is dynamic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The regimentation of life by property is my next shock in the capitalist world. The obscene phrases “damages for alienation of affections” or “a $50,000 man” or the remark: “I do it only for the money that is in it”—what degradation they imply of human life and work! I see able engineers spending creative power on little models in a government relief job just to keep alive. I see a journal of high standard, the life-work of an able editor submerged by a new owner’s wish for quick profit. Lives are conditioned in the Soviet world also, by trends and sages of organization, but not by the profits of a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference appears in the use of pronouns. People under capitalism are contrasting “I” and “they.” “Too bad it couldn’t have been on my land,” a man remarks of a California oil-strike. Soviet folk would be hailing “our new oil-wells”; to them the idea of a private oil-well is already as quaint as a private postal system. I note a remark about American unemployment: “If it gets any worse, they’ll have to do something.” Who is this ultimate, uncontrollable “they”? The term betrays the class society of which the speakers are unconscious; they are waiting for some boss to act. To hear a debate: “Is America going fascist?” and think how much less passively Soviet folk would word it. “Shall we go fascist? No. Then exactly how shall we prevent it?” Soviet folk say “we” of one-sixth of the earth’s surface. Uzbek cotton-pickers, toiling under the sun of Central Asia, say: “We are conquering the Arctic; we rescued the Chelyuskinites.” Ukrainian farmers who never went up in an airplane talk of “our stratosphere records” and “the loss of our Maxim Gorky airplane” as they take up collections to build ten new ones. But even Mrs. Roosevelt asks me: “Are Russian peasants getting more reconciled to accepting direction?” I feel the hopelessness of language as I answer: “No, they are learning better to organize and direct themselves.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Americans often ask me whether Russians are not naturally more altruistic than Americans, more fit for communism, they imply. No, it is something quite different. Russians at the time of Revolution were more medieval than Americans, which means “naturally” more petty, unreliable, inefficient, given to bargaining and cheating. Traits of the Asiatic market-place were widespread and occasionally still annoy the visitor. But these traits are disappearing under the fact of joint ownership, which brings identity of individual with community good.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Joint possession of the country’s resources and productive mechanism is the economic reality which unifies Soviet life and makes it dynamic. It is this that washes out the antagonism between personal and public good, that makes men say “we.” It is this that makes men conscious planners of the future; for owners plan but non-owners can only fight or drift. The chief quality of Soviet civilization is the sense that the world is “ours,” to seize, understand and make over.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This Soviet world is my theme; I give scant space to those fast disintegrating forces that fought it. I tell not the “whole truth,” for truth is never “whole”; there are always at least two truths in conflict: the truth that is dying and the truth that is coming into existence. American Tories who intrigued for King George had their truth also, but it remains only as piquant sauce to romance; the truth of the Continental armies remained to build the modern republic. They themselves recalled the frozen feet of Valley Forge less as suffering than as heroism; their raids on hungry farms passed into memory not as banditry but as necessity and daring. History’s greatest gift to victors is that not only they, but their truth survives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet I do no injustice to those many lives which in greater or less degree were wrenched or broken by the coming of the new Soviet order. Even for them the new years obliterate the past. They also change to seek their new future in the new system; Lives broken in terms of property are being remade in terms of work. Saboteurs reform and win posts of honor; kulaks come back from exile to factories and farms; children have an equal start now regardless of fathers. For this war differs from other battles in that all men, even the conquered foes, are absorbed into the ranks of the conquerors—joint heirs to all the fruits of victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A. L. S.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART I: MEN MAKE THE SOVIET WORLD ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER I: THE PLAN FOR REMAKING THE WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“The philosophers have only interpreted the world; our business is to change it.”|Karl Marx|Theses on Feuerbach}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whenever I ask myself what brings increasing visitors to Moscow, what they want here and what they find, and why the eyes of the world turn more and more to the Soviet Union with a questing hope that hardly yet dares call itself belief, there flashes into my mind the remark made to me in 1930 at Dnieprostroy by the young and disillusioned son of a Wall Street millionaire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dnieprostroy in those days was the first of the famous giants of the new Soviet Russia, “the largest power dam in the world.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Since then surpassed by the Boulder Dam.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hour after hour we climbed the cliffs and ravines of its mighty construction. We fled from screaming sirens that warned of blasting rock. We saw great stone-crushing plants, saw-mills, locomotive repair shops, temporary power station—all sizable works harnessed to the task of making a greater power station which should in turn serve plants a hundred times their scope. We visited the “socialist city” where discussion raged between advocates of individual cottages or big apartment houses for the future town. We saw hurriedly constructed club houses where thousands of workers busily grabbed knowledge—reading, writing, political economy and the technique of their new job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Night fell. We stood on the shore of the yet unharnessed river, destined to rise to bury those high banks beneath a man-impounded lake. We far down at the great sweep of electric brilliance that had already shattered the age-old darkness of the Ukrainian steppe. It was then that my companion said: “I think that Dnieprostroy has answered the question that brought me to Russia.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What question?” I asked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Whether the world is to be changed by trying one at a time to improve human beings or by changing the social environment that makes human beings.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the pause that followed the sounds of construction came to us incessantly, rising from the bowels of earth and filling the horizon. The short, sharp puffs of engines, the roar of cliffs torn asunder, the ceaseless beat of mills grinding stone into concrete, the rasp of drills eating down into river granite. Sharpened by night and softened by distance, they blended into a mighty symphony—music of man, the builder, subduing, the earth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dark beyond the circling lights lay Hortitz Island, in ancient days the last stand of free-booting bandit chieftains against oppressors. We remembered the husky peasant girl from the island whom we had seen in overalls that morning, gang-boss over twelve men who excavated rock by explosions of liquid air. Dnieprostroy had changed her in a few months from a farm servant to a “brigadier.” We remembered the blacksmith whom we had asked in the glare of foundry fires how he liked his work and who burst forth with fiery will: “You know, we’re going to finish her in 1932”—a simple workman pushing ahead by one year the estimate of Hugh L. Cooper’s world-experienced engineers.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The workman’s estimate won out. The dam was finished in 1932 a year ahead of schedule.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We recalled how competitions between workers of right and left bank drove the dam ahead, doubling the concrete-laying estimates of the Americans by force of newly awakened will. Signals night by night across the raging torrent told in red and green lights the day’s total, celebrated over-fulfillment of plan by a great red star. Night by night, week by week each bank fought to keep its red star shining. We remembered motion pictures, dramas, concerts, lectures which brought the city’s culture to these thousands who had come from the scattered farms of the Ukraine. The fine new polytechnic institute where workers chosen from the river-gangs were being turned in forty classrooms into engineers. We saw on the high bank the homes of the American consultants, who understood better than the Russians the technique of the great job but were eternally puzzled by its spirit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yes, Dnieprostroy gave the answer to my companion’s question. Dnieprostroy was a new form of production under a new social system. It was remaking individuals by wholesale.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Increasingly in the past five years Americans have come to the Soviet Union, scientists, engineers, artists, economists all bent on their own pursuits, dogmatic or bewildered tourists, seeking proof of an old belief or material for a new one. Especially since the crash of 1929 smashed the world which was “inevitably getting better,” they have come, fleeing from the ruins of that earthquake to learn what, if anything, the Soviet Union offers. By no means all of them put their question as clearly as did my young companion; by no means all interpret so swiftly the essence of the first construction job they see. But the question he asked is basically what brings most of them, an ancient quest of man which has troubled philosophers no less than baffled tourists: “Can our world be remade? And how to remake it?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problem is especially pressing upon the American middle class of today, which has seen its old world taken from it in ways that it hardly understands. The independent small property owners, mostly farmers, who formed a hundred years ago 80 per cent of the American people except in the slave South, bequeathed to their descendants ideals of democracy and freedom, the “liberty and equality of men owning their own means of livelihood.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Lewis Corey: “Crisis of the Middle Class” &#039;&#039;The Nation&#039;&#039;, Aug. 14, 1935.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But large scale industry, developing through a century, wiped out the small enterprisers, increased the number of salaried employees and made the farmer dependent on banks and markets, thus changing America to a “nation of hired workers.” Only 12 per cent of the people live by ownership of their own property, in place of 80 per cent a century ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The myth of property remained long after the reality had vanished. Millions of these salaried people still felt hat they owned something—no longer a store, a small workshop, an unencumbered farm, but savings in stocks, bonds, insurance—which lifted them somewhat above the ranks of laboring hands. Crashingly the world economic crisis destroyed this illusion. As if to emphasize how little control these small people had over their own property, the value of their liquid wealth shrank from twenty-seven billion dollars in 1929 to four billion in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Figures from Robers R. Doane on liquid wealth of persons with incomes under $5,000. Quoted by Corey.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of the middle class were thrown into the same abyss of ruin with millions of wage-workers; they wait together on bread-lines, study together the government relief programs, hunt together for a boss. For all of them alike, as long as the capitalist world remains, most put their trust in bosses, someone who owns and will give them access to the means of production and of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Their situation is the more distressing because for most of our Western world the past hundred years has been what John Strachey aptly calls the “century of the great hope.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;John Strachey, &#039;&#039;The Menace of Fascism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of men became better fed, better housed, better clothed through the industrial revolution which took production out of the home workshop into the factory and knit together the ends of earth by railroad, steamship, telegraph. Especially America—where the arrival of the new machines and technical methods coincided with a continent-wide expansion into lands of vast wealth, developed by energetic oilers from all nations for the first time unhampered by any remnants of feudalism the belief in inevitable progress and increasing prosperity was both a conscious and unconscious national faith. The little red schoolhouse bade every boy aspire to be president. “Go west, young man.” . . . “Don’t be a bear on America,” said successful plutocrats. But far deeper than these conscious preachings spread the atmosphere of determined optimism which made every man who was not a good booster seem subtly immoral to his friends. Did not the great lands of America, the efficient industries of America, the productive energy of America, offer the basis for a good standard of life for everyone—an “American standard”? It was easy to prove that they did—and do!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What happened to that faith in inevitable progress? If it still survives in some circles as a despairing habit, elsewhere it has been replaced by belief in inevitable doom. “Inevitable drift to fascism,” “inevitable twilight of the West,” “the old standard of prosperity can never return,” are phrases common on lips that not long since hailed inevitable advance. Others begin a frenzied search into the faiths of past ages, to know if elsewhere than with us abides the truth. These learn that belief in the inevitability of progress has never been a universal faith. It has been confined to definite periods of economic advancement, and to certain nations within those periods or certain classes within nations. Did not whole centuries of the Middle Ages view the world as an essentially unchanging garden of human souls from which religion culled a few for heaven, leaving the rest for hell? Even today do not hundreds of millions of people—those great suppressed races of the East—find life’s processes so fundamentally evil that their essential faith is Buddhism in which Nothingness is bliss?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even in our West, as capitalism decays into fascism, there arise new denials of the inevitability of progress. Ideals of the past—the Roman Empire, the Germanic gods, the feudal Britain featured by fascist-striving novels—gild with emotional glamor the tenets of fascism: that science and machine production are evil, that democracy, peace and the conquest of poverty are futile dreams of a decadent society, that murderous war is man’s noblest end. For fascism is the last stand of a desperate capitalism which can no longer use the fruits of science and machine production, which dare no longer permit either peace or democracy, since it must brutally refuse to its victims that abolition of poverty which is already technically possible in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Can human reason find a way to reorganize human society—a way which human wills can follow? Must we go backing blindly into the future, cheered now by faith in inevitable progress, damned now by faith in inevitable doom, and claiming from some supernatural world a just and rational balancing of the unjust, irrational chaos found in this? Or can that continuous, collective application of human thought known as science, which we have learned to take as our best, though still unperfected guide in rationalizing and controlling subhuman phenomena, be expanded to rationalize and control our human destiny? Can man master the machines he has made which today threaten increasingly to enslave him? Can he subdue to his will those tremendously productive forces which his science and technical knowledge have released, and which seem adequate to abolish poverty, yet which at present give increasing unemployment, economic crises, wars?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are asking, in other words, can men master destiny? Are all those gleams of human reason which have given us increasing dominion over material phenomena but will-o’-the-wisps, luring to a swamp which will engulf us the more blackly for the false, brief light they gave? Or are they gleams of dawn that may brighten into an ever-increasing daylight, in which not only a few isolated phenomena but the whole of man’s own nature and his organized society can be planned by human reason and carried through by human wills?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No less than this is the search that brings men over the seas to the Soviet Union. For if to millions in our Western world the century now passing was the century of the great hope, there are other millions in two great half-continents uniting Europe and Asia, who look upon it rather as the century of the great plan. The reference is not to that Five-Year Plan which the Soviet Union made famous, but to a plan far more comprehensive which prepares and includes all five-year plans in all lands and all the future. A plan for remaking the world drawn up eighty-eight years ago on instructions from a London congress of working-men of many nations, and issued in 1848 under the title &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the work of the German economists Frederick Engels and Karl Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; is usually thought of as the defiance flung at the world by an illegal revolutionary party of hunted people. So it was. But it was also man’s first attempt to apply science to the analysis of human society in order to draw up a plan for remaking the world. Previous attempts to analyze the world were exercises of philosophers, not directed towards change. Previous attempts to change the world were confined to threats or exhortations to secure specific conversions or reforms. Many Utopian pictures had existed of how beautiful society might be when once made over. But the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; tried to answer the question: How can the thing be done? Born in the middle years of that century in which the scientific method was consciously remaking the material world, it sought to analyze the elements of human society, the nature and cause of the changes we see in history, for the purpose of producing social change in a desired direction. That is why it claims to be Scientific Socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The followers of Marx see in him the genius who combined the three chief currents of thought of the nineteenth century—classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and French revolutionary doctrines. The philosophic basis of Marxism is “dialectics,” which views every reality, whether of nature, the mind, or society, as in process of continual change through the development and clash of “inner contradictions.” This theory applied to the study of history shows how economic, political and social systems are constantly changing, at times slowly, at times by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions. American capitalism of the Civil War period is not the capitalism of today. The democracy of the New England town-meeting is not the democracy of the modern imperial nation. They may be called by the same but names deceive; the thing changes even while you look at it to disdain or admire. Even your disdain and admiration changes, the meaning of your words and concepts. What was true, right, desirable yesterday may not be true, right, desirable tomorrow. Systems have their day and cease to be.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is there any law in this change? Is there in this constant interaction and conflict of systems and ideas anything basic, changing which will change the rest? “The economic structure,” says Marx, is “the real foundation. . . . The mode of production . . . determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Preface to a &#039;&#039;Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Marx the fundamental thing about any human society is not its system of ideas or religions, nor the form of government nor the nature of its family life. These things are important but derivative. They are determined by the ways in which human beings get food, clothing, shelter, by the stage of their advance and the tools they use in these fundamental operations. In a world whose economic structure fails to reward honesty and altruism, a Marxist would not spend his efforts preaching these virtues, but in creating an economic system where honesty really prospered, where each man’s success must be build on the success, rather than the ruin, of others. The new economic system would make new people; under it, education in the new ideals would be swift and hopeful.&lt;br /&gt;
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How then do economic systems change? Marx finds the key in his theory of “class struggle.” Man’s science and invention create new ways of production, and these in turn create new “classes” of human beings, i.e., groups of people who have different and conflicting relations to production. Between these classes a struggle goes on around the ownership of the process of production, which is the means of life. “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 10-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus at different stages of human history new classes arise from new ways of working and the struggle between them produces social change. Modern capitalism has not done away with class antagonisms, but it has this distinctive feature—it has simplified them. “Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into . . . two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat,”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; those who live by owning and those who can live only by selling their labor power, by seeking a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between these two remain for a time the middle classes, distraught survivors of those small property owners and independent craftsmen who once embodied the demand for private property against a feudal past. They suffer deeply under advancing capitalism which dislodges them steadily and painfully into the ranks of hired hands. They struggle against their fate, but their strivings are confused, for their instinctive desire is to go back to small scale property. Their cry is to “share the wealth,” to start over again that old society of small owners which led to the present-day monopolies and which would lead to them again if it could be revived. The right to private property was once revolutionary pledge of freedom, but this also has changed with the passing of history. Private property in farm plots and hand tools freed serfs from feudal masters; private property in steel mills creates a new slavery. Even small ownership today, wherever it survives or comes into being, is at the mercy of large scale finance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who owns the world? That is the basic question conditioning all hopes of social change. What is wrong with the world today, according to Marxists, is private ownership of the great productive processes which are socially operated. The way out is not backward to subsistence farms and handicrafts it is forward to social ownership. Not “share the wealth,” but jointly owned wealth, jointly organized by and for all who work. Only thus can the great machines be subjugated; only thus can science and modern technique produce plenty for all mankind. Only thus can the present vision of men into owners and workers be abolished, a division which is wrecking the world by social strife and international war. It must be superseded by one united class of people—joint worker-owners of the world. From this economic equality, all other forms of equality will grow. First a stage of socialism where men have equal access to labor and receive according to their work. Then when the habits of human beings have been changed by joint ownership, will come the stage of communism in which men freely co-operate in work according to their abilities and receive according to their needs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who will bring about this change of ownership? Clearly not the present private owners: their interests lie the other way. Nor can the disintegrating middle classes achieve it, except insofar as they come to understand that their future lies with the workers. Only one class of people can develop the will to carry through this difficult long epoch of change—the working class which is bound to the mighty mechanism of modern production, mastering it yet enslaved by it. Joint ownership is their only path to freedom; when they understand this, they will accomplish it. They are thus the “really revolutionary class,” in whom social ownership of modern production is a living need and can become a flaming passion carrying humanity forward to a higher stage.&lt;br /&gt;
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The task of every Marxist is to help them understand, to make them “class-conscious,” aware of their power and function as creators of social progress. Millions of Americans resent the very idea of classes, and are indignant at “inflaming class-consciousness” where it does not yet exist. But Marxian classes are not epithets inciting to riot; they are categories in a scientific analysis. Marxists say that unless human society is to go down in a catastrophe of slavery, war and ruin, men must own their tools and the wealth which these create; that tools and wealth have grown too complexly social to be owned individually and must therefore be socially owned; and that only the working class can develop the fighting will to seize the power of ownership and through it remake society. The less the workers are organized, the less conscious they are of their power and function, the more will the coming changes in human society be protracted, painful and blind. The more conscious the workers are of their great task in history, the better they are organized, the more they are able to rally around them the middle classes, the swifter will be the change and the less will be the human suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two generations of economists in many countries developed the Marxian theory. Lenin built on it the Bolshevik Party which in 1917 carried through the Russian Revolution. Stalin is honored today by Bolsheviks not only as statesman and organizer, but as the far-seeing analyst and guider of social change, who continues and develops the scientific method of Marx, Engels, Lenin. One-sixth of the world today is being remade according to the Marxian program—the first consciously devised pattern that men ever applied to society as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER II: THE PARTY OF REVOLUTION ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“To distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident did the first socialist revolution take place in Russia. The World War imposed great strains on many countries and the chain of world imperialism broke at its weakest link.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hillquit called the Russian revolution an “historical accident,” since it occurred in a backward peasant land. Norman Thomas on the contrary holds it occurred just because the Russians were so backward that they would endure a dictatorship such as no other people would stand. &amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;  Stalin says: “The objective conditions for the revolution exist throughout the whole system of imperialist world economy, which is an integral unit.” Answering the theory that the revolution must come first “where the proletariat forms the majority, where culture is more advanced, where there is more democracy,” he says: “No, not necessarily where industry is most developed; it will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the of world imperialism at its weakest link.” From Stalin’s Lectures to Sverdlov Students.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; More than any other land, Russia was tormented by war and ravenous for peace. Tsardom, that hideous hangover from the Middle Ages, had lost all moral authority and was hated by the entire people. For decades revolution had been brewing in Russia.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx noted this as far back as 1877 in his Letter to Zorge. See &#039;&#039;Letters of Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The World War added the last unbearable pressure and the explosion came.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not least among the factors which made the revolution possible and helped determine its form was the existence of the Bolshevik Party.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Today called Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was no spontaneous creation, born at the moment of revolt; for fourteen years it had been consciously welded by painstaking thought and desperate struggle. Its traditions indeed went back much further. The whole last half of the nineteenth century advanced thinkers in Russia, under the oppression of tsardom, had sought eagerly for the effective revolutionary path. Through fifty years of torment, sacrifice, heroism, incredible energy, careful study, they had tested many methods. They had tried to educate and organize the peasantry; they had tried the terrorist assassination of tyrants. They had failed. They had checked their failures by the history of other nations and a section of them had come to Marxism as the correct program for remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Marx furnished the general program, it was Lenin who developed the theory and tactics, proletarian revolution, and built the organization for the seizure of power. Bolshevism, as a trend of political thought and a political party, exists since 1903, when the Social-Democratic Party of Russia split into groups known as Bolsheviks (majority) and Mensheviks (minority), which correspond to Communists and Social-Democrats today in other countries. The older leaders wanted to “widen” the Party, to take in all “supporters” and give them all a voice in determining the Party’s program. Lenin, though recognizing that any social change must rely on wide masses, not only of workers but of many other “allies,” insisted that membership in the Party itself “must be given a narrow definition to distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin’s Account of Second Congress, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, II&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To organize and train the Party of Revolution became thenceforth the central task and the greatest achievement of that world-renowned leader, Lenin, who gave his whole life to the study and practice of the science of political power. Power was to him no mere personal achievement of office; it was the organized lifting of the human race one stage forward in history. He studied how to ride the turbulent upheaval which the conflicts in modern society would inevitably produce, how to prepare and lead men for the seizure of the state and the creation of a new order, how at last to organize them for the conquest of nature and of their own destiny. This was to Lenin the science of power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting with the Marxian thesis that the working class is the group in modern society which can be organized to take power and to build a new order, Lenin created for this class a “vanguard” of leaders. They must be men of intelligence, will, daring; yet they must act in a disciplined manner, reinforcing a common direction. They must make the revolution a life-long profession, steadily studying the economic, political and social forces of the society in which they live. They must apply this knowledge in action. They must take active part not only in elections and political movements, but in strikes, trade union work, demonstrations, distribution of literature and all the other prosaic or dangerous activities through which the working class becomes organized and conscious of its power. They must keep close to the workers, learning from them and assisting them, and win the right to lead by the confidence they inspire.&lt;br /&gt;
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How are such leaders to be found among the great hordes of the dispossessed and discontented? How, if found, are they to be welded into a disciplined, fighting force? Lenin had no illusions; he knew that the mass of exploited men who are squeezed out by the dislocations of capitalism, and who turn in hope or despair towards communism, contains many fools, knaves, fanatics and self-pitying failures as well as men of intelligence and will. He foresaw a long period of difficult struggle, in which men fit to lead would be tested by fire, men capable of learning would be trained by experience, and others would weed themselves out by their follies. Lenin himself gave most of his years to the slow work of building up and training a not very large but thoroughly tested Party, which could give leadership when the hour of revolution came. I have met simple workers to whom Lenin devoted hours of individual teaching, and who remember today the exact phrases he used with them forty years ago. The making of real Communists able to lead the masses is a long and costly process.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nothing could be more absurd than the two contradictory views of Communists promulgated today by their opponents. They are usually pictured as planless inciters to violence and riot, people who have a crazy desire for chaos, in the hope that something vaguely called communism may somehow ensue. A more sophisticated view, to which no less a person than Sinclair Lewis falls victim in &#039;&#039;It Can’t Happen Here&#039;&#039;, portrays them as brainless sheep required to act in blind obedience to the orders of their superiors for the sake of discipline. Neither of these types could possibly lead a successful strike, much less a revolution. A communist who increased risks by recklessness would be early eliminated; a man who only took orders would be useless as a leader. Communists must learn the difficult combination of intelligence with daring; they must learn to act together but they must all know why.&lt;br /&gt;
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“What we build cannot be built by passive people,” said one of the secretaries of the Russian Communist Party to me. “We all had strong convictions; we fought for them and went to jail for them,” said another veteran Bolshevik. “Then in jail we fought with our imprisoned comrades over details of past policies, studying and learning from past errors. Often we found that the mistake of a few words in our theory had cost us a year in prison.” Again and again groups which could not agree split off from the others. Lenin made no effort to detain them; he distinguished sharply between those allies with whom co-operation was possible for a longer or shorter period, and the smaller group which would stick through everything. Thus was built up that Party of men who had placed their lives in each other’s hands so often that they could rely on each other with absolute assurance, not through blind submission but through a habit of mutual consultation and swift acceptance of joint decisions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most famous picture of the ideal Communist is given by Krupskaia, widow of Lenin, in an article entitled: “What a Communist Should Be Like.” “First of all a Communist is a social person, with strongly developed social instincts, who desires that all people should be well and be happy. Second, he must understand what is happening about him in the world—the mechanism of the existing régime, the history of the growth of human society, the history of economic development, of the growth of property, the division of classes, the growth of state forms. He must clearly picture whither society is developing—to a régime where the happiness of some will not be based on the slavery of others and where there will be no compulsion except strongly developed social instincts. And the Communists must clear the road, as you clear a path in the wilderness, to hasten its coming.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Third, the Communist must know how to organize creatively. If he is a medical worker, for instance, he must know medicine, then the history of medicine in Russia and other lands, then the Communist approach to the problem of medicine, i.e., how to organize wide masses to create from the ranks of the toilers a powerful sanitary organization in the cause of health. He must know not only what Communism is and what is coming, what his own job in it may be and his approach to the masses. Fourthly, his personal life must be submitted to and guided by the interests of Communism. No matter how much he regrets giving up the comforts and ties of home, he must if necessary cast all aside and go into danger wherever assigned. . . . Body and soul he must be devoted to the interests of the toiling masses, of Communism.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who have risen high in the Communist Party are characterized by these qualities listed by Krupskaia. They are usually reticent about their deepest motives; it is not the thing to gush one’s devotion. One learns of their qualities chiefly through others. Krupskaia, speaking to intimate Party friends at the funeral of her husband Lenin, found the completest expression in the words: “Lenin deeply loved the people.” Radek tells how Stalin, answering greetings sent him by the Party on his fiftieth birthday, “said something which, in the mouth of such a reserved man, sounded as though it came from the very depths of his being. Stalin said that he was ready to shed his blood ‘drop by drop’ for the proletariat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Radek, &#039;&#039;Problems of Soviet Literature&#039;&#039;, 144.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki&amp;quot;&amp;gt;This seems to refer to Radeks speech at the Soviet Writers Congress in August 1934. A copy is available on [https://www.marxists.org/archive/radek/1934/sovietwritercongress.htm marxists.org]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who would lead the masses in changing the world by the Marxian method must obviously strive for constant growth in two directions: in ever-deepening understanding of social and economic forces and in ever-widening participation in workers’ struggles. Perhaps the first thing that strikes an outsider is the amount of time which all Communists devote to the study of Marxian theory. Managers of great steel plants and busy county officials under the pressure of harvest will find time, at unearthly hours like eleven at night or seven in the morning, for their study of Marxism or their class in current events, deeming these things as essential as their other pressing work.&lt;br /&gt;
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Visitors to the Soviet Union are not infrequently amazed to find that a Party secretary in a rural township can discuss international affairs with an assurance and abundance of detail which few foreign editors of an American metropolitan news-paper can show, and will handle statistics and history with a good deal more ease than the “Brain Trust.” A prominent American politician once expressed to me doubts of the accuracy of the published interview of H. G. Wells with Stalin. Stalin’s references to the Cromwellian revolution seemed to him too detailed to have been available for conversation. “People,” he said, “don’t talk that way” But any Communist in the Soviet Union who did not know the essentials of Cromwellian revolution, and of other historic revolutions from which he is expected to learn, would join a class to “raise his ideological level.” A Communist who allowed himself to become as ignorant of world affairs as is the average American politician would be ruthlessly “cleaned out” of the Party, or told to join the group of “sympathizers” to learn what he has to know.&lt;br /&gt;
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The emotional vagueness which is a feature of all capitalist political platforms, and which is indeed desired in order to win wide support without being too definite, is the exact opposite of Communist statement. The Communists even seem to be painfully definite, to “take refuge in formulæ,” or to split hairs over the exact interpretation of phrases. All science and technical knowledge, however, advance by just this splitting of hairs to find the exact chemical formula which produces the alloy or the mathematical relation which strengthens the arch of the bridge; discussions in any congress of physiologists or electricians are full of this “dull theory” without which no scientific progress can be attained. Communists take Marxism as such a science; to rise to eminence among them demands years, even decades, of close and penetrating study of social forces. This is no dogma to be learned once for all; it is a developing body of thought, constantly applied to and affected by new conditions. By the very theory of dialectics, these forces are changing. The speeches of Lenin and Stalin and other Party leaders never deal in stirring oratory or spell-binding generalities but in close and careful analysis. Stalin would no more attempt to sway a Communist congress by “force of personality” expressed in brilliant oratory and colorful phrasing, than Edison would have expected to convince a group of American engineers of the reliability of some new formula by emotional words. One such attempt would ruin either an Edison or a Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Communists must not only be scientific; they must also learn to work with the masses. In this they face a special difficulty; the man who has thought for years in Marxian categories may find it as hard to explain them to simple people as an electrical engineer would find it to explain the theory of turbines to men in a candle-lighted world. This is more serious for the Communist than for the engineer; for the latter can build his turbines without help from the candle-lighted individuals, but the Communist cannot make a revolution without the people. Fortunately actions may speak as well as words, and all Communists are required to do active work which brings them in touch with the masses. When intellectuals apply for Party membership, it is a common practice to give them some tasks around a factory, such as teaching night classes in Russian language, civics or Marxism, or practical assistance in trade union work. After a year or two of such testing, the opinion of the workers is taken as to whether the candidate is fit to be a Party member.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any Communist Party at any stage in its development in any country considers persons who cannot co-operate with workers’ movements as unfit for Party membership. In the Soviet Union where the rank and file of non-Party workers have already considerable knowledge of the Party’s ideals, it has become a common thing for them to assist in helping the Party in its selection of members. Two hundred thousand workers who joined the Party some two years ago were actually nominated by the non-Party workers, through repeated meetings and discussions as to what persons in their ranks should be recommended for Party membership. From time to time the Party “cleans out” its membership, and this is always done at open meetings to which all workers of the given institution are invited. Each Communist in the institution must give before this public an extended account of his life and activities, submit to and answer all criticism, and prove before the assembled workers his fitness to remain in the “leading Party.” Members may be cleaned out not only as “hostile elements, double-dealers, violators of discipline, degenerates, career-seekers, self-seekers, morally degraded persons” but even for being merely “passive,” for having failed to keep learning and growing in knowledge and authority among the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
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People admitted to the Communist Party—this admission demands a period of study and probation—must give considerable time to unpaid “Party work” i.e., the various tasks of strengthening the organization and organizing the masses around it. Having chosen as the chief purpose of their life the achievement of the socialist revolution, they must learn how to build a joint program. They take part in the discussions from which arise the decisions of the Party and they are expected to carry out these decisions energetically but never blindly. For they must know why the decisions are made; they must understand the Party Line and be able to promote it without bothering other people for orders. They must have strong opinions and fight for them; but they must know when to fight and when to yield. If they cannot learn this, they will find themselves outside the Party, thrown out either as “passive” or as “opposition.” It is not an easy lesson; there have been many political mortalities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Party members must learn to decide and act collectively, not only in determining the general line, but also in deciding their own work in it. They must consult and accept their comrades’ judgment as to where they themselves can be of most use. In the Civil War Communists were expected to be the first to volunteer for every battle-front. In the Soviet Union today they are first to be sent to difficult posts in industry and farming. They may be torn from jobs in which they are successful and sent to work which they hate; they must there-upon cease to hate it and do it well as an important task. I know of a high official who was taken from a train by a telegram sent through an obscure local secretary in a town through which he passed, and ordered to return for a different assignment. But no order is ever the command of a superior officer; it is the decision of a group of comrades with whom one has chosen to work. This is the famous Party discipline; known as “iron” discipline but also as “conscious” discipline, for it is based not on passive submission but on understanding participation and collective choice. The reward for this discipline is conscious participation in the making of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communists expect not only to lead the masses, but to learn from them in a constant interaction. They must “organize the proletariat”; they must “guide it in its class struggle.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They must “see ahead of the working class,” and be the “experienced general staff” which “every army at war must have if it is to avoid certain defeat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 88-89, Cooperative Publishers, Moscow.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But they do not consider themselves a separate caste of leaders, but a “vanguard” intimately a part of the working class they lead. They modify their program to grant temporarily some “backward” demand of the masses, or to include permanently some new form or method which the masses invent. An example of the first was Lenin’s response to the peasants’ demands for splitting up the land, a backward step taken to secure peasant support and “in order that they may educate themselves by fulfilling their desires.” An example of the second was the adoption of “soviets” in government and “artels” in farming, neither of which forms had been foreseen by the Party until they arose. It is the working class which must dictate and not the Party; in 1925 when Zinoviev argued for dictatorship by the Party, Stalin fought against this “narrow point of view,” saying that the confidence between the masses of the people and the Party must not be destroyed by any peculiar Party rights, “because in the first place, the Party might be mistaken, and even if it were not, the masses might take some time to see that it was right.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 51.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How can three million Communists lead one hundred and seventy million people? Because they are not alien to those millions, but are the most energetic part of them, whose capacity to lead has been repeatedly tested and recognized by the others. Millions of non-Party people today in the Soviet Union work loyally, even enthusiastically under Party direction, yet do not venture to call themselves Communists. One of my best friends was a woman who gave her life to the care of homeless children, and who said to me once: “My life began with the Soviet Power; it alone gave me the chance to fight for children. . . . I care more for the Party’s success than for anything in life.” Yet when her fellow-workers voted her “worthy of being a Communist,” she declined the honor, knowing she could not honestly join while she disagreed on one or two points in the Party program.&lt;br /&gt;
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A fifty-two-year-old wheelwright, Rosenberg, whom I met in the Jewish Autonomous Territory of Birobidjan, had courageously dismantled his home in the Ukraine and taken his family of ten to pioneer in the Far East. He had fought through incredible hardships to build a collective industry which made carts; he was now a member of the city government giving much unpaid time to civic work. “When the Party decided to develop Birobidjan,” he explained, “I knew it would be a great future. It goes higher and higher to the building of socialism. I myself can’t build it, but if I work and others work, we’ll build it.” Few could have expressed the Communist goal more sincerely than Rosenberg, yet he did not think of joining the Party. “I don’t know enough,” he said. “I am just studying the first political courses. Serious reading is not so easy for me. I am fifty-two years old.”&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Far North fourteen years ago I met Rimpalle, who had risked his life to run the Finnish border and “help the Revolution.” He organized the first quarries and mines in a hungry Arctic land; he created a trade union, a co-operative and a night-school for illiterate natives of the forests. He made $100,000 for the state that first summer and got for himself—it was the time of War Communism—only “rations of potatoes and good, fat gravy and one resoling of my boots.” Rimpalle said to me: “It’s a useful job. Up here so near the border and the propaganda of the White Finns, we needed to have an industry to give food to the people.” He was already a candidate for the Communist Party, expecting to be admitted to full membership in a few months.&lt;br /&gt;
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These examples show what is required of Communists. Devoted activity under Communist direction, such as the Jewish wheelwright gave, is not enough. Ninety per cent allegiance, such as the social worker offered, is not enough. Nor was it enough for Rimpalle to work self-sacrificingly to increase socially owned wealth; he must understand consciously the political purpose of his work. I have in the course of fifteen years in the Soviet Union met an occasional Communist who was a grafter, and many more who were stubborn bureaucrats and unenlightened fanatics. But I have also seen how the Party throws out dead wood—not always accurately—and renews itself from the working class it leads.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such is the organized Party which carried through the Revolution and which today welds into shape the great masses of the Soviet Union, with its vast distances, its once backward populations, its hundred and eighty-two nationalities, its foes on all borders. It succeeds by choosing its members with discrimination, by keeping them firmly organized, forever studying and continuously on the job.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communist Party does not expect to last forever. “When classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat dies out, the Party also will die out.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It sees its task as belonging to a definite stage in human society, with a beginning, a development and an end. No other political party in the world has this type of historic consciousness, this supreme confidence; all others live from election to election, and make no long time plans. The Communist Party considers that it has a specific job in history and confidently expects to stay in power for the time required to carry it through.&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER III: THE DICTATORSHIP ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The conquest by the proletariat of such political power as will enable it to suppress all resistance on the part of the exploiters.”|Program of Russian Communist Party}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself. . . . (It) is a means, a path leading to socialism”|Stalin in Address to Sverdlov Students, June 1925}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Most Americans shrink from the word “dictatorship.” “I don’t want to be dictated to,” they say. Neither, in fact, does anyone. But why do they instinctively take the word in its passive meaning, and see themselves as the recipients of orders? Why do they never think that they might be the dictators? Is that such an impossible idea? Is it because they have been so long hammered by the subtly misleading propaganda about personal dictatorships, or is it because they have been so long accustomed to seek the right to life through a boss who hires them, that the word dictatorship arouses for them the utterly incredible picture of one man giving everybody orders?&lt;br /&gt;
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No country is ruled by one man. This assumption is a favorite red herring to disguise the real rule. Power resides in ownership of the means of production—by private capitalists in Italy, Germany and also in America, by all workers jointly in the USSR. This is the real difference which today divides the world into two systems, in respect to the ultimate location of power. When a Marxist uses the word “dictatorship,” he is not alluding to personal rulers or to methods of voting; he is contrasting rule by property with rule by workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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The heads of government in America are not the real rulers. I have talked with many of them from the President down. Some of them would really like to use power for the people. They feel baffled by their inability to do so; they blame other branches of government, legislatures, courts. But they haven’t analyzed the real reason. The difficulty is that they haven’t power to use. Neither the President nor Congress nor the common people, under any form of organization whatever, can legally dispose of the oil of Rockefeller or the gold in the vaults of Morgan. If they try, they will be checked by other branches of government, which was designed as a system of checks and balances precisely to prevent such “usurpation of power.” Private capitalists own the means of production and thus rule the lives of millions. Government, however chosen, is limited to the function of making regulations which will help capitalism run more easily by adjusting relations between property and protecting it against the “lawless” demands of non-owners. This constitutes what Marxists call the dictatorship of property. “The talk about pure democracy is but a bourgeois screen,” says Stalin, “to conceal the fact that equality between exploiters and exploited is impossible. . . . It was invented to hide the sores of capitalism . . . and lend it moral strength.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Power over the means of production—that gives rule. Men who have it are dictators. This is the power the workers of the Soviet Union seized in the October Revolution. They abolished the previously sacred right of men to live by ownership of private property. They substituted the rule: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What characteristics of the new régime most obviously showed its dictatorial character? They were the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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First, the Bolsheviks took power without waiting for a majority vote—in the elections to the Constituent Assembly they had just received nine million out of thirty-six million ballots—but relying on their overwhelming majority among the industrial workers, and an overwhelming superiority in that part of the army near the capital cities. They maintained power by a shrewd analysis of social classes, and by satisfying the demands of the sections of the population whose support they needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Second, they organized the new government on the basis of the workers’ organizations, thus dis-franchising those classes which lived by private ownership, and giving a greater proportionate representation in the higher government bodies to workers than to peasants during the first eighteen years when equal voting by great masses of illiterate small owners would have wrecked policies of social ownership.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This difference is commonly stated as a five to one proportion, but such was not the case. Industrial districts had in the higher organs one representative for 25,000 &#039;&#039;electors&#039;&#039;, while rural districts had one for 125,000 &#039;&#039;population&#039;&#039;, which included children. The proportion is thus nearer two to one, a much less disproportion than exists (in the reverse direction) between rural and city votes for many state legislatures in America. This disproportion in the Soviet Union was abolished when the rural districts reached literacy and large-scale farming. See next chapter.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Third, they took control of schools, press and all means of expression, and while encouraging the widest latitude of criticism by workers interested in augmenting or improving the public properties, suppressed any expressions which seemed to the government likely to strengthen the rights of private property or injure the efficiency of socially owned production. At certain periods when they felt their social ownership of production threatened, whether by sabotage, graft, or the strengthening of private owners, they suppressed these dangers as drastically as they thought necessary by means which varied from economic discrimination to deportation or shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are real characteristics which constitute dictatorship rather than any personal prestige of Stalin. Great men attain leadership under all forms of government; the technical forms through which Stalin leads are fully as democratic as those by which an American president governs, and infinitely more democratic than the dominance of a Morgan. Nor is the existence of a single Party necessarily a bar to democratic self-expression, which can find its way as well through one party as a dozen, as later chapters will show. But the above characteristics are definite indications of dictatorship, a rule to which not all men have equal access. They are the tactics of all owners in all countries and all periods of history when they feel themselves threatened. They are the tactics to which owners of private property resorted in Italy and Germany when the rising votes of communist and socialist workers threatened their ownership. They are resorted to today in sections of America where property feels threatened, whether by farmhands in Imperial Valley or sharecroppers in Arkansas and Alabama. They will be resorted to on a wider scale if American capitalism really feels itself slipping. Nothing in Soviet history indicates that the Bolsheviks were any more “dictatorial” or ruthless than owners of property anywhere under similar stresses. Certainly they were far less bloody and oppressive than any of the “dictatorships of the right”—whether in Hungary, Finland, China, Italy or Germany—established in retaliation or prevention by private ownership which really felt itself in danger.&lt;br /&gt;
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What were the conditions which made the Bolsheviks establish a dictatorship? Why could they not wait until they were voted into power, and then take over one by one, by government decree or by taxation, the large-scale properties which they believed must be socially owned? The history of fascist seizures of power in face of the threat of socialist voting is beginning to give the world the answer to this question. The Bolsheviks knew the answer from their Marxian analysis of history. No owning class ever gave up ownership without struggle. The holding of government office is not itself power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The power of ownership over the means of life is the day-by-day power which works incessantly, buying brains, corrupting or confusing governments, persistently re-establishing itself against any “will of the people.” Anyone who has experienced in a single American city, as I have in Seattle, the intensity and variety of methods which the capitalists use to fight so mild a thing as public ownership of street-cars, anyone who knows what they did to the war-time government-owned railroads, or today to the Tennessee Valley Corporation, must realize the resources possessed by capitalism against anything so mild as a popular vote. When they can no longer prevent a municipally owned utility, they corrupt it. They make it inefficient through graft or sabotage; they subordinate it to control by private banks. Meantime they continue to play through all the arts of high-paid propaganda on the minds of the electors, who waver and turn to other cures.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The change from capitalism to communism is a whole epoch of history,” said Lenin. “Till it is ended, the exploiters inevitably have the hope of restoration.” Even after capitalists are overthrown on a local scale or on the scale of a single country, they remain for some time “stronger than the workers who overthrew them.” Their strength lies in their foreign connections with international capital, in the money and movable property which they still possess, in their organizing and administrative ability, their superior education, their knowledge of all the secrets of administration, their superiority in the art of war. They are furthermore helped by the force of habit and traditional ways of thinking which remain even in the minds of workers and especially in large sections of the middle classes for a considerable period after capitalism is overthrown.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted and condensed from Lenin, &#039;&#039;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&#039;&#039;, Chap. 3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxists therefore hold that the working class must maintain a dictatorial power for an “entire epoch of history” both to prevent attempts at restoration of capitalism and to re-educate the entire population in habits suited to socially owned production. “You will have to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil wars and international wars,” said Marx to the workers, “not only to change external conditions, but in order to change yourselves and to make yourselves fit for the exercise of political power.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &#039;&#039;Revelations on the Communist Trial in Cologne&#039;&#039;, 1851.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The tactics used by the dictatorship in the Soviet Union were conditioned by the economic development of the land and its international relations. In the first years they were affected by foreign intervention and civil war; in later, years they conformed to and created the rapid economic advance and increasing international prestige of the country. Four chief epochs may be noted: the period of Workers’ Control in the first year of the Revolution; War Communism for the two and a half years of intervention; the New Economic Policy from 1921 to 1928; and the final offensive against capitalism ushered in by the first Five-Year Plan.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new workers’ state inherited a country economically broken by the strain of World War. Peasants were seizing lands of landlords; factories had closed and their workers were hungry; banking was demoralized by the rapid fall of the currency; soldiers without food or munitions were fleeing home from the front. “Peace, land and bread,” was the cry of the country. The capitalists could not satisfy it and this brought the Bolsheviks to power. They at once gave land to the peasants, repudiated all state debts, nationalized banks and transport and created a state monopoly of foreign trade. Industry was left in private hands, but “workers’ control” committees were established from the workers in each industry. These examined all accounts, studied the source of raw materials and fought to keep up production against the attempt of private capitalists to close down the factories as unprofitable. Internal trade remained private; on the second day of the Revolution a proclamation urged traders to continue business as usual. A policy however was announced for the gradual combining of factories into large-scale trusts, which should then be nationalized, and for the gradual socializing of internal trade through co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
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These policies—the normal reaction of a workers’ government wishing to rebuild the economic life of a ruined country with as little upheaval and disruption as possible, for the sake not of profit but of human welfare—united around the government the overwhelming majority of the population, including both workers and peasants. Opposition came from landlords, capitalists and the upper strata of engineers, civil servants and professional people; but if these used violence or sabotage against the new policy, they were suppressed by governing organizations composed of great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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A vivid example of dictatorship in this period is given by Lenin, in a contrast drawn between dictatorship by property and dictatorship by workers. “The state has forcibly to evict a family from a house. This is done time and again by the capitalist state and will be done by our proletarian state. . . . The capitalist state evicts the workers’ family which has lost its breadwinner and is unable to pay rent.” After describing the enforcement by a squad of police of the rights of property against poor people, Lenin continues with the picture of the dispossession of a rich man by the workers’ state.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Our detachment of workers’ militia consists, let us say, of fifteen people—two sailors, two soldiers, two class-conscious workers (of whom only one, let us assume, is a member of our Party or a sympathizer), one intellectual, and eight members of the toiling poor; at least five are necessarily women, domestic servants, unskilled workers, and so on. They come to the rich man’s house, inspect it, and find that there are five rooms occupied by two men and two women. “This winter, citizens, you must confine yourselves to two rooms and place two rooms at the disposal of two families that are now living in cellars. For the time being, until with the help of engineers (you are an engineer, I think?) we build good dwellings for all, you will have to put yourselves to inconvenience. Your telephone will serve ten families. This will save about a hundred hours’ work in running to the stores and so forth. The student citizen in our detachment will write out two copies of the text of this state order and you will be kind enough to give us a signed declaration that you undertake to abide by it faithfully.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Will the Bolsheviks Retain Power?&#039;&#039; published October, 1917.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This is a vivid example of a dictatorship over property enforced by great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under pressure of foreign intervention and civil war, the limited nationalization of “Workers’ Control” merged into the period of “War Communism.” Attacking armies separated Soviet Russia for two and a half years from her chief food and fuel bases. The granary of the Ukraine, the cotton of Turkestan, the coal of the Donetz, the oil of Baku, the mines of the Urals were in enemy hands. The dictatorship adopted “War Communism,” the tactics of a besieged land. It requisitioned all grain and necessities of life, and rationed them under direct government control; it seized all factories and used the broken machines of one as spares to repair the scarcely less broken machines of another. This policy alienated large sections of the peasantry by crop requisition. It ruined industry more thoroughly than any modern industry has ever been ruined, being an efficient device for using up the last ounce of raw material and the last spare bolt. But the policy of “War Communism” enabled an already exhausted land to carry on for two and a half more years against the attacking armies of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet power survived. With the coming of peace Lenin at once introduced the New Economic Policy, an attempt to build up the country’s economic life as rapidly as possible by a “two-sided process of the development of capitalism and the development of socialism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 314.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Grain requisitions were replaced by limited taxes with permission for free trade. Private capitalists were allowed to enter both trade and industry, the state retaining the “commanding heights” of land, finance, heavy industry, transport, and foreign trade. This policy brought the peasant, small enterpriser and professional classes back to loyalty—a wavering loyalty, for if some had been won to socialism, others now hoped to grow personally rich. Capitalist nations abroad echoed the belief that Russia was swinging back to the ancient order. But the Soviet workers, led by the Communists, gave time on holidays to great collective drives for repairing factories, making street-cars and new equipment as donations to their country. During “War Communism” they had worked for rations; now they worked for low but steadily increasing wages, building up out of their own sacrifice the first socialist accumulation which should give them economic power for the final offensive against capitalism. Thus industry which in 1921 produced one-fifth the pre-war standard was driven by fivefold increase in 1928 to “normalcy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia in 1928 was only half socialist. Most of industry was socially owned but farming was in the hands of peasant proprietors, the stronger of whom were petty capitalists, struggling not only to survive but to grow. Class strife went on between these emerging rural capitalists and the impoverished farmhands. Youth was leaving the farms and flooding the cities with unemployment. Discussion had racked the Communist Party as to whether socialism could be built in a single country, particularly a backward peasant land. Following the analysis of Stalin, the Party decided that it could be done by swiftly creating modern heavy industry and simultaneously industrializing farming. The Soviet Union plunged into that now famous struggle known as the Five-Year Plan, and emerged with large-scale industry and the largest scale farming in the world, both of them socially owned.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a bitter fight, carried through against the upper sections of the peasantry and part of the middle class. An epidemic of sabotage broke out in the industries among the higher engineering staff, who had consciously or half-consciously expected to advance towards privilege and wealth. Men high in the canning industry put broken glass, animal hair and fish tails into food destined for workers. A township veterinary who hated collectivization inoculated six thousand horses with plague. An irrigation engineer tried to discourage the policy of settling yellow-skinned nomads on the soil by using antiquated surveys which he knew would not deliver the water. These cases and thousands more are taken from confessions of men who were later repentant. The dictatorship fought back, shooting the most serious offenders, imprisoning and exiling others. The energy of loyal workers and engineers carried through the Five-Year Plan. Its success won over many earlier saboteurs so that by 1931 Stalin was able to announce that the intellectuals were turning towards the Soviet Government, and should be met by a policy of co-operation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Speech delivered at Conference of Leaders of Industry, June 23, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The most spectacular act of ruthlessness which occurred in those years was the exiling of several hundred thousand kulaks—rural property-owners who lived by trade, money-lending or by exploiting small mills, threshers, and hired labor—from farm homes in European Russia and the Ukraine to Siberia or the northern woods. The usual assumption outside the Soviet Union is that this exiling occurred through arbitrary action by a mystically omnipotent G.P.U. That organization did of Course organize the deportation and final place of settlement in labor camps or on new land. But the listing of kulaks who “impede our farming by force and violence” was done by village meetings of poor peasants and farmhands who were feverishly and not too efficiently organizing collectively owned farms with government loans of machinery and credits. The meetings I personally attended were as seriously judicial as a court trial in America. One by one there came before the people the “best families,” who had grabbed the best lands, exploited labor by owning the tools of production as best families normally and historically do, and who were fighting the rise of the collective farm—which had the right to take the best lands away from them—by every means up to arson, cattle-killing and murder. Obviously the situation offered chances for wreaking private grudges. Obviously the occasional agitator from the city was unconcerned with kulak “rights.” The meeting of farmhands and poor peasants discussed each case in turn, questioned the kulaks, allowed most of them to remain but asked the government to deport some as “trouble-makers.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a harsh, bitter and by no means bloodless conflict, but not one peculiar to Russia. I was reminded of it again in 1933 by the cotton-pickers’ strike in San Joaquin Valley of California. California local authorities deported pickets who interfered with the farming of ranchers; Soviet authorities deported kulaks who interfered with the collectively owned farming of the poor. In both cases central governments sent commissions to guard against the worst excesses. But the “property” which could count on government support was in California that of the wealthy rancher; in the USSR it was the collective property of the poor.&lt;br /&gt;
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Through all these struggles of eighteen years in the Soviet Union the Marxists had guessed right—one class held firm. Steadily the industrial workers supported and fought for their socialist state. Theirs was the dictatorship, the ownership, the rule. Led by Communist analysis, they made alliances with other parts of the population—with the great mass of the people to overthrow big landlords and capitalists and later with the poorer peasants to overthrow the richer. The middle classes changed back and forth in their loyalty; but the workers held through.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today the chief fight of the dictatorship is against corruption and bureaucracy. The workers, in other words, struggle with their own government, not to overthrow it but to improve it by weeding out inefficiency. A vivid example of this was given by a letter from three railway-workers published in &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;. They told how the workers of their station, hearing that Sizran station was considered a model, chose three delegates to go and study it. “The election fell on us. However, to our great regret, we convinced ourselves that Sizran is no model.” The letter proceeds to expose fictitious bookkeeping which compelled engineers to list repeated repairs as new in order to protect the reputation of the repair shops, and other false entries which hid inefficiencies. They noted employees who had been demoted for calling too open attention to troubles. They did a thorough and technically accurate job of debunking Sizran, a station on a different railroad to which they had gone in search of good methods. Imagine workers from a station on the Erie giving this attention to study, analyze and reform a station on the Pennsylvania! Imagine their securing ready access to all the records of an alien line! Imagine this as routine news in a metropolitan daily paper, leading to check-up and reprimands of railway superintendents for inaccuracy in reporting their work!&lt;br /&gt;
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This is today’s routine in the Soviet Union. Scores of letters like this appear daily in the press throughout the land. Some of them are ironic, some statistical, some outraged. But all of them express men who know themselves owners, and through ownership dictators of the land in which they live.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER IV: THE GROWING DEMOCRACY ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Soviet Power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Step by step the Soviet Union fights forward towards that complete democracy which has never yet existed anywhere on earth. For democracy is neither absolute nor static. It varies in type, extent and intensity. It may grow or diminish. In the Soviet Union it grows.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are the functions of government in the Soviet Union? How wide is the participation of the people? How much of their life can they control? Whence come the ideas that are followed in the land? What initiative and creative energy is expressed? Who rises to high posts and by what means? All these questions must be considered in determining what kind of democracy exists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take first the formal facts of voting, though this is far from exhausting in the Soviet citizen’s participation in government. The Soviet Union has today the largest body of voters any where in the world. Moreover a larger percentage of them come out to elections than in any other country; they give more time to their elections and decide a greater variety of questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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All “toilers” over the age of eighteen may elect and be elected; the word is interpreted to include students, housewives, old people who have passed the age of work as well as those more formally known as workers. Voting thus extends to a younger age than is common elsewhere, and there are no disqualifications for transient residents, paupers, migratory workers, soldiers, sailors, such as exist in most countries; even non-citizens may vote if they work in a Soviet industry. There are no restrictions for sex, creed or color, nor even for illiteracy. The only significant restriction relates to “exploiting elements,” but the steady decrease of privately owned enterprises has cut the disfranchised to 2.5 per cent of the population in the 1934 elections; by 1937 it is expected that all will have the vote. In the 1934 elections 91,000,000 people were entitled to vote, and of these 77,000,000, or 85 per cent, actually participated, which is double the proportion found in most countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take a motion picture of a Soviet election. In December 1934 the Moscow streets were thronged with processions, continuing for several days. Special street-cars, gay with banners, carried people to meetings. Men and women gathered in side streets, formed in line with merry chatter and went with bands and flags to the building secured for their election meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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All over the country for more than a month elections had been going on in far-away factories and villages. Soviet elections do not take place on a single day but are determined by local convenience within a period of several weeks prior to the convening of an All-Union Congress. Localities choose dates which will enable their outgoing governments to finish their business, and give the incoming governments time to prepare demands for the All-Union Congress. These candidates and demands had been subjects of much discussion. But the attitude to the elections expressed itself rather in action than in talk. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were joining collective farms “to break with the past and enter the elections as collective farmers.” Factory workers were energetically completing new models of locomotives, turbines, inventions, to send as presents to the coming congress. There were, in fact, so many of these presents that the sending of most of them was ordered confined to reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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In wooded mountains of Siberia the dark-skinned Oirots announced proudly: “We have abandoned the wandering life of wigwams; we have raised our literacy rate from 6 to 89 per cent; we enter these elections as educated farmers, settled on our own soil.” From the Turkoman Republic they were matching this claim with another: “Our once suppressed women have increased the proportion who turn out to elections from 2.5 per cent to 73 per cent in these eight years.” The historic city of Kiev was boasting: “Half our elected deputies are women. We lead the Soviet Union in the proportion of women elected to office; this means that we lead the world.” But their boast was matched by the textile city Tver, now renamed Kalinin, which has fully as many.&lt;br /&gt;
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Young Pioneers were reciting poems to urge on their elders:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;That we may build more firmly,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Advancing more confidently to victory,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;We choose to our Soviets firm, tested fighters,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Close-welded, the best of our best.&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On the southern Kazak steppe an aged yellow-skinned herdsman, dying, sent a last message to his son who had been village president and who was now elected delegate to the All-Union Congress: “All the years of my life were dark with toil and hunger. But I lived to see the new day. Take care of the Soviet power, my son; it is our power, our happiness.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Along the Arctic coast the autumn herring run began a few days before the date set for local elections. The fishermen went to sea. Some of the election commissioners held elections in the absence of a considerable number of voters and were roundly denounced for it by &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, central organ of the Communist Party. “A gross violation of Soviet democracy! What right have commissioners to hold elections when workers cannot come? We are glad to note that many of the ﬁshermen had a better sense of their obligations. Many crews held their own meetings and sent deputies ashore with their instructions. But they should not have been forced to this irregularity. The proper course was found by those commissioners who held regular election meetings on the boats and thus combined enthusiastic work for a good herring catch with the collective decision of what to do with it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this, taken together and multiplied by millions, makes plain the essence of the Soviet election. It is an act of joint owners deciding what to do with their production, how to build a good life on the proceeds. The task of officials is not to enforce some precedent but to find ways of adjusting election machinery to voters. “The hottest elections we ever had,” they bragged of the 1934 elections, proud of the increasing popular participation in government, which is relied on to check bureaucracy and make state enterprises efficient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic unit for government is the working institution, the factory or office; in rural districts it is the village. Deputies are chosen to the local government, the village or city soviet.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The word “soviet” means “council.” City soviet is city council.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The basis of representation and size of the local soviet depends on the size of the community: Gulin village, whose election I visited, has one deputy for every forty voters and a village soviet of thirteen members. Moscow city elects one deputy for fifteen hundred voters and has more than two thousand members in its city soviet. These local deputies meet soon after election to form the new government. They divide among themselves the various departments, which range from the five sections of Gulin village—farming, livestock, culture, roads and finance—to twenty-eight sections, each with over forty deputies, through which Moscow city does business. Besides the more commonly known functions, these local governments own and manage local industry, which in a large city like Moscow includes many municipally owned factories, the street-cars, subway, lights, water, and housing. They receive revenue from public properties, but their budgets may also be augmented by taxes and state loans. Some cities actually bring in revenue—it will be remembered that they get all the house rents; others need help from the higher governments.&lt;br /&gt;
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On these local governments is built up the whole structure of central government.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A new constitution is in preparation which will change many details, but it will hardly change the principle of close connection between local, state and central bodies in one system.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Local soviets elect deputies to a congress of soviets; the township congress elects to the province, and so on up to the All-Union Congress of Soviets, the highest body in the country. Each of these congresses elects its executive committee and the heads of its various departments; for the highest government these are the great Commissariats of heavy and light industry, finance, health, and so forth. Local departments are both horizontally and vertically controlled, by local governments and by the corresponding department in the higher government. Thus a township health department is responsible both to the township executive committee and to the provincial health department. If orders clash, if a local soviet takes the hospital for some other use, its health department appeals to the provincial health department which brings pressure on the local soviet through the provincial government in the interests of public health.&lt;br /&gt;
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The greater part of this intricate yet unified system of government is carried on by unpaid work. Elected deputies, whether to village or the All-Union Congress, receive no salaries of office. They draw their usual wages from the factory or institution which sends them and in which they keep on working, except insofar as they may be “released from production” for the needs of government; this varies with the importance of the work they do. There is thus no hard and fast line between the citizen and the man in office. Deputies are a link between the collective life of the factory and the larger collective life of the country. Any worker may approach them conveniently any day in their place of work to ask about the fulfillment of instructions given by the voters. They may be recalled by their constituents at any time simply through a factory meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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If voters thus constantly call on their deputies, the deputies are equally entitled to call on the voters for help in carrying out the election program they have voted. A deputy is no substitute for the people, no ruler; he is the representative who organizes them in their own tasks of voluntary government work. Millions of citizens take active part in the sections of the government—housing commissions, school commissions, taxing commissions, labor inspection and so on. Those who develop a taste for running public affairs will be chosen at some election for more continuous and responsible work. Those who specialize in some field, such as health, courts, housing, may be sent on pay for some months or years of study and become full-time civil servants in these departments.&lt;br /&gt;
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The growth of democracy in the Soviet Union thus depends directly on the extent to which citizens can be interested in taking part in operations of government. This interest is in part assured by the fact that government is so clearly the direct organizing of all aspects of the citizen’s life. In a million matters the citizens give direct instructions during the election. They order the increase of school-houses or sound films, the improvement in the quality of bread, the increase of retail stores, the transport of goods in big cities by night; they demand the breaking-up of housing trusts into smaller co-operatives, or the introduction of a less specialized education in the schools. All of these were part of some 48,000 instructions issued directly by Moscow voters to their city government, which reported within three months on the fulfillment of many hundred demands and on the disposition made of all. When instructions clash, as when some citizens want an odorous industrial plant removed from their neighborhood while others want it to stay, commissions are formed which try to satisfy not merely the majority, but as nearly as possible everybody, not through a showing of hands in opposition, but through various adjustments to the suggestions made by all. Capitalist ownership of private property limits the citizen’s participation, in government to an approval or rejection—expressed in conflict—of general policies. Socialist ownership causes government policies to grow directly and naturally from the correlated demands of millions of people, all of whom are interested in improving the country’s wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interest of citizens in government is also consciously promoted by the Communist Party which stirs up wide competitions between factories, villages, cities, as to the extent and energy of their participation. An industrial plant where less than 95 per cent of the workers come to the election hangs its head in shame as an institution lacking in civic consciousness. Candidates never make speeches or election promises; this would be considered highly indelicate. But the voters pride themselves on picking deputies whose previous work has been notable and who therefore give promise of being widely useful. They select a fellow worker, not an outside politician. Students choose a student, auto-workers choose an auto-worker, the Moscow Grand Opera elects a famous singer. The future task of these deputies is to extend on a wider scale the type of work for which they are already known. The opera singer will organize connections between the Moscow Grand Opera and the villages, sending out artists to help rural singing classes. The printer on the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; who mechanized its mailing list of two million subscribers was elected to the Moscow city soviet with instructions to help mechanize all the newspapers of the city. A textile worker who helps organize a good day nursery in her factory will be elected by her fellow workers to help improve the city’s day nurseries, and will choose to work on the health section of the local government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The operation of Soviet democracy is thus so intimate, continuous and organic that the observer fresh from capitalist politics hardly recognizes it as government. Where is the debate? Who determines general policies? Can the people throw out the upper officials? Can they throw out Stalin? The Communist Party? The Soviet voter, when asked these last questions, replies in a puzzled way: “Why should we want to?” The questioner thinks he has been evaded. But all elections presuppose an existing economic system, which voting is powerless to change. Voters in America cannot change Rockefeller’s method of operating oil companies for private profit. Similarly no Soviet election raises the issue of returning public properties to private hands: this was settled by the Revolution, and forms the foundation beneath the whole government.&lt;br /&gt;
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Barring that question, there is nothing whatever that Soviet voters cannot change. They actually do change thousands of officials at every election, and as their acquaintance with the wider problems of the country grows, the forms of democracy are being widened to include direct control of the highest officials. Stalin’s chief post is not in the government, but as general secretary of the Communist Party, which would certainly remove him if his policy and actions should ever discredit him with the people; at present he is by far the most popular man in the country. To throw out the Communist Party bodily would be to throw out all the leading and organizing elements in all factories, farms, schools and enterprises; it could clearly be done only by upheaval leading to chaos. But the citizens are constantly at work changing the very membership of the Party, any member of which may be “cleaned out” on protest of his non-Party associates that he is too dictatorial, too rough towards workers, or merely not a fit leader.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This is discussed in Chaps. 1 and 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Several elections which I attended will show concretely how soviet democracy functions. Four election meetings were held simultaneously in different hamlets of Gulin village, which had no assembly hall big enough for all. One of these meetings threw out the Party candidate, Borisov, because they felt that he neglected their instructions; they elected a non-Party woman who had displayed energy in improving the village and were praised by the election commissioner—himself a Party member—for having discovered good government timber which the Party had neglected. The central meeting in Gulin expected 235 voters; 227 appeared and were duly checked off by name at the door. There ensued personal discussion of every one of nine candidates, of whom seven were chosen. Mihailov “did good work on the roads.” The most enthusiasm developed over Menshina, a woman who “does everything assigned her energetically; checks farm property, tests seeds, collects state loans.” Dr. Sharkova, head of the Mothers’ Consultation, was pushed by the women: “We need a sanitary expert to clean up our village.” The incoming soviet was instructed to “increase harvest yield within two years to thirty bushels per acre, to organize a stud farm, get electricity and radio for every home, organize adult education courses, football and skiing teams, and satisfy a score of other needs.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Moscow Architectural Institute where 1,500 men and women are qualifying to become architects, every class in the school held three sessions on the elections, discussing first the shortcomings of the outgoing government, then instructions to the new government, and lastly candidates. The fourteen hundred instructions sent in by the students included more and better draughting pencils, evening schools in drawing, more money for students’ excursions to see new architecture, more exhibitions of foreign architecture, fruit trees to beautify Moscow, artists to be held responsible for designs of state-made texiles, township architects to be appointed to advise the new construction on farms. Similarly the 1,500 voters of the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; turned in 1,500 proposals, which were carefully worked over by committees, published in a special newspaper issued for the voters, and given to their deputy to put through with their help. These included adequate textbooks for all pupils in the schools, an increase in the number of children’s theaters, strengthening the fight against hooliganism, closing the sale of liquor on Suchevski Street opposite school Twenty-two—the latter being the common form of the fight against alcohol.&lt;br /&gt;
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Instructions thus adopted become the program of incoming governments, which they use as a weapon to get what they require from provincial and central authorities. Some of the demands can be put through by the electors themselves with the help of their deputy; others need central assistance. When the All-Union Congress meets it knows how many villages are demanding air-dromes, sound films, textbooks, electrification. These demands, correlated by engineers and economists, form the content for future development of the life of the country in the direction its citizens choose. But the citizens themselves expect to work to accomplish it. If villagers ask for a seven-room school or a landing field for farm airplanes, they expect deputies to investigate possible fields, make recommendations, get the needed machines from some central authority; but they themselves expect to haul the timber or pay the men who haul it with labor days credited against the joint harvest.&lt;br /&gt;
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Democracy in Soviet life is not confined to government. Trade unions organize many aspects of workers’ life; collective farms and co-operatives organize production and distribution for the farmers. Their organization is separate from that of government; it is also democratically controlled. In the past two years democracy has become more intimate and decentralized in both these directions. The administration of social insurance, which in 1936 will have eight billion rubles for hospitals, day nurseries, diet kitchens, invalid benefits, old-age pensions and the like, was two years ago given over to the trade unions, as was also the inspection of factories and of workers’ food stores. Similarly the whole organization of collective farming, including the relation between fields operated jointly and plots individually worked by farm members, is today in the hands of the farmers themselves, decided by the general meeting at which not less than two-thirds are present. Thus democracy grows more flexible, the intermediate apparatus is lessened, and the various functions of government are handled by those whom they most directly concern.&lt;br /&gt;
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The extension of social ownership into the farms and the growth in the intelligence of the entire electorate has made possible a third extension of democracy. A new constitution is being drafted by the collective labor of thousands of people in all parts of the land. Economists and historians are studying the constitutions of all countries and considering every detail of democratic technique; their reports will be further discussed in every factory and farm of the country before the constitution takes final form. It is known, however, that it will include direct election, secret ballot, and equal representation for all citizens, replacing the inequality which hitherto obtained between city workers and peasants. At is also expected to abolish all disfranchised classes, since by 1937 social ownership will be universal and all citizens will belong to one toiling-owning class.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty,” was said once of the democracy of capitalist society whereby small private owners protected their rights. But socialism demands more than vigilance. Eternally co-operating human energy is the price of socialism and of that complete democracy which operates jointly owned means of production for the expanding life of all. This is the final stage towards which the present Soviet democracy struggles and grows.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER V: THE UNION OF NATIONS ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Among the masses of people, we are but drops in the ocean, and we will be able to govern only when we properly express that which the people appreciate. Without this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not take the lead of the masses, and the whole machine will fall to pieces.”|Lenin at Eleventh Party Congress}}&lt;br /&gt;
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If by some cataclysm of war a section of the Soviet Union should be cut off from Moscow and compelled for a time to exist alone, government in these isolated areas would continue unchanged except insofar as it was crushed by invading armies. A picturesque example of this was given me by a Yakut woman, who boasted that her district of forests and tundra a thousand miles north of the Trans-Siberian Railway had had “Soviet Power” continuously since 1917. The years of civil war that raged along the railway had never penetrated so far north. To my query how this backward bit of territory knew what policies to follow she replied that a few Bolshevik exiles had remained among them and they got occasional news from Moscow over the Great Northern Telegraph which traversed their region. Many other sections of the country were isolated during the Civil War for considerable periods, yet continued to follow a common policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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For eighteen years the authority of the Communist Party in the life of the Soviet Union has grown steadily stronger; it has kept power now for a considerably longer time than any Party in any other country in the world. The accumulating discontents which in other lands throw out governments do not seem to worry it. The Party itself organizes discontent for the sake of progress. In spite of exposures of graft, inefficiency, bureaucracy, and stupid excesses—indeed through these very exposures—the hold of the Communist Party increases.&lt;br /&gt;
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To manage the state affairs of the most extensive republic on earth—covering one-sixth of the world’s land surface—might be considered enough for a political party. But to run the state is only one of the Communists’ tasks. For their plan of remaking the world the apparatus of government is insufficient. Great popular organizations like trade unions, co-operatives, physical culture societies and scores of voluntary social agencies must also move in a common, yet flexible plan. But the action of these organizations must be voluntary, arousing the initiative of their members, or their energy and life will die.&lt;br /&gt;
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How then does the Communist Party lead the country? By the energy and discipline of its members, their contact with all organizations in the land, and by the authority of repeated success. In all government bodies and voluntary organizations the Communists belonging to them act together to induce them to follow the “Party Line.” This line, however, while firm, is not rigid; Party policy itself grows from the discussions and active struggles of its members, each of whom is in touch with some aspect of the country’s life. The members serve as a living conscious bridge between the Party and all the other organizations. They explain to the Party the desires of the people with whom they are associated, and explain to the people the policies developed by the Party in regard to their demands.&lt;br /&gt;
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The primary Party organizations are set up in factories, offices, state farms, red army units, universities, villages, in any institution which has three Party members or more. In a typical iron and steel plant in the Ukraine, for instance, where 1,600 persons—workers, engineers, office staff—work in the rolling mill, 55 are Party members, 85 belong to the Young Communist League and 30 are enrolled as “sympathizers,” an organized group which is studying Communism with the presumable intent to join the Party. One Communist is paid a salary by the Party as full time organizer; the others are scattered in ordinary jobs through all the working gangs of the factory. Each of them has his assigned “Party work.” Some are editors of the sixteen “wall newspapers” which are posted in every working gang of the mill, filled with news and discussions of the gang’s successes and failures. Others read regular newspapers aloud during lunch hour and conduct discussions on current events. Others stir up “socialist competition” between different working gangs so that skill and production may increase. Others are active in the trade union or help promote sports. Every Communist, Young Communist and sympathizer does some unpaid public work of this kind; those who had none or failed to do it would be dropped from the Party as “passive.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Some years ago I visited an open meeting of a Party organization in a factory near Moscow. Not only the Communists but many non-members had gathered to hear the semi-annual report of the Party secretary of the plant. As he sat down a storm of questions arose. “Why have we no report about the Young Pioneers? . . . Has the Party looked into the question of our workers’ club building and observed that we have no summer playground? Why haven’t we a sanitary organization? Why haven’t we a ‘Friends of Aviation’? Does the co-operative housing organization report regularly to the Party, and if so, when are we going to get the houses?” From the secretary’s answers it became clear that this factory had many voluntary organizations among its members: a “Friends for Children,” an “International Labor Defense,” an organization to “Increase Production,” a “Society for Contacts with Rural Districts,” and many more. All of these had been launched with Party co-operation, usually first as small committees, and had then grown into larger organizations by the influx of people who were not Communists. The number of organizations that would be started would depend partly on popular demand and partly on the capacity of Party members to stimulate and organize interest. It would be difficult for an organization to start without Party sanction; it would not be precisely forbidden, but a score of difficulties would discourage it. On the other hand, if a popular demand arose for any new kind of organization—from a drama club to an Anti-Tuberculosis Society—some Party members would take part in it either on their own initiative or by request of the workers or the Party, and would be expected by everyone to keep the organization in touch with any Party policies which affected it.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were several ironic remarks and cat-calls in the meeting during a report by the plant’s director, who was clearly not popular with the workers. I happened to know that the Party secretary had recently recommended to the higher organizations that the director be removed to some other plant where he could profit by the mistakes he had made in this one and start without the accumulated friction. The manager also knew that his transfer had been recommended, and quite possibly concurred. At the meeting, however, the Party secretary said no word of this recommendation but put himself in the unenviable position of explaining the manager’s actions to a group which was almost howling him down. Both he and the manager were disciplined Communists, who did not wish to increase dissension but to work together for the good of the plant.&lt;br /&gt;
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The proportion of Communists in rural districts is very much less than in factories, as might be expected from the fact that the factory workers were the most active elements in the Revolution and also more literate than the peasants. A typical Party organization in a village of two hundred families—I take here the collective farm “Postishev” in the Ukraine—has five Party members, ten “sympathizers,” and twenty-seven members of the Young Communist League. The latter organization is nearly always much larger than the Party in the villages, since it is the youth on the farms which is progressive.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of the five Party members in this village, one of them, Povlichenko, is organizer, giving full time to Party work. He was born in the village, worked some years in a city factory, and was sent back in 1931 on Party order to help organize collectivization. From comments of peasant women I judge he was high-handed in that period and stirred up some antagonisms which he has not lived down. He is, however, a very energetic person, a once half-starved, half-educated farmhand with a passion for schooling which the Revolution enabled him to realize. He runs the Party school where members study Party history and current politics, teaches an elementary course in Leninism and the Soviet Constitution for the sympathizers, and organizes talks and discussions on special events, such as Party congresses, or new decrees affecting the farms. At the time of my visit these remote villagers were studying, more or less assiduously, the reports of Dimitroff and others at the recent congress of the Communist International. Povlichenko also takes active part in pushing the local school, the village club, the motion pictures, the local newspaper and all forms of education and culture.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second Communist is a local peasant, president of the collective farm since 1931, but now leaving for a three-year course in an agricultural school. His salary comes from the farm, not from the Party. The third is an electrician sent to this village because “we needed a Communist in every field brigade.” When he came he was entirely ignorant of farming, but his craft made him useful in a village just beginning to import electricity from the great power plant on the Dnieper. Recently the Party planned to transfer him to township work, but the local farmers checked this by electing him president of the village. “The Party,” he said, “always considers the desires of the masses.” He may or may not have helped organize those desires. For Party work he is attached to the third field brigade and is also adviser of the Young Communist League. The fourth party member is a woman who earns her living as saleswoman in the co-operative store, and whose Party assignment is to help the village women organize a day nursery, a first-aid society and get vacation on pay from the collective farm at time of childbirth. This right is automatic in state-owned enterprises, but not all the farmers’ organizations give it yet. The fifth Party member is manager of the local co-operative store, who, since he makes twenty or more trips to the city every month, is used by the Party for city contacts rather than for regular village work.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is plain that these five Party members have their hands on the whole life of the village. Besides their general work, the first three each keep in touch with a different field brigade of forty or more workers whom they are expected to know personally. “I must know what they want, their economic conditions and working abilities. This is called political watchfulness. If we did not know this, it would be bad for us. We could not possibly lead the masses,” said Povlichenko.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Party organization of this village is open to criticism from strict Party principles in that its members hold too many local government jobs. They are supposed to keep a better balance between office-holders and members “in production,” and to stimulate and train non-Party people for some of the government work. Hogging the offices by Party members is considered a bad sign; it means that they have not stirred up wide enough interest. The Postishev organization is trying to do this through their work with the ten sympathizers and the Young Communists, each of whom has also Party work of a less responsible character. They read and discuss the newspapers in the field brigades, organize traveling libraries, chess games, football teams, initiate competitions in reaping and threshing, help start the musical or dramatic circle, or assist in the “cottage laboratory” where sixty farmers are studying scientific methods.&lt;br /&gt;
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These primary Party organizations are correlated by the township&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rayon, a district about equivalent to a township.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; organization which in turn comes under the larger regions up to the All-Union organization. The lower bodies elect the higher but are in turn subordinate to their decisions; the system is known as “democratic centralism.” The highest power within each organization is vested in its general meeting or congress which elects a standing committee to serve between sessions. The highest power of the entire Party is the All-Union Party Congress and between its sessions the Central Committee. The Central Committee organizes a political bureau for the day-by-day determination of political policy, an organizational bureau for general guidance of organizational work, and a secretariat. Stalin is general secretary of the Party, but there are several other secretaries who share this work.&lt;br /&gt;
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Some years ago I saw a district congress of the Communist Party in action in the city of Red Lugansk of the Donetz Basin, the valley of coal and steel. Four or five hundred men and women gathered for a two day session—miners and mine managers, employees and head of the locomotive works, some teachers and health department officials—Communists all, sent as delegates from the local Party organizations of the factories and mines of the district. The problems for discussion were the policy for heavy industry and for minor nationalities. They had been announced by the Central Committee as the immediate pressing problems; “theses” on them had been published by the leading authorities and every local Party organization had discussed them for weeks.&lt;br /&gt;
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The delegates wasted no time in preliminaries and compliments. Man after man spoke hotly and strongly on the concrete difficulties of heavy industry in the mines and factories they knew. They prepared reports based on the industry of their district and elected delegates to carry their hottest criticisms to the regional Party Congress in the coal center, Bakhmut, where delegates were again chosen to the All-Ukrainian Party Congress. Then all over the Soviet Union the special trains began running. From Kharkov, from Tiflis, from Minsk, from Central Asia and Siberia, they bore the chosen delegates to Moscow where two weeks’ discussion in the All-Union Party Congress hammered out the “Party Line.” Thence the results rolled back again to the Donetz, the Caucasus, the Far East to Vladivostok, borne by returning delegates whose first duty was to explain and carry through the decisions through trade unions, cooperatives, farms, government, whatever organizations they influenced.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the most widely organized thinking ever attempted in history. It is actually the energetic thinking of three million men and women, gathering up the ideas of tens of millions of their neighbors, which beats upon the All-Union Party Congress and affects its decisions. The ideas are worked over by the ablest economists of the Party, familiar with the experience of the revolutionary movement in all countries. The decisions reached are explained to the country through every channel of organized publicity; they are discussed and studied in every field brigade and factory and put into action simultaneously throughout the land. For the test of organized thinking is organized action.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communists do not merely reflect the will of the masses, as a ballot might, or a showing of hands. They do not merely analyze what the “majority want” and hand it out. It is their job to lead, to organize the people’s will. No group of unurged soldiers would ever vote to storm a trench. Certainly the workers of the Soviet Union would not have voted, unurged, unled, for the hardships of the Five-Year Plan of rapid industrialization taken out of their own food and comforts, for the painful speed of farm collectivization without adequate machines or organizers. But when the Communist Party analyzed, urged and demanded, showing the world situation and the need of making the USSR well prepared industrially and for defense, showing the enemy classes which must be abolished to attain the goal of a socialist state, they were able to find, organize and create, deep in the heart of the masses, a will that carried through. Without that will in tens of millions, the three million could have done little. “To bring about a revolution, a leading revolutionary minority is required,” Stalin told H. G. Wells. “But the most talented, devoted and energetic minority would be helpless if it did not rely upon the at least passive support of millions.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. G. Wells’ Interview with Joseph Stalin, July 23, 1934&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As an example of the interrelation of Party, government and voluntary workers in action, let me take the “mobilization” of automobiles and mechanics in the spring of 1931 to save flax sowing in Moscow province. Collective farming came that year to the province in a great drive of organization and propaganda backed by hundreds of new tractors, which were being used chiefly to increase the area of flax. In the first week of sowing, telegrams from the newly organized tractor stations poured into Moscow, announcing that there was a “break.” Tractors all over the province stood in the fields, not moving, for causes yet to be analyzed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who moves in such a case? The Moscow Committee of the Party moves. Sorting over in its office the reports of all Moscow’s daily emergencies, it decides that the break in flax is serious and calls for a “mobilization” of mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The call goes out to Party organizations in a hundred shops and factories. It is announced by trade-union shop committees and factory newspapers. Not a single mechanic is compelled to answer, but any mechanic willing to give a day or two for tractor repair to help the sowing will be helped by foreman and fellow workers to arrange his job. He may work at this sanctioned public task without forfeiting wages, while others fill in the gap in his regular work. What is the motive? The fun of participating in saving the sowing, of helping the country, of living a varied, useful life. Automobiles also are “mobilized” to carry the mechanics to the farms, and those who lend machines for such public work may hope for a cut in automobile taxes. I volunteered for a two-day trip.&lt;br /&gt;
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One hundred and fifty miles north of Moscow we came to the tractor station to which we were assigned. Of thirty-three new tractors from Putiloff Works, eleven could not move out of the railway station. The rest were breaking down in the fields, under the hands of worried peasant boys and girls who had seen their first machine one month before. All night our volunteer mechanics repaired tractors. All night the local tractor drivers stood up to watch in their eagerness to learn. The following day I drove my car to Moscow with sleeping mechanics in the seats. They had worked twenty hours on end in a public emergency about which they would report next morning to their interested fellow workers in Moscow factories. They had also prepared a technical report charging the Putiloff tractor with certain grave defects. It was printed within two days in the Industrial Gazette, the organ of heavy industry, and led to a conference of industrial leaders on improving the Putiloff tractor. Three weeks later the flax sowing of Moscow province, which in early season threatened to lag at 50 per cent of plan, went over the top 108 per cent, the best flax record in the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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“It was the work of the social organizations that saved us,” said the Moscow Tractor Center. What were the organizations concerned? The state, the Party, the trade unions, the automobile association had all taken part. The state owned the Putiloff Works, financed the tractor stations, and also owned, through the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the Industrial Gazette which exposed the defects. The trade unions organized the volunteers and took care of their jobs during absence. The automobile association organized autos. But the driving will that saved the situation was the will of thousands of Moscow workers organized and assigned to their tasks by the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, of which most of the mechanics were not even members.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even on vacations Communists are supposed to be always watchfully aware of their responsibility for organizing the life of the country. I was slipping down the mighty Volga on a large passenger steamer when I saw a sign asking members of the Party who might be traveling to register with the secretary of the boat organization. I learned that any Communist traveling on the boat was likely to be drafted into speaking at a meeting on deck among the peasants, or at a political school for Communists of the crew. Some of the city Communists used the occasion to criticize hotly the boat Communists for lack of attention to sanitation. The river Communists, mostly untrained sailors, thus got their first lesson in modern hygiene.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ultimate destination towards which the Soviet ship of state is steering was fixed by the Revolution. The rate of speed and the daily and early course is charted by the Central Committee of the Party to take advantage of varying winds and tides. Yet it is a course which every active worker or farmer may take part in fixing. It arises from the experience of three million Party members, each keeping in touch with some section of the people, all of them interacting, discussing, comparing results. Communists of longest experience and best records have the greatest authority; but, be it noted, they do not call it “power.” “Power” resides in the will of the working masses; “authority” is that prestige of character and insight which enables its possessor to organize and release this power.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is authority rather than power that Stalin possesses. Though his standing is far higher than that of any man in the Soviet Union, though he is cheered and quoted at all congresses as high authority, men never speak of “Stalin’s will” or “Stalin’s power,” but of the “Party Line” which Stalin reports but does not make. The Party Line is accessible to all to study, to know and to help formulate. The greatness of the man is known by the range over which he can do this. “I can plan with the workers of one plant for a year,” said a factory manager to me. “Others much wiser than I, like the men in our Central Committee, can plan with wider masses for years. Stalin in this is our ablest. He sees the inter-relation of our path with world events, and the order of each step, as a man sees the earth from the stratosphere.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“The earth from the stratosphere”—the man who said this was himself an aviation engineer. Men in the Soviet Union tend to see Stalin in terms of their craft. Railway workers call him “locomotive driver of the Revolution.” An economist said to me, speaking of the leaders of Party and government in the Red Square on May-day: “Our brains are there in the tribune.” Harvester-combine operators addressed Stalin as “friend and teacher”; managers of industry say informally “the boss.” Yellow-skinned Kazaks of the desert on the fifteenth anniversary of their republic hailed him “great leader of toiling humanity.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Millions of simple folk in all callings have felt the direct impact of Stalin’s analysis, giving a solution for the chief problem of their lives. It was sometimes a way that was harsh to follow, but it was the one clear path to the goal that the millions desired. There have been statements by Stalin that ushered in great changes, as when he told the agrarian Marxist conference that the time had come to “abolish kulaks as a class.” Yet he only announced the time for a process which every Marxist knew was on the program. His famous article “Dizziness from Success” which called sudden halt on March 2, 1930, to widespread excesses of Communists in rural regions, was regarded by foreign correspondents and peasants alike as an “order from Stalin.” Stalin at once disclaimed any personal prestige therefrom accruing, stating in the press: “Some people think that the article is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin. That of course is nonsense. The Central Committee does not exist to permit personal initiative of anybody in matters of this kind. It was a reconnaissance undertaken by the Central Committee.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin does not rule personally. To a lifelong habit of collective action he adds his personal genius, that of supreme analyst of situations, personalities, tendencies. He leads as supreme combiner of many minds and wills, When Emil Ludwig asked him who really made decisions, he answered: “Single persons cannot decide. . . . Experience of three revolutions has shown us that out of a hundred individual decisions which have not been tested and corrected collectively, ninety are biased. The leadership of our Party in the Central Committee, which directs all the Soviet and Communist organizations, consists of about seventy people. Among those seventy members of our Central Committee there are to be found the best of our industrial leaders, our cleverest specialists and the men who best understand every branch of our activities. It is in this Supreme Council that the whole wisdom of our Party is concentrated. Each man is entitled to challenge his neighbor’s opinion or suggestion. Each man may give the benefit of his own experience. If it were otherwise, if individual decisions were admitted, there would be serious mistakes in our work.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin’s Interview with Emil Ludwig, Dec. 13, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The art of leadership is a serious matter,” said Stalin earlier, in concluding his article “Dizziness from Success.” “One must not lag behind a movement because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But one must not rush ahead, for this is to lose contact with the masses. . . . Our Party is strong and invincible because, while leading a movement, it knows how to maintain and multiply its contacts with the millions of the workers and peasant masses.” This may be taken as Stalin’s analysis of leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are plenty of stupidities and violences in the Soviet Union, yes-men and careerists, hardship and injustice, wastage of youth and life. All man’s essential progress costs heavily in human suffering; the Soviet Union has not escaped this law. What makes it endurable is just this fact that it is caused not by behest of one man or even of three million, but is part of the slow process—history will not call it slow—whereby the tens of millions achieve the organized and conscious planning of their lives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER VI: THE TECHNIQUE OF LEADERSHIP ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“Among the masses of people, we are but drops in the ocean, and we will be able to govern only when we properly express that which the people appreciate. Without this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not take the lead of the masses, and the whole machine will fall to pieces.”|Lenin at Eleventh Party Congress}}&lt;br /&gt;
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If by some cataclysm of war a section of the Soviet Union should be cut off from Moscow and compelled for a time to exist alone, government in these isolated areas would continue unchanged except insofar as it was crushed by invading armies. A picturesque example of this was given me by a Yakut woman, who boasted that her district of forests and tundra a thousand miles north of the Trans-Siberian Railway had had “Soviet Power” continuously since 1917. The years of civil war that raged along the railway had never penetrated so far north. To my query how this backward bit of territory knew what policies to follow she replied that a few Bolshevik exiles had remained among them and they got occasional news from Moscow over the Great Northern Telegraph which traversed their region. Many other sections of the country were isolated during the Civil War for considerable periods, yet continued to follow a common policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For eighteen years the authority of the Communist Party in the life of the Soviet Union has grown steadily stronger; it has kept power now for a considerably longer time than any Party in any other country in the world. The accumulating discontents which in other lands throw out governments do not seem to worry it. The Party itself organizes discontent for the sake of progress. In spite of exposures of graft, inefficiency, bureaucracy, and stupid excesses—indeed through these very exposures—the hold of the Communist Party increases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To manage the state affairs of the most extensive republic on earth—covering one-sixth of the world’s land surface—might be considered enough for a political party. But to run the state is only one of the Communists’ tasks. For their plan of remaking the world the apparatus of government is insufficient. Great popular organizations like trade unions, co-operatives, physical culture societies and scores of voluntary social agencies must also move in a common, yet flexible plan. But the action of these organizations must be voluntary, arousing the initiative of their members, or their energy and life will die.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How then does the Communist Party lead the country? By the energy and discipline of its members, their contact with all organizations in the land, and by the authority of repeated success. In all government bodies and voluntary organizations the Communists belonging to them act together to induce them to follow the “Party Line.” This line, however, while firm, is not rigid; Party policy itself grows from the discussions and active struggles of its members, each of whom is in touch with some aspect of the country’s life. The members serve as a living conscious bridge between the Party and all the other organizations. They explain to the Party the desires of the people with whom they are associated, and explain to the people the policies developed by the Party in regard to their demands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The primary Party organizations are set up in factories, offices, state farms, red army units, universities, villages, in any institution which has three Party members or more. In a typical iron and steel plant in the Ukraine, for instance, where 1,600 persons—workers, engineers, office staff—work in the rolling mill, 55 are Party members, 85 belong to the Young Communist League and 30 are enrolled as “sympathizers,” an organized group which is studying Communism with the presumable intent to join the Party. One Communist is paid a salary by the Party as full time organizer; the others are scattered in ordinary jobs through all the working gangs of the factory. Each of them has his assigned “Party work.” Some are editors of the sixteen “wall newspapers” which are posted in every working gang of the mill, filled with news and discussions of the gang’s successes and failures. Others read regular newspapers aloud during lunch hour and conduct discussions on current events. Others stir up “socialist competition” between different working gangs so that skill and production may increase. Others are active in the trade union or help promote sports. Every Communist, Young Communist and sympathizer does some unpaid public work of this kind; those who had none or failed to do it would be dropped from the Party as “passive.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years ago I visited an open meeting of a Party organization in a factory near Moscow. Not only the Communists but many non-members had gathered to hear the semi-annual report of the Party secretary of the plant. As he sat down a storm of questions arose. “Why have we no report about the Young Pioneers? . . . Has the Party looked into the question of our workers’ club building and observed that we have no summer playground? Why haven’t we a sanitary organization? Why haven’t we a ‘Friends of Aviation’? Does the co-operative housing organization report regularly to the Party, and if so, when are we going to get the houses?” From the secretary’s answers it became clear that this factory had many voluntary organizations among its members: a “Friends for Children,” an “International Labor Defense,” an organization to “Increase Production,” a “Society for Contacts with Rural Districts,” and many more. All of these had been launched with Party co-operation, usually first as small committees, and had then grown into larger organizations by the influx of people who were not Communists. The number of organizations that would be started would depend partly on popular demand and partly on the capacity of Party members to stimulate and organize interest. It would be difficult for an organization to start without Party sanction; it would not be precisely forbidden, but a score of difficulties would discourage it. On the other hand, if a popular demand arose for any new kind of organization—from a drama club to an Anti-Tuberculosis Society—some Party members would take part in it either on their own initiative or by request of the workers or the Party, and would be expected by everyone to keep the organization in touch with any Party policies which affected it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were several ironic remarks and cat-calls in the meeting during a report by the plant’s director, who was clearly not popular with the workers. I happened to know that the Party secretary had recently recommended to the higher organizations that the director be removed to some other plant where he could profit by the mistakes he had made in this one and start without the accumulated friction. The manager also knew that his transfer had been recommended, and quite possibly concurred. At the meeting, however, the Party secretary said no word of this recommendation but put himself in the unenviable position of explaining the manager’s actions to a group which was almost howling him down. Both he and the manager were disciplined Communists, who did not wish to increase dissension but to work together for the good of the plant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proportion of Communists in rural districts is very much less than in factories, as might be expected from the fact that the factory workers were the most active elements in the Revolution and also more literate than the peasants. A typical Party organization in a village of two hundred families—I take here the collective farm “Postishev” in the Ukraine—has five Party members, ten “sympathizers,” and twenty-seven members of the Young Communist League. The latter organization is nearly always much larger than the Party in the villages, since it is the youth on the farms which is progressive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the five Party members in this village, one of them, Povlichenko, is organizer, giving full time to Party work. He was born in the village, worked some years in a city factory, and was sent back in 1931 on Party order to help organize collectivization. From comments of peasant women I judge he was high-handed in that period and stirred up some antagonisms which he has not lived down. He is, however, a very energetic person, a once half-starved, half-educated farmhand with a passion for schooling which the Revolution enabled him to realize. He runs the Party school where members study Party history and current politics, teaches an elementary course in Leninism and the Soviet Constitution for the sympathizers, and organizes talks and discussions on special events, such as Party congresses, or new decrees affecting the farms. At the time of my visit these remote villagers were studying, more or less assiduously, the reports of Dimitroff and others at the recent congress of the Communist International. Povlichenko also takes active part in pushing the local school, the village club, the motion pictures, the local newspaper and all forms of education and culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second Communist is a local peasant, president of the collective farm since 1931, but now leaving for a three-year course in an agricultural school. His salary comes from the farm, not from the Party. The third is an electrician sent to this village because “we needed a Communist in every field brigade.” When he came he was entirely ignorant of farming, but his craft made him useful in a village just beginning to import electricity from the great power plant on the Dnieper. Recently the Party planned to transfer him to township work, but the local farmers checked this by electing him president of the village. “The Party,” he said, “always considers the desires of the masses.” He may or may not have helped organize those desires. For Party work he is attached to the third field brigade and is also adviser of the Young Communist League. The fourth party member is a woman who earns her living as saleswoman in the co-operative store, and whose Party assignment is to help the village women organize a day nursery, a first-aid society and get vacation on pay from the collective farm at time of childbirth. This right is automatic in state-owned enterprises, but not all the farmers’ organizations give it yet. The fifth Party member is manager of the local co-operative store, who, since he makes twenty or more trips to the city every month, is used by the Party for city contacts rather than for regular village work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is plain that these five Party members have their hands on the whole life of the village. Besides their general work, the first three each keep in touch with a different field brigade of forty or more workers whom they are expected to know personally. “I must know what they want, their economic conditions and working abilities. This is called political watchfulness. If we did not know this, it would be bad for us. We could not possibly lead the masses,” said Povlichenko.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Party organization of this village is open to criticism from strict Party principles in that its members hold too many local government jobs. They are supposed to keep a better balance between office-holders and members “in production,” and to stimulate and train non-Party people for some of the government work. Hogging the offices by Party members is considered a bad sign; it means that they have not stirred up wide enough interest. The Postishev organization is trying to do this through their work with the ten sympathizers and the Young Communists, each of whom has also Party work of a less responsible character. They read and discuss the newspapers in the field brigades, organize traveling libraries, chess games, football teams, initiate competitions in reaping and threshing, help start the musical or dramatic circle, or assist in the “cottage laboratory” where sixty farmers are studying scientific methods.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These primary Party organizations are correlated by the township&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rayon, a district about equivalent to a township.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; organization which in turn comes under the larger regions up to the All-Union organization. The lower bodies elect the higher but are in turn subordinate to their decisions; the system is known as “democratic centralism.” The highest power within each organization is vested in its general meeting or congress which elects a standing committee to serve between sessions. The highest power of the entire Party is the All-Union Party Congress and between its sessions the Central Committee. The Central Committee organizes a political bureau for the day-by-day determination of political policy, an organizational bureau for general guidance of organizational work, and a secretariat. Stalin is general secretary of the Party, but there are several other secretaries who share this work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years ago I saw a district congress of the Communist Party in action in the city of Red Lugansk of the Donetz Basin, the valley of coal and steel. Four or five hundred men and women gathered for a two day session—miners and mine managers, employees and head of the locomotive works, some teachers and health department officials—Communists all, sent as delegates from the local Party organizations of the factories and mines of the district. The problems for discussion were the policy for heavy industry and for minor nationalities. They had been announced by the Central Committee as the immediate pressing problems; “theses” on them had been published by the leading authorities and every local Party organization had discussed them for weeks.&lt;br /&gt;
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The delegates wasted no time in preliminaries and compliments. Man after man spoke hotly and strongly on the concrete difficulties of heavy industry in the mines and factories they knew. They prepared reports based on the industry of their district and elected delegates to carry their hottest criticisms to the regional Party Congress in the coal center, Bakhmut, where delegates were again chosen to the All-Ukrainian Party Congress. Then all over the Soviet Union the special trains began running. From Kharkov, from Tiflis, from Minsk, from Central Asia and Siberia, they bore the chosen delegates to Moscow where two weeks’ discussion in the All-Union Party Congress hammered out the “Party Line.” Thence the results rolled back again to the Donetz, the Caucasus, the Far East to Vladivostok, borne by returning delegates whose first duty was to explain and carry through the decisions through trade unions, cooperatives, farms, government, whatever organizations they influenced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the most widely organized thinking ever attempted in history. It is actually the energetic thinking of three million men and women, gathering up the ideas of tens of millions of their neighbors, which beats upon the All-Union Party Congress and affects its decisions. The ideas are worked over by the ablest economists of the Party, familiar with the experience of the revolutionary movement in all countries. The decisions reached are explained to the country through every channel of organized publicity; they are discussed and studied in every field brigade and factory and put into action simultaneously throughout the land. For the test of organized thinking is organized action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Communists do not merely reflect the will of the masses, as a ballot might, or a showing of hands. They do not merely analyze what the “majority want” and hand it out. It is their job to lead, to organize the people’s will. No group of unurged soldiers would ever vote to storm a trench. Certainly the workers of the Soviet Union would not have voted, unurged, unled, for the hardships of the Five-Year Plan of rapid industrialization taken out of their own food and comforts, for the painful speed of farm collectivization without adequate machines or organizers. But when the Communist Party analyzed, urged and demanded, showing the world situation and the need of making the USSR well prepared industrially and for defense, showing the enemy classes which must be abolished to attain the goal of a socialist state, they were able to find, organize and create, deep in the heart of the masses, a will that carried through. Without that will in tens of millions, the three million could have done little. “To bring about a revolution, a leading revolutionary minority is required,” Stalin told H. G. Wells. “But the most talented, devoted and energetic minority would be helpless if it did not rely upon the at least passive support of millions.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. G. Wells’ Interview with Joseph Stalin, July 23, 1934&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As an example of the interrelation of Party, government and voluntary workers in action, let me take the “mobilization” of automobiles and mechanics in the spring of 1931 to save flax sowing in Moscow province. Collective farming came that year to the province in a great drive of organization and propaganda backed by hundreds of new tractors, which were being used chiefly to increase the area of flax. In the first week of sowing, telegrams from the newly organized tractor stations poured into Moscow, announcing that there was a “break.” Tractors all over the province stood in the fields, not moving, for causes yet to be analyzed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who moves in such a case? The Moscow Committee of the Party moves. Sorting over in its office the reports of all Moscow’s daily emergencies, it decides that the break in flax is serious and calls for a “mobilization” of mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The call goes out to Party organizations in a hundred shops and factories. It is announced by trade-union shop committees and factory newspapers. Not a single mechanic is compelled to answer, but any mechanic willing to give a day or two for tractor repair to help the sowing will be helped by foreman and fellow workers to arrange his job. He may work at this sanctioned public task without forfeiting wages, while others fill in the gap in his regular work. What is the motive? The fun of participating in saving the sowing, of helping the country, of living a varied, useful life. Automobiles also are “mobilized” to carry the mechanics to the farms, and those who lend machines for such public work may hope for a cut in automobile taxes. I volunteered for a two-day trip.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One hundred and fifty miles north of Moscow we came to the tractor station to which we were assigned. Of thirty-three new tractors from Putiloff Works, eleven could not move out of the railway station. The rest were breaking down in the fields, under the hands of worried peasant boys and girls who had seen their first machine one month before. All night our volunteer mechanics repaired tractors. All night the local tractor drivers stood up to watch in their eagerness to learn. The following day I drove my car to Moscow with sleeping mechanics in the seats. They had worked twenty hours on end in a public emergency about which they would report next morning to their interested fellow workers in Moscow factories. They had also prepared a technical report charging the Putiloff tractor with certain grave defects. It was printed within two days in the Industrial Gazette, the organ of heavy industry, and led to a conference of industrial leaders on improving the Putiloff tractor. Three weeks later the flax sowing of Moscow province, which in early season threatened to lag at 50 per cent of plan, went over the top 108 per cent, the best flax record in the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It was the work of the social organizations that saved us,” said the Moscow Tractor Center. What were the organizations concerned? The state, the Party, the trade unions, the automobile association had all taken part. The state owned the Putiloff Works, financed the tractor stations, and also owned, through the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the Industrial Gazette which exposed the defects. The trade unions organized the volunteers and took care of their jobs during absence. The automobile association organized autos. But the driving will that saved the situation was the will of thousands of Moscow workers organized and assigned to their tasks by the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, of which most of the mechanics were not even members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even on vacations Communists are supposed to be always watchfully aware of their responsibility for organizing the life of the country. I was slipping down the mighty Volga on a large passenger steamer when I saw a sign asking members of the Party who might be traveling to register with the secretary of the boat organization. I learned that any Communist traveling on the boat was likely to be drafted into speaking at a meeting on deck among the peasants, or at a political school for Communists of the crew. Some of the city Communists used the occasion to criticize hotly the boat Communists for lack of attention to sanitation. The river Communists, mostly untrained sailors, thus got their first lesson in modern hygiene.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ultimate destination towards which the Soviet ship of state is steering was fixed by the Revolution. The rate of speed and the daily and early course is charted by the Central Committee of the Party to take advantage of varying winds and tides. Yet it is a course which every active worker or farmer may take part in fixing. It arises from the experience of three million Party members, each keeping in touch with some section of the people, all of them interacting, discussing, comparing results. Communists of longest experience and best records have the greatest authority; but, be it noted, they do not call it “power.” “Power” resides in the will of the working masses; “authority” is that prestige of character and insight which enables its possessor to organize and release this power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is authority rather than power that Stalin possesses. Though his standing is far higher than that of any man in the Soviet Union, though he is cheered and quoted at all congresses as high authority, men never speak of “Stalin’s will” or “Stalin’s power,” but of the “Party Line” which Stalin reports but does not make. The Party Line is accessible to all to study, to know and to help formulate. The greatness of the man is known by the range over which he can do this. “I can plan with the workers of one plant for a year,” said a factory manager to me. “Others much wiser than I, like the men in our Central Committee, can plan with wider masses for years. Stalin in this is our ablest. He sees the inter-relation of our path with world events, and the order of each step, as a man sees the earth from the stratosphere.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The earth from the stratosphere”—the man who said this was himself an aviation engineer. Men in the Soviet Union tend to see Stalin in terms of their craft. Railway workers call him “locomotive driver of the Revolution.” An economist said to me, speaking of the leaders of Party and government in the Red Square on May-day: “Our brains are there in the tribune.” Harvester-combine operators addressed Stalin as “friend and teacher”; managers of industry say informally “the boss.” Yellow-skinned Kazaks of the desert on the fifteenth anniversary of their republic hailed him “great leader of toiling humanity.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Millions of simple folk in all callings have felt the direct impact of Stalin’s analysis, giving a solution for the chief problem of their lives. It was sometimes a way that was harsh to follow, but it was the one clear path to the goal that the millions desired. There have been statements by Stalin that ushered in great changes, as when he told the agrarian Marxist conference that the time had come to “abolish kulaks as a class.” Yet he only announced the time for a process which every Marxist knew was on the program. His famous article “Dizziness from Success” which called sudden halt on March 2, 1930, to widespread excesses of Communists in rural regions, was regarded by foreign correspondents and peasants alike as an “order from Stalin.” Stalin at once disclaimed any personal prestige therefrom accruing, stating in the press: “Some people think that the article is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin. That of course is nonsense. The Central Committee does not exist to permit personal initiative of anybody in matters of this kind. It was a reconnaissance undertaken by the Central Committee.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin does not rule personally. To a lifelong habit of collective action he adds his personal genius, that of supreme analyst of situations, personalities, tendencies. He leads as supreme combiner of many minds and wills, When Emil Ludwig asked him who really made decisions, he answered: “Single persons cannot decide. . . . Experience of three revolutions has shown us that out of a hundred individual decisions which have not been tested and corrected collectively, ninety are biased. The leadership of our Party in the Central Committee, which directs all the Soviet and Communist organizations, consists of about seventy people. Among those seventy members of our Central Committee there are to be found the best of our industrial leaders, our cleverest specialists and the men who best understand every branch of our activities. It is in this Supreme Council that the whole wisdom of our Party is concentrated. Each man is entitled to challenge his neighbor’s opinion or suggestion. Each man may give the benefit of his own experience. If it were otherwise, if individual decisions were admitted, there would be serious mistakes in our work.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin’s Interview with Emil Ludwig, Dec. 13, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The art of leadership is a serious matter,” said Stalin earlier, in concluding his article “Dizziness from Success.” “One must not lag behind a movement because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But one must not rush ahead, for this is to lose contact with the masses. . . . Our Party is strong and invincible because, while leading a movement, it knows how to maintain and multiply its contacts with the millions of the workers and peasant masses.” This may be taken as Stalin’s analysis of leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are plenty of stupidities and violences in the Soviet Union, yes-men and careerists, hardship and injustice, wastage of youth and life. All man’s essential progress costs heavily in human suffering; the Soviet Union has not escaped this law. What makes it endurable is just this fact that it is caused not by behest of one man or even of three million, but is part of the slow process—history will not call it slow—whereby the tens of millions achieve the organized and conscious planning of their lives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER VII: BUILDING THE NEW ECONOMY ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Either perish or overtake the advanced countries and surpass them. . . . This is how history has put the question.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Millions make the plan.”|Stalin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the most striking characteristics of Soviet life to a new arrival is the passionate interest which citizens show in new industries, modern equipment, figures of carloadings, economic statistics generally. The “romantic passion” of the Russians for machinery, the visitor is apt to call it. He himself is long since bored by machinery which has recently put him out of work; he finds it difficult to understand this passion. He has come to see “the revolution,” to study the characteristics of planned economy or the amazing change in human concepts. He finds the revolutionary background taken for granted by Soviet citizens; they want to show him factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The mood of the Soviet Union today is a mood of tremendous struggle and incredible conquest in which individual values and problems pale before the brightness of one great problem whose solution is told off by the ever-rising curve of production, the opening of steel mills, the successful mastery of tractor plants, machine building works, textile factories. It is a mood in which a newly literate servant girl will hail the rain running into her leaky shoes if that rain means harvest. Harvest somewhere far off on farms she never sees.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not surprising that economic facts have a vital interest for Soviet citizens. The changes in the country’s economic life since the Revolution have been stupendous and the results are felt in every person’s daily living. Fifteen years ago when first I entered the Soviet Union, the country was ravaged by famine and pestilence. Civil war and foreign intervention had ruined farming, industry, transport. Street-cars were not running in Moscow, street lights had long since burned out without replacements, and two fuelless winters had so destroyed the entire city’s plumbing that water pressure could not rise above the second floors. In the best hospital of Samara, where I lay ill in 1921 with typhus, there were but two clinical thermometers for hundreds of patients. Thermometers, light bulbs, water pipes were only a few of the million articles which long war and blockade kept out of the Soviet Union and which could not be manufactured in the few and backward factories of that vast agricultural land.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have lived through fifteen years of incredibly rapid progress which have almost wiped out all memory of the past. To dwellers in the Soviet Union, the pre-war period seems already pre-historic, and even 1921 seems a century ago. We have seen in these fifteen years a more than ten-fold increase in industrial production; we have seen a leap in farming from the sixteenth century into the twenty-first. We have lived through a series of epochs sharply distinct from each other in the regulations affecting our daily existence, but all these periods have been characterized by one continuous fury of energetic endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reasons for energetic endeavor were very plain to the people of a land just emerging from foreign intervention and long blockade. “War is implacable,” said Lenin. “It puts the question with merciless sharpness. Either perish or overtake the advanced countries and surpass them. . . . Either full steam ahead or perish. This is how history has put the question.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by Stalin in Report on &#039;&#039;Results of the First Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; All Communists hold that in the present epoch of worldwide imperialist expansion, it is the fate of economically backward lands to be parceled out among the imperial nations. Soviet Russia, unless she could make herself economically independent, had to fear the fate which has overtaken China, “a military field of operations of foreign enemies and pecked at by everybody who cares to do so.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Results of the First Five-Year Flan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If a rapid rate of economic development was necessary to preserve even the independence of the country, it was still more necessary as a prerequisite for a socialist commonwealth. The abundant life for every toiler which socialism implies demands lavish production; it cannot be attained in a country where the means of production is the individually owned tool. The material conditions for a prosperous socialist commonwealth exist today in America far more than they ever existed in Russia. Sharing the wealth cannot take place until there is really wealth to share. Socially owned wealth must be based on socially owned factories. Russia had the problem of first building the factories.&lt;br /&gt;
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The rapid development of Soviet Russia’s economic wealth was considered of crucial importance by Lenin, not only for the welfare of the Russian people, but even for the future of world-wide socialism. Faced by the handicap of a backward, semi-feudal land, the workers of the new revolutionary country had nonetheless one advantage—they were the joint owners of their country and all of its productive wealth. They must prove to the world that even against great difficulties this one advantage was decisive. Even in 1921 in the depths of economic ruin Lenin said: “We are exercising our main influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian republic. . . . If we solve this problem, then we shall have won on an international scale for certain and finally. That is why questions of economic construction assume for us absolutely exceptional significance.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 28, 1921. &#039;&#039;All-Russian Conference of the Communist Party&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a strange paradox in the economic development of the Soviet Union which even foreign resident must notice. It is that every slight achievement costs infinite effort, yet mighty achievements are won in an incredibly short time. The penalty for Russia’s ancient backwardness is to be found in an inefficiency which hampers every movement—taking a tramway, buying a spool of thread, securing a room. The difficulty of making even one blast furnace function properly arouses frantic despair in the hearts of foreign specialists. Yet in spite of these difficulties, the Soviet Union advances at a speed unknown even to the most efficient capitalist countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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This speed is due to the tremendous energy and initiative of millions of workers and farmers who are conscious owners now of their own means of production, and who know that whatever they create will be their own permanent gain. Their initiative is correlated by a system of social planning. Thus arises that paradoxical combination of individual inefficiency with tremendous social momentum. In the most developed capitalist countries the efficiencies of ten million individuals pull in conflicting directions, giving small gain to society. But each new achievement in the Soviet planned structure, attained with such painful difficulty, reinforces the sum total of a million gains.&lt;br /&gt;
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So obvious and so widely known are these benefits of social planning in the Soviet Union that in recent years it has become a common dream in many countries to transfer painlessly the technique of planning to the capitalist system, thus gaining the blessings of socialism without the harsh shock of revolution. In America especially, where the highly developed processes of production could so obviously produce plenty for all, the illusion arises that somehow some genius, some group of super-brains sitting in New York or in Washington, ought to be able to find the magic secret of putting those processes to work. It is clear that an individual owner can plan his factory and bring it to a relatively high state of efficiency as compared with the days of handicraft. But can a government brain trust, however brilliant, plan the disposal of Rockefeller’s oil wells, or the internal organization of U. S. Steel? To ask this question is to answer it, if it has not been answered already by the history of the NRA. Only owners can plan an industry and dispose of its products. Under capitalism plans of different owners clash.&lt;br /&gt;
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For a socialist state, the simplest and most basic act of government is the planning by worker-owners of the expansion and improvement of their jointly owned properties. Planning of this type takes place not only in those central institutions of Moscow where the foreign visitor habitually looks for it; it begins simultaneously at the workers’ bench. Production meetings after work discuss shop problems, what holds back production, how much it can be increased, and by what means. These discussions are enlarged on a factory scale; they go from the factory to the central offices of the industrial trusts. Word comes back from the central organizations to the shop that the country needs certain new machines. “Can we make them in our plant?” Delegates from other industries which need the machines arrive, explain, mutually consult. The inventions and suggestions of the local workers thus widen into a nation’s plan.&lt;br /&gt;
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The plan is, however, no mere blueprint to be fulfilled with exactness. In the absolute and technical sense, one cannot speak of it as a final “plan” at all. For although every factory, farm, school and government institution checks its monthly and annual achievements by its plan, yet the proudest boast is always to have overfulfilled it, i.e., broken the plan by doing more than intended. The plan is therefore a standard of what is expected, a flag of challenge, but in no sense a limit. There is no limit set in the Soviet Union. The aim is the fullest development of the creative and productive powers of the country. The more production, the better. It will be seen at once how impossible such a conception of planning becomes under capitalism. It is based on the assumption that the worker-owners of the nation’s production will be able to use everything that they care to make.&lt;br /&gt;
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Socialism is not created in a day; it is not achieved by voting and not even by seizure of power. Seizure of power is only a prerequisite. Socialism involves the expansion and organization of the collectively owned properties of the country and the building of a good life for everyone thereon. This was the purpose of the October Revolution, and in spite of all the accounts in the press of the world for eighteen years about Soviet “changes of policy,” this purpose has never changed in the slightest degree. The tactics used have, however, been conditioned by both internal strength and international relations. Not until 1921, when the new workers’ state had beaten back the armies of intervention, was it possible to begin the building of the national economy.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the wars of invasion were over, industry had sunk to one-fifth of pre-war, the production of cotton goods was only 7 per cent of normal, iron and steel production had almost entirely ceased. Grain reserves were exhausted, and the drought of 1921 led directly to the greatest famine in Russian history. The New Economic Policy, adopted at that time, encouraged all forms of economic development, both those of capitalism and those of socialism. Meantime each year the Communists led the working class of the country to concentrate a desperate, organized struggle for victory in one important field after another—victories often achieved at the expense of heavy temporary sacrifices elsewhere.&lt;br /&gt;
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The year 1922 saw the successful fight to establish a state bank and a partially stable currency by high banking charges which ruthlessly exploited all the industries of the country. In 1923 emphasis turned to the hard-pressed industries; for the first time since the revolution, their balance sheets reached “self-support,” at the expense of excessively high prices to the consumer. There followed a two years’ effort to cut prices; consumers’ co-operatives were widely developed as a link between the state factories and the peasants. By 1926 co-operative and government trade had increased threefold, successfully passing the private middle-man who had previously controlled over 80 per cent of the rural turnover. During the next two years, emphasis turned again to the restoration of industry, which reached by 1928 the pre-war standard of production. The Soviet workers had rebuilt their war-devastated country without the aid of the foreign credits which flowed to help all the war-injured capitalist lands of Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet this attainment was still of low standard, the pre-war production of backward tsarist Russia. The ancient plants were working to full capacity, but they could not begin to supply the needs of workers and farmers who expected a higher standard of life than before the Revolution. Each year the shortage of goods increased. Soviet industry could not expand further except by extension of basic capital, new buildings, more machines. Any threatening war would still find the country lacking not only in commodities, but in that heavy industry on which, in our modern mechanized world, is based the means of production in peace and of defense in war.&lt;br /&gt;
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Could Soviet Russia develop her industries rapidly and make herself economically independent, or must she live, as tsarist Russia did, by export of farm products, chancing her future on a hostile capitalist world? This problem set sharply the still more fundamental problem whether socialism could be built in one country and if so, by what means. Russia’s basic industry was state-owned but this industry was insufficient to supply the people with goods. The primitive farming system, made still more primitive by the splitting up of the former landlords’ estates into small subsistence farms, which partly consumed and partly wasted much formerly marketed grain, was increasingly failing to feed the growing cities. In 1927 the Russian farms attained the pre-war sown area of 280,000,000 acres and the pre-war grain production of somewhat over 80,000,000 tons, but only about half of the pre-war marketed grain was reaching the market. Socialized industry was like an island in an ocean of medieval agriculture, whose tides constantly threatened to undermine the base of socialism. “As long as we live in a small peasant country,” Lenin had said, “there will be a more solid economic basis for capitalism than for Communism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, Russian edition, XXVI, 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Farming must be brought out of the Middle Ages, modernized and made efficient. For this two roads of development were possible. The employing peasants, known as kulaks, who already owned the best of the rural means of production, better plows, more horses, occasional threshers, creameries and flour mills, might be allowed to expand, to acquire tractors, combines, and the additional land which these machines could cultivate, dispossessing more and more landless peasants into the ranks of unemployed. Thus capitalist farming grew in other countries out of the feudal ages. The price of such growth for Soviet Russia under the world conditions of the modern era would be not only continued class war in rural districts, not only swiftly increasing unemployment, not only the steady submergence of all socialist industry by an expanding capitalism, but the complete dependence of this young Russian capitalism on the financial oligarchs of the imperialist world. Such, at least, was the analysis made by Stalin and the Communist Party in adopting in 1928 the now famous Five-Year Plan.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Five-Year Plan proposed the rapid industrialization of the country, more rapid than any industrialization known in the world before. Heavy industry must first be built, the machines that make machines for other industry and for farming. Lighter industries to raise the standard of living must rapidly follow. Farming must be industrialized, not by strengthening a class of rural capitalists, but by the voluntary uniting of all non-exploiting peasants, beginning with the poorest, into collective groups farming their lands jointly with machinery which the developing state industry would supply. This was necessary to make farming modern, while giving the benefits of its modernization to all farmers. It was necessary to make Russia socialist, or even to preserve the half-socialism which the city workers had begun. It was necessary for the independence of the country and the very existence of the Soviet government. “We could not refrain,” said Stalin, “from whipping up a country which was a hundred years behind and which owing to its backwardness was faced with mortal danger.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Report to Joint Plenum of Central Committee and Central Control Commission on &#039;&#039;Results of Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;, 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In less than five years—for the Five-Year Plan was 96 per cent completed in four and a quarter years from October 1928 through December 1932—Stalin was able to announce that the former backward agricultural Russia had become the second industrial country in the world. The number employed in industry doubled from eleven million to twenty-two million. The volume of industrial output also doubled, from 15.7 billion rubles in 1928 to 34.3 billion in 1932 (calculated at prices prevailing in 1926-7); it was three times the pre-war production. At the same time a rapid industrialization of farming combined some twenty million tiny, uneconomic subsistence farms into 200,000 large collectively operated farms (by 1936 there were 250,000) based on machine power, scientific methods, division of labor. The relative proportion of industrial to agricultural output grew from 48 per cent at the beginning of the plan to 70 per cent at the end of 1932, thus changing Russia from an agricultural to a predominantly industrial country.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Formerly we did not have an iron and steel industry. Now we have such an industry,” reported Stalin in January 1933 at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have an automobile industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have an engineering industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have a big and modern chemical industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have a real solid industry for the production of modern farm machinery. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We did not have an aviation industry. Now we have one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“In production of electric power we were last in the list. Now we are among the first in the list...&lt;br /&gt;
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“And we have achieved these enormous new branches of industry on a scale that makes the scale of European industry pale into insignificance. . . .” Such was only part of the success reported.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Five-Year Plan cost heavily in dislocation of populations, exhaustion of youth, disorganization of harvests and many privations which attended the rationing of food and other commodities. But never in history was such an advance gained at less cost and certainly never so swiftly; and it was gained unprecedentedly without long-term credits or foreign loans. Had the pace been less swift, had the Communists postponed this breathless drive towards full industrialization, they believe that Soviet Russia would already have had “not pacts of non-aggression, but war.” “We would have been unarmed in the midst of a capitalist environment which is armed with modern technique.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Results of the First Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The advance of Japan into Manchuria in 1931 and the stated intention of Nazi Germany to expand into Soviet Ukraine are warnings today which anyone may read of the fate which might already have overtaken the Soviet Union but for its swiftly rising economic and military strength.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the conclusion of the first Five-Year Plan at the end of 1932, the Soviet Union plunged into the second. “We have already laid the foundations of a socialist society . . . and all we have to do now is to erect the edifice—a task which undoubtedly is easier,” said Stalin at the Seventeenth Party Congress in early 1934. Industry and trade were already 99 per cent socialized; three-fourths of agricultural production was socialized. On the base thus established, the second Five-Year Plan proposed to abolish “all private property in the means of production, all class distinctions, all exploitation of man by man.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Molotov, &#039;&#039;Tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It proposed three times as much new construction as had been achieved in the first Five-Year Plan. It proposed a doubling and tripling of the standard of living through the final technical reconstruction of the whole national economy, the mastery of the most modern methods and the most complex machines.&lt;br /&gt;
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Already as the year 1936 opens, it is clear that the second Five-Year Plan can be accomplished in less than five years. In the last months of 1935 the total monthly output of heavy industry was already five times as high as in 1928.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;From 404.9 million rubles, average monthly output in 1928 to 2,180.6 million in Nov. 1935, stable rubles of 1926-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Grain production has known three record harvests surpassing all pre-collectivization years. Rapid increase in the standard of living—more food, better clothing, expanding art and science—is evident in all parts of the country. Cotton pickers, sugar-beet growers, combined-harvester operators, timber workers, machinists and miners are descending triumphantly on Moscow to celebrate their achievements in production and win the plaudits of the land.&lt;br /&gt;
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With hammer blows the figures of the 1935 achievements were given by Molotov in January 1936 to the Central Executive Committee. A 20.4 per cent increase in industrial production over 1934, in place of the 16 per cent planned; 23 per cent increase in freight car loadings, 45 per cent in raw cotton, and 43 per cent in sugar beets. A grain harvest running close to one hundred million tons, nearly ten million above the highest previous harvest; horses up 5 per cent, cattle 18 per cent, sheep and goats 25 per cent, hogs 38 per cent—all increases of a single year.&lt;br /&gt;
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The abolition of the card system of rationing, reported Grinko, Commissar of Finance, had lifted the trade turnover from 60 to 80 billion rubles; the profits from socialist economy were 7.8 billion rubles; the planned state budget receipts had been exceeded and the planned expenditures cut, leaving a surplus for expansion. But the most important result of the year, said Molotov, was the Stakhanov movement “which leads to an entire revolution in industry and transport, and opens the first page of the great advance in socialist productivity of labor.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Then, with confidence born of experience, Valery Meshlauk, head of the State Planning Commission, gave page after page of the carefully plotted future. “The 1936 plan provides for a further and accelerated upsurge of the whole national economy.” The increase set for large-scale industry is 23 per cent, a 15 billion ruble advance, which is greater than the entire output of this industry in 1927. The increase set for agriculture is 24 per cent, for commodity circulation 25, railway transport 19.8, capital construction 34.8. The financial income of the population is to rise from 101 to 118 billion rubles, in the face of steadily dropping prices. Social and cultural services in the central and local budgets are to rise from 16 to 21 billion, the social insurance alone from 6.7 to 8 billion. But darkly across this shining future run figures of army expansion, from the 6.5 billion planned to 8.2 billion actually spent in 1935 and 14.8 billion planned for 1936. For beyond the borders of the triumphantly planned growth of Soviet national economy lie the unpredictable dangers of the chaotic capitalist world.&lt;br /&gt;
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If a map of the Soviet world could be drawn pictorially and changed with each changing year, it would show countless new cities arising on formerly barren land. It would show tens of millions of tiny, uneconomic farm plots merging into a rhythm of horizon-touching fields. It would show thousands of geological expeditions penetrating uncharted wildernesses to discover and chart nationally owned wealth. Following these there would flash across the scene surveyors, engineers, new railroads, steel plants, textile mills. New timber areas open, new coal and oil fields. If the map had a sound film attachment one would hear the summons sent forth to young Communists, to workers in the older, better-organized factories, demanding heroic personnel for the conquest of the wastes. The conquering march of man reaches northward to settle the Arctic and eastward to the wild coasts opposite Alaska. And a long green strip of a million and a half acres of new forest-zone moves steadily southward across treeless plains of Kazakstan as a mighty screen to protect the grain lands of South Russia from the desert winds of Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
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For the past two years the Communist leaders have begun to speak of socialism as “victorious”; its economic base is secure.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER VIII: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The Soviet Union needs no foreign wars for transforming the world.”|Manuilski at Congress of Communist International, 1935}}&lt;br /&gt;
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A socialist country craves peace for development. As the life of the Soviet people grows richer and more varied, the one great dread which hangs above it is the threat of war. Soviet citizens are never subject to the illusion—most diabolical of all the contradictions of capitalism—that war may bring a feverish, blood-bought prosperity and eliminate unemployment by turning men into the pursuits of destruction. The prosperity of socialism is based on harmonious correlation of production and needs, and there is no unemployment. The Soviet world sees war as naked destruction of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Even the need of preparing for war it sees as a waste of resources which might otherwise go in direct benefits to the population.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the eighteen years of its existence, the Soviet Union has been widely recognized as a champion of peace. Even its foes admit that the USSR does not want war for the present. Yet so confused is the world’s thinking on the subject of war and peace—a confusion promoted by diplomats and statesmen—so instinctive under capitalism has become the assumption that every advancing nation must seek in the end the test of war, that the Soviet hunger for peace is at times confused either with cowardice or hypocrisy. Are they not perhaps just watchfully waiting until their economic building is accomplished, and their strength is sure? What are they doing in the League of Nations? Why are they increasing the Red Army? Do they not after all want world revolution, which world war presumably might usher in? How permanent is the Soviet wish for peace? And, even if sincere, can it be effective?&lt;br /&gt;
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There are two ways to approach this question: by the detailed examination of Soviet history and by understanding the theory behind every Soviet action. We shall take each of these methods in turn.&lt;br /&gt;
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Behind all Soviet action is the Marxian theory that the cause of war is neither permanent in human nature, as militarists claim, nor to be found in lack of goodwill and in the character of rulers, as idealist pacifists think. Marxists hold that war arises from class conflicts. Wars in the present period of world history, according to this analysis, arise from the struggle of capitalism to survive and grow by investment in new markets. This leads the major nations to engage first in small wars of colonial oppression, the forcing of their goods and investment upon undeveloped peoples; these lead to wars between the imperialist nations over the territories which both sides wish to exploit. A socialist commonwealth where the people own jointly their means of production and receive all the fruits of their toil, wants no expanding market for surplus profits but only equal interchange of goods which encourages peace.&lt;br /&gt;
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A socialist world would thus attain peace permanently. But a single socialist country lives in a world of foes. Can peace be attained under these conditions? Not permanently and not with assurance, as long as capitalism survives. The capitalist world system from its nature breeds war. None the less, each specific war has specific causes, which may be studied, analyzed, hampered and delayed. Peace may be won from month to month and year to year by specific, well-considered actions, as an able engineer postpones collapse inherent in a faulty structure by accurate balancing of specific strains and stresses. This is an unstable peace, but better than none, for every curtailment of war prevents human suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
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In applying this analysis to our present period of history, Soviet policy holds that the economic world today is one and indivisible, and that every war must affect the whole world. No fair words of politicians can keep a nation out of it; no policy of isolation can be a guarantee. For behind all those words and beneath all such policies the economic pressures inexorably act. Trade in goods of war begins to flow towards even a minor conflict and steadily the traders are drawn further in. Thus was America drawn into the World War by increasing financial commitments, till at last an American ambassador cabled from London that a panic would shake the whole United States unless American boys followed American dollars into the battles of Britain and France. When that stage occurs, no country keeps out of it; the president who “kept us out of war” turns about and marches in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even those nations which are technically neutral—the number of these decreases with the seriousness of the war—are involved only slightly less than those who battle. “Any war,” says Litvinoff, “sooner or later, will bring distress to all countries, both to the combatants and the non-participants. We must never forget the lesson of the World War, the consequences of which are felt to this day by combatants and neutral countries alike. The impoverishment of the whole world, the lowering of the living standards of all categories of labor, both physical and mental, unemployment when no one is sure of tomorrow, to say nothing of the collapse of cultural values, the reversion of certain countries to medieval ideas—these are the consequences of the World War which are clearly felt sixteen years after its end.”&lt;br /&gt;
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To maintain peace is therefore a permanent policy for the Soviet Union. To maintain peace not only for itself but in the world. But peace is not to be had by expecting it. It may not even be won by refusing to fight. China refuses to fight, but gets no peace. Neither preparedness nor unpreparedness is a safeguard; unarmed and well-armed folk have alike gone to war. The only safeguard for even that partial peace possible under capitalism is clear, sincere study of the whole world situation, the choosing of a policy which prevents war or lessens it, and the backing of that policy by all available power. One must struggle for peace; it will not come otherwise. The methods change as the situations change.&lt;br /&gt;
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For eighteen years the Soviet Union has made this struggle. “Peace, land and bread” was the slogan of the October Revolution. The hunger for peace of a war-exhausted people brought the Bolsheviks to power. Their first official act on November 8, 1917, was to propose “to all warring peoples and their governments to begin immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace.” As an attack upon the war and to remove causes of future war, the new revolutionary government exposed and denounced the secret treaties by which England, France and Russia had agreed to redivide the world. They annulled oppressive tsarist treaties which had been enforced on Persia and Turkey, and withdrew the Russian army from Persia.&lt;br /&gt;
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The strength of the new government was not equal to its understanding. The Entente Powers—England, France and the United States—denounced the Bolsheviks for daring to speak of peace and left their former ally to the mercy of Germany. The German general staff marched onward into a prostrate country offering the Bolsheviks “robber terms.” The position of the Soviet state was further weakened by Trotsky’s attempt to deal with advancing troops by clever phrases. He refused to sign terms but protested in the formmula: “Neither war nor peace”—an appeal to the conscience of the German people. But general staffs are not expected to have a conscience, and no Germans acted to save the Russians. The invading army marched far into the Ukraine and took possession, giving in the end worse terms than those originally offered. Trotsky’s appeal reached the consciences of idealists; I recall that it thrilled me far out in Seattle. But it was Ukrainian peasants and workers who suffered; idealist gestures are dangerous tactics in war.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Germany offered the Bolsheviks only a robbers’ peace, their former allies gave them no peace at all. On April 5, 1918, the Japanese landed in Vladivostok; following them the English, French and American armies invaded Siberia. Allied armies landed on the Arctic coast to seize the northern part of Russia; the British grabbed Baku, oil capital of the south. Agents of the Entente incited and participated in armed uprisings of Czechoslovak prisoners of war along the Volga, leading them against the Bolshevik government. From east and west and north and south the armies of all the major capitalist powers surrounded the Revolution with an iron ring of war and blockade.&lt;br /&gt;
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Across this iron ring the starving people of the new state sent appeal after appeal to all those governments which refused to deal with them but especially to President Wilson. Beginning on November 24, 1918, and repeating their query through Raymond Robins, head of the American Red Cross in Russia, and also by direct cables to the State Department, they offered to consider any peace terms whatever: recognition of debts, concessions of territory, control of mines and natural resources. Rather than deal in any way with Bolsheviks, Wilson and the Allied governments sitting in Versailles issued a call to all the “organized groups in Russia” to meet at the Principo Islands, a proposal which clearly presaged the dividing of Russia into spheres of influence after the style of China. The Bolsheviks were not invited, but they accepted; the other governments refused and the scheme fell through. There followed the famous trip of William Christian Bullitt to Moscow in March 1919 as President Wilson’s semi-official representative. The hard-pressed Soviet government was ready to agree to Bullitt’s proposal that it accept all financial obligations of all past Russian governments, and divide the territory of Russia among all those governments which should be in armed possession when the treaty should be signed. But the treaty was never signed; President Wilson refused to receive the report of his own envoy. Bolsheviks were made to realize that no peace can be had from the imperialist powers of earth by any backward nation. Not even the price of slavish submission buys peace for China; nor could the offer of territory and gold buy it for Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by appeals for peace and not by offers of concessions, but by the desperate struggle and courage of the Revolutionary Red Army was peace and independence finally won. It was secured in slow stages, first cessation of battle, then trade agreements, then, much more slowly, diplomatic recognition. At each stage the strength of the new state was again and again probed and tested by a capitalist world unwilling to yield it the right to exist. Under such conditions the Soviet government stabilized its borders by granting swift recognition to the new Baltic States. Then, in the first international conference to which it was admitted, in April 1922 in Genoa, the Soviet delegate proposed a plan for strengthening general peace in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The forces directed towards restoration of world economy will be strangled as long as above Europe and above the world hangs the threat of new wars,” said Chicherin. “The Russian delegation intends to propose a general limitation of armaments and to support any proposition which has the aim of lightening the burdens of militarism.” The Soviet representatives again agreed to recognize debts of past Russian governments but now demanded in return the right to compensation for the destruction caused to Russia by unprovoked intervention. Failing to get response to either proposal, Soviet Russia signed with Germany the famous Rapallo agreement, whereby both nations canceled the debts of the other and renewed relations on the basis of equality. This was the first gesture made by any nation to cure the wounds of the World War and to deal with vanquished Germany on a basis which set foundations for peace. Had the other nations followed this example the bitter history of Europe of the past thirteen years might have been different.&lt;br /&gt;
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After the Genoa Conference, the Soviet struggle for peace was marked by slow but steady establishment of diplomatic relations with the major powers of the world. This in itself was an element of stability in Europe, but normal relations were still much shaken by frequent raids on Soviet embassies and consulates in many countries, conducted on shallow pretexts and accompanied by forged letters and provocatory accusations unprecedented in diplomatic history.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Such as the assassination of Vorovsky during the Lausanne conference, which coincided with an ultimatum from the British Foreign Office; the raid on the Soviet Embassy in Peking, April 1927, followed by the execution of many of its Chinese staff; the raid on the Soviet trading agency in London May 12, 1927; the forged “Zinoviev letter” which swayed a British election. These were only the most spectacular of a whole series of raids, attacks and attempted assassinations which made being a Soviet ambassador a hazardous occupation.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Similar attacks on nations in the past have counted as causes of war. The Soviet Union responded to these attacks by steadily widening its pacts of non-aggression with minor or hard-pressed nations—Turkey first in December 1925, followed by Germany, Lithuania, Persia, Latvia, Afghanistan and others. Unlike all previous alliances and ententes, these pacts were non-exclusive. They were offered to all nations.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament of the League of Nations held its fourth session on November 30, 1927, the newly invited Soviet delegation startled the world by proposing to disarm. Five years earlier Chicherin had made a similar proposition at Genoa; it went unnoticed and was soon forgotten. But Litvinoff’s statement in 1927 came from a nation which had proved its economic and political stability over a term of years. It came moreover at a time when the peoples of the world were beginning to be disillusioned by the ever-repeated fruitless conferences with which European governments sought to hide from their peoples the chaos which followed the World War.&lt;br /&gt;
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Litvinoff broke the polite façade by suggesting actual disarmament, stating that the Soviet Government was ready to agree to total disarmament or any percentage of disarmament which the other powers would accept. He made this challenge time after time in the sight of the peoples of the world, until the constant evasion of the militarists made it apparent that no capitalist power was willing even to reduce armaments, and that the Disarmament Conference itself was little more than a mask for the old rearmament race.&lt;br /&gt;
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As armaments grew, the Soviet Union steadily extended pacts of non-aggression and began to press for an internationally accepted “definition of the aggressor,” designed to mobilize world opinion against the provokers of war. None of the major imperialist powers was willing to accept Litvinoff’s definition, which denounced as aggression the sending of any armed forces into any other nation. A dozen or more of the smaller countries signed it; the Soviet Union began to win the post of champion of the rights of smaller powers, which it was later to expand by its participation in the League of Nations.&lt;br /&gt;
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The will to peace of the Soviet Union and its intelligence in maneuvering to keep out of war was soon severely tested by the growing tensions in the Far East. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria has been recognized by the whole world as a violation of the League of Nations Covenant, the Washington Nine-Power Pact and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to all of which Japan was signatory. It carried her troops to the Soviet borders and occasionally across them in forays by armed patrols which killed Soviet border guards and peasants. The most serious source of contention was the possession by the Soviet Government of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which crosses Manchuria as the shortest route to Vladivostok. Attacks by alleged bandits and arrests by Japanese military authorities put Soviet railway employees in peril hardly less than that of war. A report by the Soviet director of the road related over 3,000 cases of armed attack which had resulted in the murder of 56 people, the wounding of 825, the destruction of four kilometers of main line track and of hundreds of passenger and freight cars. On October 9, 1933, the USSR was able to publish four Japanese secret documents which discussed the “great necessity for assimilating the railway,” and made it plain that most of the attacks were inspired by Japanese military forces.&lt;br /&gt;
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The answer of the USSR to these provocations was neither that of the strong capitalist nation which would long since have “protected its interests and citizens” by declaring war, nor was it that of a defenseless colonial nation like China, which continually submits. The Soviet Union built strong fortifications on its entire Far Eastern border, obviously of a defensive nature; and simultaneously removed a source of conflict by selling the railroad to Manchukuo at a price hardly one-fifth of the sum originally invested by the Russians. I was present in Tokyo when the sale occurred and noted the lessening of tension. “The Japanese people are for the time being convinced of our peaceful purposes; it will be some months before their militarists will be able to inflame them against us,” said a Soviet diplomat to me, making the distinction which Communists always make between people and governments. The Japanese militarists were even then laying a basis for further provocation by suggesting the purchase of Soviet Saghalin. Yet for even a temporary lessening of tension, the USSR thought it worth while to make concessions.&lt;br /&gt;
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In September 1934 the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations, an act which startled both friend and foe. Yet it was the logical consequence of the changing conditions of Europe and the growing strength of the USSR. The Soviet Union views the League analytically rather than emotionally. What is it? What has it to give? The League is not a territory nor a state nor a super-power; still less is it an ideal or a formula which will somehow miraculously bring peace. The League is a diplomatic instrument through which a group of powers meet and come to an agreement. Its policy is decided by the powers that are in it and by the relative strength and courage of those powers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Behind the idealistic phrases with which at different stages each participating power has veiled its use of the League, the purpose of the League changes. Wilson started it as the organization of Europe on a basis of nationality; his plan involved also “freedom of the seas.” But “freedom of the seas” meant to Britain the domination of the world by American gold instead of by the British fleet; and Europe on a basis of nationality appalled Clemenceau, who knew quite well that there are twice as many Germans as French in Europe, and that “the interests of France” demand the splitting up of the Germans into minorities among many nations. The League, with America out, became the arena where Britain and France struggled for control of Europe, France wishing to crush Germany utterly and Britain willing to help Germany expand slightly. as a balance against France. Wall Street helped Britain by the Dawes and Young plans of reparations, scaling them down to “Germany’s capacity to pay,” i.e., the amount which it was thought German capitalists could squeeze from industrious German workers for several generations without revolt. Germany came into the League, hailed by phrases on the “United States of Europe,” which meant to the Soviet Union the united attempt of world capitalism to placate Germany for the Versailles deprivations by financing her in a drive to the East.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Dawes guessed wrong. The world economic crisis broke Germany’s “capacity to pay” and ability to wait. Japan and Germany both left the League to seek expansion by their own armed might. The war danger increased but the League itself became, by their disaffection, an organization of powers which had more to lose than to gain from immediate war. “The League might become a hindrance to warlike tendencies,” said Stalin. It still contained robber powers who exploited colonial peoples, and small unstable states built up on the loot of Versailles. The Soviet Union admits the justice of the German grievance, but never the right of war to enforce those claims. “Injustices perpetrated by one war,” said Litvinoff, “can never be rectified by a new one, which only perpetrates worse injustices.” The Soviet Union entered the League to strengthen it against the tendency of Germany, Japan and now Italy to throw a torch into the powder magazine of the world. She thus upholds territorial gains of robber nations in order to increase the chances of world peace.&lt;br /&gt;
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She even goes further. By pacts of mutual assistance concluded with France and Czechoslovakia, she has placed the might of her increasing Red Army behind the status quo of Europe. She joins with these “robber powers” to blockade Italy, herself the first to agree to the sanctions. Yet when oil sanctions are not agreed to, she continues to sell this commodity to Italy,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In steadily decreasing amounts, in spite of American headlines to the contrary. It is America’s sales that increase.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; bewildering the idealists of many nations. Why? Because no high example can check Italians in Abyssinia or stop the spread of the war infection through the trade channels of the world. Because idealist gestures are dangerous tactics against general staffs of armies: that lesson was learned at Brest-Litovsk. Because isolated action might turn against the Soviet Union a fascist drive from a disintegrating Europe, helped to disintegration by her choice of an individual stand. Only the threat of might may possibly halt the explosive drive towards war of a desperate fascism—the might of Europe organized through the League. The Soviet Union throws herself into the task of organizing it&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;She tried first to organize an “Eastern Locarno,” a pact of many nations against anyone who started an aggression. It failed through the refusal of Poland and Germany. Soviet policy is still to expand security pacts to all possible nations, including Germany and Poland, not even the present pacts being exclusive in nature.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; through security pacts which she seeks to widen. For the status quo is evil, but war is worse.&lt;br /&gt;
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To strengthen this might the Soviet Union increases her Red Army, the only armed force on which she can really depend. Britain and France are camps of conflicting interests; on this the Communists have no illusions. In both these countries are strong popular forces supporting the USSR and the League of Nations in the policy of collective security against aggressors, and other strong reactionary forces which would prefer to support Nazi Germany in the looting of Russia. This would launch world war with all the gigantic means of modern destruction. Hence the struggle against world war today becomes inextricably linked with the struggle against fascist tendencies in the major imperialist countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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This war, if it comes, will be no mere war between nations. It will arouse class conflicts throughout the world. Not at first perhaps, but in the end in every country. This the Red Army understands thoroughly; its loyalty is not alone to Russia but to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, wherever they exist or come into being. But not unless invaded will the Soviet Union intervene in any other country, either by war or by interference in its affairs. Marxian analysis tells them that this would hamper the revolutionary development of the other country; it would turn workers towards the capitalists of their own country under the name of patriotism. If the world war starts, the Red Army will advance with a rifle in one hand and pamphlets in the other It has shells to distribute tens of thousands of leaflets calling on the brotherhood of all workers; it has also the means of effective war. As the world’s most politically conscious, most mechanized army, trained in many languages, it is able to lead and equip partisan war on the territory of foes. It is told to get results with a minimum of suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
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I well remember a talk in Moscow with a high Soviet authority on the subject of Japan in the tense winter of 1933. It was clear to us both that the Soviet air fleet was superior and in easy reach of Tokyo. We looked from high windows on the ice in Moscow river and discussed the chances of war.&lt;br /&gt;
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“A good, industrious folk, the Japanese,” he said slowly. “It would be a pity to bomb them. Do you think any Communist likes to set aflame whole towns of toiling folk? . . . If war should come in the East between us and Japan, we have not the slightest doubt that it would be the end of capitalist Japan. Revolution would start in Manchukuo and spread southward through China, till all Asia was Communist. Every imperialist power in the world would fight this, till at last revolt flamed up in their own lands. The world revolution might thus be accomplished, but the world that survived would be badly ruined. It would cost the lives of tens of millions of toiling folk; it would mean famine and pestilence sweeping all Asia. The world revolution will be secured with much less suffering, if peace can be maintained.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“The Soviet Union needs no foreign wars for transforming the world,” said Manuilski in 1935 at the Congress of the Communist International. Her struggle for peace is no temporary slogan. With every year of peace the Soviet Union strengthens, not only as a nation, but as a shining example which the world will follow. As socialism advances in the Soviet Union, it begins to attract scientists, engineers, artists; it draws away from allegiance to capitalism wider and wider hosts. With every year of peace—granted the steadily advancing Soviet Union—the international relation of world forces shifts to the side of the Soviet world and to the disadvantage of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Capitalism breeds war, yet world war is not inevitable. For capitalism itself is no longer inevitable in the world. If the struggle for peace can avail month by month and year by year, to check, delay and hamper the forces that drive towards war, capitalism itself may collapse in one war-inciting country after another on a sufficient scale to prevent world war altogether. Or world war, if it comes, may be greatly shortened by the revolt of all those people who suffer unbearably from war.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the hope behind the Soviet struggle for peace. But whether in peace or in war, the growing strength and prosperity of the Soviet Union, achieved through two Five-Year Plans, insures the direction and is the pledge of the whole world’s future. The only question now is how deep and bitter will be the struggle—even the wars—before the far-flung peoples know and copy. But nothing any longer can stop the advance of their worldwide forces. They have both strength and knowledge and a conscience about the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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== PART II: THE SOVIET WORLD MAKES MEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER IX: THE FACTORY COLLECTIVE ===&lt;br /&gt;
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In all the recent congresses in Moscow, when miners, auto-workers, weavers, engineers and lathe-hands come up to celebrate their latest achievements in production and to receive honors for increasing a nation’s wealth, a phrase recurs which has no counterpart under capitalism, because the reality which it expresses could not exist there. Even in the Soviet Union the widening use of the phrase is recent, an instinctive expression of a new and growing reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I bring you greetings from our factory collective.” “Our factory collective pledges its full support.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The factory collective is not the plant administration. Nor is it the trade union, the shop committee or even the Party organization of the factory. All these organizations are a part of it, having their well-defined functions in its vivid life. The factory collective is the sum total of all the people in the plant in all their organized functions, the basic living cell of Soviet society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The concept of the factory collective did not spring into being full grown. It derives steadily from the joint ownership of the means of production which has now existed for eighteen years. This is the economic reality which is steadily determining the minds of men and the forms of their social life. A worker attached to a machine must be either its slave or its owner; under capitalism he is its slave. In the Soviet Union he knows himself owner of the machine but not the sole owner. It is entrusted to him to master, to get from it all that modern technical skill can give. The product belongs to him and his fellows; through his work in the plant he connects with all society. This gives back to man the old unity of life around the process of production which was riven in twain when the tools by which men created passed into alien hands. It returns on a wider scale and at a higher level by as much as the modern machine is more powerful than the ancient tool.&lt;br /&gt;
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An American who had worked for some years in a Soviet factory told me that two things especially impressed him: the relation of workers to administration and the cultural life around the factory. “The foreman always asks the workers’ advice in all problems; the relations are those of two friends instead of a boss. In America my factory was just a place to make a living, just another day to get through as soon as you could. Here it is your club, your center of culture, the thing that is closest in life.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The life of the factory collective has three main aspects: production, workers’ life, and relation to the rest of the country. Each of these aspects has its own control. The director and his assistants are responsible for organizing production. The trade union is responsible for organizing the workers’ life, including factory conditions, insurance, education and social activities. The Party organization is responsible for the political training of the workers, for widening their knowledge of the country’s policies and of their plant’s function in the building of socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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These three together—director, trade union organizer, and Party secretary—form the “triangle,” the highest authority in the plant. Each has his clearly defined function; all three together consult on questions affecting the fundamental life of the factory. Orders of the director must be taken without question in production, and he is held responsible for everything that happens in the plant. But any director who failed to get on with the Party and trade union organization wouldn’t last long. As a Russian worker explained it: “If the factory collective doesn’t like the director you may be sure the Commissariat of Heavy Industry won’t leave him there.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chap. 6 for an example of this.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The relation between workers and management was thus described to me by the American worker: “The whole working gang is interested in production. The program for next month is discussed with all of us. The foreman calls a meeting and tells us that the administration wants us to put out 3,000 milling tools next month. How shall we do it? We discuss in detail; each of us says what he can do. It all adds up to 4,000. So the foreman goes to the administration and raises the plan to 4,000. If we fulfill or surpass our plan, we get a premium which we divide among the workers on the basis of what each has done. To help us estimate this, the shop economist gives us each month a list of each worker’s production, spoilage, idle time, breakdown of machines. Naturally we give the most of the premium to the best workers because they helped the whole gang win. The factory honors the winning brigade not only with a premium but with a red banner which waves each month among the lathes for everyone who passes to see. The best factories get honor and premiums from the whole country because everyone knows that the more we produce the more everyone will have.”&lt;br /&gt;
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When conflicts occur in a factory between the management and the trade union, there are various ways in which they may be resolved. Often the Party organization of the plant can settle it by discussion within this wider group to which members both of administration and trade union belong. Serious disagreements are appealed by the shop committee to its central trade union, or even to the All-Union Council of Trade Unions which has governmental powers to enforce the rights of workers. For individual cases of injustice appeal is often made direct to the courts. These struggles may be time-consuming, but men who feel convinced enough of their case to fight it through rarely fail of satisfaction. The head of the Nijni Auto Works was removed in 1932 after an investigation by the trade unions which began with a fight over living conditions started by the foreign workers. In another case that I know, an engineer who sharply criticized the plant’s manager in the factory newspaper was later fired on grounds that he thought insufficient. Failing to interest the shop committee in his case he took it to the city organization of the Party, which ordered an investigation that resulted in his reinstatement, with wages paid for all time lost. The director was reprimanded, and the reprimand printed on the front page of the factory newspaper, in order, as one worker expressed it, that “the director may know he is not God.”&lt;br /&gt;
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More common are the conflicts in which local management and trade union unite to compel action by the central offices of the trust. The shop committee demands certain safety appliances or new construction for the health of the workers. The manager replies that his budget does not allow it. He has no objection, however, to the shop committee making the strongest possible case through the trade union to the central organization which supplies the budget. Since the manager has no personal profit to make by cutting out improvements, but advances in reputation and position rather through his ability to maintain an enthusiastic organization of productive workers, his interest lies on the side of supplying their demands.&lt;br /&gt;
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Workers, on the other hand, do not want a boss who is soft and sentimental. They want one who can efficiently organize their work. They know that their prosperity depends directly on the success of their factory. They themselves will ask to have workers transferred who make much spoilage, or even expelled if they steal or persistently disorganize production. They consider it desertion for a worker to shift jobs without reason or without training someone to take his place. If health or family matters require a change, or if a factory cannot use his highest skill or give him a chance to develop, he applies for and gets “release.” But to shift merely because another factory, better organized, can give him higher wages and better conditions is considered cowardly.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Somebody has to make this factory a good one. Why shouldn’t he? His going makes it that much harder for the rest of us; we have to break in a green man. Why should he run off to another place that other folks organized because he finds things difficult here?” Here is an attitude similar to that of partners in a business.&lt;br /&gt;
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Production, however, is only part of existence. Around this center of jointly owned production is built the whole unity of the worker’s life. Through his factory collective he enters into the duties and privileges of citizenship; it is the primary organization which elects deputies to the local Soviets. Through his shop committee he receives his social insurance, his opportunities for education, his excursions, sports and vacations, and takes part in a score of voluntary social activities from government commissions to parachute clubs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take an example of the internal organization of a factory collective, the Red Proletarian Plant in Moscow. The smallest unit in the plant is the production brigade which may have thirty to fifty workers. There are one hundred and fifty brigades in the plant, under one shop committee. These brigades not only compete in production records, rewarded by red banners and premiums, but also in social activity. Homiakov’s brigade, for instance, has twenty-nine workers, Every one of them does some social work. Some check the norms of production and standards of piece-work; some watch over the social insurance; three edit the wall newspaper which criticizes the shortcomings of the plant and of the workers. One middle-aged man was inactive socially and this was a great shame to the group, which tried to locate some tasks to interest him. They finally elected him president of the Red Aid Branch; within a month he signed up a big membership and had an active circle going.&lt;br /&gt;
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The brigade decides the list of “udarniks,” champion workers who get special privileges; but its list will be further checked by the trade union if it is too large or if there are complaints. Does a worker need a free vacation at a sanatorium? The brigade discusses it and sends a recommendation to the shop committee, which has a definite quota of places, and can fight for more. Safety devices on machinery, raising the technical knowledge of each operator, financial help to workers who are in straits, are matters which start with the brigade and are sent with their recommendation to the trade union. The union itself as a whole is actively pushing the completion of the new model dining-room, the expansion of the day nursery and clinic facilities—all these on demands which originally start in the brigades. All this work is democratically initiated, organized, carried through and checked by the rank and file members.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not the least important aspect of factory life is the cultural activity. Educational opportunities range from simple classes in reading and writing for newly arrived peasants, which characterized the earlier years of Soviet power, to the present university courses and institutions of scientific research. “You come to your factory to study, to attend a university,” said a worker to me. “You think, ‘My factory is going to make an engineer of me.’ After work you take a hot shower and go to the library or gliding club. Artists and singers come from the theaters to sing for us during the dinner hour. Famous authors come to discuss their books with us. If you want to write or act, you join the dramatic club or literary circle. Maybe some day you may go away to enter a theater or a newspaper, but even then you will sometimes come back to your factory.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The intimate sense of possession which a Soviet worker feels in his factory was strikingly shown to me by my step-daughter Ducia, who worked in a large electric plant near Moscow. I accompanied her on her return to the factory after she had been ill at home with grippe. As we approached the plant she grew excited; a vividness came into her gestures which had been lacking during her two weeks at home. She insisted that I notice and admire the factory laboratory where she worked, the power plant, the restaurant, the big workers’ club building; she pointed out the pathway between the shops that led to the park and stadium. I suddenly realized that Ducia had been positively homesick for her factory.&lt;br /&gt;
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Her reason for having chosen this particular factory to work in had little to do with wages. She chose it because it had a good reputation as an educational and social center, with a strong organization of Communist youth and a first class university. This offered her the well-rounded life which she demanded from her labor. Her working day was only six hours long, but she not infrequently spent twelve hours or more in and around the factory. She would go half an hour before her work began, drop into the Red Corner to get her newspaper or to discuss with the other girls the work of the political courses; she would come home late in the evening after her skiing club, German class or musical circle, or perhaps still later from a group party at the theater.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Ducia’s set it is the accepted view, which she does not even stop to formulate, that every human being should engage in three kinds of serious activity: productive work whereby he justifies his right to a share in the commonly produced goods of the country; voluntary social work, which holds together the whole apparatus of society; and study which improves individual capacities. Besides this serious activity there are recreations. All this many-sided life Ducia finds in her factory.&lt;br /&gt;
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The study takes different forms from year to year. In addition to courses in physics, German and political science which she takes regularly, various campaigns urge special study upon her. It may be her Young Communist League which makes a drive to have all members study the history of the Communist movement of youth. One year it was the drive for “technical minimum,” to raise the skill of all workers in the country. Ducia’s technical minimum was fixed for her by a committee of engineers who visited her laboratory, and discussed with each employee separately the special subjects needed for his work. She studied these subjects for several months, assisted by a voluntary teacher, one of the engineers of the plant who agreed to help several girls as his form of social work. “The whole laboratory is like a university,” said Ducia, “with the six hours’ work like practice on our subjects. When girls meet on the stairs, they are always asking whether you have finished such a formula.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Like most of her associates, Ducia also does social work; in her case it is the organization of the twelve current-events’ courses for young people in the various shops of the factory She takes much pride in keeping these running well. Not all social work is as serious as Ducia’s. One of the girls organizes a group for parachute jumping, another gets up theater parties, a third helps to plan excursions. Social work is not something that an individual does “for others”; it is the extension of his own interests, the organization in a social manner of what he himself most likes to do. It is also of value to the community and a direct preparation for participation in government. In a sense it is already taking part in government, which is increasingly built up from these voluntary social activities. A man whose financial ability is shown as dues collector for his union, may rise to full or part-time work as assistant chief of the city taxes. A woman who shows interest and efficiency in organizing the factory day nursery may later become chief of the city’s motherhood and infancy bureau.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is in fact the normal path to political office in the Soviet Union. I recall, for instance, Gribkova, who ten years ago was a young, illiterate farm servant. Wishing to better herself, she got a job as longshoreman on the Volga, thus entering the public services where, as she put it, “the road lay open to all life.” Working downstream she reached a textile mill and took employment as unskilled worker. Here she found the natural center for education and advancement. She learned to read and write, took technical courses and to handle a machine, took political courses and became an “active one” in her factory. From this point her specialization was possible in two directions: through technical training to higher posts in industry, or through social work and political training to posts in government. Gribkova chose the latter; she became interested in the voluntary tasks of factory inspection, and was later chosen by her fellow workers as part of their quota for a two-year training course which prepared professional factory inspectors. She is now a full-time official, head of inspection for a township. Hundreds of thousands have followed a similar path; this is the typical relation between factory life and the public activities of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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The life of a great factory is continuous. Just as its productive life goes on for three shifts, so its social life continues nearly twenty-four hours a day. If one chances to come at six-thirty in the morning to the great Stalin Auto Works in Moscow, he may see in Day Nursery No. 41 the beginning of the day’s life. Mothers bring their children to the nursery before reporting to work. Each child receives a swift medical examination as he enters; if this indicates illness, the mother is excused from work to care for her child or to take it to the hospital. In the case of nurslings, the mother is given an hour off at the end of every three hours’ work to nurse her child. These day nurseries are considered as essential a public service as public schools of other countries. But whereas education is compulsory, day nurseries are not. The picture spread abroad of a stern Soviet government forcibly taking children from their mothers would arouse incredulous laughter in any Soviet home. The Soviet mother regards a day nursery as a facility which relieves her of the child certain hours of the day, and as a center of scientific information, whose employees can assist her in its proper care. She demands the day nursery and fights for its quality. If any factory administration fails to supply adequate funds to enlarge and improve its day nursery, the working women will see that the director is reminded.&lt;br /&gt;
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About the time that the mothers are saying good-by to their children in the nursery, the newspaper office inside the plant begins to bustle with activity. Six thousand copies of Moscow daily papers and 8,500 copies of the four-page daily of the plant, &#039;&#039;Overtake and Surpass&#039;&#039;, must be delivered by eight or nine o’clock to subscribers in various shops. The plant newspaper is full of the daily life of the 35,000 workers. It organizes campaigns for production, for quality, for good housing, co-operative stores, clubs, schools, day nurseries; it contains complaints by workers about all these facilities; it is the organ through which these thousands of workers communicate with each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the midst of the great shops of the auto works, a small green square contains both the central dining room and the central polyclinic. The latter is maintained by the Moscow Board of Health, but its connection with the factory collective is very intimate. The health record of every worker is kept on file in a smaller dispensary in the shop where a doctor, medical assistant and statistician are constantly on hand for first aid and general care of this particular group of workers. For all special services the worker goes to the central polyclinic where a medical personnel of 300 includes specialists in all diseases. One interesting feature of this polyclinic is its direct connection with the diet kitchen of the factory which immediately gives the workers without extra charge the particular diet which the doctor prescribes.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is no sentimental glorification of manual labor which causes the grouping of Soviet institutions around the factory. It derives naturally from the unity of man as owner, creator and user, which under socialism replaces the capitalist division of men into bosses, hands, and buyers of goods. Even under capitalism men feel a deep human joy in creation and mastery, a mastery which may be widened and deepened by the machine. But capitalism poisons this joy at its source. A crane man in Seattle once told me that when he sat aloft picking up great loads with power and deftness, he felt “like one of those Greek giants or ancient gods.” Then he suddenly realized that he had no claim to that crane, but might face any morning, at the owner’s whim, the sign: “Closed down,” and he felt himself degraded from a god to a slave.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under capitalism the association of men in production is made hateful by a clash of interests; they seek their real life elsewhere, building it from disjointed fragments. Under socialism this association is strengthened by a thousand ties of mutual interest and becomes the solid foundation on which the whole structure of political and social life is frankly and realistically built. Life becomes unified; from worker to manager, to scientist, to artist there is at no point a break. A worker studies and becomes an engineer; he is active in the factory committee on inventions, and becomes a scientist; he shows talent in the dramatic circle and becomes an actor; he devotes himself to social work and rises in the government. Any of these interests may become professional and take him out of the factory into a wider or more specialized life. But the factory remains the social home from which he launched into life, and to which he often returns, either actually or emotionally.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER X: FARMING A CONTINENT ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Among the many flaming words which poured from the hearts of two hundred combined-harvester operators meeting in December 1935 in Moscow with the heads of Party and government, amid jubilation over present success and promises to make the future even more victorious, there was one poignant phrase of contrast with the past.&lt;br /&gt;
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“We sons and daughters of peasants—had there been no Soviet power, no Party of Lenin-Stalin, our lot would have been slavery to kulaks, or dawnless poverty in the mire of small peasant farming.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These words illumine with a piercing ray the tremendous changes that have taken place in the Soviet rural districts in a span of years so brief that the past still remains vivid in the minds of men not yet thirty years old. “When I worked as a fourteen-year-old farmhand under the tsar,” said the combine operator Kapusta, “I never saw the leaders of the government, never saw even the boss for whom I worked. . . . I never expected from life such happiness, such joy.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Five years ago Kapusta was an unskilled worker. But not Kapusta alone; so were they all. What else but unskilled workers were there on the backward individual farms of peasant Russia, where fifteen years ago the tractor was stoned as a “devil machine?” Even five years ago, who among Russian peasants had ever seen a combine-harvester? Today not only are millions of peasants acquainted by sight with the most modern farm machinery, but hundreds of thousands have mastered its operation and make a more continuous use of it than is possible on the private farms of America, which are too small to utilize profitably this modern machine. The combine is already a machine too good for capitalism. The American average harvesting record per combine is 578 acres, while the Soviet average secured in 1935 was 643. The champion operators who met in Moscow spurned this average. They had made records of a thousand, two thousand and even twenty-five hundred acres for the harvest season, and were swearing a solemn oath to train before next harvest many more operators like themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The time of this great advance has been so short that they can all look back as if to yesterday and recall the days of ignorance and poverty, when they slaved for wealthier farmers or wasted nine-tenths of their labor trudging from strip to strip of their medieval peasant fields. Today the very word “peasant” is passing from their vocabulary. They speak of themselves as “kolhozniks,” members of the collective economy, joint owners and users of the large-scale farm on which they work. They know quite well that if there had been no collectivization of farming, their slavery and darkness would have continued. For if modern machines had come to the Russian soil under capitalist conditions, a minority of successful farmers would have gained the means of production and risen to a brief wealth on the impoverishment of millions—brief until they in turn were robbed by the big banks of the cities, as farmers are under capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The years 1930 to 1933 will go down in mankind’s story as the turning point in the farm history of the world. No other events of those years will be so long remembered—not the struggles of the League of Nations, nor the American New Deal; not even the world-wide economic crisis which was but one more, the worst, of many crises. Even the rise of the Chinese Soviets and the turning of Central Europe to fascism may receive less space in future history books than the collectivization of Soviet farming, whereby men won the dream of centuries, security on the soil.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Security on the soil! Security from drought, from floods, from mortgages, from the chances of nature and the exploitations of man! Even to attain fragments of such security, if not for themselves then for their children, men of all ages have struggled and died. American families left the comforts of settled regions to homestead in dugouts, for the security promised by land ownership. Then drought or the foreclosure of mortgages showed that security based on private property in land is illusion. Markets collapsed and land was taken away for bare taxes. Soviet farmers today are winning not only security against taxes and mortgages and markets but even against drought and floods. Farming is industrialized on the basis of modern machinery and division of labor. Crop losses through “acts of God” are minimized by better tillage, crop insurance, and assistance from the more fortunate areas. The control of the joint farm is democratically organized; the general meeting not only elects the management, but decides the plan of the farm and the division of work. Security on the land thus co-exists with free initiative.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This change has occurred among people whose farming was formerly notoriously backward. Ten years ago in the central grain-growing regions of Russia, there were three homemade wooden plows for every metal plow. One-third of the peasants had no horse at all but labored for others to pay for the plowing of their own soil. Lands were divided according to a medieval system; the twenty acres of a single family might be divided into a dozen strips scattered miles apart. Scientific crop rotation and seed selection were unknown. The primitive methods of tillage steadily exhausted the soil. A typical study of grain crops in the Kirsanov district showed a steady decline of average yield from thirteen bushels per acre in 1896-1905 to ten and a half bushels in the five years preceding the World War. On this same land since the collective farm was organized in 1930 the yield rose by better tillage to an average of seventeen bushels in 1930-33, and twenty bushels in 1934-35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In four earth-shaking years, the Soviet Union changed from a country of tiny, badly tilled holdings, worked with wooden plow and hand sickle, to the largest scale farms in the world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In the United States farms of a thousand acres or more comprise only 7.5 per cent of the total tilled area; in the USSR in 1935, nine-tenths of the tilled area was made up of farms averaging thirteen hundred acres.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The initiative was taken by the poorer peasants and farm hands, urged and organized by the Communists, and assisted by government credits and machines. When the Five-Year Plan swiftly increased the farm machinery available, the new collective farm proved able to attract ever wider and wider groups of farmers. The movement was bitterly fought by the small rural capitalists known as kulaks, who farmed with hired labor, lived by money-lending, or owned small mills, threshers and other means of production and used these facilities to exploit their neighbors.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Writers unacquainted with Russian rural life often confuse kulaks with peasants generally, which leads them to describe the whole collectivization movement as an attack on the peasants. But for half a century students of Russian rural districts have spoken of kulaks. In 1895 Stepniak wrote that “hard unflinching cruelty” was their main characteristic; in 1904 Wolf von Schierhand wrote of the kulak as a “usurer and oppressor in a peasant’s blouse.” In 1918 Dr. E. J. Dillon, in &#039;&#039;The Eclipse of Russia&#039;&#039;, said: “Of all the human monsters I have ever met in my travels, I cannot recall any so malignant and odious as the Russian kulak.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The state’s donation to farming and the technical help supplied by city workers proved decisive. During the years from 1930 to 1935, the Soviet government issued more than a billion dollars of direct credits to the farms for livestock and implements and spent an additional three billion for farm machinery loaned through the tractor stations;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For tractor stations 5.5 billion rubles, for direct loans 1. billion; these were “hard rubles” whose value may be estimated as fifty cents.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; it also gave food and seed loans of 157 million bushels of grain to farms in distress. At the call of the Communist Party tens of thousands of skilled workers, bookkeepers, machine repairmen, teachers and organizers, poured into the rural districts to help organize the farms. The most difficult period was from the 1932 to the 1933 harvest when kulak sabotage, added to difficulties of inefficient organization, caused a grain shortage that put the whole country on short rations. Success was won by the 1933 harvest which reached nearly 90 million tons of grain, the largest harvest ever known in the Russian land; it was succeeded by an equal or larger grain crop in 1934 and 1935. These harvest successes helped create a government budget surplus in 1934 of 437 million rubles, which was at once applied to cancel debts owed to the state by the farmers for early expenses of organizing and equipping the collectives. This wiped out 53 per cent of the still outstanding indebtedness, including all debts incurred prior to 1933.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The economic results of collectivization have been an increase in the sown area of 30 million acres, from 293 to 323 million; a grain crop which for three years has been 15 to 20 million tons higher than the average for the five years before the collectives were formed;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The average before collectivization was 78 to 80 million tons; in 1933 and 1934, 90 million; in 1935 nearly 100 million tons. Cotton area 688,700 hectares in 1913; 802,000 in 1927, and 2,051,000 in 1933. Sugar-beet area 648,700 in 1913; 665,000 in 1927, and 1,212,000 in 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an area sown to sugar beets which is double the pre-war or any previous record; and an area sown to cotton which is two and a half times either the pre-war or the re-collectivization area. Livestock suffered catastrophically during the early years of collectivization but has been climbing rapidly back in the past three years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chap. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The indications for the future are even brighter, since the rapidly improving methods of tillage and increase of fertilizer are counted upon to increase harvest yield year by year.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;As an example 46 per cent of all spring seeding in 1935 was done on winter-fallowed land, as compared with 25 per cent in 1930, and three-fourths of the autumn sowing in 1935 was done on summer-fallowed land as compared with 30 per cent in 1930. Similar increases have occurred in the use of selected seed, of fertilizer, scientifically planned crop rotations, and so forth.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the end of 1935 Stalin in conference with the harvester-combine operators announced that “in the very near future, in three or four years,” 120 to 130 million tons of grain would be expected from the farms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By 1935, the new forms of collective farming were sufficiently stabilized for the permanent fixing of boundaries. For at least two years practically no members had wished to leave the collective farms to return to individual farming; crop rotations and the location of fields were becoming settled. The Soviet Government thereupon issued a decree granting “perpetual use of land” to the farm collectives. All over the country today rapid surveying of boundaries goes on followed by village celebrations which record the deed for perpetual use. Speakers celebrate the change of recent years, recalling days when most of the land was owned by landlords and tenant peasants worked in the slavery of debt, when freehold peasants sold their land bit by bit to pay taxes. “From perpetual debt to perpetual ownership is the change we have made,” said a Tartar farmer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In place of the old disused boundary posts with the tsarist eagle and the inscription “Each for his own,” there arise new boundary posts with the sickle and hammer and the letters, “USSR.” All the land is unitedly owned by the whole country of workers and farmers, say these symbols; its use is granted perpetually to specific organizations of working farmers. As Soviet citizen, the farmer is ultimate owner, as working farmer, he is permanent user. Both ownership and use are democratically organized and the relation of the smaller group to the whole country is fixed in part by permanent law and in part by annual contracts designed to encourage efficient production and to guarantee right to the fruits of toil. Security is gained by the permanent use of land which cannot be alienated by sale, lease, or mortgage. Freedom is secured by the democratic organization of both farm and country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is this group which thus becomes permanent user? The model constitution adopted by the Congress of “Farm Udarniks”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A delegate congress from the farms that have made the best records; their recommendations have weight as expressing the best farm practice.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and ratified by the Soviet Government February 17, 1935, states that it is a “voluntary union of working farmers” who unite “in order to build with joint means of production and jointly organized labor a collective, i.e., a social husbandry, to secure full victory over the kulak and over all exploiters, to secure full victory over need and darkness, over the backwardness of small individual husbandry, to create high productivity of labor and thus insure a better life for the members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“All boundaries formerly dividing the fields of the members are abolished. . . .&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“All draft animals, farm implements, seed reserves, fodder for the collective livestock, and buildings necessary to carry on the joint farming and the processing of the farm products are socialized. . . .&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Living quarters, family cattle and fowls and the buildings necessary for their use are not socialized but remain for the private use of the members’ family.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Up to two head of milch cattle, one brood sow and her brood, ten sheep and goats, unlimited rabbits and chickens and twenty bee-hives in the grain, cotton, and beet regions; larger numbers are allowed for individual use in the regions devoted to livestock.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All persons over sixteen who toil on the farm have equal vote. The general meeting elects the management, accepts or expels members, decides in conference with state experts the plan for farm production, crop rotation and new improvements and sets aside within certain limits private family garden plots ranging from half to one and a half acres for the individual use of members. It also contracts for the use of machinery from the Machine Tractor Station, a service center which supplies machines and expert knowledge over about a fifteen mile radius. These stations were originally organized and financed by the state but are becoming in part co-operatively owned through shares taken by the collective farms they serve. The farm must make certain deliveries of crops to the state at low prices fixed by a state commission; it must also pay the tractor station in kind. These two payments amount to about one-fourth of the average Crop; as tractor station service increases and with it the payments for machinery, the direct deliveries to the state somewhat diminish, moving towards a time when the state will receive its quota as direct payment for machinery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When these deliveries are made, and the seed and fodder fund set aside, the rest of the harvest may be divided among the members in proportion to the work they have done. The “work-day” is the unit for payment, but work-days are of different value according to the quantity and quality of work done. A tractor driver’s day may count as two ordinary work-days, a night watchman’s as three-quarters of a day. When possible, work-days are related to a definite amount of labor done—an area plowed or harvested—and additions or subtractions are made for work above or below the norm. The general meeting also sets aside part of the income for expansion and common uses such as field kitchens and day nurseries. This at first led to abuses by over-zealous farm officials wishing to build up central funds, but these amounts are now limited. In the past two years, the increased harvests have led to an increasing surplus above the government deliveries and the food required by the members. This may be freely sold, either individually or collectively, and either in town markets or through the village co-operatives, which have been greatly strengthened during the past year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some fifty miles from the railway, in a northern flax and rye district, the Kalinin Collective Farm showed me its “Farm Plan,” a document of eighteen long pages, neatly stitched into a pamphlet. It was a printed form issued by the Commissariat of Agriculture, with details filled out by the local organization. Acreage, meadows, arable land, orchards, crop rotations, farm implements, draft animals, cows, pigs and chickens—everything you could wish to know about the Kalinin farm is here recorded. Not only are all people listed but allowance is made for babies yet unborn; an estimated 2 per cent annual increase of population must be provided with a growing standard of living. The farm plans to provide food for people and animals, produce the marketable crops recommended for the district, erect new buildings, reclaim new fields and create an increasingly prosperous life for its members. To this end work must be assigned to use as far as possible the entire working-time of the hundred able-bodied members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The farmer-members have discussed this plan for months before they adopted it. The township surveyor helped them plot the fields; the township land office and the Soviet newspapers have informed them that the country’s standard of living is to double by 1937, and that they must do their share. This involves increasing wheat at the expense of rye, doubling the oat ration of their horses, increasing fats and meats. They know that the state expects from them a certain amount of flax, the chief marketable crop of their district. On the basis of all this knowledge they plan for the coming year, counting on a constantly increasing crop yield through more machines and fertilizer and better methods, and on a constantly increasing prosperity through the rational assignment of work to the members. The plan includes the labor organization, with the number of total work-days needed for sowing and harvest, and the amount of labor left over for building a new library, equipping a playground and stadium or installing electricity and radios. No one need be out of a job, for all labor can be utilized to increase in various ways the prosperity and culture of the village; all will be paid by shares in the joint harvest, according to the quantity and quality of work done.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the entire plan is accepted by the general meeting, it is registered with the township office and becomes part of the economic plan of the whole country, which is derived from and in turn controls all lesser plans. Sowing and harvest are not the affair of the individual farmer only; they are the great annual rhythm on which the nation’s life depends. The whole country knows this and relates itself consciously to the plans of the farmers. Scientific conferences consider questions of insect pests and seed selection; heavy industry makes plans to manufacture more tractors. Government and Party congresses outline the changing demands which the growing life of the land makes on farming—increase of area or yield, or a change in the proportion of crops. Congresses of farmers meet by township, province and on national scale to discuss problems of tillage and farm organization. The Russian winter which in former days was a season of hibernation in snow-bound villages, is today a season of active farm-planning on a nationwide scale. Not even the farthest farm is isolated; visits of experts and newspaper campaigns keep it in touch with the life of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When spring begins in the south, hundreds of press correspondents pour forth to cover the sowing. &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039; alone sends a dozen staff correspondents and tells sixty local correspondents to concentrate on farm news. The &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; keeps several small airplanes busy, each as the center of a group of a dozen persons covering the farms. The news-gathering organization which some of the Soviet newspapers put on the sowing or harvest is beyond the scope of the biggest dailies in the capitalist world. Every provincial paper adds its reporters. The story is the world’s biggest annual story with more reporters than covered the World War!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These reporters are not mere observers; their reporting is planned to help the harvest. One journalist of my acquaintance spent forty-four days in an airplane covering harvest in the North Caucasus; he visited one hundred farms and forty Tractor Stations, and slept in the fields without one night in a bed. His reporting was for a concrete purpose; he would drop in a field, apply his yardstick and count the grain ears lost on a square yard of harvested ground; he compared various farms, discovered which ones harvested best and how they did it. Within three days he was meeting with other journalists who made similar surveys; they discussed the chief harvest problems of the season and the best ways in which these were being met. These results were at once radioed to all the farms and published through the press of the country for the benefit of other farmers as the harvest traveled north. Every season hundreds of new ideas are thus culled from the experience of the farmers and broadcast by press and radio for the use of other farms.&lt;br /&gt;
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“A characteristic trait of the collective farm system,” says Vaviloff, chief of the Plant Institute. of Leningrad, “is its ability to assimilate new technical methods and make new scientific experiments.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The most striking example of the organization of great masses of farmers under the leadership of science was shown by the united fight of 1934 against the great drought which affected the whole southern half of Europe, including large areas in the Ukraine and Crimea. In many places no rain fell from April till harvest. In days of individual peasant farming, the peasants would have killed cattle for food and gone to the cities for work, putting back agriculture for several years. The collective farmers met swiftly in delegate congresses to declare “War Against Drought.” They took stock of all resources and made plans to suit each region. Near the Dnieper river they seeded the overflow meadows. On the slopes of the Caucasus the Kabardinians dug thousands of miles of irrigation ditches, declaring: “We have mountains; we don’t need rain.” Other farms organized continuous hauling of water by fire-department wagons, or planted swamps and forest glades. Children stormed the fields in organized detachments to pull up every moisture-sucking weed. Scientists busily determined for each district what second crops could best grow where winter wheat had failed. The press gave directions about this second planting; the government shot in by fast freight the necessary seed. The USSR secured a crop equal to the bumper harvest of 1933, and even most farms in the drought-stricken regions came through with food for man and beast, and with organization strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet farmer has come out of his old isolation; he stands on the highways of the world. Through his collective farm, like the industrial worker through the factory collective, he connects with the wider life of science and art. Seven thousand farms in the Ukraine have established during the past two years their “laboratory cottages,” where the farmers carry on scientific experiments based on their own fields. In a typical one I found exhibits of wheat grown under varying conditions, samples of new crops, collections of insect pests, instruments for weather recording. “Sixty farmers take part in our experiments,” they told me. “We exchange data with the Zaporozhe Experimental Station.” These not long since illiterate peasants who grubbed the soil blindly are farmer-scientists now, collecting nationally useful data for the conquest of harvest yields.&lt;br /&gt;
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More than a hundred thousand drama circles for self-expression have sprung up on Sovict farms. Sport and recreation of all types grow also with tremendous speed. Farmers learn gliding, parachute jumping, even aviation. The small farm airplane which can land on a harvested field is a not infrequent visitor in farm campaigns. Extra-early sowing done by air into the mud of melting snow is a recognized means of combating drought in many regions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By no means all Soviet farms are yet well organized, but efficiency steadily increases. By no means all of them are prosperous, but prosperity steadily grows. The change which is most apparent is in the faces of the farmers. They have lost the dull, unresponsive stare of the peasant; they are more vivid, alert. “Formerly even the peasant with the best income lived like a pig,” said a Soviet farmer to me. “His only use for his surplus was to get drunk. Today he has a reading-room, a hospital, a school, a laboratory; he reads the newspapers and knows about the world. His children go from the village to build factories, to discover minerals, to conquer the Arctic, to become ‘heroes of the Soviet Union.’”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than two million letters 2 year from farmers pour into the offices of the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; in Moscow, a high-piled mountain covering many tables. I asked an editor how their contents revealed the changing life of the farm. “When our paper began its existence,” he said, “in the years before collectivization, we got chiefly individual complaints and requests for simple information on farm technique. ‘My taxes are too high!’ ‘How shall I care for my cow?’ Such were the letters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What do they write about now? The education of children, the position of women, the farm theater, the economic crisis in foreign lands. We got five hundred original poems on the death of Kirov and seventy on the disaster to the Maxim Gorky airplane. They comment on world affairs, on China and Italy. You can’t compare them with what they were ten years ago. Instead of ‘my horse and cow,’ their interest is wide as the world.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the northern slopes of the Caucasus mountains, a small district of once suppressed non-Russians, known as Kabardinia, prides itself on creating “the farms of tomorrow.” Its collective farmers have been known to vote the greater part of a harvest surplus to add to the government’s school fund and build for their own village “the best school in the valley.” They bring architects from Moscow to help them plan “farm-cities,” settlements which shall combine expert farming with the culture of the town, high schools, laboratories, libraries, sound-film theaters. A forty-mile highway runs through the Kabardinian valley. Last summer travelers passing, on foot or by cart, found seven rest-stations at five-mile intervals. Brightly painted, tile-roofed pavilions were furnished with wash-basins and beds with fresh linen; large plates of watermelon were placed on the table to quench the visitor’s thirst. An old man attendant refused all payment for the refreshment, saying: “This is the farm ‘Dawn of Socialism’; we planted two extra acres of melons for the traveler.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XI: THE FREEING OF WOMEN ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“Every kitchen maid must learn to rule the state.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Throughout the world a struggle goes on for women’s equality and freedom, with varying methods and varying success. The methods most commonly known are those of different women’s organizations which fight, decade after decade, for new specific increases in women’s “rights.” They count their victories by the number of women who one by one attain high office, by the number of rights slowly secured, the right to vote, to enter industry, to inherit property, to divorce, to some individual status after marriage.&lt;br /&gt;
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Undoubted gains they have known, and also many disillusions. A tireless woman in New England recently told me that she had fought for thirty years to get “a decent inspection of women’s labor in our state” and that they would “probably lose it at the next election.” Nor does the elevation of the occasional woman to high position necessarily improve the lot of women generally. From Cleopatra down to America’s women officials, exceptional women have occasionally been permitted to rule; it is not recorded that the mass of women gained more consideration from them than from men rulers. Women the world over are still unequal to men, bound by a thousand discriminations. In the backward lands of the East hundreds of millions of women are still a subject sex. Not even in the most advanced capitalist countries are they quite equal with men; the long list of disabilities against which the National Women’s Party protests in America is evidence of that. Nowhere in capitalist lands have they equal access to all universities, equal pay for equal work in all industry, equal right to advance in all professions, equal rights in marriage and in the care and custody of children. Even those rights which they have attained are today under attack by fascism, which under the phrases of chivalry drives women back to the Middle Ages.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is therefore the more amazing that Soviet women should have gained so swiftly an equality unknown elsewhere in the world. They receive equal pay for equal work and no jobs are closed to them. They have equal opportunity in education and in government. They have equal rights and duties in marriage; they are free to have or not to have children. They have full political, economic, legal and social equality, as human beings and citizens. This has been attained in eighteen years in a country where women were once suppressed not only in the European but also in the Asiatic manner. Tsarist law made Russian wives the property of their husbands “in duty bound to render him love, respect and in all things obedience to his wishes.” They had no right to separate passports; if they ran away, the police returned them to their husbands. This law was reinforced by brutal peasant customs; Gorky relates the sight of an unfaithful wife bound naked to a cart and flogged by her peasant husband into unconsciousness in the midst of a jeering, applauding crowd. In tsarist Central Asia millions of dark-skinned Mohammedan women lived in the seclusion of harems and behind black veils.&lt;br /&gt;
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The freeing of women takes place in the Soviet Union swiftly because it is not a woman’s fight alone. It comes as part of the freeing of human beings by giving them joint ownership over the country’s means of production, irrespective of sex, color or race. . . . “The emancipation of women is not only the work of women Communists but of men Communists also, just as the fight for socialism is a mutual fight,” said Krupskaia, widow of Lenin. The Communists hold that the gains in women’s freedom made through centuries have been chiefly due to change in methods of production. The modern factory freed women from the patriarchal home, but imposed its own form of slavery; it used women to cut down wages, thus increasing the antagonism of the sexes. Economic slavery is the basis of all other inequalities, the key-log in the jam which must first be loosed that all others may rush free.&lt;br /&gt;
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No freedom comes without battle. The October Revolution created the economic, legal and political basis of woman’s equality. The industrialization of the country was the consciously applied weapon for making woman equal with man. Yet in every village and factory women still had to fight their way over the traditional habits of centuries, which lingered in their own souls and in the souls of men. But these barriers of the past were no longer buttressed by ancient law and by the need of private industry for cheap woman’s labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first women to establish their freedom were the workers in the factories who took part with their men in the Revolution. I recall Dunia, who was once an illiterate textile worker, living with husband and children in the same room with another family, nine people in all. Dunia was one of those who in the first year of Revolution seized the manager’s house for a day nursery so that her children might have space to grow. She learned to read and began to rise in political and social work, as did simultaneously millions of others. She said to me: “Once life went on without us workers, still more without us women. The father gave her to the husband; she was slave to her man and her factory. Now I am slave to no one. The road is open to all life.” This phrase of the “open road to life” I have heard hundreds of times from working women.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emancipation of peasant women came more slowly. Scores of women presidents of villages have told me of their difficulties with the peasant men who jeered at “petticoat rule.” “They laughed at the first woman we elected to the village Soviet so much that she could do nothing; at the next election we put in six women and now it is we who laugh.” This was a typical statement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The widespread collectivization of farming in 1930 gave women’s freedom in the rural districts its needed economic base. Farm women everywhere in the collective farms are awakening to the implications of their independent income. Drunken husbands are no longer masters in the home. “I got for myself a warm new coat, a dress and shoes; I got clothes for the children,” said a farm woman displaying her purchases in the local market. “But my man spent his money on drink and I’ll buy him nothing. I’ve told him if he gets drunk again I’ll throw him out of the house and not even feed him. The farm will back me up, unless he quits drinking and loafing. I can get along without him in the collective farm.” Some thirty million farm women from Leningrad to Vladivostok are awakening to the amazing fact that they can get along economically without their husbands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most cruel and bloody of all was the fight for women’s freedom in those lands of Central Asia where for centuries veiled women had been sold like chattels to the harems. Here local religion and custom supported men who murdered their wives for the crime of unveiling. When young folks in Tashkent schools spent vacations agitating for women’s freedom, one girl’s body was sent back in a cart. Accompanying the hacked pieces were the words: “This is your women’s freedom.” In another locality of Central Asia, nine murders of women occurred before any were discovered by central authority; every attempt of a woman to get justice was met by local vengeance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the women of Central Asia, led by the hope which the new government gave them and the new industries encouraged, fought their way into freedom. The blood of martyrs stirred them to greater struggle; fifty thousand women marched at the funeral of the Tashkent girl student. In Bokhara, citadel of Mohammedan orthodoxy, a spectacular unveiling of women in great meetings and processions took place on International Women’s Day, March 8, 1928. Amid indescribable enthusiasm they tore off veils, stamped on them, threw them on the streets and at the feet of speakers. When one woman was murdered by her husband for this unveiling, a public trial was held in a great mass meeting; the murderer was swiftly condemned and executed. From that time women walked unveiled in holiest Bokhara. Today a woman, Abidova, who at the age of twelve was sold in marriage to pay a fifteen-ruble debt of her father, is vice-president of the Uzbek Republic, and its permanent representative in Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These women of the East are quite aware of the relation of their new freedom to the socially owned means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The roar of the factory is in me.&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;It gives me rhythm,&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;It gives me energy,&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
sing the Uzbek girls of the state silk mill which brought them out of the harems. Another song makes the application wider:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Flower of the East,&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;the time has come To cast off the veil and the paranja. . . .&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;For a thousand years you slept in darkness under the yoke.&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;When you awake, when you arise from deep sleep,&amp;lt;br/&amp;gt;The workers of the world await you!&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Steadily the share of Soviet women in industry and in public life has climbed upward. The percentage of women among industrial workers has risen by a steady 3 per cent a year during the Five-Year Plan, and is now (1935) 42 per cent of all persons gainfully employed. In technical higher schools 36 per cent of the students are women, in medical schools 75 per cent; in no institution of learning is there any discrimination against women. The percentage of women who took part in elections rose from 28 per cent of all eligible women in 1926 to 80.3 per cent in 1934. Women constituted 18.2 per cent of the membership of city soviets in 1926; this rose to 32.1 per cent in 1934. The change in the rural districts was greater; a 9.9 percentage of women in 1926 in village soviets rose to 26.4 per cent in 1934. Only 0.6 per cent of the villages had women presidents in 1926, though even this figure testified to the successful fight of thousands of women; by 1934 the figure was over 8 per cent. More than a million women today hold some form of public office in the soviets, including 400,000 elected members of soviets, 400,000 members of local government commissions, 112,000 “co-judges” in the courts, a function similar to but somewhat more specialized than that of our jurors, and 100,000 members of managing boards of co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The city of Tver, now renamed Kalinin, gives an example of the varied kinds of work done by women. As a textile town, its population included a large proportion of women textile workers before the Revolution, a fact which explains its present status as a progressive city, boasting itself among the first Soviet cities in which women attained their full half of the seats in the city government. (Other cities are steadily following, as women through initiative and education take advantage of their legal right to equality.) Tver’s two most important women are Anna Kaligina, city secretary of the Communist Party, than which no higher post in the city exists, and Feodorova, who held till recently the prize of “best weaver” for the USSR. Thousands of others follow in the footsteps of these leaders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Policeman Lily travels fearlessly through dark woods about the city to round up criminal gangs. On one occasion, when she was convoying a prisoner caught setting fire to turf fields, she was set upon in the woods by two of his accomplices and brought back to jail not one criminal but three. That same evening she played the part of fragile heroine in lilac gown in the local dramatic club, for Lily is an ardent amateur actress specializing in dainty feminine parts. Black-eyed Katya is a street-car conductor, with the best record among the twenty-seven woman conductors of Tver. She is also in the second year of the workers’ college, where she studies Turgenieff and geometry. Morosov, the motorman, writes poems about her.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All the young men admire Nina, eighteen-year-old glider pilot, who three days a week sails through the air on light wings. Her regular job is in the car Works, making valves for railway cars. But her pastime is the aviation club and she expects some day to be an aviator. Zoya is champion motor mechanic in a clothing factory and also chairman of its shop committee, handling trade union affairs for five hundred and sixty women; in her spare time she is an enthusiastic ski runner, who took second place in a contest held by the clothing workers of five provinces. Marusia is studying to be a doctor; Tonia is a former spinner who did such good work on the wall newspaper that she is now a full time writer. Dusia was the first woman chauffeur in the city; the boys used to run after her yelling, “girl driver.” One by one the girls of Tver have conquered every trade and profession. So have the women throughout the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foreign visitors are occasionally shocked to find women taking part in heavy and dirty labor, field work, street-cleaning, even digging the subway. But Soviet women are still of the generation of peasants, who worked in the fields. They know that in all ages women have done heavy labor; it is the skilled work from which they have been barred. They know that equal share in labor means in the USSR equal share in ruling and in all opportunities of life. So young girls fought for the right to equal work on the subway, against engineers and miners who didn’t want to let the women underground. They worked knee-deep in water alongside experienced men, challenged them to records and often beat them. “The subway was the richest experience of my life,” said a prize-winning girl.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are, however, regulations governing women’s labor, which prohibit work proved by experience more dangerous to women than to men. Women may not engage in trades involving danger of lead poisoning, may not lift weights above a certain amount. Special regulations, reinforced by medical observation, surround the whole period of pregnancy, and the last six to eight weeks women may not work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Six weeks before and six weeks after childbirth for office jobs; eight weeks before and eight weeks after for physical labor; longer periods may be ordered at any time by the doctor, and are given without loss of wages.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Many labor processes are constantly under investigation to determine whether or not they are injurious to women; when experiment shows that they are, they are prohibited. This is no sex discrimination but part of the ordinary routine of the public health service, which steadily investigates the effect of occupations and bars from them those groups of the population which might be injured. Thus sand-blasting trades are prohibited to youth, which is more susceptible than older people are to tuberculosis from sand-blasting. No trade or profession is prohibited in advance as “unwomanly”; any trade may be barred after investigation to any group or individual on grounds of public health.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not access to heavy labor but to skilled professions distinguishes Soviet women from those of other lands. Anna Kofanova won fame as operator of a combined-harvester, harvesting 1,500 acres in one season, the township record. Natalia Mikhailova is director of a machine tractor station entirely manned by women which services the 15,000 acres of thirty-two collective farms. Shchetinina, a ship captain, navigates the ocean. The envelopes of Soviet stratostats were designed by a woman chemist. Irene Rousinova was the first woman polar explorer, wintering several seasons in the north; she has been followed by hosts of others, including Nina Demme, who for two years has managed the scientific station on North Land. Galina Medovnik weeded tobacco in tsarist days as a girl of eight, fought in the Red Army during the civil war and was several times condemned to death; she escaped to become today a representative of housewives in the Moscow Soviet, where she superintends the building of apartment houses for workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality in work has given to women equality in every field of life: education, politics, marriage. The assumption behind the Soviet marriage code is the equal human dignity of both parties in deciding their intimate relations—a decision with which the state has no right to interfere. State action is limited to protection of children and prevention of force or fraud. Young couples appearing at the Marriage Registry Bureau are therefore required to give name, residence, occupation, past marital history, any children, and the future name which each intends to take. Questions to each are identical. The same name is often taken but not always. A person who infects another with disease is criminally liable. Property owned before marriage remains individual; that later acquired is jointly owned. Any married person who desires a divorce gets it, nor has the state the right to ask the reason. Both parties are responsible for the care and support of children up to eighteen and for giving the other partner any needed temporary economic aid to establish the independent relation. Recent much publicized changes in the divorce code were only a better bookkeeping, insuring that both persons actually knew of the divorce and were actually held for the support of children.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recent comments of Soviet leaders that more time should be given to family life are similarly part of the general emphasis on richer human relations now possible through increasing leisure rather than any belated recognition of the family. Casual attitudes toward marriage have been discouraged from the beginning; no one was more emphatic on this than Lenin. But the pressure is social rather than legal. Trade unions, collective farms and Party organizations will penalize, even to the point of expulsion, persons who cause social havoc through their sexual instability. But they consider concrete situations, not traditions. The continuous and open living together of two people is respected, whether or not they are “registered”; it constitutes marriage in both the social and legal sense. Taking advantage of another person is penalized, through whatever forms accomplished. Peasants who took advantage of the marriage code to secure brief brides for harvest work soon stopped when they found this gave the woman equal right to the harvest. One notorious case some years ago was that of a man who seduced a girl by marriage and threw her out next morning; he was convicted of rape, which is legally defined as sex relations obtained through force or fraud, and was punished by imprisonment. The fact of the marriage registration was rather an aggravation than otherwise; he had used a Soviet office to assist fraud.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems occasionally arise in marriage from the fact that both partners have jobs. I met a girl tractor-driver in Siberia who married a tractor-driver on another field brigade. They spent their honeymoon some miles apart; once each week the young man walked ten or twelve miles on his free day to stay with his bride. The girl never met him half-way; she was boss of the winning brigade and took no chances. To my casual query why they did not get into the same field-gang, both exclaimed: “Desert my brigade in sowing-time!”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A woman’s relation to the state is always individual; it is never through her husband. Not even the wives of great men may live by reflected glory. When Stalin’s wife died, the black-bordered announcements in the press gave her own name and occupation in the artificial silk industry, and only after this mentioned that she was the “close friend and companion of Stalin.” Kalinin’s wife wins recognition by creating a state farm and center of culture in the Altai Mountains, where they call her by her own name, not by the name of the president.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tradition that love is “woman’s whole existence” is challenged by a new assumption, a refusal to admit that any human being’s happiness can be completely dependent on one other human being. When Salima, a young woman of Turkestan, accepted a scholarship to study in Tashkent, her husband ordered her to return, and, on her refusal, divorced her, boasting by letter that he had taken another wife “obedient and illiterate.” Salima showed her quality by replying: “I received your letter telling me that you have another wife. I will have my revenge. When I finish my studies I will come back to the village and teach your second wife to read and write.” The older generation may be horrified by the flippant Salima, but the new Soviet generation will applaud her as free and self-reliant citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The freedom of every woman to dispose of her own body, to marry or not to marry, to have children or not to have them, irrespective of marriage, is taken for granted by Soviet law, and is restrained only by social opinion, not by legal penalry. Dr. Milashkevich, head of the Gynecological section of the great polyclinic, where a medical personnel of three hundred serves the thirty-five thousand workers of Stalin Auto Works, told me that all women working in the plant come to her as part of their routine health examination. “If they are married I ask them: ‘Do you want children?’ Then I give them medical advice according to their intentions. If they do not want children, the poly-clinic supplies the means of prevention.” She further informed me that every attempt was made to discourage abortion, by urging grounds of health, and by sending nurses and even neighbors to reason with the wife and husband, but never by absolute refusal. “To compel a woman either to have or not to have children we would consider an infringement of human rights,” said Dr. Milashkevich. “If she decides to have them, the state gives every assistance, through free medical and hospital care, special funds for milk and children’s clothing and the use of day nurseries to care for children during her working hours.” That the women are deciding to have children is clear from the average increase of population of three million annually—in the past two years of growing prosperity three and a half million&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Figures from Soviet Statistical Dept. 1936.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;—an increase unparalleled in any other land.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every year the Soviet Union produces its crop of national heroes, who spring into fame for some notable achievement and whose methods are widely copied. In 1935 the names most heard were those of Stakhanov, a miner, and Marie Demchenko, a farm woman. A former farm servant of the sugar beet districts, Marie had risen through collectivization of farming, and the knowledge she gained in the laboratory cottage, to challenge in spring of 1935 all the beet growers of the land. Let us flood the land with sugar. My brigade will get twenty tons of beets per acre.” Hundreds of letters accepted; hundreds of visitors came to inspect the fields which Marie’s determined brigade of women nine times hoed, and eight times cleared of moths by setting fires at night. They conquered a rainless August by the local fire-fighting apparatus, pouring twenty thousand buckets of water on their fields. They won twenty-one tons per acre and came to the November celebrations in Moscow to receive the Order of Lenin amid the plaudits of the entire country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who were these women singled out for honor? They were women who got down in the dirt to dig sugar beets, who soiled their hands with slimy insects that a beet crop might be improved. What made their achievement honored? This—that their beets were no commodity for private profit, but sugar for the workers of a nation. They were leaders in the public task of farming a continent. This made of the hitherto unregarded toil of farm women a heroic collective epic, worthy to be classed with the work of explorers who raid the Arctic or scientists who storm the stratosphere.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XII: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF SCIENCE ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Russian is now recognized in American universities as a scientific language,” said a young Californian who was visiting with me the Leningrad Institute for Plant Protection. “Four years ago the universities wouldn’t take it as one of the two languages required for a scientific degree. But now my professors tell me that for my specialty of farm pests, it is the most important language of all. More original work is appearing in it than in any other language. German and French research is older and was translated some years ago. But our universities haven’t funds today to translate all this new research appearing in Russian.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This American youth hardly connected in his mind the decline in German and French research and the lack of American university funds for translation with the world-wide economic crisis. He knew little of the collectivization of Soviet farming and the stimulus it had given to his branch of science. But across two seas and two continents the results of these causes had reached the aloof halls of a university in California, interpreted thus “Russian—a scientific language—original research not yet found in translation.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Visiting scientists at the Fifteenth International Physiology Congress which met in Leningrad in August 1935, expressed an appreciation not untinged with amazement at the high respect paid science by the Soviet government and the rapid strides made by Soviet science in recent years. “No government ever ‘took up’ science as has this government. . . .” “Even the Americans are startled by the amount of resources which can be placed at the disposal of science by a government planning on a national scale. . . .” Such were some of the comments which found their way into the press of New York. Professor Walter B. Cannon, of the Harvard Medical School, told the Congress how science suffers today in all the capitalist countries, and added: “In the Soviet Union, where the social importance of science is appreciated, the funds made available for the development and prosecution of science are greater than in any country in the world.” The report of the Congress later given in &#039;&#039;Science&#039;&#039;, official organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, noted “the respect with which scientists are treated,” “the important position which science, pure as well as applied, occupies in the national economy,” and the “ardor of the army of young scientific workers.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet citizens take it for granted—Marxists in fact have taken it for granted ever since the days of Marx—that science must naturally reach a much freer and fuller development under socialism than is possible under capitalism. Capitalism, whose early expansion a century or more ago encouraged and boasted its science, has already reached the stage where science is an embarrassment, since the possibilities of human development which it reveals are unrealizable under private ownership. Science itself under capitalism suffers from a lack of aim. In England the head of the oldest agricultural experiment station in the world told a visiting Russian scientist that he hardly knew what to investigate since the declining condition of farming in England and the antagonisms in Egypt and India prevented the application of everything he discovered. In America the hostility between science and capitalism is only in its first stages, and is marked by increasing suppression of new knowledge which would interfere with profit. In Germany where a collapsing capitalism has taken the form of fascism, there is already a deep distrust of human reason and a propaganda against the very existence of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union science is rapidly expanding. Communism demands the thorough-going application of science to remake all human life; it assumes that the intellect of man can progressively understand and subdue nature to his collective will. “A new historical epoch will begin,” said Engels, “when men and their work will improve to such an extent that all previous achievements will seem as but a feeble shadow.” “We are confident that in our epoch we are entering an era of unparalleled progress in science,” is a typical editorial comment today in 2 Moscow newspaper. President Karpinsky, of the All-Union Academy of Science, spoke of the USSR as “the country where science is given a place of honor,” when he greeted the visiting physiologists “on behalf of hundreds of research institutes.” Even the famous physiologist, L. P. Pavlov, who was always antagonistic to Bolshevik ideas, said recently that he wanted to live to be a hundred because “the Soviet government has given millions for my scientific work and my laboratories flourish as never before.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those doubters who fear that state subsidies for science interfere more with scientific freedom than do the subsidies of individual millionaires, and who promote abroad the idea that the Soviets “persecute scientists,” ignore the fact that a high esteem for science is quite consistent with a deep suspicion of individual scientists. Conflicts did persist between the Soviet government and certain scientists who used their knowledge to fight the Revolution. That sabotage by scientists and engineers occurred on a very wide scale during the early years of the first Five-Year Plan has been acknowledged by thousands of former saboteurs. Only when the victory of the Five-Year Plan was assured beyond question did these waverers finally come over to find that socialism gives far greater opportunities for their science than capitalism ever did or could.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See details in Chap. 3, page 52-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Academy of Science has been greatly expanded from the three departments, mathematics, natural sciences, and historical philology, which it comprised before the Revolution. It is the center for planning and co-ordinating the scientific activity of the entire country through its twenty-one large departments and its frequent inter-departmental sessions. It works hand in hand with the State Planning Commission which indicates to it the requests for widespread scientific research in particular fields needed for the development of the country. It is also the court of appeal for all scientists who disagree with government departments or research institutes on questions of their work, or who want to do research for which no appropriation yet exists. In all conflicts on the objectives of research the Academy decides, being liberally financed directly under the All-Union government. The city of Moscow has recently assigned to the Academy 1,250 acres on the Moscow River, where the first of forty-two projected buildings are now being built.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More than one thousand scientific research institutes in the USSR, employing 41,000 scientific workers, were claimed at the Physiology Congress by Akulov, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the government. Many of these institutes are of monumental size and scope. The All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine, for instance, is the organizing center of all medical research in the USSR. Scientists, doctors and engineers worked for two years on the construction plan of its new home where 5,500 employees are to study “the biology and pathology of the human being from every aspect.” Hospitals of the institute make continuous study of typical cases of various diseases and healthy people are also studied as “controls.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the largest of the scientific institutions is the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, which correlates the work of nearly sixty institutes for research in soil chemistry, plant protection, livestock breeding, microbiology, agrometeorology and similar branches of science. The work of the agricultural institutes is based upon material obtained in 200 experiment stations and more than 1,500 smaller research stations in state and collective farms. Each of the subordinate institutes is an important organization in itself; the Institute for Plant Protection, for instance, has a central staff of 250 scientific workers and dozens of branches all over the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The expansion of Soviet science arises not only from the need of socialism for scientific planning, but from the wide interest and co-operation on the part of the people. The Academy of Science is no secluded institution of the aristocracy; it is the unity of the scientific brains of the country with the masses. Science in the Soviet Union is dear to all the people, for every citizen knows that its discoveries will become his own possession and not the property of a small privileged group. “We scientists used to feel ourselves rather unimportant, since we had already discovered so much more than people were able to apply, but now that the collective farms demand our science, we see our work for several thousand years,” said Vaviloff, Vice-Chairman of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and world-famous discoverer and creator of new plants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The wide interest of the Soviet population in science expresses itself not only in honor to scientists but in active participation in scientific work by great numbers of people. Every scientific institution receives much popular co-operation, from workers, farmers, even from children. When the All-Union geological survey sent some two thousand annual expeditions with seventy to eighty thousand participants to explore and map the resources of the Soviet Union during the first Five-Year Plan, these official expeditions became the correlating center of a still broader popular movement. Thousands of grammar school children became “discoverers of our country,” going with their teachers to study geological outcroppings. Tens of thousands of hikers learned from geologists what to look for on cliffs and mountain slopes and occasionally made discoveries of significance. One of the stimulating causes of the first great Pamir expedition came from a Khirghiz nomad who carried a gold nugget several days journey to Samarkand and fought his way through many bureaucratic offices because he “thought the government ought to know about the gold in the Pamirs.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every large factory has its bureau of workers’ inventions through which inventive genius of workers finds connection with the wider world. Workers and farmers who make practical discoveries are often asked to report them in their own non-technical words at scientific congresses. Scientists in turn give frequent lectures in factories on subjects applicable to the work of the plant. Analysis of steel by the spectrum method will be reported to a machine-building plant, and discussions on organic chemistry will be given by scientists at a rubber works to a large attendance of interested workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So deep and thorough is the interest taken by workers in science that the cleavage between workingmen and scientists already lessens, presaging that time predicted by Marx when the distinction between mental and manual labor will disappear. At a banquet held by the Academy of Science in the Neskuchny Palace in Moscow, a number of leading factory workers were present as guests. A foreign newspaperman, wishing to interview Professor Bach, a well-known member of the Academy, approached a man who was pointed out to him from 2 distance. They chatted half an hour about the revolution in culture, the creation of a new life, and the new type of human being now appearing under socialism. In parting, the correspondent asked for the Academician’s autograph. The man to whom he was speaking started in surprise. “My name Is Ivanov; Bach is the person sitting next to me,” he said, pointing to a man who had been attentively listening. “I myself am a locksmith from the ball-bearing plant.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most striking examples of the democratization of science is the “laboratory cottage,” which has developed in the last two years on the collective farms. Seven thousand of these centers of experiment are reported in the Ukraine alone. The head of the laboratory is sometimes a teacher of the village school, but more often a self-educated farmer who has the scientific instinct and whose enthusiasm has organized other farmers to make experiments in their fields and correspond with scientific stations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“This scientific tendency in human beings takes such varied forms,” said an editor, “that one cannot even classify them. In the past these scientific instincts often died stillborn because of poverty. Today we seek them out through many agencies; one of these is our &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039;. Today a new type of experimenter is developing who does not experiment secretly but organizes the masses around him to discover and carry out new ideas. There is often some waste of time and destruction of machinery in these experiments. But this does not worry us. What is important and valuable is that the human being is striving to change, to improve. Waste of time and destruction of materials matters nothing, if thereby we add even one drop of knowledge which enables man to increase his understanding and control of nature.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One such natural scientist was Akulov, a peasant of the Genichesk district. As a World War prisoner in Austria, he saw one head of grain much bigger than the surrounding heads. He kept it and eventually brought it home to his own garden to breed new giant heads. When the collective farm was formed in his village in 1930, Akulov had four bushels of this special grain to give them. The big heads were planted and cherished until there were several score acres of them. The samples were then sent to the All-Union Institute of Plants and found to be a new variety existing nowhere else in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Seventy-five-year-old illiterate Barashev was another such natural scientist. For nearly twenty years he worked to produce a frost-resistant flax; the collective fields of his farm are harvesting it this year. Pechtilief, in the Leningrad district, stirred up such an interest among his neighbors in discovering why two fields on the same farm gave such different yields, that the whole village became one vast experimental farm, planting several thousand acres in various ways and comparing the results of different types of tillage. Pechtilief appeared before the Congress of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences to demand that scientists find a way to produce a new variety of wheat which should combine the high milling quality of one variety with the non-shattering characteristics of a second. Kolosev, another collective farmer, has challenged the scientists to work out types of seeds and tillage which will insure different ripening times for the various crops and thus get an even load of work through a maximum period for the harvesting machine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The assimilation of new scientific ideas proceeds far faster under the new collective farm system than under the old individual farming. Some entire districts have already become agricultural experiment stations. In Zhadryansk district, near Cheliabinsk, several thousand experiments were carried on in a single summer with oats, wheat, green peas, sunflower seeds and other crops. Special conferences were held attended by two hundred or more delegates from the various laboratory cottages. All these popular experiments are in constant touch with the scientific organizations of the Commissariat of Agriculture, and are protected against undue loss by a government policy of crop insurance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Several achievements of Soviet agricultural science are already of world significance. The method of “vernalization,” which changes winter wheat to spring wheat, late cotton to early cotton and biennial to annual plants, has made it possible to grow Algerian wheat beyond the Polar circle, at 67.4 degrees of latitude in Khibiny. The northernmost botanical gardens in the world are on the Kola Peninsula, where experiments with six hundred plants found twenty-five that could be adapted to the Arctic. The Soviet Union has developed its own rubber industry from the newly discovered “rubber” plants, tau-sagiz and kok-sagiz, found in the mountains of Turkestan and cultivated later as far north as the Ukraine. The brilliant work of Michurin in developing frost-resistant varieties of fruits made him famous not only among scientists of the world but among millions of Soviet farmers, tens of thousands of whom journey annually to his plant-breeding station to report on their use of his varieties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New machines have been developed, a machine for retching flax which is revolutionizing the flax industry, a “northern” combined-harvester suitable for grain of high moisture content. Even the ordinary combine first imported from America has undergone sixty improvements and is said by experts to be the best in the world. Research into soil microbiology has made, according to Vaviloff, “the role of micro-organisms in the soil a calculable factor.” The artificial fertilization of livestock, in which the spermatozoa are sent by mail or airplane from experimental stations to the laboratory cottages, is today applied to half the country’s livestock, insuring rapid improvement of stock from pure-bred males. Under the constant co-operation of collective farmers with scientific centers, the agricultural map of the country is rapidly changing. Sugar beets expand towards the Urals, cotton appears in South Ukraine, irrigation and tree-planting begins to reclaim the wastes beyond the Volga, and wheat marches steadily towards the Arctic. Thousands of acres are today successfully farmed in the Murmansk district on the Arctic Ocean, in place of a scant twelve acres a few years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most spectacular example of the planned advance of man under the leadership of science is the conquest of the Polar regions, which has stirred the imagination and enthusiasm of the whole Soviet land. Scientists of the All-Union Arctic Institute first seriously broached the idea of a Great Northern Sea Route in 1930, though other scientists declared that traffic along the northern coast of Europe and Asia was “impracticable during the present glacial epoch.” The Soviet government backed its bolder scientists, established the Central Administration of the Northern Sea Route and gave it ships and funds. Step by step the rapid advance was made, first by dozens of expeditions which mapped coasts and charted waters, then by thirty-nine Polar scientific stations, equipped with radio and airplane service, then by trading fleets led by ice-breakers first from the west, then from the east, and then along the whole Polar coast from Atlantic to Pacific.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The whole world remembers the epic of the Chelyushkin, its tragic wreck northwest of Bering Straits, the skillful landing on ice which was crashing around them, the two months of heroic organization of “normal life” in their floating home on the ice-floe, where Professor Schmidt, dressed in deer-skin coat and fur cap, delivered lectures on dialectic materialism or the Freudian theory, and found time to edit the galleys of the &#039;&#039;Unabridged Soviet Encyclopedia&#039;&#039; which he had brought from Moscow, and to write a preface to a book on higher mathematics. The history of Polar expeditions has known many examples of daring, but never such courageously casual organization of normal routine under abnormal conditions as this “Soviet Republic on the Ice” which got out its “wall newspaper” with cartoons and self-criticism, and comments on the Communist Party Congress then taking place in Moscow, received by the Chelyushkinites by radio.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today special ships are built in Soviet shipyards, embodying the experience of the Chelyushkin for the conquest of the northern seas. Steadily the designs of airplanes and clothing have been adapted to Arctic weather and the plane is now the “eyes of the north.” Four ordinary freighters in the summer of 1935 made the whole trip around the north of Europe and Asia, and scores will follow in 1936. The network of heroic scientists, wintering in thirty-nine stations, begins to be supplemented by miners, timber-workers, even farmers. Extensive prospecting has been done for minerals, especially coal and oil to serve the northern trade route. A new type of man is following the explorers and scientists—engineers, technicians, builders of the Arctic. And science pushes farther north in the expedition of the Sadko, to discover, at latitude 82° 40’—the farthest north ever reached in free sailing—the re-emergence of a warm section of the Gulf Stream which may make the northern sea route practicable for more months of the year. Of all the world’s eight ships which have reached during the past half century the latitudes around 80°, two were American, two Scandinavian and four were Soviet ships of the past few years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the support of the whole Soviet country which strengthens these men of the north in their conquests. The entire Soviet population regards these Arctic subduers as their representatives and champions. It shares their lives by radio hook-ups Moscow talks through the six months’ night with Dixon Island, which issues the Arctic Radio News. All Russia thrilled when a young ex-criminal, sent to the far north to “make himself over,” was reassured across three thousand frozen miles by the voice of his factory sweetheart urging him to make good. When a winter childbirth in a distant Arctic station developed complications, the neighbors got the Dixon Island surgeon on the radio and for more than three hours he directed over the air every detail while the whole of a much-worried Arctic listened in. When the child and mother were safe, congratulations poured in from thousands of miles of icebound waterfront.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even under capitalism science breaks the boundaries of nations, steadily to lift the power of man. Under socialism it becomes the consciously applied and swiftly expanding strength of the whole population, conquering for man his world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XIII: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF ART ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Heroic people call into being heroic artists.”|Editorial in Soviet &#039;&#039;Literary Critic&#039;&#039;}}&lt;br /&gt;
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If science is the instrument of man’s dominance over nature, art is the means of his self-expression. Tens of millions of people from earth’s most backward races have awakened in the Soviet Union from long slumber. They are seeking self expression. They themselves write, sing and paint; they push up from their ranks novelists, poets and dramatists. They love these poets and dramatists; they criticize them and make serious demands from them. Soviet art is not private property, it is the wealth of the nation, and the nation is jealous and proud of its wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the first All-Union Congress of Soviet writers met in Moscow in August, 1934, thousands of letters poured in from all corners of the union, congratulating, greeting, giving practical suggestions and advice. Workers, collective farmers, students, Young Pioneers, scientists, engineers and artists thus expressed their interest in the Congress. In Moscow alone, more than two hundred factory conferences were held between readers and authors. Delegations representing millions of readers came to speak at the Congress. Each day after the meetings, authors found throngs of workers who had been unable to enter the crowded hall waiting outside to hail their favorite writers with applause. Throughout the country, millions of people concentrated their attention on questions of esthetics, the function of poetry, the form of literature best suiting the present age, subjects reported in detail in the press. Literary work in the land of the Soviets is becoming the affair of all the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are no bounds to the desire for every variety of culture. Soviet Russia in its first fifteen years published five billion books, as contrasted with two billion in the last thirty years of tsardom. The number keeps growing. At the end of the first Five-Year Plan, book production in the USSR was greater than that of England, Germany and France together. Especially amazing is the growth of literature among the national minorities whose self-expression was suppressed under tsardom. Every year since 1929 has seen the publication of more books in the Ukrainian language than were published in the whole 118 years before the Revolution. One publishing house alone, the Moscow International Book House, publishes books in eighty-five languages, some of which had formerly no alphabet—novels, textbooks, folk tales, technical works, translations of classics, short stories and dictionaries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet world feels itself the heir of the ages. Anniversaries of poets, scientists and artists of all countries are widely celebrated. The ancient Persian poet Firdousi, the English Shakespeare, the German Goethe, the famous French writers, are honored by mass meetings and columns in the press. The best works of Flaubert, Mérimée, Maupassant, Victor Hugo, Mark Twain and Jack London appear by the hundreds of thousands of copies and disappear almost as quickly from the shelves of bookstores which never expect to retain volumes more than a few weeks. Russian classics are even more popular. Lermontov, Nekrassov, Korolenko, Gogol, Turgenev, Chekhov appear in editions of seventy to a hundred thousand. The favorite poet Pushkin has been issued for several years in repeated editions of two hundred thousand copies, and his collected works in six volumes now face a subscription demand of three hundred thousand copies, exclusive of sales to the shops. Tolstoy is the most popular of all; eleven and a half million copies of his works have been sold since the Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet reader demands not only the art of the past but the art of today. The most popular novels are those like Sholokhov’s &#039;&#039;Quiet Don&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Soil Upturned&#039;&#039;, which paint on a wide canvas the personalities, difficulties, struggles and victories of the present. “No artist of the past had such material at his disposal as is given by the earth-shaking events occurring in the USSR in the last eighteen years,” said the Soviet writer Panferov speaking at a Paris congress. “The working class built a dam on the surging Dnieper and made its unruly waters serve man. It transformed the misty Urals into an industrial center, mastered the wild and distant Kuzbas. . . . In remaking the country the working class at the same time remade itself. . . . The outcast dweller of the mountains, the illiterate, solitary Yakut, the northern Nentsi, the wild Bashkir, the Mordvin with his trachoma, the persecuted Kalmyk—tens of millions of peoples in scores of scattered nationalities went into the furnace of civil war and are energetically rebuilding the country, conquering the strongholds of culture, bringing new life to the whole world. . . . Socialist realism was the inevitable phenomenon of the proletarian era—active, cheerful, bold and daring, like the era of the proletarian revolution itself.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These tens of millions of people are not only the subjects for art, they are also the artists, readers and audience. They show a wide interest in all forms of artistic expression. Theaters are constantly crowded; art museums are packed with visitors; popular exhibitions sometimes have lines before the museum entrances waiting until there is room to go in. Nor are the factory workers and collective farmers at all backward in expressing their opinion on the products of brush and pen. Are they not all also writers, artists, musicians and actors, if and when the mood seizes them? They are not only consumers of art, millions of them are amateur producers of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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More than one hundred thousand “circles for self-expression” have grown up in the past two years in the USSR. The drama circles alone have 1,200,000 members, while the total number in the singing, music, dancing and graphic art circles exceeds five million. Writers, cartoonists and photographers for the local press or wall newspapers are probably as many more. A chief characteristic of the new type of person now emerging in the Soviet Union is his dynamic energy in self-expression, usually in some collective form.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first and most direct self-expression of large numbers takes the form of participation in the press. They write their opinions about corrupt officials or inefficient farm management for the hand-lettered sheet posted on a factory wall or a village tree-trunk; more important communications they send, often with several signatures, to the great metropolitan &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039; with their million and a half subscribers. Two million letters a year pour into the office of the &#039;&#039;Peasents’ Gazette&#039;&#039; in Moscow, reflecting the life and problems of the farm; only part of them can be published but all of them are answered, filed, and carefully studied as material for novels, for history, and for the lawmaking of the state.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a northern township, fifty miles from the railroad, where before the Revolution only six people subscribed to any newspaper at all, I visited a congress of some two hundred rural press correspondents preparing for a sowing campaign. These were only part of the energetic writers of this township. Its collective farms had 470 field brigades, every one of which during the sowing campaign posted up a wall newspaper. One picturesque seventeen-year-old boy in a vivid shirt of old rose sateen under a black jacket proudly reported the overthrow of the corrupt management of his collective farm by his articles and editorials. “We got out nine numbers,” he explained to the meeting, “then we stopped for want of paper. But we had already aroused the farmers, and the general meeting removed the president and two members of the management.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Nine single sheets of crude newsprint stuck in successive weeks on a tree, protected from the rain by an overhanging board, had deposed the management of a farm, shamed idlers, carried the sowing through to success, finished the hoeing and brought the brigade on record time to the haying season. The number of these collective farm wall-newspapers throughout the country is estimated by the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; as half a million, with at least ten village correspondents for each. There are more than three thousand factory newspapers; these range from weeklies of a few hundred copies to dailies with a circulation of twenty thousand and more in the larger plants. These newspapers are both an organizing center for factory and farm life and a training school for young writers. With such a writing and reading public, it is not surprising that there are more than eleven thousand printed newspapers in the Soviet Union with a circulation of more than thirty-six million copies—thirteen times as great as before the Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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An ever-growing stream of writers enters literature through the gateway of the factory and farm newspapers, which make modest but insistent demands on the humblest worker able to use a pen. Literary groups arise in centers like the Urals and the Donetz basin, or around some tractor station which serves the nearby villages. Many of the Donbas group of writers embarked on their literary careers when through with their day’s work of furnishing coal. Their magazine &#039;&#039;Literary Donbas&#039;&#039; has produced a noteworthy crop of stories and poems widely popular among miners.&lt;br /&gt;
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The literary society of collective farmers at the machine tractor station in Voronovo village had as members two stablemen, a blacksmith, a reaper, a tractor-driver, a bookkeeper, a warehouseman, four day-nursery attendants, three teachers, two presidents of collective farms, one village president, three editors of field newspapers and sixteen farm women. In one year the members published through their own printshop two books of verses, the play &#039;&#039;Miscalculated&#039;&#039;, and 2 book of character sketches, &#039;&#039;Bolsheviks of the Politodels&#039;&#039;. They announced for the following year a play, &#039;&#039;According to Merit&#039;&#039;, a novel &#039;&#039;Quiet Subversion&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;The Diary of a Tractor Driver&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;The History of the Machine Tractor Station&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is difficult to conceive of the wide extent of amateur art activities of all kinds. Thousands of short-line popular stanzas known as &#039;&#039;chastyshki&#039;&#039; appear in the most distant parts of the Soviet Union celebrating the freedom of woman, the heroism of tractor-drivers, the growing prosperity of collective life. They vary in merit from mere doggerel giving rhymed technical guidance for reapers and cattle herders to verse of real beauty. The Donetz coal region alone reports more than eight hundred brass bands, three hundred orchestras, two hundred and fifty choruses, thousands of dramatic circles and even forty-two ballet schools. Some of the Soviet dancers who attracted attention at a recent London dance festival came from these “self-expression groups.” Amateur circles in drawing and painting also exist all over the country, and give local exhibitions which often unearth talent.&lt;br /&gt;
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A constant interchange of ideas and personnel goes on between professional and non-professional groups. The Soviet press takes active part in establishing these connections. The newspaper &#039;&#039;Culture and Sport&#039;&#039; publishes reproductions of the best art from famous galleries. It encourages would-be artists to correspond and send in their work to be judged by well-known artists; those who show talent are sent to art schools. The magazine &#039;&#039;Collective Farm Theater&#039;&#039; every month issues eight or ten special supplements containing plans of caravan theaters, rural pageants and festivals, choral programs, texts of one-act plays. It connects the self-expression groups with the nearest professional theater which can help them in their technique. There are today one hundred rural theaters of professional standing.&lt;br /&gt;
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One among many movements which swept the farms in the summer of 1935 was a campaign to discover musical talent among children. Hundreds of local musical festivals were held to many of which professors from the Moscow Conservatory came by airplane to act as judges. As a result, 715 of the most talented children are being sent to special musical schools; the twenty-five best ones were brought to a specially created branch in the Moscow Conservatory of Music.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only in music but in poetry, drama and dancing, nation-wide “Olympiads were held in the summer of 1935. In Leningrad, for instance, juries of artists visited the factories to select eleven hundred contestants for the district Olympiad from fifteen thousand amateur musicians, singers, dancers, acrobats, orators, accordion players and even jugglers. On a collective farm in Smolensk, an illiterate peasant woman of sixty-four years wrote a play, dictating it to a younger woman; the young folks of the farm produced it at the Olympiad in Smolensk. Besides the Olympiads, many “culture expeditions” of both scholars and composers penetrate the wilderness where live Khirgiz, Buryat-Mongols, Tajiks, Uzbeks, to seek and preserve the music and poems which shed light on early culture. A symphony orchestra recently organized made its first tour, playing old Cossack melodies in modern style, across what not so long ago was the steppe of half-savage nomads. Collective farms sent delegations hundreds of miles to insist that the orchestra visit them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out of this artistic ferment in the lives of millions, arises the vigor of Soviet art, which feels itself called upon to find adequate expression for the awakening genius of the people. Soviet writers today, if they would be popular, must not confine themselves to delving in the depths of a single human soul; they must depict the vast variety of changing social relations. They spend much time in deepening their contacts with intimate details of factory or of farm; Sholokhov, for instance, makes his permanent residence in the village whose changing life is the subject of a whole series of novels.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor is the artist’s human material passive; the human material talks back. The Vakhtangov Theater invites the audience to discuss plays between the scenes and at the end with the actors; witty and fruitful discussions occur. Meetings between writers and readers have become a popular feature of factory life. Authors like Sholokhov and Tretyakov have long adopted the custom of reading drafts of semi-finished manuscripts to audiences of workers and farmers. Frequently a worker is able to give sound advice on the handling of an industrial character. “Our reader, while a friend, is also a very severe critic,” says the Soviet writer, Vsevolod-Ivanov. “Intercourse with him is the best and most precious school.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet readers demand simplicity and vividness of writing. They are not interested in complex analysis of burdened souls. Their whole life faces outward. Their interest is in people who do things, who change the relations of society. In the first decade after the Revolution, a typical theme in literature and drama was the hero who died in the moment of victory while the collective achievement marched on. The hero might be a Chapayev shot down before his victorious comrades appear on the scene, or a village organizer killed by a kulak and drawn to his grave in triumphal procession by the newly-arrived tractor which his labor had secured. The victory was collective, attained through the sacrifice of the heroic individual. Thus was the natural expression of the period of revolution and civil war.&lt;br /&gt;
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New themes begin to dominate Soviet literature and drama of recent years. The hero no longer dies; he struggles, achieves, learns, and is himself made over, not by introspection but by the clash of action. He is the optimist—builder type creating a glorious and happy future. What the people demand of writers, they demand also of the graphic arts: an art that is inspired by and in torn inspires the great moods of the day. The workers of Stalingrad sent a famous open letter to the artists: “Don’t give us colored photographs, we are tired of them. We expect from you an art that is stirring and inspiring.”&lt;br /&gt;
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If the responsive demand of a great new public is a constant stimulus to Soviet artists, a second stimulus is found in co-operation with members of their craft. Writers, actors, painters—all have their organizations. They maintain club houses for social contacts, discussions and exhibitions; they have country retreats to which members withdraw for rest and creative work. They assist beginners with loans and subsidies; they foster high standards; they assist members in the sale of their work. The writers’ organization issues literary journals, organizes courses, consultations and criticisms for new writers and runs a literary university for workers. The actors’ club holds special midnight performances where its members meet famous visiting artists and see the season’s best in music, dance and drama.&lt;br /&gt;
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Four thousand artists belong to a co—operative which not only handles exhibitions all over the country, but also owns numerous factories producing artists’ supplies, workshops for stone-cutting, metal-casting and frame-making and studios for lithography and engraving. This co-operative has a yearly turnover of forty-two million rubles. It accepts on behalf of its members orders from city soviets, large industries, and workers’ clubs which wish decorations and paintings; some of these orders run over the million-ruble mark. When the ten-year reconstruction plan of Moscow creates a demand for architecture, sculpture, landscaping and monumental art, the artists’ organizations arrange discussions and excursions of sculptors and architects and initiate experimental fresco work on a large scale. Instead of being an isolated craftsman, the Soviet artist is part of a rich and influential organization which connects him with the government planning departments and the organized life of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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From this close association of artists with their fellow craftsmen and with their public has arisen a method of collective production which is becoming increasingly popular; it extends to the collective writing of books by a score of writers and even by whole factories. Thirty professional writers combined to produce &#039;&#039;Belomor&#039;&#039;, the famous tale of the building of the Baltic-White Sea Canal. “We tried to tell how a canal was built in a far, cold and rocky place and how the chekists made new men out of prisoners,” said Vsevolod-Ivanov. “We were authors entirely different in taste and in age, but we all tried to make that book united, wide-horizoned and mighty. That book is dear to me even today. In writing it, I learned that we writers are really not such individualists as we like to call ourselves.” The Events of the High Mountain, which told the history of an iron mine in the Urals, was written by more than one hundred miners. The miners consulted, wrote and improved it in common, as together they created and improved their mine. The book is a great political and artistic document, energetic, fresh and vital.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;The History of the Civil War&#039;&#039;, the &#039;&#039;History of Factories&#039;&#039; and the now projected &#039;&#039;History of the Russian Village&#039;&#039; contain whole series of books, each of which compiles the experiences of hundreds or even thousands of people. The characters are not described by others; they describe themselves, each seeking in consultation with the others a significant artistic form. The meeting of two hundred village correspondents which I attended, decided to issue a book giving artistic form to the history of the township. They selected the best writers from each of twenty-five villages to work with two professional authors who had come from Moscow. Each local writer chose with the help of his village some vivid and significant episode or character whose story illumined the changes made by the Revolution. One contrasted the intimate family relations in his father’s household with those in his own Soviet home. Another described the people who had successively looked out of the windows of a certain ancient building—once a school for the daughters of the nobility and now the central club of the collective farm. The result was a book which was lacking in style and finish but vivid and unforgettable with actual life. It was not yet art, but it made part of the rich soil out of which great art may well grow in the next few decades.&lt;br /&gt;
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Great art movements in the past have followed periods of economic expansion which gave stimulus to new creative life. “We are already in the great epoch; artistic values of permanent worth are already appearing but not yet the great masterpieces. Where else in the world are there even high artistic values?” said a Soviet writer to me. In literature Ostrovski’s &#039;&#039;How Steel is Welded&#039;&#039;, Sholokhov’s &#039;&#039;Quiet Don&#039;&#039;; in motion pictures, &#039;&#039;Potemkin&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Chapayev&#039;&#039;, the &#039;&#039;Youth of Maxim&#039;&#039;, are among the many lasting contributions which the Soviets have already made to art. The Moscow subway is one of the first significant expressions of the epoch in architecture. As forums and temples expressed the spirit of ancient Rome, cathedrals and castles the Middle Ages, and skyscrapers the power of centralized finance, so this beautiful subway expresses the rhythm of millions of workers in efficient motion. The Lenin library in Moscow and the House of State Industry in Kharkov, and some of the new factories, children’s centers, and sanitoriums, also foreshadow the new architecture.&lt;br /&gt;
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Are Soviet artists “in uniform?” Only in so far as they lack intelligence to respond to their social environment and the will to fight their way through to expression. Artists whose souls were formed by an old world felt the coming of the new as a thwarting of impulses. They had to find their way about among new publishers and new officials, who were trying more or less intelligently to protect the new order. Often groups of rising artists hogged the Revolution and organized to lord it over their fellows. Thus the RAPP (Association of Revolutionary Writers) succeeded in imposing its narrow standards for a considerable period, till other authors learned the new environment and smashed the RAPP. The social environment also changes; when that excellent play, &#039;&#039;Days of the Turbines&#039;&#039;, featured a tsarist officer as hero before post-war audiences where budding capitalists cheered him, Young Communist organizations fresh from fighting those officers protested wrathfully and had the play suppressed. When Nepmen followed the civil war into the past, the play revived to more tolerant audiences.&lt;br /&gt;
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All authors everywhere adjust themselves to editors, publishers and readers; these are necessary media no less than words or paint. Not even in America could “proletarian authors” come into being, until there were new readers who pushed them up. Soviet society also presses in various ways on artists. We authors deal with publishers who are worried by their paper quota; their criterion is “importance” rather than profit, since any half-good book is sure to sell. They rely in part on “political editors,” officials of the Commissariat of Education, whose function is to give advice on the demands of the educational field and the political significance of the work. My own conversations with these political editors—they dislike the name censors—are singularly like those with publishers’ readers in America. They make suggestions, some extremely valuable, some moderately useful and some of which I protest; they themselves yield to reason and prefer authors who know what they do. Only crude authors take them as enemies; through mutual discussion the product is improved. If differences lie too deep, one seeks another publisher; in the Soviet Union there is also the wider appeal. No one autocrat censors everything. Political editors more and more become highly educated specialists. Important plays are usually previewed by selected audiences of leading critics and persons familiar with their theme, both children and educators previewing a drama or motion picture destined for children. Only on military matters and material likely to injure the Soviets’ international relations is the censor absolute;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The most striking recent example was the suppression of information during the difficult year of 1932, a suppression which turned several American journalists permanently against the Soviets. The Soviets believed with some reason that derailed knowledge of their difficulties would provoke the threatened Japanese invasion.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and these matters are hardly the realm of art.&lt;br /&gt;
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If art survived the censoring by the whims of princelings in the feudal ages, and by the profit-motives of American publishers, why should it not survive the decisions of educational authorities and experienced critics who estimate its importance for a socialist society? To the artist now growing up in a Soviet environment, art is the natural expression of the collective life of millions given significant form by his own special talent or genius. Such an artist feels no repression in this new environment; he feels its great creative urge. Millions of rural journalists, thousands of dramatic clubs, tens of thousands of farm and factory orchestras furnish an alert and appreciative public. The leisure made possible by the social ownership of great modern machines is already widely used in the Soviet Union for pursuits of science and art. The barriers thus begin to wear thin between manual and mental labor; the same person does both. Genius, wherever it arises, finds ready access to widening expression. From such a soil, watered by the artistic strivings of millions, great art must grow. More than great art—a people to whom art becomes man’s natural self-expression, which no longer flames and dies.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER XIV: REMAKING HUMAN BEINGS ===&lt;br /&gt;
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When the All-Union Song and Dance Olympiad was held in the summer of 1935 in Moscow, the first prize for dance groups was won by a troupe who would be classed in the capitalist world as convicts. They were sentenced criminals who were still living in Labor Commune Number Two, to which they had been sent for reformation. Their performance of an Ukrainian folk-dance “The Snowstorm” took first place against fifty thousand entrants. To anyone unfamiliar with the Soviet technique for handling criminals, the dancing of the group was less amazing than their free association with other groups of artists in all the local and provincial dance festivals, which brought them at last to Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
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The remaking of criminals is only one specialized form of the process of remaking human beings which goes on consciously today in the Soviet Union. Unlike those who justify ancient abuses with the formula, “You can’t change human nature,” the Marxist knows that human nature is constantly changing. The serf of the Middle Ages was a different human being from the highly skilled industrial worker of today, not only in methods of work but in mental outlook, nervous reactions, and even physical motions. Today a remaking of people in greater or less degree takes place across the entire Soviet Union. Illiterate, slow-moving peasants become attuned to rapid work in a collective labor process. Scientists, artists, engineers, doctors, once accustomed to depend upon capitalists for their living, adjust themselves to the new controls of a socialist state as employer. Some welcome the change, others resent it, but in all men the habits derived from the past are at war with the demands imposed by the present, and this struggle changes both the human beings and their environment.&lt;br /&gt;
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To some the process of change is only half conscious, and therefore bewildering and painful. To the happiest it is a consciously welcomed process. For men in all ages have desired to change, to become in some direction “better.” Moral teachers have urged them to effect this by an emotional decision to be good, honest, industrious. But this is a struggle in the dark with forces which the human being does not understand. His emotional conversion lasts as long as he can focus will and attention. But if the old environment continues, the old habits reassert themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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To a limited extent a human being may change himself under any social system, not by efforts of will but by calmly analyzing himself and his environment and placing himself under the impact of other forces which will change him. So much free will man has. But these individual efforts are limited by the social possibilities. Can a prostitute change her environment so that street-walking will become unnecessary? Only if an honest job is somewhere accessible. Can gangsters reform? Only if honesty is really the best policy; for him who would prosper under capitalism there is a time to be honest and a time to steal, and the criminal is the unlucky or stupid person who stole at the wrong time and in the unaccepted manner. Only a social system which insures to ordinary honest labor greater rewards than can be obtained by even the luckiest dishonesty will produce instinctively honest men.&lt;br /&gt;
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A remarkable tale of the change in social standards is written by a newspaper correspondent from the Ural gold fields. Formerly, according to the writer, everybody admired clever miners who were able to steal nuggets which legally belonged to the private owners of the fields. This attitude persisted long after the mines were owned by the government. But recently at a party given to celebrate a betrothal, the young man in the heat of dancing pulled out his handkerchief and with it a gold nugget which fell to the floor. There was a sudden silence and the party broke up without comment, even the girl turning away from the man thus revealed. “Everyone knew him for an enemy,” wrote the correspondent.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sharpest test of conscious remaking of human character is found in the Soviet policy for handling law-breakers. The Soviet criminologist holds neither of the theories on which the prevalent systems of prison régime in capitalist countries are based. He does not believe in the existence of “born criminals” whose will must be broken by brutal suppression nor does he rely on emotional appeals to the “better nature” of the criminal, for he knows that this better nature exists as yet only in rudimentary form. “We don’t assume that a man of anti-social habits will be at once reclaimed by gifts of chocolate, nice bathrooms, and soft words,” a leading Soviet penologist told me. “Men are made over by a new social environment and especially by their work done collectively.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet law aims to make over social misfits while protecting society from their attacks. Punishment as vengeance has no place in such an aim: revenge merely incites revenge in return. To make prisoners sit in solitude and think of their sins produces a fixation on crime. To “break a man’s will” or lessen his human dignity in any way injures him material for a creative socialist society. Soviet justice therefore aims to give the criminal a new environment in which he will begin to act in a normal way as a responsible Soviet citizen. The less confinement the better; the less he feels himself in prison the better. Soviet justice began to fight crime under the harsh conditions of civil war, replying with ruthless measures to counter-revolutionary plots. “We have a double approach” said Attorney-General Vishinsky in an interview. “Active, confirmed enemies of our Soviet power who stick at nothing to injure us must be ruthlessly crushed. But even among these alien elements, among nobles, landlords, tsarist officers, capitalists, whom we had robbed of their private property, we had to be able even there to find those individuals who could be made over into useful workers. We cannot begin with clean hands and fresh bricks to build socialism; we must use even old bricks for the new building. But if we had tried to apply the idea of absolute humanitarianism to bitter enemies we wouldn’t be here today.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Many social offenses are handled without bringing them into ordinary courts at all. A whole series of “comradely courts,” in factories, schools and apartment houses, try informally people who disturb their neighbors. These courts have the right to fix small fines for the benefit of the local club or library; they refer cases which they cannot handle to the public courts. There are even “children’s courts” in which children judge each other in the presence of interested adults. One such children’s court in an apartment house tried a boy for cruelty in killing a cat, and came finally to the conclusion that the real culprit was the superintendent of the apartment house who persistently failed to provide a place to play. The superintendent, who was present, accepted the decision, and organized with the children a committee to make good the shortcoming.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Not only in the court but out of the court my job is social protection,” a rural judge told me. “I must prevent court cases when I can.” He told how he had prevented crime at a recent saints’ festival. “Men always drink hard on such occasions; they fight and knife each other. So I called together the presidents of collective farms an the Party members, and we went through the crowd before drinking began and took away the knives and canes. They got drunk later, but nobody was badly hurt.”&lt;br /&gt;
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I sat in the court session which this judge held under the village trees and heard a dozen cases—stealing hay, bootlegging and the like—disposed of in an afternoon. The commonest sentence was “compulsory labor” which did not remove the offender from his home but required him to do without pay some socially useful work, such as road-building, school-construction or even office work in the village soviet. Only one serious case appeared: more than half the calves in a collective dairy had died under circumstances which seemed to implicate the dairy manager of something worse than the criminal negligence charge which had been brought. The judge found that he was “guilty of negligence at least,” but held the case over for further investigation to see whether he was guilty of “something more,” i.e., intentional conspiracy to smash the farm. In that case he would be “sent away” from the village to a labor camp for a period of perhaps three years.&lt;br /&gt;
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The labor camp is the prevalent method for handling serious offenders of all kinds, whether criminal or political. Most of the old prisons have been abolished; I have found them in rural districts converted into schools. The labor camps have won high reputation throughout the Soviet Union as places where tens of thousands of men have been reclaimed. They have, however, been the center of some of the most spectacular attacks on the Soviet Union in recent years. Allegations of brutal treatment and even of torture have found their way widely into the foreign press. While it is clearly impossible to check every one of these accusations, they are contradicted by every competent observer who has ever seen the camps. Dr. Mary Stevens Callcott, the American penologist who has studied prisons all over the world and who has had the unique experience of visiting the larger part of the Soviet camps, including those for the worst—and for political—offenders, has commented both in her book &#039;&#039;Soviet justice&#039;&#039; and in conversations with me personally, on the “amazingly normal” life that differentiates these camps from prisons in any other part of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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She notes the freedom of movement over large areas of territory, the very small amount of guarding, the work done under normal conditions—seven hours for ordinary labor to ten for men whose tasks, such as driving a truck, permitted frequent rests during work. She could find no speed-up; laws of labor protection operated as in factories. Wages were the same as those outside, with deductions for living expenses; all above this could be sent by the prisoner to his family, saved or spent as he chose. “No uniforms with their psychological implications, no physical abuse; isolation only in extreme instances. Privileges and special rewards replace the system of special penalties.” Among these special rewards are the two weeks’ vacation in which the prisoner may leave the camp, and the opportunities given for his family not only to visit him but even to live with him for extended periods. Normal human association goes on; men and women meet and may even marry while serving sentence, in which case they are given separate quarters.&lt;br /&gt;
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What most impressed Dr. Callcott, however, was the type of men in charge of these camps, and the relation they had to the prisoners. She tells of going through the Moscow-Volga Canal camp with its director. Prisoners hailed him with obvious pleasure and informality. A girl rushed up to detain him by seizing the belt of his uniform lest he get away before she could tell him something. A teacher whose term was about to expire expressed a wish to stay on and work under him. There were only five officials in the central administration office of this camp of many thousand prisoners; all the work, including most of the guarding, was done by the convicted men themselves. “In fact,” said Dr. Callcott, “I could never see what kept men in this camp unless they wanted to stay there. No convicts I have known would have any difficulty if they wanted to break away.” Both prisoners and officials, of whom Dr. Callcott asked this question—she talked with prisoners freely without the presence of officials—replied they didn’t run away because if they did, “nobody in my working gang would speak to me when I came back. They would say I disgraced them.” There are, however, a certain number of incorrigibles who run away repeatedly, and these are given somewhat closer guarding for a time. Political prisoners, she noted, were treated like everyone else, except that those who had been persistent and dangerous in their attacks on the government were sent further away from the possibility of connection with their past associates. In all her conversations with these “politicals,” she was unable to find one who had been sentenced merely for expressing anti-Soviet views. All were charged with definite action against the government.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I did everything I could to destroy this government,” one such man frankly told her, “sabotage of the most serious kind. But the way they have treated me here has convinced me that they are right.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Another prisoner, who had been in Sing Sing, San Quentin, as well as in jails of England, Spain and Germany, before he was picked up by the Soviets for grand larceny, had been reclaimed by the Baltic-White Sea Canal. He had done a bit of engineering in his youth, and was promptly given a chance to work at this specialty. He won a medal, pursued his studies further, and was doing brilliant work on the Moscow-Volga Canal when Dr. Callcott met him. To her query about his reformation he replied:&lt;br /&gt;
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“In the other countries they treated me like a prisoner, clapped me in jail and taught me my place. Here they clapped me on the back and said ‘What can we do to make you into a useful citizen?’” Dr. Callcott conversed with many men now high in Soviet industry who had previously been reclaimed by the labor camps. Nothing in their attitude or that of those about them showed any stigma remaining from their prison life. “Of course, when it’s over, it’s forgotten,” one of them said to her. “That,” says Dr. Callcott, “is real restoration.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Information from many other sources and from my own observation corroborates Dr. Callcott. In August 1935 I visited the town of Bear Mountain, center of the administration of the Baltic-White Sea Canal, which is widely known in the USSR not only as a great construction job but as the place where tens of thousands of men won new lives for old. It is still the distributing center for the labor camps of this district.&lt;br /&gt;
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The chauffeur who drove me over twenty miles of wilderness without a guard in sight was one of the prisoners. He talked quite freely and said that he didn’t like the north but at least he had a chance to study a trade or become an engineer. A dozen types of industry had been established to utilize and train all kinds of workers. They took pride in their modern equipment and the high quality of goods produced. In the holiday celebration going on in the public square during my visit, one could not always tell who were prisoners, who were free workers and who were “guards.” The atmosphere was that of any new construction job in the country. Such, indeed, was the intention—to establish the atmosphere of normal constructive life, with certain old associations shut out.&lt;br /&gt;
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What most interested me was the splendid theater, whose director boasted of his production of the opera &#039;&#039;Eugene Onegin&#039;&#039;, the &#039;&#039;Red Poppy&#039;&#039; ballet, and many of the latest Moscow plays. We learned later that he was a well-known Moscow producer, sent north for a serious crime. The camp authorities at once decided to build a theater, in order to utilize his abilities to the full. The theater cast itself consisted of lawbreakers, government officials, free workers and the families of all of them, mixing in the democratic intimacy of a dramatic performance. One wonders which of all his achievements this director will most boast of in old age, his work in Moscow or the northern theater created in Bear Mountain.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many former prisoners from the Baltic-White Sea Canal, after receiving freedom together with special prizes and high honors for their good work, went of free choice to help build the Moscow-Volga Canal, another convict-labor job. Here they were especially valued because through their own experience they understood the process through which new prisoners had to go and were especially skilled in helping them make themselves over. As in other Soviet construction camps, the workers on this canal had their art studio under professional direction, their musical circle and literary magazine, and their bureau of inventions through which four thousand proposals to improve the work of the canal have been offered by the prisoners themselves. Several prisoners, given their freedom because of inventions, refused to leave until the canal should be finished.&lt;br /&gt;
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So well known and effective is the Soviet method of remaking human beings that criminals occasionally now apply to be admitted. I met one such man in Gulin village. Notorious locally as thief and drunkard, he had a dozen convictions to his discredit, till at last he went to the authorities saying: “I’m a man destroyed, but I want to be made over.” They sent him to a labor camp whence he returned a qualified worker. Bolshevo Commune, the most famous “cure” for criminals, can be entered only by application approved by the general meeting of members. Its waiting list is so long that it accepts only the most hardened cases, priding itself on being able to make over persons who cannot become cured in any other institution. Its strength lies in its large membership of intelligent former criminals, who apply to new entrants their intimate knowledge of the criminal mind.&lt;br /&gt;
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Crime today is rapidly diminishing in the Soviet Union. From 1929 to 1934 sentences for murder decreased by one-half while sex crimes fell off to one-fourth. The cause is found in the growing strength of the Soviet environment to remake human beings; the penal policy is only a supplementary force. A striking example of the play of both causes may be found in the figures of prostitution. Pre-war Moscow had 25,000 to 30,000 prostitutes; these sank by 1928 to about 3,000,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Material from Dr. V. Bronner, head of Institute of Venereal Diseases, Commissariat of Health.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; diminution clearly due to economic causes. In 1931, after the Five-Year Plan -had abolished unemployment, the number sank still further to about eight hundred. To reclaim the more habituated, prophylactoria were established. These rose to the number of thirty-four in the whole USSR in 1934, and then swiftly declined to nineteen as their work was done. They are still declining for want of inmates; only one of the original five is left in Moscow. No woman was ever compelled to go to a prophylactorium; the chief punishment for breaking rules was to be put out. Nine-tenths of those who entered left cured both of physical disease and of old habits and were accepted without comment into the normal working life of the city.&lt;br /&gt;
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An eventual disappearance of crime is expected by Soviet authorities as the mental habits produced by a socialist system become established in Soviet life. For crime, in the Marxian view, arises from the conflicts of a class-exploiting society and will follow classes and exploitation into oblivion. In the first years of the new system, the sharp conflict with classes from whom it took privileges led to a decided increase both in crimes and in the repressive measures used by the state. Kulaks committed arson, cattle-killing, murder, and were exiled in large numbers; anti-Soviet engineers and officials sabotaged and were sent to labor camps. Today the kulaks have been amnestied, not only because many of them have recovered their civil status by honest labor, but also because the collective farms in the villages are strong enough to withstand their attack and absorb them. The labor camps which supplanted prisons are themselves diminishing, partly because they have “cured” their inmates, and still more because the normal free life of Soviet society is becoming strong and prosperous enough to have a direct regenerative influence on those social misfits that remain.&lt;br /&gt;
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In unforgettably lyric language the Soviet writer Avdeyenko, who a few years ago was by his own confession 2 “two-legged beast of prey,” told the Congress of Soviets, to which in 1934 he was a delegate, the story of the degrading of a youth into a criminal and the subsequent remaking of the criminal into an honorable and famous man. “In 1926,” he said, “under one of the cars of the Moscow-Tashkent express, lay two little passengers, myself and my comrade, voyagers making our way closer to the sun, searching for good people who would not be offended when we robbed them.” He tells how the conductor threw them out on the damp earth, how they wandered in rain and sleet, seeking warmth and light, thrown out everywhere till exhaustion turned to anger, anger to despair, despair to a great hatred for mankind. In this hatred they fired a haystack set against a house. “A warm, calm feeling filled my heart. Tears of joy and vengeance came into our eyes. We embraced, laughing and crying, and spent the rest of the night in a public toilet, pressing against the warm wall to warm first our backs and then our chests till we fell asleep standing.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I was destined to live many years—one—fifth of my life—with the feelings of hatred, malice, revenge that were born in me at that station. After that I robbed and threatened without remorse.” He tells how he stole fur coats and jars of butter, robbed drunkards in dark alleys, hooked vagrants off freight cars to steal their clothing, till he gradually became “a human beast, that most fearful two-legged blood-thirsty species without love or goodness or feeling or pity. Today it is frightful for me even to remember such a person.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Today in this historic hall, I stand on the tribune, a member of government. I am a citizen with full rights. I am strong. I cherish the best human feelings: love, devotion, honesty, self-sacrifice, heroism. I write books. I dream of creating an unforgettable production. I love a girl unselfishly. I am continuing my race—it will be a happy one.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I am happy, full of the joy of life, unshakably exuberant. I go to sleep with regret, I awake with joy. I shall live a hundred years. I can fly to the moon, go to the Arctic, make a new discovery, for my creative energy is not trod on by anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Today I recall my past for the last time. In filling out my application blank, under ‘places of work,’ I wrote: “Till 1931 socially harmful activity. I begin the story of life from 1931’ And they answered: ‘So be it.’ So you see I am four years old, the youngest here.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Avdeyenko gives the stories of other former law-breakers who have been made over. He traces the source of their anti-social past to the heritage of capitalist exploitation; he finds the force that redeemed them in the new socialist industries and the life that arises around them. “All of you know the institutions where such people are re-educated. But our whole Soviet system is one big workshop for re-educating men. I know people of two generations whose lives were no better than mine. We are engineers, writers, aviators, journalists, machinists, administrators of cities, scientists, Arctic explorers. The industries of our country remade us, and the industries were established by the Stalinist policy of industrializing the country. Comrade Molotov spoke of the newly created factories, cities and whole industrial regions, but he did not refer to the giving of life, human life, to the two-legged beasts of prey I have described.”&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER XV: YOUTH SET FREE ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The generation which is now fifteen years old will see Communism and will itself build it.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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“Life is good and to live is good—in such a land, in such an epoch! . . . We, young owners of our country, called upon to conquer space and time. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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In June of 1935 these words of Anna Mlynek, young valedictorian of the first Moscow class to complete the new ten-year school, awakened in thousands of hearts the world over a realization of what youth’s outlook might be in a socialist land. To youth in capitalist countries the outlook is gloomy. They look outward and see unemployment; they look inward and find confusion. They are developing, rational beings propelled into a world whose irrationality even their parents and teachers cannot explain to them. Those who love them best offer only a host of illusions; they are taught to look at the past and go backing into the future. So there goes on within them what the well-known psychiatrist, Dr. Frankwood Williams, calls a “mighty struggle in the dark . . . with all the emotional complexities and uncertainties that home, school, community have woven into their being.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet youth have not escaped struggle. Their birth was in the flames of civil war. Their childhood endured the famine years. Their adolescence was strained by great tasks of constructing a country. Many young lives were cut short or crippled in heart or lung or nerve in those years of battle and building. Even today they see across the future the dark threat of world war which may be launched at any time by the capitalist chaos beyond their borders, and in which they know that many of them must perish.&lt;br /&gt;
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What then is the source of the explosive joy which becomes increasingly plain in the words, the sports, the celebrations of Soviet youth? It lies in those words “young owners.” Men in the past have been subjects of kings or even proud citizens of democracies. Never till socialism dared they call themselves owners of the land in which they live. Ownership brings freedom in planning, clearness of goal, harmony of intellect and will in expanding life. Joint ownership brings comradeship reinforcing freedom, and a new, widened will to conquer space and time.&lt;br /&gt;
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A letter sent by thirty-one young men and girls from a collective farm to Moscow to greet the assembling of congress in early 1935 expresses it: “We go a road that is rich with life. We know our goal. What we are doing we do with clear consciousness. We know that what we do is important, necessary, great and glorious. We know the aim of our collective farm tasks. We know what will be tomorrow for we ourselves create it. Today is good, tomorrow will be better, the day after tomorrow immeasurably better. We often think of the glorious future of our farm, our township, our dear district, all our beloved land. We think of the bright future of all mankind which will be freed by the world-wide proletarian revolution.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Not on any mystic faith do these thirty-one young people base their hope for the future, but on homely details of daily fact that seem at first sight quite inadequate to explain their joy. They relate the changing of poor soil to good soil. “Our village never knew wheat till the Bolsheviks pushed it to the north!” They tell the expansion of music, drama, sport and science built on the firm economic foundation of their increasing harvest. They see the clear connection between their farm’s success and the success of their country, and base on this their expectation of international revolution. Their life is an integrated whole from the farm to the world. They have grown up and been formed by a new social order.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are the qualities demanded of joint owners, which the Soviet schools seek consciously to develop? Neither the combativeness nor the submission which are the contradictory demands of capitalism, but a high degree of initiative and scientific interest, a high development of individual variety combined with highly developed social instincts. The aim of the Soviet school is not to create standardized people, suited to the demands of some undefined future boss, but to help youth discover and develop its own desires and capacities. In a hundred ways the schools are constantly asking: What do you most like to do? In a hundred ways they help this developing choice relate itself to the equally developing choice of others.&lt;br /&gt;
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An American teacher who has taught for years in Soviet schools tells me that the approach to the child is far more individual than in America. Persistent efforts are made to find the child’s particular aptitudes and interests. In the elementary grades there are two types of teachers:—group teachers remain with one group of children for several years, visiting their homes, becoming thoroughly acquainted with them and relating them to the special teachers who develop special aptitudes. By the seventh grade, which is roughly equivalent to second year of high school in America, psychological tests help the child decide what he can do best; they tell him his capacities but impose no compulsion on his choice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Summer camps and excursions are also planned to help children discover their special interests and widen the field of their choice. The best camps, such as the famous Artek in the Crimea, maintain amateur work of a high order in geology, botany, care of animals, study of sea-life and construction of airplane and automobile models. Children spending their summer in such camps discover and develop hobbies which may, or may not, develop into their life’s work. Newspaper discussions also draw out the self-expression of children; a special newspaper, the Pioneer Pravda, is written almost entirely by children.&lt;br /&gt;
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Last summer I met twenty young “Arctic explorers” under sixteen years of age on the Murmansk train bound for Polar regions. Their energetic study of maps, Arctic cruises, Northern peoples had been sufficient to win from their teachers a recommendation which included them in an organized cruise of the north. They would meet adult Arctic explorers who would treat them smilingly but courteously as possible future colleagues. Ten of the best pupils in botany were similarly allowed to make an expedition at government expense to the Altai mountains, where they hiked two thousand kilometers and found twenty-seven new varieties of black currants and a type of onion which resists 45° of frost. Two of these young explorers went as delegates to deliver the plants to the aged plant-creator Michurin: When he asked: “Weren’t you afraid to cross wild rivers and sleep at night in the woods?” they answered: “Sometimes we were afraid. We feared that our expedition would fail to find any new plants and we would disgrace ourselves as Michurin’s grandchildren.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Such trips are the reward of marked aptitude, but all children take some part in the “grown—up” activities of the country. In Molvitino township the farm children told me proudly of scores of tons of bird droppings and wood ashes collected to fertilize the exhausted fields. In the 1934 “war with drought,” when a chief harvest problem in the south was the low, dry stand of easily broken grain, children’s groups of gleaners followed the reapers and competed to save great piles of grain heads. Every Soviet child knows the heroism of Mitia who caught three harvest thieves red-handed. In Artek Camp I met a child who had prevented a train wreck by reporting a loose rail and another who saved an aviator by lighting a bonfire at night to guide the errant plane: these children won wide renown among other children and were rewarded by a summer at Artek. Children of railway workers in Tiflis built and operate a half-mile railroad in the Park of Culture and Rest; it is a serious enterprise which carries passengers, takes in a thousand rubles each holiday and spends the money in proper Soviet style to “expand the road.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These out-of-school activities of children became at one time so absorbing that they threatened health and education. Young Pioneers “saved the harvest,” reclaimed drunken parents, denounced village grafters and debated whether their first duty was to the school or to “help the country.” Today children are reminded that “learn, learn, learn” is Lenin’s statement of the three most necessary things for young humans to do. School dominates and organizes all other child activities. But it never excludes them. In all their learning many forms of activity have part.&lt;br /&gt;
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The early discipline of children is largely through mass pressure, highly effectively organized by the children themselves. Children often come to a teacher with suggestions about the best way to handle difficult cases. They inform the teacher of home conditions which have made certain children backward in study or in comradeliness. They organize committees to go with the teacher to the homes. Children will themselves expose violations of child labor laws, or write to the papers about parents who beat other children. The highest honor given to able children is to be asked to help more backward ones with their studies in a spirit not of condescension but of good team-work, like that of a basket-ball player who helps his team excel. The strongest penalty in any school is given when children ask to have a child excluded on the round that his conduct disturbs their work.&lt;br /&gt;
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All these activities of children directly reflect and prepare for their coming adult life. The encouragement of individual variety harmonized by regard for the rights of others expands into the more definite yet wider interests of youth. By the end of the ten-year school, which is roughly equivalent to a combination of the American elementary grades and high school, the boy or girl usually has some interest which he wants to test in serious work. Some young folks go to work even earlier, spending part of the years between fourteen and eighteen in a factory trade school with part-time work. Some go direct from the secondary school to the university. But the commonly encouraged procedure is to finish ten years of school and then go to work in the late teens for a period of self-testing before deciding on specialization.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are not odd jobs to earn one’s way through college, such as are known in American life. They are part of a youth’s conscious self-education in the actual world of production. They are related to his already appearing interests, which they test and develop. I know a boy of nineteen who chose to work on a farm in the summer. Since he already knew that he wanted to become an entomologist, the farm was expected to give him scientific work. He sorted apples for diseases, staked cabbages to count the bugs in sample areas, and otherwise used his special interest for farm production, improving his scientific technique while he worked. If an emergency had occurred, he would have helped in other ways, but emergencies which waste the time of young people in blind alley tasks are a blot on the reputation of any Soviet industry. When four girls of my acquaintance went to work in a chemical laboratory in Siberia and found it so disorganized that there was nothing really useful to do, they protested to the Party against this waste of their time, and the organization which was employing and paying them was censured and ordered to release them for other work. The time of youth is a precious treasure of the community. The most accepted reason which any youth can give for leaving a job is that it offers nothing more for him to learn.&lt;br /&gt;
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At no time in life is there any gap between work and schooling. Education is not a commodity purchased by money and consumed in childhood or in four charmed years of isolated university life. It is a personal and public necessity, without limits, freely available from childhood to old age. Courses of general culture are not crammed into a special period; they are taken after work in any quantity desired. They are paid for by state or trade union; any group of workers anywhere may decide to study chemistry, music or parachute-jumping and call on their trade union to pay the teachers. When young people feel that they have chosen a permanent specialty, for which they need some years of concentrated study, they apply to enter a university or a research institute. For these institutions their ability and seriousness is tested by severe entrance examinations. If they pass, study becomes their regular work, paid for as such by the state. It is fully as strenuous as the factory; they spend six or seven hours a day in class rooms and laboratories in courses chosen on a broad basis, but all consciously directed towards preparation for their profession.&lt;br /&gt;
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I visited the dormitory attached to three institutions of higher education in mining, metallurgy and non-ferrous metals. A pretty girl was specializing in blast furnaces, a former book-binder was studying mining engineering, a factory-worker was becoming a geologist for Central Asia, a broad-faced yellow Kazak was preparing to work in copper in the newly opened mines of Kazakstan. All of them were paid for their study by the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Their stipends ranged from one to two hundred rubles monthly, the higher pay rewarding the best students. Every summer they chose their “practice work” from a dozen localities which offered, and as soon as they found some place where they wished to sign up for a job after graduation, they got additional wages from their chosen industry. The majority decided by the third or fourth year of the five-year course. Thereafter they felt themselves bound to work, for at least a time after they finished the university, for the institution which had paid for their education. This was not felt by them as compulsion but as the intelligent specializing of their own choice on the basis of a wide range of opportunities. Any good reason, such as personal health or the demand of some national emergency, would be recognized by them and their fellows as grounds for release. But a frivolous change of occupation without reason would brand a youth as undependable, while to give up a job because conditions proved difficult would be stigmatized as cowardly. For what was he trained if not to make the conditions better? Has he not at his disposal for this all the resources of the land?&lt;br /&gt;
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What jobs does youth choose? By no means the easy ones. When has youth, when free to choose, ever asked for the easy way? Youth wants conquest. Youth is explosive energy, so explosive that under capitalism it must be befogged with illusions, lest it wreck the world’s ancient ways. Soviet youth is encouraged to make the world over; it responds to the call. In every difficult struggle faced by the Soviet state from its beginning, a mighty host of youth has volunteered.&lt;br /&gt;
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Youth does not wait to be asked; it takes the initiative. Through its organization, the Young Communist League, it repeatedly demands the right to battle on each new important “front.” I know young women who fought in the civil war, divorcing the husbands who would have prevented their going. The Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the first Soviet conveyor, was built and manned by young folks coming from every part of the country. “We give our youth to this struggle,” they said to me six years ago. “We do not spend it in ease or amusement. We shall not stop till we have built the socialist city of Stalingrad.” I have vivid memory of the boat that came at eleven o’clock one night for a long-expected boat-ride after a hot day and was turned down by young voices, with-out a word from their elders, as too late. “Got to go home; got to be fresh for the line tomorrow,” they said as they turned away.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus was launched in the far northeast of Asia the new ship-building port Comsomolsk on the shores of the Ohotsk Sea, a city proudly carved from mosquito-ridden forests by the forces of youth alone. Thus was built the Moscow subway in a titanic drive by youth to create “the most beautiful subway in the world.” Moscow’s Young Communists left office jobs, postponed university courses and requalified as underground ditch-diggers to build it. Every great construction job has its special tasks seized by youth; they take over the building of a blast furnace in competition with one raised alongside by their elders. They organize special farms which make proud records. They pour into the new industries, master the new technique, form the new staff of engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like young folks everywhere, Soviet youths have the problem of the relation between work and marriage. This is never a question of whether they can afford to get married; that is taken for granted. The problem is to find time for a satisfying family life. One troubled youth writes to the &#039;&#039;Komsomolskaya Pravda&#039;&#039; in the discussion recently held on this question: “I am a turner. I am also a Young Communist. Besides that I am working on an invention. My days are so full that I don’t have time to breathe. I see my wife only at night and then I&#039;m so dead tired that I fall down and sleep like a corpse. Lydia weeps. I am not a beast; I am sorry about Lydia. But I try to organize my time and I can’t even find an hour for my class on planning, much less for my family.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is an extreme case; it is balanced by young Kuznetsova who lays down her specifications for a husband: “I wouldn’t have a man who was not a good social worker. But neither will I live with one who is interested only in his factory. I don’t want a one-sided man. I want a husband who will play volley ball with me, do skiing, appreciate the theater, music, general culture, read a book with me and argue about it afterwards. All these things have place in a well-rounded life.” These are the problems of a rich, abundant existence, which needs only to be organized. Soviet youth never feels that it must renounce any of these satisfactions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Each year when September First brings the International Youth celebration, hundreds of telegrams pour into the offices of &#039;&#039;Komsomolskaya Pravda&#039;&#039;, organ of Communist Youth, announcing achievements of youth and the gifts which it offers the country. A group of young steel men wire that they have dismantled and reassembled an open hearth furnace in six days instead of the usual ten; a group of young miners sends an extra train of coal manned by a train crew especially chosen from scores who competed for the honor. Other groups announce the organization of “cultured field camps” where music, drama and books enliven the evening’s work on the farm. Still other groups blazon sport records on floats in the great demonstration which storms the Red Square. Young Communists of the Red Dawn Telephone Factory hiked to the Mongolian border, 5,400 miles in 180 days. Another group is back from climbing the Altai, covering 1,200 miles on foot. They celebrate the Baikal-Murmansk ski-run across half Asia and half northern Europe; they announce Alpine and parachute records made by youth. Nor is there any sharp line between records in sport and in steel-mills. All are one unified, advancing life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not in conflict with work but around it in the social life of the factory collective, Soviet youth develops activities of sport and recreation which make up a well-rounded life. Tsarist Russia possessed thirty thousand members of sport and athletic clubs; there are six million today. Tens of thousands of cheering spectators turn out to soccer matches between Moscow, Leningrad, Central Asia, Turkey and Spain. Soviet sportsmen begin to invade world records. But the characteristic of Soviet sport is not the straining for records in one field at the expense of all round physical fitness; its symbol is the GTO badge—“Ready for Labor and Defense”—to receive which one must pass certain standards in walking, running, swimming, rowing, skiing, jumping and every kind of summer and winter sport. Two and a half million persons have qualified for this symbol, and a second degree of GTO is now established, requiring high diving, parachute jumping and other difficult tests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Parachute jumping has become almost a national sport in the Soviet Union, typical of its sky-storming youth. Flying, gliding, jumping, youth fills the heavens above Tushino field several times each summer with its aviation festivals. One hundred and fifty at a time they leap from great carrier airplanes and come sailing down under canopies of many-colored silk—red, white, blue, orange, lilac—covering the sky with rainbow hues. Week after week they make new records, young men and girls in individual or group jumps. Nina Kameneva, descending from icy space nearly twice the height of Mount Blanc and breaking a world’s record, made the remark which was seized by Soviet youth as a new slogan: “The sky of our country is the highest sky in the world.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER XVI: NEW MEN EMERGE ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emergence of new people has been noted with growing frequency in recent years by the Soviet press. Editorial writers have tried to analyze their qualities; novelists have attempted to portray them. A Russian author suggested a year ago to the Moscow News a series of half-column novelettes, each containing the snapshot of a life. To the editor’s query how many of these stories he had, he answered casually: “About a thousand.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“A thousand!” exclaimed our editor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“That’s not so many,” replied the author, “to describe the great variety of people now appearing in our world.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lincoln Steffens told me of meeting one of these new people, a Soviet youth in Hollywood, “so new that he could not understand these United States. . . . He was a unit; he thought and acted together. He was constantly puzzled by the tactics of American capitalists, considered from the standpoint of their own survival.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Increasingly I also meet new people in the Soviet Union. Not infrequently I have misunderstood them; their approach to life was different from anything I had known. Their respect for my will, their unwillingness to use their personality to convince my intellect, I mistook for aloofness, so accustomed was I to the salesman’s method of putting himself over. On another occasion, traveling on a Siberian train, I made the opposite mistake and took for promiscuous flirtation the expansive joy of a high official whose deft approaches to every person he met drew forth answering flashes of life. Then I saw him evade a kiss from “Little Slant-Eyes,” a Tartar girl with whom for two days he had been joking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Kissing is for the beloved one,” he said, smiling. “But the joy of life is to be shared with everybody.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Do you know what they have thought of you on this train?” I asked him then.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What they think affects them, not me. They will also learn if it is in them.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Never had I seen a more poised personality. Later he remarked, “We Bolsheviks, as Kirov always said, must be the happiest people in the world. But I must be one of the happiest even among Bolsheviks. Our older men are marked by too many years of combat. Our younger men can hardly appreciate the grimness of what they have never known. But I spent my childhood in oppression and my youth fighting for freedom; I am old enough to know the conquered past, yet young enough for a whole new life.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it possible yet to say in what direction this new humanity is developing? Are there any characteristics common to these millions of people who are becoming subtly differentiated from the past? Many attempts are being made to analyze them. When the Turkoman horsemen descended on Moscow after their amazing 4,300 kilometer run across the deserts, Stalin said: “Only clearness of goal, perseverance in attaining the goal, and firmness of character breaking through every hindrance can achieve such a glorious victory.” Pravda elaborated this theme into an editorial on the Soviet ideal of character, declaring it to be the exact opposite of that “unquestioning obedience” which Hitler had previously demanded in an impassioned speech to fascist youth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Strong and original individuality,” was claimed by Pravda as the basic quality of a Soviet citizen. Not the “rugged individualism” which capitalism in its early stages glorifies for its upper classes, and which sinks into gangsterism in the fascist decline. Not conforming obedience responding under all conditions to “God and country,” the capitalist ideal which under fascism becomes blinder submission for men whose destiny it is to be bossed. Not that ability to look on both sides of the question which intellectuals under capitalism prize as a sign of high intelligence, but which Pravda disdains as “division of personality and double-mindedness, Hamletism in romantic colors.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Not submission and blind faith does the Communist Party implant, but consciousness, daring, decision. It is just from the clear goal, seen by millions, from fighting perseverance and firmness that there grows that remarkable voluntary discipline which bourgeois society cannot even imagine. . . . Clearness of aim, perseverance and firmness won the victory in the civil war, restored our ruined economy and created socialist industry and collective farming. Clearness of aim, perseverance and firmness made way through the ice of the Arctic, lifted our heroes of the air into the stratosphere and brought close to the Communist Party many of the great representatives of science, literature and art. . . . The Communist Party draws out from all the toilers of our great fatherland the quality of strong individuality, inseparably connected with the strong collective of the toilers. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To many persons in capitalist countries these words will be only partly intelligible. They have been so accustomed to considering that their own life is “free” and Soviet life “regimented” that they cannot at once grasp a viewpoint which holds the exact opposite. Yet even the casual observer of human beings today in the Soviet Union notices that while they have certain characteristics in common they are by no means regimented into uniformity, but show a vivid individuality at least as great as is found anywhere in the world. A business man in Chicago who had never seen Moscow but who was something of an art critic, told me that he was especially impressed in all Soviet photographs, whether of demonstrations in the Red Square or of athletes and factory workers, by the quality of will in the faces. “Utterly different from the sheepish or brutal faces of Nazi pictures,” he added. It is clear to anyone who talks with Soviet workers or the more advanced of the collective farmers that they feel themselves possessed not only of freedom, but of a peculiar type of reinforced and collectively supported freedom which is strong enough to conquer all the obstacles in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Freedom is never absolute; it is concrete and specific. It means different things to different classes and generations of men. The American pioneer faced the wilderness ax in hand with the mood of a free creator, saying: “What shall I build?” His freedom was conditioned by the loans he made or failed to make for his migration, by the railroad that came or failed to come, and by the subtler limitations of his own skill and character, yet with ax in hand, he felt free. His ownership of his primitive means of production was the source and guarantee of his sense of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the means of production became the factory, the meaning of freedom slowly changed. Freedom became to the owner the right to fix prices and wages, to the worker the right to drift from job to job, seeking an easier boss. Freedom in government became the “right to choose one’s rulers,” not the right to own and rule. Freedom of thought and speech became the right to complain, to voice transient shifts of opinion, not the right to drive one firm consistent thought into life. As capitalism advanced, men became diversified in their work and capacities, but standardized in their instinctive reference to a boss. Soviet workers notice this quality in Americans who come to their factories. “They know how to complain and make suggestions, but not how to desire and will.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Desire and will” is the form which freedom takes when men are owners. When they are joint owners, a form of will develops—not unlike that in a family, a partnership or a committee—which determines itself by consultation. “He does not make individual decisions,” is already a compliment in the Soviet Union; it is applied to Stalin. It is as if one said of a scientist that he refuses to base conclusions on a single experiment. Men always have made up what they call their own minds through the influence of other minds as well; but now they grow conscious of these sources of their choice; they organize even these sources. They criticize, but from within, not from aloof isolation. Workers express discontent not by strikes against an alien owner, but by joint fights against bureaucracy to improve the organization of the land. Freedom becomes less a protest and more a steadily burning choice; not a fight, but a seeking. It is seen not as absence of restraint, but as conscious selection of one particular, individual place in a living complex mechanism whereby a thousand similar freedoms are welded into flame and power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the latter half of 1935 the Stakhanovites began to shake the country. People compared it to an explosion, an earthquake. The movement appeared simultaneously in a hundred places and a score of industries. Despite the great variety of its people, the fundamental characteristics were the same. Workmen operating new machines began to shatter past standards of production often against the indifference or opposition of engineers and managers but accompanied by the strained attention of their fellow workers. Each of them had to fight his way against old concepts and habits; one or two of them were killed by angry workers, outraged by this sudden burst of speed. But overwhelming public opinion hailed and copied the innovators. Swiftly, in the midst of their local elation, they found themselves acclaimed across the land as heroes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within two months every country in the world was forced to take notice, disguising the information as best they could under the name “speed-up.” For this was no mere routine news from Russia. This was a storming of the world frontiers of productivity and science. Miners in the Donbas were doubling Ruhr production. Blacksmiths in Gorky Auto Works broke standards set by Ford. Shoemakers in Leningrad made records 50 per cent higher than the world record held by the Bata factories of Czechoslovakia. Young girl weavers ran far ahead of America’s best achievements. Swedish saw-mill machinery, standardized to cut ninety-six cubic meters of lumber, was impertinently pushed to nearly three hundred by woodsmen in Archangel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hundreds of American engineers and workers, who tried five years ago to “teach the Russians,” and who today are scattered in jobs and out of jobs all over the world, must have grumbled glumly when they heard of it: “Why couldn’t they do it when we showed them how?” For the events which have happened are externally obvious. The Soviet Union equipped itself throughout with modern machinery and methods, and drew eleven million greenhorns into industry to operate them. The greenhorns broke machines, wasted material and learned. They could not learn at once when their teachers told them; it had to grow in their nervous systems. But what they have learned is not only the technical skill of America. It is all that skill with the pride of ownership added. Ownership of the whole great mechanized process that makes the modern world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
People who were allowed to attend the first All-Union Congress of Stakhanovites—and everyone in Moscow wanted to go—told of the indescribable enthusiasm, the irrepressible, thundering cheers. The Soviet press grew lyric over “taming the fiery steed of science,” “washing out the barriers between manual and mental labor,” “preparing the way from socialism to communism where each shall receive according to his needs.” Stalin was saying to the assembled delegates: “We leaders of the government have learned much from you. Thanks, comrades, for the lesson, many thanks.” Those men in the Congress believed—and the country believed with them—that the plan made by Marx was coming true. They had established a new economic system. They had painfully equipped it with modern methods. They had slowly learned to manage it jointly, and now the predicted results appeared. Socialism was beating capitalist production, just as capitalism beat feudalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What are the characteristics of these Stakhanovites? A joyously dynamic initiative, a pride in mastery of complex technical processes, a conscious co-operation with society, a hunger to learn. Every phrase dropped in their discussions shows exultant power in creation and desire to share the new skill with others. Busygin, the blacksmith who made the crankshaft record in the forge of the Gorky Auto Works, declares, “There’s nothing I dream of so much as studying. I want to be not only a smith but to know how hammers are made and to make them. . . .” Marie Demchenko who made the sugar-beet record asked as a reward a course at an agricultural college—and got it. Stakhanov himself went down in the mines to make his record as the chosen representative of his fellows. “International Youth Day was approaching and I wanted to mark the day with a record in productivity. For some time my comrades and I had been thinking how to break the shackles of the norm, give the miners free play, force the drills to work a full shift.” When Slavnikova wanted to beat the record on a machine she had carefully studied but never yet used, the foreman opposed her. “I&#039;m a fearless parachute jumper; that norm doesn’t scare me; I&#039;ll upset it,” she replied. She drove the machine to a five-fold record. She relates the sequel: “At four in the afternoon we had a meeting and they gave us flowers for our good work.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bobilev, the steel smelter, wants you to know that he is a scientist: “We are no sportsmen. We tested out our open hearth; we repaired her and asked how much she could give. She told us 11.33 tons.” Vasiliev, the blacksmith who holds the record for forging connecting-rods, uses the words “boiled up” and “exploded” to describe his feelings about his forge. When his 1934 record was beaten by Andrianov, he “boiled up” and went back to the works with four days left of his vacation. I beat Sam Andrianov but I saw in a newspaper that a Kharkov smith had made more than a thousand. Then I exploded! I made 945 in one shift. The smith Stadnik also exploded and made 975. I consulted my gang how to organize our work-place; we got 1,036. We talked it over with the foreman and told him how to change the furnace; with true Stakhanov zeal he gave us in four days a furnace that could heat 1,500 in a shift. What stops us now? We talked it over and placed the metal in such order that it would be easier to take up. On October 27 I made an all-Union record 1,101 in a single shift. Comrades, I haven’t yet got out of that hammer all she’ll give, but I&#039;m going to get it out to the very bottom.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Characteristic of the Stakhanovites is their disdain for overtime work as a confession of inefficiency; their insistence that a rhythm shall be found which shall not be physically exhausting—“if the work is done right you feel better and stronger”; and their zeal in teaching the new skill to their fellows. The locomotive engineer Omelianov, demands the “worst engineer” as a pupil, and makes him also a beater of records. Slavnikova is asked by an inefficient woman: “You’re a Young Communist; why don’t you teach me?” She gives time to instruct the older woman, who also begins to improve.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Life in the new factories is by no means ease and harmony. It is more like an explosion or a battle. An engineer of my acquaintance finds the Stakhanovites frankly terrifying. “They put up signals over their lathes when out of material. These signals pop up everywhere and I have to keep them satisfied, or they’ll say I sabotage. You can lose your reputation. You can be cleaned out of the Party. I&#039;m sitting up nights to plan the flow of work.” The demands of these new men are breaking the old technical processes. For “every worker knows,” says the weaver Lisakova, “that over-fulfillment of the norm will not only improve labor conditions in the factory, but also the kindergartens, nurseries, dining-rooms. All this depends on the efficiency of organization, the spirit of solidarity, the fulfillment of the plan.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It no longer even occurs to these joint owners that a rise in productivity might throw men out of work. Shifts of workers there will be from one job to another; but industry bears the expense of retraining workers. Conflicts there will be, harsh problems and many, but they feel quite sure that they can plan and achieve. They have won through civil war, pestilence, famine; they tightened their belts to build the first Five-Year Plan. They are driving rapidly through a second, which increases food, clothing, housing visibly each year. They haven’t the faintest doubt that as owners of their country they will always have worthwhile things to do.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Ten years hence,” said a Stakhanovite to me, “farming and industry may cease to be our main occupations. But there are other occupations when once we produce all the goods we need. Human development, exploration, science—to these there are no limits!”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whatever kind of world will be made by these new builders, one thing is certain: it will be built on conscious planning and will. Not regimentation but choice will make it, a choice that develops its own social guidance. If more people want geology, there will be more geology; if more want medicine, there will be more medicine. More comforts or more leisure, more music or more exploration of the Arctic? Our new world will be what we choose to make it. And if excess of choice in one direction leaves any fields unfilled, the social ways of influencing choice are clear and conscious. A combination of material rewards with social recognition, is already the method of attracting volunteers. The announcement in January, 1933, that agriculture was the most important front, brought hosts of recruits from the ablest people of the country. Calls for help through the League of Communist Youth supplied the driving personnel for Stalingrad Tractor Plant and the Moscow subway. Increased wages and shortened hours have supplemented statements of public need to attract more people into fields as diverse as medicine and mining.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are there any bounds whatever to man’s advance? These new men recognize none. “If in so short a time and with so backward folk we owners of one-sixth of earth have done so much, what shall we men not do when we own the resources of our planet, unhindered by the fear of wars? If the earth grows old, shall we not remake it to suit us? If the solar system runs down, shall we not find ways to give heat to our sun? Need we fix any limit to attainment, when the earth is our jointly owned workshop and home?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such is their confident philosophy. So they answer, when they take time to discuss at all. A new religion? No, that is a word disdained. A widening science, they would say. Their approach to ultimate reality is not one of faith and submission, on which all religions have been based. It is one of defiance and conquest through intellect and will. When the conflicts between slave and master, serf and baron, worker and capitalist are ended, and the classless society is attained, there begins the titanic conflict of conscious men with unconscious nature. Not by faith but by analysis, not by submission but by defiance shall we rise in that unending battle. Unending? Relatively only, not absolutely. But that end is beyond our present power even to imagine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Anna Louise Strong]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:The_CIA%27s_Shining_Path:_Political_Warfare&amp;diff=64140</id>
		<title>Library:The CIA&#039;s Shining Path: Political Warfare</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:The_CIA%27s_Shining_Path:_Political_Warfare&amp;diff=64140"/>
		<updated>2024-03-13T01:14:54Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Put it into the correct group&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=The CIA&#039;s Shining Path: Political Warfare|image=CIA_Shining_Path_cover.jpg|author=Andreo Matías|published_date=1988|published_location=Peru|edition_date=2024|type=Book|source=[https://es.prolewiki.org/wiki/Biblioteca:CIA_Sendero_Luminoso:_Guerra_Politica Spanish]}}{{Foreword|foreword=Originally published in 1988, The CIA’s Shining Path (CIA Sendero Luminoso: Guerra Politica) was such an important work to Peruvian politics in its time that it even made its way into the National Library of Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ProleWiki was able to track down a copy of the book in the original Spanish and we are proud to be able to offer, for the first time ever, an English translation of this important work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much like the author, we also hope this book sparks debate about the role of the Shining Path in Peruvian politics – continuing even to this day after the death of Abimael Guzman. But the richness of this text is not contained solely in the debates it might spark. Military doctrine, Peruvian politics, South American geopolitics, and of course a complete exposé on the inner workings and methods of the Shining Path: this is where the true value of this book lies. All of these topics are appropriately expanded upon, making The CIA’s Shining Path a vast repository of knowledge for all students of Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The author also included several documents in the appendice of the original edition, which we also translated. To our knowledge, this is the first time these documents have been made available in English.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ProleWiki has done its best to ensure this book has been properly translated but, we have to admit the author has been less than clear at several points (a combination of his writing style and the reader needing to be familiar with late 20th century Peruvian history). We provide the original edition in [https://es.prolewiki.org/wiki/Biblioteca:CIA_Sendero_Luminoso:_Guerra_Politica Spanish] on ProleWiki for anyone who would like to compare our work with the original.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If you have any questions or corrections to bring up, please get in touch with us.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This edition is offered FREE of charge under the [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ CC-BY-SA-4.0] license.&#039;&#039;&#039;}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PREFACE ==&lt;br /&gt;
The use of the pseudonym Andreo Matías aims to avoid a false association of ideas between the author&#039;s name and the title of the book but not to conceal his identity: Washington Huaracha Apaza.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Furthermore, Washington Huaracha Apaza is not a stranger to the country&#039;s political life. A confessed socialist, he has a record of consistent involvement in the revolutionary movement since the formation of the National Democratic Front in 1945, in Arequipa, his hometown. He served as the national leader of the Hotel Workers Federation of Peru in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Years of imprisonment during the Odría dictatorship took a toll on his health, leading him to assume, more or less, responsibility in social scientific research. This book is the product from that period of his life. It also translates years of experience: the study of social contradictions in the country and the global development of insurgency around the world. It results from patient collection of documents, in-depth analysis of information sources, and meticulous teamwork.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For Washington Huaracha Apaza, this work should spark debate, lead the struggle down its true path, and engage with ideological and political battles, where the Shining Path and its leaders are obligated to either deny or confirm the validity of the arguments contained in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== INTRODUCTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
To claim that the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path is an offspring of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would seem like hyperbole in anti-communist propaganda or a misconception in the study of Peru&#039;s socio-political reality, if not a far-fetched interpretation of the phenomenon in question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the ideological, programmatic and political methodology peculiar to the Shining Path, the existing experience of other insurgent movements generated by foreign intelligence services in other parts of the world, the basic knowledge of the rules and principles of modern irregular warfare, the interests at stake for other states in Latin America and Peru, and, above all, the effort for a fair understanding of Peru&#039;s political reality, leave no room for an appropriate inclusion of the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path in the international conglomerate of Marxist movements, let alone recognizing it as an integral part of the political structure of the national revolution. The Shining Path does not even claim a place in the latter; on the contrary, it definitively excludes itself from the national revolutionary ensemble and mass organizations. It proclaims itself a “new party”, resistant to any contamination, with an ideology forging a new society and state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Its mysterious and concealed forms, as well as the messianic thaumaturgy of the Sole Leadership, only manifest themselves dramatically in a violent, destructive, and calculatedly regulated praxis that shakes Peruvian society to its foundations. Practical and eccentric, but which knows how to insert itself in the permanent situation of structural injustice that Peru is suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fanatical violence is not the historical violence seen in Tupac Amaru and hundreds of rebel leaders against Spanish colonialism. It is not of the same nature as the violence that confronted opposing interests in the independence war of the last century. Nor is it the violence of a homeland&#039;s resistance war against invaders, much less the violence of a modern national liberation war, anti-imperialist and popular opposition to foreign domination. The violence exercised by Shining Path is not, therefore, a genuine expression of the deep internal contradictions of Peruvian society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We discover, then, that it is an exogenous violence that seeks to insert itself into these contradictions, not to achieve a dialectical solution releasing internal productive and creative forces, but to stimulate destructive social forces to the maximum through the concrete execution of &amp;quot;strategically highly centralized and tactically decentralized plans.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Until now, the insane violence of Shining Path has been characterized particularly by a very specific execution methodology, which it has been applying in Peru since 1980, when irregular combatant teams assumed the mission of &amp;quot;disrupting the productive process&amp;quot; of this &amp;quot;feudal society&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;bureaucratic capitalism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To ideologically and theoretically support its actions, the Shining Path adopts the name of the Communist Party of Peru, without needing more to move within the realm of factional struggle among Marxist left-wing groups, which, with political shyness, deny it but not combat it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sociologists and anthropologists who have analyzed the Shining Path&#039;s violence have found native, ancestral, magical-religious, and Andean peculiarities in it. Many social communicators have become Senderologists, reporting on the Shining Path&#039;s armed propaganda or providing sophisticated commentary on it, both for Western news agendas and for capitalist countries&#039; foundations that finance million-dollar research on the Shining Path phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, the state confronts this violence with another kind — namely legal, military and traditional — inscribed in the laws of regular warfare. The state’s forces, tasked with maintaining national sovereignty, territorial integrity, public order, the state&#039;s independence and freedom of state and national action, as well as the nation&#039;s independence, has had to make a 180-degree turn in mindset and attitude, dangerously shifting from the concepts of external enemy to internal enemy. Induced by old counterinsurgency manuals from the early days of the Cold War, it does what it knows best: war. Today, the Legal Force of the state unexpectedly finds itself fighting elements from the popular sectors, combating &amp;quot;terrorist-communists&amp;quot; in peasant communities, urban marginal settlements, universities, labor unions, and other grassroots social institutions, which are recipients of the structural violence of Peruvian society indirectly linked to the ubiquitous Shining Path, which remains elusive, unidentifiable, and unknown in its true essence and character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This anomalous and unprecedented phenomenon in the Peruvian revolutionary process compels us to seek more accurate answers as to the Shining Path phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the Shining Path really? &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it an instrument of the Revolutionary War of some faction of International Communism, specifically a Maoist Communist Party tasked with expanding the international political space of Communist China? &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a violent movement that claims to represent Andean culture? &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a new philosophical worldview originating from Peru?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a faction of Marxist membership that has become the armed wing of the Peruvian Revolution?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a political-military apparatus of drug trafficking forces?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a tool of Political Warfare against Third World countries?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a Low-Intensity Operation organized or used by foreign intelligence services to annihilate the social forces of Peruvian nationalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peru, a country that is bleeding, demands definitive and urgent answers regarding the nature of the Shining Path. Their violence, systematically applied over eight years among the peasantry’s social base and economic infrastructure, affects the foundations of national unity, destroys values that are inherent and characteristic of Peruvian national identity, and, worse, compromises almost all efforts for a military solution, which is not feasible in unconventional warfare. As long as Peruvian institutions do not understand what is happening, simply because their structures correspond to the 19th-century concept of the bourgeois world, our thinking remains captive to Manichaen philosophical dualism, and our political tasks are prisoners of the bipolarity of the world, if not of repugnant petty interests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of this provides ample motivation for those aware of the danger to assume the historical responsibility of promoting a real understanding of the self-proclaimed Communist Party of Peru the Shining Path. Its years of activity are sufficient to evaluate its ideology, organization, strategy, methods of struggle, and objectives. At this stage of events, it is no longer possible to claim that the Shining Path is an enigma. It has certainly been difficult to locate and observe due to its unique, confusing, and intentionally misleading modus operandi. However, this does not mean that capturing its essence is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is worth noting that our interest in the Shining Path dates back to its emergence as a member of the pro-Chinese faction that split from the Peruvian Communist Party and repeatedly dissented from that original pro-Chinese current in Communist circles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That interest grew when we observed the close confrontation of the Shining Path to the nationalism of the Peruvian Armed Forces government (1968-1980), especially during General Velasco Alvarado&#039;s administration. Particularly, we were intrigued by its efforts to sabotage the celebration of the Sesquicentennial of the Battle of Ayacucho in 1974 and the signing of the Ayacucho Act, whose main purpose was to engage Latin American leaders in a regional disarmament policy. At that time, this so-called Communist Party of Peru, &amp;quot;along the shining path of Mariátegui&#039;s thought,&amp;quot; was already one of the seventy-eight organizations that, outside of traditional parties, appeared as if by magic to oppose the changes promoted by Peruvian nationalist military officers. Just as it now opposes any change or even disregards it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, when the Shining Path enters the Peruvian social conflict as an armed apparatus, using individual and collective terrorization and other psychological techniques typical of modern political warfare rather than revolutionary warfare, we must assume the moral obligation to promote and deepen research into the ideology and operations of the Shining Path, to understand what it really is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not easy to trace the Shining Path due to its permanent clandestinity and internal compartmentalization, which make any assessment from the outside difficult. Also, because of the credibility issues surrounding the sources disseminating its ideology, analysis, and reports.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much has been written and researched using various perspectives on the Shining Path, but with a few exceptions, it can be said that these studies have scratched the surface and often constructed tautologies that only serve, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, to conceal the true purpose of this real and dramatic phenomenon in our time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even insiders do not have access to the movement&#039;s internal documents. Most of the documents seized by the police are handwritten and come from the middle or lower levels of the militancy; documents which bear the heavy stamp of official secrecy, which makes them problematic for private social research. What the Shining Path disseminates externally is carefully processed propaganda with a planned circulation, designed to impact specific and carefully selected audiences. However, there is a reasonable and significant margin for analysis and interpretation in these documents. Documents referring to Plenums and Conferences supposedly held pronouncements on specific issues, or tactical plans to be executed contribute more to elucidating and understanding the phenomenon. Similarly, the hundreds of events carried out by its irregular combatants whose orientation, nature and purpose cannot be distorted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Furthermore, it is also essential to mention the more serious works that have been conducted on the Shining Path and that help elucidate and understand its purposes. Among the few, we highlight the following as important.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An unpublished historiographical work on the Shining Path(1) includes rich classified and encoded documentation in an initial attempt at scientific categorization which has allowed for comparisons of writings, source assessment, chronological tracking, and studies of the various components of the Shining Path movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Carlos Iván De Gregory&#039;s studies (2) published between 1985 and 1987, are a thorough and substantive investigation of the geo-economic environment and socio-political opportunities for the Shining Path&#039;s growth. He candidly denounces the “errors and limitations” of the Shining Path&#039;s “people&#039;s war” and considers the organization as a “pre-classist response” to the “destructive advance of capitalism”, similar to the [[Guardians of Islam]] and the [[Khmer Rouge]]. Finally, he envisions the slippery slope of the Shining Path&#039;s actions dangerously tipping the balance towards the most reactionary elements of the right.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Manuel Jesús Granados Aponte&#039;s bachelor&#039;s thesis (3) presented at the University of Huamanga, is a critical study of the Shining Path that builds on De Gregory&#039;s research, enriching it with forays into the ideological field. It demonstrates the historical dissimilarity between the Peruvian reality analyzed by José Carlos Mariátegui in the 1920s, the Chinese situation studied by Mao Zedong in 1937, and today&#039;s Peruvian reality. Granados has subsequently completed his study with another on the typology of the Shining Path&#039;s actions and the chimera of the Guiding Thought (4). Granados rightly wonders why those who have used his work have not focused on the central aspect of his thesis: the Shining Path&#039;s ideological misunderstanding. Instead, they have seized on the adjectives and partial aspects of his work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Eloy Villacrés Riquelme&#039;s (5) work published in 1985, is a valuable analytical contribution to the strategies of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Ayacucho region, based on general principles of warfare. Its importance lies in leading us to question and delve into the central issue regarding the nature of the war called for by the Shining Path and the war policy pursued by the Legal Force. The critical input characterizing these works allows us to locate the true contours of the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Without diminishing the value of other studies on the subject, it can be observed that most investigations start with a certain conditioning imposed by the Shining Path&#039;s propaganda to look for the causes of the phenomenon from its own perspective. They delve into our internal contradictions, the limits of our own conflict as if it were isolated from the world. They focus on the tactical aspects.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We forget that the important thing is the strategic aspect: the widespread, universal conflict, the new nature of modern irregular warfare, of which the “Senderista war” is a part.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This perspective brings us to study the Shining Path not only from the scope of internal contradictions within Peru, but having in mind the strategic importance of our country in the global confrontation as well as the development, characteristics, and nature of modern irregular warfare, which does not always equate to revolutionary warfare. Our analysis of the Shining Path, therefore, aims to first understand ourselves as the cause or motive of the war; that is, to understand the strategic external factors that condition the war that Shining Path  irregulars call for in the country. By knowing the nature of this war, it is possible to identify the objectives, strategy, and operational tactics of this &amp;quot;unconventional war” developed within the Peruvian, Latin American “low-intensity conflict”.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the rest, it is an ethical duty to demonstrate the true essence of the irregular warfare that is shaking Peru and the role of the Shining Path, which, under the name of the Communist Party of Peru, fuels genocide and the destruction of our conductive forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path, claiming to be the only true representative of communism, acts with a military force of irregulars against everyone and everything; its main enemies are the currents of Peruvian nationalist thought and Marxist and non-Marxist socialism. Explanations are superfluous, and so are arguments. The eight confrontations with the Shining Path&#039;s irregulars, their propaganda and mechanisms of national and international dissemination, and the Shining Path-like behavior of the Peruvian right leave no doubt about the reactionary nature of the phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART ONE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Chapter 1: Peru, an important enclave, and the Shining Path ===&lt;br /&gt;
In a globally interconnected world like the present, local events cannot be explained by themselves. Even less so without an understanding of the environment, especially regarding international political and economic ties, and the significance they hold in the context of global controversy and the widespread conflict characteristic of this stage in history.&lt;br /&gt;
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It&#039;s worth noting that the doctrines of insurgency and counterinsurgency follow standardized methods and techniques, distinguished from one another only by their purpose and how they serve different ideological views. The greater or lesser strength—whether liberating or imposing—of these modern scientific mechanisms of “unconventional warfare” used to impose wills, defend, preserve, or conquer interests, depends on the conditions of the various social groups where they are applied.&lt;br /&gt;
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For these reasons, it&#039;s impossible to fully understand the Shining Path phenomenon or subversion in Peru without first examining, on a global scale, the potential motivations for which this country falls victim to an insurgent movement of a terrorist character; the reasons and nature of this type of internal warfare. All of this stems from an analysis of the country&#039;s importance on the global strategic board.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are clarifications that must be made. At the very least, to place us on the same strategic level as the Shining Path, which considers the development of its war as part of the global revolution. Whether or not this last statement is true, the Shining Path&#039;s interest in Peru is strategic and operates within a system of ideas and interests that are universal, not merely local.&lt;br /&gt;
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It cannot be ignored that there are currently more than fifty conflict zones in the world—geostrategic enclaves of global politics of the superpowers—and Peru is one of them, distinguished by its strategic location in South America and the South Pacific, as well as its abundant natural resources and military capabilities, the latter partly stemming from its possession of Soviet military technology.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== A thousand year old culture ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;In Ayacucho, the most ancient evidence of humans in South America has been found. Richard Mac Neis from the Peabody made these discoveries and after prolonged investigations, he managed to establish an antiquity of twenty thousand years before Christ for the presence of the first inhabitants in the Ayacucho region, making it the oldest known site of human habitation in South America to date&amp;quot; (6).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peruvian culture has a long history that begins in the lithic period and evolved from hunter-gatherer groups to the urban societies of our era. The Wari Empire (500-1000 CE) is the oldest. However, before the Inca or Quechua culture arrived, others flourished, such as the Chimu, Mochica, Pachacamac, Chincha, Nazca, Paracas, Cañaris, Chavin, Chanca, Huanca, Lupaca, Colla, and Tiahuanaco. These were coastal and mountain societies, of which we have scientific references only. In several cases, their current ethnic presence and values serve as the foundation for our current national culture in formation. This all stems from the impact experienced by ancient Peru when the Judeo-Christian culture of the 16th century, in its capitalist-mercantile stage, was forcefully introduced. A culture shaken by universal scientific and technological development.&lt;br /&gt;
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Understanding the persistence of this cultural confrontation is essential for comprehending the real motives behind any type of insurgency, and in this special case, properly explaining the presence of the movement called the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
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Centuries of domination and the violent insertion of capitalism have not destroyed the inherent values of pre-Hispanic Peruvian societies. These values transcend the unstoppable demographic growth of their ethnicities, especially the Quechua, which overlays the most diverse range of intermixing. But not only in this aspect but also in the endurance of their customs and beliefs, their old technologies and their aspirations, which now intermingle and enrich themselves with the universal values of the contemporary world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Peru is undergoing a cultural renaissance, a process of social change that is not convenient for dominant cultures on the international level. Hence the idea that all forms of indigenous intellectual creation, all new valorizations and aspirations, all currents of thought or leadership alien to the prevailing system must be destroyed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The survival of the root factors of Peruvian culture signifies the possible consolidation of a sovereign and independent nation integrated into the region, as well as a just and solidarity-based society with guaranteed development. As long as it can maintain the free availability of its potential and diverse natural resources, which in the distant past allowed for the emergence of the only civilization south of the equatorial line.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Peru’s potential ====&lt;br /&gt;
For all intended purposes, there is no need for a statistical and quantified inventory of Peru&#039;s potential resources and reserves. Rather it is about assessing their strategic importance in industrial development, both in the past, present, and future.&lt;br /&gt;
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As sources of detailed and scientific information on this matter, Peru has the historical accounts of Spanish chroniclers from the colonial era, the research of Alexander Von Humboldt, and more recent accounts by Antonio Raimondi and Atunes de Mayolo. Additionally, there is the &#039;&#039;Great geography of Peru&#039;&#039; by various authors, scientific inventories from the National Office of Natural Resources Assessment (&#039;&#039;Oficina Nacional de Evaluación de Recursos Naturales&#039;&#039;) (7) or the Institute of the Peruvian Sea (&#039;&#039;Instituto del Mar Peruano&#039;&#039;), valuations by Peruvianist Victor Volsky from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and those conducted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).&lt;br /&gt;
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These are comprehensive or specific studies that confirm the country&#039;s importance in the world due to its possession of renewable and non-renewable resources, as well as its geographical location and geophysical configuration that enables the development of infinite energy sources such as solar and nuclear, as well as other cosmic sources like magnetic currents, turbulence, and atomic plasma released in the Magnetic Equator, an energy belt for which only India and Peru have an advantage due to their location on the planet.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many products native to Peru have substantially served global food and industry. Among others, potatoes, cassava, corn, pineapples, beans, tomatoes, cocoa, peanuts, quinoa, rubber, coca, and quinine. Also, minerals like gold have contributed to European industrial development.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like these, there are other resources, located and coveted in this part of the world, that will serve the future development of humanity. Organizations such as the well-known Trilateral Commission (8) have already scheduled their use in the era of the 2000s.&lt;br /&gt;
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The gold reserves of Madre de Dios and the Andean massif will contribute to the near-future development, with their initial intensive exploitation potentially allowing Peru to play a significant role in the establishment of an international monetary system. The richest oil and gas formations in the subcontinent, on the continental shelf and in the Amazon basin, will also contribute. The mineral-rich areas are known as the &amp;quot;Eastern and Western Andean Metallogenic Provinces&amp;quot; with their silver, gold, zinc, lead, copper, tungsten, lithium, vanadium, plutonium, uranium, among other minerals, and a varied range of non-metals. The gigantic phosphate reserves of Bayovar, which together with smaller ones in the Moroccan Sahara and Namibia, are the only ones in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to all this, there are the vast coal basins of Alto Chicama and Gazuza Oyon, those in Santa, Cajamarca, Huanuco, Pasco; the polymetallic nodules of manganese, iron, cobalt, nickel, copper, uranium, thorium, titanium, plutonium, and other metals found on the coasts, continental shelves, and seabeds of Peru. According to the geographer Pulgar Vidal, their exploitation in relatively near terms seems possible. There are also immense hydrobiological marine resources with a rich variety of species, hydroelectric energy sources in the western and eastern slopes of the Andes that will enable the exploitation of all these resources. Their significance is highly strategic because without this hydroelectric energy, it would be nearly impossible to achieve optimal levels of resource exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to this vast reserve of resources and potential, whose general description falls short, the country&#039;s position on the western coast of the Pacific Ocean with access to the Atlantic through the Amazon River and a natural projection towards Antarctica should be noted.&lt;br /&gt;
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Ports such as Callao, Bayovar, Huacho, San Juan, Matarani, Ilo, and Arica (a port where Peru shares sovereignty) have become essential points of use for landlocked or Atlantic countries seeking access to the Pacific market. Despite any claims or attempts to suggest otherwise, Peru, as in pre-Inca, Inca, and colonial times, will continue to be a hub for land and sea communications and, now, in the realm of aerospace and electronics as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Geopolitical context ====&lt;br /&gt;
In light of the extensive prospects offered by the Pacific Basin, all of Peru&#039;s neighboring countries have their own clear interests that can affect Peruvian interests in the absence of specific national objectives and a defined project regarding the said Oceanic Basin and its potential as a future market.&lt;br /&gt;
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From this perspective and to appreciate how pressures and interests converge on Peru, it is interesting to briefly review the national interests that the neighboring countries of Peru have in the Pacific.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ecuador: Its national and geopolitical goal is to become an Amazonian country, for which it integrates into the Amazon Pact, offering Brazil a duty-free zone at the Port of San Lorenzo, seeking to establish access to the Pacific (9). The conflict over the El Cóndor mountain range is immersed in this geopolitical projection. Furthermore, Ecuador extends its meridian arcs towards the Antarctic, starting from the highest point of the Galápagos Islands (10).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chile: The President of the Chilean Military Junta, General Augusto Pinochet, asserts, &amp;quot;... what one state lacks, another has, the low population of one is compensated by the larger number of neighbors, and to lower costs, we need large masses of consumers, which will be achieved through the integration of the South American superstate. A superstate capable of countering the communist threat&amp;quot; (11). In this regard, Chilean Major General Ramón Cafias Montalva has declared that Chile is destined to be the power of the South Pacific and, from this perspective, even of the Antarctic (12). Conflicts with Argentina over the Beagle Channel and the Drake Passage imply Chile&#039;s geopolitical desire to establish its presence in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Antarctic, in a clear alliance with England and the United States since the Falklands War, which may eventually include the People&#039;s Republic of China due to its tensions with the Soviet Union. This fundamentally military alliance has resulted in the provision of military bases to Western powers. All of this constitutes the Chilean regime&#039;s policy of alliances to achieve its national objective of forming and leading the South Pacific Confederation, based on the Republic of Chile, the Bolivian Massif territory, and Peru up to Guayaquil, mirroring the incisive power, thereby acting as the support or head of the Pacific System and in logical connection with Ecuador (13). In its desire to assert its leadership of a Pacific Community of Nations, the Chilean administration does not cease its efforts to develop an economic-military aggression scheme with the support of large transnational companies such as Kennecott, Exxon, and others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolivia: Since Chile snatched Bolivia&#039;s access to the Pacific Ocean 106 years ago, Bolivia has been caught in a cycle of permanent instability, closely linked to its main national goal: access to the Pacific, a right recognized by global consensus and constantly claimed in international organizations such as the UN, OAS, and Non-Aligned Conferences, among others. Chile, in order not to grant Bolivia access through territories that were formerly its own, has always sought a solution through Peruvian territories or territories that were once Peruvian.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Brazil: Since 1919, Brazil has shared with Bolivia the goal of gaining access to the Pacific Ocean, which would be made possible by the construction of the railway line Santos-Corumba-Puerto Suárez-Santa Cruz de la Sierra-Cochabamba-La Paz-Arica, known as the Capricorn Route. As a counterbalance to this project, which is already well underway, Chile has expanded its concepts, promoting the development of the Interregional Business Group of Southwestern South America consisting of private entrepreneurs from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and observers from southern Peru. Through more than a dozen international meetings they have been encouraged to form an economic superstate with access through the ports of Arica, Iquique, and Antofagasta (14). Astute analysts suggest that this could be related to the old Andina Project, the former state that the international Jewish community once sought to establish in South America before settling in Palestine. For Brazil, the projection of the Amazon Pact and the development of its road infrastructure to Peru through Iquitos, Pucallpa, and Puerto Maldonado provide it with a broader opening and immediate possibilities to support its theory of a bi-oceanic country. Brazilian policy also aims to achieve sovereignty in the Antarctic Continent. Based on Portugal&#039;s priority in the discovery, Brazil supports the &amp;quot;Defrontation&amp;quot; theory, an adaptation of the &amp;quot;sector principle&amp;quot; proposed in 1907 by Canada for the division of the Arctic (15).&lt;br /&gt;
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Regarding Antarctica, the Brazilian theory projects the extreme points of each coastal state of the South Atlantic and South Pacific oceans, resulting in different arcs greatly favoring Brazil. This situation was consolidated through negotiations with Poland, where Poland ceded its Artowsky Antarctic base to Brazil as payment for its debt of $1.6 billion to Brazil.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Colombia: Colombia&#039;s objectives in the Pacific lie in efforts to create a business scheme to the west, starting from the Andean Pact; its integration into the Permanent Commission of the South Pacific since the 1970s; its participation in events such as the Consultative Meeting of Researchers, which brought together 14 countries, including Japan, the Philippines, and the USSR, in the city of Barranquilla, to address political, economic, and technical-scientific issues of the Pacific; and its active participation in the Scientific Committee of the Regional Study on the El Niño Phenomenon and climatological and oceanographic changes in the southeastern South Pacific, involving specialists from the United States, the USSR, and France, indicating the interest generated by this national goal of Colombia.&lt;br /&gt;
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As can be observed, Peru is involved in all the national objectives of its neighboring countries and does not have clear objectives of its own, at least in terms of the Pacific Basin - without touching on other topics.&lt;br /&gt;
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In other words, the process of Latin American integration is taking place amid tensions surrounding Peru, which it must confront and overcome. This is not only in the context of developing domestic markets but primarily in the context of the vast Pacific market, which all the countries in the sub-region are oriented toward.&lt;br /&gt;
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Arnaldo Rufz, a professor of Economics and Geopolitics at the Technical University of Callao and Bausate Meza School of Journalism states, &amp;quot;If Peru&#039;s integration with other countries is to be based on the unforeseen future of the Pacific Basin, three basic aspects must be considered: 1) Longitudinal Peru, based on communications parallel to the coast that converge with the Highland and Northern Historical Peru. 2) Transverse Peru, which integrates the altitudinal zones of the Peruvian ecosystem. 3) Centralized Peru in South America, oriented towards the Pacific as an extension of the Amazon basin combined with the altiplano that opens to the Plata Basin&amp;quot; (16).&lt;br /&gt;
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Ruiz goes on to explain that addressing these aspects imply the implementation of an economic policy of coordinated expansion towards new markets as a means of overcoming the international crisis. This policy is based on export capacity with comparative advantages, which would position Peru as the gateway and key to communication with the Pacific Basin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Otherwise, by turning our back on the Pacific and the future we may be aligning ourselves with the U.S. National Security framework for this area in the event of a Third World War. This framework&#039;s central thesis is the defense of interior lines of the continent assuming a blockade of exterior lines, both from the Pacific and the Atlantic. This concept, developed in 1947, considers the creation of an inland waterway based on the integration of the Plata, Amazon, and Orinoco basins, along with respective marginal roads, and the establishment of a U.S. protectorate in the Peruvian territory of Arica (17).&lt;br /&gt;
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For any analysis of the internal situation, one cannot ignore the connections between it and Latin American integration in its true dimension. Relations with neighboring countries, physical integration with South American countries, Peru&#039;s presence in Antarctica and the Pacific all form a converging set that determines Peru&#039;s attitude toward the Central American problem, relations with the United States, and Peru&#039;s position regarding the Non-Aligned Movement, the New International Economic Order, and the Law of the Sea.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not coincidental but historical that Peru has waged wars among its pre-Inca cultures, that the Inca society based its development on conquest and it is not by chance that Peru was the convergence center during the war for independence. Peru has been the Latin American country that has suffered the most wars of aggression by its neighbors. It is no accident that Peru has been present in one way or another in the wars of the subcontinental area (18).&lt;br /&gt;
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On the whole set of pressures caused by the main national objectives of neighboring countries, there exists a global political-strategic situation worldwide within which Peru, like all the countries in the area, plays a role. The significance of this role whether major or minor, is crucial because it is closely related to the generalized conflict of high, medium, or low intensity in which the war of terrorist insurgency affecting the country is a part.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore for the purposes of this research, it is necessary to review some of the points of interest for major world powers in this part of the region, neighboring countries, as well as Peru&#039;s own internal situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The attitude of the United States of America specifically points to the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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# Collection of external debt, imposition of surcharges, and falling prices of basic imports from Latin America, as a predicted framework for its financial institutions for 1987-1988. These events are expected to lead to a confrontation with countries in the subcontinent, according to economists and analysts of the system (19).&lt;br /&gt;
# Urgent adoption of new counterinsurgency strategies to avoid disaster in Latin America, according to the exclusive projections of the Special Military Investigations Team of the Canal Zone. These projections indicate that national armies in Latin America prefer legality to special operations. They believe that legitimacy is more important than military tactics (20).&lt;br /&gt;
# Consequently, U.S. interests, taking into account their Foreign Internal Security, logically guide their diplomacy, aid programs, cooperation, and anti-drug efforts in terms of counterinsurgency policies. This includes the preparation and/or execution of direct or indirect interventions in countries in the area. Historically, the following models of intervention are known:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Chilean model (1973-1974): Direct destabilization of the established government through conspiracy, sabotage, and armed uprising directed by the Central Intelligence Agency.&lt;br /&gt;
* Argentine model (1976-1986): Combined use of factors such as internal subversion promoted by montoneros and Trotskyists between March 24, 1976, and December 10, 1983, and its corollary of dirty war, which was even exported to Central America with the acquiescence of the Department of State. Border conflict with Chile, which kept the possibility of a regular war between the two countries open until a diplomatic solution to the Beagle problem was reached.&lt;br /&gt;
* Outbreak of localized warfare in the Falkland Islands in 1982, leading to the defeat of the Argentine military establishment, its gradual and certain technological deactivation, and the ongoing psychological coercion on military personnel.&lt;br /&gt;
* Nicaraguan model (1980-1987): Through third parties, applying economic isolation as well as a military encirclement using neighboring countries, promoting and supporting internal subversive actions from border sanctuaries, low-intensity operations with the participation of mercenaries, controlled regular armies, and the U.S. military apparatus itself.&lt;br /&gt;
* Grenada model (1981): Direct military intervention, as had occurred previously in the Dominican Republic and other Central American countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The presence of the Soviet Union is significant due to:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Technological assistance and military cooperation in Cuba, Peru, and Nicaragua. This is unacceptable to the United States, which considers Latin America within its security area. Maps of Soviet military deployment distributed by the U.S. Department of Defense depict Peru as a Soviet military base.&lt;br /&gt;
# The development of commercial activities in the Latin American market, especially with Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Guyana, and Colombia. This trade offsets Peru to facilitate the collection of its external debt.&lt;br /&gt;
# Diplomatic and peaceful cooperation efforts, including a planned visit by M. Gorbachev to several Latin American countries.&lt;br /&gt;
# Support for insurgency in Chile to overthrow Augusto Pinochet&#039;s regime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
China is active due to:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Its predominant interest in the Pacific Basin, leading to increased trade relations with Panama, Ecuador, and Chile, to a lesser extent with Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
# Activities aimed at expanding its political space in the world. In Peru and Latin America, its interest, not hidden, is to displace the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
# The ideological inspiration of violent Maoist political movements, although officially and pragmatically, they deny any material support to these movements and even any government affiliation with them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is worth noting that the governments of Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan also have interests in economic, ideological, and military fields, especially in Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, among other Latin American countries. These are three governments that share the common characteristic of having issues with the United Nations international community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regarding Peru&#039;s neighboring countries, in the current strategic situation, the following significant events are registered:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Chile:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Diplomatic offensive to conclude, advantageously, the unfulfilled aspects of the 1929 Peruvian-Chilean Complementary Peace and Boundary Protocol to prevent it from being denounced for non-compliance. At the same time, minimize Peru&#039;s shared sovereignty rights in Arica.&lt;br /&gt;
# Dissuasion of Bolivia&#039;s aspirations to return to the Pacific, following a period of détente that began with the meeting in Montevideo in April 1987 between the Bolivian and Chilean foreign ministers.&lt;br /&gt;
# Strategies for the use of waters from the Titicaca Basin, which are under Peruvian-Bolivian joint control, to initiate the exploitation of lithium, a strategic mineral in northern Chile.&lt;br /&gt;
# Direct references to the danger of the spread of the subversive movement of Peru, as seen in the seminar &#039;&#039;Subversion and Democracy&#039;&#039; sponsored by the Chilean government and the University of Santiago in January 1987. There have also been constant accusations in the press and government circles about the danger of Peru as a Soviet beachhead in Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
# Support from the Anglo-American system for the development of the Chilean arms industry. This system has obtained military concessions in Punta Arenas and Easter Island.&lt;br /&gt;
# Purchase of Chinese military equipment, especially aircraft.&lt;br /&gt;
# Participation in Operation Unitas XVII with the involvement of a U.S. nuclear submarine, despite the South Pacific being an intentionally nuclear-free zone.&lt;br /&gt;
# Facilities provided to the People&#039;s Republic of China for exploration in the Antarctic continent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Bolivia:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The issue of landlocked status as a constant factor of internal instability due to Chile&#039;s demand for territorial concessions as a basis for any negotiation formula.&lt;br /&gt;
# The creation of the Ninth Division of the Bolivian Army in January 1987, based in Rurrenabaque, with the mission of monitoring the border with Peru and preventing the spread of the Shining Path insurgency, which operates in the Peruvian department of Puno, to Bolivia.&lt;br /&gt;
# Presence of U.S. troops in Bolivian territory:&lt;br /&gt;
#* From April 26 to May 6, 1986, for joint conventional and unconventional warfare operations in the Chapare region, Cochabamba.&lt;br /&gt;
#* From July 15 to November 15, the deployment of a U.S. Rapid Intervention Unit in the fight against drug trafficking.&lt;br /&gt;
#* From May 11 to May 25, 1987, joint maneuvers of U.S. and Bolivian armies in conventional and unconventional warfare operations in the Rurrenabaque-Apolo-Exiamas-Reyes area, near the Peruvian border in the Department of La Paz.&lt;br /&gt;
# Expulsion of Peruvian settlers in August and September 1987 from the Futuro Valley, a border area with Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Brazil:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Since November 1986, the execution of the Calha Norte Project, which aims to economically and militarily occupy 5,995 kilometers of border areas with Colombia, Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana, and French Guiana within four years. There is a special reinforcement of the border with Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, as announced by the Minister of the Army, General Leonidas Pires Goncalves, in March 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
# Traditional geopolitical pressure to reach the Pacific Ocean coast. A national goal that is being implemented through aggressive trade and communication policies and by exerting its greatest influence on countries in the Amazon Pact.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Colombia:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Continued violation of Peru&#039;s airspace due to the development of the narco-trafficking aviation infrastructure, which presents the Peruvian-Colombian border as the most vulnerable to the penetration of unidentified aircraft, which could arrive with supplies and contraband. The existence of clandestine airport infrastructures that, in the event of conflict or conventional warfare circumstances, could be used militarily.&lt;br /&gt;
# Colombia serves as the strategic center for the production and international distribution of cocaine produced in Peru and Bolivia. The arrest of Carlos Lehder Rivas demonstrates the connection between some subversive groups and drug trafficking.&lt;br /&gt;
# The existence and operation of the America Battalion as an expression of an alliance of subversive forces from Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
# Traditional support for Ecuador in its territorial claims against Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Ecuador:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Interest in U.S. military support. During the year of 1986, Ecuadorian media, members of Parliament and personalities criticized the presence of U.S. troops in the country. There is a possibility of establishing the &#039;&#039;School of the Americas&#039;&#039; — a training school for Latin American armies&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;More accurately, the School of the Americas trained US-backed dictators in Latin America and their armies who later committed various war crimes against civilian populations; the “school” itself is a tool of imperialism and regime change for the country&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; — in the Amazon region, as well as granting a U.S. military base in the Galapagos Islands. U.S. troops are building a strategic road in the province of Manabi, between Bahia de Caraquez and Canoas, as part of military agreements between the Armed Forces of Ecuador and the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
# The maintenance of an anti-Peruvian campaign as a means of psychological mobilization of its population for war, based on the disregard for the &#039;&#039;Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Also known as the [[Rio Protocol]]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and the encouragement of territorial invasion of the Peruvian Amazon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The current national situation of Peru, in the context of an international situation characterized by conflicting interests and events at the strategic level, presents the following difficulties:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Problematic external debt, restricted markets and rising inflation are phenomena that, among others, create imbalances in Peru&#039;s economic development and disrupt the definition of capital accumulation within the national economic model.&lt;br /&gt;
# The lack of effective state control over areas related to activities such as drug trafficking, finance, arms, smuggling, and pharmaceuticals, which currently constitute major sectors of the national economy, surpassing formal industry and agriculture.&lt;br /&gt;
# Crisis in democratic institutions, bureaucratic chaos, inconsistency in the state apparatus, and violations of the constitutional order, among other adverse circumstances affecting the government.&lt;br /&gt;
# The growth of insurgency, especially in the interior of the country. Nullification of the psychological defenses in the population due to insurgent and counterinsurgent terror causing fear, disorientation and collective confusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of the above leads us to believe, without too much effort, that the interests of various countries at the strategic level seriously affect and will continue to influence Peruvian politics. Given its evident projection, it can be predicted that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. The United States will try to secure debt repayment by subjecting Peru to International Monetary Fund policies, promote complete economic liberalization in the region, continue plans to standardize and harmonize hemispheric defense, eliminating the presence of competitive Soviet and even European technologies. It will insist on further alignment of national policies in the region with the dictates of the State Department, as expressed in Reagan&#039;s speech at the United Nations on September 19, 1987. The U.S. will expand military support to Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador against a hypothetical subversive overflow from Peru. Furthermore, the U.S. will consider the potential use of Chile and Ecuador, as well as Central American countries, in the East-West conflict and the de facto inclusion of the South Pacific in its nuclear defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. The Soviet Union will not give up expanding its political influence in the region, consolidating its trade and cultural relations, conditioning the Peruvian industry to the Soviet market, and taking advantage of debt repayment in products of its interest. It will aim to increase military technological dependence and consolidate its strategic gravitational points within the continental defense system of the United States (Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru) as part of its global strategy in the East-West conflict. This implies the possibility of supporting Peru against possible military interventions in the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. The People&#039;s Republic of China will continue its trend of sharing political and trade spaces in the Pacific Basin with the United States. It will also seek to destabilize spaces gained by the Soviets in Latin America, whether in trade, politics, or military. China will consolidate its alliance with Chile to facilitate its entry into the Antarctic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. Israel, South Africa and Taiwan will maintain their influence in the political, commercial, and military fields in Latin America and try to increase their impact to expand their space and freedom of action against international pressures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5. Peru&#039;s neighboring countries will continue seeking to satisfy their national interests from their perspectives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
6. Chile, as part of the Anglo-American military system,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Pinochet, who was aligned with Thatcher and Nixon, would lose the election later the same year this book was published, 1988.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; will continue working towards achieving access to Peruvian and Bolivian territories through political, psychological and economic warfare, supported by diplomatic offensives and the strength of its military apparatus, with the eventual capacity to militarily occupy the Pacific coast and the highland region of Titicaca.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
7. Bolivia will not abandon its struggle to gain access to the Pacific, whether through territories that were once Peruvian or through Peruvian territories if provided with the opportunity for a localized conflict. In this regard, it is taking precautions to neutralize potential Peruvian military operations in the Altiplano through the development of its own forces or allies of the United States, allegedly oriented towards the fight against subversion and drug trafficking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
8. Brazil will consolidate occupation of its borders, especially in the north and northwest, within four years. This implies a geopolitical containment of Peru while increasing its pressure to reach the Pacific and gain advantages in the integration of its Amazonian countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
9. Colombia will maintain its de facto projection over the Peruvian Amazon, taking advantage of the existing infrastructure and communications related to drug trafficking in Peruvian territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
10. Ecuador will seek to define the dispute over the Peruvian Amazon in its favor, through the occupation of the Cenepa Basin — rich in oil, coal and gold — as a logical complement to its actions following the bilateral denunciation of the Rio Protocol. It may even lean towards provoking a localized war, with the support of the United States, Chile, and Israel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of these circumstances create a situation in which Peru is placed in conditions to take advantage of the benefits that the strategic balance between the USSR and the US can offer, rather than being a victim of their pressures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To do so, it would have to manage its economic crisis&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Also called the Lost Decade. Starting in 1980, Peru plunged into a recession that would last until the early 90s, with inflation reaching record heights.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; by orienting towards social forms of capital accumulation in an economic model that preserves Peru’s sovereignty &amp;amp; independence and guarantees its freedom of action. Peru would need to improve the structural and logistical base of its national defense to deter potential external agressions, gain and consolidate political and economic spaces in the region as well as the solidarity of the international community, especially the Third World. However, the most crucial aspect would be to defeat, in the short term, the internal insurgency that threatens its national goals and stability in the global strategic framework.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary, to facilitate a correct interpretation of the current state of affairs in Peru, it is necessary to understand that the current political situation is dominated by the &#039;&#039;dissuasion-distension&#039;&#039; actions of the superpowers (the United States and the USSR) which both unmistakably exhibit characteristics of unconventional warfare carried out by irregular elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this context, Peru is seen as an important piece in the global strategic balance, as previously established, due to its privileged position in the South Pacific, its vast natural resources, its bi-oceanic condition with access to the Atlantic ocean through the Amazon, the handling of Soviet military technology and the emergence of nationalist governments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On a regional level the Anglo-American military system, as we will see later, is completing its continental defense scheme. In recent years, it has achieved effective military presence in Punta Arenas, the Falkland Islands, Juan Fernandez, Easter Island, San Felix, San Ambrosio and the Galapagos Islands. This suggests that Chile and Ecuador are operating as operational bases of the continental encirclement military system, and even hints at a possible nuclearization of the South Pacific.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The threat of the growth of the Shining Path and its spread to neighboring nations, as well as the rise of drug trafficking, serves as provocation and justification for the presence of rapid intervention troops from the United States in the subcontinent and for joint operations in Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile; both conventional and unconventional warfare aimed at potential enemies originating from Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the border, Peru has problems with Chile related to the execution of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and others related to maritime boundaries, a topic we will not touch upon for now. There are sporadic Ecuadorian claims that prevent the final delineation of the border. Furthermore, the joint management of the waters of Lake Titicaca with Bolivia, geostrategic pressure from Brazil, the loss of control of airspace against Colombia, coupled with Chile and Ecuador&#039;s arms race, form the basic elements of a latent threat of military aggression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, there are serious difficulties in building an anti-imperialist, popular democratic economic and social model, which is the mortal enemy of the Shining Path insurgency.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of the above allows us to state that the growth of insurgency and developments in the current political-strategic context operate as a favorable factor for the purposes of the Anglo-American system. It hinders the establishment of a social model by the national majorities; may lead to strategic errors in the conception of political, economic and military measures; engages the Armed Forces in a war with the population by psychologically altering the conception of the theater of operations and the identity of the enemy; erodes national potential and weakens the psychological defenses of the population. It would also facilitate possible external interference in the form of low-intensity operations. This, in summary, means that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The global interests of the great powers and military systems converge on Peru to decide its medium-term course. The national interests and objectives of neighboring countries converge and coincide in violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of this country.&lt;br /&gt;
* In addition to this, there is currently a serious obstacle to the consolidation of the Peruvian nation-state as a result of unconventional warfare — namely insurgency, terrorism and subversion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite these adverse circumstances, Peru enjoys the privilege of being a point of strategic balance within the global context. This balance, more precisely, would be sought to be broken by the major interests at stake. The rational exploitation of this balance would allow Peru to consolidate its interests as a Nation-State, despite the disadvantages of time and space, and break free from external subjugation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the way, it is worth recalling how other countries, in different times and historical circumstances, have used the advantages of strategic balance. The examples of Yugoslavia, Israel, South Africa, Syria, Taiwan, not to mention various medium-level European or Eastern powers, which have known how to manage circumstances and maintain their freedom of action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Chapter 2: unconventional warfare ===&lt;br /&gt;
Understanding the objectives of the Shining Path means finding an explanation for the nature of their war and correlations in the strategic framework of the current global situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We believe that to study any insurgent movement correctly, it is not enough to refer to its origins and social foundations. It is essential to also do so from the perspective of war itself. A country&#039;s survival is determined by its ability to achieve its national objectives through political integration or the path of war; it is the alternative. War and politics ultimately mean confrontation and the imposition of wills. This leads us to establish some brief premises necessary for a better understanding of unconventional and irregular warfare in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== On war and politics ====&lt;br /&gt;
According to Carl von Clausewitz,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;18th-century Prussian general who was recognized by Lenin, Mao and others as being the first to apply dialectics to warfare in his treatise [[Library:On War|On War]].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; war is &amp;quot;an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;nothing but a duel on a larger scale.&amp;quot; He further argues that &amp;quot;violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence.&amp;quot; (21)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
War is not only characterized by the use of physical force but by a confrontation of wills.Therefore, it seeks to undermine the opponent psychologically. To that end, it encompasses non-conventional fields compared to strictly military fields when it uses psychological techniques that aim for control of the opponent’s symbols of power to ensure victory. It also employs diplomatic persuasion before, during and after armed conflict as well as the mobilization of intellectual forces for final victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Politics, as the dynamic science of governance and relations between states, does not stop or cease with the act of war, given that &amp;quot;war is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument&amp;quot; (22). Politics also pursues psychological goals, such as the image of Popular Representation, and uses techniques of social communication and instruments of sociology and psychology to gain adherents, strengthen party will and discourage opponents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a consensus in recognizing the genesis of contemporary unconventional warfare theory — both revolutionary or political — in the contributions of Clausewitz and Vladimir Lenin. For Maurice Megret, the &amp;quot;contemporary success of Clausewitz largely stems from the upheaval in political perspectives following the victory of the Bolshevik revolution, and because, more or less consciously, we interpret Clausewitz through the dialectical modification that Lenin subjected him to&amp;quot;(23).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Clausewitz’s classic treatise &#039;&#039;On War&#039;&#039; presents a fundamental and transcendent formula: &amp;quot;War is the continuation of politics by other means,&amp;quot; says he. Clausewitz demonstrates that &amp;quot;war is never an isolated act&amp;quot; and that none of the contenders is an abstract person to the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nearly a century after Clausewitz&#039;s thought was formulated, &amp;quot;Lenin combined the lines of force of his revolutionary action based on the interaction of four words formed into an equation: War, Politics, Will, Propaganda. But he made a radical inversion of Clausewitz&#039;s doctrine that Soviet doctrine allows us to express as follows: &#039;Politics is the continuation of war by other means&#039;&amp;quot;(24).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This inversion is the key to approaching permanent war and gives rise to Lenin&#039;s revolutionary warfare, which, by its nature, is non-conventional and primarily develops in the psycho-social field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Some relevant background ====&lt;br /&gt;
Maurice Megret, when referring to psychological warfare — perhaps the primary form of unconventional warfare –- establishes three historical stages in the development of the use of violence:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Psychological deception - initially presents itself as a form of violence in warfare, serving to unsettle the enemy and create terror to weaken their will to fight.&lt;br /&gt;
# This type of operation evolves into a multiplier of violence, extending the conflict beyond traditional battlefronts and becoming widespread within nations.&lt;br /&gt;
# Finally, these operations serve to systematize violence by extending their application to the emotions and psychological structure, both individual and collective, of humanity. This dimension of warfare becomes an effective scientific tool at the service of states in their political and socio-economic struggles, an ultimate offensive weapon applicable in all times and circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s important to note that unconventional or irregular warfare is as ancient as war itself. Some historical figures are worth recalling in this context (25):&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Sun Tzu&#039;&#039;&#039;: A Chinese military writer from 500 years before Christ, who authored a masterpiece titled &#039;&#039;The Art of War&#039;&#039;. This classic explores conflict through five key factors: moral influence, timing, terrain, leadership and doctrine. Sun Tzu emphasized that true warfare is waged in the minds of people, and winning those minds equates to winning the war. He also advocated for offensive strategies that focused on capturing states intact rather than destroying them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Alexander the Great&#039;&#039;&#039;: Known for unifying the Greek world and placing his son at the helm of the empire. His success was not only due to his military prowess but also to his father Philip of Macedon&#039;s strategic principles, which included:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Maintaining and cultivating &amp;quot;peaceful&amp;quot; friendships in adversary countries to promote the idea that times of adventurism have passed and nations should focus on peaceful activities.&lt;br /&gt;
* Reinforcing and expediting these indirect actions through secret agents, the spread of rumors, and the cultivation of a war of nerves.&lt;br /&gt;
* Burying the adversary&#039;s opinion under a mountain of both true and false information, ultimately leading to disintegration, collapse, and dissolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Muhammad&#039;&#039;&#039;: In the 7th century CE, Muhammad appeared as a Prophet preaching Islam with only two options: conversion, or extermination. This phenomenon demonstrated two basic rules of psychological defense:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The first rule is that a people lacking a strong national ideology or deeply rooted faith can be completely converted to another ideology or creed simply by presenting them with the option of extermination.&lt;br /&gt;
* The second rule is that, to convince or convert a people deeply entrenched in their own faith or national ideology, cunning is often more effective than violence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Eight centuries of Arab domination in Spain left a profound mark of a cultural shift in language, sciences and customs, but they could not erase an identity based on Christianity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The Incas&#039;&#039;&#039;: They have been mentioned as masters in the use of non-military techniques in the service of war and the state. To win and capture the minds of the American population, Colonel Torres Llosa says they made intensive and skillful use of myth, aligning rulers and state objectives with religion and the will of the gods. They knew how to use the technique of rumors and spies along with diplomatic negotiations, subtly combining means of persuasion and force. Their institutions, such as the &#039;&#039;mitimaes&#039;&#039; (the relocation of entire communities to different territories), were always aimed at ensuring the perfect conversion and loyalty of their subjects, combining genuine concern for social justice and the collective well-being of the empire&#039;s population(26).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his &#039;&#039;General History of America&#039;&#039;, Luis Albedo Sánchez points out that the Incas used a &#039;&#039;dual&#039;&#039; language: one in Quechua to preserve the history of the state and the emperors, whether good or bad, and another vulgar Quechua that only allowed remembrance of the victors and positive aspects of the Inca Empire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is also worth noting the cohesive and communal nature of the language, which did not use the individual pronoun &amp;quot;I&amp;quot; but only employed &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; (&#039;&#039;ñocanchiss&#039;&#039;). Another aspect of the use of psychological factors in Tahuantinsuyo society was the creation and application of their motto: &#039;&#039;Ama sua - ama llulla - ama quella&#039;&#039; (Do not steal - do not lie - do not be lazy). The repetition of these principles as a moral code for a people creates a system of reflexes to achieve superior individual and collective behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Systematization of violence ====&lt;br /&gt;
In contemporary times, we can fairly accurately trace the evolution of unconventional warfare through the development of psychological operations, which emerged as support for military operations. Later, they replaced violence during the Cold War, became an offensive weapon in revolutionary warfare and its counterpart, counter-revolutionary warfare, or were employed in political warfare. These forms find significant expression in the psychological bombardment conducted by modern media targeting the &amp;quot;unarmed man,&amp;quot; contributing to the generalization and systematization of violence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From ancient times until the emergence and development of the modern State, psychological warfare evolved alongside scientific advances. In the present century, it has benefited from humanity&#039;s enormous progress in science and technology. Major historical events have also marked the historical evolution of psychological warfare:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# From 1914 to 1918, during &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[World War I]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;, psychological warfare remained relatively rudimentary. It was characterized by propaganda, the scientific theory of which was still in its infancy. Additionally, the war of positions and trenches created a separation between the front lines and the rear. The Germans attempted a pan-German movement, aiming to incite a holy war against British influence in the Middle East.&lt;br /&gt;
# In 1919, with the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, revolutionary warfare became institutionalized. Russia marked the beginning of a technical level of irregular and unconventional warfare by applying agitation, propaganda, and the methods of reflexological psychology by Petrovic Pavlov to ideological combat.&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1936 and 1945, the Nazi propaganda developed significantly, with Dr. Joseph Goebbels&#039; techniques garnering both admiration and fear. The work of Dr. Blau, Chief of the Army&#039;s Psychological Laboratory Service, combined psychology and psychoanalysis, laying the groundwork for this type of psychological warfare. The observations and theses recorded in his work &#039;&#039;Propaganda als Waffe&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;Propaganda as a weapon&#039;&#039;) in 1935 merged psychology and psychoanalysis in their methods.&lt;br /&gt;
# From 1939 to 1945, during World War II, psychological warfare was marked by the use of vast resources and the unification of allied organizations for psychological offensives in Europe. The strategic branch aimed for unconditional surrender following military victories, while the tactical branch sought specific objectives for the immediate benefit of the Allied war machine.&lt;br /&gt;
# From approximately 1945 to 1970, tensions rose, stemming from the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, which divided global supremacy into two major strategic fields: the &#039;&#039; Free World&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Communist World&#039;&#039;. This period gave birth to the Cold War, characterized by the perfection of the empire of terror and the threat of total war.&lt;br /&gt;
# From 1970 onward, the conflict turned global and the Cold War was succeeded by the threat of Nuclear Resolution, the War of the Rays, and the use of a worldwide apparatus of deterrence-distension. This period is characterized by the management of points of conflict, with more than half a dozen of them in Latin America alone, many of which originated from the execution of low-intensity operations or the subversive dynamics of major powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The end of World War II also marked the beginning of intensified research in psychosocial sciences. The goal was to maintain the psychological superiority achieved through strategic aerial bombardments over Europe and Japan with the use of strategic &#039;&#039;psychological&#039;&#039; bombardments. England carried out the transformation of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, led by scientific and academic personalities. Kurt Lewis and Brigadier John Rawlings Rees refined their method of political control based on precipitating the majority of populations into psychosis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The United States quickly followed suit through its universities, specialized centers, foundations and strategic intelligence agencies. These entities were responsible for the initial research on mass population control and the totalization of psychological warfare and unconventional warfare that we witness, experience and suffer today. They did this through the application of political warfare and agitprop in the context of global deterrence-distension, aggression, and the elimination of nationalist or decolonization movements in Third World countries, or the reversal of the terms of revolutionary warfare through low-intensity operations. These operations range from planting subversion (fabricating insurgency) to armed intervention (imposed or consented to), preceded by population conditioning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Doctrines ====&lt;br /&gt;
Discussing the doctrine of the systematization of violence involves addressing two aspects:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The general strategic concepts regarding unconventional warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
# Manuals on unconventional warfare, which are treatises outlining the norms, techniques, and procedures to be used in unconventional warfare, specifically in the operational aspects of military actions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is important to differentiate between these two levels because the first reflects a conception of the purpose, goals, policies, and strategies to achieve a doctrine. In contrast, the second level — the manuals — outline tactical objectives and techniques to achieve objectives, essentially serving as an operational program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One common mistake in regular confrontation is attempting to initiate insurgency or counterinsurgency based solely on a manual without having a comprehensive strategic concept. When the expected failure occurs, it is often wrongly attributed to the manual not being suitable for the situation. However, the majority of techniques and procedures outlined in the manuals are not exclusive to any particular ideology. What is exclusive is the doctrinal strategic conception to which the procedures in the manuals serve. Clumsy application of manual procedures or using them in a manner inconsistent with the nation&#039;s goals only yields favorable results for the adversary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, it is essential to understand the conceptual framework of the systematization of violence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Agitprop =====&lt;br /&gt;
In centrally planned economies under the Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialist ideology, all aspects of life, both in times of peace and war, are seen as a psychological struggle. Marxist dialectics are considered the expression of the very movement of history, and therefore, the ideology permeates the structures of the party and the State entirely.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
National psychological mobilization is based on the belief that everything is education within and that everything is oriented towards the liberation of peoples abroad. Institutions are organized to cover this broad perspective, and at the highest level, the Central Committee of the party includes the Department of Propaganda and Agitation Administration, which centralizes the task of mobilizing public opinion in favor of the party&#039;s defined goals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This involves a planned use of media as a conduit between the party and the masses, forming the basis for mobilization in political, economic, and military fields.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mobilization for psychological offense and defense relies on the development of social consciousness and class consciousness determined by social existence. Social consciousness comprises not only ideology, i.e., the worldview in line with the desired system, but also psychology. Ideology uses science; it doesn&#039;t create it. In this case, it complements it with psychology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For Soviet academics Boris Pershene and M. Lukomskaya, the two aspects of social consciousness, the psyche, and ideas, each have their own structure and specific characteristics. But what sets the ideas in motion or, conversely, hinders their development are socio-psychic phenomena that occur on one socio-economic basis or another (27).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this framework, subaltern psychological techniques are subordinate to higher conditions of revolutionary warfare proper. Their methodology revolves around two fundamental concerns: directing operations through specialized secret organizations and never separating actions from the overall strategy or tactics. In other words, there is no concept of psychological warfare in the doctrinal sense; it is not conceived in the Western manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Political warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
Political warfare is based on the principle that psychological warfare is intimately linked to the conduct of general politics. The British, often credited with this thesis, did not have to invent psychological warfare per se; they had always practiced it. Their doctrine states that political warfare is &amp;quot;a meticulous and patient dosing of all political, economic, social, and psychological factors that can enter as components into the assessment and conduct of experimental politics.&amp;quot; (28) When used, it is indifferent to the ideological speculations of others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The historical drive of peoples to free themselves from colonialism, especially since 1945, and the urgency of confronting revolutionary warfare led the British to perfect their techniques for dealing with these new aspects of the Cold War. The Tavistock Institute in London&#039;s prestigious psychological laboratories initiated the study of Generalized Conflict. This combined the study of reflexology, psychoanalysis, and introduced behaviorism as an instrument for population control and techniques for reversing the terms of revolutionary warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political warfare possesses the following characteristics:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Regarding space, it is not restricted to any specific location.&lt;br /&gt;
* Concerning time, it can begin and end at any moment.&lt;br /&gt;
* In terms of human resources, its combatants are not limited by age, gender, or physical limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
* In combat, its actions and manifestations are mostly intangible, achieving success without bloodshed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political warfare encompasses:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Ideological warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; The confrontation of philosophies and doctrines to weaken the enemy&#039;s will and moral strength.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Psychological warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; The mobilization of psychological forces to destroy the enemy, employing psychological and social communication techniques to bend their will, modify their behavior favorably, and control public opinion. It constitutes the operational aspect of ideological warfare and, alongside economics and politics, is part of national strategy.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Strategic warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; A high-level intelligence activity that plans for the enemy to make mistakes and destroy their own economic, political, and military forces.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Intelligence warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; It applies offensive intelligence to uncover the enemy&#039;s secrets while providing them with false information. It also involves heightened counterintelligence and security measures.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Organizational warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; The aim is to organize the population in a combat-ready manner to prevent enemy infiltration and destroy adversary institutions and organizations. This task falls to the core or party.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Mass warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; It mobilizes and utilizes the masses to defeat the enemy. &amp;quot;Masses are the basis of politics; where there are no masses, there is no politics, and without masses, there is no front of war.&amp;quot; This form of warfare serves as the foundation for organizational warfare.(29)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Psychological operations =====&lt;br /&gt;
American &#039;&#039;psychological operations&#039;&#039; (PSYOPs) encompass both offensive and defensive psychological warfare. The American author Harold D. Lassawell noted that psychological operations was a new term for a very old idea. In &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[World War II]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;, American terminology incorporated this concept to define three areas of psychological mobilization:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Boosting the morale of their armed forces.&lt;br /&gt;
# Shaping information for public consumption.&lt;br /&gt;
# Undermining the enemy&#039;s morale and beliefs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only the last technique corresponded to the term psychological warfare; the first two fell under the category of psychological action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This dual conception of American doctrine reflected the conduct of psychological warfare according to the same norms governing the defense and exaltation of national morale, the American way of life. Successes in psychological warfare during World War II and the Korean War were, to a significant extent, due to the magnitude of resources used. Despite this, Americans encountered numerous difficulties and contradictions due to the dualism of their psychological warfare services, which culminated in the moral breakdown known as the Vietnam trauma.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The need to reevaluate the theory of conflict and the actions required to maintain their country&#039;s influence and global supremacy prompted American specialists to revise their techniques and principles of psychological warfare. This led them to approach the British equation: psychological warfare = political warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Current PSYOPs are employed to create a favorable image, gain supporters, and undermine adversaries. They have transitioned from being defensive to becoming a potent offensive weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of PSYOPs depends on the President and involves the Department of State, all defense organizations and their Unified Commands and Theater Commands, the Agency for International Development (USAID), and the International Communications Association (ICA). Even diplomatic missions have the U.S. Ambassador as the head of PSYOPs in the host country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The specific purpose of PSYOPs is to create favorable attitudes among foreign groups towards the national objectives of the United States. To achieve this, they influence the host country&#039;s policies, decisions, governing abilities, leadership skills, willingness to fight, obedience, and support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
PSYOPs serve to garner support for Internal Foreign Defense by the United States, Conventional Warfare, Limited Warfare, and General Warfare.(30)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Low-intensity operations =====&lt;br /&gt;
Following the debacle in Vietnam, the United States Army accelerated its research to define a counterinsurgency doctrine that would respond to the terms of generalized conflict and the objectives of the Total Army, a new vision of its force and air-land tactics. The mission of the Total Army is to deter the realization of any attack against the national interests of the United States and, if deterrence fails, to engage the enemy in any environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The American review of its doctrine establishes that the nation is capable of addressing high and medium-intensity conflicts and must prepare for low-intensity conflicts. This is because the United States is involved in a series of low-intensity conflicts around the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the broad mission of the Total Army includes all levels of conflict encompassing the escalation of violence.(31)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A situation of peace and free cultural, political, and economic competition can, at any given moment, transform into a configuration of low-intensity conflict. This is characterized by three progressions, each with specific tasks to fulfill:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Political-economic conflict&#039;&#039;&#039;, involving the formation of unions, alliances, subtle propaganda, economic and political sanctions, and military assistance.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;National and localized conflict&#039;&#039;&#039;, encompassing hostile propaganda, captures, incidents, border reprisals, terrorism, counterterrorism, assassinations, sabotage, kidnappings, rescues, training assistance, advisory roles, and military assistance.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Limited-open conflict&#039;&#039;&#039;, characterized by rebellion, revolution, guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations; foreign advisers participating in combat; territorial occupation; resource seizure; increased military support, and limited combat operation assistance, including the involvement of external forces in combat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Low-intensity conflict is followed in the escalation by medium-intensity conflict, which includes warfare expressed in regular force engagements, attacks on political and economic infrastructure, declarations of war, invasion, military force expansion across the spectrum of conventional capabilities, and mobilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
High-intensity conflicts are characterized by total war involving complete mobilization, warfare across all theaters, declared intent to conquer, tactical nuclear warfare, and strategic nuclear warfare, and marks the highest level of escalation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to American doctrine, &amp;quot;any change, whether positive or negative, creates social, economic, and political conditions that can be exploited by those seeking influence and political power or social reforms. Often, this leads to a conflict that may threaten U.S. interests … the increasing Soviet influence in the Third World poses a direct challenge to U.S. interests … therefore, low-intensity conflict must be considered from a regional perspective as well as from the unique perspective of each country.” (32)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the path of American doctrine, where military effort must be coordinated with ambassadors and U.S. regional teams, as well as with intelligence activities, psychological operations, and civil affairs, has already been explored by the British. Since 1945, the British have been involved in many operations of this nature, confronting limited wars in Korea, Suez, Kuwait, Indonesia, and the Falklands. Most of the time, Her Majesty&#039;s armed forces have carried out counterinsurgency operations in places like Kenya, Anguilla, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Malaysia among many others. These experiences allowed Brigadier Frank Kitson, a veteran of Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus, to write a book on Low-Intensity Operations published in 1975.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping&#039;&#039;, first published in 1971 and not 1975 as the author wrote.)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Primarily intended for instructors, his book discusses the issue of morality in preparing to suppress subversion with exemplary British cynicism: &amp;quot;Many consider subversion primarily as a form of redress used by oppressed people around the world against oppressors and therefore think that there is something immoral in preparing to suppress it. Undoubtedly, subversion is sometimes used this way, and in these cases, those who support the government find themselves defending an evil cause. On the other hand, subversion can also be used by bad men to promote their own interests, in which case those who fight it are on the right side. More often, as in other forms of conflict, there is something good and something bad on both sides, and there are well-intentioned as well as ill-intentioned people on both sides. Therefore, fighting subversion can be a good thing in some cases, just as promoting it can be right in other cases, and a country&#039;s army must be capable of performing either of these two functions when necessary, just as it must be able to operate in other forms of warfare.&amp;quot; (33)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Protracted war =====&lt;br /&gt;
Referred to by the Americans as Asian insurgency, protracted war encompasses the revolutionary movements in China and Southeast Asia. It has a historical framework dating back to 1920 and the struggle against English, Japanese, French and American colonialism. This was a war of peasant societies pitted against industrialized powers with national allies in those regions. Mao Zedong&#039;s military doctrine reached its highest conceptual level in 1939, following his experiences in fighting against the Chinese nationalists and Japanese armies. For Mao, protracted war consists of three phases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Guerrilla warfare, which precedes and accompanies the following phases and is permanent from beginning to end. Its aim is to subject the enemy to attrition and annihilation.&lt;br /&gt;
# The second phase is mobile warfare, which includes battles of regular forces designed to eliminate the enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
# The third phase is positional warfare, which Mao conceived as engaging the adversary in a war of attrition. Truong Chin&#039;s (Trường Chinh&#039;&#039;)&#039;&#039; doctrinal conception, published between 1946 and 1947, incorporates Mao&#039;s three stages but in a different form:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First, an initial containment phase characterized by low-level combat.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second, a balance phase when mobile combat appears in both confronting forces.&lt;br /&gt;
* Third, an insurgent counteroffensive with regular combat units, including the general uprising.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1950, after the defeat of the French, the famous Vo Nguyen Giap&#039;s doctrinal works emerged, which consider:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Guerrilla warfare in a permanent form throughout the protracted war.&lt;br /&gt;
* Mobile warfare involving confrontations with and between regular forces.&lt;br /&gt;
* Camp Enchained Warfare (position), based on the experience of Dien Bien Phu.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A two month siege of the colonial French fortress at Dien Bien Phu in March 1954 which culminated in Vietnamese victory and the withdrawal of French troops from Vietnam.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
* General insurrection as the final culmination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doctrinal approaches of Mao, Truong, and Giap have the following common ideological purpose and fundamental characterization:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The war is waged against invading armies with significant technological resources and their internal allies.&lt;br /&gt;
# Sustain protracted warfare through close coordination between regular troops, local forces and guerrillas.&lt;br /&gt;
# Expand control over resources progressively.&lt;br /&gt;
# Keep the enemy dispersed. Large forces scattered and forced to defend against attacks from regular and irregular forces create depth on the battlefield.(34)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This doctrine combines unconventional and conventional warfare as well as low and medium-intensity conflicts against well-defined enemies. It is the doctrine for wars of independence and liberation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== The theater of war =====&lt;br /&gt;
In irregular or unconventional warfare, the theater of war is not confined to a specific territory. Its position in space is relative. In such cases, the theater of war can be any place on the planet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a result, theaters of operations are &#039;&#039;regional&#039;&#039; at the very least and do not encompass just one country, even if one of them is most affected by an irregular insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For Caspar Weinberger, ex-Secretary of Defense of the United States,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;From 1981 to 1987.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &amp;quot;the world is at war today. It is not a global war, although it happens all over the globe. It is not a war between fully mobilized armies, although it is no less destructive for that. It is not a war that follows the laws of war and is indeed the objective of this peculiar variety of aggression, the law itself, as an instrument of civilization. It benefits from the pernicious fallacies of those who wish to present these wars as the efforts of the sovereign people to pursue their own destinies and, as such, something that concerns us.&amp;quot; (35)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Weinberger&#039;s recognition serves as the justifying premise for highlighting the interventionist role of the American military forces: &amp;quot;The role or the objective of our military forces is not primarily to preserve the blessed doctrine, nor the honorable traditions, nor the budgets. Their role is to preserve freedom ... some basic decisions must be made, and not years later when entire populations are polarized and the countryside is in flames ... If involvement is guaranteed, we must be prepared to act alone. We have sometimes had an unfortunate tendency to believe that every management in favor of freedom needs to be multilateral.&amp;quot; (36)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peru is located in a region considered a security area for the United States of America and an area of low and medium-intensity conflicts, for which the great power has its own strategic military concepts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The military strategic concepts of the United States have evolved from the last century to the present, according to Lieutenant-Colonel John Child.(37)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Between 1898 and 1933, the United States had the concept of the American Lake, which was based on the importance of the Caribbean Sea in the relations between the United States and Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The period from 1933 to 1939 is marked by the Lieutenant-Colonel as a period of abandonment of the aforementioned strategy and a void in strategic approaches regarding Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From 1939 to 1942, the concept was the establishment of a defensive perimeter against all external aggression, which included the area within a line running from Alaska through the Pacific Ocean down to the Galapagos Islands and from there crossing to Natal in Brazil and moving back north to Newfoundland, covering half of the Western Northern Hemisphere. Hence, it was called the &#039;&#039;Hemisphere Defense&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This concept, due to its limitations, lost its relevance in 1942 when Sumner Welles and President Roosevelt proposed the collective responsibility of American countries for Hemispheric Defense in the context of World War II. Despite the opposition of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, who preferred bilateral agreements, Roosevelt imposed a multinational military agenda, the &#039;&#039;Inter-American Defense Board&#039;&#039;, to address external aggressions to the continent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1947, Hemispheric Defense was expressed in the &#039;&#039;Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance&#039;&#039; of Rio de Janeiro. The validity of this treaty has deteriorated due to the lack of agreement on the different natures of the extracontinental threats that need to be defended against. Thus, in the face of England&#039;s aggression against Argentina in the Falklands War, the Treaty did not work, despite being invoked. As a result, the United States has preferred special bilateral relations with certain countries in Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another concept that appears in the Cold War years is that of secondary space. In 1950, for the U.S. Department of Defense, there existed the buffer zone (Alaska and Canada), the industrial zone (southern Canada and the U.S.), and the materials supply zone (Latin America).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emergence of the nationalist government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, the victory of Fidel Castro&#039;s revolution in Cuba in 1956, as well as efforts to extend the Cuban Revolution, changed the US military-strategic conception of Latin America. In the 1960s, the concept of &amp;quot;antifoco&amp;quot; developed as a counter-strategy to the &amp;quot;Foco theory,&amp;quot; which first appeared in 1961 in Che Guevara&#039;s book &amp;quot;Guerrilla Warfare.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In that decade, U.S. military policy was supplemented by major civic action programs, embodied in Kennedy’s &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[Alliance for Progress]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;. His administration promoted the strategic concept of antifoco, and considered foco guerrilla foci to be present in Uruguay, Bolivia, Southern Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico at the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the growth of insurgent movements across Latin America. There was an emergence of peasant movements in Peru and Brazil, urban guerrillas in Uruguay and Argentina, and rural guerrillas in Peru and Colombia. Additionally, there was a resurgence of Latin American nationalism with the military government of Velasco Alvarado in Peru (1968-1975), the socialist regime of Allende in Chile, Rodriguez Lara in Ecuador, General Torres in Bolivia, and the resurrection of Peronism in Argentina.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Panamanian nationalism under Torrijos intersected with the Nicaraguan revolution and guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala. Combined with U.S. presence, it created a hot zone within the East-West conflict, which disrupted American interests in the old American Lake.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This situation, along with other internal conflicts between Latin American countries and the United States, led Washington to redefine its military strategy in Latin America as Low-Intensity Conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed it as follows: &amp;quot;Low-Intensity Conflict is a limited political-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures to terrorism and insurgency. Low-Intensity Conflict is generally limited in scope and often characterized by constraints on the weapons, tactics, and levels of violence.&amp;quot; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Since understanding the broad scope of this type of conflict was more important than an exact definition, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command began developing an operational concept for U.S. Army involvement in Low-Intensity Conflict in January 1984,&amp;quot; according to U.S. Army Colonel Peter A. Bond (38).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can see Anglo-American military encirclement of Latin America: NATO task forces that left from Portsmouth, with a stop at Ascension Island base, have permanently settled in the Falkland Islands. The utilization of the air-naval bases in Punta Arenas, Easter Island, San Ambrosio, and San Roque in Chile, as well as the Galapagos Islands in Ecuador, completes the encirclement through the Southern Command in Panama. This Command is directly linked to counterinsurgency strategies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s interesting to note that according to former head of the Southern Command, U.S. General Paul Gorman, the Southern Command is involved in Low-Intensity Conflict. According to his opinion, these situations are when &amp;quot;perpetrators of violence resort to coercive crime, sabotage, subversion, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, in which the United States limits its military response to the direct action of Special Operations Forces, or advising and supporting a threatened ally.&amp;quot; He thus proposes to emphasize the use of military civic action and psychological warfare as instruments of the Low-Intensity Conflict strategy (39).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commenting on these concepts, the Panamanian writer Raúl Leis says: &amp;quot;Under this imperialist globalist perspective, the U.S. perceives Latin America as a region subordinate to its sphere of power, where any &#039;suspicious&#039; change constitutes a threat to its interests. Therefore, the region is involved in the Counterinsurgency and Flexible Response strategy. The latter is designed to respond to any conflict and develops between large military escalations: counterinsurgency, supporting, training, and coordinating the action of native armies, combined with &#039;cover action&#039; (covert intelligence and physical elimination); direct intervention; and the use of nuclear warfare&amp;quot; (40).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that cover action must be carried out by their secret agencies, intelligence apparatuses, which should also justify the intervention of their military forces and apply the teachings of Kitson to &amp;quot;make subversion.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Being able to prepare the insurgency wherever they need it to justify their presence, which is increasingly diminished by their misguided imperial policy.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Psychological warfare has replaced diplomacy. Terror and strategies for generating internal conflicts are permanent situations, considered normal in Latin American societies, especially those in Central America, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. The goal is to destroy the native armies by pitting them against their own populations, eroding nationalism and leadership that threaten the empire&#039;s interests, and blaming communism for this unconventional warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The theater of war can be any country or any region, and nothing is forbidden for this type of cover operations. Some years ago, the U.S. magazine [[Newsweek]] published a schematic plan by the CIA (41) to overthrow a government; refining at that time that it was being applied against Muammar Gaddafi. The plan consisted of the following guidelines:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Disinformation campaign to create trouble for a government.&lt;br /&gt;
* Terrorist escalation by discontented national elements.&lt;br /&gt;
* The bombing of bridges.&lt;br /&gt;
* Small-scale guerrilla operations.&lt;br /&gt;
* Creation of a parallel or counter-government.&lt;br /&gt;
* Promotion of opponents to the president or leader within their own political force.&lt;br /&gt;
* Physical elimination (ultimate removal) of the national leader.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Newsweek outlined this plan for Libya. But today we can assert that the model fits perfectly for countries like Peru and that, indeed, the previous counterinsurgency guidelines are being executed, almost mathematically, in Peru. Or is it that the script of the &#039;revolution&#039; of the Shining Path was written and published by the CIA on page eighteen of the magazine Newsweek in its August 3, 1981 edition?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Newsweek, August 3 1981 edition: [[Media:Newsweek98julnewy_0382.jpg|Page 18]], [[Media:Newsweek98julnewy_0383.jpg|Page 19]], [[Media:Newsweek98julnewy_0384.jpg|Page 20]]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whether the Shining Path is insurgent or counterinsurgent is a matter of debate. When its strategy is thoroughly reviewed, it will be seen as more closely resembling the one proposed by the CIA than that of communist subversion through revolutionary war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Atypical revolutions ====&lt;br /&gt;
The concept of Low-Intensity Conflict, as we have seen, encompasses revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war, insurgency, and counterinsurgency. Low-Intensity Conflict, or Low-Intensity Operations, is nothing more than the rationalized use of violence at the lowest point of conflict. This includes the use of military and paramilitary forces, political and economic pressure, psychological operations, guerrilla warfare, counter-guerrilla operations, and counter-terrorism actions, which encompass both anti-terrorism (defensive measures) and counter-terrorism (offensive measures, including acts of terrorism). This is what the English doctrine refers to as the reversal of the terms of Revolutionary War, a concept that, according to Brigadier Frank Kitson, the British armed forces have applied numerous times in third-world countries. France and the United States have also used similar strategies in Indochina, Indonesia, Chad, Lebanon, the Philippines, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Grenada, and other places and nations. In many of these cases, such operations have taken on characteristics of insurgency, pushing subversive forces to precipitate their actions and thus escalating the conflict to its maximum for better military management, to the detriment of the country where it occurs—the &amp;quot;host country&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the theater of operations,&amp;quot; in imperial language.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has not been uncommon to find that movements like the Mau Mau in Kenya were first promoted and then taken prisoner by the British. Investigations into the murder of Aldo Moro in Italy found the involvement of Israeli and British secret agents within the Red Brigades. It is also known that the creation of &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[Black September]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; was attributed to the British Intelligence Service, which had endorsed it to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The use of scientific techniques to manipulate individuals and human groups, leading them to fanatical extremes and alignment, is also well-documented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the development of nations, nothing happens by chance; everything in social events occurs as a process with causes and effects, thus having a rational explanation. This means that if we consider that we are currently experiencing a period of the application of the doctrine and strategy of Low-Intensity Operations, we can explain the existence of atypical revolutions that, while appearing to be Marxist, do not align with the doctrine of revolutionary warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand what an atypical revolution is, let&#039;s look at the tragic &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[Pol Pot]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; experience in what he called the &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[Democratic Republic of Kampuchea]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Without further ado, let&#039;s provide a brief description of the events that bled Cambodia in a horrifying genocide over four years, from 1975 to 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cambodia (or Kampuchea) is a strategically located country in the center of Indochina, situated between Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, with access to the South China Sea, Malaysia, and the large islands of Indonesia. Its population, mainly composed of the Khmer ethnic group since the 9th century, has a distinct culture and nationality. However, due to its prominent position in Southeast Asia since the 16th century, it became a victim of Spanish, Portuguese, French, English, Chinese, and American colonialism, as evidenced by its dramatic history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Colonialism created a political landscape characterized by decades of relentless and unequal liberation warfare. After the American defeat in Vietnam, this struggle transformed into a power game in which China sought to control strategic Southeast Asia and neutralize Soviet rather than American and European influence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This geostrategic situation and the regional political framework allow us to better understand the pointless &amp;quot;Maoist revolution&amp;quot; carried out by Pol Pot, a Cambodian educated in Paris, at the cost of two million Khmer lives at the hands of other Khmer individuals, in addition to the extermination of other ethnic groups, such as the Thai, whose population was reduced from 20,000 to 8,000 in a single day on May 25, 1975, in Koh Kong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upon recognizing Cambodia&#039;s independence in 1953, France left a puppet government led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, whose apparent neutrality was not in line with U.S. interests. In 1970, a CIA-engineered coup brought Lon Nol to power, and the Nixon administration began bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, causing serious destruction in Cambodia. It is estimated that this offensive against the Cambodian resistance, carried out by General Westmoreland with American and South Vietnamese troops, known as the Secret War, resulted in over three million deaths.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Under the leadership of Norodom Sihanouk, a symbol of the nation,&amp;quot; says Roberto Remo, the Kampuchean National Unity Front (KNUF) was created, bringing together three major sectors: progressive nationalists, intellectuals abroad, and militants of the resistance inside Cambodia. The latter group came from the ranks of the old Khmer Communist Party and the Pacheachon (nationalist) Party. Additionally, since the 1960s, political-military organizations had been receiving students trained in France, not in large numbers but with significant ideological influence (42).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this period, the Khmer Issarak army strengthened, but Western intelligence services managed to promote the Khmer Rouge within their ranks, which was widely publicized at the time by the French press. The Khmer Rouge played a prominent role in resisting the South Vietnamese invasion and fighting against Lon Nol. In five years of conflict, neither side took prisoners; everyone was exterminated. Lon Nol&#039;s fighters were encouraged to be violent and barbaric, even consuming the liver and hearts of dead enemies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On April 17, 1975, Phnom Penh fell, and Lon Nol fled to Hawaii. Sihanouk returned from China to assume the leadership of the Cambodian state, appointing Khieu Samphan as Minister of Defense. Khieu Samphan quickly became the strongman leader. Disagreements between the government and the KNUF became evident and public. The third congress of the KNUF in December 1975 abolished the monarchy and enacted a constitution that abolished private ownership of all property in the country, except for personal use. In March 1976, Sihanouk, who had been designated Head of State by the Assembly, resigned in favor of Khieu Samphan. The Revolutionary Government of National Unity and the FUNK ceased to exist with the constitution coming into effect. The population only knew that the &amp;quot;organization,&amp;quot; ANGKA, governed the country. It wasn&#039;t until 1977 that it became known that ANGKA was the Khmer Communist Party, with Pol Pot as the Secretary General and Prime Minister of the government, and Ieng Sary as Vice Premier.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let&#039;s read Remo&#039;s commentary in &#039;&#039;Cuadernos del Tercer Mundo&#039;&#039;: &amp;quot;There is no doubt that Pol Pot-Ieng Sary&#039;s foreign policy aligned with Beijing&#039;s. However, internally, their peculiar conception does not seem to have responded to orthodox Maoism, &#039;the Gang of Four,&#039; or Deng Xiaoping&#039;s current modernizing orientation. The leaders of Democratic Kampuchea never showed much enthusiasm for deepening the ideological basis of their revolution. However, they liked to present it as a model, the most radical, unique, original, and at the same time an example for the Third World. &#039;Our experience,&#039; proclaimed Radio Phnom Penh, &#039;is an experiment that will serve all of Southeast Asia, all agricultural countries, spreading its light throughout the world&#039;&amp;quot; (43).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pol Pot&#039;s strategy ultimately resulted in the destruction of Cambodia&#039;s productive forces. Genocide and the elimination of science and technology complemented the devastation caused by General Westmoreland&#039;s strategic bombings. Moreover, American diplomacy subsequently encouraged Chinese intervention in Cambodia and against Vietnam, but Vietnam preempted the maneuver.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pol Pot&#039;s government did not seek to end the war by defeating the Saigonese and Americans, who were being defeated by North Vietnam. Instead, it aimed to destroy the unification of Vietnam due to narrow nationalistic motivations. Therefore, it launched a war that reached its offensive climax in September 1977. By the end of that month, he was received by Beijing authorities as a hero.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight against Pol Pot&#039;s genocidal regime was taken up by the National Salvation Front, and by late 1978, Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia. In January 1979, they captured its capital, Phnom Penh, and on January 8 of that year, they contributed to the proclamation of the People&#039;s Republic of Kampuchea.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United Nations, Prince Norodom Sihanouk denounced the invasion of Democratic Kampuchea by Vietnam. On February 17, 1979, China supported Pol Pot, opening a war front in the north of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and demanding sanctions against this country for its invasion of Cambodia. Pol Pot and his &amp;quot;Khmer Rouge,&amp;quot; Sihanouk, and the forces of Son Sann took refuge behind the Thailand border to continue their fight against the People&#039;s Republic of Kampuchea. They would be supplied as war refugees by the United States, France, and England, directly and through humanitarian assistance and solidarity organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On November 14, 1979, the United Nations General Assembly, led by a strong majority, including the United States, declared that Pol Pot&#039;s government remained legitimate and adopted Resolution 34/22 demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was the Cambodian experiment ultimately an attempt to apply a Marxist-Maoist ideology? We have already seen the limitations of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary&#039;s ideological approach. Nevertheless, consciously or unconsciously, sociologists and political scientists from Western opinion-forming agendas made efforts to find a Khmer ideology. They argued and published things like these: &amp;quot;that in Pol Pot&#039;s thinking, European university theory merged with the ideological trends of rural society, producing the future enlightened vanguard (1). Khmer thought stems from &#039;French liberal Marxism and triumphant Maoism.&#039;&amp;quot; (44).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the [[Angkar]]&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Name of the [[Communist Party of Kampuchea]] in its early days, meaning ‘the organization’.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; program was very concrete and clear:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* An exacerbated, xenophobic nationalism that aimed to destroy everything foreign, including means of production and medicines.&lt;br /&gt;
* A return to illuminated earth trenches; the entire population, regardless of age and gender, was forced into agricultural labor.&lt;br /&gt;
* A collectivist economy that abolished private property and currency. Only the Angkar could dispose of the fruits of labor.&lt;br /&gt;
* Total prohibition of education to ensure that no one would be more educated than others.&lt;br /&gt;
* Physical elimination of vast sectors of the population. Only a million Kampucheans were deemed necessary to rebuild the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the governments that supported Pol Pot at the UN, the crimes against humanity committed in Democratic Kampuchea were disregarded, and no value was given to the &#039;&#039;Act of Genocide&#039;&#039; Accusation made known by the People&#039;s Revolutionary Tribunal of Phnom Penh in August 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pol Pot and Leng Sary were accused of the following crimes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Systematic and brutal execution of the population, which was divided into three categories: old, new, and collaborators of the Lon Nol administration.&lt;br /&gt;
* Forced evacuation of the population from cities to the countryside and displacement of rural populations, with the prior surrender of all their possessions to Angkar.&lt;br /&gt;
* Repression and coercion in the popular communes, where the population was forced into physically exhausting labor to cultivate land, build dikes, and open roads, all using only their hands and rudimentary tools.&lt;br /&gt;
* Violent destruction and alteration of social relations. Elimination of family ties, separation of children from parents, prohibition of romantic relationships among young people, and marriage celebrated by Angkar. Rejection of feeling pity for the wounded and dead or having feelings of solidarity among relatives and friends.&lt;br /&gt;
* Elimination of pre-revolutionary religions and national culture. Elimination of intellectuals. A directive issued by the Central Committee of the Party on September 5, 1977, stated: &amp;quot;It is necessary to redouble revolutionary vigilance against people who have served in the old apparatus of power: technicians, professors, doctors, engineers. Our party should not employ them. If we pursue technology and employ it, the enemy will infiltrate our power structure through it.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
* Massacre of children and the corruption of adolescents to turn them into torturers. They forced children under the age of 15 to enroll in the army or in their mobile shock groups.&lt;br /&gt;
* Complete disintegration of the national economy, leading the population to famine. Technicians were killed, and workers were sent to the countryside. Unhusked rice was exported in exchange for weapons. Many lands remained uncultivated.&lt;br /&gt;
* Methods of torture and massacre to terrorize the population, such as breaking skulls with hoes, picks, sticks, and iron bars; using knives and parlan leaf stems to cut throats or open people&#039;s bellies; sequentially dismembering and causing deaths through various atrocities.(45)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are the facts relevant to the purposes of this work. Now, let&#039;s summarize the evidence to deduce the true nature of the model.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Historically, the United States, France, China, and England considered their interests in Southeast Asia threatened by Vietnam and Soviet presence.&lt;br /&gt;
# All levels of conflict have occurred in Southeast Asia, except for atomic warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
# Since 1960, in Cambodia (Kampuchea), revolutionary political parties and the Khmer Issarak army have been infiltrated by agents trained in France. Secretly, Angkar was formed as a result of divisions within the Communist Party of Kampuchea.&lt;br /&gt;
# In 1970, the CIA, in a scandalous intervention, led to the replacement of Norodon Sihanuk with Lon Nol. Sihanuk traveled to China for asylum.&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1970 and 1973, Lon Nol facilitated the secret war against Kampuchea. American strategic bombings and the fall of Saigon eliminated nearly three million potentially subversive inhabitants who were allies of Vietnam.&lt;br /&gt;
# In 1975, following Vietnam&#039;s triumph and American defeat, the CIA facilitated the replacement of Lon Nol and used and guided the policies of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan, an elite educated in Paris, exclusive and closed due to matrimonial and other kinship ties (Pot and Sary are brothers-in-law).&lt;br /&gt;
# Once in power, Pol Pot and Leng Sary, under the direction of Angkar, accelerated the destruction of Cambodia. They implemented English techniques for population control through terror, involving massacres, public beheadings, and physical labor to exhaustion. Children were turned into killers, erasing feelings of mercy, and the Khmer Rouge launched a violent offensive against Vietnam.&lt;br /&gt;
# Vietnamese forces repelled the aggression, and in January 1979, along with the National Salvation Front, they defeated Pol Pot and established the People&#039;s Republic of Cambodia. China responded with military aggression in support of Pol Pot.&lt;br /&gt;
# Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge, along with Leng Sary and Son Sann, who opposed the new Republic, took refuge along the Thai border to receive assistance from the United States and the UN.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This Maoist revolution led by Pol Pot and Leng Sary exhibits some typical characteristics of certain movements that claim to be communist. Under the leadership of highly educated intellectuals, they were capable of applying destruction and death with unprecedented refinement and savagery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s not necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis to realize that this model doesn&#039;t exactly align with any specific ideological movement or serve as a revolutionary political alternative. These atypical revolutions fundamentally involve large-scale irregular warfare operations of low intensity. They are applied against countries deemed potentially subversive involved in liberation wars or susceptible to being considered adversaries in the global confrontation with the enemy camp.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These operations are the result of intelligence mechanisms carefully constructed to exploit political, social, ethnic, cultural, ideological, and mythical factors within any human group, guiding them towards self-destruction. Their ultimate goal is the mass annihilation of the population, the destruction of means and forces of production, the erosion of community morals, collective frustration, the obliteration of scientific and technological progress, and the instigation of conflicts between natural and other atrocities. These once-fevered and deranged imaginations have become concrete realities in various parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART TWO ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Chapter 1: development of the Shining Path ideology ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the grand context of Peru&#039;s geostrategic situation and the influences of unconventional warfare doctrines, what is the ideology of the Shining Path as the foundation for its proposal to modify the cultural structures of Peruvian society?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question is difficult to answer because this is another of the mysteries or atypical situations of the Shining Path: its definition or ideological stance regarding Peruvian society. What research reveals, both in its doctrinal documents and in the publications of its exegetes or Senderologists, is a series of interpolated excerpts whose origins are highly divergent, primarily Marxist, aiming to form a body of motivating ideas. Here, it essentially involves techniques of mobilization known in psychological warfare as &amp;quot;semantic differentiation.&amp;quot; Every people, country, or human group has certain forms of communication, thoughts, keywords that can trigger individual or collective actions, depending on how they are used, manipulated, and directed, related to the underlying choice that lies deep within the human instinct: Life or Death, Eros or Thanatos.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before delving into this substantive aspect of the Shining Path phenomenon, let&#039;s first agree on what culture and ideology are, in terms related to the Shining Path&#039;s supposed revolutionary mission and the trajectory of its founder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The creation of a new society means the formation of a new human being, which requires a transformation of cultural structures—a universal aspiration, especially in dominated and underdeveloped societies like those in the Third World, which have not been able to reach the minimum levels of satisfaction of basic human needs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This leads us to a tentative definition of culture. To do so, we&#039;ll follow the thoughts of Dr. Miguel Ángel Rodríguez Rivas, former lecturer at the Center for Advanced Military Studies of Peru and former lecturer in Philosophy at the University of San Agustín, regarded by the Lima magazine &#039;&#039;Caretas&#039;&#039; as a mentor to Abimael Guzmán Reinoso, who dedicated his philosophy thesis to him. Rodríguez states in his course on &#039;&#039;Introduction to Scientific Research Methodology&#039;&#039; that culture is a product of human intelligence, a rational creation. It is not something other than what is known as science, philosophy, and technology. But most importantly, human intelligence is guided by values, which are emotional instances, aspirations, and needs expressed in an ethical, juridical, and religious order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, Rodríguez continues to say that culture is not only an intellectual creation of science, philosophy, and technology or an ethical, juridical, and religious estimation, but all of this is internalized in human beings, giving rise to behaviors. Culture is behavioral, which is why culture is not neutral.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A society generates a system of beliefs and worldviews known as ideology at a given moment. Ideology is the conception we have at a given moment of humanity and society, provided it serves as the basis for political practice since what is essential in a society is pragmatic realization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, what is the conception of humanity and Peruvian society that the Shining Path relies on to support its political practice?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is probably a most false conception because it has nothing to do with the transformation of cultural structures with scientific, philosophical, and technological creation, or with the recreation of an ethical, judicial, and religious estimation in Peru. The Shining Path’s praxis does not seem to have any doctrinal connection with the creation of a cultural model. Its highest conception of the world is destruction, and its highest estimation is pathological delight in polarization, annihilation, and death. This can be explained from the perspective of soul purification and immortality, in line with Guzmán Reinoso&#039;s Kantian philosophical education but not from the standpoint of modern idealism, let alone Marxism. It has nothing to do with the teachings of Professor Rodríguez Rivas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Brief history of the Shining Path Thought ====&lt;br /&gt;
If we have chosen to provide an extensive preamble before specifically addressing the Shining Path, it is because we cannot ignore the generic circumstances that explain the phenomenon of irregular warfare. In the evolution of Shining Path Thought, we must also consider certain particular circumstances that, at a given moment, allowed or facilitated its emergence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We should not fall into the trap set by certain Senderologists who have, instead, invented a history of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path to promote its growth, thus diverting the course of thought regarding social change in Peru. For a while now, this thought seems to be expressed in nationalist currents of liberation and independence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We must confess that we began this research by studying the thought of the Shining Path, delving into its documents to understand the structure of this Guiding Thought and the theoretical and doctrinal foundations of the “correct application of Marxism to the Peruvian reality.&amp;quot; The result was disappointing, as it confirmed the absence of doctrinal and theoretical principles capable of linking Senderista political practice with a Marxist conception of Peruvian society and its ideological proposal for change. Simply put, the latter does not exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This discovery led to a revision of the methodology, which had led to a specific reading of Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist literature to find concurrence with the Shining Path. Driven by these dynamics, we had focused too much on the problem, as if it could only be explained from the perspective of that current.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first question had to refer, then, to the historical circumstances that allowed the emergence of the Shining Path idea as an extreme and ultra-radicalization of Marxism, based on the propagandistic use of some classical doctrinal positions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Evolution of significant events in Peruvian society =====&lt;br /&gt;
The 1960s were significant, but even more so was the decade 1965-1975, the period in which the beginning years of the Shining Path are located. This is the era of fragmentation in the main Marxist current in Peru and the structural changes of the Peruvian Revolution carried out by the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist political options in Peru had defined positions. Until 1962, Trotskyist tendencies grappled with the dilemma between insurrection or guerrilla foco in the countryside. The demands for land by small landowners in the valleys of La Convención and Lares, in the department of Cusco, marked the highest point of peasant mobilization that led them towards guerrilla warfare. However, these possibilities were not harnessed by the leadership of that political fringe, which later dispersed into the paths of electoralism and adventurism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1965 marks the end of the Castroist guerrilla experience in Peru and, above all, the failure of inserting urban groups into the Quechua peasantry of the Andes. The transposition of Cuban guerrilla tactics to the Andean conditions did not achieve the subversive mobilization of the peasantry, let alone its development as an alternative to power. This chapter closes, for Latin America, with Che Guevara&#039;s death in Bolivia. A transcendent episode of sacrifice that, among other perspectives, opens a new stage of revolutionary struggle in the region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Sino-Soviet disagreements that emerged in 1961 culminated in 1963 with a complete rupture between the two parties. This event had an immediate impact on the international communist movement and affected the unity of the Peruvian Communist Party, which split between “Muscovites” and “Beijingists.” It is a period of debate between Khrushchevian Marxism and Maoism, an aspect directly related to the topic at hand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The revolutionary nationalist option emerged between 1968 and 1975, represented by the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, which undertook a program of structural changes and implemented them boldly, within various limitations. Some of these changes were included in the program of the APRA, the Peruvian social democracy (as it is considered to fit approximately within a conventional topology of political groups); a program that was outlined in 1931.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other changes went even further than the immediate aspirations of the national Marxist left, especially regarding international relations and the transfer of Soviet military technology. These changes deeply affected the status of Western imperialist technological domination and the system of private property, especially in rural areas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Agrarian Reform achieved a radical and profound modification in land ownership and water use at the national level, awakening mass aspirations among the peasantry. Historically, immense productive forces were liberated, but they lacked – and still lack – land, technology, seeds, capital resources, business management, and adequate marketing channels. This generated new and major contradictions that definitely will not find a solution within the traditional mechanisms of the system, whose beneficiaries and defenders resist admitting this truth and seek survival in social spheres where they no longer belong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To avoid digressing further, we will not refer to other important changes, such as the officialization of pluralism in the ownership of means of production through private, co-managed, social or self-managed enterprises, as well as state-owned ones. However, it is worth noting that the changes promoted by the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces were oriented toward a social project called &amp;quot;Full Participation,&amp;quot; based on a humanistic philosophical conception. Some individuals who had been involved in the guerrilla movements of the 1962-1965 period pragmatically or convincingly adhered to this project.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To summarize, it is essential to establish some concepts before asking a question that is still looking for an answer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Between 1964 and 1966, the communist movement in Peru went through a period of rapid fragmentation, especially due to various external influences. For instance, it is well known that the CIA distributed a pirated edition of Mao&#039;s &#039;&#039;Little Red Book&#039;&#039; in Latin American universities. The goal was to accelerate the formation of &amp;quot;Beijingist&amp;quot; parties by stimulating the division of those previously formed around Moscow&#039;s guidelines.&lt;br /&gt;
* The nationalist currents within the armed forces promoted significant structural changes proposed and expected since the 1930s.&lt;br /&gt;
* The historical period of peasant struggles, rebellions, and uprisings against local authorities and landowners (&#039;&#039;gamonal&#039;&#039;) was overcome with the distribution of land, opening a new, albeit contradictory, stage for the development of productive forces in the countryside and relations between rural and urban areas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Question: who might be interested in the fragmentation of the communist movement, to destroy or paralyze the currents of revolutionary nationalism (whether civil or military) and to halt and even liquidate the emerging Native peasant class?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the strategists of modern irregular warfare, political warfare – as conceived by minds like Frank Kitson&#039;s – these are precisely elements or factors against which to unleash a counterinsurgency escalation. It becomes imperative to “make the insurgency&amp;quot; to achieve the elimination of communists, nationalists, and Peruvian Natives, who, together or separately, pose a threat to the interests of the establishment. It is precisely for this reason, let us add, that counterinsurgency and its doctrines cannot have the same meaning or application for the center of global power and for a nationalist government in the Third World. This is a strategic flaw, an error, that Argentina has already fallen victim to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The exacerbation of the mentioned revolutionary phenomena during this period determined the mobilization of foreign intelligence services, which were very active in formulating their counterinsurgency hypotheses and making the necessary decisions for the execution of their unconventional warfare actions in Peru. We must remember the antifoco military deployment or the theories of low-intensity conflicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Division of Peruvian communism and the birth of the Shining Path =====&lt;br /&gt;
In 1963, the Cuban Missile Crisis justified Mao&#039;s final condemnation of Khrushchev&#039;s regime and his thesis of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese Revolution, on the other hand, had demonstrated that the peasantry was the main driving force of social revolution in underdeveloped countries. This consideration was not entirely foreign to Soviet communism, as Lenin had been forced to rely on the peasantry, paradoxically &amp;quot;conservative by nature of class,&amp;quot; according to Marxists, to secure the fate of the Russian Revolution. He attracted them to the Bolshevik regime through the signing of peace with the German Empire and land redistribution. In this way, he defeated the counterrevolutionary forces in the civil war (1917-1921).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Sino-Soviet crisis in Peru, especially through an exacerbated debate on the characterization of the insurrectional process, whether it should be based on a war developed from the countryside, schematically reflected a transfer of the Chinese experience to Peruvian reality. Faced with this situation, the official Communist Party of Peru (PCP) postponed a definition between factions that was supposed to occur at the convening of the IV National Conference. The situation persisted until January 1964 when the pro-Chinese faction, led by Saturnino Paredes, José Sotomayor, and Jorge Hurtado, among others, decided to break with the official sector by convening their own Fourth Conference for mid-1964. As a result of the conflict, mutual expulsions occurred, and the committees and militants in Lima and the interior of the country were reorganized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can now be pointed out that this Fourth Conference was the earliest starting point of the ideological development of the Shining Path because it marked the beginning of a dogmatic thought process among Peruvian Marxists. That is, a total disregard for reality, experience, and scientific foundations for analyzing social phenomena. It simply required consulting the extensive literature from the national event to see that it was not exactly an ideological debate about the relations of production, the structure and role of Peruvian social classes, or the correlation of forces among them, their importance in the current situation, and their representation in the state apparatus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the first division of the Communist Party of Peru, Saturnino Paredes and José Sotomayor, along with their followers, began a debate on the character of Belaunde&#039;s government. To determine the correct line, they first had to establish whether this government was bourgeois or oligarchic. This discussion continued until it became institutionalized in Peruvian Maoism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the Fifth National Conference of the Communist Party of Peru Bandera Roja (Red Flag), Saturnino Paredes gained absolute control of the party apparatus. In March 1966, José Sotomayor Pérez and his followers were expelled and anathematized as &amp;quot;revisionists.&amp;quot; Sotomayor, who later realigned with Moscow, has argued that Paredes&#039; faction and his group were &amp;quot;a crude transplant of the Chinese experiences arising from their Second Revolutionary Civil War&amp;quot; (46).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this new division – the second to be precise – Abimael Guzmán and the Regional Committee of Ayacucho parted ways with Saturnino Paredes&#039; thesis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A period of party consolidation followed, dedicated to gaining control of the bases. This task was carried out thoroughly by the Ayacucho Regional Committee. However, in January 1968, a new internal crisis emerged, marking the third party division. Saturnino Paredes, then leading Red Flag, had to confront the &amp;quot;Ching Kang&amp;quot; group, a name taken by young Maoists from the Chinese region where they underwent training and preparation before being reintegrated into Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Ching Kang group effectively separated from Paredes and assumed control, taking on the name of the National Organizing Commission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In October 1968, the government of Belaunde Terry, deemed bourgeois and pro-imperialist, was overthrown in a military coup, and the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces came to power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within Red Flag, the confusing and disorienting debate intensified: now, to apply the correct line, it was needed to determine whether the Velasco Alvarado government was fascist representing the agro-exporting bourgeoisie or reformist representing the industrial-financial bourgeoisie. In this conflict, the Ayacucho Committee aligned with the first characterization and began active opposition to the policies of the Revolutionary Military Government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In March 1969, the National Organizing Commission controlled by the Ching Kang group convened the Sixth National Conference and expelled Saturnino Paredes, Abimael Guzmán Reinoso, and other members of the party&#039;s military apparatus. They officially established themselves as the Communist Party of Peru Patria Roja (Red Homeland) to distinguish themselves from Red Flag.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Paredes, in turn, continued the expulsion process by removing the Ching Kang group, a move seemingly supported and faithful to the Ayacucho Regional Committee led by &amp;quot;Álvaro&amp;quot; (Abimael Guzmán Reinoso).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The splintered Communist Party of Peru Red Flag adopted the line of action to transfer militants to the countryside to initiate armed struggle against the &amp;quot;military dictatorship&amp;quot; to seize power, in accordance with agreements dating back to the Fifth Conference:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;To prepare the material forces that carry out these objectives because without having our own armed force, born from the masses and closely linked to them in defense of their interests, it is impossible to fulfill the proposed task. It is for this reason that the Fifth National Conference of the Party agrees that the organization and development of its own armed force is the main task of the party, according to the immediate perspective that armed struggle is the principal form of struggle, and considering that it will essentially be a peasant revolution that will go from the countryside to the cities, where the peasantry will be its main force and the working class its leading force through its party. (47)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This decision, despite the criticism directed at the same Fifth Conference regarding the military conception of the Revolutionary Left Movement, represents a departure from the Marxist idea of revolution primarily based on political work and the development of the party rather than the military apparatus. Developing the party or developing the military apparatus are tendencies that, when isolated or unilaterally emphasized, lead to a distortion of the goals, according to Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this document, we find another of the interpolated and literal propositions that already reflect the schematic conception of this thought:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;... we can say that the driving forces of the revolution are, first of all, the working class with its role of leadership through its party; then the peasantry, the main force that must operate closely allied to the first. Then the impoverished and radicalized petty bourgeoisie is also a driving force of the revolution. As for the national bourgeoisie, due to its dual nature, it is a force that can potentially participate in the revolution under certain conditions, but due to its ties to imperialism and latifundia, it can betray the revolution&amp;quot; (48).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We mention these basic concepts because they are schematically repeated throughout Shining Path literature, as they were substantive in the Sixth Conference, ironically called the &amp;quot;Basis of Party Unity,&amp;quot; and they served as the basis for the fourth party segregation, this time directly prompted by Abimael Guzmán as the representative of the Ayacucho Regional Committee, in contrast to the Red Flag Central Committee led by Saturnino Paredes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On January 15, 1970, Guzmán Reinoso, in a letter to Saturnino Paredes, questioned his leadership of the party and urged him to &amp;quot;make a major turn&amp;quot; by going to the countryside to reconstitute the party:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;... we are on the brink of a major turn in the party, and this is evident from the fact that this is the foundation of this new stage in the development of party organization&amp;quot;... in &amp;quot;Bandera Roja,&amp;quot; the general direction for this new stage of struggle should already be set, guided by the basis of party unity, taking Mariátegui as the cornerstone and focusing the debate on the fundamental issue, the peasant problem&amp;quot; (49).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Coincidentally, &amp;quot;R. Anderas&amp;quot; (Saturnino Paredes), on the same date, addressed the Ayacucho Regional Committee, postponing the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee for three months, extending the deadline for a resolution to Abimael Guzmán&#039;s demands. Five days after that letter to Paredes, Guzmán sent a new letter to the Central Committee, calling on its General Secretary to &amp;quot;take a decision regarding the proposal made by the Ayacuchanos in the previous letter.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In February 1970, the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee of Red Flag took place, attended by its main base: the Ayacucho Regional Committee and its principal leader, Abimael Guzmán. The event also saw the participation of the Regional Committees of Arequipa, Lima, and La Libertad, the Committee of Chimbote, the Peasant Confederation led by José Llamoja, and the Revolutionary Student Front with its bases in Lima, Ayacucho, Huancayo, Ica, and Arequipa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this occasion, Guzmán had meticulously prepared arguments and evidence that would confirm the rightist, petty-bourgeois, and deviated conduct of Saturnino Paredes. It was not difficult for him to dismantle Paredes with a wealth of details, flyers, and statements that Paredes had used against Guzman. Guzman achieved more than he had intended, effectively shattering the entire organization of the Communist Party of Peru - Red Flag. Tendencies polarized into support and condemnation, but confusion also led to abstentions and resignations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This marked the fourth significant political split within the Communist Party, in addition to the dozens of groups and small parties that had formed and disappeared along the way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upon returning to Ayacucho, Abimael Guzmán, also known as &amp;quot;Álvaro,&amp;quot; established a new party known as the Communist Party of Peru - For the Shining Path of Mariátegui. This supplementary denomination, taken from the slogan of FER-Ayacucho, would later serve to distinguish it completely from the communist movement. For this reason, today, Shining Path members despise the name they chose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abimael Guzmán initiated the work of what he would call the pre-constitutional period of the Party, using preaching as the main weapon to disseminate his ideas and foundations. These would later be formalized in July 1973 during the Third Plenum of the Shining Path in a document on Reconstitution, a name also adopted by the mentioned assembly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path begins to characterize its history, starting from 1970, into specific stages that are literally accepted by its exegesis or Senderologists without significant critical reconsideration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the Shining Path, the years 1970 to 1977 correspond to the period of reconstitution of the party; 1977 to 1980 involve the transfer of cadres to the countryside in secrecy, and starting from 1980 marks the beginning of armed struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== The ideological framework of the Shining Path =====&lt;br /&gt;
Let&#039;s allow Abimael Guzmán himself to summarize the ideological character of the Communist Party of Peru - For the Shining Path of Mariátegui based on some excerpts from his theoretical work:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Communist Party of Peru (PCP) is based on the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. This means that Marxism has evolved and has three stages. The Marx stage, Marxism, belongs to the era of pre-monopoly capitalism, the last century, and corresponds, in the political aspect, to the preparation for the revolution. Therefore, the first stage of Marxism is Marxism of the pre-monopoly capitalist era and preparation for the revolution. Later, at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present century, capitalism enters a new phase, which is its final phase, &#039;the imperialist phase.&#039; It is Lenin who will point out the laws of the development of imperialism and find its contradictions. In this era of imperialism, the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat intensify to the fullest. Thus, Lenin, by discovering the internal laws of imperialism, also indicates the need to organize the revolution, not only as preparation but with the aim of carrying it out. Stalin defines the second stage of Marxism as &#039;Leninism.&#039; So, Leninism is characterized as &#039;Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution.&#039; Up to this point, we have &#039;Marxism-Leninism.&#039; After World War II, China is in the midst of a revolution, and Mao Zedong, by applying Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of semi-feudal and semi-colonial China, discovers new laws of the revolution. In an era in which imperialism worldwide enters a period of extreme contradictions... In this period, the revolution has shifted from advanced countries to underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Mao Zedong discovers new laws of the revolution, summarized in the laws of people&#039;s war, from the countryside to the city, in a long process under the leadership of the proletarian party, a revolution that is peasant and called the &#039;National Democratic Revolution,&#039; as a preliminary stage of a later &#039;Socialist Revolution.&#039; This period is established within Marxism as a development in the third stage and style, which was also called the &#039;Mao Zedong Thought&#039; in the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Thus, we have &#039;Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought,&#039; and that is the doctrine adopted by the Communist Party of Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, this party, according to its own documents, has taken up and developed the ideas of Mariátegui by applying them to our reality. When Mariátegui founded the Socialist Party in the country, he was establishing a proletarian party, in other words, a Communist Party. To do so, Mariátegui had to outline a general political line, which contains five problems: 1. The character of society; 2. The character of the revolution; 3. The instrument of the revolution; 4. The tasks of the revolution; and 5. A mass line.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Based on the character of that society, the character of the revolution necessarily derives from it. This comes from the analysis of our reality, which is semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Therefore, if a country is capitalist, the revolution must be socialist. In contrast, if a country is semi-feudal and semi-colonial, the revolution must be National Democratic or, as Mariátegui called it, &#039;Bourgeois Democratic.&#039; Consequently, if the revolution in our homeland must be National Democratic, it implies that the Peruvian revolution must have two stages: the first National Democratic and the second Socialist, as a continuation of the first stage of the revolution. This character of the revolution, indicating the two stages, is a logical and inevitable consequence of the character of society. This is Mariátegui&#039;s conclusion... So, the strategy of the revolution at this moment corresponds to the first stage, which is National Democratic. Therefore, the essence of this first stage of the revolution is Bourgeois Democratic. According to Mao Zedong, this type of revolution means a peasant revolution, an agrarian revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party. This kind of revolution implies a long and protracted people&#039;s war, which Mao himself in China called &#039;the path of encircling the cities from the countryside.&#039; In other words, through armed struggle, liberate rural areas, establish support bases, and gradually encircle the cities, starting with small villages and towns, then medium-sized cities, and finally the large ones, until ultimately taking central power at the national level... The strategy has to be a consequence of the reconstitution itself (the Party) in both political and organizational aspects… (50)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This is the synthesis of the Shining Path’s ideology, an elaboration that culminated in the Sixth Conference. This framework is the guiding principle, the &#039;&#039;basis of party unity&#039;&#039;, a perspective that can be found in one form or another throughout Shining Path literature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The glaring inaccuracies in this ideological foundation of the Shining Path are easy to establish if you follow the thread of its formal logic. You will find a chain of fallacious syllogisms that appear to be Marxist truths but, when using certain well-known concepts, form an argumentative set of mere sophisms. It is not about ignorance or lack of knowledge but rather a subtle creation, a framework of apparently true premises capable of misleading those who accept them as scientific truths simply because they do not align with the thinking of the mentors and creators of Marxism or with the reality of Peru. This distorted characterization of the social and political conditions of the country by the sophists of the Shining Path and certain Senderologists was completed with the theory of a supposed fourth stage of Marxism: the &amp;quot;Guiding Thought&amp;quot; of Comrade – or President – Gonzalo (the pseudonym Abimael Guzmán adopted when officially going underground with his party). Just as Marx, Lenin, and Mao discovered the laws of revolution in their times and countries, “Gonzalo” “discovers” these laws for the reality of Peru at the present moment. Laws that have not been elucidated and are unknown, not even appearing in Shining Path literature. The Guiding Thought, as we will see later, is a psychological mechanism for motivation and not the product of an analysis translated into the formulation of laws or hypotheses about the reality of Peru. There is none of that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Structure of the Shining Path ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have argued that the Shining Path phenomenon is a foreign insertion into the Peruvian social fabric. Therefore, if we want to make an accurate assessment of its origins and reasons for existence, we should not be guided by ideological sophisms and the history that Shining Path itself constructs and develops using its own resources, as well as through the media and propagandists interested in promoting violence in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reality demonstrates that the birth of Shining Path is not a product of the evolution of social contradictions manifested in an ideology, and political praxis, led by the leadership of a class or a group of classes linked by their interests and correlations. In other words, the ideology of Shining Path is not of the peasantry, the proletariat, the petite bourgeoisie, or the combination of these classes whose representation it claims to assume. It also falsely claims the intellectual representation of Marxism and appropriates the identity of the Communist Party of Peru. Shining Path attempts to embed itself in the history of Peruvian communism when it arbitrarily establishes a chronological framework divided into three periods that, according to Guzmán, precede the armed struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The Struggle for the Formation of the Party, which spans from 1918 to 1928, culminating in the realization of Mariátegui&#039;s ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
* The Struggle for the Restoration of the Basis of Party Unity, between 1929 and 1969, a year considered a milestone because, according to Guzmán&#039;s idea in the Sixth Conference, the Party unity is restored only then.&lt;br /&gt;
* The Struggle for Reconstitution between 1970 and 1980, a ten-year period covering the preparation stage of the party for armed struggle that Shining Path officially began on April 17, 1980. (51)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path truly began its history between 1965 and 1975. It emerged significantly with the decline of guerrillas in Peru and the emergence of anti-imperialist military nationalism (under Velasco Alvarado), the implementation of social reforms affecting the system, and the failure of the Alliance for Progress, a set of counterinsurgency policies and civic and developmental actions proposed for Latin America by the U.S. Kennedy administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In essence, the Shining Path is a provocation of counterinsurgency, an advanced and skillful theory and practice in the destruction of productive forces and effective revolutionary ideologies in any of their expressions, whether socialist or otherwise. Above all, the goal of the Shining Path, after seventeen years of violent activity, does not seem to be anything other than maintaining and dangerously deepening instability in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Doesn&#039;t the Shining Path, supposedly to combat imperialism, relentlessly attack regimes that are quite different from each other, such as those of Velasco, Belaunde, and García? Let&#039;s remember; it said about the Government of the Armed Forces: &amp;quot;The CPP has pointed out the basic character of the three basic laws of the fascist regime (agrarian, industrial, educational) as models of development of bureaucratic capitalism. It has also pointed out the relationship between development and Andean integration (Andean Pact) as part of the integration of the Latin American Common Market and the consolidation of the &#039;backyard&#039; of American imperialism.&amp;quot; (52)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
About Belaunde&#039;s Government: &amp;quot;The current government aims to further develop the oppressive semi-feudal structure... The current government, whose main leader and primary responsible person is Belaunde, is eagerly and obediently striving to further develop bureaucratic capitalism in the country (monopolistic big capital subservient to the landlords and subject to imperialism)...&amp;quot;(53)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In August 1986, referring to the analysis of injustice situations made by President García in his July Message, the PCP said: &amp;quot;...simply put, these are similar problems and issues that de facto governments or those derived from elections have been dealing with for decades, attempting nothing more than developing Peruvian society, developing bureaucratic capitalism in the country, (monopoly big capital enfeoffed&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;enfeoffed, noun. &#039;&#039;put in possession of land in exchange for a pledge of service, in feudal society.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; to the landlords and subjected to imperialism)...within the maintenance and defense of the  landlord-bureaucratic dictatorship, which is the Peruvian State.&amp;quot;(54)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This political behavior is not precisely that of a party that analyzes and establishes variables that exist in a situation or a country, contradictions, relationships, and differences, among others. It is more of a propagandistic attitude of an instrument, a force equipped and armed for social demolition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== The constituent elements of the Shining Path’s structure =====&lt;br /&gt;
Before attempting to identify these elements, let us make a preliminary clarification. The enumeration and analysis of these elements may seem like a forced scheme that cannot exist. If we present it schematically, it is for didactic reasons. The research has led us to discover all these constituent elements, whether voluntarily or involuntarily existing in the Shining Path’s structure. Is it possible that it was set this way? Is it credible that a mysterious hand has so much power to manipulate groups and social situations?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let&#039;s not forget that in irregular or unconventional warfare, there are states that plan and lead the actions. There are also powerful international intelligence services with the most advanced science, from the best universities and research centers, such as the Tavistock Institute in London, the University of Georgetown in the United States (owned by the North American Air Force), the Rand Corporation – which has conducted extensive studies on the Peruvian reality – and foundations like Adlai Stevenson, Ford, and others interested in researching the difficulties that the system may face and the dangers that could threaten the interests of transnational corporations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, let us remember the principles of low-intensity operations: &amp;quot;To combat subversion can be a good thing in some cases, just as promoting it may be right in others&amp;quot; (Frank Kitson).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Likewise, we must consider the concept of political warfare: &amp;quot;A meticulous and patient testing of all political, economic, social, and psychological factors capable of entering as components in the evaluation and conduct of an experimental policy&amp;quot; (M. Megret). Could the Shining Path be an experimental policy? What are the components of the Shining Path?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Studying the human environment of the Shining Path =====&lt;br /&gt;
One of the questions we need to answer is why the Shining Path chose the Andean region for its operations. Shining Path experts, supported by the anthropological and social studies of Peruvian scientists, have reached common conclusions: they talk of &amp;quot;the most depressed region,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;extreme poverty,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;regions abandoned by the state,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;cultures different from the coastal ones.&amp;quot; More serious works have delved into the socio-economic contradictions between the communal cultures of the highlands and the impact of capitalist Western culture, which produces imbalances and disturbances that have been expressed in long-standing peasant conflicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are not discussing this or any other reality, but rather are examining the perspective and purpose of certain research. We believe that we have conducted extensive research for a precise social diagnosis framed in a specific time and place. These are like inert X-rays of reality, many of which are questionable in nature and orientation. Nevertheless, they are useful as basic research for further development purposes or modifications aimed at integrating various social strata of the Andean population into Western culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the best studies of the Andean human environment that we know of were conducted for counterinsurgency purposes by foreign agendas, especially American ones. In other words, research on the anthropological and social makeup, nature, and historical projection of Andean social groups from an insurgent perspective that could affect the establishment. For this purpose, social scientists from foreign agendas have lived for years in the Andean regions, conducting research on anthropological and social makeup.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the decade of 1965 to 1975, Peru posed a serious problem for foreign intelligence agencies responsible for counterinsurgency forecasts. Peru was characterized as a highly dangerous and subversive terrain, especially when the option of changing the Peruvian military leadership, which seriously affected relations with dominant countries (and particularly the United States) was realized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As an example of everything that happened in this regard, let&#039;s take the Seminar on Peru, which lasted from July 1969 to May 1970, the month in which the Final Wings Conference was held in Wingspread, Wisconsin, the city where the Johnson Foundation&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Foundation apparently still exists.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is located. More than 75 important political leaders, high-level company executives, scholars, leaders, workers, clergymen, journalists, and representatives from various sectors of both countries attended this conference. Twenty of them were from Peru, including an official delegation. The U.S. government sent high-ranking officials directly involved in managing relations with Peru. (55)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For Daniel Sharp, the promoter and leader of the seminar, what happened in Peru was a responsibility. As a founding member of the Peace Corps, he signed the first agreements with the governments of Peru and Bolivia, led the first teams of agents to those countries, and directed their operations in the Andean region. With a bachelor&#039;s degree in International Relations from Berkeley and a doctorate in International Relations and Jurisprudence from Harvard, he was the most suitable person to lead this research seminar, which addressed the following topics:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The context of U.S. politics in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
* U.S. relations with the Peruvian military.&lt;br /&gt;
* The awakening of Peruvian nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
* The issue of the 200-mile maritime boundary.&lt;br /&gt;
* International financial organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
* The rural sector.&lt;br /&gt;
* Indigenous people.&lt;br /&gt;
* Private investment.&lt;br /&gt;
* Foreign private sector in Peru. Study of business and governmental prospects.&lt;br /&gt;
* The labor movement.&lt;br /&gt;
* Private educational development.&lt;br /&gt;
* Missions in Peru funded by North American churches.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The time when the seminar took place was characterized as the most critical period in the history of Peruvian-American relations. It saw the nationalization of oil and American companies, the expulsion of the American military mission, the mobilization of indigenous people through land reform, and the Peruvian government asserting its sovereignty over its territorial sea by legislating on the 200-mile maritime boundary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The intelligence services sought clear answers to four questions from the perspective of insurgency and counterinsurgency: &amp;quot;What has been the policy of the United States?; What were its results?; What are the various policy alternatives offered to the United States?; and What are the likely consequences of each?&amp;quot; (56)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The event was sponsored by the ADELA group, the Adlai Stevenson Institute; The Cerro Corporation, N.Y; Chicago Council on Foreign Relations; The First National Bank of Chicago; Grace &amp;amp; Co.; IBEC; IBM; ITT; Johnson Foundation; Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co; Sears Roebuck &amp;amp; Co.; Sunbeam Corporation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the previous conferences, committees and small seminars that were held, prominent Peruvians, along with entrepreneurs and government officials from the United States, participated in the advisory process. Notable participants included Ambassador Fernando Berckemeyer and former Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde. Among the attendees were Samuel Drassinover Katz, Carlos Alzamora, Marco Fernández Baca, Daniel Schydlowsky, Richard Weeb, Patricio Ricketts, and Admiral Luis Edgardo Llosa (known for his significant historical role in defending the sovereignty of the 200-mile limit) among other personalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The results of this seminar were published in a book titled &#039;&#039;U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN PERU&#039;&#039;. The Spanish edition was published by Editorial Sudamericana in Buenos Aires in 1972 under the name &#039;&#039;Estados Unidos y la Revolución Peruana&#039;&#039;, and received extensive circulation in Peru. We have provided extensive references to this source as it serves as a valuable testimonial resource for the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Peruvian context. All topics were addressed from the perspective of the Cold War, with the ultimate goal of determining the policies that the United States should adopt towards Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The topic concerning The “Indians,&amp;quot; as developed by William P. Mangin, an anthropologist, sociologist and mathematician from Syracuse University in New York, holds particular interest in understanding the human environment in which the Shining Path operates—the Andean indigenous Quechua peasant population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mangin states: &amp;quot;...for better or for worse, the United States has maintained relations with Peru for a century, and though not always consciously, they have adopted attitudes towards the Indians that shape a policy. Commercial and developmental loans, joint decisions regarding road programs, the construction of schools and food distribution, the Peace Corps, AID technicians, as well as religious missionaries, all represent different aspects of an attitude towards the Indians...for better or for worse, the existence of this general policy is a concrete fact. It should not be surprising that this policy towards the Indians has been consistent. It has generally aligned with the policy of the Peruvian government (which aimed to integrate the Indians into the National Culture), as evident in most cases. However, in certain cases, both governments have seen the Indians as a potential rebellious or revolutionary force; and then, a defensive policy was adopted, for example, joint counterinsurgency programs AID-PERU (including the construction of some penetration roads in the jungle).&amp;quot; (57)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither at that time in May 1970, nor now, is it possible to ignore or deny American involvement in Peru&#039;s rural issues. This involvement was denounced in the seminar by Julio Cotler, but its reason and inevitability are tacitly supported by Mangin himself when he says: &amp;quot;...consciously or unconsciously, almost all decisions made in Peru by public and private organizations and companies from the United States imply a policy towards the Indians since they represent a very large sector of the population.&amp;quot; (58)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mangin&#039;s study, discussed in the seminar, classifies the highland society of Peru into seven groups:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 1. It is a small upper-class group that resides in the main cities of the valleys or on their large estates, in the capital, or abroad…&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 2. It is a small group of relatively wealthy individuals who form a regional upper class and maintain some contact with Group 1 in the provinces but very little in Lima.&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 3. This group partially overlaps with Group 2 in some cases but constitutes a separate group from many points of view. Most of its members are technicians representing various Peruvian official agencies that have regional personnel…&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 4. Like the first three groups, Group 4 has both rural and urban elements, but the latter are predominant. Its existence has been noted by many observers, although they have not assigned it autonomous characteristics. It can be said that this group is made up of workers who, along with the first three groups, also includes all members of the white-collar category working for regular salaries, such as bank employees, government administrative staff, taxi drivers, teachers, primary school sub-officers of the police and the military, and other groups.&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 5. I will call it the mestizo group. The word mestizo is not widely used in Peru, except by writers and social scientists. I use it here to refer to people who live in estates and small towns... they are descendants of the first Spanish colonists... and in most cases, it would be impossible to distinguish them from the Indians... but the physical characteristics of members of Groups 5, 6, and 7 largely overlap…&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 6. In Peru, members of this group are generally referred to as &amp;quot;cholos&amp;quot;... They are individuals in the process of transitioning from indigenous to modern national Peruvian... In terms of clothing, they are bicultural... Cholos generally come from indigenous communities. In recent years... their highland origin and even their indigenous status have become a source of increasingly pronounced pride... it&#039;s possible that as this group gains political power, it may achieve some intergenerational stability, especially if it aligns with a growing Quechua nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 7. This group consists of the Indians, defined as such by themselves and others. There were many different classes of Indians, and it is still possible to distinguish varieties in dress... The number of landless Indians in the South is high... Due to the need to strategically acculturate and protect their land from the pressure exerted by landowners... Indian communities have had to assimilate notions of rights and politics... Indians are and have been engaged in two economies. They have a local economy based on kinship, mutual obligation, and the festival system. They are also closely linked to the national economy. They are natural traders. Most Indian women are aware of national price fluctuations for eggs and small animals, while most men trade in livestock... Indians being at the lowest rung of the valley hierarchy suffer from discrimination at all levels. They are treated unfairly in courts, as well as in the armed forces, education, and national activities; they are practically slaves in the region, and whites and mestizos can kill them, and sometimes they do, without being punished... (59).&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This interesting classification of the highland social groups in Peru is a scientific delineation of the psychosocial profiles of different indigenous strata, idiosyncrasies, interests, aspirations, contradictions, and ethnic overlaps that have allowed a series of miscegenation while remaining a distinct and growing culture that overwhelms the traditional coastal Peruvian culture. Mangin predicts, &amp;quot;I would venture to predict that indigenism has died, and in its place, a new type of Indian nativism is emerging. In this new trend, the need to confront the modern world as Indians, land reform, industrialization, urbanization, bilingualism, education, and politics will be highlighted. Whites and mestizos may play a role in organizing and leading, as is the case with Peruvian and Guatemalan guerrillas, but the main leadership core will consist of Indians and cholos.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Different national parties and foreign interests, including Russia, China, Cuba, and the United States, support or oppose various Indian factions, but none of these groups has deeply penetrated Indian culture. &amp;quot;Much more serious,&amp;quot; says Mangin, &amp;quot;is the increasing involvement of anthropologists and other social scientists in official and university programs developed under the auspices of &#039;public security&#039; and &#039;counterinsurgency&#039;... if a few social scientists become so involved in the Andean countries of Latin America, this presence threatens and may prevent effective work by Americans&amp;quot; (60).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ultimately, Mangin was proposing a more subtle and scientific approach to address the potential danger posed by the development of Quechua culture. His primary concern was that this differentiated culture might, at some point, assert its rights and endanger the interests of major powers, especially the United States. Therefore, Mangin proposed three solutions (61), based on hypotheses about the projection of Quechua culture. These proposals are formulated in terms of the Cold War and the policy that the United States must adopt, either as assistance to the Peruvian government or as intervention to control, neutralize, or destroy Quechua aspirations. In these terms, for American hawks, only the genocide thesis is relevant. However, Mangin also talks about a policy of American indifference to the Peruvian Indian problem, saying: &amp;quot;In any case, we can&#039;t do much for the Indians of the Andean region... As my own position is that of a conservative anarchist, I believe that confusing and unclear solutions originating in local areas are generally better than confusing and unclear solutions imposed from outside.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How about American abstention! Instead of direct intervention or confusing and unclear military cooperation and support, it would be better to create a similar internal situation of cultural destruction that is confusing and unclear. There is no better definition of the subversive phenomenon known as the Shining Path than as a provocation leading to the genocide of the Peruvian Natives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should not be forgotten that the Wingspread debate took place in 1970, and its conclusions were disseminated in 1972, at the beginning of the period of reconstitution of the Shining Path. Concrete and irrefutable reality is showing us that the way the Shining Path conducts its polarization operations with respect to rural social sectors corresponds to the conception of the highland, indigenous social structure similar to that outlined by Mangin. In other words, the Shining Path&#039;s experimental politics, with destructive goals, find in Mangin&#039;s studies and those of other social scientists the necessary knowledge for the manipulation of the Quechua social base. In other words, it has chosen the appropriate social sector for the insurgency-counterinsurgency game that promotes political warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whether coincidental or not, Mangin also mentions and reminds us of other experiences such as Project Camelot (Horowitz, 1965), the work University of Michigan anthropologists conducted with CIA agents in Vietnam to provide equipment and training to the police (Scigliano and Fox, 1965). It is worth asking, for example, whether the Vicos Project and the construction of the Marginal Jungle Highway achieved their goals from the perspective of insurgency-counterinsurgency. Or did they only serve to create that &amp;quot;confusing situation&amp;quot; that now devastates the Peruvian Andes?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Ideological contributions to Shining Path Thought =====&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen how Guzmán Reinoso presents Shining Path Thought as a set of Marxist ideas strung together schematically but without dialectical meaning, transposed and grouped into a body that, through systematic repetition of propaganda, has become &amp;quot;scientific truth.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One does not require an in-depth study to discover that Senderista thought is nothing more than a skillful mixture of ideas and concepts taken from the Peruvian and universal Marxist experience and literature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Furthermore, it is possible to identify influences of Trotskyism in its pro-Chinese version from the years 1964-65 in the ideology of the Shining Path, as we will see next.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s important to note that the process of reconstitution of the party, referred to as the “shining path to establish a peasant-based party”, is not a new concept within the Shining Path movement. Earlier, elements from various leftist currents in Peru had practiced it. In the years mentioned above, the Trotskyist movement went through a series of divisions or splinter groups. A faction led by police agents Felix Zevallos Quezada, Alfredo Chavez Ch., and Roman Flores Morell, among others, formed a group called Reagrupamiento Revolucionario (Revolutionary Regrouping) for the reconstitution of the party based on the following principles outlined in their &#039;&#039;Insurrectional Thesis&#039;&#039; (62):&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# That the Revolution originates in the countryside, moving from the periphery to the center, i.e., the urban areas.&lt;br /&gt;
# Emphasis on the guerrilla method as one of the factors of polarization during that time and at a certain level of development of the struggles.&lt;br /&gt;
# Decisive role of urban forces: “organized proletariat, bureaucratic employees, students, and oppressed layers of the petite bourgeoisie...&amp;quot; (Page 4) &amp;quot;...The Agrarian Revolution is the pivot around which the axis of the Peruvian Revolution revolves. We must ensure urban support for the peasant movement&amp;quot; (Page 5) &amp;quot;...the decision for the majority of the vanguard comes down to two concrete forms, two methodologies: promoting an isolated guerrilla focus and dispersing everywhere, or accepting the line of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Worker’s Party, RWP) and RR, which propose the development of work in all rural areas during mobilization, solving technical problems of Militias, Defense Committees, and giving birth to the first formations of the Liberation Army, or guerrilla focus, taking advantage of the already radicalized zone...&amp;quot; (Page 40). &amp;quot;Mao Zedong was in favor of a plan similar to what we, the RR and RWP, propose today in Peru; that is, the systematic preparation of a plan of work that, in its maturity, will coordinate urban and rural actions on all levels: social, political, and military&amp;quot; (Page 44).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear from the social situation in rural Peru that the conclusion arises that these masses of six million indigenous peasants, cornered and oppressed, have no future other than revolution, much like the situation in China during Chiang Kai Shek&#039;s time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This situation led to a debate within the young Communist Party of China in 1926. The General Secretary, Chen Duxiu, did not believe in the possibility of utilizing rural forces, while Zhang Guotao,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Chen Kuo Tao&#039;&#039; in the original text, which we believe to be a typo of Chang Kuo Tao, or Zhang Guotao in pinyin&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; on the left, advocated for unwavering workerism, similar to the Trotskyists in Peru associated with Voz Obrera (Worker’s Voice). However, in 1927, Mao Zedong estimated that if the party were to take the leadership of the peasant masses, it would not take twenty-five years, as happened in China, but in a short period, several hundred million peasants would rise up in various Chinese provinces with such violence, like a tempest, that no force could control them. &amp;quot;That is what we propose for Peru, the integration of RR and RWP, and merging with the peasantry&amp;quot; (Page 48).&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Regarding the difficulties that opportunism would create, this should not lead us to despair or make us believe that we should abandon revolutionary theory and the characterization of each stage and concrete situation. Let&#039;s be clear: armed actions, war, are nothing more than politics pursued by other means. This implies that all actions of weapons in the social sphere are political operations [Page 51].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it comes to organizing these militias and defense committees, it often happens that in almost all provinces, there are districts with a significant population belonging to communities that extend around the district. It&#039;s important to remember that there are mestizos engaged in business and trade with the indigenous population, and they are vacillating and reactionary, so they should not be trusted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s a common practice that the impoverished strata retreat to the suburbs and completely occupy the surrounding areas of these district capitals. This is where our work begins. In general, in places with communities and sharecropping, these villages are divided into neighborhoods, similar to cities. In some areas, it is advisable to establish units by blocks, based on the volume of inhabitants and the degree of concentration of houses in each block. An average of 50 to 100 men and women can be organized per neighborhood. The neighborhood or block militia will give rise to house-to-house militias in towns and districts as long as we eliminate the tiny reactionary elements that exist in these towns and villages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot have a uniform image of the Andean villages and hamlets. We will adapt to the environment, and not force the villages and towns into any preconceived scheme. However, the development of these rural militias urgently requires a solution to the issue of armament. Generally, these militias will be used to defend against white gangs and the police (landlords and armed landowners). We must ensure that these Decurias and Centurias militias are armed and trained with weapons that are readily available to the peasants: shotguns, slingshots, canes, dynamite in small &#039;caches,&#039; machetes... With these weapons and proper training to use them and coordinate them when the time comes, they can deal with any police squad and white gangs. Ideally, we would have crates of brand-new machine guns and shiny rifles, but those are not available, and the enemy has them: we must take them away from him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From these militias, the Defense Committees (Immediate Military Leadership) will be formed. However, these will be the organs that provide the foundation for the future revolutionary national liberation army [Pages 53 and 54].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peru is a mining country, so it&#039;s not difficult to obtain dynamite. Thousands of dynamite cartridges pass through the hands of mine workers every day. Mine workers must deliver as much dynamite, fuses, and detonators as possible to the peasants [Page 55].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I would also like to conclude by affirming that the gunslinger, the daring adventurer, the early guerrilla, and their exploits cannot replace methodical work, the creation and development of a political leadership and a political party. Nor can they replace the direction and development of a peasant and working-class student vanguard through the creation of associations. It also cannot replace the central task of today: the advanced fusion of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard with the peasantry&amp;quot; [Page 60].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
...Do not despair; the social and economic bases that generate the Peruvian Revolution are there. Marxists maintain that in semi-colonial and dependent countries, the development of productive forces is merely vegetative, and precapitalist and feudal forms fundamentally reject any planning for consumption... [Page 61].&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;...factors that nourish and strengthen social rebellion in Peru and Latin America: malnutrition. These are facts that leave no room for doubt and come from Dr. Abraham Horowitz, Director of the World Health Organization... Horowitz, the same figure from the Camelot Project.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Another characteristic of these last three revolutionary stages is that the fundamental driving force is the peasant masses, while the urban leadership is composed of workers and intellectuals. The path to socialism in the Revolution arises as a result of the connection between the urban Marxist leadership and the peasant masses in the course of armed struggle&amp;quot; (Page 95).&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This refers to the Cuban, Chinese, and Argentine revolutions. Interestingly, the language and semantics of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Regrouping are the same as those used by the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The identity in guerrilla conception is indisputable, as well as in terms of &amp;quot;polarization&amp;quot; accelerated by irrational violence. The Shining Path says: &amp;quot;This is the concrete question of the revolutionary situation currently unfolding here, and it has arisen from two issues: 1) The class struggle in polarization, and 2) The armed struggle that unfolds as guerrilla warfare born from the midst of the country&#039;s class struggle. In May 1980, armed struggle began with two fundamental slogans: armed struggle and a government of workers and peasants. Since then, our action has developed as guerrilla warfare, and today, according to the Central Committee&#039;s decision in January 1981, we are in the development of guerrilla warfare&amp;quot; (63).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Likewise, there is no difference between the Trotskyist current of 1965 and contemporary Senderismo regarding taking Mao Zedong Thought as a guiding principle and viewing the reality of China in 1927 as if it were similar to Peru in the 1980s. Nor is there a difference in terms of forming the bases of support for the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The emergence and development of guerrilla zones, the importance of which lies in the fact that they are the arenas in which, through the growing strength and armed tide of guerrilla warfare, we will build our future support bases, the advanced and reestablished bastions by the military thought of Chairman Mao Zedong,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The military thought is the [[Protracted People’s War]].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; bases that are the essence of the path to encircle the cities from the countryside, the very essence of People&#039;s War&amp;quot; (64).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in all this literature, common to Trotskyists and the Shining Path, there is something very important that must be highlighted and taken into account because it pertains to the military thinking that guides the actions of the latter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The document of the Revolutionary Regrouping, on page 51, proposes to follow as a major principle a classic rule by Carl von Clausewitz: &amp;quot;War is the continuation of politics by other means”.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In turn, Abimael Guzmán, in the Report of the First Plenary Session in December 1982, presents a document titled &#039;&#039;The Party&#039;s Military Thought and Armed Struggle: 1979-1982&#039;&#039;, and its section on &amp;quot;Some Issues&amp;quot; discusses: &amp;quot;We conceive of revolutionary war as a unity waged in both the countryside and the city... Taking into account concrete conditions and the political situation. We cannot wage a revolutionary war without considering this because war is the continuation of politics by other means&amp;quot; (65).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are Trotskyists and Shining Path members in agreement on the fundamental principle of war, according to Clausewitz: Leninists, Maoists? This is starting to be doubtful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This political conception of war by the great Prussian author, as outlined in his treatise &#039;&#039;On War&#039;&#039;, is what has governed and continues to govern bourgeois military thought. It is a basic rule of all military schools in the Western world, that is, of conventional capitalist warfare, not revolutionary war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin — who read, admired, and used Clausewitz&#039;s military teachings — reversed its fundamental principle. We have already seen at the beginning of this book how Lenin discovered that to make war permanent and revolutionary, it must have a different nature than that proposed by Clausewitz. In other words, for Leninists, Marxists, strategists, and militants of revolutionary war, politics is the continuation of war by other means, contrary to what Abimael Guzmán and the Trotskyists propose. Revolutionary war is the antithesis of conventional bourgeois warfare. And the principle that &amp;quot;war is politics carried out by other means&amp;quot; is also a basic rule of counterinsurgency warfare. The difference between one type of war and the other is their nature and the politics of war, which is distinct from political warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the basic conception of the nature of war that guides the Shining Path is different from the revolutionary one, it may very well be the opposite, reactionary. It is undoubtedly using all the Marxist trappings to conceal its true essence as a major low-intensity operation prepared by the intelligence services of the system to destroy the Peruvian nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin points out how Marxists have considered Clausewitz&#039;s principle as fundamental for analyzing the nature of war, given its certainty: &amp;quot;It is enough to consider that the present war is the continuation of the politics of &#039;great powers&#039; and of the fundamental classes within these &#039;great powers&#039;...&amp;quot; (66).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle is valid, especially for determining the nature of capitalist war, and it was used by Marx and Engels. Ultimately, it reveals that it is capitalist politics that prevails in the end and development of war. The development, analysis, and use of Clausewitz&#039;s principle by Lenin lead him to surpass its conception when he says: &amp;quot;Every war is inextricably linked to the political regime from which it emerges. The same politics that a power, a particular class within that power, pursued over a long period before the war, is continued by that same class in a fatal and inevitable manner during the war, with only the form of action varying&amp;quot; (67).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the class politics that conditions the nature of war. Implicitly, Lenin clarifies and gives the true dimension to Clausewitz&#039;s rule, which serves to prioritize politics as the continuation of war in the Leninist conception of Revolutionary War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this day and age, we cannot simply repeat Clausewitz&#039;s principle about the nature and politics of capitalist war. While its axiom remains valid, it has been surpassed in the conception of revolutionary war, the class war. It has been enriched by reversing the ear and politics factors: politics is the determinant of war and defines its nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Can war be explained without relating it to the prior politics of this or that state, of this or that system of states, of these or those classes?&amp;quot; Lenin asserts and continues by stating: &amp;quot;This is the cardinal question that is always forgotten... if you have not demonstrated the “connection of this war with the prior politics, you have understood nothing of this war&amp;quot; (68). We ask: What is the prior politics to the war of the Shining Path? What is the politics of the State, the system of States, the class or classes that translate into the &amp;quot;revolutionary war&amp;quot; of the Shining Path?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The destruction of Peru&#039;s productive forces, the Quechua peasant class, the isolation of the working class, the political destruction of the Peruvian nation-state are not the politics of a national liberation war, of exploited classes, or of mass insurrection. On the contrary, they are the politics of terrorist warfare; the politics of imperialist warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Something else that cannot go unnoticed is the conception of the chosen peasant social base to promote the &amp;quot;revolution.&amp;quot; From the description of how operations are conducted in the countryside to form support bases and manage contradictions, we can establish the identity of Shining Path Thought with the social theories that William P. Mangin presented at Wingspread, Wisconsin, USA, between 1969 and 1970. Similarly, it aligns with the scientific authors of the CIA, such as Dr. Abraham Korowitz, to underpin their insurrectional theses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, they share the characterization of Peruvian society as feudal and semi-colonial and the bourgeois democratic course of the national revolution, carried out by a conglomerate of four social classes, including the national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the peasantry, all under working-class leadership. The identical framework can be found in two tiny dissident groups, one from Trotskyism and the other from Moscow-style communism, both of which also emerged from the social mobilization of the 1960s but fought against it as &amp;quot;revisionists&amp;quot; or Focoists, positioning themselves as a more extreme and radical alternative, claiming to possess the sole truth of the revolutionary path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary, in the structure of Shining Path Thought, we find that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# It originates from an intellectual minority, professionalized and technified, philosophically influenced by Kant and foreign ideas, frustrated by its lack of growth as national bourgeois intelligence, and without prospects.&lt;br /&gt;
# It seeks to develop within the Quechua peasant social base with a distinct culture, significant demographic growth, and a massive displacement as an unskilled labor force, which, due to the lack of employment opportunities, ends up creating its own labor market within the framework of a chaotic urbanization process.&lt;br /&gt;
# It exploits the internal class contradictions of the Andean peasant population, thanks to the knowledge acquired from counterinsurgency studies conducted by anthropologists and sociologists from foreign intelligence services, especially American, British, French, and Israeli.&lt;br /&gt;
# Its most immediate precursor doctrine is pro-Chinese Trotskyism, which was encouraged in the 1960s by national and foreign police agents and intelligence services.&lt;br /&gt;
# It adopts the theses of Revolutionary Violence verbatim from Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
# It draws from the thought of José Carlos Mariátegui the characterization of Peruvian society in the 1920s, the indigenous-land issue, and Mariátegui&#039;s sympathies for George Sorel and his theories on violence.&lt;br /&gt;
# From Mao Zedong, it borrows the key theses of peasant armed struggle, the theory of protracted warfare, and the construction of Support Bases to &amp;quot;encircle the city.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of elements, mechanically taken from the national reality of Peru and universal Marxist thought, forms the ideological structure of the experimental &amp;quot;Senderista&amp;quot; politics, which, as we will see, is implemented through an irregular, insurgent, unconventional military apparatus that conducts a war with the following forms of combat:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Two-Line Struggle&lt;br /&gt;
* Sabotage&lt;br /&gt;
* Guerrilla warfare&lt;br /&gt;
* Annihilation&lt;br /&gt;
* Psychological warfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Marxism-Leninism and Maoism in Shining Path thought ====&lt;br /&gt;
For the Shining Path, this ideology which they call the &amp;quot;guiding thought,&amp;quot; is the only true and valid interpretation of Marxism that exists in the world. It is a Marxism different from all others, as a philosophy, a method of research, or a political orientation governing societies with communist regimes. It is &amp;quot;Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo Thought.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the system&#039;s Senderologists, sociologists, and anthropologists funded by American foundations or social research centers in Paris, London, or Tel Aviv, it&#039;s all the same; each interprets it in their own way as a militant form of communism. However, they don&#039;t see it as dangerous or ghostly for the right. In Peru, in the final months of 1987, the forces of the Shining Path led by Abimael Guzmán in the Andean highlands mobilized simultaneously with hundreds of young people from the urban upper classes, incited by the financial oligarchy and led by the &amp;quot;Parisian&amp;quot; writer Mario Vargas Llosa, a member of the global capitalist Pen Club. They aimed to undermine the current Peruvian democratic system, which was in the hands of a weakened and rhetorically anti-imperialist social democracy, fearful of both Vargas Llosa&#039;s &amp;quot;Senderismo&amp;quot; and Abimael Guzmán&#039;s movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other Peruvian social scientists with greater seriousness have tried to view the development of Shining Path Thought as an extreme and distorted form of Marxist thought. In some cases, they have looked for explanations in Andean messianism, within the magical-religious culture of shamans and witches in historically less developed and geographically more isolated communities or in the ancestral communal customs that have been preserved in the Quechua-Aymara civilizations of South America. However, there is nothing of this sort, at least not consciously. Such interpretations are more likely to incite hatred and contempt in Shining Path writings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, some argue that the invocation of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideas by the Shining Path is, in any case, an adherence to a Marxist ideology, albeit extreme, distorted and irrational, but still within the framework of Marxist-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this case, it would be necessary to prove that the Shining Path is not truly Marxist and merely uses Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is in this field that the debate about the validity of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideas in Shining Path thought should likely be concentrated. It should also investigate the possible objective of the Shining Path in discrediting Marxism as an ideology, a political theory, a method of social research or political praxis. Using Marxist ideas as the main guiding principles of a military irregular apparatus dedicated to the destruction of a potentially subversive society, such as the Quechua, the Peruvian, or the Latin American society; to annihilating nationalist states; and to the &amp;quot;Salvadorization&amp;quot; of large territorial areas in the Latin American continent to guarantee the recycling of the capitalist system in the region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If that were the case, it would need to be demonstrated that the Shining Path is not Marxist and that it merely exploits Marxism. In this case, the Shining Path cannot and should not be approached as a communist position or one that is ideologically Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, or Mariáteguist. It should be seen as a conspiracy of thought, whose political praxis is terrorism. The goal is to discover the elements that make up the systematization of violence in Peru, which is causing its social disintegration and destruction as a nation. For this, honesty in scientific research must prevail, along with rationality in reasoning in order to find the true identity of the enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Regarding Marxism-Leninism-Maoism =====&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path states, &amp;quot;We assume the position of the international proletariat, its status as the last class in history, with its own distinct and antagonistic class interests compared to other classes and with a goal that only the proletariat, leading the world&#039;s peoples, can achieve: communism, the unique and irreplaceable new society, without exploiters or exploited, oppressors or oppressed, classes, state, parties, democracy, weapons, wars... According to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism applied to the specific conditions of Peruvian society, revolutionary violence, or violent revolution, the only way to seize power and transform the world, takes the form of a people&#039;s war, specifically, a peasant war led by the Communist Party of Peru on behalf of the proletariat...&amp;quot;(69) All of the Shining Path’s documents are filled with these generalities. They do not present a coherent exposition of Marxist thought. In the case of a political movement that also calls itself a party, merely adopting or adhering to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is not enough. While such an attitude may be acceptable at an individual level, personally adopting or adhering to any doctrine, it is not the same when it comes to a party organization. A party presupposes the need for a theoretical elaboration of the social reality that is the subject of its political praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of the Shining Path, there is no Marxist theory, and as it has been said, &amp;quot;...the lack of theory negates the right to exist for the revolutionary tendency and inevitably condemns it to political bankruptcy.&amp;quot; (70) The absence of a theory by the Shining Path regarding the national reality of Peru or Latin America contributes to explaining why its conduct differs from what it claims to be as the representative of the proletariat as the ruling class and, ultimately, reduces itself to violent terrorism, a practice condemned and rejected by Leninism: &amp;quot;To exhort terrorism, to encourage individuals and groups who do not know each other to organize attacks against ministers at times when the revolutionaries lack the forces and means necessary to lead the masses who are already rising, not only interrupts work among the masses but also directly disorganizes it.&amp;quot; (71) Lenin, who did not in the least deny &amp;quot;violence and terrorism,&amp;quot; insisted that they should &amp;quot;foresee and ensure the direct participation of the masses.&amp;quot; In other words, he proposed a class violence conception and did not reconcile with the type of terrorism practiced by the Shining Path. &amp;quot;The revolutionary socialists do not naively realize that their inclination toward terrorism is closely linked to the fact that from the very beginning, and still today, they are outside the workers&#039; movement, without even trying to become the party of a revolutionary class that is waging its class struggle.&amp;quot; (72)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There isn&#039;t much to discuss about Marxism with the Shining Path. From their documents, the Conclusions of the Fifth National Conference (where Peruvian society was characterized as &amp;quot;semi-feudal and semi-colonial, dependent on imperialism&amp;quot;) are what could explain the inclusion of the thoughts of José Carlos Mariátegui and Mao Zedong. Similarly, their ideas about Peruvian society and Maoist Protracted People&#039;s War, transposed into Shining Path literature, have already been seriously analyzed by Manuel Jesús Granados Aponte in his thesis &#039;&#039;La Conducta Política: un caso particular, sobre Sendero Luminoso&#039;&#039; (Political Behavior: A Particular Case on the Shining Path).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s a shame that Granados hasn&#039;t been able to widely disseminate his thesis written and defended in 1981. However, it is also condemnable that the Senderologists have used it partially, only disseminating adjectival aspects due to their interest in promoting the Shining Path in their news reports and comments. In every circumstance, they have tried to diminish the importance of Granados Aponte&#039;s work. Over time, from 1981 to the present, his work has become more valuable, not only for its logical and theoretical validity but also because it contributes to the discovery and unraveling of the ideological disguise of the Shining Path and, furthermore, of the supposed Senderologists and exegeses on the payroll of foreign intelligence entities. These individuals are nothing more than those who hide the true characteristics of the organization of violent irregulars that emerged in Peru in the shadow of reactionary currents opposed to any change or transformation of outdated social structures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Characterization of Peruvian society =====&lt;br /&gt;
The characterization of Peruvian society as semi-feudal and semi-colonial is what defines the general line of action of the Shining Path. It is considered to integrate the thoughts of Mariátegui and Mao Zedong. Both made this characterization a long time ago, with the latter naturally referring to China and emphasizing the fundamental role of the peasantry as the most important mobilizable popular force in such a society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let&#039;s allow Granados to counter the Shining Path’s thesis: &amp;quot;...characterizing a society is a central and basic point for any political organization, especially if it claims to lead the popular masses. Taking the characterization of Peruvian society as semi-feudal and semi-colonial made by the Shining Path, we notice that the central points for such characterization are: a) The predominance of the agrarian sector in the Peruvian economy... b) The persistence of serfdom, which Mariátegui pointed out as something fundamental in the subsistence of feudalism... c) The &amp;quot;modern&amp;quot; economy (industry and commerce) has a smaller weight than the rural economy...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;We have noticed,&amp;quot; Granados continues, &amp;quot;that &#039;the Shining Path&#039; maintains the semi-feudal category based mainly on Mao Tse Tung&#039;s studies and his analysis of the reality in China in the 1930s. They relate it to Mariátegui&#039;s ideas about the economic reality of the 1920s. Based on this, they argue that the Peruvian reality has not changed qualitatively (through a revolution, as they put it), and therefore, the quantitative changes that have occurred until the 1970s are not decisive. This denies a fundamental thesis of Mao...Mao tells us that in every quantitative change, there is a small part of qualitative change...In the 50 years since Mao&#039;s and Mariátegui&#039;s analyses, undoubtedly new forms of relationships within the Peruvian economy have emerged, requiring a new and accurate characterization of Peruvian society&amp;quot; (73).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To further refute the Shining Path&#039;s characterization, Granados quotes Mariátegui when he states: &amp;quot;Feudalism or semi-feudalism survives in the structure of our agrarian economy...The same would not happen if industry, commerce, and the city were stronger than agriculture.&amp;quot; In order to demonstrate that from the 1920s and 1930s to the present day, there have been qualitative changes in Peruvian society, he uses the analyses of Carlos Tapia published in his pamphlet &#039;&#039;La Economía Peruana ¿sigue siendo semifeudal?&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;Is the Peruvian Economy Still Semi-Feudal?&#039;&#039;) (Ayacucho, 1979), in which the following variables are established:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Urban-rural population ratio:&#039;&#039;&#039; The urban population has grown more rapidly than the rural population over the last 30 years. By 1972, 60% of the total population resided in urban areas.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Agricultural population and its real importance in the total population of the country:&#039;&#039;&#039; &amp;quot;Regardless of the source of statistical information, the agricultural labor force currently represents no more than 2/5 of the total labor force in the country. It approximately represents half of what it represented in Mariátegui&#039;s time.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Agricultural production and its real importance in the country&#039;s production:&#039;&#039;&#039; Based on GDP; in the last 25 years from 1950 to the present, the importance of GDP as the volume of agricultural production has decreased by approximately half. This is in contrast to a considerable increase in GDP in the industrial sector, especially manufacturing.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;The nature of Agrarian Reform:&#039;&#039;&#039; By the end of 1977, approximately 11,590 landowners with a total of 7,400,000 hectares had been expropriated out of a total of 15,000 landowners in the country in 1972. Undoubtedly, this did not benefit the landowning sector of Peruvian society. The new forms of associative ownership that have emerged in the countryside prioritize wage labor over pre-capitalist relations of production. Latifundia have been transformed into &amp;quot;associative enterprises.&amp;quot; Based on the analysis of the categories used, Carlos Tapia concludes that the country&#039;s economy is no longer primarily agricultural and that, therefore, the semi-feudal character it maintained during a certain historical period has evolved into new forms where capitalist predominance defines the overall character of the Peruvian economy. This new situation is more notable when considering that by 1987, the benchmark figures had evolved significantly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Getting an accurate characterization of Peruvian society is a fundamental issue because it will determine the character of the revolution. Being wrong in the characterization also means being wrong in the rest of the political theses&amp;quot; (74).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But does the Shining Path also err in the characterization of the Protracted People&#039;s War taken from Maoism? Is it possible that the strategists and analysts of the Shining Path, the formulators of their theories, can be so mistaken in their conceptions?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The leadership of the Shining Path does not allow for errors in conception and principles that would presuppose a lack of historical knowledge and ignorance, which would be inconceivable at that level. We would then be faced with an intentional distortion of reality&#039;s data or its interpretation and a theoretical-political jumble created to justify the Shining Path&#039;s violence as if it were revolutionary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, Guzmán Reinoso and the Shining Path transplanted not only the semi-feudal reality of China in the 1930s to Peru but also Mao&#039;s scheme of Revolutionary Warfare, albeit in a partial and confusing form. Mao&#039;s three stages of war — guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare, and positional warfare — are transposed as a general strategy of defensive warfare, strategic equilibrium warfare, and offensive strategic warfare. What is strange and significant from the perspective of counterinsurgency warfare is that these assessments are used to measure the stages of revolutionary warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The military thought of the Shining Path states that &amp;quot;the military line consists of the laws that govern people&#039;s war for the conquest of power and its defense. It consists of three elements: 1) People&#039;s War, which in our case is specified as a unitary people&#039;s war, with the countryside as the principal theater and the city as complementary; 2) Construction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, which in our case is specified as the People&#039;s Guerrilla Army, with the particularity of incorporating the militia to advance towards arming the masses, and: 3) Tactical Strategy, which is manifested through campaigns of encirclement and annihilation and counter-campaigns of encirclement and annihilation, which in our case are specified by applying political and military plans that have specific political and military strategies embodied in campaigns with specific content&amp;quot; (75).&lt;br /&gt;
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While this military approach appears to be operationally concrete, it does not inherently align with a political strategy for taking power according to Maoist principles. The Shining Path attempts to give political meaning to its concrete military approach with the following explanation:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;President Mao established the path of encircling the cities from the countryside, with the heart of it being the Bases of Support. This took into account that powerful imperialists and their reactionary Chinese allies were entrenched in the main cities. If the revolution refused to capitulate and wanted to persevere in the fight, it had to turn the backward rural areas into great military, political, economic, and cultural bastions of the revolution, from where to fight against the fierce enemy attacking rural areas by using the cities and gradually lead the revolution to complete victory through a prolonged war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Based on this Maoist thesis, President Gonzalo has established the pursuit of a unitary people&#039;s war, where the countryside is the principal theater of armed actions because we have an immense majority of peasant masses, and that&#039;s where the Bases of Support must be established. As President Mao said, &#039;The prolonged revolutionary struggle maintained in such revolutionary bases is fundamentally a guerrilla war of peasants led by the Communist Party of China. Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the need to use rural areas as revolutionary bases of support, neglect the arduous work with peasants, and disregard guerrilla warfare.&#039; Additionally, President Gonzalo specifies that actions should also be carried out in the cities as complementary, as demonstrated by international experience, including ours. The lessons learned from what happened to the guerrilla in the Philippines, which retreated to the countryside and left the cities alone, especially the capital, causing the isolation of the guerrillas... Also, considering the peculiarities of cities in Latin America, where the percentage of the proletariat and poor masses is high, the masses are ready to develop complementary actions to those in the countryside. However, in cities, the new Power is not built, which would be a Base of Support, but rather a Front manifested in the People&#039;s Defense Revolutionary Movement with Centers of Resistance that wage people&#039;s war and prepare for the future insurrection that will occur when the rural forces assault the cities in combination with the uprising from within (76).&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;In this lengthy passage from the Shining Path, it can be observed how they manipulate Mao&#039;s thesis of &amp;quot;encircling the cities.&amp;quot; The final contribution of Guzmán&#039;s thinking may appear to be the impassioned discourse of an enlightened strategist who can strategically and mechanically utilize urban mass organizations for warfare and an apocalyptic national uprising. However, it is not so, and Guzmán&#039;s thought, as explained in this manner, seems to be a calculated intention to involve urban popular grassroots organizations in terrorist actions of dirty warfare. This would first expose them to government repression and then lead to their destruction. Marxists, by doctrine, know that this is not the insurrectional methodology of Leninism, let alone a Maoist orientation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let&#039;s read what Mao Zedong says on this matter:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The central task and the highest form of any revolution is the seizure of power through armed struggle, in other words, solving the problem through war. This revolutionary Marxist-Leninist principle has universal validity, both in China and in other countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, adhering to the same principle, the party of the proletariat applies it differently according to different conditions. In capitalist countries, when they are not fascist and not at war, the conditions are as follows: internally, there is no feudal system, but rather bourgeois democracy; externally, these countries do not suffer from national oppression, but they themselves oppress other nations. Due to these characteristics, the area of the proletarian party in capitalist countries consists of educating workers, accumulating strength through a long period of legal struggle, and preparing for the final overthrow of capitalism. There, the issue is to sustain a long legal struggle, use Parliament as a platform, resort to political and economic strikes, organize unions, and educate the workers. The forms of organization are legal, and the forms of struggle are non-violent (non-military). Regarding the issue of war, the Communist Parties in capitalist countries oppose imperialist wars... The war they intend to wage is nothing other than the civil war for which they are preparing. But as long as the bourgeoisie is not truly rendered powerless, as long as the majority of the proletariat is not determined to take up armed uprising and civil war, and as long as the peasant masses are not willing to voluntarily assist the proletariat, such an uprising and war should not be carried out. Furthermore, when the time comes to initiate such actions, the first step will be to occupy the cities and then advance into the countryside, not the other way around. All of this is how the Communist Parties have acted in capitalist countries, and the October Revolution in Russia has confirmed its correctness.&lt;br /&gt;
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In China, the situation is different. The peculiarity of China is that it is not an independent and democratic country but semi-colonial and semi-feudal, where there is no democracy but rather feudal oppression, and in its external relations, it does not enjoy national independence but suffers from imperialist oppression. Therefore, we do not have a parliament to use, nor a legal right to organize workers for strikes. Here, the fundamental task of the Communist Party is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before embarking on an uprising and war, or to first take control of the cities and then occupy the countryside, but the opposite... In China, the main form of struggle is war, and the primary form of organization is the army. All other forms, such as popular mass organizations and struggles, are also important and absolutely indispensable and should by no means be neglected, but their objective is to serve the war (77).&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== The inconsistency of Shining Path Thought ====&lt;br /&gt;
Neither Marxism-Leninism nor Maoism form a revolutionary theory that the Shining Path can legitimately claim as its own, not even from the thinking of Mariátegui. In Marxist-Leninist thought, the concept of class violence allows for various levels of confrontation between the main social classes (bourgeoisie-proletariat) or a class alliance to oppose imperialist domination. Depending on the balance of power at a given historical moment, revolutionary violence can take different forms, up to armed insurgency, led by a class and involving the direct participation of the population.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, terrorism and sabotage are not part of this class violence in Marxism-Leninism. If they have occurred in the history of revolutionary movements, they have been secondary and usually aimed against foreign invaders. Systematic destruction of means of production is also not conceivable within Marxist thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The violence that the Shining Path claims to derive from Marxism-Leninism is primarily directed towards the Peruvian peasantry, a historically subjugated class. This class is experiencing rapid changes and is rich in new social contradictions. According to classifications by sociologists and anthropologists from the CIA and other foreign intelligence services, the peasantry is a social base that the Shining Path considers useful for their so-called revolutionary violence. They aim to destroy the social and economic relations of the peasant class, applying selective terrorism and assassinating local leaders and authorities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike other groups like Jewish Zionists or Shia fanatics, the Shining Path doesn&#039;t focus its terrorism on big cities. The reason for this is never provided by its adherents. Their talk of belonging to a global revolution is more of a motivating phrase for naive militants. It is a calculated theoretical deception by those who are not interested in destroying imperialism but rather aim to undermine indigenous communities and the Peruvian military, as well as any government whose policies don&#039;t align with their plans for domination in the Andean countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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The characterization of Peruvian society is neither accurate nor is the application of Maoism to Peruvian reality precise. This is a crude distortion of Mao&#039;s ideas, which becomes evident through a straightforward reading of his writings and a proper understanding of the Chinese revolutionary experience. It also doesn&#039;t require much debate to prove that the Peruvian society analyzed by Mariátegui in the late 1920s is not the same as Peru in 1988. Although still underdeveloped and economically and technologically dependent, Peru is no longer semi-feudal due to ongoing changes in rural economic relationships and land reform.&lt;br /&gt;
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What the Shining Path presents as Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, or Gonzalo Thought, is not a scientific social, economic, and political theory. It&#039;s a complicated patchwork of Marxist texts designed to make readers believe they are embracing Marxism and to convince its opponents that they are preventing the triumph of Marxism and defeating &amp;quot;communist terrorists.&amp;quot; This political ubiquity is achieved by Gonzalo Thought isolating itself as a &amp;quot;new universal conception&amp;quot; of social science theory, thereby rejecting all left, right, and center political tendencies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Manuel Jesús Granados Aponte was the first to uncover the flawed thinking within the Shining Path. In his thesis, &#039;&#039;Political Behavior: A Specific Case&#039;&#039;, he discussed the group&#039;s dogmatic nature. Granados identifies several key points:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The Shining Path produces articles and pamphlets that are long-winded and devoid of substantive content relevant to the Peruvian context. These articles reflect minimal research efforts on the part of the Shining Path to genuinely interpret Peruvian circumstances. Any research that does exist is predominantly focused on the area of Huamanga within the academic sector.&lt;br /&gt;
# Furthermore, it portrays itself in all its documents and leaflets as the holders of the &amp;quot;Correct Line,&amp;quot; a stance that fosters a sense of self-importance. They consider themselves superior and, as a result, use virulent language intended to intimidate other political groups, particularly those on the left, but also against indigenous peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
# They repetitively use so-called revolutionary concepts and terms. Though orderly presented, these terms reveal their inability to develop these ideas further. The language they employ remains largely disconnected from the material conditions and the lived experience of the Peruvian populace.&lt;br /&gt;
# They link the ideological frameworks of Mao Zedong and José Carlos Mariátegui; while both may apply Marxism-Leninism to their respective countries, the Shining Path makes this connection through a chaotic and parallel arrangement of writings. They ignore the need to consider the context and specific circumstances of the original texts.(78)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Granados bravely and honestly states what few or none in Peru do: that the Shining Path lacks a Marxist-Leninist theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Granados&#039; research on the political behavior of the Shining Path is limited and doesn&#039;t fully explain its causes. However, he suggests some when he observes its effects: &amp;quot;Spreading their political agenda only brings disaster to the people; these are the results of paranoia. It has reached a demented state&amp;quot; (79). These grim statements about the Shining Path&#039;s political actions don&#039;t fit into an analysis focused on revolutionary theory and behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instead, they make sense when considering paranoid and disastrous social behaviors rooted in ideological deviations. These are scientifically programmed to result in negative and self-destructive behaviors. All of this is achievable in the Psychological Warfare of Low-Intensity Operations conducted against potentially subversive countries by intelligence services involved in counterinsurgent Political Warfare doctrine. This includes American, British, French, Israeli, Taiwanese, South African intelligence services, and others who are their dependents, operating in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Chapter 2: the Shining Path as an apparatus of irregular warfare ===&lt;br /&gt;
In September 1987, two political organizations of the Peruvian Marxist left decided to unite: the Democratic Popular Union (DPU, Unión Democrático Popular) led by Cecilia Oviedo and &amp;quot;People on the Move&amp;quot; (Pueblo en Marcha) led by Walter Palacios Vinces. Both organizations are not affiliated with the &amp;quot;United Left&amp;quot; (Izquerdia Unida), a Marxist electoral front. They are likely the most ideologically radical and have come closest to grassroots popular organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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For some time, they have proposed and promoted the centralization of these into a National Popular Assembly. After stubborn resistance, other leftist groups had to support this effort in hopes of controlling and politically benefiting from it.&lt;br /&gt;
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From the joint congress of the PDU and People on the Move, a single organization emerged, the &amp;quot;Popular Democratic Union&amp;quot; (Unión Democrática Popular). It is the only leftist group in Peru that has distanced itself from the Shining Path, clarifying its dual nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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The rest of the Peruvian left rejects the Shining Path, as its violence disrupts the social democratic atmosphere they enjoy. However, they prefer to criticize the military fighting the Shining Path with vague slogans like &amp;quot;no to dirty war&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;no to the militarization of the country,&amp;quot; without explaining their meaning or relevance to the reactionary war carried out by the Shining Path in the Peruvian Andes, which has resulted in over 10,000 Indigenous and mestizo deaths from 1980 to October 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
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The DPU, in its official unification congress statement, acknowledges the peasant mobilization achieved by the Shining Path but disagrees with its military structure. Their analysis of the Shining Path led them to distinguish between a political mechanism for peasant mobilization and a military apparatus of destruction. The DPU&#039;s skepticism also confirms the lack of coherence in the Shining Path between its claimed political objectives and its militant actions against the Peruvian nation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This statement is significant because it exposes the essentially military nature of the Shining Path organization. It&#039;s worth noting that the Shining Path doesn&#039;t deny this; on the contrary, it proudly emphasized its military nature. Only its supposed scholars and other supporters argue that it is a Maoist communist political party with ideology and party organization. Some even propose dialogue to understand its combat operations. Such views may be well-intentioned but ultimately seem to be the result of uncritical acceptance of Shining Path propaganda.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that the Shining Path doesn&#039;t have a revolutionary theory and uses communist texts to make incorrect descriptions of Peru&#039;s national reality doesn&#039;t mean it&#039;s not a political phenomenon. It is, but in the sense that it is a group applying an irregular warfare model. It represents a Peruvian variant of modern counterinsurgency theories and is a military organization with goals, strategies, and tactics aimed more at achieving short-term objectives rather than long-term ones.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== The guerrilla model ====&lt;br /&gt;
To better understand the nature of the Shining Path, we&#039;ve had to consider the broader context of global confrontation, within which Peru&#039;s interests, as well as those of Andean and Latin American countries, are at play. It&#039;s also useful to delve into the operational models stemming from existing confrontation doctrines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An explanatory approach to the Shining Path phenomenon can benefit from Richard Dyson&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Guerrilla Game&#039;&#039;, as discussed in Issue 4 of &#039;&#039;The Yale Literary Magazine&#039;&#039;. Dyson, focused on studying the models of insurgency and counterinsurgency, states: &amp;quot;As much as we&#039;d like to, Americans can no longer ignore the unpleasant fact that large parts of the globe have been absorbed by the Soviet empire in recent years. What&#039;s even more unsettling is the evidence that this process is gaining momentum, that significant territorial gains by the Soviets are yet to come, and that if this process isn&#039;t halted, the remaining islands and peninsulas of Western civilization will ultimately become indefensible.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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He continues: &amp;quot;This process of imperial expansion has unfolded with methodical regularity, a dark, repetitive set of Soviet moves and American responses that has all the characteristics of psychological games described by Eric Berne in &#039;Games People Play.&#039; Upon closer examination, we can begin to see it for what it is: a game with a predetermined outcome, engineered by the Soviets and replayed over and over. It&#039;s the Guerrilla Game. Our civilization&#039;s survival depends on our ability to recognize and stop it.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dyson emphasizes that nations, like individuals, tend to act according to repetitive patterns. Some of these behavioral models are what we call &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot;—like Italians who vote their government out every few months, or the Japanese who strive to dominate global markets. There are also other models of growth and achievement, like the Roman Empire before and during Julius Caesar&#039;s reign, or others of decline and self-destruction, slow like the late Roman Empire or fast like Hitler&#039;s Germany.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Again, much like individuals—and here the analogy is particularly sharp—nations can voluntarily break a repetitive behavioral model only if they can perceive that model and accept the idea that it can be changed, and is not part of an unchangeable order. Often, this leap in perception is accompanied by a significant traumatic event.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the strengths of democracies with freedom of thought is their ability to self-examine, to perceive problems that could become overwhelming, and to arrive at solutions through debate. But this flexibility has a downside: the potential to generate internal conflict when trying to pinpoint the real problem or the best solution. If not constructively resolved, such conflict can lead to repetitive, self-destructive behavior—similar to neurosis in an individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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These national conflicts rarely align with Marxist class theory; more often, they appear to be conflicts of values reflecting differences between people from rural or urban areas, individualists or collectivists, and so on. Moreover, these persistent internal conflicts tend to avoid democratic resolution through normal democratic means, the most basic and important of which is voting. Instead, they give rise to endless &#039;yes, but&#039; and &#039;no, but&#039; dialogues, much like those that occur among individuals.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nations or individuals suffering from unresolved conflicts are vulnerable to manipulation, and this is where the idea of the game comes in. Not all psychological games involve conscious manipulation, but the most malicious and damaging ones do: the manipulator spots the weakness, sets up the game to exploit it, controls the game, benefits from the rules, and reaps the desired payoff or &#039;retribution.&#039; The manipulator is not outside the game but is as much a part of it as the unsuspecting victim. One of Berne&#039;s most fascinating insights is that the victim, at least in repetitively played games, also receives retribution. In their case, however, the retribution tends to be &#039;unconscious&#039; and doesn’t appear, on the surface, to be a reward. It is, of course, why the victim keeps coming back for more of the same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We currently find ourselves deeply engrossed in such a game... (80)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Dyson illustrates how the application of the game in the conflicts of Korea and Vietnam had different outcomes. Both were peninsular territories, geographically unified but politically divided in halves, with populations of the same race, creed, and customs. In both instances, there were tactical errors made by the powers involved: resorting to open invasion, where the enemies were their own compatriots—North against South and vice versa. In the first case, the presumed victim state was South Korea; in the second, it was North Vietnam. South Korea was able to strengthen its cohesion and survive as a nation separate from North Korea; Vietnam managed to strengthen its national cohesion and survive as a unified nation. The advantages of these situations fell to the powers manipulating the conflict. The Korean conflict became a regular war, while Vietnam&#039;s Guerrilla War escalated to become a large-scale war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let&#039;s let Dyson show us the Rules of the Guerrilla Game:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;As in every game, and especially in psychological games, the players and their roles are carefully assigned. The first two players are the main antagonists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Manipulator... has invented the game, controls the timing of major events, and receives substantial payoff. The Unwitting... cooperates with the Manipulator&#039;s rules, even in the timing, and receives only a &#039;neurotic&#039; payoff. The Victim State is the prize of the game, the Manipulator’s retribution. The Logistic State. One or more. These are the Manipulator’s satellites located nearby and preferably adjacent to the Victim State.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Revolutionary Front. These forces nominally come from the Victim State. They are complemented by fighters and personnel from the Logistic State, but a sufficient number come from the Victim State to maintain the illusion of being a &#039;national front.&#039; Additionally, there are minor players. Perhaps the most notable of these is usually adjacent to the Victim State; the antagonists agree that it will be a bonus payoff when the Manipulator acquires the Victim State. Laos and Cambodia played this role in the Vietnam Game; Honduras might assume it in the current El Salvador Game. Other minor players include the Chorus. They usually speak in unison and thereby reinforce the game&#039;s rules by chastising the Unwitting if he fails to strictly observe them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main players never refer to the game as a &#039;war,&#039; despite the fact that it has all the characteristics of a war, including actual combat with military and civilian casualties. Preferably, the term &#039;war&#039; is avoided by all parties. But where it does appear, players are ready to explain that the &#039;war&#039; is limited to the Victim State and is actually a &#039;civil war.&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In truth, the most important rule of all—which makes the game work for everyone—is that all action, all suffering, and destruction take place on the turf of the Victim State. Whenever the Unwitting and the Victim State try to carry out any activity that interferes in the Logistic States, they are immediately condemned as aggressors by the Chorus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Manipulator opens the game by moving, either directly or through satellites, weapons, supplies, and personnel to the Logistic State and from there to the Revolutionary Front. The Front uses these resources to carry out escalating terrorism and guerrilla warfare against the Victim State and its military and police forces. The Manipulator’s global propaganda machine describes the &#039;front&#039; as &#039;freedom fighters&#039; rebelling against an oppressive tyranny. The Victim State&#039;s efforts to save itself are condemned as violations of &#039;human rights&#039;; the Front is hailed as heroic and humanitarian; and the Unwitting is warned not to intervene.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here the Game takes one of two forms: The Short Game or the Long Game. &amp;quot;If the Unwitting does not help the Victim State, in most cases the Game is Short... If the Unwitting decides to try to help the Victim State, the Game is Long... &amp;quot;During the growth period, the Guerrilla forces within the Victim State lead to the breakdown of civil order, and consequently an increase in violence on both sides. This gives rise to the argument that the Victim State is unworthy of help and lays the foundation for an eventual withdrawal.&amp;quot; (81)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Dyson, the Guerrilla Game is a mechanism of political warfare developed by the USSR, based on experiences from the Korean and Vietnamese wars, and currently being applied in Central America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given this dominant mechanism, which operates with various variants around the globe, the analyst studies the modification of the model and the possibility of its variation. They aim to come up with new rules that would allow the United States to reverse the Game in any area of Latin America where its security, interests, and influence are at stake.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this context, it&#039;s possible that the United States is applying this model in Peru. Various factors like the rising Quechua-origin population, lack of social services, rapid urbanization, limited industrial development, interests of major powers in Peru&#039;s national resources and their projection into the Pacific Ocean basin, Soviet military assistance to the country, ambitions of neighboring countries, growth of drug trafficking, extreme violence from the Shining Path, and the emergence of a well-equipped TARM&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;[[Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement]], called the &#039;&#039;Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru&#039;&#039; in Spanish. A Marxist guerilla outfit in Peru active in the 80s and 90s.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; guerrilla when Shining Path exhausts its projections, all contribute to this hypothesis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a serious working hypothesis, it&#039;s worth identifying the players of the Game:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Manipulating State: United States&lt;br /&gt;
* Unwitting State: Soviet Union (Cuba-Nicaragua)&lt;br /&gt;
* Victim State: Peru&lt;br /&gt;
* Logistic State: Great Britain, China, Israel, Chile, Ecuador&lt;br /&gt;
* Revolutionary Front: Shining Path plus TARM plus Drug Trafficking Groups&lt;br /&gt;
* Additional Prize State: Bolivia, Colombia&lt;br /&gt;
* Chorus States: OAS countries&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The development of the Model is clearly a Long Game, and would be as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulating State (U.S.) moves arms, ammunition, personnel, and provides military assistance to the Logistics State (Ecuador, Chile, China, Great Britain, Israel).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulating State, using the Revolutionary Front (SP + TARM + Drug Trafficking) and terror, aims to change the behavior and national character of the Victim State to claim it as a prize.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Unwitting State (USSR, Cuba, Nicaragua) supports the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Unwitting State (USSR) supplies military equipment and training to the armed forces of the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Unwitting State (USSR) offers to engage its own forces on a limited scale.&lt;br /&gt;
# This situation of intervention by the Unwitting State (USSR, Cuba, Nicaragua) in the Victim State (Peru) is denounced by the Manipulating State (U.S.), warning against an &amp;quot;endless war.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# The Revolutionary Front (SP, TARM, Drug Trafficking) attacks the Victim State internally with guerrilla warfare and terrorism, to change the national character of the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Logistics State (Great Britain, Israel, China, Chile, Ecuador) warns of Soviet danger in the Victim State (Peru), denouncing the presence of military bases, advisers, political and economic interference, and the promotion of armed subversion in the country.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Additional Prize State (Bolivia, Colombia) will either be a prize for the Manipulating State (U.S.) or the Logistics State (Chile) and will also denounce the Victim State (Peru) as a subversive danger on the continent.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Revolutionary Front (SP, TARM, Drug Trafficking) will cause, instigate, and carry out the killing of thousands to millions of inhabitants in the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Unwitting State (USSR, Cuba) enters the escalation with casualties on its side.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulator State (U.S.) through campaigns, forces the withdrawal of advisors from the Unwitting State (USSR) and also cuts off technical and military assistance to the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulator State (U.S.) may intervene in the Victim State (Peru) to pacify the region.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Revolutionary Front (SP, TARM, Drug Trafficking) will eventually sign a peace agreement with the Unwitting State (Peru), or it will disappear, like the Khmer Rouge or the Montoneros.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Chorus State (OAS) will approve all peace-making measures on the Victim State (Peru) and condemn any extracontinental interference from the Unwitting State (USSR).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulator State (U.S.) will capture the Victim State (Peru), converting it into a satellite and a potential Logistics State for a new Game.&lt;br /&gt;
# Everyone will feel gratified, rewarded, and compensated at the end of the violent game in the Victim State: military equipment will have been destroyed, there will be several million fewer indigenous people and unemployed, and the national character will have new traumatic values originating from the historic violence experienced by the Victim State.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This outlook could have other variants if it relates to other Guerrilla Games in the region or if combined with other geopolitical variables and power dynamics of major nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is this imagination? Fiction? Invention? None of that. We must conclude that there are many real facts that don&#039;t allow us to dismiss the existence of these political warfare mechanisms. If one carefully and scientifically compares the game variables with actual events and developments in Peru, it becomes clear they fit the moves of the game. This can&#039;t be considered mere coincidence but rather veiled mechanisms of insurgency and counterinsurgency operating at higher strategic levels. Intelligence here serves to subtly manipulate perceptions and impose will, making the enemy destroy itself in the bloodiest way possible while believing they are being saved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is Peru not in flames? Aren&#039;t Peruvians killing each other? Isn&#039;t Peru caught in a whirlwind of campaigns and counter-campaigns? The Shining Path terrorists wreak havoc and kill; paramilitary forces compete with them; the military employs counter-revolutionary Warfare with their 1945 Manuals; Shining Path propagandists complete their propaganda maneuvers for the first Congress of the Shining Path; in the TARM they disguise themselves as Cubans or Nicaraguans in drug trafficking zones to wage guerrilla warfare; the radicalized right announces the fall of the government in mass chants imported from Pinochet&#039;s Chile. Also, there has been someone who managed to get the entire official Peruvian community to &amp;quot;hold a minute of silence for peace&amp;quot; on a predetermined day and time to soothe the conscience of a lost ruling class amid irregular warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Organization ====&lt;br /&gt;
Like the Angka of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, it&#039;s said that the organization of the Shining Path is invisible but felt; it acts and has grown. However, this is not entirely true; their actions have outlined their shape, providing enough evidence for an increasingly complete understanding of the Shining Path’s organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a paper, James Anderson, an advisor at Control &amp;amp; Risk and a member of the Institute for Terrorism Studies in London, notes: &amp;quot;The growth of the Shining Path becomes more problematic when considering some of its main features: its unique ideology, extreme secrecy, lack of external support or sympathy, sectarianism and xenophobia, extreme cruelty, and its attraction and magnetism as a response to the age-old problem of the peasantry.&amp;quot;(82)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although not necessarily intended by Anderson, in one way or another, the &amp;quot;main features&amp;quot; he attributes to the Shining Path correspond doctrinally to each of the six wars or types of war that comprise Political Warfare:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Ideological War - &amp;quot;Unique Ideology&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Strategic War - &amp;quot;Extreme Secrecy&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Organizational War - &amp;quot;Lack of External Support or Sympathy&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Psychological War - &amp;quot;Sectarianism and Xenophobia&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Intelligence War - &amp;quot;Extreme Cruelty&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Mass War - &amp;quot;Magnetism as a Response&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Each of the features is part of the texture of the Shining Path and results from its actions in different areas of unconventional warfare. These features are also manifestations of the internal contradictions within its structure and its interaction with the concrete reality. They form the discernible profile of the organization, allowing Anderson to conclude that the Shining Path is &amp;quot;an essentially Peruvian, more precisely Andean, phenomenon.&amp;quot; Its &amp;quot;ideological purity, not to mention its bloodthirsty nature, has placed it at the farthest and most isolated end of the political left. It is almost certain to remain there, completely on the margins of everything else... if it threatens and continues to threaten the existence of the Peruvian State. What it does seriously threaten is the continuation of a genuinely democratic government in Peru... it should be said that if it succeeds in destroying the democratic regime, the Shining Path will only be part of the causes of that destruction.&amp;quot; (83)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path is merely the &amp;quot;tip of the iceberg,&amp;quot; a variable phenomenon between the stability of the State and the destabilization of the government. For Peruvians, it seems to be more. It&#039;s an organization fueling an escalating destruction of their especially Andean, Quechua nationality. Regardless of this last point, we have cited Anderson because he views the Shining Path from an objective angle, different from that of the Senderologists in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path organization stands out as a machine designed to plan and execute irregular warfare operations, and nothing more. All its ideology, strategy, and organic structure are geared toward that. So, it&#039;s important to make some clarifications concerning what others understand as the organization of the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, one cannot simply accept as universally true the Shining Path&#039;s supposed organizational aspirations: A nascent new democratic republic with its support bases, an ongoing class front, and a people&#039;s guerrilla army fighting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, one can&#039;t strictly adhere to the research and conclusions of Senderologists and eulogists of the Shining Path, as doing so could lead to misunderstandings. Many of these social researchers, both from Peru and other countries, have become a sort of mimetic amplifier for the group, acting as imaginative propagandists. Their work has consequently helped shape the Shining Path mythos.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These researchers have outlined a social base, consisting of popular committees and support bases that run along the Peruvian highlands, from the Ecuadorian border in the north to the Bolivian border in the south. They also claim that the Shining Path is completing a significant organizational phase with its First National Congress set for early 1988. This Congress is expected to address five major aspects: 1) The International Line; 2) The Democratic Revolution; 3) Military Thought; 4) Line of Construction of the Three Instruments; and 5) Mass Line. (84)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such views, aimed at promoting the organization both organically and politically for export, should not mislead us. The central leadership does not admit congresses or plenaries; thus, the opinions of the Shining Path apologists should not be taken as authoritative, especially knowing they form part of the group&#039;s psychological dimension aimed at confusing the enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path is focusing its organizational efforts on popular committees, encountering many limitations due to the simultaneous levels within a single committee, which comprises &amp;quot;The organizing committee of the popular committee, the reorganizing committee, the parallel popular committee, the clandestine popular committee, and the open popular committee.&amp;quot; Their primary effort is in creating not the party, but the &amp;quot;People&#039;s Guerrilla Army with its three parts: Main Force, Local Force, Base Force.&amp;quot; (85) These elements, motivated by the myth of &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought,&amp;quot; provide the Shining Path with the operational capacity for irregular combat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
James Anderson, in the section of his work dealing with Structure and Personnel, objectively notes that the Shining Path operates through a closed cell structure. A Shining Path cell usually has between 5 and 9 members and typically does not operate in its native region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Each cell is unaware of the orders given to other cells, and even the identities of other members within their own cell. Only one member of the cell has vertical communication with the leadership. Each cell has a leader (&#039;&#039;responsable político&#039;&#039;), two explosives experts, a physical training instructor, and a political ideologue. Within this cell structure, Shining Path personnel are divided into five distinct roles:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Pre-militants&lt;br /&gt;
# Militants&lt;br /&gt;
# Military Personnel&lt;br /&gt;
# Organizers&lt;br /&gt;
# Leaders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The activities of pre-militants, militants, and military personnel, operating separately in their respective cells, are coordinated by leaders of sub-zones or sectors. For example, Lima is divided into five sub-zones: north, south, east, west, and central. These are overseen by zonal directors who in turn report to a regional committee. All planning and communications between zones are handled by a Coordination Committee. This committee and the Regional Committees are controlled by the Political Bureau, which sets the group&#039;s norms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like all guerrilla groups, the cells have a dual command structure: military and political. The military is subordinate to the political at all times, except during the execution of an armed action. Operational members are given their weapons and explosives shortly before an action starts, and these are returned afterward at predetermined locations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s impossible to determine the exact number of Shining Path members. They blend into society and are recruited from various groups: peasants, workers, miners, students, street vendors, domestic workers, and industrial laborers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The extreme youth of many Shining Path militants, some as young as 14 or 15 in rural areas, represents a significant and concerning future potential. (86)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Application of political warfare ====&lt;br /&gt;
The goal of political operations is to gain public support and destroy the enemy in all social dimensions. The Shining Path generally follows some rules in applying this, such as allocating 30% of effort to military matters and 70% to political issues. On a tactical level, the effort against the enemy should also be 30%, with 70% focused on the rear guard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political warfare is carried out in a unified manner across six divisions: ideology, strategy, organization, intelligence, psychology, and mass mobilization. According to military operations, there&#039;s both a strategic and a tactical use of political warfare in each of these areas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proper application of political warfare aims to mobilize large masses with a few irregular forces and a single direction, strengthened by strong ideological ties. There&#039;s no democratic centralism or traditional party functions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These general and specific conditions of the application of political warfare can be clearly located and identified in the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Ideological warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
In this type of warfare, the aim is to solidify a central ideological system that serves as the &amp;quot;spiritual armament&amp;quot; capable of confronting and destroying the ideologies of the adversary. Shining Path has developed a system based on the Guiding Thought, reached through the mechanisms of the Two-Line Struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Among the forms of struggle that the Shining Path employs, the Two-Line Struggle is the most important, as it is a mechanism for internal ideological control and self-control. It&#039;s the internal struggle within the group to maintain unity and cohesion based on the unquestionable acceptance of the ideological framework.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In July 1971, the Shining Path published a pamphlet titled &#039;&#039;Bases for the History of the Party&#039;&#039;, in which point 3 states the History of the PCP: Two-Line Struggle, Struggle for Constitution, Struggle for Establishing the Base of Party Unity, Struggle for Pre-Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These phases or stages designated for the organization of Shining Path&#039;s irregular warfare apparatus are marked by the main mechanism of execution, the Two-Line Struggle. Everything that Shining Path leaders do at all organizational levels will be governed by this principle. &amp;quot;The experience of armed struggle shows that the struggle between two lines has its points of antagonism, which intensify when trying to take stock, thereby concluding and laying the groundwork for another plan; in this sense, it is understandable that the struggle sharpens... The Two-Line Struggle is nothing but class struggle within the Party; it is like war, but without weapons; it is waged with ideas...&amp;quot; (87). &amp;quot;Agreeably, the Two-Line Struggle is necessary to maintain the unity of the party and develop armed struggle. In general, the main danger is revisionism, although the party continues to simply develop against right-wing criteria, opinions, attitudes, and positions&amp;quot; (88).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Two-Line Struggle is expressed against both rightism and left-wing deviations (revisionism). In Shining Path cell meetings, even the most unintentional slip-up by any participant is interpreted as a right or left deviation and requires immediate correction according to the Guiding Thought. Participants go to the extent of criticism, mutual criticism, and censure for these presumed deviations. The mechanism seeks self-incrimination first, followed by total submission to Shining Path principles. New members not only purify themselves by denouncing supposed mistakes but also naively believe that this activity is part of the class struggle &amp;quot;within the party.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight against rightism is promoted and carried out in peasant, proletarian, and petty-bourgeois social strata, among different subdivisions of the exploited classes. Here, violent confrontation is encouraged between the poorest and the relatively rich. The struggle is not between social classes defined by their relation to the means of production and power, but between sub-groups of the most impoverished strata.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, the internal Two-Line Struggle within the Shining Path apparatus is not directed against expressions of bourgeois or capitalist thoughts, which would be unacceptable, but mainly against all forms of Marxist expression and presence. They condemn the entire international communist movement, attacking it as Soviet, Chinese, or Albanian revisionism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path claims to create ideological contradictions within Marxist currents themselves. They say the Soviets &amp;quot;were the first to start their sinister attack against Marxism-Leninism… they have fought all the developments made by Chairman Mao on Marxism-Leninism...they have turned against revolutionary violence, abandoned class struggle and proposed peaceful revolution.&amp;quot; They hold that &amp;quot;Chinese revisionism has a long history,&amp;quot; arguing that after Chairman Mao&#039;s death, although they have scientifically established Mao Zedong Thought, they haven&#039;t actually developed it but rather revised it, ultimately denying Mao, Marx, and Lenin. They state that there has been an ideological reorganization in China based on revisionism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They also condemn Enver Hoxha of Albania for falsely analyzing Chairman Mao&#039;s thought, claiming it to be &amp;quot;an amalgamation of ideologies, starting from anarchism, Trotskyism, revisionism, Titoism, etc.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path adds, &amp;quot;All these are open forms of revisionism against Maoism. But also, those who, while defending Chairman Mao, assume covert revisionist forms that lead them to go against Maoism; in these people, there are different criteria, divergent ways, questioning of the classics behind the idea that every man can be wrong... we must defend the purity of dialectical development, through its three stages, involving three leaps: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism&amp;quot; (89).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As one can see, the all-encompassing Shining Path sees itself as capable of waging a sectarian and destructive opposition against all Marxist currents from another supposed extreme and pure Marxist position, referred to as &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Guiding Thought,&amp;quot; complementing Marx-Lenin-Mao. This &amp;quot;Guiding Thought,&amp;quot; considered the pinnacle of Marxist ideology, leaves no room for debate. Guzmán says &amp;quot;dialogue is poison.&amp;quot; According to the principle of the Two-Line Struggle, their guiding thought &amp;quot;has no friends, only enemies and adherents.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Two-Line Struggle, as a psychological mechanism for self-incrimination, leads to a form of dogmatic thinking where initiates end up believing that their falsehoods and sophistries are indisputable truths. Thus, Shining Path members acquire a combination of ideological stability, fanatical belief and conviction with the ability to react on impulse rather than reason, to defend their principles and to wage ideological war against other doctrines. This gives them the advantage of essentially being a &amp;quot;Trojan Horse&amp;quot; within the socialist and nationalist currents in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Two-Line Struggle allows the Shining Path to maintain the &amp;quot;purity&amp;quot; of their internal ideology and, more than anything, to preserve their single line of leadership. Among other things, it enabled Guzmán to eliminate &amp;quot;David&amp;quot; in 1980 for opposing the start of the armed struggle; to later restore control of the Metropolitan Committee of Lima by accusing &amp;quot;Pedro&amp;quot; of being a member of the TARM and of right-wing opportunist deviations; and to establish himself as the only true and consistent interpreter of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism at the Fourth National Conference of the Shining Path in July 1986. There, the resolution on the twelfth issue, &#039;&#039;How We Can Develop People&#039;s War&#039;&#039;, clarified that the Guiding Thought was not the fourth stage: &amp;quot;...we cannot confuse Maoism with Guiding Thought; first, we talk about universal truth and then about its applications. Maoism is the third stage, and we will not give an inch on this point, deviations into the swamp of opportunism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Regarding the Guiding Thought, there&#039;s an attempt to separate it from &amp;quot;President Gonzalo.&amp;quot; The thought can&#039;t be detached from a person until they have died; separating the two is a mistake and implies a change in direction. In terms of our specific situation, it is a development confined to our country, with a focus on guiding the revolution in Peru as a whole. There is no document stating that the Guiding Thought is the fourth stage because it&#039;s not a reality. What people should know is that there is Marx, Lenin, and Mao.”(90)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, by September 1987, Guzmán&#039;s egocentrism had progressed in his intent to establish himself as the fourth stage of the global revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Continuing the development of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, &#039;President Gonzalo&#039; upholds, defends, and applies our undefeated and unwithering ideology, making Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, &#039;Gonzalo Thought,&#039; the basis of unity for the Party. This drives the Peruvian revolution and contributes to the global revolution. &#039;Gonzalo Thought&#039; is the main thing we need to face, as it guarantees success, leading us to democratic revolution, socialist revolution, and cultural revolutions all the way to communism.&amp;quot;(91)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path&#039;s ideological exclusivity is a fundamental pattern of behavior: &amp;quot;We have entered a tough ideological battle, in terms of having sanctioned &#039;Guiding Thought,&#039; which is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism applied to our reality. We will have a lot of struggle to establish this, a fight for ideological hegemony.&amp;quot;(92)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The struggle for the hegemony of &amp;quot;Guiding Thought&amp;quot; has two opposing viewpoints: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Shining Path leaders see this &amp;quot;thought&amp;quot; as &amp;quot;a correct application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Peruvian reality.&amp;quot; &lt;br /&gt;
# Guzmán, along with his followers and admirers, have long been campaigning to establish that &amp;quot;Guzmán&#039;s Thought&amp;quot; is the &amp;quot;Fourth Stage,&amp;quot; thereby aiming to amplify the Gonzalo myth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ideological system of the Shining Path consists of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# A set of propaganda outlines tied to a central ideological principle: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. These include concepts such as &amp;quot;correct application,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;contribution to the world revolution,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;discoveries of the laws of dialectics in our reality,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;discovery of bureaucratic capitalism,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;guarantee of success in democratic, socialist, and cultural revolution,&amp;quot; as well as &amp;quot;unfading ideology.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# A psychological mechanism of &amp;quot;group dynamics&amp;quot; and blame-generation that acts on the innate aspects of the initiates&#039; personalities. This involves tendencies, instincts, impulses, habits, will, and reflexes. In this way, the unconscious parts of the personality are sensitized, achieving unconscious obedience and mechanical, forceful behaviors that have become classic among Shining Path militants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary, this is the ideological warfare apparatus of the Shining Path that produces cadres that are &amp;quot;prepared for action,&amp;quot; with &amp;quot;respect for their own hierarchies,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;high morale and austere life,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;self-destructive feelings,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;rigid behavior,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;disregard for life.&amp;quot; (93) In other words, irregular soldiers confident in their &amp;quot;truth&amp;quot; and capable of destroying others&#039; ideas. They hold a fanatical ideology riddled with simplistic motivations and a lack of scientific political theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Marxist-like publications and statements of the Shining Path have no connection with national reality and only serve to mask the true essence of their reactionary ideology. This ideology is prefabricated with formulas from modern neo-behavioral psychology and is presumably set up by CIA provocateurs skilled in creating insurgencies in third-world countries like Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Strategic warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
In employing this kind of war, the Shining Path aims for a sound strategic policy and a military strategy that gives them the advantage in offense and consolidation. The goal is to make the enemy (the Peruvian state) falter in its strategies and plans, rendering it perpetually incapable of defense. The enemy is thus led into a disorganized and scattered deployment of its resources, confined to a flawed defensive strategy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In simple terms, it&#039;s about using the best judgment, common sense, or tact to win irregular warfare and to &amp;quot;bend the enemy&#039;s mind.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the achievements of the Shining Path&#039;s strategic warfare, specifically by its scientific manipulators, is in having constructed &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Guiding Thought&amp;quot; as if it were a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist system of ideas, which it is not. This serves two counter-insurgent purposes: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# To push Marxist currents towards violent action, and &lt;br /&gt;
# To pit the State against both Marxist and non-Marxist socialist currents, as well as against military and Quechua nationalism that have emerged in Peru over the past twenty years, altering social structures with the participation of social democratic and Christian democratic tendencies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, this strategic accomplishment has become one of the Shining Path&#039;s most severe internal limitations and contradictions. Firstly, &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; has never existed as a theory; it is more like a form of thaumaturgy that can unite Shining Path followers in a trance-like state leading to their deaths, thereby becoming a real myth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In an analysis published by the Peruvian magazine &#039;&#039;Socialism and Participation&#039;&#039;, Jesús Granados uncovers the sequence of key concepts in Guiding Thought, their relations, and significance within the Shining Path&#039;s semantics. These concepts then form a conditioning mechanism similar to that found in American religious sects:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Mao = A single spark can start a prairie fire&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;A Shining Path Member = I am ready to cross the river of blood&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Statement by the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path = The leadership is with you in the supreme moment of total surrender to the purifying fire of Armed Struggle&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Slogan of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path  = Die to invent the subjective myth.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Fire - Invincible Fire - River of Blood - Death - Purifying Myth - Purifying Fire.&amp;quot;(94)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path operates on a fanatical strategic concept, with an ideological system that essentially encourages triumph through death for its own defense. This conceptual base clearly shows the Kantian influence on Guzmán Reinoso and helps to explain the collective suicide-murder event of July 1986 in Lima&#039;s prisons where more than 300 Shining Path members orchestrated their deaths to &amp;quot;Seal the Great Leap&amp;quot; in their own jargon, meaning to complete the plan of &amp;quot;Conquering Bases&amp;quot; and initiate the plan of &amp;quot;Consolidating Bases.&amp;quot; The Shining Path managed to create a myth, the &amp;quot;Day of Heroism,&amp;quot; and led the Peruvian government and its armed forces into a tragic repressive strategic error. These forces became victims, both immediately and in the long term, of the consequences of this action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the psychological mechanism is wearing thin. The Shining Path increasingly finds itself isolated in the far-left spectrum of violence, revealing its true nature of reactionary terrorism useful to the most reactionary right-wing in Peru and the world. On the other hand, progressive, Marxist, and Christian social groups have distanced or are distancing themselves from the Shining Path, making it nearly impossible to suggest any current affiliation with the group.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only ultra-conservative minorities and CIA agents in serving their own interests and looking for exoneration, can continue to assert that the terrorism carried out by the Shining Path is communist revolutionary warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a second stage, it should be considered that the forces unleashed by the Shining Path&#039;s actions in recent years have created a new situation demanding improvements in the subtle and subjective manipulation mechanisms devised by CIA behaviorist and neo-behaviorist psychologists. In this regard, experts on the Shining Path, violence analysts, and proponents of &amp;quot;Guiding Thought&amp;quot; have circulated a document called &amp;quot;Discussion Bases&amp;quot; for a First National Congress of the Shining Path. The aim is clear: to formalize the chatter and Marxist talk of recent years so that &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; continues to meet the same objectives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another cornerstone of the Shining Path&#039;s strategic warfare is the use of secrecy and silence. These elements provide maximum security for their organization and operations; they effectively promote dogmatism and the group&#039;s theoretical infallibility, blocking any form of discussion, verification, or confrontation. Outsiders will always be the ones discussing the Shining Path, thus helping to maintain its myth and Unified Leadership as major mobilizing factors akin to religious inspiration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other part of this type of warfare, designed to mislead &amp;quot;the enemy,&amp;quot; involves encouraging those who fight the Shining Path to use the same elements of secrecy, silence, and this time, &amp;quot;official&amp;quot; clandestinity. The advice at the highest levels will always be to maintain utmost secrecy and give every action a military character and classification. The mistake occurs when one tries to combat the group in the same manner but without taking the initiative. Losing the initiative under these circumstances only allows the Shining Path to make public what it wants through its armed propaganda, while preventing the population from breaking its silence and secrecy to end its clandestine operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The real and fictitious objectives of the Shining Path are crucial in this strategic war. Experts must handle this aspect carefully, especially due to the global nature of the operation. We&#039;re dealing with a large-scale, Low-Intensity Operation aimed at counterinsurgency. One mistake and the objectives can flip on its head, serving the insurgency instead. English, American, and French experiences show many failures, except for British successes in Malaysia, Kenya, and the French in Chad and the Red Sea. So far, Political Warfare and its Low-Intensity Operations have shown great efficiency in destroying social structures but have always been political failures; in the case of the CIA, they&#039;ve been loud and scandalous failures. However, even for its own benefit, the American Administration can&#039;t correct this policy due to the inherent decline of the system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To what extent is the Shining Path&#039;s supposed grand objective of building the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy true, as propagated by its supporters and experts?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There&#039;s a stratagem at play, which is to make the &amp;quot;enemy&amp;quot; (the Peruvian state) fight against fictitious objectives while the Shining Path achieves real objectives. According to them, the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy, the New State (an exact copy of the original Maoist model in all its documents), will be reached through the &amp;quot;Construction of The Three Instruments of the Revolution&amp;quot; (also an exact copy of Maoism): &amp;quot;The Party, which is the main form of organization, the army, and the Front, which is the third instrument. All these three instruments are for taking power.&amp;quot; (95)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shining Path documents point out that Chairman Mao considered the Chinese Communist Party, the Red Army and the new State &amp;quot;as independent,&amp;quot; while &amp;quot;Chairman Gonzalo,&amp;quot; developing this &amp;quot;tremendous contribution,&amp;quot; discovers &amp;quot;concentric development&amp;quot; and its laws: centering on the Party, surrounding it with the People&#039;s Guerrilla Army, and on the periphery the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This approach actually distances itself from the Maoist &amp;quot;democratic centralism&amp;quot; and Mao&#039;s strategic coordination of revolutionary warfare. Guzmán Reinoso&#039;s concept of concentric development is a strategic subtlety that is closely related to two aspects: defining the strategic and intermediate objectives of the Shining Path and conducting operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Peruvian state is led to believe that the Shining Path&#039;s true strategic objective is the construction of the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy, while its Front and Support Bases would be the intermediate objectives that must be destroyed to prevent the advent of communism. No further reasoning is needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The real aim of the Shining Path is the systematic destruction of Peruvian society through violence and genocide. This is done by provoking actions from the &amp;quot;People&#039;s Guerrilla Army,&amp;quot; the &amp;quot;Support Bases,&amp;quot; and the &amp;quot;Popular Fronts.&amp;quot; Their methods involve irregular terrorist operations carried out by these groups, which infiltrate or develop in both urban and rural social foundations in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The time has come, comrades, the time has come. It&#039;s time for a great break. We will sever everything that ties us to the old, rotten order to completely destroy it. For if we have any interest in this decaying world, we won&#039;t be able to destroy it.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Men, individually speaking, may be weak, but the revolution is all-powerful, and the armed revolution even more so. It relies on the masses, the strength of the earth, and is guided by the Party, the light of the universe.&amp;quot;(96)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Shining Path&#039;s unique strategy, the most crucial aspect is how they conceal the management of their operations. There exists an Irregular High Command with a physical Operations Center, hidden either domestically or abroad. What matters is that their actions are executed here and now.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This concealment occurs under the euphemisms of &amp;quot;concentric construction,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Unified Leadership,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Communist Party of Peru,&amp;quot; which also ensure unconditional proselytism and prior acceptance of the myth and mystery. For this reason, the Unified Leadership of the Shining Path is central and accepted: &amp;quot;The only approved form of leadership for tackling work is to submit to a single will. In the end, the issue is one of having a single leader.&amp;quot; (97)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path reaffirms: &amp;quot;We are based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, &#039;Thought of Gonzalo,&#039; primarily &#039;Thought of Gonzalo.&#039; This is the ideology of the proletariat, the highest expression of humanity, the only true, scientific, and invincible one... We have the general political line of the revolution, which means the laws that govern the class struggle for the seizure of power; established by Chairman Gonzalo... The military line is the core of the general political line... And we maintain ideological, political, and organizational independence, relying on our own efforts and the masses. The Shining Path is the “new type of party generated by the Leader of the Peruvian revolution, Chairman Gonzalo, the greatest living Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, who leads the party.”(98)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of this strategy, in this case, leads to the acceptance of a political-doctrinal proposition that doesn&#039;t really have any valid theoretical foundation. Nevertheless, it must be considered true within a process of convincing based more on faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reality is that the tactical operations are conducted by a group of Shining Path irregulars, mostly neurotic, compulsive believers, and followers of the &amp;quot;greatest living Marxist-Leninist-Maoist.&amp;quot; They pretend to be a single political party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another real aspect is the existence of the Shining Path Operative Command, concealed behind a mythical personality: Gonzalo.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this purpose, a very detailed biography of the supposed leader of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán Reinoso, has been fabricated, from his birth in southern Peru, in the port of Mollendo, Arequipa, on December 3, 1934, to the complete change of his personality to embody &amp;quot;President Gonzalo.&amp;quot; His life, portrayed as a succession of outstanding qualities and remarkable achievements, leads inexorably to the acceptance of the myth. Even a critical scholar of Shining Path, like Manuel Jesús Granados, comes to accept Guzmán&#039;s transfiguration (&amp;quot;he will no longer be the same&amp;quot;), probably because he misunderstands the perspective—Guzmán is not the maker; he is the product of Shining Path&#039;s irregular warfare. Guzmán remains a real and concrete man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although this is not about constructing Guzmán Reinoso&#039;s biography, it&#039;s worth knowing that he received a Falangist, fascist educational formation at the most exclusive and classist school in Arequipa, run by the Christian Brothers of Saint John the Baptist de La Salle. There, to maintain his dignity, he had to confront Brother José, a small Galician with an overbite, who was remembered with repulsion among the La Salle promotions of those times. Guzmán&#039;s extremely neurotic personality always manifested itself in excessive neatness, narcissism, and intellectual self-sufficiency—a last faculty that has often been confused with extraordinary lucidity. Consistent with his Lasallian education, Guzmán embraced Kantian philosophy. His investigations into Marxism initially served to perfect Kantian thought, modernize it, or surpass it in terms of the &amp;quot;conception of space,&amp;quot; and later, as a &amp;quot;truth&amp;quot; to translate or convert his Kantian ideal into a movement capable of serving as a means and form to attain eternity through purifying death.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be noted that there is nothing significant or remarkable in Guzmán&#039;s biography, except that he abstains from tobacco entirely and is enthusiastic about sexual promiscuity, which is hidden, with the young vestals who serve him with loyalty and passion. Many of them were interrogated by the Peruvian police, and not a few were taken into judicial proceedings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no abrupt change in the personality of the Shining Path leader. On the contrary, there is a very human realization consistent with his personal aspirations. It is logical for him to abandon his enthusiastic support for Belaúnde and his membership in Acción Popular (Popular Action), as well as the job he performed so effectively at the Offices of Popular Cooperation in the town of Chocita, 60 kilometers east of the Peruvian capital. These are trivial details that the myth does not need. However, within the same populist line, his destiny was more nihilistic. Anyone who seriously investigates the factors that contributed to the peculiar formation of Guzmán Reinoso can understand how he reaches his current paranoid and messianic personality, which, diluted in the prefabricated myth, serves to conceal the Shining Path&#039;s leadership. Guzmán Reinoso doesn&#039;t become, nor does he make &amp;quot;President Gonzalo&amp;quot; in the class struggle. He has definitely never set foot in a labor union, has never led a local or national labor strike, has never participated in open debates of the University Federations, and was not a partisan political leader. His past is not part of the national political scene, nor was he a combative theorist and public dissident of the Peruvian Communist Party. Guzmán&#039;s political personality is subtly veiled in the later stages of the factional struggle of Peruvian communism, rooted in Ayacucho. He appears more as a methodical instructor of pre-university students and secondary school students at the Colegio de Aplicación Huaman Poma de Ayala. The class struggle never led Guzmán into exile or long imprisonments. In this field, his political life includes brief judicial and police detentions, on June 26 1970, October 23 1981, and February 19 1982. On these last two occasions, he was – strangely – interrogated and released by the police when it was supposed that he was the subject of relentless persecution and his life was in danger for having unleashed the armed struggle in 1980.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Organizational warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
In the use of this type of warfare, the Shining Path makes every possible effort to consolidate its tangible and intangible organizations in all fields: economic, political, social, military, in such a way that it achieves maximum efficiency and coordination, and prevents the &amp;quot;enemy&amp;quot; from infiltrating its ranks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From another perspective, it exerts every effort to infiltrate and sabotage the Peruvian state (the &amp;quot;enemy&amp;quot;) in all fields, in order to place its organizations in an imminent situation of chaos and collapse.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A fundamental principle of this type of warfare is the destruction of enemy organizations in coordination with military warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen how the &amp;quot;military line is the center and the political line is the general.&amp;quot; This principle reflects the irregular military character of the centralized Shining Path organization under the Unified Leadership, which is covered by the euphemisms of &amp;quot;democratic centralism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;the Party as the center.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path is an intangible organization: the organic follows the political, and taking into account that the line alone is not enough, simultaneously, organic structures must be established, considering the organic structure, the organic system, and party work. The organic structure of the Party is based on democratic centralism, primarily on centralism; two armed party networks are established, the territorial network that covers a jurisdiction, and the mobile network whose structure is mobile. The organic system is the distribution of forces in relation to the main and secondary points where the revolution operates. Party work involves the relationship between secret work, which is primary, and open work; the importance of the five requirements: democratic centralism, clandestinity, discipline, surveillance, and secrecy, particularly democratic centralism (99).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The military axis is composed of the so-called People&#039;s Guerrilla Army, which is supposed to incorporate popular militias, organizing them into three forces: the main force, local forces, and grassroots forces. However, the agreement reached at the second plenary of the Shining Path on December 3, 1979, to form the Company of the First Division of the Red Army, remained a mere declaration but no less important. The organization of the Shining Path consists of irregular platoons that can become occasional guerrillas in rural areas and sabotage or annihilation squads in urban areas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that the intangible organization proposed theoretically by the Shining Path is not a reality does not diminish the power, operational capacity, and presence of the Shining Path military apparatus, which continues to operate in Peru with great efficiency and offensive advantage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tangible organization of the Shining Path is made up of what they call the generated bodies, whose organization was agreed upon in July 1973, at the third plenary of the Shining Path. These bodies include the Movement of Workers and Classist Workers; Movement of Poor Peasants; Movement of Democratic Lawyers; Classist Neighborhood Movement; Revolutionary Student Front; Secondary Revolutionary Student Front; Popular Women&#039;s Movement; Single Union of Peruvian Education Workers; Popular Relief; Internationalist Support Committees abroad; Internationalist Revolutionary Movement (MRI), based in London.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Interestingly, it has been outside of Peru and in countries such as the United States, England, France, Spain, and Sweden, that public activity of the Shining Path has been most strongly felt. In these countries, there are base committees of the Shining Path that operate openly and publicly, acting as resonating elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within Peru, the Shining Path operates isolated from the masses, especially in urban areas. For this reason, their successes have been limited to certain progress in the educational, student, judicial, and welfare sectors, all of which display characteristics of opportunism and petit-bourgeois frustration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the rural areas where the military axis of the Shining Path holds sway, especially in the mountainous regions subject to political-military states of emergency, the compulsory organization of Popular Committees, the construction of Support Bases following the destruction of small towns and Andean or edge-of-the-jungle communities, and the irregular platoons have succeeded in influencing populations such as those in Ayacucho and Huanta. They have managed to establish a general base of support for Shining Path&#039;s activities. This allows the Shining Path to maintain the initiative in irregular warfare in these areas and resume its plans for forming Support Bases, especially in areas with limited communication routes that are disconnected from state entities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The logistical organization of the Shining Path is of a non-tangible nature and is linked to the drug trade. Reasons that support this hypothesis:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# If the facts strongly confirm that the Shining Path is a product of Western intelligence systems to deactivate nationalist, civilian, and military currents in the country, the CIA plays a predominant role in this action. Consequently, the DEA, the other intelligence agency for drug trafficking, which in Peru, as in Colombia and Bolivia, has an army of agents, cannot be disconnected from such activities.&lt;br /&gt;
# The map of subversion in Peru shows the &amp;quot;People&#039;s Guerrilla Army&amp;quot; operating in the Ayacuchan province of La Mar and southward in the coca-growing valleys of Cusco, with a projection towards Bolivia, particularly centered around the processing of cocaine in Cachipucará, Puno. The extension of the Shining Path&#039;s actions to Tingo Maria, Huanuco, and the entire Upper Huallaga, as well as the appearance of TARM guerrillas in San Martin, along with the advance of the Shining Path along the Ucayali River towards the north, leaves no doubt about the coincidence of the movements of the Shining Path and, more recently, the TARM, with the drug trafficking map and its projection on international routes.&lt;br /&gt;
# Here is a summary of the actions carried out by the Shining Path&#039;s irregular forces during the specified months and years:(100)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;Year&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;January&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;May&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;June&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;July&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;August&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;December&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1982&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|75&lt;br /&gt;
|142&lt;br /&gt;
|33&lt;br /&gt;
|151&lt;br /&gt;
|150&lt;br /&gt;
|157&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1983&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|138&lt;br /&gt;
|236&lt;br /&gt;
|246&lt;br /&gt;
|320&lt;br /&gt;
|201&lt;br /&gt;
|177&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1984&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|206&lt;br /&gt;
|185&lt;br /&gt;
|154&lt;br /&gt;
|387&lt;br /&gt;
|173&lt;br /&gt;
|156&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1985&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|76&lt;br /&gt;
|315&lt;br /&gt;
|320&lt;br /&gt;
|283&lt;br /&gt;
|270&lt;br /&gt;
|329&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1986&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|175&lt;br /&gt;
|265&lt;br /&gt;
|339&lt;br /&gt;
|290&lt;br /&gt;
|201&lt;br /&gt;
|210&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1987&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|190&lt;br /&gt;
|245&lt;br /&gt;
|206&lt;br /&gt;
|214&lt;br /&gt;
|230&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
The constant pattern in this scenario is that the actions of the Shining Path&#039;s irregular forces start low at the beginning of the year but then significantly increase  from May to August, maintaining some stability before decreasing again. This implies a symptomatic coincidence with the periods of coca harvesting and drying along with the periods of &amp;quot;subversive reactivation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# In 1986, Peruvian media graphically displayed an understanding between drug traffickers and Shining Path irregulars, with an apparent dispute emerging between the Shining Path and the TARM for control of the coca-growing zone in Huallaga at the end of the year. By then, the Shining Path had openly acknowledged advocating for the rights of coca-planting peasants and had practically occupied the towns along the jungle&#039;s marginal road from Tingo Maria to Tocache.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the eastern slopes of the Peruvian Andes, more than 200,000 peasants are engaged in coca cultivation, whose export value in just 1986 was estimated at over 4 billion dollars. It is well-known and verified that the Shining Path collected fees from coca growers and drug traffickers. The latter have access to a network of nearly a hundred airports that have not been destroyed, fleets of modern boats for navigation on the Amazon rivers of Peru and Colombia, especially. The air network facilitates comfortable and permanent movements to the English islands in the Caribbean, the United States, and England, which are central to the international organization of the Shining Path, the International Revolutionary Movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the organization of the Shining Path, with a significantly unconventional infrastructure that acts destructively against official institutions and social and production organizations in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As is the case everywhere, the social structure of the Peruvian state is composed of tangible, stable, and conventional organizations and institutions. Its structure is easily penetrable and, therefore, vulnerable to the destructive actions of the irregulars of the Shining Path, who employ forms of warfare different from those used by the state for its development and survival.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shining Path irregulars use guerrilla warfare, sabotage, annihilation, and armed propaganda. According to one of their documents, the Shining Path admits to having acted against the Peruvian social organization between June 1984 and the same month in 1986 in the following way: &amp;quot;...45.9% of all actions carried out in the country are guerrilla actions carried out by detachments operating in cities or platoons and companies in the countryside; while sabotage accounts for only 11.2% and selective annihilation barely reaches 8.2%, while armed propaganda and agitation account for 34.1% (101).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this period, based on a cross-referencing of reliable sources, our research estimates approximately 5,965 irregular warfare actions of all types, including white terrorism and urban bombings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Using this figure as a reference, which is a close approximation to reality, we can establish the following: first, not all actions can be attributed to the Shining Path. However, the variation would not be substantial. If we assume that 45.9% of the actions were attributed to the guerrillas, this means there would have been 2,737.99 guerrilla incidents in the two years under consideration, 668 sabotage events, 489.1 assassinations, and 2,034 activities related to armed propaganda and agitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The data published by the Shining Path in Peru and abroad is indeed propaganda and highly exaggerated. None of the government institutions that monitor the incidents of irregular warfare in the Andean region have recorded 2,737 guerrilla confrontations in two years. Similarly, the rest of the figures provided by the Shining Path are manipulated and cannot serve as a basis for any serious social research.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only certainty lies in the forms of attack it employs to destroy the strategic organizations of Peruvian society:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1980 and October 1987, Shining Path irregulars targeted 131 agricultural and livestock production units in Ayacucho, Apurímac, Cajamarca, Cusco, Huanuco, Huancavelica, Ica, Junín, La Libertad, Lambayeque, Cerro de Pasco and San Martín, with a higher incidence in Ayacucho and Puno. The exact extent of the damages is unknown, but it is estimated to be substantial and that these attacks had a significant impact on agricultural and food production, directly affecting the rural workforce.&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1985 and October 1987, Shining Path irregulars targeted 21 industrial companies, mainly in Lima and the Huallaga region (Palma del Espino). Many of these companies had financial ties to banks involved in money laundering related to cocaine trafficking. In other cases, companies with significant debts to the state or labor issues were also targeted, some of which were linked to the Japanese capital.&lt;br /&gt;
# Institutions like Electro Perú and Electro Lima faced the most substantial offensive by irregulars. From 1980 to October 1987, there were reports of 726 high-tension towers being toppled, with the costs of repair exceeding 19 million dollars. The costs also included disruptions in the industry and interruptions of public services, particularly those dependent on Peru&#039;s central hydroelectric system. To date, no institution has accurately quantified these costs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These actions committed by the Shining Path had targeted not the financial oligarchy or major power groups linked to imperialism or drug trafficking, but rather social enterprises, agricultural communities, and specific industrial entities, causing significant economical and social disruption.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These attacks are significant because they actively hinder the development of alternative energy sources to petroleum, leading to the continued and increased dependence on transnational oil companies and the depletion of domestic energy sources. Additionally, they constitute a substantial sabotage, given the disruptions to the hydroelectric system. These disruptions not only affect energy generation but also jeopardize the entire productive apparatus in the central region of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1985 and October 1987, there were 56 attacks on communication bridges and 40 on railway lines. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These attacks aimed to isolate the productive areas controlled by Shining Path irregulars. While major routes connecting Lima to the interior of the country were vulnerable, including three highways, a railway line, two main power lines, and a water supply system, the Shining Path&#039;s military objectives were primarily directed at breaking entities like Centromín which operates over a dozen large production units scattered across various departments, relying heavily on the railway for mineral export and supply of inputs and equipment. State-owned enterprises like Enafer (railways), Electro Perú (energy) and ENTEL (communications) faced calls for privatization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1980 and October 1987, the state administration suffered greatly with the assassinations of 164 officials, including technicians and politicians. These acts of violence soon weakened the state structure, especially in highly conflicted areas, and disrupted development programs in places like Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac, which traditionally had limited connections to the central government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
High levels of corruption also festered within the state apparatus, leading to wastefulness, abuse, and illicit enrichment in regional bodies that further complicated the situation. These factors eased the Shining Path&#039;s efforts to annihilate its opponents, as they tapped into the population&#039;s pent-up desires for justice. This manipulation of public sentiment also promoted a shift in values, with the Shining Path presenting itself as the champion of justice against a corrupt state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This psychological mechanism managed to sensitize the population, particularly in the emergency-declared mountainous regions, making them passively sympathetic to the Shining Path&#039;s cause. This situation has become a significant challenge for the Peruvian state, as the deterioration of administrative structures is compounded by the bankruptcy and loss of credibility of social control organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up until twenty years ago, within the social structure of the highlands, symbols of power were recognized not in the &#039;&#039;gamonalismo&#039;&#039; (feudal landlords) but rather in the representatives of the &#039;&#039;señor gobierno&#039;&#039; (government), which included the police, priests and teachers. When they weren&#039;t colluding with the local bosses (&#039;&#039;caciques&#039;&#039;), these figures represented a level of control and mediation between the peasants and the landlords. However, the situation has changed significantly today. Peasants have not only gained property rights, effectively ending the &#039;&#039;gamonalismo&#039;&#039; system, but communal peasant leaders have emerged as well, often with military support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The black-robed priests with a domineering demeanor have disappeared, only to be replaced by religious congregations and prelates committed to the poor, competing for leadership among the peasants. In the name of these demands, some individuals have aligned themselves with the Shining Path, promoting the destruction of both cooperatives and cooperative enterprises because they viewed them as enemies of social property. Teachers, on the other hand, highly attuned to the changes and continuous frustrations on their path to social advancement, have become recipients and disseminators of a culture alien to the Andean world, particularly towards a coastal culture. They have become disconnected from the chaotic official education system and find themselves at the center of the conflict, often as victims of the Shining Path&#039;s irregulars or the state&#039;s counterinsurgency forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this context, the social control organization, which was originally meant to support authority, had not only confused its role by trying to become an authority itself and dispense justice but also allowed its position to be used for personal enrichment, opportunism, and local social ladder climbing. Thus, it transformed from a law enforcement entity into a highly destabilizing factor in the structural tension.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path is well aware of this problem and has directed its most ferocious annihilation campaign against the police organization. Between 1980 and October 1987, they carried out more than 600 attacks on police posts of varying intensity and nature. During the same period, credible and serious sources estimate approximately 481 deaths resulting from these attacks and individual incidents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What have the Shining Path irregulars achieved by systematically targeting this organization responsible for maintaining public order? Firstly, they forced the police to retreat. In the same period, from 1980 to 1987, Peruvian police forces had closed or reduced operations in 191 units across the country, particularly impacting the departments of Cusco, Ayacucho, Huánuco, Huancavelica, and Apurímac. This means that there has been a territorial concession to the Shining Path in key strategic Andean areas. Secondly, they aimed to hinder the reorganization of Peruvian police forces with rapid, top-heavy growth and the acquisition of sophisticated military-style equipment. Perhaps this oversight ignores that such measures have little to do with the social control of the population—prevention, investigation, surveillance—to maintain public order and support the administration of justice. It also does not necessarily guarantee the sympathy of the local populations. Thirdly, the police forces, due to their vulnerability, have become a constant source of arms for the Shining Path and the TARM. Official reports suggest that by 1987, these groups had seized around 240 weapons of various types, ranging from revolvers, shotguns, and submachine guns to light automatic rifles and grenades.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The core of the Shining Path&#039;s offensive activity lies in its intangible organization, specifically its squads of irregulars with highly centralized leadership that operate in a decentralized manner, executing specific tactical plans. The other significant organization is external, not the internal tangible organizations, which are limited and of little importance in the national movement of popular masses in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some analysts, particularly officials, like to point out that the Shining Path&#039;s actions do not shake or endanger the structure of the state, somewhat as a consolation. From a military confrontation perspective, Shining Path irregulars have not seriously threatened the Peruvian armed forces, and state institutions continue to function. However, this view is overly simplistic. The military organization of the state remains intact in terms of firepower and offensive capability, maintaining strategic superiority in the sub-region. But it is precisely this potential and power that the Shining Path aims to destroy, through the wear and tear of its logistical infrastructure and by waging a mass war to shift its defense and attack mechanisms from external to internal fronts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this context, it is not reassuring that official institutions continue to function; it&#039;s about how they function. One must consider how a ministry operates in Peru, or how the customs organization and the agricultural product marketing system function. Most importantly, one must evaluate whether these entities function effectively within the interior of the republic, especially in the Andean region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Psychological warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
This war, doctrinally, is the operative warfare of ideological warfare. To overcome or change an ideology, one must modify behaviors and values. For the Shining Path, the escalation of psychological warfare is well-defined: convince, persuade, dissuade, and destroy. In the use of psychological warfare, the Shining Path irregulars have all the advantages; they fight alone, exploiting the psychological weaknesses of the Peruvian state - non-compliance with obligations and promises and the suffering of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The psychological front for the Shining Path is one and the same, composed of the national and world public opinion, especially the latter. Its paradoxical objective is anti-communist and counter-insurgent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the first level, it aims to divide the communist movement between the &amp;quot;true Marxist-Leninist-Maoist communists&amp;quot; and the revisionists from Moscow, Beijing, or any other tendency. On the second level, it targets the &amp;quot;opportunistic left,&amp;quot; nationalists, and militarism. A fundamental psychological objective in Peru is the militarization of the Party to counteract the militarization of the government, which signifies the development of mass warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The struggle against imperialism and capitalism is rhetoric, falsely mobilizing because the goal is to associate capitalism with the military and the democratic state, in order to polarize the social groups and classes in Peru. Moreover, the media used by the Shining Path for its psychological warfare are those of the capitalist system; it doesn&#039;t even have its own media. In this sense, the grassroots organization, the so-called psychological instrument, the media system is the largest ever deployed in Peru by any subversive organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path enjoys the leniency or support of prestigious global humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty International, American Wash, and European and North American organizations of the International Fellowships of Reconciliation (IFOR), among others, those that defend human rights but generally in accordance with English financing interests. Some of these organizations were created by intelligence services in 1914, like IFOR, or are directly or indirectly subsidized, as is the case with the Service for Peace and Justice (SERPAJ).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
SERPAJ is a branch of IFOR in Vienna, created under the direction of a Nobel Peace Prize laureate,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We have been unable to find who exactly.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with specific purposes for psychological warfare in Latin America. This organization conducted campaigns in Argentina against armament, militarism and war, in favor of peace in the Beagle issue. It supported the Chilean solution and was a mediator in the Falklands War, yet played a significant role in promoting defeatism during the war, prosecuting military leaders, mobilizing the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo for the condemnation of military leadership and the disappearance of the armed forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these campaigns were conducted under the guise of the fight against the Dirty War, for the respect of human rights, against torture and disappearances. In essence, they took advantage of the strategic errors of the Argentine military&#039;s counterinsurgency policy, which closely followed American counterinsurgency texts and even exported their experiences to Central America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
SERPAJ, in Peru, plays a significant role as a cover for psychological warfare actions. It is responsible for the campaign of the Committee of Disappeared Families and Prisoners of War of Ayacucho, whose objective is to promote legal actions against the &amp;quot;authors&amp;quot; of torture, disappearances, and executions, recognizing them as crimes against humanity. SERPAJ conducts demonstrations and mobilizations, including chaining in squares and the placement of crosses and wreaths at the doors of the joint command of the armed forces. They also travel to Europe to seek support from the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which is a Council of Europe institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In July 1985, between the 4th and 15th, SERPAJ organized a meeting with European bishops in Peru under the presidency of Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, who was a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, to establish a People&#039;s Tribunal in Ayacucho. The maneuver failed as the Peruvian Episcopal Commission did not participate in the meeting. However, this setback did not prevent the  organization from continuing its campaign at the national and international levels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
SERPAJ is directed by a figure from European intelligence named Hans Reiner. He oversees the organization&#039;s bases in Pacasmayo, Puno, Huancayo, Lima, and Huacho. They have &amp;quot;non-violence&amp;quot; organizations throughout the Sierra of Lima, Huancavelica, the Desaguadero area in Puno, and Native communities in Amazonas. Their psychological objectives align with those that guided British intelligence services for the defeat of the conservative Argentine military, a history that continues to have an impact on the Rio de la Plata region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are other covert psychological operations apparatuses, especially in the field of press and broadcasting, which require deeper investigation, as there is abundant evidence of their activities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
International television systems have placed the Shining Path in the public spotlight. Their violence and brutality align with the Western media&#039;s trend, thereby making it a constant news item. Any information, generally prefabricated since it doesn&#039;t actually exist, is received, disseminated, and paid for by television networks worldwide. It&#039;s a system that serves &amp;quot;President” Gonzalo, even though he claims he will destroy and eliminate such a system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A tracking of news information about the Shining Path from Peru abroad in 1987 yielded the following estimated result:&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;Agency&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;Period covered&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;Number of reports&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|AFP (France)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 6 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|81 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|ANSA (Italy)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 2 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|31 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|DPA (West Germany)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 7 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|26 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|EFE (Spain)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 2 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|71 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|IPS (Italy)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 6 - September 15&lt;br /&gt;
|37 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|REUTERS (Great-Britain)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 6 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|35 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
In approximately 270 days of the year 1987, 281 news articles about the Shining Path were repeatedly published in Peru, enough for any social communicator to consider it a sustained news campaign of interest. This quantitative aspect indicates the level of news saturation for the foreign public. However, the content analysis of the information will confirm to any social researcher the astonishing results in promoting the Shining Path&#039;s violence and discrediting the Peruvian government, especially its armed forces. This is simply the manipulation of capitalist media in service of the &amp;quot;Shining Path subversion&amp;quot; in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this section, it is worth noting that the news agendas of socialist countries either do not report on the topic or only do so sparingly. However, Cuba&#039;s &#039;&#039;Prensa Latina&#039;&#039; agency, for the period from January 2 to August 29, 1987, issued 143 reports on the Shining Path, setting a quantitative record and contributing to the global public opinion saturation. It is fair to point out that Prensa Latina&#039;s information differs in significant aspects. While capitalist agencies provide between five hundred to a thousand words per report, &#039;&#039;Prensa Latina&#039;&#039; does so with 100 to 150 words. The contents are objective and do not argue for or against the Shining Path. This informational neutrality benefits the Shining Path. They don&#039;t even defend Fidel Castro from the epithets that the Shining Path bestows upon him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tactically, the Shining Path does not neglect the support of psychological operations for its specific actions. Their plans consider the &amp;quot;respective&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;appropriate&amp;quot; psychological action, taking into account circumstances, timing, and targets (102). In short, they apply all the techniques of modern Western psychological warfare and the doctrine of PSYOPS and political warfare. It&#039;s important to remember that in revolutionary warfare, there is no application of psychological operations or psychological warfare; the doctrinal concept is different. Dialectical materialism, as a comprehensive and exclusive philosophy, doesn&#039;t require psychological operations; it is internalized in humans through education, agitation, and propaganda, as overarching strategic lines of action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its final phase, the Shining Path uses armed propaganda to gain resonance, employing annihilation, blackmail, kidnapping, bombings, rumors and obscurantism to achieve population control. Another aspect is the fragmented preparation of the Shining Path militant as an alienated irregular soldier. This aspect is well-known, as it represents the visible part of the Shining Path. The effects of their psychological strategy and tactics are what concern us, and scientific studies should dive deeper into these, as we are facing a neo-behaviorist school of population control that is leading the Peruvian population towards self-destruction through the application of these operational techniques of psychological warfare, typical of the CIA, which also proposes them for the preparation of counterinsurgency forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, another application of this type of warfare lies in weakening the enemy&#039;s psychological defenses so that they cannot react, or when they do, it&#039;s too late, leading to self-incrimination and acceptance of defeat and failure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the Shining Path, as well as for the dominant great powers that have shown their staunch opposition to the development of culture in Third World countries in UNESCO, and to the need for a New International Information Order, as well as for information merchants in Peru, it is not in their interest for the country, for example, to have a Social Communication or Information Policy, which is a right of every nation anywhere in the world. Simply because if it were so, at the strategic level, the irregular Senderistas and any other kind would not have at their disposal the theater of psychological operations (the minds of the Peruvian population and world public opinion).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the tactical level, the Peruvian nation cannot respond to the psychological warfare of the Shining Path, not only due to a lack of technical resources and the absence of policies but also because of the chaos prevailing in private media, the use of frequencies and licenses, the lack of generosity and patriotism where each owner believes their individual opinion and interests represent the entire country. Moreover, the government lacks public information outlets that are not obsequious and fawning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only valid front resisting the Shining Path in this field is a set of information systems or communications in grassroots, neighborhood, institutional, religious, union, and professional social organizations, where there is an independent effort to provide educational and controversial information that contributes to the formation of their own values and reflects their aspirations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a form of alternative information, which, despite its widespread proliferation, has nothing to do with the information from major media outlets, it is the only serious shield against the destabilizing influence of the Shining Path&#039;s psychological warfare. In this psychological warfare, the Shining Path maintains a strategic and tactical advantage, using the vast resources of the capitalist system rather than the socialist one. Among these resources are opinion leaders who act as the Shining Path&#039;s ideologists or propagandists, many of them with education from American universities or undergoing training stints, such as the director of &amp;quot;El Diario,&amp;quot; the unofficial, if not official, newspaper of the Shining Path in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These propagandists of the Shining Path skillfully lead their strategic psychological warfare efforts, primarily by preparing both nationally and internationally for the grand maneuvers included in the Shining Path&#039;s plans. For instance, the &amp;quot;genocide in the prisons&amp;quot; was carried out as part of a meticulously phased psychological campaign in preparation, execution, and consolidation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the preparation phase, prisoners affiliated with the Shining Path were encouraged to provoke, turning the prisons into &amp;quot;luminous combat trenches&amp;quot; through propaganda and psychologically preparing the Shining Path&#039;s cadres for the holocaust. This period was more or less lengthy, and during its development, distinctions were made between common prisoners and Marxist leftist prisoners who were not affiliated with the Shining Path. These distinctions were marked by confrontations, vendettas, and even murders. Externally, a campaign of inducing death was mounted: &amp;quot;No to the transfer to Canto Grande&amp;quot; (a high-security prison); &amp;quot;No to genocide,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Defend the Prisoners of War,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;They want to assassinate them from behind,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Prisoners of war will resist in their luminous combat trenches until death.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The deaths of Shining Path members in the prisons marked the culmination of this maneuver. The violent military intervention was preceded by the assassinations of senior officers, the exacerbations of law enforcement and internal provocations, allowing everyone to believe that all of the Shining Path’s plans were being developed within the prisons. All these issues were effectively stirred up by the opinions of influencers in the capitalist media until the strategic mistake was made: to believe that the elimination of Shining Path-affiliated prisoners would end the Shining Path, and that it was possible to satisfy the Armed Forces&#039; frustration in the face of terrorism through revenge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The psychological consolidation of the plan still continues, and the issue of the deaths of Shining Path members in June 1986 will always be a cause for news and agitation. The negative effects are suffered by the Armed Forces and the social-democratic government of García Pérez. The Shining Path capitalizes on &amp;quot;heroism&amp;quot; and solidifies the myth and the idea of death for the &amp;quot;Guiding Thought,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;crossing rivers of blood to become immortal.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another strategic psychological plan of the Shining Path is related to the establishment of the &amp;quot;People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy.&amp;quot; In May 1986, &amp;quot;Guzmán&amp;quot; stated: &amp;quot;We are using the term New State, and this has a strategic content... Therefore, we affirm the following: The three levels have been defined: People&#039;s Committee, Support Bases, and People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy. The First Level (People&#039;s Committee) exists; the second level is a matter of delineation of Zonal and Regional Committees, which need to make adjustments according to the development of the war. The leadership of the set of bases that a Zonal or Regional Committee may have is under its direction. The Third Level continues to develop and advance toward the formation of the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy, which would be the set of Committees and Bases, for which the three functions remain valid: leadership, construction, planning&amp;quot; (103).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before continuing, note the writing style in the Shining Path text attributed to Guzmán Reinoso. It is the same as in many documents of the Shining Path: the language is Spanish, but the grammatical construction and syntax are English.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Returning to the topic, these strategic guidelines, formulated in the pre-fabricated documents of Senderismo, appear as a directive to achieve the grand objective of creating a parallel or counter-government. Let&#039;s recall the plan of the CIA revealed by &amp;quot;Newsweek&amp;quot; magazine in its August 3, 1981 edition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In September 1987, the psychological operators of the Shining Path produced a &amp;quot;Discussion Document&amp;quot; that aimed to give structure to their ideas, resulting in a pseudo-Marxist mishmash. By the end of 1987, the &#039;&#039;Qué Hacer&#039;&#039; magazine of the Friedrich Elberth Foundation would be responsible for publicizing it, and &#039;&#039;El Diario&#039;&#039;, the unofficial organ of the Shining Path, would spread it widely in apparent debate with &amp;quot;¿Qué Hace?&amp;quot; and the newspaper &#039;&#039;La República&#039;&#039;, which provided its opinions on the topic. By January 1988, the debate was publicly underway.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regarding the &amp;quot;Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; framework, it was naturally discussed by the Shining Path&#039;s followers and some political leaders and public figures who clearly had never read Marx, Lenin, or Mao. However, for the campaign, knowledge was not the goal; it was about gathering opinions to generate more opinions about what was said, ultimately transforming the shoddiness into a form of science through information manipulation and the media.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Simultaneously, the idea of a National Congress of the Shining Path was promoted, claiming that it had already taken place and would produce a constituent document for the New State to oppose the Old State. It would propose the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution within the framework and philosophy of the Shining Path, precisely to thwart the structural changes that Marxism recognizes as part of the development of capital under that name. But the main goal was to establish a parallel government, alongside the existing one in Peru, with the aim of bringing about structural changes in Peruvian society. Whether it would be installed in Ayacucho or in exile would depend on circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path&#039;s maneuver took advantage of the psychological opportunity provided by the social situation in Peru in 1988. Right-wing groups and the middle class were being sensitized in a campaign summarized by the slogan, &amp;quot;No one can save this country.&amp;quot; In Peru, defeatism was fueled by major transnational corporations in the food, finance, and drug trade industries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prospect of submission to the International Monetary Fund was accompanied by large campaigns of scarcity and price increases to make the people suffer. In the face of this capitalist maneuver, the Shining Path’s plan for the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy is not an alternative, as some might believe, for the methodology of destroying means of production, murder and terrorism serves the same purpose as economic sabotage, corruption, drug trafficking, shortages, medicine scarcity and the deterioration of social services.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here we have described the operation of two of the Shining Path’s psychological campaigns, one already executed and another ongoing to date, solely for educational purposes, to demonstrate the underlying use of psychological warfare techniques, the mechanisms for undermining morale (one cannot believe in Peru; it is portrayed as a failed and collapsed country), and the utilization of significant resources (adept planners, mass media, opinion influencers). The victim is the Peruvian nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Intelligence warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
According to the doctrine of political warfare, intelligence warfare begins by executing the operational actions of strategic warfare. This type of warfare is highly subtle and occurs at both the defensive and offensive levels. It involves one&#039;s own defense and security as well as the breach of the enemy&#039;s security and secrecy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the Shining Path, the basic rule present in both strategic and tactical intelligence warfare is &#039;&#039;clandestinity&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;military vigilance and discipline&#039;&#039; (a political element and the combination of two military ones), representing a rather advanced concept of production and initiation of intelligence. According to their documents, the Shining Path’s intelligence network &amp;quot;involves dealing with special elements and requires great discretion and secrecy.&amp;quot; As expected, these elements are at a particular level of secrecy within the organization and compartmentalized discipline. Naturally, secrecy and discretion can only be achieved through the highly administrative concentration of the agent network.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The documents of the Shining Path do not explicitly mention this field of their activity. However, they are insistent in recommending secrecy and inducing their membership to investigate the environment and social relationships. Before and after their actions, they are trained in the collection and processing of basic information. Every Shining Path irregular is, above all, an informant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As far as we can know to date, the Shining Path’s secrecy has not been compromised. Probably because any efforts to discover it have been misguided by attempting to uncover it from within penetrated or captured base cells. There, they are only informants. In contrast, it is public knowledge that the true agents, both foreign and national, who have been captured and identified, manage to preserve secrecy by evading their responsibilities before the Peruvian justice system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are some elements that can allow for an evaluation of the intelligence apparatus of the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the strategic level, the Shining Path has had a research and study apparatus closely linked to the CIA&#039;s counterinsurgency policies. The study of the human environment in the Peruvian highlands was provided by various organizations which includes the Wingspread Conference in Wisconsin, organized by Daniel Sharp of the Peace Corps and involving a multitude of businessmen and social scientists. The studies and experiments conducted by USAID (United States Agency for International Development) were also influential. Through patiently conducted works, like the one by Eric Cohen, who was a professor at the University of Jerusalem and conducted the work &#039;&#039;Potential for Internal War and Leadership Forms in Ayacucho 1969-1979&#039;&#039;, these contributed to the Shining Path&#039;s understanding of its operational theater, both in terms of the environment and the human context. In summary, the Shining Path obtains its knowledge of its operational theater, both in terms of the environment and the human context, from institutions or individuals linked, in one way or another, to American or Western counterinsurgency efforts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path has never published any studies or works on class relations in Peru, except for the works of Díaz Martínez and Kawata, which are more of an anthropological nature, specialized and theoretical. We reiterate that the compilations and interpolations of citations from Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Mariátegui that make up &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; do not constitute studies or research on the character of Peruvian society. In this sense, all the intelligence available to the Shining Path is foreign.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The publication of the document &#039;&#039;Developing People&#039;s War in Service to the World Revolution&#039;&#039; is another indicator of the nature of the Shining Path intelligence apparatus. This is not so much because it was printed in modern workshops with formatting, grammatical correction, and graphical cleanliness, but because of its content.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This document represents a significance in the intelligence appreciation of the Shining Path. It is noteworthy first because it is free from their pseudo-Marxist verbosity, and second because it evaluates their irregular warfare in a maximized manner. It provides a political and statistical evaluation of their actions, celebrates their potential, and also evaluates the potential and vulnerabilities of the government of the Aprista Party from their perspective. It also tracks the electoral process in Peru and the government&#039;s economic administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion, the logical projections of this work indicate advantages for the Shining Path and its irregular warfare and disadvantages for the Peruvian government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The methodology employed in this study or appreciation is definitively not Marxist; it does not follow the analytical method of dialectical materialism. Both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars and any student of Research Methodology can scrutinize the Shining Path document titled &#039;&#039;Developing People&#039;s War in Service to the World Revolution&#039;&#039; and establish the methodology used in its preparation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This short book exhibits the typical characteristics of a work processed by a foreign intelligence station and not in the highlands of Ayacucho or the marginal areas of Lima, where they lack the computer infrastructure required for storing and processing information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another notable aspect of the Shining Path&#039;s intelligence apparatus that emerges publicly is its international organization. Western intelligence services, particularly those of NATO, which are always involved in low-intensity operations, have facilitated a support organization for the Shining Path. This support ranges from providing residence visas for asylum seekers in Europe to any Peruvian who requests them, especially in Sweden, to gather dissatisfied individuals with their country. This process extends to the formation of Support and Solidarity Committees. It&#039;s worth highlighting that no socialist country grants asylum to Peruvians claiming persecution due to their ideas, and they certainly don&#039;t allow the operation of support organizations for irregular combatants of the Shining Path in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States, support committees for the Shining Path&#039;s cause have proliferated the most. There are over 30 active committees, some linked to North American &amp;quot;subversive&amp;quot; currents, such as the &#039;&#039;Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru&#039;&#039; in Berkeley, with its address at 2483 Hearst Ave. PQ 94709 CA. Others have a religious or ecclesial character, like the &#039;&#039;TASK Force On Latin America and the Caribbean&#039;&#039; at P.O. Box 2324, Santa Cruz, California 95063.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
France also has a significant number of support committees, seemingly directed by the Peruvian scientist Maximiliano Durand Araujo. It is suggested that he may be the real Number One member of the Shining Path and the probable &amp;quot;President Gonzalo&amp;quot; in exile of the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy. Among these groups, the &#039;&#039;Centre Interculturel Franco-Peruvien&#039;&#039; (Intercultural Franco-Peruvian center), directed by Jean Marie Mondet Isnard, operates as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Spain, cities like Madrid and Barcelona host more than a dozen of these support committees for the Shining Path. The same holds true in Germany and Switzerland. Sweden is a unique case due to the extensive activities of two groups belonging to the Shining Path that operate as social sports entities, serving as a kind of hub for international relations of the Shining Path. Without strong evidence, it is claimed that Malmo is the city where Shining Path leaders take their vacations, and individuals like Guzmán, Mezzich, and Morote have been seen there on several occasions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, about eight entities operate in support of the Shining Path, but the most significant one is the international communist movement of the Shining Path, known as the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The International in London (RIM) was initiated by the Revolutionary Communist Party of the United States in 1980 and consolidated in London with the support of eighteen &amp;quot;communist parties,&amp;quot; including the Shining Path, all of which were dissidents from the Moscow and Chinese currents. They were Maoists, and interestingly, they belonged to countries within NATO or countries that were former British colonies. Behind this organization, providing financial support from 1983 onward, was D. Chaujan: the &amp;quot;President of the State of JALISTAN&amp;quot; (Punjab, India) which is  a republic invented by one of the 27 Sikh parties in India, the &amp;quot;Anand Marg&amp;quot; (The Path of Perpetual Happiness), an international terrorist organization that has the largest network of social and religious organizations in the world, estimated to have around 4 million followers in 96 countries worldwide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another aspect related to the breach of the Shining Path&#039;s secrecy is the detention of foreigners by Peruvian authorities. Peru&#039;s intelligence services (there are several in the country, not just one for Peru and abroad like the Shining Path) have always been eager to prove the Shining Path&#039;s communist connections by detaining Cuban, Nicaraguan, or any agents from socialist countries. Up to the present, there have been three significant detentions of foreigners linked to the Shining Path known to the public. Recently, on December 14, 1987, Cynthia Sotwell MacNamara, a 39-year-old American citizen, was arrested in Ayacucho, implicated in the murder of a lawyer and a nurse, with evidence of belonging to a Shining Path assassination team. The case was tried in court and led to the intervention of the U.S. Embassy. Another previous case involved Renata Hehr, a 36-year-old citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany, who was arrested in Arequipa on May 21, 1983. She was tried and sentenced for terrorism, crimes against property, and public health as a member of a Shining Path cell that detonated explosives in the southern city&#039;s commercial buildings &amp;quot;Gibson,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Monterrey,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Braillard,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Caras.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most notorious cases is that of Father Jean Marie Mondet Isnard, a member of the Congregation of the Regular Canons of the Immaculate Conception. He was arrested in Lima on July 22, 1983, by order of Judge Una Rodríguez from the 78th Court of Instruction, after being accused of terrorism. Mondet was part of a Shining Path cell that included Haydee Cáceres Hidalgo (also known as Emma Valiente), Manuel Herrera Aspauza, and Marian Kierelson, among others, who were all involved in the judicial process. Cáceres, who was Mondet&#039;s secretary at the time, had previously been Guzmán Reinoso&#039;s secretary and was acquitted in October 1985 due to a lack of evidence, although she was the key figure in the case. When Mondet was arrested, the French Embassy intervened through diplomats Joan Marc Simen and Jacques Márquez, securing Mondet&#039;s conditional release. They then arranged for his departure to France on Air France on the same day of his release, August 15, 1983, in violation of the terms of his conditional release set by the judge. Later, these same officials facilitated the clandestine exit of Herrera and Kierelson to France via Bolivia, where they currently enjoy asylum. Mondet, Herrera, Kierelson, and other Shining Path members established the Centre Interculturel Franco-Peruvien in Paris, located at Boite Postale B.P. N2 371 - 75526 Paris - CEDEX 11. They published a Shining Path information bulletin and collected funds through account number 67672Q at Credit Lyonnais, Agence J410-75011 Paris, in the name of Jean Marie Mondet Isnard. Mondet returned to Peru on October 17, 1985, via Aeroflot, with the support of humanitarian institutions and Peruvian parliamentarians, and he continued his public activities in Peru without facing legal consequences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these examples of the exposure of the Shining Path&#039;s activities allow us to observe the functioning of the intelligence apparatus that provides security and cover for the Shining Path, enabling it to maintain a good operational capacity. If a biography needs to be fabricated and disseminated, it is done. If operational military intelligence is required to target a critical objective (such as a dam or electrical system), it is provided. If it is necessary to eliminate an official, the apparatus provides details of their life, habits, vulnerabilities, and daily activities, all of which is information that took a long time to acquire. If a congress or press organization needs to be organized, or if financial documents need to be created, or if Shining Path analysts and opinion shapers are required, the intelligence apparatus will see to it. Having supporters at all levels, whether due to interest, sympathy, resentment or blackmail, the apparatus achieves it. This intelligence system, which operates in Peru and abroad, is efficient because it is highly centralized and compartmentalized, with a network that covers all national and international activities. It is led by a brilliant mind in the international intelligence community. This is beyond doubt. Who else can manage such a network? Is it the dedicated, unstable Professor Guzmán from Huamanpoma de Alaya University? Or the disciplined and paranoid instructor of young students at Huamanpoma de Alaya? Or perhaps President Gonzalo himself? The latter is more likely because behind the myth of Gonzalo, in no Shining Path document is it stated that he is Abimael Guzmán. Abimael Guzmán is the apparatus itself. The leader must be a more remarkable mind than the politicized and confused one of Professor Guzmán.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The apparatus is the central driver and executor of the war. The regular Shining Path combatants are squads of fighters who act according to the script of irregular warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This system that conducts intelligence warfare, and has the capacity to generate and provide intelligence as well as carry out operations in support of its strategic goals also has the ability to provide inaccurate or biased intelligence to organizations tasked with combating the Shining Path. Who can claim otherwise? This is a fundamental and doctrinal principle of all intelligence systems in the world: providing false information to the enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Mass warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
The war of masses, within the doctrine of political warfare, is conceived as the operational part of organizational warfare, and it is based on the mobilization of the masses, which are considered the foundation of political power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it comes to warfare, the contenders strive to gain the sympathy and support of the masses for their own organizations. In the war of masses, the goal is to control the psychology of the masses and to sow division and discord among the population of the opposing side.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path, in this type of warfare, promotes the mobilization of masses, especially among the peasantry, by using psychological techniques of intimidation, exasperation, and lascivious paranoia. They aim to organize them into popular committees, support bases, zonal and regional groups in order to serve as the foundation for the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy. To achieve this, they polarize the struggle among different groups and strata within the poorest classes of Peru, applying the principle of division and discord.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To conduct this type of warfare at a strategic level, the Shining Path offers the masses a New State and presents a program. &amp;quot;A party must define its program... we must carry out the democratic revolution; therefore, we propose both a minimum and a maximum program.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&#039;Minimum Program&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A) New Politics: The politics of New Democracy is to overthrow foreign oppression and the domination of landlords and feudalists. It involves destroying the old landlord and bureaucratic state and establishing a joint dictatorship. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
B) New Economy: All foreign monopoly companies or those that are excessively large will be confiscated. The new economy entails three aspects: the confiscation of land from landlords, the confiscation of bureaucratic capital, and protecting the interests of the middle bourgeoisie. Due to the nature of the democratic revolution, the middle capital should consist of three sectors: state, private, and cooperative. The State should not be owned by a few. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
C) New Culture: National, scientific, and mass culture. It is national because it is anti-imperialist, scientific because it is based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism or guiding thought, and it is a mass party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&#039;Maximum Program&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three inequalities will disappear with communism: City and Countryside; Worker and Peasant; Manual and Intellectual Labor. We have always considered ideology and politics as members of a single historical class, and this idea is essential. The party must have a General Political Line, and &amp;quot;President Gonzalo&amp;quot; has defined that a party cannot advance without a political line. The revolution cannot be carried out without the guiding thought of the &amp;quot;President Gonzalo,&amp;quot; which encompasses five points: International Line, Democratic Revolution, Military Line, Construction Line, and Mass Line. (104)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This simulation of a political plan turns out to be rather simplistic, and, when considered in &amp;quot;Discussion Documents,&amp;quot; it provokes a deceptive controversy among Senderistas, Senderologists, and politically naive individuals in Peru, as we have already noted. It is a calculated step in the Shining Path&#039;s mass warfare strategy to gain influence in a way that its very brutal violence does not provide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the use of this warfare, the Shining Path&#039;s contradictions become insurmountable. It is impossible to conceive the compatibility of the principles of its program, even setting aside its terrifying simplicity, with the techniques of psychological population control through terror, nor is this program being applied or motivating the irregular fighters of the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In population control, the Shining Path also faces significant challenges. So far, the organizations it has generated have not progressed or developed. The masses choose different political options, despite many circumstances, both natural and intentional, leading them to violent solutions. Grassroots social organizations do not reach the level of insanity, which is the main form of control and imposition by the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most crucial aspect of the Shining Path’s application of this warfare is the use of social polarization techniques to destroy &amp;quot;the Old Power,&amp;quot; the state, and the Peruvian nation. Their centralized work in the central southern highlands of Peru has provided them an undisputed presence, especially through forced recruitment of young individuals, extermination of the elderly, and subjugation of adults. The vendettas against those questioned by the community, as mentioned before, have sensitized a significant portion of the population. However, this has not occurred in Puno, for example, where peasants, with a greater tradition of rebellion and access to property, have thwarted the irregular Senderista incursions. Another field of mass mobilization favorable to them, through coercion, is that of coca-growing peasants. In the city, they have achieved some success within the ranks of teachers and students, but these groups are not significant compared to other competitive political currents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the slogans for the mass warfare, such as &amp;quot;going deep into the masses&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;educating them in people&#039;s war,&amp;quot; are nothing more than rhetoric. In this field, what stands out in the Shining Path is the destruction of state organizations and production by sabotage and annihilation squads.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This destruction and polarization are not accepted by the Peruvian masses, which have their own dynamics. This is the point that should mark the failure of this conspiratorial movement. If it has had any success in Peru, it is due to the efficiency of its irregular warfare apparatus and the logistical support of two major international systems: one for psychological warfare and another for intelligence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path knows that the strength of Peruvian society against its designs lies within the masses. That&#039;s why, in their campaign of polarization, they induce a strategic mistake to make the masses confront the armed forces and the government. The nature of the Senderista apparatus seeks to generalize genocide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Genocide ====&lt;br /&gt;
An article by Gretchen Small, published in August 1984, comments on research conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) led by Kissinger and Georgetown University for the United States Army.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Under the guise of combating Soviet subversion, the study recommends that the United States has been the instrument for a policy of genocide, enforcing the austerity conditions of the International Monetary Fund and forcing the Third World to accept a reduction in its population. The study, titled Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000, was published in June... Assuming that the world does not change and that underdeveloped countries will always remain so, &#039;Requirements&#039; predicts that both superpowers &#039;will seek to ensure access to select portions of territory that are vital to their global strategic purposes.&#039; While on one hand, it dismisses the possibility of a Soviet attack in Western Europe, despite abundant indications to the contrary, on the other hand, it promotes a state of military alert in the United States towards Ibero-American countries... It foresees the transformation of the United States Army into a British-style colonial expeditionary instrument, to carry out what British experts in psychological warfare and CSIS refer to as low-intensity operations. The core of this new army would be the Rapid Deployment Force...In a friendly country that the United States wishes to protect (from the designs of the USSR), various levels of action can be taken, using psychological operations to induce governments or populations to take direct action; military or paramilitary aid; special unconventional force training operations; deployment of surrogate or allied forces of the United States; deployment of U.S. troops; or any combination of the above. (105)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;It is not our diagnosis that Peru is already suffering from this action; it is the announcement by someone as anti-communist as the Lyndon LaRouche organization. It is now necessary to fully uncover the identity of the Shining Path. All the evidence, testimonials, and documentary evidence point to it being a &amp;quot;substitute&amp;quot; creation for &amp;quot;communist&amp;quot; subversion, created by the psychological warfare of a large Low-Intensity operation against Peru and Latin America. That is why the subversive techniques of the Shining Path do not belong to revolutionary warfare but to English political warfare. (106) The veil will be gradually lifted before the masses of Latin America and Peru. Only they will ultimately be able to account for painful and criminal experiments like the Shining Path. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, fundamentally, the secret has already been revealed: The Shining Path is equal to the CIA.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 4.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
(1) In Peru, many private institutions and specialized individuals, such as social researchers or journalists, have extensive computerized archives on the Shining Path. A good example includes the archives of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Center for Christian Projection, as well as publications in English edited in the Peruvian capital, among others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) CARLOS IVAN DEGREGORI &amp;quot;SHINING PATH&amp;quot;: I. THE DEEP AND DEADLY ENCOUNTERS II. ARMED STRUGGLE AND AUTHORITARIAN UTOPIA Institute of Peruvian Studies - November 1986 New Society No. 890&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE &amp;quot;POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A PARTICULAR CASE&amp;quot;: Bachelor&#039;s Thesis in Social Sciences San Cristóbal de Huamanga University Anthropology Academic Program Ayacucho, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE &amp;quot;PCP SHINING PATH: APPROACHES TO ITS IDEOLOGY&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Socialism and Participation&amp;quot; Magazine No. 37, Pages 15 to 37 March 1987&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) ELOY VILLACREZ RIQUELME &amp;quot;OUR CIVIL WAR AYACUCHO 80...&amp;quot; Gramos 100 Publishers, Lima, Peru October 1985&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) GONZALES CARRE - GALVEZ PEREZ &amp;quot;WARI: THE FIRST ANDEAN EMPIRE&amp;quot; Grafica Pérez, Ayacucho, Peru, June 1981.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) &amp;quot;THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF PERU&amp;quot; Published and printed by the National Office of Natural Resources Evaluation (NONRE), Lima, Peru, December 1985.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) &amp;quot;The Trilateral Commission brings together a significant portion of the political, economic, financial, and ideological centers of the capitalist world. It has, in fact, been argued that the Trilateral Commission is the executive committee of transnational financial capital. It defines itself as an organization oriented towards the formulation of policies...viable for joint action by North America - the United States and Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. Comprising just over 200 private entrepreneurs, chaired by a 32-member executive committee, it has met annually since 1973 when David Rockefeller founded it at a Bilderberg conference, along with 300 important figures from the financial, industrial, and academic world of the West.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;INFORMACION COMERCIAL ESPAÑOLA (ICE) No. 155, Pages 131-133, Spain, November 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) BERNARDO QUAGLIO DEBELLIS &amp;quot;URUGUAY IN THE SOUTHERN CONE&amp;quot; Ed. Tierra Nueva, Page 101, Buenos Aires, 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) GENERAL MERIA MATTOS &amp;quot;BRAZIL: GEOPOLITICS AND DESTINY&amp;quot; Ed. José Olympio, 2nd Edition, Page 68, Brazil 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(11) AUGUSTO PINOCHET &amp;quot;GEOPOLITICS&amp;quot; Memorial del Ejército, Pages 340, 341 Santiago de Chile, 1958.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(12) &amp;quot;POLITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICA AND CHILE&amp;quot; &amp;quot;ERCILLA&amp;quot; Magazine No. 1024, Santiago de Chile, February 1955.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(13) GENERAL RAMON CASAS M. &amp;quot;GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE OF AMERICA OR PACIFIC CONFEDERATION&amp;quot; GEOGRAPHIC REVIEW OF CHILE, 1958, Page 18.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(14) ROGELIO GARCIA LUPO &amp;quot;They Fear Another Balkanization of South America&amp;quot; &amp;quot;El Nacional de Caracas&amp;quot; Newspaper No. 14,179, Page A-2 Caracas, February 20, 1983.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(15) GENERAL MEIRA MATTOS Op. Cit. Pages 41 to 68.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(16) ARNALDO RUIZ A. PERUVIAN ANALYSIS. &amp;quot;South American Integration.&amp;quot; Page 37 Lima, March 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(17) BERNARDO QUAGLIOTTI DEBELLIS Op. Cit. Pages 63 and 64.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(18) In the present century, Peru has participated in one way or another in the conventional wars of the region: 1932 with Colombia; 1941 with Ecuador; 1981 again with Ecuador; 1982 Falklands War; Peruvians fought alongside Sandino and in the Nicaraguan Revolution. In the previous century, in 1836 with Chile and in 1879 again with Chile; in the Caribbean, it participated in the Cuban War of Independence, where Leoncio Prado is the founder of the Cuban Navy and fought against the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. It cannot be said that Peru did not participate in the War of Bolivia and Paraguay in 1932 because Commander Julio C. Guerrero, a former aide to Marshal Cáceres, was at one point the Commander-in-Chief of the Bolivian Forces; in the Football War between Honduras and El Salvador, it did not have a belligerent role, but a pacifying one, through former Peruvian President José Luis Bustamante, who acted as an official mediator.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(19) United Press International (UPI) Cable New York, March 6, 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(20) Prensa Latina (PL) Cable Washington, March 8, 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(21) CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, &#039;&#039;ON WAR&#039;&#039;, Volume I, pages 27, 28, Ed. OIEE, 1977.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(22) CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ Op. Cit. Volume IV, page 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(23) MAURICE MEGRET, &#039;&#039;PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE&#039;&#039;, Ed. Paidos, page 27, Buenos Aires, December 1959.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(24) MAURICE MEGRET Op. Cit. page 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(25) OSCAR TORRES LLOSA &amp;quot;PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS&amp;quot; Basic Course, Mimeographed, 1980 Lima, Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(26) OSCAR TORRES LLOSA &amp;quot;ELEMENTS OF INSTRUCTION ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS&amp;quot; Manual, Page 30, Lima, Peru, February 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(27) BORIS PORSHNEV &amp;quot;THE LENINIST SCIENCE OF REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY&amp;quot; Novosti Press Agenda, Page 12, Moscow 1970.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(28) MAURICE MEGRET Op. Cit. Page 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(29) GENERAL E.G. WANG CHENG &amp;quot;THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLITICAL WARFARE&amp;quot; Pages 145 to 192. School of Political Warfare, Nien Chih Hall, Taipei.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this text, General Cheng of Nationalist China dedicates an entire chapter to explain the application and use of the six types of war that make up political warfare, detailing the actions to be taken in each of them. According to this doctrine, &amp;quot;The combat of political war relies on comparing intelligence rather than comparing strengths. And just like in military war, political war has its battles. In the combat of military war, there are reconnaissance, approaches, attacks, and assaults. But in the combat of political war, there is propaganda, organization, research, and service. Political combat emphasizes techniques and mental acuteness.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(30) MANUAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS School of the Americas, USA. February 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(31) DONALD R. MORELLI and MICHAEL M. FERGUSON &amp;quot;LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE&amp;quot; Military Review, March-April 1985.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(32) DONALD R. MORELLI and MICHAEL M. FERGUSON Op. Cit. Page 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(33) FRANK KITSON &amp;quot;LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS&amp;quot; Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Redwood Burn Limited Ed. Faber Father, London, 1975.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(34) ROD PASCHALL &amp;quot;THE DOCTRINE OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: WHO NEEDS IT?&amp;quot; Military Review, Pages 57 to 73, March-April 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(35) CONFERENCE ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS FORT MCNAIR, WASHINGTON D.C., TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1986, by CASPAR W. WEINBERGER. U.S. Secretary of Defense. CUADERNOS DEL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS ESTRATEGICOS DE URUGUAY, Montevideo, May 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(36) CASPAR W. WEINBERGER&#039;s Conference Op. Cit. pages 46 and 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(37) JOHN CHILD &amp;quot;THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA, STRATEGIC-MILITARY CONCEPTS&amp;quot; Air University Review Reproduced by ESTRATEGIA Magazine, Pages 72 to 91, Buenos Aires, 1985.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(38) PETER A. BOND &amp;quot;IN SEARCH OF CBI (COUNTERINSURGENCY)&amp;quot; Military Review, Page 52, November 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(39) RAUL LEIS &amp;quot;SOUTHERN COMMAND HOSTILE POWER&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Nuevo Sociedad&amp;quot; Magazine No. 81, Page 78, January-February 1986, Venezuela.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(40) RAUL LEIS Op. Cit. page 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(41) NEWSWEEK Magazine August 3, 1981 Edition, Page 18, UNITED STATES.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(42) ROBERTO REMO &amp;quot;KAMPUCHEA, SECOND LIBERATION&amp;quot; Cuadernos del Tercer Mundo No. 27, Page 26, February 1979, MONTEVIDEO.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(43) ROBERTO REMO Op. Cit., Page 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(44) &amp;quot;QUE HACER&amp;quot; Magazine, No. 22, Page 72. &amp;quot;The Ideology of the Khmer Rouge,&amp;quot; May 1983, PERU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(45) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES No. 427, Pages 7 to 10. &amp;quot;Genocide Act committed by Pol Pot-Ieng Sary,&amp;quot; November 6, 1981, FRANCE.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(46) JOSE SOTOMAYOR PEREZ &amp;quot;LENINISM OR MAOISM?&amp;quot;, Page. Printed. Editorial Universo Lima, 1979 PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(47) CONCLUSIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE V NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCP. Ed. Bandera Roja Page 10, Lima PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(48) CONCLUSIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE V NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCP. Op.Cit. Page 8&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(49) LETTERS FROM ABIMAEL GUZMAN REINOSO TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF BANDERA ROJA (See Appendix 1)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(50) Extracts from an unpublished document corresponding to instructions given by Abimael Guzmán in February 1981. Social research on this point established that Guzmán&#039;s police biography includes arrests on June 26, 1970, to be placed under the jurisdiction of the II Judicial Zone of Police; on October 23, 1981, jointly with the Departmental Committee of Arequipa, and on February 19, 1982, having been released on the 23rd of the same month and year. It is assumed that Guzmán lived in clandestinity from the end of 1977 or the beginning of 1978, according to Sendero Luminoso versions. (See Appendix 2)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(51) &amp;quot;THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARXIST IDEAS IN PERU&amp;quot; Pedagogical Editorial &amp;quot;ASCENCIOS&amp;quot;: February 1979 Lima. PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(52) Op. Cit., Page 28&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(53) &amp;quot;DEVELOP GUERRILLA WARFARE Pages 15 and 16 International Edition March 1982&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(54) &amp;quot;DEVELOP PEOPLE&#039;S WAR SERVING THE WORLD REVOLUTION&amp;quot; Page 82 Editorial Bandera Roja August 1986 PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(55) DANIEL A. SHARP &amp;quot;THE UNITED STATES AND THE PERUVIAN REVOLUTION&amp;quot; &amp;quot;U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN PERU&amp;quot; (English title) Editorial Sudamericana 1972, Buenos Aires ARGENTINA&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(56) DANIEL A. SHARP Op. Cit., Page 17&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(57) Op. Cit., Page.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(58) Op. Cit., Pages 330 and 331&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(59) Op. Cit., Pages 338 to 349&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(60) Op. Cit., Page 357&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(61) Op. Cit., Pages 358 to 367 (See Appendix 3)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(62) KAYPACHA Magazine (This Land) FELIX ZEVALLOS QUESADA &amp;quot;INSURRECTIONAL THESIS&amp;quot; Edi. Chaupimayo April 1984 UMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(63) &amp;quot;DEVELOP GUERRILLA WARFARE&amp;quot; Pages 24 and 26 Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru. March 1982, Mimeographed Edi. LIMA PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(64) Op.Cit.- Pages 5 and 6&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(65) REPORT OF THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE &amp;quot;MILITARY THOUGHT OF THE PARTY&amp;quot; Mimeographed Transcript Edition Pages 30 and 31 LIMA PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(66) V. LENIN &amp;quot;SOCIALISM AND WAR&amp;quot; . Selected Works, in 12 Volumes Edi. Progress, 1976 MOSCOW&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(67) V. LENIN &amp;quot;WAR AND REVOLUTION&amp;quot; Selected Works, in 12 Volumes Edi. Progress 1976 MOSCOW&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(68) V. LENIN Op. Cit., Page 446&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(69) DEVELOP PEOPLE&#039;S WAR SERVING THE WORLD REVOLUTION Page 20 Central Committee of the PC. of the P. Edi. &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; August 1986 PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(70) V.I. LENIN &amp;quot;REVOLUTIONARY ADVENTURISM&amp;quot; SELECTED WORKS Volume III Page 192 Edi. Progress- 1975 MOSCOW&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(71) V.I. LENIN Op. Cit. Pages 196,197&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(72) V.I. LENIN Op. Cit. Page 193&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(73) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE &amp;quot;POLITICAL CONDUCT: A PARTICULAR CASE&amp;quot; Pages 63 to 66 Edi. Universidad San Cristóbal de Huamanga Academic Program in Anthropology Ayacucho-1981 PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(74) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE Op. Cit. Pages 67 to 74&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(75) MILITARY LINE BASIS OF DISCUSSION, Central Committee of the PC. September 1987 Transcript of &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988 LIMA – PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(76) MILITARY LINE Op. Cit. Pages 77 and 78&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(77) MAO Zedong PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY (November 6, 1938) Selected Works, Volume II, Pages 225, 226, and 227 1976 BEIJING&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(78) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE Op. Cit. Pages 170 and 171&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(79) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE Op. Cit, Pages 170 and 174&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(80) RICHARD DYSON &amp;quot;THE GUERRILLA GAME&amp;quot; Current News No. 1162 June 13, 1984 Special Edition U.S. Air Force Department (Reproduced from &amp;quot;The Yale Literary Magazine&amp;quot; No. 4, 1984)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(81) RICHARD DYSON Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(82) JAMES ANDERSON (Control &amp;amp; Risk Advisor) &#039;SHINING PATH: NEW REVOLUTIONARY MODEL&amp;quot; Institute For The Study of Conflict London-1987 ENGLAND&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(83) JAMES ANDERSON. Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(84) BASIS OF DISCUSSION Central Committee of the PCP Transcript &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988. LIMA - PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(85) NEW GRAND PLAN TO DEVELOP SUPPORT BASES IV National Conference of the PCP Pages 34 and 37 December 1986 Ed; Mimeograph LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(86) JAMES ANDERSON Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(87) NATIONAL INTERMEDIATE MEETING OF LEADERS AND CADRES Mimeographed copy of handwritten document May 1986 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(88) IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP Mimeographed Document September-October 1986. LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(89) MAXIMIZE THE START OF THE GREAT LEAP Report to the II Expanded Plenum of the PCP Mimeographed Copy February 1985 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(90) NEW GRAND PLAN: DEVELOP SUPPORT BASES IV National Conference of the PCP Mimeograph Edition July 1986 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(91) BASIS OF DISCUSSION Central Committee of the PCP Transcript of &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988. LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(92) II NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCP Mimeographed Printing July 12, 1982 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(93) PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF THE SENDERISTA URBAN MILITANT Conducted by behaviorist psychologists of the Armed Forces (See Appendix 4)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(94) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS &amp;quot;The PCP SHINING PATH: AN APPROACH TO ITS IDEOLOGY&amp;quot; &amp;quot;SOCIALISM AND PARTICIPATION&amp;quot; Magazine No. 37, Pages 30 and 31 May 1987 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(95) BASIS OF DISCUSSION &amp;quot;Central Committee of the PCP,&amp;quot; Transcript of &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(96) &amp;quot;CLOSURE OF THE FIRST MILITARY SCHOOL: BEGINNING OF ARMED STRUGGLE&amp;quot; Speech by Abimael Guzmán Reinoso Mimeographed Copy April 1980 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(97) II NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCP Directional Thesis&amp;quot; Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(98) BASIS OF DISCUSSION PCP Transcript of &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988. LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(99) BASIS OF DISCUSSION PCP Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(100) &amp;quot;ACTION FRAMEWORK OF SENDERISTA IRREGULARS&amp;quot; For the preparation of this framework and the estimation of other statistical figures in this book, information from public and private sources, reliable and trustworthy, has been cross-referenced in such a way that it can withstand verification of its accuracy and correctness. The different sources that have been used as references - because they are not all the same - may show slight variations, but not adulterations or falsifications.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(101) &amp;quot;DEVELOP GUERRILLA WARFARE WHILE SERVING THE WORLD REVOLUTION.&amp;quot; Op. Cit. Page 31&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(102) Revolutionary War, based on the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism, has a totalizing conception of the world; therefore, it does not conceive or accept psychological warfare as a method of combat. Psychological warfare is a technique of Political Warfare, Psychological Operations or Low-Intensity Operations, it is a conception of Western warfare strategy. (See Appendix 5)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(103) &amp;quot;NATIONAL INTERMEDIATE MEETING OF LEADERS AND CADRES&amp;quot; Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(104) &amp;quot;THE PARTY PROBLEM IN THE NEW GRAND PLAN&amp;quot; The Program Meeting of the CC of the PCP October 1986 Typed Copy LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(105) GRETCHEN SMALL AND CSIS PROPOSE GENOCIDE&amp;quot; &amp;quot;DECORRELATION AND Resumen Ejecutivo Vol. I. NS28 of August 1, 1984 New York - UNITED STATES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(106) The &amp;quot;FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU &amp;quot;SHINING PATH,&amp;quot; published in &amp;quot;El Diario,&amp;quot; edition NB 322, Year VII of February 7, 1988, confirm the substitutive nature of &amp;quot;Shining Path&amp;quot;: The enemy for the Shining Path is not imperialism but Marxism (&amp;quot;revisionism&amp;quot; Soviet, Chinese, and Albanian); the Aprista government and President García (representatives of bureaucratic capitalism); and the Armed Forces (which must be primarily destroyed). These &amp;quot;Fundamental Documents&amp;quot; prove the suitability of the sources used to write this book. The documents listed in this bibliography with numbers 65, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 97, and 104 have been used to &amp;quot;construct&amp;quot; what &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; publishes as the result of a supposed Congress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== APPENDICE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Letters exchanged between Abimael Guzmán Reinoso (Álvaro) and Saturnina Paredes Macedo (R. Arderás): I - II - III ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== I ====&lt;br /&gt;
January 15, 1970&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comrade Secretary General:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two months have passed since your reintegration into party work, one month since the date when the Permanent Committee should have met again, and we have not received any new news from you to date. Therefore, we find it necessary to send you this letter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been nearly two months since our last meeting. During this time, while some comrades strive to remain faithful to the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the agreements of the 6th Conference of our Communist Party, others are working diligently to abandon them, exacerbate contradictions, and engage in a liquidationist practice that only serves the class enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A series of recent documents, leaflets, etc., accurately reflect this situation. While some analyze and apply principles, others freely propagate liquidationism, even going so far as to reveal the names and locations of comrades and the Party. We are sending you a comprehensive collection that supports our claims, and we have no doubt that it will help you form a clear and defined understanding of what is happening.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mariátegui emphasizes the theory and practice of our activity, stating that the fundamental problem of our Party, our Revolution, and our Homeland is the peasant problem. Our great Party has traveled a long, tortuous, and difficult path to reaffirm this direction. The fact that we are on the threshold of a major shift within the Party regarding this issue is evident from the fact that it forms the foundation of this new stage in the development of the party organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, here we have clearly defined the boundaries with those who seek to exploit the hopes of the peasants: we have exposed (and will continue to do so) two supposed &amp;quot;departmental&amp;quot; peasant leaders, including one who, deceiving the people, pretended to be the &amp;quot;base&amp;quot; of a popular organization with a tradition of struggle and prestige among the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, considering that the definition of the current situation is still under study, we have not yet expanded the scope of our action. We are still treating even those who already see us as enemies with discrimination. But it is evident that this situation cannot be maintained for much longer, except at the risk of being seen as weaknesses by our desires and the forces of unity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the 8th of this month, we received a document from the Peasant Commission with a surprising and unusual delay, not even indicating the day but only the month of its approval (November). In this regard, we understand that the distribution of documents is still subject to centralization norms. The Peasant Commission knows perfectly well who the link to AGIPRO (Agitation and Propaganda) is. On the other hand, even if it had not been distributed to the Central Committee through that channel, we understand that they should have consulted with you. And they should not have done so, because otherwise the document would have been received here along with a note from you. Unless you are aware of it, everything changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, if in the previous document of the Peasant Commission the Permanent Committee was not recognized because it &amp;quot;demanded&amp;quot; that the Secretary of Organization directly convene the Central Committee, thus arrogating powers that are not within its competence, with the current document, it exacerbates rather than corrects the previous error. Now it even disregards the Political Bureau, as well as the Permanent Committee. So, to whom is it &amp;quot;addressed&amp;quot; for the immediate convocation of the Central Committee? Is it addressed to the Permanent Committee, perhaps? Maybe to the Political Bureau? We believe that you should seriously consider the gravity of this situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regarding the content of the document, it is clear that the Peasant Commission has advanced further in exacerbating the current contradictions. We reserve the right to provide the appropriate critique of this document as well as others and activities and even positions that are clearly divergent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We believe that &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; should already provide the general guidance on this new stage of struggle, on this Great Controversy regarding the preconstitution of the Party, guided by the foundation of party unity, taking Mariátegui as the cornerstone, and focusing the debate on the fundamental problem, the peasant issue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, we hope to receive news from you as soon as possible, even by return mail, to finally know where we stand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yours sincerely, &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of Organization &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Abimael Guzmán Reynoso) &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of AGIPRO&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== II ====&lt;br /&gt;
February 15, 1970&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I hereby inform you that during the meeting of the Political Bureau at the end of last January, attended by the majority of its members and the Responsible for Youth, the following agreements were reached:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, considering that the comrades responsible for Organization and Agitation and Propaganda have effectively abandoned their areas of work in practice, engaging instead in an intense internal struggle at the regional level, and that they have unjustifiably refused to attend the meeting of the Political Bureau, insisting instead that the Permanent Committee should function first, where they have a majority that they use to hinder the radicalization of the Party, DECLARE that, apart from the Central Committee, the only body of the National Leadership at this moment is the Political Bureau, led by the Secretary General who was directly elected by the Central Committee in accordance with the powers granted at the VI National Conference.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, temporarily assign the responsibilities of the Organization and Agitation and Propaganda fronts to the Secretary General, thereby removing the comrades in charge of them, who will continue to be members of the Political Bureau.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thirdly, convene the II Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected at the VI National Conference within a period of three months, on a date and at a location that will be duly indicated. The following agenda must be discussed and decided upon:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Report on the political situation&lt;br /&gt;
# Report on the Party&#039;s situation and co-reports (Internal Struggle)&lt;br /&gt;
# Election of the Political Bureau and the Permanent Committee&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fourthly, all items on the agenda must be addressed with the fundamental criterion of revolutionary practice to fully implement the Party&#039;s proletarian line. The manner and form of conducting the internal struggle must be subjected to this criterion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fifthly, consider the Party&#039;s connection with the popular masses, primarily workers and peasants, as a matter of life or death for the Party. Party members must take the lead in their struggles and, through their example, promote fresh blood from the proletariat to enrich the Party&#039;s ranks, as well as the best and most combative sons of the peasantry. Simultaneously, combat all forms of sectarianism and opportunism, both from the right and the &amp;quot;left,&amp;quot; while adhering to the norms of open and secret work, in accordance with the principle of preserving and developing one&#039;s own forces in the process of struggle. Those who consciously adopt an attitude that leads to the isolation of the Party or the weakening of its ranks must be relentlessly fought against.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sixthly, start from the slogan of forging the unity of the Party through revolutionary practice, guided by proletarian politics rooted in Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung Thought, Mariátegui&#039;s legacy, and the principles of the V National Conference.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fraternally, R. Anderas &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Saturnino Paredes Macedo) &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary General&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== III ====&lt;br /&gt;
January 20, 1970&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comrade Secretary General:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the 13th of this month, at 7:30 p.m., we received a letter from you dated the current month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the 15th, we wrote you a letter accompanied by an extensive collection of documents (40 in number, totaling 118 letter-sized pages, single-spaced). In that letter, among other points, we expressed our surprise at the delay with which you had sent us the document from the Peasant Commission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot help but express our surprise and bewilderment at your letter, to which we respond herewith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The revolution demands from us, as an essential requirement to be able to participate in it, extreme frankness and complete honesty. Without this requirement, we not only act against ourselves, sealing our political fate once and for all, but, more importantly, against our Homeland, our Revolution, and our Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a corollary of the VI Conference of our Communist Party, we have entered a great process of unification based on party unity. An expression of this process is the Great Controversy, whose prelude we are currently experiencing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We want unity, seek unity, and fight for unity. But it is a law of Marxism that &amp;quot;before uniting and in order to unite, it is necessary to clearly and decisively delineate the positions.&amp;quot; We openly and honestly declare that we adhere to this principled stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In November, you urgently summoned us to a meeting of the Permanent Committee. Despite our best efforts to get there in time, we had to wait for nearly a week to be able to convene. Until now, the fundamental reason for this delay has not been explained to us.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once assembled, we were surprised to learn that the session of the Permanent Committee had become a mere formality, as its only purpose was to convene the meeting of the Political Bureau. Clearly misguided about what you should do after your reintegration into party work, and even less informed about what was really happening, you took a step that evidently contributed nothing to unity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to the initial information you received at the meeting, the conclusion was reached that a hasty meeting of the Political Bureau, let alone the Central Committee, such as the one that the Peasant Commission had &amp;quot;demanded&amp;quot; weeks ago, threatening even to hold it if it was not convened and setting deadlines for its realization, would contribute nothing to the interests of our Homeland, our Revolution, and our Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was also agreed that you should thoroughly inform yourself about what was really happening, for which you should take all the time you deemed necessary. Then, once you had a clear, unambiguous, and defined opinion on the situation, the position of each member of the Permanent Committee should be determined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is obvious that several meetings would be needed for this purpose. Thus, we left it at that and also decided that you would convene the next meeting of the Permanent Committee for mid-December.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We stated in the Permanent Committee that a communist can participate in any discussion, but first, they must know clearly what kind of meeting it is: a meeting among comrades, or a meeting between us and the enemy. If it is the former, we go with a desire for unity and with the objective of strengthening this unity through self-criticism and criticism. If it is the latter, we go knowing that the positions are clearly defined, and our only concern is to avoid getting involved in a potential compromise that, contrary to the principles, would favor our Homeland, our Revolution, and our Party in the long run.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was necessary to state this because, as we informed you, some comrades had gone so far as to say that we were on both sides, that the contradictions were antagonistic (with the enemy), and they called for the overthrow of the &amp;quot;distorters of the VI Conference.&amp;quot; In these circumstances, is a meeting of the Political Bureau or the Central Committee appropriate, considering that these meetings, being party meetings, are necessarily meetings among comrades who participate with a subjective desire for unity? This is why a series of meetings of the Permanent Committee was and continues to be necessary to define and clarify these and other points.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What has happened in these last two months? As we mentioned in our previous letter, &amp;quot;a series of documents, flyers, etc., published recently, faithfully reflect this situation. While some analyze and apply principles, in others, liquidationism is rampant, even going so far as to mention names and locations of comrades and the Party.&amp;quot; A new gem of this liquidationism, dated the 19th, is attached to this letter as evidence of what we reiterate.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is impossible not to take a position on these events. Even more impossible is taking a third position, a centrist or expectant position. It is entirely impossible for the Permanent Committee not to define its position as soon as possible. Therefore, we reaffirm that, before any other meeting, whether the Political Bureau or the Central Committee, a meeting of the Permanent Committee is necessary to finally understand where each of us stands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We await news from you. Furthermore, considering the time that has passed and the events that have occurred, we expected that you would at least outline your position on this reality. On the contrary, we received a brief note in which we couldn&#039;t even decipher which meeting you are convening us to and for what objectives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not possible to continue like this. We have already told you that &amp;quot;this situation cannot persist for much longer, lest our desires and efforts for unity be seen as a sign of weakness.&amp;quot; For months, it has been opportunely claimed that there is a &amp;quot;leadership crisis in the Party.&amp;quot; What identity does this have with the jester who throws a stone and hides his hand, with the thief who shouts, &amp;quot;thief&amp;quot;? Before your reintegration into party work, the Permanent Committee&#039;s declaration on the June meeting was distributed to the Central Committee, outlining the principles we must keep in mind in this stage and the tasks we must fulfill. The resolutions of the VI Conference have also been disseminated. &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; No. 42 has been published. It is evident that this material is not being considered. On the contrary, it has even been boldly declared that &amp;quot;the resolutions have contraband, they have not been reviewed by the Secretary General,&amp;quot; and that &amp;quot;Bandera Roja No. 41 has contraband; it has not been reviewed by the Secretary General.&amp;quot; You returned to party work in November, and at that time, &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; No. 42 was also circulated. However, even in January, it is still said that there is a &amp;quot;leadership crisis.&amp;quot; What is the stance regarding &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; No. 42? Does it have contraband? Is it being supported? Is it intended to be wrapped up in a conspiracy of silence?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the &amp;quot;leadership crisis&amp;quot; refers to the absence of meetings of the Party&#039;s top organs, revolutionary frankness and honesty demand that we clarify why there are no such meetings. Who thwarted the meeting of the Political Bureau in June? Who, with their liquidationist attitude, made it impossible for any meeting of the Permanent Committee or the Political Bureau to take place before your return? Who is responsible for attempting to turn the November meeting of the Permanent Committee into a mere formality? Why have no new meetings of the Permanent Committee been held until now?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How true and relevant is Lenin&#039;s statement now, &amp;quot;(the liquidators) try to obscure the truth with noisy shouts and scandals. Sometimes, novices can be bewildered by methods of this nature, but the workers, in spite of everything, will find their own way and will soon reject the insults.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In November, we told you that an important meeting would be held here in Ayacucho soon, and it would be very beneficial for you to participate. The expectation of the Political Bureau meeting on one hand and your silence afterward did not make it possible to inform you in a timely manner. This important meeting will take place precisely on the days you have invited us. This is the second reason why we cannot travel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, reiterating that meetings of the Permanent Committee should resume before any other meetings, whether of the Political Bureau or the Central Committee, we propose that, if it is our mutual desire, the first of the new meetings should take place at the end of this month or the beginning of the next. In this meeting, there would be a fruitful exchange of opinions regarding &amp;quot;the general orientation of this new stage of struggle, on this Great Debate about the reconstitution of the Party, guided by the basis of party unity, with Mariátegui as our cornerstone, and focusing the debate on the fundamental issue, the peasant problem,&amp;quot; as we expressed in our previous letter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We await your response.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of Organization &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Abimael Guzmán Reynoso) &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of Agipro&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Statements By Abimael Guzman Reynoso To A Police Official In Lima In February 1982, Regarding The Communist Party Of Peru: ===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What is the true name of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 6.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;PCP-SL in the original, which is the Spanish abbreviation. The entirety of the questions in this interview specifically say PCP-SL in the original, which we translated to the full English form each time.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; The Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;Shining Path&amp;quot;, which people commonly refer to, does not actually use that name. The party&#039;s own documents indicate that its true name is the Communist Party of Peru, simply abbreviated as CPP. The term &amp;quot;Shining Path&amp;quot; has its origins from the 1960s when the newspaper &#039;&#039;Red Flag&#039;&#039; was published. At the end, it used the slogan &amp;quot;Por el Luminoso Sendero de Mariátegui&amp;quot; (For the Shining Path of Mariátegui). In the early 1960s, university students affiliated with the party, as part of the RSF (Revolutionary Students’ Front, Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios), used &amp;quot;For the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; as an identification slogan to distinguish themselves from other RSF groups on campus. Later, this term became more widespread, and it became common to refer to anyone associated with the political position of the Communist Party of Peru as &amp;quot;Shining Path.&amp;quot; This means that the Party itself did not adopt this name; rather, it was used by various groups and people who opposed the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What is the ideological character of the Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;for the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; This is specified in the party&#039;s own documents. The Communist Party of Peru is based on the decision of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, meaning that Marxism has developed in three stages. Marx’s stage, Marxism, corresponds to the era of pre-monopoly capitalism, the last century, and in terms of politics, it corresponds to the preparation for revolution. So, the first stage of Marxism is &amp;quot;Marxism of the era of pre-monopoly capitalism and the preparation for revolution.&amp;quot; Later, at the end of the last century and the beginning of this century, capitalism enters a new phase, which is its final stage, the &amp;quot;imperialist phase.&amp;quot; Lenin is the one who would point out the laws of the development of imperialism and find its contradictions. In this era of imperialism, the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are exacerbated to the fullest extent. Lenin, while discovering the internal laws of imperialism, also points out the need to organize the revolution, not just in preparation but with a view to its execution. Stalin defines the second stage of Marxism as &amp;quot;Leninism.&amp;quot; Therefore, Leninism is typified as &amp;quot;Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution.&amp;quot; So far, we have &amp;quot;Marxism-Leninism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After World War II, China is in the midst of a revolution, and Mao Zedong, by applying Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of a semi-feudal and semi-colonial China, will discover that imperialism on a global level enters a period of extreme contradictions. The two world wars are symptoms of these extreme inter-imperialist contradictions. In this period, the revolution has shifted from advanced countries to backward countries, to agrarian countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Mao Zedong will discover new laws of revolution, which are synthesized in the laws of people&#039;s war, from the countryside to the city, in a long process under the leadership of the party of the proletariat. This is a peasant revolution called the &amp;quot;Democratic National Revolution&amp;quot; as a preliminary stage of a subsequent &amp;quot;Socialist Revolution.&amp;quot; This period is established within Marxism as a development in the third stage, and it is what was called &amp;quot;Mao Zedong Thought&amp;quot; during the Chinese proletarian cultural revolution. So, we now have &amp;quot;Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought,&amp;quot; and this is the doctrine adopted by the Communist Party of Peru. Furthermore, this party, according to its own documents, has taken up and developed the ideas of Mariátegui, applying them to our reality. When Mariátegui founded the Socialist Party in the country, he was essentially founding a proletarian party, which means it became a Communist Party. To do this, Mariátegui had to outline a general political line that includes five key issues: 1. The character of society, 2. The character of the revolution, 3. The instrument of the revolution, 4. The tasks of the revolution, and 5. A mass line.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the character of that society, the character of the revolution necessarily follows. This comes from the analysis Mariátegui made of our reality, which is semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Therefore, if a country is capitalist, the revolution must be socialist. However, if a country is semi-feudal and semi-colonial, the revolution must be a National Democratic or Bourgeois Democratic one, as Mariátegui called it. Thus, if the Peruvian revolution must be National Democratic, this implies that the Peruvian revolution has to have two stages: the first, National Democratic, and the second, Socialist, as a continuation of the first stage of the revolution. This character of the revolution, indicating the two stages, is the logical and inevitable consequence of the character of society, and this is Mariátegui&#039;s conclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What are the motives, reasons, and when did the Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;for the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; emerge in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; This is directly related to the historical process of the Party. Everyone knows that the Communist Party was a single entity in our country, and as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split in 1963, it had to reflect in all Communist Parties worldwide. The Peruvian Communist Party couldn&#039;t remain unaffected by this, so in our country, the Communist Party also experienced a split. On one side, there were those oriented towards what the public knows as &amp;quot;Muscovites,&amp;quot; and on the other side, the &amp;quot;Pekingese.&amp;quot; Concerning the &amp;quot;Muscovites,&amp;quot; they still called themselves the Peruvian Communist Party, publishing the newspaper &#039;&#039;Unidad&#039;&#039; (Unity). On the other hand, another group also known as the Peruvian Communist Party emerged, and they began publishing the newspaper &#039;&#039;Red Flag&#039;&#039; (Bandera Roja). In 1963, during the last months, the Fourth Conference of the Communist Party took place. During this event, under the leadership of Jorge Sotomayor Suárez, they decided to expel all those who belonged to the other faction, including Jorge del Piado and others. At this conference, the Party adopted the thought of Mao Zedong for application in our reality, but they hadn&#039;t yet clarified the strategy for the Peruvian revolution. The progress consisted of adopting Mao&#039;s thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, between the Fourth and Fifth Conferences, Jorge Sotomayor Pérez left the Party. I don&#039;t know the reasons, but it must have been intense due to very serious contradictions regarding the main problem, which is the people&#039;s war, the strategy of the revolution. Then, Saturnino Paredes Macedo assumes leadership as Secretary General. When the Fifth Conference takes place, I believe it was in 1965, the Party&#039;s progress is mainly expressed in the establishment of what was called a &amp;quot;basis of party unity&amp;quot;; this basis was &amp;quot;Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought&amp;quot; at the global level and &amp;quot;Mariátegui&#039;s thought&amp;quot; at the national level; that is, the unity of all members of that organization had to be based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Mariátegui&#039;s thought. Another important aspect of that Conference is that they identify organizing the &amp;quot;people&#039;s war&amp;quot; as the Party&#039;s main task. However, there was a pending issue, which was the fact that the Party itself was the result of a long process since the death of Mariátegui, a process in which the Party participated in several electoral processes and its own organic structure was adapted according to electoral requirements, and the criterion of the leaders regarding the Party&#039;s system and structure has been that &amp;quot;the partisan system and structure do not correspond to the needs of a party that must organize and lead the people&#039;s war&amp;quot; unless it were a party with an electoral system and structure. Therefore, the need for &amp;quot;reconstitution&amp;quot; is raised, which constitutes the essence of the contradictions that were to develop thereafter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, between the Fifth and Sixth Conferences, a new internal contradiction emerged, leading to another split. It&#039;s worth noting that this period coincided with the Revolutionary Left Movement’s guerrilla actions in 1965, which had a significant influence on the minds of those who were in our Party. After the Fifth Conference, a position that the Party labeled as militaristic, foco-oriented, and influenced by Cuba started to emerge. This position emerged among militant groups associated with a Committee in one region that published a newspaper called &#039;&#039;Red Homeland&#039;&#039; (Patria Roja). People who adhered to this position from the &#039;&#039;Red Homeland&#039;&#039; newspaper started to be labeled by the Party as a danger. However, I should mention that the actions taken by the Party leadership in response to this were, in my opinion, erroneous. There was no ideological struggle or clarification; instead, purely organizational measures were taken. Consequently, before the Sixth Conference, everyone from &#039;&#039;Patria Roja&#039;&#039; had already been expelled from the Party without any Party event, meeting, or discussion. This was a highly abnormal situation within a Communist Party. This event had repercussions on the Party. &#039;&#039;Patria Roja&#039;&#039; took around 80% of the militants, and the Party was left significantly weakened. There was a schism, and &#039;&#039;Patria Roja&#039;&#039; emerged, while the Party still called itself the Peruvian Communist Party and continued publishing &#039;&#039;Bandera Roja&#039;&#039;. Additionally, &#039;&#039;Patria Roja&#039;&#039; also called itself the Communist Party of Peru, with the acronym “PC del P”. The issue of Party &amp;quot;reconstitution&amp;quot; became prominent again between the Fifth and Sixth Conferences. However, there weren&#039;t significant problems at that time. Some members expressed a willingness to carry out the reconstitution, while others intended to promote it. After the Sixth Conference, two groups started to differentiate themselves in practice. Saturnino Paredes started publishing &#039;&#039;Bandera Roja&#039;&#039; with personal and group criteria, no longer representing the Party. On the other hand, another &#039;&#039;Bandera Roja&#039;&#039; increasingly emphasized the Party&#039;s agreed-upon base of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Mariátegui&#039;s thought, adding to it the task of organizing the people&#039;s war, as mandated by the V Conference. In 1972 or 1973, it became noticeable at the university level that the Revolutionary Student Fronts &amp;quot;For the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; were openly engaging in a struggle against what was called &amp;quot;liquidationism,&amp;quot; labeling the Mariátegui group. The faction publishing &#039;&#039;Bandera Roja&#039;&#039; opposed Mariátegui, and they referred to themselves as the Communist Party of Peru. However, they did not adopt any special acronym or slogan to distinguish themselves. This difference was only noticeable at the university or Front level, which is why this Party began to be called or identified as RSF - &amp;quot;By the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; as a consequence of the split from Saturnino Paredes&#039; group.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What is the current strategy being developed by the Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;for the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; The strategy is derived from the general political line established by Mariátegui. The strategy of the revolution is a logical consequence of the very nature of the revolution. If the revolution has two stages, the first being Democratic National and the second Socialist, then the strategy of the revolution at this moment corresponds to the first stage, which is essentially Democratic Bourgeois. In Mao Zedong&#039;s terms, this means a peasant revolution, an agrarian revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party. This type of revolution entails a long and protracted people&#039;s war. It follows the path that Mao called &amp;quot;surrounding the cities from the countryside,&amp;quot; which involves liberating rural areas through armed struggle, establishing support bases, and gradually encircling cities, starting with small villages and towns, then moving to medium-sized cities, and finally the large cities until the ultimate capture of central power at the national level. Logically, the strategy adopted by the Communist Party must be a result of its own process of reconstitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fundamentally, the reconstitution of the Party should be understood as organic, but from a Marxist perspective, the organic aspect always follows the ideological and political aspects. This means that the reconstitution of the Party should have been an organic reconstitution. If the Communist Party of Peru claims that it is already implementing its revolutionary strategy, it implies that the Party has been reconstituted in ideological, political, and organic terms. Concerning the strategy, this indicates that it has been reconstituted from a political standpoint, implying the consistent application of the laws of people&#039;s war outlined by Mao Zedong to the specific conditions of our country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What are the necessary conditions required for applying the revolution in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; In any revolution, Marxists identify two types of requirements or conditions. Firstly, there are the objective conditions or material conditions of the revolution, which Lenin referred to as the &amp;quot;revolutionary situation.&amp;quot; These are manifested through the misery of the masses, poverty, hunger, oppression, discontent, protests, and struggles, among other factors. From a Marxist perspective, there cannot be a revolution without a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation.&amp;quot; Secondly, from a Marxist standpoint, even when there are objective conditions for a revolution, it cannot be realized without the presence of subjective conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Subjective conditions in a country like ours are outlined by Mao as the &amp;quot;three magic weapons of revolution,&amp;quot; which are the Party, the United Front, and Armed Struggle. Without these subjective conditions, even if there are objective conditions, the revolution is unlikely to occur. Therefore, the Party&#039;s role is to build and consolidate these subjective conditions, the &amp;quot;three magic weapons of revolution,&amp;quot; which, when acting on the objective conditions, enable the development of revolutionary action. These subjective conditions, according to Marxist dialectics, have decisive importance in the revolution to such an extent that they can even generate the following: if the objective conditions for the revolution do not exist, the subjective conditions can, through various actions, create the necessary objective conditions to develop the revolutionary process.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Based on your experiences, do the objective conditions of the revolution exist in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding this, we must consider the analytical approach. Lenin&#039;s analysis, applied to a capitalist country like the USSR, and Mao&#039;s analysis applied to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country like China, offer different perspectives. Lenin argued that a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation&amp;quot; does not always exist in a capitalist country, but arises at a specific moment and may have a short or extended existence but is not permanent. Armed insurrection must, therefore, occur when a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation&amp;quot; emerges. In contrast, Mao argued that in China, there is always a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation&amp;quot; due to its semi-feudal and semi-colonial nature. Applying this doctrine to our country, following Mariátegui&#039;s general policy, our society is also semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Therefore, in our homeland, there is a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation,&amp;quot; meaning there are objective conditions for a revolution. Among these conditions, we have constant protests and movements by peasants demanding land reform, protests against the actions of cooperatives, and ongoing claims for individual land ownership. In the urban working class, there are frequent strikes, protests over rising living costs, demands for wage increases, and more. Even the petite bourgeoisie, teachers, health workers, and various workers protest against economic policies. These conditions indicate that the masses are discontented, suffering from poverty and hunger, which are signs of the presence of objective conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; You mentioned the three objective conditions of the revolution: the Party, the United Front, and Armed Struggle. Do these three conditions exist in the Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;for the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; From the Party&#039;s perspective, the three subjective conditions do exist. Firstly, the Party itself exists, and it remains the same. This Party is the principal condition because it constitutes the guiding force of the entire process. The issue lies in determining if the other two subjective conditions, the United Front (UF) and Armed Struggle (AS), exist. The Party has a clear concept of what it conceives as the United Front. The first form of concrete existence of the UF is the worker-peasant alliance, so we must first inquire if this worker-peasant alliance exists. If it does, then the UF exists. The Party has a fairly clear concept of the UF in this case. The worker-peasant alliance means the Proletarian Party, which is the Communist Party itself, embedded within the peasant masses. In certain peasant areas, primarily among the poor peasantry, the Party guides, organizes, and directs their struggle. Therefore, when peasants are directly guided by the Party, it signifies the Party&#039;s connection to the peasantry. Since the Party represents the working class and is embodied within the peasant masses, this constitutes the concrete worker-peasant alliance, and thus, the UF exists. According to the Party&#039;s conception, this worker-peasant alliance does not end there; it must develop as the backbone of the revolutionary UF. The strategic UF, according to the Party, encompasses four revolutionary classes: the proletariat, the peasantry, the petite bourgeoisie (loyal allies of the revolution), and the national or middle bourgeoisie, considered allies during crucial moments of the revolution. Therefore, the strategic UF unites these four classes: the proletariat, peasantry, petite bourgeoisie, and the national or middle bourgeoisie. The proletariat in our country consists of wage workers in industries and mines, as per Marxist definition, with a particular emphasis on mine workers. Within the peasantry, the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist perspective recognizes three categories: the rich peasantry, the middle peasantry, and the poor peasantry. In terms of percentages, the rich peasantry accounts for approximately 5% to 10%, the middle peasantry about 20% to 30%, while the majority is the poor peasantry. In the early stages, the rich peasantry does not participate in the revolution due to their economic status, and the middle peasantry does so hesitantly. Therefore, the Party focuses primarily on the poor peasantry, who make up the majority and are more inclined toward revolutionary ideology and action. The petite bourgeoisie includes intellectuals, liberal professionals, students, teachers, small-scale merchants, and small-scale artisans—people who economically meet their fundamental needs but also experience oppression from both big capital and the feudal backwardness of the country. Consequently, they are highly inclined to join the revolutionary process. However, they can also easily serve the classes opposing the revolution if they find an easy way to accommodate. The national or middle bourgeoisie comprises medium-sized industrialists, owners of medium-sized mines, and medium-sized merchants—considered as an exploiting class since they exploit wage labor. Nonetheless, they are also disadvantaged by big capital, both foreign and domestic, which limits their growth. Therefore, in specific revolutionary moments, they may align with the big bourgeoisie but can also serve the revolution when their interests depend on their dependency on imperialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regarding armed struggle, the third subjective condition of the revolution, I have only general ideas, but they result from analyzing the texts of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought and global experience. The Party believes that this third subjective condition also exists from the moment there are determined individuals with the will to engage in armed actions, even when they do not possess weapons. As Lenin stated, &amp;quot;armed struggle without weapons exists from the moment determined individuals are willing to execute it.&amp;quot; Therefore, the Party&#039;s concern is not only about the existence of determined individuals but also about developing these individuals and their actions to the point where armed struggle can be waged effectively. I understand that if the Party has set the task of developing armed struggle, it&#039;s because there are individuals determined and willing to sacrifice their lives for armed struggle. So, for the Party, the third &amp;quot;magic weapon&amp;quot; of the revolution, armed struggle, also exists. At this moment, I cannot confirm if the Party already possesses the necessary weapons to carry out authentic armed actions, as conceived in armed struggle, but I believe that the Party, according to its own strategy, must have necessarily carried out a series of actions that would enable the development of people&#039;s war with weapons. To achieve this, preliminary actions must have been executed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; How do you explain that despite the strategy of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path, which focuses on armed struggle from rural to urban areas, there have been terrorist or disruptive actions in cities, including attacks on essential public services, public places, and private properties nationwide since July 1980?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; I have a clear opinion on this matter. In China, the first peasant uprising truly led by Mao Zedong occurred in the Chin Kang mountains, which historically served as the base of support for the Chinese revolution. It&#039;s essential to consider the following: before the uprising in the Chin Kang mountains, sabotage actions took place in nearby mining areas and cities. These actions were linked to a strategic plan of the revolution, including acts of sabotage or what is currently termed terrorism. Logically, these actions were intended to divert the military forces of the Chinese state, making it easier to organize, prepare, and develop the peasant uprising led by the Chinese Communist Party. Considering this global experience, it&#039;s not challenging to analyze what is happening in our homeland. Moreover, it&#039;s worth noting that the entire region in China where the Chin Kang mountain uprising took place, including the mining areas and various nearby cities where sabotage acts occurred, collectively covered a territorial expanse similar to that of Peru. Therefore, although individual actions may seem isolated in different cities in Peru, such as in the North, South, Lima, Ayacucho, Huancayo, and more, when viewed as a whole, it is akin to what occurred in China. Thus, even though there are actions in cities, mining areas, and sabotage acts like the destruction of radio antennas in certain locations, primarily state institutions, I believe and am confident that these are supportive actions aiding the preparation and gestation of a genuine revolutionary movement—the peasant uprising.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Do you believe that there is gestation or emergence in the countryside for the purposes of armed struggle?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; I believe one thing regarding this issue. The poor peasantry genuinely suffers from poverty, which is a subjective reality. The misery endured by the poor peasantry throughout the centuries, spanning four centuries, as the Republic failed to resolve the land issue, makes the poor peasantry highly receptive to revolutionary ideology and actions. Our nation&#039;s history and the current century consistently show peasant uprisings, rebellions, such as the armed struggle of 1960 and the well-known peasant invasions. These movements mobilized thousands, even hundreds of thousands of peasants. At this very moment, various regions in the country experience discontent, protests, and, as in 1979, significant peasant movements in the Central Sierra, where even the Sinchis and other military forces had to engage in combat. Therefore, I genuinely believe that the peasantry, especially the poor peasantry, in our homeland, is the sector most inclined towards the preparation and organization of the revolution, as well as the eventual peasant uprising. Even if the poor peasantry lacks systematic, conscious indoctrination, they are still favorable conditions, potentially spontaneous.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; For the gestation of people&#039;s war, which strategically begins in the countryside but is also manifest traditionally in cities through certain actions carried out by the Party, are there mechanisms or structures within the Party for the dissemination or execution of these actions?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding actions like sabotage or terrorism, I am not aware of whether the Party has specialized entities for this purpose. However, I do not believe that this type of action can be carried out by gathering individuals, discussing it on the streets, or hiring people for a task. These actions must necessarily result from well-organized and well-directed work by the Party itself. It is unlikely that many of these groups carrying out sabotage actions have individuals who, in an adventurous and idealistic manner, are not Party members or sympathizers but participate simply out of a desire to engage in revolutionary actions. Nevertheless, I believe such cases are minimal and exceptional, and there are few of them, which cannot be considered the main factor. The primary factor, in my opinion, is that the Party must have entities that systematically and organizationally plan the execution of these actions.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; It has been established that there is a LCWM (Laborers and Class Workers Movement; Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas) linked to the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path; do you consider this link to be real and if the LCWM is an operative organism of the Party?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; I believe that the LCWM is primarily a liaison organization. Since the Party operates clandestinely and cannot openly present itself to the masses or its members as representatives of the Communist Party, it uses what Lenin and Mao Zedong called &amp;quot;transmission belts.&amp;quot; In our country, the Communist Party of Peru (CPP) refers to these as &amp;quot;Generated Organizations,&amp;quot; but the concept is essentially the same—transmission belts or Generated Organizations. The LCWM is one such Generated Organization. In various trade unions, both in mining and industry, there are workers who may or may not be union leaders but are aligned with the CPP’s program. If Party members become aware of these workers, they are considered individuals who serve the Party, even if they are not Party members themselves. This collective of workers, who may not know each other or hold meetings, constitutes what the Party calls the LCWM on a national level. So, any worker or sympathizer who wants to serve the Party or promote the people&#039;s war presents themselves on behalf of the LCWM, which serves as a transmission belt or an organization that is not the Party but supports the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As transmission belts, if a group of members who consider themselves part of the LCWM understands that these sabotage actions are part of the Party&#039;s plan to establish the people&#039;s war, then even though they may not be aware of it, some present may be Party members. They generate a proposal or an idea for carrying out a sabotage action, which they may believe is entirely isolated, but from the Party&#039;s perspective, it is part of the plan. They coordinate, plan the action, seek the necessary materials, and execute it. Consequently, it may appear that the LCWM has carried out the sabotage action, but it is under the direct guidance of the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Are there other Generated Organizations or transmission belts of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Yes, that depends on what is conceived of as various sectors within the popular masses. Following Mao Zedong&#039;s thinking applied to our homeland, the Party conceives of five sectors within the popular masses: a) the worker sector, b) the peasant sector, c) the women&#039;s sector, d) the youth sector, and e) the intellectual sector. To have a transmission belt for each of these sectors, there is a corresponding organization. Thus, in addition to the LCWM for the worker sector, there is the Movement of Poor Peasants (Movimiento de Campesinos Pobres) for the peasant sector, the Popular Women&#039;s Movement (Movimiento Femenino Popular) for the women&#039;s sector, the Youth Movement (Movimiento Juvenil) for the youth sector, and an organization called CTIM, the Mariátegui Intellectual Work Center (Centro de Trabajo Intelectual Mariátegui), for the intellectual sector. Therefore, whether or not these organizations or entities are active, they exist because when the Party wants to reach the women&#039;s masses, taking into account the specific issues facing women, they receive news or analysis from the Women&#039;s Movement, which functions as transmission belts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What are the forms or means of dissemination of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Based on my knowledge up to the end of 1979, there were three forms of written propaganda: firstly, the Party&#039;s official organ, &#039;&#039;Red Flag&#039;&#039;; secondly, the publication of pamphlets claiming to be from the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party, but these pamphlets focus on specific issues. For example, before the Constituent Assembly elections, a pamphlet titled &#039;&#039;Against Constitutional Illusions&#039;&#039; was published, discouraging people from voting. Similarly, before the campaign that resulted in the election of the current government, another document from the CC titled &#039;&#039;Initiate Armed Struggle&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;Let&#039;s Start Armed Struggle&#039;&#039; was circulated. The third form of written propaganda involves using flyers and similar materials under the names of some of the Generated Organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; How are these means of dissemination subsidized, and how do the Party members move through different regions of the country with specific tasks or slogans?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding this issue, there are multiple aspects to consider. For instance, when I was engaged in dissemination and propaganda activities and had to give talks in distant places from where I lived, the same organizations or institutions that hosted me covered my expenses. These could be clubs, cultural associations, or even communities in some districts. In such cases, I did not incur any personal expenses. In other cases, I have observed the following: for the creation of propaganda materials to be released in the name of the LCWM, in a certain place addressing a specific issue of a union, some members of that organization, which identifies with the LCWM, would collect voluntary contributions from friends and sympathizers. This was another way to fund specific expenses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, I believe that one form of funding that never ceases to exist is the financial contributions made by Party members themselves. In all communist parties around the world, there is usually a requirement for monthly dues, although the specific amount may vary. In China, it is based on a percentage of what the members earn. From a strict Marxist perspective, the primary source of economic support for the Party is the dues paid by its members. However, it may not be possible for a party to sustain itself solely with these modest contributions, given the substantial expenses involved. In this regard, Chairman Mao Zedong once said, &amp;quot;The main economic source for the expenses required by a party to conduct a revolution is the masses themselves.&amp;quot; Therefore, the Communist Party of China proposed other ideas. If the masses are very poor, and the peasantry is struggling for higher wages, how can you ask them for economic support? Mao Zedong used to respond that the masses are the gods of the revolution and, although they are poor, they are the primary economic source for true revolutionary peoples. Historically, global experiences teach us that, for example, the Communist Party of China received significant assistance from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (USSR) during Stalin&#039;s time, including not only weapons and advice but also economic assistance. Therefore, it should be considered that the Communist Party of Peru may need to receive support from sources beyond the dues of its members or direct help from the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, regarding whether this could be financial assistance from other countries, it cannot be precisely from the Communist Party of China for a very clear reason. The Communist Party of Peru is against the Communist Party of China because the CPP has characterized and publicized with documents that the government established in China after the death of Mao Zedong is a reactionary, bourgeois, revisionist, counter-revolutionary government that is restoring capitalism. Therefore, they are considered enemies, and I do not believe that the current Communist Party of China would offer or be willing to assist the CPP.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Do the top leaders of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path and other militants, particularly those in middle management, have extensive ideological training and formation? Is this the result of instruction received abroad or from foreigners coming to our country?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding this, during my extensive political activities as a propagandist, I naturally received information on various aspects of the revolutionary life. I know that during Stalin&#039;s time in the USSR, people from many communist parties around the world went there and received ideological, political, and even military training. In Mao Zedong&#039;s era, especially during the lengthy process of the Cultural Revolution in China, I also know that people from many communist parties around the world visited China and received ideological, political, and even military training. Some Peruvians have been to China, had special meetings with Mao Zedong himself, and he advised them to serve their own people when they returned to their country. In an illustrated Chinese magazine from around the late 1960s that came to our country after Mao Zedong&#039;s death, there is a picture of a group of relatively young individuals from various Latin American countries. The person standing directly in front of Mao Zedong in the photograph is Saturnino Paredes Macedo. However, I do not have concrete evidence; it&#039;s a matter of conjecture, and I cannot confirm whether individuals from the CPP have traveled abroad for such purposes. Nonetheless, I do know that many of those involved in the 1965 guerrillas received training in Cuba. So, it wouldn&#039;t be far-fetched to speculate that members of the CPP might have traveled abroad and received ideological, political, and possibly military training. I cannot say whether people from other countries have come to Peru to provide this kind of training, as I am not a witness to such activities, and I do not know if it is happening now.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Do you speculate that members of the Central Committee have no connection with the Embassy of the People&#039;s Republic of China in Peru?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; I dare say that they have no connection because, as I mentioned earlier, the CPP considers the Communist Party of China as its enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Has the Communist Party of Peru, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (CPP-MLM), emerged, and can you indicate when it emerged and the reasons?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; That party must be the one that publishes &#039;&#039;Red Homeland&#039;&#039; (Patria Roja), publicly known as Patria Roja, which is the dissident group that emerged after the Fifth Conference of the CPP. This group was oriented towards militaristic, focoist, and Cubanist concepts and had practically dragged the majority of the party with it when it left. The party, known today as MLM (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist), did not originally emerge with these specific initials. In its early days, it was simply called the Communist Party of Peru, and they were referred to as &amp;quot;Patria Roja.&amp;quot; I believe that after the elections for the Constituent Assembly, this group split into two parts. One of them published a publication called &#039;&#039;Puka Llacta&#039;&#039;, and I think the group behind this publication is the one that calls itself the Communist Party of Peru MLM (Puka Llacta).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; According to the political character of the CPP-MLM (Puka Llacta), do they have any connection or identification with the CPP-Shining Path from the perspective of armed struggle?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; To the best of my knowledge, there were no organic connections between the CPP-MLM (Puka Llacta) and CPP-Shining Path. However, I believe that politically, they share a common goal, which is the people&#039;s war, and both are against electoral processes. They do have differences, such as CPP-Shining Path advocating not voting while &amp;quot;Puka Llacta&amp;quot; advocated casting blank votes. Nevertheless, when it comes to concrete actions within the Party&#039;s main task, which is armed struggle, their commonality outweighs their differences. So, it did not surprise me to read news reports indicating that both Shining Path and Red Homeland (referring to &amp;quot;Puka Llacta&amp;quot;) might be involved in acts of sabotage or terrorism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What is your opinion on left-wing political parties that have representation in the current National Congress, and do some of them located in the far-left tend to access power through armed struggle in this camouflaged manner?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding this, I consider what Lenin pointed out: &amp;quot;In electoral processes, those who participate in elections always try to demonstrate that there are two camps, the left and the right.&amp;quot; But Lenin said, &amp;quot;This is false; in reality, there are three camps: the right, the true left, and a third camp that presents itself as left but is the opportunist camp.&amp;quot; So, from the perspective of these concepts, members of the so-called left who have participated in elections and are in Congress are not the true left; rather, they belong to what Lenin called the third camp, the opportunist camp, according to Leninist concepts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 6.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Excerpts From The Topic &amp;quot;The Indians,&amp;quot; Developed By William P. S. Mangin At The Wingspread Conference, Wisconsin, Usa, In 1970 ===&lt;br /&gt;
(&#039;&#039;The Peruvian Revolution and the United States&#039;&#039; by David Sharp, Pages 358 to 367, South American Edition, Buenos Aires).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== QUECHUA IDENTITY AND THE COLD WAR ====&lt;br /&gt;
The indigenous people, mostly speakers of Quechua, make up approximately half of the Peruvian population. Half of this group either does not speak Spanish or only knows it to a limited extent, and their way of life, according to their own definition and that of others, is typical of indigenous people. It is likely that the Quechua-speaking population today has the same number of individuals as it did at the height of the Inca Empire, and its members are increasingly aware of their indigenous identity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to modern methods of transportation and communication, especially affordable bus travel and transistor radios, many now know the coastal region, Lima, and other mountain valleys. Many men have seen the country and conversed with other indigenous people during their military service. The Army uses propaganda groups to recruit indigenous people, but during their time in the military, they learn Spanish and a trade, discovering the existence of other indigenous people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The many peasant unions, either formed or infiltrated by Maoists, Communists, the GIO, the CIA, Cubans, etc., have also raised the political consciousness of indigenous people and developed general awareness of their numbers and identity. Still, many indigenous people express shame and discomfort about their own condition, and many do not want their children to learn Quechua in schools.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, based on my own experience, these feelings have diminished in the last twenty years, and now there are many more indigenous people who do not feel ashamed of their language and their particular condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For several years in Peru, I suggested to various officials at the US Embassy, especially members of AID, USIS, and the Peace Corps, the need to develop special programs in Quechua and to work directly with indigenous people. In 1958-59, the response was a smile or indifference. An AID official (then called Point 4) mentioned that some Peruvian colleagues from the Ministry of Education had explained to him that Quechua only had 400 words and that it was a dialect, not a language. He saw no reason to waste time on such an ineffective tool. In 1962-64, there was more interest, but still with reluctance. Peruvians did not like the idea that the Peace Corps was instructing a group in Quechua instead of Spanish. A Fulbright program official (Peruvian) stated, &amp;quot;Quechua, Indianism, and communism go hand in hand.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The majority of American officials in general have shown little interest in indigenous people, except as rural Peruvians, and this policy has been satisfactory because it was also that of the Peruvian government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some members of the Embassy staff who established relationships with the APRA party were interested in the somewhat romantic concept of &amp;quot;Indoamerican&amp;quot; promoted by Haya de la Torre. However, the Apristas have been considerably more active on the coast and in working with Spanish-speaking individuals, many of whom are racially indigenous but culturally cholos or mestizos.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The trend of previous governments, the current one, and practically all political parties, including the APRA, has been to integrate the &amp;quot;Indian&amp;quot; into the national culture as a &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; man (or better, but no one mentions women) of modern Peru. The idea is that the time of Túpac Amaru has passed, and talking about separatism is a divisive attitude. I agree that it is divisive, but I believe there are ample reasons to anticipate a powerful separatist movement, and it will matter little whether we like it or not, or whether we speak about it or remain silent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nationalism and separatist movements are still strong in France (Bretons), Spain (Catalans and Basques), Belgium (Walloons and Flemings), Great Britain (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland), Yugoslavia, Russia, and other regions of Europe. Nigeria, Burundi, Kenya, Congo, Ghana, and other African states are torn apart by nationalist and separatist movements. The same phenomenon is observed in Indochina (Vietnamese, Montagnards, Khmers, and other mountain peoples), and Malaysia, China, and Myanmar have minorities that wish to be autonomous. Canada has a significant separatist movement, and so on. In my opinion, it would be short-sighted to believe that one of the most important nations (tribes, peoples, or whatever term is used) with the greatest cultural uniformity, referring to the Quechuas, will not demand recognition of their rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peruvian colonial and republican governments, both civilian and military, have attempted to abolish the indigenous people through decrees (for example, the current government has claimed that all are peasants). But for better or worse, the indigenous people do not take these attempts seriously. The various attempts made over the last 400 years to assimilate, integrate, or control them, including sending them to the jungle to expose them to malaria, have not succeeded. The Quechuas (and Aymaras) are resilient, and their numbers have continued to grow, despite their contributions to the formation of mestizo and cholo groups with the intelligence and energy of a large number of their own members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I wish to briefly outline some impossible facts and the potential responses from the United States. I understand that assuming a U.S. response separate from the Peruvian attitude implies a certain arrogance, and for that reason, I will attempt to place the U.S. attitude within the context of Peruvian positions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The first possibility is the least likely. Let&#039;s assume that, thanks to the emergence of highly capable political leaders, a Quechua-Aymara state is formed or attempted to be formed in the Andes of Bolivia and Ecuador. As I mentioned, this is a highly improbable phenomenon. The opposition of Western governments in all three countries to the actions of internal separatists is firm, so combined resistance would be immense. It is likely that the United States would provide military assistance to contain such movements, ultimately intertwining with the political dynamics of the Cold War. I won&#039;t dwell on this possibility, except to point out that I don&#039;t consider it entirely impossible in the distant future.&lt;br /&gt;
# The second possibility, and I must clarify that I find it as improbable as the first, is the complete integration of Quechua and Aymara Indians into Peruvian national culture as Spanish-speaking peasants. Many Peruvian political leaders, both white and mestizo, as well as many Americans, rely on this possibility. Most of U.S. policy has been based on the assumption that integration was taking place, that it was desirable, and deserved support. If this possibility were to occur—and it should not be ruled out—there would be no major need to modify the policy followed thus far.&lt;br /&gt;
# The most probable series of events will unfold within the general framework outlined in this work. Centuries of gradual and abrupt change have determined a complex social structure, with partially overlapping groups of different social and economic positions and aspirations. Indigenous people live in isolated communities, but it is more common for them to be members of communities where they coexist with individuals from non-indigenous groups. As with most national groups, some wish to assimilate into the general society, others want to become Peruvians while maintaining their indigenous identity, some want separation, and the majority probably doesn&#039;t think much about it. Depending on the political circumstances, some individuals will identify as indigenous in one context and as non-indigenous in another. The first two possibilities are often seen as ideal forms. The Peruvian and American governments will have to respond to real situations that will never be well-defined examples of Quechua nationalism or separatism, but rather complex phenomena influenced by many causes, with Quechua identity being just one facet.  However, if my assumption that the importance of Quechua identity as a political phenomenon increases is valid, it will be necessary for the governments involved to adopt a defined attitude towards the existence of indigenous people as a differentiated culture, or at the very least, become aware that this people exists. This is because in the various controversies that will arise, the concerns of indigenous people will be a factor that will not go unnoticed by others. In reality, as many observers have pointed out, Peruvian mestizos and whites have used local protests by indigenous people against abuses as a political lever in disputes they have had with other mestizos and whites for generations. When the idea of Quechua independence enters the international political scene, it will become a factor in the Cold War.  As the United States has already collaborated in an operation against two guerrilla groups, a policy begins to take shape. In the 1965 operation against guerrilla groups, aircraft, bombs, and napalm produced in the United States, as well as troops trained by Americans, were used, and there have been accusations that American special forces in Peru were also involved. Many Peruvian Indians, some involved in the movement and most unrelated to the issue, were killed, and the effects of this episode on the entire area are still difficult to estimate. In 1960, after the Civil Guard wounded ten Indians and killed four on the Huapra estate near Vicos, many believed that the United States was siding with the Indians. However, this position was more apparent than real. In a casual visit to Vicos, Edward Kennedy learned about the incident from the accounts of several locals, as well as from the accounts of Americans strongly supportive of the Indians. He then pressured President Prado to initiate negotiations that would lead to the expropriation of the Hacienda Vicos in favor of the resident Indians. During the uprisings of peasant unions in the Convención area in 1962 and 1963, the United States barely had any involvement with both sides, and the situation became even more complicated due to the presence of the American company Anderson Clayton. There were conflicts with Indian communities in the Central Andes, where the interests of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation were at stake, and to a lesser extent in Pararín and the Colca Valley, where Grace and Co. had interests. There were many other incidents involving American participation and many more without it, for example, the incident near Anta in June of this year (1969), when the police fired on Indians who were apparently protesting a real or imagined consequence of the new official agrarian reform, which they believed would deprive them of land. I mention this Anta incident (Ayacucho) to introduce the idea that Indian communities have economic interests distinct from those that characterize Indians who own small farms and/or work on other people&#039;s land. Thus, a policy towards &amp;quot;Indians&amp;quot; applied in a situation involving nationalism or Indian identity could provoke contradictory reactions in cases related to agrarian reform, land redistribution, small loans, cooperatives, etc. It cannot be asserted that there is an automatic Indian response to agrarian reform or any other issue.  In view of the current situation, characterized by many incidents involving indigenous participation, albeit with different characteristics and sometimes conflicting interests, and the increasingly pronounced self-awareness of the indigenous people themselves, one can speak of the emergence of a series of situations in which official Peruvian and American attitudes may coincide or diverge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Psychological Profile Of Urban Militants Of The Shining Path ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== GENERAL ANALYSIS ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Permanent Conditions =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 50% mestizo, 25% indigenous, 25% white, mulatto, and Black. 90% with secondary and higher education. More from provinces than from the capital.&lt;br /&gt;
* Exclusive manifestations of Peruvian nationality through ethnic motivations, (pride) of the Quechua-Aymara culture, mainly symbolized in the strong personality of the highland women of the group.&lt;br /&gt;
* Center of revolutionary political attraction for youth due to the failure or lack of other valid alternatives to the current aspirations of the youth population.&lt;br /&gt;
* Exploitation of basic needs and deficiencies of the population in general.&lt;br /&gt;
* Organizational &amp;quot;Natural Selection&amp;quot; scheme based on Agitation and Propaganda conducted by initiates and reeducated individuals.&lt;br /&gt;
* Practice of responsible, conscious, and extreme discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
* Strictly hierarchical and compartmentalized organizational structure vertically and laterally.&lt;br /&gt;
* Need for, recognition of, and acceptance of maximum authority.&lt;br /&gt;
* Controlled social integration. Self-control and inter-control of behaviors. Disregard for the pleasure (Eros) of living, glorious acceptance of death (Thanatos).&lt;br /&gt;
* Externalization of primary impulses of obedience and dedication, reinforced by tanic passions that show processes of psychotization directed by intellectualized states of fanaticization.&lt;br /&gt;
* Ideological-military indoctrination of &amp;quot;Mao-Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Seven Military Writings&amp;quot; of Mao Zedong.&lt;br /&gt;
* Cult of party solidarity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Semi-Permanent Conditions =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Modifications in the organization due to geographical displacements or adaptation to various functions.&lt;br /&gt;
* Complementary training and self-determined training.&lt;br /&gt;
* Maximum security, differentiated by organization levels and hierarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Motivating rituals prior to immediate action.&lt;br /&gt;
* Break with recognized socialization institutions: Family, Church, educational centers, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
* Periodic potentiation of group aggressiveness as a result of numerous plans and practices for reserve action.&lt;br /&gt;
* Feelings of frustration stemming from major national problems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Exogenous actions aimed at strengthening the morale of prisoners.&lt;br /&gt;
* Practice of mind control discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
* Confidence and trust in the organization.&lt;br /&gt;
* Development of behaviors, education, and conduct in the face of adverse contingencies.&lt;br /&gt;
* Training of activists through mobilization centers of the social status of expectant or paralyzed youth groups that do not see a future, let alone fulfillment.&lt;br /&gt;
* Maximum utilization of endemic social circumstances: Legal Resources, impunity of minors, institutional differences between security forces, police repression, uncontrolled increase in social needs, schizophrenic state of Peruvian society (everyone against everyone).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ATTITUDE ANALYSIS ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Positive Attitudes: =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Life with ideological motivations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Political-military capacity (strategists and tacticians).&lt;br /&gt;
* Advocacy for ethnic and cultural values of our past civilizations.&lt;br /&gt;
* Education and preparation for action. Willpower.&lt;br /&gt;
* Respect for hierarchy and one&#039;s own authority.&lt;br /&gt;
* High morale and austere life.&lt;br /&gt;
* Developed security awareness.&lt;br /&gt;
* Sense of opportunity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Organized solidarity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Ability for planning and executing actions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Negative Attitudes: =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Lack of national motivations and values.&lt;br /&gt;
* Self-destructive feelings due to political passion.&lt;br /&gt;
* Overvaluation of one&#039;s own convictions.&lt;br /&gt;
* Rigid, schematic, and ambivalent behaviors.&lt;br /&gt;
* Permanent state of frustration.&lt;br /&gt;
* Violation of beliefs or interests to influence or create independence.&lt;br /&gt;
* Irrevocable decisions.&lt;br /&gt;
* Disregard for life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== PROFILE =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Insurgent and clandestine political-military organization with great mobility.&lt;br /&gt;
* Builds cohesion based on cultural differentiation from the current Peruvian society, which it challenges; and global transformation proposals without specifying precise national objectives.&lt;br /&gt;
* Elite, rigid, and closed organization.&lt;br /&gt;
* Effective participation of women in the tactical direction of actions, support, and maintenance of the organization.&lt;br /&gt;
* Element of psychological maneuver against the State, Government, Politics, and National Defense Plans of uncertain origin and covert dependence.&lt;br /&gt;
* Real knowledge of the strategic position they occupy in the national subversive process.&lt;br /&gt;
* Logistical self-sufficiency.&lt;br /&gt;
* Great intellectual development.&lt;br /&gt;
* Severe rejection of other tendencies: Yankee imperialism, Soviet social imperialism, pro-imperialist bourgeoisie, and nationalist Armed Forces.&lt;br /&gt;
* Serious, hierarchical, and two-way social communication system, with intermediate couriers.&lt;br /&gt;
* Imposing practice of self-criticism as a catalyst for shame and failure, as well as a regulator of behavior within the group.&lt;br /&gt;
* Replaces ideological debate and confrontation with armed action and messianic thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
* Bases its struggle on concrete facts (tactics) and directs it towards forms of generalized struggle against the prevailing system (strategy).&lt;br /&gt;
* Maintains prestige, strengthens willpower, and perfects its organization due to the counterproductive effects of conventional repression carried out without the necessary reinforcement of concurrent socio-economic actions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* A tiny group in relation to the total urban population of Lima.&lt;br /&gt;
* Develops its potential based on mobility and surprise.&lt;br /&gt;
* Sustains its cohesion through ideological internationalization, high morale, and willingness to fight.&lt;br /&gt;
* Translates its organization into minimal operational units (communal) at the local, regional, and national levels.&lt;br /&gt;
* Highly centralized command, resembling a General Staff.&lt;br /&gt;
* Extends influence and power through persuasion and cohesion.&lt;br /&gt;
* Intensely dissolves social function due to the insecurity and social schizophrenia generated by its actions.&lt;br /&gt;
* Feels the ability to condition the political life of the community, destabilize the Government, and wear down the Armed Forces.&lt;br /&gt;
* Increases its international prestige promoted by international news agencies, under the guise of Human Rights and the socio-economic weakening factors of the Central Government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== SPECIFIC ANALYSIS ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Susceptibility =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Own logistical resources.&lt;br /&gt;
* Organization subordinated to urban armed struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
* Relative isolation from formal Marxist left and metropolitan working class.&lt;br /&gt;
* Ideological schematism.&lt;br /&gt;
* Verticalism and hierarchical rigidity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Complicated internal social communication system.&lt;br /&gt;
* Personality disrupted by political passion and ambivalence of values.&lt;br /&gt;
* Oversaturation of self-destructive feelings that reverse the effects of insecurity and schizophrenia.&lt;br /&gt;
* Eventual detentions disrupt the leadership cadre.&lt;br /&gt;
* Sensitivity to concurrent socio-economic actions and policies aimed at improving the national situation.&lt;br /&gt;
* Open centers for recruitment and proselytism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Plans Of The Shining Path Specifying Psychological Warfare ===&lt;br /&gt;
a) Evaluation of Actions in the General Plan in 1984 (Transcription of Handwritten Copy).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
b) Reproduction of Specific Plan (Holograph) for Psychological Campaign for April, May, and June 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== a) EVALUATION OF ACTIONS IN THE GENERAL PLAN IN 1984. ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== THE FOUR FORMS OF STRUGGLE =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====== &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;I. GUERRILLA ACTION&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ======&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Crops and Collective Planting:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Airabamba, Tancayllo, Aizarco, and collective plantings protected by the Popular Guerrilla Army and led by the People&#039;s Committee. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Assault:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Assault on police posts in Luricocha, Quinua, Tambo, Totos, Vilcashuamán. Disarmament. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No raid on Ñaña, Ricardo Palma.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Ambushes:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leap in the 1st Campaign of Defend, Develop, and Construct Sivia, Minascucho. Ambush of military vehicles. Surprise attacks. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Need to develop further, no counter-ambush tactics applied; target patrols; forces are surprised: Omasi, Manallascac, Tuco.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Occupation of Towns:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Quantitative and qualitative leaps from the beginning (Pujas) to conquering Bases; from small to medium. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Vinchos (CR-Central) allowed reactionaries to regroup and capture them for not camouflaging and not conducting proper reconnaissance, failed to annihilate them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Confrontation:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reverence for the Armed Forces is beginning to diminish, and they respond with great determination. Andahuaylas, Aranhuay, Milucha, Sacsamarca, Huacasancos. Against combined forces or mesnadas. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They are caught off guard and do not plan their response.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Scorched Earth and Counter-Establishment, Critical Point Strikes, and Overruns:&#039;&#039;&#039; Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They are beginning to handle guerrilla warfare with extensive mobility, campaigns of encirclement and annihilation, and counter-campaigns of encirclement and annihilation. Umaru. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hit and run; bypass the main point of the Base-manifestation of the errant Lucanas. Develop more extensive guerrilla warfare with high mobility. Resolve displacements silently and by platoons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Campaigns of Encirclement and Annihilation and Counter-Campaigns of Encirclement and Annihilation:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Escape:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Escape policy CRAS Ayacucho. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems with basic principles of high-level war misunderstanding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Disturbances, Street Fighting Tactics:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the capital of the country, simultaneously at 13 points and a wide area with successive blows. Progress in uniting armed struggle with the people&#039;s struggle. Centers of resistance. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Develop them around the proletariat&#039;s struggles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====== &#039;&#039;II. SABOTAGE&#039;&#039; ======&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Sabotage:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heavy blows to the country&#039;s economy, bureaucratic capitalism, and imperialism and social-imperialism. Applied in series. San Martín de Forres, Southern, Oil pipelines, light and microwave towers, Hogar S.A., Bayer, cotton bales, sugarcane fields. A three-part plan. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not hitting Social-imperialism, need for more significant sabotage. More roadblocks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====== &#039;&#039;III. SELECTIVE TERRORISM&#039;&#039; ======&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Execution and Popular Trials:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Execution of authorities and informants. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not executing higher-level authorities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====== &#039;&#039;IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE&#039;&#039; ======&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Agitation:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armed propaganda focused on peasants as the primary target. 200,000 copies of &amp;quot;Let&#039;s Develop Guerrilla Warfare,&amp;quot; 100,000 posters, graphic flyers, 150,000 for the first, and 100,000 for the second. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Psychological Warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Don&#039;t target the proletariat in the city.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Mobilization:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From mobilizing hundreds of people to mobilizing 50,000 peasants only in the main CR during the &amp;quot;Batir.&amp;quot; It&#039;s primarily armed. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Proletariat and the urban poor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== THE FIVE STEPS =====&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;1. ACTIONS&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advances:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have entered the main form of civil war, campaigns and counter-campaigns of encirclement and annihilation. Management of campaigns. The five steps. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Failures:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Plan failure, Ñaña, Tambo 2, Chumbes, failure of recognition, investigation; fixing terrain. Information failure. They don&#039;t see two hills. Lircay, Ricardo Palma.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;2. DETACHMENTS&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advances:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Popular Guerrilla Army, three forces: night march, regular march, and forced march. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Failures:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems in force management, problems in concentration and dispersion. Company: leadership doesn&#039;t function; amorphous without squads. Daytime road mobility. They are caught off guard: Tuco, Manallasca, etc. Surveillance failures, coordination failure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;3. PLANNING&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advances:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Night withdrawal, with shelter, staggered. One point, two sides, main point, containment, irruption. Three groups: attack, support, security. Means: Acquisition and distribution. Striking where the weakest point is. Never between two flanks. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Improvisation; anticipating success, failure, casualties. Starting point, fallback point, concentration point. Drills, command voice. Start signal; signals, liaisons, task control. Thoroughness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;4. EXECUTION&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advances:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Objective achieved. Key assaults, irruption if missing, they surrender with fires. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Objective attainment: Ricardo Palma; Vilcashuamán, CRAS Ayacucho (weapons). Bellicosity, audacity, quick decision. Most crucial moment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;5. EVALUATION&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advance:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zonal assessments &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neglect, no positive and negative lessons drawn for squads, detachments, etc.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:The_CIA%27s_Shining_Path:_Political_Warfare&amp;diff=64139</id>
		<title>Library:The CIA&#039;s Shining Path: Political Warfare</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:The_CIA%27s_Shining_Path:_Political_Warfare&amp;diff=64139"/>
		<updated>2024-03-13T01:12:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Add Newsweek August 3 1981 ref&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=The CIA&#039;s Shining Path: Political Warfare|image=CIA_Shining_Path_cover.jpg|author=Andreo Matías|published_date=1988|published_location=Peru|edition_date=2024|type=Book|source=[https://es.prolewiki.org/wiki/Biblioteca:CIA_Sendero_Luminoso:_Guerra_Politica Spanish]}}{{Foreword|foreword=Originally published in 1988, The CIA’s Shining Path (CIA Sendero Luminoso: Guerra Politica) was such an important work to Peruvian politics in its time that it even made its way into the National Library of Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ProleWiki was able to track down a copy of the book in the original Spanish and we are proud to be able to offer, for the first time ever, an English translation of this important work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much like the author, we also hope this book sparks debate about the role of the Shining Path in Peruvian politics – continuing even to this day after the death of Abimael Guzman. But the richness of this text is not contained solely in the debates it might spark. Military doctrine, Peruvian politics, South American geopolitics, and of course a complete exposé on the inner workings and methods of the Shining Path: this is where the true value of this book lies. All of these topics are appropriately expanded upon, making The CIA’s Shining Path a vast repository of knowledge for all students of Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The author also included several documents in the appendice of the original edition, which we also translated. To our knowledge, this is the first time these documents have been made available in English.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ProleWiki has done its best to ensure this book has been properly translated but, we have to admit the author has been less than clear at several points (a combination of his writing style and the reader needing to be familiar with late 20th century Peruvian history). We provide the original edition in [https://es.prolewiki.org/wiki/Biblioteca:CIA_Sendero_Luminoso:_Guerra_Politica Spanish] on ProleWiki for anyone who would like to compare our work with the original.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If you have any questions or corrections to bring up, please get in touch with us.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This edition is offered FREE of charge under the [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ CC-BY-SA-4.0] license.&#039;&#039;&#039;}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PREFACE ==&lt;br /&gt;
The use of the pseudonym Andreo Matías aims to avoid a false association of ideas between the author&#039;s name and the title of the book but not to conceal his identity: Washington Huaracha Apaza.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Furthermore, Washington Huaracha Apaza is not a stranger to the country&#039;s political life. A confessed socialist, he has a record of consistent involvement in the revolutionary movement since the formation of the National Democratic Front in 1945, in Arequipa, his hometown. He served as the national leader of the Hotel Workers Federation of Peru in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Years of imprisonment during the Odría dictatorship took a toll on his health, leading him to assume, more or less, responsibility in social scientific research. This book is the product from that period of his life. It also translates years of experience: the study of social contradictions in the country and the global development of insurgency around the world. It results from patient collection of documents, in-depth analysis of information sources, and meticulous teamwork.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For Washington Huaracha Apaza, this work should spark debate, lead the struggle down its true path, and engage with ideological and political battles, where the Shining Path and its leaders are obligated to either deny or confirm the validity of the arguments contained in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== INTRODUCTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
To claim that the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path is an offspring of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would seem like hyperbole in anti-communist propaganda or a misconception in the study of Peru&#039;s socio-political reality, if not a far-fetched interpretation of the phenomenon in question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the ideological, programmatic and political methodology peculiar to the Shining Path, the existing experience of other insurgent movements generated by foreign intelligence services in other parts of the world, the basic knowledge of the rules and principles of modern irregular warfare, the interests at stake for other states in Latin America and Peru, and, above all, the effort for a fair understanding of Peru&#039;s political reality, leave no room for an appropriate inclusion of the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path in the international conglomerate of Marxist movements, let alone recognizing it as an integral part of the political structure of the national revolution. The Shining Path does not even claim a place in the latter; on the contrary, it definitively excludes itself from the national revolutionary ensemble and mass organizations. It proclaims itself a “new party”, resistant to any contamination, with an ideology forging a new society and state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Its mysterious and concealed forms, as well as the messianic thaumaturgy of the Sole Leadership, only manifest themselves dramatically in a violent, destructive, and calculatedly regulated praxis that shakes Peruvian society to its foundations. Practical and eccentric, but which knows how to insert itself in the permanent situation of structural injustice that Peru is suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fanatical violence is not the historical violence seen in Tupac Amaru and hundreds of rebel leaders against Spanish colonialism. It is not of the same nature as the violence that confronted opposing interests in the independence war of the last century. Nor is it the violence of a homeland&#039;s resistance war against invaders, much less the violence of a modern national liberation war, anti-imperialist and popular opposition to foreign domination. The violence exercised by Shining Path is not, therefore, a genuine expression of the deep internal contradictions of Peruvian society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We discover, then, that it is an exogenous violence that seeks to insert itself into these contradictions, not to achieve a dialectical solution releasing internal productive and creative forces, but to stimulate destructive social forces to the maximum through the concrete execution of &amp;quot;strategically highly centralized and tactically decentralized plans.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Until now, the insane violence of Shining Path has been characterized particularly by a very specific execution methodology, which it has been applying in Peru since 1980, when irregular combatant teams assumed the mission of &amp;quot;disrupting the productive process&amp;quot; of this &amp;quot;feudal society&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;bureaucratic capitalism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To ideologically and theoretically support its actions, the Shining Path adopts the name of the Communist Party of Peru, without needing more to move within the realm of factional struggle among Marxist left-wing groups, which, with political shyness, deny it but not combat it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sociologists and anthropologists who have analyzed the Shining Path&#039;s violence have found native, ancestral, magical-religious, and Andean peculiarities in it. Many social communicators have become Senderologists, reporting on the Shining Path&#039;s armed propaganda or providing sophisticated commentary on it, both for Western news agendas and for capitalist countries&#039; foundations that finance million-dollar research on the Shining Path phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, the state confronts this violence with another kind — namely legal, military and traditional — inscribed in the laws of regular warfare. The state’s forces, tasked with maintaining national sovereignty, territorial integrity, public order, the state&#039;s independence and freedom of state and national action, as well as the nation&#039;s independence, has had to make a 180-degree turn in mindset and attitude, dangerously shifting from the concepts of external enemy to internal enemy. Induced by old counterinsurgency manuals from the early days of the Cold War, it does what it knows best: war. Today, the Legal Force of the state unexpectedly finds itself fighting elements from the popular sectors, combating &amp;quot;terrorist-communists&amp;quot; in peasant communities, urban marginal settlements, universities, labor unions, and other grassroots social institutions, which are recipients of the structural violence of Peruvian society indirectly linked to the ubiquitous Shining Path, which remains elusive, unidentifiable, and unknown in its true essence and character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This anomalous and unprecedented phenomenon in the Peruvian revolutionary process compels us to seek more accurate answers as to the Shining Path phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the Shining Path really? &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it an instrument of the Revolutionary War of some faction of International Communism, specifically a Maoist Communist Party tasked with expanding the international political space of Communist China? &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a violent movement that claims to represent Andean culture? &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a new philosophical worldview originating from Peru?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a faction of Marxist membership that has become the armed wing of the Peruvian Revolution?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a political-military apparatus of drug trafficking forces?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a tool of Political Warfare against Third World countries?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a Low-Intensity Operation organized or used by foreign intelligence services to annihilate the social forces of Peruvian nationalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peru, a country that is bleeding, demands definitive and urgent answers regarding the nature of the Shining Path. Their violence, systematically applied over eight years among the peasantry’s social base and economic infrastructure, affects the foundations of national unity, destroys values that are inherent and characteristic of Peruvian national identity, and, worse, compromises almost all efforts for a military solution, which is not feasible in unconventional warfare. As long as Peruvian institutions do not understand what is happening, simply because their structures correspond to the 19th-century concept of the bourgeois world, our thinking remains captive to Manichaen philosophical dualism, and our political tasks are prisoners of the bipolarity of the world, if not of repugnant petty interests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of this provides ample motivation for those aware of the danger to assume the historical responsibility of promoting a real understanding of the self-proclaimed Communist Party of Peru the Shining Path. Its years of activity are sufficient to evaluate its ideology, organization, strategy, methods of struggle, and objectives. At this stage of events, it is no longer possible to claim that the Shining Path is an enigma. It has certainly been difficult to locate and observe due to its unique, confusing, and intentionally misleading modus operandi. However, this does not mean that capturing its essence is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is worth noting that our interest in the Shining Path dates back to its emergence as a member of the pro-Chinese faction that split from the Peruvian Communist Party and repeatedly dissented from that original pro-Chinese current in Communist circles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That interest grew when we observed the close confrontation of the Shining Path to the nationalism of the Peruvian Armed Forces government (1968-1980), especially during General Velasco Alvarado&#039;s administration. Particularly, we were intrigued by its efforts to sabotage the celebration of the Sesquicentennial of the Battle of Ayacucho in 1974 and the signing of the Ayacucho Act, whose main purpose was to engage Latin American leaders in a regional disarmament policy. At that time, this so-called Communist Party of Peru, &amp;quot;along the shining path of Mariátegui&#039;s thought,&amp;quot; was already one of the seventy-eight organizations that, outside of traditional parties, appeared as if by magic to oppose the changes promoted by Peruvian nationalist military officers. Just as it now opposes any change or even disregards it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, when the Shining Path enters the Peruvian social conflict as an armed apparatus, using individual and collective terrorization and other psychological techniques typical of modern political warfare rather than revolutionary warfare, we must assume the moral obligation to promote and deepen research into the ideology and operations of the Shining Path, to understand what it really is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not easy to trace the Shining Path due to its permanent clandestinity and internal compartmentalization, which make any assessment from the outside difficult. Also, because of the credibility issues surrounding the sources disseminating its ideology, analysis, and reports.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much has been written and researched using various perspectives on the Shining Path, but with a few exceptions, it can be said that these studies have scratched the surface and often constructed tautologies that only serve, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, to conceal the true purpose of this real and dramatic phenomenon in our time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even insiders do not have access to the movement&#039;s internal documents. Most of the documents seized by the police are handwritten and come from the middle or lower levels of the militancy; documents which bear the heavy stamp of official secrecy, which makes them problematic for private social research. What the Shining Path disseminates externally is carefully processed propaganda with a planned circulation, designed to impact specific and carefully selected audiences. However, there is a reasonable and significant margin for analysis and interpretation in these documents. Documents referring to Plenums and Conferences supposedly held pronouncements on specific issues, or tactical plans to be executed contribute more to elucidating and understanding the phenomenon. Similarly, the hundreds of events carried out by its irregular combatants whose orientation, nature and purpose cannot be distorted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Furthermore, it is also essential to mention the more serious works that have been conducted on the Shining Path and that help elucidate and understand its purposes. Among the few, we highlight the following as important.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An unpublished historiographical work on the Shining Path(1) includes rich classified and encoded documentation in an initial attempt at scientific categorization which has allowed for comparisons of writings, source assessment, chronological tracking, and studies of the various components of the Shining Path movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Carlos Iván De Gregory&#039;s studies (2) published between 1985 and 1987, are a thorough and substantive investigation of the geo-economic environment and socio-political opportunities for the Shining Path&#039;s growth. He candidly denounces the “errors and limitations” of the Shining Path&#039;s “people&#039;s war” and considers the organization as a “pre-classist response” to the “destructive advance of capitalism”, similar to the [[Guardians of Islam]] and the [[Khmer Rouge]]. Finally, he envisions the slippery slope of the Shining Path&#039;s actions dangerously tipping the balance towards the most reactionary elements of the right.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Manuel Jesús Granados Aponte&#039;s bachelor&#039;s thesis (3) presented at the University of Huamanga, is a critical study of the Shining Path that builds on De Gregory&#039;s research, enriching it with forays into the ideological field. It demonstrates the historical dissimilarity between the Peruvian reality analyzed by José Carlos Mariátegui in the 1920s, the Chinese situation studied by Mao Zedong in 1937, and today&#039;s Peruvian reality. Granados has subsequently completed his study with another on the typology of the Shining Path&#039;s actions and the chimera of the Guiding Thought (4). Granados rightly wonders why those who have used his work have not focused on the central aspect of his thesis: the Shining Path&#039;s ideological misunderstanding. Instead, they have seized on the adjectives and partial aspects of his work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Eloy Villacrés Riquelme&#039;s (5) work published in 1985, is a valuable analytical contribution to the strategies of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Ayacucho region, based on general principles of warfare. Its importance lies in leading us to question and delve into the central issue regarding the nature of the war called for by the Shining Path and the war policy pursued by the Legal Force. The critical input characterizing these works allows us to locate the true contours of the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Without diminishing the value of other studies on the subject, it can be observed that most investigations start with a certain conditioning imposed by the Shining Path&#039;s propaganda to look for the causes of the phenomenon from its own perspective. They delve into our internal contradictions, the limits of our own conflict as if it were isolated from the world. They focus on the tactical aspects.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We forget that the important thing is the strategic aspect: the widespread, universal conflict, the new nature of modern irregular warfare, of which the “Senderista war” is a part.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This perspective brings us to study the Shining Path not only from the scope of internal contradictions within Peru, but having in mind the strategic importance of our country in the global confrontation as well as the development, characteristics, and nature of modern irregular warfare, which does not always equate to revolutionary warfare. Our analysis of the Shining Path, therefore, aims to first understand ourselves as the cause or motive of the war; that is, to understand the strategic external factors that condition the war that Shining Path  irregulars call for in the country. By knowing the nature of this war, it is possible to identify the objectives, strategy, and operational tactics of this &amp;quot;unconventional war” developed within the Peruvian, Latin American “low-intensity conflict”.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the rest, it is an ethical duty to demonstrate the true essence of the irregular warfare that is shaking Peru and the role of the Shining Path, which, under the name of the Communist Party of Peru, fuels genocide and the destruction of our conductive forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path, claiming to be the only true representative of communism, acts with a military force of irregulars against everyone and everything; its main enemies are the currents of Peruvian nationalist thought and Marxist and non-Marxist socialism. Explanations are superfluous, and so are arguments. The eight confrontations with the Shining Path&#039;s irregulars, their propaganda and mechanisms of national and international dissemination, and the Shining Path-like behavior of the Peruvian right leave no doubt about the reactionary nature of the phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART ONE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Chapter 1: Peru, an important enclave, and the Shining Path ===&lt;br /&gt;
In a globally interconnected world like the present, local events cannot be explained by themselves. Even less so without an understanding of the environment, especially regarding international political and economic ties, and the significance they hold in the context of global controversy and the widespread conflict characteristic of this stage in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s worth noting that the doctrines of insurgency and counterinsurgency follow standardized methods and techniques, distinguished from one another only by their purpose and how they serve different ideological views. The greater or lesser strength—whether liberating or imposing—of these modern scientific mechanisms of “unconventional warfare” used to impose wills, defend, preserve, or conquer interests, depends on the conditions of the various social groups where they are applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For these reasons, it&#039;s impossible to fully understand the Shining Path phenomenon or subversion in Peru without first examining, on a global scale, the potential motivations for which this country falls victim to an insurgent movement of a terrorist character; the reasons and nature of this type of internal warfare. All of this stems from an analysis of the country&#039;s importance on the global strategic board.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are clarifications that must be made. At the very least, to place us on the same strategic level as the Shining Path, which considers the development of its war as part of the global revolution. Whether or not this last statement is true, the Shining Path&#039;s interest in Peru is strategic and operates within a system of ideas and interests that are universal, not merely local.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It cannot be ignored that there are currently more than fifty conflict zones in the world—geostrategic enclaves of global politics of the superpowers—and Peru is one of them, distinguished by its strategic location in South America and the South Pacific, as well as its abundant natural resources and military capabilities, the latter partly stemming from its possession of Soviet military technology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== A thousand year old culture ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;In Ayacucho, the most ancient evidence of humans in South America has been found. Richard Mac Neis from the Peabody made these discoveries and after prolonged investigations, he managed to establish an antiquity of twenty thousand years before Christ for the presence of the first inhabitants in the Ayacucho region, making it the oldest known site of human habitation in South America to date&amp;quot; (6).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peruvian culture has a long history that begins in the lithic period and evolved from hunter-gatherer groups to the urban societies of our era. The Wari Empire (500-1000 CE) is the oldest. However, before the Inca or Quechua culture arrived, others flourished, such as the Chimu, Mochica, Pachacamac, Chincha, Nazca, Paracas, Cañaris, Chavin, Chanca, Huanca, Lupaca, Colla, and Tiahuanaco. These were coastal and mountain societies, of which we have scientific references only. In several cases, their current ethnic presence and values serve as the foundation for our current national culture in formation. This all stems from the impact experienced by ancient Peru when the Judeo-Christian culture of the 16th century, in its capitalist-mercantile stage, was forcefully introduced. A culture shaken by universal scientific and technological development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Understanding the persistence of this cultural confrontation is essential for comprehending the real motives behind any type of insurgency, and in this special case, properly explaining the presence of the movement called the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Centuries of domination and the violent insertion of capitalism have not destroyed the inherent values of pre-Hispanic Peruvian societies. These values transcend the unstoppable demographic growth of their ethnicities, especially the Quechua, which overlays the most diverse range of intermixing. But not only in this aspect but also in the endurance of their customs and beliefs, their old technologies and their aspirations, which now intermingle and enrich themselves with the universal values of the contemporary world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peru is undergoing a cultural renaissance, a process of social change that is not convenient for dominant cultures on the international level. Hence the idea that all forms of indigenous intellectual creation, all new valorizations and aspirations, all currents of thought or leadership alien to the prevailing system must be destroyed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The survival of the root factors of Peruvian culture signifies the possible consolidation of a sovereign and independent nation integrated into the region, as well as a just and solidarity-based society with guaranteed development. As long as it can maintain the free availability of its potential and diverse natural resources, which in the distant past allowed for the emergence of the only civilization south of the equatorial line.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Peru’s potential ====&lt;br /&gt;
For all intended purposes, there is no need for a statistical and quantified inventory of Peru&#039;s potential resources and reserves. Rather it is about assessing their strategic importance in industrial development, both in the past, present, and future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As sources of detailed and scientific information on this matter, Peru has the historical accounts of Spanish chroniclers from the colonial era, the research of Alexander Von Humboldt, and more recent accounts by Antonio Raimondi and Atunes de Mayolo. Additionally, there is the &#039;&#039;Great geography of Peru&#039;&#039; by various authors, scientific inventories from the National Office of Natural Resources Assessment (&#039;&#039;Oficina Nacional de Evaluación de Recursos Naturales&#039;&#039;) (7) or the Institute of the Peruvian Sea (&#039;&#039;Instituto del Mar Peruano&#039;&#039;), valuations by Peruvianist Victor Volsky from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and those conducted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are comprehensive or specific studies that confirm the country&#039;s importance in the world due to its possession of renewable and non-renewable resources, as well as its geographical location and geophysical configuration that enables the development of infinite energy sources such as solar and nuclear, as well as other cosmic sources like magnetic currents, turbulence, and atomic plasma released in the Magnetic Equator, an energy belt for which only India and Peru have an advantage due to their location on the planet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many products native to Peru have substantially served global food and industry. Among others, potatoes, cassava, corn, pineapples, beans, tomatoes, cocoa, peanuts, quinoa, rubber, coca, and quinine. Also, minerals like gold have contributed to European industrial development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like these, there are other resources, located and coveted in this part of the world, that will serve the future development of humanity. Organizations such as the well-known Trilateral Commission (8) have already scheduled their use in the era of the 2000s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gold reserves of Madre de Dios and the Andean massif will contribute to the near-future development, with their initial intensive exploitation potentially allowing Peru to play a significant role in the establishment of an international monetary system. The richest oil and gas formations in the subcontinent, on the continental shelf and in the Amazon basin, will also contribute. The mineral-rich areas are known as the &amp;quot;Eastern and Western Andean Metallogenic Provinces&amp;quot; with their silver, gold, zinc, lead, copper, tungsten, lithium, vanadium, plutonium, uranium, among other minerals, and a varied range of non-metals. The gigantic phosphate reserves of Bayovar, which together with smaller ones in the Moroccan Sahara and Namibia, are the only ones in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to all this, there are the vast coal basins of Alto Chicama and Gazuza Oyon, those in Santa, Cajamarca, Huanuco, Pasco; the polymetallic nodules of manganese, iron, cobalt, nickel, copper, uranium, thorium, titanium, plutonium, and other metals found on the coasts, continental shelves, and seabeds of Peru. According to the geographer Pulgar Vidal, their exploitation in relatively near terms seems possible. There are also immense hydrobiological marine resources with a rich variety of species, hydroelectric energy sources in the western and eastern slopes of the Andes that will enable the exploitation of all these resources. Their significance is highly strategic because without this hydroelectric energy, it would be nearly impossible to achieve optimal levels of resource exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to this vast reserve of resources and potential, whose general description falls short, the country&#039;s position on the western coast of the Pacific Ocean with access to the Atlantic through the Amazon River and a natural projection towards Antarctica should be noted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ports such as Callao, Bayovar, Huacho, San Juan, Matarani, Ilo, and Arica (a port where Peru shares sovereignty) have become essential points of use for landlocked or Atlantic countries seeking access to the Pacific market. Despite any claims or attempts to suggest otherwise, Peru, as in pre-Inca, Inca, and colonial times, will continue to be a hub for land and sea communications and, now, in the realm of aerospace and electronics as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Geopolitical context ====&lt;br /&gt;
In light of the extensive prospects offered by the Pacific Basin, all of Peru&#039;s neighboring countries have their own clear interests that can affect Peruvian interests in the absence of specific national objectives and a defined project regarding the said Oceanic Basin and its potential as a future market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this perspective and to appreciate how pressures and interests converge on Peru, it is interesting to briefly review the national interests that the neighboring countries of Peru have in the Pacific.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ecuador: Its national and geopolitical goal is to become an Amazonian country, for which it integrates into the Amazon Pact, offering Brazil a duty-free zone at the Port of San Lorenzo, seeking to establish access to the Pacific (9). The conflict over the El Cóndor mountain range is immersed in this geopolitical projection. Furthermore, Ecuador extends its meridian arcs towards the Antarctic, starting from the highest point of the Galápagos Islands (10).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chile: The President of the Chilean Military Junta, General Augusto Pinochet, asserts, &amp;quot;... what one state lacks, another has, the low population of one is compensated by the larger number of neighbors, and to lower costs, we need large masses of consumers, which will be achieved through the integration of the South American superstate. A superstate capable of countering the communist threat&amp;quot; (11). In this regard, Chilean Major General Ramón Cafias Montalva has declared that Chile is destined to be the power of the South Pacific and, from this perspective, even of the Antarctic (12). Conflicts with Argentina over the Beagle Channel and the Drake Passage imply Chile&#039;s geopolitical desire to establish its presence in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Antarctic, in a clear alliance with England and the United States since the Falklands War, which may eventually include the People&#039;s Republic of China due to its tensions with the Soviet Union. This fundamentally military alliance has resulted in the provision of military bases to Western powers. All of this constitutes the Chilean regime&#039;s policy of alliances to achieve its national objective of forming and leading the South Pacific Confederation, based on the Republic of Chile, the Bolivian Massif territory, and Peru up to Guayaquil, mirroring the incisive power, thereby acting as the support or head of the Pacific System and in logical connection with Ecuador (13). In its desire to assert its leadership of a Pacific Community of Nations, the Chilean administration does not cease its efforts to develop an economic-military aggression scheme with the support of large transnational companies such as Kennecott, Exxon, and others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolivia: Since Chile snatched Bolivia&#039;s access to the Pacific Ocean 106 years ago, Bolivia has been caught in a cycle of permanent instability, closely linked to its main national goal: access to the Pacific, a right recognized by global consensus and constantly claimed in international organizations such as the UN, OAS, and Non-Aligned Conferences, among others. Chile, in order not to grant Bolivia access through territories that were formerly its own, has always sought a solution through Peruvian territories or territories that were once Peruvian.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Brazil: Since 1919, Brazil has shared with Bolivia the goal of gaining access to the Pacific Ocean, which would be made possible by the construction of the railway line Santos-Corumba-Puerto Suárez-Santa Cruz de la Sierra-Cochabamba-La Paz-Arica, known as the Capricorn Route. As a counterbalance to this project, which is already well underway, Chile has expanded its concepts, promoting the development of the Interregional Business Group of Southwestern South America consisting of private entrepreneurs from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and observers from southern Peru. Through more than a dozen international meetings they have been encouraged to form an economic superstate with access through the ports of Arica, Iquique, and Antofagasta (14). Astute analysts suggest that this could be related to the old Andina Project, the former state that the international Jewish community once sought to establish in South America before settling in Palestine. For Brazil, the projection of the Amazon Pact and the development of its road infrastructure to Peru through Iquitos, Pucallpa, and Puerto Maldonado provide it with a broader opening and immediate possibilities to support its theory of a bi-oceanic country. Brazilian policy also aims to achieve sovereignty in the Antarctic Continent. Based on Portugal&#039;s priority in the discovery, Brazil supports the &amp;quot;Defrontation&amp;quot; theory, an adaptation of the &amp;quot;sector principle&amp;quot; proposed in 1907 by Canada for the division of the Arctic (15).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regarding Antarctica, the Brazilian theory projects the extreme points of each coastal state of the South Atlantic and South Pacific oceans, resulting in different arcs greatly favoring Brazil. This situation was consolidated through negotiations with Poland, where Poland ceded its Artowsky Antarctic base to Brazil as payment for its debt of $1.6 billion to Brazil.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Colombia: Colombia&#039;s objectives in the Pacific lie in efforts to create a business scheme to the west, starting from the Andean Pact; its integration into the Permanent Commission of the South Pacific since the 1970s; its participation in events such as the Consultative Meeting of Researchers, which brought together 14 countries, including Japan, the Philippines, and the USSR, in the city of Barranquilla, to address political, economic, and technical-scientific issues of the Pacific; and its active participation in the Scientific Committee of the Regional Study on the El Niño Phenomenon and climatological and oceanographic changes in the southeastern South Pacific, involving specialists from the United States, the USSR, and France, indicating the interest generated by this national goal of Colombia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As can be observed, Peru is involved in all the national objectives of its neighboring countries and does not have clear objectives of its own, at least in terms of the Pacific Basin - without touching on other topics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In other words, the process of Latin American integration is taking place amid tensions surrounding Peru, which it must confront and overcome. This is not only in the context of developing domestic markets but primarily in the context of the vast Pacific market, which all the countries in the sub-region are oriented toward.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arnaldo Rufz, a professor of Economics and Geopolitics at the Technical University of Callao and Bausate Meza School of Journalism states, &amp;quot;If Peru&#039;s integration with other countries is to be based on the unforeseen future of the Pacific Basin, three basic aspects must be considered: 1) Longitudinal Peru, based on communications parallel to the coast that converge with the Highland and Northern Historical Peru. 2) Transverse Peru, which integrates the altitudinal zones of the Peruvian ecosystem. 3) Centralized Peru in South America, oriented towards the Pacific as an extension of the Amazon basin combined with the altiplano that opens to the Plata Basin&amp;quot; (16).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ruiz goes on to explain that addressing these aspects imply the implementation of an economic policy of coordinated expansion towards new markets as a means of overcoming the international crisis. This policy is based on export capacity with comparative advantages, which would position Peru as the gateway and key to communication with the Pacific Basin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Otherwise, by turning our back on the Pacific and the future we may be aligning ourselves with the U.S. National Security framework for this area in the event of a Third World War. This framework&#039;s central thesis is the defense of interior lines of the continent assuming a blockade of exterior lines, both from the Pacific and the Atlantic. This concept, developed in 1947, considers the creation of an inland waterway based on the integration of the Plata, Amazon, and Orinoco basins, along with respective marginal roads, and the establishment of a U.S. protectorate in the Peruvian territory of Arica (17).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For any analysis of the internal situation, one cannot ignore the connections between it and Latin American integration in its true dimension. Relations with neighboring countries, physical integration with South American countries, Peru&#039;s presence in Antarctica and the Pacific all form a converging set that determines Peru&#039;s attitude toward the Central American problem, relations with the United States, and Peru&#039;s position regarding the Non-Aligned Movement, the New International Economic Order, and the Law of the Sea.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not coincidental but historical that Peru has waged wars among its pre-Inca cultures, that the Inca society based its development on conquest and it is not by chance that Peru was the convergence center during the war for independence. Peru has been the Latin American country that has suffered the most wars of aggression by its neighbors. It is no accident that Peru has been present in one way or another in the wars of the subcontinental area (18).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the whole set of pressures caused by the main national objectives of neighboring countries, there exists a global political-strategic situation worldwide within which Peru, like all the countries in the area, plays a role. The significance of this role whether major or minor, is crucial because it is closely related to the generalized conflict of high, medium, or low intensity in which the war of terrorist insurgency affecting the country is a part.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore for the purposes of this research, it is necessary to review some of the points of interest for major world powers in this part of the region, neighboring countries, as well as Peru&#039;s own internal situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude of the United States of America specifically points to the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Collection of external debt, imposition of surcharges, and falling prices of basic imports from Latin America, as a predicted framework for its financial institutions for 1987-1988. These events are expected to lead to a confrontation with countries in the subcontinent, according to economists and analysts of the system (19).&lt;br /&gt;
# Urgent adoption of new counterinsurgency strategies to avoid disaster in Latin America, according to the exclusive projections of the Special Military Investigations Team of the Canal Zone. These projections indicate that national armies in Latin America prefer legality to special operations. They believe that legitimacy is more important than military tactics (20).&lt;br /&gt;
# Consequently, U.S. interests, taking into account their Foreign Internal Security, logically guide their diplomacy, aid programs, cooperation, and anti-drug efforts in terms of counterinsurgency policies. This includes the preparation and/or execution of direct or indirect interventions in countries in the area. Historically, the following models of intervention are known:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Chilean model (1973-1974): Direct destabilization of the established government through conspiracy, sabotage, and armed uprising directed by the Central Intelligence Agency.&lt;br /&gt;
* Argentine model (1976-1986): Combined use of factors such as internal subversion promoted by montoneros and Trotskyists between March 24, 1976, and December 10, 1983, and its corollary of dirty war, which was even exported to Central America with the acquiescence of the Department of State. Border conflict with Chile, which kept the possibility of a regular war between the two countries open until a diplomatic solution to the Beagle problem was reached.&lt;br /&gt;
* Outbreak of localized warfare in the Falkland Islands in 1982, leading to the defeat of the Argentine military establishment, its gradual and certain technological deactivation, and the ongoing psychological coercion on military personnel.&lt;br /&gt;
* Nicaraguan model (1980-1987): Through third parties, applying economic isolation as well as a military encirclement using neighboring countries, promoting and supporting internal subversive actions from border sanctuaries, low-intensity operations with the participation of mercenaries, controlled regular armies, and the U.S. military apparatus itself.&lt;br /&gt;
* Grenada model (1981): Direct military intervention, as had occurred previously in the Dominican Republic and other Central American countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The presence of the Soviet Union is significant due to:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Technological assistance and military cooperation in Cuba, Peru, and Nicaragua. This is unacceptable to the United States, which considers Latin America within its security area. Maps of Soviet military deployment distributed by the U.S. Department of Defense depict Peru as a Soviet military base.&lt;br /&gt;
# The development of commercial activities in the Latin American market, especially with Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Guyana, and Colombia. This trade offsets Peru to facilitate the collection of its external debt.&lt;br /&gt;
# Diplomatic and peaceful cooperation efforts, including a planned visit by M. Gorbachev to several Latin American countries.&lt;br /&gt;
# Support for insurgency in Chile to overthrow Augusto Pinochet&#039;s regime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
China is active due to:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Its predominant interest in the Pacific Basin, leading to increased trade relations with Panama, Ecuador, and Chile, to a lesser extent with Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
# Activities aimed at expanding its political space in the world. In Peru and Latin America, its interest, not hidden, is to displace the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
# The ideological inspiration of violent Maoist political movements, although officially and pragmatically, they deny any material support to these movements and even any government affiliation with them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is worth noting that the governments of Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan also have interests in economic, ideological, and military fields, especially in Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, among other Latin American countries. These are three governments that share the common characteristic of having issues with the United Nations international community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regarding Peru&#039;s neighboring countries, in the current strategic situation, the following significant events are registered:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Chile:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Diplomatic offensive to conclude, advantageously, the unfulfilled aspects of the 1929 Peruvian-Chilean Complementary Peace and Boundary Protocol to prevent it from being denounced for non-compliance. At the same time, minimize Peru&#039;s shared sovereignty rights in Arica.&lt;br /&gt;
# Dissuasion of Bolivia&#039;s aspirations to return to the Pacific, following a period of détente that began with the meeting in Montevideo in April 1987 between the Bolivian and Chilean foreign ministers.&lt;br /&gt;
# Strategies for the use of waters from the Titicaca Basin, which are under Peruvian-Bolivian joint control, to initiate the exploitation of lithium, a strategic mineral in northern Chile.&lt;br /&gt;
# Direct references to the danger of the spread of the subversive movement of Peru, as seen in the seminar &#039;&#039;Subversion and Democracy&#039;&#039; sponsored by the Chilean government and the University of Santiago in January 1987. There have also been constant accusations in the press and government circles about the danger of Peru as a Soviet beachhead in Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
# Support from the Anglo-American system for the development of the Chilean arms industry. This system has obtained military concessions in Punta Arenas and Easter Island.&lt;br /&gt;
# Purchase of Chinese military equipment, especially aircraft.&lt;br /&gt;
# Participation in Operation Unitas XVII with the involvement of a U.S. nuclear submarine, despite the South Pacific being an intentionally nuclear-free zone.&lt;br /&gt;
# Facilities provided to the People&#039;s Republic of China for exploration in the Antarctic continent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Bolivia:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The issue of landlocked status as a constant factor of internal instability due to Chile&#039;s demand for territorial concessions as a basis for any negotiation formula.&lt;br /&gt;
# The creation of the Ninth Division of the Bolivian Army in January 1987, based in Rurrenabaque, with the mission of monitoring the border with Peru and preventing the spread of the Shining Path insurgency, which operates in the Peruvian department of Puno, to Bolivia.&lt;br /&gt;
# Presence of U.S. troops in Bolivian territory:&lt;br /&gt;
#* From April 26 to May 6, 1986, for joint conventional and unconventional warfare operations in the Chapare region, Cochabamba.&lt;br /&gt;
#* From July 15 to November 15, the deployment of a U.S. Rapid Intervention Unit in the fight against drug trafficking.&lt;br /&gt;
#* From May 11 to May 25, 1987, joint maneuvers of U.S. and Bolivian armies in conventional and unconventional warfare operations in the Rurrenabaque-Apolo-Exiamas-Reyes area, near the Peruvian border in the Department of La Paz.&lt;br /&gt;
# Expulsion of Peruvian settlers in August and September 1987 from the Futuro Valley, a border area with Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Brazil:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Since November 1986, the execution of the Calha Norte Project, which aims to economically and militarily occupy 5,995 kilometers of border areas with Colombia, Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana, and French Guiana within four years. There is a special reinforcement of the border with Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, as announced by the Minister of the Army, General Leonidas Pires Goncalves, in March 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
# Traditional geopolitical pressure to reach the Pacific Ocean coast. A national goal that is being implemented through aggressive trade and communication policies and by exerting its greatest influence on countries in the Amazon Pact.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Colombia:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Continued violation of Peru&#039;s airspace due to the development of the narco-trafficking aviation infrastructure, which presents the Peruvian-Colombian border as the most vulnerable to the penetration of unidentified aircraft, which could arrive with supplies and contraband. The existence of clandestine airport infrastructures that, in the event of conflict or conventional warfare circumstances, could be used militarily.&lt;br /&gt;
# Colombia serves as the strategic center for the production and international distribution of cocaine produced in Peru and Bolivia. The arrest of Carlos Lehder Rivas demonstrates the connection between some subversive groups and drug trafficking.&lt;br /&gt;
# The existence and operation of the America Battalion as an expression of an alliance of subversive forces from Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
# Traditional support for Ecuador in its territorial claims against Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Ecuador:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Interest in U.S. military support. During the year of 1986, Ecuadorian media, members of Parliament and personalities criticized the presence of U.S. troops in the country. There is a possibility of establishing the &#039;&#039;School of the Americas&#039;&#039; — a training school for Latin American armies&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;More accurately, the School of the Americas trained US-backed dictators in Latin America and their armies who later committed various war crimes against civilian populations; the “school” itself is a tool of imperialism and regime change for the country&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; — in the Amazon region, as well as granting a U.S. military base in the Galapagos Islands. U.S. troops are building a strategic road in the province of Manabi, between Bahia de Caraquez and Canoas, as part of military agreements between the Armed Forces of Ecuador and the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
# The maintenance of an anti-Peruvian campaign as a means of psychological mobilization of its population for war, based on the disregard for the &#039;&#039;Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Also known as the [[Rio Protocol]]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and the encouragement of territorial invasion of the Peruvian Amazon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The current national situation of Peru, in the context of an international situation characterized by conflicting interests and events at the strategic level, presents the following difficulties:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Problematic external debt, restricted markets and rising inflation are phenomena that, among others, create imbalances in Peru&#039;s economic development and disrupt the definition of capital accumulation within the national economic model.&lt;br /&gt;
# The lack of effective state control over areas related to activities such as drug trafficking, finance, arms, smuggling, and pharmaceuticals, which currently constitute major sectors of the national economy, surpassing formal industry and agriculture.&lt;br /&gt;
# Crisis in democratic institutions, bureaucratic chaos, inconsistency in the state apparatus, and violations of the constitutional order, among other adverse circumstances affecting the government.&lt;br /&gt;
# The growth of insurgency, especially in the interior of the country. Nullification of the psychological defenses in the population due to insurgent and counterinsurgent terror causing fear, disorientation and collective confusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of the above leads us to believe, without too much effort, that the interests of various countries at the strategic level seriously affect and will continue to influence Peruvian politics. Given its evident projection, it can be predicted that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. The United States will try to secure debt repayment by subjecting Peru to International Monetary Fund policies, promote complete economic liberalization in the region, continue plans to standardize and harmonize hemispheric defense, eliminating the presence of competitive Soviet and even European technologies. It will insist on further alignment of national policies in the region with the dictates of the State Department, as expressed in Reagan&#039;s speech at the United Nations on September 19, 1987. The U.S. will expand military support to Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador against a hypothetical subversive overflow from Peru. Furthermore, the U.S. will consider the potential use of Chile and Ecuador, as well as Central American countries, in the East-West conflict and the de facto inclusion of the South Pacific in its nuclear defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. The Soviet Union will not give up expanding its political influence in the region, consolidating its trade and cultural relations, conditioning the Peruvian industry to the Soviet market, and taking advantage of debt repayment in products of its interest. It will aim to increase military technological dependence and consolidate its strategic gravitational points within the continental defense system of the United States (Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru) as part of its global strategy in the East-West conflict. This implies the possibility of supporting Peru against possible military interventions in the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. The People&#039;s Republic of China will continue its trend of sharing political and trade spaces in the Pacific Basin with the United States. It will also seek to destabilize spaces gained by the Soviets in Latin America, whether in trade, politics, or military. China will consolidate its alliance with Chile to facilitate its entry into the Antarctic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. Israel, South Africa and Taiwan will maintain their influence in the political, commercial, and military fields in Latin America and try to increase their impact to expand their space and freedom of action against international pressures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5. Peru&#039;s neighboring countries will continue seeking to satisfy their national interests from their perspectives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
6. Chile, as part of the Anglo-American military system,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Pinochet, who was aligned with Thatcher and Nixon, would lose the election later the same year this book was published, 1988.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; will continue working towards achieving access to Peruvian and Bolivian territories through political, psychological and economic warfare, supported by diplomatic offensives and the strength of its military apparatus, with the eventual capacity to militarily occupy the Pacific coast and the highland region of Titicaca.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
7. Bolivia will not abandon its struggle to gain access to the Pacific, whether through territories that were once Peruvian or through Peruvian territories if provided with the opportunity for a localized conflict. In this regard, it is taking precautions to neutralize potential Peruvian military operations in the Altiplano through the development of its own forces or allies of the United States, allegedly oriented towards the fight against subversion and drug trafficking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
8. Brazil will consolidate occupation of its borders, especially in the north and northwest, within four years. This implies a geopolitical containment of Peru while increasing its pressure to reach the Pacific and gain advantages in the integration of its Amazonian countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
9. Colombia will maintain its de facto projection over the Peruvian Amazon, taking advantage of the existing infrastructure and communications related to drug trafficking in Peruvian territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
10. Ecuador will seek to define the dispute over the Peruvian Amazon in its favor, through the occupation of the Cenepa Basin — rich in oil, coal and gold — as a logical complement to its actions following the bilateral denunciation of the Rio Protocol. It may even lean towards provoking a localized war, with the support of the United States, Chile, and Israel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of these circumstances create a situation in which Peru is placed in conditions to take advantage of the benefits that the strategic balance between the USSR and the US can offer, rather than being a victim of their pressures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To do so, it would have to manage its economic crisis&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Also called the Lost Decade. Starting in 1980, Peru plunged into a recession that would last until the early 90s, with inflation reaching record heights.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; by orienting towards social forms of capital accumulation in an economic model that preserves Peru’s sovereignty &amp;amp; independence and guarantees its freedom of action. Peru would need to improve the structural and logistical base of its national defense to deter potential external agressions, gain and consolidate political and economic spaces in the region as well as the solidarity of the international community, especially the Third World. However, the most crucial aspect would be to defeat, in the short term, the internal insurgency that threatens its national goals and stability in the global strategic framework.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary, to facilitate a correct interpretation of the current state of affairs in Peru, it is necessary to understand that the current political situation is dominated by the &#039;&#039;dissuasion-distension&#039;&#039; actions of the superpowers (the United States and the USSR) which both unmistakably exhibit characteristics of unconventional warfare carried out by irregular elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this context, Peru is seen as an important piece in the global strategic balance, as previously established, due to its privileged position in the South Pacific, its vast natural resources, its bi-oceanic condition with access to the Atlantic ocean through the Amazon, the handling of Soviet military technology and the emergence of nationalist governments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On a regional level the Anglo-American military system, as we will see later, is completing its continental defense scheme. In recent years, it has achieved effective military presence in Punta Arenas, the Falkland Islands, Juan Fernandez, Easter Island, San Felix, San Ambrosio and the Galapagos Islands. This suggests that Chile and Ecuador are operating as operational bases of the continental encirclement military system, and even hints at a possible nuclearization of the South Pacific.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The threat of the growth of the Shining Path and its spread to neighboring nations, as well as the rise of drug trafficking, serves as provocation and justification for the presence of rapid intervention troops from the United States in the subcontinent and for joint operations in Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile; both conventional and unconventional warfare aimed at potential enemies originating from Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the border, Peru has problems with Chile related to the execution of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and others related to maritime boundaries, a topic we will not touch upon for now. There are sporadic Ecuadorian claims that prevent the final delineation of the border. Furthermore, the joint management of the waters of Lake Titicaca with Bolivia, geostrategic pressure from Brazil, the loss of control of airspace against Colombia, coupled with Chile and Ecuador&#039;s arms race, form the basic elements of a latent threat of military aggression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, there are serious difficulties in building an anti-imperialist, popular democratic economic and social model, which is the mortal enemy of the Shining Path insurgency.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of the above allows us to state that the growth of insurgency and developments in the current political-strategic context operate as a favorable factor for the purposes of the Anglo-American system. It hinders the establishment of a social model by the national majorities; may lead to strategic errors in the conception of political, economic and military measures; engages the Armed Forces in a war with the population by psychologically altering the conception of the theater of operations and the identity of the enemy; erodes national potential and weakens the psychological defenses of the population. It would also facilitate possible external interference in the form of low-intensity operations. This, in summary, means that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The global interests of the great powers and military systems converge on Peru to decide its medium-term course. The national interests and objectives of neighboring countries converge and coincide in violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of this country.&lt;br /&gt;
* In addition to this, there is currently a serious obstacle to the consolidation of the Peruvian nation-state as a result of unconventional warfare — namely insurgency, terrorism and subversion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite these adverse circumstances, Peru enjoys the privilege of being a point of strategic balance within the global context. This balance, more precisely, would be sought to be broken by the major interests at stake. The rational exploitation of this balance would allow Peru to consolidate its interests as a Nation-State, despite the disadvantages of time and space, and break free from external subjugation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the way, it is worth recalling how other countries, in different times and historical circumstances, have used the advantages of strategic balance. The examples of Yugoslavia, Israel, South Africa, Syria, Taiwan, not to mention various medium-level European or Eastern powers, which have known how to manage circumstances and maintain their freedom of action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 1.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Chapter 2: unconventional warfare ===&lt;br /&gt;
Understanding the objectives of the Shining Path means finding an explanation for the nature of their war and correlations in the strategic framework of the current global situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We believe that to study any insurgent movement correctly, it is not enough to refer to its origins and social foundations. It is essential to also do so from the perspective of war itself. A country&#039;s survival is determined by its ability to achieve its national objectives through political integration or the path of war; it is the alternative. War and politics ultimately mean confrontation and the imposition of wills. This leads us to establish some brief premises necessary for a better understanding of unconventional and irregular warfare in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== On war and politics ====&lt;br /&gt;
According to Carl von Clausewitz,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;18th-century Prussian general who was recognized by Lenin, Mao and others as being the first to apply dialectics to warfare in his treatise [[Library:On War|On War]].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; war is &amp;quot;an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;nothing but a duel on a larger scale.&amp;quot; He further argues that &amp;quot;violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence.&amp;quot; (21)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
War is not only characterized by the use of physical force but by a confrontation of wills.Therefore, it seeks to undermine the opponent psychologically. To that end, it encompasses non-conventional fields compared to strictly military fields when it uses psychological techniques that aim for control of the opponent’s symbols of power to ensure victory. It also employs diplomatic persuasion before, during and after armed conflict as well as the mobilization of intellectual forces for final victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Politics, as the dynamic science of governance and relations between states, does not stop or cease with the act of war, given that &amp;quot;war is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument&amp;quot; (22). Politics also pursues psychological goals, such as the image of Popular Representation, and uses techniques of social communication and instruments of sociology and psychology to gain adherents, strengthen party will and discourage opponents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a consensus in recognizing the genesis of contemporary unconventional warfare theory — both revolutionary or political — in the contributions of Clausewitz and Vladimir Lenin. For Maurice Megret, the &amp;quot;contemporary success of Clausewitz largely stems from the upheaval in political perspectives following the victory of the Bolshevik revolution, and because, more or less consciously, we interpret Clausewitz through the dialectical modification that Lenin subjected him to&amp;quot;(23).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Clausewitz’s classic treatise &#039;&#039;On War&#039;&#039; presents a fundamental and transcendent formula: &amp;quot;War is the continuation of politics by other means,&amp;quot; says he. Clausewitz demonstrates that &amp;quot;war is never an isolated act&amp;quot; and that none of the contenders is an abstract person to the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nearly a century after Clausewitz&#039;s thought was formulated, &amp;quot;Lenin combined the lines of force of his revolutionary action based on the interaction of four words formed into an equation: War, Politics, Will, Propaganda. But he made a radical inversion of Clausewitz&#039;s doctrine that Soviet doctrine allows us to express as follows: &#039;Politics is the continuation of war by other means&#039;&amp;quot;(24).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This inversion is the key to approaching permanent war and gives rise to Lenin&#039;s revolutionary warfare, which, by its nature, is non-conventional and primarily develops in the psycho-social field.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Some relevant background ====&lt;br /&gt;
Maurice Megret, when referring to psychological warfare — perhaps the primary form of unconventional warfare –- establishes three historical stages in the development of the use of violence:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Psychological deception - initially presents itself as a form of violence in warfare, serving to unsettle the enemy and create terror to weaken their will to fight.&lt;br /&gt;
# This type of operation evolves into a multiplier of violence, extending the conflict beyond traditional battlefronts and becoming widespread within nations.&lt;br /&gt;
# Finally, these operations serve to systematize violence by extending their application to the emotions and psychological structure, both individual and collective, of humanity. This dimension of warfare becomes an effective scientific tool at the service of states in their political and socio-economic struggles, an ultimate offensive weapon applicable in all times and circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s important to note that unconventional or irregular warfare is as ancient as war itself. Some historical figures are worth recalling in this context (25):&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Sun Tzu&#039;&#039;&#039;: A Chinese military writer from 500 years before Christ, who authored a masterpiece titled &#039;&#039;The Art of War&#039;&#039;. This classic explores conflict through five key factors: moral influence, timing, terrain, leadership and doctrine. Sun Tzu emphasized that true warfare is waged in the minds of people, and winning those minds equates to winning the war. He also advocated for offensive strategies that focused on capturing states intact rather than destroying them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Alexander the Great&#039;&#039;&#039;: Known for unifying the Greek world and placing his son at the helm of the empire. His success was not only due to his military prowess but also to his father Philip of Macedon&#039;s strategic principles, which included:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Maintaining and cultivating &amp;quot;peaceful&amp;quot; friendships in adversary countries to promote the idea that times of adventurism have passed and nations should focus on peaceful activities.&lt;br /&gt;
* Reinforcing and expediting these indirect actions through secret agents, the spread of rumors, and the cultivation of a war of nerves.&lt;br /&gt;
* Burying the adversary&#039;s opinion under a mountain of both true and false information, ultimately leading to disintegration, collapse, and dissolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Muhammad&#039;&#039;&#039;: In the 7th century CE, Muhammad appeared as a Prophet preaching Islam with only two options: conversion, or extermination. This phenomenon demonstrated two basic rules of psychological defense:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The first rule is that a people lacking a strong national ideology or deeply rooted faith can be completely converted to another ideology or creed simply by presenting them with the option of extermination.&lt;br /&gt;
* The second rule is that, to convince or convert a people deeply entrenched in their own faith or national ideology, cunning is often more effective than violence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Eight centuries of Arab domination in Spain left a profound mark of a cultural shift in language, sciences and customs, but they could not erase an identity based on Christianity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The Incas&#039;&#039;&#039;: They have been mentioned as masters in the use of non-military techniques in the service of war and the state. To win and capture the minds of the American population, Colonel Torres Llosa says they made intensive and skillful use of myth, aligning rulers and state objectives with religion and the will of the gods. They knew how to use the technique of rumors and spies along with diplomatic negotiations, subtly combining means of persuasion and force. Their institutions, such as the &#039;&#039;mitimaes&#039;&#039; (the relocation of entire communities to different territories), were always aimed at ensuring the perfect conversion and loyalty of their subjects, combining genuine concern for social justice and the collective well-being of the empire&#039;s population(26).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his &#039;&#039;General History of America&#039;&#039;, Luis Albedo Sánchez points out that the Incas used a &#039;&#039;dual&#039;&#039; language: one in Quechua to preserve the history of the state and the emperors, whether good or bad, and another vulgar Quechua that only allowed remembrance of the victors and positive aspects of the Inca Empire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is also worth noting the cohesive and communal nature of the language, which did not use the individual pronoun &amp;quot;I&amp;quot; but only employed &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; (&#039;&#039;ñocanchiss&#039;&#039;). Another aspect of the use of psychological factors in Tahuantinsuyo society was the creation and application of their motto: &#039;&#039;Ama sua - ama llulla - ama quella&#039;&#039; (Do not steal - do not lie - do not be lazy). The repetition of these principles as a moral code for a people creates a system of reflexes to achieve superior individual and collective behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Systematization of violence ====&lt;br /&gt;
In contemporary times, we can fairly accurately trace the evolution of unconventional warfare through the development of psychological operations, which emerged as support for military operations. Later, they replaced violence during the Cold War, became an offensive weapon in revolutionary warfare and its counterpart, counter-revolutionary warfare, or were employed in political warfare. These forms find significant expression in the psychological bombardment conducted by modern media targeting the &amp;quot;unarmed man,&amp;quot; contributing to the generalization and systematization of violence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From ancient times until the emergence and development of the modern State, psychological warfare evolved alongside scientific advances. In the present century, it has benefited from humanity&#039;s enormous progress in science and technology. Major historical events have also marked the historical evolution of psychological warfare:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# From 1914 to 1918, during &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[World War I]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;, psychological warfare remained relatively rudimentary. It was characterized by propaganda, the scientific theory of which was still in its infancy. Additionally, the war of positions and trenches created a separation between the front lines and the rear. The Germans attempted a pan-German movement, aiming to incite a holy war against British influence in the Middle East.&lt;br /&gt;
# In 1919, with the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, revolutionary warfare became institutionalized. Russia marked the beginning of a technical level of irregular and unconventional warfare by applying agitation, propaganda, and the methods of reflexological psychology by Petrovic Pavlov to ideological combat.&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1936 and 1945, the Nazi propaganda developed significantly, with Dr. Joseph Goebbels&#039; techniques garnering both admiration and fear. The work of Dr. Blau, Chief of the Army&#039;s Psychological Laboratory Service, combined psychology and psychoanalysis, laying the groundwork for this type of psychological warfare. The observations and theses recorded in his work &#039;&#039;Propaganda als Waffe&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;Propaganda as a weapon&#039;&#039;) in 1935 merged psychology and psychoanalysis in their methods.&lt;br /&gt;
# From 1939 to 1945, during World War II, psychological warfare was marked by the use of vast resources and the unification of allied organizations for psychological offensives in Europe. The strategic branch aimed for unconditional surrender following military victories, while the tactical branch sought specific objectives for the immediate benefit of the Allied war machine.&lt;br /&gt;
# From approximately 1945 to 1970, tensions rose, stemming from the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, which divided global supremacy into two major strategic fields: the &#039;&#039; Free World&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Communist World&#039;&#039;. This period gave birth to the Cold War, characterized by the perfection of the empire of terror and the threat of total war.&lt;br /&gt;
# From 1970 onward, the conflict turned global and the Cold War was succeeded by the threat of Nuclear Resolution, the War of the Rays, and the use of a worldwide apparatus of deterrence-distension. This period is characterized by the management of points of conflict, with more than half a dozen of them in Latin America alone, many of which originated from the execution of low-intensity operations or the subversive dynamics of major powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The end of World War II also marked the beginning of intensified research in psychosocial sciences. The goal was to maintain the psychological superiority achieved through strategic aerial bombardments over Europe and Japan with the use of strategic &#039;&#039;psychological&#039;&#039; bombardments. England carried out the transformation of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, led by scientific and academic personalities. Kurt Lewis and Brigadier John Rawlings Rees refined their method of political control based on precipitating the majority of populations into psychosis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The United States quickly followed suit through its universities, specialized centers, foundations and strategic intelligence agencies. These entities were responsible for the initial research on mass population control and the totalization of psychological warfare and unconventional warfare that we witness, experience and suffer today. They did this through the application of political warfare and agitprop in the context of global deterrence-distension, aggression, and the elimination of nationalist or decolonization movements in Third World countries, or the reversal of the terms of revolutionary warfare through low-intensity operations. These operations range from planting subversion (fabricating insurgency) to armed intervention (imposed or consented to), preceded by population conditioning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Doctrines ====&lt;br /&gt;
Discussing the doctrine of the systematization of violence involves addressing two aspects:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The general strategic concepts regarding unconventional warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
# Manuals on unconventional warfare, which are treatises outlining the norms, techniques, and procedures to be used in unconventional warfare, specifically in the operational aspects of military actions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is important to differentiate between these two levels because the first reflects a conception of the purpose, goals, policies, and strategies to achieve a doctrine. In contrast, the second level — the manuals — outline tactical objectives and techniques to achieve objectives, essentially serving as an operational program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One common mistake in regular confrontation is attempting to initiate insurgency or counterinsurgency based solely on a manual without having a comprehensive strategic concept. When the expected failure occurs, it is often wrongly attributed to the manual not being suitable for the situation. However, the majority of techniques and procedures outlined in the manuals are not exclusive to any particular ideology. What is exclusive is the doctrinal strategic conception to which the procedures in the manuals serve. Clumsy application of manual procedures or using them in a manner inconsistent with the nation&#039;s goals only yields favorable results for the adversary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, it is essential to understand the conceptual framework of the systematization of violence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Agitprop =====&lt;br /&gt;
In centrally planned economies under the Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialist ideology, all aspects of life, both in times of peace and war, are seen as a psychological struggle. Marxist dialectics are considered the expression of the very movement of history, and therefore, the ideology permeates the structures of the party and the State entirely.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
National psychological mobilization is based on the belief that everything is education within and that everything is oriented towards the liberation of peoples abroad. Institutions are organized to cover this broad perspective, and at the highest level, the Central Committee of the party includes the Department of Propaganda and Agitation Administration, which centralizes the task of mobilizing public opinion in favor of the party&#039;s defined goals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This involves a planned use of media as a conduit between the party and the masses, forming the basis for mobilization in political, economic, and military fields.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mobilization for psychological offense and defense relies on the development of social consciousness and class consciousness determined by social existence. Social consciousness comprises not only ideology, i.e., the worldview in line with the desired system, but also psychology. Ideology uses science; it doesn&#039;t create it. In this case, it complements it with psychology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For Soviet academics Boris Pershene and M. Lukomskaya, the two aspects of social consciousness, the psyche, and ideas, each have their own structure and specific characteristics. But what sets the ideas in motion or, conversely, hinders their development are socio-psychic phenomena that occur on one socio-economic basis or another (27).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this framework, subaltern psychological techniques are subordinate to higher conditions of revolutionary warfare proper. Their methodology revolves around two fundamental concerns: directing operations through specialized secret organizations and never separating actions from the overall strategy or tactics. In other words, there is no concept of psychological warfare in the doctrinal sense; it is not conceived in the Western manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Political warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
Political warfare is based on the principle that psychological warfare is intimately linked to the conduct of general politics. The British, often credited with this thesis, did not have to invent psychological warfare per se; they had always practiced it. Their doctrine states that political warfare is &amp;quot;a meticulous and patient dosing of all political, economic, social, and psychological factors that can enter as components into the assessment and conduct of experimental politics.&amp;quot; (28) When used, it is indifferent to the ideological speculations of others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The historical drive of peoples to free themselves from colonialism, especially since 1945, and the urgency of confronting revolutionary warfare led the British to perfect their techniques for dealing with these new aspects of the Cold War. The Tavistock Institute in London&#039;s prestigious psychological laboratories initiated the study of Generalized Conflict. This combined the study of reflexology, psychoanalysis, and introduced behaviorism as an instrument for population control and techniques for reversing the terms of revolutionary warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political warfare possesses the following characteristics:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Regarding space, it is not restricted to any specific location.&lt;br /&gt;
* Concerning time, it can begin and end at any moment.&lt;br /&gt;
* In terms of human resources, its combatants are not limited by age, gender, or physical limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
* In combat, its actions and manifestations are mostly intangible, achieving success without bloodshed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political warfare encompasses:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Ideological warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; The confrontation of philosophies and doctrines to weaken the enemy&#039;s will and moral strength.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Psychological warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; The mobilization of psychological forces to destroy the enemy, employing psychological and social communication techniques to bend their will, modify their behavior favorably, and control public opinion. It constitutes the operational aspect of ideological warfare and, alongside economics and politics, is part of national strategy.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Strategic warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; A high-level intelligence activity that plans for the enemy to make mistakes and destroy their own economic, political, and military forces.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Intelligence warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; It applies offensive intelligence to uncover the enemy&#039;s secrets while providing them with false information. It also involves heightened counterintelligence and security measures.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Organizational warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; The aim is to organize the population in a combat-ready manner to prevent enemy infiltration and destroy adversary institutions and organizations. This task falls to the core or party.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Mass warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; It mobilizes and utilizes the masses to defeat the enemy. &amp;quot;Masses are the basis of politics; where there are no masses, there is no politics, and without masses, there is no front of war.&amp;quot; This form of warfare serves as the foundation for organizational warfare.(29)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Psychological operations =====&lt;br /&gt;
American &#039;&#039;psychological operations&#039;&#039; (PSYOPs) encompass both offensive and defensive psychological warfare. The American author Harold D. Lassawell noted that psychological operations was a new term for a very old idea. In &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[World War II]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;, American terminology incorporated this concept to define three areas of psychological mobilization:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Boosting the morale of their armed forces.&lt;br /&gt;
# Shaping information for public consumption.&lt;br /&gt;
# Undermining the enemy&#039;s morale and beliefs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only the last technique corresponded to the term psychological warfare; the first two fell under the category of psychological action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This dual conception of American doctrine reflected the conduct of psychological warfare according to the same norms governing the defense and exaltation of national morale, the American way of life. Successes in psychological warfare during World War II and the Korean War were, to a significant extent, due to the magnitude of resources used. Despite this, Americans encountered numerous difficulties and contradictions due to the dualism of their psychological warfare services, which culminated in the moral breakdown known as the Vietnam trauma.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The need to reevaluate the theory of conflict and the actions required to maintain their country&#039;s influence and global supremacy prompted American specialists to revise their techniques and principles of psychological warfare. This led them to approach the British equation: psychological warfare = political warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Current PSYOPs are employed to create a favorable image, gain supporters, and undermine adversaries. They have transitioned from being defensive to becoming a potent offensive weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of PSYOPs depends on the President and involves the Department of State, all defense organizations and their Unified Commands and Theater Commands, the Agency for International Development (USAID), and the International Communications Association (ICA). Even diplomatic missions have the U.S. Ambassador as the head of PSYOPs in the host country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The specific purpose of PSYOPs is to create favorable attitudes among foreign groups towards the national objectives of the United States. To achieve this, they influence the host country&#039;s policies, decisions, governing abilities, leadership skills, willingness to fight, obedience, and support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
PSYOPs serve to garner support for Internal Foreign Defense by the United States, Conventional Warfare, Limited Warfare, and General Warfare.(30)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Low-intensity operations =====&lt;br /&gt;
Following the debacle in Vietnam, the United States Army accelerated its research to define a counterinsurgency doctrine that would respond to the terms of generalized conflict and the objectives of the Total Army, a new vision of its force and air-land tactics. The mission of the Total Army is to deter the realization of any attack against the national interests of the United States and, if deterrence fails, to engage the enemy in any environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The American review of its doctrine establishes that the nation is capable of addressing high and medium-intensity conflicts and must prepare for low-intensity conflicts. This is because the United States is involved in a series of low-intensity conflicts around the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, the broad mission of the Total Army includes all levels of conflict encompassing the escalation of violence.(31)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A situation of peace and free cultural, political, and economic competition can, at any given moment, transform into a configuration of low-intensity conflict. This is characterized by three progressions, each with specific tasks to fulfill:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Political-economic conflict&#039;&#039;&#039;, involving the formation of unions, alliances, subtle propaganda, economic and political sanctions, and military assistance.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;National and localized conflict&#039;&#039;&#039;, encompassing hostile propaganda, captures, incidents, border reprisals, terrorism, counterterrorism, assassinations, sabotage, kidnappings, rescues, training assistance, advisory roles, and military assistance.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Limited-open conflict&#039;&#039;&#039;, characterized by rebellion, revolution, guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations; foreign advisers participating in combat; territorial occupation; resource seizure; increased military support, and limited combat operation assistance, including the involvement of external forces in combat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Low-intensity conflict is followed in the escalation by medium-intensity conflict, which includes warfare expressed in regular force engagements, attacks on political and economic infrastructure, declarations of war, invasion, military force expansion across the spectrum of conventional capabilities, and mobilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
High-intensity conflicts are characterized by total war involving complete mobilization, warfare across all theaters, declared intent to conquer, tactical nuclear warfare, and strategic nuclear warfare, and marks the highest level of escalation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to American doctrine, &amp;quot;any change, whether positive or negative, creates social, economic, and political conditions that can be exploited by those seeking influence and political power or social reforms. Often, this leads to a conflict that may threaten U.S. interests … the increasing Soviet influence in the Third World poses a direct challenge to U.S. interests … therefore, low-intensity conflict must be considered from a regional perspective as well as from the unique perspective of each country.” (32)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the path of American doctrine, where military effort must be coordinated with ambassadors and U.S. regional teams, as well as with intelligence activities, psychological operations, and civil affairs, has already been explored by the British. Since 1945, the British have been involved in many operations of this nature, confronting limited wars in Korea, Suez, Kuwait, Indonesia, and the Falklands. Most of the time, Her Majesty&#039;s armed forces have carried out counterinsurgency operations in places like Kenya, Anguilla, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Malaysia among many others. These experiences allowed Brigadier Frank Kitson, a veteran of Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus, to write a book on Low-Intensity Operations published in 1975.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping&#039;&#039;, first published in 1971 and not 1975 as the author wrote.)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Primarily intended for instructors, his book discusses the issue of morality in preparing to suppress subversion with exemplary British cynicism: &amp;quot;Many consider subversion primarily as a form of redress used by oppressed people around the world against oppressors and therefore think that there is something immoral in preparing to suppress it. Undoubtedly, subversion is sometimes used this way, and in these cases, those who support the government find themselves defending an evil cause. On the other hand, subversion can also be used by bad men to promote their own interests, in which case those who fight it are on the right side. More often, as in other forms of conflict, there is something good and something bad on both sides, and there are well-intentioned as well as ill-intentioned people on both sides. Therefore, fighting subversion can be a good thing in some cases, just as promoting it can be right in other cases, and a country&#039;s army must be capable of performing either of these two functions when necessary, just as it must be able to operate in other forms of warfare.&amp;quot; (33)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Protracted war =====&lt;br /&gt;
Referred to by the Americans as Asian insurgency, protracted war encompasses the revolutionary movements in China and Southeast Asia. It has a historical framework dating back to 1920 and the struggle against English, Japanese, French and American colonialism. This was a war of peasant societies pitted against industrialized powers with national allies in those regions. Mao Zedong&#039;s military doctrine reached its highest conceptual level in 1939, following his experiences in fighting against the Chinese nationalists and Japanese armies. For Mao, protracted war consists of three phases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Guerrilla warfare, which precedes and accompanies the following phases and is permanent from beginning to end. Its aim is to subject the enemy to attrition and annihilation.&lt;br /&gt;
# The second phase is mobile warfare, which includes battles of regular forces designed to eliminate the enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
# The third phase is positional warfare, which Mao conceived as engaging the adversary in a war of attrition. Truong Chin&#039;s (Trường Chinh&#039;&#039;)&#039;&#039; doctrinal conception, published between 1946 and 1947, incorporates Mao&#039;s three stages but in a different form:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First, an initial containment phase characterized by low-level combat.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second, a balance phase when mobile combat appears in both confronting forces.&lt;br /&gt;
* Third, an insurgent counteroffensive with regular combat units, including the general uprising.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1950, after the defeat of the French, the famous Vo Nguyen Giap&#039;s doctrinal works emerged, which consider:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Guerrilla warfare in a permanent form throughout the protracted war.&lt;br /&gt;
* Mobile warfare involving confrontations with and between regular forces.&lt;br /&gt;
* Camp Enchained Warfare (position), based on the experience of Dien Bien Phu.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A two month siege of the colonial French fortress at Dien Bien Phu in March 1954 which culminated in Vietnamese victory and the withdrawal of French troops from Vietnam.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
* General insurrection as the final culmination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doctrinal approaches of Mao, Truong, and Giap have the following common ideological purpose and fundamental characterization:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The war is waged against invading armies with significant technological resources and their internal allies.&lt;br /&gt;
# Sustain protracted warfare through close coordination between regular troops, local forces and guerrillas.&lt;br /&gt;
# Expand control over resources progressively.&lt;br /&gt;
# Keep the enemy dispersed. Large forces scattered and forced to defend against attacks from regular and irregular forces create depth on the battlefield.(34)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This doctrine combines unconventional and conventional warfare as well as low and medium-intensity conflicts against well-defined enemies. It is the doctrine for wars of independence and liberation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== The theater of war =====&lt;br /&gt;
In irregular or unconventional warfare, the theater of war is not confined to a specific territory. Its position in space is relative. In such cases, the theater of war can be any place on the planet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a result, theaters of operations are &#039;&#039;regional&#039;&#039; at the very least and do not encompass just one country, even if one of them is most affected by an irregular insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For Caspar Weinberger, ex-Secretary of Defense of the United States,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;From 1981 to 1987.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &amp;quot;the world is at war today. It is not a global war, although it happens all over the globe. It is not a war between fully mobilized armies, although it is no less destructive for that. It is not a war that follows the laws of war and is indeed the objective of this peculiar variety of aggression, the law itself, as an instrument of civilization. It benefits from the pernicious fallacies of those who wish to present these wars as the efforts of the sovereign people to pursue their own destinies and, as such, something that concerns us.&amp;quot; (35)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Weinberger&#039;s recognition serves as the justifying premise for highlighting the interventionist role of the American military forces: &amp;quot;The role or the objective of our military forces is not primarily to preserve the blessed doctrine, nor the honorable traditions, nor the budgets. Their role is to preserve freedom ... some basic decisions must be made, and not years later when entire populations are polarized and the countryside is in flames ... If involvement is guaranteed, we must be prepared to act alone. We have sometimes had an unfortunate tendency to believe that every management in favor of freedom needs to be multilateral.&amp;quot; (36)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peru is located in a region considered a security area for the United States of America and an area of low and medium-intensity conflicts, for which the great power has its own strategic military concepts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The military strategic concepts of the United States have evolved from the last century to the present, according to Lieutenant-Colonel John Child.(37)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Between 1898 and 1933, the United States had the concept of the American Lake, which was based on the importance of the Caribbean Sea in the relations between the United States and Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The period from 1933 to 1939 is marked by the Lieutenant-Colonel as a period of abandonment of the aforementioned strategy and a void in strategic approaches regarding Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From 1939 to 1942, the concept was the establishment of a defensive perimeter against all external aggression, which included the area within a line running from Alaska through the Pacific Ocean down to the Galapagos Islands and from there crossing to Natal in Brazil and moving back north to Newfoundland, covering half of the Western Northern Hemisphere. Hence, it was called the &#039;&#039;Hemisphere Defense&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This concept, due to its limitations, lost its relevance in 1942 when Sumner Welles and President Roosevelt proposed the collective responsibility of American countries for Hemispheric Defense in the context of World War II. Despite the opposition of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, who preferred bilateral agreements, Roosevelt imposed a multinational military agenda, the &#039;&#039;Inter-American Defense Board&#039;&#039;, to address external aggressions to the continent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1947, Hemispheric Defense was expressed in the &#039;&#039;Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance&#039;&#039; of Rio de Janeiro. The validity of this treaty has deteriorated due to the lack of agreement on the different natures of the extracontinental threats that need to be defended against. Thus, in the face of England&#039;s aggression against Argentina in the Falklands War, the Treaty did not work, despite being invoked. As a result, the United States has preferred special bilateral relations with certain countries in Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another concept that appears in the Cold War years is that of secondary space. In 1950, for the U.S. Department of Defense, there existed the buffer zone (Alaska and Canada), the industrial zone (southern Canada and the U.S.), and the materials supply zone (Latin America).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emergence of the nationalist government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, the victory of Fidel Castro&#039;s revolution in Cuba in 1956, as well as efforts to extend the Cuban Revolution, changed the US military-strategic conception of Latin America. In the 1960s, the concept of &amp;quot;antifoco&amp;quot; developed as a counter-strategy to the &amp;quot;Foco theory,&amp;quot; which first appeared in 1961 in Che Guevara&#039;s book &amp;quot;Guerrilla Warfare.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In that decade, U.S. military policy was supplemented by major civic action programs, embodied in Kennedy’s &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[Alliance for Progress]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;. His administration promoted the strategic concept of antifoco, and considered foco guerrilla foci to be present in Uruguay, Bolivia, Southern Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico at the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the growth of insurgent movements across Latin America. There was an emergence of peasant movements in Peru and Brazil, urban guerrillas in Uruguay and Argentina, and rural guerrillas in Peru and Colombia. Additionally, there was a resurgence of Latin American nationalism with the military government of Velasco Alvarado in Peru (1968-1975), the socialist regime of Allende in Chile, Rodriguez Lara in Ecuador, General Torres in Bolivia, and the resurrection of Peronism in Argentina.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Panamanian nationalism under Torrijos intersected with the Nicaraguan revolution and guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala. Combined with U.S. presence, it created a hot zone within the East-West conflict, which disrupted American interests in the old American Lake.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This situation, along with other internal conflicts between Latin American countries and the United States, led Washington to redefine its military strategy in Latin America as Low-Intensity Conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed it as follows: &amp;quot;Low-Intensity Conflict is a limited political-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures to terrorism and insurgency. Low-Intensity Conflict is generally limited in scope and often characterized by constraints on the weapons, tactics, and levels of violence.&amp;quot; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Since understanding the broad scope of this type of conflict was more important than an exact definition, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command began developing an operational concept for U.S. Army involvement in Low-Intensity Conflict in January 1984,&amp;quot; according to U.S. Army Colonel Peter A. Bond (38).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can see Anglo-American military encirclement of Latin America: NATO task forces that left from Portsmouth, with a stop at Ascension Island base, have permanently settled in the Falkland Islands. The utilization of the air-naval bases in Punta Arenas, Easter Island, San Ambrosio, and San Roque in Chile, as well as the Galapagos Islands in Ecuador, completes the encirclement through the Southern Command in Panama. This Command is directly linked to counterinsurgency strategies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s interesting to note that according to former head of the Southern Command, U.S. General Paul Gorman, the Southern Command is involved in Low-Intensity Conflict. According to his opinion, these situations are when &amp;quot;perpetrators of violence resort to coercive crime, sabotage, subversion, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, in which the United States limits its military response to the direct action of Special Operations Forces, or advising and supporting a threatened ally.&amp;quot; He thus proposes to emphasize the use of military civic action and psychological warfare as instruments of the Low-Intensity Conflict strategy (39).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commenting on these concepts, the Panamanian writer Raúl Leis says: &amp;quot;Under this imperialist globalist perspective, the U.S. perceives Latin America as a region subordinate to its sphere of power, where any &#039;suspicious&#039; change constitutes a threat to its interests. Therefore, the region is involved in the Counterinsurgency and Flexible Response strategy. The latter is designed to respond to any conflict and develops between large military escalations: counterinsurgency, supporting, training, and coordinating the action of native armies, combined with &#039;cover action&#039; (covert intelligence and physical elimination); direct intervention; and the use of nuclear warfare&amp;quot; (40).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that cover action must be carried out by their secret agencies, intelligence apparatuses, which should also justify the intervention of their military forces and apply the teachings of Kitson to &amp;quot;make subversion.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Being able to prepare the insurgency wherever they need it to justify their presence, which is increasingly diminished by their misguided imperial policy.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Psychological warfare has replaced diplomacy. Terror and strategies for generating internal conflicts are permanent situations, considered normal in Latin American societies, especially those in Central America, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. The goal is to destroy the native armies by pitting them against their own populations, eroding nationalism and leadership that threaten the empire&#039;s interests, and blaming communism for this unconventional warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The theater of war can be any country or any region, and nothing is forbidden for this type of cover operations. Some years ago, the U.S. magazine [[Newsweek]] published a schematic plan by the CIA (41) to overthrow a government; refining at that time that it was being applied against Muammar Gaddafi. The plan consisted of the following guidelines:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Disinformation campaign to create trouble for a government.&lt;br /&gt;
* Terrorist escalation by discontented national elements.&lt;br /&gt;
* The bombing of bridges.&lt;br /&gt;
* Small-scale guerrilla operations.&lt;br /&gt;
* Creation of a parallel or counter-government.&lt;br /&gt;
* Promotion of opponents to the president or leader within their own political force.&lt;br /&gt;
* Physical elimination (ultimate removal) of the national leader.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Newsweek outlined this plan for Libya. But today we can assert that the model fits perfectly for countries like Peru and that, indeed, the previous counterinsurgency guidelines are being executed, almost mathematically, in Peru. Or is it that the script of the &#039;revolution&#039; of the Shining Path was written and published by the CIA on page eighteen of the magazine Newsweek in its August 3, 1981 edition?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Newsweek, August 3 1981 edition: [[Media:Newsweek98julnewy_0382.jpg|Page 18]], [[Media:Newsweek98julnewy_0383.jpg|Page 19]], [[Media:Newsweek98julnewy_0384.jpg|Page 20]]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whether the Shining Path is insurgent or counterinsurgent is a matter of debate. When its strategy is thoroughly reviewed, it will be seen as more closely resembling the one proposed by the CIA than that of communist subversion through revolutionary war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Atypical revolutions ====&lt;br /&gt;
The concept of Low-Intensity Conflict, as we have seen, encompasses revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war, insurgency, and counterinsurgency. Low-Intensity Conflict, or Low-Intensity Operations, is nothing more than the rationalized use of violence at the lowest point of conflict. This includes the use of military and paramilitary forces, political and economic pressure, psychological operations, guerrilla warfare, counter-guerrilla operations, and counter-terrorism actions, which encompass both anti-terrorism (defensive measures) and counter-terrorism (offensive measures, including acts of terrorism). This is what the English doctrine refers to as the reversal of the terms of Revolutionary War, a concept that, according to Brigadier Frank Kitson, the British armed forces have applied numerous times in third-world countries. France and the United States have also used similar strategies in Indochina, Indonesia, Chad, Lebanon, the Philippines, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Grenada, and other places and nations. In many of these cases, such operations have taken on characteristics of insurgency, pushing subversive forces to precipitate their actions and thus escalating the conflict to its maximum for better military management, to the detriment of the country where it occurs—the &amp;quot;host country&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the theater of operations,&amp;quot; in imperial language.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has not been uncommon to find that movements like the Mau Mau in Kenya were first promoted and then taken prisoner by the British. Investigations into the murder of Aldo Moro in Italy found the involvement of Israeli and British secret agents within the Red Brigades. It is also known that the creation of &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[Black September]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; was attributed to the British Intelligence Service, which had endorsed it to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The use of scientific techniques to manipulate individuals and human groups, leading them to fanatical extremes and alignment, is also well-documented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the development of nations, nothing happens by chance; everything in social events occurs as a process with causes and effects, thus having a rational explanation. This means that if we consider that we are currently experiencing a period of the application of the doctrine and strategy of Low-Intensity Operations, we can explain the existence of atypical revolutions that, while appearing to be Marxist, do not align with the doctrine of revolutionary warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand what an atypical revolution is, let&#039;s look at the tragic &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[Pol Pot]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; experience in what he called the &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;[[Democratic Republic of Kampuchea]]&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Without further ado, let&#039;s provide a brief description of the events that bled Cambodia in a horrifying genocide over four years, from 1975 to 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cambodia (or Kampuchea) is a strategically located country in the center of Indochina, situated between Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, with access to the South China Sea, Malaysia, and the large islands of Indonesia. Its population, mainly composed of the Khmer ethnic group since the 9th century, has a distinct culture and nationality. However, due to its prominent position in Southeast Asia since the 16th century, it became a victim of Spanish, Portuguese, French, English, Chinese, and American colonialism, as evidenced by its dramatic history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Colonialism created a political landscape characterized by decades of relentless and unequal liberation warfare. After the American defeat in Vietnam, this struggle transformed into a power game in which China sought to control strategic Southeast Asia and neutralize Soviet rather than American and European influence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This geostrategic situation and the regional political framework allow us to better understand the pointless &amp;quot;Maoist revolution&amp;quot; carried out by Pol Pot, a Cambodian educated in Paris, at the cost of two million Khmer lives at the hands of other Khmer individuals, in addition to the extermination of other ethnic groups, such as the Thai, whose population was reduced from 20,000 to 8,000 in a single day on May 25, 1975, in Koh Kong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upon recognizing Cambodia&#039;s independence in 1953, France left a puppet government led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, whose apparent neutrality was not in line with U.S. interests. In 1970, a CIA-engineered coup brought Lon Nol to power, and the Nixon administration began bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, causing serious destruction in Cambodia. It is estimated that this offensive against the Cambodian resistance, carried out by General Westmoreland with American and South Vietnamese troops, known as the Secret War, resulted in over three million deaths.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Under the leadership of Norodom Sihanouk, a symbol of the nation,&amp;quot; says Roberto Remo, the Kampuchean National Unity Front (KNUF) was created, bringing together three major sectors: progressive nationalists, intellectuals abroad, and militants of the resistance inside Cambodia. The latter group came from the ranks of the old Khmer Communist Party and the Pacheachon (nationalist) Party. Additionally, since the 1960s, political-military organizations had been receiving students trained in France, not in large numbers but with significant ideological influence (42).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this period, the Khmer Issarak army strengthened, but Western intelligence services managed to promote the Khmer Rouge within their ranks, which was widely publicized at the time by the French press. The Khmer Rouge played a prominent role in resisting the South Vietnamese invasion and fighting against Lon Nol. In five years of conflict, neither side took prisoners; everyone was exterminated. Lon Nol&#039;s fighters were encouraged to be violent and barbaric, even consuming the liver and hearts of dead enemies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On April 17, 1975, Phnom Penh fell, and Lon Nol fled to Hawaii. Sihanouk returned from China to assume the leadership of the Cambodian state, appointing Khieu Samphan as Minister of Defense. Khieu Samphan quickly became the strongman leader. Disagreements between the government and the KNUF became evident and public. The third congress of the KNUF in December 1975 abolished the monarchy and enacted a constitution that abolished private ownership of all property in the country, except for personal use. In March 1976, Sihanouk, who had been designated Head of State by the Assembly, resigned in favor of Khieu Samphan. The Revolutionary Government of National Unity and the FUNK ceased to exist with the constitution coming into effect. The population only knew that the &amp;quot;organization,&amp;quot; ANGKA, governed the country. It wasn&#039;t until 1977 that it became known that ANGKA was the Khmer Communist Party, with Pol Pot as the Secretary General and Prime Minister of the government, and Ieng Sary as Vice Premier.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let&#039;s read Remo&#039;s commentary in &#039;&#039;Cuadernos del Tercer Mundo&#039;&#039;: &amp;quot;There is no doubt that Pol Pot-Ieng Sary&#039;s foreign policy aligned with Beijing&#039;s. However, internally, their peculiar conception does not seem to have responded to orthodox Maoism, &#039;the Gang of Four,&#039; or Deng Xiaoping&#039;s current modernizing orientation. The leaders of Democratic Kampuchea never showed much enthusiasm for deepening the ideological basis of their revolution. However, they liked to present it as a model, the most radical, unique, original, and at the same time an example for the Third World. &#039;Our experience,&#039; proclaimed Radio Phnom Penh, &#039;is an experiment that will serve all of Southeast Asia, all agricultural countries, spreading its light throughout the world&#039;&amp;quot; (43).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pol Pot&#039;s strategy ultimately resulted in the destruction of Cambodia&#039;s productive forces. Genocide and the elimination of science and technology complemented the devastation caused by General Westmoreland&#039;s strategic bombings. Moreover, American diplomacy subsequently encouraged Chinese intervention in Cambodia and against Vietnam, but Vietnam preempted the maneuver.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pol Pot&#039;s government did not seek to end the war by defeating the Saigonese and Americans, who were being defeated by North Vietnam. Instead, it aimed to destroy the unification of Vietnam due to narrow nationalistic motivations. Therefore, it launched a war that reached its offensive climax in September 1977. By the end of that month, he was received by Beijing authorities as a hero.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight against Pol Pot&#039;s genocidal regime was taken up by the National Salvation Front, and by late 1978, Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia. In January 1979, they captured its capital, Phnom Penh, and on January 8 of that year, they contributed to the proclamation of the People&#039;s Republic of Kampuchea.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United Nations, Prince Norodom Sihanouk denounced the invasion of Democratic Kampuchea by Vietnam. On February 17, 1979, China supported Pol Pot, opening a war front in the north of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and demanding sanctions against this country for its invasion of Cambodia. Pol Pot and his &amp;quot;Khmer Rouge,&amp;quot; Sihanouk, and the forces of Son Sann took refuge behind the Thailand border to continue their fight against the People&#039;s Republic of Kampuchea. They would be supplied as war refugees by the United States, France, and England, directly and through humanitarian assistance and solidarity organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On November 14, 1979, the United Nations General Assembly, led by a strong majority, including the United States, declared that Pol Pot&#039;s government remained legitimate and adopted Resolution 34/22 demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was the Cambodian experiment ultimately an attempt to apply a Marxist-Maoist ideology? We have already seen the limitations of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary&#039;s ideological approach. Nevertheless, consciously or unconsciously, sociologists and political scientists from Western opinion-forming agendas made efforts to find a Khmer ideology. They argued and published things like these: &amp;quot;that in Pol Pot&#039;s thinking, European university theory merged with the ideological trends of rural society, producing the future enlightened vanguard (1). Khmer thought stems from &#039;French liberal Marxism and triumphant Maoism.&#039;&amp;quot; (44).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the [[Angkar]]&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Name of the [[Communist Party of Kampuchea]] in its early days, meaning ‘the organization’.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; program was very concrete and clear:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* An exacerbated, xenophobic nationalism that aimed to destroy everything foreign, including means of production and medicines.&lt;br /&gt;
* A return to illuminated earth trenches; the entire population, regardless of age and gender, was forced into agricultural labor.&lt;br /&gt;
* A collectivist economy that abolished private property and currency. Only the Angkar could dispose of the fruits of labor.&lt;br /&gt;
* Total prohibition of education to ensure that no one would be more educated than others.&lt;br /&gt;
* Physical elimination of vast sectors of the population. Only a million Kampucheans were deemed necessary to rebuild the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the governments that supported Pol Pot at the UN, the crimes against humanity committed in Democratic Kampuchea were disregarded, and no value was given to the &#039;&#039;Act of Genocide&#039;&#039; Accusation made known by the People&#039;s Revolutionary Tribunal of Phnom Penh in August 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pol Pot and Leng Sary were accused of the following crimes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Systematic and brutal execution of the population, which was divided into three categories: old, new, and collaborators of the Lon Nol administration.&lt;br /&gt;
* Forced evacuation of the population from cities to the countryside and displacement of rural populations, with the prior surrender of all their possessions to Angkar.&lt;br /&gt;
* Repression and coercion in the popular communes, where the population was forced into physically exhausting labor to cultivate land, build dikes, and open roads, all using only their hands and rudimentary tools.&lt;br /&gt;
* Violent destruction and alteration of social relations. Elimination of family ties, separation of children from parents, prohibition of romantic relationships among young people, and marriage celebrated by Angkar. Rejection of feeling pity for the wounded and dead or having feelings of solidarity among relatives and friends.&lt;br /&gt;
* Elimination of pre-revolutionary religions and national culture. Elimination of intellectuals. A directive issued by the Central Committee of the Party on September 5, 1977, stated: &amp;quot;It is necessary to redouble revolutionary vigilance against people who have served in the old apparatus of power: technicians, professors, doctors, engineers. Our party should not employ them. If we pursue technology and employ it, the enemy will infiltrate our power structure through it.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
* Massacre of children and the corruption of adolescents to turn them into torturers. They forced children under the age of 15 to enroll in the army or in their mobile shock groups.&lt;br /&gt;
* Complete disintegration of the national economy, leading the population to famine. Technicians were killed, and workers were sent to the countryside. Unhusked rice was exported in exchange for weapons. Many lands remained uncultivated.&lt;br /&gt;
* Methods of torture and massacre to terrorize the population, such as breaking skulls with hoes, picks, sticks, and iron bars; using knives and parlan leaf stems to cut throats or open people&#039;s bellies; sequentially dismembering and causing deaths through various atrocities.(45)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are the facts relevant to the purposes of this work. Now, let&#039;s summarize the evidence to deduce the true nature of the model.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Historically, the United States, France, China, and England considered their interests in Southeast Asia threatened by Vietnam and Soviet presence.&lt;br /&gt;
# All levels of conflict have occurred in Southeast Asia, except for atomic warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
# Since 1960, in Cambodia (Kampuchea), revolutionary political parties and the Khmer Issarak army have been infiltrated by agents trained in France. Secretly, Angkar was formed as a result of divisions within the Communist Party of Kampuchea.&lt;br /&gt;
# In 1970, the CIA, in a scandalous intervention, led to the replacement of Norodon Sihanuk with Lon Nol. Sihanuk traveled to China for asylum.&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1970 and 1973, Lon Nol facilitated the secret war against Kampuchea. American strategic bombings and the fall of Saigon eliminated nearly three million potentially subversive inhabitants who were allies of Vietnam.&lt;br /&gt;
# In 1975, following Vietnam&#039;s triumph and American defeat, the CIA facilitated the replacement of Lon Nol and used and guided the policies of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan, an elite educated in Paris, exclusive and closed due to matrimonial and other kinship ties (Pot and Sary are brothers-in-law).&lt;br /&gt;
# Once in power, Pol Pot and Leng Sary, under the direction of Angkar, accelerated the destruction of Cambodia. They implemented English techniques for population control through terror, involving massacres, public beheadings, and physical labor to exhaustion. Children were turned into killers, erasing feelings of mercy, and the Khmer Rouge launched a violent offensive against Vietnam.&lt;br /&gt;
# Vietnamese forces repelled the aggression, and in January 1979, along with the National Salvation Front, they defeated Pol Pot and established the People&#039;s Republic of Cambodia. China responded with military aggression in support of Pol Pot.&lt;br /&gt;
# Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge, along with Leng Sary and Son Sann, who opposed the new Republic, took refuge along the Thai border to receive assistance from the United States and the UN.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This Maoist revolution led by Pol Pot and Leng Sary exhibits some typical characteristics of certain movements that claim to be communist. Under the leadership of highly educated intellectuals, they were capable of applying destruction and death with unprecedented refinement and savagery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s not necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis to realize that this model doesn&#039;t exactly align with any specific ideological movement or serve as a revolutionary political alternative. These atypical revolutions fundamentally involve large-scale irregular warfare operations of low intensity. They are applied against countries deemed potentially subversive involved in liberation wars or susceptible to being considered adversaries in the global confrontation with the enemy camp.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These operations are the result of intelligence mechanisms carefully constructed to exploit political, social, ethnic, cultural, ideological, and mythical factors within any human group, guiding them towards self-destruction. Their ultimate goal is the mass annihilation of the population, the destruction of means and forces of production, the erosion of community morals, collective frustration, the obliteration of scientific and technological progress, and the instigation of conflicts between natural and other atrocities. These once-fevered and deranged imaginations have become concrete realities in various parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 2.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART TWO ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Chapter 1: development of the Shining Path ideology ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the grand context of Peru&#039;s geostrategic situation and the influences of unconventional warfare doctrines, what is the ideology of the Shining Path as the foundation for its proposal to modify the cultural structures of Peruvian society?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question is difficult to answer because this is another of the mysteries or atypical situations of the Shining Path: its definition or ideological stance regarding Peruvian society. What research reveals, both in its doctrinal documents and in the publications of its exegetes or Senderologists, is a series of interpolated excerpts whose origins are highly divergent, primarily Marxist, aiming to form a body of motivating ideas. Here, it essentially involves techniques of mobilization known in psychological warfare as &amp;quot;semantic differentiation.&amp;quot; Every people, country, or human group has certain forms of communication, thoughts, keywords that can trigger individual or collective actions, depending on how they are used, manipulated, and directed, related to the underlying choice that lies deep within the human instinct: Life or Death, Eros or Thanatos.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before delving into this substantive aspect of the Shining Path phenomenon, let&#039;s first agree on what culture and ideology are, in terms related to the Shining Path&#039;s supposed revolutionary mission and the trajectory of its founder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The creation of a new society means the formation of a new human being, which requires a transformation of cultural structures—a universal aspiration, especially in dominated and underdeveloped societies like those in the Third World, which have not been able to reach the minimum levels of satisfaction of basic human needs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This leads us to a tentative definition of culture. To do so, we&#039;ll follow the thoughts of Dr. Miguel Ángel Rodríguez Rivas, former lecturer at the Center for Advanced Military Studies of Peru and former lecturer in Philosophy at the University of San Agustín, regarded by the Lima magazine &#039;&#039;Caretas&#039;&#039; as a mentor to Abimael Guzmán Reinoso, who dedicated his philosophy thesis to him. Rodríguez states in his course on &#039;&#039;Introduction to Scientific Research Methodology&#039;&#039; that culture is a product of human intelligence, a rational creation. It is not something other than what is known as science, philosophy, and technology. But most importantly, human intelligence is guided by values, which are emotional instances, aspirations, and needs expressed in an ethical, juridical, and religious order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, Rodríguez continues to say that culture is not only an intellectual creation of science, philosophy, and technology or an ethical, juridical, and religious estimation, but all of this is internalized in human beings, giving rise to behaviors. Culture is behavioral, which is why culture is not neutral.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A society generates a system of beliefs and worldviews known as ideology at a given moment. Ideology is the conception we have at a given moment of humanity and society, provided it serves as the basis for political practice since what is essential in a society is pragmatic realization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, what is the conception of humanity and Peruvian society that the Shining Path relies on to support its political practice?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is probably a most false conception because it has nothing to do with the transformation of cultural structures with scientific, philosophical, and technological creation, or with the recreation of an ethical, judicial, and religious estimation in Peru. The Shining Path’s praxis does not seem to have any doctrinal connection with the creation of a cultural model. Its highest conception of the world is destruction, and its highest estimation is pathological delight in polarization, annihilation, and death. This can be explained from the perspective of soul purification and immortality, in line with Guzmán Reinoso&#039;s Kantian philosophical education but not from the standpoint of modern idealism, let alone Marxism. It has nothing to do with the teachings of Professor Rodríguez Rivas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Brief history of the Shining Path Thought ====&lt;br /&gt;
If we have chosen to provide an extensive preamble before specifically addressing the Shining Path, it is because we cannot ignore the generic circumstances that explain the phenomenon of irregular warfare. In the evolution of Shining Path Thought, we must also consider certain particular circumstances that, at a given moment, allowed or facilitated its emergence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We should not fall into the trap set by certain Senderologists who have, instead, invented a history of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path to promote its growth, thus diverting the course of thought regarding social change in Peru. For a while now, this thought seems to be expressed in nationalist currents of liberation and independence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We must confess that we began this research by studying the thought of the Shining Path, delving into its documents to understand the structure of this Guiding Thought and the theoretical and doctrinal foundations of the “correct application of Marxism to the Peruvian reality.&amp;quot; The result was disappointing, as it confirmed the absence of doctrinal and theoretical principles capable of linking Senderista political practice with a Marxist conception of Peruvian society and its ideological proposal for change. Simply put, the latter does not exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This discovery led to a revision of the methodology, which had led to a specific reading of Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist literature to find concurrence with the Shining Path. Driven by these dynamics, we had focused too much on the problem, as if it could only be explained from the perspective of that current.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first question had to refer, then, to the historical circumstances that allowed the emergence of the Shining Path idea as an extreme and ultra-radicalization of Marxism, based on the propagandistic use of some classical doctrinal positions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Evolution of significant events in Peruvian society =====&lt;br /&gt;
The 1960s were significant, but even more so was the decade 1965-1975, the period in which the beginning years of the Shining Path are located. This is the era of fragmentation in the main Marxist current in Peru and the structural changes of the Peruvian Revolution carried out by the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist political options in Peru had defined positions. Until 1962, Trotskyist tendencies grappled with the dilemma between insurrection or guerrilla foco in the countryside. The demands for land by small landowners in the valleys of La Convención and Lares, in the department of Cusco, marked the highest point of peasant mobilization that led them towards guerrilla warfare. However, these possibilities were not harnessed by the leadership of that political fringe, which later dispersed into the paths of electoralism and adventurism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1965 marks the end of the Castroist guerrilla experience in Peru and, above all, the failure of inserting urban groups into the Quechua peasantry of the Andes. The transposition of Cuban guerrilla tactics to the Andean conditions did not achieve the subversive mobilization of the peasantry, let alone its development as an alternative to power. This chapter closes, for Latin America, with Che Guevara&#039;s death in Bolivia. A transcendent episode of sacrifice that, among other perspectives, opens a new stage of revolutionary struggle in the region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Sino-Soviet disagreements that emerged in 1961 culminated in 1963 with a complete rupture between the two parties. This event had an immediate impact on the international communist movement and affected the unity of the Peruvian Communist Party, which split between “Muscovites” and “Beijingists.” It is a period of debate between Khrushchevian Marxism and Maoism, an aspect directly related to the topic at hand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The revolutionary nationalist option emerged between 1968 and 1975, represented by the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, which undertook a program of structural changes and implemented them boldly, within various limitations. Some of these changes were included in the program of the APRA, the Peruvian social democracy (as it is considered to fit approximately within a conventional topology of political groups); a program that was outlined in 1931.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other changes went even further than the immediate aspirations of the national Marxist left, especially regarding international relations and the transfer of Soviet military technology. These changes deeply affected the status of Western imperialist technological domination and the system of private property, especially in rural areas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Agrarian Reform achieved a radical and profound modification in land ownership and water use at the national level, awakening mass aspirations among the peasantry. Historically, immense productive forces were liberated, but they lacked – and still lack – land, technology, seeds, capital resources, business management, and adequate marketing channels. This generated new and major contradictions that definitely will not find a solution within the traditional mechanisms of the system, whose beneficiaries and defenders resist admitting this truth and seek survival in social spheres where they no longer belong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To avoid digressing further, we will not refer to other important changes, such as the officialization of pluralism in the ownership of means of production through private, co-managed, social or self-managed enterprises, as well as state-owned ones. However, it is worth noting that the changes promoted by the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces were oriented toward a social project called &amp;quot;Full Participation,&amp;quot; based on a humanistic philosophical conception. Some individuals who had been involved in the guerrilla movements of the 1962-1965 period pragmatically or convincingly adhered to this project.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To summarize, it is essential to establish some concepts before asking a question that is still looking for an answer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Between 1964 and 1966, the communist movement in Peru went through a period of rapid fragmentation, especially due to various external influences. For instance, it is well known that the CIA distributed a pirated edition of Mao&#039;s &#039;&#039;Little Red Book&#039;&#039; in Latin American universities. The goal was to accelerate the formation of &amp;quot;Beijingist&amp;quot; parties by stimulating the division of those previously formed around Moscow&#039;s guidelines.&lt;br /&gt;
* The nationalist currents within the armed forces promoted significant structural changes proposed and expected since the 1930s.&lt;br /&gt;
* The historical period of peasant struggles, rebellions, and uprisings against local authorities and landowners (&#039;&#039;gamonal&#039;&#039;) was overcome with the distribution of land, opening a new, albeit contradictory, stage for the development of productive forces in the countryside and relations between rural and urban areas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Question: who might be interested in the fragmentation of the communist movement, to destroy or paralyze the currents of revolutionary nationalism (whether civil or military) and to halt and even liquidate the emerging Native peasant class?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the strategists of modern irregular warfare, political warfare – as conceived by minds like Frank Kitson&#039;s – these are precisely elements or factors against which to unleash a counterinsurgency escalation. It becomes imperative to “make the insurgency&amp;quot; to achieve the elimination of communists, nationalists, and Peruvian Natives, who, together or separately, pose a threat to the interests of the establishment. It is precisely for this reason, let us add, that counterinsurgency and its doctrines cannot have the same meaning or application for the center of global power and for a nationalist government in the Third World. This is a strategic flaw, an error, that Argentina has already fallen victim to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The exacerbation of the mentioned revolutionary phenomena during this period determined the mobilization of foreign intelligence services, which were very active in formulating their counterinsurgency hypotheses and making the necessary decisions for the execution of their unconventional warfare actions in Peru. We must remember the antifoco military deployment or the theories of low-intensity conflicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Division of Peruvian communism and the birth of the Shining Path =====&lt;br /&gt;
In 1963, the Cuban Missile Crisis justified Mao&#039;s final condemnation of Khrushchev&#039;s regime and his thesis of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese Revolution, on the other hand, had demonstrated that the peasantry was the main driving force of social revolution in underdeveloped countries. This consideration was not entirely foreign to Soviet communism, as Lenin had been forced to rely on the peasantry, paradoxically &amp;quot;conservative by nature of class,&amp;quot; according to Marxists, to secure the fate of the Russian Revolution. He attracted them to the Bolshevik regime through the signing of peace with the German Empire and land redistribution. In this way, he defeated the counterrevolutionary forces in the civil war (1917-1921).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Sino-Soviet crisis in Peru, especially through an exacerbated debate on the characterization of the insurrectional process, whether it should be based on a war developed from the countryside, schematically reflected a transfer of the Chinese experience to Peruvian reality. Faced with this situation, the official Communist Party of Peru (PCP) postponed a definition between factions that was supposed to occur at the convening of the IV National Conference. The situation persisted until January 1964 when the pro-Chinese faction, led by Saturnino Paredes, José Sotomayor, and Jorge Hurtado, among others, decided to break with the official sector by convening their own Fourth Conference for mid-1964. As a result of the conflict, mutual expulsions occurred, and the committees and militants in Lima and the interior of the country were reorganized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can now be pointed out that this Fourth Conference was the earliest starting point of the ideological development of the Shining Path because it marked the beginning of a dogmatic thought process among Peruvian Marxists. That is, a total disregard for reality, experience, and scientific foundations for analyzing social phenomena. It simply required consulting the extensive literature from the national event to see that it was not exactly an ideological debate about the relations of production, the structure and role of Peruvian social classes, or the correlation of forces among them, their importance in the current situation, and their representation in the state apparatus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the first division of the Communist Party of Peru, Saturnino Paredes and José Sotomayor, along with their followers, began a debate on the character of Belaunde&#039;s government. To determine the correct line, they first had to establish whether this government was bourgeois or oligarchic. This discussion continued until it became institutionalized in Peruvian Maoism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the Fifth National Conference of the Communist Party of Peru Bandera Roja (Red Flag), Saturnino Paredes gained absolute control of the party apparatus. In March 1966, José Sotomayor Pérez and his followers were expelled and anathematized as &amp;quot;revisionists.&amp;quot; Sotomayor, who later realigned with Moscow, has argued that Paredes&#039; faction and his group were &amp;quot;a crude transplant of the Chinese experiences arising from their Second Revolutionary Civil War&amp;quot; (46).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this new division – the second to be precise – Abimael Guzmán and the Regional Committee of Ayacucho parted ways with Saturnino Paredes&#039; thesis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A period of party consolidation followed, dedicated to gaining control of the bases. This task was carried out thoroughly by the Ayacucho Regional Committee. However, in January 1968, a new internal crisis emerged, marking the third party division. Saturnino Paredes, then leading Red Flag, had to confront the &amp;quot;Ching Kang&amp;quot; group, a name taken by young Maoists from the Chinese region where they underwent training and preparation before being reintegrated into Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Ching Kang group effectively separated from Paredes and assumed control, taking on the name of the National Organizing Commission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In October 1968, the government of Belaunde Terry, deemed bourgeois and pro-imperialist, was overthrown in a military coup, and the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces came to power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within Red Flag, the confusing and disorienting debate intensified: now, to apply the correct line, it was needed to determine whether the Velasco Alvarado government was fascist representing the agro-exporting bourgeoisie or reformist representing the industrial-financial bourgeoisie. In this conflict, the Ayacucho Committee aligned with the first characterization and began active opposition to the policies of the Revolutionary Military Government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In March 1969, the National Organizing Commission controlled by the Ching Kang group convened the Sixth National Conference and expelled Saturnino Paredes, Abimael Guzmán Reinoso, and other members of the party&#039;s military apparatus. They officially established themselves as the Communist Party of Peru Patria Roja (Red Homeland) to distinguish themselves from Red Flag.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Paredes, in turn, continued the expulsion process by removing the Ching Kang group, a move seemingly supported and faithful to the Ayacucho Regional Committee led by &amp;quot;Álvaro&amp;quot; (Abimael Guzmán Reinoso).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The splintered Communist Party of Peru Red Flag adopted the line of action to transfer militants to the countryside to initiate armed struggle against the &amp;quot;military dictatorship&amp;quot; to seize power, in accordance with agreements dating back to the Fifth Conference:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;To prepare the material forces that carry out these objectives because without having our own armed force, born from the masses and closely linked to them in defense of their interests, it is impossible to fulfill the proposed task. It is for this reason that the Fifth National Conference of the Party agrees that the organization and development of its own armed force is the main task of the party, according to the immediate perspective that armed struggle is the principal form of struggle, and considering that it will essentially be a peasant revolution that will go from the countryside to the cities, where the peasantry will be its main force and the working class its leading force through its party. (47)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This decision, despite the criticism directed at the same Fifth Conference regarding the military conception of the Revolutionary Left Movement, represents a departure from the Marxist idea of revolution primarily based on political work and the development of the party rather than the military apparatus. Developing the party or developing the military apparatus are tendencies that, when isolated or unilaterally emphasized, lead to a distortion of the goals, according to Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this document, we find another of the interpolated and literal propositions that already reflect the schematic conception of this thought:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;... we can say that the driving forces of the revolution are, first of all, the working class with its role of leadership through its party; then the peasantry, the main force that must operate closely allied to the first. Then the impoverished and radicalized petty bourgeoisie is also a driving force of the revolution. As for the national bourgeoisie, due to its dual nature, it is a force that can potentially participate in the revolution under certain conditions, but due to its ties to imperialism and latifundia, it can betray the revolution&amp;quot; (48).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We mention these basic concepts because they are schematically repeated throughout Shining Path literature, as they were substantive in the Sixth Conference, ironically called the &amp;quot;Basis of Party Unity,&amp;quot; and they served as the basis for the fourth party segregation, this time directly prompted by Abimael Guzmán as the representative of the Ayacucho Regional Committee, in contrast to the Red Flag Central Committee led by Saturnino Paredes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On January 15, 1970, Guzmán Reinoso, in a letter to Saturnino Paredes, questioned his leadership of the party and urged him to &amp;quot;make a major turn&amp;quot; by going to the countryside to reconstitute the party:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;... we are on the brink of a major turn in the party, and this is evident from the fact that this is the foundation of this new stage in the development of party organization&amp;quot;... in &amp;quot;Bandera Roja,&amp;quot; the general direction for this new stage of struggle should already be set, guided by the basis of party unity, taking Mariátegui as the cornerstone and focusing the debate on the fundamental issue, the peasant problem&amp;quot; (49).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Coincidentally, &amp;quot;R. Anderas&amp;quot; (Saturnino Paredes), on the same date, addressed the Ayacucho Regional Committee, postponing the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee for three months, extending the deadline for a resolution to Abimael Guzmán&#039;s demands. Five days after that letter to Paredes, Guzmán sent a new letter to the Central Committee, calling on its General Secretary to &amp;quot;take a decision regarding the proposal made by the Ayacuchanos in the previous letter.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In February 1970, the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee of Red Flag took place, attended by its main base: the Ayacucho Regional Committee and its principal leader, Abimael Guzmán. The event also saw the participation of the Regional Committees of Arequipa, Lima, and La Libertad, the Committee of Chimbote, the Peasant Confederation led by José Llamoja, and the Revolutionary Student Front with its bases in Lima, Ayacucho, Huancayo, Ica, and Arequipa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this occasion, Guzmán had meticulously prepared arguments and evidence that would confirm the rightist, petty-bourgeois, and deviated conduct of Saturnino Paredes. It was not difficult for him to dismantle Paredes with a wealth of details, flyers, and statements that Paredes had used against Guzman. Guzman achieved more than he had intended, effectively shattering the entire organization of the Communist Party of Peru - Red Flag. Tendencies polarized into support and condemnation, but confusion also led to abstentions and resignations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This marked the fourth significant political split within the Communist Party, in addition to the dozens of groups and small parties that had formed and disappeared along the way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upon returning to Ayacucho, Abimael Guzmán, also known as &amp;quot;Álvaro,&amp;quot; established a new party known as the Communist Party of Peru - For the Shining Path of Mariátegui. This supplementary denomination, taken from the slogan of FER-Ayacucho, would later serve to distinguish it completely from the communist movement. For this reason, today, Shining Path members despise the name they chose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abimael Guzmán initiated the work of what he would call the pre-constitutional period of the Party, using preaching as the main weapon to disseminate his ideas and foundations. These would later be formalized in July 1973 during the Third Plenum of the Shining Path in a document on Reconstitution, a name also adopted by the mentioned assembly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path begins to characterize its history, starting from 1970, into specific stages that are literally accepted by its exegesis or Senderologists without significant critical reconsideration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the Shining Path, the years 1970 to 1977 correspond to the period of reconstitution of the party; 1977 to 1980 involve the transfer of cadres to the countryside in secrecy, and starting from 1980 marks the beginning of armed struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== The ideological framework of the Shining Path =====&lt;br /&gt;
Let&#039;s allow Abimael Guzmán himself to summarize the ideological character of the Communist Party of Peru - For the Shining Path of Mariátegui based on some excerpts from his theoretical work:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Communist Party of Peru (PCP) is based on the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. This means that Marxism has evolved and has three stages. The Marx stage, Marxism, belongs to the era of pre-monopoly capitalism, the last century, and corresponds, in the political aspect, to the preparation for the revolution. Therefore, the first stage of Marxism is Marxism of the pre-monopoly capitalist era and preparation for the revolution. Later, at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present century, capitalism enters a new phase, which is its final phase, &#039;the imperialist phase.&#039; It is Lenin who will point out the laws of the development of imperialism and find its contradictions. In this era of imperialism, the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat intensify to the fullest. Thus, Lenin, by discovering the internal laws of imperialism, also indicates the need to organize the revolution, not only as preparation but with the aim of carrying it out. Stalin defines the second stage of Marxism as &#039;Leninism.&#039; So, Leninism is characterized as &#039;Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution.&#039; Up to this point, we have &#039;Marxism-Leninism.&#039; After World War II, China is in the midst of a revolution, and Mao Zedong, by applying Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of semi-feudal and semi-colonial China, discovers new laws of the revolution. In an era in which imperialism worldwide enters a period of extreme contradictions... In this period, the revolution has shifted from advanced countries to underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Mao Zedong discovers new laws of the revolution, summarized in the laws of people&#039;s war, from the countryside to the city, in a long process under the leadership of the proletarian party, a revolution that is peasant and called the &#039;National Democratic Revolution,&#039; as a preliminary stage of a later &#039;Socialist Revolution.&#039; This period is established within Marxism as a development in the third stage and style, which was also called the &#039;Mao Zedong Thought&#039; in the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Thus, we have &#039;Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought,&#039; and that is the doctrine adopted by the Communist Party of Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, this party, according to its own documents, has taken up and developed the ideas of Mariátegui by applying them to our reality. When Mariátegui founded the Socialist Party in the country, he was establishing a proletarian party, in other words, a Communist Party. To do so, Mariátegui had to outline a general political line, which contains five problems: 1. The character of society; 2. The character of the revolution; 3. The instrument of the revolution; 4. The tasks of the revolution; and 5. A mass line.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Based on the character of that society, the character of the revolution necessarily derives from it. This comes from the analysis of our reality, which is semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Therefore, if a country is capitalist, the revolution must be socialist. In contrast, if a country is semi-feudal and semi-colonial, the revolution must be National Democratic or, as Mariátegui called it, &#039;Bourgeois Democratic.&#039; Consequently, if the revolution in our homeland must be National Democratic, it implies that the Peruvian revolution must have two stages: the first National Democratic and the second Socialist, as a continuation of the first stage of the revolution. This character of the revolution, indicating the two stages, is a logical and inevitable consequence of the character of society. This is Mariátegui&#039;s conclusion... So, the strategy of the revolution at this moment corresponds to the first stage, which is National Democratic. Therefore, the essence of this first stage of the revolution is Bourgeois Democratic. According to Mao Zedong, this type of revolution means a peasant revolution, an agrarian revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party. This kind of revolution implies a long and protracted people&#039;s war, which Mao himself in China called &#039;the path of encircling the cities from the countryside.&#039; In other words, through armed struggle, liberate rural areas, establish support bases, and gradually encircle the cities, starting with small villages and towns, then medium-sized cities, and finally the large ones, until ultimately taking central power at the national level... The strategy has to be a consequence of the reconstitution itself (the Party) in both political and organizational aspects… (50)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This is the synthesis of the Shining Path’s ideology, an elaboration that culminated in the Sixth Conference. This framework is the guiding principle, the &#039;&#039;basis of party unity&#039;&#039;, a perspective that can be found in one form or another throughout Shining Path literature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The glaring inaccuracies in this ideological foundation of the Shining Path are easy to establish if you follow the thread of its formal logic. You will find a chain of fallacious syllogisms that appear to be Marxist truths but, when using certain well-known concepts, form an argumentative set of mere sophisms. It is not about ignorance or lack of knowledge but rather a subtle creation, a framework of apparently true premises capable of misleading those who accept them as scientific truths simply because they do not align with the thinking of the mentors and creators of Marxism or with the reality of Peru. This distorted characterization of the social and political conditions of the country by the sophists of the Shining Path and certain Senderologists was completed with the theory of a supposed fourth stage of Marxism: the &amp;quot;Guiding Thought&amp;quot; of Comrade – or President – Gonzalo (the pseudonym Abimael Guzmán adopted when officially going underground with his party). Just as Marx, Lenin, and Mao discovered the laws of revolution in their times and countries, “Gonzalo” “discovers” these laws for the reality of Peru at the present moment. Laws that have not been elucidated and are unknown, not even appearing in Shining Path literature. The Guiding Thought, as we will see later, is a psychological mechanism for motivation and not the product of an analysis translated into the formulation of laws or hypotheses about the reality of Peru. There is none of that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Structure of the Shining Path ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have argued that the Shining Path phenomenon is a foreign insertion into the Peruvian social fabric. Therefore, if we want to make an accurate assessment of its origins and reasons for existence, we should not be guided by ideological sophisms and the history that Shining Path itself constructs and develops using its own resources, as well as through the media and propagandists interested in promoting violence in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reality demonstrates that the birth of Shining Path is not a product of the evolution of social contradictions manifested in an ideology, and political praxis, led by the leadership of a class or a group of classes linked by their interests and correlations. In other words, the ideology of Shining Path is not of the peasantry, the proletariat, the petite bourgeoisie, or the combination of these classes whose representation it claims to assume. It also falsely claims the intellectual representation of Marxism and appropriates the identity of the Communist Party of Peru. Shining Path attempts to embed itself in the history of Peruvian communism when it arbitrarily establishes a chronological framework divided into three periods that, according to Guzmán, precede the armed struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The Struggle for the Formation of the Party, which spans from 1918 to 1928, culminating in the realization of Mariátegui&#039;s ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
* The Struggle for the Restoration of the Basis of Party Unity, between 1929 and 1969, a year considered a milestone because, according to Guzmán&#039;s idea in the Sixth Conference, the Party unity is restored only then.&lt;br /&gt;
* The Struggle for Reconstitution between 1970 and 1980, a ten-year period covering the preparation stage of the party for armed struggle that Shining Path officially began on April 17, 1980. (51)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path truly began its history between 1965 and 1975. It emerged significantly with the decline of guerrillas in Peru and the emergence of anti-imperialist military nationalism (under Velasco Alvarado), the implementation of social reforms affecting the system, and the failure of the Alliance for Progress, a set of counterinsurgency policies and civic and developmental actions proposed for Latin America by the U.S. Kennedy administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In essence, the Shining Path is a provocation of counterinsurgency, an advanced and skillful theory and practice in the destruction of productive forces and effective revolutionary ideologies in any of their expressions, whether socialist or otherwise. Above all, the goal of the Shining Path, after seventeen years of violent activity, does not seem to be anything other than maintaining and dangerously deepening instability in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Doesn&#039;t the Shining Path, supposedly to combat imperialism, relentlessly attack regimes that are quite different from each other, such as those of Velasco, Belaunde, and García? Let&#039;s remember; it said about the Government of the Armed Forces: &amp;quot;The CPP has pointed out the basic character of the three basic laws of the fascist regime (agrarian, industrial, educational) as models of development of bureaucratic capitalism. It has also pointed out the relationship between development and Andean integration (Andean Pact) as part of the integration of the Latin American Common Market and the consolidation of the &#039;backyard&#039; of American imperialism.&amp;quot; (52)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
About Belaunde&#039;s Government: &amp;quot;The current government aims to further develop the oppressive semi-feudal structure... The current government, whose main leader and primary responsible person is Belaunde, is eagerly and obediently striving to further develop bureaucratic capitalism in the country (monopolistic big capital subservient to the landlords and subject to imperialism)...&amp;quot;(53)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In August 1986, referring to the analysis of injustice situations made by President García in his July Message, the PCP said: &amp;quot;...simply put, these are similar problems and issues that de facto governments or those derived from elections have been dealing with for decades, attempting nothing more than developing Peruvian society, developing bureaucratic capitalism in the country, (monopoly big capital enfeoffed&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;enfeoffed, noun. &#039;&#039;put in possession of land in exchange for a pledge of service, in feudal society.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; to the landlords and subjected to imperialism)...within the maintenance and defense of the  landlord-bureaucratic dictatorship, which is the Peruvian State.&amp;quot;(54)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This political behavior is not precisely that of a party that analyzes and establishes variables that exist in a situation or a country, contradictions, relationships, and differences, among others. It is more of a propagandistic attitude of an instrument, a force equipped and armed for social demolition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== The constituent elements of the Shining Path’s structure =====&lt;br /&gt;
Before attempting to identify these elements, let us make a preliminary clarification. The enumeration and analysis of these elements may seem like a forced scheme that cannot exist. If we present it schematically, it is for didactic reasons. The research has led us to discover all these constituent elements, whether voluntarily or involuntarily existing in the Shining Path’s structure. Is it possible that it was set this way? Is it credible that a mysterious hand has so much power to manipulate groups and social situations?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let&#039;s not forget that in irregular or unconventional warfare, there are states that plan and lead the actions. There are also powerful international intelligence services with the most advanced science, from the best universities and research centers, such as the Tavistock Institute in London, the University of Georgetown in the United States (owned by the North American Air Force), the Rand Corporation – which has conducted extensive studies on the Peruvian reality – and foundations like Adlai Stevenson, Ford, and others interested in researching the difficulties that the system may face and the dangers that could threaten the interests of transnational corporations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, let us remember the principles of low-intensity operations: &amp;quot;To combat subversion can be a good thing in some cases, just as promoting it may be right in others&amp;quot; (Frank Kitson).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Likewise, we must consider the concept of political warfare: &amp;quot;A meticulous and patient testing of all political, economic, social, and psychological factors capable of entering as components in the evaluation and conduct of an experimental policy&amp;quot; (M. Megret). Could the Shining Path be an experimental policy? What are the components of the Shining Path?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Studying the human environment of the Shining Path =====&lt;br /&gt;
One of the questions we need to answer is why the Shining Path chose the Andean region for its operations. Shining Path experts, supported by the anthropological and social studies of Peruvian scientists, have reached common conclusions: they talk of &amp;quot;the most depressed region,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;extreme poverty,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;regions abandoned by the state,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;cultures different from the coastal ones.&amp;quot; More serious works have delved into the socio-economic contradictions between the communal cultures of the highlands and the impact of capitalist Western culture, which produces imbalances and disturbances that have been expressed in long-standing peasant conflicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are not discussing this or any other reality, but rather are examining the perspective and purpose of certain research. We believe that we have conducted extensive research for a precise social diagnosis framed in a specific time and place. These are like inert X-rays of reality, many of which are questionable in nature and orientation. Nevertheless, they are useful as basic research for further development purposes or modifications aimed at integrating various social strata of the Andean population into Western culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the best studies of the Andean human environment that we know of were conducted for counterinsurgency purposes by foreign agendas, especially American ones. In other words, research on the anthropological and social makeup, nature, and historical projection of Andean social groups from an insurgent perspective that could affect the establishment. For this purpose, social scientists from foreign agendas have lived for years in the Andean regions, conducting research on anthropological and social makeup.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the decade of 1965 to 1975, Peru posed a serious problem for foreign intelligence agencies responsible for counterinsurgency forecasts. Peru was characterized as a highly dangerous and subversive terrain, especially when the option of changing the Peruvian military leadership, which seriously affected relations with dominant countries (and particularly the United States) was realized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As an example of everything that happened in this regard, let&#039;s take the Seminar on Peru, which lasted from July 1969 to May 1970, the month in which the Final Wings Conference was held in Wingspread, Wisconsin, the city where the Johnson Foundation&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Foundation apparently still exists.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is located. More than 75 important political leaders, high-level company executives, scholars, leaders, workers, clergymen, journalists, and representatives from various sectors of both countries attended this conference. Twenty of them were from Peru, including an official delegation. The U.S. government sent high-ranking officials directly involved in managing relations with Peru. (55)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For Daniel Sharp, the promoter and leader of the seminar, what happened in Peru was a responsibility. As a founding member of the Peace Corps, he signed the first agreements with the governments of Peru and Bolivia, led the first teams of agents to those countries, and directed their operations in the Andean region. With a bachelor&#039;s degree in International Relations from Berkeley and a doctorate in International Relations and Jurisprudence from Harvard, he was the most suitable person to lead this research seminar, which addressed the following topics:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The context of U.S. politics in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
* U.S. relations with the Peruvian military.&lt;br /&gt;
* The awakening of Peruvian nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
* The issue of the 200-mile maritime boundary.&lt;br /&gt;
* International financial organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
* The rural sector.&lt;br /&gt;
* Indigenous people.&lt;br /&gt;
* Private investment.&lt;br /&gt;
* Foreign private sector in Peru. Study of business and governmental prospects.&lt;br /&gt;
* The labor movement.&lt;br /&gt;
* Private educational development.&lt;br /&gt;
* Missions in Peru funded by North American churches.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The time when the seminar took place was characterized as the most critical period in the history of Peruvian-American relations. It saw the nationalization of oil and American companies, the expulsion of the American military mission, the mobilization of indigenous people through land reform, and the Peruvian government asserting its sovereignty over its territorial sea by legislating on the 200-mile maritime boundary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The intelligence services sought clear answers to four questions from the perspective of insurgency and counterinsurgency: &amp;quot;What has been the policy of the United States?; What were its results?; What are the various policy alternatives offered to the United States?; and What are the likely consequences of each?&amp;quot; (56)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The event was sponsored by the ADELA group, the Adlai Stevenson Institute; The Cerro Corporation, N.Y; Chicago Council on Foreign Relations; The First National Bank of Chicago; Grace &amp;amp; Co.; IBEC; IBM; ITT; Johnson Foundation; Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co; Sears Roebuck &amp;amp; Co.; Sunbeam Corporation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the previous conferences, committees and small seminars that were held, prominent Peruvians, along with entrepreneurs and government officials from the United States, participated in the advisory process. Notable participants included Ambassador Fernando Berckemeyer and former Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde. Among the attendees were Samuel Drassinover Katz, Carlos Alzamora, Marco Fernández Baca, Daniel Schydlowsky, Richard Weeb, Patricio Ricketts, and Admiral Luis Edgardo Llosa (known for his significant historical role in defending the sovereignty of the 200-mile limit) among other personalities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The results of this seminar were published in a book titled &#039;&#039;U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN PERU&#039;&#039;. The Spanish edition was published by Editorial Sudamericana in Buenos Aires in 1972 under the name &#039;&#039;Estados Unidos y la Revolución Peruana&#039;&#039;, and received extensive circulation in Peru. We have provided extensive references to this source as it serves as a valuable testimonial resource for the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Peruvian context. All topics were addressed from the perspective of the Cold War, with the ultimate goal of determining the policies that the United States should adopt towards Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The topic concerning The “Indians,&amp;quot; as developed by William P. Mangin, an anthropologist, sociologist and mathematician from Syracuse University in New York, holds particular interest in understanding the human environment in which the Shining Path operates—the Andean indigenous Quechua peasant population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mangin states: &amp;quot;...for better or for worse, the United States has maintained relations with Peru for a century, and though not always consciously, they have adopted attitudes towards the Indians that shape a policy. Commercial and developmental loans, joint decisions regarding road programs, the construction of schools and food distribution, the Peace Corps, AID technicians, as well as religious missionaries, all represent different aspects of an attitude towards the Indians...for better or for worse, the existence of this general policy is a concrete fact. It should not be surprising that this policy towards the Indians has been consistent. It has generally aligned with the policy of the Peruvian government (which aimed to integrate the Indians into the National Culture), as evident in most cases. However, in certain cases, both governments have seen the Indians as a potential rebellious or revolutionary force; and then, a defensive policy was adopted, for example, joint counterinsurgency programs AID-PERU (including the construction of some penetration roads in the jungle).&amp;quot; (57)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither at that time in May 1970, nor now, is it possible to ignore or deny American involvement in Peru&#039;s rural issues. This involvement was denounced in the seminar by Julio Cotler, but its reason and inevitability are tacitly supported by Mangin himself when he says: &amp;quot;...consciously or unconsciously, almost all decisions made in Peru by public and private organizations and companies from the United States imply a policy towards the Indians since they represent a very large sector of the population.&amp;quot; (58)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mangin&#039;s study, discussed in the seminar, classifies the highland society of Peru into seven groups:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 1. It is a small upper-class group that resides in the main cities of the valleys or on their large estates, in the capital, or abroad…&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 2. It is a small group of relatively wealthy individuals who form a regional upper class and maintain some contact with Group 1 in the provinces but very little in Lima.&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 3. This group partially overlaps with Group 2 in some cases but constitutes a separate group from many points of view. Most of its members are technicians representing various Peruvian official agencies that have regional personnel…&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 4. Like the first three groups, Group 4 has both rural and urban elements, but the latter are predominant. Its existence has been noted by many observers, although they have not assigned it autonomous characteristics. It can be said that this group is made up of workers who, along with the first three groups, also includes all members of the white-collar category working for regular salaries, such as bank employees, government administrative staff, taxi drivers, teachers, primary school sub-officers of the police and the military, and other groups.&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 5. I will call it the mestizo group. The word mestizo is not widely used in Peru, except by writers and social scientists. I use it here to refer to people who live in estates and small towns... they are descendants of the first Spanish colonists... and in most cases, it would be impossible to distinguish them from the Indians... but the physical characteristics of members of Groups 5, 6, and 7 largely overlap…&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 6. In Peru, members of this group are generally referred to as &amp;quot;cholos&amp;quot;... They are individuals in the process of transitioning from indigenous to modern national Peruvian... In terms of clothing, they are bicultural... Cholos generally come from indigenous communities. In recent years... their highland origin and even their indigenous status have become a source of increasingly pronounced pride... it&#039;s possible that as this group gains political power, it may achieve some intergenerational stability, especially if it aligns with a growing Quechua nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
* Group 7. This group consists of the Indians, defined as such by themselves and others. There were many different classes of Indians, and it is still possible to distinguish varieties in dress... The number of landless Indians in the South is high... Due to the need to strategically acculturate and protect their land from the pressure exerted by landowners... Indian communities have had to assimilate notions of rights and politics... Indians are and have been engaged in two economies. They have a local economy based on kinship, mutual obligation, and the festival system. They are also closely linked to the national economy. They are natural traders. Most Indian women are aware of national price fluctuations for eggs and small animals, while most men trade in livestock... Indians being at the lowest rung of the valley hierarchy suffer from discrimination at all levels. They are treated unfairly in courts, as well as in the armed forces, education, and national activities; they are practically slaves in the region, and whites and mestizos can kill them, and sometimes they do, without being punished... (59).&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This interesting classification of the highland social groups in Peru is a scientific delineation of the psychosocial profiles of different indigenous strata, idiosyncrasies, interests, aspirations, contradictions, and ethnic overlaps that have allowed a series of miscegenation while remaining a distinct and growing culture that overwhelms the traditional coastal Peruvian culture. Mangin predicts, &amp;quot;I would venture to predict that indigenism has died, and in its place, a new type of Indian nativism is emerging. In this new trend, the need to confront the modern world as Indians, land reform, industrialization, urbanization, bilingualism, education, and politics will be highlighted. Whites and mestizos may play a role in organizing and leading, as is the case with Peruvian and Guatemalan guerrillas, but the main leadership core will consist of Indians and cholos.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Different national parties and foreign interests, including Russia, China, Cuba, and the United States, support or oppose various Indian factions, but none of these groups has deeply penetrated Indian culture. &amp;quot;Much more serious,&amp;quot; says Mangin, &amp;quot;is the increasing involvement of anthropologists and other social scientists in official and university programs developed under the auspices of &#039;public security&#039; and &#039;counterinsurgency&#039;... if a few social scientists become so involved in the Andean countries of Latin America, this presence threatens and may prevent effective work by Americans&amp;quot; (60).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ultimately, Mangin was proposing a more subtle and scientific approach to address the potential danger posed by the development of Quechua culture. His primary concern was that this differentiated culture might, at some point, assert its rights and endanger the interests of major powers, especially the United States. Therefore, Mangin proposed three solutions (61), based on hypotheses about the projection of Quechua culture. These proposals are formulated in terms of the Cold War and the policy that the United States must adopt, either as assistance to the Peruvian government or as intervention to control, neutralize, or destroy Quechua aspirations. In these terms, for American hawks, only the genocide thesis is relevant. However, Mangin also talks about a policy of American indifference to the Peruvian Indian problem, saying: &amp;quot;In any case, we can&#039;t do much for the Indians of the Andean region... As my own position is that of a conservative anarchist, I believe that confusing and unclear solutions originating in local areas are generally better than confusing and unclear solutions imposed from outside.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How about American abstention! Instead of direct intervention or confusing and unclear military cooperation and support, it would be better to create a similar internal situation of cultural destruction that is confusing and unclear. There is no better definition of the subversive phenomenon known as the Shining Path than as a provocation leading to the genocide of the Peruvian Natives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should not be forgotten that the Wingspread debate took place in 1970, and its conclusions were disseminated in 1972, at the beginning of the period of reconstitution of the Shining Path. Concrete and irrefutable reality is showing us that the way the Shining Path conducts its polarization operations with respect to rural social sectors corresponds to the conception of the highland, indigenous social structure similar to that outlined by Mangin. In other words, the Shining Path&#039;s experimental politics, with destructive goals, find in Mangin&#039;s studies and those of other social scientists the necessary knowledge for the manipulation of the Quechua social base. In other words, it has chosen the appropriate social sector for the insurgency-counterinsurgency game that promotes political warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whether coincidental or not, Mangin also mentions and reminds us of other experiences such as Project Camelot (Horowitz, 1965), the work University of Michigan anthropologists conducted with CIA agents in Vietnam to provide equipment and training to the police (Scigliano and Fox, 1965). It is worth asking, for example, whether the Vicos Project and the construction of the Marginal Jungle Highway achieved their goals from the perspective of insurgency-counterinsurgency. Or did they only serve to create that &amp;quot;confusing situation&amp;quot; that now devastates the Peruvian Andes?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Ideological contributions to Shining Path Thought =====&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen how Guzmán Reinoso presents Shining Path Thought as a set of Marxist ideas strung together schematically but without dialectical meaning, transposed and grouped into a body that, through systematic repetition of propaganda, has become &amp;quot;scientific truth.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One does not require an in-depth study to discover that Senderista thought is nothing more than a skillful mixture of ideas and concepts taken from the Peruvian and universal Marxist experience and literature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Furthermore, it is possible to identify influences of Trotskyism in its pro-Chinese version from the years 1964-65 in the ideology of the Shining Path, as we will see next.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s important to note that the process of reconstitution of the party, referred to as the “shining path to establish a peasant-based party”, is not a new concept within the Shining Path movement. Earlier, elements from various leftist currents in Peru had practiced it. In the years mentioned above, the Trotskyist movement went through a series of divisions or splinter groups. A faction led by police agents Felix Zevallos Quezada, Alfredo Chavez Ch., and Roman Flores Morell, among others, formed a group called Reagrupamiento Revolucionario (Revolutionary Regrouping) for the reconstitution of the party based on the following principles outlined in their &#039;&#039;Insurrectional Thesis&#039;&#039; (62):&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# That the Revolution originates in the countryside, moving from the periphery to the center, i.e., the urban areas.&lt;br /&gt;
# Emphasis on the guerrilla method as one of the factors of polarization during that time and at a certain level of development of the struggles.&lt;br /&gt;
# Decisive role of urban forces: “organized proletariat, bureaucratic employees, students, and oppressed layers of the petite bourgeoisie...&amp;quot; (Page 4) &amp;quot;...The Agrarian Revolution is the pivot around which the axis of the Peruvian Revolution revolves. We must ensure urban support for the peasant movement&amp;quot; (Page 5) &amp;quot;...the decision for the majority of the vanguard comes down to two concrete forms, two methodologies: promoting an isolated guerrilla focus and dispersing everywhere, or accepting the line of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Worker’s Party, RWP) and RR, which propose the development of work in all rural areas during mobilization, solving technical problems of Militias, Defense Committees, and giving birth to the first formations of the Liberation Army, or guerrilla focus, taking advantage of the already radicalized zone...&amp;quot; (Page 40). &amp;quot;Mao Zedong was in favor of a plan similar to what we, the RR and RWP, propose today in Peru; that is, the systematic preparation of a plan of work that, in its maturity, will coordinate urban and rural actions on all levels: social, political, and military&amp;quot; (Page 44).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear from the social situation in rural Peru that the conclusion arises that these masses of six million indigenous peasants, cornered and oppressed, have no future other than revolution, much like the situation in China during Chiang Kai Shek&#039;s time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This situation led to a debate within the young Communist Party of China in 1926. The General Secretary, Chen Duxiu, did not believe in the possibility of utilizing rural forces, while Zhang Guotao,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Chen Kuo Tao&#039;&#039; in the original text, which we believe to be a typo of Chang Kuo Tao, or Zhang Guotao in pinyin&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; on the left, advocated for unwavering workerism, similar to the Trotskyists in Peru associated with Voz Obrera (Worker’s Voice). However, in 1927, Mao Zedong estimated that if the party were to take the leadership of the peasant masses, it would not take twenty-five years, as happened in China, but in a short period, several hundred million peasants would rise up in various Chinese provinces with such violence, like a tempest, that no force could control them. &amp;quot;That is what we propose for Peru, the integration of RR and RWP, and merging with the peasantry&amp;quot; (Page 48).&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Regarding the difficulties that opportunism would create, this should not lead us to despair or make us believe that we should abandon revolutionary theory and the characterization of each stage and concrete situation. Let&#039;s be clear: armed actions, war, are nothing more than politics pursued by other means. This implies that all actions of weapons in the social sphere are political operations [Page 51].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it comes to organizing these militias and defense committees, it often happens that in almost all provinces, there are districts with a significant population belonging to communities that extend around the district. It&#039;s important to remember that there are mestizos engaged in business and trade with the indigenous population, and they are vacillating and reactionary, so they should not be trusted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s a common practice that the impoverished strata retreat to the suburbs and completely occupy the surrounding areas of these district capitals. This is where our work begins. In general, in places with communities and sharecropping, these villages are divided into neighborhoods, similar to cities. In some areas, it is advisable to establish units by blocks, based on the volume of inhabitants and the degree of concentration of houses in each block. An average of 50 to 100 men and women can be organized per neighborhood. The neighborhood or block militia will give rise to house-to-house militias in towns and districts as long as we eliminate the tiny reactionary elements that exist in these towns and villages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot have a uniform image of the Andean villages and hamlets. We will adapt to the environment, and not force the villages and towns into any preconceived scheme. However, the development of these rural militias urgently requires a solution to the issue of armament. Generally, these militias will be used to defend against white gangs and the police (landlords and armed landowners). We must ensure that these Decurias and Centurias militias are armed and trained with weapons that are readily available to the peasants: shotguns, slingshots, canes, dynamite in small &#039;caches,&#039; machetes... With these weapons and proper training to use them and coordinate them when the time comes, they can deal with any police squad and white gangs. Ideally, we would have crates of brand-new machine guns and shiny rifles, but those are not available, and the enemy has them: we must take them away from him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From these militias, the Defense Committees (Immediate Military Leadership) will be formed. However, these will be the organs that provide the foundation for the future revolutionary national liberation army [Pages 53 and 54].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peru is a mining country, so it&#039;s not difficult to obtain dynamite. Thousands of dynamite cartridges pass through the hands of mine workers every day. Mine workers must deliver as much dynamite, fuses, and detonators as possible to the peasants [Page 55].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I would also like to conclude by affirming that the gunslinger, the daring adventurer, the early guerrilla, and their exploits cannot replace methodical work, the creation and development of a political leadership and a political party. Nor can they replace the direction and development of a peasant and working-class student vanguard through the creation of associations. It also cannot replace the central task of today: the advanced fusion of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard with the peasantry&amp;quot; [Page 60].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
...Do not despair; the social and economic bases that generate the Peruvian Revolution are there. Marxists maintain that in semi-colonial and dependent countries, the development of productive forces is merely vegetative, and precapitalist and feudal forms fundamentally reject any planning for consumption... [Page 61].&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;...factors that nourish and strengthen social rebellion in Peru and Latin America: malnutrition. These are facts that leave no room for doubt and come from Dr. Abraham Horowitz, Director of the World Health Organization... Horowitz, the same figure from the Camelot Project.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Another characteristic of these last three revolutionary stages is that the fundamental driving force is the peasant masses, while the urban leadership is composed of workers and intellectuals. The path to socialism in the Revolution arises as a result of the connection between the urban Marxist leadership and the peasant masses in the course of armed struggle&amp;quot; (Page 95).&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This refers to the Cuban, Chinese, and Argentine revolutions. Interestingly, the language and semantics of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Regrouping are the same as those used by the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The identity in guerrilla conception is indisputable, as well as in terms of &amp;quot;polarization&amp;quot; accelerated by irrational violence. The Shining Path says: &amp;quot;This is the concrete question of the revolutionary situation currently unfolding here, and it has arisen from two issues: 1) The class struggle in polarization, and 2) The armed struggle that unfolds as guerrilla warfare born from the midst of the country&#039;s class struggle. In May 1980, armed struggle began with two fundamental slogans: armed struggle and a government of workers and peasants. Since then, our action has developed as guerrilla warfare, and today, according to the Central Committee&#039;s decision in January 1981, we are in the development of guerrilla warfare&amp;quot; (63).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Likewise, there is no difference between the Trotskyist current of 1965 and contemporary Senderismo regarding taking Mao Zedong Thought as a guiding principle and viewing the reality of China in 1927 as if it were similar to Peru in the 1980s. Nor is there a difference in terms of forming the bases of support for the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The emergence and development of guerrilla zones, the importance of which lies in the fact that they are the arenas in which, through the growing strength and armed tide of guerrilla warfare, we will build our future support bases, the advanced and reestablished bastions by the military thought of Chairman Mao Zedong,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The military thought is the [[Protracted People’s War]].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; bases that are the essence of the path to encircle the cities from the countryside, the very essence of People&#039;s War&amp;quot; (64).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in all this literature, common to Trotskyists and the Shining Path, there is something very important that must be highlighted and taken into account because it pertains to the military thinking that guides the actions of the latter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The document of the Revolutionary Regrouping, on page 51, proposes to follow as a major principle a classic rule by Carl von Clausewitz: &amp;quot;War is the continuation of politics by other means”.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In turn, Abimael Guzmán, in the Report of the First Plenary Session in December 1982, presents a document titled &#039;&#039;The Party&#039;s Military Thought and Armed Struggle: 1979-1982&#039;&#039;, and its section on &amp;quot;Some Issues&amp;quot; discusses: &amp;quot;We conceive of revolutionary war as a unity waged in both the countryside and the city... Taking into account concrete conditions and the political situation. We cannot wage a revolutionary war without considering this because war is the continuation of politics by other means&amp;quot; (65).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are Trotskyists and Shining Path members in agreement on the fundamental principle of war, according to Clausewitz: Leninists, Maoists? This is starting to be doubtful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This political conception of war by the great Prussian author, as outlined in his treatise &#039;&#039;On War&#039;&#039;, is what has governed and continues to govern bourgeois military thought. It is a basic rule of all military schools in the Western world, that is, of conventional capitalist warfare, not revolutionary war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin — who read, admired, and used Clausewitz&#039;s military teachings — reversed its fundamental principle. We have already seen at the beginning of this book how Lenin discovered that to make war permanent and revolutionary, it must have a different nature than that proposed by Clausewitz. In other words, for Leninists, Marxists, strategists, and militants of revolutionary war, politics is the continuation of war by other means, contrary to what Abimael Guzmán and the Trotskyists propose. Revolutionary war is the antithesis of conventional bourgeois warfare. And the principle that &amp;quot;war is politics carried out by other means&amp;quot; is also a basic rule of counterinsurgency warfare. The difference between one type of war and the other is their nature and the politics of war, which is distinct from political warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the basic conception of the nature of war that guides the Shining Path is different from the revolutionary one, it may very well be the opposite, reactionary. It is undoubtedly using all the Marxist trappings to conceal its true essence as a major low-intensity operation prepared by the intelligence services of the system to destroy the Peruvian nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin points out how Marxists have considered Clausewitz&#039;s principle as fundamental for analyzing the nature of war, given its certainty: &amp;quot;It is enough to consider that the present war is the continuation of the politics of &#039;great powers&#039; and of the fundamental classes within these &#039;great powers&#039;...&amp;quot; (66).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle is valid, especially for determining the nature of capitalist war, and it was used by Marx and Engels. Ultimately, it reveals that it is capitalist politics that prevails in the end and development of war. The development, analysis, and use of Clausewitz&#039;s principle by Lenin lead him to surpass its conception when he says: &amp;quot;Every war is inextricably linked to the political regime from which it emerges. The same politics that a power, a particular class within that power, pursued over a long period before the war, is continued by that same class in a fatal and inevitable manner during the war, with only the form of action varying&amp;quot; (67).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the class politics that conditions the nature of war. Implicitly, Lenin clarifies and gives the true dimension to Clausewitz&#039;s rule, which serves to prioritize politics as the continuation of war in the Leninist conception of Revolutionary War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this day and age, we cannot simply repeat Clausewitz&#039;s principle about the nature and politics of capitalist war. While its axiom remains valid, it has been surpassed in the conception of revolutionary war, the class war. It has been enriched by reversing the ear and politics factors: politics is the determinant of war and defines its nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Can war be explained without relating it to the prior politics of this or that state, of this or that system of states, of these or those classes?&amp;quot; Lenin asserts and continues by stating: &amp;quot;This is the cardinal question that is always forgotten... if you have not demonstrated the “connection of this war with the prior politics, you have understood nothing of this war&amp;quot; (68). We ask: What is the prior politics to the war of the Shining Path? What is the politics of the State, the system of States, the class or classes that translate into the &amp;quot;revolutionary war&amp;quot; of the Shining Path?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The destruction of Peru&#039;s productive forces, the Quechua peasant class, the isolation of the working class, the political destruction of the Peruvian nation-state are not the politics of a national liberation war, of exploited classes, or of mass insurrection. On the contrary, they are the politics of terrorist warfare; the politics of imperialist warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Something else that cannot go unnoticed is the conception of the chosen peasant social base to promote the &amp;quot;revolution.&amp;quot; From the description of how operations are conducted in the countryside to form support bases and manage contradictions, we can establish the identity of Shining Path Thought with the social theories that William P. Mangin presented at Wingspread, Wisconsin, USA, between 1969 and 1970. Similarly, it aligns with the scientific authors of the CIA, such as Dr. Abraham Korowitz, to underpin their insurrectional theses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, they share the characterization of Peruvian society as feudal and semi-colonial and the bourgeois democratic course of the national revolution, carried out by a conglomerate of four social classes, including the national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the peasantry, all under working-class leadership. The identical framework can be found in two tiny dissident groups, one from Trotskyism and the other from Moscow-style communism, both of which also emerged from the social mobilization of the 1960s but fought against it as &amp;quot;revisionists&amp;quot; or Focoists, positioning themselves as a more extreme and radical alternative, claiming to possess the sole truth of the revolutionary path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary, in the structure of Shining Path Thought, we find that:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# It originates from an intellectual minority, professionalized and technified, philosophically influenced by Kant and foreign ideas, frustrated by its lack of growth as national bourgeois intelligence, and without prospects.&lt;br /&gt;
# It seeks to develop within the Quechua peasant social base with a distinct culture, significant demographic growth, and a massive displacement as an unskilled labor force, which, due to the lack of employment opportunities, ends up creating its own labor market within the framework of a chaotic urbanization process.&lt;br /&gt;
# It exploits the internal class contradictions of the Andean peasant population, thanks to the knowledge acquired from counterinsurgency studies conducted by anthropologists and sociologists from foreign intelligence services, especially American, British, French, and Israeli.&lt;br /&gt;
# Its most immediate precursor doctrine is pro-Chinese Trotskyism, which was encouraged in the 1960s by national and foreign police agents and intelligence services.&lt;br /&gt;
# It adopts the theses of Revolutionary Violence verbatim from Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
# It draws from the thought of José Carlos Mariátegui the characterization of Peruvian society in the 1920s, the indigenous-land issue, and Mariátegui&#039;s sympathies for George Sorel and his theories on violence.&lt;br /&gt;
# From Mao Zedong, it borrows the key theses of peasant armed struggle, the theory of protracted warfare, and the construction of Support Bases to &amp;quot;encircle the city.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This collection of elements, mechanically taken from the national reality of Peru and universal Marxist thought, forms the ideological structure of the experimental &amp;quot;Senderista&amp;quot; politics, which, as we will see, is implemented through an irregular, insurgent, unconventional military apparatus that conducts a war with the following forms of combat:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Two-Line Struggle&lt;br /&gt;
* Sabotage&lt;br /&gt;
* Guerrilla warfare&lt;br /&gt;
* Annihilation&lt;br /&gt;
* Psychological warfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Marxism-Leninism and Maoism in Shining Path thought ====&lt;br /&gt;
For the Shining Path, this ideology which they call the &amp;quot;guiding thought,&amp;quot; is the only true and valid interpretation of Marxism that exists in the world. It is a Marxism different from all others, as a philosophy, a method of research, or a political orientation governing societies with communist regimes. It is &amp;quot;Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo Thought.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the system&#039;s Senderologists, sociologists, and anthropologists funded by American foundations or social research centers in Paris, London, or Tel Aviv, it&#039;s all the same; each interprets it in their own way as a militant form of communism. However, they don&#039;t see it as dangerous or ghostly for the right. In Peru, in the final months of 1987, the forces of the Shining Path led by Abimael Guzmán in the Andean highlands mobilized simultaneously with hundreds of young people from the urban upper classes, incited by the financial oligarchy and led by the &amp;quot;Parisian&amp;quot; writer Mario Vargas Llosa, a member of the global capitalist Pen Club. They aimed to undermine the current Peruvian democratic system, which was in the hands of a weakened and rhetorically anti-imperialist social democracy, fearful of both Vargas Llosa&#039;s &amp;quot;Senderismo&amp;quot; and Abimael Guzmán&#039;s movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other Peruvian social scientists with greater seriousness have tried to view the development of Shining Path Thought as an extreme and distorted form of Marxist thought. In some cases, they have looked for explanations in Andean messianism, within the magical-religious culture of shamans and witches in historically less developed and geographically more isolated communities or in the ancestral communal customs that have been preserved in the Quechua-Aymara civilizations of South America. However, there is nothing of this sort, at least not consciously. Such interpretations are more likely to incite hatred and contempt in Shining Path writings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, some argue that the invocation of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideas by the Shining Path is, in any case, an adherence to a Marxist ideology, albeit extreme, distorted and irrational, but still within the framework of Marxist-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this case, it would be necessary to prove that the Shining Path is not truly Marxist and merely uses Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is in this field that the debate about the validity of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideas in Shining Path thought should likely be concentrated. It should also investigate the possible objective of the Shining Path in discrediting Marxism as an ideology, a political theory, a method of social research or political praxis. Using Marxist ideas as the main guiding principles of a military irregular apparatus dedicated to the destruction of a potentially subversive society, such as the Quechua, the Peruvian, or the Latin American society; to annihilating nationalist states; and to the &amp;quot;Salvadorization&amp;quot; of large territorial areas in the Latin American continent to guarantee the recycling of the capitalist system in the region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If that were the case, it would need to be demonstrated that the Shining Path is not Marxist and that it merely exploits Marxism. In this case, the Shining Path cannot and should not be approached as a communist position or one that is ideologically Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, or Mariáteguist. It should be seen as a conspiracy of thought, whose political praxis is terrorism. The goal is to discover the elements that make up the systematization of violence in Peru, which is causing its social disintegration and destruction as a nation. For this, honesty in scientific research must prevail, along with rationality in reasoning in order to find the true identity of the enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Regarding Marxism-Leninism-Maoism =====&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path states, &amp;quot;We assume the position of the international proletariat, its status as the last class in history, with its own distinct and antagonistic class interests compared to other classes and with a goal that only the proletariat, leading the world&#039;s peoples, can achieve: communism, the unique and irreplaceable new society, without exploiters or exploited, oppressors or oppressed, classes, state, parties, democracy, weapons, wars... According to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism applied to the specific conditions of Peruvian society, revolutionary violence, or violent revolution, the only way to seize power and transform the world, takes the form of a people&#039;s war, specifically, a peasant war led by the Communist Party of Peru on behalf of the proletariat...&amp;quot;(69) All of the Shining Path’s documents are filled with these generalities. They do not present a coherent exposition of Marxist thought. In the case of a political movement that also calls itself a party, merely adopting or adhering to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is not enough. While such an attitude may be acceptable at an individual level, personally adopting or adhering to any doctrine, it is not the same when it comes to a party organization. A party presupposes the need for a theoretical elaboration of the social reality that is the subject of its political praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of the Shining Path, there is no Marxist theory, and as it has been said, &amp;quot;...the lack of theory negates the right to exist for the revolutionary tendency and inevitably condemns it to political bankruptcy.&amp;quot; (70) The absence of a theory by the Shining Path regarding the national reality of Peru or Latin America contributes to explaining why its conduct differs from what it claims to be as the representative of the proletariat as the ruling class and, ultimately, reduces itself to violent terrorism, a practice condemned and rejected by Leninism: &amp;quot;To exhort terrorism, to encourage individuals and groups who do not know each other to organize attacks against ministers at times when the revolutionaries lack the forces and means necessary to lead the masses who are already rising, not only interrupts work among the masses but also directly disorganizes it.&amp;quot; (71) Lenin, who did not in the least deny &amp;quot;violence and terrorism,&amp;quot; insisted that they should &amp;quot;foresee and ensure the direct participation of the masses.&amp;quot; In other words, he proposed a class violence conception and did not reconcile with the type of terrorism practiced by the Shining Path. &amp;quot;The revolutionary socialists do not naively realize that their inclination toward terrorism is closely linked to the fact that from the very beginning, and still today, they are outside the workers&#039; movement, without even trying to become the party of a revolutionary class that is waging its class struggle.&amp;quot; (72)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There isn&#039;t much to discuss about Marxism with the Shining Path. From their documents, the Conclusions of the Fifth National Conference (where Peruvian society was characterized as &amp;quot;semi-feudal and semi-colonial, dependent on imperialism&amp;quot;) are what could explain the inclusion of the thoughts of José Carlos Mariátegui and Mao Zedong. Similarly, their ideas about Peruvian society and Maoist Protracted People&#039;s War, transposed into Shining Path literature, have already been seriously analyzed by Manuel Jesús Granados Aponte in his thesis &#039;&#039;La Conducta Política: un caso particular, sobre Sendero Luminoso&#039;&#039; (Political Behavior: A Particular Case on the Shining Path).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s a shame that Granados hasn&#039;t been able to widely disseminate his thesis written and defended in 1981. However, it is also condemnable that the Senderologists have used it partially, only disseminating adjectival aspects due to their interest in promoting the Shining Path in their news reports and comments. In every circumstance, they have tried to diminish the importance of Granados Aponte&#039;s work. Over time, from 1981 to the present, his work has become more valuable, not only for its logical and theoretical validity but also because it contributes to the discovery and unraveling of the ideological disguise of the Shining Path and, furthermore, of the supposed Senderologists and exegeses on the payroll of foreign intelligence entities. These individuals are nothing more than those who hide the true characteristics of the organization of violent irregulars that emerged in Peru in the shadow of reactionary currents opposed to any change or transformation of outdated social structures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Characterization of Peruvian society =====&lt;br /&gt;
The characterization of Peruvian society as semi-feudal and semi-colonial is what defines the general line of action of the Shining Path. It is considered to integrate the thoughts of Mariátegui and Mao Zedong. Both made this characterization a long time ago, with the latter naturally referring to China and emphasizing the fundamental role of the peasantry as the most important mobilizable popular force in such a society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let&#039;s allow Granados to counter the Shining Path’s thesis: &amp;quot;...characterizing a society is a central and basic point for any political organization, especially if it claims to lead the popular masses. Taking the characterization of Peruvian society as semi-feudal and semi-colonial made by the Shining Path, we notice that the central points for such characterization are: a) The predominance of the agrarian sector in the Peruvian economy... b) The persistence of serfdom, which Mariátegui pointed out as something fundamental in the subsistence of feudalism... c) The &amp;quot;modern&amp;quot; economy (industry and commerce) has a smaller weight than the rural economy...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;We have noticed,&amp;quot; Granados continues, &amp;quot;that &#039;the Shining Path&#039; maintains the semi-feudal category based mainly on Mao Tse Tung&#039;s studies and his analysis of the reality in China in the 1930s. They relate it to Mariátegui&#039;s ideas about the economic reality of the 1920s. Based on this, they argue that the Peruvian reality has not changed qualitatively (through a revolution, as they put it), and therefore, the quantitative changes that have occurred until the 1970s are not decisive. This denies a fundamental thesis of Mao...Mao tells us that in every quantitative change, there is a small part of qualitative change...In the 50 years since Mao&#039;s and Mariátegui&#039;s analyses, undoubtedly new forms of relationships within the Peruvian economy have emerged, requiring a new and accurate characterization of Peruvian society&amp;quot; (73).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To further refute the Shining Path&#039;s characterization, Granados quotes Mariátegui when he states: &amp;quot;Feudalism or semi-feudalism survives in the structure of our agrarian economy...The same would not happen if industry, commerce, and the city were stronger than agriculture.&amp;quot; In order to demonstrate that from the 1920s and 1930s to the present day, there have been qualitative changes in Peruvian society, he uses the analyses of Carlos Tapia published in his pamphlet &#039;&#039;La Economía Peruana ¿sigue siendo semifeudal?&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;Is the Peruvian Economy Still Semi-Feudal?&#039;&#039;) (Ayacucho, 1979), in which the following variables are established:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Urban-rural population ratio:&#039;&#039;&#039; The urban population has grown more rapidly than the rural population over the last 30 years. By 1972, 60% of the total population resided in urban areas.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Agricultural population and its real importance in the total population of the country:&#039;&#039;&#039; &amp;quot;Regardless of the source of statistical information, the agricultural labor force currently represents no more than 2/5 of the total labor force in the country. It approximately represents half of what it represented in Mariátegui&#039;s time.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;Agricultural production and its real importance in the country&#039;s production:&#039;&#039;&#039; Based on GDP; in the last 25 years from 1950 to the present, the importance of GDP as the volume of agricultural production has decreased by approximately half. This is in contrast to a considerable increase in GDP in the industrial sector, especially manufacturing.&lt;br /&gt;
# &#039;&#039;&#039;The nature of Agrarian Reform:&#039;&#039;&#039; By the end of 1977, approximately 11,590 landowners with a total of 7,400,000 hectares had been expropriated out of a total of 15,000 landowners in the country in 1972. Undoubtedly, this did not benefit the landowning sector of Peruvian society. The new forms of associative ownership that have emerged in the countryside prioritize wage labor over pre-capitalist relations of production. Latifundia have been transformed into &amp;quot;associative enterprises.&amp;quot; Based on the analysis of the categories used, Carlos Tapia concludes that the country&#039;s economy is no longer primarily agricultural and that, therefore, the semi-feudal character it maintained during a certain historical period has evolved into new forms where capitalist predominance defines the overall character of the Peruvian economy. This new situation is more notable when considering that by 1987, the benchmark figures had evolved significantly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Getting an accurate characterization of Peruvian society is a fundamental issue because it will determine the character of the revolution. Being wrong in the characterization also means being wrong in the rest of the political theses&amp;quot; (74).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But does the Shining Path also err in the characterization of the Protracted People&#039;s War taken from Maoism? Is it possible that the strategists and analysts of the Shining Path, the formulators of their theories, can be so mistaken in their conceptions?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The leadership of the Shining Path does not allow for errors in conception and principles that would presuppose a lack of historical knowledge and ignorance, which would be inconceivable at that level. We would then be faced with an intentional distortion of reality&#039;s data or its interpretation and a theoretical-political jumble created to justify the Shining Path&#039;s violence as if it were revolutionary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, Guzmán Reinoso and the Shining Path transplanted not only the semi-feudal reality of China in the 1930s to Peru but also Mao&#039;s scheme of Revolutionary Warfare, albeit in a partial and confusing form. Mao&#039;s three stages of war — guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare, and positional warfare — are transposed as a general strategy of defensive warfare, strategic equilibrium warfare, and offensive strategic warfare. What is strange and significant from the perspective of counterinsurgency warfare is that these assessments are used to measure the stages of revolutionary warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The military thought of the Shining Path states that &amp;quot;the military line consists of the laws that govern people&#039;s war for the conquest of power and its defense. It consists of three elements: 1) People&#039;s War, which in our case is specified as a unitary people&#039;s war, with the countryside as the principal theater and the city as complementary; 2) Construction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, which in our case is specified as the People&#039;s Guerrilla Army, with the particularity of incorporating the militia to advance towards arming the masses, and: 3) Tactical Strategy, which is manifested through campaigns of encirclement and annihilation and counter-campaigns of encirclement and annihilation, which in our case are specified by applying political and military plans that have specific political and military strategies embodied in campaigns with specific content&amp;quot; (75).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this military approach appears to be operationally concrete, it does not inherently align with a political strategy for taking power according to Maoist principles. The Shining Path attempts to give political meaning to its concrete military approach with the following explanation:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;President Mao established the path of encircling the cities from the countryside, with the heart of it being the Bases of Support. This took into account that powerful imperialists and their reactionary Chinese allies were entrenched in the main cities. If the revolution refused to capitulate and wanted to persevere in the fight, it had to turn the backward rural areas into great military, political, economic, and cultural bastions of the revolution, from where to fight against the fierce enemy attacking rural areas by using the cities and gradually lead the revolution to complete victory through a prolonged war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Based on this Maoist thesis, President Gonzalo has established the pursuit of a unitary people&#039;s war, where the countryside is the principal theater of armed actions because we have an immense majority of peasant masses, and that&#039;s where the Bases of Support must be established. As President Mao said, &#039;The prolonged revolutionary struggle maintained in such revolutionary bases is fundamentally a guerrilla war of peasants led by the Communist Party of China. Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the need to use rural areas as revolutionary bases of support, neglect the arduous work with peasants, and disregard guerrilla warfare.&#039; Additionally, President Gonzalo specifies that actions should also be carried out in the cities as complementary, as demonstrated by international experience, including ours. The lessons learned from what happened to the guerrilla in the Philippines, which retreated to the countryside and left the cities alone, especially the capital, causing the isolation of the guerrillas... Also, considering the peculiarities of cities in Latin America, where the percentage of the proletariat and poor masses is high, the masses are ready to develop complementary actions to those in the countryside. However, in cities, the new Power is not built, which would be a Base of Support, but rather a Front manifested in the People&#039;s Defense Revolutionary Movement with Centers of Resistance that wage people&#039;s war and prepare for the future insurrection that will occur when the rural forces assault the cities in combination with the uprising from within (76).&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;In this lengthy passage from the Shining Path, it can be observed how they manipulate Mao&#039;s thesis of &amp;quot;encircling the cities.&amp;quot; The final contribution of Guzmán&#039;s thinking may appear to be the impassioned discourse of an enlightened strategist who can strategically and mechanically utilize urban mass organizations for warfare and an apocalyptic national uprising. However, it is not so, and Guzmán&#039;s thought, as explained in this manner, seems to be a calculated intention to involve urban popular grassroots organizations in terrorist actions of dirty warfare. This would first expose them to government repression and then lead to their destruction. Marxists, by doctrine, know that this is not the insurrectional methodology of Leninism, let alone a Maoist orientation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let&#039;s read what Mao Zedong says on this matter:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The central task and the highest form of any revolution is the seizure of power through armed struggle, in other words, solving the problem through war. This revolutionary Marxist-Leninist principle has universal validity, both in China and in other countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, adhering to the same principle, the party of the proletariat applies it differently according to different conditions. In capitalist countries, when they are not fascist and not at war, the conditions are as follows: internally, there is no feudal system, but rather bourgeois democracy; externally, these countries do not suffer from national oppression, but they themselves oppress other nations. Due to these characteristics, the area of the proletarian party in capitalist countries consists of educating workers, accumulating strength through a long period of legal struggle, and preparing for the final overthrow of capitalism. There, the issue is to sustain a long legal struggle, use Parliament as a platform, resort to political and economic strikes, organize unions, and educate the workers. The forms of organization are legal, and the forms of struggle are non-violent (non-military). Regarding the issue of war, the Communist Parties in capitalist countries oppose imperialist wars... The war they intend to wage is nothing other than the civil war for which they are preparing. But as long as the bourgeoisie is not truly rendered powerless, as long as the majority of the proletariat is not determined to take up armed uprising and civil war, and as long as the peasant masses are not willing to voluntarily assist the proletariat, such an uprising and war should not be carried out. Furthermore, when the time comes to initiate such actions, the first step will be to occupy the cities and then advance into the countryside, not the other way around. All of this is how the Communist Parties have acted in capitalist countries, and the October Revolution in Russia has confirmed its correctness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In China, the situation is different. The peculiarity of China is that it is not an independent and democratic country but semi-colonial and semi-feudal, where there is no democracy but rather feudal oppression, and in its external relations, it does not enjoy national independence but suffers from imperialist oppression. Therefore, we do not have a parliament to use, nor a legal right to organize workers for strikes. Here, the fundamental task of the Communist Party is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before embarking on an uprising and war, or to first take control of the cities and then occupy the countryside, but the opposite... In China, the main form of struggle is war, and the primary form of organization is the army. All other forms, such as popular mass organizations and struggles, are also important and absolutely indispensable and should by no means be neglected, but their objective is to serve the war (77).&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The inconsistency of Shining Path Thought ====&lt;br /&gt;
Neither Marxism-Leninism nor Maoism form a revolutionary theory that the Shining Path can legitimately claim as its own, not even from the thinking of Mariátegui. In Marxist-Leninist thought, the concept of class violence allows for various levels of confrontation between the main social classes (bourgeoisie-proletariat) or a class alliance to oppose imperialist domination. Depending on the balance of power at a given historical moment, revolutionary violence can take different forms, up to armed insurgency, led by a class and involving the direct participation of the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, terrorism and sabotage are not part of this class violence in Marxism-Leninism. If they have occurred in the history of revolutionary movements, they have been secondary and usually aimed against foreign invaders. Systematic destruction of means of production is also not conceivable within Marxist thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The violence that the Shining Path claims to derive from Marxism-Leninism is primarily directed towards the Peruvian peasantry, a historically subjugated class. This class is experiencing rapid changes and is rich in new social contradictions. According to classifications by sociologists and anthropologists from the CIA and other foreign intelligence services, the peasantry is a social base that the Shining Path considers useful for their so-called revolutionary violence. They aim to destroy the social and economic relations of the peasant class, applying selective terrorism and assassinating local leaders and authorities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unlike other groups like Jewish Zionists or Shia fanatics, the Shining Path doesn&#039;t focus its terrorism on big cities. The reason for this is never provided by its adherents. Their talk of belonging to a global revolution is more of a motivating phrase for naive militants. It is a calculated theoretical deception by those who are not interested in destroying imperialism but rather aim to undermine indigenous communities and the Peruvian military, as well as any government whose policies don&#039;t align with their plans for domination in the Andean countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The characterization of Peruvian society is neither accurate nor is the application of Maoism to Peruvian reality precise. This is a crude distortion of Mao&#039;s ideas, which becomes evident through a straightforward reading of his writings and a proper understanding of the Chinese revolutionary experience. It also doesn&#039;t require much debate to prove that the Peruvian society analyzed by Mariátegui in the late 1920s is not the same as Peru in 1988. Although still underdeveloped and economically and technologically dependent, Peru is no longer semi-feudal due to ongoing changes in rural economic relationships and land reform.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What the Shining Path presents as Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, or Gonzalo Thought, is not a scientific social, economic, and political theory. It&#039;s a complicated patchwork of Marxist texts designed to make readers believe they are embracing Marxism and to convince its opponents that they are preventing the triumph of Marxism and defeating &amp;quot;communist terrorists.&amp;quot; This political ubiquity is achieved by Gonzalo Thought isolating itself as a &amp;quot;new universal conception&amp;quot; of social science theory, thereby rejecting all left, right, and center political tendencies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Manuel Jesús Granados Aponte was the first to uncover the flawed thinking within the Shining Path. In his thesis, &#039;&#039;Political Behavior: A Specific Case&#039;&#039;, he discussed the group&#039;s dogmatic nature. Granados identifies several key points:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The Shining Path produces articles and pamphlets that are long-winded and devoid of substantive content relevant to the Peruvian context. These articles reflect minimal research efforts on the part of the Shining Path to genuinely interpret Peruvian circumstances. Any research that does exist is predominantly focused on the area of Huamanga within the academic sector.&lt;br /&gt;
# Furthermore, it portrays itself in all its documents and leaflets as the holders of the &amp;quot;Correct Line,&amp;quot; a stance that fosters a sense of self-importance. They consider themselves superior and, as a result, use virulent language intended to intimidate other political groups, particularly those on the left, but also against indigenous peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
# They repetitively use so-called revolutionary concepts and terms. Though orderly presented, these terms reveal their inability to develop these ideas further. The language they employ remains largely disconnected from the material conditions and the lived experience of the Peruvian populace.&lt;br /&gt;
# They link the ideological frameworks of Mao Zedong and José Carlos Mariátegui; while both may apply Marxism-Leninism to their respective countries, the Shining Path makes this connection through a chaotic and parallel arrangement of writings. They ignore the need to consider the context and specific circumstances of the original texts.(78)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Granados bravely and honestly states what few or none in Peru do: that the Shining Path lacks a Marxist-Leninist theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Granados&#039; research on the political behavior of the Shining Path is limited and doesn&#039;t fully explain its causes. However, he suggests some when he observes its effects: &amp;quot;Spreading their political agenda only brings disaster to the people; these are the results of paranoia. It has reached a demented state&amp;quot; (79). These grim statements about the Shining Path&#039;s political actions don&#039;t fit into an analysis focused on revolutionary theory and behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instead, they make sense when considering paranoid and disastrous social behaviors rooted in ideological deviations. These are scientifically programmed to result in negative and self-destructive behaviors. All of this is achievable in the Psychological Warfare of Low-Intensity Operations conducted against potentially subversive countries by intelligence services involved in counterinsurgent Political Warfare doctrine. This includes American, British, French, Israeli, Taiwanese, South African intelligence services, and others who are their dependents, operating in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 3.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Chapter 2: the Shining Path as an apparatus of irregular warfare ===&lt;br /&gt;
In September 1987, two political organizations of the Peruvian Marxist left decided to unite: the Democratic Popular Union (DPU, Unión Democrático Popular) led by Cecilia Oviedo and &amp;quot;People on the Move&amp;quot; (Pueblo en Marcha) led by Walter Palacios Vinces. Both organizations are not affiliated with the &amp;quot;United Left&amp;quot; (Izquerdia Unida), a Marxist electoral front. They are likely the most ideologically radical and have come closest to grassroots popular organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For some time, they have proposed and promoted the centralization of these into a National Popular Assembly. After stubborn resistance, other leftist groups had to support this effort in hopes of controlling and politically benefiting from it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the joint congress of the PDU and People on the Move, a single organization emerged, the &amp;quot;Popular Democratic Union&amp;quot; (Unión Democrática Popular). It is the only leftist group in Peru that has distanced itself from the Shining Path, clarifying its dual nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The rest of the Peruvian left rejects the Shining Path, as its violence disrupts the social democratic atmosphere they enjoy. However, they prefer to criticize the military fighting the Shining Path with vague slogans like &amp;quot;no to dirty war&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;no to the militarization of the country,&amp;quot; without explaining their meaning or relevance to the reactionary war carried out by the Shining Path in the Peruvian Andes, which has resulted in over 10,000 Indigenous and mestizo deaths from 1980 to October 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The DPU, in its official unification congress statement, acknowledges the peasant mobilization achieved by the Shining Path but disagrees with its military structure. Their analysis of the Shining Path led them to distinguish between a political mechanism for peasant mobilization and a military apparatus of destruction. The DPU&#039;s skepticism also confirms the lack of coherence in the Shining Path between its claimed political objectives and its militant actions against the Peruvian nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This statement is significant because it exposes the essentially military nature of the Shining Path organization. It&#039;s worth noting that the Shining Path doesn&#039;t deny this; on the contrary, it proudly emphasized its military nature. Only its supposed scholars and other supporters argue that it is a Maoist communist political party with ideology and party organization. Some even propose dialogue to understand its combat operations. Such views may be well-intentioned but ultimately seem to be the result of uncritical acceptance of Shining Path propaganda.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that the Shining Path doesn&#039;t have a revolutionary theory and uses communist texts to make incorrect descriptions of Peru&#039;s national reality doesn&#039;t mean it&#039;s not a political phenomenon. It is, but in the sense that it is a group applying an irregular warfare model. It represents a Peruvian variant of modern counterinsurgency theories and is a military organization with goals, strategies, and tactics aimed more at achieving short-term objectives rather than long-term ones.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== The guerrilla model ====&lt;br /&gt;
To better understand the nature of the Shining Path, we&#039;ve had to consider the broader context of global confrontation, within which Peru&#039;s interests, as well as those of Andean and Latin American countries, are at play. It&#039;s also useful to delve into the operational models stemming from existing confrontation doctrines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An explanatory approach to the Shining Path phenomenon can benefit from Richard Dyson&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Guerrilla Game&#039;&#039;, as discussed in Issue 4 of &#039;&#039;The Yale Literary Magazine&#039;&#039;. Dyson, focused on studying the models of insurgency and counterinsurgency, states: &amp;quot;As much as we&#039;d like to, Americans can no longer ignore the unpleasant fact that large parts of the globe have been absorbed by the Soviet empire in recent years. What&#039;s even more unsettling is the evidence that this process is gaining momentum, that significant territorial gains by the Soviets are yet to come, and that if this process isn&#039;t halted, the remaining islands and peninsulas of Western civilization will ultimately become indefensible.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He continues: &amp;quot;This process of imperial expansion has unfolded with methodical regularity, a dark, repetitive set of Soviet moves and American responses that has all the characteristics of psychological games described by Eric Berne in &#039;Games People Play.&#039; Upon closer examination, we can begin to see it for what it is: a game with a predetermined outcome, engineered by the Soviets and replayed over and over. It&#039;s the Guerrilla Game. Our civilization&#039;s survival depends on our ability to recognize and stop it.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dyson emphasizes that nations, like individuals, tend to act according to repetitive patterns. Some of these behavioral models are what we call &amp;quot;national character&amp;quot;—like Italians who vote their government out every few months, or the Japanese who strive to dominate global markets. There are also other models of growth and achievement, like the Roman Empire before and during Julius Caesar&#039;s reign, or others of decline and self-destruction, slow like the late Roman Empire or fast like Hitler&#039;s Germany.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Again, much like individuals—and here the analogy is particularly sharp—nations can voluntarily break a repetitive behavioral model only if they can perceive that model and accept the idea that it can be changed, and is not part of an unchangeable order. Often, this leap in perception is accompanied by a significant traumatic event.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the strengths of democracies with freedom of thought is their ability to self-examine, to perceive problems that could become overwhelming, and to arrive at solutions through debate. But this flexibility has a downside: the potential to generate internal conflict when trying to pinpoint the real problem or the best solution. If not constructively resolved, such conflict can lead to repetitive, self-destructive behavior—similar to neurosis in an individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These national conflicts rarely align with Marxist class theory; more often, they appear to be conflicts of values reflecting differences between people from rural or urban areas, individualists or collectivists, and so on. Moreover, these persistent internal conflicts tend to avoid democratic resolution through normal democratic means, the most basic and important of which is voting. Instead, they give rise to endless &#039;yes, but&#039; and &#039;no, but&#039; dialogues, much like those that occur among individuals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nations or individuals suffering from unresolved conflicts are vulnerable to manipulation, and this is where the idea of the game comes in. Not all psychological games involve conscious manipulation, but the most malicious and damaging ones do: the manipulator spots the weakness, sets up the game to exploit it, controls the game, benefits from the rules, and reaps the desired payoff or &#039;retribution.&#039; The manipulator is not outside the game but is as much a part of it as the unsuspecting victim. One of Berne&#039;s most fascinating insights is that the victim, at least in repetitively played games, also receives retribution. In their case, however, the retribution tends to be &#039;unconscious&#039; and doesn’t appear, on the surface, to be a reward. It is, of course, why the victim keeps coming back for more of the same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We currently find ourselves deeply engrossed in such a game... (80)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Dyson illustrates how the application of the game in the conflicts of Korea and Vietnam had different outcomes. Both were peninsular territories, geographically unified but politically divided in halves, with populations of the same race, creed, and customs. In both instances, there were tactical errors made by the powers involved: resorting to open invasion, where the enemies were their own compatriots—North against South and vice versa. In the first case, the presumed victim state was South Korea; in the second, it was North Vietnam. South Korea was able to strengthen its cohesion and survive as a nation separate from North Korea; Vietnam managed to strengthen its national cohesion and survive as a unified nation. The advantages of these situations fell to the powers manipulating the conflict. The Korean conflict became a regular war, while Vietnam&#039;s Guerrilla War escalated to become a large-scale war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let&#039;s let Dyson show us the Rules of the Guerrilla Game:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;As in every game, and especially in psychological games, the players and their roles are carefully assigned. The first two players are the main antagonists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Manipulator... has invented the game, controls the timing of major events, and receives substantial payoff. The Unwitting... cooperates with the Manipulator&#039;s rules, even in the timing, and receives only a &#039;neurotic&#039; payoff. The Victim State is the prize of the game, the Manipulator’s retribution. The Logistic State. One or more. These are the Manipulator’s satellites located nearby and preferably adjacent to the Victim State.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Revolutionary Front. These forces nominally come from the Victim State. They are complemented by fighters and personnel from the Logistic State, but a sufficient number come from the Victim State to maintain the illusion of being a &#039;national front.&#039; Additionally, there are minor players. Perhaps the most notable of these is usually adjacent to the Victim State; the antagonists agree that it will be a bonus payoff when the Manipulator acquires the Victim State. Laos and Cambodia played this role in the Vietnam Game; Honduras might assume it in the current El Salvador Game. Other minor players include the Chorus. They usually speak in unison and thereby reinforce the game&#039;s rules by chastising the Unwitting if he fails to strictly observe them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main players never refer to the game as a &#039;war,&#039; despite the fact that it has all the characteristics of a war, including actual combat with military and civilian casualties. Preferably, the term &#039;war&#039; is avoided by all parties. But where it does appear, players are ready to explain that the &#039;war&#039; is limited to the Victim State and is actually a &#039;civil war.&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In truth, the most important rule of all—which makes the game work for everyone—is that all action, all suffering, and destruction take place on the turf of the Victim State. Whenever the Unwitting and the Victim State try to carry out any activity that interferes in the Logistic States, they are immediately condemned as aggressors by the Chorus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Manipulator opens the game by moving, either directly or through satellites, weapons, supplies, and personnel to the Logistic State and from there to the Revolutionary Front. The Front uses these resources to carry out escalating terrorism and guerrilla warfare against the Victim State and its military and police forces. The Manipulator’s global propaganda machine describes the &#039;front&#039; as &#039;freedom fighters&#039; rebelling against an oppressive tyranny. The Victim State&#039;s efforts to save itself are condemned as violations of &#039;human rights&#039;; the Front is hailed as heroic and humanitarian; and the Unwitting is warned not to intervene.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here the Game takes one of two forms: The Short Game or the Long Game. &amp;quot;If the Unwitting does not help the Victim State, in most cases the Game is Short... If the Unwitting decides to try to help the Victim State, the Game is Long... &amp;quot;During the growth period, the Guerrilla forces within the Victim State lead to the breakdown of civil order, and consequently an increase in violence on both sides. This gives rise to the argument that the Victim State is unworthy of help and lays the foundation for an eventual withdrawal.&amp;quot; (81)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Dyson, the Guerrilla Game is a mechanism of political warfare developed by the USSR, based on experiences from the Korean and Vietnamese wars, and currently being applied in Central America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given this dominant mechanism, which operates with various variants around the globe, the analyst studies the modification of the model and the possibility of its variation. They aim to come up with new rules that would allow the United States to reverse the Game in any area of Latin America where its security, interests, and influence are at stake.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this context, it&#039;s possible that the United States is applying this model in Peru. Various factors like the rising Quechua-origin population, lack of social services, rapid urbanization, limited industrial development, interests of major powers in Peru&#039;s national resources and their projection into the Pacific Ocean basin, Soviet military assistance to the country, ambitions of neighboring countries, growth of drug trafficking, extreme violence from the Shining Path, and the emergence of a well-equipped TARM&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;[[Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement]], called the &#039;&#039;Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru&#039;&#039; in Spanish. A Marxist guerilla outfit in Peru active in the 80s and 90s.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; guerrilla when Shining Path exhausts its projections, all contribute to this hypothesis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a serious working hypothesis, it&#039;s worth identifying the players of the Game:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Manipulating State: United States&lt;br /&gt;
* Unwitting State: Soviet Union (Cuba-Nicaragua)&lt;br /&gt;
* Victim State: Peru&lt;br /&gt;
* Logistic State: Great Britain, China, Israel, Chile, Ecuador&lt;br /&gt;
* Revolutionary Front: Shining Path plus TARM plus Drug Trafficking Groups&lt;br /&gt;
* Additional Prize State: Bolivia, Colombia&lt;br /&gt;
* Chorus States: OAS countries&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The development of the Model is clearly a Long Game, and would be as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulating State (U.S.) moves arms, ammunition, personnel, and provides military assistance to the Logistics State (Ecuador, Chile, China, Great Britain, Israel).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulating State, using the Revolutionary Front (SP + TARM + Drug Trafficking) and terror, aims to change the behavior and national character of the Victim State to claim it as a prize.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Unwitting State (USSR, Cuba, Nicaragua) supports the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Unwitting State (USSR) supplies military equipment and training to the armed forces of the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Unwitting State (USSR) offers to engage its own forces on a limited scale.&lt;br /&gt;
# This situation of intervention by the Unwitting State (USSR, Cuba, Nicaragua) in the Victim State (Peru) is denounced by the Manipulating State (U.S.), warning against an &amp;quot;endless war.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# The Revolutionary Front (SP, TARM, Drug Trafficking) attacks the Victim State internally with guerrilla warfare and terrorism, to change the national character of the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Logistics State (Great Britain, Israel, China, Chile, Ecuador) warns of Soviet danger in the Victim State (Peru), denouncing the presence of military bases, advisers, political and economic interference, and the promotion of armed subversion in the country.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Additional Prize State (Bolivia, Colombia) will either be a prize for the Manipulating State (U.S.) or the Logistics State (Chile) and will also denounce the Victim State (Peru) as a subversive danger on the continent.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Revolutionary Front (SP, TARM, Drug Trafficking) will cause, instigate, and carry out the killing of thousands to millions of inhabitants in the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Unwitting State (USSR, Cuba) enters the escalation with casualties on its side.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulator State (U.S.) through campaigns, forces the withdrawal of advisors from the Unwitting State (USSR) and also cuts off technical and military assistance to the Victim State (Peru).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulator State (U.S.) may intervene in the Victim State (Peru) to pacify the region.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Revolutionary Front (SP, TARM, Drug Trafficking) will eventually sign a peace agreement with the Unwitting State (Peru), or it will disappear, like the Khmer Rouge or the Montoneros.&lt;br /&gt;
# The Chorus State (OAS) will approve all peace-making measures on the Victim State (Peru) and condemn any extracontinental interference from the Unwitting State (USSR).&lt;br /&gt;
# The Manipulator State (U.S.) will capture the Victim State (Peru), converting it into a satellite and a potential Logistics State for a new Game.&lt;br /&gt;
# Everyone will feel gratified, rewarded, and compensated at the end of the violent game in the Victim State: military equipment will have been destroyed, there will be several million fewer indigenous people and unemployed, and the national character will have new traumatic values originating from the historic violence experienced by the Victim State.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This outlook could have other variants if it relates to other Guerrilla Games in the region or if combined with other geopolitical variables and power dynamics of major nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is this imagination? Fiction? Invention? None of that. We must conclude that there are many real facts that don&#039;t allow us to dismiss the existence of these political warfare mechanisms. If one carefully and scientifically compares the game variables with actual events and developments in Peru, it becomes clear they fit the moves of the game. This can&#039;t be considered mere coincidence but rather veiled mechanisms of insurgency and counterinsurgency operating at higher strategic levels. Intelligence here serves to subtly manipulate perceptions and impose will, making the enemy destroy itself in the bloodiest way possible while believing they are being saved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is Peru not in flames? Aren&#039;t Peruvians killing each other? Isn&#039;t Peru caught in a whirlwind of campaigns and counter-campaigns? The Shining Path terrorists wreak havoc and kill; paramilitary forces compete with them; the military employs counter-revolutionary Warfare with their 1945 Manuals; Shining Path propagandists complete their propaganda maneuvers for the first Congress of the Shining Path; in the TARM they disguise themselves as Cubans or Nicaraguans in drug trafficking zones to wage guerrilla warfare; the radicalized right announces the fall of the government in mass chants imported from Pinochet&#039;s Chile. Also, there has been someone who managed to get the entire official Peruvian community to &amp;quot;hold a minute of silence for peace&amp;quot; on a predetermined day and time to soothe the conscience of a lost ruling class amid irregular warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Organization ====&lt;br /&gt;
Like the Angka of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, it&#039;s said that the organization of the Shining Path is invisible but felt; it acts and has grown. However, this is not entirely true; their actions have outlined their shape, providing enough evidence for an increasingly complete understanding of the Shining Path’s organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a paper, James Anderson, an advisor at Control &amp;amp; Risk and a member of the Institute for Terrorism Studies in London, notes: &amp;quot;The growth of the Shining Path becomes more problematic when considering some of its main features: its unique ideology, extreme secrecy, lack of external support or sympathy, sectarianism and xenophobia, extreme cruelty, and its attraction and magnetism as a response to the age-old problem of the peasantry.&amp;quot;(82)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although not necessarily intended by Anderson, in one way or another, the &amp;quot;main features&amp;quot; he attributes to the Shining Path correspond doctrinally to each of the six wars or types of war that comprise Political Warfare:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Ideological War - &amp;quot;Unique Ideology&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Strategic War - &amp;quot;Extreme Secrecy&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Organizational War - &amp;quot;Lack of External Support or Sympathy&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Psychological War - &amp;quot;Sectarianism and Xenophobia&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Intelligence War - &amp;quot;Extreme Cruelty&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# Mass War - &amp;quot;Magnetism as a Response&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Each of the features is part of the texture of the Shining Path and results from its actions in different areas of unconventional warfare. These features are also manifestations of the internal contradictions within its structure and its interaction with the concrete reality. They form the discernible profile of the organization, allowing Anderson to conclude that the Shining Path is &amp;quot;an essentially Peruvian, more precisely Andean, phenomenon.&amp;quot; Its &amp;quot;ideological purity, not to mention its bloodthirsty nature, has placed it at the farthest and most isolated end of the political left. It is almost certain to remain there, completely on the margins of everything else... if it threatens and continues to threaten the existence of the Peruvian State. What it does seriously threaten is the continuation of a genuinely democratic government in Peru... it should be said that if it succeeds in destroying the democratic regime, the Shining Path will only be part of the causes of that destruction.&amp;quot; (83)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path is merely the &amp;quot;tip of the iceberg,&amp;quot; a variable phenomenon between the stability of the State and the destabilization of the government. For Peruvians, it seems to be more. It&#039;s an organization fueling an escalating destruction of their especially Andean, Quechua nationality. Regardless of this last point, we have cited Anderson because he views the Shining Path from an objective angle, different from that of the Senderologists in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path organization stands out as a machine designed to plan and execute irregular warfare operations, and nothing more. All its ideology, strategy, and organic structure are geared toward that. So, it&#039;s important to make some clarifications concerning what others understand as the organization of the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, one cannot simply accept as universally true the Shining Path&#039;s supposed organizational aspirations: A nascent new democratic republic with its support bases, an ongoing class front, and a people&#039;s guerrilla army fighting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, one can&#039;t strictly adhere to the research and conclusions of Senderologists and eulogists of the Shining Path, as doing so could lead to misunderstandings. Many of these social researchers, both from Peru and other countries, have become a sort of mimetic amplifier for the group, acting as imaginative propagandists. Their work has consequently helped shape the Shining Path mythos.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These researchers have outlined a social base, consisting of popular committees and support bases that run along the Peruvian highlands, from the Ecuadorian border in the north to the Bolivian border in the south. They also claim that the Shining Path is completing a significant organizational phase with its First National Congress set for early 1988. This Congress is expected to address five major aspects: 1) The International Line; 2) The Democratic Revolution; 3) Military Thought; 4) Line of Construction of the Three Instruments; and 5) Mass Line. (84)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such views, aimed at promoting the organization both organically and politically for export, should not mislead us. The central leadership does not admit congresses or plenaries; thus, the opinions of the Shining Path apologists should not be taken as authoritative, especially knowing they form part of the group&#039;s psychological dimension aimed at confusing the enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path is focusing its organizational efforts on popular committees, encountering many limitations due to the simultaneous levels within a single committee, which comprises &amp;quot;The organizing committee of the popular committee, the reorganizing committee, the parallel popular committee, the clandestine popular committee, and the open popular committee.&amp;quot; Their primary effort is in creating not the party, but the &amp;quot;People&#039;s Guerrilla Army with its three parts: Main Force, Local Force, Base Force.&amp;quot; (85) These elements, motivated by the myth of &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought,&amp;quot; provide the Shining Path with the operational capacity for irregular combat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
James Anderson, in the section of his work dealing with Structure and Personnel, objectively notes that the Shining Path operates through a closed cell structure. A Shining Path cell usually has between 5 and 9 members and typically does not operate in its native region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Each cell is unaware of the orders given to other cells, and even the identities of other members within their own cell. Only one member of the cell has vertical communication with the leadership. Each cell has a leader (&#039;&#039;responsable político&#039;&#039;), two explosives experts, a physical training instructor, and a political ideologue. Within this cell structure, Shining Path personnel are divided into five distinct roles:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Pre-militants&lt;br /&gt;
# Militants&lt;br /&gt;
# Military Personnel&lt;br /&gt;
# Organizers&lt;br /&gt;
# Leaders&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The activities of pre-militants, militants, and military personnel, operating separately in their respective cells, are coordinated by leaders of sub-zones or sectors. For example, Lima is divided into five sub-zones: north, south, east, west, and central. These are overseen by zonal directors who in turn report to a regional committee. All planning and communications between zones are handled by a Coordination Committee. This committee and the Regional Committees are controlled by the Political Bureau, which sets the group&#039;s norms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like all guerrilla groups, the cells have a dual command structure: military and political. The military is subordinate to the political at all times, except during the execution of an armed action. Operational members are given their weapons and explosives shortly before an action starts, and these are returned afterward at predetermined locations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It&#039;s impossible to determine the exact number of Shining Path members. They blend into society and are recruited from various groups: peasants, workers, miners, students, street vendors, domestic workers, and industrial laborers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The extreme youth of many Shining Path militants, some as young as 14 or 15 in rural areas, represents a significant and concerning future potential. (86)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Application of political warfare ====&lt;br /&gt;
The goal of political operations is to gain public support and destroy the enemy in all social dimensions. The Shining Path generally follows some rules in applying this, such as allocating 30% of effort to military matters and 70% to political issues. On a tactical level, the effort against the enemy should also be 30%, with 70% focused on the rear guard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political warfare is carried out in a unified manner across six divisions: ideology, strategy, organization, intelligence, psychology, and mass mobilization. According to military operations, there&#039;s both a strategic and a tactical use of political warfare in each of these areas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proper application of political warfare aims to mobilize large masses with a few irregular forces and a single direction, strengthened by strong ideological ties. There&#039;s no democratic centralism or traditional party functions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These general and specific conditions of the application of political warfare can be clearly located and identified in the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Ideological warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
In this type of warfare, the aim is to solidify a central ideological system that serves as the &amp;quot;spiritual armament&amp;quot; capable of confronting and destroying the ideologies of the adversary. Shining Path has developed a system based on the Guiding Thought, reached through the mechanisms of the Two-Line Struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Among the forms of struggle that the Shining Path employs, the Two-Line Struggle is the most important, as it is a mechanism for internal ideological control and self-control. It&#039;s the internal struggle within the group to maintain unity and cohesion based on the unquestionable acceptance of the ideological framework.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In July 1971, the Shining Path published a pamphlet titled &#039;&#039;Bases for the History of the Party&#039;&#039;, in which point 3 states the History of the PCP: Two-Line Struggle, Struggle for Constitution, Struggle for Establishing the Base of Party Unity, Struggle for Pre-Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These phases or stages designated for the organization of Shining Path&#039;s irregular warfare apparatus are marked by the main mechanism of execution, the Two-Line Struggle. Everything that Shining Path leaders do at all organizational levels will be governed by this principle. &amp;quot;The experience of armed struggle shows that the struggle between two lines has its points of antagonism, which intensify when trying to take stock, thereby concluding and laying the groundwork for another plan; in this sense, it is understandable that the struggle sharpens... The Two-Line Struggle is nothing but class struggle within the Party; it is like war, but without weapons; it is waged with ideas...&amp;quot; (87). &amp;quot;Agreeably, the Two-Line Struggle is necessary to maintain the unity of the party and develop armed struggle. In general, the main danger is revisionism, although the party continues to simply develop against right-wing criteria, opinions, attitudes, and positions&amp;quot; (88).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Two-Line Struggle is expressed against both rightism and left-wing deviations (revisionism). In Shining Path cell meetings, even the most unintentional slip-up by any participant is interpreted as a right or left deviation and requires immediate correction according to the Guiding Thought. Participants go to the extent of criticism, mutual criticism, and censure for these presumed deviations. The mechanism seeks self-incrimination first, followed by total submission to Shining Path principles. New members not only purify themselves by denouncing supposed mistakes but also naively believe that this activity is part of the class struggle &amp;quot;within the party.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight against rightism is promoted and carried out in peasant, proletarian, and petty-bourgeois social strata, among different subdivisions of the exploited classes. Here, violent confrontation is encouraged between the poorest and the relatively rich. The struggle is not between social classes defined by their relation to the means of production and power, but between sub-groups of the most impoverished strata.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, the internal Two-Line Struggle within the Shining Path apparatus is not directed against expressions of bourgeois or capitalist thoughts, which would be unacceptable, but mainly against all forms of Marxist expression and presence. They condemn the entire international communist movement, attacking it as Soviet, Chinese, or Albanian revisionism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path claims to create ideological contradictions within Marxist currents themselves. They say the Soviets &amp;quot;were the first to start their sinister attack against Marxism-Leninism… they have fought all the developments made by Chairman Mao on Marxism-Leninism...they have turned against revolutionary violence, abandoned class struggle and proposed peaceful revolution.&amp;quot; They hold that &amp;quot;Chinese revisionism has a long history,&amp;quot; arguing that after Chairman Mao&#039;s death, although they have scientifically established Mao Zedong Thought, they haven&#039;t actually developed it but rather revised it, ultimately denying Mao, Marx, and Lenin. They state that there has been an ideological reorganization in China based on revisionism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They also condemn Enver Hoxha of Albania for falsely analyzing Chairman Mao&#039;s thought, claiming it to be &amp;quot;an amalgamation of ideologies, starting from anarchism, Trotskyism, revisionism, Titoism, etc.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path adds, &amp;quot;All these are open forms of revisionism against Maoism. But also, those who, while defending Chairman Mao, assume covert revisionist forms that lead them to go against Maoism; in these people, there are different criteria, divergent ways, questioning of the classics behind the idea that every man can be wrong... we must defend the purity of dialectical development, through its three stages, involving three leaps: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism&amp;quot; (89).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As one can see, the all-encompassing Shining Path sees itself as capable of waging a sectarian and destructive opposition against all Marxist currents from another supposed extreme and pure Marxist position, referred to as &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Guiding Thought,&amp;quot; complementing Marx-Lenin-Mao. This &amp;quot;Guiding Thought,&amp;quot; considered the pinnacle of Marxist ideology, leaves no room for debate. Guzmán says &amp;quot;dialogue is poison.&amp;quot; According to the principle of the Two-Line Struggle, their guiding thought &amp;quot;has no friends, only enemies and adherents.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Two-Line Struggle, as a psychological mechanism for self-incrimination, leads to a form of dogmatic thinking where initiates end up believing that their falsehoods and sophistries are indisputable truths. Thus, Shining Path members acquire a combination of ideological stability, fanatical belief and conviction with the ability to react on impulse rather than reason, to defend their principles and to wage ideological war against other doctrines. This gives them the advantage of essentially being a &amp;quot;Trojan Horse&amp;quot; within the socialist and nationalist currents in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Two-Line Struggle allows the Shining Path to maintain the &amp;quot;purity&amp;quot; of their internal ideology and, more than anything, to preserve their single line of leadership. Among other things, it enabled Guzmán to eliminate &amp;quot;David&amp;quot; in 1980 for opposing the start of the armed struggle; to later restore control of the Metropolitan Committee of Lima by accusing &amp;quot;Pedro&amp;quot; of being a member of the TARM and of right-wing opportunist deviations; and to establish himself as the only true and consistent interpreter of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism at the Fourth National Conference of the Shining Path in July 1986. There, the resolution on the twelfth issue, &#039;&#039;How We Can Develop People&#039;s War&#039;&#039;, clarified that the Guiding Thought was not the fourth stage: &amp;quot;...we cannot confuse Maoism with Guiding Thought; first, we talk about universal truth and then about its applications. Maoism is the third stage, and we will not give an inch on this point, deviations into the swamp of opportunism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Regarding the Guiding Thought, there&#039;s an attempt to separate it from &amp;quot;President Gonzalo.&amp;quot; The thought can&#039;t be detached from a person until they have died; separating the two is a mistake and implies a change in direction. In terms of our specific situation, it is a development confined to our country, with a focus on guiding the revolution in Peru as a whole. There is no document stating that the Guiding Thought is the fourth stage because it&#039;s not a reality. What people should know is that there is Marx, Lenin, and Mao.”(90)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, by September 1987, Guzmán&#039;s egocentrism had progressed in his intent to establish himself as the fourth stage of the global revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Continuing the development of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, &#039;President Gonzalo&#039; upholds, defends, and applies our undefeated and unwithering ideology, making Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, &#039;Gonzalo Thought,&#039; the basis of unity for the Party. This drives the Peruvian revolution and contributes to the global revolution. &#039;Gonzalo Thought&#039; is the main thing we need to face, as it guarantees success, leading us to democratic revolution, socialist revolution, and cultural revolutions all the way to communism.&amp;quot;(91)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path&#039;s ideological exclusivity is a fundamental pattern of behavior: &amp;quot;We have entered a tough ideological battle, in terms of having sanctioned &#039;Guiding Thought,&#039; which is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism applied to our reality. We will have a lot of struggle to establish this, a fight for ideological hegemony.&amp;quot;(92)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The struggle for the hegemony of &amp;quot;Guiding Thought&amp;quot; has two opposing viewpoints: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Shining Path leaders see this &amp;quot;thought&amp;quot; as &amp;quot;a correct application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Peruvian reality.&amp;quot; &lt;br /&gt;
# Guzmán, along with his followers and admirers, have long been campaigning to establish that &amp;quot;Guzmán&#039;s Thought&amp;quot; is the &amp;quot;Fourth Stage,&amp;quot; thereby aiming to amplify the Gonzalo myth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ideological system of the Shining Path consists of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# A set of propaganda outlines tied to a central ideological principle: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. These include concepts such as &amp;quot;correct application,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;contribution to the world revolution,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;discoveries of the laws of dialectics in our reality,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;discovery of bureaucratic capitalism,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;guarantee of success in democratic, socialist, and cultural revolution,&amp;quot; as well as &amp;quot;unfading ideology.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
# A psychological mechanism of &amp;quot;group dynamics&amp;quot; and blame-generation that acts on the innate aspects of the initiates&#039; personalities. This involves tendencies, instincts, impulses, habits, will, and reflexes. In this way, the unconscious parts of the personality are sensitized, achieving unconscious obedience and mechanical, forceful behaviors that have become classic among Shining Path militants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary, this is the ideological warfare apparatus of the Shining Path that produces cadres that are &amp;quot;prepared for action,&amp;quot; with &amp;quot;respect for their own hierarchies,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;high morale and austere life,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;self-destructive feelings,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;rigid behavior,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;disregard for life.&amp;quot; (93) In other words, irregular soldiers confident in their &amp;quot;truth&amp;quot; and capable of destroying others&#039; ideas. They hold a fanatical ideology riddled with simplistic motivations and a lack of scientific political theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Marxist-like publications and statements of the Shining Path have no connection with national reality and only serve to mask the true essence of their reactionary ideology. This ideology is prefabricated with formulas from modern neo-behavioral psychology and is presumably set up by CIA provocateurs skilled in creating insurgencies in third-world countries like Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Strategic warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
In employing this kind of war, the Shining Path aims for a sound strategic policy and a military strategy that gives them the advantage in offense and consolidation. The goal is to make the enemy (the Peruvian state) falter in its strategies and plans, rendering it perpetually incapable of defense. The enemy is thus led into a disorganized and scattered deployment of its resources, confined to a flawed defensive strategy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In simple terms, it&#039;s about using the best judgment, common sense, or tact to win irregular warfare and to &amp;quot;bend the enemy&#039;s mind.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the achievements of the Shining Path&#039;s strategic warfare, specifically by its scientific manipulators, is in having constructed &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Guiding Thought&amp;quot; as if it were a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist system of ideas, which it is not. This serves two counter-insurgent purposes: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# To push Marxist currents towards violent action, and &lt;br /&gt;
# To pit the State against both Marxist and non-Marxist socialist currents, as well as against military and Quechua nationalism that have emerged in Peru over the past twenty years, altering social structures with the participation of social democratic and Christian democratic tendencies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, this strategic accomplishment has become one of the Shining Path&#039;s most severe internal limitations and contradictions. Firstly, &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; has never existed as a theory; it is more like a form of thaumaturgy that can unite Shining Path followers in a trance-like state leading to their deaths, thereby becoming a real myth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In an analysis published by the Peruvian magazine &#039;&#039;Socialism and Participation&#039;&#039;, Jesús Granados uncovers the sequence of key concepts in Guiding Thought, their relations, and significance within the Shining Path&#039;s semantics. These concepts then form a conditioning mechanism similar to that found in American religious sects:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Mao = A single spark can start a prairie fire&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;A Shining Path Member = I am ready to cross the river of blood&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Statement by the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path = The leadership is with you in the supreme moment of total surrender to the purifying fire of Armed Struggle&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Slogan of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path  = Die to invent the subjective myth.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Fire - Invincible Fire - River of Blood - Death - Purifying Myth - Purifying Fire.&amp;quot;(94)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path operates on a fanatical strategic concept, with an ideological system that essentially encourages triumph through death for its own defense. This conceptual base clearly shows the Kantian influence on Guzmán Reinoso and helps to explain the collective suicide-murder event of July 1986 in Lima&#039;s prisons where more than 300 Shining Path members orchestrated their deaths to &amp;quot;Seal the Great Leap&amp;quot; in their own jargon, meaning to complete the plan of &amp;quot;Conquering Bases&amp;quot; and initiate the plan of &amp;quot;Consolidating Bases.&amp;quot; The Shining Path managed to create a myth, the &amp;quot;Day of Heroism,&amp;quot; and led the Peruvian government and its armed forces into a tragic repressive strategic error. These forces became victims, both immediately and in the long term, of the consequences of this action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the psychological mechanism is wearing thin. The Shining Path increasingly finds itself isolated in the far-left spectrum of violence, revealing its true nature of reactionary terrorism useful to the most reactionary right-wing in Peru and the world. On the other hand, progressive, Marxist, and Christian social groups have distanced or are distancing themselves from the Shining Path, making it nearly impossible to suggest any current affiliation with the group.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only ultra-conservative minorities and CIA agents in serving their own interests and looking for exoneration, can continue to assert that the terrorism carried out by the Shining Path is communist revolutionary warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a second stage, it should be considered that the forces unleashed by the Shining Path&#039;s actions in recent years have created a new situation demanding improvements in the subtle and subjective manipulation mechanisms devised by CIA behaviorist and neo-behaviorist psychologists. In this regard, experts on the Shining Path, violence analysts, and proponents of &amp;quot;Guiding Thought&amp;quot; have circulated a document called &amp;quot;Discussion Bases&amp;quot; for a First National Congress of the Shining Path. The aim is clear: to formalize the chatter and Marxist talk of recent years so that &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; continues to meet the same objectives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another cornerstone of the Shining Path&#039;s strategic warfare is the use of secrecy and silence. These elements provide maximum security for their organization and operations; they effectively promote dogmatism and the group&#039;s theoretical infallibility, blocking any form of discussion, verification, or confrontation. Outsiders will always be the ones discussing the Shining Path, thus helping to maintain its myth and Unified Leadership as major mobilizing factors akin to religious inspiration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other part of this type of warfare, designed to mislead &amp;quot;the enemy,&amp;quot; involves encouraging those who fight the Shining Path to use the same elements of secrecy, silence, and this time, &amp;quot;official&amp;quot; clandestinity. The advice at the highest levels will always be to maintain utmost secrecy and give every action a military character and classification. The mistake occurs when one tries to combat the group in the same manner but without taking the initiative. Losing the initiative under these circumstances only allows the Shining Path to make public what it wants through its armed propaganda, while preventing the population from breaking its silence and secrecy to end its clandestine operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The real and fictitious objectives of the Shining Path are crucial in this strategic war. Experts must handle this aspect carefully, especially due to the global nature of the operation. We&#039;re dealing with a large-scale, Low-Intensity Operation aimed at counterinsurgency. One mistake and the objectives can flip on its head, serving the insurgency instead. English, American, and French experiences show many failures, except for British successes in Malaysia, Kenya, and the French in Chad and the Red Sea. So far, Political Warfare and its Low-Intensity Operations have shown great efficiency in destroying social structures but have always been political failures; in the case of the CIA, they&#039;ve been loud and scandalous failures. However, even for its own benefit, the American Administration can&#039;t correct this policy due to the inherent decline of the system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To what extent is the Shining Path&#039;s supposed grand objective of building the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy true, as propagated by its supporters and experts?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There&#039;s a stratagem at play, which is to make the &amp;quot;enemy&amp;quot; (the Peruvian state) fight against fictitious objectives while the Shining Path achieves real objectives. According to them, the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy, the New State (an exact copy of the original Maoist model in all its documents), will be reached through the &amp;quot;Construction of The Three Instruments of the Revolution&amp;quot; (also an exact copy of Maoism): &amp;quot;The Party, which is the main form of organization, the army, and the Front, which is the third instrument. All these three instruments are for taking power.&amp;quot; (95)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shining Path documents point out that Chairman Mao considered the Chinese Communist Party, the Red Army and the new State &amp;quot;as independent,&amp;quot; while &amp;quot;Chairman Gonzalo,&amp;quot; developing this &amp;quot;tremendous contribution,&amp;quot; discovers &amp;quot;concentric development&amp;quot; and its laws: centering on the Party, surrounding it with the People&#039;s Guerrilla Army, and on the periphery the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This approach actually distances itself from the Maoist &amp;quot;democratic centralism&amp;quot; and Mao&#039;s strategic coordination of revolutionary warfare. Guzmán Reinoso&#039;s concept of concentric development is a strategic subtlety that is closely related to two aspects: defining the strategic and intermediate objectives of the Shining Path and conducting operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Peruvian state is led to believe that the Shining Path&#039;s true strategic objective is the construction of the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy, while its Front and Support Bases would be the intermediate objectives that must be destroyed to prevent the advent of communism. No further reasoning is needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The real aim of the Shining Path is the systematic destruction of Peruvian society through violence and genocide. This is done by provoking actions from the &amp;quot;People&#039;s Guerrilla Army,&amp;quot; the &amp;quot;Support Bases,&amp;quot; and the &amp;quot;Popular Fronts.&amp;quot; Their methods involve irregular terrorist operations carried out by these groups, which infiltrate or develop in both urban and rural social foundations in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;The time has come, comrades, the time has come. It&#039;s time for a great break. We will sever everything that ties us to the old, rotten order to completely destroy it. For if we have any interest in this decaying world, we won&#039;t be able to destroy it.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Men, individually speaking, may be weak, but the revolution is all-powerful, and the armed revolution even more so. It relies on the masses, the strength of the earth, and is guided by the Party, the light of the universe.&amp;quot;(96)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Shining Path&#039;s unique strategy, the most crucial aspect is how they conceal the management of their operations. There exists an Irregular High Command with a physical Operations Center, hidden either domestically or abroad. What matters is that their actions are executed here and now.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This concealment occurs under the euphemisms of &amp;quot;concentric construction,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Unified Leadership,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Communist Party of Peru,&amp;quot; which also ensure unconditional proselytism and prior acceptance of the myth and mystery. For this reason, the Unified Leadership of the Shining Path is central and accepted: &amp;quot;The only approved form of leadership for tackling work is to submit to a single will. In the end, the issue is one of having a single leader.&amp;quot; (97)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path reaffirms: &amp;quot;We are based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, &#039;Thought of Gonzalo,&#039; primarily &#039;Thought of Gonzalo.&#039; This is the ideology of the proletariat, the highest expression of humanity, the only true, scientific, and invincible one... We have the general political line of the revolution, which means the laws that govern the class struggle for the seizure of power; established by Chairman Gonzalo... The military line is the core of the general political line... And we maintain ideological, political, and organizational independence, relying on our own efforts and the masses. The Shining Path is the “new type of party generated by the Leader of the Peruvian revolution, Chairman Gonzalo, the greatest living Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, who leads the party.”(98)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All of this strategy, in this case, leads to the acceptance of a political-doctrinal proposition that doesn&#039;t really have any valid theoretical foundation. Nevertheless, it must be considered true within a process of convincing based more on faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reality is that the tactical operations are conducted by a group of Shining Path irregulars, mostly neurotic, compulsive believers, and followers of the &amp;quot;greatest living Marxist-Leninist-Maoist.&amp;quot; They pretend to be a single political party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another real aspect is the existence of the Shining Path Operative Command, concealed behind a mythical personality: Gonzalo.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this purpose, a very detailed biography of the supposed leader of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán Reinoso, has been fabricated, from his birth in southern Peru, in the port of Mollendo, Arequipa, on December 3, 1934, to the complete change of his personality to embody &amp;quot;President Gonzalo.&amp;quot; His life, portrayed as a succession of outstanding qualities and remarkable achievements, leads inexorably to the acceptance of the myth. Even a critical scholar of Shining Path, like Manuel Jesús Granados, comes to accept Guzmán&#039;s transfiguration (&amp;quot;he will no longer be the same&amp;quot;), probably because he misunderstands the perspective—Guzmán is not the maker; he is the product of Shining Path&#039;s irregular warfare. Guzmán remains a real and concrete man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although this is not about constructing Guzmán Reinoso&#039;s biography, it&#039;s worth knowing that he received a Falangist, fascist educational formation at the most exclusive and classist school in Arequipa, run by the Christian Brothers of Saint John the Baptist de La Salle. There, to maintain his dignity, he had to confront Brother José, a small Galician with an overbite, who was remembered with repulsion among the La Salle promotions of those times. Guzmán&#039;s extremely neurotic personality always manifested itself in excessive neatness, narcissism, and intellectual self-sufficiency—a last faculty that has often been confused with extraordinary lucidity. Consistent with his Lasallian education, Guzmán embraced Kantian philosophy. His investigations into Marxism initially served to perfect Kantian thought, modernize it, or surpass it in terms of the &amp;quot;conception of space,&amp;quot; and later, as a &amp;quot;truth&amp;quot; to translate or convert his Kantian ideal into a movement capable of serving as a means and form to attain eternity through purifying death.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be noted that there is nothing significant or remarkable in Guzmán&#039;s biography, except that he abstains from tobacco entirely and is enthusiastic about sexual promiscuity, which is hidden, with the young vestals who serve him with loyalty and passion. Many of them were interrogated by the Peruvian police, and not a few were taken into judicial proceedings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no abrupt change in the personality of the Shining Path leader. On the contrary, there is a very human realization consistent with his personal aspirations. It is logical for him to abandon his enthusiastic support for Belaúnde and his membership in Acción Popular (Popular Action), as well as the job he performed so effectively at the Offices of Popular Cooperation in the town of Chocita, 60 kilometers east of the Peruvian capital. These are trivial details that the myth does not need. However, within the same populist line, his destiny was more nihilistic. Anyone who seriously investigates the factors that contributed to the peculiar formation of Guzmán Reinoso can understand how he reaches his current paranoid and messianic personality, which, diluted in the prefabricated myth, serves to conceal the Shining Path&#039;s leadership. Guzmán Reinoso doesn&#039;t become, nor does he make &amp;quot;President Gonzalo&amp;quot; in the class struggle. He has definitely never set foot in a labor union, has never led a local or national labor strike, has never participated in open debates of the University Federations, and was not a partisan political leader. His past is not part of the national political scene, nor was he a combative theorist and public dissident of the Peruvian Communist Party. Guzmán&#039;s political personality is subtly veiled in the later stages of the factional struggle of Peruvian communism, rooted in Ayacucho. He appears more as a methodical instructor of pre-university students and secondary school students at the Colegio de Aplicación Huaman Poma de Ayala. The class struggle never led Guzmán into exile or long imprisonments. In this field, his political life includes brief judicial and police detentions, on June 26 1970, October 23 1981, and February 19 1982. On these last two occasions, he was – strangely – interrogated and released by the police when it was supposed that he was the subject of relentless persecution and his life was in danger for having unleashed the armed struggle in 1980.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Organizational warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
In the use of this type of warfare, the Shining Path makes every possible effort to consolidate its tangible and intangible organizations in all fields: economic, political, social, military, in such a way that it achieves maximum efficiency and coordination, and prevents the &amp;quot;enemy&amp;quot; from infiltrating its ranks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From another perspective, it exerts every effort to infiltrate and sabotage the Peruvian state (the &amp;quot;enemy&amp;quot;) in all fields, in order to place its organizations in an imminent situation of chaos and collapse.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A fundamental principle of this type of warfare is the destruction of enemy organizations in coordination with military warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen how the &amp;quot;military line is the center and the political line is the general.&amp;quot; This principle reflects the irregular military character of the centralized Shining Path organization under the Unified Leadership, which is covered by the euphemisms of &amp;quot;democratic centralism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;the Party as the center.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path is an intangible organization: the organic follows the political, and taking into account that the line alone is not enough, simultaneously, organic structures must be established, considering the organic structure, the organic system, and party work. The organic structure of the Party is based on democratic centralism, primarily on centralism; two armed party networks are established, the territorial network that covers a jurisdiction, and the mobile network whose structure is mobile. The organic system is the distribution of forces in relation to the main and secondary points where the revolution operates. Party work involves the relationship between secret work, which is primary, and open work; the importance of the five requirements: democratic centralism, clandestinity, discipline, surveillance, and secrecy, particularly democratic centralism (99).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The military axis is composed of the so-called People&#039;s Guerrilla Army, which is supposed to incorporate popular militias, organizing them into three forces: the main force, local forces, and grassroots forces. However, the agreement reached at the second plenary of the Shining Path on December 3, 1979, to form the Company of the First Division of the Red Army, remained a mere declaration but no less important. The organization of the Shining Path consists of irregular platoons that can become occasional guerrillas in rural areas and sabotage or annihilation squads in urban areas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that the intangible organization proposed theoretically by the Shining Path is not a reality does not diminish the power, operational capacity, and presence of the Shining Path military apparatus, which continues to operate in Peru with great efficiency and offensive advantage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tangible organization of the Shining Path is made up of what they call the generated bodies, whose organization was agreed upon in July 1973, at the third plenary of the Shining Path. These bodies include the Movement of Workers and Classist Workers; Movement of Poor Peasants; Movement of Democratic Lawyers; Classist Neighborhood Movement; Revolutionary Student Front; Secondary Revolutionary Student Front; Popular Women&#039;s Movement; Single Union of Peruvian Education Workers; Popular Relief; Internationalist Support Committees abroad; Internationalist Revolutionary Movement (MRI), based in London.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Interestingly, it has been outside of Peru and in countries such as the United States, England, France, Spain, and Sweden, that public activity of the Shining Path has been most strongly felt. In these countries, there are base committees of the Shining Path that operate openly and publicly, acting as resonating elements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within Peru, the Shining Path operates isolated from the masses, especially in urban areas. For this reason, their successes have been limited to certain progress in the educational, student, judicial, and welfare sectors, all of which display characteristics of opportunism and petit-bourgeois frustration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the rural areas where the military axis of the Shining Path holds sway, especially in the mountainous regions subject to political-military states of emergency, the compulsory organization of Popular Committees, the construction of Support Bases following the destruction of small towns and Andean or edge-of-the-jungle communities, and the irregular platoons have succeeded in influencing populations such as those in Ayacucho and Huanta. They have managed to establish a general base of support for Shining Path&#039;s activities. This allows the Shining Path to maintain the initiative in irregular warfare in these areas and resume its plans for forming Support Bases, especially in areas with limited communication routes that are disconnected from state entities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The logistical organization of the Shining Path is of a non-tangible nature and is linked to the drug trade. Reasons that support this hypothesis:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# If the facts strongly confirm that the Shining Path is a product of Western intelligence systems to deactivate nationalist, civilian, and military currents in the country, the CIA plays a predominant role in this action. Consequently, the DEA, the other intelligence agency for drug trafficking, which in Peru, as in Colombia and Bolivia, has an army of agents, cannot be disconnected from such activities.&lt;br /&gt;
# The map of subversion in Peru shows the &amp;quot;People&#039;s Guerrilla Army&amp;quot; operating in the Ayacuchan province of La Mar and southward in the coca-growing valleys of Cusco, with a projection towards Bolivia, particularly centered around the processing of cocaine in Cachipucará, Puno. The extension of the Shining Path&#039;s actions to Tingo Maria, Huanuco, and the entire Upper Huallaga, as well as the appearance of TARM guerrillas in San Martin, along with the advance of the Shining Path along the Ucayali River towards the north, leaves no doubt about the coincidence of the movements of the Shining Path and, more recently, the TARM, with the drug trafficking map and its projection on international routes.&lt;br /&gt;
# Here is a summary of the actions carried out by the Shining Path&#039;s irregular forces during the specified months and years:(100)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;Year&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;January&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;May&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;June&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;July&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;August&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;December&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1982&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|75&lt;br /&gt;
|142&lt;br /&gt;
|33&lt;br /&gt;
|151&lt;br /&gt;
|150&lt;br /&gt;
|157&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1983&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|138&lt;br /&gt;
|236&lt;br /&gt;
|246&lt;br /&gt;
|320&lt;br /&gt;
|201&lt;br /&gt;
|177&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1984&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|206&lt;br /&gt;
|185&lt;br /&gt;
|154&lt;br /&gt;
|387&lt;br /&gt;
|173&lt;br /&gt;
|156&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1985&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|76&lt;br /&gt;
|315&lt;br /&gt;
|320&lt;br /&gt;
|283&lt;br /&gt;
|270&lt;br /&gt;
|329&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1986&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|175&lt;br /&gt;
|265&lt;br /&gt;
|339&lt;br /&gt;
|290&lt;br /&gt;
|201&lt;br /&gt;
|210&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;1987&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|190&lt;br /&gt;
|245&lt;br /&gt;
|206&lt;br /&gt;
|214&lt;br /&gt;
|230&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
The constant pattern in this scenario is that the actions of the Shining Path&#039;s irregular forces start low at the beginning of the year but then significantly increase  from May to August, maintaining some stability before decreasing again. This implies a symptomatic coincidence with the periods of coca harvesting and drying along with the periods of &amp;quot;subversive reactivation.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# In 1986, Peruvian media graphically displayed an understanding between drug traffickers and Shining Path irregulars, with an apparent dispute emerging between the Shining Path and the TARM for control of the coca-growing zone in Huallaga at the end of the year. By then, the Shining Path had openly acknowledged advocating for the rights of coca-planting peasants and had practically occupied the towns along the jungle&#039;s marginal road from Tingo Maria to Tocache.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the eastern slopes of the Peruvian Andes, more than 200,000 peasants are engaged in coca cultivation, whose export value in just 1986 was estimated at over 4 billion dollars. It is well-known and verified that the Shining Path collected fees from coca growers and drug traffickers. The latter have access to a network of nearly a hundred airports that have not been destroyed, fleets of modern boats for navigation on the Amazon rivers of Peru and Colombia, especially. The air network facilitates comfortable and permanent movements to the English islands in the Caribbean, the United States, and England, which are central to the international organization of the Shining Path, the International Revolutionary Movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the organization of the Shining Path, with a significantly unconventional infrastructure that acts destructively against official institutions and social and production organizations in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As is the case everywhere, the social structure of the Peruvian state is composed of tangible, stable, and conventional organizations and institutions. Its structure is easily penetrable and, therefore, vulnerable to the destructive actions of the irregulars of the Shining Path, who employ forms of warfare different from those used by the state for its development and survival.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shining Path irregulars use guerrilla warfare, sabotage, annihilation, and armed propaganda. According to one of their documents, the Shining Path admits to having acted against the Peruvian social organization between June 1984 and the same month in 1986 in the following way: &amp;quot;...45.9% of all actions carried out in the country are guerrilla actions carried out by detachments operating in cities or platoons and companies in the countryside; while sabotage accounts for only 11.2% and selective annihilation barely reaches 8.2%, while armed propaganda and agitation account for 34.1% (101).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this period, based on a cross-referencing of reliable sources, our research estimates approximately 5,965 irregular warfare actions of all types, including white terrorism and urban bombings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Using this figure as a reference, which is a close approximation to reality, we can establish the following: first, not all actions can be attributed to the Shining Path. However, the variation would not be substantial. If we assume that 45.9% of the actions were attributed to the guerrillas, this means there would have been 2,737.99 guerrilla incidents in the two years under consideration, 668 sabotage events, 489.1 assassinations, and 2,034 activities related to armed propaganda and agitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The data published by the Shining Path in Peru and abroad is indeed propaganda and highly exaggerated. None of the government institutions that monitor the incidents of irregular warfare in the Andean region have recorded 2,737 guerrilla confrontations in two years. Similarly, the rest of the figures provided by the Shining Path are manipulated and cannot serve as a basis for any serious social research.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only certainty lies in the forms of attack it employs to destroy the strategic organizations of Peruvian society:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1980 and October 1987, Shining Path irregulars targeted 131 agricultural and livestock production units in Ayacucho, Apurímac, Cajamarca, Cusco, Huanuco, Huancavelica, Ica, Junín, La Libertad, Lambayeque, Cerro de Pasco and San Martín, with a higher incidence in Ayacucho and Puno. The exact extent of the damages is unknown, but it is estimated to be substantial and that these attacks had a significant impact on agricultural and food production, directly affecting the rural workforce.&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1985 and October 1987, Shining Path irregulars targeted 21 industrial companies, mainly in Lima and the Huallaga region (Palma del Espino). Many of these companies had financial ties to banks involved in money laundering related to cocaine trafficking. In other cases, companies with significant debts to the state or labor issues were also targeted, some of which were linked to the Japanese capital.&lt;br /&gt;
# Institutions like Electro Perú and Electro Lima faced the most substantial offensive by irregulars. From 1980 to October 1987, there were reports of 726 high-tension towers being toppled, with the costs of repair exceeding 19 million dollars. The costs also included disruptions in the industry and interruptions of public services, particularly those dependent on Peru&#039;s central hydroelectric system. To date, no institution has accurately quantified these costs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These actions committed by the Shining Path had targeted not the financial oligarchy or major power groups linked to imperialism or drug trafficking, but rather social enterprises, agricultural communities, and specific industrial entities, causing significant economical and social disruption.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These attacks are significant because they actively hinder the development of alternative energy sources to petroleum, leading to the continued and increased dependence on transnational oil companies and the depletion of domestic energy sources. Additionally, they constitute a substantial sabotage, given the disruptions to the hydroelectric system. These disruptions not only affect energy generation but also jeopardize the entire productive apparatus in the central region of the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1985 and October 1987, there were 56 attacks on communication bridges and 40 on railway lines. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These attacks aimed to isolate the productive areas controlled by Shining Path irregulars. While major routes connecting Lima to the interior of the country were vulnerable, including three highways, a railway line, two main power lines, and a water supply system, the Shining Path&#039;s military objectives were primarily directed at breaking entities like Centromín which operates over a dozen large production units scattered across various departments, relying heavily on the railway for mineral export and supply of inputs and equipment. State-owned enterprises like Enafer (railways), Electro Perú (energy) and ENTEL (communications) faced calls for privatization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Between 1980 and October 1987, the state administration suffered greatly with the assassinations of 164 officials, including technicians and politicians. These acts of violence soon weakened the state structure, especially in highly conflicted areas, and disrupted development programs in places like Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac, which traditionally had limited connections to the central government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
High levels of corruption also festered within the state apparatus, leading to wastefulness, abuse, and illicit enrichment in regional bodies that further complicated the situation. These factors eased the Shining Path&#039;s efforts to annihilate its opponents, as they tapped into the population&#039;s pent-up desires for justice. This manipulation of public sentiment also promoted a shift in values, with the Shining Path presenting itself as the champion of justice against a corrupt state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This psychological mechanism managed to sensitize the population, particularly in the emergency-declared mountainous regions, making them passively sympathetic to the Shining Path&#039;s cause. This situation has become a significant challenge for the Peruvian state, as the deterioration of administrative structures is compounded by the bankruptcy and loss of credibility of social control organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up until twenty years ago, within the social structure of the highlands, symbols of power were recognized not in the &#039;&#039;gamonalismo&#039;&#039; (feudal landlords) but rather in the representatives of the &#039;&#039;señor gobierno&#039;&#039; (government), which included the police, priests and teachers. When they weren&#039;t colluding with the local bosses (&#039;&#039;caciques&#039;&#039;), these figures represented a level of control and mediation between the peasants and the landlords. However, the situation has changed significantly today. Peasants have not only gained property rights, effectively ending the &#039;&#039;gamonalismo&#039;&#039; system, but communal peasant leaders have emerged as well, often with military support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The black-robed priests with a domineering demeanor have disappeared, only to be replaced by religious congregations and prelates committed to the poor, competing for leadership among the peasants. In the name of these demands, some individuals have aligned themselves with the Shining Path, promoting the destruction of both cooperatives and cooperative enterprises because they viewed them as enemies of social property. Teachers, on the other hand, highly attuned to the changes and continuous frustrations on their path to social advancement, have become recipients and disseminators of a culture alien to the Andean world, particularly towards a coastal culture. They have become disconnected from the chaotic official education system and find themselves at the center of the conflict, often as victims of the Shining Path&#039;s irregulars or the state&#039;s counterinsurgency forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this context, the social control organization, which was originally meant to support authority, had not only confused its role by trying to become an authority itself and dispense justice but also allowed its position to be used for personal enrichment, opportunism, and local social ladder climbing. Thus, it transformed from a law enforcement entity into a highly destabilizing factor in the structural tension.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path is well aware of this problem and has directed its most ferocious annihilation campaign against the police organization. Between 1980 and October 1987, they carried out more than 600 attacks on police posts of varying intensity and nature. During the same period, credible and serious sources estimate approximately 481 deaths resulting from these attacks and individual incidents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What have the Shining Path irregulars achieved by systematically targeting this organization responsible for maintaining public order? Firstly, they forced the police to retreat. In the same period, from 1980 to 1987, Peruvian police forces had closed or reduced operations in 191 units across the country, particularly impacting the departments of Cusco, Ayacucho, Huánuco, Huancavelica, and Apurímac. This means that there has been a territorial concession to the Shining Path in key strategic Andean areas. Secondly, they aimed to hinder the reorganization of Peruvian police forces with rapid, top-heavy growth and the acquisition of sophisticated military-style equipment. Perhaps this oversight ignores that such measures have little to do with the social control of the population—prevention, investigation, surveillance—to maintain public order and support the administration of justice. It also does not necessarily guarantee the sympathy of the local populations. Thirdly, the police forces, due to their vulnerability, have become a constant source of arms for the Shining Path and the TARM. Official reports suggest that by 1987, these groups had seized around 240 weapons of various types, ranging from revolvers, shotguns, and submachine guns to light automatic rifles and grenades.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The core of the Shining Path&#039;s offensive activity lies in its intangible organization, specifically its squads of irregulars with highly centralized leadership that operate in a decentralized manner, executing specific tactical plans. The other significant organization is external, not the internal tangible organizations, which are limited and of little importance in the national movement of popular masses in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some analysts, particularly officials, like to point out that the Shining Path&#039;s actions do not shake or endanger the structure of the state, somewhat as a consolation. From a military confrontation perspective, Shining Path irregulars have not seriously threatened the Peruvian armed forces, and state institutions continue to function. However, this view is overly simplistic. The military organization of the state remains intact in terms of firepower and offensive capability, maintaining strategic superiority in the sub-region. But it is precisely this potential and power that the Shining Path aims to destroy, through the wear and tear of its logistical infrastructure and by waging a mass war to shift its defense and attack mechanisms from external to internal fronts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this context, it is not reassuring that official institutions continue to function; it&#039;s about how they function. One must consider how a ministry operates in Peru, or how the customs organization and the agricultural product marketing system function. Most importantly, one must evaluate whether these entities function effectively within the interior of the republic, especially in the Andean region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Psychological warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
This war, doctrinally, is the operative warfare of ideological warfare. To overcome or change an ideology, one must modify behaviors and values. For the Shining Path, the escalation of psychological warfare is well-defined: convince, persuade, dissuade, and destroy. In the use of psychological warfare, the Shining Path irregulars have all the advantages; they fight alone, exploiting the psychological weaknesses of the Peruvian state - non-compliance with obligations and promises and the suffering of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The psychological front for the Shining Path is one and the same, composed of the national and world public opinion, especially the latter. Its paradoxical objective is anti-communist and counter-insurgent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the first level, it aims to divide the communist movement between the &amp;quot;true Marxist-Leninist-Maoist communists&amp;quot; and the revisionists from Moscow, Beijing, or any other tendency. On the second level, it targets the &amp;quot;opportunistic left,&amp;quot; nationalists, and militarism. A fundamental psychological objective in Peru is the militarization of the Party to counteract the militarization of the government, which signifies the development of mass warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The struggle against imperialism and capitalism is rhetoric, falsely mobilizing because the goal is to associate capitalism with the military and the democratic state, in order to polarize the social groups and classes in Peru. Moreover, the media used by the Shining Path for its psychological warfare are those of the capitalist system; it doesn&#039;t even have its own media. In this sense, the grassroots organization, the so-called psychological instrument, the media system is the largest ever deployed in Peru by any subversive organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path enjoys the leniency or support of prestigious global humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty International, American Wash, and European and North American organizations of the International Fellowships of Reconciliation (IFOR), among others, those that defend human rights but generally in accordance with English financing interests. Some of these organizations were created by intelligence services in 1914, like IFOR, or are directly or indirectly subsidized, as is the case with the Service for Peace and Justice (SERPAJ).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
SERPAJ is a branch of IFOR in Vienna, created under the direction of a Nobel Peace Prize laureate,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We have been unable to find who exactly.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with specific purposes for psychological warfare in Latin America. This organization conducted campaigns in Argentina against armament, militarism and war, in favor of peace in the Beagle issue. It supported the Chilean solution and was a mediator in the Falklands War, yet played a significant role in promoting defeatism during the war, prosecuting military leaders, mobilizing the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo for the condemnation of military leadership and the disappearance of the armed forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these campaigns were conducted under the guise of the fight against the Dirty War, for the respect of human rights, against torture and disappearances. In essence, they took advantage of the strategic errors of the Argentine military&#039;s counterinsurgency policy, which closely followed American counterinsurgency texts and even exported their experiences to Central America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
SERPAJ, in Peru, plays a significant role as a cover for psychological warfare actions. It is responsible for the campaign of the Committee of Disappeared Families and Prisoners of War of Ayacucho, whose objective is to promote legal actions against the &amp;quot;authors&amp;quot; of torture, disappearances, and executions, recognizing them as crimes against humanity. SERPAJ conducts demonstrations and mobilizations, including chaining in squares and the placement of crosses and wreaths at the doors of the joint command of the armed forces. They also travel to Europe to seek support from the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which is a Council of Europe institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In July 1985, between the 4th and 15th, SERPAJ organized a meeting with European bishops in Peru under the presidency of Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, who was a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, to establish a People&#039;s Tribunal in Ayacucho. The maneuver failed as the Peruvian Episcopal Commission did not participate in the meeting. However, this setback did not prevent the  organization from continuing its campaign at the national and international levels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
SERPAJ is directed by a figure from European intelligence named Hans Reiner. He oversees the organization&#039;s bases in Pacasmayo, Puno, Huancayo, Lima, and Huacho. They have &amp;quot;non-violence&amp;quot; organizations throughout the Sierra of Lima, Huancavelica, the Desaguadero area in Puno, and Native communities in Amazonas. Their psychological objectives align with those that guided British intelligence services for the defeat of the conservative Argentine military, a history that continues to have an impact on the Rio de la Plata region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are other covert psychological operations apparatuses, especially in the field of press and broadcasting, which require deeper investigation, as there is abundant evidence of their activities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
International television systems have placed the Shining Path in the public spotlight. Their violence and brutality align with the Western media&#039;s trend, thereby making it a constant news item. Any information, generally prefabricated since it doesn&#039;t actually exist, is received, disseminated, and paid for by television networks worldwide. It&#039;s a system that serves &amp;quot;President” Gonzalo, even though he claims he will destroy and eliminate such a system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A tracking of news information about the Shining Path from Peru abroad in 1987 yielded the following estimated result:&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;Agency&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;Period covered&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|&#039;&#039;&#039;Number of reports&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|AFP (France)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 6 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|81 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|ANSA (Italy)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 2 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|31 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|DPA (West Germany)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 7 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|26 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|EFE (Spain)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 2 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|71 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|IPS (Italy)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 6 - September 15&lt;br /&gt;
|37 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|REUTERS (Great-Britain)&lt;br /&gt;
|January 6 - September 24&lt;br /&gt;
|35 cables&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
In approximately 270 days of the year 1987, 281 news articles about the Shining Path were repeatedly published in Peru, enough for any social communicator to consider it a sustained news campaign of interest. This quantitative aspect indicates the level of news saturation for the foreign public. However, the content analysis of the information will confirm to any social researcher the astonishing results in promoting the Shining Path&#039;s violence and discrediting the Peruvian government, especially its armed forces. This is simply the manipulation of capitalist media in service of the &amp;quot;Shining Path subversion&amp;quot; in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this section, it is worth noting that the news agendas of socialist countries either do not report on the topic or only do so sparingly. However, Cuba&#039;s &#039;&#039;Prensa Latina&#039;&#039; agency, for the period from January 2 to August 29, 1987, issued 143 reports on the Shining Path, setting a quantitative record and contributing to the global public opinion saturation. It is fair to point out that Prensa Latina&#039;s information differs in significant aspects. While capitalist agencies provide between five hundred to a thousand words per report, &#039;&#039;Prensa Latina&#039;&#039; does so with 100 to 150 words. The contents are objective and do not argue for or against the Shining Path. This informational neutrality benefits the Shining Path. They don&#039;t even defend Fidel Castro from the epithets that the Shining Path bestows upon him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tactically, the Shining Path does not neglect the support of psychological operations for its specific actions. Their plans consider the &amp;quot;respective&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;appropriate&amp;quot; psychological action, taking into account circumstances, timing, and targets (102). In short, they apply all the techniques of modern Western psychological warfare and the doctrine of PSYOPS and political warfare. It&#039;s important to remember that in revolutionary warfare, there is no application of psychological operations or psychological warfare; the doctrinal concept is different. Dialectical materialism, as a comprehensive and exclusive philosophy, doesn&#039;t require psychological operations; it is internalized in humans through education, agitation, and propaganda, as overarching strategic lines of action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its final phase, the Shining Path uses armed propaganda to gain resonance, employing annihilation, blackmail, kidnapping, bombings, rumors and obscurantism to achieve population control. Another aspect is the fragmented preparation of the Shining Path militant as an alienated irregular soldier. This aspect is well-known, as it represents the visible part of the Shining Path. The effects of their psychological strategy and tactics are what concern us, and scientific studies should dive deeper into these, as we are facing a neo-behaviorist school of population control that is leading the Peruvian population towards self-destruction through the application of these operational techniques of psychological warfare, typical of the CIA, which also proposes them for the preparation of counterinsurgency forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, another application of this type of warfare lies in weakening the enemy&#039;s psychological defenses so that they cannot react, or when they do, it&#039;s too late, leading to self-incrimination and acceptance of defeat and failure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the Shining Path, as well as for the dominant great powers that have shown their staunch opposition to the development of culture in Third World countries in UNESCO, and to the need for a New International Information Order, as well as for information merchants in Peru, it is not in their interest for the country, for example, to have a Social Communication or Information Policy, which is a right of every nation anywhere in the world. Simply because if it were so, at the strategic level, the irregular Senderistas and any other kind would not have at their disposal the theater of psychological operations (the minds of the Peruvian population and world public opinion).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the tactical level, the Peruvian nation cannot respond to the psychological warfare of the Shining Path, not only due to a lack of technical resources and the absence of policies but also because of the chaos prevailing in private media, the use of frequencies and licenses, the lack of generosity and patriotism where each owner believes their individual opinion and interests represent the entire country. Moreover, the government lacks public information outlets that are not obsequious and fawning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The only valid front resisting the Shining Path in this field is a set of information systems or communications in grassroots, neighborhood, institutional, religious, union, and professional social organizations, where there is an independent effort to provide educational and controversial information that contributes to the formation of their own values and reflects their aspirations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a form of alternative information, which, despite its widespread proliferation, has nothing to do with the information from major media outlets, it is the only serious shield against the destabilizing influence of the Shining Path&#039;s psychological warfare. In this psychological warfare, the Shining Path maintains a strategic and tactical advantage, using the vast resources of the capitalist system rather than the socialist one. Among these resources are opinion leaders who act as the Shining Path&#039;s ideologists or propagandists, many of them with education from American universities or undergoing training stints, such as the director of &amp;quot;El Diario,&amp;quot; the unofficial, if not official, newspaper of the Shining Path in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These propagandists of the Shining Path skillfully lead their strategic psychological warfare efforts, primarily by preparing both nationally and internationally for the grand maneuvers included in the Shining Path&#039;s plans. For instance, the &amp;quot;genocide in the prisons&amp;quot; was carried out as part of a meticulously phased psychological campaign in preparation, execution, and consolidation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the preparation phase, prisoners affiliated with the Shining Path were encouraged to provoke, turning the prisons into &amp;quot;luminous combat trenches&amp;quot; through propaganda and psychologically preparing the Shining Path&#039;s cadres for the holocaust. This period was more or less lengthy, and during its development, distinctions were made between common prisoners and Marxist leftist prisoners who were not affiliated with the Shining Path. These distinctions were marked by confrontations, vendettas, and even murders. Externally, a campaign of inducing death was mounted: &amp;quot;No to the transfer to Canto Grande&amp;quot; (a high-security prison); &amp;quot;No to genocide,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Defend the Prisoners of War,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;They want to assassinate them from behind,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Prisoners of war will resist in their luminous combat trenches until death.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The deaths of Shining Path members in the prisons marked the culmination of this maneuver. The violent military intervention was preceded by the assassinations of senior officers, the exacerbations of law enforcement and internal provocations, allowing everyone to believe that all of the Shining Path’s plans were being developed within the prisons. All these issues were effectively stirred up by the opinions of influencers in the capitalist media until the strategic mistake was made: to believe that the elimination of Shining Path-affiliated prisoners would end the Shining Path, and that it was possible to satisfy the Armed Forces&#039; frustration in the face of terrorism through revenge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The psychological consolidation of the plan still continues, and the issue of the deaths of Shining Path members in June 1986 will always be a cause for news and agitation. The negative effects are suffered by the Armed Forces and the social-democratic government of García Pérez. The Shining Path capitalizes on &amp;quot;heroism&amp;quot; and solidifies the myth and the idea of death for the &amp;quot;Guiding Thought,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;crossing rivers of blood to become immortal.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another strategic psychological plan of the Shining Path is related to the establishment of the &amp;quot;People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy.&amp;quot; In May 1986, &amp;quot;Guzmán&amp;quot; stated: &amp;quot;We are using the term New State, and this has a strategic content... Therefore, we affirm the following: The three levels have been defined: People&#039;s Committee, Support Bases, and People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy. The First Level (People&#039;s Committee) exists; the second level is a matter of delineation of Zonal and Regional Committees, which need to make adjustments according to the development of the war. The leadership of the set of bases that a Zonal or Regional Committee may have is under its direction. The Third Level continues to develop and advance toward the formation of the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy, which would be the set of Committees and Bases, for which the three functions remain valid: leadership, construction, planning&amp;quot; (103).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before continuing, note the writing style in the Shining Path text attributed to Guzmán Reinoso. It is the same as in many documents of the Shining Path: the language is Spanish, but the grammatical construction and syntax are English.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Returning to the topic, these strategic guidelines, formulated in the pre-fabricated documents of Senderismo, appear as a directive to achieve the grand objective of creating a parallel or counter-government. Let&#039;s recall the plan of the CIA revealed by &amp;quot;Newsweek&amp;quot; magazine in its August 3, 1981 edition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In September 1987, the psychological operators of the Shining Path produced a &amp;quot;Discussion Document&amp;quot; that aimed to give structure to their ideas, resulting in a pseudo-Marxist mishmash. By the end of 1987, the &#039;&#039;Qué Hacer&#039;&#039; magazine of the Friedrich Elberth Foundation would be responsible for publicizing it, and &#039;&#039;El Diario&#039;&#039;, the unofficial organ of the Shining Path, would spread it widely in apparent debate with &amp;quot;¿Qué Hace?&amp;quot; and the newspaper &#039;&#039;La República&#039;&#039;, which provided its opinions on the topic. By January 1988, the debate was publicly underway.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regarding the &amp;quot;Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; framework, it was naturally discussed by the Shining Path&#039;s followers and some political leaders and public figures who clearly had never read Marx, Lenin, or Mao. However, for the campaign, knowledge was not the goal; it was about gathering opinions to generate more opinions about what was said, ultimately transforming the shoddiness into a form of science through information manipulation and the media.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Simultaneously, the idea of a National Congress of the Shining Path was promoted, claiming that it had already taken place and would produce a constituent document for the New State to oppose the Old State. It would propose the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution within the framework and philosophy of the Shining Path, precisely to thwart the structural changes that Marxism recognizes as part of the development of capital under that name. But the main goal was to establish a parallel government, alongside the existing one in Peru, with the aim of bringing about structural changes in Peruvian society. Whether it would be installed in Ayacucho or in exile would depend on circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path&#039;s maneuver took advantage of the psychological opportunity provided by the social situation in Peru in 1988. Right-wing groups and the middle class were being sensitized in a campaign summarized by the slogan, &amp;quot;No one can save this country.&amp;quot; In Peru, defeatism was fueled by major transnational corporations in the food, finance, and drug trade industries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prospect of submission to the International Monetary Fund was accompanied by large campaigns of scarcity and price increases to make the people suffer. In the face of this capitalist maneuver, the Shining Path’s plan for the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy is not an alternative, as some might believe, for the methodology of destroying means of production, murder and terrorism serves the same purpose as economic sabotage, corruption, drug trafficking, shortages, medicine scarcity and the deterioration of social services.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here we have described the operation of two of the Shining Path’s psychological campaigns, one already executed and another ongoing to date, solely for educational purposes, to demonstrate the underlying use of psychological warfare techniques, the mechanisms for undermining morale (one cannot believe in Peru; it is portrayed as a failed and collapsed country), and the utilization of significant resources (adept planners, mass media, opinion influencers). The victim is the Peruvian nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Intelligence warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
According to the doctrine of political warfare, intelligence warfare begins by executing the operational actions of strategic warfare. This type of warfare is highly subtle and occurs at both the defensive and offensive levels. It involves one&#039;s own defense and security as well as the breach of the enemy&#039;s security and secrecy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the Shining Path, the basic rule present in both strategic and tactical intelligence warfare is &#039;&#039;clandestinity&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;military vigilance and discipline&#039;&#039; (a political element and the combination of two military ones), representing a rather advanced concept of production and initiation of intelligence. According to their documents, the Shining Path’s intelligence network &amp;quot;involves dealing with special elements and requires great discretion and secrecy.&amp;quot; As expected, these elements are at a particular level of secrecy within the organization and compartmentalized discipline. Naturally, secrecy and discretion can only be achieved through the highly administrative concentration of the agent network.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The documents of the Shining Path do not explicitly mention this field of their activity. However, they are insistent in recommending secrecy and inducing their membership to investigate the environment and social relationships. Before and after their actions, they are trained in the collection and processing of basic information. Every Shining Path irregular is, above all, an informant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As far as we can know to date, the Shining Path’s secrecy has not been compromised. Probably because any efforts to discover it have been misguided by attempting to uncover it from within penetrated or captured base cells. There, they are only informants. In contrast, it is public knowledge that the true agents, both foreign and national, who have been captured and identified, manage to preserve secrecy by evading their responsibilities before the Peruvian justice system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there are some elements that can allow for an evaluation of the intelligence apparatus of the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the strategic level, the Shining Path has had a research and study apparatus closely linked to the CIA&#039;s counterinsurgency policies. The study of the human environment in the Peruvian highlands was provided by various organizations which includes the Wingspread Conference in Wisconsin, organized by Daniel Sharp of the Peace Corps and involving a multitude of businessmen and social scientists. The studies and experiments conducted by USAID (United States Agency for International Development) were also influential. Through patiently conducted works, like the one by Eric Cohen, who was a professor at the University of Jerusalem and conducted the work &#039;&#039;Potential for Internal War and Leadership Forms in Ayacucho 1969-1979&#039;&#039;, these contributed to the Shining Path&#039;s understanding of its operational theater, both in terms of the environment and the human context. In summary, the Shining Path obtains its knowledge of its operational theater, both in terms of the environment and the human context, from institutions or individuals linked, in one way or another, to American or Western counterinsurgency efforts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path has never published any studies or works on class relations in Peru, except for the works of Díaz Martínez and Kawata, which are more of an anthropological nature, specialized and theoretical. We reiterate that the compilations and interpolations of citations from Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Mariátegui that make up &amp;quot;Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; do not constitute studies or research on the character of Peruvian society. In this sense, all the intelligence available to the Shining Path is foreign.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The publication of the document &#039;&#039;Developing People&#039;s War in Service to the World Revolution&#039;&#039; is another indicator of the nature of the Shining Path intelligence apparatus. This is not so much because it was printed in modern workshops with formatting, grammatical correction, and graphical cleanliness, but because of its content.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This document represents a significance in the intelligence appreciation of the Shining Path. It is noteworthy first because it is free from their pseudo-Marxist verbosity, and second because it evaluates their irregular warfare in a maximized manner. It provides a political and statistical evaluation of their actions, celebrates their potential, and also evaluates the potential and vulnerabilities of the government of the Aprista Party from their perspective. It also tracks the electoral process in Peru and the government&#039;s economic administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion, the logical projections of this work indicate advantages for the Shining Path and its irregular warfare and disadvantages for the Peruvian government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The methodology employed in this study or appreciation is definitively not Marxist; it does not follow the analytical method of dialectical materialism. Both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars and any student of Research Methodology can scrutinize the Shining Path document titled &#039;&#039;Developing People&#039;s War in Service to the World Revolution&#039;&#039; and establish the methodology used in its preparation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This short book exhibits the typical characteristics of a work processed by a foreign intelligence station and not in the highlands of Ayacucho or the marginal areas of Lima, where they lack the computer infrastructure required for storing and processing information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another notable aspect of the Shining Path&#039;s intelligence apparatus that emerges publicly is its international organization. Western intelligence services, particularly those of NATO, which are always involved in low-intensity operations, have facilitated a support organization for the Shining Path. This support ranges from providing residence visas for asylum seekers in Europe to any Peruvian who requests them, especially in Sweden, to gather dissatisfied individuals with their country. This process extends to the formation of Support and Solidarity Committees. It&#039;s worth highlighting that no socialist country grants asylum to Peruvians claiming persecution due to their ideas, and they certainly don&#039;t allow the operation of support organizations for irregular combatants of the Shining Path in Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States, support committees for the Shining Path&#039;s cause have proliferated the most. There are over 30 active committees, some linked to North American &amp;quot;subversive&amp;quot; currents, such as the &#039;&#039;Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru&#039;&#039; in Berkeley, with its address at 2483 Hearst Ave. PQ 94709 CA. Others have a religious or ecclesial character, like the &#039;&#039;TASK Force On Latin America and the Caribbean&#039;&#039; at P.O. Box 2324, Santa Cruz, California 95063.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
France also has a significant number of support committees, seemingly directed by the Peruvian scientist Maximiliano Durand Araujo. It is suggested that he may be the real Number One member of the Shining Path and the probable &amp;quot;President Gonzalo&amp;quot; in exile of the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy. Among these groups, the &#039;&#039;Centre Interculturel Franco-Peruvien&#039;&#039; (Intercultural Franco-Peruvian center), directed by Jean Marie Mondet Isnard, operates as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Spain, cities like Madrid and Barcelona host more than a dozen of these support committees for the Shining Path. The same holds true in Germany and Switzerland. Sweden is a unique case due to the extensive activities of two groups belonging to the Shining Path that operate as social sports entities, serving as a kind of hub for international relations of the Shining Path. Without strong evidence, it is claimed that Malmo is the city where Shining Path leaders take their vacations, and individuals like Guzmán, Mezzich, and Morote have been seen there on several occasions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, about eight entities operate in support of the Shining Path, but the most significant one is the international communist movement of the Shining Path, known as the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The International in London (RIM) was initiated by the Revolutionary Communist Party of the United States in 1980 and consolidated in London with the support of eighteen &amp;quot;communist parties,&amp;quot; including the Shining Path, all of which were dissidents from the Moscow and Chinese currents. They were Maoists, and interestingly, they belonged to countries within NATO or countries that were former British colonies. Behind this organization, providing financial support from 1983 onward, was D. Chaujan: the &amp;quot;President of the State of JALISTAN&amp;quot; (Punjab, India) which is  a republic invented by one of the 27 Sikh parties in India, the &amp;quot;Anand Marg&amp;quot; (The Path of Perpetual Happiness), an international terrorist organization that has the largest network of social and religious organizations in the world, estimated to have around 4 million followers in 96 countries worldwide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another aspect related to the breach of the Shining Path&#039;s secrecy is the detention of foreigners by Peruvian authorities. Peru&#039;s intelligence services (there are several in the country, not just one for Peru and abroad like the Shining Path) have always been eager to prove the Shining Path&#039;s communist connections by detaining Cuban, Nicaraguan, or any agents from socialist countries. Up to the present, there have been three significant detentions of foreigners linked to the Shining Path known to the public. Recently, on December 14, 1987, Cynthia Sotwell MacNamara, a 39-year-old American citizen, was arrested in Ayacucho, implicated in the murder of a lawyer and a nurse, with evidence of belonging to a Shining Path assassination team. The case was tried in court and led to the intervention of the U.S. Embassy. Another previous case involved Renata Hehr, a 36-year-old citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany, who was arrested in Arequipa on May 21, 1983. She was tried and sentenced for terrorism, crimes against property, and public health as a member of a Shining Path cell that detonated explosives in the southern city&#039;s commercial buildings &amp;quot;Gibson,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Monterrey,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Braillard,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Caras.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most notorious cases is that of Father Jean Marie Mondet Isnard, a member of the Congregation of the Regular Canons of the Immaculate Conception. He was arrested in Lima on July 22, 1983, by order of Judge Una Rodríguez from the 78th Court of Instruction, after being accused of terrorism. Mondet was part of a Shining Path cell that included Haydee Cáceres Hidalgo (also known as Emma Valiente), Manuel Herrera Aspauza, and Marian Kierelson, among others, who were all involved in the judicial process. Cáceres, who was Mondet&#039;s secretary at the time, had previously been Guzmán Reinoso&#039;s secretary and was acquitted in October 1985 due to a lack of evidence, although she was the key figure in the case. When Mondet was arrested, the French Embassy intervened through diplomats Joan Marc Simen and Jacques Márquez, securing Mondet&#039;s conditional release. They then arranged for his departure to France on Air France on the same day of his release, August 15, 1983, in violation of the terms of his conditional release set by the judge. Later, these same officials facilitated the clandestine exit of Herrera and Kierelson to France via Bolivia, where they currently enjoy asylum. Mondet, Herrera, Kierelson, and other Shining Path members established the Centre Interculturel Franco-Peruvien in Paris, located at Boite Postale B.P. N2 371 - 75526 Paris - CEDEX 11. They published a Shining Path information bulletin and collected funds through account number 67672Q at Credit Lyonnais, Agence J410-75011 Paris, in the name of Jean Marie Mondet Isnard. Mondet returned to Peru on October 17, 1985, via Aeroflot, with the support of humanitarian institutions and Peruvian parliamentarians, and he continued his public activities in Peru without facing legal consequences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these examples of the exposure of the Shining Path&#039;s activities allow us to observe the functioning of the intelligence apparatus that provides security and cover for the Shining Path, enabling it to maintain a good operational capacity. If a biography needs to be fabricated and disseminated, it is done. If operational military intelligence is required to target a critical objective (such as a dam or electrical system), it is provided. If it is necessary to eliminate an official, the apparatus provides details of their life, habits, vulnerabilities, and daily activities, all of which is information that took a long time to acquire. If a congress or press organization needs to be organized, or if financial documents need to be created, or if Shining Path analysts and opinion shapers are required, the intelligence apparatus will see to it. Having supporters at all levels, whether due to interest, sympathy, resentment or blackmail, the apparatus achieves it. This intelligence system, which operates in Peru and abroad, is efficient because it is highly centralized and compartmentalized, with a network that covers all national and international activities. It is led by a brilliant mind in the international intelligence community. This is beyond doubt. Who else can manage such a network? Is it the dedicated, unstable Professor Guzmán from Huamanpoma de Alaya University? Or the disciplined and paranoid instructor of young students at Huamanpoma de Alaya? Or perhaps President Gonzalo himself? The latter is more likely because behind the myth of Gonzalo, in no Shining Path document is it stated that he is Abimael Guzmán. Abimael Guzmán is the apparatus itself. The leader must be a more remarkable mind than the politicized and confused one of Professor Guzmán.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The apparatus is the central driver and executor of the war. The regular Shining Path combatants are squads of fighters who act according to the script of irregular warfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This system that conducts intelligence warfare, and has the capacity to generate and provide intelligence as well as carry out operations in support of its strategic goals also has the ability to provide inaccurate or biased intelligence to organizations tasked with combating the Shining Path. Who can claim otherwise? This is a fundamental and doctrinal principle of all intelligence systems in the world: providing false information to the enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Mass warfare =====&lt;br /&gt;
The war of masses, within the doctrine of political warfare, is conceived as the operational part of organizational warfare, and it is based on the mobilization of the masses, which are considered the foundation of political power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it comes to warfare, the contenders strive to gain the sympathy and support of the masses for their own organizations. In the war of masses, the goal is to control the psychology of the masses and to sow division and discord among the population of the opposing side.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path, in this type of warfare, promotes the mobilization of masses, especially among the peasantry, by using psychological techniques of intimidation, exasperation, and lascivious paranoia. They aim to organize them into popular committees, support bases, zonal and regional groups in order to serve as the foundation for the People&#039;s Republic of New Democracy. To achieve this, they polarize the struggle among different groups and strata within the poorest classes of Peru, applying the principle of division and discord.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To conduct this type of warfare at a strategic level, the Shining Path offers the masses a New State and presents a program. &amp;quot;A party must define its program... we must carry out the democratic revolution; therefore, we propose both a minimum and a maximum program.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&#039;Minimum Program&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A) New Politics: The politics of New Democracy is to overthrow foreign oppression and the domination of landlords and feudalists. It involves destroying the old landlord and bureaucratic state and establishing a joint dictatorship. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
B) New Economy: All foreign monopoly companies or those that are excessively large will be confiscated. The new economy entails three aspects: the confiscation of land from landlords, the confiscation of bureaucratic capital, and protecting the interests of the middle bourgeoisie. Due to the nature of the democratic revolution, the middle capital should consist of three sectors: state, private, and cooperative. The State should not be owned by a few. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
C) New Culture: National, scientific, and mass culture. It is national because it is anti-imperialist, scientific because it is based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism or guiding thought, and it is a mass party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&#039;Maximum Program&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;quot;: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three inequalities will disappear with communism: City and Countryside; Worker and Peasant; Manual and Intellectual Labor. We have always considered ideology and politics as members of a single historical class, and this idea is essential. The party must have a General Political Line, and &amp;quot;President Gonzalo&amp;quot; has defined that a party cannot advance without a political line. The revolution cannot be carried out without the guiding thought of the &amp;quot;President Gonzalo,&amp;quot; which encompasses five points: International Line, Democratic Revolution, Military Line, Construction Line, and Mass Line. (104)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This simulation of a political plan turns out to be rather simplistic, and, when considered in &amp;quot;Discussion Documents,&amp;quot; it provokes a deceptive controversy among Senderistas, Senderologists, and politically naive individuals in Peru, as we have already noted. It is a calculated step in the Shining Path&#039;s mass warfare strategy to gain influence in a way that its very brutal violence does not provide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the use of this warfare, the Shining Path&#039;s contradictions become insurmountable. It is impossible to conceive the compatibility of the principles of its program, even setting aside its terrifying simplicity, with the techniques of psychological population control through terror, nor is this program being applied or motivating the irregular fighters of the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In population control, the Shining Path also faces significant challenges. So far, the organizations it has generated have not progressed or developed. The masses choose different political options, despite many circumstances, both natural and intentional, leading them to violent solutions. Grassroots social organizations do not reach the level of insanity, which is the main form of control and imposition by the Shining Path.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most crucial aspect of the Shining Path’s application of this warfare is the use of social polarization techniques to destroy &amp;quot;the Old Power,&amp;quot; the state, and the Peruvian nation. Their centralized work in the central southern highlands of Peru has provided them an undisputed presence, especially through forced recruitment of young individuals, extermination of the elderly, and subjugation of adults. The vendettas against those questioned by the community, as mentioned before, have sensitized a significant portion of the population. However, this has not occurred in Puno, for example, where peasants, with a greater tradition of rebellion and access to property, have thwarted the irregular Senderista incursions. Another field of mass mobilization favorable to them, through coercion, is that of coca-growing peasants. In the city, they have achieved some success within the ranks of teachers and students, but these groups are not significant compared to other competitive political currents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the slogans for the mass warfare, such as &amp;quot;going deep into the masses&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;educating them in people&#039;s war,&amp;quot; are nothing more than rhetoric. In this field, what stands out in the Shining Path is the destruction of state organizations and production by sabotage and annihilation squads.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This destruction and polarization are not accepted by the Peruvian masses, which have their own dynamics. This is the point that should mark the failure of this conspiratorial movement. If it has had any success in Peru, it is due to the efficiency of its irregular warfare apparatus and the logistical support of two major international systems: one for psychological warfare and another for intelligence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shining Path knows that the strength of Peruvian society against its designs lies within the masses. That&#039;s why, in their campaign of polarization, they induce a strategic mistake to make the masses confront the armed forces and the government. The nature of the Senderista apparatus seeks to generalize genocide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Genocide ====&lt;br /&gt;
An article by Gretchen Small, published in August 1984, comments on research conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) led by Kissinger and Georgetown University for the United States Army.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Under the guise of combating Soviet subversion, the study recommends that the United States has been the instrument for a policy of genocide, enforcing the austerity conditions of the International Monetary Fund and forcing the Third World to accept a reduction in its population. The study, titled Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000, was published in June... Assuming that the world does not change and that underdeveloped countries will always remain so, &#039;Requirements&#039; predicts that both superpowers &#039;will seek to ensure access to select portions of territory that are vital to their global strategic purposes.&#039; While on one hand, it dismisses the possibility of a Soviet attack in Western Europe, despite abundant indications to the contrary, on the other hand, it promotes a state of military alert in the United States towards Ibero-American countries... It foresees the transformation of the United States Army into a British-style colonial expeditionary instrument, to carry out what British experts in psychological warfare and CSIS refer to as low-intensity operations. The core of this new army would be the Rapid Deployment Force...In a friendly country that the United States wishes to protect (from the designs of the USSR), various levels of action can be taken, using psychological operations to induce governments or populations to take direct action; military or paramilitary aid; special unconventional force training operations; deployment of surrogate or allied forces of the United States; deployment of U.S. troops; or any combination of the above. (105)&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;It is not our diagnosis that Peru is already suffering from this action; it is the announcement by someone as anti-communist as the Lyndon LaRouche organization. It is now necessary to fully uncover the identity of the Shining Path. All the evidence, testimonials, and documentary evidence point to it being a &amp;quot;substitute&amp;quot; creation for &amp;quot;communist&amp;quot; subversion, created by the psychological warfare of a large Low-Intensity operation against Peru and Latin America. That is why the subversive techniques of the Shining Path do not belong to revolutionary warfare but to English political warfare. (106) The veil will be gradually lifted before the masses of Latin America and Peru. Only they will ultimately be able to account for painful and criminal experiments like the Shining Path. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, fundamentally, the secret has already been revealed: The Shining Path is equal to the CIA.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 4.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
(1) In Peru, many private institutions and specialized individuals, such as social researchers or journalists, have extensive computerized archives on the Shining Path. A good example includes the archives of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Center for Christian Projection, as well as publications in English edited in the Peruvian capital, among others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) CARLOS IVAN DEGREGORI &amp;quot;SHINING PATH&amp;quot;: I. THE DEEP AND DEADLY ENCOUNTERS II. ARMED STRUGGLE AND AUTHORITARIAN UTOPIA Institute of Peruvian Studies - November 1986 New Society No. 890&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE &amp;quot;POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A PARTICULAR CASE&amp;quot;: Bachelor&#039;s Thesis in Social Sciences San Cristóbal de Huamanga University Anthropology Academic Program Ayacucho, 1981&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE &amp;quot;PCP SHINING PATH: APPROACHES TO ITS IDEOLOGY&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Socialism and Participation&amp;quot; Magazine No. 37, Pages 15 to 37 March 1987&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) ELOY VILLACREZ RIQUELME &amp;quot;OUR CIVIL WAR AYACUCHO 80...&amp;quot; Gramos 100 Publishers, Lima, Peru October 1985&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) GONZALES CARRE - GALVEZ PEREZ &amp;quot;WARI: THE FIRST ANDEAN EMPIRE&amp;quot; Grafica Pérez, Ayacucho, Peru, June 1981.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) &amp;quot;THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF PERU&amp;quot; Published and printed by the National Office of Natural Resources Evaluation (NONRE), Lima, Peru, December 1985.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) &amp;quot;The Trilateral Commission brings together a significant portion of the political, economic, financial, and ideological centers of the capitalist world. It has, in fact, been argued that the Trilateral Commission is the executive committee of transnational financial capital. It defines itself as an organization oriented towards the formulation of policies...viable for joint action by North America - the United States and Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. Comprising just over 200 private entrepreneurs, chaired by a 32-member executive committee, it has met annually since 1973 when David Rockefeller founded it at a Bilderberg conference, along with 300 important figures from the financial, industrial, and academic world of the West.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;INFORMACION COMERCIAL ESPAÑOLA (ICE) No. 155, Pages 131-133, Spain, November 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) BERNARDO QUAGLIO DEBELLIS &amp;quot;URUGUAY IN THE SOUTHERN CONE&amp;quot; Ed. Tierra Nueva, Page 101, Buenos Aires, 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) GENERAL MERIA MATTOS &amp;quot;BRAZIL: GEOPOLITICS AND DESTINY&amp;quot; Ed. José Olympio, 2nd Edition, Page 68, Brazil 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(11) AUGUSTO PINOCHET &amp;quot;GEOPOLITICS&amp;quot; Memorial del Ejército, Pages 340, 341 Santiago de Chile, 1958.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(12) &amp;quot;POLITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICA AND CHILE&amp;quot; &amp;quot;ERCILLA&amp;quot; Magazine No. 1024, Santiago de Chile, February 1955.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(13) GENERAL RAMON CASAS M. &amp;quot;GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE OF AMERICA OR PACIFIC CONFEDERATION&amp;quot; GEOGRAPHIC REVIEW OF CHILE, 1958, Page 18.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(14) ROGELIO GARCIA LUPO &amp;quot;They Fear Another Balkanization of South America&amp;quot; &amp;quot;El Nacional de Caracas&amp;quot; Newspaper No. 14,179, Page A-2 Caracas, February 20, 1983.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(15) GENERAL MEIRA MATTOS Op. Cit. Pages 41 to 68.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(16) ARNALDO RUIZ A. PERUVIAN ANALYSIS. &amp;quot;South American Integration.&amp;quot; Page 37 Lima, March 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(17) BERNARDO QUAGLIOTTI DEBELLIS Op. Cit. Pages 63 and 64.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(18) In the present century, Peru has participated in one way or another in the conventional wars of the region: 1932 with Colombia; 1941 with Ecuador; 1981 again with Ecuador; 1982 Falklands War; Peruvians fought alongside Sandino and in the Nicaraguan Revolution. In the previous century, in 1836 with Chile and in 1879 again with Chile; in the Caribbean, it participated in the Cuban War of Independence, where Leoncio Prado is the founder of the Cuban Navy and fought against the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. It cannot be said that Peru did not participate in the War of Bolivia and Paraguay in 1932 because Commander Julio C. Guerrero, a former aide to Marshal Cáceres, was at one point the Commander-in-Chief of the Bolivian Forces; in the Football War between Honduras and El Salvador, it did not have a belligerent role, but a pacifying one, through former Peruvian President José Luis Bustamante, who acted as an official mediator.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(19) United Press International (UPI) Cable New York, March 6, 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(20) Prensa Latina (PL) Cable Washington, March 8, 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(21) CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, &#039;&#039;ON WAR&#039;&#039;, Volume I, pages 27, 28, Ed. OIEE, 1977.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(22) CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ Op. Cit. Volume IV, page 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(23) MAURICE MEGRET, &#039;&#039;PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE&#039;&#039;, Ed. Paidos, page 27, Buenos Aires, December 1959.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(24) MAURICE MEGRET Op. Cit. page 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(25) OSCAR TORRES LLOSA &amp;quot;PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS&amp;quot; Basic Course, Mimeographed, 1980 Lima, Peru.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(26) OSCAR TORRES LLOSA &amp;quot;ELEMENTS OF INSTRUCTION ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS&amp;quot; Manual, Page 30, Lima, Peru, February 1979.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(27) BORIS PORSHNEV &amp;quot;THE LENINIST SCIENCE OF REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY&amp;quot; Novosti Press Agenda, Page 12, Moscow 1970.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(28) MAURICE MEGRET Op. Cit. Page 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(29) GENERAL E.G. WANG CHENG &amp;quot;THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLITICAL WARFARE&amp;quot; Pages 145 to 192. School of Political Warfare, Nien Chih Hall, Taipei.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this text, General Cheng of Nationalist China dedicates an entire chapter to explain the application and use of the six types of war that make up political warfare, detailing the actions to be taken in each of them. According to this doctrine, &amp;quot;The combat of political war relies on comparing intelligence rather than comparing strengths. And just like in military war, political war has its battles. In the combat of military war, there are reconnaissance, approaches, attacks, and assaults. But in the combat of political war, there is propaganda, organization, research, and service. Political combat emphasizes techniques and mental acuteness.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(30) MANUAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS School of the Americas, USA. February 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(31) DONALD R. MORELLI and MICHAEL M. FERGUSON &amp;quot;LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE&amp;quot; Military Review, March-April 1985.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(32) DONALD R. MORELLI and MICHAEL M. FERGUSON Op. Cit. Page 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(33) FRANK KITSON &amp;quot;LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS&amp;quot; Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Redwood Burn Limited Ed. Faber Father, London, 1975.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(34) ROD PASCHALL &amp;quot;THE DOCTRINE OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: WHO NEEDS IT?&amp;quot; Military Review, Pages 57 to 73, March-April 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(35) CONFERENCE ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS FORT MCNAIR, WASHINGTON D.C., TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1986, by CASPAR W. WEINBERGER. U.S. Secretary of Defense. CUADERNOS DEL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS ESTRATEGICOS DE URUGUAY, Montevideo, May 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(36) CASPAR W. WEINBERGER&#039;s Conference Op. Cit. pages 46 and 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(37) JOHN CHILD &amp;quot;THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA, STRATEGIC-MILITARY CONCEPTS&amp;quot; Air University Review Reproduced by ESTRATEGIA Magazine, Pages 72 to 91, Buenos Aires, 1985.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(38) PETER A. BOND &amp;quot;IN SEARCH OF CBI (COUNTERINSURGENCY)&amp;quot; Military Review, Page 52, November 1986.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(39) RAUL LEIS &amp;quot;SOUTHERN COMMAND HOSTILE POWER&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Nuevo Sociedad&amp;quot; Magazine No. 81, Page 78, January-February 1986, Venezuela.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(40) RAUL LEIS Op. Cit. page 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(41) NEWSWEEK Magazine August 3, 1981 Edition, Page 18, UNITED STATES.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(42) ROBERTO REMO &amp;quot;KAMPUCHEA, SECOND LIBERATION&amp;quot; Cuadernos del Tercer Mundo No. 27, Page 26, February 1979, MONTEVIDEO.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(43) ROBERTO REMO Op. Cit., Page 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(44) &amp;quot;QUE HACER&amp;quot; Magazine, No. 22, Page 72. &amp;quot;The Ideology of the Khmer Rouge,&amp;quot; May 1983, PERU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(45) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES No. 427, Pages 7 to 10. &amp;quot;Genocide Act committed by Pol Pot-Ieng Sary,&amp;quot; November 6, 1981, FRANCE.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(46) JOSE SOTOMAYOR PEREZ &amp;quot;LENINISM OR MAOISM?&amp;quot;, Page. Printed. Editorial Universo Lima, 1979 PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(47) CONCLUSIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE V NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCP. Ed. Bandera Roja Page 10, Lima PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(48) CONCLUSIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE V NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCP. Op.Cit. Page 8&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(49) LETTERS FROM ABIMAEL GUZMAN REINOSO TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF BANDERA ROJA (See Appendix 1)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(50) Extracts from an unpublished document corresponding to instructions given by Abimael Guzmán in February 1981. Social research on this point established that Guzmán&#039;s police biography includes arrests on June 26, 1970, to be placed under the jurisdiction of the II Judicial Zone of Police; on October 23, 1981, jointly with the Departmental Committee of Arequipa, and on February 19, 1982, having been released on the 23rd of the same month and year. It is assumed that Guzmán lived in clandestinity from the end of 1977 or the beginning of 1978, according to Sendero Luminoso versions. (See Appendix 2)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(51) &amp;quot;THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARXIST IDEAS IN PERU&amp;quot; Pedagogical Editorial &amp;quot;ASCENCIOS&amp;quot;: February 1979 Lima. PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(52) Op. Cit., Page 28&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(53) &amp;quot;DEVELOP GUERRILLA WARFARE Pages 15 and 16 International Edition March 1982&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(54) &amp;quot;DEVELOP PEOPLE&#039;S WAR SERVING THE WORLD REVOLUTION&amp;quot; Page 82 Editorial Bandera Roja August 1986 PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(55) DANIEL A. SHARP &amp;quot;THE UNITED STATES AND THE PERUVIAN REVOLUTION&amp;quot; &amp;quot;U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN PERU&amp;quot; (English title) Editorial Sudamericana 1972, Buenos Aires ARGENTINA&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(56) DANIEL A. SHARP Op. Cit., Page 17&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(57) Op. Cit., Page.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(58) Op. Cit., Pages 330 and 331&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(59) Op. Cit., Pages 338 to 349&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(60) Op. Cit., Page 357&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(61) Op. Cit., Pages 358 to 367 (See Appendix 3)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(62) KAYPACHA Magazine (This Land) FELIX ZEVALLOS QUESADA &amp;quot;INSURRECTIONAL THESIS&amp;quot; Edi. Chaupimayo April 1984 UMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(63) &amp;quot;DEVELOP GUERRILLA WARFARE&amp;quot; Pages 24 and 26 Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru. March 1982, Mimeographed Edi. LIMA PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(64) Op.Cit.- Pages 5 and 6&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(65) REPORT OF THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE &amp;quot;MILITARY THOUGHT OF THE PARTY&amp;quot; Mimeographed Transcript Edition Pages 30 and 31 LIMA PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(66) V. LENIN &amp;quot;SOCIALISM AND WAR&amp;quot; . Selected Works, in 12 Volumes Edi. Progress, 1976 MOSCOW&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(67) V. LENIN &amp;quot;WAR AND REVOLUTION&amp;quot; Selected Works, in 12 Volumes Edi. Progress 1976 MOSCOW&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(68) V. LENIN Op. Cit., Page 446&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(69) DEVELOP PEOPLE&#039;S WAR SERVING THE WORLD REVOLUTION Page 20 Central Committee of the PC. of the P. Edi. &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; August 1986 PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(70) V.I. LENIN &amp;quot;REVOLUTIONARY ADVENTURISM&amp;quot; SELECTED WORKS Volume III Page 192 Edi. Progress- 1975 MOSCOW&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(71) V.I. LENIN Op. Cit. Pages 196,197&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(72) V.I. LENIN Op. Cit. Page 193&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(73) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE &amp;quot;POLITICAL CONDUCT: A PARTICULAR CASE&amp;quot; Pages 63 to 66 Edi. Universidad San Cristóbal de Huamanga Academic Program in Anthropology Ayacucho-1981 PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(74) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE Op. Cit. Pages 67 to 74&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(75) MILITARY LINE BASIS OF DISCUSSION, Central Committee of the PC. September 1987 Transcript of &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988 LIMA – PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(76) MILITARY LINE Op. Cit. Pages 77 and 78&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(77) MAO Zedong PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY (November 6, 1938) Selected Works, Volume II, Pages 225, 226, and 227 1976 BEIJING&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(78) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE Op. Cit. Pages 170 and 171&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(79) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS APONTE Op. Cit, Pages 170 and 174&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(80) RICHARD DYSON &amp;quot;THE GUERRILLA GAME&amp;quot; Current News No. 1162 June 13, 1984 Special Edition U.S. Air Force Department (Reproduced from &amp;quot;The Yale Literary Magazine&amp;quot; No. 4, 1984)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(81) RICHARD DYSON Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(82) JAMES ANDERSON (Control &amp;amp; Risk Advisor) &#039;SHINING PATH: NEW REVOLUTIONARY MODEL&amp;quot; Institute For The Study of Conflict London-1987 ENGLAND&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(83) JAMES ANDERSON. Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(84) BASIS OF DISCUSSION Central Committee of the PCP Transcript &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988. LIMA - PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(85) NEW GRAND PLAN TO DEVELOP SUPPORT BASES IV National Conference of the PCP Pages 34 and 37 December 1986 Ed; Mimeograph LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(86) JAMES ANDERSON Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(87) NATIONAL INTERMEDIATE MEETING OF LEADERS AND CADRES Mimeographed copy of handwritten document May 1986 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(88) IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP Mimeographed Document September-October 1986. LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(89) MAXIMIZE THE START OF THE GREAT LEAP Report to the II Expanded Plenum of the PCP Mimeographed Copy February 1985 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(90) NEW GRAND PLAN: DEVELOP SUPPORT BASES IV National Conference of the PCP Mimeograph Edition July 1986 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(91) BASIS OF DISCUSSION Central Committee of the PCP Transcript of &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988. LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(92) II NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCP Mimeographed Printing July 12, 1982 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(93) PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF THE SENDERISTA URBAN MILITANT Conducted by behaviorist psychologists of the Armed Forces (See Appendix 4)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(94) MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS &amp;quot;The PCP SHINING PATH: AN APPROACH TO ITS IDEOLOGY&amp;quot; &amp;quot;SOCIALISM AND PARTICIPATION&amp;quot; Magazine No. 37, Pages 30 and 31 May 1987 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(95) BASIS OF DISCUSSION &amp;quot;Central Committee of the PCP,&amp;quot; Transcript of &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(96) &amp;quot;CLOSURE OF THE FIRST MILITARY SCHOOL: BEGINNING OF ARMED STRUGGLE&amp;quot; Speech by Abimael Guzmán Reinoso Mimeographed Copy April 1980 LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(97) II NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCP Directional Thesis&amp;quot; Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(98) BASIS OF DISCUSSION PCP Transcript of &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; Editions from January 3 to 8, 1988. LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(99) BASIS OF DISCUSSION PCP Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(100) &amp;quot;ACTION FRAMEWORK OF SENDERISTA IRREGULARS&amp;quot; For the preparation of this framework and the estimation of other statistical figures in this book, information from public and private sources, reliable and trustworthy, has been cross-referenced in such a way that it can withstand verification of its accuracy and correctness. The different sources that have been used as references - because they are not all the same - may show slight variations, but not adulterations or falsifications.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(101) &amp;quot;DEVELOP GUERRILLA WARFARE WHILE SERVING THE WORLD REVOLUTION.&amp;quot; Op. Cit. Page 31&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(102) Revolutionary War, based on the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism, has a totalizing conception of the world; therefore, it does not conceive or accept psychological warfare as a method of combat. Psychological warfare is a technique of Political Warfare, Psychological Operations or Low-Intensity Operations, it is a conception of Western warfare strategy. (See Appendix 5)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(103) &amp;quot;NATIONAL INTERMEDIATE MEETING OF LEADERS AND CADRES&amp;quot; Op. Cit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(104) &amp;quot;THE PARTY PROBLEM IN THE NEW GRAND PLAN&amp;quot; The Program Meeting of the CC of the PCP October 1986 Typed Copy LIMA-PERU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(105) GRETCHEN SMALL AND CSIS PROPOSE GENOCIDE&amp;quot; &amp;quot;DECORRELATION AND Resumen Ejecutivo Vol. I. NS28 of August 1, 1984 New York - UNITED STATES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(106) The &amp;quot;FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU &amp;quot;SHINING PATH,&amp;quot; published in &amp;quot;El Diario,&amp;quot; edition NB 322, Year VII of February 7, 1988, confirm the substitutive nature of &amp;quot;Shining Path&amp;quot;: The enemy for the Shining Path is not imperialism but Marxism (&amp;quot;revisionism&amp;quot; Soviet, Chinese, and Albanian); the Aprista government and President García (representatives of bureaucratic capitalism); and the Armed Forces (which must be primarily destroyed). These &amp;quot;Fundamental Documents&amp;quot; prove the suitability of the sources used to write this book. The documents listed in this bibliography with numbers 65, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 97, and 104 have been used to &amp;quot;construct&amp;quot; what &amp;quot;El Diario&amp;quot; publishes as the result of a supposed Congress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== APPENDICE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Letters exchanged between Abimael Guzmán Reinoso (Álvaro) and Saturnina Paredes Macedo (R. Arderás): I - II - III ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== I ====&lt;br /&gt;
January 15, 1970&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comrade Secretary General:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two months have passed since your reintegration into party work, one month since the date when the Permanent Committee should have met again, and we have not received any new news from you to date. Therefore, we find it necessary to send you this letter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been nearly two months since our last meeting. During this time, while some comrades strive to remain faithful to the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the agreements of the 6th Conference of our Communist Party, others are working diligently to abandon them, exacerbate contradictions, and engage in a liquidationist practice that only serves the class enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A series of recent documents, leaflets, etc., accurately reflect this situation. While some analyze and apply principles, others freely propagate liquidationism, even going so far as to reveal the names and locations of comrades and the Party. We are sending you a comprehensive collection that supports our claims, and we have no doubt that it will help you form a clear and defined understanding of what is happening.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mariátegui emphasizes the theory and practice of our activity, stating that the fundamental problem of our Party, our Revolution, and our Homeland is the peasant problem. Our great Party has traveled a long, tortuous, and difficult path to reaffirm this direction. The fact that we are on the threshold of a major shift within the Party regarding this issue is evident from the fact that it forms the foundation of this new stage in the development of the party organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, here we have clearly defined the boundaries with those who seek to exploit the hopes of the peasants: we have exposed (and will continue to do so) two supposed &amp;quot;departmental&amp;quot; peasant leaders, including one who, deceiving the people, pretended to be the &amp;quot;base&amp;quot; of a popular organization with a tradition of struggle and prestige among the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, considering that the definition of the current situation is still under study, we have not yet expanded the scope of our action. We are still treating even those who already see us as enemies with discrimination. But it is evident that this situation cannot be maintained for much longer, except at the risk of being seen as weaknesses by our desires and the forces of unity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the 8th of this month, we received a document from the Peasant Commission with a surprising and unusual delay, not even indicating the day but only the month of its approval (November). In this regard, we understand that the distribution of documents is still subject to centralization norms. The Peasant Commission knows perfectly well who the link to AGIPRO (Agitation and Propaganda) is. On the other hand, even if it had not been distributed to the Central Committee through that channel, we understand that they should have consulted with you. And they should not have done so, because otherwise the document would have been received here along with a note from you. Unless you are aware of it, everything changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, if in the previous document of the Peasant Commission the Permanent Committee was not recognized because it &amp;quot;demanded&amp;quot; that the Secretary of Organization directly convene the Central Committee, thus arrogating powers that are not within its competence, with the current document, it exacerbates rather than corrects the previous error. Now it even disregards the Political Bureau, as well as the Permanent Committee. So, to whom is it &amp;quot;addressed&amp;quot; for the immediate convocation of the Central Committee? Is it addressed to the Permanent Committee, perhaps? Maybe to the Political Bureau? We believe that you should seriously consider the gravity of this situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regarding the content of the document, it is clear that the Peasant Commission has advanced further in exacerbating the current contradictions. We reserve the right to provide the appropriate critique of this document as well as others and activities and even positions that are clearly divergent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We believe that &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; should already provide the general guidance on this new stage of struggle, on this Great Controversy regarding the preconstitution of the Party, guided by the foundation of party unity, taking Mariátegui as the cornerstone, and focusing the debate on the fundamental problem, the peasant issue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, we hope to receive news from you as soon as possible, even by return mail, to finally know where we stand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yours sincerely, &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of Organization &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Abimael Guzmán Reynoso) &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of AGIPRO&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== II ====&lt;br /&gt;
February 15, 1970&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I hereby inform you that during the meeting of the Political Bureau at the end of last January, attended by the majority of its members and the Responsible for Youth, the following agreements were reached:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, considering that the comrades responsible for Organization and Agitation and Propaganda have effectively abandoned their areas of work in practice, engaging instead in an intense internal struggle at the regional level, and that they have unjustifiably refused to attend the meeting of the Political Bureau, insisting instead that the Permanent Committee should function first, where they have a majority that they use to hinder the radicalization of the Party, DECLARE that, apart from the Central Committee, the only body of the National Leadership at this moment is the Political Bureau, led by the Secretary General who was directly elected by the Central Committee in accordance with the powers granted at the VI National Conference.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, temporarily assign the responsibilities of the Organization and Agitation and Propaganda fronts to the Secretary General, thereby removing the comrades in charge of them, who will continue to be members of the Political Bureau.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thirdly, convene the II Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected at the VI National Conference within a period of three months, on a date and at a location that will be duly indicated. The following agenda must be discussed and decided upon:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Report on the political situation&lt;br /&gt;
# Report on the Party&#039;s situation and co-reports (Internal Struggle)&lt;br /&gt;
# Election of the Political Bureau and the Permanent Committee&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fourthly, all items on the agenda must be addressed with the fundamental criterion of revolutionary practice to fully implement the Party&#039;s proletarian line. The manner and form of conducting the internal struggle must be subjected to this criterion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fifthly, consider the Party&#039;s connection with the popular masses, primarily workers and peasants, as a matter of life or death for the Party. Party members must take the lead in their struggles and, through their example, promote fresh blood from the proletariat to enrich the Party&#039;s ranks, as well as the best and most combative sons of the peasantry. Simultaneously, combat all forms of sectarianism and opportunism, both from the right and the &amp;quot;left,&amp;quot; while adhering to the norms of open and secret work, in accordance with the principle of preserving and developing one&#039;s own forces in the process of struggle. Those who consciously adopt an attitude that leads to the isolation of the Party or the weakening of its ranks must be relentlessly fought against.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sixthly, start from the slogan of forging the unity of the Party through revolutionary practice, guided by proletarian politics rooted in Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung Thought, Mariátegui&#039;s legacy, and the principles of the V National Conference.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fraternally, R. Anderas &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Saturnino Paredes Macedo) &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary General&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== III ====&lt;br /&gt;
January 20, 1970&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comrade Secretary General:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the 13th of this month, at 7:30 p.m., we received a letter from you dated the current month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the 15th, we wrote you a letter accompanied by an extensive collection of documents (40 in number, totaling 118 letter-sized pages, single-spaced). In that letter, among other points, we expressed our surprise at the delay with which you had sent us the document from the Peasant Commission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot help but express our surprise and bewilderment at your letter, to which we respond herewith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The revolution demands from us, as an essential requirement to be able to participate in it, extreme frankness and complete honesty. Without this requirement, we not only act against ourselves, sealing our political fate once and for all, but, more importantly, against our Homeland, our Revolution, and our Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a corollary of the VI Conference of our Communist Party, we have entered a great process of unification based on party unity. An expression of this process is the Great Controversy, whose prelude we are currently experiencing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We want unity, seek unity, and fight for unity. But it is a law of Marxism that &amp;quot;before uniting and in order to unite, it is necessary to clearly and decisively delineate the positions.&amp;quot; We openly and honestly declare that we adhere to this principled stance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In November, you urgently summoned us to a meeting of the Permanent Committee. Despite our best efforts to get there in time, we had to wait for nearly a week to be able to convene. Until now, the fundamental reason for this delay has not been explained to us.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once assembled, we were surprised to learn that the session of the Permanent Committee had become a mere formality, as its only purpose was to convene the meeting of the Political Bureau. Clearly misguided about what you should do after your reintegration into party work, and even less informed about what was really happening, you took a step that evidently contributed nothing to unity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to the initial information you received at the meeting, the conclusion was reached that a hasty meeting of the Political Bureau, let alone the Central Committee, such as the one that the Peasant Commission had &amp;quot;demanded&amp;quot; weeks ago, threatening even to hold it if it was not convened and setting deadlines for its realization, would contribute nothing to the interests of our Homeland, our Revolution, and our Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was also agreed that you should thoroughly inform yourself about what was really happening, for which you should take all the time you deemed necessary. Then, once you had a clear, unambiguous, and defined opinion on the situation, the position of each member of the Permanent Committee should be determined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is obvious that several meetings would be needed for this purpose. Thus, we left it at that and also decided that you would convene the next meeting of the Permanent Committee for mid-December.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We stated in the Permanent Committee that a communist can participate in any discussion, but first, they must know clearly what kind of meeting it is: a meeting among comrades, or a meeting between us and the enemy. If it is the former, we go with a desire for unity and with the objective of strengthening this unity through self-criticism and criticism. If it is the latter, we go knowing that the positions are clearly defined, and our only concern is to avoid getting involved in a potential compromise that, contrary to the principles, would favor our Homeland, our Revolution, and our Party in the long run.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was necessary to state this because, as we informed you, some comrades had gone so far as to say that we were on both sides, that the contradictions were antagonistic (with the enemy), and they called for the overthrow of the &amp;quot;distorters of the VI Conference.&amp;quot; In these circumstances, is a meeting of the Political Bureau or the Central Committee appropriate, considering that these meetings, being party meetings, are necessarily meetings among comrades who participate with a subjective desire for unity? This is why a series of meetings of the Permanent Committee was and continues to be necessary to define and clarify these and other points.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What has happened in these last two months? As we mentioned in our previous letter, &amp;quot;a series of documents, flyers, etc., published recently, faithfully reflect this situation. While some analyze and apply principles, in others, liquidationism is rampant, even going so far as to mention names and locations of comrades and the Party.&amp;quot; A new gem of this liquidationism, dated the 19th, is attached to this letter as evidence of what we reiterate.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is impossible not to take a position on these events. Even more impossible is taking a third position, a centrist or expectant position. It is entirely impossible for the Permanent Committee not to define its position as soon as possible. Therefore, we reaffirm that, before any other meeting, whether the Political Bureau or the Central Committee, a meeting of the Permanent Committee is necessary to finally understand where each of us stands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We await news from you. Furthermore, considering the time that has passed and the events that have occurred, we expected that you would at least outline your position on this reality. On the contrary, we received a brief note in which we couldn&#039;t even decipher which meeting you are convening us to and for what objectives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not possible to continue like this. We have already told you that &amp;quot;this situation cannot persist for much longer, lest our desires and efforts for unity be seen as a sign of weakness.&amp;quot; For months, it has been opportunely claimed that there is a &amp;quot;leadership crisis in the Party.&amp;quot; What identity does this have with the jester who throws a stone and hides his hand, with the thief who shouts, &amp;quot;thief&amp;quot;? Before your reintegration into party work, the Permanent Committee&#039;s declaration on the June meeting was distributed to the Central Committee, outlining the principles we must keep in mind in this stage and the tasks we must fulfill. The resolutions of the VI Conference have also been disseminated. &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; No. 42 has been published. It is evident that this material is not being considered. On the contrary, it has even been boldly declared that &amp;quot;the resolutions have contraband, they have not been reviewed by the Secretary General,&amp;quot; and that &amp;quot;Bandera Roja No. 41 has contraband; it has not been reviewed by the Secretary General.&amp;quot; You returned to party work in November, and at that time, &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; No. 42 was also circulated. However, even in January, it is still said that there is a &amp;quot;leadership crisis.&amp;quot; What is the stance regarding &amp;quot;Bandera Roja&amp;quot; No. 42? Does it have contraband? Is it being supported? Is it intended to be wrapped up in a conspiracy of silence?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the &amp;quot;leadership crisis&amp;quot; refers to the absence of meetings of the Party&#039;s top organs, revolutionary frankness and honesty demand that we clarify why there are no such meetings. Who thwarted the meeting of the Political Bureau in June? Who, with their liquidationist attitude, made it impossible for any meeting of the Permanent Committee or the Political Bureau to take place before your return? Who is responsible for attempting to turn the November meeting of the Permanent Committee into a mere formality? Why have no new meetings of the Permanent Committee been held until now?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How true and relevant is Lenin&#039;s statement now, &amp;quot;(the liquidators) try to obscure the truth with noisy shouts and scandals. Sometimes, novices can be bewildered by methods of this nature, but the workers, in spite of everything, will find their own way and will soon reject the insults.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In November, we told you that an important meeting would be held here in Ayacucho soon, and it would be very beneficial for you to participate. The expectation of the Political Bureau meeting on one hand and your silence afterward did not make it possible to inform you in a timely manner. This important meeting will take place precisely on the days you have invited us. This is the second reason why we cannot travel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, reiterating that meetings of the Permanent Committee should resume before any other meetings, whether of the Political Bureau or the Central Committee, we propose that, if it is our mutual desire, the first of the new meetings should take place at the end of this month or the beginning of the next. In this meeting, there would be a fruitful exchange of opinions regarding &amp;quot;the general orientation of this new stage of struggle, on this Great Debate about the reconstitution of the Party, guided by the basis of party unity, with Mariátegui as our cornerstone, and focusing the debate on the fundamental issue, the peasant problem,&amp;quot; as we expressed in our previous letter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We await your response.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of Organization &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Abimael Guzmán Reynoso) &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of Agipro&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Statements By Abimael Guzman Reynoso To A Police Official In Lima In February 1982, Regarding The Communist Party Of Peru: ===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What is the true name of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 6.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;PCP-SL in the original, which is the Spanish abbreviation. The entirety of the questions in this interview specifically say PCP-SL in the original, which we translated to the full English form each time.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; The Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;Shining Path&amp;quot;, which people commonly refer to, does not actually use that name. The party&#039;s own documents indicate that its true name is the Communist Party of Peru, simply abbreviated as CPP. The term &amp;quot;Shining Path&amp;quot; has its origins from the 1960s when the newspaper &#039;&#039;Red Flag&#039;&#039; was published. At the end, it used the slogan &amp;quot;Por el Luminoso Sendero de Mariátegui&amp;quot; (For the Shining Path of Mariátegui). In the early 1960s, university students affiliated with the party, as part of the RSF (Revolutionary Students’ Front, Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios), used &amp;quot;For the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; as an identification slogan to distinguish themselves from other RSF groups on campus. Later, this term became more widespread, and it became common to refer to anyone associated with the political position of the Communist Party of Peru as &amp;quot;Shining Path.&amp;quot; This means that the Party itself did not adopt this name; rather, it was used by various groups and people who opposed the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What is the ideological character of the Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;for the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; This is specified in the party&#039;s own documents. The Communist Party of Peru is based on the decision of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, meaning that Marxism has developed in three stages. Marx’s stage, Marxism, corresponds to the era of pre-monopoly capitalism, the last century, and in terms of politics, it corresponds to the preparation for revolution. So, the first stage of Marxism is &amp;quot;Marxism of the era of pre-monopoly capitalism and the preparation for revolution.&amp;quot; Later, at the end of the last century and the beginning of this century, capitalism enters a new phase, which is its final stage, the &amp;quot;imperialist phase.&amp;quot; Lenin is the one who would point out the laws of the development of imperialism and find its contradictions. In this era of imperialism, the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are exacerbated to the fullest extent. Lenin, while discovering the internal laws of imperialism, also points out the need to organize the revolution, not just in preparation but with a view to its execution. Stalin defines the second stage of Marxism as &amp;quot;Leninism.&amp;quot; Therefore, Leninism is typified as &amp;quot;Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution.&amp;quot; So far, we have &amp;quot;Marxism-Leninism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After World War II, China is in the midst of a revolution, and Mao Zedong, by applying Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of a semi-feudal and semi-colonial China, will discover that imperialism on a global level enters a period of extreme contradictions. The two world wars are symptoms of these extreme inter-imperialist contradictions. In this period, the revolution has shifted from advanced countries to backward countries, to agrarian countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Mao Zedong will discover new laws of revolution, which are synthesized in the laws of people&#039;s war, from the countryside to the city, in a long process under the leadership of the party of the proletariat. This is a peasant revolution called the &amp;quot;Democratic National Revolution&amp;quot; as a preliminary stage of a subsequent &amp;quot;Socialist Revolution.&amp;quot; This period is established within Marxism as a development in the third stage, and it is what was called &amp;quot;Mao Zedong Thought&amp;quot; during the Chinese proletarian cultural revolution. So, we now have &amp;quot;Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought,&amp;quot; and this is the doctrine adopted by the Communist Party of Peru. Furthermore, this party, according to its own documents, has taken up and developed the ideas of Mariátegui, applying them to our reality. When Mariátegui founded the Socialist Party in the country, he was essentially founding a proletarian party, which means it became a Communist Party. To do this, Mariátegui had to outline a general political line that includes five key issues: 1. The character of society, 2. The character of the revolution, 3. The instrument of the revolution, 4. The tasks of the revolution, and 5. A mass line.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to the character of that society, the character of the revolution necessarily follows. This comes from the analysis Mariátegui made of our reality, which is semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Therefore, if a country is capitalist, the revolution must be socialist. However, if a country is semi-feudal and semi-colonial, the revolution must be a National Democratic or Bourgeois Democratic one, as Mariátegui called it. Thus, if the Peruvian revolution must be National Democratic, this implies that the Peruvian revolution has to have two stages: the first, National Democratic, and the second, Socialist, as a continuation of the first stage of the revolution. This character of the revolution, indicating the two stages, is the logical and inevitable consequence of the character of society, and this is Mariátegui&#039;s conclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What are the motives, reasons, and when did the Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;for the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; emerge in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; This is directly related to the historical process of the Party. Everyone knows that the Communist Party was a single entity in our country, and as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split in 1963, it had to reflect in all Communist Parties worldwide. The Peruvian Communist Party couldn&#039;t remain unaffected by this, so in our country, the Communist Party also experienced a split. On one side, there were those oriented towards what the public knows as &amp;quot;Muscovites,&amp;quot; and on the other side, the &amp;quot;Pekingese.&amp;quot; Concerning the &amp;quot;Muscovites,&amp;quot; they still called themselves the Peruvian Communist Party, publishing the newspaper &#039;&#039;Unidad&#039;&#039; (Unity). On the other hand, another group also known as the Peruvian Communist Party emerged, and they began publishing the newspaper &#039;&#039;Red Flag&#039;&#039; (Bandera Roja). In 1963, during the last months, the Fourth Conference of the Communist Party took place. During this event, under the leadership of Jorge Sotomayor Suárez, they decided to expel all those who belonged to the other faction, including Jorge del Piado and others. At this conference, the Party adopted the thought of Mao Zedong for application in our reality, but they hadn&#039;t yet clarified the strategy for the Peruvian revolution. The progress consisted of adopting Mao&#039;s thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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Later, between the Fourth and Fifth Conferences, Jorge Sotomayor Pérez left the Party. I don&#039;t know the reasons, but it must have been intense due to very serious contradictions regarding the main problem, which is the people&#039;s war, the strategy of the revolution. Then, Saturnino Paredes Macedo assumes leadership as Secretary General. When the Fifth Conference takes place, I believe it was in 1965, the Party&#039;s progress is mainly expressed in the establishment of what was called a &amp;quot;basis of party unity&amp;quot;; this basis was &amp;quot;Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought&amp;quot; at the global level and &amp;quot;Mariátegui&#039;s thought&amp;quot; at the national level; that is, the unity of all members of that organization had to be based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Mariátegui&#039;s thought. Another important aspect of that Conference is that they identify organizing the &amp;quot;people&#039;s war&amp;quot; as the Party&#039;s main task. However, there was a pending issue, which was the fact that the Party itself was the result of a long process since the death of Mariátegui, a process in which the Party participated in several electoral processes and its own organic structure was adapted according to electoral requirements, and the criterion of the leaders regarding the Party&#039;s system and structure has been that &amp;quot;the partisan system and structure do not correspond to the needs of a party that must organize and lead the people&#039;s war&amp;quot; unless it were a party with an electoral system and structure. Therefore, the need for &amp;quot;reconstitution&amp;quot; is raised, which constitutes the essence of the contradictions that were to develop thereafter.&lt;br /&gt;
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Later, between the Fifth and Sixth Conferences, a new internal contradiction emerged, leading to another split. It&#039;s worth noting that this period coincided with the Revolutionary Left Movement’s guerrilla actions in 1965, which had a significant influence on the minds of those who were in our Party. After the Fifth Conference, a position that the Party labeled as militaristic, foco-oriented, and influenced by Cuba started to emerge. This position emerged among militant groups associated with a Committee in one region that published a newspaper called &#039;&#039;Red Homeland&#039;&#039; (Patria Roja). People who adhered to this position from the &#039;&#039;Red Homeland&#039;&#039; newspaper started to be labeled by the Party as a danger. However, I should mention that the actions taken by the Party leadership in response to this were, in my opinion, erroneous. There was no ideological struggle or clarification; instead, purely organizational measures were taken. Consequently, before the Sixth Conference, everyone from &#039;&#039;Patria Roja&#039;&#039; had already been expelled from the Party without any Party event, meeting, or discussion. This was a highly abnormal situation within a Communist Party. This event had repercussions on the Party. &#039;&#039;Patria Roja&#039;&#039; took around 80% of the militants, and the Party was left significantly weakened. There was a schism, and &#039;&#039;Patria Roja&#039;&#039; emerged, while the Party still called itself the Peruvian Communist Party and continued publishing &#039;&#039;Bandera Roja&#039;&#039;. Additionally, &#039;&#039;Patria Roja&#039;&#039; also called itself the Communist Party of Peru, with the acronym “PC del P”. The issue of Party &amp;quot;reconstitution&amp;quot; became prominent again between the Fifth and Sixth Conferences. However, there weren&#039;t significant problems at that time. Some members expressed a willingness to carry out the reconstitution, while others intended to promote it. After the Sixth Conference, two groups started to differentiate themselves in practice. Saturnino Paredes started publishing &#039;&#039;Bandera Roja&#039;&#039; with personal and group criteria, no longer representing the Party. On the other hand, another &#039;&#039;Bandera Roja&#039;&#039; increasingly emphasized the Party&#039;s agreed-upon base of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Mariátegui&#039;s thought, adding to it the task of organizing the people&#039;s war, as mandated by the V Conference. In 1972 or 1973, it became noticeable at the university level that the Revolutionary Student Fronts &amp;quot;For the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; were openly engaging in a struggle against what was called &amp;quot;liquidationism,&amp;quot; labeling the Mariátegui group. The faction publishing &#039;&#039;Bandera Roja&#039;&#039; opposed Mariátegui, and they referred to themselves as the Communist Party of Peru. However, they did not adopt any special acronym or slogan to distinguish themselves. This difference was only noticeable at the university or Front level, which is why this Party began to be called or identified as RSF - &amp;quot;By the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; as a consequence of the split from Saturnino Paredes&#039; group.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What is the current strategy being developed by the Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;for the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot;?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; The strategy is derived from the general political line established by Mariátegui. The strategy of the revolution is a logical consequence of the very nature of the revolution. If the revolution has two stages, the first being Democratic National and the second Socialist, then the strategy of the revolution at this moment corresponds to the first stage, which is essentially Democratic Bourgeois. In Mao Zedong&#039;s terms, this means a peasant revolution, an agrarian revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party. This type of revolution entails a long and protracted people&#039;s war. It follows the path that Mao called &amp;quot;surrounding the cities from the countryside,&amp;quot; which involves liberating rural areas through armed struggle, establishing support bases, and gradually encircling cities, starting with small villages and towns, then moving to medium-sized cities, and finally the large cities until the ultimate capture of central power at the national level. Logically, the strategy adopted by the Communist Party must be a result of its own process of reconstitution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fundamentally, the reconstitution of the Party should be understood as organic, but from a Marxist perspective, the organic aspect always follows the ideological and political aspects. This means that the reconstitution of the Party should have been an organic reconstitution. If the Communist Party of Peru claims that it is already implementing its revolutionary strategy, it implies that the Party has been reconstituted in ideological, political, and organic terms. Concerning the strategy, this indicates that it has been reconstituted from a political standpoint, implying the consistent application of the laws of people&#039;s war outlined by Mao Zedong to the specific conditions of our country.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What are the necessary conditions required for applying the revolution in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; In any revolution, Marxists identify two types of requirements or conditions. Firstly, there are the objective conditions or material conditions of the revolution, which Lenin referred to as the &amp;quot;revolutionary situation.&amp;quot; These are manifested through the misery of the masses, poverty, hunger, oppression, discontent, protests, and struggles, among other factors. From a Marxist perspective, there cannot be a revolution without a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation.&amp;quot; Secondly, from a Marxist standpoint, even when there are objective conditions for a revolution, it cannot be realized without the presence of subjective conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Subjective conditions in a country like ours are outlined by Mao as the &amp;quot;three magic weapons of revolution,&amp;quot; which are the Party, the United Front, and Armed Struggle. Without these subjective conditions, even if there are objective conditions, the revolution is unlikely to occur. Therefore, the Party&#039;s role is to build and consolidate these subjective conditions, the &amp;quot;three magic weapons of revolution,&amp;quot; which, when acting on the objective conditions, enable the development of revolutionary action. These subjective conditions, according to Marxist dialectics, have decisive importance in the revolution to such an extent that they can even generate the following: if the objective conditions for the revolution do not exist, the subjective conditions can, through various actions, create the necessary objective conditions to develop the revolutionary process.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Based on your experiences, do the objective conditions of the revolution exist in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding this, we must consider the analytical approach. Lenin&#039;s analysis, applied to a capitalist country like the USSR, and Mao&#039;s analysis applied to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country like China, offer different perspectives. Lenin argued that a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation&amp;quot; does not always exist in a capitalist country, but arises at a specific moment and may have a short or extended existence but is not permanent. Armed insurrection must, therefore, occur when a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation&amp;quot; emerges. In contrast, Mao argued that in China, there is always a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation&amp;quot; due to its semi-feudal and semi-colonial nature. Applying this doctrine to our country, following Mariátegui&#039;s general policy, our society is also semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Therefore, in our homeland, there is a &amp;quot;revolutionary situation,&amp;quot; meaning there are objective conditions for a revolution. Among these conditions, we have constant protests and movements by peasants demanding land reform, protests against the actions of cooperatives, and ongoing claims for individual land ownership. In the urban working class, there are frequent strikes, protests over rising living costs, demands for wage increases, and more. Even the petite bourgeoisie, teachers, health workers, and various workers protest against economic policies. These conditions indicate that the masses are discontented, suffering from poverty and hunger, which are signs of the presence of objective conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; You mentioned the three objective conditions of the revolution: the Party, the United Front, and Armed Struggle. Do these three conditions exist in the Communist Party of Peru &amp;quot;for the Shining Path of Mariátegui&amp;quot; in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; From the Party&#039;s perspective, the three subjective conditions do exist. Firstly, the Party itself exists, and it remains the same. This Party is the principal condition because it constitutes the guiding force of the entire process. The issue lies in determining if the other two subjective conditions, the United Front (UF) and Armed Struggle (AS), exist. The Party has a clear concept of what it conceives as the United Front. The first form of concrete existence of the UF is the worker-peasant alliance, so we must first inquire if this worker-peasant alliance exists. If it does, then the UF exists. The Party has a fairly clear concept of the UF in this case. The worker-peasant alliance means the Proletarian Party, which is the Communist Party itself, embedded within the peasant masses. In certain peasant areas, primarily among the poor peasantry, the Party guides, organizes, and directs their struggle. Therefore, when peasants are directly guided by the Party, it signifies the Party&#039;s connection to the peasantry. Since the Party represents the working class and is embodied within the peasant masses, this constitutes the concrete worker-peasant alliance, and thus, the UF exists. According to the Party&#039;s conception, this worker-peasant alliance does not end there; it must develop as the backbone of the revolutionary UF. The strategic UF, according to the Party, encompasses four revolutionary classes: the proletariat, the peasantry, the petite bourgeoisie (loyal allies of the revolution), and the national or middle bourgeoisie, considered allies during crucial moments of the revolution. Therefore, the strategic UF unites these four classes: the proletariat, peasantry, petite bourgeoisie, and the national or middle bourgeoisie. The proletariat in our country consists of wage workers in industries and mines, as per Marxist definition, with a particular emphasis on mine workers. Within the peasantry, the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist perspective recognizes three categories: the rich peasantry, the middle peasantry, and the poor peasantry. In terms of percentages, the rich peasantry accounts for approximately 5% to 10%, the middle peasantry about 20% to 30%, while the majority is the poor peasantry. In the early stages, the rich peasantry does not participate in the revolution due to their economic status, and the middle peasantry does so hesitantly. Therefore, the Party focuses primarily on the poor peasantry, who make up the majority and are more inclined toward revolutionary ideology and action. The petite bourgeoisie includes intellectuals, liberal professionals, students, teachers, small-scale merchants, and small-scale artisans—people who economically meet their fundamental needs but also experience oppression from both big capital and the feudal backwardness of the country. Consequently, they are highly inclined to join the revolutionary process. However, they can also easily serve the classes opposing the revolution if they find an easy way to accommodate. The national or middle bourgeoisie comprises medium-sized industrialists, owners of medium-sized mines, and medium-sized merchants—considered as an exploiting class since they exploit wage labor. Nonetheless, they are also disadvantaged by big capital, both foreign and domestic, which limits their growth. Therefore, in specific revolutionary moments, they may align with the big bourgeoisie but can also serve the revolution when their interests depend on their dependency on imperialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Regarding armed struggle, the third subjective condition of the revolution, I have only general ideas, but they result from analyzing the texts of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought and global experience. The Party believes that this third subjective condition also exists from the moment there are determined individuals with the will to engage in armed actions, even when they do not possess weapons. As Lenin stated, &amp;quot;armed struggle without weapons exists from the moment determined individuals are willing to execute it.&amp;quot; Therefore, the Party&#039;s concern is not only about the existence of determined individuals but also about developing these individuals and their actions to the point where armed struggle can be waged effectively. I understand that if the Party has set the task of developing armed struggle, it&#039;s because there are individuals determined and willing to sacrifice their lives for armed struggle. So, for the Party, the third &amp;quot;magic weapon&amp;quot; of the revolution, armed struggle, also exists. At this moment, I cannot confirm if the Party already possesses the necessary weapons to carry out authentic armed actions, as conceived in armed struggle, but I believe that the Party, according to its own strategy, must have necessarily carried out a series of actions that would enable the development of people&#039;s war with weapons. To achieve this, preliminary actions must have been executed.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; How do you explain that despite the strategy of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path, which focuses on armed struggle from rural to urban areas, there have been terrorist or disruptive actions in cities, including attacks on essential public services, public places, and private properties nationwide since July 1980?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; I have a clear opinion on this matter. In China, the first peasant uprising truly led by Mao Zedong occurred in the Chin Kang mountains, which historically served as the base of support for the Chinese revolution. It&#039;s essential to consider the following: before the uprising in the Chin Kang mountains, sabotage actions took place in nearby mining areas and cities. These actions were linked to a strategic plan of the revolution, including acts of sabotage or what is currently termed terrorism. Logically, these actions were intended to divert the military forces of the Chinese state, making it easier to organize, prepare, and develop the peasant uprising led by the Chinese Communist Party. Considering this global experience, it&#039;s not challenging to analyze what is happening in our homeland. Moreover, it&#039;s worth noting that the entire region in China where the Chin Kang mountain uprising took place, including the mining areas and various nearby cities where sabotage acts occurred, collectively covered a territorial expanse similar to that of Peru. Therefore, although individual actions may seem isolated in different cities in Peru, such as in the North, South, Lima, Ayacucho, Huancayo, and more, when viewed as a whole, it is akin to what occurred in China. Thus, even though there are actions in cities, mining areas, and sabotage acts like the destruction of radio antennas in certain locations, primarily state institutions, I believe and am confident that these are supportive actions aiding the preparation and gestation of a genuine revolutionary movement—the peasant uprising.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Do you believe that there is gestation or emergence in the countryside for the purposes of armed struggle?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; I believe one thing regarding this issue. The poor peasantry genuinely suffers from poverty, which is a subjective reality. The misery endured by the poor peasantry throughout the centuries, spanning four centuries, as the Republic failed to resolve the land issue, makes the poor peasantry highly receptive to revolutionary ideology and actions. Our nation&#039;s history and the current century consistently show peasant uprisings, rebellions, such as the armed struggle of 1960 and the well-known peasant invasions. These movements mobilized thousands, even hundreds of thousands of peasants. At this very moment, various regions in the country experience discontent, protests, and, as in 1979, significant peasant movements in the Central Sierra, where even the Sinchis and other military forces had to engage in combat. Therefore, I genuinely believe that the peasantry, especially the poor peasantry, in our homeland, is the sector most inclined towards the preparation and organization of the revolution, as well as the eventual peasant uprising. Even if the poor peasantry lacks systematic, conscious indoctrination, they are still favorable conditions, potentially spontaneous.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; For the gestation of people&#039;s war, which strategically begins in the countryside but is also manifest traditionally in cities through certain actions carried out by the Party, are there mechanisms or structures within the Party for the dissemination or execution of these actions?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding actions like sabotage or terrorism, I am not aware of whether the Party has specialized entities for this purpose. However, I do not believe that this type of action can be carried out by gathering individuals, discussing it on the streets, or hiring people for a task. These actions must necessarily result from well-organized and well-directed work by the Party itself. It is unlikely that many of these groups carrying out sabotage actions have individuals who, in an adventurous and idealistic manner, are not Party members or sympathizers but participate simply out of a desire to engage in revolutionary actions. Nevertheless, I believe such cases are minimal and exceptional, and there are few of them, which cannot be considered the main factor. The primary factor, in my opinion, is that the Party must have entities that systematically and organizationally plan the execution of these actions.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; It has been established that there is a LCWM (Laborers and Class Workers Movement; Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas) linked to the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path; do you consider this link to be real and if the LCWM is an operative organism of the Party?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; I believe that the LCWM is primarily a liaison organization. Since the Party operates clandestinely and cannot openly present itself to the masses or its members as representatives of the Communist Party, it uses what Lenin and Mao Zedong called &amp;quot;transmission belts.&amp;quot; In our country, the Communist Party of Peru (CPP) refers to these as &amp;quot;Generated Organizations,&amp;quot; but the concept is essentially the same—transmission belts or Generated Organizations. The LCWM is one such Generated Organization. In various trade unions, both in mining and industry, there are workers who may or may not be union leaders but are aligned with the CPP’s program. If Party members become aware of these workers, they are considered individuals who serve the Party, even if they are not Party members themselves. This collective of workers, who may not know each other or hold meetings, constitutes what the Party calls the LCWM on a national level. So, any worker or sympathizer who wants to serve the Party or promote the people&#039;s war presents themselves on behalf of the LCWM, which serves as a transmission belt or an organization that is not the Party but supports the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
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As transmission belts, if a group of members who consider themselves part of the LCWM understands that these sabotage actions are part of the Party&#039;s plan to establish the people&#039;s war, then even though they may not be aware of it, some present may be Party members. They generate a proposal or an idea for carrying out a sabotage action, which they may believe is entirely isolated, but from the Party&#039;s perspective, it is part of the plan. They coordinate, plan the action, seek the necessary materials, and execute it. Consequently, it may appear that the LCWM has carried out the sabotage action, but it is under the direct guidance of the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Are there other Generated Organizations or transmission belts of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path in the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Yes, that depends on what is conceived of as various sectors within the popular masses. Following Mao Zedong&#039;s thinking applied to our homeland, the Party conceives of five sectors within the popular masses: a) the worker sector, b) the peasant sector, c) the women&#039;s sector, d) the youth sector, and e) the intellectual sector. To have a transmission belt for each of these sectors, there is a corresponding organization. Thus, in addition to the LCWM for the worker sector, there is the Movement of Poor Peasants (Movimiento de Campesinos Pobres) for the peasant sector, the Popular Women&#039;s Movement (Movimiento Femenino Popular) for the women&#039;s sector, the Youth Movement (Movimiento Juvenil) for the youth sector, and an organization called CTIM, the Mariátegui Intellectual Work Center (Centro de Trabajo Intelectual Mariátegui), for the intellectual sector. Therefore, whether or not these organizations or entities are active, they exist because when the Party wants to reach the women&#039;s masses, taking into account the specific issues facing women, they receive news or analysis from the Women&#039;s Movement, which functions as transmission belts.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What are the forms or means of dissemination of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Based on my knowledge up to the end of 1979, there were three forms of written propaganda: firstly, the Party&#039;s official organ, &#039;&#039;Red Flag&#039;&#039;; secondly, the publication of pamphlets claiming to be from the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party, but these pamphlets focus on specific issues. For example, before the Constituent Assembly elections, a pamphlet titled &#039;&#039;Against Constitutional Illusions&#039;&#039; was published, discouraging people from voting. Similarly, before the campaign that resulted in the election of the current government, another document from the CC titled &#039;&#039;Initiate Armed Struggle&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;Let&#039;s Start Armed Struggle&#039;&#039; was circulated. The third form of written propaganda involves using flyers and similar materials under the names of some of the Generated Organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; How are these means of dissemination subsidized, and how do the Party members move through different regions of the country with specific tasks or slogans?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding this issue, there are multiple aspects to consider. For instance, when I was engaged in dissemination and propaganda activities and had to give talks in distant places from where I lived, the same organizations or institutions that hosted me covered my expenses. These could be clubs, cultural associations, or even communities in some districts. In such cases, I did not incur any personal expenses. In other cases, I have observed the following: for the creation of propaganda materials to be released in the name of the LCWM, in a certain place addressing a specific issue of a union, some members of that organization, which identifies with the LCWM, would collect voluntary contributions from friends and sympathizers. This was another way to fund specific expenses.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, I believe that one form of funding that never ceases to exist is the financial contributions made by Party members themselves. In all communist parties around the world, there is usually a requirement for monthly dues, although the specific amount may vary. In China, it is based on a percentage of what the members earn. From a strict Marxist perspective, the primary source of economic support for the Party is the dues paid by its members. However, it may not be possible for a party to sustain itself solely with these modest contributions, given the substantial expenses involved. In this regard, Chairman Mao Zedong once said, &amp;quot;The main economic source for the expenses required by a party to conduct a revolution is the masses themselves.&amp;quot; Therefore, the Communist Party of China proposed other ideas. If the masses are very poor, and the peasantry is struggling for higher wages, how can you ask them for economic support? Mao Zedong used to respond that the masses are the gods of the revolution and, although they are poor, they are the primary economic source for true revolutionary peoples. Historically, global experiences teach us that, for example, the Communist Party of China received significant assistance from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (USSR) during Stalin&#039;s time, including not only weapons and advice but also economic assistance. Therefore, it should be considered that the Communist Party of Peru may need to receive support from sources beyond the dues of its members or direct help from the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now, regarding whether this could be financial assistance from other countries, it cannot be precisely from the Communist Party of China for a very clear reason. The Communist Party of Peru is against the Communist Party of China because the CPP has characterized and publicized with documents that the government established in China after the death of Mao Zedong is a reactionary, bourgeois, revisionist, counter-revolutionary government that is restoring capitalism. Therefore, they are considered enemies, and I do not believe that the current Communist Party of China would offer or be willing to assist the CPP.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Do the top leaders of the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path and other militants, particularly those in middle management, have extensive ideological training and formation? Is this the result of instruction received abroad or from foreigners coming to our country?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding this, during my extensive political activities as a propagandist, I naturally received information on various aspects of the revolutionary life. I know that during Stalin&#039;s time in the USSR, people from many communist parties around the world went there and received ideological, political, and even military training. In Mao Zedong&#039;s era, especially during the lengthy process of the Cultural Revolution in China, I also know that people from many communist parties around the world visited China and received ideological, political, and even military training. Some Peruvians have been to China, had special meetings with Mao Zedong himself, and he advised them to serve their own people when they returned to their country. In an illustrated Chinese magazine from around the late 1960s that came to our country after Mao Zedong&#039;s death, there is a picture of a group of relatively young individuals from various Latin American countries. The person standing directly in front of Mao Zedong in the photograph is Saturnino Paredes Macedo. However, I do not have concrete evidence; it&#039;s a matter of conjecture, and I cannot confirm whether individuals from the CPP have traveled abroad for such purposes. Nonetheless, I do know that many of those involved in the 1965 guerrillas received training in Cuba. So, it wouldn&#039;t be far-fetched to speculate that members of the CPP might have traveled abroad and received ideological, political, and possibly military training. I cannot say whether people from other countries have come to Peru to provide this kind of training, as I am not a witness to such activities, and I do not know if it is happening now.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Do you speculate that members of the Central Committee have no connection with the Embassy of the People&#039;s Republic of China in Peru?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; I dare say that they have no connection because, as I mentioned earlier, the CPP considers the Communist Party of China as its enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; Has the Communist Party of Peru, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (CPP-MLM), emerged, and can you indicate when it emerged and the reasons?&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; That party must be the one that publishes &#039;&#039;Red Homeland&#039;&#039; (Patria Roja), publicly known as Patria Roja, which is the dissident group that emerged after the Fifth Conference of the CPP. This group was oriented towards militaristic, focoist, and Cubanist concepts and had practically dragged the majority of the party with it when it left. The party, known today as MLM (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist), did not originally emerge with these specific initials. In its early days, it was simply called the Communist Party of Peru, and they were referred to as &amp;quot;Patria Roja.&amp;quot; I believe that after the elections for the Constituent Assembly, this group split into two parts. One of them published a publication called &#039;&#039;Puka Llacta&#039;&#039;, and I think the group behind this publication is the one that calls itself the Communist Party of Peru MLM (Puka Llacta).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; According to the political character of the CPP-MLM (Puka Llacta), do they have any connection or identification with the CPP-Shining Path from the perspective of armed struggle?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; To the best of my knowledge, there were no organic connections between the CPP-MLM (Puka Llacta) and CPP-Shining Path. However, I believe that politically, they share a common goal, which is the people&#039;s war, and both are against electoral processes. They do have differences, such as CPP-Shining Path advocating not voting while &amp;quot;Puka Llacta&amp;quot; advocated casting blank votes. Nevertheless, when it comes to concrete actions within the Party&#039;s main task, which is armed struggle, their commonality outweighs their differences. So, it did not surprise me to read news reports indicating that both Shining Path and Red Homeland (referring to &amp;quot;Puka Llacta&amp;quot;) might be involved in acts of sabotage or terrorism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;QUESTION:&#039;&#039;&#039; What is your opinion on left-wing political parties that have representation in the current National Congress, and do some of them located in the far-left tend to access power through armed struggle in this camouflaged manner?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;ANSWER:&#039;&#039;&#039; Regarding this, I consider what Lenin pointed out: &amp;quot;In electoral processes, those who participate in elections always try to demonstrate that there are two camps, the left and the right.&amp;quot; But Lenin said, &amp;quot;This is false; in reality, there are three camps: the right, the true left, and a third camp that presents itself as left but is the opportunist camp.&amp;quot; So, from the perspective of these concepts, members of the so-called left who have participated in elections and are in Congress are not the true left; rather, they belong to what Lenin called the third camp, the opportunist camp, according to Leninist concepts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ProleWiki annotations ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki 6.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Excerpts From The Topic &amp;quot;The Indians,&amp;quot; Developed By William P. S. Mangin At The Wingspread Conference, Wisconsin, Usa, In 1970 ===&lt;br /&gt;
(&#039;&#039;The Peruvian Revolution and the United States&#039;&#039; by David Sharp, Pages 358 to 367, South American Edition, Buenos Aires).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== QUECHUA IDENTITY AND THE COLD WAR ====&lt;br /&gt;
The indigenous people, mostly speakers of Quechua, make up approximately half of the Peruvian population. Half of this group either does not speak Spanish or only knows it to a limited extent, and their way of life, according to their own definition and that of others, is typical of indigenous people. It is likely that the Quechua-speaking population today has the same number of individuals as it did at the height of the Inca Empire, and its members are increasingly aware of their indigenous identity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to modern methods of transportation and communication, especially affordable bus travel and transistor radios, many now know the coastal region, Lima, and other mountain valleys. Many men have seen the country and conversed with other indigenous people during their military service. The Army uses propaganda groups to recruit indigenous people, but during their time in the military, they learn Spanish and a trade, discovering the existence of other indigenous people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The many peasant unions, either formed or infiltrated by Maoists, Communists, the GIO, the CIA, Cubans, etc., have also raised the political consciousness of indigenous people and developed general awareness of their numbers and identity. Still, many indigenous people express shame and discomfort about their own condition, and many do not want their children to learn Quechua in schools.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, based on my own experience, these feelings have diminished in the last twenty years, and now there are many more indigenous people who do not feel ashamed of their language and their particular condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For several years in Peru, I suggested to various officials at the US Embassy, especially members of AID, USIS, and the Peace Corps, the need to develop special programs in Quechua and to work directly with indigenous people. In 1958-59, the response was a smile or indifference. An AID official (then called Point 4) mentioned that some Peruvian colleagues from the Ministry of Education had explained to him that Quechua only had 400 words and that it was a dialect, not a language. He saw no reason to waste time on such an ineffective tool. In 1962-64, there was more interest, but still with reluctance. Peruvians did not like the idea that the Peace Corps was instructing a group in Quechua instead of Spanish. A Fulbright program official (Peruvian) stated, &amp;quot;Quechua, Indianism, and communism go hand in hand.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The majority of American officials in general have shown little interest in indigenous people, except as rural Peruvians, and this policy has been satisfactory because it was also that of the Peruvian government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some members of the Embassy staff who established relationships with the APRA party were interested in the somewhat romantic concept of &amp;quot;Indoamerican&amp;quot; promoted by Haya de la Torre. However, the Apristas have been considerably more active on the coast and in working with Spanish-speaking individuals, many of whom are racially indigenous but culturally cholos or mestizos.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The trend of previous governments, the current one, and practically all political parties, including the APRA, has been to integrate the &amp;quot;Indian&amp;quot; into the national culture as a &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; man (or better, but no one mentions women) of modern Peru. The idea is that the time of Túpac Amaru has passed, and talking about separatism is a divisive attitude. I agree that it is divisive, but I believe there are ample reasons to anticipate a powerful separatist movement, and it will matter little whether we like it or not, or whether we speak about it or remain silent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nationalism and separatist movements are still strong in France (Bretons), Spain (Catalans and Basques), Belgium (Walloons and Flemings), Great Britain (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland), Yugoslavia, Russia, and other regions of Europe. Nigeria, Burundi, Kenya, Congo, Ghana, and other African states are torn apart by nationalist and separatist movements. The same phenomenon is observed in Indochina (Vietnamese, Montagnards, Khmers, and other mountain peoples), and Malaysia, China, and Myanmar have minorities that wish to be autonomous. Canada has a significant separatist movement, and so on. In my opinion, it would be short-sighted to believe that one of the most important nations (tribes, peoples, or whatever term is used) with the greatest cultural uniformity, referring to the Quechuas, will not demand recognition of their rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peruvian colonial and republican governments, both civilian and military, have attempted to abolish the indigenous people through decrees (for example, the current government has claimed that all are peasants). But for better or worse, the indigenous people do not take these attempts seriously. The various attempts made over the last 400 years to assimilate, integrate, or control them, including sending them to the jungle to expose them to malaria, have not succeeded. The Quechuas (and Aymaras) are resilient, and their numbers have continued to grow, despite their contributions to the formation of mestizo and cholo groups with the intelligence and energy of a large number of their own members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I wish to briefly outline some impossible facts and the potential responses from the United States. I understand that assuming a U.S. response separate from the Peruvian attitude implies a certain arrogance, and for that reason, I will attempt to place the U.S. attitude within the context of Peruvian positions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# The first possibility is the least likely. Let&#039;s assume that, thanks to the emergence of highly capable political leaders, a Quechua-Aymara state is formed or attempted to be formed in the Andes of Bolivia and Ecuador. As I mentioned, this is a highly improbable phenomenon. The opposition of Western governments in all three countries to the actions of internal separatists is firm, so combined resistance would be immense. It is likely that the United States would provide military assistance to contain such movements, ultimately intertwining with the political dynamics of the Cold War. I won&#039;t dwell on this possibility, except to point out that I don&#039;t consider it entirely impossible in the distant future.&lt;br /&gt;
# The second possibility, and I must clarify that I find it as improbable as the first, is the complete integration of Quechua and Aymara Indians into Peruvian national culture as Spanish-speaking peasants. Many Peruvian political leaders, both white and mestizo, as well as many Americans, rely on this possibility. Most of U.S. policy has been based on the assumption that integration was taking place, that it was desirable, and deserved support. If this possibility were to occur—and it should not be ruled out—there would be no major need to modify the policy followed thus far.&lt;br /&gt;
# The most probable series of events will unfold within the general framework outlined in this work. Centuries of gradual and abrupt change have determined a complex social structure, with partially overlapping groups of different social and economic positions and aspirations. Indigenous people live in isolated communities, but it is more common for them to be members of communities where they coexist with individuals from non-indigenous groups. As with most national groups, some wish to assimilate into the general society, others want to become Peruvians while maintaining their indigenous identity, some want separation, and the majority probably doesn&#039;t think much about it. Depending on the political circumstances, some individuals will identify as indigenous in one context and as non-indigenous in another. The first two possibilities are often seen as ideal forms. The Peruvian and American governments will have to respond to real situations that will never be well-defined examples of Quechua nationalism or separatism, but rather complex phenomena influenced by many causes, with Quechua identity being just one facet.  However, if my assumption that the importance of Quechua identity as a political phenomenon increases is valid, it will be necessary for the governments involved to adopt a defined attitude towards the existence of indigenous people as a differentiated culture, or at the very least, become aware that this people exists. This is because in the various controversies that will arise, the concerns of indigenous people will be a factor that will not go unnoticed by others. In reality, as many observers have pointed out, Peruvian mestizos and whites have used local protests by indigenous people against abuses as a political lever in disputes they have had with other mestizos and whites for generations. When the idea of Quechua independence enters the international political scene, it will become a factor in the Cold War.  As the United States has already collaborated in an operation against two guerrilla groups, a policy begins to take shape. In the 1965 operation against guerrilla groups, aircraft, bombs, and napalm produced in the United States, as well as troops trained by Americans, were used, and there have been accusations that American special forces in Peru were also involved. Many Peruvian Indians, some involved in the movement and most unrelated to the issue, were killed, and the effects of this episode on the entire area are still difficult to estimate. In 1960, after the Civil Guard wounded ten Indians and killed four on the Huapra estate near Vicos, many believed that the United States was siding with the Indians. However, this position was more apparent than real. In a casual visit to Vicos, Edward Kennedy learned about the incident from the accounts of several locals, as well as from the accounts of Americans strongly supportive of the Indians. He then pressured President Prado to initiate negotiations that would lead to the expropriation of the Hacienda Vicos in favor of the resident Indians. During the uprisings of peasant unions in the Convención area in 1962 and 1963, the United States barely had any involvement with both sides, and the situation became even more complicated due to the presence of the American company Anderson Clayton. There were conflicts with Indian communities in the Central Andes, where the interests of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation were at stake, and to a lesser extent in Pararín and the Colca Valley, where Grace and Co. had interests. There were many other incidents involving American participation and many more without it, for example, the incident near Anta in June of this year (1969), when the police fired on Indians who were apparently protesting a real or imagined consequence of the new official agrarian reform, which they believed would deprive them of land. I mention this Anta incident (Ayacucho) to introduce the idea that Indian communities have economic interests distinct from those that characterize Indians who own small farms and/or work on other people&#039;s land. Thus, a policy towards &amp;quot;Indians&amp;quot; applied in a situation involving nationalism or Indian identity could provoke contradictory reactions in cases related to agrarian reform, land redistribution, small loans, cooperatives, etc. It cannot be asserted that there is an automatic Indian response to agrarian reform or any other issue.  In view of the current situation, characterized by many incidents involving indigenous participation, albeit with different characteristics and sometimes conflicting interests, and the increasingly pronounced self-awareness of the indigenous people themselves, one can speak of the emergence of a series of situations in which official Peruvian and American attitudes may coincide or diverge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Psychological Profile Of Urban Militants Of The Shining Path ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== GENERAL ANALYSIS ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Permanent Conditions =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* 50% mestizo, 25% indigenous, 25% white, mulatto, and Black. 90% with secondary and higher education. More from provinces than from the capital.&lt;br /&gt;
* Exclusive manifestations of Peruvian nationality through ethnic motivations, (pride) of the Quechua-Aymara culture, mainly symbolized in the strong personality of the highland women of the group.&lt;br /&gt;
* Center of revolutionary political attraction for youth due to the failure or lack of other valid alternatives to the current aspirations of the youth population.&lt;br /&gt;
* Exploitation of basic needs and deficiencies of the population in general.&lt;br /&gt;
* Organizational &amp;quot;Natural Selection&amp;quot; scheme based on Agitation and Propaganda conducted by initiates and reeducated individuals.&lt;br /&gt;
* Practice of responsible, conscious, and extreme discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
* Strictly hierarchical and compartmentalized organizational structure vertically and laterally.&lt;br /&gt;
* Need for, recognition of, and acceptance of maximum authority.&lt;br /&gt;
* Controlled social integration. Self-control and inter-control of behaviors. Disregard for the pleasure (Eros) of living, glorious acceptance of death (Thanatos).&lt;br /&gt;
* Externalization of primary impulses of obedience and dedication, reinforced by tanic passions that show processes of psychotization directed by intellectualized states of fanaticization.&lt;br /&gt;
* Ideological-military indoctrination of &amp;quot;Mao-Gonzalo Thought&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Seven Military Writings&amp;quot; of Mao Zedong.&lt;br /&gt;
* Cult of party solidarity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Semi-Permanent Conditions =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Modifications in the organization due to geographical displacements or adaptation to various functions.&lt;br /&gt;
* Complementary training and self-determined training.&lt;br /&gt;
* Maximum security, differentiated by organization levels and hierarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Motivating rituals prior to immediate action.&lt;br /&gt;
* Break with recognized socialization institutions: Family, Church, educational centers, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
* Periodic potentiation of group aggressiveness as a result of numerous plans and practices for reserve action.&lt;br /&gt;
* Feelings of frustration stemming from major national problems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Exogenous actions aimed at strengthening the morale of prisoners.&lt;br /&gt;
* Practice of mind control discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
* Confidence and trust in the organization.&lt;br /&gt;
* Development of behaviors, education, and conduct in the face of adverse contingencies.&lt;br /&gt;
* Training of activists through mobilization centers of the social status of expectant or paralyzed youth groups that do not see a future, let alone fulfillment.&lt;br /&gt;
* Maximum utilization of endemic social circumstances: Legal Resources, impunity of minors, institutional differences between security forces, police repression, uncontrolled increase in social needs, schizophrenic state of Peruvian society (everyone against everyone).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== ATTITUDE ANALYSIS ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Positive Attitudes: =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Life with ideological motivations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Political-military capacity (strategists and tacticians).&lt;br /&gt;
* Advocacy for ethnic and cultural values of our past civilizations.&lt;br /&gt;
* Education and preparation for action. Willpower.&lt;br /&gt;
* Respect for hierarchy and one&#039;s own authority.&lt;br /&gt;
* High morale and austere life.&lt;br /&gt;
* Developed security awareness.&lt;br /&gt;
* Sense of opportunity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Organized solidarity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Ability for planning and executing actions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Negative Attitudes: =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Lack of national motivations and values.&lt;br /&gt;
* Self-destructive feelings due to political passion.&lt;br /&gt;
* Overvaluation of one&#039;s own convictions.&lt;br /&gt;
* Rigid, schematic, and ambivalent behaviors.&lt;br /&gt;
* Permanent state of frustration.&lt;br /&gt;
* Violation of beliefs or interests to influence or create independence.&lt;br /&gt;
* Irrevocable decisions.&lt;br /&gt;
* Disregard for life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== PROFILE =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Insurgent and clandestine political-military organization with great mobility.&lt;br /&gt;
* Builds cohesion based on cultural differentiation from the current Peruvian society, which it challenges; and global transformation proposals without specifying precise national objectives.&lt;br /&gt;
* Elite, rigid, and closed organization.&lt;br /&gt;
* Effective participation of women in the tactical direction of actions, support, and maintenance of the organization.&lt;br /&gt;
* Element of psychological maneuver against the State, Government, Politics, and National Defense Plans of uncertain origin and covert dependence.&lt;br /&gt;
* Real knowledge of the strategic position they occupy in the national subversive process.&lt;br /&gt;
* Logistical self-sufficiency.&lt;br /&gt;
* Great intellectual development.&lt;br /&gt;
* Severe rejection of other tendencies: Yankee imperialism, Soviet social imperialism, pro-imperialist bourgeoisie, and nationalist Armed Forces.&lt;br /&gt;
* Serious, hierarchical, and two-way social communication system, with intermediate couriers.&lt;br /&gt;
* Imposing practice of self-criticism as a catalyst for shame and failure, as well as a regulator of behavior within the group.&lt;br /&gt;
* Replaces ideological debate and confrontation with armed action and messianic thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
* Bases its struggle on concrete facts (tactics) and directs it towards forms of generalized struggle against the prevailing system (strategy).&lt;br /&gt;
* Maintains prestige, strengthens willpower, and perfects its organization due to the counterproductive effects of conventional repression carried out without the necessary reinforcement of concurrent socio-economic actions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* A tiny group in relation to the total urban population of Lima.&lt;br /&gt;
* Develops its potential based on mobility and surprise.&lt;br /&gt;
* Sustains its cohesion through ideological internationalization, high morale, and willingness to fight.&lt;br /&gt;
* Translates its organization into minimal operational units (communal) at the local, regional, and national levels.&lt;br /&gt;
* Highly centralized command, resembling a General Staff.&lt;br /&gt;
* Extends influence and power through persuasion and cohesion.&lt;br /&gt;
* Intensely dissolves social function due to the insecurity and social schizophrenia generated by its actions.&lt;br /&gt;
* Feels the ability to condition the political life of the community, destabilize the Government, and wear down the Armed Forces.&lt;br /&gt;
* Increases its international prestige promoted by international news agencies, under the guise of Human Rights and the socio-economic weakening factors of the Central Government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== SPECIFIC ANALYSIS ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Susceptibility =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Own logistical resources.&lt;br /&gt;
* Organization subordinated to urban armed struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
* Relative isolation from formal Marxist left and metropolitan working class.&lt;br /&gt;
* Ideological schematism.&lt;br /&gt;
* Verticalism and hierarchical rigidity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Complicated internal social communication system.&lt;br /&gt;
* Personality disrupted by political passion and ambivalence of values.&lt;br /&gt;
* Oversaturation of self-destructive feelings that reverse the effects of insecurity and schizophrenia.&lt;br /&gt;
* Eventual detentions disrupt the leadership cadre.&lt;br /&gt;
* Sensitivity to concurrent socio-economic actions and policies aimed at improving the national situation.&lt;br /&gt;
* Open centers for recruitment and proselytism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Plans Of The Shining Path Specifying Psychological Warfare ===&lt;br /&gt;
a) Evaluation of Actions in the General Plan in 1984 (Transcription of Handwritten Copy).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
b) Reproduction of Specific Plan (Holograph) for Psychological Campaign for April, May, and June 1987.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== a) EVALUATION OF ACTIONS IN THE GENERAL PLAN IN 1984. ====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== THE FOUR FORMS OF STRUGGLE =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====== &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;I. GUERRILLA ACTION&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ======&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Crops and Collective Planting:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Airabamba, Tancayllo, Aizarco, and collective plantings protected by the Popular Guerrilla Army and led by the People&#039;s Committee. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Assault:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Assault on police posts in Luricocha, Quinua, Tambo, Totos, Vilcashuamán. Disarmament. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No raid on Ñaña, Ricardo Palma.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Ambushes:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leap in the 1st Campaign of Defend, Develop, and Construct Sivia, Minascucho. Ambush of military vehicles. Surprise attacks. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Need to develop further, no counter-ambush tactics applied; target patrols; forces are surprised: Omasi, Manallascac, Tuco.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Occupation of Towns:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Quantitative and qualitative leaps from the beginning (Pujas) to conquering Bases; from small to medium. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Vinchos (CR-Central) allowed reactionaries to regroup and capture them for not camouflaging and not conducting proper reconnaissance, failed to annihilate them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Confrontation:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reverence for the Armed Forces is beginning to diminish, and they respond with great determination. Andahuaylas, Aranhuay, Milucha, Sacsamarca, Huacasancos. Against combined forces or mesnadas. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They are caught off guard and do not plan their response.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Scorched Earth and Counter-Establishment, Critical Point Strikes, and Overruns:&#039;&#039;&#039; Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They are beginning to handle guerrilla warfare with extensive mobility, campaigns of encirclement and annihilation, and counter-campaigns of encirclement and annihilation. Umaru. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hit and run; bypass the main point of the Base-manifestation of the errant Lucanas. Develop more extensive guerrilla warfare with high mobility. Resolve displacements silently and by platoons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Campaigns of Encirclement and Annihilation and Counter-Campaigns of Encirclement and Annihilation:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Escape:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Escape policy CRAS Ayacucho. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems with basic principles of high-level war misunderstanding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Disturbances, Street Fighting Tactics:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the capital of the country, simultaneously at 13 points and a wide area with successive blows. Progress in uniting armed struggle with the people&#039;s struggle. Centers of resistance. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Develop them around the proletariat&#039;s struggles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====== &#039;&#039;II. SABOTAGE&#039;&#039; ======&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Sabotage:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heavy blows to the country&#039;s economy, bureaucratic capitalism, and imperialism and social-imperialism. Applied in series. San Martín de Forres, Southern, Oil pipelines, light and microwave towers, Hogar S.A., Bayer, cotton bales, sugarcane fields. A three-part plan. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not hitting Social-imperialism, need for more significant sabotage. More roadblocks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====== &#039;&#039;III. SELECTIVE TERRORISM&#039;&#039; ======&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Execution and Popular Trials:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Execution of authorities and informants. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not executing higher-level authorities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====== &#039;&#039;IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE&#039;&#039; ======&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Agitation:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armed propaganda focused on peasants as the primary target. 200,000 copies of &amp;quot;Let&#039;s Develop Guerrilla Warfare,&amp;quot; 100,000 posters, graphic flyers, 150,000 for the first, and 100,000 for the second. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Psychological Warfare:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Don&#039;t target the proletariat in the city.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Mobilization:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Advances &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From mobilizing hundreds of people to mobilizing 50,000 peasants only in the main CR during the &amp;quot;Batir.&amp;quot; It&#039;s primarily armed. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Limitation: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Proletariat and the urban poor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== THE FIVE STEPS =====&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;1. ACTIONS&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advances:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have entered the main form of civil war, campaigns and counter-campaigns of encirclement and annihilation. Management of campaigns. The five steps. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Failures:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Plan failure, Ñaña, Tambo 2, Chumbes, failure of recognition, investigation; fixing terrain. Information failure. They don&#039;t see two hills. Lircay, Ricardo Palma.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;2. DETACHMENTS&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advances:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Popular Guerrilla Army, three forces: night march, regular march, and forced march. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Failures:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems in force management, problems in concentration and dispersion. Company: leadership doesn&#039;t function; amorphous without squads. Daytime road mobility. They are caught off guard: Tuco, Manallasca, etc. Surveillance failures, coordination failure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;3. PLANNING&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advances:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Night withdrawal, with shelter, staggered. One point, two sides, main point, containment, irruption. Three groups: attack, support, security. Means: Acquisition and distribution. Striking where the weakest point is. Never between two flanks. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Improvisation; anticipating success, failure, casualties. Starting point, fallback point, concentration point. Drills, command voice. Start signal; signals, liaisons, task control. Thoroughness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;4. EXECUTION&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advances:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Objective achieved. Key assaults, irruption if missing, they surrender with fires. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Objective attainment: Ricardo Palma; Vilcashuamán, CRAS Ayacucho (weapons). Bellicosity, audacity, quick decision. Most crucial moment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;5. EVALUATION&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Advance:&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zonal assessments &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Problems: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neglect, no positive and negative lessons drawn for squads, detachments, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Newsweek98julnewy_0384.jpg&amp;diff=64138</id>
		<title>File:Newsweek98julnewy 0384.jpg</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Newsweek98julnewy_0384.jpg&amp;diff=64138"/>
		<updated>2024-03-13T01:06:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Newsweek, August 3 1981, page 20&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Summary ==&lt;br /&gt;
Newsweek, August 3 1981, page 20&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Newsweek98julnewy_0383.jpg&amp;diff=64137</id>
		<title>File:Newsweek98julnewy 0383.jpg</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Newsweek98julnewy_0383.jpg&amp;diff=64137"/>
		<updated>2024-03-13T01:05:54Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Newsweek, August 3 1981, page 19&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Summary ==&lt;br /&gt;
Newsweek, August 3 1981, page 19&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Newsweek98julnewy_0382.jpg&amp;diff=64136</id>
		<title>File:Newsweek98julnewy 0382.jpg</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Newsweek98julnewy_0382.jpg&amp;diff=64136"/>
		<updated>2024-03-13T01:05:30Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Newsweek, August 3 1981, page 18&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Summary ==&lt;br /&gt;
Newsweek, August 3 1981, page 18&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Hezbollah:_A_Short_History&amp;diff=63963</id>
		<title>Library:Hezbollah: A Short History</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Hezbollah:_A_Short_History&amp;diff=63963"/>
		<updated>2024-03-09T20:32:48Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Import references&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Hezbollah: A Short History|author=Augustus Norton|audiobook=[https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceajyiclzata4sjdy2jhwadhpszghupdoqbsoftbfagnywgibgiz7s?filename=Hezbollah%3A%20a%20short%20history%20--%20Norton%2C%20Augustus%20R%20--%20Princeton%20studies%20in%20Muslim%20politics%2C%20New%20paperback%20edition%2C%20--%20Princeton%20University%20Press%20--%209780691160818%20--%2083eeaf5a0b85ae0e20731f49dd8e231b%20--%20Anna%E2%80%99s%20Archive.pdf PDF]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;06_pro_1.xhtml#page_vii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Prologue to the New Paperback Edition&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;y work on the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community began in tumultuous times many years ago. The Shah of Iran had been toppled, Iraq was about to invade Iran (launching a savage eight-year war), and Lebanon, ever permeable to external influence, was divided into militia fiefdoms supported by regional and global rivals. Next door in Syria, the legitimacy of the al-Asad regime was being challenged by Islamist opponents who would soon be pitilessly obliterated along with much of the city of Hama in 1981. The most significant non-state actor in the Arab world was the PLO, then dismissed by Israel as “terrorist.” Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Hezbollah did not yet exist (its establishment is discussed in [[#09_chap2.xhtml|chapter 2]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 35 years that have passed, the country has enjoyed some peaceful, prosperous interludes, and some Lebanese have managed to insulate themselves from disorder and violence or lose themselves in the rampant consumerism of Beirut. Others have made new lives as expatriates. For all too many Lebanese, however, it is sobering to consider how often invasion, warfare, dislocation, or the threat of impending disaster have impinged on daily life. Too many of the Lebanese whom I first encountered in the early 1980s or later have died violently: three were assassinated; others fell in battle or were otherwise victims of violence. As this updated version of &#039;&#039;Hezbollah&#039;&#039; goes to press, civil war rages in Syria and ominous storm clouds hang over Lebanon, where bad weather hardly stops at the border.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Inspired by the initial successes of the “Arab Spring,” Syrians mounted peaceful demonstrations beginning in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;06_pro_1.xhtml#page_viii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;March 2011. The Damascus regime responded ruthlessly. Of course, the iron fist response failed to squash the protests, and as the opposition turned to bullets and bombs, floods of refugees began to cross borders into neighboring countries, including in Lebanon, where more than one million refugees from Syria sought safety by the end of 2013. Considering that Lebanon’s population is just four million, the refugee crisis alone has been calamitous for the small country’s stability and treasury.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In contrast to Syria, only a handful of Lebanese were inspired by the initial success of massive protests in Tunisia and Egypt to take to the streets shouting “&#039;&#039;irhal&#039;&#039;” (leave/scram). Changing the government in Lebanon would accomplish very little, because political and economic power rests largely in patronage networks, political movements, and political parties, as exemplified by Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah’s initial response to the “Arab Spring” demonstrations was calm and self-assured. When Egyptian president Husni Mubarak was toppled in February 2011, many Hezbollah supporters were gleeful that an arch foe, who had lent strong support to the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i group’s Lebanese rivals, had fallen from power. There was little concern that the group’s close ally in Damascus would be threatened at all. It turned out that Hezbollah shared in the Syrian government’s self-delusions. Al-Asad’s armed forces not only failed to suppress its internal opposition but also precipitated a civil war that imposed destitution, death, and destruction on its own citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for Iran, whose government has close ties with Hezbollah, leading regime figures incredulously claimed that the “Islamic Revolution” had inspired the “Arab Spring.” Even before the Arab Spring, Saudi-Iranian jousting was already the main event in Lebanon; with the developing civil war in neighboring Syria, it has &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;06_pro_1.xhtml#page_ix&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;become a blood sport. Although Hezbollah extolled its Iranian ally’s virtues, the squashing of the reformist Green Movement protests in Iran during 2009 received wide play in the Arab media, and the Iranian regime was widely viewed in Arab countries as both repressive and alien.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many Lebanese would naturally prefer to keep these regional catastrophes at arm’s length, praying that what happens in Syria, in particular, stays in Syria. This is not happening. Notwithstanding the efforts of leading Lebanese political figures to avoid entanglement in Syria and maintain a neutral stance of “disassociation,” the creeping encroachment of the Syrian civil war has proven unstoppable. The two countries are intertwined economically, culturally, and politically. Well before Hezbollah’s high profile intervention in Syria bolstered the regime in the spring of 2013, cross border shoot-outs, ambushes, kidnappings, floods of Syrian refugees entering Lebanon, and the counter flow of Lebanese to join the fight in Syria dashed hopes for neutrality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although precise survey data is unavailable, my impression, which is shared by a number of other close observers, is that the Lebanese are more or less split half-and-half in terms of which side they support in Syria. Three decades of Syrian domination of Lebanon ended only in 2005, and many who suffered would celebrate the fall of the al-Asad regime. It must be said, however, that large numbers of Lebanese, including many Christians as well as Muslims, continue to see the Syrian regime in a more favorable light. They note that it has protected minorities and fear the prospect of a new regime in which extreme jihadist groups can gain significant power and potentially pose a lethal threat to those who do not embrace a Salafist interpretation of Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;06_pro_1.xhtml#page_x&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hezbollah’s decision to side openly with the Damascus regime in the fighting provoked an angry response from Salafist Sunni preachers in Lebanon who declared a jihad in Syria and rallied supporters to strike back at Hezbollah. Syrian opposition forces vowed to bring their war to Lebanon, and have done so with massive car bombs and artillery salvos on Hezbollah’s urban stronghold in southern Beirut, which is now festooned with posters of martyrs who have fallen in Syria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the carnage enters its fourth year, a definitive end to the Syrian civil war remains nowhere in sight. Cooperation between Russia—Damascus’s most powerful ally—and the United States to dismantle Syria’s massive chemical weapons arsenal under UN supervision at least opened the door for a negotiated end to the civil war. However, neither the al-Asad regime nor its fractious opponents appear ready to compromise, and even if an anticipated international conference on Syria convenes, it is likely to be a forum for an airing of demands, not a resolution of the conflict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
More likely, blowback from Syria will continue to be felt in Lebanon. In order to impede its deployment to Syria, more attacks on Hezbollah by its Lebanese and Syrian enemies are probable, and Hezbollah is unlikely to back away from a conflict that it sees as vital to its security, if not its survival.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If there is a Lebanese consensus about the horridly vicious Syrian civil war, it is around the broadly shared fear that Lebanon may again find itself in a new era of mayhem. Militant forces within Lebanon that are opposed to Hezbollah have gained momentum, especially in the Sunni community, which nearly rivals the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i population in size. Recent calls by Sunni clerics for a jihad in Syria that would destroy Hezbollah and stamp out Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism do not augur well for a peaceful future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;06_pro_1.xhtml#page_xi&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Despite these serious challenges to its authority, Hezbollah is likely to retain its dominant role in Lebanon for the foreseeable future. Over the last two decades, the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i organization has evolved from an Iranian-influenced conspiratorial terrorist group that rejects participation in Lebanese politics to a party with considerable autonomy and a talent for playing politics and winning elections. Now a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i political party with a large base of popular support, Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government and, at the same time, Lebanon’s most powerful military power. And it has not been beneath flaunting that power to get its way. (Chapter 5 describes and analyzes the organization’s evolution and its complex profile on the Lebanese political landscape.) Its Janus-faced profile infuriates detractors, while seeming perfectly reasonable to its defenders and supporters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Especially since the 2006 war with Israel (discussed in [[#13_chap6.xhtml|chapter 6]]), an overwhelming majority of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a have embraced Hezbollah as the defender of their community. Hezbollah’s security narrative, if not its worldview, suddenly became compelling, not simply for ardent Hezbollahis but even for many apolitical and avowedly secular Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims. The plausibility of Hezbollah’s security narrative—that the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a must protect themselves because the Lebanese Army is incapable of doing so and no one else will—is a crucial explanation for the uncommon unity one finds among many Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a Muslims today. This suggests that outsiders (such as the United States or France) seeking to reduce Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon must redress the security narrative rather than take steps that validate it. Additionally, however legitimate Israel’s concerns may be about Hezbollah’s military capacity and its armory, not to mention its deep-seated enmity toward Israel, it is foolhardy to consider &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;06_pro_1.xhtml#page_xii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hezbollah’s strength without acknowledging how widely and how often the Lebanese, and especially Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Lebanese, have suffered from Israel’s characteristically disproportionate violence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, Hezbollah supporters have cause for grave concern. While many supporters share the leadership’s appraisal of the high stakes in Syria, they do not necessarily approve of the party’s intervention there, which they fear may make conflagration more likely in Lebanon. This raises what is perhaps the key question about Hezbollah’s dominant role in Lebanon, which is how it would maintain its power if its supporters start to vote with their feet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equally significant and worrisome for the group’s partisans is Hezbollah’s recent loss of popular esteem in the Arab world. In contrast to high-flying days following the 2006 war, when Hezbollah’s virtues and battlefield exploits were widely celebrated, the group is now commonly derided around the Arab world and in the ubiquitous Saudi-funded media for its connections to the reviled theocracy in Iran, its implication in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005, and for its alleged involvement in terrorist attacks. The decision of the European Union in 2013 to designate Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist group only adds to the ostracism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any outcome in Syria that includes the demise of the present regime will undermine Hezbollah’s power, and undermining Hezbollah is a central goal of Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy as well as that of the United States. Even so, a dramatic shift in the internal balance of power in Lebanon might prove far less palatable than United States and Saudi Arabia seem to presume, especially if violent Sunni jihadists gain broader power as a result.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No one of us may claim knowledge from a crystal ball, but there is little doubt that in the coming years Hezbollah &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;06_pro_1.xhtml#page_xiii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;faces a future of trials and challenges. For better or worse, Hezbollah will remain a big part of the unfolding story in that troubled region.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;07_pro_2.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;07_pro_2.xhtml#page_1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Prologue&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:images/15.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Map 1. Major cities, and some important towns and villages, as well as Lebanon’s six provinces and the areas of deployment of United Nations peacekeepers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;I&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;t was an easy summer evening in August 2004. The Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslim village lies about five miles southeast of Tyre, Lebanon’s southernmost city, and the border with Israel is eight miles due south. Al-Bazuriya boasts a few simple shops and a couple of hundred homes of stone or cinder block, and we are gathered on the large balcony of one of these homes. Grapes, begging for picking, hang overhead on a thick fabric of vines, shading a long table brimming with Lebanon’s famous &#039;&#039;mezze&#039;&#039; (appetizers)—tabbouleh, hummus, pickles in pastel shades, finger-shaped wrapped grape leaves stuffed with rice and herbs, milk white cheese, breads, and other delicacies of vivid red, brown and orange hues. The &#039;&#039;mezze&#039;&#039; and the meats, fish, and chicken that would follow were to celebrate the visit of a son of the village of al-Bazuriya, a successful surgeon, and his bride, from Michigan. Many of the people around the table—parents, siblings, cousins, and friends—moved easily between Arabic and English, especially and most helpfully when this author lost his way in Arabic. English has been the preferred second language in almost every Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i family for decades.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is a successful middle-class Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i family, for which, like many others in Lebanon, education and emigration are the steps on a ladder to a good life. In other families and villages, the destinations would vary—Abidjan instead of Dearborn, Michigan; Ivory Coast instead of Brazil—but the pattern is the same. The Lebanese emigrants, whether their path of migration is circular, as with those who work in Africa as merchants and traders and return to Lebanon to marry and invest their earnings, or goes in one direction, as with those who end up in the Americas, typically sharing the largess they accumulate abroad with their extended families still in Lebanon. These remittances are vital to their families. By one credible estimate, the annual remittances &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of all Lebanese abroad totaled nearly $2.5 billion in 2001 (Hourani 2006, 27).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over dessert and, later, small glasses of sweet hot tea, the conversation drifted from the cozy trivialities of family intimacy to serious talk about the politics of Lebanon now that the South was “liberated.” A little more than four years before this gathering, in May 2000, Israel had withdrawn its occupation army from southern Lebanon under pressure from Lebanese fighters, especially the self-styled “Islamic Resistance” led by the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslim Hezbollah (the “Party of God”). Mention of the two-decade-long Israeli occupation of their country and the retreat of the occupiers still inspired pride and a joyful &#039;&#039;ilhamdilillah&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;nushkur allah&#039;&#039; (“praise to God” or “thank God”) within this circle of family and friends. Like many Lebanese, this family, in the course of the 1990s, had come to believe that the Israelis might never leave.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These sons and daughters of Bazuriya wanted me to know that theirs was the village where Hasan Nasrallah, now the leader of Hezbollah, grew up and went to school. One of his teachers, who was present at the family gathering, recalled young Hasan’s serious cast of mind and his piety even as an adolescent. Like many religiously minded young Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i men before him, Nasrallah went to study in the famous Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i seminaries of Iraq’s al-Najaf, one of the great shrine cities of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism. Nasrallah became secretary-general of Hezbollah in 1992, and ever since has been detested by Israel and America but widely admired in much of the Muslim world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was in al-Najaf as well as Karbala that key episodes in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism occurred, and multitudes of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a visit annually to pray there alongside the tombs of two of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism’s epic figures. For Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims, such as the young Nasrallah, the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;language, food, and hospitality of al-Najaf and Karbala were familiar. In contrast, the seminaries of Iran were further removed culturally, linguistically, and physically. Still, these days it is just as likely that scores of young Lebanese men will journey to Iran for their religious instruction than to Iraq. This is not so much because of a sudden new affinity for Iran but because Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, became a menacing place for Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i students. Also, the country has been dangerous and chaotic since the Anglo-American invasion in March 2003. In any case, the Iranians offer an attractive stipend to entice young Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a to their seminaries. One of the cousins, in fact, who was present on that summer evening in Bazuriya in 2004, was a pleasant young seminary student home for the summer from Qum in Iran. He was intent on welcoming a non-Arab visitor from America and eager to engage me in conversation, especially on the topic of his computer classes in Qum and the relative merits of Microsoft computer software.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Bazuriya and villages across southern Lebanon, as in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i locales in and around Beirut and in the Beqaa valley, political affinities and loyalties are multilayered and constantly shifting. Although the parties on the secular left have lost their appeal for most of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, the secularist Communist Party of Lebanon, with its emphasis on social and economic equity, retains pockets of fervent support. Some villages are renowned for the continuing grip of leftist ideologies (further to the east, the village of Kafr Rumann, for instance, is jokingly called “Kafr Moscow” by its neighbors). Traditional land-owning elites, who have held sway over their clients for nearly a century, retain pockets of support, especially when they are understood to have changed with the times and have cultivated reputations for fair dealing and honesty. But the two major political players are &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;now Amal, the reformist movement described in detail in [[#08_chap1.xhtml|chapter 1]], and Hezbollah, the militant party introduced in [[#09_chap2.xhtml|chapter 2]]. Accurate membership figures are hard to find, but Amal, now more of an extensive patronage network than an institutionalized political party, clearly retains widespread support, especially in southern Lebanon. In fact, just down the street from the balcony dinner a large billboard commemorates ten Amal martyrs from Bazuriya who died fighting Israel. In contrast to Amal, Hezbollah enjoys broad-based support in all three areas where the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims predominate in Lebanon, namely, in the South, in Beirut and the vicinity of the city, and in the northern Beqaa valley and Hirmil region. Both these parties draw heavily on the rich history of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Islam, especially the sect’s famous martyrs and, in particular, Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. This history is recounted in [[#10_chap3.xhtml|chapter 3]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Following the attack on the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, Hezbollah has been associated with violence and terrorism in the minds of informed Americans. [[#11_chap4.xhtml|Chapter 4]] addresses the broad question of violence with regard to Hezbollah and the implication that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over the last fifteen years Hezbollah has evolved from an Iranian-influenced conspiratorial terrorist group rejecting participation in Lebanese politics, to a party with considerable autonomy and a talent for playing politics and winning elections. The Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i party is now part of the Lebanese government but simultaneously adopts an opposition demeanor, with a Janus-faced profile that infuriates detractors while seeming perfectly reasonable to its defenders and supporters. [[#12_chap5.xhtml|Chapter 5]] describes and analyzes the organization’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;evolution and its complex profile on the Lebanese political landscape.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The pleasant summer evening described above marked an all-too-short period of calm in Lebanon’s history. Just a few weeks later, Syria, Hezbollah’s ally and the power broker in Lebanon, would force the extension in office of an unpopular president and trigger momentous developments in Lebanon and internationally. In the coming months a famous former prime minister would be blown to pieces by a bomb that also killed twenty-two of his colleagues. March 2005 saw nearly a million and a half people rise up in two massive demonstrations in Beirut streets, one condemning Syria for its likely role in the assassination, and the other praising Syria for its involvement in Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In July 2006 Hezbollah launched an operation to capture two Israeli soldiers in Israel, thus provoking an Israeli invasion that would leave much of Hezbollah’s constituency homeless and more than a thousand, predominantly Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslim Lebanese dead in a war the Lebanese call Harb Tammuz (“the July war”). Hezbollah evidently had miscalculated, never anticipating Israel’s furious onslaught. Although neither Israel nor Hezbollah were unequivocal victors, the war solidified Hezbollah’s role as both a political player in Lebanon and a regional exemplar for other opposition-minded Muslims. How and why the war broke out when it did—after six years of relative calm on the Israeli-Lebanese border after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000—is the subject of [[#13_chap6.xhtml|chapter 6]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Internal pressure on Hezbollah, once awash in praise and adulation for its leading role in forcing Israel’s 2000 exit from Lebanon, now mounted to disarm its militia. France and the United States, working in rare unison under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, would support the fledgling &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;07_pro_2.xhtml#page_8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Lebanese government and pressure Hezbollah to disarm. How the unexpected war of 2006, and its aftermath, will affect the course of Middle East history is still unclear, but the war certainly brought Hezbollah to the fore as a key influence on the region’s political landscape. Hezbollah is not easily understood either by simplistic stereotypes that typically inform depictions of the organization in the newspapers and on the airwaves of the Western world nor by black and white worldviews. The purpose of this book is to offer a more balanced and nuanced account of this complex organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chapter 1&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Origins and Prehistory of Hezbollah&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:images/23.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Billboard in southern Lebanon depicting Musa al-Sadr, the seminal Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i leader who disappeared in 1978; and Hasan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah since 1992. Copyright A. R. Norton, 2006.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;T&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;he modern state of Lebanon won its independence from France in 1943. The defining compromise of Lebanese politics was the &#039;&#039;mithaq al-watani&#039;&#039; or national pact, an unwritten understanding between the dominant political communities of the day—the Sunni Muslims and the Maronite Christians—that would provide the terms of reference for Lebanon’s independence. In the 1920s the French, exploiting their League of Nations mandates in Lebanon and Syria, carved out generous chunks of Syria to create a viable “Greater Lebanon,” thereby thwarting the Arab nationalist dream of an independent state in Damascus. For the Sunnis, the acceptance of an independent state ended the hope of reuniting Lebanon with Syria. Although the Sunnis, many of them merchants, dominated the new republic’s coastal cities, their history was in the Syrian capital of Damascus. The Maronites, long the favored ally of French power and influence in the region, now had to concede that Lebanon was not an appendage of Europe but instead an Arab state. Neither Sunnis nor Christians spoke with a single voice, however, and dissent flourished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The political system that emerged from the national pact was formalized into a system of sectarian communities, or confessions. Each of the country’s seventeen recognized sects was accorded political privilege, including senior appointments in the bureaucracy, membership in parliament, and positions in high political office, roughly proportionate to the community’s size.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;At the end of the civil war the Copts became another recognized confession, bringing the total number to eighteen. The original seventeen included four Muslim sects: Sunni, Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Alawi, and Druze; twelve Christian sects: Assyrians, Syriac Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Chaldeans, Maronites, “Rome” Catholics, Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, evangelicals, and smaller Christian sects, which are considered one group; and Jews (few remain in Lebanon today, but children born of Lebanese Jewish parents may register as citizens at Lebanese embassies).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This process was always rather &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;inexact, except for the highest political positions which were awarded to the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. Thus, the Maronites, considered the plurality, were accorded the presidency, which carried preeminent prerogatives and powers, and the second largest community, the Sunnis, won the premiership, decidedly second fiddle to the presidency. The Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community, third largest, was awarded the speakership of the parliament, a position with far weaker constitutional powers than either the presidency or the premiership. The provenance of this allocation of power was a 1932 census of dubious reliability and, in fact, the last official census ever conducted in Lebanon. The data were sound estimates at best. The imbalance of power between the “three presidents” was rectified significantly by political reforms in 1989 in the agreement that provided the framework for ending the civil war of 1975–1990, which claimed about 150,000 lives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community, in any case, could yield little influence over the political system at the time, as it was impoverished and underdeveloped (Norton 1987, 16–23). A small community of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a lived in and around Beirut, but the overwhelming mass lived in southern Lebanon and in the northern Beqaa valley. Of course, the historical context for the impoverishment of all the Arab Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i communities (found, notably, in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia) derives from the fact that the dominant Arab Sunnis often despised the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a for “deviating” from the path of Sunni Islam. Over the course of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Lebanon and Syria more or less effectively for more than four hundred years, the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a were suspected &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of being a stalking horse for Persia, notwithstanding the venerable origins of Arab Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism, which, in fact, long predates the introduction of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism in Persia in the sixteenth century. Indeed, the central contention between Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i and Sunni Muslims to this day goes back to the validity of the claim made by the partisans of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali, the husband of the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter, Fatimah, that he should succeed Muhammad upon the prophet’s death.&lt;br /&gt;
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A conjuncture of social facts, regional conflicts, and domestic policies shaped the politicization of the Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The rate of this community’s natural increase outpaced all others in Lebanon, as the average Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i family generally had nine members in the early 1970s, whereas the average Christian household had only six. Although fertility among Sunni women was also higher than among the Christians, Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i women bore an average of one more child than their fellow Muslims (Chamie 1981, 44). Families of a dozen or more children are not uncommon among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, and as mobility improved in the first decades of Lebanese independence, tens of thousands migrated from the hinterlands to Beirut and abroad.&lt;br /&gt;
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The hardscrabble Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i farmers cultivated the hills and valleys of the South and the Beqaa plateau but most could not subsist on what they earned selling tobacco to the state monopoly or growing vegetables and fruits. Even those who owned land rather than working as sharecroppers often struggled to eke out a living from farming. The state was of little help, providing piddling sums for rural development, a pattern that still persists. In the northern Beqaa and the Hirmil region, where the influence of the state was especially weak, poppies and hashish became valuable cash crops. In many Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i villages several generations of young men left Lebanon to find their fortunes in Ivory Coast, Nigeria, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Senegal, and throughout Africa, as well as in Latin America and the Arab oil-producing states of the Gulf. Later, these migrant workers would return to Lebanon, sometimes with impressive sums of money, and usually with little affection for the traditionally powerful families that dominated Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i society from Ottoman times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the South, the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i heartland, the influx of one hundred thousand Palestinians beginning with the 1948–49 Palestine war introduced a pool of cheap labor, willing to work for less than were Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i farm laborers, adding further impetus to migration. Later, of course, following the civil war in Jordan in 1970–71, thousands of armed Palestinian guerrillas would move to Lebanon, where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would challenge the authority of the Beirut government and establish a virtual state-within-a-state encompassing west Beirut and much of southern Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Against this background, the Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims mobilized their political efforts. For nearly half a century the transformation of this community from quiescence to activism has brought into question the durability of Lebanon’s founding compromise, and substantially contributed to the violent turmoil that has enveloped the country in the 1970s and 1980s.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Rise of Shi`i Politics from the Mid-twentieth Century to the Lebanese Civil War&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political bosses (&#039;&#039;zu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ama&#039;&#039;) from a handful of powerful families dominated Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i politics into the 1960s and maintained their control through extensive patronage networks. The authority of the &#039;&#039;zu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ama&#039;&#039; depended on their clients’ support, but by the 1960s many young Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i men and women became &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;alienated from old-style politics and were attracted by new political forces. The promise of radical change could only have been irresistible to a community whose ethos emphasized its exploitation and dispossession by the ruling elites. In Lebanon, as in Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in large numbers were attracted in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to secular opposition parties. In Lebanon the opposition took the form of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), the Organization for Communist Labor Action, and pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi factions of the Arab Socialist Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th (or “Resurrection”) Party. Particularly in the case of the Communist organizations and the SSNP, there was an inherent ideological attraction to parties that condemned the tribal, religious, or ethnic bases of discrimination. Indeed, it is notable that the leadership of these secular parties was predominantly Christian. Although support for secular parties has dwindled, significant numbers of politicized Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a continue to express a preference for them, usually in particular families, villages, or regions. For instance, the Communists remain strong in the large village of Bra&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sheet in the South, in an area now otherwise dominated by Hezbollah, literally, the Party of God, and the Amal movement, an acroynym for Lebanese Resistance Detachments, often rendered as “Hope.” Amal, and especially Hezbollah, were relative latecomers on the political scene and appealed to the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in clearly sectarian terms, despite their avowals of welcoming all comers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Four major (and sometimes intertwined) political trends distinguished the political mobilization of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a after the 1960s: secularism, liberation—especially the view that the fate of the deprived Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a was linked to the dispossessed Palestinians, Islamism, and reformism, often couched in demands for more access to political privilege and for stamping &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;out corruption. Although Arab nationalism certainly enjoyed Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i adherents, given that Sunni Muslims numerically dominate the Arab world, many of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a would not see a unified Arab nation as a very ideal solution. In 1997 a fifth, incipient trend appeared from within Hezbollah, when Shaikh Subhi al-Tufayli, the organization’s former secretary-general, launched a populist dissident movement in the Beqaa valley among alienated farmers and tribesmen. Although the fortunes of secular movements and parties have declined, the loyalties and sympathies of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a remain widely distributed, and no single organization—including Hezbollah—may claim an overwhelming majority following from among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. By the 1990s, however, Hezbollah was certainly the best-organized political phenomenon and enjoyed the largest base of popular support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the three distinctive trends preceding the emergence of Hezbollah in 1982, several secular parties, as well as the reformist Amal movement, retain a significant following. As the Lebanese civil war approached in the early 1970s and the armed Palestinian presence grew stronger, many young Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a found their place in one or another of the &#039;&#039;fida&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;i&#039;&#039;, or guerrilla fighter organizations.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Fida&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;i&#039;&#039; (pl., &#039;&#039;fida&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;iyun&#039;&#039;, rendered often as fedayeen) is a common Arabic term for one who sacrifices himself, that is, a guerrilla fighter.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Support for the Palestinian cause has now withered but not disappeared. Political loyalties within families are often shared between two or more organizations or are not “lent” to any political group at all. Hussein Nasrallah, a brother of Hasan Nasrallah, a founding member of Hezbollah and its famous secretary-general, is a life member of Amal. When the two groups were at each other’s throats in the late 1980s, Hussein was on the front &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;lines confronting his brother. Notwithstanding the longterm commitments of the Nasrallah brothers, one commonly meets individuals whose biography includes membership in three or four different political organizations, usually in sequence. In Lebanon political support is conditional and political loyalty sometimes has a short shelf life. Even so, ideological currents have shifted dramatically in the last two decades in favor of Hezbollah, which offers an ideological vision that many Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a now find persuasive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Palestine resistance movement did more than directly challenge the power of Lebanon’s entrenched elites; the resistance fighters were also paid comparatively well. It is widely known that many young men, and a few women, took up arms not only out of an ideological commitment but also simply to feed their families in a society offering few other economic opportunities. Once full-fledged civil war erupted in 1975, the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a became the cannon fodder for the fedayeen. Indeed, more Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a died in the fighting than members of any other sect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even before the Israeli invasion of 1982, the fortunes of the armed Palestinian presence had soured, especially in southern Lebanon where the Amal movement gained many adherents at the expense of the parties of the Left. Amal had been founded, in the early 1970s, by Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, the Iran-born cleric of Lebanese ancestry, as a militia adjunct to the Harakat al-Mahrumin, the Movement of the Deprived, the predominantly Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i populist reform movement. Amal was initially trained by Fatah, the largest organization in the PLO, and played a minor role in the fighting of 1975 and 1976. Although Amal was aligned with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM)—an array of radical and reformist groups opposed to the political dominance &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the Maronite Christians—by 1976 the alignment was strained by Amal’s support for Syria and its armed intervention to prevent a victory by the PLO and the LNM over the Maronite militias.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Role of Musa al-Sadr&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Musa al-Sadr, widely known as Imam Musa, was instrumental in improving the lot of the ordinary Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in southern Lebanon while reducing the power of traditional Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i elites. His unremitting opponent was Kamil al-As&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ad, the powerful Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i political boss from the southern town of al-Tayyiba who had long grown accustomed to power. Kamil-bey (“bey” is a Turkish honorific) accurately viewed al-Sadr as a serious threat to his political power base, which was built on a foundation of subordination and patronage. Physically imposing and a man of intelligence, courage, personal charm, enormous energy, and great complexity, al-Sadr attracted a wide array of supporters. He set out to establish himself as the paramount leader of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. When he arrived in Lebanon in the late 1950s, the community was most known for its poverty and general underdevelopment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Al-Sadr exhorted his followers not to accept their deprivation fatalistically; he believed that as long as his fellow Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i could speak out through their religion they could overcome their condition. As he once observed, “Whenever the poor involve themselves in a social revolution it is a confirmation that injustice is not predestined” (Norton 1987, 40). One of his first significant acts was to establish a vocational institute in the southern town of Burj al-Shimali. The institute, constructed at a cost of about $165,000, became an important symbol of Musa al-Sadr’s leadership, and it survives to this day under the competent supervision of his &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sister, known commonly as Sitt (or Lady) Rabab, one of the most admired women in the Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Musa al-Sadr recognized the insecurity of the Maronites and acknowledged their need to maintain their monopoly hold on the presidency. Yet he was critical of this Christian community for its arrogant stance toward the Muslims, and particularly the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. He argued that the Maronite-dominated government had neglected the South, where half the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a lived. He was anticommunist, probably not only on principled grounds but because the various Communist organizations were among his prime competitors for Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i recruits. While the two branches of the Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th Party (pro-Iraqi and pro-Syrian) were making significant inroads among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a of the South and of the Beirut suburbs, he appropriated their pan-Arab slogans. Although the movement he founded, Harakat al-Mahrumin and its Amal militia, was aligned with the ideologically eclectic and radical Lebanese National Movement in the early stages of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1976), he found its Druze leader, Kamal Jumblatt, irresponsible and exploitative of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a and willing “to combat the Christians to the last Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i” (Pakradouni 1983, 106).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Al-Sadr’s stance toward the Palestinian presence in the South was similarly complex. He consistently expressed sympathy for Palestinian aspirations, and yet he was unwilling to countenance actions that exposed Lebanese citizens, especially Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i citizens of the South, to additional suffering. Imam Musa prophetically warned the PLO that it was not in its interest to establish a state within a state in Lebanon. The PLO’s failure to heed this warning helped to spawn the alienation of their “natural allies,” the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, who actively resisted the Palestinian fighters in their midst only a few years later. In May 1976 al-Sadr threw his support to Syria &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;when Syrian president Hafez al-Asad intervened in Lebanon on the side of the Maronite militias and against the LNM and its Palestinian allies. Although he mistrusted Syrian motives in Lebanon and felt that it was only Lebanon’s indigestibility that prevented it from being swallowed by its more powerful neighbor, he nonetheless believed that the Syrians were an important ally in his challenge to Palestinian power in the southern Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Musa al-Sadr first came to prominence in 1969, when a Lebanese Supreme Islamic Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Council came into existence with Imam Musa as its chairman. The Council, formally authorized two years earlier by the Chamber of Deputies, or Lebanese parliament, provided for the first time a representative body for the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a independent of the Sunni Muslims. It was a stunning confirmation of al-Sadr’s status as the leading Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i cleric and one of the most important political figures in the country. The al-Sadr–led Council quickly made its presence known by issuing demands in the military, social, economic, and political realms, including improved measures for the defense of the South, provision of development funds, construction and improvement of schools and hospitals, and an increase in the number of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a appointed to senior government positions. Unfortunately the response of the Lebanese government was ineffectual. Its Council of the South (Majlis al-Janub), created in the late 1960s in the wake of a general strike organized by al-Sadr and chartered to support the development of the region, became an infamous locus of corruption.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The growing influence of Musa al-Sadr prior to the civil war certainly gave direction to the political awakening of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a; it bears reiterating, however, that Imam Musa led only a fraction of his politically affiliated co-religionists. It was the multi-confessional parties and militias that attracted the majority of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i recruits and many more Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a carried arms under the colors of these organizations than under Amal. Perhaps al-Sadr’s single most important success was to reduce the authority and influence of the traditional Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i elites, but it was the civil war and the associated explosion of extralegal organizations that smashed the power of many political personalities long comfortable in privilege and power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whatever he may have been, and despite his occasionally vehement histrionics, Musa al-Sadr was hardly a man of war. His weapons were words, and in a country where the force of arms increasingly held sway, his political efforts were eventually short-circuited. He seemed destined to be eclipsed by the violence that engulfed Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In August 1978 al-Sadr flew from Beirut to Tripoli with two aides to attend ceremonies commemorating the ascent of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to power in 1969. When his failure to arrive at the ceremony was noticed, rumors circulated that he had left for Italy. The Libyan government quickly claimed to have evidence that al-Sadr had indeed left the country. However, supporters of the missing cleric pointed out that al-Sadr’s baggage was found in a Tripoli hotel and there was no evidence of his arrival in Rome. Airline crews could not confirm that al-Sadr had ever flown from Libya to Italy. Although his fate is unknown to this day, Gaddafi is widely suspected of having ordered his assassination because, so the rumors have it, he viewed him as a political rival.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Resurgence of Amal&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Amal which was fading into obscurity after the eruption of the civil war in 1975, began an impressive resurgence in part because of the intense Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i outcry after al-Sadr’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;enigmatic disappearance. Also contributing to Amal’s renewed popularity was, of course, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and the historic Iranian revolution of 1978– 79, which provided an exemplar for action, if not a precise model for emulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Amal drew substantial support from the growing Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i middle class, for whom the movement represented an assertive voice against the power of the political zu‘ama. Equally important, Amal challenged the stifling and often brutal domination of the Palestinian guerrillas whose public support plummeted in the late 1970s and early 1980s for bringing southern Lebanon into the crossfire with Israel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Israel’s invasion of 1978, the “Litani Operation,” though minor compared to the wars yet to come in 1982 and 2006, displaced hundreds of thousands of Lebanese from the southern region. Relations between the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in the South and the Palestinian resistance and its Lebanese affiliates were deteriorating. Not only were the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a weary of being caught in the Israeli-Palestinian cross fire, but they increasingly viewed the Palestinians as an occupying force prone to high-handedness and brutality. Amal militiamen and Palestinian guerrillas clashed with increasing frequency. For most Amal supporters, the overriding and immediate concern was security, and their efforts were often centered on forming local home-guards or militias that, naturally, the PLO viewed with great suspicion. Fierce confrontations also erupted between Amal partisans and pro-Iraq groups, such as the Arab Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th (Resurrection) Party, the Nationalist Party, and the Iraq-sponsored Arab Liberation Front, given the Iraqi regime’s often brutal treatment of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although Amal resistance fighters actively opposed the continuing Israeli occupation of Lebanon, especially after &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;1983, Amal tacitly welcomed the Israeli invasion of June 1982 because it broke the power of the Palestinian fighters in the South. Amal leaders, especially Nabih Berri and Daoud Suleiman Daoud, the powerful leader in the South until his assassination under still murky circumstances in the late 1980s, sought a modus vivendi with Israel and the United States. Berri’s participation in the National Salvation Committee—which had been created by Lebanese president Elias Sarkis to foster dialogue among Lebanon’s most powerful militia leaders during the Israeli siege of Beirut—was castigated by young radicals within Amal who described the Committee as no more than an “American-Israeli bridge” allowing the United States to enter and control Lebanon (Norton 1987, 105). There is no doubt that Berri’s willingness to contemplate a deal that would favor Syria’s enemies also provoked Damascus to lend support to Hezbollah as a counterweight to Amal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, from 1985 to 1988, the militia and sympathetic units of the Lebanese army—spurred on by Syria—conducted its “war of the camps” to prevent the Palestinians from regaining the position of dominance they had enjoyed prior to the Israeli invasion. The campaign prompted Amal’s emerging political rival among the Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, Hezbollah, to assist the Palestinians. (The “war of the camps” is discussed further in [[#11_chap4.xhtml|chapter 4]].)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the civil war in Lebanon drew to a close in the late 1980s, Amal was overstretched and weakened. What had been a dynamic and progressive movement in the early 1980s, with extensive popular support, now became a fullblown patronage system with all the corruption, inefficiency, and inequity that Amal had long ascribed to the traditional zu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ama. As for Nabih Berri, with the end of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;internal war in 1990 he became speaker of the parliament and remains a fixture in Lebanese politics. The irony of Berri’s transformation from populist nemesis of the confessional system to powerful and wealthy denizen of confessional politics is not lost on the Lebanese.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After Imam Musa’s disappearance, the Supreme Islamic Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Council was taken over by the cerebral Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i &#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;alim&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The term &#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;alim&#039;&#039; (pl., &#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ulama&#039;&#039;), which literally means “scholar,” connotes a person who has acquired specialized religious knowledge, whether in philosophy, jurisprudence, or rhetoric, or who has profound knowledge of the Quran. Although it is convenient to think of an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;alim as a cleric or member of the clergy, this is only an approximation, as the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;alim may not necessarily hold any formal religious position, and there is no close equivalent to the concept of ordination in Islam. In Christianity, a “man of religion” is often understood to be a member of the clergy, whereas in Islam a “rajul al-tadayyun” means, literally, a religious man, not an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;alim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Shaikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, an intellectually gifted cleric without a significant grass-roots following. Under his guidance, however, the Council became especially active in sponsoring and launching a series of ecumenical dialogues, intended to foster dialogue between Christians and Muslims. Shams al-Din emphasized the spiritual renewal of Muslims rather than the goal of seeking power, which, he argued, is often at cross purposes with the goal of Islamic renewal. Although it still enjoys respect as a religious and political focal point of the growing Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i professional class, it has been eclipsed both by Amal and Hezbollah, especially since Shams al-Din’s death from lung cancer in 2001. Today the group is led by the plain-spoken cleric and Amal’s longtime ally &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abd al-Amr Qabalan, the Ja&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;fari Mufti al-Mumtaz, that is, the officially recognized senior expert on Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i religious law. This author was first introduced to him, in fact, in 1980 by the Amal leader in the South, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Daoud Suleiman Daoud, at an informal Amal gathering in a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i village. Qabalan, tellingly, remains the vice president of the Council; the post of president is vacant. Although the Council no longer has the extensive popular support it had during its years under al-Sadr’s leadership, it does enjoy guaranteed access to the state and remains a potential institutional rival to Amal, as well as to Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;08_chap1.xhtml#page_26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;[[File:images/40.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Map 2. Lebanon’s major confessional groups (sects) and the areas where they predominate.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chapter 2&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Founding of Hezbollah&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:images/41.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A view of southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah and the Amal movement compete for support. Copyright A. R. Norton, 2006.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;T&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;he late 1970s and early 1980s were a time of great foment, enthusiasm, and transition among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a of Lebanon. Amal, as noted in [[#08_chap1.xhtml|chapter 1]], enjoyed a resurgence among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a of southern Lebanon, particularly following the disappearance of Sayyid Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978 and the example set by the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a-led Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978–79. Originally an adjunct militia to the Movement of the Deprived, Amal expanded into a political reform movement as well, and its new leaders were not clerics but members of the lay middle class, typified by the lawyer Nabih Berri, who became leader in 1979. Berri’s father, Mustafa, had been a trader in Sierre Leone, one of thousands of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a who had left Lebanon to seek opportunities in Africa. (Nabih was born in Freetown, Sierra Leone’s capital.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the early 1980s Amal embraced many ideological currents and disagreements and had no firm hierarchy. What most adherents of the movement shared was a disdain for the &#039;&#039;zu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ama&#039;&#039; (political bosses), who traditionally dominated Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i society, and anger toward Palestinian guerrillas and their allies. Although one heard expressions of hatred toward Israel, particularly in the South, these were far less common and less intense than they became a quarter-century later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Amal officials at the time would speak with admiration of Iranian intellectuals such as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Shariati, the Paris-trained Iranian modernist and intellectual who urged Muslims to avoid becoming “humanoids” uncritically emulating the West. Shariati, who died in 1977 and was buried in Damascus, with a eulogy delivered by his friend Musa al-Sadr, exhorted his multitude of readers and listeners to find their identity in Islam, especially in the exemplary courage of the prophet Muhammad’s grandson, Hussein, whose martyrdom &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in 680 c.e. or 60 a.h. (discussed in [[#10_chap3.xhtml|chapter 3]]) became the model for the Iranian Revolution. Mehdi Bazargan, head of Iran’s Freedom Movement and revolutionary Iran’s first prime minister, was also accorded great respect, as was Mustafa Chamran, a close associate of Imam Musa who earned his engineering Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. Each of the three was a noted reformer, but Bazargan was pushed aside in Iran as the revolution grew more radical, and Chamran, who became chair of the Supreme Defense Council in Iran, died under mysterious circumstances in a plane crash on the Iraqi front in the first year of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980–88).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Iraq Connection&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Amal officials also spoke with deep respect for Imam Musa’s Iraqi cousin Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr of al-Najaf, the Iraqi cleric who suffered summary execution in Iraq, in April 1980, after he was forced to watch the rape and murder of his sister. In May 1980, when the author arrived in southern Lebanon, the horrid killing of Baqr al-Sadr was often discussed, usually coupled with a denunciation of Iraq—and its Lebanese allies. Baqr al-Sadr was a major thinker whose books in Arabic, particularly &#039;&#039;Iqtisaduna&#039;&#039; (Our Economy) are revered as seminal. (His nephew, of course, is Muqtada al-Sadr, the young firebrand who formed the Jaysh al-Mahdi [the “Army of the Guided One”] in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thist regime was toppled in 2003.) In my visits with middle-class Amal supporters and officials, in 1980 and 1981 and many times later, I often spotted Baqr al-Sadr’s books on a bookshelf, but perhaps more as an emblem of respect than as a volume that actually had been read. In Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i villages, in those early chaotic days, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;posters honoring Baqr al-Sadr were almost as widespread as those featuring Musa al-Sadr, which far outnumbered images of Ayatollah Khomeini.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When young Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i men were selected for a religious education, their traditional destinations had been the revered Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i seminaries of al-Najaf or Karbala in Iraq. By the end of the 1970s, however, as the revolution in Iran gathered force, Iraq had become inhospitable for foreign Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. In 1978 Ayatollah Khomeini was himself expelled from Iraq at the insistence of the Shah, thereby gaining international notoriety in a suburb of Paris with much of the international media just a few steps away as the Iranian revolution gathered force. Young Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i clerics such as Subhi al-Tufayli and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas al-Musawi, who later played important leadership roles in Hezbollah’s early days, trickled back into Lebanon from Iraq. Al-Musawi established a &#039;&#039;hawza&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In the Iraqi or Iranian context, &#039;&#039;hawza&#039;&#039; refers to a complex of seminaries roughly resembling a university with affiliated colleges, as in the al-Najaf &#039;&#039;hawza&#039;&#039; led in 2006 by Ayatollah &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Sistani. In Lebanon, in contrast, &#039;&#039;hawza&#039;&#039; refers to a single seminary. Ruha Jurdi Abisaab, a leading authority on the topic, reports that, in the 1990s, there were sixteen hawzas in Lebanon with about six hundred scholars enrolled (Abisaab 2006).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or religious seminary, in Baalbak, where the future Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah became his student and protégé. The returnees from Iraq brought with them revolutionary fervor and the commitment to change their societies. They shared antipathy toward Israel and loyalty to Iran. Most of the returnees were members of the Hizb al-Da&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wa party (“Party of the [Islamic] Call”), founded in Iraq in 1958 as an Islamic alternative to the Communist Party. The Lebanese Da&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wa was disbanded, and its erstwhile members were instructed by party strategists to infiltrate the secular Amal and reform it from within. Sayyid Muhammad &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hussein Fadlallah urged them in the same direction—away from Amal’s de facto secularism toward something approximating an Islamic system of rule (Sankari 2005 172). After Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance in 1978, Fadlallah was the most influential &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;alim in Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Iranian revolutionaries, meanwhile, had long been familiar with Lebanon. Many, including Mohsen Rafiqdost, who became the head of the Pasdaran or Revolutionary Guard, had trained in the Beqaa valley of Lebanon with the PLO. This is a prime reason for the extraordinarily enthusiastic reception that Yasser Arafat enjoyed in Tehran, in February 1979, just weeks after the triumphant return of Khomeini. Arafat was handed the keys to the Israeli Embassy, among other honors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For its part, Syria, in the early 1980s, had a very different future in mind. It saw in Amal a mechanism for checking Palestinian power in Lebanon, especially if Arafat should seek his own route to peace, deserting Syria. By 1980 and 1981 young Amalists were going off to train in Syria and coming back wearing new, Syria-style uniforms and sporting military-style radios. As tensions between Amal and the Palestinians worsened in 1981 and 1982, many expected a war—but not with Israel. Some leading Amal figures even argued that they were in an objective alliance with Israel against Palestinian guerrillas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The 1982 Israeli Invasion&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Israel invaded Lebanon on June 6, 1982, following an eleven-month cease-fire with the PLO, which Israel claimed had been broken by the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom Shlomo Argov, who had been badly wounded but survived. It made little difference to the Israelis that the assassination had been carried &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;out by a renegade Palestinian group led by the infamous Sabri al-Banna (“Abu Nidal”), a blood foe of the PLO. The invasion gave Ariel Sharon, then the Israeli defense minister, carte blanche to pursue his own dream of destroying the PLO as a political force in the region and putting in place a pliant government in Beirut that would become the second Arab state, after Egypt, to enter into a formal peace agreement with Israel (Schiff and Ya&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ari 1984). Within the Israeli government at the time—as within the American foreign policy establishment—there was little understanding of the developments under way among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims of Lebanon and no analysis was made of the impact of this invasion on them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if Israel had not launched its invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982, the young would-be revolutionaries among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a would have pursued their path of emulating Iran’s Islamic revolution. Undoubtedly, however, the invasion pushed the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a further in this direction, creating conditions for the establishment and flourishing of Hezbollah. The former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak put the matter succinctly in July 2006: “When we entered Lebanon . . . there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah” (&#039;&#039;Newsweek&#039;&#039;, July 18, 2006). As Barak’s comment suggests, by occupying Lebanon rather than promptly withdrawing, Israel wore out is warm welcome and provided a context for Hezbollah to grow.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, who was assassinated in 1995, made precisely the same point in 1987, speaking of how Israel had let the “genie out of the bottle.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Yitzhak Rabin made this comment a number of times, including on the British Grenada Productions documentary film &#039;&#039;The Sword of Islam&#039;&#039; (1987). He also made the comment to me in a meeting in New York City, but I do not recall the year.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When Rabin asked to see me in December 1984, I urged &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;him to leave Lebanon because a continued Israeli presence would inevitably radicalize the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. He replied, to the best of my recollection, “Professor, I am a politician, and what will I say to the people of Kiryat Shimona when the rockets fall?”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The author would like to thank Professor Yossi Kostiner of Tel Aviv University for reminding him of this meeting.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And so the die was cast.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah Emerges&lt;br /&gt;
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Although its leading members refer to 1982 as the year the group was founded, Hezbollah did not exist as a coherent organization until the mid-1980s. From 1982 through the mid-1980s it was less an organization than a cabal. The Lebanese who comprised its first cadre were young, committed revolutionaries, in some cases barely in their twenties. Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, who was only twenty-two in 1982, had been a rising star in his teens as an Amal representative in al-Bazuriya, his village in southern Lebanon. His mentor, thirty-year-old Sayyid &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas al-Musawi, from Nabisheet in the Beqaa valley, had taken him under his wing in al-Najaf in 1982, at the direction of Baqr al-Sadr. Raghib Harb, also thirty years old at the time of the Israeli invasion, was born in Jibsheet in the South. Harb, a major early leader of the resistance in the South, would be assassinated, probably by Israel, in 1984. And Shaikh Subhi al-Tufayli, a firebrand from Brital outside Baalbak, who would become Hezbollah’s first secretary-general in 1989, was only thirty-four in 1982.&lt;br /&gt;
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Iran and Syria share credit for sponsoring these young revolutionaries, although Iran certainly played the leading role. For Iran, the creation of Hezbollah was a realization of the revolutionary state’s zealous campaign to spread the message of the self-styled “Islamic revolution.” From Syria’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;standpoint, the new militant Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i party was a fortuitous instrument for preserving Syrian interests: supporting Hezbollah allowed Syria to maintain its alliance with Iran, gain the means for striking indirectly at both Israel and the United States, and keep its Lebanese allies, including the Amal movement, in line.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Syria’s support of the young Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i militants was ambivalent. The 1980s were rocky times in Syria’s relations with Iran, and the al-Asad regime in Damascus remained wary of Hezbollah and its ties to the Islamic republic for a full decade. While maintaining its rapport with Hezbollah throughout the 1980s, Damascus also reinforced its ties to Amal. The U.S. government unwittingly aided Syria in this tactic when Amal’s political overtures to Washington, in 1982, yielded little benefit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Syria has no overall interest in seeing Amal or Hezbollah (or any other political force) triumph in Lebanon, and its strategy in Lebanon has consistently followed the principles of Realpolitik. To paraphrase the dictum of Lord Palmertson, Syria has neither eternal allies nor perpetual enemies in Lebanon. The Hezbollah leadership understands this and maintains its strategic alliance with Damascus, ever mindful that alliances of convenience are expendable by definition.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Hezbollah Worldview&lt;br /&gt;
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Notwithstanding this Syrian connection, throughout the 1980s Hezbollah hewed closely to the Iranian line. In fact, its remarkable programmatic document of 1985, an open letter addressed to the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World,” bears a strong made-in-Tehran coloration (translation in Norton 1987, 167–87).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The page references in the text below are to the translation in Norton 1987, 167–87.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This remarkable &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;document emphasized that the 1978–79 revolution in Iran served as an inspiration to action, a proof of what can be accomplished when the faithful gather under the banner of Islam. “We address all the Arab and Islamic peoples to declare to them that the Muslim’s experience in Islamic Iran left no one any excuse since it proved beyond all doubt that bare chests motivated by faith are capable, with God’s help, of breaking the iron and oppression of tyrannical regimes” (183–84). “It is time to realize that all the Western ideas concerning man’s origin and nature cannot respond to man’s aspirations or rescue him from the darkness of misguidedness and ignorance” (184). Islam is the answer. “Only Islam can bring about man’s renaissance, progress, and creativity because ‘He lights with the oil of an olive tree that is neither Eastern nor Western, a tree whose oil burns, even if not touched by fire, to light the path. God leads to His light whomever He wishes’” (184).&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah released this revealing 1985 document to mark the first anniversary of the assassination of Shaikh Raghib Harb, the bright young cleric of Jibsheet in southern Lebanon. It declares that the world is divided between the oppressed and the oppressors, the latter being “the countries of the arrogant world”—especially the United States and the Soviet Union (still Cold War adversaries in 1985)—who struggle for influence at the expense of the Third World. “Consequently, the oppressed countries have become the struggle’s bone of contention and the oppressed peoples have become its fuel” (178). In Iran the ethos of the revolution was summed up by the slogan “neither East nor West,” which is also Hezbollah’s view. One commentator, writing in the Hezbollah newspaper &#039;&#039;al-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ahd&#039;&#039;, puts the two superpowers on the same plane: “The Soviets are not one iota different from the Americans in terms of political danger, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;indeed are more dangerous than them in terms of ideological considerations as well, and this requires that light be shed on this fact and that the Soviets be assigned their proper place in the forces striving to strike at the interests of the Muslim people and arrogate their political present and future” (&#039;&#039;al-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ahd&#039;&#039;, May 9, 1987, 12). Within Lebanon, Hezbollah proved to be especially intolerant of the Communist Party. Dozens, if not hundreds, of party members were killed in a brutal, bloody campaign of suppression and assassination in 1984 and 1985.&lt;br /&gt;
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The starring role for Islam’s main enemy, according to the Hezbollah document, went to the United States, which was charged with using its “spearhead,” Israel, to directly or indirectly inflict suffering upon the Muslims of Lebanon (179). “Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. By fighting it, we are only exercising our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the dignity of our nation” (170).&lt;br /&gt;
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The French were also attacked, largely because of their long-standing support of the Maronite community in Lebanon, and for their arms sales to Iraq. In August 1989, for example, the Hezbollah radio station noted that the French should be “taught a lesson because of their scorn for other people and lack of respect for Lebanese Muslims” (&#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039;, August 24, 1989).&lt;br /&gt;
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In Hezbollah’s worldview, compromise and mediation were no answer. Where fractiousness existed among Muslims, it had to have been the product of imperialism. Disunity was caused by imperialism and its agents, including compromisers, evil &#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ulama&#039;&#039;, and the leaders imposed by colonialism (184). It followed, then, that the Lebanese government was corrupt to its core. No renovation could make &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;it palatable, and those who pursued such solutions were traitors to Islam. Self-help was the only answer. The superpowers were corrupt. They had no answers for Lebanon. When the Muslims were under brutal attack in 1982, no one came to their rescue. “We appealed to the world’s conscience but heard nothing from and found no trace of it” (170). The United Nations, despite its pretensions, merely served the interests of the arrogant superpowers or was, at least, prevented from acting by the tacit conspiracy of the superpowers through their use of the veto. The only answer was to fight under the banner of Islam. “Thus, we have seen that aggression can be repelled only with the sacrifice of blood, and that freedom is not given but regained with the sacrifice of both heart and soul” (171).&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah thus positioned itself as a force resisting the actions of Israel and the superpowers, which have led to subjugation and oppression throughout the Third World. The objective was to free Lebanon from the manipulation and chicanery of the malevolent outside powers in order to achieve “the final departure of America, France, and their allies from Lebanon and the termination of the influence of any imperialist power in the country” (173).&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the burdens of the open letter was to explain and justify Hezbollah’s use of violence, which, it is argued, the West trivialized as “a handful of fanatics and terrorists who are only concerned with blowing up drinking, gambling, and entertainment spots” (170). “Each of us is a combat soldier when the call of &#039;&#039;jihad&#039;&#039; demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his lawful assignment within the framework of action under the guardianship of the leader jurisprudent” (169).&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah regards negotiations with Israel as only a form of compromise that validates Israel’s occupation of Palestine. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;“We condemn strongly all the plans for mediation between us and Israel and we consider the mediators a hostile party because their mediation will only serve to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of Palestine” (179). The ultimate objective is to destroy Israel and to liberate Palestine. Thus “Israel’s final departure from Lebanon is a prelude to its final obliteration from existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem from the talons of occupation” (173). This absolutism explains the operational links between Hezbollah and the rejectionist Palestinian groups that have opposed the efforts of mainstream PLO officials to make peace with Israel.&lt;br /&gt;
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A key unanswered question in the letter is, precisely, Hezbollah’s political design for Lebanon, a significant omission in view of that organization’s expressed disdain for the existing political system. The letter only states that, once Lebanon is freed from external and internal domination, the Lebanese will be allowed to determine their fate; if they choose freely, they will only choose Islam. Whether the goal is clerical rule under the concept of the &#039;&#039;wilayat al-faqih&#039;&#039;, the creation of an Islamic republic on the Iranian model, is not made clear in the open letter. Some scholars claim that Hezbollah was not calling for “guardianship” on the Iran model but rather the “rule of the &#039;&#039;shari&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a&#039;&#039;,” or Islamic law, but this would be a distinction without difference.&lt;br /&gt;
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The application of &#039;&#039;shari&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a&#039;&#039; in the context of Khomeini’s neo-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism requires clerical guardianship. In any event, given the doctrinal role of the &#039;&#039;mujtahids&#039;&#039;, clerics qualified to independently interpret religious law and responsibility, and the requirement of &#039;&#039;taqlid&#039;&#039; (imitation) in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Islam, a state founded on the &#039;&#039;shari&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a&#039;&#039; could scarcely function without regular recourse to the &#039;&#039;mujtahids&#039;&#039;. In Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Islam, in the absence of the Awaited Imam (Imam al-Muntazar), the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;adherent must “imitate” (&#039;&#039;taqlid&#039;&#039;) the legal rulings of the &#039;&#039;mujtahids&#039;&#039;. This is the doctrinal foundation for the influence of the clerics in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism, in contrast to the more fluid conception of religious authority held by Sunni Islam. For both Sunni and Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims, Islam is a system of law, and individuals have been known to “convert” from one legal school to another or from one clerical authority to another, in order to exploit a more advantageous legal interpretation. Thus a former prime minister of Lebanon, Salim al-Huss, a Sunni Muslim, performed a technical one-day conversion to Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism in order to improve inheritance rights for his daughter under the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Ja&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;fari legal interpretation. Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i inheritance rules are more favorable to daughters than the Sunni schools of law.&lt;br /&gt;
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The open letter also addresses the role of the &#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ulama&#039;&#039;, implicitly the bulk of the Sunni &#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ulamas&#039;&#039; as well as those Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i clerics who do not actively support Hezbollah: “Therefore, one of your most important responsibilities, O Muslim &#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ulama&#039;&#039;, is to educate the Muslims to abide by the dictates of Islam, to point out to them the political line they should follow, to lead them toward glory and honor, and to devote attention to the religious institutes so that they may graduate leaders faithful to God and eager to uphold religion and the nation” (186). “We do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam and that we urge an Islamic system that alone guarantees justice and dignity for all and prevents any new imperialist attempt to infiltrate our country” (173). Hezbollah advocates “adoption of the Islamic system on the basis of free and direct selection by the people, not the basis of forceful imposition, as some people imagine” (175). Unfortunately the organization’s history of violence against its political and ideological rivals casts doubt on Hezbollah’s commitment to voluntarism. Anecdotal data from non-affiliated &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a living in the Hezbollah-dominated regions only deepened these doubts.&lt;br /&gt;
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The letter had been issued at a time of real exultation born from a string of military and political successes that humiliated both the United States and Israel. Hezbollah had played a major role in the departure of the American marines from Lebanon and the scuttling of the U.S.-brokered May 17, 1983, agreement between Lebanon and Israel, and the organization held the world at bay over the fate of Western hostages, the last hostage not released until 1991. Equally impressive was that it forced an Israeli withdrawal from most of Lebanese territory. In January 1985, only a month before the letter was issued, Israel announced its decision to “redeploy” its forces and then retreated to the border region where its self-declared “security zone” became a magnet for Hezbollah attacks that continued through the 1990s (Norton 1993).&lt;br /&gt;
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Implementing the Design&lt;br /&gt;
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True to the often intransigent and consistently militant tone of the open letter, Hezbollah moved aggressively, in the midto late 1980s, to strike at Westerners in Lebanon and at Western influence. Groups linked to Hezbollah, if not directly controlled by the party, kidnapped dozens of foreigners and held them hostage for as long as seven years (in the case of the American journalist Terry Anderson). Although the myriad groups that abducted foreigners often pursued their own local agendas, particularly the freeing of Lebanese held in Kuwaiti and Israeli prisons, the captors were also sensitive to the interests and influence of Iran. As a result, freeing captives required a complex series of negotiations involving the release of Iranian assets frozen by the United &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;States, the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel, and, more important, a government in Tehran determined to end the hostage crisis. Negotiations were conducted under the personal auspices of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, and, by the early 1990s, Iranian officials (not least, President Hashemi Rafsanjani) clearly wished to resolve the issue. President George H. W. Bush’s January 1989 inaugural promise that “goodwill begets goodwill” created a mood of expectancy in Tehran.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even so, long, tedious negotiations were required between Perez de Cuellar’s representative, Giandominico Picco, and the captors themselves. At that point in Lebanon’s history, the civil war had drawn to a close, most Lebanese did not support the taking of hostages (few ever did), and the conclusion of the Cold War was pregnant with potential to redefine the dimensions of politics in the region. Picco’s valuable book, &#039;&#039;Man without a Gun&#039;&#039;, presents an insider’s account of negotiations that were often as much between the captors as with their Italian interlocutor. Picco does not hide his disappointment that the United States did not, in the end, return goodwill for goodwill in terms of reciprocating Iranian efforts to free the hostages (Picco 1999).&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the signal act of the period was the June 1985 skyjacking of TWA flight 847 to Beirut, masterminded by the infamous Imad Mughniyah, who continues to be linked to Hezbollah’s External Security Organization. Hezbollah was deeply implicated in the hijacking, which was intended to highlight the fate of 766 Lebanese prisoners held in Israel (primarily in the Atlit prison), many of whom languished in extremely difficult conditions, with no recourse to the protections of international law. Some of the captives had participated in resistance operations, but others were merely suspects that Israel held hostage.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The hijacking exposed the deep tensions between Hezbollah and Amal, for when Amal leader Nabih Berri attempted to mediate the crisis, Hezbollah heatedly objected that Berri had no ability to speak on its behalf. The crisis ended only when Israel quietly agreed to release Lebanese prisoners from the Atlit prison, and Syria, and especially when Iranian Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, intervened to pressure the perpetrators to bring the crisis to an end.&lt;br /&gt;
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By then there was much tension between Amal and Hezbollah, which finally exploded in 1988–89, with two militias fighting to win the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i heartland in the South, as well as the teeming southern suburbs of Beirut, where fully half the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i population resides. The fighting was sparked by the kidnapping of U.S. marine Lt. Colonel William R. Higgins, who was serving with UN forces in the south. The operation was carried out by a splinter group of Amal—the “Believers’ Resistance,” led by the former Lebanese army intelligence sergeant Mustafa Dirani—a group sympathetic to Hezbollah. Dirani himself was later kidnapped by Israeli forces from his Beqaa valley village in 1994 and released in 2004 in a prisoner exchange (more on this in [[#11_chap4.xhtml|chapter 4]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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The Higgins incident threatened Amal’s strategy of maintaining a cooperative working relationship with the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), so Amal reacted by attempting to find Higgins and free him. The kidnappers evaded the Amal searchers, and Higgins was later brutally murdered, but not before the incident triggered serious clashes between Amal and Hezbollah, allowing Amal to momentarily consolidate its grip on southern Lebanon. Shortly thereafter, in the fall of 1988, fighting erupted in the southern suburbs of Beirut, and Amal was badly defeated, losing virtually its entire military foothold in the capital. Hezbollah’s efforts to roll back Amal influence in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the South, in 1989, succeeded in eroding Amal’s position there, though Amal remains popular in the South.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah certainly served as a stalking horse for Iranian interests, especially in the 1980s, but by the end of the decade Iran’s policies were changing—often in ways unsettling to devotees of the Islamic revolution—and its support for Hezbollah wavered. In 1988 the first Gulf war, which Ayatollah Khomeini had vowed to pursue until Saddam Hussein was toppled, ended with Iran embracing a ceasefire. Iran’s submission inspired sarcastic graffiti in Lebanon: “Why 598 and not 425?” a reference to UN Security Council Resolution 598 that ended the war and Resolution 425 that dealt with the restoration of security in southern Lebanon. With Khomeini’s death in 1989, this charismatic symbol of the revolution was replaced by men of more modest views who now had to address the mundane but daunting challenges of restoring post-revolutionary Iran. The Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and the new Iranian leadership of the early 1990s moved to reorient their policy more toward the broader Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community and Lebanon as a whole, distancing themselves from militias, at least for a few years (Norton 1990, 132). Internecine fighting between Amal and Hezbollah had provoked a significant change of attitude in Tehran, where the bloodletting in Lebanon was viewed with disgust. Because the vicious fighting between the two groups cost many civilian lives, Rafsanjani reacted sharply, pointedly condemning both sides for their actions. But Iran was not merely outraged at the bloodshed in Lebanon, for 1990 marked the closing days of the Cold War, the assembling of an international coalition against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the long overdue end of the Lebanese civil war. Thus Iran was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;adjusting to the new balance of power in the world in which U.S. power was without rival.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah, from its first moments, had always defined itself in contrast to Amal. The coterie of young clerics who made up Hezbollah’s cadre in the 1980s and early 1990s resented Amal’s non-clerical leadership and accommodation with Lebanese clientelism. Unlike the Amal politicos, who were intent on comprising the new Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i bourgeoisie, the leaders of Hezbollah—brimming with revolutionary passion—refused to accommodate a corrupt political system, or so they said in the 1980s. Most of them had been trained in Najaf, Karbala, and Qum where they were ideologically inculcated by Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, Muhsin al-Hakim, and Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini, but by the 1990s their fervor began to give way to a more realistic sense of the possible.&lt;br /&gt;
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In contrast to the fierce ideological tenor in the 1985 open letter, Hezbollah now pragmatically confronted the shifting political landscape of regional politics, as well as the changing terrain of Lebanese politics. The result has been the evolution to a Janus-faced organization, retaining a fierce commitment to confront Israel’s occupation in southern Lebanon while engaging in precisely the game of confessional Lebanese politics that they previously had denounced. Hezbollah was affected by the change in the Iranian regime, especially after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, as well as by Syria’s growing political and military dominance in Lebanon. Meantime, there is little doubt that Hezbollah has proved responsive to the attitudes and aspirations of its domestic constituency. This constituency includes a large portion of the expanding Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i middle class that grew skeptical of the Amal movement and its corruption, and came to admire Hezbollah’s relative integrity.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;09_chap2.xhtml#page_46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The party’s broadened constituency brings with it new requisites for sustaining support, as the new Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i middle class does not yearn to live in an Islamic Republic, least of all the Islamic Republic of Lebanon. Hezbollah’s virtue aside, it frequently cites its goal to be an open political system with a place at the table of government, instead of standing as a supplicant at the back door of politics. There have been periodic hints from leading Hezbollah officials, including Nasrallah and Deputy Secretary-General Na&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;im Qassem, that the 1985 open letter is obsolete and no longer an authoritative guide to the party’s positions. This issue was the topic of a documentary on al-Jazeera TV, in September 1998, where a number of party officials, members, supporters, and journalists were interviewed for the program (Alagha 2006, 328). The conclusion reached was that the open letter belonged to a certain historical moment that had passed. Hezbollah officials, in various settings in Lebanon, have made the same point to this author. Still, the bald fact is that the 1985 program has not been explicitly replaced. The result is that skeptics and opponents of the party are left with a picture of ambivalence and, perhaps, dissimulation, which have only been sharpened by Hezbollah’s behavior in the early twenty-first century.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chapter 3&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Being a Shi`i Muslim in the Twenty-first Century&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:images/61.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A museum in the village of Nabisheet, in the Beqaa valley, commemorates the Hezbollah martyrs who have died in southern Lebanon fighting Israel. The village is the birthplace of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas al-Musawi, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, who was assassinated, along with his wife and two children, by Israel. Copright A. R. Norton, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;bout 10 percent of all Muslims in the world are Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. Both Sh&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ia and the majority Sunni Muslims believe that the prophet Muhammad is the “Rasul,” the Messenger of Allah, chosen by God to transmit His Word, and both accord special, central reverence to his memory, deeds, and actions as the last and most important prophet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although several doctrinal and legal issues separate the minority Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a from the Sunni majority, the most serious split is over the succession after the death of Prophet Muhammad, in 632 c.e. (10 a.h.). Only &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali, the fourth and last of the four Rashidun—the “rightly guided” successors or Caliphs—is considered to have been a legitimate heir to the prophet by both the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a and the Sunnis. Caliph &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of Muhammad, served four years until his assassination in 660 c.e., in Kufa, a city in modern-day Iraq.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali’s death in Kufa, although mourned, has not made the deepest mark on Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism. The event that most shaped the ethos of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura, which refers to the fate of the grandson of the prophet Imam Hussein. Since the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a believe that the successor should derive from the House of the Prophet, the sons of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali and his wife, the Prophet’s daughter Fatimah, were favored. Two sons, Hasan and Hussein, are accepted by all Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a as leaders or Imams of the Muslim community. (A third son of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali by a different mother, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas, is a figure of military prowess and valor in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i history and, as we shall see, has a leading role in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a remembrance of that era.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Imam Hussein is a central and beloved figure in the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i imagination as an exemplar of courage, self-sacrifice, and compassion. When called by the people of Kufa in 680 c.e. (61 a.h.) to become their leader, Imam Hussein accepted the invitation and described his journey from Mecca as a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;mission to “restore my grandfather’s community of Muslims.” His decision to go to Kufa provoked a response from his adversary in Damascus, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Umayyad Caliph Yazid, whose father Mu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;awiyya succeeded Caliph &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali, Hussein’s father, as the putative ruler of all Muslims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The lessons of religion are captured in the dramas and tragedies of its heroes. In the case of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, the main event in their history is the story of Hussein’s defeat and martyrdom, in 680 c.e., at the hands of Yazid’s massive army at Karbala, in what is now modern Iraq. Surrounded, outmanned, yet refusing to submit to Yazid’s authority, and thereby surrender his claim to be the successor to the prophet Muhammad, Imam Hussein’s fate was sealed in a bloody confrontation lasting ten days on a blistering Iraqi plain. Hussein’s martyrdom came on the tenth day of the first month of the Muslim calendar, Muharram—hence the use of the term &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura, derived from the Arabic word for “tenth,” to commemorate the event. The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura commemoration is shared by Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims around the world—in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Europe, and North America, as well as in smaller communities in the Gulf, and the Caribbean. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura is a time for reflection, worship, and mourning, and therefore weddings and other joyous events are not held during this period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hussein’s sacrifice has special significance in recent history, as its reinterpretation by Musa al-Sadr, Ruhollah Khomeini, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Shariati, and other leading figures of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism provided the revolutionary exemplar for both the overthrow of the shah in Iran and the mobilization of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims in Lebanon. Hussein’s martyrdom is presented as a model of courage, assertiveness, and self-help, and the modern interpretation of that event led to conclusions very similar to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;those arrived at by Catholic liberation theology: that people must not wallow in fatalism but must act to help themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The detailed discussion in this chapter of the commemoration in Lebanon of Hussein’s martyrdom provides a glimpse of a central aspect of Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i society, as well as an appreciation of Hezbollah’s largely successful efforts to shape Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a sensibilities for its own ends.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ritual and Identity&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lebanon is a small country, roughly the size of Connecticut, but the venerable southern city of al-Nabatiya seems a continent away from the fussy lifestyles and bustling restaurants and cafes of cosmopolitan Beirut. The approximately sixtyminute drive from Beirut to al-Nabatiya is not just a departure from the capital’s sensual delights but a sojourn to a part of the country that has lived in the vortex of conflict for more than three decades. Many Beiruti bon vivants are aghast at the prospect of making the southward trek.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Al-Nabatiya is a commercial center in Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil, the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i heartland that extends from the &#039;&#039;wadis&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A &#039;&#039;wadi&#039;&#039; is a dry streambed that swells with winter and spring rains and often becomes lush with vegetation until it dries up in the parching heat of summer.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and hills of southern Lebanon to the southern Beqaa valley. Almost every weekend features a tidal flow of people from the overwhelmingly Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslim suburbs of Beirut southward as Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a head to al-dai&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ah (“the hamlet”), which is usually taken to mean “going to the countryside,” where life is simple, wholesome, and unblemished by urban vices. Except in the bone-chilling, often icy winter in Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil, when people stay in Beirut and its environs, hundreds of thousands of people move back and forth weekly. Unfortunately, from the 1960s through 2006 the flow often reversed as the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;people of the South sought refuge from bombardment and conflict with relatives in the comparative safety of the city.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although the precise emergence of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism in Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil is in dispute, the community unquestionably predates the introduction of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism to Persia (Iran) in the sixteenth century. Certainly Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil was a center for scholarship as early as the late fourteenth century, and scholars from Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil (as well as from Iraq and Bahrain) assisted in the installation of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Islam in Safavid Persia. This was long before the Persian cities of Mashhad or Qum became major centers of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i scholarship. Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil continues to be revered by Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, although it has long been eclipsed by al-Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, the two great Iraqi shrine cities, and, since the nineteenth century, by the now famous Iranian cities of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i learning.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Beirut, where members of Lebanon’s eighteen recognized sects work and often live cheek to jowl, religious practice and ritual are often tucked away from public view (for a list of all the sects, see [[#08_chap1.xhtml|chapter 1]], note 1). Lebanese are adept at discerning cues and clues that reveal an interlocutor’s confessional roots and cultural identity, but, at least until recent decades, public religious ritual was often spurned to avoid provoking sectarian tension. Although public and private mourning of Imam Hussein (&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;azah al-Hussein) and the tragic events (&#039;&#039;masa&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ib&#039;&#039;) of Karbala, have long been observed in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i communities, public commemorations of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura are relatively recent phenomena in &#039;&#039;aldahiya&#039;&#039; (literally “the suburb,” the usual term for the densely populated southern suburbs of Beirut), where they began less than fifty years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The practice of publicly mourning Imam Hussein (&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura) was introduced to the Beirut suburbs by a migrant from Baalbek, al-Hajj Ahmed al-Khansa, after he made pilgrimages &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;(&#039;&#039;ziyarat&#039;&#039;; literally, “visits”; singular, &#039;&#039;ziyara&#039;&#039;), in 1938, to al-Najaf and Karbala, where he witnessed a number of public ceremonies during Muharram. On returning to Beirut, he instituted public mourning not simply as a display of communal piety but as a vehicle for mobilizing recent migrants to the city. Not surprisingly longtime residents and well-established Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a resisted ostentatious commemorations of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura, which, they feared, might alienate their Christian neighbors who then controlled these areas politically (Khuri 1975). Hajj Ahmed built such a powerful foundation among the new urban residents that he eventually became a leading local politician.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In recent years, major public commemorations of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura take place in several parts of Lebanon, including &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039;; in the Beqaa valley, especially in the city of Baalbek; the southern coastal city of Tyre; and across Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil. As many as a quarter of a million people either participate in or watch the military-style &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura parades organized by Hezbollah in the &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039;. Much smaller, less tightly organized processions are held in Baalbek and in Tyre, with representation from various political and social organizations. Smallscale processions are conducted in villages and timed to precede larger commemorations in nearby towns and cities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most sensational commemorations are in al-Nabatiya, an overwhelmingly Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i city of thirty thousand people, where the event has a unique character. Public &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura rituals had been repressed by the Ottomans until their defeat in 1918, but annual mourning processions became popular in the 1920s and featured self-flagellation and ritualized bleeding to mark the culmination of the Karbala tragedy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although the rituals of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura commemoration are often debated vigorously among Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i, with religious leaders continually attempting to prescribe “appropriate” ways of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;remembering &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura, local practices vary widely and popular local customs blend in with Islamic traditions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, commemorative ritual processions sometimes include flailing oneself with chains, metal whips, or swords or intentionally nicking the skin on the forehead to induce bleeding (&#039;&#039;tatbir&#039;&#039;), as well as the more common practice of rhythmically beating one’s chest with a balled fist (&#039;&#039;latam&#039;&#039;). Of course, this is not to every Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i’s taste, and some prefer quiet contemplation and prayer to public performance. Clerical disapproval has been strong; like many of his colleagues, the popular and respected (and al-Najaf born) Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah argues that the blood rituals of al-Nabatiya are improper pragmatically, as they put Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims in a bad light in the eyes of non-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, but they also violate religious law that does not allow Muslims to injure or kill themselves. He emphasizes that the self-flagellation and similar rituals are “socially backward,” even “reactionary.” Instead, the events of Muharram must be understood as a model for an intellectual revolution. Similarly the Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, who until his death in 2001 was one of the most respected clerical voices among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, urged that Imam Hussein’s sacrifice be understood ethically and normatively, not simply as an occasion for demonstrative tears or sensational rituals (Shams al-Din 1985). Along similar lines, the Iranian leader &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Khamenei issued a 1994 &#039;&#039;fatwa&#039;&#039; (an authoritative religious opinion; pl., &#039;&#039;fatawa&#039;&#039;) condemning the shedding of blood during Muharram rituals and underlining the negative image the rituals project. He argued that these rituals were not Islamic but the product of tradition. (Hezbollah has embraced Khamenei as the supreme Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i leader and has promoted his views.) Virtually every important Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i cleric, with few exceptions, has condemned and forbidden the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;practice in recent years and issued &#039;&#039;fatawa&#039;&#039; calling on Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a not to participate.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still, predominantly male rituals of bloodletting of various sorts have proven remarkably resilient in the face of persistent clerical disapproval. Bleeding is an important aspect of the ritual for many—but by no means all—of the participants in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i commemorations of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura in al-Nabatiya (although it is practiced in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i communities in India, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, it is uncommon elsewhere in Lebanon). As one articulate enthusiast, an optometrist in al-Nabatiya, told me as we watched the spectacle in 2000, “What you see here is the real Islam. Islam is not found in books, it is here [in the ritual].” In addition to the label &#039;&#039;tatbir&#039;&#039;, the ritual is sometimes locally called &#039;&#039;haidar&#039;&#039;, meaning lion, a reference to Hussein’s father Imam &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali, the son-in-law of the prophet who is revered for his wisdom. As men run through the streets, they sometimes simply chant “&#039;&#039;haidar, haidar, haidar&#039;&#039;,” as they strike their foreheads with the open palm of their hands or occasionally with a blade.&lt;br /&gt;
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From the first day of Muharram, black banners are draped on buildings and hung across the streets of al-Nabatiya, as they are throughout the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i areas of Lebanon. (In contrast, when the author visited Tehran during &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura 2004 such public signage was much less common.) The banners proclaim: “Everyone is calling for Hussein”; “Every day is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura and every land is Karbala”; “Crying for Hussein is a victory of the oppressed over the oppressor”; or a variety of similar messages. Black pennants are fastened to power and light poles invoking “Hussein,” “the Awaited One,” “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas,” or “Haidar.”&lt;br /&gt;
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During Muharram, entrepreneurs open roadside stands and impromptu &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura souvenir shops to sell tapes and books of readings from the saga of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura and the killing &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;(&#039;&#039;al-maqtal&#039;&#039;) of Hussein, as well as cassettes of mourning lamentations, buttons, banners, paperweights, posters, and other keepsakes. A variety of clothing is offered, including T-shirts for youngsters and adults, and baseball caps with &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura slogans. Many of these &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura mementos are manufactured in Iran and imported by enterprising Lebanese traders attracted by Iran’s bargain basement prices. Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i men and women dress in subdued clothing, and many men wear black trousers and shirts to mark this period of ritual mourning. In addition, the two rival political organizations compete, handing out an array of scarves, vests, head and wristbands, caps, and pennants, all emblazoned with the logos of Amal or Hezbollah in distinctive color combinations (green, red, and white for Amal; black, red, and especially yellow for Hezbollah).&lt;br /&gt;
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For the first ten days of the Muharram, daily readings in private homes and in Husseiniyas (centers for the observance of Hussein’s martyrdom) recall the drama and tragedy of Karbala (&#039;&#039;masa&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ib&#039;&#039;; sing., &#039;&#039;musiba&#039;&#039;). The usual pattern in many villages and neighborhoods is to hold readings in one’s home or with neighbors, followed by an evening visit to the Husseiniya. (There are sometimes separate Husseiniyas for men and women; if not, women retreat to a separate section of the men’s Husseiniya). In these gatherings (&#039;&#039;majalis&#039;&#039;), skilled readers are often hired to relate the &#039;&#039;masa&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ib&#039;&#039; and recite &#039;&#039;al-ta&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ziya&#039;&#039;, the lamentations of mourning, which are also read in contemporary Lebanon to mourn the death of a loved one. The fate of Hussein and his followers is, of course, well known: all the men and boys will die, save Hussein’s infant son &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Zayn al-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abidin, who will carry on the Imamate as the successor to the Prophet Muhammad, and the surviving women will suffer horrible humiliation and suffering at the hand of Yazid, Hussein’s triumphant rival. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Listeners often respond with tears, and crying is &#039;&#039;mustahabb&#039;&#039; or commendable. A variety of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i sources include the succeeding Imams’ emphasis that the weeping for Hussein and his family is rewarded in the hereafter, and that tears (and prayers) offered in this context will be rewarded at the Day of Judgment (Ayoub 1978). Readings often continue throughout the month, focusing especially on the tribulations of the women captives.&lt;br /&gt;
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Zainab, Hussein’s sister, is honored and discussed as a strong figure, an exemplar for women. Her endurance of suffering and her courage to speak truth to power when she was brought in captivity to the court of Yazid in Damascus is now understood as an archetype for women. Women usually gather separately from men in private homes or, as noted above, in a separate Husseiniya.&lt;br /&gt;
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In one prosperous village, just outside al-Nabatiya, a lovely women’s Husseiniya was built a decade ago by a wealthy resident who shared the consensus of the community that a women’s Husseiniya was the most important community need. The author asked a female doctor from Beirut, “Had there always been a women’s Husseiniya in the village?” She answered yes, but it used to be [switching to English] “shitty.” Her comment illustrates the transformation in recent years among Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i women, who now are much less inclined than in the past to derive a counsel of despair from &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura. Just as the larger meaning of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura has changed in recent decades to encompass more activist interpretations, so Zainab’s exemplar provides encouragement for Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i women to move decisively and courageously in society (Deeb 2006).&lt;br /&gt;
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In contrast to other sites in Lebanon, the processions in al-Nabatiya last for two full days, encompassing both the ninth and tenth days of Muharram. Al-Nabatiya’s population &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;swells in Muharram as Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a from al-Nabatiya and southern Lebanon, and even from abroad, close in on the city to mark the event. Wealthy Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a who work abroad often bring their friends and relatives. Hajj Majid Rihan, a rich son of al-Nabatiya who lives and works in Gabon, flew co-religionists, in 2000, from West Africa to Lebanon on a charter jet to take part in the rituals. Accurate crowd counts are always a challenge, but local authorities estimate that as many as fifty thousand people crowd into the city annually. Most participants have been Lebanese, but in recent years contingents of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a have arrived from Iraq and Iran, though few Iranians have participated recently.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the ninth and tenth days of Muharram, many hundreds of men, boys, and even infants, as well as a handful of young women, embrace the suffering of Imam Hussein by shedding their blood in memory of his martyrdom. Since the 1990s several public health organizations, as well as Hezbollah, have called upon people to make blood donations rather than inflict bleeding upon themselves, and a blood collection station enjoyed a steady clientele. It is not uncommon for &#039;&#039;darribeen&#039;&#039; (those who strike themselves) to bleed ritually and also donate blood, and even female workers at the blood donor station sometimes join the ritual.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Intersection of Ritual and Politics&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura is not merely the grass-roots practice of religion. It is also a political event, an opportunity for the rival Amal movement and Hezbollah to show their strength and demonstrate their solidarity. When the author observed the event in March 2000, just two months before the Israeli withdrawal from the “security zone,” enthusiastic Amal supporters, many from southern Lebanese villages, were everywhere in evidence, but Hezbollah also enjoyed a strong core of support in the town, which was reinforced four years later when the party triumphed in municipal elections in al-Nabatiya (more on this in [[#12_chap5.xhtml|chapter 5]]). In 2000 both groups were well represented in the parades or processions on both days, and thousands of others were spectators. Whereas the Amal marchers seemed to be loosely organized but not unruly, Hezbollah members marched with military precision and organized effective cordons for crowd control. The contrast between the loosely organized, populist Amal and the tightly disciplined Hezbollah was quite obvious. Both groups marshaled men, women, and children for their processions, and the numerous children were organized by age or school grade, although the Hezbollah groups were by far more regimented. Even women with babies in their arms, or pushing baby strollers, were enlisted to march.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:images/73.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;3.1 Members of the Amal movement participating in the bleeding ritual, which is a popular religious ritual in southern Lebanon, and one that is condemned by many clerics and dismissed as a folk ritual by Hezbollah. Copyright A. R. Norton, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:images/74.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;3.2 In this part of the dramatic reenactment of the events of Karbala in 680 ce, Hussein’s half-brother &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas, a famous warrior clad here in white, is fighting the enemy. Copyright A. R. Norton, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Lebanese army and police are usually much in evidence, and sometimes confrontations erupt with a political flavor. At one point, in 2000, the army fired a few shots in the air to disperse some shoving matches between participants, whose adrenaline had gotten the better of their good judgment. The same year a van carrying men from a pro-Amal village was turned away from the entrance to al-Nabatiya, when soldiers discovered that the men were armed; an altercation followed in which an army officer was punched, but the soldiers prevailed.&lt;br /&gt;
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More serious clashes occurred in 2002, when sixty people were injured and dozens of cars damaged in melees involving angry Amal and Hezbollah members. The Amalists charged that the Hezbollah parade ran overtime and delayed their own processions (&#039;&#039;masirat&#039;&#039;) by an hour. Hezbollah boycotted &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;al-Nabatiya in 2003, and its television channel, al-Manar, did not cover the &#039;&#039;tatbir&#039;&#039; ritual the next year.&lt;br /&gt;
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Notwithstanding the clashes between rival hotheads, the mood is usually friendly and welcoming. The public commemoration actually occupies two days, in contrast to all the other Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i locales in Lebanon. On &#039;&#039;al-tasu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a&#039;&#039;—the ninth day of Muharram—there are dozens of processions of &#039;&#039;darribeen&#039;&#039; as people begin to gather in al-Nabatiya. Despite the heavy stench of blood, particularly on &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura—the tenth day—visitors often remark on a carnival-like atmosphere. After participating in the processions, &#039;&#039;shabaab&#039;&#039;, or young men, casually walk the street showing off their bloodsplattered clothes as testimony to their fidelity to Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism and to their bravado. Teenaged girls enjoy themselves, sometimes ogling their male contemporaries and, of course, giggling. A handful of young women participate in the bloodletting, but they usually number no more than a few dozen at most. Street vendors sell snacks and drinks, but many people purchase cases of juice and water which they dispense to anyone wishing to quench his or her thirst. Local restaurant owners cook dozens of sheep that they donate to feed hundreds of people.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps most important, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura is a family holiday and an occasion for reunions and feasts. It is also the occasion for special foods, and some of the faithful work late into the night preparing tens of kilos of food for free distribution. Women spend days preparing particular foods associated with &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura. The most common is &#039;&#039;harisa&#039;&#039;, which is made by soaking and softening wheat overnight and then cooking it three or four hours before adding shredded chicken to the pudding-like product. The &#039;&#039;harisa&#039;&#039; is seasoned with cinnamon and cloves, and then offered to family and visitors or even passersby. In other Arab countries, such as Iraq, &#039;&#039;harisa&#039;&#039; is sweetened. &#039;&#039;Qima&#039;&#039;, a less commonly prepared dish from al-Najaf in Iraq, features chick peas, tomatoes, and cooked red meat which some see as symbolizing the blood sacrifice of Hussein and his followers.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:images/76.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;3.3 Four young women from southern Lebanon enjoying the holiday spectacle of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura in al-Nabatiya. Copyright A. R. Norton, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;
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Participating in the bleeding ritual is an individual choice, although the parents of many young boys clearly encourage them to take part. Many of the participants start out at the Husseiniya, where a heaving crowd of thousands gather. Using a straight razor, or &#039;&#039;mouss&#039;&#039;, and deft flicks of the wrist, an obliging barber inflicts shallow cuts on the upper forehead. One or two suffices to cause some bleeding, but some participants wish to bleed more demonstrably and so they will have five, ten, or even more cuts made or do it themselves. (Health-conscious, middle-class &#039;&#039;darribeen&#039;&#039; bring their own razors, which can be purchased inexpensively for about a dollar.) Participants then join a group and follow a prescribed route past the &#039;&#039;baidar&#039;&#039;, or field, where the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;events are dramatized, and then around the main streets of the town, culminating at the Husseiniya.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Everyone has their own Hussein,” notes Ali Safa, a respected professor in Beirut whose natal village is nearby. Some people have participated in the ritual all their lives and cannot imagine missing it. Others do so to fulfill a &#039;&#039;nidhir&#039;&#039;, or pledge. Ra’ed Moukalled is a local optometrist who lost a son, Ahmad, in 1999, during a picnic the day before his fifth birthday; the boy had picked up what looked like a toy but was an unexploded cluster bomb dropped by Israel. Ra’ed participates in the ritual annually in tribute to his deceased son, and his friends join him to show their support and to share in his personal tragedy. Ra’ed has also been a civic leader actively involved in efforts to work with international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to clear cluster bombs and mines from southern Lebanon. Even a few Christians get involved in the Hussein ritual, either out of community spirit or to fulfill their own pledge, perhaps to mark the recovery of an ill relative or a reversal of family fortunes.&lt;br /&gt;
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The mood of the bloodletting rituals is infectious and often onlookers impulsively join the bloodletting. This author has seen a couple of Lebanese policemen and soldiers do just that, slipping on a civilian shirt and returning to don their uniform with a blood-stained bandage secure on their forehead. Aid stations do a robust business, applying bandages and reviving those who have fainted from heat exhaustion or loss of blood. In winter or early spring the weather is usually comfortable, but when &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura falls in the hot months of summer the heat and dehydration claim many more casualties. Nonetheless, no deaths from the ritual have been reported.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:images/78.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;3.4 Hezbollah members participating in an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura procession in southern Lebanon. Posters depict Raghib Harb (in the foreground), the popular Hezbollah leader assassinated in 1984, and Musa al-Sadr, the Iranian of Lebanese descent who founded the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i movement in Lebanon. Copyright A. R. Norton, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;
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The dramatization of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura, the &#039;&#039;timthiliyya&#039;&#039; (a play or performance), takes place on a &#039;&#039;baidar&#039;&#039;, or field, in front of the city’s large Husseiniya. The rendition of the &#039;&#039;timthiliyya&#039;&#039; often lasts more than three hours. Thousands of people crowd around the field or on the roofs of neighboring buildings to watch the event. In 2000 Yazid’s soldiers wore lurid florescent costumes in yellow and orange, whereas Hussein’s somber troupe decamped at a green-rimmed tent, after entering the field on camels and parading before the crowd. A large Islamic standard waves to mark the camp of the prophet’s grandson. A narrator reads a script, but the players themselves, Hussein as well, often recite their lines, much to the displeasure of some clerics. One such cleric, Shaikh Qabalan, disapproves of the entire play, strongly objecting to the idea that any person could portray Hussein.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Historically, on the seventh day of Muharram, Hussein’s group was cut off from water, and heroic battles were fought to reach the Euphrates River, in this reenactment a small concrete pond. As the replay of history continues, Hussein’s half-brother, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas, a brilliant warrior and Hussein’s standard-bearer, succeeds in reaching the water twice. The first time, never taking a sip himself, he watches helplessly as the hard-won water spills onto the sand, and thirsty and anxious children attempt to open the leather water bag. The second time he fails to return. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas fights fiercely, and is only defeated when both his hands are severed at the wrists. The &#039;&#039;kifaf&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas, literally the palms of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas, are a central motif in parade floats and displays throughout the day.&lt;br /&gt;
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The drama takes it toll on the crowd, a number of women faint, exhausted by the emotion-wrenching play and fatigued from standing in place for hours. At particularly poignant moments, such as the death of Hussein’s son, Ali al-Akbar, who is said to have resembled his great-grandfather Muhammad, women are sobbing loudly. The death of an infant in Hussein’s arms evokes a similar chorus of sobs. The play is punctuated by long soliloquies from Hussein and by his entreaties to the enemy. He offers to withdraw from Karbala but refuses to pay homage to Yazid; hence his fate is cast. Imam Hussein reflects on injustice, on the price of loyalty to Islam, on the need to confront our own death bravely, to sacrifice our own flesh and blood in order to see Allah. He is the last man to die, slain while badly wounded and in prayer. His severed head is carried to Damascus in tribute to Yazid, and his body is trampled along with the corpses of his followers by the enemy horsemen. The women of his band are marched off into misery. Variants of the &#039;&#039;timthiliyya&#039;&#039; are performed annually, and lessons of the tragedy are not lost on the rapt audience.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_66&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In 1983, just as the drama was being performed and groups of blood-splattered celebrants were milling about in front of the Husseiniya, an armed Israeli patrol of several trucks suddenly appeared and attempted to crash through the crowds. The incident was caused when an Israeli lieutenant, who had been ordered to avoid the town on &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura, misread his map and took the wrong road. The scene is easy enough to imagine, as the occupiers were instantly seen in the role of Yazid. The crowd threw stones and the Israelis responded with rifles and grenades, killing several Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. The incident was a turning point in the resistance to Israel’s occupation, especially as it spurred many previous fencesitters to join the resistance. In Lebanon’s Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community the 1983 incident is intrinsic to a commonly shared narrative emphasizing Israel’s disrespect for Islam and the injustice of the long Israeli occupation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another event still talked about is the 1996 massacre in Qana, the southern Lebanese town where more than a hundred people were killed in the Israeli shelling of the UNIFIL base in Qana (more on this in [[#11_chap4.xhtml|chapter 4]]). Floats in the Muharram parade often recall the massacre, emphasizing anti-Israel themes and memorializing the resistance. Individuals frequently make the same connection that was so easily made by the crowds in 1983, that the Israeli occupiers are the modern incarnation of Yazid. In contrast to the tragedy that befell Hussein, however, this time the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, having learned from Karbala, will confront and defeat Yazid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Until recent decades the rituals of Muharram in Lebanon had reified and affirmed the status quo, and taught quiescence. Half a century ago the renowned anthropologist Emyrs Peters studied a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i village in Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil, where he found that the play, the &#039;&#039;timthiliyya&#039;&#039;, was a conservative device for sustaining an existing order, not challenging it.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_67&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;What the Play did was to give the vast audience a glimpse of the kind of world they could anticipate when evil triumphs. What was depicted was a world of madness, a world of complete unreason, a world without order of any sort. It did not depict a revolutionary situation of one group supplanting another—indeed, the peasantry could never supplant the Learned Families in this sense, for the peasants are far too numerous. What it showed was the chaos that would result if the Learned Families lost their control of village affairs. (Peters 1970)&lt;br /&gt;
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Contemporary &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura rituals, however, exemplify, and indeed encourage, a heightened and widespread sense of politicization. The ceremonies are an occasion for competing political organizations to perform contending variations of the ritual in order to exemplify piety and mobilize support. In this sense, the rituals offer no less than a public performance of ideology, with, for example, rituals explicitly casting Israel in the role of Caliph Yazid, the Umayyad ruler responsible for Imam Hussein’s martyrdom. Lebanese politicians in the Amal and Hezbollah organizations work hard to harness these sentiments to their advantage, often with impressive success. A striking illustration of this in recent years is the televised addresses by Hezbollah’s current secretary-general al-Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah during the first ten days of Muharram, which are viewed attentively by multitudes. Nasrallah is a popular and often riveting speaker, and his nightly Muharram sermons often probe the “real meaning” of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura, analyzing why death is not to be feared and offering an explicit political commentary. His sermons routinely have two parts, one more or less religious and the other political, in which he routinely castigates the United States for its policies in the Middle East and sometimes comments &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;10_chap3.xhtml#page_68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;more generally on U.S. affairs. In February 2005 he emphasized the inherent justice of Hezbollah’s cause, inspired as it was by the Imam Hussein’s quest, and he railed against depictions of the party as a “terrorist” group. At other times the talks during the month of Muharram are used to offer a social critique, as in March 2000, when one of Nasrallah’s sermons scathingly assessed America’s social ills, underlining that nation’s social problems in order to dampen the dreams of many Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a to immigrate to America.&lt;br /&gt;
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Prior to Israel’s May 2000 unilateral withdrawal of its occupation forces from southern Lebanon, Nasrallah’s Muharram sermons were major political statements, listened to carefully by a wide audience of apprehensive Lebanese for hints about whether chaos or order would follow Israel’s impending withdrawal. He astutely anticipated that there would be little disorder. Whatever one thinks about his views, Nasrallah also exploited the occasion of Muharram to further legitimate Hezbollah as a social and political force among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. The party benefited from a wave of support for its leading role in fighting Israel and creating the pressure that prompted Israel’s withdrawal. In contrast to Lebanon’s elected political leaders, who seemed thoroughly flummoxed by Israel’s declared intention to leave southern Lebanon, with or without an agreement with Syria, Nasrallah projected a tough, clearheaded image.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chapter 4&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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Resistance, Terrorism, and Violence in Lebanon&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:images/83.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Two Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i participants in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura processions in al-Nabatiya. Both wear headbands honoring the Imam Hussein as the leader of martyrs. Copyright A. R. Norton, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;T&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;he 1980s was a decade of extraordinary violence and chaos in Lebanon, often remembered in the United States with indelible images of the ruins of the U.S. marine barracks obliterated by a suicide bomber on a Sunday morning in October 1983. The lives of 220 marines, 18 sailors, and 3 soldiers, in addition to the wife and four children of a Lebanese janitor, were snuffed out in the attack. Simultaneously 58 French paratroopers were killed by a second bomb-laden truck. The French, like the Americans, were participants in the Multinational Force (MNF) that had been dispatched to Beirut to bring stability to Lebanon in the wake of the June 1982 Israeli invasion of that country. Israel’s goals were twofold: to destroy the PLO as an important political force and to install a friendly government in Beirut. The MNF’s involvement began that summer after the retreat of most armed Palestinian guerrillas from Lebanon by ship and land. More than three hundred thousand Palestinians remained, most of them refugees or descendents of refugees from the first Palestinian war of 1948–49. After the catastrophic suicide bombings of October 1983, the marines, to use Ronald Reagan’s word, “redeployed” by early 1984, and the MNF ceased to exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is little question that the attacks were carried out by Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i militants, under Iranian direction. A blue-ribbon investigating commission established by the American government and headed by retired admiral Robert L. J. Long, described the October bombing as an “act of war” and found Iran largely responsible. Iran is also widely believed to be responsible for the earlier suicide bombing and decimation of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983. The oft-unnoticed precedent for the 1983 attacks was established in mid-December 1981, when the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was leveled by a suicide bomber. The Iraqi al-Da&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wa &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;party claimed credit for the attack, citing Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 1980.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lebanon, porous to outside influence and militarily weak, had long been the site for proxy wars, and this was especially the case in the 1980s, with war materials supplied by rival political and military sponsors, including Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Israel, the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet Union. Among the contestants for power, Syria and Iran played key roles, though not always in cooperation with each other. Although Damascus and Teheran shared an interest in thwarting U.S. influence in Lebanon and defeating Israel’s occupation of the country, throughout the decade Syria revealed great suspicion of Iran and its protégé, Hezbollah. Early in the 1980s Hezbollah existed less as a concrete organization than as a cat’s paw of Iran. As Hezbollah’s strength grew over the course of the decade, Syria periodically tried to contain it, most dramatically when the al-Asad regime killed twenty-three Hezbollah members in 1987. Syria also provided support to Amal in that rival Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a organization’s ferocious battles with Hezbollah, in 1988 and 1989. Four years earlier, in 1985, Syria also provided material support for Amal’s “war of the camps,” a three-year campaign to eliminate the power base of Palestinian militants in the refugee camps surrounding Beirut. Although Amal imposed great suffering on Palestinians in the camps, the armed Palestinian militants were never fully subdued, largely because Hezbollah gave them extensive support. Whereas many Amal members were hostile to the Palestinian guerrillas for their abusive behavior in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah supported them on principle. The revered Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a religious authority Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah backed Hezbollah’s position and condemned the Amal campaign. Because of this crucial clerical approval, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and despite Syrian opposition, Hezbollah won increasing support among the local Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. By 1990 the organization had largely supplanted Amal in the environs of Beirut.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lebanon became infamous, in the 1980s, for the kidnapping of Westerners, thirty in all, most of whom were hapless innocents snared at a time of venomous xenophobia. Kidnapping for vengeance, politics, or profit was a well-practiced craft throughout the civil war. After the Israeli invasion in June 1982, however, the first foreigners kidnapped were not Westerners but four Iranian diplomats snatched by the Maronite Lebanese Forces militia and subsequently murdered. The string of Western hostages began in 1982 with David Dodge, the president of the American University of Beirut (AUB), who was held for a year, including some time in Iran. The Dodge kidnapping was apparently intended as a rejoinder to the disappearance of the four Iranians, as well as to strike a blow at the most obvious and well-known symbol of America’s connection to Lebanon, namely, the AUB.&lt;br /&gt;
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There was no “kidnapping-central” but a cabal of militants, some certainly linked to Hezbollah, others in various other gangs and groups, including some that were in the hostage business, selling and trading hostages for profit (a phenomenon that presaged similar criminal activities in Iraq). The UN official who played the lead role in many of the hostage negotiations was Giandominico Picco, whose memoir, &#039;&#039;Man without a Gun&#039;&#039; (Random House, 1999), leaves little doubt that Syria had almost no influence over the kidnappers, and Iran’s leverage was operationally limited.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although Iran did not exercise direct control of the kidnappings, its revolutionary regime did exert strong ideological influence and was particularly effective at sowing the suspicion that Westerners in Lebanon were agents for imperialist &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Americans and Israelis. The hostage seizures were fully consistent with Hezbollah’s declared goal of expunging America from Lebanon, its citizens as well as its diplomatic presence. Western hostages were held in Lebanon in despicable conditions, often alone and chained to radiators for months on end, denied even the slightest dignity. The longest held was Terry Anderson, a reporter for the Associated Press, who spent seven long years as a hostage. CIA Station Chief William Buckley died in captivity, after being brutally interrogated and tortured. The hostages’ fate was often manipulated to serve the interests of Hezbollah’s sponsor, Iran. Lebanon became so dangerous for Americans that, in 1987, the State Department banned the use of U.S. passports for travel to the country, a ban that was not lifted until 1997 (although tens of thousands of Americans ignored the ban in the 1990s after the civil war ended and simply avoided having their passports stamped).&lt;br /&gt;
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The hostage crisis gave rise to “Iran-Contra,” the 1986 scandal that revealed the willingness of then U.S. president Ronald Reagan to trade arms to Iran in return for the freeing of hostages. Unfortunately the hostage releases made possible by these deals were shortly followed by the snatching of others, and four more years would pass before the hostage era ended in Lebanon. Unquestionably Iran exploited the hostages to serve its interests. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hosein Sheikholeslam confirmed Iran’s stake, when, in 1988, he expressed his hope that “the hostage situation would be resolved in a way that serves the objectives for which they were kidnapped.” (Chehabi 2006, 228)&lt;br /&gt;
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Lebanon was a cockpit for violence and a breeding ground for terrorism in the 1980s, but endemic violence began to ebb as the civil war ended in 1989 and 1990. Simultaneously Syria tightened its control over Lebanon with the implicit &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;consent of the U.S., which rewarded Syria’s symbolic participation in the 1990–91 Gulf War coalition against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In the South, however, Israel’s occupation continued to provoke resistance, not least by Hezbollah. Before turning to a fuller examination of the situation in southern Lebanon in the course of the 1990s, we should pause to reflect more generally on the relationship between terrorism and political violence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah and Terrorism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Can all of Hezbollah’s military activity be classified as terrorism? U.S. and Israeli policymakers certainly think so, and they have defined Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Anyone supporting Hezbollah is supporting a terrorist group. By definition, any act of violence that it commits or seeks to commit is an act of terrorism, and so there are no gray areas of justifiable behavior in which terrorists may lurk. Whether for law enforcement officials, spies, or soldiers, the issue is assumed to be settled.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Terrorist” is a useful rhetorical bludgeon that many states have wielded to outlaw or de-humanize radical or revolutionary groups. Thus, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, before Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Oslo accords, almost any mention of PLO included the description “terrorist,” and any Israeli aerial bombing of the PLO, which was in those days a major armed presence in Lebanon, was an attack on terrorist targets, according to Israeli spokespersons and journalists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Following the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224 specifying a series of steps that were to taken to combat al-Qaeda, and its affiliates &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and resources. The groups described in that executive order as terrorists of “global reach” did not include Hezbollah, even though the U.S. Department of State, in 1997, had labeled it a “foreign terrorist organization.” Nor was the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas included, even though it, too, had long been included in the State Department’s terrorist list.&lt;br /&gt;
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These omissions prompted a lively debate, with pro-Israeli lobbying groups, particularly the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, the influential Washingtonbased group that describes itself as “America’s pro-Israel lobby,” as well as a number of members of Congress, arguing strenuously for including Hezbollah and Hamas in the terms of the executive order. Many officials resisted the move, arguing that America’s focus should be on al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and noting that the U.S. would need the support of many Arab states that recognize Hamas and Hezbollah as bona fide resistance groups. Although leading figures in the Bush administration, notably Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, maintained that the additional designation was unnecessary and redundant, the administration amended the executive order to include Hezbollah and other groups as enemies in the “war against terrorism.” In Israel, the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon moved quickly in the days following 9/11 to associate Israel with America’s war on terrorism, thereby gaining further leverage against Israel’s enemies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Terrorism can be defined as the intentional use of political violence against civilians and civilian sites such as schools, hospitals, restaurants, buses, trains, or planes. Putting aside for the moment that Hezbollah promotes activities and performs services in Lebanon that have nothing to do with terrorism, such as running hospitals, the organization has engaged &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in forms of violence that fall outside the rubric of terrorism as it is generally understood. Most notably, so long as Israel was occupying a significant area of Lebanon, there is no doubt that Hezbollah and other Lebanese groups were fully within their rights to resist the occupation forces and to do so with deadly violence. That the resistance usually restricted its attacks to enemy soldiers and the enemy’s proxy forces only reinforced their firm normative footing. The primary reason why the United States has not succeeded in convincing most European states to endorse its blanket designation of Hezbollah as “terrorist” is because many of those states insist on a more precise conception of terrorism than the U.S. habitually employs. Of course, once Israel withdrew unilaterally from Lebanon, in 2000, Hezbollah found itself on far weaker normative ground.&lt;br /&gt;
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Also, there is no question that Hezbollah has engaged in acts that do, indeed, constitute terrorism in its more precise and generally understood sense. One such clear instance was the 1985 skyjacking, by two Hezbollah operatives, of TWA flight 847, en route from Athens to Rome. Robert Stethem, a U.S. sailor on leave and traveling on the flight, was mercilessly beaten and shot in the head. The hijackers, Muhammad &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Hammadi and Hasan Izz al-Din, who remain close to the top of the FBI’s “wanted list,” disgracefully dumped his body on the tarmac of Beirut airport. Another clearcut case, cited previously in [[#09_chap2.xhtml|chapter 2]], was the 1988 kidnapping of Lieutenant Colonel William R. Higgins of the U.S. Marines, an unarmed UN observer who was tortured and murdered by the “Believers’ Resistance,” a group sympathetic to Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is generally easier to trace much of the terrorism of the 1980s and early 1990s to Iran than to Hezbollah. Iran murdered a variety of regime opponents during this time, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;including Shapur Bakhtiar, the last prime minister of the Pahlavi dynasty that had been overthrown in 1979, as well as members of the Pahlavi family and other former officials of the toppled regime. Especially at risk were Kurdish nationalists, who advocated greater autonomy or independence for the Kurdish minority in Iran. After the killing of four Kurds in a Greek restaurant in Berlin, an Iranian intelligence official boasted that a blow had been struck at the Kurdish opposition. An Iranian official and three Lebanese were convicted in a 1997 trial of the Berlin assassinations, and four other Iranian officials who were judged responsible, in absentia, included President Rafsanjani and the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. The evidence of Iranian complicity in many of these attacks is clear to any impartial observer. The extent of Hezbollah’s involvement, however, is murkier. Robert Baer, a former CIA agent with extensive experience in Lebanon and in the Middle East, has argued that Hezbollah was not involved: “It’s not that Hezbollah is doing the terrorism out of Lebanon. They didn’t do the US Embassy in 1983 or the Marines. It was the Iranians. It’s a political issue [in the U.S.] because the Israelis want the Americans to go after Hezbollah” (&#039;&#039;Christian Science Monitor&#039;&#039;, July 7, 2003). But although Baer’s conclusions are accurate for many of the attacks in Europe during this period, in other instances Hezbollah’s role is more clearly indicated. Following Israel’s 1992 assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas al-Musawi, two terrorist attacks occurred in Argentina that many knowledgeable observers believe were the joint work of Iran and Hezbollah’s external security organization, which apparently operates autonomously from the party and is widely believed to be closely linked to Iranian intelligence. The first attack, within months of al-Musawi’s murder, was the detonation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of a large bomb under the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing twenty-nine people. The Argentinean authorities issued an arrest warrant for Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyah, who directed the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985 and was believed to have regularly collaborated with Iran in acts of terrorism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second attack, in 1994, was the result of a bombladen van driven into the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina in Buenos Aires, killing eighty-five people, most of them Jews. The suicide bomber was allegedly Hezbollah member Ibrahim Hussein Berro, but Hezbollah claims that he died later in southern Lebanon in a resistance operation. The former Iranian ambassador to Argentina Hade Soleimanpour was later briefly arrested in Britain but was released for lack of evidence. Then, in November 2006, warrants were issued for the arrest of former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani and eight other former Iranian officials, including the ex-foreign minister Ali-Akbar Velayati.&lt;br /&gt;
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Occupation in Southern Lebanon&lt;br /&gt;
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Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon spanned more than two decades and rendered Hezbollah’s ideology persuasive to many Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in the region. Israel’s military involvement in the South began in 1978 with its “Litani Operation,” intended to push Palestinian guerrillas north of the Litani River. The invasion left important pockets of armed Palestinian strength intact, but it provided a context for creating a border “security zone” under the nominal control of a proxy militia led initially by the volatile, renegade Lebanese army major Sa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ad Haddad. Despite the terms of UN Security Resolution 425, passed in 1978 with heavy U.S. support and calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the restoraion &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of Lebanese sovereignty, Israel sustained this security zone for the next twenty-two years until unilaterally withdrawing in 2000. By that time Hezbollah had, indisputably, become both Israel’s nemesis and a central fixture among Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in southern Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Within months of Israel’s June 1982 invasion, when it became clear that Israel had no intention of disengaging from Lebanon anytime soon, a variety of groups across the political spectrum began to organize attacks against the Israeli occupation forces. These included factions of the Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th and Communist parties, Nasserist organizations, and other secular nationalist groups. By the 1990s, however, Hezbollah was carrying out most of the attacks, each appearing to have been characterized by careful planning and well-practiced professionalism. Its first post-invasion operation, and one of its deadliest, was mounted in November 1982, in the southern city of Tyre. Hezbollah member Shaikh Ahmad Qasir drove a bomb-laden car into an Israeli headquarters and intelligence center. At least seventy-five Israeli officials and soldiers were killed, along with fourteen Arab prisoners. The attack was so unexpected that Israel did not even know initially how it had happened and for years persisted in saying that the explosion was caused by a “gas leakage.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For an official Israeli report of the incident, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1982-1984.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Tyre attack, in fact, was one of twelve “self-martyrdom missions” (in Hezbollah parlance) mounted by Hezbollah members. This was less than one-third of all the suicide attacks. The other suicide missions were launched by Amal and various secular nationalist groups all intent on ending Israel’s occupation. This distribution of suicide missions &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;between secular and Islamist-leaning groups illustrates that the tactic of mounting suicide attacks was motivated more often by nationalist and patriotic impulses than by religious inspiration.&lt;br /&gt;
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The turning point in the resistance was the 1983 al-Nabatiya incident described in the previous chapter, when an Israeli army patrol blundered into the middle of the town during a mass procession on &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura and opened fire in an attempt to disperse the crowd. From that time on there would be no fence sitting. By 1984 the pace of attacks was so intense that an Israeli soldier was dying every third day.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1985 Israel hunkered down in an enlarged border zone comprising some 10 percent of all Lebanese territory which the Israelis referred to by the euphemism “security zone.” Israel asserted that it would abide by UN Resolution 425, calling for unconditional Israeli withdrawal only after the security situation improved. In reality, this was an &#039;&#039;in&#039;&#039;security zone that became an argument for continuing occupation. If the situation in the South quieted, as it did periodically, Israeli officials held up the zone as a success that could not be safely terminated. When the situation became hotter, the zone became a necessity. Effectively the zone was an impetus to violence.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah officials, meanwhile, frequently claimed that, without effective Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i resistance to the occupation, Israel would have little incentive to consider withdrawing—a view widely shared in Lebanon. The converse proposition—that a cessation of resistance activities would induce Israel to withdraw—was often dismissed as laughably improbable, and not just by members of Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
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Neighboring Syria viewed the southern Lebanon situation as a fundamental strategic concern. To the extent that Israel held sway in the area, Syria’s Lebanese flank was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;further exposed to an Israeli attack. Equally important, Syria insisted on firmly linking the fate of the South with that of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. When the Lebanese government tried to break that linkage in 1983, in the course of peace negotiations brokered by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, Damascus sabotaged the draft agreement. The May 17 agreement of 1983 would have ceded southern Lebanon to de-facto Israeli control in return for a formal Israeli military withdrawal. But the agreement contained a secret U.S.-Israeli provision in which the U.S. promised that the agreement would not be implemented without Syrian assent, which was not forthcoming. As Syria tightened its power grip in Lebanon, Lebanese officials repeatedly emphasized that the South was captive to Israeli-Syrian negotiations. A decade later, in 1993, when the Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri tried to break the linkage, he was quickly yanked back in line. Hezbollah, meanwhile, backed Syria’s contention that the prospect of a separate Lebanese deal with Israel was the route of weakness and would subordinate Lebanon to Israeli interests.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah developed its own relations with various Palestinian groups, based in Lebanon, Palestine, and elsewhere. Fostering these ties was Israel’s expulsion of four hundred alleged Palestinian militants to southern Lebanon in 1992. The Lebanese government forced the expelled Palestinians to stay in a contained area in the South that became, as many Palestinians later called it, “Hezbollah University,” where Hezbollah indoctrinated its “students” in its perspective on resistance. Although many of the Palestinians were eventually allowed to return home, the ties built during that period have been largely sustained at Israel’s cost.&lt;br /&gt;
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Generally the Lebanese strongly resist the &#039;&#039;tawtin&#039;&#039;, or “naturalization,” of its resident population of nearly four &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hundred thousand registered Palestinian refugees (although UN officials believe the actual number to be over 200,000, since many Palestinians have left for economic reasons). The Lebanese fear that integrating these refugees would destabilize Lebanon’s delicate political balance, and they also bitterly recollect the Palestinian state-within-a-state that existed for more than a decade (until Israel’s 1982 invasion). Most of the refugees have roots in Haifa and the villages of the Galilee, areas that are now very much part of the state of Israel. Although their camps were nominally disarmed in 1991, significant arms caches remain, and camps like &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ain al-Hilwah, near Saida, are strongholds that the Lebanese army skirts. A number of armed Palestinian factions reportedly maintain cooperative relations with Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
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The civil war came to a close in Lebanon by the early 1990s, when all the militias, except Hezbollah, agreed to disband in accordance with the 1989 Ta’if accord. Hezbollah, which signed on to the accord only after the Iranian government gave its blessing, justified the maintenance of its armed forces by calling them “Islamic resistance” groups, not militias, committed to ending Israel’s occupation. The forces were said to be needed to defend the country against the Israel-sponsored SLA (South Lebanon Army). This position enjoyed wide, though not unanimous, support in Lebanon, where the Israeli occupation was seen as an impediment to the country’s recovery.&lt;br /&gt;
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The “Rules of the Game”&lt;br /&gt;
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Practical “rules of the game” emerged, during the 1990s, between Hezbollah-led resistance forces versus the Israelis and their proxy, the SLA. Israel would not attack civilian targets in Lebanon, and the resistance would focus its actions on &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Security Zone (Sobelman 2004). This modus vivendi was clearly articulated in an oral agreement in 1993, following Israel’s “Operation Accountability,” launched in July of that year. The 1993 agreement led to a temporary reduction in the intensity of violence and reprisal. But in 1996, after Hezbollah fired katyusha rockets into Israel in retaliation for the killing of Lebanese civilians, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) again launched a major campaign into Lebanon. “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” initiated in April of that year, was intended to undermine popular support for Hezbollah among the Lebanese, as well as to prompt Syria to rein in the organization. The strategy failed, largely as a result of the horrible slaughter at Qana, an ancient village some locals like to claim as the town cited in the Bible where Jesus turned water to wine (John 2:1–11). (In fact, the actual site is probably Cana in the Galilee.) At the UN base in Qana—a protected zone in international law—civilians sought refuge from IDF air and ground attacks. But rather than finding safety, 106 civilians were killed by Israeli artillery. Authoritative reports by the UN and Amnesty International challenged Israeli claims that the shelling of the UN base was unintentional, and these findings are well known in Lebanon.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The UN report was prepared by Major General Franklin van Kappen, a Dutch officer serving on the staff of Secretary General Butrous Butrous Ghali. See Security Council document S/1996/137, May 7, 1996. See also Amnesty International, “Unlawful Killings during Operation ‘Grapes of Wrath,’” July 1996, http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/engMDE150421996 (accessed October 21, 2006); and Human Rights Watch, “Israel/Lebanon: ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’: The Civilian Victims” (September 1997).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, the report of the UN Secretary-General’s military adviser demonstrated that the Israeli shelling of the UNIFIL site was not accidental, and the thirteen shells that fell on the compound had exploded where they had been aimed.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;No incident in recent memory has inspired more hatred for the Jewish state than the Qana attack. Close to the UN base, a memorial cemetery has been created where the victims are buried, and the site has become a popular memorial for many Lebanese to visit. Among middle-class professionals in &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039; trips to Qana, usually with children in tow, are now common and have taken on the aspects of ritual. The site is festooned with banners (most in Arabic) accusing Israel of terrorism and genocide, and invoking sayings by some of the central figures in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism such as Imam Hussein. Many of the banners emphasize the loss of innocent blood and demand vengeance. One sign reads: “Qana is the Karbala [the site of Hussein’s martyrdom in the year 680 c.e.; see [[#10_chap3.xhtml|chapter 3]]] of the twentieth century; it is a land made holy by the Lord Jesus and contaminated by the Zionist Satan (enemy of God).”&lt;br /&gt;
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As CNN broadcast horrific pictures of mangled and burned civilians in the wake of this massacre, the then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher succeeded in persuading all sides to abide once again by the same rules that had been in place since 1993. This time, however, the agreement was committed to an unsigned piece of paper. A noteworthy point is that in the course of negotiations Israel never challenged the right of Hezbollah to attack its soldiers in Lebanon, thus tacitly conceding that the IDF was an occupation force in the country. The April understanding brokered by Secretary Christopher specified that armed groups would not launch attacks against Israeli territory; Israel and its allies would not bombard civilians or civilian targets; both sides would commit themselves to avoid attacking civilians and launching attacks from civilian areas; and nothing in the agreement would prevent the right to self-defense. The agreement also provided for a monitoring &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;group of the United States, France, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel to oversee the implementation of the agreement and to receive complaints of violations. The group would operate on the basis of unanimity and be based at Naqura, a southern coastal village and the site of an old customs house now used as the UNIFIL headquarters. From 1996 to 2000 the group operated as an effective mechanism for policing and reinforcing the rules of the game. UNIFIL has also functioned throughout its existence (from 1978 to the present) as a useful backchannel conduit for indirect communications between the belligerents.&lt;br /&gt;
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One measure of the importance of the accepted rules was that both Israel and Hezbollah apologized for actions that fell outside the rules, as in November 1998, when Hezbollah apologized for a katyusha firing which it not only had not authorized but which it condemned. Israel has occasionally acted with marked restraint after suffering major casualties, on the argument that a given Hezbollah attack was permitted by the rules. It also bears emphasizing that Hezbollah resistance operations were mainly targeted against Israeli soldiers and the allied Lebanese militia, not against civilians. This is an important difference between Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. Whereas Hamas has intentionally targeted Israeli civilians, not least in suicide bombings, Hezbollah usually did not do so over the course of Israel’s long occupation in Lebanon. Though shocking, perhaps, to many Western observers, the twelve suicide attacks launched by Hezbollah were all targeted against the occupation force and its allies, all legitimate resistance targets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not to say that both sides always played by the “rules of the game.” Both sides periodically disregarded timehonored principles of noncombatant immunity and proportionality. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Resistance attacks on Israeli soldiers sometimes sparked indiscriminate Israeli reprisals that led to civilian deaths, especially after several Israeli soldiers had been killed. Hezbollah proved adept at moving within the rule box, which no doubt frustrated Israeli soldiers. The IDF, on a day-to-day basis, often adopted a policy of shoot first and ask questions later, which made daily life more than a bit risky for those living in the shadow of the Security Zone. Thus civilians were regularly killed “by accident” and in greater cumulative numbers than either members of the resistance, the IDF, or the SLA. In all, more than five hundred Lebanese and Palestinian civilians were killed in southern Lebanon from the time of the 1982 invasion to the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, or more than thirty times the number of Israeli civilian fatalities during this time. Human Rights Watch has carefully analyzed the deadly civilian toll (see, for example, Hilterman 1996).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The logic of Israel’s “iron fist” was to punish Lebanese civilians disproportionately for the inability of the IDF to prevent attacks on its own soldiers and for retaliatory firing of katyusha rockets at Israel. Support for the resistance would wither, Israeli strategists thought, if they placed an awesome burden on the Lebanese, as, for example, when several hundred thousand people were roused from their homes and given a few hours to flee on threat of bombardment in April 1996. This proved to be a miscalculation, as many Lebanese believed that less resistance would induce Israel not to leave but to stay in the South.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although Israel is anathema in the ideology of Hezbollah, there have been some mechanisms for negotiation, often through UNIFIL and sometimes through European states. The rules of the game allowed for both sides to conduct periodic, indirect negotiations for the return of prisoners &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and bodies.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A typical statement of Hezbollah’s position on Israel is provided by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abdallah Qasir, a former member of parliament: “Direct negotiations are impossible because we do not recognize the existence of the State of Israel” (&#039;&#039;Al-Zaman&#039;&#039;, May 29, 2002).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Typically German negotiators have played an active role in the negotiations. Thus, in 1996, in return for the bodies of 2 IDF and 17 SLA soldiers, Israel released 45 detainees and the remains of 123 Lebanese. A similar exchange occurred in 1998, which was notable because one of the Lebanese bodies exchanged by Israel was that of Hadi Nasrallah, the son of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah. Hadi was killed in September 1997, in a raging battle with Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. (The elder Nasrallah’s stoic acceptance of his son’s death is often cited by party members as one of the reasons he is so highly esteemed.) The most sensational prisoner exchange was conducted as late as January 2004, when, in return for three bodies and one living retired lieutenant colonel who had been captured in Beirut, Israel released 23 Lebanese and 400 Palestinian prisoners. The Lebanese included Mustafa Dirani (captured in 1994) and Shaikh &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abdul Karim &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ubayd (captured in 1989). These men had been held by Israel (in Camp 1391, one of the places Israeli officials do not talk about) as bargaining chips to gain information about Ron Arad, a long missing aviator who was captured alive in Lebanon, in 1986, but whose fate is now unknown.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The 2000 Israeli Withdrawal&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1999 the retired chief of staff General Ehud Barak was elected prime minister of Israel. One of his campaign promises was that he would withdraw from Lebanon within twelve months of assuming office, either in conjunction with bilateral negotiations with Syria or unilaterally, with &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the former the obvious preference. After several months of preparatory discussion between Israel and Syria in March 2000, President William Clinton flew to Geneva to meet with the Syrian president Hafez al-Asad, and, to the utter surprise of al-Asad and multitudes of Lebanese and Syrians, the negotiations failed. Barak refused (to Clinton’s apparent annoyance) to release a pocket of Syrian land abutting Lake Tiberias, and the Syrians found this unacceptable. Al-Asad told Clinton, “I used to swim in that lake as a boy,” and he insisted that all occupied Syrian land be returned. Israel then began focusing on unilateral withdrawal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the abortive Geneva meeting, the run-up to Israel’s unilateral withdrawal began. Confusion abounded In Beirut and Damascus, with dire warnings of widespread chaos in Lebanon, including the slaughter of collaborators and bloody vendettas. Hasan Nasrallah’s statements stood out for their clear analysis and calm assurances of Hezbollah’s careful preparations for the aftermath of withdrawal. He emphasized that there would be no retaliatory killings or revenge attacks. In contrast, many other officials seemed like actors confused about their lines and unsure of their parts, so disconcerting and unwelcome was a voluntary Israeli exit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah maintained a position of calculated and coy ambiguity concerning the Israeli withdrawal. Although it was widely believed in Lebanon that the violence against the Jewish state would stop after the Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah avoided saying so directly. Muhammad Ra&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d, the unflappable and very popular Hezbollah leader (and schoolteacher) from al-Nabatiya, who has been elected four times to the Lebanese parliament on the party’s ticket, argued, in a 1996 interview with the author, that ambiguity increased Lebanese anxiety and the fear of Israel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The withdrawal finally came on May 24, 2000. It was a time of extraordinary celebration in Lebanon, most especially in the South, and displaced residents immediately flooded into the South to repossess their liberated homes and villages. At the prison of al-Khiam, a horrendous detention center run by the SLA in close collaboration with Israel and the site of much mistreatment, even torture, people were literally tearing down prison doors with their bare hands to free the prisoners. In the rest of the countryside, apart from a few incidents that mainly involved beatings of collaborators—not even serious injuries, much less deaths—there was a remarkable degree of calm. Very little associated violence occurred, and certainly none of the revenge killings so widely anticipated. Many of the SLA people fled to Israel with their families. Those who remained were tried for collaboration and, typically, given sentences of four or five years, and in some cases advised not to return to their villages for a time. Overall, that time will be remembered as a remarkably orderly and humane period, especially when measured against the history of internecine violence that scarred Lebanon for much of the preceding few decades.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The summer following Israel’s withdrawal, a serious debate arose within Hezbollah about whether to focus on Lebanese politics and themes, such as corruption, or to maintain the resistance posture both in Lebanon and the Middle East. After internal party discussions settled on the latter strategy, Nasrallah consulted with the Iranian &#039;&#039;rahbar&#039;&#039; (or leader) Ayatollah &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Khamenei, who gave his blessing to continue the resistance, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian theater. Hezbollah found a clever pretext to continue paramilitary operations against Israel by attacking Israeli patrols on farmland adjoining the village of Shebaa, a disputed territory in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (called “Har Dov” &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Mount David by Israelis) that Lebanon claims as its own. Israeli military presence there allowed Hezbollah to maintain a military posture on the pretext that the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon had not been complete.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the period between the Israeli withdrawal of May 2000 and the explosion of war in July 2006 (examined in [[#13_chap6.xhtml|chapter 6]]) one Israeli civilian was killed by Hezbollah weapons, and five more were killed in a Palestinian operation that may have had Hezbollah’s help. Nine Israeli soldiers died in Hezbollah attacks in the contested farms area, and eight others were killed in six clashes along the “Blue Line” demarcated by the UN after Israel’s withdrawal. Some of the attacks were in retaliation for Israeli-caused deaths in Lebanon. At least twenty-one Israeli soldiers were also wounded. The total of seventeen Israeli soldiers killed during a six-year period contrasted to an average of twenty-five Israeli soldiers who died annually during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, according to Israeli Justice Minister Haim Ramon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harassing fire, aggressive patrolling, and heated rhetoric by both sides marked the entire period. On the Lebanese side of the border billboards facing Israel exhibited slogans in Hebrew, stating, for example, “If you come back, we’ll come back.” Hezbollah delighted in sponsoring cross-border taunting and stone throwing at Israeli military positions. In fact, piles of rocks were conveniently available adjacent to the Fatima gate, through which Israel had often entered Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Generally, however, this six-year period was a relatively quiet, peaceful time by historical standards, and this was frequently commented on by Israeli officials prior to the summer of 2006. The more serious clashes tended to occur in the Shebaa area of the occupied Golan Heights. This &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;period is important to consider because it indicated that maintaining stability across this hostile border is neither impossible nor infeasible. Indeed, the rules of the game were well understood by both Israel and its Hezbollah foe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In October 2000 Hezbollah launched an operation in the Shebaa Farms area that led to the ambush and capture of three Israeli soldiers. The captives all died, either on the spot or later from their wounds, their bodies only returned in the January 2004 exchange. After that operation Israel resumed the routine violations of Lebanese airspace and territorial waters that it had ceased in May or June 2000, when it was seeking UN certification of its withdrawal under the terms of Security Council Resolution 425. From October 2000 on, Israeli war planes regularly flew over Lebanese territory, with sonic booms over Beirut, intelligence collecting drones, and similar incursions. In time, Hezbollah began firing anti-aircraft weapons at Israeli planes violating Lebanese airspace, but as they were firing southward, in the direction the planes were coming from, the spent ammunition rounds would land in Israel. Hezbollah also began firing Katyusha rockets, mostly into the occupied Golan Heights, with a few episodes of Katyusha firings into Israel proper as well. Although several dozen incidents occurred over the last six years, in almost every case, according to Israeli sources, the culprits were Palestinian fedayeen, not Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The periodic episodes of violence during this period occurred in the Shebaa Farms area, Israeli-occupied territory. The rules were so well established, in fact, that officials on both sides were periodically quoted as saying that such and such a military action was within the “rules of the game.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon was followed closely by the eruption of the second Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, in September 2000. That Intifada movement &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;11_chap4.xhtml#page_93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clearly was partially inspired by Hezbollah’s stunning success. In 2000 and 2001 Hezbollah flags flew in many Palestinian camps in the West Bank and Gaza, and Hezbollah played a role in training anti-Israeli Palestinians and a minor role in supplying them. The major exception were the arms that Iran shipped on the &#039;&#039;Karine-A&#039;&#039;, which included a Hezbollah crewman and was intercepted by Israel in January 2002 (the incident apparently encouraged George Bush to pin the “axis-of-evil” label on Iran). Otherwise, Nasrallah carefully stressed that the job of liberating Palestine belonged to the Palestinians, just as the job of liberating the Golan Heights belonged to Syria. Even so, the level of incitement from Hezbollah was very high. The Hezbollah television station, al-Manar (“the Lighthouse”), beamed terrestrial and satellite propaganda to many avid Palestinian viewers. The number of viewers had peaked in 2001, and dropped in 2003 to 8 percent, compared to an audience of more than 50 percent for the CNN-clone al-Jazeerah. Al-Manar was the sixth most popular satellite station in the Arab world, trailing far behind al-Arabiya as well as al-Jazeerah, according to a January 2006 poll by the U.S. firm Zogby International.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Lebanon, meanwhile, the Hezbollah leadership was unanimously persuaded, as were most of the supporters, that its demonstrated military prowess and accumulating military arsenal provided by Iran and Syria was successfully deterring Israel from invading Lebanon again, or from bombarding Lebanon as it had done so often in the past. In July 2006, however, Hezbollah was to discover that its deterrent shield was not as intimidating as it imagined.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chapter 5&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Playing Politics&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:images/109.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bahman hospital in the southern suburbs of Beirut, one of a multitude of social services connected with Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i foundations, religious figures or political groups such as Hezbollah. Copyright A. R. Norton, 2006.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;L&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ebanon has a curious electoral system that is intended to accommodate its mélange of confessional spirits, diverse regional interests, and personal rivalries. Voters have gone to the polls every four years (except for the civil war years of 1975 to 1990) to vote for members of parliament. As a result of the Ta’if accord of 1989, which marked the end of the civil war, seats are divided equally between Muslim and Christians, in contrast to the prior distribution that favored Christians by a 6 to 5 ratio. The 128 parliamentary seats are subdivided along confessional lines: 27 seats each for the three largest sects—Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, Sunni, and Maronites—with most districts confessionally mixed. Voters cast ballots for each available seat in the district regardless of the seat’s confessional label. The system promotes local inter-sectarian alliances to persuade voters to cast votes for an entire alliance list rather than picking and choosing individual candidates. Voters are not without discretionary choices, such as the fairly common &#039;&#039;al-tashtib&#039;&#039;, or “crossing out”; the voter scratches out the undesired candidate and then votes for the remaining members of a list rather than for the whole list. On rare occasions voters even pick and choose among lists, writing in the names of their preferred candidates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the civil war in Lebanon finally ended, elections for parliament had not been held in eighteen years. Only about two-thirds of the parliamentarians from the 1975 Chamber of Deputies survived to see the chaos and bloodshed end. As an ostensible transitional step, parliamentary appointments in 1991 filled forty seats. This unpopular technique was, in part, a device championed by Syria to seed the new parliament with pro-Damascus militia leaders who had gained power during the civil war. The appointments coincided with the consolidation of Syria’s grip on Lebanon, which was formalized in May 1991 with a Treaty of Brotherhood, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Cooperation, and Coordination. The treaty legitimated a heavy Syrian hand, particularly in defense and security realms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first post–civil war elections were finally held in 1992. Unsuccessful efforts to formally explore the monitoring of balloting were launched by the International Peace Academy, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and the Centre for Lebanese Studies, which included such highly respected figures as the late Katchiq Babikian, who had served with distinction as Lebanon’s minister of justice. These efforts—which count this author as one of the initiators—proved fruitless when it became clear that neither Beirut nor Damascus had the slightest inclination to welcome foreign oversight. Syria’s covert manipulation of these elections included interference in the composition of candidate lists and drawing up electoral districts with a view to isolating opposition voices and insuring the victory of Syria’s allies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many Lebanese Christians, especially Maronites, were deeply resentful of Syria’s overbearing role, and they moved to boycott the elections. As a result of the boycott, voter participation rates of less than 10 percent were not uncommon in predominantly Christian districts and, thanks to the absence of many Christian voters at the polls, pro-Syrian candidates were swept into office in many districts where they might otherwise have faced tougher competition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;s Decision to Participate&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The 1992 elections posed a crucial question for Hezbollah: Should the party adhere to its previous denunciation of the confessional electoral system as corrupt, and reject participation, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;or seize the moment and compete in the election? The very idea that Hezbollah would participate in Lebanese elections had been rejected outright by its leaders in the 1980s. However, the most influential Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i cleric in Lebanon, Shaikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, had been espousing a pro-election position for years. Fadlallah argued that, because revolutionary transition to Islamic rule and an Islamic state was impossible in the diverse Lebanese society, gradual reformation was necessary. And that, insisted Fadlallah, required participating in the political system. As Jamal Sankari reveals in his intricately detailed biography of the pragmatic Fadlallah, the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i cleric emphasized the need to come to a modus vivendi with the state rather than remain outside the political system and judge it as abhorrent in strictly Islamic terms. Other leading Lebanese clerics less closely associated with Hezbollah made similar points. The late Shaikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, a cleric revered for his intellectual depth and leader and president of the Supreme Islamic Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Council from 1978 to 2001, told me emphatically, in a 1997 interview, that it is necessary for Islamist parties to take into account the power of contending secular forces. Shams al-Din emphasized that political compromises are often necessary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah’s deputy secretary-general Na&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;im Qassem, who began his involvement in Lebanese politics, like many party members, as a member of Amal in the 1970s, has offered an insider account’s of the “deep internal debate” that preceded the 1992 elections. Twelve leading members were deputized to debate the issue, including Qassem; Nasrallah, who had replaced the assassinated &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas al-Musawi just the year before; and Subhi al-Tufayli, the president of the ephemeral Islamic Republic of Baalbek (the major town in the northern &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Beqaa valley) in 1984, who rose to become Hezbollah’s first secretary-general in 1989. The debate turned on three key questions. From the standpoint of Islamic law, was participation in a “non-Islamic” government legitimate? Should ideology bend to practical interests? And would Hezbollah, by its participation, be co-opted into a secular political system, thereby deserting its principles and Islamic vision? Al-Tufayli, known not for eloquence but for rash stridency, insisted (and continues to insist) that by running for office the party would be “selling out,” and that Hezbollah would be transformed (&#039;&#039;tahawwal&#039;&#039;) from a revolutionary force to a tame political participant. Other members sought a compromise, suggesting that party members should run as individuals, not in the name of the party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The legitimacy issue was referred to Iran’s Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ruhollah Khomeini as the supreme legal authority (wali al-faqih), in 1989, upon Khomeini’s death. In Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism individuals choose a respected and learned scholar as their &#039;&#039;marji&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; al-taqlid&#039;&#039;, or “source of emulation,” their ultimate authority on Islamic law. In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini had taken this principle a major step beyond accepted practice by arguing for the necessity of a supreme jurisconsult, a distinguished Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i scholar who would not just resolve religious and legal matters but also would be the nation’s ultimate political authority. Thus Iran’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Khamenei, considered by Hezbollah to be its “official” marji&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, gave his blessing to the possibility of Hezbollah’s participation in Lebanese elections, thereby strongly supporting the proelection wing and also providing grist for Hezbollah’s critics in Lebanon who question its national identity. Incidentally, most rank-and-file Hezbollah members and supporters emulate Iraq’s Ayatollah &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali al-Sistani or Lebanon’s Ayatollah &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Fadlallah, who are both important thinkers in the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i world. The Iranian leader is simply not taken very seriously as a religious scholar, but he enjoys obvious and important political authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the end, ten men embraced running for office, whereas two, including al-Tufayli, rejected the idea and left in a fury over the decision, which, at the delegation’s conclusion, was again submitted to Khamenei for approval.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The determination to enter Lebanese politics for the first time was widely popular in the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. Adherents of both Amal and Hezbollah had always suffered a deep-seated sense of political disenfranchisement, so the prospect of gaining representation offered hope of growing political empowerment. Of course, some viewed the elections merely as means for greater access to political benefits, literally allocations (&#039;&#039;muhasasat&#039;&#039;), which refers to access to government jobs, contracts, licenses, or permits, among other goods that are typically allocated along confessional lines in Lebanon. But officials debating the question also saw strategic benefits to winning elected office. Hezbollah would gain both official recognition as a political institution in Lebanon as well as a public podium, and would also be able to influence the budget to its constituents’ advantage. By being inside the political system, Hezbollah might also be able to shape political dialogue to its benefit, as well as head off problematic initiatives. In the end, therefore, ideology bent to pragmatism, and Nasrallah announced, on July 3, 1992, that the party would compete in that summer’s elections.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 1992 elections Hezbollah and its non-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i electoral allies (often from Baalbek, where Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a comprise only about half the population) captured twelve seats in the Lebanese parliament, including eight Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i seats. With only &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;small variations from one election to the next, Hezbollah has maintained its electoral standing, routinely winning around 10 percent of all parliamentary seats. And although the Hezbollah leadership sometimes made questionable use of Islamic doctrine in each election—for example, the leadership’s repeated declaration that Hezbollah members were legally required, as though commanded by Allah (&#039;&#039;taklif alshar&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i&#039;&#039;), to support the party—most striking about Hezbollah’s political campaigns is the extent to which nonreligious themes are habitually emphasized. The party electoral platform emphasizes battling economic exploitation and underdevelopment, inequities in the political system, personal freedom and opportunity, and, of course, security. Hezbollah’s electoral strategy does not dwell explicitly on religious themes at all, in stark contrast to, for example, Christian fundamentalist groups in the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For many years the central preoccupation of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community has been the Israeli military occupation of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has regularly capitalized on its role in the resistance in its campaign slogans, as in 1996 when some of its posters read: “They resist with their blood, resist with your vote.” Particularly in 2000, the year of Israel’s unilateral withdrawal, Hezbollah might have won four or five more seats at the expense of Amal but the &#039;&#039;saqf alsuri&#039;&#039;, or the “Syrian ceiling,” was widely understood to set an upper limit on the number of Hezbollahi candidates permitted to compete. The ceiling reflected Syria’s usual balancing act in Lebanese politics, with the result that, in 2000, an Amal-Hezbollah alliance—the Resistance and Development Bloc—won all twenty-three available seats in southern Lebanon and more than a quarter of all seats in parliament ([[#12_chap5.xhtml#fg_5.1|table 5.1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;T&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;small&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ABLE&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 5.1&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Parliamentary Election Results for 27 Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Seats&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:images/117.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Secular parties and traditional elites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Municipal Elections&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unlike the parliamentary elections, in which Syria has meddled incessantly, municipal elections have largely been left alone. Most election observers have noted the relative fairness of Lebanon’s municipal elections, especially compared to its recent parliamentary elections, which have been transparently manipulated by the government and by Syria. The stakes are lower, the contests are harder to stagemanage, and it is not as easy to fool local voters if their choices are thwarted. Thus recent elections in municipalities provide a useful gauge of the popularity of Hezbollah and its rivals. These elections also illustrate the pragmatic political bargains that Hezbollah has often made with ideological opposites, such as the avowedly secular Syrian Social Nationalist Party and even the Communist Party. This is a striking contrast to the 1980s when Hezbollah fought pitched battles with the former party and reputedly killed dozens of members of the latter.&lt;br /&gt;
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The municipal elections in the summer of 1998 were the first local elections in more than three decades. Hezbollah &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;demonstrated its strong base in Beirut, especially in &#039;&#039;aldahiya&#039;&#039; (the suburbs) where it soundly thrashed the candidates of Nabih Berri’s Amal Party. In the massive Beirut suburbs of Burj al-Barajnah and al-Ghubayri, Hezbollah slates carried the day. Ghubayri has become an interesting example of Hezbollah’s capacity to govern at the local level. It is the largest town in the suburbs and it has been singled out by the United Nations for its exemplary efforts at providing low-income housing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The suburb is also notable for another reason, well known to Lebanese, namely, it is the site of Monoprix, which not only offers a nice selection of foods and clothing but arguably the best liquor store in the country. The store is an important source of tax income for Ghubayri, because the municipality maneuvered deftly to prevent the national government from having all the tax revenues flow directly to the state. In 2000, when this writer asked the head of the municipality, a widely admired member of Hezbollah, about the sale of alcohol, normally prohibited in Islam, his response implied pragmatic tolerance. At first he noted that many Lebanese Christians shop in Monoprix, and Christians face no prohibition on alcohol. Then, when pushed a bit, he chuckled and said that many of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a who had worked in West Africa “drank like fish.” With a laugh he said, “That’s their choice.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In Ghubayri the 1998 Hezbollah municipal election slate was led by Muhammad Sa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;id al-Khansa, a scion of a large and much respected clan that dominates the busy trade in automobile parts. The Khansas are represented across a rich variety of businesses far removed from tires and transmissions, including the haute couture studio of Jamil al-Khansa, which is well known in Paris and the Gulf. Like many other extended Lebanese families, the Khansas boast a government-chartered family association, which gives needy members of the large extended family subsidies and loans for foreign education, sophisticated medical attention, or disaster relief. With hundreds of clan members, the al-Khansa family enjoys considerable electoral clout at the municipal level. Their Husseiniya—which, as discussed in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;[[#10_chap3.xhtml|chapter 3]], is the building used annually during Muharram for the commemoration of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom at Karbala—is one of the largest in &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039;, which makes it an important political and social site, as well as an important gathering place for community events and rites of passage, such as funerals.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although parliamentary speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri’s slate performed poorly in &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039;, Amal performed credibly in the South and in the Beqaa valley, winning control of Tyre, a movement stronghold. Hezbollah held its own by capturing the southern municipality of al-Nabatiya In the southern town of Sarafand, Hezbollah aligned with the secular Syrian Social Nationalist Party to win shared control of the municipal council. In the underdeveloped northern Beqaa valley, Amal captured Baalbek through a deal with secular parties and farmers, and Hezbollah captured Hirmil to the north. Although Baalbek is often thought of as the bedrock of Hezbollah, the city’s population is only half Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslim, with Sunnis and Christians accounting for the rest. The Beqaa valley also features one of Hezbollah’s most formidable regional political rivals, former Hezbollah secretary-general Subhi al-Tufayli, who has accused his former party of doting on the South to the neglect of the suffering Beqaa. Al-Tufayli has built a large constituency in the Beqaa valley, where the economy remains heavily dependent upon agriculture, including illicit drug cultivation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Revolt of the Hungry&lt;br /&gt;
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By the mid-1990s Lebanon’s agricultural sector was suffering from the flood of cheap produce from Syria. (Syria’s exploitation of its free access to the Lebanese economy ended only in 2005.) The hardship this caused to the valley’s farmers &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;spawned a mood of angry discontent that al-Tufayli helped to inflame. Al-Tufayli famously opposed Hezbollah’s decision to run in Lebanese elections, but by 1997 he announced that he would be running for election in the 1998 municipal races. Then, on July 4, 1997, he organized rallies that, while banned by the government, were still attended by several thousand followers. Al-Tufayli’s populist platform—the &#039;&#039;thawrat al-jiyaa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;, or “revolution of the hungry”—included demands for job creation; crop subsidies; free education, electricity, and water; and state benefits and pensions for service with the resistance in lieu of army service. The platform implicitly criticized Hezbollah for failing its needy constituents and prompted well-founded concern on the part of the Hezbollah leadership, which understood the potential attraction of a “revolution of the hungry” in the dense Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i suburbs of Beirut.&lt;br /&gt;
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Al-Tufayli’s seeds of revolution bore electoral fruit. In the 1998 municipal elections al-Tufayli captured his hometown as well as neighboring Tarayya but split a large adjoining village with Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
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Al-Tufayli was indicted for killing an army lieutenant, in January 1998, yet he is still on the scene, accusing Hezbollah of being a tool of Syrian foreign policy and a servant of Israel, and charging that Hasan Nasrallah is an intelligence agent for Iran. He explains, not unjustifiably, that his freedom of action is the result of his huge following, which acts as a check on Hezbollah’s influence. As the al-Tufayli episode illustrates, Hezbollah cannot afford to take its electoral success in Lebanon for granted.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the next set of municipal elections, in 2004, Hezbollah offered a more palatable political program in the Beqaa and Hirmil regions than it had in 1998. Building on a proven track record of efficient governance, and profiting from its &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;leading role in the liberation of the South, the party was a steamroller in both the Beqaa and in the Beirut suburbs, as well as in the South. The voters’ enthusiasm for Hezbollah also had been bolstered by the German-mediated release, in January 2004, of four hundred Palestinian and twenty-three Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails in return for a captured retired lieutenant colonel and the bodies of three Israeli soldiers. Not only did Hezbollah capture the municipality of Baalbek, but it gained control of twenty-six other local governments in the Beqaa where it lost only three contests. Throughout Lebanon it topped its main rival, Amal, by 2 to 1 in local government seats won.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Rich Texture of Shi`i Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
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The Lebanese government offers paltry social welfare services for its citizens, and the few that are available are heavily concentrated within Beirut. A broad range of services are sorely needed in &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039;, where per capita income is one-fifth to one-sixth of the national average ($6,000 prior to the 2006 war). With no safety net of state-provided social services, life has traditionally been very hard indeed for those without prosperous extended families. But the glaring lack of non-family—based support services began to ease in recent decades, at least in the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community, owing in part to the vision of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i cleric Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. During the civil war Fadlallah spoke about the necessity of creating a &#039;&#039;dawlat al-insan&#039;&#039;, or “a government for mankind,” that would provide the resources for people to help themselves and one another. Fadlallah’s concept has inspired the emergence of many private social service associations mostly serving the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. Some are linked directly to Fadlallah or to other leading sayyids, institutions, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and parties, notably including the Musa al-Sadr Foundation, the Supreme Islamic Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Council, the Amal movement, and Hezbollah. Husseiniyas, some built by families, others funded by municipalities or benevolent trusts (&#039;&#039;awqaf&#039;&#039;; sing., &#039;&#039;waqf&#039;&#039;) are often important centers for associational life, and in smaller villages they are often the only site for social assistance. Anthropologist Lara Deeb (2006, 170) recently quoted a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i woman in the Beirut suburbs who observed, “Before, there was nothing here, not a single &#039;&#039;jam&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;iya&#039;&#039; (charitable organization), nothing.” Although not literally true, the statement does underline the paucity of &#039;&#039;jam&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;iyyat&#039;&#039;, or associations, only a few decades ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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The present abundance of associations in the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community is an essential part of the construction of a modern, confident notion of identity, and a spirit of activism and volunteerism (discussed in [[#10_chap3.xhtml|chapter 3]]) stands in contrast to earlier, rampant acceptance of deprivation among the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fadlallah has been particularly effective as an institution builder. In 1976 he was named &#039;&#039;wakil&#039;&#039;, or deputy, by the Najafbased Ayatollah al-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Uzma Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khu&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;i, who until his death in 1992 was one of the most revered of the marja&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i. (“sources” of law). As al-Khu&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;i’s &#039;&#039;wakil&#039;&#039;, Fadlallah was entrusted to collect donations on his behalf and use those donations for good purpose in Lebanon. Thus Fadlallah oversaw cooperatively with Musa al-Sadr and Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din the Imam Khu&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;i Orphanage (begun ca. 1963 in Beirut), as well as the Bahman Hospital in &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039;. With the death of his colleagues, these important institutions were absorbed by Fadlallah’s massive Benevolent Charity Society (Jam&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;iyyat al-Mabarrat al-Khayriyya, created in 1978). Fadlallah’s Social Services Office (Maktab al-Khadamat al-Ijtima&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;iyya) is also highly respected. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;These institutions employ several thousand people and include many volunteers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although wealthy Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, including émigrés and rich Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in the Gulf, are often important donors, most of the &#039;&#039;jam&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;iyyaat&#039;&#039; depend heavily on local fund-raising and donations or generate income themselves. As Lara Deeb (2006, 89) notes, Fadlallah’s rich complex of institutions includes businesses such as gas stations, a publishing house, a photocopy store, a factory for religiously permissible or &#039;&#039;halal&#039;&#039; foods (such as meat that has been slaughtered according to Islamic rules—similar to Kosher standards), and a computer store. Individual donations include alms (&#039;&#039;zakat&#039;&#039;) that may be paid in kind, such as gifts of food for the poor; Ramadan gifts, &#039;&#039;khums&#039;&#039; (a fifth of one yearly income after meeting living expenses), half of which is paid to one’s &#039;&#039;marji&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;wakil&#039;&#039; and the other half to a descendant of the prophet or &#039;&#039;sayyid&#039;&#039;, and ad hoc donations by the faithful (&#039;&#039;sadaqat&#039;&#039;). Respected &#039;&#039;jam&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;iyyat&#039;&#039; are often authorized by several &#039;&#039;maraji&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s&#039;&#039; to collect donations on their behalf. It is not unusual for as much as two million dollars to be collected on a single night during Ramadan.&lt;br /&gt;
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Also noteworthy is the Imam Sadr Foundation based in the southernmost city of Tyre and run by Rabab al-Sadr, the sister of Imam Musa. In addition to the Burj al-Barajnah vocational school for boys, Sitt Rabab heads an extremely impressive vocational institute for women, which is often much admired by visitors.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah offers an array of social services to its constituents that include construction companies, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, and micro-finance initiatives (notably al-Qard al-Hasan, literally the “good loan,” that began making loans in 1984 and now offers about 750 small loans &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a month). These tend to be located in predominantly Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i areas, but some serve anyone requesting help. Hezbollah hospital and clinic staff also treat all walk-in patients, regardless of political views or their sect, for only a small fee.&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the funding for the social and medical infrastructure is raised domestically, but Hezbollah also receives significant subsidies from Iran. The amounts are often estimated at $100 million a year, but, in fact, they vary widely, depending on the political climate in Iran. A significant portion of Iranian support is for Hezbollah’s militia wing. Several of the Hezbollah-sponsored societies are actually branches of Iranian organizations or were initially created by Iran. Hence the large Islamic Charity Emdad (ICEC) was created in 1987 with Iranian financial support but today depends heavily on volunteer labor. Deeb (2006, 90) notes that of 440 Emdad employees only about 90 were paid, and many paid employees donate a significant amount of unpaid labor. The Martyr’s Association was created in 1982 by Khomeini and operates as a sister organization to an Iranian organization of the same name, as does the Association for the Wounded. Other organizations were created by Hezbollah, more notably the Jihad al-Bina&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Development Organization, which has literally reconstructed and repaired much of the damage wrought by war. The Hezbollah Women’s Committee and the Islamic Health Committee are also important groups.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Amal movement also provides various services to its supporters, including schools, clinics, and hospitals, some of which rival individual Hezbollah facilities. Amal is able to draw on the donations of its membership and some well-to-do benefactors, but it lacks a generous benefactor such as &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the role Iran plays for Hezbollah. The Amal movement’s institutions generally have had much less impact on Lebanese society than either Hezbollah’s institutions or those connected with leaders such as Ayatollah Fadlallah. Of course, as speaker of the parliament, Amal’s leader, Nabih Berri, is an important source of government patronage, which is often harnessed to Amal’s purposes.&lt;br /&gt;
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A Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i friend, in 2004, told me that, “there are no needy people in &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039;,” implying that the rich fabric of social and charitable organizations meet the needs of people who would otherwise be impoverished. A safety net exists today that simply was not there before, and many Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a take pride in knowing that they have helped to build it. Nonetheless segments of the community remain in distress, as the example of Subhi al-Tufayli’s Beqaa-based “Revolt of the Hungry” demonstrated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The social services institutions that do exist in the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community were put to an extraordinary test in 2006 by the Israeli attacks that targeted broad swaths of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community and left as many as fifteen thousand homes destroyed or badly damaged. The severe, extensive damage obviously has overwhelmed even Hezbollah’s services framework, but the party’s prompt action to meet its constituents’ needs, in August 2006 (discussed in [[#13_chap6.xhtml|chapter 6]]), is a vivid example of the competence and professionalism that has won Hezbollah extensive support among many Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a.&lt;br /&gt;
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More important than the specifics of any one association is the evidence that a palpable sense of community and religious commitment (&#039;&#039;iltizam&#039;&#039;) now exist which emphasize that a mark of faith is to offer a helping hand to others and participate in the community. Ayatollah Fadlallah is known for &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;12_chap5.xhtml#page_112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;capturing this ethos in his comment that he does not want followers but rather partners. It is impossible to appreciate the striking durability and loyalty that modern Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i groups, such as Hezbollah (or comparable groups in Iraq, for instance), generate unless one understands that their strength derives from the strong social fabric that they have woven over the years.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Chapter 6&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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From Celebration to War&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:images/127.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Beirut suburbs of Haret Hreik on the morning of August 14, 2006, a few hours after a cease-fire in the 2006 war. Copyright Ali Safa, 2006.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;T&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;he exuberant nationwide Lebanese celebration of Israel’s 2000 withdrawal began to run out of steam within a couple of years, particularly outside the formerly occupied region. People still made the trek to the large village of al-Khiam, a couple of miles north of the Israeli town of Metulla, where they visited the infamous Israeli prison from the period of the occupation. The prison, formerly a French military barracks built during the League of Nations mandate in pre-independence Syria and Lebanon (1920–43), had been a thoroughly miserable place to be jailed. Until Israel bombed it during the summer of 2006, it was preserved more or less as it was on May 24, 2000, the day of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, when the guards—members of the Israeli-funded proxy militia—fled and neighboring villagers forced the cells open. Visitors would come to gawk at the poorly lit, cramped cells, the frayed toothbrushes, improvised eating utensils, a “dispensary” that seemed more a janitor’s closet than a medical facility, and a metal utility pole to which inmates were occasionally tied and beaten with electric cables (on two occasions to death). After leaving al-Khiam, visitors might make their way to the much-bombed, ruined, but still awesome crusader fortress, Chateau de Beaufort, with its sweeping vistas of the Galilee, or to a memorial cemetery for the victims of the shelling of Qana in 1996. En route, Hezbollah flags were common, interspersed with billboards honoring martyrs and schematics recounting resistance operations. Voyeuristic sightseeing aside, many Lebanese wanted to “live and let live,” as one founding member of Hezbollah said to this author in May 2000. Israel was gone, and most Lebanese had no desire to fight other people’s battles. For five consecutive years, on May 25, the government sponsored an annual commemoration of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;liberation of the South, but that stopped in 2006, as if Lebanon’s political elites had decided it was time to move on.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the summer of 2000, before the second Palestinian intifadah erupted in September, and before Hezbollah began its campaign against the few remaining Israeli forces in the Shebaa Farms area of the occupied Golan Heights. Hasan Nasrallah was a regional, even international celebrity. He was rewarded by a visit from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. His ordering of the operation that led to the capture, in October, of three Israeli soldiers in the Shebaa area possessed a clear logic; like Israel, which had earlier captured Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i fighters in the South as bargaining chips, Hezbollah now had bargaining chips of its own. The chips were exploited to full effect when, with German help, a deal was reached, in January 2004, to give up the bodies of the three captured soldiers (who were either dead when captured, or succumbed to their wounds) and to return an Israeli reserve lieutenant colonel reputedly lured to Beirut under murky, apparently illicit circumstances. In an Israeli procedure clothed in secrecy, the officer was charged with unspecified crimes and agreed to a plea bargain by which he was sentenced to the time that he was held in captivity by Hezbollah.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For some details surrounding this intriguing episode, see the &#039;&#039;Jerusalem Post&#039;&#039;, October 23, 2003; and http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=66727.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In exchange for the Israeli captives who were released, Israel freed 423 prisoners, of whom 23 were Lebanese and the remainder Palestinians. The prisoner exchange was a moment of triumph, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, paid off a few months later in sweeping victories for Hezbollah in the 2004 municipal elections.&lt;br /&gt;
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The occasional skirmish in Shebaa often obscured the fact that, as noted in [[#11_chap4.xhtml|chapter 4]], for the six years following &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Israel’s exit from Lebanon in the spring of 2000, the border was more or less quiet. This confounded the predictions of many experts who had predicted that the Israeli exit would leave a vacuum that would likely be filled by mayhem. During these six years of relative stability, nine Israeli soldiers were killed in the Shebaa Farms area. Another eight Israeli soldiers were killed along the “Blue Line” demarcated by the UN after Israel’s withdrawal (some on Lebanese soil and others on Israeli soil). A total of seventeen Israeli soldiers were lost during the six-year period compared to about twenty-five per year during the occupation. As far as Israeli civilian casualties were concerned, during this entire sixyear period, there was only one Israeli civilian fatality, a teenaged boy who was killed by an anti-aircraft round fired by Hezbollah. (There was also an operation in 2002 involving two Palestinian fighters who managed to cross the border and ambush and kill six Israelis—five civilians and a soldier. Even though Hezbollah was not directly involved, it is difficult to imagine anyone crossing the border without some level of Hezbollah cooperation. If these are counted, the total Israeli civilian deaths were six, or one per year.) Lebanese and Palestinian civilian deaths during this same period included a shepherd killed by Israeli gunfire, and a preponderance of deaths caused by landmines and cluster bombs left as a legacy of Israel’s operations and attacks.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the euphoria of the Israeli withdrawal began to fade, so did the adulation for Hezbollah. Critics arose who argued that the organization’s periodic attacks on Israel, even if confined to the Shebaa Farms area, were reckless and unjustified. In one of his many outspoken newspaper articles, Gibran Tueni, the publisher of Lebanon’s leading newspaper and a widely read critic of both Syria and Hezbollah, asked: “Who authorized Nasrallah to represent all the Lebanese, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to make decisions for them and to embroil them in something they don’t want to be embroiled in? Did Nasrallah appoint himself secretary general of all the Lebanese and the whole Arab world?” (&#039;&#039;an-Nahar&#039;&#039;, May 5, 2003). Tueni was only one of many who accused Nasrallah of being intoxicated with his own fame.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another sign of discord involving Hezbollah at this time (2003) occurred when Nayif Krayem, the well-known director of the party’s television station al-Manar, was dismissed from his post because he seemed to be loyal to Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, whose moral influence Hezbollah had come to distrust. All this arose indirectly from Hezbollah’s criticism of flagellation and similar religious practices in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura commemorations, as discussed in [[#11_chap4.xhtml|chapter 4]]. Indeed, Hezbollah’s position is complementary to that of many senior &#039;&#039;mujtahid&#039;&#039;s who argue that these rituals detract from Islam and divert people from appropriately contemplating the Muharram tragedy. Before his dismissal, Krayem wrote an article making the same points, using quotations from the revered Iranian Ayatollah Mortaza Mutaharri as support. The reason for his dismissal was not his citation of Mutaharri but the suspicion that he was using the citations as a smoke screen to obscure his debt to the ideas of Fadlallah, who, as previously seen in [[#12_chap5.xhtml|chapter 5]], is the most influential Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i thinker and cleric in Lebanon. Krayem categorically denied the charges in an extraordinary series of newspaper articles in the Arabic press. Although frequently and incorrectly described in the West as Hezbollah’s “spiritual guide,” Fadlallah’s relationship with Hezbollah, although civil, is often strained and tense. Krayem’s 2003 firing should be understood to reflect not only the party leadership’s distrust of Fadlallah’s moral influence but &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;their overall siege mentality following a couple of years of basking in adulation after the Israeli withdrawal.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq loomed in early 2003, Hezbollah wanted to step out of the crosshairs. The party cooled its rhetoric, its episodic taunts along the border with Israel, and its strikes at Israeli army positions in the Shebaa region. Although many Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a adored him, Nasrallah won few plaudits from Iraqi co-religionists when he argued against toppling Saddam Hussein and his regime, and instead urged the Iraqis to convene a national reconciliation conference, with elections and the formation of a new government. There was no rush among Iraqi Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a and Kurds to embrace Nasrallah’s unsolicited proposal; the plan only evoked their criticism, as they viewed the suggestion as laughable that the Iraqi Baathist regime would conciliate itself out of existence. In the United States, meanwhile, the spring of its Iraq invasion in 2003 was a period of unfettered optimism not yet undermined by the Bush administration’s miscalculations or the nightmare of violence that haunts Iraq still. Nasrallah’s trenchant assessment proved prescient: “We tell the United States, don’t expect that the people of this region will welcome you with roses and jasmine. The people of this region will welcome you with rifles, blood, and martyrdom operations. We are not afraid of the American invaders, and we will keep saying ‘death to America’” (&#039;&#039;al-Intiqad&#039;&#039;, March 14, 2003). Such prophetic statements did nothing to diminish U.S. hostility toward Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nasrallah had his own, self-interested reasons to oppose the Americans. This became clear during the first weeks after the Iraq invasion, when the euphoria of a quick succession of victories led to speculation, in and around the Bush administration, about further, immanent military action to snatch the “low-hanging fruit” elsewhere in the region to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;exploit America’s apparent strategic momentum. The threatening chatter, which received lively play in the Beirut media, referred most commonly to toppling the government in Syria, attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the rather fanciful notion that the U.S. might sponsor an opposition uprising in Iran to topple the Islamic regime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Changing Social Tapestry in Post–Civil War Lebanon&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over the past few decades the social tapestry in Lebanon has changed in ways that help explain why sectarianism has kept a stubborn grip on the country, why Hezbollah has succeeded so well in mobilizing support, and why inter-confessional cooperation is more elusive today than it was a few decades ago. The key changes were a result of Lebanon’s terrible civil war, which claimed nearly 150,000 lives, or nearly 5 percent of the country’s population.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is commonly assumed that the fifteen-year civil war in Lebanon, ending in 1990, was a conflict only between Christians and Muslims. There is some truth to this, for the main line of battle, especially in the first years of the conflict, divided the politically dominant Christian Maronite community and the mainly Muslim Palestinian resistance movement, which saw Lebanon as a battleground in their war to wrest a homeland from Israel. However, this notion obscures much more complex patterns of belligerence involving many different sectarian groups at odds over the Palestinian cause. Many Lebanese Christians, especially the Greek Orthodox who accounted for about 10 percent of the population during the civil war, tended to be much more sympathetic than the Maronites to the Palestinians. The non-Arab Armenian community, which is wholly Christian, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;mostly stayed out of the civil war, with notable exceptions of Armenian groups fighting on both sides. The main pro-Palestinian grouping of Lebanese during the civil war was the Lebanese National Movement, an admixture of Arab nationalists, communists in several flavors, and various sectarian militias, notably from the Druze community, which accounted for about 7 percent of the total population. Most of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a backed the Palestinian militias, but smaller yet not insignificant numbers joined the Maronite militias. Later in the war, especially in the 1980s, groups with a distinctly Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i sectarian orientation—particularly Amal and Hezbollah—emerged as significant players. As already noted, Amal opposed the Palestinian guerrillas and Hezbollah supported them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most Lebanese and others who witnessed the civil war agree that &#039;&#039;ta&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ifiyya&#039;&#039; (sectarianism, or “confessionalism”) became more pronounced after the civil war than during the war. At least four factors may explain this heightened sectarianism, which have been analyzed incisively by the Lebanese sociologist Salim Nasr (S. Nasr 2003).&lt;br /&gt;
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For one, the outbreak of intercommunal violence at the start of the civil war forced a significant displacement of people that transformed the previous, socially heterogeneous communities into more segmented patterns of living. An unfortunate example is the well-known shopping district in West Beirut, al-Hamra, where Christians and Muslims had lived closely together in adjacent apartments before the civil war, but today the Christian population has shrunk and Hamra is now predominantly Sunni Muslim. Some observers claim that the ambience of the once cosmopolitan Hamra has suffered as a result of this change. A short visit to Hamra will confirm this impression: If you stand, at ten or eleven in the evening, outside a movie theater &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that was once packed with patrons, today you will see only a handful of movie-goers trickle into the street when the movie ends.&lt;br /&gt;
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Second, sectarianism has been abetted by growing economic difficulties, income inequality, and immense corruption, estimated by a UN-commissioned study, in the 1990s, to exceed $1.5 billion a year (&#039;&#039;Daily Star&#039;&#039;, January 20, 2001). Even before the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006, the country’s national debt stood at $40 billion—the highest per capita national debt in the world—which had been created by massive public spending on infrastructure damaged during the civil conflicts and the Israeli invasion. (Much of the rebuilt infrastructure was destroyed by Israeli bombs in the summer of 2006, which will only add to the national debt problem.) The huge debt constrains the ability of the state to intervene in the economy and inhibits private sector investment, severely limiting economic opportunities. This has resulted in a shrinking middle class, increased flight of Lebanese with the financial means to emigrate (largely Christians, who have comparatively easier access to visas to the West), and growing dependence of the remaining population on the patronage dispensed by the new sectarian political bosses (&#039;&#039;zu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ama&#039;&#039;), such as Amal leader Nabih Berri, who gained immense power and personal wealth by dispensing largesse, jobs, and political favors.&lt;br /&gt;
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A third cause of rising sectarianism concerns the revival of religious institutions and leaders, as illustrated by the strong influence of the Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Sfeir, the Sunni Grand Mufti Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, and the head of the Supreme Islamic Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Council Shaikh &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abd al-Amr Qabalan. Within sectarian organizations, clerics have come to predominate. In Hezbollah, for example, Muhammad Ra&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d and Muhammad Fneish, the only two &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;non-clerical members of the seven-member al-Shura (“consultation” body), the highest decision-making body in the party, were replaced by clerics in 2001. Ra&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d and Fneish, perhaps not coincidentally, were known to be pragmatists who were skeptical of the organization’s belligerent risk-taking. (The only non-clerical member of al-Shura is now al-Hajj Hasan Khalil, a close adviser to Nasrallah.) Although this religious revival cannot be traced to any single factor, Syria’s domination of Lebanon’s political space cannot be underestimated as a key element. Syrian hegemony has stunted the growth of independent political personalities and, conversely, has fostered the promotion of pro-Syrian sycophants. A political environment with little opportunity for men and women of real stature to develop as political leaders attracts religious figures prepared to criticize widespread corruption and a generally compromised political system, and also advance a convincing normative model for a religiously rooted society.&lt;br /&gt;
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A final reason concerns regional developments that have affected Sunni-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i relations throughout the Middle East and beyond. The political ascendancy of the majority Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community in Iraq in the wake of the American occupation has heightened the shared identity of Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a to their religious brethren in Iraq. The rise of violent Sunni movements, such as al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraq, which are virulently anti-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i and frequently deny that the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a qualify as Muslims, has encouraged Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims across the Middle East and even in Pakistan to identify themselves more in sectarian than secular terms. Younger Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in the region are much less likely than their fathers and grandfathers were a generation or more ago to join secular parties of the ideological left or right.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Lebanon&#039;s Love-Hate Relationship with Rafiq al-Hariri, and His Assassination&lt;br /&gt;
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When Rafiq al-Hariri was maneuvered out of office in 1998 after six years as Lebanon’s prime minister, many Lebanese were happy to see him go. They were equally happy to see him return as prime minister in 2000, however, when the Lebanese surprised even themselves by upsetting Syria’s plans for fraudulent elections that would install pro-Syrian officials. Disappointment with the government of Salim al-Huss, the Sunni politician who was prime minister from 1998 to 2000, was rampant, largely because it could not cope with the economic mess that al-Hariri had bequeathed. The transparent subservience of the al-Huss government toward Syria did not help either.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the run-up to the 2000 national elections, al-Hariri’s shadow loomed very large. The publicity-shy general Ghazi Kanaan, then the Syrian pro-consul in Lebanon, dictated the redrawing of electoral districts in Beirut to facilitate simultaneous victories for Tamam Salaam, son of a former prime minister, Prime Minister al-Huss and for Rafiq al-Hariri. According to Syria’s master plan, the nineteen seats in Beirut would be divided between three pliant Sunni politicians in the capital. The smart money was betting that Najib Mikati from Tripoli, known for his close ties to Syria, would head the new government. The election confounded the game-plan. Al-Hariri proved to be a steamroller. He captured eighteen seats in Beirut and vanquished his two major Sunni opponents. The nineteenth seat was left open for a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslim from Hezbollah. Al-Hariri himself won his Beirut constituency with more votes than any of the other Sunni candidates in Beirut.&lt;br /&gt;
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Al-Hariri had been careful to cultivate good ties in Syria, including Vice President &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abdul Halim Khaddam, who long &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;handled the Lebanon portfolio until Syrian leader Hafiz al-Asad passed it on to his son, Bashar. Press reports indicated a momentary warming with Bashar, to whom al-Hariri promised $400 million in foreign investment for Syria, but the rapprochement was not destined to last.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ensuing four years, until al-Hariri’s resignation in October 2004, were marked by deadlock, political frustration, and mutual animosity between al-Hariri and Emile Lahoud, Lebanon’s president since 1998. Lahoud, who was widely understood to be Bashar al-Asad’s &#039;&#039;wakil&#039;&#039; (or “deputy”) and who did not hesitate to wield the considerable power of his Syrian patron, succeeded in usurping the prerogatives of his adversary. For instance, although the prime minister chairs cabinet meetings under the terms of the 1989 Ta’if accord, President Lahoud assumed the prerogative to do so. Lahoud often summarily dismissed al-Hariri’s agenda for cabinet meetings.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the Lebanese constitution, presidents may not succeed themselves. Al-Hariri made no secret of his unhappiness with Syria’s plans to extend President Lahoud’s six-year term in 2004 for a further three years. Syrian president al-Asad reacted sharply, informing al-Hariri in a curt ten-minute meeting in Damascus, in August 2004, that opposing Lahoud’s extension would be considered tantamount to opposing the Syrian president. Accounts of this terse encounter began ricocheting around Beirut that same evening, when the former prime minister, Salim al-Huss, stated the bottom line succinctly when he met this author: “It is done.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Syria’s engineering of Lahoud’s three-year extension as president was received with approval, resignation, or resentment depending on where one sat on the political spectrum. For Hezbollah, Lahoud is an ally and a guarantor that the “resistance” will not be forced to disarm. In many quarters, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_126&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;including among veteran politicians such al-Huss, the extension was merely another example of Syria’s controlling hand in Lebanese politics. In contrast, for many Christians and Druze, and certainly for al-Hariri and his allies, Syria’s diktat provoked resentment and a mood of opposition. By deploying its power so brazenly, Damascus overreached and provoked an international response. The U.S. and France acted in concert with UN Security Council Resolution 1559, passed with their joint sponsorship in September 2004, which called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces and the disarming of Hezbollah. Given al-Hariri’s close relationship with President Jacques Chirac, there was much speculation about al-Hariri’s role in crafting, or at least promoting, the resolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a direct result of the extension of Lahoud, political opposition to Syrian political domination began to coalesce, particularly around Walid Jumblatt, leader of Lebanon’s two hundred thousand Druze. Jumblatt organized a series of opposition meetings in the fall of 2004 at Beirut’s fashionable Bristol Hotel. Prime Minister al-Hariri did not attend, but he was widely known to have sent friends and proxies. The October 2004 attempt on the life of Jumblatt ally Marwan Hamade, one of twenty-nine deputies who voted against the extension, was universally understood as a warning to al-Hariri in particular, and to the opposition in general.&lt;br /&gt;
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The opposition’s defiance of Syria, in the face of Damascus’s warnings, gained momentum that autumn, and al-Hariri was widely understood to be the opposition’s de facto leader. He was feeling sufficiently confident in January 2005 to tell Rustum Ghazali, Syria’s pro-consul in Beirut from 2002 to 2005, that he would not accept any Syrianimposed candidates on his list in the elections scheduled for May 2005. Rustum replied icily, “You have to think &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;about it, and we have to think about it” (&#039;&#039;New York Times&#039;&#039;, March 22, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;
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Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination by a car bomb explosion in Beirut, on February 14, 2005, should be understood in the context of his status as the focus of Lebanese opposition to Syrian authority. Although the assassins have not yet been conclusively identified and a UN investigation into the murder continues, there is little doubt that pro-Syrian political figures in Lebanon and their Syrian allies understood al-Hariri to be a serious threat to their political survival.&lt;br /&gt;
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Syria, which held the political controls until its forces withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005, played a balance of power game in Lebanon and often promoted intra- and inter-sectarian divisions. The prospect of an organized coalition empowered to challenge Syrian authority would be ipso facto a hostile act toward Syria. Syria’s stakes in Lebanon extended well beyond security: Syrian officials were deeply enmeshed in networks of political corruption, smuggling, and crime, and were sensitive to developments that would jeopardize its Lebanese golden goose. In 2000 President Lahoud, abruptly called off an anti-corruption drive when it seemed to threaten Syria’s friends (Gambill 2006a). When Prime Minister al-Hariri, in August 1997, asked this author for an appraisal of developments in Lebanon, and I cited the rampant corruption, he replied, “Some of the people in my cabinet are criminals and should be in jail, but I can’t do anything about it.” His claim of impotence, although transparently self-serving, also reflected his inability to defy Syria.&lt;br /&gt;
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The initial wave of demonstrations following the death of al-Hariri and twenty-two others traveling in his entourage was met with celebratory chest-thumping and self-congratulation in Washington, where government officials anticipated the definitive overthrow of Syrian influence by a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;pro-American, democratic “Cedar Revolution.” But within a few weeks the situation in Lebanon became much more complex when Hezbollah regained the initiative. Hezbollah expressed gratitude to Syria with a massive demonstration of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims in Beirut on March 8, 2005, attended by some four hundred thousand people, according to journalists’ estimates. Clearly many Lebanese do not object to Syrian hegemony. Indeed, Syria’s influence over the country remains pervasive through its strategic coordination with Hezbollah and a coterie of pliant allies, including President Lahoud, Speaker Nabih Berri, and other major political figures such as former prime minister &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Umar Karami from Tripoli, in northern Lebanon where pro-Syrian sentiment is notable.&lt;br /&gt;
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In response to the Hezbollah demonstration, and to mark the one-month anniversary of al-Hariri’s assassination, the Cedar Revolutionaries organized a massive rally of their own in central Beirut, on March 14, attended by as many as a million people, according to widely shared estimates—incredibly, a full quarter of the country’s population. Although the rally centered on Martyr’s Square, where the Ottoman governor had hanged Lebanese nationalists nearly ninety years before, the city spilled over with the sea of demonstrators. There had not been a rally of similar scale in the Middle East since four million Egyptians turned out to bury their national singer, Umm Kulthoum, in 1975 (&#039;&#039;al-Ahram&#039;&#039;, February 6, 1975, 1). But that massive public gathering was in a country with ten times the population of today’s Lebanon. The month of dueling mass demonstrations ended with mutual recognition that neither side would prevail and that a compromise was necessary.&lt;br /&gt;
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A wildcard player in this volatile game was the former commander-in-chief of the Lebanese army, General Michel &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Aoun, a Maronite who had been in exile in France since the early 1990s and returned to Lebanon in time for parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2005. Aoun showed a penchant for overplaying his hand; he had blundered badly in Lebanese politics in the late 1980s by failing to reach out to the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i, Sunni, and Druze communities, and instead launching terrible violence against his own citizens. He then recklessly challenged the Syrian Baathist regime in a “war of liberation” that had neither the support of key external or internal Lebanese players nor the means to succeed. In the process, Aoun alienated potential supporters in both Washington and his own country. Thus isolated, Aoun was forced into exile by Syria in 1990.&lt;br /&gt;
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Aoun sustained a broad popular following in Lebanon during his exile years in France, especially among secular Christians but among the Muslim communities as well. He has been admired for his courage, honesty, and nationalism. When he returned to Lebanon, in May 2005, shortly before the scheduled parliamentary elections, established politicians viewed him with trepidation because his populist following was seen as a potential threat. Aoun joined Nabih Berri and Hezbollah in calling for a delay in the election in order to revise the electoral law, which had been designed by Syria to insure that friendly politicians would be elected and to minimize opportunities for independent candidates to emerge, especially in the Christian community. Although Aoun’s supporters comprised a significant proportion of the March 14 demonstration, and they certainly expected to see Aoun emerge as a major figure in any new government, it was all too clear that Aoun’s Christian rivals had no intention of inviting him to join the government and thereby improve his odds for becoming president in 2007. Aoun found allies instead within the pro-Syrian “March 8 Group” &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;(so named after the Hezbollah-organized mass demonstration of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a on that date). They calculated that buying time might lead to splits in the rival “Cedar Revolution.” Under U.S. pressure, the elections were held as scheduled and were won by the anti-Syrian coalition. Ironically, the victors came to power by means of the very electoral system designed to preserve Syrian authority in Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
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The May 2005 election produced three distinct blocs of votes. The Cedar Revolution, under the leadership of Saad al-Din al-Hariri, a son of the assassinated former prime minister, captured seventy-two seats, short of the two-thirds total needed to unseat the pro-Syrian president Lahoud. Amal and Hezbollah offered shared tickets and won thirtyfive seats, whereas Michel Aoun aligned with pro-Syrian Christians in the North and sustained his important populist base in the Christian heartland, winning twenty-one seats. Aoun, having reasoned that his prior opposition to Syrian influence in Lebanon had been overtaken by events, counted on his new pro-Syrian stance to help forge an alliance with Hezbollah. This was consummated in February 2006, when the Aoun faction and Hezbollah signed a political pact pledging to work together to fight against corruption and for electoral and economic reform. It is significant that Hezbollah won Aoun’s recognition as a legitimate party of national resistance, and held his support throughout the 2006 war and its aftermath. The new Hezbollah-Aoun coalition was in force in subsequent student elections in the universities, where Hezbollah supporters joined Aoun partisans to elect pro-Aoun candidates.&lt;br /&gt;
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The UN investigation of al-Hariri’s killing remains a major preoccupation in Lebanon and a threat to the credibility and perhaps the survival of the Syrian regime, especially if President Bashar al-Asad is directly implicated. In &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;August 2005, under orders from the first UN investigator Detlev Mehlis, four powerful heads of the Lebanese intelligence and state police organizations were arrested, including General Jamil al-Sayyid, previously a man of enormous power who headed al-Amn al-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amm (the General Security Directorate), often said to be the most fearsome intelligence agent in the country. The investigation was digging into the very quick of Syrian influence in Lebanon. The dangers to Lebanese who pointed fingers at Syria were real and potentially lethal as underlined by a series of explosions, assassinations, and attempted assassinations all targeting anti-Syrian personalities who had accused Syria of complicity in al-Hariri’s murder. Following the killing of former prime minister al-Hariri, three leading public figures were blown up, including George Hawi, an aged leader of the Communist Party; Samir Kassir, a respected &#039;&#039;an-Nahar&#039;&#039; columnist; and Gibran Tueni, the an-Nahar publisher whose own columns passionately criticized Syria and Hezbollah. Tueni was killed by a massive car bomb, only hours after he returned to Beirut from his Paris home.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah, which holds two cabinet posts in the government, has attempted to constrain the investigation by insisting that the Lebanese government maintain strict control of any tribunals operating in conjunction with it. When a majority of the Lebanese parliament passed a motion, in December 2005, to authorize a mixed Lebanon-international tribunal, Hezbollah and Amal walked out of the cabinet, accused the body of being a “tyranny of the majority,” and insisted that all future action regarding the al-Hariri investigation proceed according to strict consensus. Hezbollah’s tactic froze the government for two months, until it was persuaded to return to the cabinet by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. In return for Hezbollah’s renewed participation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in the government, Siniora agreed never to refer to the organization as a “militia” but only as a “national resistance group,” thus effectively removing Hezbollah from being subjected to UN Security Council Resolution 1559, calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces and the disarming of all militias in the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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Setting the Stage for War&lt;br /&gt;
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In the months before the summer of 2006 Beirut was preparing for a record summer tourist business. Unlike other popular Mediterranean destinations that feature package tours at cut-rate prices, Beirut’s hotel owners have generally been unwilling to offer bargains to “low-end” customers, instead targeting the more affluent tourists. After the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks in 2001, the industry had great success attracting well-to-do Arab customers who were put off by heightened border security at American and other Western destinations. Beirut became a convenient and more culturally familiar playground. Wealthy visitors flocked to villas with signature red-tile roofs, apartments, hotels, and inns in mountainous villages, less than an hour from Beirut, and came down to the capitol city to dine and play. Clearly Lebanon had recovered from the stigma of civil war and was back as a high-end tourist destination. Lebanese officials and politicians wanted to keep it that way, and Hezbollah insisted, publicly and repeatedly, that it would do nothing to jeopardize the bountiful summer trade.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many of these same politicians were urging Hezbollah to disarm, especially after Syria pulled out its troops in April 2005. The group steadfastly refused, arguing that its armed wing was needed more than ever as the only credible force available to defend the country against an Israeli invasion. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hezbollah’s position retains strong support in the South, but there are many detractors in the country as well. In the weeks before the outbreak of open hostilities with Israel in the summer of 2006, popular skepticism of Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm turned to mockery, most notably in the June 1, 2006, television broadcast of a comedy program, where an actor in the role of a &#039;&#039;sayyid&#039;&#039; (a descendant of the prophet Muhammad), and looking very much like a younger Hasan Nasrallah, held forth on a variety of preposterous reasons why Hezbollah would not give up its weapons. Within hours, tens of thousands of Hezbollah sympathizers demonstrated around the country to protest the disrespect implied for Sayyid Hasan. The incident clearly revealed the exposed nerves of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community, where memories of marginalization and second-class citizenship remain vivid. Nasrallah, for his part, did not hide his pique. The incident whetted Hezbollah’s appetite for a dramatic coup de théâtre directed at its arch enemy that would allow the organization to reclaim its honor and make its militia appear all the more essential.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the Israeli side, the desire within the country’s political and military leadership to have it out with Hezbollah increased markedly in 2005 and early 2006. Israeli officials have endured Hezbollah’s taunting ever since their unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, and have found Nasrallah’s May 2000 comparison of Israel with a fragile “spider’s web” especially grating. The last straw for Israeli officials seems to have been a series of secretly monitored communications between Hezbollah and Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist group, in the spring and early summer of 2006. In these exchanges the Hezbollah leadership urged the Palestinians to hang tough in negotiations with Israel over the return of an Israeli soldier captured in June 2006. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In these same exchanges Nasrallah referred to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz as weak (Hersh 2006, 30). When these communications came to light within Israeli leadership circles, along with reports by respected analysts that Hezbollah was developing a “firststrike” capacity to unleash massive, preemptive rocket attacks on Israel (Gambill 2006b, 2), the Israelis were less inclined to respect the rules of the game with Hezbollah that had been respected after the 2000 withdrawal. Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh refers to a meeting in the early summer of 2006 in Washington in which U.S. and Israeli officials made plans for a crushing attack on Hezbollah (Hersh 2006). It is unclear how much operational coordination took place at this meeting, if any, but there is little doubt that officials on both sides found the prospect of inflicting a devastating blow on Hezbollah very appetizing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tensions between Israel and Hezbollah had, in fact, been growing for months before the start of large-scale hostilities on July 12, 2006. In November 2005 Hezbollah tried to capture several Israeli soldiers in the border village of Ghajar, which sits astride the Lebanese border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The operation, thwarted by the Israeli army, represented Hezbollah’s attempt to redeem its &#039;&#039;wa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d alsadiq&#039;&#039; (“faithful promise”) to secure the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails, including Samir Kuntar, one of the terrorists responsible for a 1979 attack in Nahariya, Israel, that killed four members of an Israeli family. Israel has steadfastly refused to release him.&lt;br /&gt;
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In late May 2006 Hezbollah fired on an Israeli border post, wounding an Israeli soldier. A typical response to such an incident—according to the “rules of the game” developed between the two sides over the years since the Israeli withdrawal of 2000—would have the Israeli army shelling a few &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hezbollah positions and command and control centers. In this instance, however, Israel opted for a more robust response, shelling twenty Hezbollah positions along the border and destroying many of them. Hezbollah responded by upping the ante still further by launching eight Katyusha rockets at Safad, the location of the Israeli army’s northern headquarters. Five of these notoriously inaccurate rockets actually hit an antennae farm near the headquarters and sent a clear reminder to Israel of the nature of Hezbollah’s arsenal, which was reported to include at least twelve thousand rockets—mostly short-range Katyushas but also various longer-range rockets, notably the Iranian-supplied Zelzal-2 with a range of up to 210 kilometers. Both sides were clearly itching for a fight.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Start of Hostilities, July 2006&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah’s dramatic operation of July 12, 2006, was yet another attempt to deliver on its &#039;&#039;wa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d al-sadiq&#039;&#039;, but launching the attack on Israeli soil was also intended to demonstrate the organization’s formidable offensive abilities and its tenacity, while at the same time appealing to Lebanese critics of the organization who had been calling on it to disarm. From a tactical standpoint, the operation was a stunning success. Hezbollah militants ambushed a motorized Israeli patrol in an unpopulated area of northern Israel on its border with Lebanon, capturing two Israeli soldiers and killing three others. After the Israeli Defense Forces pursued the militants into Lebanon on a rescue mission, five more soldiers were killed and a state-of-the-art Merkava tank destroyed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah’s leadership group had clearly stretched the rules of the game by conducting the daring raid on Israeli soil. Although it anticipated Israeli retaliation, the leadership &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;expected to be able to ride it out. Initially Hezbollah’s goal seemed to have been achieved to perfection. The response to Hezbollah’s &#039;&#039;al-wa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d al-madhkur&#039;&#039; (“promise remembered”) in &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039; of Beirut was jubilant. But as Hezbollah’s Lebanese critics would soon point out, and as Nasrallah himself would later admit, Hezbollah had made a major miscalculation.&lt;br /&gt;
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By July 13 Israel began its retaliatory offensive against Hezbollah, and it soon became clear that the assault went well beyond what Nasrallah and company anticipated. Within a day Lebanon was blockaded from the sea, and the Beirut airport was hit, effectively closing it. Shortly after Nasrallah’s offices were bombed on July 14, Hezbollah released a recorded statement from Nasrallah that was far from conciliatory: “You wanted an open war, and we are heading for an open war. We are ready for it.” (Nasrallah invited listeners to look to the sea, and with perfect theatrical timing an explosion on the horizon rocked the INS &#039;&#039;Hanit&#039;&#039;, an Israeli naval vessel that was hit by an Iranian-produced C-802 Noor guided missile. The ship was disabled and four of its sailors killed. This was an early hint that Hezbollah might have been better prepared than Israel presumed.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the initial outbreak of open hostilities, Israel enjoyed broad international support and Hezbollah attracted widespread international condemnation for violating Israeli territory and snatching the soldiers. Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon six years earlier allowed it some moral superiority on this score. Strong U.S. support was, of course, expected and instantly evident. Less predictable was the quick disapproval of Hezbollah’s action voiced by key Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government criticized Hezbollah’s “uncalculated adventures” (&#039;&#039;al-Watan&#039;&#039;, July &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;14, 2006), and Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates followed suit. This coalition between the Americans and the Arab states was held together by convergent interests. The Sunni Arab governments were understandably apprehensive about the rising profile of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ite power Iran in the Arab world, the emergence of a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i-dominated government in American-occupied Iraq, and the influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon. All these forces might well inspire domestic opposition forces in their own countries, especially as Hezbollah gained enthusiastic support even among the vast Sunni population of the Arab world. In the same vein, America and its Israeli ally wished to declaw Hezbollah and indeed deal a humiliating blow to an Iranian ally in Lebanon that might inspire hostile groups in Iraq.&lt;br /&gt;
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In his first long interview after the outbreak of hostilities, on al-Jazeera television on July 21, 2006, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah referred to the widely broadcast Arab disapproval as a “surprise,” and he subtly alluded to his failure to anticipate the scale of the Israeli response. As Nasrallah said, “The Israeli reaction to the capture could have been harsh but limited, were it not for the international and Arab cover.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Prosecuting the War&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Israel’s war plan depended heavily on its air power and on artillery bombardment from northern Israel into Lebanon. Its military objectives were to isolate the battlefield by cutting off routes of re-supply for Hezbollah, striking Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal (especially its long-range rockets capable of striking far into Israel), hitting Hezbollah’s command and control, and media instruments (such as the television station al-Manar), and creating a “killing box” in southern &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Lebanon where Hezbollah could be destroyed in detail by bombing and shelling. These objectives allowed for Israeli strikes on roads, bridges, seaports, and airports throughout Lebanon, as well as on the densely populated &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039;, where many of Hezbollah command and control centers were thought to be located. Israel also struck al-Manar television repeatedly throughout the war, but except for an interruption of several minutes, the station never went off the air. On July 15 Israeli bombs targeted the home of Ayatollah Fadlallah, destroying it. The bombing of this home surprised Lebanese analysts, as Fadlallah’s relations with Nasrallah were known to be tense as a result of Fadlallah’s criticism of Hezbollah’s periodic political inflexibility.&lt;br /&gt;
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Within days of the start of the Israeli military response, hundreds of targets had been struck across southern Lebanon, around Beirut, in the Beqaa valley, and even in northern Lebanon. The population of the South and &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039; was forced to flee en masse to relative safety wherever it could be found, often in schools or parking garages, if not with friends and relatives. Israel’s plan in establishing its “killing box” in the South was clearly to force out all civilians. To that end Israel not only struck gasoline stations and possible militia positions, but it also hit food stores, as though to ensure that the civilians could not endure a siege. Hezbollah responded by firing rockets at Israel, usually at least one hundred and fifty rockets a day, but two hundred and fifty rockets on the last day of the war. In an unprecedented response, on July 16, Hezbollah struck the city of Haifa, home to nearly 275,000 people with longer-range rockets provided by Syria and Iran. Eight people died in the first attack on Israel’s third largest city. Hezbollah’s Zelzal-2 rockets could strike Tel Aviv, although none were fired, and the Israeli army claims to have destroyed most of them in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the first days of the war. The advantage of the short-range Katyusha is that it can be fired in about a minute, far quicker than Israeli detection equipment can find it, whereas the larger rockets require a more elaborate launcher and much more time. Facing an enemy with complete air superiority and plenty of detection capability, the larger rockets are harder to fire successfully.&lt;br /&gt;
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The day after Haifa was hit by rocket fire, Prime Minister Olmert addressed the Knesset and stated his goals as the return of the two captured soldiers, a complete cease-fire, meaning the end of Hezbollah’s presence close to Israel’s border with Lebanon; the deployment of the Lebanese army in the South; and the expulsion of Hezbollah from the South. He emphasized his determination to see to the elimination of Hezbollah as a military force and to the dismantling of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1559. At the United Nations, Israeli Ambassador Dan Gillerman, a frequent guest on American television news programs, echoed his prime minister’s sentiments by repeatedly referring to Hezbollah as a cancer that would have to be cut out. The Israelis certainly have no monopoly on this sort of language; Hezbollah propaganda routinely refers to Israel as a cancer (Qassem 2005, 15). What Gillerman and his prime minister revealed in their comments was the common expectation that Hezbollah somehow could be expunged from Lebanon. The Israelis were eager to persuade a credulous White House that this was entirely realistic. In confidential discussions with the White House, Israel promised President Bush a “quick and decisive” result (author’s private sources) and reportedly told Condoleezza Rice: “You did it in about 70 days [in Kosovo], but we need half of that—35 days” (Hersh 2006, 31).&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Israeli efforts to excise the “cancer” of Hezbollah proved as deadly as misapplied chemotherapy for a cancer patient. The turning point might have been the Israeli bombing of Qana on July 30, killing twenty-eight civilians. After this tragedy, support for Israel’s campaign in the Arab capitals melted under the heat of public outrage and demonstration. For instance, in Egypt, scores of demonstrations erupted around the country in late July and August. Although none of them were massive—the largest involved eight thousand demonstrators—the widespread underlying anger and foment in response to the July war shook the Mubarak regime and prompted a reversal of tone.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah proved more resilient than the Israeli analysts had predicted. Israeli Brigadier General Guy Zur, commander of the 162d Armored Division that fought in Lebanon, described Hezbollah as “by far the greatest guerrilla group in the world” (&#039;&#039;USA Today&#039;&#039;, September 14, 2006). After more than a month of Israeli bombardment, Hezbollah emerged with its support intact, if not bolstered, in the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. Its impressive and rapid response to the needs of those whose homes and lives were ravaged—mostly but not all Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims—further consolidated Hezbollah’s impressive base of support. Its fighters left IOUs for items taken from shops during the war. One shopkeeper from Debin, a small village in the South, reported receiving $1,000 for redeemed IOUs (Leenders 2006, 46). More important, Hezbollah paid $10,000 to $12,000 to anyone losing their home. As many as fifteen thousand homeless families received the grants. Affiliated architects and engineers planned the construction of new homes, doctors dispensed free medicine, and about twenty-five thousand free meals were distributed daily in the weeks following the cease-fire.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;By the time a UN- and Lebanon-brokered cease-fire was finally in place in mid-August 2006, Israel and the United States were forced to dramatically scale back their demands and expectations for the war’s outcome. Indeed, a “sevenpoint plan” promulgated by the Lebanese government, preserving the sovereign prerogatives of Lebanon, would decisively shape the cease-fire. The centerpiece for the ending of the war was the decision in UN Security Council Resolution 1701 to enhance an existing peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, the UNIFIL, which was first created in 1978 to oversee an Israeli withdrawal, after its Litani Operation. With heavy European involvement, the UN force would become UNIFIL on steroids, or so the architects of Resolution 1701 hoped. In practice, however, the force is explicitly prohibited from taking any action to disarm Hezbollah without Lebanese government approval—and this is highly unlikely to be forthcoming.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outsiders often forget that the Lebanese have suffered tremendously under Israeli attacks for three decades, and so one of UNIFIL’s key tasks is to insure that Lebanese civilians are permitted to peacefully return to and rebuild their devastated villages. Given Hezbollah’s broad base of support, and the fact that its Lebanese supporters see no other force that can thwart Israel should it decide to re-ignite the war, it is completely unrealistic that the new international contingents will succeed either in disarming Hezbollah or in diminishing its appeal. If UNIFIL is going to succeed, it will need the cooperation—not the animosity—of Hezbollah. For its part, Hezbollah has formally declared its agreement, with the provision that any of its members who are found carrying arms may be detained and disarmed. In effect, what is being pursued is a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The major question is whether UNIFIL-plus will operate not only competently but fairly. The key to restoring stability to southern Lebanon is not only to see Hezbollah stand down but also for the new force to avoid being seen as an instrument of Israeli influence or occupation.&lt;br /&gt;
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UN Resolution 1701 also provides for the deployment of the Lebanese army in force to the South, as Israel demanded, but the army has been deployed, as several of its generals noted, to work &#039;&#039;bi-ta&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;awun ma&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; al-muqawama&#039;&#039; (in cooperation with “the resistance,” meaning Hezbollah). This is not surprising, as about half the rank and file of the Lebanese army are Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims and the resistance is popular with the army.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The war that broke out between Israel and Hezbollah during the summer of 2006 lasted thirty-four days. During this time half the population of northern Israel was displaced (approximately 500,000 people) and southern Lebanon was largely emptied of its civilian population—900,000 people were evacuated, or nearly one-quarter of Lebanon’s population. By the war’s end, 43 Israeli and 1,109 Lebanese civilians had been killed. The military casualties included 118 Israeli and 28 Lebanese soldiers, and roughly 200 Hezbollah fighters. Israel claims to have killed as many as 500 Hezbollah militants in July and August of 2006, but independent and reliable sources judge this number to be too high. Material losses were considerable, totaling approximately $500 million in Israel and about $4 billion in Lebanon, which saw the undoing of fifteen years of post–civil war reconstruction. About 900 factories were hit and 15,000 homes severely damaged or destroyed.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5257128.stm.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;13_chap6.xhtml#page_143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Both sides paid a heavy price for the war, with Lebanon paying the heaviest by far. But it was a war without an unequivocal winner. Both Israel and Hezbollah went to war to bolster their credibility and perceived ability to deter enemies, yet in neither case did they fully succeed. Each side seriously misread its adversary. After the war of arms ended, the war of words began, as each side struggled to persuade friend and foe alike of their victory, revealing the fragility of the claims of both sides.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Conclusion&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:images/159.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The home of the Lebanese Parliament (officially: the majlis alnawab, or Chamber of Deputies) where the balance of power between Hezbollah and its adversaries has shifted periodically since the party joined the electoral process in 1992. Copyright A. R. Norton.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;T&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;he Islamic month of Ramadan, a time of daily fasting and reflection on the meaning of the Quran and the mercy of Allah, began in late September 2006 and concluded a month later with the traditional three-day feast. Throughout the Islamic world, families and friends gathered for the &#039;&#039;iftar&#039;&#039;, the breaking of the fast, at dusk. Following the meal it is customary for guests and hosts to chat about religion and the issues of the day. In many homes these discussions turn into long debates. This was certainly the case in Cairo, where the author lived during the fall of 2006 and where many &#039;&#039;iftar&#039;&#039; discussions focused on the July war in Lebanon. A month and a half after the August 14 cease-fire, many Egyptians were still outraged at the suffering inflicted on the Lebanese and the unwillingness of the U.S. to join international efforts aimed at an early cease-fire. In solidly middle- and upper-class Muslim homes, where secular values were often openly embraced, televisions were more commonly tuned to the BBC World Service or al-Arabiya (a less polemical rival to al-Jazeera) than to Hezbollah’s al-Manar, but Hezbollah still received widespread respect, even admiration, for its success in confronting Israel.&lt;br /&gt;
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Admiration of Hezbollah was seen not only in the homes of privileged Cairenes. Throughout Egypt in July and August there were dozens of demonstrations to protest the war or express solidarity with the Lebanese and often with Hezbollah. On August 4, 2006, for instance, demonstrations in Cairo involving about eight thousand people were timed to coincide with parallel ones in Baghdad, Amman, and Damascus. Many of the demonstrations were organized by the Society of Muslim Brothers, a venerable Egyptian Sunni Muslim group, but they were also joined by non-Islamist opposition groups including the Kefaya movement. If the demonstrations over the course of the war engaged tens of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thousands of Egyptians, they were only the most obvious manifestation of a seething anger among the broader public. Egyptians talked openly about this reaction to the Lebanon war after the August cease-fire. What was most remarkable about the demonstrations in Egypt and elsewhere was that the Sunni Muslims publicly expressed solidarity for a trademark Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i party. The presumed Sunni-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i sectarian divide that fascinates a variety of pundits and scholars proved to be a marginal phenomenon, whereas Hezbollah’s example of resistance and its rejection of quiescence catalyzed support among many Sunni (cf. V. Nasr 2006). Muhammad Mahdi &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Akef, the Cairo-based Supreme Guide of the Brothers, issued a strong statement in favor of Hezbollah and even promised to send ten thousand men to fight in Lebanon (although none was actually dispatched). Shaikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian-born Sunni cleric whose television program is seen by a vast Arab audience on al-Jazeerah, insisted on Sunni-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i cooperation, castigated the Saudi regime for its criticism of Hezbollah, and fulminated against Arab regimes in general for their weakness.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Brothers’ support illustrates precisely why ruling elites in the Islamic world find Hezbollah so worrisome, namely, that it may inspire copycat dissent movements in their own societies, especially if sectarian divisions become less salient and pan-Islamic sentiments grow. In Saudi Arabia, during the July war, in an attempt to forestall Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i-Sunni solidarity, the regime reiterated the admonition of some anti-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i clerics that Saudi Muslims were not permitted to pray for Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the war between Israel and Hezbollah continued into August 2006, swelling anger against Israel and resentment of Arab governments for accrediting Israel’s offensive forced &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Egyptian government to backtrack in its public statements about the conflict. President Husni Mubarak downplayed his earlier criticisms of Hezbollah and began criticizing Israel for its “disproportionate” attacks on Lebanon. A seventy-member Egyptian delegation led by the heir apparent to the presidency, Gamal Mubarak, arrived in Beirut in early August to show solidarity with Lebanon. Similar backtracking was under way in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, where, by late July, public expressions of solidarity with the Lebanese and Hezbollah were expressed by Saudi officials, albeit grudgingly. Although some ultra-conservative clerics throughout the Sunni world still refused to countenance prayers on behalf of the “heretical” Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, others were less reticent to encourage solidarity.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Damascus, where Hezbollah’s secretary-general Nasrallah was already a popular figure, the July war prompted a rush on souvenir paraphernalia, including key rings, shirts, buttons, bumper stickers, and posters featuring either Nasrallah alone or alongside Syrian president Bashar al-Asad and his father, the late Hafez al-Asad. Nasrallah was widely celebrated as a latter-day Salah al-Din (Saladin), the Kurdish general widely seen in the Arab world as a great Arab hero for his liberation of Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah’s example of military strength against Israel also galvanized Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. As in the past, when successful resistance in southern Lebanon helped to inspire Palestinian militants to wage their own uprising against Israel, pro-Hezbollah sentiment exploded in the Palestinian territories on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah posters and graffiti spread throughout the occupied territories, and Hezbollah-run al-Manar &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;television enjoyed a boost in Palestinian viewership, though al-Jazeera remains more popular by far. Most Palestinians were behind the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i organization despite ambivalence within the Palestinian Authority where there was concern that the Lebanese battle shifted Western media attention away from Palestinian suffering under U.S.-orchestrated sanctions. Nevertheless, Fatah president Farouk Qaddoumi, speaking to some of the more than two hundred thousand Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, embraced Hezbollah’s “success” in the war (&#039;&#039;Daily Star&#039;&#039;, July 30, 2006). Within Palestine itself a local pop-music group, &#039;&#039;firqat alshimal&#039;&#039; (the “Band of the North”), recorded a tribute to Nasrallah, “Saqr Lubnan” (The Hawk of Lebanon), that became a runaway hit in the West Bank. The lyrics celebrate “the boldness and courage that characterizes this battle [as] Islamic courage,” exclaiming that the Palestinians only want a “free life” and that they welcome death in order to achieve it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;An MP3 version of the song is available at http://netzoo.net/the-hawk-oflebanon/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Concerned about the growing influence of Hezbollah within the territories, Israeli occupation forces began checking cell phones of young Palestinians and arresting those with Nasrallah screensavers.&lt;br /&gt;
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In other Arab settings in the months following the war, CDs containing speeches by Nasrallah outsold recent recordings by popular Lebanese singers Nancy Ajram and Haifa Wahbe, and the speeches themselves influenced Arab pop culture. Nasrallah’s tribute to Hezbollah fighters in the first days of the war inspired a wildly popular song by the Lebanon-based Julia Boutros entitled “Ahibba&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;i” (My Beloved Ones). Its lyrics include the lines, “I want to kiss your heads and kiss your fingers on the triggers.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For the lyrics, see http://www.julia.ws/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Strong support for Hezbollah during and after the July war was also apparent within Iraq’s Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. The leading Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i religious leader Ayatollah Sistani issued a &#039;&#039;fatwa&#039;&#039; on July 16, 2006, condemning the Israeli attack on Lebanon as disproportionate and authorizing his deputies (&#039;&#039;wakil&#039;&#039;s) to collect alms for humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese. Since Sistani is by far the most revered cleric in Iraq (as well as a highly influential figure among Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in Lebanon),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Precise figures on those who follow or “imitate” (&#039;&#039;taqlid&#039;&#039;) Sistani in Lebanon are not available, but he certainly enjoys a broader following than Lebanon’s widely respected Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, or even the Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whom Hezbollah considers the official source for Islamic law. This author’s impression, based on informal interviews and discussion with a wide variety of Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, is that, as of November 2006, at least 60 percent of all Lebanese follow Sistani, with the rest following Fadlallah. Very few consider themselves “imitators” of Khamenei.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; his ruling effectively validated the shared identity of non-Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a with their brethren in Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah has also been embraced by the firebrand Iraqi Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his loyal supporters in the impoverished suburbs of Baghdad. His scholarly credentials as a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i cleric are weak, but as the son of the revered Ayatollah Muhammad al-Sadr (assassinated in 1999, reputedly under orders from Saddam Hussein), Muqtada has inherited his father’s broad social support base among what his relative Musa al-Sadr referred to a generation ago in Lebanon as the &#039;&#039;al-mahrumin&#039;&#039; (the deprived). On August 4, 2006, Muqtada led a demonstration in Baghdad that included about one hundred thousand of his followers who chanted “death to Israel,” as Muqtada railed against what he called &#039;&#039;al-muthallath al-mash&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;um&#039;&#039; (“the evil triangle”), presumably a jibe at George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” and a reference to the United States, Israel, and the Arab states supporting Israel’s campaign in Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hezbollah in a Fractured Postwar Lebanon&lt;br /&gt;
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In contrast to the celebrations of Hezbollah’s “victory” in the wider Arab world, within Lebanon adulation of Hezbollah was far from universal. Although the organization benefited from pan-Lebanese expressions of solidarity and anti-Israel feeling during the armed conflict and in the weeks after the cease-fire, cross-confessional solidarity faded quickly as Lebanese began to openly question Hezbollah’s role in provoking the war. It was hard to celebrate a “victory” in the face of a reconstruction bill now estimated at $4 billion. The war has been an economic calamity for the country. It will take at least two years to complete most of the infrastructure repairs, which includes the rebuilding of some seventy-eight bridges. The war sabotaged the tourist season of 2006, representing, according to reliable estimates, a loss of $2 billion in income. Future tourism is likely to suffer as travelers weigh the risks of a visit to Lebanon against other, less conflict-prone locales. And further mitigating any sense of triumph was the human cost of the war—1,109 dead civilians and 15,000 displaced families whose homes were destroyed or badly damaged.&lt;br /&gt;
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The recent war has, in fact, split Lebanon in two. One Lebanon is represented by a coalition of mainly Sunnis, Druze, and Christians that coalesced following the assassination of the former prime minister and Sunni Muslim Rafiq al-Hariri. This is the so-called Cedar Revolution that united in reaction to al-Hariri’s murder to demand a full investigation into the assassination, and to call on Syrian forces to leave Lebanon. This group, which won the 2005 parliamentary elections by capturing 72 of 128 seats, was in power during the 2006 war. Many of its members consider Hezbollah’s provocative actions, including the July 12 ambush &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in Israel, as a “coup d’état.” They accuse the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i group of being an agent of Syria and Iran, with the ultimate aim of installing a theocratic Islamic Republic on the shores of the Mediterranean.&lt;br /&gt;
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The other Lebanon is also a coalition, consisting of much of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community and large elements of the Christian community—especially the many followers of the magnetic Maronite politician and former general Michel Aoun. This coalition is somewhat confusingly called the March 8 Group, in commemoration of the large demonstration led by Hezbollah and Amal on March 8, 2005, ostensibly to respect al-Hariri’s memory but also to thank Syria for its supposed role in maintaining peace in the country. In fact, the Aounists probably comprised close to half of the one million people who participated in the massive March 14, 2005, demonstration that made the Cedar Revolution a phenomenon known ’round the world. When their leader, General Aoun, was shut out of the government after the 2005 elections, they shifted to the opposition. Since then, Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement has shown considerable strength in university-student elections, and in the important professional associations of lawyers, doctors, and engineers. The “Aounists” and the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a share a profound sense of victimization in the face of what they see as a corrupt and unresponsive political system. They work together to expand their share of power in significant measure at the expense of the Sunni Muslims.&lt;br /&gt;
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Timur Goksel, a Turk who served for twenty-five years as political adviser to UNIFIL and who is respected for his sage reflections on Lebanese politics, observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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Now that the war is over, any hope for a true national unity in Lebanon has again become a dream. Nasrallah’s repeated calls for a strong central state free of corruption, and able to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;protect Lebanon, as a prerequisite for his party to give up its weapons usually generates knowing smiles from those who believe that Lebanon’s “tribalism” is not going to change any time soon. The Maronite–Sunni–Druze coalition that is the majority in the parliament has a single priority now: to stop Hezbollah from using its arms and recently enhanced political standing from changing the sectarian system’s domestic political and economic balances.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Interview by Internet, October 8, 2006.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Hezbollah, meanwhile, rejects blame for precipitating the July 2006 war. Nasrallah claims that Israel had been preparing an attack on Hezbollah even months before the capture of the Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006. Israel, it is alleged, used the capture as a convenient pretext to launch its failed campaign of annihilation. In a remarkable interview on Lebanese television, on August 27, 2006, however, Nasrallah took a very different tack and conceded that his organization had miscalculated: “If any of us [on the fifteen-member political-military council] had a 1 percent concern that Israel was going to reply in this savage manner we would not have captured those soldiers.” At the same time Hezbollah accused the ruling coalition of complicity in an Americanand Israeli-led plot to destroy the organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nasrallah used this same television interview to attempt to reassure his fellow Lebanese that Hezbollah’s weapons were only for fighting the Israeli enemy and would not be “pointed” at fellow Lebanese. These words were coupled, however, with a demand for a “national unity” government that would include representatives of the political party of Hezbollah’s main Christian ally, Michel Aoun. His opponents were not reassured, claiming that the insistence on a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;national unity parliamentary coalition run by strict consensus—thus granting Hezbollah veto power—was tantamount to bullying the current government out of existence. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and his coalition partners further accuse Nasrallah of serving Syria’s interests by precipitating a political crisis, thereby disrupting the efforts of the present Lebanese government to authorize an international tribunal to try suspects in the killing of former prime minister al-Hariri.&lt;br /&gt;
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Both sides dug in their heels as the political stakes of the showdown are, in fact, high. Hezbollah is using its arms and enhanced political standing in the Islamic world to attempt to change the delicate political balance of Lebanon’s sectarian government in its favor. And the ruling Maronite-Sunni-Druze coalition is doing what it can to block such change. The veteran political observer Sofia Saadeh puts the dilemma quite clearly:&lt;br /&gt;
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When there is a demographic change in this country . . . the constitution does not explain how this can be translated at the level of politics. Since the Lebanese system revolves around the sects sharing power, this is a very crucial shortcoming. So, every time a sect wants to move forward and upward in the political hierarchy, we end up with strife. In a regular democracy, the votes will tell you which direction to take. Unfortunately, in Lebanon, there is no such mechanism. The ascendancy of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i is being fought by the Sunnis.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Interview by author, November 13, 2006, Beirut.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The fall of 2006 was marked by an escalation of tension and demands. On October 31 Nasrallah’s call for a national unity government turned into a blatant ultimatum: the government must either agree to a new consensus arrangement, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;with a Hezbollah veto over all government measures, or face widespread demonstrations and other forms of organized pressure such as blocking the route to the national airport. Prior to the resignation of an allied Christian member, and in conjunction with these demands, all five Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i members of the government resigned from the cabinet, leaving even the legal status of the rump government in question. Because the al-Ta’if agreement, which ended the civil war in 1989, required every major sect to participate in government, the departure of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a prompted the pro-Hezbollah president Lahoud to assert that the government was no longer legitimate and could not undertake major initiatives—including the seating of an international tribunal.&lt;br /&gt;
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The postwar crisis took a deadly turn on November 21, 2006, with the assassination of thirty-three-year-old Pierre Gemayel, the Lebanese Minister of Industry. The slain minister was the son of Amin Gemayel, a former president, and grandson and namesake of the founder of the Phalange militia, the largest Christian-led militia during the civil war. The victim had frequently criticized Hezbollah and Syria, and was the fifth and most recent prominent critic of Syrian involvement in Lebanon who was assassinated since 2005. Many fingers understandably pointed at Syria, which has demonstrated a penchant for eradicating its Lebanese adversaries. This time, however, some informed observers were skeptical about Syria’s culpability, especially as reports surfaced suggesting that Gemayel held confidential talks with Hezbollah political ally Michel Aoun in the weeks preceding his gangland-style killing. If true, the reports imply that Lebanese rivals might have been responsible. Whoever was responsible, the killing increased fears among Lebanese that they were edging toward an eruption of wider violence. One hopeful sign was found in the wisdom of Pierre Gemayel’s father, former president Amin Gemayel, who called upon &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the tens of thousands of mourners and supporters that gathered at Martyr’s Square in Beirut to abjure revenge. Although he refused a condolence call from General Aoun, he did speak with Hasan Nasrallah—whose son, Hadi, was killed fighting Israel—and the two found common emotional ground according to press reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nonetheless, the joint effort by Hezbollah, Amal, and the Aounists to topple the Siniora government picked up steam as December began with a massive peaceful protest gathering in downtown Beirut. With Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and many of his ministers hunkered down in their offices in the Grand Serail, the Ottoman-era seat of government, fearful that their offices would be occupied if they vacated, half a million Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a and Christians (with Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a predominating) vowed to stay put until the government succumbed to pressure and either accepted a national unity government or agreed to call elections. The previous year Western governments, especially the U.S. government, endorsed and encouraged similar protests to topple a pro-Syrian government, but now the shoe was on the other foot. If Washington and the predominantly Sunni world was aghast at Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i muscle flexing, especially since it might well benefit Iran’s power projection into the wider Middle East, perhaps the most profound importance of the December protest, if it remains peaceful, will be as a model for collective action in other Arab locales, which is a prospect no less distressing to the Arab world’s autocrats.&lt;br /&gt;
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What Next?&lt;br /&gt;
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Lebanon has rather stubbornly demonstrated, at many different times and under many different circumstances, that its political system is not readily dominated by any community, at least for very long. This is why half-solutions and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;compromise usually prevail, just as they will likely prevail in the 2006 crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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Much will depend on how true Hezbollah remains to the positions it has frequently espoused over the past decade and a half, particularly regarding the prospects for an Islamic state in Lebanon and the party’s attachment to Lebanon as a pluralist society. Nasrallah and his colleagues have repeatedly declared that the prospects for establishing a state based on Islamic rule will probably never exist in Lebanon, as such a state could only be established on the basis of broad consent. Hezbollah, its leaders have promised, is committed to the survival of Lebanon as a diverse, multicultural society, because it is precisely Lebanon’s diversity that defines its unique appeal and character. As Nasrallah told Rafiq al-Hariri in their first of several reconciliation meetings in 2000: “We don’t possess second citizenship, we were born here, we will die here and we will be buried here. And we starve here and satisfy our appetite here, so nobody may outbid us on our patriotism or on [our right] to belong.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The author wishes to thank Ali Safa for finding Nasrallah’s comment.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The July war threw a bomb into Lebanese politics, and it was utterly predictable that the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a would emerge from the war as a mobilized, assertive, and more militant community. At the same time the fears that grip Hezbollah’s opponents are rational and wholly understandable, especially given the destruction Hezbollah provoked in the July war. And it is not only fear that needs to be addressed. Contending interests must be accommodated, no easy matter even in quieter times.&lt;br /&gt;
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Postwar reconstruction will require not only engineering prowess to rebuild scores of bridges but also the political and moral courage to build political bridges to traverse the gulf &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;14_con.xhtml#page_159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of anger that continues to divide the two Lebanons. It remains to be seen how the bridges of cooperation will be designed and how sturdy they will be. Collective memories of civil war are still fresh in Lebanon, and even fresher memories of violence and destruction linger, especially throughout the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. There are, in short, strong incentives to find pragmatic compromises to avoid a further disaster in a country that has had more than its share of calamities, a country where Hezbollah is clearly fated to play a continuing and important role. And, one hopes, a constructive one.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Afterword to the Paperback Edition&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:images/175.jpg|image]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As Lebanese government and opposition figures negotiated in Doha in May 2008, the Union of the Disabled held demonstrations in Beirut with a theme that captured a widely held sentiment: “If you don’t agree, don’t come back.” Courtesy of Getty Images.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;big&amp;quot;&amp;gt;T&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;he tent city that Hezbollah and its Muslim and Christian allies erected in downtown Beirut in early December 2006 signaled the opposition’s resolve to topple the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Nightly rallies featured a who’s who of opposition notables. Initially, exuberant villagers enjoyed the novelty of riding free buses to rallies in upscale central Beirut, where some would stay for days at a time. One month later, and just two days before an international donors’ conference was to open in Paris, Hezbollah increased its pressure on the Siniora government by leading widespread demonstrations to protest the government’s failure to address the needs of those displaced by the war six months earlier, in July 2006, between Hezbollah and Israel. In a belligerent speech the night before the planned demonstrations, Nasrallah argued that the Paris conference would shackle Lebanon with political conditions and would threaten the country’s independence. He implied that the perfidy of the Siniora government was proven by its presence in Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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The next day scattered violence erupted around the campus of the Lebanese University, where an altercation sparked wider Sunni-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i clashes and several deaths. Lebanese police and especially the army performed admirably to curtail the clashes, but angry partisans were ready to fight. Nasrallah appeared on television and urged his followers off the streets, insisting that it was a religious duty for them to comply.&lt;br /&gt;
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The clashes of January 2007 revealed how sharply the level of distrust had risen between Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a and Sunni since the July 2006 war. The tension has encouraged the growth of militant Sunni groups that viewed the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a with contempt. These groups are concentrated in the impoverished northern region of the country, and in the twelve Palestinian refugee camps, where living conditions are often &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;miserable (there are more than four hundred thousand registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon). This trend is compellingly described by the French scholar Bernard Rougier in his book &#039;&#039;Everyday Jihad&#039;&#039; (Harvard University Press, 2007). In Tripoli, the country’s second largest city, Sunni Islamist groups incited followers to attack &#039;&#039;rawafid&#039;&#039; (“rejecters,” a derogatory term for Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims) following clashes with &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Alawi allies of Hezbollah (&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Alawis are a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i sect found mainly in Syria).&lt;br /&gt;
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One militant Sunni group, Fatah al-Islam—based in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp near Tripoli—attacked an army unit in May 2007, killing several soldiers. In the wake of this incident, the Lebanese army responded forcefully. The army launched an assault on Fatah al-Islam, which controlled several blocks of the sprawling camp. The group put up fierce resistance to the lightly armed army. It was only in early September 2007, after more than three months of fighting, that the militants succumbed. By then, 168 soldiers had been killed, scores of innocent Palestinians had lost their homes, and the camp had been devastated, with more than 250 dead—many of them civilians.&lt;br /&gt;
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The army is one of Lebanon’s few revered national institutions. It enjoyed robust public support during the Nahr al-Barid fighting, but its limited capabilities were on display. Vietnam War–era helicopters were used to drop bombs because the Lebanese air force did not have a single airworthy combat aircraft. Early in the fighting the army ran out of ammunition and was able to continue the battle only because the United States airlifted munitions to Lebanon. For many Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, as I was reminded in discussions during my May 2008 visits to southern Lebanese villages, the army’s modest capacity lent substance to the argument that Hezbollah is more capable of defending Lebanon than the national army.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;While the fighting was underway in the north, United Nations peacekeepers serving in the south with UNIFIL suffered a blow in late June 2007. A roadside bomb killed six UNIFIL peacekeepers. The attack was probably the work of a militant Sunni group, perhaps in retaliation for the Nahr al-Barid campaign. UNIFIL, beefed up as part of the arrangements for ending the Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2006, was charged with ensuring that Hezbollah did not reconstitute an armed presence adjacent to the Israeli-Lebanese border. Nonetheless, the June attack prompted several of the national military contingents in UNIFIL to quietly bolster informal liaison arrangements with Hezbollah in order to benefit from its well-oiled intelligence network and its help in forestalling future militant attacks. The threat remains palpable. In April 2008, Ayman al-Zawahiri renewed al-Qaeda’s call for attacks on “Crusaders and Jews,” specifically including UNIFIL.&lt;br /&gt;
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The attacks on the peacekeepers came a few weeks after Walid Eido, a Sunni member of parliament and government supporter, was killed by a car bomb on Beirut’s popular seaside corniche, along with nine other victims. Lebanese politics continued to be a dangerous profession. In September 2007, Antoine Ghanem, a Maronite member of parliament and, like Eido, a supporter of the government, was blown up along with eight bystanders in Sin al-Fil, a respectable professional district in East Beirut. Ghanem was the fourth legislator killed in less than two years, a chain of killings widely, but not universally, ascribed by Lebanese to Syria.&lt;br /&gt;
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The month before Ghanem’s death, a by-election was held in the Metn, the overwhelmingly Christian district that is a part of Mount Lebanon as well as the home base of former president Amin Gemayel. As noted in the conclusion, Amin’s son Pierre was assassinated in November 2006, and Amin was the odds-on favorite to win this election &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to fill his son’s vacant seat. Dr. Kamil Khoury, Amin’s obscure opponent, was endorsed by retired general Michel Aoun, the Christian opposition leader and opposition ally of Hezbollah. With more than 50 percent of eligible voters participating, Khoury won the election by a whisker of 418 votes out of about 78,000 cast. As the one-seat contest highlighted, factionalism often divides Lebanese Christians.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many Lebanese hoped that the election of a new president would break the political stalemate, yet their hopes were thwarted. President Emile Lahoud left office in November 2007, but the presidential palace in Baabda remained vacant for the next six months. In Lebanon, the parliament is directly elected by the people, while the president is elected by a majority vote of parliament. Speaker Nabih Berri insisted that without the political consensus signified by a two-thirds quorum, there would be no election. The election was postponed nineteen times, to the frustration of the parliamentary majority. Only after Lebanon tottered on the brink of disaster was army commander General Michel Suleiman, who had long been the consensus choice, elected and sworn into office on May 25, 2008.&lt;br /&gt;
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Suleiman’s candidacy was initially vetoed by the United States, which viewed him as too close to Syria and to pro-Syrian groups, including Hezbollah. Then, when Suleiman’s candidacy was embraced by the government (with U.S. assent) in November, he was nixed by the opposition. In January 2008, new opposition demonstrations led to deadly Sunni-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i clashes south of Beirut, and four Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i demonstrators were killed by the army, evoking Hezbollah recriminations against the army and Suleiman specifically.&lt;br /&gt;
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The prior month, the army’s renowned chief of operations, Brigadier General François al-Hajj, was assassinated en route to the army headquarters in Yarzi, near &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Beirut. Al-Hajj, who had directed the army’s assault at Nahr al-Barid, was a Maronite from the southern village of Rmeish. He was widely expected to replace Suleiman as army commander, and he was known to enjoy excellent relations with Aoun, who described him as “his candidate” to become commander of the army. He maintained good relations with the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community, but he was also widely respected in Western circles as a consummate professional. The mastermind of the general’s assassination remains a mystery, and in addition to the usual suspects—including Syria and revenge-bent Islamists—it is plausible that other hands, Lebanese ones, were intent on preventing the rise of a nationalist officer as much at ease with opposition as with pro-government forces.&lt;br /&gt;
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Damascus was the site for the fatal end of another career when on February 12, 2008, a man using the name al-Hajj Radwan died from a car bomb. He was better known as Imad Mughniyah (see [[#11_chap4.xhtml|chapter 4]]), and he earned infamy in his early twenties by playing a key role in the 1983 bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut and by masterminding the snatching and egregious imprisonment of foreign hostages in the 1980s, as well as other horrendous exploits. His funeral in &#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039; had the feel of a state funeral and was attended by tens of thousands of Lebanese mourners and an official Iranian delegation, including the foreign minister, who heard Nasrallah praise Mughniyah in his eulogy as “the commander of the two victories”—Israel’s exit in 2000 and the July 2006 war. Nasrallah, who accused Israeli agents of masterminding the attack, also promised revenge against Israel for killing Mughniyah. Most Lebanese were surprised to learn that the notorious Mughniyah was so integral to Hezbollah’s battlefield successes, but they were later amply reminded by ubiquitous posters and even an over-the-top opera &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;(&#039;&#039;The Scented Light&#039;&#039;) that celebrated Mughniyah’s exploits and his martyrdom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the posthumous outing of Mughniyah was an occasion for adulation in Hezbollah circles, the party’s embrace of a renowned terrorist, who was also purported to be an officer in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, underlined the Hezbollah “otherness” for its many Lebanese detractors. Hezbollah celebrated its links to Iran and promoted resistance to American influence in the Middle East, just as Iran’s hardline leaders do. Coupled with credible reports of Hezbollah officials working in league with Iran to train insurgents in Iraq, fear spread that the party’s domestic political pretensions were only camouflage to hide its wider regional pretensions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah’s domestic adversaries, still seething about the party’s devastating provocation of Israel in 2006, justifiably feared—despite repeated pledges to the contrary—that Hezbollah’s weapons would be turned against Lebanese, thus precipitating a new civil war. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Fayyad, the wellknown head of Hezbollah’s Studies and Documentation Center, emphasized Nasrallah’s frequent assurances that Hezbollah’s weapons would be used only to defend Lebanon (Fayyad 2006, 9). Nevertheless, in cooperation with some opposition allies, Hezbollah’s weapons were used with deadly effect against other Lebanese in May 2008.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In early May, Walid Jumblatt, the mercurial Druze leader, insisted that the government take action against Hezbollah by dismissing the pro-Hezbollah head of security at the airport and investigating an extensive fiber-optic phone network that Hezbollah claimed was integral to its security infrastructure. (It is very unlikely that the cabinet would have acted without significant outside encouragement, probably from the United States, but perhaps from Saudi Arabia.) After a long debate, the cabinet agreed and ordered &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the reassignment of Brigadier General Wafiq Shuqair, a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i from a small village in the south, and directed an investigation of the independent telephone system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Hezbollah response was quick in coming. The next day, May 7, demonstrators blocked the roads to the airport with the help of Jihad al-Bina&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; trucks, which dumped debris to make the route impassable. Hezbollah fighters were joined by unruly Amal and SSNP gunmen and seized control of West Beirut on May 8 and 9. Hezbollah succeeded in coercing the government to rescind the decisions that triggered the crisis, but an immediate casualty was the party’s oft-repeated pledge not to turn its weapons on fellow Lebanese. A private militia, funded by Saad al-Din al-Hariri, was brushed aside, and the state’s Internal Security Force, which is usually presumed to reflect Sunni interests, simply disappeared. Notably, government buildings were not attacked or occupied. As the opposition gunmen left their positions to return home in the ensuing days, the army competently assumed security, but only after days of standing aside rather than risking a fracture of the army.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Hezbollah-led thrust was a brutal object lesson in power, but it also illustrated the limitations of power. In the Shouf, the region where the Druze predominate, seasoned Hezbollah fighters met their match. Followers of the rival Druze leaders, Talal Arslan and Walid Jumblatt, temporarily put aside their differences to strike blows against Hezbollah. In the far north of Lebanon, in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Akkar town of Halba, Sunni gunmen affiliated with the Future Movement tortured and executed eleven members of the Syrian Social Nationalist opposition party, apparently while the army figuratively held the coats of the assailants. In all, eighty-one people were killed in a few days of fighting. Very gruesome videos of the violence—particularly of the Halba incident—circulated on the Internet and via cell phones, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and within days almost all Lebanese knew of the images and most had seen the footage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No feasible mediated solution would avoid returning to a government based on consensus between the major Lebanese players. The United States clung to the politically convenient fiction that a consensus government (with an attendant role for Hezbollah) could be avoided. The realities on the ground in May 2008 forced an adjustment in Washington’s thinking. As a result, when the Emir of Qatar offered to mediate between the Lebanese contestants in a hastily organized meeting in Doha, the United States grudgingly supported the effort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To the relief of most Lebanese, particularly those with a living memory of the fifteen-year civil war that ended only in 1990, an agreement was reached on May 21 in Doha. The next morning at dawn, the opposition tents, erected in the heart of Beirut a year and a half before, were removed. The key components of the Doha Agreement included the election by parliament of Michel Suleiman as president, the creation of a consensus government in which the opposition would hold an effective veto, and the crafting of a new elections the following year, in June 2009. Suleiman was elected president and inaugurated on May 25, just in time to save the lucrative summer tourism season.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As is often the case in Lebanon, many of the underlying issues would remain unresolved. Local demands for Hezbollah to disarm would continue to resonate in Washington and Riyadh, Amman and Paris, where the group was viewed as a dangerous expression of Iran’s regional ambitions. However, the prospects for disarming the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i group were dimmer than ever. Sunni Islamists, who sometimes argue that the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a are not even authentic Muslims, have reacted to Hezbollah’s military prowess by upgrading their own militias. Although Hezbollah has tried to downplay &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the hostility of Sunni groups, it is noteworthy that the party’s attempts to reach a rapprochement with the most powerful Sunni Islamist groups ultimately failed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Politics in Lebanon often are a patchwork of competing sectarian and personal interests, joined only by fraying threads of national identity. This was certainly the case in following the Doha Agreement, when it took five weeks of horse trading to assemble a cabinet to be headed by Fouad Siniora, who remained in office until after the 2009 election.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Israel and Hezbollah concluded successful indirect negotiations through German mediators to arrange for the exchange of prisoners and bodies, in July 2008. The exchange returned to Israel the bodies of the two soldiers whose capture two summers before precipitated the thirty-four-day war (both soldiers apparently died in captivity of wounds inflicted in the ambush). In return, four Lebanese captured in 2006 were repatriated and Samir Kuntar (see p. 134) was freed. Kuntar, a Druze, is much despised in Israel because two civilians died at his hands, including a four-year-old girl. One may easily imagine Israelis seething at the spectacle of Kuntar being greeted by the Lebanese government with fanfare and acclaim, as though he were a national hero. Turned out in a brand-new Hezbollah uniform, Kuntar was embraced by Nasrallah, who gloated that the prisoner deal validated the victory of 2006.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2009 Parliamentary Elections&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within Lebanon recrimination between Hezbollah and its adversaries accelerated in the run-up to the June 7, 2009, parliamentary elections. Electioneering featured politically-significant color-coding. Hezbollah ally General Michel &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Aoun and his Free Political Movement’s characteristically orange signs joined with Hezbollah’s yellow posters emphasized the party’s stand against corruption, indebtedness, and deprivation, as well as its stance of resistance. The opposing and predominantly Maronite Lebanese Forces (the chief rival to Michel Aoun’s party) produced posters featuring the horizontal red stripes of Lebanese national flag and emphasized that “our national colors will not change.” The Future Movement, the other Hezbollah adversary group led by Saad al-Hariri, son of the assassinated prime minister, offered a variety of symbolic references to the martyred Rafiq al-Hariri. Their bright red posters, proclaiming “I ♥ life,” invited comparison with Hezbollahis and their avowal of martyrdom and death.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The elections, competently organized under the leadership of Interior Minister Ziyad Baroud and observed by election monitors from the Arab League, the European Union, and the Carter Center, proceeded without incident, despite the persistence of vote buying, which remains common in Lebanon. (In and around the Beqaa valley city of Zahle, where the author was on the ground and where seven decisive seats were hotly contested, the going price for a vote was said to be $200.) The results reflected deep polarization, particularly between Sunni and Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i voters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Hariri “Future” camp was extraordinarily successful in mobilizing Sunni voters, including Beduin tribespeople along with expatriate voters who were (legally) provided with free plane tickets to allow them to return to vote. I interviewed a family of at least four adults who had been flown all the way from Australia to cast their ballots. Expatriate Lebanese not fortunate enough to trace their roots to competitive electoral districts complained that they were not offered tickets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was widely remarked at the time that Saudi Arabia, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;intent on defeating Hezbollah and checking the power of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community and its Iranian patrons, transferred large sums to finance the campaign of the March 14 alliance.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The March 14 alliance took its name from the date in 2005, one month after the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, when a coalition of political groups and individuals mounted a massive demonstration in Beirut to mark the assassination, demanded that the assassins be brought to justice, and called for an end to Syrian domination of Lebanon. The leading elements in the alliance included Saad al-Hariri’s Future Movement and a variety of Christian groups, of which the largest was Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement. Aoun later broke with the March 14 alliance and aligned with Hezbollah and the March 8 coalition. The March 8 coalition, for its part, takes its name from a very large and rival demonstration in 2005 composed of members of pro-Syrian groups who assembled to thank Syria for its role in Lebanon. In addition to Hezbollah and Amal, several predominantly Christian parties participated (see pp. 127–29 for more details).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the votes were counted, the March 14 forces carried the day, winning 68 seats as compared to 57 for the Hezbollah-dominated March 8 coalition (three seats were won by independents in the 128-member Chamber of Deputies). In Zahle, heretofore a stronghold for a pro-Syrian politician and his allies, all seven seats, including a single Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i seat, were won by March 14 candidates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the seemingly decisive electoral victory of the March 14 coalition in these 2009 parliamentary elections, the next four years would be marked by repeated political deadlock. Five months passed before prime minister-designate Saad al-Hariri succeeded in assembling his cabinet. His eventual successors, Najib Mikati and Tamam Salam, would face similar delays due to long bargaining over cabinet composition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dickering over cabinet portfolios is a familiar feature of all parliamentary systems, but in Lebanon the tough horse-trading stems from intense mutual distrust and rival &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;strategic visions. For Hezbollah’s rivals, the bitter memory of the May 2008 Hezbollah-led armed incursion into West Beirut remains fresh. They feared the group and insisted that Hezbollah must disarm. For its part, Hezbollah blocked any effort to impede its military capabilities and pressed for control of two ministries, Interior and Telecommunications.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a speech on June 8, 2009, the day following the election, the Hezbollah secretary general Hasan Nasrallah announced that he accepted the results “with sportsmanship and a democratic spirit,” but then added that there was a difference between a parliamentary majority and a popular majority. He was alluding to the fact that the cumulative total of votes won by Hezbollah and its allies exceeded by more than 100,000 the votes by the other side (nearly 840,000 votes versus over 690,000).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nasrallah promised democratic compromise but at the same time signaled obduracy. In addition to the aforementioned attempt to claim two key ministries, Hezbollah and its allies sought to block cabinet action on critical matters, including in particular cooperation with the Netherlands-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), tasked by the United Nations with bringing to trial the accused perpetrators of the killing of Rafiq al-Hariri and twenty-one others who died with him on February 14, 2005. Hezbollah’s goal was to attain a “blocking third.” (In Lebanon, a coalition government that loses more than one-third of its members is considered to have been toppled.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The thirty-member cabinet was finally formed in November 2009. Fifteen cabinet seats were accorded to the anti-Hezbollah March 14 coalition, while Hezbollah and its allies held ten. The remaining five seats were occupied by Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims politically aligned with President Michel &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Suleiman and in tune with political currents in the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community—i.e. largely (but not always) supportive of Hezbollah. Hezbollah thus easily attained its “blocking third” goal. However, it failed to gain the coveted post of interior minister, which went to much-respected Ziyad Baroud, a presidential appointee. The Telecommunications Ministry was awarded to economist Charbel Nahas, a supporter of Hezbollah ally Michel Aoun.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A joint ministerial declaration marking the formation of the new government restated the long-standing official position of Lebanon that emphasizes the right of the army and “the resistance” to defend the country and to recover territory that remains occupied by Israel (including the Shebaa Farms; see pp. 90–92, above). Five cabinet members from the March 14 coalition dissented from the declaration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A Change of Tone and a Tweaking of Ideology&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On November 30, 2009, Hezbollah released an ideological declaration, the first such document published since 1985. To underline the importance of the new manifesto, Hasan Nasrallah read it via a video link to a live audience in al-dahiya.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In Arabic, the document was called a &#039;&#039;wathiqa siyasiyya&#039;&#039; (political paper), but Hezbollah officials have a styled it a “manifesto.” An English translation may be found at http://sns.sy/sns/?path=news/read/7187.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In contrast to the 1985 document, the language in the new paper was subdued in style and in substance and emphasized the Lebanese roots and commitments of the organization: “Lebanon is our homeland and the homeland of our fathers, ancestors. It’s also the homeland of our children, grandchildren, and the coming generations. It is the country to which we have given our most precious sacrifices for its sovereignty and pride, dignity &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and liberation.” This differs from the 1985 Open Letter, in which the Lebanese political system was dismissed with contempt and Lebanese Christians were told, in no uncertain terms, that they must submit to a life under a system of Islamic law. The 2009 statement decried sectarianism (as many Lebanese often do) and also insisted on the importance of a national dialogue, a reform, and improvement of the state. “We want Lebanon for all Lebanese alike, and we want it unified.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If this manifesto reflected a degree of political maturity and rhetorical restraint, there still remained considerable continuity with the 1985 Open Letter, especially in its strong emphasis on liberating Palestine, its confrontational stance toward the domination of the United States, and its call to combat Israeli expansionism and aggression. In fact, the country most frequently mentioned in the 2009 manifesto is Israel, whereas the Hezbollah patron, Iran, was mentioned only once, as a major Islamic state that provided a model of revolutionary action. If one were to draw only on the evidence of this document, one would never have guessed just how close the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah had become, or how willing Hezbollah was to jeopardize Lebanese security in order to preserve these ties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon—and Lebanese-Syrian Relations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), authorized by the UN Security Council following the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and twenty-one others, began its work in 2009. In the spring of 2009, the German news magazine &#039;&#039;Der Spiegel&#039;&#039; predicted that members of Hezbollah would likely be indicted &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for playing a role in the assassination.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Eric Follath, “New Evidence Points to Hezbollah in Hariri Murder,” &#039;&#039;Der Spiegel&#039;&#039;, May 23, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/break-through-in-tribunal-investigation-new-evidence-points-to-hezbollah-in-hariri-murder-a-626412.html.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; According to the article in &#039;&#039;Der Spiegel&#039;&#039;, the indictment would heavily rely on mobile phone data revealing that members of Hezbollah had coordinated with one another on mobile phones purchased in Tripoli weeks before the attack and that had been used only in conjunction with the assassination (with the exception of a single errant call by a Hezbollahi to his girlfriend, which provided a vital clue). Captain Wissam Eid, a terrorism investigator in the Lebanese Internal Security Force, connected the dots and identified the initial streams of cellular data to establish Hezbollah’s complicity. He did not live to see the end of the investigation; on January 25, 2008, he was assassinated by a car bomb, presumably intended to put an end to his investigative efforts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this period, when both Hezbollah and its Syrian ally were deeply preoccupied by the activity of the STL, Lebanese prime minister Saad al-Hariri decided that it was in his country’s best interest to assuage Syrian apprehensions about STL’s investigations while, at the same time, focusing on Hezbollah’s role in his father’s assassination. (Although it is unlikely that the killing would have gone forward without Syrian assent, if not its complicity, indeed, many Lebanese believe to this day that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad had a controlling hand in the killing of Saad’s father.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In December 2009, Prime Minister al-Hariri made an official visit to Damascus and was hosted by President Bashar al-Asad. Syria had long insisted that its ties with “sisterly” Lebanon were so close that there was no need for usual diplomatic relations, a stance that Lebanese nationalists often &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;took to mean that Syria did not truly acknowledge Lebanon as an independent state. (Only in March 2009 did the “sister states” Syria and Lebanon exchange ambassadors and open embassies in their respective capitals, sixty-five years after each country gained its independence from France.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Al-Hariri’s agenda included pursuing inquires about the more than six hundred Lebanese who remain missing in Syria after being arrested or seized during the civil war, when Syria was the dominant power in Lebanon, and addressing border disagreements and anomalies. The visit was not particularly successful in substantive terms, although there were cosmetic improvements in bilateral relations. Most important, the meeting signaled that Syria was not being held culpable for the killing of al-Hariri’s father, a striking accomplishment for Bashar al-Asad. The extent of al-Asad’s victory became even more evident in an extraordinary interview given by Saad al-Hariri to the London-based &#039;&#039;al-Sharq al-Awsat&#039;&#039;, on September 5, 2010:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have opened a new page in relations with Syria since the formation of the government. . . One must be realistic in this relationship and build it on solid foundations. One should also assess the past years, so as not to repeat previous mistakes. Hence, we conducted an assessment of errors committed on our behalf with Syria, [and] I felt for the Syrian people, and the relationship between the two countries. We must always look to the interests of both peoples, both countries and their relationship. At a certain stage we made mistakes. We accused Syria of assassinating the martyred premier, and this was a political accusation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He then promised that the tribunal would only look at evidence, not pursue political agendas as, it might be added, Hezbollah and its allies accused the March 14 movement of doing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, these assurances did not mitigate Hezbollah’s concerns. Despite backing down where Syria was concerned, Prime Minister al-Hariri continued to insist on a weapons-free Beirut, where only the army and police would be armed, and he refused to disavow the STL, as Hezbollah had insisted he do. Hezbollah officials, including Hasan Nasrallah in widely publicized speeches, made accusations of Israeli complicity in the 2005 assassination, noting evidence of Israeli surveillance on February 14, 2005, while pointing to about seventy Israeli spies who had been unearthed in Lebanon since 2008, including forty who were in custody by the end of 2010. Al-Hariri and his cabinet allies insisted on sticking with the STL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During a visit to Washington, D.C. in January 2011, the Lebanese prime minister was hardly out of the White House Oval Office after a meeting with President Barack Obama when he learned that his government had fallen. On January 12, all ten Hezbollah-aligned members resigned and were joined by one of the five cabinet members appointed by President Suleiman.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Lebanese parliament, the Druze bloc (representing about 7 percent of the Lebanese population), accompanied by a couple of Armenian deputies, also shifted sides and broke with al-Hariri’s government. Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, known among his people by the honorific “Walid Baik,” has always enjoyed a well-earned reputation for anticipating changes in political currents and shifting position accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These developments set the stage in late January 2011 for a Lebanese parliamentary vote for leadership of the new government. The major political beneficiary of the new administration was General Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement, which secured seven seats for itself in a cabinet completely dominated by Hezbollah-affiliated &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;March 8 elements. Najib Mikati, a wealthy businessman from Tripoli who headed a brief caretaker government following the 2005 assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, defeated the incumbent Saad al-Hariri for the post of prime minister by a vote of 68–60. Mikati has a reputation for being close to Syria, but, like most Sunni politicians in contemporary Lebanon, he strives to stay on good terms with Saudi Arabia. Mikati is commonly described as an accomplice of Hezbollah, but after assuming the prime ministry, he thwarted Hezbollah on several key issues, most notably the payment of Lebanon’s contribution for the funding of the STL, which the party opposed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In November 2011, despite intense pressure from Hezbollah to drop support for the tribunal, Mikati arranged for the payment of the full Lebanese contribution of $34 million (€24 million) without seeking government approval. Western powers, including the United States and France, were left little doubt of the dire consequences should Lebanon fail to support the STL. Equally important, non-payment would have thrown Lebanon into chaos. Mikati avoided having to address the issue at the cabinet level by drawing on an account independently controlled by the prime minister’s office. By doing so, he was able to keep the peace with Hezbollah while placating the country’s western allies. In the end, Hezbollah head Nasrallah and his colleagues were not willing to face the consequences of the turmoil that would have ensued if its demands for defunding the STL had been met.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first half of 2011 saw plenty of turmoil in Lebanon, as the Syrian civil war increasingly spilled over into Lebanon. Evidence of Hezbollah’s growing role in the Syria fighting became irrefutable, as the Hezbollahi casualty numbers mounted. Criticism, not to mention ridicule of Hezbollah’s hypocrisy mounted. On March 19, 2011, when the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_181&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;“Arab Spring” was still in its early days, Nasrallah made a speech applauding the inherent authenticity and justice of the Arab Spring: “These popular revolutions are real. They came from the people and the political parties followed. They express awareness, enthusiasm and willingness to sacrifice. This should not be forgotten by the regimes that are facing these peoples.” Yet, in addressing Syria, he adopted a different perspective by extolling the wise leadership of Bashar al-Asad and commending his reform agenda. Meanwhile, fears of violence grew in Lebanon. Deadly Sunni-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Alawi clashes in Tripoli punctuated 2012, and anti-Hezbollah demonstrations led by the Salafi Shaikh Ahmad al-Assir grew increasingly militant. Along the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanese Sunnis intent on joining the fighting in Syria were sometimes interdicted by the Lebanese army. In May 2012, Shaikh Ahmad &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abd al-Wahid, a leading Lebanese Sunni adversary of the Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thist regime in Syria, was killed at an army checkpoint in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Akkar when he and his driver allegedly refused to stop.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The country was already a tangle of exposed nerves when Major General Wissam al-Hassan was assassinated by a planted car bomb in October 2012. The general was close to Saad al-Hariri and headed the intelligence bureau of the Internal Security Forces. Al-Hassan was cooperating closely with the STL, and it was one his officers, the late Captain Wissam Eid, who had discovered the electronic evidence that was integral to the STL’s investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two months prior to al-Hassan’s death, in August 2012, Michel Samaha, a former information minister who was famously close to the Syrian regime, was arrested after being caught red-handed on surveillance video and audio recordings accepting a $170,000 payment to direct bombings against opponents of Syria in Lebanon’s northern &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Akkar province. The physical evidence included twenty-four explosive &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;devices found in the trunk of his car. The head of Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF), Major General Ashraf Rifi, describes the case as “airtight.” There has been much speculation about the reasons for al-Hassan’s assassination, including the possibility that it was in retaliation for Samaha’s arrest. The jailed minister faces a possible death sentence if convicted. His trial was scheduled to resume in late 2013, but did not. Despite the “airtight” evidence, the outcome of the trial is hardly assured. Bashar al-Asad’s fortunes and the outcome of the civil war in Syria are widely expected to influence Samaha’s fate.&lt;br /&gt;
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Mikati’s tenure as prime minister continued to be driven by the “security portfolio.” In March 2013, he pushed for the extension in office of ISF head Ashraf Rifi, despite Rifi’s having reached the mandatory retirement age of fifty-nine. Among Lebanon’s three major security institutions—the army, General Security (&#039;&#039;al-amn al-&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;amm&#039;&#039;), and the ISF (&#039;&#039;quwa al-amn al-dakhali&#039;&#039;)—the ISF has been most resistant to the influence of March 8 elements, including Hezbollah. Mikati also sought to extend his term, in conjunction with an extension of the term in office for General Jean Kahwaji, the commander of the Lebanese armed forces. He failed for two reasons: first, and most obviously, Hezbollah and its allies wished to put in place an ally in the ISF; second, Michel Aoun was not anxious to the see the army chief’s term extended because he was pushing for his own candidate, Brigadier General Shamel Roukoz, to be given the job. Roukoz just happens to be Aoun’s son-in-law, as well as the commander of the esteemed Commando Regiment (&#039;&#039;fawj al-mughawir&#039;&#039;).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The Commando Brigade was previously commanded by François al-Hajj, who was also close to Aoun and was assassinated in 2007 (see p. 167).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In Lebanon, the sweetest plums are shared with family.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a result, Prime Minister Mikati resigned in March 2013, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;but continued to serve as a caretaker for months while his successor attempted to assemble a government. His designated successor, Tamam Salam, is a familiar Beirut figure, and his father Saeb Salam frequently served as prime minister in Lebanon’s pre–civil war years. Tamam Salam has been sometimes described as aligned with March 14, but that is arguable. He has walked a careful path sustaining cordial relations with Syria and respectful ties to Saudi Arabia, and he is the consummate diplomat who calibrates his political stances with the deftness of a tightrope walker. He was approved nearly unanimously by the parliament (124–4) yet by January 2014 his government was still in formation.&lt;br /&gt;
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With only a caretaker government in place in July 2013, and little prospect for agreement on a new military commander, the term in office of General Kahwaji was extended for two years by Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn, an assertion of dubious authority that was promptly challenged by Michel Aoun.&lt;br /&gt;
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Parliamentary elections should have been held in June 2013, but were rescheduled for November 2014. Wrangling over the electoral law, particularly the drawing of electoral districts, caused the delay. This is a common occurrence and one that typically is driven by gerrymandering that would be familiar to any student of U.S. politics. Hezbollah, and the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community in general, tend to prefer a proportional representation formula for elections, which would benefit the large Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. Many non-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i politicians prefer smaller districts and majoritarian criteria. As a compromise, the 2014 elections are certain to be organized with a mixed system of proportional and majoritarian criteria and electoral districts of widely variant sizes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since the elections are scheduled well after the May 2014 expiration of the president’s six-year term, it is likely &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that Michel Suleiman’s term of office will be extended. According to the Lebanese Constitution the president is limited to a single six-year term, but the Chamber of Deputies nevertheless extended the incumbencies of both the previous two presidents (Elias Hrawi and Emile Lahoud) for three years, and the same “exception” may occur in the case of Michel Suleiman. President Suleiman is often viewed by Hezbollah’s adversaries in Lebanon as a steady partner of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i group, but he has become increasingly critical of Hezbollah’s heavy involvement in the Syrian fighting, which bolsters the argument for his extension in office among the March 14 supporters.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sunni-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Tensions&lt;br /&gt;
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The respect Hezbollah gained in the Arab world for its ability to go toe-to-toe with Israel in 2006 has since been supplanted by animosity and suspicion. Except within Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i communities, the luster of Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah’s reputation has been badly tarnished.&lt;br /&gt;
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The shift reflects transnational factors, including waves of populism and rising sectarianism unleashed by the Arab awakenings that began in late 2010, which played out against a decade of geopolitical jousting between leading Arab states and Iran. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, which hugely benefited Iran and which made possible the rise to power of the Iraqi Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i majority, exacerbated sectarian tensions and prompted an us-versus-them mentality in a variety of predominantly Sunni Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the smaller Gulf states. Local detail or nuance has been ignored in favor of a simple-minded focus on an alleged Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i threat said to be orchestrated by Iran. This is certainly true in Lebanon, where the Sunni &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;community sees Hezbollah as an extension of Iran’s quest for hegemony.&lt;br /&gt;
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Polling in the region conducted in late 2012 confirms both a polarization between Arab Sunnis and Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a and a plummeting of support for Iran among Sunni Arabs.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;John Zogby, &#039;&#039;Looking at Iran&#039;&#039;. (Washington, D.C., Zogby Research Services, 2013), and for a summary of the survey see http://www.aaiusa.org/page/-/Polls/LookingatIran2013.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Whereas Iran enjoyed favorability ratings of over 70 percent in Jordan and Morocco and over 90 percent in Egypt in 2006, six years later the numbers had fallen to between 20 and 30 percent. When former Iranian President Ahmedinejad visited Cairo in February 2013, shoes were thrown at him, an indignity previously reserved for U.S. President George W. Bush, who had dodged shoe leather five years earlier in Baghdad. The Cairo shoe-throwing protester was angered by Iran’s support for the Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;athist regime in Damascus.&lt;br /&gt;
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The apparently fraudulent Iranian elections in 2009 exposed Iran to close scrutiny when it clamped down harshly on demonstrators protesting the reelection of President Ahmedinejad. This played poorly in Arab media across the region. More recently, Iran’s continuing support for the Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;athist regime in Syria, a longtime ally, has been widely disparaged in Sunni Arab circles. Iran’s unfettered flights through Iraqi airspace to deliver armaments to Syria have only served to validate suspicions about the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i-dominated government in Baghdad and its friendly relations with Iran.&lt;br /&gt;
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Saudi Arabia has contributed to the deepening sectarian divide by underwriting anti-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i diatribes in the many print and electronic media outlets that it controls or influences. Riyadh’s formula has been to denounce groups that it opposes—especially Hezbollah and other Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i groups or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;communities, such as Yemen’s Houthi movement and Bahrain’s Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i majority—as agents of Iranian influence.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even where the evidence for Iranian meddling is flimsy, notably in Bahrain, Saudi officials are undeterred. Charges from the Bahraini and Saudi governments that Iran was behind the demonstrations that began in 2011, were countered by U.S. officials who pointedly noted that the charges were not supported by evidence. (In fact the majority Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i population in Bahrain has long been moderate, and surprisingly so given the systematic discrimination that routinely confronts Bahraini Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. The risk is that the Bahraini Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a will be radicalized, and that charges of foreign meddling by Iran will prove to be self-fulfilling.)&lt;br /&gt;
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Worsening Relations with Egypt&lt;br /&gt;
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As noted above, Hezbollah gained many admirers across the Arab world following its 2006 war with Israel, and Egypt was no exception. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood applauded the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i group’s success, as did many secular professionals. These warm feelings chilled by early 2009. When Israel launched a punitive campaign against the Gaza-based Palestinian Islamist group Hamas in December 2008 and January 2009, Hasan Nasrallah called on the Egyptian people to “take to the streets in the millions.” The Egyptian government of the day, not unhappy to see Hamas pummeled, was livid. The Mubarak regime and many Egyptian media commentators close to the regime condemned Hezbollah for trying to foment an uprising. Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu-al-Ghayt depicted Hezbollah as a puppet of Iran. He declared: “Iran and its followers in this region want to turn Egypt into the maid of honor or the page for the crowned Iranian queen when she enters the Middle East. Egypt can never be the maid of honor for anyone because it itself is the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;crowned lady in this region.” (&#039;&#039;al-sharq al-awsat&#039;&#039;, April 14, 2009.)&lt;br /&gt;
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These remarks were made in April 2009, when Egyptian authorities announced the arrest of twenty-five people, including Muhammad Mansour (also known as Sami Shehab), whom Hasan Nasrallah acknowledged as a member of Hezbollah. Nasrallah revealed that he had dispatched him to Egypt to facilitate the smuggling of weapons to Hamas in Gaza. In 2010, Egypt sentenced Mansour and twenty-one others, including at least one other Hezbollah member (Hassan al-Manakhly), to prison for espionage and illegal possession of weapons. Mansour escaped captivity in 2011 in the chaos of Egypt’s “January 25 Revolution” and resurfaced in Lebanon in February 2011.&lt;br /&gt;
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Widening Rifts within Lebanon&lt;br /&gt;
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Within Lebanon itself, Sunni-Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i mistrust has intensified for several reasons. Leading the list is the alleged complicity of Hezbollah in the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri. As noted above, accusations of Hezbollah’s complicity in the killing began in 2009 with the expose in the German newsweekly &#039;&#039;Der Spiegel&#039;&#039;. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon formally indicted four Hezbollah members for their role in the assassination in July 2012. The accused remain at large to this day, and Hezbollah has vowed that the STL will never be allowed to apprehend them.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The accused include Mustafa Amin Badr al-Din, brother-in-law of the late Imad Mughniyah. Badr al-Din is thought to have replaced Mughniyah as the head of the External Operations Branch of Hezbollah, which is believed to have been responsible for a variety of terrorist attacks. The STL indictment may be downloaded at: http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11–01/main/filings/indictments/f0007.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; While Hezbollah’s campaign to discredit the STL still resonates &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;with its core supporters, the party’s opponents see it as proof of the organization’s culpability—even as they dread the disorder that a trial and guilty verdict would bring. The four accused Hezbollahis will be tried in absentia, with the trial scheduled to convene in early 2014. In October 2013, a fifth man linked to Hezbollah was named by the STL as a suspect.&lt;br /&gt;
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Recent memories of the 2006 war with Israel also remain a source of mutual embitterment. Hezbollah’s opponents continue to hold it responsible for provoking the war and for the attendant destruction. They fear that Hezbollah will ignite new military conflicts in the South in retaliation for a possible U.S. and/or Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, or simply in order to reinforce its reputation as the symbol of “resistance” in the region. For Hezbollah’s part, its leaders have long suspected that during the 2006 conflict its Lebanese rivals surreptitiously encouraged Israel in its campaign to destroy Hezbollah’s military capacity. Classified U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks in 2011 lend veracity to the accusation. One such cable recounted a wartime meeting between U.S. ambassador Jeffrey Feltman, UN envoy Terje Larsen, and several Lebanese political leaders. Among the Lebanese present was the mercurial Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader and then an ally of the anti-Hezbollah March 14 coalition. The cable paraphrases Jumblatt: “Although March 14 must call for a cease-fire in public, it is hoping that Israel continues its military operations until it destroys Hezbollah’s military capabilities.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The meeting took place on July 16, 2006. See http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2403.html.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These irrefutable WikiLeaks transcripts of anti-Hezbollah comments in discussions between western diplomats and leading political figures, including then prime minister Fouad Siniora, inflamed Lebanon’s Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a community.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hezbollah’s public image within Lebanon has also taken a beating of late from self-inflicted wounds. Unfortunately for a party that has cultivated a reputation of being untainted by corruption, a 2009 financial scandal struck at the core of the organization and affected a number of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i investors, particularly prosperous emigrants who retain strong ties to southern Lebanon. Salah Izz al-Din, a “son of the South” with close ties to the party, was charged with fraud for bilking investors, including close advisors to Nasrallah, out of as much as a billion dollars. Described as a “Lebanese Bernie Madoff,” he benefited from close ties to influential figures and the glow of legitimacy gained by generous donations to local institutions. His pyramid scheme offered outsize returns from investments in minerals and other natural resources. The scandal was a source of enormous embarrassment to the party. While there have been other charges of corruption against Hezbollah, this case unleashed unprecedented anger and public debate.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is little question that Hezbollah, along with its former rival and present ally Amal, still dominates the politics of the Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. At the popular level, however, support is tenuous. Resentment of Iran’s often heavy hand in Lebanon is strongly felt within Amal, and across the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community fears of broadened conflict, stemming either from Syria or from a new war with Israel, are common. Pious Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i youths who respect the sacrifices of their parents to liberate Lebanon from occupation and to end the deprivation and marginality of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, are not necessarily ready to emulate them.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the excellent ethnography by Lara Deeb and Mona Harb, &#039;&#039;Leisurely Islam: Negotiating Geography and Morality in Shi’ite South Beirut&#039;&#039; (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This waning of zeal is a matter of concern for Hezbollah’s leaders.&lt;br /&gt;
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In some regions, especially in the Beqaa valley in the vicinity &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of Baalbek and Hirmil, tribes (&#039;&#039;‘ashira&#039;&#039;, plural: &#039;&#039;‘asha’ir&#039;&#039;) remain strong. Despite their support for Hezbollah, the tribes remain fiercely autonomous from both the party and the Lebanese government. Tribes are large extended families, often organized through government-chartered family associations, and they must be treated with deference. This was illustrated in August 2013 when the al-Miqdad clan, with roots in Baalbek but also a strong presence in the &#039;&#039;dahiya&#039;&#039;, kidnapped more than forty people, including members of the Free Syrian Army, in retaliation for the capture of a Miqdad in Syria. The captives were later freed by the Lebanese army (reportedly with help from Hezbollah), but the episode illustrates the limits of Hezbollah’s influence and control, especially at a time when challenges are coming from many different directions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the informative analysis by Lara Deeb and Mona Harb, “Fissures in Hizballah’s Edifice of Control,” &#039;&#039;Middle East Report&#039;&#039;, October 30, 2012, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero103012.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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A number of Hezbollah’s critics have become increasingly vocal, particularly as the party became an active combatant in Syria. Former secretary general Subhi Tufayli often accuses Hezbollah of being an instrument of Iranian ambition and argues that Hezbollahis who die in Syria are not martyrs but victims of a party that is supporting the wrong side in Syria. Tufayli retains a respectable following in the northern Beqaa valley, which he has long accused both the government and Hezbollah of neglecting. Similarly critical are Shaykhs Hani Fahs and Ali al-Amin; Ahmad al-As&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ad, scion of a famous &#039;&#039;za&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;im&#039;&#039;; and Ibrahim Shams al-Din, son of the late Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. The legacy of Shams al-Din is important, since the late ayatollah was known for his advocacy of inter-sectarian tolerance and dialogue, as well as for his commitment to reform and integration within the context of shari&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. He &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was a formidable critic of Iran’s agenda in Lebanon and was often a thorn in the side of Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another ayatollah who inspired enormous respect in Arab Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i communities, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, died in July 2010. Unlike Hezbollah, he rejected the Iranian model of a supreme clerical authority (&#039;&#039;wilayat al-faqih&#039;&#039;), and he offered a rational, modern, and often scientific approach to piety that appealed to his following, especially younger, educated Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a in Lebanon and well beyond. The esteem in which Fadlallah’s memory is held remains worrisome to Hezbollah’s leadership precisely because he directly challenged the centrality of Iran to contemporary Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since the death of Ayatollah Fadlallah, his son, Sayyid &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Fadlallah, has assumed leadership of the ayatollah’s widespread institutional legacy: an array of schools, charities, and service agencies that rival the Hezbollah-dominated infrastructure. Based in Beirut, Sayyid &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali now occupies his late father’s offices in al-dahiya. Like his late father, he has emphasized diversity within Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism, rejected the idea that Iran should play a privileged leadership role for the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, and has spoken out against the brutal al-Asad regime in Damascus.&lt;br /&gt;
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Syrian Entanglement&lt;br /&gt;
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On June 11, 2012, the National Committee of Dialogue, under the chairmanship of President Suleiman, issued the Baabda Declaration, which was an attempt to revive the flagging dialogue of rivals that began in March 2006. The declaration promotes Lebanese neutrality in regional conflicts, supports UN Security Council resolutions calling for the disarming of militias, and, with specific reference to Syria, states that Lebanon “cannot be used as a base, corridor or starting point to smuggle weapons and combatants.” &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This position is often referred to as a policy of “disassociation” from the Syrian civil war.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Lebanon is deeply entangled with Syria. The sectarian parameters of the civil war in Syria have provided a fertile space for confessional recruitment, for instance in the northern and predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli, where the Free Syrian Army opposing Bashar al-Asad has found a strong base of support. Tripoli has been the site of many deadly clashes between the resident &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Alawi community (which aligns with brethren in Syria in support of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Alawi-dominated regime) and the adjacent Sunni urban quarter. The city has become the epicenter for militant Salafism, and Hezbollah’s involvement in northern Lebanon has spurred Sunni recruitment.&lt;br /&gt;
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The easily infiltrated northern and northeastern border that Lebanon shares with Syria has been crossed by hundreds of thousands of refugees, and by early 2014 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) placed the total number in Lebanon at more than one million. The UNHCR predicts that the refugee population in Lebanon is likely to reach 1,500,000 by the end of 2014, or nearly 40 percent of the four million Lebanese citizens living in the country. Many of the Syrians who have fled to Lebanon have found sanctuary with extended family members or have depended on the generosity of Lebanese villagers. The Lebanese government has opposed the establishment of formal refugee camps that would likely become autonomous bases for the Syrian opposition forces or permanent entities, as happened in the case of Palestinian refugee camps. Allies of the Syrian regime, notably Hezbollah, have deployed forces in the north to attempt to interdict the flow of arms and fighters across the border with limited success.&lt;br /&gt;
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The stakes for Hezbollah in Syria are not hard to fathom. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Syria has offered the resistance strategic depth and a conduit for arms shipments. Particularly since the elevation of Bashar al-Asad to the Syrian presidency in 2000, a close working relationship developed between Nasrallah and the president. Moreover, Hezbollah was enormously popular in Syria for its role in ending the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000 and for its conduct of the 2006 war. The days of reverence for Hezbollah have ended, however, as Hezbollah has become progressively entangled in the civil war.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first significant deployment of Hezbollah fighters to Syria, in the summer of 2012, was south of Damascus to protect a revered religious site: the mosque and mausoleum of Sayyida Sitt Zainab, the revered daughter of Imam &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali and sister of Imam Hussein (see p. 57). Since the 1970s the area has enjoyed growing pious tourism by Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a. Sitt Zainab, as the area is called, is the site of religious schools (&#039;&#039;hawzas&#039;&#039;) established by Hasan al-Shirazi, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Khamenei and others, as well as a focal point for Iraqi Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i refugees fleeing the rampages of violence that followed the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Not unexpectedly, hundreds of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i volunteers converged in 2011 on Sitt Zainab to aid in its defense, many of them comprising the multi-national al-Abbas Brigade. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has reportedly played a role in arming the al-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas force, which contains recruits from Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, the small Syrian Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community, and Afghanistan. A Hezbollah contingent has been active in Sitt Zainab for years, and it was expanded after a June 2012 car bombing damaged the shrine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the June 2012 bombing, Hezbollahi militiamen have deployed widely in Syria, often in coordination with the Iranian Quds Force. Initially, Hezbollah’s involvement was limited to the offering of technical advice and training. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;By the autumn of 2012, Hezbollahi armed formations were operating in Syria, especially along the border, and in twenty-three villages inhabited by Lebanese Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a, including Lebanese citizens whose villages are actually within Syria or difficult to reach except from the Syrian side of the international boundary. Party media began to memorialize Syrian-based fighters who were “fulfilling jihadist duties.” In late 2012 and early 2013, the militia extended its campaigns to Sunni border villages in Lebanon and Syria, and clashes and causalities increased in number, including veteran militia leaders such as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Hussein Nassif, who was killed in October 2012. Reliable Hezbollah casualty figures are not available, but credible estimates point to nearly two hundred dead Hezbollahis by late 2013, a sizable number considering that many of the deaths have been among its experienced frontline fighters. The full-time Hezbollah force, which is strengthened significantly by an extensive network of reserve fighters, numbers about two thousand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The watershed moment came in April 2013 when Hezbollah graduated from a shadow participant on the geographic margins to a major combatant in the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah fighters were in the vanguard that month as Syrian government forces fought to retake al-Qusayr, a strategic border town that commands access to the contested city of Hims, which is twenty miles to the northeast and a short drive from the Lebanese city of Hirmil, a Hezbollah stronghold. Al-Qusayr had been controlled by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) since April 2011, and Syrian army forces put the city under siege in November 2011 but were unable to recapture it until May 2013. The Hezbollah offensive decimated al-Qusayr, which was an enormous blow for the FSA. Hezbollah’s role was angrily condemned in Europe, the United States, and in much of the Middle East, and certainly in many Lebanese circles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On May 25, 2013, “Resistance and Liberation Day”—the thirteenth anniversary of the liberation of south Lebanon from occupation—Nasrallah made a direct reference to Hezbollah’s intervention, emphasizing the critical importance of Syria to Lebanon and especially to Hezbollah. It would be “stupid,” he said, given the potential threats from Syria for Hezbollah, to remain on the sidelines. In this speech Nasrallah also made numerous references to the threat posed by “&#039;&#039;takfiri&#039;&#039;” elements that are the dominant forces in the Syrian opposition. The term “&#039;&#039;takfiri&#039;&#039;” is often used to refer to Sunni Salafists who espouse an essentialist conception of Islam and typically view the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a as polytheists and apostates who deserve to be slaughtered. A cynic might gloss Nasrallah’s focus on &#039;&#039;takfiris&#039;&#039; as a none too subtle appeal to Western policymakers, but it is fair to note that the prospect of living cheek by jowl with a larger neighbor dominated by &#039;&#039;takfiri&#039;&#039; militants would inspire unease in many places, not just Hezbollah’s command center.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Incredibly, Nasrallah suggested to his fellow Lebanese that life should go on normally in Lebanon and that whatever violence occurs in Syria should stay in Syria (where over 100,000 people had died in the civil war as of August 2013). He argued:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You are fighting in Syria and we are fighting in Syria. Let us fight there. Do you want frankness more than this? Let us fight there. Let us put Lebanon aside. Why should we fight in Lebanon? There are different viewpoints, different visions, and different diagnosis of duty. That is OK; but let us keep Lebanon away from the fighting, conflict, and bloody confrontations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the fiercest and perhaps the most consequential regional response to Hezbollah’s high-profile intervention came from Shaikh Yusif al-Qaradawi, the influential Doha-based cleric who reaches millions of Arab Muslims &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;via al-Jazeera, the satellite TV station. On May 31, 2013, al-Qaradawi, who had previously defended Hezbollah when it was under fire from Saudi Arabia, now confessed that he had been wrong: “It seems that the clerics of Saudi Arabia were more mature than me.” Al-Qaradawi now declared that “every Muslim trained to fight and capable of doing that [must] make himself available” to support the Syrian rebels. Referring to Iran and to the Hizb al-Shaytan (the party of the devil), he argued that their intention was to massacre Muslims, and every able Muslim has a personal duty (&#039;&#039;fard&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;ayn&#039;&#039;) to join the fight. Al-Qaradawi’s call to action will not only bolster efforts to fight Hezbollah, but also further undermine the more secular wing of the Syrian opposition. Given al-Qaradawi’s standing, it is a major development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In June 2013, followers of Shaikh Ahmad al-Assir, a longtime critic of Hezbollah, clashed with Hezbollah supporters near the Abra district in Saida, which is less than 30 miles south of Beirut. The clashes included an ultimatum that supporters of Hezbollah vacate their apartments. The army attempted to quell the fighting but suffered sixteen deaths at the hands of the shaikh’s followers, which prompted intervention by army commandos and elements linked with Hezbollah. The army eventually established control, but the shaikh and many of his followers escaped. A reliable Lebanese observer and lifetime resident of Saida noted that he and others were happy to see the firebrand cleric vanquished, but he also complained about the behavior of the Hezbollah forces, including the looting of valuables from the apartments of innocent bystanders to the clashes. This is a striking detail because Hezbollah has taken great pains to preserve the image of their forces as being highly disciplined and not corruptible. In reaction to the incident, several Salafist shaikhs in Tripoli called for a jihad against &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hezbollah and the Lebanese army, an indication that the subversion of public order within Lebanon will continue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The blowback from Syria also reached the heart of Hezbollah’s support, namely, the southern Beirut neighborhoods of al-dahiya, in the form of rocket fire in May 2013. Car bombs are hardly a novelty in Lebanon, and these opprobrious devices for killing, maiming, and terrorizing civilians have been a staple in the arsenals of combatants in Syria and Iraq. Unfortunately, the frequency and lethality of car bombings in Lebanon is rising. On the first day of Ramadan in July 2013, a car bomb exploded in Bir al-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abd adjacent to a supermarket, wounding fifty-three people. The following month a deadlier car bomb nearby killed twenty-seven people. Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general Na&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;im Qassem insinuated that Israel was responsible for the blasts, but within Lebanon the perpetrators were widely understood to be elements within the Syrian opposition who were, presumably, making good on their promise to bring the war to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although the Free Syrian Army (FSA) condemned the July bombing, a component of the FSA claimed credit for it within days and promised more to come. In Syria, elements of the FSA handed out candies to celebrate the attacks, which underlined the futility of Nasrallah’s wishful suggestion to keep the Syrian fighting away from Lebanon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In response to these attacks, Nasrallah lashed out by promising payback: “our hands will reach you.” He suggested that Hezbollah would vastly expand its forces in Syria. Later in August 2013, two car bombs detonated adjacent to mosques in predominantly Sunni Tripoli as Friday prayers were underway. Nearly fifty people were killed. It was no accident that the targeted mosques were associated with shaikhs known to be hostile to Hezbollah. One of them, Shaikh Salem al-Rafi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i, an ally of Ahmad al-Assir, earlier &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had issued a fatwa in which he called on Muslims to join the battle in Syria and against Hezbollah. The Unification (&#039;&#039;al-tawhid&#039;&#039;) Movement, which has long enjoyed good relations with Iran, and in recent years with Syria, carried out the bombing. Lebanese police arrested two Lebanese clerics affiliated with &#039;&#039;al-tawhid&#039;&#039; in connection with the Tripoli bombings, one of whom, Ahmad al-Gharib, reportedly confessed to a role and implicated Syrian security agents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In early December 2013, Hassan al-Laqis, an important Hezbollah official who played a key role in the acquisition of arms and technology, was assassinated as he arrived home in Beirut suburb of Hadath. A Baalbek-based Sunni group claimed that the killing was in revenge for Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria, but, given the assassins’ tradecraft, Israel’s involvement was strongly suspected. Al-Laqis was targeted by Israel in 2006, but his son was killed instead. As 2013 was drawing to a close and Beirut’s renewed Central District was festooned with Christmas decorations, a second prominent figure was murdered right at the historic epicenter of Lebanon. Former finance minister and former ambassador to the United States Muhammad B. Shatah, along with seven other victims, died when a car bomb was driven into his convoy. Shatah, a prospective prime minister, was an articulate critic of the Syrian regime and a leading opponent of Hezbollah. Violence continued less than a week later, on January 2, 2014, when a car bomb killed five people in Hezbollah’s stronghold in al-dahiya. Credit was claimed by ISIS (the Islamic State Iraq and Syria, the powerful al-Qaeda-linked group), which promised more of the same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sadly, violent reverberations from the civil war next door will continue. Nothwithstanding the expressed preference of many Lebanese, including Hezbollah, for a negotiated settlement in Syria, the country is likely to be unsettled &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for years to come with a government in Damascus, whether Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thist or not, unable to control all of its territory. Iran and Hezbollah will be able to find local allies in an environment of fractious political competition among warlords and emerging political elites. Ideological difference, power struggles, and sectarian division plague the Syrian opposition. Many years ago, the late Ghassan Tueni, a Lebanese public intellectual, published a widely read account of the Lebanese civil war titled, &#039;&#039;Une guerre pour les autres&#039;&#039; (The War of Others). Although many Lebanese died savagely at the hands of other Lebanese, Tueni argued that outside powers propelled the war by sponsoring rival militias, exploiting venal and corrupt power brokers, and using Lebanon as battlefield for their proxy wars and geopolitical jousting. Unfortunately, Syria seems well on its way to experiencing the agonies of its own bitter civil war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Lebanon-Israel Front&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Always looming, in addition to the dangers associated with implication in Syria’s civil conflict, is the prospect of another round of war with Israel. Since 2006, the southern border between Lebanon and Israel has remained quiet, but both Hezbollah and its Israeli adversary continue to prepare for a new engagement, which both sides vow will be more extensive, deadly, and decisive than the last. Hezbollah’s bête noire insists that it remains arm’s length from the fighting in Syria. However, despite official silence, there is little doubt that the Israeli armed forces have launched significant air or missile strikes on five occasions in 2013 (January 29, April 27, May 4, July 5, and October 30), and intend to do the same in the future with a view to further degrading the ability of Syria to improve its air defenses &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and to transfer arms to Hezbollah. Arguably, barring a war on Iran by Israel or the United States, the tacit choreography of move and countermove in southern Lebanon would seem less likely to turn to violence than a further unraveling of the security environment in Syria, which might find Israel and Hezbollah going at one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Economic Picture&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lebanon always seems to be in the permanent grip of crisis, and yet the Lebanese reveal a capacity to endure, and even prosper, during some of the darkest moments. But prosperity eludes many Lebanese today, particularly younger adults. Youth unemployment is estimated at 24 percent and shows little sign of improving. Expatriate Lebanese regularly return large sums of hard currency to their native villages, towns, and cities where nominal state services are typically far from adequate, but these monies only supplement rather than replace salaries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Influxes of funds from the Gulf, particularly from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have helped to maintain stability in the well-managed banking sector. In fact, the official Central Bank enjoys statutory autonomy from the endemically corrupt and often dysfunctional political system. Even so, the banking sector suffers when Lebanon is on the brink of conflict, if not in the grip of widespread violence. In 2013, several of the prosperous Gulf Arab states announced that Lebanon was unsafe and urged their citizens to stay away.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the number of guests dwindles, some hotels have been forced to shut their doors. Arabs, who account for the bulk of visitors, are visiting less frequently, as governments in the Gulf have warned their citizens away following a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;spate of sectarian kidnappings. Americans, Asians, and Europeans are steering clear too. Even the Lebanese diaspora, who outnumber those at home and generally visit regularly, returned in smaller numbers in 2012.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In good years, affluent tourists flood into Lebanon, buttress the economy, fill hotels and restaurants to capacity in summer months, and leave large deposits in Beirut’s banks. Tourism normally accounts for as much as 22 percent of national income, and the arrival rate of tourists is a barometer of the country’s political stability and economic health. In times of conflict or disorder, however, these same well-heeled guests—and their cash—leave quickly. It comes as no surprise that foreign direct investment in Lebanon has almost disappeared since 2011. Among the other Arab states, only Libya is the recipient of less foreign investment. The troubled economy is only made worse by the humanitarian burden confronting Lebanon as a result of the massive influx of refugees.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
International Ostracism of Hezbollah&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After years of resisting U.S. and Israeli efforts to stigmatize Hezbollah as a terrorist group, the European Union (EU) compromised in July 2013 by declaring Hezbollah’s “military wing” to be a terrorist organization. A majority of EU members have long held that Hezbollah is a legitimate political party in Lebanon, but several events have contributed to a rethinking of that presumption. In July 2012, a suicide bomber attacked a bus carrying Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria, resulting in the deaths of five Israeli passengers and the Bulgarian bus driver. The Bulgarian government linked two conspirators with dual citizenship (Australian-Lebanese &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and Canadian-Lebanese) to Hezbollah, and gathered (or was provided with) additional evidence implicating Hezbollah in the attack. Other anti-Israel plots linked to Hezbollah (presumably, in retaliation for the Israeli assassination of Imad Mughniyya in 2008) have been thwarted or discovered in India, Thailand, Azerbaijan, and Africa. The Burgas attack was, however, the first of its kind on European soil. Just a few months before the EU designation, in March 2013, a Lebanese man was convicted in Cyprus of conducting surveillance of Israeli flights at Larnaca Airport. Further impetus for the EU’s action was provided by Hezbollah’s decisive armed intervention in al-Qusayr in April 2013.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a practical matter, it is not at all clear how the EU will implement its decision. Hezbollah does not reveal the identities of militia cadre and its military wing depends heavily on a system of volunteer reservists who move fluidly between military and civilian life. The influential leader of Hezbollah’s parliamentary delegation, Muhammad Ra&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ad, cynically noted, “The Hezbollah military wing is a lie invented by the Europeans because they feel the need to communicate with us and they want to make a delusional separation between the so-called military and political wings.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Al-Sharq al-Awsat&#039;&#039;, July 30, 2013.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In anticipation of the EU decision, Hasan Nasrallah dismissively suggested that the EU dip the paper in water and drink the ink.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;From remarks on May 25, 2013, marking the liberation of Lebanon in 2000, and broadcast on al-Manar.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nasrallah was being cavalier however. The EU designation further erodes Hezbollah’s credibility in the Arab world and encourages its regional adversaries, particularly the Arab Gulf states, to continue steps to isolate and weaken the organization. Following the al-Qusayr intervention &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of 2013, the six Arab states comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council declared an economic and political boycott of Hezbollah, and individual members, especially the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, expelled scores of alleged supporters of Hezbollah.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Iran’s economy and currency in decline under the pressure from U.S.- and UN-mandated economic sanctions, the ability of the Islamic Republic to sustain its large subsidies to Hezbollah and the range of institutions that it superintends is in question. Steps such as those taken by the EU and the GCC, as well as sanctions imposed by the U.S. Department of Treasury on Hezbollah financiers and officials, threaten to further reduce the flow of funds to Hezbollah at a time when the organization is stretched thin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The victory of Hasan Rouhani in the Iranian presidential elections of June 2013 introduces another variable into the discussion. President Rouhani’s efforts to engage the United States and its allies diplomatically, with the apparent blessing of Iran’s Supreme Leader &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Khamenei, suggest that productive negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program may be feasible. If progress is made to guarantee that Iran will not seek to develop a nuclear weapons arsenal, there may be beneficial spillovers to international efforts to end the bloodshed in Syria and prevent the country from collapsing into chaos. At earlier junctures in Iran’s national politics, for instance in the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic recalibrated its interests in Lebanon, including its heavy investment in Hezbollah. Were that to happen again, Hezbollah might have to rethink its present course of heavy engagement in Syria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Conclusion&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we have seen in this Afterword, Hezbollah’s response to its adversaries has been to double-down. Nasrallah threatens to deploy more fighters in Syria in response to armed attacks within Lebanon. However, there are very real practical limits to the party’s ability to maintain its “deterrence” of Israel—the core rationale for its armaments and military formations—and its capacity for upping the ante in Syria. The organization’s ability to sustain heightened levels of mobilization, whether in terms of manpower, public support, or matériel resources, will be severely tested. In the context of Lebanese politics, external pressure insures that Hezbollah will remain keen on maintaining a “blocking third” of cabinet seats. The continuing support of avowed and tacit allies will be crucial, of course, and there is shakiness to Hezbollah’s partnership with General Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement. This was evidenced in the summer of 2013 by the ever-ambitious Aoun’s overtures to Saudi Arabia and his poisonous relationship with Speaker Nabih Berri.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equally important, President Suleiman’s periodic calls for Hezbollah’s disengagement from Syria grew increasingly pointed when he suggested a reexamination of national security policy since, in his view, the primary mission of the Resistance is to defend Lebanon from Israel, not to fight in Syria.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Suleiman’s remark were made in an Army Day speech on August 1, 2013.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah’s ability to retain broad support within Lebanon and to remain a major player in Lebanese politics may become increasingly difficult because of its insistence on becoming a major combatant in Syria.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And yet, Hezbollah remains, by far, Lebanon’s best-organized &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;15_afterword.xhtml#page_205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political party and most potent military force. Reviled by its many adversaries, both inside and outside Lebanon, it retains impressive support at home, especially within the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community. Apart from its most diehard partisans, however, that support for the organization is far from unconditional. Hezbollah supporters assume that the organization will prevail over its enemies because of the wisdom of its leadership, the prowess of its militia, and the logic of its ethos of resistance. If instead these elements become an engine of calamity, all bets are off.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sources Cited&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Deeb, Lara, and Mona Harb. 2013. &#039;&#039;Leisurely Islam: Negotiating Geography and&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Morality in Shi’ite South Beirut.&#039;&#039; Princeton: Princeton University Press.&lt;br /&gt;
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Deeb, Lara, and Mona Harb. 2012. “Fissures in Hizballah’s Edifice of Control.” &#039;&#039;Middle East Report&#039;&#039;, October 30. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero103012.&lt;br /&gt;
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Follath, Eric. 2009. “New Evidence Points to Hezbollah in Hariri Murder.” &#039;&#039;Der&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Spiegel&#039;&#039;, May 23.&lt;br /&gt;
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Tueni, Ghassan. 1985. &#039;&#039;Une Guerre pour les autres&#039;&#039;. Paris: Jean-Claude Lattes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zogby, Zogby. 2013. &#039;&#039;Looking at Iran&#039;&#039;. Washington, D.C.: Zogby Research Services.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;16_glos.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;16_glos.xhtml#page_207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Glossary&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Amal —the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i reform group founded by Musa al-Sadr; Hezbollah’s main political rival in the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura&#039;&#039; —literally, “the tenth”; refers to the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram, when the Imam Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, was martyred at Karbala&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;ayatollah&#039;&#039; — literally, “sign of God”; refers to the learned Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i scholars eligible to render &#039;&#039;ijtihad&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th — literally, “renaissance”; refers to the Arab nationalist party, which has had pro-Iraq and pro-Syrian branches in Lebanon&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039; — “the suburb”; usually understood in Lebanon to refer collectively to the southern suburbs of Beirut, where the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a predominate&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-da&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wa&#039;&#039; — “the call” to Islam, a reference to the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i party (Hizb al-Da&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wa) founded in Iraq in 1958&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;fatwa&#039;&#039; (pl., &#039;&#039;fatawa&#039;&#039;) — a religious ruling or opinion issued by a Muslim cleric&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Husseiniya&#039;&#039; — a building used especially during Muharram for honoring Imam Hussein and members of his extended family, including his sister Zaynab&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;ijtihad&#039;&#039; — a religious interpretation by a qualified Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i scholar, usually an &#039;&#039;ayatollah&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;imam&#039;&#039; — the term used in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Islam to refer to one of the twelve male successors to the Prophet, beginning with Imam &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali and ending with the Twelfth Imam, who is believed to be in occultation (a state of being present but &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;16_glos.xhtml#page_208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;unseen). Sometimes, in a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i village for instance, the title &#039;&#039;imam&#039;&#039; simply refers to a local religious figure.&lt;br /&gt;
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Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil — the venerable Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i heartland in southern Lebanon that extends into the southern Beqaa valley&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;majlis&#039;&#039; (pl., &#039;&#039;majalis&#039;&#039;) —literally, a place of sitting; a term often used to mean “parliament” or to refer to the gatherings of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a during Muharram to reflect on the meaning of Karbala&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;marji&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; al-taqlid&#039;&#039; —literally, a “source of imitation”; a leading &#039;&#039;mujtahid&#039;&#039; who is considered a reliable source of &#039;&#039;ijtihad&#039;&#039; by many Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a (for instance, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah of Lebanon or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali Sistani of al-Najaf, Iraq)&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;mujtahid&#039;&#039; — a cleric who is qualified to do &#039;&#039;ijtihad&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Shaikh&#039;&#039; — a term of respect, often used to refer to learned Islamic scholars&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Shari&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a&#039;&#039; —Islamic law&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;ta&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ifiyya&#039;&#039; — confessionalism or sectarianism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;ta&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ziya&#039;&#039; — in Lebanon, this refers to a mourning ritual (whereas in Iran it often refers to the dramatic performance of Hussein’s martyrdom and events surrounding the Karbala epic)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;timthiliyya&#039;&#039; — a performance, as in the dramatic re-creation of the tragedy of Karbala&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;ziyara&#039;&#039; (pl., &#039;&#039;ziyarat&#039;&#039;) — a visit to the tomb or to a site associated with one of the twelve Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Imams or to other significant descendants of the prophet&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;za&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;im&#039;&#039; (pl., &#039;&#039;zu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ama&#039;&#039;) — political boss, usually with the connotation of a figure who dispenses patronage in exchange for support&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;17_ad.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;17_ad.xhtml#page_209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Additional Reading&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lebanon is a complex country that observers all too quickly try to reduce to Christian-Muslim or sectarian labels, as though Lebanese fit into neat cultural boxes. Indeed, even officials who should know better are sometimes seduced by this sort of confessional typecasting, as though people’s behavior is predetermined by a cultural nugget that is magically transmitted from one generation to the next. This is lazy thinking. If confession did determine behavior, the idea of a Lebanese nationality would be an illusion, civil war would be the norm, not the aberration, and Lebanon would be divided into a messy collection of emirates and enclaves. Instead, even in the early twenty-first century—when sectarian identities are peculiarly salient—we must take account of regional, class, or ideological differences, not to mention political jealousies and simple opportunism, to think sensibly about Lebanon and its politics.&lt;br /&gt;
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For those who are provoked or curious to learn more about Lebanon and its complex history, there is probably no better starting place than Kamal Salibi’s rich and elegantly written introduction to Lebanon, &#039;&#039;A House of Many Mansions&#039;&#039;. There are several important accounts of the incremental collapse of Lebanon into civil war in 1975, and the many internal and external dimensions of violence since then, but Elizabeth Picard’s incisive &#039;&#039;A Shattered Country&#039;&#039; is especially sophisticated yet accessible.&lt;br /&gt;
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In recent decades, and for that matter over the past two centuries, Lebanon has been deeply affected by external &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;17_ad.xhtml#page_210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;powers. Israel has played a weighty role in Lebanon’s history, and never less so than the momentous 1982 invasion and its aftermath which included the rise of Hezbollah. Ze&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ev Schiff and Ehud Ya&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ari’s &#039;&#039;Israel’s Lebanon War&#039;&#039; is an indispensable account of a grand plan gone wrong. Daniel Sobelman’s more recent &#039;&#039;New Rules of the Game&#039;&#039; brings to bear many Hebrew and Arabic sources, and a detailed knowledge of Lebanon, to analyze the Israeli confrontation with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, particularly after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Distant Relations&#039;&#039;, a volume edited by Houchang Chehabi, focuses on Lebanon’s multifaceted connections with non-Arab Iran. The editor and the other contributors to the volume combine scholarly craftsmanship with sometimes unique insights into the five-hundred-year relationship between the two countries, as well as the role of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i religious institutions and personalities in maintaining and redefining the liaison.&lt;br /&gt;
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Until recent years the Arab Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslim communities were often relegated to footnotes in scholarly publications. These communities in Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and elsewhere have all been experiencing what is still best called “social mobilization.” The term implies the changes wrought within the various Arab Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i communities by virtue of education, increased mobility, a growing awareness of momentous changes across borders through growing media access as well as through pilgrimages, and other travel experiences. Many of these aspects of change are anticipated in Fuad Khuri’s brilliant &#039;&#039;From Village to Suburb&#039;&#039;, which focused precisely on the southern suburbs of Beirut.&lt;br /&gt;
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A variety of sometimes overlapping and momentous events have been particularly important in shaping the political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;17_ad.xhtml#page_211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;consciousness of Arab Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims, including the Iranian revolution of 1978–79, and the Israeli and American interventions in Lebanon. The ensuing instability and violence gave rise to a number of books, the best among them arguably Robin Wright’s &#039;&#039;Sacred Rage&#039;&#039;. If hijacking, the taking of hostages, and terrorism understandably captured the headlines a quarter of a century ago, by the mid-1980s leading Middle East scholars began to offer more broadly contextualized accounts of &#039;&#039;Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism and Social Protest&#039;&#039;, to cite the still rewarding 1986 book edited by Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie. Two recent volumes—both notable for their accounts of Iraq and the other Arab Gulf states—include seasoned, clearly written surveys of &#039;&#039;The Forgotten Muslims&#039;&#039;, in the case of the book by Graham Fuller and Rend Francke, and the quests of several Arab Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i communities &#039;&#039;Reaching for Power&#039;&#039;, to cite Yitzhak Nakash’s timely book. Vali Nasr offers a wider focus in &#039;&#039;The Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a Revival&#039;&#039;, where he examines the historical subordination of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims to Sunni Muslim authority, and reveals growing signs of conflict and competition between the two major Islamic sects.&lt;br /&gt;
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To the extent that Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i-Sunni tensions are growing in a variety of settings, no small part has been played by the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Jamal Sankari’s biography, &#039;&#039;Fadlallah&#039;&#039;, offers a finely woven account of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i milieu in Iraq, in which Lebanon’s Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah was a notable participant. Sankari’s gem of a book also offers an essential account of the Lebanese context in which the cleric maneuvered. Fadlallah has been the dominant Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i voice in Lebanon for more than two decades, although he may now be outstaged by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah, who has become something of a folk hero in the Arab world in recent years.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;17_ad.xhtml#page_212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Only in the early 1980s did an extensive literature on the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community in Lebanon begin to develop. My book, &#039;&#039;Amal and the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a&#039;&#039;, made possible by a fortuitously timed adventure in southern Lebanon as the leader of a UN peacekeeping team in 1980 and 1981, came at a time when rather one-dimensional views of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims prevailed in much of the press and within the U.S. government. The volume focused on the early political mobilization of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i community by Sayyid Musa al-Sadr and the role of his Amal movement, as well as on the impact of Israeli and Palestinian actions on the radicalization of the community. Fouad Ajami, a Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i native of the southern Lebanese village of Arnoun and now a major public intellectual and policy advocate, crafted &#039;&#039;The Vanished Imam&#039;&#039;, an elegant and Conrad-esque saga of Musa al-Sadr.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Younger scholars from Lebanon later made noteworthy contributions to our knowledge of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i politics in Lebanon, and especially of Hezbollah.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Like many Arabic words, “Hezbollah” is subject to various transliterations. Here we have retained the original spelling in book titles in order to avoid confusion should readers search for a book in a library or bookstore, or merely wish to cite the title.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Nizar Hamzeh is a longtime student of Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i politics, and his &#039;&#039;In the Path of Hizbullah&#039;&#039; offers capable and systematic analysis. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb concentrates, in &#039;&#039;Hizbu&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;llah&#039;&#039;, on the ideological development of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i party. Her assessment is comprehensive if occasionally dense. &#039;&#039;An Enchanted Modern&#039;&#039; by the anthropologist Lara Deeb is a richly textured, insightful excursion into the contemporary Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i society in Lebanon. Deeb focuses especially on Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i women and how religion influences their identities. Unlike any of the other books available in English, Naim Qassem’s &#039;&#039;Hizbullah&#039;&#039;, translated from Arabic, is by a consummate insider. Qassem is, of course, the Deputy &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;17_ad.xhtml#page_213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Secretary-General of Hezbollah, and his discussion of a number of key decisions, such as the debate over participating in Lebanese elections, is often valuable and unexpectedly frank.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, thanks to the wonder of Internet publishing, a solid special issue of the &#039;&#039;MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies&#039;&#039;, titled “The Sixth War,” appeared only a few months after the July War of 2006. The issue includes extensive analyses of Hezbollah’s decision making, war fighting, and postwar political orientation.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;18_sc.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;18_sc.xhtml#page_215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Sources Cited&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abisaab, Ruha Jurdi. 2006. “The Cleric as Organic Intellectual: Revolutionary Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism in the Lebanese Hawzas.” In &#039;&#039;Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years&#039;&#039;, ed. H. E. Chehabi. London: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ajami, Fouad. 1986. &#039;&#039;The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Lebanon&#039;&#039;. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Alagha, Joseph Elie. 2006. &#039;&#039;The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program&#039;&#039;. Leiden: Amsterdam University Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anderson, Jon Lee. 2006. “Letter from Beirut: The Battle for Lebanon.” &#039;&#039;New Yorker&#039;&#039;, August 7, 34–41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ayoub, Mahmoud. 1978. &#039;&#039;Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in Twelver Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism&#039;&#039;. The Hague: Mouton.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chamie, Joseph. 1981. &#039;&#039;Religion and Fertility: Christian-Muslim Differentials&#039;&#039;. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chehabi, H. E., ed. 2006. &#039;&#039;Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;500 Years&#039;&#039;. London: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cole, Juan I., and Nikki Keddie, eds. 1986. &#039;&#039;Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism and Social Protest&#039;&#039;. New Haven: Yale University Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Deeb, Lara. 2006. &#039;&#039;An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Lebanon&#039;&#039;. Princeton: Princeton University Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
el-Kak, Mona Harb. 2001. “Post-war Beirut: Resources, Negotiations, and Contestations in the Elyssar Project.” In &#039;&#039;Capital Cities: Ethnographies of Urban Governance in the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. S. K. Shami. Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fayyad, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali. 2006. “Hizballah and the Lebanese State: Reconciling a National Strategy with a Regional Role.” &#039;&#039;Arab Reform Initiative: Arab Reform Brief&#039;&#039; 11:1–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fuller, Graham E., and Rend Rahim Francke. 1999. &#039;&#039;The Arab Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a: The&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Forgotten Muslims&#039;&#039;. New York: St. Martin’s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gambill, Gary C. 2006a. “The Counter-Revolution of the Cedars.” In &#039;&#039;Mideast Monitor&#039;&#039; 1 (2) (April–May). http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0604/0604_1.htm.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;18_sc.xhtml#page_216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Gambill, Gary C. 2006b. “Hezbollah and the Political Ecology of Postwar Lebanon.” In &#039;&#039;Mideast Monitor&#039;&#039; 1 (3) (September–October). http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0609/0609_1.htm.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hamzeh, A. Nizar. 2004. &#039;&#039;In the Path of Hizbullah&#039;&#039;. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harb, Mona, and Reinoud Leenders. 2005. “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, ‘Terrorism’, and the Politics of Perception.” &#039;&#039;Third World Quarterly&#039;&#039; 26 (1): 173–97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harel, Amos, and Avi Issacharoff. 2008. &#039;&#039;34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon&#039;&#039;. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harik, Judith Palmer. 2004. &#039;&#039;Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism&#039;&#039;. London: Tauris.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
Hourani, Guita. 2006. &#039;&#039;The Impact of the Summer War on Migration in Lebanon: Emigration, Remigration, Evacuation&#039;&#039;. Louaize, Lebanon: Lebanese Emigation Research Center, Notre Dame University.&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
Khuri, Fuad I. 1975. &#039;&#039;From Village to Suburb: Order and Change in Greater&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Beirut&#039;&#039;. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kramer, Martin. 1993. “Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad.” In &#039;&#039;Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance&#039;&#039;, ed. M. Marty and R. S. Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leenders, Reinoud. 2006. “How the Rebel Regained His Cause: Hizbullah &amp;amp;amp; the Sixth Arab-Israeli War.” &#039;&#039;MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies&#039;&#039; 6:38–56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leenders, Reinoud, Amal Ghazal, and Jens Hanssen, eds. 2006. “The Sixth War: Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon.” Special issue, &#039;&#039;MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies&#039;&#039; 6 (summer). http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/mitejmes/.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Melman, Yosi. 2006. “What Will Happen Next?” &#039;&#039;Haaretz&#039;&#039;, July 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nasr, Salim. 2003. “The New Social Map.” In &#039;&#039;Lebanon in Limbo: Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional Environment&#039;&#039;, ed. T. Hanf and N. Salam. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nasr, Vali. 2006. &#039;&#039;The Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future&#039;&#039;. New York: Norton.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;18_sc.xhtml#page_217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Norton, Augustus Richard. 1987. &#039;&#039;Amal and the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon&#039;&#039;. Austin: University of Texas Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
————. 1990a. “Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection.” In &#039;&#039;The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact&#039;&#039;, ed. J. L. Esposito. Miami: Florida International University Press.&lt;br /&gt;
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————. 1990b. “Religious Resurgence and Political Mobilization of the Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a of Lebanon.” In &#039;&#039;Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World&#039;&#039;, ed. Emile Sahliyeh. Albany: State University of New York Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
————. 1993. “(In)security Zones in South Lebanon.” &#039;&#039;Journal of Palestine Studies&#039;&#039; 23 (1):61–79.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
————. 2006. “The Peacekeeping Challenge in Lebanon.” &#039;&#039;MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies&#039;&#039; 6:76–79.&lt;br /&gt;
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Pakradouni, Karim. 1983. &#039;&#039;La Paix Manquee&#039;&#039;. Beirut: FMA Editions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Peters, Emryrs. 1970. “Aspects of Rank and Status among Muslims in a Lebanese Village.” In &#039;&#039;People and Culture of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. L. E. Sweet. Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Picard, Elizabeth. 2002. &#039;&#039;Lebanon: A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon&#039;&#039;, revised edition. New York: Holmes &amp;amp;amp; Meier.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Picco, Giandomenico. 1999. &#039;&#039;Man without a Gun: One Diplomat’s Secret&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War&#039;&#039;. New York: Random House.&lt;br /&gt;
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Qassem, Naim. 2005. &#039;&#039;Hizbullah: The Story from Within&#039;&#039;. London: Saqi.&lt;br /&gt;
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Rougier, Bernard. 2007. &#039;&#039;Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Palestinians in Lebanon&#039;&#039;. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. 2002. &#039;&#039;Hizbu&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;llah: Politics and Religion&#039;&#039;. London, and Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press.&lt;br /&gt;
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Salibi, Kamal. 1988. &#039;&#039;A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Reconsidered&#039;&#039;. London: I. B. Tauris.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sankari, Jamal. 2005. &#039;&#039;Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ite Leader&#039;&#039;. London: Saqi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Schiff, Ze&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ev, and Ehud Ya&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ari. 1984. &#039;&#039;Israel’s Lebanon War&#039;&#039;. New York: Simon and Schuster.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shams al-Din, Muhammad Mahdi. 1985. &#039;&#039;The Rising of al-Husayn: Its Impact on the Consciousness of Muslim Society&#039;&#039; [based on &#039;&#039;Thawrat al-Husayn: Zurufuha al-Ijtima&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;iyya wa-l Athaaruha al-Insaniyya&#039;&#039;, 1977, 5th ed.]. Translated by I. K. A. Howard. London: The Muhammadi Trust of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shatz, Adam. 2004a. “In Search of Hizballah (Part I).” &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; 51 (7).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;18_sc.xhtml#page_218&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Shatz, Adam. 2004b. “In Search of Hizballah (Part II).” &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; 51 (8).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sobelman, Daniel. 2004. &#039;&#039;New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizballah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon&#039;&#039;. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zisser, EyaI. 2006. “Hizballah and Israel: Strategic Threat on the Northern Border.” &#039;&#039;Israel Affairs&#039;&#039; 12 (1):186–206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Index&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas (grandson of Muhammad), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_65|65]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abidjan, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abisaab, Ruha Jurdi, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Africa, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
agriculture, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_106|6]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ahd&#039;&#039; newspaper, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Ahibba&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;i” (Boutros), [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ajram, Nancy, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Akbar, Ali, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_65|65]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Akef, Muhammad Mahdi, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Alagha, Joseph Eli, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Alawi, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ali, Imam (Muhammad’s son-in-law), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;alim&#039;&#039; (priest), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24n3]]. See also [[#19_index.xhtml#idx1|&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ulama&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amal, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]; Believers’ Resistance and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]; disagreements with Hezbollah and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_60|60]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]; expansion of, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]; al-Fatah and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]; fighter wages and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]; Higgins abduction and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]; hostages and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]; Iran and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]; Iraq and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]; Litani Operation and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]]; Muharram and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_56|56]]; Nasrallah and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]; Palestinians and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]; political participation and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_99|99]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_101|101]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_104|104]]; postwar period and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_121|121]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]; proxy wars and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]; reform and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]; religion and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]]; Resistance and Development Bloc and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_102|102]]; resurgence of, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_21|21]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_25|25]]; al-Sadr and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]]; secularism and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]; social services and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_110|110]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_111|11]]; Syria and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]; TWA flight 847 and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]; “war of the camps” and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
American University of Beirut (AUB), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Amn al-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amm (General Security Directorate), [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Amnesty International, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anderson, Terry, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Annan, Kofi, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Aoun, Michel, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|128]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|30]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_155|55]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arabic, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Arabiya, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arabs, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]; Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th Party and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]; nationalism and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]; resentment against, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|49]]; Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ism and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arad, Ron, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arafat, Yasser, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Argentina, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Argov, Shlomo, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armenian Catholics, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armenian Orthodox, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Asad, Bashar, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_125|125]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Asad, Hafez, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_89|89]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-As&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ad, Kamil, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura: bloodletting and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]]; religion and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_53|53]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_59|59]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_81|81]]; &#039;&#039;timthiliyya&#039;&#039; and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_64|64]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Associated Press, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Assyrian Christians, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Awaited Imam, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;awqaf&#039;&#039;. See [[#19_index.xhtml#idx2|&#039;&#039;waqf&#039;&#039; (benevolent trust)]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;“axis of evil,” [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ayoub, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_57|57]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Baalbek, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_53|53]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_99|99]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_101|101]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Babikian, Katchiq, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Baer, Robert, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bahman hospital, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_95|95]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bahrain, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bakhtiar, Shapur, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;al-Banna, Sabri, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Barak, Ehud, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_89|89]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th (“Resurrection”) Party, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Bazuriya, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
BBC World Service, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Beirut, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Believers’ Resistance, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Beqaa valley, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_53|53]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_100|100]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Berri, Mustafa, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Berri, Nabih, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_104|104]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|5]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_111|111]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|128]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_129|29]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Berro, Ibrahim Hussein, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bible, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;bi-ta&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;awun ma&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; al-muqawama&#039;&#039; (resistance cooperation), [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_142|142]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
bloodletting ritual, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blue Line, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_91|91]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Boutros, Julia, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bra&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sheet, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Buckley, William, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Burj al-Barajnah, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_104|104]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Burj al-Shimali, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bush, George H. W., [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bush, George W., [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|139]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|40]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
C-802 Noor missile, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_136|136]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Camp 1391, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
car bombs, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_81|81]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_127|127]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Catholic liberation theology, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cedar Revolution, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|128]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|130]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|53]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chaldeans, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chamie, Joseph, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
charity, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_106|106]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_112|12]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chateau de Beaufort, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_115|115]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chehabi, H. E., [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chirac, Jacques, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_126|126]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christians, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_126|126]]; Aoun and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_129|129]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|30]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_155|55]]; Druze and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]; post–civil war period and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|23]]; postwar conditions and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]; secular opposition parties and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]; Siniora government and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]. &#039;&#039;See also&#039;&#039; [[#19_index.xhtml#idx3|Maronite Christians]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Christian Science Monitor&#039;&#039;, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christopher, Warren, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
civilian targets, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Clinton, William, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_89|89]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
CNN, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cold War, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communist Party, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Copts, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-dahiya&#039;&#039; (suburbs), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_53|53]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|8]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_111|111]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_136|136]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_138|138]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Damascus, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Daoud, Daoud Suleiman, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_25|25]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;dawlat al-insan&#039;&#039; (a government for mankind), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|8]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Day of Judgment, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_57|57]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Deeb, Lara, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_57|57]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_110|10]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dirani, Mustafa, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
disarmament, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_8|8]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dodge, David, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Druze, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_121|121]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_126|126]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_129|129]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_155|55]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
economic issues, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]; Baqr al-Sadr and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]; emigration and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]; expanding middle class and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]]; fighter wages and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]; frozen Iranian assets and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]; Hezbollah IOUs and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]; national debt and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]]; poverty and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]; recent hostilities and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_142|142]]; religious, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]; &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;social services and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_106|106]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]; tourism and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]; U.S. sanctions and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]; war costs and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
education, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_106|106]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Egypt, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|128]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_137|137]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|49]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
elections, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]; municipal, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|5]]; parliamentary, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]]; results (table), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
elitism, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
emigration, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
English, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
evangelical Christians, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Executive Order 13224, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fadlallah, Muhammad Hussein, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151n3]]; bombing home of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_138|138]]; distrust of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|118]]; identity and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]]; political participation and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_99|99]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_100|100]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|8]]; social services and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|9]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_111|111]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_112|12]]; violence and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_138|138]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
family size, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fatah, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
fatalism, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fatimah (daughter of Muhammad), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;fatwa&#039;&#039; (religious opinion), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
fedayeen (guerilla fighters), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16n2]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;firqat al-shimal&#039;&#039; (Band of the North), [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fneish, Muhammad, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|23]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
food, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_62|62]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
France, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_126|126]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Free Patriotic Movement, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gabon, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gaddafi, Muammar, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_21|21]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gambill, Gary C., [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_127|127]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gaza Strip, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|50]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gemayel, Amin, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|156]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|57]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gemayel, Pierre, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|156]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Germany, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ghali, Butrous Butrous, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84n2]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ghazali, Rustum, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_126|126]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_127|27]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Ghubayri, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_104|104]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|5]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gillerman, Dan, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|139]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Goksel, Timur, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|54]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Golan Heights, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_82|82]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_90|90]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Grand Serail, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Greek Catholics, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Greek Orthodox, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
guerillas, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16n2]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gulf War, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Haddad, Sa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ad, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;haidar&#039;&#039; (lion), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Hakim, Muhsin, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;halal&#039;&#039; (permissible) foods, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hamade, Marwan, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_126|126]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hamas, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_133|133]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hammadi, Muhammad &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Deprived), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harb, Raghib, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_64|64]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harb Tammuz (July War), [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Haret Hreik, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_113|113]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Hariri, Rafiq, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_82|82]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_158|158]]; assassination of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_127|127]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|31]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]; Ghazali and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_126|126]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_127|27]]; postwar conditions and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]; Syria and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_124|124]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|28]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Hariri, Saad al-Din, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|130]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;harisa&#039;&#039; (wheat dish), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_62|62]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hasan, Imam (grandson of Muhammad), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hawi, George, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;hawza&#039;&#039; (religious seminary), [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hersh, Seymour, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|139]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah (“Party of God”), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_25|25]]; Aoun and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_129|129]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|30]]; Barak and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]]; Believers’ Resistance and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]; blames United States, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]; as cabal, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]; Communist Party and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]; compromise and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]; criticism of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_117|117]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|20]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_133|33]]; disagreements with Amal and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_60|60]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]; disarmament and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_8|8]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_133|33]]; emergence of, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]; External Security &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Organization and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]; France and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]; future of, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_159|59]]; Harb Tammuz (July War) and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]; Higgins abduction and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]; hijackings and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]; hostages and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]; internal pressure of, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_8|8]]; IOUs of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]; Iran and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]; Israeli withdrawal (2000) and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]]; Lahoud and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_125|125]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_126|26]]; letter to “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World,” [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]]; Litani Operation and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]; membership level of, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]]; municipal elections and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|5]]; Nasrallah and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_67|67]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]] (&#039;&#039;See also&#039;&#039; [[#19_index.xhtml#idx4|Nasrallah, Hasan]]); PLO and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]]; political participation by, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_112|112]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|130]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|32]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|56]]; pop music tribute to, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]; post–civil war period and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|32]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|57]]; proxy wars and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]; recent hostilities and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_143|43]]; recent support for, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|51]]; rejects blame, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]; religion and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]]; Resistance and Development Bloc and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_102|102]]; “rules of the game” and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_135|35]]; secularism and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]; social services and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_106|106]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_112|12]]; suicide bombers and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_81|81]]; Syria and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]; terrorism and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]; al-Tufayli and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]; TWA flight 847 and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]; UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_8|8]]; U.S. marine barracks attack and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]]; veto power of, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_155|155]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|56]]; “war of the camps” and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]; Western influence and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]]; worldview of, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]; young revolutionaries of, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah University, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_82|82]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hezbollah Women’s Committee, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_110|110]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Higgins, William R., [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
hijackings, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hilterman, Joost, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_87|87]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hirmil, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_106|6]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hizb al-Da&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wa (“Party of the Islamic Call”), [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
hostages, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hourani, Guita, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Huss, Salim, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_124|124]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_126|26]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hussein, Imam (grandson of Muhammad), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]]; commemoration of, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hussein, Saddam, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Husseiniyas, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_56|56]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_57|57]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;iftar&#039;&#039; (breaking of fast), [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;ilhamdilillah&#039;&#039; (praise to God), [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;iltizam&#039;&#039; (religious commitment), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_111|111]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Imam Khu&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;i Orphanage, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Imam Sadr Foundation, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
imperialism, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]&lt;br /&gt;
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INS &#039;&#039;Hanit&#039;&#039;, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_136|136]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039;, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
International Peace Academy, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Intifada (uprising), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_92|92]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-Intiqad&#039;&#039; journal, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Iqtisaduna (Our Economy)&#039;&#039; (Baqr al-Sadr), [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Iran, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]; Amal and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]; “axis of evil” and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]]; Baqr al-Sadr and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]; frozen assets of, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]; Hezbollah and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]; hostage taking and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]; Kurds and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]; postwar conditions and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]; proxy wars and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]; recent hostilities and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_137|137]]; revolution of 1978–79 in, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]]; sponsorship of revolutionaries by, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]; U.S. Embassy attacks and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]; U.S. marine barracks attack and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Iran-Contra Affair, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]] Iraq, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]; Amal and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]; Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th Party and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]; embassy attacks and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]; Gulf War and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]; Kuwait and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]; proxy wars and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]; religious education and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]]; secular opposition parties and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]; U.S.-British invasion of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Islamic Charity Emdad (ICEC), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_110|110]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Islamic Health Committee, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_110|110]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Islamic Resistance, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Islamism, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Israel, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]; Arafat and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]; Barak and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_89|89]]; Buenos Aires Embassy attack and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]; Camp 1391 and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]; defining terrorism and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]; Egyptian criticism of, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|49]]; Gaza Strip and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|50]]; Golan Heights and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_82|82]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_90|90]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116]]; Harb Tammuz (July War) and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]; international support of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_136|136]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_137|37]]; invasion by, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]; iron-fist policy of, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_87|87]]; Litani Operation and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]; Operation Accountability and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]; Operation Grapes of Wrath and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]; Qana slaughter and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]]; recent hostilities and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_143|43]]; resentment against, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|49]]; “rules of the game” and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_135|35]]; withdrawal from Lebanon (2000) and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_115|115]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|18]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Israel Defense Forces (IDF), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ivory Coast, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Izz al-Din, Hasan, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jabal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Amil, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ja&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;fari, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_25|25]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jam&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;iyyat al-Mabarrat al-Khayriyya (Benevolent Charity Society), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|9]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jaysh al-Maaahdi (Army of the Guided One), [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Jazeera, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|48]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Jerusalem Post&#039;&#039;, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jesus Christ, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jews, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jibsheet, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;jihad&#039;&#039;, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_38|38]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jihad al-Bina&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Development Organization, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_110|110]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jordan, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_137|137]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jumblatt, Kamal, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kafr Rumann, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kanaan, Ghazi, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_124|124]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
van Kappen, Franklin van, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84n2]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Karami, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Umar, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|128]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Karbala, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_56|56]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_66|66]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Karine-A&#039;&#039; (ship), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Katyusha rockets, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_87|87]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_135|135]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kefaya movement, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Khaddam, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abdul Halim, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_124|124]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_125|25]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Khalil, Hajj Hasan, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|123]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Khamenei, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_90|90]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_100|100]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151n3]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Khansa, al-Hajj Ahmed, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_53|53]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Khansa, Muhammad Sa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;id, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_104|104]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|5]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Khiam, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_115|115]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Khomeini, Ruhollah Musavi, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_100|100]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Khu&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;i, Sayyid Abu al-Qasim, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;khums&#039;&#039; (Ramadan gifts), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Khuri, Fuad, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_53|53]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
killing box, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_137|137]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|39]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Krayem, Nayif, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|118]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kulthoum, Umm, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|128]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kurds, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kuwait, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
labor: agriculture and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_106|6]]; emigration and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]; fighter wages and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]; Palestinians and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]; revolution of the hungry and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|7]]; social welfare and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_112|12]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lahoud, Emile, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_125|125]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|30]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|156]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
language, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]], [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Latin America, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
League of Nations, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]. &#039;&#039;See also&#039;&#039; [[#19_index.xhtml#idx5|United Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lebanese National Movement (LNM), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_121|121]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lebanese Resistance Detachments. &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; [[#19_index.xhtml#idx6|Amal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lebanon: al-Bazuriya, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]; Beirut, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]; changing social structure in, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|23]]; civil war in, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_121|21]]; Communist Party and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]; confessional groups (map), [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_1|1]]; electoral system of, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]; future of, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_159|59]]; Gulf War and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]; &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;al-Hariri and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_124|124]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|32]]; identity and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]; independence of, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]; Israeli invasion of, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]; Israeli withdrawal from (2000), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_115|115]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|18]]; League of Nations mandates and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]; Litani Operation and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]; &#039;&#039;mithaq al-watani&#039;&#039; (national pact) and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]; monitoring groups and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]]; municipal elections and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|5]]; national debt of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]]; occupation in Southern, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]; Operation Grapes of Wrath and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]; political map of, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_145|145]]; postwar position of, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|57]]; poverty and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]; proxy wars in, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]; recent hostilities and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_143|43]]; “rules of the game” and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]; secular opposition parties and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]; Ta&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;if accord and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]; &#039;&#039;tawtin&#039;&#039; and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_82|82]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]; tourism and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]; Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]; Tyre, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]; U.S. marine barracks attack and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]; war costs and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]; “war of the camps” and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leenders, Reinoud, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Libya, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_21|21]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Litani Operation, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
lobbying, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Long, Robert L. J., [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Majlis al-Janub (Council of the South), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Maktab al-Khadamat al-Ijtima&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;iyya (Social Services Office), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Manar television, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_137|137]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|50]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Man without a Gun&#039;&#039; (Picco), [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
March 8 Group, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_129|129]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|30]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;marji&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; al-taqlid&#039;&#039; (source of emulation), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_100|100]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Maronite Christians, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_121|21]]; average family size of, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]; France and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]; &#039;&#039;mithaq al-watani&#039;&#039; (national pact) and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]; parliamentary representation and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]; reformism and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]; al-Sadr and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]; Syria’s dominance and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]; tribalism and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Martyr’s Square, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|128]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;masa&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ib&#039;&#039; (afflictions), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_56|56]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mashhad, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;masirat&#039;&#039; (processions), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mehlis, Detlev, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metulla, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_115|115]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;mezze&#039;&#039; (appetizers), [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mikati, Najib, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_124|124]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
missiles, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_136|136]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;mithaq al-watani&#039;&#039; (national pact), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
monitoring groups, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moukalled, Ra&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ed, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;mouss&#039;&#039; (straight razor), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_62|62]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;awiyya, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mubarak, Husni, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mughniyah, Imad, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Muhammad (Prophet), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_56|56]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Muharram, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_65|65]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;muhasasat&#039;&#039; (allocations), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_101|101]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Multinational Force (MNF), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Musa al-Sadr Foundation, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Musawi, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abbas, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_47|47]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_99|99]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mutaharri, Mortaza, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|118]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-muthallath al-mash&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;um&#039;&#039; (evil triangle), [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Nabatiya, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_57|57]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nabisheet, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-Nahar&#039;&#039; newspaper, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|118]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Najaf, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_53|53]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nasr, Salim, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_121|121]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nasr, Vali, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nasrallah, Hadi, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Nasrallah, Hasan, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_9|9]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116]]; centralism and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|54]]; comedic representation of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_133|133]]; criticism of, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_117|117]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|20]]; future and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_158|158]]; Gemayel assassination and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]; politics and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_99|99]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_106|106]]; recent Israeli tauntings by, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_133|133]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|34]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_136|136]]; religion and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_67|67]]; souvenir vending and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]; television interview of, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_155|55]]; &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;tribute to, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]; ultimatum of, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_155|155]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|56]]; violence and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nasrallah, Hussein, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Newsweek&#039;&#039;, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;New York Times&#039;&#039;, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_127|127]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nidal, Abu. &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; [[#19_index.xhtml#idx7|al-Banna, Sabri]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;nidhir&#039;&#039; (pledge), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nigeria, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Norton, A. R., [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;nushkur allah&#039;&#039; (thank God), [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Olmert, Ehud, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|139]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Operation Accountability, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Operation Grapes of Wrath, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Organization for Communist Labor Action, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ottoman Empire, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pahlavi dynasty, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pakistan, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|123]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pakradouni, Karim, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Palestinian Authority, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Palestinians, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]]; Amal and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]; fighter wages and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]; Gaza Strip and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|50]]; guerillas and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]; Hamas and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_133|133]]; Litani Operation and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]; al-Sadr and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]]; &#039;&#039;tawtin&#039;&#039; and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_82|82]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]; war of the camps and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pasdaran. &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; [[#19_index.xhtml#idx8|Revolutionary Guard]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
patronage networks, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peretz, Amir, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perez de Cuellar, Javier, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persia, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peters, Emyrs, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_66|66]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_67|67]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Phalange militia, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|156]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Picco, Giandominico, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;politics: Amal and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_21|21]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_25|25]]; “axis of evil” and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]; Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th Party, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]]; Blue Line and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_91|91]]; centralism and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|54]]; civilian targets and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]]; Communist Party, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]; disarmament and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_8|8]]; Executive Order 13224 and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]; Gulf War and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]; Harb Tammuz (July War) and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]; al-Hariri and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_124|124]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|32]]; Hezbollah’s participation in, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_112|112]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|130]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|32]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|56]]; institutional services and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_112|12]]; Iran-Contra Affair and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]; Islamism and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]; Israeli invasion of 1982 and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]; land owners and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]]; League of Nations mandates and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]; Lebanese electoral system and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]; liberation and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]; Litani Operation and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]]; lobbying groups and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]; &#039;&#039;mithaq al-watani&#039;&#039; (national pact) and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]; municipal elections and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|5]]; Operation Accountability and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]; Operation Grapes of Wrath and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]; Ottoman Empire and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]; parliamentary representation and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]; patronage networks and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]]; post–civil war period and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|32]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|57]]; Realpolitik principles and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]; recent hostilities and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_143|43]]; reformism and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]; Resistance and Development Bloc and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_102|102]]; revolution of the hungry and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|7]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_111|111]]; ritual and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]]; al-Sadr and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_21|21]]; secularism and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]; Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]; Syrian ceiling and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_102|102]]; Ta&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;if accord and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]; Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]; voting practices and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]; &#039;&#039;zu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ama&#039;&#039; and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
pop music, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
poverty, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
prisoner release, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_90|90]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_115|115]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|16]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_133|133]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|34]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
proxy wars, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Qabalan, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abd al-Amr, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_25|25]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qabbani, Mufti Muhammad Rashid, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qaddoumi, Farouk, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Qaeda, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|123]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qana massacre, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_66|66]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_115|115]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Qard al-Hasan (“good loan,” micro-finance loans), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_110|10]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qasir, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Abdallah, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88n3]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qasir, Ahmad, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qassem, Na&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;im, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_99|99]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_100|100]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|139]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;qima&#039;&#039; (food dish), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_62|62]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qum, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Quran, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24n3]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ra&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d, Muhammad, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_89|89]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|23]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rabin, Yitzhak, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rafiqdost, Mohsen, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rafsanjani, Hashemi, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;rahbar&#039;&#039; (leader), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_90|90]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ramadan, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Rasul&#039;&#039; (Messenger of Allah), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reagan, Ronald, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Realpolitik principles, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
reformism, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
religion, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]; Aoun and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_129|129]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|30]]; &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]]; clerical influence and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]]; Day of Judgment and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_57|57]]; education and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]; fatalism and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]; &#039;&#039;fatwas&#039;&#039; and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]; Hussein (grandson of Muhammad) and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]; &#039;&#039;mithaq al-watani&#039;&#039; (national pact) and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]; Muhammad’s succession and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]; Muharram and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]; numerous confessions of, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]; politics and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]] (&#039;&#039;See also&#039;&#039; [[#19_index.xhtml#idx9|politics]]); post–civil war period and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|23]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|57]]; public mourning and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]]; Quran and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24n3]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]; Ramadan and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]; ritual and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]]; al-Sadr and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_21|21]]; sectarianism and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_121|121]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|23]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]; self-flagellation and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|118]]; &#039;&#039;shari&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a&#039;&#039; and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]]; Siniora government and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]; spread of, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]; tribalism and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]; violence and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_60|60]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]. &#039;&#039;See also&#039;&#039; specific confessions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Resistance and Development Bloc, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_102|102]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Revolutionary Guard, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rice, Condoleezza, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|139]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rihan, Hajj Majid, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Roman Catholics, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“rules of the game,” [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_135|35]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rumsfeld, Donald, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;sadaqat&#039;&#039; (donations), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqr, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Sadr, Muqtada, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_30|30]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Sadr, Musa, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_9|9]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]; Amal and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]]; assassination of, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]; disappearance of, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_21|21]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]; Palestinians and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]]; poverty and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]; rise of, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_21|21]]; Syria and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Sadr, Rabab, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Safa, Ali, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Salaam, Tamam, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_124|124]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sankari, Jamal, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_99|99]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;saqf al-suri&#039;&#039; (Syrian ceiling), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_102|102]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Saqr Lubnan” (“The Hawk of Lebanon”), [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sarkis, Elias, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Saudi Arabia, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_136|136]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_137|37]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|49]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Sayyid, Jamil, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;sayyid&#039;&#039; (prophet descendant), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Schiff, Ze&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ev, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
sectarianism, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_121|121]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|23]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
secularism, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Security Zone, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_87|87]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
self-flagellation, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|118]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Senegal, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
September 11 attacks, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sfeir, Mar Nasrallah, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;shabab&#039;&#039; (young men), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shams al-Din, Muhammad Mahdi, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_99|99]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;shari&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a&#039;&#039; (Islamic law), [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shariati, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sharon, Ariel, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shebaa region, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_90|90]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_92|92]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_117|17]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sheikholeslam, Hosein, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Muslims, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]]; Aoun and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_129|129]]; Arab nationalism and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]; &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ashura and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]]; average family size of, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]; clerical influence and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]]; expanding middle class of, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_46|46]]; Hussein (grandson of Muhammad) and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]; institutional services and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_112|12]]; Karbala and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]; Litani Operation and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]]; &#039;&#039;marji&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; al-taqlid&#039;&#039; and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_100|100]]; as minority, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]; &#039;&#039;mithaq al-watani&#039;&#039; (national pact) and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]; Muhammad’s succession and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]; al-Najaf and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]; parliamentary representation and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]; patronage networks and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]]; politics and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]; proxy wars and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]; rituals of, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_58|58]]; Saddam Hussein and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_5|5]]; al-Sadr and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_21|21]]; s&#039;&#039;hari&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a&#039;&#039; and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]]; Siniora government and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]; spread of, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_52|52]]; Sunni cooperation and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Shultz, George, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_82|82]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Shura (consultation body), [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|123]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sierra Leone, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Siniora, Fouad, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|32]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_155|155]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Sistani, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ali, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31n1]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_100|100]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_101|101]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
SLA (South Lebanon Army), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_90|90]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sobelman, Daniel, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
social welfare, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|107]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_112|12]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Society of Muslim Brothers, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|48]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soleimanpour, Hade, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet Union, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stethem, Robert, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
suicide bombers, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_81|81]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sunni Muslims, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|123]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_155|155]]; Aoun and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_129|129]]; Arab nationalism and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]; average family size of, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]; clerical influence and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]]; Hussein (grandson of Muhammad) and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]; as majority, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]; &#039;&#039;mithaq al-watani&#039;&#039; (national pact) and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_12|12]]; Muhammad’s succession and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_49|49]]; Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i cooperation and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]; tribalism and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Supreme Islamic Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i Council, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_24|24]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_25|25]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Sword of Islam, The&#039;&#039; (Grenada Productions), [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33n2]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Syria, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_45|45]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_81|81]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_82|82]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|123]]; Amal and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_32|32]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]; Aoun and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_129|129]]; Ba&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;th Party and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]; Gemayel assassination and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|156]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|57]]; Gulf War and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]; al-Hariri and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_124|124]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|28]]; Hezbollah and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]; Israeli withdrawal (2000) and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_89|89]]; League of Nations mandates and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11]]; monitoring groups and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]]; municipal elections and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|5]]; political ceiling of, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_102|102]]; postwar conditions and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|53]]; proxy wars and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]; al-Sadr and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_20|20]]; Siniora and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_155|155]]; sponsorship of revolutionaries by, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]; Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]; “war of the camps” and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Syriac Catholics, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Syriac Orthodox, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_11|11n1]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_103|103]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ta&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;if accord, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|156]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;ta&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ifiyya&#039;&#039; (sectarianism), [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_121|121]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|23]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_148|148]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;taklif al-shar&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i&#039;&#039; (commanded by Allah), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_102|102]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-tashtib&#039;&#039; (crossing out), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;tatbir&#039;&#039; (induced bleeding), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_54|54]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_55|55]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_63|63]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|118]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;tawtin&#039;&#039; (naturalization), [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_82|82]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;terrorism, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_38|38]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|123]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]; abductions and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]; car bombs and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_81|81]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_127|127]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]; classification of, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]; embassy attacks and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]; Executive Order 13224 and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]; hijackings and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]; hostages and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]; professionalism &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]; proxy wars and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]; al-Qaeda and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]; Qana slaughter and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_66|66]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_115|115]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]; “rules of the game” and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]; September 11 attacks and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]; suicide bombers &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#page_229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_81|81]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]]; Ta&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;if accord and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]; TWA flight 847 and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]; U.S. marine barracks attack and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;thawrat al-jiyaa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; (revolution of the hungry), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_107|7]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_111|111]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;timthiliyya&#039;&#039; (performance), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_64|64]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
tourism, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_152|152]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_98|98]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
tribalism, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|154]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tueni, Gibran, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_117|117]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_118|18]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
al-Tufayli, Subhi, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_31|31]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_34|34]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_99|99]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_100|100]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_101|101]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_106|6]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_111|111]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TWA flight 847, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tyre, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_3|3]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_105|105]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Ubayd, Abdul Karim, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ulama&#039;&#039; (“clergy,” plural) [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_40|40]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]; as evil compromisers, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]. See also [[#19_index.xhtml#idx10|&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;alim&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
United Arab Emirates, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_137|137]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
United Kingdom, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;United Nations, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_38|38]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]]; Annan and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_116|116]]; al-Hariri assassination and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_127|127]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|130]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|31]]; hostages and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]; Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_66|66]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_141|141]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_142|42]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_153|153]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_154|54]]; Qana slaughter and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]]; recent hostilities and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_141|141]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_142|42]]; sanctions by, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]; Security Council Resolution 425 and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_81|81]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_92|92]]; Security Council Resolution 1559 and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|139]]; Security Council Resolution 1701 and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_8|8]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_141|141]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_142|2]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
United States, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_147|147]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|157]]; Beirut marine barracks attack and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]; blamed by Hezbollah, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]; defining terrorism and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]; Department of State, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]; embassy attacks and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]; Executive Order 13224 and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]]; Higgins abduction and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]; invasion of Iraq by, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_119|119]]; Iran-Contra Affair and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]; Iranian assets and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]; Lebanon-Israel agreement of 1983 and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]; Litani Operation and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]; monitoring by, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_86|86]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_130|130]]; Nasrallah sermons and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_67|67]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_68|68]]; proxy wars and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]; recent hostilities and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|139]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_141|141]]; Soviet Union and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_36|36]]; Syria and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_35|35]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;USA Today&#039;&#039;, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Velayati, Ali-Akbar, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
violence, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_4|4]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_91|91]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_131|131]]; abductions and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_41|41]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]; civilian displacement and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_142|142]]; Communist assassinations and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_37|37]]; disarmament and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]–[[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_8|8]]; embassy attacks and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]; fighter wages and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_18|18]]; Gemayel assassination and, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_156|156]]–[[#14_con.xhtml#page_157|57]]; guerilla fighters and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_16|16]]; Harb Tammuz (July War) and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_7|7]]; al-Hariri assassination and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_127|127]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_128|28]]; Higgins abduction and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_44|44]]; hostage taking and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_74|74]]; Hussein (grandson of Muhammad) and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]; Israeli withdrawal (2000) and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_91|91]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]]; Litani Operation and, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_22|22]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_80|80]]; Operation Grapes of Wrath and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]; post–civil war period and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_120|120]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|23]]; proxy wars and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]; Qana slaughter and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_66|66]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_84|84]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_115|115]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]; recent hostilities and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_132|132]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_143|43]]; rituals and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_60|60]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]]; “rules of the game” and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_88|88]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_135|35]]; September 11 attacks and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_76|76]]; Ta&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;if accord and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_83|83]], [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_97|97]]; terrorism and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_75|75]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]] (&#039;&#039;See also&#039;&#039; [[#19_index.xhtml#idx11|terrorism]]); TWA flight 847 and, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_42|42]]–[[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_43|43]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_77|77]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_79|79]]; U.S. marine barracks attack and, [[#07_pro_2.xhtml#page_6|6]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_71|71]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_78|78]]; “war of the camps” and, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-wa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d al-madhkur&#039;&#039; (promise remembered), [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_136|136]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;wa&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d al-sadiq&#039;&#039; (faithful promise), [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_134|134]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_135|35]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;wadis&#039;&#039; (dry streambeds), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_51|51]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wahbe, Haifa, [[#14_con.xhtml#page_150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;wakil&#039;&#039; (deputy), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|9]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_125|125]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_151|151]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;waqf&#039;&#039; (benevolent trust), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_108|108]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“war of the camps,” [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_72|72]]–[[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_73|73]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;al-Watan&#039;&#039; journal, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_136|136]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_137|37]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
West Bank, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]], [[#14_con.xhtml#page_149|149]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
women, [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_13|13]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_17|17]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_19|19]]; changing social structures and, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_123|123]]; ritual and, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_56|56]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_61|61]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_65|65]]; Shi&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i institutions and, [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]–[[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_110|10]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ya&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʾ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;ari, Ehud, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_33|33]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yazid, [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_50|50]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_56|56]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_57|57]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_64|64]], [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_66|66]]–[[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_67|67]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;19_index.xhtml#idx12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;za&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;im&#039;&#039; (political boss; plural, &#039;&#039;zu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ama&#039;&#039;), [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_14|14]]–[[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_15|15]], [[#08_chap1.xhtml#page_23|23]], [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_29|29]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_122|122]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zainab (sister of Imam Hussein), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_57|57]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;zakat&#039;&#039; (alms), [[#12_chap5.xhtml#page_109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zelzal-2 rockets, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_135|135]], [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_138|138]]–[[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_139|39]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zionism, [[#09_chap2.xhtml#page_39|39]], [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_85|85]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;ziyara&#039;&#039; (visit), [[#10_chap3.xhtml#page_53|53]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zogby International, [[#11_chap4.xhtml#page_93|93]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;zu&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ama&#039;&#039;. See [[#19_index.xhtml#idx12|&#039;&#039;za&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;font&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ʿ&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;im&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zur, General Guy, [[#13_chap6.xhtml#page_140|140]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Empty library pages]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Russian_Justice&amp;diff=63492</id>
		<title>Library:Russian Justice</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Russian_Justice&amp;diff=63492"/>
		<updated>2024-02-28T17:06:35Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Use published_date rather than written in&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Russian Justice|author=Mary Stevenson Callcott|published_date=1935|publisher=Macmillan Company|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/soviet-justice/}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PREFACE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; problem of crime in the United States is one of our most serious social questions. Within recent years the activities of the gangster and the kidnapper, the increasing number of young criminals whom we do not know how to treat so that they are re-established in life, have brought alarm not only to the social worker and others who try to meet the situation, but to the ordinary citizen as well. Not only is our penal system failing to reform the lawbreaker, but our social conditions are breeding others. The delay in our courts, the influence of politics, and the swaying of sentimental or incompetent juries by artful criminal lawyers without social conscience, are familiar to our citizens. Confronted by all this, we ask ourselves what we might do in order to fulfill our duty in protecting society and at the same time in aiding the transgressor to become a useful citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One thing we can do is to examine closely any system that seems to work in other countries. Russia, with her broad social program, gives much attention to her problem of crime and criminals. Sherwood Eddy, a student of Russia for a long time, has included the humane treatment of prisoners as one of the things which we might profitably get from that country. He might have added also that the simplicity of court procedure by which they arrive at justice has some commendable virtues.&lt;br /&gt;
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I have visited prisons in many parts of our country as well as in several others and have sat through criminal trials in almost as many places, so in my visits to courts and prisons in the USSR I had an experience that made observation intelligent. There is no doubt that we may learn something from the Russians about the restoration to society of those who contravene the law. Whether one sympathizes with or condemns the political faith of this country, one must admire and respect a people who are able to put ideals into works as they do. They know what they want of the man who is their criminal and they set to work to teach him how to fit into their society.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are shortcomings in this phase of their work, mostly on the physical side, but they know that as well as we do and are correcting them as rapidly as possible. They have often had to use old buildings because in the short space of years of the new nation they have not had time to build enough modern ones; but they have reformed such gloomy spots as the Women’s Prison of Moscow is said to have been in Tzarist days, into a place of considerable light and more livable conditions. There are also some old cells in the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute of much too little ventilation but this building is to be replaced within a short time. Most of the buildings of this institute are already in good condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the United States we have been so led away with preparing better buildings (we still have some of the worst in the world) that we have often forgotten the spiritual side. There are some penal institutions, such as the New Jersey Prison for Women at Clinton, N. J., where an excellent spirit certainly prevails, but even in our best prisons I think that we do not overcome that feeling on the part of the prisoner that he or she is permanently set aside from normal society. It is the exceptional individual case where this is not true. In the Russian institutions, especially those where there is great freedom, one is struck by the atmosphere that prevails among the prisoners of still being a part of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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In undertaking to give to the American public in general a picture of the situation in Soviet Russia in regard to crime and its repression certain usual questions have been kept in mind. Interested inquirers, both in this country and abroad, have repeatedly asked me, “What are the courts really like?” “What kinds of crime are committed?”’ “Who commits them?” and “What is the punishment given?” The answers are found in the pages of this book. Since it is intended to reach the layman as well as the social worker, the student of criminology, the lawyer, and the legislator, an informal approach has been used. It is hoped, however, that this will not tend to detract from the authenticity of the work. No effort has been spared to give as accurate an account as possible, both by means of research over a period of years in connection with my Criminology class and by recent visits to courts and penal institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gratitude for help must be expressed to many people whom I cannot enumerate here. I am especially indebted to the Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, Prof. A. J. Vishinsky, who gave valuable time for appointments, to Mr. C. S. Smith of the Associated Press who aided me in many ways, to Director Shlaposnitchov of the Institute of Criminal Policy, to Professor Brusilovsky for conferences and appointments he both arranged and participated in and for lectures which was permitted to attend, to S. Golunsky, of the Commissariat of Justice, who in addition to such services as were rendered by others, has contributed the further service of reading and criticizing the manuscript. Finally, to my two young countrywomen, Miss Margaret Moore and Miss Margaret Ross, who gave up parts of their vacation in Moscow to contribute typing to the project.&lt;br /&gt;
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M. S. C.&lt;br /&gt;
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New York City&lt;br /&gt;
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October, 1934&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Criminal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; repression in the Soviet Union is bound up with the whole social program which the state has been developing. A good many of us had thought of the Soviet’s welfare work as more of a hit-or-miss arrangement, gathering up a few threads here, omitting to notice some quite as important in other places, but as the work is examined in its entirety, it gives evidence of more than usually comprehensive planning.&lt;br /&gt;
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In making an evaluation of the present situation in regard to any of its phases of development, it is not sufficient merely to consider standards as they now exist, but it is also, of course, necessary to take into account the distance traversed in the brief time and the difficulties surrounding the accomplishment.&lt;br /&gt;
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The important thing, let us say for an example, in child care, is to see that ten or twelve years ago thousands upon thousands of children were wandering in wild gangs, all over the country, thieving, plundering, killing even, unfed and unclothed, and that today they are, with few exceptions both clothed and fed, being trained and cared for in institutions or at home, and that the period of distress and acute exigency is over. If that had extended to children alone we might understand that with all the forces available the authorities could handle such a situation, but it was a larger thing than that, and the fact that in the face of what seemed an undertaking of impossible dimensions the authorities were able to come through, and with a program so constructive that it has revolutionized their treatment of offenders against the law, seems something of a miracle. Or again, it is of great significance, especially to such a study as this, that the banditry and roving lawlessness on the part of men in 1922, has been reduced so sharply that this form of crime is pretty well under control. So, it is the distance revolutionary Russia has come, the rapidity of her pace, that are more significant than the actual standards in practice. That is not to say, however, that her present standards always need a defense. Her achievement in treatment of prisoners, for example, which is the subject of this book, does not suffer by comparison with that of western nations.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the pages that follow attention is given to treatment and to standards, but for the moment, assuming that advances have been rapidly made in the repression of crime, let us focus our interest on other factors that have contributed to this progress. For us it is important to discover, if we can, what factors are responsible for the one-third decrease in the number of criminals which authorities say has been effected since the beginning of the Revolution. Even if their estimate of the reduction seems high, it is still apparent to a student of the situation that a real decrease, perhaps smaller, has been made. The united front with which the nation has attacked its social problems on all sides has, as would be expected, exerted great influence in the handling of the crime problem. Prevention has resulted in a large way from the development in the various phases of social welfare that have gone on simultaneously, and as one begins to consider the relationship that exists there appears that whole pattern, referred to earlier, which leaves few phases of social and economic life untouched.&lt;br /&gt;
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The care of children has already been spoken of. It is clear that one of the big problems, among the horde that have puzzled and challenged the group who have had chief responsibility in steering the government, was juvenile delinquency. While authorities gathered these young offenders together and put them in places for care, they were at the same time preparing and carrying out a program for their youth that would prevent others following in the footsteps of the delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the preventive program that was now first in interest, the item of education stood at the head of the list. No doubt in the early days of the proletarian state, schools were woefully inadequate, but children were at least placed under the guidance of people who gave them the elements of an education as well as taught them something of how to work. But the nation appears to have a mania for the education of its masses and a point has now been reached where there is university study in sight, with a stipend attached for those who attend, for all those able to take advantage of it. Juvenile delinquency rates have steadily decreased and the development of the school system has obviously contributed largely to this reduced figure.&lt;br /&gt;
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Health programs are, of course, directly related to crime repression. There is a book on the socialized medicine of Russia, written by Sir Arthur Newsholme of England and Dr. Kingsbury of our own country, that should be read for full information on this subject, but it can be said that the scope of the program is wide and the extent far-reaching. Beyond the broad development of curative medicine there is the preventive program in which physical culture activities figure largely. As an illustration of the results achieved in this work, a demonstration staged in Moscow in the summer of 1934 was very impressive. The author along with a good many other Americans and other foreign visitors witnessed the parade in which a hundred thousand physical culturists, with their canoes, paddles, tennis racquets, flowers, and other things suggestive of health and enjoyment of life, passed in excellent order, so well disciplined that one group followed another without a break in ranks. There is, of course, a great significance to that when it is considered on a national scale. With every factory and farm providing such a program for its workers there should be a rapid diminution in the number of weaklings who turn to crime.&lt;br /&gt;
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One finds himself on the defensive at the mention of more liberal divorce laws, but such a provision may actually lessen criminal acts. Since a woman who finds her husband wholly incompatible and wants to remarry some more congenial person has only to indicate her wish in order to be free, she is not nearly as likely to poison her husband or work herself into a state from which some expert psychiatrist will have to untangle her. When the system was first initiated in the Soviet Union we were told that there was a great rush of those who wished to benefit, but that since the first period exhausted the number of those eager for separation, there has been a noticeable decrease. One meets a great number of people who have been married a long time! Such an authority as Vishinsky attributed much of the decrease in criminal acts to these liberal laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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The rapid industrialization of the country has made for less crime except in the case of offenses against the state. In that period just before the installation of NEP when farmers and others discharged from the army could find no work, when distribution without production had left the nation in starvation, banditry flourished, but when the five-year plan began to make demands for more workers than could be furnished, a halt was called in the advance of ordinary crime. Also, with work plentiful, there is no problem of providing jobs for those discharged from prisons. With the system of training which gives a skilled trade to every man capable of assimilating the instruction and mastering the tasks, and of giving instruction also to the unskilled type who are thereby enabled to fill some job well, there is no question of work for discharged prisoners. How long this condition will hold depends, of course, on the time it will take for industrialization to reach its zenith and for the population to catch up and exceed the ability of the system to absorb them. However, there is an encouragement of birth control and that may manage the question somewhat better than has been done in other countries gone on before with their industrialization program. Since Russia sits down with pencil and paper and makes her plans of production, perhaps she can do something in the nature of requirements for population increase!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following comment is offered by a Russian authority: “That is something like the Malthusian theory. We don’t believe in it. We are sure that at present, and for a very long time in the future there can be no real over-population. If sometimes something like that seems to happen in the capitalistic countries, it is an illusion. It is the result of the social conditions of those countries. Our social system makes it possible for us to use any quantity of labour and there can be no question of over-population for us. Therefore the question of something like State birth control does not even arise.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Housing is, of course, one of the biggest problems in Soviet Russia. They are building with feverish rapidity but one suspects it will be some time until they catch up to the need. It is popular to correlate bad health, crime, and most other social evils with congested housing, and one feels sure that much of the blame attached to it is well placed. If Russia can eliminate this condition she will have done much in exercising control of those situations that are supposed to be the major causes of crime. She has her own theory of cause which another chapter discusses, but optimistic socialists believe she is in a fair way to remove that also. Russians know well enough of their shortage of housing and they know the social significance of that shortage, but one cannot rebuild an entire nation in the few short years since their social cataclysm. There had to be a gap somewhere and both lack of trained workers and of material accounts for its existence.&lt;br /&gt;
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Training for taking part in government affairs, such as elections and jury service, is also conducive to securing law observance. The writer’s visit was so taken up with courts and prisons that other angles of investigation were neglected and any ideas as to government practices in democracy are secured second-hand. However, some of those Americans who live there and observe intelligently state that there is a steady progress toward greater participation by the people themselves in government. As education prepares the way, participation becomes more real.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any mention of fight against crime in this country ought to take into account the establishment of the new culture of this society. At the close of the October Revolution, Russia had as its chief asset a great many millions of people whose rights the leaders had sworn to establish and protect, and who were unlettered, superstitious and without social understanding. Educating children was a small task compared to what they must do with those adults, and in the period when the old culture had come to an end with the last efforts of the civil war and the new had not well begun, crime swelled into large numbers of convicted. But these peasants and workers have many of them learned, at evening classes, at conferences, and in trade unions of various sorts, something of what this order stands for. A new social consciousness that makes the individual feel responsible for the law and order of the country has arisen and makes itself felt even in such small offenses as the case of some thoughtless individual throwing paper in a park which is certain to be otherwise immaculate, or of a more delinquent one climbing on a street car at the front in the hope of not being detected.&lt;br /&gt;
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The freeing of the people from hardships of the pioneer stage of the new civilization is also beginning to be felt. There is much attention to beauty which I am told was not evident as recently as two or three years ago. Natural yearnings are being satisfied and a broader life is opening; the labor pains of the rebirth of a nation are about over. All this relieves tension and tends to establish a normality of living such as results in a more settled order.&lt;br /&gt;
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A condition that ought soon to make for a decrease in crime against the state by the so-called class enemy is the fact that the government is now established. We are so accustomed to use the phrase “the Russian experiment” that it is hard for one to give it up; but, it is no longer much of an experiment. The author remembers a gentle reproof given to her when she remarked that since this sort of thing had never been tried before, it was difficult to see how it might work. There was a smiling rejoinder of “We have tried it and it does work.” Surely there will be a cessation in “crimes against the state” when it is clearly seen that efforts against the order of government will not be of avail.&lt;br /&gt;
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Emphasis ought, of course, to be put on the social planning that gives security for old age and removes fear of illness and unemployment. It would be impossible to estimate how much crime is due to a feeling of insecurity in society, but there is no doubt that it is a large percentage. Provisions looking toward the elimination of this insecurity have already been effective enough to have a part in the reduction of the number of those driven to crime because of fear of such economic woes.&lt;br /&gt;
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One point on which observers agree that we need to imitate these people is in the humane treatment of prisoners. It ought to be understood here that “humane” is not synonymous with “coddling.” Some of us who do not distinguish have grown shy of that word but in these pages it is used in its proper meaning. Prisoners are given a “man to man” treatment, held to a strict régime just as if they worked in a factory outside. There is discipline in industry and they are prepared to meet that condition, to learn to discipline themselves, but the approach is one of dignity, with any thought of humiliation put far away. It is only when one thinks of the prisoner as suffering undignified imprisonment, degraded by acts of physical or verbal abuse on the part of guards who ought themselves to be in prison, that one stoops to pity and “feels sorry for him,” but when a man is subjected only to a constructive training such as it might be a privilege to get, one’s sympathy is hardly needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question of how much one can see in a limited time always comes up when one writes of foreign conditions, and cognizance of it should be taken in this Introductory Chapter. The answer, of course, depends on the preparation of the person for the task. It seems too obvious even to remark that one can live in a country for years and know considerably less about specialized subjects than one trained observer who merely visits the institutions. The book on Red Medicine by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. Kingsbury has already been referred to. One would naturally rather trust the judgment of such authorities even though they visit briefly than that of others, unfamiliar with this field, who have resided there for years on end.&lt;br /&gt;
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The author trusts her own judgment in regard to prisons and courts. She has been seeing both for years, and in many places. Physical equipment is not all that one looks for. There are signs that give things away. There are glances that indicate a whole policy. If a warden tells a visitor of a wholesome approach to his men, and that person then sees the inmates fall away and look up from lowered eyes as he goes through, he knows what to think. If a superintendent says, as one did to the writer, that he does not really enforce the silent system, and one watches the men a while, talking through the side of a twisted mouth as a guard half turns his head and never speaking normally during the entire time of the visit, one knows again that representations are not in accord with practice. Prisoners do not put on acts for visitors, and members of a staff would probably be letting themselves in for trouble with any suggestion that they do so.&lt;br /&gt;
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The writer expresses no opinions on conditions outside her own field of special investigation, except on obvious points. Other institutions were visited only in a casual way, but a great deal of life itself was seen. There were long walks in all sorts of places. Groups of children were played with and workmen of all kinds talked to, usually through an interpreter; but there were those with whom the conversation was carried on directly in French, German or sometimes English. All of this formed a background for any conclusions, and years of working with people in a social work relationship had also prepared the writer again for significant observation.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the major portion of the book is concerned with research, and that has been thoroughly checked for accuracy of statement by a member of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER II: THE SOVIET THEORY OF CRIME ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;To understand&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; rightly the theory of crime officially accepted in Russia today, one must read the works of Lenin. Karl Marx is there in the background, to be sure, but he is explained or interpreted in accordance with the opinion of the Soviet Union’s first leader. It sounds a simple enough theory—that, with the final attainment of the classless society, crime, which is the result of economic class relationship, will disappear. But it needs some elucidation. The accomplishment of a state of society in which this would be true is not, after all, quite so simple as the statement sounds.&lt;br /&gt;
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People have tried for a good many years to account for the phenomenon of crime and to work out some manner of punishment that would control even if not eliminate it, as the present Soviet theory permits. Anthropologists tell us that acts not pleasing to the group, even antagonistic to its best interests, are apparently as old as human society itself. Penalties consisting of curses, banishment, even death, were visited upon those who broke the law in the earliest ages of society. Up to very recent years punishment in the form of untold cruelties was dealt out to those who transgressed. Still crime grew and criminals increased with the complexity of civilization. What makes people do those things—commit those acts which are against the folk ways or state ways of the community in which he lives, and brings him usually to account? Who knows? Within fairly recent times three main theories have attempted to establish the causes and have laid out measures of punishment designed to protect law-abiding society from the criminal and, later, to aid in the readjustment of the individual to life.&lt;br /&gt;
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We might take a hasty look at these theories before we speak of their rejection by proletariat Russia. The classical school had as one of its chief characteristics the doctrine of free will in the commission of crime. The discretionary power of judges in the years just preceding the development of this theory gave too much play to the possibility, supposedly, of circumstances surrounding the act. As a matter of actual practice, according to such an authority as Gillin, it gave them instead an excellent chance to wreak a personal vengeance on some enemy, or, still acting according to the discretionary power given them, befriend someone to whom they wished to show favor.&lt;br /&gt;
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But this was one of the evils the classical school of writers decided to remedy. If one committed an act of his own free will, then circumstances had nothing to do with it. A man was a criminal because he chose to be. Thus when two persons committed the same act they should be given the same punishment. And the French Code of 1791 put such a theory into practice, listing a great number of such transgressions and providing for each a set penalty. The difficulties would hardly need to be set down for us. The resulting unwieldy code, the lack of any punishment for acts not listed, made the administration of the code an impossible task.&lt;br /&gt;
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There was another reason for its modification. It did not take an expert in criminology to see that there were differentiating conditions surrounding the commissions of crime. It was clear that of two people committing similar acts, the one would have the sympathy of those who saw him, whereas the second would be looked on with contempt. That the people in the street were able to arrive at such a conclusion and public opinion in the days of revolutionary action against tyranny, must have had some effect. At any rate the Code of 1810 in France provided a modification of the definite penalty for a definite crime by setting a maximum and minimum and permitting the judge to choose between. The doctrine of free will in the commission of crime thus became modified to a milder form of the same theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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The neo-classical school went a step further. While it still recognized the theory of free will and individual responsibility on the part of one transgressing the law, it did decide that in view of evidences being submitted by a body of biologists, physicians, and other scientists, that every person was not free to choose, and was thus not responsible for his behavior. There might, for example, be insanity or imbecility to account for an act. It was, however, necessary to establish that at the time of the crime he was in such a mental state. This theory is incorporated in the practice of our criminal courts today.&lt;br /&gt;
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But here begins another story. Modern science was developing. Research connected with psychiatry and psychology was adding important contributions to the field of the study of the criminal and an attempt to account for crime. Why did a man do things of such an anti-social nature, things harmful to his fellow beings? The anthropological school with Lombroso as its initial spokesman, entered with its explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This theory, attacking the classical and neo-classical writers, took a different line, and swung far in the other direction. Why did the criminal commit his crime? Because he was born with certain stigmata that prevented his following other lines of behavior. He had no choice in the matter. Far from the free-will theory that made him a creature responsible for his deeds, this doctrine made him incapable of rational analysis, or any logical deductions as to cause and consequence. Lombroso weighted his argument with facts and figures. He made an extensive study of criminals in Italian prisons and concluded finally that at least a certain percentage of those committing crimes were born criminals with definite physical features characteristic of the lower stages of evolution. However, in his later writings he concluded that only one-third of all criminals belonged to this group. Still having to account for the other two-thirds, he decided that part of this number was insane and that the other belonged in the category for which he invented the term—&#039;&#039;criminaloid&#039;&#039;. It is in regard to the latter group that we see his recognition of social influences on crime. Besides those born to criminal ways and those committing their acts because of insanity, there was this third group, who while not born to their deeds, still acted like criminals. There was too much proof by this time of the influence of environment for even an ardent advocate of his own theory to deny its importance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Long before the death of Lombroso, Ferri had written his &#039;&#039;Criminal Sociology&#039;&#039; and our third main theory was well launched. This school, of course, is prominently with us today. It recognizes biological causes and adds to them the results of various social environments. It goes even beyond that and takes into account such physical environment as climate, weather, and geographic location.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet criminal theory repudiates all of the aforementioned and asserts that crime is caused by the exploitation of one class by another. The attitude which accounts for such behavior, they insist, has evolved over a period that has lasted since the state became an instrument in the hands of a ruling class to force a weaker one into submission by making “laws” to protect its own interests and punishing those who transgressed one of these regulations. Because that “conscience” has had a historical development, has been long in the making, it will likewise take time to change it.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Marx-Lenin theory assumes that all crime is the result of the exploitation of one class by another, and that with the achievement of classless society—which is the ultimate aim of socialist construction—crime itself will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us trace this line of thought for a moment for fear it is not as familiar as it should be for one to get the full import of this doctrine. According to this belief, there has been one continuous evolution of society toward the establishment of full Communism, beginning with its earliest stage, which will be in its final stage world-wide. But in this evolution, going on since the dawn of history and before, there emerged at one stage of the process an organization through which the stronger element came to rule the weaker and make its members submit to its will. The instrument through which they effected this was the state. From that time on, the interests of the class or group in power have been protected by rules or laws and those who break those regulations, or commit some act not in accord with these interests of the ruling class, are guilty of a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Marx-Lenin doctrine in rejecting any sort of an idealistic notion such as Rousseau’s “social contract” and Hegel’s “the reality of the moral idea” as accounting for the state, accepts instead the definition that “the state as organized violence emerged at the definite stage in the evolution of society, that society was broken up into irreconcilable classes, that it could no longer exist without the ‘authority’ supposed to be above society and to a certain degree isolated from it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Or again, speaking more plainly, the Marxian formula states “that the state is an organ of oppression of one class by another; that it sets up an order which legalizes and consolidates this oppression modifying the conflict of classes.” Thus since the state is an organ of class domination, and crime necessarily, by the same definition, is the commission of an act against the interests of the ruling class, a criminal code would be a formulation of penalties imposed for such acts. When a state is reached where there is no domination of one class by another in society, it would logically appear that there would be no need of a criminal code.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Soviet Union has a criminal code now, as we shall later see, and of course a recognition of crime. This, however, in their theory is no contradiction. In the first place there is one class now in power (there is an admitted class basis for criminal legislation), and the transgression of the rights of those in authority, the proletariat or working group, does constitute a serious and major crime. That, of course, is to be expected from the nature of our definition. But what of the group of criminals who come from the working class itself?&lt;br /&gt;
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They are those whose attitude is the result of long centuries of class struggle, and their point of view cannot be changed at once. Every effort is made by a policy resulting from this theory to change their “social conscience” by education while they serve their sentence, but even with that effort it is certain that many of the older generation will not be won over to the new way of thinking. Thus they concentrate on youth, as we shall see in a later chapter devoted to the child who comes in contact with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
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But crime, except in isolated instances, will disappear as need for the state also vanishes. Let us take the word of an authority for it. Commissar of Justice of the USSR, N. Krylenko, writes: “Only under Communism will the state become wholly superfluous, for then there will be no one to suppress in the sense of waging a systematic class struggle against a definite part of the population.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Understand that, in accordance with the theory, criminal repression will exist as long as the state itself is necessary, and for the present the perfect socialist society is a thing of the future. Even when it is fully come there will still be some who will commit acts of a criminal nature, but they will be of such infrequency that there will be no need of penal restriction. Lenin is our authority this time. In Vol. XXI, p. 432, we find the following: “For this there will be no need for a special machine, for a special apparatus of coercion; this will be done by the army of people themselves with the simplicity and ease with which any crowd of civilized people even in contemporary society will stop a street fight of rowdies or will disallow the outraging of a woman.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps it will be easier to understand the theory that permits of the final disappearance of crime if the legal definition contained in their code were given. One can see then that with the gaining of strength on the part of the government, with the “mopping up” of the remaining opposition, there could possibly be such a situation. Part 3 of the Criminal Code, Article 6, contains this:&lt;br /&gt;
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“A socially dangerous act is deemed every act of commission or omission, directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government for the period of time pending transition to a communist régime.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A note added to this article is of special significance in providing for consideration of the circumstances of social class. It reads:&lt;br /&gt;
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“An act which, although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code, is free from socially dangerous characteristics, owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It can be seen that crime in the Soviet Union consists mainly of those acts directed against the state by the so-called class enemies; or those desiring to hamper socialist construction. In this situation those acts defined as criminal would tend to have usually an economic basis. And this would substantiate the theory that recognizes no other motive for a crime than an economic one, which, in a society where all needs would be met, would supposedly disappear. That is, if in the final socialist state every one should receive according to his needs—as they insist he will—then the economic motive for crime would be eliminated. This takes care of those acts which in our own country, we might attribute to economic causes.&lt;br /&gt;
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But what, we might ask, of those murders or other crimes, motivated by jealousy or rage? The theory answers that those, in the person not ill and requiring medical treatment instead of penal, are rare and the act thus usually constitutes the one crime in the person’s career. For example the man who murders his wife in a jealous rage would very likely make a good citizen who would never again commit such an excessive act. However, this, in the person not mentally deranged, would also be a rare occurrence for the reason assigned that marriage and divorce are made so liberal under the laws of the USSR that the jealousy motive in marital tangles is taken care of, and thus one of the main causes of murder is eliminated.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to note in this regard that the maximum penalty for murder in Russia in any case, except for death resulting from banditry and robbery with a firearm, is a ten year sentence. In fact the maximum term of imprisonment for any cause is ten years. They hold long sentences to be neither humane nor constructive. If a man is mentally abnormal to a dangerous extent, there are other places for him than prisons. If he has committed such a serious act as banditry or robbery with firearms, he is likely to get a death sentence unless there are extenuating circumstances such as the youth of the offender, and for the other crimes the shorter sentence is held to be more conducive to reformation.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we note for a moment the chief types of crime against which the penal provisions are directed, we will be able to see what acts any theory must account for. In the pamphlet &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039; by the Commissar of Justice, N. Krylenko, we find the four main categories of criminal law listed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, the laws safeguarding the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under this class are all provisions for penalties for acts of a counter-revolutionary nature; against such things as wrecking, activities of the Kulaks (the middle-class peasants who owned a moderate degree of private property and who were opposed to relinquishing it to the state) directed against the order of government, and against speculators, and any form of pilfering, theft, bribery, and squandering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the second category the author places the laws which protect the interest of the toiling masses. These are of various natures. Punishment is here provided for officials who fail to fulfill the pledges of the government as to food and living conditions promised to the working class. Protection is also afforded against excessive fines or punishment of the people. The need for such a measure he illustrates by the case of the imposition of a fine of a hundred rubles in a trivial incident where ten was the maximum permitted by law, and there was no occasion for any at all. An official permitting or contributing to such an act must, of course, be punished. In the same category are provisions against undue severity in enforced collectivisation, which tend to frighten and coerce rather than to the persuasion favored by Stalin. In this category also would fall any law providing for punishment of one committing deeds of violence against one’s person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the third category&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; are found “laws regulating the inter-relations between the various social strata of the toiling masses.” This division consists of the laws on Soviet trade and is directed against any act that contributes to squandering of goods or disposition of unwanted articles by forcing a customer to take one such article along with his other purchases,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The author writes of this: “What is a ‘compulsory assortment?’ You enter a store and ask for something. Well, you get what you want, but you must also take something else. What? A lamp, for instance. Now a lamp is a good thing to have, but where is the burner? You are curtly told that the lamp comes without a burner. Another store expects you to buy electric flashlights without a battery—a third tags on batteries without flashlights.” He also speaks of sweaters sent to a city sweltering in the heat, and skiis to Odessa. All this, he says, is in violation of the law and must be punished. The people’s rights must be protected (&#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 29-30).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or any other act by trade bodies that interferes with the rights of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fourth category consists of laws punishing non-observance of regulations as to business accounting and fulfillment of plans by the various economic organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“These categories of law,” says this author, “exhaust the fundamental questions that comprehend every aspect of our economic and social life.” At this phase of the development of their socialist state they, of course, recognize the necessity for the provisions that their penal code contains. But their faith in their ideal—the final classless society—and the change which it will bring in social consciousness enables them to prophesy according to Lenin the disappearance of excessive acts. “We do not know,” he says, “how quickly and in what stages, but we do know that it will be withering away; with their withering away, the state will also wither away.” Crime and punishment in their theory are therefore transitory phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The disappearance of crime will not be achieved with the end of the second five-year plan as some optimists might have expected. There are still sectors where the struggle between the classes flares up, and where the opposition is for the moment strengthened by influencing some of the toilers themselves to come to their aid. But types of crime outside this group will be steadily losing in degree of social danger and should be treated with increasing leniency. Repressive measures in regard to the first type of crimes, those of menace to the advancing socialist state, must be made more severe until all opposition has ceased and the ideal society ushered in.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criminal repression will not disappear until the full realization of the Communist order, but then in the words of Lenin once more&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XXI, p. 431.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “free from the thrall of capitalism . . . people will gradually get accustomed to observe the elementary, perennially known rules of social life that were repeated for ages in all books on good conduct; to observe them without the special apparatus of coercion which is called the State.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While these theorists expect that by the end of the second five-year plan, class distinctions will be pretty well smoothed out, criminal repression will still remain to combat the remnants of the old order which will linger on for some time. They emphasize that they have no magic wand for clearing all this suddenly and completely from the consciousness of the people. Crime and criminal repression came at one stage in evolution—the beginning of the domination of one class by another—and they will vanish at another stage—the appearance of the highest phase of Communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a final summation of the theory, crime results solely from a class struggle and will disappear with the extinction of classes, just as the state itself, according to Lenin, will disappear, and the court, now an organ of the state guarding the interests, life, health, and liberty of toilers of the state, will also disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The period is called transitory,” said Professor Brusilovsky in a lecture, “because after the achievement of Communism there will be neither crime nor punishment. Each stage and development of Soviet authority while lowering the importance of some crimes, aggravates the weight of others, depending upon the actual economic and political situation. To us criminal law is no fetish, but a tool for sweeping away the obstacles to socialist construction. Our criminal law is to a high degree historic, our proletarian semi-state is in a stage of constant change and motion toward the construction of classless society.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A theory is only a theory, and when it deals with human beings there is no accuracy of prophecy. The advent of a proletarian state, however, might indicate to some of us that other strange things could happen in the same land, especially so with the social mind that is apparent, and with as sane an approach to criminal treatment as their policy calls for. Let that social mind have another few generations for extension to fringes of the group, and that policy of treatment of criminals come into full play, and we might be as surprised as we are that the Soviet State has not only survived, but has recently been received into the League of Nations as one of the powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The student will want to know, though, something of the degree to which the theory proves accurate as the period of socialist construction advances in the Soviet Union. It might be said here that according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky there is a decrease in the number of prisoners convicted of such familiar crimes as theft, murder, arson, robbery, rape, etc., by almost one-third since the days just before the revolution. Chapter IV discusses in detail the crimes committed and some analysis is given of those who commit them. The reader must be reminded again, however, that the authorities contend that no radical change can be made in the social conscience of their people in the one generation of the revolution which has elapsed, especially as so little constructive work was done up to the last few years. It is, however, important to know what problems they have at this time and the chapter referred to above is devoted to that discussion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER III: CRIME REPRESSION SINCE THE REVOLUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We turn&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; now from theory to fact. Whether or not a state of classless society will be achieved no one can know; but it is certain that at the moment crime and criminals do exist in Soviet Russia. While our concern is with the present program of criminal repression, a review of the situation since the revolution will give us perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin enumerates three basic aspects of the proletarian dictatorship: “First, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the crushing of the exploiters, for the defense of the country, for the consolidation of ties with the proletariat of other countries, for the development and victory of revolutions in all countries. Second, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the final separation of the toiling and exploited masses from the bourgeoisie, for the attraction of the masses to the cause of socialist construction, for state leadership of these masses by the proletarian. And, third, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the organization of forces, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a society without state.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Criminal repression must necessarily be considered in connection with these purposes of the state. It can be seen that there are three main factors involved. There is, first of all, the crushing of the enemies of the state; secondly, the discipline and control of the toiling masses themselves; and, third, the socialist construction. The method used for accomplishing these ends have changed with the various phases of the development of the Communist state.&lt;br /&gt;
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Considering first the crushing of those who oppose the order of government or hinder its development, we find the methods of coercion varying from leniency and toleration in the beginning of the Revolution, through the frightful years of the Cheka (extraordinary commission to combat speculation and counter-revolution in the early days) reign, to the more severe activities of the OGPU in recent times. Shortly after the October Revolution in May, 1918, all those persons held for political crimes were set free by an act of general amnesty. The results of this liberality were rather serious for the rule of the proletariat, since those released, bitterly determined to overthrow the new and not too firmly seated government, returned to the fight with vigor. Among these was the renowned General Krasnow who organized the White Guard Cossacks and caused no end of trouble to the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a policy of clemency was bound to end if the Soviet government continued to live. When next they had political prisoners in hand there was a different tale to tell. Whoever of them saw the inside of a prison or place of detention were not released to run back to the fight. We find Stalin defending later severe measures toward these prisoners in an interview with Ludwig in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P.7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Soon it transpired that such leniency was only undermining the strength of the authority of the Soviets. We committed a mistake in showing such leniency toward the enemies of the working class. If we repeated this mistake any further, we would have committed a crime toward the working class. We would have betrayed its interest. And this became perfectly clear very soon. It became very sure that the greater our leniency toward our enemies, the greater their resistance.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Leniency was no part of their program thereafter. History will attest to the fact. Military Communism and the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, agent of superlative revolutionary terror, attended to that. Civil wars are brutal, cruel, and Russia’s was notoriously no exception. The period that followed with its terrorist activities is no bright spot in the history of crime repression of post-revolutionary Russia. Lenin threw the responsibility for the establishment of the so-called Red Terror on their class enemies. He says: “You have yourselves to blame, friends! Do not run away with the idea that the Russian peasants and workers have forgotten about your actions. You challenged us to a fight of the most desperate form in October, and in reply to this we have announced the terror, and the triple terror, and if necessary we will make it even hotter for you, if you try again.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. XXVII, p. 175.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They tried again, and yet again, the open fighting of the Civil War giving way to underground methods, not deterred by the worst the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and its successors the GPU could do. But early measures must have quadrupled, for Communism can no longer be considered a mere experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who were the people against which this repression was directed? The urban bourgeoisie joined by the rural Kulaks formed the great number. There was a tremendous increase of criminals from these two classes in the early years of the proletarian state. In their combined efforts they were able to prove of much hindrance to the Soviet cause, and, aided by those waverers within the toiling class who were able to be influenced to counter-revolutionary activities, they presented a grave menace. Again Lenin, whom the Russians think of in his kindly moods, showed his grim side. “We must exert every effort,” he wrote, “to track down and catch all those highwaymen, all the landlords and capitalists in hiding, in all their disguises, expose and punish them without pity—sly, subtle, experienced, patiently waiting for the opportune moment in hatching their plots; they are saboteurs who will stoop to any crime to do harm to the Soviet rule. With these enemies of the toilers, with the landlords, capitalists, saboteurs, and White Guards, we must be merciless.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. 24, XXIV, p. 434.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Economically, the first period was one of distribution of goods without production. Its aftermath was famine and unemployment and Lenin and Trotsky were at odds over a policy of alleviation. Trotsky, impatient at delay over a program of more complete state ownership, advocated immediate action against all private possession of property. Lenin considered a starving people no advantage in furthering a socialist construction, and was besides a humanitarian. He wanted his people fed. The result was the institution of NEP, the New Economic Policy, which permitted private ownership within limits, and brought about the eventual political annihilation of Trotsky.&lt;br /&gt;
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The policy of fighting the class enemy remained practically the same even through the era of NEP. There was some let-up in the counter-revolutionary activities on the initiation of NEP, as it had been hoped by those opposed to Communism that this probably indicated the return to Capitalism, but activities of an anti-Communistic nature were still sternly repressed.&lt;br /&gt;
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N. Krylenko, prosecutor of note and now Commissar of Justice of the USSR, writes in defense against a criticism of mildness toward the enemies of the government at this time: “The form of the dictatorship of the proletariat changes in the different stages of the proletarian revolution. For instance, in the first period of the October Revolution the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters was the most conspicuous feature . . . during the transition to the NEP, the peaceful, cultural, organizational work of the dictatorship of the proletariat was most conspicuous, but this again did not mean that the importance of overcoming the resistance of the exploiters had receded in the least.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The chief agent of “resisting the exploiters” was now the GPU (later, as it became the joint organization of all the republics, the OGPU), the full title of which is the United State Political Administration. There seems no doubt that their midnight arrests and executions were an effective weapon against any counter-Soviet efforts even as the activities of their predecessors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, had been before.&lt;br /&gt;
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The method now undergoes an important change. Note this from Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XX, p. 460.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “To the extent that the basic purpose of authority becomes not military crushing but administrative, the typical manifestation of crushing and coercion will become not the method of shooting on the spot, but trial in court.” Not in love himself, apparently, with methods such as he felt they had to use, he seized the first opportunity afforded by an end of Civil War to advance a revolutionary legality which his party had already been trying to establish.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Criminal Code was written in 1922, as was also the Code for Criminal Procedure, and the way was paved for an enlargement of orderly court procedure. The provisions of the code gave not greater leniency but legalized measures that had already been practiced. The step of importance, however, was that “tried in court” replaced “shooting on the spot.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The history of violence against the Kulaks, the most startling of all violence used by the USSR in establishing itself, was entering now a modified phase. Nerves were settling somewhat, and panic beginning to clear away. Legal guarantees, so nearly obscured through years when “crushing” was regarded as necessary at any price if the proletariat was to stay in authority, might now begin, at least, to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Along with this a new idea was put into practice which presents a happier side to the study of crime repression in this country. Since the state could not kill all of its class enemies and certainly would not find it profitable to fill innumerable prisons with them, there developed a new approach to the problem. It is not accurate to say that the idea was new, because it had been present since the earliest days of the Revolution. The Civil War, however, had so disrupted the development of any program that this influence was not properly felt until later.&lt;br /&gt;
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This new approach was by means of educating and training these offenders so that they might be turned out again as useful workers in a state so greatly in need of all the man power it could muster. Authorities built their plans on the belief that even a class enemy might reform and see his way to becoming a member of the new society if properly guided. And as for the convicts from among the loyal masses, any program for crime repression must have as its fundamental object the training of these as useful citizens. The theory of how it might be done has turned out to be a practical one. Its translation into government policy was a most significant development and leads straight to the constructive attitude one finds in present-day treatment of prisoners in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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Most of us, it seems, have had the impression that during the days of the Civil War there were no legal guarantees in the state, but such an idea is not correct. One thinks of courts as suspended, but there were orderly trials even in the darkest days of military Communism when non-judicial bodies like the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; were at their height. This was possible, of course, almost entirely for those members of the toiling masses themselves and not for enemies of the proletarian authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a bare year after the October Revolution (November 6-9, 1918) that the Emergency Congress of the Soviets was held in Moscow. And if ever emergency existed in political affairs, it did so then for the Soviets. Civil War was at its highest point, the White Guards aided by Czecho-Slovaks, were in possession of Siberia, the English were pushing to the north and the French to the south. It is surprising that a party at the helm of the ship of state could take its mind even for a moment from such an international and military situation to think of admonishing a people to observe law. But we find Kursky, then Commissar of Justice, rising gravely to remind the Congress and the people that “during the year of revolutionary activity the working class of Russia has elaborated the basic laws of the RSFSR which must be faithfully observed in order to develop and strengthen the authority of workers and peasants,” and the Congress, after listening to his speech, resolved unanimously, “to appeal to all citizens of the Republic, to all organs and all officials of Soviet authority, to observe most strictly the laws of the RSFSR and the rules, regulations and orders issued and to be issued by the Central authorities.” A significant effort that was, and one whose importance was momentous to a people struggling through a chaos that must have all but obscured any semblance of order.&lt;br /&gt;
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To forestall the high-handed measures which they must have seen would be forthcoming as a result of the counter-revolutionary work during the Civil War, they surrounded such action with certain safeguards. It was resolved that “(a) Exact, formal ascertaining by the Soviet institution or official concerned as to the presence of conditions necessitated a departure from the limits of the law; (b) Immediate written notification to the Council of People’s Commissars, with a copy for local and interested authorities, should be provided.” In the midst of violence and excesses these efforts to establish revolutionary legality were significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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In March, 1919, the Communist party adopted as a distinctive feature of its program a plank reading: “Our courts have already led to a cardinal change in the character of punishment, resulting on a large scale in conditional sentences, introducing public censure as a measure of punishment, substituting compulsory labor with retention of liberty for imprisonment, replacing the prisons by educational institutions, and allowing the possibility for the factor and time by comradely courts. The Communist party, while urging further development of the court in this direction, should aim for the ultimate substitution of the system of punishment by a system of measures of educational character.”&lt;br /&gt;
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As early as December, 1917, Lenin sent instructions to the Revolutionary Tribunal, in which he urged that repressive measures take the form of corrective labor tasks, and that the harmful element be dealt with in a reformative way. Shooting was abolished by a decree dated October 28, 1917, and Decree No. 3 of July 20, 1918, provided that one sentenced to a three-month period should be sent to compulsory social labor and should not be guarded while serving. In the Ural region and Siberia prisons were replaced with working homes where study was combined with work.&lt;br /&gt;
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Various other decrees were adopted, furthering this principle of reformation through education and discipline. In 1919 one such established a distribution committee composed of people of special equipment, by psychiatrists, educators, etc., who were to determine by a study of background, personality, and physical condition of the convict what prison would be best suited to him.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky, (Ed.) &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, Moscow, 1933, p. 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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A decree of 1920 dealt with the organization of provincial detention points, and in the main ones there was to be established a university with courses in the sciences—applied, natural and technical—in history and the arts. An attempt was also made to have prisoners trained not just in crafts of their small villages but in factory and larger industrial work, and in spite of Civil War and shortage of shops, the number given such training was raised from 214 per cent. in 1919 to 10 per cent. in 1920.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 29.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To refer again to the volume edited by Vishinsky, we find on page 20 a statement that any penal treatment tending to degrade the prisoner was forbidden by a decree of July 23, 1918, to be practiced. This principle is now incorporated in the Criminal Code, Article 9, which reads: “Measures of social defense may not have for their purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity, as they do not contemplate the purposes of retribution and penalty.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The present-day approach to crime repression in the USSR is, then, through educational and correctional labor. The extreme penalty of death is given now in only three cases: crimes against the state, military crimes, and armed robbery in which death occurs. A. J. Estrin in his book, &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039;, a 1933 publication, gives a table on page 229 containing the percentages of persons sentenced to different forms of repression, and from 1926 to 1930 the percentage sentenced to death is less than 0.1. For all others the educational program holds even for political prisoners. The author can give no first-hand information on the latter, but official reports indicate that this is true.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the treatment of criminals, Vishinsky speaks of the indispensable part the state apparatus must play in the realization of their program.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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“Within the system of the institutions of proletarian dictatorship,” he says, “the corrective labor institutions play a great and serious part, because through them, in effect, is realized the entire judicial policy. These institutions with their entire force of live human relationships, with all their methods and means with the help of which these relations are built, define the reality or falsity of the judicial verdict as they define also the extent of achieving of the genuine aim of the problem posed before these institutions.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet jurisprudence is thus based not on restrictive measures alone but on corrective, educational, and cultural ones. The authorities seek to use labor that is constructive as to character and useful economically, and not the kind that brings indignity and resentment when resorted to as punishment or disciplinary measures.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sentence is designed to be as brief as possible. In the USSR it is not necessary that a prisoner serve more than one-third of his sentence in order to be re- leased on parole, but his release is based solely on the condition of his fitness for return to society. The Observation Commission, whose duty it is to determine the time of such release is required by law to inform itself in intimate detail of the condition of training and education of the prisoners, of the personal characteristics and attitude toward society of each individual. It is thus likely to be able to judge to a higher degree when a prisoner is ready for release. If the figures they give on recidivism with 18 per cent. for men and 21 per cent. for women are accurate then they may be said to judge well indeed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The policy of re-educating the “enemy,” or winning him over to the aid of the state, is still more marked in the treatment of the working masses themselves. Repressive measures must necessarily be used for the discipline of cases among the workers. While penalties are still severe and a decree of August 7, 1932, providing for the protection of state possessions, attaches the death sentence for those who steal or pilfer public property, the measures designed for those of the working population who transgress the law are in general more liberal.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is to be expected. It has already been stated that the Russians acknowledge the class nature of their administration of criminal law. The content of the criminal code is directed almost entirely toward the forced subjugation of those elements who would not voluntarily be subjected to the dictates of the ruling class or the proletariat. As a matter of policy they manage this subjugation by the use of such corrective measures as the construction of the White-Sea Baltic Canal when it is possible. Such other provisions as the code contains may be made to apply to the workers, but discrimination is openly observed between the classes.&lt;br /&gt;
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To refer back for a moment to the decree of August 7, 1932 already mentioned, we may note the indication of the sharpening of the class struggle. The state intensified its program of collectivization in 1928, and launched into a broad program intended to crush the Kulaks and extend Socialism into the villages. The Kulak antagonism immediately became more pronounced, and if we consult a table on page 80 of M. N. Gernet’s &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039; we see the results tabulated in a sudden jump of crimes against the state.&lt;br /&gt;
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Cattle were killed, farm machinery was destroyed or put out of order, and plans were hampered in any way possible. There was also organized theft of state property to such an extent that severe measures were considered necessary. Thus the provision by this decree four years later of the death sentence for these offenses. In the meantime the necessity for such a measure was taken care of by the judicial powers and authority of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
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While this decree is necessarily directed against the definite enemy class, it applies also to the workers themselves who are bribed or otherwise used as tools by the urban bourgeoisie or Kulaks. This, however, is outside the program of treatment of the ordinary criminal, and in no wise is it to be understood that the death penalty is always applied even for those considered to be class enemies. The author personally heard a trial in court in which the indictment was for organized theft, and on appeal the death sentence was commuted to a ten-year sentence. For the more serious offenses, however, such as those involving sabotage in factories, the death sentence is usual, at least for those most responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The program of compulsory education provided for those from among the toiling element who are imprisoned is the chief weapon of the fight against crime by the state. The prisons are equipped (as will be seen in later pages) with all sorts of devices for carrying out this work. The whole criminal law reflects this attitude toward crime repression on the part of the Communist party. The evolution of this code since its establishment in 1922, by a multitude of amendments and two almost new writings, reflects the needs and purposes of the state in various phases of its development in a most interesting manner. It is divided into a general and a special part, and although the general part is appended to this book, it seems of interest here to speak of its various divisions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first section is devoted to the purposes of criminal legislation. The second deals with the extent of operation and the limits of action of the code. Section three is concerned with the general principles of the penal policy. Section four deals with the measures of social defense applied to persons committing various crimes. The fifth concerns the manner in which social defense measures of correctional character are applied, and the sixth deals with conditional sentences and release on probation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since the code’s adoption in 1922 there have been two important amendments aside from the many year by year. In 1926 when numerous changes were made, the chief feature was a more lenient application of penalties. This was at the time of reconstruction, when the development of the socialist state took on greater emphasis and education in the matter of penal treatment was held to be one of its chief tools. By the change of 1928, deprivation of liberty was limited to sentences of one year or more. Previous to this time sentences of even one day might carry with them deprivation of liberty. The aim now in short sentences is that the convicted person may retain his liberty, but have supervision in his place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 1926 edition of the Criminal Code, the whole concept of punishment is abolished. Although, according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky, there are certain survivals of old methods and ideas among a few of those connected with penal administration, the official thought is not of retribution or any infliction of pain or even of “just reward.” From this time on, the term used is a “measure of social defense” and, as nearly as one can judge both from records and from actual visits to their institutions for criminals, the change has been not only in terminology but in actual practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The measures of social defense now provided by the Criminal Code are divided into three categories: first are the measures of judicial and correctional character; second, measures of social defense of medical character; and third, measures of social defense of medical and pedagogical character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measure of social defense of judicial and correctional character are enumerated as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the Union of USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the Union of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the Union of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts 1930, No. 26, Item 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is in addition the use of public censure as a repressive measure which is a “public expression of condemnation in the name of the court.” It must be published through the press and may be either the only penalty assessed or be added to another. The use of warning is also provided for by Article 43 of the Criminal Code and is practiced in cases where the accused is acquitted but by his conduct gives “every reason to fear commitment of crimes by him in the future.” By this means an effort is made to prevent his committing some criminal act in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the present Criminal Code there is a division of repressive measures into the basic and the supplementary. To the basic measures of declaring one a class enemy with the consequences such a decision carries, deprivation of liberty and compulsory work without deprivation of liberty, are added the other enumerated measures, with the exception of confiscation of property. This is also a supplementary measure but it can be used only in the cases specifically mentioned in the special section of the code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary it might be said that while severe measures still exist and are used in regard to counter-revolutionary activities or crimes against the state, the emphasis in the penal program is decidedly upon educational measures for re-establishing the criminal as a useful member of society in the socialist state. While the beginnings of this policy are almost obscured by the activities of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and the OGPU (whose judicial powers have by the Decree of July 10, 1934, been withdrawn and turned over to the courts) and the extra-legal activities of the Civil War days, yet the germ was there from the beginning of the Revolution and its development is one of the marked achievements of the Soviet government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IV: WHAT CRIMES ARE COMMITTED AND WHO COMMITS THEM? ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In answering&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the question “What crimes are committed?” one could say in general that it is the usual line-up found in any country plus that category defined as the crimes against the state or the order of government. It would be hard to say what is included in the latter group. It would run the gamut from, let us say, the theft of bread from a collective farm, if it was intended to hamper the rule of the proletariat in any way, to the wrecking of a factory. It depends on the “socially dangerous” character of the person committing the act for one thing, on the social background, and for the other consideration, the motive behind the act. It is quite to be expected that this group ranks at the top of any list of crimes in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If one wishes to go into detailed statistics on the subject of crimes committed, there is a small, compact volume, &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039;, by M. N. Gernet, which supplies such information. It was, however, published in 1931 which is far in the past, gauged by the speed with which the Criminal Code and judicial practices change under proletariat rule. But in the main the list of crimes are the same and the classifications as to age and sex still hold.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There has been a change in the type of crime since the days of military Communism. A. J. Estrin, in his &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039; includes the following&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 51 &#039;&#039;et. seq.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; as characterizing the period of militarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Counter-revolutionary activities&lt;br /&gt;
* Speculation&lt;br /&gt;
* Banditry&lt;br /&gt;
* Adventures&lt;br /&gt;
* Desertion&lt;br /&gt;
* Bureaucratism&lt;br /&gt;
* Occasional bad conduct crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He goes on to say that there was considerable growth in crimes of banditry during 1918, practically all having a political or anarchistic coloring. In the matter of desertion, the menace was so great that a special commission was set up to deal with it, and by the time of the entry of the Communist army into Warsaw it had been successfully repressed on the western front. During this period there was likewise an increase in hooliganism, the acceptance of bribery on the part of officials, and speculation. The latter presented an especially difficult problem but was nearly at an end when the institution of the New Economic Policy in 1922 brought new forms of it. From then on it has been one of the crimes that has given most trouble to the government. Acts of pilfering state property in order to resell it at a greater price, or securing goods for speculation by persons working either on a state farm or in a store, are extensive. Since the law of August, 1932, providing a death penalty for taking state property these crimes have decreased in number.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Open warfare between the classes had so far subsided by 1921 that there was a demobilization of farmers and other workers from the army, and that led to the increase in another crime—banditry. These people, suddenly released from fighting ranks, broke and unable to find work in that period when production was at a low ebb, turned to theft, robbery or banditry, especially the latter, filling the country with a terror all their own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this period of 1921-22 there was a very definite growth in the number of crimes committed against persons—not in those of a more serious nature such as murder or severe injury but in sex crime, fighting and insults. The author explains this as resulting from the transition from the old culture to the new. The old was at an end and the new not yet sufficiently established to set up an influence against such acts of attack and rowdyism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a reference here by Estrin to a statement by N. Krylenko which connects the beginning of the crime of sabotage—so serious since to the Soviet government—with activities of former owners during the years of 1921, 1922 and 1923. There was no longer opportunity for armed fighting but the opposition relentlessly kept up its battle by any means at hand and its best methods were to hinder the production without which Communism would be undermined by starvation and physical depletion. From 1923 on, there began to appear with increasing frequency in the courts cases of &#039;&#039;economic&#039;&#039; counter-revolutionary character. Firearms and open resistance might have gone by the board but sabotage grew apace until 1925-26 when it reached its greatest height.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A numerical count of court convictions in 1925 would make it appear that there was a tremendous drop in ordinary crimes and an increase in those of a political type. There is an explanation for this in the fact that a reform of the Criminal Code in 1924 deleted a number of crimes of lesser importance, and there was a consequent lessening of 300,000 in convictions during the following year, most of which loss was, of course, from the ranks of the ordinary criminals. Class lines were drawn in a still more distinct fashion, thus emphasizing the direction criminal repression was to take for some time to come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of crimes against the state are today mostly of an economic nature. Before, however, we set down some of the more important ones that harass law enforcement let us look at a brief list of the type of acts which are encountered in court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes against the state&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Crimes against the person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Crimes against property&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Official crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Hooliganism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The items here of particular interest to foreigners are the first and the last. The list of crimes included in the first category will shortly be enumerated. As for the last, the term “hooliganism” covers a multitude of crimes. If one suddenly gets up in a theater and strikes his neighbor without apparent cause, such is an act of hooliganism. It was described to the writer as defining “unmotivated” acts. If one does not pursue “motivation” into psychological or psychiatric realms that explanation pretty well expresses what is meant. Deeds not logically accounted for might come a little closer. If a group of young men go out just to “raise cain” for no particular cause they may destroy property, attack a man, and do various other criminal acts which would all fall within the definition of hooliganism. The charge corresponds roughly to our “disorderly conduct,” except that the deeds committed may be of a more serious nature. But into this category are lumped a miscellany not classified otherwise.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, what are the chief crimes against the state? There would be, first of all, such major deeds as counter-revolutionary activities and the dissemination of propaganda. There are no longer organizations fostering counter-revolutionary work, but a great amount of such work is carried on. Individuals with malice aforethought, work their way into factory or collective farm, and spread what discontent they may. The author heard, for example, of the trial of the director of a collective farm who managed cleverly to see that the plan of production was unfulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Next in line would be industrial sabotage and attack on or the theft of government property. So prevalent had the latter become by the committing of such acts as killing cattle or the destruction of anything possible, as well as organized theft of state property that the government had recently acquired, that the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for such crimes, was enacted to meet the situation. On some occasions of organized theft the motive is for personal gain rather than one of desire to harm the state. For example, the author heard one case in court where the theft of grain from a collective farm was resold in speculating and the gain to the eleven persons involved was some 20,000 rubles. The death penalty was given to the leaders, prison sentences to the others. There is also the evasion of government orders and taxes, insubordination to the demands of the law, insults by word of mouth, if such involves a Kulak as against an officer. This does not by any means complete the possibilities, but it lists the headings under which the majority of such acts come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sabotage hardly needs comment here. So associated has the term come to be with industrial affairs in Russia that one would expect to find it ranking high as a crime against the state. It is, of course, committed by the enemies of the established order, and has hampered the progress of collectivization and industrial development to a great degree. Five men were shot and the others in the plot sentenced to ten years in prison (corrective labor with deprivation of liberty) during the past summer for burning a large factory in the Ural region by electric wire manipulation. Activities of the disorganized opposition have centered in crimes of this sort as the most effective weapon in its hands. Not much quarter is shown when guilt is established. The extreme penalty is surely and speedily given.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An enumeration of the counter-revolutionary crimes listed in the Criminal Code includes the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any act directed towards overthrow, undermining and weakening of the peasants’ and workers’ order of government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armed uprising and entering Soviet territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communication with a foreign government for counter-revolutionary purposes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Extending aid and comfort to that part of the international bourgeoisie which aims at the overthrow of the Communist order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Inducing a foreign government by means of forged documents to declare war or to make armed intervention, or by the same method to induce blockade, confiscation of property of USSR, interruption of diplomatic relations, renouncing of a treaty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Espionage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Transmission, collection, or theft, of economic information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Undermining of state industry, transport, trade, monetary circulation, cooperatives, committed with a counter-revolutionary purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commission of terrorist acts against representatives of the Soviet order or workers’ and peasants’ organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Destruction or damaging with counter-revolutionary purposes by means of the use of explosive, arson, or any other method, of railways, and other means of transportation, means of communication, aqueducts, community warehouses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Propaganda and agitation containing an appeal to overthrow, undermine, or weaken the Soviet order. Circulation or preparation of literature. Same actions in time of mass disorders, or making use of religious and national prejudices, or in time of war or in localities under martial law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All kinds of organizational activity directed toward preparation and commission of crimes mentioned in this chapter as well as participation in an organization founded for the preparation or commission of one of the crimes mentioned in this chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Failure to report a known counter-revolutionary crime or preparation for same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any action or active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement committed while in office under the Tzarist régime or under the counter-revolutionary government, during the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Counter-revolutionary sabotage, i.e., premeditated omission to carry out the duties or deliberate negligence in carrying them out with the specific purpose of weakening the authority of the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chief in the list of “official crimes” is the accepting of bribery, dealing out sentences in excess of the provision of the law, or beyond what circumstances warrant, failing to fulfill one’s duty, taking the law into one’s hands, etc. As an example of punishment in excess of justification of circumstances there is a case recorded in which a drunken priest was given a heavy penalty in a Siberian People’s Court. In view of the government’s attitude toward religion one would suppose that such a sentence might stand, but when it was called to the attention of the higher court, the prosecutor was removed from office and the militiaman was arrested.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commissar of Justice Krylenko, in his &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039;, lists a number of omissions and commissions on the part of officials, but when a complaint of, or information on, such acts reach the authorities, action follows. The population, taught from the cradle up that this is their government, has no timidity, apparently, about seeing that men in office regard the laws of the land, if they have information of acts to the contrary. This authority says, after mentioning a variety of actual cases of such violation, “The struggle against distortions of this kind must be waged with absolute ruthlessness.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other two classifications—crimes against the person and against property—include what they would in our own country, but penalties imposed differ from ours a great deal. Since they, as our most elementary groupings, are generally understood, and since outside of crimes against the state or order of government, these two comprise the great bulk of criminal transgressions in Russia as well as in our own country, it seems of general interest to include here, even at the risk of being tedious, those two chapters of the Criminal Code which relate to these classes of crime, and they are therefore inserted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, HEALTH, LIBERTY, AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed: a) Out of greed, jealousy (if it does not come under description in Article 138) and other base reasons; b) by a person previously convicted for premeditated murder or bodily injury who served the measure of social protection established by the court; c) by means particularly painful to the victim; d) for the purpose of lightening [the consequences of] or concealing another grave crime; e) by a person whose duty it was to have particular care of the victim, or f) making use of the helpless condition of the victim.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder not coming under the provisions of paragraph 136,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed in a state of sudden and strong emotional excitement, caused by violence or grave insult from the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Murder caused by carelessness, as well as murder resulting from exceeding the limits of self defence,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Abortion caused with consent of the mother by persons not having the proper medical qualifications or by persons having such qualifications but in unsanitary conditions,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to five hundred rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If these acts were committed under conditions given in the first part of this paragraph, professionally or without consent of the mother or having as their consequence death,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The bringing of a person who is financially or in some other way dependent on another person, by cruel treatment of the dependent person or in other similar way to suicide or to an attempt at same,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The giving of aid or incitement to suicide of a minor or a person knowingly incapable of understanding the nature and meaning of the act committed or a person incapable of self-guidance if suicide or attempt at same followed,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated grave bodily injury which carried as a consequence loss of sight, hearing, or any other organ, permanent disfigurement, mental illness, or any other injury to health, combined with considerable disability,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If as a consequence of such injury death followed or if it was committed by means having the character of torture, or causing suffering, or if such injury came as a consequence of inflicting systematic though light injuries,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated light bodily injury, not dangerous to life, but causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Premeditated light bodily injury without causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury coming under paragraph 1, Article 143, committed under influence of sudden and strong, emotional excitement caused by violence or grave insult to the offender on the part of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury caused by negligence if it came as a consequence of a knowing infraction of safety rules established by law or government orders and having as its consequence conditions aforementioned in Article 142 and the first paragraph of Article 143,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Bodily injury caused by negligence not having grave consequences,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated assault and battery and other violent acts combined with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said acts had the character of torture,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Violent, illegal deprivation of liberty of some person,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty by a method dangerous to life or health of victim, or accompanied with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Placing in a hospital for mental cases of a person known to be sane out of greed or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft, or concealment, or exchange of some one else’s child, motivated by greed, vengeance, or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Infection of a person with a venereal disease by a person aware of having said disease,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Knowingly exposing of a person to the danger of infection with venereal disease through the sex act or some other act,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relation with persons not having reached sex maturity combined with corruption of the morals or with perverted forms of sex satisfaction,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sex relations with persons not having reached sex maturity committed without aforesaid aggravating circumstances,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Corruption of the morals of children or minors committed by means of immoral acts toward them,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relations by means of physical violence, threat, or by intimidation or making use, through deception, of the helpless condition of the victim (rape),—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said rape had as its consequences the suicide of the victim or was committed toward one not having reached sex maturity, or even though on a person having reached said maturity but committed by several persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing a woman to enter into a sex relationship or satisfy sex passion in some other form by a person on whom said woman was financially dependent or to whom she was in a subordinate position,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing to engage in prostitution, procuring, maintenance of houses of assignation, also engaging in traffic of women for purposes of prostitution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years with confiscation of all or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deliberately leaving a person without help, when said person, in a condition dangerous to life, is incapable of measures of self-protection because of minority, feebleness, sickness, or helplessness generally, in cases when the person leaving the other helpless was in duty bound to have cared for the abandoned and was able to extend help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Not extending of help by a ship’s captain to persons perishing on sea or on other bodies of water if said help could be extended without grave danger to the ship, crew, or passengers,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to two years. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts No. 60, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Not extending of help to a sick person without satisfactory reasons by a person having as his duty by law or special regulation the extending of such help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Refusal of a person engaged in medical practice to extend medical aid if said refusal knowingly to said person could have been dangerous to the patient,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Malicious evasion of payment, for the support of children in spite of being capable of such payment,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Abandonment by parents of minor children without support as well as forcing children to beg,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same measure of social protection.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted verbally or in writing,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Fine up to 300 rubles or public censure.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Insult inflicted by action,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to two months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted through generally circulated or exhibited publications or pictures,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Slander, i.e. circulation of knowingly false defaming rumors,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Libel in an article published in the press or multiplied by some other means,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 100 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
PROPERTY CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret appropriation of someone else’s property (theft) carries with it:&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
a) If committed without application of any mechanical devices, for the first time and without conspiring with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a term up to three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
When committed under the same conditions, but because of need and unemployment for the purpose of satisfying the minimum requirements of self and family,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a term of three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
b) Committed repeatedly and with regard to property which is a known necessity for the existence of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to six months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
c) If committed with application of mechanical device or repeatedly or by previous conspiracy with other persons, and also, even without the aforementioned conditions when committed in railroad stations, docks, ships, railway coaches, in hotels,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
d) When committed by a private person from state or community warehouses, railway cars, ships, or other storage places, or in the places of community use (aforementioned in sub-paragraph) with the application of mechanical devices, or by conspiring with other persons, or repeatedly, also when committed though without aforementioned conditions by a person having special right of entry into these storage places, or [by persons engaged in] safeguarding them, or in time of fire, flood, or other social calamity,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
e) When committed out of state or community warehouses and storage places by a person having special right of entry in same or [by persons] safeguarding them, with application of mechanical devices, or repeatedly, or by conspiring with other persons, and also any theft out of the aforementioned warehouses and storage places when the theft is exceptionally large,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
 NOTE: Theft of material and tools committed in the factory or mill by a workman or employee within the confines of his own [his place of employment] enterprise the first time and when the value of the stolen goods does not exceed 15 rubles carries disciplinary punishment in accordance with special schedule established by the People’s Commissariat of Labor.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft of electric current,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of one month with compulsory restitution of the loss inflicted.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The purchase of goods known to be stolen,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a period up to six months and fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions committed professionally,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to three years with confiscation of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Purchase, possession and sale of fire arms, known to be stolen (hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition therefor,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to 5 years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Open appropriation of some one else’s property in the presence of the person having possession, use, or authority over such property (robbery) when committed without use of force,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same action when committed by a group of people or repeatedly,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret as well as open appropriation of horses or cattle from the laboring agricultural population as well as those engaged in animal husbandry,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions, committed repeatedly or in conspiracy with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to eight years. Aug. 7, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 102, Article 645).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Secret or open appropriation of fire arms (except hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition for same if this action does not come under Article 59 of this Code,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Robbery, i.e., open attack for the purpose of taking possession of someone else’s property, combined with use of force dangerous to the life or the health of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts, committed repeatedly or having as a consequence the death or maiming of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Armed robbery,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years, and with aggravating circumstances—Supreme measure of social protection. Aug. 26, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 65, Article 641).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Appropriation, i.e., withholding with mercenary purpose of somebody else’s property, entrusted for a definite purpose, or embezzlement of that property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Appropriation of a fund,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one month.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage having as its consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years with confiscation of entire or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The issuance of a check, which knowingly to the issuer is not subject to payment, and also cancellation of the check by him without satisfactory reason, or taking any other measures for the prevention of the receipt by the check holder or the amount of the check, as well as passing by the check holder of a check which knowingly to him is not subject to payment by the agent on whom it is drawn,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts having as their consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution or enterprise,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. Feb. 28, 1930 (Collection of Acts, No. 11, Article 131).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forgery with mercenary purpose of official papers, documents and receipts,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a period up to one year and fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deceptive change with mercenary purpose of the appearance or properties of objects, intended for sale or social use, if that said change had or could have had as its consequence the infliction of injury to health, as well as sale of such objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to one year with confiscation of part of property with prohibition of the right to sell merchandise, or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The making or keeping for the purpose of sale of a forged stamping tool, the stamping of jewelry and bars of gold, silver and platinum, affixing to objects made from other metals of stamps and marks having resemblance to the official stamping mark, as well as sale of aforementioned objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year, with confiscation in both cases of forged objects and stamping tools.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Usury, i.e., receiving of interest on money or property lent at a rate exceeding the interest rate established by law, and in particular, inclusion of the interest in the principal amount of the loan, or withholding a remuneration out of the amount received by the borrower or providing of fine and penalty for delay in payment of the loan or in other concealed forms,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a term up to one year or fine up to 5,000 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The same acts committed either professionally or by making use of the embarrassed state of the borrower,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years With confiscation of part of the property or without such confiscation, or with fine up to ten thousand rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Making available for use of means of production and cattle for a monetary remuneration or remuneration in kind or on condition of payment by labor obviously in excess of the customary amount for this locality, making use of the need or embarrassed position of the user,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to one year. Mar. 29, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 38, Article 283).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Extortion, i.e., demanding of transfer of property advantages or rights to property or committing of any kind of actions, of a property character, through fear of coercion of the person of the sufferer, spreading of defaming information or destruction of his property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated destruction or damage of property belonging to private persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts when committed by means of arson, flooding, or any other generally dangerous methods,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts if they are followed by loss of human life or a community misfortune,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Omission by a captain of one of the ships involved in a collision at sea of taking necessary measures for the saving of the other ship, in so far as such measures could be taken without serious danger to the said captain’s passengers, crew, or ship, regardless of the responsibility for not extending help to the crew and the passengers of the ship suffering from the calamity (Art. 156)—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Making public an invention before registration without the consent of the inventor, as well as unauthorized uses of literary, musical, or other artistic or scientific productions with infractions of the copyright law,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to three months or fine up to 1,000 rubles. August 30, 1931 (Collection of Acts, No. 59, Article 429).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Unauthorized use for purposes of unethical competition of someone else’s trade mark, design, model, as well as someone else’s firm name, or someone else’s name,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 3,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those familiar with women’s prisons in our own country will have missed “prostitution” from among the crimes enumerated in the Soviet Criminal Code. This practice is treated as a social problem in Russia, and rightly, in the opinion of most persons interested in penology, it is not held to be a crime. The six articles in the code directed against sex offenses, it will be noted, provide penalties for rape, or, in the interest of public health, for the infection of a person with a venereal disease by one aware that he (or she) has the disease. By treating prostitution as a social problem Russia has almost eliminated it. Women plying this trade are picked up by inspectors at railroad stations or other public places and taken, not to a jail, but to a prophylactorium where they are taught a useful trade with a view to removing the economic cause which is held to be the chief one in this practice. Many of the women at these centers have come voluntarily, the director of the prophylactorium in Moscow reports, through friends who have already received training and treatment. As a result of this omission from the Criminal Code, one does not find in women’s prisons that the chief cause of sentence is sex offense as it is in the United States, nor that the prisons are filled with a group who not only in the opinion of the author, but also in that of such organizations as the Women’s Prison Association of New York, should not have been sent there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who commits the crimes? Immediately following the Revolution the chief concern in regard to the crime situation was the suppression of those acts which jeopardized the authority of the Soviet government, but as the program of Socialist construction went forward, as they got the political situation more in hand, the type of prisoner began to change in the predominant number. Counter-revolutionary organizations were practically wiped out; the Kulak war, though still going on, somewhat thinned out, and in the residue of those of the criminal ranks there now appeared more of such types as constitute the convict population of other countries. In other words, the social composition of the group changed. Instead of there being more of an otherwise honest group of middle class farm people whose crimes consisted in efforts to overthrow a government, there was a rising percentage of ordinary criminals. This does not mean to say that the government is not still confronted with a great number of crimes against the state, by those of the bourgeoisie and Kulak class who, while not attempting to organize counter activities, still manage to get into collective farm or factory and cause a great deal of trouble, but it is noticeable that the other type of crimes is being given more attention and that programs of treatment are designed to apply to that problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In age, considering both sexes, the peak is reached in criminal acts at about twenty-four years. The curve descends sharply to forty and in a more leisurely fashion from forty to sixty. Official figures give the age group of 14-18 years as committing 2.5 per cent. of all crimes, 18-24 as being responsible for 25 per cent., and 24 and above, for the remaining. The crimes committed by the first group are almost wholly stealing; in the second group there are, of course, all sorts, but hooliganism figures large, and in the third there is every kind of law breaking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The youth, then, from 14-18 years are guilty of theft, more than of any other crime, both as to male and female, and next to that are crimes against the person—fisticuffs, breaking of bones, etc. Then, there shows up a phenomenon that is noted both in juveniles and adults—the female commits more crimes against the order of the government than do the men, relatively speaking. The author asked repeatedly for an explanation of this fact, and one man who had come from the rural districts, and is now an Intourist representative in Moscow, gave an interpretation which may or may not be right. It is interesting enough to pass on. The men, he said, did not resist collectivization so intensely when they saw that it was no use, but when a woman had collected a few goats or pigs, or a cow or two, it was no use trying to take them from her. She poisoned them first. No ideal of a final society in which she could take according to her needs could make up to her for the immediate loss of her treasures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is a more extensive comparison of the crimes committed by male and female transgressors. The first important thing to note is that the female is more given to excesses than the male in crimes of a less serious nature (Gernet, op. cit. p. 169). In one type of crime, hooliganism, the male is in the majority, with a percentage of 27.4 as against the female’s 2.8; but, in all other groups the woman is far in the lead. She commits six times the offenses of the men in insults, five times as many in the illegal manufacture of liquor, twice as many for assault, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in the crimes carrying sentences of above a year the men take the lead again. Note this table from an article Women in Correctional Labor Institutions, by A. Shestakova and B. Utievsky, included in the volume edited by Vishinsky. It shows clearly to what point women exceed in crime.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 358.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-bottom&amp;quot;| Length of sentence&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of male&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of female&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Up to 3 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 8.7&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 18.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 to 6 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 20.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 6 months to a year&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 16.8&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 1 year to 2 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.1&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 17.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 2 years to 3 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 13.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 years to 5 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 14.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 7.9&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 5 years to 10 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 12.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 4.5&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The social composition of the criminal group in the USSR is, as is to be expected, different from that of the ordinary capitalist country. In the first group of crimes mentioned the guilty are largely those of the village bourgeoisie and the rural Kulaks, who still struggle against the socialist order. They are persons who would not ordinarily be included in a criminal classification. Yet if we regard any legal definition of crime as including acts that contravene the rules and regulations of the proletariat society then they are actually criminals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this group commits most of the crimes against the state, the laborers themselves constitute the major portion of persons committing other types of crime. We find Professor Gernet,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; dividing them into owners of property or employers, and laborers. In theft we have a percentage of 12.2 for the first class, and 21.9 for the second; banditry is .8 per cent. for the first, and 1.7 per cent. for the second; murders 1.6 per cent. for the first, 2.4 per cent. for the second; hooliganism is 9.3 per cent. for the first, and 11.4 per cent. for the second. The situation is reversed in regard to crimes against the person. We find the first group there with a percentage of 10.5 and the second with 7.1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is some substantiation of the theory of the economic basis of crime which disciples of Marx and Lenin hold to so firmly in the fact that the curve for crime and unemployment rise and fall together. Russia claims to have no unemployment problem now, but there are those who do not work. There is always an idle band in any country. She has her dregs, misfits, and those who fall by the wayside from a variety of causes. And it is from this group that a large degree of criminals come. It furnishes its quota in Russia, too.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gernet, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is danger of getting too statistical. We want only to have a picture of the situation. Since 1928, the date already referred to as the beginning of a program to extend Socialism from villages to cities by means of collectivization, the curve for crimes against the state has risen. The Kulaks and the village middle class have waged a relentless war, apparently not daunted by what happens to those who are caught. Or, it may be heroism of a kind, even if a misplaced one. However, the expressed attitude of the authorities who administer the corrective labor system is steadfastly to win them over, to persuade and to educate in such a political fashion that they will be convinced. Whereas “crushing” was once the order of the day, the firmer establishment of the government now gives leeway for the more constructive measures. It is interesting to note that whoever is responsible for that political education knows his approaches well, if the statements of authorities are accurate. They have released enough, they say, to see what zealous citizens it turns back to society. I have no figures on it. But as I said in the preface, they know what they want of the man who is their criminal. Given that, accomplishment is easier. It is no small thing to persuade a man that the society he thought he was against was his all the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER V: WHAT THE COURTS ARE LIKE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; courts of Russia, in their present form a result of seventeen years of revolutionary evolution, and a mixture of proletarian ideas with older principles of justice, represent one of the most interesting developments in the country. It has been the aim of Soviet rule that the working class should by its participation in government be able to take part in carrying out the laws of the land. The administration of justice by the proletariat through which “Every representative of the masses, every citizen, must be placed in such conditions that he will be able to take part in discussing the laws of the state, in the choosing of his representatives, and in the carrying out of the laws of the state,” was a principle expressed by Lenin as early as 1918. The policy in political education has moved steadily toward the fulfillment of this plan. The use of jurors and their selection yearly in such a manner as will include a great number in the service is one way in which participation in administering and discussing laws is being carried out. Another is in the use of comradely courts carried on by the people of village or factory, which are later discussed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The responsibility of the courts in the establishment of strict legality has been increased tremendously by two recent events. The first was the meeting in April, 1934, of the first All-Union Conference of Jurists which made wide recommendations in regard to attaining a higher quality of work on the part of courts, prosecution, and correctional labor institutions. The second act of significance was the reorganization of the OGPU by the formation of the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the transference of all judicial functions to the courts of the land. It takes brief time and space for this last statement, but it would require a good many pages to discuss the full significance of the step, and a number are devoted to it a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the work of the All-Union Conference of Jurists, it is of high significance just now when the observance of legality and the establishment of a wide legal consciousness are so important in the relatively advanced stage of socialist construction which the state is entering. Openness must be the observed principle, and secrecy, even though legally judicial, discouraged, if confidence is to be widespread. A government cannot continue turning trials over to secret tribunals outside its judicial system and enjoy a reputation, even among its own loyal masses, of being adequately established. A normality of functions of institutions can go far toward establishing, even if only psychologically at first, a normality of conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Likewise, sentences must be constructive. This was not a new note as will be seen throughout this book. All along the party program had advocated an educational approach to the treatment of criminals, and year by year had strengthened provisions for realizing the fulfillment of its plans. But the emphasis on this problem by so authoritative a body brought it freshly to the attention of the courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0086.svg|SCHEME OF TRIAL IN RSFSR|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Note the recommendation of the Conference in this regard. “In order to insure the effectiveness of judicial work, the judges should endeavor to ascertain the economic and social-political results of the verdict rendered by them, being assisted in this work by public opinion organized around the judicial institutions.” The same body placed a responsibility for prevention of crime on its courts. It was not only a duty to pronounce a sentence on a guilty person, but the tribunal must by means of its favorable position discover the reason for the circumstance of the crime. The recommendation ran, “The court, when trying a case, should not only establish the guilty persons but should also disclose those economic and organizational defects and shortcomings which create a favorable atmosphere for criminal actions, signalizing such circumstances to the attention of the Party and Soviet organs by means of special riders. The results of such signalizing should be checked up from time to time.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, as an important instrument in the accomplishing of the socialist society which is the goal of the people, the court’s function is first to subdue the enemies that would undermine any such progress, and second to aid in giving discipline and control to those of the proletariat themselves who are not strong enough on their own account. Added to that, it is an organ of prevention.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not within the purpose of this volume to give a detailed description of the system of courts existing in the country at present, but a brief account is necessary. Before going further it may be well to repeat the reminder that a class distinction is fundamental in administering the criminal law in the USSR. This statement will appear too many times very likely, in relation to various phases of the subject, but it is important. The court as an organ of the state is devoted in its administration of law to carrying out the purpose and policy of the state, and since the class idea is prevalent in the government, it will have to be also in court action. With this explanation we proceed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is at the very bottom of the judicial system the People’s Courts.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Military crimes are under the jurisdiction of military tribunals and transport crimes of the transport courts of the various railway lines.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The territory represented by one such has a population of from 20,000 to 100,000. Its jurisdiction may include any case against property or person not carrying a death sentence, although the more serious ones go in actual practice to the higher courts. It has other functions than as a lower court of the first instance. It is a member of the observation commission which supervises the correctional labor policy at the local penitentiary or correctional labor institution. It has an administrative function when the judge, sitting without the jurors in a “business session,” decides whether the evidence gathered in a preliminary investigation is sufficient to warrant court proceedings.&lt;br /&gt;
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In trials the People’s Court is presided over by a judge assisted by two jurors who actually have most of the rights and responsibilities of the judge, and might, therefore, be called co-judges. The judges for the People’s Courts are elected for a one-year term by the local Soviet and may be recalled either by the same body or by the Commissar of Justice for sufficient cause. This provision for impeachability is one of the basic principles of organization of the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0089.svg|COURT TRIAL|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The judges of these lower courts are representatives of the working class for they themselves are of their number. A judge (and, he seemed an adequate one), in a city court of Moscow with whom the writer talked was a baker before he took up his present profession. The qualifications of the office are that in addition to being from among the toilers the judge must have “a record of two years’ responsible work in state or workers’ and peasants’ public trade union, or party organization of the workers, or of three years’ practical work in organs of Soviet justice in the capacity of not less than judicial investigators.” Whether this may be regarded as high fitness or not, it seems to insure the selection of men of fair ability for the job. Perhaps it is that business of recall that makes them so careful, but those whom the writer saw sitting were impressive in their earnestness and efforts to arrive at a constructive sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
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The jurors, whom we may think of as co-judges, are about 40 per cent. women and 60 per cent. men. These persons are elected by factory committees, Red Army sections, and village Soviets, and a special commission distributes the number to be elected among these various groups in the percentage of 50 per cent. to the first, 15 per cent. to the second, and 35 per cent. to the third. There are no specific qualifications, except the right to vote, but there is the restriction that “A person has no right to be a juror, if he has been expelled from a social or professional organization for a disgraceful offense or conduct, for a period of three years from the day of expulsion. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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The names of the candidates for jurors are posted, and objections, if motivated, may be presented to the election committee. When the list of elected ones is finally sent to the commission, the latter prepares another list of those to serve in the various courts. Each serves for only six days of the year, and during absence from work in the act of performing this duty the worker retains his place and wage of employment.&lt;br /&gt;
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While there seems to be no specific preparation for the task of a juror beyond the requirement that the judge explain to those who sit with him their rights and duties, there are conferences held and some evening classes which acquaint them better with the work before them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Before we pass to the consideration of the next step in the Soviet judicature it would perhaps help in getting a clear picture of jurisdiction and procedure to take a look at some of the cases before the People’s Court. A typical day is described from the writer’s notes.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first trial we attended in the morning the room used was a small one, perhaps with a capacity for seating forty people altogether. It was on the ground floor of the building, and street cars clanging along their track outside made hearing difficult. On a slightly raised dais underneath a picture of Lenin there was a long plain table covered with a green cloth. Three chairs were placed at the back and one at the end. Three men and a woman, evidently having something to do with the case about to be tried, were already in the court room when we entered. The benches on which we took our places were arranged on either side of the narrow aisle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Exactly at the hour set for the beginning of court, a door at the back of the room opened and a man, accompanied by two women, entered. The women sat in the outside chairs at the back of the table; the man took the center one. Already the young woman, who had been in the room on our arrival had seated herself at the end of the table. She was the clerk, the man was the judge, the two women the jurors.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judge was obviously of the toiling classes, as were also the women. The judge, with his short black mustache, his close-cropped hair, his ordinary working clothes consisting of dark suit and blue shirt, ignored us and immediately got to work. The women were perhaps a little more conscious of our presence. The older in particular reached up to push back her hair, a little later smoothed her dress, a simple black cotton one. We noticed that her hands had seen much work. The other woman, about thirty and good looking, turned curious eyes toward us a moment, but finally gave her attention to the men who were seated on the front bench ahead of us.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judge adjusted his glasses and read from the papers in his hand. The plaintiff had worked faithfully for a school, discharging all his duties as per requirement, but he had not been paid. He was asking for his money.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were no attorneys, neither defense nor for the plaintiff. The plaintiff had his witness; he told his story, then summoned his corroborator, who had been excluded as required by law. The school representative told his side. The women jurors, forgetting us by that time, listened attentively, and the older asked frequent questions. The judge too, interrogated often.&lt;br /&gt;
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It seemed obvious to us that the verdict should favor the man whose wages had been withheld, but it is difficult to tell about court decisions. We waited an instant; the three behind the table conferred so briefly that it was plain there was no dissension. The school was ordered to pay, and was fined five rubles. As simply as that and requiring hardly more time than the telling here, it was finished.&lt;br /&gt;
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We left the room as the next case was called and went upstairs. A trial of some seriousness was in progress there. The judge sitting appeared of unusual intelligence. He was leaning forward, questioning the man in front of him, and he took no note, apparently, of our entry. One juror was a woman, the other a man. There was the same long table, the clerk at the end, a red cloth (Communist symbol), instead of the green, an especially attractive picture of Lenin, and one of Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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We asked cautiously of one of the spectators what the case was about. A factory director was on trial, accused of criminal negligence by the workmen, because he had been given money to insure the factory against fire some three or four months previously, and had failed to do so, thus imperiling the lives of those who worked there.&lt;br /&gt;
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But even though there might have been a severe sentence, if the motive was proved sufficiently base, there still were no attorneys, either for the state or defense. The defendant told his story. He had been ill and on vacation, but the matter of insurance would have his immediate attention, he said. He brought in his witnesses; but the workers’ evidence outweighed his. He had been warned, they said, and he had gone carelessly on.&lt;br /&gt;
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But, said his witness, he had been a good worker. He had managed his factory well. It had done its prescribed quota and more. It was not right nor just that he should suffer for one negligent act.&lt;br /&gt;
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The verdict was not so simple. The judge and jury retired into the mystery of the consultation room at the back. We sat wondering what sort of penalty, in case guilt was adjudged, would be imposed. Five minutes passed and they returned. The man was held guilty of negligence, and since he had been warned, and since the act was of a serious nature, imperiling the lives of workers and the property of the state, some measure must be used to impress him. He stood quietly, but the fingers of the hand hanging at his side worked nervously. The judge paused a bare moment, shuffled his papers, and then spoke.&lt;br /&gt;
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For six months the man was to have no political rights and his party connections were to be cut off. But he was to stay in his job; go right on with the work he had done so well, and give up fifteen per cent. of his salary for the six month period. Even the accused seemed to feel that the penalty was just, and there was obvious agreement among those who listened.&lt;br /&gt;
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So much for the People’s Court, the basic nucleus in the Russian judicial system. Now, for the second step in the judicature. The People’s Court takes care of the great mass of cases, both criminal and civil, and in addition exercises a function of supervision in regard to the village public courts and comradely courts of factories and other state institutions. But this will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just now we pass to the Regional Court. It is both a court of cassational instance (the form review of a criminal case usually takes in the USSR) and a court of original jurisdiction for more serious cases. Its territory comprises a province or region of three to eleven millions population. It is, first of all, the organ of control of all the courts within its region. It supervises the work of the People’s judges, as well as selects and presents the names of such to the regional executive committees for election.&lt;br /&gt;
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A word must be said here as to the use of the cassational method. The court of appeals was abolished by the first decree issued by the Soviets on the courts, and in its place was the following provision.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Act 349 of Code of Criminal Procedure, now in force.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Complaints from verdicts of the People’s Courts may be lodged by each of the interested parties exclusively on account of formal infringement of the rights and interests of the given party in the conduct of the case or in the judicial examination of the case, and as such constitute cassation complaints, and may not touch upon the substance of the verdict.” Thus the law seems to prevent the right of the court to go into the substance of the case. Such, however, is not actually a fact.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ruling of the Supreme Court in regard to criminal cassation, in 1924, laid down the general rule for cassation review which is still followed. “The court of criminal cassation, being a cassation court in that it does not go into the substance of the case, at the same time avoids a purely formal bureaucratic approach to the case. While never turning into a court of appeals, it does not hypocritically shut its eyes to the substance; manifest lack of elucidation of the circumstances which should have influenced the verdict, inconsistency of the punishment with the crimes committed, manifest errors and contradictions between the verdict and the undeniable facts of the case, . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a form of revision on the complaint of the proper parties, which combines the elements of cassation as practiced by the French courts with a method of appeal and together make up the cassation-revision form of investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
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These complaints may be made by the defendant and his lawyer, the state prosecutor, the plaintiff and his legal representative, or by the legal suitor and his representative. Complaints by any other persons result in the case being handled by judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
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The form of the complaint follows no standard rule. A peasant may write a few words on a piece of paper, without even setting forth his argument, and the case will pass to the proper cassation court and be completely checked up.&lt;br /&gt;
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The form of judicial supervision differs somewhat from the cassation method. The latter depends on the action of the parties concerned while the first depends on the intervention of the chairman or prosecutor of the court of the first instance. From this it can be seen that the normal way to have a criminal case reviewed is by the cassation method, on complaint by the interested parties.&lt;br /&gt;
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We will pass from the work of the Regional Court as a court of cassation or supervision to look at a case which it tries in its capacity as a tribunal of first instance. In cases of appeal there are three judges sitting, but in cases of original jurisdiction there is the one judge and two jurors just as in the lower court. The judges of the Regional Court are elected by the Regional Executive Committee from a list of names presented by the Commissar of Justice. Their term of office is for one year. The qualifications are that in addition to the requirements for a People’s judge, the candidate shall also have served in a judicial capacity in a position not lower than the People’s Court for a period of three years.&lt;br /&gt;
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On our visit to the regional court we found a somewhat larger room, seating perhaps a hundred persons, but still lacking any formal atmosphere. Its standing capacity was crowded when we arrived. Even the door leading to the corridor was open and filled with men and women. We attempted to look over, but the spectators politely made way for us. We saw, as we edged forward, the usual picture of Lenin, the familiar red cloth on the table. One knew at once by the atmosphere of the room that a case of interest was in process of trial. The judge and jurors were already in their places and the judge was reading the charge which alleged that the four young men and a girl on the front seats in the custody of an officer, had some two weeks before entered and robbed the house of the woman across the aisle from them, and that such robbery was accompanied by the use of a firearm in which the husband was wounded. No murder, however, was done. In that case death could have been the assessed penalty.&lt;br /&gt;
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Three attorneys for the defendants sat at the side of the room, but as the trial proceeded we noticed how little part they took. The judge questioned the defendants, and got the story almost entirely from them. Witnesses were there and the judge and jurors interrogated them as they came, but they turned again and again to the accused to check up, to give them a chance to verify or deny. The procedure was highly informal. The court sought to find out the truth of the matter, but we soon saw that the inquiry went even beyond that. True to the duty imposed on him in the matter of discovering the reason for the circumstance, the judge pursued his questioning. He wanted to find the motive for such conduct. To discover that he questioned the young criminals on the whole circumstances of their lives, of their social background, without regard to apparent relevancy. Guilt was not in question, but the “measure of social defense” to be applied depended on the whole circumstance of the deed. One of the offenders had run away from his home with his grandmother, from a good job, but he appeared to have been led by the older who admitted that he did not want to work. The girl, defiantly, confessed. The youth, who used the gun, was asked again why he shot the man. He looked down and said he did not know, unless it was because the victim did not raise his hands soon enough. The spectators, jammed to the door and tense, laughed in relief. The judge did not reprove them, but he did not laugh, and the room became quickly silent.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judge surveyed the defendants with something of sorrow; we were particularly interested in his attitude for he appeared to be concerned that the young people should deliberately choose such a career, and gave occasional words of admonition. But judges and citizens alike in the USSR have faith in what labor of a correctional sort can do for the construction of character. The next day the young offenders were sentenced to institutions where the ruling principle, in accordance with Soviet policy, is to teach them the dignity of work, and how to do some important kind well, and where they will be given certain cultural and political education.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is next in the system the Supreme Courts of the seven republics—much like our own state Supreme tribunals—which act both as organs of judicial control for all courts of the territory, as courts of appeal for those lower courts subject to their jurisdiction, and as courts of original jurisdiction in more serious cases. The judges of these courts are elected by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the top of the judicial system is the Supreme Court of the USSR. It is, of course, the organ of highest judicial supervision, and in its various branches acts as a court of appeals of all cases from various lower tribunals. The Military Section reviews the cases appealed from the military tribunals, the Transport Section performs the same function for those appealed from the railroad courts. Its judges are elected by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for a term of one year, and they must have had at least three years’ service as judge of the People’s Court.&lt;br /&gt;
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In original jurisdiction this court has only the most important cases in the Union. The Code of Criminal Procedure specifies: “The Judicial Department of the Supreme Court as a court of first instance, shall take jurisdiction (1) over cases of exceptional importance, when sent to it for trial by the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as cases offered for adjudication by the People’s Commissar of Justice, the Prosecutor of the Republic [now, the Attorney General] or the chairman of the State Political Bureau (OGPU). The Supreme Court has the right to accept for its adjudication or transfer for adjudication to any provincial court at its discretion cases offered for its adjudication by the prosecutor of the republic or Chairman of the OGPU. (2) Over cases involving offenses in office committed by members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the people’s commissars and members of the &#039;&#039;Collegiums&#039;&#039; of People’s Commissariats, members of the Supreme Court, the assistant prosecutors of the Republic. (3) Over cases of alleged offenses in office on the part of the provincial prosecutors and their assistants, the members of the presidium of the provincial executive committee, heads of its departments, chairmen or deputy chairmen of the provincial court.” All cases enumerated in this paragraph may be accepted by the Supreme Court for its adjudication or transferred by it to a provincial court depending on the importance of the case.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 449.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In several of these cases jurisdiction is not mandatory and may be transferred to other appropriate courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the cases tried by it and familiar to most Americans was the Metropolitan-Vickers case of two years ago, in which a certain group of Englishmen was accused of sabotage. But to continue the method used in discussing the lower courts, let us again consider a case. The following was appealed from the Siberian Regional Court, and does not present the human elements of cases of the first instance, yet it has its interesting points.&lt;br /&gt;
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The building itself is a scant two blocks from the spot where Lenin lies in his red granite tomb. There was a militiaman inside the entrance who directed us upstairs to the proper room. Another officer was in the hall but he only looked at us curiously as we went by. It is the highest court of the land, and we were impressed by the informality of the approach.&lt;br /&gt;
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Three judges presided in the room which presented a more formal appearance than those of the courts visited previously. An armed guard stood at the door leading out into the room at the back. Across the aisle from us sat three lawyers, the defense counsel. At the end of the table was the prosecuting attorney, a woman of some thirty years, who seemed competent and determined. Above the judges the usual portrait of Lenin looked down upon us. As we entered two young Russian women got up from the benches at the front to make way for us. They were the wives of the two condemned men whose case was on appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judges themselves, all men, were impressive in their dignity, and seemed intelligent and capable. They were dressed simply in ordinary street clothes, the dark shirt of one was open at the throat. One of them, not the chairman, read the charge in the original case. Two men had been condemned to die for murder and robbery. One, the manager of a fur factory, had stolen money to the amount of 7,500 rubles from the factory, and he and a companion, in a boat with a third, were crossing a lake. The third had a sum of money in his possession. While they stopped on the shore of the lake the first two sent the third for wood, and as he returned, they waylaid him and clubbed him to death. The Siberian Regional Court had sentenced the men to be shot.&lt;br /&gt;
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After the reading, one of the defense attorneys spoke at length. In Russia there is no death sentence for murder, but for robbery in which murder occurs such a penalty is attached. The counsel, realizing that weight of evidence was against him, tried to separate the crime into two distinct acts. It was his one chance. The murder had been motivated by other causes, he said, and robbery followed as an afterthought. He contended also that the stick with which the man was killed did not constitute a weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, his argument did not hold and in addition the prosecutor pointed out that the one man had already stolen money from the state, which act in itself might carry the death penalty. The judges retired and we discussed the case while we waited. The defense attorney, who had spoken, walked up and down the aisle. The two wives were quietly huddled in seats farther back. A bell sounded, the court returned, and the chairman or presiding judge read the decision allowing the sentence to stand.&lt;br /&gt;
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The case illustrated also the speed with which trials are completed after the crime is known. The murder of the man had occurred in October of 1933, but the body was not discovered until the latter part of June of 1934. There was no certainty of the third man’s death until that time as the other two had steadfastly maintained that he had left them. But less than one month after the discovery of the body, the two men had been tried and condemned to death. That was on July 19, and it was on August 9th that we heard the Supreme Court uphold the sentence. That is probably one of the main reasons why such deeds do not flourish there.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is still to mention the village public courts and the comradely courts of factories and various institutions. These occupy a special place in the judicial system and were therefore not mentioned except in passing in the beginning of the chapter. They are under the supervision of the People’s Courts, and are for the purpose of interesting the large masses of people in handling such violations of laws as occur in factory or village. Among such problems would be disorganization of production in factory, on the farm, or in offices, as well as drunkenness, indolence, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
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These courts are of, by, and for the people. There may be some little matter of form separating the masses from the formal courts, but they handle these among themselves. At a meeting of the workers of a given village a chairman and not less than ten members are elected to sit as a court. The factory conference follows the same plan, and elects a chairman, one or more substitutes, and not less than ten members, the exact number to be decided upon, from among the shockworkers of the factory or office.&lt;br /&gt;
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The People’s Court, functioning as a supervisor of these organs, may decide that a case is outside their competency, and take it from them or cancel the decision in a case that is considered not to have been within their jurisdiction, but the decision given in cases which are considered to be proper to them is final and subject to no appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
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A friend who was a spectator of the proceedings related the following case to the writer. A man had been drunk and had beaten his wife, not injuring her but outraging the village. In the presence of a large group of interested neighbors, the court assembled and tried him and decided that he must go forth from the apartment where he lived with his family and shift for himself as best he could. He did not deserve the shelter the home afforded him. There was no appeal. He left.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are more definitely the types of cases handled by the comradely courts which, like the village public courts are free from any formal judicial rules?&lt;br /&gt;
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The following is quoted from a lecture delivered by S. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The comradely courts examine cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) of violation of labor discipline, to wit: repeated late-coming for work, staying away from work, reporting for work in a drunken condition;&lt;br /&gt;
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(b) of systematic neglectful attitude to socialist property (machines, tools, materials, premises, etc.);&lt;br /&gt;
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(c) of turning out misfits above the allowed limit;&lt;br /&gt;
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(d) of insults either by word of mouth or in writing, or action (spreading false derogatory stories about individuals), and inflicting blows without bodily injury;&lt;br /&gt;
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(e) of thefts from factory and office by workers upon the territory of the enterprise, as well as of materials and tools belonging to the enterprise to the value of not more than 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) of Hooliganism that is not subject to criminal prosecution, and other behavior which does not correspond with the requirements of public decency and reflects the negative sides of social life.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
From the same source is taken the following list of penalties imposed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The following penalties may be imposed by the comradely courts:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) public warning;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) public censure with announcement in the wallnewspaper or in general press;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) a fine of not more than 10 rubles for the benefit of public organizations (Chemical Defense Society, Children’s Friends, etc.) ;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) reparation of damage caused to property, if not in excess of 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) raising the question before the administration of discharging the culprit;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) raising the question before the trade union of expelling a member from the union for a stated period.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Examination of the cases must take place not later than five days from the time of registration of the complaint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a closing paragraph I set down the basic principles of organization of the Soviet Courts. It summarizes what has gone before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;(a) administration of justice exclusively by toilers;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) election of judges and accountability before the electors;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) impeachability of judges, the latter being independent from any local or personal influences but most intimately bound up with their class and called upon to carry out the policy of their class;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) collegiate trial of judicial cases, as a rule, by a body of three people with an assured majority to the people’s jurors, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) participation of jurors in trial and judgment upon equal terms with the state judges, both in regard to fact and in regard to law, i.e., in the full scope of the rights of the state judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER VI: THE PRELIMINARY STAGE ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Let&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; us start with the beginning. The Criminal Code of 1927 specifies how proceedings may be begun. We should expect that there would be an arrest, but this may not be the case. In fact it is unlikely except in the more serious cases. In the lesser ones there will almost surely be none at all. What happens then? There are two main possibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
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First of all, the prosecutor, the investigators, the militia or the agency of Administration of State Safety of the People’s Commissariat of the Interior (formerly the OGPU) may start proceedings when they know or are informed of a criminal act. Since these organs are by their nature in a position to know of criminal law violations, it is usual for a case to start with them. The course they take will be discussed in a moment.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second manner in which criminal procedure is usually instituted is on complaint made to a competent authority by a person, an organization, an official, or by a confession on the part of the criminal, in which the officials proceed as mentioned above, if there is evidence of a criminal act. Otherwise they take no action, and so notify the complaining person or agent, in which case he may appeal to a proper court if he so wishes. Thus, if a citizen comes to a proper authority and complains, either orally or by writing, of some act, but does not present sufficient evidence that a crime has taken place, the authority refuses to start initial proceedings. Often, not even a confession on the part of the supposed guilty party will be accepted as &#039;&#039;prima facie&#039;&#039; evidence. This decision on the part of the authority not to proceed may, however, be appealed to the competent court within seven days.&lt;br /&gt;
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When once this evidence is accepted as indicating that a crime has been committed there may or may not be an arrest. Quite naturally, if a serious crime has been committed such as murder, and the criminal is making an effort to escape, there is arrest and detention. The law, however, states&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, 1923, section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “No person shall be deprived of his liberty and taken into custody otherwise than in the instances and in the manner provided by law.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Later, in the same edition of the Code,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 100.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there is an enumeration of the cases in which an arrest may be legally made. They are “(1) When a criminal is apprehended while making direct preparations, or while actually engaged in commission of the crime, or immediately afterwards; (2) When the victim or eye witnesses point to a given person as the one who committed the crime; (3) When articles of evidence are found on the person of a suspect or in his dwelling; (4) When a suspect attempted to flee or is apprehended while in flight; (5) When a suspect has no domicile or a permanent occupation; (6) When a suspect cannot identify himself.” These are the six instances in which an arrest may be made. The police, however, may use their judgment as to the necessity of such action, and in the event of detaining the supposed criminal they must report within twenty-four hours either to the prosecutor or to a judge of the People’s Court, in whose jurisdiction the case may be, giving information as to who made the arrest, when, where, and at what hour, information obtained in regard to the person held, the crime with which he is charged, reason for the arrest, and the name of the official signing the order for arrest.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 107, Commentaries.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the evidence obtained is sufficient to warrant holding the person for investigation the authority to whom the report is made gives his assent. Otherwise he reverses the decision and the man is released.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the absence of these conditions an arrest may not be made and in that event the method of securing attendance is to have the suspected person sign a declaration that he will appear when summoned.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Criminal Code of 1927, Section 103.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, there is a way provided to meet necessity. If the act committed appears to be of a nature so serious that it would carry a penalty of more than a year’s sentence to imprisonment, one of the above measures may be selected so that he may be held.&lt;br /&gt;
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While it is usually the police organs acting as investigators who take a person into custody at the beginning of a trial, the investigator may also order an arrest. The Code in Section 145 provides: “Means of cutting off the possibility of escape shall be selected only after the suspected person has been formally accused and can be altered or abolished after the first questioning. In exceptional cases these means may also be applied to mere suspects who have not yet been declared accused.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Who makes arrests in the USSR? The police force is the militia. This organ not only makes the elementary inquiry on cases which come under the jurisdiction of the investigator—to be discussed more fully in later paragraphs of this chapter—but they may themselves also conduct such preliminary investigation in all other cases. Besides carrying out the official open investigation they also carry on detective activity in order to establish grounds for future criminal trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there is another agent of arrest. Wherever Russia is known, the “Gay-Pay-Oo” is a familiar institution. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; of early revolutionary days gave way in 1922, in the days of NEP, to an organ a little less frightening. But the OGPU had an ability on its own account to send shivers down the backs of people and caused would-be lawbreakers of the less hardy type to check their actions. If those critics, who feared that NEP ushered in an era that would in its mildness take power from the direct hands of the proletariat and turn it over to well-established revolutionary law, had waited for this organ to be in action they would have been reassured. Whether all the deeds attributed to this secret police be truly theirs or not, it is certain that it has been an effective means of protecting Soviet authority. It has been a court unto itself as well. It was, until July 10, 1934, empowered to punish even by shooting “all persons apprehended while participating in a banditry raid or armed robbery,” and the purpose for which it was avowedly organized was to “unite all the revolutionary powers of the republics for the purpose of combatting political and economic counter-revolution, espionage and banditry.” It is in this enumeration of crimes that it has jurisdiction as an organ of preliminary investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This organization has directed most of its attention to counter-revolutionary activities and uses its judicial powers mostly against the enemy class. Ordinary criminals arrested by it are usually turned over to the courts for trial. As for the actual number shot during recent years, there seems no way to judge, but indications are that they have been sparing in executions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chamberlin, Soviet Russia, p. 390.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are other phases of their work such as the maintaining of places of deprivation of liberty which will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
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The OGPU has recently been incorporated into the newly formed All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs as the Administration of State Safety, and its judicial &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; has been abolished. The significance of this is apparent. It ends a chapter in the history of Soviet Russia. Cases once disposed of by this organization now will pass through the courts, and the pictures the world held of midnight secret trials will have to be put away. While the activities of the OGPU were duly authorized by law, the possibilities of excesses under such a system seem apparent, and the establishment of a more definite order of legality is bound to produce a quieter confidence. Because of the widespread interest in the transferring of this authority, the entire decree is given here.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) To form an All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, including in its composition the United State Political Department (OGPU).&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs is to be entrusted with:&lt;br /&gt;
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(a) The guaranteeing of revolutionary order and state security.&lt;br /&gt;
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(b) The protection of public (socialist) property.&lt;br /&gt;
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(c) Registration of civil acts (registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces).&lt;br /&gt;
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(d) Protection of the frontiers.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The following departments are to be formed in the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs:&lt;br /&gt;
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(a)Chief Department of State Security.&lt;br /&gt;
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(b) Chief Department of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia.&lt;br /&gt;
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(c) Chief Department of Frontier and Internal Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
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(d) Chief Department of Fire Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
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(e) Chief Department of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements.&lt;br /&gt;
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(f) Department of Civil Acts.&lt;br /&gt;
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(g) Administrative and Business Department.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) To organize in the Union Republics People’s Commissariats of Home Affairs, acting on the basis of the law on the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, and in the RSFSR to establish instead of a People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs for the Republic an Institute Plenipotentiary for Home Affairs of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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Departments of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the Union Republics are to be organized in the autonomous republics, regions and provinces.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) To abolish the judicial collegium of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
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(6) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs are to send all cases of crimes on the completion of their investigation to the competent judicial organs in accordance with the legal requirements.&lt;br /&gt;
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(7) Cases under the Department of State Security of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs are to be directed to the Supreme Court of the USSR, while cases of such crimes as high treason, espionage and similar crimes are to be handed over to the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR or to the competent military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
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(8) A special conference is to be organized under the People’s Commissar of Home Affairs of the USSR which, on the basis of the regulations, is to be entrusted with the right of applying, by administrative order, banishment, exile, imprisonment in corrective labor camps for a period not exceeding five years and banishment beyond the frontiers of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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(9) To instruct the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR to present to the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR regulations for the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
What judicial authority is to handle the cases previously in the jurisdiction of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of the OGPU? Here is the decree:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In connection with the organization of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and with the object of insuring the proper consideration of cases handed over to the judicial organs and investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Cases of state crimes (counter-revolutionary and against administrative order), with the exception of those indicated in the subsequent points of this section, investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and also. the principal courts of the autonomous republics.&lt;br /&gt;
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Special collegiums composed of a chairman and two members of the Court, are to be formed in the judicial institutions of the USSR and Union republics, named for the consideration of these cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) Cases of high treason, espionage, terrorism, causing explosions, incendiarism and other forms of crime (Art. 6, 8 and 9 of the law on state crimes), investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and competent military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) Cases of crimes on the railway and water transport, investigated by the same organs are subject to the jurisdiction of the railway and water transport collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the courts of the railways and water transport to which they belong.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) All other cases, investigated by the same organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Courts in the usual order.&lt;br /&gt;
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II&lt;br /&gt;
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For the consideration of appeals against the resolutions of the Plenums and Presidiums of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, and also appeals against the sentences, decisions and definitions of the collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR, a judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR is to be established which is to be composed of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and two of his deputies, who are to have the right of directly rescinding or changing the resolutions, definitions, decisions and sentences of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics and Collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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Considerations of cases in the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR are to take place with the obligatory participation of the State Prosecutor of the USSR or his deputy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Resolutions of the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR may be appealed against by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the State Prosecutor of the USSR in the plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR and in the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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III&lt;br /&gt;
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In conformity with sections I and II of this decree, to recognize the necessity of strengthening the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
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To instruct the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics to oblige the People’s Commissariats of Justice and Chairmen of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics to work out and carry through in the fixed order, within a period of five days, appropriate additions to the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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To instruct the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR to work out and carry through in fixed order, within the same period, addition to the staffs of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus does Russia make another advance in the administration of her criminal law.&lt;br /&gt;
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With proceedings begun, the next step is to determine by preliminary investigation if the suspect is to be definitely accused and held for trial. The purpose of this is to keep the court calendar from being crowded with cases which ought never to come to trial because the accusation is unfounded. It likewise guarantees the investigation and consideration of the substantial facts and saves much of the court’s time. The organs involved here are the prosecutor, the investigators appointed by him, and attached to his office, the police (militia) and the body formerly known as the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a great deal of informality and flexibility in the matter of this preliminary investigation. The investigator may take the whole matter into the atmosphere where the crime was committed. He may conduct it among the workers of the factory, if the act occurred there, in order that the workers themselves may aid in furnishing proofs, and in checking up the various facts. He also benefits in this way from the public opinion in regard to the case. This method of investigation in regard to labor crimes, both in factories and more recently in agricultural spheres, has been growing more and more common.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the more complex cases this investigation is carried on by the prosecutor himself after the initial evidence is turned over to him by the militia, organs of criminal detection, or other competent authority making the first inquiry. In lesser cases the investigating organ will usually prepare the case although the prosecutor may at any time examine the evidence and otherwise supervise the conduct of the case. Now that (since 1933) there is an Attorney General of the USSR, centralizing the prosecuting forces of the entire federated republics, the most important cases such as the famous Metropolitan-Vickers would be turned over to his personal supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this preliminary investigation it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney under whom it is carried on to see that evidence both for and against the suspect is gathered. If he neglects to see that the rights of the person under suspicion are protected and permits a case to come to trial when the evidence, if properly gathered, would indicate innocence, then he is laying up trouble for himself and will probably have to answer to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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To the end that all information and evidence may be secured, the investigator is given wide powers as to search and seizure of anything having a relation to the case. But if one thinks of rough-shod entry and abuse, he may be consoled by certain restrictions which the law places around such activities. In conducting searches and seizures the investigator calls in official witnesses. Persons participating in the case as parties to it, and relatives of the parties, cannot be official witnesses. And Sec. 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “the searches and seizures are to be made in daytime, except in cases which cannot be postponed.” The searcher is further ordered to announce his decision to make the search and to use all possible care to avoid damage (Section 179 of the same Code), and the additional protection is given to the accused in that the investigator is to see “that the facts of the private life of the person searched which have no relation with the case shall not be made public.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sec. 181.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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All articles seized in such a search must be listed, remarks made, and a copy deposited with the person or his family, and the articles themselves must be sealed at the place before being taken away.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 183, 184, 185.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Mail may also be seized by the investigator if permission has been given by the prosecutor, as may also any telegraphic or other communications, but the safeguard is provided that a representative of the postal-telegraphic institution must be present.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 186-188.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first stage of the preliminary investigation there is no “accused.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Except in such obvious cases that no investigation would be necessary. An example of this would be a man actually caught murdering another.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The aim at this time is to find if a criminal act has really been committed and if so who committed it. After the deed is decided to be of a criminal nature and is definitely attributed to a particular person or persons then the second stage is undertaken. At this time the “decision” is framed, and the accused is notified that he is to appear before the authority. This “decision” is written after the evidence has been carefully weighed and guilt indicated. This document must contain all the information and circumstances gathered up to that time.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the person has been finally accused he is summoned to appear before the investigator who is handling the case. He is not yet definitely held for trial. When he appears he is made acquainted with the accusation. “And that does not mean,” a prosecutor told the writer, “that he is given a chair and table and told to read the papers before him. The whole thing is explained to him by the authority in charge.” Thereafter he is questioned and given a chance to tell his side of the matter. His statements are checked and any new evidence is gathered.&lt;br /&gt;
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Steps must now be taken to insure his appearance during the completion of the investigation. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for five measures, as follows:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 144 and 150-154.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (1) He will not leave the place specified in the statement he signs without the permission of the proper authority which is the investigator or the court. (2) &#039;&#039;Personal or property parole&#039;&#039;. In the arrangement for property parole, the organization signing the bond must produce the accused when wanted or forfeit the sum of money agreed upon, but in the personal parole the persons (not less than two) who have agreed to produce the accused when wanted may, on failure to do so, be fined or sentenced to compulsory labor for a period up to three months. (3) &#039;&#039;Cash bail&#039;&#039;. Either he or other persons may deposit with the court a cash bail to insure his presence, the amount to be determined as in our courts, by the seriousness of the crime. (4) &#039;&#039;Detention in the home&#039;&#039;. The person may be restricted to his own home, as in the case of illness, or if a woman, because of pregnancy or of the care of her children. (5) &#039;&#039;Holding in custody&#039;&#039;. To be used in more serious cases. This latter is permissible only in certain prescribed cases. One of the conditions is that the case be of such a nature that the penalty, if conviction is secured, will be for a year or more of imprisonment. In addition one may be held in custody in cases covered by a definite enumeration in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which the sentence is not to exceed one year. The third possibility is in case of such serious crimes as banditry, or those of a socially dangerous nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the use of these measures the class nature of the criminal trial is strikingly portrayed. If the personality of the accused, or the crime he has committed, represents a high degree of social danger then one of the more severe measures is chosen. This would be the case for one appraised as a class enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The preliminary investigation may not yet be completed. If the evidence seems conclusive the prosecutor may end the preliminaries by simply drawing up the accusatory decision and conveying such information to the accused, but there may also be much more to this stage of procedure.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the appearance of the accused for questioning a whole new set of resources may be opened up. He mentions witnesses of his own, he gives his own testimony. His relatives must testify if needed. Apparently no one is omitted but the defendant’s counsel. And any falsifying or hiding of evidence on the part of any witness makes him liable to more severe punishment. Even though there is no oath administered due to the official attitude toward religion, there are still effective means of impressing a witness with the importance of telling the truth, one of which is to let him know what will happen to him if he is caught deviating from it!&lt;br /&gt;
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But to go back to the investigation. The accused may make certain requests or demands, and as indicated before, it is not only the duty of the investigating authority to see that they are met if reasonable, but if he neglects to take cognizance of any fact in favor of the defendant he is placing his own position in jeopardy. Not only must the investigator inquire into circumstances and facts that determine guilt or innocence, but he must also find out anything he can that will help in determining the measure of social defense to be given. What, for example, would be some of the things that he would want to know?&lt;br /&gt;
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First and foremost at this time is the question as to whether or not the act was committed in an attempt to restore the bourgeoisie to power; after that the motive and circumstances of the act. In Soviet jurisprudence circumstances play an important part in disposing of the case. The history of the accused himself will be of help if there is a consideration of insanity, the whole circumstances of the crime will establish whether there was coercion, or threat, or whether the offender was at the moment of committing the crime in a state of destitution, hunger, or strong excitement, or influenced by any extremity of personal or family conditions. All of these circumstances are considered extenuating and influence the penalty assessed.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the establishment of all relevant facts pertaining to the case the investigator may summon any experts deemed necessary. These must appear and give their conclusions no matter whether they aid or harm the accused, and a refusal to do so carries a fine of fifty rubles. The use of experts by the criminal courts in Russia will be discussed later but for the time being it may be said that such a custom is in wide use.&lt;br /&gt;
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The calling of experts or other witnesses may also be at the request of the accused. The law provides&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “The investigator shall not have the right to refuse the request of the accused or of the complainant to summon additional witnesses or examine experts if the facts or circumstances sought to be established may have any bearing on the case.” Not only that, but the investigator is likewise limited in interpreting some line of inquiry sought by the accused as not having relevant bearing on the case. Not only must he furnish some adequate grounds for such a refusal, but he must also state in writing his reason for taking such a stand.&lt;br /&gt;
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The number and kind of experts to be used are determined by the investigator if it is on his initiative that they are called. But if the defendant requests others he must call them, unless it is impossible to get the desired expert or unless the granting of this request would delay the preliminary hearing beyond the time legally set. It might be that the defendant would purposely request some one whom it was impossible to produce in order to secure delay, and in such an event, the investigator is naturally not forced to comply.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question of sanity may arise during the preliminary investigation and the proceedings may be dismissed on the grounds of insanity at the time of the commission of the act. If it is judged that the insanity has set in since the act then the trial is postponed until a cure is effected. There is a Judicial Psychiatric Institute where persons awaiting trial are observed for this purpose; but in order to facilitate the work of the medical staff the investigators gather all pertinent data as to the mental history of the accused.&lt;br /&gt;
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With all the information finally assembled the investigator is in a position to make his decision. The police organs, in their initial investigation, may discontinue the case if they find the evidence does not warrant going on. The investigator, if the case has been in his hands, may likewise discontinue for lack of sufficient evidence. And the prosecutor, with the collected data in his hands, may decide that there is no case. But if the person or organization first initiating proceedings is convinced that this is a mistake, the decisions in each of these cases may be appealed to the next higher authority and finally to the court of proper jurisdiction, within a month.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the investigator may decide to hold the accused for trial. In this event as soon as the investigation is completed the accused is notified of the decision and all the facts laid before him. He must be informed of his right to examine the entire records in the case, and the investigator must be sure that he is acquainted with the entire contents. If he is able to suggest anything to be added, the investigator must see that it is included before it finally leaves his hands. Any basic error in this stage of the proceedings may be the cause of a reversal by a higher court, so that great care must be taken to fulfill all points of law.&lt;br /&gt;
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A time limit is set by law as to the completion of this investigation. One used to American delays gasps at the speed with which these people dispense justice. One month from the time the defendant is formally accused the preliminary inquiry must be completed. However, this is not always possible, as appeals may be taken all along on the acts of investigator or prosecutor, and other delays may occur. But certainly all speed possible is used and there is no question of postponement of trial to the extent that we are accustomed to in our country.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the preliminary investigation completed the accused is formally held for trial. This may, in the simpler instances, be by the judge of the People’s Court in cases when there is no necessity for investigation or in those cases when the police officers make all investigations and forward the information to the People’s judge. This would be true in cases involving sentences of less than one year.&lt;br /&gt;
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In cases punishable by not less than one year sentence, yet not of so serious a nature as to require a preliminary inquiry, the investigator holds the accused for trial, on the basis of the information submitted to him by the police or OGPU. In such cases, all the evidence gathered together with the decision of the organs making the investigation is forwarded to the investigator, who, if he agrees submits the records to the competent court. There it is put on the trial list. If he feels that the conclusion to hold for trial is not warranted, then he may refer it to the court of proper jurisdiction for approval or rejection. In cases where the investigator himself is in charge of the preliminary inquiry he forwards his findings to the prosecutor, and he holds for trial in precisely the same way as was indicated above.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER VII: SCIENTIFIC AIDS TO THE COURT ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;It has&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; already been said that a heavy responsibility has been thrown on the courts in the USSR in regard not only to establishing guilt but also to finding, within the bounds of the provisions of the law, the proper measure of social defense to insure a corrective influence on the one on whom it is assessed. Guilt is often obvious, but the proper steps to take in an attempt to see that the offender does not repeat his crime do not usually show themselves with such clarity.&lt;br /&gt;
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The court, in trial, is not limited in any way in its efforts to get complete testimony and an accurate interpretation of such information. It is one of the fundamental principles of the administration of Soviet criminal law that the responsibility for the fullness and correctness of both investigation and verdict in the course of the trial rests on the court, and it may take any action on its own initiative to secure such ends. The prosecution and the defense may actually conduct the case within the bounds and direction which the court gives, but the court sets such limits and directions, interferes at any time on any point not cleared up by the argument, and decides on all questions relative to the examination. The court is independent of the opinion of either party in the trial and it is its responsibility to investigate any circumstance that appears essential to the case, whether the parties request it or not. It may likewise rule out what appears to be non-essential, even if it is requested by one of the parties. It is master of the whole proceedings and the expressed basic principle guiding its actions is to get at the truth of the incident involved and interpret the act in the light of all circumstances, so that a correct measure both for the protection of society from the socially dangerous and for the rehabilitation of the individual may be given.&lt;br /&gt;
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Superhuman wisdom would be required to fulfill such a demand if the judge acted alone, or even in conjunction with his co-judges, the two jurors. But the Code of Criminal Procedure has provided that he be supplied with whatever aid scientific research and endeavor can give. During the trial the court may call experts and it may also have the benefit of advice or testimony of specialized institutions connected with it.&lt;br /&gt;
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With no further evidence than the space devoted to the use of experts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, one would know that much importance was attached to the practice in the USSR. It is the subject of many articles, not only as regards the use of such aids in the court trial but, as already seen, in the preliminary trial as well. It might, because of its frequency, become a loose, taken-for-granted observance, but there are safeguards which make it a matter of serious regard.&lt;br /&gt;
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One matter of interest in the use of such experts as the defense itself may request to have called is that there is never any financial transaction between the two. The expert receives his fee from the state and in case the defendant is found guilty it is charged to him. This practice eliminates the possible sense on the part of the expert that he must give evidence, or rather interpretations, in favor of the man from whom he is receiving money. He has no feeling of obligation in this direction and is thus more disposed to give unprejudiced opinions. The spectacle of the bitter clashing of “alienists” hired by prosecution and defense is not likely to take place in a Soviet court room. Opinions naturally differ and on occasion the court may have to summon others, so that he may see which way the weight of opinion falls, but the dividing line is not due to a desire on the part of either to defend his client.&lt;br /&gt;
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Experts are called by the courts whenever specialized information of any kind that is desired is available. Article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Experts are called in when in the investigation and examination of the case, special knowledge in science, art, and the crafts is required.” And in a note to the same article it is further provided that “Experts must be called in to establish the cause of death and the character of bodily injuries, as well as in order to determine the psychic condition of the accused or of the witness if there be any doubt on this score in the opinion of the court or of the investigation.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A limitation is, of course, placed in that a science may not have grown in such a way as to furnish a reliable basis for inspection of evidence and conclusions. On the other hand something of an unusual nature may be called in a case presenting such a problem as one related to the author by a state prosecutor. In the USSR one causing a suicide receives a severe sentence. In a case of a double suicide of two women, there seemed no clue pointing to the guilt of any person until a small drawing was discovered. On the evidence obtained from this paper, with the aid of an expert in the identification of characteristics of lines and angles, an arrest was made and a confession and corroborating data obtained. This would not ordinarily be a legitimate line of expert aid, but in this case it afforded the only chance of detection. It is an excellent example of a case where expert testimony may be the only available resource.&lt;br /&gt;
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The expert, once summoned, has practically unlimited rights and privileges in gathering needed material for forming his conclusions. He is given all the data in the case for study, and he attends throughout the entire trial exactly as do the prosecution and defense. He may question the witnesses, ask for any further materials such as publications, documents, records, or even the subpœnaing of witnesses, and the court sees that his requests are granted. It is said that there is no known case of a refusal of co-operation with the expert on the part of either court or investigator. He is responsible in arriving at the proper solution of the case, and he is held accountable for any negligence in obtaining any information that can contribute to the accuracy of his conclusion. He may, make an error but he may not falsify, at least not without penalty. The Code of Criminal Procedure which devotes so much attention to this matter of experts says, “In regard to answering summonses, obligation to speak the truth, responsibility for false testimony, i.e., for deliberately false and not mistaken testimony, the expert shall be equal to witnesses.”&lt;br /&gt;
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But experts may disagree, even honestly and without regard to a fee! Also, it is conceivable that one might be inadequate. An American mind, at least one whose owner has attended court in the United States, might understand such a contention. The Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure takes care of that possibility, too. In Article 300 we find it provided that, “If the expert conclusion be found insufficiently clear or inadequate, and also in the event of dissension among experts, the court shall appoint new experts, either on its own initiative or upon the request of either side.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The conclusion of the experts is given at the close of the hearing and is attached to the records of the case. The court does not have to agree with the findings but he must consider them. He is free to criticise, and so, for that matter, is either of the sides in the case. But, in any disagreement he must defend himself well. The Code of Criminal Procedure again says:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article 295.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “However, if the court disagrees with the conclusion of the experts, such dissent shall be minutely motivated either in the verdict or in a special rider.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The testimony of the expert is held to be of peculiar character in Soviet judicature. He is not a witness, giving facts, but it is his function to examine and appraise facts, to inspect and to weigh and to give his opinions and conclusions in the special way of which he is capable. His evidence is distinguished from the other given in the trial in that it is specialized and independent. In other words the court can look after the facts but he wants the expert to tell him the meaning of what he finds out. And the experts have accepted the challenge and the responsibility with vigor. They have developed what might almost be called an “official psychology” that fits well into the nation’s philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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This science, called “judicial psychology,” occupies first place among the branches used by the courts in the Soviet judicature, and the second of importance is correctional labor psychology. The authorities attach no importance to what we call criminal psychology because they reject the idea that the criminal has any psychological or biological peculiarity. The use of the term alone suggests that they have, and the content likewise reminds them of some brand of Lombroso doctrine. For their theory of crime with its economic base, with its contention that this phenomena results practically &#039;&#039;in toto&#039;&#039; from the exploitation of one class by another, such a consideration would not do. Here one sees an application of their theory of crime. The criminal for them is like other people, and as the classless society approaches its perfect state a new social consciousness will evolve and any urge to crime will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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They reject likewise a juridical psychology which makes use of an analysis of psychological concepts into such elements as “imprudence,” “intent,” “spiritual agitation” because its content is too much one of juridical scholasticism, and affords no practical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Judicial psychology, considered in its broader sense, would involve the correctional labor psychology referred to above as one branch of this science important to the Soviet judicature. Defined in this larger way it would mean the application to the work of the court and the corrective labor institutions of all results of psychological research. Used in the narrower meaning it refers to criminal procedure psychology, or the application of whatever is known in this field to the case as a whole during the procedure or what transpired in the preliminary investigation. It would comprise the psychology of the accused, of the witnesses, of any other participant, even of the judge, jurors, experts themselves, and of the prosecutor and defense. They emphasize that they do not deal with the breaking up of the personality under consideration into such atoms as attention, memory, etc. as is done in the German school, but that they study the entire behavior of the witness, or other person, against a background of the broad, whole situation of the judicial investigation. They interest themselves, first of all, in the obtaining of true testimony and later in its correct appraisal, and their chief endeavor is to develop a better technique to arrive at these ends. With the emphasis they put on the importance of this usage and the talent they have in the field and the serious attitude the research workers take toward the problem, they should develop something compensating for their great effort.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in the field of correctional labor psychology there should be an even greater future. This is where the practical worker begs for more light from his scientific colleague. It is one field, said an authority, where the practical worker has gone on ahead of the research worker. There is eagerness to regenerate the psychology of the lawbreaker, to get him so readjusted that he will fit usefully into life. But more of this will be found in the chapter on Corrective Labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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To think only of the individual and his happiness would spur a scientist on to great effort, but it is even more than that in this instance. The nation’s progress toward its ideal depends on the successful use of these unfitted elements. It is no wonder that so many of the best minds are devoting themselves to working out the most adequate possible corrective labor policy. Filled with zeal as they are for their cause, they feel the responsibility which rests on them of making every human possible of use in the Socialist order.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are two institutes attached to the judicature in the USSR that require special attention in this consideration of expert aid rendered to the courts. Their work is of the utmost importance in the whole system of criminal procedure and the administration of corrective labor. The two referred to are the Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute and the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy, both attached to the office of the Attorney General and to the Commissariat of Justice. It was in visits to these two places that the writer experienced the greatest enthusiasm for what is being accomplished in the field of criminal repression in the USSR. Work of the finest type is being carried on in the lines covered by these two institutions by staffs well equipped for their respective fields of endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
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The writer visited the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy several times, looked through its library and used its books, and had the aid by conferences and advice of Director Shlaposnitchov, of the assistant director, of Professor Brusilovsky, and others of its officers. It is admirably staffed all the way through by persons not only of ability but of social conscience. The seriousness with which they attack the problems which face them and their acquaintance with the work being done in other nations are bound to impress anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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This Institute carries out the usual policy in the USSR of combining the theoretical and the practical. Along with those who are engaged in problems of research into the cause and treatment of crime there come the workers from the courts with practical problems to solve. Working in the library and reference section are persons who read and speak several languages and who carry their research into the study of foreign legislation and reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are a number of sections devoted to special lines of inquiry, chief of which are: Criminal Law and Criminal Trial, a Judicial Section, Statistical Section, and one giving its attention to the problems of juvenile offenders.&lt;br /&gt;
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Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute is the principal other scientific body on which the courts rely for solving their crime problem. It has likewise its practical and theoretical side. Research is carried on by a large staff of medical men and women, of research workers, of professors, and collaborators, and it publishes the results in numerous volumes. It also holds conferences and discussion meetings. It is equipped with all the latest devices and instruments for treatment of its cases and works in close contact with judicial establishments. Its director gave the following as the purposes of the Institute:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) To examine all those about to be tried when there is a question as to psychic condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) To aid all correctional labor camps both as to policy and on actual cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) To help in problems of juvenile delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) To carry on research in the problems connected with the work of the Institute.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) To establish graduate courses and train medical aids.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity for patients is one hundred and fifty beds, these are divided into different groups; such as those for men, for women, for children, for the definitely deranged, and for those who are of apparently sane condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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No one is admitted at Serbsky except those who have come in contact with the law, through its contravention. When a question of sanity comes up in a case at trial or in the preliminary stage of procedure, it may be cleared up by a brief examination by doctors, but in every case where extended observation is needed the person is sent to Serbsky. After not longer than a month a report is made to the court. In case insanity is adjudged by the staff, then the patient may be sent to a hospital where care is given him, or, if he is dangerously demented, he is placed in an institution where there is more restriction and compulsory treatment and care.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Institute maintains a department where children are kept, and where they are taught by teachers who come in for that purpose, and trained in certain arts and crafts. Also, some adults are kept beyond the month period when it is thought that only brief treatment is needed so that the trial may go on. There was one who had been there for eight months and another for six at the time of the author’s visit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because of the short period of retention in this place one would not expect that much of a constructive nature could be done in the matter of work. But here the policy of Soviet treatment shows to advantage. The shop teacher exhibited to us with pride what he had been able to accomplish, and his enthusiasm was justified. In accordance with their theory that labor can correct almost anything they use it here as a constructive treatment. They also use, as has already been said, all of the latest medical and psychological therapy, but there is at the same time an insistence that training for work, giving one something to do and teaching him how to do it well, is the best way to psychical readjustment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Pursuant to the fulfillment of this idea those sent here make things and they are carefully observed while they work. Some of the objects in the shops and on exhibit in a small conference room were beautiful models. Among those, of especial note, there was an airplane, perfect in minute detail, a movie machine, a system of traffic lights, and a collective shop made by the children. The latter would have a political significance, of course, and serve to put over education of a socialist nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one goes into Serbsky Institute one encounters a guard at the outer gate, and the feeling is that here is a prison. It is, of course, of a kind. Men who are in this place are, many of them, of a dangerous nature, such as we would call criminally insane. This terminology will not do, however, for Soviet criminology, as one may be either insane or criminal, but not both. But a number are guilty of murder, are pleading insanity as a defense when they may, of course, be sane; a number have made homicidal attacks on individuals. With this in mind one expects to see more of a prison atmosphere prevail.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the outside there were no armed guards in evidence, and we were told that there were none. When we went through a ward of some twenty-odd men of the most dangerous type with only a woman attendant, and no one else about, the writer frankly felt somewhat nervous. It seemed they ought to be under guard, but the woman in charge assured us that there had never been an attack by one of them on an attendant. The attitude of the Serbsky staff toward the patients and the attitude they manage to get from them in return seemed to us remarkable.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went through the gardens where those persons of a less dangerous nature were reading, talking, or doing whatever they wished. Some came to speak to us. One wished to make a long speech. A part of these were judged to be mentally normal, others must return to face their trial. We came at last to the place where are kept the most obstreperous; those who would surely make an attempt to escape if not restrained. This was the only example the writer encountered in Russia of persons locked in cells. There may be others in isolated instances, but solitary confinement has been done away with as a matter of policy. The building housing these prisoners was two-story, and the cells faced inward on the garden. There were tall big windows of unbreakable glass affording plenty of light, but the ventilation was bad. A remark was made to that effect and we were told that it was an old building they had had to utilize, and that it was to be replaced within the year. It certainly was out of keeping with the rest of the place, and made us think that it would actually be taken care of before long. However, there were not many persons there. Glass panes in the doors enabled one to peer in and there were only ten inmates in all the rooms on the two floors.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was in one of these cells, where all the furniture is secured to the floor, that we were allowed to talk for a moment to a man who is quite a character in criminal circles in the USSR. He is held to be the chief swindler of the country and a recital of his escapades made the assertion sound entirely plausible. Perhaps it should be emphasized for fear that it was not made clear above, that it is not the ravingly insane who are kept in these rooms. They are the ones kept in the ward already mentioned. These are they who are the more dangerous criminally, who possibly are not insane at all. The swindler was held to be normal mentally, and if he got away with all that his record enumerated one feels sure he must be.&lt;br /&gt;
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The swindler, a young man of near thirty, thin, dark, sat morosely on his cot as we went in. The attendant spoke to him, put her hand on his shoulder. We had the story of him before we entered. He had been in prison a number of times, he had supplied a luxurious living to himself and admiring companions over a period of years. He had been sent to this Institute at several of his previous trials and the opinion had been each time that he was mentally normal. A few months before our visit he had been returned to court to stand trial, and had been sent to a corrective labor institution. But he had refused to work. He had refused to follow any of the prison régime, and the authorities had returned him to Serbsky for a check on his mental condition. He ignored us, seemed hardly to be conscious of our presence, as he begged to know of the young woman what they were going to do with him now. She talked to him for a few moments in an encouraging manner. Her effort with him, she said, was to convince him of a better way of living by means of the training he would get in the corrective labor institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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We had already been in the children’s department and had talked there to two girls whom we were told to remember for future reference. One in particular was a pretty, gentle-appearing child of twelve. Here is her story. She had been a run-away, she had wandered in various parts of the USSR, or so she said. Her acts of a criminal nature had all been directed against children. She had stolen several whom she said she had pinched and tortured in a sadistic manner and killed. The number she set at ten, but there was no verification of her report. She had become well enough known and feared in certain sections so that she was threatened by mothers of young children if she so much as entered the village or town. She had a few months previously come into the care of the Institute, and they felt sure that an entire change of her whole character had been effected. On the wall of the room where she stayed she had put some pictures, and she had become interested in art as well as other work and study. They thought her normal, and although her family wished her returned to its custody, the opinion was that the environment had not up to then been sufficiently constructive to permit that. They were sending her to an institution at Leningrad where she was to be taught and trained in some labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even at the risk of being tedious, it seems desirable to record two more cases among the children. In a yard at the rear of the building we found a group of boys at play. Two of them were indicated as presenting challenging problems. Safely back in a conference room we heard of what they had done. The first case especially was interesting as indicating that animosity does not always exist in the treatment of those who are in opposition to the proletariat rule.&lt;br /&gt;
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A boy of seventeen, who was the son of a Kulak, had been discharged from his job for indolence. He went later to stay with a friend overnight. He wanted the friend to go with him to some place to which the mother objected. Filled with anger he waited until the son had departed for school the next morning, then murdered the mother, took some money which she had in the house, and escaped. When caught, he was sent to Serbsky for examination and the analysis showed mental deficiency and a difficult, sulky character. They had kept him for a time, had made some progress with him, and were then about to send him to a medical-pedagogical institution for juveniles where he would be trained and treated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The other boy, a charming black-haired fellow of thirteen, was held to be normal, but he was an alcoholic and stole constantly. The trouble in his case seemed to be in an irrational, coddling kind of upbringing. The decision was to send him to a state educational institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were only seven women inmates of the institution at the time of our visit and in view of the high percentage of women criminals in the USSR that seemed strange. No explanation was vouchsafed in answer to a question as to the cause, but it might indicate that women in this country do not base a defense plea on grounds of insanity!&lt;br /&gt;
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With such thorough effort as the care in Serbsky indicates, the conclusions as to mental condition ought to be as authoritative as human fallacy permits. The institution has representatives in various shops and schools and co-operates closely with the heads of the various prisons, and every effort is made at supervision and observation of those within its jurisdiction. We asked for statistics on results and were reminded that this work is all very new in the USSR, of necessity, and that figures were not complete, but that we could be assured that the results were worth to them all the painstaking care they put on their work.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER VIII: THE PROSECUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; functioning of the prosecution in the Soviet judicature is of especial interest to a student of criminal procedure. Its development from the time of the total abolition of the institution as it had existed in the Tzarist régime, by Decree #1 of 1917, to the establishment of the office of the Attorney General in 1933, has been experimental and not without dissension among the ranks of the Central Executive Committee itself. In the early years following the Revolution when everything Tzarist was swept away, there prevailed a spirit of liberalism so far as the rights of the people were concerned. In the sudden accession of power by the proletariat, lack of restraint was the predominating note, and this philosophy—if such irrational conclusions could be called one—of the epoch was reflected also in the procedure of the criminal courts. A more conservative opinion had wished merely to place the defense on an equal footing with the prosecution to correct the dominance of the state over the people in such a manner as it had been practiced for all the years of the reign of Tzars. But this was not enough to satisfy those who were clamoring for everything to be placed in the hands of the proletariat, the administering of justice as well as other branches of government.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this moment of judicial liberalism prosecution through official channels was done away with, and in its place the persons in attendance at the trial were vested with the right of accusal as well as defense. It must have distressed many a hardy judge, even though he sat as a representative of the toiling masses himself, to try to figure out a decision in the face of untrained and conflicting contentions. At any time during the trial any citizen might rise and address the court either in behalf of the accused or as the state’s prosecutor. The idea took hold rapidly, and up to the beginning of its control in 1918, it was so widely used that it became customary for the judge to call on some one in his audience to act as defender or accuser of the person on trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was bound to lead to difficulties. Civil war was at hand, the class struggle was at its height, and the court was an organ of the state in its struggle against its enemies. Even the most liberal saw that it would not do. Some system must be used whereby the prosecution of cases would be strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is an interesting point involved in the restoration of the prosecution, as it now began, even though it was of revolutionary expediency. It was a swinging back to the western criminal law administration which they had annihilated at the beginning of their rule. A legal man said to me in this regard, “We acknowledge that there are many good points in the capitalist system, and we do not hesitate to borrow what are useful to us.” In court procedure, even while they do preserve the proletarian administration, one can recognize many things about their orderly procedure that has its foundation in familiar bourgeois practices. There is no denial of this on their part. Certain well established ideas of justice have proved over long years to be adequate and proper and these have been incorporated into their own judicial structure. The early disorganized practices of the proletarian administration of justice gave way when necessities and panic of the Civil War had been dissipated to a deliberative plan resulting in the many codes of 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0141.svg|ORGINAZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF USSR|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before this a resurrection of the public prosecutor was on its way. Revolutionary tribunals, in their post as out-sentinels in the struggle of the government, were the first in the demand for sterner equipment of prosecution, and political expediency put an end to judicial liberalism in their practice. Characterizing this period was the attitude that placed in the hands of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; the power to impose even the death penalty on those persons charged with political offenses such as the participation in counter-revolutionary activities, deliberate destruction of property or espionage, and other such crimes against the state. It was felt that if the proletariat was to continue to rule it was no time for softness, either in the judicial system or in the non-judicial tribunals which continued to exist through the bloody days of the Civil War period.&lt;br /&gt;
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As just pointed out, it was in the Revolutionary Tribunals, created by Decree of November 24, 1917, and differing very little from the People’s Courts except in the requirement as to the number of co-judges,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Six sat in the Revolutionary Tribunals while two were required in the People’s Court.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that the first change came in regard to the prosecution. Let it be understood that although these tribunals were organs of the revolution and continued in force for five years, they were proper judicial institutions, with a definite prescribed procedure and jurisdiction. There had been too much mildness in their administration, so much so that the present Commissar of Justice, N. V. Krylenko, stated in his Soviet law,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “Their softness with regard to sentences discredited them completely.”&lt;br /&gt;
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There were too many of them in the first place and by Act of May, 1918, their number was reduced so that they remained in existence only in the capitals of the provinces and other important places. But that reform would not necessarily make them deal out sterner justice, and by this same Act there was created at each of the existing tribunals a &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors. To make the check-up more complete there was also established a Central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; of State Prosecutors in connection with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee created by an act of June, 1918.&lt;br /&gt;
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The character of the Revolutionary Tribunals was undergoing a change. Sternness and determination now marked their attitude. Mildness was fading away as class struggle advanced. They were created to spike the activities directed against the achievements of the Revolution or designed to weaken Soviet authority. It was not enough that some citizen give voice to a plea for conviction; it was neither sufficient that local tribunals be left to carry on their own unaided and unsupervised prosecution. There must be central supervision. This very distrust of local competency led later to a dissension in which Lenin had to take a hand, but for the time being, it served its purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the decree already referred to (of May, 1918), the central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; was given wide powers. It might demand of local prosecutors or tribunals that certain cases be transferred to Moscow or in the event the case remained in its original territory, it might send prosecutors there to see that it took the direction desired. It might also demand an accounting from the local &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; so that by supervision they could be sure that the functions of these organs to look after all facts of criminal action committed by any person anywhere and the institution of criminal procedure might be faithfully and zealously fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the Revolutionary Tribunal Acts of 1920, all previous acts pertaining to tribunals were repealed and sweeping changes again occurred. Counter-revolutionary activity was on the decline, the Civil War was receding, and non-judicial methods of suppression not so much needed. Orderly government was growing stronger. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; suffered the abolition of its special tribunal, the military judicial powers even were required to comply with the provisions of this Act. As a result of these curtailments the powers of the Revolutionary Tribunals were widened and jurisdiction extended to include any case involving counter-revolutionary charges as well as any other that was of a nature dangerous to the Soviet Republic. Not only was the jurisdiction of these tribunals enlarged but their power of punishment was likewise increased and was now practically unrestricted. With such authority they could assess any measure of repression which they thought necessary to the occasion and could thereby cover any ground lately held by extra-judicial bodies. These tribunals were established in the capitals of the various provinces and by permission of the Commissar of Justice might also be instituted in the larger cities.&lt;br /&gt;
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What happened in regard to the prosecution? The &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of prosecutors set up by the previous acts were abolished and in their stead there now appeared state &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of defense and prosecution, both for the people’s court and for the Revolutionary Tribunals. From this time on more attention was given to the perfecting of a system and technique of prosecution. The qualifications for the person filling this office became of a more adequate nature. He must be a man competent to make an appearance before an assemblage, to speak or otherwise conduct public affairs, and he must also know the Soviet system of government thoroughly as well as be acquainted with the workings of trade unions. There was still no centralized system such as exists today since the prosecutors were at this time provided merely to represent the people in trial, much as a defense lawyer might be appointed in a particular case. But the era of floundering, of experimentation, of entertaining thought of complete proletarian administration of law, had made its contribution, and the evolution moved on with the rapidity with which other things have moved in Soviet Russia. In 1922 there was another Act containing other innovations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By this Act there was a general revision of the whole system of judicial legislation, and there emerged such results as the Criminal Code, the Law on Basic Property rights, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the year of 1923 furnished additional legislation. The matter of some centralization of a state prosecution seems to have been taken for granted, but the form that the organization was to have, the basic principles, brought forth differences of opinion as we shall see later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The New Economic Policy had been introduced and the economic and political situation in the country was in a confused and complex state. Civil war had died down but the class struggle, already well on its feet, took encouragement from the feeling among the property owners that capitalism, at least in a modified form, might with timely effort be brought back. The form of conflict now encountered was hardly less threatening to Soviet rule than had been the more open warfare. The government, dependent on its courts, now effectively augmented by the judicial powers of the terrifying GPU, needed a strengthened prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In May of 1922 the People’s Commissariat of Justice presented its proposal of organization to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and found itself immediately on the defensive against attack by opposition within the Communist faction. This had not been expected, and there was some dismay when the main points were rejected altogether. Once before, a central &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors—even though for the Revolutionary Tribunals—had cast reflection on local organs by demanding transferal of cases to their jurisdiction or by sending one of their own number to prosecute locally. Now, as the Commissariat of Justice proposed: (1) the direct subordination of the local prosecutors to the Prosecuting Attorney of the Republic who appoints and dismisses them, and (2) the right of local prosecutors to protest before the central authorities against unconstitutional decisions by local executive committees, it was held by the majority of the Central Executive Committee that there was in such suggestions an element of distrust of local authorities too strong to be accepted. A commission appointed by the session, in rejecting such proposals, made one of its own. It was suggested that there be set up a “dual” subordination of prosecutors, making them responsible both to the central authority and to the local executive committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a state of affairs brought intervention from the captain of the ship of state. Lenin wrote a special letter to Stalin that brought the opposition to terms when it was read before the Central Executive Committee. He enumerated therein some of the causes of the difficulties of establishing revolutionary legality and a lack of uniformity of the application and administration of the laws were chief among these. Likewise, there was always the alibi of local peculiarities and conditions. For us of the United States who have struggled with forty-eight different types of provisions, of applications, and administration, there is understanding of his argument. A suggestion of anything possible to prevent it seems unanswerable. “The basic evil in the whole of our life and in the whole of our lack of culture,” wrote Lenin, “is in the ancient Russian attitude of laissez-faire and in the custom of semi-savages who want to retain the local justice of Kaluga as distinguished from that of Kazan.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He then puts a question. Can it be tolerated in a country of proletarian dictatorship, in a country building up a socialist economy? Here is his answer. “There can be no Kaluga justice different from that of Kazan, but there must be a uniform All-Russian justice, and even a uniform justice for the whole Federation of Soviet Republics.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That started the effort toward uniformity. The most recent chapter in the development was in 1933 (June 23) when the office of the Attorney General was created to centralize the prosecution of the whole Soviet Union. There have been steps between the two enactments but they have moved steadily toward the recent accomplishment. In the earlier organization the position as head of the public prosecution of the USSR, now held by the Attorney General, was occupied by the Commissar of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duty of the prosecution, now headed by the Attorney General of the USSR, is not merely to prosecute. His functions are far beyond that limit. If he were confined to that there would not be great importance to his office.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet judicial trial the prosecutor is robbed of his glamorous role as he appears in our own courts. He, as well as the defending attorney, is a mere assistant to the court, there to aid it in getting at the truth of the affair before them. It is apparent that he has been appointed in such a manner that he is nearer to the judge than the defense lawyer. He is likely of the same party affiliation, he comes from the same social class, he is in sympathy with the order of government. It is certainly more likely that he exerts a greater influence on the court than the other side’s attorney who may hold an opposite viewpoint. One notices that often the defense attorney is of a different appearance in manner of dress, in terminology, and in speech, from the court and prosecutor. It may be supposed that this occasionally causes the court to decide against him, even though the bias is unconscious, since it is very likely that he is defending a person who is a “class enemy,” and with whose point of view he may be in sympathy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That would probably have been truer a few years ago than it is now. With the prevailing attitude of “winning over” wherever possible, and the “crushing” of only those who are distinctly to be feared as socially dangerous, there seems to be no great prejudice shown. It must exist to a degree, but antagonism does not seem a part of the present policy of state. If a person before the court can be made into a useful citizen then the object is to do it. Those who deliberately continue to struggle against the laws of the class in power will certainly be dealt with in an uncompromising manner, and if it is fairly clear the crime is of this nature then a defending lawyer would hardly be listened to with very much thought. It would be the day of the prosecutor. Likewise in establishing the class nature of the crime, the word of the prosecutor would be worth more to the court because of his sympathy with the existing order. But since it is to the interest of the state to protect an individual, to retain the aid and sympathy of all possible and to win and keep the confidence of its masses, it is not likely that there will be many who are innocent in this respect convicted in the regular judicial trials where open sessions prevail and the people in large numbers attend. One of the impressive characteristics of the court room in the Soviet Union is the attendance and interest of the citizens. They discuss the verdict with animation and it is to be noted that they usually agree with the court’s decision. If those in attendance disagreed too often it would hardly be a good thing for the judge. It will be remembered that power of impeachment is exercised in this country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The lack of importance of the prosecutor in trial is exemplified by his absence from trial frequently, in the People’s Court. It is not usual in this lower tribunal for either prosecutor or defense lawyer to be in attendance. At times, however, they do appear. But there is no place in the system for the ingenious display of a game of wits between attorneys as there is no jury such as ours nor anyone on whom an emotional impression could be made. There is really no great need in the ordinary case for attorneys either for the state or the defense. The court has both the power and responsibility to see that all evidence is placed before it. There can be no such objections to its introduction as we are accustomed to hear, resulting in the escape of criminals from the law because of the lack of admission of evidence. The story comes out, the witness tells the tale without any instruction to answer “yes” or “no” to the questions put to him. As already illustrated by actual cases, it is an informal narrative, interrupted by pertinent questions by judge or jurors or other parties to the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To see, then, what the prosecutor’s functions are, let us look at the following list as given in 1922 at the establishment of the centralized prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To supervise on behalf of the State the legality of the actions of all administrative organs, economic institutions, public and private organizations, and private persons, by instituting criminal proceedings against guilty persons and by protesting against decisions infringing upon the laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To observe directly the activities of investigation organs, criminal inquiry organs, and also the activity of organs of OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To prosecute in court. [Note that this is third in order of importance.]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To see to the proper treatment of inmates in homes of correction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As can be seen from this enumeration the functions of the organs of Soviet prosecution extend far beyond the limits of mere judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Accordingly, the Attorney of the Republic (originally in RSFSR, the People’s Commissar of Justice) was entrusted:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To look after the legal activity of all the People’s Commissariats and other central institutions and organizations and to make proposals for the repeal or amendment of orders and regulations issued by them that are not consistent with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To protest against such orders and regulations before the Council of People’s Commissars and the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee with a view to their abolition [the protest by the Attorney General does not stop, however, the carrying out of an order against which a protest was made].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To guide and control the activities of local prosecuting organs. The functions of local prosecutors were:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To propose to local executive committees the repeal or amendment of regulations and decisions that do not conform to the law, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To protest against such regulations and decisions, through the Attorney General of the republic, to the Council of People’s Commissars or to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the realm of combatting criminality, the Public Prosecutor was commissioned:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To institute local proceedings against officials and private persons either on his own initiative or on complaints and statements received by him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the conducting of inquiries and preliminary investigations, to advise organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation on the question of restrictive measures and other questions connected with preliminary investigation, and to conform the indictment drawn up by investigators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To decide the question of prosecution or cancelling of cases coming up to him from investigating organs, to take part in preliminary sittings of the court on the question of trying or dismissing a given case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To prosecute in court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) To protest in the order of cassation against verdicts and findings of the court, and also protest by way of supervision against verdicts of the first instance and cassation decisions of regional and provincial courts that have already come into force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) To look after the proper treatment of inmates in all places of detention without exception, and to liberate persons improperly held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this enumeration it can be seen that his duty as prosecutor is third on the list. But it is in this function that we think of him and it is this part of his work that we shall go into in some detail because of its connection with what we are studying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to the prosecutor’s occupation with criminal procedure there is first the preliminary investigation. When the militia or the former organs of the OGPU or any other agent turn over to the investigator certain material evidence of crime the prosecution starts to function. The office of the prosecution is to institute criminal proceedings on the first definite suspicion that a crime has been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the proceedings are in the preliminary stage the position of the prosecution is very different from what it will be later. He is now concerned with finding out the truth of the situation and not of “fastening” upon some one an act of which he is not guilty but for which there must be a conviction. If he goes into court for trial too many times with cases that are not supported by the testimony as brought out by the court the inference is that he either is not honest or not capable in his preliminary investigation. While a prosecutor often makes a mistake, as further court testimony may show, and is in honor bound to withdraw prosecution when he discovers it, this would probably be because of circumstances which he could not control such as the absence of a witness or the testimony of one not revealed at that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, in the preliminary examination he is not an accuser. He is the chief of all that takes place, and he is in full charge. His investigator carries out the work of this stage in less complex cases but the prosecutor is responsible for direction and policy. He does not seek evidence of guilt at this time any more than he tries to establish innocence. He gathers every available bit of data and then makes his decision as to whether the case is to go on. But once he has come to the conclusion that the indictment is sufficiently well founded and the accused becomes the defendant in the judicial trial, his position is changed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the trial he is the prosecutor. He now believes the defendant guilty or he would not have remanded him for court action. He now takes part in weighing the evidence produced in court and urges some measure of punishment in his speech. But so intent is he still on getting justice that he may cease his prosecution if he decides that he has been wrong in his preliminary examination. It is his duty to do so and to convince the court he is correct in his action. One prosecutor told the writer of four occasions in his own practice when he had done this. One has an incredulous feeling in hearing a prosecuting attorney make a plea for the reduction of a sentence or for a verdict of not guilty, but such a case is recorded in the following paragraphs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Supreme Court a case was on appeal from a Regional Court. A group of seven men had been found guilty of stealing vegetables and fruit from a co-operative store in which one was manager. They had resold the articles and had thereby made some 20,000 rubles. The two leaders had received the death penalty, the others lesser ones. The death penalties had been appealed and the prosecutor and the defense attorneys were present with their arguments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense lawyer spoke quite at length, arguing that the amount had been really smaller than was stated, that the character of the men had always been good, and then he went to points of law. He contended that it had been a mistake to apply the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for larceny of state property, to this act as no theft of state property had actually taken place. The men had paid the regulation amount to the state, but had simply sold the fruit and vegetables at an advanced price over state prices, for a sufficient period to bring in the money in that manner. He contended that instead the men were guilty of using official position for personal benefit and that Article 109 of the Criminal Code, providing punishment for such a crime, should have been applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His points had not been well made and when the prosecutor arose to speak one was quite prepared for his demolition of the previous argument. He was an able, well-trained man. No one consults any precedents or books of law in the Soviet court. The observer is struck by the absence of such volumes from the room. The court judges each case on its merits in the light of certain established policy. It seemed only a matter of formality for the judges to retire and bring back the decision that the verdict should stand. But the peculiarity of the prosecution in this judicial system now showed. The attorney paused, started again. He reminded the court that the men were young, that this was the only offense with which they had been charged and that one of these in particular had been a good citizen until he had begun to drink too heavily. He thought the sentence too severe and that it should be commuted to the maximum ten-year term. He likewise recommended that some of the sentences of the lesser members of the group needed revision. The court acted on his recommendation and the two wives present were able to go into frenzied joy over the giving back of life to their respective husbands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case brings out the attitude of the prosecution toward their tasks as accusers. The basic function of the prosecutor is to establish all the testimony he can to support an indictment before the court. That is what he comes into court for. The defense has its lawyer to see that its interests are protected. The prosecutor thinks of the side of society and the state. But at the same time, theoretically, he must not do anything to prevent the real truth of the case from being revealed. It is not in keeping with the role and dignity of his office to keep back evidence, to shuffle facts, or in any manner to defeat the carriage of justice. And in attempting to carry out the higher requirements of his office he cannot insist on the charges of the indictment if the testimony brought out at the trial has modified them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to note that there are deviations from the general principle that the prosecutor conducts the prosecution at the trial. Throughout the land there is a system in practice of giving training to the more able among the peasants and workers to act in the capacity of public accuser in the simpler cases. This special prosecutor is usually unaided unless the case is of a more serious nature, when he will probably serve in conjunction with some member of the prosecutor’s office. This service is of a wholly voluntary nature with no pay attached, but there is compensation for the individual in the position of importance he occupies in his community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are also cases where the plaintiff hires his own lawyer to prosecute the case and a public prosecutor appears only if the case is of such a nature or takes such a turn that there is a public interest which needs protecting, or in case there must be intervention to secure fair play. An example of this type of case would be one in which there was bodily injury that while causing pain still had no serious consequences. Cases involving insults, libels and slander likewise are often prosecuted by private attorneys without the aid of the public official. In all of such cases action is not brought by the state, of course, but is begun by the oral or written complaint of the injured party and may be settled by the plaintiff and defendant between themselves at any time while the trial is in progress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In cases involving such charges as the violation of patent or copyright laws, forced sexual intercourse, and a few others of a private nature, the procedure is still different. Prosecution is by the public prosecutor but even though he knows of the existence of such violations he cannot institute proceedings. The injured party must make the complaint and give co-operation but while he may have his own lawyer also the state takes charge of the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For a more complete picture of the prosecution as it exists in the Soviet Union today, its organization is briefly given. It follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Attorney General of the USSR who is the head of the prosecution in the Soviet Union. He has, of course, a staff of assistants. He is appointed by the Central Executive Committee, and is also responsible to the Council of People’s Commissars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The attorneys of the various federal republics who are appointed by the Attorney General of the USSR on approval by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) The prosecutors of the regional and provincial courts are appointed and may be dismissed for cause by the attorneys of the federal republics with the consent of the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) The attorneys for military and transport tribunals are appointed and may be dismissed by the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) District attorneys and people’s investigators are appointed and dismissed by regional and provincial attorneys.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Senior investigators and investigators on most important cases are appointed and dismissed by those attorneys to whom they are attached.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties with which they are charged are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To supervise the consistence of decisions and regulations of separate departments of the USSR and federal republics and of local authorities with the constitution of the USSR and the decisions and regulations of the government of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the correct and uniform application of the laws by the judicial institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To institute criminal proceedings and to prosecute in all legal instances throughout the territory of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To look after the legality and correctness of the actions of OGPU, militia, and correctional labor institutions on the basis of a special order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) General guidance of the activities of the prosecution in the federal republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IX: THE DEFENSE AND THE DEFENDANT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Bar has had a precarious existence under Soviet rule, but it seems now to have come on to firm ground. Going back to that First Decree of 1917, when the prosecution was swept away, we find the institution of private attorneys suffering a like fate and an idea substituted that anybody might be an attorney and defend. However, a limitation was soon put on the “anybody” by the Second Decree on Courts which created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, the duties of whose members were both to prosecute and to defend. While any citizen might become a member of this &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; on the proper recommendation of the Soviets of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies, he was supposed to give his time and attention to being an attorney, which somewhat narrowed down the first broad inclusion. There must have been some slight ability, too, on the part of the persons appointed, over the ordinary run of citizen, in order that they be recommended to membership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This method of providing for defense and prosecution existed until 1920. The People’s Court Act of 1918 changed the status of these defenders and prosecutors in that they were made officials of the Republic and were accorded a salary equal to that of a people’s judge. These members of the college in their capacity&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
as defenders were augmented at times by relatives of the defendant and at times replaced by the legal adviser of an institution, appointed by the director to serve in some particular case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By 1920 this system of one body affording now a prosecutor, now a defender, was found to be not adequate, not in keeping with the rights of the defendant which orderly legality must establish, nor, on the other hand, providing a sustained attitude of prosecution such as the state needed. The People’s Court Act of that year created separate institutions for the two purposes. There was now evidence of a selected membership. Not just “any citizen,” even though he might devote himself to the duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, could serve, but there was to be a list prepared by the local Soviets, of persons who were qualified to act in this capacity. From this list defending advocates were to be selected for temporary duty, not to exceed six days in a six month period, and were to be paid a sum in proportion to the remuneration received by a co-judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was something in the nature of our own jury service, and was regarded as a solemn duty of a citizen qualified for the function. In the Collected Laws of 1920 we find a circular from the Commissar of Justice issuing instructions and admonishing that the defense in court, in criminal cases, is a social duty of all citizens, who, because of profession, education, or party affiliation, are qualified to appear as defenders at the trial.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collected Laws, No. 100, Article 543, 1920, Section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Doubtful defense it may have been to one whose life hung in balance, but the institution was progressing toward a time when persons on trial might be ably represented in the judicial inquiry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The institution of the New Economic Policy, bringing a new complexity and confusion into the economic and political life of the Union, created new necessities of various kinds, one of which, as we have already seen, was a development in the administration of Criminal Law. With the remarkable rapidity of the development of institutions in other lines, the Soviet judicial system began to take firmer shape and to assume a character of responsibility for orderly legality. If the court was to provide equality of opportunity and privileges to all, thus fulfilling the slogan of the Socialist State of which it was an organ, then the rights of the defendant must be protected, not only by legislative safeguards but by means of adequate representation at the bar of justice. If prosecution was to be stiffened in this era of fighting the opponents in a new way, then a balanced procedure called also for more adequate aid to the man accused.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Advocacy Act of 1922, with its sweeping reforms for the judiciary, restored to the Union the possibility of adequate defense for the person who stands accused in court. It created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers, and made its members responsible for the legal aid of a party held for trial. The number of members of the college were, however, to be restricted by authority of the provincial departments of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This limitation was removed by the Judiciary Act of 1926 which elaborated the provisions of the earlier Act and dealt fully with the organization, function, and duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;. While the number is not restricted, the member, when accepted by the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, may be rejected by the provincial executive committee within a month from the time it is informed of his admission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The qualifications required of the members provides for at least two years’ service in some judiciary position within the Soviet Union not lower than the People’s Court which insures an acquaintance with the law. To be admitted one must also either have a higher juridical education or have passed a prescribed examination. Admission is refused to those who have been expelled from public organizations for misconduct (for a period of three years), condemned for crimes, or under trial or investigation the member is suspended in certain cases. No lawyer may defend in court unless he is a member of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, or bar.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; is self-governing along the lines of other Soviet institutions. It elects its own presidium which works out the general problems of the organization. It decides on disciplinary questions, on general plans of work, and on the fees to be paid by its members. It has no authority over the fees to be paid by clients. That lies in the hands of the Commissariat of Justice which sets up a regular schedule, according to the ability of the person to pay and the complexity of the case. There are four groups according to these provisions. At the bottom are the poor, so designated by the people’s court, who pay no fees; in the next group are those workers, clerks and peasants who are permitted a small rate; the third group consists of any not included in the first two, who may also pay a rate set by the Commissariat; and there is the final group who, not needing the intervention of the Commissar, may make its own terms with the collegium.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In Moscow alone there are about fifty private lawyers not connected with any “corporation,” later to be described, who may be hired as they would be anywhere. They are those sufficiently well known to attract a private practice, and do not need the aid the corporation can give. They agree on the fee to be paid, without any intervention on the part of the state, and are not restricted in income.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties of the members of this organization do not consist alone in defending in court. The members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; attached to the courts, provincial, regional, or organized as county bureaus, deliver lectures on law, acquaint the masses with their legal rights and duties through visits to large factories and other centers, and must defend without pay any case referred to them. The first duty of the legal profession is concerned with the observance of revolutionary legality, but within the bounds set by this legality, he must defend his client. The protection of this same individual is, however, the acknowledged duty of both judge and prosecutor, so why the necessity of defense counsel at all in such a system, one wonders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As already pointed out the simpler cases tried in the People’s Court rarely do have attorneys on either side, but in the more complicated cases the story may not be so easily got at. It may be necessary to the honest defense of the accused or in the determination of his sentence that certain orders or decrees about which he knows nothing be applied to his case. In such an event he needs some one who is acquainted with various enactments. In the next place he may not be of a nature so cool and composed when his life or liberty is at stake that he can interrogate witnesses himself, cross question, and otherwise exercise his legal rights. Likewise, if it is a serious case, when he gets his last word before the court he will want it to be an effective one. The speech of a good lawyer, analyzing and weighing the evidence, may be a deciding factor. Straightforward and interested in the protection of the state as a lawyer may be, he is likely to think of some points in favor of his client that neither judge nor prosecutor would find unaided. And that leads to the third and last acknowledged reason for the use of private attorneys. It is likely that the prosecutor may be prejudiced in favor of the guilt which he has already seen indicated by the evidence he had in hand when he remanded the accused for trial. It is likely also that the judge, having found that evidence sufficient to sustain the indictment, may not be able to see some things on the other side that a legal adviser hired for the purpose would be able to find. The authorities on criminal law believe that, too, and therefore, on the theory that innocence is presumed until guilt is proved, they provide for an advocate who is more likely to be conscious of the innocence. A question occurs here as to whether an advocate would risk defending a client whom he knew to be guilty through a confession or otherwise. Theoretically, he would only in this case attempt to interpret or explain the act so as to get freedom or a lesser sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense often has a lawyer when there is no prosecuting attorney present. In the People’s Court the state representative may not appear, and yet the counsel for the defense is always admitted. The reverse cannot be true. There can be no prosecutor present without the defense counsel. One of the specific provisions of the law is that on all occasions when a prosecutor appears for the state there must also be a counsel for the defendant. In case the latter has not been able to get one or is not able to pay, the court looks after the matter for him by having the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers appoint a counsel. It may be a case a lawyer would not want; it may be the worst of the so-called “class enemies,” but some one must serve. Not only that, but if the complexity of the case warrants it, one of the best must be appointed. The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; pays the member serving on such an unremunerated errand out of its own funds, according to the fees he is accustomed to receive and according to the complexity of the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is one other condition in which the court must see that the defense is represented by counsel. If the defendant is deaf or dumb or suffering from any physical handicap that will prevent his understanding correctly the procedure of the case counsel is obligatory. Likewise, in the case of juveniles of 16-18 years of age (the court does not handle the cases of those under 16), the instructions of the Commissariat of Justice is that there be counsel provided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense counsel, once in charge of the case, has rights and privileges as great as the prosecution. He may see his client as often as he wants to, for as long as is necessary, without the presence of any attendant or official. He has the right to advise the defendant all during the trial. He has the right to records in the case so that he may study it thoroughly and introduce any evidence he finds necessary in the interest of justice for his client. And he has a right to the last word. He not only makes the final speech but he questions witnesses after the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
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The lawyers of Russia, with the exception of a few independent ones, are organized into “collective corporations.” This, of course, is right in line with the socialist theory of government. While lawyers have a right to engage in private practice there are a number of reasons why one would prefer to be a member of one of these collective bodies. Let us look at some of the characteristics of these organizations. The following list was given by Professor Brusilovsky, who is himself a member of the collegium.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(1) The individual lawyer has no direct financial transaction with the client. The fee is fixed by a special consultant and paid to the treasurer of the ‘collective.’&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The lawyer may go on his vacation knowing his client will be served by colleagues. While on vacation he draws a salary equal to his normal monthly income.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) here is value in consulting a number of lawyers on a case to clear up difficult points. This is especially valuable for the young members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Fees are differentiated according to the qualification of the individual lawyer, his service record, experience and ability. He is insured against sickness and incapacity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Membership—It is open to all citizens who: (a) possess electoral rights, (b) have a certain record of service in the organs of Soviet justice, and (c) have either passed the prescribed examination or have received a superior juridical education.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have been considering up to now in this chapter the organization of the defense provided for in the law. This is the machinery through which the rights of an individual may be protected in criminal procedure. Now, let us turn to the defendant himself as he appears in the case and see what safeguards are given him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is, first, the matter of the preliminary trial. While that phase of the case as a whole has already been discussed the rights accorded to the suspected person were purposely not emphasized since that angle of the proceedings properly belongs here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To begin with, let us suppose the suspect is held in custody by the arresting organs, the militia or the former agents of the OGPU. They can keep him just twenty-four hours, and no more, until they must get permission from the people’s judge or from the prosecuting attorney for his detention. If they cannot get enough evidence in that time to support the arrest there is nothing to do but release him. That does not mean, however, that the case must be dropped. If they are convinced of his guilt, but have not been able by that time to establish it, the authorities may permit the man to be held a longer time so that the case can be built up, or in case the suspicion has not enough grounds even for that, they may go on working quietly until they do uncover what they want. However, for the sake of our case, suppose the prosecutor gives permission for the man to be held. In fourteen days there must be either release or sufficient evidence to hold him. While there are no &#039;&#039;habeas corpus&#039;&#039; proceedings in the administration of Soviet law, there is the assurance that a man must be either released at the end of two weeks or some testimony produced that will justify his being held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor may he languish in jail while his trial is put off from day to day. The maximum time permitted for the preliminary work and the bringing of a case to trial is one month. Obviously there may be cases when it will be absolutely necessary to extend this limit and by permission it may be extended. But the law provides that there must be reasons shown as to why extra time is asked. The fact that this limit is adhered to in practice is shown by records that in the city court trials of Moscow 75 per cent. of the cases are tried in ten days and the majority of the others in fifteen or twenty. It is quite likely that there are cases in which an arresting organ holds a man more than the twenty-four hours or an investigator permits more than the maximum time to elapse before trial, but members of the Commissariat of Justice insist that if detected in such acts the agents are swiftly and surely punished. Those in authority do not hold in high esteem those officials who do not cooperate in the establishment of revolutionary legality. While there would, of course, be no statistics of such illegal practices, those in prison of whom the writer asked the question about the time of pre-trial detention gave answers of periods which were all within the limit except two. One man indicated that his rights had been violated, the other gave causes for his detention beyond the period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The person under suspicion (it will be recalled that he is not the “accused” until such time as a definite accusal is made) may make a complaint at any time against the actions of those conducting the preliminary inquiry or investigation, and such a complaint may be appealed within seven days, not only to the prosecutor but to the judge under whose jurisdiction the case may be. If it is a serious case, he may from the beginning have employed counsel to do that for him, but in the event of the simpler case, or of his having no counsel, there is sure to be some interested person among family or friends who will attend to this for him, if he should be detained in such a manner that he could not reach the proper authority and the one against whom he complained would not take care of the matter for him. The law provides that such an official must receive and transmit a complaint directed against him, but there might conceivably be instances when meeting this duty would be unpleasant—especially if the official was guilty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the preliminary trial the defendant is protected in every possible way. If he has not been in custody the initial steps may have been taken without his cognizance. This may have been necessary in order to prevent his escape while ground was being prepared for holding him. But, if there is sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation he is now apprized of it. He may be summoned to appear in almost any manner—by telephone, telegraph or otherwise, or if the circumstances are such that his escape must be prevented, he may be then arrested. In any case he now participates in the investigation which, it is remembered, is carried on by the investigator or, in the event of a serious case, by the prosecutor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He is now told what the charges against him are, and it is made very clear to him. He may at this moment offer an explanation of the substantial facts which will put an entirely new interpretation on the case, and cause its dismissal, if he substantiates what he tells. It is to be remembered that there are no sides taken in this stage of the procedure. It is usual that no counsel has yet appeared for the person under inquiry, the prosecutor is acting in his rôle of collector of information and there is, theoretically, at least, no effort to pin either guilt or innocence on to the party. The accused (he becomes “accused” from the moment the charge is officially explained to him) may suggest witnesses, may request experts, as we have previously seen, and attach any proofs to the documents, and such requests must be granted unless the investigator is convinced that they have no real importance in the case. If he does the latter, he is likely to be rather sure of his ground, as otherwise his judgment would face reversal when his decision was appealed to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred to the use of experts and the accused person’s rights as to selection. With all the information collected and the decision made, his chance to submit evidence to prevent the trial is still not exhausted. On the decision of the investigator to present the accusation, the person against whom it is directed may go over all the materials collected. Now, in the light of what he finds, he may offer further elucidation himself or he may request further witnesses who will be able to shed additional light. He is given every opportunity here, by law at least, to get in a stroke that will indicate his innocence. And in the event it goes to the court, in spite of his efforts, the judge may be convinced of the weight of his argument or evidence and direct the investigator to either build up his case better or dismiss it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We will suppose it stands. The administrative session of court places the case on its calendar. It comes to trial after not longer than a month from the time the accusation is handed over by the investigator, and the accused becomes the defendant. In the meantime the accused will have secured his counsel. Little was said about the part a counsel for the defense might play in the preliminary stages, for the reason that except in serious cases there would almost surely be none at that time. The normal time for the appointment of one by the court, in cases requiring this, would be immediately after it was decided to hold the person for trial. On the presentation of the accusation to the accused he is informed of his legal right to counsel. In case he is unable to provide for an attorney he petitions the court for aid. Likewise, if he chooses one at this time, he submits the name for approval. Then the court, in its administrative session, when deciding whether to hold the accused for trial, likewise settles the question of counsel, if the accused has petitioned, by approving his choice or appointing one. Approval of his choice is necessary only if he has selected some person outside of such authorized lists as members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; or some representative provided by government institutions. Otherwise he may select whomever he will among the authorized persons and be assured that that person must act for him and for a fee that will be set for him within his ability to pay. The element of contest which is one of the basic principles in the Soviet judicature is now found for the first time. Two parties are aligned one against the other, each to prove its rightness. From this time on, the accused is the defendant and there are two sides to the case. Let us see the trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defendant has the right to a public trial. This, too, is one of the principles of criminal procedure of the Soviet courts and by its observation there is insured fairness through public opinion. Through publicity there is brought about both the education of the people and the control of the court by them. There are only two conditions under which the trial may be behind closed doors—when a state secret must be kept, and in sexual crimes where intimate details must be revealed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defendant has a right to be present at his own trial, unless he voluntarily stays away. A case may be tried without him, if he has given his consent or when he has failed to respond to the summons. In the latter case, however, it must be clearly shown that an effort was made to reach him and that he directly evaded it, or there will probably be a reversal of the verdict in the higher court. An attempt to use his lack of response as an excuse for trial without his presence would have to be supported sufficiently to avoid abuse. In simpler cases when there is no possibility of imposing a prison sentence, his presence may not be required by the court, but in offenses punishable by a prison sentence he must be there if he can be found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the case opens, the presiding judge explains to the defendant his rights, as a party to the court, to make use of all material, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to make any statements he will at any stage of the trial. These things he may do even though he is represented by counsel, and if he has decided to defend himself or entrust it to some relative he is sure to find plenty of opportunity to exercise this right. The writer witnessed one case in which a simple-looking workman took care of his interests so well that one could understand his going to trial without legal aid. Before his vehement and rapid-fire interrogation, witnesses quailed and became confused. The informality of the proceedings permits of participation without timidity in most cases. There is no fear of set rules of the game, because they do not exist. The accused defends himself as he would before his neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;
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The next assurance is that the defendant may cause the removal of judge or juror if there is likely to be bias in his attitude. Perhaps one of them is relative or friend to the injured party, or to some other person who would be interested in the conviction of the defendant. In that case he may challenge, giving his grounds therefor, and the question will be decided by the rest of the court sitting without the member so indicated. If he is overruled he has that fact as grounds for complaint to the cassation instance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now as the case goes to trial, with the defendant a party to the court so that he may spar as he wishes with prosecutor or clash with witnesses, either with counsel or without, he has also the right of presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It would seem that the preliminary trial had already established guilt sufficiently so that the actual trial would merely bring to light what had gone before, and establish the degree of guilt. But such is not the theory incorporated in Soviet criminal law. It may be that evidence will take a different turn, that the very atmosphere of the public trial will provide a new viewpoint. The object of the preliminary investigation is not to constitute a determination of guilt but to give guarantee that there are some grounds for trial. Authorities on the administration of criminal law point to the relatively low percentage of convictions, there being, according to one authority, almost one-third of those remanded to the People’s Court dismissed, and a lack of conviction of at least a quarter of those actually reaching court. From that one would judge that the holding for trial by the investigation organs of the courts does not mean in actual practice that one’s guilt has been established. During the trial the defendant has every right which he has already been accorded in the preliminary procedure, but they are now rendered broader and of more value because he is familiar with all the data that have been produced, and all the witnesses who have been gathered by the investigation are now before him for questioning. Through his cross-examination of the state’s witnesses he may develop lines of proof that he can substantiate by calling further witnesses of his own, or he may refute the state’s contention. Some expert, whom the investigation used for some specific interpretation, may change his own opinion in the light of some explanation which the defendant himself or his witness can give. He has here three distinct privileges—he may request certain witnesses, other experts, or fresh proofs from the state if the case is to be sustained; he may give explanations to the court of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act at any time and as often during the trial as he wishes or thinks necessary; and he has the invaluable right to take part in the examination of all witnesses, experts, or others who take part in the trial. And now, if he has been directing his own defense he may also make the final speech and thus leave the last word with the court as it goes forth to deliberate on the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is some difference in the privileges and rights accorded one tried in the People’s Courts and in the higher courts. The reason is not far to seek. In the People’s Court there are no cases of a class nature of the serious sort. There could not be, since the jurisdiction of the People’s Court does not extend to crimes punishable by the death sentence. Here come the people from among the masses who have violated the law, but when a Kulak or one of the bourgeoisie is involved and the offense is against the state or the order of government, the case goes to a higher tribunal and the rights of the defendant are more circumscribed. In a trial when the accused is of a socially dangerous character, and restrictions are held to be necessary, the discretionary power of the judge may draw such limits as depriving the defendant of rights of counsel, of certain witnesses, or of records in the case. Such procedure, however, is said to be unusual and resorted to only in cases where the offense is of a highly dangerous character. Even in such an instance the defendant may still conduct his own case with all of his customary rights. The accused may be a socially dangerous character who must necessarily be subjected to restrictions. It is likely that this happens in a small degree and only in the most serious cases, but in fairness a chapter dealing with the rights of the defendant should call attention to this possible limitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To see the defendant in court one is impressed with the amount of liberty he has. One forgets that he is the man whose life or liberty is in jeopardy. He talks, he interrogates, he explains and argues. And it is amazing to see how these people have come to understand the working of the law. It is a part of the duty of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers to help in explaining and popularizing the Soviet laws and a good job they have done of it, too. Of course, they have had their helpers, but one finds children who know why the law of August 7, 1932, providing a death penalty for larceny from the state was necessary, and as for the enactment which specifies a five-year period of imprisonment for adulteration in an effort to make for better quality, every housewife knows the answer. She demands better material for her dresses, better sugar for her table, and she has heard all about the law, its necessity and purpose, in her factory or other place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
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That acquaintance with the laws, that knowledge of the principle involved, makes it possible for an offender to do a pretty good job as his own attorney, unless he be one of the illiterate peasants. In that case, if he has no counsel, he can be rather sure of the court’s interest in finding out the facts and in interpreting them correctly. It is to the state’s interest to see that the accused person has every opportunity to be treated fairly, and the court is only the organ of the state in carrying out such a policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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As has already been said, the people seem in most cases to agree with the verdict of the court and that is worth something as an indication of justice. They are encouraged to follow the case and to understand the application of the law. After hearing their discussion at a trial, one would know of their intense interest. It seems to be an added cloak of protection for the defendant in case a judge did exceed fair play. It would be felt in the appeal!&lt;br /&gt;
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In the event of a verdict of guilty the convicted one now has his right of complaint so that his case will be reviewed by the cassational division of the higher court, the Regional or the Supreme Court, or to the latter even from the first. Herein is his last chance of life or liberty. Already we have talked of cases where the decision of the lower courts was reversed. That happens in about ten per cent. of the cases. So a man has a slim one-chance-in-ten hope of getting off from his punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the reader has, in this enumeration of rights, been impressed with the absence of one held dear in the United States—the right of a person to trial by a jury of his “peers.” But the system existent in the Soviet Union bears a resemblance in effect, although they repudiate the idea of our jury system both for political expedience and because they think the practice unsound from a judicial point of view. However, the two persons who sit with the judge do actually provide some check on his judgment and authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet system the two jurors, or co-judges, may decide independently of the judge in all cases. They are selected with a view to their having some ability to serve, and most of them seem to be people of intelligence who take an active part in the trial. While they are without doubt subject at times to influence from the judge in deliberating on the verdict, there seems also ground for suspecting that because of their nearness to the workers there would be a strong tendency to reflect the opinion of such a group in a verdict they would render. They cannot be regarded as party tools, since a large majority are not party members as against the large majority of judges who are. However, there is a class feeling. The court, as said before, is an organ for carrying out the policy of the state, and decisions will naturally consider the dangerous character of the person on trial. The class nature of the procedure is apparent and is acknowledged, but it is held to be legitimate, a necessity. The jurors could not be expected to aid in a decision, or render one on their own account, which would go against this policy. Thus it would seem that the jurors might have effect in trials not of a class nature, might actually constitute an additional safeguard to the rights of the defendant. There are cases on record where they have gone against the judgment of the court, and rendered their own verdict, thus proving that they are not always a rubber stamp.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER X: CORRECTIVE LABOR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; title of this chapter defines the attitude of the Soviet government toward those persons whom it sets apart from society for a time. It is almost necessary to see what they have done in this line to understand it properly. The institutions in which the policy is carried out have moved many people to warm praise. M. Herriot of France, on visiting the Kharkov Labor Commune exclaimed, “I am not a Communist. I am an old man,” then launched into exuberant appreciation of the system in use there.&lt;br /&gt;
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For the discussion of the system in all its details of work and education, one should read the volume, already referred to, &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, edited by Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky. Each separate article is written by a specialist in his particular field and each presents in minuteness some phase of the system which the Russians use. They have known what they wanted to do in the direction of reformation even back in the days of 1917, but for so many years the idea lay, like others did, obscured by catastrophe. Terror and necessity caused severity to prevail for a long time. Punishment was the mainstay of defense from foe within in order to withstand a little better the ones then pressing from without.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the idea was there in the minds of those who were to define the penal policy and the Code of 1922, and set down the principle that punishment was not for the purpose of revenge and might not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain. With this beginning there was a steady progress toward the removing of those indignities that tend to degrade a man, until the Correctional Labor Code of 1933 completed the process. In the meantime various amendments have prohibited torture, the use of handcuffs, solitary confinement, deprivation of food, or any other measure that would have the effect of degradation or do physical harm to the person.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0178.svg|SYSTEM OF PLACES FOR DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
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There has been a steady effort to remove what they term the “prison spirit.” There is, they tell you, no such thing as a “captive” or “prisoner.” The idea is to keep the person deprived of his liberty from feeling in any measure isolated. He is given work to do such as he would have outside and he is always conscious of its useful nature. There are instructors for the various trades, machinery, carpentry, etc., who see that each man is educated for his job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are two main types of places for deprivation of liberty, those located in cities in close quarters, and those out in the country where there is space and greater freedom. In chapters just following some of these typical ones will be described, but they are mentioned here so that references may be clearer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before describing the characteristics of the institutions used for corrective labor, we shall need to define the policy that goes into the system. The articles on which the materials for this chapter are mainly based are those by B. Utievsky on &#039;&#039;Prison Regime&#039;&#039;, and another entitled &#039;&#039;Work in Correctional Labor Institutions&#039;&#039; by M. Kessler and B. Oleinin, both of which are included in the volume edited by Vishinsky, already referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
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We note again in connection with this work the class character of criminal legislation. One of the basic principles is the assumption that peasants and workers deprived of their liberty are not premeditated enemies of the Soviet order, and under these circumstances it is natural to suppose that treatment for them would be milder than for the anti-proletarians, and the privileges enjoyed by them would be greater. However, this assumption does not prevent the use of the same policy and the same methods in the prison treatment of the so-called class enemies. While the main purpose in placing the political prisoner and others whose crime is chiefly against the state in outlying places was to isolate them from society and prevent their continued danger, there was still a desire to restore them as useful citizens by means of education and labor. The principle expressed in the Code that “maintenance in correctional labor institutions shall be reasonable, and shall not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity” is carried out, they say, in the places where political prisoners are kept just as in others. The main difference is that these prisoners have less freedom, less liberty for contact with society. The aim, however, uppermost in their treatment is to organize a collective life for them, and by the education which is provided to cause these people to fit into that life.&lt;br /&gt;
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An example of constructive use of these prisoners from the anti-proletarian class is the building of the White Sea-Baltic Canal. It is interesting just here to give a quotation from Maxim Gorki, which illustrates their own point of view as to the value of this policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“How did the kulaks work? Here is an instance. The Podlipinsky brigade of the first section in which there were 32 kulaks in the last ten days has set a record of 25 per cent. fulfillment of their quota. But the brigade would not quit its job even when the next shift came to take their place. The brigade had to be taken off by direct order of the chief of the section.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The order Number One brigade consisted chiefly of kulaks. It was on rock work in the sixth section. It has fulfilled 130-150 per cent. of its quota. Their exemplary work was rewarded and entered into the Red Labor Book.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While this may be propaganda, the fact remains that there are those operating the locks in this canal who have been discharged as prisoners, but who continue loyally at the post. We are assured by another author that “thousands of convicts from anti-Soviet elements redeemed themselves, and showed great devotion to Soviet construction. Many gained their freedom; a great many were accorded all kinds of privileges, and a few awarded the highest order of merit.”&lt;br /&gt;
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As we come to consider the program for those prisoners from among their own masses we get on safer grounds, at least as to practice. The policy follows much the same lines. We have mentioned before the change in terminology from jails or prisons to “places for deprivation of liberty.” It has also been mentioned that the change does not appear to be limited to terminology, but that the actual purpose to carry out some definite measure by which a man may be rendered fit for a useful place in society seems well observed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here, perhaps, would be a good place to say that the program of the Communist Party in regard to treatment of those who break the law calls for eventual correctional labor without deprivation of liberty. Their ultimate goal, both expressed in policy and now being put into practice in a limited way, is that persons shall be sent to labor under supervision where training is provided. This practice will have to go slowly and proceed as their educational program prepares the way for it. At the present time there is usually no sentence of deprivation of liberty for less than one year. Any penalty of compulsory labor given for less than that minimum permits the offender to retain his liberty. In such cases the unemployed among these persons is farmed out to factory or to agricultural work with supervision and training provided. He is given a place to live near to his work, but he is free to go and come as he wishes. It is the aim of the higher judicial organs to abolish the use of deprivation of liberty as rapidly as possible, and to use it only for cases who do not respond to other measures of social defense. The Superior Court has likewise given instructions to the lower tribunals to use deprivation of liberty only as other measures have failed. The employed who are sentenced to labor without deprivation of liberty remain on the job on which they are at work and a certain per cent. of the salary received is deducted each month. With both of these classes there is a possibility of early discharge for good work and because of the practice used in all their penal institutions of counting two working days equal to three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
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Up to 1929 there were still in existence isolated places of detention but since that time the policy prevalent has been to change all of these into the favored educational establishments. At the present time all persons sentenced are taken care of in the various types of labor colonies (industrial, agricultural, road building, land improvement, etc.) or in the semi-free labor camps where guards are maintained, usually selected from among the inmates themselves, but where there are no locked rooms or prison walls.&lt;br /&gt;
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The régime, then, of these institutions, according to Utievsky, has three basic influences: (1) Socially useful, productive labor, (2) political educational influences, and (3) the development of public activity among the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us now see how these three methods of influence are carried out in the institutions themselves. The purpose of labor on the part of the convicts is to provide organized collective work in a society where collective living in all its phases is a predominant note. It is essential to successful readjustment. The Kulak, with his individualistic tendencies, is re-educated in this political philosophy. While he is at this labor, the convict works under the same conditions, and with the same protections that he would enjoy in outside labor. His hours are seven or eight a day, depending upon the nature of his work, and he is permitted a weekly rest of a continuous 42-hour period. Special protection is given to the juvenile laborer, but this will be mentioned again in the chapter concerning juvenile delinquency.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no night work for women, just as there would not be in outside labor, and minors under eighteen are not to be employed in injurious trades. Maternity vacations of eight weeks for physical labor, and six weeks for mental work, both before and after childbirth are prescribed for women. There also exist regulations of various sorts for sanitation and safety. The whole idea is that the person deprived of his liberty may be made to feel that he labors on a par with workers outside; that he may feel useful in the economic plan of the nation; and, through the pay given him, continue support to his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the general consideration mentioned above, there are some special rules of importance. For example, women who are in the fifth month of pregnancy may not be sent to any work outside the institution of which they are inmates, without their consent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all labor in the Soviet Union there are a certain number of days of work (five is the general rule) and one day of rest. This is likewise true of convict labor, and on the eve of the rest day all work and school study must be suspended from dinner time (which is at midday). Another privilege of importance is that each person keeps his own work book with a record of hours, wages due, and deductions made, properly entered. In this way he does not have to take the word of any official as to the correctness of the count, but is able to see for himself and complain if an error has been made.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the matter of food there is a provision for increase in accordance with the expenditure of energy in the work assigned. One doing heavy physical labor would, for example, be given food in larger quantities than one using less strength. In accordance with the principle that a prisoner may not be degraded, the administrative office of these institutions is not permitted to make use of the personal services of the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was mentioned in the beginning that one type of institution provided for the carrying on of all activities in small areas. These are of the nature of penitentiaries, but even for the type of convict in these prisons there are large works of a variety of kinds organized outside the city limits. Among these would be brick-work, bridge building colonies, house building, dairy farms and truck gardens. One of the most constructive things about this labor, in whatever line, is that it forms a part of the five-year plan, and is thus put on the same basis as other forms. The industry carried on must, first of all, satisfy the needs of the institution itself, but goods in excess of this amount are placed on the home market. Export of prison-made goods is forbidden except in the case of the sports goods made at Bolshevo Labor Commune. The latter are noted for their excellent quality and are exported to various countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the grave prison problems in this country is the question of payment of wages to persons serving sentences in penal institutions. In the Soviet system there is no unpaid labor. The amount may not be less than 25 per cent. of the existing scale, nor more than 50 per cent. The cost of maintenance is, of course, not deducted from this amount. In establishing the schedule the prison administration must have the agreement of the Commissar of Labor, and the fact of the profit or loss of the enterprise does not enter into the calculations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convict is not restricted in the spending of his earnings. He may purchase extra foodstuffs, clothing, or he may send his income to his family for support. He may be given advice in the matter, but there is no compulsion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One point in connection with this system is that labor is not compulsory. A convict may work or not as he wishes, and still receive maintenance. But in refusing to work, he loses most of the privileges which he would otherwise enjoy. Practically none do refuse, it is said. On the other hand, there is a great increase in those joining the shock brigade, the group doing excellent work, sometimes even for additional hours. In 1933 in the Moscow region, this figure reached 51.3 per cent. of the total number in these institutions. The number fluctuates usually between 54 and 78 per cent. As a result quotas of production are usually more than fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second basic influence in the program of this institution is political education. A system is established in each place of deprivation of liberty, and the official in charge is the assistant warden. Practically all education carried on has a strong political influence. However, one of the aims involved is the elimination of illiteracy. Every effort is being made in the Soviet Union to give to each citizen at least an elementary education, whether he be in prison or out. To that end there is established in every state institution schools providing for the first seven years of work. There are also other penal institution courses for the semi-illiterates and those of a sufficiently advanced nature for the more educated. There are in addition some evening and university classes for those wishing to take advantage of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the regular school work which is carried on both by teachers from the outside and some selected from qualified inmates, there is a system of lectures covering specialized subjects. These are designed to give information of a social-political nature and educate the individual in the use of sanitation and hygiene. There are others of a general educational character embracing material of interest to the group. These lectures are given by specialists in the various fields, who are invited by prison administrators, and by any one among the convicts who might be qualified to talk on a particular subject. Admission, of course, is open to all without restriction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In connection with the education work, there are libraries and reading rooms. There is a library located in each place of deprivation of liberty, and there are also circulating ones, and in neither are there restrictions as to the use of books. In most cases some work of this nature is obligatory, but beyond that every convict is not only permitted to use the facilities, but is encouraged to take advantage of the privileges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reading room may be visited at any free hour. Here are found recent newspapers, magazines and other periodicals. Newspapers are also distributed in the rooms, and convicts may subscribe to their own outside these limits if they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The radio with which each room is usually equipped also constitutes an important instrument of education. Lectures, music, and other information or entertainment of an educational and cultural nature may be listened to by the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most interesting phases in the development of this program in these institutions is the art work. The convicts are trained in dramatic performance and also enjoy in this connection entertainment by outside companies. There are concerts and moving pictures given, in almost every one of these places, and convicts attend not less than once a week. But the interesting side of it to an observer is the work the inmates do themselves in the matter of writing and producing their own stage performances. The convicts are free to attend and there is, of course, no charge for admission. A theater or auditorium is a part of the equipment of every institution of this nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sanitary education carried on is in line with the program of other education of this nature, distributing such information to the masses of people. There is an opportunity here for teaching individuals in an effective way, and for seeing that certain fundamentals are put into actual practice. There is a bureau of sanitary education in each institution, composed of the house physician, representatives from the department of political education, and delegates elected by the convicts themselves, devoting itself to this phase of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The purpose of these institutions is seen in its most complete fulfillment in the vocational training which each gives. There are courses in schools of all the various trade groups, providing both theoretical and practical training in skilled trades. The unskilled laborer is here transformed into a man with specialized information in some particular line, which will both render him useful in industry and give him happiness in his work. In 1931, 7,700 convicts attended such courses in the Soviet Union, and 6,500 workers were in that year turned out trained for some particular trade. In 1933 the plan was for giving such preparation to 24,000. Salvation for society and for the individual, they hold, lies in this direction and every man and woman sentenced for law-breaking must be so fitted to earning a livelihood that he will not transgress again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be mentioned before passing to the next point that both cultural and legal work is carried on by means of mass meetings through the organization of such groups as law clubs, and by means of evening forums, lectures and talks. There is also a legal bureau composed of representatives of the department of political education, and two members elected from the convicts, which gives legal aid or advice to the inmates whenever it is needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third basic influence in correctional labor—the development of public activities among the convicts—accounts for some of the most valuable rehabilitating work done in these places, in the author’s opinion. The aim here is to strengthen, or develop where they have been lacking, the social habits of the individual; to turn him into a conscious and active member of society. The basic forms of social activity in these institutions take several directions. There is first the general meeting on various occasions for a variety of purposes. This may be for the formation of social organizations, for the conducting of a campaign for the election of some representative, or perhaps for a celebration of some revolutionary event. The convicts establish their own rules of procedure and make whatever proposals are appropriate. These general meetings take care of whatever concerns are common to the entire population, and leave to the more specialized groups whatever is of narrower interest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the production conferences, held by convicts in the same manner as those used by free-workers in industrial enterprises, an active part is taken in settling whatever questions arise in relation to production. They discuss industrial plans for improvement, financial methods, quota fulfillment, or any question that would logically come within their jurisdiction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most outstanding achievements in the line of self-activities among the convicts is the development of the comradely courts. Through this tribunal those disciplinary problems referred to it are transferred from the administration to the convicts themselves. This court is responsible for the maintenance of order and for seeing that a high quality of educational work prevails, for administering disciplinary measures in the case of shirking work or lessons, of spoiling the equipment of the shops, of laxity in observance of regulations of sanitation and health, of the use of indecent language, of damage done to any book or periodical, of inciting ill treatment of one convict by another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court is composed of a chairman, and two jurors elected at one of the general meetings referred to above. The penalties which they may impose on one who breaks the rules, or fails to live up to the standard set, are as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) Reprimand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Censure with strict warning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Censure with publication in local newspapers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Limitation of visits by friends from outside for a period of not more than one month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) Application to supervisory committee for transfer to another prison with a stricter régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Application for withholding vacation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) Application for either partial or complete non-discounting of working days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) Application for withholding all probation, and early release during a certain period of not more than one month after maturing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) Restitution of damage done.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case of undue severity on the part of this court, the warden may alter the penalty to a milder form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred in the paragraphs dealing with education to cultural committees. These are elected at a general mass meeting to put into action the plans for political education work or to devote themselves to other problems of a cultural nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every place of deprivation of liberty has its wall newspaper, changed about every week or ten days and carrying news of various sorts of a political or educational nature, as well as items of interest to prison life. The editorial boards of these papers are likewise elected at the general meetings. Prison administrators as well as other authorities on penal policy in the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the development of public activities among the prisoners has yielded splendid results of a social nature. They point to the success of the “book soobotnik” (one day’s salary given for books) which netted 100,000 rubles. It is stated that the gifts were entirely voluntary without pressure from any source. Another incident showing a desirable spirit was the collection among the convicts of 31,818 rubles for an aeroplane which was presented to the fleet. There have been other acts of the same kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now we turn to the régime found in these institutions, the express purpose of which is to develop free will, initiative and self-activity. All privileges possible are permitted to the man deprived of his liberty, and his freedom as little restricted as the nature of the person himself permits. Following out the principle that no condition designed to degrade the convict or make him feel inferior may be permitted, penal authorities proceeded legislatively to remove whatever might exist in this line. The corrective labor code of 1933, for example, completely severed all connection with the progressive system of progressive classification of prisoners. The theory is that in this educational-labor program no man is to be treated with greater privilege than another unless he himself makes some deprivation necessary. Even then there are limits. A recalcitrant member of the penal population may be deprived for a period not longer than one month of such privileges as writing letters, or receiving visitors, but no corporal punishment may be inflicted nor may he be locked in solitary confinement. It is worth noting here that the solitary cells left from the Tzarist days may at times be used for tenants, but the door of the cell may not be locked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convicts have privileges as great as can be accorded. From the day of their entrance they may walk about anywhere they wish at any time they are free from work. In those institutions located in the country, this may take the character of quite a good walk, while in those of the penitentiary type located in cities, it naturally is limited to the prison yard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Visitors may come as often as twice in five days and may consist not only of relatives but of friends and acquaintances as well. There is no red tape in making arrangements for a visit so that no difficulty of this sort prevents contact between the convict and those outside. There may be as many as three persons at one time, and they may bring with them, if they wish, gifts of food, tobacco, etc. There is no restriction in the use of tobacco except that there are some particular places where the convict is requested not to smoke. Outside of this he may have as many cigarettes as he wishes or can obtain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither is there restriction in the number of letters which he may write or receive. In the matter of either letters or gifts the administration reserves the right of inspection, but in the majority of cases, unless there is some suspicion attached to the person, this right is not utilized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is an interesting development in the matter of leaves. For the man who has proved himself a good worker and who is not suspected of any intention of escape, a leave of fourteen days in the year is granted. He may go where he likes on this vacation, and use it as he pleases. He is placed entirely on his honor and no guard is in attendance at any time. In addition to this a convict may obtain a leave at any time because of an emergency such as an illness or death in his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still more liberal terms are granted to the peasant or collective farmer. In the event that he is needed for field labor, he is given a leave for the full three-month period of the season, and if he breaks no law during this leave, the time counts on his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to this leave and vacation, there is always the possibility of release after a short part of the original sentence has been served. If the person is judged fit to be restored to his place in society, and thought to be no longer a menace, he may be released after serving a minimum of one-third of his sentence. There is also the practice, as already mentioned, of counting two productive working days as three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before passing from the chapter describing the policy and character of corrective labor work, some mention ought to be made of the administration. Who exactly is responsible in the USSR for seeing that this policy is translated into action? At the very head are the Commissariats of Justice of the various republics.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A Law of October 24, 1934, transferred the administration of all places of deprivation of liberty to the newly created Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR. The organization described is now within this Department, but the author had the information too late to incorporate in the body of the book.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There is a certain amount of independence in these relationships. The Collective Labor Code of 1933 of the RSFSR made a considerable advance in the direction of autonomous supervision on the part of the administration of corrective labor organization in these republics. Those institutions located in the territory of these various republics are administered and managed by local commissars of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this organization there are local administrative bodies known as observation committees. One of these exists in connection with each institution and is directly responsible for administration and management. In direct charge is the superintendent or warden, and his staff of assistants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is especially close relation between the agency of supervision and the prisoners which enables the Observation Commission to know with a high degree of accuracy as to when release is advisable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Previous to 1926 there had been two commissions participating in the distribution and release of prisoners—the Distributory Commission and the Observation Commission. The Observation Commission, however, while making recommendations to the Distributory Commission in matters of dismissal and release, played a minor role, since its viewpoint was in no way binding on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1924 provided for an Observation Commission to be established at every place of deprivation of liberty as a part of the staff of the place. On this commission was the people’s judge, and a representative of the local bureau of trade unions. This extension in the scope of the work of these commissions was made in an effort both to raise the level of work being done at the prisons and also to establish a closer contact between commission and prisoners. The result hoped for, however, was not realized as the judge was entirely, by nature of his position, separated from his work, and the representatives of the bureau took little interest in the matter. By the same Act the powers of the Distributory Commission were widened, and the Act of April 21, 1926, went further still, giving to this body authority to assign the long-term prisoners to places of agricultural work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There still was the gap between the work of the commission of release and the correctional labor institutions. The Observation Commission which was on the ground could make recommendations but they were not always accepted by the Distributory Commission which handled dismissals and releases. Many mistakes resulted and the desire of the authorities to establish intimate contact between commission and prisoners was being thwarted. Thus the Sixth Congress of Jurists proposed the liquidation of the Distributory Commissions and the reorganization of the Observation Commissions. By the reformation of 1929 new opportunities for constructive work were opened to these commissions, and the contact between them and the prisoners of the institution was finally made close and real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 made several important changes in the composition and work of these commissions of the RSFSR. There is now a Central Commission and under it trade union observation committees on which are the head of the correctional labor institution and two representatives from the general organization which are installed in each of the large corrective labor units and in all field production. Every effort has been made to see that there is close contact of these commissions with the institutions, that the policy of the central administration is carried out, that the work follows the lines it should, and results in fitting the inmates of the institutions for life as it is supposed to do. The Commissar of Justice is, in the last analysis, responsible for the work of these commissions, but by Act of February 10, 1933, he has placed that responsibility squarely on one man, the chairman of the Corrective Labor Commission, whose duty it now is to see that the policy and plans of the commissariat are carried out. This chairman is a member of the Central Observation Commission, but not the chairman of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prosecutors who were supposed to be attending the open session of these meetings and were actually present at them to the extent of 78 per cent., were found to be merely sitting quietly and taking no active part in solving problems and working out plans. By the same Act of February 10, 1933, the Commissar of Justice ordered them not only to be present but to participate actively in all meetings. There are no figures on actual participation but the percentage of attendance jumped from 78 to 82 and it is stated that practically all those present take an active part in discussions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no lack of effort to see that this commission inquires into, and knows, what is going on, is acquainted with the prisoners, and never for a moment forgets what it is set up to do. For the accomplishment of an organic union between the Observation Commission and the corrective labor institution, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee has demanded that the members of this commission participate actively in the creative and labor life of the institution as well as in its political education. To effect this there are many special meetings, besides the open ones, devoted to the problems of various industries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us see for a moment what organizations are represented on these commissions and how often the respective members attend the meetings.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 406407.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| style=&amp;quot;width: 70%&amp;quot;| Name of organization&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| No. of meetings attended&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(in per cent.)&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Corrective Labor Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 68&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Court&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 82&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Worker-peasant inspection&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 74.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Other Soviet Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 54&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Women’s delegate groups&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 73&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Enterprizes&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 58&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Organization of Komsomol&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 47&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Sections of Revolutionary Law&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 63&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Trade Unions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 66&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jurors&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 95&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Agricultural collectives&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 60&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This table was for the last nine months of 1932. It represents not a particularly bad showing but it was in 1933 that the All-Union Central Executive Committee decided that this was not sufficient and that there must be even better attendance. It aimed its order this time at the social members and demanded that they give active aid in inculcating social form of labor into correctional labor institutions. There is no thought of sending a man away to prison to get him out of the community then forgetting all about him. He will be returning in an average time of a year and a half and the community through its representative is responsible to see that he shall return in good order. It is thus made directly everybody’s problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been said elsewhere in this book that the Observation Commission is the authority for handling release and dismissal. Appeal may be taken from all of its decisions and a good percentage are reversed. Its mistakes, it is said, are largely because of a one-sided attack of the case in which its members were able only to see the seriousness of the crime, or perhaps only the social status of the convict, or maybe only his industrial activity at the place of his imprisonment. The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 takes a broader approach to the problem and demands that those responsible do the same. Each individual case must be treated from a differentiated viewpoint, with a survey of all angles involved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following table is given to show what types of disposal is used in the Soviet Union, and the relative importance of each.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; Article by N. Durmanov, entitled “Observation Commissions,” p. 396&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| &#039;&#039;Cases Examined in 1928&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| Per cent.&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of those serving in correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 22.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of prisoners&lt;br /&gt;
| 0.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Amnesty&lt;br /&gt;
| 7.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Release from imprisonment under guard&lt;br /&gt;
| 1.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Installment of labor days&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;It has been mentioned elsewhere that sentences are shortened by counting two productive work days as three of the sentence.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| 28.4&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Removal of strict isolation&lt;br /&gt;
| 3.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to other classification&lt;br /&gt;
| 2.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Assignment of type of place of detention&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Miscellaneous&lt;br /&gt;
| 13.0&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the duties already mentioned the Observation Commission has charge of the distribution of prisoners to the proper places for the serving of the sentence imposed and for their transferal from one place to another when it becomes necessary. In order to place a convict so that the best results may be secured, a close case study is made, an analysis of his personality, characteristics, ability, social status, and other pertinent information, but if an error is made after all, then he is transferred when better acquaintance shows where he belongs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XI: SOKOLNIKI ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sokolniki&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a prison, call it by whatever name one will. It is true that the national policy relating to corrective labor and discipline modify its physiognomy, but it still presents the atmosphere of a penitentiary. This statement is not meant as any criticism of either it or its administration, since one can hardly see how that aspect of it could be otherwise as long as criminals do exist who need restraining—and some of such there are bound to be. The fact of its sterner nature is emphasized in the beginning so that the impression will not be given that a place like Bolshevo Labor Commune, described in later pages, would fulfill the requirements for all the elements found among the criminals in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Standing outside the wall, just as cold and gray as the usual for penitentiaries, and looking up at the towers at the corners where sentinels armed with rifles keep watch, one has all the feeling of a sinking heart that comes with such a sight. People are shut away there and possibly forgotten by the citizenry from whom they have been separated, perhaps, since it is the customary thing for ignorance to prevail as to prisons and penal methods. One thinks, standing there, wondering about men behind that wall, of a description written in verse by one prisoner some quarter of a century ago. It is sentimental, belonging to an age when emotion was expressed a little more freely than our practice of restraint permits now, but one suspects men still suffer as he did in a good many prison cells such as this writer has seen. Lines of the poem, especially descriptive and appropriate to this subject, speak of “where tongues are mute, and men arise to newborn wrong,” and “where men must fawn or walk with scars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stell and Null, &#039;&#039;Convict Verse&#039;&#039;, Ft. Madison, Iowa, 1908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One doesn’t need to tell people who know anything of the penal situation in the United States that conditions make it possible to write lines like that. Of all of our social endeavor, the treatment of men convicted of crime seems the place where we have most signally failed in constructive results. Constructive treatment is, of course, a rare exception rather than a rule. But it seems to this writer that the implications of the verse have a less favorable chance of being true of Soviet prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place there is no prison sentence longer than ten years, and few offenders serve that long. The authorities figure that a maximum ten-year constructive program will fit anybody for proper living unless he is irredeemable. There will be some cases, of course, where there is failure, but the idea is to fit the régime to the majority. Right here there will be the question always forthcoming as to what they would do with our own gangster type. Give them a ten-year sentence? Not at all. They have few of them and for armed robbery one may be sentenced to death. No arguments are listed here for or against punishment by death, but in order to understand the absence of a long prison sentence it is necessary to be informed as to what happens to those who would ordinarily be the recipients of such a term. The fellow who murders in a jealous rage or great anger may find himself in for a long treatment in a place for mental abnormals, or he may, if judged sane, be given a sentence of ten years or less. They do not consider this type of murderer to be, usually, a further social menace.&lt;br /&gt;
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With those disposed of the formulators of the policy believe that a longer sentence for others is not needed. They see no aid anywhere in having one languish in prison beyond that point where a sentence ceases to have the possibility of being constructive and begins to dull the senses and perspective of the prisoner so that he is worthless anywhere. Some of our penologists have said that it is better to keep a man either a brief period or for his life because after a certain time it is practically impossible for him to fit into a society of which he has no knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet system provides measures for keeping a man in touch with society so that he may not feel that entire isolation even though ten years is the maximum of incarceration. In the first place, as we have seen, only those whose term is short or whose character makes it necessary are put in the closed institutions; in the next even those who are there are given vacations of leave if it is thought that they can be trusted not to escape. And in case that has to be denied to an inmate, he still has opportunity for contacts with associates within and friends and relatives without in open, wholesome manner.&lt;br /&gt;
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Tongues are not mute, either. Prisoners gather where they like, walk together, work together, play together. Nor do they “fawn or walk with scars.” The stated policy is to encourage them to approach and conduct themselves with dignity and no guard may inflict physical punishment on any prisoner. One might say that such a policy is likely not carried out. There may be isolated instances of violation, and one feels sure there are, but the attitude of the men toward the attendants and guards seem to indicate that such regulations are regarded.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sokolniki is a prison for men who have been sentenced, supposedly, from one to three years. Article 28 of the Criminal Code says, ‘Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labour camps.&lt;br /&gt;
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“In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labour or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labour camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence.” (May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;)&lt;br /&gt;
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There are therefore a number serving sentences of longer periods than the three years who, because of physical condition, can not be sent to the labor camp to which they should be assigned, or because they need the restraint, perhaps, of these stronger walls. At the time of the writer’s visit there were a few more than eleven hundred prisoners in Sokolniki. The prison’s capacity is said to be something more than that, but it seemed then to be more crowded than was good for adequate treatment. However, one must remember that the housing situation in all of the USSR is acute and especially is that true of the cities where industrialization has required the assembling of more persons than can comfortably be housed. It is to be expected that prisons might share in this shortage.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet system uses the collective dormitory system rather than the single room standard. This is in keeping with their idea of community living and we were told at the women’s prison that it is preferred by the prisoners themselves who like being with others and have no wish to be shut off. They use it also in student dormitories where beds are placed eight or ten to a large room. That, however, they wish to remedy. Their aim is a room for every worker and every student but that will require much more building.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because Sokolniki is a well-known prison it will perhaps be interesting to set down a detailed description of it. The Soviet picture, The Road to Life, shown in this country, was made there, we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
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In arriving at Sokolniki, which is not far outside the city limits of Moscow, one comes to a closed door in the stone wall, some fifteen feet high, already mentioned. There must, of course, be an appointment just as there must be for entering a penitentiary in our own country. There is a bell and after it is rung the door is opened by an armed guard. The visitor is then in a small entrance room where there are other guards and which leads into a large court back of and around which the prison buildings form a square. There are other guards scattered in places about the court and near a large gate through which automobiles and trucks enter when they have business there.&lt;br /&gt;
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As we went through the court to the first building we were to see, about a hundred feet away, two men sat at the door of a side building, peeling potatoes. They were talking and laughing as they worked, evidently enjoying themselves. This was the first glimpse of the informal atmosphere that prevailed throughout, and which caused us to look in some amazement at occasional scenes such as that encountered as we entered the auditorium where a good pianist was playing and other men stood beside him or leaned on the piano, at ease and absorbed in the music.&lt;br /&gt;
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We had now left all the armed guards behind and there were no others in evidence until we came to depart. There were attendants, supervisors of work, etc., but there were no weapons among them. We went through shops and factories, observing the men at work. They wore any sort of clothes that they happened to own, mostly of the poor peasant type, since prisoners in Russia are never put in uniform.&lt;br /&gt;
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The spinning and weaving shops were interesting. They were well lighted, had good ventilation except in one room where neither was very adequate. As we went by the men talked to each other in a normal conversational manner, watched us, both amused and curious. Also, we talked to them as we wished. Others, not then at work for some reason (we were told that every man in the prison works, but it was late in the day when we went and some had ended their shift), followed us about good naturedly, enjoying our curiosity.&lt;br /&gt;
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A prosecuting attorney was our guide and he stopped to talk to various ones among them. Also as we went along men occasionally stopped him with requests, some with complaints, and he noted them on paper. At times he good naturedly refused what was asked, but any came who wanted to, informally, and without permission from any source.&lt;br /&gt;
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The attitude of the convicts toward labor may be explained by several things which have already been mentioned. There is no feeling of punishment about the work since the prison factories are placed on the same basis as others in the country. They have an eight-hour day, they receive pay (from 20 to 50 rubles per month) which they are permitted to spend as they like and which often goes to the support of a family at home, and they have the knowledge that the work they do is counted in the regular plan so that even while they serve their sentence they are actively helping in the nation’s economic life. At any rate, these men did not appear depressed as they worked, nor in bad spirits. We watched an older inmate pleasantly talking to a young fellow beside him while he manipulated a loom, apparently telling some interesting story for he used his hands occasionally in quick gestures, but he kept his eyes on his work, and he seemed to take pride in his job.&lt;br /&gt;
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From the shops we went to the dormitories and saw not one room only, but a number of them. As has already been intimated these rooms were too crowded. The cots were quite close together, even using the center of the room, and there was not enough space left for walking about. However, the men are not in a great deal of time. They go outside as they wish, walk when they care to, read in the library, exercise on the outside gymnasium apparatus, and are in the work shops at other times. Also, as already said, the problem of space is one that is occupying Soviet authorities extensively at present and they will require time to remedy the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We were asked to enter the room and sit down on the cots. The prosecuting attorney with us led the way. We were somewhat slow in following and one of the men, sitting on his cot in the center of the room, said, “Come on in. The beds are clean.” His invitation was accompanied by a smile and we quickly entered. By this time our presence had become known about the place and a great number had gathered in the corridor outside the room we were visiting, talking volubly. We were told to speak to any one we wished, to ask any question. We did so freely and were answered frankly. One prisoner told us that he was displeased with his sentence, that it was his first offense, that he had stolen a hat, and had been given a five-year term. “Impossible,” exclaimed the prosecutor, and promptly sent a messenger to the office to get the papers in the case. Some time later, when we were in the auditorium the records came and the man was sent for. He was a little chagrined but not greatly disturbed when his record showed robbery, not once but several times, with even the use of firearms. “Well,” he said nonchalantly, not too much put out that he hadn’t got away with his story, “it was too much anyway.”&lt;br /&gt;
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After we had visited a number of the dormitories we went to the yard. Several hundred prisoners were with us then. In the center of a bunch of them, we remembered again that here were some of the worst criminals in the country. They gathered all around to ask us about prisons in the United States or any other questions they could think of. One particularly intelligent man talked freely of conditions in Sokolniki, of his own sentence, and of his outlook on life. He had been a teacher before he had been caught in some sort of speculation, but he was teaching in the prison as well as doing some shop work. We continued questioning, now in French, now in German, more often through the Russian interpreter. The attendants were among them, talking also. There seemed to be no feeling of restraint in their presence, but on the contrary an existence of comradeship showed, especially on one occasion when one of the men had been asked a question he could not answer and turned to a guard for information. Such an attitude was apparent often, particularly as we went to the auditorium. As we were leaving the yard an incident happened that impressed us greatly. From the flower garden, one of the men came with an arm full of flowers that he wished to present to a member of the party who had passed some cigarettes around. He did it with the air of one who brings a bouquet from a prized garden of his own.&lt;br /&gt;
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We stopped to look at the dining room next. It was an ordinary room of almost square dimensions with long tables, seating two hundred and fifty at a time, and immaculately clean. From there we went through a small hall and upstairs to the auditorium where we were told to ask any questions on points of either policy or practice about which we still would like information. We were not sparing but every query was answered with great patience and detail. Then, as we were about to go, the prosecutor suggested to the superintendent who had been with us that we might like to hear the orchestra play. A messenger was sent and eventually a few musicians were rounded up but as there were not, enough to give a very good account of themselves, they tried the drama and dancing group with better luck. These hastily summoned the stage director, the curtains to the stage were drawn, a splendid pianist among their number who had discontinued some piece he was playing as we went in, now entertained us while preparations went on. In the meantime both men and attendants were crowding into the auditorium, messengers from among the prisoners were darting in and out with stringed musical instruments, and an informal atmosphere prevailed that it would be hard to give an impression of. The men talked in low excited tones, the music continued, the prosecutor and the prison director leaned against the piano. An attendant near to us carried on an excited conversation with a group of prisoners with him. It was difficult to believe that this was indeed a prison of a more serious type. It had all the earmarks just then of a community affair of local talent about to start.&lt;br /&gt;
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The program was given with zest and enjoyment. It lasted an hour and consisted of dances, singing, a reading, most of which they had written and produced themselves under the direction of the specialists who are in charge of that type of work in the prison. The results they got with the scant attention they gave to costuming was interesting. They used only a kind of high-throated long white tunic over whatever trousers they happened to have on, because they had no time for further preparation, but there was a uniform effect which was appropriate to the selections they gave. We were reluctant to have the entertainment end but we had undoubtedly kept them from their supper for the time, and their graciousness reminded us that we too must be considerate. We thanked them, said goodbye, and went upstairs for a visit to the library.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here was a long light room with bookshelves across the farther end and with reading tables and chairs nearer the door. At the side as we entered was the atheist corner, so-called, which is found in nearly all the institutions and which is devoted mostly to evolution. A large picture of Darwin was prominently placed among the exhibits. There were also pictorial illustrations of the lower stages through which man has come and such other things as one would expect to find in a geological or anthropological display. Science, in their new culture, is designed to replace religion in so far as state recognition is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out again in the yard some of the prisoners demonstrated their athletic ability and performed gymnastic feats on bars. We noted their carefree attitude, the interested passive participation of their comrades, but the wall was there again just across from us reminding that after all there was restriction—deprivation of liberty. And that, after all, is the chiefest of punishment. On top of the towers at the corners of the wall the men with long rifles looked down at us. No matter what the correctional labor policy, how designed to be constructive of character, certain men have to be restricted and the program forced on them. But it is to be doubted whether there is often achievement of a spirit like that in the prisons of many other countries and even in case it does exist, it is likely to be in some isolated place where an exceptional warden has been able to achieve it, possibly in a lesser place, one suspects, and not a major penitentiary.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XII: A WOMEN’S PRISON ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; full name of this institution is Moscow Novinsky Women’s Isolator. There is another such prison at Orenburg, and these are the only two in the RSFSR. There were many things about this place that compared unfavorably with Sokolniki, chief of which was a lesser liberty of action. That was explained to us as being necessary because fifty per cent. of the population are there awaiting trial, which means that they stay only for a brief time. This makes a constructive program more difficult, since it is not possible to undertake for a yet unconvicted person the same type of treatment as would be accorded one actually sentenced. They must be kept separately, and with the small outdoor space available it is quite a problem to handle the question of freedom and recreation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity of the place is 375, but at the time of our visit it had only 360 in both classes; that is, those sentenced by the court and those awaiting trial. There are more problems connected with a women’s prison than with one for men. Children must be thought of, both those about to be born and small ones who depend on the mother and for whom there is no other care. There is a small hospital for ordinary cases in this prison, but a pregnant woman is taken out to a proper place for the birth of her child. It is emphasized that she is entitled to the same treatment as any other mother in the land, and that by virtue of her being a prisoner, she is not to be deprived of the best medical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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One comes up to this prison suddenly, without warning. Around a corner from a wide avenue and up a cobbled street for a block and the building is there before you. One enters the prison straight from the street into a small hallway, such as is found dividing the two front rooms of a residence. All the guards are women and they stand with guns to which are attached bayonets. They seemed much more severe than the men guards at other prisons, but perhaps that is because one is not accustomed to seeing them. Others wearing revolvers were about in the hallway and at other points in this entrance building. Their uniform consists of white blouse and dark skirt, with the gun belt acting in the place of a normal one, and military-looking caps. They are businesslike and, one feels sure, equal to an emergency. However, we were assured that none arises. The action of the comradely court takes care of the majority of whatever disciplinary problems there might be.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our first pause was in the office where we were received by the director and told some few points about the prison. However, we were reminded that a tour of it would be worth more than a lecture, and since that seemed a logical statement to us, we started out. Across the hall from the office in which we had been sitting was the visiting room. Every six days each prisoner may see visitors. There is no screen through which they must talk; the contact is direct; but there is a long counter behind which the prisoners sit. A guard is present in the room at all times, but takes care not to listen to the conversation. That is regarded as the person’s private affair. Mail may be censored but mere words are not restricted, so we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
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Passing through this room, we found ourselves in a court around which the buildings form a hollow square. This institution was a prison in Tzarist days, and a gloomy spot it must have been according to descriptions. Now, there are many windows which are large and admit plenty of light and air. We visited next the wing used as a dormitory and found there somewhat more space than in Sokolniki. One room was particularly large, about fifty feet long. Beds are fairly well spaced; there is a small cabinet for each woman, and the ventilation is good. A girl with a guitar was furnishing entertainment for others who sat on their respective cots and listened. She stopped playing loudly as we entered but continued to strum. We were told here, as at all other places we visited, to talk to any whom we wished, to ask any question we would. The superintendent seemed eager to emphasize that we were free to see or know anything. She had heard the prevalent story that in Russia one never sees things. She begged us to feel free to look and to question. No one would listen to what we said to the prisoner nor she to us. We talked to an old woman who wore the headdress of a peasant. She sat aloof on her cot and we were moved by her lonely appearance. What had she done? She stole bread, she told us, and for that she had a ten-year sentence. The same prosecutor who was with us at Sokolniki was listening at this moment. His face was full of sympathy. A person, whatever he might have on his conscience, could scarcely find him forbidding to talk to. He began to question and discovered that this was no ordinary theft of bread but a widespread attempt to defraud the state. A written note went into his pocket before he turned away and one wonders whether the ten-year sentence which might possibly not be served anyway, would be reduced.&lt;br /&gt;
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We talked next with a pretty black-haired girl whose eyes sparkled with mischief. No one was near to listen. For robbery, she told us frankly, she had been sent for five years of deprivation of liberty. One hopes that not even a prison can dim that gayness which seemed to cause her to bubble over. Was she getting along all right, she was asked? Fine! She laughed with us, talked animatedly for several minutes. Did she feel resentful? No, because she was learning there and she shouldn’t have stolen anyway. How will she get a job when she gets out? There were more jobs than people she told us as if she had learned a lesson. Was she sure? we asked. All the people who leave here get work at once. She knew that to be true. Why shouldn’t they? They were good workmen, she added. We left them to visit other rooms, and down the hall past two or three we came to one with spreads on the beds, with white covers on the tables, with a framed picture here and there and other personal belongings in place. It was the room occupied by the shock-brigaders. Russia honors its &#039;&#039;Udarnicks&#039;&#039;, whether in prison or out, for their efforts are such as send the nation bounding on its way. In this room, the honor spot of the dormitories, a young woman, perhaps twenty-one, sat at a desk with her back to us. She is the chairman of the comradely court, we were told, and she smiles at us with great pride. It is evidently an achievement which carries satisfaction.&lt;br /&gt;
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She had stolen continuously since she was fifteen, her case read, but by means of the approach they use here they have been able to aid her. The superintendent assured us that her whole character had undergone a change, that she was trusted and valuable to the institution, and supervised with ability the court that was responsible for discipline within the prison. We talked to others, one a middle-aged woman, who did exceptionally good work. She was proud of her ability and the praise she had won.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went to the nursery. A mother sat in a small room beside it, nursing her child. We noticed the position of her foot, the way she held her baby, and were reminded that some one gave instruction in such points in a way that would meet the best approval. Cribs were lined up along the sides of the nursery and a trained woman, not a prisoner, was in charge. She was assisted with the children by inmates themselves. There were about twenty beds but only a few children. The others had already been taken to the play-yard. We took time to observe before we left that the room was well ventilated and well kept and the woman in charge briskly businesslike. As we descended again to the court we passed a small room back of the stairway where women were washing their clothes. Each must do her own, and a room equipped with tubs was provided for the purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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The children are kept up to four years of age, then disposed of among the other state institutions for children or dismissed with the mother, or possibly, if she must stay longer, sent to some of her family. In the yard, a grassy spot with shrubbery, the children were having a gay time with all sorts of apparatus and a playhouse. Like the children in other Russian centers, they wore no clothes except light cotton trunks.&lt;br /&gt;
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They looked healthy and well cared for and showed, it seemed to us, less of physical abnormalities than one usually notices in children of imprisoned women.&lt;br /&gt;
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We visited the school room and were told that compulsory education is provided up to the seventh year and opportunity given for work beyond, by means of university evening courses. There is at the same time the usual political education, the clubs, and physical education that characterizes all penal places, and a radio in every room for additional education and entertainment.&lt;br /&gt;
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We came out into the court again to go to the wing containing the shops. Some of the informal attitude which we had noticed at Sokolniki now began to show itself. There were groups who leaned out of their windows and shouted to us, and some of the younger girls talked to us in the court. Three of them begged us to tell them about the prisons in America, much as three children would waylay one and insist on being told tales. We gave them some information, and then tried to answer questions about New York and life in the United States. No, they didn’t think they would like America because people did not have jobs there, while here when they got out, they would be assured of work. We asked if they felt certain of that. Of course. The patron factory of this institution gives preference to those released from here. They boldly hailed the prosecutor now, to tell him that they wanted their sentences reduced. The law gives them the right to complain to the prison management, to the Commissar of Justice, or to the prosecuting attorney, but they are not offering a complaint of the sentence. It is only that they are ready to be good and work like faithful citizens. Another note is thrust into the prosecutor’s coat pocket. What was done with them we did not know but since the inmates seemed to expect that procedure it must be a general practice, and the fact that he definitely refused some and made no note seemed to indicate that the others had real significance. We were told that each case so noted would be checked. The approach to official channels is evidently quite easy.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were no shops in this prison in Tzarist days, and the women did not work. Now the wing which has been newly built is thrust out in such a way that it is long and narrow, with windows on both sides. There is plenty of ventilation and light. The women were cutting and sewing shirts and other garments from the same material we had seen the men making at Sokolniki. There were long tables with good working space and as we walked about various women showed us finished articles with pride. The sewing machines had all the latest equipment, and the operatives worked rapidly. The products of their shops are turned over to the cooperatives and sold where needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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They, too, work on the same basis as do factory workers of the land, with the exception (as in the case of all prisoners) that because they are supplied with their upkeep they are not paid normal wages. At the time we were there some of them were not at work, due, the directress told us, to a shortage of material. The supervisors are not prisoners but come in from the outside to teach and direct the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
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Already in the chapter on “What Crimes Are Committed and Who Commits Them” we referred to the acts committed by women. In this prison the records showed that theft came first and robbery a close second, but in cases with whom we talked, the theft often turned out to be some act involving state property which carried a severe penalty. For that reason one was surprised at first to find long sentences attached to what appeared to be less serious crimes. But, in view of the provisions of the law of August 7, 1932, such larceny is sternly dealt with, even though the act is committed by a person from among the peasants or toiling class. One stealing from her neighbor would get a much lighter sentence. This is where the class nature of punishment shows up very strongly and unbalances the scales of justice that otherwise seem to work with such fairness. An example of the difference was very clear in two cases. One girl had been in prison nine times for theft and her present sentence was for two years only. Another had committed her first offense by stealing from a collective farm, a tool apparently of some “class enemy,” and her sentence was ten years. The “measure of social danger” accounts for the difference, and while it is easy to see that the authorities are confronted by a real problem of deep seriousness, one wonders whether something more of justice&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This statement by the author has caused Mr. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow to offer the following explanation. “The word ‘justice’ in the USSR has another meaning than in the writings of the bourgeois sociologists. Criminal repression is not expiation of the crime. We don’t feel it just to shoot a man who has committed a murder only in order to punish him. Instead of one murder that would make two. But we call it just, if by means of shooting such a murderer, we can prevent a score of other murders. The construction of Socialism is our greatest task. Everything that helps the achievement of it is just, everything that hinders it is unjust. That is the point of view in every criminal case and I don’t suppose that we shall ever change it. But of course the methods of our fight for Socialism change at every stage of Socialist construction, and today they are other than they were five years ago.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; might not in the long run make for better feeling as well as a more ethical foundation for their socialist state. It is contradictory to their usual administration of justice among their own masses. One hopes that, as the conflict recedes, “pure justice” in so far as such is possible will replace “socially dangerous” measurements now in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again we were in the court preparing to leave. A girl of some eighteen or nineteen years, with thick golden braids hanging to her waist, was at the window above us shouting laughingly down to the superintendent. One of our party had a camera and she wished her picture made. It was all right, we were told, and the picture was snapped, and she was promised one as soon as it could be developed. Others were calling to us, too, setting up a din, with their comments and questions. Such an informal atmosphere can hardly be described. A group stood about like girls let out of school, talking, watching us curiously, unrestrained by the presence of attendants or directress. One feels that so long as there is no attempt to escape, and no running afoul the comradely court, one can do about as she likes—play volley ball when she pleases, if she is free from work, listen to the radio, read in the library, or gossip with her neighbor. She also has a good atmosphere in which to learn that labor and happiness are pretty close companions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The parting word from our hostess was, “I wish I might visit a prison in America with the same freedom with which I have shown you this.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What a western observer would feel first in these prisons is a lack of physical equipment such as his own best might boast. There was such criticism expressed. But this is not an adequate standard with which to measure their success. It is true that in these closed prisons of a penitentiary type their equipment, while much better than that in our worst, is not nearly so good as that in our best, but the fact that without this equipment they are able to achieve the attitude and cooperation they do on the part of the prisoners is all the more significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is also the point that the aim of Soviet penal authorities is to remove as rapidly as possible every person whose character will permit into the open or semi-closed correctional labor institutions and discontinue the use of the closed types except for the most incorrigible cases. Because of that, they are devoting all possible attention to the development and improvement of the labor institutions. And one finds different conditions in these places. They would not suffer very much by comparison with our best. A description of Bolshevo Labor Commune, in a later chapter, will indicate that.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the meantime they create that constructive businesslike atmosphere, among the women as well as the men, that gives genuine hope of equipping these people for a place in social life.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XIII: THE CHILD AND THE LAW ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;When&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; H. G. Wells was visiting in Moscow the past summer, he is said to have made the following observation to a Russian journalist: “I know, you Moscow people look upon all this with different eyes. You are Robinson Crusoes recreating life upon barren land after a social cataclysm. You are proud that you are manufacturing without the capitalists’ air motors, and reoentgen apparatus which the capitalists before you did not manufacture. You are happy to be doing all this. I understand this. And I should have been happy in your place, but of all your productions, excuse me, I am struck only by one thing. You are making people. It is this that I have come here to see and I see it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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If they are making people in this Soviet land, and I think it is pretty well agreed by thoughtful persons that they are, the beginning of the process is found in their treatment of children. So much has been said and written on the care of the child in Russia that no elaboration should be necessary here, and in regard to the delinquent it is no less than that given to the normal child. Their attitude toward the child who breaks the law is not that society must be protected, but that the individual may be given an opportunity for developing his own life. His interest is uppermost and practically every branch of government cooperates in his protection and training.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0222.svg|TYPICAL SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF F.Z.U. SCHOOL|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Geneva declaration has been of special interest to the authorities dealing with this problem in the USSR. They believe with the author of the statement that mankind must give the child the best it has. In many of their publications they quote the main points of that declaration, and it seems of interest to set them down in relation to this chapter. They follow:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) The child should be given an opportunity of normal development, materially as well as spiritually.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The starved child must be fed, the sick cured, the retarded pushed ahead, the defective trained, and the orphan taken care of.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The child must be helped first of all during public misfortune.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) The child must be prepared to earn his bread, and protected from all types of exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) The child must be trained with the understanding that his best powers must be devoted to his brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
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For them the application of these points is to all children. The problem of the upbringing of the juvenile criminal is not separable from the general question of juvenile training. And whenever it is possible, the child who has broken the law is sent to schools for his training which in no wise differ from those for the noncriminal child.&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia’s fight against juvenile crime has been one of its major problems. It is an old story that the Civil War and the Volga famine in 1921 left hordes of wild children wandering over the land. They crowded in the railway stations, they rode the rods from place to place, they congregated in market places, behind billboards, in any places they could find, and were so depraved by street life that they became the most hardened of criminals. At this time, too, men released from the army, with no jobs available, turned in great numbers to banditry, and these children became their associates in their illegal enterprise. In history there is perhaps no picture greatly darker so far as children are concerned, and handling such a situation is not the least of Russia’s achievements. Today there are still a few scattered remnants of that vast number that one sees in railway stations, but the problem is in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the moment when this condition reached its worst, the government was dealing with the Civil War at its greatest height, giving its attention and energy to the defense of the proletarian state. But it is to its great credit that it found time even then to concentrate its forces to give care to this growing army of homeless waifs and juvenile delinquents. We have at that moment a proposal on the part of the leader of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, later referred to in detail, which marked the beginning of the system of care given today to young offenders in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, there was already machinery in operation for dealing with juvenile criminals or children needing the aid of the state because of some abnormal condition. As early as January 14, 1918, only a little more than two months after the October Revolution, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a decree establishing Commissions for Cases of Minors. These commissions, with their powers greatly broadened, exist today, and are the organs charged to look after the interests not only of delinquent children, but of any child who needs the intervention of the law. During the period when children swarmed everywhere, homeless, starving, some criminal, and others forced by necessity into such an existence, no single force could have been adequate, but these bodies were the official channels through which the cases passed after the GPU or some other agency had first gathered the children in.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is not a children’s court, but is a pedagogical and educational organization. Its chief task is in educating the juvenile offender so that he may become a productive member of society, and with that in view the composition provided for the commission is of professions and persons able to make appropriate contributions. The chairman must be a pedagogue of very high qualifications. He must possess not only an adequate education, but he must have had experience either in work of a pedagogical nature or with home children or with juvenile criminals. In addition to the chairman there is a member representing the local department of public education, a physician from the local health department, a judge from the People’s Court, an investigation educator, a member of the Komsomol (the youth about to enter the Communist Party), a representative of the Children’s Friend’s Society, and a representative of the local trade union organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission sits in closed session, permitting only the attendance of those connected with the cases. This would include parents, relatives or guardians, or a representative of a public or school organization. Its work is under the jurisdiction of the commissariat of education, and is not connected with the commissariat of justice, such as the children’s court would be. There are, of course, local commissions which take care of the cases for each city or rural district. The procedure before the commission is entirely informal. When a case comes up the chairman takes the proper steps to have the juvenile appear, unless for some reason his presence is thought to be unnecessary. Some of the circumstances under which the child would not appear would be: if the child is under eight years of age; when the child is already known to the commission; when the evidence does not substantiate the charge; when there is no reason for the medico-pedagogical measures to be applied; or when it is thought that the appearance of the minor before the commission might do some harm to him in either a physical or mental way. But in case it is thought his appearance is desirable, the investigator is instructed to take charge of the case. The chairman then proceeds to gather the necessary information, evidence, etc., concerning the child and advise him that his case is to come up. If at that time the youth has reached the age of sixteen, his case is turned over to the courts for trial, since minors between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are subject to the jurisdiction of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is competent to deal not only with the cases of all children delinquents between the ages of eight and sixteen (children under eight years of age are never summoned to appear before the commission) but it is also empowered to institute criminal proceedings against any person who is an offender against the child in a manner of demoralization, incitement to crime, or exploitation of minors.&lt;br /&gt;
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What measures may be taken in the cases of children convicted of some crime before the commission? Here is a list of the more important, although it is not an exhaustive one:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) A request for granting assistance, document, certificate, etc., to the child.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) Placing out the child in the care of a family.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) Placing the child on maintenance and education by public or party organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) Finding a guardian for the child.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) Finding work for the child or apprenticing him.&lt;br /&gt;
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(6) Sending the child to his birthplace.&lt;br /&gt;
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(7) Placing the child in an educational institution, school or children’s home.&lt;br /&gt;
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(8) Sending the child to a medical or medico-pedagogical institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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(9) Helping the child to enroll in a children’s club.&lt;br /&gt;
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(10) Talk and exhortation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(11) Putting the child in the care of parents or other persons with or without supervision by investigation educator.&lt;br /&gt;
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(12) Putting the child in the care of an investigating educator.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is one final measure which it is within the power of the commission to use, but it is never resorted to unless all other efforts have failed. That is that the commission may send the child as a final resort to an industrial school of which we will speak later on in the chapter. The list given above constitutes the medico-pedagogical measures and are applied only to those offenders under sixteen years of age who come within the competency of this commission.&lt;br /&gt;
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The case of the minor between sixteen and eighteen years of age is approached in a somewhat different manner. Originally under the Criminal Code of 1922, the court was given jurisdiction over minors between fourteen and eighteen years of age, and might at that time sentence them to terms of deprivation of liberty, but only to industrial homes set apart for them, and never by any manner of means to a place for adults. This, however, has been changed so that the commission referred to takes care of children up to sixteen years of age, and only the cases of those between sixteen and eighteen are referred to courts. Although the cases of juvenile offenders between sixteen and eighteen are tried by the courts, the measures applied are of a medico-pedagogical nature very similar to those used for the younger children. Only when the circumstances of the crime convince the court that these measures will not be adequate may the minor be sentenced to deprivation of liberty. In fixing the terms, the sentence is to be reduced by one third of what would be imposed on an adult in the same situation, and the maximum term under the USSR is not to exceed one half of that imposed on adults. A death sentence may never be given to either child or minor, and no severe measures may be used.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the case of trial, a copy of the summons as well as the indictment must be sent to the minor’s legal representative, as well as to the minor himself. And the Supreme Court has especially instructed the lower courts to see that all juveniles under trial be provided with counsel whenever it may be needed. During the hearing of the case, the minor is accorded all the rights that we have already seen are granted to defendants in the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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That the fight waged by the authorities against juvenile crime is being successful is indicated by the steady drop of the percentage to the total convictions in the Union. We find that, in 1928, 36 per cent. of the total number of persons convicted of crime were juvenile offenders. In 1931, this figure had dropped to 28.2 per cent. Also indicative of the achievement in this direction is, as already mentioned, the fact that this army of vagrant youth no longer wanders about in Russia. There are few of such children remaining.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet government has practically removed from its system all of the homes and colonies for juveniles which it inherited from the Tzarist régime, and has at the present time in their stead the system of institutions operating in an educational manner. The most constructive work being done is in those owing their initiation to the efforts of an agent that we do not usually connect with such activities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Back in 1921 when the whole place swarmed with homeless and criminal children, and there was despair over the hopelessness of the condition, the GPU came to the rescue with the establishment of places for wholesale care called “collectors.” Children were snatched from the streets, stations, trains, or wherever they were, and were taken to these places where they were bathed, dressed, fed, sorted out, given all sorts of examinations, mental and physical, then turned over to the Commission for the Cases of Minors, and were finally distributed to the various institutions. The institutions, at that time, while educational in nature, were without a definite social goal, and not adequately prepared or equipped to turn a youth into a productive and useful citizen. At the present time the institutions for juvenile offenders are established under the control of the Commissariat of Education, the Commissariat of Justice, and the Commissariat of Home Affairs (formerly the OGPU). In the Commissariat of Education we find a whole network of children’s homes, directly leading the child from training into the industrial life of the country in such a manner that there is no gap through which he can escape into a life of crime. In their early days the task of these homes was simply to house the children, to prevent them from becoming vagrants and criminals, and their program was by no means as constructive as it might have been. But, at present, no effort is spared in delivering the child to society in a state of preparation for his place.&lt;br /&gt;
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A. Shestakova in her article &#039;&#039;Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children&#039;&#039; tells us that in the first days of these homes the children were taught to make shoes and footstools, to bind books, and how to read and write; and slightly how to adjust themselves in life. But she says that the homes were inadequate to attack the basic problems of turning those sent to them into a specifically trained group, sufficiently equipped with industrial knowledge and social culture, prepared to enter a factory or other center in such a manner as to evolve into useful citizens. The misfit was unfortunate in two ways. Not only were the children unprepared as to basic industrial knowledge or other means of adjustment to their new life, but the state itself was deprived, because of this inadequacy, of the services of many young citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new economic policy had given way to the five-year plan with its tremendous program of industrial development and agricultural collectivization, and there was need for every available trained workman. Because of this urgent need of the country those in charge of juvenile offenders were given an extra instrument for their purpose. With definite ends in view, with specific jobs to fill, training took on an additional purpose. Here was a definite challenge to the places of training of those juvenile offenders to teach them so that they might make their contribution to the economic plan, and that they might thereby gain the satisfaction of having work which they could do well.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not enough that education be directed only toward keeping the child busy with some elementary task, but that it concern itself with the possibility of active participation in the nation’s economic development. To accomplish this task the children’s homes were merged with the factory apprenticeship schools which were attached to factories in towns, and to the peasant youth schools connected in like manner with state farms and rural localities, by which merging they now afforded places for training skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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As now organized the direction of these homes is in the hands of the Commissariat of Education, and children are sent by the Commission of Cases for Minors. They are not limited to the training of delinquents but also have the task of educating the children of workers and peasants from the general population. No coercive methods are used. There are of course no wardens or guards, and their express task is to “combine teaching with productive labor upon such basis that the whole social productive labor of the pupils was to be subordinated to the academic and educational aims of the school.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The inmates of these homes are given preference of admission to the factory apprenticeship schools, and to peasant youth schools next to the children of workers. From this training they move straight into the stream of factory workers and, almost without knowing it, take their place in the productive life of the nation. By the time they have gone through these schools of apprenticeship and the factory, or the state farms, they have forgotten that they ever were attached to a life of crime and are removed from the environment so effectually that they have no temptation to return. This describes the treatment given to the cases of those children not classified as habitual criminals. Even in this category of the 8-16 group coming under the direction of the Commissariat of Education, there is an occasional child who requires more restrictive treatment, and measures of a severer nature may then be resorted to.&lt;br /&gt;
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For this type, who have become habitual criminals, or who have committed more serious crimes that require a term of deprivation of liberty, we have a second kind of institution. It is important to note that this set of establishments is connected with the Commissariat of Justice, and not with the Department of Education. There has been a period of evolution of these institutions in which much study has been given to methods to be used, and experiments of a bold nature tried with regard to some of them.&lt;br /&gt;
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On July 11, 1918, there was published the Order for the First Russian Reformatory where juvenile offenders of this type were to be detained, and there were consequently organized industrial homes for these offenders which were intrusted with the duty of teaching to minors “skilled trades, to widen their mental horizon by means of general and vocational education, and to transform them into active citizens conscious of their rights and obligations, giving them at the same time a physical and health education by means of gymnastics, sports and hygiene.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These institutions, although of the educational type referred to, were inadequate for any serious training. Arts and crafts constituted the principal type of labor, and practically no attention was given to the higher and more skilled trades. We have already spoken of the demands made by the reconstruction period for more skilled workers, and of the notable inadequacy of places for juvenile offenders to turn out young people who filled such a need. The program needed a decided reformation, and in 1930 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee set up a commission for specific remedy of the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission was created for two definitely assigned tasks: the first was to institute an investigation of the work of the fight against juvenile criminals and minors, and of the organization of factory communes and corrective labor organizations, using for this purpose the equipment of the People’s Commissariat of Justice. Secondly, it was to work out and to hand to the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; a project of administrative and practical measures, with due attention being given to the experiment of the Izhorsk plant in the North Caucasus. The result of the investigation was that in 1930, the Commissariat of Justice decided to reconstruct these institutions into factory apprenticeship schools for juvenile offenders which were to be attached to large factories and mills. It must be noted here that these schools differed from those just discussed in that they were for offenders only and liberty was restricted, whereas in the first there were no guards of any nature and noncriminal children attended along with the criminal ones.&lt;br /&gt;
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In these schools they were to create a cultural and social condition conducive to drawing the inmates into social work, and to this end, bars, locks, and prison régime, and all prison atmosphere was to be resolutely banished from them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The character of the training was educational just as it had been in the others, but in the case of this more hardened type it was necessary to detain the juvenile forcibly while he was subjected to the program. However, pupils in these schools now enjoy vacations, take part in regular group hikes, and go out to camps in the summer, in the same manner as other pupils do. The term of sentence is from two to three years, and the arrangements as to schedule, life, and discipline, organization and labor, are taken care of by the usual self-government organization. The schedule of the work is arranged in such a manner that the children are never left entirely to their own devices, but are constantly with those who guide and direct them. Four hours of industrial training are followed by four hours of study, and the latter is again followed by three hours devoted to public activity organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1931, 4,000 juvenile offenders were trained in these schools and 500 industrial workers were graduated from the industrial establishments. In 1933, the aim was to put all the juvenile offenders into these schools from which it was expected there would be turned out 2,400 highly skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to notice here what happened to those released from these schools. Figures for the years 1931 and 1932, giving percentages of distribution for those released, show that 63.2 per cent. went into industrial undertakings. This would indicate a high degree of success in the passage of the trained youth from schools to industry. The next largest percentage, 19.7 per cent., found a place in the building trade. The third highest, 9.3 per cent., was released to the parents with supervision on the part of the school. 4.7 per cent. were placed on Soviet farms; 1.2 per cent. found a location in the factory labor and technical communes and 0.6 per cent. were released to parents and relatives but continued under the supervision of the schools.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article by A. Shestakova, “Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children,” from Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 348.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The most important training given in these schools is for metal work and work on wood. In addition to that the inmates are taught tractor handling, animal husbandry, vegetable garden work, and field work. The health and physical training require that the workers take a month and a half to two months’ camp trip in the country. Because of the inconvenience attached to these trips, when the institution is located in a city, the First Moscow School was moved to a small village a short distance out, so that country places would be more accessible for health training.&lt;br /&gt;
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The chief problems now attached to this education, according to A. Shestakova, are the building up of the physical health, an establishing of self-discipline, and the introduction of these delinquents to methods used in other camps, to a life of such neighboring activities as the collective or state farms. The prize agricultural schools among all of those at present existing in the Soviet Union are Saratov, which now has first place in the contest for these schools; Serpooh, in second place; the First Moscow School in third place; and in the fourth, the First Leningrad School.&lt;br /&gt;
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We come finally to the third type of establishment. These are incorporated into the system of the organization of the GPU, in the Commissariat for Home Affairs. There is something incongruous to most of us in the supervision of children by an agent that is avowedly for terroristic purposes. However, the labor communes, organized by this body for juvenile offenders of the worst type, are one of the outstanding developments in the care of the children in Soviet Russia, and set a standard that few if any institutions in other lands manage to reach.&lt;br /&gt;
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The inhabitants of these communes are young people with long criminal records, who have been up repeatedly before the Commission for Cases of Minors, before the courts, who have served many terms of deprivation of liberty in various juvenile institutions. The cases seemed hopeless, and the experiment, so bold and unique, was tried in an effort to give a new viewpoint that would induce a complete break with the former criminal type of life. One of these communes, the largest both as to number and scope of development, is described in detail in the next chapter. In this place we only mention the general plan and underlying principles.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main difference between the apprenticeship school and these labor communes of the OGPU is in method and not in principle. The labor commune is organized around large labor work, where both sexes contribute, while in the apprenticeship schools the emphasis is on education, on the preparation for industrial work. One of the basic principles in the labor commune is complete freedom as to movement, while in the schools restriction of movement is naturally required since the program is compulsory in its nature. In the apprenticeship schools there is also segregation of the sexes in the matter of residence; the boys and girls meet together in theatres, on excursions, in museums, on walks, and other places, but live in separate homes. It seems inconsistent to state that the labor commune is made up of those more habituated to crime, since it enjoys greater freedom, while the schools are composed of the less criminal; but this is nevertheless true. When one remembers, though, that the commune is the result of a desperate move to save a great number of habitual criminals, whereas the schools are merely for training those of even younger years, the situation is more easily understood.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the schools the age group is from 15-18 years. The sources from which they come are, (a) those sent on court order, and (b) those sent by the Commission for Cases of Minors, and all other authorities empowered to commit them. If the term is up before the training of the child is completed, the pedagogical commune may retain him, provided the entire term does not exceed three years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 42 of the Correctional Labor Code of 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the communes, the age group, although in the beginning limited to those of 13-17, is now composed of those of 16-24. The satisfaction of the authorities with the achievement of the First Labor Commune (Bolshevo) led to the establishment of others, and at the present time several thousand former criminals, some of them committing the worst sort of crimes, are being trained and educated while they participate in community life.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XIV: BOLSHEVO LABOR COMMUNE ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; following is the official record of the beginning of such places for criminals as the one described in this chapter:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;ORDERS&lt;br /&gt;
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Of the Administrative and Organizational Board, OGPU&lt;br /&gt;
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No. 185&lt;br /&gt;
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Moscow, August 18, 1924&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;#&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;1&lt;br /&gt;
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Orders issued by Comrade Yagoda, assistant chief of the OGPU:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) In order to combat crime among young people between the ages of 13 and 17 years, a Children’s Labor Commune for 50 persons is to be organized.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) F. G. Melikhov is appointed head of the Children’s Labor Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The head of the Children’s Labor Commune is to act in all matters under the orders of M. S. Pogrebinsky, who, in turn, will act on the basis of a plan of work confirmed by me.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such an order, judging from the resulting situation of ten years later, ought to be marked with a monument, and it is. Just outside of Moscow, on the location of a once lovely estate, there is now a small town of modern buildings replacing the wooden ones of ten years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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One does not know what to call this place. To say that it is a penal institution is misleading unless the reader has seen something like it. However, it rates as that in the USSR, and since there are others like it in scattered sections, one comes to the conclusion that it is something unique in this line and accepts it as such. It is easy to be enthusiastic over such things and not to look deeper for some adverse angles, but the author, after as careful examination as she could make in a skeptical manner, could only praise the development.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two trips were made to this colony, the second to confirm what had first been observed. However, since it was a visit to a similar colony at Kharkov that elicited the warm praise from M. Herriot that has already been quoted, it seemed safe to conclude that it existed as had first been believed. It is impossible to understand how any one could fail to be moved on viewing the place and realizing its tremendous import in the matter of remaking criminals. If the OGPU had committed nothing but the acts of terror it has been credited with, the creation of such spots as these would compensate in a great way for its darker deeds. It is unfortunate that one must try to tell of Bolshevo. The only thing to do is to visit and see for one’s self. It is difficult to describe atmosphere, and that is the thing that pervades the place and makes it even more constructive than the physical side could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
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This commune celebrated its tenth birthday in August of this year (1934). Its population was preparing for it when we were there, building platforms out under the trees, putting finishing touches here and there, and getting ready for speeches, visitors, and other entertainment of various kinds. And these people can tell a good tale of growth and progress, too, for they started with a handful in the initiation of a bold experiment and now their town has a population of three thousand inhabitants. The reader’s first deduction will be that a prison growth such as that must indicate some undesirable conclusions. But when one knows that it means that this number has been transferred from other penal institutions with a view to having everyone possible enjoy this freedom and training, then the significance is different.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reference has already been made to the wandering hordes of children, confirmed in criminal habits, who presented the gravest of problems to the government authorities at the end of the Civil War and Volga famine. It was seen that if headway was to be made against the situation, the whole perspective of life must be changed, and the new one must be attractive enough to make these vagrant criminals want to break with a past that to their imaginative years had a glamour and provided escape from the responsibilities of ordinary living.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the midst of the perplexity, the groping for some plan, we find Felix Dzerzhinsky, organizer of that terror of terrors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, and original head of the GPU, offering his far-reaching organ to effect this merciful innovation. Let his own words inform us:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“I wish to apply part of my personal efforts and above all the efforts of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; to looking after these homeless waifs. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of two considerations. Firstly, it is a terrible calamity, and when you look at children, you cannot help thinking everything should be for them. The fruits of the revolution are not for us but for them. But how many of them have been wrecked by struggle and poverty! We must rush to their aid just as if we saw children drowning. The Commissariat of Education alone cannot cope with this matter, the widest help from all Soviet bodies is needed. It is necessary to form under the Central Executive Committee a broad commission containing representatives of all commissariats and all organizations which can be useful in this matter. I have already spoken with people here and there. I want to be at the head of this commission myself. I want to include the apparatus of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; practically in this work.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I am impelled to do this for the second reason. I think that our apparatus is one of those which works most accurately. It has branches everywhere. People reckon with it. They are afraid of it, but even in such a matter as saving and feeding children, it is possible to find laxness and even dishonesty. We are going over more and more to peaceful construction; and I think: why not use our fighting apparatus to combat such a calamity as homelessness among children?”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This proposition was made in 1921. It was in August, 1924, that the GPU of which he was then head, established the Bolshevo Labor Commune, thus launching a new epoch not only in the care of juvenile criminals for whom it was particularly intended, but in the treatment of all the others. It must have given a great thrill to this man who had brought death to so many of the state’s enemies to take a part in reconstructing the lives of youths who would, he hoped, be its friends. At least he had the satisfaction of seeing his judgment vindicated, for, from the beginning, the venture proved his rightness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These men did not jump into the scheme as suddenly as might seem, nor without consideration. They went into intimate study of the forms of education of children, they applied themselves vigorously to working out an accurate theory, then they formulated what appeared to them three basic rules of procedure. That the GPU, in the midst of their frightening activities, could muster faith enough in anybody to develop such a plan is in itself a phenomenon, but that they could convey such a trust to others, to these young criminals, seems more incredulous still. They were not exactly an agent for inspiring such a feeling. But notice the three basic principles referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost was that principle of “trust” held like a shining torch before the eyes of incredulous youngsters. It was decided that there must be no compulsion anywhere in the commune. With coercion the order of the day, there was to be none here. Strange contradiction, one of many that has filled the land. Side by side with sternness toward those who oppose the order, one finds this steady development of humane institutions, untouched by the harsher methods used in the other direction. In this colony there was to be only trust. If one wanted to stay, he was to stay, and if he wanted to go, then he was to go. He simply walked away, for there were not to be—and are not today— any guards. There were to be no restrictions of their freedom. They were to realize that they were in an educational institution pure and simple. They were to come of their own volition, because of an expressed desire to join in the program of this commune. These inhabitants were to be persons who had come to realize the futility of a life of crime and who wished therefore to change to another sort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the individual was to make this change he would have to be able to perform some task well, and to that end the second principle was incorporated. The commune was to be devoted to teaching these people how to do some kind of work. Workshops were established and instructors installed, but the responsibility for sustaining a condition under which the trades could be learned was placed on the residents of the Commune. There was no preaching, no lectures, but it was demonstrated that each must be responsible for his share in this life or all would suffer. If machines stopped because of the irregularity of one or two, then the education of others in an industrial line would suffer. And one who brought about this inconvenience must answer to his comrades for his conduct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third principle was to make each feel his responsibility for the group, and the reverse, that all were responsible for seeing that each member measured up to his duties. Every member of the Commune was bound to see that a recalcitrant one was brought to account. In this manner any disciplinary problems were taken care of from the beginning. Thus, in the lack of any compulsion the onetime criminal learns to lead a normal life and to discipline himself; in being taught a trade he is prepared to return to a life or perhaps enter it for the first time, in which he earns his way; and by his feeling of responsibility for others, he in conjunction with the group keeps the affairs of the Commune running smoothly and efficiently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the Commune had been set up, the next problem was to get some inhabitants for it. Among the institutions housing juvenile offenders, volunteers were asked for, after explanations of the character of the new place had been given. Pogrebinsky who, it will be recalled, was one of the organizers, gives a version of this experience that is interesting. He writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“When we called for volunteers for the first commune, 15 responded. Very suspiciously they donned their new clothes. They could not believe that henceforth they were free, and they warily eyed the prison guards, trying to guess how many would be sent with them as a convoy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“But here began something unusual. They were given money with which to buy railway tickets to the Commune, and no guards were sent with them. Only the manager of the Commune was with them. Sure enough, they seemed to be free! Should they run away? No, better wait. There was something hard to understand, and in addition, something very flattering—they were being trusted!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“On arrival at the place, two of the boys were sent with money for supper. Here was something altogether strange! They were sent off with money, and no guard to convoy them. The boys bought some foodstuff, came back and returned the whole change. They were utterly astounded when the manager showed them the house where they were to live and explained to them: Everything that you can see, boys—the clothes, food, tools—is being lent to you by the OGPU, and you will have to pay for it all later on.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
One can understand their incredulity, even their staying on through curiosity, if nothing else, to see what would happen next in such a topsy-turvy affair. And day after day the wonder and pleasure in having a home, being free and engaged in making interesting things would grow and hold them steadily.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The managers of the Commune were wary and anxious too, not through fear of escape of their charges, but lest they do the wrong thing and check the growing confidence. In their eagerness not to put pressure of any kind on these young people, they have let the initiative for expansion come from them. In the beginning those who came made shoes, stools, and other things, and were satisfied to watch their own tasks grow under supervision, but as the project became more firmly established there were demands for wider industrial training. The leaders granted the requests with great satisfaction as they developed, their only anxiety being that nothing should ever seem “forced.” There was no doubt subtle guidance, but the group was encouraged to undertake its own education. The story is one of continuous growth, both in number and in development of a broader program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What actually exists now in this place where three thousand work? To begin with there are the paved streets, clean and lined with green shrubbery. The houses beside them are of modern structure, many with flower-filled balconies for each floor, with rows of large windows. There are some small individual houses also, where families live, but it is the lines of those looking from the outside like sunny apartment buildings that gives the place an air of being a town proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On inspection one finds small apartments provided for the married couples and dormitory rooms for the single people. A man who is serving a sentence may have his family there with him and so may a married young woman if it is convenient for the husband to come. The apartments that we saw contained two rooms and a bath. One of the rooms was a large kitchen which could also be used for other purposes. One entered into a small hallway which led to the main room, a large combination living-sleeping room. The furniture was good. There were pictures around, a couch, comfortable chairs, the windows were nicely curtained and the appearance altogether homelike. There is a large community dining room, but in case a family wishes to prepare its own meals it can do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the dormitories we saw, there were rather good-sized rooms, not so large as most of those described in the other prisons, with cot-beds placed in line in the usual way. There seemed to be comfort in these collective places but not, of course, as much space per person as the apartments permitted, nor did they have the homelike appearance of the latter. There was light from several windows and a pleasant outlook, and the two girls present on our visit looked exactly as occupants of a home would appear. As housing goes in crowded Moscow this represented an average standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dining room in the factory-kitchen building was quite large and equipped with small tables, such as one would find in a restaurant. One side was almost an entire window. A few late eaters were sitting at tables and attendants were beginning to clean so that the place had a disorderly after-dinner appearance but one of deeper cleanliness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One might as well not try to keep remembering, as he goes along the street meeting people, that these are convicts of the most habitual sort. They are going or coming from their work exactly as other people would. There is absolutely no difference. They could run away, of course, and a few have, but in the majority of cases, the reverse is true. They do not wish to leave the Commune at the end of their sentence and so they live on and keep a job in some of the factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school building in this Commune is especially lovely. It was completed about two years ago at a cost of a million and a half rubles. It has all the equipment that a good school would be expected to have—a library, reading rooms, laboratories, an auditorium interestingly decorated with murals of working men, which is the work of artist inhabitants, spacious halls and class rooms. The teachers are not residents of the Commune but members of their own profession who come in to teach. The man in charge of the school showed us the building with great pride. The first seven years of education are compulsory, after that there are evening classes for the more advanced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Education, as already indicated, does not stop with formal classroom work but those interested in the arts, in music, or in writing are provided with channels for special training. There are music circles, art classes, drama work, and literary clubs, and the persons making up this artistic group live in their own building, forming a congenial household. A number of the leading ones, the most talented ones, are paid a stipend by the state, and we were told of a number of musicians and writers who had had their first training in this Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The physical education is carried on in a large and splendidly equipped gymnasium, and building up the body is made a major consideration in the training. Setting up exercises are also a part of the daily program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school, with its formal teaching of elementary subjects, is one side of the education program; the other is the work done in the shops. In these two places as well as in this whole atmosphere, the “making people,” spoken of by H. G. Wells, goes on. One must learn a trade and then he must work at it, not as drudgery, but with free enjoyment of his task. In the shops of the shoe factory, the skate factory, the knitting goods factory, the mechanized laundry, the sports goods factory, and the factory kitchen, these former thieves and bandits who have barely escaped with their necks, work at their jobs, some still in the ranks of the unskilled, others risen to instructors and supervisors. One looks and remembers again that there is nothing between them and escape, no one to prevent their walking away, and yet they stay and work. When the day is ended they go out in the street and to their rooms or Walk or do any other thing they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One may break a law of the Commune. To meet the exigencies of such occurrences, there is the comradely court and a penalty either mild or more serious according to the act, and if that is not sufficient then the greatest blow of all will fall—the culprit will be sent back whence he came, or if he came directly he will be transferred to a more severe institution. A new member is on probation for a month and he must prove his worth if he is to live with this group who is serious about making life worth while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The age is 16-24 now, although at its beginning it was 13-17. There are three thousand inhabitants of the Commune, some of whom have finished their terms and have worked on in the factories. These naturally may be older than the maximum age given for those who are sent. The surrounding community was hostile to the idea at the time of the establishment of the Commune among them, as one can imagine any neighborhood might be at having a group of unrestrained criminals, thieves and housebreakers, set down among them, but there is now a general esteem and friendliness felt for those who work in this unique town.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The hospital is perhaps the greatest prize of the place. A large building, set back from the street, with grass, trees, and shrubs in its front yard, it presents an excellent impression. It is equipped for all the best care of the health of the community. Babies are born, children of the communards attended to, and the whole population served by its staff. It fills not only the role of medical care, but an especially educational one as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolshevo has been described in detail because it is the largest of the labor communes and was the first in construction. But there is another close to Moscow, built second in order, on the site of the former Nikolo-Ugreshsky Monastery. This commune has four factories, making musical instruments, incubators, electrical repairs, and compressed fiber, and in 1934 it is estimated that they will turn out goods to the value of some twenty-three or twenty-four million rubles. Here, too, are modern houses with all equipment in which the workers are housed according to industry, the metal workers in one, wood workers in another, and those making musical instruments in a third. There is a separate house for those communards who are members of artist circles, a separate house for women, and a building where probationers stay until permanently assigned. There are twenty-two hundred members of the commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A third is the Dzerzhinsky Labor Commune at Kharkov which follows the same line of development but is smaller than the others. There are only four hundred members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is hard to estimate the results of the work done in such centers as these. A tangible evidence of success is pointed to by authorities on the subject in the steady descent of the percentage of juvenile delinquents to the total number of criminals. This system, spreading year by year to take in all that it may serve, aided by those factory apprenticeship schools that train the 15-18 year old group, ought to do a good deal to depopulate the adult prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XV: CONCLUSION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; concluding remarks of most books on Russia begin with a discussion of class distinction. In this case it would be further stated that it showed not only in court action but was likewise felt in the fact that while the OGPU as an arresting agent turned the ordinary prisoner over to the courts, it acted in the capacity of a judicial organ for those of the opposition class. A few months ago that would have been true. With the transforming of that agent into the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the stripping from it of all judicial powers, one more step has been made toward the disappearance of class lines in the administration of criminal law.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Again there has been the following comment from an authority on the Administration of Criminal Law in the USSR, in regard to this statement: “The class line in the criminal justice can disappear only when the classes themselves disappear. So long as the classes exist, so long as the struggle between them goes on, it is absolutely impossible to avoid the class character of criminal justice You may keep silent about that, you may try to disguise it, but you cannot make it disappear. We don’t find it necessary to disguise the class character of our courts, as the bourgeois science of law and the bourgeois legislation does, because the class whose interests our courts defend, is the overwhelming majority of all the people. With the bourgeois criminal justice it is quite the opposite. Of course, as I have already stated, the victory we have gained over our class enemies here has enormously changed our policy, but this policy remains a class policy, because it remains the policy of the proletariat struggling for socialism. The first aim of this policy does not change, only the methods of its practical accomplishment. If you build a railway, the forms of your work will be different in a plain or in mountains, but the final aim will be the same. “Our final aim is to build a classless society. When this task will be accomplished, not only the class line in the criminal law will disappear, but the criminal law itself will become useless and will die as well as the criminal courts. “But so long as those courts do exist, they cannot go on without an open or a hidden class policy.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the distinction does exist. But in this final evaluation of the present situation in regard to crime repression in the USSR the treatment of political prisoners is not considered. While the method as developed is used for both classes it naturally shows to its best advantage in the treatment of the prisoners from among the workers, and it ought to be judged on that score. It is to be hoped that not many years hence class distinctions will disappear to the extent that machinery for justice will furnish equal measures for all.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following explanation is supplied. “By this time criminal justice will become something quite different from what we are accustomed to. It will become a system of medical and pedagogical measures, which will take their place among other radical and educational institutions. Till then criminal justice will serve the interests of the ruling class as it has always done.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When that happens the treatment of all prisoners will be of the kind that is found so admirably used today in places where discipline and industry are taught to those of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Russians claim no Utopia. When on one occasion the writer expressed admiration to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky for what they had achieved, he quickly and positively responded, “I warn you of its shortcomings.” Well, of course, they are there, plenty of them. They can be found in the administration of justice, too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems though that one who wishes to see actually how the matter stands would find it effective to take first the policy of the state, the standards it sets and the goal at which it aims, then see not only how fully that aim is achieved, but what progress is made year by year toward the goal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Take whatever phase of criminal repression one will, and one finds progress and a pretty good practice of policy. Judges in the beginning, one supposes by the Soviet’s own records, woefully inadequate at finding out what justice might be in a case, are now much more fully qualified; jurors for a time without any qualifications except as to vote are now selected with more care and given some training for the task before them. How fully adequate are they? It would take a firsthand survey of the nation’s tribunals to be able to say, but to judge by a fair sample the author believes them to be fulfilling their duty in a high degree and with more than average competence. Their attendance to work and their conscientious effort to get at the straight of the affair before them is pronounced. They seem in general to feel the responsibility of being the agent for administering justice to their own toiling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the prisons and places of deprivation of liberty one sees more evenness of tone. The personality of those in charge of these places strikes one as indicating fitness for the job. Members of staffs were observed closely by the writer and with one single exception they seemed well selected for handling the work. Vishinsky, in the Introduction of the book edited by him, states that one of the shortcomings of the prison system is the need for more trained persons who will understand what this policy really is and help put it into practice. One would expect that to be true, since it is so universally a fact with regard to prison workers. It would be indeed a Utopia that provided an adequate staff for penal places. But it seems to the author, by comparison, that he is better off than he thinks he is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the appearance these staffs make may be due in part to the fact of close supervision from above. There is another factor, too, which ought to help. Responsible authorities have a good picture in mind of what a man needs to be in order to fit into their scheme of living. Their society makes definite requirements of its members and training is provided to make the misfits fit. To do that thing which they see clearly they have developed a policy that merely trains a man, both to discipline himself if possible, and do some work that will be of economic benefit both to himself and to the country, while punishment is forgotten. One of their chief tasks is to teach him to prefer the “Life of Labor,” and by instilling in him, or encouraging the spark if it is already there, the joy of creation, they manage in most cases to do it—if their statistics on recidivism are anywhere near correct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another advantage is that they have one very definite policy and every superintendent of penal places knows what that policy is. It is, as stated in their codes, to educate and to train without doing anything to degrade, to build up a personality, a self-respect, and to do nothing that could hinder such development. With that knowledge in hand it is easier to put the program into practice, and they can develop plans for carrying it out. An understanding of psychological principles enters here, not only in expression of policy as found in the Criminal Code but in the actual practice as one finds it. In doing away with handcuffs, with solitary confinement, with any type of corporal punishment, and with any prison garb, the enunciation of policy does its part, but in the approach of the immediate staff to the inmates there is seen a wholesomeness that no code could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude of the authorities toward violations on the part of officers is another indication of their sincerity of purpose in this work. In their zeal to put their policy into action they not only provide that the Observation Commission shall be in close touch with all that goes on in the Institution, and impose on them much responsibility for the régime, but they also back them up by providing a penalty for the man who violates the regulations. A guard who strikes a prisoner is in danger of arrest himself, and since there are official records of such cases, one is sure that an attempt is made to put the policy into practice. It must be true that in isolated instances some such things happen and go unpunished, but it is the stated policy of the authorities to discourage in every way possible the committing of these acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Central authorities, as we have seen in discussing administration of these prisons, have made repeated efforts year by year to see that the Observation Committee keeps in close touch with all the life of the Institution and thereby effects better parole and release work as well as brings up the level of work done in the place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another indication of progress in putting the government’s policy into practice is the speed with which they have built open agricultural colonies, institutions of semi-closed type, and labor communes such as Bolshevo so that prisoners might be taken out of the old type of places. Judging from past accomplishment, there should in a very few years be left only those who demand restriction. In addition they are year by year adding to the number of those sentenced to compulsory labor without deprivation of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, then, is a system that deserves to attract the attention of those genuinely interested in a better approach to effective crime repression. It has without doubt made a distinct contribution in this field of social endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF CRIMINAL CODE GENERAL SECTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL SECTION&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE AIMS OF PENAL LEGISLATION OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. The penal legislation of the RSFSR pursues the task of protecting the socialist state of workers and peasants and the régime established therein from socially dangerous acts (crimes) by applying to persons committing them measures of social protection set out in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
EXTENT OF OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. The provisions of the present code extend to all citizens of the RSFSR, who have committed socially dangerous acts within the territory of the USSR, as well as beyond the boundaries of the USSR in case they are detained within the territory of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Citizens of other constituent republics are in accordance with the RSFSR laws liable to be prosecuted for crimes committed within the territory of the RSFSR as well as outside the boundaries of the USSR, if they had been detained and subjected to trial or investigation within the RSFSR territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes committed within the territory of the Union, citizens of the constituent republics are liable according to the laws of the locality where they committed the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. For crimes committed within the territory of the USSR foreigners are liable according to the laws of the locality where the crime was committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5. The question of the criminal liability of foreign nationals enjoying the right of exterritoriality shall be decided in each individual case by diplomatic means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PENAL POLICY OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
6. A socially dangerous act is any act of commission or omission directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government, for the period of time pending a transition to a communist régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: An act, which although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code is free from socially dangerous characteristics owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
7. In regard to persons who commit socially dangerous acts or who are dangerous owing to their connections with criminal circles, measures of social protection of judicial-corrective, medical, or medical-educational nature are applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
8. In the event of the concrete act, which at the time it was committed was a crime in accordance with Article 6 of the present code, but by the time it was investigated or examined in court lost its socially dangerous character owing to a change in the criminal law, or owing to the mere change in the social-political conditions, or in case the person who committed it cannot, in the opinion of the court be regarded as socially dangerous at the time indicated, then such an act does not entail the application of a measure of social protection to the person who committed it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
9. Measures of social protection are applied for the following purposes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To prevent the commission of further crimes by persons who have committed them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To exercise influence over other unstable elements of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To adapt the offender to the conditions of the social life of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measures of social protection cannot have for their purpose the infliction of physical suffering or the degradation of human dignity and they do not pursue the object of retribution or punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
10. With regard to persons who have committed socially dangerous acts, methods of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applied only in cases when these persons&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Acted knowingly, i.e., foresaw the socially dangerous effect of their acts, desired these consequences, or knowingly allowed such effects to take place, or&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Acted carelessly, i.e., did not foresee the effects of their acts—although they should have foreseen them—or recklessly hoped to avert the effects of their acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
11. Measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not to be applied in the case of persons who have committed a crime while suffering from chronic mental diseases, or while temporarily insane, or in general in such a state of deranged health as to be incapable of realizing their acts or of controlling them. Neither are these measures to be applied to persons, who although at the time they committed a crime were in possession of their mental faculties, nevertheless suffered from mental derangement by the time sentenced was pronounced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection which are applied to these persons are confined to those of a medical nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: The present article does not apply to persons who have committed a crime in a state of intoxication.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
12. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not applied in the case of minors up to the age of 16. When regarding the latter, the Commission of Juvenile Offenders finds it possible to confine itself to measures of social protection of a medical and educational nature. Oct. 30, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 82, Article 796.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
13. Measures of social protection are not applied to persons who have committed acts foreseen by the penal laws, if the court establishes that these acts were committed by them in a state of necessary defense against attempts at the Soviet rule, or at the body or rights of a person defending himself or another person, provided there was no excess of the limits of self-defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection are not applied when the same acts were committed in order to avert a danger, which under the given circumstances were unavertable by any other means, provided the harm thereby caused was less serious than the harm averted. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
14. Criminal prosecution may not take place&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) when ten years have elapsed from the time of the commission of the crime, for which the court may inflict a penalty of not more than five years’ imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) when five years have elapsed since the time the crime for which the court may impose a penalty of not more than five years had been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) when three years have elapsed since the perpetration of the crime, for which a court may sentence the criminal to not more than one year’s imprisonment, or when the law provides a more lenient measure of social protection than imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle of remoteness is applied when in the course of the corresponding period of time no proceedings were instituted in connection with the given case. The period of remoteness is interrupted when the person who committed a crime within the corresponding period of remoteness commits another similar or not less serious crime, or evades judicial examination or investigation. In such cases the periods of remoteness begin to run from the date of the perpetration of the second offense or from the date of the resumption of the interrupted proceedings. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: In cases of criminal prosecutions for counter-revolutionary crimes the application of the principle of remoteness is left to the discretion of the court in each individual case. However, if the court does not find it possible to apply the principle of remoteness, and sentences a person to be shot for such a crime, such sentence must necessarily be commuted to the proclamation that the person accused is an enemy of the toilers coupled with the forfeiture of the citizenship of the USSR, and exile from the confines of the USSR forever or imprisonment for a period of not less than two years. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: In regard to persons criminally prosecuted for active participation in acts, and active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement, committed while holding responsible or secret posts under the Tsarist régime, or under counter-reveolutionary governments during the civil war, the application of the principle of remoteness and the question of commuting capital punishment by shooting are left to the discretion of the court. June 6, 19275.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 3: The periods of remoteness laid down in the present article do not apply to acts prosecuted by way of administrative action according to the present code, and the infliction of punishments for such acts can take place only within one month from the date they were committed. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
15. A sentence of conviction shall not be carried into effect if it was not carried into effect within ten years from the date of the passing of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
16. In case a certain socially dangerous act is not directly foreseen by the present code, the grounds and limits of liability for such acts are determined in accordance with those articles of the code which foresee crimes most closely approximating them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
17. The measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applicable equally to persons who have committed the crime—participants as well as their accomplices—instigators and abettors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instigators are persons who induced the commission of the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abettors are persons who assisted in the carrying out of the crime by means of advice, indications, providing of means and removal of obstacles, or by means of concealing the criminal or the traces of crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
18. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are determined for each of the accomplices according to the degree of their participation in the given crime, as well as according to the degree of danger of the crime, and of the person who took part in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The failure to report a crime that has been committed, or is being planned, entails the application of the measures of social defense of judicial-corrective nature only in cases specially designated in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
19. An attempt to commit a crime, as well as acts preparatory to a crime, which take the form of finding or adapting weapons and means, and creating conditions favorable for a crime, are prosecuted on the same basis as a crime which has actually been committed. In such cases, the court, when selecting the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature, must be guided by the degree of danger of the person who has committed the crime or the preparatory act. The court must also examine how far the preparations for the crime went, and how near the consequences were to the act as well as the causes owing to which the crime was not completed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the crime was not committed owing to the persons intending to commit it having voluntarily renounced it, the court fixes a corresponding measure of social defense for those acts which were in fact committed by the person who attempted or prepared to commit the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; IV&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON THE MEASURES OF SOCIAL PROTECTION APPLIED UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE WITH REGARD TO PERSONS WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
20. The following are the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
21. Execution by shooting is applied for the purpose of combating the gravest kinds of crimes, threatening the foundations of Soviet rule, and of Soviet régime, pending the abolition of that punishment by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, in cases specially indicated in the articles of the present Code, as an exceptional measure for the protection of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
22. Persons who have not reached the age of 18 at the time the crime was committed and women in a state of pregnancy cannot be condemned to shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
23. The principal measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature applied with regard to persons who have committed crimes, consist in proclaiming them enemies of the toilers with the consequences following such measure, imprisonment, and compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other measures of social protection set out in Article 20, except warning and the confiscation of property, may be decreed either as independent measures or be combined with the basic ones as supplementary measures. The confiscation of property as a supplementary measure of social protection may be imposed by the court only in cases specified in the articles of the present Code. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
24. The following are measures of social protection of a medical nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Compulsory medical treatment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Placing a person in a hospital coupled with isolation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
25. The following are measures of social protection of a medical-education kind:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Delivery of a minor into the charge of his parents, adopters, guardians, relatives, provided the aforementioned are able to support him, or to other persons or institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The placing in a special medical-educational institution. December 20, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 4, Article 38.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
26. Measures of social protection of a medical-educational and medical nature may be applied by the court in case it recognizes that the application of measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind does not fit the given case; or they may be applied in addition to the latter, if moreover the measures of social protection of a medical-pedagogical and pedagogical kind have not been applied by the competent judicial inquiry organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
27. The proclamation of a person as enemy of the toilers and expulsion from the confines of the USSR with the forfeiture of the citizenship of a constituent republic, and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR may only be applied for an unlimited period. June 6. 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
28. Imprisonment may be imposed for a period of between one and ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labor camps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labor, or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labor camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: Persons who are uninterruptedly serving in the units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and who are in the cadres either as privates or junior commanders, serving for a definite period, are sentenced in peace time, instead of to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for two months to one year, to serve for a like period in the military-corrective units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and instead of imprisonment for a period up to two months, to arrest for a like period, served in a manner prescribed for the disciplinary arrest of persons in military service.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, by special decree of the court in each individual case, the same measures may be applied to the above-mentioned persons also for common crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons in military service of the middle, senior, highest and junior commanding personnel of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who remain in the cadres after serving the required period in the army, and who have been sentenced to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for a period up to one year, in case of dismissal from the ranks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, serve their term indicated in the sentences by doing compulsory labor according to the general rules. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: When the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army passes to the state of war, persons in the military service who are in military-corrective units are dispatched to the active army, and the subsequent serving of the measure of social protection imposed on them is postponed until after the termination of military operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sentence condemning a soldier in time of war to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights may, by decree of the court which passed that sentence, be postponed until after the termination of military operations, on condition that the convicted person joins the active army.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons in military service mentioned in the first and second parts of the above note, who while in the ranks of active army have proved themselves staunch defenders of the USSR, the court which passed the sentence may, on the petition of the competent military authorities, release the convicted person from the measure of social protection formerly imposed on him, or substitute for it a more lenient measure of social protection. October 1, 1928.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1928, No. 127, Article 816.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
29. The period of preliminary detention, and also the time spent in confinement from the moment the sentence was passed pending its coming into force must obligatorily be reckoned as part of the period of detention decreed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the court applies a measure of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind other than imprisonment, it has the right to take into consideration the period of detention previous to the trial and accordingly mitigate the measure of social protection chosen by it, or to resolve not to apply to the defendant the measure of social protection set out in the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons sentenced to compulsory labor each day of preliminary detention is credited as three days of compulsory labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
30. Compulsory labor without imprisonment may be imposed for a period ranging from one day to one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: Compulsory labor without imprisonment is not applied to the middle, senior, highest and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who are in the cadres and have completed their term of service, and also to persons in military service who belong to the cadres of privates and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during their appointed period of service. In place of compulsory labor the above-mentioned persons in military service are sentenced to arrest for a period not exceeding two months, which is served in a manner prescribed for persons in military service under disciplinary arrest. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
31. Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights consists of the deprivation of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) elective franchise both active and passive&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the right to occupy elective posts in public organizations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the right to occupy certain specified state offices&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) the right to the titles of distinction&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) parental rights&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) right to pensions paid by way of social insurance and to unemployment relief paid by way of social insurance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights may be prescribed both fully—so as to cover all the above-mentioned rights—and partially, in respect of their separate categories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of parental rights may be prescribed by the court, only if it has been proven that this right has been abused by the convicted person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of pension may be prescribed by the courts only in the following cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) conviction for the commission of state crimes (part I of the Special Section)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) conviction for the commission of crimes prompted by greed to imprisonment or to exile with a compulsory residence in other localities (as the basic measure of social protection)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the prescription of the confiscation of the entire property as supplementary measure of social protection&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) conviction in time of peace for military crimes, falling under articles of 193(3), 193(4), 193(7), 193(9), 193(12), 193(13), 193(17), 193(20)-193(28), of the present Code, and in time of war, for any of the crimes falling under Chapter IX of the Criminal Code (on crimes by persons in military service). June 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 30, Article 388.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
32. Forfeiture of rights cannot be prescribed for a period exceeding five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case this measure of social protection is prescribed as one supplementary to imprisonment, forfeiture of rights extends to the entire period of imprisonment served plus a period determined by the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
33. Forfeiture of rights, foreseen by paragraphs a-c of Article 31 is accompanied by the forfeiture of the orders of the USSR, and of the orders of the RSFSR. In such cases the court is obliged, after the sentence comes into force, to present a petition to that effect to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as the case may be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of the other marks of distinction and of distinctive titles, is effected by sentence of the court. August 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 42, Article 504.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
34. Forfeiture of rights may be decreed by the court both as a supplementary and as an independent measure of social protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When imposing a sentence of over one year’s imprisonment, the court is obliged to discuss the question of the forfeiture of the convicted person’s rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights cannot be combined with conditional conviction or with public censure. December 6, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 8788, Article 854.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
35. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement or with prohibition to reside in other localities or without these limitations, coupled with compulsory labor or without compulsory labor, may be applied by the court with regard to those convicted persons, who, in the opinion of the court, it would be socially dangerous to leave in the given locality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the boundaries of a separate locality with an obligatory residence in other localities is prescribed for a period of three to ten years. This measure, as a supplementary one, can only be prescribed for a period not exceeding five years. The removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory residence in other localities, coupled with compulsory labor, may only be prescribed as a basic measure of social protection. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with prohibition to reside in certain localities, or without this restrictive provision is prescribed for a period of one to five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case one of these measures is decreed by the court as a supplementary one to imprisonment, the period of this supplementary measure begins to run from the date of the release of the prisoner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons sentenced to the removal from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in some other locality in order to serve their terms of imprisonment in corrective labor camps, after serving their term of imprisonment, settle in the district of the camp pending the period when they will be allowed a free choice of their residence. Land must be allotted to them, or else they must be provided with paid work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Removal from the RSFSR territory, as well as removal from any specified locality whatever form it takes, cannot be applied to persons under sixteen. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
36. Removal from the confines of the USSR or RSFSR for a definite period of time may take place only in a manner specially provided by federal legislation. Removal from the confines of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities may be applied by the court only in cases of conviction for crimes specified by Articles 58(2)-58(14), 59(2), Part I, a, 59(3), 59(302), 59(3-b), 59(7), 59 (8), Part I, 59(9), 59(21), 61 Part III, 73(1), 74 Part II, 104, 107, 116 Part II, 117 Part II, 118, 129, 129-a, 136, 140 Part II, 142 Part II, 153 Part II, 155, 162, b, c, d, and e, 164 Part II, 165 Part III, 166, 167, 169, Part II, 173 and 175 Parts II and III.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Places in which compulsory settlement may be prescribed are determined as follows: With regard to persons condemned to exile without compulsory labor by the chief administration of militia at the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, by agreement with the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR; and with regard to persons condemned to exile with compulsory labor, by the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR. February 15, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 9, Article 102.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; May 30, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 27, Article 247.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
37. Removal from office may be applied in case the court deems it impossible to leave the condemned person at the post he occupied at the time of his conviction, or at the time he committed the crime. It may be accompanied by a prohibition to occupy a certain post, such prohibition not to last over five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
38. Prohibition to follow a certain activity or industry is applied by the court for a period not to exceed five years in cases where the court shall consider it impossible, owing to the ascertained abuses by the person convicted while he was engaged in his profession or industry, to allow him to continue same further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In particular, the court has the right to prohibit the person convicted to undertake any responsibilities with regard to furnishing labor and material to State institutions, to enter into contracts with State and public enterprises and institutions, to manage trade or commission enterprises either in his own name or on behalf of other persons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
39. Public censure consists of the public expression of condemnation to the person condemned declared in the name of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
40. Confiscation of property is the compulsory and uncompensated alienation in favor of the State of the whole property of a convicted person, or of a proportion thereof exactly defined by the court, such property being either entirely owned by him, or constituting a share in common property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of domestic use and indispensable to the condemned person and his family, the stock and tools required for small-scale peasant industry or agricultural production, and serving as a means of existence for him and his family, are not subject to confiscation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foodstuffs and sums of money left at the disposal of the convicted person and members of his family, may not, according to valuation in their totality, be less than the average three-months’ wages of a worker or that locality in respect to each member of the family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The stock of tools indispensable to a convicted person for his professional work may be confiscated only in case the court decrees that he shall be deprived of the right of exercising such profession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: In kulak households only the property mentioned in Articles 1-9 of the List of Kinds of Property on which execution may not be levied in respect of arrears of taxes, custom duties, and dues, is not liable to confiscation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, Nos. 8990, Article 924.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
41. When property is confiscated, the State shall not answer for the debts and liabilities of the convicted person, if such had been contracted after the taking of steps by the investigation or judicial organs to protect the property, and without the consent of these organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to claims subject to gratification out of the confiscated property, the State answers only within the limits of the assets, while in regard to priority of gratification of claims the rules shall be observed that are laid down in Articles 99 and 101 of the Civil Code and 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure of RSFSR published April 10, 1930.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
42. A fine is a money penalty imposed by the court within the limits established by separate articles of the present Code, and when applied as an additional measure, the fine shall be imposed at the discretion of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all cases a fine shall be imposed in conformity to the property status of the convicted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In determining the fine, the court may decide to substitute, in the event of nonpayment, by compulsory work without deprivation of liberty at the rate of one month compulsory labor for 100 rubles fine. No substitution of deprivation of liberty for a fine or vice versa shall be allowed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of property that are not subject to confiscation may not be taken in payment of a fine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
43. The caution is applied by the court only when a verdict of acquittal is given, if the court considers that the behavior of the acquitted gives ground, nevertheless, to fear that he might commit the crime in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
44. The obligation to repair the damage is imposed upon the convicted in those cases when the court finds it expedient that the convicted shall eliminate the consequences of the violation of the law committed by him, or of the damage caused by him to the plaintiff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This measure of social defense, however, may not exceed by its severity the measure of social defense given as the basic penalty in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; V&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON MEASURES OF SOCIAL DEFENSE OF JUDICO-CORRECTIONAL CHARACTER AND THEIR IMPOSITION BY COURT&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
45. In imposing a measure of social protection of judico-correctional character the court shall be guided by:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) the provisions of the general section of the present code&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the limits indicated in the article of the Special Section which provides a penalty for a given kind of crime&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the Socialist conception of law, taking into consideration the social danger of the crime committed, the circumstances of the case, and the personality of the defendant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
46. The crimes foreseen by the present code are divided into:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes directed against the foundations of the Soviet system established by the authority of Workers and Peasants in the USSR, such crimes being consequently considered the more dangerous, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) All other crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes of the first category the Code lays down the limit below which the court may not go in imposing a measure of social defense of judico-correctional character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On all other crimes the Code lays down only the maximum limit of penalty to be imposed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
47. The basic question to be settled in each separate case is the question of the social danger of the crime that has been tried.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An aggravating factor in this respect, when determining one or the other measure of social protection foreseen by the Code, is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Committing a crime in order to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie. ‘&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Possibility of causing harm to the interests of the State, of the toilers by committing the crime, although the crime itself was not immediately directed against the interests of the State or of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Committing of a crime by a group or a band.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Committing a crime by a person who already committed a crime before, except in cases when a given person is considered as not having been tried before, or when a long time, in a judicial sense, has passed since the committing of the first crime, or since the conviction of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Articles 14 and 15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The court, however, depending on the character of the first crime, may not consider it as an aggravating factor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Committing a crime for selfish or base motives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Committing a crime with particular cruelty, violence, slyness, or in regard to persons subordinated to the criminal or materially dependent on him, or particularly helpless on account of age, or other circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
48. Extenuating circumstances in the imposition of one or another measure of social defense or when a crime has been committed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Although exceeding the limits of self-defense, yet for the protection of Soviet law, revolutionary law, or the personality and right of the party defending himself or another person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) For the first time&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) For motives other than selfishness or base desires&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Under the influence of threats, compulsion, or official or material dependence&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Under the influence of strong mental agitation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) In a state of hunger or distress, or under the influence of severe personal or family conditions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Due to ignorance, lack of consciousness, or an accidental chain of circumstances&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) By a person under age, or by a woman in a state of pregnancy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
49. If the crime committed by the defendant contains the symptoms of several crimes, as well as in the case of the defendant having committed several crimes for which he has not been sentenced, the court, having defined the measure of social defense for each crime separately, finally imposes the penalty according to the article which provides for the gravest of the crimes committed by the defendant and the severest measure of social defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
50. If a minor (16-20 years of age) is sentenced to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the term must be reduced by one-third as compared with the term of an adult sentenced under the same article. At all events the term of the sentence of a minor shall not exceed one-half the maximum laid down by the present Code for a given crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
51. In the event when, in view of exceptional circumstances of the case, the court finds it necessary to impose a measure of social defense below the lowest limit indicated in a corresponding article of the present Code, or to apply another, less stringent measure of social defense that is not indicated in the article, the court may also depart from the article, but the motives of such departure from the code must, be clearly stated in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same rule applies in those cases when the court finds that the defendant at the time of the trial is not socially dangerous and no measure of social defense is imposed on him by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
52. The right of either complete or partial release of the condemned person from the application of measures of social defense, under sentences of all judicial organs of RSFSR, except cases foreseen in the present Code, constitutes the exclusive prerogative of the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; VI&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON CONDITIONAL SENTENCES AND CONDITIONAL AND EARLY RELEASE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
53. If the court finds that the degree of social danger of the defendant does not call either for his isolation, or for the imposition of compulsory labor, it may impose a conditional sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such cases the court decides not to execute the verdict if within a stated period the convicted person will not commit a fresh crime of equal gravity. This period may not be less than one year and not more than ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: If a fine or property requisition is added to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the fine is imposed irrespective of the conditional nature of the basic verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
54. In the event of the committing of a crime by the conditionally condemned during the probation period the court has the right either to add the conditioned measure of social defense either fully or in part to the measure of social defense given by the second verdict. In the first case, the total term of deprivation of liberty must not exceed ten years, and the total term of compulsory labor must not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
55. The following persons shall be held free from previous convictions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Persons acquitted by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Persons conditionally sentenced, who did not commit a crime of equal gravity during the probation period given by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for terms of not more than three months, or to any other minor measure of social defense, who in the course of three years after serving the first sentence, did not commit a fresh crime, or persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a period of more than six months if they committed no fresh crime of equal gravity in the course of six years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
56. If persons sentenced to terms of social defense show reformation, they may be released before the end of the term imposed by the verdict of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conditional early release consists either in abstaining from further serving of the sentence, or in substituting a milder form of social defense. The manner of application of conditional early release is laid down by the Correctional Labor Code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to persons serving sentences in correctional labor camps, conditional early release is applied in the form of transferring the convict to free settlement in the district of the given camp for the rest of his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the conditionally-released person should commit a fresh crime of equal gravity during the unexpired time of his sentence, the latter is added to the measure of social defense imposed by the court for the new crime, while the total term of deprivation of liberty may not exceed ten years and the total term of compulsory labor may not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
57. Persons under age, sentenced to deprivation of liberty and placed in industrial homes for minors, remain there until fully corrected, but not later than reaching the age of 18. If, by the time of reaching this age, the sentence has not yet expired, they may be given early discharge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Minors, in regard to whom early discharge should be deemed impossible, shall either remain in the same industrial home, or shall be transferred to other industrial homes or colonies on the grounds laid down by the correctional labor code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Russian Justice|author=Mary Stevenson Callcott|written in=1935|publisher=Macmillan Company|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/soviet-justice/}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PREFACE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; problem of crime in the United States is one of our most serious social questions. Within recent years the activities of the gangster and the kidnapper, the increasing number of young criminals whom we do not know how to treat so that they are re-established in life, have brought alarm not only to the social worker and others who try to meet the situation, but to the ordinary citizen as well. Not only is our penal system failing to reform the lawbreaker, but our social conditions are breeding others. The delay in our courts, the influence of politics, and the swaying of sentimental or incompetent juries by artful criminal lawyers without social conscience, are familiar to our citizens. Confronted by all this, we ask ourselves what we might do in order to fulfill our duty in protecting society and at the same time in aiding the transgressor to become a useful citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One thing we can do is to examine closely any system that seems to work in other countries. Russia, with her broad social program, gives much attention to her problem of crime and criminals. Sherwood Eddy, a student of Russia for a long time, has included the humane treatment of prisoners as one of the things which we might profitably get from that country. He might have added also that the simplicity of court procedure by which they arrive at justice has some commendable virtues.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have visited prisons in many parts of our country as well as in several others and have sat through criminal trials in almost as many places, so in my visits to courts and prisons in the USSR I had an experience that made observation intelligent. There is no doubt that we may learn something from the Russians about the restoration to society of those who contravene the law. Whether one sympathizes with or condemns the political faith of this country, one must admire and respect a people who are able to put ideals into works as they do. They know what they want of the man who is their criminal and they set to work to teach him how to fit into their society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are shortcomings in this phase of their work, mostly on the physical side, but they know that as well as we do and are correcting them as rapidly as possible. They have often had to use old buildings because in the short space of years of the new nation they have not had time to build enough modern ones; but they have reformed such gloomy spots as the Women’s Prison of Moscow is said to have been in Tzarist days, into a place of considerable light and more livable conditions. There are also some old cells in the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute of much too little ventilation but this building is to be replaced within a short time. Most of the buildings of this institute are already in good condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States we have been so led away with preparing better buildings (we still have some of the worst in the world) that we have often forgotten the spiritual side. There are some penal institutions, such as the New Jersey Prison for Women at Clinton, N. J., where an excellent spirit certainly prevails, but even in our best prisons I think that we do not overcome that feeling on the part of the prisoner that he or she is permanently set aside from normal society. It is the exceptional individual case where this is not true. In the Russian institutions, especially those where there is great freedom, one is struck by the atmosphere that prevails among the prisoners of still being a part of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In undertaking to give to the American public in general a picture of the situation in Soviet Russia in regard to crime and its repression certain usual questions have been kept in mind. Interested inquirers, both in this country and abroad, have repeatedly asked me, “What are the courts really like?” “What kinds of crime are committed?”’ “Who commits them?” and “What is the punishment given?” The answers are found in the pages of this book. Since it is intended to reach the layman as well as the social worker, the student of criminology, the lawyer, and the legislator, an informal approach has been used. It is hoped, however, that this will not tend to detract from the authenticity of the work. No effort has been spared to give as accurate an account as possible, both by means of research over a period of years in connection with my Criminology class and by recent visits to courts and penal institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gratitude for help must be expressed to many people whom I cannot enumerate here. I am especially indebted to the Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, Prof. A. J. Vishinsky, who gave valuable time for appointments, to Mr. C. S. Smith of the Associated Press who aided me in many ways, to Director Shlaposnitchov of the Institute of Criminal Policy, to Professor Brusilovsky for conferences and appointments he both arranged and participated in and for lectures which was permitted to attend, to S. Golunsky, of the Commissariat of Justice, who in addition to such services as were rendered by others, has contributed the further service of reading and criticizing the manuscript. Finally, to my two young countrywomen, Miss Margaret Moore and Miss Margaret Ross, who gave up parts of their vacation in Moscow to contribute typing to the project.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
M. S. C.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New York City&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
October, 1934&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Criminal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; repression in the Soviet Union is bound up with the whole social program which the state has been developing. A good many of us had thought of the Soviet’s welfare work as more of a hit-or-miss arrangement, gathering up a few threads here, omitting to notice some quite as important in other places, but as the work is examined in its entirety, it gives evidence of more than usually comprehensive planning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In making an evaluation of the present situation in regard to any of its phases of development, it is not sufficient merely to consider standards as they now exist, but it is also, of course, necessary to take into account the distance traversed in the brief time and the difficulties surrounding the accomplishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The important thing, let us say for an example, in child care, is to see that ten or twelve years ago thousands upon thousands of children were wandering in wild gangs, all over the country, thieving, plundering, killing even, unfed and unclothed, and that today they are, with few exceptions both clothed and fed, being trained and cared for in institutions or at home, and that the period of distress and acute exigency is over. If that had extended to children alone we might understand that with all the forces available the authorities could handle such a situation, but it was a larger thing than that, and the fact that in the face of what seemed an undertaking of impossible dimensions the authorities were able to come through, and with a program so constructive that it has revolutionized their treatment of offenders against the law, seems something of a miracle. Or again, it is of great significance, especially to such a study as this, that the banditry and roving lawlessness on the part of men in 1922, has been reduced so sharply that this form of crime is pretty well under control. So, it is the distance revolutionary Russia has come, the rapidity of her pace, that are more significant than the actual standards in practice. That is not to say, however, that her present standards always need a defense. Her achievement in treatment of prisoners, for example, which is the subject of this book, does not suffer by comparison with that of western nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the pages that follow attention is given to treatment and to standards, but for the moment, assuming that advances have been rapidly made in the repression of crime, let us focus our interest on other factors that have contributed to this progress. For us it is important to discover, if we can, what factors are responsible for the one-third decrease in the number of criminals which authorities say has been effected since the beginning of the Revolution. Even if their estimate of the reduction seems high, it is still apparent to a student of the situation that a real decrease, perhaps smaller, has been made. The united front with which the nation has attacked its social problems on all sides has, as would be expected, exerted great influence in the handling of the crime problem. Prevention has resulted in a large way from the development in the various phases of social welfare that have gone on simultaneously, and as one begins to consider the relationship that exists there appears that whole pattern, referred to earlier, which leaves few phases of social and economic life untouched.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The care of children has already been spoken of. It is clear that one of the big problems, among the horde that have puzzled and challenged the group who have had chief responsibility in steering the government, was juvenile delinquency. While authorities gathered these young offenders together and put them in places for care, they were at the same time preparing and carrying out a program for their youth that would prevent others following in the footsteps of the delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the preventive program that was now first in interest, the item of education stood at the head of the list. No doubt in the early days of the proletarian state, schools were woefully inadequate, but children were at least placed under the guidance of people who gave them the elements of an education as well as taught them something of how to work. But the nation appears to have a mania for the education of its masses and a point has now been reached where there is university study in sight, with a stipend attached for those who attend, for all those able to take advantage of it. Juvenile delinquency rates have steadily decreased and the development of the school system has obviously contributed largely to this reduced figure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Health programs are, of course, directly related to crime repression. There is a book on the socialized medicine of Russia, written by Sir Arthur Newsholme of England and Dr. Kingsbury of our own country, that should be read for full information on this subject, but it can be said that the scope of the program is wide and the extent far-reaching. Beyond the broad development of curative medicine there is the preventive program in which physical culture activities figure largely. As an illustration of the results achieved in this work, a demonstration staged in Moscow in the summer of 1934 was very impressive. The author along with a good many other Americans and other foreign visitors witnessed the parade in which a hundred thousand physical culturists, with their canoes, paddles, tennis racquets, flowers, and other things suggestive of health and enjoyment of life, passed in excellent order, so well disciplined that one group followed another without a break in ranks. There is, of course, a great significance to that when it is considered on a national scale. With every factory and farm providing such a program for its workers there should be a rapid diminution in the number of weaklings who turn to crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One finds himself on the defensive at the mention of more liberal divorce laws, but such a provision may actually lessen criminal acts. Since a woman who finds her husband wholly incompatible and wants to remarry some more congenial person has only to indicate her wish in order to be free, she is not nearly as likely to poison her husband or work herself into a state from which some expert psychiatrist will have to untangle her. When the system was first initiated in the Soviet Union we were told that there was a great rush of those who wished to benefit, but that since the first period exhausted the number of those eager for separation, there has been a noticeable decrease. One meets a great number of people who have been married a long time! Such an authority as Vishinsky attributed much of the decrease in criminal acts to these liberal laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The rapid industrialization of the country has made for less crime except in the case of offenses against the state. In that period just before the installation of NEP when farmers and others discharged from the army could find no work, when distribution without production had left the nation in starvation, banditry flourished, but when the five-year plan began to make demands for more workers than could be furnished, a halt was called in the advance of ordinary crime. Also, with work plentiful, there is no problem of providing jobs for those discharged from prisons. With the system of training which gives a skilled trade to every man capable of assimilating the instruction and mastering the tasks, and of giving instruction also to the unskilled type who are thereby enabled to fill some job well, there is no question of work for discharged prisoners. How long this condition will hold depends, of course, on the time it will take for industrialization to reach its zenith and for the population to catch up and exceed the ability of the system to absorb them. However, there is an encouragement of birth control and that may manage the question somewhat better than has been done in other countries gone on before with their industrialization program. Since Russia sits down with pencil and paper and makes her plans of production, perhaps she can do something in the nature of requirements for population increase!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following comment is offered by a Russian authority: “That is something like the Malthusian theory. We don’t believe in it. We are sure that at present, and for a very long time in the future there can be no real over-population. If sometimes something like that seems to happen in the capitalistic countries, it is an illusion. It is the result of the social conditions of those countries. Our social system makes it possible for us to use any quantity of labour and there can be no question of over-population for us. Therefore the question of something like State birth control does not even arise.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Housing is, of course, one of the biggest problems in Soviet Russia. They are building with feverish rapidity but one suspects it will be some time until they catch up to the need. It is popular to correlate bad health, crime, and most other social evils with congested housing, and one feels sure that much of the blame attached to it is well placed. If Russia can eliminate this condition she will have done much in exercising control of those situations that are supposed to be the major causes of crime. She has her own theory of cause which another chapter discusses, but optimistic socialists believe she is in a fair way to remove that also. Russians know well enough of their shortage of housing and they know the social significance of that shortage, but one cannot rebuild an entire nation in the few short years since their social cataclysm. There had to be a gap somewhere and both lack of trained workers and of material accounts for its existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Training for taking part in government affairs, such as elections and jury service, is also conducive to securing law observance. The writer’s visit was so taken up with courts and prisons that other angles of investigation were neglected and any ideas as to government practices in democracy are secured second-hand. However, some of those Americans who live there and observe intelligently state that there is a steady progress toward greater participation by the people themselves in government. As education prepares the way, participation becomes more real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any mention of fight against crime in this country ought to take into account the establishment of the new culture of this society. At the close of the October Revolution, Russia had as its chief asset a great many millions of people whose rights the leaders had sworn to establish and protect, and who were unlettered, superstitious and without social understanding. Educating children was a small task compared to what they must do with those adults, and in the period when the old culture had come to an end with the last efforts of the civil war and the new had not well begun, crime swelled into large numbers of convicted. But these peasants and workers have many of them learned, at evening classes, at conferences, and in trade unions of various sorts, something of what this order stands for. A new social consciousness that makes the individual feel responsible for the law and order of the country has arisen and makes itself felt even in such small offenses as the case of some thoughtless individual throwing paper in a park which is certain to be otherwise immaculate, or of a more delinquent one climbing on a street car at the front in the hope of not being detected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The freeing of the people from hardships of the pioneer stage of the new civilization is also beginning to be felt. There is much attention to beauty which I am told was not evident as recently as two or three years ago. Natural yearnings are being satisfied and a broader life is opening; the labor pains of the rebirth of a nation are about over. All this relieves tension and tends to establish a normality of living such as results in a more settled order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A condition that ought soon to make for a decrease in crime against the state by the so-called class enemy is the fact that the government is now established. We are so accustomed to use the phrase “the Russian experiment” that it is hard for one to give it up; but, it is no longer much of an experiment. The author remembers a gentle reproof given to her when she remarked that since this sort of thing had never been tried before, it was difficult to see how it might work. There was a smiling rejoinder of “We have tried it and it does work.” Surely there will be a cessation in “crimes against the state” when it is clearly seen that efforts against the order of government will not be of avail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Emphasis ought, of course, to be put on the social planning that gives security for old age and removes fear of illness and unemployment. It would be impossible to estimate how much crime is due to a feeling of insecurity in society, but there is no doubt that it is a large percentage. Provisions looking toward the elimination of this insecurity have already been effective enough to have a part in the reduction of the number of those driven to crime because of fear of such economic woes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One point on which observers agree that we need to imitate these people is in the humane treatment of prisoners. It ought to be understood here that “humane” is not synonymous with “coddling.” Some of us who do not distinguish have grown shy of that word but in these pages it is used in its proper meaning. Prisoners are given a “man to man” treatment, held to a strict régime just as if they worked in a factory outside. There is discipline in industry and they are prepared to meet that condition, to learn to discipline themselves, but the approach is one of dignity, with any thought of humiliation put far away. It is only when one thinks of the prisoner as suffering undignified imprisonment, degraded by acts of physical or verbal abuse on the part of guards who ought themselves to be in prison, that one stoops to pity and “feels sorry for him,” but when a man is subjected only to a constructive training such as it might be a privilege to get, one’s sympathy is hardly needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question of how much one can see in a limited time always comes up when one writes of foreign conditions, and cognizance of it should be taken in this Introductory Chapter. The answer, of course, depends on the preparation of the person for the task. It seems too obvious even to remark that one can live in a country for years and know considerably less about specialized subjects than one trained observer who merely visits the institutions. The book on Red Medicine by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. Kingsbury has already been referred to. One would naturally rather trust the judgment of such authorities even though they visit briefly than that of others, unfamiliar with this field, who have resided there for years on end.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The author trusts her own judgment in regard to prisons and courts. She has been seeing both for years, and in many places. Physical equipment is not all that one looks for. There are signs that give things away. There are glances that indicate a whole policy. If a warden tells a visitor of a wholesome approach to his men, and that person then sees the inmates fall away and look up from lowered eyes as he goes through, he knows what to think. If a superintendent says, as one did to the writer, that he does not really enforce the silent system, and one watches the men a while, talking through the side of a twisted mouth as a guard half turns his head and never speaking normally during the entire time of the visit, one knows again that representations are not in accord with practice. Prisoners do not put on acts for visitors, and members of a staff would probably be letting themselves in for trouble with any suggestion that they do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The writer expresses no opinions on conditions outside her own field of special investigation, except on obvious points. Other institutions were visited only in a casual way, but a great deal of life itself was seen. There were long walks in all sorts of places. Groups of children were played with and workmen of all kinds talked to, usually through an interpreter; but there were those with whom the conversation was carried on directly in French, German or sometimes English. All of this formed a background for any conclusions, and years of working with people in a social work relationship had also prepared the writer again for significant observation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the major portion of the book is concerned with research, and that has been thoroughly checked for accuracy of statement by a member of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER II: THE SOVIET THEORY OF CRIME ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;To understand&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; rightly the theory of crime officially accepted in Russia today, one must read the works of Lenin. Karl Marx is there in the background, to be sure, but he is explained or interpreted in accordance with the opinion of the Soviet Union’s first leader. It sounds a simple enough theory—that, with the final attainment of the classless society, crime, which is the result of economic class relationship, will disappear. But it needs some elucidation. The accomplishment of a state of society in which this would be true is not, after all, quite so simple as the statement sounds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
People have tried for a good many years to account for the phenomenon of crime and to work out some manner of punishment that would control even if not eliminate it, as the present Soviet theory permits. Anthropologists tell us that acts not pleasing to the group, even antagonistic to its best interests, are apparently as old as human society itself. Penalties consisting of curses, banishment, even death, were visited upon those who broke the law in the earliest ages of society. Up to very recent years punishment in the form of untold cruelties was dealt out to those who transgressed. Still crime grew and criminals increased with the complexity of civilization. What makes people do those things—commit those acts which are against the folk ways or state ways of the community in which he lives, and brings him usually to account? Who knows? Within fairly recent times three main theories have attempted to establish the causes and have laid out measures of punishment designed to protect law-abiding society from the criminal and, later, to aid in the readjustment of the individual to life.&lt;br /&gt;
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We might take a hasty look at these theories before we speak of their rejection by proletariat Russia. The classical school had as one of its chief characteristics the doctrine of free will in the commission of crime. The discretionary power of judges in the years just preceding the development of this theory gave too much play to the possibility, supposedly, of circumstances surrounding the act. As a matter of actual practice, according to such an authority as Gillin, it gave them instead an excellent chance to wreak a personal vengeance on some enemy, or, still acting according to the discretionary power given them, befriend someone to whom they wished to show favor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this was one of the evils the classical school of writers decided to remedy. If one committed an act of his own free will, then circumstances had nothing to do with it. A man was a criminal because he chose to be. Thus when two persons committed the same act they should be given the same punishment. And the French Code of 1791 put such a theory into practice, listing a great number of such transgressions and providing for each a set penalty. The difficulties would hardly need to be set down for us. The resulting unwieldy code, the lack of any punishment for acts not listed, made the administration of the code an impossible task.&lt;br /&gt;
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There was another reason for its modification. It did not take an expert in criminology to see that there were differentiating conditions surrounding the commissions of crime. It was clear that of two people committing similar acts, the one would have the sympathy of those who saw him, whereas the second would be looked on with contempt. That the people in the street were able to arrive at such a conclusion and public opinion in the days of revolutionary action against tyranny, must have had some effect. At any rate the Code of 1810 in France provided a modification of the definite penalty for a definite crime by setting a maximum and minimum and permitting the judge to choose between. The doctrine of free will in the commission of crime thus became modified to a milder form of the same theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The neo-classical school went a step further. While it still recognized the theory of free will and individual responsibility on the part of one transgressing the law, it did decide that in view of evidences being submitted by a body of biologists, physicians, and other scientists, that every person was not free to choose, and was thus not responsible for his behavior. There might, for example, be insanity or imbecility to account for an act. It was, however, necessary to establish that at the time of the crime he was in such a mental state. This theory is incorporated in the practice of our criminal courts today.&lt;br /&gt;
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But here begins another story. Modern science was developing. Research connected with psychiatry and psychology was adding important contributions to the field of the study of the criminal and an attempt to account for crime. Why did a man do things of such an anti-social nature, things harmful to his fellow beings? The anthropological school with Lombroso as its initial spokesman, entered with its explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This theory, attacking the classical and neo-classical writers, took a different line, and swung far in the other direction. Why did the criminal commit his crime? Because he was born with certain stigmata that prevented his following other lines of behavior. He had no choice in the matter. Far from the free-will theory that made him a creature responsible for his deeds, this doctrine made him incapable of rational analysis, or any logical deductions as to cause and consequence. Lombroso weighted his argument with facts and figures. He made an extensive study of criminals in Italian prisons and concluded finally that at least a certain percentage of those committing crimes were born criminals with definite physical features characteristic of the lower stages of evolution. However, in his later writings he concluded that only one-third of all criminals belonged to this group. Still having to account for the other two-thirds, he decided that part of this number was insane and that the other belonged in the category for which he invented the term—&#039;&#039;criminaloid&#039;&#039;. It is in regard to the latter group that we see his recognition of social influences on crime. Besides those born to criminal ways and those committing their acts because of insanity, there was this third group, who while not born to their deeds, still acted like criminals. There was too much proof by this time of the influence of environment for even an ardent advocate of his own theory to deny its importance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Long before the death of Lombroso, Ferri had written his &#039;&#039;Criminal Sociology&#039;&#039; and our third main theory was well launched. This school, of course, is prominently with us today. It recognizes biological causes and adds to them the results of various social environments. It goes even beyond that and takes into account such physical environment as climate, weather, and geographic location.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet criminal theory repudiates all of the aforementioned and asserts that crime is caused by the exploitation of one class by another. The attitude which accounts for such behavior, they insist, has evolved over a period that has lasted since the state became an instrument in the hands of a ruling class to force a weaker one into submission by making “laws” to protect its own interests and punishing those who transgressed one of these regulations. Because that “conscience” has had a historical development, has been long in the making, it will likewise take time to change it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the Marx-Lenin theory assumes that all crime is the result of the exploitation of one class by another, and that with the achievement of classless society—which is the ultimate aim of socialist construction—crime itself will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us trace this line of thought for a moment for fear it is not as familiar as it should be for one to get the full import of this doctrine. According to this belief, there has been one continuous evolution of society toward the establishment of full Communism, beginning with its earliest stage, which will be in its final stage world-wide. But in this evolution, going on since the dawn of history and before, there emerged at one stage of the process an organization through which the stronger element came to rule the weaker and make its members submit to its will. The instrument through which they effected this was the state. From that time on, the interests of the class or group in power have been protected by rules or laws and those who break those regulations, or commit some act not in accord with these interests of the ruling class, are guilty of a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Marx-Lenin doctrine in rejecting any sort of an idealistic notion such as Rousseau’s “social contract” and Hegel’s “the reality of the moral idea” as accounting for the state, accepts instead the definition that “the state as organized violence emerged at the definite stage in the evolution of society, that society was broken up into irreconcilable classes, that it could no longer exist without the ‘authority’ supposed to be above society and to a certain degree isolated from it.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Or again, speaking more plainly, the Marxian formula states “that the state is an organ of oppression of one class by another; that it sets up an order which legalizes and consolidates this oppression modifying the conflict of classes.” Thus since the state is an organ of class domination, and crime necessarily, by the same definition, is the commission of an act against the interests of the ruling class, a criminal code would be a formulation of penalties imposed for such acts. When a state is reached where there is no domination of one class by another in society, it would logically appear that there would be no need of a criminal code.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Soviet Union has a criminal code now, as we shall later see, and of course a recognition of crime. This, however, in their theory is no contradiction. In the first place there is one class now in power (there is an admitted class basis for criminal legislation), and the transgression of the rights of those in authority, the proletariat or working group, does constitute a serious and major crime. That, of course, is to be expected from the nature of our definition. But what of the group of criminals who come from the working class itself?&lt;br /&gt;
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They are those whose attitude is the result of long centuries of class struggle, and their point of view cannot be changed at once. Every effort is made by a policy resulting from this theory to change their “social conscience” by education while they serve their sentence, but even with that effort it is certain that many of the older generation will not be won over to the new way of thinking. Thus they concentrate on youth, as we shall see in a later chapter devoted to the child who comes in contact with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But crime, except in isolated instances, will disappear as need for the state also vanishes. Let us take the word of an authority for it. Commissar of Justice of the USSR, N. Krylenko, writes: “Only under Communism will the state become wholly superfluous, for then there will be no one to suppress in the sense of waging a systematic class struggle against a definite part of the population.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Understand that, in accordance with the theory, criminal repression will exist as long as the state itself is necessary, and for the present the perfect socialist society is a thing of the future. Even when it is fully come there will still be some who will commit acts of a criminal nature, but they will be of such infrequency that there will be no need of penal restriction. Lenin is our authority this time. In Vol. XXI, p. 432, we find the following: “For this there will be no need for a special machine, for a special apparatus of coercion; this will be done by the army of people themselves with the simplicity and ease with which any crowd of civilized people even in contemporary society will stop a street fight of rowdies or will disallow the outraging of a woman.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perhaps it will be easier to understand the theory that permits of the final disappearance of crime if the legal definition contained in their code were given. One can see then that with the gaining of strength on the part of the government, with the “mopping up” of the remaining opposition, there could possibly be such a situation. Part 3 of the Criminal Code, Article 6, contains this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“A socially dangerous act is deemed every act of commission or omission, directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government for the period of time pending transition to a communist régime.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A note added to this article is of special significance in providing for consideration of the circumstances of social class. It reads:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“An act which, although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code, is free from socially dangerous characteristics, owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen that crime in the Soviet Union consists mainly of those acts directed against the state by the so-called class enemies; or those desiring to hamper socialist construction. In this situation those acts defined as criminal would tend to have usually an economic basis. And this would substantiate the theory that recognizes no other motive for a crime than an economic one, which, in a society where all needs would be met, would supposedly disappear. That is, if in the final socialist state every one should receive according to his needs—as they insist he will—then the economic motive for crime would be eliminated. This takes care of those acts which in our own country, we might attribute to economic causes.&lt;br /&gt;
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But what, we might ask, of those murders or other crimes, motivated by jealousy or rage? The theory answers that those, in the person not ill and requiring medical treatment instead of penal, are rare and the act thus usually constitutes the one crime in the person’s career. For example the man who murders his wife in a jealous rage would very likely make a good citizen who would never again commit such an excessive act. However, this, in the person not mentally deranged, would also be a rare occurrence for the reason assigned that marriage and divorce are made so liberal under the laws of the USSR that the jealousy motive in marital tangles is taken care of, and thus one of the main causes of murder is eliminated.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to note in this regard that the maximum penalty for murder in Russia in any case, except for death resulting from banditry and robbery with a firearm, is a ten year sentence. In fact the maximum term of imprisonment for any cause is ten years. They hold long sentences to be neither humane nor constructive. If a man is mentally abnormal to a dangerous extent, there are other places for him than prisons. If he has committed such a serious act as banditry or robbery with firearms, he is likely to get a death sentence unless there are extenuating circumstances such as the youth of the offender, and for the other crimes the shorter sentence is held to be more conducive to reformation.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we note for a moment the chief types of crime against which the penal provisions are directed, we will be able to see what acts any theory must account for. In the pamphlet &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039; by the Commissar of Justice, N. Krylenko, we find the four main categories of criminal law listed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, the laws safeguarding the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under this class are all provisions for penalties for acts of a counter-revolutionary nature; against such things as wrecking, activities of the Kulaks (the middle-class peasants who owned a moderate degree of private property and who were opposed to relinquishing it to the state) directed against the order of government, and against speculators, and any form of pilfering, theft, bribery, and squandering.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the second category the author places the laws which protect the interest of the toiling masses. These are of various natures. Punishment is here provided for officials who fail to fulfill the pledges of the government as to food and living conditions promised to the working class. Protection is also afforded against excessive fines or punishment of the people. The need for such a measure he illustrates by the case of the imposition of a fine of a hundred rubles in a trivial incident where ten was the maximum permitted by law, and there was no occasion for any at all. An official permitting or contributing to such an act must, of course, be punished. In the same category are provisions against undue severity in enforced collectivisation, which tend to frighten and coerce rather than to the persuasion favored by Stalin. In this category also would fall any law providing for punishment of one committing deeds of violence against one’s person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the third category&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; are found “laws regulating the inter-relations between the various social strata of the toiling masses.” This division consists of the laws on Soviet trade and is directed against any act that contributes to squandering of goods or disposition of unwanted articles by forcing a customer to take one such article along with his other purchases,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The author writes of this: “What is a ‘compulsory assortment?’ You enter a store and ask for something. Well, you get what you want, but you must also take something else. What? A lamp, for instance. Now a lamp is a good thing to have, but where is the burner? You are curtly told that the lamp comes without a burner. Another store expects you to buy electric flashlights without a battery—a third tags on batteries without flashlights.” He also speaks of sweaters sent to a city sweltering in the heat, and skiis to Odessa. All this, he says, is in violation of the law and must be punished. The people’s rights must be protected (&#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 29-30).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or any other act by trade bodies that interferes with the rights of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fourth category consists of laws punishing non-observance of regulations as to business accounting and fulfillment of plans by the various economic organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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“These categories of law,” says this author, “exhaust the fundamental questions that comprehend every aspect of our economic and social life.” At this phase of the development of their socialist state they, of course, recognize the necessity for the provisions that their penal code contains. But their faith in their ideal—the final classless society—and the change which it will bring in social consciousness enables them to prophesy according to Lenin the disappearance of excessive acts. “We do not know,” he says, “how quickly and in what stages, but we do know that it will be withering away; with their withering away, the state will also wither away.” Crime and punishment in their theory are therefore transitory phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The disappearance of crime will not be achieved with the end of the second five-year plan as some optimists might have expected. There are still sectors where the struggle between the classes flares up, and where the opposition is for the moment strengthened by influencing some of the toilers themselves to come to their aid. But types of crime outside this group will be steadily losing in degree of social danger and should be treated with increasing leniency. Repressive measures in regard to the first type of crimes, those of menace to the advancing socialist state, must be made more severe until all opposition has ceased and the ideal society ushered in.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criminal repression will not disappear until the full realization of the Communist order, but then in the words of Lenin once more&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XXI, p. 431.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “free from the thrall of capitalism . . . people will gradually get accustomed to observe the elementary, perennially known rules of social life that were repeated for ages in all books on good conduct; to observe them without the special apparatus of coercion which is called the State.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While these theorists expect that by the end of the second five-year plan, class distinctions will be pretty well smoothed out, criminal repression will still remain to combat the remnants of the old order which will linger on for some time. They emphasize that they have no magic wand for clearing all this suddenly and completely from the consciousness of the people. Crime and criminal repression came at one stage in evolution—the beginning of the domination of one class by another—and they will vanish at another stage—the appearance of the highest phase of Communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a final summation of the theory, crime results solely from a class struggle and will disappear with the extinction of classes, just as the state itself, according to Lenin, will disappear, and the court, now an organ of the state guarding the interests, life, health, and liberty of toilers of the state, will also disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The period is called transitory,” said Professor Brusilovsky in a lecture, “because after the achievement of Communism there will be neither crime nor punishment. Each stage and development of Soviet authority while lowering the importance of some crimes, aggravates the weight of others, depending upon the actual economic and political situation. To us criminal law is no fetish, but a tool for sweeping away the obstacles to socialist construction. Our criminal law is to a high degree historic, our proletarian semi-state is in a stage of constant change and motion toward the construction of classless society.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A theory is only a theory, and when it deals with human beings there is no accuracy of prophecy. The advent of a proletarian state, however, might indicate to some of us that other strange things could happen in the same land, especially so with the social mind that is apparent, and with as sane an approach to criminal treatment as their policy calls for. Let that social mind have another few generations for extension to fringes of the group, and that policy of treatment of criminals come into full play, and we might be as surprised as we are that the Soviet State has not only survived, but has recently been received into the League of Nations as one of the powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The student will want to know, though, something of the degree to which the theory proves accurate as the period of socialist construction advances in the Soviet Union. It might be said here that according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky there is a decrease in the number of prisoners convicted of such familiar crimes as theft, murder, arson, robbery, rape, etc., by almost one-third since the days just before the revolution. Chapter IV discusses in detail the crimes committed and some analysis is given of those who commit them. The reader must be reminded again, however, that the authorities contend that no radical change can be made in the social conscience of their people in the one generation of the revolution which has elapsed, especially as so little constructive work was done up to the last few years. It is, however, important to know what problems they have at this time and the chapter referred to above is devoted to that discussion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER III: CRIME REPRESSION SINCE THE REVOLUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We turn&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; now from theory to fact. Whether or not a state of classless society will be achieved no one can know; but it is certain that at the moment crime and criminals do exist in Soviet Russia. While our concern is with the present program of criminal repression, a review of the situation since the revolution will give us perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin enumerates three basic aspects of the proletarian dictatorship: “First, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the crushing of the exploiters, for the defense of the country, for the consolidation of ties with the proletariat of other countries, for the development and victory of revolutions in all countries. Second, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the final separation of the toiling and exploited masses from the bourgeoisie, for the attraction of the masses to the cause of socialist construction, for state leadership of these masses by the proletarian. And, third, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the organization of forces, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a society without state.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Criminal repression must necessarily be considered in connection with these purposes of the state. It can be seen that there are three main factors involved. There is, first of all, the crushing of the enemies of the state; secondly, the discipline and control of the toiling masses themselves; and, third, the socialist construction. The method used for accomplishing these ends have changed with the various phases of the development of the Communist state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considering first the crushing of those who oppose the order of government or hinder its development, we find the methods of coercion varying from leniency and toleration in the beginning of the Revolution, through the frightful years of the Cheka (extraordinary commission to combat speculation and counter-revolution in the early days) reign, to the more severe activities of the OGPU in recent times. Shortly after the October Revolution in May, 1918, all those persons held for political crimes were set free by an act of general amnesty. The results of this liberality were rather serious for the rule of the proletariat, since those released, bitterly determined to overthrow the new and not too firmly seated government, returned to the fight with vigor. Among these was the renowned General Krasnow who organized the White Guard Cossacks and caused no end of trouble to the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a policy of clemency was bound to end if the Soviet government continued to live. When next they had political prisoners in hand there was a different tale to tell. Whoever of them saw the inside of a prison or place of detention were not released to run back to the fight. We find Stalin defending later severe measures toward these prisoners in an interview with Ludwig in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P.7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Soon it transpired that such leniency was only undermining the strength of the authority of the Soviets. We committed a mistake in showing such leniency toward the enemies of the working class. If we repeated this mistake any further, we would have committed a crime toward the working class. We would have betrayed its interest. And this became perfectly clear very soon. It became very sure that the greater our leniency toward our enemies, the greater their resistance.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leniency was no part of their program thereafter. History will attest to the fact. Military Communism and the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, agent of superlative revolutionary terror, attended to that. Civil wars are brutal, cruel, and Russia’s was notoriously no exception. The period that followed with its terrorist activities is no bright spot in the history of crime repression of post-revolutionary Russia. Lenin threw the responsibility for the establishment of the so-called Red Terror on their class enemies. He says: “You have yourselves to blame, friends! Do not run away with the idea that the Russian peasants and workers have forgotten about your actions. You challenged us to a fight of the most desperate form in October, and in reply to this we have announced the terror, and the triple terror, and if necessary we will make it even hotter for you, if you try again.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. XXVII, p. 175.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They tried again, and yet again, the open fighting of the Civil War giving way to underground methods, not deterred by the worst the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and its successors the GPU could do. But early measures must have quadrupled, for Communism can no longer be considered a mere experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who were the people against which this repression was directed? The urban bourgeoisie joined by the rural Kulaks formed the great number. There was a tremendous increase of criminals from these two classes in the early years of the proletarian state. In their combined efforts they were able to prove of much hindrance to the Soviet cause, and, aided by those waverers within the toiling class who were able to be influenced to counter-revolutionary activities, they presented a grave menace. Again Lenin, whom the Russians think of in his kindly moods, showed his grim side. “We must exert every effort,” he wrote, “to track down and catch all those highwaymen, all the landlords and capitalists in hiding, in all their disguises, expose and punish them without pity—sly, subtle, experienced, patiently waiting for the opportune moment in hatching their plots; they are saboteurs who will stoop to any crime to do harm to the Soviet rule. With these enemies of the toilers, with the landlords, capitalists, saboteurs, and White Guards, we must be merciless.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. 24, XXIV, p. 434.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Economically, the first period was one of distribution of goods without production. Its aftermath was famine and unemployment and Lenin and Trotsky were at odds over a policy of alleviation. Trotsky, impatient at delay over a program of more complete state ownership, advocated immediate action against all private possession of property. Lenin considered a starving people no advantage in furthering a socialist construction, and was besides a humanitarian. He wanted his people fed. The result was the institution of NEP, the New Economic Policy, which permitted private ownership within limits, and brought about the eventual political annihilation of Trotsky.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of fighting the class enemy remained practically the same even through the era of NEP. There was some let-up in the counter-revolutionary activities on the initiation of NEP, as it had been hoped by those opposed to Communism that this probably indicated the return to Capitalism, but activities of an anti-Communistic nature were still sternly repressed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
N. Krylenko, prosecutor of note and now Commissar of Justice of the USSR, writes in defense against a criticism of mildness toward the enemies of the government at this time: “The form of the dictatorship of the proletariat changes in the different stages of the proletarian revolution. For instance, in the first period of the October Revolution the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters was the most conspicuous feature . . . during the transition to the NEP, the peaceful, cultural, organizational work of the dictatorship of the proletariat was most conspicuous, but this again did not mean that the importance of overcoming the resistance of the exploiters had receded in the least.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief agent of “resisting the exploiters” was now the GPU (later, as it became the joint organization of all the republics, the OGPU), the full title of which is the United State Political Administration. There seems no doubt that their midnight arrests and executions were an effective weapon against any counter-Soviet efforts even as the activities of their predecessors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, had been before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The method now undergoes an important change. Note this from Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XX, p. 460.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “To the extent that the basic purpose of authority becomes not military crushing but administrative, the typical manifestation of crushing and coercion will become not the method of shooting on the spot, but trial in court.” Not in love himself, apparently, with methods such as he felt they had to use, he seized the first opportunity afforded by an end of Civil War to advance a revolutionary legality which his party had already been trying to establish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Criminal Code was written in 1922, as was also the Code for Criminal Procedure, and the way was paved for an enlargement of orderly court procedure. The provisions of the code gave not greater leniency but legalized measures that had already been practiced. The step of importance, however, was that “tried in court” replaced “shooting on the spot.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The history of violence against the Kulaks, the most startling of all violence used by the USSR in establishing itself, was entering now a modified phase. Nerves were settling somewhat, and panic beginning to clear away. Legal guarantees, so nearly obscured through years when “crushing” was regarded as necessary at any price if the proletariat was to stay in authority, might now begin, at least, to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with this a new idea was put into practice which presents a happier side to the study of crime repression in this country. Since the state could not kill all of its class enemies and certainly would not find it profitable to fill innumerable prisons with them, there developed a new approach to the problem. It is not accurate to say that the idea was new, because it had been present since the earliest days of the Revolution. The Civil War, however, had so disrupted the development of any program that this influence was not properly felt until later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This new approach was by means of educating and training these offenders so that they might be turned out again as useful workers in a state so greatly in need of all the man power it could muster. Authorities built their plans on the belief that even a class enemy might reform and see his way to becoming a member of the new society if properly guided. And as for the convicts from among the loyal masses, any program for crime repression must have as its fundamental object the training of these as useful citizens. The theory of how it might be done has turned out to be a practical one. Its translation into government policy was a most significant development and leads straight to the constructive attitude one finds in present-day treatment of prisoners in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most of us, it seems, have had the impression that during the days of the Civil War there were no legal guarantees in the state, but such an idea is not correct. One thinks of courts as suspended, but there were orderly trials even in the darkest days of military Communism when non-judicial bodies like the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; were at their height. This was possible, of course, almost entirely for those members of the toiling masses themselves and not for enemies of the proletarian authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was a bare year after the October Revolution (November 6-9, 1918) that the Emergency Congress of the Soviets was held in Moscow. And if ever emergency existed in political affairs, it did so then for the Soviets. Civil War was at its highest point, the White Guards aided by Czecho-Slovaks, were in possession of Siberia, the English were pushing to the north and the French to the south. It is surprising that a party at the helm of the ship of state could take its mind even for a moment from such an international and military situation to think of admonishing a people to observe law. But we find Kursky, then Commissar of Justice, rising gravely to remind the Congress and the people that “during the year of revolutionary activity the working class of Russia has elaborated the basic laws of the RSFSR which must be faithfully observed in order to develop and strengthen the authority of workers and peasants,” and the Congress, after listening to his speech, resolved unanimously, “to appeal to all citizens of the Republic, to all organs and all officials of Soviet authority, to observe most strictly the laws of the RSFSR and the rules, regulations and orders issued and to be issued by the Central authorities.” A significant effort that was, and one whose importance was momentous to a people struggling through a chaos that must have all but obscured any semblance of order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To forestall the high-handed measures which they must have seen would be forthcoming as a result of the counter-revolutionary work during the Civil War, they surrounded such action with certain safeguards. It was resolved that “(a) Exact, formal ascertaining by the Soviet institution or official concerned as to the presence of conditions necessitated a departure from the limits of the law; (b) Immediate written notification to the Council of People’s Commissars, with a copy for local and interested authorities, should be provided.” In the midst of violence and excesses these efforts to establish revolutionary legality were significant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In March, 1919, the Communist party adopted as a distinctive feature of its program a plank reading: “Our courts have already led to a cardinal change in the character of punishment, resulting on a large scale in conditional sentences, introducing public censure as a measure of punishment, substituting compulsory labor with retention of liberty for imprisonment, replacing the prisons by educational institutions, and allowing the possibility for the factor and time by comradely courts. The Communist party, while urging further development of the court in this direction, should aim for the ultimate substitution of the system of punishment by a system of measures of educational character.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As early as December, 1917, Lenin sent instructions to the Revolutionary Tribunal, in which he urged that repressive measures take the form of corrective labor tasks, and that the harmful element be dealt with in a reformative way. Shooting was abolished by a decree dated October 28, 1917, and Decree No. 3 of July 20, 1918, provided that one sentenced to a three-month period should be sent to compulsory social labor and should not be guarded while serving. In the Ural region and Siberia prisons were replaced with working homes where study was combined with work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Various other decrees were adopted, furthering this principle of reformation through education and discipline. In 1919 one such established a distribution committee composed of people of special equipment, by psychiatrists, educators, etc., who were to determine by a study of background, personality, and physical condition of the convict what prison would be best suited to him.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky, (Ed.) &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, Moscow, 1933, p. 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A decree of 1920 dealt with the organization of provincial detention points, and in the main ones there was to be established a university with courses in the sciences—applied, natural and technical—in history and the arts. An attempt was also made to have prisoners trained not just in crafts of their small villages but in factory and larger industrial work, and in spite of Civil War and shortage of shops, the number given such training was raised from 214 per cent. in 1919 to 10 per cent. in 1920.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 29.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer again to the volume edited by Vishinsky, we find on page 20 a statement that any penal treatment tending to degrade the prisoner was forbidden by a decree of July 23, 1918, to be practiced. This principle is now incorporated in the Criminal Code, Article 9, which reads: “Measures of social defense may not have for their purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity, as they do not contemplate the purposes of retribution and penalty.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The present-day approach to crime repression in the USSR is, then, through educational and correctional labor. The extreme penalty of death is given now in only three cases: crimes against the state, military crimes, and armed robbery in which death occurs. A. J. Estrin in his book, &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039;, a 1933 publication, gives a table on page 229 containing the percentages of persons sentenced to different forms of repression, and from 1926 to 1930 the percentage sentenced to death is less than 0.1. For all others the educational program holds even for political prisoners. The author can give no first-hand information on the latter, but official reports indicate that this is true.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the treatment of criminals, Vishinsky speaks of the indispensable part the state apparatus must play in the realization of their program.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Within the system of the institutions of proletarian dictatorship,” he says, “the corrective labor institutions play a great and serious part, because through them, in effect, is realized the entire judicial policy. These institutions with their entire force of live human relationships, with all their methods and means with the help of which these relations are built, define the reality or falsity of the judicial verdict as they define also the extent of achieving of the genuine aim of the problem posed before these institutions.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet jurisprudence is thus based not on restrictive measures alone but on corrective, educational, and cultural ones. The authorities seek to use labor that is constructive as to character and useful economically, and not the kind that brings indignity and resentment when resorted to as punishment or disciplinary measures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sentence is designed to be as brief as possible. In the USSR it is not necessary that a prisoner serve more than one-third of his sentence in order to be re- leased on parole, but his release is based solely on the condition of his fitness for return to society. The Observation Commission, whose duty it is to determine the time of such release is required by law to inform itself in intimate detail of the condition of training and education of the prisoners, of the personal characteristics and attitude toward society of each individual. It is thus likely to be able to judge to a higher degree when a prisoner is ready for release. If the figures they give on recidivism with 18 per cent. for men and 21 per cent. for women are accurate then they may be said to judge well indeed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of re-educating the “enemy,” or winning him over to the aid of the state, is still more marked in the treatment of the working masses themselves. Repressive measures must necessarily be used for the discipline of cases among the workers. While penalties are still severe and a decree of August 7, 1932, providing for the protection of state possessions, attaches the death sentence for those who steal or pilfer public property, the measures designed for those of the working population who transgress the law are in general more liberal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to be expected. It has already been stated that the Russians acknowledge the class nature of their administration of criminal law. The content of the criminal code is directed almost entirely toward the forced subjugation of those elements who would not voluntarily be subjected to the dictates of the ruling class or the proletariat. As a matter of policy they manage this subjugation by the use of such corrective measures as the construction of the White-Sea Baltic Canal when it is possible. Such other provisions as the code contains may be made to apply to the workers, but discrimination is openly observed between the classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer back for a moment to the decree of August 7, 1932 already mentioned, we may note the indication of the sharpening of the class struggle. The state intensified its program of collectivization in 1928, and launched into a broad program intended to crush the Kulaks and extend Socialism into the villages. The Kulak antagonism immediately became more pronounced, and if we consult a table on page 80 of M. N. Gernet’s &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039; we see the results tabulated in a sudden jump of crimes against the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cattle were killed, farm machinery was destroyed or put out of order, and plans were hampered in any way possible. There was also organized theft of state property to such an extent that severe measures were considered necessary. Thus the provision by this decree four years later of the death sentence for these offenses. In the meantime the necessity for such a measure was taken care of by the judicial powers and authority of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this decree is necessarily directed against the definite enemy class, it applies also to the workers themselves who are bribed or otherwise used as tools by the urban bourgeoisie or Kulaks. This, however, is outside the program of treatment of the ordinary criminal, and in no wise is it to be understood that the death penalty is always applied even for those considered to be class enemies. The author personally heard a trial in court in which the indictment was for organized theft, and on appeal the death sentence was commuted to a ten-year sentence. For the more serious offenses, however, such as those involving sabotage in factories, the death sentence is usual, at least for those most responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The program of compulsory education provided for those from among the toiling element who are imprisoned is the chief weapon of the fight against crime by the state. The prisons are equipped (as will be seen in later pages) with all sorts of devices for carrying out this work. The whole criminal law reflects this attitude toward crime repression on the part of the Communist party. The evolution of this code since its establishment in 1922, by a multitude of amendments and two almost new writings, reflects the needs and purposes of the state in various phases of its development in a most interesting manner. It is divided into a general and a special part, and although the general part is appended to this book, it seems of interest here to speak of its various divisions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first section is devoted to the purposes of criminal legislation. The second deals with the extent of operation and the limits of action of the code. Section three is concerned with the general principles of the penal policy. Section four deals with the measures of social defense applied to persons committing various crimes. The fifth concerns the manner in which social defense measures of correctional character are applied, and the sixth deals with conditional sentences and release on probation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the code’s adoption in 1922 there have been two important amendments aside from the many year by year. In 1926 when numerous changes were made, the chief feature was a more lenient application of penalties. This was at the time of reconstruction, when the development of the socialist state took on greater emphasis and education in the matter of penal treatment was held to be one of its chief tools. By the change of 1928, deprivation of liberty was limited to sentences of one year or more. Previous to this time sentences of even one day might carry with them deprivation of liberty. The aim now in short sentences is that the convicted person may retain his liberty, but have supervision in his place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 1926 edition of the Criminal Code, the whole concept of punishment is abolished. Although, according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky, there are certain survivals of old methods and ideas among a few of those connected with penal administration, the official thought is not of retribution or any infliction of pain or even of “just reward.” From this time on, the term used is a “measure of social defense” and, as nearly as one can judge both from records and from actual visits to their institutions for criminals, the change has been not only in terminology but in actual practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The measures of social defense now provided by the Criminal Code are divided into three categories: first are the measures of judicial and correctional character; second, measures of social defense of medical character; and third, measures of social defense of medical and pedagogical character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measure of social defense of judicial and correctional character are enumerated as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the Union of USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the Union of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the Union of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts 1930, No. 26, Item 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is in addition the use of public censure as a repressive measure which is a “public expression of condemnation in the name of the court.” It must be published through the press and may be either the only penalty assessed or be added to another. The use of warning is also provided for by Article 43 of the Criminal Code and is practiced in cases where the accused is acquitted but by his conduct gives “every reason to fear commitment of crimes by him in the future.” By this means an effort is made to prevent his committing some criminal act in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the present Criminal Code there is a division of repressive measures into the basic and the supplementary. To the basic measures of declaring one a class enemy with the consequences such a decision carries, deprivation of liberty and compulsory work without deprivation of liberty, are added the other enumerated measures, with the exception of confiscation of property. This is also a supplementary measure but it can be used only in the cases specifically mentioned in the special section of the code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary it might be said that while severe measures still exist and are used in regard to counter-revolutionary activities or crimes against the state, the emphasis in the penal program is decidedly upon educational measures for re-establishing the criminal as a useful member of society in the socialist state. While the beginnings of this policy are almost obscured by the activities of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and the OGPU (whose judicial powers have by the Decree of July 10, 1934, been withdrawn and turned over to the courts) and the extra-legal activities of the Civil War days, yet the germ was there from the beginning of the Revolution and its development is one of the marked achievements of the Soviet government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IV: WHAT CRIMES ARE COMMITTED AND WHO COMMITS THEM? ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In answering&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the question “What crimes are committed?” one could say in general that it is the usual line-up found in any country plus that category defined as the crimes against the state or the order of government. It would be hard to say what is included in the latter group. It would run the gamut from, let us say, the theft of bread from a collective farm, if it was intended to hamper the rule of the proletariat in any way, to the wrecking of a factory. It depends on the “socially dangerous” character of the person committing the act for one thing, on the social background, and for the other consideration, the motive behind the act. It is quite to be expected that this group ranks at the top of any list of crimes in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If one wishes to go into detailed statistics on the subject of crimes committed, there is a small, compact volume, &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039;, by M. N. Gernet, which supplies such information. It was, however, published in 1931 which is far in the past, gauged by the speed with which the Criminal Code and judicial practices change under proletariat rule. But in the main the list of crimes are the same and the classifications as to age and sex still hold.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There has been a change in the type of crime since the days of military Communism. A. J. Estrin, in his &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039; includes the following&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 51 &#039;&#039;et. seq.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; as characterizing the period of militarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Counter-revolutionary activities&lt;br /&gt;
* Speculation&lt;br /&gt;
* Banditry&lt;br /&gt;
* Adventures&lt;br /&gt;
* Desertion&lt;br /&gt;
* Bureaucratism&lt;br /&gt;
* Occasional bad conduct crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He goes on to say that there was considerable growth in crimes of banditry during 1918, practically all having a political or anarchistic coloring. In the matter of desertion, the menace was so great that a special commission was set up to deal with it, and by the time of the entry of the Communist army into Warsaw it had been successfully repressed on the western front. During this period there was likewise an increase in hooliganism, the acceptance of bribery on the part of officials, and speculation. The latter presented an especially difficult problem but was nearly at an end when the institution of the New Economic Policy in 1922 brought new forms of it. From then on it has been one of the crimes that has given most trouble to the government. Acts of pilfering state property in order to resell it at a greater price, or securing goods for speculation by persons working either on a state farm or in a store, are extensive. Since the law of August, 1932, providing a death penalty for taking state property these crimes have decreased in number.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Open warfare between the classes had so far subsided by 1921 that there was a demobilization of farmers and other workers from the army, and that led to the increase in another crime—banditry. These people, suddenly released from fighting ranks, broke and unable to find work in that period when production was at a low ebb, turned to theft, robbery or banditry, especially the latter, filling the country with a terror all their own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this period of 1921-22 there was a very definite growth in the number of crimes committed against persons—not in those of a more serious nature such as murder or severe injury but in sex crime, fighting and insults. The author explains this as resulting from the transition from the old culture to the new. The old was at an end and the new not yet sufficiently established to set up an influence against such acts of attack and rowdyism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a reference here by Estrin to a statement by N. Krylenko which connects the beginning of the crime of sabotage—so serious since to the Soviet government—with activities of former owners during the years of 1921, 1922 and 1923. There was no longer opportunity for armed fighting but the opposition relentlessly kept up its battle by any means at hand and its best methods were to hinder the production without which Communism would be undermined by starvation and physical depletion. From 1923 on, there began to appear with increasing frequency in the courts cases of &#039;&#039;economic&#039;&#039; counter-revolutionary character. Firearms and open resistance might have gone by the board but sabotage grew apace until 1925-26 when it reached its greatest height.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A numerical count of court convictions in 1925 would make it appear that there was a tremendous drop in ordinary crimes and an increase in those of a political type. There is an explanation for this in the fact that a reform of the Criminal Code in 1924 deleted a number of crimes of lesser importance, and there was a consequent lessening of 300,000 in convictions during the following year, most of which loss was, of course, from the ranks of the ordinary criminals. Class lines were drawn in a still more distinct fashion, thus emphasizing the direction criminal repression was to take for some time to come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of crimes against the state are today mostly of an economic nature. Before, however, we set down some of the more important ones that harass law enforcement let us look at a brief list of the type of acts which are encountered in court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes against the state&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Crimes against the person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Crimes against property&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Official crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Hooliganism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The items here of particular interest to foreigners are the first and the last. The list of crimes included in the first category will shortly be enumerated. As for the last, the term “hooliganism” covers a multitude of crimes. If one suddenly gets up in a theater and strikes his neighbor without apparent cause, such is an act of hooliganism. It was described to the writer as defining “unmotivated” acts. If one does not pursue “motivation” into psychological or psychiatric realms that explanation pretty well expresses what is meant. Deeds not logically accounted for might come a little closer. If a group of young men go out just to “raise cain” for no particular cause they may destroy property, attack a man, and do various other criminal acts which would all fall within the definition of hooliganism. The charge corresponds roughly to our “disorderly conduct,” except that the deeds committed may be of a more serious nature. But into this category are lumped a miscellany not classified otherwise.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, what are the chief crimes against the state? There would be, first of all, such major deeds as counter-revolutionary activities and the dissemination of propaganda. There are no longer organizations fostering counter-revolutionary work, but a great amount of such work is carried on. Individuals with malice aforethought, work their way into factory or collective farm, and spread what discontent they may. The author heard, for example, of the trial of the director of a collective farm who managed cleverly to see that the plan of production was unfulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Next in line would be industrial sabotage and attack on or the theft of government property. So prevalent had the latter become by the committing of such acts as killing cattle or the destruction of anything possible, as well as organized theft of state property that the government had recently acquired, that the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for such crimes, was enacted to meet the situation. On some occasions of organized theft the motive is for personal gain rather than one of desire to harm the state. For example, the author heard one case in court where the theft of grain from a collective farm was resold in speculating and the gain to the eleven persons involved was some 20,000 rubles. The death penalty was given to the leaders, prison sentences to the others. There is also the evasion of government orders and taxes, insubordination to the demands of the law, insults by word of mouth, if such involves a Kulak as against an officer. This does not by any means complete the possibilities, but it lists the headings under which the majority of such acts come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sabotage hardly needs comment here. So associated has the term come to be with industrial affairs in Russia that one would expect to find it ranking high as a crime against the state. It is, of course, committed by the enemies of the established order, and has hampered the progress of collectivization and industrial development to a great degree. Five men were shot and the others in the plot sentenced to ten years in prison (corrective labor with deprivation of liberty) during the past summer for burning a large factory in the Ural region by electric wire manipulation. Activities of the disorganized opposition have centered in crimes of this sort as the most effective weapon in its hands. Not much quarter is shown when guilt is established. The extreme penalty is surely and speedily given.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An enumeration of the counter-revolutionary crimes listed in the Criminal Code includes the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any act directed towards overthrow, undermining and weakening of the peasants’ and workers’ order of government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armed uprising and entering Soviet territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communication with a foreign government for counter-revolutionary purposes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Extending aid and comfort to that part of the international bourgeoisie which aims at the overthrow of the Communist order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Inducing a foreign government by means of forged documents to declare war or to make armed intervention, or by the same method to induce blockade, confiscation of property of USSR, interruption of diplomatic relations, renouncing of a treaty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Espionage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Transmission, collection, or theft, of economic information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Undermining of state industry, transport, trade, monetary circulation, cooperatives, committed with a counter-revolutionary purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commission of terrorist acts against representatives of the Soviet order or workers’ and peasants’ organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Destruction or damaging with counter-revolutionary purposes by means of the use of explosive, arson, or any other method, of railways, and other means of transportation, means of communication, aqueducts, community warehouses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Propaganda and agitation containing an appeal to overthrow, undermine, or weaken the Soviet order. Circulation or preparation of literature. Same actions in time of mass disorders, or making use of religious and national prejudices, or in time of war or in localities under martial law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All kinds of organizational activity directed toward preparation and commission of crimes mentioned in this chapter as well as participation in an organization founded for the preparation or commission of one of the crimes mentioned in this chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Failure to report a known counter-revolutionary crime or preparation for same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any action or active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement committed while in office under the Tzarist régime or under the counter-revolutionary government, during the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Counter-revolutionary sabotage, i.e., premeditated omission to carry out the duties or deliberate negligence in carrying them out with the specific purpose of weakening the authority of the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chief in the list of “official crimes” is the accepting of bribery, dealing out sentences in excess of the provision of the law, or beyond what circumstances warrant, failing to fulfill one’s duty, taking the law into one’s hands, etc. As an example of punishment in excess of justification of circumstances there is a case recorded in which a drunken priest was given a heavy penalty in a Siberian People’s Court. In view of the government’s attitude toward religion one would suppose that such a sentence might stand, but when it was called to the attention of the higher court, the prosecutor was removed from office and the militiaman was arrested.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commissar of Justice Krylenko, in his &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039;, lists a number of omissions and commissions on the part of officials, but when a complaint of, or information on, such acts reach the authorities, action follows. The population, taught from the cradle up that this is their government, has no timidity, apparently, about seeing that men in office regard the laws of the land, if they have information of acts to the contrary. This authority says, after mentioning a variety of actual cases of such violation, “The struggle against distortions of this kind must be waged with absolute ruthlessness.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other two classifications—crimes against the person and against property—include what they would in our own country, but penalties imposed differ from ours a great deal. Since they, as our most elementary groupings, are generally understood, and since outside of crimes against the state or order of government, these two comprise the great bulk of criminal transgressions in Russia as well as in our own country, it seems of general interest to include here, even at the risk of being tedious, those two chapters of the Criminal Code which relate to these classes of crime, and they are therefore inserted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, HEALTH, LIBERTY, AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed: a) Out of greed, jealousy (if it does not come under description in Article 138) and other base reasons; b) by a person previously convicted for premeditated murder or bodily injury who served the measure of social protection established by the court; c) by means particularly painful to the victim; d) for the purpose of lightening [the consequences of] or concealing another grave crime; e) by a person whose duty it was to have particular care of the victim, or f) making use of the helpless condition of the victim.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder not coming under the provisions of paragraph 136,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed in a state of sudden and strong emotional excitement, caused by violence or grave insult from the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Murder caused by carelessness, as well as murder resulting from exceeding the limits of self defence,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Abortion caused with consent of the mother by persons not having the proper medical qualifications or by persons having such qualifications but in unsanitary conditions,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to five hundred rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If these acts were committed under conditions given in the first part of this paragraph, professionally or without consent of the mother or having as their consequence death,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The bringing of a person who is financially or in some other way dependent on another person, by cruel treatment of the dependent person or in other similar way to suicide or to an attempt at same,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The giving of aid or incitement to suicide of a minor or a person knowingly incapable of understanding the nature and meaning of the act committed or a person incapable of self-guidance if suicide or attempt at same followed,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated grave bodily injury which carried as a consequence loss of sight, hearing, or any other organ, permanent disfigurement, mental illness, or any other injury to health, combined with considerable disability,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If as a consequence of such injury death followed or if it was committed by means having the character of torture, or causing suffering, or if such injury came as a consequence of inflicting systematic though light injuries,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated light bodily injury, not dangerous to life, but causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Premeditated light bodily injury without causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury coming under paragraph 1, Article 143, committed under influence of sudden and strong, emotional excitement caused by violence or grave insult to the offender on the part of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury caused by negligence if it came as a consequence of a knowing infraction of safety rules established by law or government orders and having as its consequence conditions aforementioned in Article 142 and the first paragraph of Article 143,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Bodily injury caused by negligence not having grave consequences,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated assault and battery and other violent acts combined with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said acts had the character of torture,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Violent, illegal deprivation of liberty of some person,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty by a method dangerous to life or health of victim, or accompanied with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Placing in a hospital for mental cases of a person known to be sane out of greed or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft, or concealment, or exchange of some one else’s child, motivated by greed, vengeance, or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Infection of a person with a venereal disease by a person aware of having said disease,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Knowingly exposing of a person to the danger of infection with venereal disease through the sex act or some other act,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relation with persons not having reached sex maturity combined with corruption of the morals or with perverted forms of sex satisfaction,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sex relations with persons not having reached sex maturity committed without aforesaid aggravating circumstances,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Corruption of the morals of children or minors committed by means of immoral acts toward them,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relations by means of physical violence, threat, or by intimidation or making use, through deception, of the helpless condition of the victim (rape),—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said rape had as its consequences the suicide of the victim or was committed toward one not having reached sex maturity, or even though on a person having reached said maturity but committed by several persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing a woman to enter into a sex relationship or satisfy sex passion in some other form by a person on whom said woman was financially dependent or to whom she was in a subordinate position,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing to engage in prostitution, procuring, maintenance of houses of assignation, also engaging in traffic of women for purposes of prostitution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years with confiscation of all or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deliberately leaving a person without help, when said person, in a condition dangerous to life, is incapable of measures of self-protection because of minority, feebleness, sickness, or helplessness generally, in cases when the person leaving the other helpless was in duty bound to have cared for the abandoned and was able to extend help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Not extending of help by a ship’s captain to persons perishing on sea or on other bodies of water if said help could be extended without grave danger to the ship, crew, or passengers,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to two years. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts No. 60, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Not extending of help to a sick person without satisfactory reasons by a person having as his duty by law or special regulation the extending of such help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Refusal of a person engaged in medical practice to extend medical aid if said refusal knowingly to said person could have been dangerous to the patient,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Malicious evasion of payment, for the support of children in spite of being capable of such payment,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Abandonment by parents of minor children without support as well as forcing children to beg,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same measure of social protection.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted verbally or in writing,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Fine up to 300 rubles or public censure.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Insult inflicted by action,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to two months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted through generally circulated or exhibited publications or pictures,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Slander, i.e. circulation of knowingly false defaming rumors,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Libel in an article published in the press or multiplied by some other means,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 100 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
PROPERTY CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret appropriation of someone else’s property (theft) carries with it:&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
a) If committed without application of any mechanical devices, for the first time and without conspiring with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a term up to three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
When committed under the same conditions, but because of need and unemployment for the purpose of satisfying the minimum requirements of self and family,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a term of three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
b) Committed repeatedly and with regard to property which is a known necessity for the existence of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to six months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
c) If committed with application of mechanical device or repeatedly or by previous conspiracy with other persons, and also, even without the aforementioned conditions when committed in railroad stations, docks, ships, railway coaches, in hotels,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
d) When committed by a private person from state or community warehouses, railway cars, ships, or other storage places, or in the places of community use (aforementioned in sub-paragraph) with the application of mechanical devices, or by conspiring with other persons, or repeatedly, also when committed though without aforementioned conditions by a person having special right of entry into these storage places, or [by persons engaged in] safeguarding them, or in time of fire, flood, or other social calamity,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
e) When committed out of state or community warehouses and storage places by a person having special right of entry in same or [by persons] safeguarding them, with application of mechanical devices, or repeatedly, or by conspiring with other persons, and also any theft out of the aforementioned warehouses and storage places when the theft is exceptionally large,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
 NOTE: Theft of material and tools committed in the factory or mill by a workman or employee within the confines of his own [his place of employment] enterprise the first time and when the value of the stolen goods does not exceed 15 rubles carries disciplinary punishment in accordance with special schedule established by the People’s Commissariat of Labor.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft of electric current,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of one month with compulsory restitution of the loss inflicted.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The purchase of goods known to be stolen,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a period up to six months and fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions committed professionally,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to three years with confiscation of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Purchase, possession and sale of fire arms, known to be stolen (hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition therefor,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to 5 years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Open appropriation of some one else’s property in the presence of the person having possession, use, or authority over such property (robbery) when committed without use of force,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same action when committed by a group of people or repeatedly,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret as well as open appropriation of horses or cattle from the laboring agricultural population as well as those engaged in animal husbandry,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions, committed repeatedly or in conspiracy with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to eight years. Aug. 7, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 102, Article 645).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Secret or open appropriation of fire arms (except hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition for same if this action does not come under Article 59 of this Code,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Robbery, i.e., open attack for the purpose of taking possession of someone else’s property, combined with use of force dangerous to the life or the health of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts, committed repeatedly or having as a consequence the death or maiming of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Armed robbery,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years, and with aggravating circumstances—Supreme measure of social protection. Aug. 26, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 65, Article 641).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Appropriation, i.e., withholding with mercenary purpose of somebody else’s property, entrusted for a definite purpose, or embezzlement of that property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Appropriation of a fund,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one month.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage having as its consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years with confiscation of entire or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The issuance of a check, which knowingly to the issuer is not subject to payment, and also cancellation of the check by him without satisfactory reason, or taking any other measures for the prevention of the receipt by the check holder or the amount of the check, as well as passing by the check holder of a check which knowingly to him is not subject to payment by the agent on whom it is drawn,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts having as their consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution or enterprise,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. Feb. 28, 1930 (Collection of Acts, No. 11, Article 131).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forgery with mercenary purpose of official papers, documents and receipts,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a period up to one year and fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deceptive change with mercenary purpose of the appearance or properties of objects, intended for sale or social use, if that said change had or could have had as its consequence the infliction of injury to health, as well as sale of such objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to one year with confiscation of part of property with prohibition of the right to sell merchandise, or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The making or keeping for the purpose of sale of a forged stamping tool, the stamping of jewelry and bars of gold, silver and platinum, affixing to objects made from other metals of stamps and marks having resemblance to the official stamping mark, as well as sale of aforementioned objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year, with confiscation in both cases of forged objects and stamping tools.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Usury, i.e., receiving of interest on money or property lent at a rate exceeding the interest rate established by law, and in particular, inclusion of the interest in the principal amount of the loan, or withholding a remuneration out of the amount received by the borrower or providing of fine and penalty for delay in payment of the loan or in other concealed forms,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a term up to one year or fine up to 5,000 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The same acts committed either professionally or by making use of the embarrassed state of the borrower,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years With confiscation of part of the property or without such confiscation, or with fine up to ten thousand rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Making available for use of means of production and cattle for a monetary remuneration or remuneration in kind or on condition of payment by labor obviously in excess of the customary amount for this locality, making use of the need or embarrassed position of the user,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to one year. Mar. 29, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 38, Article 283).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Extortion, i.e., demanding of transfer of property advantages or rights to property or committing of any kind of actions, of a property character, through fear of coercion of the person of the sufferer, spreading of defaming information or destruction of his property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated destruction or damage of property belonging to private persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts when committed by means of arson, flooding, or any other generally dangerous methods,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts if they are followed by loss of human life or a community misfortune,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Omission by a captain of one of the ships involved in a collision at sea of taking necessary measures for the saving of the other ship, in so far as such measures could be taken without serious danger to the said captain’s passengers, crew, or ship, regardless of the responsibility for not extending help to the crew and the passengers of the ship suffering from the calamity (Art. 156)—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Making public an invention before registration without the consent of the inventor, as well as unauthorized uses of literary, musical, or other artistic or scientific productions with infractions of the copyright law,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to three months or fine up to 1,000 rubles. August 30, 1931 (Collection of Acts, No. 59, Article 429).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Unauthorized use for purposes of unethical competition of someone else’s trade mark, design, model, as well as someone else’s firm name, or someone else’s name,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 3,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those familiar with women’s prisons in our own country will have missed “prostitution” from among the crimes enumerated in the Soviet Criminal Code. This practice is treated as a social problem in Russia, and rightly, in the opinion of most persons interested in penology, it is not held to be a crime. The six articles in the code directed against sex offenses, it will be noted, provide penalties for rape, or, in the interest of public health, for the infection of a person with a venereal disease by one aware that he (or she) has the disease. By treating prostitution as a social problem Russia has almost eliminated it. Women plying this trade are picked up by inspectors at railroad stations or other public places and taken, not to a jail, but to a prophylactorium where they are taught a useful trade with a view to removing the economic cause which is held to be the chief one in this practice. Many of the women at these centers have come voluntarily, the director of the prophylactorium in Moscow reports, through friends who have already received training and treatment. As a result of this omission from the Criminal Code, one does not find in women’s prisons that the chief cause of sentence is sex offense as it is in the United States, nor that the prisons are filled with a group who not only in the opinion of the author, but also in that of such organizations as the Women’s Prison Association of New York, should not have been sent there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who commits the crimes? Immediately following the Revolution the chief concern in regard to the crime situation was the suppression of those acts which jeopardized the authority of the Soviet government, but as the program of Socialist construction went forward, as they got the political situation more in hand, the type of prisoner began to change in the predominant number. Counter-revolutionary organizations were practically wiped out; the Kulak war, though still going on, somewhat thinned out, and in the residue of those of the criminal ranks there now appeared more of such types as constitute the convict population of other countries. In other words, the social composition of the group changed. Instead of there being more of an otherwise honest group of middle class farm people whose crimes consisted in efforts to overthrow a government, there was a rising percentage of ordinary criminals. This does not mean to say that the government is not still confronted with a great number of crimes against the state, by those of the bourgeoisie and Kulak class who, while not attempting to organize counter activities, still manage to get into collective farm or factory and cause a great deal of trouble, but it is noticeable that the other type of crimes is being given more attention and that programs of treatment are designed to apply to that problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In age, considering both sexes, the peak is reached in criminal acts at about twenty-four years. The curve descends sharply to forty and in a more leisurely fashion from forty to sixty. Official figures give the age group of 14-18 years as committing 2.5 per cent. of all crimes, 18-24 as being responsible for 25 per cent., and 24 and above, for the remaining. The crimes committed by the first group are almost wholly stealing; in the second group there are, of course, all sorts, but hooliganism figures large, and in the third there is every kind of law breaking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The youth, then, from 14-18 years are guilty of theft, more than of any other crime, both as to male and female, and next to that are crimes against the person—fisticuffs, breaking of bones, etc. Then, there shows up a phenomenon that is noted both in juveniles and adults—the female commits more crimes against the order of the government than do the men, relatively speaking. The author asked repeatedly for an explanation of this fact, and one man who had come from the rural districts, and is now an Intourist representative in Moscow, gave an interpretation which may or may not be right. It is interesting enough to pass on. The men, he said, did not resist collectivization so intensely when they saw that it was no use, but when a woman had collected a few goats or pigs, or a cow or two, it was no use trying to take them from her. She poisoned them first. No ideal of a final society in which she could take according to her needs could make up to her for the immediate loss of her treasures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is a more extensive comparison of the crimes committed by male and female transgressors. The first important thing to note is that the female is more given to excesses than the male in crimes of a less serious nature (Gernet, op. cit. p. 169). In one type of crime, hooliganism, the male is in the majority, with a percentage of 27.4 as against the female’s 2.8; but, in all other groups the woman is far in the lead. She commits six times the offenses of the men in insults, five times as many in the illegal manufacture of liquor, twice as many for assault, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in the crimes carrying sentences of above a year the men take the lead again. Note this table from an article Women in Correctional Labor Institutions, by A. Shestakova and B. Utievsky, included in the volume edited by Vishinsky. It shows clearly to what point women exceed in crime.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 358.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-bottom&amp;quot;| Length of sentence&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of male&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of female&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Up to 3 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 8.7&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 18.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 to 6 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 20.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 6 months to a year&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 16.8&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 1 year to 2 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.1&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 17.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 2 years to 3 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 13.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 years to 5 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 14.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 7.9&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 5 years to 10 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 12.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 4.5&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The social composition of the criminal group in the USSR is, as is to be expected, different from that of the ordinary capitalist country. In the first group of crimes mentioned the guilty are largely those of the village bourgeoisie and the rural Kulaks, who still struggle against the socialist order. They are persons who would not ordinarily be included in a criminal classification. Yet if we regard any legal definition of crime as including acts that contravene the rules and regulations of the proletariat society then they are actually criminals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this group commits most of the crimes against the state, the laborers themselves constitute the major portion of persons committing other types of crime. We find Professor Gernet,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; dividing them into owners of property or employers, and laborers. In theft we have a percentage of 12.2 for the first class, and 21.9 for the second; banditry is .8 per cent. for the first, and 1.7 per cent. for the second; murders 1.6 per cent. for the first, 2.4 per cent. for the second; hooliganism is 9.3 per cent. for the first, and 11.4 per cent. for the second. The situation is reversed in regard to crimes against the person. We find the first group there with a percentage of 10.5 and the second with 7.1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is some substantiation of the theory of the economic basis of crime which disciples of Marx and Lenin hold to so firmly in the fact that the curve for crime and unemployment rise and fall together. Russia claims to have no unemployment problem now, but there are those who do not work. There is always an idle band in any country. She has her dregs, misfits, and those who fall by the wayside from a variety of causes. And it is from this group that a large degree of criminals come. It furnishes its quota in Russia, too.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gernet, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is danger of getting too statistical. We want only to have a picture of the situation. Since 1928, the date already referred to as the beginning of a program to extend Socialism from villages to cities by means of collectivization, the curve for crimes against the state has risen. The Kulaks and the village middle class have waged a relentless war, apparently not daunted by what happens to those who are caught. Or, it may be heroism of a kind, even if a misplaced one. However, the expressed attitude of the authorities who administer the corrective labor system is steadfastly to win them over, to persuade and to educate in such a political fashion that they will be convinced. Whereas “crushing” was once the order of the day, the firmer establishment of the government now gives leeway for the more constructive measures. It is interesting to note that whoever is responsible for that political education knows his approaches well, if the statements of authorities are accurate. They have released enough, they say, to see what zealous citizens it turns back to society. I have no figures on it. But as I said in the preface, they know what they want of the man who is their criminal. Given that, accomplishment is easier. It is no small thing to persuade a man that the society he thought he was against was his all the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER V: WHAT THE COURTS ARE LIKE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; courts of Russia, in their present form a result of seventeen years of revolutionary evolution, and a mixture of proletarian ideas with older principles of justice, represent one of the most interesting developments in the country. It has been the aim of Soviet rule that the working class should by its participation in government be able to take part in carrying out the laws of the land. The administration of justice by the proletariat through which “Every representative of the masses, every citizen, must be placed in such conditions that he will be able to take part in discussing the laws of the state, in the choosing of his representatives, and in the carrying out of the laws of the state,” was a principle expressed by Lenin as early as 1918. The policy in political education has moved steadily toward the fulfillment of this plan. The use of jurors and their selection yearly in such a manner as will include a great number in the service is one way in which participation in administering and discussing laws is being carried out. Another is in the use of comradely courts carried on by the people of village or factory, which are later discussed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The responsibility of the courts in the establishment of strict legality has been increased tremendously by two recent events. The first was the meeting in April, 1934, of the first All-Union Conference of Jurists which made wide recommendations in regard to attaining a higher quality of work on the part of courts, prosecution, and correctional labor institutions. The second act of significance was the reorganization of the OGPU by the formation of the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the transference of all judicial functions to the courts of the land. It takes brief time and space for this last statement, but it would require a good many pages to discuss the full significance of the step, and a number are devoted to it a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the work of the All-Union Conference of Jurists, it is of high significance just now when the observance of legality and the establishment of a wide legal consciousness are so important in the relatively advanced stage of socialist construction which the state is entering. Openness must be the observed principle, and secrecy, even though legally judicial, discouraged, if confidence is to be widespread. A government cannot continue turning trials over to secret tribunals outside its judicial system and enjoy a reputation, even among its own loyal masses, of being adequately established. A normality of functions of institutions can go far toward establishing, even if only psychologically at first, a normality of conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Likewise, sentences must be constructive. This was not a new note as will be seen throughout this book. All along the party program had advocated an educational approach to the treatment of criminals, and year by year had strengthened provisions for realizing the fulfillment of its plans. But the emphasis on this problem by so authoritative a body brought it freshly to the attention of the courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0086.svg|SCHEME OF TRIAL IN RSFSR|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note the recommendation of the Conference in this regard. “In order to insure the effectiveness of judicial work, the judges should endeavor to ascertain the economic and social-political results of the verdict rendered by them, being assisted in this work by public opinion organized around the judicial institutions.” The same body placed a responsibility for prevention of crime on its courts. It was not only a duty to pronounce a sentence on a guilty person, but the tribunal must by means of its favorable position discover the reason for the circumstance of the crime. The recommendation ran, “The court, when trying a case, should not only establish the guilty persons but should also disclose those economic and organizational defects and shortcomings which create a favorable atmosphere for criminal actions, signalizing such circumstances to the attention of the Party and Soviet organs by means of special riders. The results of such signalizing should be checked up from time to time.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, as an important instrument in the accomplishing of the socialist society which is the goal of the people, the court’s function is first to subdue the enemies that would undermine any such progress, and second to aid in giving discipline and control to those of the proletariat themselves who are not strong enough on their own account. Added to that, it is an organ of prevention.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not within the purpose of this volume to give a detailed description of the system of courts existing in the country at present, but a brief account is necessary. Before going further it may be well to repeat the reminder that a class distinction is fundamental in administering the criminal law in the USSR. This statement will appear too many times very likely, in relation to various phases of the subject, but it is important. The court as an organ of the state is devoted in its administration of law to carrying out the purpose and policy of the state, and since the class idea is prevalent in the government, it will have to be also in court action. With this explanation we proceed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is at the very bottom of the judicial system the People’s Courts.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Military crimes are under the jurisdiction of military tribunals and transport crimes of the transport courts of the various railway lines.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The territory represented by one such has a population of from 20,000 to 100,000. Its jurisdiction may include any case against property or person not carrying a death sentence, although the more serious ones go in actual practice to the higher courts. It has other functions than as a lower court of the first instance. It is a member of the observation commission which supervises the correctional labor policy at the local penitentiary or correctional labor institution. It has an administrative function when the judge, sitting without the jurors in a “business session,” decides whether the evidence gathered in a preliminary investigation is sufficient to warrant court proceedings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In trials the People’s Court is presided over by a judge assisted by two jurors who actually have most of the rights and responsibilities of the judge, and might, therefore, be called co-judges. The judges for the People’s Courts are elected for a one-year term by the local Soviet and may be recalled either by the same body or by the Commissar of Justice for sufficient cause. This provision for impeachability is one of the basic principles of organization of the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0089.svg|COURT TRIAL|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judges of these lower courts are representatives of the working class for they themselves are of their number. A judge (and, he seemed an adequate one), in a city court of Moscow with whom the writer talked was a baker before he took up his present profession. The qualifications of the office are that in addition to being from among the toilers the judge must have “a record of two years’ responsible work in state or workers’ and peasants’ public trade union, or party organization of the workers, or of three years’ practical work in organs of Soviet justice in the capacity of not less than judicial investigators.” Whether this may be regarded as high fitness or not, it seems to insure the selection of men of fair ability for the job. Perhaps it is that business of recall that makes them so careful, but those whom the writer saw sitting were impressive in their earnestness and efforts to arrive at a constructive sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The jurors, whom we may think of as co-judges, are about 40 per cent. women and 60 per cent. men. These persons are elected by factory committees, Red Army sections, and village Soviets, and a special commission distributes the number to be elected among these various groups in the percentage of 50 per cent. to the first, 15 per cent. to the second, and 35 per cent. to the third. There are no specific qualifications, except the right to vote, but there is the restriction that “A person has no right to be a juror, if he has been expelled from a social or professional organization for a disgraceful offense or conduct, for a period of three years from the day of expulsion. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The names of the candidates for jurors are posted, and objections, if motivated, may be presented to the election committee. When the list of elected ones is finally sent to the commission, the latter prepares another list of those to serve in the various courts. Each serves for only six days of the year, and during absence from work in the act of performing this duty the worker retains his place and wage of employment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While there seems to be no specific preparation for the task of a juror beyond the requirement that the judge explain to those who sit with him their rights and duties, there are conferences held and some evening classes which acquaint them better with the work before them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before we pass to the consideration of the next step in the Soviet judicature it would perhaps help in getting a clear picture of jurisdiction and procedure to take a look at some of the cases before the People’s Court. A typical day is described from the writer’s notes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first trial we attended in the morning the room used was a small one, perhaps with a capacity for seating forty people altogether. It was on the ground floor of the building, and street cars clanging along their track outside made hearing difficult. On a slightly raised dais underneath a picture of Lenin there was a long plain table covered with a green cloth. Three chairs were placed at the back and one at the end. Three men and a woman, evidently having something to do with the case about to be tried, were already in the court room when we entered. The benches on which we took our places were arranged on either side of the narrow aisle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Exactly at the hour set for the beginning of court, a door at the back of the room opened and a man, accompanied by two women, entered. The women sat in the outside chairs at the back of the table; the man took the center one. Already the young woman, who had been in the room on our arrival had seated herself at the end of the table. She was the clerk, the man was the judge, the two women the jurors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judge was obviously of the toiling classes, as were also the women. The judge, with his short black mustache, his close-cropped hair, his ordinary working clothes consisting of dark suit and blue shirt, ignored us and immediately got to work. The women were perhaps a little more conscious of our presence. The older in particular reached up to push back her hair, a little later smoothed her dress, a simple black cotton one. We noticed that her hands had seen much work. The other woman, about thirty and good looking, turned curious eyes toward us a moment, but finally gave her attention to the men who were seated on the front bench ahead of us.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judge adjusted his glasses and read from the papers in his hand. The plaintiff had worked faithfully for a school, discharging all his duties as per requirement, but he had not been paid. He was asking for his money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were no attorneys, neither defense nor for the plaintiff. The plaintiff had his witness; he told his story, then summoned his corroborator, who had been excluded as required by law. The school representative told his side. The women jurors, forgetting us by that time, listened attentively, and the older asked frequent questions. The judge too, interrogated often.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seemed obvious to us that the verdict should favor the man whose wages had been withheld, but it is difficult to tell about court decisions. We waited an instant; the three behind the table conferred so briefly that it was plain there was no dissension. The school was ordered to pay, and was fined five rubles. As simply as that and requiring hardly more time than the telling here, it was finished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We left the room as the next case was called and went upstairs. A trial of some seriousness was in progress there. The judge sitting appeared of unusual intelligence. He was leaning forward, questioning the man in front of him, and he took no note, apparently, of our entry. One juror was a woman, the other a man. There was the same long table, the clerk at the end, a red cloth (Communist symbol), instead of the green, an especially attractive picture of Lenin, and one of Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We asked cautiously of one of the spectators what the case was about. A factory director was on trial, accused of criminal negligence by the workmen, because he had been given money to insure the factory against fire some three or four months previously, and had failed to do so, thus imperiling the lives of those who worked there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But even though there might have been a severe sentence, if the motive was proved sufficiently base, there still were no attorneys, either for the state or defense. The defendant told his story. He had been ill and on vacation, but the matter of insurance would have his immediate attention, he said. He brought in his witnesses; but the workers’ evidence outweighed his. He had been warned, they said, and he had gone carelessly on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, said his witness, he had been a good worker. He had managed his factory well. It had done its prescribed quota and more. It was not right nor just that he should suffer for one negligent act.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The verdict was not so simple. The judge and jury retired into the mystery of the consultation room at the back. We sat wondering what sort of penalty, in case guilt was adjudged, would be imposed. Five minutes passed and they returned. The man was held guilty of negligence, and since he had been warned, and since the act was of a serious nature, imperiling the lives of workers and the property of the state, some measure must be used to impress him. He stood quietly, but the fingers of the hand hanging at his side worked nervously. The judge paused a bare moment, shuffled his papers, and then spoke.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For six months the man was to have no political rights and his party connections were to be cut off. But he was to stay in his job; go right on with the work he had done so well, and give up fifteen per cent. of his salary for the six month period. Even the accused seemed to feel that the penalty was just, and there was obvious agreement among those who listened.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So much for the People’s Court, the basic nucleus in the Russian judicial system. Now, for the second step in the judicature. The People’s Court takes care of the great mass of cases, both criminal and civil, and in addition exercises a function of supervision in regard to the village public courts and comradely courts of factories and other state institutions. But this will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just now we pass to the Regional Court. It is both a court of cassational instance (the form review of a criminal case usually takes in the USSR) and a court of original jurisdiction for more serious cases. Its territory comprises a province or region of three to eleven millions population. It is, first of all, the organ of control of all the courts within its region. It supervises the work of the People’s judges, as well as selects and presents the names of such to the regional executive committees for election.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A word must be said here as to the use of the cassational method. The court of appeals was abolished by the first decree issued by the Soviets on the courts, and in its place was the following provision.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Act 349 of Code of Criminal Procedure, now in force.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Complaints from verdicts of the People’s Courts may be lodged by each of the interested parties exclusively on account of formal infringement of the rights and interests of the given party in the conduct of the case or in the judicial examination of the case, and as such constitute cassation complaints, and may not touch upon the substance of the verdict.” Thus the law seems to prevent the right of the court to go into the substance of the case. Such, however, is not actually a fact.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling of the Supreme Court in regard to criminal cassation, in 1924, laid down the general rule for cassation review which is still followed. “The court of criminal cassation, being a cassation court in that it does not go into the substance of the case, at the same time avoids a purely formal bureaucratic approach to the case. While never turning into a court of appeals, it does not hypocritically shut its eyes to the substance; manifest lack of elucidation of the circumstances which should have influenced the verdict, inconsistency of the punishment with the crimes committed, manifest errors and contradictions between the verdict and the undeniable facts of the case, . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a form of revision on the complaint of the proper parties, which combines the elements of cassation as practiced by the French courts with a method of appeal and together make up the cassation-revision form of investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These complaints may be made by the defendant and his lawyer, the state prosecutor, the plaintiff and his legal representative, or by the legal suitor and his representative. Complaints by any other persons result in the case being handled by judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The form of the complaint follows no standard rule. A peasant may write a few words on a piece of paper, without even setting forth his argument, and the case will pass to the proper cassation court and be completely checked up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The form of judicial supervision differs somewhat from the cassation method. The latter depends on the action of the parties concerned while the first depends on the intervention of the chairman or prosecutor of the court of the first instance. From this it can be seen that the normal way to have a criminal case reviewed is by the cassation method, on complaint by the interested parties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We will pass from the work of the Regional Court as a court of cassation or supervision to look at a case which it tries in its capacity as a tribunal of first instance. In cases of appeal there are three judges sitting, but in cases of original jurisdiction there is the one judge and two jurors just as in the lower court. The judges of the Regional Court are elected by the Regional Executive Committee from a list of names presented by the Commissar of Justice. Their term of office is for one year. The qualifications are that in addition to the requirements for a People’s judge, the candidate shall also have served in a judicial capacity in a position not lower than the People’s Court for a period of three years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On our visit to the regional court we found a somewhat larger room, seating perhaps a hundred persons, but still lacking any formal atmosphere. Its standing capacity was crowded when we arrived. Even the door leading to the corridor was open and filled with men and women. We attempted to look over, but the spectators politely made way for us. We saw, as we edged forward, the usual picture of Lenin, the familiar red cloth on the table. One knew at once by the atmosphere of the room that a case of interest was in process of trial. The judge and jurors were already in their places and the judge was reading the charge which alleged that the four young men and a girl on the front seats in the custody of an officer, had some two weeks before entered and robbed the house of the woman across the aisle from them, and that such robbery was accompanied by the use of a firearm in which the husband was wounded. No murder, however, was done. In that case death could have been the assessed penalty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three attorneys for the defendants sat at the side of the room, but as the trial proceeded we noticed how little part they took. The judge questioned the defendants, and got the story almost entirely from them. Witnesses were there and the judge and jurors interrogated them as they came, but they turned again and again to the accused to check up, to give them a chance to verify or deny. The procedure was highly informal. The court sought to find out the truth of the matter, but we soon saw that the inquiry went even beyond that. True to the duty imposed on him in the matter of discovering the reason for the circumstance, the judge pursued his questioning. He wanted to find the motive for such conduct. To discover that he questioned the young criminals on the whole circumstances of their lives, of their social background, without regard to apparent relevancy. Guilt was not in question, but the “measure of social defense” to be applied depended on the whole circumstance of the deed. One of the offenders had run away from his home with his grandmother, from a good job, but he appeared to have been led by the older who admitted that he did not want to work. The girl, defiantly, confessed. The youth, who used the gun, was asked again why he shot the man. He looked down and said he did not know, unless it was because the victim did not raise his hands soon enough. The spectators, jammed to the door and tense, laughed in relief. The judge did not reprove them, but he did not laugh, and the room became quickly silent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judge surveyed the defendants with something of sorrow; we were particularly interested in his attitude for he appeared to be concerned that the young people should deliberately choose such a career, and gave occasional words of admonition. But judges and citizens alike in the USSR have faith in what labor of a correctional sort can do for the construction of character. The next day the young offenders were sentenced to institutions where the ruling principle, in accordance with Soviet policy, is to teach them the dignity of work, and how to do some important kind well, and where they will be given certain cultural and political education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is next in the system the Supreme Courts of the seven republics—much like our own state Supreme tribunals—which act both as organs of judicial control for all courts of the territory, as courts of appeal for those lower courts subject to their jurisdiction, and as courts of original jurisdiction in more serious cases. The judges of these courts are elected by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the top of the judicial system is the Supreme Court of the USSR. It is, of course, the organ of highest judicial supervision, and in its various branches acts as a court of appeals of all cases from various lower tribunals. The Military Section reviews the cases appealed from the military tribunals, the Transport Section performs the same function for those appealed from the railroad courts. Its judges are elected by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for a term of one year, and they must have had at least three years’ service as judge of the People’s Court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In original jurisdiction this court has only the most important cases in the Union. The Code of Criminal Procedure specifies: “The Judicial Department of the Supreme Court as a court of first instance, shall take jurisdiction (1) over cases of exceptional importance, when sent to it for trial by the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as cases offered for adjudication by the People’s Commissar of Justice, the Prosecutor of the Republic [now, the Attorney General] or the chairman of the State Political Bureau (OGPU). The Supreme Court has the right to accept for its adjudication or transfer for adjudication to any provincial court at its discretion cases offered for its adjudication by the prosecutor of the republic or Chairman of the OGPU. (2) Over cases involving offenses in office committed by members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the people’s commissars and members of the &#039;&#039;Collegiums&#039;&#039; of People’s Commissariats, members of the Supreme Court, the assistant prosecutors of the Republic. (3) Over cases of alleged offenses in office on the part of the provincial prosecutors and their assistants, the members of the presidium of the provincial executive committee, heads of its departments, chairmen or deputy chairmen of the provincial court.” All cases enumerated in this paragraph may be accepted by the Supreme Court for its adjudication or transferred by it to a provincial court depending on the importance of the case.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 449.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In several of these cases jurisdiction is not mandatory and may be transferred to other appropriate courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the cases tried by it and familiar to most Americans was the Metropolitan-Vickers case of two years ago, in which a certain group of Englishmen was accused of sabotage. But to continue the method used in discussing the lower courts, let us again consider a case. The following was appealed from the Siberian Regional Court, and does not present the human elements of cases of the first instance, yet it has its interesting points.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The building itself is a scant two blocks from the spot where Lenin lies in his red granite tomb. There was a militiaman inside the entrance who directed us upstairs to the proper room. Another officer was in the hall but he only looked at us curiously as we went by. It is the highest court of the land, and we were impressed by the informality of the approach.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three judges presided in the room which presented a more formal appearance than those of the courts visited previously. An armed guard stood at the door leading out into the room at the back. Across the aisle from us sat three lawyers, the defense counsel. At the end of the table was the prosecuting attorney, a woman of some thirty years, who seemed competent and determined. Above the judges the usual portrait of Lenin looked down upon us. As we entered two young Russian women got up from the benches at the front to make way for us. They were the wives of the two condemned men whose case was on appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judges themselves, all men, were impressive in their dignity, and seemed intelligent and capable. They were dressed simply in ordinary street clothes, the dark shirt of one was open at the throat. One of them, not the chairman, read the charge in the original case. Two men had been condemned to die for murder and robbery. One, the manager of a fur factory, had stolen money to the amount of 7,500 rubles from the factory, and he and a companion, in a boat with a third, were crossing a lake. The third had a sum of money in his possession. While they stopped on the shore of the lake the first two sent the third for wood, and as he returned, they waylaid him and clubbed him to death. The Siberian Regional Court had sentenced the men to be shot.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the reading, one of the defense attorneys spoke at length. In Russia there is no death sentence for murder, but for robbery in which murder occurs such a penalty is attached. The counsel, realizing that weight of evidence was against him, tried to separate the crime into two distinct acts. It was his one chance. The murder had been motivated by other causes, he said, and robbery followed as an afterthought. He contended also that the stick with which the man was killed did not constitute a weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, his argument did not hold and in addition the prosecutor pointed out that the one man had already stolen money from the state, which act in itself might carry the death penalty. The judges retired and we discussed the case while we waited. The defense attorney, who had spoken, walked up and down the aisle. The two wives were quietly huddled in seats farther back. A bell sounded, the court returned, and the chairman or presiding judge read the decision allowing the sentence to stand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case illustrated also the speed with which trials are completed after the crime is known. The murder of the man had occurred in October of 1933, but the body was not discovered until the latter part of June of 1934. There was no certainty of the third man’s death until that time as the other two had steadfastly maintained that he had left them. But less than one month after the discovery of the body, the two men had been tried and condemned to death. That was on July 19, and it was on August 9th that we heard the Supreme Court uphold the sentence. That is probably one of the main reasons why such deeds do not flourish there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is still to mention the village public courts and the comradely courts of factories and various institutions. These occupy a special place in the judicial system and were therefore not mentioned except in passing in the beginning of the chapter. They are under the supervision of the People’s Courts, and are for the purpose of interesting the large masses of people in handling such violations of laws as occur in factory or village. Among such problems would be disorganization of production in factory, on the farm, or in offices, as well as drunkenness, indolence, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These courts are of, by, and for the people. There may be some little matter of form separating the masses from the formal courts, but they handle these among themselves. At a meeting of the workers of a given village a chairman and not less than ten members are elected to sit as a court. The factory conference follows the same plan, and elects a chairman, one or more substitutes, and not less than ten members, the exact number to be decided upon, from among the shockworkers of the factory or office.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The People’s Court, functioning as a supervisor of these organs, may decide that a case is outside their competency, and take it from them or cancel the decision in a case that is considered not to have been within their jurisdiction, but the decision given in cases which are considered to be proper to them is final and subject to no appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A friend who was a spectator of the proceedings related the following case to the writer. A man had been drunk and had beaten his wife, not injuring her but outraging the village. In the presence of a large group of interested neighbors, the court assembled and tried him and decided that he must go forth from the apartment where he lived with his family and shift for himself as best he could. He did not deserve the shelter the home afforded him. There was no appeal. He left.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What are more definitely the types of cases handled by the comradely courts which, like the village public courts are free from any formal judicial rules?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following is quoted from a lecture delivered by S. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The comradely courts examine cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) of violation of labor discipline, to wit: repeated late-coming for work, staying away from work, reporting for work in a drunken condition;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) of systematic neglectful attitude to socialist property (machines, tools, materials, premises, etc.);&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) of turning out misfits above the allowed limit;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) of insults either by word of mouth or in writing, or action (spreading false derogatory stories about individuals), and inflicting blows without bodily injury;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) of thefts from factory and office by workers upon the territory of the enterprise, as well as of materials and tools belonging to the enterprise to the value of not more than 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) of Hooliganism that is not subject to criminal prosecution, and other behavior which does not correspond with the requirements of public decency and reflects the negative sides of social life.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
From the same source is taken the following list of penalties imposed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The following penalties may be imposed by the comradely courts:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) public warning;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) public censure with announcement in the wallnewspaper or in general press;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) a fine of not more than 10 rubles for the benefit of public organizations (Chemical Defense Society, Children’s Friends, etc.) ;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) reparation of damage caused to property, if not in excess of 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) raising the question before the administration of discharging the culprit;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) raising the question before the trade union of expelling a member from the union for a stated period.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Examination of the cases must take place not later than five days from the time of registration of the complaint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a closing paragraph I set down the basic principles of organization of the Soviet Courts. It summarizes what has gone before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;(a) administration of justice exclusively by toilers;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) election of judges and accountability before the electors;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) impeachability of judges, the latter being independent from any local or personal influences but most intimately bound up with their class and called upon to carry out the policy of their class;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) collegiate trial of judicial cases, as a rule, by a body of three people with an assured majority to the people’s jurors, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) participation of jurors in trial and judgment upon equal terms with the state judges, both in regard to fact and in regard to law, i.e., in the full scope of the rights of the state judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER VI: THE PRELIMINARY STAGE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Let&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; us start with the beginning. The Criminal Code of 1927 specifies how proceedings may be begun. We should expect that there would be an arrest, but this may not be the case. In fact it is unlikely except in the more serious cases. In the lesser ones there will almost surely be none at all. What happens then? There are two main possibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, the prosecutor, the investigators, the militia or the agency of Administration of State Safety of the People’s Commissariat of the Interior (formerly the OGPU) may start proceedings when they know or are informed of a criminal act. Since these organs are by their nature in a position to know of criminal law violations, it is usual for a case to start with them. The course they take will be discussed in a moment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second manner in which criminal procedure is usually instituted is on complaint made to a competent authority by a person, an organization, an official, or by a confession on the part of the criminal, in which the officials proceed as mentioned above, if there is evidence of a criminal act. Otherwise they take no action, and so notify the complaining person or agent, in which case he may appeal to a proper court if he so wishes. Thus, if a citizen comes to a proper authority and complains, either orally or by writing, of some act, but does not present sufficient evidence that a crime has taken place, the authority refuses to start initial proceedings. Often, not even a confession on the part of the supposed guilty party will be accepted as &#039;&#039;prima facie&#039;&#039; evidence. This decision on the part of the authority not to proceed may, however, be appealed to the competent court within seven days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When once this evidence is accepted as indicating that a crime has been committed there may or may not be an arrest. Quite naturally, if a serious crime has been committed such as murder, and the criminal is making an effort to escape, there is arrest and detention. The law, however, states&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, 1923, section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “No person shall be deprived of his liberty and taken into custody otherwise than in the instances and in the manner provided by law.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, in the same edition of the Code,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 100.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there is an enumeration of the cases in which an arrest may be legally made. They are “(1) When a criminal is apprehended while making direct preparations, or while actually engaged in commission of the crime, or immediately afterwards; (2) When the victim or eye witnesses point to a given person as the one who committed the crime; (3) When articles of evidence are found on the person of a suspect or in his dwelling; (4) When a suspect attempted to flee or is apprehended while in flight; (5) When a suspect has no domicile or a permanent occupation; (6) When a suspect cannot identify himself.” These are the six instances in which an arrest may be made. The police, however, may use their judgment as to the necessity of such action, and in the event of detaining the supposed criminal they must report within twenty-four hours either to the prosecutor or to a judge of the People’s Court, in whose jurisdiction the case may be, giving information as to who made the arrest, when, where, and at what hour, information obtained in regard to the person held, the crime with which he is charged, reason for the arrest, and the name of the official signing the order for arrest.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 107, Commentaries.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the evidence obtained is sufficient to warrant holding the person for investigation the authority to whom the report is made gives his assent. Otherwise he reverses the decision and the man is released.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the absence of these conditions an arrest may not be made and in that event the method of securing attendance is to have the suspected person sign a declaration that he will appear when summoned.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Criminal Code of 1927, Section 103.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, there is a way provided to meet necessity. If the act committed appears to be of a nature so serious that it would carry a penalty of more than a year’s sentence to imprisonment, one of the above measures may be selected so that he may be held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it is usually the police organs acting as investigators who take a person into custody at the beginning of a trial, the investigator may also order an arrest. The Code in Section 145 provides: “Means of cutting off the possibility of escape shall be selected only after the suspected person has been formally accused and can be altered or abolished after the first questioning. In exceptional cases these means may also be applied to mere suspects who have not yet been declared accused.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who makes arrests in the USSR? The police force is the militia. This organ not only makes the elementary inquiry on cases which come under the jurisdiction of the investigator—to be discussed more fully in later paragraphs of this chapter—but they may themselves also conduct such preliminary investigation in all other cases. Besides carrying out the official open investigation they also carry on detective activity in order to establish grounds for future criminal trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is another agent of arrest. Wherever Russia is known, the “Gay-Pay-Oo” is a familiar institution. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; of early revolutionary days gave way in 1922, in the days of NEP, to an organ a little less frightening. But the OGPU had an ability on its own account to send shivers down the backs of people and caused would-be lawbreakers of the less hardy type to check their actions. If those critics, who feared that NEP ushered in an era that would in its mildness take power from the direct hands of the proletariat and turn it over to well-established revolutionary law, had waited for this organ to be in action they would have been reassured. Whether all the deeds attributed to this secret police be truly theirs or not, it is certain that it has been an effective means of protecting Soviet authority. It has been a court unto itself as well. It was, until July 10, 1934, empowered to punish even by shooting “all persons apprehended while participating in a banditry raid or armed robbery,” and the purpose for which it was avowedly organized was to “unite all the revolutionary powers of the republics for the purpose of combatting political and economic counter-revolution, espionage and banditry.” It is in this enumeration of crimes that it has jurisdiction as an organ of preliminary investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This organization has directed most of its attention to counter-revolutionary activities and uses its judicial powers mostly against the enemy class. Ordinary criminals arrested by it are usually turned over to the courts for trial. As for the actual number shot during recent years, there seems no way to judge, but indications are that they have been sparing in executions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chamberlin, Soviet Russia, p. 390.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are other phases of their work such as the maintaining of places of deprivation of liberty which will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The OGPU has recently been incorporated into the newly formed All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs as the Administration of State Safety, and its judicial &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; has been abolished. The significance of this is apparent. It ends a chapter in the history of Soviet Russia. Cases once disposed of by this organization now will pass through the courts, and the pictures the world held of midnight secret trials will have to be put away. While the activities of the OGPU were duly authorized by law, the possibilities of excesses under such a system seem apparent, and the establishment of a more definite order of legality is bound to produce a quieter confidence. Because of the widespread interest in the transferring of this authority, the entire decree is given here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To form an All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, including in its composition the United State Political Department (OGPU).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs is to be entrusted with:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The guaranteeing of revolutionary order and state security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The protection of public (socialist) property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Registration of civil acts (registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Protection of the frontiers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The following departments are to be formed in the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a)Chief Department of State Security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Chief Department of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Chief Department of Frontier and Internal Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Chief Department of Fire Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Chief Department of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Department of Civil Acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Administrative and Business Department.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To organize in the Union Republics People’s Commissariats of Home Affairs, acting on the basis of the law on the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, and in the RSFSR to establish instead of a People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs for the Republic an Institute Plenipotentiary for Home Affairs of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Departments of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the Union Republics are to be organized in the autonomous republics, regions and provinces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) To abolish the judicial collegium of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs are to send all cases of crimes on the completion of their investigation to the competent judicial organs in accordance with the legal requirements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Cases under the Department of State Security of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs are to be directed to the Supreme Court of the USSR, while cases of such crimes as high treason, espionage and similar crimes are to be handed over to the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR or to the competent military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) A special conference is to be organized under the People’s Commissar of Home Affairs of the USSR which, on the basis of the regulations, is to be entrusted with the right of applying, by administrative order, banishment, exile, imprisonment in corrective labor camps for a period not exceeding five years and banishment beyond the frontiers of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) To instruct the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR to present to the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR regulations for the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
What judicial authority is to handle the cases previously in the jurisdiction of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of the OGPU? Here is the decree:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In connection with the organization of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and with the object of insuring the proper consideration of cases handed over to the judicial organs and investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Cases of state crimes (counter-revolutionary and against administrative order), with the exception of those indicated in the subsequent points of this section, investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and also. the principal courts of the autonomous republics.&lt;br /&gt;
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Special collegiums composed of a chairman and two members of the Court, are to be formed in the judicial institutions of the USSR and Union republics, named for the consideration of these cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) Cases of high treason, espionage, terrorism, causing explosions, incendiarism and other forms of crime (Art. 6, 8 and 9 of the law on state crimes), investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and competent military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) Cases of crimes on the railway and water transport, investigated by the same organs are subject to the jurisdiction of the railway and water transport collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the courts of the railways and water transport to which they belong.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) All other cases, investigated by the same organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Courts in the usual order.&lt;br /&gt;
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II&lt;br /&gt;
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For the consideration of appeals against the resolutions of the Plenums and Presidiums of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, and also appeals against the sentences, decisions and definitions of the collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR, a judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR is to be established which is to be composed of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and two of his deputies, who are to have the right of directly rescinding or changing the resolutions, definitions, decisions and sentences of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics and Collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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Considerations of cases in the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR are to take place with the obligatory participation of the State Prosecutor of the USSR or his deputy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Resolutions of the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR may be appealed against by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the State Prosecutor of the USSR in the plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR and in the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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III&lt;br /&gt;
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In conformity with sections I and II of this decree, to recognize the necessity of strengthening the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
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To instruct the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics to oblige the People’s Commissariats of Justice and Chairmen of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics to work out and carry through in the fixed order, within a period of five days, appropriate additions to the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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To instruct the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR to work out and carry through in fixed order, within the same period, addition to the staffs of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus does Russia make another advance in the administration of her criminal law.&lt;br /&gt;
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With proceedings begun, the next step is to determine by preliminary investigation if the suspect is to be definitely accused and held for trial. The purpose of this is to keep the court calendar from being crowded with cases which ought never to come to trial because the accusation is unfounded. It likewise guarantees the investigation and consideration of the substantial facts and saves much of the court’s time. The organs involved here are the prosecutor, the investigators appointed by him, and attached to his office, the police (militia) and the body formerly known as the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a great deal of informality and flexibility in the matter of this preliminary investigation. The investigator may take the whole matter into the atmosphere where the crime was committed. He may conduct it among the workers of the factory, if the act occurred there, in order that the workers themselves may aid in furnishing proofs, and in checking up the various facts. He also benefits in this way from the public opinion in regard to the case. This method of investigation in regard to labor crimes, both in factories and more recently in agricultural spheres, has been growing more and more common.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the more complex cases this investigation is carried on by the prosecutor himself after the initial evidence is turned over to him by the militia, organs of criminal detection, or other competent authority making the first inquiry. In lesser cases the investigating organ will usually prepare the case although the prosecutor may at any time examine the evidence and otherwise supervise the conduct of the case. Now that (since 1933) there is an Attorney General of the USSR, centralizing the prosecuting forces of the entire federated republics, the most important cases such as the famous Metropolitan-Vickers would be turned over to his personal supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this preliminary investigation it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney under whom it is carried on to see that evidence both for and against the suspect is gathered. If he neglects to see that the rights of the person under suspicion are protected and permits a case to come to trial when the evidence, if properly gathered, would indicate innocence, then he is laying up trouble for himself and will probably have to answer to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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To the end that all information and evidence may be secured, the investigator is given wide powers as to search and seizure of anything having a relation to the case. But if one thinks of rough-shod entry and abuse, he may be consoled by certain restrictions which the law places around such activities. In conducting searches and seizures the investigator calls in official witnesses. Persons participating in the case as parties to it, and relatives of the parties, cannot be official witnesses. And Sec. 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “the searches and seizures are to be made in daytime, except in cases which cannot be postponed.” The searcher is further ordered to announce his decision to make the search and to use all possible care to avoid damage (Section 179 of the same Code), and the additional protection is given to the accused in that the investigator is to see “that the facts of the private life of the person searched which have no relation with the case shall not be made public.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sec. 181.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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All articles seized in such a search must be listed, remarks made, and a copy deposited with the person or his family, and the articles themselves must be sealed at the place before being taken away.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 183, 184, 185.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Mail may also be seized by the investigator if permission has been given by the prosecutor, as may also any telegraphic or other communications, but the safeguard is provided that a representative of the postal-telegraphic institution must be present.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 186-188.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first stage of the preliminary investigation there is no “accused.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Except in such obvious cases that no investigation would be necessary. An example of this would be a man actually caught murdering another.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The aim at this time is to find if a criminal act has really been committed and if so who committed it. After the deed is decided to be of a criminal nature and is definitely attributed to a particular person or persons then the second stage is undertaken. At this time the “decision” is framed, and the accused is notified that he is to appear before the authority. This “decision” is written after the evidence has been carefully weighed and guilt indicated. This document must contain all the information and circumstances gathered up to that time.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the person has been finally accused he is summoned to appear before the investigator who is handling the case. He is not yet definitely held for trial. When he appears he is made acquainted with the accusation. “And that does not mean,” a prosecutor told the writer, “that he is given a chair and table and told to read the papers before him. The whole thing is explained to him by the authority in charge.” Thereafter he is questioned and given a chance to tell his side of the matter. His statements are checked and any new evidence is gathered.&lt;br /&gt;
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Steps must now be taken to insure his appearance during the completion of the investigation. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for five measures, as follows:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 144 and 150-154.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (1) He will not leave the place specified in the statement he signs without the permission of the proper authority which is the investigator or the court. (2) &#039;&#039;Personal or property parole&#039;&#039;. In the arrangement for property parole, the organization signing the bond must produce the accused when wanted or forfeit the sum of money agreed upon, but in the personal parole the persons (not less than two) who have agreed to produce the accused when wanted may, on failure to do so, be fined or sentenced to compulsory labor for a period up to three months. (3) &#039;&#039;Cash bail&#039;&#039;. Either he or other persons may deposit with the court a cash bail to insure his presence, the amount to be determined as in our courts, by the seriousness of the crime. (4) &#039;&#039;Detention in the home&#039;&#039;. The person may be restricted to his own home, as in the case of illness, or if a woman, because of pregnancy or of the care of her children. (5) &#039;&#039;Holding in custody&#039;&#039;. To be used in more serious cases. This latter is permissible only in certain prescribed cases. One of the conditions is that the case be of such a nature that the penalty, if conviction is secured, will be for a year or more of imprisonment. In addition one may be held in custody in cases covered by a definite enumeration in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which the sentence is not to exceed one year. The third possibility is in case of such serious crimes as banditry, or those of a socially dangerous nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the use of these measures the class nature of the criminal trial is strikingly portrayed. If the personality of the accused, or the crime he has committed, represents a high degree of social danger then one of the more severe measures is chosen. This would be the case for one appraised as a class enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The preliminary investigation may not yet be completed. If the evidence seems conclusive the prosecutor may end the preliminaries by simply drawing up the accusatory decision and conveying such information to the accused, but there may also be much more to this stage of procedure.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the appearance of the accused for questioning a whole new set of resources may be opened up. He mentions witnesses of his own, he gives his own testimony. His relatives must testify if needed. Apparently no one is omitted but the defendant’s counsel. And any falsifying or hiding of evidence on the part of any witness makes him liable to more severe punishment. Even though there is no oath administered due to the official attitude toward religion, there are still effective means of impressing a witness with the importance of telling the truth, one of which is to let him know what will happen to him if he is caught deviating from it!&lt;br /&gt;
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But to go back to the investigation. The accused may make certain requests or demands, and as indicated before, it is not only the duty of the investigating authority to see that they are met if reasonable, but if he neglects to take cognizance of any fact in favor of the defendant he is placing his own position in jeopardy. Not only must the investigator inquire into circumstances and facts that determine guilt or innocence, but he must also find out anything he can that will help in determining the measure of social defense to be given. What, for example, would be some of the things that he would want to know?&lt;br /&gt;
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First and foremost at this time is the question as to whether or not the act was committed in an attempt to restore the bourgeoisie to power; after that the motive and circumstances of the act. In Soviet jurisprudence circumstances play an important part in disposing of the case. The history of the accused himself will be of help if there is a consideration of insanity, the whole circumstances of the crime will establish whether there was coercion, or threat, or whether the offender was at the moment of committing the crime in a state of destitution, hunger, or strong excitement, or influenced by any extremity of personal or family conditions. All of these circumstances are considered extenuating and influence the penalty assessed.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the establishment of all relevant facts pertaining to the case the investigator may summon any experts deemed necessary. These must appear and give their conclusions no matter whether they aid or harm the accused, and a refusal to do so carries a fine of fifty rubles. The use of experts by the criminal courts in Russia will be discussed later but for the time being it may be said that such a custom is in wide use.&lt;br /&gt;
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The calling of experts or other witnesses may also be at the request of the accused. The law provides&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “The investigator shall not have the right to refuse the request of the accused or of the complainant to summon additional witnesses or examine experts if the facts or circumstances sought to be established may have any bearing on the case.” Not only that, but the investigator is likewise limited in interpreting some line of inquiry sought by the accused as not having relevant bearing on the case. Not only must he furnish some adequate grounds for such a refusal, but he must also state in writing his reason for taking such a stand.&lt;br /&gt;
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The number and kind of experts to be used are determined by the investigator if it is on his initiative that they are called. But if the defendant requests others he must call them, unless it is impossible to get the desired expert or unless the granting of this request would delay the preliminary hearing beyond the time legally set. It might be that the defendant would purposely request some one whom it was impossible to produce in order to secure delay, and in such an event, the investigator is naturally not forced to comply.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question of sanity may arise during the preliminary investigation and the proceedings may be dismissed on the grounds of insanity at the time of the commission of the act. If it is judged that the insanity has set in since the act then the trial is postponed until a cure is effected. There is a Judicial Psychiatric Institute where persons awaiting trial are observed for this purpose; but in order to facilitate the work of the medical staff the investigators gather all pertinent data as to the mental history of the accused.&lt;br /&gt;
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With all the information finally assembled the investigator is in a position to make his decision. The police organs, in their initial investigation, may discontinue the case if they find the evidence does not warrant going on. The investigator, if the case has been in his hands, may likewise discontinue for lack of sufficient evidence. And the prosecutor, with the collected data in his hands, may decide that there is no case. But if the person or organization first initiating proceedings is convinced that this is a mistake, the decisions in each of these cases may be appealed to the next higher authority and finally to the court of proper jurisdiction, within a month.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the investigator may decide to hold the accused for trial. In this event as soon as the investigation is completed the accused is notified of the decision and all the facts laid before him. He must be informed of his right to examine the entire records in the case, and the investigator must be sure that he is acquainted with the entire contents. If he is able to suggest anything to be added, the investigator must see that it is included before it finally leaves his hands. Any basic error in this stage of the proceedings may be the cause of a reversal by a higher court, so that great care must be taken to fulfill all points of law.&lt;br /&gt;
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A time limit is set by law as to the completion of this investigation. One used to American delays gasps at the speed with which these people dispense justice. One month from the time the defendant is formally accused the preliminary inquiry must be completed. However, this is not always possible, as appeals may be taken all along on the acts of investigator or prosecutor, and other delays may occur. But certainly all speed possible is used and there is no question of postponement of trial to the extent that we are accustomed to in our country.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the preliminary investigation completed the accused is formally held for trial. This may, in the simpler instances, be by the judge of the People’s Court in cases when there is no necessity for investigation or in those cases when the police officers make all investigations and forward the information to the People’s judge. This would be true in cases involving sentences of less than one year.&lt;br /&gt;
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In cases punishable by not less than one year sentence, yet not of so serious a nature as to require a preliminary inquiry, the investigator holds the accused for trial, on the basis of the information submitted to him by the police or OGPU. In such cases, all the evidence gathered together with the decision of the organs making the investigation is forwarded to the investigator, who, if he agrees submits the records to the competent court. There it is put on the trial list. If he feels that the conclusion to hold for trial is not warranted, then he may refer it to the court of proper jurisdiction for approval or rejection. In cases where the investigator himself is in charge of the preliminary inquiry he forwards his findings to the prosecutor, and he holds for trial in precisely the same way as was indicated above.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER VII: SCIENTIFIC AIDS TO THE COURT ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;It has&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; already been said that a heavy responsibility has been thrown on the courts in the USSR in regard not only to establishing guilt but also to finding, within the bounds of the provisions of the law, the proper measure of social defense to insure a corrective influence on the one on whom it is assessed. Guilt is often obvious, but the proper steps to take in an attempt to see that the offender does not repeat his crime do not usually show themselves with such clarity.&lt;br /&gt;
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The court, in trial, is not limited in any way in its efforts to get complete testimony and an accurate interpretation of such information. It is one of the fundamental principles of the administration of Soviet criminal law that the responsibility for the fullness and correctness of both investigation and verdict in the course of the trial rests on the court, and it may take any action on its own initiative to secure such ends. The prosecution and the defense may actually conduct the case within the bounds and direction which the court gives, but the court sets such limits and directions, interferes at any time on any point not cleared up by the argument, and decides on all questions relative to the examination. The court is independent of the opinion of either party in the trial and it is its responsibility to investigate any circumstance that appears essential to the case, whether the parties request it or not. It may likewise rule out what appears to be non-essential, even if it is requested by one of the parties. It is master of the whole proceedings and the expressed basic principle guiding its actions is to get at the truth of the incident involved and interpret the act in the light of all circumstances, so that a correct measure both for the protection of society from the socially dangerous and for the rehabilitation of the individual may be given.&lt;br /&gt;
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Superhuman wisdom would be required to fulfill such a demand if the judge acted alone, or even in conjunction with his co-judges, the two jurors. But the Code of Criminal Procedure has provided that he be supplied with whatever aid scientific research and endeavor can give. During the trial the court may call experts and it may also have the benefit of advice or testimony of specialized institutions connected with it.&lt;br /&gt;
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With no further evidence than the space devoted to the use of experts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, one would know that much importance was attached to the practice in the USSR. It is the subject of many articles, not only as regards the use of such aids in the court trial but, as already seen, in the preliminary trial as well. It might, because of its frequency, become a loose, taken-for-granted observance, but there are safeguards which make it a matter of serious regard.&lt;br /&gt;
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One matter of interest in the use of such experts as the defense itself may request to have called is that there is never any financial transaction between the two. The expert receives his fee from the state and in case the defendant is found guilty it is charged to him. This practice eliminates the possible sense on the part of the expert that he must give evidence, or rather interpretations, in favor of the man from whom he is receiving money. He has no feeling of obligation in this direction and is thus more disposed to give unprejudiced opinions. The spectacle of the bitter clashing of “alienists” hired by prosecution and defense is not likely to take place in a Soviet court room. Opinions naturally differ and on occasion the court may have to summon others, so that he may see which way the weight of opinion falls, but the dividing line is not due to a desire on the part of either to defend his client.&lt;br /&gt;
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Experts are called by the courts whenever specialized information of any kind that is desired is available. Article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Experts are called in when in the investigation and examination of the case, special knowledge in science, art, and the crafts is required.” And in a note to the same article it is further provided that “Experts must be called in to establish the cause of death and the character of bodily injuries, as well as in order to determine the psychic condition of the accused or of the witness if there be any doubt on this score in the opinion of the court or of the investigation.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A limitation is, of course, placed in that a science may not have grown in such a way as to furnish a reliable basis for inspection of evidence and conclusions. On the other hand something of an unusual nature may be called in a case presenting such a problem as one related to the author by a state prosecutor. In the USSR one causing a suicide receives a severe sentence. In a case of a double suicide of two women, there seemed no clue pointing to the guilt of any person until a small drawing was discovered. On the evidence obtained from this paper, with the aid of an expert in the identification of characteristics of lines and angles, an arrest was made and a confession and corroborating data obtained. This would not ordinarily be a legitimate line of expert aid, but in this case it afforded the only chance of detection. It is an excellent example of a case where expert testimony may be the only available resource.&lt;br /&gt;
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The expert, once summoned, has practically unlimited rights and privileges in gathering needed material for forming his conclusions. He is given all the data in the case for study, and he attends throughout the entire trial exactly as do the prosecution and defense. He may question the witnesses, ask for any further materials such as publications, documents, records, or even the subpœnaing of witnesses, and the court sees that his requests are granted. It is said that there is no known case of a refusal of co-operation with the expert on the part of either court or investigator. He is responsible in arriving at the proper solution of the case, and he is held accountable for any negligence in obtaining any information that can contribute to the accuracy of his conclusion. He may, make an error but he may not falsify, at least not without penalty. The Code of Criminal Procedure which devotes so much attention to this matter of experts says, “In regard to answering summonses, obligation to speak the truth, responsibility for false testimony, i.e., for deliberately false and not mistaken testimony, the expert shall be equal to witnesses.”&lt;br /&gt;
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But experts may disagree, even honestly and without regard to a fee! Also, it is conceivable that one might be inadequate. An American mind, at least one whose owner has attended court in the United States, might understand such a contention. The Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure takes care of that possibility, too. In Article 300 we find it provided that, “If the expert conclusion be found insufficiently clear or inadequate, and also in the event of dissension among experts, the court shall appoint new experts, either on its own initiative or upon the request of either side.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The conclusion of the experts is given at the close of the hearing and is attached to the records of the case. The court does not have to agree with the findings but he must consider them. He is free to criticise, and so, for that matter, is either of the sides in the case. But, in any disagreement he must defend himself well. The Code of Criminal Procedure again says:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article 295.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “However, if the court disagrees with the conclusion of the experts, such dissent shall be minutely motivated either in the verdict or in a special rider.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The testimony of the expert is held to be of peculiar character in Soviet judicature. He is not a witness, giving facts, but it is his function to examine and appraise facts, to inspect and to weigh and to give his opinions and conclusions in the special way of which he is capable. His evidence is distinguished from the other given in the trial in that it is specialized and independent. In other words the court can look after the facts but he wants the expert to tell him the meaning of what he finds out. And the experts have accepted the challenge and the responsibility with vigor. They have developed what might almost be called an “official psychology” that fits well into the nation’s philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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This science, called “judicial psychology,” occupies first place among the branches used by the courts in the Soviet judicature, and the second of importance is correctional labor psychology. The authorities attach no importance to what we call criminal psychology because they reject the idea that the criminal has any psychological or biological peculiarity. The use of the term alone suggests that they have, and the content likewise reminds them of some brand of Lombroso doctrine. For their theory of crime with its economic base, with its contention that this phenomena results practically &#039;&#039;in toto&#039;&#039; from the exploitation of one class by another, such a consideration would not do. Here one sees an application of their theory of crime. The criminal for them is like other people, and as the classless society approaches its perfect state a new social consciousness will evolve and any urge to crime will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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They reject likewise a juridical psychology which makes use of an analysis of psychological concepts into such elements as “imprudence,” “intent,” “spiritual agitation” because its content is too much one of juridical scholasticism, and affords no practical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Judicial psychology, considered in its broader sense, would involve the correctional labor psychology referred to above as one branch of this science important to the Soviet judicature. Defined in this larger way it would mean the application to the work of the court and the corrective labor institutions of all results of psychological research. Used in the narrower meaning it refers to criminal procedure psychology, or the application of whatever is known in this field to the case as a whole during the procedure or what transpired in the preliminary investigation. It would comprise the psychology of the accused, of the witnesses, of any other participant, even of the judge, jurors, experts themselves, and of the prosecutor and defense. They emphasize that they do not deal with the breaking up of the personality under consideration into such atoms as attention, memory, etc. as is done in the German school, but that they study the entire behavior of the witness, or other person, against a background of the broad, whole situation of the judicial investigation. They interest themselves, first of all, in the obtaining of true testimony and later in its correct appraisal, and their chief endeavor is to develop a better technique to arrive at these ends. With the emphasis they put on the importance of this usage and the talent they have in the field and the serious attitude the research workers take toward the problem, they should develop something compensating for their great effort.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in the field of correctional labor psychology there should be an even greater future. This is where the practical worker begs for more light from his scientific colleague. It is one field, said an authority, where the practical worker has gone on ahead of the research worker. There is eagerness to regenerate the psychology of the lawbreaker, to get him so readjusted that he will fit usefully into life. But more of this will be found in the chapter on Corrective Labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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To think only of the individual and his happiness would spur a scientist on to great effort, but it is even more than that in this instance. The nation’s progress toward its ideal depends on the successful use of these unfitted elements. It is no wonder that so many of the best minds are devoting themselves to working out the most adequate possible corrective labor policy. Filled with zeal as they are for their cause, they feel the responsibility which rests on them of making every human possible of use in the Socialist order.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are two institutes attached to the judicature in the USSR that require special attention in this consideration of expert aid rendered to the courts. Their work is of the utmost importance in the whole system of criminal procedure and the administration of corrective labor. The two referred to are the Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute and the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy, both attached to the office of the Attorney General and to the Commissariat of Justice. It was in visits to these two places that the writer experienced the greatest enthusiasm for what is being accomplished in the field of criminal repression in the USSR. Work of the finest type is being carried on in the lines covered by these two institutions by staffs well equipped for their respective fields of endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
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The writer visited the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy several times, looked through its library and used its books, and had the aid by conferences and advice of Director Shlaposnitchov, of the assistant director, of Professor Brusilovsky, and others of its officers. It is admirably staffed all the way through by persons not only of ability but of social conscience. The seriousness with which they attack the problems which face them and their acquaintance with the work being done in other nations are bound to impress anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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This Institute carries out the usual policy in the USSR of combining the theoretical and the practical. Along with those who are engaged in problems of research into the cause and treatment of crime there come the workers from the courts with practical problems to solve. Working in the library and reference section are persons who read and speak several languages and who carry their research into the study of foreign legislation and reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are a number of sections devoted to special lines of inquiry, chief of which are: Criminal Law and Criminal Trial, a Judicial Section, Statistical Section, and one giving its attention to the problems of juvenile offenders.&lt;br /&gt;
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Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute is the principal other scientific body on which the courts rely for solving their crime problem. It has likewise its practical and theoretical side. Research is carried on by a large staff of medical men and women, of research workers, of professors, and collaborators, and it publishes the results in numerous volumes. It also holds conferences and discussion meetings. It is equipped with all the latest devices and instruments for treatment of its cases and works in close contact with judicial establishments. Its director gave the following as the purposes of the Institute:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) To examine all those about to be tried when there is a question as to psychic condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) To aid all correctional labor camps both as to policy and on actual cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) To help in problems of juvenile delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To carry on research in the problems connected with the work of the Institute.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) To establish graduate courses and train medical aids.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The capacity for patients is one hundred and fifty beds, these are divided into different groups; such as those for men, for women, for children, for the definitely deranged, and for those who are of apparently sane condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No one is admitted at Serbsky except those who have come in contact with the law, through its contravention. When a question of sanity comes up in a case at trial or in the preliminary stage of procedure, it may be cleared up by a brief examination by doctors, but in every case where extended observation is needed the person is sent to Serbsky. After not longer than a month a report is made to the court. In case insanity is adjudged by the staff, then the patient may be sent to a hospital where care is given him, or, if he is dangerously demented, he is placed in an institution where there is more restriction and compulsory treatment and care.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Institute maintains a department where children are kept, and where they are taught by teachers who come in for that purpose, and trained in certain arts and crafts. Also, some adults are kept beyond the month period when it is thought that only brief treatment is needed so that the trial may go on. There was one who had been there for eight months and another for six at the time of the author’s visit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because of the short period of retention in this place one would not expect that much of a constructive nature could be done in the matter of work. But here the policy of Soviet treatment shows to advantage. The shop teacher exhibited to us with pride what he had been able to accomplish, and his enthusiasm was justified. In accordance with their theory that labor can correct almost anything they use it here as a constructive treatment. They also use, as has already been said, all of the latest medical and psychological therapy, but there is at the same time an insistence that training for work, giving one something to do and teaching him how to do it well, is the best way to psychical readjustment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pursuant to the fulfillment of this idea those sent here make things and they are carefully observed while they work. Some of the objects in the shops and on exhibit in a small conference room were beautiful models. Among those, of especial note, there was an airplane, perfect in minute detail, a movie machine, a system of traffic lights, and a collective shop made by the children. The latter would have a political significance, of course, and serve to put over education of a socialist nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As one goes into Serbsky Institute one encounters a guard at the outer gate, and the feeling is that here is a prison. It is, of course, of a kind. Men who are in this place are, many of them, of a dangerous nature, such as we would call criminally insane. This terminology will not do, however, for Soviet criminology, as one may be either insane or criminal, but not both. But a number are guilty of murder, are pleading insanity as a defense when they may, of course, be sane; a number have made homicidal attacks on individuals. With this in mind one expects to see more of a prison atmosphere prevail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the outside there were no armed guards in evidence, and we were told that there were none. When we went through a ward of some twenty-odd men of the most dangerous type with only a woman attendant, and no one else about, the writer frankly felt somewhat nervous. It seemed they ought to be under guard, but the woman in charge assured us that there had never been an attack by one of them on an attendant. The attitude of the Serbsky staff toward the patients and the attitude they manage to get from them in return seemed to us remarkable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We went through the gardens where those persons of a less dangerous nature were reading, talking, or doing whatever they wished. Some came to speak to us. One wished to make a long speech. A part of these were judged to be mentally normal, others must return to face their trial. We came at last to the place where are kept the most obstreperous; those who would surely make an attempt to escape if not restrained. This was the only example the writer encountered in Russia of persons locked in cells. There may be others in isolated instances, but solitary confinement has been done away with as a matter of policy. The building housing these prisoners was two-story, and the cells faced inward on the garden. There were tall big windows of unbreakable glass affording plenty of light, but the ventilation was bad. A remark was made to that effect and we were told that it was an old building they had had to utilize, and that it was to be replaced within the year. It certainly was out of keeping with the rest of the place, and made us think that it would actually be taken care of before long. However, there were not many persons there. Glass panes in the doors enabled one to peer in and there were only ten inmates in all the rooms on the two floors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was in one of these cells, where all the furniture is secured to the floor, that we were allowed to talk for a moment to a man who is quite a character in criminal circles in the USSR. He is held to be the chief swindler of the country and a recital of his escapades made the assertion sound entirely plausible. Perhaps it should be emphasized for fear that it was not made clear above, that it is not the ravingly insane who are kept in these rooms. They are the ones kept in the ward already mentioned. These are they who are the more dangerous criminally, who possibly are not insane at all. The swindler was held to be normal mentally, and if he got away with all that his record enumerated one feels sure he must be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The swindler, a young man of near thirty, thin, dark, sat morosely on his cot as we went in. The attendant spoke to him, put her hand on his shoulder. We had the story of him before we entered. He had been in prison a number of times, he had supplied a luxurious living to himself and admiring companions over a period of years. He had been sent to this Institute at several of his previous trials and the opinion had been each time that he was mentally normal. A few months before our visit he had been returned to court to stand trial, and had been sent to a corrective labor institution. But he had refused to work. He had refused to follow any of the prison régime, and the authorities had returned him to Serbsky for a check on his mental condition. He ignored us, seemed hardly to be conscious of our presence, as he begged to know of the young woman what they were going to do with him now. She talked to him for a few moments in an encouraging manner. Her effort with him, she said, was to convince him of a better way of living by means of the training he would get in the corrective labor institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We had already been in the children’s department and had talked there to two girls whom we were told to remember for future reference. One in particular was a pretty, gentle-appearing child of twelve. Here is her story. She had been a run-away, she had wandered in various parts of the USSR, or so she said. Her acts of a criminal nature had all been directed against children. She had stolen several whom she said she had pinched and tortured in a sadistic manner and killed. The number she set at ten, but there was no verification of her report. She had become well enough known and feared in certain sections so that she was threatened by mothers of young children if she so much as entered the village or town. She had a few months previously come into the care of the Institute, and they felt sure that an entire change of her whole character had been effected. On the wall of the room where she stayed she had put some pictures, and she had become interested in art as well as other work and study. They thought her normal, and although her family wished her returned to its custody, the opinion was that the environment had not up to then been sufficiently constructive to permit that. They were sending her to an institution at Leningrad where she was to be taught and trained in some labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even at the risk of being tedious, it seems desirable to record two more cases among the children. In a yard at the rear of the building we found a group of boys at play. Two of them were indicated as presenting challenging problems. Safely back in a conference room we heard of what they had done. The first case especially was interesting as indicating that animosity does not always exist in the treatment of those who are in opposition to the proletariat rule.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A boy of seventeen, who was the son of a Kulak, had been discharged from his job for indolence. He went later to stay with a friend overnight. He wanted the friend to go with him to some place to which the mother objected. Filled with anger he waited until the son had departed for school the next morning, then murdered the mother, took some money which she had in the house, and escaped. When caught, he was sent to Serbsky for examination and the analysis showed mental deficiency and a difficult, sulky character. They had kept him for a time, had made some progress with him, and were then about to send him to a medical-pedagogical institution for juveniles where he would be trained and treated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other boy, a charming black-haired fellow of thirteen, was held to be normal, but he was an alcoholic and stole constantly. The trouble in his case seemed to be in an irrational, coddling kind of upbringing. The decision was to send him to a state educational institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were only seven women inmates of the institution at the time of our visit and in view of the high percentage of women criminals in the USSR that seemed strange. No explanation was vouchsafed in answer to a question as to the cause, but it might indicate that women in this country do not base a defense plea on grounds of insanity!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With such thorough effort as the care in Serbsky indicates, the conclusions as to mental condition ought to be as authoritative as human fallacy permits. The institution has representatives in various shops and schools and co-operates closely with the heads of the various prisons, and every effort is made at supervision and observation of those within its jurisdiction. We asked for statistics on results and were reminded that this work is all very new in the USSR, of necessity, and that figures were not complete, but that we could be assured that the results were worth to them all the painstaking care they put on their work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER VIII: THE PROSECUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; functioning of the prosecution in the Soviet judicature is of especial interest to a student of criminal procedure. Its development from the time of the total abolition of the institution as it had existed in the Tzarist régime, by Decree #1 of 1917, to the establishment of the office of the Attorney General in 1933, has been experimental and not without dissension among the ranks of the Central Executive Committee itself. In the early years following the Revolution when everything Tzarist was swept away, there prevailed a spirit of liberalism so far as the rights of the people were concerned. In the sudden accession of power by the proletariat, lack of restraint was the predominating note, and this philosophy—if such irrational conclusions could be called one—of the epoch was reflected also in the procedure of the criminal courts. A more conservative opinion had wished merely to place the defense on an equal footing with the prosecution to correct the dominance of the state over the people in such a manner as it had been practiced for all the years of the reign of Tzars. But this was not enough to satisfy those who were clamoring for everything to be placed in the hands of the proletariat, the administering of justice as well as other branches of government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this moment of judicial liberalism prosecution through official channels was done away with, and in its place the persons in attendance at the trial were vested with the right of accusal as well as defense. It must have distressed many a hardy judge, even though he sat as a representative of the toiling masses himself, to try to figure out a decision in the face of untrained and conflicting contentions. At any time during the trial any citizen might rise and address the court either in behalf of the accused or as the state’s prosecutor. The idea took hold rapidly, and up to the beginning of its control in 1918, it was so widely used that it became customary for the judge to call on some one in his audience to act as defender or accuser of the person on trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was bound to lead to difficulties. Civil war was at hand, the class struggle was at its height, and the court was an organ of the state in its struggle against its enemies. Even the most liberal saw that it would not do. Some system must be used whereby the prosecution of cases would be strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is an interesting point involved in the restoration of the prosecution, as it now began, even though it was of revolutionary expediency. It was a swinging back to the western criminal law administration which they had annihilated at the beginning of their rule. A legal man said to me in this regard, “We acknowledge that there are many good points in the capitalist system, and we do not hesitate to borrow what are useful to us.” In court procedure, even while they do preserve the proletarian administration, one can recognize many things about their orderly procedure that has its foundation in familiar bourgeois practices. There is no denial of this on their part. Certain well established ideas of justice have proved over long years to be adequate and proper and these have been incorporated into their own judicial structure. The early disorganized practices of the proletarian administration of justice gave way when necessities and panic of the Civil War had been dissipated to a deliberative plan resulting in the many codes of 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0141.svg|ORGINAZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF USSR|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before this a resurrection of the public prosecutor was on its way. Revolutionary tribunals, in their post as out-sentinels in the struggle of the government, were the first in the demand for sterner equipment of prosecution, and political expediency put an end to judicial liberalism in their practice. Characterizing this period was the attitude that placed in the hands of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; the power to impose even the death penalty on those persons charged with political offenses such as the participation in counter-revolutionary activities, deliberate destruction of property or espionage, and other such crimes against the state. It was felt that if the proletariat was to continue to rule it was no time for softness, either in the judicial system or in the non-judicial tribunals which continued to exist through the bloody days of the Civil War period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As just pointed out, it was in the Revolutionary Tribunals, created by Decree of November 24, 1917, and differing very little from the People’s Courts except in the requirement as to the number of co-judges,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Six sat in the Revolutionary Tribunals while two were required in the People’s Court.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that the first change came in regard to the prosecution. Let it be understood that although these tribunals were organs of the revolution and continued in force for five years, they were proper judicial institutions, with a definite prescribed procedure and jurisdiction. There had been too much mildness in their administration, so much so that the present Commissar of Justice, N. V. Krylenko, stated in his Soviet law,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “Their softness with regard to sentences discredited them completely.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were too many of them in the first place and by Act of May, 1918, their number was reduced so that they remained in existence only in the capitals of the provinces and other important places. But that reform would not necessarily make them deal out sterner justice, and by this same Act there was created at each of the existing tribunals a &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors. To make the check-up more complete there was also established a Central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; of State Prosecutors in connection with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee created by an act of June, 1918.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of the Revolutionary Tribunals was undergoing a change. Sternness and determination now marked their attitude. Mildness was fading away as class struggle advanced. They were created to spike the activities directed against the achievements of the Revolution or designed to weaken Soviet authority. It was not enough that some citizen give voice to a plea for conviction; it was neither sufficient that local tribunals be left to carry on their own unaided and unsupervised prosecution. There must be central supervision. This very distrust of local competency led later to a dissension in which Lenin had to take a hand, but for the time being, it served its purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the decree already referred to (of May, 1918), the central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; was given wide powers. It might demand of local prosecutors or tribunals that certain cases be transferred to Moscow or in the event the case remained in its original territory, it might send prosecutors there to see that it took the direction desired. It might also demand an accounting from the local &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; so that by supervision they could be sure that the functions of these organs to look after all facts of criminal action committed by any person anywhere and the institution of criminal procedure might be faithfully and zealously fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the Revolutionary Tribunal Acts of 1920, all previous acts pertaining to tribunals were repealed and sweeping changes again occurred. Counter-revolutionary activity was on the decline, the Civil War was receding, and non-judicial methods of suppression not so much needed. Orderly government was growing stronger. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; suffered the abolition of its special tribunal, the military judicial powers even were required to comply with the provisions of this Act. As a result of these curtailments the powers of the Revolutionary Tribunals were widened and jurisdiction extended to include any case involving counter-revolutionary charges as well as any other that was of a nature dangerous to the Soviet Republic. Not only was the jurisdiction of these tribunals enlarged but their power of punishment was likewise increased and was now practically unrestricted. With such authority they could assess any measure of repression which they thought necessary to the occasion and could thereby cover any ground lately held by extra-judicial bodies. These tribunals were established in the capitals of the various provinces and by permission of the Commissar of Justice might also be instituted in the larger cities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What happened in regard to the prosecution? The &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of prosecutors set up by the previous acts were abolished and in their stead there now appeared state &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of defense and prosecution, both for the people’s court and for the Revolutionary Tribunals. From this time on more attention was given to the perfecting of a system and technique of prosecution. The qualifications for the person filling this office became of a more adequate nature. He must be a man competent to make an appearance before an assemblage, to speak or otherwise conduct public affairs, and he must also know the Soviet system of government thoroughly as well as be acquainted with the workings of trade unions. There was still no centralized system such as exists today since the prosecutors were at this time provided merely to represent the people in trial, much as a defense lawyer might be appointed in a particular case. But the era of floundering, of experimentation, of entertaining thought of complete proletarian administration of law, had made its contribution, and the evolution moved on with the rapidity with which other things have moved in Soviet Russia. In 1922 there was another Act containing other innovations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By this Act there was a general revision of the whole system of judicial legislation, and there emerged such results as the Criminal Code, the Law on Basic Property rights, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the year of 1923 furnished additional legislation. The matter of some centralization of a state prosecution seems to have been taken for granted, but the form that the organization was to have, the basic principles, brought forth differences of opinion as we shall see later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The New Economic Policy had been introduced and the economic and political situation in the country was in a confused and complex state. Civil war had died down but the class struggle, already well on its feet, took encouragement from the feeling among the property owners that capitalism, at least in a modified form, might with timely effort be brought back. The form of conflict now encountered was hardly less threatening to Soviet rule than had been the more open warfare. The government, dependent on its courts, now effectively augmented by the judicial powers of the terrifying GPU, needed a strengthened prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In May of 1922 the People’s Commissariat of Justice presented its proposal of organization to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and found itself immediately on the defensive against attack by opposition within the Communist faction. This had not been expected, and there was some dismay when the main points were rejected altogether. Once before, a central &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors—even though for the Revolutionary Tribunals—had cast reflection on local organs by demanding transferal of cases to their jurisdiction or by sending one of their own number to prosecute locally. Now, as the Commissariat of Justice proposed: (1) the direct subordination of the local prosecutors to the Prosecuting Attorney of the Republic who appoints and dismisses them, and (2) the right of local prosecutors to protest before the central authorities against unconstitutional decisions by local executive committees, it was held by the majority of the Central Executive Committee that there was in such suggestions an element of distrust of local authorities too strong to be accepted. A commission appointed by the session, in rejecting such proposals, made one of its own. It was suggested that there be set up a “dual” subordination of prosecutors, making them responsible both to the central authority and to the local executive committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a state of affairs brought intervention from the captain of the ship of state. Lenin wrote a special letter to Stalin that brought the opposition to terms when it was read before the Central Executive Committee. He enumerated therein some of the causes of the difficulties of establishing revolutionary legality and a lack of uniformity of the application and administration of the laws were chief among these. Likewise, there was always the alibi of local peculiarities and conditions. For us of the United States who have struggled with forty-eight different types of provisions, of applications, and administration, there is understanding of his argument. A suggestion of anything possible to prevent it seems unanswerable. “The basic evil in the whole of our life and in the whole of our lack of culture,” wrote Lenin, “is in the ancient Russian attitude of laissez-faire and in the custom of semi-savages who want to retain the local justice of Kaluga as distinguished from that of Kazan.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He then puts a question. Can it be tolerated in a country of proletarian dictatorship, in a country building up a socialist economy? Here is his answer. “There can be no Kaluga justice different from that of Kazan, but there must be a uniform All-Russian justice, and even a uniform justice for the whole Federation of Soviet Republics.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That started the effort toward uniformity. The most recent chapter in the development was in 1933 (June 23) when the office of the Attorney General was created to centralize the prosecution of the whole Soviet Union. There have been steps between the two enactments but they have moved steadily toward the recent accomplishment. In the earlier organization the position as head of the public prosecution of the USSR, now held by the Attorney General, was occupied by the Commissar of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duty of the prosecution, now headed by the Attorney General of the USSR, is not merely to prosecute. His functions are far beyond that limit. If he were confined to that there would not be great importance to his office.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet judicial trial the prosecutor is robbed of his glamorous role as he appears in our own courts. He, as well as the defending attorney, is a mere assistant to the court, there to aid it in getting at the truth of the affair before them. It is apparent that he has been appointed in such a manner that he is nearer to the judge than the defense lawyer. He is likely of the same party affiliation, he comes from the same social class, he is in sympathy with the order of government. It is certainly more likely that he exerts a greater influence on the court than the other side’s attorney who may hold an opposite viewpoint. One notices that often the defense attorney is of a different appearance in manner of dress, in terminology, and in speech, from the court and prosecutor. It may be supposed that this occasionally causes the court to decide against him, even though the bias is unconscious, since it is very likely that he is defending a person who is a “class enemy,” and with whose point of view he may be in sympathy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That would probably have been truer a few years ago than it is now. With the prevailing attitude of “winning over” wherever possible, and the “crushing” of only those who are distinctly to be feared as socially dangerous, there seems to be no great prejudice shown. It must exist to a degree, but antagonism does not seem a part of the present policy of state. If a person before the court can be made into a useful citizen then the object is to do it. Those who deliberately continue to struggle against the laws of the class in power will certainly be dealt with in an uncompromising manner, and if it is fairly clear the crime is of this nature then a defending lawyer would hardly be listened to with very much thought. It would be the day of the prosecutor. Likewise in establishing the class nature of the crime, the word of the prosecutor would be worth more to the court because of his sympathy with the existing order. But since it is to the interest of the state to protect an individual, to retain the aid and sympathy of all possible and to win and keep the confidence of its masses, it is not likely that there will be many who are innocent in this respect convicted in the regular judicial trials where open sessions prevail and the people in large numbers attend. One of the impressive characteristics of the court room in the Soviet Union is the attendance and interest of the citizens. They discuss the verdict with animation and it is to be noted that they usually agree with the court’s decision. If those in attendance disagreed too often it would hardly be a good thing for the judge. It will be remembered that power of impeachment is exercised in this country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The lack of importance of the prosecutor in trial is exemplified by his absence from trial frequently, in the People’s Court. It is not usual in this lower tribunal for either prosecutor or defense lawyer to be in attendance. At times, however, they do appear. But there is no place in the system for the ingenious display of a game of wits between attorneys as there is no jury such as ours nor anyone on whom an emotional impression could be made. There is really no great need in the ordinary case for attorneys either for the state or the defense. The court has both the power and responsibility to see that all evidence is placed before it. There can be no such objections to its introduction as we are accustomed to hear, resulting in the escape of criminals from the law because of the lack of admission of evidence. The story comes out, the witness tells the tale without any instruction to answer “yes” or “no” to the questions put to him. As already illustrated by actual cases, it is an informal narrative, interrupted by pertinent questions by judge or jurors or other parties to the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To see, then, what the prosecutor’s functions are, let us look at the following list as given in 1922 at the establishment of the centralized prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To supervise on behalf of the State the legality of the actions of all administrative organs, economic institutions, public and private organizations, and private persons, by instituting criminal proceedings against guilty persons and by protesting against decisions infringing upon the laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To observe directly the activities of investigation organs, criminal inquiry organs, and also the activity of organs of OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To prosecute in court. [Note that this is third in order of importance.]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To see to the proper treatment of inmates in homes of correction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As can be seen from this enumeration the functions of the organs of Soviet prosecution extend far beyond the limits of mere judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Accordingly, the Attorney of the Republic (originally in RSFSR, the People’s Commissar of Justice) was entrusted:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To look after the legal activity of all the People’s Commissariats and other central institutions and organizations and to make proposals for the repeal or amendment of orders and regulations issued by them that are not consistent with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To protest against such orders and regulations before the Council of People’s Commissars and the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee with a view to their abolition [the protest by the Attorney General does not stop, however, the carrying out of an order against which a protest was made].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To guide and control the activities of local prosecuting organs. The functions of local prosecutors were:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To propose to local executive committees the repeal or amendment of regulations and decisions that do not conform to the law, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To protest against such regulations and decisions, through the Attorney General of the republic, to the Council of People’s Commissars or to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the realm of combatting criminality, the Public Prosecutor was commissioned:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To institute local proceedings against officials and private persons either on his own initiative or on complaints and statements received by him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the conducting of inquiries and preliminary investigations, to advise organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation on the question of restrictive measures and other questions connected with preliminary investigation, and to conform the indictment drawn up by investigators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To decide the question of prosecution or cancelling of cases coming up to him from investigating organs, to take part in preliminary sittings of the court on the question of trying or dismissing a given case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To prosecute in court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) To protest in the order of cassation against verdicts and findings of the court, and also protest by way of supervision against verdicts of the first instance and cassation decisions of regional and provincial courts that have already come into force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) To look after the proper treatment of inmates in all places of detention without exception, and to liberate persons improperly held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this enumeration it can be seen that his duty as prosecutor is third on the list. But it is in this function that we think of him and it is this part of his work that we shall go into in some detail because of its connection with what we are studying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to the prosecutor’s occupation with criminal procedure there is first the preliminary investigation. When the militia or the former organs of the OGPU or any other agent turn over to the investigator certain material evidence of crime the prosecution starts to function. The office of the prosecution is to institute criminal proceedings on the first definite suspicion that a crime has been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the proceedings are in the preliminary stage the position of the prosecution is very different from what it will be later. He is now concerned with finding out the truth of the situation and not of “fastening” upon some one an act of which he is not guilty but for which there must be a conviction. If he goes into court for trial too many times with cases that are not supported by the testimony as brought out by the court the inference is that he either is not honest or not capable in his preliminary investigation. While a prosecutor often makes a mistake, as further court testimony may show, and is in honor bound to withdraw prosecution when he discovers it, this would probably be because of circumstances which he could not control such as the absence of a witness or the testimony of one not revealed at that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, in the preliminary examination he is not an accuser. He is the chief of all that takes place, and he is in full charge. His investigator carries out the work of this stage in less complex cases but the prosecutor is responsible for direction and policy. He does not seek evidence of guilt at this time any more than he tries to establish innocence. He gathers every available bit of data and then makes his decision as to whether the case is to go on. But once he has come to the conclusion that the indictment is sufficiently well founded and the accused becomes the defendant in the judicial trial, his position is changed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the trial he is the prosecutor. He now believes the defendant guilty or he would not have remanded him for court action. He now takes part in weighing the evidence produced in court and urges some measure of punishment in his speech. But so intent is he still on getting justice that he may cease his prosecution if he decides that he has been wrong in his preliminary examination. It is his duty to do so and to convince the court he is correct in his action. One prosecutor told the writer of four occasions in his own practice when he had done this. One has an incredulous feeling in hearing a prosecuting attorney make a plea for the reduction of a sentence or for a verdict of not guilty, but such a case is recorded in the following paragraphs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Supreme Court a case was on appeal from a Regional Court. A group of seven men had been found guilty of stealing vegetables and fruit from a co-operative store in which one was manager. They had resold the articles and had thereby made some 20,000 rubles. The two leaders had received the death penalty, the others lesser ones. The death penalties had been appealed and the prosecutor and the defense attorneys were present with their arguments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense lawyer spoke quite at length, arguing that the amount had been really smaller than was stated, that the character of the men had always been good, and then he went to points of law. He contended that it had been a mistake to apply the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for larceny of state property, to this act as no theft of state property had actually taken place. The men had paid the regulation amount to the state, but had simply sold the fruit and vegetables at an advanced price over state prices, for a sufficient period to bring in the money in that manner. He contended that instead the men were guilty of using official position for personal benefit and that Article 109 of the Criminal Code, providing punishment for such a crime, should have been applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His points had not been well made and when the prosecutor arose to speak one was quite prepared for his demolition of the previous argument. He was an able, well-trained man. No one consults any precedents or books of law in the Soviet court. The observer is struck by the absence of such volumes from the room. The court judges each case on its merits in the light of certain established policy. It seemed only a matter of formality for the judges to retire and bring back the decision that the verdict should stand. But the peculiarity of the prosecution in this judicial system now showed. The attorney paused, started again. He reminded the court that the men were young, that this was the only offense with which they had been charged and that one of these in particular had been a good citizen until he had begun to drink too heavily. He thought the sentence too severe and that it should be commuted to the maximum ten-year term. He likewise recommended that some of the sentences of the lesser members of the group needed revision. The court acted on his recommendation and the two wives present were able to go into frenzied joy over the giving back of life to their respective husbands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case brings out the attitude of the prosecution toward their tasks as accusers. The basic function of the prosecutor is to establish all the testimony he can to support an indictment before the court. That is what he comes into court for. The defense has its lawyer to see that its interests are protected. The prosecutor thinks of the side of society and the state. But at the same time, theoretically, he must not do anything to prevent the real truth of the case from being revealed. It is not in keeping with the role and dignity of his office to keep back evidence, to shuffle facts, or in any manner to defeat the carriage of justice. And in attempting to carry out the higher requirements of his office he cannot insist on the charges of the indictment if the testimony brought out at the trial has modified them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to note that there are deviations from the general principle that the prosecutor conducts the prosecution at the trial. Throughout the land there is a system in practice of giving training to the more able among the peasants and workers to act in the capacity of public accuser in the simpler cases. This special prosecutor is usually unaided unless the case is of a more serious nature, when he will probably serve in conjunction with some member of the prosecutor’s office. This service is of a wholly voluntary nature with no pay attached, but there is compensation for the individual in the position of importance he occupies in his community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are also cases where the plaintiff hires his own lawyer to prosecute the case and a public prosecutor appears only if the case is of such a nature or takes such a turn that there is a public interest which needs protecting, or in case there must be intervention to secure fair play. An example of this type of case would be one in which there was bodily injury that while causing pain still had no serious consequences. Cases involving insults, libels and slander likewise are often prosecuted by private attorneys without the aid of the public official. In all of such cases action is not brought by the state, of course, but is begun by the oral or written complaint of the injured party and may be settled by the plaintiff and defendant between themselves at any time while the trial is in progress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In cases involving such charges as the violation of patent or copyright laws, forced sexual intercourse, and a few others of a private nature, the procedure is still different. Prosecution is by the public prosecutor but even though he knows of the existence of such violations he cannot institute proceedings. The injured party must make the complaint and give co-operation but while he may have his own lawyer also the state takes charge of the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For a more complete picture of the prosecution as it exists in the Soviet Union today, its organization is briefly given. It follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Attorney General of the USSR who is the head of the prosecution in the Soviet Union. He has, of course, a staff of assistants. He is appointed by the Central Executive Committee, and is also responsible to the Council of People’s Commissars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The attorneys of the various federal republics who are appointed by the Attorney General of the USSR on approval by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) The prosecutors of the regional and provincial courts are appointed and may be dismissed for cause by the attorneys of the federal republics with the consent of the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) The attorneys for military and transport tribunals are appointed and may be dismissed by the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) District attorneys and people’s investigators are appointed and dismissed by regional and provincial attorneys.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Senior investigators and investigators on most important cases are appointed and dismissed by those attorneys to whom they are attached.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties with which they are charged are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To supervise the consistence of decisions and regulations of separate departments of the USSR and federal republics and of local authorities with the constitution of the USSR and the decisions and regulations of the government of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the correct and uniform application of the laws by the judicial institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To institute criminal proceedings and to prosecute in all legal instances throughout the territory of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To look after the legality and correctness of the actions of OGPU, militia, and correctional labor institutions on the basis of a special order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) General guidance of the activities of the prosecution in the federal republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IX: THE DEFENSE AND THE DEFENDANT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Bar has had a precarious existence under Soviet rule, but it seems now to have come on to firm ground. Going back to that First Decree of 1917, when the prosecution was swept away, we find the institution of private attorneys suffering a like fate and an idea substituted that anybody might be an attorney and defend. However, a limitation was soon put on the “anybody” by the Second Decree on Courts which created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, the duties of whose members were both to prosecute and to defend. While any citizen might become a member of this &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; on the proper recommendation of the Soviets of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies, he was supposed to give his time and attention to being an attorney, which somewhat narrowed down the first broad inclusion. There must have been some slight ability, too, on the part of the persons appointed, over the ordinary run of citizen, in order that they be recommended to membership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This method of providing for defense and prosecution existed until 1920. The People’s Court Act of 1918 changed the status of these defenders and prosecutors in that they were made officials of the Republic and were accorded a salary equal to that of a people’s judge. These members of the college in their capacity&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
as defenders were augmented at times by relatives of the defendant and at times replaced by the legal adviser of an institution, appointed by the director to serve in some particular case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By 1920 this system of one body affording now a prosecutor, now a defender, was found to be not adequate, not in keeping with the rights of the defendant which orderly legality must establish, nor, on the other hand, providing a sustained attitude of prosecution such as the state needed. The People’s Court Act of that year created separate institutions for the two purposes. There was now evidence of a selected membership. Not just “any citizen,” even though he might devote himself to the duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, could serve, but there was to be a list prepared by the local Soviets, of persons who were qualified to act in this capacity. From this list defending advocates were to be selected for temporary duty, not to exceed six days in a six month period, and were to be paid a sum in proportion to the remuneration received by a co-judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was something in the nature of our own jury service, and was regarded as a solemn duty of a citizen qualified for the function. In the Collected Laws of 1920 we find a circular from the Commissar of Justice issuing instructions and admonishing that the defense in court, in criminal cases, is a social duty of all citizens, who, because of profession, education, or party affiliation, are qualified to appear as defenders at the trial.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collected Laws, No. 100, Article 543, 1920, Section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Doubtful defense it may have been to one whose life hung in balance, but the institution was progressing toward a time when persons on trial might be ably represented in the judicial inquiry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The institution of the New Economic Policy, bringing a new complexity and confusion into the economic and political life of the Union, created new necessities of various kinds, one of which, as we have already seen, was a development in the administration of Criminal Law. With the remarkable rapidity of the development of institutions in other lines, the Soviet judicial system began to take firmer shape and to assume a character of responsibility for orderly legality. If the court was to provide equality of opportunity and privileges to all, thus fulfilling the slogan of the Socialist State of which it was an organ, then the rights of the defendant must be protected, not only by legislative safeguards but by means of adequate representation at the bar of justice. If prosecution was to be stiffened in this era of fighting the opponents in a new way, then a balanced procedure called also for more adequate aid to the man accused.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Advocacy Act of 1922, with its sweeping reforms for the judiciary, restored to the Union the possibility of adequate defense for the person who stands accused in court. It created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers, and made its members responsible for the legal aid of a party held for trial. The number of members of the college were, however, to be restricted by authority of the provincial departments of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This limitation was removed by the Judiciary Act of 1926 which elaborated the provisions of the earlier Act and dealt fully with the organization, function, and duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;. While the number is not restricted, the member, when accepted by the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, may be rejected by the provincial executive committee within a month from the time it is informed of his admission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The qualifications required of the members provides for at least two years’ service in some judiciary position within the Soviet Union not lower than the People’s Court which insures an acquaintance with the law. To be admitted one must also either have a higher juridical education or have passed a prescribed examination. Admission is refused to those who have been expelled from public organizations for misconduct (for a period of three years), condemned for crimes, or under trial or investigation the member is suspended in certain cases. No lawyer may defend in court unless he is a member of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, or bar.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; is self-governing along the lines of other Soviet institutions. It elects its own presidium which works out the general problems of the organization. It decides on disciplinary questions, on general plans of work, and on the fees to be paid by its members. It has no authority over the fees to be paid by clients. That lies in the hands of the Commissariat of Justice which sets up a regular schedule, according to the ability of the person to pay and the complexity of the case. There are four groups according to these provisions. At the bottom are the poor, so designated by the people’s court, who pay no fees; in the next group are those workers, clerks and peasants who are permitted a small rate; the third group consists of any not included in the first two, who may also pay a rate set by the Commissariat; and there is the final group who, not needing the intervention of the Commissar, may make its own terms with the collegium.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In Moscow alone there are about fifty private lawyers not connected with any “corporation,” later to be described, who may be hired as they would be anywhere. They are those sufficiently well known to attract a private practice, and do not need the aid the corporation can give. They agree on the fee to be paid, without any intervention on the part of the state, and are not restricted in income.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties of the members of this organization do not consist alone in defending in court. The members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; attached to the courts, provincial, regional, or organized as county bureaus, deliver lectures on law, acquaint the masses with their legal rights and duties through visits to large factories and other centers, and must defend without pay any case referred to them. The first duty of the legal profession is concerned with the observance of revolutionary legality, but within the bounds set by this legality, he must defend his client. The protection of this same individual is, however, the acknowledged duty of both judge and prosecutor, so why the necessity of defense counsel at all in such a system, one wonders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As already pointed out the simpler cases tried in the People’s Court rarely do have attorneys on either side, but in the more complicated cases the story may not be so easily got at. It may be necessary to the honest defense of the accused or in the determination of his sentence that certain orders or decrees about which he knows nothing be applied to his case. In such an event he needs some one who is acquainted with various enactments. In the next place he may not be of a nature so cool and composed when his life or liberty is at stake that he can interrogate witnesses himself, cross question, and otherwise exercise his legal rights. Likewise, if it is a serious case, when he gets his last word before the court he will want it to be an effective one. The speech of a good lawyer, analyzing and weighing the evidence, may be a deciding factor. Straightforward and interested in the protection of the state as a lawyer may be, he is likely to think of some points in favor of his client that neither judge nor prosecutor would find unaided. And that leads to the third and last acknowledged reason for the use of private attorneys. It is likely that the prosecutor may be prejudiced in favor of the guilt which he has already seen indicated by the evidence he had in hand when he remanded the accused for trial. It is likely also that the judge, having found that evidence sufficient to sustain the indictment, may not be able to see some things on the other side that a legal adviser hired for the purpose would be able to find. The authorities on criminal law believe that, too, and therefore, on the theory that innocence is presumed until guilt is proved, they provide for an advocate who is more likely to be conscious of the innocence. A question occurs here as to whether an advocate would risk defending a client whom he knew to be guilty through a confession or otherwise. Theoretically, he would only in this case attempt to interpret or explain the act so as to get freedom or a lesser sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense often has a lawyer when there is no prosecuting attorney present. In the People’s Court the state representative may not appear, and yet the counsel for the defense is always admitted. The reverse cannot be true. There can be no prosecutor present without the defense counsel. One of the specific provisions of the law is that on all occasions when a prosecutor appears for the state there must also be a counsel for the defendant. In case the latter has not been able to get one or is not able to pay, the court looks after the matter for him by having the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers appoint a counsel. It may be a case a lawyer would not want; it may be the worst of the so-called “class enemies,” but some one must serve. Not only that, but if the complexity of the case warrants it, one of the best must be appointed. The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; pays the member serving on such an unremunerated errand out of its own funds, according to the fees he is accustomed to receive and according to the complexity of the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is one other condition in which the court must see that the defense is represented by counsel. If the defendant is deaf or dumb or suffering from any physical handicap that will prevent his understanding correctly the procedure of the case counsel is obligatory. Likewise, in the case of juveniles of 16-18 years of age (the court does not handle the cases of those under 16), the instructions of the Commissariat of Justice is that there be counsel provided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense counsel, once in charge of the case, has rights and privileges as great as the prosecution. He may see his client as often as he wants to, for as long as is necessary, without the presence of any attendant or official. He has the right to advise the defendant all during the trial. He has the right to records in the case so that he may study it thoroughly and introduce any evidence he finds necessary in the interest of justice for his client. And he has a right to the last word. He not only makes the final speech but he questions witnesses after the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The lawyers of Russia, with the exception of a few independent ones, are organized into “collective corporations.” This, of course, is right in line with the socialist theory of government. While lawyers have a right to engage in private practice there are a number of reasons why one would prefer to be a member of one of these collective bodies. Let us look at some of the characteristics of these organizations. The following list was given by Professor Brusilovsky, who is himself a member of the collegium.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(1) The individual lawyer has no direct financial transaction with the client. The fee is fixed by a special consultant and paid to the treasurer of the ‘collective.’&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The lawyer may go on his vacation knowing his client will be served by colleagues. While on vacation he draws a salary equal to his normal monthly income.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) here is value in consulting a number of lawyers on a case to clear up difficult points. This is especially valuable for the young members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Fees are differentiated according to the qualification of the individual lawyer, his service record, experience and ability. He is insured against sickness and incapacity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Membership—It is open to all citizens who: (a) possess electoral rights, (b) have a certain record of service in the organs of Soviet justice, and (c) have either passed the prescribed examination or have received a superior juridical education.”&lt;br /&gt;
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We have been considering up to now in this chapter the organization of the defense provided for in the law. This is the machinery through which the rights of an individual may be protected in criminal procedure. Now, let us turn to the defendant himself as he appears in the case and see what safeguards are given him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is, first, the matter of the preliminary trial. While that phase of the case as a whole has already been discussed the rights accorded to the suspected person were purposely not emphasized since that angle of the proceedings properly belongs here.&lt;br /&gt;
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To begin with, let us suppose the suspect is held in custody by the arresting organs, the militia or the former agents of the OGPU. They can keep him just twenty-four hours, and no more, until they must get permission from the people’s judge or from the prosecuting attorney for his detention. If they cannot get enough evidence in that time to support the arrest there is nothing to do but release him. That does not mean, however, that the case must be dropped. If they are convinced of his guilt, but have not been able by that time to establish it, the authorities may permit the man to be held a longer time so that the case can be built up, or in case the suspicion has not enough grounds even for that, they may go on working quietly until they do uncover what they want. However, for the sake of our case, suppose the prosecutor gives permission for the man to be held. In fourteen days there must be either release or sufficient evidence to hold him. While there are no &#039;&#039;habeas corpus&#039;&#039; proceedings in the administration of Soviet law, there is the assurance that a man must be either released at the end of two weeks or some testimony produced that will justify his being held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor may he languish in jail while his trial is put off from day to day. The maximum time permitted for the preliminary work and the bringing of a case to trial is one month. Obviously there may be cases when it will be absolutely necessary to extend this limit and by permission it may be extended. But the law provides that there must be reasons shown as to why extra time is asked. The fact that this limit is adhered to in practice is shown by records that in the city court trials of Moscow 75 per cent. of the cases are tried in ten days and the majority of the others in fifteen or twenty. It is quite likely that there are cases in which an arresting organ holds a man more than the twenty-four hours or an investigator permits more than the maximum time to elapse before trial, but members of the Commissariat of Justice insist that if detected in such acts the agents are swiftly and surely punished. Those in authority do not hold in high esteem those officials who do not cooperate in the establishment of revolutionary legality. While there would, of course, be no statistics of such illegal practices, those in prison of whom the writer asked the question about the time of pre-trial detention gave answers of periods which were all within the limit except two. One man indicated that his rights had been violated, the other gave causes for his detention beyond the period.&lt;br /&gt;
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The person under suspicion (it will be recalled that he is not the “accused” until such time as a definite accusal is made) may make a complaint at any time against the actions of those conducting the preliminary inquiry or investigation, and such a complaint may be appealed within seven days, not only to the prosecutor but to the judge under whose jurisdiction the case may be. If it is a serious case, he may from the beginning have employed counsel to do that for him, but in the event of the simpler case, or of his having no counsel, there is sure to be some interested person among family or friends who will attend to this for him, if he should be detained in such a manner that he could not reach the proper authority and the one against whom he complained would not take care of the matter for him. The law provides that such an official must receive and transmit a complaint directed against him, but there might conceivably be instances when meeting this duty would be unpleasant—especially if the official was guilty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the preliminary trial the defendant is protected in every possible way. If he has not been in custody the initial steps may have been taken without his cognizance. This may have been necessary in order to prevent his escape while ground was being prepared for holding him. But, if there is sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation he is now apprized of it. He may be summoned to appear in almost any manner—by telephone, telegraph or otherwise, or if the circumstances are such that his escape must be prevented, he may be then arrested. In any case he now participates in the investigation which, it is remembered, is carried on by the investigator or, in the event of a serious case, by the prosecutor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He is now told what the charges against him are, and it is made very clear to him. He may at this moment offer an explanation of the substantial facts which will put an entirely new interpretation on the case, and cause its dismissal, if he substantiates what he tells. It is to be remembered that there are no sides taken in this stage of the procedure. It is usual that no counsel has yet appeared for the person under inquiry, the prosecutor is acting in his rôle of collector of information and there is, theoretically, at least, no effort to pin either guilt or innocence on to the party. The accused (he becomes “accused” from the moment the charge is officially explained to him) may suggest witnesses, may request experts, as we have previously seen, and attach any proofs to the documents, and such requests must be granted unless the investigator is convinced that they have no real importance in the case. If he does the latter, he is likely to be rather sure of his ground, as otherwise his judgment would face reversal when his decision was appealed to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred to the use of experts and the accused person’s rights as to selection. With all the information collected and the decision made, his chance to submit evidence to prevent the trial is still not exhausted. On the decision of the investigator to present the accusation, the person against whom it is directed may go over all the materials collected. Now, in the light of what he finds, he may offer further elucidation himself or he may request further witnesses who will be able to shed additional light. He is given every opportunity here, by law at least, to get in a stroke that will indicate his innocence. And in the event it goes to the court, in spite of his efforts, the judge may be convinced of the weight of his argument or evidence and direct the investigator to either build up his case better or dismiss it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We will suppose it stands. The administrative session of court places the case on its calendar. It comes to trial after not longer than a month from the time the accusation is handed over by the investigator, and the accused becomes the defendant. In the meantime the accused will have secured his counsel. Little was said about the part a counsel for the defense might play in the preliminary stages, for the reason that except in serious cases there would almost surely be none at that time. The normal time for the appointment of one by the court, in cases requiring this, would be immediately after it was decided to hold the person for trial. On the presentation of the accusation to the accused he is informed of his legal right to counsel. In case he is unable to provide for an attorney he petitions the court for aid. Likewise, if he chooses one at this time, he submits the name for approval. Then the court, in its administrative session, when deciding whether to hold the accused for trial, likewise settles the question of counsel, if the accused has petitioned, by approving his choice or appointing one. Approval of his choice is necessary only if he has selected some person outside of such authorized lists as members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; or some representative provided by government institutions. Otherwise he may select whomever he will among the authorized persons and be assured that that person must act for him and for a fee that will be set for him within his ability to pay. The element of contest which is one of the basic principles in the Soviet judicature is now found for the first time. Two parties are aligned one against the other, each to prove its rightness. From this time on, the accused is the defendant and there are two sides to the case. Let us see the trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defendant has the right to a public trial. This, too, is one of the principles of criminal procedure of the Soviet courts and by its observation there is insured fairness through public opinion. Through publicity there is brought about both the education of the people and the control of the court by them. There are only two conditions under which the trial may be behind closed doors—when a state secret must be kept, and in sexual crimes where intimate details must be revealed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defendant has a right to be present at his own trial, unless he voluntarily stays away. A case may be tried without him, if he has given his consent or when he has failed to respond to the summons. In the latter case, however, it must be clearly shown that an effort was made to reach him and that he directly evaded it, or there will probably be a reversal of the verdict in the higher court. An attempt to use his lack of response as an excuse for trial without his presence would have to be supported sufficiently to avoid abuse. In simpler cases when there is no possibility of imposing a prison sentence, his presence may not be required by the court, but in offenses punishable by a prison sentence he must be there if he can be found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the case opens, the presiding judge explains to the defendant his rights, as a party to the court, to make use of all material, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to make any statements he will at any stage of the trial. These things he may do even though he is represented by counsel, and if he has decided to defend himself or entrust it to some relative he is sure to find plenty of opportunity to exercise this right. The writer witnessed one case in which a simple-looking workman took care of his interests so well that one could understand his going to trial without legal aid. Before his vehement and rapid-fire interrogation, witnesses quailed and became confused. The informality of the proceedings permits of participation without timidity in most cases. There is no fear of set rules of the game, because they do not exist. The accused defends himself as he would before his neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next assurance is that the defendant may cause the removal of judge or juror if there is likely to be bias in his attitude. Perhaps one of them is relative or friend to the injured party, or to some other person who would be interested in the conviction of the defendant. In that case he may challenge, giving his grounds therefor, and the question will be decided by the rest of the court sitting without the member so indicated. If he is overruled he has that fact as grounds for complaint to the cassation instance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now as the case goes to trial, with the defendant a party to the court so that he may spar as he wishes with prosecutor or clash with witnesses, either with counsel or without, he has also the right of presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It would seem that the preliminary trial had already established guilt sufficiently so that the actual trial would merely bring to light what had gone before, and establish the degree of guilt. But such is not the theory incorporated in Soviet criminal law. It may be that evidence will take a different turn, that the very atmosphere of the public trial will provide a new viewpoint. The object of the preliminary investigation is not to constitute a determination of guilt but to give guarantee that there are some grounds for trial. Authorities on the administration of criminal law point to the relatively low percentage of convictions, there being, according to one authority, almost one-third of those remanded to the People’s Court dismissed, and a lack of conviction of at least a quarter of those actually reaching court. From that one would judge that the holding for trial by the investigation organs of the courts does not mean in actual practice that one’s guilt has been established. During the trial the defendant has every right which he has already been accorded in the preliminary procedure, but they are now rendered broader and of more value because he is familiar with all the data that have been produced, and all the witnesses who have been gathered by the investigation are now before him for questioning. Through his cross-examination of the state’s witnesses he may develop lines of proof that he can substantiate by calling further witnesses of his own, or he may refute the state’s contention. Some expert, whom the investigation used for some specific interpretation, may change his own opinion in the light of some explanation which the defendant himself or his witness can give. He has here three distinct privileges—he may request certain witnesses, other experts, or fresh proofs from the state if the case is to be sustained; he may give explanations to the court of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act at any time and as often during the trial as he wishes or thinks necessary; and he has the invaluable right to take part in the examination of all witnesses, experts, or others who take part in the trial. And now, if he has been directing his own defense he may also make the final speech and thus leave the last word with the court as it goes forth to deliberate on the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is some difference in the privileges and rights accorded one tried in the People’s Courts and in the higher courts. The reason is not far to seek. In the People’s Court there are no cases of a class nature of the serious sort. There could not be, since the jurisdiction of the People’s Court does not extend to crimes punishable by the death sentence. Here come the people from among the masses who have violated the law, but when a Kulak or one of the bourgeoisie is involved and the offense is against the state or the order of government, the case goes to a higher tribunal and the rights of the defendant are more circumscribed. In a trial when the accused is of a socially dangerous character, and restrictions are held to be necessary, the discretionary power of the judge may draw such limits as depriving the defendant of rights of counsel, of certain witnesses, or of records in the case. Such procedure, however, is said to be unusual and resorted to only in cases where the offense is of a highly dangerous character. Even in such an instance the defendant may still conduct his own case with all of his customary rights. The accused may be a socially dangerous character who must necessarily be subjected to restrictions. It is likely that this happens in a small degree and only in the most serious cases, but in fairness a chapter dealing with the rights of the defendant should call attention to this possible limitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To see the defendant in court one is impressed with the amount of liberty he has. One forgets that he is the man whose life or liberty is in jeopardy. He talks, he interrogates, he explains and argues. And it is amazing to see how these people have come to understand the working of the law. It is a part of the duty of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers to help in explaining and popularizing the Soviet laws and a good job they have done of it, too. Of course, they have had their helpers, but one finds children who know why the law of August 7, 1932, providing a death penalty for larceny from the state was necessary, and as for the enactment which specifies a five-year period of imprisonment for adulteration in an effort to make for better quality, every housewife knows the answer. She demands better material for her dresses, better sugar for her table, and she has heard all about the law, its necessity and purpose, in her factory or other place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That acquaintance with the laws, that knowledge of the principle involved, makes it possible for an offender to do a pretty good job as his own attorney, unless he be one of the illiterate peasants. In that case, if he has no counsel, he can be rather sure of the court’s interest in finding out the facts and in interpreting them correctly. It is to the state’s interest to see that the accused person has every opportunity to be treated fairly, and the court is only the organ of the state in carrying out such a policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As has already been said, the people seem in most cases to agree with the verdict of the court and that is worth something as an indication of justice. They are encouraged to follow the case and to understand the application of the law. After hearing their discussion at a trial, one would know of their intense interest. It seems to be an added cloak of protection for the defendant in case a judge did exceed fair play. It would be felt in the appeal!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the event of a verdict of guilty the convicted one now has his right of complaint so that his case will be reviewed by the cassational division of the higher court, the Regional or the Supreme Court, or to the latter even from the first. Herein is his last chance of life or liberty. Already we have talked of cases where the decision of the lower courts was reversed. That happens in about ten per cent. of the cases. So a man has a slim one-chance-in-ten hope of getting off from his punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perhaps the reader has, in this enumeration of rights, been impressed with the absence of one held dear in the United States—the right of a person to trial by a jury of his “peers.” But the system existent in the Soviet Union bears a resemblance in effect, although they repudiate the idea of our jury system both for political expedience and because they think the practice unsound from a judicial point of view. However, the two persons who sit with the judge do actually provide some check on his judgment and authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet system the two jurors, or co-judges, may decide independently of the judge in all cases. They are selected with a view to their having some ability to serve, and most of them seem to be people of intelligence who take an active part in the trial. While they are without doubt subject at times to influence from the judge in deliberating on the verdict, there seems also ground for suspecting that because of their nearness to the workers there would be a strong tendency to reflect the opinion of such a group in a verdict they would render. They cannot be regarded as party tools, since a large majority are not party members as against the large majority of judges who are. However, there is a class feeling. The court, as said before, is an organ for carrying out the policy of the state, and decisions will naturally consider the dangerous character of the person on trial. The class nature of the procedure is apparent and is acknowledged, but it is held to be legitimate, a necessity. The jurors could not be expected to aid in a decision, or render one on their own account, which would go against this policy. Thus it would seem that the jurors might have effect in trials not of a class nature, might actually constitute an additional safeguard to the rights of the defendant. There are cases on record where they have gone against the judgment of the court, and rendered their own verdict, thus proving that they are not always a rubber stamp.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER X: CORRECTIVE LABOR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; title of this chapter defines the attitude of the Soviet government toward those persons whom it sets apart from society for a time. It is almost necessary to see what they have done in this line to understand it properly. The institutions in which the policy is carried out have moved many people to warm praise. M. Herriot of France, on visiting the Kharkov Labor Commune exclaimed, “I am not a Communist. I am an old man,” then launched into exuberant appreciation of the system in use there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the discussion of the system in all its details of work and education, one should read the volume, already referred to, &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, edited by Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky. Each separate article is written by a specialist in his particular field and each presents in minuteness some phase of the system which the Russians use. They have known what they wanted to do in the direction of reformation even back in the days of 1917, but for so many years the idea lay, like others did, obscured by catastrophe. Terror and necessity caused severity to prevail for a long time. Punishment was the mainstay of defense from foe within in order to withstand a little better the ones then pressing from without.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the idea was there in the minds of those who were to define the penal policy and the Code of 1922, and set down the principle that punishment was not for the purpose of revenge and might not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain. With this beginning there was a steady progress toward the removing of those indignities that tend to degrade a man, until the Correctional Labor Code of 1933 completed the process. In the meantime various amendments have prohibited torture, the use of handcuffs, solitary confinement, deprivation of food, or any other measure that would have the effect of degradation or do physical harm to the person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0178.svg|SYSTEM OF PLACES FOR DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There has been a steady effort to remove what they term the “prison spirit.” There is, they tell you, no such thing as a “captive” or “prisoner.” The idea is to keep the person deprived of his liberty from feeling in any measure isolated. He is given work to do such as he would have outside and he is always conscious of its useful nature. There are instructors for the various trades, machinery, carpentry, etc., who see that each man is educated for his job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are two main types of places for deprivation of liberty, those located in cities in close quarters, and those out in the country where there is space and greater freedom. In chapters just following some of these typical ones will be described, but they are mentioned here so that references may be clearer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before describing the characteristics of the institutions used for corrective labor, we shall need to define the policy that goes into the system. The articles on which the materials for this chapter are mainly based are those by B. Utievsky on &#039;&#039;Prison Regime&#039;&#039;, and another entitled &#039;&#039;Work in Correctional Labor Institutions&#039;&#039; by M. Kessler and B. Oleinin, both of which are included in the volume edited by Vishinsky, already referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We note again in connection with this work the class character of criminal legislation. One of the basic principles is the assumption that peasants and workers deprived of their liberty are not premeditated enemies of the Soviet order, and under these circumstances it is natural to suppose that treatment for them would be milder than for the anti-proletarians, and the privileges enjoyed by them would be greater. However, this assumption does not prevent the use of the same policy and the same methods in the prison treatment of the so-called class enemies. While the main purpose in placing the political prisoner and others whose crime is chiefly against the state in outlying places was to isolate them from society and prevent their continued danger, there was still a desire to restore them as useful citizens by means of education and labor. The principle expressed in the Code that “maintenance in correctional labor institutions shall be reasonable, and shall not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity” is carried out, they say, in the places where political prisoners are kept just as in others. The main difference is that these prisoners have less freedom, less liberty for contact with society. The aim, however, uppermost in their treatment is to organize a collective life for them, and by the education which is provided to cause these people to fit into that life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An example of constructive use of these prisoners from the anti-proletarian class is the building of the White Sea-Baltic Canal. It is interesting just here to give a quotation from Maxim Gorki, which illustrates their own point of view as to the value of this policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“How did the kulaks work? Here is an instance. The Podlipinsky brigade of the first section in which there were 32 kulaks in the last ten days has set a record of 25 per cent. fulfillment of their quota. But the brigade would not quit its job even when the next shift came to take their place. The brigade had to be taken off by direct order of the chief of the section.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The order Number One brigade consisted chiefly of kulaks. It was on rock work in the sixth section. It has fulfilled 130-150 per cent. of its quota. Their exemplary work was rewarded and entered into the Red Labor Book.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While this may be propaganda, the fact remains that there are those operating the locks in this canal who have been discharged as prisoners, but who continue loyally at the post. We are assured by another author that “thousands of convicts from anti-Soviet elements redeemed themselves, and showed great devotion to Soviet construction. Many gained their freedom; a great many were accorded all kinds of privileges, and a few awarded the highest order of merit.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we come to consider the program for those prisoners from among their own masses we get on safer grounds, at least as to practice. The policy follows much the same lines. We have mentioned before the change in terminology from jails or prisons to “places for deprivation of liberty.” It has also been mentioned that the change does not appear to be limited to terminology, but that the actual purpose to carry out some definite measure by which a man may be rendered fit for a useful place in society seems well observed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, perhaps, would be a good place to say that the program of the Communist Party in regard to treatment of those who break the law calls for eventual correctional labor without deprivation of liberty. Their ultimate goal, both expressed in policy and now being put into practice in a limited way, is that persons shall be sent to labor under supervision where training is provided. This practice will have to go slowly and proceed as their educational program prepares the way for it. At the present time there is usually no sentence of deprivation of liberty for less than one year. Any penalty of compulsory labor given for less than that minimum permits the offender to retain his liberty. In such cases the unemployed among these persons is farmed out to factory or to agricultural work with supervision and training provided. He is given a place to live near to his work, but he is free to go and come as he wishes. It is the aim of the higher judicial organs to abolish the use of deprivation of liberty as rapidly as possible, and to use it only for cases who do not respond to other measures of social defense. The Superior Court has likewise given instructions to the lower tribunals to use deprivation of liberty only as other measures have failed. The employed who are sentenced to labor without deprivation of liberty remain on the job on which they are at work and a certain per cent. of the salary received is deducted each month. With both of these classes there is a possibility of early discharge for good work and because of the practice used in all their penal institutions of counting two working days equal to three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up to 1929 there were still in existence isolated places of detention but since that time the policy prevalent has been to change all of these into the favored educational establishments. At the present time all persons sentenced are taken care of in the various types of labor colonies (industrial, agricultural, road building, land improvement, etc.) or in the semi-free labor camps where guards are maintained, usually selected from among the inmates themselves, but where there are no locked rooms or prison walls.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The régime, then, of these institutions, according to Utievsky, has three basic influences: (1) Socially useful, productive labor, (2) political educational influences, and (3) the development of public activity among the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now see how these three methods of influence are carried out in the institutions themselves. The purpose of labor on the part of the convicts is to provide organized collective work in a society where collective living in all its phases is a predominant note. It is essential to successful readjustment. The Kulak, with his individualistic tendencies, is re-educated in this political philosophy. While he is at this labor, the convict works under the same conditions, and with the same protections that he would enjoy in outside labor. His hours are seven or eight a day, depending upon the nature of his work, and he is permitted a weekly rest of a continuous 42-hour period. Special protection is given to the juvenile laborer, but this will be mentioned again in the chapter concerning juvenile delinquency.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no night work for women, just as there would not be in outside labor, and minors under eighteen are not to be employed in injurious trades. Maternity vacations of eight weeks for physical labor, and six weeks for mental work, both before and after childbirth are prescribed for women. There also exist regulations of various sorts for sanitation and safety. The whole idea is that the person deprived of his liberty may be made to feel that he labors on a par with workers outside; that he may feel useful in the economic plan of the nation; and, through the pay given him, continue support to his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the general consideration mentioned above, there are some special rules of importance. For example, women who are in the fifth month of pregnancy may not be sent to any work outside the institution of which they are inmates, without their consent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all labor in the Soviet Union there are a certain number of days of work (five is the general rule) and one day of rest. This is likewise true of convict labor, and on the eve of the rest day all work and school study must be suspended from dinner time (which is at midday). Another privilege of importance is that each person keeps his own work book with a record of hours, wages due, and deductions made, properly entered. In this way he does not have to take the word of any official as to the correctness of the count, but is able to see for himself and complain if an error has been made.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the matter of food there is a provision for increase in accordance with the expenditure of energy in the work assigned. One doing heavy physical labor would, for example, be given food in larger quantities than one using less strength. In accordance with the principle that a prisoner may not be degraded, the administrative office of these institutions is not permitted to make use of the personal services of the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was mentioned in the beginning that one type of institution provided for the carrying on of all activities in small areas. These are of the nature of penitentiaries, but even for the type of convict in these prisons there are large works of a variety of kinds organized outside the city limits. Among these would be brick-work, bridge building colonies, house building, dairy farms and truck gardens. One of the most constructive things about this labor, in whatever line, is that it forms a part of the five-year plan, and is thus put on the same basis as other forms. The industry carried on must, first of all, satisfy the needs of the institution itself, but goods in excess of this amount are placed on the home market. Export of prison-made goods is forbidden except in the case of the sports goods made at Bolshevo Labor Commune. The latter are noted for their excellent quality and are exported to various countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the grave prison problems in this country is the question of payment of wages to persons serving sentences in penal institutions. In the Soviet system there is no unpaid labor. The amount may not be less than 25 per cent. of the existing scale, nor more than 50 per cent. The cost of maintenance is, of course, not deducted from this amount. In establishing the schedule the prison administration must have the agreement of the Commissar of Labor, and the fact of the profit or loss of the enterprise does not enter into the calculations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convict is not restricted in the spending of his earnings. He may purchase extra foodstuffs, clothing, or he may send his income to his family for support. He may be given advice in the matter, but there is no compulsion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One point in connection with this system is that labor is not compulsory. A convict may work or not as he wishes, and still receive maintenance. But in refusing to work, he loses most of the privileges which he would otherwise enjoy. Practically none do refuse, it is said. On the other hand, there is a great increase in those joining the shock brigade, the group doing excellent work, sometimes even for additional hours. In 1933 in the Moscow region, this figure reached 51.3 per cent. of the total number in these institutions. The number fluctuates usually between 54 and 78 per cent. As a result quotas of production are usually more than fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second basic influence in the program of this institution is political education. A system is established in each place of deprivation of liberty, and the official in charge is the assistant warden. Practically all education carried on has a strong political influence. However, one of the aims involved is the elimination of illiteracy. Every effort is being made in the Soviet Union to give to each citizen at least an elementary education, whether he be in prison or out. To that end there is established in every state institution schools providing for the first seven years of work. There are also other penal institution courses for the semi-illiterates and those of a sufficiently advanced nature for the more educated. There are in addition some evening and university classes for those wishing to take advantage of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the regular school work which is carried on both by teachers from the outside and some selected from qualified inmates, there is a system of lectures covering specialized subjects. These are designed to give information of a social-political nature and educate the individual in the use of sanitation and hygiene. There are others of a general educational character embracing material of interest to the group. These lectures are given by specialists in the various fields, who are invited by prison administrators, and by any one among the convicts who might be qualified to talk on a particular subject. Admission, of course, is open to all without restriction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In connection with the education work, there are libraries and reading rooms. There is a library located in each place of deprivation of liberty, and there are also circulating ones, and in neither are there restrictions as to the use of books. In most cases some work of this nature is obligatory, but beyond that every convict is not only permitted to use the facilities, but is encouraged to take advantage of the privileges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reading room may be visited at any free hour. Here are found recent newspapers, magazines and other periodicals. Newspapers are also distributed in the rooms, and convicts may subscribe to their own outside these limits if they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The radio with which each room is usually equipped also constitutes an important instrument of education. Lectures, music, and other information or entertainment of an educational and cultural nature may be listened to by the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most interesting phases in the development of this program in these institutions is the art work. The convicts are trained in dramatic performance and also enjoy in this connection entertainment by outside companies. There are concerts and moving pictures given, in almost every one of these places, and convicts attend not less than once a week. But the interesting side of it to an observer is the work the inmates do themselves in the matter of writing and producing their own stage performances. The convicts are free to attend and there is, of course, no charge for admission. A theater or auditorium is a part of the equipment of every institution of this nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sanitary education carried on is in line with the program of other education of this nature, distributing such information to the masses of people. There is an opportunity here for teaching individuals in an effective way, and for seeing that certain fundamentals are put into actual practice. There is a bureau of sanitary education in each institution, composed of the house physician, representatives from the department of political education, and delegates elected by the convicts themselves, devoting itself to this phase of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The purpose of these institutions is seen in its most complete fulfillment in the vocational training which each gives. There are courses in schools of all the various trade groups, providing both theoretical and practical training in skilled trades. The unskilled laborer is here transformed into a man with specialized information in some particular line, which will both render him useful in industry and give him happiness in his work. In 1931, 7,700 convicts attended such courses in the Soviet Union, and 6,500 workers were in that year turned out trained for some particular trade. In 1933 the plan was for giving such preparation to 24,000. Salvation for society and for the individual, they hold, lies in this direction and every man and woman sentenced for law-breaking must be so fitted to earning a livelihood that he will not transgress again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be mentioned before passing to the next point that both cultural and legal work is carried on by means of mass meetings through the organization of such groups as law clubs, and by means of evening forums, lectures and talks. There is also a legal bureau composed of representatives of the department of political education, and two members elected from the convicts, which gives legal aid or advice to the inmates whenever it is needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third basic influence in correctional labor—the development of public activities among the convicts—accounts for some of the most valuable rehabilitating work done in these places, in the author’s opinion. The aim here is to strengthen, or develop where they have been lacking, the social habits of the individual; to turn him into a conscious and active member of society. The basic forms of social activity in these institutions take several directions. There is first the general meeting on various occasions for a variety of purposes. This may be for the formation of social organizations, for the conducting of a campaign for the election of some representative, or perhaps for a celebration of some revolutionary event. The convicts establish their own rules of procedure and make whatever proposals are appropriate. These general meetings take care of whatever concerns are common to the entire population, and leave to the more specialized groups whatever is of narrower interest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the production conferences, held by convicts in the same manner as those used by free-workers in industrial enterprises, an active part is taken in settling whatever questions arise in relation to production. They discuss industrial plans for improvement, financial methods, quota fulfillment, or any question that would logically come within their jurisdiction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most outstanding achievements in the line of self-activities among the convicts is the development of the comradely courts. Through this tribunal those disciplinary problems referred to it are transferred from the administration to the convicts themselves. This court is responsible for the maintenance of order and for seeing that a high quality of educational work prevails, for administering disciplinary measures in the case of shirking work or lessons, of spoiling the equipment of the shops, of laxity in observance of regulations of sanitation and health, of the use of indecent language, of damage done to any book or periodical, of inciting ill treatment of one convict by another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court is composed of a chairman, and two jurors elected at one of the general meetings referred to above. The penalties which they may impose on one who breaks the rules, or fails to live up to the standard set, are as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) Reprimand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Censure with strict warning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Censure with publication in local newspapers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Limitation of visits by friends from outside for a period of not more than one month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) Application to supervisory committee for transfer to another prison with a stricter régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Application for withholding vacation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) Application for either partial or complete non-discounting of working days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) Application for withholding all probation, and early release during a certain period of not more than one month after maturing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) Restitution of damage done.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case of undue severity on the part of this court, the warden may alter the penalty to a milder form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred in the paragraphs dealing with education to cultural committees. These are elected at a general mass meeting to put into action the plans for political education work or to devote themselves to other problems of a cultural nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every place of deprivation of liberty has its wall newspaper, changed about every week or ten days and carrying news of various sorts of a political or educational nature, as well as items of interest to prison life. The editorial boards of these papers are likewise elected at the general meetings. Prison administrators as well as other authorities on penal policy in the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the development of public activities among the prisoners has yielded splendid results of a social nature. They point to the success of the “book soobotnik” (one day’s salary given for books) which netted 100,000 rubles. It is stated that the gifts were entirely voluntary without pressure from any source. Another incident showing a desirable spirit was the collection among the convicts of 31,818 rubles for an aeroplane which was presented to the fleet. There have been other acts of the same kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now we turn to the régime found in these institutions, the express purpose of which is to develop free will, initiative and self-activity. All privileges possible are permitted to the man deprived of his liberty, and his freedom as little restricted as the nature of the person himself permits. Following out the principle that no condition designed to degrade the convict or make him feel inferior may be permitted, penal authorities proceeded legislatively to remove whatever might exist in this line. The corrective labor code of 1933, for example, completely severed all connection with the progressive system of progressive classification of prisoners. The theory is that in this educational-labor program no man is to be treated with greater privilege than another unless he himself makes some deprivation necessary. Even then there are limits. A recalcitrant member of the penal population may be deprived for a period not longer than one month of such privileges as writing letters, or receiving visitors, but no corporal punishment may be inflicted nor may he be locked in solitary confinement. It is worth noting here that the solitary cells left from the Tzarist days may at times be used for tenants, but the door of the cell may not be locked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convicts have privileges as great as can be accorded. From the day of their entrance they may walk about anywhere they wish at any time they are free from work. In those institutions located in the country, this may take the character of quite a good walk, while in those of the penitentiary type located in cities, it naturally is limited to the prison yard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Visitors may come as often as twice in five days and may consist not only of relatives but of friends and acquaintances as well. There is no red tape in making arrangements for a visit so that no difficulty of this sort prevents contact between the convict and those outside. There may be as many as three persons at one time, and they may bring with them, if they wish, gifts of food, tobacco, etc. There is no restriction in the use of tobacco except that there are some particular places where the convict is requested not to smoke. Outside of this he may have as many cigarettes as he wishes or can obtain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither is there restriction in the number of letters which he may write or receive. In the matter of either letters or gifts the administration reserves the right of inspection, but in the majority of cases, unless there is some suspicion attached to the person, this right is not utilized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is an interesting development in the matter of leaves. For the man who has proved himself a good worker and who is not suspected of any intention of escape, a leave of fourteen days in the year is granted. He may go where he likes on this vacation, and use it as he pleases. He is placed entirely on his honor and no guard is in attendance at any time. In addition to this a convict may obtain a leave at any time because of an emergency such as an illness or death in his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still more liberal terms are granted to the peasant or collective farmer. In the event that he is needed for field labor, he is given a leave for the full three-month period of the season, and if he breaks no law during this leave, the time counts on his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to this leave and vacation, there is always the possibility of release after a short part of the original sentence has been served. If the person is judged fit to be restored to his place in society, and thought to be no longer a menace, he may be released after serving a minimum of one-third of his sentence. There is also the practice, as already mentioned, of counting two productive working days as three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before passing from the chapter describing the policy and character of corrective labor work, some mention ought to be made of the administration. Who exactly is responsible in the USSR for seeing that this policy is translated into action? At the very head are the Commissariats of Justice of the various republics.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A Law of October 24, 1934, transferred the administration of all places of deprivation of liberty to the newly created Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR. The organization described is now within this Department, but the author had the information too late to incorporate in the body of the book.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There is a certain amount of independence in these relationships. The Collective Labor Code of 1933 of the RSFSR made a considerable advance in the direction of autonomous supervision on the part of the administration of corrective labor organization in these republics. Those institutions located in the territory of these various republics are administered and managed by local commissars of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this organization there are local administrative bodies known as observation committees. One of these exists in connection with each institution and is directly responsible for administration and management. In direct charge is the superintendent or warden, and his staff of assistants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is especially close relation between the agency of supervision and the prisoners which enables the Observation Commission to know with a high degree of accuracy as to when release is advisable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Previous to 1926 there had been two commissions participating in the distribution and release of prisoners—the Distributory Commission and the Observation Commission. The Observation Commission, however, while making recommendations to the Distributory Commission in matters of dismissal and release, played a minor role, since its viewpoint was in no way binding on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1924 provided for an Observation Commission to be established at every place of deprivation of liberty as a part of the staff of the place. On this commission was the people’s judge, and a representative of the local bureau of trade unions. This extension in the scope of the work of these commissions was made in an effort both to raise the level of work being done at the prisons and also to establish a closer contact between commission and prisoners. The result hoped for, however, was not realized as the judge was entirely, by nature of his position, separated from his work, and the representatives of the bureau took little interest in the matter. By the same Act the powers of the Distributory Commission were widened, and the Act of April 21, 1926, went further still, giving to this body authority to assign the long-term prisoners to places of agricultural work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There still was the gap between the work of the commission of release and the correctional labor institutions. The Observation Commission which was on the ground could make recommendations but they were not always accepted by the Distributory Commission which handled dismissals and releases. Many mistakes resulted and the desire of the authorities to establish intimate contact between commission and prisoners was being thwarted. Thus the Sixth Congress of Jurists proposed the liquidation of the Distributory Commissions and the reorganization of the Observation Commissions. By the reformation of 1929 new opportunities for constructive work were opened to these commissions, and the contact between them and the prisoners of the institution was finally made close and real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 made several important changes in the composition and work of these commissions of the RSFSR. There is now a Central Commission and under it trade union observation committees on which are the head of the correctional labor institution and two representatives from the general organization which are installed in each of the large corrective labor units and in all field production. Every effort has been made to see that there is close contact of these commissions with the institutions, that the policy of the central administration is carried out, that the work follows the lines it should, and results in fitting the inmates of the institutions for life as it is supposed to do. The Commissar of Justice is, in the last analysis, responsible for the work of these commissions, but by Act of February 10, 1933, he has placed that responsibility squarely on one man, the chairman of the Corrective Labor Commission, whose duty it now is to see that the policy and plans of the commissariat are carried out. This chairman is a member of the Central Observation Commission, but not the chairman of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prosecutors who were supposed to be attending the open session of these meetings and were actually present at them to the extent of 78 per cent., were found to be merely sitting quietly and taking no active part in solving problems and working out plans. By the same Act of February 10, 1933, the Commissar of Justice ordered them not only to be present but to participate actively in all meetings. There are no figures on actual participation but the percentage of attendance jumped from 78 to 82 and it is stated that practically all those present take an active part in discussions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no lack of effort to see that this commission inquires into, and knows, what is going on, is acquainted with the prisoners, and never for a moment forgets what it is set up to do. For the accomplishment of an organic union between the Observation Commission and the corrective labor institution, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee has demanded that the members of this commission participate actively in the creative and labor life of the institution as well as in its political education. To effect this there are many special meetings, besides the open ones, devoted to the problems of various industries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us see for a moment what organizations are represented on these commissions and how often the respective members attend the meetings.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 406407.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| style=&amp;quot;width: 70%&amp;quot;| Name of organization&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| No. of meetings attended&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(in per cent.)&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Corrective Labor Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 68&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Court&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 82&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Worker-peasant inspection&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 74.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Other Soviet Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 54&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Women’s delegate groups&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 73&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Enterprizes&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 58&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Organization of Komsomol&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 47&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Sections of Revolutionary Law&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 63&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Trade Unions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 66&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jurors&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 95&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Agricultural collectives&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 60&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This table was for the last nine months of 1932. It represents not a particularly bad showing but it was in 1933 that the All-Union Central Executive Committee decided that this was not sufficient and that there must be even better attendance. It aimed its order this time at the social members and demanded that they give active aid in inculcating social form of labor into correctional labor institutions. There is no thought of sending a man away to prison to get him out of the community then forgetting all about him. He will be returning in an average time of a year and a half and the community through its representative is responsible to see that he shall return in good order. It is thus made directly everybody’s problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been said elsewhere in this book that the Observation Commission is the authority for handling release and dismissal. Appeal may be taken from all of its decisions and a good percentage are reversed. Its mistakes, it is said, are largely because of a one-sided attack of the case in which its members were able only to see the seriousness of the crime, or perhaps only the social status of the convict, or maybe only his industrial activity at the place of his imprisonment. The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 takes a broader approach to the problem and demands that those responsible do the same. Each individual case must be treated from a differentiated viewpoint, with a survey of all angles involved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following table is given to show what types of disposal is used in the Soviet Union, and the relative importance of each.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; Article by N. Durmanov, entitled “Observation Commissions,” p. 396&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| &#039;&#039;Cases Examined in 1928&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| Per cent.&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of those serving in correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 22.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of prisoners&lt;br /&gt;
| 0.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Amnesty&lt;br /&gt;
| 7.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Release from imprisonment under guard&lt;br /&gt;
| 1.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Installment of labor days&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;It has been mentioned elsewhere that sentences are shortened by counting two productive work days as three of the sentence.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| 28.4&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Removal of strict isolation&lt;br /&gt;
| 3.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to other classification&lt;br /&gt;
| 2.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Assignment of type of place of detention&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Miscellaneous&lt;br /&gt;
| 13.0&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the duties already mentioned the Observation Commission has charge of the distribution of prisoners to the proper places for the serving of the sentence imposed and for their transferal from one place to another when it becomes necessary. In order to place a convict so that the best results may be secured, a close case study is made, an analysis of his personality, characteristics, ability, social status, and other pertinent information, but if an error is made after all, then he is transferred when better acquaintance shows where he belongs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XI: SOKOLNIKI ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sokolniki&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a prison, call it by whatever name one will. It is true that the national policy relating to corrective labor and discipline modify its physiognomy, but it still presents the atmosphere of a penitentiary. This statement is not meant as any criticism of either it or its administration, since one can hardly see how that aspect of it could be otherwise as long as criminals do exist who need restraining—and some of such there are bound to be. The fact of its sterner nature is emphasized in the beginning so that the impression will not be given that a place like Bolshevo Labor Commune, described in later pages, would fulfill the requirements for all the elements found among the criminals in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Standing outside the wall, just as cold and gray as the usual for penitentiaries, and looking up at the towers at the corners where sentinels armed with rifles keep watch, one has all the feeling of a sinking heart that comes with such a sight. People are shut away there and possibly forgotten by the citizenry from whom they have been separated, perhaps, since it is the customary thing for ignorance to prevail as to prisons and penal methods. One thinks, standing there, wondering about men behind that wall, of a description written in verse by one prisoner some quarter of a century ago. It is sentimental, belonging to an age when emotion was expressed a little more freely than our practice of restraint permits now, but one suspects men still suffer as he did in a good many prison cells such as this writer has seen. Lines of the poem, especially descriptive and appropriate to this subject, speak of “where tongues are mute, and men arise to newborn wrong,” and “where men must fawn or walk with scars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stell and Null, &#039;&#039;Convict Verse&#039;&#039;, Ft. Madison, Iowa, 1908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One doesn’t need to tell people who know anything of the penal situation in the United States that conditions make it possible to write lines like that. Of all of our social endeavor, the treatment of men convicted of crime seems the place where we have most signally failed in constructive results. Constructive treatment is, of course, a rare exception rather than a rule. But it seems to this writer that the implications of the verse have a less favorable chance of being true of Soviet prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place there is no prison sentence longer than ten years, and few offenders serve that long. The authorities figure that a maximum ten-year constructive program will fit anybody for proper living unless he is irredeemable. There will be some cases, of course, where there is failure, but the idea is to fit the régime to the majority. Right here there will be the question always forthcoming as to what they would do with our own gangster type. Give them a ten-year sentence? Not at all. They have few of them and for armed robbery one may be sentenced to death. No arguments are listed here for or against punishment by death, but in order to understand the absence of a long prison sentence it is necessary to be informed as to what happens to those who would ordinarily be the recipients of such a term. The fellow who murders in a jealous rage or great anger may find himself in for a long treatment in a place for mental abnormals, or he may, if judged sane, be given a sentence of ten years or less. They do not consider this type of murderer to be, usually, a further social menace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With those disposed of the formulators of the policy believe that a longer sentence for others is not needed. They see no aid anywhere in having one languish in prison beyond that point where a sentence ceases to have the possibility of being constructive and begins to dull the senses and perspective of the prisoner so that he is worthless anywhere. Some of our penologists have said that it is better to keep a man either a brief period or for his life because after a certain time it is practically impossible for him to fit into a society of which he has no knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet system provides measures for keeping a man in touch with society so that he may not feel that entire isolation even though ten years is the maximum of incarceration. In the first place, as we have seen, only those whose term is short or whose character makes it necessary are put in the closed institutions; in the next even those who are there are given vacations of leave if it is thought that they can be trusted not to escape. And in case that has to be denied to an inmate, he still has opportunity for contacts with associates within and friends and relatives without in open, wholesome manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tongues are not mute, either. Prisoners gather where they like, walk together, work together, play together. Nor do they “fawn or walk with scars.” The stated policy is to encourage them to approach and conduct themselves with dignity and no guard may inflict physical punishment on any prisoner. One might say that such a policy is likely not carried out. There may be isolated instances of violation, and one feels sure there are, but the attitude of the men toward the attendants and guards seem to indicate that such regulations are regarded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sokolniki is a prison for men who have been sentenced, supposedly, from one to three years. Article 28 of the Criminal Code says, ‘Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labour camps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labour or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labour camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence.” (May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are therefore a number serving sentences of longer periods than the three years who, because of physical condition, can not be sent to the labor camp to which they should be assigned, or because they need the restraint, perhaps, of these stronger walls. At the time of the writer’s visit there were a few more than eleven hundred prisoners in Sokolniki. The prison’s capacity is said to be something more than that, but it seemed then to be more crowded than was good for adequate treatment. However, one must remember that the housing situation in all of the USSR is acute and especially is that true of the cities where industrialization has required the assembling of more persons than can comfortably be housed. It is to be expected that prisons might share in this shortage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet system uses the collective dormitory system rather than the single room standard. This is in keeping with their idea of community living and we were told at the women’s prison that it is preferred by the prisoners themselves who like being with others and have no wish to be shut off. They use it also in student dormitories where beds are placed eight or ten to a large room. That, however, they wish to remedy. Their aim is a room for every worker and every student but that will require much more building.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Sokolniki is a well-known prison it will perhaps be interesting to set down a detailed description of it. The Soviet picture, The Road to Life, shown in this country, was made there, we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In arriving at Sokolniki, which is not far outside the city limits of Moscow, one comes to a closed door in the stone wall, some fifteen feet high, already mentioned. There must, of course, be an appointment just as there must be for entering a penitentiary in our own country. There is a bell and after it is rung the door is opened by an armed guard. The visitor is then in a small entrance room where there are other guards and which leads into a large court back of and around which the prison buildings form a square. There are other guards scattered in places about the court and near a large gate through which automobiles and trucks enter when they have business there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we went through the court to the first building we were to see, about a hundred feet away, two men sat at the door of a side building, peeling potatoes. They were talking and laughing as they worked, evidently enjoying themselves. This was the first glimpse of the informal atmosphere that prevailed throughout, and which caused us to look in some amazement at occasional scenes such as that encountered as we entered the auditorium where a good pianist was playing and other men stood beside him or leaned on the piano, at ease and absorbed in the music.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We had now left all the armed guards behind and there were no others in evidence until we came to depart. There were attendants, supervisors of work, etc., but there were no weapons among them. We went through shops and factories, observing the men at work. They wore any sort of clothes that they happened to own, mostly of the poor peasant type, since prisoners in Russia are never put in uniform.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The spinning and weaving shops were interesting. They were well lighted, had good ventilation except in one room where neither was very adequate. As we went by the men talked to each other in a normal conversational manner, watched us, both amused and curious. Also, we talked to them as we wished. Others, not then at work for some reason (we were told that every man in the prison works, but it was late in the day when we went and some had ended their shift), followed us about good naturedly, enjoying our curiosity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A prosecuting attorney was our guide and he stopped to talk to various ones among them. Also as we went along men occasionally stopped him with requests, some with complaints, and he noted them on paper. At times he good naturedly refused what was asked, but any came who wanted to, informally, and without permission from any source.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude of the convicts toward labor may be explained by several things which have already been mentioned. There is no feeling of punishment about the work since the prison factories are placed on the same basis as others in the country. They have an eight-hour day, they receive pay (from 20 to 50 rubles per month) which they are permitted to spend as they like and which often goes to the support of a family at home, and they have the knowledge that the work they do is counted in the regular plan so that even while they serve their sentence they are actively helping in the nation’s economic life. At any rate, these men did not appear depressed as they worked, nor in bad spirits. We watched an older inmate pleasantly talking to a young fellow beside him while he manipulated a loom, apparently telling some interesting story for he used his hands occasionally in quick gestures, but he kept his eyes on his work, and he seemed to take pride in his job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the shops we went to the dormitories and saw not one room only, but a number of them. As has already been intimated these rooms were too crowded. The cots were quite close together, even using the center of the room, and there was not enough space left for walking about. However, the men are not in a great deal of time. They go outside as they wish, walk when they care to, read in the library, exercise on the outside gymnasium apparatus, and are in the work shops at other times. Also, as already said, the problem of space is one that is occupying Soviet authorities extensively at present and they will require time to remedy the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We were asked to enter the room and sit down on the cots. The prosecuting attorney with us led the way. We were somewhat slow in following and one of the men, sitting on his cot in the center of the room, said, “Come on in. The beds are clean.” His invitation was accompanied by a smile and we quickly entered. By this time our presence had become known about the place and a great number had gathered in the corridor outside the room we were visiting, talking volubly. We were told to speak to any one we wished, to ask any question. We did so freely and were answered frankly. One prisoner told us that he was displeased with his sentence, that it was his first offense, that he had stolen a hat, and had been given a five-year term. “Impossible,” exclaimed the prosecutor, and promptly sent a messenger to the office to get the papers in the case. Some time later, when we were in the auditorium the records came and the man was sent for. He was a little chagrined but not greatly disturbed when his record showed robbery, not once but several times, with even the use of firearms. “Well,” he said nonchalantly, not too much put out that he hadn’t got away with his story, “it was too much anyway.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After we had visited a number of the dormitories we went to the yard. Several hundred prisoners were with us then. In the center of a bunch of them, we remembered again that here were some of the worst criminals in the country. They gathered all around to ask us about prisons in the United States or any other questions they could think of. One particularly intelligent man talked freely of conditions in Sokolniki, of his own sentence, and of his outlook on life. He had been a teacher before he had been caught in some sort of speculation, but he was teaching in the prison as well as doing some shop work. We continued questioning, now in French, now in German, more often through the Russian interpreter. The attendants were among them, talking also. There seemed to be no feeling of restraint in their presence, but on the contrary an existence of comradeship showed, especially on one occasion when one of the men had been asked a question he could not answer and turned to a guard for information. Such an attitude was apparent often, particularly as we went to the auditorium. As we were leaving the yard an incident happened that impressed us greatly. From the flower garden, one of the men came with an arm full of flowers that he wished to present to a member of the party who had passed some cigarettes around. He did it with the air of one who brings a bouquet from a prized garden of his own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We stopped to look at the dining room next. It was an ordinary room of almost square dimensions with long tables, seating two hundred and fifty at a time, and immaculately clean. From there we went through a small hall and upstairs to the auditorium where we were told to ask any questions on points of either policy or practice about which we still would like information. We were not sparing but every query was answered with great patience and detail. Then, as we were about to go, the prosecutor suggested to the superintendent who had been with us that we might like to hear the orchestra play. A messenger was sent and eventually a few musicians were rounded up but as there were not, enough to give a very good account of themselves, they tried the drama and dancing group with better luck. These hastily summoned the stage director, the curtains to the stage were drawn, a splendid pianist among their number who had discontinued some piece he was playing as we went in, now entertained us while preparations went on. In the meantime both men and attendants were crowding into the auditorium, messengers from among the prisoners were darting in and out with stringed musical instruments, and an informal atmosphere prevailed that it would be hard to give an impression of. The men talked in low excited tones, the music continued, the prosecutor and the prison director leaned against the piano. An attendant near to us carried on an excited conversation with a group of prisoners with him. It was difficult to believe that this was indeed a prison of a more serious type. It had all the earmarks just then of a community affair of local talent about to start.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The program was given with zest and enjoyment. It lasted an hour and consisted of dances, singing, a reading, most of which they had written and produced themselves under the direction of the specialists who are in charge of that type of work in the prison. The results they got with the scant attention they gave to costuming was interesting. They used only a kind of high-throated long white tunic over whatever trousers they happened to have on, because they had no time for further preparation, but there was a uniform effect which was appropriate to the selections they gave. We were reluctant to have the entertainment end but we had undoubtedly kept them from their supper for the time, and their graciousness reminded us that we too must be considerate. We thanked them, said goodbye, and went upstairs for a visit to the library.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here was a long light room with bookshelves across the farther end and with reading tables and chairs nearer the door. At the side as we entered was the atheist corner, so-called, which is found in nearly all the institutions and which is devoted mostly to evolution. A large picture of Darwin was prominently placed among the exhibits. There were also pictorial illustrations of the lower stages through which man has come and such other things as one would expect to find in a geological or anthropological display. Science, in their new culture, is designed to replace religion in so far as state recognition is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Out again in the yard some of the prisoners demonstrated their athletic ability and performed gymnastic feats on bars. We noted their carefree attitude, the interested passive participation of their comrades, but the wall was there again just across from us reminding that after all there was restriction—deprivation of liberty. And that, after all, is the chiefest of punishment. On top of the towers at the corners of the wall the men with long rifles looked down at us. No matter what the correctional labor policy, how designed to be constructive of character, certain men have to be restricted and the program forced on them. But it is to be doubted whether there is often achievement of a spirit like that in the prisons of many other countries and even in case it does exist, it is likely to be in some isolated place where an exceptional warden has been able to achieve it, possibly in a lesser place, one suspects, and not a major penitentiary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XII: A WOMEN’S PRISON ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; full name of this institution is Moscow Novinsky Women’s Isolator. There is another such prison at Orenburg, and these are the only two in the RSFSR. There were many things about this place that compared unfavorably with Sokolniki, chief of which was a lesser liberty of action. That was explained to us as being necessary because fifty per cent. of the population are there awaiting trial, which means that they stay only for a brief time. This makes a constructive program more difficult, since it is not possible to undertake for a yet unconvicted person the same type of treatment as would be accorded one actually sentenced. They must be kept separately, and with the small outdoor space available it is quite a problem to handle the question of freedom and recreation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity of the place is 375, but at the time of our visit it had only 360 in both classes; that is, those sentenced by the court and those awaiting trial. There are more problems connected with a women’s prison than with one for men. Children must be thought of, both those about to be born and small ones who depend on the mother and for whom there is no other care. There is a small hospital for ordinary cases in this prison, but a pregnant woman is taken out to a proper place for the birth of her child. It is emphasized that she is entitled to the same treatment as any other mother in the land, and that by virtue of her being a prisoner, she is not to be deprived of the best medical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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One comes up to this prison suddenly, without warning. Around a corner from a wide avenue and up a cobbled street for a block and the building is there before you. One enters the prison straight from the street into a small hallway, such as is found dividing the two front rooms of a residence. All the guards are women and they stand with guns to which are attached bayonets. They seemed much more severe than the men guards at other prisons, but perhaps that is because one is not accustomed to seeing them. Others wearing revolvers were about in the hallway and at other points in this entrance building. Their uniform consists of white blouse and dark skirt, with the gun belt acting in the place of a normal one, and military-looking caps. They are businesslike and, one feels sure, equal to an emergency. However, we were assured that none arises. The action of the comradely court takes care of the majority of whatever disciplinary problems there might be.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our first pause was in the office where we were received by the director and told some few points about the prison. However, we were reminded that a tour of it would be worth more than a lecture, and since that seemed a logical statement to us, we started out. Across the hall from the office in which we had been sitting was the visiting room. Every six days each prisoner may see visitors. There is no screen through which they must talk; the contact is direct; but there is a long counter behind which the prisoners sit. A guard is present in the room at all times, but takes care not to listen to the conversation. That is regarded as the person’s private affair. Mail may be censored but mere words are not restricted, so we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
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Passing through this room, we found ourselves in a court around which the buildings form a hollow square. This institution was a prison in Tzarist days, and a gloomy spot it must have been according to descriptions. Now, there are many windows which are large and admit plenty of light and air. We visited next the wing used as a dormitory and found there somewhat more space than in Sokolniki. One room was particularly large, about fifty feet long. Beds are fairly well spaced; there is a small cabinet for each woman, and the ventilation is good. A girl with a guitar was furnishing entertainment for others who sat on their respective cots and listened. She stopped playing loudly as we entered but continued to strum. We were told here, as at all other places we visited, to talk to any whom we wished, to ask any question we would. The superintendent seemed eager to emphasize that we were free to see or know anything. She had heard the prevalent story that in Russia one never sees things. She begged us to feel free to look and to question. No one would listen to what we said to the prisoner nor she to us. We talked to an old woman who wore the headdress of a peasant. She sat aloof on her cot and we were moved by her lonely appearance. What had she done? She stole bread, she told us, and for that she had a ten-year sentence. The same prosecutor who was with us at Sokolniki was listening at this moment. His face was full of sympathy. A person, whatever he might have on his conscience, could scarcely find him forbidding to talk to. He began to question and discovered that this was no ordinary theft of bread but a widespread attempt to defraud the state. A written note went into his pocket before he turned away and one wonders whether the ten-year sentence which might possibly not be served anyway, would be reduced.&lt;br /&gt;
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We talked next with a pretty black-haired girl whose eyes sparkled with mischief. No one was near to listen. For robbery, she told us frankly, she had been sent for five years of deprivation of liberty. One hopes that not even a prison can dim that gayness which seemed to cause her to bubble over. Was she getting along all right, she was asked? Fine! She laughed with us, talked animatedly for several minutes. Did she feel resentful? No, because she was learning there and she shouldn’t have stolen anyway. How will she get a job when she gets out? There were more jobs than people she told us as if she had learned a lesson. Was she sure? we asked. All the people who leave here get work at once. She knew that to be true. Why shouldn’t they? They were good workmen, she added. We left them to visit other rooms, and down the hall past two or three we came to one with spreads on the beds, with white covers on the tables, with a framed picture here and there and other personal belongings in place. It was the room occupied by the shock-brigaders. Russia honors its &#039;&#039;Udarnicks&#039;&#039;, whether in prison or out, for their efforts are such as send the nation bounding on its way. In this room, the honor spot of the dormitories, a young woman, perhaps twenty-one, sat at a desk with her back to us. She is the chairman of the comradely court, we were told, and she smiles at us with great pride. It is evidently an achievement which carries satisfaction.&lt;br /&gt;
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She had stolen continuously since she was fifteen, her case read, but by means of the approach they use here they have been able to aid her. The superintendent assured us that her whole character had undergone a change, that she was trusted and valuable to the institution, and supervised with ability the court that was responsible for discipline within the prison. We talked to others, one a middle-aged woman, who did exceptionally good work. She was proud of her ability and the praise she had won.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went to the nursery. A mother sat in a small room beside it, nursing her child. We noticed the position of her foot, the way she held her baby, and were reminded that some one gave instruction in such points in a way that would meet the best approval. Cribs were lined up along the sides of the nursery and a trained woman, not a prisoner, was in charge. She was assisted with the children by inmates themselves. There were about twenty beds but only a few children. The others had already been taken to the play-yard. We took time to observe before we left that the room was well ventilated and well kept and the woman in charge briskly businesslike. As we descended again to the court we passed a small room back of the stairway where women were washing their clothes. Each must do her own, and a room equipped with tubs was provided for the purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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The children are kept up to four years of age, then disposed of among the other state institutions for children or dismissed with the mother, or possibly, if she must stay longer, sent to some of her family. In the yard, a grassy spot with shrubbery, the children were having a gay time with all sorts of apparatus and a playhouse. Like the children in other Russian centers, they wore no clothes except light cotton trunks.&lt;br /&gt;
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They looked healthy and well cared for and showed, it seemed to us, less of physical abnormalities than one usually notices in children of imprisoned women.&lt;br /&gt;
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We visited the school room and were told that compulsory education is provided up to the seventh year and opportunity given for work beyond, by means of university evening courses. There is at the same time the usual political education, the clubs, and physical education that characterizes all penal places, and a radio in every room for additional education and entertainment.&lt;br /&gt;
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We came out into the court again to go to the wing containing the shops. Some of the informal attitude which we had noticed at Sokolniki now began to show itself. There were groups who leaned out of their windows and shouted to us, and some of the younger girls talked to us in the court. Three of them begged us to tell them about the prisons in America, much as three children would waylay one and insist on being told tales. We gave them some information, and then tried to answer questions about New York and life in the United States. No, they didn’t think they would like America because people did not have jobs there, while here when they got out, they would be assured of work. We asked if they felt certain of that. Of course. The patron factory of this institution gives preference to those released from here. They boldly hailed the prosecutor now, to tell him that they wanted their sentences reduced. The law gives them the right to complain to the prison management, to the Commissar of Justice, or to the prosecuting attorney, but they are not offering a complaint of the sentence. It is only that they are ready to be good and work like faithful citizens. Another note is thrust into the prosecutor’s coat pocket. What was done with them we did not know but since the inmates seemed to expect that procedure it must be a general practice, and the fact that he definitely refused some and made no note seemed to indicate that the others had real significance. We were told that each case so noted would be checked. The approach to official channels is evidently quite easy.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were no shops in this prison in Tzarist days, and the women did not work. Now the wing which has been newly built is thrust out in such a way that it is long and narrow, with windows on both sides. There is plenty of ventilation and light. The women were cutting and sewing shirts and other garments from the same material we had seen the men making at Sokolniki. There were long tables with good working space and as we walked about various women showed us finished articles with pride. The sewing machines had all the latest equipment, and the operatives worked rapidly. The products of their shops are turned over to the cooperatives and sold where needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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They, too, work on the same basis as do factory workers of the land, with the exception (as in the case of all prisoners) that because they are supplied with their upkeep they are not paid normal wages. At the time we were there some of them were not at work, due, the directress told us, to a shortage of material. The supervisors are not prisoners but come in from the outside to teach and direct the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
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Already in the chapter on “What Crimes Are Committed and Who Commits Them” we referred to the acts committed by women. In this prison the records showed that theft came first and robbery a close second, but in cases with whom we talked, the theft often turned out to be some act involving state property which carried a severe penalty. For that reason one was surprised at first to find long sentences attached to what appeared to be less serious crimes. But, in view of the provisions of the law of August 7, 1932, such larceny is sternly dealt with, even though the act is committed by a person from among the peasants or toiling class. One stealing from her neighbor would get a much lighter sentence. This is where the class nature of punishment shows up very strongly and unbalances the scales of justice that otherwise seem to work with such fairness. An example of the difference was very clear in two cases. One girl had been in prison nine times for theft and her present sentence was for two years only. Another had committed her first offense by stealing from a collective farm, a tool apparently of some “class enemy,” and her sentence was ten years. The “measure of social danger” accounts for the difference, and while it is easy to see that the authorities are confronted by a real problem of deep seriousness, one wonders whether something more of justice&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This statement by the author has caused Mr. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow to offer the following explanation. “The word ‘justice’ in the USSR has another meaning than in the writings of the bourgeois sociologists. Criminal repression is not expiation of the crime. We don’t feel it just to shoot a man who has committed a murder only in order to punish him. Instead of one murder that would make two. But we call it just, if by means of shooting such a murderer, we can prevent a score of other murders. The construction of Socialism is our greatest task. Everything that helps the achievement of it is just, everything that hinders it is unjust. That is the point of view in every criminal case and I don’t suppose that we shall ever change it. But of course the methods of our fight for Socialism change at every stage of Socialist construction, and today they are other than they were five years ago.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; might not in the long run make for better feeling as well as a more ethical foundation for their socialist state. It is contradictory to their usual administration of justice among their own masses. One hopes that, as the conflict recedes, “pure justice” in so far as such is possible will replace “socially dangerous” measurements now in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again we were in the court preparing to leave. A girl of some eighteen or nineteen years, with thick golden braids hanging to her waist, was at the window above us shouting laughingly down to the superintendent. One of our party had a camera and she wished her picture made. It was all right, we were told, and the picture was snapped, and she was promised one as soon as it could be developed. Others were calling to us, too, setting up a din, with their comments and questions. Such an informal atmosphere can hardly be described. A group stood about like girls let out of school, talking, watching us curiously, unrestrained by the presence of attendants or directress. One feels that so long as there is no attempt to escape, and no running afoul the comradely court, one can do about as she likes—play volley ball when she pleases, if she is free from work, listen to the radio, read in the library, or gossip with her neighbor. She also has a good atmosphere in which to learn that labor and happiness are pretty close companions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The parting word from our hostess was, “I wish I might visit a prison in America with the same freedom with which I have shown you this.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What a western observer would feel first in these prisons is a lack of physical equipment such as his own best might boast. There was such criticism expressed. But this is not an adequate standard with which to measure their success. It is true that in these closed prisons of a penitentiary type their equipment, while much better than that in our worst, is not nearly so good as that in our best, but the fact that without this equipment they are able to achieve the attitude and cooperation they do on the part of the prisoners is all the more significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is also the point that the aim of Soviet penal authorities is to remove as rapidly as possible every person whose character will permit into the open or semi-closed correctional labor institutions and discontinue the use of the closed types except for the most incorrigible cases. Because of that, they are devoting all possible attention to the development and improvement of the labor institutions. And one finds different conditions in these places. They would not suffer very much by comparison with our best. A description of Bolshevo Labor Commune, in a later chapter, will indicate that.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the meantime they create that constructive businesslike atmosphere, among the women as well as the men, that gives genuine hope of equipping these people for a place in social life.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XIII: THE CHILD AND THE LAW ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;When&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; H. G. Wells was visiting in Moscow the past summer, he is said to have made the following observation to a Russian journalist: “I know, you Moscow people look upon all this with different eyes. You are Robinson Crusoes recreating life upon barren land after a social cataclysm. You are proud that you are manufacturing without the capitalists’ air motors, and reoentgen apparatus which the capitalists before you did not manufacture. You are happy to be doing all this. I understand this. And I should have been happy in your place, but of all your productions, excuse me, I am struck only by one thing. You are making people. It is this that I have come here to see and I see it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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If they are making people in this Soviet land, and I think it is pretty well agreed by thoughtful persons that they are, the beginning of the process is found in their treatment of children. So much has been said and written on the care of the child in Russia that no elaboration should be necessary here, and in regard to the delinquent it is no less than that given to the normal child. Their attitude toward the child who breaks the law is not that society must be protected, but that the individual may be given an opportunity for developing his own life. His interest is uppermost and practically every branch of government cooperates in his protection and training.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0222.svg|TYPICAL SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF F.Z.U. SCHOOL|800x800px]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Geneva declaration has been of special interest to the authorities dealing with this problem in the USSR. They believe with the author of the statement that mankind must give the child the best it has. In many of their publications they quote the main points of that declaration, and it seems of interest to set them down in relation to this chapter. They follow:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) The child should be given an opportunity of normal development, materially as well as spiritually.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The starved child must be fed, the sick cured, the retarded pushed ahead, the defective trained, and the orphan taken care of.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The child must be helped first of all during public misfortune.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) The child must be prepared to earn his bread, and protected from all types of exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) The child must be trained with the understanding that his best powers must be devoted to his brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
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For them the application of these points is to all children. The problem of the upbringing of the juvenile criminal is not separable from the general question of juvenile training. And whenever it is possible, the child who has broken the law is sent to schools for his training which in no wise differ from those for the noncriminal child.&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia’s fight against juvenile crime has been one of its major problems. It is an old story that the Civil War and the Volga famine in 1921 left hordes of wild children wandering over the land. They crowded in the railway stations, they rode the rods from place to place, they congregated in market places, behind billboards, in any places they could find, and were so depraved by street life that they became the most hardened of criminals. At this time, too, men released from the army, with no jobs available, turned in great numbers to banditry, and these children became their associates in their illegal enterprise. In history there is perhaps no picture greatly darker so far as children are concerned, and handling such a situation is not the least of Russia’s achievements. Today there are still a few scattered remnants of that vast number that one sees in railway stations, but the problem is in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the moment when this condition reached its worst, the government was dealing with the Civil War at its greatest height, giving its attention and energy to the defense of the proletarian state. But it is to its great credit that it found time even then to concentrate its forces to give care to this growing army of homeless waifs and juvenile delinquents. We have at that moment a proposal on the part of the leader of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, later referred to in detail, which marked the beginning of the system of care given today to young offenders in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, there was already machinery in operation for dealing with juvenile criminals or children needing the aid of the state because of some abnormal condition. As early as January 14, 1918, only a little more than two months after the October Revolution, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a decree establishing Commissions for Cases of Minors. These commissions, with their powers greatly broadened, exist today, and are the organs charged to look after the interests not only of delinquent children, but of any child who needs the intervention of the law. During the period when children swarmed everywhere, homeless, starving, some criminal, and others forced by necessity into such an existence, no single force could have been adequate, but these bodies were the official channels through which the cases passed after the GPU or some other agency had first gathered the children in.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is not a children’s court, but is a pedagogical and educational organization. Its chief task is in educating the juvenile offender so that he may become a productive member of society, and with that in view the composition provided for the commission is of professions and persons able to make appropriate contributions. The chairman must be a pedagogue of very high qualifications. He must possess not only an adequate education, but he must have had experience either in work of a pedagogical nature or with home children or with juvenile criminals. In addition to the chairman there is a member representing the local department of public education, a physician from the local health department, a judge from the People’s Court, an investigation educator, a member of the Komsomol (the youth about to enter the Communist Party), a representative of the Children’s Friend’s Society, and a representative of the local trade union organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission sits in closed session, permitting only the attendance of those connected with the cases. This would include parents, relatives or guardians, or a representative of a public or school organization. Its work is under the jurisdiction of the commissariat of education, and is not connected with the commissariat of justice, such as the children’s court would be. There are, of course, local commissions which take care of the cases for each city or rural district. The procedure before the commission is entirely informal. When a case comes up the chairman takes the proper steps to have the juvenile appear, unless for some reason his presence is thought to be unnecessary. Some of the circumstances under which the child would not appear would be: if the child is under eight years of age; when the child is already known to the commission; when the evidence does not substantiate the charge; when there is no reason for the medico-pedagogical measures to be applied; or when it is thought that the appearance of the minor before the commission might do some harm to him in either a physical or mental way. But in case it is thought his appearance is desirable, the investigator is instructed to take charge of the case. The chairman then proceeds to gather the necessary information, evidence, etc., concerning the child and advise him that his case is to come up. If at that time the youth has reached the age of sixteen, his case is turned over to the courts for trial, since minors between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are subject to the jurisdiction of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is competent to deal not only with the cases of all children delinquents between the ages of eight and sixteen (children under eight years of age are never summoned to appear before the commission) but it is also empowered to institute criminal proceedings against any person who is an offender against the child in a manner of demoralization, incitement to crime, or exploitation of minors.&lt;br /&gt;
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What measures may be taken in the cases of children convicted of some crime before the commission? Here is a list of the more important, although it is not an exhaustive one:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) A request for granting assistance, document, certificate, etc., to the child.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) Placing out the child in the care of a family.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) Placing the child on maintenance and education by public or party organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) Finding a guardian for the child.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) Finding work for the child or apprenticing him.&lt;br /&gt;
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(6) Sending the child to his birthplace.&lt;br /&gt;
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(7) Placing the child in an educational institution, school or children’s home.&lt;br /&gt;
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(8) Sending the child to a medical or medico-pedagogical institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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(9) Helping the child to enroll in a children’s club.&lt;br /&gt;
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(10) Talk and exhortation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(11) Putting the child in the care of parents or other persons with or without supervision by investigation educator.&lt;br /&gt;
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(12) Putting the child in the care of an investigating educator.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is one final measure which it is within the power of the commission to use, but it is never resorted to unless all other efforts have failed. That is that the commission may send the child as a final resort to an industrial school of which we will speak later on in the chapter. The list given above constitutes the medico-pedagogical measures and are applied only to those offenders under sixteen years of age who come within the competency of this commission.&lt;br /&gt;
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The case of the minor between sixteen and eighteen years of age is approached in a somewhat different manner. Originally under the Criminal Code of 1922, the court was given jurisdiction over minors between fourteen and eighteen years of age, and might at that time sentence them to terms of deprivation of liberty, but only to industrial homes set apart for them, and never by any manner of means to a place for adults. This, however, has been changed so that the commission referred to takes care of children up to sixteen years of age, and only the cases of those between sixteen and eighteen are referred to courts. Although the cases of juvenile offenders between sixteen and eighteen are tried by the courts, the measures applied are of a medico-pedagogical nature very similar to those used for the younger children. Only when the circumstances of the crime convince the court that these measures will not be adequate may the minor be sentenced to deprivation of liberty. In fixing the terms, the sentence is to be reduced by one third of what would be imposed on an adult in the same situation, and the maximum term under the USSR is not to exceed one half of that imposed on adults. A death sentence may never be given to either child or minor, and no severe measures may be used.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the case of trial, a copy of the summons as well as the indictment must be sent to the minor’s legal representative, as well as to the minor himself. And the Supreme Court has especially instructed the lower courts to see that all juveniles under trial be provided with counsel whenever it may be needed. During the hearing of the case, the minor is accorded all the rights that we have already seen are granted to defendants in the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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That the fight waged by the authorities against juvenile crime is being successful is indicated by the steady drop of the percentage to the total convictions in the Union. We find that, in 1928, 36 per cent. of the total number of persons convicted of crime were juvenile offenders. In 1931, this figure had dropped to 28.2 per cent. Also indicative of the achievement in this direction is, as already mentioned, the fact that this army of vagrant youth no longer wanders about in Russia. There are few of such children remaining.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet government has practically removed from its system all of the homes and colonies for juveniles which it inherited from the Tzarist régime, and has at the present time in their stead the system of institutions operating in an educational manner. The most constructive work being done is in those owing their initiation to the efforts of an agent that we do not usually connect with such activities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Back in 1921 when the whole place swarmed with homeless and criminal children, and there was despair over the hopelessness of the condition, the GPU came to the rescue with the establishment of places for wholesale care called “collectors.” Children were snatched from the streets, stations, trains, or wherever they were, and were taken to these places where they were bathed, dressed, fed, sorted out, given all sorts of examinations, mental and physical, then turned over to the Commission for the Cases of Minors, and were finally distributed to the various institutions. The institutions, at that time, while educational in nature, were without a definite social goal, and not adequately prepared or equipped to turn a youth into a productive and useful citizen. At the present time the institutions for juvenile offenders are established under the control of the Commissariat of Education, the Commissariat of Justice, and the Commissariat of Home Affairs (formerly the OGPU). In the Commissariat of Education we find a whole network of children’s homes, directly leading the child from training into the industrial life of the country in such a manner that there is no gap through which he can escape into a life of crime. In their early days the task of these homes was simply to house the children, to prevent them from becoming vagrants and criminals, and their program was by no means as constructive as it might have been. But, at present, no effort is spared in delivering the child to society in a state of preparation for his place.&lt;br /&gt;
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A. Shestakova in her article &#039;&#039;Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children&#039;&#039; tells us that in the first days of these homes the children were taught to make shoes and footstools, to bind books, and how to read and write; and slightly how to adjust themselves in life. But she says that the homes were inadequate to attack the basic problems of turning those sent to them into a specifically trained group, sufficiently equipped with industrial knowledge and social culture, prepared to enter a factory or other center in such a manner as to evolve into useful citizens. The misfit was unfortunate in two ways. Not only were the children unprepared as to basic industrial knowledge or other means of adjustment to their new life, but the state itself was deprived, because of this inadequacy, of the services of many young citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new economic policy had given way to the five-year plan with its tremendous program of industrial development and agricultural collectivization, and there was need for every available trained workman. Because of this urgent need of the country those in charge of juvenile offenders were given an extra instrument for their purpose. With definite ends in view, with specific jobs to fill, training took on an additional purpose. Here was a definite challenge to the places of training of those juvenile offenders to teach them so that they might make their contribution to the economic plan, and that they might thereby gain the satisfaction of having work which they could do well.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not enough that education be directed only toward keeping the child busy with some elementary task, but that it concern itself with the possibility of active participation in the nation’s economic development. To accomplish this task the children’s homes were merged with the factory apprenticeship schools which were attached to factories in towns, and to the peasant youth schools connected in like manner with state farms and rural localities, by which merging they now afforded places for training skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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As now organized the direction of these homes is in the hands of the Commissariat of Education, and children are sent by the Commission of Cases for Minors. They are not limited to the training of delinquents but also have the task of educating the children of workers and peasants from the general population. No coercive methods are used. There are of course no wardens or guards, and their express task is to “combine teaching with productive labor upon such basis that the whole social productive labor of the pupils was to be subordinated to the academic and educational aims of the school.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The inmates of these homes are given preference of admission to the factory apprenticeship schools, and to peasant youth schools next to the children of workers. From this training they move straight into the stream of factory workers and, almost without knowing it, take their place in the productive life of the nation. By the time they have gone through these schools of apprenticeship and the factory, or the state farms, they have forgotten that they ever were attached to a life of crime and are removed from the environment so effectually that they have no temptation to return. This describes the treatment given to the cases of those children not classified as habitual criminals. Even in this category of the 8-16 group coming under the direction of the Commissariat of Education, there is an occasional child who requires more restrictive treatment, and measures of a severer nature may then be resorted to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this type, who have become habitual criminals, or who have committed more serious crimes that require a term of deprivation of liberty, we have a second kind of institution. It is important to note that this set of establishments is connected with the Commissariat of Justice, and not with the Department of Education. There has been a period of evolution of these institutions in which much study has been given to methods to be used, and experiments of a bold nature tried with regard to some of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On July 11, 1918, there was published the Order for the First Russian Reformatory where juvenile offenders of this type were to be detained, and there were consequently organized industrial homes for these offenders which were intrusted with the duty of teaching to minors “skilled trades, to widen their mental horizon by means of general and vocational education, and to transform them into active citizens conscious of their rights and obligations, giving them at the same time a physical and health education by means of gymnastics, sports and hygiene.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These institutions, although of the educational type referred to, were inadequate for any serious training. Arts and crafts constituted the principal type of labor, and practically no attention was given to the higher and more skilled trades. We have already spoken of the demands made by the reconstruction period for more skilled workers, and of the notable inadequacy of places for juvenile offenders to turn out young people who filled such a need. The program needed a decided reformation, and in 1930 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee set up a commission for specific remedy of the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The commission was created for two definitely assigned tasks: the first was to institute an investigation of the work of the fight against juvenile criminals and minors, and of the organization of factory communes and corrective labor organizations, using for this purpose the equipment of the People’s Commissariat of Justice. Secondly, it was to work out and to hand to the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; a project of administrative and practical measures, with due attention being given to the experiment of the Izhorsk plant in the North Caucasus. The result of the investigation was that in 1930, the Commissariat of Justice decided to reconstruct these institutions into factory apprenticeship schools for juvenile offenders which were to be attached to large factories and mills. It must be noted here that these schools differed from those just discussed in that they were for offenders only and liberty was restricted, whereas in the first there were no guards of any nature and noncriminal children attended along with the criminal ones.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these schools they were to create a cultural and social condition conducive to drawing the inmates into social work, and to this end, bars, locks, and prison régime, and all prison atmosphere was to be resolutely banished from them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of the training was educational just as it had been in the others, but in the case of this more hardened type it was necessary to detain the juvenile forcibly while he was subjected to the program. However, pupils in these schools now enjoy vacations, take part in regular group hikes, and go out to camps in the summer, in the same manner as other pupils do. The term of sentence is from two to three years, and the arrangements as to schedule, life, and discipline, organization and labor, are taken care of by the usual self-government organization. The schedule of the work is arranged in such a manner that the children are never left entirely to their own devices, but are constantly with those who guide and direct them. Four hours of industrial training are followed by four hours of study, and the latter is again followed by three hours devoted to public activity organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1931, 4,000 juvenile offenders were trained in these schools and 500 industrial workers were graduated from the industrial establishments. In 1933, the aim was to put all the juvenile offenders into these schools from which it was expected there would be turned out 2,400 highly skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to notice here what happened to those released from these schools. Figures for the years 1931 and 1932, giving percentages of distribution for those released, show that 63.2 per cent. went into industrial undertakings. This would indicate a high degree of success in the passage of the trained youth from schools to industry. The next largest percentage, 19.7 per cent., found a place in the building trade. The third highest, 9.3 per cent., was released to the parents with supervision on the part of the school. 4.7 per cent. were placed on Soviet farms; 1.2 per cent. found a location in the factory labor and technical communes and 0.6 per cent. were released to parents and relatives but continued under the supervision of the schools.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article by A. Shestakova, “Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children,” from Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 348.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most important training given in these schools is for metal work and work on wood. In addition to that the inmates are taught tractor handling, animal husbandry, vegetable garden work, and field work. The health and physical training require that the workers take a month and a half to two months’ camp trip in the country. Because of the inconvenience attached to these trips, when the institution is located in a city, the First Moscow School was moved to a small village a short distance out, so that country places would be more accessible for health training.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief problems now attached to this education, according to A. Shestakova, are the building up of the physical health, an establishing of self-discipline, and the introduction of these delinquents to methods used in other camps, to a life of such neighboring activities as the collective or state farms. The prize agricultural schools among all of those at present existing in the Soviet Union are Saratov, which now has first place in the contest for these schools; Serpooh, in second place; the First Moscow School in third place; and in the fourth, the First Leningrad School.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We come finally to the third type of establishment. These are incorporated into the system of the organization of the GPU, in the Commissariat for Home Affairs. There is something incongruous to most of us in the supervision of children by an agent that is avowedly for terroristic purposes. However, the labor communes, organized by this body for juvenile offenders of the worst type, are one of the outstanding developments in the care of the children in Soviet Russia, and set a standard that few if any institutions in other lands manage to reach.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The inhabitants of these communes are young people with long criminal records, who have been up repeatedly before the Commission for Cases of Minors, before the courts, who have served many terms of deprivation of liberty in various juvenile institutions. The cases seemed hopeless, and the experiment, so bold and unique, was tried in an effort to give a new viewpoint that would induce a complete break with the former criminal type of life. One of these communes, the largest both as to number and scope of development, is described in detail in the next chapter. In this place we only mention the general plan and underlying principles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main difference between the apprenticeship school and these labor communes of the OGPU is in method and not in principle. The labor commune is organized around large labor work, where both sexes contribute, while in the apprenticeship schools the emphasis is on education, on the preparation for industrial work. One of the basic principles in the labor commune is complete freedom as to movement, while in the schools restriction of movement is naturally required since the program is compulsory in its nature. In the apprenticeship schools there is also segregation of the sexes in the matter of residence; the boys and girls meet together in theatres, on excursions, in museums, on walks, and other places, but live in separate homes. It seems inconsistent to state that the labor commune is made up of those more habituated to crime, since it enjoys greater freedom, while the schools are composed of the less criminal; but this is nevertheless true. When one remembers, though, that the commune is the result of a desperate move to save a great number of habitual criminals, whereas the schools are merely for training those of even younger years, the situation is more easily understood.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the schools the age group is from 15-18 years. The sources from which they come are, (a) those sent on court order, and (b) those sent by the Commission for Cases of Minors, and all other authorities empowered to commit them. If the term is up before the training of the child is completed, the pedagogical commune may retain him, provided the entire term does not exceed three years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 42 of the Correctional Labor Code of 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the communes, the age group, although in the beginning limited to those of 13-17, is now composed of those of 16-24. The satisfaction of the authorities with the achievement of the First Labor Commune (Bolshevo) led to the establishment of others, and at the present time several thousand former criminals, some of them committing the worst sort of crimes, are being trained and educated while they participate in community life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XIV: BOLSHEVO LABOR COMMUNE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; following is the official record of the beginning of such places for criminals as the one described in this chapter:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;ORDERS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the Administrative and Organizational Board, OGPU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No. 185&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, August 18, 1924&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;#&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;1&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Orders issued by Comrade Yagoda, assistant chief of the OGPU:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) In order to combat crime among young people between the ages of 13 and 17 years, a Children’s Labor Commune for 50 persons is to be organized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) F. G. Melikhov is appointed head of the Children’s Labor Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The head of the Children’s Labor Commune is to act in all matters under the orders of M. S. Pogrebinsky, who, in turn, will act on the basis of a plan of work confirmed by me.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Such an order, judging from the resulting situation of ten years later, ought to be marked with a monument, and it is. Just outside of Moscow, on the location of a once lovely estate, there is now a small town of modern buildings replacing the wooden ones of ten years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One does not know what to call this place. To say that it is a penal institution is misleading unless the reader has seen something like it. However, it rates as that in the USSR, and since there are others like it in scattered sections, one comes to the conclusion that it is something unique in this line and accepts it as such. It is easy to be enthusiastic over such things and not to look deeper for some adverse angles, but the author, after as careful examination as she could make in a skeptical manner, could only praise the development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two trips were made to this colony, the second to confirm what had first been observed. However, since it was a visit to a similar colony at Kharkov that elicited the warm praise from M. Herriot that has already been quoted, it seemed safe to conclude that it existed as had first been believed. It is impossible to understand how any one could fail to be moved on viewing the place and realizing its tremendous import in the matter of remaking criminals. If the OGPU had committed nothing but the acts of terror it has been credited with, the creation of such spots as these would compensate in a great way for its darker deeds. It is unfortunate that one must try to tell of Bolshevo. The only thing to do is to visit and see for one’s self. It is difficult to describe atmosphere, and that is the thing that pervades the place and makes it even more constructive than the physical side could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This commune celebrated its tenth birthday in August of this year (1934). Its population was preparing for it when we were there, building platforms out under the trees, putting finishing touches here and there, and getting ready for speeches, visitors, and other entertainment of various kinds. And these people can tell a good tale of growth and progress, too, for they started with a handful in the initiation of a bold experiment and now their town has a population of three thousand inhabitants. The reader’s first deduction will be that a prison growth such as that must indicate some undesirable conclusions. But when one knows that it means that this number has been transferred from other penal institutions with a view to having everyone possible enjoy this freedom and training, then the significance is different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reference has already been made to the wandering hordes of children, confirmed in criminal habits, who presented the gravest of problems to the government authorities at the end of the Civil War and Volga famine. It was seen that if headway was to be made against the situation, the whole perspective of life must be changed, and the new one must be attractive enough to make these vagrant criminals want to break with a past that to their imaginative years had a glamour and provided escape from the responsibilities of ordinary living.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the midst of the perplexity, the groping for some plan, we find Felix Dzerzhinsky, organizer of that terror of terrors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, and original head of the GPU, offering his far-reaching organ to effect this merciful innovation. Let his own words inform us:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“I wish to apply part of my personal efforts and above all the efforts of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; to looking after these homeless waifs. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of two considerations. Firstly, it is a terrible calamity, and when you look at children, you cannot help thinking everything should be for them. The fruits of the revolution are not for us but for them. But how many of them have been wrecked by struggle and poverty! We must rush to their aid just as if we saw children drowning. The Commissariat of Education alone cannot cope with this matter, the widest help from all Soviet bodies is needed. It is necessary to form under the Central Executive Committee a broad commission containing representatives of all commissariats and all organizations which can be useful in this matter. I have already spoken with people here and there. I want to be at the head of this commission myself. I want to include the apparatus of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; practically in this work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“I am impelled to do this for the second reason. I think that our apparatus is one of those which works most accurately. It has branches everywhere. People reckon with it. They are afraid of it, but even in such a matter as saving and feeding children, it is possible to find laxness and even dishonesty. We are going over more and more to peaceful construction; and I think: why not use our fighting apparatus to combat such a calamity as homelessness among children?”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This proposition was made in 1921. It was in August, 1924, that the GPU of which he was then head, established the Bolshevo Labor Commune, thus launching a new epoch not only in the care of juvenile criminals for whom it was particularly intended, but in the treatment of all the others. It must have given a great thrill to this man who had brought death to so many of the state’s enemies to take a part in reconstructing the lives of youths who would, he hoped, be its friends. At least he had the satisfaction of seeing his judgment vindicated, for, from the beginning, the venture proved his rightness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These men did not jump into the scheme as suddenly as might seem, nor without consideration. They went into intimate study of the forms of education of children, they applied themselves vigorously to working out an accurate theory, then they formulated what appeared to them three basic rules of procedure. That the GPU, in the midst of their frightening activities, could muster faith enough in anybody to develop such a plan is in itself a phenomenon, but that they could convey such a trust to others, to these young criminals, seems more incredulous still. They were not exactly an agent for inspiring such a feeling. But notice the three basic principles referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost was that principle of “trust” held like a shining torch before the eyes of incredulous youngsters. It was decided that there must be no compulsion anywhere in the commune. With coercion the order of the day, there was to be none here. Strange contradiction, one of many that has filled the land. Side by side with sternness toward those who oppose the order, one finds this steady development of humane institutions, untouched by the harsher methods used in the other direction. In this colony there was to be only trust. If one wanted to stay, he was to stay, and if he wanted to go, then he was to go. He simply walked away, for there were not to be—and are not today— any guards. There were to be no restrictions of their freedom. They were to realize that they were in an educational institution pure and simple. They were to come of their own volition, because of an expressed desire to join in the program of this commune. These inhabitants were to be persons who had come to realize the futility of a life of crime and who wished therefore to change to another sort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the individual was to make this change he would have to be able to perform some task well, and to that end the second principle was incorporated. The commune was to be devoted to teaching these people how to do some kind of work. Workshops were established and instructors installed, but the responsibility for sustaining a condition under which the trades could be learned was placed on the residents of the Commune. There was no preaching, no lectures, but it was demonstrated that each must be responsible for his share in this life or all would suffer. If machines stopped because of the irregularity of one or two, then the education of others in an industrial line would suffer. And one who brought about this inconvenience must answer to his comrades for his conduct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third principle was to make each feel his responsibility for the group, and the reverse, that all were responsible for seeing that each member measured up to his duties. Every member of the Commune was bound to see that a recalcitrant one was brought to account. In this manner any disciplinary problems were taken care of from the beginning. Thus, in the lack of any compulsion the onetime criminal learns to lead a normal life and to discipline himself; in being taught a trade he is prepared to return to a life or perhaps enter it for the first time, in which he earns his way; and by his feeling of responsibility for others, he in conjunction with the group keeps the affairs of the Commune running smoothly and efficiently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the Commune had been set up, the next problem was to get some inhabitants for it. Among the institutions housing juvenile offenders, volunteers were asked for, after explanations of the character of the new place had been given. Pogrebinsky who, it will be recalled, was one of the organizers, gives a version of this experience that is interesting. He writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“When we called for volunteers for the first commune, 15 responded. Very suspiciously they donned their new clothes. They could not believe that henceforth they were free, and they warily eyed the prison guards, trying to guess how many would be sent with them as a convoy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“But here began something unusual. They were given money with which to buy railway tickets to the Commune, and no guards were sent with them. Only the manager of the Commune was with them. Sure enough, they seemed to be free! Should they run away? No, better wait. There was something hard to understand, and in addition, something very flattering—they were being trusted!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“On arrival at the place, two of the boys were sent with money for supper. Here was something altogether strange! They were sent off with money, and no guard to convoy them. The boys bought some foodstuff, came back and returned the whole change. They were utterly astounded when the manager showed them the house where they were to live and explained to them: Everything that you can see, boys—the clothes, food, tools—is being lent to you by the OGPU, and you will have to pay for it all later on.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
One can understand their incredulity, even their staying on through curiosity, if nothing else, to see what would happen next in such a topsy-turvy affair. And day after day the wonder and pleasure in having a home, being free and engaged in making interesting things would grow and hold them steadily.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The managers of the Commune were wary and anxious too, not through fear of escape of their charges, but lest they do the wrong thing and check the growing confidence. In their eagerness not to put pressure of any kind on these young people, they have let the initiative for expansion come from them. In the beginning those who came made shoes, stools, and other things, and were satisfied to watch their own tasks grow under supervision, but as the project became more firmly established there were demands for wider industrial training. The leaders granted the requests with great satisfaction as they developed, their only anxiety being that nothing should ever seem “forced.” There was no doubt subtle guidance, but the group was encouraged to undertake its own education. The story is one of continuous growth, both in number and in development of a broader program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What actually exists now in this place where three thousand work? To begin with there are the paved streets, clean and lined with green shrubbery. The houses beside them are of modern structure, many with flower-filled balconies for each floor, with rows of large windows. There are some small individual houses also, where families live, but it is the lines of those looking from the outside like sunny apartment buildings that gives the place an air of being a town proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On inspection one finds small apartments provided for the married couples and dormitory rooms for the single people. A man who is serving a sentence may have his family there with him and so may a married young woman if it is convenient for the husband to come. The apartments that we saw contained two rooms and a bath. One of the rooms was a large kitchen which could also be used for other purposes. One entered into a small hallway which led to the main room, a large combination living-sleeping room. The furniture was good. There were pictures around, a couch, comfortable chairs, the windows were nicely curtained and the appearance altogether homelike. There is a large community dining room, but in case a family wishes to prepare its own meals it can do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the dormitories we saw, there were rather good-sized rooms, not so large as most of those described in the other prisons, with cot-beds placed in line in the usual way. There seemed to be comfort in these collective places but not, of course, as much space per person as the apartments permitted, nor did they have the homelike appearance of the latter. There was light from several windows and a pleasant outlook, and the two girls present on our visit looked exactly as occupants of a home would appear. As housing goes in crowded Moscow this represented an average standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dining room in the factory-kitchen building was quite large and equipped with small tables, such as one would find in a restaurant. One side was almost an entire window. A few late eaters were sitting at tables and attendants were beginning to clean so that the place had a disorderly after-dinner appearance but one of deeper cleanliness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One might as well not try to keep remembering, as he goes along the street meeting people, that these are convicts of the most habitual sort. They are going or coming from their work exactly as other people would. There is absolutely no difference. They could run away, of course, and a few have, but in the majority of cases, the reverse is true. They do not wish to leave the Commune at the end of their sentence and so they live on and keep a job in some of the factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school building in this Commune is especially lovely. It was completed about two years ago at a cost of a million and a half rubles. It has all the equipment that a good school would be expected to have—a library, reading rooms, laboratories, an auditorium interestingly decorated with murals of working men, which is the work of artist inhabitants, spacious halls and class rooms. The teachers are not residents of the Commune but members of their own profession who come in to teach. The man in charge of the school showed us the building with great pride. The first seven years of education are compulsory, after that there are evening classes for the more advanced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Education, as already indicated, does not stop with formal classroom work but those interested in the arts, in music, or in writing are provided with channels for special training. There are music circles, art classes, drama work, and literary clubs, and the persons making up this artistic group live in their own building, forming a congenial household. A number of the leading ones, the most talented ones, are paid a stipend by the state, and we were told of a number of musicians and writers who had had their first training in this Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The physical education is carried on in a large and splendidly equipped gymnasium, and building up the body is made a major consideration in the training. Setting up exercises are also a part of the daily program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school, with its formal teaching of elementary subjects, is one side of the education program; the other is the work done in the shops. In these two places as well as in this whole atmosphere, the “making people,” spoken of by H. G. Wells, goes on. One must learn a trade and then he must work at it, not as drudgery, but with free enjoyment of his task. In the shops of the shoe factory, the skate factory, the knitting goods factory, the mechanized laundry, the sports goods factory, and the factory kitchen, these former thieves and bandits who have barely escaped with their necks, work at their jobs, some still in the ranks of the unskilled, others risen to instructors and supervisors. One looks and remembers again that there is nothing between them and escape, no one to prevent their walking away, and yet they stay and work. When the day is ended they go out in the street and to their rooms or Walk or do any other thing they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One may break a law of the Commune. To meet the exigencies of such occurrences, there is the comradely court and a penalty either mild or more serious according to the act, and if that is not sufficient then the greatest blow of all will fall—the culprit will be sent back whence he came, or if he came directly he will be transferred to a more severe institution. A new member is on probation for a month and he must prove his worth if he is to live with this group who is serious about making life worth while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The age is 16-24 now, although at its beginning it was 13-17. There are three thousand inhabitants of the Commune, some of whom have finished their terms and have worked on in the factories. These naturally may be older than the maximum age given for those who are sent. The surrounding community was hostile to the idea at the time of the establishment of the Commune among them, as one can imagine any neighborhood might be at having a group of unrestrained criminals, thieves and housebreakers, set down among them, but there is now a general esteem and friendliness felt for those who work in this unique town.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The hospital is perhaps the greatest prize of the place. A large building, set back from the street, with grass, trees, and shrubs in its front yard, it presents an excellent impression. It is equipped for all the best care of the health of the community. Babies are born, children of the communards attended to, and the whole population served by its staff. It fills not only the role of medical care, but an especially educational one as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolshevo has been described in detail because it is the largest of the labor communes and was the first in construction. But there is another close to Moscow, built second in order, on the site of the former Nikolo-Ugreshsky Monastery. This commune has four factories, making musical instruments, incubators, electrical repairs, and compressed fiber, and in 1934 it is estimated that they will turn out goods to the value of some twenty-three or twenty-four million rubles. Here, too, are modern houses with all equipment in which the workers are housed according to industry, the metal workers in one, wood workers in another, and those making musical instruments in a third. There is a separate house for those communards who are members of artist circles, a separate house for women, and a building where probationers stay until permanently assigned. There are twenty-two hundred members of the commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A third is the Dzerzhinsky Labor Commune at Kharkov which follows the same line of development but is smaller than the others. There are only four hundred members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is hard to estimate the results of the work done in such centers as these. A tangible evidence of success is pointed to by authorities on the subject in the steady descent of the percentage of juvenile delinquents to the total number of criminals. This system, spreading year by year to take in all that it may serve, aided by those factory apprenticeship schools that train the 15-18 year old group, ought to do a good deal to depopulate the adult prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XV: CONCLUSION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; concluding remarks of most books on Russia begin with a discussion of class distinction. In this case it would be further stated that it showed not only in court action but was likewise felt in the fact that while the OGPU as an arresting agent turned the ordinary prisoner over to the courts, it acted in the capacity of a judicial organ for those of the opposition class. A few months ago that would have been true. With the transforming of that agent into the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the stripping from it of all judicial powers, one more step has been made toward the disappearance of class lines in the administration of criminal law.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Again there has been the following comment from an authority on the Administration of Criminal Law in the USSR, in regard to this statement: “The class line in the criminal justice can disappear only when the classes themselves disappear. So long as the classes exist, so long as the struggle between them goes on, it is absolutely impossible to avoid the class character of criminal justice You may keep silent about that, you may try to disguise it, but you cannot make it disappear. We don’t find it necessary to disguise the class character of our courts, as the bourgeois science of law and the bourgeois legislation does, because the class whose interests our courts defend, is the overwhelming majority of all the people. With the bourgeois criminal justice it is quite the opposite. Of course, as I have already stated, the victory we have gained over our class enemies here has enormously changed our policy, but this policy remains a class policy, because it remains the policy of the proletariat struggling for socialism. The first aim of this policy does not change, only the methods of its practical accomplishment. If you build a railway, the forms of your work will be different in a plain or in mountains, but the final aim will be the same. “Our final aim is to build a classless society. When this task will be accomplished, not only the class line in the criminal law will disappear, but the criminal law itself will become useless and will die as well as the criminal courts. “But so long as those courts do exist, they cannot go on without an open or a hidden class policy.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the distinction does exist. But in this final evaluation of the present situation in regard to crime repression in the USSR the treatment of political prisoners is not considered. While the method as developed is used for both classes it naturally shows to its best advantage in the treatment of the prisoners from among the workers, and it ought to be judged on that score. It is to be hoped that not many years hence class distinctions will disappear to the extent that machinery for justice will furnish equal measures for all.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following explanation is supplied. “By this time criminal justice will become something quite different from what we are accustomed to. It will become a system of medical and pedagogical measures, which will take their place among other radical and educational institutions. Till then criminal justice will serve the interests of the ruling class as it has always done.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When that happens the treatment of all prisoners will be of the kind that is found so admirably used today in places where discipline and industry are taught to those of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Russians claim no Utopia. When on one occasion the writer expressed admiration to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky for what they had achieved, he quickly and positively responded, “I warn you of its shortcomings.” Well, of course, they are there, plenty of them. They can be found in the administration of justice, too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems though that one who wishes to see actually how the matter stands would find it effective to take first the policy of the state, the standards it sets and the goal at which it aims, then see not only how fully that aim is achieved, but what progress is made year by year toward the goal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Take whatever phase of criminal repression one will, and one finds progress and a pretty good practice of policy. Judges in the beginning, one supposes by the Soviet’s own records, woefully inadequate at finding out what justice might be in a case, are now much more fully qualified; jurors for a time without any qualifications except as to vote are now selected with more care and given some training for the task before them. How fully adequate are they? It would take a firsthand survey of the nation’s tribunals to be able to say, but to judge by a fair sample the author believes them to be fulfilling their duty in a high degree and with more than average competence. Their attendance to work and their conscientious effort to get at the straight of the affair before them is pronounced. They seem in general to feel the responsibility of being the agent for administering justice to their own toiling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the prisons and places of deprivation of liberty one sees more evenness of tone. The personality of those in charge of these places strikes one as indicating fitness for the job. Members of staffs were observed closely by the writer and with one single exception they seemed well selected for handling the work. Vishinsky, in the Introduction of the book edited by him, states that one of the shortcomings of the prison system is the need for more trained persons who will understand what this policy really is and help put it into practice. One would expect that to be true, since it is so universally a fact with regard to prison workers. It would be indeed a Utopia that provided an adequate staff for penal places. But it seems to the author, by comparison, that he is better off than he thinks he is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the appearance these staffs make may be due in part to the fact of close supervision from above. There is another factor, too, which ought to help. Responsible authorities have a good picture in mind of what a man needs to be in order to fit into their scheme of living. Their society makes definite requirements of its members and training is provided to make the misfits fit. To do that thing which they see clearly they have developed a policy that merely trains a man, both to discipline himself if possible, and do some work that will be of economic benefit both to himself and to the country, while punishment is forgotten. One of their chief tasks is to teach him to prefer the “Life of Labor,” and by instilling in him, or encouraging the spark if it is already there, the joy of creation, they manage in most cases to do it—if their statistics on recidivism are anywhere near correct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another advantage is that they have one very definite policy and every superintendent of penal places knows what that policy is. It is, as stated in their codes, to educate and to train without doing anything to degrade, to build up a personality, a self-respect, and to do nothing that could hinder such development. With that knowledge in hand it is easier to put the program into practice, and they can develop plans for carrying it out. An understanding of psychological principles enters here, not only in expression of policy as found in the Criminal Code but in the actual practice as one finds it. In doing away with handcuffs, with solitary confinement, with any type of corporal punishment, and with any prison garb, the enunciation of policy does its part, but in the approach of the immediate staff to the inmates there is seen a wholesomeness that no code could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude of the authorities toward violations on the part of officers is another indication of their sincerity of purpose in this work. In their zeal to put their policy into action they not only provide that the Observation Commission shall be in close touch with all that goes on in the Institution, and impose on them much responsibility for the régime, but they also back them up by providing a penalty for the man who violates the regulations. A guard who strikes a prisoner is in danger of arrest himself, and since there are official records of such cases, one is sure that an attempt is made to put the policy into practice. It must be true that in isolated instances some such things happen and go unpunished, but it is the stated policy of the authorities to discourage in every way possible the committing of these acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Central authorities, as we have seen in discussing administration of these prisons, have made repeated efforts year by year to see that the Observation Committee keeps in close touch with all the life of the Institution and thereby effects better parole and release work as well as brings up the level of work done in the place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another indication of progress in putting the government’s policy into practice is the speed with which they have built open agricultural colonies, institutions of semi-closed type, and labor communes such as Bolshevo so that prisoners might be taken out of the old type of places. Judging from past accomplishment, there should in a very few years be left only those who demand restriction. In addition they are year by year adding to the number of those sentenced to compulsory labor without deprivation of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, then, is a system that deserves to attract the attention of those genuinely interested in a better approach to effective crime repression. It has without doubt made a distinct contribution in this field of social endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF CRIMINAL CODE GENERAL SECTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL SECTION&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE AIMS OF PENAL LEGISLATION OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. The penal legislation of the RSFSR pursues the task of protecting the socialist state of workers and peasants and the régime established therein from socially dangerous acts (crimes) by applying to persons committing them measures of social protection set out in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
EXTENT OF OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. The provisions of the present code extend to all citizens of the RSFSR, who have committed socially dangerous acts within the territory of the USSR, as well as beyond the boundaries of the USSR in case they are detained within the territory of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Citizens of other constituent republics are in accordance with the RSFSR laws liable to be prosecuted for crimes committed within the territory of the RSFSR as well as outside the boundaries of the USSR, if they had been detained and subjected to trial or investigation within the RSFSR territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes committed within the territory of the Union, citizens of the constituent republics are liable according to the laws of the locality where they committed the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. For crimes committed within the territory of the USSR foreigners are liable according to the laws of the locality where the crime was committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5. The question of the criminal liability of foreign nationals enjoying the right of exterritoriality shall be decided in each individual case by diplomatic means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PENAL POLICY OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
6. A socially dangerous act is any act of commission or omission directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government, for the period of time pending a transition to a communist régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: An act, which although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code is free from socially dangerous characteristics owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
7. In regard to persons who commit socially dangerous acts or who are dangerous owing to their connections with criminal circles, measures of social protection of judicial-corrective, medical, or medical-educational nature are applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
8. In the event of the concrete act, which at the time it was committed was a crime in accordance with Article 6 of the present code, but by the time it was investigated or examined in court lost its socially dangerous character owing to a change in the criminal law, or owing to the mere change in the social-political conditions, or in case the person who committed it cannot, in the opinion of the court be regarded as socially dangerous at the time indicated, then such an act does not entail the application of a measure of social protection to the person who committed it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
9. Measures of social protection are applied for the following purposes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To prevent the commission of further crimes by persons who have committed them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To exercise influence over other unstable elements of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To adapt the offender to the conditions of the social life of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measures of social protection cannot have for their purpose the infliction of physical suffering or the degradation of human dignity and they do not pursue the object of retribution or punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
10. With regard to persons who have committed socially dangerous acts, methods of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applied only in cases when these persons&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Acted knowingly, i.e., foresaw the socially dangerous effect of their acts, desired these consequences, or knowingly allowed such effects to take place, or&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Acted carelessly, i.e., did not foresee the effects of their acts—although they should have foreseen them—or recklessly hoped to avert the effects of their acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
11. Measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not to be applied in the case of persons who have committed a crime while suffering from chronic mental diseases, or while temporarily insane, or in general in such a state of deranged health as to be incapable of realizing their acts or of controlling them. Neither are these measures to be applied to persons, who although at the time they committed a crime were in possession of their mental faculties, nevertheless suffered from mental derangement by the time sentenced was pronounced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection which are applied to these persons are confined to those of a medical nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: The present article does not apply to persons who have committed a crime in a state of intoxication.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
12. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not applied in the case of minors up to the age of 16. When regarding the latter, the Commission of Juvenile Offenders finds it possible to confine itself to measures of social protection of a medical and educational nature. Oct. 30, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 82, Article 796.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
13. Measures of social protection are not applied to persons who have committed acts foreseen by the penal laws, if the court establishes that these acts were committed by them in a state of necessary defense against attempts at the Soviet rule, or at the body or rights of a person defending himself or another person, provided there was no excess of the limits of self-defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection are not applied when the same acts were committed in order to avert a danger, which under the given circumstances were unavertable by any other means, provided the harm thereby caused was less serious than the harm averted. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
14. Criminal prosecution may not take place&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) when ten years have elapsed from the time of the commission of the crime, for which the court may inflict a penalty of not more than five years’ imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) when five years have elapsed since the time the crime for which the court may impose a penalty of not more than five years had been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) when three years have elapsed since the perpetration of the crime, for which a court may sentence the criminal to not more than one year’s imprisonment, or when the law provides a more lenient measure of social protection than imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle of remoteness is applied when in the course of the corresponding period of time no proceedings were instituted in connection with the given case. The period of remoteness is interrupted when the person who committed a crime within the corresponding period of remoteness commits another similar or not less serious crime, or evades judicial examination or investigation. In such cases the periods of remoteness begin to run from the date of the perpetration of the second offense or from the date of the resumption of the interrupted proceedings. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: In cases of criminal prosecutions for counter-revolutionary crimes the application of the principle of remoteness is left to the discretion of the court in each individual case. However, if the court does not find it possible to apply the principle of remoteness, and sentences a person to be shot for such a crime, such sentence must necessarily be commuted to the proclamation that the person accused is an enemy of the toilers coupled with the forfeiture of the citizenship of the USSR, and exile from the confines of the USSR forever or imprisonment for a period of not less than two years. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: In regard to persons criminally prosecuted for active participation in acts, and active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement, committed while holding responsible or secret posts under the Tsarist régime, or under counter-reveolutionary governments during the civil war, the application of the principle of remoteness and the question of commuting capital punishment by shooting are left to the discretion of the court. June 6, 19275.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 3: The periods of remoteness laid down in the present article do not apply to acts prosecuted by way of administrative action according to the present code, and the infliction of punishments for such acts can take place only within one month from the date they were committed. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
15. A sentence of conviction shall not be carried into effect if it was not carried into effect within ten years from the date of the passing of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
16. In case a certain socially dangerous act is not directly foreseen by the present code, the grounds and limits of liability for such acts are determined in accordance with those articles of the code which foresee crimes most closely approximating them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
17. The measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applicable equally to persons who have committed the crime—participants as well as their accomplices—instigators and abettors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instigators are persons who induced the commission of the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abettors are persons who assisted in the carrying out of the crime by means of advice, indications, providing of means and removal of obstacles, or by means of concealing the criminal or the traces of crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
18. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are determined for each of the accomplices according to the degree of their participation in the given crime, as well as according to the degree of danger of the crime, and of the person who took part in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The failure to report a crime that has been committed, or is being planned, entails the application of the measures of social defense of judicial-corrective nature only in cases specially designated in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
19. An attempt to commit a crime, as well as acts preparatory to a crime, which take the form of finding or adapting weapons and means, and creating conditions favorable for a crime, are prosecuted on the same basis as a crime which has actually been committed. In such cases, the court, when selecting the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature, must be guided by the degree of danger of the person who has committed the crime or the preparatory act. The court must also examine how far the preparations for the crime went, and how near the consequences were to the act as well as the causes owing to which the crime was not completed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the crime was not committed owing to the persons intending to commit it having voluntarily renounced it, the court fixes a corresponding measure of social defense for those acts which were in fact committed by the person who attempted or prepared to commit the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; IV&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON THE MEASURES OF SOCIAL PROTECTION APPLIED UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE WITH REGARD TO PERSONS WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
20. The following are the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
21. Execution by shooting is applied for the purpose of combating the gravest kinds of crimes, threatening the foundations of Soviet rule, and of Soviet régime, pending the abolition of that punishment by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, in cases specially indicated in the articles of the present Code, as an exceptional measure for the protection of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
22. Persons who have not reached the age of 18 at the time the crime was committed and women in a state of pregnancy cannot be condemned to shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
23. The principal measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature applied with regard to persons who have committed crimes, consist in proclaiming them enemies of the toilers with the consequences following such measure, imprisonment, and compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other measures of social protection set out in Article 20, except warning and the confiscation of property, may be decreed either as independent measures or be combined with the basic ones as supplementary measures. The confiscation of property as a supplementary measure of social protection may be imposed by the court only in cases specified in the articles of the present Code. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
24. The following are measures of social protection of a medical nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Compulsory medical treatment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Placing a person in a hospital coupled with isolation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
25. The following are measures of social protection of a medical-education kind:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Delivery of a minor into the charge of his parents, adopters, guardians, relatives, provided the aforementioned are able to support him, or to other persons or institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The placing in a special medical-educational institution. December 20, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 4, Article 38.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
26. Measures of social protection of a medical-educational and medical nature may be applied by the court in case it recognizes that the application of measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind does not fit the given case; or they may be applied in addition to the latter, if moreover the measures of social protection of a medical-pedagogical and pedagogical kind have not been applied by the competent judicial inquiry organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
27. The proclamation of a person as enemy of the toilers and expulsion from the confines of the USSR with the forfeiture of the citizenship of a constituent republic, and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR may only be applied for an unlimited period. June 6. 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
28. Imprisonment may be imposed for a period of between one and ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labor camps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labor, or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labor camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: Persons who are uninterruptedly serving in the units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and who are in the cadres either as privates or junior commanders, serving for a definite period, are sentenced in peace time, instead of to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for two months to one year, to serve for a like period in the military-corrective units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and instead of imprisonment for a period up to two months, to arrest for a like period, served in a manner prescribed for the disciplinary arrest of persons in military service.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, by special decree of the court in each individual case, the same measures may be applied to the above-mentioned persons also for common crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons in military service of the middle, senior, highest and junior commanding personnel of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who remain in the cadres after serving the required period in the army, and who have been sentenced to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for a period up to one year, in case of dismissal from the ranks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, serve their term indicated in the sentences by doing compulsory labor according to the general rules. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: When the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army passes to the state of war, persons in the military service who are in military-corrective units are dispatched to the active army, and the subsequent serving of the measure of social protection imposed on them is postponed until after the termination of military operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sentence condemning a soldier in time of war to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights may, by decree of the court which passed that sentence, be postponed until after the termination of military operations, on condition that the convicted person joins the active army.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons in military service mentioned in the first and second parts of the above note, who while in the ranks of active army have proved themselves staunch defenders of the USSR, the court which passed the sentence may, on the petition of the competent military authorities, release the convicted person from the measure of social protection formerly imposed on him, or substitute for it a more lenient measure of social protection. October 1, 1928.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1928, No. 127, Article 816.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
29. The period of preliminary detention, and also the time spent in confinement from the moment the sentence was passed pending its coming into force must obligatorily be reckoned as part of the period of detention decreed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the court applies a measure of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind other than imprisonment, it has the right to take into consideration the period of detention previous to the trial and accordingly mitigate the measure of social protection chosen by it, or to resolve not to apply to the defendant the measure of social protection set out in the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons sentenced to compulsory labor each day of preliminary detention is credited as three days of compulsory labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
30. Compulsory labor without imprisonment may be imposed for a period ranging from one day to one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: Compulsory labor without imprisonment is not applied to the middle, senior, highest and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who are in the cadres and have completed their term of service, and also to persons in military service who belong to the cadres of privates and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during their appointed period of service. In place of compulsory labor the above-mentioned persons in military service are sentenced to arrest for a period not exceeding two months, which is served in a manner prescribed for persons in military service under disciplinary arrest. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
31. Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights consists of the deprivation of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) elective franchise both active and passive&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the right to occupy elective posts in public organizations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the right to occupy certain specified state offices&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) the right to the titles of distinction&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) parental rights&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) right to pensions paid by way of social insurance and to unemployment relief paid by way of social insurance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights may be prescribed both fully—so as to cover all the above-mentioned rights—and partially, in respect of their separate categories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of parental rights may be prescribed by the court, only if it has been proven that this right has been abused by the convicted person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of pension may be prescribed by the courts only in the following cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) conviction for the commission of state crimes (part I of the Special Section)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) conviction for the commission of crimes prompted by greed to imprisonment or to exile with a compulsory residence in other localities (as the basic measure of social protection)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the prescription of the confiscation of the entire property as supplementary measure of social protection&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) conviction in time of peace for military crimes, falling under articles of 193(3), 193(4), 193(7), 193(9), 193(12), 193(13), 193(17), 193(20)-193(28), of the present Code, and in time of war, for any of the crimes falling under Chapter IX of the Criminal Code (on crimes by persons in military service). June 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 30, Article 388.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
32. Forfeiture of rights cannot be prescribed for a period exceeding five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case this measure of social protection is prescribed as one supplementary to imprisonment, forfeiture of rights extends to the entire period of imprisonment served plus a period determined by the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
33. Forfeiture of rights, foreseen by paragraphs a-c of Article 31 is accompanied by the forfeiture of the orders of the USSR, and of the orders of the RSFSR. In such cases the court is obliged, after the sentence comes into force, to present a petition to that effect to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as the case may be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of the other marks of distinction and of distinctive titles, is effected by sentence of the court. August 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 42, Article 504.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
34. Forfeiture of rights may be decreed by the court both as a supplementary and as an independent measure of social protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When imposing a sentence of over one year’s imprisonment, the court is obliged to discuss the question of the forfeiture of the convicted person’s rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights cannot be combined with conditional conviction or with public censure. December 6, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 8788, Article 854.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
35. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement or with prohibition to reside in other localities or without these limitations, coupled with compulsory labor or without compulsory labor, may be applied by the court with regard to those convicted persons, who, in the opinion of the court, it would be socially dangerous to leave in the given locality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the boundaries of a separate locality with an obligatory residence in other localities is prescribed for a period of three to ten years. This measure, as a supplementary one, can only be prescribed for a period not exceeding five years. The removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory residence in other localities, coupled with compulsory labor, may only be prescribed as a basic measure of social protection. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with prohibition to reside in certain localities, or without this restrictive provision is prescribed for a period of one to five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case one of these measures is decreed by the court as a supplementary one to imprisonment, the period of this supplementary measure begins to run from the date of the release of the prisoner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons sentenced to the removal from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in some other locality in order to serve their terms of imprisonment in corrective labor camps, after serving their term of imprisonment, settle in the district of the camp pending the period when they will be allowed a free choice of their residence. Land must be allotted to them, or else they must be provided with paid work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Removal from the RSFSR territory, as well as removal from any specified locality whatever form it takes, cannot be applied to persons under sixteen. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
36. Removal from the confines of the USSR or RSFSR for a definite period of time may take place only in a manner specially provided by federal legislation. Removal from the confines of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities may be applied by the court only in cases of conviction for crimes specified by Articles 58(2)-58(14), 59(2), Part I, a, 59(3), 59(302), 59(3-b), 59(7), 59 (8), Part I, 59(9), 59(21), 61 Part III, 73(1), 74 Part II, 104, 107, 116 Part II, 117 Part II, 118, 129, 129-a, 136, 140 Part II, 142 Part II, 153 Part II, 155, 162, b, c, d, and e, 164 Part II, 165 Part III, 166, 167, 169, Part II, 173 and 175 Parts II and III.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Places in which compulsory settlement may be prescribed are determined as follows: With regard to persons condemned to exile without compulsory labor by the chief administration of militia at the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, by agreement with the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR; and with regard to persons condemned to exile with compulsory labor, by the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR. February 15, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 9, Article 102.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; May 30, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 27, Article 247.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
37. Removal from office may be applied in case the court deems it impossible to leave the condemned person at the post he occupied at the time of his conviction, or at the time he committed the crime. It may be accompanied by a prohibition to occupy a certain post, such prohibition not to last over five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
38. Prohibition to follow a certain activity or industry is applied by the court for a period not to exceed five years in cases where the court shall consider it impossible, owing to the ascertained abuses by the person convicted while he was engaged in his profession or industry, to allow him to continue same further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In particular, the court has the right to prohibit the person convicted to undertake any responsibilities with regard to furnishing labor and material to State institutions, to enter into contracts with State and public enterprises and institutions, to manage trade or commission enterprises either in his own name or on behalf of other persons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
39. Public censure consists of the public expression of condemnation to the person condemned declared in the name of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
40. Confiscation of property is the compulsory and uncompensated alienation in favor of the State of the whole property of a convicted person, or of a proportion thereof exactly defined by the court, such property being either entirely owned by him, or constituting a share in common property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of domestic use and indispensable to the condemned person and his family, the stock and tools required for small-scale peasant industry or agricultural production, and serving as a means of existence for him and his family, are not subject to confiscation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foodstuffs and sums of money left at the disposal of the convicted person and members of his family, may not, according to valuation in their totality, be less than the average three-months’ wages of a worker or that locality in respect to each member of the family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The stock of tools indispensable to a convicted person for his professional work may be confiscated only in case the court decrees that he shall be deprived of the right of exercising such profession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: In kulak households only the property mentioned in Articles 1-9 of the List of Kinds of Property on which execution may not be levied in respect of arrears of taxes, custom duties, and dues, is not liable to confiscation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, Nos. 8990, Article 924.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
41. When property is confiscated, the State shall not answer for the debts and liabilities of the convicted person, if such had been contracted after the taking of steps by the investigation or judicial organs to protect the property, and without the consent of these organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to claims subject to gratification out of the confiscated property, the State answers only within the limits of the assets, while in regard to priority of gratification of claims the rules shall be observed that are laid down in Articles 99 and 101 of the Civil Code and 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure of RSFSR published April 10, 1930.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
42. A fine is a money penalty imposed by the court within the limits established by separate articles of the present Code, and when applied as an additional measure, the fine shall be imposed at the discretion of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all cases a fine shall be imposed in conformity to the property status of the convicted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In determining the fine, the court may decide to substitute, in the event of nonpayment, by compulsory work without deprivation of liberty at the rate of one month compulsory labor for 100 rubles fine. No substitution of deprivation of liberty for a fine or vice versa shall be allowed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of property that are not subject to confiscation may not be taken in payment of a fine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
43. The caution is applied by the court only when a verdict of acquittal is given, if the court considers that the behavior of the acquitted gives ground, nevertheless, to fear that he might commit the crime in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
44. The obligation to repair the damage is imposed upon the convicted in those cases when the court finds it expedient that the convicted shall eliminate the consequences of the violation of the law committed by him, or of the damage caused by him to the plaintiff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This measure of social defense, however, may not exceed by its severity the measure of social defense given as the basic penalty in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; V&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON MEASURES OF SOCIAL DEFENSE OF JUDICO-CORRECTIONAL CHARACTER AND THEIR IMPOSITION BY COURT&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
45. In imposing a measure of social protection of judico-correctional character the court shall be guided by:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) the provisions of the general section of the present code&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the limits indicated in the article of the Special Section which provides a penalty for a given kind of crime&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the Socialist conception of law, taking into consideration the social danger of the crime committed, the circumstances of the case, and the personality of the defendant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
46. The crimes foreseen by the present code are divided into:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes directed against the foundations of the Soviet system established by the authority of Workers and Peasants in the USSR, such crimes being consequently considered the more dangerous, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) All other crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes of the first category the Code lays down the limit below which the court may not go in imposing a measure of social defense of judico-correctional character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On all other crimes the Code lays down only the maximum limit of penalty to be imposed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
47. The basic question to be settled in each separate case is the question of the social danger of the crime that has been tried.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An aggravating factor in this respect, when determining one or the other measure of social protection foreseen by the Code, is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Committing a crime in order to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie. ‘&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Possibility of causing harm to the interests of the State, of the toilers by committing the crime, although the crime itself was not immediately directed against the interests of the State or of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Committing of a crime by a group or a band.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Committing a crime by a person who already committed a crime before, except in cases when a given person is considered as not having been tried before, or when a long time, in a judicial sense, has passed since the committing of the first crime, or since the conviction of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Articles 14 and 15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The court, however, depending on the character of the first crime, may not consider it as an aggravating factor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Committing a crime for selfish or base motives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Committing a crime with particular cruelty, violence, slyness, or in regard to persons subordinated to the criminal or materially dependent on him, or particularly helpless on account of age, or other circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
48. Extenuating circumstances in the imposition of one or another measure of social defense or when a crime has been committed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Although exceeding the limits of self-defense, yet for the protection of Soviet law, revolutionary law, or the personality and right of the party defending himself or another person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) For the first time&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) For motives other than selfishness or base desires&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Under the influence of threats, compulsion, or official or material dependence&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Under the influence of strong mental agitation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) In a state of hunger or distress, or under the influence of severe personal or family conditions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Due to ignorance, lack of consciousness, or an accidental chain of circumstances&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) By a person under age, or by a woman in a state of pregnancy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
49. If the crime committed by the defendant contains the symptoms of several crimes, as well as in the case of the defendant having committed several crimes for which he has not been sentenced, the court, having defined the measure of social defense for each crime separately, finally imposes the penalty according to the article which provides for the gravest of the crimes committed by the defendant and the severest measure of social defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
50. If a minor (16-20 years of age) is sentenced to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the term must be reduced by one-third as compared with the term of an adult sentenced under the same article. At all events the term of the sentence of a minor shall not exceed one-half the maximum laid down by the present Code for a given crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
51. In the event when, in view of exceptional circumstances of the case, the court finds it necessary to impose a measure of social defense below the lowest limit indicated in a corresponding article of the present Code, or to apply another, less stringent measure of social defense that is not indicated in the article, the court may also depart from the article, but the motives of such departure from the code must, be clearly stated in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same rule applies in those cases when the court finds that the defendant at the time of the trial is not socially dangerous and no measure of social defense is imposed on him by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
52. The right of either complete or partial release of the condemned person from the application of measures of social defense, under sentences of all judicial organs of RSFSR, except cases foreseen in the present Code, constitutes the exclusive prerogative of the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; VI&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON CONDITIONAL SENTENCES AND CONDITIONAL AND EARLY RELEASE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
53. If the court finds that the degree of social danger of the defendant does not call either for his isolation, or for the imposition of compulsory labor, it may impose a conditional sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such cases the court decides not to execute the verdict if within a stated period the convicted person will not commit a fresh crime of equal gravity. This period may not be less than one year and not more than ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: If a fine or property requisition is added to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the fine is imposed irrespective of the conditional nature of the basic verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
54. In the event of the committing of a crime by the conditionally condemned during the probation period the court has the right either to add the conditioned measure of social defense either fully or in part to the measure of social defense given by the second verdict. In the first case, the total term of deprivation of liberty must not exceed ten years, and the total term of compulsory labor must not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
55. The following persons shall be held free from previous convictions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Persons acquitted by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Persons conditionally sentenced, who did not commit a crime of equal gravity during the probation period given by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for terms of not more than three months, or to any other minor measure of social defense, who in the course of three years after serving the first sentence, did not commit a fresh crime, or persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a period of more than six months if they committed no fresh crime of equal gravity in the course of six years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
56. If persons sentenced to terms of social defense show reformation, they may be released before the end of the term imposed by the verdict of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conditional early release consists either in abstaining from further serving of the sentence, or in substituting a milder form of social defense. The manner of application of conditional early release is laid down by the Correctional Labor Code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to persons serving sentences in correctional labor camps, conditional early release is applied in the form of transferring the convict to free settlement in the district of the given camp for the rest of his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the conditionally-released person should commit a fresh crime of equal gravity during the unexpired time of his sentence, the latter is added to the measure of social defense imposed by the court for the new crime, while the total term of deprivation of liberty may not exceed ten years and the total term of compulsory labor may not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
57. Persons under age, sentenced to deprivation of liberty and placed in industrial homes for minors, remain there until fully corrected, but not later than reaching the age of 18. If, by the time of reaching this age, the sentence has not yet expired, they may be given early discharge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Minors, in regard to whom early discharge should be deemed impossible, shall either remain in the same industrial home, or shall be transferred to other industrial homes or colonies on the grounds laid down by the correctional labor code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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&lt;div&gt;== Summary ==&lt;br /&gt;
Page 86 from Russian Justice&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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	<entry>
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		<title>Library:Russian Justice</title>
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		<updated>2024-02-27T10:12:49Z</updated>

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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Russian Justice|author=Mary Stevenson Callcott|written in=1935|publisher=Macmillan Company|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/soviet-justice/}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PREFACE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; problem of crime in the United States is one of our most serious social questions. Within recent years the activities of the gangster and the kidnapper, the increasing number of young criminals whom we do not know how to treat so that they are re-established in life, have brought alarm not only to the social worker and others who try to meet the situation, but to the ordinary citizen as well. Not only is our penal system failing to reform the lawbreaker, but our social conditions are breeding others. The delay in our courts, the influence of politics, and the swaying of sentimental or incompetent juries by artful criminal lawyers without social conscience, are familiar to our citizens. Confronted by all this, we ask ourselves what we might do in order to fulfill our duty in protecting society and at the same time in aiding the transgressor to become a useful citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One thing we can do is to examine closely any system that seems to work in other countries. Russia, with her broad social program, gives much attention to her problem of crime and criminals. Sherwood Eddy, a student of Russia for a long time, has included the humane treatment of prisoners as one of the things which we might profitably get from that country. He might have added also that the simplicity of court procedure by which they arrive at justice has some commendable virtues.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have visited prisons in many parts of our country as well as in several others and have sat through criminal trials in almost as many places, so in my visits to courts and prisons in the USSR I had an experience that made observation intelligent. There is no doubt that we may learn something from the Russians about the restoration to society of those who contravene the law. Whether one sympathizes with or condemns the political faith of this country, one must admire and respect a people who are able to put ideals into works as they do. They know what they want of the man who is their criminal and they set to work to teach him how to fit into their society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are shortcomings in this phase of their work, mostly on the physical side, but they know that as well as we do and are correcting them as rapidly as possible. They have often had to use old buildings because in the short space of years of the new nation they have not had time to build enough modern ones; but they have reformed such gloomy spots as the Women’s Prison of Moscow is said to have been in Tzarist days, into a place of considerable light and more livable conditions. There are also some old cells in the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute of much too little ventilation but this building is to be replaced within a short time. Most of the buildings of this institute are already in good condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States we have been so led away with preparing better buildings (we still have some of the worst in the world) that we have often forgotten the spiritual side. There are some penal institutions, such as the New Jersey Prison for Women at Clinton, N. J., where an excellent spirit certainly prevails, but even in our best prisons I think that we do not overcome that feeling on the part of the prisoner that he or she is permanently set aside from normal society. It is the exceptional individual case where this is not true. In the Russian institutions, especially those where there is great freedom, one is struck by the atmosphere that prevails among the prisoners of still being a part of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In undertaking to give to the American public in general a picture of the situation in Soviet Russia in regard to crime and its repression certain usual questions have been kept in mind. Interested inquirers, both in this country and abroad, have repeatedly asked me, “What are the courts really like?” “What kinds of crime are committed?”’ “Who commits them?” and “What is the punishment given?” The answers are found in the pages of this book. Since it is intended to reach the layman as well as the social worker, the student of criminology, the lawyer, and the legislator, an informal approach has been used. It is hoped, however, that this will not tend to detract from the authenticity of the work. No effort has been spared to give as accurate an account as possible, both by means of research over a period of years in connection with my Criminology class and by recent visits to courts and penal institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gratitude for help must be expressed to many people whom I cannot enumerate here. I am especially indebted to the Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, Prof. A. J. Vishinsky, who gave valuable time for appointments, to Mr. C. S. Smith of the Associated Press who aided me in many ways, to Director Shlaposnitchov of the Institute of Criminal Policy, to Professor Brusilovsky for conferences and appointments he both arranged and participated in and for lectures which was permitted to attend, to S. Golunsky, of the Commissariat of Justice, who in addition to such services as were rendered by others, has contributed the further service of reading and criticizing the manuscript. Finally, to my two young countrywomen, Miss Margaret Moore and Miss Margaret Ross, who gave up parts of their vacation in Moscow to contribute typing to the project.&lt;br /&gt;
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M. S. C.&lt;br /&gt;
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New York City&lt;br /&gt;
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October, 1934&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Criminal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; repression in the Soviet Union is bound up with the whole social program which the state has been developing. A good many of us had thought of the Soviet’s welfare work as more of a hit-or-miss arrangement, gathering up a few threads here, omitting to notice some quite as important in other places, but as the work is examined in its entirety, it gives evidence of more than usually comprehensive planning.&lt;br /&gt;
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In making an evaluation of the present situation in regard to any of its phases of development, it is not sufficient merely to consider standards as they now exist, but it is also, of course, necessary to take into account the distance traversed in the brief time and the difficulties surrounding the accomplishment.&lt;br /&gt;
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The important thing, let us say for an example, in child care, is to see that ten or twelve years ago thousands upon thousands of children were wandering in wild gangs, all over the country, thieving, plundering, killing even, unfed and unclothed, and that today they are, with few exceptions both clothed and fed, being trained and cared for in institutions or at home, and that the period of distress and acute exigency is over. If that had extended to children alone we might understand that with all the forces available the authorities could handle such a situation, but it was a larger thing than that, and the fact that in the face of what seemed an undertaking of impossible dimensions the authorities were able to come through, and with a program so constructive that it has revolutionized their treatment of offenders against the law, seems something of a miracle. Or again, it is of great significance, especially to such a study as this, that the banditry and roving lawlessness on the part of men in 1922, has been reduced so sharply that this form of crime is pretty well under control. So, it is the distance revolutionary Russia has come, the rapidity of her pace, that are more significant than the actual standards in practice. That is not to say, however, that her present standards always need a defense. Her achievement in treatment of prisoners, for example, which is the subject of this book, does not suffer by comparison with that of western nations.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the pages that follow attention is given to treatment and to standards, but for the moment, assuming that advances have been rapidly made in the repression of crime, let us focus our interest on other factors that have contributed to this progress. For us it is important to discover, if we can, what factors are responsible for the one-third decrease in the number of criminals which authorities say has been effected since the beginning of the Revolution. Even if their estimate of the reduction seems high, it is still apparent to a student of the situation that a real decrease, perhaps smaller, has been made. The united front with which the nation has attacked its social problems on all sides has, as would be expected, exerted great influence in the handling of the crime problem. Prevention has resulted in a large way from the development in the various phases of social welfare that have gone on simultaneously, and as one begins to consider the relationship that exists there appears that whole pattern, referred to earlier, which leaves few phases of social and economic life untouched.&lt;br /&gt;
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The care of children has already been spoken of. It is clear that one of the big problems, among the horde that have puzzled and challenged the group who have had chief responsibility in steering the government, was juvenile delinquency. While authorities gathered these young offenders together and put them in places for care, they were at the same time preparing and carrying out a program for their youth that would prevent others following in the footsteps of the delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the preventive program that was now first in interest, the item of education stood at the head of the list. No doubt in the early days of the proletarian state, schools were woefully inadequate, but children were at least placed under the guidance of people who gave them the elements of an education as well as taught them something of how to work. But the nation appears to have a mania for the education of its masses and a point has now been reached where there is university study in sight, with a stipend attached for those who attend, for all those able to take advantage of it. Juvenile delinquency rates have steadily decreased and the development of the school system has obviously contributed largely to this reduced figure.&lt;br /&gt;
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Health programs are, of course, directly related to crime repression. There is a book on the socialized medicine of Russia, written by Sir Arthur Newsholme of England and Dr. Kingsbury of our own country, that should be read for full information on this subject, but it can be said that the scope of the program is wide and the extent far-reaching. Beyond the broad development of curative medicine there is the preventive program in which physical culture activities figure largely. As an illustration of the results achieved in this work, a demonstration staged in Moscow in the summer of 1934 was very impressive. The author along with a good many other Americans and other foreign visitors witnessed the parade in which a hundred thousand physical culturists, with their canoes, paddles, tennis racquets, flowers, and other things suggestive of health and enjoyment of life, passed in excellent order, so well disciplined that one group followed another without a break in ranks. There is, of course, a great significance to that when it is considered on a national scale. With every factory and farm providing such a program for its workers there should be a rapid diminution in the number of weaklings who turn to crime.&lt;br /&gt;
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One finds himself on the defensive at the mention of more liberal divorce laws, but such a provision may actually lessen criminal acts. Since a woman who finds her husband wholly incompatible and wants to remarry some more congenial person has only to indicate her wish in order to be free, she is not nearly as likely to poison her husband or work herself into a state from which some expert psychiatrist will have to untangle her. When the system was first initiated in the Soviet Union we were told that there was a great rush of those who wished to benefit, but that since the first period exhausted the number of those eager for separation, there has been a noticeable decrease. One meets a great number of people who have been married a long time! Such an authority as Vishinsky attributed much of the decrease in criminal acts to these liberal laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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The rapid industrialization of the country has made for less crime except in the case of offenses against the state. In that period just before the installation of NEP when farmers and others discharged from the army could find no work, when distribution without production had left the nation in starvation, banditry flourished, but when the five-year plan began to make demands for more workers than could be furnished, a halt was called in the advance of ordinary crime. Also, with work plentiful, there is no problem of providing jobs for those discharged from prisons. With the system of training which gives a skilled trade to every man capable of assimilating the instruction and mastering the tasks, and of giving instruction also to the unskilled type who are thereby enabled to fill some job well, there is no question of work for discharged prisoners. How long this condition will hold depends, of course, on the time it will take for industrialization to reach its zenith and for the population to catch up and exceed the ability of the system to absorb them. However, there is an encouragement of birth control and that may manage the question somewhat better than has been done in other countries gone on before with their industrialization program. Since Russia sits down with pencil and paper and makes her plans of production, perhaps she can do something in the nature of requirements for population increase!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following comment is offered by a Russian authority: “That is something like the Malthusian theory. We don’t believe in it. We are sure that at present, and for a very long time in the future there can be no real over-population. If sometimes something like that seems to happen in the capitalistic countries, it is an illusion. It is the result of the social conditions of those countries. Our social system makes it possible for us to use any quantity of labour and there can be no question of over-population for us. Therefore the question of something like State birth control does not even arise.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Housing is, of course, one of the biggest problems in Soviet Russia. They are building with feverish rapidity but one suspects it will be some time until they catch up to the need. It is popular to correlate bad health, crime, and most other social evils with congested housing, and one feels sure that much of the blame attached to it is well placed. If Russia can eliminate this condition she will have done much in exercising control of those situations that are supposed to be the major causes of crime. She has her own theory of cause which another chapter discusses, but optimistic socialists believe she is in a fair way to remove that also. Russians know well enough of their shortage of housing and they know the social significance of that shortage, but one cannot rebuild an entire nation in the few short years since their social cataclysm. There had to be a gap somewhere and both lack of trained workers and of material accounts for its existence.&lt;br /&gt;
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Training for taking part in government affairs, such as elections and jury service, is also conducive to securing law observance. The writer’s visit was so taken up with courts and prisons that other angles of investigation were neglected and any ideas as to government practices in democracy are secured second-hand. However, some of those Americans who live there and observe intelligently state that there is a steady progress toward greater participation by the people themselves in government. As education prepares the way, participation becomes more real.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any mention of fight against crime in this country ought to take into account the establishment of the new culture of this society. At the close of the October Revolution, Russia had as its chief asset a great many millions of people whose rights the leaders had sworn to establish and protect, and who were unlettered, superstitious and without social understanding. Educating children was a small task compared to what they must do with those adults, and in the period when the old culture had come to an end with the last efforts of the civil war and the new had not well begun, crime swelled into large numbers of convicted. But these peasants and workers have many of them learned, at evening classes, at conferences, and in trade unions of various sorts, something of what this order stands for. A new social consciousness that makes the individual feel responsible for the law and order of the country has arisen and makes itself felt even in such small offenses as the case of some thoughtless individual throwing paper in a park which is certain to be otherwise immaculate, or of a more delinquent one climbing on a street car at the front in the hope of not being detected.&lt;br /&gt;
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The freeing of the people from hardships of the pioneer stage of the new civilization is also beginning to be felt. There is much attention to beauty which I am told was not evident as recently as two or three years ago. Natural yearnings are being satisfied and a broader life is opening; the labor pains of the rebirth of a nation are about over. All this relieves tension and tends to establish a normality of living such as results in a more settled order.&lt;br /&gt;
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A condition that ought soon to make for a decrease in crime against the state by the so-called class enemy is the fact that the government is now established. We are so accustomed to use the phrase “the Russian experiment” that it is hard for one to give it up; but, it is no longer much of an experiment. The author remembers a gentle reproof given to her when she remarked that since this sort of thing had never been tried before, it was difficult to see how it might work. There was a smiling rejoinder of “We have tried it and it does work.” Surely there will be a cessation in “crimes against the state” when it is clearly seen that efforts against the order of government will not be of avail.&lt;br /&gt;
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Emphasis ought, of course, to be put on the social planning that gives security for old age and removes fear of illness and unemployment. It would be impossible to estimate how much crime is due to a feeling of insecurity in society, but there is no doubt that it is a large percentage. Provisions looking toward the elimination of this insecurity have already been effective enough to have a part in the reduction of the number of those driven to crime because of fear of such economic woes.&lt;br /&gt;
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One point on which observers agree that we need to imitate these people is in the humane treatment of prisoners. It ought to be understood here that “humane” is not synonymous with “coddling.” Some of us who do not distinguish have grown shy of that word but in these pages it is used in its proper meaning. Prisoners are given a “man to man” treatment, held to a strict régime just as if they worked in a factory outside. There is discipline in industry and they are prepared to meet that condition, to learn to discipline themselves, but the approach is one of dignity, with any thought of humiliation put far away. It is only when one thinks of the prisoner as suffering undignified imprisonment, degraded by acts of physical or verbal abuse on the part of guards who ought themselves to be in prison, that one stoops to pity and “feels sorry for him,” but when a man is subjected only to a constructive training such as it might be a privilege to get, one’s sympathy is hardly needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question of how much one can see in a limited time always comes up when one writes of foreign conditions, and cognizance of it should be taken in this Introductory Chapter. The answer, of course, depends on the preparation of the person for the task. It seems too obvious even to remark that one can live in a country for years and know considerably less about specialized subjects than one trained observer who merely visits the institutions. The book on Red Medicine by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. Kingsbury has already been referred to. One would naturally rather trust the judgment of such authorities even though they visit briefly than that of others, unfamiliar with this field, who have resided there for years on end.&lt;br /&gt;
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The author trusts her own judgment in regard to prisons and courts. She has been seeing both for years, and in many places. Physical equipment is not all that one looks for. There are signs that give things away. There are glances that indicate a whole policy. If a warden tells a visitor of a wholesome approach to his men, and that person then sees the inmates fall away and look up from lowered eyes as he goes through, he knows what to think. If a superintendent says, as one did to the writer, that he does not really enforce the silent system, and one watches the men a while, talking through the side of a twisted mouth as a guard half turns his head and never speaking normally during the entire time of the visit, one knows again that representations are not in accord with practice. Prisoners do not put on acts for visitors, and members of a staff would probably be letting themselves in for trouble with any suggestion that they do so.&lt;br /&gt;
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The writer expresses no opinions on conditions outside her own field of special investigation, except on obvious points. Other institutions were visited only in a casual way, but a great deal of life itself was seen. There were long walks in all sorts of places. Groups of children were played with and workmen of all kinds talked to, usually through an interpreter; but there were those with whom the conversation was carried on directly in French, German or sometimes English. All of this formed a background for any conclusions, and years of working with people in a social work relationship had also prepared the writer again for significant observation.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the major portion of the book is concerned with research, and that has been thoroughly checked for accuracy of statement by a member of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER II: THE SOVIET THEORY OF CRIME ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;To understand&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; rightly the theory of crime officially accepted in Russia today, one must read the works of Lenin. Karl Marx is there in the background, to be sure, but he is explained or interpreted in accordance with the opinion of the Soviet Union’s first leader. It sounds a simple enough theory—that, with the final attainment of the classless society, crime, which is the result of economic class relationship, will disappear. But it needs some elucidation. The accomplishment of a state of society in which this would be true is not, after all, quite so simple as the statement sounds.&lt;br /&gt;
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People have tried for a good many years to account for the phenomenon of crime and to work out some manner of punishment that would control even if not eliminate it, as the present Soviet theory permits. Anthropologists tell us that acts not pleasing to the group, even antagonistic to its best interests, are apparently as old as human society itself. Penalties consisting of curses, banishment, even death, were visited upon those who broke the law in the earliest ages of society. Up to very recent years punishment in the form of untold cruelties was dealt out to those who transgressed. Still crime grew and criminals increased with the complexity of civilization. What makes people do those things—commit those acts which are against the folk ways or state ways of the community in which he lives, and brings him usually to account? Who knows? Within fairly recent times three main theories have attempted to establish the causes and have laid out measures of punishment designed to protect law-abiding society from the criminal and, later, to aid in the readjustment of the individual to life.&lt;br /&gt;
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We might take a hasty look at these theories before we speak of their rejection by proletariat Russia. The classical school had as one of its chief characteristics the doctrine of free will in the commission of crime. The discretionary power of judges in the years just preceding the development of this theory gave too much play to the possibility, supposedly, of circumstances surrounding the act. As a matter of actual practice, according to such an authority as Gillin, it gave them instead an excellent chance to wreak a personal vengeance on some enemy, or, still acting according to the discretionary power given them, befriend someone to whom they wished to show favor.&lt;br /&gt;
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But this was one of the evils the classical school of writers decided to remedy. If one committed an act of his own free will, then circumstances had nothing to do with it. A man was a criminal because he chose to be. Thus when two persons committed the same act they should be given the same punishment. And the French Code of 1791 put such a theory into practice, listing a great number of such transgressions and providing for each a set penalty. The difficulties would hardly need to be set down for us. The resulting unwieldy code, the lack of any punishment for acts not listed, made the administration of the code an impossible task.&lt;br /&gt;
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There was another reason for its modification. It did not take an expert in criminology to see that there were differentiating conditions surrounding the commissions of crime. It was clear that of two people committing similar acts, the one would have the sympathy of those who saw him, whereas the second would be looked on with contempt. That the people in the street were able to arrive at such a conclusion and public opinion in the days of revolutionary action against tyranny, must have had some effect. At any rate the Code of 1810 in France provided a modification of the definite penalty for a definite crime by setting a maximum and minimum and permitting the judge to choose between. The doctrine of free will in the commission of crime thus became modified to a milder form of the same theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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The neo-classical school went a step further. While it still recognized the theory of free will and individual responsibility on the part of one transgressing the law, it did decide that in view of evidences being submitted by a body of biologists, physicians, and other scientists, that every person was not free to choose, and was thus not responsible for his behavior. There might, for example, be insanity or imbecility to account for an act. It was, however, necessary to establish that at the time of the crime he was in such a mental state. This theory is incorporated in the practice of our criminal courts today.&lt;br /&gt;
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But here begins another story. Modern science was developing. Research connected with psychiatry and psychology was adding important contributions to the field of the study of the criminal and an attempt to account for crime. Why did a man do things of such an anti-social nature, things harmful to his fellow beings? The anthropological school with Lombroso as its initial spokesman, entered with its explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This theory, attacking the classical and neo-classical writers, took a different line, and swung far in the other direction. Why did the criminal commit his crime? Because he was born with certain stigmata that prevented his following other lines of behavior. He had no choice in the matter. Far from the free-will theory that made him a creature responsible for his deeds, this doctrine made him incapable of rational analysis, or any logical deductions as to cause and consequence. Lombroso weighted his argument with facts and figures. He made an extensive study of criminals in Italian prisons and concluded finally that at least a certain percentage of those committing crimes were born criminals with definite physical features characteristic of the lower stages of evolution. However, in his later writings he concluded that only one-third of all criminals belonged to this group. Still having to account for the other two-thirds, he decided that part of this number was insane and that the other belonged in the category for which he invented the term—&#039;&#039;criminaloid&#039;&#039;. It is in regard to the latter group that we see his recognition of social influences on crime. Besides those born to criminal ways and those committing their acts because of insanity, there was this third group, who while not born to their deeds, still acted like criminals. There was too much proof by this time of the influence of environment for even an ardent advocate of his own theory to deny its importance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Long before the death of Lombroso, Ferri had written his &#039;&#039;Criminal Sociology&#039;&#039; and our third main theory was well launched. This school, of course, is prominently with us today. It recognizes biological causes and adds to them the results of various social environments. It goes even beyond that and takes into account such physical environment as climate, weather, and geographic location.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet criminal theory repudiates all of the aforementioned and asserts that crime is caused by the exploitation of one class by another. The attitude which accounts for such behavior, they insist, has evolved over a period that has lasted since the state became an instrument in the hands of a ruling class to force a weaker one into submission by making “laws” to protect its own interests and punishing those who transgressed one of these regulations. Because that “conscience” has had a historical development, has been long in the making, it will likewise take time to change it.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Marx-Lenin theory assumes that all crime is the result of the exploitation of one class by another, and that with the achievement of classless society—which is the ultimate aim of socialist construction—crime itself will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us trace this line of thought for a moment for fear it is not as familiar as it should be for one to get the full import of this doctrine. According to this belief, there has been one continuous evolution of society toward the establishment of full Communism, beginning with its earliest stage, which will be in its final stage world-wide. But in this evolution, going on since the dawn of history and before, there emerged at one stage of the process an organization through which the stronger element came to rule the weaker and make its members submit to its will. The instrument through which they effected this was the state. From that time on, the interests of the class or group in power have been protected by rules or laws and those who break those regulations, or commit some act not in accord with these interests of the ruling class, are guilty of a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Marx-Lenin doctrine in rejecting any sort of an idealistic notion such as Rousseau’s “social contract” and Hegel’s “the reality of the moral idea” as accounting for the state, accepts instead the definition that “the state as organized violence emerged at the definite stage in the evolution of society, that society was broken up into irreconcilable classes, that it could no longer exist without the ‘authority’ supposed to be above society and to a certain degree isolated from it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Or again, speaking more plainly, the Marxian formula states “that the state is an organ of oppression of one class by another; that it sets up an order which legalizes and consolidates this oppression modifying the conflict of classes.” Thus since the state is an organ of class domination, and crime necessarily, by the same definition, is the commission of an act against the interests of the ruling class, a criminal code would be a formulation of penalties imposed for such acts. When a state is reached where there is no domination of one class by another in society, it would logically appear that there would be no need of a criminal code.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Soviet Union has a criminal code now, as we shall later see, and of course a recognition of crime. This, however, in their theory is no contradiction. In the first place there is one class now in power (there is an admitted class basis for criminal legislation), and the transgression of the rights of those in authority, the proletariat or working group, does constitute a serious and major crime. That, of course, is to be expected from the nature of our definition. But what of the group of criminals who come from the working class itself?&lt;br /&gt;
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They are those whose attitude is the result of long centuries of class struggle, and their point of view cannot be changed at once. Every effort is made by a policy resulting from this theory to change their “social conscience” by education while they serve their sentence, but even with that effort it is certain that many of the older generation will not be won over to the new way of thinking. Thus they concentrate on youth, as we shall see in a later chapter devoted to the child who comes in contact with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
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But crime, except in isolated instances, will disappear as need for the state also vanishes. Let us take the word of an authority for it. Commissar of Justice of the USSR, N. Krylenko, writes: “Only under Communism will the state become wholly superfluous, for then there will be no one to suppress in the sense of waging a systematic class struggle against a definite part of the population.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Understand that, in accordance with the theory, criminal repression will exist as long as the state itself is necessary, and for the present the perfect socialist society is a thing of the future. Even when it is fully come there will still be some who will commit acts of a criminal nature, but they will be of such infrequency that there will be no need of penal restriction. Lenin is our authority this time. In Vol. XXI, p. 432, we find the following: “For this there will be no need for a special machine, for a special apparatus of coercion; this will be done by the army of people themselves with the simplicity and ease with which any crowd of civilized people even in contemporary society will stop a street fight of rowdies or will disallow the outraging of a woman.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps it will be easier to understand the theory that permits of the final disappearance of crime if the legal definition contained in their code were given. One can see then that with the gaining of strength on the part of the government, with the “mopping up” of the remaining opposition, there could possibly be such a situation. Part 3 of the Criminal Code, Article 6, contains this:&lt;br /&gt;
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“A socially dangerous act is deemed every act of commission or omission, directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government for the period of time pending transition to a communist régime.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A note added to this article is of special significance in providing for consideration of the circumstances of social class. It reads:&lt;br /&gt;
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“An act which, although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code, is free from socially dangerous characteristics, owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It can be seen that crime in the Soviet Union consists mainly of those acts directed against the state by the so-called class enemies; or those desiring to hamper socialist construction. In this situation those acts defined as criminal would tend to have usually an economic basis. And this would substantiate the theory that recognizes no other motive for a crime than an economic one, which, in a society where all needs would be met, would supposedly disappear. That is, if in the final socialist state every one should receive according to his needs—as they insist he will—then the economic motive for crime would be eliminated. This takes care of those acts which in our own country, we might attribute to economic causes.&lt;br /&gt;
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But what, we might ask, of those murders or other crimes, motivated by jealousy or rage? The theory answers that those, in the person not ill and requiring medical treatment instead of penal, are rare and the act thus usually constitutes the one crime in the person’s career. For example the man who murders his wife in a jealous rage would very likely make a good citizen who would never again commit such an excessive act. However, this, in the person not mentally deranged, would also be a rare occurrence for the reason assigned that marriage and divorce are made so liberal under the laws of the USSR that the jealousy motive in marital tangles is taken care of, and thus one of the main causes of murder is eliminated.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to note in this regard that the maximum penalty for murder in Russia in any case, except for death resulting from banditry and robbery with a firearm, is a ten year sentence. In fact the maximum term of imprisonment for any cause is ten years. They hold long sentences to be neither humane nor constructive. If a man is mentally abnormal to a dangerous extent, there are other places for him than prisons. If he has committed such a serious act as banditry or robbery with firearms, he is likely to get a death sentence unless there are extenuating circumstances such as the youth of the offender, and for the other crimes the shorter sentence is held to be more conducive to reformation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we note for a moment the chief types of crime against which the penal provisions are directed, we will be able to see what acts any theory must account for. In the pamphlet &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039; by the Commissar of Justice, N. Krylenko, we find the four main categories of criminal law listed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, the laws safeguarding the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under this class are all provisions for penalties for acts of a counter-revolutionary nature; against such things as wrecking, activities of the Kulaks (the middle-class peasants who owned a moderate degree of private property and who were opposed to relinquishing it to the state) directed against the order of government, and against speculators, and any form of pilfering, theft, bribery, and squandering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the second category the author places the laws which protect the interest of the toiling masses. These are of various natures. Punishment is here provided for officials who fail to fulfill the pledges of the government as to food and living conditions promised to the working class. Protection is also afforded against excessive fines or punishment of the people. The need for such a measure he illustrates by the case of the imposition of a fine of a hundred rubles in a trivial incident where ten was the maximum permitted by law, and there was no occasion for any at all. An official permitting or contributing to such an act must, of course, be punished. In the same category are provisions against undue severity in enforced collectivisation, which tend to frighten and coerce rather than to the persuasion favored by Stalin. In this category also would fall any law providing for punishment of one committing deeds of violence against one’s person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the third category&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; are found “laws regulating the inter-relations between the various social strata of the toiling masses.” This division consists of the laws on Soviet trade and is directed against any act that contributes to squandering of goods or disposition of unwanted articles by forcing a customer to take one such article along with his other purchases,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The author writes of this: “What is a ‘compulsory assortment?’ You enter a store and ask for something. Well, you get what you want, but you must also take something else. What? A lamp, for instance. Now a lamp is a good thing to have, but where is the burner? You are curtly told that the lamp comes without a burner. Another store expects you to buy electric flashlights without a battery—a third tags on batteries without flashlights.” He also speaks of sweaters sent to a city sweltering in the heat, and skiis to Odessa. All this, he says, is in violation of the law and must be punished. The people’s rights must be protected (&#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 29-30).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or any other act by trade bodies that interferes with the rights of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fourth category consists of laws punishing non-observance of regulations as to business accounting and fulfillment of plans by the various economic organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“These categories of law,” says this author, “exhaust the fundamental questions that comprehend every aspect of our economic and social life.” At this phase of the development of their socialist state they, of course, recognize the necessity for the provisions that their penal code contains. But their faith in their ideal—the final classless society—and the change which it will bring in social consciousness enables them to prophesy according to Lenin the disappearance of excessive acts. “We do not know,” he says, “how quickly and in what stages, but we do know that it will be withering away; with their withering away, the state will also wither away.” Crime and punishment in their theory are therefore transitory phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The disappearance of crime will not be achieved with the end of the second five-year plan as some optimists might have expected. There are still sectors where the struggle between the classes flares up, and where the opposition is for the moment strengthened by influencing some of the toilers themselves to come to their aid. But types of crime outside this group will be steadily losing in degree of social danger and should be treated with increasing leniency. Repressive measures in regard to the first type of crimes, those of menace to the advancing socialist state, must be made more severe until all opposition has ceased and the ideal society ushered in.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criminal repression will not disappear until the full realization of the Communist order, but then in the words of Lenin once more&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XXI, p. 431.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “free from the thrall of capitalism . . . people will gradually get accustomed to observe the elementary, perennially known rules of social life that were repeated for ages in all books on good conduct; to observe them without the special apparatus of coercion which is called the State.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While these theorists expect that by the end of the second five-year plan, class distinctions will be pretty well smoothed out, criminal repression will still remain to combat the remnants of the old order which will linger on for some time. They emphasize that they have no magic wand for clearing all this suddenly and completely from the consciousness of the people. Crime and criminal repression came at one stage in evolution—the beginning of the domination of one class by another—and they will vanish at another stage—the appearance of the highest phase of Communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a final summation of the theory, crime results solely from a class struggle and will disappear with the extinction of classes, just as the state itself, according to Lenin, will disappear, and the court, now an organ of the state guarding the interests, life, health, and liberty of toilers of the state, will also disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The period is called transitory,” said Professor Brusilovsky in a lecture, “because after the achievement of Communism there will be neither crime nor punishment. Each stage and development of Soviet authority while lowering the importance of some crimes, aggravates the weight of others, depending upon the actual economic and political situation. To us criminal law is no fetish, but a tool for sweeping away the obstacles to socialist construction. Our criminal law is to a high degree historic, our proletarian semi-state is in a stage of constant change and motion toward the construction of classless society.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A theory is only a theory, and when it deals with human beings there is no accuracy of prophecy. The advent of a proletarian state, however, might indicate to some of us that other strange things could happen in the same land, especially so with the social mind that is apparent, and with as sane an approach to criminal treatment as their policy calls for. Let that social mind have another few generations for extension to fringes of the group, and that policy of treatment of criminals come into full play, and we might be as surprised as we are that the Soviet State has not only survived, but has recently been received into the League of Nations as one of the powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The student will want to know, though, something of the degree to which the theory proves accurate as the period of socialist construction advances in the Soviet Union. It might be said here that according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky there is a decrease in the number of prisoners convicted of such familiar crimes as theft, murder, arson, robbery, rape, etc., by almost one-third since the days just before the revolution. Chapter IV discusses in detail the crimes committed and some analysis is given of those who commit them. The reader must be reminded again, however, that the authorities contend that no radical change can be made in the social conscience of their people in the one generation of the revolution which has elapsed, especially as so little constructive work was done up to the last few years. It is, however, important to know what problems they have at this time and the chapter referred to above is devoted to that discussion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER III: CRIME REPRESSION SINCE THE REVOLUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We turn&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; now from theory to fact. Whether or not a state of classless society will be achieved no one can know; but it is certain that at the moment crime and criminals do exist in Soviet Russia. While our concern is with the present program of criminal repression, a review of the situation since the revolution will give us perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin enumerates three basic aspects of the proletarian dictatorship: “First, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the crushing of the exploiters, for the defense of the country, for the consolidation of ties with the proletariat of other countries, for the development and victory of revolutions in all countries. Second, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the final separation of the toiling and exploited masses from the bourgeoisie, for the attraction of the masses to the cause of socialist construction, for state leadership of these masses by the proletarian. And, third, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the organization of forces, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a society without state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criminal repression must necessarily be considered in connection with these purposes of the state. It can be seen that there are three main factors involved. There is, first of all, the crushing of the enemies of the state; secondly, the discipline and control of the toiling masses themselves; and, third, the socialist construction. The method used for accomplishing these ends have changed with the various phases of the development of the Communist state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considering first the crushing of those who oppose the order of government or hinder its development, we find the methods of coercion varying from leniency and toleration in the beginning of the Revolution, through the frightful years of the Cheka (extraordinary commission to combat speculation and counter-revolution in the early days) reign, to the more severe activities of the OGPU in recent times. Shortly after the October Revolution in May, 1918, all those persons held for political crimes were set free by an act of general amnesty. The results of this liberality were rather serious for the rule of the proletariat, since those released, bitterly determined to overthrow the new and not too firmly seated government, returned to the fight with vigor. Among these was the renowned General Krasnow who organized the White Guard Cossacks and caused no end of trouble to the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a policy of clemency was bound to end if the Soviet government continued to live. When next they had political prisoners in hand there was a different tale to tell. Whoever of them saw the inside of a prison or place of detention were not released to run back to the fight. We find Stalin defending later severe measures toward these prisoners in an interview with Ludwig in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P.7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Soon it transpired that such leniency was only undermining the strength of the authority of the Soviets. We committed a mistake in showing such leniency toward the enemies of the working class. If we repeated this mistake any further, we would have committed a crime toward the working class. We would have betrayed its interest. And this became perfectly clear very soon. It became very sure that the greater our leniency toward our enemies, the greater their resistance.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leniency was no part of their program thereafter. History will attest to the fact. Military Communism and the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, agent of superlative revolutionary terror, attended to that. Civil wars are brutal, cruel, and Russia’s was notoriously no exception. The period that followed with its terrorist activities is no bright spot in the history of crime repression of post-revolutionary Russia. Lenin threw the responsibility for the establishment of the so-called Red Terror on their class enemies. He says: “You have yourselves to blame, friends! Do not run away with the idea that the Russian peasants and workers have forgotten about your actions. You challenged us to a fight of the most desperate form in October, and in reply to this we have announced the terror, and the triple terror, and if necessary we will make it even hotter for you, if you try again.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. XXVII, p. 175.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They tried again, and yet again, the open fighting of the Civil War giving way to underground methods, not deterred by the worst the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and its successors the GPU could do. But early measures must have quadrupled, for Communism can no longer be considered a mere experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who were the people against which this repression was directed? The urban bourgeoisie joined by the rural Kulaks formed the great number. There was a tremendous increase of criminals from these two classes in the early years of the proletarian state. In their combined efforts they were able to prove of much hindrance to the Soviet cause, and, aided by those waverers within the toiling class who were able to be influenced to counter-revolutionary activities, they presented a grave menace. Again Lenin, whom the Russians think of in his kindly moods, showed his grim side. “We must exert every effort,” he wrote, “to track down and catch all those highwaymen, all the landlords and capitalists in hiding, in all their disguises, expose and punish them without pity—sly, subtle, experienced, patiently waiting for the opportune moment in hatching their plots; they are saboteurs who will stoop to any crime to do harm to the Soviet rule. With these enemies of the toilers, with the landlords, capitalists, saboteurs, and White Guards, we must be merciless.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. 24, XXIV, p. 434.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Economically, the first period was one of distribution of goods without production. Its aftermath was famine and unemployment and Lenin and Trotsky were at odds over a policy of alleviation. Trotsky, impatient at delay over a program of more complete state ownership, advocated immediate action against all private possession of property. Lenin considered a starving people no advantage in furthering a socialist construction, and was besides a humanitarian. He wanted his people fed. The result was the institution of NEP, the New Economic Policy, which permitted private ownership within limits, and brought about the eventual political annihilation of Trotsky.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of fighting the class enemy remained practically the same even through the era of NEP. There was some let-up in the counter-revolutionary activities on the initiation of NEP, as it had been hoped by those opposed to Communism that this probably indicated the return to Capitalism, but activities of an anti-Communistic nature were still sternly repressed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
N. Krylenko, prosecutor of note and now Commissar of Justice of the USSR, writes in defense against a criticism of mildness toward the enemies of the government at this time: “The form of the dictatorship of the proletariat changes in the different stages of the proletarian revolution. For instance, in the first period of the October Revolution the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters was the most conspicuous feature . . . during the transition to the NEP, the peaceful, cultural, organizational work of the dictatorship of the proletariat was most conspicuous, but this again did not mean that the importance of overcoming the resistance of the exploiters had receded in the least.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief agent of “resisting the exploiters” was now the GPU (later, as it became the joint organization of all the republics, the OGPU), the full title of which is the United State Political Administration. There seems no doubt that their midnight arrests and executions were an effective weapon against any counter-Soviet efforts even as the activities of their predecessors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, had been before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The method now undergoes an important change. Note this from Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XX, p. 460.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “To the extent that the basic purpose of authority becomes not military crushing but administrative, the typical manifestation of crushing and coercion will become not the method of shooting on the spot, but trial in court.” Not in love himself, apparently, with methods such as he felt they had to use, he seized the first opportunity afforded by an end of Civil War to advance a revolutionary legality which his party had already been trying to establish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Criminal Code was written in 1922, as was also the Code for Criminal Procedure, and the way was paved for an enlargement of orderly court procedure. The provisions of the code gave not greater leniency but legalized measures that had already been practiced. The step of importance, however, was that “tried in court” replaced “shooting on the spot.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The history of violence against the Kulaks, the most startling of all violence used by the USSR in establishing itself, was entering now a modified phase. Nerves were settling somewhat, and panic beginning to clear away. Legal guarantees, so nearly obscured through years when “crushing” was regarded as necessary at any price if the proletariat was to stay in authority, might now begin, at least, to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with this a new idea was put into practice which presents a happier side to the study of crime repression in this country. Since the state could not kill all of its class enemies and certainly would not find it profitable to fill innumerable prisons with them, there developed a new approach to the problem. It is not accurate to say that the idea was new, because it had been present since the earliest days of the Revolution. The Civil War, however, had so disrupted the development of any program that this influence was not properly felt until later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This new approach was by means of educating and training these offenders so that they might be turned out again as useful workers in a state so greatly in need of all the man power it could muster. Authorities built their plans on the belief that even a class enemy might reform and see his way to becoming a member of the new society if properly guided. And as for the convicts from among the loyal masses, any program for crime repression must have as its fundamental object the training of these as useful citizens. The theory of how it might be done has turned out to be a practical one. Its translation into government policy was a most significant development and leads straight to the constructive attitude one finds in present-day treatment of prisoners in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most of us, it seems, have had the impression that during the days of the Civil War there were no legal guarantees in the state, but such an idea is not correct. One thinks of courts as suspended, but there were orderly trials even in the darkest days of military Communism when non-judicial bodies like the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; were at their height. This was possible, of course, almost entirely for those members of the toiling masses themselves and not for enemies of the proletarian authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was a bare year after the October Revolution (November 6-9, 1918) that the Emergency Congress of the Soviets was held in Moscow. And if ever emergency existed in political affairs, it did so then for the Soviets. Civil War was at its highest point, the White Guards aided by Czecho-Slovaks, were in possession of Siberia, the English were pushing to the north and the French to the south. It is surprising that a party at the helm of the ship of state could take its mind even for a moment from such an international and military situation to think of admonishing a people to observe law. But we find Kursky, then Commissar of Justice, rising gravely to remind the Congress and the people that “during the year of revolutionary activity the working class of Russia has elaborated the basic laws of the RSFSR which must be faithfully observed in order to develop and strengthen the authority of workers and peasants,” and the Congress, after listening to his speech, resolved unanimously, “to appeal to all citizens of the Republic, to all organs and all officials of Soviet authority, to observe most strictly the laws of the RSFSR and the rules, regulations and orders issued and to be issued by the Central authorities.” A significant effort that was, and one whose importance was momentous to a people struggling through a chaos that must have all but obscured any semblance of order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To forestall the high-handed measures which they must have seen would be forthcoming as a result of the counter-revolutionary work during the Civil War, they surrounded such action with certain safeguards. It was resolved that “(a) Exact, formal ascertaining by the Soviet institution or official concerned as to the presence of conditions necessitated a departure from the limits of the law; (b) Immediate written notification to the Council of People’s Commissars, with a copy for local and interested authorities, should be provided.” In the midst of violence and excesses these efforts to establish revolutionary legality were significant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In March, 1919, the Communist party adopted as a distinctive feature of its program a plank reading: “Our courts have already led to a cardinal change in the character of punishment, resulting on a large scale in conditional sentences, introducing public censure as a measure of punishment, substituting compulsory labor with retention of liberty for imprisonment, replacing the prisons by educational institutions, and allowing the possibility for the factor and time by comradely courts. The Communist party, while urging further development of the court in this direction, should aim for the ultimate substitution of the system of punishment by a system of measures of educational character.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As early as December, 1917, Lenin sent instructions to the Revolutionary Tribunal, in which he urged that repressive measures take the form of corrective labor tasks, and that the harmful element be dealt with in a reformative way. Shooting was abolished by a decree dated October 28, 1917, and Decree No. 3 of July 20, 1918, provided that one sentenced to a three-month period should be sent to compulsory social labor and should not be guarded while serving. In the Ural region and Siberia prisons were replaced with working homes where study was combined with work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Various other decrees were adopted, furthering this principle of reformation through education and discipline. In 1919 one such established a distribution committee composed of people of special equipment, by psychiatrists, educators, etc., who were to determine by a study of background, personality, and physical condition of the convict what prison would be best suited to him.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky, (Ed.) &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, Moscow, 1933, p. 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A decree of 1920 dealt with the organization of provincial detention points, and in the main ones there was to be established a university with courses in the sciences—applied, natural and technical—in history and the arts. An attempt was also made to have prisoners trained not just in crafts of their small villages but in factory and larger industrial work, and in spite of Civil War and shortage of shops, the number given such training was raised from 214 per cent. in 1919 to 10 per cent. in 1920.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 29.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer again to the volume edited by Vishinsky, we find on page 20 a statement that any penal treatment tending to degrade the prisoner was forbidden by a decree of July 23, 1918, to be practiced. This principle is now incorporated in the Criminal Code, Article 9, which reads: “Measures of social defense may not have for their purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity, as they do not contemplate the purposes of retribution and penalty.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The present-day approach to crime repression in the USSR is, then, through educational and correctional labor. The extreme penalty of death is given now in only three cases: crimes against the state, military crimes, and armed robbery in which death occurs. A. J. Estrin in his book, &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039;, a 1933 publication, gives a table on page 229 containing the percentages of persons sentenced to different forms of repression, and from 1926 to 1930 the percentage sentenced to death is less than 0.1. For all others the educational program holds even for political prisoners. The author can give no first-hand information on the latter, but official reports indicate that this is true.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the treatment of criminals, Vishinsky speaks of the indispensable part the state apparatus must play in the realization of their program.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Within the system of the institutions of proletarian dictatorship,” he says, “the corrective labor institutions play a great and serious part, because through them, in effect, is realized the entire judicial policy. These institutions with their entire force of live human relationships, with all their methods and means with the help of which these relations are built, define the reality or falsity of the judicial verdict as they define also the extent of achieving of the genuine aim of the problem posed before these institutions.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet jurisprudence is thus based not on restrictive measures alone but on corrective, educational, and cultural ones. The authorities seek to use labor that is constructive as to character and useful economically, and not the kind that brings indignity and resentment when resorted to as punishment or disciplinary measures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sentence is designed to be as brief as possible. In the USSR it is not necessary that a prisoner serve more than one-third of his sentence in order to be re- leased on parole, but his release is based solely on the condition of his fitness for return to society. The Observation Commission, whose duty it is to determine the time of such release is required by law to inform itself in intimate detail of the condition of training and education of the prisoners, of the personal characteristics and attitude toward society of each individual. It is thus likely to be able to judge to a higher degree when a prisoner is ready for release. If the figures they give on recidivism with 18 per cent. for men and 21 per cent. for women are accurate then they may be said to judge well indeed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of re-educating the “enemy,” or winning him over to the aid of the state, is still more marked in the treatment of the working masses themselves. Repressive measures must necessarily be used for the discipline of cases among the workers. While penalties are still severe and a decree of August 7, 1932, providing for the protection of state possessions, attaches the death sentence for those who steal or pilfer public property, the measures designed for those of the working population who transgress the law are in general more liberal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to be expected. It has already been stated that the Russians acknowledge the class nature of their administration of criminal law. The content of the criminal code is directed almost entirely toward the forced subjugation of those elements who would not voluntarily be subjected to the dictates of the ruling class or the proletariat. As a matter of policy they manage this subjugation by the use of such corrective measures as the construction of the White-Sea Baltic Canal when it is possible. Such other provisions as the code contains may be made to apply to the workers, but discrimination is openly observed between the classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer back for a moment to the decree of August 7, 1932 already mentioned, we may note the indication of the sharpening of the class struggle. The state intensified its program of collectivization in 1928, and launched into a broad program intended to crush the Kulaks and extend Socialism into the villages. The Kulak antagonism immediately became more pronounced, and if we consult a table on page 80 of M. N. Gernet’s &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039; we see the results tabulated in a sudden jump of crimes against the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cattle were killed, farm machinery was destroyed or put out of order, and plans were hampered in any way possible. There was also organized theft of state property to such an extent that severe measures were considered necessary. Thus the provision by this decree four years later of the death sentence for these offenses. In the meantime the necessity for such a measure was taken care of by the judicial powers and authority of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this decree is necessarily directed against the definite enemy class, it applies also to the workers themselves who are bribed or otherwise used as tools by the urban bourgeoisie or Kulaks. This, however, is outside the program of treatment of the ordinary criminal, and in no wise is it to be understood that the death penalty is always applied even for those considered to be class enemies. The author personally heard a trial in court in which the indictment was for organized theft, and on appeal the death sentence was commuted to a ten-year sentence. For the more serious offenses, however, such as those involving sabotage in factories, the death sentence is usual, at least for those most responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The program of compulsory education provided for those from among the toiling element who are imprisoned is the chief weapon of the fight against crime by the state. The prisons are equipped (as will be seen in later pages) with all sorts of devices for carrying out this work. The whole criminal law reflects this attitude toward crime repression on the part of the Communist party. The evolution of this code since its establishment in 1922, by a multitude of amendments and two almost new writings, reflects the needs and purposes of the state in various phases of its development in a most interesting manner. It is divided into a general and a special part, and although the general part is appended to this book, it seems of interest here to speak of its various divisions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first section is devoted to the purposes of criminal legislation. The second deals with the extent of operation and the limits of action of the code. Section three is concerned with the general principles of the penal policy. Section four deals with the measures of social defense applied to persons committing various crimes. The fifth concerns the manner in which social defense measures of correctional character are applied, and the sixth deals with conditional sentences and release on probation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the code’s adoption in 1922 there have been two important amendments aside from the many year by year. In 1926 when numerous changes were made, the chief feature was a more lenient application of penalties. This was at the time of reconstruction, when the development of the socialist state took on greater emphasis and education in the matter of penal treatment was held to be one of its chief tools. By the change of 1928, deprivation of liberty was limited to sentences of one year or more. Previous to this time sentences of even one day might carry with them deprivation of liberty. The aim now in short sentences is that the convicted person may retain his liberty, but have supervision in his place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 1926 edition of the Criminal Code, the whole concept of punishment is abolished. Although, according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky, there are certain survivals of old methods and ideas among a few of those connected with penal administration, the official thought is not of retribution or any infliction of pain or even of “just reward.” From this time on, the term used is a “measure of social defense” and, as nearly as one can judge both from records and from actual visits to their institutions for criminals, the change has been not only in terminology but in actual practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The measures of social defense now provided by the Criminal Code are divided into three categories: first are the measures of judicial and correctional character; second, measures of social defense of medical character; and third, measures of social defense of medical and pedagogical character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measure of social defense of judicial and correctional character are enumerated as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the Union of USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the Union of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the Union of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts 1930, No. 26, Item 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is in addition the use of public censure as a repressive measure which is a “public expression of condemnation in the name of the court.” It must be published through the press and may be either the only penalty assessed or be added to another. The use of warning is also provided for by Article 43 of the Criminal Code and is practiced in cases where the accused is acquitted but by his conduct gives “every reason to fear commitment of crimes by him in the future.” By this means an effort is made to prevent his committing some criminal act in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the present Criminal Code there is a division of repressive measures into the basic and the supplementary. To the basic measures of declaring one a class enemy with the consequences such a decision carries, deprivation of liberty and compulsory work without deprivation of liberty, are added the other enumerated measures, with the exception of confiscation of property. This is also a supplementary measure but it can be used only in the cases specifically mentioned in the special section of the code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary it might be said that while severe measures still exist and are used in regard to counter-revolutionary activities or crimes against the state, the emphasis in the penal program is decidedly upon educational measures for re-establishing the criminal as a useful member of society in the socialist state. While the beginnings of this policy are almost obscured by the activities of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and the OGPU (whose judicial powers have by the Decree of July 10, 1934, been withdrawn and turned over to the courts) and the extra-legal activities of the Civil War days, yet the germ was there from the beginning of the Revolution and its development is one of the marked achievements of the Soviet government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IV: WHAT CRIMES ARE COMMITTED AND WHO COMMITS THEM? ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In answering&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the question “What crimes are committed?” one could say in general that it is the usual line-up found in any country plus that category defined as the crimes against the state or the order of government. It would be hard to say what is included in the latter group. It would run the gamut from, let us say, the theft of bread from a collective farm, if it was intended to hamper the rule of the proletariat in any way, to the wrecking of a factory. It depends on the “socially dangerous” character of the person committing the act for one thing, on the social background, and for the other consideration, the motive behind the act. It is quite to be expected that this group ranks at the top of any list of crimes in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If one wishes to go into detailed statistics on the subject of crimes committed, there is a small, compact volume, &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039;, by M. N. Gernet, which supplies such information. It was, however, published in 1931 which is far in the past, gauged by the speed with which the Criminal Code and judicial practices change under proletariat rule. But in the main the list of crimes are the same and the classifications as to age and sex still hold.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There has been a change in the type of crime since the days of military Communism. A. J. Estrin, in his &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039; includes the following&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 51 &#039;&#039;et. seq.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; as characterizing the period of militarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Counter-revolutionary activities&lt;br /&gt;
* Speculation&lt;br /&gt;
* Banditry&lt;br /&gt;
* Adventures&lt;br /&gt;
* Desertion&lt;br /&gt;
* Bureaucratism&lt;br /&gt;
* Occasional bad conduct crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He goes on to say that there was considerable growth in crimes of banditry during 1918, practically all having a political or anarchistic coloring. In the matter of desertion, the menace was so great that a special commission was set up to deal with it, and by the time of the entry of the Communist army into Warsaw it had been successfully repressed on the western front. During this period there was likewise an increase in hooliganism, the acceptance of bribery on the part of officials, and speculation. The latter presented an especially difficult problem but was nearly at an end when the institution of the New Economic Policy in 1922 brought new forms of it. From then on it has been one of the crimes that has given most trouble to the government. Acts of pilfering state property in order to resell it at a greater price, or securing goods for speculation by persons working either on a state farm or in a store, are extensive. Since the law of August, 1932, providing a death penalty for taking state property these crimes have decreased in number.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Open warfare between the classes had so far subsided by 1921 that there was a demobilization of farmers and other workers from the army, and that led to the increase in another crime—banditry. These people, suddenly released from fighting ranks, broke and unable to find work in that period when production was at a low ebb, turned to theft, robbery or banditry, especially the latter, filling the country with a terror all their own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this period of 1921-22 there was a very definite growth in the number of crimes committed against persons—not in those of a more serious nature such as murder or severe injury but in sex crime, fighting and insults. The author explains this as resulting from the transition from the old culture to the new. The old was at an end and the new not yet sufficiently established to set up an influence against such acts of attack and rowdyism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a reference here by Estrin to a statement by N. Krylenko which connects the beginning of the crime of sabotage—so serious since to the Soviet government—with activities of former owners during the years of 1921, 1922 and 1923. There was no longer opportunity for armed fighting but the opposition relentlessly kept up its battle by any means at hand and its best methods were to hinder the production without which Communism would be undermined by starvation and physical depletion. From 1923 on, there began to appear with increasing frequency in the courts cases of &#039;&#039;economic&#039;&#039; counter-revolutionary character. Firearms and open resistance might have gone by the board but sabotage grew apace until 1925-26 when it reached its greatest height.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A numerical count of court convictions in 1925 would make it appear that there was a tremendous drop in ordinary crimes and an increase in those of a political type. There is an explanation for this in the fact that a reform of the Criminal Code in 1924 deleted a number of crimes of lesser importance, and there was a consequent lessening of 300,000 in convictions during the following year, most of which loss was, of course, from the ranks of the ordinary criminals. Class lines were drawn in a still more distinct fashion, thus emphasizing the direction criminal repression was to take for some time to come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of crimes against the state are today mostly of an economic nature. Before, however, we set down some of the more important ones that harass law enforcement let us look at a brief list of the type of acts which are encountered in court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes against the state&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Crimes against the person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Crimes against property&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Official crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Hooliganism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The items here of particular interest to foreigners are the first and the last. The list of crimes included in the first category will shortly be enumerated. As for the last, the term “hooliganism” covers a multitude of crimes. If one suddenly gets up in a theater and strikes his neighbor without apparent cause, such is an act of hooliganism. It was described to the writer as defining “unmotivated” acts. If one does not pursue “motivation” into psychological or psychiatric realms that explanation pretty well expresses what is meant. Deeds not logically accounted for might come a little closer. If a group of young men go out just to “raise cain” for no particular cause they may destroy property, attack a man, and do various other criminal acts which would all fall within the definition of hooliganism. The charge corresponds roughly to our “disorderly conduct,” except that the deeds committed may be of a more serious nature. But into this category are lumped a miscellany not classified otherwise.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, what are the chief crimes against the state? There would be, first of all, such major deeds as counter-revolutionary activities and the dissemination of propaganda. There are no longer organizations fostering counter-revolutionary work, but a great amount of such work is carried on. Individuals with malice aforethought, work their way into factory or collective farm, and spread what discontent they may. The author heard, for example, of the trial of the director of a collective farm who managed cleverly to see that the plan of production was unfulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Next in line would be industrial sabotage and attack on or the theft of government property. So prevalent had the latter become by the committing of such acts as killing cattle or the destruction of anything possible, as well as organized theft of state property that the government had recently acquired, that the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for such crimes, was enacted to meet the situation. On some occasions of organized theft the motive is for personal gain rather than one of desire to harm the state. For example, the author heard one case in court where the theft of grain from a collective farm was resold in speculating and the gain to the eleven persons involved was some 20,000 rubles. The death penalty was given to the leaders, prison sentences to the others. There is also the evasion of government orders and taxes, insubordination to the demands of the law, insults by word of mouth, if such involves a Kulak as against an officer. This does not by any means complete the possibilities, but it lists the headings under which the majority of such acts come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sabotage hardly needs comment here. So associated has the term come to be with industrial affairs in Russia that one would expect to find it ranking high as a crime against the state. It is, of course, committed by the enemies of the established order, and has hampered the progress of collectivization and industrial development to a great degree. Five men were shot and the others in the plot sentenced to ten years in prison (corrective labor with deprivation of liberty) during the past summer for burning a large factory in the Ural region by electric wire manipulation. Activities of the disorganized opposition have centered in crimes of this sort as the most effective weapon in its hands. Not much quarter is shown when guilt is established. The extreme penalty is surely and speedily given.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An enumeration of the counter-revolutionary crimes listed in the Criminal Code includes the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any act directed towards overthrow, undermining and weakening of the peasants’ and workers’ order of government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armed uprising and entering Soviet territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communication with a foreign government for counter-revolutionary purposes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Extending aid and comfort to that part of the international bourgeoisie which aims at the overthrow of the Communist order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Inducing a foreign government by means of forged documents to declare war or to make armed intervention, or by the same method to induce blockade, confiscation of property of USSR, interruption of diplomatic relations, renouncing of a treaty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Espionage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Transmission, collection, or theft, of economic information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Undermining of state industry, transport, trade, monetary circulation, cooperatives, committed with a counter-revolutionary purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commission of terrorist acts against representatives of the Soviet order or workers’ and peasants’ organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Destruction or damaging with counter-revolutionary purposes by means of the use of explosive, arson, or any other method, of railways, and other means of transportation, means of communication, aqueducts, community warehouses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Propaganda and agitation containing an appeal to overthrow, undermine, or weaken the Soviet order. Circulation or preparation of literature. Same actions in time of mass disorders, or making use of religious and national prejudices, or in time of war or in localities under martial law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All kinds of organizational activity directed toward preparation and commission of crimes mentioned in this chapter as well as participation in an organization founded for the preparation or commission of one of the crimes mentioned in this chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Failure to report a known counter-revolutionary crime or preparation for same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any action or active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement committed while in office under the Tzarist régime or under the counter-revolutionary government, during the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Counter-revolutionary sabotage, i.e., premeditated omission to carry out the duties or deliberate negligence in carrying them out with the specific purpose of weakening the authority of the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chief in the list of “official crimes” is the accepting of bribery, dealing out sentences in excess of the provision of the law, or beyond what circumstances warrant, failing to fulfill one’s duty, taking the law into one’s hands, etc. As an example of punishment in excess of justification of circumstances there is a case recorded in which a drunken priest was given a heavy penalty in a Siberian People’s Court. In view of the government’s attitude toward religion one would suppose that such a sentence might stand, but when it was called to the attention of the higher court, the prosecutor was removed from office and the militiaman was arrested.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commissar of Justice Krylenko, in his &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039;, lists a number of omissions and commissions on the part of officials, but when a complaint of, or information on, such acts reach the authorities, action follows. The population, taught from the cradle up that this is their government, has no timidity, apparently, about seeing that men in office regard the laws of the land, if they have information of acts to the contrary. This authority says, after mentioning a variety of actual cases of such violation, “The struggle against distortions of this kind must be waged with absolute ruthlessness.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other two classifications—crimes against the person and against property—include what they would in our own country, but penalties imposed differ from ours a great deal. Since they, as our most elementary groupings, are generally understood, and since outside of crimes against the state or order of government, these two comprise the great bulk of criminal transgressions in Russia as well as in our own country, it seems of general interest to include here, even at the risk of being tedious, those two chapters of the Criminal Code which relate to these classes of crime, and they are therefore inserted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, HEALTH, LIBERTY, AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed: a) Out of greed, jealousy (if it does not come under description in Article 138) and other base reasons; b) by a person previously convicted for premeditated murder or bodily injury who served the measure of social protection established by the court; c) by means particularly painful to the victim; d) for the purpose of lightening [the consequences of] or concealing another grave crime; e) by a person whose duty it was to have particular care of the victim, or f) making use of the helpless condition of the victim.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder not coming under the provisions of paragraph 136,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed in a state of sudden and strong emotional excitement, caused by violence or grave insult from the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Murder caused by carelessness, as well as murder resulting from exceeding the limits of self defence,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Abortion caused with consent of the mother by persons not having the proper medical qualifications or by persons having such qualifications but in unsanitary conditions,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to five hundred rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If these acts were committed under conditions given in the first part of this paragraph, professionally or without consent of the mother or having as their consequence death,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The bringing of a person who is financially or in some other way dependent on another person, by cruel treatment of the dependent person or in other similar way to suicide or to an attempt at same,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The giving of aid or incitement to suicide of a minor or a person knowingly incapable of understanding the nature and meaning of the act committed or a person incapable of self-guidance if suicide or attempt at same followed,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated grave bodily injury which carried as a consequence loss of sight, hearing, or any other organ, permanent disfigurement, mental illness, or any other injury to health, combined with considerable disability,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If as a consequence of such injury death followed or if it was committed by means having the character of torture, or causing suffering, or if such injury came as a consequence of inflicting systematic though light injuries,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated light bodily injury, not dangerous to life, but causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Premeditated light bodily injury without causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury coming under paragraph 1, Article 143, committed under influence of sudden and strong, emotional excitement caused by violence or grave insult to the offender on the part of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury caused by negligence if it came as a consequence of a knowing infraction of safety rules established by law or government orders and having as its consequence conditions aforementioned in Article 142 and the first paragraph of Article 143,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Bodily injury caused by negligence not having grave consequences,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated assault and battery and other violent acts combined with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said acts had the character of torture,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Violent, illegal deprivation of liberty of some person,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty by a method dangerous to life or health of victim, or accompanied with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Placing in a hospital for mental cases of a person known to be sane out of greed or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft, or concealment, or exchange of some one else’s child, motivated by greed, vengeance, or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Infection of a person with a venereal disease by a person aware of having said disease,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Knowingly exposing of a person to the danger of infection with venereal disease through the sex act or some other act,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relation with persons not having reached sex maturity combined with corruption of the morals or with perverted forms of sex satisfaction,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sex relations with persons not having reached sex maturity committed without aforesaid aggravating circumstances,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Corruption of the morals of children or minors committed by means of immoral acts toward them,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relations by means of physical violence, threat, or by intimidation or making use, through deception, of the helpless condition of the victim (rape),—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said rape had as its consequences the suicide of the victim or was committed toward one not having reached sex maturity, or even though on a person having reached said maturity but committed by several persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing a woman to enter into a sex relationship or satisfy sex passion in some other form by a person on whom said woman was financially dependent or to whom she was in a subordinate position,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing to engage in prostitution, procuring, maintenance of houses of assignation, also engaging in traffic of women for purposes of prostitution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years with confiscation of all or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deliberately leaving a person without help, when said person, in a condition dangerous to life, is incapable of measures of self-protection because of minority, feebleness, sickness, or helplessness generally, in cases when the person leaving the other helpless was in duty bound to have cared for the abandoned and was able to extend help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Not extending of help by a ship’s captain to persons perishing on sea or on other bodies of water if said help could be extended without grave danger to the ship, crew, or passengers,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to two years. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts No. 60, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Not extending of help to a sick person without satisfactory reasons by a person having as his duty by law or special regulation the extending of such help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Refusal of a person engaged in medical practice to extend medical aid if said refusal knowingly to said person could have been dangerous to the patient,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Malicious evasion of payment, for the support of children in spite of being capable of such payment,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Abandonment by parents of minor children without support as well as forcing children to beg,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same measure of social protection.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted verbally or in writing,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Fine up to 300 rubles or public censure.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Insult inflicted by action,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to two months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted through generally circulated or exhibited publications or pictures,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Slander, i.e. circulation of knowingly false defaming rumors,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Libel in an article published in the press or multiplied by some other means,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 100 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
PROPERTY CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret appropriation of someone else’s property (theft) carries with it:&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
a) If committed without application of any mechanical devices, for the first time and without conspiring with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a term up to three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
When committed under the same conditions, but because of need and unemployment for the purpose of satisfying the minimum requirements of self and family,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a term of three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
b) Committed repeatedly and with regard to property which is a known necessity for the existence of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to six months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
c) If committed with application of mechanical device or repeatedly or by previous conspiracy with other persons, and also, even without the aforementioned conditions when committed in railroad stations, docks, ships, railway coaches, in hotels,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
d) When committed by a private person from state or community warehouses, railway cars, ships, or other storage places, or in the places of community use (aforementioned in sub-paragraph) with the application of mechanical devices, or by conspiring with other persons, or repeatedly, also when committed though without aforementioned conditions by a person having special right of entry into these storage places, or [by persons engaged in] safeguarding them, or in time of fire, flood, or other social calamity,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
e) When committed out of state or community warehouses and storage places by a person having special right of entry in same or [by persons] safeguarding them, with application of mechanical devices, or repeatedly, or by conspiring with other persons, and also any theft out of the aforementioned warehouses and storage places when the theft is exceptionally large,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
 NOTE: Theft of material and tools committed in the factory or mill by a workman or employee within the confines of his own [his place of employment] enterprise the first time and when the value of the stolen goods does not exceed 15 rubles carries disciplinary punishment in accordance with special schedule established by the People’s Commissariat of Labor.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft of electric current,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of one month with compulsory restitution of the loss inflicted.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The purchase of goods known to be stolen,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a period up to six months and fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions committed professionally,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to three years with confiscation of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Purchase, possession and sale of fire arms, known to be stolen (hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition therefor,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to 5 years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Open appropriation of some one else’s property in the presence of the person having possession, use, or authority over such property (robbery) when committed without use of force,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same action when committed by a group of people or repeatedly,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret as well as open appropriation of horses or cattle from the laboring agricultural population as well as those engaged in animal husbandry,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions, committed repeatedly or in conspiracy with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to eight years. Aug. 7, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 102, Article 645).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Secret or open appropriation of fire arms (except hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition for same if this action does not come under Article 59 of this Code,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Robbery, i.e., open attack for the purpose of taking possession of someone else’s property, combined with use of force dangerous to the life or the health of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts, committed repeatedly or having as a consequence the death or maiming of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Armed robbery,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years, and with aggravating circumstances—Supreme measure of social protection. Aug. 26, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 65, Article 641).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Appropriation, i.e., withholding with mercenary purpose of somebody else’s property, entrusted for a definite purpose, or embezzlement of that property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Appropriation of a fund,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one month.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage having as its consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years with confiscation of entire or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The issuance of a check, which knowingly to the issuer is not subject to payment, and also cancellation of the check by him without satisfactory reason, or taking any other measures for the prevention of the receipt by the check holder or the amount of the check, as well as passing by the check holder of a check which knowingly to him is not subject to payment by the agent on whom it is drawn,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts having as their consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution or enterprise,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. Feb. 28, 1930 (Collection of Acts, No. 11, Article 131).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forgery with mercenary purpose of official papers, documents and receipts,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a period up to one year and fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deceptive change with mercenary purpose of the appearance or properties of objects, intended for sale or social use, if that said change had or could have had as its consequence the infliction of injury to health, as well as sale of such objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to one year with confiscation of part of property with prohibition of the right to sell merchandise, or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The making or keeping for the purpose of sale of a forged stamping tool, the stamping of jewelry and bars of gold, silver and platinum, affixing to objects made from other metals of stamps and marks having resemblance to the official stamping mark, as well as sale of aforementioned objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year, with confiscation in both cases of forged objects and stamping tools.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Usury, i.e., receiving of interest on money or property lent at a rate exceeding the interest rate established by law, and in particular, inclusion of the interest in the principal amount of the loan, or withholding a remuneration out of the amount received by the borrower or providing of fine and penalty for delay in payment of the loan or in other concealed forms,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a term up to one year or fine up to 5,000 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The same acts committed either professionally or by making use of the embarrassed state of the borrower,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years With confiscation of part of the property or without such confiscation, or with fine up to ten thousand rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Making available for use of means of production and cattle for a monetary remuneration or remuneration in kind or on condition of payment by labor obviously in excess of the customary amount for this locality, making use of the need or embarrassed position of the user,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to one year. Mar. 29, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 38, Article 283).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Extortion, i.e., demanding of transfer of property advantages or rights to property or committing of any kind of actions, of a property character, through fear of coercion of the person of the sufferer, spreading of defaming information or destruction of his property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated destruction or damage of property belonging to private persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts when committed by means of arson, flooding, or any other generally dangerous methods,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts if they are followed by loss of human life or a community misfortune,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Omission by a captain of one of the ships involved in a collision at sea of taking necessary measures for the saving of the other ship, in so far as such measures could be taken without serious danger to the said captain’s passengers, crew, or ship, regardless of the responsibility for not extending help to the crew and the passengers of the ship suffering from the calamity (Art. 156)—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Making public an invention before registration without the consent of the inventor, as well as unauthorized uses of literary, musical, or other artistic or scientific productions with infractions of the copyright law,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to three months or fine up to 1,000 rubles. August 30, 1931 (Collection of Acts, No. 59, Article 429).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Unauthorized use for purposes of unethical competition of someone else’s trade mark, design, model, as well as someone else’s firm name, or someone else’s name,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 3,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those familiar with women’s prisons in our own country will have missed “prostitution” from among the crimes enumerated in the Soviet Criminal Code. This practice is treated as a social problem in Russia, and rightly, in the opinion of most persons interested in penology, it is not held to be a crime. The six articles in the code directed against sex offenses, it will be noted, provide penalties for rape, or, in the interest of public health, for the infection of a person with a venereal disease by one aware that he (or she) has the disease. By treating prostitution as a social problem Russia has almost eliminated it. Women plying this trade are picked up by inspectors at railroad stations or other public places and taken, not to a jail, but to a prophylactorium where they are taught a useful trade with a view to removing the economic cause which is held to be the chief one in this practice. Many of the women at these centers have come voluntarily, the director of the prophylactorium in Moscow reports, through friends who have already received training and treatment. As a result of this omission from the Criminal Code, one does not find in women’s prisons that the chief cause of sentence is sex offense as it is in the United States, nor that the prisons are filled with a group who not only in the opinion of the author, but also in that of such organizations as the Women’s Prison Association of New York, should not have been sent there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who commits the crimes? Immediately following the Revolution the chief concern in regard to the crime situation was the suppression of those acts which jeopardized the authority of the Soviet government, but as the program of Socialist construction went forward, as they got the political situation more in hand, the type of prisoner began to change in the predominant number. Counter-revolutionary organizations were practically wiped out; the Kulak war, though still going on, somewhat thinned out, and in the residue of those of the criminal ranks there now appeared more of such types as constitute the convict population of other countries. In other words, the social composition of the group changed. Instead of there being more of an otherwise honest group of middle class farm people whose crimes consisted in efforts to overthrow a government, there was a rising percentage of ordinary criminals. This does not mean to say that the government is not still confronted with a great number of crimes against the state, by those of the bourgeoisie and Kulak class who, while not attempting to organize counter activities, still manage to get into collective farm or factory and cause a great deal of trouble, but it is noticeable that the other type of crimes is being given more attention and that programs of treatment are designed to apply to that problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In age, considering both sexes, the peak is reached in criminal acts at about twenty-four years. The curve descends sharply to forty and in a more leisurely fashion from forty to sixty. Official figures give the age group of 14-18 years as committing 2.5 per cent. of all crimes, 18-24 as being responsible for 25 per cent., and 24 and above, for the remaining. The crimes committed by the first group are almost wholly stealing; in the second group there are, of course, all sorts, but hooliganism figures large, and in the third there is every kind of law breaking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The youth, then, from 14-18 years are guilty of theft, more than of any other crime, both as to male and female, and next to that are crimes against the person—fisticuffs, breaking of bones, etc. Then, there shows up a phenomenon that is noted both in juveniles and adults—the female commits more crimes against the order of the government than do the men, relatively speaking. The author asked repeatedly for an explanation of this fact, and one man who had come from the rural districts, and is now an Intourist representative in Moscow, gave an interpretation which may or may not be right. It is interesting enough to pass on. The men, he said, did not resist collectivization so intensely when they saw that it was no use, but when a woman had collected a few goats or pigs, or a cow or two, it was no use trying to take them from her. She poisoned them first. No ideal of a final society in which she could take according to her needs could make up to her for the immediate loss of her treasures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is a more extensive comparison of the crimes committed by male and female transgressors. The first important thing to note is that the female is more given to excesses than the male in crimes of a less serious nature (Gernet, op. cit. p. 169). In one type of crime, hooliganism, the male is in the majority, with a percentage of 27.4 as against the female’s 2.8; but, in all other groups the woman is far in the lead. She commits six times the offenses of the men in insults, five times as many in the illegal manufacture of liquor, twice as many for assault, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in the crimes carrying sentences of above a year the men take the lead again. Note this table from an article Women in Correctional Labor Institutions, by A. Shestakova and B. Utievsky, included in the volume edited by Vishinsky. It shows clearly to what point women exceed in crime.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 358.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-bottom&amp;quot;| Length of sentence&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of male&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of female&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Up to 3 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 8.7&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 18.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 to 6 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 20.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 6 months to a year&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 16.8&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 1 year to 2 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.1&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 17.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 2 years to 3 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 13.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 years to 5 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 14.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 7.9&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 5 years to 10 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 12.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 4.5&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The social composition of the criminal group in the USSR is, as is to be expected, different from that of the ordinary capitalist country. In the first group of crimes mentioned the guilty are largely those of the village bourgeoisie and the rural Kulaks, who still struggle against the socialist order. They are persons who would not ordinarily be included in a criminal classification. Yet if we regard any legal definition of crime as including acts that contravene the rules and regulations of the proletariat society then they are actually criminals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this group commits most of the crimes against the state, the laborers themselves constitute the major portion of persons committing other types of crime. We find Professor Gernet,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; dividing them into owners of property or employers, and laborers. In theft we have a percentage of 12.2 for the first class, and 21.9 for the second; banditry is .8 per cent. for the first, and 1.7 per cent. for the second; murders 1.6 per cent. for the first, 2.4 per cent. for the second; hooliganism is 9.3 per cent. for the first, and 11.4 per cent. for the second. The situation is reversed in regard to crimes against the person. We find the first group there with a percentage of 10.5 and the second with 7.1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is some substantiation of the theory of the economic basis of crime which disciples of Marx and Lenin hold to so firmly in the fact that the curve for crime and unemployment rise and fall together. Russia claims to have no unemployment problem now, but there are those who do not work. There is always an idle band in any country. She has her dregs, misfits, and those who fall by the wayside from a variety of causes. And it is from this group that a large degree of criminals come. It furnishes its quota in Russia, too.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gernet, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is danger of getting too statistical. We want only to have a picture of the situation. Since 1928, the date already referred to as the beginning of a program to extend Socialism from villages to cities by means of collectivization, the curve for crimes against the state has risen. The Kulaks and the village middle class have waged a relentless war, apparently not daunted by what happens to those who are caught. Or, it may be heroism of a kind, even if a misplaced one. However, the expressed attitude of the authorities who administer the corrective labor system is steadfastly to win them over, to persuade and to educate in such a political fashion that they will be convinced. Whereas “crushing” was once the order of the day, the firmer establishment of the government now gives leeway for the more constructive measures. It is interesting to note that whoever is responsible for that political education knows his approaches well, if the statements of authorities are accurate. They have released enough, they say, to see what zealous citizens it turns back to society. I have no figures on it. But as I said in the preface, they know what they want of the man who is their criminal. Given that, accomplishment is easier. It is no small thing to persuade a man that the society he thought he was against was his all the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER V: WHAT THE COURTS ARE LIKE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; courts of Russia, in their present form a result of seventeen years of revolutionary evolution, and a mixture of proletarian ideas with older principles of justice, represent one of the most interesting developments in the country. It has been the aim of Soviet rule that the working class should by its participation in government be able to take part in carrying out the laws of the land. The administration of justice by the proletariat through which “Every representative of the masses, every citizen, must be placed in such conditions that he will be able to take part in discussing the laws of the state, in the choosing of his representatives, and in the carrying out of the laws of the state,” was a principle expressed by Lenin as early as 1918. The policy in political education has moved steadily toward the fulfillment of this plan. The use of jurors and their selection yearly in such a manner as will include a great number in the service is one way in which participation in administering and discussing laws is being carried out. Another is in the use of comradely courts carried on by the people of village or factory, which are later discussed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The responsibility of the courts in the establishment of strict legality has been increased tremendously by two recent events. The first was the meeting in April, 1934, of the first All-Union Conference of Jurists which made wide recommendations in regard to attaining a higher quality of work on the part of courts, prosecution, and correctional labor institutions. The second act of significance was the reorganization of the OGPU by the formation of the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the transference of all judicial functions to the courts of the land. It takes brief time and space for this last statement, but it would require a good many pages to discuss the full significance of the step, and a number are devoted to it a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the work of the All-Union Conference of Jurists, it is of high significance just now when the observance of legality and the establishment of a wide legal consciousness are so important in the relatively advanced stage of socialist construction which the state is entering. Openness must be the observed principle, and secrecy, even though legally judicial, discouraged, if confidence is to be widespread. A government cannot continue turning trials over to secret tribunals outside its judicial system and enjoy a reputation, even among its own loyal masses, of being adequately established. A normality of functions of institutions can go far toward establishing, even if only psychologically at first, a normality of conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Likewise, sentences must be constructive. This was not a new note as will be seen throughout this book. All along the party program had advocated an educational approach to the treatment of criminals, and year by year had strengthened provisions for realizing the fulfillment of its plans. But the emphasis on this problem by so authoritative a body brought it freshly to the attention of the courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0086.svg|SCHEME OF TRIAL IN RSFSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note the recommendation of the Conference in this regard. “In order to insure the effectiveness of judicial work, the judges should endeavor to ascertain the economic and social-political results of the verdict rendered by them, being assisted in this work by public opinion organized around the judicial institutions.” The same body placed a responsibility for prevention of crime on its courts. It was not only a duty to pronounce a sentence on a guilty person, but the tribunal must by means of its favorable position discover the reason for the circumstance of the crime. The recommendation ran, “The court, when trying a case, should not only establish the guilty persons but should also disclose those economic and organizational defects and shortcomings which create a favorable atmosphere for criminal actions, signalizing such circumstances to the attention of the Party and Soviet organs by means of special riders. The results of such signalizing should be checked up from time to time.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, as an important instrument in the accomplishing of the socialist society which is the goal of the people, the court’s function is first to subdue the enemies that would undermine any such progress, and second to aid in giving discipline and control to those of the proletariat themselves who are not strong enough on their own account. Added to that, it is an organ of prevention.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not within the purpose of this volume to give a detailed description of the system of courts existing in the country at present, but a brief account is necessary. Before going further it may be well to repeat the reminder that a class distinction is fundamental in administering the criminal law in the USSR. This statement will appear too many times very likely, in relation to various phases of the subject, but it is important. The court as an organ of the state is devoted in its administration of law to carrying out the purpose and policy of the state, and since the class idea is prevalent in the government, it will have to be also in court action. With this explanation we proceed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is at the very bottom of the judicial system the People’s Courts.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Military crimes are under the jurisdiction of military tribunals and transport crimes of the transport courts of the various railway lines.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The territory represented by one such has a population of from 20,000 to 100,000. Its jurisdiction may include any case against property or person not carrying a death sentence, although the more serious ones go in actual practice to the higher courts. It has other functions than as a lower court of the first instance. It is a member of the observation commission which supervises the correctional labor policy at the local penitentiary or correctional labor institution. It has an administrative function when the judge, sitting without the jurors in a “business session,” decides whether the evidence gathered in a preliminary investigation is sufficient to warrant court proceedings.&lt;br /&gt;
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In trials the People’s Court is presided over by a judge assisted by two jurors who actually have most of the rights and responsibilities of the judge, and might, therefore, be called co-judges. The judges for the People’s Courts are elected for a one-year term by the local Soviet and may be recalled either by the same body or by the Commissar of Justice for sufficient cause. This provision for impeachability is one of the basic principles of organization of the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0089.svg|COURT TRIAL]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The judges of these lower courts are representatives of the working class for they themselves are of their number. A judge (and, he seemed an adequate one), in a city court of Moscow with whom the writer talked was a baker before he took up his present profession. The qualifications of the office are that in addition to being from among the toilers the judge must have “a record of two years’ responsible work in state or workers’ and peasants’ public trade union, or party organization of the workers, or of three years’ practical work in organs of Soviet justice in the capacity of not less than judicial investigators.” Whether this may be regarded as high fitness or not, it seems to insure the selection of men of fair ability for the job. Perhaps it is that business of recall that makes them so careful, but those whom the writer saw sitting were impressive in their earnestness and efforts to arrive at a constructive sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
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The jurors, whom we may think of as co-judges, are about 40 per cent. women and 60 per cent. men. These persons are elected by factory committees, Red Army sections, and village Soviets, and a special commission distributes the number to be elected among these various groups in the percentage of 50 per cent. to the first, 15 per cent. to the second, and 35 per cent. to the third. There are no specific qualifications, except the right to vote, but there is the restriction that “A person has no right to be a juror, if he has been expelled from a social or professional organization for a disgraceful offense or conduct, for a period of three years from the day of expulsion. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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The names of the candidates for jurors are posted, and objections, if motivated, may be presented to the election committee. When the list of elected ones is finally sent to the commission, the latter prepares another list of those to serve in the various courts. Each serves for only six days of the year, and during absence from work in the act of performing this duty the worker retains his place and wage of employment.&lt;br /&gt;
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While there seems to be no specific preparation for the task of a juror beyond the requirement that the judge explain to those who sit with him their rights and duties, there are conferences held and some evening classes which acquaint them better with the work before them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Before we pass to the consideration of the next step in the Soviet judicature it would perhaps help in getting a clear picture of jurisdiction and procedure to take a look at some of the cases before the People’s Court. A typical day is described from the writer’s notes.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first trial we attended in the morning the room used was a small one, perhaps with a capacity for seating forty people altogether. It was on the ground floor of the building, and street cars clanging along their track outside made hearing difficult. On a slightly raised dais underneath a picture of Lenin there was a long plain table covered with a green cloth. Three chairs were placed at the back and one at the end. Three men and a woman, evidently having something to do with the case about to be tried, were already in the court room when we entered. The benches on which we took our places were arranged on either side of the narrow aisle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Exactly at the hour set for the beginning of court, a door at the back of the room opened and a man, accompanied by two women, entered. The women sat in the outside chairs at the back of the table; the man took the center one. Already the young woman, who had been in the room on our arrival had seated herself at the end of the table. She was the clerk, the man was the judge, the two women the jurors.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judge was obviously of the toiling classes, as were also the women. The judge, with his short black mustache, his close-cropped hair, his ordinary working clothes consisting of dark suit and blue shirt, ignored us and immediately got to work. The women were perhaps a little more conscious of our presence. The older in particular reached up to push back her hair, a little later smoothed her dress, a simple black cotton one. We noticed that her hands had seen much work. The other woman, about thirty and good looking, turned curious eyes toward us a moment, but finally gave her attention to the men who were seated on the front bench ahead of us.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judge adjusted his glasses and read from the papers in his hand. The plaintiff had worked faithfully for a school, discharging all his duties as per requirement, but he had not been paid. He was asking for his money.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were no attorneys, neither defense nor for the plaintiff. The plaintiff had his witness; he told his story, then summoned his corroborator, who had been excluded as required by law. The school representative told his side. The women jurors, forgetting us by that time, listened attentively, and the older asked frequent questions. The judge too, interrogated often.&lt;br /&gt;
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It seemed obvious to us that the verdict should favor the man whose wages had been withheld, but it is difficult to tell about court decisions. We waited an instant; the three behind the table conferred so briefly that it was plain there was no dissension. The school was ordered to pay, and was fined five rubles. As simply as that and requiring hardly more time than the telling here, it was finished.&lt;br /&gt;
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We left the room as the next case was called and went upstairs. A trial of some seriousness was in progress there. The judge sitting appeared of unusual intelligence. He was leaning forward, questioning the man in front of him, and he took no note, apparently, of our entry. One juror was a woman, the other a man. There was the same long table, the clerk at the end, a red cloth (Communist symbol), instead of the green, an especially attractive picture of Lenin, and one of Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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We asked cautiously of one of the spectators what the case was about. A factory director was on trial, accused of criminal negligence by the workmen, because he had been given money to insure the factory against fire some three or four months previously, and had failed to do so, thus imperiling the lives of those who worked there.&lt;br /&gt;
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But even though there might have been a severe sentence, if the motive was proved sufficiently base, there still were no attorneys, either for the state or defense. The defendant told his story. He had been ill and on vacation, but the matter of insurance would have his immediate attention, he said. He brought in his witnesses; but the workers’ evidence outweighed his. He had been warned, they said, and he had gone carelessly on.&lt;br /&gt;
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But, said his witness, he had been a good worker. He had managed his factory well. It had done its prescribed quota and more. It was not right nor just that he should suffer for one negligent act.&lt;br /&gt;
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The verdict was not so simple. The judge and jury retired into the mystery of the consultation room at the back. We sat wondering what sort of penalty, in case guilt was adjudged, would be imposed. Five minutes passed and they returned. The man was held guilty of negligence, and since he had been warned, and since the act was of a serious nature, imperiling the lives of workers and the property of the state, some measure must be used to impress him. He stood quietly, but the fingers of the hand hanging at his side worked nervously. The judge paused a bare moment, shuffled his papers, and then spoke.&lt;br /&gt;
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For six months the man was to have no political rights and his party connections were to be cut off. But he was to stay in his job; go right on with the work he had done so well, and give up fifteen per cent. of his salary for the six month period. Even the accused seemed to feel that the penalty was just, and there was obvious agreement among those who listened.&lt;br /&gt;
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So much for the People’s Court, the basic nucleus in the Russian judicial system. Now, for the second step in the judicature. The People’s Court takes care of the great mass of cases, both criminal and civil, and in addition exercises a function of supervision in regard to the village public courts and comradely courts of factories and other state institutions. But this will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just now we pass to the Regional Court. It is both a court of cassational instance (the form review of a criminal case usually takes in the USSR) and a court of original jurisdiction for more serious cases. Its territory comprises a province or region of three to eleven millions population. It is, first of all, the organ of control of all the courts within its region. It supervises the work of the People’s judges, as well as selects and presents the names of such to the regional executive committees for election.&lt;br /&gt;
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A word must be said here as to the use of the cassational method. The court of appeals was abolished by the first decree issued by the Soviets on the courts, and in its place was the following provision.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Act 349 of Code of Criminal Procedure, now in force.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Complaints from verdicts of the People’s Courts may be lodged by each of the interested parties exclusively on account of formal infringement of the rights and interests of the given party in the conduct of the case or in the judicial examination of the case, and as such constitute cassation complaints, and may not touch upon the substance of the verdict.” Thus the law seems to prevent the right of the court to go into the substance of the case. Such, however, is not actually a fact.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ruling of the Supreme Court in regard to criminal cassation, in 1924, laid down the general rule for cassation review which is still followed. “The court of criminal cassation, being a cassation court in that it does not go into the substance of the case, at the same time avoids a purely formal bureaucratic approach to the case. While never turning into a court of appeals, it does not hypocritically shut its eyes to the substance; manifest lack of elucidation of the circumstances which should have influenced the verdict, inconsistency of the punishment with the crimes committed, manifest errors and contradictions between the verdict and the undeniable facts of the case, . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a form of revision on the complaint of the proper parties, which combines the elements of cassation as practiced by the French courts with a method of appeal and together make up the cassation-revision form of investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
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These complaints may be made by the defendant and his lawyer, the state prosecutor, the plaintiff and his legal representative, or by the legal suitor and his representative. Complaints by any other persons result in the case being handled by judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
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The form of the complaint follows no standard rule. A peasant may write a few words on a piece of paper, without even setting forth his argument, and the case will pass to the proper cassation court and be completely checked up.&lt;br /&gt;
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The form of judicial supervision differs somewhat from the cassation method. The latter depends on the action of the parties concerned while the first depends on the intervention of the chairman or prosecutor of the court of the first instance. From this it can be seen that the normal way to have a criminal case reviewed is by the cassation method, on complaint by the interested parties.&lt;br /&gt;
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We will pass from the work of the Regional Court as a court of cassation or supervision to look at a case which it tries in its capacity as a tribunal of first instance. In cases of appeal there are three judges sitting, but in cases of original jurisdiction there is the one judge and two jurors just as in the lower court. The judges of the Regional Court are elected by the Regional Executive Committee from a list of names presented by the Commissar of Justice. Their term of office is for one year. The qualifications are that in addition to the requirements for a People’s judge, the candidate shall also have served in a judicial capacity in a position not lower than the People’s Court for a period of three years.&lt;br /&gt;
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On our visit to the regional court we found a somewhat larger room, seating perhaps a hundred persons, but still lacking any formal atmosphere. Its standing capacity was crowded when we arrived. Even the door leading to the corridor was open and filled with men and women. We attempted to look over, but the spectators politely made way for us. We saw, as we edged forward, the usual picture of Lenin, the familiar red cloth on the table. One knew at once by the atmosphere of the room that a case of interest was in process of trial. The judge and jurors were already in their places and the judge was reading the charge which alleged that the four young men and a girl on the front seats in the custody of an officer, had some two weeks before entered and robbed the house of the woman across the aisle from them, and that such robbery was accompanied by the use of a firearm in which the husband was wounded. No murder, however, was done. In that case death could have been the assessed penalty.&lt;br /&gt;
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Three attorneys for the defendants sat at the side of the room, but as the trial proceeded we noticed how little part they took. The judge questioned the defendants, and got the story almost entirely from them. Witnesses were there and the judge and jurors interrogated them as they came, but they turned again and again to the accused to check up, to give them a chance to verify or deny. The procedure was highly informal. The court sought to find out the truth of the matter, but we soon saw that the inquiry went even beyond that. True to the duty imposed on him in the matter of discovering the reason for the circumstance, the judge pursued his questioning. He wanted to find the motive for such conduct. To discover that he questioned the young criminals on the whole circumstances of their lives, of their social background, without regard to apparent relevancy. Guilt was not in question, but the “measure of social defense” to be applied depended on the whole circumstance of the deed. One of the offenders had run away from his home with his grandmother, from a good job, but he appeared to have been led by the older who admitted that he did not want to work. The girl, defiantly, confessed. The youth, who used the gun, was asked again why he shot the man. He looked down and said he did not know, unless it was because the victim did not raise his hands soon enough. The spectators, jammed to the door and tense, laughed in relief. The judge did not reprove them, but he did not laugh, and the room became quickly silent.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judge surveyed the defendants with something of sorrow; we were particularly interested in his attitude for he appeared to be concerned that the young people should deliberately choose such a career, and gave occasional words of admonition. But judges and citizens alike in the USSR have faith in what labor of a correctional sort can do for the construction of character. The next day the young offenders were sentenced to institutions where the ruling principle, in accordance with Soviet policy, is to teach them the dignity of work, and how to do some important kind well, and where they will be given certain cultural and political education.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is next in the system the Supreme Courts of the seven republics—much like our own state Supreme tribunals—which act both as organs of judicial control for all courts of the territory, as courts of appeal for those lower courts subject to their jurisdiction, and as courts of original jurisdiction in more serious cases. The judges of these courts are elected by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the top of the judicial system is the Supreme Court of the USSR. It is, of course, the organ of highest judicial supervision, and in its various branches acts as a court of appeals of all cases from various lower tribunals. The Military Section reviews the cases appealed from the military tribunals, the Transport Section performs the same function for those appealed from the railroad courts. Its judges are elected by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for a term of one year, and they must have had at least three years’ service as judge of the People’s Court.&lt;br /&gt;
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In original jurisdiction this court has only the most important cases in the Union. The Code of Criminal Procedure specifies: “The Judicial Department of the Supreme Court as a court of first instance, shall take jurisdiction (1) over cases of exceptional importance, when sent to it for trial by the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as cases offered for adjudication by the People’s Commissar of Justice, the Prosecutor of the Republic [now, the Attorney General] or the chairman of the State Political Bureau (OGPU). The Supreme Court has the right to accept for its adjudication or transfer for adjudication to any provincial court at its discretion cases offered for its adjudication by the prosecutor of the republic or Chairman of the OGPU. (2) Over cases involving offenses in office committed by members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the people’s commissars and members of the &#039;&#039;Collegiums&#039;&#039; of People’s Commissariats, members of the Supreme Court, the assistant prosecutors of the Republic. (3) Over cases of alleged offenses in office on the part of the provincial prosecutors and their assistants, the members of the presidium of the provincial executive committee, heads of its departments, chairmen or deputy chairmen of the provincial court.” All cases enumerated in this paragraph may be accepted by the Supreme Court for its adjudication or transferred by it to a provincial court depending on the importance of the case.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 449.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In several of these cases jurisdiction is not mandatory and may be transferred to other appropriate courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the cases tried by it and familiar to most Americans was the Metropolitan-Vickers case of two years ago, in which a certain group of Englishmen was accused of sabotage. But to continue the method used in discussing the lower courts, let us again consider a case. The following was appealed from the Siberian Regional Court, and does not present the human elements of cases of the first instance, yet it has its interesting points.&lt;br /&gt;
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The building itself is a scant two blocks from the spot where Lenin lies in his red granite tomb. There was a militiaman inside the entrance who directed us upstairs to the proper room. Another officer was in the hall but he only looked at us curiously as we went by. It is the highest court of the land, and we were impressed by the informality of the approach.&lt;br /&gt;
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Three judges presided in the room which presented a more formal appearance than those of the courts visited previously. An armed guard stood at the door leading out into the room at the back. Across the aisle from us sat three lawyers, the defense counsel. At the end of the table was the prosecuting attorney, a woman of some thirty years, who seemed competent and determined. Above the judges the usual portrait of Lenin looked down upon us. As we entered two young Russian women got up from the benches at the front to make way for us. They were the wives of the two condemned men whose case was on appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judges themselves, all men, were impressive in their dignity, and seemed intelligent and capable. They were dressed simply in ordinary street clothes, the dark shirt of one was open at the throat. One of them, not the chairman, read the charge in the original case. Two men had been condemned to die for murder and robbery. One, the manager of a fur factory, had stolen money to the amount of 7,500 rubles from the factory, and he and a companion, in a boat with a third, were crossing a lake. The third had a sum of money in his possession. While they stopped on the shore of the lake the first two sent the third for wood, and as he returned, they waylaid him and clubbed him to death. The Siberian Regional Court had sentenced the men to be shot.&lt;br /&gt;
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After the reading, one of the defense attorneys spoke at length. In Russia there is no death sentence for murder, but for robbery in which murder occurs such a penalty is attached. The counsel, realizing that weight of evidence was against him, tried to separate the crime into two distinct acts. It was his one chance. The murder had been motivated by other causes, he said, and robbery followed as an afterthought. He contended also that the stick with which the man was killed did not constitute a weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, his argument did not hold and in addition the prosecutor pointed out that the one man had already stolen money from the state, which act in itself might carry the death penalty. The judges retired and we discussed the case while we waited. The defense attorney, who had spoken, walked up and down the aisle. The two wives were quietly huddled in seats farther back. A bell sounded, the court returned, and the chairman or presiding judge read the decision allowing the sentence to stand.&lt;br /&gt;
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The case illustrated also the speed with which trials are completed after the crime is known. The murder of the man had occurred in October of 1933, but the body was not discovered until the latter part of June of 1934. There was no certainty of the third man’s death until that time as the other two had steadfastly maintained that he had left them. But less than one month after the discovery of the body, the two men had been tried and condemned to death. That was on July 19, and it was on August 9th that we heard the Supreme Court uphold the sentence. That is probably one of the main reasons why such deeds do not flourish there.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is still to mention the village public courts and the comradely courts of factories and various institutions. These occupy a special place in the judicial system and were therefore not mentioned except in passing in the beginning of the chapter. They are under the supervision of the People’s Courts, and are for the purpose of interesting the large masses of people in handling such violations of laws as occur in factory or village. Among such problems would be disorganization of production in factory, on the farm, or in offices, as well as drunkenness, indolence, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
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These courts are of, by, and for the people. There may be some little matter of form separating the masses from the formal courts, but they handle these among themselves. At a meeting of the workers of a given village a chairman and not less than ten members are elected to sit as a court. The factory conference follows the same plan, and elects a chairman, one or more substitutes, and not less than ten members, the exact number to be decided upon, from among the shockworkers of the factory or office.&lt;br /&gt;
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The People’s Court, functioning as a supervisor of these organs, may decide that a case is outside their competency, and take it from them or cancel the decision in a case that is considered not to have been within their jurisdiction, but the decision given in cases which are considered to be proper to them is final and subject to no appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
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A friend who was a spectator of the proceedings related the following case to the writer. A man had been drunk and had beaten his wife, not injuring her but outraging the village. In the presence of a large group of interested neighbors, the court assembled and tried him and decided that he must go forth from the apartment where he lived with his family and shift for himself as best he could. He did not deserve the shelter the home afforded him. There was no appeal. He left.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are more definitely the types of cases handled by the comradely courts which, like the village public courts are free from any formal judicial rules?&lt;br /&gt;
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The following is quoted from a lecture delivered by S. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The comradely courts examine cases:&lt;br /&gt;
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(a) of violation of labor discipline, to wit: repeated late-coming for work, staying away from work, reporting for work in a drunken condition;&lt;br /&gt;
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(b) of systematic neglectful attitude to socialist property (machines, tools, materials, premises, etc.);&lt;br /&gt;
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(c) of turning out misfits above the allowed limit;&lt;br /&gt;
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(d) of insults either by word of mouth or in writing, or action (spreading false derogatory stories about individuals), and inflicting blows without bodily injury;&lt;br /&gt;
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(e) of thefts from factory and office by workers upon the territory of the enterprise, as well as of materials and tools belonging to the enterprise to the value of not more than 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
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(f) of Hooliganism that is not subject to criminal prosecution, and other behavior which does not correspond with the requirements of public decency and reflects the negative sides of social life.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
From the same source is taken the following list of penalties imposed.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The following penalties may be imposed by the comradely courts:&lt;br /&gt;
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(a) public warning;&lt;br /&gt;
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(b) public censure with announcement in the wallnewspaper or in general press;&lt;br /&gt;
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(c) a fine of not more than 10 rubles for the benefit of public organizations (Chemical Defense Society, Children’s Friends, etc.) ;&lt;br /&gt;
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(d) reparation of damage caused to property, if not in excess of 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
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(e) raising the question before the administration of discharging the culprit;&lt;br /&gt;
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(f) raising the question before the trade union of expelling a member from the union for a stated period.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Examination of the cases must take place not later than five days from the time of registration of the complaint.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a closing paragraph I set down the basic principles of organization of the Soviet Courts. It summarizes what has gone before.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;(a) administration of justice exclusively by toilers;&lt;br /&gt;
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(b) election of judges and accountability before the electors;&lt;br /&gt;
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(c) impeachability of judges, the latter being independent from any local or personal influences but most intimately bound up with their class and called upon to carry out the policy of their class;&lt;br /&gt;
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(d) collegiate trial of judicial cases, as a rule, by a body of three people with an assured majority to the people’s jurors, and&lt;br /&gt;
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(e) participation of jurors in trial and judgment upon equal terms with the state judges, both in regard to fact and in regard to law, i.e., in the full scope of the rights of the state judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER VI: THE PRELIMINARY STAGE ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Let&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; us start with the beginning. The Criminal Code of 1927 specifies how proceedings may be begun. We should expect that there would be an arrest, but this may not be the case. In fact it is unlikely except in the more serious cases. In the lesser ones there will almost surely be none at all. What happens then? There are two main possibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
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First of all, the prosecutor, the investigators, the militia or the agency of Administration of State Safety of the People’s Commissariat of the Interior (formerly the OGPU) may start proceedings when they know or are informed of a criminal act. Since these organs are by their nature in a position to know of criminal law violations, it is usual for a case to start with them. The course they take will be discussed in a moment.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second manner in which criminal procedure is usually instituted is on complaint made to a competent authority by a person, an organization, an official, or by a confession on the part of the criminal, in which the officials proceed as mentioned above, if there is evidence of a criminal act. Otherwise they take no action, and so notify the complaining person or agent, in which case he may appeal to a proper court if he so wishes. Thus, if a citizen comes to a proper authority and complains, either orally or by writing, of some act, but does not present sufficient evidence that a crime has taken place, the authority refuses to start initial proceedings. Often, not even a confession on the part of the supposed guilty party will be accepted as &#039;&#039;prima facie&#039;&#039; evidence. This decision on the part of the authority not to proceed may, however, be appealed to the competent court within seven days.&lt;br /&gt;
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When once this evidence is accepted as indicating that a crime has been committed there may or may not be an arrest. Quite naturally, if a serious crime has been committed such as murder, and the criminal is making an effort to escape, there is arrest and detention. The law, however, states&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, 1923, section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “No person shall be deprived of his liberty and taken into custody otherwise than in the instances and in the manner provided by law.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, in the same edition of the Code,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 100.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there is an enumeration of the cases in which an arrest may be legally made. They are “(1) When a criminal is apprehended while making direct preparations, or while actually engaged in commission of the crime, or immediately afterwards; (2) When the victim or eye witnesses point to a given person as the one who committed the crime; (3) When articles of evidence are found on the person of a suspect or in his dwelling; (4) When a suspect attempted to flee or is apprehended while in flight; (5) When a suspect has no domicile or a permanent occupation; (6) When a suspect cannot identify himself.” These are the six instances in which an arrest may be made. The police, however, may use their judgment as to the necessity of such action, and in the event of detaining the supposed criminal they must report within twenty-four hours either to the prosecutor or to a judge of the People’s Court, in whose jurisdiction the case may be, giving information as to who made the arrest, when, where, and at what hour, information obtained in regard to the person held, the crime with which he is charged, reason for the arrest, and the name of the official signing the order for arrest.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 107, Commentaries.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the evidence obtained is sufficient to warrant holding the person for investigation the authority to whom the report is made gives his assent. Otherwise he reverses the decision and the man is released.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the absence of these conditions an arrest may not be made and in that event the method of securing attendance is to have the suspected person sign a declaration that he will appear when summoned.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Criminal Code of 1927, Section 103.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, there is a way provided to meet necessity. If the act committed appears to be of a nature so serious that it would carry a penalty of more than a year’s sentence to imprisonment, one of the above measures may be selected so that he may be held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it is usually the police organs acting as investigators who take a person into custody at the beginning of a trial, the investigator may also order an arrest. The Code in Section 145 provides: “Means of cutting off the possibility of escape shall be selected only after the suspected person has been formally accused and can be altered or abolished after the first questioning. In exceptional cases these means may also be applied to mere suspects who have not yet been declared accused.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who makes arrests in the USSR? The police force is the militia. This organ not only makes the elementary inquiry on cases which come under the jurisdiction of the investigator—to be discussed more fully in later paragraphs of this chapter—but they may themselves also conduct such preliminary investigation in all other cases. Besides carrying out the official open investigation they also carry on detective activity in order to establish grounds for future criminal trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is another agent of arrest. Wherever Russia is known, the “Gay-Pay-Oo” is a familiar institution. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; of early revolutionary days gave way in 1922, in the days of NEP, to an organ a little less frightening. But the OGPU had an ability on its own account to send shivers down the backs of people and caused would-be lawbreakers of the less hardy type to check their actions. If those critics, who feared that NEP ushered in an era that would in its mildness take power from the direct hands of the proletariat and turn it over to well-established revolutionary law, had waited for this organ to be in action they would have been reassured. Whether all the deeds attributed to this secret police be truly theirs or not, it is certain that it has been an effective means of protecting Soviet authority. It has been a court unto itself as well. It was, until July 10, 1934, empowered to punish even by shooting “all persons apprehended while participating in a banditry raid or armed robbery,” and the purpose for which it was avowedly organized was to “unite all the revolutionary powers of the republics for the purpose of combatting political and economic counter-revolution, espionage and banditry.” It is in this enumeration of crimes that it has jurisdiction as an organ of preliminary investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This organization has directed most of its attention to counter-revolutionary activities and uses its judicial powers mostly against the enemy class. Ordinary criminals arrested by it are usually turned over to the courts for trial. As for the actual number shot during recent years, there seems no way to judge, but indications are that they have been sparing in executions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chamberlin, Soviet Russia, p. 390.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are other phases of their work such as the maintaining of places of deprivation of liberty which will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The OGPU has recently been incorporated into the newly formed All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs as the Administration of State Safety, and its judicial &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; has been abolished. The significance of this is apparent. It ends a chapter in the history of Soviet Russia. Cases once disposed of by this organization now will pass through the courts, and the pictures the world held of midnight secret trials will have to be put away. While the activities of the OGPU were duly authorized by law, the possibilities of excesses under such a system seem apparent, and the establishment of a more definite order of legality is bound to produce a quieter confidence. Because of the widespread interest in the transferring of this authority, the entire decree is given here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To form an All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, including in its composition the United State Political Department (OGPU).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs is to be entrusted with:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The guaranteeing of revolutionary order and state security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The protection of public (socialist) property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Registration of civil acts (registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Protection of the frontiers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The following departments are to be formed in the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a)Chief Department of State Security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Chief Department of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Chief Department of Frontier and Internal Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Chief Department of Fire Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Chief Department of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Department of Civil Acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Administrative and Business Department.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To organize in the Union Republics People’s Commissariats of Home Affairs, acting on the basis of the law on the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, and in the RSFSR to establish instead of a People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs for the Republic an Institute Plenipotentiary for Home Affairs of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Departments of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the Union Republics are to be organized in the autonomous republics, regions and provinces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) To abolish the judicial collegium of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs are to send all cases of crimes on the completion of their investigation to the competent judicial organs in accordance with the legal requirements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Cases under the Department of State Security of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs are to be directed to the Supreme Court of the USSR, while cases of such crimes as high treason, espionage and similar crimes are to be handed over to the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR or to the competent military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) A special conference is to be organized under the People’s Commissar of Home Affairs of the USSR which, on the basis of the regulations, is to be entrusted with the right of applying, by administrative order, banishment, exile, imprisonment in corrective labor camps for a period not exceeding five years and banishment beyond the frontiers of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) To instruct the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR to present to the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR regulations for the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
What judicial authority is to handle the cases previously in the jurisdiction of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of the OGPU? Here is the decree:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In connection with the organization of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and with the object of insuring the proper consideration of cases handed over to the judicial organs and investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Cases of state crimes (counter-revolutionary and against administrative order), with the exception of those indicated in the subsequent points of this section, investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and also. the principal courts of the autonomous republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Special collegiums composed of a chairman and two members of the Court, are to be formed in the judicial institutions of the USSR and Union republics, named for the consideration of these cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Cases of high treason, espionage, terrorism, causing explosions, incendiarism and other forms of crime (Art. 6, 8 and 9 of the law on state crimes), investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and competent military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Cases of crimes on the railway and water transport, investigated by the same organs are subject to the jurisdiction of the railway and water transport collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the courts of the railways and water transport to which they belong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) All other cases, investigated by the same organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Courts in the usual order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the consideration of appeals against the resolutions of the Plenums and Presidiums of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, and also appeals against the sentences, decisions and definitions of the collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR, a judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR is to be established which is to be composed of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and two of his deputies, who are to have the right of directly rescinding or changing the resolutions, definitions, decisions and sentences of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics and Collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considerations of cases in the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR are to take place with the obligatory participation of the State Prosecutor of the USSR or his deputy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Resolutions of the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR may be appealed against by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the State Prosecutor of the USSR in the plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR and in the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In conformity with sections I and II of this decree, to recognize the necessity of strengthening the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To instruct the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics to oblige the People’s Commissariats of Justice and Chairmen of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics to work out and carry through in the fixed order, within a period of five days, appropriate additions to the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To instruct the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR to work out and carry through in fixed order, within the same period, addition to the staffs of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus does Russia make another advance in the administration of her criminal law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With proceedings begun, the next step is to determine by preliminary investigation if the suspect is to be definitely accused and held for trial. The purpose of this is to keep the court calendar from being crowded with cases which ought never to come to trial because the accusation is unfounded. It likewise guarantees the investigation and consideration of the substantial facts and saves much of the court’s time. The organs involved here are the prosecutor, the investigators appointed by him, and attached to his office, the police (militia) and the body formerly known as the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a great deal of informality and flexibility in the matter of this preliminary investigation. The investigator may take the whole matter into the atmosphere where the crime was committed. He may conduct it among the workers of the factory, if the act occurred there, in order that the workers themselves may aid in furnishing proofs, and in checking up the various facts. He also benefits in this way from the public opinion in regard to the case. This method of investigation in regard to labor crimes, both in factories and more recently in agricultural spheres, has been growing more and more common.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the more complex cases this investigation is carried on by the prosecutor himself after the initial evidence is turned over to him by the militia, organs of criminal detection, or other competent authority making the first inquiry. In lesser cases the investigating organ will usually prepare the case although the prosecutor may at any time examine the evidence and otherwise supervise the conduct of the case. Now that (since 1933) there is an Attorney General of the USSR, centralizing the prosecuting forces of the entire federated republics, the most important cases such as the famous Metropolitan-Vickers would be turned over to his personal supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this preliminary investigation it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney under whom it is carried on to see that evidence both for and against the suspect is gathered. If he neglects to see that the rights of the person under suspicion are protected and permits a case to come to trial when the evidence, if properly gathered, would indicate innocence, then he is laying up trouble for himself and will probably have to answer to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To the end that all information and evidence may be secured, the investigator is given wide powers as to search and seizure of anything having a relation to the case. But if one thinks of rough-shod entry and abuse, he may be consoled by certain restrictions which the law places around such activities. In conducting searches and seizures the investigator calls in official witnesses. Persons participating in the case as parties to it, and relatives of the parties, cannot be official witnesses. And Sec. 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “the searches and seizures are to be made in daytime, except in cases which cannot be postponed.” The searcher is further ordered to announce his decision to make the search and to use all possible care to avoid damage (Section 179 of the same Code), and the additional protection is given to the accused in that the investigator is to see “that the facts of the private life of the person searched which have no relation with the case shall not be made public.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sec. 181.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All articles seized in such a search must be listed, remarks made, and a copy deposited with the person or his family, and the articles themselves must be sealed at the place before being taken away.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 183, 184, 185.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mail may also be seized by the investigator if permission has been given by the prosecutor, as may also any telegraphic or other communications, but the safeguard is provided that a representative of the postal-telegraphic institution must be present.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 186-188.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first stage of the preliminary investigation there is no “accused.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Except in such obvious cases that no investigation would be necessary. An example of this would be a man actually caught murdering another.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The aim at this time is to find if a criminal act has really been committed and if so who committed it. After the deed is decided to be of a criminal nature and is definitely attributed to a particular person or persons then the second stage is undertaken. At this time the “decision” is framed, and the accused is notified that he is to appear before the authority. This “decision” is written after the evidence has been carefully weighed and guilt indicated. This document must contain all the information and circumstances gathered up to that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the person has been finally accused he is summoned to appear before the investigator who is handling the case. He is not yet definitely held for trial. When he appears he is made acquainted with the accusation. “And that does not mean,” a prosecutor told the writer, “that he is given a chair and table and told to read the papers before him. The whole thing is explained to him by the authority in charge.” Thereafter he is questioned and given a chance to tell his side of the matter. His statements are checked and any new evidence is gathered.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Steps must now be taken to insure his appearance during the completion of the investigation. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for five measures, as follows:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 144 and 150-154.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (1) He will not leave the place specified in the statement he signs without the permission of the proper authority which is the investigator or the court. (2) &#039;&#039;Personal or property parole&#039;&#039;. In the arrangement for property parole, the organization signing the bond must produce the accused when wanted or forfeit the sum of money agreed upon, but in the personal parole the persons (not less than two) who have agreed to produce the accused when wanted may, on failure to do so, be fined or sentenced to compulsory labor for a period up to three months. (3) &#039;&#039;Cash bail&#039;&#039;. Either he or other persons may deposit with the court a cash bail to insure his presence, the amount to be determined as in our courts, by the seriousness of the crime. (4) &#039;&#039;Detention in the home&#039;&#039;. The person may be restricted to his own home, as in the case of illness, or if a woman, because of pregnancy or of the care of her children. (5) &#039;&#039;Holding in custody&#039;&#039;. To be used in more serious cases. This latter is permissible only in certain prescribed cases. One of the conditions is that the case be of such a nature that the penalty, if conviction is secured, will be for a year or more of imprisonment. In addition one may be held in custody in cases covered by a definite enumeration in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which the sentence is not to exceed one year. The third possibility is in case of such serious crimes as banditry, or those of a socially dangerous nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the use of these measures the class nature of the criminal trial is strikingly portrayed. If the personality of the accused, or the crime he has committed, represents a high degree of social danger then one of the more severe measures is chosen. This would be the case for one appraised as a class enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The preliminary investigation may not yet be completed. If the evidence seems conclusive the prosecutor may end the preliminaries by simply drawing up the accusatory decision and conveying such information to the accused, but there may also be much more to this stage of procedure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the appearance of the accused for questioning a whole new set of resources may be opened up. He mentions witnesses of his own, he gives his own testimony. His relatives must testify if needed. Apparently no one is omitted but the defendant’s counsel. And any falsifying or hiding of evidence on the part of any witness makes him liable to more severe punishment. Even though there is no oath administered due to the official attitude toward religion, there are still effective means of impressing a witness with the importance of telling the truth, one of which is to let him know what will happen to him if he is caught deviating from it!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But to go back to the investigation. The accused may make certain requests or demands, and as indicated before, it is not only the duty of the investigating authority to see that they are met if reasonable, but if he neglects to take cognizance of any fact in favor of the defendant he is placing his own position in jeopardy. Not only must the investigator inquire into circumstances and facts that determine guilt or innocence, but he must also find out anything he can that will help in determining the measure of social defense to be given. What, for example, would be some of the things that he would want to know?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost at this time is the question as to whether or not the act was committed in an attempt to restore the bourgeoisie to power; after that the motive and circumstances of the act. In Soviet jurisprudence circumstances play an important part in disposing of the case. The history of the accused himself will be of help if there is a consideration of insanity, the whole circumstances of the crime will establish whether there was coercion, or threat, or whether the offender was at the moment of committing the crime in a state of destitution, hunger, or strong excitement, or influenced by any extremity of personal or family conditions. All of these circumstances are considered extenuating and influence the penalty assessed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the establishment of all relevant facts pertaining to the case the investigator may summon any experts deemed necessary. These must appear and give their conclusions no matter whether they aid or harm the accused, and a refusal to do so carries a fine of fifty rubles. The use of experts by the criminal courts in Russia will be discussed later but for the time being it may be said that such a custom is in wide use.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The calling of experts or other witnesses may also be at the request of the accused. The law provides&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “The investigator shall not have the right to refuse the request of the accused or of the complainant to summon additional witnesses or examine experts if the facts or circumstances sought to be established may have any bearing on the case.” Not only that, but the investigator is likewise limited in interpreting some line of inquiry sought by the accused as not having relevant bearing on the case. Not only must he furnish some adequate grounds for such a refusal, but he must also state in writing his reason for taking such a stand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The number and kind of experts to be used are determined by the investigator if it is on his initiative that they are called. But if the defendant requests others he must call them, unless it is impossible to get the desired expert or unless the granting of this request would delay the preliminary hearing beyond the time legally set. It might be that the defendant would purposely request some one whom it was impossible to produce in order to secure delay, and in such an event, the investigator is naturally not forced to comply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question of sanity may arise during the preliminary investigation and the proceedings may be dismissed on the grounds of insanity at the time of the commission of the act. If it is judged that the insanity has set in since the act then the trial is postponed until a cure is effected. There is a Judicial Psychiatric Institute where persons awaiting trial are observed for this purpose; but in order to facilitate the work of the medical staff the investigators gather all pertinent data as to the mental history of the accused.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With all the information finally assembled the investigator is in a position to make his decision. The police organs, in their initial investigation, may discontinue the case if they find the evidence does not warrant going on. The investigator, if the case has been in his hands, may likewise discontinue for lack of sufficient evidence. And the prosecutor, with the collected data in his hands, may decide that there is no case. But if the person or organization first initiating proceedings is convinced that this is a mistake, the decisions in each of these cases may be appealed to the next higher authority and finally to the court of proper jurisdiction, within a month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the investigator may decide to hold the accused for trial. In this event as soon as the investigation is completed the accused is notified of the decision and all the facts laid before him. He must be informed of his right to examine the entire records in the case, and the investigator must be sure that he is acquainted with the entire contents. If he is able to suggest anything to be added, the investigator must see that it is included before it finally leaves his hands. Any basic error in this stage of the proceedings may be the cause of a reversal by a higher court, so that great care must be taken to fulfill all points of law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A time limit is set by law as to the completion of this investigation. One used to American delays gasps at the speed with which these people dispense justice. One month from the time the defendant is formally accused the preliminary inquiry must be completed. However, this is not always possible, as appeals may be taken all along on the acts of investigator or prosecutor, and other delays may occur. But certainly all speed possible is used and there is no question of postponement of trial to the extent that we are accustomed to in our country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the preliminary investigation completed the accused is formally held for trial. This may, in the simpler instances, be by the judge of the People’s Court in cases when there is no necessity for investigation or in those cases when the police officers make all investigations and forward the information to the People’s judge. This would be true in cases involving sentences of less than one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In cases punishable by not less than one year sentence, yet not of so serious a nature as to require a preliminary inquiry, the investigator holds the accused for trial, on the basis of the information submitted to him by the police or OGPU. In such cases, all the evidence gathered together with the decision of the organs making the investigation is forwarded to the investigator, who, if he agrees submits the records to the competent court. There it is put on the trial list. If he feels that the conclusion to hold for trial is not warranted, then he may refer it to the court of proper jurisdiction for approval or rejection. In cases where the investigator himself is in charge of the preliminary inquiry he forwards his findings to the prosecutor, and he holds for trial in precisely the same way as was indicated above.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER VII: SCIENTIFIC AIDS TO THE COURT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;It has&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; already been said that a heavy responsibility has been thrown on the courts in the USSR in regard not only to establishing guilt but also to finding, within the bounds of the provisions of the law, the proper measure of social defense to insure a corrective influence on the one on whom it is assessed. Guilt is often obvious, but the proper steps to take in an attempt to see that the offender does not repeat his crime do not usually show themselves with such clarity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court, in trial, is not limited in any way in its efforts to get complete testimony and an accurate interpretation of such information. It is one of the fundamental principles of the administration of Soviet criminal law that the responsibility for the fullness and correctness of both investigation and verdict in the course of the trial rests on the court, and it may take any action on its own initiative to secure such ends. The prosecution and the defense may actually conduct the case within the bounds and direction which the court gives, but the court sets such limits and directions, interferes at any time on any point not cleared up by the argument, and decides on all questions relative to the examination. The court is independent of the opinion of either party in the trial and it is its responsibility to investigate any circumstance that appears essential to the case, whether the parties request it or not. It may likewise rule out what appears to be non-essential, even if it is requested by one of the parties. It is master of the whole proceedings and the expressed basic principle guiding its actions is to get at the truth of the incident involved and interpret the act in the light of all circumstances, so that a correct measure both for the protection of society from the socially dangerous and for the rehabilitation of the individual may be given.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Superhuman wisdom would be required to fulfill such a demand if the judge acted alone, or even in conjunction with his co-judges, the two jurors. But the Code of Criminal Procedure has provided that he be supplied with whatever aid scientific research and endeavor can give. During the trial the court may call experts and it may also have the benefit of advice or testimony of specialized institutions connected with it.&lt;br /&gt;
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With no further evidence than the space devoted to the use of experts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, one would know that much importance was attached to the practice in the USSR. It is the subject of many articles, not only as regards the use of such aids in the court trial but, as already seen, in the preliminary trial as well. It might, because of its frequency, become a loose, taken-for-granted observance, but there are safeguards which make it a matter of serious regard.&lt;br /&gt;
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One matter of interest in the use of such experts as the defense itself may request to have called is that there is never any financial transaction between the two. The expert receives his fee from the state and in case the defendant is found guilty it is charged to him. This practice eliminates the possible sense on the part of the expert that he must give evidence, or rather interpretations, in favor of the man from whom he is receiving money. He has no feeling of obligation in this direction and is thus more disposed to give unprejudiced opinions. The spectacle of the bitter clashing of “alienists” hired by prosecution and defense is not likely to take place in a Soviet court room. Opinions naturally differ and on occasion the court may have to summon others, so that he may see which way the weight of opinion falls, but the dividing line is not due to a desire on the part of either to defend his client.&lt;br /&gt;
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Experts are called by the courts whenever specialized information of any kind that is desired is available. Article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Experts are called in when in the investigation and examination of the case, special knowledge in science, art, and the crafts is required.” And in a note to the same article it is further provided that “Experts must be called in to establish the cause of death and the character of bodily injuries, as well as in order to determine the psychic condition of the accused or of the witness if there be any doubt on this score in the opinion of the court or of the investigation.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A limitation is, of course, placed in that a science may not have grown in such a way as to furnish a reliable basis for inspection of evidence and conclusions. On the other hand something of an unusual nature may be called in a case presenting such a problem as one related to the author by a state prosecutor. In the USSR one causing a suicide receives a severe sentence. In a case of a double suicide of two women, there seemed no clue pointing to the guilt of any person until a small drawing was discovered. On the evidence obtained from this paper, with the aid of an expert in the identification of characteristics of lines and angles, an arrest was made and a confession and corroborating data obtained. This would not ordinarily be a legitimate line of expert aid, but in this case it afforded the only chance of detection. It is an excellent example of a case where expert testimony may be the only available resource.&lt;br /&gt;
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The expert, once summoned, has practically unlimited rights and privileges in gathering needed material for forming his conclusions. He is given all the data in the case for study, and he attends throughout the entire trial exactly as do the prosecution and defense. He may question the witnesses, ask for any further materials such as publications, documents, records, or even the subpœnaing of witnesses, and the court sees that his requests are granted. It is said that there is no known case of a refusal of co-operation with the expert on the part of either court or investigator. He is responsible in arriving at the proper solution of the case, and he is held accountable for any negligence in obtaining any information that can contribute to the accuracy of his conclusion. He may, make an error but he may not falsify, at least not without penalty. The Code of Criminal Procedure which devotes so much attention to this matter of experts says, “In regard to answering summonses, obligation to speak the truth, responsibility for false testimony, i.e., for deliberately false and not mistaken testimony, the expert shall be equal to witnesses.”&lt;br /&gt;
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But experts may disagree, even honestly and without regard to a fee! Also, it is conceivable that one might be inadequate. An American mind, at least one whose owner has attended court in the United States, might understand such a contention. The Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure takes care of that possibility, too. In Article 300 we find it provided that, “If the expert conclusion be found insufficiently clear or inadequate, and also in the event of dissension among experts, the court shall appoint new experts, either on its own initiative or upon the request of either side.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The conclusion of the experts is given at the close of the hearing and is attached to the records of the case. The court does not have to agree with the findings but he must consider them. He is free to criticise, and so, for that matter, is either of the sides in the case. But, in any disagreement he must defend himself well. The Code of Criminal Procedure again says:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article 295.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “However, if the court disagrees with the conclusion of the experts, such dissent shall be minutely motivated either in the verdict or in a special rider.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The testimony of the expert is held to be of peculiar character in Soviet judicature. He is not a witness, giving facts, but it is his function to examine and appraise facts, to inspect and to weigh and to give his opinions and conclusions in the special way of which he is capable. His evidence is distinguished from the other given in the trial in that it is specialized and independent. In other words the court can look after the facts but he wants the expert to tell him the meaning of what he finds out. And the experts have accepted the challenge and the responsibility with vigor. They have developed what might almost be called an “official psychology” that fits well into the nation’s philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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This science, called “judicial psychology,” occupies first place among the branches used by the courts in the Soviet judicature, and the second of importance is correctional labor psychology. The authorities attach no importance to what we call criminal psychology because they reject the idea that the criminal has any psychological or biological peculiarity. The use of the term alone suggests that they have, and the content likewise reminds them of some brand of Lombroso doctrine. For their theory of crime with its economic base, with its contention that this phenomena results practically &#039;&#039;in toto&#039;&#039; from the exploitation of one class by another, such a consideration would not do. Here one sees an application of their theory of crime. The criminal for them is like other people, and as the classless society approaches its perfect state a new social consciousness will evolve and any urge to crime will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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They reject likewise a juridical psychology which makes use of an analysis of psychological concepts into such elements as “imprudence,” “intent,” “spiritual agitation” because its content is too much one of juridical scholasticism, and affords no practical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Judicial psychology, considered in its broader sense, would involve the correctional labor psychology referred to above as one branch of this science important to the Soviet judicature. Defined in this larger way it would mean the application to the work of the court and the corrective labor institutions of all results of psychological research. Used in the narrower meaning it refers to criminal procedure psychology, or the application of whatever is known in this field to the case as a whole during the procedure or what transpired in the preliminary investigation. It would comprise the psychology of the accused, of the witnesses, of any other participant, even of the judge, jurors, experts themselves, and of the prosecutor and defense. They emphasize that they do not deal with the breaking up of the personality under consideration into such atoms as attention, memory, etc. as is done in the German school, but that they study the entire behavior of the witness, or other person, against a background of the broad, whole situation of the judicial investigation. They interest themselves, first of all, in the obtaining of true testimony and later in its correct appraisal, and their chief endeavor is to develop a better technique to arrive at these ends. With the emphasis they put on the importance of this usage and the talent they have in the field and the serious attitude the research workers take toward the problem, they should develop something compensating for their great effort.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in the field of correctional labor psychology there should be an even greater future. This is where the practical worker begs for more light from his scientific colleague. It is one field, said an authority, where the practical worker has gone on ahead of the research worker. There is eagerness to regenerate the psychology of the lawbreaker, to get him so readjusted that he will fit usefully into life. But more of this will be found in the chapter on Corrective Labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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To think only of the individual and his happiness would spur a scientist on to great effort, but it is even more than that in this instance. The nation’s progress toward its ideal depends on the successful use of these unfitted elements. It is no wonder that so many of the best minds are devoting themselves to working out the most adequate possible corrective labor policy. Filled with zeal as they are for their cause, they feel the responsibility which rests on them of making every human possible of use in the Socialist order.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are two institutes attached to the judicature in the USSR that require special attention in this consideration of expert aid rendered to the courts. Their work is of the utmost importance in the whole system of criminal procedure and the administration of corrective labor. The two referred to are the Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute and the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy, both attached to the office of the Attorney General and to the Commissariat of Justice. It was in visits to these two places that the writer experienced the greatest enthusiasm for what is being accomplished in the field of criminal repression in the USSR. Work of the finest type is being carried on in the lines covered by these two institutions by staffs well equipped for their respective fields of endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
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The writer visited the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy several times, looked through its library and used its books, and had the aid by conferences and advice of Director Shlaposnitchov, of the assistant director, of Professor Brusilovsky, and others of its officers. It is admirably staffed all the way through by persons not only of ability but of social conscience. The seriousness with which they attack the problems which face them and their acquaintance with the work being done in other nations are bound to impress anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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This Institute carries out the usual policy in the USSR of combining the theoretical and the practical. Along with those who are engaged in problems of research into the cause and treatment of crime there come the workers from the courts with practical problems to solve. Working in the library and reference section are persons who read and speak several languages and who carry their research into the study of foreign legislation and reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are a number of sections devoted to special lines of inquiry, chief of which are: Criminal Law and Criminal Trial, a Judicial Section, Statistical Section, and one giving its attention to the problems of juvenile offenders.&lt;br /&gt;
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Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute is the principal other scientific body on which the courts rely for solving their crime problem. It has likewise its practical and theoretical side. Research is carried on by a large staff of medical men and women, of research workers, of professors, and collaborators, and it publishes the results in numerous volumes. It also holds conferences and discussion meetings. It is equipped with all the latest devices and instruments for treatment of its cases and works in close contact with judicial establishments. Its director gave the following as the purposes of the Institute:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) To examine all those about to be tried when there is a question as to psychic condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) To aid all correctional labor camps both as to policy and on actual cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) To help in problems of juvenile delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) To carry on research in the problems connected with the work of the Institute.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) To establish graduate courses and train medical aids.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity for patients is one hundred and fifty beds, these are divided into different groups; such as those for men, for women, for children, for the definitely deranged, and for those who are of apparently sane condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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No one is admitted at Serbsky except those who have come in contact with the law, through its contravention. When a question of sanity comes up in a case at trial or in the preliminary stage of procedure, it may be cleared up by a brief examination by doctors, but in every case where extended observation is needed the person is sent to Serbsky. After not longer than a month a report is made to the court. In case insanity is adjudged by the staff, then the patient may be sent to a hospital where care is given him, or, if he is dangerously demented, he is placed in an institution where there is more restriction and compulsory treatment and care.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Institute maintains a department where children are kept, and where they are taught by teachers who come in for that purpose, and trained in certain arts and crafts. Also, some adults are kept beyond the month period when it is thought that only brief treatment is needed so that the trial may go on. There was one who had been there for eight months and another for six at the time of the author’s visit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because of the short period of retention in this place one would not expect that much of a constructive nature could be done in the matter of work. But here the policy of Soviet treatment shows to advantage. The shop teacher exhibited to us with pride what he had been able to accomplish, and his enthusiasm was justified. In accordance with their theory that labor can correct almost anything they use it here as a constructive treatment. They also use, as has already been said, all of the latest medical and psychological therapy, but there is at the same time an insistence that training for work, giving one something to do and teaching him how to do it well, is the best way to psychical readjustment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Pursuant to the fulfillment of this idea those sent here make things and they are carefully observed while they work. Some of the objects in the shops and on exhibit in a small conference room were beautiful models. Among those, of especial note, there was an airplane, perfect in minute detail, a movie machine, a system of traffic lights, and a collective shop made by the children. The latter would have a political significance, of course, and serve to put over education of a socialist nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one goes into Serbsky Institute one encounters a guard at the outer gate, and the feeling is that here is a prison. It is, of course, of a kind. Men who are in this place are, many of them, of a dangerous nature, such as we would call criminally insane. This terminology will not do, however, for Soviet criminology, as one may be either insane or criminal, but not both. But a number are guilty of murder, are pleading insanity as a defense when they may, of course, be sane; a number have made homicidal attacks on individuals. With this in mind one expects to see more of a prison atmosphere prevail.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the outside there were no armed guards in evidence, and we were told that there were none. When we went through a ward of some twenty-odd men of the most dangerous type with only a woman attendant, and no one else about, the writer frankly felt somewhat nervous. It seemed they ought to be under guard, but the woman in charge assured us that there had never been an attack by one of them on an attendant. The attitude of the Serbsky staff toward the patients and the attitude they manage to get from them in return seemed to us remarkable.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went through the gardens where those persons of a less dangerous nature were reading, talking, or doing whatever they wished. Some came to speak to us. One wished to make a long speech. A part of these were judged to be mentally normal, others must return to face their trial. We came at last to the place where are kept the most obstreperous; those who would surely make an attempt to escape if not restrained. This was the only example the writer encountered in Russia of persons locked in cells. There may be others in isolated instances, but solitary confinement has been done away with as a matter of policy. The building housing these prisoners was two-story, and the cells faced inward on the garden. There were tall big windows of unbreakable glass affording plenty of light, but the ventilation was bad. A remark was made to that effect and we were told that it was an old building they had had to utilize, and that it was to be replaced within the year. It certainly was out of keeping with the rest of the place, and made us think that it would actually be taken care of before long. However, there were not many persons there. Glass panes in the doors enabled one to peer in and there were only ten inmates in all the rooms on the two floors.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was in one of these cells, where all the furniture is secured to the floor, that we were allowed to talk for a moment to a man who is quite a character in criminal circles in the USSR. He is held to be the chief swindler of the country and a recital of his escapades made the assertion sound entirely plausible. Perhaps it should be emphasized for fear that it was not made clear above, that it is not the ravingly insane who are kept in these rooms. They are the ones kept in the ward already mentioned. These are they who are the more dangerous criminally, who possibly are not insane at all. The swindler was held to be normal mentally, and if he got away with all that his record enumerated one feels sure he must be.&lt;br /&gt;
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The swindler, a young man of near thirty, thin, dark, sat morosely on his cot as we went in. The attendant spoke to him, put her hand on his shoulder. We had the story of him before we entered. He had been in prison a number of times, he had supplied a luxurious living to himself and admiring companions over a period of years. He had been sent to this Institute at several of his previous trials and the opinion had been each time that he was mentally normal. A few months before our visit he had been returned to court to stand trial, and had been sent to a corrective labor institution. But he had refused to work. He had refused to follow any of the prison régime, and the authorities had returned him to Serbsky for a check on his mental condition. He ignored us, seemed hardly to be conscious of our presence, as he begged to know of the young woman what they were going to do with him now. She talked to him for a few moments in an encouraging manner. Her effort with him, she said, was to convince him of a better way of living by means of the training he would get in the corrective labor institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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We had already been in the children’s department and had talked there to two girls whom we were told to remember for future reference. One in particular was a pretty, gentle-appearing child of twelve. Here is her story. She had been a run-away, she had wandered in various parts of the USSR, or so she said. Her acts of a criminal nature had all been directed against children. She had stolen several whom she said she had pinched and tortured in a sadistic manner and killed. The number she set at ten, but there was no verification of her report. She had become well enough known and feared in certain sections so that she was threatened by mothers of young children if she so much as entered the village or town. She had a few months previously come into the care of the Institute, and they felt sure that an entire change of her whole character had been effected. On the wall of the room where she stayed she had put some pictures, and she had become interested in art as well as other work and study. They thought her normal, and although her family wished her returned to its custody, the opinion was that the environment had not up to then been sufficiently constructive to permit that. They were sending her to an institution at Leningrad where she was to be taught and trained in some labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even at the risk of being tedious, it seems desirable to record two more cases among the children. In a yard at the rear of the building we found a group of boys at play. Two of them were indicated as presenting challenging problems. Safely back in a conference room we heard of what they had done. The first case especially was interesting as indicating that animosity does not always exist in the treatment of those who are in opposition to the proletariat rule.&lt;br /&gt;
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A boy of seventeen, who was the son of a Kulak, had been discharged from his job for indolence. He went later to stay with a friend overnight. He wanted the friend to go with him to some place to which the mother objected. Filled with anger he waited until the son had departed for school the next morning, then murdered the mother, took some money which she had in the house, and escaped. When caught, he was sent to Serbsky for examination and the analysis showed mental deficiency and a difficult, sulky character. They had kept him for a time, had made some progress with him, and were then about to send him to a medical-pedagogical institution for juveniles where he would be trained and treated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The other boy, a charming black-haired fellow of thirteen, was held to be normal, but he was an alcoholic and stole constantly. The trouble in his case seemed to be in an irrational, coddling kind of upbringing. The decision was to send him to a state educational institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were only seven women inmates of the institution at the time of our visit and in view of the high percentage of women criminals in the USSR that seemed strange. No explanation was vouchsafed in answer to a question as to the cause, but it might indicate that women in this country do not base a defense plea on grounds of insanity!&lt;br /&gt;
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With such thorough effort as the care in Serbsky indicates, the conclusions as to mental condition ought to be as authoritative as human fallacy permits. The institution has representatives in various shops and schools and co-operates closely with the heads of the various prisons, and every effort is made at supervision and observation of those within its jurisdiction. We asked for statistics on results and were reminded that this work is all very new in the USSR, of necessity, and that figures were not complete, but that we could be assured that the results were worth to them all the painstaking care they put on their work.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER VIII: THE PROSECUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; functioning of the prosecution in the Soviet judicature is of especial interest to a student of criminal procedure. Its development from the time of the total abolition of the institution as it had existed in the Tzarist régime, by Decree #1 of 1917, to the establishment of the office of the Attorney General in 1933, has been experimental and not without dissension among the ranks of the Central Executive Committee itself. In the early years following the Revolution when everything Tzarist was swept away, there prevailed a spirit of liberalism so far as the rights of the people were concerned. In the sudden accession of power by the proletariat, lack of restraint was the predominating note, and this philosophy—if such irrational conclusions could be called one—of the epoch was reflected also in the procedure of the criminal courts. A more conservative opinion had wished merely to place the defense on an equal footing with the prosecution to correct the dominance of the state over the people in such a manner as it had been practiced for all the years of the reign of Tzars. But this was not enough to satisfy those who were clamoring for everything to be placed in the hands of the proletariat, the administering of justice as well as other branches of government.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this moment of judicial liberalism prosecution through official channels was done away with, and in its place the persons in attendance at the trial were vested with the right of accusal as well as defense. It must have distressed many a hardy judge, even though he sat as a representative of the toiling masses himself, to try to figure out a decision in the face of untrained and conflicting contentions. At any time during the trial any citizen might rise and address the court either in behalf of the accused or as the state’s prosecutor. The idea took hold rapidly, and up to the beginning of its control in 1918, it was so widely used that it became customary for the judge to call on some one in his audience to act as defender or accuser of the person on trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was bound to lead to difficulties. Civil war was at hand, the class struggle was at its height, and the court was an organ of the state in its struggle against its enemies. Even the most liberal saw that it would not do. Some system must be used whereby the prosecution of cases would be strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is an interesting point involved in the restoration of the prosecution, as it now began, even though it was of revolutionary expediency. It was a swinging back to the western criminal law administration which they had annihilated at the beginning of their rule. A legal man said to me in this regard, “We acknowledge that there are many good points in the capitalist system, and we do not hesitate to borrow what are useful to us.” In court procedure, even while they do preserve the proletarian administration, one can recognize many things about their orderly procedure that has its foundation in familiar bourgeois practices. There is no denial of this on their part. Certain well established ideas of justice have proved over long years to be adequate and proper and these have been incorporated into their own judicial structure. The early disorganized practices of the proletarian administration of justice gave way when necessities and panic of the Civil War had been dissipated to a deliberative plan resulting in the many codes of 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0141.svg|ORGINAZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF USSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before this a resurrection of the public prosecutor was on its way. Revolutionary tribunals, in their post as out-sentinels in the struggle of the government, were the first in the demand for sterner equipment of prosecution, and political expediency put an end to judicial liberalism in their practice. Characterizing this period was the attitude that placed in the hands of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; the power to impose even the death penalty on those persons charged with political offenses such as the participation in counter-revolutionary activities, deliberate destruction of property or espionage, and other such crimes against the state. It was felt that if the proletariat was to continue to rule it was no time for softness, either in the judicial system or in the non-judicial tribunals which continued to exist through the bloody days of the Civil War period.&lt;br /&gt;
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As just pointed out, it was in the Revolutionary Tribunals, created by Decree of November 24, 1917, and differing very little from the People’s Courts except in the requirement as to the number of co-judges,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Six sat in the Revolutionary Tribunals while two were required in the People’s Court.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that the first change came in regard to the prosecution. Let it be understood that although these tribunals were organs of the revolution and continued in force for five years, they were proper judicial institutions, with a definite prescribed procedure and jurisdiction. There had been too much mildness in their administration, so much so that the present Commissar of Justice, N. V. Krylenko, stated in his Soviet law,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “Their softness with regard to sentences discredited them completely.”&lt;br /&gt;
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There were too many of them in the first place and by Act of May, 1918, their number was reduced so that they remained in existence only in the capitals of the provinces and other important places. But that reform would not necessarily make them deal out sterner justice, and by this same Act there was created at each of the existing tribunals a &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors. To make the check-up more complete there was also established a Central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; of State Prosecutors in connection with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee created by an act of June, 1918.&lt;br /&gt;
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The character of the Revolutionary Tribunals was undergoing a change. Sternness and determination now marked their attitude. Mildness was fading away as class struggle advanced. They were created to spike the activities directed against the achievements of the Revolution or designed to weaken Soviet authority. It was not enough that some citizen give voice to a plea for conviction; it was neither sufficient that local tribunals be left to carry on their own unaided and unsupervised prosecution. There must be central supervision. This very distrust of local competency led later to a dissension in which Lenin had to take a hand, but for the time being, it served its purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the decree already referred to (of May, 1918), the central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; was given wide powers. It might demand of local prosecutors or tribunals that certain cases be transferred to Moscow or in the event the case remained in its original territory, it might send prosecutors there to see that it took the direction desired. It might also demand an accounting from the local &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; so that by supervision they could be sure that the functions of these organs to look after all facts of criminal action committed by any person anywhere and the institution of criminal procedure might be faithfully and zealously fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the Revolutionary Tribunal Acts of 1920, all previous acts pertaining to tribunals were repealed and sweeping changes again occurred. Counter-revolutionary activity was on the decline, the Civil War was receding, and non-judicial methods of suppression not so much needed. Orderly government was growing stronger. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; suffered the abolition of its special tribunal, the military judicial powers even were required to comply with the provisions of this Act. As a result of these curtailments the powers of the Revolutionary Tribunals were widened and jurisdiction extended to include any case involving counter-revolutionary charges as well as any other that was of a nature dangerous to the Soviet Republic. Not only was the jurisdiction of these tribunals enlarged but their power of punishment was likewise increased and was now practically unrestricted. With such authority they could assess any measure of repression which they thought necessary to the occasion and could thereby cover any ground lately held by extra-judicial bodies. These tribunals were established in the capitals of the various provinces and by permission of the Commissar of Justice might also be instituted in the larger cities.&lt;br /&gt;
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What happened in regard to the prosecution? The &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of prosecutors set up by the previous acts were abolished and in their stead there now appeared state &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of defense and prosecution, both for the people’s court and for the Revolutionary Tribunals. From this time on more attention was given to the perfecting of a system and technique of prosecution. The qualifications for the person filling this office became of a more adequate nature. He must be a man competent to make an appearance before an assemblage, to speak or otherwise conduct public affairs, and he must also know the Soviet system of government thoroughly as well as be acquainted with the workings of trade unions. There was still no centralized system such as exists today since the prosecutors were at this time provided merely to represent the people in trial, much as a defense lawyer might be appointed in a particular case. But the era of floundering, of experimentation, of entertaining thought of complete proletarian administration of law, had made its contribution, and the evolution moved on with the rapidity with which other things have moved in Soviet Russia. In 1922 there was another Act containing other innovations.&lt;br /&gt;
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By this Act there was a general revision of the whole system of judicial legislation, and there emerged such results as the Criminal Code, the Law on Basic Property rights, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the year of 1923 furnished additional legislation. The matter of some centralization of a state prosecution seems to have been taken for granted, but the form that the organization was to have, the basic principles, brought forth differences of opinion as we shall see later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The New Economic Policy had been introduced and the economic and political situation in the country was in a confused and complex state. Civil war had died down but the class struggle, already well on its feet, took encouragement from the feeling among the property owners that capitalism, at least in a modified form, might with timely effort be brought back. The form of conflict now encountered was hardly less threatening to Soviet rule than had been the more open warfare. The government, dependent on its courts, now effectively augmented by the judicial powers of the terrifying GPU, needed a strengthened prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In May of 1922 the People’s Commissariat of Justice presented its proposal of organization to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and found itself immediately on the defensive against attack by opposition within the Communist faction. This had not been expected, and there was some dismay when the main points were rejected altogether. Once before, a central &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors—even though for the Revolutionary Tribunals—had cast reflection on local organs by demanding transferal of cases to their jurisdiction or by sending one of their own number to prosecute locally. Now, as the Commissariat of Justice proposed: (1) the direct subordination of the local prosecutors to the Prosecuting Attorney of the Republic who appoints and dismisses them, and (2) the right of local prosecutors to protest before the central authorities against unconstitutional decisions by local executive committees, it was held by the majority of the Central Executive Committee that there was in such suggestions an element of distrust of local authorities too strong to be accepted. A commission appointed by the session, in rejecting such proposals, made one of its own. It was suggested that there be set up a “dual” subordination of prosecutors, making them responsible both to the central authority and to the local executive committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a state of affairs brought intervention from the captain of the ship of state. Lenin wrote a special letter to Stalin that brought the opposition to terms when it was read before the Central Executive Committee. He enumerated therein some of the causes of the difficulties of establishing revolutionary legality and a lack of uniformity of the application and administration of the laws were chief among these. Likewise, there was always the alibi of local peculiarities and conditions. For us of the United States who have struggled with forty-eight different types of provisions, of applications, and administration, there is understanding of his argument. A suggestion of anything possible to prevent it seems unanswerable. “The basic evil in the whole of our life and in the whole of our lack of culture,” wrote Lenin, “is in the ancient Russian attitude of laissez-faire and in the custom of semi-savages who want to retain the local justice of Kaluga as distinguished from that of Kazan.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He then puts a question. Can it be tolerated in a country of proletarian dictatorship, in a country building up a socialist economy? Here is his answer. “There can be no Kaluga justice different from that of Kazan, but there must be a uniform All-Russian justice, and even a uniform justice for the whole Federation of Soviet Republics.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That started the effort toward uniformity. The most recent chapter in the development was in 1933 (June 23) when the office of the Attorney General was created to centralize the prosecution of the whole Soviet Union. There have been steps between the two enactments but they have moved steadily toward the recent accomplishment. In the earlier organization the position as head of the public prosecution of the USSR, now held by the Attorney General, was occupied by the Commissar of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duty of the prosecution, now headed by the Attorney General of the USSR, is not merely to prosecute. His functions are far beyond that limit. If he were confined to that there would not be great importance to his office.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet judicial trial the prosecutor is robbed of his glamorous role as he appears in our own courts. He, as well as the defending attorney, is a mere assistant to the court, there to aid it in getting at the truth of the affair before them. It is apparent that he has been appointed in such a manner that he is nearer to the judge than the defense lawyer. He is likely of the same party affiliation, he comes from the same social class, he is in sympathy with the order of government. It is certainly more likely that he exerts a greater influence on the court than the other side’s attorney who may hold an opposite viewpoint. One notices that often the defense attorney is of a different appearance in manner of dress, in terminology, and in speech, from the court and prosecutor. It may be supposed that this occasionally causes the court to decide against him, even though the bias is unconscious, since it is very likely that he is defending a person who is a “class enemy,” and with whose point of view he may be in sympathy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That would probably have been truer a few years ago than it is now. With the prevailing attitude of “winning over” wherever possible, and the “crushing” of only those who are distinctly to be feared as socially dangerous, there seems to be no great prejudice shown. It must exist to a degree, but antagonism does not seem a part of the present policy of state. If a person before the court can be made into a useful citizen then the object is to do it. Those who deliberately continue to struggle against the laws of the class in power will certainly be dealt with in an uncompromising manner, and if it is fairly clear the crime is of this nature then a defending lawyer would hardly be listened to with very much thought. It would be the day of the prosecutor. Likewise in establishing the class nature of the crime, the word of the prosecutor would be worth more to the court because of his sympathy with the existing order. But since it is to the interest of the state to protect an individual, to retain the aid and sympathy of all possible and to win and keep the confidence of its masses, it is not likely that there will be many who are innocent in this respect convicted in the regular judicial trials where open sessions prevail and the people in large numbers attend. One of the impressive characteristics of the court room in the Soviet Union is the attendance and interest of the citizens. They discuss the verdict with animation and it is to be noted that they usually agree with the court’s decision. If those in attendance disagreed too often it would hardly be a good thing for the judge. It will be remembered that power of impeachment is exercised in this country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The lack of importance of the prosecutor in trial is exemplified by his absence from trial frequently, in the People’s Court. It is not usual in this lower tribunal for either prosecutor or defense lawyer to be in attendance. At times, however, they do appear. But there is no place in the system for the ingenious display of a game of wits between attorneys as there is no jury such as ours nor anyone on whom an emotional impression could be made. There is really no great need in the ordinary case for attorneys either for the state or the defense. The court has both the power and responsibility to see that all evidence is placed before it. There can be no such objections to its introduction as we are accustomed to hear, resulting in the escape of criminals from the law because of the lack of admission of evidence. The story comes out, the witness tells the tale without any instruction to answer “yes” or “no” to the questions put to him. As already illustrated by actual cases, it is an informal narrative, interrupted by pertinent questions by judge or jurors or other parties to the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To see, then, what the prosecutor’s functions are, let us look at the following list as given in 1922 at the establishment of the centralized prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To supervise on behalf of the State the legality of the actions of all administrative organs, economic institutions, public and private organizations, and private persons, by instituting criminal proceedings against guilty persons and by protesting against decisions infringing upon the laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To observe directly the activities of investigation organs, criminal inquiry organs, and also the activity of organs of OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To prosecute in court. [Note that this is third in order of importance.]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To see to the proper treatment of inmates in homes of correction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As can be seen from this enumeration the functions of the organs of Soviet prosecution extend far beyond the limits of mere judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Accordingly, the Attorney of the Republic (originally in RSFSR, the People’s Commissar of Justice) was entrusted:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To look after the legal activity of all the People’s Commissariats and other central institutions and organizations and to make proposals for the repeal or amendment of orders and regulations issued by them that are not consistent with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To protest against such orders and regulations before the Council of People’s Commissars and the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee with a view to their abolition [the protest by the Attorney General does not stop, however, the carrying out of an order against which a protest was made].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To guide and control the activities of local prosecuting organs. The functions of local prosecutors were:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To propose to local executive committees the repeal or amendment of regulations and decisions that do not conform to the law, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To protest against such regulations and decisions, through the Attorney General of the republic, to the Council of People’s Commissars or to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the realm of combatting criminality, the Public Prosecutor was commissioned:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To institute local proceedings against officials and private persons either on his own initiative or on complaints and statements received by him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the conducting of inquiries and preliminary investigations, to advise organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation on the question of restrictive measures and other questions connected with preliminary investigation, and to conform the indictment drawn up by investigators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To decide the question of prosecution or cancelling of cases coming up to him from investigating organs, to take part in preliminary sittings of the court on the question of trying or dismissing a given case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To prosecute in court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) To protest in the order of cassation against verdicts and findings of the court, and also protest by way of supervision against verdicts of the first instance and cassation decisions of regional and provincial courts that have already come into force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) To look after the proper treatment of inmates in all places of detention without exception, and to liberate persons improperly held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this enumeration it can be seen that his duty as prosecutor is third on the list. But it is in this function that we think of him and it is this part of his work that we shall go into in some detail because of its connection with what we are studying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to the prosecutor’s occupation with criminal procedure there is first the preliminary investigation. When the militia or the former organs of the OGPU or any other agent turn over to the investigator certain material evidence of crime the prosecution starts to function. The office of the prosecution is to institute criminal proceedings on the first definite suspicion that a crime has been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the proceedings are in the preliminary stage the position of the prosecution is very different from what it will be later. He is now concerned with finding out the truth of the situation and not of “fastening” upon some one an act of which he is not guilty but for which there must be a conviction. If he goes into court for trial too many times with cases that are not supported by the testimony as brought out by the court the inference is that he either is not honest or not capable in his preliminary investigation. While a prosecutor often makes a mistake, as further court testimony may show, and is in honor bound to withdraw prosecution when he discovers it, this would probably be because of circumstances which he could not control such as the absence of a witness or the testimony of one not revealed at that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, in the preliminary examination he is not an accuser. He is the chief of all that takes place, and he is in full charge. His investigator carries out the work of this stage in less complex cases but the prosecutor is responsible for direction and policy. He does not seek evidence of guilt at this time any more than he tries to establish innocence. He gathers every available bit of data and then makes his decision as to whether the case is to go on. But once he has come to the conclusion that the indictment is sufficiently well founded and the accused becomes the defendant in the judicial trial, his position is changed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the trial he is the prosecutor. He now believes the defendant guilty or he would not have remanded him for court action. He now takes part in weighing the evidence produced in court and urges some measure of punishment in his speech. But so intent is he still on getting justice that he may cease his prosecution if he decides that he has been wrong in his preliminary examination. It is his duty to do so and to convince the court he is correct in his action. One prosecutor told the writer of four occasions in his own practice when he had done this. One has an incredulous feeling in hearing a prosecuting attorney make a plea for the reduction of a sentence or for a verdict of not guilty, but such a case is recorded in the following paragraphs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Supreme Court a case was on appeal from a Regional Court. A group of seven men had been found guilty of stealing vegetables and fruit from a co-operative store in which one was manager. They had resold the articles and had thereby made some 20,000 rubles. The two leaders had received the death penalty, the others lesser ones. The death penalties had been appealed and the prosecutor and the defense attorneys were present with their arguments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense lawyer spoke quite at length, arguing that the amount had been really smaller than was stated, that the character of the men had always been good, and then he went to points of law. He contended that it had been a mistake to apply the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for larceny of state property, to this act as no theft of state property had actually taken place. The men had paid the regulation amount to the state, but had simply sold the fruit and vegetables at an advanced price over state prices, for a sufficient period to bring in the money in that manner. He contended that instead the men were guilty of using official position for personal benefit and that Article 109 of the Criminal Code, providing punishment for such a crime, should have been applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His points had not been well made and when the prosecutor arose to speak one was quite prepared for his demolition of the previous argument. He was an able, well-trained man. No one consults any precedents or books of law in the Soviet court. The observer is struck by the absence of such volumes from the room. The court judges each case on its merits in the light of certain established policy. It seemed only a matter of formality for the judges to retire and bring back the decision that the verdict should stand. But the peculiarity of the prosecution in this judicial system now showed. The attorney paused, started again. He reminded the court that the men were young, that this was the only offense with which they had been charged and that one of these in particular had been a good citizen until he had begun to drink too heavily. He thought the sentence too severe and that it should be commuted to the maximum ten-year term. He likewise recommended that some of the sentences of the lesser members of the group needed revision. The court acted on his recommendation and the two wives present were able to go into frenzied joy over the giving back of life to their respective husbands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case brings out the attitude of the prosecution toward their tasks as accusers. The basic function of the prosecutor is to establish all the testimony he can to support an indictment before the court. That is what he comes into court for. The defense has its lawyer to see that its interests are protected. The prosecutor thinks of the side of society and the state. But at the same time, theoretically, he must not do anything to prevent the real truth of the case from being revealed. It is not in keeping with the role and dignity of his office to keep back evidence, to shuffle facts, or in any manner to defeat the carriage of justice. And in attempting to carry out the higher requirements of his office he cannot insist on the charges of the indictment if the testimony brought out at the trial has modified them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to note that there are deviations from the general principle that the prosecutor conducts the prosecution at the trial. Throughout the land there is a system in practice of giving training to the more able among the peasants and workers to act in the capacity of public accuser in the simpler cases. This special prosecutor is usually unaided unless the case is of a more serious nature, when he will probably serve in conjunction with some member of the prosecutor’s office. This service is of a wholly voluntary nature with no pay attached, but there is compensation for the individual in the position of importance he occupies in his community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are also cases where the plaintiff hires his own lawyer to prosecute the case and a public prosecutor appears only if the case is of such a nature or takes such a turn that there is a public interest which needs protecting, or in case there must be intervention to secure fair play. An example of this type of case would be one in which there was bodily injury that while causing pain still had no serious consequences. Cases involving insults, libels and slander likewise are often prosecuted by private attorneys without the aid of the public official. In all of such cases action is not brought by the state, of course, but is begun by the oral or written complaint of the injured party and may be settled by the plaintiff and defendant between themselves at any time while the trial is in progress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In cases involving such charges as the violation of patent or copyright laws, forced sexual intercourse, and a few others of a private nature, the procedure is still different. Prosecution is by the public prosecutor but even though he knows of the existence of such violations he cannot institute proceedings. The injured party must make the complaint and give co-operation but while he may have his own lawyer also the state takes charge of the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For a more complete picture of the prosecution as it exists in the Soviet Union today, its organization is briefly given. It follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Attorney General of the USSR who is the head of the prosecution in the Soviet Union. He has, of course, a staff of assistants. He is appointed by the Central Executive Committee, and is also responsible to the Council of People’s Commissars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The attorneys of the various federal republics who are appointed by the Attorney General of the USSR on approval by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) The prosecutors of the regional and provincial courts are appointed and may be dismissed for cause by the attorneys of the federal republics with the consent of the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) The attorneys for military and transport tribunals are appointed and may be dismissed by the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) District attorneys and people’s investigators are appointed and dismissed by regional and provincial attorneys.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Senior investigators and investigators on most important cases are appointed and dismissed by those attorneys to whom they are attached.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties with which they are charged are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To supervise the consistence of decisions and regulations of separate departments of the USSR and federal republics and of local authorities with the constitution of the USSR and the decisions and regulations of the government of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the correct and uniform application of the laws by the judicial institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To institute criminal proceedings and to prosecute in all legal instances throughout the territory of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To look after the legality and correctness of the actions of OGPU, militia, and correctional labor institutions on the basis of a special order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) General guidance of the activities of the prosecution in the federal republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IX: THE DEFENSE AND THE DEFENDANT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Bar has had a precarious existence under Soviet rule, but it seems now to have come on to firm ground. Going back to that First Decree of 1917, when the prosecution was swept away, we find the institution of private attorneys suffering a like fate and an idea substituted that anybody might be an attorney and defend. However, a limitation was soon put on the “anybody” by the Second Decree on Courts which created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, the duties of whose members were both to prosecute and to defend. While any citizen might become a member of this &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; on the proper recommendation of the Soviets of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies, he was supposed to give his time and attention to being an attorney, which somewhat narrowed down the first broad inclusion. There must have been some slight ability, too, on the part of the persons appointed, over the ordinary run of citizen, in order that they be recommended to membership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This method of providing for defense and prosecution existed until 1920. The People’s Court Act of 1918 changed the status of these defenders and prosecutors in that they were made officials of the Republic and were accorded a salary equal to that of a people’s judge. These members of the college in their capacity&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
as defenders were augmented at times by relatives of the defendant and at times replaced by the legal adviser of an institution, appointed by the director to serve in some particular case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By 1920 this system of one body affording now a prosecutor, now a defender, was found to be not adequate, not in keeping with the rights of the defendant which orderly legality must establish, nor, on the other hand, providing a sustained attitude of prosecution such as the state needed. The People’s Court Act of that year created separate institutions for the two purposes. There was now evidence of a selected membership. Not just “any citizen,” even though he might devote himself to the duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, could serve, but there was to be a list prepared by the local Soviets, of persons who were qualified to act in this capacity. From this list defending advocates were to be selected for temporary duty, not to exceed six days in a six month period, and were to be paid a sum in proportion to the remuneration received by a co-judge.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was something in the nature of our own jury service, and was regarded as a solemn duty of a citizen qualified for the function. In the Collected Laws of 1920 we find a circular from the Commissar of Justice issuing instructions and admonishing that the defense in court, in criminal cases, is a social duty of all citizens, who, because of profession, education, or party affiliation, are qualified to appear as defenders at the trial.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collected Laws, No. 100, Article 543, 1920, Section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Doubtful defense it may have been to one whose life hung in balance, but the institution was progressing toward a time when persons on trial might be ably represented in the judicial inquiry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The institution of the New Economic Policy, bringing a new complexity and confusion into the economic and political life of the Union, created new necessities of various kinds, one of which, as we have already seen, was a development in the administration of Criminal Law. With the remarkable rapidity of the development of institutions in other lines, the Soviet judicial system began to take firmer shape and to assume a character of responsibility for orderly legality. If the court was to provide equality of opportunity and privileges to all, thus fulfilling the slogan of the Socialist State of which it was an organ, then the rights of the defendant must be protected, not only by legislative safeguards but by means of adequate representation at the bar of justice. If prosecution was to be stiffened in this era of fighting the opponents in a new way, then a balanced procedure called also for more adequate aid to the man accused.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Advocacy Act of 1922, with its sweeping reforms for the judiciary, restored to the Union the possibility of adequate defense for the person who stands accused in court. It created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers, and made its members responsible for the legal aid of a party held for trial. The number of members of the college were, however, to be restricted by authority of the provincial departments of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This limitation was removed by the Judiciary Act of 1926 which elaborated the provisions of the earlier Act and dealt fully with the organization, function, and duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;. While the number is not restricted, the member, when accepted by the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, may be rejected by the provincial executive committee within a month from the time it is informed of his admission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The qualifications required of the members provides for at least two years’ service in some judiciary position within the Soviet Union not lower than the People’s Court which insures an acquaintance with the law. To be admitted one must also either have a higher juridical education or have passed a prescribed examination. Admission is refused to those who have been expelled from public organizations for misconduct (for a period of three years), condemned for crimes, or under trial or investigation the member is suspended in certain cases. No lawyer may defend in court unless he is a member of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, or bar.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; is self-governing along the lines of other Soviet institutions. It elects its own presidium which works out the general problems of the organization. It decides on disciplinary questions, on general plans of work, and on the fees to be paid by its members. It has no authority over the fees to be paid by clients. That lies in the hands of the Commissariat of Justice which sets up a regular schedule, according to the ability of the person to pay and the complexity of the case. There are four groups according to these provisions. At the bottom are the poor, so designated by the people’s court, who pay no fees; in the next group are those workers, clerks and peasants who are permitted a small rate; the third group consists of any not included in the first two, who may also pay a rate set by the Commissariat; and there is the final group who, not needing the intervention of the Commissar, may make its own terms with the collegium.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In Moscow alone there are about fifty private lawyers not connected with any “corporation,” later to be described, who may be hired as they would be anywhere. They are those sufficiently well known to attract a private practice, and do not need the aid the corporation can give. They agree on the fee to be paid, without any intervention on the part of the state, and are not restricted in income.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties of the members of this organization do not consist alone in defending in court. The members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; attached to the courts, provincial, regional, or organized as county bureaus, deliver lectures on law, acquaint the masses with their legal rights and duties through visits to large factories and other centers, and must defend without pay any case referred to them. The first duty of the legal profession is concerned with the observance of revolutionary legality, but within the bounds set by this legality, he must defend his client. The protection of this same individual is, however, the acknowledged duty of both judge and prosecutor, so why the necessity of defense counsel at all in such a system, one wonders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As already pointed out the simpler cases tried in the People’s Court rarely do have attorneys on either side, but in the more complicated cases the story may not be so easily got at. It may be necessary to the honest defense of the accused or in the determination of his sentence that certain orders or decrees about which he knows nothing be applied to his case. In such an event he needs some one who is acquainted with various enactments. In the next place he may not be of a nature so cool and composed when his life or liberty is at stake that he can interrogate witnesses himself, cross question, and otherwise exercise his legal rights. Likewise, if it is a serious case, when he gets his last word before the court he will want it to be an effective one. The speech of a good lawyer, analyzing and weighing the evidence, may be a deciding factor. Straightforward and interested in the protection of the state as a lawyer may be, he is likely to think of some points in favor of his client that neither judge nor prosecutor would find unaided. And that leads to the third and last acknowledged reason for the use of private attorneys. It is likely that the prosecutor may be prejudiced in favor of the guilt which he has already seen indicated by the evidence he had in hand when he remanded the accused for trial. It is likely also that the judge, having found that evidence sufficient to sustain the indictment, may not be able to see some things on the other side that a legal adviser hired for the purpose would be able to find. The authorities on criminal law believe that, too, and therefore, on the theory that innocence is presumed until guilt is proved, they provide for an advocate who is more likely to be conscious of the innocence. A question occurs here as to whether an advocate would risk defending a client whom he knew to be guilty through a confession or otherwise. Theoretically, he would only in this case attempt to interpret or explain the act so as to get freedom or a lesser sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense often has a lawyer when there is no prosecuting attorney present. In the People’s Court the state representative may not appear, and yet the counsel for the defense is always admitted. The reverse cannot be true. There can be no prosecutor present without the defense counsel. One of the specific provisions of the law is that on all occasions when a prosecutor appears for the state there must also be a counsel for the defendant. In case the latter has not been able to get one or is not able to pay, the court looks after the matter for him by having the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers appoint a counsel. It may be a case a lawyer would not want; it may be the worst of the so-called “class enemies,” but some one must serve. Not only that, but if the complexity of the case warrants it, one of the best must be appointed. The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; pays the member serving on such an unremunerated errand out of its own funds, according to the fees he is accustomed to receive and according to the complexity of the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is one other condition in which the court must see that the defense is represented by counsel. If the defendant is deaf or dumb or suffering from any physical handicap that will prevent his understanding correctly the procedure of the case counsel is obligatory. Likewise, in the case of juveniles of 16-18 years of age (the court does not handle the cases of those under 16), the instructions of the Commissariat of Justice is that there be counsel provided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense counsel, once in charge of the case, has rights and privileges as great as the prosecution. He may see his client as often as he wants to, for as long as is necessary, without the presence of any attendant or official. He has the right to advise the defendant all during the trial. He has the right to records in the case so that he may study it thoroughly and introduce any evidence he finds necessary in the interest of justice for his client. And he has a right to the last word. He not only makes the final speech but he questions witnesses after the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The lawyers of Russia, with the exception of a few independent ones, are organized into “collective corporations.” This, of course, is right in line with the socialist theory of government. While lawyers have a right to engage in private practice there are a number of reasons why one would prefer to be a member of one of these collective bodies. Let us look at some of the characteristics of these organizations. The following list was given by Professor Brusilovsky, who is himself a member of the collegium.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(1) The individual lawyer has no direct financial transaction with the client. The fee is fixed by a special consultant and paid to the treasurer of the ‘collective.’&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The lawyer may go on his vacation knowing his client will be served by colleagues. While on vacation he draws a salary equal to his normal monthly income.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) here is value in consulting a number of lawyers on a case to clear up difficult points. This is especially valuable for the young members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Fees are differentiated according to the qualification of the individual lawyer, his service record, experience and ability. He is insured against sickness and incapacity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Membership—It is open to all citizens who: (a) possess electoral rights, (b) have a certain record of service in the organs of Soviet justice, and (c) have either passed the prescribed examination or have received a superior juridical education.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have been considering up to now in this chapter the organization of the defense provided for in the law. This is the machinery through which the rights of an individual may be protected in criminal procedure. Now, let us turn to the defendant himself as he appears in the case and see what safeguards are given him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is, first, the matter of the preliminary trial. While that phase of the case as a whole has already been discussed the rights accorded to the suspected person were purposely not emphasized since that angle of the proceedings properly belongs here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To begin with, let us suppose the suspect is held in custody by the arresting organs, the militia or the former agents of the OGPU. They can keep him just twenty-four hours, and no more, until they must get permission from the people’s judge or from the prosecuting attorney for his detention. If they cannot get enough evidence in that time to support the arrest there is nothing to do but release him. That does not mean, however, that the case must be dropped. If they are convinced of his guilt, but have not been able by that time to establish it, the authorities may permit the man to be held a longer time so that the case can be built up, or in case the suspicion has not enough grounds even for that, they may go on working quietly until they do uncover what they want. However, for the sake of our case, suppose the prosecutor gives permission for the man to be held. In fourteen days there must be either release or sufficient evidence to hold him. While there are no &#039;&#039;habeas corpus&#039;&#039; proceedings in the administration of Soviet law, there is the assurance that a man must be either released at the end of two weeks or some testimony produced that will justify his being held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor may he languish in jail while his trial is put off from day to day. The maximum time permitted for the preliminary work and the bringing of a case to trial is one month. Obviously there may be cases when it will be absolutely necessary to extend this limit and by permission it may be extended. But the law provides that there must be reasons shown as to why extra time is asked. The fact that this limit is adhered to in practice is shown by records that in the city court trials of Moscow 75 per cent. of the cases are tried in ten days and the majority of the others in fifteen or twenty. It is quite likely that there are cases in which an arresting organ holds a man more than the twenty-four hours or an investigator permits more than the maximum time to elapse before trial, but members of the Commissariat of Justice insist that if detected in such acts the agents are swiftly and surely punished. Those in authority do not hold in high esteem those officials who do not cooperate in the establishment of revolutionary legality. While there would, of course, be no statistics of such illegal practices, those in prison of whom the writer asked the question about the time of pre-trial detention gave answers of periods which were all within the limit except two. One man indicated that his rights had been violated, the other gave causes for his detention beyond the period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The person under suspicion (it will be recalled that he is not the “accused” until such time as a definite accusal is made) may make a complaint at any time against the actions of those conducting the preliminary inquiry or investigation, and such a complaint may be appealed within seven days, not only to the prosecutor but to the judge under whose jurisdiction the case may be. If it is a serious case, he may from the beginning have employed counsel to do that for him, but in the event of the simpler case, or of his having no counsel, there is sure to be some interested person among family or friends who will attend to this for him, if he should be detained in such a manner that he could not reach the proper authority and the one against whom he complained would not take care of the matter for him. The law provides that such an official must receive and transmit a complaint directed against him, but there might conceivably be instances when meeting this duty would be unpleasant—especially if the official was guilty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the preliminary trial the defendant is protected in every possible way. If he has not been in custody the initial steps may have been taken without his cognizance. This may have been necessary in order to prevent his escape while ground was being prepared for holding him. But, if there is sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation he is now apprized of it. He may be summoned to appear in almost any manner—by telephone, telegraph or otherwise, or if the circumstances are such that his escape must be prevented, he may be then arrested. In any case he now participates in the investigation which, it is remembered, is carried on by the investigator or, in the event of a serious case, by the prosecutor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He is now told what the charges against him are, and it is made very clear to him. He may at this moment offer an explanation of the substantial facts which will put an entirely new interpretation on the case, and cause its dismissal, if he substantiates what he tells. It is to be remembered that there are no sides taken in this stage of the procedure. It is usual that no counsel has yet appeared for the person under inquiry, the prosecutor is acting in his rôle of collector of information and there is, theoretically, at least, no effort to pin either guilt or innocence on to the party. The accused (he becomes “accused” from the moment the charge is officially explained to him) may suggest witnesses, may request experts, as we have previously seen, and attach any proofs to the documents, and such requests must be granted unless the investigator is convinced that they have no real importance in the case. If he does the latter, he is likely to be rather sure of his ground, as otherwise his judgment would face reversal when his decision was appealed to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred to the use of experts and the accused person’s rights as to selection. With all the information collected and the decision made, his chance to submit evidence to prevent the trial is still not exhausted. On the decision of the investigator to present the accusation, the person against whom it is directed may go over all the materials collected. Now, in the light of what he finds, he may offer further elucidation himself or he may request further witnesses who will be able to shed additional light. He is given every opportunity here, by law at least, to get in a stroke that will indicate his innocence. And in the event it goes to the court, in spite of his efforts, the judge may be convinced of the weight of his argument or evidence and direct the investigator to either build up his case better or dismiss it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We will suppose it stands. The administrative session of court places the case on its calendar. It comes to trial after not longer than a month from the time the accusation is handed over by the investigator, and the accused becomes the defendant. In the meantime the accused will have secured his counsel. Little was said about the part a counsel for the defense might play in the preliminary stages, for the reason that except in serious cases there would almost surely be none at that time. The normal time for the appointment of one by the court, in cases requiring this, would be immediately after it was decided to hold the person for trial. On the presentation of the accusation to the accused he is informed of his legal right to counsel. In case he is unable to provide for an attorney he petitions the court for aid. Likewise, if he chooses one at this time, he submits the name for approval. Then the court, in its administrative session, when deciding whether to hold the accused for trial, likewise settles the question of counsel, if the accused has petitioned, by approving his choice or appointing one. Approval of his choice is necessary only if he has selected some person outside of such authorized lists as members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; or some representative provided by government institutions. Otherwise he may select whomever he will among the authorized persons and be assured that that person must act for him and for a fee that will be set for him within his ability to pay. The element of contest which is one of the basic principles in the Soviet judicature is now found for the first time. Two parties are aligned one against the other, each to prove its rightness. From this time on, the accused is the defendant and there are two sides to the case. Let us see the trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defendant has the right to a public trial. This, too, is one of the principles of criminal procedure of the Soviet courts and by its observation there is insured fairness through public opinion. Through publicity there is brought about both the education of the people and the control of the court by them. There are only two conditions under which the trial may be behind closed doors—when a state secret must be kept, and in sexual crimes where intimate details must be revealed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defendant has a right to be present at his own trial, unless he voluntarily stays away. A case may be tried without him, if he has given his consent or when he has failed to respond to the summons. In the latter case, however, it must be clearly shown that an effort was made to reach him and that he directly evaded it, or there will probably be a reversal of the verdict in the higher court. An attempt to use his lack of response as an excuse for trial without his presence would have to be supported sufficiently to avoid abuse. In simpler cases when there is no possibility of imposing a prison sentence, his presence may not be required by the court, but in offenses punishable by a prison sentence he must be there if he can be found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the case opens, the presiding judge explains to the defendant his rights, as a party to the court, to make use of all material, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to make any statements he will at any stage of the trial. These things he may do even though he is represented by counsel, and if he has decided to defend himself or entrust it to some relative he is sure to find plenty of opportunity to exercise this right. The writer witnessed one case in which a simple-looking workman took care of his interests so well that one could understand his going to trial without legal aid. Before his vehement and rapid-fire interrogation, witnesses quailed and became confused. The informality of the proceedings permits of participation without timidity in most cases. There is no fear of set rules of the game, because they do not exist. The accused defends himself as he would before his neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next assurance is that the defendant may cause the removal of judge or juror if there is likely to be bias in his attitude. Perhaps one of them is relative or friend to the injured party, or to some other person who would be interested in the conviction of the defendant. In that case he may challenge, giving his grounds therefor, and the question will be decided by the rest of the court sitting without the member so indicated. If he is overruled he has that fact as grounds for complaint to the cassation instance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now as the case goes to trial, with the defendant a party to the court so that he may spar as he wishes with prosecutor or clash with witnesses, either with counsel or without, he has also the right of presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It would seem that the preliminary trial had already established guilt sufficiently so that the actual trial would merely bring to light what had gone before, and establish the degree of guilt. But such is not the theory incorporated in Soviet criminal law. It may be that evidence will take a different turn, that the very atmosphere of the public trial will provide a new viewpoint. The object of the preliminary investigation is not to constitute a determination of guilt but to give guarantee that there are some grounds for trial. Authorities on the administration of criminal law point to the relatively low percentage of convictions, there being, according to one authority, almost one-third of those remanded to the People’s Court dismissed, and a lack of conviction of at least a quarter of those actually reaching court. From that one would judge that the holding for trial by the investigation organs of the courts does not mean in actual practice that one’s guilt has been established. During the trial the defendant has every right which he has already been accorded in the preliminary procedure, but they are now rendered broader and of more value because he is familiar with all the data that have been produced, and all the witnesses who have been gathered by the investigation are now before him for questioning. Through his cross-examination of the state’s witnesses he may develop lines of proof that he can substantiate by calling further witnesses of his own, or he may refute the state’s contention. Some expert, whom the investigation used for some specific interpretation, may change his own opinion in the light of some explanation which the defendant himself or his witness can give. He has here three distinct privileges—he may request certain witnesses, other experts, or fresh proofs from the state if the case is to be sustained; he may give explanations to the court of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act at any time and as often during the trial as he wishes or thinks necessary; and he has the invaluable right to take part in the examination of all witnesses, experts, or others who take part in the trial. And now, if he has been directing his own defense he may also make the final speech and thus leave the last word with the court as it goes forth to deliberate on the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is some difference in the privileges and rights accorded one tried in the People’s Courts and in the higher courts. The reason is not far to seek. In the People’s Court there are no cases of a class nature of the serious sort. There could not be, since the jurisdiction of the People’s Court does not extend to crimes punishable by the death sentence. Here come the people from among the masses who have violated the law, but when a Kulak or one of the bourgeoisie is involved and the offense is against the state or the order of government, the case goes to a higher tribunal and the rights of the defendant are more circumscribed. In a trial when the accused is of a socially dangerous character, and restrictions are held to be necessary, the discretionary power of the judge may draw such limits as depriving the defendant of rights of counsel, of certain witnesses, or of records in the case. Such procedure, however, is said to be unusual and resorted to only in cases where the offense is of a highly dangerous character. Even in such an instance the defendant may still conduct his own case with all of his customary rights. The accused may be a socially dangerous character who must necessarily be subjected to restrictions. It is likely that this happens in a small degree and only in the most serious cases, but in fairness a chapter dealing with the rights of the defendant should call attention to this possible limitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To see the defendant in court one is impressed with the amount of liberty he has. One forgets that he is the man whose life or liberty is in jeopardy. He talks, he interrogates, he explains and argues. And it is amazing to see how these people have come to understand the working of the law. It is a part of the duty of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers to help in explaining and popularizing the Soviet laws and a good job they have done of it, too. Of course, they have had their helpers, but one finds children who know why the law of August 7, 1932, providing a death penalty for larceny from the state was necessary, and as for the enactment which specifies a five-year period of imprisonment for adulteration in an effort to make for better quality, every housewife knows the answer. She demands better material for her dresses, better sugar for her table, and she has heard all about the law, its necessity and purpose, in her factory or other place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
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That acquaintance with the laws, that knowledge of the principle involved, makes it possible for an offender to do a pretty good job as his own attorney, unless he be one of the illiterate peasants. In that case, if he has no counsel, he can be rather sure of the court’s interest in finding out the facts and in interpreting them correctly. It is to the state’s interest to see that the accused person has every opportunity to be treated fairly, and the court is only the organ of the state in carrying out such a policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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As has already been said, the people seem in most cases to agree with the verdict of the court and that is worth something as an indication of justice. They are encouraged to follow the case and to understand the application of the law. After hearing their discussion at a trial, one would know of their intense interest. It seems to be an added cloak of protection for the defendant in case a judge did exceed fair play. It would be felt in the appeal!&lt;br /&gt;
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In the event of a verdict of guilty the convicted one now has his right of complaint so that his case will be reviewed by the cassational division of the higher court, the Regional or the Supreme Court, or to the latter even from the first. Herein is his last chance of life or liberty. Already we have talked of cases where the decision of the lower courts was reversed. That happens in about ten per cent. of the cases. So a man has a slim one-chance-in-ten hope of getting off from his punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the reader has, in this enumeration of rights, been impressed with the absence of one held dear in the United States—the right of a person to trial by a jury of his “peers.” But the system existent in the Soviet Union bears a resemblance in effect, although they repudiate the idea of our jury system both for political expedience and because they think the practice unsound from a judicial point of view. However, the two persons who sit with the judge do actually provide some check on his judgment and authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet system the two jurors, or co-judges, may decide independently of the judge in all cases. They are selected with a view to their having some ability to serve, and most of them seem to be people of intelligence who take an active part in the trial. While they are without doubt subject at times to influence from the judge in deliberating on the verdict, there seems also ground for suspecting that because of their nearness to the workers there would be a strong tendency to reflect the opinion of such a group in a verdict they would render. They cannot be regarded as party tools, since a large majority are not party members as against the large majority of judges who are. However, there is a class feeling. The court, as said before, is an organ for carrying out the policy of the state, and decisions will naturally consider the dangerous character of the person on trial. The class nature of the procedure is apparent and is acknowledged, but it is held to be legitimate, a necessity. The jurors could not be expected to aid in a decision, or render one on their own account, which would go against this policy. Thus it would seem that the jurors might have effect in trials not of a class nature, might actually constitute an additional safeguard to the rights of the defendant. There are cases on record where they have gone against the judgment of the court, and rendered their own verdict, thus proving that they are not always a rubber stamp.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER X: CORRECTIVE LABOR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; title of this chapter defines the attitude of the Soviet government toward those persons whom it sets apart from society for a time. It is almost necessary to see what they have done in this line to understand it properly. The institutions in which the policy is carried out have moved many people to warm praise. M. Herriot of France, on visiting the Kharkov Labor Commune exclaimed, “I am not a Communist. I am an old man,” then launched into exuberant appreciation of the system in use there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the discussion of the system in all its details of work and education, one should read the volume, already referred to, &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, edited by Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky. Each separate article is written by a specialist in his particular field and each presents in minuteness some phase of the system which the Russians use. They have known what they wanted to do in the direction of reformation even back in the days of 1917, but for so many years the idea lay, like others did, obscured by catastrophe. Terror and necessity caused severity to prevail for a long time. Punishment was the mainstay of defense from foe within in order to withstand a little better the ones then pressing from without.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the idea was there in the minds of those who were to define the penal policy and the Code of 1922, and set down the principle that punishment was not for the purpose of revenge and might not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain. With this beginning there was a steady progress toward the removing of those indignities that tend to degrade a man, until the Correctional Labor Code of 1933 completed the process. In the meantime various amendments have prohibited torture, the use of handcuffs, solitary confinement, deprivation of food, or any other measure that would have the effect of degradation or do physical harm to the person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0178.svg|SYSTEM OF PLACES FOR DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY]]&lt;br /&gt;
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There has been a steady effort to remove what they term the “prison spirit.” There is, they tell you, no such thing as a “captive” or “prisoner.” The idea is to keep the person deprived of his liberty from feeling in any measure isolated. He is given work to do such as he would have outside and he is always conscious of its useful nature. There are instructors for the various trades, machinery, carpentry, etc., who see that each man is educated for his job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are two main types of places for deprivation of liberty, those located in cities in close quarters, and those out in the country where there is space and greater freedom. In chapters just following some of these typical ones will be described, but they are mentioned here so that references may be clearer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before describing the characteristics of the institutions used for corrective labor, we shall need to define the policy that goes into the system. The articles on which the materials for this chapter are mainly based are those by B. Utievsky on &#039;&#039;Prison Regime&#039;&#039;, and another entitled &#039;&#039;Work in Correctional Labor Institutions&#039;&#039; by M. Kessler and B. Oleinin, both of which are included in the volume edited by Vishinsky, already referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We note again in connection with this work the class character of criminal legislation. One of the basic principles is the assumption that peasants and workers deprived of their liberty are not premeditated enemies of the Soviet order, and under these circumstances it is natural to suppose that treatment for them would be milder than for the anti-proletarians, and the privileges enjoyed by them would be greater. However, this assumption does not prevent the use of the same policy and the same methods in the prison treatment of the so-called class enemies. While the main purpose in placing the political prisoner and others whose crime is chiefly against the state in outlying places was to isolate them from society and prevent their continued danger, there was still a desire to restore them as useful citizens by means of education and labor. The principle expressed in the Code that “maintenance in correctional labor institutions shall be reasonable, and shall not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity” is carried out, they say, in the places where political prisoners are kept just as in others. The main difference is that these prisoners have less freedom, less liberty for contact with society. The aim, however, uppermost in their treatment is to organize a collective life for them, and by the education which is provided to cause these people to fit into that life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An example of constructive use of these prisoners from the anti-proletarian class is the building of the White Sea-Baltic Canal. It is interesting just here to give a quotation from Maxim Gorki, which illustrates their own point of view as to the value of this policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“How did the kulaks work? Here is an instance. The Podlipinsky brigade of the first section in which there were 32 kulaks in the last ten days has set a record of 25 per cent. fulfillment of their quota. But the brigade would not quit its job even when the next shift came to take their place. The brigade had to be taken off by direct order of the chief of the section.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The order Number One brigade consisted chiefly of kulaks. It was on rock work in the sixth section. It has fulfilled 130-150 per cent. of its quota. Their exemplary work was rewarded and entered into the Red Labor Book.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While this may be propaganda, the fact remains that there are those operating the locks in this canal who have been discharged as prisoners, but who continue loyally at the post. We are assured by another author that “thousands of convicts from anti-Soviet elements redeemed themselves, and showed great devotion to Soviet construction. Many gained their freedom; a great many were accorded all kinds of privileges, and a few awarded the highest order of merit.”&lt;br /&gt;
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As we come to consider the program for those prisoners from among their own masses we get on safer grounds, at least as to practice. The policy follows much the same lines. We have mentioned before the change in terminology from jails or prisons to “places for deprivation of liberty.” It has also been mentioned that the change does not appear to be limited to terminology, but that the actual purpose to carry out some definite measure by which a man may be rendered fit for a useful place in society seems well observed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, perhaps, would be a good place to say that the program of the Communist Party in regard to treatment of those who break the law calls for eventual correctional labor without deprivation of liberty. Their ultimate goal, both expressed in policy and now being put into practice in a limited way, is that persons shall be sent to labor under supervision where training is provided. This practice will have to go slowly and proceed as their educational program prepares the way for it. At the present time there is usually no sentence of deprivation of liberty for less than one year. Any penalty of compulsory labor given for less than that minimum permits the offender to retain his liberty. In such cases the unemployed among these persons is farmed out to factory or to agricultural work with supervision and training provided. He is given a place to live near to his work, but he is free to go and come as he wishes. It is the aim of the higher judicial organs to abolish the use of deprivation of liberty as rapidly as possible, and to use it only for cases who do not respond to other measures of social defense. The Superior Court has likewise given instructions to the lower tribunals to use deprivation of liberty only as other measures have failed. The employed who are sentenced to labor without deprivation of liberty remain on the job on which they are at work and a certain per cent. of the salary received is deducted each month. With both of these classes there is a possibility of early discharge for good work and because of the practice used in all their penal institutions of counting two working days equal to three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up to 1929 there were still in existence isolated places of detention but since that time the policy prevalent has been to change all of these into the favored educational establishments. At the present time all persons sentenced are taken care of in the various types of labor colonies (industrial, agricultural, road building, land improvement, etc.) or in the semi-free labor camps where guards are maintained, usually selected from among the inmates themselves, but where there are no locked rooms or prison walls.&lt;br /&gt;
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The régime, then, of these institutions, according to Utievsky, has three basic influences: (1) Socially useful, productive labor, (2) political educational influences, and (3) the development of public activity among the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us now see how these three methods of influence are carried out in the institutions themselves. The purpose of labor on the part of the convicts is to provide organized collective work in a society where collective living in all its phases is a predominant note. It is essential to successful readjustment. The Kulak, with his individualistic tendencies, is re-educated in this political philosophy. While he is at this labor, the convict works under the same conditions, and with the same protections that he would enjoy in outside labor. His hours are seven or eight a day, depending upon the nature of his work, and he is permitted a weekly rest of a continuous 42-hour period. Special protection is given to the juvenile laborer, but this will be mentioned again in the chapter concerning juvenile delinquency.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no night work for women, just as there would not be in outside labor, and minors under eighteen are not to be employed in injurious trades. Maternity vacations of eight weeks for physical labor, and six weeks for mental work, both before and after childbirth are prescribed for women. There also exist regulations of various sorts for sanitation and safety. The whole idea is that the person deprived of his liberty may be made to feel that he labors on a par with workers outside; that he may feel useful in the economic plan of the nation; and, through the pay given him, continue support to his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the general consideration mentioned above, there are some special rules of importance. For example, women who are in the fifth month of pregnancy may not be sent to any work outside the institution of which they are inmates, without their consent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all labor in the Soviet Union there are a certain number of days of work (five is the general rule) and one day of rest. This is likewise true of convict labor, and on the eve of the rest day all work and school study must be suspended from dinner time (which is at midday). Another privilege of importance is that each person keeps his own work book with a record of hours, wages due, and deductions made, properly entered. In this way he does not have to take the word of any official as to the correctness of the count, but is able to see for himself and complain if an error has been made.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the matter of food there is a provision for increase in accordance with the expenditure of energy in the work assigned. One doing heavy physical labor would, for example, be given food in larger quantities than one using less strength. In accordance with the principle that a prisoner may not be degraded, the administrative office of these institutions is not permitted to make use of the personal services of the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was mentioned in the beginning that one type of institution provided for the carrying on of all activities in small areas. These are of the nature of penitentiaries, but even for the type of convict in these prisons there are large works of a variety of kinds organized outside the city limits. Among these would be brick-work, bridge building colonies, house building, dairy farms and truck gardens. One of the most constructive things about this labor, in whatever line, is that it forms a part of the five-year plan, and is thus put on the same basis as other forms. The industry carried on must, first of all, satisfy the needs of the institution itself, but goods in excess of this amount are placed on the home market. Export of prison-made goods is forbidden except in the case of the sports goods made at Bolshevo Labor Commune. The latter are noted for their excellent quality and are exported to various countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the grave prison problems in this country is the question of payment of wages to persons serving sentences in penal institutions. In the Soviet system there is no unpaid labor. The amount may not be less than 25 per cent. of the existing scale, nor more than 50 per cent. The cost of maintenance is, of course, not deducted from this amount. In establishing the schedule the prison administration must have the agreement of the Commissar of Labor, and the fact of the profit or loss of the enterprise does not enter into the calculations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convict is not restricted in the spending of his earnings. He may purchase extra foodstuffs, clothing, or he may send his income to his family for support. He may be given advice in the matter, but there is no compulsion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One point in connection with this system is that labor is not compulsory. A convict may work or not as he wishes, and still receive maintenance. But in refusing to work, he loses most of the privileges which he would otherwise enjoy. Practically none do refuse, it is said. On the other hand, there is a great increase in those joining the shock brigade, the group doing excellent work, sometimes even for additional hours. In 1933 in the Moscow region, this figure reached 51.3 per cent. of the total number in these institutions. The number fluctuates usually between 54 and 78 per cent. As a result quotas of production are usually more than fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second basic influence in the program of this institution is political education. A system is established in each place of deprivation of liberty, and the official in charge is the assistant warden. Practically all education carried on has a strong political influence. However, one of the aims involved is the elimination of illiteracy. Every effort is being made in the Soviet Union to give to each citizen at least an elementary education, whether he be in prison or out. To that end there is established in every state institution schools providing for the first seven years of work. There are also other penal institution courses for the semi-illiterates and those of a sufficiently advanced nature for the more educated. There are in addition some evening and university classes for those wishing to take advantage of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the regular school work which is carried on both by teachers from the outside and some selected from qualified inmates, there is a system of lectures covering specialized subjects. These are designed to give information of a social-political nature and educate the individual in the use of sanitation and hygiene. There are others of a general educational character embracing material of interest to the group. These lectures are given by specialists in the various fields, who are invited by prison administrators, and by any one among the convicts who might be qualified to talk on a particular subject. Admission, of course, is open to all without restriction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In connection with the education work, there are libraries and reading rooms. There is a library located in each place of deprivation of liberty, and there are also circulating ones, and in neither are there restrictions as to the use of books. In most cases some work of this nature is obligatory, but beyond that every convict is not only permitted to use the facilities, but is encouraged to take advantage of the privileges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reading room may be visited at any free hour. Here are found recent newspapers, magazines and other periodicals. Newspapers are also distributed in the rooms, and convicts may subscribe to their own outside these limits if they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The radio with which each room is usually equipped also constitutes an important instrument of education. Lectures, music, and other information or entertainment of an educational and cultural nature may be listened to by the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most interesting phases in the development of this program in these institutions is the art work. The convicts are trained in dramatic performance and also enjoy in this connection entertainment by outside companies. There are concerts and moving pictures given, in almost every one of these places, and convicts attend not less than once a week. But the interesting side of it to an observer is the work the inmates do themselves in the matter of writing and producing their own stage performances. The convicts are free to attend and there is, of course, no charge for admission. A theater or auditorium is a part of the equipment of every institution of this nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sanitary education carried on is in line with the program of other education of this nature, distributing such information to the masses of people. There is an opportunity here for teaching individuals in an effective way, and for seeing that certain fundamentals are put into actual practice. There is a bureau of sanitary education in each institution, composed of the house physician, representatives from the department of political education, and delegates elected by the convicts themselves, devoting itself to this phase of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The purpose of these institutions is seen in its most complete fulfillment in the vocational training which each gives. There are courses in schools of all the various trade groups, providing both theoretical and practical training in skilled trades. The unskilled laborer is here transformed into a man with specialized information in some particular line, which will both render him useful in industry and give him happiness in his work. In 1931, 7,700 convicts attended such courses in the Soviet Union, and 6,500 workers were in that year turned out trained for some particular trade. In 1933 the plan was for giving such preparation to 24,000. Salvation for society and for the individual, they hold, lies in this direction and every man and woman sentenced for law-breaking must be so fitted to earning a livelihood that he will not transgress again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be mentioned before passing to the next point that both cultural and legal work is carried on by means of mass meetings through the organization of such groups as law clubs, and by means of evening forums, lectures and talks. There is also a legal bureau composed of representatives of the department of political education, and two members elected from the convicts, which gives legal aid or advice to the inmates whenever it is needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third basic influence in correctional labor—the development of public activities among the convicts—accounts for some of the most valuable rehabilitating work done in these places, in the author’s opinion. The aim here is to strengthen, or develop where they have been lacking, the social habits of the individual; to turn him into a conscious and active member of society. The basic forms of social activity in these institutions take several directions. There is first the general meeting on various occasions for a variety of purposes. This may be for the formation of social organizations, for the conducting of a campaign for the election of some representative, or perhaps for a celebration of some revolutionary event. The convicts establish their own rules of procedure and make whatever proposals are appropriate. These general meetings take care of whatever concerns are common to the entire population, and leave to the more specialized groups whatever is of narrower interest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the production conferences, held by convicts in the same manner as those used by free-workers in industrial enterprises, an active part is taken in settling whatever questions arise in relation to production. They discuss industrial plans for improvement, financial methods, quota fulfillment, or any question that would logically come within their jurisdiction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most outstanding achievements in the line of self-activities among the convicts is the development of the comradely courts. Through this tribunal those disciplinary problems referred to it are transferred from the administration to the convicts themselves. This court is responsible for the maintenance of order and for seeing that a high quality of educational work prevails, for administering disciplinary measures in the case of shirking work or lessons, of spoiling the equipment of the shops, of laxity in observance of regulations of sanitation and health, of the use of indecent language, of damage done to any book or periodical, of inciting ill treatment of one convict by another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court is composed of a chairman, and two jurors elected at one of the general meetings referred to above. The penalties which they may impose on one who breaks the rules, or fails to live up to the standard set, are as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) Reprimand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Censure with strict warning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Censure with publication in local newspapers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Limitation of visits by friends from outside for a period of not more than one month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) Application to supervisory committee for transfer to another prison with a stricter régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Application for withholding vacation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) Application for either partial or complete non-discounting of working days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) Application for withholding all probation, and early release during a certain period of not more than one month after maturing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) Restitution of damage done.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case of undue severity on the part of this court, the warden may alter the penalty to a milder form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred in the paragraphs dealing with education to cultural committees. These are elected at a general mass meeting to put into action the plans for political education work or to devote themselves to other problems of a cultural nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every place of deprivation of liberty has its wall newspaper, changed about every week or ten days and carrying news of various sorts of a political or educational nature, as well as items of interest to prison life. The editorial boards of these papers are likewise elected at the general meetings. Prison administrators as well as other authorities on penal policy in the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the development of public activities among the prisoners has yielded splendid results of a social nature. They point to the success of the “book soobotnik” (one day’s salary given for books) which netted 100,000 rubles. It is stated that the gifts were entirely voluntary without pressure from any source. Another incident showing a desirable spirit was the collection among the convicts of 31,818 rubles for an aeroplane which was presented to the fleet. There have been other acts of the same kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now we turn to the régime found in these institutions, the express purpose of which is to develop free will, initiative and self-activity. All privileges possible are permitted to the man deprived of his liberty, and his freedom as little restricted as the nature of the person himself permits. Following out the principle that no condition designed to degrade the convict or make him feel inferior may be permitted, penal authorities proceeded legislatively to remove whatever might exist in this line. The corrective labor code of 1933, for example, completely severed all connection with the progressive system of progressive classification of prisoners. The theory is that in this educational-labor program no man is to be treated with greater privilege than another unless he himself makes some deprivation necessary. Even then there are limits. A recalcitrant member of the penal population may be deprived for a period not longer than one month of such privileges as writing letters, or receiving visitors, but no corporal punishment may be inflicted nor may he be locked in solitary confinement. It is worth noting here that the solitary cells left from the Tzarist days may at times be used for tenants, but the door of the cell may not be locked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convicts have privileges as great as can be accorded. From the day of their entrance they may walk about anywhere they wish at any time they are free from work. In those institutions located in the country, this may take the character of quite a good walk, while in those of the penitentiary type located in cities, it naturally is limited to the prison yard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Visitors may come as often as twice in five days and may consist not only of relatives but of friends and acquaintances as well. There is no red tape in making arrangements for a visit so that no difficulty of this sort prevents contact between the convict and those outside. There may be as many as three persons at one time, and they may bring with them, if they wish, gifts of food, tobacco, etc. There is no restriction in the use of tobacco except that there are some particular places where the convict is requested not to smoke. Outside of this he may have as many cigarettes as he wishes or can obtain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither is there restriction in the number of letters which he may write or receive. In the matter of either letters or gifts the administration reserves the right of inspection, but in the majority of cases, unless there is some suspicion attached to the person, this right is not utilized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is an interesting development in the matter of leaves. For the man who has proved himself a good worker and who is not suspected of any intention of escape, a leave of fourteen days in the year is granted. He may go where he likes on this vacation, and use it as he pleases. He is placed entirely on his honor and no guard is in attendance at any time. In addition to this a convict may obtain a leave at any time because of an emergency such as an illness or death in his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still more liberal terms are granted to the peasant or collective farmer. In the event that he is needed for field labor, he is given a leave for the full three-month period of the season, and if he breaks no law during this leave, the time counts on his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to this leave and vacation, there is always the possibility of release after a short part of the original sentence has been served. If the person is judged fit to be restored to his place in society, and thought to be no longer a menace, he may be released after serving a minimum of one-third of his sentence. There is also the practice, as already mentioned, of counting two productive working days as three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before passing from the chapter describing the policy and character of corrective labor work, some mention ought to be made of the administration. Who exactly is responsible in the USSR for seeing that this policy is translated into action? At the very head are the Commissariats of Justice of the various republics.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A Law of October 24, 1934, transferred the administration of all places of deprivation of liberty to the newly created Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR. The organization described is now within this Department, but the author had the information too late to incorporate in the body of the book.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There is a certain amount of independence in these relationships. The Collective Labor Code of 1933 of the RSFSR made a considerable advance in the direction of autonomous supervision on the part of the administration of corrective labor organization in these republics. Those institutions located in the territory of these various republics are administered and managed by local commissars of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this organization there are local administrative bodies known as observation committees. One of these exists in connection with each institution and is directly responsible for administration and management. In direct charge is the superintendent or warden, and his staff of assistants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is especially close relation between the agency of supervision and the prisoners which enables the Observation Commission to know with a high degree of accuracy as to when release is advisable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Previous to 1926 there had been two commissions participating in the distribution and release of prisoners—the Distributory Commission and the Observation Commission. The Observation Commission, however, while making recommendations to the Distributory Commission in matters of dismissal and release, played a minor role, since its viewpoint was in no way binding on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1924 provided for an Observation Commission to be established at every place of deprivation of liberty as a part of the staff of the place. On this commission was the people’s judge, and a representative of the local bureau of trade unions. This extension in the scope of the work of these commissions was made in an effort both to raise the level of work being done at the prisons and also to establish a closer contact between commission and prisoners. The result hoped for, however, was not realized as the judge was entirely, by nature of his position, separated from his work, and the representatives of the bureau took little interest in the matter. By the same Act the powers of the Distributory Commission were widened, and the Act of April 21, 1926, went further still, giving to this body authority to assign the long-term prisoners to places of agricultural work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There still was the gap between the work of the commission of release and the correctional labor institutions. The Observation Commission which was on the ground could make recommendations but they were not always accepted by the Distributory Commission which handled dismissals and releases. Many mistakes resulted and the desire of the authorities to establish intimate contact between commission and prisoners was being thwarted. Thus the Sixth Congress of Jurists proposed the liquidation of the Distributory Commissions and the reorganization of the Observation Commissions. By the reformation of 1929 new opportunities for constructive work were opened to these commissions, and the contact between them and the prisoners of the institution was finally made close and real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 made several important changes in the composition and work of these commissions of the RSFSR. There is now a Central Commission and under it trade union observation committees on which are the head of the correctional labor institution and two representatives from the general organization which are installed in each of the large corrective labor units and in all field production. Every effort has been made to see that there is close contact of these commissions with the institutions, that the policy of the central administration is carried out, that the work follows the lines it should, and results in fitting the inmates of the institutions for life as it is supposed to do. The Commissar of Justice is, in the last analysis, responsible for the work of these commissions, but by Act of February 10, 1933, he has placed that responsibility squarely on one man, the chairman of the Corrective Labor Commission, whose duty it now is to see that the policy and plans of the commissariat are carried out. This chairman is a member of the Central Observation Commission, but not the chairman of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prosecutors who were supposed to be attending the open session of these meetings and were actually present at them to the extent of 78 per cent., were found to be merely sitting quietly and taking no active part in solving problems and working out plans. By the same Act of February 10, 1933, the Commissar of Justice ordered them not only to be present but to participate actively in all meetings. There are no figures on actual participation but the percentage of attendance jumped from 78 to 82 and it is stated that practically all those present take an active part in discussions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no lack of effort to see that this commission inquires into, and knows, what is going on, is acquainted with the prisoners, and never for a moment forgets what it is set up to do. For the accomplishment of an organic union between the Observation Commission and the corrective labor institution, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee has demanded that the members of this commission participate actively in the creative and labor life of the institution as well as in its political education. To effect this there are many special meetings, besides the open ones, devoted to the problems of various industries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us see for a moment what organizations are represented on these commissions and how often the respective members attend the meetings.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 406407.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| style=&amp;quot;width: 70%&amp;quot;| Name of organization&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| No. of meetings attended&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(in per cent.)&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Corrective Labor Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 68&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Court&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 82&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Worker-peasant inspection&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 74.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Other Soviet Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 54&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Women’s delegate groups&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 73&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Enterprizes&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 58&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Organization of Komsomol&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 47&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Sections of Revolutionary Law&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 63&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Trade Unions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 66&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jurors&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 95&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Agricultural collectives&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 60&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This table was for the last nine months of 1932. It represents not a particularly bad showing but it was in 1933 that the All-Union Central Executive Committee decided that this was not sufficient and that there must be even better attendance. It aimed its order this time at the social members and demanded that they give active aid in inculcating social form of labor into correctional labor institutions. There is no thought of sending a man away to prison to get him out of the community then forgetting all about him. He will be returning in an average time of a year and a half and the community through its representative is responsible to see that he shall return in good order. It is thus made directly everybody’s problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been said elsewhere in this book that the Observation Commission is the authority for handling release and dismissal. Appeal may be taken from all of its decisions and a good percentage are reversed. Its mistakes, it is said, are largely because of a one-sided attack of the case in which its members were able only to see the seriousness of the crime, or perhaps only the social status of the convict, or maybe only his industrial activity at the place of his imprisonment. The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 takes a broader approach to the problem and demands that those responsible do the same. Each individual case must be treated from a differentiated viewpoint, with a survey of all angles involved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following table is given to show what types of disposal is used in the Soviet Union, and the relative importance of each.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; Article by N. Durmanov, entitled “Observation Commissions,” p. 396&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| &#039;&#039;Cases Examined in 1928&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| Per cent.&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of those serving in correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 22.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of prisoners&lt;br /&gt;
| 0.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Amnesty&lt;br /&gt;
| 7.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Release from imprisonment under guard&lt;br /&gt;
| 1.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Installment of labor days&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;It has been mentioned elsewhere that sentences are shortened by counting two productive work days as three of the sentence.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| 28.4&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Removal of strict isolation&lt;br /&gt;
| 3.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to other classification&lt;br /&gt;
| 2.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Assignment of type of place of detention&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Miscellaneous&lt;br /&gt;
| 13.0&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the duties already mentioned the Observation Commission has charge of the distribution of prisoners to the proper places for the serving of the sentence imposed and for their transferal from one place to another when it becomes necessary. In order to place a convict so that the best results may be secured, a close case study is made, an analysis of his personality, characteristics, ability, social status, and other pertinent information, but if an error is made after all, then he is transferred when better acquaintance shows where he belongs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XI: SOKOLNIKI ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sokolniki&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a prison, call it by whatever name one will. It is true that the national policy relating to corrective labor and discipline modify its physiognomy, but it still presents the atmosphere of a penitentiary. This statement is not meant as any criticism of either it or its administration, since one can hardly see how that aspect of it could be otherwise as long as criminals do exist who need restraining—and some of such there are bound to be. The fact of its sterner nature is emphasized in the beginning so that the impression will not be given that a place like Bolshevo Labor Commune, described in later pages, would fulfill the requirements for all the elements found among the criminals in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Standing outside the wall, just as cold and gray as the usual for penitentiaries, and looking up at the towers at the corners where sentinels armed with rifles keep watch, one has all the feeling of a sinking heart that comes with such a sight. People are shut away there and possibly forgotten by the citizenry from whom they have been separated, perhaps, since it is the customary thing for ignorance to prevail as to prisons and penal methods. One thinks, standing there, wondering about men behind that wall, of a description written in verse by one prisoner some quarter of a century ago. It is sentimental, belonging to an age when emotion was expressed a little more freely than our practice of restraint permits now, but one suspects men still suffer as he did in a good many prison cells such as this writer has seen. Lines of the poem, especially descriptive and appropriate to this subject, speak of “where tongues are mute, and men arise to newborn wrong,” and “where men must fawn or walk with scars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stell and Null, &#039;&#039;Convict Verse&#039;&#039;, Ft. Madison, Iowa, 1908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One doesn’t need to tell people who know anything of the penal situation in the United States that conditions make it possible to write lines like that. Of all of our social endeavor, the treatment of men convicted of crime seems the place where we have most signally failed in constructive results. Constructive treatment is, of course, a rare exception rather than a rule. But it seems to this writer that the implications of the verse have a less favorable chance of being true of Soviet prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place there is no prison sentence longer than ten years, and few offenders serve that long. The authorities figure that a maximum ten-year constructive program will fit anybody for proper living unless he is irredeemable. There will be some cases, of course, where there is failure, but the idea is to fit the régime to the majority. Right here there will be the question always forthcoming as to what they would do with our own gangster type. Give them a ten-year sentence? Not at all. They have few of them and for armed robbery one may be sentenced to death. No arguments are listed here for or against punishment by death, but in order to understand the absence of a long prison sentence it is necessary to be informed as to what happens to those who would ordinarily be the recipients of such a term. The fellow who murders in a jealous rage or great anger may find himself in for a long treatment in a place for mental abnormals, or he may, if judged sane, be given a sentence of ten years or less. They do not consider this type of murderer to be, usually, a further social menace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With those disposed of the formulators of the policy believe that a longer sentence for others is not needed. They see no aid anywhere in having one languish in prison beyond that point where a sentence ceases to have the possibility of being constructive and begins to dull the senses and perspective of the prisoner so that he is worthless anywhere. Some of our penologists have said that it is better to keep a man either a brief period or for his life because after a certain time it is practically impossible for him to fit into a society of which he has no knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet system provides measures for keeping a man in touch with society so that he may not feel that entire isolation even though ten years is the maximum of incarceration. In the first place, as we have seen, only those whose term is short or whose character makes it necessary are put in the closed institutions; in the next even those who are there are given vacations of leave if it is thought that they can be trusted not to escape. And in case that has to be denied to an inmate, he still has opportunity for contacts with associates within and friends and relatives without in open, wholesome manner.&lt;br /&gt;
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Tongues are not mute, either. Prisoners gather where they like, walk together, work together, play together. Nor do they “fawn or walk with scars.” The stated policy is to encourage them to approach and conduct themselves with dignity and no guard may inflict physical punishment on any prisoner. One might say that such a policy is likely not carried out. There may be isolated instances of violation, and one feels sure there are, but the attitude of the men toward the attendants and guards seem to indicate that such regulations are regarded.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sokolniki is a prison for men who have been sentenced, supposedly, from one to three years. Article 28 of the Criminal Code says, ‘Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labour camps.&lt;br /&gt;
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“In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labour or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labour camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence.” (May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are therefore a number serving sentences of longer periods than the three years who, because of physical condition, can not be sent to the labor camp to which they should be assigned, or because they need the restraint, perhaps, of these stronger walls. At the time of the writer’s visit there were a few more than eleven hundred prisoners in Sokolniki. The prison’s capacity is said to be something more than that, but it seemed then to be more crowded than was good for adequate treatment. However, one must remember that the housing situation in all of the USSR is acute and especially is that true of the cities where industrialization has required the assembling of more persons than can comfortably be housed. It is to be expected that prisons might share in this shortage.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet system uses the collective dormitory system rather than the single room standard. This is in keeping with their idea of community living and we were told at the women’s prison that it is preferred by the prisoners themselves who like being with others and have no wish to be shut off. They use it also in student dormitories where beds are placed eight or ten to a large room. That, however, they wish to remedy. Their aim is a room for every worker and every student but that will require much more building.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because Sokolniki is a well-known prison it will perhaps be interesting to set down a detailed description of it. The Soviet picture, The Road to Life, shown in this country, was made there, we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
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In arriving at Sokolniki, which is not far outside the city limits of Moscow, one comes to a closed door in the stone wall, some fifteen feet high, already mentioned. There must, of course, be an appointment just as there must be for entering a penitentiary in our own country. There is a bell and after it is rung the door is opened by an armed guard. The visitor is then in a small entrance room where there are other guards and which leads into a large court back of and around which the prison buildings form a square. There are other guards scattered in places about the court and near a large gate through which automobiles and trucks enter when they have business there.&lt;br /&gt;
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As we went through the court to the first building we were to see, about a hundred feet away, two men sat at the door of a side building, peeling potatoes. They were talking and laughing as they worked, evidently enjoying themselves. This was the first glimpse of the informal atmosphere that prevailed throughout, and which caused us to look in some amazement at occasional scenes such as that encountered as we entered the auditorium where a good pianist was playing and other men stood beside him or leaned on the piano, at ease and absorbed in the music.&lt;br /&gt;
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We had now left all the armed guards behind and there were no others in evidence until we came to depart. There were attendants, supervisors of work, etc., but there were no weapons among them. We went through shops and factories, observing the men at work. They wore any sort of clothes that they happened to own, mostly of the poor peasant type, since prisoners in Russia are never put in uniform.&lt;br /&gt;
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The spinning and weaving shops were interesting. They were well lighted, had good ventilation except in one room where neither was very adequate. As we went by the men talked to each other in a normal conversational manner, watched us, both amused and curious. Also, we talked to them as we wished. Others, not then at work for some reason (we were told that every man in the prison works, but it was late in the day when we went and some had ended their shift), followed us about good naturedly, enjoying our curiosity.&lt;br /&gt;
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A prosecuting attorney was our guide and he stopped to talk to various ones among them. Also as we went along men occasionally stopped him with requests, some with complaints, and he noted them on paper. At times he good naturedly refused what was asked, but any came who wanted to, informally, and without permission from any source.&lt;br /&gt;
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The attitude of the convicts toward labor may be explained by several things which have already been mentioned. There is no feeling of punishment about the work since the prison factories are placed on the same basis as others in the country. They have an eight-hour day, they receive pay (from 20 to 50 rubles per month) which they are permitted to spend as they like and which often goes to the support of a family at home, and they have the knowledge that the work they do is counted in the regular plan so that even while they serve their sentence they are actively helping in the nation’s economic life. At any rate, these men did not appear depressed as they worked, nor in bad spirits. We watched an older inmate pleasantly talking to a young fellow beside him while he manipulated a loom, apparently telling some interesting story for he used his hands occasionally in quick gestures, but he kept his eyes on his work, and he seemed to take pride in his job.&lt;br /&gt;
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From the shops we went to the dormitories and saw not one room only, but a number of them. As has already been intimated these rooms were too crowded. The cots were quite close together, even using the center of the room, and there was not enough space left for walking about. However, the men are not in a great deal of time. They go outside as they wish, walk when they care to, read in the library, exercise on the outside gymnasium apparatus, and are in the work shops at other times. Also, as already said, the problem of space is one that is occupying Soviet authorities extensively at present and they will require time to remedy the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We were asked to enter the room and sit down on the cots. The prosecuting attorney with us led the way. We were somewhat slow in following and one of the men, sitting on his cot in the center of the room, said, “Come on in. The beds are clean.” His invitation was accompanied by a smile and we quickly entered. By this time our presence had become known about the place and a great number had gathered in the corridor outside the room we were visiting, talking volubly. We were told to speak to any one we wished, to ask any question. We did so freely and were answered frankly. One prisoner told us that he was displeased with his sentence, that it was his first offense, that he had stolen a hat, and had been given a five-year term. “Impossible,” exclaimed the prosecutor, and promptly sent a messenger to the office to get the papers in the case. Some time later, when we were in the auditorium the records came and the man was sent for. He was a little chagrined but not greatly disturbed when his record showed robbery, not once but several times, with even the use of firearms. “Well,” he said nonchalantly, not too much put out that he hadn’t got away with his story, “it was too much anyway.”&lt;br /&gt;
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After we had visited a number of the dormitories we went to the yard. Several hundred prisoners were with us then. In the center of a bunch of them, we remembered again that here were some of the worst criminals in the country. They gathered all around to ask us about prisons in the United States or any other questions they could think of. One particularly intelligent man talked freely of conditions in Sokolniki, of his own sentence, and of his outlook on life. He had been a teacher before he had been caught in some sort of speculation, but he was teaching in the prison as well as doing some shop work. We continued questioning, now in French, now in German, more often through the Russian interpreter. The attendants were among them, talking also. There seemed to be no feeling of restraint in their presence, but on the contrary an existence of comradeship showed, especially on one occasion when one of the men had been asked a question he could not answer and turned to a guard for information. Such an attitude was apparent often, particularly as we went to the auditorium. As we were leaving the yard an incident happened that impressed us greatly. From the flower garden, one of the men came with an arm full of flowers that he wished to present to a member of the party who had passed some cigarettes around. He did it with the air of one who brings a bouquet from a prized garden of his own.&lt;br /&gt;
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We stopped to look at the dining room next. It was an ordinary room of almost square dimensions with long tables, seating two hundred and fifty at a time, and immaculately clean. From there we went through a small hall and upstairs to the auditorium where we were told to ask any questions on points of either policy or practice about which we still would like information. We were not sparing but every query was answered with great patience and detail. Then, as we were about to go, the prosecutor suggested to the superintendent who had been with us that we might like to hear the orchestra play. A messenger was sent and eventually a few musicians were rounded up but as there were not, enough to give a very good account of themselves, they tried the drama and dancing group with better luck. These hastily summoned the stage director, the curtains to the stage were drawn, a splendid pianist among their number who had discontinued some piece he was playing as we went in, now entertained us while preparations went on. In the meantime both men and attendants were crowding into the auditorium, messengers from among the prisoners were darting in and out with stringed musical instruments, and an informal atmosphere prevailed that it would be hard to give an impression of. The men talked in low excited tones, the music continued, the prosecutor and the prison director leaned against the piano. An attendant near to us carried on an excited conversation with a group of prisoners with him. It was difficult to believe that this was indeed a prison of a more serious type. It had all the earmarks just then of a community affair of local talent about to start.&lt;br /&gt;
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The program was given with zest and enjoyment. It lasted an hour and consisted of dances, singing, a reading, most of which they had written and produced themselves under the direction of the specialists who are in charge of that type of work in the prison. The results they got with the scant attention they gave to costuming was interesting. They used only a kind of high-throated long white tunic over whatever trousers they happened to have on, because they had no time for further preparation, but there was a uniform effect which was appropriate to the selections they gave. We were reluctant to have the entertainment end but we had undoubtedly kept them from their supper for the time, and their graciousness reminded us that we too must be considerate. We thanked them, said goodbye, and went upstairs for a visit to the library.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here was a long light room with bookshelves across the farther end and with reading tables and chairs nearer the door. At the side as we entered was the atheist corner, so-called, which is found in nearly all the institutions and which is devoted mostly to evolution. A large picture of Darwin was prominently placed among the exhibits. There were also pictorial illustrations of the lower stages through which man has come and such other things as one would expect to find in a geological or anthropological display. Science, in their new culture, is designed to replace religion in so far as state recognition is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out again in the yard some of the prisoners demonstrated their athletic ability and performed gymnastic feats on bars. We noted their carefree attitude, the interested passive participation of their comrades, but the wall was there again just across from us reminding that after all there was restriction—deprivation of liberty. And that, after all, is the chiefest of punishment. On top of the towers at the corners of the wall the men with long rifles looked down at us. No matter what the correctional labor policy, how designed to be constructive of character, certain men have to be restricted and the program forced on them. But it is to be doubted whether there is often achievement of a spirit like that in the prisons of many other countries and even in case it does exist, it is likely to be in some isolated place where an exceptional warden has been able to achieve it, possibly in a lesser place, one suspects, and not a major penitentiary.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XII: A WOMEN’S PRISON ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; full name of this institution is Moscow Novinsky Women’s Isolator. There is another such prison at Orenburg, and these are the only two in the RSFSR. There were many things about this place that compared unfavorably with Sokolniki, chief of which was a lesser liberty of action. That was explained to us as being necessary because fifty per cent. of the population are there awaiting trial, which means that they stay only for a brief time. This makes a constructive program more difficult, since it is not possible to undertake for a yet unconvicted person the same type of treatment as would be accorded one actually sentenced. They must be kept separately, and with the small outdoor space available it is quite a problem to handle the question of freedom and recreation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity of the place is 375, but at the time of our visit it had only 360 in both classes; that is, those sentenced by the court and those awaiting trial. There are more problems connected with a women’s prison than with one for men. Children must be thought of, both those about to be born and small ones who depend on the mother and for whom there is no other care. There is a small hospital for ordinary cases in this prison, but a pregnant woman is taken out to a proper place for the birth of her child. It is emphasized that she is entitled to the same treatment as any other mother in the land, and that by virtue of her being a prisoner, she is not to be deprived of the best medical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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One comes up to this prison suddenly, without warning. Around a corner from a wide avenue and up a cobbled street for a block and the building is there before you. One enters the prison straight from the street into a small hallway, such as is found dividing the two front rooms of a residence. All the guards are women and they stand with guns to which are attached bayonets. They seemed much more severe than the men guards at other prisons, but perhaps that is because one is not accustomed to seeing them. Others wearing revolvers were about in the hallway and at other points in this entrance building. Their uniform consists of white blouse and dark skirt, with the gun belt acting in the place of a normal one, and military-looking caps. They are businesslike and, one feels sure, equal to an emergency. However, we were assured that none arises. The action of the comradely court takes care of the majority of whatever disciplinary problems there might be.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our first pause was in the office where we were received by the director and told some few points about the prison. However, we were reminded that a tour of it would be worth more than a lecture, and since that seemed a logical statement to us, we started out. Across the hall from the office in which we had been sitting was the visiting room. Every six days each prisoner may see visitors. There is no screen through which they must talk; the contact is direct; but there is a long counter behind which the prisoners sit. A guard is present in the room at all times, but takes care not to listen to the conversation. That is regarded as the person’s private affair. Mail may be censored but mere words are not restricted, so we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
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Passing through this room, we found ourselves in a court around which the buildings form a hollow square. This institution was a prison in Tzarist days, and a gloomy spot it must have been according to descriptions. Now, there are many windows which are large and admit plenty of light and air. We visited next the wing used as a dormitory and found there somewhat more space than in Sokolniki. One room was particularly large, about fifty feet long. Beds are fairly well spaced; there is a small cabinet for each woman, and the ventilation is good. A girl with a guitar was furnishing entertainment for others who sat on their respective cots and listened. She stopped playing loudly as we entered but continued to strum. We were told here, as at all other places we visited, to talk to any whom we wished, to ask any question we would. The superintendent seemed eager to emphasize that we were free to see or know anything. She had heard the prevalent story that in Russia one never sees things. She begged us to feel free to look and to question. No one would listen to what we said to the prisoner nor she to us. We talked to an old woman who wore the headdress of a peasant. She sat aloof on her cot and we were moved by her lonely appearance. What had she done? She stole bread, she told us, and for that she had a ten-year sentence. The same prosecutor who was with us at Sokolniki was listening at this moment. His face was full of sympathy. A person, whatever he might have on his conscience, could scarcely find him forbidding to talk to. He began to question and discovered that this was no ordinary theft of bread but a widespread attempt to defraud the state. A written note went into his pocket before he turned away and one wonders whether the ten-year sentence which might possibly not be served anyway, would be reduced.&lt;br /&gt;
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We talked next with a pretty black-haired girl whose eyes sparkled with mischief. No one was near to listen. For robbery, she told us frankly, she had been sent for five years of deprivation of liberty. One hopes that not even a prison can dim that gayness which seemed to cause her to bubble over. Was she getting along all right, she was asked? Fine! She laughed with us, talked animatedly for several minutes. Did she feel resentful? No, because she was learning there and she shouldn’t have stolen anyway. How will she get a job when she gets out? There were more jobs than people she told us as if she had learned a lesson. Was she sure? we asked. All the people who leave here get work at once. She knew that to be true. Why shouldn’t they? They were good workmen, she added. We left them to visit other rooms, and down the hall past two or three we came to one with spreads on the beds, with white covers on the tables, with a framed picture here and there and other personal belongings in place. It was the room occupied by the shock-brigaders. Russia honors its &#039;&#039;Udarnicks&#039;&#039;, whether in prison or out, for their efforts are such as send the nation bounding on its way. In this room, the honor spot of the dormitories, a young woman, perhaps twenty-one, sat at a desk with her back to us. She is the chairman of the comradely court, we were told, and she smiles at us with great pride. It is evidently an achievement which carries satisfaction.&lt;br /&gt;
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She had stolen continuously since she was fifteen, her case read, but by means of the approach they use here they have been able to aid her. The superintendent assured us that her whole character had undergone a change, that she was trusted and valuable to the institution, and supervised with ability the court that was responsible for discipline within the prison. We talked to others, one a middle-aged woman, who did exceptionally good work. She was proud of her ability and the praise she had won.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went to the nursery. A mother sat in a small room beside it, nursing her child. We noticed the position of her foot, the way she held her baby, and were reminded that some one gave instruction in such points in a way that would meet the best approval. Cribs were lined up along the sides of the nursery and a trained woman, not a prisoner, was in charge. She was assisted with the children by inmates themselves. There were about twenty beds but only a few children. The others had already been taken to the play-yard. We took time to observe before we left that the room was well ventilated and well kept and the woman in charge briskly businesslike. As we descended again to the court we passed a small room back of the stairway where women were washing their clothes. Each must do her own, and a room equipped with tubs was provided for the purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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The children are kept up to four years of age, then disposed of among the other state institutions for children or dismissed with the mother, or possibly, if she must stay longer, sent to some of her family. In the yard, a grassy spot with shrubbery, the children were having a gay time with all sorts of apparatus and a playhouse. Like the children in other Russian centers, they wore no clothes except light cotton trunks.&lt;br /&gt;
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They looked healthy and well cared for and showed, it seemed to us, less of physical abnormalities than one usually notices in children of imprisoned women.&lt;br /&gt;
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We visited the school room and were told that compulsory education is provided up to the seventh year and opportunity given for work beyond, by means of university evening courses. There is at the same time the usual political education, the clubs, and physical education that characterizes all penal places, and a radio in every room for additional education and entertainment.&lt;br /&gt;
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We came out into the court again to go to the wing containing the shops. Some of the informal attitude which we had noticed at Sokolniki now began to show itself. There were groups who leaned out of their windows and shouted to us, and some of the younger girls talked to us in the court. Three of them begged us to tell them about the prisons in America, much as three children would waylay one and insist on being told tales. We gave them some information, and then tried to answer questions about New York and life in the United States. No, they didn’t think they would like America because people did not have jobs there, while here when they got out, they would be assured of work. We asked if they felt certain of that. Of course. The patron factory of this institution gives preference to those released from here. They boldly hailed the prosecutor now, to tell him that they wanted their sentences reduced. The law gives them the right to complain to the prison management, to the Commissar of Justice, or to the prosecuting attorney, but they are not offering a complaint of the sentence. It is only that they are ready to be good and work like faithful citizens. Another note is thrust into the prosecutor’s coat pocket. What was done with them we did not know but since the inmates seemed to expect that procedure it must be a general practice, and the fact that he definitely refused some and made no note seemed to indicate that the others had real significance. We were told that each case so noted would be checked. The approach to official channels is evidently quite easy.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were no shops in this prison in Tzarist days, and the women did not work. Now the wing which has been newly built is thrust out in such a way that it is long and narrow, with windows on both sides. There is plenty of ventilation and light. The women were cutting and sewing shirts and other garments from the same material we had seen the men making at Sokolniki. There were long tables with good working space and as we walked about various women showed us finished articles with pride. The sewing machines had all the latest equipment, and the operatives worked rapidly. The products of their shops are turned over to the cooperatives and sold where needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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They, too, work on the same basis as do factory workers of the land, with the exception (as in the case of all prisoners) that because they are supplied with their upkeep they are not paid normal wages. At the time we were there some of them were not at work, due, the directress told us, to a shortage of material. The supervisors are not prisoners but come in from the outside to teach and direct the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
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Already in the chapter on “What Crimes Are Committed and Who Commits Them” we referred to the acts committed by women. In this prison the records showed that theft came first and robbery a close second, but in cases with whom we talked, the theft often turned out to be some act involving state property which carried a severe penalty. For that reason one was surprised at first to find long sentences attached to what appeared to be less serious crimes. But, in view of the provisions of the law of August 7, 1932, such larceny is sternly dealt with, even though the act is committed by a person from among the peasants or toiling class. One stealing from her neighbor would get a much lighter sentence. This is where the class nature of punishment shows up very strongly and unbalances the scales of justice that otherwise seem to work with such fairness. An example of the difference was very clear in two cases. One girl had been in prison nine times for theft and her present sentence was for two years only. Another had committed her first offense by stealing from a collective farm, a tool apparently of some “class enemy,” and her sentence was ten years. The “measure of social danger” accounts for the difference, and while it is easy to see that the authorities are confronted by a real problem of deep seriousness, one wonders whether something more of justice&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This statement by the author has caused Mr. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow to offer the following explanation. “The word ‘justice’ in the USSR has another meaning than in the writings of the bourgeois sociologists. Criminal repression is not expiation of the crime. We don’t feel it just to shoot a man who has committed a murder only in order to punish him. Instead of one murder that would make two. But we call it just, if by means of shooting such a murderer, we can prevent a score of other murders. The construction of Socialism is our greatest task. Everything that helps the achievement of it is just, everything that hinders it is unjust. That is the point of view in every criminal case and I don’t suppose that we shall ever change it. But of course the methods of our fight for Socialism change at every stage of Socialist construction, and today they are other than they were five years ago.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; might not in the long run make for better feeling as well as a more ethical foundation for their socialist state. It is contradictory to their usual administration of justice among their own masses. One hopes that, as the conflict recedes, “pure justice” in so far as such is possible will replace “socially dangerous” measurements now in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again we were in the court preparing to leave. A girl of some eighteen or nineteen years, with thick golden braids hanging to her waist, was at the window above us shouting laughingly down to the superintendent. One of our party had a camera and she wished her picture made. It was all right, we were told, and the picture was snapped, and she was promised one as soon as it could be developed. Others were calling to us, too, setting up a din, with their comments and questions. Such an informal atmosphere can hardly be described. A group stood about like girls let out of school, talking, watching us curiously, unrestrained by the presence of attendants or directress. One feels that so long as there is no attempt to escape, and no running afoul the comradely court, one can do about as she likes—play volley ball when she pleases, if she is free from work, listen to the radio, read in the library, or gossip with her neighbor. She also has a good atmosphere in which to learn that labor and happiness are pretty close companions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The parting word from our hostess was, “I wish I might visit a prison in America with the same freedom with which I have shown you this.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What a western observer would feel first in these prisons is a lack of physical equipment such as his own best might boast. There was such criticism expressed. But this is not an adequate standard with which to measure their success. It is true that in these closed prisons of a penitentiary type their equipment, while much better than that in our worst, is not nearly so good as that in our best, but the fact that without this equipment they are able to achieve the attitude and cooperation they do on the part of the prisoners is all the more significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is also the point that the aim of Soviet penal authorities is to remove as rapidly as possible every person whose character will permit into the open or semi-closed correctional labor institutions and discontinue the use of the closed types except for the most incorrigible cases. Because of that, they are devoting all possible attention to the development and improvement of the labor institutions. And one finds different conditions in these places. They would not suffer very much by comparison with our best. A description of Bolshevo Labor Commune, in a later chapter, will indicate that.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the meantime they create that constructive businesslike atmosphere, among the women as well as the men, that gives genuine hope of equipping these people for a place in social life.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XIII: THE CHILD AND THE LAW ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;When&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; H. G. Wells was visiting in Moscow the past summer, he is said to have made the following observation to a Russian journalist: “I know, you Moscow people look upon all this with different eyes. You are Robinson Crusoes recreating life upon barren land after a social cataclysm. You are proud that you are manufacturing without the capitalists’ air motors, and reoentgen apparatus which the capitalists before you did not manufacture. You are happy to be doing all this. I understand this. And I should have been happy in your place, but of all your productions, excuse me, I am struck only by one thing. You are making people. It is this that I have come here to see and I see it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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If they are making people in this Soviet land, and I think it is pretty well agreed by thoughtful persons that they are, the beginning of the process is found in their treatment of children. So much has been said and written on the care of the child in Russia that no elaboration should be necessary here, and in regard to the delinquent it is no less than that given to the normal child. Their attitude toward the child who breaks the law is not that society must be protected, but that the individual may be given an opportunity for developing his own life. His interest is uppermost and practically every branch of government cooperates in his protection and training.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0222.svg|TYPICAL SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF F.Z.U. SCHOOL]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Geneva declaration has been of special interest to the authorities dealing with this problem in the USSR. They believe with the author of the statement that mankind must give the child the best it has. In many of their publications they quote the main points of that declaration, and it seems of interest to set them down in relation to this chapter. They follow:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) The child should be given an opportunity of normal development, materially as well as spiritually.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The starved child must be fed, the sick cured, the retarded pushed ahead, the defective trained, and the orphan taken care of.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The child must be helped first of all during public misfortune.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) The child must be prepared to earn his bread, and protected from all types of exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) The child must be trained with the understanding that his best powers must be devoted to his brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For them the application of these points is to all children. The problem of the upbringing of the juvenile criminal is not separable from the general question of juvenile training. And whenever it is possible, the child who has broken the law is sent to schools for his training which in no wise differ from those for the noncriminal child.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Russia’s fight against juvenile crime has been one of its major problems. It is an old story that the Civil War and the Volga famine in 1921 left hordes of wild children wandering over the land. They crowded in the railway stations, they rode the rods from place to place, they congregated in market places, behind billboards, in any places they could find, and were so depraved by street life that they became the most hardened of criminals. At this time, too, men released from the army, with no jobs available, turned in great numbers to banditry, and these children became their associates in their illegal enterprise. In history there is perhaps no picture greatly darker so far as children are concerned, and handling such a situation is not the least of Russia’s achievements. Today there are still a few scattered remnants of that vast number that one sees in railway stations, but the problem is in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the moment when this condition reached its worst, the government was dealing with the Civil War at its greatest height, giving its attention and energy to the defense of the proletarian state. But it is to its great credit that it found time even then to concentrate its forces to give care to this growing army of homeless waifs and juvenile delinquents. We have at that moment a proposal on the part of the leader of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, later referred to in detail, which marked the beginning of the system of care given today to young offenders in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, there was already machinery in operation for dealing with juvenile criminals or children needing the aid of the state because of some abnormal condition. As early as January 14, 1918, only a little more than two months after the October Revolution, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a decree establishing Commissions for Cases of Minors. These commissions, with their powers greatly broadened, exist today, and are the organs charged to look after the interests not only of delinquent children, but of any child who needs the intervention of the law. During the period when children swarmed everywhere, homeless, starving, some criminal, and others forced by necessity into such an existence, no single force could have been adequate, but these bodies were the official channels through which the cases passed after the GPU or some other agency had first gathered the children in.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The commission is not a children’s court, but is a pedagogical and educational organization. Its chief task is in educating the juvenile offender so that he may become a productive member of society, and with that in view the composition provided for the commission is of professions and persons able to make appropriate contributions. The chairman must be a pedagogue of very high qualifications. He must possess not only an adequate education, but he must have had experience either in work of a pedagogical nature or with home children or with juvenile criminals. In addition to the chairman there is a member representing the local department of public education, a physician from the local health department, a judge from the People’s Court, an investigation educator, a member of the Komsomol (the youth about to enter the Communist Party), a representative of the Children’s Friend’s Society, and a representative of the local trade union organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The commission sits in closed session, permitting only the attendance of those connected with the cases. This would include parents, relatives or guardians, or a representative of a public or school organization. Its work is under the jurisdiction of the commissariat of education, and is not connected with the commissariat of justice, such as the children’s court would be. There are, of course, local commissions which take care of the cases for each city or rural district. The procedure before the commission is entirely informal. When a case comes up the chairman takes the proper steps to have the juvenile appear, unless for some reason his presence is thought to be unnecessary. Some of the circumstances under which the child would not appear would be: if the child is under eight years of age; when the child is already known to the commission; when the evidence does not substantiate the charge; when there is no reason for the medico-pedagogical measures to be applied; or when it is thought that the appearance of the minor before the commission might do some harm to him in either a physical or mental way. But in case it is thought his appearance is desirable, the investigator is instructed to take charge of the case. The chairman then proceeds to gather the necessary information, evidence, etc., concerning the child and advise him that his case is to come up. If at that time the youth has reached the age of sixteen, his case is turned over to the courts for trial, since minors between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are subject to the jurisdiction of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The commission is competent to deal not only with the cases of all children delinquents between the ages of eight and sixteen (children under eight years of age are never summoned to appear before the commission) but it is also empowered to institute criminal proceedings against any person who is an offender against the child in a manner of demoralization, incitement to crime, or exploitation of minors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What measures may be taken in the cases of children convicted of some crime before the commission? Here is a list of the more important, although it is not an exhaustive one:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) A request for granting assistance, document, certificate, etc., to the child.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Placing out the child in the care of a family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Placing the child on maintenance and education by public or party organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Finding a guardian for the child.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Finding work for the child or apprenticing him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) Sending the child to his birthplace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Placing the child in an educational institution, school or children’s home.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) Sending the child to a medical or medico-pedagogical institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) Helping the child to enroll in a children’s club.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) Talk and exhortation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(11) Putting the child in the care of parents or other persons with or without supervision by investigation educator.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(12) Putting the child in the care of an investigating educator.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is one final measure which it is within the power of the commission to use, but it is never resorted to unless all other efforts have failed. That is that the commission may send the child as a final resort to an industrial school of which we will speak later on in the chapter. The list given above constitutes the medico-pedagogical measures and are applied only to those offenders under sixteen years of age who come within the competency of this commission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case of the minor between sixteen and eighteen years of age is approached in a somewhat different manner. Originally under the Criminal Code of 1922, the court was given jurisdiction over minors between fourteen and eighteen years of age, and might at that time sentence them to terms of deprivation of liberty, but only to industrial homes set apart for them, and never by any manner of means to a place for adults. This, however, has been changed so that the commission referred to takes care of children up to sixteen years of age, and only the cases of those between sixteen and eighteen are referred to courts. Although the cases of juvenile offenders between sixteen and eighteen are tried by the courts, the measures applied are of a medico-pedagogical nature very similar to those used for the younger children. Only when the circumstances of the crime convince the court that these measures will not be adequate may the minor be sentenced to deprivation of liberty. In fixing the terms, the sentence is to be reduced by one third of what would be imposed on an adult in the same situation, and the maximum term under the USSR is not to exceed one half of that imposed on adults. A death sentence may never be given to either child or minor, and no severe measures may be used.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of trial, a copy of the summons as well as the indictment must be sent to the minor’s legal representative, as well as to the minor himself. And the Supreme Court has especially instructed the lower courts to see that all juveniles under trial be provided with counsel whenever it may be needed. During the hearing of the case, the minor is accorded all the rights that we have already seen are granted to defendants in the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That the fight waged by the authorities against juvenile crime is being successful is indicated by the steady drop of the percentage to the total convictions in the Union. We find that, in 1928, 36 per cent. of the total number of persons convicted of crime were juvenile offenders. In 1931, this figure had dropped to 28.2 per cent. Also indicative of the achievement in this direction is, as already mentioned, the fact that this army of vagrant youth no longer wanders about in Russia. There are few of such children remaining.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet government has practically removed from its system all of the homes and colonies for juveniles which it inherited from the Tzarist régime, and has at the present time in their stead the system of institutions operating in an educational manner. The most constructive work being done is in those owing their initiation to the efforts of an agent that we do not usually connect with such activities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Back in 1921 when the whole place swarmed with homeless and criminal children, and there was despair over the hopelessness of the condition, the GPU came to the rescue with the establishment of places for wholesale care called “collectors.” Children were snatched from the streets, stations, trains, or wherever they were, and were taken to these places where they were bathed, dressed, fed, sorted out, given all sorts of examinations, mental and physical, then turned over to the Commission for the Cases of Minors, and were finally distributed to the various institutions. The institutions, at that time, while educational in nature, were without a definite social goal, and not adequately prepared or equipped to turn a youth into a productive and useful citizen. At the present time the institutions for juvenile offenders are established under the control of the Commissariat of Education, the Commissariat of Justice, and the Commissariat of Home Affairs (formerly the OGPU). In the Commissariat of Education we find a whole network of children’s homes, directly leading the child from training into the industrial life of the country in such a manner that there is no gap through which he can escape into a life of crime. In their early days the task of these homes was simply to house the children, to prevent them from becoming vagrants and criminals, and their program was by no means as constructive as it might have been. But, at present, no effort is spared in delivering the child to society in a state of preparation for his place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A. Shestakova in her article &#039;&#039;Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children&#039;&#039; tells us that in the first days of these homes the children were taught to make shoes and footstools, to bind books, and how to read and write; and slightly how to adjust themselves in life. But she says that the homes were inadequate to attack the basic problems of turning those sent to them into a specifically trained group, sufficiently equipped with industrial knowledge and social culture, prepared to enter a factory or other center in such a manner as to evolve into useful citizens. The misfit was unfortunate in two ways. Not only were the children unprepared as to basic industrial knowledge or other means of adjustment to their new life, but the state itself was deprived, because of this inadequacy, of the services of many young citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A new economic policy had given way to the five-year plan with its tremendous program of industrial development and agricultural collectivization, and there was need for every available trained workman. Because of this urgent need of the country those in charge of juvenile offenders were given an extra instrument for their purpose. With definite ends in view, with specific jobs to fill, training took on an additional purpose. Here was a definite challenge to the places of training of those juvenile offenders to teach them so that they might make their contribution to the economic plan, and that they might thereby gain the satisfaction of having work which they could do well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not enough that education be directed only toward keeping the child busy with some elementary task, but that it concern itself with the possibility of active participation in the nation’s economic development. To accomplish this task the children’s homes were merged with the factory apprenticeship schools which were attached to factories in towns, and to the peasant youth schools connected in like manner with state farms and rural localities, by which merging they now afforded places for training skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As now organized the direction of these homes is in the hands of the Commissariat of Education, and children are sent by the Commission of Cases for Minors. They are not limited to the training of delinquents but also have the task of educating the children of workers and peasants from the general population. No coercive methods are used. There are of course no wardens or guards, and their express task is to “combine teaching with productive labor upon such basis that the whole social productive labor of the pupils was to be subordinated to the academic and educational aims of the school.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The inmates of these homes are given preference of admission to the factory apprenticeship schools, and to peasant youth schools next to the children of workers. From this training they move straight into the stream of factory workers and, almost without knowing it, take their place in the productive life of the nation. By the time they have gone through these schools of apprenticeship and the factory, or the state farms, they have forgotten that they ever were attached to a life of crime and are removed from the environment so effectually that they have no temptation to return. This describes the treatment given to the cases of those children not classified as habitual criminals. Even in this category of the 8-16 group coming under the direction of the Commissariat of Education, there is an occasional child who requires more restrictive treatment, and measures of a severer nature may then be resorted to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this type, who have become habitual criminals, or who have committed more serious crimes that require a term of deprivation of liberty, we have a second kind of institution. It is important to note that this set of establishments is connected with the Commissariat of Justice, and not with the Department of Education. There has been a period of evolution of these institutions in which much study has been given to methods to be used, and experiments of a bold nature tried with regard to some of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On July 11, 1918, there was published the Order for the First Russian Reformatory where juvenile offenders of this type were to be detained, and there were consequently organized industrial homes for these offenders which were intrusted with the duty of teaching to minors “skilled trades, to widen their mental horizon by means of general and vocational education, and to transform them into active citizens conscious of their rights and obligations, giving them at the same time a physical and health education by means of gymnastics, sports and hygiene.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These institutions, although of the educational type referred to, were inadequate for any serious training. Arts and crafts constituted the principal type of labor, and practically no attention was given to the higher and more skilled trades. We have already spoken of the demands made by the reconstruction period for more skilled workers, and of the notable inadequacy of places for juvenile offenders to turn out young people who filled such a need. The program needed a decided reformation, and in 1930 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee set up a commission for specific remedy of the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The commission was created for two definitely assigned tasks: the first was to institute an investigation of the work of the fight against juvenile criminals and minors, and of the organization of factory communes and corrective labor organizations, using for this purpose the equipment of the People’s Commissariat of Justice. Secondly, it was to work out and to hand to the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; a project of administrative and practical measures, with due attention being given to the experiment of the Izhorsk plant in the North Caucasus. The result of the investigation was that in 1930, the Commissariat of Justice decided to reconstruct these institutions into factory apprenticeship schools for juvenile offenders which were to be attached to large factories and mills. It must be noted here that these schools differed from those just discussed in that they were for offenders only and liberty was restricted, whereas in the first there were no guards of any nature and noncriminal children attended along with the criminal ones.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these schools they were to create a cultural and social condition conducive to drawing the inmates into social work, and to this end, bars, locks, and prison régime, and all prison atmosphere was to be resolutely banished from them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of the training was educational just as it had been in the others, but in the case of this more hardened type it was necessary to detain the juvenile forcibly while he was subjected to the program. However, pupils in these schools now enjoy vacations, take part in regular group hikes, and go out to camps in the summer, in the same manner as other pupils do. The term of sentence is from two to three years, and the arrangements as to schedule, life, and discipline, organization and labor, are taken care of by the usual self-government organization. The schedule of the work is arranged in such a manner that the children are never left entirely to their own devices, but are constantly with those who guide and direct them. Four hours of industrial training are followed by four hours of study, and the latter is again followed by three hours devoted to public activity organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1931, 4,000 juvenile offenders were trained in these schools and 500 industrial workers were graduated from the industrial establishments. In 1933, the aim was to put all the juvenile offenders into these schools from which it was expected there would be turned out 2,400 highly skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to notice here what happened to those released from these schools. Figures for the years 1931 and 1932, giving percentages of distribution for those released, show that 63.2 per cent. went into industrial undertakings. This would indicate a high degree of success in the passage of the trained youth from schools to industry. The next largest percentage, 19.7 per cent., found a place in the building trade. The third highest, 9.3 per cent., was released to the parents with supervision on the part of the school. 4.7 per cent. were placed on Soviet farms; 1.2 per cent. found a location in the factory labor and technical communes and 0.6 per cent. were released to parents and relatives but continued under the supervision of the schools.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article by A. Shestakova, “Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children,” from Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 348.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most important training given in these schools is for metal work and work on wood. In addition to that the inmates are taught tractor handling, animal husbandry, vegetable garden work, and field work. The health and physical training require that the workers take a month and a half to two months’ camp trip in the country. Because of the inconvenience attached to these trips, when the institution is located in a city, the First Moscow School was moved to a small village a short distance out, so that country places would be more accessible for health training.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief problems now attached to this education, according to A. Shestakova, are the building up of the physical health, an establishing of self-discipline, and the introduction of these delinquents to methods used in other camps, to a life of such neighboring activities as the collective or state farms. The prize agricultural schools among all of those at present existing in the Soviet Union are Saratov, which now has first place in the contest for these schools; Serpooh, in second place; the First Moscow School in third place; and in the fourth, the First Leningrad School.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We come finally to the third type of establishment. These are incorporated into the system of the organization of the GPU, in the Commissariat for Home Affairs. There is something incongruous to most of us in the supervision of children by an agent that is avowedly for terroristic purposes. However, the labor communes, organized by this body for juvenile offenders of the worst type, are one of the outstanding developments in the care of the children in Soviet Russia, and set a standard that few if any institutions in other lands manage to reach.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The inhabitants of these communes are young people with long criminal records, who have been up repeatedly before the Commission for Cases of Minors, before the courts, who have served many terms of deprivation of liberty in various juvenile institutions. The cases seemed hopeless, and the experiment, so bold and unique, was tried in an effort to give a new viewpoint that would induce a complete break with the former criminal type of life. One of these communes, the largest both as to number and scope of development, is described in detail in the next chapter. In this place we only mention the general plan and underlying principles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main difference between the apprenticeship school and these labor communes of the OGPU is in method and not in principle. The labor commune is organized around large labor work, where both sexes contribute, while in the apprenticeship schools the emphasis is on education, on the preparation for industrial work. One of the basic principles in the labor commune is complete freedom as to movement, while in the schools restriction of movement is naturally required since the program is compulsory in its nature. In the apprenticeship schools there is also segregation of the sexes in the matter of residence; the boys and girls meet together in theatres, on excursions, in museums, on walks, and other places, but live in separate homes. It seems inconsistent to state that the labor commune is made up of those more habituated to crime, since it enjoys greater freedom, while the schools are composed of the less criminal; but this is nevertheless true. When one remembers, though, that the commune is the result of a desperate move to save a great number of habitual criminals, whereas the schools are merely for training those of even younger years, the situation is more easily understood.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the schools the age group is from 15-18 years. The sources from which they come are, (a) those sent on court order, and (b) those sent by the Commission for Cases of Minors, and all other authorities empowered to commit them. If the term is up before the training of the child is completed, the pedagogical commune may retain him, provided the entire term does not exceed three years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 42 of the Correctional Labor Code of 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the communes, the age group, although in the beginning limited to those of 13-17, is now composed of those of 16-24. The satisfaction of the authorities with the achievement of the First Labor Commune (Bolshevo) led to the establishment of others, and at the present time several thousand former criminals, some of them committing the worst sort of crimes, are being trained and educated while they participate in community life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XIV: BOLSHEVO LABOR COMMUNE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; following is the official record of the beginning of such places for criminals as the one described in this chapter:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;ORDERS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the Administrative and Organizational Board, OGPU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No. 185&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, August 18, 1924&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;#&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;1&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Orders issued by Comrade Yagoda, assistant chief of the OGPU:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) In order to combat crime among young people between the ages of 13 and 17 years, a Children’s Labor Commune for 50 persons is to be organized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) F. G. Melikhov is appointed head of the Children’s Labor Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The head of the Children’s Labor Commune is to act in all matters under the orders of M. S. Pogrebinsky, who, in turn, will act on the basis of a plan of work confirmed by me.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Such an order, judging from the resulting situation of ten years later, ought to be marked with a monument, and it is. Just outside of Moscow, on the location of a once lovely estate, there is now a small town of modern buildings replacing the wooden ones of ten years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One does not know what to call this place. To say that it is a penal institution is misleading unless the reader has seen something like it. However, it rates as that in the USSR, and since there are others like it in scattered sections, one comes to the conclusion that it is something unique in this line and accepts it as such. It is easy to be enthusiastic over such things and not to look deeper for some adverse angles, but the author, after as careful examination as she could make in a skeptical manner, could only praise the development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two trips were made to this colony, the second to confirm what had first been observed. However, since it was a visit to a similar colony at Kharkov that elicited the warm praise from M. Herriot that has already been quoted, it seemed safe to conclude that it existed as had first been believed. It is impossible to understand how any one could fail to be moved on viewing the place and realizing its tremendous import in the matter of remaking criminals. If the OGPU had committed nothing but the acts of terror it has been credited with, the creation of such spots as these would compensate in a great way for its darker deeds. It is unfortunate that one must try to tell of Bolshevo. The only thing to do is to visit and see for one’s self. It is difficult to describe atmosphere, and that is the thing that pervades the place and makes it even more constructive than the physical side could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This commune celebrated its tenth birthday in August of this year (1934). Its population was preparing for it when we were there, building platforms out under the trees, putting finishing touches here and there, and getting ready for speeches, visitors, and other entertainment of various kinds. And these people can tell a good tale of growth and progress, too, for they started with a handful in the initiation of a bold experiment and now their town has a population of three thousand inhabitants. The reader’s first deduction will be that a prison growth such as that must indicate some undesirable conclusions. But when one knows that it means that this number has been transferred from other penal institutions with a view to having everyone possible enjoy this freedom and training, then the significance is different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reference has already been made to the wandering hordes of children, confirmed in criminal habits, who presented the gravest of problems to the government authorities at the end of the Civil War and Volga famine. It was seen that if headway was to be made against the situation, the whole perspective of life must be changed, and the new one must be attractive enough to make these vagrant criminals want to break with a past that to their imaginative years had a glamour and provided escape from the responsibilities of ordinary living.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the midst of the perplexity, the groping for some plan, we find Felix Dzerzhinsky, organizer of that terror of terrors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, and original head of the GPU, offering his far-reaching organ to effect this merciful innovation. Let his own words inform us:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“I wish to apply part of my personal efforts and above all the efforts of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; to looking after these homeless waifs. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of two considerations. Firstly, it is a terrible calamity, and when you look at children, you cannot help thinking everything should be for them. The fruits of the revolution are not for us but for them. But how many of them have been wrecked by struggle and poverty! We must rush to their aid just as if we saw children drowning. The Commissariat of Education alone cannot cope with this matter, the widest help from all Soviet bodies is needed. It is necessary to form under the Central Executive Committee a broad commission containing representatives of all commissariats and all organizations which can be useful in this matter. I have already spoken with people here and there. I want to be at the head of this commission myself. I want to include the apparatus of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; practically in this work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“I am impelled to do this for the second reason. I think that our apparatus is one of those which works most accurately. It has branches everywhere. People reckon with it. They are afraid of it, but even in such a matter as saving and feeding children, it is possible to find laxness and even dishonesty. We are going over more and more to peaceful construction; and I think: why not use our fighting apparatus to combat such a calamity as homelessness among children?”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This proposition was made in 1921. It was in August, 1924, that the GPU of which he was then head, established the Bolshevo Labor Commune, thus launching a new epoch not only in the care of juvenile criminals for whom it was particularly intended, but in the treatment of all the others. It must have given a great thrill to this man who had brought death to so many of the state’s enemies to take a part in reconstructing the lives of youths who would, he hoped, be its friends. At least he had the satisfaction of seeing his judgment vindicated, for, from the beginning, the venture proved his rightness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These men did not jump into the scheme as suddenly as might seem, nor without consideration. They went into intimate study of the forms of education of children, they applied themselves vigorously to working out an accurate theory, then they formulated what appeared to them three basic rules of procedure. That the GPU, in the midst of their frightening activities, could muster faith enough in anybody to develop such a plan is in itself a phenomenon, but that they could convey such a trust to others, to these young criminals, seems more incredulous still. They were not exactly an agent for inspiring such a feeling. But notice the three basic principles referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost was that principle of “trust” held like a shining torch before the eyes of incredulous youngsters. It was decided that there must be no compulsion anywhere in the commune. With coercion the order of the day, there was to be none here. Strange contradiction, one of many that has filled the land. Side by side with sternness toward those who oppose the order, one finds this steady development of humane institutions, untouched by the harsher methods used in the other direction. In this colony there was to be only trust. If one wanted to stay, he was to stay, and if he wanted to go, then he was to go. He simply walked away, for there were not to be—and are not today— any guards. There were to be no restrictions of their freedom. They were to realize that they were in an educational institution pure and simple. They were to come of their own volition, because of an expressed desire to join in the program of this commune. These inhabitants were to be persons who had come to realize the futility of a life of crime and who wished therefore to change to another sort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the individual was to make this change he would have to be able to perform some task well, and to that end the second principle was incorporated. The commune was to be devoted to teaching these people how to do some kind of work. Workshops were established and instructors installed, but the responsibility for sustaining a condition under which the trades could be learned was placed on the residents of the Commune. There was no preaching, no lectures, but it was demonstrated that each must be responsible for his share in this life or all would suffer. If machines stopped because of the irregularity of one or two, then the education of others in an industrial line would suffer. And one who brought about this inconvenience must answer to his comrades for his conduct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third principle was to make each feel his responsibility for the group, and the reverse, that all were responsible for seeing that each member measured up to his duties. Every member of the Commune was bound to see that a recalcitrant one was brought to account. In this manner any disciplinary problems were taken care of from the beginning. Thus, in the lack of any compulsion the onetime criminal learns to lead a normal life and to discipline himself; in being taught a trade he is prepared to return to a life or perhaps enter it for the first time, in which he earns his way; and by his feeling of responsibility for others, he in conjunction with the group keeps the affairs of the Commune running smoothly and efficiently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the Commune had been set up, the next problem was to get some inhabitants for it. Among the institutions housing juvenile offenders, volunteers were asked for, after explanations of the character of the new place had been given. Pogrebinsky who, it will be recalled, was one of the organizers, gives a version of this experience that is interesting. He writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“When we called for volunteers for the first commune, 15 responded. Very suspiciously they donned their new clothes. They could not believe that henceforth they were free, and they warily eyed the prison guards, trying to guess how many would be sent with them as a convoy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“But here began something unusual. They were given money with which to buy railway tickets to the Commune, and no guards were sent with them. Only the manager of the Commune was with them. Sure enough, they seemed to be free! Should they run away? No, better wait. There was something hard to understand, and in addition, something very flattering—they were being trusted!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“On arrival at the place, two of the boys were sent with money for supper. Here was something altogether strange! They were sent off with money, and no guard to convoy them. The boys bought some foodstuff, came back and returned the whole change. They were utterly astounded when the manager showed them the house where they were to live and explained to them: Everything that you can see, boys—the clothes, food, tools—is being lent to you by the OGPU, and you will have to pay for it all later on.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
One can understand their incredulity, even their staying on through curiosity, if nothing else, to see what would happen next in such a topsy-turvy affair. And day after day the wonder and pleasure in having a home, being free and engaged in making interesting things would grow and hold them steadily.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The managers of the Commune were wary and anxious too, not through fear of escape of their charges, but lest they do the wrong thing and check the growing confidence. In their eagerness not to put pressure of any kind on these young people, they have let the initiative for expansion come from them. In the beginning those who came made shoes, stools, and other things, and were satisfied to watch their own tasks grow under supervision, but as the project became more firmly established there were demands for wider industrial training. The leaders granted the requests with great satisfaction as they developed, their only anxiety being that nothing should ever seem “forced.” There was no doubt subtle guidance, but the group was encouraged to undertake its own education. The story is one of continuous growth, both in number and in development of a broader program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What actually exists now in this place where three thousand work? To begin with there are the paved streets, clean and lined with green shrubbery. The houses beside them are of modern structure, many with flower-filled balconies for each floor, with rows of large windows. There are some small individual houses also, where families live, but it is the lines of those looking from the outside like sunny apartment buildings that gives the place an air of being a town proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On inspection one finds small apartments provided for the married couples and dormitory rooms for the single people. A man who is serving a sentence may have his family there with him and so may a married young woman if it is convenient for the husband to come. The apartments that we saw contained two rooms and a bath. One of the rooms was a large kitchen which could also be used for other purposes. One entered into a small hallway which led to the main room, a large combination living-sleeping room. The furniture was good. There were pictures around, a couch, comfortable chairs, the windows were nicely curtained and the appearance altogether homelike. There is a large community dining room, but in case a family wishes to prepare its own meals it can do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the dormitories we saw, there were rather good-sized rooms, not so large as most of those described in the other prisons, with cot-beds placed in line in the usual way. There seemed to be comfort in these collective places but not, of course, as much space per person as the apartments permitted, nor did they have the homelike appearance of the latter. There was light from several windows and a pleasant outlook, and the two girls present on our visit looked exactly as occupants of a home would appear. As housing goes in crowded Moscow this represented an average standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dining room in the factory-kitchen building was quite large and equipped with small tables, such as one would find in a restaurant. One side was almost an entire window. A few late eaters were sitting at tables and attendants were beginning to clean so that the place had a disorderly after-dinner appearance but one of deeper cleanliness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One might as well not try to keep remembering, as he goes along the street meeting people, that these are convicts of the most habitual sort. They are going or coming from their work exactly as other people would. There is absolutely no difference. They could run away, of course, and a few have, but in the majority of cases, the reverse is true. They do not wish to leave the Commune at the end of their sentence and so they live on and keep a job in some of the factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school building in this Commune is especially lovely. It was completed about two years ago at a cost of a million and a half rubles. It has all the equipment that a good school would be expected to have—a library, reading rooms, laboratories, an auditorium interestingly decorated with murals of working men, which is the work of artist inhabitants, spacious halls and class rooms. The teachers are not residents of the Commune but members of their own profession who come in to teach. The man in charge of the school showed us the building with great pride. The first seven years of education are compulsory, after that there are evening classes for the more advanced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Education, as already indicated, does not stop with formal classroom work but those interested in the arts, in music, or in writing are provided with channels for special training. There are music circles, art classes, drama work, and literary clubs, and the persons making up this artistic group live in their own building, forming a congenial household. A number of the leading ones, the most talented ones, are paid a stipend by the state, and we were told of a number of musicians and writers who had had their first training in this Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The physical education is carried on in a large and splendidly equipped gymnasium, and building up the body is made a major consideration in the training. Setting up exercises are also a part of the daily program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school, with its formal teaching of elementary subjects, is one side of the education program; the other is the work done in the shops. In these two places as well as in this whole atmosphere, the “making people,” spoken of by H. G. Wells, goes on. One must learn a trade and then he must work at it, not as drudgery, but with free enjoyment of his task. In the shops of the shoe factory, the skate factory, the knitting goods factory, the mechanized laundry, the sports goods factory, and the factory kitchen, these former thieves and bandits who have barely escaped with their necks, work at their jobs, some still in the ranks of the unskilled, others risen to instructors and supervisors. One looks and remembers again that there is nothing between them and escape, no one to prevent their walking away, and yet they stay and work. When the day is ended they go out in the street and to their rooms or Walk or do any other thing they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One may break a law of the Commune. To meet the exigencies of such occurrences, there is the comradely court and a penalty either mild or more serious according to the act, and if that is not sufficient then the greatest blow of all will fall—the culprit will be sent back whence he came, or if he came directly he will be transferred to a more severe institution. A new member is on probation for a month and he must prove his worth if he is to live with this group who is serious about making life worth while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The age is 16-24 now, although at its beginning it was 13-17. There are three thousand inhabitants of the Commune, some of whom have finished their terms and have worked on in the factories. These naturally may be older than the maximum age given for those who are sent. The surrounding community was hostile to the idea at the time of the establishment of the Commune among them, as one can imagine any neighborhood might be at having a group of unrestrained criminals, thieves and housebreakers, set down among them, but there is now a general esteem and friendliness felt for those who work in this unique town.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The hospital is perhaps the greatest prize of the place. A large building, set back from the street, with grass, trees, and shrubs in its front yard, it presents an excellent impression. It is equipped for all the best care of the health of the community. Babies are born, children of the communards attended to, and the whole population served by its staff. It fills not only the role of medical care, but an especially educational one as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolshevo has been described in detail because it is the largest of the labor communes and was the first in construction. But there is another close to Moscow, built second in order, on the site of the former Nikolo-Ugreshsky Monastery. This commune has four factories, making musical instruments, incubators, electrical repairs, and compressed fiber, and in 1934 it is estimated that they will turn out goods to the value of some twenty-three or twenty-four million rubles. Here, too, are modern houses with all equipment in which the workers are housed according to industry, the metal workers in one, wood workers in another, and those making musical instruments in a third. There is a separate house for those communards who are members of artist circles, a separate house for women, and a building where probationers stay until permanently assigned. There are twenty-two hundred members of the commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A third is the Dzerzhinsky Labor Commune at Kharkov which follows the same line of development but is smaller than the others. There are only four hundred members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is hard to estimate the results of the work done in such centers as these. A tangible evidence of success is pointed to by authorities on the subject in the steady descent of the percentage of juvenile delinquents to the total number of criminals. This system, spreading year by year to take in all that it may serve, aided by those factory apprenticeship schools that train the 15-18 year old group, ought to do a good deal to depopulate the adult prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XV: CONCLUSION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; concluding remarks of most books on Russia begin with a discussion of class distinction. In this case it would be further stated that it showed not only in court action but was likewise felt in the fact that while the OGPU as an arresting agent turned the ordinary prisoner over to the courts, it acted in the capacity of a judicial organ for those of the opposition class. A few months ago that would have been true. With the transforming of that agent into the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the stripping from it of all judicial powers, one more step has been made toward the disappearance of class lines in the administration of criminal law.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Again there has been the following comment from an authority on the Administration of Criminal Law in the USSR, in regard to this statement: “The class line in the criminal justice can disappear only when the classes themselves disappear. So long as the classes exist, so long as the struggle between them goes on, it is absolutely impossible to avoid the class character of criminal justice You may keep silent about that, you may try to disguise it, but you cannot make it disappear. We don’t find it necessary to disguise the class character of our courts, as the bourgeois science of law and the bourgeois legislation does, because the class whose interests our courts defend, is the overwhelming majority of all the people. With the bourgeois criminal justice it is quite the opposite. Of course, as I have already stated, the victory we have gained over our class enemies here has enormously changed our policy, but this policy remains a class policy, because it remains the policy of the proletariat struggling for socialism. The first aim of this policy does not change, only the methods of its practical accomplishment. If you build a railway, the forms of your work will be different in a plain or in mountains, but the final aim will be the same. “Our final aim is to build a classless society. When this task will be accomplished, not only the class line in the criminal law will disappear, but the criminal law itself will become useless and will die as well as the criminal courts. “But so long as those courts do exist, they cannot go on without an open or a hidden class policy.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the distinction does exist. But in this final evaluation of the present situation in regard to crime repression in the USSR the treatment of political prisoners is not considered. While the method as developed is used for both classes it naturally shows to its best advantage in the treatment of the prisoners from among the workers, and it ought to be judged on that score. It is to be hoped that not many years hence class distinctions will disappear to the extent that machinery for justice will furnish equal measures for all.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following explanation is supplied. “By this time criminal justice will become something quite different from what we are accustomed to. It will become a system of medical and pedagogical measures, which will take their place among other radical and educational institutions. Till then criminal justice will serve the interests of the ruling class as it has always done.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When that happens the treatment of all prisoners will be of the kind that is found so admirably used today in places where discipline and industry are taught to those of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Russians claim no Utopia. When on one occasion the writer expressed admiration to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky for what they had achieved, he quickly and positively responded, “I warn you of its shortcomings.” Well, of course, they are there, plenty of them. They can be found in the administration of justice, too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems though that one who wishes to see actually how the matter stands would find it effective to take first the policy of the state, the standards it sets and the goal at which it aims, then see not only how fully that aim is achieved, but what progress is made year by year toward the goal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Take whatever phase of criminal repression one will, and one finds progress and a pretty good practice of policy. Judges in the beginning, one supposes by the Soviet’s own records, woefully inadequate at finding out what justice might be in a case, are now much more fully qualified; jurors for a time without any qualifications except as to vote are now selected with more care and given some training for the task before them. How fully adequate are they? It would take a firsthand survey of the nation’s tribunals to be able to say, but to judge by a fair sample the author believes them to be fulfilling their duty in a high degree and with more than average competence. Their attendance to work and their conscientious effort to get at the straight of the affair before them is pronounced. They seem in general to feel the responsibility of being the agent for administering justice to their own toiling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the prisons and places of deprivation of liberty one sees more evenness of tone. The personality of those in charge of these places strikes one as indicating fitness for the job. Members of staffs were observed closely by the writer and with one single exception they seemed well selected for handling the work. Vishinsky, in the Introduction of the book edited by him, states that one of the shortcomings of the prison system is the need for more trained persons who will understand what this policy really is and help put it into practice. One would expect that to be true, since it is so universally a fact with regard to prison workers. It would be indeed a Utopia that provided an adequate staff for penal places. But it seems to the author, by comparison, that he is better off than he thinks he is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the appearance these staffs make may be due in part to the fact of close supervision from above. There is another factor, too, which ought to help. Responsible authorities have a good picture in mind of what a man needs to be in order to fit into their scheme of living. Their society makes definite requirements of its members and training is provided to make the misfits fit. To do that thing which they see clearly they have developed a policy that merely trains a man, both to discipline himself if possible, and do some work that will be of economic benefit both to himself and to the country, while punishment is forgotten. One of their chief tasks is to teach him to prefer the “Life of Labor,” and by instilling in him, or encouraging the spark if it is already there, the joy of creation, they manage in most cases to do it—if their statistics on recidivism are anywhere near correct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another advantage is that they have one very definite policy and every superintendent of penal places knows what that policy is. It is, as stated in their codes, to educate and to train without doing anything to degrade, to build up a personality, a self-respect, and to do nothing that could hinder such development. With that knowledge in hand it is easier to put the program into practice, and they can develop plans for carrying it out. An understanding of psychological principles enters here, not only in expression of policy as found in the Criminal Code but in the actual practice as one finds it. In doing away with handcuffs, with solitary confinement, with any type of corporal punishment, and with any prison garb, the enunciation of policy does its part, but in the approach of the immediate staff to the inmates there is seen a wholesomeness that no code could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude of the authorities toward violations on the part of officers is another indication of their sincerity of purpose in this work. In their zeal to put their policy into action they not only provide that the Observation Commission shall be in close touch with all that goes on in the Institution, and impose on them much responsibility for the régime, but they also back them up by providing a penalty for the man who violates the regulations. A guard who strikes a prisoner is in danger of arrest himself, and since there are official records of such cases, one is sure that an attempt is made to put the policy into practice. It must be true that in isolated instances some such things happen and go unpunished, but it is the stated policy of the authorities to discourage in every way possible the committing of these acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Central authorities, as we have seen in discussing administration of these prisons, have made repeated efforts year by year to see that the Observation Committee keeps in close touch with all the life of the Institution and thereby effects better parole and release work as well as brings up the level of work done in the place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another indication of progress in putting the government’s policy into practice is the speed with which they have built open agricultural colonies, institutions of semi-closed type, and labor communes such as Bolshevo so that prisoners might be taken out of the old type of places. Judging from past accomplishment, there should in a very few years be left only those who demand restriction. In addition they are year by year adding to the number of those sentenced to compulsory labor without deprivation of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, then, is a system that deserves to attract the attention of those genuinely interested in a better approach to effective crime repression. It has without doubt made a distinct contribution in this field of social endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF CRIMINAL CODE GENERAL SECTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL SECTION&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE AIMS OF PENAL LEGISLATION OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. The penal legislation of the RSFSR pursues the task of protecting the socialist state of workers and peasants and the régime established therein from socially dangerous acts (crimes) by applying to persons committing them measures of social protection set out in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
EXTENT OF OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. The provisions of the present code extend to all citizens of the RSFSR, who have committed socially dangerous acts within the territory of the USSR, as well as beyond the boundaries of the USSR in case they are detained within the territory of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Citizens of other constituent republics are in accordance with the RSFSR laws liable to be prosecuted for crimes committed within the territory of the RSFSR as well as outside the boundaries of the USSR, if they had been detained and subjected to trial or investigation within the RSFSR territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes committed within the territory of the Union, citizens of the constituent republics are liable according to the laws of the locality where they committed the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. For crimes committed within the territory of the USSR foreigners are liable according to the laws of the locality where the crime was committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5. The question of the criminal liability of foreign nationals enjoying the right of exterritoriality shall be decided in each individual case by diplomatic means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PENAL POLICY OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
6. A socially dangerous act is any act of commission or omission directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government, for the period of time pending a transition to a communist régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: An act, which although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code is free from socially dangerous characteristics owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
7. In regard to persons who commit socially dangerous acts or who are dangerous owing to their connections with criminal circles, measures of social protection of judicial-corrective, medical, or medical-educational nature are applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
8. In the event of the concrete act, which at the time it was committed was a crime in accordance with Article 6 of the present code, but by the time it was investigated or examined in court lost its socially dangerous character owing to a change in the criminal law, or owing to the mere change in the social-political conditions, or in case the person who committed it cannot, in the opinion of the court be regarded as socially dangerous at the time indicated, then such an act does not entail the application of a measure of social protection to the person who committed it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
9. Measures of social protection are applied for the following purposes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To prevent the commission of further crimes by persons who have committed them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To exercise influence over other unstable elements of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To adapt the offender to the conditions of the social life of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measures of social protection cannot have for their purpose the infliction of physical suffering or the degradation of human dignity and they do not pursue the object of retribution or punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
10. With regard to persons who have committed socially dangerous acts, methods of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applied only in cases when these persons&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Acted knowingly, i.e., foresaw the socially dangerous effect of their acts, desired these consequences, or knowingly allowed such effects to take place, or&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Acted carelessly, i.e., did not foresee the effects of their acts—although they should have foreseen them—or recklessly hoped to avert the effects of their acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
11. Measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not to be applied in the case of persons who have committed a crime while suffering from chronic mental diseases, or while temporarily insane, or in general in such a state of deranged health as to be incapable of realizing their acts or of controlling them. Neither are these measures to be applied to persons, who although at the time they committed a crime were in possession of their mental faculties, nevertheless suffered from mental derangement by the time sentenced was pronounced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection which are applied to these persons are confined to those of a medical nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: The present article does not apply to persons who have committed a crime in a state of intoxication.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
12. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not applied in the case of minors up to the age of 16. When regarding the latter, the Commission of Juvenile Offenders finds it possible to confine itself to measures of social protection of a medical and educational nature. Oct. 30, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 82, Article 796.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
13. Measures of social protection are not applied to persons who have committed acts foreseen by the penal laws, if the court establishes that these acts were committed by them in a state of necessary defense against attempts at the Soviet rule, or at the body or rights of a person defending himself or another person, provided there was no excess of the limits of self-defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection are not applied when the same acts were committed in order to avert a danger, which under the given circumstances were unavertable by any other means, provided the harm thereby caused was less serious than the harm averted. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
14. Criminal prosecution may not take place&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) when ten years have elapsed from the time of the commission of the crime, for which the court may inflict a penalty of not more than five years’ imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) when five years have elapsed since the time the crime for which the court may impose a penalty of not more than five years had been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) when three years have elapsed since the perpetration of the crime, for which a court may sentence the criminal to not more than one year’s imprisonment, or when the law provides a more lenient measure of social protection than imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle of remoteness is applied when in the course of the corresponding period of time no proceedings were instituted in connection with the given case. The period of remoteness is interrupted when the person who committed a crime within the corresponding period of remoteness commits another similar or not less serious crime, or evades judicial examination or investigation. In such cases the periods of remoteness begin to run from the date of the perpetration of the second offense or from the date of the resumption of the interrupted proceedings. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: In cases of criminal prosecutions for counter-revolutionary crimes the application of the principle of remoteness is left to the discretion of the court in each individual case. However, if the court does not find it possible to apply the principle of remoteness, and sentences a person to be shot for such a crime, such sentence must necessarily be commuted to the proclamation that the person accused is an enemy of the toilers coupled with the forfeiture of the citizenship of the USSR, and exile from the confines of the USSR forever or imprisonment for a period of not less than two years. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: In regard to persons criminally prosecuted for active participation in acts, and active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement, committed while holding responsible or secret posts under the Tsarist régime, or under counter-reveolutionary governments during the civil war, the application of the principle of remoteness and the question of commuting capital punishment by shooting are left to the discretion of the court. June 6, 19275.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 3: The periods of remoteness laid down in the present article do not apply to acts prosecuted by way of administrative action according to the present code, and the infliction of punishments for such acts can take place only within one month from the date they were committed. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
15. A sentence of conviction shall not be carried into effect if it was not carried into effect within ten years from the date of the passing of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
16. In case a certain socially dangerous act is not directly foreseen by the present code, the grounds and limits of liability for such acts are determined in accordance with those articles of the code which foresee crimes most closely approximating them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
17. The measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applicable equally to persons who have committed the crime—participants as well as their accomplices—instigators and abettors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instigators are persons who induced the commission of the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abettors are persons who assisted in the carrying out of the crime by means of advice, indications, providing of means and removal of obstacles, or by means of concealing the criminal or the traces of crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
18. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are determined for each of the accomplices according to the degree of their participation in the given crime, as well as according to the degree of danger of the crime, and of the person who took part in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The failure to report a crime that has been committed, or is being planned, entails the application of the measures of social defense of judicial-corrective nature only in cases specially designated in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
19. An attempt to commit a crime, as well as acts preparatory to a crime, which take the form of finding or adapting weapons and means, and creating conditions favorable for a crime, are prosecuted on the same basis as a crime which has actually been committed. In such cases, the court, when selecting the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature, must be guided by the degree of danger of the person who has committed the crime or the preparatory act. The court must also examine how far the preparations for the crime went, and how near the consequences were to the act as well as the causes owing to which the crime was not completed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the crime was not committed owing to the persons intending to commit it having voluntarily renounced it, the court fixes a corresponding measure of social defense for those acts which were in fact committed by the person who attempted or prepared to commit the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; IV&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON THE MEASURES OF SOCIAL PROTECTION APPLIED UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE WITH REGARD TO PERSONS WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
20. The following are the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
21. Execution by shooting is applied for the purpose of combating the gravest kinds of crimes, threatening the foundations of Soviet rule, and of Soviet régime, pending the abolition of that punishment by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, in cases specially indicated in the articles of the present Code, as an exceptional measure for the protection of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
22. Persons who have not reached the age of 18 at the time the crime was committed and women in a state of pregnancy cannot be condemned to shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
23. The principal measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature applied with regard to persons who have committed crimes, consist in proclaiming them enemies of the toilers with the consequences following such measure, imprisonment, and compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other measures of social protection set out in Article 20, except warning and the confiscation of property, may be decreed either as independent measures or be combined with the basic ones as supplementary measures. The confiscation of property as a supplementary measure of social protection may be imposed by the court only in cases specified in the articles of the present Code. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
24. The following are measures of social protection of a medical nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Compulsory medical treatment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Placing a person in a hospital coupled with isolation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
25. The following are measures of social protection of a medical-education kind:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Delivery of a minor into the charge of his parents, adopters, guardians, relatives, provided the aforementioned are able to support him, or to other persons or institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The placing in a special medical-educational institution. December 20, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 4, Article 38.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
26. Measures of social protection of a medical-educational and medical nature may be applied by the court in case it recognizes that the application of measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind does not fit the given case; or they may be applied in addition to the latter, if moreover the measures of social protection of a medical-pedagogical and pedagogical kind have not been applied by the competent judicial inquiry organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
27. The proclamation of a person as enemy of the toilers and expulsion from the confines of the USSR with the forfeiture of the citizenship of a constituent republic, and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR may only be applied for an unlimited period. June 6. 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
28. Imprisonment may be imposed for a period of between one and ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labor camps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labor, or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labor camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: Persons who are uninterruptedly serving in the units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and who are in the cadres either as privates or junior commanders, serving for a definite period, are sentenced in peace time, instead of to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for two months to one year, to serve for a like period in the military-corrective units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and instead of imprisonment for a period up to two months, to arrest for a like period, served in a manner prescribed for the disciplinary arrest of persons in military service.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, by special decree of the court in each individual case, the same measures may be applied to the above-mentioned persons also for common crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons in military service of the middle, senior, highest and junior commanding personnel of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who remain in the cadres after serving the required period in the army, and who have been sentenced to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for a period up to one year, in case of dismissal from the ranks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, serve their term indicated in the sentences by doing compulsory labor according to the general rules. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: When the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army passes to the state of war, persons in the military service who are in military-corrective units are dispatched to the active army, and the subsequent serving of the measure of social protection imposed on them is postponed until after the termination of military operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sentence condemning a soldier in time of war to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights may, by decree of the court which passed that sentence, be postponed until after the termination of military operations, on condition that the convicted person joins the active army.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons in military service mentioned in the first and second parts of the above note, who while in the ranks of active army have proved themselves staunch defenders of the USSR, the court which passed the sentence may, on the petition of the competent military authorities, release the convicted person from the measure of social protection formerly imposed on him, or substitute for it a more lenient measure of social protection. October 1, 1928.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1928, No. 127, Article 816.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
29. The period of preliminary detention, and also the time spent in confinement from the moment the sentence was passed pending its coming into force must obligatorily be reckoned as part of the period of detention decreed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the court applies a measure of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind other than imprisonment, it has the right to take into consideration the period of detention previous to the trial and accordingly mitigate the measure of social protection chosen by it, or to resolve not to apply to the defendant the measure of social protection set out in the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons sentenced to compulsory labor each day of preliminary detention is credited as three days of compulsory labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
30. Compulsory labor without imprisonment may be imposed for a period ranging from one day to one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: Compulsory labor without imprisonment is not applied to the middle, senior, highest and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who are in the cadres and have completed their term of service, and also to persons in military service who belong to the cadres of privates and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during their appointed period of service. In place of compulsory labor the above-mentioned persons in military service are sentenced to arrest for a period not exceeding two months, which is served in a manner prescribed for persons in military service under disciplinary arrest. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
31. Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights consists of the deprivation of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) elective franchise both active and passive&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the right to occupy elective posts in public organizations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the right to occupy certain specified state offices&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) the right to the titles of distinction&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) parental rights&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) right to pensions paid by way of social insurance and to unemployment relief paid by way of social insurance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights may be prescribed both fully—so as to cover all the above-mentioned rights—and partially, in respect of their separate categories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of parental rights may be prescribed by the court, only if it has been proven that this right has been abused by the convicted person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of pension may be prescribed by the courts only in the following cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) conviction for the commission of state crimes (part I of the Special Section)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) conviction for the commission of crimes prompted by greed to imprisonment or to exile with a compulsory residence in other localities (as the basic measure of social protection)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the prescription of the confiscation of the entire property as supplementary measure of social protection&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) conviction in time of peace for military crimes, falling under articles of 193(3), 193(4), 193(7), 193(9), 193(12), 193(13), 193(17), 193(20)-193(28), of the present Code, and in time of war, for any of the crimes falling under Chapter IX of the Criminal Code (on crimes by persons in military service). June 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 30, Article 388.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
32. Forfeiture of rights cannot be prescribed for a period exceeding five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case this measure of social protection is prescribed as one supplementary to imprisonment, forfeiture of rights extends to the entire period of imprisonment served plus a period determined by the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
33. Forfeiture of rights, foreseen by paragraphs a-c of Article 31 is accompanied by the forfeiture of the orders of the USSR, and of the orders of the RSFSR. In such cases the court is obliged, after the sentence comes into force, to present a petition to that effect to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as the case may be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of the other marks of distinction and of distinctive titles, is effected by sentence of the court. August 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 42, Article 504.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
34. Forfeiture of rights may be decreed by the court both as a supplementary and as an independent measure of social protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When imposing a sentence of over one year’s imprisonment, the court is obliged to discuss the question of the forfeiture of the convicted person’s rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights cannot be combined with conditional conviction or with public censure. December 6, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 8788, Article 854.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
35. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement or with prohibition to reside in other localities or without these limitations, coupled with compulsory labor or without compulsory labor, may be applied by the court with regard to those convicted persons, who, in the opinion of the court, it would be socially dangerous to leave in the given locality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the boundaries of a separate locality with an obligatory residence in other localities is prescribed for a period of three to ten years. This measure, as a supplementary one, can only be prescribed for a period not exceeding five years. The removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory residence in other localities, coupled with compulsory labor, may only be prescribed as a basic measure of social protection. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with prohibition to reside in certain localities, or without this restrictive provision is prescribed for a period of one to five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case one of these measures is decreed by the court as a supplementary one to imprisonment, the period of this supplementary measure begins to run from the date of the release of the prisoner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons sentenced to the removal from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in some other locality in order to serve their terms of imprisonment in corrective labor camps, after serving their term of imprisonment, settle in the district of the camp pending the period when they will be allowed a free choice of their residence. Land must be allotted to them, or else they must be provided with paid work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Removal from the RSFSR territory, as well as removal from any specified locality whatever form it takes, cannot be applied to persons under sixteen. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
36. Removal from the confines of the USSR or RSFSR for a definite period of time may take place only in a manner specially provided by federal legislation. Removal from the confines of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities may be applied by the court only in cases of conviction for crimes specified by Articles 58(2)-58(14), 59(2), Part I, a, 59(3), 59(302), 59(3-b), 59(7), 59 (8), Part I, 59(9), 59(21), 61 Part III, 73(1), 74 Part II, 104, 107, 116 Part II, 117 Part II, 118, 129, 129-a, 136, 140 Part II, 142 Part II, 153 Part II, 155, 162, b, c, d, and e, 164 Part II, 165 Part III, 166, 167, 169, Part II, 173 and 175 Parts II and III.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Places in which compulsory settlement may be prescribed are determined as follows: With regard to persons condemned to exile without compulsory labor by the chief administration of militia at the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, by agreement with the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR; and with regard to persons condemned to exile with compulsory labor, by the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR. February 15, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 9, Article 102.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; May 30, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 27, Article 247.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
37. Removal from office may be applied in case the court deems it impossible to leave the condemned person at the post he occupied at the time of his conviction, or at the time he committed the crime. It may be accompanied by a prohibition to occupy a certain post, such prohibition not to last over five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
38. Prohibition to follow a certain activity or industry is applied by the court for a period not to exceed five years in cases where the court shall consider it impossible, owing to the ascertained abuses by the person convicted while he was engaged in his profession or industry, to allow him to continue same further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In particular, the court has the right to prohibit the person convicted to undertake any responsibilities with regard to furnishing labor and material to State institutions, to enter into contracts with State and public enterprises and institutions, to manage trade or commission enterprises either in his own name or on behalf of other persons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
39. Public censure consists of the public expression of condemnation to the person condemned declared in the name of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
40. Confiscation of property is the compulsory and uncompensated alienation in favor of the State of the whole property of a convicted person, or of a proportion thereof exactly defined by the court, such property being either entirely owned by him, or constituting a share in common property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of domestic use and indispensable to the condemned person and his family, the stock and tools required for small-scale peasant industry or agricultural production, and serving as a means of existence for him and his family, are not subject to confiscation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foodstuffs and sums of money left at the disposal of the convicted person and members of his family, may not, according to valuation in their totality, be less than the average three-months’ wages of a worker or that locality in respect to each member of the family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The stock of tools indispensable to a convicted person for his professional work may be confiscated only in case the court decrees that he shall be deprived of the right of exercising such profession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: In kulak households only the property mentioned in Articles 1-9 of the List of Kinds of Property on which execution may not be levied in respect of arrears of taxes, custom duties, and dues, is not liable to confiscation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, Nos. 8990, Article 924.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
41. When property is confiscated, the State shall not answer for the debts and liabilities of the convicted person, if such had been contracted after the taking of steps by the investigation or judicial organs to protect the property, and without the consent of these organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to claims subject to gratification out of the confiscated property, the State answers only within the limits of the assets, while in regard to priority of gratification of claims the rules shall be observed that are laid down in Articles 99 and 101 of the Civil Code and 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure of RSFSR published April 10, 1930.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
42. A fine is a money penalty imposed by the court within the limits established by separate articles of the present Code, and when applied as an additional measure, the fine shall be imposed at the discretion of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all cases a fine shall be imposed in conformity to the property status of the convicted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In determining the fine, the court may decide to substitute, in the event of nonpayment, by compulsory work without deprivation of liberty at the rate of one month compulsory labor for 100 rubles fine. No substitution of deprivation of liberty for a fine or vice versa shall be allowed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of property that are not subject to confiscation may not be taken in payment of a fine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
43. The caution is applied by the court only when a verdict of acquittal is given, if the court considers that the behavior of the acquitted gives ground, nevertheless, to fear that he might commit the crime in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
44. The obligation to repair the damage is imposed upon the convicted in those cases when the court finds it expedient that the convicted shall eliminate the consequences of the violation of the law committed by him, or of the damage caused by him to the plaintiff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This measure of social defense, however, may not exceed by its severity the measure of social defense given as the basic penalty in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; V&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON MEASURES OF SOCIAL DEFENSE OF JUDICO-CORRECTIONAL CHARACTER AND THEIR IMPOSITION BY COURT&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
45. In imposing a measure of social protection of judico-correctional character the court shall be guided by:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) the provisions of the general section of the present code&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the limits indicated in the article of the Special Section which provides a penalty for a given kind of crime&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the Socialist conception of law, taking into consideration the social danger of the crime committed, the circumstances of the case, and the personality of the defendant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
46. The crimes foreseen by the present code are divided into:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes directed against the foundations of the Soviet system established by the authority of Workers and Peasants in the USSR, such crimes being consequently considered the more dangerous, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) All other crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes of the first category the Code lays down the limit below which the court may not go in imposing a measure of social defense of judico-correctional character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On all other crimes the Code lays down only the maximum limit of penalty to be imposed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
47. The basic question to be settled in each separate case is the question of the social danger of the crime that has been tried.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An aggravating factor in this respect, when determining one or the other measure of social protection foreseen by the Code, is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Committing a crime in order to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie. ‘&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Possibility of causing harm to the interests of the State, of the toilers by committing the crime, although the crime itself was not immediately directed against the interests of the State or of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Committing of a crime by a group or a band.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Committing a crime by a person who already committed a crime before, except in cases when a given person is considered as not having been tried before, or when a long time, in a judicial sense, has passed since the committing of the first crime, or since the conviction of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Articles 14 and 15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The court, however, depending on the character of the first crime, may not consider it as an aggravating factor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Committing a crime for selfish or base motives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Committing a crime with particular cruelty, violence, slyness, or in regard to persons subordinated to the criminal or materially dependent on him, or particularly helpless on account of age, or other circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
48. Extenuating circumstances in the imposition of one or another measure of social defense or when a crime has been committed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Although exceeding the limits of self-defense, yet for the protection of Soviet law, revolutionary law, or the personality and right of the party defending himself or another person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) For the first time&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) For motives other than selfishness or base desires&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Under the influence of threats, compulsion, or official or material dependence&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Under the influence of strong mental agitation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) In a state of hunger or distress, or under the influence of severe personal or family conditions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Due to ignorance, lack of consciousness, or an accidental chain of circumstances&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) By a person under age, or by a woman in a state of pregnancy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
49. If the crime committed by the defendant contains the symptoms of several crimes, as well as in the case of the defendant having committed several crimes for which he has not been sentenced, the court, having defined the measure of social defense for each crime separately, finally imposes the penalty according to the article which provides for the gravest of the crimes committed by the defendant and the severest measure of social defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
50. If a minor (16-20 years of age) is sentenced to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the term must be reduced by one-third as compared with the term of an adult sentenced under the same article. At all events the term of the sentence of a minor shall not exceed one-half the maximum laid down by the present Code for a given crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
51. In the event when, in view of exceptional circumstances of the case, the court finds it necessary to impose a measure of social defense below the lowest limit indicated in a corresponding article of the present Code, or to apply another, less stringent measure of social defense that is not indicated in the article, the court may also depart from the article, but the motives of such departure from the code must, be clearly stated in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same rule applies in those cases when the court finds that the defendant at the time of the trial is not socially dangerous and no measure of social defense is imposed on him by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
52. The right of either complete or partial release of the condemned person from the application of measures of social defense, under sentences of all judicial organs of RSFSR, except cases foreseen in the present Code, constitutes the exclusive prerogative of the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; VI&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON CONDITIONAL SENTENCES AND CONDITIONAL AND EARLY RELEASE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
53. If the court finds that the degree of social danger of the defendant does not call either for his isolation, or for the imposition of compulsory labor, it may impose a conditional sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such cases the court decides not to execute the verdict if within a stated period the convicted person will not commit a fresh crime of equal gravity. This period may not be less than one year and not more than ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: If a fine or property requisition is added to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the fine is imposed irrespective of the conditional nature of the basic verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
54. In the event of the committing of a crime by the conditionally condemned during the probation period the court has the right either to add the conditioned measure of social defense either fully or in part to the measure of social defense given by the second verdict. In the first case, the total term of deprivation of liberty must not exceed ten years, and the total term of compulsory labor must not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
55. The following persons shall be held free from previous convictions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Persons acquitted by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Persons conditionally sentenced, who did not commit a crime of equal gravity during the probation period given by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for terms of not more than three months, or to any other minor measure of social defense, who in the course of three years after serving the first sentence, did not commit a fresh crime, or persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a period of more than six months if they committed no fresh crime of equal gravity in the course of six years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
56. If persons sentenced to terms of social defense show reformation, they may be released before the end of the term imposed by the verdict of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conditional early release consists either in abstaining from further serving of the sentence, or in substituting a milder form of social defense. The manner of application of conditional early release is laid down by the Correctional Labor Code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to persons serving sentences in correctional labor camps, conditional early release is applied in the form of transferring the convict to free settlement in the district of the given camp for the rest of his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the conditionally-released person should commit a fresh crime of equal gravity during the unexpired time of his sentence, the latter is added to the measure of social defense imposed by the court for the new crime, while the total term of deprivation of liberty may not exceed ten years and the total term of compulsory labor may not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
57. Persons under age, sentenced to deprivation of liberty and placed in industrial homes for minors, remain there until fully corrected, but not later than reaching the age of 18. If, by the time of reaching this age, the sentence has not yet expired, they may be given early discharge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Minors, in regard to whom early discharge should be deemed impossible, shall either remain in the same industrial home, or shall be transferred to other industrial homes or colonies on the grounds laid down by the correctional labor code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Russian_Justice&amp;diff=63404</id>
		<title>Library:Russian Justice</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Russian_Justice&amp;diff=63404"/>
		<updated>2024-02-26T23:40:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: nowiki a #&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Russian Justice|author=Mary Stevenson Callcott|written in=1935|publisher=Macmillan Company|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/soviet-justice/}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PREFACE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; problem of crime in the United States is one of our most serious social questions. Within recent years the activities of the gangster and the kidnapper, the increasing number of young criminals whom we do not know how to treat so that they are re-established in life, have brought alarm not only to the social worker and others who try to meet the situation, but to the ordinary citizen as well. Not only is our penal system failing to reform the lawbreaker, but our social conditions are breeding others. The delay in our courts, the influence of politics, and the swaying of sentimental or incompetent juries by artful criminal lawyers without social conscience, are familiar to our citizens. Confronted by all this, we ask ourselves what we might do in order to fulfill our duty in protecting society and at the same time in aiding the transgressor to become a useful citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One thing we can do is to examine closely any system that seems to work in other countries. Russia, with her broad social program, gives much attention to her problem of crime and criminals. Sherwood Eddy, a student of Russia for a long time, has included the humane treatment of prisoners as one of the things which we might profitably get from that country. He might have added also that the simplicity of court procedure by which they arrive at justice has some commendable virtues.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have visited prisons in many parts of our country as well as in several others and have sat through criminal trials in almost as many places, so in my visits to courts and prisons in the USSR I had an experience that made observation intelligent. There is no doubt that we may learn something from the Russians about the restoration to society of those who contravene the law. Whether one sympathizes with or condemns the political faith of this country, one must admire and respect a people who are able to put ideals into works as they do. They know what they want of the man who is their criminal and they set to work to teach him how to fit into their society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are shortcomings in this phase of their work, mostly on the physical side, but they know that as well as we do and are correcting them as rapidly as possible. They have often had to use old buildings because in the short space of years of the new nation they have not had time to build enough modern ones; but they have reformed such gloomy spots as the Women’s Prison of Moscow is said to have been in Tzarist days, into a place of considerable light and more livable conditions. There are also some old cells in the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute of much too little ventilation but this building is to be replaced within a short time. Most of the buildings of this institute are already in good condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States we have been so led away with preparing better buildings (we still have some of the worst in the world) that we have often forgotten the spiritual side. There are some penal institutions, such as the New Jersey Prison for Women at Clinton, N. J., where an excellent spirit certainly prevails, but even in our best prisons I think that we do not overcome that feeling on the part of the prisoner that he or she is permanently set aside from normal society. It is the exceptional individual case where this is not true. In the Russian institutions, especially those where there is great freedom, one is struck by the atmosphere that prevails among the prisoners of still being a part of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In undertaking to give to the American public in general a picture of the situation in Soviet Russia in regard to crime and its repression certain usual questions have been kept in mind. Interested inquirers, both in this country and abroad, have repeatedly asked me, “What are the courts really like?” “What kinds of crime are committed?”’ “Who commits them?” and “What is the punishment given?” The answers are found in the pages of this book. Since it is intended to reach the layman as well as the social worker, the student of criminology, the lawyer, and the legislator, an informal approach has been used. It is hoped, however, that this will not tend to detract from the authenticity of the work. No effort has been spared to give as accurate an account as possible, both by means of research over a period of years in connection with my Criminology class and by recent visits to courts and penal institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gratitude for help must be expressed to many people whom I cannot enumerate here. I am especially indebted to the Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, Prof. A. J. Vishinsky, who gave valuable time for appointments, to Mr. C. S. Smith of the Associated Press who aided me in many ways, to Director Shlaposnitchov of the Institute of Criminal Policy, to Professor Brusilovsky for conferences and appointments he both arranged and participated in and for lectures which was permitted to attend, to S. Golunsky, of the Commissariat of Justice, who in addition to such services as were rendered by others, has contributed the further service of reading and criticizing the manuscript. Finally, to my two young countrywomen, Miss Margaret Moore and Miss Margaret Ross, who gave up parts of their vacation in Moscow to contribute typing to the project.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
M. S. C.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New York City&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
October, 1934&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Criminal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; repression in the Soviet Union is bound up with the whole social program which the state has been developing. A good many of us had thought of the Soviet’s welfare work as more of a hit-or-miss arrangement, gathering up a few threads here, omitting to notice some quite as important in other places, but as the work is examined in its entirety, it gives evidence of more than usually comprehensive planning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In making an evaluation of the present situation in regard to any of its phases of development, it is not sufficient merely to consider standards as they now exist, but it is also, of course, necessary to take into account the distance traversed in the brief time and the difficulties surrounding the accomplishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The important thing, let us say for an example, in child care, is to see that ten or twelve years ago thousands upon thousands of children were wandering in wild gangs, all over the country, thieving, plundering, killing even, unfed and unclothed, and that today they are, with few exceptions both clothed and fed, being trained and cared for in institutions or at home, and that the period of distress and acute exigency is over. If that had extended to children alone we might understand that with all the forces available the authorities could handle such a situation, but it was a larger thing than that, and the fact that in the face of what seemed an undertaking of impossible dimensions the authorities were able to come through, and with a program so constructive that it has revolutionized their treatment of offenders against the law, seems something of a miracle. Or again, it is of great significance, especially to such a study as this, that the banditry and roving lawlessness on the part of men in 1922, has been reduced so sharply that this form of crime is pretty well under control. So, it is the distance revolutionary Russia has come, the rapidity of her pace, that are more significant than the actual standards in practice. That is not to say, however, that her present standards always need a defense. Her achievement in treatment of prisoners, for example, which is the subject of this book, does not suffer by comparison with that of western nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the pages that follow attention is given to treatment and to standards, but for the moment, assuming that advances have been rapidly made in the repression of crime, let us focus our interest on other factors that have contributed to this progress. For us it is important to discover, if we can, what factors are responsible for the one-third decrease in the number of criminals which authorities say has been effected since the beginning of the Revolution. Even if their estimate of the reduction seems high, it is still apparent to a student of the situation that a real decrease, perhaps smaller, has been made. The united front with which the nation has attacked its social problems on all sides has, as would be expected, exerted great influence in the handling of the crime problem. Prevention has resulted in a large way from the development in the various phases of social welfare that have gone on simultaneously, and as one begins to consider the relationship that exists there appears that whole pattern, referred to earlier, which leaves few phases of social and economic life untouched.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The care of children has already been spoken of. It is clear that one of the big problems, among the horde that have puzzled and challenged the group who have had chief responsibility in steering the government, was juvenile delinquency. While authorities gathered these young offenders together and put them in places for care, they were at the same time preparing and carrying out a program for their youth that would prevent others following in the footsteps of the delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the preventive program that was now first in interest, the item of education stood at the head of the list. No doubt in the early days of the proletarian state, schools were woefully inadequate, but children were at least placed under the guidance of people who gave them the elements of an education as well as taught them something of how to work. But the nation appears to have a mania for the education of its masses and a point has now been reached where there is university study in sight, with a stipend attached for those who attend, for all those able to take advantage of it. Juvenile delinquency rates have steadily decreased and the development of the school system has obviously contributed largely to this reduced figure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Health programs are, of course, directly related to crime repression. There is a book on the socialized medicine of Russia, written by Sir Arthur Newsholme of England and Dr. Kingsbury of our own country, that should be read for full information on this subject, but it can be said that the scope of the program is wide and the extent far-reaching. Beyond the broad development of curative medicine there is the preventive program in which physical culture activities figure largely. As an illustration of the results achieved in this work, a demonstration staged in Moscow in the summer of 1934 was very impressive. The author along with a good many other Americans and other foreign visitors witnessed the parade in which a hundred thousand physical culturists, with their canoes, paddles, tennis racquets, flowers, and other things suggestive of health and enjoyment of life, passed in excellent order, so well disciplined that one group followed another without a break in ranks. There is, of course, a great significance to that when it is considered on a national scale. With every factory and farm providing such a program for its workers there should be a rapid diminution in the number of weaklings who turn to crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One finds himself on the defensive at the mention of more liberal divorce laws, but such a provision may actually lessen criminal acts. Since a woman who finds her husband wholly incompatible and wants to remarry some more congenial person has only to indicate her wish in order to be free, she is not nearly as likely to poison her husband or work herself into a state from which some expert psychiatrist will have to untangle her. When the system was first initiated in the Soviet Union we were told that there was a great rush of those who wished to benefit, but that since the first period exhausted the number of those eager for separation, there has been a noticeable decrease. One meets a great number of people who have been married a long time! Such an authority as Vishinsky attributed much of the decrease in criminal acts to these liberal laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The rapid industrialization of the country has made for less crime except in the case of offenses against the state. In that period just before the installation of NEP when farmers and others discharged from the army could find no work, when distribution without production had left the nation in starvation, banditry flourished, but when the five-year plan began to make demands for more workers than could be furnished, a halt was called in the advance of ordinary crime. Also, with work plentiful, there is no problem of providing jobs for those discharged from prisons. With the system of training which gives a skilled trade to every man capable of assimilating the instruction and mastering the tasks, and of giving instruction also to the unskilled type who are thereby enabled to fill some job well, there is no question of work for discharged prisoners. How long this condition will hold depends, of course, on the time it will take for industrialization to reach its zenith and for the population to catch up and exceed the ability of the system to absorb them. However, there is an encouragement of birth control and that may manage the question somewhat better than has been done in other countries gone on before with their industrialization program. Since Russia sits down with pencil and paper and makes her plans of production, perhaps she can do something in the nature of requirements for population increase!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following comment is offered by a Russian authority: “That is something like the Malthusian theory. We don’t believe in it. We are sure that at present, and for a very long time in the future there can be no real over-population. If sometimes something like that seems to happen in the capitalistic countries, it is an illusion. It is the result of the social conditions of those countries. Our social system makes it possible for us to use any quantity of labour and there can be no question of over-population for us. Therefore the question of something like State birth control does not even arise.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Housing is, of course, one of the biggest problems in Soviet Russia. They are building with feverish rapidity but one suspects it will be some time until they catch up to the need. It is popular to correlate bad health, crime, and most other social evils with congested housing, and one feels sure that much of the blame attached to it is well placed. If Russia can eliminate this condition she will have done much in exercising control of those situations that are supposed to be the major causes of crime. She has her own theory of cause which another chapter discusses, but optimistic socialists believe she is in a fair way to remove that also. Russians know well enough of their shortage of housing and they know the social significance of that shortage, but one cannot rebuild an entire nation in the few short years since their social cataclysm. There had to be a gap somewhere and both lack of trained workers and of material accounts for its existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Training for taking part in government affairs, such as elections and jury service, is also conducive to securing law observance. The writer’s visit was so taken up with courts and prisons that other angles of investigation were neglected and any ideas as to government practices in democracy are secured second-hand. However, some of those Americans who live there and observe intelligently state that there is a steady progress toward greater participation by the people themselves in government. As education prepares the way, participation becomes more real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any mention of fight against crime in this country ought to take into account the establishment of the new culture of this society. At the close of the October Revolution, Russia had as its chief asset a great many millions of people whose rights the leaders had sworn to establish and protect, and who were unlettered, superstitious and without social understanding. Educating children was a small task compared to what they must do with those adults, and in the period when the old culture had come to an end with the last efforts of the civil war and the new had not well begun, crime swelled into large numbers of convicted. But these peasants and workers have many of them learned, at evening classes, at conferences, and in trade unions of various sorts, something of what this order stands for. A new social consciousness that makes the individual feel responsible for the law and order of the country has arisen and makes itself felt even in such small offenses as the case of some thoughtless individual throwing paper in a park which is certain to be otherwise immaculate, or of a more delinquent one climbing on a street car at the front in the hope of not being detected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The freeing of the people from hardships of the pioneer stage of the new civilization is also beginning to be felt. There is much attention to beauty which I am told was not evident as recently as two or three years ago. Natural yearnings are being satisfied and a broader life is opening; the labor pains of the rebirth of a nation are about over. All this relieves tension and tends to establish a normality of living such as results in a more settled order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A condition that ought soon to make for a decrease in crime against the state by the so-called class enemy is the fact that the government is now established. We are so accustomed to use the phrase “the Russian experiment” that it is hard for one to give it up; but, it is no longer much of an experiment. The author remembers a gentle reproof given to her when she remarked that since this sort of thing had never been tried before, it was difficult to see how it might work. There was a smiling rejoinder of “We have tried it and it does work.” Surely there will be a cessation in “crimes against the state” when it is clearly seen that efforts against the order of government will not be of avail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Emphasis ought, of course, to be put on the social planning that gives security for old age and removes fear of illness and unemployment. It would be impossible to estimate how much crime is due to a feeling of insecurity in society, but there is no doubt that it is a large percentage. Provisions looking toward the elimination of this insecurity have already been effective enough to have a part in the reduction of the number of those driven to crime because of fear of such economic woes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One point on which observers agree that we need to imitate these people is in the humane treatment of prisoners. It ought to be understood here that “humane” is not synonymous with “coddling.” Some of us who do not distinguish have grown shy of that word but in these pages it is used in its proper meaning. Prisoners are given a “man to man” treatment, held to a strict régime just as if they worked in a factory outside. There is discipline in industry and they are prepared to meet that condition, to learn to discipline themselves, but the approach is one of dignity, with any thought of humiliation put far away. It is only when one thinks of the prisoner as suffering undignified imprisonment, degraded by acts of physical or verbal abuse on the part of guards who ought themselves to be in prison, that one stoops to pity and “feels sorry for him,” but when a man is subjected only to a constructive training such as it might be a privilege to get, one’s sympathy is hardly needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question of how much one can see in a limited time always comes up when one writes of foreign conditions, and cognizance of it should be taken in this Introductory Chapter. The answer, of course, depends on the preparation of the person for the task. It seems too obvious even to remark that one can live in a country for years and know considerably less about specialized subjects than one trained observer who merely visits the institutions. The book on Red Medicine by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. Kingsbury has already been referred to. One would naturally rather trust the judgment of such authorities even though they visit briefly than that of others, unfamiliar with this field, who have resided there for years on end.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The author trusts her own judgment in regard to prisons and courts. She has been seeing both for years, and in many places. Physical equipment is not all that one looks for. There are signs that give things away. There are glances that indicate a whole policy. If a warden tells a visitor of a wholesome approach to his men, and that person then sees the inmates fall away and look up from lowered eyes as he goes through, he knows what to think. If a superintendent says, as one did to the writer, that he does not really enforce the silent system, and one watches the men a while, talking through the side of a twisted mouth as a guard half turns his head and never speaking normally during the entire time of the visit, one knows again that representations are not in accord with practice. Prisoners do not put on acts for visitors, and members of a staff would probably be letting themselves in for trouble with any suggestion that they do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The writer expresses no opinions on conditions outside her own field of special investigation, except on obvious points. Other institutions were visited only in a casual way, but a great deal of life itself was seen. There were long walks in all sorts of places. Groups of children were played with and workmen of all kinds talked to, usually through an interpreter; but there were those with whom the conversation was carried on directly in French, German or sometimes English. All of this formed a background for any conclusions, and years of working with people in a social work relationship had also prepared the writer again for significant observation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the major portion of the book is concerned with research, and that has been thoroughly checked for accuracy of statement by a member of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER II: THE SOVIET THEORY OF CRIME ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;To understand&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; rightly the theory of crime officially accepted in Russia today, one must read the works of Lenin. Karl Marx is there in the background, to be sure, but he is explained or interpreted in accordance with the opinion of the Soviet Union’s first leader. It sounds a simple enough theory—that, with the final attainment of the classless society, crime, which is the result of economic class relationship, will disappear. But it needs some elucidation. The accomplishment of a state of society in which this would be true is not, after all, quite so simple as the statement sounds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
People have tried for a good many years to account for the phenomenon of crime and to work out some manner of punishment that would control even if not eliminate it, as the present Soviet theory permits. Anthropologists tell us that acts not pleasing to the group, even antagonistic to its best interests, are apparently as old as human society itself. Penalties consisting of curses, banishment, even death, were visited upon those who broke the law in the earliest ages of society. Up to very recent years punishment in the form of untold cruelties was dealt out to those who transgressed. Still crime grew and criminals increased with the complexity of civilization. What makes people do those things—commit those acts which are against the folk ways or state ways of the community in which he lives, and brings him usually to account? Who knows? Within fairly recent times three main theories have attempted to establish the causes and have laid out measures of punishment designed to protect law-abiding society from the criminal and, later, to aid in the readjustment of the individual to life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We might take a hasty look at these theories before we speak of their rejection by proletariat Russia. The classical school had as one of its chief characteristics the doctrine of free will in the commission of crime. The discretionary power of judges in the years just preceding the development of this theory gave too much play to the possibility, supposedly, of circumstances surrounding the act. As a matter of actual practice, according to such an authority as Gillin, it gave them instead an excellent chance to wreak a personal vengeance on some enemy, or, still acting according to the discretionary power given them, befriend someone to whom they wished to show favor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this was one of the evils the classical school of writers decided to remedy. If one committed an act of his own free will, then circumstances had nothing to do with it. A man was a criminal because he chose to be. Thus when two persons committed the same act they should be given the same punishment. And the French Code of 1791 put such a theory into practice, listing a great number of such transgressions and providing for each a set penalty. The difficulties would hardly need to be set down for us. The resulting unwieldy code, the lack of any punishment for acts not listed, made the administration of the code an impossible task.&lt;br /&gt;
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There was another reason for its modification. It did not take an expert in criminology to see that there were differentiating conditions surrounding the commissions of crime. It was clear that of two people committing similar acts, the one would have the sympathy of those who saw him, whereas the second would be looked on with contempt. That the people in the street were able to arrive at such a conclusion and public opinion in the days of revolutionary action against tyranny, must have had some effect. At any rate the Code of 1810 in France provided a modification of the definite penalty for a definite crime by setting a maximum and minimum and permitting the judge to choose between. The doctrine of free will in the commission of crime thus became modified to a milder form of the same theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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The neo-classical school went a step further. While it still recognized the theory of free will and individual responsibility on the part of one transgressing the law, it did decide that in view of evidences being submitted by a body of biologists, physicians, and other scientists, that every person was not free to choose, and was thus not responsible for his behavior. There might, for example, be insanity or imbecility to account for an act. It was, however, necessary to establish that at the time of the crime he was in such a mental state. This theory is incorporated in the practice of our criminal courts today.&lt;br /&gt;
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But here begins another story. Modern science was developing. Research connected with psychiatry and psychology was adding important contributions to the field of the study of the criminal and an attempt to account for crime. Why did a man do things of such an anti-social nature, things harmful to his fellow beings? The anthropological school with Lombroso as its initial spokesman, entered with its explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This theory, attacking the classical and neo-classical writers, took a different line, and swung far in the other direction. Why did the criminal commit his crime? Because he was born with certain stigmata that prevented his following other lines of behavior. He had no choice in the matter. Far from the free-will theory that made him a creature responsible for his deeds, this doctrine made him incapable of rational analysis, or any logical deductions as to cause and consequence. Lombroso weighted his argument with facts and figures. He made an extensive study of criminals in Italian prisons and concluded finally that at least a certain percentage of those committing crimes were born criminals with definite physical features characteristic of the lower stages of evolution. However, in his later writings he concluded that only one-third of all criminals belonged to this group. Still having to account for the other two-thirds, he decided that part of this number was insane and that the other belonged in the category for which he invented the term—&#039;&#039;criminaloid&#039;&#039;. It is in regard to the latter group that we see his recognition of social influences on crime. Besides those born to criminal ways and those committing their acts because of insanity, there was this third group, who while not born to their deeds, still acted like criminals. There was too much proof by this time of the influence of environment for even an ardent advocate of his own theory to deny its importance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Long before the death of Lombroso, Ferri had written his &#039;&#039;Criminal Sociology&#039;&#039; and our third main theory was well launched. This school, of course, is prominently with us today. It recognizes biological causes and adds to them the results of various social environments. It goes even beyond that and takes into account such physical environment as climate, weather, and geographic location.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet criminal theory repudiates all of the aforementioned and asserts that crime is caused by the exploitation of one class by another. The attitude which accounts for such behavior, they insist, has evolved over a period that has lasted since the state became an instrument in the hands of a ruling class to force a weaker one into submission by making “laws” to protect its own interests and punishing those who transgressed one of these regulations. Because that “conscience” has had a historical development, has been long in the making, it will likewise take time to change it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the Marx-Lenin theory assumes that all crime is the result of the exploitation of one class by another, and that with the achievement of classless society—which is the ultimate aim of socialist construction—crime itself will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us trace this line of thought for a moment for fear it is not as familiar as it should be for one to get the full import of this doctrine. According to this belief, there has been one continuous evolution of society toward the establishment of full Communism, beginning with its earliest stage, which will be in its final stage world-wide. But in this evolution, going on since the dawn of history and before, there emerged at one stage of the process an organization through which the stronger element came to rule the weaker and make its members submit to its will. The instrument through which they effected this was the state. From that time on, the interests of the class or group in power have been protected by rules or laws and those who break those regulations, or commit some act not in accord with these interests of the ruling class, are guilty of a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Marx-Lenin doctrine in rejecting any sort of an idealistic notion such as Rousseau’s “social contract” and Hegel’s “the reality of the moral idea” as accounting for the state, accepts instead the definition that “the state as organized violence emerged at the definite stage in the evolution of society, that society was broken up into irreconcilable classes, that it could no longer exist without the ‘authority’ supposed to be above society and to a certain degree isolated from it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Or again, speaking more plainly, the Marxian formula states “that the state is an organ of oppression of one class by another; that it sets up an order which legalizes and consolidates this oppression modifying the conflict of classes.” Thus since the state is an organ of class domination, and crime necessarily, by the same definition, is the commission of an act against the interests of the ruling class, a criminal code would be a formulation of penalties imposed for such acts. When a state is reached where there is no domination of one class by another in society, it would logically appear that there would be no need of a criminal code.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Soviet Union has a criminal code now, as we shall later see, and of course a recognition of crime. This, however, in their theory is no contradiction. In the first place there is one class now in power (there is an admitted class basis for criminal legislation), and the transgression of the rights of those in authority, the proletariat or working group, does constitute a serious and major crime. That, of course, is to be expected from the nature of our definition. But what of the group of criminals who come from the working class itself?&lt;br /&gt;
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They are those whose attitude is the result of long centuries of class struggle, and their point of view cannot be changed at once. Every effort is made by a policy resulting from this theory to change their “social conscience” by education while they serve their sentence, but even with that effort it is certain that many of the older generation will not be won over to the new way of thinking. Thus they concentrate on youth, as we shall see in a later chapter devoted to the child who comes in contact with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But crime, except in isolated instances, will disappear as need for the state also vanishes. Let us take the word of an authority for it. Commissar of Justice of the USSR, N. Krylenko, writes: “Only under Communism will the state become wholly superfluous, for then there will be no one to suppress in the sense of waging a systematic class struggle against a definite part of the population.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Understand that, in accordance with the theory, criminal repression will exist as long as the state itself is necessary, and for the present the perfect socialist society is a thing of the future. Even when it is fully come there will still be some who will commit acts of a criminal nature, but they will be of such infrequency that there will be no need of penal restriction. Lenin is our authority this time. In Vol. XXI, p. 432, we find the following: “For this there will be no need for a special machine, for a special apparatus of coercion; this will be done by the army of people themselves with the simplicity and ease with which any crowd of civilized people even in contemporary society will stop a street fight of rowdies or will disallow the outraging of a woman.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps it will be easier to understand the theory that permits of the final disappearance of crime if the legal definition contained in their code were given. One can see then that with the gaining of strength on the part of the government, with the “mopping up” of the remaining opposition, there could possibly be such a situation. Part 3 of the Criminal Code, Article 6, contains this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“A socially dangerous act is deemed every act of commission or omission, directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government for the period of time pending transition to a communist régime.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A note added to this article is of special significance in providing for consideration of the circumstances of social class. It reads:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“An act which, although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code, is free from socially dangerous characteristics, owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It can be seen that crime in the Soviet Union consists mainly of those acts directed against the state by the so-called class enemies; or those desiring to hamper socialist construction. In this situation those acts defined as criminal would tend to have usually an economic basis. And this would substantiate the theory that recognizes no other motive for a crime than an economic one, which, in a society where all needs would be met, would supposedly disappear. That is, if in the final socialist state every one should receive according to his needs—as they insist he will—then the economic motive for crime would be eliminated. This takes care of those acts which in our own country, we might attribute to economic causes.&lt;br /&gt;
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But what, we might ask, of those murders or other crimes, motivated by jealousy or rage? The theory answers that those, in the person not ill and requiring medical treatment instead of penal, are rare and the act thus usually constitutes the one crime in the person’s career. For example the man who murders his wife in a jealous rage would very likely make a good citizen who would never again commit such an excessive act. However, this, in the person not mentally deranged, would also be a rare occurrence for the reason assigned that marriage and divorce are made so liberal under the laws of the USSR that the jealousy motive in marital tangles is taken care of, and thus one of the main causes of murder is eliminated.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to note in this regard that the maximum penalty for murder in Russia in any case, except for death resulting from banditry and robbery with a firearm, is a ten year sentence. In fact the maximum term of imprisonment for any cause is ten years. They hold long sentences to be neither humane nor constructive. If a man is mentally abnormal to a dangerous extent, there are other places for him than prisons. If he has committed such a serious act as banditry or robbery with firearms, he is likely to get a death sentence unless there are extenuating circumstances such as the youth of the offender, and for the other crimes the shorter sentence is held to be more conducive to reformation.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we note for a moment the chief types of crime against which the penal provisions are directed, we will be able to see what acts any theory must account for. In the pamphlet &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039; by the Commissar of Justice, N. Krylenko, we find the four main categories of criminal law listed.&lt;br /&gt;
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First, the laws safeguarding the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under this class are all provisions for penalties for acts of a counter-revolutionary nature; against such things as wrecking, activities of the Kulaks (the middle-class peasants who owned a moderate degree of private property and who were opposed to relinquishing it to the state) directed against the order of government, and against speculators, and any form of pilfering, theft, bribery, and squandering.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the second category the author places the laws which protect the interest of the toiling masses. These are of various natures. Punishment is here provided for officials who fail to fulfill the pledges of the government as to food and living conditions promised to the working class. Protection is also afforded against excessive fines or punishment of the people. The need for such a measure he illustrates by the case of the imposition of a fine of a hundred rubles in a trivial incident where ten was the maximum permitted by law, and there was no occasion for any at all. An official permitting or contributing to such an act must, of course, be punished. In the same category are provisions against undue severity in enforced collectivisation, which tend to frighten and coerce rather than to the persuasion favored by Stalin. In this category also would fall any law providing for punishment of one committing deeds of violence against one’s person.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the third category&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; are found “laws regulating the inter-relations between the various social strata of the toiling masses.” This division consists of the laws on Soviet trade and is directed against any act that contributes to squandering of goods or disposition of unwanted articles by forcing a customer to take one such article along with his other purchases,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The author writes of this: “What is a ‘compulsory assortment?’ You enter a store and ask for something. Well, you get what you want, but you must also take something else. What? A lamp, for instance. Now a lamp is a good thing to have, but where is the burner? You are curtly told that the lamp comes without a burner. Another store expects you to buy electric flashlights without a battery—a third tags on batteries without flashlights.” He also speaks of sweaters sent to a city sweltering in the heat, and skiis to Odessa. All this, he says, is in violation of the law and must be punished. The people’s rights must be protected (&#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 29-30).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or any other act by trade bodies that interferes with the rights of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fourth category consists of laws punishing non-observance of regulations as to business accounting and fulfillment of plans by the various economic organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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“These categories of law,” says this author, “exhaust the fundamental questions that comprehend every aspect of our economic and social life.” At this phase of the development of their socialist state they, of course, recognize the necessity for the provisions that their penal code contains. But their faith in their ideal—the final classless society—and the change which it will bring in social consciousness enables them to prophesy according to Lenin the disappearance of excessive acts. “We do not know,” he says, “how quickly and in what stages, but we do know that it will be withering away; with their withering away, the state will also wither away.” Crime and punishment in their theory are therefore transitory phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The disappearance of crime will not be achieved with the end of the second five-year plan as some optimists might have expected. There are still sectors where the struggle between the classes flares up, and where the opposition is for the moment strengthened by influencing some of the toilers themselves to come to their aid. But types of crime outside this group will be steadily losing in degree of social danger and should be treated with increasing leniency. Repressive measures in regard to the first type of crimes, those of menace to the advancing socialist state, must be made more severe until all opposition has ceased and the ideal society ushered in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Criminal repression will not disappear until the full realization of the Communist order, but then in the words of Lenin once more&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XXI, p. 431.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “free from the thrall of capitalism . . . people will gradually get accustomed to observe the elementary, perennially known rules of social life that were repeated for ages in all books on good conduct; to observe them without the special apparatus of coercion which is called the State.”&lt;br /&gt;
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While these theorists expect that by the end of the second five-year plan, class distinctions will be pretty well smoothed out, criminal repression will still remain to combat the remnants of the old order which will linger on for some time. They emphasize that they have no magic wand for clearing all this suddenly and completely from the consciousness of the people. Crime and criminal repression came at one stage in evolution—the beginning of the domination of one class by another—and they will vanish at another stage—the appearance of the highest phase of Communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a final summation of the theory, crime results solely from a class struggle and will disappear with the extinction of classes, just as the state itself, according to Lenin, will disappear, and the court, now an organ of the state guarding the interests, life, health, and liberty of toilers of the state, will also disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The period is called transitory,” said Professor Brusilovsky in a lecture, “because after the achievement of Communism there will be neither crime nor punishment. Each stage and development of Soviet authority while lowering the importance of some crimes, aggravates the weight of others, depending upon the actual economic and political situation. To us criminal law is no fetish, but a tool for sweeping away the obstacles to socialist construction. Our criminal law is to a high degree historic, our proletarian semi-state is in a stage of constant change and motion toward the construction of classless society.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A theory is only a theory, and when it deals with human beings there is no accuracy of prophecy. The advent of a proletarian state, however, might indicate to some of us that other strange things could happen in the same land, especially so with the social mind that is apparent, and with as sane an approach to criminal treatment as their policy calls for. Let that social mind have another few generations for extension to fringes of the group, and that policy of treatment of criminals come into full play, and we might be as surprised as we are that the Soviet State has not only survived, but has recently been received into the League of Nations as one of the powers.&lt;br /&gt;
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The student will want to know, though, something of the degree to which the theory proves accurate as the period of socialist construction advances in the Soviet Union. It might be said here that according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky there is a decrease in the number of prisoners convicted of such familiar crimes as theft, murder, arson, robbery, rape, etc., by almost one-third since the days just before the revolution. Chapter IV discusses in detail the crimes committed and some analysis is given of those who commit them. The reader must be reminded again, however, that the authorities contend that no radical change can be made in the social conscience of their people in the one generation of the revolution which has elapsed, especially as so little constructive work was done up to the last few years. It is, however, important to know what problems they have at this time and the chapter referred to above is devoted to that discussion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER III: CRIME REPRESSION SINCE THE REVOLUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We turn&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; now from theory to fact. Whether or not a state of classless society will be achieved no one can know; but it is certain that at the moment crime and criminals do exist in Soviet Russia. While our concern is with the present program of criminal repression, a review of the situation since the revolution will give us perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin enumerates three basic aspects of the proletarian dictatorship: “First, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the crushing of the exploiters, for the defense of the country, for the consolidation of ties with the proletariat of other countries, for the development and victory of revolutions in all countries. Second, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the final separation of the toiling and exploited masses from the bourgeoisie, for the attraction of the masses to the cause of socialist construction, for state leadership of these masses by the proletarian. And, third, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the organization of forces, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a society without state.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Criminal repression must necessarily be considered in connection with these purposes of the state. It can be seen that there are three main factors involved. There is, first of all, the crushing of the enemies of the state; secondly, the discipline and control of the toiling masses themselves; and, third, the socialist construction. The method used for accomplishing these ends have changed with the various phases of the development of the Communist state.&lt;br /&gt;
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Considering first the crushing of those who oppose the order of government or hinder its development, we find the methods of coercion varying from leniency and toleration in the beginning of the Revolution, through the frightful years of the Cheka (extraordinary commission to combat speculation and counter-revolution in the early days) reign, to the more severe activities of the OGPU in recent times. Shortly after the October Revolution in May, 1918, all those persons held for political crimes were set free by an act of general amnesty. The results of this liberality were rather serious for the rule of the proletariat, since those released, bitterly determined to overthrow the new and not too firmly seated government, returned to the fight with vigor. Among these was the renowned General Krasnow who organized the White Guard Cossacks and caused no end of trouble to the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a policy of clemency was bound to end if the Soviet government continued to live. When next they had political prisoners in hand there was a different tale to tell. Whoever of them saw the inside of a prison or place of detention were not released to run back to the fight. We find Stalin defending later severe measures toward these prisoners in an interview with Ludwig in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P.7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Soon it transpired that such leniency was only undermining the strength of the authority of the Soviets. We committed a mistake in showing such leniency toward the enemies of the working class. If we repeated this mistake any further, we would have committed a crime toward the working class. We would have betrayed its interest. And this became perfectly clear very soon. It became very sure that the greater our leniency toward our enemies, the greater their resistance.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Leniency was no part of their program thereafter. History will attest to the fact. Military Communism and the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, agent of superlative revolutionary terror, attended to that. Civil wars are brutal, cruel, and Russia’s was notoriously no exception. The period that followed with its terrorist activities is no bright spot in the history of crime repression of post-revolutionary Russia. Lenin threw the responsibility for the establishment of the so-called Red Terror on their class enemies. He says: “You have yourselves to blame, friends! Do not run away with the idea that the Russian peasants and workers have forgotten about your actions. You challenged us to a fight of the most desperate form in October, and in reply to this we have announced the terror, and the triple terror, and if necessary we will make it even hotter for you, if you try again.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. XXVII, p. 175.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They tried again, and yet again, the open fighting of the Civil War giving way to underground methods, not deterred by the worst the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and its successors the GPU could do. But early measures must have quadrupled, for Communism can no longer be considered a mere experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who were the people against which this repression was directed? The urban bourgeoisie joined by the rural Kulaks formed the great number. There was a tremendous increase of criminals from these two classes in the early years of the proletarian state. In their combined efforts they were able to prove of much hindrance to the Soviet cause, and, aided by those waverers within the toiling class who were able to be influenced to counter-revolutionary activities, they presented a grave menace. Again Lenin, whom the Russians think of in his kindly moods, showed his grim side. “We must exert every effort,” he wrote, “to track down and catch all those highwaymen, all the landlords and capitalists in hiding, in all their disguises, expose and punish them without pity—sly, subtle, experienced, patiently waiting for the opportune moment in hatching their plots; they are saboteurs who will stoop to any crime to do harm to the Soviet rule. With these enemies of the toilers, with the landlords, capitalists, saboteurs, and White Guards, we must be merciless.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. 24, XXIV, p. 434.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Economically, the first period was one of distribution of goods without production. Its aftermath was famine and unemployment and Lenin and Trotsky were at odds over a policy of alleviation. Trotsky, impatient at delay over a program of more complete state ownership, advocated immediate action against all private possession of property. Lenin considered a starving people no advantage in furthering a socialist construction, and was besides a humanitarian. He wanted his people fed. The result was the institution of NEP, the New Economic Policy, which permitted private ownership within limits, and brought about the eventual political annihilation of Trotsky.&lt;br /&gt;
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The policy of fighting the class enemy remained practically the same even through the era of NEP. There was some let-up in the counter-revolutionary activities on the initiation of NEP, as it had been hoped by those opposed to Communism that this probably indicated the return to Capitalism, but activities of an anti-Communistic nature were still sternly repressed.&lt;br /&gt;
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N. Krylenko, prosecutor of note and now Commissar of Justice of the USSR, writes in defense against a criticism of mildness toward the enemies of the government at this time: “The form of the dictatorship of the proletariat changes in the different stages of the proletarian revolution. For instance, in the first period of the October Revolution the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters was the most conspicuous feature . . . during the transition to the NEP, the peaceful, cultural, organizational work of the dictatorship of the proletariat was most conspicuous, but this again did not mean that the importance of overcoming the resistance of the exploiters had receded in the least.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The chief agent of “resisting the exploiters” was now the GPU (later, as it became the joint organization of all the republics, the OGPU), the full title of which is the United State Political Administration. There seems no doubt that their midnight arrests and executions were an effective weapon against any counter-Soviet efforts even as the activities of their predecessors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, had been before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The method now undergoes an important change. Note this from Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XX, p. 460.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “To the extent that the basic purpose of authority becomes not military crushing but administrative, the typical manifestation of crushing and coercion will become not the method of shooting on the spot, but trial in court.” Not in love himself, apparently, with methods such as he felt they had to use, he seized the first opportunity afforded by an end of Civil War to advance a revolutionary legality which his party had already been trying to establish.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Criminal Code was written in 1922, as was also the Code for Criminal Procedure, and the way was paved for an enlargement of orderly court procedure. The provisions of the code gave not greater leniency but legalized measures that had already been practiced. The step of importance, however, was that “tried in court” replaced “shooting on the spot.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The history of violence against the Kulaks, the most startling of all violence used by the USSR in establishing itself, was entering now a modified phase. Nerves were settling somewhat, and panic beginning to clear away. Legal guarantees, so nearly obscured through years when “crushing” was regarded as necessary at any price if the proletariat was to stay in authority, might now begin, at least, to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Along with this a new idea was put into practice which presents a happier side to the study of crime repression in this country. Since the state could not kill all of its class enemies and certainly would not find it profitable to fill innumerable prisons with them, there developed a new approach to the problem. It is not accurate to say that the idea was new, because it had been present since the earliest days of the Revolution. The Civil War, however, had so disrupted the development of any program that this influence was not properly felt until later.&lt;br /&gt;
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This new approach was by means of educating and training these offenders so that they might be turned out again as useful workers in a state so greatly in need of all the man power it could muster. Authorities built their plans on the belief that even a class enemy might reform and see his way to becoming a member of the new society if properly guided. And as for the convicts from among the loyal masses, any program for crime repression must have as its fundamental object the training of these as useful citizens. The theory of how it might be done has turned out to be a practical one. Its translation into government policy was a most significant development and leads straight to the constructive attitude one finds in present-day treatment of prisoners in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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Most of us, it seems, have had the impression that during the days of the Civil War there were no legal guarantees in the state, but such an idea is not correct. One thinks of courts as suspended, but there were orderly trials even in the darkest days of military Communism when non-judicial bodies like the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; were at their height. This was possible, of course, almost entirely for those members of the toiling masses themselves and not for enemies of the proletarian authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a bare year after the October Revolution (November 6-9, 1918) that the Emergency Congress of the Soviets was held in Moscow. And if ever emergency existed in political affairs, it did so then for the Soviets. Civil War was at its highest point, the White Guards aided by Czecho-Slovaks, were in possession of Siberia, the English were pushing to the north and the French to the south. It is surprising that a party at the helm of the ship of state could take its mind even for a moment from such an international and military situation to think of admonishing a people to observe law. But we find Kursky, then Commissar of Justice, rising gravely to remind the Congress and the people that “during the year of revolutionary activity the working class of Russia has elaborated the basic laws of the RSFSR which must be faithfully observed in order to develop and strengthen the authority of workers and peasants,” and the Congress, after listening to his speech, resolved unanimously, “to appeal to all citizens of the Republic, to all organs and all officials of Soviet authority, to observe most strictly the laws of the RSFSR and the rules, regulations and orders issued and to be issued by the Central authorities.” A significant effort that was, and one whose importance was momentous to a people struggling through a chaos that must have all but obscured any semblance of order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To forestall the high-handed measures which they must have seen would be forthcoming as a result of the counter-revolutionary work during the Civil War, they surrounded such action with certain safeguards. It was resolved that “(a) Exact, formal ascertaining by the Soviet institution or official concerned as to the presence of conditions necessitated a departure from the limits of the law; (b) Immediate written notification to the Council of People’s Commissars, with a copy for local and interested authorities, should be provided.” In the midst of violence and excesses these efforts to establish revolutionary legality were significant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In March, 1919, the Communist party adopted as a distinctive feature of its program a plank reading: “Our courts have already led to a cardinal change in the character of punishment, resulting on a large scale in conditional sentences, introducing public censure as a measure of punishment, substituting compulsory labor with retention of liberty for imprisonment, replacing the prisons by educational institutions, and allowing the possibility for the factor and time by comradely courts. The Communist party, while urging further development of the court in this direction, should aim for the ultimate substitution of the system of punishment by a system of measures of educational character.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As early as December, 1917, Lenin sent instructions to the Revolutionary Tribunal, in which he urged that repressive measures take the form of corrective labor tasks, and that the harmful element be dealt with in a reformative way. Shooting was abolished by a decree dated October 28, 1917, and Decree No. 3 of July 20, 1918, provided that one sentenced to a three-month period should be sent to compulsory social labor and should not be guarded while serving. In the Ural region and Siberia prisons were replaced with working homes where study was combined with work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Various other decrees were adopted, furthering this principle of reformation through education and discipline. In 1919 one such established a distribution committee composed of people of special equipment, by psychiatrists, educators, etc., who were to determine by a study of background, personality, and physical condition of the convict what prison would be best suited to him.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky, (Ed.) &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, Moscow, 1933, p. 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A decree of 1920 dealt with the organization of provincial detention points, and in the main ones there was to be established a university with courses in the sciences—applied, natural and technical—in history and the arts. An attempt was also made to have prisoners trained not just in crafts of their small villages but in factory and larger industrial work, and in spite of Civil War and shortage of shops, the number given such training was raised from 214 per cent. in 1919 to 10 per cent. in 1920.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 29.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer again to the volume edited by Vishinsky, we find on page 20 a statement that any penal treatment tending to degrade the prisoner was forbidden by a decree of July 23, 1918, to be practiced. This principle is now incorporated in the Criminal Code, Article 9, which reads: “Measures of social defense may not have for their purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity, as they do not contemplate the purposes of retribution and penalty.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The present-day approach to crime repression in the USSR is, then, through educational and correctional labor. The extreme penalty of death is given now in only three cases: crimes against the state, military crimes, and armed robbery in which death occurs. A. J. Estrin in his book, &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039;, a 1933 publication, gives a table on page 229 containing the percentages of persons sentenced to different forms of repression, and from 1926 to 1930 the percentage sentenced to death is less than 0.1. For all others the educational program holds even for political prisoners. The author can give no first-hand information on the latter, but official reports indicate that this is true.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the treatment of criminals, Vishinsky speaks of the indispensable part the state apparatus must play in the realization of their program.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Within the system of the institutions of proletarian dictatorship,” he says, “the corrective labor institutions play a great and serious part, because through them, in effect, is realized the entire judicial policy. These institutions with their entire force of live human relationships, with all their methods and means with the help of which these relations are built, define the reality or falsity of the judicial verdict as they define also the extent of achieving of the genuine aim of the problem posed before these institutions.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet jurisprudence is thus based not on restrictive measures alone but on corrective, educational, and cultural ones. The authorities seek to use labor that is constructive as to character and useful economically, and not the kind that brings indignity and resentment when resorted to as punishment or disciplinary measures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sentence is designed to be as brief as possible. In the USSR it is not necessary that a prisoner serve more than one-third of his sentence in order to be re- leased on parole, but his release is based solely on the condition of his fitness for return to society. The Observation Commission, whose duty it is to determine the time of such release is required by law to inform itself in intimate detail of the condition of training and education of the prisoners, of the personal characteristics and attitude toward society of each individual. It is thus likely to be able to judge to a higher degree when a prisoner is ready for release. If the figures they give on recidivism with 18 per cent. for men and 21 per cent. for women are accurate then they may be said to judge well indeed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of re-educating the “enemy,” or winning him over to the aid of the state, is still more marked in the treatment of the working masses themselves. Repressive measures must necessarily be used for the discipline of cases among the workers. While penalties are still severe and a decree of August 7, 1932, providing for the protection of state possessions, attaches the death sentence for those who steal or pilfer public property, the measures designed for those of the working population who transgress the law are in general more liberal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to be expected. It has already been stated that the Russians acknowledge the class nature of their administration of criminal law. The content of the criminal code is directed almost entirely toward the forced subjugation of those elements who would not voluntarily be subjected to the dictates of the ruling class or the proletariat. As a matter of policy they manage this subjugation by the use of such corrective measures as the construction of the White-Sea Baltic Canal when it is possible. Such other provisions as the code contains may be made to apply to the workers, but discrimination is openly observed between the classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer back for a moment to the decree of August 7, 1932 already mentioned, we may note the indication of the sharpening of the class struggle. The state intensified its program of collectivization in 1928, and launched into a broad program intended to crush the Kulaks and extend Socialism into the villages. The Kulak antagonism immediately became more pronounced, and if we consult a table on page 80 of M. N. Gernet’s &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039; we see the results tabulated in a sudden jump of crimes against the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cattle were killed, farm machinery was destroyed or put out of order, and plans were hampered in any way possible. There was also organized theft of state property to such an extent that severe measures were considered necessary. Thus the provision by this decree four years later of the death sentence for these offenses. In the meantime the necessity for such a measure was taken care of by the judicial powers and authority of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this decree is necessarily directed against the definite enemy class, it applies also to the workers themselves who are bribed or otherwise used as tools by the urban bourgeoisie or Kulaks. This, however, is outside the program of treatment of the ordinary criminal, and in no wise is it to be understood that the death penalty is always applied even for those considered to be class enemies. The author personally heard a trial in court in which the indictment was for organized theft, and on appeal the death sentence was commuted to a ten-year sentence. For the more serious offenses, however, such as those involving sabotage in factories, the death sentence is usual, at least for those most responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The program of compulsory education provided for those from among the toiling element who are imprisoned is the chief weapon of the fight against crime by the state. The prisons are equipped (as will be seen in later pages) with all sorts of devices for carrying out this work. The whole criminal law reflects this attitude toward crime repression on the part of the Communist party. The evolution of this code since its establishment in 1922, by a multitude of amendments and two almost new writings, reflects the needs and purposes of the state in various phases of its development in a most interesting manner. It is divided into a general and a special part, and although the general part is appended to this book, it seems of interest here to speak of its various divisions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first section is devoted to the purposes of criminal legislation. The second deals with the extent of operation and the limits of action of the code. Section three is concerned with the general principles of the penal policy. Section four deals with the measures of social defense applied to persons committing various crimes. The fifth concerns the manner in which social defense measures of correctional character are applied, and the sixth deals with conditional sentences and release on probation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the code’s adoption in 1922 there have been two important amendments aside from the many year by year. In 1926 when numerous changes were made, the chief feature was a more lenient application of penalties. This was at the time of reconstruction, when the development of the socialist state took on greater emphasis and education in the matter of penal treatment was held to be one of its chief tools. By the change of 1928, deprivation of liberty was limited to sentences of one year or more. Previous to this time sentences of even one day might carry with them deprivation of liberty. The aim now in short sentences is that the convicted person may retain his liberty, but have supervision in his place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 1926 edition of the Criminal Code, the whole concept of punishment is abolished. Although, according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky, there are certain survivals of old methods and ideas among a few of those connected with penal administration, the official thought is not of retribution or any infliction of pain or even of “just reward.” From this time on, the term used is a “measure of social defense” and, as nearly as one can judge both from records and from actual visits to their institutions for criminals, the change has been not only in terminology but in actual practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The measures of social defense now provided by the Criminal Code are divided into three categories: first are the measures of judicial and correctional character; second, measures of social defense of medical character; and third, measures of social defense of medical and pedagogical character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measure of social defense of judicial and correctional character are enumerated as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the Union of USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the Union of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the Union of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts 1930, No. 26, Item 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is in addition the use of public censure as a repressive measure which is a “public expression of condemnation in the name of the court.” It must be published through the press and may be either the only penalty assessed or be added to another. The use of warning is also provided for by Article 43 of the Criminal Code and is practiced in cases where the accused is acquitted but by his conduct gives “every reason to fear commitment of crimes by him in the future.” By this means an effort is made to prevent his committing some criminal act in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the present Criminal Code there is a division of repressive measures into the basic and the supplementary. To the basic measures of declaring one a class enemy with the consequences such a decision carries, deprivation of liberty and compulsory work without deprivation of liberty, are added the other enumerated measures, with the exception of confiscation of property. This is also a supplementary measure but it can be used only in the cases specifically mentioned in the special section of the code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary it might be said that while severe measures still exist and are used in regard to counter-revolutionary activities or crimes against the state, the emphasis in the penal program is decidedly upon educational measures for re-establishing the criminal as a useful member of society in the socialist state. While the beginnings of this policy are almost obscured by the activities of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and the OGPU (whose judicial powers have by the Decree of July 10, 1934, been withdrawn and turned over to the courts) and the extra-legal activities of the Civil War days, yet the germ was there from the beginning of the Revolution and its development is one of the marked achievements of the Soviet government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IV: WHAT CRIMES ARE COMMITTED AND WHO COMMITS THEM? ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In answering&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the question “What crimes are committed?” one could say in general that it is the usual line-up found in any country plus that category defined as the crimes against the state or the order of government. It would be hard to say what is included in the latter group. It would run the gamut from, let us say, the theft of bread from a collective farm, if it was intended to hamper the rule of the proletariat in any way, to the wrecking of a factory. It depends on the “socially dangerous” character of the person committing the act for one thing, on the social background, and for the other consideration, the motive behind the act. It is quite to be expected that this group ranks at the top of any list of crimes in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If one wishes to go into detailed statistics on the subject of crimes committed, there is a small, compact volume, &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039;, by M. N. Gernet, which supplies such information. It was, however, published in 1931 which is far in the past, gauged by the speed with which the Criminal Code and judicial practices change under proletariat rule. But in the main the list of crimes are the same and the classifications as to age and sex still hold.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There has been a change in the type of crime since the days of military Communism. A. J. Estrin, in his &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039; includes the following&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 51 &#039;&#039;et. seq.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; as characterizing the period of militarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Counter-revolutionary activities&lt;br /&gt;
* Speculation&lt;br /&gt;
* Banditry&lt;br /&gt;
* Adventures&lt;br /&gt;
* Desertion&lt;br /&gt;
* Bureaucratism&lt;br /&gt;
* Occasional bad conduct crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He goes on to say that there was considerable growth in crimes of banditry during 1918, practically all having a political or anarchistic coloring. In the matter of desertion, the menace was so great that a special commission was set up to deal with it, and by the time of the entry of the Communist army into Warsaw it had been successfully repressed on the western front. During this period there was likewise an increase in hooliganism, the acceptance of bribery on the part of officials, and speculation. The latter presented an especially difficult problem but was nearly at an end when the institution of the New Economic Policy in 1922 brought new forms of it. From then on it has been one of the crimes that has given most trouble to the government. Acts of pilfering state property in order to resell it at a greater price, or securing goods for speculation by persons working either on a state farm or in a store, are extensive. Since the law of August, 1932, providing a death penalty for taking state property these crimes have decreased in number.&lt;br /&gt;
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Open warfare between the classes had so far subsided by 1921 that there was a demobilization of farmers and other workers from the army, and that led to the increase in another crime—banditry. These people, suddenly released from fighting ranks, broke and unable to find work in that period when production was at a low ebb, turned to theft, robbery or banditry, especially the latter, filling the country with a terror all their own.&lt;br /&gt;
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During this period of 1921-22 there was a very definite growth in the number of crimes committed against persons—not in those of a more serious nature such as murder or severe injury but in sex crime, fighting and insults. The author explains this as resulting from the transition from the old culture to the new. The old was at an end and the new not yet sufficiently established to set up an influence against such acts of attack and rowdyism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a reference here by Estrin to a statement by N. Krylenko which connects the beginning of the crime of sabotage—so serious since to the Soviet government—with activities of former owners during the years of 1921, 1922 and 1923. There was no longer opportunity for armed fighting but the opposition relentlessly kept up its battle by any means at hand and its best methods were to hinder the production without which Communism would be undermined by starvation and physical depletion. From 1923 on, there began to appear with increasing frequency in the courts cases of &#039;&#039;economic&#039;&#039; counter-revolutionary character. Firearms and open resistance might have gone by the board but sabotage grew apace until 1925-26 when it reached its greatest height.&lt;br /&gt;
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A numerical count of court convictions in 1925 would make it appear that there was a tremendous drop in ordinary crimes and an increase in those of a political type. There is an explanation for this in the fact that a reform of the Criminal Code in 1924 deleted a number of crimes of lesser importance, and there was a consequent lessening of 300,000 in convictions during the following year, most of which loss was, of course, from the ranks of the ordinary criminals. Class lines were drawn in a still more distinct fashion, thus emphasizing the direction criminal repression was to take for some time to come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of crimes against the state are today mostly of an economic nature. Before, however, we set down some of the more important ones that harass law enforcement let us look at a brief list of the type of acts which are encountered in court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes against the state&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Crimes against the person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Crimes against property&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Official crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Hooliganism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The items here of particular interest to foreigners are the first and the last. The list of crimes included in the first category will shortly be enumerated. As for the last, the term “hooliganism” covers a multitude of crimes. If one suddenly gets up in a theater and strikes his neighbor without apparent cause, such is an act of hooliganism. It was described to the writer as defining “unmotivated” acts. If one does not pursue “motivation” into psychological or psychiatric realms that explanation pretty well expresses what is meant. Deeds not logically accounted for might come a little closer. If a group of young men go out just to “raise cain” for no particular cause they may destroy property, attack a man, and do various other criminal acts which would all fall within the definition of hooliganism. The charge corresponds roughly to our “disorderly conduct,” except that the deeds committed may be of a more serious nature. But into this category are lumped a miscellany not classified otherwise.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, what are the chief crimes against the state? There would be, first of all, such major deeds as counter-revolutionary activities and the dissemination of propaganda. There are no longer organizations fostering counter-revolutionary work, but a great amount of such work is carried on. Individuals with malice aforethought, work their way into factory or collective farm, and spread what discontent they may. The author heard, for example, of the trial of the director of a collective farm who managed cleverly to see that the plan of production was unfulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Next in line would be industrial sabotage and attack on or the theft of government property. So prevalent had the latter become by the committing of such acts as killing cattle or the destruction of anything possible, as well as organized theft of state property that the government had recently acquired, that the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for such crimes, was enacted to meet the situation. On some occasions of organized theft the motive is for personal gain rather than one of desire to harm the state. For example, the author heard one case in court where the theft of grain from a collective farm was resold in speculating and the gain to the eleven persons involved was some 20,000 rubles. The death penalty was given to the leaders, prison sentences to the others. There is also the evasion of government orders and taxes, insubordination to the demands of the law, insults by word of mouth, if such involves a Kulak as against an officer. This does not by any means complete the possibilities, but it lists the headings under which the majority of such acts come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sabotage hardly needs comment here. So associated has the term come to be with industrial affairs in Russia that one would expect to find it ranking high as a crime against the state. It is, of course, committed by the enemies of the established order, and has hampered the progress of collectivization and industrial development to a great degree. Five men were shot and the others in the plot sentenced to ten years in prison (corrective labor with deprivation of liberty) during the past summer for burning a large factory in the Ural region by electric wire manipulation. Activities of the disorganized opposition have centered in crimes of this sort as the most effective weapon in its hands. Not much quarter is shown when guilt is established. The extreme penalty is surely and speedily given.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An enumeration of the counter-revolutionary crimes listed in the Criminal Code includes the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any act directed towards overthrow, undermining and weakening of the peasants’ and workers’ order of government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armed uprising and entering Soviet territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communication with a foreign government for counter-revolutionary purposes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Extending aid and comfort to that part of the international bourgeoisie which aims at the overthrow of the Communist order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Inducing a foreign government by means of forged documents to declare war or to make armed intervention, or by the same method to induce blockade, confiscation of property of USSR, interruption of diplomatic relations, renouncing of a treaty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Espionage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Transmission, collection, or theft, of economic information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Undermining of state industry, transport, trade, monetary circulation, cooperatives, committed with a counter-revolutionary purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commission of terrorist acts against representatives of the Soviet order or workers’ and peasants’ organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Destruction or damaging with counter-revolutionary purposes by means of the use of explosive, arson, or any other method, of railways, and other means of transportation, means of communication, aqueducts, community warehouses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Propaganda and agitation containing an appeal to overthrow, undermine, or weaken the Soviet order. Circulation or preparation of literature. Same actions in time of mass disorders, or making use of religious and national prejudices, or in time of war or in localities under martial law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All kinds of organizational activity directed toward preparation and commission of crimes mentioned in this chapter as well as participation in an organization founded for the preparation or commission of one of the crimes mentioned in this chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Failure to report a known counter-revolutionary crime or preparation for same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any action or active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement committed while in office under the Tzarist régime or under the counter-revolutionary government, during the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Counter-revolutionary sabotage, i.e., premeditated omission to carry out the duties or deliberate negligence in carrying them out with the specific purpose of weakening the authority of the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chief in the list of “official crimes” is the accepting of bribery, dealing out sentences in excess of the provision of the law, or beyond what circumstances warrant, failing to fulfill one’s duty, taking the law into one’s hands, etc. As an example of punishment in excess of justification of circumstances there is a case recorded in which a drunken priest was given a heavy penalty in a Siberian People’s Court. In view of the government’s attitude toward religion one would suppose that such a sentence might stand, but when it was called to the attention of the higher court, the prosecutor was removed from office and the militiaman was arrested.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commissar of Justice Krylenko, in his &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039;, lists a number of omissions and commissions on the part of officials, but when a complaint of, or information on, such acts reach the authorities, action follows. The population, taught from the cradle up that this is their government, has no timidity, apparently, about seeing that men in office regard the laws of the land, if they have information of acts to the contrary. This authority says, after mentioning a variety of actual cases of such violation, “The struggle against distortions of this kind must be waged with absolute ruthlessness.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other two classifications—crimes against the person and against property—include what they would in our own country, but penalties imposed differ from ours a great deal. Since they, as our most elementary groupings, are generally understood, and since outside of crimes against the state or order of government, these two comprise the great bulk of criminal transgressions in Russia as well as in our own country, it seems of general interest to include here, even at the risk of being tedious, those two chapters of the Criminal Code which relate to these classes of crime, and they are therefore inserted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, HEALTH, LIBERTY, AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed: a) Out of greed, jealousy (if it does not come under description in Article 138) and other base reasons; b) by a person previously convicted for premeditated murder or bodily injury who served the measure of social protection established by the court; c) by means particularly painful to the victim; d) for the purpose of lightening [the consequences of] or concealing another grave crime; e) by a person whose duty it was to have particular care of the victim, or f) making use of the helpless condition of the victim.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder not coming under the provisions of paragraph 136,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed in a state of sudden and strong emotional excitement, caused by violence or grave insult from the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Murder caused by carelessness, as well as murder resulting from exceeding the limits of self defence,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Abortion caused with consent of the mother by persons not having the proper medical qualifications or by persons having such qualifications but in unsanitary conditions,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to five hundred rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If these acts were committed under conditions given in the first part of this paragraph, professionally or without consent of the mother or having as their consequence death,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The bringing of a person who is financially or in some other way dependent on another person, by cruel treatment of the dependent person or in other similar way to suicide or to an attempt at same,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The giving of aid or incitement to suicide of a minor or a person knowingly incapable of understanding the nature and meaning of the act committed or a person incapable of self-guidance if suicide or attempt at same followed,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated grave bodily injury which carried as a consequence loss of sight, hearing, or any other organ, permanent disfigurement, mental illness, or any other injury to health, combined with considerable disability,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If as a consequence of such injury death followed or if it was committed by means having the character of torture, or causing suffering, or if such injury came as a consequence of inflicting systematic though light injuries,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated light bodily injury, not dangerous to life, but causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Premeditated light bodily injury without causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury coming under paragraph 1, Article 143, committed under influence of sudden and strong, emotional excitement caused by violence or grave insult to the offender on the part of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury caused by negligence if it came as a consequence of a knowing infraction of safety rules established by law or government orders and having as its consequence conditions aforementioned in Article 142 and the first paragraph of Article 143,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Bodily injury caused by negligence not having grave consequences,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated assault and battery and other violent acts combined with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said acts had the character of torture,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Violent, illegal deprivation of liberty of some person,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty by a method dangerous to life or health of victim, or accompanied with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Placing in a hospital for mental cases of a person known to be sane out of greed or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft, or concealment, or exchange of some one else’s child, motivated by greed, vengeance, or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Infection of a person with a venereal disease by a person aware of having said disease,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Knowingly exposing of a person to the danger of infection with venereal disease through the sex act or some other act,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relation with persons not having reached sex maturity combined with corruption of the morals or with perverted forms of sex satisfaction,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sex relations with persons not having reached sex maturity committed without aforesaid aggravating circumstances,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Corruption of the morals of children or minors committed by means of immoral acts toward them,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relations by means of physical violence, threat, or by intimidation or making use, through deception, of the helpless condition of the victim (rape),—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said rape had as its consequences the suicide of the victim or was committed toward one not having reached sex maturity, or even though on a person having reached said maturity but committed by several persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing a woman to enter into a sex relationship or satisfy sex passion in some other form by a person on whom said woman was financially dependent or to whom she was in a subordinate position,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing to engage in prostitution, procuring, maintenance of houses of assignation, also engaging in traffic of women for purposes of prostitution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years with confiscation of all or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deliberately leaving a person without help, when said person, in a condition dangerous to life, is incapable of measures of self-protection because of minority, feebleness, sickness, or helplessness generally, in cases when the person leaving the other helpless was in duty bound to have cared for the abandoned and was able to extend help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Not extending of help by a ship’s captain to persons perishing on sea or on other bodies of water if said help could be extended without grave danger to the ship, crew, or passengers,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to two years. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts No. 60, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Not extending of help to a sick person without satisfactory reasons by a person having as his duty by law or special regulation the extending of such help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Refusal of a person engaged in medical practice to extend medical aid if said refusal knowingly to said person could have been dangerous to the patient,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Malicious evasion of payment, for the support of children in spite of being capable of such payment,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Abandonment by parents of minor children without support as well as forcing children to beg,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same measure of social protection.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted verbally or in writing,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Fine up to 300 rubles or public censure.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Insult inflicted by action,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to two months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted through generally circulated or exhibited publications or pictures,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Slander, i.e. circulation of knowingly false defaming rumors,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Libel in an article published in the press or multiplied by some other means,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 100 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
PROPERTY CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret appropriation of someone else’s property (theft) carries with it:&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
a) If committed without application of any mechanical devices, for the first time and without conspiring with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a term up to three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
When committed under the same conditions, but because of need and unemployment for the purpose of satisfying the minimum requirements of self and family,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a term of three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
b) Committed repeatedly and with regard to property which is a known necessity for the existence of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to six months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
c) If committed with application of mechanical device or repeatedly or by previous conspiracy with other persons, and also, even without the aforementioned conditions when committed in railroad stations, docks, ships, railway coaches, in hotels,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
d) When committed by a private person from state or community warehouses, railway cars, ships, or other storage places, or in the places of community use (aforementioned in sub-paragraph) with the application of mechanical devices, or by conspiring with other persons, or repeatedly, also when committed though without aforementioned conditions by a person having special right of entry into these storage places, or [by persons engaged in] safeguarding them, or in time of fire, flood, or other social calamity,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
e) When committed out of state or community warehouses and storage places by a person having special right of entry in same or [by persons] safeguarding them, with application of mechanical devices, or repeatedly, or by conspiring with other persons, and also any theft out of the aforementioned warehouses and storage places when the theft is exceptionally large,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
 NOTE: Theft of material and tools committed in the factory or mill by a workman or employee within the confines of his own [his place of employment] enterprise the first time and when the value of the stolen goods does not exceed 15 rubles carries disciplinary punishment in accordance with special schedule established by the People’s Commissariat of Labor.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft of electric current,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of one month with compulsory restitution of the loss inflicted.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The purchase of goods known to be stolen,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a period up to six months and fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions committed professionally,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to three years with confiscation of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Purchase, possession and sale of fire arms, known to be stolen (hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition therefor,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to 5 years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Open appropriation of some one else’s property in the presence of the person having possession, use, or authority over such property (robbery) when committed without use of force,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same action when committed by a group of people or repeatedly,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret as well as open appropriation of horses or cattle from the laboring agricultural population as well as those engaged in animal husbandry,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions, committed repeatedly or in conspiracy with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to eight years. Aug. 7, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 102, Article 645).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Secret or open appropriation of fire arms (except hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition for same if this action does not come under Article 59 of this Code,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Robbery, i.e., open attack for the purpose of taking possession of someone else’s property, combined with use of force dangerous to the life or the health of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts, committed repeatedly or having as a consequence the death or maiming of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Armed robbery,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years, and with aggravating circumstances—Supreme measure of social protection. Aug. 26, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 65, Article 641).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Appropriation, i.e., withholding with mercenary purpose of somebody else’s property, entrusted for a definite purpose, or embezzlement of that property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Appropriation of a fund,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one month.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage having as its consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years with confiscation of entire or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The issuance of a check, which knowingly to the issuer is not subject to payment, and also cancellation of the check by him without satisfactory reason, or taking any other measures for the prevention of the receipt by the check holder or the amount of the check, as well as passing by the check holder of a check which knowingly to him is not subject to payment by the agent on whom it is drawn,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts having as their consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution or enterprise,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. Feb. 28, 1930 (Collection of Acts, No. 11, Article 131).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forgery with mercenary purpose of official papers, documents and receipts,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a period up to one year and fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deceptive change with mercenary purpose of the appearance or properties of objects, intended for sale or social use, if that said change had or could have had as its consequence the infliction of injury to health, as well as sale of such objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to one year with confiscation of part of property with prohibition of the right to sell merchandise, or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The making or keeping for the purpose of sale of a forged stamping tool, the stamping of jewelry and bars of gold, silver and platinum, affixing to objects made from other metals of stamps and marks having resemblance to the official stamping mark, as well as sale of aforementioned objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year, with confiscation in both cases of forged objects and stamping tools.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Usury, i.e., receiving of interest on money or property lent at a rate exceeding the interest rate established by law, and in particular, inclusion of the interest in the principal amount of the loan, or withholding a remuneration out of the amount received by the borrower or providing of fine and penalty for delay in payment of the loan or in other concealed forms,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a term up to one year or fine up to 5,000 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The same acts committed either professionally or by making use of the embarrassed state of the borrower,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years With confiscation of part of the property or without such confiscation, or with fine up to ten thousand rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Making available for use of means of production and cattle for a monetary remuneration or remuneration in kind or on condition of payment by labor obviously in excess of the customary amount for this locality, making use of the need or embarrassed position of the user,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to one year. Mar. 29, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 38, Article 283).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Extortion, i.e., demanding of transfer of property advantages or rights to property or committing of any kind of actions, of a property character, through fear of coercion of the person of the sufferer, spreading of defaming information or destruction of his property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated destruction or damage of property belonging to private persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts when committed by means of arson, flooding, or any other generally dangerous methods,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts if they are followed by loss of human life or a community misfortune,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Omission by a captain of one of the ships involved in a collision at sea of taking necessary measures for the saving of the other ship, in so far as such measures could be taken without serious danger to the said captain’s passengers, crew, or ship, regardless of the responsibility for not extending help to the crew and the passengers of the ship suffering from the calamity (Art. 156)—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Making public an invention before registration without the consent of the inventor, as well as unauthorized uses of literary, musical, or other artistic or scientific productions with infractions of the copyright law,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to three months or fine up to 1,000 rubles. August 30, 1931 (Collection of Acts, No. 59, Article 429).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Unauthorized use for purposes of unethical competition of someone else’s trade mark, design, model, as well as someone else’s firm name, or someone else’s name,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 3,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those familiar with women’s prisons in our own country will have missed “prostitution” from among the crimes enumerated in the Soviet Criminal Code. This practice is treated as a social problem in Russia, and rightly, in the opinion of most persons interested in penology, it is not held to be a crime. The six articles in the code directed against sex offenses, it will be noted, provide penalties for rape, or, in the interest of public health, for the infection of a person with a venereal disease by one aware that he (or she) has the disease. By treating prostitution as a social problem Russia has almost eliminated it. Women plying this trade are picked up by inspectors at railroad stations or other public places and taken, not to a jail, but to a prophylactorium where they are taught a useful trade with a view to removing the economic cause which is held to be the chief one in this practice. Many of the women at these centers have come voluntarily, the director of the prophylactorium in Moscow reports, through friends who have already received training and treatment. As a result of this omission from the Criminal Code, one does not find in women’s prisons that the chief cause of sentence is sex offense as it is in the United States, nor that the prisons are filled with a group who not only in the opinion of the author, but also in that of such organizations as the Women’s Prison Association of New York, should not have been sent there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who commits the crimes? Immediately following the Revolution the chief concern in regard to the crime situation was the suppression of those acts which jeopardized the authority of the Soviet government, but as the program of Socialist construction went forward, as they got the political situation more in hand, the type of prisoner began to change in the predominant number. Counter-revolutionary organizations were practically wiped out; the Kulak war, though still going on, somewhat thinned out, and in the residue of those of the criminal ranks there now appeared more of such types as constitute the convict population of other countries. In other words, the social composition of the group changed. Instead of there being more of an otherwise honest group of middle class farm people whose crimes consisted in efforts to overthrow a government, there was a rising percentage of ordinary criminals. This does not mean to say that the government is not still confronted with a great number of crimes against the state, by those of the bourgeoisie and Kulak class who, while not attempting to organize counter activities, still manage to get into collective farm or factory and cause a great deal of trouble, but it is noticeable that the other type of crimes is being given more attention and that programs of treatment are designed to apply to that problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In age, considering both sexes, the peak is reached in criminal acts at about twenty-four years. The curve descends sharply to forty and in a more leisurely fashion from forty to sixty. Official figures give the age group of 14-18 years as committing 2.5 per cent. of all crimes, 18-24 as being responsible for 25 per cent., and 24 and above, for the remaining. The crimes committed by the first group are almost wholly stealing; in the second group there are, of course, all sorts, but hooliganism figures large, and in the third there is every kind of law breaking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The youth, then, from 14-18 years are guilty of theft, more than of any other crime, both as to male and female, and next to that are crimes against the person—fisticuffs, breaking of bones, etc. Then, there shows up a phenomenon that is noted both in juveniles and adults—the female commits more crimes against the order of the government than do the men, relatively speaking. The author asked repeatedly for an explanation of this fact, and one man who had come from the rural districts, and is now an Intourist representative in Moscow, gave an interpretation which may or may not be right. It is interesting enough to pass on. The men, he said, did not resist collectivization so intensely when they saw that it was no use, but when a woman had collected a few goats or pigs, or a cow or two, it was no use trying to take them from her. She poisoned them first. No ideal of a final society in which she could take according to her needs could make up to her for the immediate loss of her treasures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is a more extensive comparison of the crimes committed by male and female transgressors. The first important thing to note is that the female is more given to excesses than the male in crimes of a less serious nature (Gernet, op. cit. p. 169). In one type of crime, hooliganism, the male is in the majority, with a percentage of 27.4 as against the female’s 2.8; but, in all other groups the woman is far in the lead. She commits six times the offenses of the men in insults, five times as many in the illegal manufacture of liquor, twice as many for assault, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in the crimes carrying sentences of above a year the men take the lead again. Note this table from an article Women in Correctional Labor Institutions, by A. Shestakova and B. Utievsky, included in the volume edited by Vishinsky. It shows clearly to what point women exceed in crime.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 358.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-bottom&amp;quot;| Length of sentence&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of male&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of female&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Up to 3 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 8.7&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 18.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 to 6 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 20.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 6 months to a year&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 16.8&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 1 year to 2 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.1&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 17.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 2 years to 3 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 13.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 years to 5 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 14.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 7.9&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 5 years to 10 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 12.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 4.5&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The social composition of the criminal group in the USSR is, as is to be expected, different from that of the ordinary capitalist country. In the first group of crimes mentioned the guilty are largely those of the village bourgeoisie and the rural Kulaks, who still struggle against the socialist order. They are persons who would not ordinarily be included in a criminal classification. Yet if we regard any legal definition of crime as including acts that contravene the rules and regulations of the proletariat society then they are actually criminals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this group commits most of the crimes against the state, the laborers themselves constitute the major portion of persons committing other types of crime. We find Professor Gernet,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; dividing them into owners of property or employers, and laborers. In theft we have a percentage of 12.2 for the first class, and 21.9 for the second; banditry is .8 per cent. for the first, and 1.7 per cent. for the second; murders 1.6 per cent. for the first, 2.4 per cent. for the second; hooliganism is 9.3 per cent. for the first, and 11.4 per cent. for the second. The situation is reversed in regard to crimes against the person. We find the first group there with a percentage of 10.5 and the second with 7.1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is some substantiation of the theory of the economic basis of crime which disciples of Marx and Lenin hold to so firmly in the fact that the curve for crime and unemployment rise and fall together. Russia claims to have no unemployment problem now, but there are those who do not work. There is always an idle band in any country. She has her dregs, misfits, and those who fall by the wayside from a variety of causes. And it is from this group that a large degree of criminals come. It furnishes its quota in Russia, too.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gernet, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is danger of getting too statistical. We want only to have a picture of the situation. Since 1928, the date already referred to as the beginning of a program to extend Socialism from villages to cities by means of collectivization, the curve for crimes against the state has risen. The Kulaks and the village middle class have waged a relentless war, apparently not daunted by what happens to those who are caught. Or, it may be heroism of a kind, even if a misplaced one. However, the expressed attitude of the authorities who administer the corrective labor system is steadfastly to win them over, to persuade and to educate in such a political fashion that they will be convinced. Whereas “crushing” was once the order of the day, the firmer establishment of the government now gives leeway for the more constructive measures. It is interesting to note that whoever is responsible for that political education knows his approaches well, if the statements of authorities are accurate. They have released enough, they say, to see what zealous citizens it turns back to society. I have no figures on it. But as I said in the preface, they know what they want of the man who is their criminal. Given that, accomplishment is easier. It is no small thing to persuade a man that the society he thought he was against was his all the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER V: WHAT THE COURTS ARE LIKE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; courts of Russia, in their present form a result of seventeen years of revolutionary evolution, and a mixture of proletarian ideas with older principles of justice, represent one of the most interesting developments in the country. It has been the aim of Soviet rule that the working class should by its participation in government be able to take part in carrying out the laws of the land. The administration of justice by the proletariat through which “Every representative of the masses, every citizen, must be placed in such conditions that he will be able to take part in discussing the laws of the state, in the choosing of his representatives, and in the carrying out of the laws of the state,” was a principle expressed by Lenin as early as 1918. The policy in political education has moved steadily toward the fulfillment of this plan. The use of jurors and their selection yearly in such a manner as will include a great number in the service is one way in which participation in administering and discussing laws is being carried out. Another is in the use of comradely courts carried on by the people of village or factory, which are later discussed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The responsibility of the courts in the establishment of strict legality has been increased tremendously by two recent events. The first was the meeting in April, 1934, of the first All-Union Conference of Jurists which made wide recommendations in regard to attaining a higher quality of work on the part of courts, prosecution, and correctional labor institutions. The second act of significance was the reorganization of the OGPU by the formation of the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the transference of all judicial functions to the courts of the land. It takes brief time and space for this last statement, but it would require a good many pages to discuss the full significance of the step, and a number are devoted to it a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the work of the All-Union Conference of Jurists, it is of high significance just now when the observance of legality and the establishment of a wide legal consciousness are so important in the relatively advanced stage of socialist construction which the state is entering. Openness must be the observed principle, and secrecy, even though legally judicial, discouraged, if confidence is to be widespread. A government cannot continue turning trials over to secret tribunals outside its judicial system and enjoy a reputation, even among its own loyal masses, of being adequately established. A normality of functions of institutions can go far toward establishing, even if only psychologically at first, a normality of conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Likewise, sentences must be constructive. This was not a new note as will be seen throughout this book. All along the party program had advocated an educational approach to the treatment of criminals, and year by year had strengthened provisions for realizing the fulfillment of its plans. But the emphasis on this problem by so authoritative a body brought it freshly to the attention of the courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0086.svg|SCHEME OF TRIAL IN RSFSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note the recommendation of the Conference in this regard. “In order to insure the effectiveness of judicial work, the judges should endeavor to ascertain the economic and social-political results of the verdict rendered by them, being assisted in this work by public opinion organized around the judicial institutions.” The same body placed a responsibility for prevention of crime on its courts. It was not only a duty to pronounce a sentence on a guilty person, but the tribunal must by means of its favorable position discover the reason for the circumstance of the crime. The recommendation ran, “The court, when trying a case, should not only establish the guilty persons but should also disclose those economic and organizational defects and shortcomings which create a favorable atmosphere for criminal actions, signalizing such circumstances to the attention of the Party and Soviet organs by means of special riders. The results of such signalizing should be checked up from time to time.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, as an important instrument in the accomplishing of the socialist society which is the goal of the people, the court’s function is first to subdue the enemies that would undermine any such progress, and second to aid in giving discipline and control to those of the proletariat themselves who are not strong enough on their own account. Added to that, it is an organ of prevention.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not within the purpose of this volume to give a detailed description of the system of courts existing in the country at present, but a brief account is necessary. Before going further it may be well to repeat the reminder that a class distinction is fundamental in administering the criminal law in the USSR. This statement will appear too many times very likely, in relation to various phases of the subject, but it is important. The court as an organ of the state is devoted in its administration of law to carrying out the purpose and policy of the state, and since the class idea is prevalent in the government, it will have to be also in court action. With this explanation we proceed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is at the very bottom of the judicial system the People’s Courts.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Military crimes are under the jurisdiction of military tribunals and transport crimes of the transport courts of the various railway lines.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The territory represented by one such has a population of from 20,000 to 100,000. Its jurisdiction may include any case against property or person not carrying a death sentence, although the more serious ones go in actual practice to the higher courts. It has other functions than as a lower court of the first instance. It is a member of the observation commission which supervises the correctional labor policy at the local penitentiary or correctional labor institution. It has an administrative function when the judge, sitting without the jurors in a “business session,” decides whether the evidence gathered in a preliminary investigation is sufficient to warrant court proceedings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In trials the People’s Court is presided over by a judge assisted by two jurors who actually have most of the rights and responsibilities of the judge, and might, therefore, be called co-judges. The judges for the People’s Courts are elected for a one-year term by the local Soviet and may be recalled either by the same body or by the Commissar of Justice for sufficient cause. This provision for impeachability is one of the basic principles of organization of the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0089.svg|COURT TRIAL]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judges of these lower courts are representatives of the working class for they themselves are of their number. A judge (and, he seemed an adequate one), in a city court of Moscow with whom the writer talked was a baker before he took up his present profession. The qualifications of the office are that in addition to being from among the toilers the judge must have “a record of two years’ responsible work in state or workers’ and peasants’ public trade union, or party organization of the workers, or of three years’ practical work in organs of Soviet justice in the capacity of not less than judicial investigators.” Whether this may be regarded as high fitness or not, it seems to insure the selection of men of fair ability for the job. Perhaps it is that business of recall that makes them so careful, but those whom the writer saw sitting were impressive in their earnestness and efforts to arrive at a constructive sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The jurors, whom we may think of as co-judges, are about 40 per cent. women and 60 per cent. men. These persons are elected by factory committees, Red Army sections, and village Soviets, and a special commission distributes the number to be elected among these various groups in the percentage of 50 per cent. to the first, 15 per cent. to the second, and 35 per cent. to the third. There are no specific qualifications, except the right to vote, but there is the restriction that “A person has no right to be a juror, if he has been expelled from a social or professional organization for a disgraceful offense or conduct, for a period of three years from the day of expulsion. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The names of the candidates for jurors are posted, and objections, if motivated, may be presented to the election committee. When the list of elected ones is finally sent to the commission, the latter prepares another list of those to serve in the various courts. Each serves for only six days of the year, and during absence from work in the act of performing this duty the worker retains his place and wage of employment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While there seems to be no specific preparation for the task of a juror beyond the requirement that the judge explain to those who sit with him their rights and duties, there are conferences held and some evening classes which acquaint them better with the work before them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before we pass to the consideration of the next step in the Soviet judicature it would perhaps help in getting a clear picture of jurisdiction and procedure to take a look at some of the cases before the People’s Court. A typical day is described from the writer’s notes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first trial we attended in the morning the room used was a small one, perhaps with a capacity for seating forty people altogether. It was on the ground floor of the building, and street cars clanging along their track outside made hearing difficult. On a slightly raised dais underneath a picture of Lenin there was a long plain table covered with a green cloth. Three chairs were placed at the back and one at the end. Three men and a woman, evidently having something to do with the case about to be tried, were already in the court room when we entered. The benches on which we took our places were arranged on either side of the narrow aisle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Exactly at the hour set for the beginning of court, a door at the back of the room opened and a man, accompanied by two women, entered. The women sat in the outside chairs at the back of the table; the man took the center one. Already the young woman, who had been in the room on our arrival had seated herself at the end of the table. She was the clerk, the man was the judge, the two women the jurors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judge was obviously of the toiling classes, as were also the women. The judge, with his short black mustache, his close-cropped hair, his ordinary working clothes consisting of dark suit and blue shirt, ignored us and immediately got to work. The women were perhaps a little more conscious of our presence. The older in particular reached up to push back her hair, a little later smoothed her dress, a simple black cotton one. We noticed that her hands had seen much work. The other woman, about thirty and good looking, turned curious eyes toward us a moment, but finally gave her attention to the men who were seated on the front bench ahead of us.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judge adjusted his glasses and read from the papers in his hand. The plaintiff had worked faithfully for a school, discharging all his duties as per requirement, but he had not been paid. He was asking for his money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were no attorneys, neither defense nor for the plaintiff. The plaintiff had his witness; he told his story, then summoned his corroborator, who had been excluded as required by law. The school representative told his side. The women jurors, forgetting us by that time, listened attentively, and the older asked frequent questions. The judge too, interrogated often.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seemed obvious to us that the verdict should favor the man whose wages had been withheld, but it is difficult to tell about court decisions. We waited an instant; the three behind the table conferred so briefly that it was plain there was no dissension. The school was ordered to pay, and was fined five rubles. As simply as that and requiring hardly more time than the telling here, it was finished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We left the room as the next case was called and went upstairs. A trial of some seriousness was in progress there. The judge sitting appeared of unusual intelligence. He was leaning forward, questioning the man in front of him, and he took no note, apparently, of our entry. One juror was a woman, the other a man. There was the same long table, the clerk at the end, a red cloth (Communist symbol), instead of the green, an especially attractive picture of Lenin, and one of Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We asked cautiously of one of the spectators what the case was about. A factory director was on trial, accused of criminal negligence by the workmen, because he had been given money to insure the factory against fire some three or four months previously, and had failed to do so, thus imperiling the lives of those who worked there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But even though there might have been a severe sentence, if the motive was proved sufficiently base, there still were no attorneys, either for the state or defense. The defendant told his story. He had been ill and on vacation, but the matter of insurance would have his immediate attention, he said. He brought in his witnesses; but the workers’ evidence outweighed his. He had been warned, they said, and he had gone carelessly on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, said his witness, he had been a good worker. He had managed his factory well. It had done its prescribed quota and more. It was not right nor just that he should suffer for one negligent act.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The verdict was not so simple. The judge and jury retired into the mystery of the consultation room at the back. We sat wondering what sort of penalty, in case guilt was adjudged, would be imposed. Five minutes passed and they returned. The man was held guilty of negligence, and since he had been warned, and since the act was of a serious nature, imperiling the lives of workers and the property of the state, some measure must be used to impress him. He stood quietly, but the fingers of the hand hanging at his side worked nervously. The judge paused a bare moment, shuffled his papers, and then spoke.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For six months the man was to have no political rights and his party connections were to be cut off. But he was to stay in his job; go right on with the work he had done so well, and give up fifteen per cent. of his salary for the six month period. Even the accused seemed to feel that the penalty was just, and there was obvious agreement among those who listened.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So much for the People’s Court, the basic nucleus in the Russian judicial system. Now, for the second step in the judicature. The People’s Court takes care of the great mass of cases, both criminal and civil, and in addition exercises a function of supervision in regard to the village public courts and comradely courts of factories and other state institutions. But this will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just now we pass to the Regional Court. It is both a court of cassational instance (the form review of a criminal case usually takes in the USSR) and a court of original jurisdiction for more serious cases. Its territory comprises a province or region of three to eleven millions population. It is, first of all, the organ of control of all the courts within its region. It supervises the work of the People’s judges, as well as selects and presents the names of such to the regional executive committees for election.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A word must be said here as to the use of the cassational method. The court of appeals was abolished by the first decree issued by the Soviets on the courts, and in its place was the following provision.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Act 349 of Code of Criminal Procedure, now in force.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Complaints from verdicts of the People’s Courts may be lodged by each of the interested parties exclusively on account of formal infringement of the rights and interests of the given party in the conduct of the case or in the judicial examination of the case, and as such constitute cassation complaints, and may not touch upon the substance of the verdict.” Thus the law seems to prevent the right of the court to go into the substance of the case. Such, however, is not actually a fact.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling of the Supreme Court in regard to criminal cassation, in 1924, laid down the general rule for cassation review which is still followed. “The court of criminal cassation, being a cassation court in that it does not go into the substance of the case, at the same time avoids a purely formal bureaucratic approach to the case. While never turning into a court of appeals, it does not hypocritically shut its eyes to the substance; manifest lack of elucidation of the circumstances which should have influenced the verdict, inconsistency of the punishment with the crimes committed, manifest errors and contradictions between the verdict and the undeniable facts of the case, . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a form of revision on the complaint of the proper parties, which combines the elements of cassation as practiced by the French courts with a method of appeal and together make up the cassation-revision form of investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These complaints may be made by the defendant and his lawyer, the state prosecutor, the plaintiff and his legal representative, or by the legal suitor and his representative. Complaints by any other persons result in the case being handled by judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The form of the complaint follows no standard rule. A peasant may write a few words on a piece of paper, without even setting forth his argument, and the case will pass to the proper cassation court and be completely checked up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The form of judicial supervision differs somewhat from the cassation method. The latter depends on the action of the parties concerned while the first depends on the intervention of the chairman or prosecutor of the court of the first instance. From this it can be seen that the normal way to have a criminal case reviewed is by the cassation method, on complaint by the interested parties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We will pass from the work of the Regional Court as a court of cassation or supervision to look at a case which it tries in its capacity as a tribunal of first instance. In cases of appeal there are three judges sitting, but in cases of original jurisdiction there is the one judge and two jurors just as in the lower court. The judges of the Regional Court are elected by the Regional Executive Committee from a list of names presented by the Commissar of Justice. Their term of office is for one year. The qualifications are that in addition to the requirements for a People’s judge, the candidate shall also have served in a judicial capacity in a position not lower than the People’s Court for a period of three years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On our visit to the regional court we found a somewhat larger room, seating perhaps a hundred persons, but still lacking any formal atmosphere. Its standing capacity was crowded when we arrived. Even the door leading to the corridor was open and filled with men and women. We attempted to look over, but the spectators politely made way for us. We saw, as we edged forward, the usual picture of Lenin, the familiar red cloth on the table. One knew at once by the atmosphere of the room that a case of interest was in process of trial. The judge and jurors were already in their places and the judge was reading the charge which alleged that the four young men and a girl on the front seats in the custody of an officer, had some two weeks before entered and robbed the house of the woman across the aisle from them, and that such robbery was accompanied by the use of a firearm in which the husband was wounded. No murder, however, was done. In that case death could have been the assessed penalty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three attorneys for the defendants sat at the side of the room, but as the trial proceeded we noticed how little part they took. The judge questioned the defendants, and got the story almost entirely from them. Witnesses were there and the judge and jurors interrogated them as they came, but they turned again and again to the accused to check up, to give them a chance to verify or deny. The procedure was highly informal. The court sought to find out the truth of the matter, but we soon saw that the inquiry went even beyond that. True to the duty imposed on him in the matter of discovering the reason for the circumstance, the judge pursued his questioning. He wanted to find the motive for such conduct. To discover that he questioned the young criminals on the whole circumstances of their lives, of their social background, without regard to apparent relevancy. Guilt was not in question, but the “measure of social defense” to be applied depended on the whole circumstance of the deed. One of the offenders had run away from his home with his grandmother, from a good job, but he appeared to have been led by the older who admitted that he did not want to work. The girl, defiantly, confessed. The youth, who used the gun, was asked again why he shot the man. He looked down and said he did not know, unless it was because the victim did not raise his hands soon enough. The spectators, jammed to the door and tense, laughed in relief. The judge did not reprove them, but he did not laugh, and the room became quickly silent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judge surveyed the defendants with something of sorrow; we were particularly interested in his attitude for he appeared to be concerned that the young people should deliberately choose such a career, and gave occasional words of admonition. But judges and citizens alike in the USSR have faith in what labor of a correctional sort can do for the construction of character. The next day the young offenders were sentenced to institutions where the ruling principle, in accordance with Soviet policy, is to teach them the dignity of work, and how to do some important kind well, and where they will be given certain cultural and political education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is next in the system the Supreme Courts of the seven republics—much like our own state Supreme tribunals—which act both as organs of judicial control for all courts of the territory, as courts of appeal for those lower courts subject to their jurisdiction, and as courts of original jurisdiction in more serious cases. The judges of these courts are elected by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the top of the judicial system is the Supreme Court of the USSR. It is, of course, the organ of highest judicial supervision, and in its various branches acts as a court of appeals of all cases from various lower tribunals. The Military Section reviews the cases appealed from the military tribunals, the Transport Section performs the same function for those appealed from the railroad courts. Its judges are elected by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for a term of one year, and they must have had at least three years’ service as judge of the People’s Court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In original jurisdiction this court has only the most important cases in the Union. The Code of Criminal Procedure specifies: “The Judicial Department of the Supreme Court as a court of first instance, shall take jurisdiction (1) over cases of exceptional importance, when sent to it for trial by the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as cases offered for adjudication by the People’s Commissar of Justice, the Prosecutor of the Republic [now, the Attorney General] or the chairman of the State Political Bureau (OGPU). The Supreme Court has the right to accept for its adjudication or transfer for adjudication to any provincial court at its discretion cases offered for its adjudication by the prosecutor of the republic or Chairman of the OGPU. (2) Over cases involving offenses in office committed by members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the people’s commissars and members of the &#039;&#039;Collegiums&#039;&#039; of People’s Commissariats, members of the Supreme Court, the assistant prosecutors of the Republic. (3) Over cases of alleged offenses in office on the part of the provincial prosecutors and their assistants, the members of the presidium of the provincial executive committee, heads of its departments, chairmen or deputy chairmen of the provincial court.” All cases enumerated in this paragraph may be accepted by the Supreme Court for its adjudication or transferred by it to a provincial court depending on the importance of the case.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 449.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In several of these cases jurisdiction is not mandatory and may be transferred to other appropriate courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the cases tried by it and familiar to most Americans was the Metropolitan-Vickers case of two years ago, in which a certain group of Englishmen was accused of sabotage. But to continue the method used in discussing the lower courts, let us again consider a case. The following was appealed from the Siberian Regional Court, and does not present the human elements of cases of the first instance, yet it has its interesting points.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The building itself is a scant two blocks from the spot where Lenin lies in his red granite tomb. There was a militiaman inside the entrance who directed us upstairs to the proper room. Another officer was in the hall but he only looked at us curiously as we went by. It is the highest court of the land, and we were impressed by the informality of the approach.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three judges presided in the room which presented a more formal appearance than those of the courts visited previously. An armed guard stood at the door leading out into the room at the back. Across the aisle from us sat three lawyers, the defense counsel. At the end of the table was the prosecuting attorney, a woman of some thirty years, who seemed competent and determined. Above the judges the usual portrait of Lenin looked down upon us. As we entered two young Russian women got up from the benches at the front to make way for us. They were the wives of the two condemned men whose case was on appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judges themselves, all men, were impressive in their dignity, and seemed intelligent and capable. They were dressed simply in ordinary street clothes, the dark shirt of one was open at the throat. One of them, not the chairman, read the charge in the original case. Two men had been condemned to die for murder and robbery. One, the manager of a fur factory, had stolen money to the amount of 7,500 rubles from the factory, and he and a companion, in a boat with a third, were crossing a lake. The third had a sum of money in his possession. While they stopped on the shore of the lake the first two sent the third for wood, and as he returned, they waylaid him and clubbed him to death. The Siberian Regional Court had sentenced the men to be shot.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the reading, one of the defense attorneys spoke at length. In Russia there is no death sentence for murder, but for robbery in which murder occurs such a penalty is attached. The counsel, realizing that weight of evidence was against him, tried to separate the crime into two distinct acts. It was his one chance. The murder had been motivated by other causes, he said, and robbery followed as an afterthought. He contended also that the stick with which the man was killed did not constitute a weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, his argument did not hold and in addition the prosecutor pointed out that the one man had already stolen money from the state, which act in itself might carry the death penalty. The judges retired and we discussed the case while we waited. The defense attorney, who had spoken, walked up and down the aisle. The two wives were quietly huddled in seats farther back. A bell sounded, the court returned, and the chairman or presiding judge read the decision allowing the sentence to stand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case illustrated also the speed with which trials are completed after the crime is known. The murder of the man had occurred in October of 1933, but the body was not discovered until the latter part of June of 1934. There was no certainty of the third man’s death until that time as the other two had steadfastly maintained that he had left them. But less than one month after the discovery of the body, the two men had been tried and condemned to death. That was on July 19, and it was on August 9th that we heard the Supreme Court uphold the sentence. That is probably one of the main reasons why such deeds do not flourish there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is still to mention the village public courts and the comradely courts of factories and various institutions. These occupy a special place in the judicial system and were therefore not mentioned except in passing in the beginning of the chapter. They are under the supervision of the People’s Courts, and are for the purpose of interesting the large masses of people in handling such violations of laws as occur in factory or village. Among such problems would be disorganization of production in factory, on the farm, or in offices, as well as drunkenness, indolence, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These courts are of, by, and for the people. There may be some little matter of form separating the masses from the formal courts, but they handle these among themselves. At a meeting of the workers of a given village a chairman and not less than ten members are elected to sit as a court. The factory conference follows the same plan, and elects a chairman, one or more substitutes, and not less than ten members, the exact number to be decided upon, from among the shockworkers of the factory or office.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The People’s Court, functioning as a supervisor of these organs, may decide that a case is outside their competency, and take it from them or cancel the decision in a case that is considered not to have been within their jurisdiction, but the decision given in cases which are considered to be proper to them is final and subject to no appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A friend who was a spectator of the proceedings related the following case to the writer. A man had been drunk and had beaten his wife, not injuring her but outraging the village. In the presence of a large group of interested neighbors, the court assembled and tried him and decided that he must go forth from the apartment where he lived with his family and shift for himself as best he could. He did not deserve the shelter the home afforded him. There was no appeal. He left.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What are more definitely the types of cases handled by the comradely courts which, like the village public courts are free from any formal judicial rules?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following is quoted from a lecture delivered by S. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The comradely courts examine cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) of violation of labor discipline, to wit: repeated late-coming for work, staying away from work, reporting for work in a drunken condition;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) of systematic neglectful attitude to socialist property (machines, tools, materials, premises, etc.);&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) of turning out misfits above the allowed limit;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) of insults either by word of mouth or in writing, or action (spreading false derogatory stories about individuals), and inflicting blows without bodily injury;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) of thefts from factory and office by workers upon the territory of the enterprise, as well as of materials and tools belonging to the enterprise to the value of not more than 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) of Hooliganism that is not subject to criminal prosecution, and other behavior which does not correspond with the requirements of public decency and reflects the negative sides of social life.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
From the same source is taken the following list of penalties imposed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The following penalties may be imposed by the comradely courts:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) public warning;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) public censure with announcement in the wallnewspaper or in general press;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) a fine of not more than 10 rubles for the benefit of public organizations (Chemical Defense Society, Children’s Friends, etc.) ;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) reparation of damage caused to property, if not in excess of 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) raising the question before the administration of discharging the culprit;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) raising the question before the trade union of expelling a member from the union for a stated period.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Examination of the cases must take place not later than five days from the time of registration of the complaint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a closing paragraph I set down the basic principles of organization of the Soviet Courts. It summarizes what has gone before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;(a) administration of justice exclusively by toilers;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) election of judges and accountability before the electors;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) impeachability of judges, the latter being independent from any local or personal influences but most intimately bound up with their class and called upon to carry out the policy of their class;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) collegiate trial of judicial cases, as a rule, by a body of three people with an assured majority to the people’s jurors, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) participation of jurors in trial and judgment upon equal terms with the state judges, both in regard to fact and in regard to law, i.e., in the full scope of the rights of the state judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER VI: THE PRELIMINARY STAGE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Let&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; us start with the beginning. The Criminal Code of 1927 specifies how proceedings may be begun. We should expect that there would be an arrest, but this may not be the case. In fact it is unlikely except in the more serious cases. In the lesser ones there will almost surely be none at all. What happens then? There are two main possibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, the prosecutor, the investigators, the militia or the agency of Administration of State Safety of the People’s Commissariat of the Interior (formerly the OGPU) may start proceedings when they know or are informed of a criminal act. Since these organs are by their nature in a position to know of criminal law violations, it is usual for a case to start with them. The course they take will be discussed in a moment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second manner in which criminal procedure is usually instituted is on complaint made to a competent authority by a person, an organization, an official, or by a confession on the part of the criminal, in which the officials proceed as mentioned above, if there is evidence of a criminal act. Otherwise they take no action, and so notify the complaining person or agent, in which case he may appeal to a proper court if he so wishes. Thus, if a citizen comes to a proper authority and complains, either orally or by writing, of some act, but does not present sufficient evidence that a crime has taken place, the authority refuses to start initial proceedings. Often, not even a confession on the part of the supposed guilty party will be accepted as &#039;&#039;prima facie&#039;&#039; evidence. This decision on the part of the authority not to proceed may, however, be appealed to the competent court within seven days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When once this evidence is accepted as indicating that a crime has been committed there may or may not be an arrest. Quite naturally, if a serious crime has been committed such as murder, and the criminal is making an effort to escape, there is arrest and detention. The law, however, states&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, 1923, section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “No person shall be deprived of his liberty and taken into custody otherwise than in the instances and in the manner provided by law.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, in the same edition of the Code,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 100.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there is an enumeration of the cases in which an arrest may be legally made. They are “(1) When a criminal is apprehended while making direct preparations, or while actually engaged in commission of the crime, or immediately afterwards; (2) When the victim or eye witnesses point to a given person as the one who committed the crime; (3) When articles of evidence are found on the person of a suspect or in his dwelling; (4) When a suspect attempted to flee or is apprehended while in flight; (5) When a suspect has no domicile or a permanent occupation; (6) When a suspect cannot identify himself.” These are the six instances in which an arrest may be made. The police, however, may use their judgment as to the necessity of such action, and in the event of detaining the supposed criminal they must report within twenty-four hours either to the prosecutor or to a judge of the People’s Court, in whose jurisdiction the case may be, giving information as to who made the arrest, when, where, and at what hour, information obtained in regard to the person held, the crime with which he is charged, reason for the arrest, and the name of the official signing the order for arrest.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 107, Commentaries.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the evidence obtained is sufficient to warrant holding the person for investigation the authority to whom the report is made gives his assent. Otherwise he reverses the decision and the man is released.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the absence of these conditions an arrest may not be made and in that event the method of securing attendance is to have the suspected person sign a declaration that he will appear when summoned.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Criminal Code of 1927, Section 103.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, there is a way provided to meet necessity. If the act committed appears to be of a nature so serious that it would carry a penalty of more than a year’s sentence to imprisonment, one of the above measures may be selected so that he may be held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it is usually the police organs acting as investigators who take a person into custody at the beginning of a trial, the investigator may also order an arrest. The Code in Section 145 provides: “Means of cutting off the possibility of escape shall be selected only after the suspected person has been formally accused and can be altered or abolished after the first questioning. In exceptional cases these means may also be applied to mere suspects who have not yet been declared accused.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who makes arrests in the USSR? The police force is the militia. This organ not only makes the elementary inquiry on cases which come under the jurisdiction of the investigator—to be discussed more fully in later paragraphs of this chapter—but they may themselves also conduct such preliminary investigation in all other cases. Besides carrying out the official open investigation they also carry on detective activity in order to establish grounds for future criminal trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is another agent of arrest. Wherever Russia is known, the “Gay-Pay-Oo” is a familiar institution. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; of early revolutionary days gave way in 1922, in the days of NEP, to an organ a little less frightening. But the OGPU had an ability on its own account to send shivers down the backs of people and caused would-be lawbreakers of the less hardy type to check their actions. If those critics, who feared that NEP ushered in an era that would in its mildness take power from the direct hands of the proletariat and turn it over to well-established revolutionary law, had waited for this organ to be in action they would have been reassured. Whether all the deeds attributed to this secret police be truly theirs or not, it is certain that it has been an effective means of protecting Soviet authority. It has been a court unto itself as well. It was, until July 10, 1934, empowered to punish even by shooting “all persons apprehended while participating in a banditry raid or armed robbery,” and the purpose for which it was avowedly organized was to “unite all the revolutionary powers of the republics for the purpose of combatting political and economic counter-revolution, espionage and banditry.” It is in this enumeration of crimes that it has jurisdiction as an organ of preliminary investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This organization has directed most of its attention to counter-revolutionary activities and uses its judicial powers mostly against the enemy class. Ordinary criminals arrested by it are usually turned over to the courts for trial. As for the actual number shot during recent years, there seems no way to judge, but indications are that they have been sparing in executions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chamberlin, Soviet Russia, p. 390.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are other phases of their work such as the maintaining of places of deprivation of liberty which will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The OGPU has recently been incorporated into the newly formed All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs as the Administration of State Safety, and its judicial &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; has been abolished. The significance of this is apparent. It ends a chapter in the history of Soviet Russia. Cases once disposed of by this organization now will pass through the courts, and the pictures the world held of midnight secret trials will have to be put away. While the activities of the OGPU were duly authorized by law, the possibilities of excesses under such a system seem apparent, and the establishment of a more definite order of legality is bound to produce a quieter confidence. Because of the widespread interest in the transferring of this authority, the entire decree is given here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To form an All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, including in its composition the United State Political Department (OGPU).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs is to be entrusted with:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The guaranteeing of revolutionary order and state security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The protection of public (socialist) property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Registration of civil acts (registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Protection of the frontiers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The following departments are to be formed in the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a)Chief Department of State Security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Chief Department of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Chief Department of Frontier and Internal Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Chief Department of Fire Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Chief Department of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Department of Civil Acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Administrative and Business Department.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To organize in the Union Republics People’s Commissariats of Home Affairs, acting on the basis of the law on the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, and in the RSFSR to establish instead of a People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs for the Republic an Institute Plenipotentiary for Home Affairs of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Departments of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the Union Republics are to be organized in the autonomous republics, regions and provinces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) To abolish the judicial collegium of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs are to send all cases of crimes on the completion of their investigation to the competent judicial organs in accordance with the legal requirements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Cases under the Department of State Security of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs are to be directed to the Supreme Court of the USSR, while cases of such crimes as high treason, espionage and similar crimes are to be handed over to the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR or to the competent military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) A special conference is to be organized under the People’s Commissar of Home Affairs of the USSR which, on the basis of the regulations, is to be entrusted with the right of applying, by administrative order, banishment, exile, imprisonment in corrective labor camps for a period not exceeding five years and banishment beyond the frontiers of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) To instruct the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR to present to the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR regulations for the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
What judicial authority is to handle the cases previously in the jurisdiction of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of the OGPU? Here is the decree:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In connection with the organization of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and with the object of insuring the proper consideration of cases handed over to the judicial organs and investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Cases of state crimes (counter-revolutionary and against administrative order), with the exception of those indicated in the subsequent points of this section, investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and also. the principal courts of the autonomous republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Special collegiums composed of a chairman and two members of the Court, are to be formed in the judicial institutions of the USSR and Union republics, named for the consideration of these cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Cases of high treason, espionage, terrorism, causing explosions, incendiarism and other forms of crime (Art. 6, 8 and 9 of the law on state crimes), investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and competent military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Cases of crimes on the railway and water transport, investigated by the same organs are subject to the jurisdiction of the railway and water transport collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the courts of the railways and water transport to which they belong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) All other cases, investigated by the same organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Courts in the usual order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the consideration of appeals against the resolutions of the Plenums and Presidiums of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, and also appeals against the sentences, decisions and definitions of the collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR, a judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR is to be established which is to be composed of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and two of his deputies, who are to have the right of directly rescinding or changing the resolutions, definitions, decisions and sentences of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics and Collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considerations of cases in the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR are to take place with the obligatory participation of the State Prosecutor of the USSR or his deputy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Resolutions of the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR may be appealed against by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the State Prosecutor of the USSR in the plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR and in the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In conformity with sections I and II of this decree, to recognize the necessity of strengthening the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To instruct the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics to oblige the People’s Commissariats of Justice and Chairmen of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics to work out and carry through in the fixed order, within a period of five days, appropriate additions to the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To instruct the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR to work out and carry through in fixed order, within the same period, addition to the staffs of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus does Russia make another advance in the administration of her criminal law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With proceedings begun, the next step is to determine by preliminary investigation if the suspect is to be definitely accused and held for trial. The purpose of this is to keep the court calendar from being crowded with cases which ought never to come to trial because the accusation is unfounded. It likewise guarantees the investigation and consideration of the substantial facts and saves much of the court’s time. The organs involved here are the prosecutor, the investigators appointed by him, and attached to his office, the police (militia) and the body formerly known as the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a great deal of informality and flexibility in the matter of this preliminary investigation. The investigator may take the whole matter into the atmosphere where the crime was committed. He may conduct it among the workers of the factory, if the act occurred there, in order that the workers themselves may aid in furnishing proofs, and in checking up the various facts. He also benefits in this way from the public opinion in regard to the case. This method of investigation in regard to labor crimes, both in factories and more recently in agricultural spheres, has been growing more and more common.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the more complex cases this investigation is carried on by the prosecutor himself after the initial evidence is turned over to him by the militia, organs of criminal detection, or other competent authority making the first inquiry. In lesser cases the investigating organ will usually prepare the case although the prosecutor may at any time examine the evidence and otherwise supervise the conduct of the case. Now that (since 1933) there is an Attorney General of the USSR, centralizing the prosecuting forces of the entire federated republics, the most important cases such as the famous Metropolitan-Vickers would be turned over to his personal supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this preliminary investigation it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney under whom it is carried on to see that evidence both for and against the suspect is gathered. If he neglects to see that the rights of the person under suspicion are protected and permits a case to come to trial when the evidence, if properly gathered, would indicate innocence, then he is laying up trouble for himself and will probably have to answer to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To the end that all information and evidence may be secured, the investigator is given wide powers as to search and seizure of anything having a relation to the case. But if one thinks of rough-shod entry and abuse, he may be consoled by certain restrictions which the law places around such activities. In conducting searches and seizures the investigator calls in official witnesses. Persons participating in the case as parties to it, and relatives of the parties, cannot be official witnesses. And Sec. 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “the searches and seizures are to be made in daytime, except in cases which cannot be postponed.” The searcher is further ordered to announce his decision to make the search and to use all possible care to avoid damage (Section 179 of the same Code), and the additional protection is given to the accused in that the investigator is to see “that the facts of the private life of the person searched which have no relation with the case shall not be made public.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sec. 181.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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All articles seized in such a search must be listed, remarks made, and a copy deposited with the person or his family, and the articles themselves must be sealed at the place before being taken away.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 183, 184, 185.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Mail may also be seized by the investigator if permission has been given by the prosecutor, as may also any telegraphic or other communications, but the safeguard is provided that a representative of the postal-telegraphic institution must be present.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 186-188.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first stage of the preliminary investigation there is no “accused.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Except in such obvious cases that no investigation would be necessary. An example of this would be a man actually caught murdering another.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The aim at this time is to find if a criminal act has really been committed and if so who committed it. After the deed is decided to be of a criminal nature and is definitely attributed to a particular person or persons then the second stage is undertaken. At this time the “decision” is framed, and the accused is notified that he is to appear before the authority. This “decision” is written after the evidence has been carefully weighed and guilt indicated. This document must contain all the information and circumstances gathered up to that time.&lt;br /&gt;
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When the person has been finally accused he is summoned to appear before the investigator who is handling the case. He is not yet definitely held for trial. When he appears he is made acquainted with the accusation. “And that does not mean,” a prosecutor told the writer, “that he is given a chair and table and told to read the papers before him. The whole thing is explained to him by the authority in charge.” Thereafter he is questioned and given a chance to tell his side of the matter. His statements are checked and any new evidence is gathered.&lt;br /&gt;
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Steps must now be taken to insure his appearance during the completion of the investigation. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for five measures, as follows:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 144 and 150-154.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (1) He will not leave the place specified in the statement he signs without the permission of the proper authority which is the investigator or the court. (2) &#039;&#039;Personal or property parole&#039;&#039;. In the arrangement for property parole, the organization signing the bond must produce the accused when wanted or forfeit the sum of money agreed upon, but in the personal parole the persons (not less than two) who have agreed to produce the accused when wanted may, on failure to do so, be fined or sentenced to compulsory labor for a period up to three months. (3) &#039;&#039;Cash bail&#039;&#039;. Either he or other persons may deposit with the court a cash bail to insure his presence, the amount to be determined as in our courts, by the seriousness of the crime. (4) &#039;&#039;Detention in the home&#039;&#039;. The person may be restricted to his own home, as in the case of illness, or if a woman, because of pregnancy or of the care of her children. (5) &#039;&#039;Holding in custody&#039;&#039;. To be used in more serious cases. This latter is permissible only in certain prescribed cases. One of the conditions is that the case be of such a nature that the penalty, if conviction is secured, will be for a year or more of imprisonment. In addition one may be held in custody in cases covered by a definite enumeration in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which the sentence is not to exceed one year. The third possibility is in case of such serious crimes as banditry, or those of a socially dangerous nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the use of these measures the class nature of the criminal trial is strikingly portrayed. If the personality of the accused, or the crime he has committed, represents a high degree of social danger then one of the more severe measures is chosen. This would be the case for one appraised as a class enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The preliminary investigation may not yet be completed. If the evidence seems conclusive the prosecutor may end the preliminaries by simply drawing up the accusatory decision and conveying such information to the accused, but there may also be much more to this stage of procedure.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the appearance of the accused for questioning a whole new set of resources may be opened up. He mentions witnesses of his own, he gives his own testimony. His relatives must testify if needed. Apparently no one is omitted but the defendant’s counsel. And any falsifying or hiding of evidence on the part of any witness makes him liable to more severe punishment. Even though there is no oath administered due to the official attitude toward religion, there are still effective means of impressing a witness with the importance of telling the truth, one of which is to let him know what will happen to him if he is caught deviating from it!&lt;br /&gt;
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But to go back to the investigation. The accused may make certain requests or demands, and as indicated before, it is not only the duty of the investigating authority to see that they are met if reasonable, but if he neglects to take cognizance of any fact in favor of the defendant he is placing his own position in jeopardy. Not only must the investigator inquire into circumstances and facts that determine guilt or innocence, but he must also find out anything he can that will help in determining the measure of social defense to be given. What, for example, would be some of the things that he would want to know?&lt;br /&gt;
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First and foremost at this time is the question as to whether or not the act was committed in an attempt to restore the bourgeoisie to power; after that the motive and circumstances of the act. In Soviet jurisprudence circumstances play an important part in disposing of the case. The history of the accused himself will be of help if there is a consideration of insanity, the whole circumstances of the crime will establish whether there was coercion, or threat, or whether the offender was at the moment of committing the crime in a state of destitution, hunger, or strong excitement, or influenced by any extremity of personal or family conditions. All of these circumstances are considered extenuating and influence the penalty assessed.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the establishment of all relevant facts pertaining to the case the investigator may summon any experts deemed necessary. These must appear and give their conclusions no matter whether they aid or harm the accused, and a refusal to do so carries a fine of fifty rubles. The use of experts by the criminal courts in Russia will be discussed later but for the time being it may be said that such a custom is in wide use.&lt;br /&gt;
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The calling of experts or other witnesses may also be at the request of the accused. The law provides&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “The investigator shall not have the right to refuse the request of the accused or of the complainant to summon additional witnesses or examine experts if the facts or circumstances sought to be established may have any bearing on the case.” Not only that, but the investigator is likewise limited in interpreting some line of inquiry sought by the accused as not having relevant bearing on the case. Not only must he furnish some adequate grounds for such a refusal, but he must also state in writing his reason for taking such a stand.&lt;br /&gt;
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The number and kind of experts to be used are determined by the investigator if it is on his initiative that they are called. But if the defendant requests others he must call them, unless it is impossible to get the desired expert or unless the granting of this request would delay the preliminary hearing beyond the time legally set. It might be that the defendant would purposely request some one whom it was impossible to produce in order to secure delay, and in such an event, the investigator is naturally not forced to comply.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question of sanity may arise during the preliminary investigation and the proceedings may be dismissed on the grounds of insanity at the time of the commission of the act. If it is judged that the insanity has set in since the act then the trial is postponed until a cure is effected. There is a Judicial Psychiatric Institute where persons awaiting trial are observed for this purpose; but in order to facilitate the work of the medical staff the investigators gather all pertinent data as to the mental history of the accused.&lt;br /&gt;
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With all the information finally assembled the investigator is in a position to make his decision. The police organs, in their initial investigation, may discontinue the case if they find the evidence does not warrant going on. The investigator, if the case has been in his hands, may likewise discontinue for lack of sufficient evidence. And the prosecutor, with the collected data in his hands, may decide that there is no case. But if the person or organization first initiating proceedings is convinced that this is a mistake, the decisions in each of these cases may be appealed to the next higher authority and finally to the court of proper jurisdiction, within a month.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the investigator may decide to hold the accused for trial. In this event as soon as the investigation is completed the accused is notified of the decision and all the facts laid before him. He must be informed of his right to examine the entire records in the case, and the investigator must be sure that he is acquainted with the entire contents. If he is able to suggest anything to be added, the investigator must see that it is included before it finally leaves his hands. Any basic error in this stage of the proceedings may be the cause of a reversal by a higher court, so that great care must be taken to fulfill all points of law.&lt;br /&gt;
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A time limit is set by law as to the completion of this investigation. One used to American delays gasps at the speed with which these people dispense justice. One month from the time the defendant is formally accused the preliminary inquiry must be completed. However, this is not always possible, as appeals may be taken all along on the acts of investigator or prosecutor, and other delays may occur. But certainly all speed possible is used and there is no question of postponement of trial to the extent that we are accustomed to in our country.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the preliminary investigation completed the accused is formally held for trial. This may, in the simpler instances, be by the judge of the People’s Court in cases when there is no necessity for investigation or in those cases when the police officers make all investigations and forward the information to the People’s judge. This would be true in cases involving sentences of less than one year.&lt;br /&gt;
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In cases punishable by not less than one year sentence, yet not of so serious a nature as to require a preliminary inquiry, the investigator holds the accused for trial, on the basis of the information submitted to him by the police or OGPU. In such cases, all the evidence gathered together with the decision of the organs making the investigation is forwarded to the investigator, who, if he agrees submits the records to the competent court. There it is put on the trial list. If he feels that the conclusion to hold for trial is not warranted, then he may refer it to the court of proper jurisdiction for approval or rejection. In cases where the investigator himself is in charge of the preliminary inquiry he forwards his findings to the prosecutor, and he holds for trial in precisely the same way as was indicated above.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER VII: SCIENTIFIC AIDS TO THE COURT ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;It has&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; already been said that a heavy responsibility has been thrown on the courts in the USSR in regard not only to establishing guilt but also to finding, within the bounds of the provisions of the law, the proper measure of social defense to insure a corrective influence on the one on whom it is assessed. Guilt is often obvious, but the proper steps to take in an attempt to see that the offender does not repeat his crime do not usually show themselves with such clarity.&lt;br /&gt;
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The court, in trial, is not limited in any way in its efforts to get complete testimony and an accurate interpretation of such information. It is one of the fundamental principles of the administration of Soviet criminal law that the responsibility for the fullness and correctness of both investigation and verdict in the course of the trial rests on the court, and it may take any action on its own initiative to secure such ends. The prosecution and the defense may actually conduct the case within the bounds and direction which the court gives, but the court sets such limits and directions, interferes at any time on any point not cleared up by the argument, and decides on all questions relative to the examination. The court is independent of the opinion of either party in the trial and it is its responsibility to investigate any circumstance that appears essential to the case, whether the parties request it or not. It may likewise rule out what appears to be non-essential, even if it is requested by one of the parties. It is master of the whole proceedings and the expressed basic principle guiding its actions is to get at the truth of the incident involved and interpret the act in the light of all circumstances, so that a correct measure both for the protection of society from the socially dangerous and for the rehabilitation of the individual may be given.&lt;br /&gt;
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Superhuman wisdom would be required to fulfill such a demand if the judge acted alone, or even in conjunction with his co-judges, the two jurors. But the Code of Criminal Procedure has provided that he be supplied with whatever aid scientific research and endeavor can give. During the trial the court may call experts and it may also have the benefit of advice or testimony of specialized institutions connected with it.&lt;br /&gt;
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With no further evidence than the space devoted to the use of experts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, one would know that much importance was attached to the practice in the USSR. It is the subject of many articles, not only as regards the use of such aids in the court trial but, as already seen, in the preliminary trial as well. It might, because of its frequency, become a loose, taken-for-granted observance, but there are safeguards which make it a matter of serious regard.&lt;br /&gt;
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One matter of interest in the use of such experts as the defense itself may request to have called is that there is never any financial transaction between the two. The expert receives his fee from the state and in case the defendant is found guilty it is charged to him. This practice eliminates the possible sense on the part of the expert that he must give evidence, or rather interpretations, in favor of the man from whom he is receiving money. He has no feeling of obligation in this direction and is thus more disposed to give unprejudiced opinions. The spectacle of the bitter clashing of “alienists” hired by prosecution and defense is not likely to take place in a Soviet court room. Opinions naturally differ and on occasion the court may have to summon others, so that he may see which way the weight of opinion falls, but the dividing line is not due to a desire on the part of either to defend his client.&lt;br /&gt;
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Experts are called by the courts whenever specialized information of any kind that is desired is available. Article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Experts are called in when in the investigation and examination of the case, special knowledge in science, art, and the crafts is required.” And in a note to the same article it is further provided that “Experts must be called in to establish the cause of death and the character of bodily injuries, as well as in order to determine the psychic condition of the accused or of the witness if there be any doubt on this score in the opinion of the court or of the investigation.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A limitation is, of course, placed in that a science may not have grown in such a way as to furnish a reliable basis for inspection of evidence and conclusions. On the other hand something of an unusual nature may be called in a case presenting such a problem as one related to the author by a state prosecutor. In the USSR one causing a suicide receives a severe sentence. In a case of a double suicide of two women, there seemed no clue pointing to the guilt of any person until a small drawing was discovered. On the evidence obtained from this paper, with the aid of an expert in the identification of characteristics of lines and angles, an arrest was made and a confession and corroborating data obtained. This would not ordinarily be a legitimate line of expert aid, but in this case it afforded the only chance of detection. It is an excellent example of a case where expert testimony may be the only available resource.&lt;br /&gt;
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The expert, once summoned, has practically unlimited rights and privileges in gathering needed material for forming his conclusions. He is given all the data in the case for study, and he attends throughout the entire trial exactly as do the prosecution and defense. He may question the witnesses, ask for any further materials such as publications, documents, records, or even the subpœnaing of witnesses, and the court sees that his requests are granted. It is said that there is no known case of a refusal of co-operation with the expert on the part of either court or investigator. He is responsible in arriving at the proper solution of the case, and he is held accountable for any negligence in obtaining any information that can contribute to the accuracy of his conclusion. He may, make an error but he may not falsify, at least not without penalty. The Code of Criminal Procedure which devotes so much attention to this matter of experts says, “In regard to answering summonses, obligation to speak the truth, responsibility for false testimony, i.e., for deliberately false and not mistaken testimony, the expert shall be equal to witnesses.”&lt;br /&gt;
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But experts may disagree, even honestly and without regard to a fee! Also, it is conceivable that one might be inadequate. An American mind, at least one whose owner has attended court in the United States, might understand such a contention. The Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure takes care of that possibility, too. In Article 300 we find it provided that, “If the expert conclusion be found insufficiently clear or inadequate, and also in the event of dissension among experts, the court shall appoint new experts, either on its own initiative or upon the request of either side.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The conclusion of the experts is given at the close of the hearing and is attached to the records of the case. The court does not have to agree with the findings but he must consider them. He is free to criticise, and so, for that matter, is either of the sides in the case. But, in any disagreement he must defend himself well. The Code of Criminal Procedure again says:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article 295.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “However, if the court disagrees with the conclusion of the experts, such dissent shall be minutely motivated either in the verdict or in a special rider.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The testimony of the expert is held to be of peculiar character in Soviet judicature. He is not a witness, giving facts, but it is his function to examine and appraise facts, to inspect and to weigh and to give his opinions and conclusions in the special way of which he is capable. His evidence is distinguished from the other given in the trial in that it is specialized and independent. In other words the court can look after the facts but he wants the expert to tell him the meaning of what he finds out. And the experts have accepted the challenge and the responsibility with vigor. They have developed what might almost be called an “official psychology” that fits well into the nation’s philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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This science, called “judicial psychology,” occupies first place among the branches used by the courts in the Soviet judicature, and the second of importance is correctional labor psychology. The authorities attach no importance to what we call criminal psychology because they reject the idea that the criminal has any psychological or biological peculiarity. The use of the term alone suggests that they have, and the content likewise reminds them of some brand of Lombroso doctrine. For their theory of crime with its economic base, with its contention that this phenomena results practically &#039;&#039;in toto&#039;&#039; from the exploitation of one class by another, such a consideration would not do. Here one sees an application of their theory of crime. The criminal for them is like other people, and as the classless society approaches its perfect state a new social consciousness will evolve and any urge to crime will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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They reject likewise a juridical psychology which makes use of an analysis of psychological concepts into such elements as “imprudence,” “intent,” “spiritual agitation” because its content is too much one of juridical scholasticism, and affords no practical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Judicial psychology, considered in its broader sense, would involve the correctional labor psychology referred to above as one branch of this science important to the Soviet judicature. Defined in this larger way it would mean the application to the work of the court and the corrective labor institutions of all results of psychological research. Used in the narrower meaning it refers to criminal procedure psychology, or the application of whatever is known in this field to the case as a whole during the procedure or what transpired in the preliminary investigation. It would comprise the psychology of the accused, of the witnesses, of any other participant, even of the judge, jurors, experts themselves, and of the prosecutor and defense. They emphasize that they do not deal with the breaking up of the personality under consideration into such atoms as attention, memory, etc. as is done in the German school, but that they study the entire behavior of the witness, or other person, against a background of the broad, whole situation of the judicial investigation. They interest themselves, first of all, in the obtaining of true testimony and later in its correct appraisal, and their chief endeavor is to develop a better technique to arrive at these ends. With the emphasis they put on the importance of this usage and the talent they have in the field and the serious attitude the research workers take toward the problem, they should develop something compensating for their great effort.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in the field of correctional labor psychology there should be an even greater future. This is where the practical worker begs for more light from his scientific colleague. It is one field, said an authority, where the practical worker has gone on ahead of the research worker. There is eagerness to regenerate the psychology of the lawbreaker, to get him so readjusted that he will fit usefully into life. But more of this will be found in the chapter on Corrective Labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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To think only of the individual and his happiness would spur a scientist on to great effort, but it is even more than that in this instance. The nation’s progress toward its ideal depends on the successful use of these unfitted elements. It is no wonder that so many of the best minds are devoting themselves to working out the most adequate possible corrective labor policy. Filled with zeal as they are for their cause, they feel the responsibility which rests on them of making every human possible of use in the Socialist order.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are two institutes attached to the judicature in the USSR that require special attention in this consideration of expert aid rendered to the courts. Their work is of the utmost importance in the whole system of criminal procedure and the administration of corrective labor. The two referred to are the Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute and the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy, both attached to the office of the Attorney General and to the Commissariat of Justice. It was in visits to these two places that the writer experienced the greatest enthusiasm for what is being accomplished in the field of criminal repression in the USSR. Work of the finest type is being carried on in the lines covered by these two institutions by staffs well equipped for their respective fields of endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
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The writer visited the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy several times, looked through its library and used its books, and had the aid by conferences and advice of Director Shlaposnitchov, of the assistant director, of Professor Brusilovsky, and others of its officers. It is admirably staffed all the way through by persons not only of ability but of social conscience. The seriousness with which they attack the problems which face them and their acquaintance with the work being done in other nations are bound to impress anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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This Institute carries out the usual policy in the USSR of combining the theoretical and the practical. Along with those who are engaged in problems of research into the cause and treatment of crime there come the workers from the courts with practical problems to solve. Working in the library and reference section are persons who read and speak several languages and who carry their research into the study of foreign legislation and reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are a number of sections devoted to special lines of inquiry, chief of which are: Criminal Law and Criminal Trial, a Judicial Section, Statistical Section, and one giving its attention to the problems of juvenile offenders.&lt;br /&gt;
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Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute is the principal other scientific body on which the courts rely for solving their crime problem. It has likewise its practical and theoretical side. Research is carried on by a large staff of medical men and women, of research workers, of professors, and collaborators, and it publishes the results in numerous volumes. It also holds conferences and discussion meetings. It is equipped with all the latest devices and instruments for treatment of its cases and works in close contact with judicial establishments. Its director gave the following as the purposes of the Institute:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) To examine all those about to be tried when there is a question as to psychic condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) To aid all correctional labor camps both as to policy and on actual cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) To help in problems of juvenile delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) To carry on research in the problems connected with the work of the Institute.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) To establish graduate courses and train medical aids.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity for patients is one hundred and fifty beds, these are divided into different groups; such as those for men, for women, for children, for the definitely deranged, and for those who are of apparently sane condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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No one is admitted at Serbsky except those who have come in contact with the law, through its contravention. When a question of sanity comes up in a case at trial or in the preliminary stage of procedure, it may be cleared up by a brief examination by doctors, but in every case where extended observation is needed the person is sent to Serbsky. After not longer than a month a report is made to the court. In case insanity is adjudged by the staff, then the patient may be sent to a hospital where care is given him, or, if he is dangerously demented, he is placed in an institution where there is more restriction and compulsory treatment and care.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Institute maintains a department where children are kept, and where they are taught by teachers who come in for that purpose, and trained in certain arts and crafts. Also, some adults are kept beyond the month period when it is thought that only brief treatment is needed so that the trial may go on. There was one who had been there for eight months and another for six at the time of the author’s visit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because of the short period of retention in this place one would not expect that much of a constructive nature could be done in the matter of work. But here the policy of Soviet treatment shows to advantage. The shop teacher exhibited to us with pride what he had been able to accomplish, and his enthusiasm was justified. In accordance with their theory that labor can correct almost anything they use it here as a constructive treatment. They also use, as has already been said, all of the latest medical and psychological therapy, but there is at the same time an insistence that training for work, giving one something to do and teaching him how to do it well, is the best way to psychical readjustment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Pursuant to the fulfillment of this idea those sent here make things and they are carefully observed while they work. Some of the objects in the shops and on exhibit in a small conference room were beautiful models. Among those, of especial note, there was an airplane, perfect in minute detail, a movie machine, a system of traffic lights, and a collective shop made by the children. The latter would have a political significance, of course, and serve to put over education of a socialist nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one goes into Serbsky Institute one encounters a guard at the outer gate, and the feeling is that here is a prison. It is, of course, of a kind. Men who are in this place are, many of them, of a dangerous nature, such as we would call criminally insane. This terminology will not do, however, for Soviet criminology, as one may be either insane or criminal, but not both. But a number are guilty of murder, are pleading insanity as a defense when they may, of course, be sane; a number have made homicidal attacks on individuals. With this in mind one expects to see more of a prison atmosphere prevail.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the outside there were no armed guards in evidence, and we were told that there were none. When we went through a ward of some twenty-odd men of the most dangerous type with only a woman attendant, and no one else about, the writer frankly felt somewhat nervous. It seemed they ought to be under guard, but the woman in charge assured us that there had never been an attack by one of them on an attendant. The attitude of the Serbsky staff toward the patients and the attitude they manage to get from them in return seemed to us remarkable.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went through the gardens where those persons of a less dangerous nature were reading, talking, or doing whatever they wished. Some came to speak to us. One wished to make a long speech. A part of these were judged to be mentally normal, others must return to face their trial. We came at last to the place where are kept the most obstreperous; those who would surely make an attempt to escape if not restrained. This was the only example the writer encountered in Russia of persons locked in cells. There may be others in isolated instances, but solitary confinement has been done away with as a matter of policy. The building housing these prisoners was two-story, and the cells faced inward on the garden. There were tall big windows of unbreakable glass affording plenty of light, but the ventilation was bad. A remark was made to that effect and we were told that it was an old building they had had to utilize, and that it was to be replaced within the year. It certainly was out of keeping with the rest of the place, and made us think that it would actually be taken care of before long. However, there were not many persons there. Glass panes in the doors enabled one to peer in and there were only ten inmates in all the rooms on the two floors.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was in one of these cells, where all the furniture is secured to the floor, that we were allowed to talk for a moment to a man who is quite a character in criminal circles in the USSR. He is held to be the chief swindler of the country and a recital of his escapades made the assertion sound entirely plausible. Perhaps it should be emphasized for fear that it was not made clear above, that it is not the ravingly insane who are kept in these rooms. They are the ones kept in the ward already mentioned. These are they who are the more dangerous criminally, who possibly are not insane at all. The swindler was held to be normal mentally, and if he got away with all that his record enumerated one feels sure he must be.&lt;br /&gt;
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The swindler, a young man of near thirty, thin, dark, sat morosely on his cot as we went in. The attendant spoke to him, put her hand on his shoulder. We had the story of him before we entered. He had been in prison a number of times, he had supplied a luxurious living to himself and admiring companions over a period of years. He had been sent to this Institute at several of his previous trials and the opinion had been each time that he was mentally normal. A few months before our visit he had been returned to court to stand trial, and had been sent to a corrective labor institution. But he had refused to work. He had refused to follow any of the prison régime, and the authorities had returned him to Serbsky for a check on his mental condition. He ignored us, seemed hardly to be conscious of our presence, as he begged to know of the young woman what they were going to do with him now. She talked to him for a few moments in an encouraging manner. Her effort with him, she said, was to convince him of a better way of living by means of the training he would get in the corrective labor institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We had already been in the children’s department and had talked there to two girls whom we were told to remember for future reference. One in particular was a pretty, gentle-appearing child of twelve. Here is her story. She had been a run-away, she had wandered in various parts of the USSR, or so she said. Her acts of a criminal nature had all been directed against children. She had stolen several whom she said she had pinched and tortured in a sadistic manner and killed. The number she set at ten, but there was no verification of her report. She had become well enough known and feared in certain sections so that she was threatened by mothers of young children if she so much as entered the village or town. She had a few months previously come into the care of the Institute, and they felt sure that an entire change of her whole character had been effected. On the wall of the room where she stayed she had put some pictures, and she had become interested in art as well as other work and study. They thought her normal, and although her family wished her returned to its custody, the opinion was that the environment had not up to then been sufficiently constructive to permit that. They were sending her to an institution at Leningrad where she was to be taught and trained in some labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even at the risk of being tedious, it seems desirable to record two more cases among the children. In a yard at the rear of the building we found a group of boys at play. Two of them were indicated as presenting challenging problems. Safely back in a conference room we heard of what they had done. The first case especially was interesting as indicating that animosity does not always exist in the treatment of those who are in opposition to the proletariat rule.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A boy of seventeen, who was the son of a Kulak, had been discharged from his job for indolence. He went later to stay with a friend overnight. He wanted the friend to go with him to some place to which the mother objected. Filled with anger he waited until the son had departed for school the next morning, then murdered the mother, took some money which she had in the house, and escaped. When caught, he was sent to Serbsky for examination and the analysis showed mental deficiency and a difficult, sulky character. They had kept him for a time, had made some progress with him, and were then about to send him to a medical-pedagogical institution for juveniles where he would be trained and treated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other boy, a charming black-haired fellow of thirteen, was held to be normal, but he was an alcoholic and stole constantly. The trouble in his case seemed to be in an irrational, coddling kind of upbringing. The decision was to send him to a state educational institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were only seven women inmates of the institution at the time of our visit and in view of the high percentage of women criminals in the USSR that seemed strange. No explanation was vouchsafed in answer to a question as to the cause, but it might indicate that women in this country do not base a defense plea on grounds of insanity!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With such thorough effort as the care in Serbsky indicates, the conclusions as to mental condition ought to be as authoritative as human fallacy permits. The institution has representatives in various shops and schools and co-operates closely with the heads of the various prisons, and every effort is made at supervision and observation of those within its jurisdiction. We asked for statistics on results and were reminded that this work is all very new in the USSR, of necessity, and that figures were not complete, but that we could be assured that the results were worth to them all the painstaking care they put on their work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER VIII: THE PROSECUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; functioning of the prosecution in the Soviet judicature is of especial interest to a student of criminal procedure. Its development from the time of the total abolition of the institution as it had existed in the Tzarist régime, by Decree #1 of 1917, to the establishment of the office of the Attorney General in 1933, has been experimental and not without dissension among the ranks of the Central Executive Committee itself. In the early years following the Revolution when everything Tzarist was swept away, there prevailed a spirit of liberalism so far as the rights of the people were concerned. In the sudden accession of power by the proletariat, lack of restraint was the predominating note, and this philosophy—if such irrational conclusions could be called one—of the epoch was reflected also in the procedure of the criminal courts. A more conservative opinion had wished merely to place the defense on an equal footing with the prosecution to correct the dominance of the state over the people in such a manner as it had been practiced for all the years of the reign of Tzars. But this was not enough to satisfy those who were clamoring for everything to be placed in the hands of the proletariat, the administering of justice as well as other branches of government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this moment of judicial liberalism prosecution through official channels was done away with, and in its place the persons in attendance at the trial were vested with the right of accusal as well as defense. It must have distressed many a hardy judge, even though he sat as a representative of the toiling masses himself, to try to figure out a decision in the face of untrained and conflicting contentions. At any time during the trial any citizen might rise and address the court either in behalf of the accused or as the state’s prosecutor. The idea took hold rapidly, and up to the beginning of its control in 1918, it was so widely used that it became customary for the judge to call on some one in his audience to act as defender or accuser of the person on trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was bound to lead to difficulties. Civil war was at hand, the class struggle was at its height, and the court was an organ of the state in its struggle against its enemies. Even the most liberal saw that it would not do. Some system must be used whereby the prosecution of cases would be strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is an interesting point involved in the restoration of the prosecution, as it now began, even though it was of revolutionary expediency. It was a swinging back to the western criminal law administration which they had annihilated at the beginning of their rule. A legal man said to me in this regard, “We acknowledge that there are many good points in the capitalist system, and we do not hesitate to borrow what are useful to us.” In court procedure, even while they do preserve the proletarian administration, one can recognize many things about their orderly procedure that has its foundation in familiar bourgeois practices. There is no denial of this on their part. Certain well established ideas of justice have proved over long years to be adequate and proper and these have been incorporated into their own judicial structure. The early disorganized practices of the proletarian administration of justice gave way when necessities and panic of the Civil War had been dissipated to a deliberative plan resulting in the many codes of 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0141.svg|ORGINAZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF USSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before this a resurrection of the public prosecutor was on its way. Revolutionary tribunals, in their post as out-sentinels in the struggle of the government, were the first in the demand for sterner equipment of prosecution, and political expediency put an end to judicial liberalism in their practice. Characterizing this period was the attitude that placed in the hands of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; the power to impose even the death penalty on those persons charged with political offenses such as the participation in counter-revolutionary activities, deliberate destruction of property or espionage, and other such crimes against the state. It was felt that if the proletariat was to continue to rule it was no time for softness, either in the judicial system or in the non-judicial tribunals which continued to exist through the bloody days of the Civil War period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As just pointed out, it was in the Revolutionary Tribunals, created by Decree of November 24, 1917, and differing very little from the People’s Courts except in the requirement as to the number of co-judges,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Six sat in the Revolutionary Tribunals while two were required in the People’s Court.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that the first change came in regard to the prosecution. Let it be understood that although these tribunals were organs of the revolution and continued in force for five years, they were proper judicial institutions, with a definite prescribed procedure and jurisdiction. There had been too much mildness in their administration, so much so that the present Commissar of Justice, N. V. Krylenko, stated in his Soviet law,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “Their softness with regard to sentences discredited them completely.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were too many of them in the first place and by Act of May, 1918, their number was reduced so that they remained in existence only in the capitals of the provinces and other important places. But that reform would not necessarily make them deal out sterner justice, and by this same Act there was created at each of the existing tribunals a &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors. To make the check-up more complete there was also established a Central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; of State Prosecutors in connection with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee created by an act of June, 1918.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of the Revolutionary Tribunals was undergoing a change. Sternness and determination now marked their attitude. Mildness was fading away as class struggle advanced. They were created to spike the activities directed against the achievements of the Revolution or designed to weaken Soviet authority. It was not enough that some citizen give voice to a plea for conviction; it was neither sufficient that local tribunals be left to carry on their own unaided and unsupervised prosecution. There must be central supervision. This very distrust of local competency led later to a dissension in which Lenin had to take a hand, but for the time being, it served its purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the decree already referred to (of May, 1918), the central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; was given wide powers. It might demand of local prosecutors or tribunals that certain cases be transferred to Moscow or in the event the case remained in its original territory, it might send prosecutors there to see that it took the direction desired. It might also demand an accounting from the local &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; so that by supervision they could be sure that the functions of these organs to look after all facts of criminal action committed by any person anywhere and the institution of criminal procedure might be faithfully and zealously fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the Revolutionary Tribunal Acts of 1920, all previous acts pertaining to tribunals were repealed and sweeping changes again occurred. Counter-revolutionary activity was on the decline, the Civil War was receding, and non-judicial methods of suppression not so much needed. Orderly government was growing stronger. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; suffered the abolition of its special tribunal, the military judicial powers even were required to comply with the provisions of this Act. As a result of these curtailments the powers of the Revolutionary Tribunals were widened and jurisdiction extended to include any case involving counter-revolutionary charges as well as any other that was of a nature dangerous to the Soviet Republic. Not only was the jurisdiction of these tribunals enlarged but their power of punishment was likewise increased and was now practically unrestricted. With such authority they could assess any measure of repression which they thought necessary to the occasion and could thereby cover any ground lately held by extra-judicial bodies. These tribunals were established in the capitals of the various provinces and by permission of the Commissar of Justice might also be instituted in the larger cities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What happened in regard to the prosecution? The &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of prosecutors set up by the previous acts were abolished and in their stead there now appeared state &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of defense and prosecution, both for the people’s court and for the Revolutionary Tribunals. From this time on more attention was given to the perfecting of a system and technique of prosecution. The qualifications for the person filling this office became of a more adequate nature. He must be a man competent to make an appearance before an assemblage, to speak or otherwise conduct public affairs, and he must also know the Soviet system of government thoroughly as well as be acquainted with the workings of trade unions. There was still no centralized system such as exists today since the prosecutors were at this time provided merely to represent the people in trial, much as a defense lawyer might be appointed in a particular case. But the era of floundering, of experimentation, of entertaining thought of complete proletarian administration of law, had made its contribution, and the evolution moved on with the rapidity with which other things have moved in Soviet Russia. In 1922 there was another Act containing other innovations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By this Act there was a general revision of the whole system of judicial legislation, and there emerged such results as the Criminal Code, the Law on Basic Property rights, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the year of 1923 furnished additional legislation. The matter of some centralization of a state prosecution seems to have been taken for granted, but the form that the organization was to have, the basic principles, brought forth differences of opinion as we shall see later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The New Economic Policy had been introduced and the economic and political situation in the country was in a confused and complex state. Civil war had died down but the class struggle, already well on its feet, took encouragement from the feeling among the property owners that capitalism, at least in a modified form, might with timely effort be brought back. The form of conflict now encountered was hardly less threatening to Soviet rule than had been the more open warfare. The government, dependent on its courts, now effectively augmented by the judicial powers of the terrifying GPU, needed a strengthened prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In May of 1922 the People’s Commissariat of Justice presented its proposal of organization to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and found itself immediately on the defensive against attack by opposition within the Communist faction. This had not been expected, and there was some dismay when the main points were rejected altogether. Once before, a central &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors—even though for the Revolutionary Tribunals—had cast reflection on local organs by demanding transferal of cases to their jurisdiction or by sending one of their own number to prosecute locally. Now, as the Commissariat of Justice proposed: (1) the direct subordination of the local prosecutors to the Prosecuting Attorney of the Republic who appoints and dismisses them, and (2) the right of local prosecutors to protest before the central authorities against unconstitutional decisions by local executive committees, it was held by the majority of the Central Executive Committee that there was in such suggestions an element of distrust of local authorities too strong to be accepted. A commission appointed by the session, in rejecting such proposals, made one of its own. It was suggested that there be set up a “dual” subordination of prosecutors, making them responsible both to the central authority and to the local executive committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a state of affairs brought intervention from the captain of the ship of state. Lenin wrote a special letter to Stalin that brought the opposition to terms when it was read before the Central Executive Committee. He enumerated therein some of the causes of the difficulties of establishing revolutionary legality and a lack of uniformity of the application and administration of the laws were chief among these. Likewise, there was always the alibi of local peculiarities and conditions. For us of the United States who have struggled with forty-eight different types of provisions, of applications, and administration, there is understanding of his argument. A suggestion of anything possible to prevent it seems unanswerable. “The basic evil in the whole of our life and in the whole of our lack of culture,” wrote Lenin, “is in the ancient Russian attitude of laissez-faire and in the custom of semi-savages who want to retain the local justice of Kaluga as distinguished from that of Kazan.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He then puts a question. Can it be tolerated in a country of proletarian dictatorship, in a country building up a socialist economy? Here is his answer. “There can be no Kaluga justice different from that of Kazan, but there must be a uniform All-Russian justice, and even a uniform justice for the whole Federation of Soviet Republics.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That started the effort toward uniformity. The most recent chapter in the development was in 1933 (June 23) when the office of the Attorney General was created to centralize the prosecution of the whole Soviet Union. There have been steps between the two enactments but they have moved steadily toward the recent accomplishment. In the earlier organization the position as head of the public prosecution of the USSR, now held by the Attorney General, was occupied by the Commissar of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duty of the prosecution, now headed by the Attorney General of the USSR, is not merely to prosecute. His functions are far beyond that limit. If he were confined to that there would not be great importance to his office.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet judicial trial the prosecutor is robbed of his glamorous role as he appears in our own courts. He, as well as the defending attorney, is a mere assistant to the court, there to aid it in getting at the truth of the affair before them. It is apparent that he has been appointed in such a manner that he is nearer to the judge than the defense lawyer. He is likely of the same party affiliation, he comes from the same social class, he is in sympathy with the order of government. It is certainly more likely that he exerts a greater influence on the court than the other side’s attorney who may hold an opposite viewpoint. One notices that often the defense attorney is of a different appearance in manner of dress, in terminology, and in speech, from the court and prosecutor. It may be supposed that this occasionally causes the court to decide against him, even though the bias is unconscious, since it is very likely that he is defending a person who is a “class enemy,” and with whose point of view he may be in sympathy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That would probably have been truer a few years ago than it is now. With the prevailing attitude of “winning over” wherever possible, and the “crushing” of only those who are distinctly to be feared as socially dangerous, there seems to be no great prejudice shown. It must exist to a degree, but antagonism does not seem a part of the present policy of state. If a person before the court can be made into a useful citizen then the object is to do it. Those who deliberately continue to struggle against the laws of the class in power will certainly be dealt with in an uncompromising manner, and if it is fairly clear the crime is of this nature then a defending lawyer would hardly be listened to with very much thought. It would be the day of the prosecutor. Likewise in establishing the class nature of the crime, the word of the prosecutor would be worth more to the court because of his sympathy with the existing order. But since it is to the interest of the state to protect an individual, to retain the aid and sympathy of all possible and to win and keep the confidence of its masses, it is not likely that there will be many who are innocent in this respect convicted in the regular judicial trials where open sessions prevail and the people in large numbers attend. One of the impressive characteristics of the court room in the Soviet Union is the attendance and interest of the citizens. They discuss the verdict with animation and it is to be noted that they usually agree with the court’s decision. If those in attendance disagreed too often it would hardly be a good thing for the judge. It will be remembered that power of impeachment is exercised in this country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The lack of importance of the prosecutor in trial is exemplified by his absence from trial frequently, in the People’s Court. It is not usual in this lower tribunal for either prosecutor or defense lawyer to be in attendance. At times, however, they do appear. But there is no place in the system for the ingenious display of a game of wits between attorneys as there is no jury such as ours nor anyone on whom an emotional impression could be made. There is really no great need in the ordinary case for attorneys either for the state or the defense. The court has both the power and responsibility to see that all evidence is placed before it. There can be no such objections to its introduction as we are accustomed to hear, resulting in the escape of criminals from the law because of the lack of admission of evidence. The story comes out, the witness tells the tale without any instruction to answer “yes” or “no” to the questions put to him. As already illustrated by actual cases, it is an informal narrative, interrupted by pertinent questions by judge or jurors or other parties to the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To see, then, what the prosecutor’s functions are, let us look at the following list as given in 1922 at the establishment of the centralized prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To supervise on behalf of the State the legality of the actions of all administrative organs, economic institutions, public and private organizations, and private persons, by instituting criminal proceedings against guilty persons and by protesting against decisions infringing upon the laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To observe directly the activities of investigation organs, criminal inquiry organs, and also the activity of organs of OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To prosecute in court. [Note that this is third in order of importance.]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To see to the proper treatment of inmates in homes of correction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As can be seen from this enumeration the functions of the organs of Soviet prosecution extend far beyond the limits of mere judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Accordingly, the Attorney of the Republic (originally in RSFSR, the People’s Commissar of Justice) was entrusted:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To look after the legal activity of all the People’s Commissariats and other central institutions and organizations and to make proposals for the repeal or amendment of orders and regulations issued by them that are not consistent with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To protest against such orders and regulations before the Council of People’s Commissars and the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee with a view to their abolition [the protest by the Attorney General does not stop, however, the carrying out of an order against which a protest was made].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To guide and control the activities of local prosecuting organs. The functions of local prosecutors were:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To propose to local executive committees the repeal or amendment of regulations and decisions that do not conform to the law, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To protest against such regulations and decisions, through the Attorney General of the republic, to the Council of People’s Commissars or to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the realm of combatting criminality, the Public Prosecutor was commissioned:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To institute local proceedings against officials and private persons either on his own initiative or on complaints and statements received by him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the conducting of inquiries and preliminary investigations, to advise organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation on the question of restrictive measures and other questions connected with preliminary investigation, and to conform the indictment drawn up by investigators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To decide the question of prosecution or cancelling of cases coming up to him from investigating organs, to take part in preliminary sittings of the court on the question of trying or dismissing a given case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To prosecute in court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) To protest in the order of cassation against verdicts and findings of the court, and also protest by way of supervision against verdicts of the first instance and cassation decisions of regional and provincial courts that have already come into force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) To look after the proper treatment of inmates in all places of detention without exception, and to liberate persons improperly held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this enumeration it can be seen that his duty as prosecutor is third on the list. But it is in this function that we think of him and it is this part of his work that we shall go into in some detail because of its connection with what we are studying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to the prosecutor’s occupation with criminal procedure there is first the preliminary investigation. When the militia or the former organs of the OGPU or any other agent turn over to the investigator certain material evidence of crime the prosecution starts to function. The office of the prosecution is to institute criminal proceedings on the first definite suspicion that a crime has been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the proceedings are in the preliminary stage the position of the prosecution is very different from what it will be later. He is now concerned with finding out the truth of the situation and not of “fastening” upon some one an act of which he is not guilty but for which there must be a conviction. If he goes into court for trial too many times with cases that are not supported by the testimony as brought out by the court the inference is that he either is not honest or not capable in his preliminary investigation. While a prosecutor often makes a mistake, as further court testimony may show, and is in honor bound to withdraw prosecution when he discovers it, this would probably be because of circumstances which he could not control such as the absence of a witness or the testimony of one not revealed at that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, in the preliminary examination he is not an accuser. He is the chief of all that takes place, and he is in full charge. His investigator carries out the work of this stage in less complex cases but the prosecutor is responsible for direction and policy. He does not seek evidence of guilt at this time any more than he tries to establish innocence. He gathers every available bit of data and then makes his decision as to whether the case is to go on. But once he has come to the conclusion that the indictment is sufficiently well founded and the accused becomes the defendant in the judicial trial, his position is changed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the trial he is the prosecutor. He now believes the defendant guilty or he would not have remanded him for court action. He now takes part in weighing the evidence produced in court and urges some measure of punishment in his speech. But so intent is he still on getting justice that he may cease his prosecution if he decides that he has been wrong in his preliminary examination. It is his duty to do so and to convince the court he is correct in his action. One prosecutor told the writer of four occasions in his own practice when he had done this. One has an incredulous feeling in hearing a prosecuting attorney make a plea for the reduction of a sentence or for a verdict of not guilty, but such a case is recorded in the following paragraphs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Supreme Court a case was on appeal from a Regional Court. A group of seven men had been found guilty of stealing vegetables and fruit from a co-operative store in which one was manager. They had resold the articles and had thereby made some 20,000 rubles. The two leaders had received the death penalty, the others lesser ones. The death penalties had been appealed and the prosecutor and the defense attorneys were present with their arguments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense lawyer spoke quite at length, arguing that the amount had been really smaller than was stated, that the character of the men had always been good, and then he went to points of law. He contended that it had been a mistake to apply the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for larceny of state property, to this act as no theft of state property had actually taken place. The men had paid the regulation amount to the state, but had simply sold the fruit and vegetables at an advanced price over state prices, for a sufficient period to bring in the money in that manner. He contended that instead the men were guilty of using official position for personal benefit and that Article 109 of the Criminal Code, providing punishment for such a crime, should have been applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His points had not been well made and when the prosecutor arose to speak one was quite prepared for his demolition of the previous argument. He was an able, well-trained man. No one consults any precedents or books of law in the Soviet court. The observer is struck by the absence of such volumes from the room. The court judges each case on its merits in the light of certain established policy. It seemed only a matter of formality for the judges to retire and bring back the decision that the verdict should stand. But the peculiarity of the prosecution in this judicial system now showed. The attorney paused, started again. He reminded the court that the men were young, that this was the only offense with which they had been charged and that one of these in particular had been a good citizen until he had begun to drink too heavily. He thought the sentence too severe and that it should be commuted to the maximum ten-year term. He likewise recommended that some of the sentences of the lesser members of the group needed revision. The court acted on his recommendation and the two wives present were able to go into frenzied joy over the giving back of life to their respective husbands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case brings out the attitude of the prosecution toward their tasks as accusers. The basic function of the prosecutor is to establish all the testimony he can to support an indictment before the court. That is what he comes into court for. The defense has its lawyer to see that its interests are protected. The prosecutor thinks of the side of society and the state. But at the same time, theoretically, he must not do anything to prevent the real truth of the case from being revealed. It is not in keeping with the role and dignity of his office to keep back evidence, to shuffle facts, or in any manner to defeat the carriage of justice. And in attempting to carry out the higher requirements of his office he cannot insist on the charges of the indictment if the testimony brought out at the trial has modified them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to note that there are deviations from the general principle that the prosecutor conducts the prosecution at the trial. Throughout the land there is a system in practice of giving training to the more able among the peasants and workers to act in the capacity of public accuser in the simpler cases. This special prosecutor is usually unaided unless the case is of a more serious nature, when he will probably serve in conjunction with some member of the prosecutor’s office. This service is of a wholly voluntary nature with no pay attached, but there is compensation for the individual in the position of importance he occupies in his community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are also cases where the plaintiff hires his own lawyer to prosecute the case and a public prosecutor appears only if the case is of such a nature or takes such a turn that there is a public interest which needs protecting, or in case there must be intervention to secure fair play. An example of this type of case would be one in which there was bodily injury that while causing pain still had no serious consequences. Cases involving insults, libels and slander likewise are often prosecuted by private attorneys without the aid of the public official. In all of such cases action is not brought by the state, of course, but is begun by the oral or written complaint of the injured party and may be settled by the plaintiff and defendant between themselves at any time while the trial is in progress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In cases involving such charges as the violation of patent or copyright laws, forced sexual intercourse, and a few others of a private nature, the procedure is still different. Prosecution is by the public prosecutor but even though he knows of the existence of such violations he cannot institute proceedings. The injured party must make the complaint and give co-operation but while he may have his own lawyer also the state takes charge of the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
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For a more complete picture of the prosecution as it exists in the Soviet Union today, its organization is briefly given. It follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Attorney General of the USSR who is the head of the prosecution in the Soviet Union. He has, of course, a staff of assistants. He is appointed by the Central Executive Committee, and is also responsible to the Council of People’s Commissars.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The attorneys of the various federal republics who are appointed by the Attorney General of the USSR on approval by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) The prosecutors of the regional and provincial courts are appointed and may be dismissed for cause by the attorneys of the federal republics with the consent of the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) The attorneys for military and transport tribunals are appointed and may be dismissed by the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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(6) District attorneys and people’s investigators are appointed and dismissed by regional and provincial attorneys.&lt;br /&gt;
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(7) Senior investigators and investigators on most important cases are appointed and dismissed by those attorneys to whom they are attached.&lt;br /&gt;
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The duties with which they are charged are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To supervise the consistence of decisions and regulations of separate departments of the USSR and federal republics and of local authorities with the constitution of the USSR and the decisions and regulations of the government of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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(b) To look after the correct and uniform application of the laws by the judicial institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
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(c) To institute criminal proceedings and to prosecute in all legal instances throughout the territory of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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(d) To look after the legality and correctness of the actions of OGPU, militia, and correctional labor institutions on the basis of a special order.&lt;br /&gt;
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(e) General guidance of the activities of the prosecution in the federal republics.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER IX: THE DEFENSE AND THE DEFENDANT ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Bar has had a precarious existence under Soviet rule, but it seems now to have come on to firm ground. Going back to that First Decree of 1917, when the prosecution was swept away, we find the institution of private attorneys suffering a like fate and an idea substituted that anybody might be an attorney and defend. However, a limitation was soon put on the “anybody” by the Second Decree on Courts which created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, the duties of whose members were both to prosecute and to defend. While any citizen might become a member of this &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; on the proper recommendation of the Soviets of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies, he was supposed to give his time and attention to being an attorney, which somewhat narrowed down the first broad inclusion. There must have been some slight ability, too, on the part of the persons appointed, over the ordinary run of citizen, in order that they be recommended to membership.&lt;br /&gt;
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This method of providing for defense and prosecution existed until 1920. The People’s Court Act of 1918 changed the status of these defenders and prosecutors in that they were made officials of the Republic and were accorded a salary equal to that of a people’s judge. These members of the college in their capacity&lt;br /&gt;
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as defenders were augmented at times by relatives of the defendant and at times replaced by the legal adviser of an institution, appointed by the director to serve in some particular case.&lt;br /&gt;
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By 1920 this system of one body affording now a prosecutor, now a defender, was found to be not adequate, not in keeping with the rights of the defendant which orderly legality must establish, nor, on the other hand, providing a sustained attitude of prosecution such as the state needed. The People’s Court Act of that year created separate institutions for the two purposes. There was now evidence of a selected membership. Not just “any citizen,” even though he might devote himself to the duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, could serve, but there was to be a list prepared by the local Soviets, of persons who were qualified to act in this capacity. From this list defending advocates were to be selected for temporary duty, not to exceed six days in a six month period, and were to be paid a sum in proportion to the remuneration received by a co-judge.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was something in the nature of our own jury service, and was regarded as a solemn duty of a citizen qualified for the function. In the Collected Laws of 1920 we find a circular from the Commissar of Justice issuing instructions and admonishing that the defense in court, in criminal cases, is a social duty of all citizens, who, because of profession, education, or party affiliation, are qualified to appear as defenders at the trial.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collected Laws, No. 100, Article 543, 1920, Section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Doubtful defense it may have been to one whose life hung in balance, but the institution was progressing toward a time when persons on trial might be ably represented in the judicial inquiry.&lt;br /&gt;
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The institution of the New Economic Policy, bringing a new complexity and confusion into the economic and political life of the Union, created new necessities of various kinds, one of which, as we have already seen, was a development in the administration of Criminal Law. With the remarkable rapidity of the development of institutions in other lines, the Soviet judicial system began to take firmer shape and to assume a character of responsibility for orderly legality. If the court was to provide equality of opportunity and privileges to all, thus fulfilling the slogan of the Socialist State of which it was an organ, then the rights of the defendant must be protected, not only by legislative safeguards but by means of adequate representation at the bar of justice. If prosecution was to be stiffened in this era of fighting the opponents in a new way, then a balanced procedure called also for more adequate aid to the man accused.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Advocacy Act of 1922, with its sweeping reforms for the judiciary, restored to the Union the possibility of adequate defense for the person who stands accused in court. It created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers, and made its members responsible for the legal aid of a party held for trial. The number of members of the college were, however, to be restricted by authority of the provincial departments of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This limitation was removed by the Judiciary Act of 1926 which elaborated the provisions of the earlier Act and dealt fully with the organization, function, and duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;. While the number is not restricted, the member, when accepted by the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, may be rejected by the provincial executive committee within a month from the time it is informed of his admission.&lt;br /&gt;
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The qualifications required of the members provides for at least two years’ service in some judiciary position within the Soviet Union not lower than the People’s Court which insures an acquaintance with the law. To be admitted one must also either have a higher juridical education or have passed a prescribed examination. Admission is refused to those who have been expelled from public organizations for misconduct (for a period of three years), condemned for crimes, or under trial or investigation the member is suspended in certain cases. No lawyer may defend in court unless he is a member of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, or bar.&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; is self-governing along the lines of other Soviet institutions. It elects its own presidium which works out the general problems of the organization. It decides on disciplinary questions, on general plans of work, and on the fees to be paid by its members. It has no authority over the fees to be paid by clients. That lies in the hands of the Commissariat of Justice which sets up a regular schedule, according to the ability of the person to pay and the complexity of the case. There are four groups according to these provisions. At the bottom are the poor, so designated by the people’s court, who pay no fees; in the next group are those workers, clerks and peasants who are permitted a small rate; the third group consists of any not included in the first two, who may also pay a rate set by the Commissariat; and there is the final group who, not needing the intervention of the Commissar, may make its own terms with the collegium.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In Moscow alone there are about fifty private lawyers not connected with any “corporation,” later to be described, who may be hired as they would be anywhere. They are those sufficiently well known to attract a private practice, and do not need the aid the corporation can give. They agree on the fee to be paid, without any intervention on the part of the state, and are not restricted in income.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The duties of the members of this organization do not consist alone in defending in court. The members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; attached to the courts, provincial, regional, or organized as county bureaus, deliver lectures on law, acquaint the masses with their legal rights and duties through visits to large factories and other centers, and must defend without pay any case referred to them. The first duty of the legal profession is concerned with the observance of revolutionary legality, but within the bounds set by this legality, he must defend his client. The protection of this same individual is, however, the acknowledged duty of both judge and prosecutor, so why the necessity of defense counsel at all in such a system, one wonders.&lt;br /&gt;
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As already pointed out the simpler cases tried in the People’s Court rarely do have attorneys on either side, but in the more complicated cases the story may not be so easily got at. It may be necessary to the honest defense of the accused or in the determination of his sentence that certain orders or decrees about which he knows nothing be applied to his case. In such an event he needs some one who is acquainted with various enactments. In the next place he may not be of a nature so cool and composed when his life or liberty is at stake that he can interrogate witnesses himself, cross question, and otherwise exercise his legal rights. Likewise, if it is a serious case, when he gets his last word before the court he will want it to be an effective one. The speech of a good lawyer, analyzing and weighing the evidence, may be a deciding factor. Straightforward and interested in the protection of the state as a lawyer may be, he is likely to think of some points in favor of his client that neither judge nor prosecutor would find unaided. And that leads to the third and last acknowledged reason for the use of private attorneys. It is likely that the prosecutor may be prejudiced in favor of the guilt which he has already seen indicated by the evidence he had in hand when he remanded the accused for trial. It is likely also that the judge, having found that evidence sufficient to sustain the indictment, may not be able to see some things on the other side that a legal adviser hired for the purpose would be able to find. The authorities on criminal law believe that, too, and therefore, on the theory that innocence is presumed until guilt is proved, they provide for an advocate who is more likely to be conscious of the innocence. A question occurs here as to whether an advocate would risk defending a client whom he knew to be guilty through a confession or otherwise. Theoretically, he would only in this case attempt to interpret or explain the act so as to get freedom or a lesser sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defense often has a lawyer when there is no prosecuting attorney present. In the People’s Court the state representative may not appear, and yet the counsel for the defense is always admitted. The reverse cannot be true. There can be no prosecutor present without the defense counsel. One of the specific provisions of the law is that on all occasions when a prosecutor appears for the state there must also be a counsel for the defendant. In case the latter has not been able to get one or is not able to pay, the court looks after the matter for him by having the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers appoint a counsel. It may be a case a lawyer would not want; it may be the worst of the so-called “class enemies,” but some one must serve. Not only that, but if the complexity of the case warrants it, one of the best must be appointed. The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; pays the member serving on such an unremunerated errand out of its own funds, according to the fees he is accustomed to receive and according to the complexity of the case.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is one other condition in which the court must see that the defense is represented by counsel. If the defendant is deaf or dumb or suffering from any physical handicap that will prevent his understanding correctly the procedure of the case counsel is obligatory. Likewise, in the case of juveniles of 16-18 years of age (the court does not handle the cases of those under 16), the instructions of the Commissariat of Justice is that there be counsel provided.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defense counsel, once in charge of the case, has rights and privileges as great as the prosecution. He may see his client as often as he wants to, for as long as is necessary, without the presence of any attendant or official. He has the right to advise the defendant all during the trial. He has the right to records in the case so that he may study it thoroughly and introduce any evidence he finds necessary in the interest of justice for his client. And he has a right to the last word. He not only makes the final speech but he questions witnesses after the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
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The lawyers of Russia, with the exception of a few independent ones, are organized into “collective corporations.” This, of course, is right in line with the socialist theory of government. While lawyers have a right to engage in private practice there are a number of reasons why one would prefer to be a member of one of these collective bodies. Let us look at some of the characteristics of these organizations. The following list was given by Professor Brusilovsky, who is himself a member of the collegium.&lt;br /&gt;
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“(1) The individual lawyer has no direct financial transaction with the client. The fee is fixed by a special consultant and paid to the treasurer of the ‘collective.’&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The lawyer may go on his vacation knowing his client will be served by colleagues. While on vacation he draws a salary equal to his normal monthly income.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) here is value in consulting a number of lawyers on a case to clear up difficult points. This is especially valuable for the young members.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) Fees are differentiated according to the qualification of the individual lawyer, his service record, experience and ability. He is insured against sickness and incapacity.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) Membership—It is open to all citizens who: (a) possess electoral rights, (b) have a certain record of service in the organs of Soviet justice, and (c) have either passed the prescribed examination or have received a superior juridical education.”&lt;br /&gt;
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We have been considering up to now in this chapter the organization of the defense provided for in the law. This is the machinery through which the rights of an individual may be protected in criminal procedure. Now, let us turn to the defendant himself as he appears in the case and see what safeguards are given him.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is, first, the matter of the preliminary trial. While that phase of the case as a whole has already been discussed the rights accorded to the suspected person were purposely not emphasized since that angle of the proceedings properly belongs here.&lt;br /&gt;
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To begin with, let us suppose the suspect is held in custody by the arresting organs, the militia or the former agents of the OGPU. They can keep him just twenty-four hours, and no more, until they must get permission from the people’s judge or from the prosecuting attorney for his detention. If they cannot get enough evidence in that time to support the arrest there is nothing to do but release him. That does not mean, however, that the case must be dropped. If they are convinced of his guilt, but have not been able by that time to establish it, the authorities may permit the man to be held a longer time so that the case can be built up, or in case the suspicion has not enough grounds even for that, they may go on working quietly until they do uncover what they want. However, for the sake of our case, suppose the prosecutor gives permission for the man to be held. In fourteen days there must be either release or sufficient evidence to hold him. While there are no &#039;&#039;habeas corpus&#039;&#039; proceedings in the administration of Soviet law, there is the assurance that a man must be either released at the end of two weeks or some testimony produced that will justify his being held.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor may he languish in jail while his trial is put off from day to day. The maximum time permitted for the preliminary work and the bringing of a case to trial is one month. Obviously there may be cases when it will be absolutely necessary to extend this limit and by permission it may be extended. But the law provides that there must be reasons shown as to why extra time is asked. The fact that this limit is adhered to in practice is shown by records that in the city court trials of Moscow 75 per cent. of the cases are tried in ten days and the majority of the others in fifteen or twenty. It is quite likely that there are cases in which an arresting organ holds a man more than the twenty-four hours or an investigator permits more than the maximum time to elapse before trial, but members of the Commissariat of Justice insist that if detected in such acts the agents are swiftly and surely punished. Those in authority do not hold in high esteem those officials who do not cooperate in the establishment of revolutionary legality. While there would, of course, be no statistics of such illegal practices, those in prison of whom the writer asked the question about the time of pre-trial detention gave answers of periods which were all within the limit except two. One man indicated that his rights had been violated, the other gave causes for his detention beyond the period.&lt;br /&gt;
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The person under suspicion (it will be recalled that he is not the “accused” until such time as a definite accusal is made) may make a complaint at any time against the actions of those conducting the preliminary inquiry or investigation, and such a complaint may be appealed within seven days, not only to the prosecutor but to the judge under whose jurisdiction the case may be. If it is a serious case, he may from the beginning have employed counsel to do that for him, but in the event of the simpler case, or of his having no counsel, there is sure to be some interested person among family or friends who will attend to this for him, if he should be detained in such a manner that he could not reach the proper authority and the one against whom he complained would not take care of the matter for him. The law provides that such an official must receive and transmit a complaint directed against him, but there might conceivably be instances when meeting this duty would be unpleasant—especially if the official was guilty.&lt;br /&gt;
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During the preliminary trial the defendant is protected in every possible way. If he has not been in custody the initial steps may have been taken without his cognizance. This may have been necessary in order to prevent his escape while ground was being prepared for holding him. But, if there is sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation he is now apprized of it. He may be summoned to appear in almost any manner—by telephone, telegraph or otherwise, or if the circumstances are such that his escape must be prevented, he may be then arrested. In any case he now participates in the investigation which, it is remembered, is carried on by the investigator or, in the event of a serious case, by the prosecutor.&lt;br /&gt;
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He is now told what the charges against him are, and it is made very clear to him. He may at this moment offer an explanation of the substantial facts which will put an entirely new interpretation on the case, and cause its dismissal, if he substantiates what he tells. It is to be remembered that there are no sides taken in this stage of the procedure. It is usual that no counsel has yet appeared for the person under inquiry, the prosecutor is acting in his rôle of collector of information and there is, theoretically, at least, no effort to pin either guilt or innocence on to the party. The accused (he becomes “accused” from the moment the charge is officially explained to him) may suggest witnesses, may request experts, as we have previously seen, and attach any proofs to the documents, and such requests must be granted unless the investigator is convinced that they have no real importance in the case. If he does the latter, he is likely to be rather sure of his ground, as otherwise his judgment would face reversal when his decision was appealed to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have already referred to the use of experts and the accused person’s rights as to selection. With all the information collected and the decision made, his chance to submit evidence to prevent the trial is still not exhausted. On the decision of the investigator to present the accusation, the person against whom it is directed may go over all the materials collected. Now, in the light of what he finds, he may offer further elucidation himself or he may request further witnesses who will be able to shed additional light. He is given every opportunity here, by law at least, to get in a stroke that will indicate his innocence. And in the event it goes to the court, in spite of his efforts, the judge may be convinced of the weight of his argument or evidence and direct the investigator to either build up his case better or dismiss it.&lt;br /&gt;
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We will suppose it stands. The administrative session of court places the case on its calendar. It comes to trial after not longer than a month from the time the accusation is handed over by the investigator, and the accused becomes the defendant. In the meantime the accused will have secured his counsel. Little was said about the part a counsel for the defense might play in the preliminary stages, for the reason that except in serious cases there would almost surely be none at that time. The normal time for the appointment of one by the court, in cases requiring this, would be immediately after it was decided to hold the person for trial. On the presentation of the accusation to the accused he is informed of his legal right to counsel. In case he is unable to provide for an attorney he petitions the court for aid. Likewise, if he chooses one at this time, he submits the name for approval. Then the court, in its administrative session, when deciding whether to hold the accused for trial, likewise settles the question of counsel, if the accused has petitioned, by approving his choice or appointing one. Approval of his choice is necessary only if he has selected some person outside of such authorized lists as members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; or some representative provided by government institutions. Otherwise he may select whomever he will among the authorized persons and be assured that that person must act for him and for a fee that will be set for him within his ability to pay. The element of contest which is one of the basic principles in the Soviet judicature is now found for the first time. Two parties are aligned one against the other, each to prove its rightness. From this time on, the accused is the defendant and there are two sides to the case. Let us see the trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defendant has the right to a public trial. This, too, is one of the principles of criminal procedure of the Soviet courts and by its observation there is insured fairness through public opinion. Through publicity there is brought about both the education of the people and the control of the court by them. There are only two conditions under which the trial may be behind closed doors—when a state secret must be kept, and in sexual crimes where intimate details must be revealed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defendant has a right to be present at his own trial, unless he voluntarily stays away. A case may be tried without him, if he has given his consent or when he has failed to respond to the summons. In the latter case, however, it must be clearly shown that an effort was made to reach him and that he directly evaded it, or there will probably be a reversal of the verdict in the higher court. An attempt to use his lack of response as an excuse for trial without his presence would have to be supported sufficiently to avoid abuse. In simpler cases when there is no possibility of imposing a prison sentence, his presence may not be required by the court, but in offenses punishable by a prison sentence he must be there if he can be found.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the case opens, the presiding judge explains to the defendant his rights, as a party to the court, to make use of all material, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to make any statements he will at any stage of the trial. These things he may do even though he is represented by counsel, and if he has decided to defend himself or entrust it to some relative he is sure to find plenty of opportunity to exercise this right. The writer witnessed one case in which a simple-looking workman took care of his interests so well that one could understand his going to trial without legal aid. Before his vehement and rapid-fire interrogation, witnesses quailed and became confused. The informality of the proceedings permits of participation without timidity in most cases. There is no fear of set rules of the game, because they do not exist. The accused defends himself as he would before his neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;
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The next assurance is that the defendant may cause the removal of judge or juror if there is likely to be bias in his attitude. Perhaps one of them is relative or friend to the injured party, or to some other person who would be interested in the conviction of the defendant. In that case he may challenge, giving his grounds therefor, and the question will be decided by the rest of the court sitting without the member so indicated. If he is overruled he has that fact as grounds for complaint to the cassation instance.&lt;br /&gt;
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And now as the case goes to trial, with the defendant a party to the court so that he may spar as he wishes with prosecutor or clash with witnesses, either with counsel or without, he has also the right of presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It would seem that the preliminary trial had already established guilt sufficiently so that the actual trial would merely bring to light what had gone before, and establish the degree of guilt. But such is not the theory incorporated in Soviet criminal law. It may be that evidence will take a different turn, that the very atmosphere of the public trial will provide a new viewpoint. The object of the preliminary investigation is not to constitute a determination of guilt but to give guarantee that there are some grounds for trial. Authorities on the administration of criminal law point to the relatively low percentage of convictions, there being, according to one authority, almost one-third of those remanded to the People’s Court dismissed, and a lack of conviction of at least a quarter of those actually reaching court. From that one would judge that the holding for trial by the investigation organs of the courts does not mean in actual practice that one’s guilt has been established. During the trial the defendant has every right which he has already been accorded in the preliminary procedure, but they are now rendered broader and of more value because he is familiar with all the data that have been produced, and all the witnesses who have been gathered by the investigation are now before him for questioning. Through his cross-examination of the state’s witnesses he may develop lines of proof that he can substantiate by calling further witnesses of his own, or he may refute the state’s contention. Some expert, whom the investigation used for some specific interpretation, may change his own opinion in the light of some explanation which the defendant himself or his witness can give. He has here three distinct privileges—he may request certain witnesses, other experts, or fresh proofs from the state if the case is to be sustained; he may give explanations to the court of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act at any time and as often during the trial as he wishes or thinks necessary; and he has the invaluable right to take part in the examination of all witnesses, experts, or others who take part in the trial. And now, if he has been directing his own defense he may also make the final speech and thus leave the last word with the court as it goes forth to deliberate on the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is some difference in the privileges and rights accorded one tried in the People’s Courts and in the higher courts. The reason is not far to seek. In the People’s Court there are no cases of a class nature of the serious sort. There could not be, since the jurisdiction of the People’s Court does not extend to crimes punishable by the death sentence. Here come the people from among the masses who have violated the law, but when a Kulak or one of the bourgeoisie is involved and the offense is against the state or the order of government, the case goes to a higher tribunal and the rights of the defendant are more circumscribed. In a trial when the accused is of a socially dangerous character, and restrictions are held to be necessary, the discretionary power of the judge may draw such limits as depriving the defendant of rights of counsel, of certain witnesses, or of records in the case. Such procedure, however, is said to be unusual and resorted to only in cases where the offense is of a highly dangerous character. Even in such an instance the defendant may still conduct his own case with all of his customary rights. The accused may be a socially dangerous character who must necessarily be subjected to restrictions. It is likely that this happens in a small degree and only in the most serious cases, but in fairness a chapter dealing with the rights of the defendant should call attention to this possible limitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To see the defendant in court one is impressed with the amount of liberty he has. One forgets that he is the man whose life or liberty is in jeopardy. He talks, he interrogates, he explains and argues. And it is amazing to see how these people have come to understand the working of the law. It is a part of the duty of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers to help in explaining and popularizing the Soviet laws and a good job they have done of it, too. Of course, they have had their helpers, but one finds children who know why the law of August 7, 1932, providing a death penalty for larceny from the state was necessary, and as for the enactment which specifies a five-year period of imprisonment for adulteration in an effort to make for better quality, every housewife knows the answer. She demands better material for her dresses, better sugar for her table, and she has heard all about the law, its necessity and purpose, in her factory or other place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
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That acquaintance with the laws, that knowledge of the principle involved, makes it possible for an offender to do a pretty good job as his own attorney, unless he be one of the illiterate peasants. In that case, if he has no counsel, he can be rather sure of the court’s interest in finding out the facts and in interpreting them correctly. It is to the state’s interest to see that the accused person has every opportunity to be treated fairly, and the court is only the organ of the state in carrying out such a policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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As has already been said, the people seem in most cases to agree with the verdict of the court and that is worth something as an indication of justice. They are encouraged to follow the case and to understand the application of the law. After hearing their discussion at a trial, one would know of their intense interest. It seems to be an added cloak of protection for the defendant in case a judge did exceed fair play. It would be felt in the appeal!&lt;br /&gt;
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In the event of a verdict of guilty the convicted one now has his right of complaint so that his case will be reviewed by the cassational division of the higher court, the Regional or the Supreme Court, or to the latter even from the first. Herein is his last chance of life or liberty. Already we have talked of cases where the decision of the lower courts was reversed. That happens in about ten per cent. of the cases. So a man has a slim one-chance-in-ten hope of getting off from his punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the reader has, in this enumeration of rights, been impressed with the absence of one held dear in the United States—the right of a person to trial by a jury of his “peers.” But the system existent in the Soviet Union bears a resemblance in effect, although they repudiate the idea of our jury system both for political expedience and because they think the practice unsound from a judicial point of view. However, the two persons who sit with the judge do actually provide some check on his judgment and authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet system the two jurors, or co-judges, may decide independently of the judge in all cases. They are selected with a view to their having some ability to serve, and most of them seem to be people of intelligence who take an active part in the trial. While they are without doubt subject at times to influence from the judge in deliberating on the verdict, there seems also ground for suspecting that because of their nearness to the workers there would be a strong tendency to reflect the opinion of such a group in a verdict they would render. They cannot be regarded as party tools, since a large majority are not party members as against the large majority of judges who are. However, there is a class feeling. The court, as said before, is an organ for carrying out the policy of the state, and decisions will naturally consider the dangerous character of the person on trial. The class nature of the procedure is apparent and is acknowledged, but it is held to be legitimate, a necessity. The jurors could not be expected to aid in a decision, or render one on their own account, which would go against this policy. Thus it would seem that the jurors might have effect in trials not of a class nature, might actually constitute an additional safeguard to the rights of the defendant. There are cases on record where they have gone against the judgment of the court, and rendered their own verdict, thus proving that they are not always a rubber stamp.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER X: CORRECTIVE LABOR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; title of this chapter defines the attitude of the Soviet government toward those persons whom it sets apart from society for a time. It is almost necessary to see what they have done in this line to understand it properly. The institutions in which the policy is carried out have moved many people to warm praise. M. Herriot of France, on visiting the Kharkov Labor Commune exclaimed, “I am not a Communist. I am an old man,” then launched into exuberant appreciation of the system in use there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the discussion of the system in all its details of work and education, one should read the volume, already referred to, &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, edited by Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky. Each separate article is written by a specialist in his particular field and each presents in minuteness some phase of the system which the Russians use. They have known what they wanted to do in the direction of reformation even back in the days of 1917, but for so many years the idea lay, like others did, obscured by catastrophe. Terror and necessity caused severity to prevail for a long time. Punishment was the mainstay of defense from foe within in order to withstand a little better the ones then pressing from without.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the idea was there in the minds of those who were to define the penal policy and the Code of 1922, and set down the principle that punishment was not for the purpose of revenge and might not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain. With this beginning there was a steady progress toward the removing of those indignities that tend to degrade a man, until the Correctional Labor Code of 1933 completed the process. In the meantime various amendments have prohibited torture, the use of handcuffs, solitary confinement, deprivation of food, or any other measure that would have the effect of degradation or do physical harm to the person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0178.svg|SYSTEM OF PLACES FOR DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There has been a steady effort to remove what they term the “prison spirit.” There is, they tell you, no such thing as a “captive” or “prisoner.” The idea is to keep the person deprived of his liberty from feeling in any measure isolated. He is given work to do such as he would have outside and he is always conscious of its useful nature. There are instructors for the various trades, machinery, carpentry, etc., who see that each man is educated for his job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are two main types of places for deprivation of liberty, those located in cities in close quarters, and those out in the country where there is space and greater freedom. In chapters just following some of these typical ones will be described, but they are mentioned here so that references may be clearer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before describing the characteristics of the institutions used for corrective labor, we shall need to define the policy that goes into the system. The articles on which the materials for this chapter are mainly based are those by B. Utievsky on &#039;&#039;Prison Regime&#039;&#039;, and another entitled &#039;&#039;Work in Correctional Labor Institutions&#039;&#039; by M. Kessler and B. Oleinin, both of which are included in the volume edited by Vishinsky, already referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We note again in connection with this work the class character of criminal legislation. One of the basic principles is the assumption that peasants and workers deprived of their liberty are not premeditated enemies of the Soviet order, and under these circumstances it is natural to suppose that treatment for them would be milder than for the anti-proletarians, and the privileges enjoyed by them would be greater. However, this assumption does not prevent the use of the same policy and the same methods in the prison treatment of the so-called class enemies. While the main purpose in placing the political prisoner and others whose crime is chiefly against the state in outlying places was to isolate them from society and prevent their continued danger, there was still a desire to restore them as useful citizens by means of education and labor. The principle expressed in the Code that “maintenance in correctional labor institutions shall be reasonable, and shall not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity” is carried out, they say, in the places where political prisoners are kept just as in others. The main difference is that these prisoners have less freedom, less liberty for contact with society. The aim, however, uppermost in their treatment is to organize a collective life for them, and by the education which is provided to cause these people to fit into that life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An example of constructive use of these prisoners from the anti-proletarian class is the building of the White Sea-Baltic Canal. It is interesting just here to give a quotation from Maxim Gorki, which illustrates their own point of view as to the value of this policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“How did the kulaks work? Here is an instance. The Podlipinsky brigade of the first section in which there were 32 kulaks in the last ten days has set a record of 25 per cent. fulfillment of their quota. But the brigade would not quit its job even when the next shift came to take their place. The brigade had to be taken off by direct order of the chief of the section.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The order Number One brigade consisted chiefly of kulaks. It was on rock work in the sixth section. It has fulfilled 130-150 per cent. of its quota. Their exemplary work was rewarded and entered into the Red Labor Book.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While this may be propaganda, the fact remains that there are those operating the locks in this canal who have been discharged as prisoners, but who continue loyally at the post. We are assured by another author that “thousands of convicts from anti-Soviet elements redeemed themselves, and showed great devotion to Soviet construction. Many gained their freedom; a great many were accorded all kinds of privileges, and a few awarded the highest order of merit.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we come to consider the program for those prisoners from among their own masses we get on safer grounds, at least as to practice. The policy follows much the same lines. We have mentioned before the change in terminology from jails or prisons to “places for deprivation of liberty.” It has also been mentioned that the change does not appear to be limited to terminology, but that the actual purpose to carry out some definite measure by which a man may be rendered fit for a useful place in society seems well observed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, perhaps, would be a good place to say that the program of the Communist Party in regard to treatment of those who break the law calls for eventual correctional labor without deprivation of liberty. Their ultimate goal, both expressed in policy and now being put into practice in a limited way, is that persons shall be sent to labor under supervision where training is provided. This practice will have to go slowly and proceed as their educational program prepares the way for it. At the present time there is usually no sentence of deprivation of liberty for less than one year. Any penalty of compulsory labor given for less than that minimum permits the offender to retain his liberty. In such cases the unemployed among these persons is farmed out to factory or to agricultural work with supervision and training provided. He is given a place to live near to his work, but he is free to go and come as he wishes. It is the aim of the higher judicial organs to abolish the use of deprivation of liberty as rapidly as possible, and to use it only for cases who do not respond to other measures of social defense. The Superior Court has likewise given instructions to the lower tribunals to use deprivation of liberty only as other measures have failed. The employed who are sentenced to labor without deprivation of liberty remain on the job on which they are at work and a certain per cent. of the salary received is deducted each month. With both of these classes there is a possibility of early discharge for good work and because of the practice used in all their penal institutions of counting two working days equal to three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up to 1929 there were still in existence isolated places of detention but since that time the policy prevalent has been to change all of these into the favored educational establishments. At the present time all persons sentenced are taken care of in the various types of labor colonies (industrial, agricultural, road building, land improvement, etc.) or in the semi-free labor camps where guards are maintained, usually selected from among the inmates themselves, but where there are no locked rooms or prison walls.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The régime, then, of these institutions, according to Utievsky, has three basic influences: (1) Socially useful, productive labor, (2) political educational influences, and (3) the development of public activity among the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now see how these three methods of influence are carried out in the institutions themselves. The purpose of labor on the part of the convicts is to provide organized collective work in a society where collective living in all its phases is a predominant note. It is essential to successful readjustment. The Kulak, with his individualistic tendencies, is re-educated in this political philosophy. While he is at this labor, the convict works under the same conditions, and with the same protections that he would enjoy in outside labor. His hours are seven or eight a day, depending upon the nature of his work, and he is permitted a weekly rest of a continuous 42-hour period. Special protection is given to the juvenile laborer, but this will be mentioned again in the chapter concerning juvenile delinquency.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no night work for women, just as there would not be in outside labor, and minors under eighteen are not to be employed in injurious trades. Maternity vacations of eight weeks for physical labor, and six weeks for mental work, both before and after childbirth are prescribed for women. There also exist regulations of various sorts for sanitation and safety. The whole idea is that the person deprived of his liberty may be made to feel that he labors on a par with workers outside; that he may feel useful in the economic plan of the nation; and, through the pay given him, continue support to his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the general consideration mentioned above, there are some special rules of importance. For example, women who are in the fifth month of pregnancy may not be sent to any work outside the institution of which they are inmates, without their consent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all labor in the Soviet Union there are a certain number of days of work (five is the general rule) and one day of rest. This is likewise true of convict labor, and on the eve of the rest day all work and school study must be suspended from dinner time (which is at midday). Another privilege of importance is that each person keeps his own work book with a record of hours, wages due, and deductions made, properly entered. In this way he does not have to take the word of any official as to the correctness of the count, but is able to see for himself and complain if an error has been made.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the matter of food there is a provision for increase in accordance with the expenditure of energy in the work assigned. One doing heavy physical labor would, for example, be given food in larger quantities than one using less strength. In accordance with the principle that a prisoner may not be degraded, the administrative office of these institutions is not permitted to make use of the personal services of the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was mentioned in the beginning that one type of institution provided for the carrying on of all activities in small areas. These are of the nature of penitentiaries, but even for the type of convict in these prisons there are large works of a variety of kinds organized outside the city limits. Among these would be brick-work, bridge building colonies, house building, dairy farms and truck gardens. One of the most constructive things about this labor, in whatever line, is that it forms a part of the five-year plan, and is thus put on the same basis as other forms. The industry carried on must, first of all, satisfy the needs of the institution itself, but goods in excess of this amount are placed on the home market. Export of prison-made goods is forbidden except in the case of the sports goods made at Bolshevo Labor Commune. The latter are noted for their excellent quality and are exported to various countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the grave prison problems in this country is the question of payment of wages to persons serving sentences in penal institutions. In the Soviet system there is no unpaid labor. The amount may not be less than 25 per cent. of the existing scale, nor more than 50 per cent. The cost of maintenance is, of course, not deducted from this amount. In establishing the schedule the prison administration must have the agreement of the Commissar of Labor, and the fact of the profit or loss of the enterprise does not enter into the calculations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convict is not restricted in the spending of his earnings. He may purchase extra foodstuffs, clothing, or he may send his income to his family for support. He may be given advice in the matter, but there is no compulsion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One point in connection with this system is that labor is not compulsory. A convict may work or not as he wishes, and still receive maintenance. But in refusing to work, he loses most of the privileges which he would otherwise enjoy. Practically none do refuse, it is said. On the other hand, there is a great increase in those joining the shock brigade, the group doing excellent work, sometimes even for additional hours. In 1933 in the Moscow region, this figure reached 51.3 per cent. of the total number in these institutions. The number fluctuates usually between 54 and 78 per cent. As a result quotas of production are usually more than fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second basic influence in the program of this institution is political education. A system is established in each place of deprivation of liberty, and the official in charge is the assistant warden. Practically all education carried on has a strong political influence. However, one of the aims involved is the elimination of illiteracy. Every effort is being made in the Soviet Union to give to each citizen at least an elementary education, whether he be in prison or out. To that end there is established in every state institution schools providing for the first seven years of work. There are also other penal institution courses for the semi-illiterates and those of a sufficiently advanced nature for the more educated. There are in addition some evening and university classes for those wishing to take advantage of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the regular school work which is carried on both by teachers from the outside and some selected from qualified inmates, there is a system of lectures covering specialized subjects. These are designed to give information of a social-political nature and educate the individual in the use of sanitation and hygiene. There are others of a general educational character embracing material of interest to the group. These lectures are given by specialists in the various fields, who are invited by prison administrators, and by any one among the convicts who might be qualified to talk on a particular subject. Admission, of course, is open to all without restriction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In connection with the education work, there are libraries and reading rooms. There is a library located in each place of deprivation of liberty, and there are also circulating ones, and in neither are there restrictions as to the use of books. In most cases some work of this nature is obligatory, but beyond that every convict is not only permitted to use the facilities, but is encouraged to take advantage of the privileges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reading room may be visited at any free hour. Here are found recent newspapers, magazines and other periodicals. Newspapers are also distributed in the rooms, and convicts may subscribe to their own outside these limits if they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The radio with which each room is usually equipped also constitutes an important instrument of education. Lectures, music, and other information or entertainment of an educational and cultural nature may be listened to by the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most interesting phases in the development of this program in these institutions is the art work. The convicts are trained in dramatic performance and also enjoy in this connection entertainment by outside companies. There are concerts and moving pictures given, in almost every one of these places, and convicts attend not less than once a week. But the interesting side of it to an observer is the work the inmates do themselves in the matter of writing and producing their own stage performances. The convicts are free to attend and there is, of course, no charge for admission. A theater or auditorium is a part of the equipment of every institution of this nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sanitary education carried on is in line with the program of other education of this nature, distributing such information to the masses of people. There is an opportunity here for teaching individuals in an effective way, and for seeing that certain fundamentals are put into actual practice. There is a bureau of sanitary education in each institution, composed of the house physician, representatives from the department of political education, and delegates elected by the convicts themselves, devoting itself to this phase of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The purpose of these institutions is seen in its most complete fulfillment in the vocational training which each gives. There are courses in schools of all the various trade groups, providing both theoretical and practical training in skilled trades. The unskilled laborer is here transformed into a man with specialized information in some particular line, which will both render him useful in industry and give him happiness in his work. In 1931, 7,700 convicts attended such courses in the Soviet Union, and 6,500 workers were in that year turned out trained for some particular trade. In 1933 the plan was for giving such preparation to 24,000. Salvation for society and for the individual, they hold, lies in this direction and every man and woman sentenced for law-breaking must be so fitted to earning a livelihood that he will not transgress again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be mentioned before passing to the next point that both cultural and legal work is carried on by means of mass meetings through the organization of such groups as law clubs, and by means of evening forums, lectures and talks. There is also a legal bureau composed of representatives of the department of political education, and two members elected from the convicts, which gives legal aid or advice to the inmates whenever it is needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third basic influence in correctional labor—the development of public activities among the convicts—accounts for some of the most valuable rehabilitating work done in these places, in the author’s opinion. The aim here is to strengthen, or develop where they have been lacking, the social habits of the individual; to turn him into a conscious and active member of society. The basic forms of social activity in these institutions take several directions. There is first the general meeting on various occasions for a variety of purposes. This may be for the formation of social organizations, for the conducting of a campaign for the election of some representative, or perhaps for a celebration of some revolutionary event. The convicts establish their own rules of procedure and make whatever proposals are appropriate. These general meetings take care of whatever concerns are common to the entire population, and leave to the more specialized groups whatever is of narrower interest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the production conferences, held by convicts in the same manner as those used by free-workers in industrial enterprises, an active part is taken in settling whatever questions arise in relation to production. They discuss industrial plans for improvement, financial methods, quota fulfillment, or any question that would logically come within their jurisdiction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most outstanding achievements in the line of self-activities among the convicts is the development of the comradely courts. Through this tribunal those disciplinary problems referred to it are transferred from the administration to the convicts themselves. This court is responsible for the maintenance of order and for seeing that a high quality of educational work prevails, for administering disciplinary measures in the case of shirking work or lessons, of spoiling the equipment of the shops, of laxity in observance of regulations of sanitation and health, of the use of indecent language, of damage done to any book or periodical, of inciting ill treatment of one convict by another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court is composed of a chairman, and two jurors elected at one of the general meetings referred to above. The penalties which they may impose on one who breaks the rules, or fails to live up to the standard set, are as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) Reprimand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Censure with strict warning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Censure with publication in local newspapers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Limitation of visits by friends from outside for a period of not more than one month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) Application to supervisory committee for transfer to another prison with a stricter régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Application for withholding vacation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) Application for either partial or complete non-discounting of working days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) Application for withholding all probation, and early release during a certain period of not more than one month after maturing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) Restitution of damage done.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case of undue severity on the part of this court, the warden may alter the penalty to a milder form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred in the paragraphs dealing with education to cultural committees. These are elected at a general mass meeting to put into action the plans for political education work or to devote themselves to other problems of a cultural nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every place of deprivation of liberty has its wall newspaper, changed about every week or ten days and carrying news of various sorts of a political or educational nature, as well as items of interest to prison life. The editorial boards of these papers are likewise elected at the general meetings. Prison administrators as well as other authorities on penal policy in the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the development of public activities among the prisoners has yielded splendid results of a social nature. They point to the success of the “book soobotnik” (one day’s salary given for books) which netted 100,000 rubles. It is stated that the gifts were entirely voluntary without pressure from any source. Another incident showing a desirable spirit was the collection among the convicts of 31,818 rubles for an aeroplane which was presented to the fleet. There have been other acts of the same kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now we turn to the régime found in these institutions, the express purpose of which is to develop free will, initiative and self-activity. All privileges possible are permitted to the man deprived of his liberty, and his freedom as little restricted as the nature of the person himself permits. Following out the principle that no condition designed to degrade the convict or make him feel inferior may be permitted, penal authorities proceeded legislatively to remove whatever might exist in this line. The corrective labor code of 1933, for example, completely severed all connection with the progressive system of progressive classification of prisoners. The theory is that in this educational-labor program no man is to be treated with greater privilege than another unless he himself makes some deprivation necessary. Even then there are limits. A recalcitrant member of the penal population may be deprived for a period not longer than one month of such privileges as writing letters, or receiving visitors, but no corporal punishment may be inflicted nor may he be locked in solitary confinement. It is worth noting here that the solitary cells left from the Tzarist days may at times be used for tenants, but the door of the cell may not be locked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convicts have privileges as great as can be accorded. From the day of their entrance they may walk about anywhere they wish at any time they are free from work. In those institutions located in the country, this may take the character of quite a good walk, while in those of the penitentiary type located in cities, it naturally is limited to the prison yard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Visitors may come as often as twice in five days and may consist not only of relatives but of friends and acquaintances as well. There is no red tape in making arrangements for a visit so that no difficulty of this sort prevents contact between the convict and those outside. There may be as many as three persons at one time, and they may bring with them, if they wish, gifts of food, tobacco, etc. There is no restriction in the use of tobacco except that there are some particular places where the convict is requested not to smoke. Outside of this he may have as many cigarettes as he wishes or can obtain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither is there restriction in the number of letters which he may write or receive. In the matter of either letters or gifts the administration reserves the right of inspection, but in the majority of cases, unless there is some suspicion attached to the person, this right is not utilized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is an interesting development in the matter of leaves. For the man who has proved himself a good worker and who is not suspected of any intention of escape, a leave of fourteen days in the year is granted. He may go where he likes on this vacation, and use it as he pleases. He is placed entirely on his honor and no guard is in attendance at any time. In addition to this a convict may obtain a leave at any time because of an emergency such as an illness or death in his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still more liberal terms are granted to the peasant or collective farmer. In the event that he is needed for field labor, he is given a leave for the full three-month period of the season, and if he breaks no law during this leave, the time counts on his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to this leave and vacation, there is always the possibility of release after a short part of the original sentence has been served. If the person is judged fit to be restored to his place in society, and thought to be no longer a menace, he may be released after serving a minimum of one-third of his sentence. There is also the practice, as already mentioned, of counting two productive working days as three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before passing from the chapter describing the policy and character of corrective labor work, some mention ought to be made of the administration. Who exactly is responsible in the USSR for seeing that this policy is translated into action? At the very head are the Commissariats of Justice of the various republics.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A Law of October 24, 1934, transferred the administration of all places of deprivation of liberty to the newly created Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR. The organization described is now within this Department, but the author had the information too late to incorporate in the body of the book.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There is a certain amount of independence in these relationships. The Collective Labor Code of 1933 of the RSFSR made a considerable advance in the direction of autonomous supervision on the part of the administration of corrective labor organization in these republics. Those institutions located in the territory of these various republics are administered and managed by local commissars of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this organization there are local administrative bodies known as observation committees. One of these exists in connection with each institution and is directly responsible for administration and management. In direct charge is the superintendent or warden, and his staff of assistants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is especially close relation between the agency of supervision and the prisoners which enables the Observation Commission to know with a high degree of accuracy as to when release is advisable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Previous to 1926 there had been two commissions participating in the distribution and release of prisoners—the Distributory Commission and the Observation Commission. The Observation Commission, however, while making recommendations to the Distributory Commission in matters of dismissal and release, played a minor role, since its viewpoint was in no way binding on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1924 provided for an Observation Commission to be established at every place of deprivation of liberty as a part of the staff of the place. On this commission was the people’s judge, and a representative of the local bureau of trade unions. This extension in the scope of the work of these commissions was made in an effort both to raise the level of work being done at the prisons and also to establish a closer contact between commission and prisoners. The result hoped for, however, was not realized as the judge was entirely, by nature of his position, separated from his work, and the representatives of the bureau took little interest in the matter. By the same Act the powers of the Distributory Commission were widened, and the Act of April 21, 1926, went further still, giving to this body authority to assign the long-term prisoners to places of agricultural work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There still was the gap between the work of the commission of release and the correctional labor institutions. The Observation Commission which was on the ground could make recommendations but they were not always accepted by the Distributory Commission which handled dismissals and releases. Many mistakes resulted and the desire of the authorities to establish intimate contact between commission and prisoners was being thwarted. Thus the Sixth Congress of Jurists proposed the liquidation of the Distributory Commissions and the reorganization of the Observation Commissions. By the reformation of 1929 new opportunities for constructive work were opened to these commissions, and the contact between them and the prisoners of the institution was finally made close and real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 made several important changes in the composition and work of these commissions of the RSFSR. There is now a Central Commission and under it trade union observation committees on which are the head of the correctional labor institution and two representatives from the general organization which are installed in each of the large corrective labor units and in all field production. Every effort has been made to see that there is close contact of these commissions with the institutions, that the policy of the central administration is carried out, that the work follows the lines it should, and results in fitting the inmates of the institutions for life as it is supposed to do. The Commissar of Justice is, in the last analysis, responsible for the work of these commissions, but by Act of February 10, 1933, he has placed that responsibility squarely on one man, the chairman of the Corrective Labor Commission, whose duty it now is to see that the policy and plans of the commissariat are carried out. This chairman is a member of the Central Observation Commission, but not the chairman of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prosecutors who were supposed to be attending the open session of these meetings and were actually present at them to the extent of 78 per cent., were found to be merely sitting quietly and taking no active part in solving problems and working out plans. By the same Act of February 10, 1933, the Commissar of Justice ordered them not only to be present but to participate actively in all meetings. There are no figures on actual participation but the percentage of attendance jumped from 78 to 82 and it is stated that practically all those present take an active part in discussions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no lack of effort to see that this commission inquires into, and knows, what is going on, is acquainted with the prisoners, and never for a moment forgets what it is set up to do. For the accomplishment of an organic union between the Observation Commission and the corrective labor institution, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee has demanded that the members of this commission participate actively in the creative and labor life of the institution as well as in its political education. To effect this there are many special meetings, besides the open ones, devoted to the problems of various industries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us see for a moment what organizations are represented on these commissions and how often the respective members attend the meetings.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 406407.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| style=&amp;quot;width: 70%&amp;quot;| Name of organization&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| No. of meetings attended&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(in per cent.)&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Corrective Labor Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 68&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Court&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 82&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Worker-peasant inspection&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 74.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Other Soviet Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 54&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Women’s delegate groups&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 73&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Enterprizes&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 58&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Organization of Komsomol&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 47&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Sections of Revolutionary Law&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 63&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Trade Unions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 66&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jurors&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 95&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Agricultural collectives&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 60&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This table was for the last nine months of 1932. It represents not a particularly bad showing but it was in 1933 that the All-Union Central Executive Committee decided that this was not sufficient and that there must be even better attendance. It aimed its order this time at the social members and demanded that they give active aid in inculcating social form of labor into correctional labor institutions. There is no thought of sending a man away to prison to get him out of the community then forgetting all about him. He will be returning in an average time of a year and a half and the community through its representative is responsible to see that he shall return in good order. It is thus made directly everybody’s problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been said elsewhere in this book that the Observation Commission is the authority for handling release and dismissal. Appeal may be taken from all of its decisions and a good percentage are reversed. Its mistakes, it is said, are largely because of a one-sided attack of the case in which its members were able only to see the seriousness of the crime, or perhaps only the social status of the convict, or maybe only his industrial activity at the place of his imprisonment. The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 takes a broader approach to the problem and demands that those responsible do the same. Each individual case must be treated from a differentiated viewpoint, with a survey of all angles involved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following table is given to show what types of disposal is used in the Soviet Union, and the relative importance of each.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; Article by N. Durmanov, entitled “Observation Commissions,” p. 396&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| &#039;&#039;Cases Examined in 1928&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| Per cent.&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of those serving in correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 22.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of prisoners&lt;br /&gt;
| 0.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Amnesty&lt;br /&gt;
| 7.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Release from imprisonment under guard&lt;br /&gt;
| 1.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Installment of labor days&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;It has been mentioned elsewhere that sentences are shortened by counting two productive work days as three of the sentence.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| 28.4&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Removal of strict isolation&lt;br /&gt;
| 3.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to other classification&lt;br /&gt;
| 2.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Assignment of type of place of detention&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Miscellaneous&lt;br /&gt;
| 13.0&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the duties already mentioned the Observation Commission has charge of the distribution of prisoners to the proper places for the serving of the sentence imposed and for their transferal from one place to another when it becomes necessary. In order to place a convict so that the best results may be secured, a close case study is made, an analysis of his personality, characteristics, ability, social status, and other pertinent information, but if an error is made after all, then he is transferred when better acquaintance shows where he belongs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XI: SOKOLNIKI ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sokolniki&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a prison, call it by whatever name one will. It is true that the national policy relating to corrective labor and discipline modify its physiognomy, but it still presents the atmosphere of a penitentiary. This statement is not meant as any criticism of either it or its administration, since one can hardly see how that aspect of it could be otherwise as long as criminals do exist who need restraining—and some of such there are bound to be. The fact of its sterner nature is emphasized in the beginning so that the impression will not be given that a place like Bolshevo Labor Commune, described in later pages, would fulfill the requirements for all the elements found among the criminals in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Standing outside the wall, just as cold and gray as the usual for penitentiaries, and looking up at the towers at the corners where sentinels armed with rifles keep watch, one has all the feeling of a sinking heart that comes with such a sight. People are shut away there and possibly forgotten by the citizenry from whom they have been separated, perhaps, since it is the customary thing for ignorance to prevail as to prisons and penal methods. One thinks, standing there, wondering about men behind that wall, of a description written in verse by one prisoner some quarter of a century ago. It is sentimental, belonging to an age when emotion was expressed a little more freely than our practice of restraint permits now, but one suspects men still suffer as he did in a good many prison cells such as this writer has seen. Lines of the poem, especially descriptive and appropriate to this subject, speak of “where tongues are mute, and men arise to newborn wrong,” and “where men must fawn or walk with scars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stell and Null, &#039;&#039;Convict Verse&#039;&#039;, Ft. Madison, Iowa, 1908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One doesn’t need to tell people who know anything of the penal situation in the United States that conditions make it possible to write lines like that. Of all of our social endeavor, the treatment of men convicted of crime seems the place where we have most signally failed in constructive results. Constructive treatment is, of course, a rare exception rather than a rule. But it seems to this writer that the implications of the verse have a less favorable chance of being true of Soviet prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place there is no prison sentence longer than ten years, and few offenders serve that long. The authorities figure that a maximum ten-year constructive program will fit anybody for proper living unless he is irredeemable. There will be some cases, of course, where there is failure, but the idea is to fit the régime to the majority. Right here there will be the question always forthcoming as to what they would do with our own gangster type. Give them a ten-year sentence? Not at all. They have few of them and for armed robbery one may be sentenced to death. No arguments are listed here for or against punishment by death, but in order to understand the absence of a long prison sentence it is necessary to be informed as to what happens to those who would ordinarily be the recipients of such a term. The fellow who murders in a jealous rage or great anger may find himself in for a long treatment in a place for mental abnormals, or he may, if judged sane, be given a sentence of ten years or less. They do not consider this type of murderer to be, usually, a further social menace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With those disposed of the formulators of the policy believe that a longer sentence for others is not needed. They see no aid anywhere in having one languish in prison beyond that point where a sentence ceases to have the possibility of being constructive and begins to dull the senses and perspective of the prisoner so that he is worthless anywhere. Some of our penologists have said that it is better to keep a man either a brief period or for his life because after a certain time it is practically impossible for him to fit into a society of which he has no knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet system provides measures for keeping a man in touch with society so that he may not feel that entire isolation even though ten years is the maximum of incarceration. In the first place, as we have seen, only those whose term is short or whose character makes it necessary are put in the closed institutions; in the next even those who are there are given vacations of leave if it is thought that they can be trusted not to escape. And in case that has to be denied to an inmate, he still has opportunity for contacts with associates within and friends and relatives without in open, wholesome manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tongues are not mute, either. Prisoners gather where they like, walk together, work together, play together. Nor do they “fawn or walk with scars.” The stated policy is to encourage them to approach and conduct themselves with dignity and no guard may inflict physical punishment on any prisoner. One might say that such a policy is likely not carried out. There may be isolated instances of violation, and one feels sure there are, but the attitude of the men toward the attendants and guards seem to indicate that such regulations are regarded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sokolniki is a prison for men who have been sentenced, supposedly, from one to three years. Article 28 of the Criminal Code says, ‘Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labour camps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labour or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labour camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence.” (May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are therefore a number serving sentences of longer periods than the three years who, because of physical condition, can not be sent to the labor camp to which they should be assigned, or because they need the restraint, perhaps, of these stronger walls. At the time of the writer’s visit there were a few more than eleven hundred prisoners in Sokolniki. The prison’s capacity is said to be something more than that, but it seemed then to be more crowded than was good for adequate treatment. However, one must remember that the housing situation in all of the USSR is acute and especially is that true of the cities where industrialization has required the assembling of more persons than can comfortably be housed. It is to be expected that prisons might share in this shortage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet system uses the collective dormitory system rather than the single room standard. This is in keeping with their idea of community living and we were told at the women’s prison that it is preferred by the prisoners themselves who like being with others and have no wish to be shut off. They use it also in student dormitories where beds are placed eight or ten to a large room. That, however, they wish to remedy. Their aim is a room for every worker and every student but that will require much more building.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Sokolniki is a well-known prison it will perhaps be interesting to set down a detailed description of it. The Soviet picture, The Road to Life, shown in this country, was made there, we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In arriving at Sokolniki, which is not far outside the city limits of Moscow, one comes to a closed door in the stone wall, some fifteen feet high, already mentioned. There must, of course, be an appointment just as there must be for entering a penitentiary in our own country. There is a bell and after it is rung the door is opened by an armed guard. The visitor is then in a small entrance room where there are other guards and which leads into a large court back of and around which the prison buildings form a square. There are other guards scattered in places about the court and near a large gate through which automobiles and trucks enter when they have business there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we went through the court to the first building we were to see, about a hundred feet away, two men sat at the door of a side building, peeling potatoes. They were talking and laughing as they worked, evidently enjoying themselves. This was the first glimpse of the informal atmosphere that prevailed throughout, and which caused us to look in some amazement at occasional scenes such as that encountered as we entered the auditorium where a good pianist was playing and other men stood beside him or leaned on the piano, at ease and absorbed in the music.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We had now left all the armed guards behind and there were no others in evidence until we came to depart. There were attendants, supervisors of work, etc., but there were no weapons among them. We went through shops and factories, observing the men at work. They wore any sort of clothes that they happened to own, mostly of the poor peasant type, since prisoners in Russia are never put in uniform.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The spinning and weaving shops were interesting. They were well lighted, had good ventilation except in one room where neither was very adequate. As we went by the men talked to each other in a normal conversational manner, watched us, both amused and curious. Also, we talked to them as we wished. Others, not then at work for some reason (we were told that every man in the prison works, but it was late in the day when we went and some had ended their shift), followed us about good naturedly, enjoying our curiosity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A prosecuting attorney was our guide and he stopped to talk to various ones among them. Also as we went along men occasionally stopped him with requests, some with complaints, and he noted them on paper. At times he good naturedly refused what was asked, but any came who wanted to, informally, and without permission from any source.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude of the convicts toward labor may be explained by several things which have already been mentioned. There is no feeling of punishment about the work since the prison factories are placed on the same basis as others in the country. They have an eight-hour day, they receive pay (from 20 to 50 rubles per month) which they are permitted to spend as they like and which often goes to the support of a family at home, and they have the knowledge that the work they do is counted in the regular plan so that even while they serve their sentence they are actively helping in the nation’s economic life. At any rate, these men did not appear depressed as they worked, nor in bad spirits. We watched an older inmate pleasantly talking to a young fellow beside him while he manipulated a loom, apparently telling some interesting story for he used his hands occasionally in quick gestures, but he kept his eyes on his work, and he seemed to take pride in his job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the shops we went to the dormitories and saw not one room only, but a number of them. As has already been intimated these rooms were too crowded. The cots were quite close together, even using the center of the room, and there was not enough space left for walking about. However, the men are not in a great deal of time. They go outside as they wish, walk when they care to, read in the library, exercise on the outside gymnasium apparatus, and are in the work shops at other times. Also, as already said, the problem of space is one that is occupying Soviet authorities extensively at present and they will require time to remedy the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We were asked to enter the room and sit down on the cots. The prosecuting attorney with us led the way. We were somewhat slow in following and one of the men, sitting on his cot in the center of the room, said, “Come on in. The beds are clean.” His invitation was accompanied by a smile and we quickly entered. By this time our presence had become known about the place and a great number had gathered in the corridor outside the room we were visiting, talking volubly. We were told to speak to any one we wished, to ask any question. We did so freely and were answered frankly. One prisoner told us that he was displeased with his sentence, that it was his first offense, that he had stolen a hat, and had been given a five-year term. “Impossible,” exclaimed the prosecutor, and promptly sent a messenger to the office to get the papers in the case. Some time later, when we were in the auditorium the records came and the man was sent for. He was a little chagrined but not greatly disturbed when his record showed robbery, not once but several times, with even the use of firearms. “Well,” he said nonchalantly, not too much put out that he hadn’t got away with his story, “it was too much anyway.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After we had visited a number of the dormitories we went to the yard. Several hundred prisoners were with us then. In the center of a bunch of them, we remembered again that here were some of the worst criminals in the country. They gathered all around to ask us about prisons in the United States or any other questions they could think of. One particularly intelligent man talked freely of conditions in Sokolniki, of his own sentence, and of his outlook on life. He had been a teacher before he had been caught in some sort of speculation, but he was teaching in the prison as well as doing some shop work. We continued questioning, now in French, now in German, more often through the Russian interpreter. The attendants were among them, talking also. There seemed to be no feeling of restraint in their presence, but on the contrary an existence of comradeship showed, especially on one occasion when one of the men had been asked a question he could not answer and turned to a guard for information. Such an attitude was apparent often, particularly as we went to the auditorium. As we were leaving the yard an incident happened that impressed us greatly. From the flower garden, one of the men came with an arm full of flowers that he wished to present to a member of the party who had passed some cigarettes around. He did it with the air of one who brings a bouquet from a prized garden of his own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We stopped to look at the dining room next. It was an ordinary room of almost square dimensions with long tables, seating two hundred and fifty at a time, and immaculately clean. From there we went through a small hall and upstairs to the auditorium where we were told to ask any questions on points of either policy or practice about which we still would like information. We were not sparing but every query was answered with great patience and detail. Then, as we were about to go, the prosecutor suggested to the superintendent who had been with us that we might like to hear the orchestra play. A messenger was sent and eventually a few musicians were rounded up but as there were not, enough to give a very good account of themselves, they tried the drama and dancing group with better luck. These hastily summoned the stage director, the curtains to the stage were drawn, a splendid pianist among their number who had discontinued some piece he was playing as we went in, now entertained us while preparations went on. In the meantime both men and attendants were crowding into the auditorium, messengers from among the prisoners were darting in and out with stringed musical instruments, and an informal atmosphere prevailed that it would be hard to give an impression of. The men talked in low excited tones, the music continued, the prosecutor and the prison director leaned against the piano. An attendant near to us carried on an excited conversation with a group of prisoners with him. It was difficult to believe that this was indeed a prison of a more serious type. It had all the earmarks just then of a community affair of local talent about to start.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The program was given with zest and enjoyment. It lasted an hour and consisted of dances, singing, a reading, most of which they had written and produced themselves under the direction of the specialists who are in charge of that type of work in the prison. The results they got with the scant attention they gave to costuming was interesting. They used only a kind of high-throated long white tunic over whatever trousers they happened to have on, because they had no time for further preparation, but there was a uniform effect which was appropriate to the selections they gave. We were reluctant to have the entertainment end but we had undoubtedly kept them from their supper for the time, and their graciousness reminded us that we too must be considerate. We thanked them, said goodbye, and went upstairs for a visit to the library.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here was a long light room with bookshelves across the farther end and with reading tables and chairs nearer the door. At the side as we entered was the atheist corner, so-called, which is found in nearly all the institutions and which is devoted mostly to evolution. A large picture of Darwin was prominently placed among the exhibits. There were also pictorial illustrations of the lower stages through which man has come and such other things as one would expect to find in a geological or anthropological display. Science, in their new culture, is designed to replace religion in so far as state recognition is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Out again in the yard some of the prisoners demonstrated their athletic ability and performed gymnastic feats on bars. We noted their carefree attitude, the interested passive participation of their comrades, but the wall was there again just across from us reminding that after all there was restriction—deprivation of liberty. And that, after all, is the chiefest of punishment. On top of the towers at the corners of the wall the men with long rifles looked down at us. No matter what the correctional labor policy, how designed to be constructive of character, certain men have to be restricted and the program forced on them. But it is to be doubted whether there is often achievement of a spirit like that in the prisons of many other countries and even in case it does exist, it is likely to be in some isolated place where an exceptional warden has been able to achieve it, possibly in a lesser place, one suspects, and not a major penitentiary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XII: A WOMEN’S PRISON ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; full name of this institution is Moscow Novinsky Women’s Isolator. There is another such prison at Orenburg, and these are the only two in the RSFSR. There were many things about this place that compared unfavorably with Sokolniki, chief of which was a lesser liberty of action. That was explained to us as being necessary because fifty per cent. of the population are there awaiting trial, which means that they stay only for a brief time. This makes a constructive program more difficult, since it is not possible to undertake for a yet unconvicted person the same type of treatment as would be accorded one actually sentenced. They must be kept separately, and with the small outdoor space available it is quite a problem to handle the question of freedom and recreation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The capacity of the place is 375, but at the time of our visit it had only 360 in both classes; that is, those sentenced by the court and those awaiting trial. There are more problems connected with a women’s prison than with one for men. Children must be thought of, both those about to be born and small ones who depend on the mother and for whom there is no other care. There is a small hospital for ordinary cases in this prison, but a pregnant woman is taken out to a proper place for the birth of her child. It is emphasized that she is entitled to the same treatment as any other mother in the land, and that by virtue of her being a prisoner, she is not to be deprived of the best medical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One comes up to this prison suddenly, without warning. Around a corner from a wide avenue and up a cobbled street for a block and the building is there before you. One enters the prison straight from the street into a small hallway, such as is found dividing the two front rooms of a residence. All the guards are women and they stand with guns to which are attached bayonets. They seemed much more severe than the men guards at other prisons, but perhaps that is because one is not accustomed to seeing them. Others wearing revolvers were about in the hallway and at other points in this entrance building. Their uniform consists of white blouse and dark skirt, with the gun belt acting in the place of a normal one, and military-looking caps. They are businesslike and, one feels sure, equal to an emergency. However, we were assured that none arises. The action of the comradely court takes care of the majority of whatever disciplinary problems there might be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our first pause was in the office where we were received by the director and told some few points about the prison. However, we were reminded that a tour of it would be worth more than a lecture, and since that seemed a logical statement to us, we started out. Across the hall from the office in which we had been sitting was the visiting room. Every six days each prisoner may see visitors. There is no screen through which they must talk; the contact is direct; but there is a long counter behind which the prisoners sit. A guard is present in the room at all times, but takes care not to listen to the conversation. That is regarded as the person’s private affair. Mail may be censored but mere words are not restricted, so we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Passing through this room, we found ourselves in a court around which the buildings form a hollow square. This institution was a prison in Tzarist days, and a gloomy spot it must have been according to descriptions. Now, there are many windows which are large and admit plenty of light and air. We visited next the wing used as a dormitory and found there somewhat more space than in Sokolniki. One room was particularly large, about fifty feet long. Beds are fairly well spaced; there is a small cabinet for each woman, and the ventilation is good. A girl with a guitar was furnishing entertainment for others who sat on their respective cots and listened. She stopped playing loudly as we entered but continued to strum. We were told here, as at all other places we visited, to talk to any whom we wished, to ask any question we would. The superintendent seemed eager to emphasize that we were free to see or know anything. She had heard the prevalent story that in Russia one never sees things. She begged us to feel free to look and to question. No one would listen to what we said to the prisoner nor she to us. We talked to an old woman who wore the headdress of a peasant. She sat aloof on her cot and we were moved by her lonely appearance. What had she done? She stole bread, she told us, and for that she had a ten-year sentence. The same prosecutor who was with us at Sokolniki was listening at this moment. His face was full of sympathy. A person, whatever he might have on his conscience, could scarcely find him forbidding to talk to. He began to question and discovered that this was no ordinary theft of bread but a widespread attempt to defraud the state. A written note went into his pocket before he turned away and one wonders whether the ten-year sentence which might possibly not be served anyway, would be reduced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We talked next with a pretty black-haired girl whose eyes sparkled with mischief. No one was near to listen. For robbery, she told us frankly, she had been sent for five years of deprivation of liberty. One hopes that not even a prison can dim that gayness which seemed to cause her to bubble over. Was she getting along all right, she was asked? Fine! She laughed with us, talked animatedly for several minutes. Did she feel resentful? No, because she was learning there and she shouldn’t have stolen anyway. How will she get a job when she gets out? There were more jobs than people she told us as if she had learned a lesson. Was she sure? we asked. All the people who leave here get work at once. She knew that to be true. Why shouldn’t they? They were good workmen, she added. We left them to visit other rooms, and down the hall past two or three we came to one with spreads on the beds, with white covers on the tables, with a framed picture here and there and other personal belongings in place. It was the room occupied by the shock-brigaders. Russia honors its &#039;&#039;Udarnicks&#039;&#039;, whether in prison or out, for their efforts are such as send the nation bounding on its way. In this room, the honor spot of the dormitories, a young woman, perhaps twenty-one, sat at a desk with her back to us. She is the chairman of the comradely court, we were told, and she smiles at us with great pride. It is evidently an achievement which carries satisfaction.&lt;br /&gt;
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She had stolen continuously since she was fifteen, her case read, but by means of the approach they use here they have been able to aid her. The superintendent assured us that her whole character had undergone a change, that she was trusted and valuable to the institution, and supervised with ability the court that was responsible for discipline within the prison. We talked to others, one a middle-aged woman, who did exceptionally good work. She was proud of her ability and the praise she had won.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went to the nursery. A mother sat in a small room beside it, nursing her child. We noticed the position of her foot, the way she held her baby, and were reminded that some one gave instruction in such points in a way that would meet the best approval. Cribs were lined up along the sides of the nursery and a trained woman, not a prisoner, was in charge. She was assisted with the children by inmates themselves. There were about twenty beds but only a few children. The others had already been taken to the play-yard. We took time to observe before we left that the room was well ventilated and well kept and the woman in charge briskly businesslike. As we descended again to the court we passed a small room back of the stairway where women were washing their clothes. Each must do her own, and a room equipped with tubs was provided for the purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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The children are kept up to four years of age, then disposed of among the other state institutions for children or dismissed with the mother, or possibly, if she must stay longer, sent to some of her family. In the yard, a grassy spot with shrubbery, the children were having a gay time with all sorts of apparatus and a playhouse. Like the children in other Russian centers, they wore no clothes except light cotton trunks.&lt;br /&gt;
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They looked healthy and well cared for and showed, it seemed to us, less of physical abnormalities than one usually notices in children of imprisoned women.&lt;br /&gt;
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We visited the school room and were told that compulsory education is provided up to the seventh year and opportunity given for work beyond, by means of university evening courses. There is at the same time the usual political education, the clubs, and physical education that characterizes all penal places, and a radio in every room for additional education and entertainment.&lt;br /&gt;
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We came out into the court again to go to the wing containing the shops. Some of the informal attitude which we had noticed at Sokolniki now began to show itself. There were groups who leaned out of their windows and shouted to us, and some of the younger girls talked to us in the court. Three of them begged us to tell them about the prisons in America, much as three children would waylay one and insist on being told tales. We gave them some information, and then tried to answer questions about New York and life in the United States. No, they didn’t think they would like America because people did not have jobs there, while here when they got out, they would be assured of work. We asked if they felt certain of that. Of course. The patron factory of this institution gives preference to those released from here. They boldly hailed the prosecutor now, to tell him that they wanted their sentences reduced. The law gives them the right to complain to the prison management, to the Commissar of Justice, or to the prosecuting attorney, but they are not offering a complaint of the sentence. It is only that they are ready to be good and work like faithful citizens. Another note is thrust into the prosecutor’s coat pocket. What was done with them we did not know but since the inmates seemed to expect that procedure it must be a general practice, and the fact that he definitely refused some and made no note seemed to indicate that the others had real significance. We were told that each case so noted would be checked. The approach to official channels is evidently quite easy.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were no shops in this prison in Tzarist days, and the women did not work. Now the wing which has been newly built is thrust out in such a way that it is long and narrow, with windows on both sides. There is plenty of ventilation and light. The women were cutting and sewing shirts and other garments from the same material we had seen the men making at Sokolniki. There were long tables with good working space and as we walked about various women showed us finished articles with pride. The sewing machines had all the latest equipment, and the operatives worked rapidly. The products of their shops are turned over to the cooperatives and sold where needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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They, too, work on the same basis as do factory workers of the land, with the exception (as in the case of all prisoners) that because they are supplied with their upkeep they are not paid normal wages. At the time we were there some of them were not at work, due, the directress told us, to a shortage of material. The supervisors are not prisoners but come in from the outside to teach and direct the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
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Already in the chapter on “What Crimes Are Committed and Who Commits Them” we referred to the acts committed by women. In this prison the records showed that theft came first and robbery a close second, but in cases with whom we talked, the theft often turned out to be some act involving state property which carried a severe penalty. For that reason one was surprised at first to find long sentences attached to what appeared to be less serious crimes. But, in view of the provisions of the law of August 7, 1932, such larceny is sternly dealt with, even though the act is committed by a person from among the peasants or toiling class. One stealing from her neighbor would get a much lighter sentence. This is where the class nature of punishment shows up very strongly and unbalances the scales of justice that otherwise seem to work with such fairness. An example of the difference was very clear in two cases. One girl had been in prison nine times for theft and her present sentence was for two years only. Another had committed her first offense by stealing from a collective farm, a tool apparently of some “class enemy,” and her sentence was ten years. The “measure of social danger” accounts for the difference, and while it is easy to see that the authorities are confronted by a real problem of deep seriousness, one wonders whether something more of justice&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This statement by the author has caused Mr. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow to offer the following explanation. “The word ‘justice’ in the USSR has another meaning than in the writings of the bourgeois sociologists. Criminal repression is not expiation of the crime. We don’t feel it just to shoot a man who has committed a murder only in order to punish him. Instead of one murder that would make two. But we call it just, if by means of shooting such a murderer, we can prevent a score of other murders. The construction of Socialism is our greatest task. Everything that helps the achievement of it is just, everything that hinders it is unjust. That is the point of view in every criminal case and I don’t suppose that we shall ever change it. But of course the methods of our fight for Socialism change at every stage of Socialist construction, and today they are other than they were five years ago.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; might not in the long run make for better feeling as well as a more ethical foundation for their socialist state. It is contradictory to their usual administration of justice among their own masses. One hopes that, as the conflict recedes, “pure justice” in so far as such is possible will replace “socially dangerous” measurements now in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again we were in the court preparing to leave. A girl of some eighteen or nineteen years, with thick golden braids hanging to her waist, was at the window above us shouting laughingly down to the superintendent. One of our party had a camera and she wished her picture made. It was all right, we were told, and the picture was snapped, and she was promised one as soon as it could be developed. Others were calling to us, too, setting up a din, with their comments and questions. Such an informal atmosphere can hardly be described. A group stood about like girls let out of school, talking, watching us curiously, unrestrained by the presence of attendants or directress. One feels that so long as there is no attempt to escape, and no running afoul the comradely court, one can do about as she likes—play volley ball when she pleases, if she is free from work, listen to the radio, read in the library, or gossip with her neighbor. She also has a good atmosphere in which to learn that labor and happiness are pretty close companions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The parting word from our hostess was, “I wish I might visit a prison in America with the same freedom with which I have shown you this.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What a western observer would feel first in these prisons is a lack of physical equipment such as his own best might boast. There was such criticism expressed. But this is not an adequate standard with which to measure their success. It is true that in these closed prisons of a penitentiary type their equipment, while much better than that in our worst, is not nearly so good as that in our best, but the fact that without this equipment they are able to achieve the attitude and cooperation they do on the part of the prisoners is all the more significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is also the point that the aim of Soviet penal authorities is to remove as rapidly as possible every person whose character will permit into the open or semi-closed correctional labor institutions and discontinue the use of the closed types except for the most incorrigible cases. Because of that, they are devoting all possible attention to the development and improvement of the labor institutions. And one finds different conditions in these places. They would not suffer very much by comparison with our best. A description of Bolshevo Labor Commune, in a later chapter, will indicate that.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the meantime they create that constructive businesslike atmosphere, among the women as well as the men, that gives genuine hope of equipping these people for a place in social life.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XIII: THE CHILD AND THE LAW ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;When&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; H. G. Wells was visiting in Moscow the past summer, he is said to have made the following observation to a Russian journalist: “I know, you Moscow people look upon all this with different eyes. You are Robinson Crusoes recreating life upon barren land after a social cataclysm. You are proud that you are manufacturing without the capitalists’ air motors, and reoentgen apparatus which the capitalists before you did not manufacture. You are happy to be doing all this. I understand this. And I should have been happy in your place, but of all your productions, excuse me, I am struck only by one thing. You are making people. It is this that I have come here to see and I see it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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If they are making people in this Soviet land, and I think it is pretty well agreed by thoughtful persons that they are, the beginning of the process is found in their treatment of children. So much has been said and written on the care of the child in Russia that no elaboration should be necessary here, and in regard to the delinquent it is no less than that given to the normal child. Their attitude toward the child who breaks the law is not that society must be protected, but that the individual may be given an opportunity for developing his own life. His interest is uppermost and practically every branch of government cooperates in his protection and training.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0222.svg|TYPICAL SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF F.Z.U. SCHOOL]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Geneva declaration has been of special interest to the authorities dealing with this problem in the USSR. They believe with the author of the statement that mankind must give the child the best it has. In many of their publications they quote the main points of that declaration, and it seems of interest to set them down in relation to this chapter. They follow:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) The child should be given an opportunity of normal development, materially as well as spiritually.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The starved child must be fed, the sick cured, the retarded pushed ahead, the defective trained, and the orphan taken care of.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The child must be helped first of all during public misfortune.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) The child must be prepared to earn his bread, and protected from all types of exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) The child must be trained with the understanding that his best powers must be devoted to his brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
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For them the application of these points is to all children. The problem of the upbringing of the juvenile criminal is not separable from the general question of juvenile training. And whenever it is possible, the child who has broken the law is sent to schools for his training which in no wise differ from those for the noncriminal child.&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia’s fight against juvenile crime has been one of its major problems. It is an old story that the Civil War and the Volga famine in 1921 left hordes of wild children wandering over the land. They crowded in the railway stations, they rode the rods from place to place, they congregated in market places, behind billboards, in any places they could find, and were so depraved by street life that they became the most hardened of criminals. At this time, too, men released from the army, with no jobs available, turned in great numbers to banditry, and these children became their associates in their illegal enterprise. In history there is perhaps no picture greatly darker so far as children are concerned, and handling such a situation is not the least of Russia’s achievements. Today there are still a few scattered remnants of that vast number that one sees in railway stations, but the problem is in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the moment when this condition reached its worst, the government was dealing with the Civil War at its greatest height, giving its attention and energy to the defense of the proletarian state. But it is to its great credit that it found time even then to concentrate its forces to give care to this growing army of homeless waifs and juvenile delinquents. We have at that moment a proposal on the part of the leader of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, later referred to in detail, which marked the beginning of the system of care given today to young offenders in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, there was already machinery in operation for dealing with juvenile criminals or children needing the aid of the state because of some abnormal condition. As early as January 14, 1918, only a little more than two months after the October Revolution, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a decree establishing Commissions for Cases of Minors. These commissions, with their powers greatly broadened, exist today, and are the organs charged to look after the interests not only of delinquent children, but of any child who needs the intervention of the law. During the period when children swarmed everywhere, homeless, starving, some criminal, and others forced by necessity into such an existence, no single force could have been adequate, but these bodies were the official channels through which the cases passed after the GPU or some other agency had first gathered the children in.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is not a children’s court, but is a pedagogical and educational organization. Its chief task is in educating the juvenile offender so that he may become a productive member of society, and with that in view the composition provided for the commission is of professions and persons able to make appropriate contributions. The chairman must be a pedagogue of very high qualifications. He must possess not only an adequate education, but he must have had experience either in work of a pedagogical nature or with home children or with juvenile criminals. In addition to the chairman there is a member representing the local department of public education, a physician from the local health department, a judge from the People’s Court, an investigation educator, a member of the Komsomol (the youth about to enter the Communist Party), a representative of the Children’s Friend’s Society, and a representative of the local trade union organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission sits in closed session, permitting only the attendance of those connected with the cases. This would include parents, relatives or guardians, or a representative of a public or school organization. Its work is under the jurisdiction of the commissariat of education, and is not connected with the commissariat of justice, such as the children’s court would be. There are, of course, local commissions which take care of the cases for each city or rural district. The procedure before the commission is entirely informal. When a case comes up the chairman takes the proper steps to have the juvenile appear, unless for some reason his presence is thought to be unnecessary. Some of the circumstances under which the child would not appear would be: if the child is under eight years of age; when the child is already known to the commission; when the evidence does not substantiate the charge; when there is no reason for the medico-pedagogical measures to be applied; or when it is thought that the appearance of the minor before the commission might do some harm to him in either a physical or mental way. But in case it is thought his appearance is desirable, the investigator is instructed to take charge of the case. The chairman then proceeds to gather the necessary information, evidence, etc., concerning the child and advise him that his case is to come up. If at that time the youth has reached the age of sixteen, his case is turned over to the courts for trial, since minors between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are subject to the jurisdiction of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is competent to deal not only with the cases of all children delinquents between the ages of eight and sixteen (children under eight years of age are never summoned to appear before the commission) but it is also empowered to institute criminal proceedings against any person who is an offender against the child in a manner of demoralization, incitement to crime, or exploitation of minors.&lt;br /&gt;
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What measures may be taken in the cases of children convicted of some crime before the commission? Here is a list of the more important, although it is not an exhaustive one:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) A request for granting assistance, document, certificate, etc., to the child.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) Placing out the child in the care of a family.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) Placing the child on maintenance and education by public or party organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) Finding a guardian for the child.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) Finding work for the child or apprenticing him.&lt;br /&gt;
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(6) Sending the child to his birthplace.&lt;br /&gt;
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(7) Placing the child in an educational institution, school or children’s home.&lt;br /&gt;
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(8) Sending the child to a medical or medico-pedagogical institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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(9) Helping the child to enroll in a children’s club.&lt;br /&gt;
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(10) Talk and exhortation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(11) Putting the child in the care of parents or other persons with or without supervision by investigation educator.&lt;br /&gt;
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(12) Putting the child in the care of an investigating educator.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is one final measure which it is within the power of the commission to use, but it is never resorted to unless all other efforts have failed. That is that the commission may send the child as a final resort to an industrial school of which we will speak later on in the chapter. The list given above constitutes the medico-pedagogical measures and are applied only to those offenders under sixteen years of age who come within the competency of this commission.&lt;br /&gt;
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The case of the minor between sixteen and eighteen years of age is approached in a somewhat different manner. Originally under the Criminal Code of 1922, the court was given jurisdiction over minors between fourteen and eighteen years of age, and might at that time sentence them to terms of deprivation of liberty, but only to industrial homes set apart for them, and never by any manner of means to a place for adults. This, however, has been changed so that the commission referred to takes care of children up to sixteen years of age, and only the cases of those between sixteen and eighteen are referred to courts. Although the cases of juvenile offenders between sixteen and eighteen are tried by the courts, the measures applied are of a medico-pedagogical nature very similar to those used for the younger children. Only when the circumstances of the crime convince the court that these measures will not be adequate may the minor be sentenced to deprivation of liberty. In fixing the terms, the sentence is to be reduced by one third of what would be imposed on an adult in the same situation, and the maximum term under the USSR is not to exceed one half of that imposed on adults. A death sentence may never be given to either child or minor, and no severe measures may be used.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the case of trial, a copy of the summons as well as the indictment must be sent to the minor’s legal representative, as well as to the minor himself. And the Supreme Court has especially instructed the lower courts to see that all juveniles under trial be provided with counsel whenever it may be needed. During the hearing of the case, the minor is accorded all the rights that we have already seen are granted to defendants in the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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That the fight waged by the authorities against juvenile crime is being successful is indicated by the steady drop of the percentage to the total convictions in the Union. We find that, in 1928, 36 per cent. of the total number of persons convicted of crime were juvenile offenders. In 1931, this figure had dropped to 28.2 per cent. Also indicative of the achievement in this direction is, as already mentioned, the fact that this army of vagrant youth no longer wanders about in Russia. There are few of such children remaining.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet government has practically removed from its system all of the homes and colonies for juveniles which it inherited from the Tzarist régime, and has at the present time in their stead the system of institutions operating in an educational manner. The most constructive work being done is in those owing their initiation to the efforts of an agent that we do not usually connect with such activities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Back in 1921 when the whole place swarmed with homeless and criminal children, and there was despair over the hopelessness of the condition, the GPU came to the rescue with the establishment of places for wholesale care called “collectors.” Children were snatched from the streets, stations, trains, or wherever they were, and were taken to these places where they were bathed, dressed, fed, sorted out, given all sorts of examinations, mental and physical, then turned over to the Commission for the Cases of Minors, and were finally distributed to the various institutions. The institutions, at that time, while educational in nature, were without a definite social goal, and not adequately prepared or equipped to turn a youth into a productive and useful citizen. At the present time the institutions for juvenile offenders are established under the control of the Commissariat of Education, the Commissariat of Justice, and the Commissariat of Home Affairs (formerly the OGPU). In the Commissariat of Education we find a whole network of children’s homes, directly leading the child from training into the industrial life of the country in such a manner that there is no gap through which he can escape into a life of crime. In their early days the task of these homes was simply to house the children, to prevent them from becoming vagrants and criminals, and their program was by no means as constructive as it might have been. But, at present, no effort is spared in delivering the child to society in a state of preparation for his place.&lt;br /&gt;
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A. Shestakova in her article &#039;&#039;Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children&#039;&#039; tells us that in the first days of these homes the children were taught to make shoes and footstools, to bind books, and how to read and write; and slightly how to adjust themselves in life. But she says that the homes were inadequate to attack the basic problems of turning those sent to them into a specifically trained group, sufficiently equipped with industrial knowledge and social culture, prepared to enter a factory or other center in such a manner as to evolve into useful citizens. The misfit was unfortunate in two ways. Not only were the children unprepared as to basic industrial knowledge or other means of adjustment to their new life, but the state itself was deprived, because of this inadequacy, of the services of many young citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new economic policy had given way to the five-year plan with its tremendous program of industrial development and agricultural collectivization, and there was need for every available trained workman. Because of this urgent need of the country those in charge of juvenile offenders were given an extra instrument for their purpose. With definite ends in view, with specific jobs to fill, training took on an additional purpose. Here was a definite challenge to the places of training of those juvenile offenders to teach them so that they might make their contribution to the economic plan, and that they might thereby gain the satisfaction of having work which they could do well.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not enough that education be directed only toward keeping the child busy with some elementary task, but that it concern itself with the possibility of active participation in the nation’s economic development. To accomplish this task the children’s homes were merged with the factory apprenticeship schools which were attached to factories in towns, and to the peasant youth schools connected in like manner with state farms and rural localities, by which merging they now afforded places for training skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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As now organized the direction of these homes is in the hands of the Commissariat of Education, and children are sent by the Commission of Cases for Minors. They are not limited to the training of delinquents but also have the task of educating the children of workers and peasants from the general population. No coercive methods are used. There are of course no wardens or guards, and their express task is to “combine teaching with productive labor upon such basis that the whole social productive labor of the pupils was to be subordinated to the academic and educational aims of the school.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The inmates of these homes are given preference of admission to the factory apprenticeship schools, and to peasant youth schools next to the children of workers. From this training they move straight into the stream of factory workers and, almost without knowing it, take their place in the productive life of the nation. By the time they have gone through these schools of apprenticeship and the factory, or the state farms, they have forgotten that they ever were attached to a life of crime and are removed from the environment so effectually that they have no temptation to return. This describes the treatment given to the cases of those children not classified as habitual criminals. Even in this category of the 8-16 group coming under the direction of the Commissariat of Education, there is an occasional child who requires more restrictive treatment, and measures of a severer nature may then be resorted to.&lt;br /&gt;
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For this type, who have become habitual criminals, or who have committed more serious crimes that require a term of deprivation of liberty, we have a second kind of institution. It is important to note that this set of establishments is connected with the Commissariat of Justice, and not with the Department of Education. There has been a period of evolution of these institutions in which much study has been given to methods to be used, and experiments of a bold nature tried with regard to some of them.&lt;br /&gt;
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On July 11, 1918, there was published the Order for the First Russian Reformatory where juvenile offenders of this type were to be detained, and there were consequently organized industrial homes for these offenders which were intrusted with the duty of teaching to minors “skilled trades, to widen their mental horizon by means of general and vocational education, and to transform them into active citizens conscious of their rights and obligations, giving them at the same time a physical and health education by means of gymnastics, sports and hygiene.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These institutions, although of the educational type referred to, were inadequate for any serious training. Arts and crafts constituted the principal type of labor, and practically no attention was given to the higher and more skilled trades. We have already spoken of the demands made by the reconstruction period for more skilled workers, and of the notable inadequacy of places for juvenile offenders to turn out young people who filled such a need. The program needed a decided reformation, and in 1930 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee set up a commission for specific remedy of the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission was created for two definitely assigned tasks: the first was to institute an investigation of the work of the fight against juvenile criminals and minors, and of the organization of factory communes and corrective labor organizations, using for this purpose the equipment of the People’s Commissariat of Justice. Secondly, it was to work out and to hand to the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; a project of administrative and practical measures, with due attention being given to the experiment of the Izhorsk plant in the North Caucasus. The result of the investigation was that in 1930, the Commissariat of Justice decided to reconstruct these institutions into factory apprenticeship schools for juvenile offenders which were to be attached to large factories and mills. It must be noted here that these schools differed from those just discussed in that they were for offenders only and liberty was restricted, whereas in the first there were no guards of any nature and noncriminal children attended along with the criminal ones.&lt;br /&gt;
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In these schools they were to create a cultural and social condition conducive to drawing the inmates into social work, and to this end, bars, locks, and prison régime, and all prison atmosphere was to be resolutely banished from them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of the training was educational just as it had been in the others, but in the case of this more hardened type it was necessary to detain the juvenile forcibly while he was subjected to the program. However, pupils in these schools now enjoy vacations, take part in regular group hikes, and go out to camps in the summer, in the same manner as other pupils do. The term of sentence is from two to three years, and the arrangements as to schedule, life, and discipline, organization and labor, are taken care of by the usual self-government organization. The schedule of the work is arranged in such a manner that the children are never left entirely to their own devices, but are constantly with those who guide and direct them. Four hours of industrial training are followed by four hours of study, and the latter is again followed by three hours devoted to public activity organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1931, 4,000 juvenile offenders were trained in these schools and 500 industrial workers were graduated from the industrial establishments. In 1933, the aim was to put all the juvenile offenders into these schools from which it was expected there would be turned out 2,400 highly skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to notice here what happened to those released from these schools. Figures for the years 1931 and 1932, giving percentages of distribution for those released, show that 63.2 per cent. went into industrial undertakings. This would indicate a high degree of success in the passage of the trained youth from schools to industry. The next largest percentage, 19.7 per cent., found a place in the building trade. The third highest, 9.3 per cent., was released to the parents with supervision on the part of the school. 4.7 per cent. were placed on Soviet farms; 1.2 per cent. found a location in the factory labor and technical communes and 0.6 per cent. were released to parents and relatives but continued under the supervision of the schools.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article by A. Shestakova, “Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children,” from Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 348.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most important training given in these schools is for metal work and work on wood. In addition to that the inmates are taught tractor handling, animal husbandry, vegetable garden work, and field work. The health and physical training require that the workers take a month and a half to two months’ camp trip in the country. Because of the inconvenience attached to these trips, when the institution is located in a city, the First Moscow School was moved to a small village a short distance out, so that country places would be more accessible for health training.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief problems now attached to this education, according to A. Shestakova, are the building up of the physical health, an establishing of self-discipline, and the introduction of these delinquents to methods used in other camps, to a life of such neighboring activities as the collective or state farms. The prize agricultural schools among all of those at present existing in the Soviet Union are Saratov, which now has first place in the contest for these schools; Serpooh, in second place; the First Moscow School in third place; and in the fourth, the First Leningrad School.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We come finally to the third type of establishment. These are incorporated into the system of the organization of the GPU, in the Commissariat for Home Affairs. There is something incongruous to most of us in the supervision of children by an agent that is avowedly for terroristic purposes. However, the labor communes, organized by this body for juvenile offenders of the worst type, are one of the outstanding developments in the care of the children in Soviet Russia, and set a standard that few if any institutions in other lands manage to reach.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The inhabitants of these communes are young people with long criminal records, who have been up repeatedly before the Commission for Cases of Minors, before the courts, who have served many terms of deprivation of liberty in various juvenile institutions. The cases seemed hopeless, and the experiment, so bold and unique, was tried in an effort to give a new viewpoint that would induce a complete break with the former criminal type of life. One of these communes, the largest both as to number and scope of development, is described in detail in the next chapter. In this place we only mention the general plan and underlying principles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main difference between the apprenticeship school and these labor communes of the OGPU is in method and not in principle. The labor commune is organized around large labor work, where both sexes contribute, while in the apprenticeship schools the emphasis is on education, on the preparation for industrial work. One of the basic principles in the labor commune is complete freedom as to movement, while in the schools restriction of movement is naturally required since the program is compulsory in its nature. In the apprenticeship schools there is also segregation of the sexes in the matter of residence; the boys and girls meet together in theatres, on excursions, in museums, on walks, and other places, but live in separate homes. It seems inconsistent to state that the labor commune is made up of those more habituated to crime, since it enjoys greater freedom, while the schools are composed of the less criminal; but this is nevertheless true. When one remembers, though, that the commune is the result of a desperate move to save a great number of habitual criminals, whereas the schools are merely for training those of even younger years, the situation is more easily understood.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the schools the age group is from 15-18 years. The sources from which they come are, (a) those sent on court order, and (b) those sent by the Commission for Cases of Minors, and all other authorities empowered to commit them. If the term is up before the training of the child is completed, the pedagogical commune may retain him, provided the entire term does not exceed three years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 42 of the Correctional Labor Code of 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the communes, the age group, although in the beginning limited to those of 13-17, is now composed of those of 16-24. The satisfaction of the authorities with the achievement of the First Labor Commune (Bolshevo) led to the establishment of others, and at the present time several thousand former criminals, some of them committing the worst sort of crimes, are being trained and educated while they participate in community life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XIV: BOLSHEVO LABOR COMMUNE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; following is the official record of the beginning of such places for criminals as the one described in this chapter:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;ORDERS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the Administrative and Organizational Board, OGPU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No. 185&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, August 18, 1924&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;#&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt;1&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Orders issued by Comrade Yagoda, assistant chief of the OGPU:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) In order to combat crime among young people between the ages of 13 and 17 years, a Children’s Labor Commune for 50 persons is to be organized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) F. G. Melikhov is appointed head of the Children’s Labor Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The head of the Children’s Labor Commune is to act in all matters under the orders of M. S. Pogrebinsky, who, in turn, will act on the basis of a plan of work confirmed by me.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Such an order, judging from the resulting situation of ten years later, ought to be marked with a monument, and it is. Just outside of Moscow, on the location of a once lovely estate, there is now a small town of modern buildings replacing the wooden ones of ten years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One does not know what to call this place. To say that it is a penal institution is misleading unless the reader has seen something like it. However, it rates as that in the USSR, and since there are others like it in scattered sections, one comes to the conclusion that it is something unique in this line and accepts it as such. It is easy to be enthusiastic over such things and not to look deeper for some adverse angles, but the author, after as careful examination as she could make in a skeptical manner, could only praise the development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two trips were made to this colony, the second to confirm what had first been observed. However, since it was a visit to a similar colony at Kharkov that elicited the warm praise from M. Herriot that has already been quoted, it seemed safe to conclude that it existed as had first been believed. It is impossible to understand how any one could fail to be moved on viewing the place and realizing its tremendous import in the matter of remaking criminals. If the OGPU had committed nothing but the acts of terror it has been credited with, the creation of such spots as these would compensate in a great way for its darker deeds. It is unfortunate that one must try to tell of Bolshevo. The only thing to do is to visit and see for one’s self. It is difficult to describe atmosphere, and that is the thing that pervades the place and makes it even more constructive than the physical side could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This commune celebrated its tenth birthday in August of this year (1934). Its population was preparing for it when we were there, building platforms out under the trees, putting finishing touches here and there, and getting ready for speeches, visitors, and other entertainment of various kinds. And these people can tell a good tale of growth and progress, too, for they started with a handful in the initiation of a bold experiment and now their town has a population of three thousand inhabitants. The reader’s first deduction will be that a prison growth such as that must indicate some undesirable conclusions. But when one knows that it means that this number has been transferred from other penal institutions with a view to having everyone possible enjoy this freedom and training, then the significance is different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reference has already been made to the wandering hordes of children, confirmed in criminal habits, who presented the gravest of problems to the government authorities at the end of the Civil War and Volga famine. It was seen that if headway was to be made against the situation, the whole perspective of life must be changed, and the new one must be attractive enough to make these vagrant criminals want to break with a past that to their imaginative years had a glamour and provided escape from the responsibilities of ordinary living.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the midst of the perplexity, the groping for some plan, we find Felix Dzerzhinsky, organizer of that terror of terrors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, and original head of the GPU, offering his far-reaching organ to effect this merciful innovation. Let his own words inform us:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“I wish to apply part of my personal efforts and above all the efforts of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; to looking after these homeless waifs. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of two considerations. Firstly, it is a terrible calamity, and when you look at children, you cannot help thinking everything should be for them. The fruits of the revolution are not for us but for them. But how many of them have been wrecked by struggle and poverty! We must rush to their aid just as if we saw children drowning. The Commissariat of Education alone cannot cope with this matter, the widest help from all Soviet bodies is needed. It is necessary to form under the Central Executive Committee a broad commission containing representatives of all commissariats and all organizations which can be useful in this matter. I have already spoken with people here and there. I want to be at the head of this commission myself. I want to include the apparatus of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; practically in this work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“I am impelled to do this for the second reason. I think that our apparatus is one of those which works most accurately. It has branches everywhere. People reckon with it. They are afraid of it, but even in such a matter as saving and feeding children, it is possible to find laxness and even dishonesty. We are going over more and more to peaceful construction; and I think: why not use our fighting apparatus to combat such a calamity as homelessness among children?”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This proposition was made in 1921. It was in August, 1924, that the GPU of which he was then head, established the Bolshevo Labor Commune, thus launching a new epoch not only in the care of juvenile criminals for whom it was particularly intended, but in the treatment of all the others. It must have given a great thrill to this man who had brought death to so many of the state’s enemies to take a part in reconstructing the lives of youths who would, he hoped, be its friends. At least he had the satisfaction of seeing his judgment vindicated, for, from the beginning, the venture proved his rightness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These men did not jump into the scheme as suddenly as might seem, nor without consideration. They went into intimate study of the forms of education of children, they applied themselves vigorously to working out an accurate theory, then they formulated what appeared to them three basic rules of procedure. That the GPU, in the midst of their frightening activities, could muster faith enough in anybody to develop such a plan is in itself a phenomenon, but that they could convey such a trust to others, to these young criminals, seems more incredulous still. They were not exactly an agent for inspiring such a feeling. But notice the three basic principles referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost was that principle of “trust” held like a shining torch before the eyes of incredulous youngsters. It was decided that there must be no compulsion anywhere in the commune. With coercion the order of the day, there was to be none here. Strange contradiction, one of many that has filled the land. Side by side with sternness toward those who oppose the order, one finds this steady development of humane institutions, untouched by the harsher methods used in the other direction. In this colony there was to be only trust. If one wanted to stay, he was to stay, and if he wanted to go, then he was to go. He simply walked away, for there were not to be—and are not today— any guards. There were to be no restrictions of their freedom. They were to realize that they were in an educational institution pure and simple. They were to come of their own volition, because of an expressed desire to join in the program of this commune. These inhabitants were to be persons who had come to realize the futility of a life of crime and who wished therefore to change to another sort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the individual was to make this change he would have to be able to perform some task well, and to that end the second principle was incorporated. The commune was to be devoted to teaching these people how to do some kind of work. Workshops were established and instructors installed, but the responsibility for sustaining a condition under which the trades could be learned was placed on the residents of the Commune. There was no preaching, no lectures, but it was demonstrated that each must be responsible for his share in this life or all would suffer. If machines stopped because of the irregularity of one or two, then the education of others in an industrial line would suffer. And one who brought about this inconvenience must answer to his comrades for his conduct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third principle was to make each feel his responsibility for the group, and the reverse, that all were responsible for seeing that each member measured up to his duties. Every member of the Commune was bound to see that a recalcitrant one was brought to account. In this manner any disciplinary problems were taken care of from the beginning. Thus, in the lack of any compulsion the onetime criminal learns to lead a normal life and to discipline himself; in being taught a trade he is prepared to return to a life or perhaps enter it for the first time, in which he earns his way; and by his feeling of responsibility for others, he in conjunction with the group keeps the affairs of the Commune running smoothly and efficiently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the Commune had been set up, the next problem was to get some inhabitants for it. Among the institutions housing juvenile offenders, volunteers were asked for, after explanations of the character of the new place had been given. Pogrebinsky who, it will be recalled, was one of the organizers, gives a version of this experience that is interesting. He writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“When we called for volunteers for the first commune, 15 responded. Very suspiciously they donned their new clothes. They could not believe that henceforth they were free, and they warily eyed the prison guards, trying to guess how many would be sent with them as a convoy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“But here began something unusual. They were given money with which to buy railway tickets to the Commune, and no guards were sent with them. Only the manager of the Commune was with them. Sure enough, they seemed to be free! Should they run away? No, better wait. There was something hard to understand, and in addition, something very flattering—they were being trusted!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“On arrival at the place, two of the boys were sent with money for supper. Here was something altogether strange! They were sent off with money, and no guard to convoy them. The boys bought some foodstuff, came back and returned the whole change. They were utterly astounded when the manager showed them the house where they were to live and explained to them: Everything that you can see, boys—the clothes, food, tools—is being lent to you by the OGPU, and you will have to pay for it all later on.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
One can understand their incredulity, even their staying on through curiosity, if nothing else, to see what would happen next in such a topsy-turvy affair. And day after day the wonder and pleasure in having a home, being free and engaged in making interesting things would grow and hold them steadily.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The managers of the Commune were wary and anxious too, not through fear of escape of their charges, but lest they do the wrong thing and check the growing confidence. In their eagerness not to put pressure of any kind on these young people, they have let the initiative for expansion come from them. In the beginning those who came made shoes, stools, and other things, and were satisfied to watch their own tasks grow under supervision, but as the project became more firmly established there were demands for wider industrial training. The leaders granted the requests with great satisfaction as they developed, their only anxiety being that nothing should ever seem “forced.” There was no doubt subtle guidance, but the group was encouraged to undertake its own education. The story is one of continuous growth, both in number and in development of a broader program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What actually exists now in this place where three thousand work? To begin with there are the paved streets, clean and lined with green shrubbery. The houses beside them are of modern structure, many with flower-filled balconies for each floor, with rows of large windows. There are some small individual houses also, where families live, but it is the lines of those looking from the outside like sunny apartment buildings that gives the place an air of being a town proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On inspection one finds small apartments provided for the married couples and dormitory rooms for the single people. A man who is serving a sentence may have his family there with him and so may a married young woman if it is convenient for the husband to come. The apartments that we saw contained two rooms and a bath. One of the rooms was a large kitchen which could also be used for other purposes. One entered into a small hallway which led to the main room, a large combination living-sleeping room. The furniture was good. There were pictures around, a couch, comfortable chairs, the windows were nicely curtained and the appearance altogether homelike. There is a large community dining room, but in case a family wishes to prepare its own meals it can do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the dormitories we saw, there were rather good-sized rooms, not so large as most of those described in the other prisons, with cot-beds placed in line in the usual way. There seemed to be comfort in these collective places but not, of course, as much space per person as the apartments permitted, nor did they have the homelike appearance of the latter. There was light from several windows and a pleasant outlook, and the two girls present on our visit looked exactly as occupants of a home would appear. As housing goes in crowded Moscow this represented an average standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dining room in the factory-kitchen building was quite large and equipped with small tables, such as one would find in a restaurant. One side was almost an entire window. A few late eaters were sitting at tables and attendants were beginning to clean so that the place had a disorderly after-dinner appearance but one of deeper cleanliness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One might as well not try to keep remembering, as he goes along the street meeting people, that these are convicts of the most habitual sort. They are going or coming from their work exactly as other people would. There is absolutely no difference. They could run away, of course, and a few have, but in the majority of cases, the reverse is true. They do not wish to leave the Commune at the end of their sentence and so they live on and keep a job in some of the factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school building in this Commune is especially lovely. It was completed about two years ago at a cost of a million and a half rubles. It has all the equipment that a good school would be expected to have—a library, reading rooms, laboratories, an auditorium interestingly decorated with murals of working men, which is the work of artist inhabitants, spacious halls and class rooms. The teachers are not residents of the Commune but members of their own profession who come in to teach. The man in charge of the school showed us the building with great pride. The first seven years of education are compulsory, after that there are evening classes for the more advanced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Education, as already indicated, does not stop with formal classroom work but those interested in the arts, in music, or in writing are provided with channels for special training. There are music circles, art classes, drama work, and literary clubs, and the persons making up this artistic group live in their own building, forming a congenial household. A number of the leading ones, the most talented ones, are paid a stipend by the state, and we were told of a number of musicians and writers who had had their first training in this Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The physical education is carried on in a large and splendidly equipped gymnasium, and building up the body is made a major consideration in the training. Setting up exercises are also a part of the daily program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school, with its formal teaching of elementary subjects, is one side of the education program; the other is the work done in the shops. In these two places as well as in this whole atmosphere, the “making people,” spoken of by H. G. Wells, goes on. One must learn a trade and then he must work at it, not as drudgery, but with free enjoyment of his task. In the shops of the shoe factory, the skate factory, the knitting goods factory, the mechanized laundry, the sports goods factory, and the factory kitchen, these former thieves and bandits who have barely escaped with their necks, work at their jobs, some still in the ranks of the unskilled, others risen to instructors and supervisors. One looks and remembers again that there is nothing between them and escape, no one to prevent their walking away, and yet they stay and work. When the day is ended they go out in the street and to their rooms or Walk or do any other thing they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One may break a law of the Commune. To meet the exigencies of such occurrences, there is the comradely court and a penalty either mild or more serious according to the act, and if that is not sufficient then the greatest blow of all will fall—the culprit will be sent back whence he came, or if he came directly he will be transferred to a more severe institution. A new member is on probation for a month and he must prove his worth if he is to live with this group who is serious about making life worth while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The age is 16-24 now, although at its beginning it was 13-17. There are three thousand inhabitants of the Commune, some of whom have finished their terms and have worked on in the factories. These naturally may be older than the maximum age given for those who are sent. The surrounding community was hostile to the idea at the time of the establishment of the Commune among them, as one can imagine any neighborhood might be at having a group of unrestrained criminals, thieves and housebreakers, set down among them, but there is now a general esteem and friendliness felt for those who work in this unique town.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The hospital is perhaps the greatest prize of the place. A large building, set back from the street, with grass, trees, and shrubs in its front yard, it presents an excellent impression. It is equipped for all the best care of the health of the community. Babies are born, children of the communards attended to, and the whole population served by its staff. It fills not only the role of medical care, but an especially educational one as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolshevo has been described in detail because it is the largest of the labor communes and was the first in construction. But there is another close to Moscow, built second in order, on the site of the former Nikolo-Ugreshsky Monastery. This commune has four factories, making musical instruments, incubators, electrical repairs, and compressed fiber, and in 1934 it is estimated that they will turn out goods to the value of some twenty-three or twenty-four million rubles. Here, too, are modern houses with all equipment in which the workers are housed according to industry, the metal workers in one, wood workers in another, and those making musical instruments in a third. There is a separate house for those communards who are members of artist circles, a separate house for women, and a building where probationers stay until permanently assigned. There are twenty-two hundred members of the commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A third is the Dzerzhinsky Labor Commune at Kharkov which follows the same line of development but is smaller than the others. There are only four hundred members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is hard to estimate the results of the work done in such centers as these. A tangible evidence of success is pointed to by authorities on the subject in the steady descent of the percentage of juvenile delinquents to the total number of criminals. This system, spreading year by year to take in all that it may serve, aided by those factory apprenticeship schools that train the 15-18 year old group, ought to do a good deal to depopulate the adult prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XV: CONCLUSION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; concluding remarks of most books on Russia begin with a discussion of class distinction. In this case it would be further stated that it showed not only in court action but was likewise felt in the fact that while the OGPU as an arresting agent turned the ordinary prisoner over to the courts, it acted in the capacity of a judicial organ for those of the opposition class. A few months ago that would have been true. With the transforming of that agent into the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the stripping from it of all judicial powers, one more step has been made toward the disappearance of class lines in the administration of criminal law.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Again there has been the following comment from an authority on the Administration of Criminal Law in the USSR, in regard to this statement: “The class line in the criminal justice can disappear only when the classes themselves disappear. So long as the classes exist, so long as the struggle between them goes on, it is absolutely impossible to avoid the class character of criminal justice You may keep silent about that, you may try to disguise it, but you cannot make it disappear. We don’t find it necessary to disguise the class character of our courts, as the bourgeois science of law and the bourgeois legislation does, because the class whose interests our courts defend, is the overwhelming majority of all the people. With the bourgeois criminal justice it is quite the opposite. Of course, as I have already stated, the victory we have gained over our class enemies here has enormously changed our policy, but this policy remains a class policy, because it remains the policy of the proletariat struggling for socialism. The first aim of this policy does not change, only the methods of its practical accomplishment. If you build a railway, the forms of your work will be different in a plain or in mountains, but the final aim will be the same. “Our final aim is to build a classless society. When this task will be accomplished, not only the class line in the criminal law will disappear, but the criminal law itself will become useless and will die as well as the criminal courts. “But so long as those courts do exist, they cannot go on without an open or a hidden class policy.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the distinction does exist. But in this final evaluation of the present situation in regard to crime repression in the USSR the treatment of political prisoners is not considered. While the method as developed is used for both classes it naturally shows to its best advantage in the treatment of the prisoners from among the workers, and it ought to be judged on that score. It is to be hoped that not many years hence class distinctions will disappear to the extent that machinery for justice will furnish equal measures for all.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following explanation is supplied. “By this time criminal justice will become something quite different from what we are accustomed to. It will become a system of medical and pedagogical measures, which will take their place among other radical and educational institutions. Till then criminal justice will serve the interests of the ruling class as it has always done.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When that happens the treatment of all prisoners will be of the kind that is found so admirably used today in places where discipline and industry are taught to those of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Russians claim no Utopia. When on one occasion the writer expressed admiration to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky for what they had achieved, he quickly and positively responded, “I warn you of its shortcomings.” Well, of course, they are there, plenty of them. They can be found in the administration of justice, too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems though that one who wishes to see actually how the matter stands would find it effective to take first the policy of the state, the standards it sets and the goal at which it aims, then see not only how fully that aim is achieved, but what progress is made year by year toward the goal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Take whatever phase of criminal repression one will, and one finds progress and a pretty good practice of policy. Judges in the beginning, one supposes by the Soviet’s own records, woefully inadequate at finding out what justice might be in a case, are now much more fully qualified; jurors for a time without any qualifications except as to vote are now selected with more care and given some training for the task before them. How fully adequate are they? It would take a firsthand survey of the nation’s tribunals to be able to say, but to judge by a fair sample the author believes them to be fulfilling their duty in a high degree and with more than average competence. Their attendance to work and their conscientious effort to get at the straight of the affair before them is pronounced. They seem in general to feel the responsibility of being the agent for administering justice to their own toiling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the prisons and places of deprivation of liberty one sees more evenness of tone. The personality of those in charge of these places strikes one as indicating fitness for the job. Members of staffs were observed closely by the writer and with one single exception they seemed well selected for handling the work. Vishinsky, in the Introduction of the book edited by him, states that one of the shortcomings of the prison system is the need for more trained persons who will understand what this policy really is and help put it into practice. One would expect that to be true, since it is so universally a fact with regard to prison workers. It would be indeed a Utopia that provided an adequate staff for penal places. But it seems to the author, by comparison, that he is better off than he thinks he is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the appearance these staffs make may be due in part to the fact of close supervision from above. There is another factor, too, which ought to help. Responsible authorities have a good picture in mind of what a man needs to be in order to fit into their scheme of living. Their society makes definite requirements of its members and training is provided to make the misfits fit. To do that thing which they see clearly they have developed a policy that merely trains a man, both to discipline himself if possible, and do some work that will be of economic benefit both to himself and to the country, while punishment is forgotten. One of their chief tasks is to teach him to prefer the “Life of Labor,” and by instilling in him, or encouraging the spark if it is already there, the joy of creation, they manage in most cases to do it—if their statistics on recidivism are anywhere near correct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another advantage is that they have one very definite policy and every superintendent of penal places knows what that policy is. It is, as stated in their codes, to educate and to train without doing anything to degrade, to build up a personality, a self-respect, and to do nothing that could hinder such development. With that knowledge in hand it is easier to put the program into practice, and they can develop plans for carrying it out. An understanding of psychological principles enters here, not only in expression of policy as found in the Criminal Code but in the actual practice as one finds it. In doing away with handcuffs, with solitary confinement, with any type of corporal punishment, and with any prison garb, the enunciation of policy does its part, but in the approach of the immediate staff to the inmates there is seen a wholesomeness that no code could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude of the authorities toward violations on the part of officers is another indication of their sincerity of purpose in this work. In their zeal to put their policy into action they not only provide that the Observation Commission shall be in close touch with all that goes on in the Institution, and impose on them much responsibility for the régime, but they also back them up by providing a penalty for the man who violates the regulations. A guard who strikes a prisoner is in danger of arrest himself, and since there are official records of such cases, one is sure that an attempt is made to put the policy into practice. It must be true that in isolated instances some such things happen and go unpunished, but it is the stated policy of the authorities to discourage in every way possible the committing of these acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Central authorities, as we have seen in discussing administration of these prisons, have made repeated efforts year by year to see that the Observation Committee keeps in close touch with all the life of the Institution and thereby effects better parole and release work as well as brings up the level of work done in the place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another indication of progress in putting the government’s policy into practice is the speed with which they have built open agricultural colonies, institutions of semi-closed type, and labor communes such as Bolshevo so that prisoners might be taken out of the old type of places. Judging from past accomplishment, there should in a very few years be left only those who demand restriction. In addition they are year by year adding to the number of those sentenced to compulsory labor without deprivation of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, then, is a system that deserves to attract the attention of those genuinely interested in a better approach to effective crime repression. It has without doubt made a distinct contribution in this field of social endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF CRIMINAL CODE GENERAL SECTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL SECTION&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE AIMS OF PENAL LEGISLATION OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. The penal legislation of the RSFSR pursues the task of protecting the socialist state of workers and peasants and the régime established therein from socially dangerous acts (crimes) by applying to persons committing them measures of social protection set out in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
EXTENT OF OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. The provisions of the present code extend to all citizens of the RSFSR, who have committed socially dangerous acts within the territory of the USSR, as well as beyond the boundaries of the USSR in case they are detained within the territory of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Citizens of other constituent republics are in accordance with the RSFSR laws liable to be prosecuted for crimes committed within the territory of the RSFSR as well as outside the boundaries of the USSR, if they had been detained and subjected to trial or investigation within the RSFSR territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes committed within the territory of the Union, citizens of the constituent republics are liable according to the laws of the locality where they committed the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. For crimes committed within the territory of the USSR foreigners are liable according to the laws of the locality where the crime was committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5. The question of the criminal liability of foreign nationals enjoying the right of exterritoriality shall be decided in each individual case by diplomatic means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PENAL POLICY OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
6. A socially dangerous act is any act of commission or omission directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government, for the period of time pending a transition to a communist régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: An act, which although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code is free from socially dangerous characteristics owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
7. In regard to persons who commit socially dangerous acts or who are dangerous owing to their connections with criminal circles, measures of social protection of judicial-corrective, medical, or medical-educational nature are applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
8. In the event of the concrete act, which at the time it was committed was a crime in accordance with Article 6 of the present code, but by the time it was investigated or examined in court lost its socially dangerous character owing to a change in the criminal law, or owing to the mere change in the social-political conditions, or in case the person who committed it cannot, in the opinion of the court be regarded as socially dangerous at the time indicated, then such an act does not entail the application of a measure of social protection to the person who committed it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
9. Measures of social protection are applied for the following purposes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To prevent the commission of further crimes by persons who have committed them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To exercise influence over other unstable elements of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To adapt the offender to the conditions of the social life of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measures of social protection cannot have for their purpose the infliction of physical suffering or the degradation of human dignity and they do not pursue the object of retribution or punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
10. With regard to persons who have committed socially dangerous acts, methods of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applied only in cases when these persons&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Acted knowingly, i.e., foresaw the socially dangerous effect of their acts, desired these consequences, or knowingly allowed such effects to take place, or&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Acted carelessly, i.e., did not foresee the effects of their acts—although they should have foreseen them—or recklessly hoped to avert the effects of their acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
11. Measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not to be applied in the case of persons who have committed a crime while suffering from chronic mental diseases, or while temporarily insane, or in general in such a state of deranged health as to be incapable of realizing their acts or of controlling them. Neither are these measures to be applied to persons, who although at the time they committed a crime were in possession of their mental faculties, nevertheless suffered from mental derangement by the time sentenced was pronounced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection which are applied to these persons are confined to those of a medical nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: The present article does not apply to persons who have committed a crime in a state of intoxication.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
12. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not applied in the case of minors up to the age of 16. When regarding the latter, the Commission of Juvenile Offenders finds it possible to confine itself to measures of social protection of a medical and educational nature. Oct. 30, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 82, Article 796.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
13. Measures of social protection are not applied to persons who have committed acts foreseen by the penal laws, if the court establishes that these acts were committed by them in a state of necessary defense against attempts at the Soviet rule, or at the body or rights of a person defending himself or another person, provided there was no excess of the limits of self-defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection are not applied when the same acts were committed in order to avert a danger, which under the given circumstances were unavertable by any other means, provided the harm thereby caused was less serious than the harm averted. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
14. Criminal prosecution may not take place&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) when ten years have elapsed from the time of the commission of the crime, for which the court may inflict a penalty of not more than five years’ imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) when five years have elapsed since the time the crime for which the court may impose a penalty of not more than five years had been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) when three years have elapsed since the perpetration of the crime, for which a court may sentence the criminal to not more than one year’s imprisonment, or when the law provides a more lenient measure of social protection than imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle of remoteness is applied when in the course of the corresponding period of time no proceedings were instituted in connection with the given case. The period of remoteness is interrupted when the person who committed a crime within the corresponding period of remoteness commits another similar or not less serious crime, or evades judicial examination or investigation. In such cases the periods of remoteness begin to run from the date of the perpetration of the second offense or from the date of the resumption of the interrupted proceedings. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: In cases of criminal prosecutions for counter-revolutionary crimes the application of the principle of remoteness is left to the discretion of the court in each individual case. However, if the court does not find it possible to apply the principle of remoteness, and sentences a person to be shot for such a crime, such sentence must necessarily be commuted to the proclamation that the person accused is an enemy of the toilers coupled with the forfeiture of the citizenship of the USSR, and exile from the confines of the USSR forever or imprisonment for a period of not less than two years. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: In regard to persons criminally prosecuted for active participation in acts, and active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement, committed while holding responsible or secret posts under the Tsarist régime, or under counter-reveolutionary governments during the civil war, the application of the principle of remoteness and the question of commuting capital punishment by shooting are left to the discretion of the court. June 6, 19275.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 3: The periods of remoteness laid down in the present article do not apply to acts prosecuted by way of administrative action according to the present code, and the infliction of punishments for such acts can take place only within one month from the date they were committed. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
15. A sentence of conviction shall not be carried into effect if it was not carried into effect within ten years from the date of the passing of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
16. In case a certain socially dangerous act is not directly foreseen by the present code, the grounds and limits of liability for such acts are determined in accordance with those articles of the code which foresee crimes most closely approximating them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
17. The measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applicable equally to persons who have committed the crime—participants as well as their accomplices—instigators and abettors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instigators are persons who induced the commission of the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abettors are persons who assisted in the carrying out of the crime by means of advice, indications, providing of means and removal of obstacles, or by means of concealing the criminal or the traces of crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
18. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are determined for each of the accomplices according to the degree of their participation in the given crime, as well as according to the degree of danger of the crime, and of the person who took part in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The failure to report a crime that has been committed, or is being planned, entails the application of the measures of social defense of judicial-corrective nature only in cases specially designated in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
19. An attempt to commit a crime, as well as acts preparatory to a crime, which take the form of finding or adapting weapons and means, and creating conditions favorable for a crime, are prosecuted on the same basis as a crime which has actually been committed. In such cases, the court, when selecting the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature, must be guided by the degree of danger of the person who has committed the crime or the preparatory act. The court must also examine how far the preparations for the crime went, and how near the consequences were to the act as well as the causes owing to which the crime was not completed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the crime was not committed owing to the persons intending to commit it having voluntarily renounced it, the court fixes a corresponding measure of social defense for those acts which were in fact committed by the person who attempted or prepared to commit the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; IV&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON THE MEASURES OF SOCIAL PROTECTION APPLIED UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE WITH REGARD TO PERSONS WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
20. The following are the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
21. Execution by shooting is applied for the purpose of combating the gravest kinds of crimes, threatening the foundations of Soviet rule, and of Soviet régime, pending the abolition of that punishment by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, in cases specially indicated in the articles of the present Code, as an exceptional measure for the protection of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
22. Persons who have not reached the age of 18 at the time the crime was committed and women in a state of pregnancy cannot be condemned to shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
23. The principal measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature applied with regard to persons who have committed crimes, consist in proclaiming them enemies of the toilers with the consequences following such measure, imprisonment, and compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other measures of social protection set out in Article 20, except warning and the confiscation of property, may be decreed either as independent measures or be combined with the basic ones as supplementary measures. The confiscation of property as a supplementary measure of social protection may be imposed by the court only in cases specified in the articles of the present Code. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
24. The following are measures of social protection of a medical nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Compulsory medical treatment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Placing a person in a hospital coupled with isolation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
25. The following are measures of social protection of a medical-education kind:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Delivery of a minor into the charge of his parents, adopters, guardians, relatives, provided the aforementioned are able to support him, or to other persons or institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The placing in a special medical-educational institution. December 20, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 4, Article 38.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
26. Measures of social protection of a medical-educational and medical nature may be applied by the court in case it recognizes that the application of measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind does not fit the given case; or they may be applied in addition to the latter, if moreover the measures of social protection of a medical-pedagogical and pedagogical kind have not been applied by the competent judicial inquiry organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
27. The proclamation of a person as enemy of the toilers and expulsion from the confines of the USSR with the forfeiture of the citizenship of a constituent republic, and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR may only be applied for an unlimited period. June 6. 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
28. Imprisonment may be imposed for a period of between one and ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labor camps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labor, or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labor camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: Persons who are uninterruptedly serving in the units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and who are in the cadres either as privates or junior commanders, serving for a definite period, are sentenced in peace time, instead of to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for two months to one year, to serve for a like period in the military-corrective units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and instead of imprisonment for a period up to two months, to arrest for a like period, served in a manner prescribed for the disciplinary arrest of persons in military service.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, by special decree of the court in each individual case, the same measures may be applied to the above-mentioned persons also for common crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons in military service of the middle, senior, highest and junior commanding personnel of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who remain in the cadres after serving the required period in the army, and who have been sentenced to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for a period up to one year, in case of dismissal from the ranks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, serve their term indicated in the sentences by doing compulsory labor according to the general rules. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: When the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army passes to the state of war, persons in the military service who are in military-corrective units are dispatched to the active army, and the subsequent serving of the measure of social protection imposed on them is postponed until after the termination of military operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sentence condemning a soldier in time of war to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights may, by decree of the court which passed that sentence, be postponed until after the termination of military operations, on condition that the convicted person joins the active army.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons in military service mentioned in the first and second parts of the above note, who while in the ranks of active army have proved themselves staunch defenders of the USSR, the court which passed the sentence may, on the petition of the competent military authorities, release the convicted person from the measure of social protection formerly imposed on him, or substitute for it a more lenient measure of social protection. October 1, 1928.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1928, No. 127, Article 816.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
29. The period of preliminary detention, and also the time spent in confinement from the moment the sentence was passed pending its coming into force must obligatorily be reckoned as part of the period of detention decreed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the court applies a measure of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind other than imprisonment, it has the right to take into consideration the period of detention previous to the trial and accordingly mitigate the measure of social protection chosen by it, or to resolve not to apply to the defendant the measure of social protection set out in the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons sentenced to compulsory labor each day of preliminary detention is credited as three days of compulsory labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
30. Compulsory labor without imprisonment may be imposed for a period ranging from one day to one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: Compulsory labor without imprisonment is not applied to the middle, senior, highest and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who are in the cadres and have completed their term of service, and also to persons in military service who belong to the cadres of privates and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during their appointed period of service. In place of compulsory labor the above-mentioned persons in military service are sentenced to arrest for a period not exceeding two months, which is served in a manner prescribed for persons in military service under disciplinary arrest. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
31. Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights consists of the deprivation of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) elective franchise both active and passive&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the right to occupy elective posts in public organizations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the right to occupy certain specified state offices&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) the right to the titles of distinction&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) parental rights&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) right to pensions paid by way of social insurance and to unemployment relief paid by way of social insurance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights may be prescribed both fully—so as to cover all the above-mentioned rights—and partially, in respect of their separate categories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of parental rights may be prescribed by the court, only if it has been proven that this right has been abused by the convicted person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of pension may be prescribed by the courts only in the following cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) conviction for the commission of state crimes (part I of the Special Section)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) conviction for the commission of crimes prompted by greed to imprisonment or to exile with a compulsory residence in other localities (as the basic measure of social protection)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the prescription of the confiscation of the entire property as supplementary measure of social protection&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) conviction in time of peace for military crimes, falling under articles of 193(3), 193(4), 193(7), 193(9), 193(12), 193(13), 193(17), 193(20)-193(28), of the present Code, and in time of war, for any of the crimes falling under Chapter IX of the Criminal Code (on crimes by persons in military service). June 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 30, Article 388.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
32. Forfeiture of rights cannot be prescribed for a period exceeding five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case this measure of social protection is prescribed as one supplementary to imprisonment, forfeiture of rights extends to the entire period of imprisonment served plus a period determined by the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
33. Forfeiture of rights, foreseen by paragraphs a-c of Article 31 is accompanied by the forfeiture of the orders of the USSR, and of the orders of the RSFSR. In such cases the court is obliged, after the sentence comes into force, to present a petition to that effect to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as the case may be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of the other marks of distinction and of distinctive titles, is effected by sentence of the court. August 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 42, Article 504.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
34. Forfeiture of rights may be decreed by the court both as a supplementary and as an independent measure of social protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When imposing a sentence of over one year’s imprisonment, the court is obliged to discuss the question of the forfeiture of the convicted person’s rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights cannot be combined with conditional conviction or with public censure. December 6, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 8788, Article 854.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
35. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement or with prohibition to reside in other localities or without these limitations, coupled with compulsory labor or without compulsory labor, may be applied by the court with regard to those convicted persons, who, in the opinion of the court, it would be socially dangerous to leave in the given locality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the boundaries of a separate locality with an obligatory residence in other localities is prescribed for a period of three to ten years. This measure, as a supplementary one, can only be prescribed for a period not exceeding five years. The removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory residence in other localities, coupled with compulsory labor, may only be prescribed as a basic measure of social protection. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with prohibition to reside in certain localities, or without this restrictive provision is prescribed for a period of one to five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case one of these measures is decreed by the court as a supplementary one to imprisonment, the period of this supplementary measure begins to run from the date of the release of the prisoner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons sentenced to the removal from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in some other locality in order to serve their terms of imprisonment in corrective labor camps, after serving their term of imprisonment, settle in the district of the camp pending the period when they will be allowed a free choice of their residence. Land must be allotted to them, or else they must be provided with paid work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Removal from the RSFSR territory, as well as removal from any specified locality whatever form it takes, cannot be applied to persons under sixteen. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
36. Removal from the confines of the USSR or RSFSR for a definite period of time may take place only in a manner specially provided by federal legislation. Removal from the confines of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities may be applied by the court only in cases of conviction for crimes specified by Articles 58(2)-58(14), 59(2), Part I, a, 59(3), 59(302), 59(3-b), 59(7), 59 (8), Part I, 59(9), 59(21), 61 Part III, 73(1), 74 Part II, 104, 107, 116 Part II, 117 Part II, 118, 129, 129-a, 136, 140 Part II, 142 Part II, 153 Part II, 155, 162, b, c, d, and e, 164 Part II, 165 Part III, 166, 167, 169, Part II, 173 and 175 Parts II and III.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Places in which compulsory settlement may be prescribed are determined as follows: With regard to persons condemned to exile without compulsory labor by the chief administration of militia at the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, by agreement with the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR; and with regard to persons condemned to exile with compulsory labor, by the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR. February 15, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 9, Article 102.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; May 30, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 27, Article 247.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
37. Removal from office may be applied in case the court deems it impossible to leave the condemned person at the post he occupied at the time of his conviction, or at the time he committed the crime. It may be accompanied by a prohibition to occupy a certain post, such prohibition not to last over five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
38. Prohibition to follow a certain activity or industry is applied by the court for a period not to exceed five years in cases where the court shall consider it impossible, owing to the ascertained abuses by the person convicted while he was engaged in his profession or industry, to allow him to continue same further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In particular, the court has the right to prohibit the person convicted to undertake any responsibilities with regard to furnishing labor and material to State institutions, to enter into contracts with State and public enterprises and institutions, to manage trade or commission enterprises either in his own name or on behalf of other persons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
39. Public censure consists of the public expression of condemnation to the person condemned declared in the name of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
40. Confiscation of property is the compulsory and uncompensated alienation in favor of the State of the whole property of a convicted person, or of a proportion thereof exactly defined by the court, such property being either entirely owned by him, or constituting a share in common property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of domestic use and indispensable to the condemned person and his family, the stock and tools required for small-scale peasant industry or agricultural production, and serving as a means of existence for him and his family, are not subject to confiscation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foodstuffs and sums of money left at the disposal of the convicted person and members of his family, may not, according to valuation in their totality, be less than the average three-months’ wages of a worker or that locality in respect to each member of the family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The stock of tools indispensable to a convicted person for his professional work may be confiscated only in case the court decrees that he shall be deprived of the right of exercising such profession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: In kulak households only the property mentioned in Articles 1-9 of the List of Kinds of Property on which execution may not be levied in respect of arrears of taxes, custom duties, and dues, is not liable to confiscation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, Nos. 8990, Article 924.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
41. When property is confiscated, the State shall not answer for the debts and liabilities of the convicted person, if such had been contracted after the taking of steps by the investigation or judicial organs to protect the property, and without the consent of these organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to claims subject to gratification out of the confiscated property, the State answers only within the limits of the assets, while in regard to priority of gratification of claims the rules shall be observed that are laid down in Articles 99 and 101 of the Civil Code and 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure of RSFSR published April 10, 1930.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
42. A fine is a money penalty imposed by the court within the limits established by separate articles of the present Code, and when applied as an additional measure, the fine shall be imposed at the discretion of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all cases a fine shall be imposed in conformity to the property status of the convicted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In determining the fine, the court may decide to substitute, in the event of nonpayment, by compulsory work without deprivation of liberty at the rate of one month compulsory labor for 100 rubles fine. No substitution of deprivation of liberty for a fine or vice versa shall be allowed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of property that are not subject to confiscation may not be taken in payment of a fine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
43. The caution is applied by the court only when a verdict of acquittal is given, if the court considers that the behavior of the acquitted gives ground, nevertheless, to fear that he might commit the crime in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
44. The obligation to repair the damage is imposed upon the convicted in those cases when the court finds it expedient that the convicted shall eliminate the consequences of the violation of the law committed by him, or of the damage caused by him to the plaintiff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This measure of social defense, however, may not exceed by its severity the measure of social defense given as the basic penalty in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; V&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON MEASURES OF SOCIAL DEFENSE OF JUDICO-CORRECTIONAL CHARACTER AND THEIR IMPOSITION BY COURT&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
45. In imposing a measure of social protection of judico-correctional character the court shall be guided by:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) the provisions of the general section of the present code&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the limits indicated in the article of the Special Section which provides a penalty for a given kind of crime&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the Socialist conception of law, taking into consideration the social danger of the crime committed, the circumstances of the case, and the personality of the defendant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
46. The crimes foreseen by the present code are divided into:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes directed against the foundations of the Soviet system established by the authority of Workers and Peasants in the USSR, such crimes being consequently considered the more dangerous, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) All other crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes of the first category the Code lays down the limit below which the court may not go in imposing a measure of social defense of judico-correctional character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On all other crimes the Code lays down only the maximum limit of penalty to be imposed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
47. The basic question to be settled in each separate case is the question of the social danger of the crime that has been tried.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An aggravating factor in this respect, when determining one or the other measure of social protection foreseen by the Code, is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Committing a crime in order to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie. ‘&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Possibility of causing harm to the interests of the State, of the toilers by committing the crime, although the crime itself was not immediately directed against the interests of the State or of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Committing of a crime by a group or a band.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Committing a crime by a person who already committed a crime before, except in cases when a given person is considered as not having been tried before, or when a long time, in a judicial sense, has passed since the committing of the first crime, or since the conviction of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Articles 14 and 15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The court, however, depending on the character of the first crime, may not consider it as an aggravating factor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Committing a crime for selfish or base motives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Committing a crime with particular cruelty, violence, slyness, or in regard to persons subordinated to the criminal or materially dependent on him, or particularly helpless on account of age, or other circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
48. Extenuating circumstances in the imposition of one or another measure of social defense or when a crime has been committed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Although exceeding the limits of self-defense, yet for the protection of Soviet law, revolutionary law, or the personality and right of the party defending himself or another person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) For the first time&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) For motives other than selfishness or base desires&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Under the influence of threats, compulsion, or official or material dependence&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Under the influence of strong mental agitation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) In a state of hunger or distress, or under the influence of severe personal or family conditions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Due to ignorance, lack of consciousness, or an accidental chain of circumstances&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) By a person under age, or by a woman in a state of pregnancy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
49. If the crime committed by the defendant contains the symptoms of several crimes, as well as in the case of the defendant having committed several crimes for which he has not been sentenced, the court, having defined the measure of social defense for each crime separately, finally imposes the penalty according to the article which provides for the gravest of the crimes committed by the defendant and the severest measure of social defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
50. If a minor (16-20 years of age) is sentenced to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the term must be reduced by one-third as compared with the term of an adult sentenced under the same article. At all events the term of the sentence of a minor shall not exceed one-half the maximum laid down by the present Code for a given crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
51. In the event when, in view of exceptional circumstances of the case, the court finds it necessary to impose a measure of social defense below the lowest limit indicated in a corresponding article of the present Code, or to apply another, less stringent measure of social defense that is not indicated in the article, the court may also depart from the article, but the motives of such departure from the code must, be clearly stated in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same rule applies in those cases when the court finds that the defendant at the time of the trial is not socially dangerous and no measure of social defense is imposed on him by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
52. The right of either complete or partial release of the condemned person from the application of measures of social defense, under sentences of all judicial organs of RSFSR, except cases foreseen in the present Code, constitutes the exclusive prerogative of the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; VI&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON CONDITIONAL SENTENCES AND CONDITIONAL AND EARLY RELEASE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
53. If the court finds that the degree of social danger of the defendant does not call either for his isolation, or for the imposition of compulsory labor, it may impose a conditional sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such cases the court decides not to execute the verdict if within a stated period the convicted person will not commit a fresh crime of equal gravity. This period may not be less than one year and not more than ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: If a fine or property requisition is added to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the fine is imposed irrespective of the conditional nature of the basic verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
54. In the event of the committing of a crime by the conditionally condemned during the probation period the court has the right either to add the conditioned measure of social defense either fully or in part to the measure of social defense given by the second verdict. In the first case, the total term of deprivation of liberty must not exceed ten years, and the total term of compulsory labor must not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
55. The following persons shall be held free from previous convictions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Persons acquitted by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Persons conditionally sentenced, who did not commit a crime of equal gravity during the probation period given by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for terms of not more than three months, or to any other minor measure of social defense, who in the course of three years after serving the first sentence, did not commit a fresh crime, or persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a period of more than six months if they committed no fresh crime of equal gravity in the course of six years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
56. If persons sentenced to terms of social defense show reformation, they may be released before the end of the term imposed by the verdict of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conditional early release consists either in abstaining from further serving of the sentence, or in substituting a milder form of social defense. The manner of application of conditional early release is laid down by the Correctional Labor Code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to persons serving sentences in correctional labor camps, conditional early release is applied in the form of transferring the convict to free settlement in the district of the given camp for the rest of his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the conditionally-released person should commit a fresh crime of equal gravity during the unexpired time of his sentence, the latter is added to the measure of social defense imposed by the court for the new crime, while the total term of deprivation of liberty may not exceed ten years and the total term of compulsory labor may not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
57. Persons under age, sentenced to deprivation of liberty and placed in industrial homes for minors, remain there until fully corrected, but not later than reaching the age of 18. If, by the time of reaching this age, the sentence has not yet expired, they may be given early discharge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Minors, in regard to whom early discharge should be deemed impossible, shall either remain in the same industrial home, or shall be transferred to other industrial homes or colonies on the grounds laid down by the correctional labor code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Russian_Justice&amp;diff=63403</id>
		<title>Library:Russian Justice</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Russian_Justice&amp;diff=63403"/>
		<updated>2024-02-26T23:39:28Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: /* CHAPTER XIV: BOLSHEVO LABOR COMMUNE */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Russian Justice|author=Mary Stevenson Callcott|written in=1935|publisher=Macmillan Company|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/soviet-justice/}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PREFACE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; problem of crime in the United States is one of our most serious social questions. Within recent years the activities of the gangster and the kidnapper, the increasing number of young criminals whom we do not know how to treat so that they are re-established in life, have brought alarm not only to the social worker and others who try to meet the situation, but to the ordinary citizen as well. Not only is our penal system failing to reform the lawbreaker, but our social conditions are breeding others. The delay in our courts, the influence of politics, and the swaying of sentimental or incompetent juries by artful criminal lawyers without social conscience, are familiar to our citizens. Confronted by all this, we ask ourselves what we might do in order to fulfill our duty in protecting society and at the same time in aiding the transgressor to become a useful citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One thing we can do is to examine closely any system that seems to work in other countries. Russia, with her broad social program, gives much attention to her problem of crime and criminals. Sherwood Eddy, a student of Russia for a long time, has included the humane treatment of prisoners as one of the things which we might profitably get from that country. He might have added also that the simplicity of court procedure by which they arrive at justice has some commendable virtues.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have visited prisons in many parts of our country as well as in several others and have sat through criminal trials in almost as many places, so in my visits to courts and prisons in the USSR I had an experience that made observation intelligent. There is no doubt that we may learn something from the Russians about the restoration to society of those who contravene the law. Whether one sympathizes with or condemns the political faith of this country, one must admire and respect a people who are able to put ideals into works as they do. They know what they want of the man who is their criminal and they set to work to teach him how to fit into their society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are shortcomings in this phase of their work, mostly on the physical side, but they know that as well as we do and are correcting them as rapidly as possible. They have often had to use old buildings because in the short space of years of the new nation they have not had time to build enough modern ones; but they have reformed such gloomy spots as the Women’s Prison of Moscow is said to have been in Tzarist days, into a place of considerable light and more livable conditions. There are also some old cells in the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute of much too little ventilation but this building is to be replaced within a short time. Most of the buildings of this institute are already in good condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States we have been so led away with preparing better buildings (we still have some of the worst in the world) that we have often forgotten the spiritual side. There are some penal institutions, such as the New Jersey Prison for Women at Clinton, N. J., where an excellent spirit certainly prevails, but even in our best prisons I think that we do not overcome that feeling on the part of the prisoner that he or she is permanently set aside from normal society. It is the exceptional individual case where this is not true. In the Russian institutions, especially those where there is great freedom, one is struck by the atmosphere that prevails among the prisoners of still being a part of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In undertaking to give to the American public in general a picture of the situation in Soviet Russia in regard to crime and its repression certain usual questions have been kept in mind. Interested inquirers, both in this country and abroad, have repeatedly asked me, “What are the courts really like?” “What kinds of crime are committed?”’ “Who commits them?” and “What is the punishment given?” The answers are found in the pages of this book. Since it is intended to reach the layman as well as the social worker, the student of criminology, the lawyer, and the legislator, an informal approach has been used. It is hoped, however, that this will not tend to detract from the authenticity of the work. No effort has been spared to give as accurate an account as possible, both by means of research over a period of years in connection with my Criminology class and by recent visits to courts and penal institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gratitude for help must be expressed to many people whom I cannot enumerate here. I am especially indebted to the Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, Prof. A. J. Vishinsky, who gave valuable time for appointments, to Mr. C. S. Smith of the Associated Press who aided me in many ways, to Director Shlaposnitchov of the Institute of Criminal Policy, to Professor Brusilovsky for conferences and appointments he both arranged and participated in and for lectures which was permitted to attend, to S. Golunsky, of the Commissariat of Justice, who in addition to such services as were rendered by others, has contributed the further service of reading and criticizing the manuscript. Finally, to my two young countrywomen, Miss Margaret Moore and Miss Margaret Ross, who gave up parts of their vacation in Moscow to contribute typing to the project.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
M. S. C.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New York City&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
October, 1934&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Criminal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; repression in the Soviet Union is bound up with the whole social program which the state has been developing. A good many of us had thought of the Soviet’s welfare work as more of a hit-or-miss arrangement, gathering up a few threads here, omitting to notice some quite as important in other places, but as the work is examined in its entirety, it gives evidence of more than usually comprehensive planning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In making an evaluation of the present situation in regard to any of its phases of development, it is not sufficient merely to consider standards as they now exist, but it is also, of course, necessary to take into account the distance traversed in the brief time and the difficulties surrounding the accomplishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The important thing, let us say for an example, in child care, is to see that ten or twelve years ago thousands upon thousands of children were wandering in wild gangs, all over the country, thieving, plundering, killing even, unfed and unclothed, and that today they are, with few exceptions both clothed and fed, being trained and cared for in institutions or at home, and that the period of distress and acute exigency is over. If that had extended to children alone we might understand that with all the forces available the authorities could handle such a situation, but it was a larger thing than that, and the fact that in the face of what seemed an undertaking of impossible dimensions the authorities were able to come through, and with a program so constructive that it has revolutionized their treatment of offenders against the law, seems something of a miracle. Or again, it is of great significance, especially to such a study as this, that the banditry and roving lawlessness on the part of men in 1922, has been reduced so sharply that this form of crime is pretty well under control. So, it is the distance revolutionary Russia has come, the rapidity of her pace, that are more significant than the actual standards in practice. That is not to say, however, that her present standards always need a defense. Her achievement in treatment of prisoners, for example, which is the subject of this book, does not suffer by comparison with that of western nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the pages that follow attention is given to treatment and to standards, but for the moment, assuming that advances have been rapidly made in the repression of crime, let us focus our interest on other factors that have contributed to this progress. For us it is important to discover, if we can, what factors are responsible for the one-third decrease in the number of criminals which authorities say has been effected since the beginning of the Revolution. Even if their estimate of the reduction seems high, it is still apparent to a student of the situation that a real decrease, perhaps smaller, has been made. The united front with which the nation has attacked its social problems on all sides has, as would be expected, exerted great influence in the handling of the crime problem. Prevention has resulted in a large way from the development in the various phases of social welfare that have gone on simultaneously, and as one begins to consider the relationship that exists there appears that whole pattern, referred to earlier, which leaves few phases of social and economic life untouched.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The care of children has already been spoken of. It is clear that one of the big problems, among the horde that have puzzled and challenged the group who have had chief responsibility in steering the government, was juvenile delinquency. While authorities gathered these young offenders together and put them in places for care, they were at the same time preparing and carrying out a program for their youth that would prevent others following in the footsteps of the delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the preventive program that was now first in interest, the item of education stood at the head of the list. No doubt in the early days of the proletarian state, schools were woefully inadequate, but children were at least placed under the guidance of people who gave them the elements of an education as well as taught them something of how to work. But the nation appears to have a mania for the education of its masses and a point has now been reached where there is university study in sight, with a stipend attached for those who attend, for all those able to take advantage of it. Juvenile delinquency rates have steadily decreased and the development of the school system has obviously contributed largely to this reduced figure.&lt;br /&gt;
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Health programs are, of course, directly related to crime repression. There is a book on the socialized medicine of Russia, written by Sir Arthur Newsholme of England and Dr. Kingsbury of our own country, that should be read for full information on this subject, but it can be said that the scope of the program is wide and the extent far-reaching. Beyond the broad development of curative medicine there is the preventive program in which physical culture activities figure largely. As an illustration of the results achieved in this work, a demonstration staged in Moscow in the summer of 1934 was very impressive. The author along with a good many other Americans and other foreign visitors witnessed the parade in which a hundred thousand physical culturists, with their canoes, paddles, tennis racquets, flowers, and other things suggestive of health and enjoyment of life, passed in excellent order, so well disciplined that one group followed another without a break in ranks. There is, of course, a great significance to that when it is considered on a national scale. With every factory and farm providing such a program for its workers there should be a rapid diminution in the number of weaklings who turn to crime.&lt;br /&gt;
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One finds himself on the defensive at the mention of more liberal divorce laws, but such a provision may actually lessen criminal acts. Since a woman who finds her husband wholly incompatible and wants to remarry some more congenial person has only to indicate her wish in order to be free, she is not nearly as likely to poison her husband or work herself into a state from which some expert psychiatrist will have to untangle her. When the system was first initiated in the Soviet Union we were told that there was a great rush of those who wished to benefit, but that since the first period exhausted the number of those eager for separation, there has been a noticeable decrease. One meets a great number of people who have been married a long time! Such an authority as Vishinsky attributed much of the decrease in criminal acts to these liberal laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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The rapid industrialization of the country has made for less crime except in the case of offenses against the state. In that period just before the installation of NEP when farmers and others discharged from the army could find no work, when distribution without production had left the nation in starvation, banditry flourished, but when the five-year plan began to make demands for more workers than could be furnished, a halt was called in the advance of ordinary crime. Also, with work plentiful, there is no problem of providing jobs for those discharged from prisons. With the system of training which gives a skilled trade to every man capable of assimilating the instruction and mastering the tasks, and of giving instruction also to the unskilled type who are thereby enabled to fill some job well, there is no question of work for discharged prisoners. How long this condition will hold depends, of course, on the time it will take for industrialization to reach its zenith and for the population to catch up and exceed the ability of the system to absorb them. However, there is an encouragement of birth control and that may manage the question somewhat better than has been done in other countries gone on before with their industrialization program. Since Russia sits down with pencil and paper and makes her plans of production, perhaps she can do something in the nature of requirements for population increase!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following comment is offered by a Russian authority: “That is something like the Malthusian theory. We don’t believe in it. We are sure that at present, and for a very long time in the future there can be no real over-population. If sometimes something like that seems to happen in the capitalistic countries, it is an illusion. It is the result of the social conditions of those countries. Our social system makes it possible for us to use any quantity of labour and there can be no question of over-population for us. Therefore the question of something like State birth control does not even arise.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Housing is, of course, one of the biggest problems in Soviet Russia. They are building with feverish rapidity but one suspects it will be some time until they catch up to the need. It is popular to correlate bad health, crime, and most other social evils with congested housing, and one feels sure that much of the blame attached to it is well placed. If Russia can eliminate this condition she will have done much in exercising control of those situations that are supposed to be the major causes of crime. She has her own theory of cause which another chapter discusses, but optimistic socialists believe she is in a fair way to remove that also. Russians know well enough of their shortage of housing and they know the social significance of that shortage, but one cannot rebuild an entire nation in the few short years since their social cataclysm. There had to be a gap somewhere and both lack of trained workers and of material accounts for its existence.&lt;br /&gt;
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Training for taking part in government affairs, such as elections and jury service, is also conducive to securing law observance. The writer’s visit was so taken up with courts and prisons that other angles of investigation were neglected and any ideas as to government practices in democracy are secured second-hand. However, some of those Americans who live there and observe intelligently state that there is a steady progress toward greater participation by the people themselves in government. As education prepares the way, participation becomes more real.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any mention of fight against crime in this country ought to take into account the establishment of the new culture of this society. At the close of the October Revolution, Russia had as its chief asset a great many millions of people whose rights the leaders had sworn to establish and protect, and who were unlettered, superstitious and without social understanding. Educating children was a small task compared to what they must do with those adults, and in the period when the old culture had come to an end with the last efforts of the civil war and the new had not well begun, crime swelled into large numbers of convicted. But these peasants and workers have many of them learned, at evening classes, at conferences, and in trade unions of various sorts, something of what this order stands for. A new social consciousness that makes the individual feel responsible for the law and order of the country has arisen and makes itself felt even in such small offenses as the case of some thoughtless individual throwing paper in a park which is certain to be otherwise immaculate, or of a more delinquent one climbing on a street car at the front in the hope of not being detected.&lt;br /&gt;
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The freeing of the people from hardships of the pioneer stage of the new civilization is also beginning to be felt. There is much attention to beauty which I am told was not evident as recently as two or three years ago. Natural yearnings are being satisfied and a broader life is opening; the labor pains of the rebirth of a nation are about over. All this relieves tension and tends to establish a normality of living such as results in a more settled order.&lt;br /&gt;
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A condition that ought soon to make for a decrease in crime against the state by the so-called class enemy is the fact that the government is now established. We are so accustomed to use the phrase “the Russian experiment” that it is hard for one to give it up; but, it is no longer much of an experiment. The author remembers a gentle reproof given to her when she remarked that since this sort of thing had never been tried before, it was difficult to see how it might work. There was a smiling rejoinder of “We have tried it and it does work.” Surely there will be a cessation in “crimes against the state” when it is clearly seen that efforts against the order of government will not be of avail.&lt;br /&gt;
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Emphasis ought, of course, to be put on the social planning that gives security for old age and removes fear of illness and unemployment. It would be impossible to estimate how much crime is due to a feeling of insecurity in society, but there is no doubt that it is a large percentage. Provisions looking toward the elimination of this insecurity have already been effective enough to have a part in the reduction of the number of those driven to crime because of fear of such economic woes.&lt;br /&gt;
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One point on which observers agree that we need to imitate these people is in the humane treatment of prisoners. It ought to be understood here that “humane” is not synonymous with “coddling.” Some of us who do not distinguish have grown shy of that word but in these pages it is used in its proper meaning. Prisoners are given a “man to man” treatment, held to a strict régime just as if they worked in a factory outside. There is discipline in industry and they are prepared to meet that condition, to learn to discipline themselves, but the approach is one of dignity, with any thought of humiliation put far away. It is only when one thinks of the prisoner as suffering undignified imprisonment, degraded by acts of physical or verbal abuse on the part of guards who ought themselves to be in prison, that one stoops to pity and “feels sorry for him,” but when a man is subjected only to a constructive training such as it might be a privilege to get, one’s sympathy is hardly needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question of how much one can see in a limited time always comes up when one writes of foreign conditions, and cognizance of it should be taken in this Introductory Chapter. The answer, of course, depends on the preparation of the person for the task. It seems too obvious even to remark that one can live in a country for years and know considerably less about specialized subjects than one trained observer who merely visits the institutions. The book on Red Medicine by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. Kingsbury has already been referred to. One would naturally rather trust the judgment of such authorities even though they visit briefly than that of others, unfamiliar with this field, who have resided there for years on end.&lt;br /&gt;
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The author trusts her own judgment in regard to prisons and courts. She has been seeing both for years, and in many places. Physical equipment is not all that one looks for. There are signs that give things away. There are glances that indicate a whole policy. If a warden tells a visitor of a wholesome approach to his men, and that person then sees the inmates fall away and look up from lowered eyes as he goes through, he knows what to think. If a superintendent says, as one did to the writer, that he does not really enforce the silent system, and one watches the men a while, talking through the side of a twisted mouth as a guard half turns his head and never speaking normally during the entire time of the visit, one knows again that representations are not in accord with practice. Prisoners do not put on acts for visitors, and members of a staff would probably be letting themselves in for trouble with any suggestion that they do so.&lt;br /&gt;
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The writer expresses no opinions on conditions outside her own field of special investigation, except on obvious points. Other institutions were visited only in a casual way, but a great deal of life itself was seen. There were long walks in all sorts of places. Groups of children were played with and workmen of all kinds talked to, usually through an interpreter; but there were those with whom the conversation was carried on directly in French, German or sometimes English. All of this formed a background for any conclusions, and years of working with people in a social work relationship had also prepared the writer again for significant observation.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the major portion of the book is concerned with research, and that has been thoroughly checked for accuracy of statement by a member of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER II: THE SOVIET THEORY OF CRIME ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;To understand&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; rightly the theory of crime officially accepted in Russia today, one must read the works of Lenin. Karl Marx is there in the background, to be sure, but he is explained or interpreted in accordance with the opinion of the Soviet Union’s first leader. It sounds a simple enough theory—that, with the final attainment of the classless society, crime, which is the result of economic class relationship, will disappear. But it needs some elucidation. The accomplishment of a state of society in which this would be true is not, after all, quite so simple as the statement sounds.&lt;br /&gt;
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People have tried for a good many years to account for the phenomenon of crime and to work out some manner of punishment that would control even if not eliminate it, as the present Soviet theory permits. Anthropologists tell us that acts not pleasing to the group, even antagonistic to its best interests, are apparently as old as human society itself. Penalties consisting of curses, banishment, even death, were visited upon those who broke the law in the earliest ages of society. Up to very recent years punishment in the form of untold cruelties was dealt out to those who transgressed. Still crime grew and criminals increased with the complexity of civilization. What makes people do those things—commit those acts which are against the folk ways or state ways of the community in which he lives, and brings him usually to account? Who knows? Within fairly recent times three main theories have attempted to establish the causes and have laid out measures of punishment designed to protect law-abiding society from the criminal and, later, to aid in the readjustment of the individual to life.&lt;br /&gt;
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We might take a hasty look at these theories before we speak of their rejection by proletariat Russia. The classical school had as one of its chief characteristics the doctrine of free will in the commission of crime. The discretionary power of judges in the years just preceding the development of this theory gave too much play to the possibility, supposedly, of circumstances surrounding the act. As a matter of actual practice, according to such an authority as Gillin, it gave them instead an excellent chance to wreak a personal vengeance on some enemy, or, still acting according to the discretionary power given them, befriend someone to whom they wished to show favor.&lt;br /&gt;
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But this was one of the evils the classical school of writers decided to remedy. If one committed an act of his own free will, then circumstances had nothing to do with it. A man was a criminal because he chose to be. Thus when two persons committed the same act they should be given the same punishment. And the French Code of 1791 put such a theory into practice, listing a great number of such transgressions and providing for each a set penalty. The difficulties would hardly need to be set down for us. The resulting unwieldy code, the lack of any punishment for acts not listed, made the administration of the code an impossible task.&lt;br /&gt;
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There was another reason for its modification. It did not take an expert in criminology to see that there were differentiating conditions surrounding the commissions of crime. It was clear that of two people committing similar acts, the one would have the sympathy of those who saw him, whereas the second would be looked on with contempt. That the people in the street were able to arrive at such a conclusion and public opinion in the days of revolutionary action against tyranny, must have had some effect. At any rate the Code of 1810 in France provided a modification of the definite penalty for a definite crime by setting a maximum and minimum and permitting the judge to choose between. The doctrine of free will in the commission of crime thus became modified to a milder form of the same theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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The neo-classical school went a step further. While it still recognized the theory of free will and individual responsibility on the part of one transgressing the law, it did decide that in view of evidences being submitted by a body of biologists, physicians, and other scientists, that every person was not free to choose, and was thus not responsible for his behavior. There might, for example, be insanity or imbecility to account for an act. It was, however, necessary to establish that at the time of the crime he was in such a mental state. This theory is incorporated in the practice of our criminal courts today.&lt;br /&gt;
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But here begins another story. Modern science was developing. Research connected with psychiatry and psychology was adding important contributions to the field of the study of the criminal and an attempt to account for crime. Why did a man do things of such an anti-social nature, things harmful to his fellow beings? The anthropological school with Lombroso as its initial spokesman, entered with its explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This theory, attacking the classical and neo-classical writers, took a different line, and swung far in the other direction. Why did the criminal commit his crime? Because he was born with certain stigmata that prevented his following other lines of behavior. He had no choice in the matter. Far from the free-will theory that made him a creature responsible for his deeds, this doctrine made him incapable of rational analysis, or any logical deductions as to cause and consequence. Lombroso weighted his argument with facts and figures. He made an extensive study of criminals in Italian prisons and concluded finally that at least a certain percentage of those committing crimes were born criminals with definite physical features characteristic of the lower stages of evolution. However, in his later writings he concluded that only one-third of all criminals belonged to this group. Still having to account for the other two-thirds, he decided that part of this number was insane and that the other belonged in the category for which he invented the term—&#039;&#039;criminaloid&#039;&#039;. It is in regard to the latter group that we see his recognition of social influences on crime. Besides those born to criminal ways and those committing their acts because of insanity, there was this third group, who while not born to their deeds, still acted like criminals. There was too much proof by this time of the influence of environment for even an ardent advocate of his own theory to deny its importance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Long before the death of Lombroso, Ferri had written his &#039;&#039;Criminal Sociology&#039;&#039; and our third main theory was well launched. This school, of course, is prominently with us today. It recognizes biological causes and adds to them the results of various social environments. It goes even beyond that and takes into account such physical environment as climate, weather, and geographic location.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet criminal theory repudiates all of the aforementioned and asserts that crime is caused by the exploitation of one class by another. The attitude which accounts for such behavior, they insist, has evolved over a period that has lasted since the state became an instrument in the hands of a ruling class to force a weaker one into submission by making “laws” to protect its own interests and punishing those who transgressed one of these regulations. Because that “conscience” has had a historical development, has been long in the making, it will likewise take time to change it.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Marx-Lenin theory assumes that all crime is the result of the exploitation of one class by another, and that with the achievement of classless society—which is the ultimate aim of socialist construction—crime itself will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us trace this line of thought for a moment for fear it is not as familiar as it should be for one to get the full import of this doctrine. According to this belief, there has been one continuous evolution of society toward the establishment of full Communism, beginning with its earliest stage, which will be in its final stage world-wide. But in this evolution, going on since the dawn of history and before, there emerged at one stage of the process an organization through which the stronger element came to rule the weaker and make its members submit to its will. The instrument through which they effected this was the state. From that time on, the interests of the class or group in power have been protected by rules or laws and those who break those regulations, or commit some act not in accord with these interests of the ruling class, are guilty of a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Marx-Lenin doctrine in rejecting any sort of an idealistic notion such as Rousseau’s “social contract” and Hegel’s “the reality of the moral idea” as accounting for the state, accepts instead the definition that “the state as organized violence emerged at the definite stage in the evolution of society, that society was broken up into irreconcilable classes, that it could no longer exist without the ‘authority’ supposed to be above society and to a certain degree isolated from it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Or again, speaking more plainly, the Marxian formula states “that the state is an organ of oppression of one class by another; that it sets up an order which legalizes and consolidates this oppression modifying the conflict of classes.” Thus since the state is an organ of class domination, and crime necessarily, by the same definition, is the commission of an act against the interests of the ruling class, a criminal code would be a formulation of penalties imposed for such acts. When a state is reached where there is no domination of one class by another in society, it would logically appear that there would be no need of a criminal code.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the Soviet Union has a criminal code now, as we shall later see, and of course a recognition of crime. This, however, in their theory is no contradiction. In the first place there is one class now in power (there is an admitted class basis for criminal legislation), and the transgression of the rights of those in authority, the proletariat or working group, does constitute a serious and major crime. That, of course, is to be expected from the nature of our definition. But what of the group of criminals who come from the working class itself?&lt;br /&gt;
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They are those whose attitude is the result of long centuries of class struggle, and their point of view cannot be changed at once. Every effort is made by a policy resulting from this theory to change their “social conscience” by education while they serve their sentence, but even with that effort it is certain that many of the older generation will not be won over to the new way of thinking. Thus they concentrate on youth, as we shall see in a later chapter devoted to the child who comes in contact with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
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But crime, except in isolated instances, will disappear as need for the state also vanishes. Let us take the word of an authority for it. Commissar of Justice of the USSR, N. Krylenko, writes: “Only under Communism will the state become wholly superfluous, for then there will be no one to suppress in the sense of waging a systematic class struggle against a definite part of the population.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Understand that, in accordance with the theory, criminal repression will exist as long as the state itself is necessary, and for the present the perfect socialist society is a thing of the future. Even when it is fully come there will still be some who will commit acts of a criminal nature, but they will be of such infrequency that there will be no need of penal restriction. Lenin is our authority this time. In Vol. XXI, p. 432, we find the following: “For this there will be no need for a special machine, for a special apparatus of coercion; this will be done by the army of people themselves with the simplicity and ease with which any crowd of civilized people even in contemporary society will stop a street fight of rowdies or will disallow the outraging of a woman.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps it will be easier to understand the theory that permits of the final disappearance of crime if the legal definition contained in their code were given. One can see then that with the gaining of strength on the part of the government, with the “mopping up” of the remaining opposition, there could possibly be such a situation. Part 3 of the Criminal Code, Article 6, contains this:&lt;br /&gt;
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“A socially dangerous act is deemed every act of commission or omission, directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government for the period of time pending transition to a communist régime.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A note added to this article is of special significance in providing for consideration of the circumstances of social class. It reads:&lt;br /&gt;
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“An act which, although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code, is free from socially dangerous characteristics, owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It can be seen that crime in the Soviet Union consists mainly of those acts directed against the state by the so-called class enemies; or those desiring to hamper socialist construction. In this situation those acts defined as criminal would tend to have usually an economic basis. And this would substantiate the theory that recognizes no other motive for a crime than an economic one, which, in a society where all needs would be met, would supposedly disappear. That is, if in the final socialist state every one should receive according to his needs—as they insist he will—then the economic motive for crime would be eliminated. This takes care of those acts which in our own country, we might attribute to economic causes.&lt;br /&gt;
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But what, we might ask, of those murders or other crimes, motivated by jealousy or rage? The theory answers that those, in the person not ill and requiring medical treatment instead of penal, are rare and the act thus usually constitutes the one crime in the person’s career. For example the man who murders his wife in a jealous rage would very likely make a good citizen who would never again commit such an excessive act. However, this, in the person not mentally deranged, would also be a rare occurrence for the reason assigned that marriage and divorce are made so liberal under the laws of the USSR that the jealousy motive in marital tangles is taken care of, and thus one of the main causes of murder is eliminated.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to note in this regard that the maximum penalty for murder in Russia in any case, except for death resulting from banditry and robbery with a firearm, is a ten year sentence. In fact the maximum term of imprisonment for any cause is ten years. They hold long sentences to be neither humane nor constructive. If a man is mentally abnormal to a dangerous extent, there are other places for him than prisons. If he has committed such a serious act as banditry or robbery with firearms, he is likely to get a death sentence unless there are extenuating circumstances such as the youth of the offender, and for the other crimes the shorter sentence is held to be more conducive to reformation.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we note for a moment the chief types of crime against which the penal provisions are directed, we will be able to see what acts any theory must account for. In the pamphlet &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039; by the Commissar of Justice, N. Krylenko, we find the four main categories of criminal law listed.&lt;br /&gt;
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First, the laws safeguarding the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under this class are all provisions for penalties for acts of a counter-revolutionary nature; against such things as wrecking, activities of the Kulaks (the middle-class peasants who owned a moderate degree of private property and who were opposed to relinquishing it to the state) directed against the order of government, and against speculators, and any form of pilfering, theft, bribery, and squandering.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the second category the author places the laws which protect the interest of the toiling masses. These are of various natures. Punishment is here provided for officials who fail to fulfill the pledges of the government as to food and living conditions promised to the working class. Protection is also afforded against excessive fines or punishment of the people. The need for such a measure he illustrates by the case of the imposition of a fine of a hundred rubles in a trivial incident where ten was the maximum permitted by law, and there was no occasion for any at all. An official permitting or contributing to such an act must, of course, be punished. In the same category are provisions against undue severity in enforced collectivisation, which tend to frighten and coerce rather than to the persuasion favored by Stalin. In this category also would fall any law providing for punishment of one committing deeds of violence against one’s person.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the third category&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; are found “laws regulating the inter-relations between the various social strata of the toiling masses.” This division consists of the laws on Soviet trade and is directed against any act that contributes to squandering of goods or disposition of unwanted articles by forcing a customer to take one such article along with his other purchases,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The author writes of this: “What is a ‘compulsory assortment?’ You enter a store and ask for something. Well, you get what you want, but you must also take something else. What? A lamp, for instance. Now a lamp is a good thing to have, but where is the burner? You are curtly told that the lamp comes without a burner. Another store expects you to buy electric flashlights without a battery—a third tags on batteries without flashlights.” He also speaks of sweaters sent to a city sweltering in the heat, and skiis to Odessa. All this, he says, is in violation of the law and must be punished. The people’s rights must be protected (&#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 29-30).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or any other act by trade bodies that interferes with the rights of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fourth category consists of laws punishing non-observance of regulations as to business accounting and fulfillment of plans by the various economic organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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“These categories of law,” says this author, “exhaust the fundamental questions that comprehend every aspect of our economic and social life.” At this phase of the development of their socialist state they, of course, recognize the necessity for the provisions that their penal code contains. But their faith in their ideal—the final classless society—and the change which it will bring in social consciousness enables them to prophesy according to Lenin the disappearance of excessive acts. “We do not know,” he says, “how quickly and in what stages, but we do know that it will be withering away; with their withering away, the state will also wither away.” Crime and punishment in their theory are therefore transitory phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The disappearance of crime will not be achieved with the end of the second five-year plan as some optimists might have expected. There are still sectors where the struggle between the classes flares up, and where the opposition is for the moment strengthened by influencing some of the toilers themselves to come to their aid. But types of crime outside this group will be steadily losing in degree of social danger and should be treated with increasing leniency. Repressive measures in regard to the first type of crimes, those of menace to the advancing socialist state, must be made more severe until all opposition has ceased and the ideal society ushered in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Criminal repression will not disappear until the full realization of the Communist order, but then in the words of Lenin once more&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XXI, p. 431.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “free from the thrall of capitalism . . . people will gradually get accustomed to observe the elementary, perennially known rules of social life that were repeated for ages in all books on good conduct; to observe them without the special apparatus of coercion which is called the State.”&lt;br /&gt;
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While these theorists expect that by the end of the second five-year plan, class distinctions will be pretty well smoothed out, criminal repression will still remain to combat the remnants of the old order which will linger on for some time. They emphasize that they have no magic wand for clearing all this suddenly and completely from the consciousness of the people. Crime and criminal repression came at one stage in evolution—the beginning of the domination of one class by another—and they will vanish at another stage—the appearance of the highest phase of Communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a final summation of the theory, crime results solely from a class struggle and will disappear with the extinction of classes, just as the state itself, according to Lenin, will disappear, and the court, now an organ of the state guarding the interests, life, health, and liberty of toilers of the state, will also disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The period is called transitory,” said Professor Brusilovsky in a lecture, “because after the achievement of Communism there will be neither crime nor punishment. Each stage and development of Soviet authority while lowering the importance of some crimes, aggravates the weight of others, depending upon the actual economic and political situation. To us criminal law is no fetish, but a tool for sweeping away the obstacles to socialist construction. Our criminal law is to a high degree historic, our proletarian semi-state is in a stage of constant change and motion toward the construction of classless society.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A theory is only a theory, and when it deals with human beings there is no accuracy of prophecy. The advent of a proletarian state, however, might indicate to some of us that other strange things could happen in the same land, especially so with the social mind that is apparent, and with as sane an approach to criminal treatment as their policy calls for. Let that social mind have another few generations for extension to fringes of the group, and that policy of treatment of criminals come into full play, and we might be as surprised as we are that the Soviet State has not only survived, but has recently been received into the League of Nations as one of the powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The student will want to know, though, something of the degree to which the theory proves accurate as the period of socialist construction advances in the Soviet Union. It might be said here that according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky there is a decrease in the number of prisoners convicted of such familiar crimes as theft, murder, arson, robbery, rape, etc., by almost one-third since the days just before the revolution. Chapter IV discusses in detail the crimes committed and some analysis is given of those who commit them. The reader must be reminded again, however, that the authorities contend that no radical change can be made in the social conscience of their people in the one generation of the revolution which has elapsed, especially as so little constructive work was done up to the last few years. It is, however, important to know what problems they have at this time and the chapter referred to above is devoted to that discussion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER III: CRIME REPRESSION SINCE THE REVOLUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We turn&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; now from theory to fact. Whether or not a state of classless society will be achieved no one can know; but it is certain that at the moment crime and criminals do exist in Soviet Russia. While our concern is with the present program of criminal repression, a review of the situation since the revolution will give us perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin enumerates three basic aspects of the proletarian dictatorship: “First, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the crushing of the exploiters, for the defense of the country, for the consolidation of ties with the proletariat of other countries, for the development and victory of revolutions in all countries. Second, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the final separation of the toiling and exploited masses from the bourgeoisie, for the attraction of the masses to the cause of socialist construction, for state leadership of these masses by the proletarian. And, third, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the organization of forces, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a society without state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criminal repression must necessarily be considered in connection with these purposes of the state. It can be seen that there are three main factors involved. There is, first of all, the crushing of the enemies of the state; secondly, the discipline and control of the toiling masses themselves; and, third, the socialist construction. The method used for accomplishing these ends have changed with the various phases of the development of the Communist state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considering first the crushing of those who oppose the order of government or hinder its development, we find the methods of coercion varying from leniency and toleration in the beginning of the Revolution, through the frightful years of the Cheka (extraordinary commission to combat speculation and counter-revolution in the early days) reign, to the more severe activities of the OGPU in recent times. Shortly after the October Revolution in May, 1918, all those persons held for political crimes were set free by an act of general amnesty. The results of this liberality were rather serious for the rule of the proletariat, since those released, bitterly determined to overthrow the new and not too firmly seated government, returned to the fight with vigor. Among these was the renowned General Krasnow who organized the White Guard Cossacks and caused no end of trouble to the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a policy of clemency was bound to end if the Soviet government continued to live. When next they had political prisoners in hand there was a different tale to tell. Whoever of them saw the inside of a prison or place of detention were not released to run back to the fight. We find Stalin defending later severe measures toward these prisoners in an interview with Ludwig in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P.7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Soon it transpired that such leniency was only undermining the strength of the authority of the Soviets. We committed a mistake in showing such leniency toward the enemies of the working class. If we repeated this mistake any further, we would have committed a crime toward the working class. We would have betrayed its interest. And this became perfectly clear very soon. It became very sure that the greater our leniency toward our enemies, the greater their resistance.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leniency was no part of their program thereafter. History will attest to the fact. Military Communism and the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, agent of superlative revolutionary terror, attended to that. Civil wars are brutal, cruel, and Russia’s was notoriously no exception. The period that followed with its terrorist activities is no bright spot in the history of crime repression of post-revolutionary Russia. Lenin threw the responsibility for the establishment of the so-called Red Terror on their class enemies. He says: “You have yourselves to blame, friends! Do not run away with the idea that the Russian peasants and workers have forgotten about your actions. You challenged us to a fight of the most desperate form in October, and in reply to this we have announced the terror, and the triple terror, and if necessary we will make it even hotter for you, if you try again.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. XXVII, p. 175.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They tried again, and yet again, the open fighting of the Civil War giving way to underground methods, not deterred by the worst the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and its successors the GPU could do. But early measures must have quadrupled, for Communism can no longer be considered a mere experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who were the people against which this repression was directed? The urban bourgeoisie joined by the rural Kulaks formed the great number. There was a tremendous increase of criminals from these two classes in the early years of the proletarian state. In their combined efforts they were able to prove of much hindrance to the Soviet cause, and, aided by those waverers within the toiling class who were able to be influenced to counter-revolutionary activities, they presented a grave menace. Again Lenin, whom the Russians think of in his kindly moods, showed his grim side. “We must exert every effort,” he wrote, “to track down and catch all those highwaymen, all the landlords and capitalists in hiding, in all their disguises, expose and punish them without pity—sly, subtle, experienced, patiently waiting for the opportune moment in hatching their plots; they are saboteurs who will stoop to any crime to do harm to the Soviet rule. With these enemies of the toilers, with the landlords, capitalists, saboteurs, and White Guards, we must be merciless.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. 24, XXIV, p. 434.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Economically, the first period was one of distribution of goods without production. Its aftermath was famine and unemployment and Lenin and Trotsky were at odds over a policy of alleviation. Trotsky, impatient at delay over a program of more complete state ownership, advocated immediate action against all private possession of property. Lenin considered a starving people no advantage in furthering a socialist construction, and was besides a humanitarian. He wanted his people fed. The result was the institution of NEP, the New Economic Policy, which permitted private ownership within limits, and brought about the eventual political annihilation of Trotsky.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of fighting the class enemy remained practically the same even through the era of NEP. There was some let-up in the counter-revolutionary activities on the initiation of NEP, as it had been hoped by those opposed to Communism that this probably indicated the return to Capitalism, but activities of an anti-Communistic nature were still sternly repressed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
N. Krylenko, prosecutor of note and now Commissar of Justice of the USSR, writes in defense against a criticism of mildness toward the enemies of the government at this time: “The form of the dictatorship of the proletariat changes in the different stages of the proletarian revolution. For instance, in the first period of the October Revolution the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters was the most conspicuous feature . . . during the transition to the NEP, the peaceful, cultural, organizational work of the dictatorship of the proletariat was most conspicuous, but this again did not mean that the importance of overcoming the resistance of the exploiters had receded in the least.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief agent of “resisting the exploiters” was now the GPU (later, as it became the joint organization of all the republics, the OGPU), the full title of which is the United State Political Administration. There seems no doubt that their midnight arrests and executions were an effective weapon against any counter-Soviet efforts even as the activities of their predecessors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, had been before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The method now undergoes an important change. Note this from Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XX, p. 460.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “To the extent that the basic purpose of authority becomes not military crushing but administrative, the typical manifestation of crushing and coercion will become not the method of shooting on the spot, but trial in court.” Not in love himself, apparently, with methods such as he felt they had to use, he seized the first opportunity afforded by an end of Civil War to advance a revolutionary legality which his party had already been trying to establish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Criminal Code was written in 1922, as was also the Code for Criminal Procedure, and the way was paved for an enlargement of orderly court procedure. The provisions of the code gave not greater leniency but legalized measures that had already been practiced. The step of importance, however, was that “tried in court” replaced “shooting on the spot.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The history of violence against the Kulaks, the most startling of all violence used by the USSR in establishing itself, was entering now a modified phase. Nerves were settling somewhat, and panic beginning to clear away. Legal guarantees, so nearly obscured through years when “crushing” was regarded as necessary at any price if the proletariat was to stay in authority, might now begin, at least, to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with this a new idea was put into practice which presents a happier side to the study of crime repression in this country. Since the state could not kill all of its class enemies and certainly would not find it profitable to fill innumerable prisons with them, there developed a new approach to the problem. It is not accurate to say that the idea was new, because it had been present since the earliest days of the Revolution. The Civil War, however, had so disrupted the development of any program that this influence was not properly felt until later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This new approach was by means of educating and training these offenders so that they might be turned out again as useful workers in a state so greatly in need of all the man power it could muster. Authorities built their plans on the belief that even a class enemy might reform and see his way to becoming a member of the new society if properly guided. And as for the convicts from among the loyal masses, any program for crime repression must have as its fundamental object the training of these as useful citizens. The theory of how it might be done has turned out to be a practical one. Its translation into government policy was a most significant development and leads straight to the constructive attitude one finds in present-day treatment of prisoners in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most of us, it seems, have had the impression that during the days of the Civil War there were no legal guarantees in the state, but such an idea is not correct. One thinks of courts as suspended, but there were orderly trials even in the darkest days of military Communism when non-judicial bodies like the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; were at their height. This was possible, of course, almost entirely for those members of the toiling masses themselves and not for enemies of the proletarian authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was a bare year after the October Revolution (November 6-9, 1918) that the Emergency Congress of the Soviets was held in Moscow. And if ever emergency existed in political affairs, it did so then for the Soviets. Civil War was at its highest point, the White Guards aided by Czecho-Slovaks, were in possession of Siberia, the English were pushing to the north and the French to the south. It is surprising that a party at the helm of the ship of state could take its mind even for a moment from such an international and military situation to think of admonishing a people to observe law. But we find Kursky, then Commissar of Justice, rising gravely to remind the Congress and the people that “during the year of revolutionary activity the working class of Russia has elaborated the basic laws of the RSFSR which must be faithfully observed in order to develop and strengthen the authority of workers and peasants,” and the Congress, after listening to his speech, resolved unanimously, “to appeal to all citizens of the Republic, to all organs and all officials of Soviet authority, to observe most strictly the laws of the RSFSR and the rules, regulations and orders issued and to be issued by the Central authorities.” A significant effort that was, and one whose importance was momentous to a people struggling through a chaos that must have all but obscured any semblance of order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To forestall the high-handed measures which they must have seen would be forthcoming as a result of the counter-revolutionary work during the Civil War, they surrounded such action with certain safeguards. It was resolved that “(a) Exact, formal ascertaining by the Soviet institution or official concerned as to the presence of conditions necessitated a departure from the limits of the law; (b) Immediate written notification to the Council of People’s Commissars, with a copy for local and interested authorities, should be provided.” In the midst of violence and excesses these efforts to establish revolutionary legality were significant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In March, 1919, the Communist party adopted as a distinctive feature of its program a plank reading: “Our courts have already led to a cardinal change in the character of punishment, resulting on a large scale in conditional sentences, introducing public censure as a measure of punishment, substituting compulsory labor with retention of liberty for imprisonment, replacing the prisons by educational institutions, and allowing the possibility for the factor and time by comradely courts. The Communist party, while urging further development of the court in this direction, should aim for the ultimate substitution of the system of punishment by a system of measures of educational character.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As early as December, 1917, Lenin sent instructions to the Revolutionary Tribunal, in which he urged that repressive measures take the form of corrective labor tasks, and that the harmful element be dealt with in a reformative way. Shooting was abolished by a decree dated October 28, 1917, and Decree No. 3 of July 20, 1918, provided that one sentenced to a three-month period should be sent to compulsory social labor and should not be guarded while serving. In the Ural region and Siberia prisons were replaced with working homes where study was combined with work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Various other decrees were adopted, furthering this principle of reformation through education and discipline. In 1919 one such established a distribution committee composed of people of special equipment, by psychiatrists, educators, etc., who were to determine by a study of background, personality, and physical condition of the convict what prison would be best suited to him.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky, (Ed.) &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, Moscow, 1933, p. 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A decree of 1920 dealt with the organization of provincial detention points, and in the main ones there was to be established a university with courses in the sciences—applied, natural and technical—in history and the arts. An attempt was also made to have prisoners trained not just in crafts of their small villages but in factory and larger industrial work, and in spite of Civil War and shortage of shops, the number given such training was raised from 214 per cent. in 1919 to 10 per cent. in 1920.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 29.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer again to the volume edited by Vishinsky, we find on page 20 a statement that any penal treatment tending to degrade the prisoner was forbidden by a decree of July 23, 1918, to be practiced. This principle is now incorporated in the Criminal Code, Article 9, which reads: “Measures of social defense may not have for their purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity, as they do not contemplate the purposes of retribution and penalty.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The present-day approach to crime repression in the USSR is, then, through educational and correctional labor. The extreme penalty of death is given now in only three cases: crimes against the state, military crimes, and armed robbery in which death occurs. A. J. Estrin in his book, &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039;, a 1933 publication, gives a table on page 229 containing the percentages of persons sentenced to different forms of repression, and from 1926 to 1930 the percentage sentenced to death is less than 0.1. For all others the educational program holds even for political prisoners. The author can give no first-hand information on the latter, but official reports indicate that this is true.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the treatment of criminals, Vishinsky speaks of the indispensable part the state apparatus must play in the realization of their program.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Within the system of the institutions of proletarian dictatorship,” he says, “the corrective labor institutions play a great and serious part, because through them, in effect, is realized the entire judicial policy. These institutions with their entire force of live human relationships, with all their methods and means with the help of which these relations are built, define the reality or falsity of the judicial verdict as they define also the extent of achieving of the genuine aim of the problem posed before these institutions.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet jurisprudence is thus based not on restrictive measures alone but on corrective, educational, and cultural ones. The authorities seek to use labor that is constructive as to character and useful economically, and not the kind that brings indignity and resentment when resorted to as punishment or disciplinary measures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sentence is designed to be as brief as possible. In the USSR it is not necessary that a prisoner serve more than one-third of his sentence in order to be re- leased on parole, but his release is based solely on the condition of his fitness for return to society. The Observation Commission, whose duty it is to determine the time of such release is required by law to inform itself in intimate detail of the condition of training and education of the prisoners, of the personal characteristics and attitude toward society of each individual. It is thus likely to be able to judge to a higher degree when a prisoner is ready for release. If the figures they give on recidivism with 18 per cent. for men and 21 per cent. for women are accurate then they may be said to judge well indeed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of re-educating the “enemy,” or winning him over to the aid of the state, is still more marked in the treatment of the working masses themselves. Repressive measures must necessarily be used for the discipline of cases among the workers. While penalties are still severe and a decree of August 7, 1932, providing for the protection of state possessions, attaches the death sentence for those who steal or pilfer public property, the measures designed for those of the working population who transgress the law are in general more liberal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to be expected. It has already been stated that the Russians acknowledge the class nature of their administration of criminal law. The content of the criminal code is directed almost entirely toward the forced subjugation of those elements who would not voluntarily be subjected to the dictates of the ruling class or the proletariat. As a matter of policy they manage this subjugation by the use of such corrective measures as the construction of the White-Sea Baltic Canal when it is possible. Such other provisions as the code contains may be made to apply to the workers, but discrimination is openly observed between the classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer back for a moment to the decree of August 7, 1932 already mentioned, we may note the indication of the sharpening of the class struggle. The state intensified its program of collectivization in 1928, and launched into a broad program intended to crush the Kulaks and extend Socialism into the villages. The Kulak antagonism immediately became more pronounced, and if we consult a table on page 80 of M. N. Gernet’s &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039; we see the results tabulated in a sudden jump of crimes against the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cattle were killed, farm machinery was destroyed or put out of order, and plans were hampered in any way possible. There was also organized theft of state property to such an extent that severe measures were considered necessary. Thus the provision by this decree four years later of the death sentence for these offenses. In the meantime the necessity for such a measure was taken care of by the judicial powers and authority of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this decree is necessarily directed against the definite enemy class, it applies also to the workers themselves who are bribed or otherwise used as tools by the urban bourgeoisie or Kulaks. This, however, is outside the program of treatment of the ordinary criminal, and in no wise is it to be understood that the death penalty is always applied even for those considered to be class enemies. The author personally heard a trial in court in which the indictment was for organized theft, and on appeal the death sentence was commuted to a ten-year sentence. For the more serious offenses, however, such as those involving sabotage in factories, the death sentence is usual, at least for those most responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The program of compulsory education provided for those from among the toiling element who are imprisoned is the chief weapon of the fight against crime by the state. The prisons are equipped (as will be seen in later pages) with all sorts of devices for carrying out this work. The whole criminal law reflects this attitude toward crime repression on the part of the Communist party. The evolution of this code since its establishment in 1922, by a multitude of amendments and two almost new writings, reflects the needs and purposes of the state in various phases of its development in a most interesting manner. It is divided into a general and a special part, and although the general part is appended to this book, it seems of interest here to speak of its various divisions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first section is devoted to the purposes of criminal legislation. The second deals with the extent of operation and the limits of action of the code. Section three is concerned with the general principles of the penal policy. Section four deals with the measures of social defense applied to persons committing various crimes. The fifth concerns the manner in which social defense measures of correctional character are applied, and the sixth deals with conditional sentences and release on probation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the code’s adoption in 1922 there have been two important amendments aside from the many year by year. In 1926 when numerous changes were made, the chief feature was a more lenient application of penalties. This was at the time of reconstruction, when the development of the socialist state took on greater emphasis and education in the matter of penal treatment was held to be one of its chief tools. By the change of 1928, deprivation of liberty was limited to sentences of one year or more. Previous to this time sentences of even one day might carry with them deprivation of liberty. The aim now in short sentences is that the convicted person may retain his liberty, but have supervision in his place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 1926 edition of the Criminal Code, the whole concept of punishment is abolished. Although, according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky, there are certain survivals of old methods and ideas among a few of those connected with penal administration, the official thought is not of retribution or any infliction of pain or even of “just reward.” From this time on, the term used is a “measure of social defense” and, as nearly as one can judge both from records and from actual visits to their institutions for criminals, the change has been not only in terminology but in actual practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The measures of social defense now provided by the Criminal Code are divided into three categories: first are the measures of judicial and correctional character; second, measures of social defense of medical character; and third, measures of social defense of medical and pedagogical character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measure of social defense of judicial and correctional character are enumerated as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the Union of USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the Union of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the Union of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts 1930, No. 26, Item 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is in addition the use of public censure as a repressive measure which is a “public expression of condemnation in the name of the court.” It must be published through the press and may be either the only penalty assessed or be added to another. The use of warning is also provided for by Article 43 of the Criminal Code and is practiced in cases where the accused is acquitted but by his conduct gives “every reason to fear commitment of crimes by him in the future.” By this means an effort is made to prevent his committing some criminal act in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the present Criminal Code there is a division of repressive measures into the basic and the supplementary. To the basic measures of declaring one a class enemy with the consequences such a decision carries, deprivation of liberty and compulsory work without deprivation of liberty, are added the other enumerated measures, with the exception of confiscation of property. This is also a supplementary measure but it can be used only in the cases specifically mentioned in the special section of the code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary it might be said that while severe measures still exist and are used in regard to counter-revolutionary activities or crimes against the state, the emphasis in the penal program is decidedly upon educational measures for re-establishing the criminal as a useful member of society in the socialist state. While the beginnings of this policy are almost obscured by the activities of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and the OGPU (whose judicial powers have by the Decree of July 10, 1934, been withdrawn and turned over to the courts) and the extra-legal activities of the Civil War days, yet the germ was there from the beginning of the Revolution and its development is one of the marked achievements of the Soviet government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IV: WHAT CRIMES ARE COMMITTED AND WHO COMMITS THEM? ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In answering&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the question “What crimes are committed?” one could say in general that it is the usual line-up found in any country plus that category defined as the crimes against the state or the order of government. It would be hard to say what is included in the latter group. It would run the gamut from, let us say, the theft of bread from a collective farm, if it was intended to hamper the rule of the proletariat in any way, to the wrecking of a factory. It depends on the “socially dangerous” character of the person committing the act for one thing, on the social background, and for the other consideration, the motive behind the act. It is quite to be expected that this group ranks at the top of any list of crimes in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If one wishes to go into detailed statistics on the subject of crimes committed, there is a small, compact volume, &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039;, by M. N. Gernet, which supplies such information. It was, however, published in 1931 which is far in the past, gauged by the speed with which the Criminal Code and judicial practices change under proletariat rule. But in the main the list of crimes are the same and the classifications as to age and sex still hold.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There has been a change in the type of crime since the days of military Communism. A. J. Estrin, in his &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039; includes the following&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 51 &#039;&#039;et. seq.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; as characterizing the period of militarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Counter-revolutionary activities&lt;br /&gt;
* Speculation&lt;br /&gt;
* Banditry&lt;br /&gt;
* Adventures&lt;br /&gt;
* Desertion&lt;br /&gt;
* Bureaucratism&lt;br /&gt;
* Occasional bad conduct crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He goes on to say that there was considerable growth in crimes of banditry during 1918, practically all having a political or anarchistic coloring. In the matter of desertion, the menace was so great that a special commission was set up to deal with it, and by the time of the entry of the Communist army into Warsaw it had been successfully repressed on the western front. During this period there was likewise an increase in hooliganism, the acceptance of bribery on the part of officials, and speculation. The latter presented an especially difficult problem but was nearly at an end when the institution of the New Economic Policy in 1922 brought new forms of it. From then on it has been one of the crimes that has given most trouble to the government. Acts of pilfering state property in order to resell it at a greater price, or securing goods for speculation by persons working either on a state farm or in a store, are extensive. Since the law of August, 1932, providing a death penalty for taking state property these crimes have decreased in number.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Open warfare between the classes had so far subsided by 1921 that there was a demobilization of farmers and other workers from the army, and that led to the increase in another crime—banditry. These people, suddenly released from fighting ranks, broke and unable to find work in that period when production was at a low ebb, turned to theft, robbery or banditry, especially the latter, filling the country with a terror all their own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this period of 1921-22 there was a very definite growth in the number of crimes committed against persons—not in those of a more serious nature such as murder or severe injury but in sex crime, fighting and insults. The author explains this as resulting from the transition from the old culture to the new. The old was at an end and the new not yet sufficiently established to set up an influence against such acts of attack and rowdyism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a reference here by Estrin to a statement by N. Krylenko which connects the beginning of the crime of sabotage—so serious since to the Soviet government—with activities of former owners during the years of 1921, 1922 and 1923. There was no longer opportunity for armed fighting but the opposition relentlessly kept up its battle by any means at hand and its best methods were to hinder the production without which Communism would be undermined by starvation and physical depletion. From 1923 on, there began to appear with increasing frequency in the courts cases of &#039;&#039;economic&#039;&#039; counter-revolutionary character. Firearms and open resistance might have gone by the board but sabotage grew apace until 1925-26 when it reached its greatest height.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A numerical count of court convictions in 1925 would make it appear that there was a tremendous drop in ordinary crimes and an increase in those of a political type. There is an explanation for this in the fact that a reform of the Criminal Code in 1924 deleted a number of crimes of lesser importance, and there was a consequent lessening of 300,000 in convictions during the following year, most of which loss was, of course, from the ranks of the ordinary criminals. Class lines were drawn in a still more distinct fashion, thus emphasizing the direction criminal repression was to take for some time to come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of crimes against the state are today mostly of an economic nature. Before, however, we set down some of the more important ones that harass law enforcement let us look at a brief list of the type of acts which are encountered in court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes against the state&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Crimes against the person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Crimes against property&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Official crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Hooliganism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The items here of particular interest to foreigners are the first and the last. The list of crimes included in the first category will shortly be enumerated. As for the last, the term “hooliganism” covers a multitude of crimes. If one suddenly gets up in a theater and strikes his neighbor without apparent cause, such is an act of hooliganism. It was described to the writer as defining “unmotivated” acts. If one does not pursue “motivation” into psychological or psychiatric realms that explanation pretty well expresses what is meant. Deeds not logically accounted for might come a little closer. If a group of young men go out just to “raise cain” for no particular cause they may destroy property, attack a man, and do various other criminal acts which would all fall within the definition of hooliganism. The charge corresponds roughly to our “disorderly conduct,” except that the deeds committed may be of a more serious nature. But into this category are lumped a miscellany not classified otherwise.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, what are the chief crimes against the state? There would be, first of all, such major deeds as counter-revolutionary activities and the dissemination of propaganda. There are no longer organizations fostering counter-revolutionary work, but a great amount of such work is carried on. Individuals with malice aforethought, work their way into factory or collective farm, and spread what discontent they may. The author heard, for example, of the trial of the director of a collective farm who managed cleverly to see that the plan of production was unfulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Next in line would be industrial sabotage and attack on or the theft of government property. So prevalent had the latter become by the committing of such acts as killing cattle or the destruction of anything possible, as well as organized theft of state property that the government had recently acquired, that the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for such crimes, was enacted to meet the situation. On some occasions of organized theft the motive is for personal gain rather than one of desire to harm the state. For example, the author heard one case in court where the theft of grain from a collective farm was resold in speculating and the gain to the eleven persons involved was some 20,000 rubles. The death penalty was given to the leaders, prison sentences to the others. There is also the evasion of government orders and taxes, insubordination to the demands of the law, insults by word of mouth, if such involves a Kulak as against an officer. This does not by any means complete the possibilities, but it lists the headings under which the majority of such acts come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sabotage hardly needs comment here. So associated has the term come to be with industrial affairs in Russia that one would expect to find it ranking high as a crime against the state. It is, of course, committed by the enemies of the established order, and has hampered the progress of collectivization and industrial development to a great degree. Five men were shot and the others in the plot sentenced to ten years in prison (corrective labor with deprivation of liberty) during the past summer for burning a large factory in the Ural region by electric wire manipulation. Activities of the disorganized opposition have centered in crimes of this sort as the most effective weapon in its hands. Not much quarter is shown when guilt is established. The extreme penalty is surely and speedily given.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An enumeration of the counter-revolutionary crimes listed in the Criminal Code includes the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any act directed towards overthrow, undermining and weakening of the peasants’ and workers’ order of government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armed uprising and entering Soviet territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communication with a foreign government for counter-revolutionary purposes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Extending aid and comfort to that part of the international bourgeoisie which aims at the overthrow of the Communist order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Inducing a foreign government by means of forged documents to declare war or to make armed intervention, or by the same method to induce blockade, confiscation of property of USSR, interruption of diplomatic relations, renouncing of a treaty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Espionage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Transmission, collection, or theft, of economic information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Undermining of state industry, transport, trade, monetary circulation, cooperatives, committed with a counter-revolutionary purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commission of terrorist acts against representatives of the Soviet order or workers’ and peasants’ organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Destruction or damaging with counter-revolutionary purposes by means of the use of explosive, arson, or any other method, of railways, and other means of transportation, means of communication, aqueducts, community warehouses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Propaganda and agitation containing an appeal to overthrow, undermine, or weaken the Soviet order. Circulation or preparation of literature. Same actions in time of mass disorders, or making use of religious and national prejudices, or in time of war or in localities under martial law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All kinds of organizational activity directed toward preparation and commission of crimes mentioned in this chapter as well as participation in an organization founded for the preparation or commission of one of the crimes mentioned in this chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Failure to report a known counter-revolutionary crime or preparation for same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any action or active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement committed while in office under the Tzarist régime or under the counter-revolutionary government, during the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Counter-revolutionary sabotage, i.e., premeditated omission to carry out the duties or deliberate negligence in carrying them out with the specific purpose of weakening the authority of the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chief in the list of “official crimes” is the accepting of bribery, dealing out sentences in excess of the provision of the law, or beyond what circumstances warrant, failing to fulfill one’s duty, taking the law into one’s hands, etc. As an example of punishment in excess of justification of circumstances there is a case recorded in which a drunken priest was given a heavy penalty in a Siberian People’s Court. In view of the government’s attitude toward religion one would suppose that such a sentence might stand, but when it was called to the attention of the higher court, the prosecutor was removed from office and the militiaman was arrested.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commissar of Justice Krylenko, in his &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039;, lists a number of omissions and commissions on the part of officials, but when a complaint of, or information on, such acts reach the authorities, action follows. The population, taught from the cradle up that this is their government, has no timidity, apparently, about seeing that men in office regard the laws of the land, if they have information of acts to the contrary. This authority says, after mentioning a variety of actual cases of such violation, “The struggle against distortions of this kind must be waged with absolute ruthlessness.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other two classifications—crimes against the person and against property—include what they would in our own country, but penalties imposed differ from ours a great deal. Since they, as our most elementary groupings, are generally understood, and since outside of crimes against the state or order of government, these two comprise the great bulk of criminal transgressions in Russia as well as in our own country, it seems of general interest to include here, even at the risk of being tedious, those two chapters of the Criminal Code which relate to these classes of crime, and they are therefore inserted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, HEALTH, LIBERTY, AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed: a) Out of greed, jealousy (if it does not come under description in Article 138) and other base reasons; b) by a person previously convicted for premeditated murder or bodily injury who served the measure of social protection established by the court; c) by means particularly painful to the victim; d) for the purpose of lightening [the consequences of] or concealing another grave crime; e) by a person whose duty it was to have particular care of the victim, or f) making use of the helpless condition of the victim.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder not coming under the provisions of paragraph 136,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed in a state of sudden and strong emotional excitement, caused by violence or grave insult from the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Murder caused by carelessness, as well as murder resulting from exceeding the limits of self defence,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Abortion caused with consent of the mother by persons not having the proper medical qualifications or by persons having such qualifications but in unsanitary conditions,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to five hundred rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If these acts were committed under conditions given in the first part of this paragraph, professionally or without consent of the mother or having as their consequence death,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The bringing of a person who is financially or in some other way dependent on another person, by cruel treatment of the dependent person or in other similar way to suicide or to an attempt at same,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The giving of aid or incitement to suicide of a minor or a person knowingly incapable of understanding the nature and meaning of the act committed or a person incapable of self-guidance if suicide or attempt at same followed,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated grave bodily injury which carried as a consequence loss of sight, hearing, or any other organ, permanent disfigurement, mental illness, or any other injury to health, combined with considerable disability,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If as a consequence of such injury death followed or if it was committed by means having the character of torture, or causing suffering, or if such injury came as a consequence of inflicting systematic though light injuries,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated light bodily injury, not dangerous to life, but causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Premeditated light bodily injury without causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury coming under paragraph 1, Article 143, committed under influence of sudden and strong, emotional excitement caused by violence or grave insult to the offender on the part of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury caused by negligence if it came as a consequence of a knowing infraction of safety rules established by law or government orders and having as its consequence conditions aforementioned in Article 142 and the first paragraph of Article 143,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Bodily injury caused by negligence not having grave consequences,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated assault and battery and other violent acts combined with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said acts had the character of torture,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Violent, illegal deprivation of liberty of some person,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty by a method dangerous to life or health of victim, or accompanied with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Placing in a hospital for mental cases of a person known to be sane out of greed or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft, or concealment, or exchange of some one else’s child, motivated by greed, vengeance, or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Infection of a person with a venereal disease by a person aware of having said disease,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Knowingly exposing of a person to the danger of infection with venereal disease through the sex act or some other act,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relation with persons not having reached sex maturity combined with corruption of the morals or with perverted forms of sex satisfaction,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sex relations with persons not having reached sex maturity committed without aforesaid aggravating circumstances,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Corruption of the morals of children or minors committed by means of immoral acts toward them,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relations by means of physical violence, threat, or by intimidation or making use, through deception, of the helpless condition of the victim (rape),—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said rape had as its consequences the suicide of the victim or was committed toward one not having reached sex maturity, or even though on a person having reached said maturity but committed by several persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing a woman to enter into a sex relationship or satisfy sex passion in some other form by a person on whom said woman was financially dependent or to whom she was in a subordinate position,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing to engage in prostitution, procuring, maintenance of houses of assignation, also engaging in traffic of women for purposes of prostitution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years with confiscation of all or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deliberately leaving a person without help, when said person, in a condition dangerous to life, is incapable of measures of self-protection because of minority, feebleness, sickness, or helplessness generally, in cases when the person leaving the other helpless was in duty bound to have cared for the abandoned and was able to extend help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Not extending of help by a ship’s captain to persons perishing on sea or on other bodies of water if said help could be extended without grave danger to the ship, crew, or passengers,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to two years. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts No. 60, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Not extending of help to a sick person without satisfactory reasons by a person having as his duty by law or special regulation the extending of such help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Refusal of a person engaged in medical practice to extend medical aid if said refusal knowingly to said person could have been dangerous to the patient,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Malicious evasion of payment, for the support of children in spite of being capable of such payment,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Abandonment by parents of minor children without support as well as forcing children to beg,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same measure of social protection.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted verbally or in writing,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Fine up to 300 rubles or public censure.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Insult inflicted by action,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to two months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted through generally circulated or exhibited publications or pictures,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Slander, i.e. circulation of knowingly false defaming rumors,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Libel in an article published in the press or multiplied by some other means,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 100 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
PROPERTY CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret appropriation of someone else’s property (theft) carries with it:&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
a) If committed without application of any mechanical devices, for the first time and without conspiring with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a term up to three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
When committed under the same conditions, but because of need and unemployment for the purpose of satisfying the minimum requirements of self and family,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a term of three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
b) Committed repeatedly and with regard to property which is a known necessity for the existence of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to six months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
c) If committed with application of mechanical device or repeatedly or by previous conspiracy with other persons, and also, even without the aforementioned conditions when committed in railroad stations, docks, ships, railway coaches, in hotels,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
d) When committed by a private person from state or community warehouses, railway cars, ships, or other storage places, or in the places of community use (aforementioned in sub-paragraph) with the application of mechanical devices, or by conspiring with other persons, or repeatedly, also when committed though without aforementioned conditions by a person having special right of entry into these storage places, or [by persons engaged in] safeguarding them, or in time of fire, flood, or other social calamity,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
e) When committed out of state or community warehouses and storage places by a person having special right of entry in same or [by persons] safeguarding them, with application of mechanical devices, or repeatedly, or by conspiring with other persons, and also any theft out of the aforementioned warehouses and storage places when the theft is exceptionally large,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
 NOTE: Theft of material and tools committed in the factory or mill by a workman or employee within the confines of his own [his place of employment] enterprise the first time and when the value of the stolen goods does not exceed 15 rubles carries disciplinary punishment in accordance with special schedule established by the People’s Commissariat of Labor.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft of electric current,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of one month with compulsory restitution of the loss inflicted.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The purchase of goods known to be stolen,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a period up to six months and fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions committed professionally,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to three years with confiscation of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Purchase, possession and sale of fire arms, known to be stolen (hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition therefor,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to 5 years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Open appropriation of some one else’s property in the presence of the person having possession, use, or authority over such property (robbery) when committed without use of force,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same action when committed by a group of people or repeatedly,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret as well as open appropriation of horses or cattle from the laboring agricultural population as well as those engaged in animal husbandry,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions, committed repeatedly or in conspiracy with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to eight years. Aug. 7, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 102, Article 645).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Secret or open appropriation of fire arms (except hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition for same if this action does not come under Article 59 of this Code,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Robbery, i.e., open attack for the purpose of taking possession of someone else’s property, combined with use of force dangerous to the life or the health of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts, committed repeatedly or having as a consequence the death or maiming of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Armed robbery,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years, and with aggravating circumstances—Supreme measure of social protection. Aug. 26, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 65, Article 641).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Appropriation, i.e., withholding with mercenary purpose of somebody else’s property, entrusted for a definite purpose, or embezzlement of that property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Appropriation of a fund,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one month.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage having as its consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years with confiscation of entire or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The issuance of a check, which knowingly to the issuer is not subject to payment, and also cancellation of the check by him without satisfactory reason, or taking any other measures for the prevention of the receipt by the check holder or the amount of the check, as well as passing by the check holder of a check which knowingly to him is not subject to payment by the agent on whom it is drawn,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts having as their consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution or enterprise,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. Feb. 28, 1930 (Collection of Acts, No. 11, Article 131).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forgery with mercenary purpose of official papers, documents and receipts,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a period up to one year and fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deceptive change with mercenary purpose of the appearance or properties of objects, intended for sale or social use, if that said change had or could have had as its consequence the infliction of injury to health, as well as sale of such objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to one year with confiscation of part of property with prohibition of the right to sell merchandise, or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The making or keeping for the purpose of sale of a forged stamping tool, the stamping of jewelry and bars of gold, silver and platinum, affixing to objects made from other metals of stamps and marks having resemblance to the official stamping mark, as well as sale of aforementioned objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year, with confiscation in both cases of forged objects and stamping tools.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Usury, i.e., receiving of interest on money or property lent at a rate exceeding the interest rate established by law, and in particular, inclusion of the interest in the principal amount of the loan, or withholding a remuneration out of the amount received by the borrower or providing of fine and penalty for delay in payment of the loan or in other concealed forms,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a term up to one year or fine up to 5,000 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The same acts committed either professionally or by making use of the embarrassed state of the borrower,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years With confiscation of part of the property or without such confiscation, or with fine up to ten thousand rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Making available for use of means of production and cattle for a monetary remuneration or remuneration in kind or on condition of payment by labor obviously in excess of the customary amount for this locality, making use of the need or embarrassed position of the user,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to one year. Mar. 29, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 38, Article 283).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Extortion, i.e., demanding of transfer of property advantages or rights to property or committing of any kind of actions, of a property character, through fear of coercion of the person of the sufferer, spreading of defaming information or destruction of his property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated destruction or damage of property belonging to private persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts when committed by means of arson, flooding, or any other generally dangerous methods,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts if they are followed by loss of human life or a community misfortune,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Omission by a captain of one of the ships involved in a collision at sea of taking necessary measures for the saving of the other ship, in so far as such measures could be taken without serious danger to the said captain’s passengers, crew, or ship, regardless of the responsibility for not extending help to the crew and the passengers of the ship suffering from the calamity (Art. 156)—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Making public an invention before registration without the consent of the inventor, as well as unauthorized uses of literary, musical, or other artistic or scientific productions with infractions of the copyright law,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to three months or fine up to 1,000 rubles. August 30, 1931 (Collection of Acts, No. 59, Article 429).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Unauthorized use for purposes of unethical competition of someone else’s trade mark, design, model, as well as someone else’s firm name, or someone else’s name,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 3,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those familiar with women’s prisons in our own country will have missed “prostitution” from among the crimes enumerated in the Soviet Criminal Code. This practice is treated as a social problem in Russia, and rightly, in the opinion of most persons interested in penology, it is not held to be a crime. The six articles in the code directed against sex offenses, it will be noted, provide penalties for rape, or, in the interest of public health, for the infection of a person with a venereal disease by one aware that he (or she) has the disease. By treating prostitution as a social problem Russia has almost eliminated it. Women plying this trade are picked up by inspectors at railroad stations or other public places and taken, not to a jail, but to a prophylactorium where they are taught a useful trade with a view to removing the economic cause which is held to be the chief one in this practice. Many of the women at these centers have come voluntarily, the director of the prophylactorium in Moscow reports, through friends who have already received training and treatment. As a result of this omission from the Criminal Code, one does not find in women’s prisons that the chief cause of sentence is sex offense as it is in the United States, nor that the prisons are filled with a group who not only in the opinion of the author, but also in that of such organizations as the Women’s Prison Association of New York, should not have been sent there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who commits the crimes? Immediately following the Revolution the chief concern in regard to the crime situation was the suppression of those acts which jeopardized the authority of the Soviet government, but as the program of Socialist construction went forward, as they got the political situation more in hand, the type of prisoner began to change in the predominant number. Counter-revolutionary organizations were practically wiped out; the Kulak war, though still going on, somewhat thinned out, and in the residue of those of the criminal ranks there now appeared more of such types as constitute the convict population of other countries. In other words, the social composition of the group changed. Instead of there being more of an otherwise honest group of middle class farm people whose crimes consisted in efforts to overthrow a government, there was a rising percentage of ordinary criminals. This does not mean to say that the government is not still confronted with a great number of crimes against the state, by those of the bourgeoisie and Kulak class who, while not attempting to organize counter activities, still manage to get into collective farm or factory and cause a great deal of trouble, but it is noticeable that the other type of crimes is being given more attention and that programs of treatment are designed to apply to that problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In age, considering both sexes, the peak is reached in criminal acts at about twenty-four years. The curve descends sharply to forty and in a more leisurely fashion from forty to sixty. Official figures give the age group of 14-18 years as committing 2.5 per cent. of all crimes, 18-24 as being responsible for 25 per cent., and 24 and above, for the remaining. The crimes committed by the first group are almost wholly stealing; in the second group there are, of course, all sorts, but hooliganism figures large, and in the third there is every kind of law breaking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The youth, then, from 14-18 years are guilty of theft, more than of any other crime, both as to male and female, and next to that are crimes against the person—fisticuffs, breaking of bones, etc. Then, there shows up a phenomenon that is noted both in juveniles and adults—the female commits more crimes against the order of the government than do the men, relatively speaking. The author asked repeatedly for an explanation of this fact, and one man who had come from the rural districts, and is now an Intourist representative in Moscow, gave an interpretation which may or may not be right. It is interesting enough to pass on. The men, he said, did not resist collectivization so intensely when they saw that it was no use, but when a woman had collected a few goats or pigs, or a cow or two, it was no use trying to take them from her. She poisoned them first. No ideal of a final society in which she could take according to her needs could make up to her for the immediate loss of her treasures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is a more extensive comparison of the crimes committed by male and female transgressors. The first important thing to note is that the female is more given to excesses than the male in crimes of a less serious nature (Gernet, op. cit. p. 169). In one type of crime, hooliganism, the male is in the majority, with a percentage of 27.4 as against the female’s 2.8; but, in all other groups the woman is far in the lead. She commits six times the offenses of the men in insults, five times as many in the illegal manufacture of liquor, twice as many for assault, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in the crimes carrying sentences of above a year the men take the lead again. Note this table from an article Women in Correctional Labor Institutions, by A. Shestakova and B. Utievsky, included in the volume edited by Vishinsky. It shows clearly to what point women exceed in crime.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 358.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-bottom&amp;quot;| Length of sentence&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of male&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of female&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Up to 3 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 8.7&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 18.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 to 6 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 20.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 6 months to a year&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 16.8&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 1 year to 2 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.1&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 17.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 2 years to 3 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 13.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 years to 5 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 14.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 7.9&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 5 years to 10 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 12.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 4.5&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The social composition of the criminal group in the USSR is, as is to be expected, different from that of the ordinary capitalist country. In the first group of crimes mentioned the guilty are largely those of the village bourgeoisie and the rural Kulaks, who still struggle against the socialist order. They are persons who would not ordinarily be included in a criminal classification. Yet if we regard any legal definition of crime as including acts that contravene the rules and regulations of the proletariat society then they are actually criminals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this group commits most of the crimes against the state, the laborers themselves constitute the major portion of persons committing other types of crime. We find Professor Gernet,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; dividing them into owners of property or employers, and laborers. In theft we have a percentage of 12.2 for the first class, and 21.9 for the second; banditry is .8 per cent. for the first, and 1.7 per cent. for the second; murders 1.6 per cent. for the first, 2.4 per cent. for the second; hooliganism is 9.3 per cent. for the first, and 11.4 per cent. for the second. The situation is reversed in regard to crimes against the person. We find the first group there with a percentage of 10.5 and the second with 7.1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is some substantiation of the theory of the economic basis of crime which disciples of Marx and Lenin hold to so firmly in the fact that the curve for crime and unemployment rise and fall together. Russia claims to have no unemployment problem now, but there are those who do not work. There is always an idle band in any country. She has her dregs, misfits, and those who fall by the wayside from a variety of causes. And it is from this group that a large degree of criminals come. It furnishes its quota in Russia, too.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gernet, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is danger of getting too statistical. We want only to have a picture of the situation. Since 1928, the date already referred to as the beginning of a program to extend Socialism from villages to cities by means of collectivization, the curve for crimes against the state has risen. The Kulaks and the village middle class have waged a relentless war, apparently not daunted by what happens to those who are caught. Or, it may be heroism of a kind, even if a misplaced one. However, the expressed attitude of the authorities who administer the corrective labor system is steadfastly to win them over, to persuade and to educate in such a political fashion that they will be convinced. Whereas “crushing” was once the order of the day, the firmer establishment of the government now gives leeway for the more constructive measures. It is interesting to note that whoever is responsible for that political education knows his approaches well, if the statements of authorities are accurate. They have released enough, they say, to see what zealous citizens it turns back to society. I have no figures on it. But as I said in the preface, they know what they want of the man who is their criminal. Given that, accomplishment is easier. It is no small thing to persuade a man that the society he thought he was against was his all the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER V: WHAT THE COURTS ARE LIKE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; courts of Russia, in their present form a result of seventeen years of revolutionary evolution, and a mixture of proletarian ideas with older principles of justice, represent one of the most interesting developments in the country. It has been the aim of Soviet rule that the working class should by its participation in government be able to take part in carrying out the laws of the land. The administration of justice by the proletariat through which “Every representative of the masses, every citizen, must be placed in such conditions that he will be able to take part in discussing the laws of the state, in the choosing of his representatives, and in the carrying out of the laws of the state,” was a principle expressed by Lenin as early as 1918. The policy in political education has moved steadily toward the fulfillment of this plan. The use of jurors and their selection yearly in such a manner as will include a great number in the service is one way in which participation in administering and discussing laws is being carried out. Another is in the use of comradely courts carried on by the people of village or factory, which are later discussed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The responsibility of the courts in the establishment of strict legality has been increased tremendously by two recent events. The first was the meeting in April, 1934, of the first All-Union Conference of Jurists which made wide recommendations in regard to attaining a higher quality of work on the part of courts, prosecution, and correctional labor institutions. The second act of significance was the reorganization of the OGPU by the formation of the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the transference of all judicial functions to the courts of the land. It takes brief time and space for this last statement, but it would require a good many pages to discuss the full significance of the step, and a number are devoted to it a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the work of the All-Union Conference of Jurists, it is of high significance just now when the observance of legality and the establishment of a wide legal consciousness are so important in the relatively advanced stage of socialist construction which the state is entering. Openness must be the observed principle, and secrecy, even though legally judicial, discouraged, if confidence is to be widespread. A government cannot continue turning trials over to secret tribunals outside its judicial system and enjoy a reputation, even among its own loyal masses, of being adequately established. A normality of functions of institutions can go far toward establishing, even if only psychologically at first, a normality of conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Likewise, sentences must be constructive. This was not a new note as will be seen throughout this book. All along the party program had advocated an educational approach to the treatment of criminals, and year by year had strengthened provisions for realizing the fulfillment of its plans. But the emphasis on this problem by so authoritative a body brought it freshly to the attention of the courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0086.svg|SCHEME OF TRIAL IN RSFSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note the recommendation of the Conference in this regard. “In order to insure the effectiveness of judicial work, the judges should endeavor to ascertain the economic and social-political results of the verdict rendered by them, being assisted in this work by public opinion organized around the judicial institutions.” The same body placed a responsibility for prevention of crime on its courts. It was not only a duty to pronounce a sentence on a guilty person, but the tribunal must by means of its favorable position discover the reason for the circumstance of the crime. The recommendation ran, “The court, when trying a case, should not only establish the guilty persons but should also disclose those economic and organizational defects and shortcomings which create a favorable atmosphere for criminal actions, signalizing such circumstances to the attention of the Party and Soviet organs by means of special riders. The results of such signalizing should be checked up from time to time.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, as an important instrument in the accomplishing of the socialist society which is the goal of the people, the court’s function is first to subdue the enemies that would undermine any such progress, and second to aid in giving discipline and control to those of the proletariat themselves who are not strong enough on their own account. Added to that, it is an organ of prevention.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is not within the purpose of this volume to give a detailed description of the system of courts existing in the country at present, but a brief account is necessary. Before going further it may be well to repeat the reminder that a class distinction is fundamental in administering the criminal law in the USSR. This statement will appear too many times very likely, in relation to various phases of the subject, but it is important. The court as an organ of the state is devoted in its administration of law to carrying out the purpose and policy of the state, and since the class idea is prevalent in the government, it will have to be also in court action. With this explanation we proceed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is at the very bottom of the judicial system the People’s Courts.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Military crimes are under the jurisdiction of military tribunals and transport crimes of the transport courts of the various railway lines.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The territory represented by one such has a population of from 20,000 to 100,000. Its jurisdiction may include any case against property or person not carrying a death sentence, although the more serious ones go in actual practice to the higher courts. It has other functions than as a lower court of the first instance. It is a member of the observation commission which supervises the correctional labor policy at the local penitentiary or correctional labor institution. It has an administrative function when the judge, sitting without the jurors in a “business session,” decides whether the evidence gathered in a preliminary investigation is sufficient to warrant court proceedings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In trials the People’s Court is presided over by a judge assisted by two jurors who actually have most of the rights and responsibilities of the judge, and might, therefore, be called co-judges. The judges for the People’s Courts are elected for a one-year term by the local Soviet and may be recalled either by the same body or by the Commissar of Justice for sufficient cause. This provision for impeachability is one of the basic principles of organization of the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0089.svg|COURT TRIAL]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judges of these lower courts are representatives of the working class for they themselves are of their number. A judge (and, he seemed an adequate one), in a city court of Moscow with whom the writer talked was a baker before he took up his present profession. The qualifications of the office are that in addition to being from among the toilers the judge must have “a record of two years’ responsible work in state or workers’ and peasants’ public trade union, or party organization of the workers, or of three years’ practical work in organs of Soviet justice in the capacity of not less than judicial investigators.” Whether this may be regarded as high fitness or not, it seems to insure the selection of men of fair ability for the job. Perhaps it is that business of recall that makes them so careful, but those whom the writer saw sitting were impressive in their earnestness and efforts to arrive at a constructive sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The jurors, whom we may think of as co-judges, are about 40 per cent. women and 60 per cent. men. These persons are elected by factory committees, Red Army sections, and village Soviets, and a special commission distributes the number to be elected among these various groups in the percentage of 50 per cent. to the first, 15 per cent. to the second, and 35 per cent. to the third. There are no specific qualifications, except the right to vote, but there is the restriction that “A person has no right to be a juror, if he has been expelled from a social or professional organization for a disgraceful offense or conduct, for a period of three years from the day of expulsion. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The names of the candidates for jurors are posted, and objections, if motivated, may be presented to the election committee. When the list of elected ones is finally sent to the commission, the latter prepares another list of those to serve in the various courts. Each serves for only six days of the year, and during absence from work in the act of performing this duty the worker retains his place and wage of employment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While there seems to be no specific preparation for the task of a juror beyond the requirement that the judge explain to those who sit with him their rights and duties, there are conferences held and some evening classes which acquaint them better with the work before them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before we pass to the consideration of the next step in the Soviet judicature it would perhaps help in getting a clear picture of jurisdiction and procedure to take a look at some of the cases before the People’s Court. A typical day is described from the writer’s notes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first trial we attended in the morning the room used was a small one, perhaps with a capacity for seating forty people altogether. It was on the ground floor of the building, and street cars clanging along their track outside made hearing difficult. On a slightly raised dais underneath a picture of Lenin there was a long plain table covered with a green cloth. Three chairs were placed at the back and one at the end. Three men and a woman, evidently having something to do with the case about to be tried, were already in the court room when we entered. The benches on which we took our places were arranged on either side of the narrow aisle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Exactly at the hour set for the beginning of court, a door at the back of the room opened and a man, accompanied by two women, entered. The women sat in the outside chairs at the back of the table; the man took the center one. Already the young woman, who had been in the room on our arrival had seated herself at the end of the table. She was the clerk, the man was the judge, the two women the jurors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judge was obviously of the toiling classes, as were also the women. The judge, with his short black mustache, his close-cropped hair, his ordinary working clothes consisting of dark suit and blue shirt, ignored us and immediately got to work. The women were perhaps a little more conscious of our presence. The older in particular reached up to push back her hair, a little later smoothed her dress, a simple black cotton one. We noticed that her hands had seen much work. The other woman, about thirty and good looking, turned curious eyes toward us a moment, but finally gave her attention to the men who were seated on the front bench ahead of us.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judge adjusted his glasses and read from the papers in his hand. The plaintiff had worked faithfully for a school, discharging all his duties as per requirement, but he had not been paid. He was asking for his money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were no attorneys, neither defense nor for the plaintiff. The plaintiff had his witness; he told his story, then summoned his corroborator, who had been excluded as required by law. The school representative told his side. The women jurors, forgetting us by that time, listened attentively, and the older asked frequent questions. The judge too, interrogated often.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seemed obvious to us that the verdict should favor the man whose wages had been withheld, but it is difficult to tell about court decisions. We waited an instant; the three behind the table conferred so briefly that it was plain there was no dissension. The school was ordered to pay, and was fined five rubles. As simply as that and requiring hardly more time than the telling here, it was finished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We left the room as the next case was called and went upstairs. A trial of some seriousness was in progress there. The judge sitting appeared of unusual intelligence. He was leaning forward, questioning the man in front of him, and he took no note, apparently, of our entry. One juror was a woman, the other a man. There was the same long table, the clerk at the end, a red cloth (Communist symbol), instead of the green, an especially attractive picture of Lenin, and one of Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We asked cautiously of one of the spectators what the case was about. A factory director was on trial, accused of criminal negligence by the workmen, because he had been given money to insure the factory against fire some three or four months previously, and had failed to do so, thus imperiling the lives of those who worked there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But even though there might have been a severe sentence, if the motive was proved sufficiently base, there still were no attorneys, either for the state or defense. The defendant told his story. He had been ill and on vacation, but the matter of insurance would have his immediate attention, he said. He brought in his witnesses; but the workers’ evidence outweighed his. He had been warned, they said, and he had gone carelessly on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, said his witness, he had been a good worker. He had managed his factory well. It had done its prescribed quota and more. It was not right nor just that he should suffer for one negligent act.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The verdict was not so simple. The judge and jury retired into the mystery of the consultation room at the back. We sat wondering what sort of penalty, in case guilt was adjudged, would be imposed. Five minutes passed and they returned. The man was held guilty of negligence, and since he had been warned, and since the act was of a serious nature, imperiling the lives of workers and the property of the state, some measure must be used to impress him. He stood quietly, but the fingers of the hand hanging at his side worked nervously. The judge paused a bare moment, shuffled his papers, and then spoke.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For six months the man was to have no political rights and his party connections were to be cut off. But he was to stay in his job; go right on with the work he had done so well, and give up fifteen per cent. of his salary for the six month period. Even the accused seemed to feel that the penalty was just, and there was obvious agreement among those who listened.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So much for the People’s Court, the basic nucleus in the Russian judicial system. Now, for the second step in the judicature. The People’s Court takes care of the great mass of cases, both criminal and civil, and in addition exercises a function of supervision in regard to the village public courts and comradely courts of factories and other state institutions. But this will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just now we pass to the Regional Court. It is both a court of cassational instance (the form review of a criminal case usually takes in the USSR) and a court of original jurisdiction for more serious cases. Its territory comprises a province or region of three to eleven millions population. It is, first of all, the organ of control of all the courts within its region. It supervises the work of the People’s judges, as well as selects and presents the names of such to the regional executive committees for election.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A word must be said here as to the use of the cassational method. The court of appeals was abolished by the first decree issued by the Soviets on the courts, and in its place was the following provision.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Act 349 of Code of Criminal Procedure, now in force.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Complaints from verdicts of the People’s Courts may be lodged by each of the interested parties exclusively on account of formal infringement of the rights and interests of the given party in the conduct of the case or in the judicial examination of the case, and as such constitute cassation complaints, and may not touch upon the substance of the verdict.” Thus the law seems to prevent the right of the court to go into the substance of the case. Such, however, is not actually a fact.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling of the Supreme Court in regard to criminal cassation, in 1924, laid down the general rule for cassation review which is still followed. “The court of criminal cassation, being a cassation court in that it does not go into the substance of the case, at the same time avoids a purely formal bureaucratic approach to the case. While never turning into a court of appeals, it does not hypocritically shut its eyes to the substance; manifest lack of elucidation of the circumstances which should have influenced the verdict, inconsistency of the punishment with the crimes committed, manifest errors and contradictions between the verdict and the undeniable facts of the case, . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a form of revision on the complaint of the proper parties, which combines the elements of cassation as practiced by the French courts with a method of appeal and together make up the cassation-revision form of investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These complaints may be made by the defendant and his lawyer, the state prosecutor, the plaintiff and his legal representative, or by the legal suitor and his representative. Complaints by any other persons result in the case being handled by judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The form of the complaint follows no standard rule. A peasant may write a few words on a piece of paper, without even setting forth his argument, and the case will pass to the proper cassation court and be completely checked up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The form of judicial supervision differs somewhat from the cassation method. The latter depends on the action of the parties concerned while the first depends on the intervention of the chairman or prosecutor of the court of the first instance. From this it can be seen that the normal way to have a criminal case reviewed is by the cassation method, on complaint by the interested parties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We will pass from the work of the Regional Court as a court of cassation or supervision to look at a case which it tries in its capacity as a tribunal of first instance. In cases of appeal there are three judges sitting, but in cases of original jurisdiction there is the one judge and two jurors just as in the lower court. The judges of the Regional Court are elected by the Regional Executive Committee from a list of names presented by the Commissar of Justice. Their term of office is for one year. The qualifications are that in addition to the requirements for a People’s judge, the candidate shall also have served in a judicial capacity in a position not lower than the People’s Court for a period of three years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On our visit to the regional court we found a somewhat larger room, seating perhaps a hundred persons, but still lacking any formal atmosphere. Its standing capacity was crowded when we arrived. Even the door leading to the corridor was open and filled with men and women. We attempted to look over, but the spectators politely made way for us. We saw, as we edged forward, the usual picture of Lenin, the familiar red cloth on the table. One knew at once by the atmosphere of the room that a case of interest was in process of trial. The judge and jurors were already in their places and the judge was reading the charge which alleged that the four young men and a girl on the front seats in the custody of an officer, had some two weeks before entered and robbed the house of the woman across the aisle from them, and that such robbery was accompanied by the use of a firearm in which the husband was wounded. No murder, however, was done. In that case death could have been the assessed penalty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three attorneys for the defendants sat at the side of the room, but as the trial proceeded we noticed how little part they took. The judge questioned the defendants, and got the story almost entirely from them. Witnesses were there and the judge and jurors interrogated them as they came, but they turned again and again to the accused to check up, to give them a chance to verify or deny. The procedure was highly informal. The court sought to find out the truth of the matter, but we soon saw that the inquiry went even beyond that. True to the duty imposed on him in the matter of discovering the reason for the circumstance, the judge pursued his questioning. He wanted to find the motive for such conduct. To discover that he questioned the young criminals on the whole circumstances of their lives, of their social background, without regard to apparent relevancy. Guilt was not in question, but the “measure of social defense” to be applied depended on the whole circumstance of the deed. One of the offenders had run away from his home with his grandmother, from a good job, but he appeared to have been led by the older who admitted that he did not want to work. The girl, defiantly, confessed. The youth, who used the gun, was asked again why he shot the man. He looked down and said he did not know, unless it was because the victim did not raise his hands soon enough. The spectators, jammed to the door and tense, laughed in relief. The judge did not reprove them, but he did not laugh, and the room became quickly silent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judge surveyed the defendants with something of sorrow; we were particularly interested in his attitude for he appeared to be concerned that the young people should deliberately choose such a career, and gave occasional words of admonition. But judges and citizens alike in the USSR have faith in what labor of a correctional sort can do for the construction of character. The next day the young offenders were sentenced to institutions where the ruling principle, in accordance with Soviet policy, is to teach them the dignity of work, and how to do some important kind well, and where they will be given certain cultural and political education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is next in the system the Supreme Courts of the seven republics—much like our own state Supreme tribunals—which act both as organs of judicial control for all courts of the territory, as courts of appeal for those lower courts subject to their jurisdiction, and as courts of original jurisdiction in more serious cases. The judges of these courts are elected by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the top of the judicial system is the Supreme Court of the USSR. It is, of course, the organ of highest judicial supervision, and in its various branches acts as a court of appeals of all cases from various lower tribunals. The Military Section reviews the cases appealed from the military tribunals, the Transport Section performs the same function for those appealed from the railroad courts. Its judges are elected by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for a term of one year, and they must have had at least three years’ service as judge of the People’s Court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In original jurisdiction this court has only the most important cases in the Union. The Code of Criminal Procedure specifies: “The Judicial Department of the Supreme Court as a court of first instance, shall take jurisdiction (1) over cases of exceptional importance, when sent to it for trial by the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as cases offered for adjudication by the People’s Commissar of Justice, the Prosecutor of the Republic [now, the Attorney General] or the chairman of the State Political Bureau (OGPU). The Supreme Court has the right to accept for its adjudication or transfer for adjudication to any provincial court at its discretion cases offered for its adjudication by the prosecutor of the republic or Chairman of the OGPU. (2) Over cases involving offenses in office committed by members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the people’s commissars and members of the &#039;&#039;Collegiums&#039;&#039; of People’s Commissariats, members of the Supreme Court, the assistant prosecutors of the Republic. (3) Over cases of alleged offenses in office on the part of the provincial prosecutors and their assistants, the members of the presidium of the provincial executive committee, heads of its departments, chairmen or deputy chairmen of the provincial court.” All cases enumerated in this paragraph may be accepted by the Supreme Court for its adjudication or transferred by it to a provincial court depending on the importance of the case.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 449.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In several of these cases jurisdiction is not mandatory and may be transferred to other appropriate courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the cases tried by it and familiar to most Americans was the Metropolitan-Vickers case of two years ago, in which a certain group of Englishmen was accused of sabotage. But to continue the method used in discussing the lower courts, let us again consider a case. The following was appealed from the Siberian Regional Court, and does not present the human elements of cases of the first instance, yet it has its interesting points.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The building itself is a scant two blocks from the spot where Lenin lies in his red granite tomb. There was a militiaman inside the entrance who directed us upstairs to the proper room. Another officer was in the hall but he only looked at us curiously as we went by. It is the highest court of the land, and we were impressed by the informality of the approach.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Three judges presided in the room which presented a more formal appearance than those of the courts visited previously. An armed guard stood at the door leading out into the room at the back. Across the aisle from us sat three lawyers, the defense counsel. At the end of the table was the prosecuting attorney, a woman of some thirty years, who seemed competent and determined. Above the judges the usual portrait of Lenin looked down upon us. As we entered two young Russian women got up from the benches at the front to make way for us. They were the wives of the two condemned men whose case was on appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The judges themselves, all men, were impressive in their dignity, and seemed intelligent and capable. They were dressed simply in ordinary street clothes, the dark shirt of one was open at the throat. One of them, not the chairman, read the charge in the original case. Two men had been condemned to die for murder and robbery. One, the manager of a fur factory, had stolen money to the amount of 7,500 rubles from the factory, and he and a companion, in a boat with a third, were crossing a lake. The third had a sum of money in his possession. While they stopped on the shore of the lake the first two sent the third for wood, and as he returned, they waylaid him and clubbed him to death. The Siberian Regional Court had sentenced the men to be shot.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the reading, one of the defense attorneys spoke at length. In Russia there is no death sentence for murder, but for robbery in which murder occurs such a penalty is attached. The counsel, realizing that weight of evidence was against him, tried to separate the crime into two distinct acts. It was his one chance. The murder had been motivated by other causes, he said, and robbery followed as an afterthought. He contended also that the stick with which the man was killed did not constitute a weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, his argument did not hold and in addition the prosecutor pointed out that the one man had already stolen money from the state, which act in itself might carry the death penalty. The judges retired and we discussed the case while we waited. The defense attorney, who had spoken, walked up and down the aisle. The two wives were quietly huddled in seats farther back. A bell sounded, the court returned, and the chairman or presiding judge read the decision allowing the sentence to stand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case illustrated also the speed with which trials are completed after the crime is known. The murder of the man had occurred in October of 1933, but the body was not discovered until the latter part of June of 1934. There was no certainty of the third man’s death until that time as the other two had steadfastly maintained that he had left them. But less than one month after the discovery of the body, the two men had been tried and condemned to death. That was on July 19, and it was on August 9th that we heard the Supreme Court uphold the sentence. That is probably one of the main reasons why such deeds do not flourish there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is still to mention the village public courts and the comradely courts of factories and various institutions. These occupy a special place in the judicial system and were therefore not mentioned except in passing in the beginning of the chapter. They are under the supervision of the People’s Courts, and are for the purpose of interesting the large masses of people in handling such violations of laws as occur in factory or village. Among such problems would be disorganization of production in factory, on the farm, or in offices, as well as drunkenness, indolence, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These courts are of, by, and for the people. There may be some little matter of form separating the masses from the formal courts, but they handle these among themselves. At a meeting of the workers of a given village a chairman and not less than ten members are elected to sit as a court. The factory conference follows the same plan, and elects a chairman, one or more substitutes, and not less than ten members, the exact number to be decided upon, from among the shockworkers of the factory or office.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The People’s Court, functioning as a supervisor of these organs, may decide that a case is outside their competency, and take it from them or cancel the decision in a case that is considered not to have been within their jurisdiction, but the decision given in cases which are considered to be proper to them is final and subject to no appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A friend who was a spectator of the proceedings related the following case to the writer. A man had been drunk and had beaten his wife, not injuring her but outraging the village. In the presence of a large group of interested neighbors, the court assembled and tried him and decided that he must go forth from the apartment where he lived with his family and shift for himself as best he could. He did not deserve the shelter the home afforded him. There was no appeal. He left.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What are more definitely the types of cases handled by the comradely courts which, like the village public courts are free from any formal judicial rules?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following is quoted from a lecture delivered by S. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The comradely courts examine cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) of violation of labor discipline, to wit: repeated late-coming for work, staying away from work, reporting for work in a drunken condition;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) of systematic neglectful attitude to socialist property (machines, tools, materials, premises, etc.);&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) of turning out misfits above the allowed limit;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) of insults either by word of mouth or in writing, or action (spreading false derogatory stories about individuals), and inflicting blows without bodily injury;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) of thefts from factory and office by workers upon the territory of the enterprise, as well as of materials and tools belonging to the enterprise to the value of not more than 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) of Hooliganism that is not subject to criminal prosecution, and other behavior which does not correspond with the requirements of public decency and reflects the negative sides of social life.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
From the same source is taken the following list of penalties imposed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The following penalties may be imposed by the comradely courts:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) public warning;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) public censure with announcement in the wallnewspaper or in general press;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) a fine of not more than 10 rubles for the benefit of public organizations (Chemical Defense Society, Children’s Friends, etc.) ;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) reparation of damage caused to property, if not in excess of 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) raising the question before the administration of discharging the culprit;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) raising the question before the trade union of expelling a member from the union for a stated period.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Examination of the cases must take place not later than five days from the time of registration of the complaint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a closing paragraph I set down the basic principles of organization of the Soviet Courts. It summarizes what has gone before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;(a) administration of justice exclusively by toilers;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) election of judges and accountability before the electors;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) impeachability of judges, the latter being independent from any local or personal influences but most intimately bound up with their class and called upon to carry out the policy of their class;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) collegiate trial of judicial cases, as a rule, by a body of three people with an assured majority to the people’s jurors, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) participation of jurors in trial and judgment upon equal terms with the state judges, both in regard to fact and in regard to law, i.e., in the full scope of the rights of the state judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER VI: THE PRELIMINARY STAGE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Let&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; us start with the beginning. The Criminal Code of 1927 specifies how proceedings may be begun. We should expect that there would be an arrest, but this may not be the case. In fact it is unlikely except in the more serious cases. In the lesser ones there will almost surely be none at all. What happens then? There are two main possibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, the prosecutor, the investigators, the militia or the agency of Administration of State Safety of the People’s Commissariat of the Interior (formerly the OGPU) may start proceedings when they know or are informed of a criminal act. Since these organs are by their nature in a position to know of criminal law violations, it is usual for a case to start with them. The course they take will be discussed in a moment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second manner in which criminal procedure is usually instituted is on complaint made to a competent authority by a person, an organization, an official, or by a confession on the part of the criminal, in which the officials proceed as mentioned above, if there is evidence of a criminal act. Otherwise they take no action, and so notify the complaining person or agent, in which case he may appeal to a proper court if he so wishes. Thus, if a citizen comes to a proper authority and complains, either orally or by writing, of some act, but does not present sufficient evidence that a crime has taken place, the authority refuses to start initial proceedings. Often, not even a confession on the part of the supposed guilty party will be accepted as &#039;&#039;prima facie&#039;&#039; evidence. This decision on the part of the authority not to proceed may, however, be appealed to the competent court within seven days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When once this evidence is accepted as indicating that a crime has been committed there may or may not be an arrest. Quite naturally, if a serious crime has been committed such as murder, and the criminal is making an effort to escape, there is arrest and detention. The law, however, states&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, 1923, section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “No person shall be deprived of his liberty and taken into custody otherwise than in the instances and in the manner provided by law.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, in the same edition of the Code,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 100.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there is an enumeration of the cases in which an arrest may be legally made. They are “(1) When a criminal is apprehended while making direct preparations, or while actually engaged in commission of the crime, or immediately afterwards; (2) When the victim or eye witnesses point to a given person as the one who committed the crime; (3) When articles of evidence are found on the person of a suspect or in his dwelling; (4) When a suspect attempted to flee or is apprehended while in flight; (5) When a suspect has no domicile or a permanent occupation; (6) When a suspect cannot identify himself.” These are the six instances in which an arrest may be made. The police, however, may use their judgment as to the necessity of such action, and in the event of detaining the supposed criminal they must report within twenty-four hours either to the prosecutor or to a judge of the People’s Court, in whose jurisdiction the case may be, giving information as to who made the arrest, when, where, and at what hour, information obtained in regard to the person held, the crime with which he is charged, reason for the arrest, and the name of the official signing the order for arrest.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 107, Commentaries.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the evidence obtained is sufficient to warrant holding the person for investigation the authority to whom the report is made gives his assent. Otherwise he reverses the decision and the man is released.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the absence of these conditions an arrest may not be made and in that event the method of securing attendance is to have the suspected person sign a declaration that he will appear when summoned.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Criminal Code of 1927, Section 103.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, there is a way provided to meet necessity. If the act committed appears to be of a nature so serious that it would carry a penalty of more than a year’s sentence to imprisonment, one of the above measures may be selected so that he may be held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it is usually the police organs acting as investigators who take a person into custody at the beginning of a trial, the investigator may also order an arrest. The Code in Section 145 provides: “Means of cutting off the possibility of escape shall be selected only after the suspected person has been formally accused and can be altered or abolished after the first questioning. In exceptional cases these means may also be applied to mere suspects who have not yet been declared accused.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who makes arrests in the USSR? The police force is the militia. This organ not only makes the elementary inquiry on cases which come under the jurisdiction of the investigator—to be discussed more fully in later paragraphs of this chapter—but they may themselves also conduct such preliminary investigation in all other cases. Besides carrying out the official open investigation they also carry on detective activity in order to establish grounds for future criminal trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is another agent of arrest. Wherever Russia is known, the “Gay-Pay-Oo” is a familiar institution. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; of early revolutionary days gave way in 1922, in the days of NEP, to an organ a little less frightening. But the OGPU had an ability on its own account to send shivers down the backs of people and caused would-be lawbreakers of the less hardy type to check their actions. If those critics, who feared that NEP ushered in an era that would in its mildness take power from the direct hands of the proletariat and turn it over to well-established revolutionary law, had waited for this organ to be in action they would have been reassured. Whether all the deeds attributed to this secret police be truly theirs or not, it is certain that it has been an effective means of protecting Soviet authority. It has been a court unto itself as well. It was, until July 10, 1934, empowered to punish even by shooting “all persons apprehended while participating in a banditry raid or armed robbery,” and the purpose for which it was avowedly organized was to “unite all the revolutionary powers of the republics for the purpose of combatting political and economic counter-revolution, espionage and banditry.” It is in this enumeration of crimes that it has jurisdiction as an organ of preliminary investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This organization has directed most of its attention to counter-revolutionary activities and uses its judicial powers mostly against the enemy class. Ordinary criminals arrested by it are usually turned over to the courts for trial. As for the actual number shot during recent years, there seems no way to judge, but indications are that they have been sparing in executions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chamberlin, Soviet Russia, p. 390.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are other phases of their work such as the maintaining of places of deprivation of liberty which will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The OGPU has recently been incorporated into the newly formed All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs as the Administration of State Safety, and its judicial &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; has been abolished. The significance of this is apparent. It ends a chapter in the history of Soviet Russia. Cases once disposed of by this organization now will pass through the courts, and the pictures the world held of midnight secret trials will have to be put away. While the activities of the OGPU were duly authorized by law, the possibilities of excesses under such a system seem apparent, and the establishment of a more definite order of legality is bound to produce a quieter confidence. Because of the widespread interest in the transferring of this authority, the entire decree is given here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To form an All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, including in its composition the United State Political Department (OGPU).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs is to be entrusted with:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The guaranteeing of revolutionary order and state security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The protection of public (socialist) property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Registration of civil acts (registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Protection of the frontiers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The following departments are to be formed in the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a)Chief Department of State Security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Chief Department of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Chief Department of Frontier and Internal Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Chief Department of Fire Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Chief Department of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Department of Civil Acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Administrative and Business Department.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To organize in the Union Republics People’s Commissariats of Home Affairs, acting on the basis of the law on the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, and in the RSFSR to establish instead of a People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs for the Republic an Institute Plenipotentiary for Home Affairs of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Departments of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the Union Republics are to be organized in the autonomous republics, regions and provinces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) To abolish the judicial collegium of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs are to send all cases of crimes on the completion of their investigation to the competent judicial organs in accordance with the legal requirements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Cases under the Department of State Security of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs are to be directed to the Supreme Court of the USSR, while cases of such crimes as high treason, espionage and similar crimes are to be handed over to the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR or to the competent military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) A special conference is to be organized under the People’s Commissar of Home Affairs of the USSR which, on the basis of the regulations, is to be entrusted with the right of applying, by administrative order, banishment, exile, imprisonment in corrective labor camps for a period not exceeding five years and banishment beyond the frontiers of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) To instruct the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR to present to the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR regulations for the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
What judicial authority is to handle the cases previously in the jurisdiction of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of the OGPU? Here is the decree:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In connection with the organization of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and with the object of insuring the proper consideration of cases handed over to the judicial organs and investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Cases of state crimes (counter-revolutionary and against administrative order), with the exception of those indicated in the subsequent points of this section, investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and also. the principal courts of the autonomous republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Special collegiums composed of a chairman and two members of the Court, are to be formed in the judicial institutions of the USSR and Union republics, named for the consideration of these cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Cases of high treason, espionage, terrorism, causing explosions, incendiarism and other forms of crime (Art. 6, 8 and 9 of the law on state crimes), investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and competent military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Cases of crimes on the railway and water transport, investigated by the same organs are subject to the jurisdiction of the railway and water transport collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the courts of the railways and water transport to which they belong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) All other cases, investigated by the same organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Courts in the usual order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the consideration of appeals against the resolutions of the Plenums and Presidiums of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, and also appeals against the sentences, decisions and definitions of the collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR, a judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR is to be established which is to be composed of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and two of his deputies, who are to have the right of directly rescinding or changing the resolutions, definitions, decisions and sentences of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics and Collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considerations of cases in the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR are to take place with the obligatory participation of the State Prosecutor of the USSR or his deputy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Resolutions of the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR may be appealed against by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the State Prosecutor of the USSR in the plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR and in the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In conformity with sections I and II of this decree, to recognize the necessity of strengthening the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To instruct the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics to oblige the People’s Commissariats of Justice and Chairmen of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics to work out and carry through in the fixed order, within a period of five days, appropriate additions to the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To instruct the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR to work out and carry through in fixed order, within the same period, addition to the staffs of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus does Russia make another advance in the administration of her criminal law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With proceedings begun, the next step is to determine by preliminary investigation if the suspect is to be definitely accused and held for trial. The purpose of this is to keep the court calendar from being crowded with cases which ought never to come to trial because the accusation is unfounded. It likewise guarantees the investigation and consideration of the substantial facts and saves much of the court’s time. The organs involved here are the prosecutor, the investigators appointed by him, and attached to his office, the police (militia) and the body formerly known as the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a great deal of informality and flexibility in the matter of this preliminary investigation. The investigator may take the whole matter into the atmosphere where the crime was committed. He may conduct it among the workers of the factory, if the act occurred there, in order that the workers themselves may aid in furnishing proofs, and in checking up the various facts. He also benefits in this way from the public opinion in regard to the case. This method of investigation in regard to labor crimes, both in factories and more recently in agricultural spheres, has been growing more and more common.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the more complex cases this investigation is carried on by the prosecutor himself after the initial evidence is turned over to him by the militia, organs of criminal detection, or other competent authority making the first inquiry. In lesser cases the investigating organ will usually prepare the case although the prosecutor may at any time examine the evidence and otherwise supervise the conduct of the case. Now that (since 1933) there is an Attorney General of the USSR, centralizing the prosecuting forces of the entire federated republics, the most important cases such as the famous Metropolitan-Vickers would be turned over to his personal supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this preliminary investigation it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney under whom it is carried on to see that evidence both for and against the suspect is gathered. If he neglects to see that the rights of the person under suspicion are protected and permits a case to come to trial when the evidence, if properly gathered, would indicate innocence, then he is laying up trouble for himself and will probably have to answer to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To the end that all information and evidence may be secured, the investigator is given wide powers as to search and seizure of anything having a relation to the case. But if one thinks of rough-shod entry and abuse, he may be consoled by certain restrictions which the law places around such activities. In conducting searches and seizures the investigator calls in official witnesses. Persons participating in the case as parties to it, and relatives of the parties, cannot be official witnesses. And Sec. 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “the searches and seizures are to be made in daytime, except in cases which cannot be postponed.” The searcher is further ordered to announce his decision to make the search and to use all possible care to avoid damage (Section 179 of the same Code), and the additional protection is given to the accused in that the investigator is to see “that the facts of the private life of the person searched which have no relation with the case shall not be made public.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sec. 181.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All articles seized in such a search must be listed, remarks made, and a copy deposited with the person or his family, and the articles themselves must be sealed at the place before being taken away.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 183, 184, 185.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mail may also be seized by the investigator if permission has been given by the prosecutor, as may also any telegraphic or other communications, but the safeguard is provided that a representative of the postal-telegraphic institution must be present.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 186-188.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first stage of the preliminary investigation there is no “accused.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Except in such obvious cases that no investigation would be necessary. An example of this would be a man actually caught murdering another.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The aim at this time is to find if a criminal act has really been committed and if so who committed it. After the deed is decided to be of a criminal nature and is definitely attributed to a particular person or persons then the second stage is undertaken. At this time the “decision” is framed, and the accused is notified that he is to appear before the authority. This “decision” is written after the evidence has been carefully weighed and guilt indicated. This document must contain all the information and circumstances gathered up to that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the person has been finally accused he is summoned to appear before the investigator who is handling the case. He is not yet definitely held for trial. When he appears he is made acquainted with the accusation. “And that does not mean,” a prosecutor told the writer, “that he is given a chair and table and told to read the papers before him. The whole thing is explained to him by the authority in charge.” Thereafter he is questioned and given a chance to tell his side of the matter. His statements are checked and any new evidence is gathered.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Steps must now be taken to insure his appearance during the completion of the investigation. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for five measures, as follows:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 144 and 150-154.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (1) He will not leave the place specified in the statement he signs without the permission of the proper authority which is the investigator or the court. (2) &#039;&#039;Personal or property parole&#039;&#039;. In the arrangement for property parole, the organization signing the bond must produce the accused when wanted or forfeit the sum of money agreed upon, but in the personal parole the persons (not less than two) who have agreed to produce the accused when wanted may, on failure to do so, be fined or sentenced to compulsory labor for a period up to three months. (3) &#039;&#039;Cash bail&#039;&#039;. Either he or other persons may deposit with the court a cash bail to insure his presence, the amount to be determined as in our courts, by the seriousness of the crime. (4) &#039;&#039;Detention in the home&#039;&#039;. The person may be restricted to his own home, as in the case of illness, or if a woman, because of pregnancy or of the care of her children. (5) &#039;&#039;Holding in custody&#039;&#039;. To be used in more serious cases. This latter is permissible only in certain prescribed cases. One of the conditions is that the case be of such a nature that the penalty, if conviction is secured, will be for a year or more of imprisonment. In addition one may be held in custody in cases covered by a definite enumeration in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which the sentence is not to exceed one year. The third possibility is in case of such serious crimes as banditry, or those of a socially dangerous nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the use of these measures the class nature of the criminal trial is strikingly portrayed. If the personality of the accused, or the crime he has committed, represents a high degree of social danger then one of the more severe measures is chosen. This would be the case for one appraised as a class enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The preliminary investigation may not yet be completed. If the evidence seems conclusive the prosecutor may end the preliminaries by simply drawing up the accusatory decision and conveying such information to the accused, but there may also be much more to this stage of procedure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the appearance of the accused for questioning a whole new set of resources may be opened up. He mentions witnesses of his own, he gives his own testimony. His relatives must testify if needed. Apparently no one is omitted but the defendant’s counsel. And any falsifying or hiding of evidence on the part of any witness makes him liable to more severe punishment. Even though there is no oath administered due to the official attitude toward religion, there are still effective means of impressing a witness with the importance of telling the truth, one of which is to let him know what will happen to him if he is caught deviating from it!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But to go back to the investigation. The accused may make certain requests or demands, and as indicated before, it is not only the duty of the investigating authority to see that they are met if reasonable, but if he neglects to take cognizance of any fact in favor of the defendant he is placing his own position in jeopardy. Not only must the investigator inquire into circumstances and facts that determine guilt or innocence, but he must also find out anything he can that will help in determining the measure of social defense to be given. What, for example, would be some of the things that he would want to know?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost at this time is the question as to whether or not the act was committed in an attempt to restore the bourgeoisie to power; after that the motive and circumstances of the act. In Soviet jurisprudence circumstances play an important part in disposing of the case. The history of the accused himself will be of help if there is a consideration of insanity, the whole circumstances of the crime will establish whether there was coercion, or threat, or whether the offender was at the moment of committing the crime in a state of destitution, hunger, or strong excitement, or influenced by any extremity of personal or family conditions. All of these circumstances are considered extenuating and influence the penalty assessed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the establishment of all relevant facts pertaining to the case the investigator may summon any experts deemed necessary. These must appear and give their conclusions no matter whether they aid or harm the accused, and a refusal to do so carries a fine of fifty rubles. The use of experts by the criminal courts in Russia will be discussed later but for the time being it may be said that such a custom is in wide use.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The calling of experts or other witnesses may also be at the request of the accused. The law provides&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “The investigator shall not have the right to refuse the request of the accused or of the complainant to summon additional witnesses or examine experts if the facts or circumstances sought to be established may have any bearing on the case.” Not only that, but the investigator is likewise limited in interpreting some line of inquiry sought by the accused as not having relevant bearing on the case. Not only must he furnish some adequate grounds for such a refusal, but he must also state in writing his reason for taking such a stand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The number and kind of experts to be used are determined by the investigator if it is on his initiative that they are called. But if the defendant requests others he must call them, unless it is impossible to get the desired expert or unless the granting of this request would delay the preliminary hearing beyond the time legally set. It might be that the defendant would purposely request some one whom it was impossible to produce in order to secure delay, and in such an event, the investigator is naturally not forced to comply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question of sanity may arise during the preliminary investigation and the proceedings may be dismissed on the grounds of insanity at the time of the commission of the act. If it is judged that the insanity has set in since the act then the trial is postponed until a cure is effected. There is a Judicial Psychiatric Institute where persons awaiting trial are observed for this purpose; but in order to facilitate the work of the medical staff the investigators gather all pertinent data as to the mental history of the accused.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With all the information finally assembled the investigator is in a position to make his decision. The police organs, in their initial investigation, may discontinue the case if they find the evidence does not warrant going on. The investigator, if the case has been in his hands, may likewise discontinue for lack of sufficient evidence. And the prosecutor, with the collected data in his hands, may decide that there is no case. But if the person or organization first initiating proceedings is convinced that this is a mistake, the decisions in each of these cases may be appealed to the next higher authority and finally to the court of proper jurisdiction, within a month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the investigator may decide to hold the accused for trial. In this event as soon as the investigation is completed the accused is notified of the decision and all the facts laid before him. He must be informed of his right to examine the entire records in the case, and the investigator must be sure that he is acquainted with the entire contents. If he is able to suggest anything to be added, the investigator must see that it is included before it finally leaves his hands. Any basic error in this stage of the proceedings may be the cause of a reversal by a higher court, so that great care must be taken to fulfill all points of law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A time limit is set by law as to the completion of this investigation. One used to American delays gasps at the speed with which these people dispense justice. One month from the time the defendant is formally accused the preliminary inquiry must be completed. However, this is not always possible, as appeals may be taken all along on the acts of investigator or prosecutor, and other delays may occur. But certainly all speed possible is used and there is no question of postponement of trial to the extent that we are accustomed to in our country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the preliminary investigation completed the accused is formally held for trial. This may, in the simpler instances, be by the judge of the People’s Court in cases when there is no necessity for investigation or in those cases when the police officers make all investigations and forward the information to the People’s judge. This would be true in cases involving sentences of less than one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In cases punishable by not less than one year sentence, yet not of so serious a nature as to require a preliminary inquiry, the investigator holds the accused for trial, on the basis of the information submitted to him by the police or OGPU. In such cases, all the evidence gathered together with the decision of the organs making the investigation is forwarded to the investigator, who, if he agrees submits the records to the competent court. There it is put on the trial list. If he feels that the conclusion to hold for trial is not warranted, then he may refer it to the court of proper jurisdiction for approval or rejection. In cases where the investigator himself is in charge of the preliminary inquiry he forwards his findings to the prosecutor, and he holds for trial in precisely the same way as was indicated above.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER VII: SCIENTIFIC AIDS TO THE COURT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;It has&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; already been said that a heavy responsibility has been thrown on the courts in the USSR in regard not only to establishing guilt but also to finding, within the bounds of the provisions of the law, the proper measure of social defense to insure a corrective influence on the one on whom it is assessed. Guilt is often obvious, but the proper steps to take in an attempt to see that the offender does not repeat his crime do not usually show themselves with such clarity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court, in trial, is not limited in any way in its efforts to get complete testimony and an accurate interpretation of such information. It is one of the fundamental principles of the administration of Soviet criminal law that the responsibility for the fullness and correctness of both investigation and verdict in the course of the trial rests on the court, and it may take any action on its own initiative to secure such ends. The prosecution and the defense may actually conduct the case within the bounds and direction which the court gives, but the court sets such limits and directions, interferes at any time on any point not cleared up by the argument, and decides on all questions relative to the examination. The court is independent of the opinion of either party in the trial and it is its responsibility to investigate any circumstance that appears essential to the case, whether the parties request it or not. It may likewise rule out what appears to be non-essential, even if it is requested by one of the parties. It is master of the whole proceedings and the expressed basic principle guiding its actions is to get at the truth of the incident involved and interpret the act in the light of all circumstances, so that a correct measure both for the protection of society from the socially dangerous and for the rehabilitation of the individual may be given.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Superhuman wisdom would be required to fulfill such a demand if the judge acted alone, or even in conjunction with his co-judges, the two jurors. But the Code of Criminal Procedure has provided that he be supplied with whatever aid scientific research and endeavor can give. During the trial the court may call experts and it may also have the benefit of advice or testimony of specialized institutions connected with it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With no further evidence than the space devoted to the use of experts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, one would know that much importance was attached to the practice in the USSR. It is the subject of many articles, not only as regards the use of such aids in the court trial but, as already seen, in the preliminary trial as well. It might, because of its frequency, become a loose, taken-for-granted observance, but there are safeguards which make it a matter of serious regard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One matter of interest in the use of such experts as the defense itself may request to have called is that there is never any financial transaction between the two. The expert receives his fee from the state and in case the defendant is found guilty it is charged to him. This practice eliminates the possible sense on the part of the expert that he must give evidence, or rather interpretations, in favor of the man from whom he is receiving money. He has no feeling of obligation in this direction and is thus more disposed to give unprejudiced opinions. The spectacle of the bitter clashing of “alienists” hired by prosecution and defense is not likely to take place in a Soviet court room. Opinions naturally differ and on occasion the court may have to summon others, so that he may see which way the weight of opinion falls, but the dividing line is not due to a desire on the part of either to defend his client.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Experts are called by the courts whenever specialized information of any kind that is desired is available. Article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Experts are called in when in the investigation and examination of the case, special knowledge in science, art, and the crafts is required.” And in a note to the same article it is further provided that “Experts must be called in to establish the cause of death and the character of bodily injuries, as well as in order to determine the psychic condition of the accused or of the witness if there be any doubt on this score in the opinion of the court or of the investigation.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A limitation is, of course, placed in that a science may not have grown in such a way as to furnish a reliable basis for inspection of evidence and conclusions. On the other hand something of an unusual nature may be called in a case presenting such a problem as one related to the author by a state prosecutor. In the USSR one causing a suicide receives a severe sentence. In a case of a double suicide of two women, there seemed no clue pointing to the guilt of any person until a small drawing was discovered. On the evidence obtained from this paper, with the aid of an expert in the identification of characteristics of lines and angles, an arrest was made and a confession and corroborating data obtained. This would not ordinarily be a legitimate line of expert aid, but in this case it afforded the only chance of detection. It is an excellent example of a case where expert testimony may be the only available resource.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The expert, once summoned, has practically unlimited rights and privileges in gathering needed material for forming his conclusions. He is given all the data in the case for study, and he attends throughout the entire trial exactly as do the prosecution and defense. He may question the witnesses, ask for any further materials such as publications, documents, records, or even the subpœnaing of witnesses, and the court sees that his requests are granted. It is said that there is no known case of a refusal of co-operation with the expert on the part of either court or investigator. He is responsible in arriving at the proper solution of the case, and he is held accountable for any negligence in obtaining any information that can contribute to the accuracy of his conclusion. He may, make an error but he may not falsify, at least not without penalty. The Code of Criminal Procedure which devotes so much attention to this matter of experts says, “In regard to answering summonses, obligation to speak the truth, responsibility for false testimony, i.e., for deliberately false and not mistaken testimony, the expert shall be equal to witnesses.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But experts may disagree, even honestly and without regard to a fee! Also, it is conceivable that one might be inadequate. An American mind, at least one whose owner has attended court in the United States, might understand such a contention. The Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure takes care of that possibility, too. In Article 300 we find it provided that, “If the expert conclusion be found insufficiently clear or inadequate, and also in the event of dissension among experts, the court shall appoint new experts, either on its own initiative or upon the request of either side.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The conclusion of the experts is given at the close of the hearing and is attached to the records of the case. The court does not have to agree with the findings but he must consider them. He is free to criticise, and so, for that matter, is either of the sides in the case. But, in any disagreement he must defend himself well. The Code of Criminal Procedure again says:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article 295.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “However, if the court disagrees with the conclusion of the experts, such dissent shall be minutely motivated either in the verdict or in a special rider.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The testimony of the expert is held to be of peculiar character in Soviet judicature. He is not a witness, giving facts, but it is his function to examine and appraise facts, to inspect and to weigh and to give his opinions and conclusions in the special way of which he is capable. His evidence is distinguished from the other given in the trial in that it is specialized and independent. In other words the court can look after the facts but he wants the expert to tell him the meaning of what he finds out. And the experts have accepted the challenge and the responsibility with vigor. They have developed what might almost be called an “official psychology” that fits well into the nation’s philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This science, called “judicial psychology,” occupies first place among the branches used by the courts in the Soviet judicature, and the second of importance is correctional labor psychology. The authorities attach no importance to what we call criminal psychology because they reject the idea that the criminal has any psychological or biological peculiarity. The use of the term alone suggests that they have, and the content likewise reminds them of some brand of Lombroso doctrine. For their theory of crime with its economic base, with its contention that this phenomena results practically &#039;&#039;in toto&#039;&#039; from the exploitation of one class by another, such a consideration would not do. Here one sees an application of their theory of crime. The criminal for them is like other people, and as the classless society approaches its perfect state a new social consciousness will evolve and any urge to crime will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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They reject likewise a juridical psychology which makes use of an analysis of psychological concepts into such elements as “imprudence,” “intent,” “spiritual agitation” because its content is too much one of juridical scholasticism, and affords no practical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Judicial psychology, considered in its broader sense, would involve the correctional labor psychology referred to above as one branch of this science important to the Soviet judicature. Defined in this larger way it would mean the application to the work of the court and the corrective labor institutions of all results of psychological research. Used in the narrower meaning it refers to criminal procedure psychology, or the application of whatever is known in this field to the case as a whole during the procedure or what transpired in the preliminary investigation. It would comprise the psychology of the accused, of the witnesses, of any other participant, even of the judge, jurors, experts themselves, and of the prosecutor and defense. They emphasize that they do not deal with the breaking up of the personality under consideration into such atoms as attention, memory, etc. as is done in the German school, but that they study the entire behavior of the witness, or other person, against a background of the broad, whole situation of the judicial investigation. They interest themselves, first of all, in the obtaining of true testimony and later in its correct appraisal, and their chief endeavor is to develop a better technique to arrive at these ends. With the emphasis they put on the importance of this usage and the talent they have in the field and the serious attitude the research workers take toward the problem, they should develop something compensating for their great effort.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in the field of correctional labor psychology there should be an even greater future. This is where the practical worker begs for more light from his scientific colleague. It is one field, said an authority, where the practical worker has gone on ahead of the research worker. There is eagerness to regenerate the psychology of the lawbreaker, to get him so readjusted that he will fit usefully into life. But more of this will be found in the chapter on Corrective Labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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To think only of the individual and his happiness would spur a scientist on to great effort, but it is even more than that in this instance. The nation’s progress toward its ideal depends on the successful use of these unfitted elements. It is no wonder that so many of the best minds are devoting themselves to working out the most adequate possible corrective labor policy. Filled with zeal as they are for their cause, they feel the responsibility which rests on them of making every human possible of use in the Socialist order.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are two institutes attached to the judicature in the USSR that require special attention in this consideration of expert aid rendered to the courts. Their work is of the utmost importance in the whole system of criminal procedure and the administration of corrective labor. The two referred to are the Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute and the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy, both attached to the office of the Attorney General and to the Commissariat of Justice. It was in visits to these two places that the writer experienced the greatest enthusiasm for what is being accomplished in the field of criminal repression in the USSR. Work of the finest type is being carried on in the lines covered by these two institutions by staffs well equipped for their respective fields of endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
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The writer visited the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy several times, looked through its library and used its books, and had the aid by conferences and advice of Director Shlaposnitchov, of the assistant director, of Professor Brusilovsky, and others of its officers. It is admirably staffed all the way through by persons not only of ability but of social conscience. The seriousness with which they attack the problems which face them and their acquaintance with the work being done in other nations are bound to impress anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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This Institute carries out the usual policy in the USSR of combining the theoretical and the practical. Along with those who are engaged in problems of research into the cause and treatment of crime there come the workers from the courts with practical problems to solve. Working in the library and reference section are persons who read and speak several languages and who carry their research into the study of foreign legislation and reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are a number of sections devoted to special lines of inquiry, chief of which are: Criminal Law and Criminal Trial, a Judicial Section, Statistical Section, and one giving its attention to the problems of juvenile offenders.&lt;br /&gt;
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Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute is the principal other scientific body on which the courts rely for solving their crime problem. It has likewise its practical and theoretical side. Research is carried on by a large staff of medical men and women, of research workers, of professors, and collaborators, and it publishes the results in numerous volumes. It also holds conferences and discussion meetings. It is equipped with all the latest devices and instruments for treatment of its cases and works in close contact with judicial establishments. Its director gave the following as the purposes of the Institute:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) To examine all those about to be tried when there is a question as to psychic condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) To aid all correctional labor camps both as to policy and on actual cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) To help in problems of juvenile delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) To carry on research in the problems connected with the work of the Institute.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) To establish graduate courses and train medical aids.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity for patients is one hundred and fifty beds, these are divided into different groups; such as those for men, for women, for children, for the definitely deranged, and for those who are of apparently sane condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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No one is admitted at Serbsky except those who have come in contact with the law, through its contravention. When a question of sanity comes up in a case at trial or in the preliminary stage of procedure, it may be cleared up by a brief examination by doctors, but in every case where extended observation is needed the person is sent to Serbsky. After not longer than a month a report is made to the court. In case insanity is adjudged by the staff, then the patient may be sent to a hospital where care is given him, or, if he is dangerously demented, he is placed in an institution where there is more restriction and compulsory treatment and care.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Institute maintains a department where children are kept, and where they are taught by teachers who come in for that purpose, and trained in certain arts and crafts. Also, some adults are kept beyond the month period when it is thought that only brief treatment is needed so that the trial may go on. There was one who had been there for eight months and another for six at the time of the author’s visit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because of the short period of retention in this place one would not expect that much of a constructive nature could be done in the matter of work. But here the policy of Soviet treatment shows to advantage. The shop teacher exhibited to us with pride what he had been able to accomplish, and his enthusiasm was justified. In accordance with their theory that labor can correct almost anything they use it here as a constructive treatment. They also use, as has already been said, all of the latest medical and psychological therapy, but there is at the same time an insistence that training for work, giving one something to do and teaching him how to do it well, is the best way to psychical readjustment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Pursuant to the fulfillment of this idea those sent here make things and they are carefully observed while they work. Some of the objects in the shops and on exhibit in a small conference room were beautiful models. Among those, of especial note, there was an airplane, perfect in minute detail, a movie machine, a system of traffic lights, and a collective shop made by the children. The latter would have a political significance, of course, and serve to put over education of a socialist nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one goes into Serbsky Institute one encounters a guard at the outer gate, and the feeling is that here is a prison. It is, of course, of a kind. Men who are in this place are, many of them, of a dangerous nature, such as we would call criminally insane. This terminology will not do, however, for Soviet criminology, as one may be either insane or criminal, but not both. But a number are guilty of murder, are pleading insanity as a defense when they may, of course, be sane; a number have made homicidal attacks on individuals. With this in mind one expects to see more of a prison atmosphere prevail.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the outside there were no armed guards in evidence, and we were told that there were none. When we went through a ward of some twenty-odd men of the most dangerous type with only a woman attendant, and no one else about, the writer frankly felt somewhat nervous. It seemed they ought to be under guard, but the woman in charge assured us that there had never been an attack by one of them on an attendant. The attitude of the Serbsky staff toward the patients and the attitude they manage to get from them in return seemed to us remarkable.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went through the gardens where those persons of a less dangerous nature were reading, talking, or doing whatever they wished. Some came to speak to us. One wished to make a long speech. A part of these were judged to be mentally normal, others must return to face their trial. We came at last to the place where are kept the most obstreperous; those who would surely make an attempt to escape if not restrained. This was the only example the writer encountered in Russia of persons locked in cells. There may be others in isolated instances, but solitary confinement has been done away with as a matter of policy. The building housing these prisoners was two-story, and the cells faced inward on the garden. There were tall big windows of unbreakable glass affording plenty of light, but the ventilation was bad. A remark was made to that effect and we were told that it was an old building they had had to utilize, and that it was to be replaced within the year. It certainly was out of keeping with the rest of the place, and made us think that it would actually be taken care of before long. However, there were not many persons there. Glass panes in the doors enabled one to peer in and there were only ten inmates in all the rooms on the two floors.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was in one of these cells, where all the furniture is secured to the floor, that we were allowed to talk for a moment to a man who is quite a character in criminal circles in the USSR. He is held to be the chief swindler of the country and a recital of his escapades made the assertion sound entirely plausible. Perhaps it should be emphasized for fear that it was not made clear above, that it is not the ravingly insane who are kept in these rooms. They are the ones kept in the ward already mentioned. These are they who are the more dangerous criminally, who possibly are not insane at all. The swindler was held to be normal mentally, and if he got away with all that his record enumerated one feels sure he must be.&lt;br /&gt;
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The swindler, a young man of near thirty, thin, dark, sat morosely on his cot as we went in. The attendant spoke to him, put her hand on his shoulder. We had the story of him before we entered. He had been in prison a number of times, he had supplied a luxurious living to himself and admiring companions over a period of years. He had been sent to this Institute at several of his previous trials and the opinion had been each time that he was mentally normal. A few months before our visit he had been returned to court to stand trial, and had been sent to a corrective labor institution. But he had refused to work. He had refused to follow any of the prison régime, and the authorities had returned him to Serbsky for a check on his mental condition. He ignored us, seemed hardly to be conscious of our presence, as he begged to know of the young woman what they were going to do with him now. She talked to him for a few moments in an encouraging manner. Her effort with him, she said, was to convince him of a better way of living by means of the training he would get in the corrective labor institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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We had already been in the children’s department and had talked there to two girls whom we were told to remember for future reference. One in particular was a pretty, gentle-appearing child of twelve. Here is her story. She had been a run-away, she had wandered in various parts of the USSR, or so she said. Her acts of a criminal nature had all been directed against children. She had stolen several whom she said she had pinched and tortured in a sadistic manner and killed. The number she set at ten, but there was no verification of her report. She had become well enough known and feared in certain sections so that she was threatened by mothers of young children if she so much as entered the village or town. She had a few months previously come into the care of the Institute, and they felt sure that an entire change of her whole character had been effected. On the wall of the room where she stayed she had put some pictures, and she had become interested in art as well as other work and study. They thought her normal, and although her family wished her returned to its custody, the opinion was that the environment had not up to then been sufficiently constructive to permit that. They were sending her to an institution at Leningrad where she was to be taught and trained in some labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even at the risk of being tedious, it seems desirable to record two more cases among the children. In a yard at the rear of the building we found a group of boys at play. Two of them were indicated as presenting challenging problems. Safely back in a conference room we heard of what they had done. The first case especially was interesting as indicating that animosity does not always exist in the treatment of those who are in opposition to the proletariat rule.&lt;br /&gt;
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A boy of seventeen, who was the son of a Kulak, had been discharged from his job for indolence. He went later to stay with a friend overnight. He wanted the friend to go with him to some place to which the mother objected. Filled with anger he waited until the son had departed for school the next morning, then murdered the mother, took some money which she had in the house, and escaped. When caught, he was sent to Serbsky for examination and the analysis showed mental deficiency and a difficult, sulky character. They had kept him for a time, had made some progress with him, and were then about to send him to a medical-pedagogical institution for juveniles where he would be trained and treated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The other boy, a charming black-haired fellow of thirteen, was held to be normal, but he was an alcoholic and stole constantly. The trouble in his case seemed to be in an irrational, coddling kind of upbringing. The decision was to send him to a state educational institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were only seven women inmates of the institution at the time of our visit and in view of the high percentage of women criminals in the USSR that seemed strange. No explanation was vouchsafed in answer to a question as to the cause, but it might indicate that women in this country do not base a defense plea on grounds of insanity!&lt;br /&gt;
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With such thorough effort as the care in Serbsky indicates, the conclusions as to mental condition ought to be as authoritative as human fallacy permits. The institution has representatives in various shops and schools and co-operates closely with the heads of the various prisons, and every effort is made at supervision and observation of those within its jurisdiction. We asked for statistics on results and were reminded that this work is all very new in the USSR, of necessity, and that figures were not complete, but that we could be assured that the results were worth to them all the painstaking care they put on their work.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER VIII: THE PROSECUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; functioning of the prosecution in the Soviet judicature is of especial interest to a student of criminal procedure. Its development from the time of the total abolition of the institution as it had existed in the Tzarist régime, by Decree #1 of 1917, to the establishment of the office of the Attorney General in 1933, has been experimental and not without dissension among the ranks of the Central Executive Committee itself. In the early years following the Revolution when everything Tzarist was swept away, there prevailed a spirit of liberalism so far as the rights of the people were concerned. In the sudden accession of power by the proletariat, lack of restraint was the predominating note, and this philosophy—if such irrational conclusions could be called one—of the epoch was reflected also in the procedure of the criminal courts. A more conservative opinion had wished merely to place the defense on an equal footing with the prosecution to correct the dominance of the state over the people in such a manner as it had been practiced for all the years of the reign of Tzars. But this was not enough to satisfy those who were clamoring for everything to be placed in the hands of the proletariat, the administering of justice as well as other branches of government.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this moment of judicial liberalism prosecution through official channels was done away with, and in its place the persons in attendance at the trial were vested with the right of accusal as well as defense. It must have distressed many a hardy judge, even though he sat as a representative of the toiling masses himself, to try to figure out a decision in the face of untrained and conflicting contentions. At any time during the trial any citizen might rise and address the court either in behalf of the accused or as the state’s prosecutor. The idea took hold rapidly, and up to the beginning of its control in 1918, it was so widely used that it became customary for the judge to call on some one in his audience to act as defender or accuser of the person on trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was bound to lead to difficulties. Civil war was at hand, the class struggle was at its height, and the court was an organ of the state in its struggle against its enemies. Even the most liberal saw that it would not do. Some system must be used whereby the prosecution of cases would be strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is an interesting point involved in the restoration of the prosecution, as it now began, even though it was of revolutionary expediency. It was a swinging back to the western criminal law administration which they had annihilated at the beginning of their rule. A legal man said to me in this regard, “We acknowledge that there are many good points in the capitalist system, and we do not hesitate to borrow what are useful to us.” In court procedure, even while they do preserve the proletarian administration, one can recognize many things about their orderly procedure that has its foundation in familiar bourgeois practices. There is no denial of this on their part. Certain well established ideas of justice have proved over long years to be adequate and proper and these have been incorporated into their own judicial structure. The early disorganized practices of the proletarian administration of justice gave way when necessities and panic of the Civil War had been dissipated to a deliberative plan resulting in the many codes of 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0141.svg|ORGINAZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF USSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before this a resurrection of the public prosecutor was on its way. Revolutionary tribunals, in their post as out-sentinels in the struggle of the government, were the first in the demand for sterner equipment of prosecution, and political expediency put an end to judicial liberalism in their practice. Characterizing this period was the attitude that placed in the hands of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; the power to impose even the death penalty on those persons charged with political offenses such as the participation in counter-revolutionary activities, deliberate destruction of property or espionage, and other such crimes against the state. It was felt that if the proletariat was to continue to rule it was no time for softness, either in the judicial system or in the non-judicial tribunals which continued to exist through the bloody days of the Civil War period.&lt;br /&gt;
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As just pointed out, it was in the Revolutionary Tribunals, created by Decree of November 24, 1917, and differing very little from the People’s Courts except in the requirement as to the number of co-judges,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Six sat in the Revolutionary Tribunals while two were required in the People’s Court.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that the first change came in regard to the prosecution. Let it be understood that although these tribunals were organs of the revolution and continued in force for five years, they were proper judicial institutions, with a definite prescribed procedure and jurisdiction. There had been too much mildness in their administration, so much so that the present Commissar of Justice, N. V. Krylenko, stated in his Soviet law,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “Their softness with regard to sentences discredited them completely.”&lt;br /&gt;
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There were too many of them in the first place and by Act of May, 1918, their number was reduced so that they remained in existence only in the capitals of the provinces and other important places. But that reform would not necessarily make them deal out sterner justice, and by this same Act there was created at each of the existing tribunals a &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors. To make the check-up more complete there was also established a Central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; of State Prosecutors in connection with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee created by an act of June, 1918.&lt;br /&gt;
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The character of the Revolutionary Tribunals was undergoing a change. Sternness and determination now marked their attitude. Mildness was fading away as class struggle advanced. They were created to spike the activities directed against the achievements of the Revolution or designed to weaken Soviet authority. It was not enough that some citizen give voice to a plea for conviction; it was neither sufficient that local tribunals be left to carry on their own unaided and unsupervised prosecution. There must be central supervision. This very distrust of local competency led later to a dissension in which Lenin had to take a hand, but for the time being, it served its purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the decree already referred to (of May, 1918), the central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; was given wide powers. It might demand of local prosecutors or tribunals that certain cases be transferred to Moscow or in the event the case remained in its original territory, it might send prosecutors there to see that it took the direction desired. It might also demand an accounting from the local &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; so that by supervision they could be sure that the functions of these organs to look after all facts of criminal action committed by any person anywhere and the institution of criminal procedure might be faithfully and zealously fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the Revolutionary Tribunal Acts of 1920, all previous acts pertaining to tribunals were repealed and sweeping changes again occurred. Counter-revolutionary activity was on the decline, the Civil War was receding, and non-judicial methods of suppression not so much needed. Orderly government was growing stronger. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; suffered the abolition of its special tribunal, the military judicial powers even were required to comply with the provisions of this Act. As a result of these curtailments the powers of the Revolutionary Tribunals were widened and jurisdiction extended to include any case involving counter-revolutionary charges as well as any other that was of a nature dangerous to the Soviet Republic. Not only was the jurisdiction of these tribunals enlarged but their power of punishment was likewise increased and was now practically unrestricted. With such authority they could assess any measure of repression which they thought necessary to the occasion and could thereby cover any ground lately held by extra-judicial bodies. These tribunals were established in the capitals of the various provinces and by permission of the Commissar of Justice might also be instituted in the larger cities.&lt;br /&gt;
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What happened in regard to the prosecution? The &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of prosecutors set up by the previous acts were abolished and in their stead there now appeared state &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of defense and prosecution, both for the people’s court and for the Revolutionary Tribunals. From this time on more attention was given to the perfecting of a system and technique of prosecution. The qualifications for the person filling this office became of a more adequate nature. He must be a man competent to make an appearance before an assemblage, to speak or otherwise conduct public affairs, and he must also know the Soviet system of government thoroughly as well as be acquainted with the workings of trade unions. There was still no centralized system such as exists today since the prosecutors were at this time provided merely to represent the people in trial, much as a defense lawyer might be appointed in a particular case. But the era of floundering, of experimentation, of entertaining thought of complete proletarian administration of law, had made its contribution, and the evolution moved on with the rapidity with which other things have moved in Soviet Russia. In 1922 there was another Act containing other innovations.&lt;br /&gt;
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By this Act there was a general revision of the whole system of judicial legislation, and there emerged such results as the Criminal Code, the Law on Basic Property rights, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the year of 1923 furnished additional legislation. The matter of some centralization of a state prosecution seems to have been taken for granted, but the form that the organization was to have, the basic principles, brought forth differences of opinion as we shall see later.&lt;br /&gt;
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The New Economic Policy had been introduced and the economic and political situation in the country was in a confused and complex state. Civil war had died down but the class struggle, already well on its feet, took encouragement from the feeling among the property owners that capitalism, at least in a modified form, might with timely effort be brought back. The form of conflict now encountered was hardly less threatening to Soviet rule than had been the more open warfare. The government, dependent on its courts, now effectively augmented by the judicial powers of the terrifying GPU, needed a strengthened prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
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In May of 1922 the People’s Commissariat of Justice presented its proposal of organization to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and found itself immediately on the defensive against attack by opposition within the Communist faction. This had not been expected, and there was some dismay when the main points were rejected altogether. Once before, a central &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors—even though for the Revolutionary Tribunals—had cast reflection on local organs by demanding transferal of cases to their jurisdiction or by sending one of their own number to prosecute locally. Now, as the Commissariat of Justice proposed: (1) the direct subordination of the local prosecutors to the Prosecuting Attorney of the Republic who appoints and dismisses them, and (2) the right of local prosecutors to protest before the central authorities against unconstitutional decisions by local executive committees, it was held by the majority of the Central Executive Committee that there was in such suggestions an element of distrust of local authorities too strong to be accepted. A commission appointed by the session, in rejecting such proposals, made one of its own. It was suggested that there be set up a “dual” subordination of prosecutors, making them responsible both to the central authority and to the local executive committee.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a state of affairs brought intervention from the captain of the ship of state. Lenin wrote a special letter to Stalin that brought the opposition to terms when it was read before the Central Executive Committee. He enumerated therein some of the causes of the difficulties of establishing revolutionary legality and a lack of uniformity of the application and administration of the laws were chief among these. Likewise, there was always the alibi of local peculiarities and conditions. For us of the United States who have struggled with forty-eight different types of provisions, of applications, and administration, there is understanding of his argument. A suggestion of anything possible to prevent it seems unanswerable. “The basic evil in the whole of our life and in the whole of our lack of culture,” wrote Lenin, “is in the ancient Russian attitude of laissez-faire and in the custom of semi-savages who want to retain the local justice of Kaluga as distinguished from that of Kazan.”&lt;br /&gt;
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He then puts a question. Can it be tolerated in a country of proletarian dictatorship, in a country building up a socialist economy? Here is his answer. “There can be no Kaluga justice different from that of Kazan, but there must be a uniform All-Russian justice, and even a uniform justice for the whole Federation of Soviet Republics.”&lt;br /&gt;
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That started the effort toward uniformity. The most recent chapter in the development was in 1933 (June 23) when the office of the Attorney General was created to centralize the prosecution of the whole Soviet Union. There have been steps between the two enactments but they have moved steadily toward the recent accomplishment. In the earlier organization the position as head of the public prosecution of the USSR, now held by the Attorney General, was occupied by the Commissar of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
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The duty of the prosecution, now headed by the Attorney General of the USSR, is not merely to prosecute. His functions are far beyond that limit. If he were confined to that there would not be great importance to his office.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet judicial trial the prosecutor is robbed of his glamorous role as he appears in our own courts. He, as well as the defending attorney, is a mere assistant to the court, there to aid it in getting at the truth of the affair before them. It is apparent that he has been appointed in such a manner that he is nearer to the judge than the defense lawyer. He is likely of the same party affiliation, he comes from the same social class, he is in sympathy with the order of government. It is certainly more likely that he exerts a greater influence on the court than the other side’s attorney who may hold an opposite viewpoint. One notices that often the defense attorney is of a different appearance in manner of dress, in terminology, and in speech, from the court and prosecutor. It may be supposed that this occasionally causes the court to decide against him, even though the bias is unconscious, since it is very likely that he is defending a person who is a “class enemy,” and with whose point of view he may be in sympathy.&lt;br /&gt;
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That would probably have been truer a few years ago than it is now. With the prevailing attitude of “winning over” wherever possible, and the “crushing” of only those who are distinctly to be feared as socially dangerous, there seems to be no great prejudice shown. It must exist to a degree, but antagonism does not seem a part of the present policy of state. If a person before the court can be made into a useful citizen then the object is to do it. Those who deliberately continue to struggle against the laws of the class in power will certainly be dealt with in an uncompromising manner, and if it is fairly clear the crime is of this nature then a defending lawyer would hardly be listened to with very much thought. It would be the day of the prosecutor. Likewise in establishing the class nature of the crime, the word of the prosecutor would be worth more to the court because of his sympathy with the existing order. But since it is to the interest of the state to protect an individual, to retain the aid and sympathy of all possible and to win and keep the confidence of its masses, it is not likely that there will be many who are innocent in this respect convicted in the regular judicial trials where open sessions prevail and the people in large numbers attend. One of the impressive characteristics of the court room in the Soviet Union is the attendance and interest of the citizens. They discuss the verdict with animation and it is to be noted that they usually agree with the court’s decision. If those in attendance disagreed too often it would hardly be a good thing for the judge. It will be remembered that power of impeachment is exercised in this country.&lt;br /&gt;
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The lack of importance of the prosecutor in trial is exemplified by his absence from trial frequently, in the People’s Court. It is not usual in this lower tribunal for either prosecutor or defense lawyer to be in attendance. At times, however, they do appear. But there is no place in the system for the ingenious display of a game of wits between attorneys as there is no jury such as ours nor anyone on whom an emotional impression could be made. There is really no great need in the ordinary case for attorneys either for the state or the defense. The court has both the power and responsibility to see that all evidence is placed before it. There can be no such objections to its introduction as we are accustomed to hear, resulting in the escape of criminals from the law because of the lack of admission of evidence. The story comes out, the witness tells the tale without any instruction to answer “yes” or “no” to the questions put to him. As already illustrated by actual cases, it is an informal narrative, interrupted by pertinent questions by judge or jurors or other parties to the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To see, then, what the prosecutor’s functions are, let us look at the following list as given in 1922 at the establishment of the centralized prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To supervise on behalf of the State the legality of the actions of all administrative organs, economic institutions, public and private organizations, and private persons, by instituting criminal proceedings against guilty persons and by protesting against decisions infringing upon the laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To observe directly the activities of investigation organs, criminal inquiry organs, and also the activity of organs of OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To prosecute in court. [Note that this is third in order of importance.]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To see to the proper treatment of inmates in homes of correction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As can be seen from this enumeration the functions of the organs of Soviet prosecution extend far beyond the limits of mere judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Accordingly, the Attorney of the Republic (originally in RSFSR, the People’s Commissar of Justice) was entrusted:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To look after the legal activity of all the People’s Commissariats and other central institutions and organizations and to make proposals for the repeal or amendment of orders and regulations issued by them that are not consistent with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To protest against such orders and regulations before the Council of People’s Commissars and the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee with a view to their abolition [the protest by the Attorney General does not stop, however, the carrying out of an order against which a protest was made].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To guide and control the activities of local prosecuting organs. The functions of local prosecutors were:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To propose to local executive committees the repeal or amendment of regulations and decisions that do not conform to the law, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To protest against such regulations and decisions, through the Attorney General of the republic, to the Council of People’s Commissars or to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the realm of combatting criminality, the Public Prosecutor was commissioned:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To institute local proceedings against officials and private persons either on his own initiative or on complaints and statements received by him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the conducting of inquiries and preliminary investigations, to advise organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation on the question of restrictive measures and other questions connected with preliminary investigation, and to conform the indictment drawn up by investigators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To decide the question of prosecution or cancelling of cases coming up to him from investigating organs, to take part in preliminary sittings of the court on the question of trying or dismissing a given case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To prosecute in court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) To protest in the order of cassation against verdicts and findings of the court, and also protest by way of supervision against verdicts of the first instance and cassation decisions of regional and provincial courts that have already come into force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) To look after the proper treatment of inmates in all places of detention without exception, and to liberate persons improperly held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this enumeration it can be seen that his duty as prosecutor is third on the list. But it is in this function that we think of him and it is this part of his work that we shall go into in some detail because of its connection with what we are studying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to the prosecutor’s occupation with criminal procedure there is first the preliminary investigation. When the militia or the former organs of the OGPU or any other agent turn over to the investigator certain material evidence of crime the prosecution starts to function. The office of the prosecution is to institute criminal proceedings on the first definite suspicion that a crime has been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the proceedings are in the preliminary stage the position of the prosecution is very different from what it will be later. He is now concerned with finding out the truth of the situation and not of “fastening” upon some one an act of which he is not guilty but for which there must be a conviction. If he goes into court for trial too many times with cases that are not supported by the testimony as brought out by the court the inference is that he either is not honest or not capable in his preliminary investigation. While a prosecutor often makes a mistake, as further court testimony may show, and is in honor bound to withdraw prosecution when he discovers it, this would probably be because of circumstances which he could not control such as the absence of a witness or the testimony of one not revealed at that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, in the preliminary examination he is not an accuser. He is the chief of all that takes place, and he is in full charge. His investigator carries out the work of this stage in less complex cases but the prosecutor is responsible for direction and policy. He does not seek evidence of guilt at this time any more than he tries to establish innocence. He gathers every available bit of data and then makes his decision as to whether the case is to go on. But once he has come to the conclusion that the indictment is sufficiently well founded and the accused becomes the defendant in the judicial trial, his position is changed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the trial he is the prosecutor. He now believes the defendant guilty or he would not have remanded him for court action. He now takes part in weighing the evidence produced in court and urges some measure of punishment in his speech. But so intent is he still on getting justice that he may cease his prosecution if he decides that he has been wrong in his preliminary examination. It is his duty to do so and to convince the court he is correct in his action. One prosecutor told the writer of four occasions in his own practice when he had done this. One has an incredulous feeling in hearing a prosecuting attorney make a plea for the reduction of a sentence or for a verdict of not guilty, but such a case is recorded in the following paragraphs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Supreme Court a case was on appeal from a Regional Court. A group of seven men had been found guilty of stealing vegetables and fruit from a co-operative store in which one was manager. They had resold the articles and had thereby made some 20,000 rubles. The two leaders had received the death penalty, the others lesser ones. The death penalties had been appealed and the prosecutor and the defense attorneys were present with their arguments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense lawyer spoke quite at length, arguing that the amount had been really smaller than was stated, that the character of the men had always been good, and then he went to points of law. He contended that it had been a mistake to apply the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for larceny of state property, to this act as no theft of state property had actually taken place. The men had paid the regulation amount to the state, but had simply sold the fruit and vegetables at an advanced price over state prices, for a sufficient period to bring in the money in that manner. He contended that instead the men were guilty of using official position for personal benefit and that Article 109 of the Criminal Code, providing punishment for such a crime, should have been applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His points had not been well made and when the prosecutor arose to speak one was quite prepared for his demolition of the previous argument. He was an able, well-trained man. No one consults any precedents or books of law in the Soviet court. The observer is struck by the absence of such volumes from the room. The court judges each case on its merits in the light of certain established policy. It seemed only a matter of formality for the judges to retire and bring back the decision that the verdict should stand. But the peculiarity of the prosecution in this judicial system now showed. The attorney paused, started again. He reminded the court that the men were young, that this was the only offense with which they had been charged and that one of these in particular had been a good citizen until he had begun to drink too heavily. He thought the sentence too severe and that it should be commuted to the maximum ten-year term. He likewise recommended that some of the sentences of the lesser members of the group needed revision. The court acted on his recommendation and the two wives present were able to go into frenzied joy over the giving back of life to their respective husbands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case brings out the attitude of the prosecution toward their tasks as accusers. The basic function of the prosecutor is to establish all the testimony he can to support an indictment before the court. That is what he comes into court for. The defense has its lawyer to see that its interests are protected. The prosecutor thinks of the side of society and the state. But at the same time, theoretically, he must not do anything to prevent the real truth of the case from being revealed. It is not in keeping with the role and dignity of his office to keep back evidence, to shuffle facts, or in any manner to defeat the carriage of justice. And in attempting to carry out the higher requirements of his office he cannot insist on the charges of the indictment if the testimony brought out at the trial has modified them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to note that there are deviations from the general principle that the prosecutor conducts the prosecution at the trial. Throughout the land there is a system in practice of giving training to the more able among the peasants and workers to act in the capacity of public accuser in the simpler cases. This special prosecutor is usually unaided unless the case is of a more serious nature, when he will probably serve in conjunction with some member of the prosecutor’s office. This service is of a wholly voluntary nature with no pay attached, but there is compensation for the individual in the position of importance he occupies in his community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are also cases where the plaintiff hires his own lawyer to prosecute the case and a public prosecutor appears only if the case is of such a nature or takes such a turn that there is a public interest which needs protecting, or in case there must be intervention to secure fair play. An example of this type of case would be one in which there was bodily injury that while causing pain still had no serious consequences. Cases involving insults, libels and slander likewise are often prosecuted by private attorneys without the aid of the public official. In all of such cases action is not brought by the state, of course, but is begun by the oral or written complaint of the injured party and may be settled by the plaintiff and defendant between themselves at any time while the trial is in progress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In cases involving such charges as the violation of patent or copyright laws, forced sexual intercourse, and a few others of a private nature, the procedure is still different. Prosecution is by the public prosecutor but even though he knows of the existence of such violations he cannot institute proceedings. The injured party must make the complaint and give co-operation but while he may have his own lawyer also the state takes charge of the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For a more complete picture of the prosecution as it exists in the Soviet Union today, its organization is briefly given. It follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Attorney General of the USSR who is the head of the prosecution in the Soviet Union. He has, of course, a staff of assistants. He is appointed by the Central Executive Committee, and is also responsible to the Council of People’s Commissars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The attorneys of the various federal republics who are appointed by the Attorney General of the USSR on approval by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) The prosecutors of the regional and provincial courts are appointed and may be dismissed for cause by the attorneys of the federal republics with the consent of the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) The attorneys for military and transport tribunals are appointed and may be dismissed by the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) District attorneys and people’s investigators are appointed and dismissed by regional and provincial attorneys.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Senior investigators and investigators on most important cases are appointed and dismissed by those attorneys to whom they are attached.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties with which they are charged are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To supervise the consistence of decisions and regulations of separate departments of the USSR and federal republics and of local authorities with the constitution of the USSR and the decisions and regulations of the government of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the correct and uniform application of the laws by the judicial institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To institute criminal proceedings and to prosecute in all legal instances throughout the territory of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To look after the legality and correctness of the actions of OGPU, militia, and correctional labor institutions on the basis of a special order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) General guidance of the activities of the prosecution in the federal republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IX: THE DEFENSE AND THE DEFENDANT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Bar has had a precarious existence under Soviet rule, but it seems now to have come on to firm ground. Going back to that First Decree of 1917, when the prosecution was swept away, we find the institution of private attorneys suffering a like fate and an idea substituted that anybody might be an attorney and defend. However, a limitation was soon put on the “anybody” by the Second Decree on Courts which created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, the duties of whose members were both to prosecute and to defend. While any citizen might become a member of this &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; on the proper recommendation of the Soviets of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies, he was supposed to give his time and attention to being an attorney, which somewhat narrowed down the first broad inclusion. There must have been some slight ability, too, on the part of the persons appointed, over the ordinary run of citizen, in order that they be recommended to membership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This method of providing for defense and prosecution existed until 1920. The People’s Court Act of 1918 changed the status of these defenders and prosecutors in that they were made officials of the Republic and were accorded a salary equal to that of a people’s judge. These members of the college in their capacity&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
as defenders were augmented at times by relatives of the defendant and at times replaced by the legal adviser of an institution, appointed by the director to serve in some particular case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By 1920 this system of one body affording now a prosecutor, now a defender, was found to be not adequate, not in keeping with the rights of the defendant which orderly legality must establish, nor, on the other hand, providing a sustained attitude of prosecution such as the state needed. The People’s Court Act of that year created separate institutions for the two purposes. There was now evidence of a selected membership. Not just “any citizen,” even though he might devote himself to the duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, could serve, but there was to be a list prepared by the local Soviets, of persons who were qualified to act in this capacity. From this list defending advocates were to be selected for temporary duty, not to exceed six days in a six month period, and were to be paid a sum in proportion to the remuneration received by a co-judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was something in the nature of our own jury service, and was regarded as a solemn duty of a citizen qualified for the function. In the Collected Laws of 1920 we find a circular from the Commissar of Justice issuing instructions and admonishing that the defense in court, in criminal cases, is a social duty of all citizens, who, because of profession, education, or party affiliation, are qualified to appear as defenders at the trial.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collected Laws, No. 100, Article 543, 1920, Section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Doubtful defense it may have been to one whose life hung in balance, but the institution was progressing toward a time when persons on trial might be ably represented in the judicial inquiry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The institution of the New Economic Policy, bringing a new complexity and confusion into the economic and political life of the Union, created new necessities of various kinds, one of which, as we have already seen, was a development in the administration of Criminal Law. With the remarkable rapidity of the development of institutions in other lines, the Soviet judicial system began to take firmer shape and to assume a character of responsibility for orderly legality. If the court was to provide equality of opportunity and privileges to all, thus fulfilling the slogan of the Socialist State of which it was an organ, then the rights of the defendant must be protected, not only by legislative safeguards but by means of adequate representation at the bar of justice. If prosecution was to be stiffened in this era of fighting the opponents in a new way, then a balanced procedure called also for more adequate aid to the man accused.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Advocacy Act of 1922, with its sweeping reforms for the judiciary, restored to the Union the possibility of adequate defense for the person who stands accused in court. It created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers, and made its members responsible for the legal aid of a party held for trial. The number of members of the college were, however, to be restricted by authority of the provincial departments of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This limitation was removed by the Judiciary Act of 1926 which elaborated the provisions of the earlier Act and dealt fully with the organization, function, and duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;. While the number is not restricted, the member, when accepted by the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, may be rejected by the provincial executive committee within a month from the time it is informed of his admission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The qualifications required of the members provides for at least two years’ service in some judiciary position within the Soviet Union not lower than the People’s Court which insures an acquaintance with the law. To be admitted one must also either have a higher juridical education or have passed a prescribed examination. Admission is refused to those who have been expelled from public organizations for misconduct (for a period of three years), condemned for crimes, or under trial or investigation the member is suspended in certain cases. No lawyer may defend in court unless he is a member of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, or bar.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; is self-governing along the lines of other Soviet institutions. It elects its own presidium which works out the general problems of the organization. It decides on disciplinary questions, on general plans of work, and on the fees to be paid by its members. It has no authority over the fees to be paid by clients. That lies in the hands of the Commissariat of Justice which sets up a regular schedule, according to the ability of the person to pay and the complexity of the case. There are four groups according to these provisions. At the bottom are the poor, so designated by the people’s court, who pay no fees; in the next group are those workers, clerks and peasants who are permitted a small rate; the third group consists of any not included in the first two, who may also pay a rate set by the Commissariat; and there is the final group who, not needing the intervention of the Commissar, may make its own terms with the collegium.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In Moscow alone there are about fifty private lawyers not connected with any “corporation,” later to be described, who may be hired as they would be anywhere. They are those sufficiently well known to attract a private practice, and do not need the aid the corporation can give. They agree on the fee to be paid, without any intervention on the part of the state, and are not restricted in income.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties of the members of this organization do not consist alone in defending in court. The members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; attached to the courts, provincial, regional, or organized as county bureaus, deliver lectures on law, acquaint the masses with their legal rights and duties through visits to large factories and other centers, and must defend without pay any case referred to them. The first duty of the legal profession is concerned with the observance of revolutionary legality, but within the bounds set by this legality, he must defend his client. The protection of this same individual is, however, the acknowledged duty of both judge and prosecutor, so why the necessity of defense counsel at all in such a system, one wonders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As already pointed out the simpler cases tried in the People’s Court rarely do have attorneys on either side, but in the more complicated cases the story may not be so easily got at. It may be necessary to the honest defense of the accused or in the determination of his sentence that certain orders or decrees about which he knows nothing be applied to his case. In such an event he needs some one who is acquainted with various enactments. In the next place he may not be of a nature so cool and composed when his life or liberty is at stake that he can interrogate witnesses himself, cross question, and otherwise exercise his legal rights. Likewise, if it is a serious case, when he gets his last word before the court he will want it to be an effective one. The speech of a good lawyer, analyzing and weighing the evidence, may be a deciding factor. Straightforward and interested in the protection of the state as a lawyer may be, he is likely to think of some points in favor of his client that neither judge nor prosecutor would find unaided. And that leads to the third and last acknowledged reason for the use of private attorneys. It is likely that the prosecutor may be prejudiced in favor of the guilt which he has already seen indicated by the evidence he had in hand when he remanded the accused for trial. It is likely also that the judge, having found that evidence sufficient to sustain the indictment, may not be able to see some things on the other side that a legal adviser hired for the purpose would be able to find. The authorities on criminal law believe that, too, and therefore, on the theory that innocence is presumed until guilt is proved, they provide for an advocate who is more likely to be conscious of the innocence. A question occurs here as to whether an advocate would risk defending a client whom he knew to be guilty through a confession or otherwise. Theoretically, he would only in this case attempt to interpret or explain the act so as to get freedom or a lesser sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense often has a lawyer when there is no prosecuting attorney present. In the People’s Court the state representative may not appear, and yet the counsel for the defense is always admitted. The reverse cannot be true. There can be no prosecutor present without the defense counsel. One of the specific provisions of the law is that on all occasions when a prosecutor appears for the state there must also be a counsel for the defendant. In case the latter has not been able to get one or is not able to pay, the court looks after the matter for him by having the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers appoint a counsel. It may be a case a lawyer would not want; it may be the worst of the so-called “class enemies,” but some one must serve. Not only that, but if the complexity of the case warrants it, one of the best must be appointed. The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; pays the member serving on such an unremunerated errand out of its own funds, according to the fees he is accustomed to receive and according to the complexity of the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is one other condition in which the court must see that the defense is represented by counsel. If the defendant is deaf or dumb or suffering from any physical handicap that will prevent his understanding correctly the procedure of the case counsel is obligatory. Likewise, in the case of juveniles of 16-18 years of age (the court does not handle the cases of those under 16), the instructions of the Commissariat of Justice is that there be counsel provided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense counsel, once in charge of the case, has rights and privileges as great as the prosecution. He may see his client as often as he wants to, for as long as is necessary, without the presence of any attendant or official. He has the right to advise the defendant all during the trial. He has the right to records in the case so that he may study it thoroughly and introduce any evidence he finds necessary in the interest of justice for his client. And he has a right to the last word. He not only makes the final speech but he questions witnesses after the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The lawyers of Russia, with the exception of a few independent ones, are organized into “collective corporations.” This, of course, is right in line with the socialist theory of government. While lawyers have a right to engage in private practice there are a number of reasons why one would prefer to be a member of one of these collective bodies. Let us look at some of the characteristics of these organizations. The following list was given by Professor Brusilovsky, who is himself a member of the collegium.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(1) The individual lawyer has no direct financial transaction with the client. The fee is fixed by a special consultant and paid to the treasurer of the ‘collective.’&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The lawyer may go on his vacation knowing his client will be served by colleagues. While on vacation he draws a salary equal to his normal monthly income.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) here is value in consulting a number of lawyers on a case to clear up difficult points. This is especially valuable for the young members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Fees are differentiated according to the qualification of the individual lawyer, his service record, experience and ability. He is insured against sickness and incapacity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Membership—It is open to all citizens who: (a) possess electoral rights, (b) have a certain record of service in the organs of Soviet justice, and (c) have either passed the prescribed examination or have received a superior juridical education.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have been considering up to now in this chapter the organization of the defense provided for in the law. This is the machinery through which the rights of an individual may be protected in criminal procedure. Now, let us turn to the defendant himself as he appears in the case and see what safeguards are given him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is, first, the matter of the preliminary trial. While that phase of the case as a whole has already been discussed the rights accorded to the suspected person were purposely not emphasized since that angle of the proceedings properly belongs here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To begin with, let us suppose the suspect is held in custody by the arresting organs, the militia or the former agents of the OGPU. They can keep him just twenty-four hours, and no more, until they must get permission from the people’s judge or from the prosecuting attorney for his detention. If they cannot get enough evidence in that time to support the arrest there is nothing to do but release him. That does not mean, however, that the case must be dropped. If they are convinced of his guilt, but have not been able by that time to establish it, the authorities may permit the man to be held a longer time so that the case can be built up, or in case the suspicion has not enough grounds even for that, they may go on working quietly until they do uncover what they want. However, for the sake of our case, suppose the prosecutor gives permission for the man to be held. In fourteen days there must be either release or sufficient evidence to hold him. While there are no &#039;&#039;habeas corpus&#039;&#039; proceedings in the administration of Soviet law, there is the assurance that a man must be either released at the end of two weeks or some testimony produced that will justify his being held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor may he languish in jail while his trial is put off from day to day. The maximum time permitted for the preliminary work and the bringing of a case to trial is one month. Obviously there may be cases when it will be absolutely necessary to extend this limit and by permission it may be extended. But the law provides that there must be reasons shown as to why extra time is asked. The fact that this limit is adhered to in practice is shown by records that in the city court trials of Moscow 75 per cent. of the cases are tried in ten days and the majority of the others in fifteen or twenty. It is quite likely that there are cases in which an arresting organ holds a man more than the twenty-four hours or an investigator permits more than the maximum time to elapse before trial, but members of the Commissariat of Justice insist that if detected in such acts the agents are swiftly and surely punished. Those in authority do not hold in high esteem those officials who do not cooperate in the establishment of revolutionary legality. While there would, of course, be no statistics of such illegal practices, those in prison of whom the writer asked the question about the time of pre-trial detention gave answers of periods which were all within the limit except two. One man indicated that his rights had been violated, the other gave causes for his detention beyond the period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The person under suspicion (it will be recalled that he is not the “accused” until such time as a definite accusal is made) may make a complaint at any time against the actions of those conducting the preliminary inquiry or investigation, and such a complaint may be appealed within seven days, not only to the prosecutor but to the judge under whose jurisdiction the case may be. If it is a serious case, he may from the beginning have employed counsel to do that for him, but in the event of the simpler case, or of his having no counsel, there is sure to be some interested person among family or friends who will attend to this for him, if he should be detained in such a manner that he could not reach the proper authority and the one against whom he complained would not take care of the matter for him. The law provides that such an official must receive and transmit a complaint directed against him, but there might conceivably be instances when meeting this duty would be unpleasant—especially if the official was guilty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the preliminary trial the defendant is protected in every possible way. If he has not been in custody the initial steps may have been taken without his cognizance. This may have been necessary in order to prevent his escape while ground was being prepared for holding him. But, if there is sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation he is now apprized of it. He may be summoned to appear in almost any manner—by telephone, telegraph or otherwise, or if the circumstances are such that his escape must be prevented, he may be then arrested. In any case he now participates in the investigation which, it is remembered, is carried on by the investigator or, in the event of a serious case, by the prosecutor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He is now told what the charges against him are, and it is made very clear to him. He may at this moment offer an explanation of the substantial facts which will put an entirely new interpretation on the case, and cause its dismissal, if he substantiates what he tells. It is to be remembered that there are no sides taken in this stage of the procedure. It is usual that no counsel has yet appeared for the person under inquiry, the prosecutor is acting in his rôle of collector of information and there is, theoretically, at least, no effort to pin either guilt or innocence on to the party. The accused (he becomes “accused” from the moment the charge is officially explained to him) may suggest witnesses, may request experts, as we have previously seen, and attach any proofs to the documents, and such requests must be granted unless the investigator is convinced that they have no real importance in the case. If he does the latter, he is likely to be rather sure of his ground, as otherwise his judgment would face reversal when his decision was appealed to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred to the use of experts and the accused person’s rights as to selection. With all the information collected and the decision made, his chance to submit evidence to prevent the trial is still not exhausted. On the decision of the investigator to present the accusation, the person against whom it is directed may go over all the materials collected. Now, in the light of what he finds, he may offer further elucidation himself or he may request further witnesses who will be able to shed additional light. He is given every opportunity here, by law at least, to get in a stroke that will indicate his innocence. And in the event it goes to the court, in spite of his efforts, the judge may be convinced of the weight of his argument or evidence and direct the investigator to either build up his case better or dismiss it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We will suppose it stands. The administrative session of court places the case on its calendar. It comes to trial after not longer than a month from the time the accusation is handed over by the investigator, and the accused becomes the defendant. In the meantime the accused will have secured his counsel. Little was said about the part a counsel for the defense might play in the preliminary stages, for the reason that except in serious cases there would almost surely be none at that time. The normal time for the appointment of one by the court, in cases requiring this, would be immediately after it was decided to hold the person for trial. On the presentation of the accusation to the accused he is informed of his legal right to counsel. In case he is unable to provide for an attorney he petitions the court for aid. Likewise, if he chooses one at this time, he submits the name for approval. Then the court, in its administrative session, when deciding whether to hold the accused for trial, likewise settles the question of counsel, if the accused has petitioned, by approving his choice or appointing one. Approval of his choice is necessary only if he has selected some person outside of such authorized lists as members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; or some representative provided by government institutions. Otherwise he may select whomever he will among the authorized persons and be assured that that person must act for him and for a fee that will be set for him within his ability to pay. The element of contest which is one of the basic principles in the Soviet judicature is now found for the first time. Two parties are aligned one against the other, each to prove its rightness. From this time on, the accused is the defendant and there are two sides to the case. Let us see the trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defendant has the right to a public trial. This, too, is one of the principles of criminal procedure of the Soviet courts and by its observation there is insured fairness through public opinion. Through publicity there is brought about both the education of the people and the control of the court by them. There are only two conditions under which the trial may be behind closed doors—when a state secret must be kept, and in sexual crimes where intimate details must be revealed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defendant has a right to be present at his own trial, unless he voluntarily stays away. A case may be tried without him, if he has given his consent or when he has failed to respond to the summons. In the latter case, however, it must be clearly shown that an effort was made to reach him and that he directly evaded it, or there will probably be a reversal of the verdict in the higher court. An attempt to use his lack of response as an excuse for trial without his presence would have to be supported sufficiently to avoid abuse. In simpler cases when there is no possibility of imposing a prison sentence, his presence may not be required by the court, but in offenses punishable by a prison sentence he must be there if he can be found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the case opens, the presiding judge explains to the defendant his rights, as a party to the court, to make use of all material, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to make any statements he will at any stage of the trial. These things he may do even though he is represented by counsel, and if he has decided to defend himself or entrust it to some relative he is sure to find plenty of opportunity to exercise this right. The writer witnessed one case in which a simple-looking workman took care of his interests so well that one could understand his going to trial without legal aid. Before his vehement and rapid-fire interrogation, witnesses quailed and became confused. The informality of the proceedings permits of participation without timidity in most cases. There is no fear of set rules of the game, because they do not exist. The accused defends himself as he would before his neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next assurance is that the defendant may cause the removal of judge or juror if there is likely to be bias in his attitude. Perhaps one of them is relative or friend to the injured party, or to some other person who would be interested in the conviction of the defendant. In that case he may challenge, giving his grounds therefor, and the question will be decided by the rest of the court sitting without the member so indicated. If he is overruled he has that fact as grounds for complaint to the cassation instance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now as the case goes to trial, with the defendant a party to the court so that he may spar as he wishes with prosecutor or clash with witnesses, either with counsel or without, he has also the right of presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It would seem that the preliminary trial had already established guilt sufficiently so that the actual trial would merely bring to light what had gone before, and establish the degree of guilt. But such is not the theory incorporated in Soviet criminal law. It may be that evidence will take a different turn, that the very atmosphere of the public trial will provide a new viewpoint. The object of the preliminary investigation is not to constitute a determination of guilt but to give guarantee that there are some grounds for trial. Authorities on the administration of criminal law point to the relatively low percentage of convictions, there being, according to one authority, almost one-third of those remanded to the People’s Court dismissed, and a lack of conviction of at least a quarter of those actually reaching court. From that one would judge that the holding for trial by the investigation organs of the courts does not mean in actual practice that one’s guilt has been established. During the trial the defendant has every right which he has already been accorded in the preliminary procedure, but they are now rendered broader and of more value because he is familiar with all the data that have been produced, and all the witnesses who have been gathered by the investigation are now before him for questioning. Through his cross-examination of the state’s witnesses he may develop lines of proof that he can substantiate by calling further witnesses of his own, or he may refute the state’s contention. Some expert, whom the investigation used for some specific interpretation, may change his own opinion in the light of some explanation which the defendant himself or his witness can give. He has here three distinct privileges—he may request certain witnesses, other experts, or fresh proofs from the state if the case is to be sustained; he may give explanations to the court of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act at any time and as often during the trial as he wishes or thinks necessary; and he has the invaluable right to take part in the examination of all witnesses, experts, or others who take part in the trial. And now, if he has been directing his own defense he may also make the final speech and thus leave the last word with the court as it goes forth to deliberate on the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is some difference in the privileges and rights accorded one tried in the People’s Courts and in the higher courts. The reason is not far to seek. In the People’s Court there are no cases of a class nature of the serious sort. There could not be, since the jurisdiction of the People’s Court does not extend to crimes punishable by the death sentence. Here come the people from among the masses who have violated the law, but when a Kulak or one of the bourgeoisie is involved and the offense is against the state or the order of government, the case goes to a higher tribunal and the rights of the defendant are more circumscribed. In a trial when the accused is of a socially dangerous character, and restrictions are held to be necessary, the discretionary power of the judge may draw such limits as depriving the defendant of rights of counsel, of certain witnesses, or of records in the case. Such procedure, however, is said to be unusual and resorted to only in cases where the offense is of a highly dangerous character. Even in such an instance the defendant may still conduct his own case with all of his customary rights. The accused may be a socially dangerous character who must necessarily be subjected to restrictions. It is likely that this happens in a small degree and only in the most serious cases, but in fairness a chapter dealing with the rights of the defendant should call attention to this possible limitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To see the defendant in court one is impressed with the amount of liberty he has. One forgets that he is the man whose life or liberty is in jeopardy. He talks, he interrogates, he explains and argues. And it is amazing to see how these people have come to understand the working of the law. It is a part of the duty of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers to help in explaining and popularizing the Soviet laws and a good job they have done of it, too. Of course, they have had their helpers, but one finds children who know why the law of August 7, 1932, providing a death penalty for larceny from the state was necessary, and as for the enactment which specifies a five-year period of imprisonment for adulteration in an effort to make for better quality, every housewife knows the answer. She demands better material for her dresses, better sugar for her table, and she has heard all about the law, its necessity and purpose, in her factory or other place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That acquaintance with the laws, that knowledge of the principle involved, makes it possible for an offender to do a pretty good job as his own attorney, unless he be one of the illiterate peasants. In that case, if he has no counsel, he can be rather sure of the court’s interest in finding out the facts and in interpreting them correctly. It is to the state’s interest to see that the accused person has every opportunity to be treated fairly, and the court is only the organ of the state in carrying out such a policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As has already been said, the people seem in most cases to agree with the verdict of the court and that is worth something as an indication of justice. They are encouraged to follow the case and to understand the application of the law. After hearing their discussion at a trial, one would know of their intense interest. It seems to be an added cloak of protection for the defendant in case a judge did exceed fair play. It would be felt in the appeal!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the event of a verdict of guilty the convicted one now has his right of complaint so that his case will be reviewed by the cassational division of the higher court, the Regional or the Supreme Court, or to the latter even from the first. Herein is his last chance of life or liberty. Already we have talked of cases where the decision of the lower courts was reversed. That happens in about ten per cent. of the cases. So a man has a slim one-chance-in-ten hope of getting off from his punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perhaps the reader has, in this enumeration of rights, been impressed with the absence of one held dear in the United States—the right of a person to trial by a jury of his “peers.” But the system existent in the Soviet Union bears a resemblance in effect, although they repudiate the idea of our jury system both for political expedience and because they think the practice unsound from a judicial point of view. However, the two persons who sit with the judge do actually provide some check on his judgment and authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet system the two jurors, or co-judges, may decide independently of the judge in all cases. They are selected with a view to their having some ability to serve, and most of them seem to be people of intelligence who take an active part in the trial. While they are without doubt subject at times to influence from the judge in deliberating on the verdict, there seems also ground for suspecting that because of their nearness to the workers there would be a strong tendency to reflect the opinion of such a group in a verdict they would render. They cannot be regarded as party tools, since a large majority are not party members as against the large majority of judges who are. However, there is a class feeling. The court, as said before, is an organ for carrying out the policy of the state, and decisions will naturally consider the dangerous character of the person on trial. The class nature of the procedure is apparent and is acknowledged, but it is held to be legitimate, a necessity. The jurors could not be expected to aid in a decision, or render one on their own account, which would go against this policy. Thus it would seem that the jurors might have effect in trials not of a class nature, might actually constitute an additional safeguard to the rights of the defendant. There are cases on record where they have gone against the judgment of the court, and rendered their own verdict, thus proving that they are not always a rubber stamp.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER X: CORRECTIVE LABOR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; title of this chapter defines the attitude of the Soviet government toward those persons whom it sets apart from society for a time. It is almost necessary to see what they have done in this line to understand it properly. The institutions in which the policy is carried out have moved many people to warm praise. M. Herriot of France, on visiting the Kharkov Labor Commune exclaimed, “I am not a Communist. I am an old man,” then launched into exuberant appreciation of the system in use there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the discussion of the system in all its details of work and education, one should read the volume, already referred to, &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, edited by Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky. Each separate article is written by a specialist in his particular field and each presents in minuteness some phase of the system which the Russians use. They have known what they wanted to do in the direction of reformation even back in the days of 1917, but for so many years the idea lay, like others did, obscured by catastrophe. Terror and necessity caused severity to prevail for a long time. Punishment was the mainstay of defense from foe within in order to withstand a little better the ones then pressing from without.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the idea was there in the minds of those who were to define the penal policy and the Code of 1922, and set down the principle that punishment was not for the purpose of revenge and might not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain. With this beginning there was a steady progress toward the removing of those indignities that tend to degrade a man, until the Correctional Labor Code of 1933 completed the process. In the meantime various amendments have prohibited torture, the use of handcuffs, solitary confinement, deprivation of food, or any other measure that would have the effect of degradation or do physical harm to the person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0178.svg|SYSTEM OF PLACES FOR DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There has been a steady effort to remove what they term the “prison spirit.” There is, they tell you, no such thing as a “captive” or “prisoner.” The idea is to keep the person deprived of his liberty from feeling in any measure isolated. He is given work to do such as he would have outside and he is always conscious of its useful nature. There are instructors for the various trades, machinery, carpentry, etc., who see that each man is educated for his job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are two main types of places for deprivation of liberty, those located in cities in close quarters, and those out in the country where there is space and greater freedom. In chapters just following some of these typical ones will be described, but they are mentioned here so that references may be clearer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before describing the characteristics of the institutions used for corrective labor, we shall need to define the policy that goes into the system. The articles on which the materials for this chapter are mainly based are those by B. Utievsky on &#039;&#039;Prison Regime&#039;&#039;, and another entitled &#039;&#039;Work in Correctional Labor Institutions&#039;&#039; by M. Kessler and B. Oleinin, both of which are included in the volume edited by Vishinsky, already referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We note again in connection with this work the class character of criminal legislation. One of the basic principles is the assumption that peasants and workers deprived of their liberty are not premeditated enemies of the Soviet order, and under these circumstances it is natural to suppose that treatment for them would be milder than for the anti-proletarians, and the privileges enjoyed by them would be greater. However, this assumption does not prevent the use of the same policy and the same methods in the prison treatment of the so-called class enemies. While the main purpose in placing the political prisoner and others whose crime is chiefly against the state in outlying places was to isolate them from society and prevent their continued danger, there was still a desire to restore them as useful citizens by means of education and labor. The principle expressed in the Code that “maintenance in correctional labor institutions shall be reasonable, and shall not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity” is carried out, they say, in the places where political prisoners are kept just as in others. The main difference is that these prisoners have less freedom, less liberty for contact with society. The aim, however, uppermost in their treatment is to organize a collective life for them, and by the education which is provided to cause these people to fit into that life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An example of constructive use of these prisoners from the anti-proletarian class is the building of the White Sea-Baltic Canal. It is interesting just here to give a quotation from Maxim Gorki, which illustrates their own point of view as to the value of this policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“How did the kulaks work? Here is an instance. The Podlipinsky brigade of the first section in which there were 32 kulaks in the last ten days has set a record of 25 per cent. fulfillment of their quota. But the brigade would not quit its job even when the next shift came to take their place. The brigade had to be taken off by direct order of the chief of the section.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The order Number One brigade consisted chiefly of kulaks. It was on rock work in the sixth section. It has fulfilled 130-150 per cent. of its quota. Their exemplary work was rewarded and entered into the Red Labor Book.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While this may be propaganda, the fact remains that there are those operating the locks in this canal who have been discharged as prisoners, but who continue loyally at the post. We are assured by another author that “thousands of convicts from anti-Soviet elements redeemed themselves, and showed great devotion to Soviet construction. Many gained their freedom; a great many were accorded all kinds of privileges, and a few awarded the highest order of merit.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we come to consider the program for those prisoners from among their own masses we get on safer grounds, at least as to practice. The policy follows much the same lines. We have mentioned before the change in terminology from jails or prisons to “places for deprivation of liberty.” It has also been mentioned that the change does not appear to be limited to terminology, but that the actual purpose to carry out some definite measure by which a man may be rendered fit for a useful place in society seems well observed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, perhaps, would be a good place to say that the program of the Communist Party in regard to treatment of those who break the law calls for eventual correctional labor without deprivation of liberty. Their ultimate goal, both expressed in policy and now being put into practice in a limited way, is that persons shall be sent to labor under supervision where training is provided. This practice will have to go slowly and proceed as their educational program prepares the way for it. At the present time there is usually no sentence of deprivation of liberty for less than one year. Any penalty of compulsory labor given for less than that minimum permits the offender to retain his liberty. In such cases the unemployed among these persons is farmed out to factory or to agricultural work with supervision and training provided. He is given a place to live near to his work, but he is free to go and come as he wishes. It is the aim of the higher judicial organs to abolish the use of deprivation of liberty as rapidly as possible, and to use it only for cases who do not respond to other measures of social defense. The Superior Court has likewise given instructions to the lower tribunals to use deprivation of liberty only as other measures have failed. The employed who are sentenced to labor without deprivation of liberty remain on the job on which they are at work and a certain per cent. of the salary received is deducted each month. With both of these classes there is a possibility of early discharge for good work and because of the practice used in all their penal institutions of counting two working days equal to three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up to 1929 there were still in existence isolated places of detention but since that time the policy prevalent has been to change all of these into the favored educational establishments. At the present time all persons sentenced are taken care of in the various types of labor colonies (industrial, agricultural, road building, land improvement, etc.) or in the semi-free labor camps where guards are maintained, usually selected from among the inmates themselves, but where there are no locked rooms or prison walls.&lt;br /&gt;
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The régime, then, of these institutions, according to Utievsky, has three basic influences: (1) Socially useful, productive labor, (2) political educational influences, and (3) the development of public activity among the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us now see how these three methods of influence are carried out in the institutions themselves. The purpose of labor on the part of the convicts is to provide organized collective work in a society where collective living in all its phases is a predominant note. It is essential to successful readjustment. The Kulak, with his individualistic tendencies, is re-educated in this political philosophy. While he is at this labor, the convict works under the same conditions, and with the same protections that he would enjoy in outside labor. His hours are seven or eight a day, depending upon the nature of his work, and he is permitted a weekly rest of a continuous 42-hour period. Special protection is given to the juvenile laborer, but this will be mentioned again in the chapter concerning juvenile delinquency.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no night work for women, just as there would not be in outside labor, and minors under eighteen are not to be employed in injurious trades. Maternity vacations of eight weeks for physical labor, and six weeks for mental work, both before and after childbirth are prescribed for women. There also exist regulations of various sorts for sanitation and safety. The whole idea is that the person deprived of his liberty may be made to feel that he labors on a par with workers outside; that he may feel useful in the economic plan of the nation; and, through the pay given him, continue support to his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the general consideration mentioned above, there are some special rules of importance. For example, women who are in the fifth month of pregnancy may not be sent to any work outside the institution of which they are inmates, without their consent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all labor in the Soviet Union there are a certain number of days of work (five is the general rule) and one day of rest. This is likewise true of convict labor, and on the eve of the rest day all work and school study must be suspended from dinner time (which is at midday). Another privilege of importance is that each person keeps his own work book with a record of hours, wages due, and deductions made, properly entered. In this way he does not have to take the word of any official as to the correctness of the count, but is able to see for himself and complain if an error has been made.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the matter of food there is a provision for increase in accordance with the expenditure of energy in the work assigned. One doing heavy physical labor would, for example, be given food in larger quantities than one using less strength. In accordance with the principle that a prisoner may not be degraded, the administrative office of these institutions is not permitted to make use of the personal services of the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was mentioned in the beginning that one type of institution provided for the carrying on of all activities in small areas. These are of the nature of penitentiaries, but even for the type of convict in these prisons there are large works of a variety of kinds organized outside the city limits. Among these would be brick-work, bridge building colonies, house building, dairy farms and truck gardens. One of the most constructive things about this labor, in whatever line, is that it forms a part of the five-year plan, and is thus put on the same basis as other forms. The industry carried on must, first of all, satisfy the needs of the institution itself, but goods in excess of this amount are placed on the home market. Export of prison-made goods is forbidden except in the case of the sports goods made at Bolshevo Labor Commune. The latter are noted for their excellent quality and are exported to various countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the grave prison problems in this country is the question of payment of wages to persons serving sentences in penal institutions. In the Soviet system there is no unpaid labor. The amount may not be less than 25 per cent. of the existing scale, nor more than 50 per cent. The cost of maintenance is, of course, not deducted from this amount. In establishing the schedule the prison administration must have the agreement of the Commissar of Labor, and the fact of the profit or loss of the enterprise does not enter into the calculations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convict is not restricted in the spending of his earnings. He may purchase extra foodstuffs, clothing, or he may send his income to his family for support. He may be given advice in the matter, but there is no compulsion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One point in connection with this system is that labor is not compulsory. A convict may work or not as he wishes, and still receive maintenance. But in refusing to work, he loses most of the privileges which he would otherwise enjoy. Practically none do refuse, it is said. On the other hand, there is a great increase in those joining the shock brigade, the group doing excellent work, sometimes even for additional hours. In 1933 in the Moscow region, this figure reached 51.3 per cent. of the total number in these institutions. The number fluctuates usually between 54 and 78 per cent. As a result quotas of production are usually more than fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second basic influence in the program of this institution is political education. A system is established in each place of deprivation of liberty, and the official in charge is the assistant warden. Practically all education carried on has a strong political influence. However, one of the aims involved is the elimination of illiteracy. Every effort is being made in the Soviet Union to give to each citizen at least an elementary education, whether he be in prison or out. To that end there is established in every state institution schools providing for the first seven years of work. There are also other penal institution courses for the semi-illiterates and those of a sufficiently advanced nature for the more educated. There are in addition some evening and university classes for those wishing to take advantage of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the regular school work which is carried on both by teachers from the outside and some selected from qualified inmates, there is a system of lectures covering specialized subjects. These are designed to give information of a social-political nature and educate the individual in the use of sanitation and hygiene. There are others of a general educational character embracing material of interest to the group. These lectures are given by specialists in the various fields, who are invited by prison administrators, and by any one among the convicts who might be qualified to talk on a particular subject. Admission, of course, is open to all without restriction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In connection with the education work, there are libraries and reading rooms. There is a library located in each place of deprivation of liberty, and there are also circulating ones, and in neither are there restrictions as to the use of books. In most cases some work of this nature is obligatory, but beyond that every convict is not only permitted to use the facilities, but is encouraged to take advantage of the privileges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reading room may be visited at any free hour. Here are found recent newspapers, magazines and other periodicals. Newspapers are also distributed in the rooms, and convicts may subscribe to their own outside these limits if they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The radio with which each room is usually equipped also constitutes an important instrument of education. Lectures, music, and other information or entertainment of an educational and cultural nature may be listened to by the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most interesting phases in the development of this program in these institutions is the art work. The convicts are trained in dramatic performance and also enjoy in this connection entertainment by outside companies. There are concerts and moving pictures given, in almost every one of these places, and convicts attend not less than once a week. But the interesting side of it to an observer is the work the inmates do themselves in the matter of writing and producing their own stage performances. The convicts are free to attend and there is, of course, no charge for admission. A theater or auditorium is a part of the equipment of every institution of this nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sanitary education carried on is in line with the program of other education of this nature, distributing such information to the masses of people. There is an opportunity here for teaching individuals in an effective way, and for seeing that certain fundamentals are put into actual practice. There is a bureau of sanitary education in each institution, composed of the house physician, representatives from the department of political education, and delegates elected by the convicts themselves, devoting itself to this phase of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The purpose of these institutions is seen in its most complete fulfillment in the vocational training which each gives. There are courses in schools of all the various trade groups, providing both theoretical and practical training in skilled trades. The unskilled laborer is here transformed into a man with specialized information in some particular line, which will both render him useful in industry and give him happiness in his work. In 1931, 7,700 convicts attended such courses in the Soviet Union, and 6,500 workers were in that year turned out trained for some particular trade. In 1933 the plan was for giving such preparation to 24,000. Salvation for society and for the individual, they hold, lies in this direction and every man and woman sentenced for law-breaking must be so fitted to earning a livelihood that he will not transgress again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be mentioned before passing to the next point that both cultural and legal work is carried on by means of mass meetings through the organization of such groups as law clubs, and by means of evening forums, lectures and talks. There is also a legal bureau composed of representatives of the department of political education, and two members elected from the convicts, which gives legal aid or advice to the inmates whenever it is needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third basic influence in correctional labor—the development of public activities among the convicts—accounts for some of the most valuable rehabilitating work done in these places, in the author’s opinion. The aim here is to strengthen, or develop where they have been lacking, the social habits of the individual; to turn him into a conscious and active member of society. The basic forms of social activity in these institutions take several directions. There is first the general meeting on various occasions for a variety of purposes. This may be for the formation of social organizations, for the conducting of a campaign for the election of some representative, or perhaps for a celebration of some revolutionary event. The convicts establish their own rules of procedure and make whatever proposals are appropriate. These general meetings take care of whatever concerns are common to the entire population, and leave to the more specialized groups whatever is of narrower interest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the production conferences, held by convicts in the same manner as those used by free-workers in industrial enterprises, an active part is taken in settling whatever questions arise in relation to production. They discuss industrial plans for improvement, financial methods, quota fulfillment, or any question that would logically come within their jurisdiction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most outstanding achievements in the line of self-activities among the convicts is the development of the comradely courts. Through this tribunal those disciplinary problems referred to it are transferred from the administration to the convicts themselves. This court is responsible for the maintenance of order and for seeing that a high quality of educational work prevails, for administering disciplinary measures in the case of shirking work or lessons, of spoiling the equipment of the shops, of laxity in observance of regulations of sanitation and health, of the use of indecent language, of damage done to any book or periodical, of inciting ill treatment of one convict by another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court is composed of a chairman, and two jurors elected at one of the general meetings referred to above. The penalties which they may impose on one who breaks the rules, or fails to live up to the standard set, are as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) Reprimand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Censure with strict warning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Censure with publication in local newspapers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Limitation of visits by friends from outside for a period of not more than one month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) Application to supervisory committee for transfer to another prison with a stricter régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Application for withholding vacation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) Application for either partial or complete non-discounting of working days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) Application for withholding all probation, and early release during a certain period of not more than one month after maturing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) Restitution of damage done.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case of undue severity on the part of this court, the warden may alter the penalty to a milder form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred in the paragraphs dealing with education to cultural committees. These are elected at a general mass meeting to put into action the plans for political education work or to devote themselves to other problems of a cultural nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every place of deprivation of liberty has its wall newspaper, changed about every week or ten days and carrying news of various sorts of a political or educational nature, as well as items of interest to prison life. The editorial boards of these papers are likewise elected at the general meetings. Prison administrators as well as other authorities on penal policy in the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the development of public activities among the prisoners has yielded splendid results of a social nature. They point to the success of the “book soobotnik” (one day’s salary given for books) which netted 100,000 rubles. It is stated that the gifts were entirely voluntary without pressure from any source. Another incident showing a desirable spirit was the collection among the convicts of 31,818 rubles for an aeroplane which was presented to the fleet. There have been other acts of the same kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now we turn to the régime found in these institutions, the express purpose of which is to develop free will, initiative and self-activity. All privileges possible are permitted to the man deprived of his liberty, and his freedom as little restricted as the nature of the person himself permits. Following out the principle that no condition designed to degrade the convict or make him feel inferior may be permitted, penal authorities proceeded legislatively to remove whatever might exist in this line. The corrective labor code of 1933, for example, completely severed all connection with the progressive system of progressive classification of prisoners. The theory is that in this educational-labor program no man is to be treated with greater privilege than another unless he himself makes some deprivation necessary. Even then there are limits. A recalcitrant member of the penal population may be deprived for a period not longer than one month of such privileges as writing letters, or receiving visitors, but no corporal punishment may be inflicted nor may he be locked in solitary confinement. It is worth noting here that the solitary cells left from the Tzarist days may at times be used for tenants, but the door of the cell may not be locked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convicts have privileges as great as can be accorded. From the day of their entrance they may walk about anywhere they wish at any time they are free from work. In those institutions located in the country, this may take the character of quite a good walk, while in those of the penitentiary type located in cities, it naturally is limited to the prison yard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Visitors may come as often as twice in five days and may consist not only of relatives but of friends and acquaintances as well. There is no red tape in making arrangements for a visit so that no difficulty of this sort prevents contact between the convict and those outside. There may be as many as three persons at one time, and they may bring with them, if they wish, gifts of food, tobacco, etc. There is no restriction in the use of tobacco except that there are some particular places where the convict is requested not to smoke. Outside of this he may have as many cigarettes as he wishes or can obtain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither is there restriction in the number of letters which he may write or receive. In the matter of either letters or gifts the administration reserves the right of inspection, but in the majority of cases, unless there is some suspicion attached to the person, this right is not utilized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is an interesting development in the matter of leaves. For the man who has proved himself a good worker and who is not suspected of any intention of escape, a leave of fourteen days in the year is granted. He may go where he likes on this vacation, and use it as he pleases. He is placed entirely on his honor and no guard is in attendance at any time. In addition to this a convict may obtain a leave at any time because of an emergency such as an illness or death in his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still more liberal terms are granted to the peasant or collective farmer. In the event that he is needed for field labor, he is given a leave for the full three-month period of the season, and if he breaks no law during this leave, the time counts on his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to this leave and vacation, there is always the possibility of release after a short part of the original sentence has been served. If the person is judged fit to be restored to his place in society, and thought to be no longer a menace, he may be released after serving a minimum of one-third of his sentence. There is also the practice, as already mentioned, of counting two productive working days as three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before passing from the chapter describing the policy and character of corrective labor work, some mention ought to be made of the administration. Who exactly is responsible in the USSR for seeing that this policy is translated into action? At the very head are the Commissariats of Justice of the various republics.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A Law of October 24, 1934, transferred the administration of all places of deprivation of liberty to the newly created Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR. The organization described is now within this Department, but the author had the information too late to incorporate in the body of the book.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There is a certain amount of independence in these relationships. The Collective Labor Code of 1933 of the RSFSR made a considerable advance in the direction of autonomous supervision on the part of the administration of corrective labor organization in these republics. Those institutions located in the territory of these various republics are administered and managed by local commissars of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this organization there are local administrative bodies known as observation committees. One of these exists in connection with each institution and is directly responsible for administration and management. In direct charge is the superintendent or warden, and his staff of assistants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is especially close relation between the agency of supervision and the prisoners which enables the Observation Commission to know with a high degree of accuracy as to when release is advisable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Previous to 1926 there had been two commissions participating in the distribution and release of prisoners—the Distributory Commission and the Observation Commission. The Observation Commission, however, while making recommendations to the Distributory Commission in matters of dismissal and release, played a minor role, since its viewpoint was in no way binding on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1924 provided for an Observation Commission to be established at every place of deprivation of liberty as a part of the staff of the place. On this commission was the people’s judge, and a representative of the local bureau of trade unions. This extension in the scope of the work of these commissions was made in an effort both to raise the level of work being done at the prisons and also to establish a closer contact between commission and prisoners. The result hoped for, however, was not realized as the judge was entirely, by nature of his position, separated from his work, and the representatives of the bureau took little interest in the matter. By the same Act the powers of the Distributory Commission were widened, and the Act of April 21, 1926, went further still, giving to this body authority to assign the long-term prisoners to places of agricultural work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There still was the gap between the work of the commission of release and the correctional labor institutions. The Observation Commission which was on the ground could make recommendations but they were not always accepted by the Distributory Commission which handled dismissals and releases. Many mistakes resulted and the desire of the authorities to establish intimate contact between commission and prisoners was being thwarted. Thus the Sixth Congress of Jurists proposed the liquidation of the Distributory Commissions and the reorganization of the Observation Commissions. By the reformation of 1929 new opportunities for constructive work were opened to these commissions, and the contact between them and the prisoners of the institution was finally made close and real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 made several important changes in the composition and work of these commissions of the RSFSR. There is now a Central Commission and under it trade union observation committees on which are the head of the correctional labor institution and two representatives from the general organization which are installed in each of the large corrective labor units and in all field production. Every effort has been made to see that there is close contact of these commissions with the institutions, that the policy of the central administration is carried out, that the work follows the lines it should, and results in fitting the inmates of the institutions for life as it is supposed to do. The Commissar of Justice is, in the last analysis, responsible for the work of these commissions, but by Act of February 10, 1933, he has placed that responsibility squarely on one man, the chairman of the Corrective Labor Commission, whose duty it now is to see that the policy and plans of the commissariat are carried out. This chairman is a member of the Central Observation Commission, but not the chairman of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prosecutors who were supposed to be attending the open session of these meetings and were actually present at them to the extent of 78 per cent., were found to be merely sitting quietly and taking no active part in solving problems and working out plans. By the same Act of February 10, 1933, the Commissar of Justice ordered them not only to be present but to participate actively in all meetings. There are no figures on actual participation but the percentage of attendance jumped from 78 to 82 and it is stated that practically all those present take an active part in discussions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no lack of effort to see that this commission inquires into, and knows, what is going on, is acquainted with the prisoners, and never for a moment forgets what it is set up to do. For the accomplishment of an organic union between the Observation Commission and the corrective labor institution, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee has demanded that the members of this commission participate actively in the creative and labor life of the institution as well as in its political education. To effect this there are many special meetings, besides the open ones, devoted to the problems of various industries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us see for a moment what organizations are represented on these commissions and how often the respective members attend the meetings.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 406407.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| style=&amp;quot;width: 70%&amp;quot;| Name of organization&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| No. of meetings attended&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(in per cent.)&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Corrective Labor Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 68&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Court&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 82&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Worker-peasant inspection&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 74.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Other Soviet Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 54&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Women’s delegate groups&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 73&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Enterprizes&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 58&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Organization of Komsomol&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 47&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Sections of Revolutionary Law&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 63&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Trade Unions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 66&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jurors&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 95&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Agricultural collectives&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 60&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This table was for the last nine months of 1932. It represents not a particularly bad showing but it was in 1933 that the All-Union Central Executive Committee decided that this was not sufficient and that there must be even better attendance. It aimed its order this time at the social members and demanded that they give active aid in inculcating social form of labor into correctional labor institutions. There is no thought of sending a man away to prison to get him out of the community then forgetting all about him. He will be returning in an average time of a year and a half and the community through its representative is responsible to see that he shall return in good order. It is thus made directly everybody’s problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been said elsewhere in this book that the Observation Commission is the authority for handling release and dismissal. Appeal may be taken from all of its decisions and a good percentage are reversed. Its mistakes, it is said, are largely because of a one-sided attack of the case in which its members were able only to see the seriousness of the crime, or perhaps only the social status of the convict, or maybe only his industrial activity at the place of his imprisonment. The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 takes a broader approach to the problem and demands that those responsible do the same. Each individual case must be treated from a differentiated viewpoint, with a survey of all angles involved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following table is given to show what types of disposal is used in the Soviet Union, and the relative importance of each.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; Article by N. Durmanov, entitled “Observation Commissions,” p. 396&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| &#039;&#039;Cases Examined in 1928&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| Per cent.&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of those serving in correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 22.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of prisoners&lt;br /&gt;
| 0.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Amnesty&lt;br /&gt;
| 7.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Release from imprisonment under guard&lt;br /&gt;
| 1.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Installment of labor days&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;It has been mentioned elsewhere that sentences are shortened by counting two productive work days as three of the sentence.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| 28.4&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Removal of strict isolation&lt;br /&gt;
| 3.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to other classification&lt;br /&gt;
| 2.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Assignment of type of place of detention&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Miscellaneous&lt;br /&gt;
| 13.0&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the duties already mentioned the Observation Commission has charge of the distribution of prisoners to the proper places for the serving of the sentence imposed and for their transferal from one place to another when it becomes necessary. In order to place a convict so that the best results may be secured, a close case study is made, an analysis of his personality, characteristics, ability, social status, and other pertinent information, but if an error is made after all, then he is transferred when better acquaintance shows where he belongs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XI: SOKOLNIKI ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sokolniki&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a prison, call it by whatever name one will. It is true that the national policy relating to corrective labor and discipline modify its physiognomy, but it still presents the atmosphere of a penitentiary. This statement is not meant as any criticism of either it or its administration, since one can hardly see how that aspect of it could be otherwise as long as criminals do exist who need restraining—and some of such there are bound to be. The fact of its sterner nature is emphasized in the beginning so that the impression will not be given that a place like Bolshevo Labor Commune, described in later pages, would fulfill the requirements for all the elements found among the criminals in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Standing outside the wall, just as cold and gray as the usual for penitentiaries, and looking up at the towers at the corners where sentinels armed with rifles keep watch, one has all the feeling of a sinking heart that comes with such a sight. People are shut away there and possibly forgotten by the citizenry from whom they have been separated, perhaps, since it is the customary thing for ignorance to prevail as to prisons and penal methods. One thinks, standing there, wondering about men behind that wall, of a description written in verse by one prisoner some quarter of a century ago. It is sentimental, belonging to an age when emotion was expressed a little more freely than our practice of restraint permits now, but one suspects men still suffer as he did in a good many prison cells such as this writer has seen. Lines of the poem, especially descriptive and appropriate to this subject, speak of “where tongues are mute, and men arise to newborn wrong,” and “where men must fawn or walk with scars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stell and Null, &#039;&#039;Convict Verse&#039;&#039;, Ft. Madison, Iowa, 1908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One doesn’t need to tell people who know anything of the penal situation in the United States that conditions make it possible to write lines like that. Of all of our social endeavor, the treatment of men convicted of crime seems the place where we have most signally failed in constructive results. Constructive treatment is, of course, a rare exception rather than a rule. But it seems to this writer that the implications of the verse have a less favorable chance of being true of Soviet prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place there is no prison sentence longer than ten years, and few offenders serve that long. The authorities figure that a maximum ten-year constructive program will fit anybody for proper living unless he is irredeemable. There will be some cases, of course, where there is failure, but the idea is to fit the régime to the majority. Right here there will be the question always forthcoming as to what they would do with our own gangster type. Give them a ten-year sentence? Not at all. They have few of them and for armed robbery one may be sentenced to death. No arguments are listed here for or against punishment by death, but in order to understand the absence of a long prison sentence it is necessary to be informed as to what happens to those who would ordinarily be the recipients of such a term. The fellow who murders in a jealous rage or great anger may find himself in for a long treatment in a place for mental abnormals, or he may, if judged sane, be given a sentence of ten years or less. They do not consider this type of murderer to be, usually, a further social menace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With those disposed of the formulators of the policy believe that a longer sentence for others is not needed. They see no aid anywhere in having one languish in prison beyond that point where a sentence ceases to have the possibility of being constructive and begins to dull the senses and perspective of the prisoner so that he is worthless anywhere. Some of our penologists have said that it is better to keep a man either a brief period or for his life because after a certain time it is practically impossible for him to fit into a society of which he has no knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet system provides measures for keeping a man in touch with society so that he may not feel that entire isolation even though ten years is the maximum of incarceration. In the first place, as we have seen, only those whose term is short or whose character makes it necessary are put in the closed institutions; in the next even those who are there are given vacations of leave if it is thought that they can be trusted not to escape. And in case that has to be denied to an inmate, he still has opportunity for contacts with associates within and friends and relatives without in open, wholesome manner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tongues are not mute, either. Prisoners gather where they like, walk together, work together, play together. Nor do they “fawn or walk with scars.” The stated policy is to encourage them to approach and conduct themselves with dignity and no guard may inflict physical punishment on any prisoner. One might say that such a policy is likely not carried out. There may be isolated instances of violation, and one feels sure there are, but the attitude of the men toward the attendants and guards seem to indicate that such regulations are regarded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sokolniki is a prison for men who have been sentenced, supposedly, from one to three years. Article 28 of the Criminal Code says, ‘Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labour camps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labour or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labour camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence.” (May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are therefore a number serving sentences of longer periods than the three years who, because of physical condition, can not be sent to the labor camp to which they should be assigned, or because they need the restraint, perhaps, of these stronger walls. At the time of the writer’s visit there were a few more than eleven hundred prisoners in Sokolniki. The prison’s capacity is said to be something more than that, but it seemed then to be more crowded than was good for adequate treatment. However, one must remember that the housing situation in all of the USSR is acute and especially is that true of the cities where industrialization has required the assembling of more persons than can comfortably be housed. It is to be expected that prisons might share in this shortage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet system uses the collective dormitory system rather than the single room standard. This is in keeping with their idea of community living and we were told at the women’s prison that it is preferred by the prisoners themselves who like being with others and have no wish to be shut off. They use it also in student dormitories where beds are placed eight or ten to a large room. That, however, they wish to remedy. Their aim is a room for every worker and every student but that will require much more building.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Sokolniki is a well-known prison it will perhaps be interesting to set down a detailed description of it. The Soviet picture, The Road to Life, shown in this country, was made there, we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In arriving at Sokolniki, which is not far outside the city limits of Moscow, one comes to a closed door in the stone wall, some fifteen feet high, already mentioned. There must, of course, be an appointment just as there must be for entering a penitentiary in our own country. There is a bell and after it is rung the door is opened by an armed guard. The visitor is then in a small entrance room where there are other guards and which leads into a large court back of and around which the prison buildings form a square. There are other guards scattered in places about the court and near a large gate through which automobiles and trucks enter when they have business there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we went through the court to the first building we were to see, about a hundred feet away, two men sat at the door of a side building, peeling potatoes. They were talking and laughing as they worked, evidently enjoying themselves. This was the first glimpse of the informal atmosphere that prevailed throughout, and which caused us to look in some amazement at occasional scenes such as that encountered as we entered the auditorium where a good pianist was playing and other men stood beside him or leaned on the piano, at ease and absorbed in the music.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We had now left all the armed guards behind and there were no others in evidence until we came to depart. There were attendants, supervisors of work, etc., but there were no weapons among them. We went through shops and factories, observing the men at work. They wore any sort of clothes that they happened to own, mostly of the poor peasant type, since prisoners in Russia are never put in uniform.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The spinning and weaving shops were interesting. They were well lighted, had good ventilation except in one room where neither was very adequate. As we went by the men talked to each other in a normal conversational manner, watched us, both amused and curious. Also, we talked to them as we wished. Others, not then at work for some reason (we were told that every man in the prison works, but it was late in the day when we went and some had ended their shift), followed us about good naturedly, enjoying our curiosity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A prosecuting attorney was our guide and he stopped to talk to various ones among them. Also as we went along men occasionally stopped him with requests, some with complaints, and he noted them on paper. At times he good naturedly refused what was asked, but any came who wanted to, informally, and without permission from any source.&lt;br /&gt;
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The attitude of the convicts toward labor may be explained by several things which have already been mentioned. There is no feeling of punishment about the work since the prison factories are placed on the same basis as others in the country. They have an eight-hour day, they receive pay (from 20 to 50 rubles per month) which they are permitted to spend as they like and which often goes to the support of a family at home, and they have the knowledge that the work they do is counted in the regular plan so that even while they serve their sentence they are actively helping in the nation’s economic life. At any rate, these men did not appear depressed as they worked, nor in bad spirits. We watched an older inmate pleasantly talking to a young fellow beside him while he manipulated a loom, apparently telling some interesting story for he used his hands occasionally in quick gestures, but he kept his eyes on his work, and he seemed to take pride in his job.&lt;br /&gt;
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From the shops we went to the dormitories and saw not one room only, but a number of them. As has already been intimated these rooms were too crowded. The cots were quite close together, even using the center of the room, and there was not enough space left for walking about. However, the men are not in a great deal of time. They go outside as they wish, walk when they care to, read in the library, exercise on the outside gymnasium apparatus, and are in the work shops at other times. Also, as already said, the problem of space is one that is occupying Soviet authorities extensively at present and they will require time to remedy the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We were asked to enter the room and sit down on the cots. The prosecuting attorney with us led the way. We were somewhat slow in following and one of the men, sitting on his cot in the center of the room, said, “Come on in. The beds are clean.” His invitation was accompanied by a smile and we quickly entered. By this time our presence had become known about the place and a great number had gathered in the corridor outside the room we were visiting, talking volubly. We were told to speak to any one we wished, to ask any question. We did so freely and were answered frankly. One prisoner told us that he was displeased with his sentence, that it was his first offense, that he had stolen a hat, and had been given a five-year term. “Impossible,” exclaimed the prosecutor, and promptly sent a messenger to the office to get the papers in the case. Some time later, when we were in the auditorium the records came and the man was sent for. He was a little chagrined but not greatly disturbed when his record showed robbery, not once but several times, with even the use of firearms. “Well,” he said nonchalantly, not too much put out that he hadn’t got away with his story, “it was too much anyway.”&lt;br /&gt;
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After we had visited a number of the dormitories we went to the yard. Several hundred prisoners were with us then. In the center of a bunch of them, we remembered again that here were some of the worst criminals in the country. They gathered all around to ask us about prisons in the United States or any other questions they could think of. One particularly intelligent man talked freely of conditions in Sokolniki, of his own sentence, and of his outlook on life. He had been a teacher before he had been caught in some sort of speculation, but he was teaching in the prison as well as doing some shop work. We continued questioning, now in French, now in German, more often through the Russian interpreter. The attendants were among them, talking also. There seemed to be no feeling of restraint in their presence, but on the contrary an existence of comradeship showed, especially on one occasion when one of the men had been asked a question he could not answer and turned to a guard for information. Such an attitude was apparent often, particularly as we went to the auditorium. As we were leaving the yard an incident happened that impressed us greatly. From the flower garden, one of the men came with an arm full of flowers that he wished to present to a member of the party who had passed some cigarettes around. He did it with the air of one who brings a bouquet from a prized garden of his own.&lt;br /&gt;
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We stopped to look at the dining room next. It was an ordinary room of almost square dimensions with long tables, seating two hundred and fifty at a time, and immaculately clean. From there we went through a small hall and upstairs to the auditorium where we were told to ask any questions on points of either policy or practice about which we still would like information. We were not sparing but every query was answered with great patience and detail. Then, as we were about to go, the prosecutor suggested to the superintendent who had been with us that we might like to hear the orchestra play. A messenger was sent and eventually a few musicians were rounded up but as there were not, enough to give a very good account of themselves, they tried the drama and dancing group with better luck. These hastily summoned the stage director, the curtains to the stage were drawn, a splendid pianist among their number who had discontinued some piece he was playing as we went in, now entertained us while preparations went on. In the meantime both men and attendants were crowding into the auditorium, messengers from among the prisoners were darting in and out with stringed musical instruments, and an informal atmosphere prevailed that it would be hard to give an impression of. The men talked in low excited tones, the music continued, the prosecutor and the prison director leaned against the piano. An attendant near to us carried on an excited conversation with a group of prisoners with him. It was difficult to believe that this was indeed a prison of a more serious type. It had all the earmarks just then of a community affair of local talent about to start.&lt;br /&gt;
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The program was given with zest and enjoyment. It lasted an hour and consisted of dances, singing, a reading, most of which they had written and produced themselves under the direction of the specialists who are in charge of that type of work in the prison. The results they got with the scant attention they gave to costuming was interesting. They used only a kind of high-throated long white tunic over whatever trousers they happened to have on, because they had no time for further preparation, but there was a uniform effect which was appropriate to the selections they gave. We were reluctant to have the entertainment end but we had undoubtedly kept them from their supper for the time, and their graciousness reminded us that we too must be considerate. We thanked them, said goodbye, and went upstairs for a visit to the library.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here was a long light room with bookshelves across the farther end and with reading tables and chairs nearer the door. At the side as we entered was the atheist corner, so-called, which is found in nearly all the institutions and which is devoted mostly to evolution. A large picture of Darwin was prominently placed among the exhibits. There were also pictorial illustrations of the lower stages through which man has come and such other things as one would expect to find in a geological or anthropological display. Science, in their new culture, is designed to replace religion in so far as state recognition is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out again in the yard some of the prisoners demonstrated their athletic ability and performed gymnastic feats on bars. We noted their carefree attitude, the interested passive participation of their comrades, but the wall was there again just across from us reminding that after all there was restriction—deprivation of liberty. And that, after all, is the chiefest of punishment. On top of the towers at the corners of the wall the men with long rifles looked down at us. No matter what the correctional labor policy, how designed to be constructive of character, certain men have to be restricted and the program forced on them. But it is to be doubted whether there is often achievement of a spirit like that in the prisons of many other countries and even in case it does exist, it is likely to be in some isolated place where an exceptional warden has been able to achieve it, possibly in a lesser place, one suspects, and not a major penitentiary.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XII: A WOMEN’S PRISON ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; full name of this institution is Moscow Novinsky Women’s Isolator. There is another such prison at Orenburg, and these are the only two in the RSFSR. There were many things about this place that compared unfavorably with Sokolniki, chief of which was a lesser liberty of action. That was explained to us as being necessary because fifty per cent. of the population are there awaiting trial, which means that they stay only for a brief time. This makes a constructive program more difficult, since it is not possible to undertake for a yet unconvicted person the same type of treatment as would be accorded one actually sentenced. They must be kept separately, and with the small outdoor space available it is quite a problem to handle the question of freedom and recreation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity of the place is 375, but at the time of our visit it had only 360 in both classes; that is, those sentenced by the court and those awaiting trial. There are more problems connected with a women’s prison than with one for men. Children must be thought of, both those about to be born and small ones who depend on the mother and for whom there is no other care. There is a small hospital for ordinary cases in this prison, but a pregnant woman is taken out to a proper place for the birth of her child. It is emphasized that she is entitled to the same treatment as any other mother in the land, and that by virtue of her being a prisoner, she is not to be deprived of the best medical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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One comes up to this prison suddenly, without warning. Around a corner from a wide avenue and up a cobbled street for a block and the building is there before you. One enters the prison straight from the street into a small hallway, such as is found dividing the two front rooms of a residence. All the guards are women and they stand with guns to which are attached bayonets. They seemed much more severe than the men guards at other prisons, but perhaps that is because one is not accustomed to seeing them. Others wearing revolvers were about in the hallway and at other points in this entrance building. Their uniform consists of white blouse and dark skirt, with the gun belt acting in the place of a normal one, and military-looking caps. They are businesslike and, one feels sure, equal to an emergency. However, we were assured that none arises. The action of the comradely court takes care of the majority of whatever disciplinary problems there might be.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our first pause was in the office where we were received by the director and told some few points about the prison. However, we were reminded that a tour of it would be worth more than a lecture, and since that seemed a logical statement to us, we started out. Across the hall from the office in which we had been sitting was the visiting room. Every six days each prisoner may see visitors. There is no screen through which they must talk; the contact is direct; but there is a long counter behind which the prisoners sit. A guard is present in the room at all times, but takes care not to listen to the conversation. That is regarded as the person’s private affair. Mail may be censored but mere words are not restricted, so we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
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Passing through this room, we found ourselves in a court around which the buildings form a hollow square. This institution was a prison in Tzarist days, and a gloomy spot it must have been according to descriptions. Now, there are many windows which are large and admit plenty of light and air. We visited next the wing used as a dormitory and found there somewhat more space than in Sokolniki. One room was particularly large, about fifty feet long. Beds are fairly well spaced; there is a small cabinet for each woman, and the ventilation is good. A girl with a guitar was furnishing entertainment for others who sat on their respective cots and listened. She stopped playing loudly as we entered but continued to strum. We were told here, as at all other places we visited, to talk to any whom we wished, to ask any question we would. The superintendent seemed eager to emphasize that we were free to see or know anything. She had heard the prevalent story that in Russia one never sees things. She begged us to feel free to look and to question. No one would listen to what we said to the prisoner nor she to us. We talked to an old woman who wore the headdress of a peasant. She sat aloof on her cot and we were moved by her lonely appearance. What had she done? She stole bread, she told us, and for that she had a ten-year sentence. The same prosecutor who was with us at Sokolniki was listening at this moment. His face was full of sympathy. A person, whatever he might have on his conscience, could scarcely find him forbidding to talk to. He began to question and discovered that this was no ordinary theft of bread but a widespread attempt to defraud the state. A written note went into his pocket before he turned away and one wonders whether the ten-year sentence which might possibly not be served anyway, would be reduced.&lt;br /&gt;
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We talked next with a pretty black-haired girl whose eyes sparkled with mischief. No one was near to listen. For robbery, she told us frankly, she had been sent for five years of deprivation of liberty. One hopes that not even a prison can dim that gayness which seemed to cause her to bubble over. Was she getting along all right, she was asked? Fine! She laughed with us, talked animatedly for several minutes. Did she feel resentful? No, because she was learning there and she shouldn’t have stolen anyway. How will she get a job when she gets out? There were more jobs than people she told us as if she had learned a lesson. Was she sure? we asked. All the people who leave here get work at once. She knew that to be true. Why shouldn’t they? They were good workmen, she added. We left them to visit other rooms, and down the hall past two or three we came to one with spreads on the beds, with white covers on the tables, with a framed picture here and there and other personal belongings in place. It was the room occupied by the shock-brigaders. Russia honors its &#039;&#039;Udarnicks&#039;&#039;, whether in prison or out, for their efforts are such as send the nation bounding on its way. In this room, the honor spot of the dormitories, a young woman, perhaps twenty-one, sat at a desk with her back to us. She is the chairman of the comradely court, we were told, and she smiles at us with great pride. It is evidently an achievement which carries satisfaction.&lt;br /&gt;
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She had stolen continuously since she was fifteen, her case read, but by means of the approach they use here they have been able to aid her. The superintendent assured us that her whole character had undergone a change, that she was trusted and valuable to the institution, and supervised with ability the court that was responsible for discipline within the prison. We talked to others, one a middle-aged woman, who did exceptionally good work. She was proud of her ability and the praise she had won.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went to the nursery. A mother sat in a small room beside it, nursing her child. We noticed the position of her foot, the way she held her baby, and were reminded that some one gave instruction in such points in a way that would meet the best approval. Cribs were lined up along the sides of the nursery and a trained woman, not a prisoner, was in charge. She was assisted with the children by inmates themselves. There were about twenty beds but only a few children. The others had already been taken to the play-yard. We took time to observe before we left that the room was well ventilated and well kept and the woman in charge briskly businesslike. As we descended again to the court we passed a small room back of the stairway where women were washing their clothes. Each must do her own, and a room equipped with tubs was provided for the purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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The children are kept up to four years of age, then disposed of among the other state institutions for children or dismissed with the mother, or possibly, if she must stay longer, sent to some of her family. In the yard, a grassy spot with shrubbery, the children were having a gay time with all sorts of apparatus and a playhouse. Like the children in other Russian centers, they wore no clothes except light cotton trunks.&lt;br /&gt;
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They looked healthy and well cared for and showed, it seemed to us, less of physical abnormalities than one usually notices in children of imprisoned women.&lt;br /&gt;
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We visited the school room and were told that compulsory education is provided up to the seventh year and opportunity given for work beyond, by means of university evening courses. There is at the same time the usual political education, the clubs, and physical education that characterizes all penal places, and a radio in every room for additional education and entertainment.&lt;br /&gt;
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We came out into the court again to go to the wing containing the shops. Some of the informal attitude which we had noticed at Sokolniki now began to show itself. There were groups who leaned out of their windows and shouted to us, and some of the younger girls talked to us in the court. Three of them begged us to tell them about the prisons in America, much as three children would waylay one and insist on being told tales. We gave them some information, and then tried to answer questions about New York and life in the United States. No, they didn’t think they would like America because people did not have jobs there, while here when they got out, they would be assured of work. We asked if they felt certain of that. Of course. The patron factory of this institution gives preference to those released from here. They boldly hailed the prosecutor now, to tell him that they wanted their sentences reduced. The law gives them the right to complain to the prison management, to the Commissar of Justice, or to the prosecuting attorney, but they are not offering a complaint of the sentence. It is only that they are ready to be good and work like faithful citizens. Another note is thrust into the prosecutor’s coat pocket. What was done with them we did not know but since the inmates seemed to expect that procedure it must be a general practice, and the fact that he definitely refused some and made no note seemed to indicate that the others had real significance. We were told that each case so noted would be checked. The approach to official channels is evidently quite easy.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were no shops in this prison in Tzarist days, and the women did not work. Now the wing which has been newly built is thrust out in such a way that it is long and narrow, with windows on both sides. There is plenty of ventilation and light. The women were cutting and sewing shirts and other garments from the same material we had seen the men making at Sokolniki. There were long tables with good working space and as we walked about various women showed us finished articles with pride. The sewing machines had all the latest equipment, and the operatives worked rapidly. The products of their shops are turned over to the cooperatives and sold where needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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They, too, work on the same basis as do factory workers of the land, with the exception (as in the case of all prisoners) that because they are supplied with their upkeep they are not paid normal wages. At the time we were there some of them were not at work, due, the directress told us, to a shortage of material. The supervisors are not prisoners but come in from the outside to teach and direct the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
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Already in the chapter on “What Crimes Are Committed and Who Commits Them” we referred to the acts committed by women. In this prison the records showed that theft came first and robbery a close second, but in cases with whom we talked, the theft often turned out to be some act involving state property which carried a severe penalty. For that reason one was surprised at first to find long sentences attached to what appeared to be less serious crimes. But, in view of the provisions of the law of August 7, 1932, such larceny is sternly dealt with, even though the act is committed by a person from among the peasants or toiling class. One stealing from her neighbor would get a much lighter sentence. This is where the class nature of punishment shows up very strongly and unbalances the scales of justice that otherwise seem to work with such fairness. An example of the difference was very clear in two cases. One girl had been in prison nine times for theft and her present sentence was for two years only. Another had committed her first offense by stealing from a collective farm, a tool apparently of some “class enemy,” and her sentence was ten years. The “measure of social danger” accounts for the difference, and while it is easy to see that the authorities are confronted by a real problem of deep seriousness, one wonders whether something more of justice&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This statement by the author has caused Mr. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow to offer the following explanation. “The word ‘justice’ in the USSR has another meaning than in the writings of the bourgeois sociologists. Criminal repression is not expiation of the crime. We don’t feel it just to shoot a man who has committed a murder only in order to punish him. Instead of one murder that would make two. But we call it just, if by means of shooting such a murderer, we can prevent a score of other murders. The construction of Socialism is our greatest task. Everything that helps the achievement of it is just, everything that hinders it is unjust. That is the point of view in every criminal case and I don’t suppose that we shall ever change it. But of course the methods of our fight for Socialism change at every stage of Socialist construction, and today they are other than they were five years ago.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; might not in the long run make for better feeling as well as a more ethical foundation for their socialist state. It is contradictory to their usual administration of justice among their own masses. One hopes that, as the conflict recedes, “pure justice” in so far as such is possible will replace “socially dangerous” measurements now in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again we were in the court preparing to leave. A girl of some eighteen or nineteen years, with thick golden braids hanging to her waist, was at the window above us shouting laughingly down to the superintendent. One of our party had a camera and she wished her picture made. It was all right, we were told, and the picture was snapped, and she was promised one as soon as it could be developed. Others were calling to us, too, setting up a din, with their comments and questions. Such an informal atmosphere can hardly be described. A group stood about like girls let out of school, talking, watching us curiously, unrestrained by the presence of attendants or directress. One feels that so long as there is no attempt to escape, and no running afoul the comradely court, one can do about as she likes—play volley ball when she pleases, if she is free from work, listen to the radio, read in the library, or gossip with her neighbor. She also has a good atmosphere in which to learn that labor and happiness are pretty close companions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The parting word from our hostess was, “I wish I might visit a prison in America with the same freedom with which I have shown you this.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What a western observer would feel first in these prisons is a lack of physical equipment such as his own best might boast. There was such criticism expressed. But this is not an adequate standard with which to measure their success. It is true that in these closed prisons of a penitentiary type their equipment, while much better than that in our worst, is not nearly so good as that in our best, but the fact that without this equipment they are able to achieve the attitude and cooperation they do on the part of the prisoners is all the more significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is also the point that the aim of Soviet penal authorities is to remove as rapidly as possible every person whose character will permit into the open or semi-closed correctional labor institutions and discontinue the use of the closed types except for the most incorrigible cases. Because of that, they are devoting all possible attention to the development and improvement of the labor institutions. And one finds different conditions in these places. They would not suffer very much by comparison with our best. A description of Bolshevo Labor Commune, in a later chapter, will indicate that.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the meantime they create that constructive businesslike atmosphere, among the women as well as the men, that gives genuine hope of equipping these people for a place in social life.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XIII: THE CHILD AND THE LAW ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;When&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; H. G. Wells was visiting in Moscow the past summer, he is said to have made the following observation to a Russian journalist: “I know, you Moscow people look upon all this with different eyes. You are Robinson Crusoes recreating life upon barren land after a social cataclysm. You are proud that you are manufacturing without the capitalists’ air motors, and reoentgen apparatus which the capitalists before you did not manufacture. You are happy to be doing all this. I understand this. And I should have been happy in your place, but of all your productions, excuse me, I am struck only by one thing. You are making people. It is this that I have come here to see and I see it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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If they are making people in this Soviet land, and I think it is pretty well agreed by thoughtful persons that they are, the beginning of the process is found in their treatment of children. So much has been said and written on the care of the child in Russia that no elaboration should be necessary here, and in regard to the delinquent it is no less than that given to the normal child. Their attitude toward the child who breaks the law is not that society must be protected, but that the individual may be given an opportunity for developing his own life. His interest is uppermost and practically every branch of government cooperates in his protection and training.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0222.svg|TYPICAL SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF F.Z.U. SCHOOL]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Geneva declaration has been of special interest to the authorities dealing with this problem in the USSR. They believe with the author of the statement that mankind must give the child the best it has. In many of their publications they quote the main points of that declaration, and it seems of interest to set them down in relation to this chapter. They follow:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) The child should be given an opportunity of normal development, materially as well as spiritually.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The starved child must be fed, the sick cured, the retarded pushed ahead, the defective trained, and the orphan taken care of.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The child must be helped first of all during public misfortune.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) The child must be prepared to earn his bread, and protected from all types of exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) The child must be trained with the understanding that his best powers must be devoted to his brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
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For them the application of these points is to all children. The problem of the upbringing of the juvenile criminal is not separable from the general question of juvenile training. And whenever it is possible, the child who has broken the law is sent to schools for his training which in no wise differ from those for the noncriminal child.&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia’s fight against juvenile crime has been one of its major problems. It is an old story that the Civil War and the Volga famine in 1921 left hordes of wild children wandering over the land. They crowded in the railway stations, they rode the rods from place to place, they congregated in market places, behind billboards, in any places they could find, and were so depraved by street life that they became the most hardened of criminals. At this time, too, men released from the army, with no jobs available, turned in great numbers to banditry, and these children became their associates in their illegal enterprise. In history there is perhaps no picture greatly darker so far as children are concerned, and handling such a situation is not the least of Russia’s achievements. Today there are still a few scattered remnants of that vast number that one sees in railway stations, but the problem is in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the moment when this condition reached its worst, the government was dealing with the Civil War at its greatest height, giving its attention and energy to the defense of the proletarian state. But it is to its great credit that it found time even then to concentrate its forces to give care to this growing army of homeless waifs and juvenile delinquents. We have at that moment a proposal on the part of the leader of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, later referred to in detail, which marked the beginning of the system of care given today to young offenders in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, there was already machinery in operation for dealing with juvenile criminals or children needing the aid of the state because of some abnormal condition. As early as January 14, 1918, only a little more than two months after the October Revolution, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a decree establishing Commissions for Cases of Minors. These commissions, with their powers greatly broadened, exist today, and are the organs charged to look after the interests not only of delinquent children, but of any child who needs the intervention of the law. During the period when children swarmed everywhere, homeless, starving, some criminal, and others forced by necessity into such an existence, no single force could have been adequate, but these bodies were the official channels through which the cases passed after the GPU or some other agency had first gathered the children in.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is not a children’s court, but is a pedagogical and educational organization. Its chief task is in educating the juvenile offender so that he may become a productive member of society, and with that in view the composition provided for the commission is of professions and persons able to make appropriate contributions. The chairman must be a pedagogue of very high qualifications. He must possess not only an adequate education, but he must have had experience either in work of a pedagogical nature or with home children or with juvenile criminals. In addition to the chairman there is a member representing the local department of public education, a physician from the local health department, a judge from the People’s Court, an investigation educator, a member of the Komsomol (the youth about to enter the Communist Party), a representative of the Children’s Friend’s Society, and a representative of the local trade union organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission sits in closed session, permitting only the attendance of those connected with the cases. This would include parents, relatives or guardians, or a representative of a public or school organization. Its work is under the jurisdiction of the commissariat of education, and is not connected with the commissariat of justice, such as the children’s court would be. There are, of course, local commissions which take care of the cases for each city or rural district. The procedure before the commission is entirely informal. When a case comes up the chairman takes the proper steps to have the juvenile appear, unless for some reason his presence is thought to be unnecessary. Some of the circumstances under which the child would not appear would be: if the child is under eight years of age; when the child is already known to the commission; when the evidence does not substantiate the charge; when there is no reason for the medico-pedagogical measures to be applied; or when it is thought that the appearance of the minor before the commission might do some harm to him in either a physical or mental way. But in case it is thought his appearance is desirable, the investigator is instructed to take charge of the case. The chairman then proceeds to gather the necessary information, evidence, etc., concerning the child and advise him that his case is to come up. If at that time the youth has reached the age of sixteen, his case is turned over to the courts for trial, since minors between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are subject to the jurisdiction of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is competent to deal not only with the cases of all children delinquents between the ages of eight and sixteen (children under eight years of age are never summoned to appear before the commission) but it is also empowered to institute criminal proceedings against any person who is an offender against the child in a manner of demoralization, incitement to crime, or exploitation of minors.&lt;br /&gt;
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What measures may be taken in the cases of children convicted of some crime before the commission? Here is a list of the more important, although it is not an exhaustive one:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) A request for granting assistance, document, certificate, etc., to the child.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) Placing out the child in the care of a family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Placing the child on maintenance and education by public or party organization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Finding a guardian for the child.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Finding work for the child or apprenticing him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) Sending the child to his birthplace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Placing the child in an educational institution, school or children’s home.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) Sending the child to a medical or medico-pedagogical institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) Helping the child to enroll in a children’s club.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) Talk and exhortation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(11) Putting the child in the care of parents or other persons with or without supervision by investigation educator.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(12) Putting the child in the care of an investigating educator.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is one final measure which it is within the power of the commission to use, but it is never resorted to unless all other efforts have failed. That is that the commission may send the child as a final resort to an industrial school of which we will speak later on in the chapter. The list given above constitutes the medico-pedagogical measures and are applied only to those offenders under sixteen years of age who come within the competency of this commission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case of the minor between sixteen and eighteen years of age is approached in a somewhat different manner. Originally under the Criminal Code of 1922, the court was given jurisdiction over minors between fourteen and eighteen years of age, and might at that time sentence them to terms of deprivation of liberty, but only to industrial homes set apart for them, and never by any manner of means to a place for adults. This, however, has been changed so that the commission referred to takes care of children up to sixteen years of age, and only the cases of those between sixteen and eighteen are referred to courts. Although the cases of juvenile offenders between sixteen and eighteen are tried by the courts, the measures applied are of a medico-pedagogical nature very similar to those used for the younger children. Only when the circumstances of the crime convince the court that these measures will not be adequate may the minor be sentenced to deprivation of liberty. In fixing the terms, the sentence is to be reduced by one third of what would be imposed on an adult in the same situation, and the maximum term under the USSR is not to exceed one half of that imposed on adults. A death sentence may never be given to either child or minor, and no severe measures may be used.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of trial, a copy of the summons as well as the indictment must be sent to the minor’s legal representative, as well as to the minor himself. And the Supreme Court has especially instructed the lower courts to see that all juveniles under trial be provided with counsel whenever it may be needed. During the hearing of the case, the minor is accorded all the rights that we have already seen are granted to defendants in the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That the fight waged by the authorities against juvenile crime is being successful is indicated by the steady drop of the percentage to the total convictions in the Union. We find that, in 1928, 36 per cent. of the total number of persons convicted of crime were juvenile offenders. In 1931, this figure had dropped to 28.2 per cent. Also indicative of the achievement in this direction is, as already mentioned, the fact that this army of vagrant youth no longer wanders about in Russia. There are few of such children remaining.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet government has practically removed from its system all of the homes and colonies for juveniles which it inherited from the Tzarist régime, and has at the present time in their stead the system of institutions operating in an educational manner. The most constructive work being done is in those owing their initiation to the efforts of an agent that we do not usually connect with such activities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Back in 1921 when the whole place swarmed with homeless and criminal children, and there was despair over the hopelessness of the condition, the GPU came to the rescue with the establishment of places for wholesale care called “collectors.” Children were snatched from the streets, stations, trains, or wherever they were, and were taken to these places where they were bathed, dressed, fed, sorted out, given all sorts of examinations, mental and physical, then turned over to the Commission for the Cases of Minors, and were finally distributed to the various institutions. The institutions, at that time, while educational in nature, were without a definite social goal, and not adequately prepared or equipped to turn a youth into a productive and useful citizen. At the present time the institutions for juvenile offenders are established under the control of the Commissariat of Education, the Commissariat of Justice, and the Commissariat of Home Affairs (formerly the OGPU). In the Commissariat of Education we find a whole network of children’s homes, directly leading the child from training into the industrial life of the country in such a manner that there is no gap through which he can escape into a life of crime. In their early days the task of these homes was simply to house the children, to prevent them from becoming vagrants and criminals, and their program was by no means as constructive as it might have been. But, at present, no effort is spared in delivering the child to society in a state of preparation for his place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A. Shestakova in her article &#039;&#039;Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children&#039;&#039; tells us that in the first days of these homes the children were taught to make shoes and footstools, to bind books, and how to read and write; and slightly how to adjust themselves in life. But she says that the homes were inadequate to attack the basic problems of turning those sent to them into a specifically trained group, sufficiently equipped with industrial knowledge and social culture, prepared to enter a factory or other center in such a manner as to evolve into useful citizens. The misfit was unfortunate in two ways. Not only were the children unprepared as to basic industrial knowledge or other means of adjustment to their new life, but the state itself was deprived, because of this inadequacy, of the services of many young citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A new economic policy had given way to the five-year plan with its tremendous program of industrial development and agricultural collectivization, and there was need for every available trained workman. Because of this urgent need of the country those in charge of juvenile offenders were given an extra instrument for their purpose. With definite ends in view, with specific jobs to fill, training took on an additional purpose. Here was a definite challenge to the places of training of those juvenile offenders to teach them so that they might make their contribution to the economic plan, and that they might thereby gain the satisfaction of having work which they could do well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not enough that education be directed only toward keeping the child busy with some elementary task, but that it concern itself with the possibility of active participation in the nation’s economic development. To accomplish this task the children’s homes were merged with the factory apprenticeship schools which were attached to factories in towns, and to the peasant youth schools connected in like manner with state farms and rural localities, by which merging they now afforded places for training skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As now organized the direction of these homes is in the hands of the Commissariat of Education, and children are sent by the Commission of Cases for Minors. They are not limited to the training of delinquents but also have the task of educating the children of workers and peasants from the general population. No coercive methods are used. There are of course no wardens or guards, and their express task is to “combine teaching with productive labor upon such basis that the whole social productive labor of the pupils was to be subordinated to the academic and educational aims of the school.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The inmates of these homes are given preference of admission to the factory apprenticeship schools, and to peasant youth schools next to the children of workers. From this training they move straight into the stream of factory workers and, almost without knowing it, take their place in the productive life of the nation. By the time they have gone through these schools of apprenticeship and the factory, or the state farms, they have forgotten that they ever were attached to a life of crime and are removed from the environment so effectually that they have no temptation to return. This describes the treatment given to the cases of those children not classified as habitual criminals. Even in this category of the 8-16 group coming under the direction of the Commissariat of Education, there is an occasional child who requires more restrictive treatment, and measures of a severer nature may then be resorted to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this type, who have become habitual criminals, or who have committed more serious crimes that require a term of deprivation of liberty, we have a second kind of institution. It is important to note that this set of establishments is connected with the Commissariat of Justice, and not with the Department of Education. There has been a period of evolution of these institutions in which much study has been given to methods to be used, and experiments of a bold nature tried with regard to some of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On July 11, 1918, there was published the Order for the First Russian Reformatory where juvenile offenders of this type were to be detained, and there were consequently organized industrial homes for these offenders which were intrusted with the duty of teaching to minors “skilled trades, to widen their mental horizon by means of general and vocational education, and to transform them into active citizens conscious of their rights and obligations, giving them at the same time a physical and health education by means of gymnastics, sports and hygiene.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These institutions, although of the educational type referred to, were inadequate for any serious training. Arts and crafts constituted the principal type of labor, and practically no attention was given to the higher and more skilled trades. We have already spoken of the demands made by the reconstruction period for more skilled workers, and of the notable inadequacy of places for juvenile offenders to turn out young people who filled such a need. The program needed a decided reformation, and in 1930 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee set up a commission for specific remedy of the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The commission was created for two definitely assigned tasks: the first was to institute an investigation of the work of the fight against juvenile criminals and minors, and of the organization of factory communes and corrective labor organizations, using for this purpose the equipment of the People’s Commissariat of Justice. Secondly, it was to work out and to hand to the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; a project of administrative and practical measures, with due attention being given to the experiment of the Izhorsk plant in the North Caucasus. The result of the investigation was that in 1930, the Commissariat of Justice decided to reconstruct these institutions into factory apprenticeship schools for juvenile offenders which were to be attached to large factories and mills. It must be noted here that these schools differed from those just discussed in that they were for offenders only and liberty was restricted, whereas in the first there were no guards of any nature and noncriminal children attended along with the criminal ones.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these schools they were to create a cultural and social condition conducive to drawing the inmates into social work, and to this end, bars, locks, and prison régime, and all prison atmosphere was to be resolutely banished from them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of the training was educational just as it had been in the others, but in the case of this more hardened type it was necessary to detain the juvenile forcibly while he was subjected to the program. However, pupils in these schools now enjoy vacations, take part in regular group hikes, and go out to camps in the summer, in the same manner as other pupils do. The term of sentence is from two to three years, and the arrangements as to schedule, life, and discipline, organization and labor, are taken care of by the usual self-government organization. The schedule of the work is arranged in such a manner that the children are never left entirely to their own devices, but are constantly with those who guide and direct them. Four hours of industrial training are followed by four hours of study, and the latter is again followed by three hours devoted to public activity organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1931, 4,000 juvenile offenders were trained in these schools and 500 industrial workers were graduated from the industrial establishments. In 1933, the aim was to put all the juvenile offenders into these schools from which it was expected there would be turned out 2,400 highly skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to notice here what happened to those released from these schools. Figures for the years 1931 and 1932, giving percentages of distribution for those released, show that 63.2 per cent. went into industrial undertakings. This would indicate a high degree of success in the passage of the trained youth from schools to industry. The next largest percentage, 19.7 per cent., found a place in the building trade. The third highest, 9.3 per cent., was released to the parents with supervision on the part of the school. 4.7 per cent. were placed on Soviet farms; 1.2 per cent. found a location in the factory labor and technical communes and 0.6 per cent. were released to parents and relatives but continued under the supervision of the schools.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article by A. Shestakova, “Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children,” from Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 348.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most important training given in these schools is for metal work and work on wood. In addition to that the inmates are taught tractor handling, animal husbandry, vegetable garden work, and field work. The health and physical training require that the workers take a month and a half to two months’ camp trip in the country. Because of the inconvenience attached to these trips, when the institution is located in a city, the First Moscow School was moved to a small village a short distance out, so that country places would be more accessible for health training.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief problems now attached to this education, according to A. Shestakova, are the building up of the physical health, an establishing of self-discipline, and the introduction of these delinquents to methods used in other camps, to a life of such neighboring activities as the collective or state farms. The prize agricultural schools among all of those at present existing in the Soviet Union are Saratov, which now has first place in the contest for these schools; Serpooh, in second place; the First Moscow School in third place; and in the fourth, the First Leningrad School.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We come finally to the third type of establishment. These are incorporated into the system of the organization of the GPU, in the Commissariat for Home Affairs. There is something incongruous to most of us in the supervision of children by an agent that is avowedly for terroristic purposes. However, the labor communes, organized by this body for juvenile offenders of the worst type, are one of the outstanding developments in the care of the children in Soviet Russia, and set a standard that few if any institutions in other lands manage to reach.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The inhabitants of these communes are young people with long criminal records, who have been up repeatedly before the Commission for Cases of Minors, before the courts, who have served many terms of deprivation of liberty in various juvenile institutions. The cases seemed hopeless, and the experiment, so bold and unique, was tried in an effort to give a new viewpoint that would induce a complete break with the former criminal type of life. One of these communes, the largest both as to number and scope of development, is described in detail in the next chapter. In this place we only mention the general plan and underlying principles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main difference between the apprenticeship school and these labor communes of the OGPU is in method and not in principle. The labor commune is organized around large labor work, where both sexes contribute, while in the apprenticeship schools the emphasis is on education, on the preparation for industrial work. One of the basic principles in the labor commune is complete freedom as to movement, while in the schools restriction of movement is naturally required since the program is compulsory in its nature. In the apprenticeship schools there is also segregation of the sexes in the matter of residence; the boys and girls meet together in theatres, on excursions, in museums, on walks, and other places, but live in separate homes. It seems inconsistent to state that the labor commune is made up of those more habituated to crime, since it enjoys greater freedom, while the schools are composed of the less criminal; but this is nevertheless true. When one remembers, though, that the commune is the result of a desperate move to save a great number of habitual criminals, whereas the schools are merely for training those of even younger years, the situation is more easily understood.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the schools the age group is from 15-18 years. The sources from which they come are, (a) those sent on court order, and (b) those sent by the Commission for Cases of Minors, and all other authorities empowered to commit them. If the term is up before the training of the child is completed, the pedagogical commune may retain him, provided the entire term does not exceed three years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 42 of the Correctional Labor Code of 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the communes, the age group, although in the beginning limited to those of 13-17, is now composed of those of 16-24. The satisfaction of the authorities with the achievement of the First Labor Commune (Bolshevo) led to the establishment of others, and at the present time several thousand former criminals, some of them committing the worst sort of crimes, are being trained and educated while they participate in community life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XIV: BOLSHEVO LABOR COMMUNE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; following is the official record of the beginning of such places for criminals as the one described in this chapter:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;ORDERS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the Administrative and Organizational Board, OGPU&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No. 185&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, August 18, 1924&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
\#1&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Orders issued by Comrade Yagoda, assistant chief of the OGPU:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) In order to combat crime among young people between the ages of 13 and 17 years, a Children’s Labor Commune for 50 persons is to be organized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) F. G. Melikhov is appointed head of the Children’s Labor Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The head of the Children’s Labor Commune is to act in all matters under the orders of M. S. Pogrebinsky, who, in turn, will act on the basis of a plan of work confirmed by me.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Such an order, judging from the resulting situation of ten years later, ought to be marked with a monument, and it is. Just outside of Moscow, on the location of a once lovely estate, there is now a small town of modern buildings replacing the wooden ones of ten years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One does not know what to call this place. To say that it is a penal institution is misleading unless the reader has seen something like it. However, it rates as that in the USSR, and since there are others like it in scattered sections, one comes to the conclusion that it is something unique in this line and accepts it as such. It is easy to be enthusiastic over such things and not to look deeper for some adverse angles, but the author, after as careful examination as she could make in a skeptical manner, could only praise the development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two trips were made to this colony, the second to confirm what had first been observed. However, since it was a visit to a similar colony at Kharkov that elicited the warm praise from M. Herriot that has already been quoted, it seemed safe to conclude that it existed as had first been believed. It is impossible to understand how any one could fail to be moved on viewing the place and realizing its tremendous import in the matter of remaking criminals. If the OGPU had committed nothing but the acts of terror it has been credited with, the creation of such spots as these would compensate in a great way for its darker deeds. It is unfortunate that one must try to tell of Bolshevo. The only thing to do is to visit and see for one’s self. It is difficult to describe atmosphere, and that is the thing that pervades the place and makes it even more constructive than the physical side could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This commune celebrated its tenth birthday in August of this year (1934). Its population was preparing for it when we were there, building platforms out under the trees, putting finishing touches here and there, and getting ready for speeches, visitors, and other entertainment of various kinds. And these people can tell a good tale of growth and progress, too, for they started with a handful in the initiation of a bold experiment and now their town has a population of three thousand inhabitants. The reader’s first deduction will be that a prison growth such as that must indicate some undesirable conclusions. But when one knows that it means that this number has been transferred from other penal institutions with a view to having everyone possible enjoy this freedom and training, then the significance is different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reference has already been made to the wandering hordes of children, confirmed in criminal habits, who presented the gravest of problems to the government authorities at the end of the Civil War and Volga famine. It was seen that if headway was to be made against the situation, the whole perspective of life must be changed, and the new one must be attractive enough to make these vagrant criminals want to break with a past that to their imaginative years had a glamour and provided escape from the responsibilities of ordinary living.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the midst of the perplexity, the groping for some plan, we find Felix Dzerzhinsky, organizer of that terror of terrors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, and original head of the GPU, offering his far-reaching organ to effect this merciful innovation. Let his own words inform us:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“I wish to apply part of my personal efforts and above all the efforts of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; to looking after these homeless waifs. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of two considerations. Firstly, it is a terrible calamity, and when you look at children, you cannot help thinking everything should be for them. The fruits of the revolution are not for us but for them. But how many of them have been wrecked by struggle and poverty! We must rush to their aid just as if we saw children drowning. The Commissariat of Education alone cannot cope with this matter, the widest help from all Soviet bodies is needed. It is necessary to form under the Central Executive Committee a broad commission containing representatives of all commissariats and all organizations which can be useful in this matter. I have already spoken with people here and there. I want to be at the head of this commission myself. I want to include the apparatus of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; practically in this work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“I am impelled to do this for the second reason. I think that our apparatus is one of those which works most accurately. It has branches everywhere. People reckon with it. They are afraid of it, but even in such a matter as saving and feeding children, it is possible to find laxness and even dishonesty. We are going over more and more to peaceful construction; and I think: why not use our fighting apparatus to combat such a calamity as homelessness among children?”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This proposition was made in 1921. It was in August, 1924, that the GPU of which he was then head, established the Bolshevo Labor Commune, thus launching a new epoch not only in the care of juvenile criminals for whom it was particularly intended, but in the treatment of all the others. It must have given a great thrill to this man who had brought death to so many of the state’s enemies to take a part in reconstructing the lives of youths who would, he hoped, be its friends. At least he had the satisfaction of seeing his judgment vindicated, for, from the beginning, the venture proved his rightness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These men did not jump into the scheme as suddenly as might seem, nor without consideration. They went into intimate study of the forms of education of children, they applied themselves vigorously to working out an accurate theory, then they formulated what appeared to them three basic rules of procedure. That the GPU, in the midst of their frightening activities, could muster faith enough in anybody to develop such a plan is in itself a phenomenon, but that they could convey such a trust to others, to these young criminals, seems more incredulous still. They were not exactly an agent for inspiring such a feeling. But notice the three basic principles referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost was that principle of “trust” held like a shining torch before the eyes of incredulous youngsters. It was decided that there must be no compulsion anywhere in the commune. With coercion the order of the day, there was to be none here. Strange contradiction, one of many that has filled the land. Side by side with sternness toward those who oppose the order, one finds this steady development of humane institutions, untouched by the harsher methods used in the other direction. In this colony there was to be only trust. If one wanted to stay, he was to stay, and if he wanted to go, then he was to go. He simply walked away, for there were not to be—and are not today— any guards. There were to be no restrictions of their freedom. They were to realize that they were in an educational institution pure and simple. They were to come of their own volition, because of an expressed desire to join in the program of this commune. These inhabitants were to be persons who had come to realize the futility of a life of crime and who wished therefore to change to another sort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the individual was to make this change he would have to be able to perform some task well, and to that end the second principle was incorporated. The commune was to be devoted to teaching these people how to do some kind of work. Workshops were established and instructors installed, but the responsibility for sustaining a condition under which the trades could be learned was placed on the residents of the Commune. There was no preaching, no lectures, but it was demonstrated that each must be responsible for his share in this life or all would suffer. If machines stopped because of the irregularity of one or two, then the education of others in an industrial line would suffer. And one who brought about this inconvenience must answer to his comrades for his conduct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third principle was to make each feel his responsibility for the group, and the reverse, that all were responsible for seeing that each member measured up to his duties. Every member of the Commune was bound to see that a recalcitrant one was brought to account. In this manner any disciplinary problems were taken care of from the beginning. Thus, in the lack of any compulsion the onetime criminal learns to lead a normal life and to discipline himself; in being taught a trade he is prepared to return to a life or perhaps enter it for the first time, in which he earns his way; and by his feeling of responsibility for others, he in conjunction with the group keeps the affairs of the Commune running smoothly and efficiently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the Commune had been set up, the next problem was to get some inhabitants for it. Among the institutions housing juvenile offenders, volunteers were asked for, after explanations of the character of the new place had been given. Pogrebinsky who, it will be recalled, was one of the organizers, gives a version of this experience that is interesting. He writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“When we called for volunteers for the first commune, 15 responded. Very suspiciously they donned their new clothes. They could not believe that henceforth they were free, and they warily eyed the prison guards, trying to guess how many would be sent with them as a convoy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“But here began something unusual. They were given money with which to buy railway tickets to the Commune, and no guards were sent with them. Only the manager of the Commune was with them. Sure enough, they seemed to be free! Should they run away? No, better wait. There was something hard to understand, and in addition, something very flattering—they were being trusted!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“On arrival at the place, two of the boys were sent with money for supper. Here was something altogether strange! They were sent off with money, and no guard to convoy them. The boys bought some foodstuff, came back and returned the whole change. They were utterly astounded when the manager showed them the house where they were to live and explained to them: Everything that you can see, boys—the clothes, food, tools—is being lent to you by the OGPU, and you will have to pay for it all later on.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
One can understand their incredulity, even their staying on through curiosity, if nothing else, to see what would happen next in such a topsy-turvy affair. And day after day the wonder and pleasure in having a home, being free and engaged in making interesting things would grow and hold them steadily.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The managers of the Commune were wary and anxious too, not through fear of escape of their charges, but lest they do the wrong thing and check the growing confidence. In their eagerness not to put pressure of any kind on these young people, they have let the initiative for expansion come from them. In the beginning those who came made shoes, stools, and other things, and were satisfied to watch their own tasks grow under supervision, but as the project became more firmly established there were demands for wider industrial training. The leaders granted the requests with great satisfaction as they developed, their only anxiety being that nothing should ever seem “forced.” There was no doubt subtle guidance, but the group was encouraged to undertake its own education. The story is one of continuous growth, both in number and in development of a broader program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What actually exists now in this place where three thousand work? To begin with there are the paved streets, clean and lined with green shrubbery. The houses beside them are of modern structure, many with flower-filled balconies for each floor, with rows of large windows. There are some small individual houses also, where families live, but it is the lines of those looking from the outside like sunny apartment buildings that gives the place an air of being a town proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On inspection one finds small apartments provided for the married couples and dormitory rooms for the single people. A man who is serving a sentence may have his family there with him and so may a married young woman if it is convenient for the husband to come. The apartments that we saw contained two rooms and a bath. One of the rooms was a large kitchen which could also be used for other purposes. One entered into a small hallway which led to the main room, a large combination living-sleeping room. The furniture was good. There were pictures around, a couch, comfortable chairs, the windows were nicely curtained and the appearance altogether homelike. There is a large community dining room, but in case a family wishes to prepare its own meals it can do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the dormitories we saw, there were rather good-sized rooms, not so large as most of those described in the other prisons, with cot-beds placed in line in the usual way. There seemed to be comfort in these collective places but not, of course, as much space per person as the apartments permitted, nor did they have the homelike appearance of the latter. There was light from several windows and a pleasant outlook, and the two girls present on our visit looked exactly as occupants of a home would appear. As housing goes in crowded Moscow this represented an average standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dining room in the factory-kitchen building was quite large and equipped with small tables, such as one would find in a restaurant. One side was almost an entire window. A few late eaters were sitting at tables and attendants were beginning to clean so that the place had a disorderly after-dinner appearance but one of deeper cleanliness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One might as well not try to keep remembering, as he goes along the street meeting people, that these are convicts of the most habitual sort. They are going or coming from their work exactly as other people would. There is absolutely no difference. They could run away, of course, and a few have, but in the majority of cases, the reverse is true. They do not wish to leave the Commune at the end of their sentence and so they live on and keep a job in some of the factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school building in this Commune is especially lovely. It was completed about two years ago at a cost of a million and a half rubles. It has all the equipment that a good school would be expected to have—a library, reading rooms, laboratories, an auditorium interestingly decorated with murals of working men, which is the work of artist inhabitants, spacious halls and class rooms. The teachers are not residents of the Commune but members of their own profession who come in to teach. The man in charge of the school showed us the building with great pride. The first seven years of education are compulsory, after that there are evening classes for the more advanced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Education, as already indicated, does not stop with formal classroom work but those interested in the arts, in music, or in writing are provided with channels for special training. There are music circles, art classes, drama work, and literary clubs, and the persons making up this artistic group live in their own building, forming a congenial household. A number of the leading ones, the most talented ones, are paid a stipend by the state, and we were told of a number of musicians and writers who had had their first training in this Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The physical education is carried on in a large and splendidly equipped gymnasium, and building up the body is made a major consideration in the training. Setting up exercises are also a part of the daily program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school, with its formal teaching of elementary subjects, is one side of the education program; the other is the work done in the shops. In these two places as well as in this whole atmosphere, the “making people,” spoken of by H. G. Wells, goes on. One must learn a trade and then he must work at it, not as drudgery, but with free enjoyment of his task. In the shops of the shoe factory, the skate factory, the knitting goods factory, the mechanized laundry, the sports goods factory, and the factory kitchen, these former thieves and bandits who have barely escaped with their necks, work at their jobs, some still in the ranks of the unskilled, others risen to instructors and supervisors. One looks and remembers again that there is nothing between them and escape, no one to prevent their walking away, and yet they stay and work. When the day is ended they go out in the street and to their rooms or Walk or do any other thing they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One may break a law of the Commune. To meet the exigencies of such occurrences, there is the comradely court and a penalty either mild or more serious according to the act, and if that is not sufficient then the greatest blow of all will fall—the culprit will be sent back whence he came, or if he came directly he will be transferred to a more severe institution. A new member is on probation for a month and he must prove his worth if he is to live with this group who is serious about making life worth while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The age is 16-24 now, although at its beginning it was 13-17. There are three thousand inhabitants of the Commune, some of whom have finished their terms and have worked on in the factories. These naturally may be older than the maximum age given for those who are sent. The surrounding community was hostile to the idea at the time of the establishment of the Commune among them, as one can imagine any neighborhood might be at having a group of unrestrained criminals, thieves and housebreakers, set down among them, but there is now a general esteem and friendliness felt for those who work in this unique town.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The hospital is perhaps the greatest prize of the place. A large building, set back from the street, with grass, trees, and shrubs in its front yard, it presents an excellent impression. It is equipped for all the best care of the health of the community. Babies are born, children of the communards attended to, and the whole population served by its staff. It fills not only the role of medical care, but an especially educational one as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolshevo has been described in detail because it is the largest of the labor communes and was the first in construction. But there is another close to Moscow, built second in order, on the site of the former Nikolo-Ugreshsky Monastery. This commune has four factories, making musical instruments, incubators, electrical repairs, and compressed fiber, and in 1934 it is estimated that they will turn out goods to the value of some twenty-three or twenty-four million rubles. Here, too, are modern houses with all equipment in which the workers are housed according to industry, the metal workers in one, wood workers in another, and those making musical instruments in a third. There is a separate house for those communards who are members of artist circles, a separate house for women, and a building where probationers stay until permanently assigned. There are twenty-two hundred members of the commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A third is the Dzerzhinsky Labor Commune at Kharkov which follows the same line of development but is smaller than the others. There are only four hundred members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is hard to estimate the results of the work done in such centers as these. A tangible evidence of success is pointed to by authorities on the subject in the steady descent of the percentage of juvenile delinquents to the total number of criminals. This system, spreading year by year to take in all that it may serve, aided by those factory apprenticeship schools that train the 15-18 year old group, ought to do a good deal to depopulate the adult prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XV: CONCLUSION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; concluding remarks of most books on Russia begin with a discussion of class distinction. In this case it would be further stated that it showed not only in court action but was likewise felt in the fact that while the OGPU as an arresting agent turned the ordinary prisoner over to the courts, it acted in the capacity of a judicial organ for those of the opposition class. A few months ago that would have been true. With the transforming of that agent into the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the stripping from it of all judicial powers, one more step has been made toward the disappearance of class lines in the administration of criminal law.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Again there has been the following comment from an authority on the Administration of Criminal Law in the USSR, in regard to this statement: “The class line in the criminal justice can disappear only when the classes themselves disappear. So long as the classes exist, so long as the struggle between them goes on, it is absolutely impossible to avoid the class character of criminal justice You may keep silent about that, you may try to disguise it, but you cannot make it disappear. We don’t find it necessary to disguise the class character of our courts, as the bourgeois science of law and the bourgeois legislation does, because the class whose interests our courts defend, is the overwhelming majority of all the people. With the bourgeois criminal justice it is quite the opposite. Of course, as I have already stated, the victory we have gained over our class enemies here has enormously changed our policy, but this policy remains a class policy, because it remains the policy of the proletariat struggling for socialism. The first aim of this policy does not change, only the methods of its practical accomplishment. If you build a railway, the forms of your work will be different in a plain or in mountains, but the final aim will be the same. “Our final aim is to build a classless society. When this task will be accomplished, not only the class line in the criminal law will disappear, but the criminal law itself will become useless and will die as well as the criminal courts. “But so long as those courts do exist, they cannot go on without an open or a hidden class policy.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the distinction does exist. But in this final evaluation of the present situation in regard to crime repression in the USSR the treatment of political prisoners is not considered. While the method as developed is used for both classes it naturally shows to its best advantage in the treatment of the prisoners from among the workers, and it ought to be judged on that score. It is to be hoped that not many years hence class distinctions will disappear to the extent that machinery for justice will furnish equal measures for all.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following explanation is supplied. “By this time criminal justice will become something quite different from what we are accustomed to. It will become a system of medical and pedagogical measures, which will take their place among other radical and educational institutions. Till then criminal justice will serve the interests of the ruling class as it has always done.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When that happens the treatment of all prisoners will be of the kind that is found so admirably used today in places where discipline and industry are taught to those of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Russians claim no Utopia. When on one occasion the writer expressed admiration to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky for what they had achieved, he quickly and positively responded, “I warn you of its shortcomings.” Well, of course, they are there, plenty of them. They can be found in the administration of justice, too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems though that one who wishes to see actually how the matter stands would find it effective to take first the policy of the state, the standards it sets and the goal at which it aims, then see not only how fully that aim is achieved, but what progress is made year by year toward the goal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Take whatever phase of criminal repression one will, and one finds progress and a pretty good practice of policy. Judges in the beginning, one supposes by the Soviet’s own records, woefully inadequate at finding out what justice might be in a case, are now much more fully qualified; jurors for a time without any qualifications except as to vote are now selected with more care and given some training for the task before them. How fully adequate are they? It would take a firsthand survey of the nation’s tribunals to be able to say, but to judge by a fair sample the author believes them to be fulfilling their duty in a high degree and with more than average competence. Their attendance to work and their conscientious effort to get at the straight of the affair before them is pronounced. They seem in general to feel the responsibility of being the agent for administering justice to their own toiling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the prisons and places of deprivation of liberty one sees more evenness of tone. The personality of those in charge of these places strikes one as indicating fitness for the job. Members of staffs were observed closely by the writer and with one single exception they seemed well selected for handling the work. Vishinsky, in the Introduction of the book edited by him, states that one of the shortcomings of the prison system is the need for more trained persons who will understand what this policy really is and help put it into practice. One would expect that to be true, since it is so universally a fact with regard to prison workers. It would be indeed a Utopia that provided an adequate staff for penal places. But it seems to the author, by comparison, that he is better off than he thinks he is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the appearance these staffs make may be due in part to the fact of close supervision from above. There is another factor, too, which ought to help. Responsible authorities have a good picture in mind of what a man needs to be in order to fit into their scheme of living. Their society makes definite requirements of its members and training is provided to make the misfits fit. To do that thing which they see clearly they have developed a policy that merely trains a man, both to discipline himself if possible, and do some work that will be of economic benefit both to himself and to the country, while punishment is forgotten. One of their chief tasks is to teach him to prefer the “Life of Labor,” and by instilling in him, or encouraging the spark if it is already there, the joy of creation, they manage in most cases to do it—if their statistics on recidivism are anywhere near correct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another advantage is that they have one very definite policy and every superintendent of penal places knows what that policy is. It is, as stated in their codes, to educate and to train without doing anything to degrade, to build up a personality, a self-respect, and to do nothing that could hinder such development. With that knowledge in hand it is easier to put the program into practice, and they can develop plans for carrying it out. An understanding of psychological principles enters here, not only in expression of policy as found in the Criminal Code but in the actual practice as one finds it. In doing away with handcuffs, with solitary confinement, with any type of corporal punishment, and with any prison garb, the enunciation of policy does its part, but in the approach of the immediate staff to the inmates there is seen a wholesomeness that no code could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude of the authorities toward violations on the part of officers is another indication of their sincerity of purpose in this work. In their zeal to put their policy into action they not only provide that the Observation Commission shall be in close touch with all that goes on in the Institution, and impose on them much responsibility for the régime, but they also back them up by providing a penalty for the man who violates the regulations. A guard who strikes a prisoner is in danger of arrest himself, and since there are official records of such cases, one is sure that an attempt is made to put the policy into practice. It must be true that in isolated instances some such things happen and go unpunished, but it is the stated policy of the authorities to discourage in every way possible the committing of these acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Central authorities, as we have seen in discussing administration of these prisons, have made repeated efforts year by year to see that the Observation Committee keeps in close touch with all the life of the Institution and thereby effects better parole and release work as well as brings up the level of work done in the place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another indication of progress in putting the government’s policy into practice is the speed with which they have built open agricultural colonies, institutions of semi-closed type, and labor communes such as Bolshevo so that prisoners might be taken out of the old type of places. Judging from past accomplishment, there should in a very few years be left only those who demand restriction. In addition they are year by year adding to the number of those sentenced to compulsory labor without deprivation of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, then, is a system that deserves to attract the attention of those genuinely interested in a better approach to effective crime repression. It has without doubt made a distinct contribution in this field of social endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF CRIMINAL CODE GENERAL SECTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL SECTION&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE AIMS OF PENAL LEGISLATION OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. The penal legislation of the RSFSR pursues the task of protecting the socialist state of workers and peasants and the régime established therein from socially dangerous acts (crimes) by applying to persons committing them measures of social protection set out in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
EXTENT OF OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. The provisions of the present code extend to all citizens of the RSFSR, who have committed socially dangerous acts within the territory of the USSR, as well as beyond the boundaries of the USSR in case they are detained within the territory of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Citizens of other constituent republics are in accordance with the RSFSR laws liable to be prosecuted for crimes committed within the territory of the RSFSR as well as outside the boundaries of the USSR, if they had been detained and subjected to trial or investigation within the RSFSR territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes committed within the territory of the Union, citizens of the constituent republics are liable according to the laws of the locality where they committed the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. For crimes committed within the territory of the USSR foreigners are liable according to the laws of the locality where the crime was committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5. The question of the criminal liability of foreign nationals enjoying the right of exterritoriality shall be decided in each individual case by diplomatic means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PENAL POLICY OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
6. A socially dangerous act is any act of commission or omission directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government, for the period of time pending a transition to a communist régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: An act, which although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code is free from socially dangerous characteristics owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
7. In regard to persons who commit socially dangerous acts or who are dangerous owing to their connections with criminal circles, measures of social protection of judicial-corrective, medical, or medical-educational nature are applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
8. In the event of the concrete act, which at the time it was committed was a crime in accordance with Article 6 of the present code, but by the time it was investigated or examined in court lost its socially dangerous character owing to a change in the criminal law, or owing to the mere change in the social-political conditions, or in case the person who committed it cannot, in the opinion of the court be regarded as socially dangerous at the time indicated, then such an act does not entail the application of a measure of social protection to the person who committed it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
9. Measures of social protection are applied for the following purposes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To prevent the commission of further crimes by persons who have committed them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To exercise influence over other unstable elements of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To adapt the offender to the conditions of the social life of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measures of social protection cannot have for their purpose the infliction of physical suffering or the degradation of human dignity and they do not pursue the object of retribution or punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
10. With regard to persons who have committed socially dangerous acts, methods of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applied only in cases when these persons&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Acted knowingly, i.e., foresaw the socially dangerous effect of their acts, desired these consequences, or knowingly allowed such effects to take place, or&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Acted carelessly, i.e., did not foresee the effects of their acts—although they should have foreseen them—or recklessly hoped to avert the effects of their acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
11. Measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not to be applied in the case of persons who have committed a crime while suffering from chronic mental diseases, or while temporarily insane, or in general in such a state of deranged health as to be incapable of realizing their acts or of controlling them. Neither are these measures to be applied to persons, who although at the time they committed a crime were in possession of their mental faculties, nevertheless suffered from mental derangement by the time sentenced was pronounced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection which are applied to these persons are confined to those of a medical nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: The present article does not apply to persons who have committed a crime in a state of intoxication.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
12. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not applied in the case of minors up to the age of 16. When regarding the latter, the Commission of Juvenile Offenders finds it possible to confine itself to measures of social protection of a medical and educational nature. Oct. 30, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 82, Article 796.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
13. Measures of social protection are not applied to persons who have committed acts foreseen by the penal laws, if the court establishes that these acts were committed by them in a state of necessary defense against attempts at the Soviet rule, or at the body or rights of a person defending himself or another person, provided there was no excess of the limits of self-defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection are not applied when the same acts were committed in order to avert a danger, which under the given circumstances were unavertable by any other means, provided the harm thereby caused was less serious than the harm averted. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
14. Criminal prosecution may not take place&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) when ten years have elapsed from the time of the commission of the crime, for which the court may inflict a penalty of not more than five years’ imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) when five years have elapsed since the time the crime for which the court may impose a penalty of not more than five years had been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) when three years have elapsed since the perpetration of the crime, for which a court may sentence the criminal to not more than one year’s imprisonment, or when the law provides a more lenient measure of social protection than imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle of remoteness is applied when in the course of the corresponding period of time no proceedings were instituted in connection with the given case. The period of remoteness is interrupted when the person who committed a crime within the corresponding period of remoteness commits another similar or not less serious crime, or evades judicial examination or investigation. In such cases the periods of remoteness begin to run from the date of the perpetration of the second offense or from the date of the resumption of the interrupted proceedings. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: In cases of criminal prosecutions for counter-revolutionary crimes the application of the principle of remoteness is left to the discretion of the court in each individual case. However, if the court does not find it possible to apply the principle of remoteness, and sentences a person to be shot for such a crime, such sentence must necessarily be commuted to the proclamation that the person accused is an enemy of the toilers coupled with the forfeiture of the citizenship of the USSR, and exile from the confines of the USSR forever or imprisonment for a period of not less than two years. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: In regard to persons criminally prosecuted for active participation in acts, and active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement, committed while holding responsible or secret posts under the Tsarist régime, or under counter-reveolutionary governments during the civil war, the application of the principle of remoteness and the question of commuting capital punishment by shooting are left to the discretion of the court. June 6, 19275.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 3: The periods of remoteness laid down in the present article do not apply to acts prosecuted by way of administrative action according to the present code, and the infliction of punishments for such acts can take place only within one month from the date they were committed. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
15. A sentence of conviction shall not be carried into effect if it was not carried into effect within ten years from the date of the passing of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
16. In case a certain socially dangerous act is not directly foreseen by the present code, the grounds and limits of liability for such acts are determined in accordance with those articles of the code which foresee crimes most closely approximating them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
17. The measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applicable equally to persons who have committed the crime—participants as well as their accomplices—instigators and abettors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instigators are persons who induced the commission of the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abettors are persons who assisted in the carrying out of the crime by means of advice, indications, providing of means and removal of obstacles, or by means of concealing the criminal or the traces of crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
18. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are determined for each of the accomplices according to the degree of their participation in the given crime, as well as according to the degree of danger of the crime, and of the person who took part in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The failure to report a crime that has been committed, or is being planned, entails the application of the measures of social defense of judicial-corrective nature only in cases specially designated in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
19. An attempt to commit a crime, as well as acts preparatory to a crime, which take the form of finding or adapting weapons and means, and creating conditions favorable for a crime, are prosecuted on the same basis as a crime which has actually been committed. In such cases, the court, when selecting the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature, must be guided by the degree of danger of the person who has committed the crime or the preparatory act. The court must also examine how far the preparations for the crime went, and how near the consequences were to the act as well as the causes owing to which the crime was not completed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the crime was not committed owing to the persons intending to commit it having voluntarily renounced it, the court fixes a corresponding measure of social defense for those acts which were in fact committed by the person who attempted or prepared to commit the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; IV&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON THE MEASURES OF SOCIAL PROTECTION APPLIED UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE WITH REGARD TO PERSONS WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
20. The following are the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
21. Execution by shooting is applied for the purpose of combating the gravest kinds of crimes, threatening the foundations of Soviet rule, and of Soviet régime, pending the abolition of that punishment by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, in cases specially indicated in the articles of the present Code, as an exceptional measure for the protection of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
22. Persons who have not reached the age of 18 at the time the crime was committed and women in a state of pregnancy cannot be condemned to shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
23. The principal measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature applied with regard to persons who have committed crimes, consist in proclaiming them enemies of the toilers with the consequences following such measure, imprisonment, and compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other measures of social protection set out in Article 20, except warning and the confiscation of property, may be decreed either as independent measures or be combined with the basic ones as supplementary measures. The confiscation of property as a supplementary measure of social protection may be imposed by the court only in cases specified in the articles of the present Code. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
24. The following are measures of social protection of a medical nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Compulsory medical treatment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Placing a person in a hospital coupled with isolation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
25. The following are measures of social protection of a medical-education kind:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Delivery of a minor into the charge of his parents, adopters, guardians, relatives, provided the aforementioned are able to support him, or to other persons or institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The placing in a special medical-educational institution. December 20, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 4, Article 38.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
26. Measures of social protection of a medical-educational and medical nature may be applied by the court in case it recognizes that the application of measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind does not fit the given case; or they may be applied in addition to the latter, if moreover the measures of social protection of a medical-pedagogical and pedagogical kind have not been applied by the competent judicial inquiry organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
27. The proclamation of a person as enemy of the toilers and expulsion from the confines of the USSR with the forfeiture of the citizenship of a constituent republic, and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR may only be applied for an unlimited period. June 6. 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
28. Imprisonment may be imposed for a period of between one and ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labor camps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labor, or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labor camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: Persons who are uninterruptedly serving in the units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and who are in the cadres either as privates or junior commanders, serving for a definite period, are sentenced in peace time, instead of to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for two months to one year, to serve for a like period in the military-corrective units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and instead of imprisonment for a period up to two months, to arrest for a like period, served in a manner prescribed for the disciplinary arrest of persons in military service.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, by special decree of the court in each individual case, the same measures may be applied to the above-mentioned persons also for common crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons in military service of the middle, senior, highest and junior commanding personnel of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who remain in the cadres after serving the required period in the army, and who have been sentenced to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for a period up to one year, in case of dismissal from the ranks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, serve their term indicated in the sentences by doing compulsory labor according to the general rules. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: When the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army passes to the state of war, persons in the military service who are in military-corrective units are dispatched to the active army, and the subsequent serving of the measure of social protection imposed on them is postponed until after the termination of military operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sentence condemning a soldier in time of war to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights may, by decree of the court which passed that sentence, be postponed until after the termination of military operations, on condition that the convicted person joins the active army.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons in military service mentioned in the first and second parts of the above note, who while in the ranks of active army have proved themselves staunch defenders of the USSR, the court which passed the sentence may, on the petition of the competent military authorities, release the convicted person from the measure of social protection formerly imposed on him, or substitute for it a more lenient measure of social protection. October 1, 1928.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1928, No. 127, Article 816.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
29. The period of preliminary detention, and also the time spent in confinement from the moment the sentence was passed pending its coming into force must obligatorily be reckoned as part of the period of detention decreed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the court applies a measure of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind other than imprisonment, it has the right to take into consideration the period of detention previous to the trial and accordingly mitigate the measure of social protection chosen by it, or to resolve not to apply to the defendant the measure of social protection set out in the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons sentenced to compulsory labor each day of preliminary detention is credited as three days of compulsory labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
30. Compulsory labor without imprisonment may be imposed for a period ranging from one day to one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: Compulsory labor without imprisonment is not applied to the middle, senior, highest and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who are in the cadres and have completed their term of service, and also to persons in military service who belong to the cadres of privates and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during their appointed period of service. In place of compulsory labor the above-mentioned persons in military service are sentenced to arrest for a period not exceeding two months, which is served in a manner prescribed for persons in military service under disciplinary arrest. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
31. Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights consists of the deprivation of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) elective franchise both active and passive&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the right to occupy elective posts in public organizations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the right to occupy certain specified state offices&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) the right to the titles of distinction&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) parental rights&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) right to pensions paid by way of social insurance and to unemployment relief paid by way of social insurance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights may be prescribed both fully—so as to cover all the above-mentioned rights—and partially, in respect of their separate categories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of parental rights may be prescribed by the court, only if it has been proven that this right has been abused by the convicted person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of pension may be prescribed by the courts only in the following cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) conviction for the commission of state crimes (part I of the Special Section)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) conviction for the commission of crimes prompted by greed to imprisonment or to exile with a compulsory residence in other localities (as the basic measure of social protection)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the prescription of the confiscation of the entire property as supplementary measure of social protection&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) conviction in time of peace for military crimes, falling under articles of 193(3), 193(4), 193(7), 193(9), 193(12), 193(13), 193(17), 193(20)-193(28), of the present Code, and in time of war, for any of the crimes falling under Chapter IX of the Criminal Code (on crimes by persons in military service). June 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 30, Article 388.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
32. Forfeiture of rights cannot be prescribed for a period exceeding five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case this measure of social protection is prescribed as one supplementary to imprisonment, forfeiture of rights extends to the entire period of imprisonment served plus a period determined by the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
33. Forfeiture of rights, foreseen by paragraphs a-c of Article 31 is accompanied by the forfeiture of the orders of the USSR, and of the orders of the RSFSR. In such cases the court is obliged, after the sentence comes into force, to present a petition to that effect to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as the case may be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of the other marks of distinction and of distinctive titles, is effected by sentence of the court. August 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 42, Article 504.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
34. Forfeiture of rights may be decreed by the court both as a supplementary and as an independent measure of social protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When imposing a sentence of over one year’s imprisonment, the court is obliged to discuss the question of the forfeiture of the convicted person’s rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights cannot be combined with conditional conviction or with public censure. December 6, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 8788, Article 854.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
35. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement or with prohibition to reside in other localities or without these limitations, coupled with compulsory labor or without compulsory labor, may be applied by the court with regard to those convicted persons, who, in the opinion of the court, it would be socially dangerous to leave in the given locality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the boundaries of a separate locality with an obligatory residence in other localities is prescribed for a period of three to ten years. This measure, as a supplementary one, can only be prescribed for a period not exceeding five years. The removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory residence in other localities, coupled with compulsory labor, may only be prescribed as a basic measure of social protection. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with prohibition to reside in certain localities, or without this restrictive provision is prescribed for a period of one to five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case one of these measures is decreed by the court as a supplementary one to imprisonment, the period of this supplementary measure begins to run from the date of the release of the prisoner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons sentenced to the removal from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in some other locality in order to serve their terms of imprisonment in corrective labor camps, after serving their term of imprisonment, settle in the district of the camp pending the period when they will be allowed a free choice of their residence. Land must be allotted to them, or else they must be provided with paid work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Removal from the RSFSR territory, as well as removal from any specified locality whatever form it takes, cannot be applied to persons under sixteen. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
36. Removal from the confines of the USSR or RSFSR for a definite period of time may take place only in a manner specially provided by federal legislation. Removal from the confines of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities may be applied by the court only in cases of conviction for crimes specified by Articles 58(2)-58(14), 59(2), Part I, a, 59(3), 59(302), 59(3-b), 59(7), 59 (8), Part I, 59(9), 59(21), 61 Part III, 73(1), 74 Part II, 104, 107, 116 Part II, 117 Part II, 118, 129, 129-a, 136, 140 Part II, 142 Part II, 153 Part II, 155, 162, b, c, d, and e, 164 Part II, 165 Part III, 166, 167, 169, Part II, 173 and 175 Parts II and III.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Places in which compulsory settlement may be prescribed are determined as follows: With regard to persons condemned to exile without compulsory labor by the chief administration of militia at the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, by agreement with the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR; and with regard to persons condemned to exile with compulsory labor, by the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR. February 15, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 9, Article 102.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; May 30, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 27, Article 247.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
37. Removal from office may be applied in case the court deems it impossible to leave the condemned person at the post he occupied at the time of his conviction, or at the time he committed the crime. It may be accompanied by a prohibition to occupy a certain post, such prohibition not to last over five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
38. Prohibition to follow a certain activity or industry is applied by the court for a period not to exceed five years in cases where the court shall consider it impossible, owing to the ascertained abuses by the person convicted while he was engaged in his profession or industry, to allow him to continue same further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In particular, the court has the right to prohibit the person convicted to undertake any responsibilities with regard to furnishing labor and material to State institutions, to enter into contracts with State and public enterprises and institutions, to manage trade or commission enterprises either in his own name or on behalf of other persons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
39. Public censure consists of the public expression of condemnation to the person condemned declared in the name of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
40. Confiscation of property is the compulsory and uncompensated alienation in favor of the State of the whole property of a convicted person, or of a proportion thereof exactly defined by the court, such property being either entirely owned by him, or constituting a share in common property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of domestic use and indispensable to the condemned person and his family, the stock and tools required for small-scale peasant industry or agricultural production, and serving as a means of existence for him and his family, are not subject to confiscation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foodstuffs and sums of money left at the disposal of the convicted person and members of his family, may not, according to valuation in their totality, be less than the average three-months’ wages of a worker or that locality in respect to each member of the family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The stock of tools indispensable to a convicted person for his professional work may be confiscated only in case the court decrees that he shall be deprived of the right of exercising such profession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: In kulak households only the property mentioned in Articles 1-9 of the List of Kinds of Property on which execution may not be levied in respect of arrears of taxes, custom duties, and dues, is not liable to confiscation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, Nos. 8990, Article 924.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
41. When property is confiscated, the State shall not answer for the debts and liabilities of the convicted person, if such had been contracted after the taking of steps by the investigation or judicial organs to protect the property, and without the consent of these organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to claims subject to gratification out of the confiscated property, the State answers only within the limits of the assets, while in regard to priority of gratification of claims the rules shall be observed that are laid down in Articles 99 and 101 of the Civil Code and 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure of RSFSR published April 10, 1930.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
42. A fine is a money penalty imposed by the court within the limits established by separate articles of the present Code, and when applied as an additional measure, the fine shall be imposed at the discretion of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all cases a fine shall be imposed in conformity to the property status of the convicted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In determining the fine, the court may decide to substitute, in the event of nonpayment, by compulsory work without deprivation of liberty at the rate of one month compulsory labor for 100 rubles fine. No substitution of deprivation of liberty for a fine or vice versa shall be allowed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of property that are not subject to confiscation may not be taken in payment of a fine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
43. The caution is applied by the court only when a verdict of acquittal is given, if the court considers that the behavior of the acquitted gives ground, nevertheless, to fear that he might commit the crime in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
44. The obligation to repair the damage is imposed upon the convicted in those cases when the court finds it expedient that the convicted shall eliminate the consequences of the violation of the law committed by him, or of the damage caused by him to the plaintiff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This measure of social defense, however, may not exceed by its severity the measure of social defense given as the basic penalty in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; V&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON MEASURES OF SOCIAL DEFENSE OF JUDICO-CORRECTIONAL CHARACTER AND THEIR IMPOSITION BY COURT&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
45. In imposing a measure of social protection of judico-correctional character the court shall be guided by:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) the provisions of the general section of the present code&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the limits indicated in the article of the Special Section which provides a penalty for a given kind of crime&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the Socialist conception of law, taking into consideration the social danger of the crime committed, the circumstances of the case, and the personality of the defendant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
46. The crimes foreseen by the present code are divided into:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes directed against the foundations of the Soviet system established by the authority of Workers and Peasants in the USSR, such crimes being consequently considered the more dangerous, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) All other crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes of the first category the Code lays down the limit below which the court may not go in imposing a measure of social defense of judico-correctional character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On all other crimes the Code lays down only the maximum limit of penalty to be imposed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
47. The basic question to be settled in each separate case is the question of the social danger of the crime that has been tried.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An aggravating factor in this respect, when determining one or the other measure of social protection foreseen by the Code, is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Committing a crime in order to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie. ‘&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Possibility of causing harm to the interests of the State, of the toilers by committing the crime, although the crime itself was not immediately directed against the interests of the State or of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Committing of a crime by a group or a band.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Committing a crime by a person who already committed a crime before, except in cases when a given person is considered as not having been tried before, or when a long time, in a judicial sense, has passed since the committing of the first crime, or since the conviction of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Articles 14 and 15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The court, however, depending on the character of the first crime, may not consider it as an aggravating factor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Committing a crime for selfish or base motives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Committing a crime with particular cruelty, violence, slyness, or in regard to persons subordinated to the criminal or materially dependent on him, or particularly helpless on account of age, or other circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
48. Extenuating circumstances in the imposition of one or another measure of social defense or when a crime has been committed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Although exceeding the limits of self-defense, yet for the protection of Soviet law, revolutionary law, or the personality and right of the party defending himself or another person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) For the first time&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) For motives other than selfishness or base desires&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Under the influence of threats, compulsion, or official or material dependence&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Under the influence of strong mental agitation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) In a state of hunger or distress, or under the influence of severe personal or family conditions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Due to ignorance, lack of consciousness, or an accidental chain of circumstances&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) By a person under age, or by a woman in a state of pregnancy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
49. If the crime committed by the defendant contains the symptoms of several crimes, as well as in the case of the defendant having committed several crimes for which he has not been sentenced, the court, having defined the measure of social defense for each crime separately, finally imposes the penalty according to the article which provides for the gravest of the crimes committed by the defendant and the severest measure of social defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
50. If a minor (16-20 years of age) is sentenced to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the term must be reduced by one-third as compared with the term of an adult sentenced under the same article. At all events the term of the sentence of a minor shall not exceed one-half the maximum laid down by the present Code for a given crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
51. In the event when, in view of exceptional circumstances of the case, the court finds it necessary to impose a measure of social defense below the lowest limit indicated in a corresponding article of the present Code, or to apply another, less stringent measure of social defense that is not indicated in the article, the court may also depart from the article, but the motives of such departure from the code must, be clearly stated in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same rule applies in those cases when the court finds that the defendant at the time of the trial is not socially dangerous and no measure of social defense is imposed on him by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
52. The right of either complete or partial release of the condemned person from the application of measures of social defense, under sentences of all judicial organs of RSFSR, except cases foreseen in the present Code, constitutes the exclusive prerogative of the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; VI&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON CONDITIONAL SENTENCES AND CONDITIONAL AND EARLY RELEASE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
53. If the court finds that the degree of social danger of the defendant does not call either for his isolation, or for the imposition of compulsory labor, it may impose a conditional sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such cases the court decides not to execute the verdict if within a stated period the convicted person will not commit a fresh crime of equal gravity. This period may not be less than one year and not more than ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: If a fine or property requisition is added to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the fine is imposed irrespective of the conditional nature of the basic verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
54. In the event of the committing of a crime by the conditionally condemned during the probation period the court has the right either to add the conditioned measure of social defense either fully or in part to the measure of social defense given by the second verdict. In the first case, the total term of deprivation of liberty must not exceed ten years, and the total term of compulsory labor must not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
55. The following persons shall be held free from previous convictions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Persons acquitted by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Persons conditionally sentenced, who did not commit a crime of equal gravity during the probation period given by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for terms of not more than three months, or to any other minor measure of social defense, who in the course of three years after serving the first sentence, did not commit a fresh crime, or persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a period of more than six months if they committed no fresh crime of equal gravity in the course of six years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
56. If persons sentenced to terms of social defense show reformation, they may be released before the end of the term imposed by the verdict of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conditional early release consists either in abstaining from further serving of the sentence, or in substituting a milder form of social defense. The manner of application of conditional early release is laid down by the Correctional Labor Code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to persons serving sentences in correctional labor camps, conditional early release is applied in the form of transferring the convict to free settlement in the district of the given camp for the rest of his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the conditionally-released person should commit a fresh crime of equal gravity during the unexpired time of his sentence, the latter is added to the measure of social defense imposed by the court for the new crime, while the total term of deprivation of liberty may not exceed ten years and the total term of compulsory labor may not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
57. Persons under age, sentenced to deprivation of liberty and placed in industrial homes for minors, remain there until fully corrected, but not later than reaching the age of 18. If, by the time of reaching this age, the sentence has not yet expired, they may be given early discharge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Minors, in regard to whom early discharge should be deemed impossible, shall either remain in the same industrial home, or shall be transferred to other industrial homes or colonies on the grounds laid down by the correctional labor code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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		<title>Library:Russian Justice</title>
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Russian Justice|author=Mary Stevenson Callcott|written in=1935|publisher=Macmillan Company|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/soviet-justice/}}&lt;br /&gt;
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== PREFACE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; problem of crime in the United States is one of our most serious social questions. Within recent years the activities of the gangster and the kidnapper, the increasing number of young criminals whom we do not know how to treat so that they are re-established in life, have brought alarm not only to the social worker and others who try to meet the situation, but to the ordinary citizen as well. Not only is our penal system failing to reform the lawbreaker, but our social conditions are breeding others. The delay in our courts, the influence of politics, and the swaying of sentimental or incompetent juries by artful criminal lawyers without social conscience, are familiar to our citizens. Confronted by all this, we ask ourselves what we might do in order to fulfill our duty in protecting society and at the same time in aiding the transgressor to become a useful citizen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One thing we can do is to examine closely any system that seems to work in other countries. Russia, with her broad social program, gives much attention to her problem of crime and criminals. Sherwood Eddy, a student of Russia for a long time, has included the humane treatment of prisoners as one of the things which we might profitably get from that country. He might have added also that the simplicity of court procedure by which they arrive at justice has some commendable virtues.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have visited prisons in many parts of our country as well as in several others and have sat through criminal trials in almost as many places, so in my visits to courts and prisons in the USSR I had an experience that made observation intelligent. There is no doubt that we may learn something from the Russians about the restoration to society of those who contravene the law. Whether one sympathizes with or condemns the political faith of this country, one must admire and respect a people who are able to put ideals into works as they do. They know what they want of the man who is their criminal and they set to work to teach him how to fit into their society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are shortcomings in this phase of their work, mostly on the physical side, but they know that as well as we do and are correcting them as rapidly as possible. They have often had to use old buildings because in the short space of years of the new nation they have not had time to build enough modern ones; but they have reformed such gloomy spots as the Women’s Prison of Moscow is said to have been in Tzarist days, into a place of considerable light and more livable conditions. There are also some old cells in the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute of much too little ventilation but this building is to be replaced within a short time. Most of the buildings of this institute are already in good condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States we have been so led away with preparing better buildings (we still have some of the worst in the world) that we have often forgotten the spiritual side. There are some penal institutions, such as the New Jersey Prison for Women at Clinton, N. J., where an excellent spirit certainly prevails, but even in our best prisons I think that we do not overcome that feeling on the part of the prisoner that he or she is permanently set aside from normal society. It is the exceptional individual case where this is not true. In the Russian institutions, especially those where there is great freedom, one is struck by the atmosphere that prevails among the prisoners of still being a part of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In undertaking to give to the American public in general a picture of the situation in Soviet Russia in regard to crime and its repression certain usual questions have been kept in mind. Interested inquirers, both in this country and abroad, have repeatedly asked me, “What are the courts really like?” “What kinds of crime are committed?”’ “Who commits them?” and “What is the punishment given?” The answers are found in the pages of this book. Since it is intended to reach the layman as well as the social worker, the student of criminology, the lawyer, and the legislator, an informal approach has been used. It is hoped, however, that this will not tend to detract from the authenticity of the work. No effort has been spared to give as accurate an account as possible, both by means of research over a period of years in connection with my Criminology class and by recent visits to courts and penal institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gratitude for help must be expressed to many people whom I cannot enumerate here. I am especially indebted to the Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, Prof. A. J. Vishinsky, who gave valuable time for appointments, to Mr. C. S. Smith of the Associated Press who aided me in many ways, to Director Shlaposnitchov of the Institute of Criminal Policy, to Professor Brusilovsky for conferences and appointments he both arranged and participated in and for lectures which was permitted to attend, to S. Golunsky, of the Commissariat of Justice, who in addition to such services as were rendered by others, has contributed the further service of reading and criticizing the manuscript. Finally, to my two young countrywomen, Miss Margaret Moore and Miss Margaret Ross, who gave up parts of their vacation in Moscow to contribute typing to the project.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
M. S. C.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New York City&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
October, 1934&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Criminal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; repression in the Soviet Union is bound up with the whole social program which the state has been developing. A good many of us had thought of the Soviet’s welfare work as more of a hit-or-miss arrangement, gathering up a few threads here, omitting to notice some quite as important in other places, but as the work is examined in its entirety, it gives evidence of more than usually comprehensive planning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In making an evaluation of the present situation in regard to any of its phases of development, it is not sufficient merely to consider standards as they now exist, but it is also, of course, necessary to take into account the distance traversed in the brief time and the difficulties surrounding the accomplishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The important thing, let us say for an example, in child care, is to see that ten or twelve years ago thousands upon thousands of children were wandering in wild gangs, all over the country, thieving, plundering, killing even, unfed and unclothed, and that today they are, with few exceptions both clothed and fed, being trained and cared for in institutions or at home, and that the period of distress and acute exigency is over. If that had extended to children alone we might understand that with all the forces available the authorities could handle such a situation, but it was a larger thing than that, and the fact that in the face of what seemed an undertaking of impossible dimensions the authorities were able to come through, and with a program so constructive that it has revolutionized their treatment of offenders against the law, seems something of a miracle. Or again, it is of great significance, especially to such a study as this, that the banditry and roving lawlessness on the part of men in 1922, has been reduced so sharply that this form of crime is pretty well under control. So, it is the distance revolutionary Russia has come, the rapidity of her pace, that are more significant than the actual standards in practice. That is not to say, however, that her present standards always need a defense. Her achievement in treatment of prisoners, for example, which is the subject of this book, does not suffer by comparison with that of western nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the pages that follow attention is given to treatment and to standards, but for the moment, assuming that advances have been rapidly made in the repression of crime, let us focus our interest on other factors that have contributed to this progress. For us it is important to discover, if we can, what factors are responsible for the one-third decrease in the number of criminals which authorities say has been effected since the beginning of the Revolution. Even if their estimate of the reduction seems high, it is still apparent to a student of the situation that a real decrease, perhaps smaller, has been made. The united front with which the nation has attacked its social problems on all sides has, as would be expected, exerted great influence in the handling of the crime problem. Prevention has resulted in a large way from the development in the various phases of social welfare that have gone on simultaneously, and as one begins to consider the relationship that exists there appears that whole pattern, referred to earlier, which leaves few phases of social and economic life untouched.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The care of children has already been spoken of. It is clear that one of the big problems, among the horde that have puzzled and challenged the group who have had chief responsibility in steering the government, was juvenile delinquency. While authorities gathered these young offenders together and put them in places for care, they were at the same time preparing and carrying out a program for their youth that would prevent others following in the footsteps of the delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the preventive program that was now first in interest, the item of education stood at the head of the list. No doubt in the early days of the proletarian state, schools were woefully inadequate, but children were at least placed under the guidance of people who gave them the elements of an education as well as taught them something of how to work. But the nation appears to have a mania for the education of its masses and a point has now been reached where there is university study in sight, with a stipend attached for those who attend, for all those able to take advantage of it. Juvenile delinquency rates have steadily decreased and the development of the school system has obviously contributed largely to this reduced figure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Health programs are, of course, directly related to crime repression. There is a book on the socialized medicine of Russia, written by Sir Arthur Newsholme of England and Dr. Kingsbury of our own country, that should be read for full information on this subject, but it can be said that the scope of the program is wide and the extent far-reaching. Beyond the broad development of curative medicine there is the preventive program in which physical culture activities figure largely. As an illustration of the results achieved in this work, a demonstration staged in Moscow in the summer of 1934 was very impressive. The author along with a good many other Americans and other foreign visitors witnessed the parade in which a hundred thousand physical culturists, with their canoes, paddles, tennis racquets, flowers, and other things suggestive of health and enjoyment of life, passed in excellent order, so well disciplined that one group followed another without a break in ranks. There is, of course, a great significance to that when it is considered on a national scale. With every factory and farm providing such a program for its workers there should be a rapid diminution in the number of weaklings who turn to crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One finds himself on the defensive at the mention of more liberal divorce laws, but such a provision may actually lessen criminal acts. Since a woman who finds her husband wholly incompatible and wants to remarry some more congenial person has only to indicate her wish in order to be free, she is not nearly as likely to poison her husband or work herself into a state from which some expert psychiatrist will have to untangle her. When the system was first initiated in the Soviet Union we were told that there was a great rush of those who wished to benefit, but that since the first period exhausted the number of those eager for separation, there has been a noticeable decrease. One meets a great number of people who have been married a long time! Such an authority as Vishinsky attributed much of the decrease in criminal acts to these liberal laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The rapid industrialization of the country has made for less crime except in the case of offenses against the state. In that period just before the installation of NEP when farmers and others discharged from the army could find no work, when distribution without production had left the nation in starvation, banditry flourished, but when the five-year plan began to make demands for more workers than could be furnished, a halt was called in the advance of ordinary crime. Also, with work plentiful, there is no problem of providing jobs for those discharged from prisons. With the system of training which gives a skilled trade to every man capable of assimilating the instruction and mastering the tasks, and of giving instruction also to the unskilled type who are thereby enabled to fill some job well, there is no question of work for discharged prisoners. How long this condition will hold depends, of course, on the time it will take for industrialization to reach its zenith and for the population to catch up and exceed the ability of the system to absorb them. However, there is an encouragement of birth control and that may manage the question somewhat better than has been done in other countries gone on before with their industrialization program. Since Russia sits down with pencil and paper and makes her plans of production, perhaps she can do something in the nature of requirements for population increase!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following comment is offered by a Russian authority: “That is something like the Malthusian theory. We don’t believe in it. We are sure that at present, and for a very long time in the future there can be no real over-population. If sometimes something like that seems to happen in the capitalistic countries, it is an illusion. It is the result of the social conditions of those countries. Our social system makes it possible for us to use any quantity of labour and there can be no question of over-population for us. Therefore the question of something like State birth control does not even arise.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Housing is, of course, one of the biggest problems in Soviet Russia. They are building with feverish rapidity but one suspects it will be some time until they catch up to the need. It is popular to correlate bad health, crime, and most other social evils with congested housing, and one feels sure that much of the blame attached to it is well placed. If Russia can eliminate this condition she will have done much in exercising control of those situations that are supposed to be the major causes of crime. She has her own theory of cause which another chapter discusses, but optimistic socialists believe she is in a fair way to remove that also. Russians know well enough of their shortage of housing and they know the social significance of that shortage, but one cannot rebuild an entire nation in the few short years since their social cataclysm. There had to be a gap somewhere and both lack of trained workers and of material accounts for its existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Training for taking part in government affairs, such as elections and jury service, is also conducive to securing law observance. The writer’s visit was so taken up with courts and prisons that other angles of investigation were neglected and any ideas as to government practices in democracy are secured second-hand. However, some of those Americans who live there and observe intelligently state that there is a steady progress toward greater participation by the people themselves in government. As education prepares the way, participation becomes more real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any mention of fight against crime in this country ought to take into account the establishment of the new culture of this society. At the close of the October Revolution, Russia had as its chief asset a great many millions of people whose rights the leaders had sworn to establish and protect, and who were unlettered, superstitious and without social understanding. Educating children was a small task compared to what they must do with those adults, and in the period when the old culture had come to an end with the last efforts of the civil war and the new had not well begun, crime swelled into large numbers of convicted. But these peasants and workers have many of them learned, at evening classes, at conferences, and in trade unions of various sorts, something of what this order stands for. A new social consciousness that makes the individual feel responsible for the law and order of the country has arisen and makes itself felt even in such small offenses as the case of some thoughtless individual throwing paper in a park which is certain to be otherwise immaculate, or of a more delinquent one climbing on a street car at the front in the hope of not being detected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The freeing of the people from hardships of the pioneer stage of the new civilization is also beginning to be felt. There is much attention to beauty which I am told was not evident as recently as two or three years ago. Natural yearnings are being satisfied and a broader life is opening; the labor pains of the rebirth of a nation are about over. All this relieves tension and tends to establish a normality of living such as results in a more settled order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A condition that ought soon to make for a decrease in crime against the state by the so-called class enemy is the fact that the government is now established. We are so accustomed to use the phrase “the Russian experiment” that it is hard for one to give it up; but, it is no longer much of an experiment. The author remembers a gentle reproof given to her when she remarked that since this sort of thing had never been tried before, it was difficult to see how it might work. There was a smiling rejoinder of “We have tried it and it does work.” Surely there will be a cessation in “crimes against the state” when it is clearly seen that efforts against the order of government will not be of avail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Emphasis ought, of course, to be put on the social planning that gives security for old age and removes fear of illness and unemployment. It would be impossible to estimate how much crime is due to a feeling of insecurity in society, but there is no doubt that it is a large percentage. Provisions looking toward the elimination of this insecurity have already been effective enough to have a part in the reduction of the number of those driven to crime because of fear of such economic woes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One point on which observers agree that we need to imitate these people is in the humane treatment of prisoners. It ought to be understood here that “humane” is not synonymous with “coddling.” Some of us who do not distinguish have grown shy of that word but in these pages it is used in its proper meaning. Prisoners are given a “man to man” treatment, held to a strict régime just as if they worked in a factory outside. There is discipline in industry and they are prepared to meet that condition, to learn to discipline themselves, but the approach is one of dignity, with any thought of humiliation put far away. It is only when one thinks of the prisoner as suffering undignified imprisonment, degraded by acts of physical or verbal abuse on the part of guards who ought themselves to be in prison, that one stoops to pity and “feels sorry for him,” but when a man is subjected only to a constructive training such as it might be a privilege to get, one’s sympathy is hardly needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question of how much one can see in a limited time always comes up when one writes of foreign conditions, and cognizance of it should be taken in this Introductory Chapter. The answer, of course, depends on the preparation of the person for the task. It seems too obvious even to remark that one can live in a country for years and know considerably less about specialized subjects than one trained observer who merely visits the institutions. The book on Red Medicine by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. Kingsbury has already been referred to. One would naturally rather trust the judgment of such authorities even though they visit briefly than that of others, unfamiliar with this field, who have resided there for years on end.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The author trusts her own judgment in regard to prisons and courts. She has been seeing both for years, and in many places. Physical equipment is not all that one looks for. There are signs that give things away. There are glances that indicate a whole policy. If a warden tells a visitor of a wholesome approach to his men, and that person then sees the inmates fall away and look up from lowered eyes as he goes through, he knows what to think. If a superintendent says, as one did to the writer, that he does not really enforce the silent system, and one watches the men a while, talking through the side of a twisted mouth as a guard half turns his head and never speaking normally during the entire time of the visit, one knows again that representations are not in accord with practice. Prisoners do not put on acts for visitors, and members of a staff would probably be letting themselves in for trouble with any suggestion that they do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The writer expresses no opinions on conditions outside her own field of special investigation, except on obvious points. Other institutions were visited only in a casual way, but a great deal of life itself was seen. There were long walks in all sorts of places. Groups of children were played with and workmen of all kinds talked to, usually through an interpreter; but there were those with whom the conversation was carried on directly in French, German or sometimes English. All of this formed a background for any conclusions, and years of working with people in a social work relationship had also prepared the writer again for significant observation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the major portion of the book is concerned with research, and that has been thoroughly checked for accuracy of statement by a member of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow.&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER II: THE SOVIET THEORY OF CRIME ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;To understand&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; rightly the theory of crime officially accepted in Russia today, one must read the works of Lenin. Karl Marx is there in the background, to be sure, but he is explained or interpreted in accordance with the opinion of the Soviet Union’s first leader. It sounds a simple enough theory—that, with the final attainment of the classless society, crime, which is the result of economic class relationship, will disappear. But it needs some elucidation. The accomplishment of a state of society in which this would be true is not, after all, quite so simple as the statement sounds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
People have tried for a good many years to account for the phenomenon of crime and to work out some manner of punishment that would control even if not eliminate it, as the present Soviet theory permits. Anthropologists tell us that acts not pleasing to the group, even antagonistic to its best interests, are apparently as old as human society itself. Penalties consisting of curses, banishment, even death, were visited upon those who broke the law in the earliest ages of society. Up to very recent years punishment in the form of untold cruelties was dealt out to those who transgressed. Still crime grew and criminals increased with the complexity of civilization. What makes people do those things—commit those acts which are against the folk ways or state ways of the community in which he lives, and brings him usually to account? Who knows? Within fairly recent times three main theories have attempted to establish the causes and have laid out measures of punishment designed to protect law-abiding society from the criminal and, later, to aid in the readjustment of the individual to life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We might take a hasty look at these theories before we speak of their rejection by proletariat Russia. The classical school had as one of its chief characteristics the doctrine of free will in the commission of crime. The discretionary power of judges in the years just preceding the development of this theory gave too much play to the possibility, supposedly, of circumstances surrounding the act. As a matter of actual practice, according to such an authority as Gillin, it gave them instead an excellent chance to wreak a personal vengeance on some enemy, or, still acting according to the discretionary power given them, befriend someone to whom they wished to show favor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this was one of the evils the classical school of writers decided to remedy. If one committed an act of his own free will, then circumstances had nothing to do with it. A man was a criminal because he chose to be. Thus when two persons committed the same act they should be given the same punishment. And the French Code of 1791 put such a theory into practice, listing a great number of such transgressions and providing for each a set penalty. The difficulties would hardly need to be set down for us. The resulting unwieldy code, the lack of any punishment for acts not listed, made the administration of the code an impossible task.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There was another reason for its modification. It did not take an expert in criminology to see that there were differentiating conditions surrounding the commissions of crime. It was clear that of two people committing similar acts, the one would have the sympathy of those who saw him, whereas the second would be looked on with contempt. That the people in the street were able to arrive at such a conclusion and public opinion in the days of revolutionary action against tyranny, must have had some effect. At any rate the Code of 1810 in France provided a modification of the definite penalty for a definite crime by setting a maximum and minimum and permitting the judge to choose between. The doctrine of free will in the commission of crime thus became modified to a milder form of the same theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The neo-classical school went a step further. While it still recognized the theory of free will and individual responsibility on the part of one transgressing the law, it did decide that in view of evidences being submitted by a body of biologists, physicians, and other scientists, that every person was not free to choose, and was thus not responsible for his behavior. There might, for example, be insanity or imbecility to account for an act. It was, however, necessary to establish that at the time of the crime he was in such a mental state. This theory is incorporated in the practice of our criminal courts today.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But here begins another story. Modern science was developing. Research connected with psychiatry and psychology was adding important contributions to the field of the study of the criminal and an attempt to account for crime. Why did a man do things of such an anti-social nature, things harmful to his fellow beings? The anthropological school with Lombroso as its initial spokesman, entered with its explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This theory, attacking the classical and neo-classical writers, took a different line, and swung far in the other direction. Why did the criminal commit his crime? Because he was born with certain stigmata that prevented his following other lines of behavior. He had no choice in the matter. Far from the free-will theory that made him a creature responsible for his deeds, this doctrine made him incapable of rational analysis, or any logical deductions as to cause and consequence. Lombroso weighted his argument with facts and figures. He made an extensive study of criminals in Italian prisons and concluded finally that at least a certain percentage of those committing crimes were born criminals with definite physical features characteristic of the lower stages of evolution. However, in his later writings he concluded that only one-third of all criminals belonged to this group. Still having to account for the other two-thirds, he decided that part of this number was insane and that the other belonged in the category for which he invented the term—&#039;&#039;criminaloid&#039;&#039;. It is in regard to the latter group that we see his recognition of social influences on crime. Besides those born to criminal ways and those committing their acts because of insanity, there was this third group, who while not born to their deeds, still acted like criminals. There was too much proof by this time of the influence of environment for even an ardent advocate of his own theory to deny its importance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Long before the death of Lombroso, Ferri had written his &#039;&#039;Criminal Sociology&#039;&#039; and our third main theory was well launched. This school, of course, is prominently with us today. It recognizes biological causes and adds to them the results of various social environments. It goes even beyond that and takes into account such physical environment as climate, weather, and geographic location.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet criminal theory repudiates all of the aforementioned and asserts that crime is caused by the exploitation of one class by another. The attitude which accounts for such behavior, they insist, has evolved over a period that has lasted since the state became an instrument in the hands of a ruling class to force a weaker one into submission by making “laws” to protect its own interests and punishing those who transgressed one of these regulations. Because that “conscience” has had a historical development, has been long in the making, it will likewise take time to change it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the Marx-Lenin theory assumes that all crime is the result of the exploitation of one class by another, and that with the achievement of classless society—which is the ultimate aim of socialist construction—crime itself will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us trace this line of thought for a moment for fear it is not as familiar as it should be for one to get the full import of this doctrine. According to this belief, there has been one continuous evolution of society toward the establishment of full Communism, beginning with its earliest stage, which will be in its final stage world-wide. But in this evolution, going on since the dawn of history and before, there emerged at one stage of the process an organization through which the stronger element came to rule the weaker and make its members submit to its will. The instrument through which they effected this was the state. From that time on, the interests of the class or group in power have been protected by rules or laws and those who break those regulations, or commit some act not in accord with these interests of the ruling class, are guilty of a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Marx-Lenin doctrine in rejecting any sort of an idealistic notion such as Rousseau’s “social contract” and Hegel’s “the reality of the moral idea” as accounting for the state, accepts instead the definition that “the state as organized violence emerged at the definite stage in the evolution of society, that society was broken up into irreconcilable classes, that it could no longer exist without the ‘authority’ supposed to be above society and to a certain degree isolated from it.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Or again, speaking more plainly, the Marxian formula states “that the state is an organ of oppression of one class by another; that it sets up an order which legalizes and consolidates this oppression modifying the conflict of classes.” Thus since the state is an organ of class domination, and crime necessarily, by the same definition, is the commission of an act against the interests of the ruling class, a criminal code would be a formulation of penalties imposed for such acts. When a state is reached where there is no domination of one class by another in society, it would logically appear that there would be no need of a criminal code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the Soviet Union has a criminal code now, as we shall later see, and of course a recognition of crime. This, however, in their theory is no contradiction. In the first place there is one class now in power (there is an admitted class basis for criminal legislation), and the transgression of the rights of those in authority, the proletariat or working group, does constitute a serious and major crime. That, of course, is to be expected from the nature of our definition. But what of the group of criminals who come from the working class itself?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They are those whose attitude is the result of long centuries of class struggle, and their point of view cannot be changed at once. Every effort is made by a policy resulting from this theory to change their “social conscience” by education while they serve their sentence, but even with that effort it is certain that many of the older generation will not be won over to the new way of thinking. Thus they concentrate on youth, as we shall see in a later chapter devoted to the child who comes in contact with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But crime, except in isolated instances, will disappear as need for the state also vanishes. Let us take the word of an authority for it. Commissar of Justice of the USSR, N. Krylenko, writes: “Only under Communism will the state become wholly superfluous, for then there will be no one to suppress in the sense of waging a systematic class struggle against a definite part of the population.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Understand that, in accordance with the theory, criminal repression will exist as long as the state itself is necessary, and for the present the perfect socialist society is a thing of the future. Even when it is fully come there will still be some who will commit acts of a criminal nature, but they will be of such infrequency that there will be no need of penal restriction. Lenin is our authority this time. In Vol. XXI, p. 432, we find the following: “For this there will be no need for a special machine, for a special apparatus of coercion; this will be done by the army of people themselves with the simplicity and ease with which any crowd of civilized people even in contemporary society will stop a street fight of rowdies or will disallow the outraging of a woman.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perhaps it will be easier to understand the theory that permits of the final disappearance of crime if the legal definition contained in their code were given. One can see then that with the gaining of strength on the part of the government, with the “mopping up” of the remaining opposition, there could possibly be such a situation. Part 3 of the Criminal Code, Article 6, contains this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“A socially dangerous act is deemed every act of commission or omission, directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government for the period of time pending transition to a communist régime.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A note added to this article is of special significance in providing for consideration of the circumstances of social class. It reads:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“An act which, although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code, is free from socially dangerous characteristics, owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It can be seen that crime in the Soviet Union consists mainly of those acts directed against the state by the so-called class enemies; or those desiring to hamper socialist construction. In this situation those acts defined as criminal would tend to have usually an economic basis. And this would substantiate the theory that recognizes no other motive for a crime than an economic one, which, in a society where all needs would be met, would supposedly disappear. That is, if in the final socialist state every one should receive according to his needs—as they insist he will—then the economic motive for crime would be eliminated. This takes care of those acts which in our own country, we might attribute to economic causes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what, we might ask, of those murders or other crimes, motivated by jealousy or rage? The theory answers that those, in the person not ill and requiring medical treatment instead of penal, are rare and the act thus usually constitutes the one crime in the person’s career. For example the man who murders his wife in a jealous rage would very likely make a good citizen who would never again commit such an excessive act. However, this, in the person not mentally deranged, would also be a rare occurrence for the reason assigned that marriage and divorce are made so liberal under the laws of the USSR that the jealousy motive in marital tangles is taken care of, and thus one of the main causes of murder is eliminated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to note in this regard that the maximum penalty for murder in Russia in any case, except for death resulting from banditry and robbery with a firearm, is a ten year sentence. In fact the maximum term of imprisonment for any cause is ten years. They hold long sentences to be neither humane nor constructive. If a man is mentally abnormal to a dangerous extent, there are other places for him than prisons. If he has committed such a serious act as banditry or robbery with firearms, he is likely to get a death sentence unless there are extenuating circumstances such as the youth of the offender, and for the other crimes the shorter sentence is held to be more conducive to reformation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we note for a moment the chief types of crime against which the penal provisions are directed, we will be able to see what acts any theory must account for. In the pamphlet &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039; by the Commissar of Justice, N. Krylenko, we find the four main categories of criminal law listed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, the laws safeguarding the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under this class are all provisions for penalties for acts of a counter-revolutionary nature; against such things as wrecking, activities of the Kulaks (the middle-class peasants who owned a moderate degree of private property and who were opposed to relinquishing it to the state) directed against the order of government, and against speculators, and any form of pilfering, theft, bribery, and squandering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the second category the author places the laws which protect the interest of the toiling masses. These are of various natures. Punishment is here provided for officials who fail to fulfill the pledges of the government as to food and living conditions promised to the working class. Protection is also afforded against excessive fines or punishment of the people. The need for such a measure he illustrates by the case of the imposition of a fine of a hundred rubles in a trivial incident where ten was the maximum permitted by law, and there was no occasion for any at all. An official permitting or contributing to such an act must, of course, be punished. In the same category are provisions against undue severity in enforced collectivisation, which tend to frighten and coerce rather than to the persuasion favored by Stalin. In this category also would fall any law providing for punishment of one committing deeds of violence against one’s person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the third category&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; are found “laws regulating the inter-relations between the various social strata of the toiling masses.” This division consists of the laws on Soviet trade and is directed against any act that contributes to squandering of goods or disposition of unwanted articles by forcing a customer to take one such article along with his other purchases,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The author writes of this: “What is a ‘compulsory assortment?’ You enter a store and ask for something. Well, you get what you want, but you must also take something else. What? A lamp, for instance. Now a lamp is a good thing to have, but where is the burner? You are curtly told that the lamp comes without a burner. Another store expects you to buy electric flashlights without a battery—a third tags on batteries without flashlights.” He also speaks of sweaters sent to a city sweltering in the heat, and skiis to Odessa. All this, he says, is in violation of the law and must be punished. The people’s rights must be protected (&#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 29-30).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or any other act by trade bodies that interferes with the rights of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fourth category consists of laws punishing non-observance of regulations as to business accounting and fulfillment of plans by the various economic organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“These categories of law,” says this author, “exhaust the fundamental questions that comprehend every aspect of our economic and social life.” At this phase of the development of their socialist state they, of course, recognize the necessity for the provisions that their penal code contains. But their faith in their ideal—the final classless society—and the change which it will bring in social consciousness enables them to prophesy according to Lenin the disappearance of excessive acts. “We do not know,” he says, “how quickly and in what stages, but we do know that it will be withering away; with their withering away, the state will also wither away.” Crime and punishment in their theory are therefore transitory phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The disappearance of crime will not be achieved with the end of the second five-year plan as some optimists might have expected. There are still sectors where the struggle between the classes flares up, and where the opposition is for the moment strengthened by influencing some of the toilers themselves to come to their aid. But types of crime outside this group will be steadily losing in degree of social danger and should be treated with increasing leniency. Repressive measures in regard to the first type of crimes, those of menace to the advancing socialist state, must be made more severe until all opposition has ceased and the ideal society ushered in.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criminal repression will not disappear until the full realization of the Communist order, but then in the words of Lenin once more&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XXI, p. 431.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “free from the thrall of capitalism . . . people will gradually get accustomed to observe the elementary, perennially known rules of social life that were repeated for ages in all books on good conduct; to observe them without the special apparatus of coercion which is called the State.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While these theorists expect that by the end of the second five-year plan, class distinctions will be pretty well smoothed out, criminal repression will still remain to combat the remnants of the old order which will linger on for some time. They emphasize that they have no magic wand for clearing all this suddenly and completely from the consciousness of the people. Crime and criminal repression came at one stage in evolution—the beginning of the domination of one class by another—and they will vanish at another stage—the appearance of the highest phase of Communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a final summation of the theory, crime results solely from a class struggle and will disappear with the extinction of classes, just as the state itself, according to Lenin, will disappear, and the court, now an organ of the state guarding the interests, life, health, and liberty of toilers of the state, will also disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The period is called transitory,” said Professor Brusilovsky in a lecture, “because after the achievement of Communism there will be neither crime nor punishment. Each stage and development of Soviet authority while lowering the importance of some crimes, aggravates the weight of others, depending upon the actual economic and political situation. To us criminal law is no fetish, but a tool for sweeping away the obstacles to socialist construction. Our criminal law is to a high degree historic, our proletarian semi-state is in a stage of constant change and motion toward the construction of classless society.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A theory is only a theory, and when it deals with human beings there is no accuracy of prophecy. The advent of a proletarian state, however, might indicate to some of us that other strange things could happen in the same land, especially so with the social mind that is apparent, and with as sane an approach to criminal treatment as their policy calls for. Let that social mind have another few generations for extension to fringes of the group, and that policy of treatment of criminals come into full play, and we might be as surprised as we are that the Soviet State has not only survived, but has recently been received into the League of Nations as one of the powers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The student will want to know, though, something of the degree to which the theory proves accurate as the period of socialist construction advances in the Soviet Union. It might be said here that according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky there is a decrease in the number of prisoners convicted of such familiar crimes as theft, murder, arson, robbery, rape, etc., by almost one-third since the days just before the revolution. Chapter IV discusses in detail the crimes committed and some analysis is given of those who commit them. The reader must be reminded again, however, that the authorities contend that no radical change can be made in the social conscience of their people in the one generation of the revolution which has elapsed, especially as so little constructive work was done up to the last few years. It is, however, important to know what problems they have at this time and the chapter referred to above is devoted to that discussion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER III: CRIME REPRESSION SINCE THE REVOLUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We turn&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; now from theory to fact. Whether or not a state of classless society will be achieved no one can know; but it is certain that at the moment crime and criminals do exist in Soviet Russia. While our concern is with the present program of criminal repression, a review of the situation since the revolution will give us perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin enumerates three basic aspects of the proletarian dictatorship: “First, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the crushing of the exploiters, for the defense of the country, for the consolidation of ties with the proletariat of other countries, for the development and victory of revolutions in all countries. Second, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the final separation of the toiling and exploited masses from the bourgeoisie, for the attraction of the masses to the cause of socialist construction, for state leadership of these masses by the proletarian. And, third, the utilization of the power of the proletariat for the organization of forces, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a society without state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criminal repression must necessarily be considered in connection with these purposes of the state. It can be seen that there are three main factors involved. There is, first of all, the crushing of the enemies of the state; secondly, the discipline and control of the toiling masses themselves; and, third, the socialist construction. The method used for accomplishing these ends have changed with the various phases of the development of the Communist state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considering first the crushing of those who oppose the order of government or hinder its development, we find the methods of coercion varying from leniency and toleration in the beginning of the Revolution, through the frightful years of the Cheka (extraordinary commission to combat speculation and counter-revolution in the early days) reign, to the more severe activities of the OGPU in recent times. Shortly after the October Revolution in May, 1918, all those persons held for political crimes were set free by an act of general amnesty. The results of this liberality were rather serious for the rule of the proletariat, since those released, bitterly determined to overthrow the new and not too firmly seated government, returned to the fight with vigor. Among these was the renowned General Krasnow who organized the White Guard Cossacks and caused no end of trouble to the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a policy of clemency was bound to end if the Soviet government continued to live. When next they had political prisoners in hand there was a different tale to tell. Whoever of them saw the inside of a prison or place of detention were not released to run back to the fight. We find Stalin defending later severe measures toward these prisoners in an interview with Ludwig in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P.7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Soon it transpired that such leniency was only undermining the strength of the authority of the Soviets. We committed a mistake in showing such leniency toward the enemies of the working class. If we repeated this mistake any further, we would have committed a crime toward the working class. We would have betrayed its interest. And this became perfectly clear very soon. It became very sure that the greater our leniency toward our enemies, the greater their resistance.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Leniency was no part of their program thereafter. History will attest to the fact. Military Communism and the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, agent of superlative revolutionary terror, attended to that. Civil wars are brutal, cruel, and Russia’s was notoriously no exception. The period that followed with its terrorist activities is no bright spot in the history of crime repression of post-revolutionary Russia. Lenin threw the responsibility for the establishment of the so-called Red Terror on their class enemies. He says: “You have yourselves to blame, friends! Do not run away with the idea that the Russian peasants and workers have forgotten about your actions. You challenged us to a fight of the most desperate form in October, and in reply to this we have announced the terror, and the triple terror, and if necessary we will make it even hotter for you, if you try again.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. XXVII, p. 175.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They tried again, and yet again, the open fighting of the Civil War giving way to underground methods, not deterred by the worst the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and its successors the GPU could do. But early measures must have quadrupled, for Communism can no longer be considered a mere experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who were the people against which this repression was directed? The urban bourgeoisie joined by the rural Kulaks formed the great number. There was a tremendous increase of criminals from these two classes in the early years of the proletarian state. In their combined efforts they were able to prove of much hindrance to the Soviet cause, and, aided by those waverers within the toiling class who were able to be influenced to counter-revolutionary activities, they presented a grave menace. Again Lenin, whom the Russians think of in his kindly moods, showed his grim side. “We must exert every effort,” he wrote, “to track down and catch all those highwaymen, all the landlords and capitalists in hiding, in all their disguises, expose and punish them without pity—sly, subtle, experienced, patiently waiting for the opportune moment in hatching their plots; they are saboteurs who will stoop to any crime to do harm to the Soviet rule. With these enemies of the toilers, with the landlords, capitalists, saboteurs, and White Guards, we must be merciless.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, Vol. 24, XXIV, p. 434.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Economically, the first period was one of distribution of goods without production. Its aftermath was famine and unemployment and Lenin and Trotsky were at odds over a policy of alleviation. Trotsky, impatient at delay over a program of more complete state ownership, advocated immediate action against all private possession of property. Lenin considered a starving people no advantage in furthering a socialist construction, and was besides a humanitarian. He wanted his people fed. The result was the institution of NEP, the New Economic Policy, which permitted private ownership within limits, and brought about the eventual political annihilation of Trotsky.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of fighting the class enemy remained practically the same even through the era of NEP. There was some let-up in the counter-revolutionary activities on the initiation of NEP, as it had been hoped by those opposed to Communism that this probably indicated the return to Capitalism, but activities of an anti-Communistic nature were still sternly repressed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
N. Krylenko, prosecutor of note and now Commissar of Justice of the USSR, writes in defense against a criticism of mildness toward the enemies of the government at this time: “The form of the dictatorship of the proletariat changes in the different stages of the proletarian revolution. For instance, in the first period of the October Revolution the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters was the most conspicuous feature . . . during the transition to the NEP, the peaceful, cultural, organizational work of the dictatorship of the proletariat was most conspicuous, but this again did not mean that the importance of overcoming the resistance of the exploiters had receded in the least.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The chief agent of “resisting the exploiters” was now the GPU (later, as it became the joint organization of all the republics, the OGPU), the full title of which is the United State Political Administration. There seems no doubt that their midnight arrests and executions were an effective weapon against any counter-Soviet efforts even as the activities of their predecessors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, had been before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The method now undergoes an important change. Note this from Lenin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vol. XX, p. 460.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “To the extent that the basic purpose of authority becomes not military crushing but administrative, the typical manifestation of crushing and coercion will become not the method of shooting on the spot, but trial in court.” Not in love himself, apparently, with methods such as he felt they had to use, he seized the first opportunity afforded by an end of Civil War to advance a revolutionary legality which his party had already been trying to establish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Criminal Code was written in 1922, as was also the Code for Criminal Procedure, and the way was paved for an enlargement of orderly court procedure. The provisions of the code gave not greater leniency but legalized measures that had already been practiced. The step of importance, however, was that “tried in court” replaced “shooting on the spot.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The history of violence against the Kulaks, the most startling of all violence used by the USSR in establishing itself, was entering now a modified phase. Nerves were settling somewhat, and panic beginning to clear away. Legal guarantees, so nearly obscured through years when “crushing” was regarded as necessary at any price if the proletariat was to stay in authority, might now begin, at least, to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with this a new idea was put into practice which presents a happier side to the study of crime repression in this country. Since the state could not kill all of its class enemies and certainly would not find it profitable to fill innumerable prisons with them, there developed a new approach to the problem. It is not accurate to say that the idea was new, because it had been present since the earliest days of the Revolution. The Civil War, however, had so disrupted the development of any program that this influence was not properly felt until later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This new approach was by means of educating and training these offenders so that they might be turned out again as useful workers in a state so greatly in need of all the man power it could muster. Authorities built their plans on the belief that even a class enemy might reform and see his way to becoming a member of the new society if properly guided. And as for the convicts from among the loyal masses, any program for crime repression must have as its fundamental object the training of these as useful citizens. The theory of how it might be done has turned out to be a practical one. Its translation into government policy was a most significant development and leads straight to the constructive attitude one finds in present-day treatment of prisoners in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most of us, it seems, have had the impression that during the days of the Civil War there were no legal guarantees in the state, but such an idea is not correct. One thinks of courts as suspended, but there were orderly trials even in the darkest days of military Communism when non-judicial bodies like the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; were at their height. This was possible, of course, almost entirely for those members of the toiling masses themselves and not for enemies of the proletarian authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was a bare year after the October Revolution (November 6-9, 1918) that the Emergency Congress of the Soviets was held in Moscow. And if ever emergency existed in political affairs, it did so then for the Soviets. Civil War was at its highest point, the White Guards aided by Czecho-Slovaks, were in possession of Siberia, the English were pushing to the north and the French to the south. It is surprising that a party at the helm of the ship of state could take its mind even for a moment from such an international and military situation to think of admonishing a people to observe law. But we find Kursky, then Commissar of Justice, rising gravely to remind the Congress and the people that “during the year of revolutionary activity the working class of Russia has elaborated the basic laws of the RSFSR which must be faithfully observed in order to develop and strengthen the authority of workers and peasants,” and the Congress, after listening to his speech, resolved unanimously, “to appeal to all citizens of the Republic, to all organs and all officials of Soviet authority, to observe most strictly the laws of the RSFSR and the rules, regulations and orders issued and to be issued by the Central authorities.” A significant effort that was, and one whose importance was momentous to a people struggling through a chaos that must have all but obscured any semblance of order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To forestall the high-handed measures which they must have seen would be forthcoming as a result of the counter-revolutionary work during the Civil War, they surrounded such action with certain safeguards. It was resolved that “(a) Exact, formal ascertaining by the Soviet institution or official concerned as to the presence of conditions necessitated a departure from the limits of the law; (b) Immediate written notification to the Council of People’s Commissars, with a copy for local and interested authorities, should be provided.” In the midst of violence and excesses these efforts to establish revolutionary legality were significant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In March, 1919, the Communist party adopted as a distinctive feature of its program a plank reading: “Our courts have already led to a cardinal change in the character of punishment, resulting on a large scale in conditional sentences, introducing public censure as a measure of punishment, substituting compulsory labor with retention of liberty for imprisonment, replacing the prisons by educational institutions, and allowing the possibility for the factor and time by comradely courts. The Communist party, while urging further development of the court in this direction, should aim for the ultimate substitution of the system of punishment by a system of measures of educational character.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As early as December, 1917, Lenin sent instructions to the Revolutionary Tribunal, in which he urged that repressive measures take the form of corrective labor tasks, and that the harmful element be dealt with in a reformative way. Shooting was abolished by a decree dated October 28, 1917, and Decree No. 3 of July 20, 1918, provided that one sentenced to a three-month period should be sent to compulsory social labor and should not be guarded while serving. In the Ural region and Siberia prisons were replaced with working homes where study was combined with work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Various other decrees were adopted, furthering this principle of reformation through education and discipline. In 1919 one such established a distribution committee composed of people of special equipment, by psychiatrists, educators, etc., who were to determine by a study of background, personality, and physical condition of the convict what prison would be best suited to him.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky, (Ed.) &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, Moscow, 1933, p. 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A decree of 1920 dealt with the organization of provincial detention points, and in the main ones there was to be established a university with courses in the sciences—applied, natural and technical—in history and the arts. An attempt was also made to have prisoners trained not just in crafts of their small villages but in factory and larger industrial work, and in spite of Civil War and shortage of shops, the number given such training was raised from 214 per cent. in 1919 to 10 per cent. in 1920.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 29.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer again to the volume edited by Vishinsky, we find on page 20 a statement that any penal treatment tending to degrade the prisoner was forbidden by a decree of July 23, 1918, to be practiced. This principle is now incorporated in the Criminal Code, Article 9, which reads: “Measures of social defense may not have for their purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity, as they do not contemplate the purposes of retribution and penalty.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The present-day approach to crime repression in the USSR is, then, through educational and correctional labor. The extreme penalty of death is given now in only three cases: crimes against the state, military crimes, and armed robbery in which death occurs. A. J. Estrin in his book, &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039;, a 1933 publication, gives a table on page 229 containing the percentages of persons sentenced to different forms of repression, and from 1926 to 1930 the percentage sentenced to death is less than 0.1. For all others the educational program holds even for political prisoners. The author can give no first-hand information on the latter, but official reports indicate that this is true.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the treatment of criminals, Vishinsky speaks of the indispensable part the state apparatus must play in the realization of their program.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Within the system of the institutions of proletarian dictatorship,” he says, “the corrective labor institutions play a great and serious part, because through them, in effect, is realized the entire judicial policy. These institutions with their entire force of live human relationships, with all their methods and means with the help of which these relations are built, define the reality or falsity of the judicial verdict as they define also the extent of achieving of the genuine aim of the problem posed before these institutions.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet jurisprudence is thus based not on restrictive measures alone but on corrective, educational, and cultural ones. The authorities seek to use labor that is constructive as to character and useful economically, and not the kind that brings indignity and resentment when resorted to as punishment or disciplinary measures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sentence is designed to be as brief as possible. In the USSR it is not necessary that a prisoner serve more than one-third of his sentence in order to be re- leased on parole, but his release is based solely on the condition of his fitness for return to society. The Observation Commission, whose duty it is to determine the time of such release is required by law to inform itself in intimate detail of the condition of training and education of the prisoners, of the personal characteristics and attitude toward society of each individual. It is thus likely to be able to judge to a higher degree when a prisoner is ready for release. If the figures they give on recidivism with 18 per cent. for men and 21 per cent. for women are accurate then they may be said to judge well indeed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The policy of re-educating the “enemy,” or winning him over to the aid of the state, is still more marked in the treatment of the working masses themselves. Repressive measures must necessarily be used for the discipline of cases among the workers. While penalties are still severe and a decree of August 7, 1932, providing for the protection of state possessions, attaches the death sentence for those who steal or pilfer public property, the measures designed for those of the working population who transgress the law are in general more liberal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to be expected. It has already been stated that the Russians acknowledge the class nature of their administration of criminal law. The content of the criminal code is directed almost entirely toward the forced subjugation of those elements who would not voluntarily be subjected to the dictates of the ruling class or the proletariat. As a matter of policy they manage this subjugation by the use of such corrective measures as the construction of the White-Sea Baltic Canal when it is possible. Such other provisions as the code contains may be made to apply to the workers, but discrimination is openly observed between the classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To refer back for a moment to the decree of August 7, 1932 already mentioned, we may note the indication of the sharpening of the class struggle. The state intensified its program of collectivization in 1928, and launched into a broad program intended to crush the Kulaks and extend Socialism into the villages. The Kulak antagonism immediately became more pronounced, and if we consult a table on page 80 of M. N. Gernet’s &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039; we see the results tabulated in a sudden jump of crimes against the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cattle were killed, farm machinery was destroyed or put out of order, and plans were hampered in any way possible. There was also organized theft of state property to such an extent that severe measures were considered necessary. Thus the provision by this decree four years later of the death sentence for these offenses. In the meantime the necessity for such a measure was taken care of by the judicial powers and authority of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this decree is necessarily directed against the definite enemy class, it applies also to the workers themselves who are bribed or otherwise used as tools by the urban bourgeoisie or Kulaks. This, however, is outside the program of treatment of the ordinary criminal, and in no wise is it to be understood that the death penalty is always applied even for those considered to be class enemies. The author personally heard a trial in court in which the indictment was for organized theft, and on appeal the death sentence was commuted to a ten-year sentence. For the more serious offenses, however, such as those involving sabotage in factories, the death sentence is usual, at least for those most responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The program of compulsory education provided for those from among the toiling element who are imprisoned is the chief weapon of the fight against crime by the state. The prisons are equipped (as will be seen in later pages) with all sorts of devices for carrying out this work. The whole criminal law reflects this attitude toward crime repression on the part of the Communist party. The evolution of this code since its establishment in 1922, by a multitude of amendments and two almost new writings, reflects the needs and purposes of the state in various phases of its development in a most interesting manner. It is divided into a general and a special part, and although the general part is appended to this book, it seems of interest here to speak of its various divisions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first section is devoted to the purposes of criminal legislation. The second deals with the extent of operation and the limits of action of the code. Section three is concerned with the general principles of the penal policy. Section four deals with the measures of social defense applied to persons committing various crimes. The fifth concerns the manner in which social defense measures of correctional character are applied, and the sixth deals with conditional sentences and release on probation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the code’s adoption in 1922 there have been two important amendments aside from the many year by year. In 1926 when numerous changes were made, the chief feature was a more lenient application of penalties. This was at the time of reconstruction, when the development of the socialist state took on greater emphasis and education in the matter of penal treatment was held to be one of its chief tools. By the change of 1928, deprivation of liberty was limited to sentences of one year or more. Previous to this time sentences of even one day might carry with them deprivation of liberty. The aim now in short sentences is that the convicted person may retain his liberty, but have supervision in his place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 1926 edition of the Criminal Code, the whole concept of punishment is abolished. Although, according to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky, there are certain survivals of old methods and ideas among a few of those connected with penal administration, the official thought is not of retribution or any infliction of pain or even of “just reward.” From this time on, the term used is a “measure of social defense” and, as nearly as one can judge both from records and from actual visits to their institutions for criminals, the change has been not only in terminology but in actual practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The measures of social defense now provided by the Criminal Code are divided into three categories: first are the measures of judicial and correctional character; second, measures of social defense of medical character; and third, measures of social defense of medical and pedagogical character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measure of social defense of judicial and correctional character are enumerated as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the Union of USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the Union of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the Union of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts 1930, No. 26, Item 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is in addition the use of public censure as a repressive measure which is a “public expression of condemnation in the name of the court.” It must be published through the press and may be either the only penalty assessed or be added to another. The use of warning is also provided for by Article 43 of the Criminal Code and is practiced in cases where the accused is acquitted but by his conduct gives “every reason to fear commitment of crimes by him in the future.” By this means an effort is made to prevent his committing some criminal act in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the present Criminal Code there is a division of repressive measures into the basic and the supplementary. To the basic measures of declaring one a class enemy with the consequences such a decision carries, deprivation of liberty and compulsory work without deprivation of liberty, are added the other enumerated measures, with the exception of confiscation of property. This is also a supplementary measure but it can be used only in the cases specifically mentioned in the special section of the code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary it might be said that while severe measures still exist and are used in regard to counter-revolutionary activities or crimes against the state, the emphasis in the penal program is decidedly upon educational measures for re-establishing the criminal as a useful member of society in the socialist state. While the beginnings of this policy are almost obscured by the activities of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; and the OGPU (whose judicial powers have by the Decree of July 10, 1934, been withdrawn and turned over to the courts) and the extra-legal activities of the Civil War days, yet the germ was there from the beginning of the Revolution and its development is one of the marked achievements of the Soviet government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IV: WHAT CRIMES ARE COMMITTED AND WHO COMMITS THEM? ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In answering&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the question “What crimes are committed?” one could say in general that it is the usual line-up found in any country plus that category defined as the crimes against the state or the order of government. It would be hard to say what is included in the latter group. It would run the gamut from, let us say, the theft of bread from a collective farm, if it was intended to hamper the rule of the proletariat in any way, to the wrecking of a factory. It depends on the “socially dangerous” character of the person committing the act for one thing, on the social background, and for the other consideration, the motive behind the act. It is quite to be expected that this group ranks at the top of any list of crimes in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If one wishes to go into detailed statistics on the subject of crimes committed, there is a small, compact volume, &#039;&#039;Crime Abroad and in the USSR&#039;&#039;, by M. N. Gernet, which supplies such information. It was, however, published in 1931 which is far in the past, gauged by the speed with which the Criminal Code and judicial practices change under proletariat rule. But in the main the list of crimes are the same and the classifications as to age and sex still hold.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There has been a change in the type of crime since the days of military Communism. A. J. Estrin, in his &#039;&#039;The Development of Soviet Criminal Policy&#039;&#039; includes the following&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 51 &#039;&#039;et. seq.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; as characterizing the period of militarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Counter-revolutionary activities&lt;br /&gt;
* Speculation&lt;br /&gt;
* Banditry&lt;br /&gt;
* Adventures&lt;br /&gt;
* Desertion&lt;br /&gt;
* Bureaucratism&lt;br /&gt;
* Occasional bad conduct crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He goes on to say that there was considerable growth in crimes of banditry during 1918, practically all having a political or anarchistic coloring. In the matter of desertion, the menace was so great that a special commission was set up to deal with it, and by the time of the entry of the Communist army into Warsaw it had been successfully repressed on the western front. During this period there was likewise an increase in hooliganism, the acceptance of bribery on the part of officials, and speculation. The latter presented an especially difficult problem but was nearly at an end when the institution of the New Economic Policy in 1922 brought new forms of it. From then on it has been one of the crimes that has given most trouble to the government. Acts of pilfering state property in order to resell it at a greater price, or securing goods for speculation by persons working either on a state farm or in a store, are extensive. Since the law of August, 1932, providing a death penalty for taking state property these crimes have decreased in number.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Open warfare between the classes had so far subsided by 1921 that there was a demobilization of farmers and other workers from the army, and that led to the increase in another crime—banditry. These people, suddenly released from fighting ranks, broke and unable to find work in that period when production was at a low ebb, turned to theft, robbery or banditry, especially the latter, filling the country with a terror all their own.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During this period of 1921-22 there was a very definite growth in the number of crimes committed against persons—not in those of a more serious nature such as murder or severe injury but in sex crime, fighting and insults. The author explains this as resulting from the transition from the old culture to the new. The old was at an end and the new not yet sufficiently established to set up an influence against such acts of attack and rowdyism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a reference here by Estrin to a statement by N. Krylenko which connects the beginning of the crime of sabotage—so serious since to the Soviet government—with activities of former owners during the years of 1921, 1922 and 1923. There was no longer opportunity for armed fighting but the opposition relentlessly kept up its battle by any means at hand and its best methods were to hinder the production without which Communism would be undermined by starvation and physical depletion. From 1923 on, there began to appear with increasing frequency in the courts cases of &#039;&#039;economic&#039;&#039; counter-revolutionary character. Firearms and open resistance might have gone by the board but sabotage grew apace until 1925-26 when it reached its greatest height.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A numerical count of court convictions in 1925 would make it appear that there was a tremendous drop in ordinary crimes and an increase in those of a political type. There is an explanation for this in the fact that a reform of the Criminal Code in 1924 deleted a number of crimes of lesser importance, and there was a consequent lessening of 300,000 in convictions during the following year, most of which loss was, of course, from the ranks of the ordinary criminals. Class lines were drawn in a still more distinct fashion, thus emphasizing the direction criminal repression was to take for some time to come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of crimes against the state are today mostly of an economic nature. Before, however, we set down some of the more important ones that harass law enforcement let us look at a brief list of the type of acts which are encountered in court cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes against the state&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Crimes against the person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Crimes against property&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Official crimes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Hooliganism&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The items here of particular interest to foreigners are the first and the last. The list of crimes included in the first category will shortly be enumerated. As for the last, the term “hooliganism” covers a multitude of crimes. If one suddenly gets up in a theater and strikes his neighbor without apparent cause, such is an act of hooliganism. It was described to the writer as defining “unmotivated” acts. If one does not pursue “motivation” into psychological or psychiatric realms that explanation pretty well expresses what is meant. Deeds not logically accounted for might come a little closer. If a group of young men go out just to “raise cain” for no particular cause they may destroy property, attack a man, and do various other criminal acts which would all fall within the definition of hooliganism. The charge corresponds roughly to our “disorderly conduct,” except that the deeds committed may be of a more serious nature. But into this category are lumped a miscellany not classified otherwise.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, what are the chief crimes against the state? There would be, first of all, such major deeds as counter-revolutionary activities and the dissemination of propaganda. There are no longer organizations fostering counter-revolutionary work, but a great amount of such work is carried on. Individuals with malice aforethought, work their way into factory or collective farm, and spread what discontent they may. The author heard, for example, of the trial of the director of a collective farm who managed cleverly to see that the plan of production was unfulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Next in line would be industrial sabotage and attack on or the theft of government property. So prevalent had the latter become by the committing of such acts as killing cattle or the destruction of anything possible, as well as organized theft of state property that the government had recently acquired, that the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for such crimes, was enacted to meet the situation. On some occasions of organized theft the motive is for personal gain rather than one of desire to harm the state. For example, the author heard one case in court where the theft of grain from a collective farm was resold in speculating and the gain to the eleven persons involved was some 20,000 rubles. The death penalty was given to the leaders, prison sentences to the others. There is also the evasion of government orders and taxes, insubordination to the demands of the law, insults by word of mouth, if such involves a Kulak as against an officer. This does not by any means complete the possibilities, but it lists the headings under which the majority of such acts come.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sabotage hardly needs comment here. So associated has the term come to be with industrial affairs in Russia that one would expect to find it ranking high as a crime against the state. It is, of course, committed by the enemies of the established order, and has hampered the progress of collectivization and industrial development to a great degree. Five men were shot and the others in the plot sentenced to ten years in prison (corrective labor with deprivation of liberty) during the past summer for burning a large factory in the Ural region by electric wire manipulation. Activities of the disorganized opposition have centered in crimes of this sort as the most effective weapon in its hands. Not much quarter is shown when guilt is established. The extreme penalty is surely and speedily given.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An enumeration of the counter-revolutionary crimes listed in the Criminal Code includes the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any act directed towards overthrow, undermining and weakening of the peasants’ and workers’ order of government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Armed uprising and entering Soviet territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communication with a foreign government for counter-revolutionary purposes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Extending aid and comfort to that part of the international bourgeoisie which aims at the overthrow of the Communist order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Inducing a foreign government by means of forged documents to declare war or to make armed intervention, or by the same method to induce blockade, confiscation of property of USSR, interruption of diplomatic relations, renouncing of a treaty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Espionage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Transmission, collection, or theft, of economic information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Undermining of state industry, transport, trade, monetary circulation, cooperatives, committed with a counter-revolutionary purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commission of terrorist acts against representatives of the Soviet order or workers’ and peasants’ organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Destruction or damaging with counter-revolutionary purposes by means of the use of explosive, arson, or any other method, of railways, and other means of transportation, means of communication, aqueducts, community warehouses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Propaganda and agitation containing an appeal to overthrow, undermine, or weaken the Soviet order. Circulation or preparation of literature. Same actions in time of mass disorders, or making use of religious and national prejudices, or in time of war or in localities under martial law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All kinds of organizational activity directed toward preparation and commission of crimes mentioned in this chapter as well as participation in an organization founded for the preparation or commission of one of the crimes mentioned in this chapter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Failure to report a known counter-revolutionary crime or preparation for same.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any action or active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement committed while in office under the Tzarist régime or under the counter-revolutionary government, during the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Counter-revolutionary sabotage, i.e., premeditated omission to carry out the duties or deliberate negligence in carrying them out with the specific purpose of weakening the authority of the government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chief in the list of “official crimes” is the accepting of bribery, dealing out sentences in excess of the provision of the law, or beyond what circumstances warrant, failing to fulfill one’s duty, taking the law into one’s hands, etc. As an example of punishment in excess of justification of circumstances there is a case recorded in which a drunken priest was given a heavy penalty in a Siberian People’s Court. In view of the government’s attitude toward religion one would suppose that such a sentence might stand, but when it was called to the attention of the higher court, the prosecutor was removed from office and the militiaman was arrested.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Commissar of Justice Krylenko, in his &#039;&#039;Revolutionary Law&#039;&#039;, lists a number of omissions and commissions on the part of officials, but when a complaint of, or information on, such acts reach the authorities, action follows. The population, taught from the cradle up that this is their government, has no timidity, apparently, about seeing that men in office regard the laws of the land, if they have information of acts to the contrary. This authority says, after mentioning a variety of actual cases of such violation, “The struggle against distortions of this kind must be waged with absolute ruthlessness.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other two classifications—crimes against the person and against property—include what they would in our own country, but penalties imposed differ from ours a great deal. Since they, as our most elementary groupings, are generally understood, and since outside of crimes against the state or order of government, these two comprise the great bulk of criminal transgressions in Russia as well as in our own country, it seems of general interest to include here, even at the risk of being tedious, those two chapters of the Criminal Code which relate to these classes of crime, and they are therefore inserted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, HEALTH, LIBERTY, AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed: a) Out of greed, jealousy (if it does not come under description in Article 138) and other base reasons; b) by a person previously convicted for premeditated murder or bodily injury who served the measure of social protection established by the court; c) by means particularly painful to the victim; d) for the purpose of lightening [the consequences of] or concealing another grave crime; e) by a person whose duty it was to have particular care of the victim, or f) making use of the helpless condition of the victim.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder not coming under the provisions of paragraph 136,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated murder committed in a state of sudden and strong emotional excitement, caused by violence or grave insult from the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Murder caused by carelessness, as well as murder resulting from exceeding the limits of self defence,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Abortion caused with consent of the mother by persons not having the proper medical qualifications or by persons having such qualifications but in unsanitary conditions,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to five hundred rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If these acts were committed under conditions given in the first part of this paragraph, professionally or without consent of the mother or having as their consequence death,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The bringing of a person who is financially or in some other way dependent on another person, by cruel treatment of the dependent person or in other similar way to suicide or to an attempt at same,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The giving of aid or incitement to suicide of a minor or a person knowingly incapable of understanding the nature and meaning of the act committed or a person incapable of self-guidance if suicide or attempt at same followed,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated grave bodily injury which carried as a consequence loss of sight, hearing, or any other organ, permanent disfigurement, mental illness, or any other injury to health, combined with considerable disability,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If as a consequence of such injury death followed or if it was committed by means having the character of torture, or causing suffering, or if such injury came as a consequence of inflicting systematic though light injuries,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated light bodily injury, not dangerous to life, but causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Premeditated light bodily injury without causing injury to health,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury coming under paragraph 1, Article 143, committed under influence of sudden and strong, emotional excitement caused by violence or grave insult to the offender on the part of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Bodily injury caused by negligence if it came as a consequence of a knowing infraction of safety rules established by law or government orders and having as its consequence conditions aforementioned in Article 142 and the first paragraph of Article 143,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Bodily injury caused by negligence not having grave consequences,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated assault and battery and other violent acts combined with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said acts had the character of torture,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Violent, illegal deprivation of liberty of some person,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty by a method dangerous to life or health of victim, or accompanied with infliction of physical pain,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Placing in a hospital for mental cases of a person known to be sane out of greed or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft, or concealment, or exchange of some one else’s child, motivated by greed, vengeance, or other selfish purpose,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Infection of a person with a venereal disease by a person aware of having said disease,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Knowingly exposing of a person to the danger of infection with venereal disease through the sex act or some other act,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relation with persons not having reached sex maturity combined with corruption of the morals or with perverted forms of sex satisfaction,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to eight years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sex relations with persons not having reached sex maturity committed without aforesaid aggravating circumstances,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Corruption of the morals of children or minors committed by means of immoral acts toward them,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Sex relations by means of physical violence, threat, or by intimidation or making use, through deception, of the helpless condition of the victim (rape),—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If said rape had as its consequences the suicide of the victim or was committed toward one not having reached sex maturity, or even though on a person having reached said maturity but committed by several persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to period of eight years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing a woman to enter into a sex relationship or satisfy sex passion in some other form by a person on whom said woman was financially dependent or to whom she was in a subordinate position,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forcing to engage in prostitution, procuring, maintenance of houses of assignation, also engaging in traffic of women for purposes of prostitution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years with confiscation of all or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deliberately leaving a person without help, when said person, in a condition dangerous to life, is incapable of measures of self-protection because of minority, feebleness, sickness, or helplessness generally, in cases when the person leaving the other helpless was in duty bound to have cared for the abandoned and was able to extend help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Not extending of help by a ship’s captain to persons perishing on sea or on other bodies of water if said help could be extended without grave danger to the ship, crew, or passengers,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to two years. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts No. 60, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Not extending of help to a sick person without satisfactory reasons by a person having as his duty by law or special regulation the extending of such help,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Refusal of a person engaged in medical practice to extend medical aid if said refusal knowingly to said person could have been dangerous to the patient,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Malicious evasion of payment, for the support of children in spite of being capable of such payment,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Abandonment by parents of minor children without support as well as forcing children to beg,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same measure of social protection.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted verbally or in writing,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Fine up to 300 rubles or public censure.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Insult inflicted by action,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to two months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Insult inflicted through generally circulated or exhibited publications or pictures,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a period up to six months or fine up to 300 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Slander, i.e. circulation of knowingly false defaming rumors,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Libel in an article published in the press or multiplied by some other means,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 100 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
PROPERTY CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ol start=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret appropriation of someone else’s property (theft) carries with it:&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
a) If committed without application of any mechanical devices, for the first time and without conspiring with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a term up to three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
When committed under the same conditions, but because of need and unemployment for the purpose of satisfying the minimum requirements of self and family,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for a term of three months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
b) Committed repeatedly and with regard to property which is a known necessity for the existence of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to six months.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
c) If committed with application of mechanical device or repeatedly or by previous conspiracy with other persons, and also, even without the aforementioned conditions when committed in railroad stations, docks, ships, railway coaches, in hotels,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a term up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
d) When committed by a private person from state or community warehouses, railway cars, ships, or other storage places, or in the places of community use (aforementioned in sub-paragraph) with the application of mechanical devices, or by conspiring with other persons, or repeatedly, also when committed though without aforementioned conditions by a person having special right of entry into these storage places, or [by persons engaged in] safeguarding them, or in time of fire, flood, or other social calamity,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
e) When committed out of state or community warehouses and storage places by a person having special right of entry in same or [by persons] safeguarding them, with application of mechanical devices, or repeatedly, or by conspiring with other persons, and also any theft out of the aforementioned warehouses and storage places when the theft is exceptionally large,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
 NOTE: Theft of material and tools committed in the factory or mill by a workman or employee within the confines of his own [his place of employment] enterprise the first time and when the value of the stolen goods does not exceed 15 rubles carries disciplinary punishment in accordance with special schedule established by the People’s Commissariat of Labor.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Theft of electric current,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period of one month with compulsory restitution of the loss inflicted.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The purchase of goods known to be stolen,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty and compulsory labor for a period up to six months and fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions committed professionally,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to three years with confiscation of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Purchase, possession and sale of fire arms, known to be stolen (hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition therefor,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to 5 years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Open appropriation of some one else’s property in the presence of the person having possession, use, or authority over such property (robbery) when committed without use of force,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one year.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same action when committed by a group of people or repeatedly,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Secret as well as open appropriation of horses or cattle from the laboring agricultural population as well as those engaged in animal husbandry,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same actions, committed repeatedly or in conspiracy with other persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to eight years. Aug. 7, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 102, Article 645).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Secret or open appropriation of fire arms (except hunting arms and small caliber arms do not come under the provisions of this article) and ammunition for same if this action does not come under Article 59 of this Code,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. June 17, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 512).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Robbery, i.e., open attack for the purpose of taking possession of someone else’s property, combined with use of force dangerous to the life or the health of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts, committed repeatedly or having as a consequence the death or maiming of the victim,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Armed robbery,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to ten years, and with aggravating circumstances—Supreme measure of social protection. Aug. 26, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 65, Article 641).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Appropriation, i.e., withholding with mercenary purpose of somebody else’s property, entrusted for a definite purpose, or embezzlement of that property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Appropriation of a fund,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to one month.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Misuse of trust or deception for the purpose of obtaining property or other personal advantage having as its consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years with confiscation of entire or part of property.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li value=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The issuance of a check, which knowingly to the issuer is not subject to payment, and also cancellation of the check by him without satisfactory reason, or taking any other measures for the prevention of the receipt by the check holder or the amount of the check, as well as passing by the check holder of a check which knowingly to him is not subject to payment by the agent on whom it is drawn,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts having as their consequence infliction of loss to a state or community institution or enterprise,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to five years. Feb. 28, 1930 (Collection of Acts, No. 11, Article 131).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Forgery with mercenary purpose of official papers, documents and receipts,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a period up to one year and fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Deceptive change with mercenary purpose of the appearance or properties of objects, intended for sale or social use, if that said change had or could have had as its consequence the infliction of injury to health, as well as sale of such objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty up to one year with confiscation of part of property with prohibition of the right to sell merchandise, or fine up to 1,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;The making or keeping for the purpose of sale of a forged stamping tool, the stamping of jewelry and bars of gold, silver and platinum, affixing to objects made from other metals of stamps and marks having resemblance to the official stamping mark, as well as sale of aforementioned objects,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years or compulsory labor for a period up to one year, with confiscation in both cases of forged objects and stamping tools.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Usury, i.e., receiving of interest on money or property lent at a rate exceeding the interest rate established by law, and in particular, inclusion of the interest in the principal amount of the loan, or withholding a remuneration out of the amount received by the borrower or providing of fine and penalty for delay in payment of the loan or in other concealed forms,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for a term up to one year or fine up to 5,000 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The same acts committed either professionally or by making use of the embarrassed state of the borrower,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years With confiscation of part of the property or without such confiscation, or with fine up to ten thousand rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Making available for use of means of production and cattle for a monetary remuneration or remuneration in kind or on condition of payment by labor obviously in excess of the customary amount for this locality, making use of the need or embarrassed position of the user,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to one year. Mar. 29, 1928 (Collection of Acts, No. 38, Article 283).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Extortion, i.e., demanding of transfer of property advantages or rights to property or committing of any kind of actions, of a property character, through fear of coercion of the person of the sufferer, spreading of defaming information or destruction of his property,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to three years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Premeditated destruction or damage of property belonging to private persons,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 500 rubles.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts when committed by means of arson, flooding, or any other generally dangerous methods,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to five years.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Same acts if they are followed by loss of human life or a community misfortune,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty for period up to ten years.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Omission by a captain of one of the ships involved in a collision at sea of taking necessary measures for the saving of the other ship, in so far as such measures could be taken without serious danger to the said captain’s passengers, crew, or ship, regardless of the responsibility for not extending help to the crew and the passengers of the ship suffering from the calamity (Art. 156)—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor for period up to one year or fine up to 500 rubles. June 25, 1929 (Collection of Acts, No. 50, Article 513).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Making public an invention before registration without the consent of the inventor, as well as unauthorized uses of literary, musical, or other artistic or scientific productions with infractions of the copyright law,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to three months or fine up to 1,000 rubles. August 30, 1931 (Collection of Acts, No. 59, Article 429).&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;li&amp;gt;Unauthorized use for purposes of unethical competition of someone else’s trade mark, design, model, as well as someone else’s firm name, or someone else’s name,—&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Compulsory labor for period up to six months or fine up to 3,000 rubles.&amp;lt;/li&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/ol&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those familiar with women’s prisons in our own country will have missed “prostitution” from among the crimes enumerated in the Soviet Criminal Code. This practice is treated as a social problem in Russia, and rightly, in the opinion of most persons interested in penology, it is not held to be a crime. The six articles in the code directed against sex offenses, it will be noted, provide penalties for rape, or, in the interest of public health, for the infection of a person with a venereal disease by one aware that he (or she) has the disease. By treating prostitution as a social problem Russia has almost eliminated it. Women plying this trade are picked up by inspectors at railroad stations or other public places and taken, not to a jail, but to a prophylactorium where they are taught a useful trade with a view to removing the economic cause which is held to be the chief one in this practice. Many of the women at these centers have come voluntarily, the director of the prophylactorium in Moscow reports, through friends who have already received training and treatment. As a result of this omission from the Criminal Code, one does not find in women’s prisons that the chief cause of sentence is sex offense as it is in the United States, nor that the prisons are filled with a group who not only in the opinion of the author, but also in that of such organizations as the Women’s Prison Association of New York, should not have been sent there.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who commits the crimes? Immediately following the Revolution the chief concern in regard to the crime situation was the suppression of those acts which jeopardized the authority of the Soviet government, but as the program of Socialist construction went forward, as they got the political situation more in hand, the type of prisoner began to change in the predominant number. Counter-revolutionary organizations were practically wiped out; the Kulak war, though still going on, somewhat thinned out, and in the residue of those of the criminal ranks there now appeared more of such types as constitute the convict population of other countries. In other words, the social composition of the group changed. Instead of there being more of an otherwise honest group of middle class farm people whose crimes consisted in efforts to overthrow a government, there was a rising percentage of ordinary criminals. This does not mean to say that the government is not still confronted with a great number of crimes against the state, by those of the bourgeoisie and Kulak class who, while not attempting to organize counter activities, still manage to get into collective farm or factory and cause a great deal of trouble, but it is noticeable that the other type of crimes is being given more attention and that programs of treatment are designed to apply to that problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In age, considering both sexes, the peak is reached in criminal acts at about twenty-four years. The curve descends sharply to forty and in a more leisurely fashion from forty to sixty. Official figures give the age group of 14-18 years as committing 2.5 per cent. of all crimes, 18-24 as being responsible for 25 per cent., and 24 and above, for the remaining. The crimes committed by the first group are almost wholly stealing; in the second group there are, of course, all sorts, but hooliganism figures large, and in the third there is every kind of law breaking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The youth, then, from 14-18 years are guilty of theft, more than of any other crime, both as to male and female, and next to that are crimes against the person—fisticuffs, breaking of bones, etc. Then, there shows up a phenomenon that is noted both in juveniles and adults—the female commits more crimes against the order of the government than do the men, relatively speaking. The author asked repeatedly for an explanation of this fact, and one man who had come from the rural districts, and is now an Intourist representative in Moscow, gave an interpretation which may or may not be right. It is interesting enough to pass on. The men, he said, did not resist collectivization so intensely when they saw that it was no use, but when a woman had collected a few goats or pigs, or a cow or two, it was no use trying to take them from her. She poisoned them first. No ideal of a final society in which she could take according to her needs could make up to her for the immediate loss of her treasures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is a more extensive comparison of the crimes committed by male and female transgressors. The first important thing to note is that the female is more given to excesses than the male in crimes of a less serious nature (Gernet, op. cit. p. 169). In one type of crime, hooliganism, the male is in the majority, with a percentage of 27.4 as against the female’s 2.8; but, in all other groups the woman is far in the lead. She commits six times the offenses of the men in insults, five times as many in the illegal manufacture of liquor, twice as many for assault, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in the crimes carrying sentences of above a year the men take the lead again. Note this table from an article Women in Correctional Labor Institutions, by A. Shestakova and B. Utievsky, included in the volume edited by Vishinsky. It shows clearly to what point women exceed in crime.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 358.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-bottom&amp;quot;| Length of sentence&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of male&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| Per cent. of female&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Up to 3 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 8.7&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 18.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 to 6 months&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 20.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 6 months to a year&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 16.8&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 1 year to 2 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 21.1&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 17.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 2 years to 3 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 13.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 11.1&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| From 3 years to 5 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 14.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 7.9&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;padding-1-right&amp;quot;| From 5 years to 10 years&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 12.6&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 4.5&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The social composition of the criminal group in the USSR is, as is to be expected, different from that of the ordinary capitalist country. In the first group of crimes mentioned the guilty are largely those of the village bourgeoisie and the rural Kulaks, who still struggle against the socialist order. They are persons who would not ordinarily be included in a criminal classification. Yet if we regard any legal definition of crime as including acts that contravene the rules and regulations of the proletariat society then they are actually criminals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While this group commits most of the crimes against the state, the laborers themselves constitute the major portion of persons committing other types of crime. We find Professor Gernet,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; dividing them into owners of property or employers, and laborers. In theft we have a percentage of 12.2 for the first class, and 21.9 for the second; banditry is .8 per cent. for the first, and 1.7 per cent. for the second; murders 1.6 per cent. for the first, 2.4 per cent. for the second; hooliganism is 9.3 per cent. for the first, and 11.4 per cent. for the second. The situation is reversed in regard to crimes against the person. We find the first group there with a percentage of 10.5 and the second with 7.1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is some substantiation of the theory of the economic basis of crime which disciples of Marx and Lenin hold to so firmly in the fact that the curve for crime and unemployment rise and fall together. Russia claims to have no unemployment problem now, but there are those who do not work. There is always an idle band in any country. She has her dregs, misfits, and those who fall by the wayside from a variety of causes. And it is from this group that a large degree of criminals come. It furnishes its quota in Russia, too.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gernet, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is danger of getting too statistical. We want only to have a picture of the situation. Since 1928, the date already referred to as the beginning of a program to extend Socialism from villages to cities by means of collectivization, the curve for crimes against the state has risen. The Kulaks and the village middle class have waged a relentless war, apparently not daunted by what happens to those who are caught. Or, it may be heroism of a kind, even if a misplaced one. However, the expressed attitude of the authorities who administer the corrective labor system is steadfastly to win them over, to persuade and to educate in such a political fashion that they will be convinced. Whereas “crushing” was once the order of the day, the firmer establishment of the government now gives leeway for the more constructive measures. It is interesting to note that whoever is responsible for that political education knows his approaches well, if the statements of authorities are accurate. They have released enough, they say, to see what zealous citizens it turns back to society. I have no figures on it. But as I said in the preface, they know what they want of the man who is their criminal. Given that, accomplishment is easier. It is no small thing to persuade a man that the society he thought he was against was his all the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER V: WHAT THE COURTS ARE LIKE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; courts of Russia, in their present form a result of seventeen years of revolutionary evolution, and a mixture of proletarian ideas with older principles of justice, represent one of the most interesting developments in the country. It has been the aim of Soviet rule that the working class should by its participation in government be able to take part in carrying out the laws of the land. The administration of justice by the proletariat through which “Every representative of the masses, every citizen, must be placed in such conditions that he will be able to take part in discussing the laws of the state, in the choosing of his representatives, and in the carrying out of the laws of the state,” was a principle expressed by Lenin as early as 1918. The policy in political education has moved steadily toward the fulfillment of this plan. The use of jurors and their selection yearly in such a manner as will include a great number in the service is one way in which participation in administering and discussing laws is being carried out. Another is in the use of comradely courts carried on by the people of village or factory, which are later discussed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The responsibility of the courts in the establishment of strict legality has been increased tremendously by two recent events. The first was the meeting in April, 1934, of the first All-Union Conference of Jurists which made wide recommendations in regard to attaining a higher quality of work on the part of courts, prosecution, and correctional labor institutions. The second act of significance was the reorganization of the OGPU by the formation of the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the transference of all judicial functions to the courts of the land. It takes brief time and space for this last statement, but it would require a good many pages to discuss the full significance of the step, and a number are devoted to it a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
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As for the work of the All-Union Conference of Jurists, it is of high significance just now when the observance of legality and the establishment of a wide legal consciousness are so important in the relatively advanced stage of socialist construction which the state is entering. Openness must be the observed principle, and secrecy, even though legally judicial, discouraged, if confidence is to be widespread. A government cannot continue turning trials over to secret tribunals outside its judicial system and enjoy a reputation, even among its own loyal masses, of being adequately established. A normality of functions of institutions can go far toward establishing, even if only psychologically at first, a normality of conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Likewise, sentences must be constructive. This was not a new note as will be seen throughout this book. All along the party program had advocated an educational approach to the treatment of criminals, and year by year had strengthened provisions for realizing the fulfillment of its plans. But the emphasis on this problem by so authoritative a body brought it freshly to the attention of the courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0086.svg|SCHEME OF TRIAL IN RSFSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Note the recommendation of the Conference in this regard. “In order to insure the effectiveness of judicial work, the judges should endeavor to ascertain the economic and social-political results of the verdict rendered by them, being assisted in this work by public opinion organized around the judicial institutions.” The same body placed a responsibility for prevention of crime on its courts. It was not only a duty to pronounce a sentence on a guilty person, but the tribunal must by means of its favorable position discover the reason for the circumstance of the crime. The recommendation ran, “The court, when trying a case, should not only establish the guilty persons but should also disclose those economic and organizational defects and shortcomings which create a favorable atmosphere for criminal actions, signalizing such circumstances to the attention of the Party and Soviet organs by means of special riders. The results of such signalizing should be checked up from time to time.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, as an important instrument in the accomplishing of the socialist society which is the goal of the people, the court’s function is first to subdue the enemies that would undermine any such progress, and second to aid in giving discipline and control to those of the proletariat themselves who are not strong enough on their own account. Added to that, it is an organ of prevention.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not within the purpose of this volume to give a detailed description of the system of courts existing in the country at present, but a brief account is necessary. Before going further it may be well to repeat the reminder that a class distinction is fundamental in administering the criminal law in the USSR. This statement will appear too many times very likely, in relation to various phases of the subject, but it is important. The court as an organ of the state is devoted in its administration of law to carrying out the purpose and policy of the state, and since the class idea is prevalent in the government, it will have to be also in court action. With this explanation we proceed.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is at the very bottom of the judicial system the People’s Courts.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Military crimes are under the jurisdiction of military tribunals and transport crimes of the transport courts of the various railway lines.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The territory represented by one such has a population of from 20,000 to 100,000. Its jurisdiction may include any case against property or person not carrying a death sentence, although the more serious ones go in actual practice to the higher courts. It has other functions than as a lower court of the first instance. It is a member of the observation commission which supervises the correctional labor policy at the local penitentiary or correctional labor institution. It has an administrative function when the judge, sitting without the jurors in a “business session,” decides whether the evidence gathered in a preliminary investigation is sufficient to warrant court proceedings.&lt;br /&gt;
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In trials the People’s Court is presided over by a judge assisted by two jurors who actually have most of the rights and responsibilities of the judge, and might, therefore, be called co-judges. The judges for the People’s Courts are elected for a one-year term by the local Soviet and may be recalled either by the same body or by the Commissar of Justice for sufficient cause. This provision for impeachability is one of the basic principles of organization of the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0089.svg|COURT TRIAL]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The judges of these lower courts are representatives of the working class for they themselves are of their number. A judge (and, he seemed an adequate one), in a city court of Moscow with whom the writer talked was a baker before he took up his present profession. The qualifications of the office are that in addition to being from among the toilers the judge must have “a record of two years’ responsible work in state or workers’ and peasants’ public trade union, or party organization of the workers, or of three years’ practical work in organs of Soviet justice in the capacity of not less than judicial investigators.” Whether this may be regarded as high fitness or not, it seems to insure the selection of men of fair ability for the job. Perhaps it is that business of recall that makes them so careful, but those whom the writer saw sitting were impressive in their earnestness and efforts to arrive at a constructive sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
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The jurors, whom we may think of as co-judges, are about 40 per cent. women and 60 per cent. men. These persons are elected by factory committees, Red Army sections, and village Soviets, and a special commission distributes the number to be elected among these various groups in the percentage of 50 per cent. to the first, 15 per cent. to the second, and 35 per cent. to the third. There are no specific qualifications, except the right to vote, but there is the restriction that “A person has no right to be a juror, if he has been expelled from a social or professional organization for a disgraceful offense or conduct, for a period of three years from the day of expulsion. . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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The names of the candidates for jurors are posted, and objections, if motivated, may be presented to the election committee. When the list of elected ones is finally sent to the commission, the latter prepares another list of those to serve in the various courts. Each serves for only six days of the year, and during absence from work in the act of performing this duty the worker retains his place and wage of employment.&lt;br /&gt;
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While there seems to be no specific preparation for the task of a juror beyond the requirement that the judge explain to those who sit with him their rights and duties, there are conferences held and some evening classes which acquaint them better with the work before them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Before we pass to the consideration of the next step in the Soviet judicature it would perhaps help in getting a clear picture of jurisdiction and procedure to take a look at some of the cases before the People’s Court. A typical day is described from the writer’s notes.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first trial we attended in the morning the room used was a small one, perhaps with a capacity for seating forty people altogether. It was on the ground floor of the building, and street cars clanging along their track outside made hearing difficult. On a slightly raised dais underneath a picture of Lenin there was a long plain table covered with a green cloth. Three chairs were placed at the back and one at the end. Three men and a woman, evidently having something to do with the case about to be tried, were already in the court room when we entered. The benches on which we took our places were arranged on either side of the narrow aisle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Exactly at the hour set for the beginning of court, a door at the back of the room opened and a man, accompanied by two women, entered. The women sat in the outside chairs at the back of the table; the man took the center one. Already the young woman, who had been in the room on our arrival had seated herself at the end of the table. She was the clerk, the man was the judge, the two women the jurors.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judge was obviously of the toiling classes, as were also the women. The judge, with his short black mustache, his close-cropped hair, his ordinary working clothes consisting of dark suit and blue shirt, ignored us and immediately got to work. The women were perhaps a little more conscious of our presence. The older in particular reached up to push back her hair, a little later smoothed her dress, a simple black cotton one. We noticed that her hands had seen much work. The other woman, about thirty and good looking, turned curious eyes toward us a moment, but finally gave her attention to the men who were seated on the front bench ahead of us.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judge adjusted his glasses and read from the papers in his hand. The plaintiff had worked faithfully for a school, discharging all his duties as per requirement, but he had not been paid. He was asking for his money.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were no attorneys, neither defense nor for the plaintiff. The plaintiff had his witness; he told his story, then summoned his corroborator, who had been excluded as required by law. The school representative told his side. The women jurors, forgetting us by that time, listened attentively, and the older asked frequent questions. The judge too, interrogated often.&lt;br /&gt;
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It seemed obvious to us that the verdict should favor the man whose wages had been withheld, but it is difficult to tell about court decisions. We waited an instant; the three behind the table conferred so briefly that it was plain there was no dissension. The school was ordered to pay, and was fined five rubles. As simply as that and requiring hardly more time than the telling here, it was finished.&lt;br /&gt;
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We left the room as the next case was called and went upstairs. A trial of some seriousness was in progress there. The judge sitting appeared of unusual intelligence. He was leaning forward, questioning the man in front of him, and he took no note, apparently, of our entry. One juror was a woman, the other a man. There was the same long table, the clerk at the end, a red cloth (Communist symbol), instead of the green, an especially attractive picture of Lenin, and one of Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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We asked cautiously of one of the spectators what the case was about. A factory director was on trial, accused of criminal negligence by the workmen, because he had been given money to insure the factory against fire some three or four months previously, and had failed to do so, thus imperiling the lives of those who worked there.&lt;br /&gt;
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But even though there might have been a severe sentence, if the motive was proved sufficiently base, there still were no attorneys, either for the state or defense. The defendant told his story. He had been ill and on vacation, but the matter of insurance would have his immediate attention, he said. He brought in his witnesses; but the workers’ evidence outweighed his. He had been warned, they said, and he had gone carelessly on.&lt;br /&gt;
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But, said his witness, he had been a good worker. He had managed his factory well. It had done its prescribed quota and more. It was not right nor just that he should suffer for one negligent act.&lt;br /&gt;
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The verdict was not so simple. The judge and jury retired into the mystery of the consultation room at the back. We sat wondering what sort of penalty, in case guilt was adjudged, would be imposed. Five minutes passed and they returned. The man was held guilty of negligence, and since he had been warned, and since the act was of a serious nature, imperiling the lives of workers and the property of the state, some measure must be used to impress him. He stood quietly, but the fingers of the hand hanging at his side worked nervously. The judge paused a bare moment, shuffled his papers, and then spoke.&lt;br /&gt;
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For six months the man was to have no political rights and his party connections were to be cut off. But he was to stay in his job; go right on with the work he had done so well, and give up fifteen per cent. of his salary for the six month period. Even the accused seemed to feel that the penalty was just, and there was obvious agreement among those who listened.&lt;br /&gt;
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So much for the People’s Court, the basic nucleus in the Russian judicial system. Now, for the second step in the judicature. The People’s Court takes care of the great mass of cases, both criminal and civil, and in addition exercises a function of supervision in regard to the village public courts and comradely courts of factories and other state institutions. But this will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just now we pass to the Regional Court. It is both a court of cassational instance (the form review of a criminal case usually takes in the USSR) and a court of original jurisdiction for more serious cases. Its territory comprises a province or region of three to eleven millions population. It is, first of all, the organ of control of all the courts within its region. It supervises the work of the People’s judges, as well as selects and presents the names of such to the regional executive committees for election.&lt;br /&gt;
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A word must be said here as to the use of the cassational method. The court of appeals was abolished by the first decree issued by the Soviets on the courts, and in its place was the following provision.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Act 349 of Code of Criminal Procedure, now in force.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “Complaints from verdicts of the People’s Courts may be lodged by each of the interested parties exclusively on account of formal infringement of the rights and interests of the given party in the conduct of the case or in the judicial examination of the case, and as such constitute cassation complaints, and may not touch upon the substance of the verdict.” Thus the law seems to prevent the right of the court to go into the substance of the case. Such, however, is not actually a fact.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ruling of the Supreme Court in regard to criminal cassation, in 1924, laid down the general rule for cassation review which is still followed. “The court of criminal cassation, being a cassation court in that it does not go into the substance of the case, at the same time avoids a purely formal bureaucratic approach to the case. While never turning into a court of appeals, it does not hypocritically shut its eyes to the substance; manifest lack of elucidation of the circumstances which should have influenced the verdict, inconsistency of the punishment with the crimes committed, manifest errors and contradictions between the verdict and the undeniable facts of the case, . . .”&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a form of revision on the complaint of the proper parties, which combines the elements of cassation as practiced by the French courts with a method of appeal and together make up the cassation-revision form of investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
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These complaints may be made by the defendant and his lawyer, the state prosecutor, the plaintiff and his legal representative, or by the legal suitor and his representative. Complaints by any other persons result in the case being handled by judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
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The form of the complaint follows no standard rule. A peasant may write a few words on a piece of paper, without even setting forth his argument, and the case will pass to the proper cassation court and be completely checked up.&lt;br /&gt;
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The form of judicial supervision differs somewhat from the cassation method. The latter depends on the action of the parties concerned while the first depends on the intervention of the chairman or prosecutor of the court of the first instance. From this it can be seen that the normal way to have a criminal case reviewed is by the cassation method, on complaint by the interested parties.&lt;br /&gt;
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We will pass from the work of the Regional Court as a court of cassation or supervision to look at a case which it tries in its capacity as a tribunal of first instance. In cases of appeal there are three judges sitting, but in cases of original jurisdiction there is the one judge and two jurors just as in the lower court. The judges of the Regional Court are elected by the Regional Executive Committee from a list of names presented by the Commissar of Justice. Their term of office is for one year. The qualifications are that in addition to the requirements for a People’s judge, the candidate shall also have served in a judicial capacity in a position not lower than the People’s Court for a period of three years.&lt;br /&gt;
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On our visit to the regional court we found a somewhat larger room, seating perhaps a hundred persons, but still lacking any formal atmosphere. Its standing capacity was crowded when we arrived. Even the door leading to the corridor was open and filled with men and women. We attempted to look over, but the spectators politely made way for us. We saw, as we edged forward, the usual picture of Lenin, the familiar red cloth on the table. One knew at once by the atmosphere of the room that a case of interest was in process of trial. The judge and jurors were already in their places and the judge was reading the charge which alleged that the four young men and a girl on the front seats in the custody of an officer, had some two weeks before entered and robbed the house of the woman across the aisle from them, and that such robbery was accompanied by the use of a firearm in which the husband was wounded. No murder, however, was done. In that case death could have been the assessed penalty.&lt;br /&gt;
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Three attorneys for the defendants sat at the side of the room, but as the trial proceeded we noticed how little part they took. The judge questioned the defendants, and got the story almost entirely from them. Witnesses were there and the judge and jurors interrogated them as they came, but they turned again and again to the accused to check up, to give them a chance to verify or deny. The procedure was highly informal. The court sought to find out the truth of the matter, but we soon saw that the inquiry went even beyond that. True to the duty imposed on him in the matter of discovering the reason for the circumstance, the judge pursued his questioning. He wanted to find the motive for such conduct. To discover that he questioned the young criminals on the whole circumstances of their lives, of their social background, without regard to apparent relevancy. Guilt was not in question, but the “measure of social defense” to be applied depended on the whole circumstance of the deed. One of the offenders had run away from his home with his grandmother, from a good job, but he appeared to have been led by the older who admitted that he did not want to work. The girl, defiantly, confessed. The youth, who used the gun, was asked again why he shot the man. He looked down and said he did not know, unless it was because the victim did not raise his hands soon enough. The spectators, jammed to the door and tense, laughed in relief. The judge did not reprove them, but he did not laugh, and the room became quickly silent.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judge surveyed the defendants with something of sorrow; we were particularly interested in his attitude for he appeared to be concerned that the young people should deliberately choose such a career, and gave occasional words of admonition. But judges and citizens alike in the USSR have faith in what labor of a correctional sort can do for the construction of character. The next day the young offenders were sentenced to institutions where the ruling principle, in accordance with Soviet policy, is to teach them the dignity of work, and how to do some important kind well, and where they will be given certain cultural and political education.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is next in the system the Supreme Courts of the seven republics—much like our own state Supreme tribunals—which act both as organs of judicial control for all courts of the territory, as courts of appeal for those lower courts subject to their jurisdiction, and as courts of original jurisdiction in more serious cases. The judges of these courts are elected by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the top of the judicial system is the Supreme Court of the USSR. It is, of course, the organ of highest judicial supervision, and in its various branches acts as a court of appeals of all cases from various lower tribunals. The Military Section reviews the cases appealed from the military tribunals, the Transport Section performs the same function for those appealed from the railroad courts. Its judges are elected by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for a term of one year, and they must have had at least three years’ service as judge of the People’s Court.&lt;br /&gt;
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In original jurisdiction this court has only the most important cases in the Union. The Code of Criminal Procedure specifies: “The Judicial Department of the Supreme Court as a court of first instance, shall take jurisdiction (1) over cases of exceptional importance, when sent to it for trial by the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as cases offered for adjudication by the People’s Commissar of Justice, the Prosecutor of the Republic [now, the Attorney General] or the chairman of the State Political Bureau (OGPU). The Supreme Court has the right to accept for its adjudication or transfer for adjudication to any provincial court at its discretion cases offered for its adjudication by the prosecutor of the republic or Chairman of the OGPU. (2) Over cases involving offenses in office committed by members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the people’s commissars and members of the &#039;&#039;Collegiums&#039;&#039; of People’s Commissariats, members of the Supreme Court, the assistant prosecutors of the Republic. (3) Over cases of alleged offenses in office on the part of the provincial prosecutors and their assistants, the members of the presidium of the provincial executive committee, heads of its departments, chairmen or deputy chairmen of the provincial court.” All cases enumerated in this paragraph may be accepted by the Supreme Court for its adjudication or transferred by it to a provincial court depending on the importance of the case.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 449.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In several of these cases jurisdiction is not mandatory and may be transferred to other appropriate courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the cases tried by it and familiar to most Americans was the Metropolitan-Vickers case of two years ago, in which a certain group of Englishmen was accused of sabotage. But to continue the method used in discussing the lower courts, let us again consider a case. The following was appealed from the Siberian Regional Court, and does not present the human elements of cases of the first instance, yet it has its interesting points.&lt;br /&gt;
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The building itself is a scant two blocks from the spot where Lenin lies in his red granite tomb. There was a militiaman inside the entrance who directed us upstairs to the proper room. Another officer was in the hall but he only looked at us curiously as we went by. It is the highest court of the land, and we were impressed by the informality of the approach.&lt;br /&gt;
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Three judges presided in the room which presented a more formal appearance than those of the courts visited previously. An armed guard stood at the door leading out into the room at the back. Across the aisle from us sat three lawyers, the defense counsel. At the end of the table was the prosecuting attorney, a woman of some thirty years, who seemed competent and determined. Above the judges the usual portrait of Lenin looked down upon us. As we entered two young Russian women got up from the benches at the front to make way for us. They were the wives of the two condemned men whose case was on appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
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The judges themselves, all men, were impressive in their dignity, and seemed intelligent and capable. They were dressed simply in ordinary street clothes, the dark shirt of one was open at the throat. One of them, not the chairman, read the charge in the original case. Two men had been condemned to die for murder and robbery. One, the manager of a fur factory, had stolen money to the amount of 7,500 rubles from the factory, and he and a companion, in a boat with a third, were crossing a lake. The third had a sum of money in his possession. While they stopped on the shore of the lake the first two sent the third for wood, and as he returned, they waylaid him and clubbed him to death. The Siberian Regional Court had sentenced the men to be shot.&lt;br /&gt;
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After the reading, one of the defense attorneys spoke at length. In Russia there is no death sentence for murder, but for robbery in which murder occurs such a penalty is attached. The counsel, realizing that weight of evidence was against him, tried to separate the crime into two distinct acts. It was his one chance. The murder had been motivated by other causes, he said, and robbery followed as an afterthought. He contended also that the stick with which the man was killed did not constitute a weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, his argument did not hold and in addition the prosecutor pointed out that the one man had already stolen money from the state, which act in itself might carry the death penalty. The judges retired and we discussed the case while we waited. The defense attorney, who had spoken, walked up and down the aisle. The two wives were quietly huddled in seats farther back. A bell sounded, the court returned, and the chairman or presiding judge read the decision allowing the sentence to stand.&lt;br /&gt;
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The case illustrated also the speed with which trials are completed after the crime is known. The murder of the man had occurred in October of 1933, but the body was not discovered until the latter part of June of 1934. There was no certainty of the third man’s death until that time as the other two had steadfastly maintained that he had left them. But less than one month after the discovery of the body, the two men had been tried and condemned to death. That was on July 19, and it was on August 9th that we heard the Supreme Court uphold the sentence. That is probably one of the main reasons why such deeds do not flourish there.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is still to mention the village public courts and the comradely courts of factories and various institutions. These occupy a special place in the judicial system and were therefore not mentioned except in passing in the beginning of the chapter. They are under the supervision of the People’s Courts, and are for the purpose of interesting the large masses of people in handling such violations of laws as occur in factory or village. Among such problems would be disorganization of production in factory, on the farm, or in offices, as well as drunkenness, indolence, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
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These courts are of, by, and for the people. There may be some little matter of form separating the masses from the formal courts, but they handle these among themselves. At a meeting of the workers of a given village a chairman and not less than ten members are elected to sit as a court. The factory conference follows the same plan, and elects a chairman, one or more substitutes, and not less than ten members, the exact number to be decided upon, from among the shockworkers of the factory or office.&lt;br /&gt;
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The People’s Court, functioning as a supervisor of these organs, may decide that a case is outside their competency, and take it from them or cancel the decision in a case that is considered not to have been within their jurisdiction, but the decision given in cases which are considered to be proper to them is final and subject to no appeal.&lt;br /&gt;
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A friend who was a spectator of the proceedings related the following case to the writer. A man had been drunk and had beaten his wife, not injuring her but outraging the village. In the presence of a large group of interested neighbors, the court assembled and tried him and decided that he must go forth from the apartment where he lived with his family and shift for himself as best he could. He did not deserve the shelter the home afforded him. There was no appeal. He left.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are more definitely the types of cases handled by the comradely courts which, like the village public courts are free from any formal judicial rules?&lt;br /&gt;
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The following is quoted from a lecture delivered by S. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The comradely courts examine cases:&lt;br /&gt;
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(a) of violation of labor discipline, to wit: repeated late-coming for work, staying away from work, reporting for work in a drunken condition;&lt;br /&gt;
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(b) of systematic neglectful attitude to socialist property (machines, tools, materials, premises, etc.);&lt;br /&gt;
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(c) of turning out misfits above the allowed limit;&lt;br /&gt;
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(d) of insults either by word of mouth or in writing, or action (spreading false derogatory stories about individuals), and inflicting blows without bodily injury;&lt;br /&gt;
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(e) of thefts from factory and office by workers upon the territory of the enterprise, as well as of materials and tools belonging to the enterprise to the value of not more than 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
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(f) of Hooliganism that is not subject to criminal prosecution, and other behavior which does not correspond with the requirements of public decency and reflects the negative sides of social life.”&lt;br /&gt;
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From the same source is taken the following list of penalties imposed.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“The following penalties may be imposed by the comradely courts:&lt;br /&gt;
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(a) public warning;&lt;br /&gt;
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(b) public censure with announcement in the wallnewspaper or in general press;&lt;br /&gt;
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(c) a fine of not more than 10 rubles for the benefit of public organizations (Chemical Defense Society, Children’s Friends, etc.) ;&lt;br /&gt;
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(d) reparation of damage caused to property, if not in excess of 50 rubles;&lt;br /&gt;
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(e) raising the question before the administration of discharging the culprit;&lt;br /&gt;
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(f) raising the question before the trade union of expelling a member from the union for a stated period.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Examination of the cases must take place not later than five days from the time of registration of the complaint.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a closing paragraph I set down the basic principles of organization of the Soviet Courts. It summarizes what has gone before.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;(a) administration of justice exclusively by toilers;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) election of judges and accountability before the electors;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) impeachability of judges, the latter being independent from any local or personal influences but most intimately bound up with their class and called upon to carry out the policy of their class;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) collegiate trial of judicial cases, as a rule, by a body of three people with an assured majority to the people’s jurors, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) participation of jurors in trial and judgment upon equal terms with the state judges, both in regard to fact and in regard to law, i.e., in the full scope of the rights of the state judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER VI: THE PRELIMINARY STAGE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Let&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; us start with the beginning. The Criminal Code of 1927 specifies how proceedings may be begun. We should expect that there would be an arrest, but this may not be the case. In fact it is unlikely except in the more serious cases. In the lesser ones there will almost surely be none at all. What happens then? There are two main possibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, the prosecutor, the investigators, the militia or the agency of Administration of State Safety of the People’s Commissariat of the Interior (formerly the OGPU) may start proceedings when they know or are informed of a criminal act. Since these organs are by their nature in a position to know of criminal law violations, it is usual for a case to start with them. The course they take will be discussed in a moment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second manner in which criminal procedure is usually instituted is on complaint made to a competent authority by a person, an organization, an official, or by a confession on the part of the criminal, in which the officials proceed as mentioned above, if there is evidence of a criminal act. Otherwise they take no action, and so notify the complaining person or agent, in which case he may appeal to a proper court if he so wishes. Thus, if a citizen comes to a proper authority and complains, either orally or by writing, of some act, but does not present sufficient evidence that a crime has taken place, the authority refuses to start initial proceedings. Often, not even a confession on the part of the supposed guilty party will be accepted as &#039;&#039;prima facie&#039;&#039; evidence. This decision on the part of the authority not to proceed may, however, be appealed to the competent court within seven days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When once this evidence is accepted as indicating that a crime has been committed there may or may not be an arrest. Quite naturally, if a serious crime has been committed such as murder, and the criminal is making an effort to escape, there is arrest and detention. The law, however, states&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, 1923, section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “No person shall be deprived of his liberty and taken into custody otherwise than in the instances and in the manner provided by law.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, in the same edition of the Code,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 100.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there is an enumeration of the cases in which an arrest may be legally made. They are “(1) When a criminal is apprehended while making direct preparations, or while actually engaged in commission of the crime, or immediately afterwards; (2) When the victim or eye witnesses point to a given person as the one who committed the crime; (3) When articles of evidence are found on the person of a suspect or in his dwelling; (4) When a suspect attempted to flee or is apprehended while in flight; (5) When a suspect has no domicile or a permanent occupation; (6) When a suspect cannot identify himself.” These are the six instances in which an arrest may be made. The police, however, may use their judgment as to the necessity of such action, and in the event of detaining the supposed criminal they must report within twenty-four hours either to the prosecutor or to a judge of the People’s Court, in whose jurisdiction the case may be, giving information as to who made the arrest, when, where, and at what hour, information obtained in regard to the person held, the crime with which he is charged, reason for the arrest, and the name of the official signing the order for arrest.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 107, Commentaries.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the evidence obtained is sufficient to warrant holding the person for investigation the authority to whom the report is made gives his assent. Otherwise he reverses the decision and the man is released.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the absence of these conditions an arrest may not be made and in that event the method of securing attendance is to have the suspected person sign a declaration that he will appear when summoned.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Criminal Code of 1927, Section 103.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, there is a way provided to meet necessity. If the act committed appears to be of a nature so serious that it would carry a penalty of more than a year’s sentence to imprisonment, one of the above measures may be selected so that he may be held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it is usually the police organs acting as investigators who take a person into custody at the beginning of a trial, the investigator may also order an arrest. The Code in Section 145 provides: “Means of cutting off the possibility of escape shall be selected only after the suspected person has been formally accused and can be altered or abolished after the first questioning. In exceptional cases these means may also be applied to mere suspects who have not yet been declared accused.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who makes arrests in the USSR? The police force is the militia. This organ not only makes the elementary inquiry on cases which come under the jurisdiction of the investigator—to be discussed more fully in later paragraphs of this chapter—but they may themselves also conduct such preliminary investigation in all other cases. Besides carrying out the official open investigation they also carry on detective activity in order to establish grounds for future criminal trial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is another agent of arrest. Wherever Russia is known, the “Gay-Pay-Oo” is a familiar institution. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; of early revolutionary days gave way in 1922, in the days of NEP, to an organ a little less frightening. But the OGPU had an ability on its own account to send shivers down the backs of people and caused would-be lawbreakers of the less hardy type to check their actions. If those critics, who feared that NEP ushered in an era that would in its mildness take power from the direct hands of the proletariat and turn it over to well-established revolutionary law, had waited for this organ to be in action they would have been reassured. Whether all the deeds attributed to this secret police be truly theirs or not, it is certain that it has been an effective means of protecting Soviet authority. It has been a court unto itself as well. It was, until July 10, 1934, empowered to punish even by shooting “all persons apprehended while participating in a banditry raid or armed robbery,” and the purpose for which it was avowedly organized was to “unite all the revolutionary powers of the republics for the purpose of combatting political and economic counter-revolution, espionage and banditry.” It is in this enumeration of crimes that it has jurisdiction as an organ of preliminary investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This organization has directed most of its attention to counter-revolutionary activities and uses its judicial powers mostly against the enemy class. Ordinary criminals arrested by it are usually turned over to the courts for trial. As for the actual number shot during recent years, there seems no way to judge, but indications are that they have been sparing in executions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Chamberlin, Soviet Russia, p. 390.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are other phases of their work such as the maintaining of places of deprivation of liberty which will be discussed later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The OGPU has recently been incorporated into the newly formed All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs as the Administration of State Safety, and its judicial &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; has been abolished. The significance of this is apparent. It ends a chapter in the history of Soviet Russia. Cases once disposed of by this organization now will pass through the courts, and the pictures the world held of midnight secret trials will have to be put away. While the activities of the OGPU were duly authorized by law, the possibilities of excesses under such a system seem apparent, and the establishment of a more definite order of legality is bound to produce a quieter confidence. Because of the widespread interest in the transferring of this authority, the entire decree is given here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To form an All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, including in its composition the United State Political Department (OGPU).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs is to be entrusted with:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The guaranteeing of revolutionary order and state security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The protection of public (socialist) property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Registration of civil acts (registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Protection of the frontiers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The following departments are to be formed in the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a)Chief Department of State Security.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Chief Department of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Chief Department of Frontier and Internal Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Chief Department of Fire Protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Chief Department of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Department of Civil Acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Administrative and Business Department.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To organize in the Union Republics People’s Commissariats of Home Affairs, acting on the basis of the law on the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs, and in the RSFSR to establish instead of a People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs for the Republic an Institute Plenipotentiary for Home Affairs of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Departments of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the Union Republics are to be organized in the autonomous republics, regions and provinces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) To abolish the judicial collegium of the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) The People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs are to send all cases of crimes on the completion of their investigation to the competent judicial organs in accordance with the legal requirements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Cases under the Department of State Security of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs are to be directed to the Supreme Court of the USSR, while cases of such crimes as high treason, espionage and similar crimes are to be handed over to the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR or to the competent military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) A special conference is to be organized under the People’s Commissar of Home Affairs of the USSR which, on the basis of the regulations, is to be entrusted with the right of applying, by administrative order, banishment, exile, imprisonment in corrective labor camps for a period not exceeding five years and banishment beyond the frontiers of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) To instruct the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR to present to the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR regulations for the All-Union People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
What judicial authority is to handle the cases previously in the jurisdiction of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of the OGPU? Here is the decree:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In connection with the organization of the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and with the object of insuring the proper consideration of cases handed over to the judicial organs and investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Cases of state crimes (counter-revolutionary and against administrative order), with the exception of those indicated in the subsequent points of this section, investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and also. the principal courts of the autonomous republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Special collegiums composed of a chairman and two members of the Court, are to be formed in the judicial institutions of the USSR and Union republics, named for the consideration of these cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Cases of high treason, espionage, terrorism, causing explosions, incendiarism and other forms of crime (Art. 6, 8 and 9 of the law on state crimes), investigated by the People’s Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR and its local organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and competent military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Cases of crimes on the railway and water transport, investigated by the same organs are subject to the jurisdiction of the railway and water transport collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the courts of the railways and water transport to which they belong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) All other cases, investigated by the same organs, are subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Courts in the usual order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the consideration of appeals against the resolutions of the Plenums and Presidiums of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, and also appeals against the sentences, decisions and definitions of the collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR, a judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR is to be established which is to be composed of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and two of his deputies, who are to have the right of directly rescinding or changing the resolutions, definitions, decisions and sentences of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics and Collegiums of the Supreme Court of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considerations of cases in the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR are to take place with the obligatory participation of the State Prosecutor of the USSR or his deputy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Resolutions of the judicial-supervisory collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR may be appealed against by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the State Prosecutor of the USSR in the plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR and in the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In conformity with sections I and II of this decree, to recognize the necessity of strengthening the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts and military tribunals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To instruct the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics to oblige the People’s Commissariats of Justice and Chairmen of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics to work out and carry through in the fixed order, within a period of five days, appropriate additions to the staffs of the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the regional and provincial courts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To instruct the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR to work out and carry through in fixed order, within the same period, addition to the staffs of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the military tribunals of the districts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. Kalinin&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. Yenukidze&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moscow, Kremlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
July 10, 1934.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus does Russia make another advance in the administration of her criminal law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With proceedings begun, the next step is to determine by preliminary investigation if the suspect is to be definitely accused and held for trial. The purpose of this is to keep the court calendar from being crowded with cases which ought never to come to trial because the accusation is unfounded. It likewise guarantees the investigation and consideration of the substantial facts and saves much of the court’s time. The organs involved here are the prosecutor, the investigators appointed by him, and attached to his office, the police (militia) and the body formerly known as the OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is a great deal of informality and flexibility in the matter of this preliminary investigation. The investigator may take the whole matter into the atmosphere where the crime was committed. He may conduct it among the workers of the factory, if the act occurred there, in order that the workers themselves may aid in furnishing proofs, and in checking up the various facts. He also benefits in this way from the public opinion in regard to the case. This method of investigation in regard to labor crimes, both in factories and more recently in agricultural spheres, has been growing more and more common.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the more complex cases this investigation is carried on by the prosecutor himself after the initial evidence is turned over to him by the militia, organs of criminal detection, or other competent authority making the first inquiry. In lesser cases the investigating organ will usually prepare the case although the prosecutor may at any time examine the evidence and otherwise supervise the conduct of the case. Now that (since 1933) there is an Attorney General of the USSR, centralizing the prosecuting forces of the entire federated republics, the most important cases such as the famous Metropolitan-Vickers would be turned over to his personal supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this preliminary investigation it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney under whom it is carried on to see that evidence both for and against the suspect is gathered. If he neglects to see that the rights of the person under suspicion are protected and permits a case to come to trial when the evidence, if properly gathered, would indicate innocence, then he is laying up trouble for himself and will probably have to answer to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To the end that all information and evidence may be secured, the investigator is given wide powers as to search and seizure of anything having a relation to the case. But if one thinks of rough-shod entry and abuse, he may be consoled by certain restrictions which the law places around such activities. In conducting searches and seizures the investigator calls in official witnesses. Persons participating in the case as parties to it, and relatives of the parties, cannot be official witnesses. And Sec. 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “the searches and seizures are to be made in daytime, except in cases which cannot be postponed.” The searcher is further ordered to announce his decision to make the search and to use all possible care to avoid damage (Section 179 of the same Code), and the additional protection is given to the accused in that the investigator is to see “that the facts of the private life of the person searched which have no relation with the case shall not be made public.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sec. 181.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All articles seized in such a search must be listed, remarks made, and a copy deposited with the person or his family, and the articles themselves must be sealed at the place before being taken away.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 183, 184, 185.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mail may also be seized by the investigator if permission has been given by the prosecutor, as may also any telegraphic or other communications, but the safeguard is provided that a representative of the postal-telegraphic institution must be present.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 186-188.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first stage of the preliminary investigation there is no “accused.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Except in such obvious cases that no investigation would be necessary. An example of this would be a man actually caught murdering another.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The aim at this time is to find if a criminal act has really been committed and if so who committed it. After the deed is decided to be of a criminal nature and is definitely attributed to a particular person or persons then the second stage is undertaken. At this time the “decision” is framed, and the accused is notified that he is to appear before the authority. This “decision” is written after the evidence has been carefully weighed and guilt indicated. This document must contain all the information and circumstances gathered up to that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the person has been finally accused he is summoned to appear before the investigator who is handling the case. He is not yet definitely held for trial. When he appears he is made acquainted with the accusation. “And that does not mean,” a prosecutor told the writer, “that he is given a chair and table and told to read the papers before him. The whole thing is explained to him by the authority in charge.” Thereafter he is questioned and given a chance to tell his side of the matter. His statements are checked and any new evidence is gathered.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Steps must now be taken to insure his appearance during the completion of the investigation. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for five measures, as follows:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sections 144 and 150-154.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (1) He will not leave the place specified in the statement he signs without the permission of the proper authority which is the investigator or the court. (2) &#039;&#039;Personal or property parole&#039;&#039;. In the arrangement for property parole, the organization signing the bond must produce the accused when wanted or forfeit the sum of money agreed upon, but in the personal parole the persons (not less than two) who have agreed to produce the accused when wanted may, on failure to do so, be fined or sentenced to compulsory labor for a period up to three months. (3) &#039;&#039;Cash bail&#039;&#039;. Either he or other persons may deposit with the court a cash bail to insure his presence, the amount to be determined as in our courts, by the seriousness of the crime. (4) &#039;&#039;Detention in the home&#039;&#039;. The person may be restricted to his own home, as in the case of illness, or if a woman, because of pregnancy or of the care of her children. (5) &#039;&#039;Holding in custody&#039;&#039;. To be used in more serious cases. This latter is permissible only in certain prescribed cases. One of the conditions is that the case be of such a nature that the penalty, if conviction is secured, will be for a year or more of imprisonment. In addition one may be held in custody in cases covered by a definite enumeration in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which the sentence is not to exceed one year. The third possibility is in case of such serious crimes as banditry, or those of a socially dangerous nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the use of these measures the class nature of the criminal trial is strikingly portrayed. If the personality of the accused, or the crime he has committed, represents a high degree of social danger then one of the more severe measures is chosen. This would be the case for one appraised as a class enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The preliminary investigation may not yet be completed. If the evidence seems conclusive the prosecutor may end the preliminaries by simply drawing up the accusatory decision and conveying such information to the accused, but there may also be much more to this stage of procedure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the appearance of the accused for questioning a whole new set of resources may be opened up. He mentions witnesses of his own, he gives his own testimony. His relatives must testify if needed. Apparently no one is omitted but the defendant’s counsel. And any falsifying or hiding of evidence on the part of any witness makes him liable to more severe punishment. Even though there is no oath administered due to the official attitude toward religion, there are still effective means of impressing a witness with the importance of telling the truth, one of which is to let him know what will happen to him if he is caught deviating from it!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But to go back to the investigation. The accused may make certain requests or demands, and as indicated before, it is not only the duty of the investigating authority to see that they are met if reasonable, but if he neglects to take cognizance of any fact in favor of the defendant he is placing his own position in jeopardy. Not only must the investigator inquire into circumstances and facts that determine guilt or innocence, but he must also find out anything he can that will help in determining the measure of social defense to be given. What, for example, would be some of the things that he would want to know?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost at this time is the question as to whether or not the act was committed in an attempt to restore the bourgeoisie to power; after that the motive and circumstances of the act. In Soviet jurisprudence circumstances play an important part in disposing of the case. The history of the accused himself will be of help if there is a consideration of insanity, the whole circumstances of the crime will establish whether there was coercion, or threat, or whether the offender was at the moment of committing the crime in a state of destitution, hunger, or strong excitement, or influenced by any extremity of personal or family conditions. All of these circumstances are considered extenuating and influence the penalty assessed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the establishment of all relevant facts pertaining to the case the investigator may summon any experts deemed necessary. These must appear and give their conclusions no matter whether they aid or harm the accused, and a refusal to do so carries a fine of fifty rubles. The use of experts by the criminal courts in Russia will be discussed later but for the time being it may be said that such a custom is in wide use.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The calling of experts or other witnesses may also be at the request of the accused. The law provides&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “The investigator shall not have the right to refuse the request of the accused or of the complainant to summon additional witnesses or examine experts if the facts or circumstances sought to be established may have any bearing on the case.” Not only that, but the investigator is likewise limited in interpreting some line of inquiry sought by the accused as not having relevant bearing on the case. Not only must he furnish some adequate grounds for such a refusal, but he must also state in writing his reason for taking such a stand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The number and kind of experts to be used are determined by the investigator if it is on his initiative that they are called. But if the defendant requests others he must call them, unless it is impossible to get the desired expert or unless the granting of this request would delay the preliminary hearing beyond the time legally set. It might be that the defendant would purposely request some one whom it was impossible to produce in order to secure delay, and in such an event, the investigator is naturally not forced to comply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question of sanity may arise during the preliminary investigation and the proceedings may be dismissed on the grounds of insanity at the time of the commission of the act. If it is judged that the insanity has set in since the act then the trial is postponed until a cure is effected. There is a Judicial Psychiatric Institute where persons awaiting trial are observed for this purpose; but in order to facilitate the work of the medical staff the investigators gather all pertinent data as to the mental history of the accused.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With all the information finally assembled the investigator is in a position to make his decision. The police organs, in their initial investigation, may discontinue the case if they find the evidence does not warrant going on. The investigator, if the case has been in his hands, may likewise discontinue for lack of sufficient evidence. And the prosecutor, with the collected data in his hands, may decide that there is no case. But if the person or organization first initiating proceedings is convinced that this is a mistake, the decisions in each of these cases may be appealed to the next higher authority and finally to the court of proper jurisdiction, within a month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the investigator may decide to hold the accused for trial. In this event as soon as the investigation is completed the accused is notified of the decision and all the facts laid before him. He must be informed of his right to examine the entire records in the case, and the investigator must be sure that he is acquainted with the entire contents. If he is able to suggest anything to be added, the investigator must see that it is included before it finally leaves his hands. Any basic error in this stage of the proceedings may be the cause of a reversal by a higher court, so that great care must be taken to fulfill all points of law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A time limit is set by law as to the completion of this investigation. One used to American delays gasps at the speed with which these people dispense justice. One month from the time the defendant is formally accused the preliminary inquiry must be completed. However, this is not always possible, as appeals may be taken all along on the acts of investigator or prosecutor, and other delays may occur. But certainly all speed possible is used and there is no question of postponement of trial to the extent that we are accustomed to in our country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the preliminary investigation completed the accused is formally held for trial. This may, in the simpler instances, be by the judge of the People’s Court in cases when there is no necessity for investigation or in those cases when the police officers make all investigations and forward the information to the People’s judge. This would be true in cases involving sentences of less than one year.&lt;br /&gt;
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In cases punishable by not less than one year sentence, yet not of so serious a nature as to require a preliminary inquiry, the investigator holds the accused for trial, on the basis of the information submitted to him by the police or OGPU. In such cases, all the evidence gathered together with the decision of the organs making the investigation is forwarded to the investigator, who, if he agrees submits the records to the competent court. There it is put on the trial list. If he feels that the conclusion to hold for trial is not warranted, then he may refer it to the court of proper jurisdiction for approval or rejection. In cases where the investigator himself is in charge of the preliminary inquiry he forwards his findings to the prosecutor, and he holds for trial in precisely the same way as was indicated above.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER VII: SCIENTIFIC AIDS TO THE COURT ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;It has&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; already been said that a heavy responsibility has been thrown on the courts in the USSR in regard not only to establishing guilt but also to finding, within the bounds of the provisions of the law, the proper measure of social defense to insure a corrective influence on the one on whom it is assessed. Guilt is often obvious, but the proper steps to take in an attempt to see that the offender does not repeat his crime do not usually show themselves with such clarity.&lt;br /&gt;
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The court, in trial, is not limited in any way in its efforts to get complete testimony and an accurate interpretation of such information. It is one of the fundamental principles of the administration of Soviet criminal law that the responsibility for the fullness and correctness of both investigation and verdict in the course of the trial rests on the court, and it may take any action on its own initiative to secure such ends. The prosecution and the defense may actually conduct the case within the bounds and direction which the court gives, but the court sets such limits and directions, interferes at any time on any point not cleared up by the argument, and decides on all questions relative to the examination. The court is independent of the opinion of either party in the trial and it is its responsibility to investigate any circumstance that appears essential to the case, whether the parties request it or not. It may likewise rule out what appears to be non-essential, even if it is requested by one of the parties. It is master of the whole proceedings and the expressed basic principle guiding its actions is to get at the truth of the incident involved and interpret the act in the light of all circumstances, so that a correct measure both for the protection of society from the socially dangerous and for the rehabilitation of the individual may be given.&lt;br /&gt;
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Superhuman wisdom would be required to fulfill such a demand if the judge acted alone, or even in conjunction with his co-judges, the two jurors. But the Code of Criminal Procedure has provided that he be supplied with whatever aid scientific research and endeavor can give. During the trial the court may call experts and it may also have the benefit of advice or testimony of specialized institutions connected with it.&lt;br /&gt;
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With no further evidence than the space devoted to the use of experts by the Code of Criminal Procedure, one would know that much importance was attached to the practice in the USSR. It is the subject of many articles, not only as regards the use of such aids in the court trial but, as already seen, in the preliminary trial as well. It might, because of its frequency, become a loose, taken-for-granted observance, but there are safeguards which make it a matter of serious regard.&lt;br /&gt;
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One matter of interest in the use of such experts as the defense itself may request to have called is that there is never any financial transaction between the two. The expert receives his fee from the state and in case the defendant is found guilty it is charged to him. This practice eliminates the possible sense on the part of the expert that he must give evidence, or rather interpretations, in favor of the man from whom he is receiving money. He has no feeling of obligation in this direction and is thus more disposed to give unprejudiced opinions. The spectacle of the bitter clashing of “alienists” hired by prosecution and defense is not likely to take place in a Soviet court room. Opinions naturally differ and on occasion the court may have to summon others, so that he may see which way the weight of opinion falls, but the dividing line is not due to a desire on the part of either to defend his client.&lt;br /&gt;
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Experts are called by the courts whenever specialized information of any kind that is desired is available. Article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Experts are called in when in the investigation and examination of the case, special knowledge in science, art, and the crafts is required.” And in a note to the same article it is further provided that “Experts must be called in to establish the cause of death and the character of bodily injuries, as well as in order to determine the psychic condition of the accused or of the witness if there be any doubt on this score in the opinion of the court or of the investigation.”&lt;br /&gt;
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A limitation is, of course, placed in that a science may not have grown in such a way as to furnish a reliable basis for inspection of evidence and conclusions. On the other hand something of an unusual nature may be called in a case presenting such a problem as one related to the author by a state prosecutor. In the USSR one causing a suicide receives a severe sentence. In a case of a double suicide of two women, there seemed no clue pointing to the guilt of any person until a small drawing was discovered. On the evidence obtained from this paper, with the aid of an expert in the identification of characteristics of lines and angles, an arrest was made and a confession and corroborating data obtained. This would not ordinarily be a legitimate line of expert aid, but in this case it afforded the only chance of detection. It is an excellent example of a case where expert testimony may be the only available resource.&lt;br /&gt;
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The expert, once summoned, has practically unlimited rights and privileges in gathering needed material for forming his conclusions. He is given all the data in the case for study, and he attends throughout the entire trial exactly as do the prosecution and defense. He may question the witnesses, ask for any further materials such as publications, documents, records, or even the subpœnaing of witnesses, and the court sees that his requests are granted. It is said that there is no known case of a refusal of co-operation with the expert on the part of either court or investigator. He is responsible in arriving at the proper solution of the case, and he is held accountable for any negligence in obtaining any information that can contribute to the accuracy of his conclusion. He may, make an error but he may not falsify, at least not without penalty. The Code of Criminal Procedure which devotes so much attention to this matter of experts says, “In regard to answering summonses, obligation to speak the truth, responsibility for false testimony, i.e., for deliberately false and not mistaken testimony, the expert shall be equal to witnesses.”&lt;br /&gt;
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But experts may disagree, even honestly and without regard to a fee! Also, it is conceivable that one might be inadequate. An American mind, at least one whose owner has attended court in the United States, might understand such a contention. The Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure takes care of that possibility, too. In Article 300 we find it provided that, “If the expert conclusion be found insufficiently clear or inadequate, and also in the event of dissension among experts, the court shall appoint new experts, either on its own initiative or upon the request of either side.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The conclusion of the experts is given at the close of the hearing and is attached to the records of the case. The court does not have to agree with the findings but he must consider them. He is free to criticise, and so, for that matter, is either of the sides in the case. But, in any disagreement he must defend himself well. The Code of Criminal Procedure again says:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article 295.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; “However, if the court disagrees with the conclusion of the experts, such dissent shall be minutely motivated either in the verdict or in a special rider.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The testimony of the expert is held to be of peculiar character in Soviet judicature. He is not a witness, giving facts, but it is his function to examine and appraise facts, to inspect and to weigh and to give his opinions and conclusions in the special way of which he is capable. His evidence is distinguished from the other given in the trial in that it is specialized and independent. In other words the court can look after the facts but he wants the expert to tell him the meaning of what he finds out. And the experts have accepted the challenge and the responsibility with vigor. They have developed what might almost be called an “official psychology” that fits well into the nation’s philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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This science, called “judicial psychology,” occupies first place among the branches used by the courts in the Soviet judicature, and the second of importance is correctional labor psychology. The authorities attach no importance to what we call criminal psychology because they reject the idea that the criminal has any psychological or biological peculiarity. The use of the term alone suggests that they have, and the content likewise reminds them of some brand of Lombroso doctrine. For their theory of crime with its economic base, with its contention that this phenomena results practically &#039;&#039;in toto&#039;&#039; from the exploitation of one class by another, such a consideration would not do. Here one sees an application of their theory of crime. The criminal for them is like other people, and as the classless society approaches its perfect state a new social consciousness will evolve and any urge to crime will disappear.&lt;br /&gt;
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They reject likewise a juridical psychology which makes use of an analysis of psychological concepts into such elements as “imprudence,” “intent,” “spiritual agitation” because its content is too much one of juridical scholasticism, and affords no practical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Judicial psychology, considered in its broader sense, would involve the correctional labor psychology referred to above as one branch of this science important to the Soviet judicature. Defined in this larger way it would mean the application to the work of the court and the corrective labor institutions of all results of psychological research. Used in the narrower meaning it refers to criminal procedure psychology, or the application of whatever is known in this field to the case as a whole during the procedure or what transpired in the preliminary investigation. It would comprise the psychology of the accused, of the witnesses, of any other participant, even of the judge, jurors, experts themselves, and of the prosecutor and defense. They emphasize that they do not deal with the breaking up of the personality under consideration into such atoms as attention, memory, etc. as is done in the German school, but that they study the entire behavior of the witness, or other person, against a background of the broad, whole situation of the judicial investigation. They interest themselves, first of all, in the obtaining of true testimony and later in its correct appraisal, and their chief endeavor is to develop a better technique to arrive at these ends. With the emphasis they put on the importance of this usage and the talent they have in the field and the serious attitude the research workers take toward the problem, they should develop something compensating for their great effort.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in the field of correctional labor psychology there should be an even greater future. This is where the practical worker begs for more light from his scientific colleague. It is one field, said an authority, where the practical worker has gone on ahead of the research worker. There is eagerness to regenerate the psychology of the lawbreaker, to get him so readjusted that he will fit usefully into life. But more of this will be found in the chapter on Corrective Labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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To think only of the individual and his happiness would spur a scientist on to great effort, but it is even more than that in this instance. The nation’s progress toward its ideal depends on the successful use of these unfitted elements. It is no wonder that so many of the best minds are devoting themselves to working out the most adequate possible corrective labor policy. Filled with zeal as they are for their cause, they feel the responsibility which rests on them of making every human possible of use in the Socialist order.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are two institutes attached to the judicature in the USSR that require special attention in this consideration of expert aid rendered to the courts. Their work is of the utmost importance in the whole system of criminal procedure and the administration of corrective labor. The two referred to are the Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute and the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy, both attached to the office of the Attorney General and to the Commissariat of Justice. It was in visits to these two places that the writer experienced the greatest enthusiasm for what is being accomplished in the field of criminal repression in the USSR. Work of the finest type is being carried on in the lines covered by these two institutions by staffs well equipped for their respective fields of endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
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The writer visited the Institute of Criminal and Correctional Labor Policy several times, looked through its library and used its books, and had the aid by conferences and advice of Director Shlaposnitchov, of the assistant director, of Professor Brusilovsky, and others of its officers. It is admirably staffed all the way through by persons not only of ability but of social conscience. The seriousness with which they attack the problems which face them and their acquaintance with the work being done in other nations are bound to impress anyone.&lt;br /&gt;
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This Institute carries out the usual policy in the USSR of combining the theoretical and the practical. Along with those who are engaged in problems of research into the cause and treatment of crime there come the workers from the courts with practical problems to solve. Working in the library and reference section are persons who read and speak several languages and who carry their research into the study of foreign legislation and reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are a number of sections devoted to special lines of inquiry, chief of which are: Criminal Law and Criminal Trial, a Judicial Section, Statistical Section, and one giving its attention to the problems of juvenile offenders.&lt;br /&gt;
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Serbsky Memorial Judicial Psychiatric Institute is the principal other scientific body on which the courts rely for solving their crime problem. It has likewise its practical and theoretical side. Research is carried on by a large staff of medical men and women, of research workers, of professors, and collaborators, and it publishes the results in numerous volumes. It also holds conferences and discussion meetings. It is equipped with all the latest devices and instruments for treatment of its cases and works in close contact with judicial establishments. Its director gave the following as the purposes of the Institute:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) To examine all those about to be tried when there is a question as to psychic condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) To aid all correctional labor camps both as to policy and on actual cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) To help in problems of juvenile delinquents.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) To carry on research in the problems connected with the work of the Institute.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) To establish graduate courses and train medical aids.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity for patients is one hundred and fifty beds, these are divided into different groups; such as those for men, for women, for children, for the definitely deranged, and for those who are of apparently sane condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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No one is admitted at Serbsky except those who have come in contact with the law, through its contravention. When a question of sanity comes up in a case at trial or in the preliminary stage of procedure, it may be cleared up by a brief examination by doctors, but in every case where extended observation is needed the person is sent to Serbsky. After not longer than a month a report is made to the court. In case insanity is adjudged by the staff, then the patient may be sent to a hospital where care is given him, or, if he is dangerously demented, he is placed in an institution where there is more restriction and compulsory treatment and care.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Institute maintains a department where children are kept, and where they are taught by teachers who come in for that purpose, and trained in certain arts and crafts. Also, some adults are kept beyond the month period when it is thought that only brief treatment is needed so that the trial may go on. There was one who had been there for eight months and another for six at the time of the author’s visit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because of the short period of retention in this place one would not expect that much of a constructive nature could be done in the matter of work. But here the policy of Soviet treatment shows to advantage. The shop teacher exhibited to us with pride what he had been able to accomplish, and his enthusiasm was justified. In accordance with their theory that labor can correct almost anything they use it here as a constructive treatment. They also use, as has already been said, all of the latest medical and psychological therapy, but there is at the same time an insistence that training for work, giving one something to do and teaching him how to do it well, is the best way to psychical readjustment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Pursuant to the fulfillment of this idea those sent here make things and they are carefully observed while they work. Some of the objects in the shops and on exhibit in a small conference room were beautiful models. Among those, of especial note, there was an airplane, perfect in minute detail, a movie machine, a system of traffic lights, and a collective shop made by the children. The latter would have a political significance, of course, and serve to put over education of a socialist nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one goes into Serbsky Institute one encounters a guard at the outer gate, and the feeling is that here is a prison. It is, of course, of a kind. Men who are in this place are, many of them, of a dangerous nature, such as we would call criminally insane. This terminology will not do, however, for Soviet criminology, as one may be either insane or criminal, but not both. But a number are guilty of murder, are pleading insanity as a defense when they may, of course, be sane; a number have made homicidal attacks on individuals. With this in mind one expects to see more of a prison atmosphere prevail.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the outside there were no armed guards in evidence, and we were told that there were none. When we went through a ward of some twenty-odd men of the most dangerous type with only a woman attendant, and no one else about, the writer frankly felt somewhat nervous. It seemed they ought to be under guard, but the woman in charge assured us that there had never been an attack by one of them on an attendant. The attitude of the Serbsky staff toward the patients and the attitude they manage to get from them in return seemed to us remarkable.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went through the gardens where those persons of a less dangerous nature were reading, talking, or doing whatever they wished. Some came to speak to us. One wished to make a long speech. A part of these were judged to be mentally normal, others must return to face their trial. We came at last to the place where are kept the most obstreperous; those who would surely make an attempt to escape if not restrained. This was the only example the writer encountered in Russia of persons locked in cells. There may be others in isolated instances, but solitary confinement has been done away with as a matter of policy. The building housing these prisoners was two-story, and the cells faced inward on the garden. There were tall big windows of unbreakable glass affording plenty of light, but the ventilation was bad. A remark was made to that effect and we were told that it was an old building they had had to utilize, and that it was to be replaced within the year. It certainly was out of keeping with the rest of the place, and made us think that it would actually be taken care of before long. However, there were not many persons there. Glass panes in the doors enabled one to peer in and there were only ten inmates in all the rooms on the two floors.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was in one of these cells, where all the furniture is secured to the floor, that we were allowed to talk for a moment to a man who is quite a character in criminal circles in the USSR. He is held to be the chief swindler of the country and a recital of his escapades made the assertion sound entirely plausible. Perhaps it should be emphasized for fear that it was not made clear above, that it is not the ravingly insane who are kept in these rooms. They are the ones kept in the ward already mentioned. These are they who are the more dangerous criminally, who possibly are not insane at all. The swindler was held to be normal mentally, and if he got away with all that his record enumerated one feels sure he must be.&lt;br /&gt;
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The swindler, a young man of near thirty, thin, dark, sat morosely on his cot as we went in. The attendant spoke to him, put her hand on his shoulder. We had the story of him before we entered. He had been in prison a number of times, he had supplied a luxurious living to himself and admiring companions over a period of years. He had been sent to this Institute at several of his previous trials and the opinion had been each time that he was mentally normal. A few months before our visit he had been returned to court to stand trial, and had been sent to a corrective labor institution. But he had refused to work. He had refused to follow any of the prison régime, and the authorities had returned him to Serbsky for a check on his mental condition. He ignored us, seemed hardly to be conscious of our presence, as he begged to know of the young woman what they were going to do with him now. She talked to him for a few moments in an encouraging manner. Her effort with him, she said, was to convince him of a better way of living by means of the training he would get in the corrective labor institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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We had already been in the children’s department and had talked there to two girls whom we were told to remember for future reference. One in particular was a pretty, gentle-appearing child of twelve. Here is her story. She had been a run-away, she had wandered in various parts of the USSR, or so she said. Her acts of a criminal nature had all been directed against children. She had stolen several whom she said she had pinched and tortured in a sadistic manner and killed. The number she set at ten, but there was no verification of her report. She had become well enough known and feared in certain sections so that she was threatened by mothers of young children if she so much as entered the village or town. She had a few months previously come into the care of the Institute, and they felt sure that an entire change of her whole character had been effected. On the wall of the room where she stayed she had put some pictures, and she had become interested in art as well as other work and study. They thought her normal, and although her family wished her returned to its custody, the opinion was that the environment had not up to then been sufficiently constructive to permit that. They were sending her to an institution at Leningrad where she was to be taught and trained in some labor.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even at the risk of being tedious, it seems desirable to record two more cases among the children. In a yard at the rear of the building we found a group of boys at play. Two of them were indicated as presenting challenging problems. Safely back in a conference room we heard of what they had done. The first case especially was interesting as indicating that animosity does not always exist in the treatment of those who are in opposition to the proletariat rule.&lt;br /&gt;
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A boy of seventeen, who was the son of a Kulak, had been discharged from his job for indolence. He went later to stay with a friend overnight. He wanted the friend to go with him to some place to which the mother objected. Filled with anger he waited until the son had departed for school the next morning, then murdered the mother, took some money which she had in the house, and escaped. When caught, he was sent to Serbsky for examination and the analysis showed mental deficiency and a difficult, sulky character. They had kept him for a time, had made some progress with him, and were then about to send him to a medical-pedagogical institution for juveniles where he would be trained and treated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The other boy, a charming black-haired fellow of thirteen, was held to be normal, but he was an alcoholic and stole constantly. The trouble in his case seemed to be in an irrational, coddling kind of upbringing. The decision was to send him to a state educational institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were only seven women inmates of the institution at the time of our visit and in view of the high percentage of women criminals in the USSR that seemed strange. No explanation was vouchsafed in answer to a question as to the cause, but it might indicate that women in this country do not base a defense plea on grounds of insanity!&lt;br /&gt;
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With such thorough effort as the care in Serbsky indicates, the conclusions as to mental condition ought to be as authoritative as human fallacy permits. The institution has representatives in various shops and schools and co-operates closely with the heads of the various prisons, and every effort is made at supervision and observation of those within its jurisdiction. We asked for statistics on results and were reminded that this work is all very new in the USSR, of necessity, and that figures were not complete, but that we could be assured that the results were worth to them all the painstaking care they put on their work.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER VIII: THE PROSECUTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; functioning of the prosecution in the Soviet judicature is of especial interest to a student of criminal procedure. Its development from the time of the total abolition of the institution as it had existed in the Tzarist régime, by Decree #1 of 1917, to the establishment of the office of the Attorney General in 1933, has been experimental and not without dissension among the ranks of the Central Executive Committee itself. In the early years following the Revolution when everything Tzarist was swept away, there prevailed a spirit of liberalism so far as the rights of the people were concerned. In the sudden accession of power by the proletariat, lack of restraint was the predominating note, and this philosophy—if such irrational conclusions could be called one—of the epoch was reflected also in the procedure of the criminal courts. A more conservative opinion had wished merely to place the defense on an equal footing with the prosecution to correct the dominance of the state over the people in such a manner as it had been practiced for all the years of the reign of Tzars. But this was not enough to satisfy those who were clamoring for everything to be placed in the hands of the proletariat, the administering of justice as well as other branches of government.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this moment of judicial liberalism prosecution through official channels was done away with, and in its place the persons in attendance at the trial were vested with the right of accusal as well as defense. It must have distressed many a hardy judge, even though he sat as a representative of the toiling masses himself, to try to figure out a decision in the face of untrained and conflicting contentions. At any time during the trial any citizen might rise and address the court either in behalf of the accused or as the state’s prosecutor. The idea took hold rapidly, and up to the beginning of its control in 1918, it was so widely used that it became customary for the judge to call on some one in his audience to act as defender or accuser of the person on trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was bound to lead to difficulties. Civil war was at hand, the class struggle was at its height, and the court was an organ of the state in its struggle against its enemies. Even the most liberal saw that it would not do. Some system must be used whereby the prosecution of cases would be strengthened.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is an interesting point involved in the restoration of the prosecution, as it now began, even though it was of revolutionary expediency. It was a swinging back to the western criminal law administration which they had annihilated at the beginning of their rule. A legal man said to me in this regard, “We acknowledge that there are many good points in the capitalist system, and we do not hesitate to borrow what are useful to us.” In court procedure, even while they do preserve the proletarian administration, one can recognize many things about their orderly procedure that has its foundation in familiar bourgeois practices. There is no denial of this on their part. Certain well established ideas of justice have proved over long years to be adequate and proper and these have been incorporated into their own judicial structure. The early disorganized practices of the proletarian administration of justice gave way when necessities and panic of the Civil War had been dissipated to a deliberative plan resulting in the many codes of 1922.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0141.svg|ORGINAZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF USSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before this a resurrection of the public prosecutor was on its way. Revolutionary tribunals, in their post as out-sentinels in the struggle of the government, were the first in the demand for sterner equipment of prosecution, and political expediency put an end to judicial liberalism in their practice. Characterizing this period was the attitude that placed in the hands of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; the power to impose even the death penalty on those persons charged with political offenses such as the participation in counter-revolutionary activities, deliberate destruction of property or espionage, and other such crimes against the state. It was felt that if the proletariat was to continue to rule it was no time for softness, either in the judicial system or in the non-judicial tribunals which continued to exist through the bloody days of the Civil War period.&lt;br /&gt;
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As just pointed out, it was in the Revolutionary Tribunals, created by Decree of November 24, 1917, and differing very little from the People’s Courts except in the requirement as to the number of co-judges,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Six sat in the Revolutionary Tribunals while two were required in the People’s Court.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that the first change came in regard to the prosecution. Let it be understood that although these tribunals were organs of the revolution and continued in force for five years, they were proper judicial institutions, with a definite prescribed procedure and jurisdiction. There had been too much mildness in their administration, so much so that the present Commissar of Justice, N. V. Krylenko, stated in his Soviet law,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that “Their softness with regard to sentences discredited them completely.”&lt;br /&gt;
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There were too many of them in the first place and by Act of May, 1918, their number was reduced so that they remained in existence only in the capitals of the provinces and other important places. But that reform would not necessarily make them deal out sterner justice, and by this same Act there was created at each of the existing tribunals a &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors. To make the check-up more complete there was also established a Central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; of State Prosecutors in connection with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee created by an act of June, 1918.&lt;br /&gt;
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The character of the Revolutionary Tribunals was undergoing a change. Sternness and determination now marked their attitude. Mildness was fading away as class struggle advanced. They were created to spike the activities directed against the achievements of the Revolution or designed to weaken Soviet authority. It was not enough that some citizen give voice to a plea for conviction; it was neither sufficient that local tribunals be left to carry on their own unaided and unsupervised prosecution. There must be central supervision. This very distrust of local competency led later to a dissension in which Lenin had to take a hand, but for the time being, it served its purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the decree already referred to (of May, 1918), the central &#039;&#039;Collegium&#039;&#039; was given wide powers. It might demand of local prosecutors or tribunals that certain cases be transferred to Moscow or in the event the case remained in its original territory, it might send prosecutors there to see that it took the direction desired. It might also demand an accounting from the local &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; so that by supervision they could be sure that the functions of these organs to look after all facts of criminal action committed by any person anywhere and the institution of criminal procedure might be faithfully and zealously fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the Revolutionary Tribunal Acts of 1920, all previous acts pertaining to tribunals were repealed and sweeping changes again occurred. Counter-revolutionary activity was on the decline, the Civil War was receding, and non-judicial methods of suppression not so much needed. Orderly government was growing stronger. The &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; suffered the abolition of its special tribunal, the military judicial powers even were required to comply with the provisions of this Act. As a result of these curtailments the powers of the Revolutionary Tribunals were widened and jurisdiction extended to include any case involving counter-revolutionary charges as well as any other that was of a nature dangerous to the Soviet Republic. Not only was the jurisdiction of these tribunals enlarged but their power of punishment was likewise increased and was now practically unrestricted. With such authority they could assess any measure of repression which they thought necessary to the occasion and could thereby cover any ground lately held by extra-judicial bodies. These tribunals were established in the capitals of the various provinces and by permission of the Commissar of Justice might also be instituted in the larger cities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What happened in regard to the prosecution? The &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of prosecutors set up by the previous acts were abolished and in their stead there now appeared state &#039;&#039;collegiums&#039;&#039; of defense and prosecution, both for the people’s court and for the Revolutionary Tribunals. From this time on more attention was given to the perfecting of a system and technique of prosecution. The qualifications for the person filling this office became of a more adequate nature. He must be a man competent to make an appearance before an assemblage, to speak or otherwise conduct public affairs, and he must also know the Soviet system of government thoroughly as well as be acquainted with the workings of trade unions. There was still no centralized system such as exists today since the prosecutors were at this time provided merely to represent the people in trial, much as a defense lawyer might be appointed in a particular case. But the era of floundering, of experimentation, of entertaining thought of complete proletarian administration of law, had made its contribution, and the evolution moved on with the rapidity with which other things have moved in Soviet Russia. In 1922 there was another Act containing other innovations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By this Act there was a general revision of the whole system of judicial legislation, and there emerged such results as the Criminal Code, the Law on Basic Property rights, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the year of 1923 furnished additional legislation. The matter of some centralization of a state prosecution seems to have been taken for granted, but the form that the organization was to have, the basic principles, brought forth differences of opinion as we shall see later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The New Economic Policy had been introduced and the economic and political situation in the country was in a confused and complex state. Civil war had died down but the class struggle, already well on its feet, took encouragement from the feeling among the property owners that capitalism, at least in a modified form, might with timely effort be brought back. The form of conflict now encountered was hardly less threatening to Soviet rule than had been the more open warfare. The government, dependent on its courts, now effectively augmented by the judicial powers of the terrifying GPU, needed a strengthened prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In May of 1922 the People’s Commissariat of Justice presented its proposal of organization to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and found itself immediately on the defensive against attack by opposition within the Communist faction. This had not been expected, and there was some dismay when the main points were rejected altogether. Once before, a central &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of prosecutors—even though for the Revolutionary Tribunals—had cast reflection on local organs by demanding transferal of cases to their jurisdiction or by sending one of their own number to prosecute locally. Now, as the Commissariat of Justice proposed: (1) the direct subordination of the local prosecutors to the Prosecuting Attorney of the Republic who appoints and dismisses them, and (2) the right of local prosecutors to protest before the central authorities against unconstitutional decisions by local executive committees, it was held by the majority of the Central Executive Committee that there was in such suggestions an element of distrust of local authorities too strong to be accepted. A commission appointed by the session, in rejecting such proposals, made one of its own. It was suggested that there be set up a “dual” subordination of prosecutors, making them responsible both to the central authority and to the local executive committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a state of affairs brought intervention from the captain of the ship of state. Lenin wrote a special letter to Stalin that brought the opposition to terms when it was read before the Central Executive Committee. He enumerated therein some of the causes of the difficulties of establishing revolutionary legality and a lack of uniformity of the application and administration of the laws were chief among these. Likewise, there was always the alibi of local peculiarities and conditions. For us of the United States who have struggled with forty-eight different types of provisions, of applications, and administration, there is understanding of his argument. A suggestion of anything possible to prevent it seems unanswerable. “The basic evil in the whole of our life and in the whole of our lack of culture,” wrote Lenin, “is in the ancient Russian attitude of laissez-faire and in the custom of semi-savages who want to retain the local justice of Kaluga as distinguished from that of Kazan.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He then puts a question. Can it be tolerated in a country of proletarian dictatorship, in a country building up a socialist economy? Here is his answer. “There can be no Kaluga justice different from that of Kazan, but there must be a uniform All-Russian justice, and even a uniform justice for the whole Federation of Soviet Republics.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That started the effort toward uniformity. The most recent chapter in the development was in 1933 (June 23) when the office of the Attorney General was created to centralize the prosecution of the whole Soviet Union. There have been steps between the two enactments but they have moved steadily toward the recent accomplishment. In the earlier organization the position as head of the public prosecution of the USSR, now held by the Attorney General, was occupied by the Commissar of Justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duty of the prosecution, now headed by the Attorney General of the USSR, is not merely to prosecute. His functions are far beyond that limit. If he were confined to that there would not be great importance to his office.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet judicial trial the prosecutor is robbed of his glamorous role as he appears in our own courts. He, as well as the defending attorney, is a mere assistant to the court, there to aid it in getting at the truth of the affair before them. It is apparent that he has been appointed in such a manner that he is nearer to the judge than the defense lawyer. He is likely of the same party affiliation, he comes from the same social class, he is in sympathy with the order of government. It is certainly more likely that he exerts a greater influence on the court than the other side’s attorney who may hold an opposite viewpoint. One notices that often the defense attorney is of a different appearance in manner of dress, in terminology, and in speech, from the court and prosecutor. It may be supposed that this occasionally causes the court to decide against him, even though the bias is unconscious, since it is very likely that he is defending a person who is a “class enemy,” and with whose point of view he may be in sympathy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That would probably have been truer a few years ago than it is now. With the prevailing attitude of “winning over” wherever possible, and the “crushing” of only those who are distinctly to be feared as socially dangerous, there seems to be no great prejudice shown. It must exist to a degree, but antagonism does not seem a part of the present policy of state. If a person before the court can be made into a useful citizen then the object is to do it. Those who deliberately continue to struggle against the laws of the class in power will certainly be dealt with in an uncompromising manner, and if it is fairly clear the crime is of this nature then a defending lawyer would hardly be listened to with very much thought. It would be the day of the prosecutor. Likewise in establishing the class nature of the crime, the word of the prosecutor would be worth more to the court because of his sympathy with the existing order. But since it is to the interest of the state to protect an individual, to retain the aid and sympathy of all possible and to win and keep the confidence of its masses, it is not likely that there will be many who are innocent in this respect convicted in the regular judicial trials where open sessions prevail and the people in large numbers attend. One of the impressive characteristics of the court room in the Soviet Union is the attendance and interest of the citizens. They discuss the verdict with animation and it is to be noted that they usually agree with the court’s decision. If those in attendance disagreed too often it would hardly be a good thing for the judge. It will be remembered that power of impeachment is exercised in this country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The lack of importance of the prosecutor in trial is exemplified by his absence from trial frequently, in the People’s Court. It is not usual in this lower tribunal for either prosecutor or defense lawyer to be in attendance. At times, however, they do appear. But there is no place in the system for the ingenious display of a game of wits between attorneys as there is no jury such as ours nor anyone on whom an emotional impression could be made. There is really no great need in the ordinary case for attorneys either for the state or the defense. The court has both the power and responsibility to see that all evidence is placed before it. There can be no such objections to its introduction as we are accustomed to hear, resulting in the escape of criminals from the law because of the lack of admission of evidence. The story comes out, the witness tells the tale without any instruction to answer “yes” or “no” to the questions put to him. As already illustrated by actual cases, it is an informal narrative, interrupted by pertinent questions by judge or jurors or other parties to the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To see, then, what the prosecutor’s functions are, let us look at the following list as given in 1922 at the establishment of the centralized prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To supervise on behalf of the State the legality of the actions of all administrative organs, economic institutions, public and private organizations, and private persons, by instituting criminal proceedings against guilty persons and by protesting against decisions infringing upon the laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To observe directly the activities of investigation organs, criminal inquiry organs, and also the activity of organs of OGPU.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To prosecute in court. [Note that this is third in order of importance.]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) To see to the proper treatment of inmates in homes of correction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As can be seen from this enumeration the functions of the organs of Soviet prosecution extend far beyond the limits of mere judicial supervision.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Accordingly, the Attorney of the Republic (originally in RSFSR, the People’s Commissar of Justice) was entrusted:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) To look after the legal activity of all the People’s Commissariats and other central institutions and organizations and to make proposals for the repeal or amendment of orders and regulations issued by them that are not consistent with the law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) To protest against such orders and regulations before the Council of People’s Commissars and the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee with a view to their abolition [the protest by the Attorney General does not stop, however, the carrying out of an order against which a protest was made].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) To guide and control the activities of local prosecuting organs. The functions of local prosecutors were:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To propose to local executive committees the repeal or amendment of regulations and decisions that do not conform to the law, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To protest against such regulations and decisions, through the Attorney General of the republic, to the Council of People’s Commissars or to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the realm of combatting criminality, the Public Prosecutor was commissioned:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To institute local proceedings against officials and private persons either on his own initiative or on complaints and statements received by him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the conducting of inquiries and preliminary investigations, to advise organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation on the question of restrictive measures and other questions connected with preliminary investigation, and to conform the indictment drawn up by investigators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To decide the question of prosecution or cancelling of cases coming up to him from investigating organs, to take part in preliminary sittings of the court on the question of trying or dismissing a given case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To prosecute in court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) To protest in the order of cassation against verdicts and findings of the court, and also protest by way of supervision against verdicts of the first instance and cassation decisions of regional and provincial courts that have already come into force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) To look after the proper treatment of inmates in all places of detention without exception, and to liberate persons improperly held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this enumeration it can be seen that his duty as prosecutor is third on the list. But it is in this function that we think of him and it is this part of his work that we shall go into in some detail because of its connection with what we are studying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to the prosecutor’s occupation with criminal procedure there is first the preliminary investigation. When the militia or the former organs of the OGPU or any other agent turn over to the investigator certain material evidence of crime the prosecution starts to function. The office of the prosecution is to institute criminal proceedings on the first definite suspicion that a crime has been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the proceedings are in the preliminary stage the position of the prosecution is very different from what it will be later. He is now concerned with finding out the truth of the situation and not of “fastening” upon some one an act of which he is not guilty but for which there must be a conviction. If he goes into court for trial too many times with cases that are not supported by the testimony as brought out by the court the inference is that he either is not honest or not capable in his preliminary investigation. While a prosecutor often makes a mistake, as further court testimony may show, and is in honor bound to withdraw prosecution when he discovers it, this would probably be because of circumstances which he could not control such as the absence of a witness or the testimony of one not revealed at that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, in the preliminary examination he is not an accuser. He is the chief of all that takes place, and he is in full charge. His investigator carries out the work of this stage in less complex cases but the prosecutor is responsible for direction and policy. He does not seek evidence of guilt at this time any more than he tries to establish innocence. He gathers every available bit of data and then makes his decision as to whether the case is to go on. But once he has come to the conclusion that the indictment is sufficiently well founded and the accused becomes the defendant in the judicial trial, his position is changed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the trial he is the prosecutor. He now believes the defendant guilty or he would not have remanded him for court action. He now takes part in weighing the evidence produced in court and urges some measure of punishment in his speech. But so intent is he still on getting justice that he may cease his prosecution if he decides that he has been wrong in his preliminary examination. It is his duty to do so and to convince the court he is correct in his action. One prosecutor told the writer of four occasions in his own practice when he had done this. One has an incredulous feeling in hearing a prosecuting attorney make a plea for the reduction of a sentence or for a verdict of not guilty, but such a case is recorded in the following paragraphs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Supreme Court a case was on appeal from a Regional Court. A group of seven men had been found guilty of stealing vegetables and fruit from a co-operative store in which one was manager. They had resold the articles and had thereby made some 20,000 rubles. The two leaders had received the death penalty, the others lesser ones. The death penalties had been appealed and the prosecutor and the defense attorneys were present with their arguments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense lawyer spoke quite at length, arguing that the amount had been really smaller than was stated, that the character of the men had always been good, and then he went to points of law. He contended that it had been a mistake to apply the Law of August 7, 1932, providing the death penalty for larceny of state property, to this act as no theft of state property had actually taken place. The men had paid the regulation amount to the state, but had simply sold the fruit and vegetables at an advanced price over state prices, for a sufficient period to bring in the money in that manner. He contended that instead the men were guilty of using official position for personal benefit and that Article 109 of the Criminal Code, providing punishment for such a crime, should have been applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His points had not been well made and when the prosecutor arose to speak one was quite prepared for his demolition of the previous argument. He was an able, well-trained man. No one consults any precedents or books of law in the Soviet court. The observer is struck by the absence of such volumes from the room. The court judges each case on its merits in the light of certain established policy. It seemed only a matter of formality for the judges to retire and bring back the decision that the verdict should stand. But the peculiarity of the prosecution in this judicial system now showed. The attorney paused, started again. He reminded the court that the men were young, that this was the only offense with which they had been charged and that one of these in particular had been a good citizen until he had begun to drink too heavily. He thought the sentence too severe and that it should be commuted to the maximum ten-year term. He likewise recommended that some of the sentences of the lesser members of the group needed revision. The court acted on his recommendation and the two wives present were able to go into frenzied joy over the giving back of life to their respective husbands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The case brings out the attitude of the prosecution toward their tasks as accusers. The basic function of the prosecutor is to establish all the testimony he can to support an indictment before the court. That is what he comes into court for. The defense has its lawyer to see that its interests are protected. The prosecutor thinks of the side of society and the state. But at the same time, theoretically, he must not do anything to prevent the real truth of the case from being revealed. It is not in keeping with the role and dignity of his office to keep back evidence, to shuffle facts, or in any manner to defeat the carriage of justice. And in attempting to carry out the higher requirements of his office he cannot insist on the charges of the indictment if the testimony brought out at the trial has modified them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to note that there are deviations from the general principle that the prosecutor conducts the prosecution at the trial. Throughout the land there is a system in practice of giving training to the more able among the peasants and workers to act in the capacity of public accuser in the simpler cases. This special prosecutor is usually unaided unless the case is of a more serious nature, when he will probably serve in conjunction with some member of the prosecutor’s office. This service is of a wholly voluntary nature with no pay attached, but there is compensation for the individual in the position of importance he occupies in his community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are also cases where the plaintiff hires his own lawyer to prosecute the case and a public prosecutor appears only if the case is of such a nature or takes such a turn that there is a public interest which needs protecting, or in case there must be intervention to secure fair play. An example of this type of case would be one in which there was bodily injury that while causing pain still had no serious consequences. Cases involving insults, libels and slander likewise are often prosecuted by private attorneys without the aid of the public official. In all of such cases action is not brought by the state, of course, but is begun by the oral or written complaint of the injured party and may be settled by the plaintiff and defendant between themselves at any time while the trial is in progress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In cases involving such charges as the violation of patent or copyright laws, forced sexual intercourse, and a few others of a private nature, the procedure is still different. Prosecution is by the public prosecutor but even though he knows of the existence of such violations he cannot institute proceedings. The injured party must make the complaint and give co-operation but while he may have his own lawyer also the state takes charge of the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For a more complete picture of the prosecution as it exists in the Soviet Union today, its organization is briefly given. It follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The Attorney General of the USSR who is the head of the prosecution in the Soviet Union. He has, of course, a staff of assistants. He is appointed by the Central Executive Committee, and is also responsible to the Council of People’s Commissars.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The Assistant Attorney General of the USSR, appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) The attorneys of the various federal republics who are appointed by the Attorney General of the USSR on approval by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) The prosecutors of the regional and provincial courts are appointed and may be dismissed for cause by the attorneys of the federal republics with the consent of the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) The attorneys for military and transport tribunals are appointed and may be dismissed by the Attorney General of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) District attorneys and people’s investigators are appointed and dismissed by regional and provincial attorneys.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Senior investigators and investigators on most important cases are appointed and dismissed by those attorneys to whom they are attached.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties with which they are charged are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To supervise the consistence of decisions and regulations of separate departments of the USSR and federal republics and of local authorities with the constitution of the USSR and the decisions and regulations of the government of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To look after the correct and uniform application of the laws by the judicial institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To institute criminal proceedings and to prosecute in all legal instances throughout the territory of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) To look after the legality and correctness of the actions of OGPU, militia, and correctional labor institutions on the basis of a special order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) General guidance of the activities of the prosecution in the federal republics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER IX: THE DEFENSE AND THE DEFENDANT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Bar has had a precarious existence under Soviet rule, but it seems now to have come on to firm ground. Going back to that First Decree of 1917, when the prosecution was swept away, we find the institution of private attorneys suffering a like fate and an idea substituted that anybody might be an attorney and defend. However, a limitation was soon put on the “anybody” by the Second Decree on Courts which created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, the duties of whose members were both to prosecute and to defend. While any citizen might become a member of this &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; on the proper recommendation of the Soviets of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies, he was supposed to give his time and attention to being an attorney, which somewhat narrowed down the first broad inclusion. There must have been some slight ability, too, on the part of the persons appointed, over the ordinary run of citizen, in order that they be recommended to membership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This method of providing for defense and prosecution existed until 1920. The People’s Court Act of 1918 changed the status of these defenders and prosecutors in that they were made officials of the Republic and were accorded a salary equal to that of a people’s judge. These members of the college in their capacity&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
as defenders were augmented at times by relatives of the defendant and at times replaced by the legal adviser of an institution, appointed by the director to serve in some particular case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By 1920 this system of one body affording now a prosecutor, now a defender, was found to be not adequate, not in keeping with the rights of the defendant which orderly legality must establish, nor, on the other hand, providing a sustained attitude of prosecution such as the state needed. The People’s Court Act of that year created separate institutions for the two purposes. There was now evidence of a selected membership. Not just “any citizen,” even though he might devote himself to the duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, could serve, but there was to be a list prepared by the local Soviets, of persons who were qualified to act in this capacity. From this list defending advocates were to be selected for temporary duty, not to exceed six days in a six month period, and were to be paid a sum in proportion to the remuneration received by a co-judge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was something in the nature of our own jury service, and was regarded as a solemn duty of a citizen qualified for the function. In the Collected Laws of 1920 we find a circular from the Commissar of Justice issuing instructions and admonishing that the defense in court, in criminal cases, is a social duty of all citizens, who, because of profession, education, or party affiliation, are qualified to appear as defenders at the trial.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collected Laws, No. 100, Article 543, 1920, Section 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Doubtful defense it may have been to one whose life hung in balance, but the institution was progressing toward a time when persons on trial might be ably represented in the judicial inquiry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The institution of the New Economic Policy, bringing a new complexity and confusion into the economic and political life of the Union, created new necessities of various kinds, one of which, as we have already seen, was a development in the administration of Criminal Law. With the remarkable rapidity of the development of institutions in other lines, the Soviet judicial system began to take firmer shape and to assume a character of responsibility for orderly legality. If the court was to provide equality of opportunity and privileges to all, thus fulfilling the slogan of the Socialist State of which it was an organ, then the rights of the defendant must be protected, not only by legislative safeguards but by means of adequate representation at the bar of justice. If prosecution was to be stiffened in this era of fighting the opponents in a new way, then a balanced procedure called also for more adequate aid to the man accused.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Advocacy Act of 1922, with its sweeping reforms for the judiciary, restored to the Union the possibility of adequate defense for the person who stands accused in court. It created the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers, and made its members responsible for the legal aid of a party held for trial. The number of members of the college were, however, to be restricted by authority of the provincial departments of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This limitation was removed by the Judiciary Act of 1926 which elaborated the provisions of the earlier Act and dealt fully with the organization, function, and duties of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;. While the number is not restricted, the member, when accepted by the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, may be rejected by the provincial executive committee within a month from the time it is informed of his admission.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The qualifications required of the members provides for at least two years’ service in some judiciary position within the Soviet Union not lower than the People’s Court which insures an acquaintance with the law. To be admitted one must also either have a higher juridical education or have passed a prescribed examination. Admission is refused to those who have been expelled from public organizations for misconduct (for a period of three years), condemned for crimes, or under trial or investigation the member is suspended in certain cases. No lawyer may defend in court unless he is a member of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039;, or bar.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; is self-governing along the lines of other Soviet institutions. It elects its own presidium which works out the general problems of the organization. It decides on disciplinary questions, on general plans of work, and on the fees to be paid by its members. It has no authority over the fees to be paid by clients. That lies in the hands of the Commissariat of Justice which sets up a regular schedule, according to the ability of the person to pay and the complexity of the case. There are four groups according to these provisions. At the bottom are the poor, so designated by the people’s court, who pay no fees; in the next group are those workers, clerks and peasants who are permitted a small rate; the third group consists of any not included in the first two, who may also pay a rate set by the Commissariat; and there is the final group who, not needing the intervention of the Commissar, may make its own terms with the collegium.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In Moscow alone there are about fifty private lawyers not connected with any “corporation,” later to be described, who may be hired as they would be anywhere. They are those sufficiently well known to attract a private practice, and do not need the aid the corporation can give. They agree on the fee to be paid, without any intervention on the part of the state, and are not restricted in income.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The duties of the members of this organization do not consist alone in defending in court. The members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; attached to the courts, provincial, regional, or organized as county bureaus, deliver lectures on law, acquaint the masses with their legal rights and duties through visits to large factories and other centers, and must defend without pay any case referred to them. The first duty of the legal profession is concerned with the observance of revolutionary legality, but within the bounds set by this legality, he must defend his client. The protection of this same individual is, however, the acknowledged duty of both judge and prosecutor, so why the necessity of defense counsel at all in such a system, one wonders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As already pointed out the simpler cases tried in the People’s Court rarely do have attorneys on either side, but in the more complicated cases the story may not be so easily got at. It may be necessary to the honest defense of the accused or in the determination of his sentence that certain orders or decrees about which he knows nothing be applied to his case. In such an event he needs some one who is acquainted with various enactments. In the next place he may not be of a nature so cool and composed when his life or liberty is at stake that he can interrogate witnesses himself, cross question, and otherwise exercise his legal rights. Likewise, if it is a serious case, when he gets his last word before the court he will want it to be an effective one. The speech of a good lawyer, analyzing and weighing the evidence, may be a deciding factor. Straightforward and interested in the protection of the state as a lawyer may be, he is likely to think of some points in favor of his client that neither judge nor prosecutor would find unaided. And that leads to the third and last acknowledged reason for the use of private attorneys. It is likely that the prosecutor may be prejudiced in favor of the guilt which he has already seen indicated by the evidence he had in hand when he remanded the accused for trial. It is likely also that the judge, having found that evidence sufficient to sustain the indictment, may not be able to see some things on the other side that a legal adviser hired for the purpose would be able to find. The authorities on criminal law believe that, too, and therefore, on the theory that innocence is presumed until guilt is proved, they provide for an advocate who is more likely to be conscious of the innocence. A question occurs here as to whether an advocate would risk defending a client whom he knew to be guilty through a confession or otherwise. Theoretically, he would only in this case attempt to interpret or explain the act so as to get freedom or a lesser sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defense often has a lawyer when there is no prosecuting attorney present. In the People’s Court the state representative may not appear, and yet the counsel for the defense is always admitted. The reverse cannot be true. There can be no prosecutor present without the defense counsel. One of the specific provisions of the law is that on all occasions when a prosecutor appears for the state there must also be a counsel for the defendant. In case the latter has not been able to get one or is not able to pay, the court looks after the matter for him by having the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers appoint a counsel. It may be a case a lawyer would not want; it may be the worst of the so-called “class enemies,” but some one must serve. Not only that, but if the complexity of the case warrants it, one of the best must be appointed. The &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; pays the member serving on such an unremunerated errand out of its own funds, according to the fees he is accustomed to receive and according to the complexity of the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is one other condition in which the court must see that the defense is represented by counsel. If the defendant is deaf or dumb or suffering from any physical handicap that will prevent his understanding correctly the procedure of the case counsel is obligatory. Likewise, in the case of juveniles of 16-18 years of age (the court does not handle the cases of those under 16), the instructions of the Commissariat of Justice is that there be counsel provided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The defense counsel, once in charge of the case, has rights and privileges as great as the prosecution. He may see his client as often as he wants to, for as long as is necessary, without the presence of any attendant or official. He has the right to advise the defendant all during the trial. He has the right to records in the case so that he may study it thoroughly and introduce any evidence he finds necessary in the interest of justice for his client. And he has a right to the last word. He not only makes the final speech but he questions witnesses after the prosecution.&lt;br /&gt;
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The lawyers of Russia, with the exception of a few independent ones, are organized into “collective corporations.” This, of course, is right in line with the socialist theory of government. While lawyers have a right to engage in private practice there are a number of reasons why one would prefer to be a member of one of these collective bodies. Let us look at some of the characteristics of these organizations. The following list was given by Professor Brusilovsky, who is himself a member of the collegium.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“(1) The individual lawyer has no direct financial transaction with the client. The fee is fixed by a special consultant and paid to the treasurer of the ‘collective.’&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The lawyer may go on his vacation knowing his client will be served by colleagues. While on vacation he draws a salary equal to his normal monthly income.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) here is value in consulting a number of lawyers on a case to clear up difficult points. This is especially valuable for the young members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Fees are differentiated according to the qualification of the individual lawyer, his service record, experience and ability. He is insured against sickness and incapacity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Membership—It is open to all citizens who: (a) possess electoral rights, (b) have a certain record of service in the organs of Soviet justice, and (c) have either passed the prescribed examination or have received a superior juridical education.”&lt;br /&gt;
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We have been considering up to now in this chapter the organization of the defense provided for in the law. This is the machinery through which the rights of an individual may be protected in criminal procedure. Now, let us turn to the defendant himself as he appears in the case and see what safeguards are given him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is, first, the matter of the preliminary trial. While that phase of the case as a whole has already been discussed the rights accorded to the suspected person were purposely not emphasized since that angle of the proceedings properly belongs here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To begin with, let us suppose the suspect is held in custody by the arresting organs, the militia or the former agents of the OGPU. They can keep him just twenty-four hours, and no more, until they must get permission from the people’s judge or from the prosecuting attorney for his detention. If they cannot get enough evidence in that time to support the arrest there is nothing to do but release him. That does not mean, however, that the case must be dropped. If they are convinced of his guilt, but have not been able by that time to establish it, the authorities may permit the man to be held a longer time so that the case can be built up, or in case the suspicion has not enough grounds even for that, they may go on working quietly until they do uncover what they want. However, for the sake of our case, suppose the prosecutor gives permission for the man to be held. In fourteen days there must be either release or sufficient evidence to hold him. While there are no &#039;&#039;habeas corpus&#039;&#039; proceedings in the administration of Soviet law, there is the assurance that a man must be either released at the end of two weeks or some testimony produced that will justify his being held.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor may he languish in jail while his trial is put off from day to day. The maximum time permitted for the preliminary work and the bringing of a case to trial is one month. Obviously there may be cases when it will be absolutely necessary to extend this limit and by permission it may be extended. But the law provides that there must be reasons shown as to why extra time is asked. The fact that this limit is adhered to in practice is shown by records that in the city court trials of Moscow 75 per cent. of the cases are tried in ten days and the majority of the others in fifteen or twenty. It is quite likely that there are cases in which an arresting organ holds a man more than the twenty-four hours or an investigator permits more than the maximum time to elapse before trial, but members of the Commissariat of Justice insist that if detected in such acts the agents are swiftly and surely punished. Those in authority do not hold in high esteem those officials who do not cooperate in the establishment of revolutionary legality. While there would, of course, be no statistics of such illegal practices, those in prison of whom the writer asked the question about the time of pre-trial detention gave answers of periods which were all within the limit except two. One man indicated that his rights had been violated, the other gave causes for his detention beyond the period.&lt;br /&gt;
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The person under suspicion (it will be recalled that he is not the “accused” until such time as a definite accusal is made) may make a complaint at any time against the actions of those conducting the preliminary inquiry or investigation, and such a complaint may be appealed within seven days, not only to the prosecutor but to the judge under whose jurisdiction the case may be. If it is a serious case, he may from the beginning have employed counsel to do that for him, but in the event of the simpler case, or of his having no counsel, there is sure to be some interested person among family or friends who will attend to this for him, if he should be detained in such a manner that he could not reach the proper authority and the one against whom he complained would not take care of the matter for him. The law provides that such an official must receive and transmit a complaint directed against him, but there might conceivably be instances when meeting this duty would be unpleasant—especially if the official was guilty.&lt;br /&gt;
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During the preliminary trial the defendant is protected in every possible way. If he has not been in custody the initial steps may have been taken without his cognizance. This may have been necessary in order to prevent his escape while ground was being prepared for holding him. But, if there is sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation he is now apprized of it. He may be summoned to appear in almost any manner—by telephone, telegraph or otherwise, or if the circumstances are such that his escape must be prevented, he may be then arrested. In any case he now participates in the investigation which, it is remembered, is carried on by the investigator or, in the event of a serious case, by the prosecutor.&lt;br /&gt;
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He is now told what the charges against him are, and it is made very clear to him. He may at this moment offer an explanation of the substantial facts which will put an entirely new interpretation on the case, and cause its dismissal, if he substantiates what he tells. It is to be remembered that there are no sides taken in this stage of the procedure. It is usual that no counsel has yet appeared for the person under inquiry, the prosecutor is acting in his rôle of collector of information and there is, theoretically, at least, no effort to pin either guilt or innocence on to the party. The accused (he becomes “accused” from the moment the charge is officially explained to him) may suggest witnesses, may request experts, as we have previously seen, and attach any proofs to the documents, and such requests must be granted unless the investigator is convinced that they have no real importance in the case. If he does the latter, he is likely to be rather sure of his ground, as otherwise his judgment would face reversal when his decision was appealed to a higher authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have already referred to the use of experts and the accused person’s rights as to selection. With all the information collected and the decision made, his chance to submit evidence to prevent the trial is still not exhausted. On the decision of the investigator to present the accusation, the person against whom it is directed may go over all the materials collected. Now, in the light of what he finds, he may offer further elucidation himself or he may request further witnesses who will be able to shed additional light. He is given every opportunity here, by law at least, to get in a stroke that will indicate his innocence. And in the event it goes to the court, in spite of his efforts, the judge may be convinced of the weight of his argument or evidence and direct the investigator to either build up his case better or dismiss it.&lt;br /&gt;
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We will suppose it stands. The administrative session of court places the case on its calendar. It comes to trial after not longer than a month from the time the accusation is handed over by the investigator, and the accused becomes the defendant. In the meantime the accused will have secured his counsel. Little was said about the part a counsel for the defense might play in the preliminary stages, for the reason that except in serious cases there would almost surely be none at that time. The normal time for the appointment of one by the court, in cases requiring this, would be immediately after it was decided to hold the person for trial. On the presentation of the accusation to the accused he is informed of his legal right to counsel. In case he is unable to provide for an attorney he petitions the court for aid. Likewise, if he chooses one at this time, he submits the name for approval. Then the court, in its administrative session, when deciding whether to hold the accused for trial, likewise settles the question of counsel, if the accused has petitioned, by approving his choice or appointing one. Approval of his choice is necessary only if he has selected some person outside of such authorized lists as members of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; or some representative provided by government institutions. Otherwise he may select whomever he will among the authorized persons and be assured that that person must act for him and for a fee that will be set for him within his ability to pay. The element of contest which is one of the basic principles in the Soviet judicature is now found for the first time. Two parties are aligned one against the other, each to prove its rightness. From this time on, the accused is the defendant and there are two sides to the case. Let us see the trial.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defendant has the right to a public trial. This, too, is one of the principles of criminal procedure of the Soviet courts and by its observation there is insured fairness through public opinion. Through publicity there is brought about both the education of the people and the control of the court by them. There are only two conditions under which the trial may be behind closed doors—when a state secret must be kept, and in sexual crimes where intimate details must be revealed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defendant has a right to be present at his own trial, unless he voluntarily stays away. A case may be tried without him, if he has given his consent or when he has failed to respond to the summons. In the latter case, however, it must be clearly shown that an effort was made to reach him and that he directly evaded it, or there will probably be a reversal of the verdict in the higher court. An attempt to use his lack of response as an excuse for trial without his presence would have to be supported sufficiently to avoid abuse. In simpler cases when there is no possibility of imposing a prison sentence, his presence may not be required by the court, but in offenses punishable by a prison sentence he must be there if he can be found.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the case opens, the presiding judge explains to the defendant his rights, as a party to the court, to make use of all material, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to make any statements he will at any stage of the trial. These things he may do even though he is represented by counsel, and if he has decided to defend himself or entrust it to some relative he is sure to find plenty of opportunity to exercise this right. The writer witnessed one case in which a simple-looking workman took care of his interests so well that one could understand his going to trial without legal aid. Before his vehement and rapid-fire interrogation, witnesses quailed and became confused. The informality of the proceedings permits of participation without timidity in most cases. There is no fear of set rules of the game, because they do not exist. The accused defends himself as he would before his neighbors.&lt;br /&gt;
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The next assurance is that the defendant may cause the removal of judge or juror if there is likely to be bias in his attitude. Perhaps one of them is relative or friend to the injured party, or to some other person who would be interested in the conviction of the defendant. In that case he may challenge, giving his grounds therefor, and the question will be decided by the rest of the court sitting without the member so indicated. If he is overruled he has that fact as grounds for complaint to the cassation instance.&lt;br /&gt;
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And now as the case goes to trial, with the defendant a party to the court so that he may spar as he wishes with prosecutor or clash with witnesses, either with counsel or without, he has also the right of presumption of innocence until proven guilty. It would seem that the preliminary trial had already established guilt sufficiently so that the actual trial would merely bring to light what had gone before, and establish the degree of guilt. But such is not the theory incorporated in Soviet criminal law. It may be that evidence will take a different turn, that the very atmosphere of the public trial will provide a new viewpoint. The object of the preliminary investigation is not to constitute a determination of guilt but to give guarantee that there are some grounds for trial. Authorities on the administration of criminal law point to the relatively low percentage of convictions, there being, according to one authority, almost one-third of those remanded to the People’s Court dismissed, and a lack of conviction of at least a quarter of those actually reaching court. From that one would judge that the holding for trial by the investigation organs of the courts does not mean in actual practice that one’s guilt has been established. During the trial the defendant has every right which he has already been accorded in the preliminary procedure, but they are now rendered broader and of more value because he is familiar with all the data that have been produced, and all the witnesses who have been gathered by the investigation are now before him for questioning. Through his cross-examination of the state’s witnesses he may develop lines of proof that he can substantiate by calling further witnesses of his own, or he may refute the state’s contention. Some expert, whom the investigation used for some specific interpretation, may change his own opinion in the light of some explanation which the defendant himself or his witness can give. He has here three distinct privileges—he may request certain witnesses, other experts, or fresh proofs from the state if the case is to be sustained; he may give explanations to the court of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act at any time and as often during the trial as he wishes or thinks necessary; and he has the invaluable right to take part in the examination of all witnesses, experts, or others who take part in the trial. And now, if he has been directing his own defense he may also make the final speech and thus leave the last word with the court as it goes forth to deliberate on the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is some difference in the privileges and rights accorded one tried in the People’s Courts and in the higher courts. The reason is not far to seek. In the People’s Court there are no cases of a class nature of the serious sort. There could not be, since the jurisdiction of the People’s Court does not extend to crimes punishable by the death sentence. Here come the people from among the masses who have violated the law, but when a Kulak or one of the bourgeoisie is involved and the offense is against the state or the order of government, the case goes to a higher tribunal and the rights of the defendant are more circumscribed. In a trial when the accused is of a socially dangerous character, and restrictions are held to be necessary, the discretionary power of the judge may draw such limits as depriving the defendant of rights of counsel, of certain witnesses, or of records in the case. Such procedure, however, is said to be unusual and resorted to only in cases where the offense is of a highly dangerous character. Even in such an instance the defendant may still conduct his own case with all of his customary rights. The accused may be a socially dangerous character who must necessarily be subjected to restrictions. It is likely that this happens in a small degree and only in the most serious cases, but in fairness a chapter dealing with the rights of the defendant should call attention to this possible limitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To see the defendant in court one is impressed with the amount of liberty he has. One forgets that he is the man whose life or liberty is in jeopardy. He talks, he interrogates, he explains and argues. And it is amazing to see how these people have come to understand the working of the law. It is a part of the duty of the &#039;&#039;collegium&#039;&#039; of lawyers to help in explaining and popularizing the Soviet laws and a good job they have done of it, too. Of course, they have had their helpers, but one finds children who know why the law of August 7, 1932, providing a death penalty for larceny from the state was necessary, and as for the enactment which specifies a five-year period of imprisonment for adulteration in an effort to make for better quality, every housewife knows the answer. She demands better material for her dresses, better sugar for her table, and she has heard all about the law, its necessity and purpose, in her factory or other place of work.&lt;br /&gt;
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That acquaintance with the laws, that knowledge of the principle involved, makes it possible for an offender to do a pretty good job as his own attorney, unless he be one of the illiterate peasants. In that case, if he has no counsel, he can be rather sure of the court’s interest in finding out the facts and in interpreting them correctly. It is to the state’s interest to see that the accused person has every opportunity to be treated fairly, and the court is only the organ of the state in carrying out such a policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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As has already been said, the people seem in most cases to agree with the verdict of the court and that is worth something as an indication of justice. They are encouraged to follow the case and to understand the application of the law. After hearing their discussion at a trial, one would know of their intense interest. It seems to be an added cloak of protection for the defendant in case a judge did exceed fair play. It would be felt in the appeal!&lt;br /&gt;
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In the event of a verdict of guilty the convicted one now has his right of complaint so that his case will be reviewed by the cassational division of the higher court, the Regional or the Supreme Court, or to the latter even from the first. Herein is his last chance of life or liberty. Already we have talked of cases where the decision of the lower courts was reversed. That happens in about ten per cent. of the cases. So a man has a slim one-chance-in-ten hope of getting off from his punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the reader has, in this enumeration of rights, been impressed with the absence of one held dear in the United States—the right of a person to trial by a jury of his “peers.” But the system existent in the Soviet Union bears a resemblance in effect, although they repudiate the idea of our jury system both for political expedience and because they think the practice unsound from a judicial point of view. However, the two persons who sit with the judge do actually provide some check on his judgment and authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet system the two jurors, or co-judges, may decide independently of the judge in all cases. They are selected with a view to their having some ability to serve, and most of them seem to be people of intelligence who take an active part in the trial. While they are without doubt subject at times to influence from the judge in deliberating on the verdict, there seems also ground for suspecting that because of their nearness to the workers there would be a strong tendency to reflect the opinion of such a group in a verdict they would render. They cannot be regarded as party tools, since a large majority are not party members as against the large majority of judges who are. However, there is a class feeling. The court, as said before, is an organ for carrying out the policy of the state, and decisions will naturally consider the dangerous character of the person on trial. The class nature of the procedure is apparent and is acknowledged, but it is held to be legitimate, a necessity. The jurors could not be expected to aid in a decision, or render one on their own account, which would go against this policy. Thus it would seem that the jurors might have effect in trials not of a class nature, might actually constitute an additional safeguard to the rights of the defendant. There are cases on record where they have gone against the judgment of the court, and rendered their own verdict, thus proving that they are not always a rubber stamp.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER X: CORRECTIVE LABOR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; title of this chapter defines the attitude of the Soviet government toward those persons whom it sets apart from society for a time. It is almost necessary to see what they have done in this line to understand it properly. The institutions in which the policy is carried out have moved many people to warm praise. M. Herriot of France, on visiting the Kharkov Labor Commune exclaimed, “I am not a Communist. I am an old man,” then launched into exuberant appreciation of the system in use there.&lt;br /&gt;
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For the discussion of the system in all its details of work and education, one should read the volume, already referred to, &#039;&#039;From Prisons to Educational Institutions&#039;&#039;, edited by Assistant Attorney General A. J. Vishinsky. Each separate article is written by a specialist in his particular field and each presents in minuteness some phase of the system which the Russians use. They have known what they wanted to do in the direction of reformation even back in the days of 1917, but for so many years the idea lay, like others did, obscured by catastrophe. Terror and necessity caused severity to prevail for a long time. Punishment was the mainstay of defense from foe within in order to withstand a little better the ones then pressing from without.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the idea was there in the minds of those who were to define the penal policy and the Code of 1922, and set down the principle that punishment was not for the purpose of revenge and might not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain. With this beginning there was a steady progress toward the removing of those indignities that tend to degrade a man, until the Correctional Labor Code of 1933 completed the process. In the meantime various amendments have prohibited torture, the use of handcuffs, solitary confinement, deprivation of food, or any other measure that would have the effect of degradation or do physical harm to the person.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0178.svg|SYSTEM OF PLACES FOR DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY]]&lt;br /&gt;
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There has been a steady effort to remove what they term the “prison spirit.” There is, they tell you, no such thing as a “captive” or “prisoner.” The idea is to keep the person deprived of his liberty from feeling in any measure isolated. He is given work to do such as he would have outside and he is always conscious of its useful nature. There are instructors for the various trades, machinery, carpentry, etc., who see that each man is educated for his job.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are two main types of places for deprivation of liberty, those located in cities in close quarters, and those out in the country where there is space and greater freedom. In chapters just following some of these typical ones will be described, but they are mentioned here so that references may be clearer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Before describing the characteristics of the institutions used for corrective labor, we shall need to define the policy that goes into the system. The articles on which the materials for this chapter are mainly based are those by B. Utievsky on &#039;&#039;Prison Regime&#039;&#039;, and another entitled &#039;&#039;Work in Correctional Labor Institutions&#039;&#039; by M. Kessler and B. Oleinin, both of which are included in the volume edited by Vishinsky, already referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
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We note again in connection with this work the class character of criminal legislation. One of the basic principles is the assumption that peasants and workers deprived of their liberty are not premeditated enemies of the Soviet order, and under these circumstances it is natural to suppose that treatment for them would be milder than for the anti-proletarians, and the privileges enjoyed by them would be greater. However, this assumption does not prevent the use of the same policy and the same methods in the prison treatment of the so-called class enemies. While the main purpose in placing the political prisoner and others whose crime is chiefly against the state in outlying places was to isolate them from society and prevent their continued danger, there was still a desire to restore them as useful citizens by means of education and labor. The principle expressed in the Code that “maintenance in correctional labor institutions shall be reasonable, and shall not have for its purpose the infliction of physical pain or the degradation of human dignity” is carried out, they say, in the places where political prisoners are kept just as in others. The main difference is that these prisoners have less freedom, less liberty for contact with society. The aim, however, uppermost in their treatment is to organize a collective life for them, and by the education which is provided to cause these people to fit into that life.&lt;br /&gt;
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An example of constructive use of these prisoners from the anti-proletarian class is the building of the White Sea-Baltic Canal. It is interesting just here to give a quotation from Maxim Gorki, which illustrates their own point of view as to the value of this policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“How did the kulaks work? Here is an instance. The Podlipinsky brigade of the first section in which there were 32 kulaks in the last ten days has set a record of 25 per cent. fulfillment of their quota. But the brigade would not quit its job even when the next shift came to take their place. The brigade had to be taken off by direct order of the chief of the section.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The order Number One brigade consisted chiefly of kulaks. It was on rock work in the sixth section. It has fulfilled 130-150 per cent. of its quota. Their exemplary work was rewarded and entered into the Red Labor Book.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While this may be propaganda, the fact remains that there are those operating the locks in this canal who have been discharged as prisoners, but who continue loyally at the post. We are assured by another author that “thousands of convicts from anti-Soviet elements redeemed themselves, and showed great devotion to Soviet construction. Many gained their freedom; a great many were accorded all kinds of privileges, and a few awarded the highest order of merit.”&lt;br /&gt;
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As we come to consider the program for those prisoners from among their own masses we get on safer grounds, at least as to practice. The policy follows much the same lines. We have mentioned before the change in terminology from jails or prisons to “places for deprivation of liberty.” It has also been mentioned that the change does not appear to be limited to terminology, but that the actual purpose to carry out some definite measure by which a man may be rendered fit for a useful place in society seems well observed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here, perhaps, would be a good place to say that the program of the Communist Party in regard to treatment of those who break the law calls for eventual correctional labor without deprivation of liberty. Their ultimate goal, both expressed in policy and now being put into practice in a limited way, is that persons shall be sent to labor under supervision where training is provided. This practice will have to go slowly and proceed as their educational program prepares the way for it. At the present time there is usually no sentence of deprivation of liberty for less than one year. Any penalty of compulsory labor given for less than that minimum permits the offender to retain his liberty. In such cases the unemployed among these persons is farmed out to factory or to agricultural work with supervision and training provided. He is given a place to live near to his work, but he is free to go and come as he wishes. It is the aim of the higher judicial organs to abolish the use of deprivation of liberty as rapidly as possible, and to use it only for cases who do not respond to other measures of social defense. The Superior Court has likewise given instructions to the lower tribunals to use deprivation of liberty only as other measures have failed. The employed who are sentenced to labor without deprivation of liberty remain on the job on which they are at work and a certain per cent. of the salary received is deducted each month. With both of these classes there is a possibility of early discharge for good work and because of the practice used in all their penal institutions of counting two working days equal to three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
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Up to 1929 there were still in existence isolated places of detention but since that time the policy prevalent has been to change all of these into the favored educational establishments. At the present time all persons sentenced are taken care of in the various types of labor colonies (industrial, agricultural, road building, land improvement, etc.) or in the semi-free labor camps where guards are maintained, usually selected from among the inmates themselves, but where there are no locked rooms or prison walls.&lt;br /&gt;
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The régime, then, of these institutions, according to Utievsky, has three basic influences: (1) Socially useful, productive labor, (2) political educational influences, and (3) the development of public activity among the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now see how these three methods of influence are carried out in the institutions themselves. The purpose of labor on the part of the convicts is to provide organized collective work in a society where collective living in all its phases is a predominant note. It is essential to successful readjustment. The Kulak, with his individualistic tendencies, is re-educated in this political philosophy. While he is at this labor, the convict works under the same conditions, and with the same protections that he would enjoy in outside labor. His hours are seven or eight a day, depending upon the nature of his work, and he is permitted a weekly rest of a continuous 42-hour period. Special protection is given to the juvenile laborer, but this will be mentioned again in the chapter concerning juvenile delinquency.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no night work for women, just as there would not be in outside labor, and minors under eighteen are not to be employed in injurious trades. Maternity vacations of eight weeks for physical labor, and six weeks for mental work, both before and after childbirth are prescribed for women. There also exist regulations of various sorts for sanitation and safety. The whole idea is that the person deprived of his liberty may be made to feel that he labors on a par with workers outside; that he may feel useful in the economic plan of the nation; and, through the pay given him, continue support to his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the general consideration mentioned above, there are some special rules of importance. For example, women who are in the fifth month of pregnancy may not be sent to any work outside the institution of which they are inmates, without their consent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all labor in the Soviet Union there are a certain number of days of work (five is the general rule) and one day of rest. This is likewise true of convict labor, and on the eve of the rest day all work and school study must be suspended from dinner time (which is at midday). Another privilege of importance is that each person keeps his own work book with a record of hours, wages due, and deductions made, properly entered. In this way he does not have to take the word of any official as to the correctness of the count, but is able to see for himself and complain if an error has been made.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the matter of food there is a provision for increase in accordance with the expenditure of energy in the work assigned. One doing heavy physical labor would, for example, be given food in larger quantities than one using less strength. In accordance with the principle that a prisoner may not be degraded, the administrative office of these institutions is not permitted to make use of the personal services of the convicts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was mentioned in the beginning that one type of institution provided for the carrying on of all activities in small areas. These are of the nature of penitentiaries, but even for the type of convict in these prisons there are large works of a variety of kinds organized outside the city limits. Among these would be brick-work, bridge building colonies, house building, dairy farms and truck gardens. One of the most constructive things about this labor, in whatever line, is that it forms a part of the five-year plan, and is thus put on the same basis as other forms. The industry carried on must, first of all, satisfy the needs of the institution itself, but goods in excess of this amount are placed on the home market. Export of prison-made goods is forbidden except in the case of the sports goods made at Bolshevo Labor Commune. The latter are noted for their excellent quality and are exported to various countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the grave prison problems in this country is the question of payment of wages to persons serving sentences in penal institutions. In the Soviet system there is no unpaid labor. The amount may not be less than 25 per cent. of the existing scale, nor more than 50 per cent. The cost of maintenance is, of course, not deducted from this amount. In establishing the schedule the prison administration must have the agreement of the Commissar of Labor, and the fact of the profit or loss of the enterprise does not enter into the calculations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convict is not restricted in the spending of his earnings. He may purchase extra foodstuffs, clothing, or he may send his income to his family for support. He may be given advice in the matter, but there is no compulsion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One point in connection with this system is that labor is not compulsory. A convict may work or not as he wishes, and still receive maintenance. But in refusing to work, he loses most of the privileges which he would otherwise enjoy. Practically none do refuse, it is said. On the other hand, there is a great increase in those joining the shock brigade, the group doing excellent work, sometimes even for additional hours. In 1933 in the Moscow region, this figure reached 51.3 per cent. of the total number in these institutions. The number fluctuates usually between 54 and 78 per cent. As a result quotas of production are usually more than fulfilled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second basic influence in the program of this institution is political education. A system is established in each place of deprivation of liberty, and the official in charge is the assistant warden. Practically all education carried on has a strong political influence. However, one of the aims involved is the elimination of illiteracy. Every effort is being made in the Soviet Union to give to each citizen at least an elementary education, whether he be in prison or out. To that end there is established in every state institution schools providing for the first seven years of work. There are also other penal institution courses for the semi-illiterates and those of a sufficiently advanced nature for the more educated. There are in addition some evening and university classes for those wishing to take advantage of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the regular school work which is carried on both by teachers from the outside and some selected from qualified inmates, there is a system of lectures covering specialized subjects. These are designed to give information of a social-political nature and educate the individual in the use of sanitation and hygiene. There are others of a general educational character embracing material of interest to the group. These lectures are given by specialists in the various fields, who are invited by prison administrators, and by any one among the convicts who might be qualified to talk on a particular subject. Admission, of course, is open to all without restriction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In connection with the education work, there are libraries and reading rooms. There is a library located in each place of deprivation of liberty, and there are also circulating ones, and in neither are there restrictions as to the use of books. In most cases some work of this nature is obligatory, but beyond that every convict is not only permitted to use the facilities, but is encouraged to take advantage of the privileges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The reading room may be visited at any free hour. Here are found recent newspapers, magazines and other periodicals. Newspapers are also distributed in the rooms, and convicts may subscribe to their own outside these limits if they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The radio with which each room is usually equipped also constitutes an important instrument of education. Lectures, music, and other information or entertainment of an educational and cultural nature may be listened to by the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most interesting phases in the development of this program in these institutions is the art work. The convicts are trained in dramatic performance and also enjoy in this connection entertainment by outside companies. There are concerts and moving pictures given, in almost every one of these places, and convicts attend not less than once a week. But the interesting side of it to an observer is the work the inmates do themselves in the matter of writing and producing their own stage performances. The convicts are free to attend and there is, of course, no charge for admission. A theater or auditorium is a part of the equipment of every institution of this nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The sanitary education carried on is in line with the program of other education of this nature, distributing such information to the masses of people. There is an opportunity here for teaching individuals in an effective way, and for seeing that certain fundamentals are put into actual practice. There is a bureau of sanitary education in each institution, composed of the house physician, representatives from the department of political education, and delegates elected by the convicts themselves, devoting itself to this phase of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The purpose of these institutions is seen in its most complete fulfillment in the vocational training which each gives. There are courses in schools of all the various trade groups, providing both theoretical and practical training in skilled trades. The unskilled laborer is here transformed into a man with specialized information in some particular line, which will both render him useful in industry and give him happiness in his work. In 1931, 7,700 convicts attended such courses in the Soviet Union, and 6,500 workers were in that year turned out trained for some particular trade. In 1933 the plan was for giving such preparation to 24,000. Salvation for society and for the individual, they hold, lies in this direction and every man and woman sentenced for law-breaking must be so fitted to earning a livelihood that he will not transgress again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be mentioned before passing to the next point that both cultural and legal work is carried on by means of mass meetings through the organization of such groups as law clubs, and by means of evening forums, lectures and talks. There is also a legal bureau composed of representatives of the department of political education, and two members elected from the convicts, which gives legal aid or advice to the inmates whenever it is needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third basic influence in correctional labor—the development of public activities among the convicts—accounts for some of the most valuable rehabilitating work done in these places, in the author’s opinion. The aim here is to strengthen, or develop where they have been lacking, the social habits of the individual; to turn him into a conscious and active member of society. The basic forms of social activity in these institutions take several directions. There is first the general meeting on various occasions for a variety of purposes. This may be for the formation of social organizations, for the conducting of a campaign for the election of some representative, or perhaps for a celebration of some revolutionary event. The convicts establish their own rules of procedure and make whatever proposals are appropriate. These general meetings take care of whatever concerns are common to the entire population, and leave to the more specialized groups whatever is of narrower interest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the production conferences, held by convicts in the same manner as those used by free-workers in industrial enterprises, an active part is taken in settling whatever questions arise in relation to production. They discuss industrial plans for improvement, financial methods, quota fulfillment, or any question that would logically come within their jurisdiction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the most outstanding achievements in the line of self-activities among the convicts is the development of the comradely courts. Through this tribunal those disciplinary problems referred to it are transferred from the administration to the convicts themselves. This court is responsible for the maintenance of order and for seeing that a high quality of educational work prevails, for administering disciplinary measures in the case of shirking work or lessons, of spoiling the equipment of the shops, of laxity in observance of regulations of sanitation and health, of the use of indecent language, of damage done to any book or periodical, of inciting ill treatment of one convict by another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The court is composed of a chairman, and two jurors elected at one of the general meetings referred to above. The penalties which they may impose on one who breaks the rules, or fails to live up to the standard set, are as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) Reprimand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) Censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) Censure with strict warning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(4) Censure with publication in local newspapers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(5) Limitation of visits by friends from outside for a period of not more than one month.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(6) Application to supervisory committee for transfer to another prison with a stricter régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(7) Application for withholding vacation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(8) Application for either partial or complete non-discounting of working days.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(9) Application for withholding all probation, and early release during a certain period of not more than one month after maturing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(10) Restitution of damage done.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case of undue severity on the part of this court, the warden may alter the penalty to a milder form.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already referred in the paragraphs dealing with education to cultural committees. These are elected at a general mass meeting to put into action the plans for political education work or to devote themselves to other problems of a cultural nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every place of deprivation of liberty has its wall newspaper, changed about every week or ten days and carrying news of various sorts of a political or educational nature, as well as items of interest to prison life. The editorial boards of these papers are likewise elected at the general meetings. Prison administrators as well as other authorities on penal policy in the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the development of public activities among the prisoners has yielded splendid results of a social nature. They point to the success of the “book soobotnik” (one day’s salary given for books) which netted 100,000 rubles. It is stated that the gifts were entirely voluntary without pressure from any source. Another incident showing a desirable spirit was the collection among the convicts of 31,818 rubles for an aeroplane which was presented to the fleet. There have been other acts of the same kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now we turn to the régime found in these institutions, the express purpose of which is to develop free will, initiative and self-activity. All privileges possible are permitted to the man deprived of his liberty, and his freedom as little restricted as the nature of the person himself permits. Following out the principle that no condition designed to degrade the convict or make him feel inferior may be permitted, penal authorities proceeded legislatively to remove whatever might exist in this line. The corrective labor code of 1933, for example, completely severed all connection with the progressive system of progressive classification of prisoners. The theory is that in this educational-labor program no man is to be treated with greater privilege than another unless he himself makes some deprivation necessary. Even then there are limits. A recalcitrant member of the penal population may be deprived for a period not longer than one month of such privileges as writing letters, or receiving visitors, but no corporal punishment may be inflicted nor may he be locked in solitary confinement. It is worth noting here that the solitary cells left from the Tzarist days may at times be used for tenants, but the door of the cell may not be locked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The convicts have privileges as great as can be accorded. From the day of their entrance they may walk about anywhere they wish at any time they are free from work. In those institutions located in the country, this may take the character of quite a good walk, while in those of the penitentiary type located in cities, it naturally is limited to the prison yard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Visitors may come as often as twice in five days and may consist not only of relatives but of friends and acquaintances as well. There is no red tape in making arrangements for a visit so that no difficulty of this sort prevents contact between the convict and those outside. There may be as many as three persons at one time, and they may bring with them, if they wish, gifts of food, tobacco, etc. There is no restriction in the use of tobacco except that there are some particular places where the convict is requested not to smoke. Outside of this he may have as many cigarettes as he wishes or can obtain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Neither is there restriction in the number of letters which he may write or receive. In the matter of either letters or gifts the administration reserves the right of inspection, but in the majority of cases, unless there is some suspicion attached to the person, this right is not utilized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is an interesting development in the matter of leaves. For the man who has proved himself a good worker and who is not suspected of any intention of escape, a leave of fourteen days in the year is granted. He may go where he likes on this vacation, and use it as he pleases. He is placed entirely on his honor and no guard is in attendance at any time. In addition to this a convict may obtain a leave at any time because of an emergency such as an illness or death in his family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still more liberal terms are granted to the peasant or collective farmer. In the event that he is needed for field labor, he is given a leave for the full three-month period of the season, and if he breaks no law during this leave, the time counts on his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to this leave and vacation, there is always the possibility of release after a short part of the original sentence has been served. If the person is judged fit to be restored to his place in society, and thought to be no longer a menace, he may be released after serving a minimum of one-third of his sentence. There is also the practice, as already mentioned, of counting two productive working days as three days of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before passing from the chapter describing the policy and character of corrective labor work, some mention ought to be made of the administration. Who exactly is responsible in the USSR for seeing that this policy is translated into action? At the very head are the Commissariats of Justice of the various republics.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A Law of October 24, 1934, transferred the administration of all places of deprivation of liberty to the newly created Commissariat of Home Affairs of the USSR. The organization described is now within this Department, but the author had the information too late to incorporate in the body of the book.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There is a certain amount of independence in these relationships. The Collective Labor Code of 1933 of the RSFSR made a considerable advance in the direction of autonomous supervision on the part of the administration of corrective labor organization in these republics. Those institutions located in the territory of these various republics are administered and managed by local commissars of justice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within this organization there are local administrative bodies known as observation committees. One of these exists in connection with each institution and is directly responsible for administration and management. In direct charge is the superintendent or warden, and his staff of assistants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is especially close relation between the agency of supervision and the prisoners which enables the Observation Commission to know with a high degree of accuracy as to when release is advisable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Previous to 1926 there had been two commissions participating in the distribution and release of prisoners—the Distributory Commission and the Observation Commission. The Observation Commission, however, while making recommendations to the Distributory Commission in matters of dismissal and release, played a minor role, since its viewpoint was in no way binding on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1924 provided for an Observation Commission to be established at every place of deprivation of liberty as a part of the staff of the place. On this commission was the people’s judge, and a representative of the local bureau of trade unions. This extension in the scope of the work of these commissions was made in an effort both to raise the level of work being done at the prisons and also to establish a closer contact between commission and prisoners. The result hoped for, however, was not realized as the judge was entirely, by nature of his position, separated from his work, and the representatives of the bureau took little interest in the matter. By the same Act the powers of the Distributory Commission were widened, and the Act of April 21, 1926, went further still, giving to this body authority to assign the long-term prisoners to places of agricultural work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There still was the gap between the work of the commission of release and the correctional labor institutions. The Observation Commission which was on the ground could make recommendations but they were not always accepted by the Distributory Commission which handled dismissals and releases. Many mistakes resulted and the desire of the authorities to establish intimate contact between commission and prisoners was being thwarted. Thus the Sixth Congress of Jurists proposed the liquidation of the Distributory Commissions and the reorganization of the Observation Commissions. By the reformation of 1929 new opportunities for constructive work were opened to these commissions, and the contact between them and the prisoners of the institution was finally made close and real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 made several important changes in the composition and work of these commissions of the RSFSR. There is now a Central Commission and under it trade union observation committees on which are the head of the correctional labor institution and two representatives from the general organization which are installed in each of the large corrective labor units and in all field production. Every effort has been made to see that there is close contact of these commissions with the institutions, that the policy of the central administration is carried out, that the work follows the lines it should, and results in fitting the inmates of the institutions for life as it is supposed to do. The Commissar of Justice is, in the last analysis, responsible for the work of these commissions, but by Act of February 10, 1933, he has placed that responsibility squarely on one man, the chairman of the Corrective Labor Commission, whose duty it now is to see that the policy and plans of the commissariat are carried out. This chairman is a member of the Central Observation Commission, but not the chairman of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prosecutors who were supposed to be attending the open session of these meetings and were actually present at them to the extent of 78 per cent., were found to be merely sitting quietly and taking no active part in solving problems and working out plans. By the same Act of February 10, 1933, the Commissar of Justice ordered them not only to be present but to participate actively in all meetings. There are no figures on actual participation but the percentage of attendance jumped from 78 to 82 and it is stated that practically all those present take an active part in discussions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no lack of effort to see that this commission inquires into, and knows, what is going on, is acquainted with the prisoners, and never for a moment forgets what it is set up to do. For the accomplishment of an organic union between the Observation Commission and the corrective labor institution, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee has demanded that the members of this commission participate actively in the creative and labor life of the institution as well as in its political education. To effect this there are many special meetings, besides the open ones, devoted to the problems of various industries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us see for a moment what organizations are represented on these commissions and how often the respective members attend the meetings.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; pp. 406407.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| style=&amp;quot;width: 70%&amp;quot;| Name of organization&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| No. of meetings attended&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(in per cent.)&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Corrective Labor Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 68&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Court&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 82&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Worker-peasant inspection&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 74.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Other Soviet Institutions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 54&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Women’s delegate groups&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 73&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Enterprizes&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 58&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Organization of Komsomol&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 47&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Sections of Revolutionary Law&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 63&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Trade Unions&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 66&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jurors&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 95&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Agricultural collectives&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| 60&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This table was for the last nine months of 1932. It represents not a particularly bad showing but it was in 1933 that the All-Union Central Executive Committee decided that this was not sufficient and that there must be even better attendance. It aimed its order this time at the social members and demanded that they give active aid in inculcating social form of labor into correctional labor institutions. There is no thought of sending a man away to prison to get him out of the community then forgetting all about him. He will be returning in an average time of a year and a half and the community through its representative is responsible to see that he shall return in good order. It is thus made directly everybody’s problem.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has been said elsewhere in this book that the Observation Commission is the authority for handling release and dismissal. Appeal may be taken from all of its decisions and a good percentage are reversed. Its mistakes, it is said, are largely because of a one-sided attack of the case in which its members were able only to see the seriousness of the crime, or perhaps only the social status of the convict, or maybe only his industrial activity at the place of his imprisonment. The Corrective Labor Code of 1933 takes a broader approach to the problem and demands that those responsible do the same. Each individual case must be treated from a differentiated viewpoint, with a survey of all angles involved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following table is given to show what types of disposal is used in the Soviet Union, and the relative importance of each.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; Article by N. Durmanov, entitled “Observation Commissions,” p. 396&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| class=&amp;quot;align-center&amp;quot;| &#039;&#039;Cases Examined in 1928&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| Per cent.&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of those serving in correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 22.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Early release of prisoners&lt;br /&gt;
| 0.5&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to correctional labor work&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Amnesty&lt;br /&gt;
| 7.3&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Release from imprisonment under guard&lt;br /&gt;
| 1.0&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Installment of labor days&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;It has been mentioned elsewhere that sentences are shortened by counting two productive work days as three of the sentence.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| 28.4&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Removal of strict isolation&lt;br /&gt;
| 3.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Transfer to other classification&lt;br /&gt;
| 2.2&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Assignment of type of place of detention&lt;br /&gt;
| 10.8&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Miscellaneous&lt;br /&gt;
| 13.0&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to the duties already mentioned the Observation Commission has charge of the distribution of prisoners to the proper places for the serving of the sentence imposed and for their transferal from one place to another when it becomes necessary. In order to place a convict so that the best results may be secured, a close case study is made, an analysis of his personality, characteristics, ability, social status, and other pertinent information, but if an error is made after all, then he is transferred when better acquaintance shows where he belongs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XI: SOKOLNIKI ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sokolniki&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a prison, call it by whatever name one will. It is true that the national policy relating to corrective labor and discipline modify its physiognomy, but it still presents the atmosphere of a penitentiary. This statement is not meant as any criticism of either it or its administration, since one can hardly see how that aspect of it could be otherwise as long as criminals do exist who need restraining—and some of such there are bound to be. The fact of its sterner nature is emphasized in the beginning so that the impression will not be given that a place like Bolshevo Labor Commune, described in later pages, would fulfill the requirements for all the elements found among the criminals in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Standing outside the wall, just as cold and gray as the usual for penitentiaries, and looking up at the towers at the corners where sentinels armed with rifles keep watch, one has all the feeling of a sinking heart that comes with such a sight. People are shut away there and possibly forgotten by the citizenry from whom they have been separated, perhaps, since it is the customary thing for ignorance to prevail as to prisons and penal methods. One thinks, standing there, wondering about men behind that wall, of a description written in verse by one prisoner some quarter of a century ago. It is sentimental, belonging to an age when emotion was expressed a little more freely than our practice of restraint permits now, but one suspects men still suffer as he did in a good many prison cells such as this writer has seen. Lines of the poem, especially descriptive and appropriate to this subject, speak of “where tongues are mute, and men arise to newborn wrong,” and “where men must fawn or walk with scars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stell and Null, &#039;&#039;Convict Verse&#039;&#039;, Ft. Madison, Iowa, 1908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One doesn’t need to tell people who know anything of the penal situation in the United States that conditions make it possible to write lines like that. Of all of our social endeavor, the treatment of men convicted of crime seems the place where we have most signally failed in constructive results. Constructive treatment is, of course, a rare exception rather than a rule. But it seems to this writer that the implications of the verse have a less favorable chance of being true of Soviet prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first place there is no prison sentence longer than ten years, and few offenders serve that long. The authorities figure that a maximum ten-year constructive program will fit anybody for proper living unless he is irredeemable. There will be some cases, of course, where there is failure, but the idea is to fit the régime to the majority. Right here there will be the question always forthcoming as to what they would do with our own gangster type. Give them a ten-year sentence? Not at all. They have few of them and for armed robbery one may be sentenced to death. No arguments are listed here for or against punishment by death, but in order to understand the absence of a long prison sentence it is necessary to be informed as to what happens to those who would ordinarily be the recipients of such a term. The fellow who murders in a jealous rage or great anger may find himself in for a long treatment in a place for mental abnormals, or he may, if judged sane, be given a sentence of ten years or less. They do not consider this type of murderer to be, usually, a further social menace.&lt;br /&gt;
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With those disposed of the formulators of the policy believe that a longer sentence for others is not needed. They see no aid anywhere in having one languish in prison beyond that point where a sentence ceases to have the possibility of being constructive and begins to dull the senses and perspective of the prisoner so that he is worthless anywhere. Some of our penologists have said that it is better to keep a man either a brief period or for his life because after a certain time it is practically impossible for him to fit into a society of which he has no knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet system provides measures for keeping a man in touch with society so that he may not feel that entire isolation even though ten years is the maximum of incarceration. In the first place, as we have seen, only those whose term is short or whose character makes it necessary are put in the closed institutions; in the next even those who are there are given vacations of leave if it is thought that they can be trusted not to escape. And in case that has to be denied to an inmate, he still has opportunity for contacts with associates within and friends and relatives without in open, wholesome manner.&lt;br /&gt;
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Tongues are not mute, either. Prisoners gather where they like, walk together, work together, play together. Nor do they “fawn or walk with scars.” The stated policy is to encourage them to approach and conduct themselves with dignity and no guard may inflict physical punishment on any prisoner. One might say that such a policy is likely not carried out. There may be isolated instances of violation, and one feels sure there are, but the attitude of the men toward the attendants and guards seem to indicate that such regulations are regarded.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sokolniki is a prison for men who have been sentenced, supposedly, from one to three years. Article 28 of the Criminal Code says, ‘Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labour camps.&lt;br /&gt;
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“In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labour or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labour camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence.” (May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;)&lt;br /&gt;
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There are therefore a number serving sentences of longer periods than the three years who, because of physical condition, can not be sent to the labor camp to which they should be assigned, or because they need the restraint, perhaps, of these stronger walls. At the time of the writer’s visit there were a few more than eleven hundred prisoners in Sokolniki. The prison’s capacity is said to be something more than that, but it seemed then to be more crowded than was good for adequate treatment. However, one must remember that the housing situation in all of the USSR is acute and especially is that true of the cities where industrialization has required the assembling of more persons than can comfortably be housed. It is to be expected that prisons might share in this shortage.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet system uses the collective dormitory system rather than the single room standard. This is in keeping with their idea of community living and we were told at the women’s prison that it is preferred by the prisoners themselves who like being with others and have no wish to be shut off. They use it also in student dormitories where beds are placed eight or ten to a large room. That, however, they wish to remedy. Their aim is a room for every worker and every student but that will require much more building.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because Sokolniki is a well-known prison it will perhaps be interesting to set down a detailed description of it. The Soviet picture, The Road to Life, shown in this country, was made there, we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
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In arriving at Sokolniki, which is not far outside the city limits of Moscow, one comes to a closed door in the stone wall, some fifteen feet high, already mentioned. There must, of course, be an appointment just as there must be for entering a penitentiary in our own country. There is a bell and after it is rung the door is opened by an armed guard. The visitor is then in a small entrance room where there are other guards and which leads into a large court back of and around which the prison buildings form a square. There are other guards scattered in places about the court and near a large gate through which automobiles and trucks enter when they have business there.&lt;br /&gt;
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As we went through the court to the first building we were to see, about a hundred feet away, two men sat at the door of a side building, peeling potatoes. They were talking and laughing as they worked, evidently enjoying themselves. This was the first glimpse of the informal atmosphere that prevailed throughout, and which caused us to look in some amazement at occasional scenes such as that encountered as we entered the auditorium where a good pianist was playing and other men stood beside him or leaned on the piano, at ease and absorbed in the music.&lt;br /&gt;
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We had now left all the armed guards behind and there were no others in evidence until we came to depart. There were attendants, supervisors of work, etc., but there were no weapons among them. We went through shops and factories, observing the men at work. They wore any sort of clothes that they happened to own, mostly of the poor peasant type, since prisoners in Russia are never put in uniform.&lt;br /&gt;
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The spinning and weaving shops were interesting. They were well lighted, had good ventilation except in one room where neither was very adequate. As we went by the men talked to each other in a normal conversational manner, watched us, both amused and curious. Also, we talked to them as we wished. Others, not then at work for some reason (we were told that every man in the prison works, but it was late in the day when we went and some had ended their shift), followed us about good naturedly, enjoying our curiosity.&lt;br /&gt;
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A prosecuting attorney was our guide and he stopped to talk to various ones among them. Also as we went along men occasionally stopped him with requests, some with complaints, and he noted them on paper. At times he good naturedly refused what was asked, but any came who wanted to, informally, and without permission from any source.&lt;br /&gt;
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The attitude of the convicts toward labor may be explained by several things which have already been mentioned. There is no feeling of punishment about the work since the prison factories are placed on the same basis as others in the country. They have an eight-hour day, they receive pay (from 20 to 50 rubles per month) which they are permitted to spend as they like and which often goes to the support of a family at home, and they have the knowledge that the work they do is counted in the regular plan so that even while they serve their sentence they are actively helping in the nation’s economic life. At any rate, these men did not appear depressed as they worked, nor in bad spirits. We watched an older inmate pleasantly talking to a young fellow beside him while he manipulated a loom, apparently telling some interesting story for he used his hands occasionally in quick gestures, but he kept his eyes on his work, and he seemed to take pride in his job.&lt;br /&gt;
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From the shops we went to the dormitories and saw not one room only, but a number of them. As has already been intimated these rooms were too crowded. The cots were quite close together, even using the center of the room, and there was not enough space left for walking about. However, the men are not in a great deal of time. They go outside as they wish, walk when they care to, read in the library, exercise on the outside gymnasium apparatus, and are in the work shops at other times. Also, as already said, the problem of space is one that is occupying Soviet authorities extensively at present and they will require time to remedy the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We were asked to enter the room and sit down on the cots. The prosecuting attorney with us led the way. We were somewhat slow in following and one of the men, sitting on his cot in the center of the room, said, “Come on in. The beds are clean.” His invitation was accompanied by a smile and we quickly entered. By this time our presence had become known about the place and a great number had gathered in the corridor outside the room we were visiting, talking volubly. We were told to speak to any one we wished, to ask any question. We did so freely and were answered frankly. One prisoner told us that he was displeased with his sentence, that it was his first offense, that he had stolen a hat, and had been given a five-year term. “Impossible,” exclaimed the prosecutor, and promptly sent a messenger to the office to get the papers in the case. Some time later, when we were in the auditorium the records came and the man was sent for. He was a little chagrined but not greatly disturbed when his record showed robbery, not once but several times, with even the use of firearms. “Well,” he said nonchalantly, not too much put out that he hadn’t got away with his story, “it was too much anyway.”&lt;br /&gt;
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After we had visited a number of the dormitories we went to the yard. Several hundred prisoners were with us then. In the center of a bunch of them, we remembered again that here were some of the worst criminals in the country. They gathered all around to ask us about prisons in the United States or any other questions they could think of. One particularly intelligent man talked freely of conditions in Sokolniki, of his own sentence, and of his outlook on life. He had been a teacher before he had been caught in some sort of speculation, but he was teaching in the prison as well as doing some shop work. We continued questioning, now in French, now in German, more often through the Russian interpreter. The attendants were among them, talking also. There seemed to be no feeling of restraint in their presence, but on the contrary an existence of comradeship showed, especially on one occasion when one of the men had been asked a question he could not answer and turned to a guard for information. Such an attitude was apparent often, particularly as we went to the auditorium. As we were leaving the yard an incident happened that impressed us greatly. From the flower garden, one of the men came with an arm full of flowers that he wished to present to a member of the party who had passed some cigarettes around. He did it with the air of one who brings a bouquet from a prized garden of his own.&lt;br /&gt;
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We stopped to look at the dining room next. It was an ordinary room of almost square dimensions with long tables, seating two hundred and fifty at a time, and immaculately clean. From there we went through a small hall and upstairs to the auditorium where we were told to ask any questions on points of either policy or practice about which we still would like information. We were not sparing but every query was answered with great patience and detail. Then, as we were about to go, the prosecutor suggested to the superintendent who had been with us that we might like to hear the orchestra play. A messenger was sent and eventually a few musicians were rounded up but as there were not, enough to give a very good account of themselves, they tried the drama and dancing group with better luck. These hastily summoned the stage director, the curtains to the stage were drawn, a splendid pianist among their number who had discontinued some piece he was playing as we went in, now entertained us while preparations went on. In the meantime both men and attendants were crowding into the auditorium, messengers from among the prisoners were darting in and out with stringed musical instruments, and an informal atmosphere prevailed that it would be hard to give an impression of. The men talked in low excited tones, the music continued, the prosecutor and the prison director leaned against the piano. An attendant near to us carried on an excited conversation with a group of prisoners with him. It was difficult to believe that this was indeed a prison of a more serious type. It had all the earmarks just then of a community affair of local talent about to start.&lt;br /&gt;
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The program was given with zest and enjoyment. It lasted an hour and consisted of dances, singing, a reading, most of which they had written and produced themselves under the direction of the specialists who are in charge of that type of work in the prison. The results they got with the scant attention they gave to costuming was interesting. They used only a kind of high-throated long white tunic over whatever trousers they happened to have on, because they had no time for further preparation, but there was a uniform effect which was appropriate to the selections they gave. We were reluctant to have the entertainment end but we had undoubtedly kept them from their supper for the time, and their graciousness reminded us that we too must be considerate. We thanked them, said goodbye, and went upstairs for a visit to the library.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here was a long light room with bookshelves across the farther end and with reading tables and chairs nearer the door. At the side as we entered was the atheist corner, so-called, which is found in nearly all the institutions and which is devoted mostly to evolution. A large picture of Darwin was prominently placed among the exhibits. There were also pictorial illustrations of the lower stages through which man has come and such other things as one would expect to find in a geological or anthropological display. Science, in their new culture, is designed to replace religion in so far as state recognition is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out again in the yard some of the prisoners demonstrated their athletic ability and performed gymnastic feats on bars. We noted their carefree attitude, the interested passive participation of their comrades, but the wall was there again just across from us reminding that after all there was restriction—deprivation of liberty. And that, after all, is the chiefest of punishment. On top of the towers at the corners of the wall the men with long rifles looked down at us. No matter what the correctional labor policy, how designed to be constructive of character, certain men have to be restricted and the program forced on them. But it is to be doubted whether there is often achievement of a spirit like that in the prisons of many other countries and even in case it does exist, it is likely to be in some isolated place where an exceptional warden has been able to achieve it, possibly in a lesser place, one suspects, and not a major penitentiary.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XII: A WOMEN’S PRISON ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; full name of this institution is Moscow Novinsky Women’s Isolator. There is another such prison at Orenburg, and these are the only two in the RSFSR. There were many things about this place that compared unfavorably with Sokolniki, chief of which was a lesser liberty of action. That was explained to us as being necessary because fifty per cent. of the population are there awaiting trial, which means that they stay only for a brief time. This makes a constructive program more difficult, since it is not possible to undertake for a yet unconvicted person the same type of treatment as would be accorded one actually sentenced. They must be kept separately, and with the small outdoor space available it is quite a problem to handle the question of freedom and recreation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The capacity of the place is 375, but at the time of our visit it had only 360 in both classes; that is, those sentenced by the court and those awaiting trial. There are more problems connected with a women’s prison than with one for men. Children must be thought of, both those about to be born and small ones who depend on the mother and for whom there is no other care. There is a small hospital for ordinary cases in this prison, but a pregnant woman is taken out to a proper place for the birth of her child. It is emphasized that she is entitled to the same treatment as any other mother in the land, and that by virtue of her being a prisoner, she is not to be deprived of the best medical aid.&lt;br /&gt;
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One comes up to this prison suddenly, without warning. Around a corner from a wide avenue and up a cobbled street for a block and the building is there before you. One enters the prison straight from the street into a small hallway, such as is found dividing the two front rooms of a residence. All the guards are women and they stand with guns to which are attached bayonets. They seemed much more severe than the men guards at other prisons, but perhaps that is because one is not accustomed to seeing them. Others wearing revolvers were about in the hallway and at other points in this entrance building. Their uniform consists of white blouse and dark skirt, with the gun belt acting in the place of a normal one, and military-looking caps. They are businesslike and, one feels sure, equal to an emergency. However, we were assured that none arises. The action of the comradely court takes care of the majority of whatever disciplinary problems there might be.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our first pause was in the office where we were received by the director and told some few points about the prison. However, we were reminded that a tour of it would be worth more than a lecture, and since that seemed a logical statement to us, we started out. Across the hall from the office in which we had been sitting was the visiting room. Every six days each prisoner may see visitors. There is no screen through which they must talk; the contact is direct; but there is a long counter behind which the prisoners sit. A guard is present in the room at all times, but takes care not to listen to the conversation. That is regarded as the person’s private affair. Mail may be censored but mere words are not restricted, so we were told.&lt;br /&gt;
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Passing through this room, we found ourselves in a court around which the buildings form a hollow square. This institution was a prison in Tzarist days, and a gloomy spot it must have been according to descriptions. Now, there are many windows which are large and admit plenty of light and air. We visited next the wing used as a dormitory and found there somewhat more space than in Sokolniki. One room was particularly large, about fifty feet long. Beds are fairly well spaced; there is a small cabinet for each woman, and the ventilation is good. A girl with a guitar was furnishing entertainment for others who sat on their respective cots and listened. She stopped playing loudly as we entered but continued to strum. We were told here, as at all other places we visited, to talk to any whom we wished, to ask any question we would. The superintendent seemed eager to emphasize that we were free to see or know anything. She had heard the prevalent story that in Russia one never sees things. She begged us to feel free to look and to question. No one would listen to what we said to the prisoner nor she to us. We talked to an old woman who wore the headdress of a peasant. She sat aloof on her cot and we were moved by her lonely appearance. What had she done? She stole bread, she told us, and for that she had a ten-year sentence. The same prosecutor who was with us at Sokolniki was listening at this moment. His face was full of sympathy. A person, whatever he might have on his conscience, could scarcely find him forbidding to talk to. He began to question and discovered that this was no ordinary theft of bread but a widespread attempt to defraud the state. A written note went into his pocket before he turned away and one wonders whether the ten-year sentence which might possibly not be served anyway, would be reduced.&lt;br /&gt;
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We talked next with a pretty black-haired girl whose eyes sparkled with mischief. No one was near to listen. For robbery, she told us frankly, she had been sent for five years of deprivation of liberty. One hopes that not even a prison can dim that gayness which seemed to cause her to bubble over. Was she getting along all right, she was asked? Fine! She laughed with us, talked animatedly for several minutes. Did she feel resentful? No, because she was learning there and she shouldn’t have stolen anyway. How will she get a job when she gets out? There were more jobs than people she told us as if she had learned a lesson. Was she sure? we asked. All the people who leave here get work at once. She knew that to be true. Why shouldn’t they? They were good workmen, she added. We left them to visit other rooms, and down the hall past two or three we came to one with spreads on the beds, with white covers on the tables, with a framed picture here and there and other personal belongings in place. It was the room occupied by the shock-brigaders. Russia honors its &#039;&#039;Udarnicks&#039;&#039;, whether in prison or out, for their efforts are such as send the nation bounding on its way. In this room, the honor spot of the dormitories, a young woman, perhaps twenty-one, sat at a desk with her back to us. She is the chairman of the comradely court, we were told, and she smiles at us with great pride. It is evidently an achievement which carries satisfaction.&lt;br /&gt;
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She had stolen continuously since she was fifteen, her case read, but by means of the approach they use here they have been able to aid her. The superintendent assured us that her whole character had undergone a change, that she was trusted and valuable to the institution, and supervised with ability the court that was responsible for discipline within the prison. We talked to others, one a middle-aged woman, who did exceptionally good work. She was proud of her ability and the praise she had won.&lt;br /&gt;
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We went to the nursery. A mother sat in a small room beside it, nursing her child. We noticed the position of her foot, the way she held her baby, and were reminded that some one gave instruction in such points in a way that would meet the best approval. Cribs were lined up along the sides of the nursery and a trained woman, not a prisoner, was in charge. She was assisted with the children by inmates themselves. There were about twenty beds but only a few children. The others had already been taken to the play-yard. We took time to observe before we left that the room was well ventilated and well kept and the woman in charge briskly businesslike. As we descended again to the court we passed a small room back of the stairway where women were washing their clothes. Each must do her own, and a room equipped with tubs was provided for the purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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The children are kept up to four years of age, then disposed of among the other state institutions for children or dismissed with the mother, or possibly, if she must stay longer, sent to some of her family. In the yard, a grassy spot with shrubbery, the children were having a gay time with all sorts of apparatus and a playhouse. Like the children in other Russian centers, they wore no clothes except light cotton trunks.&lt;br /&gt;
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They looked healthy and well cared for and showed, it seemed to us, less of physical abnormalities than one usually notices in children of imprisoned women.&lt;br /&gt;
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We visited the school room and were told that compulsory education is provided up to the seventh year and opportunity given for work beyond, by means of university evening courses. There is at the same time the usual political education, the clubs, and physical education that characterizes all penal places, and a radio in every room for additional education and entertainment.&lt;br /&gt;
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We came out into the court again to go to the wing containing the shops. Some of the informal attitude which we had noticed at Sokolniki now began to show itself. There were groups who leaned out of their windows and shouted to us, and some of the younger girls talked to us in the court. Three of them begged us to tell them about the prisons in America, much as three children would waylay one and insist on being told tales. We gave them some information, and then tried to answer questions about New York and life in the United States. No, they didn’t think they would like America because people did not have jobs there, while here when they got out, they would be assured of work. We asked if they felt certain of that. Of course. The patron factory of this institution gives preference to those released from here. They boldly hailed the prosecutor now, to tell him that they wanted their sentences reduced. The law gives them the right to complain to the prison management, to the Commissar of Justice, or to the prosecuting attorney, but they are not offering a complaint of the sentence. It is only that they are ready to be good and work like faithful citizens. Another note is thrust into the prosecutor’s coat pocket. What was done with them we did not know but since the inmates seemed to expect that procedure it must be a general practice, and the fact that he definitely refused some and made no note seemed to indicate that the others had real significance. We were told that each case so noted would be checked. The approach to official channels is evidently quite easy.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were no shops in this prison in Tzarist days, and the women did not work. Now the wing which has been newly built is thrust out in such a way that it is long and narrow, with windows on both sides. There is plenty of ventilation and light. The women were cutting and sewing shirts and other garments from the same material we had seen the men making at Sokolniki. There were long tables with good working space and as we walked about various women showed us finished articles with pride. The sewing machines had all the latest equipment, and the operatives worked rapidly. The products of their shops are turned over to the cooperatives and sold where needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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They, too, work on the same basis as do factory workers of the land, with the exception (as in the case of all prisoners) that because they are supplied with their upkeep they are not paid normal wages. At the time we were there some of them were not at work, due, the directress told us, to a shortage of material. The supervisors are not prisoners but come in from the outside to teach and direct the inmates.&lt;br /&gt;
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Already in the chapter on “What Crimes Are Committed and Who Commits Them” we referred to the acts committed by women. In this prison the records showed that theft came first and robbery a close second, but in cases with whom we talked, the theft often turned out to be some act involving state property which carried a severe penalty. For that reason one was surprised at first to find long sentences attached to what appeared to be less serious crimes. But, in view of the provisions of the law of August 7, 1932, such larceny is sternly dealt with, even though the act is committed by a person from among the peasants or toiling class. One stealing from her neighbor would get a much lighter sentence. This is where the class nature of punishment shows up very strongly and unbalances the scales of justice that otherwise seem to work with such fairness. An example of the difference was very clear in two cases. One girl had been in prison nine times for theft and her present sentence was for two years only. Another had committed her first offense by stealing from a collective farm, a tool apparently of some “class enemy,” and her sentence was ten years. The “measure of social danger” accounts for the difference, and while it is easy to see that the authorities are confronted by a real problem of deep seriousness, one wonders whether something more of justice&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This statement by the author has caused Mr. Golunsky of the Commissariat of Justice in Moscow to offer the following explanation. “The word ‘justice’ in the USSR has another meaning than in the writings of the bourgeois sociologists. Criminal repression is not expiation of the crime. We don’t feel it just to shoot a man who has committed a murder only in order to punish him. Instead of one murder that would make two. But we call it just, if by means of shooting such a murderer, we can prevent a score of other murders. The construction of Socialism is our greatest task. Everything that helps the achievement of it is just, everything that hinders it is unjust. That is the point of view in every criminal case and I don’t suppose that we shall ever change it. But of course the methods of our fight for Socialism change at every stage of Socialist construction, and today they are other than they were five years ago.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; might not in the long run make for better feeling as well as a more ethical foundation for their socialist state. It is contradictory to their usual administration of justice among their own masses. One hopes that, as the conflict recedes, “pure justice” in so far as such is possible will replace “socially dangerous” measurements now in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again we were in the court preparing to leave. A girl of some eighteen or nineteen years, with thick golden braids hanging to her waist, was at the window above us shouting laughingly down to the superintendent. One of our party had a camera and she wished her picture made. It was all right, we were told, and the picture was snapped, and she was promised one as soon as it could be developed. Others were calling to us, too, setting up a din, with their comments and questions. Such an informal atmosphere can hardly be described. A group stood about like girls let out of school, talking, watching us curiously, unrestrained by the presence of attendants or directress. One feels that so long as there is no attempt to escape, and no running afoul the comradely court, one can do about as she likes—play volley ball when she pleases, if she is free from work, listen to the radio, read in the library, or gossip with her neighbor. She also has a good atmosphere in which to learn that labor and happiness are pretty close companions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The parting word from our hostess was, “I wish I might visit a prison in America with the same freedom with which I have shown you this.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What a western observer would feel first in these prisons is a lack of physical equipment such as his own best might boast. There was such criticism expressed. But this is not an adequate standard with which to measure their success. It is true that in these closed prisons of a penitentiary type their equipment, while much better than that in our worst, is not nearly so good as that in our best, but the fact that without this equipment they are able to achieve the attitude and cooperation they do on the part of the prisoners is all the more significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is also the point that the aim of Soviet penal authorities is to remove as rapidly as possible every person whose character will permit into the open or semi-closed correctional labor institutions and discontinue the use of the closed types except for the most incorrigible cases. Because of that, they are devoting all possible attention to the development and improvement of the labor institutions. And one finds different conditions in these places. They would not suffer very much by comparison with our best. A description of Bolshevo Labor Commune, in a later chapter, will indicate that.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the meantime they create that constructive businesslike atmosphere, among the women as well as the men, that gives genuine hope of equipping these people for a place in social life.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XIII: THE CHILD AND THE LAW ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;When&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; H. G. Wells was visiting in Moscow the past summer, he is said to have made the following observation to a Russian journalist: “I know, you Moscow people look upon all this with different eyes. You are Robinson Crusoes recreating life upon barren land after a social cataclysm. You are proud that you are manufacturing without the capitalists’ air motors, and reoentgen apparatus which the capitalists before you did not manufacture. You are happy to be doing all this. I understand this. And I should have been happy in your place, but of all your productions, excuse me, I am struck only by one thing. You are making people. It is this that I have come here to see and I see it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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If they are making people in this Soviet land, and I think it is pretty well agreed by thoughtful persons that they are, the beginning of the process is found in their treatment of children. So much has been said and written on the care of the child in Russia that no elaboration should be necessary here, and in regard to the delinquent it is no less than that given to the normal child. Their attitude toward the child who breaks the law is not that society must be protected, but that the individual may be given an opportunity for developing his own life. His interest is uppermost and practically every branch of government cooperates in his protection and training.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:russianjustice0000mary_0222.svg|TYPICAL SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF F.Z.U. SCHOOL]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Geneva declaration has been of special interest to the authorities dealing with this problem in the USSR. They believe with the author of the statement that mankind must give the child the best it has. In many of their publications they quote the main points of that declaration, and it seems of interest to set them down in relation to this chapter. They follow:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) The child should be given an opportunity of normal development, materially as well as spiritually.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The starved child must be fed, the sick cured, the retarded pushed ahead, the defective trained, and the orphan taken care of.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The child must be helped first of all during public misfortune.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) The child must be prepared to earn his bread, and protected from all types of exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) The child must be trained with the understanding that his best powers must be devoted to his brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
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For them the application of these points is to all children. The problem of the upbringing of the juvenile criminal is not separable from the general question of juvenile training. And whenever it is possible, the child who has broken the law is sent to schools for his training which in no wise differ from those for the noncriminal child.&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia’s fight against juvenile crime has been one of its major problems. It is an old story that the Civil War and the Volga famine in 1921 left hordes of wild children wandering over the land. They crowded in the railway stations, they rode the rods from place to place, they congregated in market places, behind billboards, in any places they could find, and were so depraved by street life that they became the most hardened of criminals. At this time, too, men released from the army, with no jobs available, turned in great numbers to banditry, and these children became their associates in their illegal enterprise. In history there is perhaps no picture greatly darker so far as children are concerned, and handling such a situation is not the least of Russia’s achievements. Today there are still a few scattered remnants of that vast number that one sees in railway stations, but the problem is in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the moment when this condition reached its worst, the government was dealing with the Civil War at its greatest height, giving its attention and energy to the defense of the proletarian state. But it is to its great credit that it found time even then to concentrate its forces to give care to this growing army of homeless waifs and juvenile delinquents. We have at that moment a proposal on the part of the leader of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, later referred to in detail, which marked the beginning of the system of care given today to young offenders in Russia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, there was already machinery in operation for dealing with juvenile criminals or children needing the aid of the state because of some abnormal condition. As early as January 14, 1918, only a little more than two months after the October Revolution, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a decree establishing Commissions for Cases of Minors. These commissions, with their powers greatly broadened, exist today, and are the organs charged to look after the interests not only of delinquent children, but of any child who needs the intervention of the law. During the period when children swarmed everywhere, homeless, starving, some criminal, and others forced by necessity into such an existence, no single force could have been adequate, but these bodies were the official channels through which the cases passed after the GPU or some other agency had first gathered the children in.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is not a children’s court, but is a pedagogical and educational organization. Its chief task is in educating the juvenile offender so that he may become a productive member of society, and with that in view the composition provided for the commission is of professions and persons able to make appropriate contributions. The chairman must be a pedagogue of very high qualifications. He must possess not only an adequate education, but he must have had experience either in work of a pedagogical nature or with home children or with juvenile criminals. In addition to the chairman there is a member representing the local department of public education, a physician from the local health department, a judge from the People’s Court, an investigation educator, a member of the Komsomol (the youth about to enter the Communist Party), a representative of the Children’s Friend’s Society, and a representative of the local trade union organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission sits in closed session, permitting only the attendance of those connected with the cases. This would include parents, relatives or guardians, or a representative of a public or school organization. Its work is under the jurisdiction of the commissariat of education, and is not connected with the commissariat of justice, such as the children’s court would be. There are, of course, local commissions which take care of the cases for each city or rural district. The procedure before the commission is entirely informal. When a case comes up the chairman takes the proper steps to have the juvenile appear, unless for some reason his presence is thought to be unnecessary. Some of the circumstances under which the child would not appear would be: if the child is under eight years of age; when the child is already known to the commission; when the evidence does not substantiate the charge; when there is no reason for the medico-pedagogical measures to be applied; or when it is thought that the appearance of the minor before the commission might do some harm to him in either a physical or mental way. But in case it is thought his appearance is desirable, the investigator is instructed to take charge of the case. The chairman then proceeds to gather the necessary information, evidence, etc., concerning the child and advise him that his case is to come up. If at that time the youth has reached the age of sixteen, his case is turned over to the courts for trial, since minors between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are subject to the jurisdiction of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission is competent to deal not only with the cases of all children delinquents between the ages of eight and sixteen (children under eight years of age are never summoned to appear before the commission) but it is also empowered to institute criminal proceedings against any person who is an offender against the child in a manner of demoralization, incitement to crime, or exploitation of minors.&lt;br /&gt;
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What measures may be taken in the cases of children convicted of some crime before the commission? Here is a list of the more important, although it is not an exhaustive one:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) A request for granting assistance, document, certificate, etc., to the child.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) Placing out the child in the care of a family.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) Placing the child on maintenance and education by public or party organization.&lt;br /&gt;
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(4) Finding a guardian for the child.&lt;br /&gt;
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(5) Finding work for the child or apprenticing him.&lt;br /&gt;
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(6) Sending the child to his birthplace.&lt;br /&gt;
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(7) Placing the child in an educational institution, school or children’s home.&lt;br /&gt;
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(8) Sending the child to a medical or medico-pedagogical institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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(9) Helping the child to enroll in a children’s club.&lt;br /&gt;
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(10) Talk and exhortation.&lt;br /&gt;
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(11) Putting the child in the care of parents or other persons with or without supervision by investigation educator.&lt;br /&gt;
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(12) Putting the child in the care of an investigating educator.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is one final measure which it is within the power of the commission to use, but it is never resorted to unless all other efforts have failed. That is that the commission may send the child as a final resort to an industrial school of which we will speak later on in the chapter. The list given above constitutes the medico-pedagogical measures and are applied only to those offenders under sixteen years of age who come within the competency of this commission.&lt;br /&gt;
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The case of the minor between sixteen and eighteen years of age is approached in a somewhat different manner. Originally under the Criminal Code of 1922, the court was given jurisdiction over minors between fourteen and eighteen years of age, and might at that time sentence them to terms of deprivation of liberty, but only to industrial homes set apart for them, and never by any manner of means to a place for adults. This, however, has been changed so that the commission referred to takes care of children up to sixteen years of age, and only the cases of those between sixteen and eighteen are referred to courts. Although the cases of juvenile offenders between sixteen and eighteen are tried by the courts, the measures applied are of a medico-pedagogical nature very similar to those used for the younger children. Only when the circumstances of the crime convince the court that these measures will not be adequate may the minor be sentenced to deprivation of liberty. In fixing the terms, the sentence is to be reduced by one third of what would be imposed on an adult in the same situation, and the maximum term under the USSR is not to exceed one half of that imposed on adults. A death sentence may never be given to either child or minor, and no severe measures may be used.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the case of trial, a copy of the summons as well as the indictment must be sent to the minor’s legal representative, as well as to the minor himself. And the Supreme Court has especially instructed the lower courts to see that all juveniles under trial be provided with counsel whenever it may be needed. During the hearing of the case, the minor is accorded all the rights that we have already seen are granted to defendants in the Soviet courts.&lt;br /&gt;
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That the fight waged by the authorities against juvenile crime is being successful is indicated by the steady drop of the percentage to the total convictions in the Union. We find that, in 1928, 36 per cent. of the total number of persons convicted of crime were juvenile offenders. In 1931, this figure had dropped to 28.2 per cent. Also indicative of the achievement in this direction is, as already mentioned, the fact that this army of vagrant youth no longer wanders about in Russia. There are few of such children remaining.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet government has practically removed from its system all of the homes and colonies for juveniles which it inherited from the Tzarist régime, and has at the present time in their stead the system of institutions operating in an educational manner. The most constructive work being done is in those owing their initiation to the efforts of an agent that we do not usually connect with such activities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Back in 1921 when the whole place swarmed with homeless and criminal children, and there was despair over the hopelessness of the condition, the GPU came to the rescue with the establishment of places for wholesale care called “collectors.” Children were snatched from the streets, stations, trains, or wherever they were, and were taken to these places where they were bathed, dressed, fed, sorted out, given all sorts of examinations, mental and physical, then turned over to the Commission for the Cases of Minors, and were finally distributed to the various institutions. The institutions, at that time, while educational in nature, were without a definite social goal, and not adequately prepared or equipped to turn a youth into a productive and useful citizen. At the present time the institutions for juvenile offenders are established under the control of the Commissariat of Education, the Commissariat of Justice, and the Commissariat of Home Affairs (formerly the OGPU). In the Commissariat of Education we find a whole network of children’s homes, directly leading the child from training into the industrial life of the country in such a manner that there is no gap through which he can escape into a life of crime. In their early days the task of these homes was simply to house the children, to prevent them from becoming vagrants and criminals, and their program was by no means as constructive as it might have been. But, at present, no effort is spared in delivering the child to society in a state of preparation for his place.&lt;br /&gt;
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A. Shestakova in her article &#039;&#039;Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children&#039;&#039; tells us that in the first days of these homes the children were taught to make shoes and footstools, to bind books, and how to read and write; and slightly how to adjust themselves in life. But she says that the homes were inadequate to attack the basic problems of turning those sent to them into a specifically trained group, sufficiently equipped with industrial knowledge and social culture, prepared to enter a factory or other center in such a manner as to evolve into useful citizens. The misfit was unfortunate in two ways. Not only were the children unprepared as to basic industrial knowledge or other means of adjustment to their new life, but the state itself was deprived, because of this inadequacy, of the services of many young citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new economic policy had given way to the five-year plan with its tremendous program of industrial development and agricultural collectivization, and there was need for every available trained workman. Because of this urgent need of the country those in charge of juvenile offenders were given an extra instrument for their purpose. With definite ends in view, with specific jobs to fill, training took on an additional purpose. Here was a definite challenge to the places of training of those juvenile offenders to teach them so that they might make their contribution to the economic plan, and that they might thereby gain the satisfaction of having work which they could do well.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not enough that education be directed only toward keeping the child busy with some elementary task, but that it concern itself with the possibility of active participation in the nation’s economic development. To accomplish this task the children’s homes were merged with the factory apprenticeship schools which were attached to factories in towns, and to the peasant youth schools connected in like manner with state farms and rural localities, by which merging they now afforded places for training skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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As now organized the direction of these homes is in the hands of the Commissariat of Education, and children are sent by the Commission of Cases for Minors. They are not limited to the training of delinquents but also have the task of educating the children of workers and peasants from the general population. No coercive methods are used. There are of course no wardens or guards, and their express task is to “combine teaching with productive labor upon such basis that the whole social productive labor of the pupils was to be subordinated to the academic and educational aims of the school.”&lt;br /&gt;
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The inmates of these homes are given preference of admission to the factory apprenticeship schools, and to peasant youth schools next to the children of workers. From this training they move straight into the stream of factory workers and, almost without knowing it, take their place in the productive life of the nation. By the time they have gone through these schools of apprenticeship and the factory, or the state farms, they have forgotten that they ever were attached to a life of crime and are removed from the environment so effectually that they have no temptation to return. This describes the treatment given to the cases of those children not classified as habitual criminals. Even in this category of the 8-16 group coming under the direction of the Commissariat of Education, there is an occasional child who requires more restrictive treatment, and measures of a severer nature may then be resorted to.&lt;br /&gt;
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For this type, who have become habitual criminals, or who have committed more serious crimes that require a term of deprivation of liberty, we have a second kind of institution. It is important to note that this set of establishments is connected with the Commissariat of Justice, and not with the Department of Education. There has been a period of evolution of these institutions in which much study has been given to methods to be used, and experiments of a bold nature tried with regard to some of them.&lt;br /&gt;
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On July 11, 1918, there was published the Order for the First Russian Reformatory where juvenile offenders of this type were to be detained, and there were consequently organized industrial homes for these offenders which were intrusted with the duty of teaching to minors “skilled trades, to widen their mental horizon by means of general and vocational education, and to transform them into active citizens conscious of their rights and obligations, giving them at the same time a physical and health education by means of gymnastics, sports and hygiene.”&lt;br /&gt;
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These institutions, although of the educational type referred to, were inadequate for any serious training. Arts and crafts constituted the principal type of labor, and practically no attention was given to the higher and more skilled trades. We have already spoken of the demands made by the reconstruction period for more skilled workers, and of the notable inadequacy of places for juvenile offenders to turn out young people who filled such a need. The program needed a decided reformation, and in 1930 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee set up a commission for specific remedy of the situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The commission was created for two definitely assigned tasks: the first was to institute an investigation of the work of the fight against juvenile criminals and minors, and of the organization of factory communes and corrective labor organizations, using for this purpose the equipment of the People’s Commissariat of Justice. Secondly, it was to work out and to hand to the &#039;&#039;presidium&#039;&#039; a project of administrative and practical measures, with due attention being given to the experiment of the Izhorsk plant in the North Caucasus. The result of the investigation was that in 1930, the Commissariat of Justice decided to reconstruct these institutions into factory apprenticeship schools for juvenile offenders which were to be attached to large factories and mills. It must be noted here that these schools differed from those just discussed in that they were for offenders only and liberty was restricted, whereas in the first there were no guards of any nature and noncriminal children attended along with the criminal ones.&lt;br /&gt;
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In these schools they were to create a cultural and social condition conducive to drawing the inmates into social work, and to this end, bars, locks, and prison régime, and all prison atmosphere was to be resolutely banished from them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The character of the training was educational just as it had been in the others, but in the case of this more hardened type it was necessary to detain the juvenile forcibly while he was subjected to the program. However, pupils in these schools now enjoy vacations, take part in regular group hikes, and go out to camps in the summer, in the same manner as other pupils do. The term of sentence is from two to three years, and the arrangements as to schedule, life, and discipline, organization and labor, are taken care of by the usual self-government organization. The schedule of the work is arranged in such a manner that the children are never left entirely to their own devices, but are constantly with those who guide and direct them. Four hours of industrial training are followed by four hours of study, and the latter is again followed by three hours devoted to public activity organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1931, 4,000 juvenile offenders were trained in these schools and 500 industrial workers were graduated from the industrial establishments. In 1933, the aim was to put all the juvenile offenders into these schools from which it was expected there would be turned out 2,400 highly skilled workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to notice here what happened to those released from these schools. Figures for the years 1931 and 1932, giving percentages of distribution for those released, show that 63.2 per cent. went into industrial undertakings. This would indicate a high degree of success in the passage of the trained youth from schools to industry. The next largest percentage, 19.7 per cent., found a place in the building trade. The third highest, 9.3 per cent., was released to the parents with supervision on the part of the school. 4.7 per cent. were placed on Soviet farms; 1.2 per cent. found a location in the factory labor and technical communes and 0.6 per cent. were released to parents and relatives but continued under the supervision of the schools.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Article by A. Shestakova, “Principles of Organization of Correctional Labor Institutions for Children,” from Vishinsky, &#039;&#039;op. cit.&#039;&#039; p. 348.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The most important training given in these schools is for metal work and work on wood. In addition to that the inmates are taught tractor handling, animal husbandry, vegetable garden work, and field work. The health and physical training require that the workers take a month and a half to two months’ camp trip in the country. Because of the inconvenience attached to these trips, when the institution is located in a city, the First Moscow School was moved to a small village a short distance out, so that country places would be more accessible for health training.&lt;br /&gt;
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The chief problems now attached to this education, according to A. Shestakova, are the building up of the physical health, an establishing of self-discipline, and the introduction of these delinquents to methods used in other camps, to a life of such neighboring activities as the collective or state farms. The prize agricultural schools among all of those at present existing in the Soviet Union are Saratov, which now has first place in the contest for these schools; Serpooh, in second place; the First Moscow School in third place; and in the fourth, the First Leningrad School.&lt;br /&gt;
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We come finally to the third type of establishment. These are incorporated into the system of the organization of the GPU, in the Commissariat for Home Affairs. There is something incongruous to most of us in the supervision of children by an agent that is avowedly for terroristic purposes. However, the labor communes, organized by this body for juvenile offenders of the worst type, are one of the outstanding developments in the care of the children in Soviet Russia, and set a standard that few if any institutions in other lands manage to reach.&lt;br /&gt;
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The inhabitants of these communes are young people with long criminal records, who have been up repeatedly before the Commission for Cases of Minors, before the courts, who have served many terms of deprivation of liberty in various juvenile institutions. The cases seemed hopeless, and the experiment, so bold and unique, was tried in an effort to give a new viewpoint that would induce a complete break with the former criminal type of life. One of these communes, the largest both as to number and scope of development, is described in detail in the next chapter. In this place we only mention the general plan and underlying principles.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main difference between the apprenticeship school and these labor communes of the OGPU is in method and not in principle. The labor commune is organized around large labor work, where both sexes contribute, while in the apprenticeship schools the emphasis is on education, on the preparation for industrial work. One of the basic principles in the labor commune is complete freedom as to movement, while in the schools restriction of movement is naturally required since the program is compulsory in its nature. In the apprenticeship schools there is also segregation of the sexes in the matter of residence; the boys and girls meet together in theatres, on excursions, in museums, on walks, and other places, but live in separate homes. It seems inconsistent to state that the labor commune is made up of those more habituated to crime, since it enjoys greater freedom, while the schools are composed of the less criminal; but this is nevertheless true. When one remembers, though, that the commune is the result of a desperate move to save a great number of habitual criminals, whereas the schools are merely for training those of even younger years, the situation is more easily understood.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the schools the age group is from 15-18 years. The sources from which they come are, (a) those sent on court order, and (b) those sent by the Commission for Cases of Minors, and all other authorities empowered to commit them. If the term is up before the training of the child is completed, the pedagogical commune may retain him, provided the entire term does not exceed three years.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Section 42 of the Correctional Labor Code of 1933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the communes, the age group, although in the beginning limited to those of 13-17, is now composed of those of 16-24. The satisfaction of the authorities with the achievement of the First Labor Commune (Bolshevo) led to the establishment of others, and at the present time several thousand former criminals, some of them committing the worst sort of crimes, are being trained and educated while they participate in community life.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER XIV: BOLSHEVO LABOR COMMUNE ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; following is the official record of the beginning of such places for criminals as the one described in this chapter:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;ORDERS&lt;br /&gt;
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Of the Administrative and Organizational Board, OGPU&lt;br /&gt;
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No. 185&lt;br /&gt;
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Moscow, August 18, 1924&lt;br /&gt;
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Orders issued by Comrade Yagoda, assistant chief of the OGPU:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) In order to combat crime among young people between the ages of 13 and 17 years, a Children’s Labor Commune for 50 persons is to be organized.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) F. G. Melikhov is appointed head of the Children’s Labor Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) The head of the Children’s Labor Commune is to act in all matters under the orders of M. S. Pogrebinsky, who, in turn, will act on the basis of a plan of work confirmed by me.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such an order, judging from the resulting situation of ten years later, ought to be marked with a monument, and it is. Just outside of Moscow, on the location of a once lovely estate, there is now a small town of modern buildings replacing the wooden ones of ten years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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One does not know what to call this place. To say that it is a penal institution is misleading unless the reader has seen something like it. However, it rates as that in the USSR, and since there are others like it in scattered sections, one comes to the conclusion that it is something unique in this line and accepts it as such. It is easy to be enthusiastic over such things and not to look deeper for some adverse angles, but the author, after as careful examination as she could make in a skeptical manner, could only praise the development.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two trips were made to this colony, the second to confirm what had first been observed. However, since it was a visit to a similar colony at Kharkov that elicited the warm praise from M. Herriot that has already been quoted, it seemed safe to conclude that it existed as had first been believed. It is impossible to understand how any one could fail to be moved on viewing the place and realizing its tremendous import in the matter of remaking criminals. If the OGPU had committed nothing but the acts of terror it has been credited with, the creation of such spots as these would compensate in a great way for its darker deeds. It is unfortunate that one must try to tell of Bolshevo. The only thing to do is to visit and see for one’s self. It is difficult to describe atmosphere, and that is the thing that pervades the place and makes it even more constructive than the physical side could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
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This commune celebrated its tenth birthday in August of this year (1934). Its population was preparing for it when we were there, building platforms out under the trees, putting finishing touches here and there, and getting ready for speeches, visitors, and other entertainment of various kinds. And these people can tell a good tale of growth and progress, too, for they started with a handful in the initiation of a bold experiment and now their town has a population of three thousand inhabitants. The reader’s first deduction will be that a prison growth such as that must indicate some undesirable conclusions. But when one knows that it means that this number has been transferred from other penal institutions with a view to having everyone possible enjoy this freedom and training, then the significance is different.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reference has already been made to the wandering hordes of children, confirmed in criminal habits, who presented the gravest of problems to the government authorities at the end of the Civil War and Volga famine. It was seen that if headway was to be made against the situation, the whole perspective of life must be changed, and the new one must be attractive enough to make these vagrant criminals want to break with a past that to their imaginative years had a glamour and provided escape from the responsibilities of ordinary living.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the midst of the perplexity, the groping for some plan, we find Felix Dzerzhinsky, organizer of that terror of terrors, the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039;, and original head of the GPU, offering his far-reaching organ to effect this merciful innovation. Let his own words inform us:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“I wish to apply part of my personal efforts and above all the efforts of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; to looking after these homeless waifs. I have come to this conclusion on the basis of two considerations. Firstly, it is a terrible calamity, and when you look at children, you cannot help thinking everything should be for them. The fruits of the revolution are not for us but for them. But how many of them have been wrecked by struggle and poverty! We must rush to their aid just as if we saw children drowning. The Commissariat of Education alone cannot cope with this matter, the widest help from all Soviet bodies is needed. It is necessary to form under the Central Executive Committee a broad commission containing representatives of all commissariats and all organizations which can be useful in this matter. I have already spoken with people here and there. I want to be at the head of this commission myself. I want to include the apparatus of the &#039;&#039;Cheka&#039;&#039; practically in this work.&lt;br /&gt;
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“I am impelled to do this for the second reason. I think that our apparatus is one of those which works most accurately. It has branches everywhere. People reckon with it. They are afraid of it, but even in such a matter as saving and feeding children, it is possible to find laxness and even dishonesty. We are going over more and more to peaceful construction; and I think: why not use our fighting apparatus to combat such a calamity as homelessness among children?”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This proposition was made in 1921. It was in August, 1924, that the GPU of which he was then head, established the Bolshevo Labor Commune, thus launching a new epoch not only in the care of juvenile criminals for whom it was particularly intended, but in the treatment of all the others. It must have given a great thrill to this man who had brought death to so many of the state’s enemies to take a part in reconstructing the lives of youths who would, he hoped, be its friends. At least he had the satisfaction of seeing his judgment vindicated, for, from the beginning, the venture proved his rightness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These men did not jump into the scheme as suddenly as might seem, nor without consideration. They went into intimate study of the forms of education of children, they applied themselves vigorously to working out an accurate theory, then they formulated what appeared to them three basic rules of procedure. That the GPU, in the midst of their frightening activities, could muster faith enough in anybody to develop such a plan is in itself a phenomenon, but that they could convey such a trust to others, to these young criminals, seems more incredulous still. They were not exactly an agent for inspiring such a feeling. But notice the three basic principles referred to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First and foremost was that principle of “trust” held like a shining torch before the eyes of incredulous youngsters. It was decided that there must be no compulsion anywhere in the commune. With coercion the order of the day, there was to be none here. Strange contradiction, one of many that has filled the land. Side by side with sternness toward those who oppose the order, one finds this steady development of humane institutions, untouched by the harsher methods used in the other direction. In this colony there was to be only trust. If one wanted to stay, he was to stay, and if he wanted to go, then he was to go. He simply walked away, for there were not to be—and are not today— any guards. There were to be no restrictions of their freedom. They were to realize that they were in an educational institution pure and simple. They were to come of their own volition, because of an expressed desire to join in the program of this commune. These inhabitants were to be persons who had come to realize the futility of a life of crime and who wished therefore to change to another sort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the individual was to make this change he would have to be able to perform some task well, and to that end the second principle was incorporated. The commune was to be devoted to teaching these people how to do some kind of work. Workshops were established and instructors installed, but the responsibility for sustaining a condition under which the trades could be learned was placed on the residents of the Commune. There was no preaching, no lectures, but it was demonstrated that each must be responsible for his share in this life or all would suffer. If machines stopped because of the irregularity of one or two, then the education of others in an industrial line would suffer. And one who brought about this inconvenience must answer to his comrades for his conduct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The third principle was to make each feel his responsibility for the group, and the reverse, that all were responsible for seeing that each member measured up to his duties. Every member of the Commune was bound to see that a recalcitrant one was brought to account. In this manner any disciplinary problems were taken care of from the beginning. Thus, in the lack of any compulsion the onetime criminal learns to lead a normal life and to discipline himself; in being taught a trade he is prepared to return to a life or perhaps enter it for the first time, in which he earns his way; and by his feeling of responsibility for others, he in conjunction with the group keeps the affairs of the Commune running smoothly and efficiently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the Commune had been set up, the next problem was to get some inhabitants for it. Among the institutions housing juvenile offenders, volunteers were asked for, after explanations of the character of the new place had been given. Pogrebinsky who, it will be recalled, was one of the organizers, gives a version of this experience that is interesting. He writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“When we called for volunteers for the first commune, 15 responded. Very suspiciously they donned their new clothes. They could not believe that henceforth they were free, and they warily eyed the prison guards, trying to guess how many would be sent with them as a convoy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“But here began something unusual. They were given money with which to buy railway tickets to the Commune, and no guards were sent with them. Only the manager of the Commune was with them. Sure enough, they seemed to be free! Should they run away? No, better wait. There was something hard to understand, and in addition, something very flattering—they were being trusted!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“On arrival at the place, two of the boys were sent with money for supper. Here was something altogether strange! They were sent off with money, and no guard to convoy them. The boys bought some foodstuff, came back and returned the whole change. They were utterly astounded when the manager showed them the house where they were to live and explained to them: Everything that you can see, boys—the clothes, food, tools—is being lent to you by the OGPU, and you will have to pay for it all later on.”&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
One can understand their incredulity, even their staying on through curiosity, if nothing else, to see what would happen next in such a topsy-turvy affair. And day after day the wonder and pleasure in having a home, being free and engaged in making interesting things would grow and hold them steadily.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The managers of the Commune were wary and anxious too, not through fear of escape of their charges, but lest they do the wrong thing and check the growing confidence. In their eagerness not to put pressure of any kind on these young people, they have let the initiative for expansion come from them. In the beginning those who came made shoes, stools, and other things, and were satisfied to watch their own tasks grow under supervision, but as the project became more firmly established there were demands for wider industrial training. The leaders granted the requests with great satisfaction as they developed, their only anxiety being that nothing should ever seem “forced.” There was no doubt subtle guidance, but the group was encouraged to undertake its own education. The story is one of continuous growth, both in number and in development of a broader program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What actually exists now in this place where three thousand work? To begin with there are the paved streets, clean and lined with green shrubbery. The houses beside them are of modern structure, many with flower-filled balconies for each floor, with rows of large windows. There are some small individual houses also, where families live, but it is the lines of those looking from the outside like sunny apartment buildings that gives the place an air of being a town proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On inspection one finds small apartments provided for the married couples and dormitory rooms for the single people. A man who is serving a sentence may have his family there with him and so may a married young woman if it is convenient for the husband to come. The apartments that we saw contained two rooms and a bath. One of the rooms was a large kitchen which could also be used for other purposes. One entered into a small hallway which led to the main room, a large combination living-sleeping room. The furniture was good. There were pictures around, a couch, comfortable chairs, the windows were nicely curtained and the appearance altogether homelike. There is a large community dining room, but in case a family wishes to prepare its own meals it can do so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the dormitories we saw, there were rather good-sized rooms, not so large as most of those described in the other prisons, with cot-beds placed in line in the usual way. There seemed to be comfort in these collective places but not, of course, as much space per person as the apartments permitted, nor did they have the homelike appearance of the latter. There was light from several windows and a pleasant outlook, and the two girls present on our visit looked exactly as occupants of a home would appear. As housing goes in crowded Moscow this represented an average standard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dining room in the factory-kitchen building was quite large and equipped with small tables, such as one would find in a restaurant. One side was almost an entire window. A few late eaters were sitting at tables and attendants were beginning to clean so that the place had a disorderly after-dinner appearance but one of deeper cleanliness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One might as well not try to keep remembering, as he goes along the street meeting people, that these are convicts of the most habitual sort. They are going or coming from their work exactly as other people would. There is absolutely no difference. They could run away, of course, and a few have, but in the majority of cases, the reverse is true. They do not wish to leave the Commune at the end of their sentence and so they live on and keep a job in some of the factories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school building in this Commune is especially lovely. It was completed about two years ago at a cost of a million and a half rubles. It has all the equipment that a good school would be expected to have—a library, reading rooms, laboratories, an auditorium interestingly decorated with murals of working men, which is the work of artist inhabitants, spacious halls and class rooms. The teachers are not residents of the Commune but members of their own profession who come in to teach. The man in charge of the school showed us the building with great pride. The first seven years of education are compulsory, after that there are evening classes for the more advanced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Education, as already indicated, does not stop with formal classroom work but those interested in the arts, in music, or in writing are provided with channels for special training. There are music circles, art classes, drama work, and literary clubs, and the persons making up this artistic group live in their own building, forming a congenial household. A number of the leading ones, the most talented ones, are paid a stipend by the state, and we were told of a number of musicians and writers who had had their first training in this Commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The physical education is carried on in a large and splendidly equipped gymnasium, and building up the body is made a major consideration in the training. Setting up exercises are also a part of the daily program.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The school, with its formal teaching of elementary subjects, is one side of the education program; the other is the work done in the shops. In these two places as well as in this whole atmosphere, the “making people,” spoken of by H. G. Wells, goes on. One must learn a trade and then he must work at it, not as drudgery, but with free enjoyment of his task. In the shops of the shoe factory, the skate factory, the knitting goods factory, the mechanized laundry, the sports goods factory, and the factory kitchen, these former thieves and bandits who have barely escaped with their necks, work at their jobs, some still in the ranks of the unskilled, others risen to instructors and supervisors. One looks and remembers again that there is nothing between them and escape, no one to prevent their walking away, and yet they stay and work. When the day is ended they go out in the street and to their rooms or Walk or do any other thing they wish.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One may break a law of the Commune. To meet the exigencies of such occurrences, there is the comradely court and a penalty either mild or more serious according to the act, and if that is not sufficient then the greatest blow of all will fall—the culprit will be sent back whence he came, or if he came directly he will be transferred to a more severe institution. A new member is on probation for a month and he must prove his worth if he is to live with this group who is serious about making life worth while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The age is 16-24 now, although at its beginning it was 13-17. There are three thousand inhabitants of the Commune, some of whom have finished their terms and have worked on in the factories. These naturally may be older than the maximum age given for those who are sent. The surrounding community was hostile to the idea at the time of the establishment of the Commune among them, as one can imagine any neighborhood might be at having a group of unrestrained criminals, thieves and housebreakers, set down among them, but there is now a general esteem and friendliness felt for those who work in this unique town.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The hospital is perhaps the greatest prize of the place. A large building, set back from the street, with grass, trees, and shrubs in its front yard, it presents an excellent impression. It is equipped for all the best care of the health of the community. Babies are born, children of the communards attended to, and the whole population served by its staff. It fills not only the role of medical care, but an especially educational one as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolshevo has been described in detail because it is the largest of the labor communes and was the first in construction. But there is another close to Moscow, built second in order, on the site of the former Nikolo-Ugreshsky Monastery. This commune has four factories, making musical instruments, incubators, electrical repairs, and compressed fiber, and in 1934 it is estimated that they will turn out goods to the value of some twenty-three or twenty-four million rubles. Here, too, are modern houses with all equipment in which the workers are housed according to industry, the metal workers in one, wood workers in another, and those making musical instruments in a third. There is a separate house for those communards who are members of artist circles, a separate house for women, and a building where probationers stay until permanently assigned. There are twenty-two hundred members of the commune.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A third is the Dzerzhinsky Labor Commune at Kharkov which follows the same line of development but is smaller than the others. There are only four hundred members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is hard to estimate the results of the work done in such centers as these. A tangible evidence of success is pointed to by authorities on the subject in the steady descent of the percentage of juvenile delinquents to the total number of criminals. This system, spreading year by year to take in all that it may serve, aided by those factory apprenticeship schools that train the 15-18 year old group, ought to do a good deal to depopulate the adult prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER XV: CONCLUSION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; concluding remarks of most books on Russia begin with a discussion of class distinction. In this case it would be further stated that it showed not only in court action but was likewise felt in the fact that while the OGPU as an arresting agent turned the ordinary prisoner over to the courts, it acted in the capacity of a judicial organ for those of the opposition class. A few months ago that would have been true. With the transforming of that agent into the Commissariat of Home Affairs and the stripping from it of all judicial powers, one more step has been made toward the disappearance of class lines in the administration of criminal law.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Again there has been the following comment from an authority on the Administration of Criminal Law in the USSR, in regard to this statement: “The class line in the criminal justice can disappear only when the classes themselves disappear. So long as the classes exist, so long as the struggle between them goes on, it is absolutely impossible to avoid the class character of criminal justice You may keep silent about that, you may try to disguise it, but you cannot make it disappear. We don’t find it necessary to disguise the class character of our courts, as the bourgeois science of law and the bourgeois legislation does, because the class whose interests our courts defend, is the overwhelming majority of all the people. With the bourgeois criminal justice it is quite the opposite. Of course, as I have already stated, the victory we have gained over our class enemies here has enormously changed our policy, but this policy remains a class policy, because it remains the policy of the proletariat struggling for socialism. The first aim of this policy does not change, only the methods of its practical accomplishment. If you build a railway, the forms of your work will be different in a plain or in mountains, but the final aim will be the same. “Our final aim is to build a classless society. When this task will be accomplished, not only the class line in the criminal law will disappear, but the criminal law itself will become useless and will die as well as the criminal courts. “But so long as those courts do exist, they cannot go on without an open or a hidden class policy.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the distinction does exist. But in this final evaluation of the present situation in regard to crime repression in the USSR the treatment of political prisoners is not considered. While the method as developed is used for both classes it naturally shows to its best advantage in the treatment of the prisoners from among the workers, and it ought to be judged on that score. It is to be hoped that not many years hence class distinctions will disappear to the extent that machinery for justice will furnish equal measures for all.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The following explanation is supplied. “By this time criminal justice will become something quite different from what we are accustomed to. It will become a system of medical and pedagogical measures, which will take their place among other radical and educational institutions. Till then criminal justice will serve the interests of the ruling class as it has always done.”&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When that happens the treatment of all prisoners will be of the kind that is found so admirably used today in places where discipline and industry are taught to those of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Russians claim no Utopia. When on one occasion the writer expressed admiration to Assistant Attorney General Vishinsky for what they had achieved, he quickly and positively responded, “I warn you of its shortcomings.” Well, of course, they are there, plenty of them. They can be found in the administration of justice, too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems though that one who wishes to see actually how the matter stands would find it effective to take first the policy of the state, the standards it sets and the goal at which it aims, then see not only how fully that aim is achieved, but what progress is made year by year toward the goal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Take whatever phase of criminal repression one will, and one finds progress and a pretty good practice of policy. Judges in the beginning, one supposes by the Soviet’s own records, woefully inadequate at finding out what justice might be in a case, are now much more fully qualified; jurors for a time without any qualifications except as to vote are now selected with more care and given some training for the task before them. How fully adequate are they? It would take a firsthand survey of the nation’s tribunals to be able to say, but to judge by a fair sample the author believes them to be fulfilling their duty in a high degree and with more than average competence. Their attendance to work and their conscientious effort to get at the straight of the affair before them is pronounced. They seem in general to feel the responsibility of being the agent for administering justice to their own toiling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the prisons and places of deprivation of liberty one sees more evenness of tone. The personality of those in charge of these places strikes one as indicating fitness for the job. Members of staffs were observed closely by the writer and with one single exception they seemed well selected for handling the work. Vishinsky, in the Introduction of the book edited by him, states that one of the shortcomings of the prison system is the need for more trained persons who will understand what this policy really is and help put it into practice. One would expect that to be true, since it is so universally a fact with regard to prison workers. It would be indeed a Utopia that provided an adequate staff for penal places. But it seems to the author, by comparison, that he is better off than he thinks he is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the appearance these staffs make may be due in part to the fact of close supervision from above. There is another factor, too, which ought to help. Responsible authorities have a good picture in mind of what a man needs to be in order to fit into their scheme of living. Their society makes definite requirements of its members and training is provided to make the misfits fit. To do that thing which they see clearly they have developed a policy that merely trains a man, both to discipline himself if possible, and do some work that will be of economic benefit both to himself and to the country, while punishment is forgotten. One of their chief tasks is to teach him to prefer the “Life of Labor,” and by instilling in him, or encouraging the spark if it is already there, the joy of creation, they manage in most cases to do it—if their statistics on recidivism are anywhere near correct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another advantage is that they have one very definite policy and every superintendent of penal places knows what that policy is. It is, as stated in their codes, to educate and to train without doing anything to degrade, to build up a personality, a self-respect, and to do nothing that could hinder such development. With that knowledge in hand it is easier to put the program into practice, and they can develop plans for carrying it out. An understanding of psychological principles enters here, not only in expression of policy as found in the Criminal Code but in the actual practice as one finds it. In doing away with handcuffs, with solitary confinement, with any type of corporal punishment, and with any prison garb, the enunciation of policy does its part, but in the approach of the immediate staff to the inmates there is seen a wholesomeness that no code could account for.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude of the authorities toward violations on the part of officers is another indication of their sincerity of purpose in this work. In their zeal to put their policy into action they not only provide that the Observation Commission shall be in close touch with all that goes on in the Institution, and impose on them much responsibility for the régime, but they also back them up by providing a penalty for the man who violates the regulations. A guard who strikes a prisoner is in danger of arrest himself, and since there are official records of such cases, one is sure that an attempt is made to put the policy into practice. It must be true that in isolated instances some such things happen and go unpunished, but it is the stated policy of the authorities to discourage in every way possible the committing of these acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Central authorities, as we have seen in discussing administration of these prisons, have made repeated efforts year by year to see that the Observation Committee keeps in close touch with all the life of the Institution and thereby effects better parole and release work as well as brings up the level of work done in the place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another indication of progress in putting the government’s policy into practice is the speed with which they have built open agricultural colonies, institutions of semi-closed type, and labor communes such as Bolshevo so that prisoners might be taken out of the old type of places. Judging from past accomplishment, there should in a very few years be left only those who demand restriction. In addition they are year by year adding to the number of those sentenced to compulsory labor without deprivation of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, then, is a system that deserves to attract the attention of those genuinely interested in a better approach to effective crime repression. It has without doubt made a distinct contribution in this field of social endeavor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF CRIMINAL CODE GENERAL SECTION ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL SECTION&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; I&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
THE AIMS OF PENAL LEGISLATION OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. The penal legislation of the RSFSR pursues the task of protecting the socialist state of workers and peasants and the régime established therein from socially dangerous acts (crimes) by applying to persons committing them measures of social protection set out in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; II&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
EXTENT OF OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. The provisions of the present code extend to all citizens of the RSFSR, who have committed socially dangerous acts within the territory of the USSR, as well as beyond the boundaries of the USSR in case they are detained within the territory of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Citizens of other constituent republics are in accordance with the RSFSR laws liable to be prosecuted for crimes committed within the territory of the RSFSR as well as outside the boundaries of the USSR, if they had been detained and subjected to trial or investigation within the RSFSR territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes committed within the territory of the Union, citizens of the constituent republics are liable according to the laws of the locality where they committed the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. For crimes committed within the territory of the USSR foreigners are liable according to the laws of the locality where the crime was committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5. The question of the criminal liability of foreign nationals enjoying the right of exterritoriality shall be decided in each individual case by diplomatic means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; III&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PENAL POLICY OF THE RSFSR&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
6. A socially dangerous act is any act of commission or omission directed against the Soviet régime, or one which violates the order established by the workers’ and peasants’ government, for the period of time pending a transition to a communist régime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: An act, which although formally falling within one of the articles of the special section of the present code is free from socially dangerous characteristics owing to its obvious insignificance or absence of harmful consequences, is not a crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
7. In regard to persons who commit socially dangerous acts or who are dangerous owing to their connections with criminal circles, measures of social protection of judicial-corrective, medical, or medical-educational nature are applied.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
8. In the event of the concrete act, which at the time it was committed was a crime in accordance with Article 6 of the present code, but by the time it was investigated or examined in court lost its socially dangerous character owing to a change in the criminal law, or owing to the mere change in the social-political conditions, or in case the person who committed it cannot, in the opinion of the court be regarded as socially dangerous at the time indicated, then such an act does not entail the application of a measure of social protection to the person who committed it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
9. Measures of social protection are applied for the following purposes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) To prevent the commission of further crimes by persons who have committed them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) To exercise influence over other unstable elements of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) To adapt the offender to the conditions of the social life of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The measures of social protection cannot have for their purpose the infliction of physical suffering or the degradation of human dignity and they do not pursue the object of retribution or punishment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
10. With regard to persons who have committed socially dangerous acts, methods of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applied only in cases when these persons&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Acted knowingly, i.e., foresaw the socially dangerous effect of their acts, desired these consequences, or knowingly allowed such effects to take place, or&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Acted carelessly, i.e., did not foresee the effects of their acts—although they should have foreseen them—or recklessly hoped to avert the effects of their acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
11. Measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not to be applied in the case of persons who have committed a crime while suffering from chronic mental diseases, or while temporarily insane, or in general in such a state of deranged health as to be incapable of realizing their acts or of controlling them. Neither are these measures to be applied to persons, who although at the time they committed a crime were in possession of their mental faculties, nevertheless suffered from mental derangement by the time sentenced was pronounced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection which are applied to these persons are confined to those of a medical nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: The present article does not apply to persons who have committed a crime in a state of intoxication.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
12. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are not applied in the case of minors up to the age of 16. When regarding the latter, the Commission of Juvenile Offenders finds it possible to confine itself to measures of social protection of a medical and educational nature. Oct. 30, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 82, Article 796.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
13. Measures of social protection are not applied to persons who have committed acts foreseen by the penal laws, if the court establishes that these acts were committed by them in a state of necessary defense against attempts at the Soviet rule, or at the body or rights of a person defending himself or another person, provided there was no excess of the limits of self-defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Measures of social protection are not applied when the same acts were committed in order to avert a danger, which under the given circumstances were unavertable by any other means, provided the harm thereby caused was less serious than the harm averted. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
14. Criminal prosecution may not take place&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) when ten years have elapsed from the time of the commission of the crime, for which the court may inflict a penalty of not more than five years’ imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) when five years have elapsed since the time the crime for which the court may impose a penalty of not more than five years had been committed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) when three years have elapsed since the perpetration of the crime, for which a court may sentence the criminal to not more than one year’s imprisonment, or when the law provides a more lenient measure of social protection than imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principle of remoteness is applied when in the course of the corresponding period of time no proceedings were instituted in connection with the given case. The period of remoteness is interrupted when the person who committed a crime within the corresponding period of remoteness commits another similar or not less serious crime, or evades judicial examination or investigation. In such cases the periods of remoteness begin to run from the date of the perpetration of the second offense or from the date of the resumption of the interrupted proceedings. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: In cases of criminal prosecutions for counter-revolutionary crimes the application of the principle of remoteness is left to the discretion of the court in each individual case. However, if the court does not find it possible to apply the principle of remoteness, and sentences a person to be shot for such a crime, such sentence must necessarily be commuted to the proclamation that the person accused is an enemy of the toilers coupled with the forfeiture of the citizenship of the USSR, and exile from the confines of the USSR forever or imprisonment for a period of not less than two years. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: In regard to persons criminally prosecuted for active participation in acts, and active struggle against the working class and the revolutionary movement, committed while holding responsible or secret posts under the Tsarist régime, or under counter-reveolutionary governments during the civil war, the application of the principle of remoteness and the question of commuting capital punishment by shooting are left to the discretion of the court. June 6, 19275.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 3: The periods of remoteness laid down in the present article do not apply to acts prosecuted by way of administrative action according to the present code, and the infliction of punishments for such acts can take place only within one month from the date they were committed. June 6, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
15. A sentence of conviction shall not be carried into effect if it was not carried into effect within ten years from the date of the passing of the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
16. In case a certain socially dangerous act is not directly foreseen by the present code, the grounds and limits of liability for such acts are determined in accordance with those articles of the code which foresee crimes most closely approximating them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
17. The measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature are applicable equally to persons who have committed the crime—participants as well as their accomplices—instigators and abettors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instigators are persons who induced the commission of the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abettors are persons who assisted in the carrying out of the crime by means of advice, indications, providing of means and removal of obstacles, or by means of concealing the criminal or the traces of crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
18. The measures of social protection of judicial-corrective nature are determined for each of the accomplices according to the degree of their participation in the given crime, as well as according to the degree of danger of the crime, and of the person who took part in it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The failure to report a crime that has been committed, or is being planned, entails the application of the measures of social defense of judicial-corrective nature only in cases specially designated in the present code.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
19. An attempt to commit a crime, as well as acts preparatory to a crime, which take the form of finding or adapting weapons and means, and creating conditions favorable for a crime, are prosecuted on the same basis as a crime which has actually been committed. In such cases, the court, when selecting the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature, must be guided by the degree of danger of the person who has committed the crime or the preparatory act. The court must also examine how far the preparations for the crime went, and how near the consequences were to the act as well as the causes owing to which the crime was not completed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the crime was not committed owing to the persons intending to commit it having voluntarily renounced it, the court fixes a corresponding measure of social defense for those acts which were in fact committed by the person who attempted or prepared to commit the crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Part&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; IV&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON THE MEASURES OF SOCIAL PROTECTION APPLIED UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE WITH REGARD TO PERSONS WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
20. The following are the measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) The offender is proclaimed enemy of the toilers and is at the same time deprived of the citizenship of the constituent republic and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR and must be necessarily expelled from its confines.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote localities of the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Imprisonment in common prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Removal from the confines of the USSR for a certain period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Removal from the confines of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities or without same, or coupled with the prohibition to reside in definite localities, or without such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) Dismissal from office coupled with prohibition of occupying a certain post or without any such prohibition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(i) Prohibition to engage in certain activities or industry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(j) Public censure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(k) Confiscation of property—complete or partial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(l) A fine expressed in money.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(m) Imposition of the duty to make good the damage caused by the culprit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(n) Warning.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;May 20, 1930, Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
21. Execution by shooting is applied for the purpose of combating the gravest kinds of crimes, threatening the foundations of Soviet rule, and of Soviet régime, pending the abolition of that punishment by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, in cases specially indicated in the articles of the present Code, as an exceptional measure for the protection of the state of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
22. Persons who have not reached the age of 18 at the time the crime was committed and women in a state of pregnancy cannot be condemned to shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
23. The principal measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective nature applied with regard to persons who have committed crimes, consist in proclaiming them enemies of the toilers with the consequences following such measure, imprisonment, and compulsory labor without confinement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other measures of social protection set out in Article 20, except warning and the confiscation of property, may be decreed either as independent measures or be combined with the basic ones as supplementary measures. The confiscation of property as a supplementary measure of social protection may be imposed by the court only in cases specified in the articles of the present Code. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
24. The following are measures of social protection of a medical nature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Compulsory medical treatment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Placing a person in a hospital coupled with isolation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
25. The following are measures of social protection of a medical-education kind:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Delivery of a minor into the charge of his parents, adopters, guardians, relatives, provided the aforementioned are able to support him, or to other persons or institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) The placing in a special medical-educational institution. December 20, 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 4, Article 38.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
26. Measures of social protection of a medical-educational and medical nature may be applied by the court in case it recognizes that the application of measures of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind does not fit the given case; or they may be applied in addition to the latter, if moreover the measures of social protection of a medical-pedagogical and pedagogical kind have not been applied by the competent judicial inquiry organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
27. The proclamation of a person as enemy of the toilers and expulsion from the confines of the USSR with the forfeiture of the citizenship of a constituent republic, and thereby of the citizenship of the USSR may only be applied for an unlimited period. June 6. 1927.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1927, No. 49, Article 330.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
28. Imprisonment may be imposed for a period of between one and ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Imprisonment for a period under three years is served in common prisons. Imprisonment for periods of three years and more is served in corrective-labor camps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, when the court recognizes that the person condemned to three or more years’ imprisonment is obviously unfit for physical labor, or owing to the degree of his social danger need not be sent to the corrective-labor camp, the court has the right to substitute a common prison for a camp by specially decreeing so in its sentence. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 1: Persons who are uninterruptedly serving in the units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and who are in the cadres either as privates or junior commanders, serving for a definite period, are sentenced in peace time, instead of to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for two months to one year, to serve for a like period in the military-corrective units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and instead of imprisonment for a period up to two months, to arrest for a like period, served in a manner prescribed for the disciplinary arrest of persons in military service.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In exceptional cases, by special decree of the court in each individual case, the same measures may be applied to the above-mentioned persons also for common crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons in military service of the middle, senior, highest and junior commanding personnel of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who remain in the cadres after serving the required period in the army, and who have been sentenced to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights for a period up to one year, in case of dismissal from the ranks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, serve their term indicated in the sentences by doing compulsory labor according to the general rules. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; 2: When the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army passes to the state of war, persons in the military service who are in military-corrective units are dispatched to the active army, and the subsequent serving of the measure of social protection imposed on them is postponed until after the termination of military operations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sentence condemning a soldier in time of war to imprisonment without forfeiture of rights may, by decree of the court which passed that sentence, be postponed until after the termination of military operations, on condition that the convicted person joins the active army.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons in military service mentioned in the first and second parts of the above note, who while in the ranks of active army have proved themselves staunch defenders of the USSR, the court which passed the sentence may, on the petition of the competent military authorities, release the convicted person from the measure of social protection formerly imposed on him, or substitute for it a more lenient measure of social protection. October 1, 1928.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1928, No. 127, Article 816.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
29. The period of preliminary detention, and also the time spent in confinement from the moment the sentence was passed pending its coming into force must obligatorily be reckoned as part of the period of detention decreed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case the court applies a measure of social protection of a judicial-corrective kind other than imprisonment, it has the right to take into consideration the period of detention previous to the trial and accordingly mitigate the measure of social protection chosen by it, or to resolve not to apply to the defendant the measure of social protection set out in the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With regard to persons sentenced to compulsory labor each day of preliminary detention is credited as three days of compulsory labor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
30. Compulsory labor without imprisonment may be imposed for a period ranging from one day to one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: Compulsory labor without imprisonment is not applied to the middle, senior, highest and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, who are in the cadres and have completed their term of service, and also to persons in military service who belong to the cadres of privates and junior commanders of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during their appointed period of service. In place of compulsory labor the above-mentioned persons in military service are sentenced to arrest for a period not exceeding two months, which is served in a manner prescribed for persons in military service under disciplinary arrest. November 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 61, Article 749.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
31. Forfeiture of political and separate civil rights consists of the deprivation of:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) elective franchise both active and passive&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the right to occupy elective posts in public organizations&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the right to occupy certain specified state offices&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) the right to the titles of distinction&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) parental rights&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) right to pensions paid by way of social insurance and to unemployment relief paid by way of social insurance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights may be prescribed both fully—so as to cover all the above-mentioned rights—and partially, in respect of their separate categories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of parental rights may be prescribed by the court, only if it has been proven that this right has been abused by the convicted person.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of pension may be prescribed by the courts only in the following cases:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) conviction for the commission of state crimes (part I of the Special Section)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) conviction for the commission of crimes prompted by greed to imprisonment or to exile with a compulsory residence in other localities (as the basic measure of social protection)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the prescription of the confiscation of the entire property as supplementary measure of social protection&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) conviction in time of peace for military crimes, falling under articles of 193(3), 193(4), 193(7), 193(9), 193(12), 193(13), 193(17), 193(20)-193(28), of the present Code, and in time of war, for any of the crimes falling under Chapter IX of the Criminal Code (on crimes by persons in military service). June 30, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 30, Article 388.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
32. Forfeiture of rights cannot be prescribed for a period exceeding five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case this measure of social protection is prescribed as one supplementary to imprisonment, forfeiture of rights extends to the entire period of imprisonment served plus a period determined by the sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
33. Forfeiture of rights, foreseen by paragraphs a-c of Article 31 is accompanied by the forfeiture of the orders of the USSR, and of the orders of the RSFSR. In such cases the court is obliged, after the sentence comes into force, to present a petition to that effect to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as the case may be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of the other marks of distinction and of distinctive titles, is effected by sentence of the court. August 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 42, Article 504.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
34. Forfeiture of rights may be decreed by the court both as a supplementary and as an independent measure of social protection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When imposing a sentence of over one year’s imprisonment, the court is obliged to discuss the question of the forfeiture of the convicted person’s rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Forfeiture of rights cannot be combined with conditional conviction or with public censure. December 6, 1929.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, No. 8788, Article 854.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
35. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement or with prohibition to reside in other localities or without these limitations, coupled with compulsory labor or without compulsory labor, may be applied by the court with regard to those convicted persons, who, in the opinion of the court, it would be socially dangerous to leave in the given locality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The removal from the territory of the RSFSR or from the boundaries of a separate locality with an obligatory residence in other localities is prescribed for a period of three to ten years. This measure, as a supplementary one, can only be prescribed for a period not exceeding five years. The removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory residence in other localities, coupled with compulsory labor, may only be prescribed as a basic measure of social protection. Removal from the territory of the RSFSR, or from the territory of a specified locality with prohibition to reside in certain localities, or without this restrictive provision is prescribed for a period of one to five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In case one of these measures is decreed by the court as a supplementary one to imprisonment, the period of this supplementary measure begins to run from the date of the release of the prisoner.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Persons sentenced to the removal from the territory of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in some other locality in order to serve their terms of imprisonment in corrective labor camps, after serving their term of imprisonment, settle in the district of the camp pending the period when they will be allowed a free choice of their residence. Land must be allotted to them, or else they must be provided with paid work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Removal from the RSFSR territory, as well as removal from any specified locality whatever form it takes, cannot be applied to persons under sixteen. May 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 26, Article 344.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
36. Removal from the confines of the USSR or RSFSR for a definite period of time may take place only in a manner specially provided by federal legislation. Removal from the confines of a specified locality with compulsory settlement in other localities may be applied by the court only in cases of conviction for crimes specified by Articles 58(2)-58(14), 59(2), Part I, a, 59(3), 59(302), 59(3-b), 59(7), 59 (8), Part I, 59(9), 59(21), 61 Part III, 73(1), 74 Part II, 104, 107, 116 Part II, 117 Part II, 118, 129, 129-a, 136, 140 Part II, 142 Part II, 153 Part II, 155, 162, b, c, d, and e, 164 Part II, 165 Part III, 166, 167, 169, Part II, 173 and 175 Parts II and III.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Places in which compulsory settlement may be prescribed are determined as follows: With regard to persons condemned to exile without compulsory labor by the chief administration of militia at the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, by agreement with the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR; and with regard to persons condemned to exile with compulsory labor, by the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR. February 15, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 9, Article 102.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; May 30, 1931.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1931, No. 27, Article 247.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
37. Removal from office may be applied in case the court deems it impossible to leave the condemned person at the post he occupied at the time of his conviction, or at the time he committed the crime. It may be accompanied by a prohibition to occupy a certain post, such prohibition not to last over five years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
38. Prohibition to follow a certain activity or industry is applied by the court for a period not to exceed five years in cases where the court shall consider it impossible, owing to the ascertained abuses by the person convicted while he was engaged in his profession or industry, to allow him to continue same further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In particular, the court has the right to prohibit the person convicted to undertake any responsibilities with regard to furnishing labor and material to State institutions, to enter into contracts with State and public enterprises and institutions, to manage trade or commission enterprises either in his own name or on behalf of other persons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
39. Public censure consists of the public expression of condemnation to the person condemned declared in the name of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
40. Confiscation of property is the compulsory and uncompensated alienation in favor of the State of the whole property of a convicted person, or of a proportion thereof exactly defined by the court, such property being either entirely owned by him, or constituting a share in common property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of domestic use and indispensable to the condemned person and his family, the stock and tools required for small-scale peasant industry or agricultural production, and serving as a means of existence for him and his family, are not subject to confiscation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foodstuffs and sums of money left at the disposal of the convicted person and members of his family, may not, according to valuation in their totality, be less than the average three-months’ wages of a worker or that locality in respect to each member of the family.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The stock of tools indispensable to a convicted person for his professional work may be confiscated only in case the court decrees that he shall be deprived of the right of exercising such profession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: In kulak households only the property mentioned in Articles 1-9 of the List of Kinds of Property on which execution may not be levied in respect of arrears of taxes, custom duties, and dues, is not liable to confiscation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1929, Nos. 8990, Article 924.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; November 20, 1930.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Collection of Acts, 1930, No. 62, Article 763.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
41. When property is confiscated, the State shall not answer for the debts and liabilities of the convicted person, if such had been contracted after the taking of steps by the investigation or judicial organs to protect the property, and without the consent of these organs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to claims subject to gratification out of the confiscated property, the State answers only within the limits of the assets, while in regard to priority of gratification of claims the rules shall be observed that are laid down in Articles 99 and 101 of the Civil Code and 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure of RSFSR published April 10, 1930.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
42. A fine is a money penalty imposed by the court within the limits established by separate articles of the present Code, and when applied as an additional measure, the fine shall be imposed at the discretion of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all cases a fine shall be imposed in conformity to the property status of the convicted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In determining the fine, the court may decide to substitute, in the event of nonpayment, by compulsory work without deprivation of liberty at the rate of one month compulsory labor for 100 rubles fine. No substitution of deprivation of liberty for a fine or vice versa shall be allowed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Articles of property that are not subject to confiscation may not be taken in payment of a fine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
43. The caution is applied by the court only when a verdict of acquittal is given, if the court considers that the behavior of the acquitted gives ground, nevertheless, to fear that he might commit the crime in the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
44. The obligation to repair the damage is imposed upon the convicted in those cases when the court finds it expedient that the convicted shall eliminate the consequences of the violation of the law committed by him, or of the damage caused by him to the plaintiff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This measure of social defense, however, may not exceed by its severity the measure of social defense given as the basic penalty in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; V&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON MEASURES OF SOCIAL DEFENSE OF JUDICO-CORRECTIONAL CHARACTER AND THEIR IMPOSITION BY COURT&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
45. In imposing a measure of social protection of judico-correctional character the court shall be guided by:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) the provisions of the general section of the present code&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) the limits indicated in the article of the Special Section which provides a penalty for a given kind of crime&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) the Socialist conception of law, taking into consideration the social danger of the crime committed, the circumstances of the case, and the personality of the defendant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
46. The crimes foreseen by the present code are divided into:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Crimes directed against the foundations of the Soviet system established by the authority of Workers and Peasants in the USSR, such crimes being consequently considered the more dangerous, and&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) All other crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For crimes of the first category the Code lays down the limit below which the court may not go in imposing a measure of social defense of judico-correctional character.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On all other crimes the Code lays down only the maximum limit of penalty to be imposed by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
47. The basic question to be settled in each separate case is the question of the social danger of the crime that has been tried.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An aggravating factor in this respect, when determining one or the other measure of social protection foreseen by the Code, is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Committing a crime in order to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie. ‘&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Possibility of causing harm to the interests of the State, of the toilers by committing the crime, although the crime itself was not immediately directed against the interests of the State or of the toilers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Committing of a crime by a group or a band.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Committing a crime by a person who already committed a crime before, except in cases when a given person is considered as not having been tried before, or when a long time, in a judicial sense, has passed since the committing of the first crime, or since the conviction of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Articles 14 and 15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The court, however, depending on the character of the first crime, may not consider it as an aggravating factor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Committing a crime for selfish or base motives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) Committing a crime with particular cruelty, violence, slyness, or in regard to persons subordinated to the criminal or materially dependent on him, or particularly helpless on account of age, or other circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
48. Extenuating circumstances in the imposition of one or another measure of social defense or when a crime has been committed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Although exceeding the limits of self-defense, yet for the protection of Soviet law, revolutionary law, or the personality and right of the party defending himself or another person&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) For the first time&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) For motives other than selfishness or base desires&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(d) Under the influence of threats, compulsion, or official or material dependence&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(e) Under the influence of strong mental agitation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(f) In a state of hunger or distress, or under the influence of severe personal or family conditions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(g) Due to ignorance, lack of consciousness, or an accidental chain of circumstances&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(h) By a person under age, or by a woman in a state of pregnancy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
49. If the crime committed by the defendant contains the symptoms of several crimes, as well as in the case of the defendant having committed several crimes for which he has not been sentenced, the court, having defined the measure of social defense for each crime separately, finally imposes the penalty according to the article which provides for the gravest of the crimes committed by the defendant and the severest measure of social defense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
50. If a minor (16-20 years of age) is sentenced to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the term must be reduced by one-third as compared with the term of an adult sentenced under the same article. At all events the term of the sentence of a minor shall not exceed one-half the maximum laid down by the present Code for a given crime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
51. In the event when, in view of exceptional circumstances of the case, the court finds it necessary to impose a measure of social defense below the lowest limit indicated in a corresponding article of the present Code, or to apply another, less stringent measure of social defense that is not indicated in the article, the court may also depart from the article, but the motives of such departure from the code must, be clearly stated in the verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same rule applies in those cases when the court finds that the defendant at the time of the trial is not socially dangerous and no measure of social defense is imposed on him by the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
52. The right of either complete or partial release of the condemned person from the application of measures of social defense, under sentences of all judicial organs of RSFSR, except cases foreseen in the present Code, constitutes the exclusive prerogative of the presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Section&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; VI&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ON CONDITIONAL SENTENCES AND CONDITIONAL AND EARLY RELEASE&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
53. If the court finds that the degree of social danger of the defendant does not call either for his isolation, or for the imposition of compulsory labor, it may impose a conditional sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such cases the court decides not to execute the verdict if within a stated period the convicted person will not commit a fresh crime of equal gravity. This period may not be less than one year and not more than ten years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-variant-caps: small-caps;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Note&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: If a fine or property requisition is added to deprivation of liberty or compulsory labor, the fine is imposed irrespective of the conditional nature of the basic verdict.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
54. In the event of the committing of a crime by the conditionally condemned during the probation period the court has the right either to add the conditioned measure of social defense either fully or in part to the measure of social defense given by the second verdict. In the first case, the total term of deprivation of liberty must not exceed ten years, and the total term of compulsory labor must not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
55. The following persons shall be held free from previous convictions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(a) Persons acquitted by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(b) Persons conditionally sentenced, who did not commit a crime of equal gravity during the probation period given by the court&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(c) Persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for terms of not more than three months, or to any other minor measure of social defense, who in the course of three years after serving the first sentence, did not commit a fresh crime, or persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a period of more than six months if they committed no fresh crime of equal gravity in the course of six years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
56. If persons sentenced to terms of social defense show reformation, they may be released before the end of the term imposed by the verdict of the court.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conditional early release consists either in abstaining from further serving of the sentence, or in substituting a milder form of social defense. The manner of application of conditional early release is laid down by the Correctional Labor Code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regard to persons serving sentences in correctional labor camps, conditional early release is applied in the form of transferring the convict to free settlement in the district of the given camp for the rest of his sentence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the conditionally-released person should commit a fresh crime of equal gravity during the unexpired time of his sentence, the latter is added to the measure of social defense imposed by the court for the new crime, while the total term of deprivation of liberty may not exceed ten years and the total term of compulsory labor may not exceed one year.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
57. Persons under age, sentenced to deprivation of liberty and placed in industrial homes for minors, remain there until fully corrected, but not later than reaching the age of 18. If, by the time of reaching this age, the sentence has not yet expired, they may be given early discharge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Minors, in regard to whom early discharge should be deemed impossible, shall either remain in the same industrial home, or shall be transferred to other industrial homes or colonies on the grounds laid down by the correctional labor code of RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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		<title>Library:The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte</title>
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		<title>Library:Orientalism</title>
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Orientalism|author=Edward Said|published_date=1978|type=Book|isbn=0 7100 0040 5|source=[https://annas-archive.org/md5/7f43dae180a3f72e0bfd0ed9e1670bed anna&#039;s archive]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;Acknowledgments&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
I have been reading about Orientalism for a number of years, but most of this book was written during 1975-1976, which I spent as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. In this unique and generous institution, it was my good fortune not only to have benefitted agreeably from several colleagues, but also from the help of Joan Warmbrunn, Chris Hoth, Jane Kielsmeier, Preston Cutler, and the center&#039;s director, Gardner Lindzey. The list of friends, colleagues, and students who read, or listened to, parts or the whole of this manuscript is so long as to embarrass me, and now that it has finally appeared as a book, perhaps even them. Nevertheless I should mention with gratitude the always helpful encouragement of Janet and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Noam Chomsky, and Roger Owen, who followed this project from its beginning to its conclusion. Likewise I must gratefully acknowledge the helpful and critical interest of the colleagues, friends, and students in various places whose questions and discussion sharpened the text considerably. Andre Schiffrin and Jeanne Morton of Pantheon Books were ideal publisher and copy editor, respectively, and made the ordeal (for the author, at least) of preparing the manuscript an instructive and genuinely intelligent process. Mariam Said helped me a great deal with her research on the early modern history of Orientalist institutions. Apart from that, though, her loving support really made much of the work on this book not only enjoyable but possible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
E. W. S.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New York&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
September-October 1977&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The East is a career.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;Preface to the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
Nine years ago, in the spring of 1994, I wrote an afterword for &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, which, in trying to clarify what I believed I had and had not said, I stressed not only the many discussions that had opened up since my book appeared in 1978, but also the ways in which a work about representations of &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; lends itself to increasing misrepresentation and misinterpretation. That I find the very same thing today more ironic than irritating is a sign of how much my age has crept up on me, along with the necessary diminutions in expectations and pedagogic zeal that usually frame the road to seniority. The recent deaths of my two main intellectual, political, and personal mentors, Eqbal Ahmad and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (who is one of the work&#039;s dedicatees) have brought sadness and loss, as well as resignation and a certain stubborn will to go on. It isn&#039;t at all a matter of being optimistic, but rather of continuing to have faith in the ongoing and literally unending process of emancipation and enlightenment that, in my opinion, frames and gives direction to the intellectual vocation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, it is still a source of amazement to me that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; continues to be discussed and translated all over the world, in thirty-six languages. Thanks to the efforts of my dear friend and colleague Professor Gaby Peterberg, now of UCLA, formerly of Ben-Gurion University in Israel, there is a Hebrew version of the book available, which has stimulated considerable discussion and debate among Israeli readers and students. In addition, a Vietnamese translation has appeared under Australian auspices; I hope it&#039;s not immodest to say that an Indochinese intellectual space seems to have opened up for the propositions of this book. In any case, it gives me great pleasure to note as an author who had never dreamed of any such happy fate for his work that interest in what I tried to do in my book hasn&#039;t completely died down, particularly in the many different lands of the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In part, of course, that is because the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam have continued to fuel enormous change, struggle, controversy and, as I write these lines, war. As I said many years ago, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is the product of circumstances that are fundamentally, indeed radically, fractious. In my memoir, &#039;&#039;Out of Place&#039;&#039; (1999), I described the strange and contradictory worlds in which I grew up, providing for myself and my readers a detailed account of the settings that I think formed me in Palestine, Egypt, and Lebanon. But that was only a very personal account that stopped short of all the years of my own political engagement that started after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, a war in whose continuing aftermath (Israel is still in military occupation of the Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights) the terms of struggle and the ideas at stake that were crucial for my generation of Arabs and Americans seem to go on. Nevertheless, I do want to affirm yet again that this book and, for that matter, my intellectual work generally have really been enabled by my life as a university academic. For all its often noted defects and problems, the American university--and mine, Columbia, in particular--is still one of the few remaining places in the United States where reflection and study can take place in an almost-utopian fashion. I have never taught &#039;&#039;anything&#039;&#039; about the Middle East, being by training and practice a teacher of the mainly European and American humanities, a specialist in modern comparative literature. The university and my pedagogic work with two generations of first-class students and excellent colleagues has made possible the kind of deliberately meditated and analyzed study that this book contains, which for all its urgent worldly references is still a book about culture, ideas, history, and power, rather than Middle Eastern politics &#039;&#039;tout court&#039;&#039;. That was my notion from the beginning, and it is very evident and a good deal clearer to me today.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is very much a book tied to the tumultuous dynamics of contemporary history. I emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term Orient nor the concept of the West has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly identification of the Other. That these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulation and the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time, when the mobilizations of fear, hatred, disgust, and resurgent self-pride and arrogance--much of it having to do with Islam and the Arabs on one side, &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; Westerners on the other--are very large-scale enterprises. &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s first page opens with a 1975 description of the Lebanese Civil War that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. We have had the failure of the Oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the Palestinians on the reinvaded West Bank and Gaza, with Israeli F-16&#039;s and Apache helicopters used routinely on defenseless civilians as part of their collective punishment. The suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of September 11 and their aftermath in the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. As I wrote these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial invasion and occupation of Iraq by Britain and the United States proceeds, with a prospect of physical ravagement, political unrest, and more invasions that are truly awful to contemplate. This is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. Nevertheless, I think not.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I wish I could say, however, that general understanding of the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam in the United States has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn&#039;t. For all kinds of reasons, the situation in Europe seems to be considerably better. In the United States, the hardening of attitudes, the tightening of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche, the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and &amp;quot;others&amp;quot; has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging, and destruction of Iraq&#039;s libraries and museums. What our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the map of the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. But this has often happened with the &amp;quot;Orient,&amp;quot; that semi-mythical construct, which, since Napoleon&#039;s invasion of Egypt in the late eighteenth century, has been made and remade countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the Orient&#039;s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. In the process the uncountable sediments of history, which include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of Baghdad&#039;s libraries and museums. My argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and rewritten, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; East, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; Orient becomes &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; to possess and direct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I should say again that I have no &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; Orient to argue for. I do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be. There has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the Arab and Muslim for their backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women&#039;s rights that we simply forget that such notions as modernity, enlightenment, and democracy are by no means simple and agreed-upon concepts that one either does or does not find, like Easter eggs in the living room. The breathtaking insouciance of jejune publicists who speak in the name of foreign policy and who have no live notion (or any knowledge at all) of the language of what real people actually speak has fabricated an arid landscape ready for American power to construct there an &#039;&#039;ersatz&#039;&#039; model of free market &amp;quot;democracy,&amp;quot; without even a trace of doubt that such projects don&#039;t exist outside of Swift&#039;s Academy of Lagado.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What I do argue also is that there is a difference between knowledge of other peoples and other times that is the result of understanding, compassion, careful study and analysis for their own sakes, and on the other hand knowledge--if that is what it is--that is part of an overall campaign of self-affirmation, belligerency, and outright war. There is, after all, a profound difference between the will to understand for purposes of coexistence and humanistic enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external dominion. It is surely one of the intellectual catastrophes of history that an imperialist war confected by a small group of unelected U.S. officials (they&#039;ve been called chicken hawks, since none of them ever served in the military) was waged against a devastated Third World dictatorship on thoroughly ideological grounds having to do with world dominance, security control, and scarce resources, but disguised for its true intent, hastened, and reasoned for by Orientalists who betrayed their calling as scholars. The major influences on George W. Bush&#039;s Pentagon and National Security Council were men such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, experts on the Arab and Islamic world who helped the American hawks think about such preposterous phenomena as the Arab mind and centuries-old Islamic decline that only American power could reverse. Today, bookstores in the United States are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror, Islam exposed, the Arab threat, and the Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange Oriental peoples over there who have been such a terrible thorn in &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; flesh. Accompanying such warmongering expertise have been the omnipresent CNNs and Fox News Channels of this world, plus myriad numbers of evangelical and right-wing radio hosts, plus innumerable tabloids and even middlebrow journals, all of them recycling the same unverifiable fictions and vast generalizations so as to stir up &amp;quot;America&amp;quot; against the foreign devil.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even with all its terrible failings and its appalling dictator (who was partly created by U.S. policy two decades ago), were Iraq to have been the world&#039;s largest exporter of bananas or oranges, surely there would have been no war, no hysteria over mysteriously vanished weapons of mass destruction, no transporting of an enormous army, navy, and air force 7000 miles away to destroy a country scarcely known even to the educated American, all in the name of &amp;quot;freedom.&amp;quot; Without a well-organized sense that these people over there were not like &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; and didn&#039;t appreciate &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; values--the very core of traditional Orientalist dogma as I describe its creation and circulation in this book--there would have been no war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So from the very same directorate of paid professional scholars enlisted by the Dutch conquerors of Malaysia and Indonesia, the British armies of India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, West Africa, the French armies of Indochina and North Africa, came the American advisers to the Pentagon and the White House, using the same cliches, the same demeaning stereotypes, the same justification for power and violence (after all, runs the chorus, power is the only language they understand) in this case as in the earlier ones. These people have now been joined in Iraq by a whole army of private contractors and eager entrepreneurs to whom shall be confided everything from the writing of textbooks and the constitution to the refashioning of Iraqi political life and its oil industry. Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is a chorus of willing intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic empires, as if one shouldn&#039;t trust the evidence of one&#039;s eyes watching the destruction and the misery and death brought by the latest &#039;&#039;mission civilizatrice&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One specifically American contribution to the discourse of empire is the specialized jargon of policy expertise. You don&#039;t need Arabic or Persian or even French to pontificate about how the democracy domino effect is just what the Arab world needs. Combative and woefully ignorant policy experts, whose world experience is limited to the Beltway, grind out books on &amp;quot;terrorism&amp;quot; and liberalism, or about Islamic fundamentalism and American foreign policy, or about the end of history, all of it vying for attention and influence quite without regard for truthfulness or reflection or real knowledge. What matters is how efficient and resourceful it sounds, and who might go for it, as it were. The worst aspect of this essentializing stuff is that human suffering in all its density and pain is spirited away. Memory and with it the historical past are effaced as in the common, dismissively contemptuous American phrase, &amp;quot;you&#039;re history.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Twenty-five years after its publication, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; once again raises the question of whether modern imperialism ever ended, or whether it has continued in the Orient since Napoleon&#039;s entry into Egypt two centuries ago. Arabs and Muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depredations of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. You have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern Orientalist. This of course is also V. S. Naipaul&#039;s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. But what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of &amp;quot;lesser&amp;quot; peoples and &amp;quot;subject races&amp;quot; generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives of, say, Palestinians or Congolese or Algerians or Iraqis. We allow justly that the Holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: Why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what Orientalism continues to do? Think of the line that starts with Napoleon, continues with the rise of Oriental studies arid the takeover of North Africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in Vietnam, in Egypt, in Palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the Gulf, in Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Afghanistan. Then think contrapuntally of the rise of anticolonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle, and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of &amp;quot;natives.&amp;quot; Each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
My idea in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. I have called what I try to do &amp;quot;humanism,&amp;quot; a word I continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated postmodern critics. By humanism I mean first of all attempting to dissolve Blake&#039;s mind-forg&#039;d manacles so as to be able to use one&#039;s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. Moreover, humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking, therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. The disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that this is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territorially reductive polarizations like &amp;quot;Islam v. the West&amp;quot; seem to conquer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri-cultural life as it entails Islam and the West, I have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. Certainly I think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experience and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. This is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socioeconomic reality. Our role is to widen the field of discussion, not to set limits in accord with the prevailing authority. I have spent a great deal of my life during the past thirty-five years advocating the rights of the Palestinian people to national self-determination, but I have always tried to do that with full attention paid to the reality of the Jewish people and what they suffered by the way of persecution and genocide. The paramount thing is that the struggle for equality in Palestine/Israel should be directed toward a humane goal, that is, coexistence, and not further suppression and denial. Not accidentally, I indicate that Orientalism and modern anti-Semitism have common roots. Therefore, it would seem to be a vital necessity for independent intellectuals always to provide alternative models to the reductively simplifying and confining ones, based on mutual hostility, that have prevailed in the Middle East and elsewhere for so long.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let me now speak about a different alternative model that has been extremely important to me in my work. As a humanist whose field is literature, I am old enough to have been trained forty years ago in the field of comparative literature, whose leading ideas go back to Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Before that I must mention the supremely creative contribution of Giambattista Vico, the Neapolitan philosopher and philologist whose ideas anticipate and later infiltrate the line of German thinkers I am about to cite. They belong to the era of Herder and Wolf, later to be followed by Goethe, Humboldt, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Gadamer, and finally the great twentieth-century Romance philologists Erich Auerback, Leo Spitzer, and Ernst Robert Curtius. To young people of the current generation the very idea of philology suggests something impossibly antiquarian and musty, but philology in fact is the most basic and creative of the interpretive arts. It is exemplified for me most admirably in Goethe&#039;s interest in Islam generally, and Hafiz in particular, a consuming passion that led to the composition of the &#039;&#039;West-Ostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039;, and it inflected Goethe&#039;s later ideas about &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039;, the study of all the literatures of the world as a symphonic whole that could be apprehended theoretically as having preserved the individuality of each work without losing sight of the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a considerable irony to the realization, then, that as today&#039;s globalized world draws together in some of the lamentable ways I have been talking about here, we may be approaching the kind of standardization and homogeneity that Goethe&#039;s ideas were specifically formulated to prevent. In an essay published in 1951 entitled &amp;quot;Philolgie der Weltliteratur,&amp;quot; Erich Auerbach made exactly that point at the outset of the postwar period, which was also the beginning of the Cold War. His great book &#039;&#039;Mimesis&#039;&#039;, published in Berne in 1946 but written while Auerbach was a wartime exile teaching Romance languages in Istanbul, was meant to be a testament to the diversity and concreteness of the reality represented in Western literature from Homer to Virginia Woolf; but reading the 1951 essay one senses that for Auerbach the great book he wrote was an elegy for a period when people could interpret texts philologically, concretely, sensitively, and intuitively, using erudition and an excellent command of several languages to support the kind of understanding that Goethe advocated for his understanding of Islamic literature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Positive knowledge of languages and history was necessary, but it was never enough, any more than the mechanical gathering of facts would constitute an adequate method for grasping what an author like Dante, for example, was all about. The main requirement for the kind of philological understanding Auerbach and his predecessors were talking about and tried to practice was one that sympathetically and subjectively entered into the life of a written text as seen from the perspective of this time and its author (&#039;&#039;eingefullen&#039;&#039;). Rather than alienation and hostility to another time and another different culture, philology as applied to &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039; involved a profound humanistic spirit deployed with generosity and, if I may use the word, hospitality. Thus the interpreter&#039;s mind actively makes a place in it for a foreign Other. And this creative making of a place for works that are otherwise alien and distant is the most important facet of the interpreter&#039;s philological mission.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this was obviously undermined and destroyed in Germany by National Socialism. After the war, Auerbach notes mournfully, the standardization of ideas, and greater and greater specialization of knowledge, gradually narrowed the opportunities for the kind of investigative and everlastingly inquiring kind of philological work that he had represented, and, alas, it&#039;s an even more depressing fact that, since Auerbach&#039;s death in 1957, both the idea and practice of humanistic research have shrunk in scope as well as in centrality. The book culture based on archival research as well as general principles of mind that once sustained humanism as a historical discipline have almost disappeared. Instead of reading in the real sense of the word, our students today are often distracted by the fragmented knowledge available on the internet and in the mass media.&lt;br /&gt;
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Worse yet, education is threatened by nationalist and religious orthodoxies often disseminated by the mass media as they focus ahistorically and sensationally on the distant electronic wars that give viewers the sense of surgical precision but that in fact obscure the terrible suffering and destruction produced by modern &amp;quot;clean&amp;quot; warfare. In the demonization of an unknown enemy, for whom the label &amp;quot;terrorist&amp;quot; serves the general purpose of keeping people stirred up and angry, media images command too much attention and can be exploited at times of crisis and insecurity of the kind that the post-9/11 period has produced. Speaking both as an American and as an Arab I must ask my reader not to underestimate the kind of simplified view of the world that a relative handful of Pentagon civilian elites have formulated for U.S. policy in the entire Arab and Islamic worlds, a view in which terror, preemptive war, and unilateral regime change--backed up by the most bloated military budget in history--are the main ideas debated endlessly and impoverishingly by a media that assigns itself the role of producing so-called &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; who validate the government&#039;s general line. I should also note that it is far from a coincidence that General Sharon of Israel, who in 1982 led the invasion of Lebanon in order to change the Lebanese government, killing 17,000 civilians in the process, is now a partner in &amp;quot;peace&amp;quot; with George W. Bush, and that in the United States at least there has been not enough dissent from the dubious thesis that military power alone can change the map of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reflection, debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate American or Western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and regard other cultures with derisive contempt. Perhaps you will say that I am making too many abrupt transitions between humanistic interpretation on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and that a modern technological society that, along with unprecedented power, possesses the internet and F-16 fighter jets must in the end be commanded by formidable technical-policy experts like Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Perle. (Neither man will do any actual fighting since that will be left to less fortunate men and women.) But what has really been lost is a sense of the density and interdependence of human life, which can neither be reduced to a formula nor be brushed aside as irrelevant. Even the language of the war is dehumanizing in the extreme: &amp;quot;We&#039;ll go in there take out Saddam, destroy his army with clean surgical strikes, and everyone will think it&#039;s great,&amp;quot; said a congresswoman on national television. It seems to me entirely symptomatic of the precarious moment in which we are living that when Vice President Cheney made his hard-line speech on August 26, 2002, about the imperative to attack Iraq, he quoted as his single Middle East &amp;quot;expert&amp;quot; in support of military intervention against Iraq an Arab academic who, as a paid consultant to the mass media on a nightly basis, keeps repeating his hatred of his own people and the renunciation of his background. Moreover, he is backed in his efforts by the military and Zionist lobbies in the United States. Such a &#039;&#039;trahison de clercs&#039;&#039; is a symptom of how genuine humanism can degenerate into jingoism and false patriotism.&lt;br /&gt;
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That is one side of the global debate. In the Arab and Muslim countries the situation is scarcely better. As Roula Khalaf argues, in an excellent &#039;&#039;Financial Times&#039;&#039; essay (September 4, 2002), the region has slipped into an easy anti-Americanism that shows little understanding of what the United States is really like as a society. Because the governments are relatively powerless to affect U.S. policy toward them, they turn their energies to repressing and keeping down their own populations, which results in resentment, anger, and helpless imprecations that do nothing to open up societies where secular ideas about human history and development have been overtaken by failure and frustration, as well as by an Islamism built out of rote learning, the obliteration of what are perceived to be other, competitive forms of secular knowledge, and an inability to analyze and exchange ideas within the generally discordant world of modern discourse. The gradual disappearance of the extraordinary tradition of Islamic &#039;&#039;ijtihad&#039;&#039; has been one of the major cultural disasters of our time, with the result that critical thinking and individual wrestling with the problems of the modern world have simply dropped out of sight. Orthodoxy and dogma rule instead.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is not to say that the cultural world has simply regressed on one side to a belligerent neo-Orientalism and on the other to blanket rejectionism. The recent United Nations World Summit in Johannesburg, for all its limitations, did in fact reveal a vast area of common global concert whose detailed workings on matters having to do with the environment, famine, the gap between advanced and developing countries, health, and human rights, suggest the welcome emergence of a new collective constituency that give the often facile notion of &amp;quot;one world&amp;quot; a new urgency. In all this, however, we must admit that no one can possibly know the extraordinarily complex unity of our globalized world, despite the reality that, as I said at the outset, the world does have a real interdependence of parts that leaves no genuine opportunity for isolation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The point I want to conclude with now is to insist that the terrible reductive conflicts that herd people under falsely unifying rubrics like &amp;quot;America,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the West,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; and invent collective identities for large numbers of individuals who are actually quite diverse, cannot remain as potent as they are, and must be opposed, their murderous effectiveness vastly reduced in influence and mobilizing power. We still have at our disposal the rational interpretive skills that are the legacy of humanistic education, not as a sentimental piety enjoining us to return to traditional values or the classics but as the active practice of worldly secular discourse. The secular world is the world of history as made by human beings. Human agency is subject to investigation and analysis, which it is the mission of understanding to apprehend, criticize, influence, and judge. Above all, critical thought does not submit to state power or to commands to join in the ranks marching against one or another approved enemy. Rather than the manufactured clash of civilizations, we need to concentrate on the slow working together of cultures that overlap, borrow from each other, and live together in far more interesting ways than any abridged or inauthentic mode of understanding can allow. But for that kind of wider perception we need time and patient and skeptical inquiry, supported by faith in communities of interpretation that are difficult to sustain in a world demanding instant action and reaction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Humanism is centered upon the agency of human individuality and subjective intuition, rather than on received ideas and approved authority. Texts have to be read as texts that were produced and live on in the historical realm in all sorts of what I have called worldly ways. But this by no means excludes power, since on the contrary what I have tried to show in my book have been the insinuations, the imbrications of power into even the most recondite of studies.&lt;br /&gt;
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And lastly, most important, humanism is the only, and I would go so far as to say, the final resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history. We are today abetted by the enormously encouraging democratic field of cyberspace, open to all users in ways undreamed of by earlier generations either of tyrants or of orthodoxies. The worldwide protests before the war began in Iraq would not have been possible were it not for the existence of alternative communities across the globe, informed by alternative news sources, and keenly aware of the environmental, human rights, and libertarian impulses that bind us together in this tiny planet. The human, and humanistic, desire or enlightenment and emancipation is not easily deferred, despite the incredible strength of the opposition to it that comes from the Rumsfelds, Bin Ladens, Sharons, and Bushes of this world. I would like to believe that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; has had a place in the long and often interrupted road to human freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
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E. W. S.&lt;br /&gt;
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New York&lt;br /&gt;
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May 2003&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;Introduction&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
On a visit to Beirut during the terrible civil war of 1975-1976 a French journalist wrote regretfully of the gutted downtown area that &amp;quot;it had once seemed to belong to ... the Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Thierry Desjardins, &#039;&#039;Le Martyre du Liban&#039;&#039; (Paris: Plon, 1976), p. 14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He was right about the place, of course, especially so far as a European was concerned. The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences. Now it was disappearing; in a sense it had happened, its time was over. Perhaps it seemed irrelevant that Orientals themselves had something at stake in the process, that even in the time of Chateaubriand and Nerval Orientals had lived there, and that now it was they who were suffering; the main thing for the European visitor was a European representation of the Orient and its contemporary fate, both of which had a privileged communal significance for the journalist and his French readers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Americans will not feel quite the same about the Orient, which for them is much more likely to be associated very differently with the Far East (China and Japan, mainly). Unlike the Americans, the French and the British--less so the Germans, Russians, Spanish, Portuguese, Italians, and Swiss--have had a long tradition of what I shall be calling &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient&#039;s special place in European Western experience. The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe&#039;s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. In contrast, the American understanding of the Orient will seem considerably less dense, although our recent Japanese, Korean, and Indochinese adventures ought now to be creating a more sober, more realistic &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; awareness. Moreover, the vastly expanded American political and economic role in the Near East (the Middle East) makes great claims on our understanding of that Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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It will be clear to the reader (and will become clearer still throughout the many pages that follow) that by Orientalism I mean several things, all of them, in my opinion, interdependent. The most readily accepted designation for Orientalism is an academic one, and indeed the label still serves in a number of academic institutions. Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient--and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist--either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism. Compared with &#039;&#039;Oriental studies&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;area studies&#039;&#039;, it is true that the term &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is less preferred by specialists today, both because it is too vague and general and because it connotes the high-handed executive attitude of nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century European colonialism. Nevertheless books are written and congresses held with &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; as their main focus, with the Orientalist in his new or old guise as their main authority. The point is that even if it does not survive as it once did, Orientalism lives on academically through its doctrines and theses about the Orient and the Oriental.&lt;br /&gt;
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Related to this academic tradition, whose fortunes, transmigrations, specializations, and transmissions are in part the subject of this study, is a more general meaning for Orientalism. Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; and (most of the time) &amp;quot;the Occident.&amp;quot; Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, &amp;quot;mind,&amp;quot; destiny, and so on. &#039;&#039;This&#039;&#039; Orientalism can accommodate Aeschylus, say, and Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx. A little later in this introduction I shall deal with the methodological problems one encounters in so broadly construed a &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; as this.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interchange between the academic and the more or less imaginative meanings of Orientalism is a constant one, and since the late eighteenth century there has been a considerable, quite disciplined--perhaps even regulated--traffic between the two. Here I come to the third meaning of Orientalism, which is something more historically and materially defined than either of the other two. Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient--dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault&#039;s notion of a discourse, as described by him in &#039;&#039;The Archaeology of Knowledge&#039;&#039; and in &#039;&#039;Discipline and Punish&#039;&#039;, to identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage--and even produce--the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; is in question. How this happens is what this book tries to demonstrate. It also tries to show that European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historically and culturally there is a quantitative as well as a qualitative difference between the Franco-British involvement in the Orient and--until the period of American ascendancy after World War II--the involvement of every other European and Atlantic power. To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such disparate realms as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the Biblical texts and the Biblical lands, the spice trade, colonial armies and a long tradition of colonial administrators, a formidable scholarly corpus, innumerable Oriental &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;hands,&amp;quot; an Oriental professorate, a complex array of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; ideas (Oriental despotism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, sensuality), many Eastern sects, philosophies, and wisdoms domesticated for local European use--the list can be extended more or less indefinitely. My point is that Orientalism derives from a particular closeness experienced between Britain and France and the Orient, which until the early nineteenth century had really meant only India and the Bible lands. From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did. Out of that closeness, whose dynamic is enormously productive even if it always demonstrates the comparatively greater strength of the Occident (British, French, or American), comes the large body of texts I call Orientalist.&lt;br /&gt;
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It should be said at once that even with the generous number of books and authors that I examine, there is a much larger number that I simply have had to leave out. My argument, however, depends neither upon an exhaustive catalogue of texts dealing with the Orient nor upon a clearly delimited set of texts, authors, and ideas that together make up the Orientalist canon. I have depended instead upon a different methodological alternative--whose backbone in a sense is the set of historical generalizations I have so far been making in this Introduction--and it is these I want now to discuss in more analytical detail.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
I have begun with the assumption that the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely &#039;&#039;there&#039;&#039;, just as the Occident itself is not just &#039;&#039;there&#039;&#039; either. We must take seriously Vico&#039;s great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities--to say nothing of historical entities--such locales, regions, geographical sectors as &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; are man-made. Therefore as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having said that, one must go on to state a number of reasonable qualifications. In the first place, it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was &#039;&#039;essentially&#039;&#039; an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality. When Disraeli said in his novel &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; that the East was a career, he meant that to be interested in the East was something bright young Westerners would find to be an all-consuming passion; he should not be interpreted as saying that the East was &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; a career for Westerners. There were--and are--cultures and nations whose location is in the East, and their lives, histories, and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that could be said about them in the West. About that fact this study of Orientalism has very little to contribute, except to acknowledge it tacitly. But the phenomenon of Orientalism as I study it here deals principally, not with a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient (the East as career) despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; Orient. My point is that Disraeli&#039;s statement about the East refers mainly to that created consistency, that regular constellation of ideas as the pre-eminent thing about the Orient, and not to its mere being, as Wallace Stevens&#039;s phrase has it.&lt;br /&gt;
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A second qualification is that ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied. To believe that the Orient was created--or, as I call it, &amp;quot;Orientalized&amp;quot;--and to believe that such things happen simply as a necessity of the imagination, is to be disingenuous. The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony, and is quite accurately indicated in the title of K. M. Panikkar&#039;s classic &#039;&#039;Asia and Western Dominance&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;K. M. Panikkar, &#039;&#039;Asia and Western Dominance&#039;&#039; (London: George Allen &amp;amp; Unwin, 1959).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; in all those ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it &#039;&#039;could be&#039;&#039;--that is, submitted to being&#039;&#039;--made&#039;&#039; Oriental. There is very little consent to be found, for example, in the fact that Flaubert&#039;s encounter with an Egyptian courtesan produced a widely influential model of the Oriental woman; she never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. &#039;&#039;He&#039;&#039; spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his readers in what way she was &amp;quot;typically Oriental.&amp;quot; My argument is that Flaubert&#039;s situation of strength in relation to Kuchuk Hanem was not an isolated instance. It fairly stands for the pattern of relative strength between East and West, and the discourse about the Orient that it enabled.&lt;br /&gt;
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This brings us to a third qualification. One ought never to assume that the structure of Orientalism is nothing more than a structure of lies or of myths which, were the truth about them to be told, would simply blow away. I myself believe that Orientalism is more particularly valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient than it is as a veridic discourse about the Orient (which is what, in its academic or scholarly form, it claims to be). Nevertheless, what we must respect and try to grasp is the sheer knitted-together strength of Orientalist discourse, its very close ties to the enabling socio-economic and political institutions, and its redoubtable durability. After all, any system of ideas that can remain unchanged as teachable wisdom (in academies, books, congresses, universities, foreign-service institutes) from the period of Ernest Renan in the late 1840s until the present in the United States must be something more formidable than a mere collection of lies. Orientalism, therefore, is not an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a created body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material investment. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness, just as that same investment multiplied--indeed, made truly productive--the statements proliferating out from Orientalism into the general culture.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gramsci has made the useful analytic distinction between civil and political society in which the former is made up of voluntary (or at least rational and noncoercive) affiliations like schools, families, and unions, the latter of state institutions (the army, the police, the central bureaucracy) whose role in the polity is direct domination. Culture, of course, is to be found operating within civil society, where the influence of ideas, of institutions, and of other persons works not through domination but by what Gramsci calls consent. In any society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others; the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as &#039;&#039;hegemony&#039;&#039;, an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism the durability and the strength I have been speaking about so far. Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Denys Hay, &#039;&#039;Europe: The Emergence of an Idea&#039;&#039;, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a collective notion identifying &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; Europeans as against all &amp;quot;those&amp;quot; non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. There is in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness, usually overriding the possibility that a more independent, or more skeptical, thinker might have had different views on the matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a quite constant way, Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible &#039;&#039;positional&#039;&#039; superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand. And why should it have been otherwise, especially during the period of extraordinary European ascendancy from the late Renaissance to the present? The scientist, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier was in, or thought about, the Orient because he &#039;&#039;could be there&#039;&#039;, or could think about it, with very little resistance on the Orient&#039;s part. Under the general heading of knowledge of the Orient, and within the umbrella of Western hegemony over the Orient during the period from the end of the eighteenth century, there emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious character. Additionally, the imaginative examination of things Oriental was based more or less exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness out of whose unchallenged centrality an Oriental world emerged, first according to general ideas about who or what was an Oriental, then according to a detailed logic governed not simply by empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projections. If we can point to great Orientalist works of genuine scholarship like Silvestre de Sacy&#039;s &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe&#039;&#039; or Edward William Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, we need also to note that Renan&#039;s and Gobineau&#039;s racial ideas came out of the same impulse, as did a great many Victorian pornographic novels (see the analysis by Steven Marcus of &amp;quot;The Lustful Turk&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Steven Marcus, &#039;&#039;The Other Victorians: A Study of Sexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth Century England&#039;&#039; (1966; reprint ed., New York: Bantam Books, 1967), pp. 200-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;).&lt;br /&gt;
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And yet, one must repeatedly ask oneself whether what matters in Orientalism is the general group of ideas overriding the mass of material--about which who could deny that they were shot through with doctrines of European superiority, various kinds of racism, imperialism, and the like, dogmatic views of &amp;quot;the Oriental&amp;quot; as a kind of ideal and unchanging abstraction?--or the much more varied work produced by almost uncountable individual writers, whom one would take up as individual instances of authors dealing with the Orient. In a sense the two alternatives, general and particular, are really two perspectives on the same material: in both instances one would have to deal with pioneers in the field like William Jones, with great artists like Nerval or Flaubert. And why would it not be possible to employ both perspectives together, or one after the other? Isn&#039;t there an obvious danger of distortion (of precisely the kind that academic Orientalism has always been prone to) if either too general or too specific a level of description is maintained systematically?&lt;br /&gt;
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My two fears are distortion and inaccuracy, or rather the kind of inaccuracy produced by too dogmatic a generality and too positivistic a localized focus. In trying to deal with these problems I have tried to deal with three main aspects of my own contemporary reality that seem to me to point the way out of the methodological or perspectival difficulties I have been discussing, difficulties that might force one, in the first instance, into writing a coarse polemic on so unacceptably general a level of description as not to be worth the effort, or in the second instance, into writing so detailed and atomistic a series of analyses as to lose all track of the general lines of force informing the field, giving it its special cogency. How then to recognize individuality and to reconcile it with its intelligent, and by no means passive or merely dictatorial, general and hegemonic context?&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
I mentioned three aspects of my contemporary reality: I must explain and briefly discuss them now, so that it can be seen how I was led to a particular course of research and writing.&lt;br /&gt;
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1. &#039;&#039;The distinction between pure and political knowledge&#039;&#039;. It is very easy to argue that knowledge about Shakespeare or Wordsworth is not political whereas knowledge about contemporary China or the Soviet Union is. My own formal and professional designation is that of &amp;quot;humanist,&amp;quot; a title which indicates the humanities as my field and therefore the unlikely eventuality that there might be anything political about what I do in that field. Of course, all these labels and terms are quite unnuanced as I use them here, but the general truth of what I am pointing to is, I think, widely held. One reason for saying that a humanist who writes about Wordsworth, or an editor whose specialty is Keats, is not involved in anything political is that what he does seems to have no direct political effect upon reality in the everyday sense. A scholar whose field is Soviet economics works in a highly charged area where there is much government interest, and what he might produce in the way of studies or proposals will be taken up by policymakers, government officials, institutional economists, intelligence experts. The distinction between &amp;quot;humanists&amp;quot; and persons whose work has policy implications, or political significance, can be broadened further by saying that the former&#039;s ideological color is a matter of incidental importance to politics (although possibly of great moment to his colleagues in the field, who may object to his Stalinism or fascism or too easy liberalism), whereas the ideology of the latter is woven directly into his material--indeed, economics, politics, and sociology in the modern academy are ideological sciences--and therefore taken for granted as being &amp;quot;political.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless the determining impingement on most knowledge produced in the contemporary West (and here I speak mainly about the United States) is that it be nonpolitical, that is, scholarly, academic, impartial, above partisan or small-minded doctrinal belief. One can have no quarrel with such an ambition in theory, perhaps, but in practice the reality is much more problematic. No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, from the fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society. These continue to bear on what he does professionally, even though naturally enough his research and its fruits do attempt to reach a level of relative freedom from the inhibitions and the restrictions of brute, everyday reality. For there is such a thing as knowledge that is less, rather than more, partial than the individual (with his entangling and distracting life circumstances) who produces it. Yet this knowledge is not therefore automatically nonpolitical.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whether discussions of literature or of classical philology are fraught with--or have unmediated--political significance is a very large question that I have tried to treat in some detail elsewhere.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See my &#039;&#039;Criticism Between Culture and System&#039;&#039; (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What I am interested in doing now is suggesting how the general liberal consensus that &amp;quot;true&amp;quot; knowledge is fundamentally nonpolitical (and conversely, that overtly political knowledge is not &amp;quot;true&amp;quot; knowledge) obscures the highly if obscurely organized political circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced. No one is helped in understanding this today when the adjective &amp;quot;political&amp;quot; is used as a label to discredit any work for daring to violate the protocol of pretended suprapolitical objectivity. We may say, first, that civil society recognizes a gradation of political importance in the various fields of knowledge. To some extent the political importance given a field comes from the possibility of its direct translation into economic terms; but to a greater extent political importance comes from the closeness of a field to ascertainable sources of power in political society. Thus an economic study of long-term Soviet energy potential and its effect on military capability is likely to be commissioned by the Defense Department, and thereafter to acquire a kind of political status impossible for a study of Tolstoi&#039;s early fiction financed in part by a foundation. Yet both works belong in what civil society acknowledges to be a similar field, Russian studies, even though one work may be done by a very conservative economist, the other by a radical literary historian. My point here is that &amp;quot;Russia&amp;quot; as a general subject matter has political priority over nicer distinctions such as &amp;quot;economics&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;literary history,&amp;quot; because political society in Gramsci&#039;s sense reaches into such realms of civil society as the academy and saturates them with significance of direct concern to it.&lt;br /&gt;
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I do not want to press all this any further on general theoretical grounds: it seems to me that the value and credibility of my case can be demonstrated by being much more specific, in the way, for example, Noam Chomsky has studied the instrumental connection between the Vietnam War and the notion of objective scholarship as it was applied to cover state-sponsored military research.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Principally in his &#039;&#039;American Power and the New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969) and &#039;&#039;For Reasons of State&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Now because Britain, France, and recently the United States are imperial powers, their political societies impart to their civil societies a sense of urgency, a direct political infusion as it were, where and whenever matters pertaining to their imperial interests abroad are concerned. I doubt that it is controversial, for example, to say that an Englishman in India or Egypt in the later nineteenth century took an interest in those countries that was never far from their status in his mind as British colonies. To say this may seem quite different from saying that all academic knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and impressed with, violated by, the gross political fact--and yet &#039;&#039;that is what I am saying&#039;&#039; in this study of Orientalism. For if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author&#039;s involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient, and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Put in this way, these political actualities are still too undefined and general to be really interesting. Anyone would agree to them without necessarily agreeing also that they mattered very much, for instance, to Flaubert as he wrote &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, or to H. A. R. Gibb as he wrote &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039;. The trouble is that there is too great a distance between the big dominating fact, as I have described it, and the details of everyday life that govern the minute discipline of a novel or a scholarly text as each is being written. Yet if we eliminate from the start any notion that &amp;quot;big&amp;quot; facts like imperial domination can be applied mechanically and deterministically to such complex matters as culture and ideas, then we will begin to approach an interesting kind of study. My idea is that European and then American interest in the Orient was political according to some of the obvious historical accounts of it that I have given here, but that it was the culture that created that interest, that acted dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales to make the Orient the varied and complicated place that it obviously was in the field I call Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; imperialist plot to hold down the &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; world. It is rather a &#039;&#039;distribution&#039;&#039; of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an &#039;&#039;elaboration&#039;&#039; not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of &amp;quot;interests&amp;quot; which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039;, rather than expresses, a certain &#039;&#039;will&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;intention&#039;&#039; to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do and what &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; cannot do or understand as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do). Indeed, my real argument is that Orientalism is--and does not simply represent--a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because Orientalism is a cultural and a political fact, then, it does not exist in some archival vacuum; quite the contrary, I think it can be shown that what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs within) certain distinct and intellectually knowable lines. Here too a considerable degree of nuance and elaboration can be seen working as between the broad superstructural pressures and the details of composition, the facts of textuality. Most humanistic scholars are, I think, perfectly happy with the notion that texts exist in contexts, that there is such a thing as intertextuality, that the pressures of conventions, predecessors, and rhetorical styles limit what Walter Benjamin once called the &amp;quot;overtaxing of the productive person in the name of ... the principle of &#039;creativity,&#039; &amp;quot; in which the poet is believed on his own, and out of his pure mind, to have brought forth his work.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Walter Benjamin, &#039;&#039;Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Harry Zohn (London: New Left Books, 1973), p. 71.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet there is a reluctance to allow that political, institutional, and ideological constraints act in the same manner on the individual author. A humanist will believe it to be an interesting fact to any interpreter of Balzac that he was influenced in the &#039;&#039;Comedie humaine&#039;&#039; by the conflict between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier, but the same sort of pressure on Balzac of deeply reactionary monarchism is felt in some vague way to demean his literary &amp;quot;genius&amp;quot; and therefore to be less worth serious study. Similarly--as Harry Bracken has been tirelessly showing--philosophers will conduct their discussions of Locke, Hume, and empiricism without ever taking into account that there is an explicit connection in these classic writers between their &amp;quot;philosophic&amp;quot; doctrines and racial theory, justifications of slavery, or arguments for colonial exploitation.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harry Bracken, &amp;quot;Essence, Accident and Race,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Hermathena&#039;&#039; 116 (Winter 1973): 81-96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These are common enough ways by which contemporary scholarship keeps itself pure.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps it is true that most attempts to rub culture&#039;s nose in the mud of politics have been crudely iconoclastic; perhaps also the social interpretation of literature in my own field has simply not kept up with the enormous technical advances in detailed textual analysis. But there is no getting away from the fact that literary studies in general, and American Marxist theorists in particular, have avoided the effort of seriously bridging the gap between the superstructural and the base levels in textual, historical scholarship; on another occasion I have gone so far as to say that the literary-cultural establishment as a whole has declared the serious study of imperialism and culture off limits.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In an interview published in &#039;&#039;Diacritics&#039;&#039; 6, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 38.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Orientalism brings one up directly against that question--that is, to realizing that political imperialism governs an entire field of study, imagination, and scholarly institutions--in such a way as to make its avoidance an intellectual and historical impossibility. Yet there will always remain the perennial escape mechanism of saying that a literary scholar and a philosopher, for example, are trained in literature and philosophy respectively, not in politics or ideological analysis. In other words, the specialist argument can work quite effectively to block the larger and, in my opinion, the more intellectually serious perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here it seems to me there is a simple two-part answer to be given, at least so far as the study of imperialism and culture (or Orientalism) is concerned. In the first place, nearly every nineteenth-century writer (and the same is true enough of writers in earlier periods) was extraordinarily well aware of the fact of empire: this is a subject not very well studied, but it will not take a modern Victorian specialist long to admit that liberal cultural heroes like John Stuart Mill, Arnold, Carlyle, Newman, Macaulay, Ruskin, George Eliot, and even Dickens had definite views on race and imperialism, which are quite easily to be found at work in their writing. So even a specialist must deal with the knowledge that Mill, for example, made it clear in &#039;&#039;On Liberty&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Representative Government&#039;&#039; that his views there could not be applied to India (he was an India Office functionary for a good deal of his life, after all) because the Indians were civilizationally, if not racially, inferior. The same kind of paradox is to be found in Marx, as I try to show in this book. In the second place, to believe that politics in the form of imperialism bears upon the production of literature, scholarship, social theory, and history writing is by no means equivalent to saying that culture is therefore a demeaned or denigrated thing. Quite the contrary: my whole point is to say that we can better understand the persistence and the durability of saturating hegemonic systems like culture when we realize that their internal constraints upon writers and thinkers were &#039;&#039;productive&#039;&#039;, not unilaterally inhibiting. It is this idea that Gramsci, certainly, and Foucault and Raymond Williams in their very different ways have been trying to illustrate. Even one or two pages by Williams on &amp;quot;the uses of the Empire&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Long Revolution&#039;&#039; tell us more about nineteenth-century cultural richness than many volumes of hermetic textual analyses.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Raymond Williams, &#039;&#039;The Long Revolution&#039;&#039; (London: Chatto &amp;amp; Windus, 1961), pp. 66-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore I study Orientalism as a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the large political concerns shaped by the three great empires--British, French, American--in whose intellectual and imaginative territory the writing was produced. What interests me most as a scholar is not the gross political verity but the detail, as indeed what interests us in someone like Lane or Flaubert or Renan is not the (to him) indisputable truth that Occidentals are superior to Orientals, but the profoundly worked over and modulated evidence of his detailed work within the very wide space opened up by that truth. One need only remember that Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; is a classic of historical and anthropological observation because of its style, its enormously intelligent and brilliant details, not because of its simple reflection of racial superiority, to understand what I am saying here.&lt;br /&gt;
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The kind of political questions raised by Orientalism, then, are as follows: What other sorts of intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly, and cultural energies went into the making of an imperialist tradition like the Orientalist one? How did philology, lexicography, history, biology, political and economic theory, novel-writing, and lyric poetry come to the service of Orientalism&#039;s broadly imperialist view of the world? What changes, modulations, refinements, even revolutions take place within Orientalism? What is the meaning of originality, of continuity, of individuality, in this context? How does Orientalism transmit or reproduce itself from one epoch to another? In fine, how can we treat the cultural, historical phenomenon of Orientalism as a kind of &#039;&#039;willed human work&#039;&#039;--not of mere unconditioned ratiocination--in all its historical complexity, detail, and worth without at the same time losing sight of the alliance between cultural work, political tendencies, the state, and the specific realities of domination? Governed by such concerns a humanistic study can responsibly address itself to politics &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; culture. But this is not to say that such a study establishes a hard-and-fast rule about the relationship between knowledge and politics. My argument is that each humanistic investigation must formulate the nature of that connection in the specific context of the study, the subject matter, and its historical circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
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2. &#039;&#039;The methodological question&#039;&#039;. In a previous book I gave a good deal of thought and analysis to the methodological importance for work in the human sciences of finding and formulating a first step, a point of departure, a beginning principle.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In my &#039;&#039;Beginnings: Intention and Method&#039;&#039; (New York: Basic Books, 1975).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A major lesson I learned and tried to present was that there is no such thing as a merely given, or simply available, starting point: beginnings have to be made for each project in such a way as to &#039;&#039;enable&#039;&#039; what follows from them. Nowhere in my experience has the difficulty of this lesson been more consciously lived (with what success--or failure--I cannot really say) than in this study of Orientalism. The idea of beginning, indeed the act of beginning, necessarily involves an act of delimitation by which something is cut out of a great mass of material, separated from the mass, and made to stand for, as well as be, a starting point, a beginning; for the student of texts one such notion of inaugural delimitation is Louis Althusser&#039;s idea of the &#039;&#039;problematic&#039;&#039;, a specific determinate unity of a text, or group of texts, which is something given rise to by analysis.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Louis Althusser, &#039;&#039;For Marx&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), pp. 65-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet in the case of Orientalism (as opposed to the case of Marx&#039;s texts, which is what Althusser studies) there is not simply the problem of finding a point of departure, or problematic, but also the question of designating which texts, authors, and periods are the ones best suited for study.&lt;br /&gt;
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It has seemed to me foolish to attempt an encyclopedic narrative history of Orientalism, first of all because if my guiding principle was to be &amp;quot;the European idea of the Orient&amp;quot; there would be virtually no limit to the material I would have had to deal with; second, because the narrative model itself did not suit my descriptive and political interests; third, because in such books as Raymond Schwab&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;, Johann Fuck&#039;s &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039;, and more recently, Dorothee Metlitzki&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Matter of Araby in Medieval England&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1950); Johann W. Fuck, &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955); Dorothee Metlitzki, &#039;&#039;The Matter of Araby in Medieval England&#039;&#039; (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there already exist encyclopedic works on certain aspects of the European-Oriental encounter such as make the critic&#039;s job, in the general political and intellectual context I sketched above, a different one.&lt;br /&gt;
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There still remained the problem of cutting down a very fat archive to manageable dimensions, and more important, outlining something in the nature of an intellectual order within that group of texts without at the same time following a mindlessly chronological order. My starting point therefore has been the British, French, and American experience of the Orient taken as a unit, what made that experience possible by way of historical and intellectual background, what the quality and character of the experience has been. For reasons I shall discuss presently I limited that already limited (but still inordinately large) set of questions to the Anglo-French-American experience of the Arabs and Islam, which for almost a thousand years together stood for the Orient. Immediately upon doing that, a large part of the Orient seemed to have been eliminated--India, Japan, China, and other sections of the Far East--not because these regions were not important (they obviously have been) but because one could discuss Europe&#039;s experience of the Near Orient, or of Islam, apart from its experience of the Far Orient. Yet at certain moments of that general European history of interest in the East, particular parts of the Orient like Egypt, Syria, and Arabia cannot be discussed without also studying Europe&#039;s involvement in the more distant parts, of which Persia and India are the most important; a notable case in point is the connection between Egypt and India so far as eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain was concerned. Similarly the French role in deciphering the Zend-Avesta, the pre-eminence of Paris as a center of Sanskrit studies during the first decade of the nineteenth century, the fact that Napoleon&#039;s interest in the Orient was contingent upon his sense of the British role in India: all these Far Eastern interests directly influenced French interest in the Near East, Islam, and the Arabs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Britain and France dominated the Eastern Mediterranean from about the end of the seventeenth century on. Yet my discussion of that domination and systematic interest does not do justice to (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) the important contributions to Orientalism of Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Portugal and (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) the fact that one of the important impulses toward the study of the Orient in the eighteenth century was the revolution in Biblical studies stimulated by such variously interesting pioneers as Bishop Lowth, Eichhorn, Herder, and Michaelis. In the first place, I had to focus rigorously upon the British-French and later the American material because it seemed inescapably true not only that Britain and France were the pioneer nations in the Orient and in Oriental studies, but that these vanguard positions were held by virtue of the two greatest colonial networks in pre-twentieth-century history; the American Oriental position since World War II has fit--I think, quite self-consciously--in the places excavated by the two earlier European powers. Then too, I believe that the sheer quality, consistency, and mass of British, French, and American writing on the Orient lifts it above the doubtless crucial work done in Germany, Italy, Russia, and elsewhere. But I think it is also true that the major steps in Oriental scholarship were first taken in either Britain and France, then elaborated upon by Germans. Silvestre de Sacy, for example, was not only the first modern and institutional European Orientalist, who worked on Islam, Arabic literature, the Druze religion, and Sassanid Persia; he was also the teacher of Champollion and of Franz Bopp, the founder of German comparative linguistics. A similar claim of priority and subsequent pre-eminence can be made for William Jones and Edward William Lane.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the second place--and here the failings of my study of Orientalism are amply made up for--there has been some important recent work on the background in Biblical scholarship to the rise of what I have called modern Orientalism. The best and the most illuminatingly relevant is E. S. Shaffer&#039;s impressive &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Kubla Khan&amp;quot; and The Fall of Jerusalem&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;E. S. Shaffer, &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;Kubla Khan&amp;quot; and The Fall of Jerusalem: The Mythological School in Biblical Criticism and Secular Literature, 1770-1880&#039;&#039; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an indispensable study of the origins of Romanticism, and of the intellectual activity underpinning a great deal of what goes on in Coleridge, Browning, and George Eliot. To some degree Shaffer&#039;s work refines upon the outlines provided in Schwab, by articulating the material of relevance to be found in the German Biblical scholars and using that material to read, in an intelligent and always interesting way, the work of three major British writers. Yet what is missing in the book is some sense of the political as well as ideological edge given the Oriental material by the British and French writers I am principally concerned with; in addition, unlike Shaffer I attempt to elucidate subsequent developments in academic as well as literary Orientalism that bear on the connection between British and French Orientalism on the one hand and the rise of an explicitly colonial-minded imperialism on the other. Then too, I wish to show how all these earlier matters are reproduced more or less in American Orientalism after the Second World War.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless there is a possibly misleading aspect to my study, where, aside from an occasional reference, I do not exhaustively discuss the German developments after the inaugural period dominated by Sacy. Any work that seeks to provide an understanding of academic Orientalism and pays little attention to scholars like Steinthal, Muller, Becker, Goldziher, Brockelmann, Noldeke--to mention only a handful--needs to be reproached, and I freely reproach myself. I particularly regret not taking more account of the great scientific prestige that accrued to German scholarship by the middle of the nineteenth century, whose neglect was made into a denunciation of insular British scholars by George Eliot. I have in mind Eliot&#039;s unforgettable portrait of Mr. Casaubon in &#039;&#039;Middlemarch&#039;&#039;. One reason Casaubon cannot finish his Key to All Mythologies is, according to his young cousin Will Ladislaw, that he is unacquainted with German scholarship. For not only has Casaubon chosen a subject &amp;quot;as changing as chemistry: new discoveries are constantly making new points of view&amp;quot;: he is undertaking a job similar to a refutation of Paracelsus because &amp;quot;he is not an Orientalist, you know.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;George Eliot, &#039;&#039;Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life&#039;&#039; (1872; reprint ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956), p. 164.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Eliot was not wrong in implying that by about 1830, which is when &#039;&#039;Middlemarch&#039;&#039; is set, German scholarship had fully attained its European pre-eminence. Yet at no time in German scholarship during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century could a close partnership have developed between Orientalists and a protracted, sustained &#039;&#039;national&#039;&#039; interest in the Orient. There was nothing in Germany to correspond to the Anglo-French presence in India, the Levant, North Africa. Moreover, the German Orient was almost exclusively a scholarly, or at least a classical, Orient: it was made the subject of lyrics, fantasies, and even novels, but it was never actual, the way Egypt and Syria were actual for Chateaubriand, Lane, Lamartine, Burton, Disraeli, or Nerval. There is some significance in the fact that the two most renowned German works on the Orient, Goethe&#039;s &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039; and Friedrich Schlegel&#039;s &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier&#039;&#039;, were based respectively on a Rhine journey and on hours spent in Paris libraries. What German Oriental scholarship did was to refine and elaborate techniques whose application was to texts, myths, ideas, and languages almost literally gathered from the Orient by imperial Britain and France.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet what German Orientalism had in common with Anglo-French and later American Orientalism was a kind of intellectual &#039;&#039;authority&#039;&#039; over the Orient within Western culture. This authority must in large part be the subject of any description of Orientalism, and it is so in this study. Even the name &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; suggests a serious, perhaps ponderous style of expertise; when I apply it to modern American social scientists (since they do not call themselves Orientalists, my use of the word is anomalous), it is to draw attention to the way Middle East experts can still draw on the vestiges of Orientalism&#039;s intellectual position in nineteenth-century Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated, disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgments it forms, transmits, reproduces. Above all, authority can, indeed must, be analyzed. All these attributes of authority apply to Orientalism, and much of what I do in this study is to describe both the historical authority in and the personal authorities of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
My principal methodological devices for studying authority here are what can be called &#039;&#039;strategic location&#039;&#039;, which is a way of describing the author&#039;s position in a text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about, and &#039;&#039;strategic formation&#039;&#039;, which is a way of analyzing the relationship between texts and the way in which groups of texts, types of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large. I use the notion of strategy simply to identify the problem every writer on the Orient has faced: how to get hold of it, how to approach it, how not to be defeated or overwhelmed by its sublimity, its scope, its awful dimensions. Everyone who writes about the Orient must locate himself vis-a-vis the Orient; translated into his text, this location includes the kind of narrative voice he adopts, the type of structure he builds, the kinds of images, themes, motifs that circulate in his text--all of which add up to deliberate ways of addressing the reader, containing the Orient, and finally, representing it or speaking in its behalf. None of this takes place in the abstract, however. Every writer on the Orient (and this is true even of Homer) assumes some Oriental precedent, some previous knowledge of the Orient, to which he refers and on which he relies. Additionally, each work on the Orient &#039;&#039;affiliates&#039;&#039; itself with other works, with audiences, with institutions, with the Orient itself. The ensemble of relationships between works, audiences, and some particular aspects of the Orient therefore constitutes an analyzable formation--for example, that of philological studies, of anthologies of extracts from Oriental literature, of travel books, of Oriental fantasies--whose presence in time, in discourse, in institutions (schools, libraries, foreign services) gives it strength and authority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear, I hope, that my concern with authority does not entail analysis of what lies hidden in the Orientalist text, but analysis rather of the text&#039;s surface, its exteriority to what it describes. I do not think that this idea can be overemphasized. Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West. He is never concerned with the Orient except as the first cause of what he says. What he says and writes, by virtue of the fact that it is said or written, is meant to indicate that the Orientalist is outside the Orient, both as an existential and as a moral fact. The principal product of this exteriority is of course representation: as early as Aeschylus&#039;s play &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039; the Orient is transformed from a very far distant and often threatening Otherness into figures that are relatively familiar (in Aeschylus&#039;s case, grieving Asiatic women). The dramatic immediacy of representation in &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039; obscures the fact that the audience is watching a highly artificial enactment of what a non-Oriental has made into a symbol for the whole Orient. My analysis of the Orientalist text therefore places emphasis on the evidence, which is by no means invisible, for such representations &#039;&#039;as representations&#039;&#039;, not as &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; depictions of the Orient. This evidence is found just as prominently in the so-called truthful text (histories, philological analyses, political treatises) as in the avowedly artistic (i.e., openly imaginative) text. The things to look at are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, &#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039; the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great original. The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job, for the West, and &#039;&#039;faute de mieux&#039;&#039;, for the poor Orient. &amp;quot;Sie konnen sich nicht vertreten, sie mussen vertreten werden,&amp;quot; as Marx wrote in &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another reason for insisting upon exteriority is that I believe it needs to be made clear about cultural discourse and exchange within a culture that what is commonly circulated by it is not &amp;quot;truth&amp;quot; but representations. It hardly needs to be demonstrated again that language itself is a highly organized and encoded system, which employs many devices to express, indicate, exchange messages and information, represent, and so forth. In any instance of at least written language, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a &#039;&#039;re-presence&#039;&#039;, or a representation. The value, efficacy, strength, apparent veracity of a written statement about the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot instrumentally depend, on the Orient as such. On the contrary, the written statement is a presence to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made supererogatory any such &#039;&#039;real thing&#039;&#039; as &amp;quot;the Orient.&amp;quot; Thus all of Orientalism stands forth and away from the Orient: that Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the West than on the Orient, and this sense is directly indebted to various Western techniques of representation that make the Orient visible, clear, &amp;quot;there&amp;quot; in discourse about it. And these representations rely upon institutions, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of understanding for their effects, not upon a distant and amorphous Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference between representations of the Orient before the last third of the eighteenth century and those after it (that is, those belonging to what I call modern Orientalism) is that the range of representation expanded enormously in the later period. It is true that after William Jones and Anquetil-Duperron, and after Napoleon&#039;s Egyptian expedition, Europe came to know the Orient more scientifically, to live in it with greater authority and discipline than ever before. But what mattered to Europe was the expanded scope and the much greater refinement given its techniques for receiving the Orient. When around the turn of the eighteenth century the Orient definitively revealed the age of its languages--thus outdating Hebrew&#039;s divine pedigree--it was a group of Europeans who made the discovery, passed it on to other scholars, and preserved the discovery in the new science of Indo-European philology. A new powerful science for viewing the linguistic Orient was born, and with it, as Foucault has shown in &#039;&#039;The Order of Things&#039;&#039;, a whole web of related scientific interests. Similarly William Beckford, Byron, Goethe, and Hugo restructured the Orient by their art and made its colors, lights, and people visible through their images, rhythms, and motifs. At most, the &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; Orient provoked a writer to his vision; it very rarely guided it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Orientalism responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West. Thus the history of Orientalism has both an internal consistency and a highly articulated set of relationships to the dominant culture surrounding it. My analyses consequently try to show the field&#039;s shape and internal organization, its pioneers, patriarchal authorities, canonical texts, doxological ideas, exemplary figures, its followers, elaborators, and new authorities; I try also to explain how Orientalism borrowed and was frequently informed by &amp;quot;strong&amp;quot; ideas, doctrines, and trends ruling the culture. Thus there was (and is) a linguistic Orient, a Freudian Orient, a Spenglerian Orient, a Darwinian Orient, a racist Orient--and so on. Yet never has there been such a thing as a pure, or unconditional, Orient; similarly, never has there been a nonmaterial form of Orientalism, much less something so innocent as an &amp;quot;idea&amp;quot; of the Orient. In this underlying conviction and in its ensuing methodological consequences do I differ from scholars who study the history of ideas. For the emphases and the executive form, above all the material effectiveness, of statements made by Orientalist discourse are possible in ways that any hermetic history of ideas tends completely to scant. Without those emphases and that material effectiveness Orientalism would be just another idea, whereas it is and was much more than that. Therefore I set out to examine not only scholarly works but also works of literature, political tracts, journalistic texts, travel books, religious and philological studies. In other words, my hybrid perspective is broadly historical and &amp;quot;anthropological,&amp;quot; given that I believe all texts to be worldly and circumstantial in (of course) ways that vary from genre to genre, and from historical period to historical period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet unlike Michel Foucault, to whose work I am greatly indebted, I do believe in the determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism. The unity of the large ensemble of texts I analyze is due in part to the fact that they frequently refer to each other: Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors. Edward William Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; was read and cited by such diverse figures as Nerval, Flaubert, and Richard Burton. He was an authority whose use was an imperative for anyone writing or thinking about the Orient, not just about Egypt: when Nerval borrows passages verbatim from &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; it is to use Lane&#039;s authority to assist him in describing village scenes in Syria, not Egypt. Lane&#039;s authority and the opportunities provided for citing him discriminately as well as indiscriminately were there because Orientalism could give his text the kind of distributive currency that he acquired. There is no way, however, of understanding Lane&#039;s currency without also understanding the peculiar features of &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; text; this is equally true of Renan, Sacy, Lamartine, Schlegel, and a group of other influential writers. Foucault believes that in general the individual text or author counts for very little; empirically, in the case of Orientalism (and perhaps nowhere else) I find this not to be so. Accordingly my analyses employ close textual readings whose goal is to reveal the dialectic between individual text or writer and the complex collective formation to which his work is a contribution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet even though it includes an ample selection of writers, this book is still far from a complete history or general account of Orientalism. Of this failing I am very conscious. The fabric of as thick a discourse as Orientalism has survived and functioned in Western society because of its richness: all I have done is to describe parts of that fabric at certain moments, and merely to suggest the existence of a larger whole, detailed, interesting, dotted with fascinating figures, texts, and events. I have consoled myself with believing that this book is one installment of several, and hope there are scholars and critics who might want to write others. There is still a general essay to be written on imperialism and culture; other studies would go more deeply into the connection between Orientalism and pedagogy, or into Italian, Dutch, German, and Swiss Orientalism, or into the dynamic between scholarship and imaginative writing, or into the relationship between administrative ideas and intellectual discipline. Perhaps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a nonrepressive and nonmanipulative, perspective. But then one would have to rethink the whole complex problem of knowledge and power. These are all tasks left embarrassingly incomplete in this study.&lt;br /&gt;
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The last, perhaps self-flattering, observation on method that I want to make here is that I have written this study with several audiences in mind. For students of literature and criticism, Orientalism offers a marvelous instance of the interrelations between society, history, and textuality; moreover, the cultural role played by the Orient in the West connects Orientalism with ideology, politics, and the logic of power, matters of relevance, I think, to the literary community. For contemporary students of the Orient, from university scholars to policymakers, I have written with two ends in mind: one, to present their intellectual genealogy to them in a way that has not been done; two, to criticize--with the hope of stirring discussion--the often unquestioned assumptions on which their work for the most part depends. For the general reader, this study deals with matters that always compel attention, all of them connected not only with Western conceptions and treatments of the Other but also with the singularly important role played by Western culture in what Vico called the world of nations. Lastly, for readers in the so-called Third World, this study proposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western politics and of the non-Western world in those politics as of the &#039;&#039;strength&#039;&#039; of Western cultural discourse, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or &amp;quot;superstructural.&amp;quot; My hope is to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves or upon others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The three long chapters and twelve shorter units into which this book is divided are intended to facilitate exposition as much as possible. Chapter One, &amp;quot;The Scope of Orientalism,&amp;quot; draws a large circle around all the dimensions of the subject, both in terms of historical time and experiences and in terms of philosophical and political themes. Chapter Two, &amp;quot;Orientalist Structures and Restructures,&amp;quot; attempts to trace the development of modern Orientalism by a broadly chronological description, and also by the description of a set of devices common to the work of important poets, artists, and scholars. Chapter Three, &amp;quot;Orientalism Now,&amp;quot; begins where its predecessor left off, at around 1870. This is the period of great colonial expansion into the Orient, and it culminates in World War II. The very last section of Chapter Three characterizes the shift from British and French to American hegemony; I attempt there finally to sketch the present intellectual and social realities of Orientalism in the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. &#039;&#039;The personal dimension&#039;&#039;. In the &#039;&#039;Prison Notebooks&#039;&#039; Gramsci says: &amp;quot;The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is &#039;knowing thyself&#039; as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory.&amp;quot; The only available English translation inexplicably leaves Gramsci&#039;s comment at that, whereas in fact Gramsci&#039;s Italian text concludes by adding, &amp;quot;therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Antonio Gramsci, &#039;&#039;The Prison Notebooks: Selections&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 324. The full passage, unavailable in the Hoare and Smith translation, is to be found in Gramsci, &#039;&#039;Quaderni del Carcere&#039;&#039;, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Turin: Einaudi Editore, 1975), 2: 1363.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much of the personal investment in this study derives from my awareness of being an &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; as a child growing up in two British colonies. All of my education, in those colonies (Palestine and Egypt) and in the United States, has been Western, and yet that deep early awareness has persisted. In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon me, the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life of all Orientals. This is why for me the Islamic Orient has had to be the center of attention. Whether what I have achieved is the inventory prescribed by Gramsci is not for me to judge, although I have felt it important to be conscious of trying to produce one. Along the way, as severely and as rationally as I have been able, I have tried to maintain a critical consciousness, as well as employing those instruments of historical, humanistic, and cultural research of which my education has made me the fortunate beneficiary. In none of that, however, have I ever lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal involvement in having been constituted as, &amp;quot;an Oriental.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The historical circumstances making such a study possible are fairly complex, and I can only list them schematically here. Anyone resident in the West since the 1950s, particularly in the United States, will have lived through an era of extraordinary turbulence in the relations of East and West. No one will have failed to note how &amp;quot;East&amp;quot; has always signified danger and threat during this period, even as it has meant the traditional Orient as well as Russia. In the universities a growing establishment of area-studies programs and institutes has made the scholarly study of the Orient a branch of national policy. Public affairs in this country include a healthy interest in the Orient, as much for its strategic and economic importance as for its traditional exoticism. If the world has become immediately accessible to a Western citizen living in the electronic age, the Orient too has drawn nearer to him, and is now less a myth perhaps than a place crisscrossed by Western, especially American, interests.&lt;br /&gt;
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One aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the media&#039;s resources have forced information into more and more standardized molds. So far as the Orient is concerned, standardization and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the nineteenth-century academic and imaginative demonology of &amp;quot;the mysterious Orient.&amp;quot; This is nowhere more true than in the ways by which the Near East is grasped. Three things have contributed to making even the simplest perception of the Arabs and Islam into a highly politicized, almost raucous matter: one, the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West, which is immediately reflected in the history of Orientalism; two, the struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism, and its effects upon American Jews as well as upon both the liberal culture and the population at large; three, the almost total absence of any cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss the Arabs or Islam. Furthermore, it hardly needs saying that because the Middle East is now so identified with Great Power politics, oil economics, and the simple-minded dichotomy of freedom-loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs, the chances of anything like a clear view of what one talks about in talking about the Near East are depressingly small.&lt;br /&gt;
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My own experiences of these matters are in part what made me write this book. The life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, particularly in America, is disheartening. There exists here an almost unanimous consensus that politically he does not exist, and when it is allowed that he does, it is either as a nuisance or, as an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian has come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny. It has made matters worse for him to remark that no person academically involved with the Near East--no Orientalist, that is--has ever in the United States culturally and politically identified himself wholeheartedly with the Arabs; certainly there have been identifications on some level, but they have never taken an &amp;quot;acceptable&amp;quot; form as has liberal American identification with Zionism, and all too frequently they have been radically flawed by their association either with discredited political and economic interests (oil-company and State Department Arabists, for example) or with religion.&lt;br /&gt;
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The nexus of knowledge and power creating &amp;quot;the Oriental&amp;quot; and in a sense obliterating him as a human being is therefore not for me an exclusively academic matter. Yet it is an &#039;&#039;intellectual&#039;&#039; matter of some very obvious importance. I have been able to put to use my humanistic and political concerns for the analysis and description of a very worldly matter, the rise, development, and consolidation of Orientalism. Too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent; it has regularly seemed otherwise to me, and certainly my study of Orientalism has convinced me (and I hope will convince my literary colleagues) that society and literary culture can only be understood and studied together. In addition, and by an almost inescapable logic, I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of Western anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism and, as I have discussed it in its Islamic branch, Orientalism resemble each other very closely is a historical, cultural, and political truth that needs only to be mentioned to an Arab Palestinian for its irony to be perfectly understood. But what I should like also to have contributed here is a better understanding of the way cultural domination has operated. If this stimulates a new kind of dealing with the Orient, indeed if it eliminates the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; altogether, then we shall have advanced a little in the process of what Raymond Williams has called the &amp;quot;unlearning&amp;quot; of &amp;quot;the inherent dominative mode.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Raymond Williams, &#039;&#039;Culture and Society, 1780-1950&#039;&#039; (London: Chatto &amp;amp; Windus, 1958), p. 376.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Footnotes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;1.&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;1.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;The Scope of Orientalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
... le genie inquiet et ambitieux de Europeens ... impatient d&#039;employer les nouveaux instruments de leur puissance ...&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, &#039;&#039;Preface historique&#039;&#039; (1809) &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== I. &#039;&#039;&#039;Knowing the Oriental&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
On June 13, 1910, Arthur James Balfour lectured the House of Commons on &amp;quot;the problems with which we have to deal in Egypt.&amp;quot; These, he said, &amp;quot;belong to a wholly different category&amp;quot; than those &amp;quot;affecting the Isle of Wight or the West Riding of Yorkshire.&amp;quot; He spoke with the authority of a long-time member of Parliament, former private secretary to Lord Salisbury, former chief secretary for Ireland, former secretary for Scotland, former prime minister, veteran of numerous overseas crises, achievements, and changes. During his involvement in imperial affairs Balfour served a monarch who in 1876 had been declared Empress of India; he had been especially well placed in positions of uncommon influence to follow the Afghan and Zulu wars, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the death of General Gordon in the Sudan, the Fashoda Incident, the battle of Omdurman, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War. In addition his remarkable social eminence, the breadth of his learning and wit--he could write on such varied subjects as Bergson, Handel, theism, and golf--his education at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, and his apparent command over imperial affairs all gave considerable authority to what he told the Commons in June 1910. But there was still more to Balfour&#039;s speech, or at least to his need for giving it so didactically and moralistically. Some members were questioning the necessity for &amp;quot;England in Egypt,&amp;quot; the subject of Alfred Milner&#039;s enthusiastic book of 1892, but here designating a once-profitable occupation that had become a source of trouble now that Egyptian nationalism was on the rise and the continuing British presence in Egypt no longer so easy to defend. Balfour, then, to inform and explain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recalling the challenge of J. M. Robertson, the member of Tyneside, Balfour himself put Robertson&#039;s question again: &amp;quot;What right have you to take up these airs of superiority with regard to people whom you choose to call Oriental?&amp;quot; The choice of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; was canonical; it had been employed by Chaucer and Mandeville, by Shakespeare, Dryden, Pope, and Byron. It designated Asia or the East, geographically, morally, culturally. One could speak in Europe of an Oriental personality, an Oriental atmosphere, an Oriental tale, Oriental despotism, or an Oriental mode of production, and be understood. Marx had used the word, and now Balfour was using it; his choice was understandable and called for no comment whatever.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I take up no attitude of superiority. But I ask [Robertson and anyone else] ... who has even the most superficial knowledge of history, if they will look in the face the facts with which a British statesman has to deal when he is put in a position of supremacy over great races like the inhabitants of Egypt and countries in the East. We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know the civilization of any other country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately; we know more about it. It goes far beyond the petty span of the history of our race, which is lost in the prehistoric period at a time when the Egyptian civilisation had already passed its prime. Look at all the Oriental countries. Do not talk about superiority or inferiority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two great themes dominate his remarks here and in what will follow: knowledge and power, the Baconian themes. As Balfour justifies the necessity for British occupation of Egypt, supremacy in his mind is associated with &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; knowledge of Egypt and not principally with military or economic power. Knowledge to Balfour means surveying a civilization from its origins to its prime to its decline--and of course, it means &#039;&#039;being able to do that&#039;&#039;. Knowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant. The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object is a &amp;quot;fact&amp;quot; which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; to deny autonomy to &amp;quot;it&amp;quot;--the Oriental country--since we know it and it exists, in a sense, &#039;&#039;as&#039;&#039; we know it. British knowledge of Egypt &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; Egypt for Balfour, and the burdens of knowledge make such questions as inferiority and superiority seem petty ones. Balfour nowhere denies British superiority and Egyptian inferiority; he takes them for granted as he describes the consequences of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, look at the facts of the case. Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities for self-government ... having merits of their own.... You may look through the whole history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, and you never find traces of self-government. All their great centuries--and they have been very great--have been passed under despotisms, under absolute government. All their great contributions to civilisation--and they have been great--have been made under that form of government. Conqueror has succeeded conqueror; one domination has followed another; but never in all the revolutions of fate and fortune have you seen one of those nations of its own motion establish what we, from a Western point of view, call self-government. That is the fact. It is not a question of superiority and inferiority. I suppose a true Eastern sage would say that the working government which we have taken upon ourselves in Egypt and elsewhere is not a work worthy of a philosopher--that it is the dirty work, the inferior work, of carrying on the necessary labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since these facts are facts, Balfour must then go on to the next part of his argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it a good thing for these great nations--I admit their greatness--that this absolute government should be exercised by us? I think it is a good thing. I think that experience shows that they have got under it far better government than in the whole history of the world they ever had before, and which not only is a benefit to them, but is undoubtedly a benefit to the whole of the civilised West.... We are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the Egyptians, though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large.&lt;br /&gt;
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Balfour produces no evidence that Egyptians and &amp;quot;the races with whom we deal&amp;quot; appreciate or even understand the good that is being done them by colonial occupation. It does not occur to Balfour, however, to let the Egyptian speak for himself, since presumably any Egyptian who would speak out is more likely to be &amp;quot;the agitator [who] wishes to raise difficulties&amp;quot; than the good native who overlooks the &amp;quot;difficulties&amp;quot; of foreign domination. And so, having settled the ethical problems, Balfour turns at last to the practical ones. &amp;quot;If it is our business to govern, with or without gratitude, with or without the real and genuine memory of all the loss of which we have relieved the population [Balfour by no means implies, as part of that loss, the loss or at least the indefinite postponement of Egyptian independence] and no vivid imagination of all the benefits which we have given to them; if that is our duty, how is it to be performed?&amp;quot; England exports &amp;quot;our very best to these countries.&amp;quot; These selfless administrators do their work &amp;quot;amidst tens of thousands of persons belonging to a different creed, a different race, a different discipline, different conditions of life.&amp;quot; What makes their work of governing possible is their sense of being supported at home by a government that endorses what they do. Yet&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
directly the native populations have that instinctive feeling that those with whom they have got to deal have not behind them the might, the authority, the sympathy, the full and ungrudging support of the country which sent them there, those populations lose all that sense of order which is the very basis of their civilisation, just as our officers lose all that sense of power and authority, which is the very basis of everything they can do for the benefit of those among whom they have been sent.&lt;br /&gt;
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Balfour&#039;s logic here is interesting, not least for being completely consistent with the premises of his entire speech. England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes &amp;quot;the very basis&amp;quot; of contemporary Egyptian civilization; Egypt requires, indeed insists upon, British occupation. But if the special intimacy between governor and governed in Egypt is disturbed by Parliament&#039;s doubts at home, then &amp;quot;the authority of what ... is the dominant race--and as I think ought to remain the dominant race--has been undermined.&amp;quot; Not only does English prestige suffer; &amp;quot;it is vain for a handful of British officials--endow them how you like, give them all the qualities of character and genius you can imagine--it is impossible for them to carry out the great task which in Egypt, not we only, but the civilised world have imposed upon them.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;This and the preceding quotations from Arthur James Balfour&#039;s speech to the House of Commons are from Great Britain, &#039;&#039;Parliamentary Debates&#039;&#039; (Commons), 5th ser., 17 (1910): 1140-46. See also A. P. Thornton, &#039;&#039;The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power&#039;&#039; (London: MacMillan &amp;amp; Co., 1959), pp. 357-60. Balfour&#039;s speech was a defense of Eldon Gorst&#039;s policy in Egypt; for a discussion of that see Peter John Dreyfus Mellini, &amp;quot;Sir Eldon Gorst and British Imperial Policy in Egypt,&amp;quot; unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1971.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As a rhetorical performance Balfour&#039;s speech is significant for the way in which he plays the part of, and represents, a variety of characters. There are of course &amp;quot;the English,&amp;quot; for whom the pronoun &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; is used with the full weight of a distinguished, powerful man who feels himself to be representative of all that is best in his nation&#039;s history. Balfour can also speak for the civilized world, the West, and the relatively small corps of colonial officials in Egypt. If he does not speak directly for the Orientals, it is because they after all speak another language; yet he knows how they feel since he knows their history, their reliance upon such as he, and their expectations. Still, he does speak for them in the sense that what they might have to say, were they to be asked and might they be able to answer, would somewhat uselessly confirm what is already evident: that they are a subject race, dominated by a race that knows them and what is good for them better than they could possibly know themselves. Their great moments were in the past; they are useful in the modern world only because the powerful and up-to-date empires have effectively brought them out of the wretchedness of their decline and turned them into rehabilitated residents of productive colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Egypt in particular was an excellent case in point, and Balfour was perfectly aware of how much right he had to speak as a member of his country&#039;s parliament on behalf of England, the West, Western civilization, about modern Egypt. For Egypt was not just another colony: it was the vindication of Western imperialism; it was, until its annexation by England, an almost academic example of Oriental backwardness; it was to become the triumph of English knowledge and power. Between 1882, the year in which England occupied Egypt and put an end to the nationalist rebellion of Colonel Arabi, and 1907, England&#039;s representative in Egypt, Egypt&#039;s master, was Evelyn Baring (also known as &amp;quot;Over-baring&amp;quot;), Lord Cromer. On July 30, 1907, it was Balfour in the Commons who had supported the project to give Cromer a retirement prize of fifty thousand pounds as a reward for what he had done in Egypt. Cromer &#039;&#039;made&#039;&#039; Egypt, said Balfour:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Everything he has touched he has succeeded in.... Lord Cromer&#039;s services during the past quarter of a century have raised Egypt from the lowest pitch of social and economic degradation until it now stands among Oriental nations, I believe, absolutely alone in its prosperity, financial and moral.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Denis Judd, &#039;&#039;Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932&#039;&#039; (London: MacMillan &amp;amp; Co., 1968), p. 286. See also p. 292: as late as 1926 Balfour spoke--without irony--of Egypt as an &amp;quot;independent nation.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How Egypt&#039;s moral prosperity was measured, Balfour did not venture to say. British exports to Egypt equaled those to the whole of Africa; that certainly indicated a sort of financial prosperity, for Egypt and England (somewhat unevenly) together. But what really mattered was the unbroken, all-embracing Western tutelage of an Oriental country, from the scholars, missionaries, businessmen, soldiers, and teachers who prepared and then implemented the occupation to the high functionaries like Cromer and Balfour who saw themselves as providing for, directing, and sometimes even forcing Egypt&#039;s rise from Oriental neglect to its present lonely eminence.&lt;br /&gt;
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If British success in Egypt was as exceptional as Balfour said, it was by no means an inexplicable or irrational success. Egyptian affairs had been controlled according to a general theory expressed both by Balfour in his notions about Oriental civilization and by Cromer in his management of everyday business in Egypt. The most important thing about the theory during the first decade of the twentieth century was that it worked, and worked staggeringly well. The argument, when reduced to its simplest form, was clear, it was precise, it was easy to grasp. There are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; the latter must be dominated, which usually means having their land occupied, their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power. That Balfour and Cromer, as we shall soon see, could strip humanity down to such ruthless cultural and racial essences was not at all an indication of their particular viciousness. Rather it was an indication of how streamlined a general doctrine had become by the time they put it to use--how streamlined and effective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Balfour, whose theses on Orientals pretended to objective universality, Cromer spoke about Orientals specifically as what he had ruled or had to deal with, first in India, then for the twenty-five years in Egypt during which he emerged as the paramount consulgeneral in England&#039;s empire. Balfour&#039;s &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot; are Cromer&#039;s &amp;quot;subject races,&amp;quot; which he made the topic of a long essay published in the &#039;&#039;Edinburgh Review&#039;&#039; in January 1908. Once again, knowledge of subject races or Orientals is what makes their management easy and profitable; knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control. Cromer&#039;s notion is that England&#039;s empire will not dissolve if such things as militarism and commercial egotism at home and &amp;quot;free institutions&amp;quot; in the colony (as opposed to British government &amp;quot;according to the Code of Christian morality&amp;quot;) are kept in check. For if, according to Cromer, logic is something &amp;quot;the existence of which the Oriental is disposed altogether to ignore,&amp;quot; the proper method of ruling is not to impose ultrascientific measures upon him or to force him bodily to accept logic. It is rather to understand his limitations and &amp;quot;endeavor to find, in the contentment of the subject race, a more worthy and, it may be hoped, a stronger bond of union between the rulers and the ruled.&amp;quot; Lurking everywhere behind the pacification of the subject race is imperial might, more effective for its refined understanding and infrequent use than for its soldiers, brutal tax gatherers, and incontinent force. In a word, the Empire must be wise; it must temper its cupidity with selflessness, and its impatience with flexible discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
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To be more explicit, what is meant when it is said that the commercial spirit should be under some control is this--that in dealing with Indians or Egyptians, or Shilluks, or Zulus, the first question is to consider what these people, who are all, nationally speaking, more or less &#039;&#039;in statu pupillari&#039;&#039;, themselves think is best in their own interests, although this is a point which deserves serious consideration. But it is essential that each special issue should be decided mainly with reference to what, by the light of Western knowledge and experience tempered by local considerations, we conscientiously think is best for the subject race, without reference to any real or supposed advantage which may accrue to England as a nation, or--as is more frequently the case--to the special interests represented by some one or more influential classes of Englishmen. If the British nation as a whole persistently bears this principle in mind, and insists sternly on its application, though we can never create a patriotism akin to that based on affinity of race or community of language, we may perhaps foster some sort of cosmopolitan allegiance grounded on the respect always accorded to superior talents and unselfish conduct, and on the gratitude derived both from favours conferred and from those to come. There may then at all events be some hope that the Egyptian will hesitate before he throws in his lot with any future Arabi.... Even the Central African savage may eventually learn to chant a hymn in honour of Astraea Redux, as represented by the British official who denies him gin but gives him justice. More than this, commerce will gain.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Political and Literary Essays&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1908-1913&#039;&#039; (1913; reprint ed., Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), pp. 40, 53, 12-14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How much &amp;quot;serious consideration&amp;quot; the ruler ought to give proposals from the subject race was illustrated in Cromer&#039;s total opposition to Egyptian nationalism. Free native institutions, the absence of foreign occupation, a self-sustaining national sovereignty: these unsurprising demands were consistently rejected by Cromer, who asserted unambiguously that &amp;quot;the real future of Egypt ... lies not in the direction of a narrow nationalism, which will only embrace native Egyptians ... but rather in that of an enlarged cosmopolitanism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Subject races did not have it in them to know what was good for them. Most of them were Orientals, of whose characteristics Cromer was very knowledgeable since he had had experience with them both in India and Egypt. One of the convenient things about Orientals for Cromer was that managing them, although circumstances might differ slightly here and there, was almost everywhere nearly the same.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Roger Owen, &amp;quot;The Influence of Lord Cromer&#039;s Indian Experience on British Policy in Egypt 1883-1907,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Middle Eastern Affairs, Number Four: St. Antony&#039;s Papers Number 17&#039;&#039;, ed. Albert Hourani (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 109-39.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was, of course, because Orientals were almost everywhere nearly the same.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now at last we approach the long-developing core of essential knowledge, knowledge both academic and practical, which Cromer and Balfour inherited from a century of modern Western Orientalism: knowledge about and knowledge of Orientals, their race, character, culture, history, traditions, society, and possibilities. This knowledge was effective: Cromer believed he had put it to use in governing Egypt. Moreover, it was tested and unchanging knowledge, since &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot; for all practical purposes were a Platonic essence, which any Orientalist (or ruler of Orientals) might examine, understand, and expose. Thus in the thirty-fourth chapter of his two-volume work &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039;, the magisterial record of his experience and achievement, Cromer puts down a sort of personal canon of Orientalist wisdom:&lt;br /&gt;
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Sir Alfred Lyall once said to me: &amp;quot;Accuracy is abhorrent to the Oriental mind. Every Anglo-Indian should always remember that maxim.&amp;quot; Want of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is in fact the main characteristic of the Oriental mind.&lt;br /&gt;
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The European is a close reasoner; his statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he is a natural logician, albeit he may not have studied logic; he is by nature sceptical and requires proof before he can accept the truth of any proposition; his trained intelligence works like a piece of mechanism. The mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description. Although the ancient Arabs acquired in a somewhat higher degree the science of dialectics, their descendants are singularly deficient in the logical faculty. They are often incapable of drawing the most obvious conclusions from any simple premises of which they may admit the truth. Endeavor to elicit a plain statement of facts from any ordinary Egyptian. His explanation will generally be lengthy, and wanting in lucidity. He will probably contradict himself half-a-dozen times before he has finished his story. He will often break down under the mildest process of cross-examination.&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientals or Arabs are thereafter shown to be gullible, &amp;quot;devoid of energy and initiative,&amp;quot; much given to &amp;quot;fulsome flattery,&amp;quot; intrigue, cunning, and unkindness to animals; Orientals cannot walk on either a road or a pavement (their disordered minds fail to understand what the clever European grasps immediately, that roads and pavements are made for walking); Orientals are inveterate liars, they are &amp;quot;lethargic and suspicious,&amp;quot; and in everything oppose the clarity, directness, and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), 2: 146-67. For a British view of British policy in Egypt that runs totally counter to Cromer&#039;s, see Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, &#039;&#039;Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Events&#039;&#039; (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922). There is a valuable discussion of Egyptian opposition to British rule in Mounah A. Khouri, &#039;&#039;Poetry and the Making of Modern Egypt, 1882-1922&#039;&#039; (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Cromer makes no effort to conceal that Orientals for him were always and only the human material he governed in British colonies. &amp;quot;As I am only a diplomatist and an administrator, whose proper study is also man, but from the point of view of governing him,&amp;quot; Cromer says, &amp;quot;... I content myself with noting the fact that somehow or other the Oriental generally acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cromer, &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039;, 2: 164.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cromer&#039;s descriptions are of course based partly on direct observation, yet here and there he refers to orthodox Orientalist authorities (in particular Ernest Renan and Constantin de Volney) to support his views. To these authorities he also defers when it comes to explaining why Orientals are the way they are. He has no doubt that &#039;&#039;any&#039;&#039; knowledge of the Oriental will confirm his views, which, to judge from his description of the Egyptian breaking under cross-examination, find the Oriental to be guilty. The crime was that the Oriental was an Oriental, and it is an accurate sign of how commonly acceptable such a tautology was that it could be written without even an appeal to European logic or symmetry of mind. Thus any deviation from what were considered the norms of Oriental behavior was believed to be unnatural; Cromer&#039;s last annual report from Egypt consequently proclaimed Egyptian nationalism to be an &amp;quot;entirely novel idea&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;a plant of exotic rather than of indigenous growth.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited in John Marlowe, &#039;&#039;Cromer in Egypt&#039;&#039; (London: Elek Books, 1970), p. 271.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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We would be wrong, I think, to underestimate the reservoir of accredited knowledge, the codes of Orientalist orthodoxy, to which Cromer and Balfour refer everywhere in their writing and in their public policy. To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact. Men have always divided the world up into regions having either real or imagined distinction from each other. The absolute demarcation between East and West, which Balfour and Cromer accept with such complacency, had been years, even centuries, in the making. There were of course innumerable voyages of discovery; there were contacts through trade and war. But more than this, since the middle of the eighteenth century there had been two principal elements in the relation between East and West. One was a growing systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient, knowledge reinforced by the colonial encounter as well as by the widespread interest in the alien and unusual, exploited by the developing sciences of ethnology, comparative anatomy, philology, and history; furthermore, to this systematic knowledge was added a sizable body of literature produced by novelists, poets, translators, and gifted travelers. The other feature of Oriental-European relations was that Europe was always in a position of strength, not to say domination. There is no way of putting this euphemistically. True, the relationship of strong to weak could be disguised or mitigated, as when Balfour acknowledged the &amp;quot;greatness&amp;quot; of Oriental civilizations. But the essential relationship, on political, cultural, and even religious grounds, was seen--in the West, which is what concerns us here--to be one between a strong and a weak partner.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many terms were used to express the relation: Balfour and Cromer, typically, used several. The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, &amp;quot;different&amp;quot;; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, &amp;quot;normal.&amp;quot; But the way of enlivening the relationship was everywhere to stress the fact that the Oriental lived in a different but thoroughly organized world of his own, a world with its own national, cultural, and epistemological boundaries and principles of internal coherence. Yet what gave the Oriental&#039;s world its intelligibility and identity was not the result of his own efforts but rather the whole complex series of knowledgeable manipulations by which the Orient was identified by the West. Thus the two features of cultural relationship I have been discussing come together. Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense &#039;&#039;creates&#039;&#039; the Orient, the Oriental, and his world. In Cromer&#039;s and Balfour&#039;s language the Oriental is depicted as something one judges (as in a court of law), something one studies and depicts (as in a curriculum), something one disciplines (as in a school or prison), something one illustrates (as in a zoological manual). The point is that in each of these cases the Oriental is &#039;&#039;contained&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;represented&#039;&#039; by dominating frameworks. Where do these come from?&lt;br /&gt;
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Cultural strength is not something we can discuss very easily--and one of the purposes of the present work is to illustrate, analyze, and reflect upon Orientalism as an exercise of cultural strength. In other words, it is better not to risk generalizations about so vague and yet so important a notion as cultural strength until a good deal of material has been analyzed first. But at the outset one can say that so far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West. The Orient was viewed as if framed by the classroom, the criminal court, the prison, the illustrated manual. Orientalism, then, is knowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgment, discipline, or governing.&lt;br /&gt;
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During the early years of the twentieth century, men like Balfour and Cromer could say what they said, in the way they did, because a still earlier tradition of Orientalism than the nineteenth-century one provided them with a vocabulary, imagery, rhetoric, and figures with which to say it. Yet Orientalism reinforced, and was reinforced by, the certain knowledge that Europe or the West literally commanded the vastly greater part of the earth&#039;s surface. The period of immense advance in the institutions and content of Orientalism coincides exactly with the period of unparalleled European expansion; from 1815 to 1914 European direct colonial dominion expanded from about 35 percent of the earth&#039;s surface to about 85 percent of it.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harry Magdoff, &amp;quot;Colonialism (1763-c. 1970),&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Encyclopaedia Britannica&#039;&#039;, 15th ed. (1974), pp. 893-4. See also D. K. Fieldhouse, &#039;&#039;The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039; (New York: Delacorte Press, 1967), p. 178.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Every continent was affected, none more so than Africa and Asia. The two greatest empires were the British and the French; allies and partners in some things, in others they were hostile rivals. In the Orient, from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean to Indochina and Malaya, their colonial possessions and imperial spheres of influence were adjacent, frequently overlapped, often were fought over. But it was in the Near Orient, the lands of the Arab Near East, where Islam was supposed to define cultural and racial characteristics, that the British and the French encountered each other and &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; with the greatest intensity, familiarity, and complexity. For much of the nineteenth century, as Lord Salisbury put it in 1881, their common view of the Orient was intricately problematic: &amp;quot;When you have got a ... faithful ally who is bent on meddling in a country in which you are deeply interested--you have three courses open to you. You may renounce--or monopolize--or share. Renouncing would have been to place the French across our road to India. Monopolizing would have been very near the risk of war. So we resolved to share.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quoted in Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, &#039;&#039;Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations&#039;&#039; (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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And share they did, in ways that we shall investigate presently. What they shared, however, was not only land or profit or rule; it was the kind of intellectual power I have been calling Orientalism. In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together was a family of ideas&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The phrase is to be found in Ian Hacking, &#039;&#039;The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference&#039;&#039; (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics. But like any set of durable ideas, Orientalist notions influenced the people who were called Orientals as well as those called Occidental, European, or Western; in short, Orientalism is better grasped as a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought than it is simply as a positive doctrine. If the essence of Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority, then we must be prepared to note how in its development and subsequent history Orientalism deepened and even hardened the distinction. When it became common practice during the nineteenth century for Britain to retire its administrators from India and elsewhere once they had reached the age of fifty-five, then a further refinement in Orientalism had been achieved; no Oriental was ever allowed to see a Westerner as he aged and degenerated, just as no Westerner needed ever to see himself, mirrored in the eyes of the subject race, as anything but a vigorous, rational, ever-alert young Raj.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;V. G. Kiernan, &#039;&#039;The Lords of Human Kind: Black Man, Yellow Man, and White Man in an Age of Empire&#039;&#039; (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1969), p. 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientalist ideas took a number of different forms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. First of all, in Europe there was a vast literature about the Orient inherited from the European past. What is distinctive about the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which is where this study assumes modern Orientalism to have begun, is that an Oriental renaissance took place, as Edgar Quinet phrased it.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Edgar Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions, in Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paguerre, 1857), pp. 55-74.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Suddenly it seemed to a wide variety of thinkers, politicians, and artists that a new awareness of the Orient, which extended from China to the Mediterranean, had arisen. This awareness was partly the result of newly discovered and translated Oriental texts in languages like Sanskrit, Zend, and Arabic; it was also the result of a newly perceived relationship between the Orient and the West. For my purposes here, the keynote of the relationship was set for the Near East and Europe by the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798, an invasion which was in many ways the very model of a truly scientific appropriation of one culture by another, apparently stronger one. For with Napoleon&#039;s occupation of Egypt processes were set in motion between East and West that still dominate our contemporary cultural and political perspectives. And the Napoleonic expedition, with its great collective monument of erudition, the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, provided a scene or setting for Orientalism, since Egypt and subsequently the other Islamic lands were viewed as the live province, the laboratory, the theater of effective Western knowledge about the Orient. I shall return to the Napoleonic adventure a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
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With such experiences as Napoleon&#039;s the Orient as a body of knowledge in the West was modernized, and this is a second form in which nineteenth- and twentieth-century Orientalism existed. From the outset of the period I shall be examining there was everywhere amongst Orientalists the ambition to formulate their discoveries, experiences, and insights suitably in modern terms, to put ideas about the Orient in very close touch with modern realities. Renan&#039;s linguistic investigations of Semitic in 1848, for example, were couched in a style that drew heavily for its authority upon contemporary comparative grammar, comparative anatomy, and racial theory; these lent his Orientalism prestige and--the other side of the coin--made Orientalism vulnerable, as it has been ever since, to modish as well as seriously influential currents of thought in the West. Orientalism has been subjected to imperialism, positivism, utopianism, historicism, Darwinism, racism, Freudianism, Marxism, Spenglerism. But Orientalism, like many of the natural and social sciences, has had &amp;quot;paradigms&amp;quot; of research, its own learned societies, its own Establishment. During the nineteenth century the field increased enormously in prestige, as did also the reputation and influence of such institutions as the Societe asiatique, the Royal Asiatic Society, the Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, and the American Oriental Society. With the growth of these societies went also an increase, all across Europe, in the number of professorships in Oriental studies; consequently there was an expansion in the available means for disseminating Orientalism. Orientalist periodicals, beginning with the &#039;&#039;Fundgraben des Orients&#039;&#039; (1809), multiplied the quantity of knowledge as well as the number of specialties.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet little of this activity and very few of these institutions existed and flourished freely, for in a third form in which it existed, Orientalism imposed limits upon thought about the Orient. Even the most imaginative writers of an age, men like Flaubert, Nerval, or Scott, were constrained in what they could either experience of or say about the Orient. For Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, &amp;quot;us&amp;quot;) and the strange (the Orient, the East, &amp;quot;them&amp;quot;). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. Orientals lived in their world, &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; lived in ours. The vision and material reality propped each other up, kept each other going. A certain freedom of intercourse was always the Westerner&#039;s privilege; because his was the stronger culture, he could penetrate, he could wrestle with, he could give shape and meaning to the great Asiatic mystery, as Disraeli once called it. Yet what has, I think, been previously overlooked is the constricted vocabulary of such a privilege, and the comparative limitations of such a vision. My argument takes it that the Orientalist reality is both antihuman and persistent. Its scope, as much as its institutions and all-pervasive influence, lasts up to the present.&lt;br /&gt;
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But how did and does Orientalism work? How can one describe it all together as a historical phenomenon, a way of thought, a contemporary problem, and a material reality? Consider Cromer again, an accomplished technician of empire but also a beneficiary of Orientalism. He can furnish us with a rudimentary answer. In &amp;quot;The Government of Subject Races&amp;quot; he wrestles with the problem of how Britain, a nation of individuals, is to administer a wide-flung empire according to a number of central principles. He contrasts the &amp;quot;local agent,&amp;quot; who has both a specialist&#039;s knowledge of the native and an Anglo-Saxon individuality, with the central authority at home in London. The former may &amp;quot;treat subjects of local interest in a manner calculated to damage, or even to jeopardize, Imperial interests. The central authority is in a position to obviate any danger arising from this cause.&amp;quot; Why? Because this authority can &amp;quot;ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;should endeavour, so far as is possible, to realise the circumstances attendant on the government of the dependency.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cromer, &#039;&#039;Political and Literary Essays&#039;&#039;, p. 35.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The language is vague and unattractive, but the point is not hard to grasp. Cromer envisions a seat of power in the West, and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine&#039;s branches feed into it in the East--human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you--is processed by the machine, then converted into more power. The specialist does the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance: the Oriental becomes, for example, a subject race, an example of an &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; mentality, all for the enhancement of the &amp;quot;authority&amp;quot; at home. &amp;quot;Local interests&amp;quot; are Orientalist special interests, the &amp;quot;central authority&amp;quot; is the general interest of the imperial society as a whole. What Cromer quite accurately sees is the management of knowledge by society, the fact that knowledge--no matter how special--is regulated first by the local concerns of a specialist, later by the general concerns of a social system of authority. The interplay between local and central interests is intricate, but by no means indiscriminate.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Cromer&#039;s own case as an imperial administrator the &amp;quot;proper study is also man,&amp;quot; he says. When Pope proclaimed the proper study of mankind to be man, he meant all men, including &amp;quot;the poor Indian&amp;quot;; whereas Cromer&#039;s &amp;quot;also&amp;quot; reminds us that certain men, such as Orientals, can be singled out as the subject for &#039;&#039;proper&#039;&#039; study. The proper study--in this sense--of Orientals is Orientalism, properly separate from other forms of knowledge, but finally useful (because finite) for the material and social reality enclosing all knowledge at any time, supporting knowledge, providing it with uses. An order of sovereignty is set up from East to West, a mock chain of being whose clearest form was given once by Kipling:&lt;br /&gt;
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Mule, horse, elephant, or bullock, he obeys his driver, and the driver his sergeant, and the sergeant his lieutenant, and the lieutenant his captain, and the captain his major, and the major his colonel, and the colonel his brigadier commanding three regiments, and the brigadier his general, who obeys the Viceroy, who is the servant of the Empress.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Jonah Raskin, &#039;&#039;The Mythology of Imperialism&#039;&#039; (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 40.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As deeply forged as is this monstrous chain of command, as strongly managed as is Cromer&#039;s &amp;quot;harmonious working,&amp;quot; Orientalism can also express the strength of the West and the Orient&#039;s weakness--as seen by the West. Such strength and such weakness are as intrinsic to Orientalism as they are to any view that divides the world into large general divisions, entities that coexist in a state of tension produced by what is believed to be radical difference.&lt;br /&gt;
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For that is the main intellectual issue raised by Orientalism. Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? By surviving the consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the hostility expressed by the division, say, of men into &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; (Westerners) and &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; (Orientals). For such divisions are generalities whose use historically and actually has been to press the importance of the distinction between some men and some other men, usually towards not especially admirable ends. When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy (as the categories were used by Balfour and Cromer), the result is usually to polarize the distinction--the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western--and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies. In short, from its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism as a form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hard-and-fast distinctions as &amp;quot;East&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;West&amp;quot;: to channel thought into a West or an East compartment. Because this tendency is right at the center of Orientalist theory, practice, and values found in the West, the sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as having the status of scientific truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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A contemporary illustration or two should clarify this observation perfectly. It is natural for men in power to survey from time to time the world with which they must deal. Balfour did it frequently. Our contemporary Henry Kissinger does it also, rarely with more express frankness than in his essay &amp;quot;Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy.&amp;quot; The drama he depicts is a real one, in which the United States must manage its behavior in the world under the pressures of domestic forces on the one hand and of foreign realities on the other. Kissinger&#039;s discourse must for that reason alone establish a polarity between the United States and the world; in addition, of course, he speaks consciously as an authoritative voice for the major Western power, whose recent history and present reality have placed it before a world that does not easily accept its power and dominance. Kissinger feels that the United States can deal less problematically with the industrial, developed West than it can with the developing world. Again, the contemporary actuality of relations between the United States and the so-called Third World (which includes China, Indochina, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America) is manifestly a thorny set of problems, which even Kissinger cannot hide.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kissinger&#039;s method in the essay proceeds according to what linguists call binary opposition: that is, he shows that there are two styles in foreign policy (the prophetic and the political), two types of technique, two periods, and so forth. When at the end of the historical part of his argument he is brought face to face with the contemporary world, he divides it accordingly into two halves, the developed and the developing countries. The first half, which is the West, &amp;quot;is deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data--the more accurately the better.&amp;quot; Kissinger&#039;s proof for this is the Newtonian revolution, which has not taken place in the developing world: &amp;quot;Cultures which escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking have retained the essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost completely &#039;&#039;internal&#039;&#039; to the observer.&amp;quot; Consequently, he adds, &amp;quot;empirical reality has a much different significance for many of the new countries than for the West because in a certain sense they never went through the process of discovering it.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Henry A. Kissinger, &#039;&#039;American Foreign Policy&#039;&#039; (New York: W. W. Norton &amp;amp; Co., 1974), pp. 48-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Cromer, Kissinger does not need to quote Sir Alfred Lyall on the Oriental&#039;s inability to be accurate; the point he makes is sufficiently unarguable to require no special validation. We had our Newtonian revolution; they didn&#039;t. As thinkers we are better off than they are. Good: the lines are drawn in much the same way, finally, as Balfour and Cromer drew them. Yet sixty or more years have intervened between Kissinger and the British imperialists. Numerous wars and revolutions have proved conclusively that the pre-Newtonian prophetic style, which Kissinger associates both with &amp;quot;inaccurate&amp;quot; developing countries and with Europe before the Congress of Vienna, is not entirely without its successes. Again unlike Balfour and Cromer, Kissinger therefore feels obliged to respect this pre-Newtonian perspective, since &amp;quot;it offers great flexibility with respect to the contemporary revolutionary turmoil.&amp;quot; Thus the duty of men in the post-Newtonian (real) world is to &amp;quot;construct an international order &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; a crisis imposes it as a necessity&amp;quot;: in other words, &#039;&#039;we&#039;&#039; must still find a way by which the developing world can be contained. Is this not similar to Cromer&#039;s vision of a harmoniously working machine designed ultimately to benefit some central authority, which opposes the developing world?&lt;br /&gt;
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Kissinger may not have known on what fund of pedigreed knowledge he was drawing when he cut the world up into pre-Newtonian and post-Newtonian conceptions of reality. But his distinction is identical with the orthodox one made by Orientalists, who separate Orientals from Westerners. And like Orientalism&#039;s distinction Kissinger&#039;s is not value-free, despite the apparent neutrality of his tone. Thus such words as &amp;quot;prophetic,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;accuracy,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;internal,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;empirical reality,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;order&amp;quot; are scattered throughout his description, and they characterize either attractive, familiar, desirable virtues or menacing, peculiar, disorderly defects. Both the traditional Orientalist, as we shall see, and Kissinger conceive of the difference between cultures, first, as creating a battlefront that separates them, and second, as inviting the West to control, contain, and otherwise govern (through superior knowledge and accommodating power) the Other. With what effect and at what considerable expense such militant divisions have been maintained, no one at present needs to be reminded.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another illustration dovetails neatly--perhaps too neatly--with Kissinger&#039;s analysis. In its February 1972 issue, the &#039;&#039;American Journal of Psychiatry&#039;&#039; printed an essay by Harold W. Glidden, who is identified as a retired member of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State; the essay&#039;s title (&amp;quot;The Arab World&amp;quot;), its tone, and its content argue a highly characteristic Orientalist bent of mind. Thus for his four-page, double-columned psychological portrait of over 100 million people, considered for a period of 1,300 years, Glidden cites exactly four sources for his views: a recent book on Tripoli, one issue of the Egyptian newspaper &#039;&#039;Al-Ahram&#039;&#039;, the periodical &#039;&#039;Oriente Moderno&#039;&#039;, and a book by Majid Khadduri, a well-known Orientalist. The article itself purports to uncover &amp;quot;the inner workings of Arab behavior,&amp;quot; which from &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; point of view is &amp;quot;aberrant&amp;quot; but for Arabs is &amp;quot;normal.&amp;quot; After this auspicious start, we are told that Arabs stress conformity; that Arabs inhabit a shame culture whose &amp;quot;prestige system&amp;quot; involves the ability to attract followers and clients (as an aside we are told that &amp;quot;Arab society is and always has been based on a system of client-patron relationships&amp;quot;); that Arabs can function only in conflict situations; that prestige is based solely on the ability to dominate others; that a shame culture--and therefore Islam itself--makes a virtue of revenge (here Glidden triumphantly cites the June 29, 1970 &#039;&#039;Ahram&#039;&#039; to show that &amp;quot;in 1969 [in Egypt] in 1070 cases of murder where the perpetrators were apprehended, it was found that 20 percent of the murders were based on a desire to wipe out shame, 30 percent on a desire to satisfy real or imaginary wrongs, and 31 percent on a desire for blood revenge&amp;quot;); that if from a Western point of view &amp;quot;the only rational thing for the Arabs to do is to make peace ... for the Arabs the situation is not governed by this kind of logic, for objectivity is not a value in the Arab system.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Glidden continues, now more enthusiastically: &amp;quot;it is a notable fact that while the Arab value system demands absolute solidarity within the group, it at the same time encourages among its members a kind of rivalry that is destructive of that very solidarity&amp;quot;; in Arab society only &amp;quot;success counts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;the end justifies the means&amp;quot;; Arabs live &amp;quot;naturally&amp;quot; in a world &amp;quot;characterized by anxiety expressed in generalized suspicion and distrust, which has been labelled free-floating hostility&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;the art of subterfuge is highly developed in Arab life, as well as in Islam itself&amp;quot;; the Arab need for vengeance overrides everything, otherwise the Arab would feel &amp;quot;ego-destroying&amp;quot; shame. Therefore, if &amp;quot;Westerners consider peace to be high on the scale of values&amp;quot; and if &amp;quot;we have a highly developed consciousness of the value of time,&amp;quot; this is not true of Arabs. &amp;quot;In fact,&amp;quot; we are told, &amp;quot;in Arab tribal society (where Arab values originated), strife, not peace, was the normal state of affairs because raiding was one of the two main supports of the economy.&amp;quot; The purpose of this learned disquisition is merely to show how on the Western and Oriental scale of values &amp;quot;the relative position of the elements is quite different.&amp;quot; QED.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harold W. Glidden, &amp;quot;The Arab World,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;American Journal of Psychiatry&#039;&#039; 128, no. 8 (February 1972): 984-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the apogee of Orientalist confidence. No merely asserted generality is denied the dignity of truth; no theoretical list of Oriental attributes is without application to the behavior of Orientals in the real world. On the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are Arab-Orientals; the former are (in no particular order) rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things. Out of what collective and yet particularized view of the Orient do these statements emerge? What specialized skills, what imaginative pressures, what institutions and traditions, what cultural forces produce such similarity in the descriptions of the Orient to be found in Cromer, Balfour, and our contemporary statesmen?&lt;br /&gt;
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=== II. Imaginative Geography and Its Representations: Orientalizing the Oriental ===&lt;br /&gt;
Strictly speaking, Orientalism is a field of learned study. In the Christian West, Orientalism is considered to have commenced its formal existence with the decision of the Church Council of Vienne in 1312 to establish a series of chairs in &amp;quot;Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, and Syriac at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Avignon, and Salamanca.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;R. W. Southern, &#039;&#039;Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages&#039;&#039; (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 72. See also Francis Dvornik, &#039;&#039;The Ecumenical Councils&#039;&#039; (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1961), pp. 65-6: &amp;quot;Of special interest is the eleventh canon directing that chairs for teaching Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Chaldean should be created at the main universities. The suggestion was Raymond Lull&#039;s, who advocated learning Arabic as the best means for the conversion of the Arabs. Although the canon remained almost without effect as there were few teachers of Oriental languages, its acceptance indicates the growth of the missionary idea in the West. Gregory X had already hoped for the conversion of the Mongols, and Franciscan friars had penetrated into the depths of Asia in their missionary zeal. Although these hopes were not fulfilled, the missionary spirit continued to develop.&amp;quot; See also Johann W. Fuck, &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet any account of Orientalism would have to consider not only the professional Orientalist and his work but also the very notion of a field of study based on a geographical, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic unit called the Orient. Fields, of course, are made. They acquire coherence and integrity in time because scholars devote themselves in different ways to what seems to be a commonly agreed-upon subject matter. Yet it goes without saying that a field of study is rarely as simply defined as even its most committed partisans--usually scholars, professors, experts, and the like--claim it is. Besides, a field can change so entirely, in even the most traditional disciplines like philology, history, or theology, as to make an all-purpose definition of subject matter almost impossible. This is certainly true of Orientalism, for some interesting reasons.&lt;br /&gt;
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To speak of scholarly specialization as a geographical &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; is, in the case of Orientalism, fairly revealing since no one is likely to imagine a field symmetrical to it called Occidentalism. Already the special, perhaps even eccentric attitude of Orientalism becomes apparent. For although many learned disciplines imply a position taken towards, say, &#039;&#039;human&#039;&#039; material (a historian deals with the human past from a special vantage point in the present), there is no real analogy for taking a fixed, more or less total geographical position towards a wide variety of social, linguistic, political, and historical realities. A classicist, a Romance specialist, even an Americanist focuses on a relatively modest portion of the world, not on a full half of it. But Orientalism is a field with considerable geographical ambition. And since Orientalists have traditionally occupied themselves with things Oriental (a specialist in Islamic law, no less than an expert in Chinese dialects or in Indian religions, is considered an Orientalist by people who call themselves Orientalists), we must learn to accept enormous, indiscriminate size plus an almost infinite capacity for subdivision as one of the chief characteristics of Orientalism--one that is evidenced in its confusing amalgam of imperial vagueness and precise detail.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this describes Orientalism as an academic discipline. The &amp;quot;ism&amp;quot; in Orientalism serves to insist on the distinction of this discipline from every other kind. The rule in its historical development as an academic discipline has been its increasing scope, not its greater selectiveness. Renaissance Orientalists like Erpenius and Guillaume Postel were primarily specialists in the languages of the Biblical provinces, although Postel boasted that he could get across Asia as far as China without needing an interpreter. By and large, until the mid-eighteenth century Orientalists were Biblical scholars, students of the Semitic languages, Islamic specialists, or, because the Jesuits had opened up the new study of China, Sinologists. The whole middle expanse of Asia was not academically conquered for Orientalism until, during the later eighteenth century, Anquetil-Duperron and Sir William Jones were able intelligibly to reveal the extraordinary riches of Avestan and Sanskrit. By the middle of the nineteenth century Orientalism was as vast a treasure-house of learning as one could imagine. There are two excellent indices of this new, triumphant eclecticism. One is the encyclopedic description of Orientalism roughly from 1765 to 1850 given by Raymond Schwab in his &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1950). See also V.-V. Barthold, &#039;&#039;La Decouverte de l&#039;Asie: Histoire de l&#039;orientalisme en Europe et en Russie&#039;&#039;, trans. B. Nikitine (Paris: Payot, 1947), and the relevant pages in Theodor Benfey, &#039;&#039;Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft und Orientalischen Philologie in Deutschland&#039;&#039; (Munich: Gottafschen, 1869). For an instructive contrast see James T. Monroe, &#039;&#039;Islam and the Arabs in Spanish Scholarship&#039;&#039; (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Quite aside from the scientific discoveries of things Oriental made by learned professionals during this period in Europe, there was the virtual epidemic of Orientalia affecting every major poet, essayist, and philosopher of the period. Schwab&#039;s notion is that &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; identifies an amateur or professional enthusiasm for everything Asiatic, which was wonderfully synonymous with the exotic, the mysterious, the profound, the seminal; this is a later transposition eastwards of a similar enthusiasm in Europe for Greek and Latin antiquity during the High Renaissance. In 1829 Victor Hugo put this change in directions as follows: &amp;quot;Au siecle de Louis XIV on etait helleniste, maintenant on est orientaliste.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Victor Hugo, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Pierre Albouy (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 1: 580.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A nineteenth-century Orientalist was therefore either a scholar (a Sinologist, an Islamicist, an Indo-Europeanist) or a gifted enthusiast (Hugo in &#039;&#039;Les Orientales&#039;&#039;, Goethe in the &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039;), or both (Richard Burton, Edward Lane, Friedrich Schlegel).&lt;br /&gt;
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The second index of how inclusive Orientalism had become since the Council of Vienne is to be found in nineteenth-century chronicles of the field itself. The most thorough of its kind is Jules Mohl&#039;s &#039;&#039;Vingt-sept Ans d&#039;histoire des etudes orientales&#039;&#039;, a two-volume logbook of everything of note that took place in Orientalism between 1840 and 1867.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Jules Mohl, &#039;&#039;Vingt-sept Ans d&#039;histoire des etudes orientales: Rapports faits a la Societe asiatique de Paris de 1840 a 1867&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Reinwald, 1879-80).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Mohl was the secretary of the Societe asiatique in Paris, and for something more than the first half of the nineteenth century Paris was the capital of the Orientalist world (and, according to Walter Benjamin, of the nineteenth century). Mohl&#039;s position in the Societe could not have been more central to the field of Orientalism. There is scarcely anything done by a European scholar touching Asia during those twenty-seven years that Mohl does not enter under &amp;quot;etudes orientales.&amp;quot; His entries of course concern publications, but the range of published material of interest to Orientalist scholars is awesome. Arabic, innumerable Indian dialects, Hebrew, Pehlevi, Assyrian, Babylonian, Mongolian, Chinese, Burmese, Mesopotamian, Javanese: the list of philological works considered Orientalist is almost uncountable. Moreover, Orientalist studies apparently cover everything from the editing and translation of texts to numismatic, anthropological, archaeological, sociological, economic, historical, literary, and cultural studies in every known Asiatic and North African civilization, ancient and modern. Gustave Dugat&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire des orientalistes de l&#039;Europe du XII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039; (1868-1870)&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gustave Dugat, &#039;&#039;Histoire des orientalistes de l&#039;Europe du XII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1868-70).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is a selective history of major figures, but the range represented is no less immense than Mohl&#039;s.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such eclecticism as this had its blind spots, nevertheless. Academic Orientalists for the most part were interested in the classical period of whatever language or society it was that they studied. Not until quite late in the century, with the single major exception of Napoleon&#039;s Institut d&#039;Egypte, was much attention given to the academic study of the modern, or actual, Orient. Moreover, the Orient studied was a textual universe by and large; the impact of the Orient was made through books and manuscripts, not, as in the impress of Greece on the Renaissance, through mimetic artifacts like sculpture and pottery. Even the rapport between an Orientalist and the Orient was textual, so much so that it is reported of some of the early-nineteenth-century German Orientalists that their first view of an eight-armed Indian statue cured them completely of their Orientalist taste.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Rene Gerard, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Orient et la pensee romantique allemande&#039;&#039; (Paris: Didier, 1963), p. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When a learned Orientalist traveled in the country of his specialization, it was always with unshakable abstract maxims about the &amp;quot;civilization&amp;quot; he had studied; rarely were Orientalists interested in anything except proving the validity of these musty &amp;quot;truths&amp;quot; by applying them, without great success, to uncomprehending, hence degenerate, natives. Finally, the very power and scope of Orientalism produced not only a fair amount of exact positive knowledge about the Orient but also a kind of second-order knowledge--lurking in such places as the &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; tale, the mythology of the mysterious East, notions of Asian inscrutability--with a life of its own, what V. G. Kiernan has aptly called &amp;quot;Europe&#039;s collective day-dream of the Orient.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Kiernan, &#039;&#039;Lords of Human Kind&#039;&#039;, p. 131.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; One happy result of this is that an estimable number of important writers during the nineteenth century were Oriental enthusiasts: It is perfectly correct, I think, to speak of a genre of Orientalist writing as exemplified in the works of Hugo, Goethe, Nerval, Flaubert, Fitzgerald, and the like. What inevitably goes with such work, however, is a kind of free-floating mythology of the Orient, an Orient that derives not only from contemporary attitudes and popular prejudices but also from what Vico called the conceit of nations and of scholars. I have already alluded to the political uses of such material as it has turned up in the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today an Orientalist is less likely to call himself an Orientalist than he was almost any time up to World War II. Yet the designation is still useful, as when universities maintain programs or departments in Oriental languages or Oriental civilizations. There is an Oriental &amp;quot;faculty&amp;quot; at Oxford, and a department of Oriental studies at Princeton. As recently as 1959, the British government empowered a commission &amp;quot;to review developments in the Universities in the fields of Oriental, Slavonic, East European and African studies ... and to consider, and advise on, proposals for future development.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;University Grants Committee, &#039;&#039;Report of the Sub-Committee on Oriental, Slavonic&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;East European and African Studies&#039;&#039; (London: Her Majesty&#039;s Stationery Office, 1961).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Hayter Report, as it was called when it appeared in 1961, seemed untroubled by the broad designation of the word &#039;&#039;Oriental&#039;&#039;, which it found serviceably employed in American universities as well. For even the greatest name in modern Anglo-American Islamic studies, H. A. R. Gibb, preferred to call himself an Orientalist rather than an Arabist. Gibb himself, classicist that he was, could use the ugly neologism &amp;quot;area study&amp;quot; for Orientalism as a way of showing that area studies and Orientalism after all were interchangeable geographical titles.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Area Studies Reconsidered&#039;&#039; (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But this, I think, ingenuously belies a much more interesting relationship between knowledge and geography. I should like to consider that relationship briefly.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the distraction of a great many vague desires, impulses, and images, the mind seems persistently to formulate what Claude Levi-Strauss has called a science of the concrete.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Claude Levi-Strauss, &#039;&#039;The Savage Mind&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), chaps. 1-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A primitive tribe, for example, assigns a definite place, function, and significance to every leafy species in its immediate environment. Many of these grasses and flowers have no practical use; but the point Levi-Strauss makes is that mind requires order, and order is achieved by discriminating and taking note of everything, placing everything of which the mind is aware in a secure, refindable place, therefore giving things some role to play in the economy of objects and identities that make up an environment. This kind of rudimentary classification has a logic to it, but the rules of the logic by which a green fern in one society is a symbol of grace and in another is considered maleficent are neither predictably rational nor universal. There is always a measure of the purely arbitrary in the way the distinctions between things are seen. And with these distinctions go values whose history, if one could unearth it completely, would probably show the same measure of arbitrariness. This is evident enough in the case of fashion. Why do wigs, lace collars, and high buckled shoes appear, then disappear, over a period of decades? Some of the answer has to do with utility and some with the inherent beauty of the fashion. But if we agree that all things in history, like history itself, are made by men, then we will appreciate how possible it is for many objects or places or times to be assigned roles and given meanings that acquire objective validity only &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the assignments are made. This is especially true of relatively uncommon things, like foreigners, mutants, or &amp;quot;abnormal&amp;quot; behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is perfectly possible to argue that some distinctive objects are made by the mind, and that these objects, while appearing to exist objectively, have only a fictional reality. A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries between their land and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, which they call &amp;quot;the land of the barbarians.&amp;quot; In other words, this universal practice of designating in one&#039;s mind a familiar space which is &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; and an unfamiliar space beyond &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; which is &amp;quot;theirs&amp;quot; is a way of making geographical distinctions that &#039;&#039;can be&#039;&#039; entirely arbitrary. I use the word &amp;quot;arbitrary&amp;quot; here because imaginative geography of the &amp;quot;our land-barbarian land&amp;quot; variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; to set up these boundaries in our own minds; &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; become &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from &amp;quot;ours.&amp;quot; To a certain extent modern and primitive societies seem thus to derive a sense of their identities negatively. A fifth-century Athenian was very likely to feel himself to be nonbarbarian as much as he positively felt himself to be Athenian. The geographic boundaries accompany the social, ethnic, and cultural ones in expected ways. Yet often the sense in which someone feels himself to be not-foreign is based on a very unrigorous idea of what is &amp;quot;out there,&amp;quot; beyond one&#039;s own territory. All kinds of suppositions, associations, and fictions appear to crowd the unfamiliar space outside one&#039;s own.&lt;br /&gt;
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The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard once wrote an analysis of what he called the poetics of space.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gaston Bachelard, &#039;&#039;The Poetics of Space&#039;&#039;, trans. Maria Jolas (New York: Orion Press, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The inside of a house, he said, acquires a sense of intimacy, secrecy, security, real or imagined, because of the experiences that come to seem appropriate for it. The objective space of a house--its corners, corridors, cellar, rooms--is far less important than what poetically it is endowed with, which is usually a quality with an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel: thus a house may be haunted, or homelike, or prisonlike, or magical. So space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here. The same process occurs when we deal with time. Much of what we associate with or even know about such periods as &amp;quot;long ago&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the beginning&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;at the end of time&amp;quot; is poetic--made up. For a historian of Middle Kingdom Egypt, &amp;quot;long ago&amp;quot; will have a very clear sort of meaning, but even this meaning does not totally dissipate the imaginative, quasi-fictional quality one senses lurking in a time very different and distant from our own. For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away. This is no less true of the feelings we often have that we would have been more &amp;quot;at home&amp;quot; in the sixteenth century or in Tahiti.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet there is no use in pretending that all we know about time and space, or rather history and geography, is more than anything else imaginative. There are such things as positive history and positive geography which in Europe and the United States have impressive achievements to point to. Scholars now do know more about the world, its past and present, than they did, for example, in Gibbon&#039;s time. Yet this is not to say that they know all there is to know, nor, more important, is it to say that what they know has effectively dispelled the imaginative geographical and historical knowledge I have been considering. We need not decide here whether this kind of imaginative knowledge infuses history and geography, or whether in some way it overrides them. Let us just say for the time being that it is there as something &#039;&#039;more&#039;&#039; than what appears to be merely positive knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Almost from earliest times in Europe the Orient was something more than what was empirically known about it. At least until the early eighteenth century, as R. W. Southern has so elegantly shown, European understanding of one kind of Oriental culture, the Islamic, was ignorant but complex.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Southern, &#039;&#039;Western Views of Islam&#039;&#039;, p. 14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For certain associations with the East--not quite ignorant, not quite informed--always seem to have gathered around the notion of an Orient. Consider first the demarcation between Orient and West. It already seems bold by the time of the &#039;&#039;Iliad&#039;&#039;. Two of the most profoundly influential qualities associated with the East appear in Aeschylus&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039;, the earliest Athenian play extant, and in &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039; of Euripides, the very last one extant. Aeschylus portrays the sense of disaster overcoming the Persians when they learn that their armies, led by King Xerxes, have been destroyed by the Greeks. The chorus sings the following ode:&lt;br /&gt;
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Now all Asia&#039;s land&lt;br /&gt;
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Moans in emptiness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Xerxes led forth, oh oh!&lt;br /&gt;
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Xerxes destroyed, woe woe!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Xerxes&#039; plans have all miscarried&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In ships of the sea.&lt;br /&gt;
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Why did Darius then&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bring no harm to his men&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he led them into battle,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That beloved leader of men from Susa?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Aeschylus, &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039;, trans. Anthony J. Podleck (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 73-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What matters here is that Asia speaks through and by virtue of the European imagination, which is depicted as victorious over Asia, that hostile &amp;quot;other&amp;quot; world beyond the seas. To Asia are given the feelings of emptiness, loss, and disaster that seem thereafter to reward Oriental challenges to the West; and also, the lament that in some glorious past Asia fared better, was itself victorious over Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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In &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039;, perhaps the most Asiatic of all the Attic dramas, Dionysus is explicitly connected with his Asian origins and with the strangely threatening excesses of Oriental mysteries. Pentheus, king of Thebes, is destroyed by his mother, Agave, and her fellow bacchantes. Having defied Dionysus by not recognizing either his power or his divinity, Pentheus is thus horribly punished, and the play ends with a general recognition of the eccentric god&#039;s terrible power. Modern commentators on &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039; have not failed to note the play&#039;s extraordinary range of intellectual and aesthetic effects; but there has been no escaping the additional historical detail that Euripides &amp;quot;was surely affected by the new aspect that the Dionysiac cults must have assumed in the light of the foreign ecstatic religions of Bendis, Cybele, Sabazius, Adonis, and Isis, which were introduced from Asia Minor and the Levant and swept through Piraeus and Athens during the frustrating and increasingly irrational years of the Peloponnesian War.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Euripides, &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039;, trans. Geoffrey S. Kirk (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 3. For further discussion of the Europe-Orient distinction see Santo Mazzarino, &#039;&#039;Fra oriente e occidente: Ricerche di storia greca arcaica&#039;&#039; (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1947), and Denys Hay, &#039;&#039;Europe: The Emergence of an Idea&#039;&#039; (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The two aspects of the Orient that set it off from the West in this pair of plays will remain essential motifs of European imaginative geography. A line is drawn between two continents. Europe is powerful and articulate; Asia is defeated and distant. Aeschylus &#039;&#039;represents&#039;&#039; Asia, makes her speak in the person of the aged Persian queen, Xerxes&#039; mother. It is Europe that articulates the Orient; this articulation is the prerogative, not of a puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose life-giving power represents, animates, constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries. There is an analogy between Aeschylus&#039;s orchestra, which contains the Asiatic world as the playwright conceives it, and the learned envelope of Orientalist scholarship, which also will hold in the vast, amorphous Asiatic sprawl for sometimes sympathetic but always dominating scrutiny. Secondly, there is the motif of the Orient as insinuating danger. Rationality is undermined by Eastern excesses, those mysteriously attractive opposites to what seem to be normal values. The difference separating East from West is symbolized by the sternness with which, at first, Pentheus rejects the hysterical bacchantes. When later he himself becomes a bacchant, he is destroyed not so much for having given in to Dionysus as for having incorrectly assessed Dionysus&#039;s menace in the first place. The lesson that Euripides intends is dramatized by the presence in the play of Cadmus and Tiresias, knowledgeable older men who realize that &amp;quot;sovereignty&amp;quot; alone does not rule men;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Euripides, &#039;&#039;Bacchae&#039;&#039;, p. 52.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there is such a thing as judgment, they say, which means sizing up correctly the force of alien powers and expertly coming to terms with them. Hereafter Oriental mysteries will be taken seriously, not least because they challenge the rational Western mind to new exercises of its enduring ambition and power.&lt;br /&gt;
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But one big division, as between West and Orient, leads to other smaller ones, especially as the normal enterprises of civilization provoke such outgoing activities as travel, conquest, new experiences. In classical Greece and Rome geographers, historians, public figures like Caesar, orators, and poets added to the fund of taxonomic lore separating races, regions, nations, and minds from each other; much of that was self-serving, and existed to prove that Romans and Greeks were superior to other kinds of people. But concern with the Orient had its own tradition of classification and hierarchy. From at least the second century B.C. on, it was lost on no traveler or eastward-looking and ambitious Western potentate that Herodotus--historian, traveler, inexhaustibly curious chronicler--and Alexander--king warrior, scientific conqueror--had been in the Orient before. The Orient was therefore subdivided into realms previously known, visited, conquered, by Herodotus and Alexander as well as their epigones, and those realms not previously known, visited, conquered. Christianity completed the setting up of main intra-Oriental spheres: there was a Near Orient and a Far Orient, a familiar Orient, which Rene Grousset calls &amp;quot;l&#039;empire du Levant,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Rene Grousset, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Empire du Levant: Histoire de la question d&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1946).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and a novel Orient. The Orient therefore alternated in the mind&#039;s geography between being an Old World to which one returned, as to Eden or Paradise, there to set up a new version of the old, and being a wholly new place to which one came as Columbus came to America, in order to set up a New World (although, ironically, Columbus himself thought that he discovered a new part of the Old World). Certainly neither of these Orients was purely one thing or the other: it is their vacillations, their tempting suggestiveness, their capacity for entertaining and confusing the mind, that are interesting.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consider how the Orient, and in particular the Near Orient, became known in the West as its great complementary opposite since antiquity. There were the Bible and the rise of Christianity; there were travelers like Marco Polo who charted the trade routes and patterned a regulated system of commercial exchange, and after him Lodovico di Varthema and Pietro della Valle; there were fabulists like Mandeville; there were the redoubtable conquering Eastern movements, principally Islam, of course; there were the militant pilgrims, chiefly the Crusaders. Altogether an internally structured archive is built up from the literature that belongs to these experiences. Out of this comes a restricted number of typical encapsulations: the journey, the history, the fable, the stereotype, the polemical confrontation. These are the lenses through which the Orient is experienced, and they shape the language, perception, and form of the encounter between East and West. What gives the immense number of encounters some unity, however, is the vacillation I was speaking about earlier. Something patently foreign and distant acquires, for one reason or another, a status more rather than less familiar. One tends to stop judging things either as completely novel or as completely well known; a new median category emerges, a category that allows one to see new things, things seen for the first time, as versions of a previously known thing. In essence such a category is not so much a way of receiving new information as it is a method of controlling what seems to be a threat to some established view of things. If the mind must suddenly deal with what it takes to be a radically new form of life--as Islam appeared to Europe in the early Middle Ages--the response on the whole is conservative and defensive. Islam is judged to be a fraudulent new version of some previous experience, in this case Christianity. The threat is muted, familiar values impose themselves, and in the end the mind reduces the pressure upon it by accommodating things to itself as either &amp;quot;original&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;repetitious.&amp;quot; Islam thereafter is &amp;quot;handled&amp;quot;: its novelty and its suggestiveness are brought under control so that relatively nuanced discriminations are now made that would have been impossible had the raw novelty of Islam been left unattended. The Orient at large, therefore, vacillates between the West&#039;s contempt for what is familiar and its shivers of delight in--or fear of--novelty.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet where Islam was concerned, European fear, if not always respect, was in order. After Mohammed&#039;s death in 632, the military and later the cultural and religious hegemony of Islam grew enormously. First Persia, Syria, and Egypt, then Turkey, then North Africa fell to the Muslim armies; in the eighth and ninth centuries Spain, Sicily, and parts of France were conquered. By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Islam ruled as far east as India, Indonesia, and China. And to this extraordinary assault Europe could respond with very little except fear and a kind of awe. Christian authors witnessing the Islamic conquests had scant interest in the learning, high culture, and frequent magnificence of the Muslims, who were, as Gibbon said, &amp;quot;coeval with the darkest and most slothful period of European annals.&amp;quot; (But with some satisfaction he added, &amp;quot;since the sum of science has risen in the West, it should seem that the Oriental studies have languished and declined.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Edward Gibbon, &#039;&#039;The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire&#039;&#039; (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1855), 6: 399.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) What Christians typically felt about the Eastern armies was that they had &amp;quot;all the appearance of a swarm of bees, but with a heavy hand ... they devastated everything&amp;quot;: so wrote Erchembert, a cleric in Monte Cassino in the eleventh century.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Norman Daniel, &#039;&#039;The Arabs and Medieval Europe&#039;&#039; (London: Longmans, Green &amp;amp; Co., 1975), p. 56.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Not for nothing did Islam come to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated barbarians. For Europe, Islam was a lasting trauma. Until the end of the seventeenth century the &amp;quot;Ottoman peril&amp;quot; lurked alongside Europe to represent for the whole of Christian civilization a constant danger, and in time European civilization incorporated that peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues, and vices, as something woven into the fabric of life. In Renaissance England alone, as Samuel Chew recounts in his classic study &#039;&#039;The Crescent and the Rose&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;a man of average education and intelligence&amp;quot; had at his fingertips, and could watch on the London stage, a relatively large number of detailed events in the history of Ottoman Islam and its encroachments upon Christian Europe.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Samuel C. Chew, &#039;&#039;The Crescent and the Rose: Islam and England During the Renaissance&#039;&#039; (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 103.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The point is that what remained current about Islam was some necessarily diminished version of those great dangerous forces that it symbolized for Europe. Like Walter Scott&#039;s Saracens, the European representation of the Muslim, Ottoman, or Arab was always a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient, and to a certain extent the same is true of the methods of contemporary learned Orientalists, whose subject is not so much the East itself as the East made known, and therefore less fearsome, to the Western reading public.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is nothing especially controversial or reprehensible about such domestications of the exotic; they take place between all cultures, certainly, and between all men. My point, however, is to emphasize the truth that the Orientalist, as much as anyone in the European West who thought about or experienced the Orient, performed this kind of mental operation. But what is more important still is the limited vocabulary and imagery that impose themselves as a consequence. The reception of Islam in the West is a perfect case in point, and has been admirably studied by Norman Daniel. One constraint acting upon Christian thinkers who tried to understand Islam was an analogical one; since Christ is the basis of Christian faith, it was assumed--quite incorrectly--that Mohammed was to Islam as Christ was to Christianity. Hence the polemic name &amp;quot;Mohammedanism&amp;quot; given to Islam, and the automatic epithet &amp;quot;imposter&amp;quot; applied to Mohammed.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Norman Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam and the West: The Making of an Image&#039;&#039; (Edinburgh: University Press, 1960), p. 33. See also James Kritzeck, &#039;&#039;Peter the Venerable and Islam&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Out of such and many other misconceptions &amp;quot;there formed a circle which was never broken by imaginative exteriorisation.... The Christian concept of Islam was integral and self-sufficient.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam and the West&#039;&#039;, p. 252.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Islam became an image--the word is Daniel&#039;s but it seems to me to have remarkable implications for Orientalism in general--whose function was not so much to represent Islam in itself as to represent it for the medieval Christian.&lt;br /&gt;
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The invariable tendency to neglect what the Qur&#039;an meant, or what Muslims thought it meant, or what Muslims thought or did in any given circumstances, necessarily implies that Qur&#039;anic and other Islamic doctrine was presented in a form that would convince Christians; and more and more extravagant forms would stand a chance of acceptance as the distance of the writers and public from the Islamic border increased. It was with very great reluctance that what Muslims said Muslims believed was accepted as what they did believe. There was a Christian picture in which the details (even under the pressure of facts) were abandoned as little as possible, and in which the general outline was never abandoned. There were shades of difference, but only with a common framework. All the corrections that were made in the interests of an increasing accuracy were only a defence of what had newly been realised to be vulnerable, a shoring up of a weakened structure. Christian opinion was an erection which could not be demolished, even to be rebuilt.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 259-60.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This rigorous Christian picture of Islam was intensified in innumerable ways, including--during the Middle Ages and early Renaissance--a large variety of poetry, learned controversy, and popular superstition.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See for example William Wistar Comfort, &amp;quot;The Literary Role of the Saracens in the French Epic,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;PMLA&#039;&#039; 55 (1940): 628-59.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; By this time the Near Orient had been all but incorporated in the common world-picture of Latin Christianity--as in the &#039;&#039;Chanson de Roland&#039;&#039; the worship of Saracens is portrayed as embracing Mahomet &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; Apollo. By the middle of the fifteenth century, as R. W. Southern has brilliantly shown, it became apparent to serious European thinkers &amp;quot;that something would have to be done about Islam,&amp;quot; which had turned the situation around somewhat by itself arriving militarily in Eastern Europe. Southern recounts a dramatic episode between 1450 and 1460 when four learned men, John of Segovia, Nicholas of Cusa, Jean Germain, and Aeneas Silvius (Pius II), attempted to deal with Islam through &#039;&#039;contraferentia&#039;&#039;, or &amp;quot;conference.&amp;quot; The idea was John of Segovia&#039;s: it was to have been a staged conference with Islam in which Christians attempted the wholesale conversion of Muslims. &amp;quot;He saw the conference as an instrument with a political as well as a strictly religious function, and in words which will strike a chord in modern breasts he exclaimed that even if it were to last ten years it would be less expensive and less damaging than war.&amp;quot; There was no agreement between the four men, but the episode is crucial for having been a fairly sophisticated attempt--part of a general European attempt from Bede to Luther--to put a representative Orient in front of Europe, to &#039;&#039;stage&#039;&#039; the Orient and Europe together in some coherent way, the idea being for Christians to make it clear to Muslims that Islam was just a misguided version of Christianity. Southern&#039;s conclusion follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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Most conspicuous to us is the inability of any of these systems of thought [European Christian] to provide a fully satisfying explanation of the phenomenon they had set out to explain [Islam]--still less to influence the course of practical events in a decisive way. At a practical level, events never turned out either so well or so ill as the most intelligent observers predicted; and it is perhaps worth noticing that they never turned out better than when the best judges confidently expected a happy ending. Was there any progress [in Christian knowledge of Islam]? I must express my conviction that there was. Even if the solution of the problem remained obstinately hidden from sight, the statement of the problem became more complex, more rational, and more related to experience.... The scholars who labored at the problem of Islam in the Middle Ages failed to find the solution they sought and desired; but they developed habits of mind and powers of comprehension which, in other men and in other fields, may yet deserve success.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Southern, &#039;&#039;Western Views of Islam&#039;&#039;, pp. 91-2, 108-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The best part of Southern&#039;s analysis, here and elsewhere in his brief history of Western views of Islam, is his demonstration that it is finally Western ignorance which becomes more refined and complex, not some body of positive Western knowledge which increases in size and accuracy. For fictions have their own logic and their own dialectic of growth or decline. Onto the character of Mohammed in the Middle Ages was heaped a bundle of attributes that corresponded to the &amp;quot;character of the [twelfth-century] prophets of the &#039;Free Spirit&#039; who did actually arise in Europe, and claim credence and collect followers.&amp;quot; Similarly, since Mohammed was viewed as the disseminator of a false Revelation, he became as well the epitome of lechery, debauchery, sodomy, and a whole battery of assorted treacheries, all of which derived &amp;quot;logically&amp;quot; from his doctrinal impostures.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam and the West&#039;&#039;, pp. 246, 96, and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus the Orient acquired representatives, so to speak, and representations, each one more concrete, more internally congruent with some Western exigency, than the ones that preceded it. It is as if, having once settled on the Orient as a locale suitable for incarnating the infinite in a finite shape, Europe could not stop the practice; the Orient and the Oriental, Arab, Islamic, Indian, Chinese, or whatever, become repetitious pseudoincarnations of some great original (Christ, Europe, the West) they were supposed to have been imitating. Only the source of these rather narcissistic Western ideas about the Orient changed in time, not their character. Thus we will find it commonly believed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that Arabia was &amp;quot;on the fringe of the Christian world, a natural asylum for heretical outlaws,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 84.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and that Mohammed was a cunning apostate, whereas in the twentieth century an Orientalist scholar, an erudite specialist, will be the one to point out how Islam is really no more than second-order Arian heresy.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Duncan Black Macdonald, &amp;quot;Whither Islam?&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Muslim World&#039;&#039; 23 (January 1933): 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Our initial description of Orientalism as a learned field now acquires a new concreteness. A field is often an enclosed space. The idea of representation is a theatrical one: the Orient is the stage on which the whole East is confined. On this stage will appear figures whose role it is to represent the larger whole from which they emanate. The Orient then seems to be, not an unlimited extension beyond the familiar European world, but rather a closed field, a theatrical stage affixed to Europe. An Orientalist is but the particular specialist in knowledge for which Europe at large is responsible, in the way that an audience is historically and culturally responsible for (and responsive to) dramas technically put together by the dramatist. In the depths of this Oriental stage stands a prodigious cultural repertoire whose individual items evoke a fabulously rich world: the Sphinx, Cleopatra, Eden, Troy, Sodom and Gomorrah, Astarte, Isis and Osiris, Sheba, Babylon, the Genii, the Magi, Nineveh, Prester John, Mahomet, and dozens more; settings, in some cases names only, half-imagined, half-known; monsters, devils, heroes; terrors, pleasures, desires. The European imagination was nourished extensively from this repertoire: between the Middle Ages and the eighteenth century such major authors as Ariosto, Milton, Marlowe, Tasso, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and the authors of the &#039;&#039;Chanson de Roland&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Poema del Cid&#039;&#039; drew on the Orient&#039;s riches for their productions, in ways that sharpened the outlines of imagery, ideas, and figures populating it. In addition, a great deal of what was considered learned Orientalist scholarship in Europe pressed ideological myths into service, even as knowledge seemed genuinely to be advancing.&lt;br /&gt;
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A celebrated instance of how dramatic form and learned imagery come together in the Orientalist theater is Barthelemy d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, published posthumously in 1697, with a preface by Antoine Galland. The introduction of the recent &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039; considers the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;, along with George Sale&#039;s preliminary discourse to his translation of the Koran (1734) and Simon Ockley&#039;s &#039;&#039;History of the Saracens&#039;&#039; (1708, 1718), to be &amp;quot;highly important&amp;quot; in widening &amp;quot;the new understanding of Islam&amp;quot; and conveying it &amp;quot;to a less academic readership.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;P. M. Holt, Introduction to &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. xvi.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This inadequately describes d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s work, which was not restricted to Islam as Sale&#039;s and Ockley&#039;s were. With the exception of Johann H. Hottinger&#039;s &#039;&#039;Historia Orientalis&#039;&#039;, which appeared in 1651, the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; remained the standard reference work in Europe until the early nineteenth century. Its scope was truly epochal. Galland, who was the first European translator of &#039;&#039;The Thousand and One Nights&#039;&#039; and an Arabist of note, contrasted d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s achievement with every prior one by noting the prodigious range of his enterprise. D&#039;Herbelot read a great number of works, Galland said, in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, with the result that he was able to find out about matters hitherto concealed from Europeans.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Antoine Galland, prefatory &amp;quot;Discours&amp;quot; to Barthelemy d&#039;Herbelot, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;ou Dictionnaire universel contenant tout ce qui fait connaitre les peuples de l&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; (The Hague: Neaulme &amp;amp; van Daalen, 1777), 1: vii. Galland&#039;s point is that d&#039;Herbelot presented real knowledge, not legend or myth of the sort associated with the &amp;quot;marvels of the East.&amp;quot; See R. Wittkower, &amp;quot;Marvels of the East: A Study in the History of Monsters,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes&#039;&#039; 5 (1942): 159-97.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; After first composing a dictionary of these three Oriental languages, d&#039;Herbelot went on to study Oriental history, theology, geography, science, and art, in both their fabulous and their truthful varieties. Thereafter he decided to compose two works, one a &#039;&#039;bibliotheque&#039;&#039;, or &amp;quot;library,&amp;quot; an alphabetically arranged dictionary, the second a &#039;&#039;florilege&#039;&#039;, or anthology. Only the first part was completed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Galland&#039;s account of the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; stated that &amp;quot;orientale&amp;quot; was planned to include principally the Levant, although--Galland says admiringly--the time period covered did not begin only with the creation of Adam and end with the &amp;quot;temps ou nous sommes&amp;quot;: d&#039;Herbelot went even further back, to a time described as &amp;quot;plus haut&amp;quot; in fabulous histories--to the long period of the pre-Adamite Solimans. As Galland&#039;s description proceeds, we learn that the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; was like &amp;quot;any other&amp;quot; history of the world, for what it attempted was a complete compendium of the knowledge available on such matters as the Creation, the Deluge, the destruction of Babel, and so forth--with the difference that d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s sources were Oriental. He divided history into two types, sacred and profane (the Jews and Christians in the first, the Muslims in the second), and two periods, pre- and postdiluvian. Thus d&#039;Herbelot was able to discuss such widely divergent histories as the Mogul, the Tartar, the Turkish, and the Slavonic; he took in as well all the provinces of the Muslim Empire, from the Extreme Orient to the Pillars of Hercules, with their customs, rituals, traditions, commentaries, dynasties, palaces, rivers, and flora. Such a work, even though it included some attention to &amp;quot;la doctrine perverse de Mahomet, qui a cause si grands dommages au Christianisme,&amp;quot; was more capaciously thorough than any work before it. Galland concluded his &amp;quot;Discours&amp;quot; by assuring the reader at length that d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; was uniquely &amp;quot;utile et agreable&amp;quot;; other Orientalists, like Postel, Scaliger, Golius, Pockoke, and Erpenius, produced Orientalist studies that were too narrowly grammatical, lexicographical, geographical, or the like. Only d&#039;Herbelot was able to write a work capable of convincing European readers that the study of Oriental culture was more than just thankless and fruitless: only d&#039;Herbelot, according to Galland, attempted to form in the minds of his readers a sufficiently ample idea of what it meant to know and study the Orient, an idea that would both fill the mind and satisfy one&#039;s great, previously conceived expectations.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Galland, prefatory &amp;quot;Discours&amp;quot; to d&#039;Herbelot, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, pp. xvi, xxxiii. For the state of Orientalist knowledge immediately before d&#039;Herbelot, see V. J. Parry, &amp;quot;Renaissance Historical Literature in Relation to the New and Middle East (with Special Reference to Paolo Giovio),&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Historians of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 277-89.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In such efforts as d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s, Europe discovered its capacities for encompassing and Orientalizing the Orient. A certain sense of superiority appears here and there in what Galland had to say about his and d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;materia orientalia&#039;&#039;; as in the work of seventeenth-century geographers like Raphael du Mans, Europeans could perceive that the Orient was being outstripped and outdated by Western science.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Barthold, &#039;&#039;La Decouverte de l&#039;Asie&#039;&#039;, pp. 137-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But what becomes evident is not only the advantage of a Western perspective: there is also the triumphant technique for taking the immense fecundity of the Orient and making it systematically, even alphabetically, knowable by Western laymen. When Galland said of d&#039;Herbelot that he satisfied one&#039;s expectations he meant, I think, that the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; did not attempt to revise commonly received ideas about the Orient. For what the Orientalist does is to &#039;&#039;confirm&#039;&#039; the Orient in his readers&#039; eyes; he neither tries nor wants to unsettle already firm convictions. All the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039; did was represent the Orient more fully and more clearly; what may have been a loose collection of randomly acquired facts concerning vaguely Levantine history, Biblical imagery, Islamic culture, place names, and so on were transformed into a rational Oriental panorama, from A to Z. Under the entry for Mohammed, d&#039;Herbelot first supplied all of the Prophet&#039;s given names, then proceeded to confirm Mohammed&#039;s ideological and doctrinal value as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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C&#039;est le fameux imposteur Mahomet, Auteur et Fondateur d&#039;une heresie, qui a pris le nom de religion, que nous appellons Mahometane. &#039;&#039;Voyez&#039;&#039; le titre d&#039;Eslam.&lt;br /&gt;
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Les Interpretes de l&#039;Alcoran et autres Docteurs de la Loy Musulmane ou Mahometane ont applique a ce faux prophete tous les eloges, que les Ariens, Paulitiens ou Paulianistes &amp;amp; autres Heretiques ont attribue a Jesus-Christ, en lui otant sa Divinite....&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;D&#039;Herbelot, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, 2: 648.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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(This is the famous imposter Mahomet, Author and Founder of a heresy, which has taken on the name of religion, which we call Mohammedan. See entry under &#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interpreters of the Alcoran and other Doctors of Muslim or Mohammedan Law have applied to this false prophet all the praises which the Arians, Paulicians or Paulianists, and other Heretics have attributed to Jesus Christ, while stripping him of his Divinity....)&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Mohammedan&amp;quot; is the relevant (and insulting) European designation; &amp;quot;Islam,&amp;quot; which happens to be the correct Muslim name, is relegated to another entry. The &amp;quot;heresy ... which we call Mohammedan&amp;quot; is &amp;quot;caught&amp;quot; as the imitation of a Christian imitation of true religion. Then, in the long historical account of Mohammed&#039;s life, d&#039;Herbelot can turn to more or less straight narrative. But it is the &#039;&#039;placing&#039;&#039; of Mohammed that counts in the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;. The dangers of free-wheeling heresy are removed when it is transformed into ideologically explicit matter for an alphabetical item. Mohammed no longer roams the Eastern world as a threatening, immoral debauchee; he sits quietly on his (admittedly prominent) portion of the Orientalist stage.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See also Montgomery Watt, &amp;quot;Muhammad in the Eyes of the West,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Boston University Journal&#039;&#039; 22, no. 3 (Fall 1974): 61-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He is given a genealogy, an explanation, even a development, all of which are subsumed under the simple statements that prevent him from straying elsewhere.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such &amp;quot;images&amp;quot; of the Orient as this are images in that they represent or stand for a very large entity, otherwise impossibly diffuse, which they enable one to grasp or see. They are also &#039;&#039;characters&#039;&#039;, related to such types as the braggarts, misers, or gluttons produced by Theophrastus, La Bruyere, or Selden. Perhaps it is not exactly correct to say that one &#039;&#039;sees&#039;&#039; such characters as the &#039;&#039;miles gloriosus&#039;&#039; or Mahomet the imposter, since the discursive confinement of a character is supposed at best to let one apprehend a generic type without difficulty or ambiguity. D&#039;Herbelot&#039;s character of Mahomet is an &#039;&#039;image&#039;&#039;, however, because the false prophet is part of a general theatrical representation called &#039;&#039;orientale&#039;&#039; whose totality is contained in the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The didactic quality of the Orientalist representation cannot be detached from the rest of the performance. In a learned work like the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, which was the result of systematic study and research, the author imposes a disciplinary order upon the material he has worked on; in addition, he wants it made clear to the reader that what the printed page delivers is an ordered, disciplined judgment of the material. What is thus conveyed by the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; is an idea of Orientalism&#039;s power and effectiveness, which everywhere remind the reader that henceforth in order to get at the Orient he must pass through the learned grids and codes provided by the Orientalist. Not only is the Orient accommodated to the moral exigencies of Western Christianity; it is also circumscribed by a series of attitudes and judgments that send the Western mind, not first to Oriental sources for correction and verification, but rather to other Orientalist works. The Orientalist stage, as I have been calling it, becomes a system of moral and epistemological rigor. As a discipline representing institutionalized Western knowledge of the Orient, Orientalism thus comes to exert a three-way force, on the Orient, on the Orientalist, and on the Western &amp;quot;consumer&amp;quot; of Orientalism. It would be wrong, I think, to underestimate the strength of the three-way relationship thus established. For the Orient (&amp;quot;out there&amp;quot; towards the East) is corrected, even penalized, for lying outside the boundaries of European society, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world; the Orient is thus &#039;&#039;Orientalized&#039;&#039;, a process that not only marks the Orient as the province of the Orientalist but also forces the uninitiated Western reader to accept Orientalist codifications (like d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s alphabetized &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;) as the &#039;&#039;true&#039;&#039; Orient. Truth, in short, becomes a function of learned judgment, not of the material itself, which in time seems to owe even its existence to the Orientalist.&lt;br /&gt;
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This whole didactic process is neither difficult to understand nor difficult to explain. One ought again to remember that all cultures impose corrections upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating objects into units of knowledge. The problem is not that conversion takes place. It is perfectly natural for the human mind to resist the assault on it of untreated strangeness; therefore cultures have always been inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving these other cultures not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be. To the Westerner, however, the Oriental was always &#039;&#039;like&#039;&#039; some aspect of the West; to some of the German Romantics, for example, Indian religion was essentially an Oriental version of Germano-Christian pantheism. Yet the Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from something into something else: he does this for himself, for the sake of his culture, in some cases for what he believes is the sake of the Oriental. This process of conversion is a disciplined one: it is taught, it has its own societies, periodicals, traditions, vocabulary, rhetoric, all in basic ways connected to and supplied by the prevailing cultural and political norms of the West. And, as I shall demonstrate, it tends to become more rather than less total in what it tries to do, so much so that as one surveys Orientalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the overriding impression is of Orientalism&#039;s insensitive schematization of the entire Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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How early this schematization began is clear from the examples I have given of Western representations of the Orient in classical Greece. How strongly articulated were later representations building on the earlier ones, how inordinately careful their schematization, how dramatically effective their placing in Western imaginative geography, can be illustrated if we turn now to Dante&#039;s &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;. Dante&#039;s achievement in &#039;&#039;The Divine Comedy&#039;&#039; was to have seamlessly combined the realistic portrayal of mundane reality with a universal and eternal system of Christian values. What Dante the pilgrim sees as he walks through the Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso is a unique vision of judgment. Paolo and Francesca, for instance, are seen as eternally confined to hell for their sins, yet they are seen as enacting, indeed living, the very characters and actions that put them where they will be for eternity. Thus each of the figures in Dante&#039;s vision not only represents himself but is also a typical representation of his character and the fate meted out to him.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Maometto&amp;quot;--Mohammed--turns up in canto 28 of the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;. He is located in the eighth of the nine circles of Hell, in the ninth of the ten Bolgias of Malebolge, a circle of gloomy ditches surrounding Satan&#039;s stronghold in Hell. Thus before Dante reaches Mohammed, he passes through circles containing people whose sins are of a lesser order: the lustful, the avaricious, the gluttonous, the heretics, the wrathful, the suicidal, the blasphemous. After Mohammed there are only the falsifiers and the treacherous (who include Judas, Brutus, and Cassius) before one arrives at the very bottom of Hell, which is where Satan himself is to be found. Mohammed thus belongs to a rigid hierarchy of evils, in the category of what Dante calls &#039;&#039;seminator di scandalo e di scisma&#039;&#039;. Mohammed&#039;s punishment, which is also his eternal fate, is a peculiarly disgusting one: he is endlessly being cleft in two from his chin to his anus like, Dante says, a cask whose staves are ripped apart. Dante&#039;s verse at this point spares the reader none of the eschatological detail that so vivid a punishment entails: Mohammed&#039;s entrails and his excrement are described with unflinching accuracy. Mohammed explains his punishment to Dante, pointing as well to Ali, who precedes him in the line of sinners whom the attendant devil is splitting in two; he also asks Dante to warn one Fra Dolcino, a renegade priest whose sect advocated community of women and goods and who was accused of having a mistress, of what will be in store for him. It will not have been lost on the reader that Dante saw a parallel between Dolcino&#039;s and Mohammed&#039;s revolting sensuality, and also between their pretensions to theological eminence.&lt;br /&gt;
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But this is not all that Dante has to say about Islam. Earlier in the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;, a small group of Muslims turns up. Avicenna, Averroes, and Saladin are among those virtuous heathens who, along with Hector, Aeneas, Abraham, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, are confined to the first circle of the Inferno, there to suffer a minimal (and even honorable) punishment for not having had the benefit of Christian revelation. Dante, of course, admires their great virtues and accomplishments, but because they were not Christians he must condemn them, however lightly, to Hell. Eternity is a great leveler of distinctions, it is true, but the special anachronisms and anomalies of putting pre-Christian luminaries in the same category of &amp;quot;heathen&amp;quot; damnation with post-Christian Muslims does not trouble Dante. Even though the Koran specifies Jesus as a prophet, Dante chooses to consider the great Muslim philosophers and king as having been fundamentally ignorant of Christianity. That they can also inhabit the same distinguished level as the heroes and sages of classical antiquity is an ahistorical vision similar to Raphael&#039;s in his fresco &#039;&#039;The School of Athens&#039;&#039;, in which Averroes rubs elbows on the academy floor with Socrates and Plato (similar to Fenelon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Dialogues des morts&#039;&#039; [1700-1718], where a discussion takes place between Socrates and Confucius).&lt;br /&gt;
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The discriminations and refinements of Dante&#039;s poetic grasp of Islam are an instance of the schematic, almost cosmological inevitability with which Islam and its designated representatives are creatures of Western geographical, historical, and above all, moral apprehension. Empirical data about the Orient or about any of its parts count for very little; what matters and is decisive is what I have been calling the Orientalist vision, a vision by no means confined to the professional scholar, but rather the common possession of all who have thought about the Orient in the West. Dante&#039;s powers as a poet intensify, make more rather than less representative, these perspectives on the Orient. Mohammed, Saladin, Averroes, and Avicenna are fixed in a visionary cosmology--fixed, laid out, boxed in, imprisoned, without much regard for anything except their &amp;quot;function&amp;quot; and the patterns they realize on the stage on which they appear. Isaiah Berlin has described the effect of such attitudes in the following way:&lt;br /&gt;
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In [such a] ... cosmology the world of men (and, in some versions, the entire universe) is a single, all-inclusive hierarchy; so that to explain why each object in it is as, and where, and when it is, and does what it does, is &#039;&#039;eo ipso&#039;&#039; to say what its goal is, how far it successfully fulfills it, and what are the relations of coordination and subordination between the goals of the various goal-pursuing entities in the harmonious pyramid which they collectively form. If this is a true picture of reality, then historical explanation, like every other form of explanation, must consist, above all, in the attribution of individuals, groups, nations, species, each to its own proper place in the universal pattern. To know the &amp;quot;cosmic&amp;quot; place of a thing or a person is to say what it is and what it does, and at the same time why it should be and do as it is and does. Hence to be and to have value, to exist and to have a function (and to fulfill it more or less successfully) are one and the same. The pattern, and it alone, brings into being and causes to pass away and confers purpose, that is to say, value and meaning, on all there is. To understand is to perceive patterns.... The more inevitable an event or an action or a character can be exhibited as being, the better it has been understood, the profounder the researcher&#039;s insight, the nearer we are to the one ultimate truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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This attitude is profoundly anti-empirical.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Historical Inevitability&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 13-14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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And so, indeed, is the Orientalist attitude in general. It shares with magic and with mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are &#039;&#039;because&#039;&#039; they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter. The European encounter with the Orient, and specifically with Islam, strengthened this system of representing the Orient and, as has been suggested by Henri Pirenne, turned Islam into the very epitome of an outsider against which the whole of European civilization from the Middle Ages on was founded. The decline of the Roman Empire as a result of the barbarian invasions had the paradoxical effect of incorporating barbarian ways into Roman and Mediterranean culture, Romania; whereas, Pirenne argues, the consequence of the Islamic invasions beginning in the seventh century was to move the center of European culture away from the Mediterranean, which was then an Arab province, and towards the North. &amp;quot;Germanism began to play its part in history. Hitherto the Roman tradition had been uninterrupted. Now an original Romano-Germanic civilization was about to develop.&amp;quot; Europe was shut in on itself: the Orient, when it was not merely a place in which one traded, was culturally, intellectually, spiritually &#039;&#039;outside&#039;&#039; Europe and European civilization, which, in Pirenne&#039;s words, became &amp;quot;one great Christian community, coterminous with the &#039;&#039;ecclesia&#039;&#039;.... The Occident was now living its own life.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Henri Pirenne, &#039;&#039;Mohammed and Charlemagne&#039;&#039;, trans. Bernard Miall (New York: W. W. Norton &amp;amp; Co., 1939), pp. 234, 283.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In Dante&#039;s poem, in the work of Peter the Venerable and other Cluniac Orientalists, in the writings of the Christian polemicists against Islam from Guibert of Nogent and Bede to Roger Bacon, William of Tripoli, Burchard of Mount Syon, and Luther, in the &#039;&#039;Poema del Cid&#039;&#039;, in the &#039;&#039;Chanson de Roland&#039;&#039;, and in Shakespeare&#039;s &#039;&#039;Othello&#039;&#039; (that &amp;quot;abuser of the world&amp;quot;), the Orient and Islam are always represented as outsiders having a special role to play &#039;&#039;inside&#039;&#039; Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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Imaginative geography, from the vivid portraits to be found in the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039; to the prosaic niches of d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, legitimates a vocabulary, a universe of representative discourse peculiar to the discussion and understanding of Islam and of the Orient. What this discourse considers to be a fact--that Mohammed is an imposter, for example--is a component of the discourse, a statement the discourse compels one to make whenever the name Mohammed occurs. Underlying all the different units of Orientalist discourse--by which I mean simply the vocabulary employed whenever the Orient is spoken or written about--is a set of representative figures, or tropes. These figures are to the actual Orient--or Islam, which is my main concern here--as stylized costumes are to characters in a play; they are like, for example, the cross that Everyman will carry, or the particolored costume worn by Harlequin in a &#039;&#039;commedia dell&#039;arte&#039;&#039; play. In other words, we need not look for correspondence between the language used to depict the Orient and the Orient itself, not so much because the language is inaccurate but because it is not even trying to be accurate. What it is trying to do, as Dante tried to do in the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;, is at one and the same time to characterize the Orient as alien and to incorporate it schematically on a theatrical stage whose audience, manager, and actors are &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; Europe, and only for Europe. Hence the vacillation between the familiar and the alien; Mohammed is always the imposter (familiar, because he pretends to be like the Jesus we know) and always the Oriental (alien, because although he is in some ways &amp;quot;like&amp;quot; Jesus, he is after all not like him).&lt;br /&gt;
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Rather than listing all the figures of speech associated with the Orient--its strangeness, its difference, its exotic sensuousness, and so forth--we can generalize about them as they were handed down through the Renaissance. They are all declarative and self-evident; the tense they employ is the timeless eternal; they convey an impression of repetition and strength; they are always symmetrical to, and yet diametrically inferior to, a European equivalent, which is sometimes specified, sometimes not. For all these functions it is frequently enough to use the simple copula &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039;. Thus, Mohammed &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; an imposter, the very phrase canonized in d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; and dramatized in a sense by Dante. No background need be given; the evidence necessary to convict Mohammed is contained in the &amp;quot;is.&amp;quot; One does not qualify the phrase, neither does it seem necessary to say that Mohammed &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; an imposter, nor need one consider for a moment that it may not be necessary to repeat the statement. It &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; repeated, he &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; an imposter, and each time one says it, he becomes more of an imposter and the author of the statement gains a little more authority in having declared it. Thus Humphrey Prideaux&#039;s famous seventeenth-century biography of Mohammed is subtitled &#039;&#039;The True Nature of Imposture&#039;&#039;. Finally, of course, such categories as imposter (or Oriental, for that matter) imply, indeed require, an opposite that is neither fraudulently something else nor endlessly in need of explicit identification. And that opposite is &amp;quot;Occidental,&amp;quot; or in Mohammed&#039;s case, Jesus.&lt;br /&gt;
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Philosophically, then, the kind of language, thought, and vision that I have been calling Orientalism very generally is a form of radical realism; anyone employing Orientalism, which is the habit for dealing with questions, objects, qualities, and regions deemed Oriental, will designate, name, point to, fix what he is talking or thinking about with a word or phrase, which then is considered either to have acquired, or more simply to be, reality. Rhetorically speaking, Orientalism is absolutely anatomical and enumerative: to use its vocabulary is to engage in the particularizing and dividing of things Oriental into manageable parts. Psychologically, Orientalism is a form of paranoia, knowledge of another kind, say, from ordinary historical knowledge. These are a few of the results, I think, of imaginative geography and of the dramatic boundaries it draws. There are some specifically modern transmutations of these Orientalized results, however, to which I must now turn.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Projects&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
It is necessary to examine the more flamboyant operational successes of Orientalism if only to judge how exactly wrong (and how totally opposite to the truth) was the grandly menacing idea expressed by Michelet, that &amp;quot;the Orient advances, invincible, fatal to the gods of light by the charm of its dreams, by the magic of its &#039;&#039;chiaroscuro&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quoted by Henri Baudet in &#039;&#039;Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man&#039;&#039;, trans. Elizabeth Wentholt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), p. xiii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cultural, material, and intellectual relations between Europe and the Orient have gone through innumerable phases, even though the line between East and West has made a certain constant impression upon Europe. Yet in general it was the West that moved upon the East, not vice versa. &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is the generic term that I have been employing to describe the Western approach to the Orient; Orientalism is the discipline by which the Orient was (and is) approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery, and practice. But in addition I have been using the word to designate that collection of dreams, images, and vocabularies available to anyone who has tried to talk about what lies east of the dividing line. These two aspects of Orientalism are not incongruent, since by use of them both Europe could advance securely and unmetaphorically upon the Orient. Here I should like principally to consider material evidence of this advance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Islam excepted, the Orient for Europe was until the nineteenth century a domain with a continuous history of unchallenged Western dominance. This is patently true of the British experience in India, the Portuguese experience in the East Indies, China, and Japan, and the French and Italian experiences in various regions of the Orient. There were occasional instances of native intransigence to disturb the idyll, as when in 1638-1639 a group of Japanese Christians threw the Portuguese out of the area; by and large, however, only the Arab and Islamic Orient presented Europe with an unresolved challenge on the political, intellectual, and for a time, economic levels. For much of its history, then, Orientalism carries within it the stamp of a problematic European attitude towards Islam, and it is this acutely sensitive aspect of Orientalism around which my interest in this study turns.&lt;br /&gt;
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Doubtless Islam was a real provocation in many ways. It lay uneasily close to Christianity, geographically and culturally. It drew on the Judeo-Hellenic traditions, it borrowed creatively from Christianity, it could boast of unrivaled military and political successes. Nor was this all. The Islamic lands sit adjacent to and even on top of the Biblical lands; moreover, the heart of the Islamic domain has always been the region closest to Europe, what has been called the Near Orient or Near East. Arabic and Hebrew are Semitic languages, and together they dispose and redispose of material that is urgently important to Christianity. From the end of the seventh century until the battle of Lepanto in 1571, Islam in either its Arab, Ottoman, or North African and Spanish form dominated or effectively threatened European Christianity. That Islam outstripped and outshone Rome cannot have been absent from the mind of any European past or present. Even Gibbon was no exception, as is evident in the following passage from the &#039;&#039;Decline and Fall&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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In the victorious days of the Roman republic it had been the aim of the senate to confine their councils and legions to a single war, and completely to suppress a first enemy before they provoked the hostilities of a second. These timid maxims of policy were disdained by the magnanimity or enthusiasm of the Arabian caliphs. With the same vigour and success they invaded the successors of Augustus and Artaxerxes; and the rival monarchies at the same instant became the prey of an enemy whom they had so long been accustomed to despise. In the ten years of the administration of Omar, the Saracens reduced to his obedience thirty-six thousand cities or castles, destroyed four thousand churches or temples of the unbelievers, and edified fourteen hundred moschs for the exercise of the religion of Mohammed. One hundred years after his flight from Mecca the arms and reign of his successors extended from India to the Atlantic Ocean, over the various and distant provinces....&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gibbon, &#039;&#039;Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire&#039;&#039;, 6: 289.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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When the term &#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; was not simply a synonym for the Asiatic East as a whole, or taken as generally denoting the distant and exotic, it was most rigorously understood as applying to the Islamic Orient. This &amp;quot;militant&amp;quot; Orient came to stand for what Henri Baudet has called &amp;quot;the Asiatic tidal wave.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Baudet, &#039;&#039;Paradise on Earth&#039;&#039;, p. 4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Certainly this was the case in Europe through the middle of the eighteenth century, the point at which repositories of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; knowledge like d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039; stop meaning primarily Islam, the Arabs, or the Ottomans. Until that time cultural memory gave understandable prominence to such relatively distant events as the fall of Constantinople, the Crusades, and the conquest of Sicily and Spain, but if these signified the menacing Orient they did not at the same time efface what remained of Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
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For there was always India, where, after Portugal pioneered the first bases of European presence in the early sixteenth century, Europe, and primarily England after a long period (from 1600 to 1758) of essentially commercial activity, dominated politically as an occupying force. Yet India itself never provided an indigenous threat to Europe. Rather it was because native authority crumbled there and opened the land to inter-European rivalry and to outright European political control that the Indian Orient could be treated by Europe with such proprietary hauteur--never with the sense of danger reserved for Islam.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Fieldhouse, &#039;&#039;Colonial Empires&#039;&#039;, pp. 138-61.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Nevertheless, between this hauteur and anything like accurate positive knowledge there existed a vast disparity. D&#039;Herbelot&#039;s entries for Indo-Persian subjects in the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; were all based on Islamic sources, and it is true to say that until the early nineteenth century &amp;quot;Oriental languages&amp;quot; was considered a synonym for &amp;quot;Semitic languages.&amp;quot; The Oriental renaissance of which Quinet spoke served the function of expanding some fairly narrow limits, in which Islam was the catchall Oriental example.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;, p. 30.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Sanskrit, Indian religion, and Indian history did not acquire the status of scientific knowledge until after Sir William Jones&#039;s efforts in the late eighteenth century, and even Jones&#039;s interest in India came to him by way of his prior interest in and knowledge of Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not surprising, then, that the first major work of Oriental scholarship after d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; was Simon Ockley&#039;s &#039;&#039;History of the Saracens&#039;&#039;, whose first volume appeared in 1708. A recent historian of Orientalism has opined that Ockley&#039;s attitude towards the Muslims--that to them is owed what was first known of philosophy by European Christians--&amp;quot;shocked painfully&amp;quot; his European audience. For not only did Ockley make this Islamic pre-eminence clear in his work; he also &amp;quot;gave Europe its first authentic and substantial taste of the Arab viewpoint touching the wars with Byzantium and Persia.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. J. Arberry, &#039;&#039;Oriental Essays: Portraits of Seven Scholars&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 30, 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, Ockley was careful to dissociate himself from the infectious influence of Islam, and unlike his colleague William Whiston (Newton&#039;s successor at Cambridge), he always made it clear that Islam was an outrageous heresy. For his Islamic enthusiasm, on the other hand, Whiston was expelled from Cambridge in 1709.&lt;br /&gt;
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Access to Indian (Oriental) riches had always to be made by first crossing the Islamic provinces and by withstanding the dangerous effect of Islam as a system of quasi-Arian belief. And at least for the larger segment of the eighteenth century, Britain and France were successful. The Ottoman Empire had long since settled into a (for Europe) comfortable senescence, to be inscribed in the nineteenth century as the &amp;quot;Eastern Question.&amp;quot; Britain and France fought each other in India between 1744 and 1748 and again between 1756 and 1763, until, in 1769, the British emerged in practical economic and political control of the subcontinent. What was more inevitable than that Napoleon should choose to harass Britain&#039;s Oriental empire by first intercepting its Islamic through-way, Egypt?&lt;br /&gt;
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Although it was almost immediately preceded by at least two major Orientalist projects, Napoleon&#039;s invasion of Egypt in 1798 and his foray into Syria have had by far the greater consequence for the modern history of Orientalism. Before Napoleon only two efforts (both by scholars) had been made to invade the Orient by stripping it of its veils and also by going beyond the comparative shelter of the Biblical Orient. The first was by Abraham-Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731-1805), an eccentric theoretician of egalitarianism, a man who managed in his head to reconcile Jansenism with orthodox Catholicism and Brahmanism, and who traveled to Asia in order to prove the actual primitive existence of a Chosen People and of the Biblical genealogies. Instead he overshot his early goal and traveled as far east as Surat, there to find a cache of Avestan texts, there also to complete his translation of the Avesta. Raymond Schwab has said of the mysterious Avestan fragment that set Anquetil off on his voyages that whereas &amp;quot;the scholars looked at the famous fragment of Oxford and then returned to their studies, Anquetil looked, and then went to India.&amp;quot; Schwab also remarks that Anquetil and Voltaire, though temperamentally and ideologically at hopeless odds with each other, had a similar interest in the Orient and the Bible, &amp;quot;the one to make the Bible more indisputable, the other to make it more unbelievable.&amp;quot; Ironically, Anquetil&#039;s Avesta translations served Voltaire&#039;s purposes, since Anquetil&#039;s discoveries &amp;quot;soon led to criticism of the very [Biblical] texts which had hitherto been considered to be revealed texts.&amp;quot; The net effect of Anquetil&#039;s expedition is well described by Schwab:&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1759, Anquetil finished his translation of the &#039;&#039;Avesta&#039;&#039; at Surat; in 1786 that of the &#039;&#039;Upanishads&#039;&#039; in Paris--he had dug a channel between the hemispheres of human genius, correcting and expanding the old humanism of the Mediterranean basin. Less than fifty years earlier, his compatriots were asked what it was like to be Persian, when he taught them how to compare the monuments of the Persians to those of the Greeks. Before him, one looked for information on the remote past of our planet exclusively among the great Latin, Greek, Jewish, and Arabic writers. The Bible was regarded as a lonely rock, an aerolite. A universe in writing was available, but scarcely anyone seemed to suspect the immensity of those unknown lands. The realization began with his translation of the &#039;&#039;Avesta&#039;&#039;, and reached dizzying heights owing to the exploration in Central Asia of the languages that multiplied after Babel. Into our schools, up to that time limited to the narrow Greco-Latin heritage of the Renaissance [of which much had been transmitted to Europe by Islam], he interjected a vision of innumerable civilizations from ages past, of an infinity of literatures; moreover the few European provinces were not the only places to have left their mark in history.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;Vie d&#039;Anquetil-Duperron suivie des Usages civils et religieux des Perses par Anquetil-Duperron&#039;&#039; (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1934), pp. 10, 96, 4, 6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For the first time, the Orient was revealed to Europe in the materiality of its texts, languages, and civilizations. Also for the first time, Asia acquired a precise intellectual and historical dimension with which to buttress the myths of its geographic distance and vastness. By one of those inevitable contracting compensations for a sudden cultural expansion, Anquetil&#039;s Oriental labors were succeeded by William Jones&#039;s, the second of the pre-Napoleonic projects I mentioned above. Whereas Anquetil opened large vistas, Jones closed them down, codifying, tabulating, comparing. Before he left England for India in 1783, Jones was already a master of Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian. These seemed perhaps the least of his accomplishments: he was also a poet, a jurist, a polyhistor, a classicist, and an indefatigable scholar whose powers would recommend him to such as Benjamin Franklin, Edmund Burke, William Pitt, and Samuel Johnson. In due course he was appointed to &amp;quot;an honorable and profitable place in the Indies,&amp;quot; and immediately upon his arrival there to take up a post with the East India Company began the course of personal study that was to gather in, to rope off, to domesticate the Orient and thereby turn it into a province of European learning. For his personal work, entitled &amp;quot;Objects of Enquiry During My Residence in Asia&amp;quot; he enumerated among the topics of his investigation &amp;quot;the Laws of the Hindus and Mohammedans, Modern Politics and Geography of Hindustan, Best Mode of Governing Bengal, Arithmetic and Geometry, and Mixed Sciences of the Asiaticks, Medicine, Chemistry, Surgery, and Anatomy of the Indians, Natural Productions of India, Poetry, Rhetoric and Morality of Asia, Music of the Eastern Nations, Trade, Manufacture, Agriculture, and Commerce of India,&amp;quot; and so forth. On August 17, 1787, he wrote unassumingly to Lord Althorp that &amp;quot;it is my ambition to know &#039;&#039;India&#039;&#039; better than any other European ever knew it.&amp;quot; Here is where Balfour in 1910 could find the first adumbration of his claim as an Englishman to know the Orient more and better than anyone else.&lt;br /&gt;
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Jones&#039;s official work was the law, an occupation with symbolic significance for the history of Orientalism. Seven years before Jones arrived in India, Warren Hastings had decided that Indians were to be ruled by their own laws, a more enterprising project than it appears at first glance since the Sanskrit code of laws existed then for practical use only in a Persian translation, and no Englishman at the time knew Sanskrit well enough to consult the original texts. A company official, Charles Wilkins, first mastered Sanskrit, then began to translate the &#039;&#039;Institutes&#039;&#039; of Manu; in this labor he was soon to be assisted by Jones. (Wilkins, incidentally, was the first translator of the Bhagavad-Gita.) In January 1784 Jones convened the inaugural meeting of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, which was to be for India what the Royal &#039;&#039;Society&#039;&#039; was for England. As first president of the society and as magistrate, Jones acquired the effective knowledge of the Orient and of Orientals that was later to make him the undisputed founder (the phrase is A. J. Arberry&#039;s) of Orientalism. To rule and to learn, then to compare Orient with Occident: these were Jones&#039;s goals, which, with an irresistible impulse always to codify, to subdue the infinite variety of the Orient to &amp;quot;a complete digest&amp;quot; of laws, figures, customs, and works, he is believed to have achieved. His most famous pronouncement indicates the extent to which modern Orientalism, even in its philosophical beginnings, was a comparative discipline having for its principal goal the grounding of the European languages in a distant, and harmless, Oriental source:&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;Sanscrit&#039;&#039; language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the &#039;&#039;Greek&#039;&#039;, more copious than the &#039;&#039;Latin&#039;&#039;, and more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three without believing them to have sprung from some common source.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Arberry, &#039;&#039;Oriental Essays&#039;&#039;, pp. 62-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Many of the early English Orientalists in India were, like Jones, legal scholars, or else, interestingly enough, they were medical men with strong missionary leanings. So far as one can tell, most of them were imbued with the dual purpose of investigating &amp;quot;the sciences and the arts of Asia, with the hope of facilitating ameliorations there and of advancing knowledge and improving the arts at home&amp;quot;:&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Frederick Eden Pargiter, ed., &#039;&#039;Centenary Volume of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 1823-1923&#039;&#039; (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), p. viii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; so the common Orientalist goal was stated in the &#039;&#039;Centenary Volume&#039;&#039; of the Royal Asiatic Society founded in 1823 by Henry Thomas Colebrooke. In their dealings with the modern Orientals, the early professional Orientalists like Jones had only two roles to fulfill, yet we cannot today fault them for strictures placed on their humanity by the official &#039;&#039;Occidental&#039;&#039; character of their presence in the Orient. They were either judges or they were doctors. Even Edgar Quinet, writing more metaphysically than realistically, was dimly aware of this therapeutic relationship. &amp;quot;L&#039;Asie a les prophetes,&amp;quot; he said in &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions&#039;&#039;; &amp;quot;L&#039;Europe a les docteurs.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions&#039;&#039;, p. 47.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Proper knowledge of the Orient proceeded from a thorough study of the classical texts, and only after that to an application of those texts to the modern Orient. Faced with the obvious decrepitude and political impotence of the modern Oriental, the European Orientalist found it his duty to rescue some portion of a lost, past classical Oriental grandeur in order to &amp;quot;facilitate ameliorations&amp;quot; in the present Orient. What the European took from the classical Oriental past was a vision (and thousands of facts and artifacts) which only he could employ to the best advantage; to the modern Oriental he gave facilitation and amelioration--and, too, the benefit of his judgment as to what was best for the modern Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was characteristic of all Orientalist projects before Napoleon&#039;s that very little could be done in advance of the project to prepare for its success. Anquetil and Jones, for example, learned what they did about the Orient only after they got there. They were confronting, as it were, the whole Orient, and only after a while and after considerable improvising could they whittle it down to a smaller province. Napoleon, on the other hand, wanted nothing less than to take the whole of Egypt, and his advance preparations were of unparalleled magnitude and thoroughness. Even so, these preparations were almost fanatically schematic and--if I may use the word--textual, which are features that will bear some analysis here. Three things above all else seem to have been in Napoleon&#039;s mind as he readied himself while in Italy in 1797 for his next military move. First, aside from the still threatening power of England, his military successes that had culminated in the Treaty of Campo Formio left him no other place to turn for additional glory than the East. Moreover, Talleyrand had recently animadverted on &amp;quot;les avantages a retirer de colonies nouvelles dans les circonstances presentes,&amp;quot; and this notion, along with the appealing prospect of hurting Britain, drew him eastwards. Secondly, Napoleon had been attracted to the Orient since his adolescence; his youthful manuscripts, for example, contain a summary he made of Marigny&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire des Arabes&#039;&#039;, and it is evident from all of his writing and conversation that he was steeped, as Jean Thiry has put it, in the memories and glories that were attached to Alexander&#039;s Orient generally and to Egypt in particular.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Jean Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte decembre 1797-24 aout 1799&#039;&#039; (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1973), p. 9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus the idea of reconquering Egypt as a new Alexander proposed itself to him, allied with the additional benefit of acquiring a new Islamic colony at England&#039;s expense. Thirdly, Napoleon considered Egypt a likely project precisely because he knew it tactically, strategically, historically, and--not to be underestimated--textually, that is, as something one read about and knew through the writings of recent as well as classical European authorities. The point in all this is that for Napoleon Egypt was a project that acquired reality in his mind, and later in his preparations for its conquest, through experiences that belong to the realm of ideas and myths culled from texts, not empirical reality. His plans for Egypt therefore became the first in a long series of European encounters with the Orient in which the Orientalist&#039;s special expertise was put directly to functional colonial use; for at the crucial instant when an Orientalist had to decide whether his loyalties and sympathies lay with the Orient or with the conquering West, he always chose the latter, from Napoleon&#039;s time on. As for the emperor himself, he saw the Orient only as it had been encoded first by classical texts and then by Orientalist experts, whose vision, based on classical texts, seemed a useful substitute for any actual encounter with the real Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Napoleon&#039;s enlistment of several dozen &amp;quot;savants&amp;quot; for his Egyptian Expedition is too well known to require detail here. His idea was to build a sort of living archive for the expedition, in the form of studies conducted on all topics by the members of the Institut d&#039;Egypte, which he founded. What is perhaps less well known is Napoleon&#039;s prior reliance upon the work of the Comte de Volney, a French traveler whose &#039;&#039;Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie&#039;&#039; appeared in two volumes in 1787. Aside from a short personal preface informing the reader that the sudden acquisition of some money (his inheritance) made it possible for him to take the trip east in 1783, Volney&#039;s &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; is an almost oppressively impersonal document. Volney evidently saw himself as a scientist, whose job it was always to record the &amp;quot;etat&amp;quot; of something he saw. The climax of the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; occurs in the second volume, an account of Islam as a religion.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Constantin-Francois Volney, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Bossange, 1821), 2: 241 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Volney&#039;s views were canonically hostile to Islam as a religion and as a system of political institutions; nevertheless Napoleon found this work and Volney&#039;s &#039;&#039;Considerations sur la guerre actuel de Turcs&#039;&#039; (1788) of particular importance. For Volney after all was a canny Frenchman, and--like Chateaubriand and Lamartine a quarter-century after him--he eyed the Near Orient as a likely place for the realization of French colonial ambition. What Napoleon profited from in Volney was the enumeration, in ascending order of difficulty, of the obstacles to be faced in the Orient by any French expeditionary force.&lt;br /&gt;
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Napoleon refers explicitly to Volney in his reflections on the Egyptian expedition, the &#039;&#039;Campagnes d&#039;Egypte et de Syrie&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1798-1799&#039;&#039;, which he dictated to General Bertrand on Saint Helena. Volney, he said, considered that there were three barriers to French hegemony in the Orient and that any French force would therefore have to fight three wars: one against England, a second against the Ottoman Porte, and a third, the most difficult, against the Muslims.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Napoleon, &#039;&#039;Campagnes d&#039;Egypte et de Syrie, 1798-1799: Memoires pour servir a l&#039;histoire de Napoleon&#039;&#039; (Paris: Comou, 1843), 1: 211.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Volney&#039;s assessment was both shrewd and hard to fault since it was clear to Napoleon, as it would be to anyone who read Volney, that his &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Considerations&#039;&#039; were effective texts to be used by any European wishing to win in the Orient. In other words, Volney&#039;s work constituted a handbook for attenuating the human shock a European might feel as he directly experienced the Orient: Read the books, seems to have been Volney&#039;s thesis, and far from being disoriented by the Orient, you will compel it to you.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Napoleon took Volney almost literally, but in a characteristically subtle way. From the first moment that the Armee d&#039;Egypte appeared on the Egyptian horizon, every effort was made to convince the Muslims that &amp;quot;nous sommes les vrais musulmans,&amp;quot; as Bonaparte&#039;s proclamation of July 2, 1798, put it to the people of Alexandria.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 126. See also Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, &#039;&#039;Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 12-20.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Equipped with a team of Orientalists (and sitting on board a flagship called the &#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039;), Napoleon used Egyptian enmity towards the Mamelukes and appeals to the revolutionary idea of equal opportunity for all to wage a uniquely benign and selective war against Islam. What more than anything impressed the first Arab chronicler of the expedition, Abd-al-Rahman al-Jabarti, was Napoleon&#039;s use of scholars to manage his contacts with the natives--that and the impact of watching a modern European intellectual establishment at close quarters.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Abu-Lughod, &#039;&#039;Arab Rediscovery of Europe&#039;&#039;, p. 22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Napoleon tried everywhere to prove that he was fighting &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; Islam; everything he said was translated into Koranic Arabic, just as the French army was urged by its command always to remember the Islamic sensibility. (Compare, in this regard, Napoleon&#039;s tactics in Egypt with the tactics of the &#039;&#039;Requerimiento&#039;&#039;, a document drawn up in 1513--in Spanish--by the Spaniards to be read aloud to the Indians: &amp;quot;We shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as such sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses [the King and Queen of Spain] may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do you all the mischief and damage that we can, as to vassals who do not obey,&amp;quot; etc. etc.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quoted from Arthur Helps, &#039;&#039;The Spanish Conquest of America&#039;&#039; (London, 1900), p. 196, by Stephen J. Greenblatt, &amp;quot;Learning to Curse: Aspects of Linguistic Colonialism in the Sixteenth Century,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;First Images of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old&#039;&#039;, ed. Fredi Chiapelli (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 573.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) When it seemed obvious to Napoleon that his force was too small to impose itself on the Egyptians, he then tried to make the local imams, cadis, muftis, and ulemas interpret the Koran in favor of the Grande Armee. To this end, the sixty ulemas who taught at the Azhar were invited to his quarters, given full military honors, and then allowed to be flattered by Napoleon&#039;s admiration for Islam and Mohammed and by his obvious veneration for the Koran, with which he seemed perfectly familiar. This worked, and soon the population of Cairo seemed to have lost its distrust of the occupiers.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 200. Napoleon was not just being cynical. It is reported of him that he discussed Voltaire&#039;s &#039;&#039;Mahomet&#039;&#039; with Goethe, and defended Islam. See Christian Cherfils, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte et l&#039;Islam d&#039;apres les documents francais arabes&#039;&#039; (Paris: A. Pedone, 1914), p. 249 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Napoleon later gave his deputy Kleber strict instructions after he left always to administer Egypt through the Orientalists and the religious Islamic leaders whom they could win over; any other politics was too expensive and foolish.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 434.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hugo thought that he grasped the tactful glory of Napoleon&#039;s Oriental expedition in his poem &amp;quot;Lui&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Au Nil je le retrouve encore.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
L&#039;Egypte resplendit des feux de son aurore;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Son astre imperial se leve a l&#039;orient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Vainqueur, enthousiaste, eclatant de prestiges,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prodige, il etonna la terre des prodiges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Les vieux scheiks veneraient l&#039;emir jeune et prudent;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Le peuple redoutait ses armes inouies;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sublime, il apparut aux tribus eblouies&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comme un Mahomet d&#039;occident.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hugo, &#039;&#039;Les Orientales, in Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, 1: 684.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(By the Nile, I find him once again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Egypt shines with the fires of his dawn;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His imperial orb rises in the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Victor, enthusiast, bursting with achievements,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prodigious, he stunned the land of prodigies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The old sheikhs venerated the young and prudent emir.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The people dreaded his unprecedented arms;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sublime, he appeared to the dazzled tribes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like a Mahomet of the Occident.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a triumph could only have been prepared &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; a military expedition, perhaps only by someone who had no prior experience of the Orient except what books and scholars told him. The idea of taking along a full-scale academy is very much an aspect of this textual attitude to the Orient. And this attitude in turn was bolstered by specific Revolutionary decrees (particularly the one of 10 Germinal An III--March 30, 1793--establishing an &#039;&#039;ecole publique&#039;&#039; in the Bibliotheque nationale to teach Arabic, Turkish, and Persian)&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Henri Deherain, &#039;&#039;Silvestre de Sacy, ses contemporains et ses disciples&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1938), p. v.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; whose object was the rationalist one of dispelling mystery and institutionalizing even the most recondite knowledge. Thus many of Napoleon&#039;s Orientalist translators were students of Sylvestre de Sacy, who, beginning in June 1796, was the first and only teacher of Arabic at the Ecole publique des langues orientales. Sacy later became the teacher of nearly every major Orientalist in Europe, where his students dominated the field for about three-quarters of a century. Many of them were politically useful, in the ways that several had been to Napoleon in Egypt.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But dealings with the Muslims were only a part of Napoleon&#039;s project to dominate Egypt. The other part was to render it completely open, to make it totally accessible to European scrutiny. From being a land of obscurity and a part of the Orient hitherto known at second hand through the exploits of earlier travelers, scholars, and conquerors, Egypt was to become a department of French learning. Here too the textual and schematic attitudes are evident. The Institut, with its teams of chemists, historians, biologists, archaeologists, surgeons, and antiquarians, was the learned division of the army. Its job was no less aggressive: to put Egypt into modern French; and unlike the Abbe Le Mascrier&#039;s 1735 &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, Napoleon&#039;s was to be a universal undertaking. Almost from the first moments of the occupation Napoleon saw to it that the Institut began its meetings, its experiments--its fact-finding mission, as we would call it today. Most important, everything said, seen, and studied was to be recorded, and indeed was recorded in that great collective appropriation of one country by another, the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, published in twenty-three enormous volumes between 1809 and 1828.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte, ou Recueil des observations et des recherches qui ont ete faites in Egypte pendant l&#039;expedition de l&#039;armee francaise, publie par les ordres de sa majeste l&#039;empereur Napoleon le grand&#039;&#039;, 23 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie imperiale, 1809-28).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Description&#039;s&#039;&#039; uniqueness is not only in its size, or even in the intelligence of its contributors, but in its attitude to its subject matter, and it is this attitude that makes it of great interest for the study of modern Orientalist projects. The first few pages of its &#039;&#039;preface historique&#039;&#039;, written by Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, the Institut&#039;s secretary, make it clear that in &amp;quot;doing&amp;quot; Egypt the scholars were also grappling directly with a kind of unadulterated cultural, geographical, and historical significance. Egypt was the focal point of the relationships between Africa and Asia, between Europe and the East, between memory and actuality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Placed between Africa and Asia, and communicating easily with Europe, Egypt occupies the center of the ancient continent. This country presents only great memories; it is the homeland of the arts and conserves innumerable monuments; its principal temples and the palaces inhabited by its kings still exist, even though its least ancient edifices had already been built by the time of the Trojan War. Homer, Lycurgus, Solon, Pythagoras, and Plato all went to Egypt to study the sciences, religion, and the laws. Alexander founded an opulent city there, which for a long time enjoyed commercial supremacy and which witnessed Pompey, Caesar, Mark Antony, and Augustus deciding between them the fate of Rome and that of the entire world. It is therefore proper for this country to attract the attention of illustrious princes who rule the destiny of nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No considerable power was ever amassed by any nation, whether in the West or in Asia, that did not also turn that nation toward Egypt, which was regarded in some measure as its natural lot.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Fourier, &#039;&#039;Preface historique&#039;&#039;, vol. 1 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Egypt was saturated with meaning for the arts, sciences, and government, its role was to be the stage on which actions of a world-historical importance would take place. By taking Egypt, then, a modern power would naturally demonstrate its strength and justify history; Egypt&#039;s own destiny was to be annexed, to Europe preferably. In addition, this power would also enter a history whose common element was defined by figures no less great than Homer, Alexander, Caesar, Plato, Solon, and Pythagoras, who graced the Orient with their prior presence there. The Orient, in short, existed as a set of values attached, not to its modern realities, but to a series of valorized contacts it had had with a distant European past. This is a pure example of the textual, schematic attitude I have been referring to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fourier continues similarly for over a hundred pages (each page, incidentally, is a square meter in size, as if the project and the size of the page had been thought of as possessing comparable scale). Out of the free-floating past, however, he must justify the Napoleonic expedition as something that needed to be undertaken when it happened. The dramatic perspective is never abandoned. Conscious of his European audience and of the Oriental figures he was manipulating, he writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One remembers the impression made on the whole of Europe by the astounding news that the French were in the Orient.... This great project was meditated in silence, and was prepared with such activity and secrecy that the worried vigilance of our enemies was deceived; only at the moment that it happened did they learn that it had been conceived, undertaken, and carried out successfully....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So dramatic a &#039;&#039;coup de theatre&#039;&#039; had its advantages for the Orient as well:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This country, which has transmitted its knowledge to so many nations, is today plunged into barbarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only a hero could bring all these factors together, which is what Fourier now describes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Napoleon appreciated the influence that this event would have on the relations between Europe, the Orient, and Africa, on Mediterranean shipping, and on Asia&#039;s destiny.... Napoleon wanted to offer a useful European example to the Orient, and finally also to make the inhabitants&#039; lives more pleasant, as well as to procure for them all the advantages of a perfected civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
None of this would be possible without a continuous application to the project of the arts and sciences.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. iii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To restore a region from its present barbarism to its former classical greatness; to instruct (for its own benefit) the Orient in the ways of the modern West; to subordinate or underplay military power in order to aggrandize the project of glorious knowledge acquired in the process of political domination of the Orient; to formulate the Orient, to give it shape, identity, definition with full recognition of its place in memory, its importance to imperial strategy, and its &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; role as an appendage to Europe; to dignify all the knowledge collected during colonial occupation with the title &amp;quot;contribution to modern learning&amp;quot; when the natives had neither been consulted nor treated as anything except as pretexts for a text whose usefulness was not to the natives; to feel oneself as a European in command, almost at will, of Oriental history, time, and geography; to institute new areas of specialization; to establish new disciplines; to divide, deploy, schematize, tabulate, index, and record everything in sight (and out of sight); to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law about the Oriental nature, temperament, mentality, custom, or type; and, above all, to transmute living reality into the stuff of texts, to possess (or think one possesses) actuality mainly because nothing in the Orient seems to resist one&#039;s powers: these are the features of Orientalist projection entirely realized in the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, itself enabled and reinforced by Napoleon&#039;s wholly Orientalist engulfment of Egypt by the instruments of Western knowledge and power. Thus Fourier concludes his preface by announcing that history will remember how &amp;quot;Egypte fut le theatre de sa [Napoleon&#039;s] gloire, et preserve de l&#039;oubli toutes les circonstances de cet evenement extraordinaire.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. xcii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; thereby displaces Egyptian or Oriental history as a history possessing its own coherence, identity, and sense. Instead, history as recorded in the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; supplants Egyptian or Oriental history by identifying itself directly and immediately with world history, a euphemism for European history. To save an event from oblivion is in the Orientalist&#039;s mind the equivalent of turning the Orient into a theater for his representations of the Orient: this is almost exactly what Fourier says. Moreover, the sheer power of having described the Orient in modern Occidental terms lifts the Orient from the realms of silent obscurity where it has lain neglected (except for the inchoate murmurings of a vast but undefined sense of its own past) into the clarity of modern European science. There this new Orient figures as--for instance, in Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire&#039;s biological theses in the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039;--the confirmation of laws of zoological specialization formulated by Buffon.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, &#039;&#039;Histoire naturelle des poissons du Nil&#039;&#039;, vol. 17 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Or it serves as a &amp;quot;contraste frappante avec les habitudes des nations Europeennes,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. de Chabrol, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs des habitants modernes de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, vol. 14 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 376.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in which the &amp;quot;bizarre jouissances&amp;quot; of Orientals serve to highlight the sobriety and rationality of Occidental habits. Or, to cite one more use for the Orient, equivalents of those Oriental physiological characteristics that made possible the successful embalming of bodies are sought for in European bodies, so that chevaliers fallen on the field of honor can be preserved as lifelike relics of Napoleon&#039;s great Oriental campaign.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;This is evident in Baron Larrey, &#039;&#039;Notice sur la conformation physique des egyptiens et des differentes races qui habitent en Egypte, suivie de quelques reflexions sur l&#039;embaumement des momies&#039;&#039;, vol. 13 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the military failure of Napoleon&#039;s occupation of Egypt did not also destroy the fertility of its over-all projection for Egypt or the rest of the Orient. Quite literally, the occupation gave birth to the entire modern experience of the Orient as interpreted from within the universe of discourse founded by Napoleon in Egypt, whose agencies of domination and dissemination included the Institut and the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039;. The idea, as it has been characterized by Charles-Roux, was that Egypt &amp;quot;restored to prosperity, regenerated by wise and enlightened administration ... would shed its civilizing rays upon all its Oriental neighbors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited by John Marlowe, &#039;&#039;The Making of the Suez Canal&#039;&#039; (London: Cresset Press, 1964), p. 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; True, the other European powers would seek to compete in this mission, none more than England. But what would happen as a continuing legacy of the common Occidental mission to the Orient--despite inter-European squabbling, indecent competition, or outright war--would be the creation of new projects, new visions, new enterprises combining additional parts of the old Orient with the conquering European spirit. After Napoleon, then, the very language of Orientalism changed radically. Its descriptive realism was upgraded and became not merely a style of representation but a language, indeed a means of &#039;&#039;creation&#039;&#039;. Along with the &#039;&#039;langues meres&#039;&#039;, as those forgotten dormant sources for the modern European demotics were entitled by Antoine Fabre d&#039;Olivet, the Orient was reconstructed, reassembled, crafted, in short, &#039;&#039;born&#039;&#039; out of the Orientalists&#039; efforts. The &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; became the master type of all further efforts to bring the Orient closer to Europe, thereafter to absorb it entirely and--centrally important--to cancel, or at least subdue and reduce, its strangeness and, in the case of Islam, its hostility. For the Islamic Orient would henceforth appear as a category denoting the Orientalists&#039; power and not the Islamic people as humans nor their history as history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus out of the Napoleonic expedition there issued a whole series of textual children, from Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039; to Lamartine&#039;s &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; to Flaubert&#039;s &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, and in the same tradition, Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; and Richard Burton&#039;s &#039;&#039;Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039;. What binds them together is not only their common background in Oriental legend and experience but also their learned reliance on the Orient as a kind of womb out of which they were brought forth. If paradoxically these creations turned out to be highly stylized simulacra, elaborately wrought imitations of what a live Orient might be thought to look like, that by no means detracts either from the strength of their imaginative conception or from the strength of European mastery of the Orient, whose prototypes respectively were Cagliostro, the great European impersonator of the Orient, and Napoleon, its first modern conqueror.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Artistic or textual work was not the only product of the Napoleonic expedition. There were, in addition and certainly more influential, the scientific project, whose chief instance is Ernest Renan&#039;s &#039;&#039;Systeme compare et histoire generale des langues semitiques&#039;&#039;, completed in 1848 for--neatly enough--the Prix Volney, and the geopolitical project, of which Ferdinand de Lesseps&#039;s Suez Canal and England&#039;s occupation of Egypt in 1882 are prime instances. The difference between the two is not only in manifest scale but also in quality of Orientalist conviction. Renan truly believed that he had re-created the Orient, as it really was, in his work. De Lesseps, on the other hand, always was somewhat awed by the newness his project had released out of the old Orient, and this sense communicated itself to everyone for whom the opening of the canal in 1869 was no ordinary event. In his &#039;&#039;Excursionist and Tourist Advertiser&#039;&#039; for July 1, 1869, Thomas Cook&#039;s enthusiasm carries on de Lesseps&#039;s:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On November the 17th, the greatest engineering feat of the present century is to have its success celebrated by a magnificent inauguration fete, at which nearly every European royal family will have its special representative. Truly the occasion will be an exceptional one. The formation of a line of water communication between Europe and the East, has been the thought of centuries, occupying in turn the minds of Greeks, Roman, Saxon and Gaul, but it was not until within the last few years that modern civilization began seriously to set about emulating the labours of the ancient Pharaohs, who, many centuries since, constructed a canal between the two seas, traces of which remain to this day.... Everything connected with [the modern] works are on the most gigantic scale, and a perusal of a little pamphlet, descriptive of the undertaking, from the pen of the Chevalier de St. Stoess, impresses us most forcibly with the genius of the great Master-mind--M. Ferdinand de Lesseps--to whose perseverance, calm daring and foresight, the dream of ages has at last become a real and tangible fact ... the project for bringing more closely together the countries of the West and the East, and thus uniting the civilizations of different epochs.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quoted in John Pudney, &#039;&#039;Suez: De Lesseps&#039; Canal&#039;&#039; (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 141-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The combination of old ideas with new methods, the bringing together of cultures whose relations to the nineteenth century were different, the genuine imposition of the power of modern technology and intellectual will upon formerly stable and divided geographical entities like East and West: this is what Cook perceives and what, in his journals, speeches, prospectuses, and letters, de Lesseps advertises.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Genealogically, Ferdinand&#039;s start was auspicious. Mathieu de Lesseps, his father, had come to Egypt with Napoleon and remained there (as &amp;quot;unofficial French representative,&amp;quot; Marlowe says&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Marlowe, &#039;&#039;Making of the Suez Canal&#039;&#039;, p. 62.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) for four years after the French evacuated it in 1801. Many of Ferdinand&#039;s later writings refer back to Napoleon&#039;s own interest in digging a canal, which, because he had been misinformed by experts, he never thought was a realizable goal. Infected by the erratic history of canal projects that included French schemes entertained by Richelieu and the Saint-Simonians, de Lesseps returned to Egypt in 1854, there to embark on the undertaking that was eventually completed fifteen years later. He had no real engineering background. Only a tremendous faith in his near-divine skills as builder, mover, and creator kept him going; as his diplomatic and financial talents gained him Egyptian and European support, he seems to have acquired the necessary knowledge to carry matters to completion. More useful, perhaps, he learned how to plant his potential contributors in the world-historical theater and make them see what his &amp;quot;pensee morale,&amp;quot; as he called his project, really meant. &amp;quot;Vous envisagez,&amp;quot; he told them in 1860, &amp;quot;les immenses services que le rapprochement de l&#039;occident et de l&#039;orient doit rendre a la civilization et au developpement de la richesse generale. Le monde attend de vous un grand progres et vous voulez repondre a l&#039;attente du monde.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ferdinand de Lesseps, &#039;&#039;Lettres, journal et documents pour servir a l&#039;histoire du Canal de Suez&#039;&#039; (Paris: Didier, 1881), 5: 310. For an apt characterization of de Lesseps and Cecil Rhodes as mystics, see Baudet, &#039;&#039;Paradise on Earth&#039;&#039;, p. 68.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In accordance with such notions the name of the investment company formed by de Lesseps in 1858 was a charged one and reflected the grandiose plans he cherished: the Compagnie universelle. In 1862 the Academie francaise offered a prize for an epic on the canal. Bornier, the winner, delivered himself of such hyperbole as the following, none of it fundamentally contradicting de Lesseps&#039;s picture of what he was up to:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Au travail! Ouvriers que notre France envoie,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tracez, pour l&#039;univers, cette nouvelle voie!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Vos peres, les heros, sont venus jusqu&#039;ici;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soyez ferme comme aux intrepides,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comme eux vous combattez aux pieds des pyramides,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Et leurs quatre mille ans vous contemplent aussi!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Oui, c&#039;est pour l&#039;univers! Pour l&#039;Asie et l&#039;Europe,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pour ces climats lointain que la nuit enveloppe,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pour le Chinois perfide et l&#039;Indien demi-nu;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pour les peuples heureux, libres, humains et braves,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pour les peuples mechants, pour les peuples esclaves,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pour ceux a qui le Christ est encore inconnu.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited in Charles Beatty, &#039;&#039;De Lesseps of Suez: The Man and His Times&#039;&#039; (New York: Harper &amp;amp; Brothers, 1956), p. 220.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Lesseps was nowhere more eloquent and resourceful than when he was called upon to justify the enormous expense in money and men the canal would require. He could pour out statistics to enchant any ear; he would quote Herodotus and maritime statistics with equal fluency. In his journal entries for 1864 he cited with approbation Casimir Leconte&#039;s observation that an eccentric life would develop significant originality in men, and from originality would come great and unusual exploits.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;De Lesseps, &#039;&#039;Lettres, journal et documents&#039;&#039;, 5: 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Such exploits were their own justification. Despite its immemorial pedigree of failures, its outrageous cost, its astounding ambitions for altering the way Europe would handle the Orient, the canal was worth the effort. It was a project uniquely able to override the objections of those who were consulted and, in improving the Orient as a whole, to do what scheming Egyptians, perfidious Chinese, and half-naked Indians could never have done for themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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The opening ceremonies in November 1869 were an occasion which, no less than the whole history of de Lesseps&#039;s machinations, perfectly embodied his ideas. For years his speeches, letters, and pamphlets were laden with a vividly energetic and theatrical vocabulary. In the pursuit of success, he could be found saying of himself (always in the first person plural), we created, fought, disposed, achieved, acted, recognized, persevered, advanced; nothing, he repeated on many occasions, could stop us, nothing was impossible, nothing mattered finally except the realization of &amp;quot;le resultat final, le grand but,&amp;quot; which he had conceived, defined, and finally executed. As the papal envoy to the ceremonies spoke on November 16 to the assembled dignitaries, his speech strove desperately to match the intellectual and imaginative spectacle offered by de Lesseps&#039;s canal:&lt;br /&gt;
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Il est permis d&#039;affirmer que l&#039;heure qui vient de sonner est non seulement une des plus solennelles de ce siecle, mais encore une des plus grandes et des plus decisives qu&#039;ait vues l&#039;humanite, depuis qu&#039;elle a une histoire ci-bas. Ce lieu, ou confinent--sans desormais y toucher--l&#039;Afrique et l&#039;Asie, cette grande fete du genre humain, cette assistance auguste et cosmopolite, toutes les races du globe, tous les drapeaux, tous les pavillions, flottant joyeusement sous ce ciel radieux et immense, la croix debout et respectee de tous en face du croissant, que de merveilles, que de contrastes saississants, que de reves reputes chimeriques devenus de palpables realites! et, dans cet assemblage de tant de prodiges, que de sujets de reflexions pour le penseur, que de joies dans l&#039;heure presente et, dans les perspectives de l&#039;avenir, que de glorieuses esperances!...&lt;br /&gt;
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Les deux extremites du globe se rapprochent; en se rapprochant, elles se reconnaissent; en se reconnaissant, tous les hommes, enfants d&#039;un seul et meme Dieu, eprouvent le tressaillement joyeux de leur mutuelle fraternite! O Occident! O Orient! rapprochez, regardez, reconnaissez, saluez, etreignez-vous!...&lt;br /&gt;
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Mais derriere le phenomene materiel, le regard du penseur decouvre des horizons plus vastes que les espaces mesurables, les horizons sans bornes ou mouvent les plus hautes destinees, les plus glorieuses conquetes, les plus immortelles certitudes du genre humain....&lt;br /&gt;
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[Dieu] que votre souffle divin plane sur ces eaux! Qu&#039;il y passe et repasse, de l&#039;Occident a l&#039;Orient, de l&#039;Orient a l&#039;Occident! O Dieu! Servez vous de cette voie pour rapprocher les hommes les uns des autres!&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 324-33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The whole world seemed crowded in to render homage to a scheme that God could only bless and make use of himself. Old distinctions and inhibitions were dissolved: the Cross faced down the Crescent, the West had come to the Orient never to leave it (until, in July 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser would activate Egypt&#039;s taking over of the canal by pronouncing the name of de Lesseps).&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Suez Canal idea we see the logical conclusion of Orientalist thought and, more interesting, of Orientalist effort. To the West, Asia had once represented silent distance and alienation; Islam was militant hostility to European Christianity. To overcome such redoubtable constants the Orient needed first to be known, then invaded and possessed, then re-created by scholars, soldiers, and judges who disinterred forgotten languages, histories, races, and cultures in order to posit them--beyond the modern Oriental&#039;s ken--as the true classical Orient that could be used to judge and rule the modern Orient. The obscurity faded to be replaced by hothouse entities; the Orient was a scholar&#039;s word, signifying what modern Europe had recently made of the still peculiar East. De Lesseps and his canal finally destroyed the Orient&#039;s distance, its cloistered intimacy &#039;&#039;away&#039;&#039; from the West, its perdurable exoticism. Just as a land barrier could be transmuted into a liquid artery, so too the Orient was transubstantiated from resistant hostility into obliging, and submissive, partnership. After de Lesseps no one could speak of the Orient as belonging to another world, strictly speaking. There was only &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world, &amp;quot;one&amp;quot; world bound together because the Suez Canal had frustrated those last provincials who still believed in the difference between worlds. Thereafter the notion of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; is an administrative or executive one, and it is subordinate to demographic, economic, and sociological factors. For imperialists like Balfour, or for anti-imperialists like J. A. Hobson, the Oriental, like the African, is a member of a subject race and not exclusively an inhabitant of a geographical area. De Lesseps had melted away the Orient&#039;s geographical identity by (almost literally) dragging the Orient into the West and finally dispelling the threat of Islam. New categories and experiences, including the imperialist ones, would emerge, and in time Orientalism would adapt itself to them, but not without some difficulty.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;IV.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Crisis&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
It may appear strange to speak about something or someone as holding a &#039;&#039;textual&#039;&#039; attitude, but a student of literature will understand the phrase more easily if he will recall the kind of view attacked by Voltaire in &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039;, or even the attitude to reality satirized by Cervantes in &#039;&#039;Don Quixote&#039;&#039;. What seems unexceptionable good sense to these writers is that it is a fallacy to assume that the swarming, unpredictable, and problematic mess in which human beings live can be understood on the basis of what books--texts--say; to apply what one learns out of a book literally to reality is to risk folly or ruin. One would no more think of using &#039;&#039;Amadis of Gaul&#039;&#039; to understand sixteenth-century (or present-day) Spain than one would use the Bible to understand, say, the House of Commons. But clearly people have tried and do try to use texts in so simple-minded a way, for otherwise &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Don Quixote&#039;&#039; would not still have the appeal for readers that they do today. It seems a common human failing to prefer the schematic authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with the human. But is this failing constantly present, or are there circumstances that, more than others, make the textual attitude likely to prevail?&lt;br /&gt;
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Two situations favor a textual attitude. One is when a human being confronts at close quarters something relatively unknown and threatening and previously distant. In such a case one has recourse not only to what in one&#039;s previous experience the novelty resembles but also to what one has read about it. Travel books or guidebooks are about as &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; a kind of text, as logical in their composition and in their use, as any book one can think of, precisely because of this human tendency to fall back on a text when the uncertainties of travel in strange parts seem to threaten one&#039;s equanimity. Many travelers find themselves saying of an experience in a new country that it wasn&#039;t what they expected, meaning that it wasn&#039;t what a book said it would be. And of course many writers of travel books or guidebooks compose them in order to say that a country &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; like this, or better, that it &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; colorful, expensive, interesting, and so forth. The idea in either case is that people, places, and experiences can always be described by a book, so much so that the book (or text) acquires a greater authority, and use, even than the actuality it describes. The comedy of Fabrice del Dongo&#039;s search for the battle of Waterloo is not so much that he fails to find the battle, but that he looks for it as something texts have told him about.&lt;br /&gt;
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A second situation favoring the textual attitude is the appearance of success. If one reads a book claiming that lions are fierce and then encounters a fierce lion (I simplify, of course), the chances are that one will be encouraged to read more books by that same author, and believe them. But if, in addition, the lion book instructs one how to deal with a fierce lion, and the instructions work perfectly, then not only will the author be greatly believed, he will also be impelled to try his hand at other kinds of written performance. There is a rather complex dialectic of reinforcement by which the experiences of readers in reality are determined by what they have read, and this in turn influences writers to take up subjects defined in advance by readers&#039; experiences. A book on how to handle a fierce lion might then cause a series of books to be produced on such subjects as the fierceness of lions, the origins of fierceness, and so forth. Similarly, as the focus of the text centers more narrowly on the subject--no longer lions but their fierceness--we might expect that the ways by which it is recommended that a lion&#039;s fierceness be handled will actually &#039;&#039;increase&#039;&#039; its fierceness, force it to be fierce since that is what it is and that is what in essence we know or can &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; know about it.&lt;br /&gt;
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A text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual, and arising out of circumstances similar to the ones I have just described, is not easily dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of academics, institutions, and governments can accrue to it, surrounding it with still greater prestige than its practical successes warrant. Most important, such texts can &#039;&#039;create&#039;&#039; not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it. This kind of text is composed out of those pre-existing units of information deposited by Flaubert in the catalogue of &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the light of all this, consider Napoleon and de Lesseps. Everything they knew, more or less, about the Orient came from books written in the tradition of Orientalism, placed in its library of &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;; for them the Orient, like the fierce lion, was something to be encountered and dealt with to a certain extent &#039;&#039;because&#039;&#039; the texts made that Orient possible. Such an Orient was silent, available to Europe for the realization of projects that involved but were never directly responsible to the native inhabitants, and unable to resist the projects, images, or mere descriptions devised for it. Earlier in this chapter I called such a relation between Western writing (and its consequences) and Oriental silence the result of and the sign of the West&#039;s great cultural strength, its will to power over the Orient. But there is another side to the strength, a side whose existence depends on the pressures of the Orientalist tradition and its textual attitude to the Orient; this side lives its own life, as books about fierce lions will do until lions can talk back. The perspective rarely drawn on Napoleon and de Lesseps--to take two among the many projectors who hatched plans for the Orient--is the one that sees them carrying on in the dimensionless silence of the Orient mainly because the discourse of Orientalism, over and above the Orient&#039;s powerlessness to do anything about them, suffused their activity with meaning, intelligibility, and reality. The discourse of Orientalism and what made it possible--in Napoleon&#039;s case, a West far more powerful militarily than the Orient--gave them Orientals who could be described in such works as the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039; and an Orient that could be cut across as de Lesseps cut across Suez. Moreover, Orientalism gave them their success--at least from their point of view, which had nothing to do with that of the Oriental. Success, in other words, had all the actual human interchange between Oriental and Westerner of the Judge&#039;s &amp;quot;said I to myself, said I&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Trial by Jury&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Once we begin to think of Orientalism as a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient, we will encounter few surprises. For if it is true that historians like Michelet, Ranke, Toqueville, and Burckhardt &#039;&#039;emplot&#039;&#039; their narratives &amp;quot;as a story of a particular kind,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hayden White, &#039;&#039;Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe&#039;&#039; (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 12.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the same is also true of Orientalists who plotted Oriental history, character, and destiny for hundreds of years. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Orientalists became a more serious quantity, because by then the reaches of imaginative and actual geography had shrunk, because the Oriental-European relationship was determined by an unstoppable European expansion in search of markets, resources, and colonies, and finally, because Orientalism had accomplished its self-metamorphosis from a scholarly discourse to an imperial institution. Evidence of this metamorphosis is already apparent in what I have said of Napoleon, de Lesseps, Balfour, and Cromer. Their projects in the Orient are understandable on only the most rudimentary level as the efforts of men of vision and genius, heroes in Carlyle&#039;s sense. In fact Napoleon, de Lesseps, Cromer, and Balfour are far more &#039;&#039;regular&#039;&#039;, far less unusual, if we recall the schemata of d&#039;Herbelot and Dante and add to them both a modernized, efficient engine (like the nineteenth-century European empire) and a positive twist: since one cannot ontologically obliterate the Orient (as d&#039;Herbelot and Dante perhaps realized), one does have the means to capture it, treat it, describe it, improve it, radically alter it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The point I am trying to make here is that the transition from a merely textual apprehension, formulation, or definition of the Orient to the putting of all this into practice in the Orient did take place, and that Orientalism had much to do with that--if I may use the word in a literal sense&#039;&#039;--preposterous&#039;&#039; transition. So far as its strictly scholarly work was concerned (and I find the idea of strictly scholarly work as disinterested and abstract hard to understand: still, we can allow it intellectually), Orientalism did a great many things. During its great age in the nineteenth century it produced scholars; it increased the number of languages taught in the West and the quantity of manuscripts edited, translated, and commented on; in many cases, it provided the Orient with sympathetic European students, genuinely interested in such matters as Sanskrit grammar, Phoenician numismatics, and Arabic poetry. Yet--and here we must be very clear--Orientalism overrode the Orient. As a system of thought about the Orient, it always rose from the specifically human detail to the general transhuman one; an observation about a tenth-century Arab poet multiplied itself into a policy towards (and about) the Oriental mentality in Egypt, Iraq, or Arabia. Similarly a verse from the Koran would be considered the best evidence of an ineradicable Muslim sensuality. Orientalism assumed an unchanging Orient, absolutely different (the reasons change from epoch to epoch) from the West. And Orientalism, in its post-eighteenth-century form, could never revise itself. All this makes Cromer and Balfour, as observers and administrators of the Orient, inevitable.&lt;br /&gt;
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The closeness between politics and Orientalism, or to put it more circumspectly, the great likelihood that ideas about the Orient drawn from Orientalism can be put to political use, is an important yet extremely sensitive truth. It raises questions about the predisposition towards innocence or guilt, scholarly disinterest or pressure-group complicity, in such fields as black or women&#039;s studies. It necessarily provokes unrest in one&#039;s conscience about cultural, racial, or historical generalizations, their uses, value, degree of objectivity, and fundamental intent. More than anything else, the political and cultural circumstances in which Western Orientalism has flourished draw attention to the debased position of the Orient or Oriental as an object of study. Can any other than a political master-slave relation produce the Orientalized Orient perfectly characterized by Anwar Abdel Malek?&lt;br /&gt;
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a) On the level of the &#039;&#039;position of the problem&#039;&#039;, and the problematic ... the Orient and Orientals [are considered by Orientalism] as an &amp;quot;object&amp;quot; of study, stamped with an otherness--as all that is different, whether it be &amp;quot;subject&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;object&amp;quot;--but of a constitutive otherness, of an essentialist character.... This &amp;quot;object&amp;quot; of study will be, as is customary, passive, non-participating, endowed with a &amp;quot;historical&amp;quot; subjectivity, above all, non-active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign with regard to itself: the only Orient or Oriental or &amp;quot;subject&amp;quot; which could be admitted, at the extreme limit, is the alienated being, philosophically, that is, other than itself in relationship to itself, posed, understood, defined--and acted--by others.&lt;br /&gt;
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b) On the level of the &#039;&#039;thematic&#039;&#039;, [the Orientalists] adopt an essentialist conception of the countries, nations and peoples of the Orient under study, a conception which expresses itself through a characterized ethnist typology ... and will soon proceed with it towards racism.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the traditional orientalists, an essence should exist--sometimes even clearly described in metaphysical terms--which constitutes the inalienable and common basis of all the beings considered; this essence is both &amp;quot;historical,&amp;quot; since it goes back to the dawn of history, and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixes the being, &amp;quot;the object&amp;quot; of study, within its inalienable and nonevolutive specificity, instead of defining it as all other beings, states, nations, peoples, and cultures--as a product, a resultant of the vection of the forces operating in the field of historical evolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus one ends with a typology--based on a real specificity, but detached from history, and, consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential--which makes of the studied &amp;quot;object&amp;quot; another being with regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent; we will have a homo Sinicus, a homo Arabicus (and why not a homo Aegypticus, etc.), a homo Africanus, the man--the &amp;quot;normal man,&amp;quot; it is understood--being the European man of the historical period, that is, since Greek antiquity. One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the hegemonism of possessing minorities, unveiled by Marx and Engels, and the anthropocentrism dismantled by Freud are accompanied by europocentrism in the area of human and social sciences, and more particularly in those in direct relationship with non-European peoples.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Anwar Abdel Malek, &amp;quot;Orientalism in Crisis,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diogenes&#039;&#039; 44 (Winter 1963): 107-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Abdel Malek sees Orientalism as having a history which, according to the &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; of the late twentieth century, led it to the impasse described above. Let us now briefly outline that history as it proceeded through the nineteenth century to accumulate weight and power, &amp;quot;the hegemonism of possessing minorities,&amp;quot; and anthropocentrism in alliance with Europocentrism. From the last decades of the eighteenth century and for at least a century and a half, Britain and France dominated Orientalism as a discipline. The great philological discoveries in comparative grammar made by Jones, Franz Bopp, Jakob Grimm, and others were originally indebted to manuscripts brought from the East to Paris and London. Almost without exception, every Orientalist began his career as a philologist, and the revolution in philology that produced Bopp, Sacy, Burnouf, and their students was a comparative science based on the premise that languages belong to families, of which the Indo-European and the Semitic are two great instances. From the outset, then, Orientalism carried forward two traits: (1) a newly found scientific self-consciousness based on the linguistic importance of the Orient to Europe, and (2) a proclivity to divide, subdivide, and redivide its subject matter without ever changing its mind about the Orient as being always the same, unchanging, uniform, and radically peculiar object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Friedrich Schlegel, who learned his Sanskrit in Paris, illustrates these traits together. Although by the time he published his &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier&#039;&#039; in 1808 Schlegel had practically renounced his Orientalism, he still held that Sanskrit and Persian on the one hand and Greek and German on the other had more affinities with each other than with the Semitic, Chinese, American, or African languages. Moreover, the Indo-European family was artistically simple and satisfactory in a way the Semitic, for one, was not. Such abstractions as this did not trouble Schlegel, for whom nations, races, minds, and peoples as things one could talk about passionately--in the ever-narrowing perspective of populism first adumbrated by Herder--held a lifelong fascination. Yet nowhere does Schlegel talk about the living, contemporary Orient. When he said in 1800, &amp;quot;It is in the Orient that we must search for the highest Romanticism,&amp;quot; he meant the Orient of the &#039;&#039;Sakuntala&#039;&#039;, the Zend-Avesta, and the Upanishads. As for the Semites, whose language was agglutinative, unaesthetic, and mechanical, they were different, inferior, backward. Schlegel&#039;s lectures on language and on life, history, and literature are full of these discriminations, which he made without the slightest qualification. Hebrew, he said, was made for prophetic utterance and divination; the Muslims, however, espoused a &amp;quot;dead empty Theism, a merely negative Unitarian faith.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Friedrich Schlegel, &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier: Ein Beitrag zur Begrundung der Altertumstunde&#039;&#039; (Heidelberg: Mohr &amp;amp; Zimmer, 1808), pp. 44-59; Schlegel, &#039;&#039;Philosophie der Geschichte: In achtzehn Vorlesungen gehalten zu Wien im Jahre 1828&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean-Jacques Anstett, vol. 9 of Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. Ernest Behler (Munich: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1971), p. 275.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the racism in Schlegel&#039;s strictures upon the Semites and other &amp;quot;low&amp;quot; Orientals was widely diffused in European culture. But nowhere else, unless it be later in the nineteenth century among Darwinian anthropologists and phrenologists, was it made the basis of a scientific subject matter as it was in comparative linguistics or philology. Language and race seemed inextricably tied, and the &amp;quot;good&amp;quot; Orient was invariably a classical period somewhere in a long-gone India, whereas the &amp;quot;bad&amp;quot; Orient lingered in present-day Asia, parts of North Africa, and Islam everywhere. &amp;quot;Aryans&amp;quot; were confined to Europe and the ancient Orient; as Leon Poliakov has shown (without once remarking, however, that &amp;quot;Semites&amp;quot; were not only the Jews but the Muslims as well&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Leon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe&#039;&#039;, trans. Edmund Howard (New York: Basic Books, 1974).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;), the Aryan myth dominated historical and cultural anthropology at the expense of the &amp;quot;lesser&amp;quot; peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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The official intellectual genealogy of Orientalism would certainly include Gobineau, Renan, Humboldt, Steinthal, Burnouf, Remusat, Palmer, Weil, Dozy, Muir, to mention a few famous names almost at random from the nineteenth century. It would also include the diffusive capacity of learned societies: the Societe asiatique, founded in 1822; the Royal Asiatic Society, founded in 1823; the American Oriental Society, founded in 1842; and so on. But it might perforce neglect the great contribution of imaginative and travel literature, which strengthened the divisions established by Orientalists between the various geographical, temporal, and racial departments of the Orient. Such neglect would be incorrect, since for the Islamic Orient this literature is especially rich and makes a significant contribution to building the Orientalist discourse. It includes work by Goethe, Hugo, Lamartine, Chateaubriand, Kinglake, Nerval, Flaubert, Lane, Burton, Scott, Byron, Vigny, Disraeli, George Eliot, Gautier. Later, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we could add Doughty, Barres, Loti, T. E. Lawrence, Forster. All these writers give a bolder outline to Disraeli&#039;s &amp;quot;great Asiatic mystery.&amp;quot; In this enterprise there is considerable support not only from the unearthing of dead Oriental civilizations (by European excavators) in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey, but also from major geographical surveys done all through the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the end of the nineteenth century these achievements were materially abetted by the European occupation of the entire Near Orient (with the exception of parts of the Ottoman Empire, which was swallowed up after 1918). The principal colonial powers once again were Britain and France, although Russia and Germany played some role as well.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Derek Hopwood, &#039;&#039;The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1943: Church and Politics in the Near East&#039;&#039; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; To colonize meant at first the identification--indeed, the creation--of interests; these could be commercial, communicational, religious, military, cultural. With regard to Islam and the Islamic territories, for example, Britain felt that it had legitimate interests, as a Christian power, to safeguard. A complex apparatus for tending these interests developed. Such early organizations as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (1698) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1701) were succeeded and later abetted by the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), the Church Missionary Society (1799), the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804), the London Society for Promoting Christianity Among the Jews (1808). These missions &amp;quot;openly joined the expansion of Europe.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A. L. Tibawi, &#039;&#039;British Interests in Palestine, 1800-1901&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Add to these the trading societies, learned societies, geographical exploration funds, translation funds, the implantation in the Orient of schools, missions, consular offices, factories, and sometimes large European communities, and the notion of an &amp;quot;interest&amp;quot; will acquire a good deal of sense. Thereafter interests were defended with much zeal and expense.&lt;br /&gt;
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So far my outline is a gross one. What of the typical experiences and emotions that accompany both the scholarly advances of Orientalism and the political conquests aided by Orientalism? First, there is disappointment that the modern Orient is not at all like the texts. Here is Gerard de Nerval writing to Theophile Gautier at the end of August 1843:&lt;br /&gt;
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I have already lost, Kingdom after Kingdom, province after province, the more beautiful half of the universe, and soon I will know of no place in which I can find a refuge for my dreams; but it is Egypt that I most regret having driven out of my imagination, now that I have sadly placed it in my memory.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gerard de Nerval, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Albert Beguin and Jean Richet (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 1: 933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is by the author of a great &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;. Nerval&#039;s lament is a common topic of Romanticism (the betrayed dream, as described by Albert Beguin in &#039;&#039;L&#039;Ame romantique et le reve&#039;&#039;) and of travelers in the Biblical Orient, from Chateaubriand to Mark Twain. Any direct experience of the mundane Orient ironically comments on such valorizations of it as were to be found in Goethe&#039;s &amp;quot;Mahometsgesang&amp;quot; or Hugo&#039;s &amp;quot;Adieux de l&#039;hotesse arabe.&amp;quot; Memory of the modern Orient disputes imagination, sends one back to the imagination as a place preferable, for the European sensibility, to the real Orient. For a person who has never seen the Orient, Nerval once said to Gautier, a lotus is still a lotus; for me it is only a kind of onion. To write about the modern Orient is either to reveal an upsetting demystification of images culled from texts, or to confine oneself to the Orient of which Hugo spoke in his original preface to &#039;&#039;Les Orientales&#039;&#039;, the Orient as &amp;quot;image&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;pensee,&amp;quot; symbols of &amp;quot;une sorte de preoccupation generale.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hugo, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, 1: 580.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If personal disenchantment and general preoccupation fairly map the Orientalist sensibility at first, they entail certain other more familiar habits of thought, feeling, and perception. The mind learns to separate a general apprehension of the Orient from a specific experience of it; each goes its separate way, so to speak. In Scott&#039;s novel &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; (1825), Sir Kenneth (of the Crouching Leopard) battles a single Saracen to a standoff somewhere in the Palestinian desert; as the Crusader and his opponent, who is Saladin in disguise, later engage in conversation, the Christian discovers his Muslim antagonist to be not so bad a fellow after all. Yet he remarks:&lt;br /&gt;
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I well thought ... that your blinded race had their descent from the foul fiend, without whose aid you would never have been able to maintain this blessed land of Palestine against so many valiant soldiers of God. I speak not thus of thee in particular, Saracen, but generally of thy people and religion. Strange is it to me, however, not that you should have the descent from the Evil One, but that you should boast of it.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sir Walter Scott, &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; (1825; reprint ed., London: J. M. Dent, 1914), pp. 38-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For indeed the Saracen does boast of tracing his race&#039;s line back to Eblis, the Muslim Lucifer. But what is truly curious is not the feeble historicism by which Scott makes the scene &amp;quot;medieval,&amp;quot; letting Christian attack Muslim theologically in a way nineteenth-century Europeans would not (they would, though); rather, it is the airy condescension of damning a whole people &amp;quot;generally&amp;quot; while mitigating the offense with a cool &amp;quot;I don&#039;t mean you in particular.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Scott, however, was no expert on Islam (although H. A. R. Gibb, who was, praised &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; for its insight into Islam and Saladin&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Albert Hourani, &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb, 1895-1971,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Proceedings of the British Academy&#039;&#039; 58 (1972): 495.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;), and he was taking enormous liberties with Eblis&#039;s role by turning him into a hero for the faithful. Scott&#039;s knowledge probably came from Byron and Beckford, but it is enough for us here to note how strongly the general character ascribed to things Oriental could withstand both the rhetorical and the existential force of obvious exceptions. It is as if, on the one hand, a bin called &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; existed into which all the authoritative, anonymous, and traditional Western attitudes to the East were dumped unthinkingly, while on the other, true to the anecdotal tradition of storytelling, one could nevertheless tell of experiences with or in the Orient that had little to do with the generally serviceable bin. But the very structure of Scott&#039;s prose shows a closer intertwining of the two than that. For the general category in advance offers the specific instance a limited terrain in which to operate: no matter how deep the specific exception, no matter how much a single Oriental can escape the fences placed around him, he is &#039;&#039;first&#039;&#039; an Oriental, &#039;&#039;second&#039;&#039; a human being, and &#039;&#039;last&#039;&#039; again an Oriental.&lt;br /&gt;
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So general a category as &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; is capable of quite interesting variations. Disraeli&#039;s enthusiasm for the Orient appeared first during a trip East in 1831. In Cairo he wrote, &amp;quot;My eyes and mind yet ache with a grandeur so little in unison with our own likeness.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quoted by B. R. Jerman, &#039;&#039;The Young Disraeli&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 126. See also Robert Blake, &#039;&#039;Disraeli&#039;&#039; (London: Eyre &amp;amp; Spottiswoode, 1966), pp. 59-70.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; General grandeur and passion inspired a transcendent sense of things and little patience for actual reality. His novel &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; is steeped in racial and geographical platitudes; everything is a matter of race, Sidonia states, so much so that salvation can only be found in the Orient and amongst its races. There, as a case in point, Druzes, Christians, Muslims, and Jews hobnob easily because--someone quips--Arabs are simply Jews on horseback, and all are Orientals at heart. The unisons are made between general categories, not between categories and what they contain. An Oriental lives in the Orient, he lives a life of Oriental ease, in a state of Oriental despotism and sensuality, imbued with a feeling of Oriental fatalism. Writers as different as Marx, Disraeli, Burton, and Nerval could carry on a lengthy discussion between themselves, as it were, using all those generalities unquestioningly and yet intelligibly.&lt;br /&gt;
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With disenchantment and a generalized--not to say schizophrenic--view of the Orient, there is usually another peculiarity. Because it is made into a general object, the whole Orient can be made to serve as an illustration of a particular form of eccentricity. Although the individual Oriental cannot shake or disturb the general categories that make sense of his oddness, his oddness can nevertheless be enjoyed for its own sake. Here, for example, is Flaubert describing the spectacle of the Orient:&lt;br /&gt;
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To amuse the crowd, Mohammed Ali&#039;s jester took a woman in a Cairo bazaar one day, set her on the counter of a shop, and coupled with her publicly while the shopkeeper calmly smoked his pipe.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the road from Cairo to Shubra some time ago a young fellow had himself publicly buggered by a large monkey--as in the story above, to create a good opinion of himself and make people laugh.&lt;br /&gt;
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A marabout died a while ago--an idiot--who had long passed as a saint marked by God; all the Moslem women came to see him and masturbated him--in the end he died of exhaustion--from morning to night it was a perpetual jacking-off....&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Quid dicis&#039;&#039; of the following fact: some time ago a &#039;&#039;santon&#039;&#039; (ascetic priest) used to walk through the streets of Cairo completely naked except for a cap on his head and another on his prick. To piss he would doff the prick-cap, and sterile women who wanted children would run up, put themselves under the parabola of his urine and rub themselves with it.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour&#039;&#039;, trans, and ed. Francis Steegmuller (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1973), pp. 44-5. See Gustave Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Correspondance&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean Bruneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 1: 542.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Flaubert frankly acknowledges that this is grotesquerie of a special kind. &amp;quot;All the old comic business&amp;quot;--by which Flaubert meant the well-known conventions of &amp;quot;the cudgeled slave ... the coarse trafficker in women ... the thieving merchant&amp;quot;--acquire a new, &amp;quot;fresh ... genuine and charming&amp;quot; meaning in the Orient. This meaning cannot be reproduced; it can only be enjoyed on the spot and &amp;quot;brought back&amp;quot; very approximately. The Orient is &#039;&#039;watched&#039;&#039;, since its almost (but never quite) offensive behavior issues out of a reservoir of infinite peculiarity; the European, whose sensibility tours the Orient, is a watcher, never involved, always detached, always ready for new examples of what the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039; called &amp;quot;bizarre jouissance.&amp;quot; The Orient becomes a living tableau of queerness.&lt;br /&gt;
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And this tableau quite logically becomes a special topic for texts. Thus the circle is completed; from being exposed as what texts do not prepare one for, the Orient can return as something one writes about in a disciplined way. Its foreignness can be translated, its meanings decoded, its hostility tamed; yet the &#039;&#039;generality&#039;&#039; assigned to the Orient, the disenchantment that one feels after encountering it, the unresolved eccentricity it displays, are all redistributed in what is said or written about it. Islam, for example, was typically Oriental for Orientalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Carl Becker argued that although &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; (note the vast generality) inherited the Hellenic tradition, it could neither grasp nor employ the Greek, humanistic tradition; moreover, to understand Islam one needed above all else to see it, not as an &amp;quot;original&amp;quot; religion, but as a sort of failed Oriental attempt to employ Greek philosophy without the creative inspiration that we find in Renaissance Europe.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;This is the argument presented in Carl H. Becker, &#039;&#039;Das Erbe der Antike im Orient und Okzident&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Quelle &amp;amp; Meyer, 1931).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Louis Massignon, perhaps the most renowned and influential of modern French Orientalists, Islam was a systematic rejection of the Christian incarnation, and its greatest hero was not Mohammed or Averroes but al-Hallaj, a Muslim saint who was crucified by the orthodox Muslims for having dared to personalize Islam.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Louis Massignon, &#039;&#039;La Passion d&#039;al-Hosayn-ibn-Mansour al-Hallaj&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1922).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What Becker and Massignon explicitly left out of their studies was the eccentricity of the Orient, which they backhandedly acknowledged by trying so hard to regularize it in Western terms. Mohammed was thrown out, but al-Hallaj was made prominent because he took himself to be a Christ-figure.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a judge of the Orient, the modern Orientalist does not, as he believes and even says, stand apart from it objectively. His human detachment, whose sign is the absence of sympathy covered by professional knowledge, is weighted heavily with all the orthodox attitudes, perspectives, and moods of Orientalism that I have been describing. His Orient is not the Orient as it is, but the Orient as it has been Orientalized. An unbroken arc of knowledge and power connects the European or Western statesman and the Western Orientalists; it forms the rim of the stage containing the Orient. By the end of World War I both Africa and the Orient formed not so much an intellectual spectacle for the West as a privileged terrain for it. The scope of Orientalism exactly matched the scope of empire, and it was this absolute unanimity between the two that provoked the only crisis in the history of Western thought about and dealings with the Orient. And this crisis continues now.&lt;br /&gt;
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Beginning in the twenties, and from one end of the Third World to the other, the response to empire and imperialism has been dialectical. By the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955 the entire Orient had gained its political independence from the Western empires and confronted a new configuration of imperial powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Unable to recognize &amp;quot;its&amp;quot; Orient in the new Third World, Orientalism now faced a challenging and politically armed Orient. Two alternatives opened before Orientalism. One was to carry on as if nothing had happened. The second was to adapt the old ways to the new. But to the Orientalist, who believes the Orient never changes, the new is simply the old betrayed by new, misunderstanding &#039;&#039;dis-Orientals&#039;&#039; (we can permit ourselves the neologism). A third, revisionist alternative, to dispense with Orientalism altogether, was considered by only a tiny minority.&lt;br /&gt;
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One index of the crisis, according to Abdel Malek, was not simply that &amp;quot;national liberation movements in the ex-colonial&amp;quot; Orient worked havoc with Orientalist conceptions of passive, fatalistic &amp;quot;subject races&amp;quot;; there was in addition the fact that &amp;quot;specialists and the public at large became aware of the time-lag, not only between orientalist science and the material under study, but also--and this was to be determining--between the conceptions, the methods and the instruments of work in the human and social sciences and those of orientalism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Abdel Malek, &amp;quot;Orientalism in Crisis,&amp;quot; p. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Orientalists--from Renan to Goldziher to Macdonald to von Grunebaum, Gibb, and Bernard Lewis--saw Islam, for example, as a &amp;quot;cultural synthesis&amp;quot; (the phrase is P. M. Holt&#039;s) that could be studied apart from the economics, sociology, and politics of the Islamic peoples. For Orientalism, Islam had a meaning which, if one were to look for its most succinct formulation, could be found in Renan&#039;s first treatise: in order best to be understood Islam had to be reduced to &amp;quot;tent and tribe.&amp;quot; The impact of colonialism, of worldly circumstances, of historical development: all these were to Orientalists as flies to wanton boys, killed--or disregarded--for their sport, never taken seriously enough to complicate the essential Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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The career of H. A. R. Gibb illustrates within itself the two alternative approaches by which Orientalism has responded to the modern Orient. In 1945 Gibb delivered the Haskell Lectures at the University of Chicago. The world he surveyed was not the same one Balfour and Cromer knew before World War I. Several revolutions, two world wars, and innumerable economic, political, and social changes made the realities of 1945 an unmistakably, even cataclysmically, new object. Yet we find Gibb opening the lectures he called &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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The student of Arabic civilization is constantly brought up against the striking contrast between the imaginative power displayed, for example, in certain branches of Arabic literature and the literalism, the pedantry, displayed in reasoning and exposition, even when it is devoted to these same productions. It is true that there have been great philosophers among the Muslim peoples and that some of them were Arabs, but they were rare exceptions. The Arab mind, whether in relation to the outer world or in relation to the processes of thought, cannot throw off its intense feeling for the separateness and the individuality of the concrete events. This is, I believe, one of the main factors lying behind that &amp;quot;lack of a sense of law&amp;quot; which Professor Macdonald regarded as the characteristic difference in the Oriental.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is this, too, which explains--what is so difficult for the Western student to grasp [until it is explained to him by the Orientalist]--the aversion of the Muslims from the thought-processes of rationalism.... The rejection of rationalist modes of thought and of the utilitarian ethic which is inseparable from them has its roots, therefore, not in the so-called &amp;quot;obscurantism&amp;quot; of the Muslim theologians but in the atomism and discreteness of the Arab imagination.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is pure Orientalism, of course, but even if one acknowledges the exceeding knowledge of institutional Islam that characterizes the rest of the book, Gibb&#039;s inaugural biases remain a formidable obstacle for anyone hoping to understand modern Islam. What is the meaning of &amp;quot;difference&amp;quot; when the preposition &amp;quot;from&amp;quot; has dropped from sight altogether? Are we not once again being asked to inspect the Oriental Muslim as if his world, unlike ours--&amp;quot;differently&amp;quot; from it--had never ventured beyond the seventh century? As for modern Islam itself, despite the complexities of his otherwise magisterial understanding of it, why must it be regarded with so implacable a hostility as Gibb&#039;s? If Islam is flawed from the start by virtue of its permanent disabilities, the Orientalist will find himself opposing any Islamic attempts to reform Islam, because, according to his views, reform is a betrayal of Islam: this is exactly Gibb&#039;s argument. How can an Oriental slip out from these manacles into the modern world except by repeating with the Fool in &#039;&#039;King Lear&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;They&#039;ll have me whipp&#039;d for speaking true, thou&#039;lt have me whipp&#039;d for lying; and sometimes I am whipp&#039;d for holding my peace.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Eighteen years later Gibb faced an audience of English compatriots, only now he was speaking as the director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard. His topic was &amp;quot;Area Studies Reconsidered,&amp;quot; in which, among other &#039;&#039;apercus&#039;&#039;, he agreed that &amp;quot;the Orient is much too important to be left to the Orientalists.&amp;quot; The new, or second alternative, approach open to Orientalists was being announced, just as &#039;&#039;Modern Trends&#039;&#039; exemplified the first, or traditional, approach. Gibb&#039;s formula is well-intentioned in &amp;quot;Area Studies Reconsidered,&amp;quot; so far, of course, as the Western experts on the Orient are concerned, whose job it is to prepare students for careers &amp;quot;in public life and business.&amp;quot; What we now need, said Gibb, is the traditional Orientalist &#039;&#039;plus&#039;&#039; a good social scientist working together: between them the two will do &amp;quot;interdisciplinary&amp;quot; work. Yet the traditional Orientalist will not bring outdated knowledge to bear on the Orient; no, his expertise will serve to remind his uninitiated colleagues in area studies that &amp;quot;to apply the psychology and mechanics of Western political institutions to Asian or Arab situations is pure Walt Disney.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gibb, &#039;&#039;Area Studies Reconsidered&#039;&#039;, pp. 12, 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In practice this notion has meant that when Orientals struggle against colonial occupation, you must say (in order not to risk a Disneyism) that Orientals have never understood the meaning of self-government the way &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do. When some Orientals oppose racial discrimination while others practice it, you say &amp;quot;they&#039;re all Orientals at bottom&amp;quot; and class interest, political circumstances, economic factors are totally irrelevant. Or with Bernard Lewis, you say that if Arab Palestinians oppose Israeli settlement and occupation of their lands, then that is merely &amp;quot;the return of Islam,&amp;quot; or, as a renowned contemporary Orientalist defines it, Islamic opposition to non-Islamic peoples,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;The Return of Islam,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, January 1976, pp. 39-49.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a principle of Islam enshrined in the seventh century. History, politics, and economics do not matter. Islam is Islam, the Orient is the Orient, and please take all your ideas about a left and a right wing, revolutions, and change back to Disneyland.&lt;br /&gt;
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If such tautologies, claims, and dismissals have not sounded familiar to historians, sociologists, economists, and humanists in any other field except Orientalism, the reason is patently obvious. For like its putative subject matter, Orientalism has not allowed ideas to violate its profound serenity. But modern Orientalists--or area experts, to give them their new name--have not passively sequestered themselves in language departments. On the contrary, they have profited from Gibb&#039;s advice. Most of them today are indistinguishable from other &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;advisers&amp;quot; in what Harold Lasswell has called the policy sciences.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, eds., &#039;&#039;The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method&#039;&#039; (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus the military-national-security possibilities of an alliance, say, between a specialist in &amp;quot;national character analysis&amp;quot; and an expert in Islamic institutions were soon recognized, for expediency&#039;s sake if for nothing else. After all, the &amp;quot;West&amp;quot; since World War II had faced a clever totalitarian enemy who collected allies for itself among gullible Oriental (African, Asian, undeveloped) nations. What better way of outflanking that enemy than by playing to the Oriental&#039;s illogical mind in ways only an Orientalist could devise? Thus emerged such masterful ploys as the stick-and-carrot technique, the Alliance for Progress, SEATO, and so forth, all of them based on traditional &amp;quot;knowledge&amp;quot; retooled for better manipulation of its supposed object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus as revolutionary turmoil grips the Islamic Orient, sociologists remind us that Arabs are addicted to &amp;quot;oral functions,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Morroe Berger, &#039;&#039;The Arab World Today&#039;&#039; (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday &amp;amp; Co., 1962), p. 158.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; while economists--recycled Orientalists--observe that for modern Islam neither capitalism nor socialism is an adequate rubric.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;There is a compendium of such attitudes listed and criticized in Maxime Rodinson, &#039;&#039;Islam and Capitalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As anticolonialism sweeps and indeed unifies the entire Oriental world, the Orientalist damns the whole business not only as a nuisance but as an insult to the Western democracies. As momentous, generally important issues face the world--issues involving nuclear destruction, catastrophically scarce resources, unprecedented human demands for equality, justice, and economic parity--popular caricatures of the Orient are exploited by politicians whose source of ideological supply is not only the half-literate technocrat but the superliterate Orientalist. The legendary Arabists in the State Department warn of Arab plans to take over the world. The perfidious Chinese, half-naked Indians, and passive Muslims are described as vultures for &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; largesse and are damned when &amp;quot;we lose them&amp;quot; to communism, or to their unregenerate Oriental instincts: the difference is scarcely significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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These contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood the press and the popular mind. Arabs, for example, are thought of as camel-riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, venal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilization. Always there lurks the assumption that although the Western consumer belongs to a numerical minority, he is entitled either to own or to expend (or both) the majority of the world resources. Why? Because he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being. No better instance exists today of what Anwar Abdel Malek calls &amp;quot;the hegemonism of possessing minorities&amp;quot; and anthropocentrism allied with Europocentrism: a white middle-class Westerner believes it his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it, just because by definition &amp;quot;it&amp;quot; is not quite as human as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; are. There is no purer example than this of dehumanized thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a sense the limitations of Orientalism are, as I said earlier, the limitations that follow upon disregarding, essentializing, denuding the humanity of another culture, people, or geographical region. But Orientalism has taken a further step than that: it views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West. So impressive have the descriptive and textual successes of Orientalism been that entire periods of the Orient&#039;s cultural, political, and social history are considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior. Yet if history during the twentieth century has provoked intrinsic change in and for the Orient, the Orientalist is stunned: he cannot realize that to some extent&lt;br /&gt;
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the new [Oriental] leaders, intellectuals or policy-makers, have learned many lessons from the travail of their predecessors. They have also been aided by the structural and institutional transformations accomplished in the intervening period and by the fact that they are to a great extent more at liberty to fashion the future of their countries. They are also much more confident and perhaps slightly aggressive. No longer do they have to function hoping to obtain a favorable verdict from the invisible jury of the West. Their dialogue is not with the West, it is with their fellow-citizens.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, &amp;quot;Retreat from the Secular Path? Islamic Dilemmas of Arab Politics,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Review of Politics&#039;&#039; 28, no. 4 (October 1966): 475.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, the Orientalist assumes that what his texts have not prepared him for is the result either of outside agitation in the Orient or of the Orient&#039;s misguided inanity. None of the innumerable Orientalist texts on Islam, including their summa, &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, can prepare their reader for what has taken place since 1948 in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or the Yemens. When the dogmas about Islam cannot serve, not even for the most Panglossian Orientalist, there is recourse to an Orientalized social-science jargon, to such marketable abstractions as elites, political stability, modernization, and institutional development, all stamped with the cachet of Orientalist wisdom. In the meantime a growing, more and more dangerous rift separates Orient and Occident.&lt;br /&gt;
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The present crisis dramatizes the disparity between texts and reality. Yet in this study of Orientalism I wish not only to expose the sources of Orientalism&#039;s views but also to reflect on its importance, for the contemporary intellectual rightly feels that to ignore a part of the world now demonstrably encroaching upon him is to avoid reality. Humanists have too often confined their attention to departmentalized topics of research. They have neither watched nor learned from disciplines like Orientalism whose unremitting ambition was to master &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; of a world, not some easily delimited part of it such as an author or a collection of texts. However, along with such academic security-blankets as &amp;quot;history,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;literature,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the humanities,&amp;quot; and despite its overreaching aspirations, Orientalism is involved in worldly, historical circumstances which it has tried to conceal behind an often pompous scientism and appeals to rationalism. The contemporary intellectual can learn from Orientalism how, on the one hand, either to limit or to enlarge realistically the scope of his discipline&#039;s claims, and on the other, to see the human ground (the foul-rag-and-bone shop of the heart, Yeats called it) in which texts, visions, methods, and disciplines begin, grow, thrive, and degenerate. To investigate Orientalism is also to propose intellectual ways for handling the methodological problems that history has brought forward, so to speak, in its subject matter, the Orient. But before that we must virtually see the humanistic values that Orientalism, by its scope, experiences, and structures, has all but eliminated.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Footnotes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;2.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;2.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Orientalist Structures and Restructures&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
When the seyyid &#039;Omar, the Nakeeb el-Ashraf (or chief of the descendants of the Prophet) ... married a daughter, about forty-five years since, there walked before the procession a young man who had made an incision in his abdomen, and drawn out a large portion of his intestines, which he carried before him on a silver tray. After the procession, he restored them to their proper place, and remained in bed many days before he recovered from the effects of this foolish and disgusting act.&lt;br /&gt;
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--Edward William Lane, &#039;&#039;An Account of the Manners and Customs of the modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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... dans le cas de la chute de cet empire, soit par une revolution a Constantinople, soit par un demembrement successif, les puissances europeennes prendront chacune, a titre de protectorat, la partie de l&#039;empire qui lui sera assignee par les stipulations du congres; que ces protectorats, definis et limites, quant aux territoires, selon les voisinages, la surete des frontieres, l&#039;analogie de religions, de moeurs et d&#039;interets ... ne consacreront que la suzerainete des puissances. Cette sorte de suzerainete definie ainsi, et consacree comme droit europeen, consistera principalement dans le droit d&#039;occuper telle partie du territoire ou des cotes, pour y fonder, soit des villes libres, soit des colonies europeennes, soit des ports et des echelles de commerce.... Ce n&#039;est qu&#039;une tutelle armee et civilisatrice que chaque puissance exercera sur son protectorat; elle garantira son existence et ses elements de nationalite, sous le drapeau d&#039;une nationalite plus forte....&lt;br /&gt;
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--Alphonse de Lamartine, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Redrawn Frontiers, Redefined Issues, Secularized Religion&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Gustave Flaubert died in 1880 without having finished &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;, his comic encyclopedic novel on the degeneration of knowledge and the inanity of human effort. Nevertheless the essential outlines of his vision are clear, and are clearly supported by the ample detail of his novel. The two clerks are members of the bourgeoisie who, because one of them is the unexpected beneficiary of a handsome will, retire from the city to spend their lives on a country estate doing what they please (&amp;quot;nous ferons tout ce que nous plaira!&amp;quot;). As Flaubert portrays their experience, doing as they please involves Bouvard and Pecuchet in a practical and theoretical jaunt through agriculture, history, chemistry, education, archaeology, literature, always with less than successful results; they move through fields of learning like travelers in time and knowledge, experiencing the disappointments, disasters, and letdowns of uninspired amateurs. What they move through, in fact, is the whole disillusioning experience of the nineteenth century, whereby--in Charles Moraze&#039;s phrase--&amp;quot;les bourgeois conquerants&amp;quot; turn out to be the bumbling victims of their own leveling incompetence and mediocrity. Every enthusiasm resolves itself into a boring cliche, and every discipline or type of knowledge changes from hope and power into disorder, ruin, and sorrow.&lt;br /&gt;
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Among Flaubert&#039;s sketches for the conclusion of this panorama of despair are two items of special interest to us here. The two men debate the future of mankind. Pecuchet sees &amp;quot;the future of Humanity through a glass darkly,&amp;quot; whereas Bouvard sees it &amp;quot;brightly!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Modern man is progressing, Europe will be regenerated by Asia. The historical law that civilization moves from Orient to Occident ... the two forms of humanity will at last be soldered together.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gustave Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;, vol. 2 of &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. A. Thibaudet and R. Dumesnil (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), p. 985.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This obvious echo of Quinet represents the start of still another of the cycles of enthusiasm and disillusionment through which the two men will pass. Flaubert&#039;s notes indicate that like all his others, this anticipated project of Bouvard&#039;s is rudely interrupted by reality--this time by the sudden appearance of gendarmes who accuse him of debauchery. A few lines later, however, the second item of interest turns up. The two men simultaneously confess to each other that their secret desire is once again to become copyists. They have a double desk made for them, they buy books, pencils, erasers, and--as Flaubert concludes the sketch--&amp;quot;ils s&#039;y mettent&amp;quot;: they turn to. From trying to live through and apply knowledge more or less directly, Bouvard and Pecuchet are reduced finally to transcribing it uncritically from one text to another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although Bouvard&#039;s vision of Europe regenerated by Asia is not fully spelled out, it (and what it comes to on the copyist&#039;s desk) can be glossed in several important ways. Like many of the two men&#039;s other visions, this one is &#039;&#039;global&#039;&#039; and it is &#039;&#039;reconstructive&#039;&#039;; it represents what Flaubert felt to be the nineteenth-century predilection for the rebuilding of the world according to an imaginative vision, sometimes accompanied by a special scientific technique. Among the visions Flaubert has in mind are the utopias of Saint-Simon and Fourier, the scientific regenerations of mankind envisioned by Comte, and all the technical or secular religions promoted by ideologues, positivists, eclectics, occultists, traditionalists, and idealists such as Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis, Michelet, Cousin, Proudhon, Cournot, Cabet, Janet, and Lamennais.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;There is an illuminating account of these visions and utopias in Donald G. Charlton, &#039;&#039;Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Throughout the novel Bouvard and Pecuchet espouse the various causes of such figures; then, having ruined them, they move on looking for newer ones, but with no better results.&lt;br /&gt;
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The roots of such revisionist ambitions as these are Romantic in a very specific way. We must remember the extent to which a major part of the spiritual and intellectual project of the late eighteenth century was a reconstituted theology--natural supernaturalism, as M. H. Abrams has called it; this type of thought is carried forward by the typical nineteenth-century attitudes Flaubert satirizes in &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;. The notion of regeneration therefore harks back to&lt;br /&gt;
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a conspicuous Romantic tendency, after the rationalism and decorum of the Enlightenment ... [to revert] to the stark drama and suprarational mysteries of the Christian story and doctrines and to the violent conflicts and abrupt reversals of the Christian inner life, turning on the extremes of destruction and creation, hell and heaven, exile and reunion, death and rebirth, dejection and joy, paradise lost and paradise regained.... But since they lived, inescapably, after the Enlightenment, Romantic writers revived these ancient matters with a difference: they undertook to save the overview of human history and destiny, the existential paradigms, and the cardinal values of their religious heritage, by reconstituting them in a way that would make them intellectually acceptable, as well as emotionally pertinent, for the time being.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;M. H. Abrams, &#039;&#039;Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature&#039;&#039; (New York: W. W. Norton &amp;amp; Co., 1971), p. 66.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What Bouvard has in mind--the regeneration of Europe by Asia--was a very influential Romantic idea. Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, for example, urged upon their countrymen, and upon Europeans in general, a detailed study of India because, they said, it was Indian culture and religion that could defeat the materialism and mechanism (and republicanism) of Occidental culture. And from this defeat would arise a new, revitalized Europe: the Biblical imagery of death, rebirth, and redemption is evident in this prescription. Moreover, the Romantic Orientalist project was not merely a specific instance of a general tendency; it was a powerful shaper of the tendency itself, as Raymond Schwab has so convincingly argued in &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;. But what mattered was not Asia so much as Asia&#039;s &#039;&#039;use to&#039;&#039; modern Europe. Thus anyone who, like Schlegel or Franz Bopp, mastered an Oriental language was a spiritual hero, a knight-errant bringing back to Europe a sense of the holy mission it had now lost. It is precisely this sense that the later secular religions portrayed by Flaubert carry on in the nineteenth century. No less than Schlegel, Wordsworth, and Chateaubriand, Auguste Comte--like Bouvard--was the adherent and proponent of a secular post-Enlightenment myth whose outlines are unmistakably Christian.&lt;br /&gt;
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In regularly allowing Bouvard and Pecuchet to go through revisionist notions from start to comically debased finish, Flaubert drew attention to the human flaw common to all projects. He saw perfectly well that underneath the &#039;&#039;idee recue&#039;&#039; &amp;quot;Europe-regenerated-by-Asia&amp;quot; lurked a very insidious hubris. Neither &amp;quot;Europe&amp;quot; nor &amp;quot;Asia&amp;quot; was anything without the visionaries&#039; technique for turning vast geographical domains into treatable, and manageable, entities. At bottom, therefore, Europe and Asia were &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; Europe and &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; Asia--our &#039;&#039;will&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;representation&#039;&#039;, as Schopenhauer had said. Historical laws were in reality &#039;&#039;historians&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039; laws, just as &amp;quot;the two forms of humanity&amp;quot; drew attention less to actuality than to a European capacity for lending man-made distinctions an air of inevitability. As for the other half of the phrase--&amp;quot;will at last be soldered together&amp;quot;--there Flaubert mocked the blithe indifference of science to actuality, a science which anatomized and melted human entities as if they were so much inert matter. But it was not just any science he mocked: it was enthusiastic, even messianic European science, whose victories included failed revolutions, wars, oppression, and an unteachable appetite for putting grand, bookish ideas quixotically to work immediately. What such science or knowledge never reckoned with was its own deeply ingrained and unself-conscious bad innocence and the resistance to it of reality. When Bouvard plays the scientist he naively assumes that science merely is, that reality is as the scientist says it is, that it does not matter whether the scientist is a fool or a visionary; he (or anyone who thinks like him) cannot see that the Orient may not wish to regenerate Europe, or that Europe was not about to fuse itself democratically with yellow or brown Asians. In short, such a scientist does not recognize in his science the egoistic will to power that feeds his endeavors and corrupts his ambitions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Flaubert, of course, sees to it that his poor fools are made to rub their noses in these difficulties. Bouvard and Pecuchet have learned that it is better not to traffic in ideas and in reality together. The novel&#039;s conclusion is a picture of the two of them now perfectly content to copy their favorite ideas faithfully from book onto paper. Knowledge no longer requires application to reality; knowledge is what gets passed on silently, without comment, from one text to another. Ideas are propagated and disseminated anonymously, they are repeated without attribution; they have literally become &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;: what matters is that they are &#039;&#039;there&#039;&#039;, to be repeated, echoed, and re-echoed uncritically.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a highly compressed form this brief episode, taken out of Flaubert&#039;s notes for &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;, frames the specifically modern structures of Orientalism, which after all is one discipline among the secular (and quasi-religious) faiths of nineteenth-century European thought. We have already characterized the general scope of thought about the Orient that was handed on through the medieval and Renaissance periods, for which Islam was the essential Orient. During the eighteenth century, however, there were a number of new, interlocking elements that hinted at the coming evangelical phase, whose outlines Flaubert was later to re-create.&lt;br /&gt;
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For one, the Orient was being opened out considerably beyond the Islamic lands. This quantitative change was to a large degree the result of continuing, and expanding, European exploration of the rest of the world. The increasing influence of travel literature, imaginary utopias, moral voyages, and scientific reporting brought the Orient into sharper and more extended focus. If Orientalism is indebted principally to the fruitful Eastern discoveries of Anquetil and Jones during the latter third of the century, these must be seen in the wider context created by Cook and Bougainville, the voyages of Tournefort and Adanson, by the President de Brosses&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire des navigations aux terres australes&#039;&#039;, by French traders in the Pacific, by Jesuit missionaries in China and the Americas, by William Dampier&#039;s explorations and reports, by innumerable speculations on giants, Patagonians, savages, natives, and monsters supposedly residing to the far east, west, south, and north of Europe. But all such widening horizons had Europe firmly in the privileged center, as main observer (or mainly observed, as in Goldsmith&#039;s &#039;&#039;Citizen of the World&#039;&#039;). For even as Europe moved itself outwards, its sense of cultural strength was fortified. From travelers&#039; tales, and not only from great institutions like the various India companies, colonies were created and ethnocentric perspectives secured.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For some illuminating material see John P. Nash, &amp;quot;The Connection of Oriental Studies with Commerce, Art, and Literature During the 18th-19th Centuries,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society Journal&#039;&#039; 15 (1930): 33-9; also John F. Laffey, &amp;quot;Roots of French Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century: The Case of Lyon,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;French Historical Studies&#039;&#039; 6, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 78-92, and R. Leportier, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Orient Porte des Indes&#039;&#039; (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1970). There is a great deal of information in Henri Omont, &#039;&#039;Missions archeologiques francaises en Orient aux XVII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; et XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecles&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1902), and in Margaret T. Hodgen, &#039;&#039;Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries&#039;&#039; (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), as well as in Norman Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam, Europe and Empire&#039;&#039; (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966). Two indispensable short studies are Albert Hourani, &amp;quot;Islam and the Philosophers of History,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Middle Eastern Studies&#039;&#039; 3, no. 3 (April 1967): 206-68, and Maxime Rodinson, &amp;quot;The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Legacy of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Joseph Schacht and C. E. Bosworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 9-62.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For another, a more knowledgeable attitude towards the alien and exotic was abetted not only by travelers and explorers but also by historians for whom European experience could profitably be compared with other, as well as older, civilizations. That powerful current in eighteenth-century historical anthropology, described by scholars as the confrontation of the gods, meant that Gibbon could read the lessons of Rome&#039;s decline in the rise of Islam, just as Vico could understand modern civilization in terms of the barbaric, poetic splendor of their earliest beginnings. Whereas Renaissance historians judged the Orient inflexibly as an enemy, those of the eighteenth century confronted the Orient&#039;s peculiarities with some detachment and with some attempt at dealing directly with Oriental source material, perhaps because such a technique helped a European to know himself better. George Sale&#039;s translation of the Koran and his accompanying preliminary discourse illustrate the change. Unlike his predecessors, Sale tried to deal with Arab history in terms of Arab sources; moreover, he let Muslim commentators on the sacred text speak for themselves.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;P. M. Holt, &amp;quot;The Treatment of Arab History by Prideaux, Ockley, and Sale,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Historians of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 302. See also Holt&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Study of Modern Arab History&#039;&#039; (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1965).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In Sale, as throughout the eighteenth century, simple comparatism was the early phase of the comparative disciplines (philology, anatomy, jurisprudence, religion) which were to become the boast of nineteenth-century method.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there was a tendency among some thinkers to exceed comparative study, and its judicious surveys of mankind from &amp;quot;China to Peru,&amp;quot; by sympathetic identification. This is a third eighteenth-century element preparing the way for modern Orientalism. What today we call historicism is an eighteenth-century idea; Vico, Herder, and Hamann, among others, believed that all cultures were organically and internally coherent, bound together by a spirit, genius, &#039;&#039;Klima&#039;&#039;, or national idea which an outsider could penetrate only by an act of historical sympathy. Thus Herder&#039;s &#039;&#039;Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit&#039;&#039; (1784-1791) was a panoramic display of various cultures, each permeated by an inimical creative spirit, each accessible only to an observer who sacrificed his prejudices to &#039;&#039;Einfuhlung&#039;&#039;. Imbued with the, populist and pluralist sense of history advocated by Herder and others,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The view of Herder as populist and pluralist is advocated by Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas&#039;&#039; (New York: Viking Press, 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an eighteenth-century mind could breach the doctrinal walls erected between the West and Islam and see hidden elements of kinship between himself and the Orient. Napoleon is a famous instance of this (usually selective) identification by sympathy. Mozart is another; &#039;&#039;The Magic Flute&#039;&#039; (in which Masonic codes intermingle with visions of a benign Orient) and &#039;&#039;The Abduction from the Seraglio&#039;&#039; locate a particularly magnanimous form of humanity in the Orient. And this, much more than the modish habits of &amp;quot;Turkish&amp;quot; music, drew Mozart sympathetically eastwards.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is very difficult nonetheless to separate such intuitions of the Orient as Mozart&#039;s from the entire range of pre-Romantic and Romantic representations of the Orient as exotic locale. Popular Orientalism during the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth attained a vogue of considerable intensity. But even this vogue, easily identifiable in William Beckford, Byron, Thomas Moore, and Goethe, cannot be simply detached from the interest taken in Gothic tales, pseudomedieval idylls, visions of barbaric splendor and cruelty. Thus in some cases the Oriental representation can be associated with Piranesi&#039;s prisons, in others with Tiepolo&#039;s luxurious ambiences, in still others with the exotic sublimity of late-eighteenth-century paintings.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For a discussion of such motifs and representations, see Jean Starobinski, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Liberty&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1700-1789&#039;&#039;, trans. Bernard C. Smith (Geneva: Skira, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Later in the nineteenth century, in the works of Delacroix and literally dozens of other French and British painters, the Oriental genre tableau carried representation into visual expression and a life of its own (which this book unfortunately must scant). Sensuality, promise, terror, sublimity, idyllic pleasure, intense energy: the Orient as a figure in the pre-Romantic, pretechnical Orientalist imagination of late-eighteenth-century Europe was really a chameleonlike quality called (adjectivally) &amp;quot;Oriental.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;There are a small number of studies on this too-little-investigated subject. Some well-known ones are: Martha P. Conant, &#039;&#039;The Oriental Tale in England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039; (1908; reprint ed., New York: Octagon Books, 1967); Marie E. de Meester, &#039;&#039;Oriental Influences in the English Literature of the Nineteenth Century, Anglistische Forschungen&#039;&#039;, no. 46 (Heidelberg, 1915); Byron Porter Smith, &#039;&#039;Islam in English Literature&#039;&#039; (Beirut: American Press, 1939). See also Jean-Luc Doutrelant, &amp;quot;L&#039;Orient tragique au XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue des Sciences Humaines&#039;&#039; 146 (April-June 1972): 255-82.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But this free-floating Orient would be severely curtailed with the advent of academic Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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A fourth element preparing the way for modern Orientalist structures was the whole impulse to classify nature and man into types. The greatest names are, of course, Linnaeus and Buffon, but the intellectual process by which bodily (and soon moral, intellectual, and spiritual) extension--the typical materiality of an object--could be transformed from mere spectacle to the precise measurement of characteristic elements was very widespread. Linnaeus said that every note made about a natural type &amp;quot;should be a product of number, of form, of proportion, of situation,&amp;quot; and indeed, if one looks in Kant or Diderot or Johnson, there is everywhere a similar penchant for dramatizing general features, for reducing vast numbers of objects to a smaller number of orderable and describable &#039;&#039;types&#039;&#039;. In natural history, in anthropology, in cultural generalization, a type had a particular &#039;&#039;character&#039;&#039; which provided the observer with a designation and, as Foucault says, &amp;quot;a controlled derivation.&amp;quot; These types and characters belonged to a system, a network of related generalizations. Thus,&lt;br /&gt;
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all designation must be accomplished by means of a certain relation to all other possible designations. To know what properly appertains to one individual is to have before one the classification--or the possibility of classifying--all others.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Michel Foucault, &#039;&#039;The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), pp. 138, 144. See also Francois Jacob, &#039;&#039;The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity&#039;&#039;, trans. Betty E. Spillmann (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 50 and passim, and Georges Canguilhem, &#039;&#039;La Connaissance de la vie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Gustave-Joseph Vrin, 1969), pp. 44-63.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the writing of philosophers, historians, encyclopedists, and essayists we find character-as-designation appearing as physiological-moral classification: there are, for example, the wild men, the Europeans, the Asiatics, and so forth. These appear of course in Linnaeus, but also in Montesquieu, in Johnson, in Blumenbach, in Soemmerring, in Kant. Physiological and moral characteristics are distributed more or less equally: the American is &amp;quot;red, choleric, erect,&amp;quot; the Asiatic is &amp;quot;yellow, melancholy, rigid,&amp;quot; the African is &amp;quot;black, phlegmatic, lax.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See John G. Burke, &amp;quot;The Wild Man&#039;s Pedigree: Scientific Method and Racial Anthropology,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism&#039;&#039;, ed. Edward Dudley and Maximillian E. Novak (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), pp. 262-8. See also Jean Biou, &amp;quot;Lumieres et anthropophagie,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue des Sciences Humaines&#039;&#039; 146 (April-June 1972): 223-34.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But such designations gather power when, later in the nineteenth century, they are allied with character as derivation, as genetic type. In Vico and Rousseau, for example, the force of moral generalization is enhanced by the precision with which dramatic, almost archetypal figures--primitive man, giants, heroes--are shown to be the genesis of current moral, philosophic, even linguistic issues. Thus when an Oriental was referred to, it was in terms of such genetic universals as his &amp;quot;primitive&amp;quot; state, his primary characteristics, his particular spiritual background.&lt;br /&gt;
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The four elements I have described--expansion, historical confrontation, sympathy, classification--are the currents in eighteenth-century thought on whose presence the specific intellectual and institutional structures of modern Orientalism depend. Without them Orientalism, as we shall see presently, could not have occurred. Moreover, these elements had the effect of releasing the Orient generally, and Islam in particular, from the narrowly religious scrutiny by which it had hitherto been examined (and judged) by the Christian West. In other words, modern Orientalism derives from secularizing elements in eighteenth-century European culture. One, the expansion of the Orient further east geographically and further back temporally loosened, even dissolved, the Biblical framework considerably. Reference points were no longer Christianity and Judaism, with their fairly modest calendars and maps, but India, China, Japan, and Sumer, Buddhism, Sanskrit, Zoroastrianism, and Manu. Two, the capacity for dealing historically (and not reductively, as a topic of ecclesiastical politics) with non-European and non-Judeo-Christian cultures was strengthened as history itself was conceived of more radically than before; to understand Europe properly meant also understanding the objective relations between Europe and its own previously unreachable temporal and cultural frontiers. In a sense, John of Segovia&#039;s idea of &#039;&#039;contraferentia&#039;&#039; between Orient and Europe was realized, but in a wholly secular way; Gibbon could treat Mohammed as a historical figure who influenced Europe and not as a diabolical miscreant hovering somewhere between magic and false prophecy. Three, a selective identification with regions and cultures not one&#039;s own wore down the obduracy of self and identity, which had been polarized into a community of embattled believers facing barbarian hordes. The borders of Christian Europe no longer served as a kind of custom house; the notions of human association and of human possibility acquired a very wide general--as opposed to parochial--legitimacy. Four, the classifications of mankind were systematically multiplied as the possibilities of designation and derivation were refined beyond the categories of what Vico called gentile and sacred nations; race, color, origin, temperament, character, and types overwhelmed the distinction between Christians and everyone else.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if these interconnected elements represent a secularizing tendency, this is not to say that the old religious patterns of human history and destiny and &amp;quot;the existential paradigms&amp;quot; were simply removed. Far from it: they were reconstituted, redeployed, redistributed in the secular frameworks just enumerated. For anyone who studied the Orient a secular vocabulary in keeping with these frameworks was required. Yet if Orientalism provided the vocabulary, the conceptual repertoire, the techniques--for this is what, from the end of the eighteenth century on, Orientalism &#039;&#039;did&#039;&#039; and what Orientalism &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039;--it also retained, as an undislodged current in its discourse, a reconstructed religious impulse, a naturalized supernaturalism. What I shall try to show is that this impulse in Orientalism resided in the Orientalist&#039;s conception of himself, of the Orient, and of his discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
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The modern Orientalist was, in his view, a hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity, alienation, and strangeness which he himself had properly distinguished. His research reconstructed the Orient&#039;s lost languages, mores, even mentalities, as Champollion reconstructed Egyptian hieroglyphics out of the Rosetta Stone. The specific Orientalist techniques--lexicography, grammar, translation, cultural decoding--restored, fleshed out, reasserted the values both of an ancient, classical Orient and of the traditional disciplines of philology, history, rhetoric, and doctrinal polemic. But in the process, the Orient and Orientalist disciplines changed dialectically, for they could not survive in their original form. The Orient, even in the &amp;quot;classic&amp;quot; form which the Orientalist usually studied, was modernized, restored to the present; the traditional disciplines too were brought into contemporary culture. Yet both bore the traces of &#039;&#039;power&#039;&#039;--power to have resurrected, indeed created, the Orient, power that dwelt in the new, scientifically advanced techniques of philology and of anthropological generalization. In short, having transported the Orient into modernity, the Orientalist could celebrate his method, and his position, as that of a secular creator, a man who made new worlds as God had once made the old. As for carrying on such methods and such positions beyond the life-span of any individual Orientalist, there would be a secular tradition of continuity, a lay order of disciplined methodologists, whose brotherhood would be based, not on blood lineage, but upon a common discourse, a praxis, a library, a set of received ideas, in short, a doxology, common to everyone who entered the ranks. Flaubert was prescient enough to see that in time the modern Orientalist would become a copyist, like Bouvard and Pecuchet; but during the early days, in the careers of Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan, no such danger was apparent.&lt;br /&gt;
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My thesis is that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism. In the form of new texts and ideas, the East was accommodated to these structures. Linguists and explorers like Jones and Anquetil were contributors to modern Orientalism, certainly, but what distinguishes modern Orientalism as a field, a group of ideas, a discourse, is the work of a later generation than theirs. If we use the Napoleonic expedition (1798-1801) as a sort of first enabling experience for modern Orientalism, we can consider its inaugural heroes--in Islamic studies, Sacy and Renan and Lane--to be builders of the field, creators of a tradition, progenitors of the Orientalist brotherhood. What Sacy, Renan, and Lane did was to place Orientalism on a scientific and rational basis. This entailed not only their own exemplary work but also the creation of a vocabulary and ideas that could be used impersonally by anyone who wished to become an Orientalist. Their inauguration of Orientalism was a considerable feat. It made possible a scientific terminology; it banished obscurity and instated a special form of illumination for the Orient; it established the figure of the Orientalist as central authority &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; the Orient; it legitimized a special kind of specifically coherent Orientalist work; it put into cultural circulation a form of discursive currency by whose presence the Orient henceforth would be &#039;&#039;spoken for&#039;&#039;; above all, the work of the inaugurators carved out a field of study and a family of ideas which in turn could form a community of scholars whose lineage, traditions, and ambitions were at once internal to the field and external enough for general prestige. The more Europe encroached upon the Orient during the nineteenth century, the more Orientalism gained in public confidence. Yet if this gain coincided with a loss in originality, we should not be entirely surprised, since its mode, from the beginning, was reconstruction and repetition.&lt;br /&gt;
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One final observation: The late-eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century ideas, institutions, and figures I shall deal with in this chapter are an important part, a crucial elaboration, of the first phase of the greatest age of territorial acquisition ever known. By the end of World War I Europe had colonized 85 percent of the earth. To say simply that modern Orientalism has been an aspect of both imperialism and colonialism is not to say anything very disputable. Yet it is not enough to say it; it needs to be worked through analytically and historically. I am interested in showing how modern Orientalism, unlike the precolonial awareness of Dante and d&#039;Herbelot, embodies a systematic discipline of &#039;&#039;accumulation&#039;&#039;. And far from this being exclusively an intellectual or theoretical feature, it made Orientalism fatally tend towards the systematic accumulation of human beings and territories. To reconstruct a dead or lost Oriental language meant ultimately to reconstruct a dead or neglected Orient; it also meant that reconstructive precision, science, even imagination could prepare the way for what armies, administrations, and bureaucracies would later do on the ground, in the Orient. In a sense, the vindication of Orientalism was not only its intellectual or artistic successes but its later effectiveness, its usefulness, its authority. Surely it deserves serious attention on all those counts.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan: &#039;&#039;Rational Anthropology and Philological Laboratory&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
The two great themes of Silvestre de Sacy&#039;s life are heroic effort and a dedicated sense of pedagogic and rational utility. Born in 1757 into a Jansenist family whose occupation was traditionally that of &#039;&#039;notaire&#039;&#039;, Antoine-Isaac-Silvestre was privately tutored at a Benedictine abbey, first in Arabic, Syriac, and Chaldean, then in Hebrew. Arabic in particular was the language that opened the Orient to him since it was in Arabic, according to Joseph Reinaud, that Oriental material, both sacred and profane, was then to be found in its oldest and most instructive form.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Henri Deherain, &#039;&#039;Silvestre de Sacy: Ses Contemporains et ses disciples&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1938), p. 111.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Although a legitimist, in 1769 he was appointed the first teacher of Arabic at the newly created school of &#039;&#039;langues orientales vivantes&#039;&#039;, of which he became director in 1824. In 1806 he was named professor at the College de France, although from 1805 on he was the resident Orientalist at the French Foreign Ministry. There his work (unpaid until 1811) at first was to translate the bulletins of the Grande Armee and Napoleon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manifesto&#039;&#039; of 1806, in which it was hoped that &amp;quot;Muslim fanaticism&amp;quot; could be excited against Russian Orthodoxy. But for many years thereafter Sacy created interpreters for the French Oriental dragomanate, as well as future scholars. When the French occupied Algiers in 1830, it was Sacy who translated the proclamation to the Algerians; he was regularly consulted on all diplomatic matters relating to the Orient by the foreign minister, and on occasion by the minister of war. At the age of seventy-five he replaced Dacier as secretary of the Academie des Inscriptions, and also became curator of Oriental manuscripts at the Bibliotheque royale. Throughout his long and distinguished career his name was rightly associated with the restructuring and re-forming of education (particularly in Oriental studies) in post-Revolutionary France.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For these and other details see ibid., pp. i-xxxiii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; With Cuvier, Sacy in 1832 was made a new peer of France.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not only because he was the first president of the Societe asiatique (founded in 1822) that Sacy&#039;s name is associated with the beginning of modern Orientalism; it is because his work virtually put before the profession an entire systematic body of texts, a pedagogic practice, a scholarly tradition, and an important link between Oriental scholarship and public policy. In Sacy&#039;s work, for the first time in Europe since the Council of Vienne, there was a self-conscious methodological principle at work as a coeval with scholarly discipline. No less important, Sacy always felt himself to be a man standing at the beginning of an important revisionist project. He was a self-aware inaugurator, and more to the point of our general thesis, he acted in his writing like a secularized ecclesiastic for whom his Orient and his students were doctrine and parishioners respectively. The Duc de Broglie, an admiring contemporary, said of Sacy&#039;s work that it reconciled the manner of a scientist with that of a Biblical teacher, and that Sacy was the one man able to reconcile &amp;quot;the goals of Leibniz with the efforts of Bossuet.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Duc de Broglie, &amp;quot;Eloge de Silvestre de Sacy,&amp;quot; in Sacy, &#039;&#039;Melanges de litterature orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: E. Ducrocq, 1833), p. xii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Consequently everything he wrote was addressed specifically to students (in the case of his first work, his &#039;&#039;Principes de grammaire generale&#039;&#039; of 1799, the student was his own son) and presented, not as a novelty, but as a revised extract of the best that had already been done, said, or written.&lt;br /&gt;
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These two characteristics--the didactic presentation to students and the avowed intention of repeating by revision and extract--are crucial. Sacy&#039;s writing always conveys the tone of a voice speaking; his prose is dotted with first-person pronouns, with personal qualifications, with rhetorical presence. Even at his most recondite--as in a scholarly note on third-century Sassanid numismatics--one senses not so much a pen writing as a voice pronouncing. The keynote of his work is contained in the opening lines of the dedication to his son of the &#039;&#039;Principes de grammaire generale&#039;&#039;: &amp;quot;C&#039;est a toi, mon cher Fils, que ce petit ouvrage a ete entrepris&amp;quot;--which is to say, I am writing (or speaking) to you because you need to know these things, and since they don&#039;t exist in any serviceable form, I have done the work myself for you. Direct address: utility: effort: immediate and beneficent rationality. For Sacy believed that everything could be made clear and reasonable, no matter how difficult the task and how obscure the subject. Here are Bossuet&#039;s sternness and Leibniz&#039;s abstract humanism, as well as the &#039;&#039;tone&#039;&#039; of Rousseau, all together in the same style.&lt;br /&gt;
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The effect of Sacy&#039;s tone is to form a circle sealing off him and his audience from the world at large, the way a teacher and his pupils together in a closed classroom also form a sealed space. Unlike the matter of physics, philosophy, or classical literature, the matter of Oriental studies is arcane; it is of import to people who already have an interest in the Orient but want to know the Orient better, in a more orderly way, and here the pedagogical discipline is more effective than it is attractive. The didactic speaker, therefore, &#039;&#039;displays&#039;&#039; his material to the disciples, whose role it is to receive what is given to them in the form of carefully selected and arranged topics. Since the Orient is old and distant, the teacher&#039;s display is a restoration, a re-vision of what has disappeared from the wider ken. And since also the vastly rich (in space, time, and cultures) Orient cannot be totally exposed, only its most representative parts need be. Thus Sacy&#039;s focus is the anthology, the chrestomathy, the tableau, the survey of general principles, in which a relatively small set of powerful examples delivers the Orient to the student. Such examples are powerful for two reasons: one, because they reflect Sacy&#039;s powers as a Western authority deliberately taking from the Orient what its distance and eccentricity have hitherto kept hidden, and two, because these examples have the semiotical power in them (or imparted to them by the Orientalist) to signify the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of Sacy&#039;s work is essentially compilatory; it is thus ceremoniously didactic and painstakingly revisionist. Aside from the &#039;&#039;Principes de grammaire generale&#039;&#039;, he produced a &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe&#039;&#039; in three volumes (1806 and 1827), an anthology of Arab grammatical writing (1825), an Arabic grammar of 1810 (&#039;&#039;a l&#039;usage des eleves de l&#039;Ecole speciale&#039;&#039;), treatises on Arabic prosody and the Druze religion, and numerous short works on Oriental numismatics, onomastics, epigraphy, geography, history, and weights and measures. He did a fair number of translations and two extended commentaries on &#039;&#039;Calila and Dumna&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Maqamat&#039;&#039; of al-Hariri. As editor, memorialist, and historian of modern learning Sacy was similarly energetic. There was very little of note in other related disciplines with which he was not &#039;&#039;au courant&#039;&#039;, although his own writing was single-minded and, in its non-Orientalist respects, of a narrow positivist range.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet when in 1802 the Institut de France was commissioned by Napoleon to form a &#039;&#039;tableau generale&#039;&#039; on the state and progress of the arts and sciences since 1789, Sacy was chosen to be one of the team of writers: he was the most rigorous of specialists and the most historical-minded of generalists. Dacier&#039;s report, as it was known informally, embodied many of Sacy&#039;s predilections as well as containing his contributions on the state of Oriental learning. Its title&#039;&#039;--Tableau historique de l&#039;erudition francaise&#039;&#039;--announces the new historical (as opposed to sacred) consciousness. Such consciousness is dramatic: learning can be arranged on a stage set, as it were, where its totality can be readily surveyed. Addressed to the king, Dacier&#039;s preface stated the theme perfectly. Such a survey as this made it possible to do something no other sovereign had attempted, namely to take in, with one &#039;&#039;coup d&#039;oeil&#039;&#039;, the whole of human knowledge. Had such a &#039;&#039;tableau historique&#039;&#039; been undertaken in former times, Dacier continued, we might today have possessed many masterpieces now either lost or destroyed; the interest and utility of the tableau were that it preserved knowledge and made it immediately accessible. Dacier intimated that such a task was simplified by Napoleon&#039;s Oriental expedition, one of whose results was to heighten the degree of modern geographical knowledge.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Bon Joseph Dacier, &#039;&#039;Tableau historique de l&#039;erudition francaise, ou Rapport sur les progres de l&#039;histoire et de la litterature ancienne depuis 1789&#039;&#039; (Paris: Imprimerie imperiale, 1810), pp. 23, 35, 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (At no point more than in Dacier&#039;s entire &#039;&#039;discours&#039;&#039; do we see how the dramatic form of a &#039;&#039;tableau historique&#039;&#039; has its use-equivalent in the arcades and counters of a modern department store.)&lt;br /&gt;
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The importance of the &#039;&#039;Tableau historique&#039;&#039; for an understanding of Orientalism&#039;s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of Orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the Orientalist&#039;s relationship to his subject matter. In Sacy&#039;s pages on Orientalism--as elsewhere in his writing--he speaks of his own work as having &#039;&#039;uncovered&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;brought to light&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;rescued&#039;&#039; a vast amount of obscure matter. Why? In order &#039;&#039;to place it before&#039;&#039; the student. For like all his learned contemporaries Sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. Knowledge was essentially the &#039;&#039;making visible&#039;&#039; of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of Benthamite Panopticon. Scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power: it gained for its user (and his students) tools and knowledge which (if he was a historian) had hitherto been lost.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Michel Foucault, &#039;&#039;Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison&#039;&#039;, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), pp. 193-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And indeed the vocabulary of specialized power and acquisition is particularly associated with Sacy&#039;s reputation as a pioneer Orientalist. His heroism as a scholar was to have dealt successfully with insurmountable difficulties; he acquired the means to present a field to his students where there was none. He &#039;&#039;made&#039;&#039; the books, the precepts, the examples, said the Duc de Broglie of Sacy. The result was the production of material about the Orient, methods for studying it, and exempla that even Orientals did not have.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Broglie, &amp;quot;Eloge de Silvestre de Sacy,&amp;quot; p. 107.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Compared with the labors of a Hellenist or a Latinist working on the Institut team, Sacy&#039;s labors were awesome. They had the texts, the conventions, the schools; he did not, and consequently had to go about making them. The dynamic of primary loss and subsequent gain in Sacy&#039;s writing is obsessional; his investment in it was truly heavy. Like his colleagues in other fields he believed that knowledge is seeing--pan-optically, so to speak--but unlike them he not only had to identify the knowledge, he had to decipher it, interpret it, and most difficult, make it available. Sacy&#039;s achievement was to have produced a whole field. As a European he ransacked the Oriental archives, and he could do so without leaving France. What texts he isolated, he then brought back; he doctored them; then he annotated, codified, arranged, and commented on them. In time, the Orient as such became less important than what the Orientalist made of it; thus, drawn by Sacy into the sealed discursive place of a pedagogical tableau, the Orientalist&#039;s Orient was thereafter reluctant to emerge into reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sacy was much too intelligent to let his views and his practice stand without supporting argument. First of all, he always made it plain why the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; on its own could not survive a European&#039;s taste, intelligence, or patience. Sacy defended the utility and interest of such things as Arabic poetry, but what he was really saying was that Arabic poetry had to be properly transformed by the Orientalist before it could begin to be appreciated. The reasons were broadly epistemological, but they also contained an Orientalistic self-justification. Arabic poetry was produced by a completely strange (to Europeans) people, under hugely different climatic, social, and historical conditions from those a European knows; in addition, such poetry as this was nourished by &amp;quot;opinions, prejudices, beliefs, superstitions which we can acquire only after long and painful study.&amp;quot; Even if one does go through the rigors of specialized training, much of the description in the poetry will not be accessible to Europeans &amp;quot;who have attained to a higher degree of civilization.&amp;quot; Yet what we can master is of great value to us as Europeans accustomed to disguise our exterior attributes, our bodily activity, and our relationship to nature. Therefore, the Orientalist&#039;s use is to make available to his compatriots a considerable range of unusual experience, and still more valuable, a kind of literature capable of helping us understand the &amp;quot;truly divine&amp;quot; poetry of the Hebrews.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sacy, &#039;&#039;Melanges de litterature orientale&#039;&#039;, pp. 107, 110, 111-12.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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So if the Orientalist is necessary because he fishes some useful gems out of the distant Oriental deep, and since the Orient cannot be known without his mediation, it is also true that Oriental writing itself ought not to be taken in whole. This is Sacy&#039;s introduction to his theory of fragments, a common Romantic concern. Not only are Oriental literary productions essentially alien to the European; they also do not contain a sustained enough interest, nor are they written with enough &amp;quot;taste and critical spirit,&amp;quot; to merit publication except as extracts (&#039;&#039;pour meriter d&#039;etre publies autrement que par extrait&#039;&#039;).&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Silvestre de Sacy, &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe, ou Extraits de divers ecrivains arabes, tant en prose qu&#039;en vers, avec une traduction francaise et des notes, a l&#039;usage des eleves de l&#039;Ecole royale et speciale des langues orientales vivantes&#039;&#039; (vol. 1, 1826; reprint ed., Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1973), p. viii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore the Orientalist is required to &#039;&#039;present&#039;&#039; the Orient by a series of representative fragments, fragments republished, explicated, annotated, and surrounded with still more fragments. For such a presentation a special genre is required: the chrestomathy, which is where in Sacy&#039;s case the usefulness and interest of Orientalism are most directly and profitably displayed. Sacy&#039;s most famous production was the three-volume &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe&#039;&#039;, which was sealed at the outset, so to speak, with an internally rhyming Arabic couplet: &amp;quot;Kitab al-anis al-mufid lil-Taleb al-mustafid;/wa gam&#039;i al shathur min manthoum wa manthur&amp;quot; (A book pleasant and profitable for the studious pupil;/it collects fragments of both poetry and prose).&lt;br /&gt;
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Sacy&#039;s anthologies were used very widely in Europe for several generations. Although what they contain was claimed as typical, they submerge and cover the censorship of the Orient exercised by the Orientalist. Moreover, the internal order of their contents, the arrangement of their parts, the choice of fragments, never reveal their secret; one has the impression that if fragments were not chosen for their importance, or for their chronological development, or for their aesthetic beauty (as Sacy&#039;s were not), they must nevertheless embody a certain Oriental naturalness, or typical inevitability. But this too is never said. Sacy claims simply to have exerted himself on behalf of his students, to make it unnecessary for them to purchase (or read) a grotesquely large library of Oriental stuff. In time, the reader forgets the Orientalist&#039;s effort and takes the restructuring of the Orient signified by a chrestomathy as the Orient &#039;&#039;tout court&#039;&#039;. Objective structure (designation of Orient) and subjective restructure (representation of Orient by Orientalist) become interchangeable. The Orient is overlaid with the Orientalist&#039;s rationality; its principles become his. From being distant, it becomes available; from being unsustainable on its own, it becomes pedagogically useful; from being lost, it is found, even if its missing parts have been made to drop away from it in the process. Sacy&#039;s anthologies not only supplement the Orient; they supply it as Oriental presence to the West.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For the notions of &amp;quot;supplementarity,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;supply,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;supplication,&amp;quot; see Jacques Derrida, &#039;&#039;De la grammatologie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967), p. 203 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Sacy&#039;s work canonizes the Orient; it begets a canon of textual objects passed on from one generation of students to the next.&lt;br /&gt;
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And the living legacy of Sacy&#039;s disciples was astounding. Every major Arabist in Europe during the nineteenth century traced his intellectual authority back to him. Universities and academies in France, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and especially Germany were dotted with the students who formed themselves at his feet and through the anthological tableaux provided by his work.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For a partial list of Sacy&#039;s students and influence see Johann W. Fuck, &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955), pp. 156-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As with all intellectual patrimonies, however, enrichments and restrictions were passed on simultaneously. Sacy&#039;s genealogical originality was to have treated the Orient as something to be restored not only because of but also despite the modern Orient&#039;s disorderly and elusive presence. Sacy &#039;&#039;placed&#039;&#039; the Arabs &#039;&#039;in&#039;&#039; the Orient, which was itself placed in the general tableau of modern learning. Orientalism belonged therefore to European scholarship, but its material had to be re-created by the Orientalist before it could enter the arcades alongside Latinism and Hellenism. Each Orientalist re-created his own Orient according to the fundamental epistemological rules of loss and gain first supplied and enacted by Sacy. Just as he was the father of Orientalism, he was also the discipline&#039;s first sacrifice, for in translating new texts, fragments, and extracts subsequent Orientalists entirely displaced Sacy&#039;s work by supplying their own restored Orient. Nevertheless the process he started would continue, as philology in particular developed systematic and institutional powers Sacy had never exploited. This was Renan&#039;s accomplishment: to have associated the Orient with the most recent comparative disciplines, of which philology was one of the most eminent.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between Sacy and Renan is the difference between inauguration and continuity. Sacy is the originator, whose work represents the field&#039;s emergence and its status as a nineteenth-century discipline with roots in revolutionary Romanticism. Renan derives from Orientalism&#039;s second generation: it was his task to solidify the official discourse of Orientalism, to systematize its insights, and to establish its intellectual and worldly institutions. For Sacy, it was his personal efforts that launched and vitalized the field and its structures; for Renan, it was his adaptation of Orientalism to philology and both of them to the intellectual culture of his time that perpetuated the Orientalist structures intellectually and gave them greater visibility.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan was a figure in his own right neither of total originality nor of absolute derivativeness. Therefore as a cultural force or as an important Orientalist he cannot be reduced simply to his personality nor to a set of schematic ideas in which he believed. Rather, Renan is best grasped as a dynamic force whose opportunities were already created for him by pioneers like Sacy, yet who brought their achievements into the culture as a kind of currency which he circulated and recirculated with (to force the image a little further) his own unmistakable re-currency. Renan is a figure who must be grasped, in short, as a type of cultural and intellectual praxis, as a style for making Orientalist statements within what Michel Foucault would call the archive of his time.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Foucault&#039;s characterization of an archive can be found in &#039;&#039;The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language&#039;&#039;, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith and Rupert Sawyer (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 79-131. Gabriel Monod, one of Renan&#039;s younger and very perspicacious contemporaries, remarks that Renan was by no means a revolutionary in linguistics, archaeology, or exegesis, yet because he had the widest and the most precise learning of anyone in his period, he was its most eminent representative (&#039;&#039;Renan, Taine, Michelet&#039;&#039; [Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1894], pp. 40-1). See also Jean-Louis Dumas, &amp;quot;La Philosophie de l&#039;histoire de Renan,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale&#039;&#039; 77, no. 1 (January-March 1972): 100-28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What matters is not only the things that Renan said but also how he said them, what, given his background and training, he chose to use as his subject matter, what to combine with what, and so forth. Renan&#039;s relations with his Oriental subject matter, with his time and audience, even with his own work, can be described, then, without resorting to formulae that depend on an unexamined assumption of ontological stability (e.g., the &#039;&#039;Zeitgeist&#039;&#039;, the history of ideas, life-and-times). Instead we are able to read Renan as a writer doing something describable, in a place defined temporally, spatially, and culturally (hence archivally), for an audience and, no less important, for the furtherance of his own position in the Orientalism of his era.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan came to Orientalism from philology, and it is the extraordinarily rich and celebrated cultural position of, that discipline that endowed Orientalism with its most important technical characteristics. For anyone to whom the word &#039;&#039;philology&#039;&#039; suggests dry-as-dust and inconsequential word-study, however, Nietzsche&#039;s proclamation that along with the greatest minds of the nineteenth century he is a philologist will come as a surprise--though not if Balzac&#039;s &#039;&#039;Louis Lambert&#039;&#039; is recalled:&lt;br /&gt;
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What a marvelous book one would write by narrating the life and adventures of a word! Undoubtedly a word has received various impressions of the events for which it was used; depending on the places it was used, a word has awakened different kinds of impressions in different people; but is it not more grand still to consider a word in its triple aspect of soul, body, and movement?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Honore de Balzac, &#039;&#039;Louis Lambert&#039;&#039; (Paris: Calmann-Levy, n.d.), p. 4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the category, Nietzsche will ask later, that includes himself, Wagner, Schopenhauer, Leopardi, all as philologists? The term seems to include both a gift for exceptional spiritual insight into language and the ability to produce work whose articulation is of aesthetic and historical power. Although the profession of philology was born the day in 1777 &amp;quot;when F. A. Wolf invented for himself the name of &#039;&#039;stud. philol&#039;&#039;.,&amp;quot; Nietzsche is nevertheless at pains to show that professional students of the Greek and Roman classics are commonly incapable of understanding their discipline: &amp;quot;they never reach the &#039;&#039;roots of the matter&#039;&#039;: they never adduce philology as a problem.&amp;quot; For simply &amp;quot;as knowledge of the ancient world philology cannot, of course, last forever; its material is exhaustible.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Nietzsche&#039;s remarks on philology are everywhere throughout his works. See principally his notes for &amp;quot;Wir Philologen&amp;quot; taken from his notebooks for the period January-July 1875, translated by William Arrowsmith as &amp;quot;Notes for &#039;We Philologists,&#039; &amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Arion&#039;&#039;, N. S. 1/2 (1974): 279-380; also the passages on language and perspectivism in &#039;&#039;The Will to Power&#039;&#039;, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It is this that the herd of philologists cannot understand. But what distinguishes the few exceptional spirits whom Nietzsche deems worthy of praise--not unambiguously, and not in the cursory way that I am now describing--is their profound relation to modernity, a relation that is given them by their practice of philology.&lt;br /&gt;
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Philology problematizes--itself, its practitioner, the present. It embodies a peculiar condition of being modern and European, since neither of those two categories has true meaning without being related to an earlier alien culture and time. What Nietzsche also sees is philology as something &#039;&#039;born, made&#039;&#039; in the Viconian sense as a sign of human enterprise, created as a category of human discovery, self-discovery, and originality. Philology is a way; of historically setting oneself off, as great artists do, from one&#039;s time and an immediate past even as, paradoxically and antinomically, one actually characterizes one&#039;s modernity by so doing.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between the Friedrich August Wolf of 1777 and the Friedrich Nietzsche of 1875 there is Ernest Renan, an Oriental philologist, also a man with a complex and interesting sense of the way philology and modern culture are involved in each other. In &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039; (written in 1848 but not published till 1890) he wrote that &amp;quot;the founders of modern mind are philologists.&amp;quot; And what is modern mind, he said in the preceding sentence, if not &amp;quot;rationalism, criticism, liberalism, [all of which] were founded on the same day as philology?&amp;quot; Philology, he goes on to say, is both a comparative discipline possessed only by moderns and a symbol of modern (and European) superiority; every advance made by humanity since the fifteenth century can be attributed to minds we should call philological. The job of philology in modern culture (a culture Renan calls philological) is to continue to see reality and nature clearly, thus driving out supernaturalism, and to continue to keep pace with discoveries in the physical sciences. But more than all this, philology enables a general view of human life and of the system of things: &amp;quot;Me, being there at the center, inhaling the perfume of everything, judging, comparing, combining, inducing--in this way I shall arrive at the very system of things.&amp;quot; There is an unmistakable aura of power about the philologist. And Renan makes his point about philology and the natural sciences:&lt;br /&gt;
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To do philosophy is to know things; following Cuvier&#039;s nice phrase, philosophy is &#039;&#039;instructing the world in theory&#039;&#039;. Like Kant I believe that every purely speculative demonstration has no more validity than a mathematical demonstration, and can teach us nothing about existing reality. Philology is the &#039;&#039;exact science&#039;&#039; of mental objects [&#039;&#039;La philologie est la science exacte des choses de&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;l&#039;esprit&#039;&#039;]. It is to the sciences of humanity what physics and chemistry are to the philosophic sciences of bodies.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science: Pensees de 1848&#039;&#039;, 4th ed. (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1890), pp. 141, 142-5, 146, 148, 149.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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I shall return to Renan&#039;s citation from Cuvier, as well as to the constant references to natural science, a little later. For the time being, we should remark that the whole middle section of &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039; is taken up with Renan&#039;s admiring accounts of philology, a science he depicts as being at once the most difficult of all human endeavors to characterize and the most precise of all disciplines. In the aspirations of philology to a veritable science of humanity, Renan associates himself explicitly with Vico, Herder, Wolf, and Montesquieu as well as with such philological near-contemporaries as Wilhelm von Humboldt, Bopp, and the great Orientalist Eugene Burnouf (to whom the volume is dedicated). Renan locates philology centrally within what he everywhere refers to as the march of knowledge, and indeed the book itself is a manifesto of humanistic meliorism, which, considering its subtitle (&amp;quot;Pensees de 1848&amp;quot;) and other books of 1848 like &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, is no mean irony. In a sense, then, the manifesto generally and Renan&#039;s accounts of philology particularly--he had by then already written the massive philological treatise on Semitic languages that had earned him the Prix Volney--were designed to place Renan as an intellectual in a clearly perceptible relationship to the great social issues raised by 1848. That he should choose to fashion such a relationship on the basis of the &#039;&#039;least&#039;&#039; immediate of all intellectual disciplines (philology), the one with the least degree of apparent &#039;&#039;popular&#039;&#039; relevance, the most conservative and the most traditional, suggests the extreme deliberateness of Renan&#039;s position. For he did not really speak as one man to all men but rather as a reflective, specialized voice that took, as he put it in the 1890 preface, the inequality of races and the necessary domination of the many by the few for granted as an antidemocratic law of nature and society.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. xiv and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But how was it possible for Renan to hold himself and what he was saying in such a paradoxical position? For what was philology on the one hand if not a science of all humanity, a science premised on the unity of the human species and the worth of every human detail, and yet what was the philologist on the other hand if not--as Renan himself proved with his notorious race prejudice against the very Oriental Semites whose study had made his professional name&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The entire opening chapter--bk. 1, chap. 1--of the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale et systeme compare des langues semitiques&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, ed. Henriette Psichari (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1947-61), 8: 143-63, is a virtual encyclopedia of race prejudice directed against Semites (i.e., Moslems and Jews). The rest of the treatise is sprinkled generously with the same notions, as are many of Renan&#039;s other works, including &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039;, especially Renan&#039;s notes.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--a harsh divider of men into superior and inferior races, a liberal critic whose work harbored the most esoteric notions of temporality, origins, development, relationship, and human worth? Part of the answer to this question is that, as his early letters of philological intent to Victor Cousin, Michelet, and Alexander von Humboldt show,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Correspondance; 1846-1871&#039;&#039; (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1926), 1: 7-12.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Renan had a strong guild sense as a professional scholar, a professional Orientalist, in fact, a sense that put distance between himself and the masses. But more important, I think, is Renan&#039;s own conception of his role as an Oriental philologist within philology&#039;s larger history, development, and objectives as he saw them. In other words, what may to us seem like paradox was; the expected result of how Renan perceived his dynastic position within philology, its history and inaugural discoveries, and what he, Renan, did within it. Therefore Renan should be characterized, not as speaking &#039;&#039;about&#039;&#039; philology, but rather as &#039;&#039;speaking philologically&#039;&#039; with all the force of an initiate using the encoded language of a new prestigious science none of whose pronouncements about language itself could be construed either directly or naively.&lt;br /&gt;
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As Renan understood, received, and was instructed in philology, the discipline imposed a set of doxological rules upon him. To be a philologist meant to be governed in one&#039;s activity first of all by a set of recent revaluative discoveries that effectively began the science of philology and gave it a distinctive epistemology of its own: I am speaking here of the period roughly from the 1780s to the mid-1830s, the latter part of which coincides with the period of Renan&#039;s beginning his education. His memoirs record how the crisis of religious faith that culminated in the loss of that faith led him in 1845 into a life of scholarship: this was his initiation into philology, its world-view, crises, and style. He believed that on a personal level his life reflected the institutional life of philology. In his life, however, he determined to be as Christian as he once was, only now without Christianity and with what he called &amp;quot;la science laique&amp;quot; (lay science).&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Souvenirs d&#039;enfance et de jeunesse&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 2: 892. Two works by Jean Pommier treat Renan&#039;s mediation between religion and philology in valuable detail: &#039;&#039;Renan, d&#039;apres des documents inedits&#039;&#039; (Paris: Perrin, 1923), pp. 48-68, and &#039;&#039;La Jeunesse clericale d&#039;Ernest Renan&#039;&#039; (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1933). There is a more recent account in J. Chaix-Ruy, &#039;&#039;Ernest Renan&#039;&#039; (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1956), pp. 89-111. The standard description--done more in terms of Renan&#039;s religious vocation--is still valuable also: Pierre Lasserre, &#039;&#039;La Jeunesse d&#039;Ernest Renan: Histoire de la crise religieuse au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039;, 3 vols. (Paris: Garnier Freres, 1925). In vol. 2, pp. 50-166 and 265-98 are useful on the relations between philology, philosophy, and science.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The best example of what a lay science could and could not do was provided years later by Renan in a lecture given at the Sorbonne in 1878, &amp;quot;On the Services Rendered by Philology to the Historical Sciences.&amp;quot; What is revealing about this text is the way Renan clearly had religion in mind when he spoke about philology--for example, what philology, like religion, teaches us about the origins of humanity, civilization, and language--only to make it evident to his hearers that philology could deliver a far less coherent, less knitted together and positive message than religion.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &amp;quot;Des services rendus aux sciences historiques par la philologie,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039; 8: 1228.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Since Renan was irremediably historical and, as he once put it, morphological in his outlook, it stood to reason that the only way in which, as a very young man, he could move out of religion into philological scholarship was to retain in the new lay science the historical world-view he had gained from religion. Hence, &amp;quot;one occupation alone seemed to me to be worthy of filling my life; and that was to pursue my critical research into Christianity [an allusion to Renan&#039;s major scholarly project on the history and origins of Christianity] using those far ampler means offered me by lay science.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Souvenirs&#039;&#039;, p. 892.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Renan had assimilated himself to philology according to his own post-Christian fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between the history offered internally by Christianity and the history offered by philology, a relatively new discipline, is precisely what made modern philology possible, and this Renan knew perfectly. For whenever &amp;quot;philology&amp;quot; is spoken of around the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, we are to understand the &#039;&#039;new&#039;&#039; philology, whose major successes include comparative grammar, the reclassification of languages into families, and the final rejection of the divine origins of language. It is no exaggeration to say that these accomplishments were a more or less direct consequence of the view that held language to be an entirely human phenomenon. And this view became current once it was discovered empirically that the so-called sacred languages (Hebrew, primarily) were neither of primordial antiquity nor of divine provenance. What Foucault has called the discovery of language was therefore a secular event that displaced a religious conception of how God delivered language to man in Eden.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Foucault, &#039;&#039;The Order of Things&#039;&#039;, pp. 290-300. Along with the discrediting of the Edenic origins of language, a number of other events--the Deluge, the building of the Tower Babel--also were discredited as explanations. The most comprehensive history of theories of linguistic origin is Arno Borst, &#039;&#039;Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen uber Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Volker&#039;&#039;, 6 vols. (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1957-63).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Indeed, one of the consequences of this change, by which an etymological, dynastic notion of linguistic filiation was pushed aside by the view of language as a domain all of its own held together with jagged internal structures and coherences, is the dramatic subsidence of interest in the problem of the origins of language. Whereas in the 1770s, which is when Herder&#039;s essay on the origins of language won the 1772 medal from the Berlin Academy, it was all the rage to discuss that problem, by the first decade of the new century it was all but banned as a topic for learned dispute in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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On all sides, and in many different ways, what William Jones stated in his &#039;&#039;Anniversary Discourses&#039;&#039; (1785-1792), or what Franz Bopp put forward in his &#039;&#039;Vergleichende Grammatik&#039;&#039; (1832), is that the divine dynasty of language was ruptured definitively and discredited as an idea. A new historical conception, in short, was needed, since Christianity seemed unable to survive the empirical evidence that reduced the divine status of its major text. For some, as Chateaubriand put it, faith was unshakable despite new knowledge of how Sanskrit outdated Hebrew: &amp;quot;Helas! il est arrive qu&#039;une connaissance plus approfondie de la langue savante de l&#039;Inde a fait rentrer ces siecles innombrables dans le cercle etroit de la Bible. Bien m&#039;en a pris d&#039;etre redevenue croyant, avant d&#039;avoir eprouve cette mortification.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quoted by Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1950), p. 69. On the dangers of too quickly succumbing to generalities about Oriental discoveries, see the reflections of the distinguished contemporary Sinologist Abel Remusat, &#039;&#039;Melanges postumes d&#039;histoire et litterature orientales&#039;&#039; (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843), p. 226 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (Alas! it has happened that a deeper knowledge of the learned language of India has forced innumerable centuries into the narrow circle of the Bible. How lucky for me that I have become a believer again before having had to experience this mortification.) For others, especially philologists like the pioneering Bopp himself, the study of language entailed its own history, philosophy, and learning, all of which did away with any notion of a primal language given by the Godhead to man in Eden. As the study of Sanskrit and the expansive mood of the later eighteenth century seemed to have moved the earliest beginnings of civilization very far east of the Biblical lands, so too language became less of a continuity between an outside power and the human speaker than an internal field created and accomplished by language users among themselves. There was no first language, just as--except by a method I shall discuss presently--there was no simple language.&lt;br /&gt;
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The legacy of these first-generation philologists was, to Renan, of the highest importance, higher even than the work done by Sacy. Whenever he discussed language and philology, whether at the beginning, middle, or end of his long career, he repeated the lessons of the new philology, of which the antidynastic, anticontinuous tenets of a technical (as opposed to a divine) linguistic practice are the major pillar. For the linguist, language cannot be pictured as the result of force emanating unilaterally from God. As Coleridge put it, &amp;quot;Language is the armory of the human mind; and at once contains the trophies of its past and the weapons of its future conquests.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Samuel Taylor Coleridge, &#039;&#039;Biographia Literaria&#039;&#039;, chap. 16, in &#039;&#039;Selected Poetry and Prose of Coleridge&#039;&#039;, ed. Donald A. Stauffer (New York: Random House, 1951), pp. 276-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The idea of a first Edenic language gives way to the heuristic notion of a protolanguage (Indo-European, Semitic) whose existence is never a subject of debate, since it is acknowledged that such a language cannot be recaptured but can only be reconstituted in the philological process. To the extent that one language serves, again heuristically, as a touchstone for all the others, it is Sanskrit in its earliest Indo-European form. The terminology has also shifted: there are now &#039;&#039;families&#039;&#039; of languages (the analogy with species and anatomical classifications is marked), there is &#039;&#039;perfect&#039;&#039; linguistic form, which need not correspond to any &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; language, and there are original languages only as a function of the philological discourse, not because of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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But some writers shrewdly commented on how it was that Sanskrit and things Indian in general simply took the place of Hebrew and the Edenic fallacy. As early as 1804 Benjamin Constant noted in his &#039;&#039;Journal intime&#039;&#039; that he was not about to discuss India in his &#039;&#039;De la religion&#039;&#039; because the English who owned the place and the Germans who studied it indefatigably had made India the &#039;&#039;fons et origo&#039;&#039; of everything; and then there were the French who had decided after Napoleon and Champollion that everything originated in Egypt and the new Orient.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), p. 78.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These teleological enthusiasms were fueled after 1808 by Friedrich Schlegel&#039;s celebrated &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier&#039;&#039;, which seemed to confirm his own pronouncement made in 1800 about the Orient being the purest form of Romanticism.&lt;br /&gt;
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What Renan&#039;s generation--educated from the mid-1830s to the late 1840s--retained from all this enthusiasm about the Orient was the intellectual necessity of the Orient for the Occidental scholar of languages, cultures, and religions. Here the key text was Edgar Quinet&#039;s &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions&#039;&#039; (1832), a work that announced the Oriental Renaissance and placed the Orient and the West in a functional relationship with each other. I have already referred to the vast meaning of this relationship as analyzed comprehensively by Raymond Schwab in &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;; my concern with it here is only to note specific aspects of it that bear upon Renan&#039;s vocation as a philologist and as an Orientalist. Quinet&#039;s association with Michelet, their interest in Herder and Vico, respectively, impressed on them the need for the scholar-historian to confront, almost in the manner of an audience seeing a dramatic event unfold, or a believer witnessing a revelation, the different, the strange, the distant. Quinet&#039;s formulation was that the Orient proposes and the West disposes: Asia has its prophets, Europe its doctors (its learned men, its scientists: the pun is intended). Out of this encounter, a new dogma or god is born, but Quinet&#039;s point is that both East and West fulfill their destinies and confirm their identities in the encounter. As a scholarly attitude the picture of a learned Westerner surveying as if from a peculiarly suited vantage point the passive, seminal, feminine, even silent and supine East, then going on to &#039;&#039;articulate&#039;&#039; the East, making the Orient deliver up its secrets under the learned authority of a philologist whose power derives from the ability to unlock secret, esoteric languages--this would persist in Renan. What did not persist in Renan during the 1840s, when he served his apprenticeship as a philologist, was the dramatic attitude: that was replaced by the scientific attitude.&lt;br /&gt;
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For Quinet and Michelet, history was a drama. Quinet suggestively describes the whole world as a temple and human history as a sort of religious rite. Both Michelet and Quinet &#039;&#039;saw&#039;&#039; the world they discussed. The origin of human history was something they could describe in the same splendid and impassioned and dramatic terms used by Vico and Rousseau to portray life on earth in primitive times. For Michelet and Quinet there is no doubt that they belong to the communal European Romantic undertaking &amp;quot;either in epic or some other major genre--in drama, in prose romance, or in the visionary &#039;greater Ode&#039;--radically to recast into terms appropriate to the historical and intellectual circumstances of their own age, the Christian pattern of the fall, the redemption, and the emergence of a new earth which will constitute a restored paradise.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Abrams, &#039;&#039;Natural Supernaturalism&#039;&#039;, p. 29.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; I think that for Quinet the idea of a new god being born was tantamount to the filling of the place left by the old god; for Renan, however, being a philologist meant the severance of any and all connections with the old Christian god, so that instead a new doctrine--probably science--would stand free and in a new place, as it were. Renan&#039;s whole career was devoted to the fleshing out of this progress.&lt;br /&gt;
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He put it very plainly at the end of his undistinguished essay on the origins of language: man is no longer an inventor, and the age of creation is definitely over.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;De l&#039;origine du langage, in Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 8: 122.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There was a period, at which we can only guess, when man was literally &#039;&#039;transported&#039;&#039; from silence into words. After that there was language, and for the true scientist the task is to examine how language &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039;, not how it came about. Yet if Renan dispels the passionate creation of primitive times (which had excited Herder, Vico, Rousseau, even Quinet and Michelet) he instates a new, and deliberate, type of artificial creation, one that is performed as a result of scientific analysis. In his &#039;&#039;lecon inaugurale&#039;&#039; at the College de France (February 21, 1862) Renan proclaimed his lectures open to the public so that it might see at first hand &amp;quot;le laboratoire meme de la science philologique&amp;quot; (the very laboratory of philological science).&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;De la part des peuples semitiques dans l&#039;histoire de la civilisation,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 2: 320.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Any reader of Renan would have understood that such a statement was meant also to carry a typical if rather limp irony, one less intended to shock than passively to delight. For Renan was succeeding to the chair of Hebrew, and his lecture was on the contribution of the Semitic peoples to the history of civilization. What more subtle affront could there be to &amp;quot;sacred&amp;quot; history than the substitution of a philological laboratory for divine intervention in history; and what more telling way was there of declaring the Orient&#039;s contemporary relevance to be simply as material for European investigation?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 333.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Sacy&#039;s comparatively lifeless fragments arranged in tableaux were now being replaced with something new.&lt;br /&gt;
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The stirring peroration with which Renan concluded his &#039;&#039;lecon&#039;&#039; had another function than simply to connect Oriental-Semitic philology with the future and with science. Etienne Quatremere, who immediately preceded Renan in the chair of Hebrew, was a scholar who seemed to exemplify the popular caricature of what a scholar was like. A man of prodigiously industrious and pedantic habits, he went about his work, Renan said in a relatively unfeeling memorial minute for the &#039;&#039;Journal des debats&#039;&#039; in October 1857, like a laborious worker who even in rendering immense services nevertheless could not see the whole edifice being constructed. The edifice was nothing less than &amp;quot;la science historique de l&#039;esprit humain,&amp;quot; now in the process of being built stone by stone.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;Trois Professeurs au College de France: Etienne Quatremere,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 1: 129. Renan was not wrong about Quatremere, who had a talent for picking interesting subjects to study and then making them quite uninteresting. See his essays &amp;quot;Le Gout des livres chez les orientaux&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Des sciences chez les arabes,&amp;quot; in his &#039;&#039;Melanges d&#039;histoire et de philologie orientales&#039;&#039; (Paris: E. Ducrocq, 1861), pp. 1-57.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Just as Quatremere was not of this age, so Renan in his work was determined to be of it. Moreover, if the Orient had been hitherto identified exclusively and indiscriminately with India and China, Renan&#039;s ambition was to carve out a new Oriental province for himself, in this case the Semitic Orient. He had no doubt remarked the casual, and surely current, confusion of Arabic with Sanskrit (as in Balzac&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Peau de chagrin&#039;&#039;, where the fateful talisman&#039;s Arabic script is described as Sanskrit), and he made it his job accordingly to do for the Semitic languages what Bopp had done for the Indo-European: so he said in the 1855 preface to the comparative Semitic treatise.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Honore de Balzac, &#039;&#039;La Peau de chagrin&#039;&#039;, vol. 9 (&#039;&#039;Etudes philosophiques&#039;&#039; 1) of &#039;&#039;La Comedie humaine&#039;&#039;, ed. Marcel Bouteron (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), p. 39; Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale des langues semitiques&#039;&#039;, p. 134.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore Renan&#039;s plans were to bring the Semitic languages into sharp and glamorous focus &#039;&#039;a la&#039;&#039; Bopp, and in addition to elevate the study of these neglected inferior languages to the level of a passionate new science of mind &#039;&#039;a la&#039;&#039; Louis Lambert.&lt;br /&gt;
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On more than one occasion Renan was quite explicit in his assertions that Semites and Semitic were &#039;&#039;creations&#039;&#039; of Orientalist philological study.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See, for instance, &#039;&#039;De l&#039;origine du langage&#039;&#039;, p. 102, and &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, p. 180.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Since he was the man who did the study, there was meant to be little ambiguity about the centrality of his role in this new, artificial creation. But how did Renan mean the word &#039;&#039;creation&#039;&#039; in these instances? And how was this creation connected with either natural creation, or the creation ascribed by Renan and others to the laboratory and to the classificatory and natural sciences, principally what was called philosophical anatomy? Here we must speculate a little. Throughout his career Renan seemed to imagine the role of science in human life as (and I quote in translation as literally as I can) &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;telling&#039;&#039; (speaking or articulating) definitively to man the word [logos?] of things.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039;, p. 23. The whole passage reads as follows: &amp;quot;Pour moi, je ne connais qu&#039;un seul resultat a la science, c&#039;est de resoudre l&#039;enigme, c&#039;est de dire definitivement a l&#039;homme le mot des choses, c&#039;est de l&#039;expliquer a lui-meme, c&#039;est de lui donner, au nom de la seule autorite legitime qui est la nature humaine toute entiere, le symbole que les religions lui donnaient tout fait et qu&#039;ils ne peut plus accepter.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Science gives speech to things; better yet, science brings out, causes to be pronounced, a potential speech within things. The special value of linguistics (as the new philology was then often called) is not that natural science resembles it, but rather that it treats words as natural, otherwise silent objects, which are made to give up their secrets. Remember that the major breakthrough in the study of inscriptions and hieroglyphs was the discovery by Champollion that the symbols on the Rosetta Stone had a &#039;&#039;phonetic&#039;&#039; as well as a semantic component.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Madeleine V.-David, &#039;&#039;Le Debat sur les ecritures et l&#039;hieroglyphe aux XVII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; et XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecles et l&#039;application de la notion de dechiffrement aux ecritures mortes&#039;&#039; (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1965), p. 130.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; To make objects speak was like making words speak, giving them circumstantial value, and a precise place in a rule-governed order of regularity. In its first sense, &#039;&#039;creation&#039;&#039;, as Renan used the word, signified the articulation by which an object like &#039;&#039;Semitic&#039;&#039; could be seen as a creature of sorts. Second, creation also signified the setting--in the case of Semitic it meant Oriental history, culture, race, mind--illuminated and brought forward from its reticence by the scientist. Finally, creation was the formulation of a system of classification by which it was possible to see the object in question comparatively with other like objects; and by &amp;quot;comparatively&amp;quot; Renan intended a complex network of paradigmatic relations that obtained between Semitic and Indo-European languages.&lt;br /&gt;
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If in what I have so far said I have insisted so much on Renan&#039;s comparatively forgotten study of Semitic languages, it has been for several important reasons. Semitic was the scientific study to which Renan turned right after the loss of his Christian faith; I described above how he came to see the study of Semitic as replacing his faith and enabling a critical future relation with it. The study of Semitic was Renan&#039;s first full-length Orientalist and scientific study (finished in 1847, published first in 1855), and was as much a part of his late major works on the origins of Christianity and the history of the Jews as it was a propaedeutic for them. In intention, if not perhaps in achievement--interestingly, few of the standard or contemporary works in either linguistic history or the history of Orientalism cite Renan with anything more than cursory attention&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan is mentioned only in passing in Schwab&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;, not at all in Foucault&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Order of Things&#039;&#039;, and only somewhat disparagingly in Holger Pederson&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Discovery of Language: Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century&#039;&#039;, trans. John Webster Spargo (1931; reprint ed., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972). Max Muller in his &#039;&#039;Lectures on the Science of Language&#039;&#039; (1861-64; reprint ed., New York: Scribner, Armstrong, &amp;amp; Co., 1875) and Gustave Dugat in his &#039;&#039;Histoire des orientalistes de l&#039;Europe du XII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1868-70) do not mention Renan at all. James Darmesteter&#039;s &#039;&#039;Essais Orientaux&#039;&#039; (Paris: A. Levy, 1883)--whose first item is a history, &amp;quot;L&#039;Orientalisme en France&amp;quot;--is dedicated to Renan but does not mention his contribution. There are half-a-dozen short notices of Renan&#039;s production in Jules Mohl&#039;s encyclopedic (and extremely valuable) quasi-logbook, &#039;&#039;Vingt-sept ans d&#039;histoire des etudes orientales: Rapports faits a la Societe asiatique de Paris de 1840 a 1867&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Reinwald, 1879-80).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--his Semitic opus was proposed as a philological breakthrough, from which in later years he was always to draw retrospective authority for his positions (almost always bad ones) on religion, race, and nationalism.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In works dealing with race and racism Renan occupies a position of some importance. He is treated in the following: Ernest Seilliere, &#039;&#039;La Philosophie de l&#039;imperialisme&#039;&#039;, 4 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1903-8); Theophile Simar, &#039;&#039;Etude critique sur la formation de la doctrine des races au XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle et son expansion au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039; (Brussels: Hayez, 1922); Erich Voegelin, &#039;&#039;Rasse und Staat&#039;&#039; (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1933), and here one must also mention his &#039;&#039;Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte von Ray bis Carus&#039;&#039; (Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, 1933), which, although it does not deal with Renan&#039;s period, is an important complement to &#039;&#039;Rasse und Staat&#039;&#039;; Jacques Barzun, &#039;&#039;Race: A Study in Modern Superstition&#039;&#039; (New York: Harcourt, Brace &amp;amp; Co., 1937).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Whenever Renan wished to make a statement about either the Jews or the Muslims, for example, it was always with his remarkably harsh (and unfounded, except according to the science he was practicing) strictures on the Semites in mind. Furthermore, Renan&#039;s Semitic was meant as a contribution both to the development of Indo-European linguistics and to the differentiation of Orientalisms. To the former Semitic was a degraded form, degraded in both the moral and the biological sense, whereas to the latter Semitic was a--if not the--stable form of cultural decadence. Lastly, Semitic was Renan&#039;s first creation, a fiction invented by him in the philological laboratory to satisfy his sense of public place and mission. It should by no means be lost on us that Semitic was for Renan&#039;s ego the symbol of European (and consequently his) dominion over the Orient and over his own era.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, as a branch of the Orient, Semitic was not fully a natural object--like a species of monkey, for instance--nor fully an unnatural or a divine object, as it had once been considered. Rather, Semitic occupied a median position, legitimated in its oddities (regularity being defined by Indo-European) by an inverse relation to normal languages, comprehended as an eccentric, quasi-monstrous phenomenon partly because libraries, laboratories, and museums could serve as its place of exhibition and analysis. In his treatise, Renan adopted a tone of voice and a method of exposition that drew the maximum from book-learning and from natural observation as practiced by men like Cuvier and the Geoffroy Saint-Hilaires &#039;&#039;pere et fils&#039;&#039;. This is an important stylistic achievement, for it allowed Renan consistently to avail himself of the &#039;&#039;library&#039;&#039;, rather than either primitivity or divine fiat, as a conceptual framework in which to understand language, together with the &#039;&#039;museum&#039;&#039;, which is where the results of laboratory observation are delivered for exhibition, study, and teaching.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; Schwab has some brilliant pages on the museum, on the parallelism between biology and linguistics, and on Cuvier, Balzac, and others; see p. 323 and passim. On the library and its importance for mid-nineteenth-century culture, see Foucault, &amp;quot;La Bibliotheque fantastique,&amp;quot; which is his preface to Flaubert&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039; (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), pp. 7-33. I am indebted to Professor Eugenio Donato for drawing my attention to these matters; see his &amp;quot;A Mere Labyrinth of Letters: Flaubert and the Quest for Fiction,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Modern Language Notes&#039;&#039; 89, no. 6 (December 1974): 885-910.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Everywhere Renan treats of normal human facts--language, history, culture, mind, imagination--as transformed into something else, as something peculiarly deviant, because they are Semitic and Oriental, and because they end up for analysis in the laboratory. Thus the Semites are rabid monotheists who produced no mythology, no art, no commerce, no civilization; their consciousness is a narrow and rigid one; all in all they represent &amp;quot;une combinaison inferieure de la nature humaine.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, pp. 145-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the same time Renan wants it understood that he speaks of a prototype, not a real Semitic type with actual existence (although he violated this too by discussing present-day Jews and Muslims with less than scientific detachment in many places in his writings).&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039;, p. 508 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; So on the one hand we have the transformation of the human into the specimen, and on the other the comparative judgment rendered by which the specimen remains a specimen and a subject for philological, scientific study.&lt;br /&gt;
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Scattered throughout the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale et systeme compare des langues semitiques&#039;&#039; are reflections on the links between linguistics and anatomy, and--for Renan this is equally important--remarks on how these links could be employed to do human history (&#039;&#039;les sciences historiques&#039;&#039;). But first we should consider the implicit links. I do not think it wrong or an exaggeration to say that a typical page of Renan&#039;s Orientalist &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039; was constructed typographically and structurally with a page of comparative philosophical anatomy, in the style of Cuvier or Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, kept in mind. Both linguists and anatomists purport to be speaking about matters not directly obtainable or observable in nature; a skeleton and a detailed line drawing of a muscle, as much as paradigms constituted by the linguists out of a purely hypothetical proto-Semitic or proto-Indo-European, are similarly products of the laboratory and of the library. The text of a linguistic or an anatomical work bears the same general relation to nature (or actuality) that a museum case exhibiting a specimen mammal or organ does. What is given on the page and in the museum case is a truncated exaggeration, like many of Sacy&#039;s Oriental extracts, whose purpose is to exhibit a relationship between the science (or scientist) and the object, not one between the object and nature. Read almost any page by Renan on Arabic, Hebrew, Aramaic, or proto-Semitic and you read a fact of power, by which the Orientalist philologist&#039;s authority summons out of the library at will examples of man&#039;s speech, and ranges them there surrounded by a suave European prose that points out defects, virtues, barbarisms, and shortcomings in the language, the people, and the civilization. The tone and the tense of the exhibition are cast almost uniformly in the contemporary present, so that one is given an impression of a pedagogical demonstration during which the scholar-scientist stands before us on a lecture-laboratory platform, creating, confining, and judging the material he discusses.&lt;br /&gt;
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This anxiety on Renan&#039;s part to convey the sense of a demonstration actually taking place is heightened when he remarks explicitly that whereas anatomy employs stable and visible signs by which to consign objects to classes, linguistics does not.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, p. 214.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore the philologist must make a given linguistic fact correspond in some way to a historical period: hence the possibility of a classification. Yet, as Renan was often to say, linguistic temporality and history are full of lacunae, enormous discontinuities, hypothetical periods. Therefore linguistic events occur in a nonlinear and essentially discontinuous temporal dimension controlled by the linguist in a, very particular way. That way, as Renan&#039;s whole treatise on the Semitic branch of the Oriental languages goes very far to show, is comparative: Indo-European is taken as the living, &#039;&#039;organic&#039;&#039; norm, and Semitic Oriental languages are seen comparatively to be &#039;&#039;inorganic&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 527. This idea goes back to Friedrich Schlegel&#039;s distinction between organic and agglutinative languages, of which latter type Semitic is an instance. Humboldt makes the same distinction, as have most Orientalists since Renan.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Time is transformed into the space of comparative classification, which at bottom is based on a rigid binary opposition between organic and inorganic languages. So on the one hand there is the organic, biologically generative process represented by Indo-European, while on the other there is an inorganic, essentially unregenerative process, ossified into Semitic: most important, Renan makes it absolutely clear that such an imperious judgment is made by the Oriental philologist in his laboratory, for distinctions of the kind he has been concerned with are neither possible nor available for anyone except the trained professional. &amp;quot;Nous refusons donc aux langues semitiques la faculte de se regenerer, toute en reconnaissant qu&#039;elles n&#039;echappent pas plus que les autres oeuvres de la conscience humaine a la necessite du changement et des modifications successives&amp;quot; (Therefore we refuse to allow that the Semitic languages have the capacity to regenerate themselves, even while recognizing that they do not escape--any more than other products of human consciousness--the necessity of change or of successive modifications).&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 531-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet behind even this radical opposition, there is another one working in Renan&#039;s mind, and for several pages in the first chapter of book 5 he exposes his position quite candidly to the reader. This occurs when he introduces Saint-Hilaire&#039;s views on the &amp;quot;degradation, of types.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 515 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Although Renan does not specify which Saint-Hilaire he refers to, the reference is clear enough. For both Etienne and his son Isidore were biological speculators of extraordinary fame and influence, particularly among literary intellectuals during the first half of the nineteenth century in France. Etienne, we recall, had been a member of the Napoleonic expedition, and Balzac dedicated an important section of the preface for &#039;&#039;La Comedie humaine&#039;&#039; to him; there is also much evidence that Flaubert read both the father and the son and used their views in his work.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Jean Seznec, &#039;&#039;Nouvelles Etudes sur &amp;quot;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (London: Warburg Institute, 1949), p. 80.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Not only were Etienne and Isidore legatees of the tradition of &amp;quot;Romantic&amp;quot; biology, which included Goethe and Cuvier, with a strong interest in analogy, homology, and organic &#039;&#039;ur&#039;&#039;-form among species, but they were also specialists in the philosophy and anatomy of monstrosity--teratology, as Isidore called it--in which the most horrendous physiological aberrations were considered a result of internal degradation within the species-life.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophie anatomique: Des monstruosites humaines&#039;&#039; (Paris: published by the author, 1822). The complete title of Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire&#039;s work is: &#039;&#039;Histoire generale et particuliere des anomalies de l&#039;organisation chez l&#039;homme et les animaux, ouvrage comprenante des recherches sur les caracteres, la classification, l&#039;influence physiologique et pathologique, les rapports generaux, les lois et les causes des monstruosites, des varietes et vices de conformation, ou traite de teratologie&#039;&#039;, 3 vols. (Paris: J.-B. Bailliere, 1832-36). There are some valuable pages on Goethe&#039;s biological ideas in Erich Heller, &#039;&#039;The Disinherited Mind&#039;&#039; (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 3-34. See also Jacob, &#039;&#039;The Logic of Life&#039;&#039;, and Canguilhem, &#039;&#039;La Connaissance de la vie&#039;&#039;, pp. 174-84, for very interesting accounts of the Saint-Hilaires&#039; place in the development of the life sciences.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; I cannot here go into the intricacies (as well as the macabre fascination) of teratology, though it is enough to mention that both Etienne and Isidore exploited the theoretical power of the linguistic paradigm to explain the deviations possible within a biological system. Thus Etienne&#039;s notion was that a monster is an &#039;&#039;anomaly&#039;&#039;, in the same sense that in language words exist in analogical as well as anomalous relations with each other: in linguistics the idea is at least as old as Varro&#039;s &#039;&#039;De Lingua Latina&#039;&#039;. No anomaly can be considered simply as a gratuitous exception; rather anomalies confirm the regular structure binding together all members of the same class. Such a view is quite daring in anatomy. At one moment in the &amp;quot;Preliminaire&amp;quot; to his &#039;&#039;Philosophie anatomique&#039;&#039; Etienne says:&lt;br /&gt;
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And, indeed, such is the character of our epoch that it becomes impossible today to enclose oneself strictly within the framework of a simple monograph. Study an object in isolation and you will only be able to bring it back to itself; consequently you can never have perfect knowledge of it. But see it in the midst of beings who are connected with each other in many different ways, and which are isolated from each other in different ways, and you will discover for this object a wider scope of relationships. First of all, you will know it better, even in its specificity: but more important, by considering it in the very center of its own sphere of activity, you will know precisely how it behaves in its own exterior world, and you will also know how its own features are constituted in reaction to its surrounding milieu.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;E. Saint-Hilaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophie anatomique&#039;&#039;, pp. xxii-xxiii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only is Saint-Hilaire saying that it is the specific character of contemporary study (he was writing in 1822) to examine phenomena comparatively; he is also saying that for the scientist there is no such thing as a phenomenon, no matter how aberrant and exceptional, that cannot be explained with reference to other phenomena. Note also how Saint-Hilaire employs the metaphor of centrality (&#039;&#039;le centre de sa sphere d&#039;activite&#039;&#039;) used later by Renan in &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039; to describe the position occupied by any object in nature--including even the philologist--once the object is scientifically &#039;&#039;placed&#039;&#039; there by the examining scientist. Thereafter between the object and the scientist a bond of sympathy is established. Of course, this can only take place during the laboratory experience, and not elsewhere. The point being made is that a scientist has at his disposal a sort of leverage by which even the totally unusual occurrence can be seen naturally and known scientifically, which in this case means without recourse to the supernatural, and with recourse only to an enveloping environment constituted by the scientist. As a result nature itself can be reperceived as continuous, harmoniously coherent, and fundamentally intelligible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus for Renan Semitic is a phenomenon of arrested development in comparison with the mature languages and cultures of the Indo-European group, and even with the other Semitic Oriental languages.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, p. 156.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The paradox that Renan sustains, however, is that even as he encourages us to see languages as in some way corresponding to &amp;quot;etres vivants de la nature,&amp;quot; he is everywhere else proving that his Oriental languages, the Semitic languages, are inorganic, arrested, totally ossified, incapable of self-regeneration; in other words, he proves that Semitic is not a live language, and for that matter, neither are Semites live creatures. Moreover, Indo-European language and culture are alive and organic &#039;&#039;because&#039;&#039; of the laboratory, not despite it. But far from being a marginal issue in Renan&#039;s work, this paradox stands, I believe, at the very center of his entire work, his style, and his archival existence in the culture of his time, a culture to which--as people so unlike each other as Matthew Arnold, Oscar Wilde, James Frazer, and Marcel Proust concurred--he was a very important contributor. To be able to sustain a vision that incorporates and holds together life and quasi-living creatures (Indo-European, European culture) as well as quasimonstrous, parallel inorganic phenomena (Semitic, Oriental culture) is precisely the achievement of the European scientist in his laboratory. He &#039;&#039;constructs&#039;&#039;, and the very act of construction is a sign of imperial power over recalcitrant phenomena, as well as a confirmation of the dominating culture and its &amp;quot;naturalization.&amp;quot; Indeed, it is not too much to say that Renan&#039;s philological laboratory is the actual locale of his European ethnocentrism; but what needs emphasis here is that the philological laboratory has no existence outside the discourse, the writing by which it is constantly produced and experienced. Thus even the culture he calls organic and alive--Europe&#039;s--is also a &#039;&#039;creature being created&#039;&#039; in the laboratory and by philology.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan&#039;s entire later career was European and cultural. Its accomplishments were varied and celebrated. Whatever authority his style possessed can, I think, be traced back to his technique for constructing the inorganic (or the missing) and for giving it the appearance of life. He was most famous, of course, for his &#039;&#039;Vie de Jesus&#039;&#039;, the work that inaugurated his monumental histories of Christianity and the Jewish people. Yet we must realize that the &#039;&#039;Vie&#039;&#039; was exactly the same type of feat that the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039; was, a construction enabled by the historian&#039;s capacity for skillfully crafting a dead (dead for Renan in the double sense of a dead faith and a lost, hence dead, historical period) Oriental biography--and the paradox is immediately apparent--&#039;&#039;as if it were&#039;&#039; the truthful narrative of a natural life. Whatever Renan said had first passed through the philological laboratory; when it appeared in print woven through the text, there was in it the life-giving force of a contemporary cultural signature, which drew from modernity all its scientific power and all its uncritical self-approbation. For that sort of culture such genealogies as dynasty, tradition, religion, ethnic communities were all simply functions of a theory whose job was to instruct the world. In borrowing this latter phrase from Cuvier, Renan was circumspectly placing scientific demonstration over experience; temporality was relegated to the scientifically useless realm of ordinary experience, while to the special periodicity of culture and cultural comparativism (which spawned ethnocentrism, racial theory, and economic oppression) were given powers far in advance of moral vision.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan&#039;s style, his career as Orientalist and man of letters, the circumstances of the meaning he communicates, his peculiarly intimate relationship with the European scholarly and general culture of his time--liberal, exclusivist, imperious, antihuman except in a very conditional sense--all these are what I would call &#039;&#039;celibate&#039;&#039; and scientific. Generation for him is consigned to the realm of &#039;&#039;l&#039;avenir&#039;&#039;, which in his famous manifesto he associated with science. Although as a historian of culture he belongs to the school of men like Turgot, Condorcet, Guizot, Cousin, Jouffroy, and Ballanche, and in scholarship to the school of Sacy, Caussin de Perceval, Ozanam, Fauriel, and Burnouf, Renan&#039;s is a peculiarly ravaged, ragingly masculine world of history and learning; it is indeed the world, not of fathers, mothers, and children, but of men like his Jesus, his Marcus Aurelius, his Caliban, his solar god (the last as described in &amp;quot;Reves&amp;quot; of the &#039;&#039;Dialogues philosophiques&#039;&#039;).&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 1: 621-2 and passim. See H. W. Wardman, &#039;&#039;Ernest Renan: A Critical Biography&#039;&#039; (London: Athlone Press, 1964), p. 66 and passim, for a subtle description of Renan&#039;s domestic life; although one would not wish to force a parallel between Renan&#039;s biography and what I have called his &amp;quot;masculine&amp;quot; world, Wardman&#039;s descriptions here are suggestive indeed--at least to me.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He cherished the power of science and Orientalist philology particularly; he sought its insights and its techniques; he used it to intervene, often with considerable effectiveness, in the life of his epoch. And yet his ideal role was that of spectator.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Renan, a philologist ought to prefer &#039;&#039;bonheur&#039;&#039; to &#039;&#039;jouissance&#039;&#039;: the preference expresses a choice of elevated, if sterile, happiness over sexual pleasure. Words belong to the realm of &#039;&#039;bonheur&#039;&#039;, as does the study of words, ideally speaking. To my knowledge, there are very few moments in all of Renan&#039;s public writing where a beneficent and instrumental role is assigned to women. One occurs when Renan opines that foreign women (nurses, maids) must have instructed the conquering Normans&#039; children, and hence we can account for the changes that take place in language. Note how productivity and dissemination are not the functions aided, but rather internal change, and a subsidiary one at that. &amp;quot;Man,&amp;quot; he says at the end of the same essay, &amp;quot;belongs neither to his language nor to his race; he belongs to himself before all, since before all he is a free being and a moral one.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;Des services rendus au sciences historiques par la philologie,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 8: 1228, 1232.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Man was free and moral, but enchained by race, history, and science as Renan saw them, conditions imposed by the scholar on man.&lt;br /&gt;
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The study of Oriental languages took Renan to the heart of these conditions, and philology made it concretely apparent that knowledge of man was--to paraphrase Ernst Cassirer--poetically transfiguring&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ernst Cassirer, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel&#039;&#039;, trans. William H. Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 307.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; only if it had been previously severed from raw actuality (as Sacy had necessarily severed his Arabic fragments from their actuality) and then put into a doxological straitjacket. By becoming &#039;&#039;philology&#039;&#039;, the study of words as once practiced by Vico, Herder, Rousseau, Michelet, and Quinet lost its plot and its dramatic presentational quality, as Schelling once called it. Instead, philology became epistemologically complex; &#039;&#039;Sprachgefuhl&#039;&#039; was no longer enough since words themselves pertained less to the senses or the body (as they had for Vico) and more to a sightless, imageless, and abstract realm ruled over by such hothouse formulations as race, mind, culture, and nation. In that realm, which was discursively constructed and called the Orient, certain kinds of assertions could be made, all of them possessing the same powerful generality and cultural validity. For all of Renan&#039;s effort was to deny Oriental culture the right to be generated, except artificially in the philological laboratory. A man was not a child of the culture; that dynastic conception had been too effectively challenged by philology. Philology taught one how culture is a construct, an &#039;&#039;articulation&#039;&#039; (in the sense that Dickens used the word for Mr. Venus&#039;s profession in &#039;&#039;Our Mutual Friend&#039;&#039;), even a creation, but not anything more than a quasi-organic structure.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is specially interesting in Renan is how much he knew himself to be a creature of his time and of his ethnocentric culture. On the occasion of an academic response to a speech made by Ferdinand de Lesseps in 1885, Renan averred as how &amp;quot;it was so sad to be a wiser man than one&#039;s nation.... One cannot feel bitterness towards one&#039;s homeland. Better to be mistaken along with the nation than to be too right with those who tell it hard truths.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;Reponse au discours de reception de M. de Lesseps (23 avril 1885),&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 1: 817. Yet the value of being truly contemporary was best shown with reference to Renan by Sainte-Beuve in his articles of June 1862. See also Donald G. Charlton, &#039;&#039;Positivist Thought in France During the Second Empire&#039;&#039; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), and his &#039;&#039;Secular Religions in France&#039;&#039;. Also Richard M. Chadbourne, &amp;quot;Renan and Sainte-Beuve,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Romanic Review&#039;&#039; 44, no. 2 (April 1953): 126-35.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The economy of such a statement is almost too perfect to be true. For does not the old Renan say that the best relationship is one of parity with one&#039;s own culture, its morality, and its ethos during one&#039;s time, that and not a dynastic relation by which one is either the child of his times or their parent? And here we return to the laboratory, for it is there--as Renan thought of it--that filial and ultimately social responsibilities cease and scientific and Orientalist ones take over. His laboratory was the platform from which as an Orientalist he addressed the world; it mediated the statements he made, gave them confidence and general precision, as well as continuity. Thus the philological laboratory as Renan understood it redefined not only his epoch and his culture, dating and shaping them in new ways; it gave his Oriental subject matter a scholarly coherence, and more, it made him (and later Orientalists in his tradition) into the Occidental &#039;&#039;cultural&#039;&#039; figure he then became. We may well wonder whether this new autonomy within the culture was the freedom Renan hoped his philological Orientalist science would bring or whether, so far as a critical historian of Orientalism is concerned, it set up a complex affiliation between Orientalism and its putative human subject matter that is based finally on power and not really on disinterested objectivity.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Oriental Residence and Scholarship: &#039;&#039;The Requirements of Lexicography and Imagination&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Renan&#039;s views of the Oriental Semites belong, of course, less to the realm of popular prejudice and common anti-Semitism than they do to the realm of scientific Oriental philology. When we read Renan and Sacy, we readily observe the way cultural generalization had begun to acquire the armor of scientific statement and the ambience of corrective study. Like many academic specialties in their early phases, modern Orientalism held its subject matter, which it defined, in a viselike grip which it did almost everything in its power to sustain. Thus a knowing vocabulary developed, and its functions, as much as its style, located the Orient in a &#039;&#039;comparative&#039;&#039; framework, of the sort employed and manipulated by Renan. Such comparatism is rarely descriptive; most often, it is both evaluative and expository. Here is Renan comparing typically:&lt;br /&gt;
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One sees that in all things the Semitic race appears to us to be an incomplete race, by virtue of its simplicity. This race--if I dare use the analogy--is to the Indo-European family what a pencil sketch is to painting; it lacks that variety, that amplitude, that abundance of life which is the condition of perfectibility. Like those individuals who possess so little fecundity that, after a gracious childhood, they attain only the most mediocre virility, the Semitic nations experienced their fullest flowering in their first age and have never been able to achieve true maturity.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 8: 156.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Indo-Europeans are the touchstone here, just as they are when Renan says that the Semitic Oriental sensibility never reached the heights attained by the Indo-Germanic races.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whether this comparative attitude is principally a scholarly necessity or whether it is disguised ethnocentric race prejudice, we cannot say with absolute certainty. What we can say is that the two work together, in support of each other. What Renan and Sacy tried to do was to reduce the Orient to a kind of human flatness, which exposed its characteristics easily to scrutiny and removed from it its complicating humanity. In Renan&#039;s case, the legitimacy of his efforts was provided by philology, whose ideological tenets encourage the reduction of a language to its roots; thereafter, the philologist finds it possible to connect those linguistics roots, as Renan and others did, to race, mind, character, and temperament at their roots. The affinity between Renan and Gobineau, for example, was acknowledged by Renan to be a common philological and Orientalist perspective;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In his letter of June 26, 1856, to Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 10: 203-4. Gobineau&#039;s ideas were expressed in his &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;inegalite des races humaines&#039;&#039; (1853-55).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in subsequent editions of the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039; he incorporated some of Gobineau&#039;s work within his own. Thus did comparatism in the study of the Orient and Orientals come to be synonymous with the apparent ontological inequality of Occident and Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main traits of this inequality are worth recapitulating briefly. I have already referred to Schlegel&#039;s enthusiasm for India, and then his subsequent revulsion from it and of course from Islam. Many of the earliest Oriental amateurs began by welcoming the Orient as a salutary &#039;&#039;derangement&#039;&#039; of their European habits of mind and spirit. The Orient was overvalued for its pantheism, its spirituality, its stability, its longevity, its primitivity, and so forth. Schelling, for example, saw in Oriental polytheism a preparation of the way for Judeo-Christian monotheism: Abraham was prefigured in Brahma. Yet almost without exception such overesteem was followed by a counterresponse: the Orient suddenly appeared lamentably underhumanized, antidemocratic, backward, barbaric, and so forth. A swing of the pendulum in one direction caused an equal and opposite swing back: the Orient was undervalued. Orientalism as a profession grew out of these opposites, of compensations and corrections based on inequality, ideas nourished by and nourishing similar ideas in the culture at large. Indeed the very project of restriction and restructuring associated with Orientalism can be traced directly to the inequality by which the Orient&#039;s comparative poverty (or wealth) besought scholarly, scientific treatment of the kind to be found in disciplines like philology, biology, history, anthropology, philosophy, or economics.&lt;br /&gt;
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And thus the actual profession of Orientalist enshrined this inequality and the special paradoxes it engendered. Most often an individual entered the profession as a way of reckoning with the Orient&#039;s claim on him; yet most often too his Orientalist training opened his eyes, so to speak, and what he was left with was a sort of debunking project, by which the Orient was reduced to considerably less than the eminence once seen in it. How else is one to explain the enormous labors represented by the work of William Muir (1819-1905), for example, or of Reinhart Dozy (1820-1883), and the impressive antipathy in that work to the Orient, Islam, and the Arabs? Characteristically, Renan was one of Dozy&#039;s supporters, just as in Dozy&#039;s four-volume &#039;&#039;Histoire des Mussulmans d&#039;Espagne&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;jusqu&#039;a la conquete de l&#039;Andalousie par les Almoravides&#039;&#039; (1861) there appear many of Renan&#039;s anti-Semitic strictures, compounded in 1864 by a volume arguing that the Jews&#039; primitive God was not Jahweh but Baal, proof for which was to be found in Mecca, of all places. Muir&#039;s &#039;&#039;Life of Mahomet&#039;&#039; (1858-1861) and his &#039;&#039;The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall&#039;&#039; (1891) are still considered reliable monuments of scholarship, yet his attitude towards his subject matter was fairly put by him when he said that &amp;quot;the sword of Muhammed, and the Kor&#039;an, are the most stubborn enemies of Civilisation, Liberty, and the Truth which the world has yet known.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited by Albert Hourani in his excellent article &amp;quot;Islam and the Philosophers of History,&amp;quot; p. 222.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Many of the same notions are to be found in the work of Alfred Lyall, who was one of the authors cited approvingly by Cromer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if the Orientalist does not explicitly judge his material as Dozy and Muir did, the principle of inequality exerts its influence nevertheless. It remains the professional Orientalist&#039;s job to piece together a portrait, a restored picture as it were, of the Orient or the Oriental; fragments, such as those unearthed by Sacy, supply the material, but the narrative shape, continuity, and figures are constructed by the scholar, for whom scholarship consists of circumventing the unruly (un-Occidental) nonhistory of the Orient with orderly chronicle, portraits, and plots. Caussin de Perceval&#039;s &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;histoire des Arabes avant l&#039;Islamisme, pendant l&#039;epoque de Mahomet&#039;&#039; (three volumes, 1847-1848) is a wholly professional study, depending for its sources on documents made available &#039;&#039;internally&#039;&#039; to the field by other Orientalists (principally Sacy, of course) or documents--like the texts of ibn-Khaldun, upon whom Caussin relied very heavily--reposing in Orientalist libraries in Europe. Caussin&#039;s thesis is that the Arabs were made a people by Mohammed, Islam being essentially a political instrument, not by any means a spiritual one. What Caussin strives for is clarity amidst a huge mass of confusing detail. Thus what emerges out of the study of Islam is quite literally a one-dimensional portrait of Mohammed, who is made to appear at the end of the work (after his death has been described) in precise photographic detail.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Caussin de Perceval, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;histoire des Arabes avant l&#039;Islamisme, pendant l&#039;epoque de Mahomet et jusqu&#039;a la reduction de toutes les tribus sous la loi musulmane&#039;&#039; (1847-48; reprint ed., Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1967), 3: 332-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Neither a demon, nor a prototype of Cagliostro, Caussin&#039;s Mohammed is a man appropriated to a history of Islam (the fittest version of it) as an exclusively political movement, centralized by the innumerable citations that thrust him up and, in a sense, out of the text. Caussin&#039;s intention was to leave nothing unsaid about Mohammed; the Prophet is thereby seen in a cold light, stripped both of his immense religious force and of any residual powers to frighten Europeans. The point here is that as a figure for his own time and place Mohammed is effaced, in order for a very slight human miniature of him to be left standing.&lt;br /&gt;
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A nonprofessional analogue to Caussin&#039;s Mohammed is Carlyle&#039;s, a Mohammed forced to serve a thesis totally overlooking the historical and cultural circumstances of the Prophet&#039;s own time and place. Although Carlyle quotes Sacy, his essay is clearly the product of someone arguing for some general ideas on sincerity, heroism, and prophethood. His attitude is salutary: Mohammed is no legend, no shameful sensualist, no laughable petty sorcerer who trained pigeons to pick peas out of his ear. Rather he is a man of real vision and self-conviction, albeit an author of a book, the Koran, that is &amp;quot;a wearisome confused jumble, crude, incondite; endless iterations, long-windedness, entanglement; most crude, incondite--insupportable stupidity, in short.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Thomas Carlyle, &#039;&#039;On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History&#039;&#039; (1841; reprint ed., New York: Longmans, Green &amp;amp; Co., 1906), p. 63.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Not a paragon of lucidity and stylistic grace himself, Carlyle asserts these things as a way of rescuing Mohammed from the Benthamite standards that would have condemned both Mohammed and him together. Yet Mohammed is a hero, transplanted into Europe out of the same barbaric Orient found wanting by Lord Macaulay in his famous &amp;quot;Minute&amp;quot; of 1835, in which it was asserted that &amp;quot;our native subjects&amp;quot; have more to learn from us than we do from them.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Macaulay&#039;s Indian experiences are described by G. Otto Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay&#039;&#039; (New York: Harper &amp;amp; Brothers, 1875), 1: 344-71. The complete text of Macaulay&#039;s &amp;quot;Minute&amp;quot; is conveniently to be found in Philip D. Curtin, ed., &#039;&#039;Imperialism: The Documentary History of Western Civilization&#039;&#039; (New York: Walker &amp;amp; Co., 1971), pp. 178-91. Some consequences of Macaulay&#039;s views for British Orientalism are discussed in A. J. Arberry, &#039;&#039;British Orientalists&#039;&#039; (London: William Collins, 1943).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Both Caussin and Carlyle, in other words, show us that the Orient need not cause us undue anxiety, so unequal are Oriental to European achievements. The Orientalist and non-Orientalist perspectives coincide here. For within the comparative field that Orientalism became after the philological revolution of the early nineteenth century, and outside it, either in popular stereotypes or in the figures made of the Orient by philosophers like Carlyle and stereotypes like those of Macaulay, the Orient in itself was subordinated intellectually to the West. As material for study or reflection the Orient acquired all the marks of an inherent weakness. It became subject to the vagaries of miscellaneous theories that used it for illustration. Cardinal Newman, no great Orientalist, used Oriental Islam as the basis of lectures in 1853 justifying British intervention in the Crimean War.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;John Henry Newman, &#039;&#039;The Turks in Their Relation to Europe&#039;&#039;, vol. 1 of his &#039;&#039;Historical Sketches&#039;&#039; (1853; reprint ed., London: Longmans, Green &amp;amp; Co., 1920).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cuvier found the Orient useful for his work &#039;&#039;Le Regne animal&#039;&#039; (1816). The Orient was usefully employed as conversation in the various salons of Paris.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Marguerite-Louise Ancelot, &#039;&#039;Salons de Paris, foyers eteints&#039;&#039; (Paris: Jules Tardieu, 1858).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The list of references, borrowings, and transformations that overtook the Oriental idea is immense, but at bottom what the early Orientalist achieved, and what the non-Orientalist in the West exploited, was a reduced model of the Orient suitable for the prevailing, dominant culture and its theoretical (and hard after the theoretical, the practical) exigencies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Occasionally one comes across exceptions, or if not exceptions then interesting complications, to this unequal partnership between East and West. Karl Marx identified the notion of an Asiatic economic system in his 1853 analyses of British rule in India, and then put beside that immediately the human depredation introduced into this system by English colonial interference, rapacity, and outright cruelty. In article after article he returned with increasing conviction to the idea that even in destroying Asia, Britain was making possible there a real social revolution. Marx&#039;s style pushes us right up against the difficulty of reconciling our natural repugnance as fellow creatures to the sufferings of Orientals while their society is being violently transformed with the historical necessity of these transformations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their ancient form of civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath the traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies....&lt;br /&gt;
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England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then, whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world may have for our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, to exclaim with Goethe:&lt;br /&gt;
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Sollte diese Qual uns qualen&lt;br /&gt;
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Da sie unsere Lust vermehrt&lt;br /&gt;
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Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen&lt;br /&gt;
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Timurs Herrschaft aufgeziehrt?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Surveys from Exile&#039;&#039;, ed. David Fernbach (London: Pelican Books, 1973), pp. 306-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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(Should this torture then torment us&lt;br /&gt;
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Since it brings us greater pleasure?&lt;br /&gt;
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Were not through the rule of Timur&lt;br /&gt;
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Souls devoured without measure?)&lt;br /&gt;
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The quotation, which supports Marx&#039;s argument about torment producing pleasure, comes from the &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039; and identifies the sources of Marx&#039;s conceptions about the Orient. These are Romantic and even messianic: as human material the Orient is less important than as an element in a Romantic redemptive project. Marx&#039;s economic analyses are perfectly fitted thus to a standard Orientalist undertaking, even though Marx&#039;s humanity, his sympathy for the misery of people, are clearly engaged. Yet in the end it is the Romantic Orientalist vision that wins out, as Marx&#039;s theoretical socio-economic views become submerged in this classically standard image:&lt;br /&gt;
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England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating--the annihilation of the Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 320.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The idea of regenerating a fundamentally lifeless Asia is a piece of pure Romantic Orientalism, of course, but coming from the same writer who could not easily forget the human suffering involved, the statement is puzzling. It requires us first to ask how Marx&#039;s moral equation of Asiatic loss with the British colonial rule he condemned gets skewed back towards the old inequality between East and West we have so far remarked. Second, it requires us to ask where the human sympathy has gone, into what realm of thought it has disappeared while the Orientalist vision takes its place.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are immediately brought back to the realization that Orientalists, like many other early-nineteenth-century thinkers, conceive of humanity either in large collective terms or in abstract generalities. Orientalists are neither interested in nor capable of discussing individuals; instead artificial entities, perhaps with their roots in Herderian populism, predominate. There are Orientals, Asiatics, Semites, Muslims, Arabs, Jews, races, mentalities, nations, and the like, some of them the product of learned operations of the type found in Renan&#039;s work. Similarly, the age-old distinction between &amp;quot;Europe&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Asia&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; herds beneath very wide labels every possible variety of human plurality, reducing it in the process to one or two terminal, collective abstractions. Marx is no exception. The collective Orient was easier for him to use in illustration of a theory than existential human identities. For between Orient and Occident, as if in a self-fulfilling proclamation, only the vast anonymous collectivity mattered, or existed. No other type of exchange, severely constrained though it may have been, was at hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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That Marx was still able to sense some fellow feeling, to identify even a little with poor Asia, suggests that something happened before the labels took over, before he was dispatched to Goethe as a source of wisdom on the Orient. It is as if the individual mind (Marx&#039;s, in this case) could find a precollective, preofficial individuality in Asia--find and give in to its pressures upon his emotions, feelings, senses--only to give it up when he confronted a more formidable censor in the very vocabulary he found himself forced to employ. What that censor did was to stop and then chase away the sympathy, and this was accompanied by a lapidary definition: Those people, it said, don&#039;t suffer--they are Orientals and hence have to be treated in other ways than the ones you&#039;ve just been using. A wash of sentiment therefore disappeared as it encountered the unshakable definitions built up by Orientalist science, supported by &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; lore (e.g., the &#039;&#039;Diwan&#039;&#039;) supposed to be appropriate for it. The vocabulary of emotion dissipated as it submitted to the lexicographical police action of Orientalist science and even Orientalist art. An experience was dislodged by a dictionary definition: one can almost see that happen in Marx&#039;s Indian essays, where what finally occurs is that something forces him to scurry back to Goethe, there to stand in his protective Orientalized Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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In part, of course, Marx was concerned with vindicating his own theses on socio-economic revolution; but in part also he seems to have had easy resource to a massed body of writing, both internally consolidated by Orientalism and put forward by it beyond the field, that controlled any statement made about the Orient. In Chapter One I tried to show how this control had had a general cultural history in Europe since antiquity; in this chapter my concern has been to show how in the nineteenth century a modern professional terminology and practice were created whose existence dominated discourse about the Orient, whether by Orientalists or non-Orientalists. Sacy and Renan were instances of the way Orientalism fashioned, respectively, a body of texts and a philologically rooted process by which the Orient took on a discursive identity that made it unequal with the West. In using Marx as the case by which a non-Orientalist&#039;s human engagements were first dissolved, then usurped by Orientalist generalizations, we find ourselves having to consider the process of lexicographical and institutional consolidation peculiar to Orientalism. What was this operation, by which whenever you discussed the Orient a formidable mechanism of omnicompetent definitions would present itself as the only one having suitable validity for your discussion? And since we must also show how this mechanism operated specifically (and effectively) upon personal human experiences that otherwise contradicted it, we must also show where &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; went and what forms &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; took, while they lasted.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this is a very difficult and complex operation to describe, at least as difficult and complex as the way any growing discipline crowds out its competitors and acquires authority for its traditions, methods, and institutions, as well as general cultural legitimacy for its statements, personalities, and agencies. But we can simplify a great deal of the sheer narrative complexity of the operation by specifying the kinds of experiences that Orientalism typically employed for its own ends and represented for its wider-than-professional audience. In essence these experiences continue the ones I described as having taken place in Sacy and Renan. But whereas those two scholars represent a wholly bookish Orientalism, since neither claimed any particular expertise with the Orient &#039;&#039;in situ&#039;&#039;, there is another tradition that claimed its legitimacy from the peculiarly compelling fact of residence in, actual existential contact with, the Orient. Anquetil, Jones, the Napoleonic expedition define the tradition&#039;s earliest contours, of course, and these will thereafter retain an unshakable influence on all Orientalist residents. These contours are the ones of European power: to reside in the Orient is to live the privileged life, not of an ordinary citizen, but of a representative European whose empire (French or British) &#039;&#039;contains&#039;&#039; the Orient in its military, economic, and above all, cultural arms. Oriental residence, and its scholarly fruits, are thereby fed into the bookish tradition of the textual attitudes we found in Renan and Sacy: together the two experiences will constitute a formidable library against which no one, not even Marx, can rebel and which no one can avoid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Residence in the Orient involves personal experience and personal testimony to a certain extent. Contributions to the library of Orientalism and to its consolidation depend on how experience and testimony get converted from a purely personal document into the enabling codes of Orientalist science. In other words, within a text there has to take place a metamorphosis from personal to official statement; the record of Oriental residence and experience by a European must shed, or at least minimize, its purely autobiographical and indulgent descriptions in favor of descriptions on which Orientalism in general and later Orientalists in particular can draw, build, and base further scientific observation and description. So one of the things we can watch for is a more explicit conversion than in Marx of personal sentiments about the Orient into official Orientalist statements.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now the situation is enriched and complicated by the fact that during the entire nineteenth century the Orient, and especially the Near Orient, was a favorite place for Europeans to travel in and write about. Moreover, there developed a fairly large body of Oriental-style European literature very frequently based on personal experiences in the Orient. Flaubert comes to mind immediately as one prominent source of such literature; Disraeli, Mark Twain, and Kinglake are three other obvious examples. But what is of interest is the difference between writing that is converted from personal to professional Orientalism, and the second type, also based on residence and personal testimony, which remains &amp;quot;literature&amp;quot; and not science: it is this difference that I now want to explore.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To be a European in the Orient &#039;&#039;always&#039;&#039; involves being a consciousness set apart from, and unequal with, its surroundings. But the main thing to note is the intention of this consciousness: What is it in the Orient for? Why does it set itself there even if, as is the case with writers like Scott, Hugo, and Goethe, it travels to the Orient for a very concrete sort of experience without actually leaving Europe? A small number of intentional categories proposed themselves schematically. One: the writer who intends to use his residence for the specific task of providing professional Orientalism with scientific material, who considers his residence a form of scientific observation. Two: the writer who intends the same purpose but is less willing to sacrifice the eccentricity and style of his individual consciousness to impersonal Orientalist definitions. These latter do appear in his work, but they are disentangled from the personal vagaries of style only with difficulty. Three: the writer for whom a real or metaphorical trip to the Orient is the fulfillment of some deeply felt and urgent project. His text therefore is built on a personal aesthetic, fed and informed by the project. In categories two and three there is considerably more space than in one for the play of a personal--or at least non-Orientalist--consciousness; if we take Edward William Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; as the pre-eminent example of category one, Burton&#039;s &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039; as belonging to category two, and Nerval&#039;s &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; as representing category three, the relative spaces left in the text for the exercise and display of authorial presence will be clear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite their differences, however, these three categories are not so separate from each other as one would imagine. Nor does each category contain &amp;quot;pure&amp;quot; representative types. For example, works in all three categories rely upon the sheer egoistic powers of the European consciousness at their center. In all cases the Orient is &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; the European observer, and what is more, in the category that contains Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Egyptians&#039;&#039;, the Orientalist ego is very much in evidence, however much his style tries for impartial impersonality. Moreover, certain motifs recur consistently in all three types. The Orient as a place of pilgrimage is one; so too is the vision of Orient as spectacle, or &#039;&#039;tableau vivant&#039;&#039;. Every work on the Orient in these categories tries to characterize the place, of course, but what is of greater interest is the extent to which the work&#039;s internal structure is in some measure synonymous with a comprehensive &#039;&#039;interpretation&#039;&#039; (or an attempt at it) of the Orient. Most of the time, not surprisingly, this interpretation is a form of Romantic restructuring of the Orient, a re-vision of it, which restores it redemptively to the present. Every interpretation, every structure created for the Orient, then, is a reinterpretation, a rebuilding of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having said that, we return directly to differences between the categories. Lane&#039;s book on the Egyptians was influential, it was frequently read and cited (by Flaubert among others), and it established its author&#039;s reputation as an eminent figure in Orientalist scholarship. In other words, Lane&#039;s authority was gained, not by virtue simply of what he said, but by virtue of how what he said could be adapted to Orientalism. He is quoted as a source of knowledge about Egypt or Arabia, whereas Burton or Flaubert were and are read for what they tell us about Burton and Flaubert over and above their knowledge of the Orient. The author-function in Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; is less strong than in the other categories because his work was disseminated into the profession, consolidated by it, institutionalized with it. The authorial identity in a work of professional discipline such as his is subordinated to the demands of the field, as well as to the demands of the subject matter. But this is not done simply, or without raising problems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lane&#039;s classic, &#039;&#039;An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; (1836), was the self-conscious result of a series of works and of two periods of residence in Egypt (1825-1828 and 1833-1835). One uses the phrase &amp;quot;self-conscious&amp;quot; with some emphasis here because the impression Lane wished to give was that his study was a work of immediate and direct, unadorned and neutral, description, whereas in fact it was the product of considerable editing (the work he wrote was not the one he finally published) and also of a considerable variety of quite special efforts. Nothing in his birth or background seemed to destine him for the Orient, except his methodical studiousness and his capacity for classical studies and for mathematics, which somewhat explain the apparent internal neatness of his book. His preface offers a series of interesting clues about what it was that he did for the book. He went to Egypt originally to study Arabic. Then, after making some notes about modern Egypt, he was encouraged to produce a systematic work on the country and its inhabitants by a committee of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. From being a random set of observations the work was changed into a document of useful knowledge, knowledge arranged for and readily accessible to anyone wishing to know the essentials of a foreign society. The preface makes it clear that such knowledge must somehow dispose of pre-existing knowledge, as well as claim for itself a particularly effective character: here Lane is the subtle polemicist. He must show initially that he did what others before him either could not or did not do, and then, that he was able to acquire information both authentic and perfectly correct. And thus his peculiar authority begins to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While Lane dallies in his preface with a Dr. Russell&#039;s &amp;quot;account of the people of Aleppo&amp;quot; (a forgotten work), it is obvious that the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039; is his main antecedent competition. But that work, confined by Lane to a long footnote, is mentioned in contemptuous quotation marks as &amp;quot;the great French work&amp;quot; on Egypt. &#039;&#039;That&#039;&#039; work was at once too philosophically general and too careless, Lane says; and Jacob Burckhardt&#039;s famous study was merely a collection of proverbial Egyptian wisdom, &amp;quot;bad tests of the morality of a people.&amp;quot; Unlike the French and Burckhardt, Lane was able to submerge himself amongst the natives, to live as they did, to conform to their habits, and &amp;quot;to escape exciting, in strangers, any suspicion of ... being a person who had no right to intrude among them.&amp;quot; Lest that imply Lane&#039;s having lost his objectivity, he goes on to say that he conformed only to the &#039;&#039;words&#039;&#039; (his italics) of the Koran, and that he was always aware of his difference from an essentially alien culture.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Edward William Lane, Author&#039;s Preface to &#039;&#039;An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; (1836; reprint ed., London: J. M. Dent, 1936), pp. xx, xxi.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus while one portion of Lane&#039;s identity floats easily in the unsuspecting Muslim sea, a submerged part retains its secret European power, to comment on, acquire, possess everything around it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Orientalist can imitate the Orient without the opposite being true. What he says about the Orient is therefore to be understood as description obtained in a one-way exchange: as &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; spoke and behaved, &#039;&#039;he&#039;&#039; observed and wrote down. His power was to have existed amongst them as a native speaker, as it were, and also as a secret writer. And what he wrote was intended as useful knowledge, not for them, but for Europe and its various disseminative institutions. For that is one thing that Lane&#039;s prose never lets us forget: that ego, the first-person pronoun moving through Egyptian customs, rituals, festivals, infancy, adulthood, and burial rites, is in reality both an Oriental masquerade and an Orientalist device for capturing and conveying valuable, otherwise inaccessible information. As narrator, Lane is both exhibit and exhibitor, winning two confidences at once, displaying two appetites for experience: the Oriental one for engaging companionship (or so it seems) and the Western one for authoritative, useful knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing illustrates this better than the last tripartite episode in the preface. Lane there describes his principal informant and friend, Sheikh Ahmed, as companion and as curiosity. Together the two pretend that Lane is a Muslim; yet only after Ahmed conquers his fear, inspired by Lane&#039;s audacious mimicry, can he go through the motions of praying by his side in a mosque. This final achievement is preceded by two scenes in which Ahmed is portrayed as a bizarre glass-eater and a polygamist. In all three portions of the Sheikh Ahmed episode the distance between the Muslim and Lane increases, even as in the action itself it decreases. As mediator and translator, so to speak, of Muslim behavior, Lane ironically enters the Muslim pattern only far enough to be able to describe it in a sedate English prose. His identity as counterfeit believer and privileged European is the very essence of bad faith, for the latter undercuts the former in no uncertain way. Thus what seems to be factual reporting of what &#039;&#039;one&#039;&#039; rather peculiar Muslim does is made to appear by Lane as the candidly exposed center of &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; Muslim faith. No mind is given by Lane to the betrayal of his friendship with Ahmed or with the others who provide him with information. What matters is that the report seem accurate, general, and dispassionate, that the English reader be convinced that Lane was never infected with heresy or apostasy, and finally, that Lane&#039;s text cancel the human content of its subject matter in favor of its scientific validity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is for all these ends that the book is organized, not simply as the narrative of Lane&#039;s residence in Egypt but as narrative structure overwhelmed by Orientalist restructuring and detail. This, I think, is the central achievement of Lane&#039;s work. In outline and shape &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; follows the routine of an eighteenth-century novel, say one by Fielding. The book opens with an account of country and setting, followed by chapters on &amp;quot;Personal Characteristics&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Infancy and Early Education.&amp;quot; Twenty-five chapters on such things as festivals, laws, character, industry, magic, and domestic life precede the last section, &amp;quot;Death and Funeral Rites.&amp;quot; On the face of it, Lane&#039;s argument is chronological and developmental. He writes about himself as the observer of scenes that follow the major divisions in the human lifetime: his model is the narrative pattern, as it is in &#039;&#039;Tom Jones&#039;&#039; with the hero&#039;s birth, adventures, marriage, and implied death. Only in Lane&#039;s text the narrative voice is ageless; his subject, however, the modern Egyptian, goes through the individual life-cycle. This reversal, by which a solitary individual endows himself with timeless faculties and imposes on a society and people a personal life-span, is but the first of several operations regulating what might have been the mere narration of travels in foreign parts, turning an artless text into an encyclopedia of exotic display and a playground for Orientalist scrutiny.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lane&#039;s control of his material is not only established through his dramatized double presence (as fake Muslim and genuine Westerner) and his manipulation of narrative voice and subject, but also through his use of detail. Each major section in each chapter is invariably introduced with some unsurprising general observation. For example, &amp;quot;it is generally observed that many of the most remarkable peculiarities in the manners, customs, and character of a nation are attributable to the physical peculiarities of the country.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What follows confirms this easily--the Nile, Egypt&#039;s &amp;quot;remarkably salubrious&amp;quot; climate, the peasant&#039;s &amp;quot;precise&amp;quot; labor. Yet instead of this leading to the next episode in narrative order, the detail is added to, and consequently the narrative fulfillment expected on purely formal grounds is not given. In other words, although the gross outlines of Lane&#039;s text conform to the narrative and causal sequence of birth-life-death, the special detail introduced during the sequence itself foils narrative movement. From a general observation, to a delineation of some aspect of Egyptian character, to an account of Egyptian childhood, adolescence, maturity, and senescence, Lane is always there with great detail to &#039;&#039;prevent&#039;&#039; smooth transitions. Shortly after we hear about Egypt&#039;s salubrious climate, for instance, we are informed that few Egyptians live beyond a few years, because of fatal illness, the absence of medical aid, and oppressive summer weather. Thereafter we are told that the heat &amp;quot;excites the Egyptian [an unqualified generalization] to intemperance in sensual enjoyments,&amp;quot; and soon are bogged down in descriptions, complete with charts and line drawings, of Cairene architecture, decoration, fountains, and locks. When a narrative strain re-emerges, it is clearly only as a formality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What prevents narrative order, at the very same time that narrative order is the dominating fiction of Lane&#039;s text, is sheer, overpowering, monumental description. Lane&#039;s objective is to make Egypt and the Egyptians totally visible, to keep nothing hidden from his reader, to deliver the Egyptians without depth, in swollen detail. As rapporteur his propensity is for sadomasochistic colossal tidbits: the self-multilation of dervishes, the cruelty of judges, the blending of religion with licentiousness among Muslims, the excess of libidinous passions, and so on. Yet no matter how odd and perverse the event and how lost we become in its dizzying detail, Lane is ubiquitous, his job being to reassemble the pieces and enable us to move on, albeit jerkily. To a certain extent he does this by just being a European who can discursively control the passions and excitements to which the Muslims are unhappily subject. But to an even greater extent, Lane&#039;s capacity to rein in his profuse subject matter with an unyielding bridle of discipline and detachment depends on his cold distance from Egyptian life and Egyptian productivity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main symbolic moment occurs at the beginning of chapter 6, &amp;quot;Domestic Life--Continued.&amp;quot; By now Lane has adopted the narrative convention of taking a walk through Egyptian life, and having reached the end of his tour of the public rooms and habits of an Egyptian household (the social and spatial worlds are mixed together by him), he begins to discuss the intimate side of home life. Immediately, he &amp;quot;must give some account of marriage and the marriage-ceremonies.&amp;quot; As usual, the account begins with a general observation: to abstain from marriage &amp;quot;when a man has attained a sufficient age, and when there is no just impediment, is esteemed by the Egyptians improper, and even disreputable.&amp;quot; Without transition this observation is applied by Lane to himself, and he is found guilty. For one long paragraph he then recounts the pressures placed on him to get married, which he unflinchingly refuses. Finally, after a native friend even offers to arrange a &#039;&#039;mariage de convenance&#039;&#039;, also refused by Lane, the whole sequence is abruptly terminated with a period and a dash.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 160-1. The standard biography of Lane, published in 1877, was by his great-nephew, Stanley Lane-Poole. There is a sympathetic account of Lane by A. J. Arberry in his &#039;&#039;Oriental Essays: Portraits of Seven Scholars&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 87-121.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He resumes his general discussion with another general observation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only do we have here a typical Lane-esque interruption of the main narrative with untidy detail, we have also a firm and literal disengagement of the author from the productive processes of Oriental society. The mini-narrative of his refusal to join the society he describes concludes with a dramatic hiatus: &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; story cannot continue, he seems to be saying, so long as he does not enter the intimacy of domestic life, and so he drops from sight as a candidate for it. He literally abolishes himself as a human subject by refusing to marry into human society. Thus he preserves his authoritative identity as a mock participant and bolsters the objectivity of his narrative. If we already knew that Lane was a non-Muslim, we now know too that in order for him to become an Orientalist--instead of an Oriental--he had to deny himself the sensual enjoyments of domestic life. Moreover, he had also to avoid dating himself by entering the human life-cycle. Only in this negative way could he retain his timeless authority as observer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s choice was between living without &amp;quot;inconvenience and discomfort&amp;quot; and accomplishing his study of the modern Egyptians. The result of his choice is plainly to have made possible his definition of the Egyptians, since had he become one of them, his perspective would no longer have been antiseptically and asexually lexicographical. In two important and urgent ways, therefore, Lane gains scholarly credibility and legitimacy. First, by interfering with the ordinary narrative course of human life: this is the function of his colossal detail, in which the observing intelligence of a foreigner can introduce and then piece together massive information. The Egyptians are disemboweled for exposition, so to speak, then put together admonishingly by Lane. Second, by disengaging from the generation of Egyptian-Oriental life: this is the function of his subduing his animal appetite in the interest of disseminating information, not in and for Egypt, but in and for European learning at large. To have achieved both the imposition of a scholarly will upon an untidy reality and an intentional shift away from the place of his residence to the scene of his scholarly reputation is the source of his great fame in the annals of Orientalism. Useful knowledge such as his could only have been obtained, formulated, and diffused by such denials.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s two other major works, his never-completed Arabic lexicon and his uninspired translation of the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039;, consolidated the system of knowledge inaugurated by &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;. In both of his later works his individuality has disappeared entirely as a creative presence, as of course has the very idea of a narrative work. Lane the man appears only in the official persona of annotator and retranslator (the &#039;&#039;Nights&#039;&#039;) and impersonal lexicographer. From being an author contemporary with his subject matter, Lane became--as Orientalist scholar of classical Arabic and classical Islam--its survivor. But it is the form of that survival which is of interest. For Lane&#039;s legacy as a scholar mattered not to the Orient, of course, but to the institutions and agencies of his European society. And these were either academic--the official Orientalist societies, institutions, and agencies--or they were extra-academic in very particular ways, figuring in the work of later Europeans resident in the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we read Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, not as a source of Oriental lore, but as a work directed towards the growing organization of academic Orientalism, we will find it illuminating. The subordination of genetic ego to scholarly authority in Lane corresponds exactly to the increased specialization and institutionalization of knowledge about the Orient represented by the various Oriental societies. The Royal Asiatic Society was founded a decade before Lane&#039;s book appeared, but its committee of correspondence--whose &amp;quot;objects were to receive intelligence and inquiries relating to the arts, sciences, literature, history and antiquities&amp;quot; of the Orient&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Frederick Eden Pargiter, ed., &#039;&#039;Centenary Volume of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1823-1923&#039;&#039; (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), p. x.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--was the structural recipient of Lane&#039;s fund of information, processed and formulated as it was. As for the diffusion of such work as Lane&#039;s, there were not only the various societies of useful knowledge but also, in an age when the original Orientalist program of aiding commerce and trade with the Orient had become exhausted, the specialized learned societies whose products were works displaying the potential (if not actual) values of disinterested scholarship. Thus, a program of the Societe asiatique states:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To compose or to print grammars, dictionaries, and other elementary books recognized as useful or indispensable for the study of those languages taught by appointed professors [of Oriental languages]; by subscriptions or by other means to contribute to the publication of the same kind of work undertaken in France or abroad; to acquire manuscripts, or to copy either completely or in part those that are to be found in Europe, to translate or to make extracts from them, to multiply their number by reproducing them either by engraving or by lithography; to make it possible for the authors of useful works on geography, history, the arts, and the sciences to acquire the means for the public to enjoy the fruits of their nocturnal labors; to draw the attention of the public, by means of a periodic collection devoted to Asiatic literature, to the scientific, literary, or poetic productions of the Orient and those of the same sort that regularly are produced in Europe, to those facts about the Orient that could be relevant to Europe, to those discoveries and works of all kinds of which the Oriental peoples could become the subject: these are the objectives proposed for and by the Societe asiatique.&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientalism organized itself systematically as the acquisition of Oriental material and its regulated dissemination as a form of specialized knowledge. One copied and printed works of grammar, one acquired original texts, one multiplied their number and diffused them widely, even dispensed knowledge in periodic form. It was into and for this system that Lane wrote his work, and sacrificed his ego. The mode in which his work persisted in the archives of Orientalism was provided for also. There was to be a &amp;quot;museum,&amp;quot; Sacy said,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
a vast depot of objects of all kinds, of drawings, of original books, maps, accounts of voyages, all offered to those who wish to give themselves to the study of [the Orient]; in such a way that each of these students would be able to feel himself transported as if by enchantment into the midst of, say, a Mongolian tribe or of the Chinese race, whichever he might have made the object of his studies.... It is possible to say ... that after the publication of elementary books on ... the Oriental languages, nothing is more important than to lay the cornerstone of this museum, which I consider a living commentary upon and interpretation [&#039;&#039;truchement&#039;&#039;] of the dictionaries.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Societe asiatique: Livre du centenaire, 1822-1922&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1922), pp. 5-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Truchement&#039;&#039; derives nicely from the Arabic &#039;&#039;turjaman&#039;&#039;, meaning &amp;quot;interpreter,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;intermediary,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;spokesman.&amp;quot; On the one hand, Orientalism acquired the Orient as literally and as widely as possible; on the other, it domesticated this knowledge to the West, filtering it through regulatory codes, classifications, specimen cases, periodical reviews, dictionaries, grammars, commentaries, editions, translations, all of which together formed a simulacrum of the Orient and reproduced it materially in the West, for the West. The Orient, in short, would be converted from the personal, sometimes garbled testimony of intrepid voyagers and residents into impersonal definition by a whole array of scientific workers. It would be converted from the consecutive experience of individual research into a sort of imaginary museum without walls, where everything gathered from the huge distances and varieties of Oriental culture became categorically &#039;&#039;Oriental&#039;&#039;. It would be reconverted, restructured from the bundle of fragments brought back piecemeal by explorers, expeditions, commissions, armies, and merchants into lexicographical, bibliographical, departmentalized, and &#039;&#039;textualized&#039;&#039; Orientalist sense. By the middle of the nineteenth century the Orient had become, as Disraeli said, a career, one in which one could remake and restore not only the Orient but also oneself.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;IV.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Pilgrims and Pilgrimages, British and French&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Every European traveler or resident in the Orient has had to protect himself from its unsettling influences. Someone like Lane ultimately rescheduled and resituated the Orient when he came to write about it. The eccentricities of Oriental life, with its odd calendars, its exotic spatial configurations, its hopelessly strange languages, its seemingly perverse morality, were reduced considerably when they appeared as a series of detailed items presented in a normative European prose style. It is correct to say that in Orientalizing the Orient, Lane not only defined but edited it; he excised from it what, in addition to his own human sympathies, might have ruffled the European sensibility. In most cases, the Orient seemed to have offended sexual propriety; everything about the Orient--or at least Lane&#039;s Orient-in-Egypt--exuded dangerous sex, threatened hygiene and domestic seemliness with an excessive &amp;quot;freedom of intercourse,&amp;quot; as Lane put it more irrepressibly than usual.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there were other sorts of threats than sex. All of them wore away the European discreteness and rationality of time, space, and personal identity. In the Orient one suddenly confronted unimaginable antiquity, inhuman beauty, boundless distance. These could be put to use more innocently, as it were, if they were thought and written about, not directly experienced. In Byron&#039;s &amp;quot;Giaour,&amp;quot; in the &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039;, in Hugo&#039;s &#039;&#039;Orientales&#039;&#039;, the Orient is a form of release, a place of original opportunity, whose keynote was struck in Goethe&#039;s &amp;quot;Hegire&amp;quot;--&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nord und West Sud zersplittern,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throne bersten, Reiche zittern,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fluchte du, in reinen Osten&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patriarchenluft zu kosten!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(North, West, and South disintegrate,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thrones burst, empires tremble.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fly away, and in the pure East&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Taste the Patriarchs&#039; air.)&lt;br /&gt;
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One always &#039;&#039;returned&#039;&#039; to the Orient--&amp;quot;Dort, im Reinen und in Rechten/Will ich menschlichen Geschlechten/In des Ursprungs Tiefe dringen&amp;quot; (There in purity and righteousness will I go back to the profound origins of the human race)--seeing it as completion and confirmation of everything one had imagined:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gottes ist der Orient!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gottes ist der Okzident!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nord und sudliches Gelande&lt;br /&gt;
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Ruht im Frieden seiner Hande.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039; (1819; reprint ed., Munich: Wilhelm Golmann, 1958), pp. 8-9, 12. Sacy&#039;s name is invoked with veneration in Goethe&#039;s apparatus for the &#039;&#039;Diwan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(God is the Orient!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
God is the Occident!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Northern and southern lands&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Repose in the peace of His hands.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Orient, with its poetry, its atmosphere, its possibilities, was represented by poets like Hafiz--&#039;&#039;unbegrenzt&#039;&#039;, boundless, Goethe said, older and younger than we Europeans. And for Hugo, in &amp;quot;Cri de guerre du mufti&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;La Douleur du pacha&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Victor Hugo, &#039;&#039;Les Orientales&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Pierre Albouy (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 1: 616-18.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the fierceness and the inordinate melancholy of Orientals was mediated, not by actual fear for life or disoriented lostness, but by Volney and George Sale, whose learned work translated barbarous splendor into usable information for the sublimely talented poet.&lt;br /&gt;
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What Orientalists like Lane, Sacy, Renan, Volney, Jones (not to mention the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;), and other pioneers made available, the literary crowd exploited. We must recall now our earlier discussion of the three types of work dealing with the Orient and based upon actual residence there. The rigorous exigencies of knowledge purged from Orientalist writing an authorial sensibility: hence Lane&#039;s self-excision, and hence also the first kind of work we enumerated. As for types two and three, the self is there prominently, subservient to a voice whose job it is to dispense real knowledge (type two), or dominating and mediating everything we are told about the Orient (type three). Yet from one end of the nineteenth century to the other--after Napoleon, that is--the Orient was a place of pilgrimage, and every major work belonging to a genuine if not always to an academic Orientalism took its form, style, and intention from the idea of pilgrimage there. In this idea as in so many of the other forms of Orientalist writing we have been discussing, the Romantic idea of restorative reconstruction (natural supernaturalism) is the principal source.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every pilgrim sees things his own way, but there are limits to what a pilgrimage can be for, to what shape and form it can take, to what truths it reveals. All pilgrimages to the Orient passed through, or had to pass through, the Biblical lands; most of them in fact were attempts either to relive or to liberate from the large, incredibly fecund Orient some portion of Judeo-Christian/Greco-Roman actuality. For these pilgrims the Orientalized Orient, the Orient of Orientalist scholars, was a gauntlet to be run, just as the Bible, the Crusades, Islam, Napoleon, and Alexander were redoubtable predecessors to be reckoned with. Not only does a learned Orient inhibit the pilgrim&#039;s musings and private fantasies; its very antecedence places barriers between the contemporary traveler and his writing, unless, as was the case with Nerval and Flaubert in their use of Lane, Orientalist work is severed from the library and caught in the aesthetic project. Another inhibition is that Orientalist writing is too circumscribed by the official requirements of Orientalist learning. A pilgrim like Chateaubriand claimed insolently that he undertook his voyages exclusively for his own sake: &amp;quot;j&#039;allais chercher des images: voila tout.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Francois-Rene de Chateaubriand, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres romanesques et voyages&#039;&#039;, ed. Maurice Regard (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 2: 702.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Flaubert, Vigny, Nerval, Kinglake, Disraeli, Burton, all undertook their pilgrimages in order to dispel the mustiness of the pre-existing Orientalist archive. Their writing was to be a fresh new repository of Oriental experience--but, as we shall see, even this project usually (but not always) resolved itself into the reductionism of the Orientalistic. The reasons are complex, and they have very much to do with the nature of the pilgrim, his mode of writing, and the intentional form of his work.&lt;br /&gt;
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What was the Orient for the individual traveler in the nineteenth century? Consider first the differences between an English speaker and a French speaker. For the former the Orient was India, of course, an actual British possession; to pass through the Near Orient was therefore to pass en route to a major colony. Already, then, the room available for imaginative play was limited by the realities of administration, territorial legality, and executive power. Scott, Kinglake, Disraeli, Warburton, Burton, and even George Eliot (in whose &#039;&#039;Daniel Deronda&#039;&#039; the Orient has plans made for it) are writers, like Lane himself and Jones before him, for whom the Orient was defined by material possession, by a material imagination, as it were. England had defeated Napoleon, evicted France: what the English mind surveyed was an imperial domain which by the 1880s had become an unbroken patch of British-held territory, from the Mediterranean to India. To write about Egypt, Syria, or Turkey, as much as traveling in them, was a matter of touring the realm of political will, political management, political definition. The territorial imperative was extremely compelling, even for so unrestrained a writer as Disraeli, whose &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; is not merely an Oriental lark but an exercise in the astute political management of actual forces on actual territories.&lt;br /&gt;
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In contrast, the French pilgrim was imbued with a sense of acute loss in the Orient. He came there to a place in which France, unlike Britain, had no sovereign presence. The Mediterranean echoed with the sounds of French defeats, from the Crusades to Napoleon. What was to become known as &amp;quot;la mission civilisatrice&amp;quot; began in the nineteenth century as a political second-best to Britain&#039;s presence. Consequently French pilgrims from Volney on planned and projected for, imagined, ruminated about places that were principally &#039;&#039;in their minds&#039;&#039;; they constructed schemes for a typically French, perhaps even a European, concert in the Orient, which of course they supposed would be orchestrated by them. Theirs was the Orient of memories, suggestive ruins, forgotten secrets, hidden correspondences, and an almost virtuosic style of being, an Orient whose highest literary forms would be found in Nerval and Flaubert, both of whose work was solidly fixed in an imaginative, unrealizable (except aesthetically) dimension.&lt;br /&gt;
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This was also true to a certain extent of scholarly French travelers in the Orient. Most of them were interested in the Biblical past or in the Crusades, as Henri Bordeaux has argued in his &#039;&#039;Voyageurs d&#039;Orient&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Henri Bordeaux, &#039;&#039;Voyageurs d&#039;Orient: Des pelerins aux meharistes de Palmyre&#039;&#039; (Paris: Plon, 1926). I have found useful the theoretical ideas about pilgrims and pilgrimages contained in Victor Turner, &#039;&#039;Dramas&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Fields&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society&#039;&#039; (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 166-230.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; To these names we must add (at Hassan al-Nouty&#039;s suggestion) the names of Oriental Semiticists, including Quatremere; Saulcy, the explorer of the Dead Sea; Renan as Phoenician archaeologist; Judas, the student of Phoenician languages; Catafago and Defremery, who studied the Ansarians, Ismailis, and Seljuks; Clermont-Ganneau, who explored Judea; and the Marquis de Vogue, whose work centered on Palmyrian epigraphy. In addition there was the whole school of Egyptologists descended from Champollion and Mariette, a school that would later include Maspero and Legrain. As an index of the difference between British realities and French fantasies, it is worthwhile recalling the words in Cairo of the painter Ludovic Lepic, who commented sadly in 1884 (two years after the British occupation had begun): &amp;quot;L&#039;Orient est mort au Caire.&amp;quot; Only Renan, ever the realistic racist, condoned the British suppression of Arabi&#039;s nationalist rebellion, which, out of his greater wisdom, he said was a &amp;quot;disgrace to civilization.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hassan al-Nouty, &#039;&#039;Le Proche-Orient dans la litterature francaise de Nerval a Barres&#039;&#039; (Paris: Nizet, 1958), pp. 47-8, 277, 272.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Volney and Napoleon, the nineteenth-century French pilgrims did not seek a scientific so much as an exotic yet especially attractive reality. This is obviously true of the literary pilgrims, beginning with Chateaubriand, who found in the Orient a locale sympathetic to their private myths, obsessions, and requirements. Here we notice how all the pilgrims, but especially the French ones, exploit the Orient in their work so as in some urgent way to justify their existential vocation. Only when there is some additional cognitive purpose in writing about the Orient does the outpouring of self seem more under control. Lamartine, for instance, writes about himself, and also about France as a power in the Orient; that second enterprise mutes and finally controls imperatives heaped upon his style by &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; soul, &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; memory, and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; imagination. No pilgrim, French or English, could so ruthlessly dominate his self or his subject as Lane did. Even Burton and T. E. Lawrence, of whom the former fashioned a deliberately Muslim pilgrimage and the latter what he called a reverse pilgrimage &#039;&#039;away&#039;&#039; from Mecca, delivered masses of historical, political, and social Orientalism that were never as free of their egos as Lane&#039;s were of his. This is why Burton, Lawrence, and Charles Doughty occupy a middle position between Lane and Chateaubriand.&lt;br /&gt;
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Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire de Paris a Jerusalem&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;et de Jerusalem a Paris&#039;&#039; (1810-1811) records the details of a journey undertaken in 1805-1806, after he had traveled in North America. Its many hundreds of pages bear witness to its author&#039;s admission that &amp;quot;je parle eternellement de moi,&amp;quot; so much so that Stendhal, no self-abnegating writer himself, could find Chateaubriand&#039;s failure as a knowledgeable traveler to be the result of his &amp;quot;stinking egotism.&amp;quot; He brought a very heavy load of personal objectives and suppositions to the Orient, unloaded them there, and proceeded thereafter to push people, places, and ideas around in the Orient as if nothing could resist his imperious imagination. Chateaubriand came to the Orient as a constructed &#039;&#039;figure&#039;&#039;, not as a true self. For him Bonaparte was the last Crusader; he in turn was &amp;quot;the last Frenchman who left his country to travel in the Holy Land with the ideas, the goals, and the sentiments of a pilgrim of former times.&amp;quot; But there were other reasons. Symmetry: having been to the New World and seen its monuments of nature, he needed to complete his circle of studies by visiting the Orient and its monuments of knowledge: as he had studied Roman and Celtic antiquity, all that was left for him was the ruins of Athens, Memphis, and Carthage. Self-completion: he needed to replenish his stock of images. Confirmation of the importance of the religious spirit: &amp;quot;religion is a kind of universal language understood by all men,&amp;quot; and where better to observe it than there in the Orient, even in lands where a comparatively low religion like Islam held sway. Above all, the need to see things, not as they were, but as Chateaubriand supposed they were: the Koran was &amp;quot;le livre de Mahomet&amp;quot;; it contained &amp;quot;ni principe de civilisation, ni precepte qui puisse elever le caractere.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;This book,&amp;quot; he continued, more or less freely inventing as he went along, &amp;quot;preaches neither hatred of tyranny nor love of liberty.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Chateaubriand, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 2: 702 and note, 1684, 769-70, 769, 701, 808, 908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To so preciously constituted a figure as Chateaubriand, the Orient was a decrepit canvas awaiting his restorative efforts. The Oriental Arab was &amp;quot;civilized man fallen again into a savage state&amp;quot;: no wonder, then, that as he watched Arabs trying to speak French, Chateaubriand felt like Robinson Crusoe thrilled by hearing his parrot speak for the first time. True, there were places like Bethlehem (whose etymological meaning Chateaubriand got completely wrong) in which one found again some semblance of real--that is, European--civilization, but those were few and far between. Everywhere, one encountered Orientals, Arabs whose civilization, religion, and manners were so low, barbaric, and antithetical as to merit reconquest. The Crusades, he argued, were not aggression; they were a just Christian counterpart to Omar&#039;s arrival in Europe. Besides, he added, even if the Crusades in their modern or original form were aggression, the issue they raised transcended such questions of ordinary mortality:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Crusades were not only about the deliverance of the Holy Sepulchre, but more about knowing which would win on the earth, a cult that was civilization&#039;s enemy, systematically favorable to ignorance [this was Islam, of course], to despotism, to slavery, or a cult that had caused to reawaken in modern people the genius of a sage antiquity, and had abolished base servitude?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 1011, 979, 990, 1052.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the first significant mention of an idea that will acquire an almost unbearable, next to mindless authority in European writing: the theme of Europe teaching the Orient the meaning of liberty, which is an idea that Chateaubriand and everyone after him believed that Orientals, and especially Muslims, knew nothing about.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of liberty, they know nothing; of propriety, they have none: force is their God. When they go for long periods without seeing conquerors who do heavenly justice, they have the air of soldiers without a leader, citizens without legislators, and a family without a father.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1069.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Already in 1810 we have a European talking like Cromer in 1910, arguing that Orientals require conquest, and finding it no paradox that a Western conquest of the Orient was not conquest after all, but liberty. Chateaubriand puts the whole idea in the Romantic redemptive terms of a Christian mission to revive a dead world, to quicken in it a sense of its own potential, one which only a European can discern underneath a lifeless and degenerate surface. For the traveler this means that he must use the Old Testament and the Gospels as his guide in Palestine;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1031.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; only in this way can the apparent degeneration of the modern Orient be gotten beyond. Yet Chateaubriand senses no irony in the fact that his tour and his vision will reveal nothing to him about the modern Oriental and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; destiny. What matters about the Orient is what it lets happen to Chateaubriand, what it allows his spirit to do, what it permits him to reveal about himself, his ideas, his expectations. The liberty that so concerns him is no more than his own release from the Orient&#039;s hostile wastes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Where his release allows him to go is directly back into the realm of imagination and imaginative interpretation. Description of the Orient is obliterated by the designs and patterns foisted upon it by the imperial ego, which makes no secret of its powers. If in Lane&#039;s prose we watch the ego disappear so that the Orient may appear in all its realistic detail, in Chateaubriand the ego dissolves itself in the contemplation of wonders it creates, and then is reborn, stronger than ever, more able to savor its powers and enjoy its interpretations.&lt;br /&gt;
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When one travels in Judea, at first a great ennui grips the heart; but when, passing from one solitary place to another, space stretches out without limits before you, slowly the ennui dissipates, and one feels a secret terror, which, far from depressing the soul, gives it courage and elevates one&#039;s native genius. Extraordinary things are disclosed from all parts of an earth worked over by miracles: the burning sun, the impetuous eagle, the sterile fig tree; all of poetry, all the scenes from Scripture are present there. Every name encloses a mystery; every grotto declares the future; every summit retains within it the accents of a prophet. God Himself has spoken from these shores: the arid torrents, the riven rocks, the open tombs attest to the prodigy; the desert still seems struck dumb with terror, and one would say that it has still not been able to break the silence since it heard the voice of the eternal.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 999.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The process of thought in this passage is revealing. An experience of Pascalian terror does not merely reduce one&#039;s self-confidence, it miraculously stimulates it. The barren landscape stands forth like an illuminated text presenting itself to the scrutiny of a very strong, refortified ego. Chateaubriand has transcended the abject, if frightening, reality of the contemporary Orient so that he may stand in an original and creative relationship to it. By the end of the passage he is no longer a modern man but a visionary seer more or less contemporary with God; if the Judean desert has been silent since God spoke there, it is Chateaubriand who can hear the silence, understand its meaning, and--to his reader--make the desert speak again.&lt;br /&gt;
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The great gifts of sympathetic intuition which had enabled Chateaubriand to represent and interpret North American mysteries in &#039;&#039;Rene&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Atala&#039;&#039;, as well as Christianity in &#039;&#039;Le Genie du Christianisme&#039;&#039;, are aroused to even greater feats of interpretation during the &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039;. No longer is the author dealing with natural primitivity and romantic sentiment: here he is dealing with eternal creativity and divine originality themselves, for it is in the Biblical Orient that they were first deposited, and they have remained there in unmediated and latent form. Of course, they cannot be simply grasped; they must be aspired to and achieved by Chateaubriand. And it is this ambitious purpose that the &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039; is made to serve, just as in the text Chateaubriand&#039;s ego must be reconstructed radically enough to get the job done. Unlike Lane, Chateaubriand attempts to &#039;&#039;consume&#039;&#039; the Orient. He not only appropriates it, he represents and speaks for it, not in history but beyond history, in the timeless dimension of a completely healed world, where men and lands, God and men, are as one. In Jerusalem, therefore, at the center of his vision and at the ultimate end of his pilgrimage, he grants himself a sort of total reconciliation with the Orient, the Orient as Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Greek, Persian, Roman, and finally French. He is moved by the plight of the Jews, but he judges that they too serve to illuminate his general vision, and as a further benefit, they give the necessary poignance to his Christian vindictiveness. God, he says, has chosen a new people, and it is not the Jews.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 1126-27, 1049.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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He makes some other concessions to terrestrial reality, however. If Jerusalem is booked into his itinerary as its final extraterrestrial goal, Egypt provides him with material for a political excursus. His ideas about Egypt supplement his pilgrimage nicely. The magnificent Nile Delta moves him to assert that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I found only the memories of my glorious country worthy of those magnificent plains; I saw the remains of monuments of a new civilization, brought to the banks of the Nile by the genius of France.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1137.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But these ideas are put in a nostalgic mode because in Egypt Chateaubriand believes he can equate the absence of France with the absence of a free government ruling a happy people. Besides, after Jerusalem, Egypt appears to be only a kind of spiritual anticlimax. After political commentary on its sorry state, Chateaubriand asks himself the routine question about &amp;quot;difference&amp;quot; as a result of historical development: how can this degenerate stupid mob of &amp;quot;Musulmans&amp;quot; have come to inhabit the same land whose vastly different owners so impressed Herodotus and Diodorus?&lt;br /&gt;
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This is a fitting valedictory to Egypt, which he leaves for Tunis, Carthaginian ruins, and finally, home. Yet he does one last thing of note in Egypt: unable to do more than look at the Pyramids from a distance, he takes the trouble to send an emissary there, to have him inscribe his (Chateaubriand&#039;s) name on the stone, adding for our benefit, &amp;quot;one has to fulfill all the little obligations of a pious traveler.&amp;quot; We would not ordinarily give much more than amused attention to this charming bit of touristic banality. As a preparation, however, for the very last page of the &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039;, it appears more important than at first glance. Reflecting on his twenty-year project to study &amp;quot;tous les hasards et tous les chagrins&amp;quot; as an exile, Chateaubriand notes elegiacally how every one of his books has been in fact a kind of prolongation of his existence. A man with neither a home nor the possibility of acquiring one, he finds himself now well past his youth. If heaven accords him eternal rest, he says, he promises to dedicate himself in silence to erecting a &amp;quot;monument a ma patrie.&amp;quot; What he is left with on earth, however, is his writing, which, if his name will live, has been enough, and if it will not live, has been too much.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 1148, 1214.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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These closing lines send us back to Chateaubriand&#039;s interest in getting his name inscribed on the Pyramids. We will have understood that his egoistic Oriental memoirs supply us with a constantly demonstrated, an indefatigably performed experience of self. Writing was an act of life for Chateaubriand, for whom nothing, not even a distant piece of stone, must remain scriptively untouched by him if he was to stay alive. If the order of Lane&#039;s narrative was to be violated by scientific authority and enormous detail, then Chateaubriand&#039;s was to be transformed into the asserted will of an egoistic, highly volatile individual. Whereas Lane would sacrifice his ego to the Orientalist canon, Chateaubriand would make everything he said about the Orient wholly dependent on his ego. Yet neither writer could conceive of his posterity as continuing on fruitfully after him. Lane entered the impersonality of a technical discipline: his work would be used, but not as a human document. Chateaubriand, on the other hand, saw that his writing, like the token inscription of his name on a Pyramid, would signify his self; if not, if he had not succeeded in prolonging his life by writing, it would be merely excessive, superfluous.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if all travelers to the Orient after Chateaubriand and Lane have taken their work into account (in some cases, even to the extent of copying from them verbatim), their legacy embodies the fate of Orientalism and the options to which it was limited. Either one wrote science like Lane or personal utterance like Chateaubriand. The problems with the former were its impersona Western confidence that descriptions of general, collective phenomena were possible, and its tendency to make realities not so much out of the Orient as out of its own observations. The problem with personal utterance was that it inevitably retreated into a position equating the Orient with private fantasy, even if that fantasy was of a very high order indeed, aesthetically speaking. In both cases, of course, Orientalism enjoyed a powerful influence on how the Orient was described and characterized. But what that influence always prevented, even until today, was some sense of the Orient that was neither impossibly general nor imperturbably private. To look into Orientalism for a lively sense of an Oriental&#039;s human or even social reality--as a contemporary inhabitant of the modern world--is to look in vain.&lt;br /&gt;
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The influence of the two options I have described, Lane&#039;s and Chateaubriand&#039;s, British and French, is a great deal of the reason for this omission. The growth of knowledge, particularly specialized knowledge, is a very slow process. Far from being merely additive or cumulative, the growth of knowledge is a process of selective accumulation, displacement, deletion, rearrangement, and insistence within what has been called a research consensus. The legitimacy of such knowledge as Orientalism was during the nineteenth century stemmed not from religious authority, as had been the case before the Enlightenment, but from what we can call the restorative citation of antecedent authority. Beginning with Sacy, the learned Orientalist&#039;s attitude was that of a scientist who surveyed a series of textual fragments, which he thereafter edited and arranged as a restorer of old sketches might put a series of them together for the cumulative picture they implicitly represent. Consequently, amongst themselves Orientalists treat each other&#039;s work in the same citationary way. Burton, for example, would deal with the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039; or with Egypt indirectly, &#039;&#039;through&#039;&#039; Lane&#039;s work, by citing his predecessor, challenging him even though he was granting him very great authority. Nerval&#039;s own voyage to the Orient was by way of Lamartine&#039;s, and the latter&#039;s by way of Chateaubriand. In short, as a form of growing knowledge Orientalism resorted mainly to citations of predecessor scholars in the field for its nutriment. Even when new materials came his way, the Orientalist judged them by borrowing from predecessors (as scholars so often do) their perspectives, ideologies, and guiding theses. In a fairly strict way, then, Orientalists after Sacy and Lane rewrote Sacy and Lane; after Chateaubriand, pilgrims rewrote him. From these complex rewritings the actualities of the modern Orient were systematically excluded, especially when gifted pilgrims like Nerval and Flaubert preferred Lane&#039;s descriptions to what their eyes and minds showed them immediately.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the system of knowledge about the Orient, the Orient is less a place than a &#039;&#039;topos&#039;&#039;, a set of references, a congeries of characteristics, that seems to have its origin in a quotation, or a fragment of a text, or a citation from someone&#039;s work on the Orient, or some bit of previous imagining, or an amalgam of all these. Direct observation or circumstantial description of the Orient are the fictions presented by writing on the Orient, yet invariably these are totally secondary to systematic tasks of another sort. In Lamartine, Nerval, and Flaubert, the Orient is a re-presentation of canonical material guided by an aesthetic and executive will capable of producing interest in the reader. Yet in all three writers, Orientalism or some aspect of it is asserted, even though, as I said earlier, the narrative consciousness is given a very large role to play. What we shall see is that for all its eccentric individuality, this narrative consciousness will end up by being aware, like Bouvard and Pecuchet, that pilgrimage is after all a form of copying.&lt;br /&gt;
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When he began his trip to the Orient in 1833, Lamartine did so, he said, as something he had always dreamed about: &amp;quot;un voyage en Orient [etait] comme un grand acte de ma vie interieure.&amp;quot; He is a bundle of predispositions, sympathies, biases: he hates the Romans and Carthage, and loves Jews, Egyptians, and Hindus, whose Dante he claims he will become. Armed with a formal verse &amp;quot;Adieu&amp;quot; to France, in which he lists everything that he plans to do in the Orient, he embarks for the East. At first everything he encounters either confirms his poetic predictions or realizes his propensity for analogy. Lady Hester Stanhope is the Circe of the desert; the Orient is the &amp;quot;patrie de mon imagination&amp;quot;; the Arabs are a primitive people; Biblical poetry is engraved on the land of Lebanon; the Orient testifies to the attractive largeness of Asia and to Greece&#039;s comparative smallness. Soon after he reaches Palestine, however, he becomes the incorrigible maker of an imaginary Orient. He alleges that the plains of Canaan appear to best advantage in the works of Poussin and Lorrain. From being a &amp;quot;translation,&amp;quot; as he called it earlier, his voyage is now turned into a prayer, which exercises his memory, soul, and heart more than it does his eyes, mind, or spirit.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Alphonse de Lamartine, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; (1835; reprint ed., Paris: Hachette, 1887), 1: 10, 48-9, 179, 178, 148, 189, 118, 245-6, 251.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This candid announcement completely unlooses Lamartine&#039;s analogic and reconstructive (and undisciplined) zeal. Christianity is a religion of imagination and recollection, and since Lamartine considers that he typifies the pious believer, he indulges himself accordingly. A catalogue of his tendentious &amp;quot;observations&amp;quot; would be interminable: a woman he sees reminds him of Haidee in &#039;&#039;Don Juan&#039;&#039;; the relationship between Jesus and Palestine is like that between Rousseau and Geneva; the actual river Jordan is less important than the &amp;quot;mysteries&amp;quot; it gives rise to in one&#039;s soul; Orientals, and Muslims in particular, are lazy, their politics are capricious, passionate, and futureless; another woman reminds him of a passage in &#039;&#039;Atala&#039;&#039;; neither Tasso nor Chateaubriand (whose antecedent travels seem often to harass Lamartine&#039;s otherwise heedless egoism) got the Holy Land right--and on and on. His pages on Arabic poetry, about which he discourses with supreme confidence, betray no discomfort at his total ignorance of the language. All that matters to him is that his travels in the Orient reveal to him how the Orient is &amp;quot;la terre des cultes, des prodiges,&amp;quot; and that he is its appointed poet in the West. With no trace of self-irony he announces:&lt;br /&gt;
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This Arab land is the land of prodigies; everything sprouts there, and every credulous or fanatical man can become a prophet there in his turn.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., 1: 363; 2: 74-5; 1: 475.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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He has become a prophet merely by the fact of residence in the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the end of his narrative Lamartine has achieved the purpose of his pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre, that beginning and end point of all time and space. He has internalized reality enough to want to retreat from it back into pure contemplation, solitude, philosophy, and poetry.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., 2: 92-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rising above the merely geographical Orient, he is transformed into a latter-day Chateaubriand, surveying the East as if it were a personal (or at the very least a French) province ready to be disposed of by European powers. From being a traveler and pilgrim in real time and space, Lamartine has become a transpersonal ego identifying itself in power and consciousness with the whole of Europe. What he sees before him is the Orient in the process of its inevitable future dismemberment, being taken over and consecrated by European suzerainty. Thus in Lamartine&#039;s climactic vision the Orient is reborn as European right-to-power over it:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This sort of suzerainty thus defined, and consecrated as a European right, will consist principally in the right to occupy one or another territory, as well as the coasts, in order to found there either free cities, or European colonies, or commercial ports of call....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor does Lamartine stop at this. He climbs still higher to the point where the Orient, what he has just seen and where he has just been, is reduced to &amp;quot;nations without territory, &#039;&#039;patrie&#039;&#039;, rights, laws or security ... waiting anxiously for the shelter&amp;quot; of European occupation.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., 2: 526-7, 533. Two important works on French writers in the Orient are Jean-Marie Carre, &#039;&#039;Voyageurs et ecrivains francais en Egypte&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Cairo: Institut francais d&#039;archeologie orientale, 1932), and Moenis Taha-Hussein, &#039;&#039;Le Romantisme francais et l&#039;Islam&#039;&#039; (Beirut: Dar-el-Maeref, 1962).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In all the visions of the Orient fabricated by Orientalism there is no recapitulation, literally, as entire as this one. For Lamartine a pilgrimage to the Orient has involved not only the penetration of the Orient by an imperious consciousness but also the virtual elimination of that consciousness as a result of its accession to a kind of impersonal and continental control over the Orient. The Orient&#039;s actual identity is withered away into a set of consecutive fragments, Lamartine&#039;s recollective observations, which are later to be gathered up and brought forth as a restated Napoleonic dream of world hegemony. Whereas Lane&#039;s human identity disappeared into the scientific grid of his Egyptian classifications, Lamartine&#039;s consciousness transgresses its normal bounds completely. In so doing, it repeats Chateaubriand&#039;s journey and his visions only to move on beyond them, into the sphere of the Shelleyan and Napoleonic abstract, by which worlds and populations are moved about like so many cards on a table. What remains of the Orient in Lamartine&#039;s prose is not very substantial at all. Its geopolitical reality has been overlaid with his plans for it; the sites he has visited, the people he has met, the experiences he has had, are reduced to a few echoes in his pompous generalizations. The last traces of particularity have been rubbed out in the &amp;quot;resume politique&amp;quot; with which the &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; concludes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Against the transcendent quasi-national egoism of Lamartine we must place Nerval and Flaubert in contrast. Their Oriental works play a substantial role in their total &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039;, a much greater one than Lamartine&#039;s imperialist &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; in his &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039;. Yet both of them, like Lamartine, came to the Orient prepared for it by voluminous reading in the classics, modern literature, and academic Orientalism; about this preparation Flaubert was much more candid than Nerval, who in &#039;&#039;Les Filles du feu&#039;&#039; says disingenuously that all he knew about the Orient was a half-forgotten memory from his school education.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gerard de Nerval, &#039;&#039;Les Filles du feu&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Albert Beguin and Jean Richet (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 1: 297-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The evidence of his &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; flatly contradicts this, although it shows a much less systematic and disciplined knowledge of Orientalia than Flaubert&#039;s. More important, however, is the fact that both writers (Nerval in 1842-1843 and Flaubert in 1849-1850) had greater personal and aesthetic uses for their visits to the Orient than any other nineteenth-century travelers. It is not inconsequential that both were geniuses to begin with, and that both were thoroughly steeped in aspects of European culture that encouraged a sympathetic, if perverse, vision of the Orient. Nerval and Flaubert belonged to that community of thought and feeling described by Mario Praz in &#039;&#039;The Romantic Agony&#039;&#039;, a community for which the imagery of exotic places, the cultivation of sadomasochistic tastes (what Praz calls &#039;&#039;algolagnia&#039;&#039;), a fascination with the macabre, with the notion of a Fatal Woman, with secrecy and occultism, all combined to enable literary work of the sort produced by Gautier (himself fascinated by the Orient), Swinburne, Baudelaire, and Huysmans.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Mario Praz, &#039;&#039;The Romantic Agony&#039;&#039;, trans. Angus Davison (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1967).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Nerval and Flaubert, such female figures as Cleopatra, Salome, and Isis have a special significance; and it was by no means accidental that in their work on the Orient, as well as in their visits to it, they pre-eminently valorized and enhanced female types of this legendary, richly suggestive, and associative sort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to their general cultural attitudes, Nerval and Flaubert brought to the Orient a personal mythology whose concerns and even structure required the Orient. Both men were touched by the Oriental renaissance as Quinet and others had defined it: they sought the invigoration provided by the fabulously antique and the exotic. For each, however, the Oriental pilgrimage was a quest for something relatively personal: Flaubert seeking a &amp;quot;homeland,&amp;quot; as Jean Bruneau has called it,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Jean Bruneau, &#039;&#039;Le &amp;quot;Conte Orientale&amp;quot; de Flaubert&#039;&#039; (Paris: Denoel, 1973), p. 79.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in the locales of the origin of religions, visions, and classical antiquity; Nerval seeking--or rather following--the traces of his personal sentiments and dreams, like Sterne&#039;s Yorick before him. For both writers the Orient was a place therefore of &#039;&#039;deja vu&#039;&#039;, and for both, with the artistic economy typical of all major aesthetic imaginations, it was a place often returned to after the actual voyage had been completed. For neither of them was the Orient exhausted by their uses of it, even if there is often a quality of disappointment, disenchantment, or demystification to be found in their Oriental writings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The paramount importance of Nerval and Flaubert to a study such as this of the Orientalist mind in the nineteenth century is that they produced work that is connected to and depends upon the kind of Orientalism we have so far discussed, yet remains independent from it. First there is the matter of their work&#039;s scope. Nerval produced his &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; as a collection of travel notes, sketches, stories, and fragments; his preoccupation with the Orient is to be found as well in &#039;&#039;Les Chimeres&#039;&#039;, in his letters, in some of his fiction and other prose writings. Flaubert&#039;s writing both before and after his visit is soaked in the Orient. The Orient appears in the &#039;&#039;Carnets de Voyage&#039;&#039; and in the first version of &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039; (and in the two later versions), as well as in &#039;&#039;Herodias, Salammbo&#039;&#039;, and the numerous reading notes, scenarios, and unfinished stories still available to us, which have been very intelligently studied by Bruneau.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;These are all considered by Bruneau in &#039;&#039;ibid&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are echoes of Orientalism in Flaubert&#039;s other major novels, too. In all, both Nerval and Flaubert continually elaborated their Oriental material and absorbed it variously into the special structures of their personal aesthetic projects. This is not to say, however, that the Orient is incidental to their work. Rather--by contrast with such writers as Lane (from whom both men borrowed shamelessly), Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Renan, Sacy--their Orient was not so much grasped, appropriated, reduced, or codified as lived in, exploited aesthetically and imaginatively as a roomy place full of possibility. What mattered to them was the structure of their work as an independent, aesthetic, and personal fact, and not the ways by which, if one wanted to, one could effectively dominate or set down the Orient graphically. Their egos never absorbed the Orient, nor totally identified the Orient with documentary and textual knowledge of it (with official Orientalism, in short).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the one hand, therefore, the scope of their Oriental work exceeds the limitations imposed by orthodox Orientalism. On the other hand, the subject of their work is more than Oriental or Orientalistic (even though they do their own Orientalizing of the Orient); it quite consciously plays with the limitations and the challenges presented to them by the Orient and by knowledge about it. Nerval, for example, believes that he has to infuse what he sees with vitality since, he says,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Le ciel et la mer sont toujours la; le ciel d&#039;Orient, la mer d&#039;Ionie se donnent chaque matin le saint baiser d&#039;amour; mais la terre est morte, morte sous la main de l&#039;homme, et les dieux se sont envoles!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(The sky and the sea are still there; the Oriental sky and the Ionian sky give each other the sacred kiss of love each morning; but the earth is dead, dead because man has killed it, and the gods have fled.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the Orient is to live at all, now that its gods have fled, it must be through his fertile efforts. In the &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; the narrative consciousness is a constantly energetic voice, moving through the labyrinths of Oriental existence armed--Nerval tells us--with two Arabic words, &#039;&#039;tayeb&#039;&#039;, the word for assent, and &#039;&#039;mafisch&#039;&#039;, the word for rejection. These two words enable him selectively to confront the antithetical Oriental world, to confront it and draw out from it its secret principles. He is predisposed to recognize that the Orient is &amp;quot;le pays des reves et de l&#039;illusion,&amp;quot; which, like the veils he sees everywhere in Cairo, conceal a deep, rich fund of female sexuality. Nerval repeats Lane&#039;s experience of discovering the necessity for marriage in an Islamic society, but unlike Lane he does attach himself to a woman. His liaison with Zaynab is more than socially obligatory:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I must unite with a guileless young girl who is of this sacred soil, which is our first homeland; I must bathe myself in the vivifying springs of humanity, from which poetry and the faith of our fathers flowed forth!... I would like to lead my life like a novel, and I willingly place myself in the situation of one of those active and resolute heroes who wish at all costs to create a drama around them, a knot of complexity, in a word, action.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Nerval, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 2: 68, 194, 96, 342.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nerval invests himself in the Orient, producing not so much a novelistic narrative as an everlasting intention--never fully realized--to fuse mind with physical action. This antinarrative, this para-pilgrimage, is a swerving away from discursive finality of the sort envisioned by previous writers on the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Connected physically and sympathetically to the Orient, Nerval wanders informally through its riches and its cultural (and principally feminine) ambience, locating in Egypt especially that maternal &amp;quot;center, at once mysterious and accessible&amp;quot; from which all wisdom derives.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 181.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His impressions, dreams, and memories alternate with sections of ornate, mannered narrative done in the Oriental style; the hard realities of travel--in Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey--mingle with the design of a deliberate digression, as if Nerval were repeating Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039; using an underground, though far less imperial and obvious, route. Michel Butor puts it beautifully:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To Nerval&#039;s eyes, Chateaubriand&#039;s journey remains a voyage along the surface, while his own is calculated, utilizing annex centers, lobbies of ellipses englobing the principal centers; this allows him to place in evidence, by parallax, all the dimensions of the snare harbored by the normal centers. Wandering the streets or environs of Cairo, Beirut, or Constantinople, Nerval is always lying in wait for anything that will allow him to sense a cavern extending beneath Rome, Athens, and Jerusalem [the principal cities of Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039;]....&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as the three cities of Chateaubriand are in communication--Rome, with its emperors and popes, reassembling the heritage, the testament, of Athens and Jerusalem--the caverns of Nerval ... become engaged in intercourse.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Michel Butor, &amp;quot;Travel and Writing,&amp;quot; trans. John Powers and K. Lisker, &#039;&#039;Mosaic&#039;&#039; 8, no. 1 (Fall 1974): 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Even the two large plotted episodes, &amp;quot;The Tale of the Caliph Hakim&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;The Tale of the Queen of the Morning,&amp;quot; that will supposedly convey a durable, solid narrative discourse seem to push Nerval away from &amp;quot;overground&amp;quot; finality, edging him further and further into a haunting internal world of paradox and dream. Both tales deal with multiple identity, one of whose motifs--explicitly stated--is incest, and both return us to Nerval&#039;s quintessential Oriental world of uncertain, fluid dreams infinitely multiplying themselves past resolution, definiteness, materiality. When the journey is completed and Nerval arrives in Malta on his way back to the European mainland, he realizes that he is now in &amp;quot;le pays du froid et des orages, et deja l&#039;Orient n&#039;est plus pour moi qu&#039;un de ses reves du matin auxquels viennent bientot succeder les ennuis du jour.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Nerval, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;, p. 628.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; incorporates numerous pages copied out of Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, but even their lucid confidence seems to dissolve in the endlessly decomposing, cavernous element which is Nerval&#039;s Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His &#039;&#039;carnet&#039;&#039; for the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; supplies us, I think, with two perfect texts for understanding how his Orient untied itself from anything resembling an Orientalist conception of the Orient, even though his work depends on Orientalism to a certain extent. First, his appetites strive to gather in experience and memory indiscriminately: &amp;quot;Je sens le besoin de m&#039;assimiler toute la nature (femmes etrangeres). Souvenirs d&#039;y avoir vecu.&amp;quot; The second elaborates a bit on the first: &amp;quot;Les reves et la folie ... Le desir de l&#039;&#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039;. L&#039;Europe s&#039;eleve. Le reve se realise ... Elle. Je l&#039;avais fuie, je l&#039;avais perdue ... Vaisseau d&#039;Orient.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 706, 718.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Orient symbolizes Nerval&#039;s dream-quest and the fugitive woman central to it, both as desire and as loss. &amp;quot;Vaisseau d&#039;Orient&amp;quot;--vessel of the Orient--refers enigmatically either to the woman as the vessel carrying the Orient, or possibly, to Nerval&#039;s own vessel for the Orient, his prose &#039;&#039;voyage&#039;&#039;. In either case, the Orient is identified with commemorative &#039;&#039;absence&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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How else can we explain in the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039;, a work of so original and individual a mind, the lazy use of large swatches of Lane, incorporated without a murmur by Nerval as &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; descriptions of the Orient? It is as if having failed both in his search for a stable Oriental reality and in his intent to give systematic order to his re-presentation of the Orient, Nerval was employing the borrowed authority of a canonized Orientalist text. After his voyage the earth remained dead, and aside from its brilliantly crafted but fragmented embodiments in the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039;, his self was no less drugged and worn out than before. Therefore the Orient seemed retrospectively to belong to a negative realm, in which failed narratives, disordered chronicles, mere transcription of scholarly texts, were its only possible vessel. At least Nerval did not try to save his project by wholeheartedly giving himself up to French designs on the Orient, although he did resort to Orientalism to make some of his points.&lt;br /&gt;
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In contrast to Nerval&#039;s negative vision of an emptied Orient, Flaubert&#039;s is eminently corporeal. His travel notes and letters reveal a man scrupulously reporting events, persons, and settings, delighting in their &#039;&#039;bizarreries&#039;&#039;, never attempting to reduce the incongruities before him. In what he writes (or perhaps because he writes), the premium is on the eye-catching, translated into self-consciously worked-out phrases: for example, &amp;quot;Inscriptions and birddroppings are the only two things in Egypt that give any indication of life.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour&#039;&#039;, trans, and ed. Francis Steegmuller (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1973), p. 200. I have also consulted the following texts, in which all Flaubert&#039;s &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; material is to be found: &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes de Gustave Flaubert&#039;&#039; (Paris: Club de l&#039;Honnete homme, 1973), vols. 10, 11; &#039;&#039;Les Lettres d&#039;Egypte, de Gustave Flaubert&#039;&#039;, ed. A. Youssef Naaman (Paris: Nizet, 1965); Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Correspondance&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean Bruneau (Paris, Gallimard, 1973), 1: 518 ff.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His tastes run to the perverse, whose form is often a combination of extreme animality, even of grotesque nastiness, with extreme and sometimes intellectual refinement. Yet this particular kind of perversity was not something merely observed, it was also studied, and came to represent an essential element in Flaubert&#039;s fiction. The familiar oppositions, or ambivalences, as Harry Levin has called them, that roam through Flaubert&#039;s writing--flesh versus mind, Salome versus Saint John, Salammbo versus Saint Anthony&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harry Levin, &#039;&#039;The Gates of Horn: A Study of Five French Realists&#039;&#039; (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 285.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--are powerfully validated by what he saw in the Orient, what, given his eclectic learning, he could see there of the partnership between knowledge and carnal grossness. In Upper Egypt he was taken with ancient Egyptian art, its preciosity and deliberate lubricity: &amp;quot;so dirty pictures existed even so far back in antiquity?&amp;quot; How much more the Orient really answered questions than it raised them is evident in the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You [Flaubert&#039;s mother] ask me whether the Orient is up to what I imagined it to be. Yes, it is; and more than that, it extends far beyond the narrow idea I had of it. I have found, clearly delineated, everything that was hazy in my mind. Facts have taken the place of suppositions--so excellently so that it is often as though I were suddenly coming upon old forgotten dreams.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, pp. 173, 75.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Flaubert&#039;s work is so complex and so vast as to make any simple account of his Oriental writing very sketchy and hopelessly incomplete. Nevertheless, in the context created by other writers on the Orient, a certain number of main features in Flaubert&#039;s Orientalism can fairly be described. Making allowances for the difference between candidly personal writing (letters, travel notes, diary jottings) and formally aesthetic writing (novels and tales), we can still remark that Flaubert&#039;s Oriental perspective is rooted in an eastward and southward search for a &amp;quot;visionary alternative,&amp;quot; which &amp;quot;meant gorgeous color, in contrast to the greyish tonality of the French provincial landscape. It meant exciting spectacle instead of hum-drum routine, the perennially mysterious in place of the all too familiar.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Levin, &#039;&#039;Gates of Horn&#039;&#039;, p. 271.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When he actually visited it, however, this Orient impressed him with its decrepitude and senescence. Like every other Orientalism, then, Flaubert&#039;s is revivalist: &#039;&#039;he&#039;&#039; must bring the Orient to life, he must deliver it to himself and to his readers, and it is his experience of it in books and on the spot, and his language for it, that will do the trick. His novels of the Orient accordingly were labored historical and learned reconstructions. Carthage in &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039; and the products of Saint Anthony&#039;s fevered imagination were authentic fruits of Flaubert&#039;s wide reading in the (mainly Western) sources of Oriental religion, warfare, ritual, and societies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What the formal aesthetic work retains, over and above the marks of Flaubert&#039;s voracious readings and recensions, are memories of Oriental travel. The &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque des idees recues&#039;&#039; has it that an Orientalist is &amp;quot;un homme qui a beaucoup voyage,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Catalogue des opinions chic, in Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 2: 1019.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; only unlike most other such travelers Flaubert put his voyages to ingenious use. Most of his experiences are conveyed in theatrical form. He is interested not only in the content of what he sees but--like Renan--in &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; he sees, the way by which the Orient, sometimes horribly but always attractively, seems to present itself to him. Flaubert is its best audience:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
... Kasr el-&#039;Aini Hospital. Well maintained. The work of Clot Bey--his hand is still to be seen. Pretty cases of syphilis; in the ward of Abbas&#039;s Mamelukes, several have it in the arse. At a sign from the doctor, they all stood up on their beds, undid their trouserbelts (it was like army drill), and opened their anuses with their fingers to show their chancres. Enormous infundibula; one had a growth of hair inside his anus. One old man&#039;s prick entirely devoid of skin; I recoiled from the stench. A rachitic: hands curved backward, nails as long as claws; one could see the bone structure of his torso as clearly as a skeleton; the rest of his body, too, was fantastically thin, and his head was ringed with whitish leprosy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dissecting room: ... On the table an Arab cadaver, wide open; beautiful black hair....&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, p. 65.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The lurid detail of this scene is related to many scenes in Flaubert&#039;s novels, in which illness is presented to us as if in a clinical theater. His fascination with dissection and beauty recalls, for instance, the final scene of &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, culminating in Matho&#039;s ceremonial death. In such scenes, sentiments of repulsion or sympathy are repressed entirely; what matters is the correct rendering of exact detail.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most celebrated moments in Flaubert&#039;s Oriental travel have to do with Kuchuk Hanem, a famous Egyptian dancer and courtesan he encountered in Wadi Haifa. He had read in Lane about the &#039;&#039;almehs&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;khawals&#039;&#039;, dancing girls and boys respectively, but it was his imagination rather than Lane&#039;s that could immediately grasp as well as enjoy the almost metaphysical paradox of the &#039;&#039;almeh&#039;s&#039;&#039; profession and the meaning of her name. (In &#039;&#039;Victory&#039;&#039;, Joseph Conrad was to repeat Flaubert&#039;s observation by making his musician heroine--Alma--irresistibly attractive and dangerous to Axel Heyst.) &#039;&#039;Alemah&#039;&#039; in Arabic means a learned woman. It was the name given to women in conservative eighteenth-century Egyptian society who were accomplished reciters of poetry. By the mid-nineteenth century the title was used as a sort of guild name for dancers who were also prostitutes, and such was Kuchuk Hanem, whose dance &amp;quot;L&#039;Abeille&amp;quot; Flaubert watched before he slept with her. She was surely the prototype of several of his novels&#039; female characters in her learned sensuality, delicacy, and (according to Flaubert) mindless coarseness. What he especially liked about her was that she seemed to place no demands on him, while the &amp;quot;nauseating odor&amp;quot; of her bedbugs mingled enchantingly with &amp;quot;the scent of her skin, which was dripping with sandalwood.&amp;quot; After his voyage, he had written Louise Colet reassuringly that &amp;quot;the oriental woman is no more than a machine: she makes no distinction between one man and another man.&amp;quot; Kuchuk&#039;s dumb and irreducible sexuality allowed Flaubert&#039;s mind to wander in ruminations whose haunting power over him reminds us somewhat of Deslauriers and Frederic Moreau at the end of &#039;&#039;l&#039;Education sentimentale&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for me, I scarcely shut my eyes. Watching that beautiful creature asleep (she snored, her head against my arm: I had slipped my forefinger under her necklace), my night was one long, infinitely intense reverie--that was why I stayed. I thought of my nights in Paris brothels--a whole series of old memories came back--and I thought of her, of her dance, of her voice as she sang songs that for me were without meaning and even without distinguishable words.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 220, 130.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Oriental woman is an occasion and an opportunity for Flaubert&#039;s musings; he is entranced by her self-sufficiency, by her emotional carelessness, and also by what, lying next to him, she allows him to think. Less a woman than a display of impressive but verbally inexpressive femininity, Kuchuk is the prototype of Flaubert&#039;s Salammbo and Salome, as well as of all the versions of carnal female temptation to which his Saint Anthony is subject. Like the Queen of Sheba (who also danced &amp;quot;The Bee&amp;quot;) she could say--were she able to speak--&amp;quot;Je ne suis pas une femme, je suis un monde.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Flaubert, &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine, in Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 1: 85.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Looked at from another angle Kuchuk is a disturbing symbol of fecundity, peculiarly Oriental in her luxuriant and seemingly unbounded sexuality. Her home near the upper reaches of the Nile occupied a position structurally similar to the place where the veil of Tanit--the goddess described as &#039;&#039;Omnifeconde&#039;&#039;--is concealed in &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 1: 809 ff. See also Maurice Z. Shroder, &amp;quot;On Reading &#039;&#039;Salammbo,&amp;quot; L&#039;Esprit createur&#039;&#039; 10, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 24-35.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet like Tanit, Salome, and Salammbo herself, Kuchuk was doomed to remain barren, corrupting, without issue. How much she and the Oriental world she lived in came to intensify for Flaubert his own sense of barrenness is indicated in the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have a large orchestra, a rich palette, a variety of resources. We know many more tricks and dodges, probably, than were ever known before. No, what we lack is the intrinsic principle, the soul of the thing, the very idea of the subject. We take notes, we make journeys: emptiness! emptiness! We become scholars, archaeologists, historians, doctors, cobblers, people of taste. What is the good of all that? Where is the heart, the verve, the sap? Where to start from? Where to go? We&#039;re good at sucking, we play a lot of tongue-games, we pet for hours: but the real thing! To ejaculate, beget the child!&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, pp. 198-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Woven through all of Flaubert&#039;s Oriental experiences, exciting or disappointing, is an almost uniform association between the Orient and sex. In making this association Flaubert was neither the first nor the most exaggerated instance of a remarkably persistent motif in Western attitudes to the Orient. And indeed, the motif itself is singularly unvaried, although Flaubert&#039;s genius may have done more than anyone else&#039;s could have to give it artistic dignity. Why the Orient seems still to suggest not only fecundity but sexual promise (and threat), untiring sensuality, unlimited desire, deep generative energies, is something on which one could speculate: it is not the province of my analysis here, alas, despite its frequently noted appearance. Nevertheless one must acknowledge its importance as something eliciting complex responses, sometimes even a frightening self-discovery, in the Orientalists, and Flaubert was an interesting case in point.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orient threw him back on his own human and technical resources. It did not respond, just as Kuchuk did not, to his presence. Standing before its ongoing life Flaubert, like Lane before him, felt his detached powerlessness, perhaps also his self-induced unwillingness, to enter and become part of what he saw. This of course was Flaubert&#039;s perennial problem; it had existed before he went East, and it remained after the visit. Flaubert admitted the difficulty, the antidote to which was in his work (especially in an Oriental work like &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;) to stress the &#039;&#039;form&#039;&#039; of encyclopedic presentation of material at the expense of human engagement in life. Indeed, Saint Anthony is nothing if not a man for whom reality is a series of books, spectacles, and pageants unrolling temptingly and at a distance before his eyes. All of Flaubert&#039;s immense learning is structured--as Michel Foucault has tellingly noted--like a theatrical, fantastic library, parading before the anchorite&#039;s gaze;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Foucault, &amp;quot;La Bibliotheque fantastique,&amp;quot; in Flaubert, &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;, pp. 7-33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; residually, the parade carries in its form Flaubert&#039;s memories of Kasr el&#039;Aini (the syphilitics&#039; army drill) and Kuchuk&#039;s dance. More to the point, however, is that Saint Anthony is a celibate to whom temptations are primarily sexual. After putting up with every sort of dangerous charm, he is finally given a glimpse into the biological processes of life; he is delirious at being able to see life being born, a scene for which Flaubert felt himself to be incompetent during his Oriental sojourn. Yet because Anthony is delirious, we are meant to read the scene ironically. What is granted to him at the end, the desire to &#039;&#039;become&#039;&#039; matter, to become life, is at best a desire--whether realizable and fulfillable or not, we cannot know.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the energy of his intelligence and his enormous power of intellectual absorption, Flaubert felt in the Orient, first, that &amp;quot;the more you concentrate on it [in detail] the less you grasp the whole,&amp;quot; and then, second, that &amp;quot;the pieces fall into place of themselves.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, p. 79.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At best, this produces a &#039;&#039;spectacular&#039;&#039; form, but it remains barred to the Westerner&#039;s full participation in it. On one level this was a personal predicament for Flaubert, and he devised means, some of which we have discussed, for dealing with it. On a more general level, this was an &#039;&#039;epistemological&#039;&#039; difficulty for which, of course, the discipline of Orientalism existed. At one moment during his Oriental tour he considered what the epistemological challenge could give rise to. Without what he called spirit and style, the mind could &amp;quot;get lost in archaeology&amp;quot;: he was referring to a sort of regimented antiquarianism by which the exotic and the strange would get formulated into lexicons, codes, and finally cliches of the kind he was to ridicule in the &#039;&#039;Dictionnaire des idees recues&#039;&#039;. Under the influence of such an attitude the world would be &amp;quot;regulated like a college. Teachers will be the law. Everyone will be in uniform.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 211-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As against such an imposed discipline, he no doubt felt that his own treatments of exotic material, notably the Oriental material he had both experienced and read about for years, were infinitely preferable. In those at least there was room for a sense of immediacy, imagination, and flair, whereas in the ranks of archaeological tomes everything but &amp;quot;learning&amp;quot; had been squeezed out. And more than most novelists Flaubert was acquainted with organized learning, its products, and its results: these products are clearly evident in the misfortunes of Bouvard and Pecuchet, but they would have been as comically apparent in fields like Orientalism, whose textual attitudes belonged to the world of &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;. Therefore one could either construct the world with verve and style, or one could copy it tirelessly according to impersonal academic rules of procedure. In both cases, with regard to the Orient, there was a frank acknowledgment that it was a world elsewhere, apart from the ordinary attachments, sentiments, and values of &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; world in the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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In all of his novels Flaubert associates the Orient with the escapism of sexual fantasy. Emma Bovary and Frederic Moreau pine for what in their drab (or harried) bourgeois lives they do not have, and what they realize they want comes easily to their daydreams packed inside Oriental cliches: harems, princesses, princes, slaves, veils, dancing girls and boys, sherbets, ointments, and so on. The repertoire is familiar, not so much because it reminds us of Flaubert&#039;s own voyages in and obsession with the Orient, but because, once again, the association is clearly made between the Orient and the freedom of licentious sex. We may as well recognize that for nineteenth-century Europe, with its increasing &#039;&#039;embourgeoisement&#039;&#039;, sex had been institutionalized to a very considerable degree. On the one hand, there was no such thing as &amp;quot;free&amp;quot; sex, and on the other, sex in society entailed a web of legal, moral, even political and economic obligations of a detailed and certainly encumbering sort. Just as the various colonial possessions--quite apart from their economic benefit to metropolitan Europe--were useful as places to send wayward sons, superfluous populations of delinquents, poor people, and other undesirables, so the Orient was a place where one could look for sexual experience unobtainable in Europe. Virtually no European writer who wrote on or traveled to the Orient in the period after 1800 exempted himself or herself from this quest: Flaubert, Nerval, &amp;quot;Dirty Dick&amp;quot; Burton, and Lane are only the most notable. In the twentieth century one thinks of Gide, Conrad, Maugham, and dozens of others. What they looked for often--correctly, I think--was a different type of sexuality, perhaps more libertine and less guilt-ridden; but even that quest, if repeated by enough people, could (and did) become as regulated and uniform as learning itself. In time &amp;quot;Oriental sex&amp;quot; was as standard a commodity as any other available in the mass culture, with the result that readers and writers could have it if they wished without necessarily going to the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was certainly true that by the middle of the nineteenth century France, no less than England and the rest of Europe, had a flourishing knowledge industry of the sort that Flaubert feared. Great numbers of texts were being produced, and more important, the agencies and institutions for their dissemination and propagation were everywhere to be found. As historians of science and knowledge have observed, the organization of scientific and learned fields that took place during the nineteenth century was both rigorous and all-encompassing. Research became a regular activity; there was a regulated exchange of information, and agreement on what the problems were as well as consensus on the appropriate paradigms for research and its results.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For a discussion of this process see Foucault, &#039;&#039;Archaeology of Knowledge&#039;&#039;; also Joseph Ben-David, &#039;&#039;The Scientist&#039;s Role in Society&#039;&#039; (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971). See also Edward W. Said, &amp;quot;An Ethics of Language,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diacritics&#039;&#039; 4, no. 2 (Summer 1974): 28-37.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The apparatus serving Oriental studies was part of the scene, and this was one thing that Flaubert surely had in mind when he proclaimed that &amp;quot;everyone will be in uniform.&amp;quot; An Orientalist was no longer a gifted amateur enthusiast, or if he was, he would have trouble being taken seriously as a scholar. To be an Orientalist meant university training in Oriental studies (by 1850 every major European university had a fully developed curriculum in one or another of the Orientalist disciplines), it meant subvention for one&#039;s travel (perhaps by one of the Asiatic societies or a geographical exploration fund or a government grant), it meant publication in accredited form (perhaps under the imprint of a learned society or an Oriental translation fund). And both within the guild of Orientalist scholars and to the public at large, such uniform accreditation as clothed the work of Orientalist scholarship, not personal testimony nor subjective impressionism, meant Science.&lt;br /&gt;
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Added to the oppressive regulation of Oriental matters was the accelerated attention paid by the Powers (as the European empires were called) to the Orient, and to the Levant in particular. Ever since the Treaty of Chanak of 1806 between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, the Eastern Question had hovered ever more prominently on Europe&#039;s Mediterranean horizons. Britain&#039;s interests were more substantial in the East than France&#039;s, but we must not forget Russia&#039;s movements into the Orient (Samarkand and Bokhara were taken in 1868; the Transcaspian Railroad was being extended systematically), nor Germany&#039;s and Austria-Hungary&#039;s. France&#039;s North African interventions, however, were not the only components of its Islamic policy. In 1860, during the clashes between Maronites and Druzes in Lebanon (already predicted by Lamartine and Nerval), France supported the Christians, England the Druzes. For standing near the center of all European politics in the East was the question of minorities, whose &amp;quot;interests&amp;quot; the Powers, each in its own way, claimed to protect and represent. Jews, Greek and Russian Orthodox, Druzes, Circassians, Armenians, Kurds, the various small Christian sects: all these were studied, planned for, designed upon by European Powers improvising as well as constructing their Oriental policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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I mention such matters simply as a way of keeping vivid the sense of layer upon layer of interests, official learning, institutional pressure, that covered the Orient as a subject matter and as a territory during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Even the most innocuous travel book--and there were literally hundreds written after mid-century&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See the invaluable listings in Richard Bevis, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheca Cisorientalia: An Annotated Checklist of Early English Travel Books on the Near and Middle East&#039;&#039; (Boston: G. K. Hall &amp;amp; Co., 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--contributed to the density of public awareness of the Orient; a heavily marked dividing line separated the delights, miscellaneous exploits, and testimonial portentousness of individual pilgrims in the East (which included some American voyagers, among them Mark Twain and Herman Melville&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For discussions of the American travelers see Dorothee Metlitski Finkelstein, &#039;&#039;Melville&#039;s Orienda&#039;&#039; (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), and Franklin Walker, &#039;&#039;Irreverent Pilgrims: Melville&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Browne, and Mark Twain in the Holy Land&#039;&#039; (Seattle; University of Washington Press, 1974).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) from the authoritative reports of scholarly travelers, missionaries, governmental functionaries, and other expert witnesses. This dividing line existed clearly in Flaubert&#039;s mind, as it must have for any individual consciousness that did not have an innocent perspective on the Orient as a terrain for literary exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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English writers on the whole had a more pronounced and harder sense of what Oriental pilgrimages might entail than the French. India was a valuably real constant in this sense, and therefore all the territory between the Mediterranean and India acquired a correspondingly weighty importance. Romantic writers like Byron and Scott consequently had a political vision of the Near Orient and a very combative awareness of how relations between the Orient and Europe would have to be conducted. Scott&#039;s historical sense in &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Count Robert of Paris&#039;&#039; allowed him to set these novels in Crusader Palestine and eleventh-century Byzantium, respectively, without at the same time detracting from his canny political appreciation of the way powers act abroad. The failure of Disraeli&#039;s &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; can easily be ascribed to its author&#039;s perhaps over-developed knowledge of Oriental politics and the British Establishment&#039;s network of interests; Tancred&#039;s ingenuous desire to go to Jerusalem very soon mires Disraeli in ludicrously complex descriptions of how a Lebanese tribal chieftain tries to manage Druzes, Muslims, Jews, and Europeans to his political advantage. By the end of the novel Tancred&#039;s Eastern quest has more or less disappeared because there is nothing in Disraeli&#039;s material vision of Oriental realities to nourish the pilgrim&#039;s somewhat capricious impulses. Even George Eliot, who never visited the Orient herself, could not sustain the Jewish equivalent of an Oriental pilgrimage in &#039;&#039;Daniel Deronda&#039;&#039; (1876) without straying into the complexities of British realities as they decisively affected the Eastern project.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus whenever the Oriental motif for the English writer was not principally a stylistic matter (as in FitzGerald&#039;s &#039;&#039;Rubaiyat&#039;&#039; or in Morier&#039;s &#039;&#039;Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan&#039;&#039;), it forced him to confront a set of imposing resistances to his individual fantasy. There are no English equivalents to the Oriental works by Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Nerval, and Flaubert, just as Lane&#039;s early Orientalist counterparts--Sacy and Renan--were considerably more aware than he was of how much they were creating what they wrote about. The form of such works as Kinglake&#039;s &#039;&#039;Eothen&#039;&#039; (1844) and Burton&#039;s &#039;&#039;Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039; (1855-1856) is rigidly chronological and dutifully linear, as if what the authors were describing was a shopping trip to an Oriental bazaar rather than an adventure. Kinglake&#039;s undeservedly famous and popular work is a pathetic catalogue of pompous ethnocentrisms and tiringly nondescript accounts of the Englishman&#039;s East. His ostensible purpose in the book is to prove that travel in the Orient is important to &amp;quot;moulding of your character--that is, your very identity,&amp;quot; but in fact this turns out to be little more than solidifying &amp;quot;your&amp;quot; anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and general all-purpose race prejudice. We are told, for instance, that the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039; is too lively and inventive a work to have been created by a &amp;quot;mere Oriental, who, for creative purposes, is a thing dead and dry--a mental mummy.&amp;quot; Although Kinglake blithely confesses to no knowledge of any Oriental language, he is not constrained by ignorance from making sweeping generalizations about the Orient, its culture, mentality, and society. Many of the attitudes he repeats are canonical, of course, but it is interesting how little the experience of actually seeing the Orient affected his opinions. Like many other travelers he is more interested in remaking himself and the Orient (dead and dry--a mental mummy) than he is in seeing what there is to be seen. Every being he encounters merely corroborates his belief that Easterners are best dealt with when intimidated, and what better instrument of intimidation than a sovereign Western ego? En route to Suez across the desert, alone, he glories in his self-sufficiency and power: &amp;quot;I was here in this African desert, and I &#039;&#039;myself&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;and no other&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;had charge of my life&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Alexander William Kinglake, &#039;&#039;Eothen, or Traces of Travel Brought Home from the East&#039;&#039;, ed. D. G. Hogarth (1844; reprint ed., London: Henry Frowde, 1906), pp. 25, 68, 241, 220.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It is for the comparatively useless purpose of letting Kinglake take hold of himself that the Orient serves him.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like Lamartine before him, Kinglake comfortably identified his superior consciousness with his nation&#039;s, the difference being that in the Englishman&#039;s case his government was closer to settling in the rest of the Orient than France was--for the time being. Flaubert saw this with perfect accuracy:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems to me almost impossible that within a short time England won&#039;t become mistress of Egypt. She already keeps Aden full of her troops, the crossing of Suez will make it very easy for the redcoats to arrive in Cairo one fine morning--the news will reach France two weeks later and everyone will be very surprised! Remember my prediction: at the first sign of trouble in Europe, England will take Egypt, Russia will take Constantinople, and we, in retaliation, will get ourselves massacred in the mountains of Syria.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, p. 81.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For all their vaunted individuality Kinglake&#039;s views express a public and national will over the Orient; his ego is the instrument of this will&#039;s expression, not by any means its master. There is no evidence in his writing that he struggled to create a novel opinion of the Orient; neither his knowledge nor his personality was adequate for that, and this is the great difference between him and Richard Burton. As a traveler, Burton was a real adventurer; as a scholar, he could hold his own with any academic Orientalist in Europe; as a character, he was fully aware of the necessity of combat between himself and the uniformed teachers who ran Europe and European knowledge with such precise anonymity and scientific firmness. Everything Burton wrote testifies to this combativeness, rarely with more candid contempt for his opponents than in the preface to his translation of the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039;. He seems to have taken a special sort of infantile pleasure in demonstrating that he knew more than any professional scholar, that he had acquired many more details than they had, that he could handle the material with more wit and tact and freshness than they.&lt;br /&gt;
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As I said earlier, Burton&#039;s work based on his personal experience occupies a median position between Orientalist genres represented on the one hand by Lane and on the other by the French writers I have discussed. His Oriental narratives are structured as pilgrimages and, in the case of &#039;&#039;The Land of Midian Revisited&#039;&#039;, pilgrimages for a second time to sites of sometimes religious, sometimes political and economic significance. He is present as the principal character of these works, as much the center of fantastic adventure and even fantasy (like the French writers) as the authoritative commentator and detached Westerner on Oriental society and customs (like Lane). He has been rightly considered the first in a series of fiercely individualistic Victorian travelers in the East (the others being Blunt and Doughty) by Thomas Assad, who bases his work on the distance in tone and intelligence between his writers&#039; work and such works as Austen Layard&#039;s &#039;&#039;Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon&#039;&#039; (1851), Eliot Warburton&#039;s celebrated &#039;&#039;The Crescent and the Cross&#039;&#039; (1844), Robert Curzon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Visit to the Monasteries of the Levant&#039;&#039; (1849), and (a work he does not mention) Thackeray&#039;s moderately amusing &#039;&#039;Notes of a Journey from Cornhill to Grand Cairo&#039;&#039; (1845).&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Thomas J. Assad, &#039;&#039;Three Victorian Travellers: Burton, Blunt and Doughty&#039;&#039; (London: Routledge &amp;amp; Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet Burton&#039;s legacy is more complex than individualism precisely because in his writing we can find exemplified the struggle between individualism and a strong feeling of national identification with Europe (specifically England) as an imperial power in the East. Assad sensitively points out that Burton was an imperialist, for all his sympathetic self-association with the Arabs; but what is more relevant is that Burton thought of himself both as a rebel against authority (hence his identification with the East as a place of freedom from Victorian moral authority) and as a potential agent of authority in the East. It is the &#039;&#039;manner&#039;&#039; of that coexistence, between two antagonistic roles for himself, that is of interest.&lt;br /&gt;
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The problem finally reduces itself to the problem of knowledge of the Orient, which is why a consideration of Burton&#039;s Orientalism ought to conclude our account of Orientalist structures and restructures in most of the nineteenth century. As a traveling adventurer Burton conceived of himself as sharing the life of the people in whose lands he lived. Far more successfully than T. E. Lawrence, he was able to become an Oriental; he not only spoke the language flawlessly, he was able to penetrate to the heart of Islam and, disguised as an Indian Muslim doctor, accomplish the pilgrimage to Mecca. Yet Burton&#039;s most extraordinary characteristic is, I believe, that he was preternaturally knowledgeable about the degree to which human life in society was governed by rules and codes. All of his vast information about the Orient, which dots every page he wrote, reveals that he knew that the Orient in general and Islam in particular were systems of information, behavior, and belief, that to be an Oriental or a Muslim was to know certain things in a certain way, and that these were of course subject to history, geography, and the development of society in circumstances specific to it. Thus his accounts of travel in the East reveal to us a consciousness aware of these things and able to steer a narrative course through them: no man who did not know Arabic and Islam as well as Burton could have gone as far as he did in actually becoming a pilgrim to Mecca and Medina. So what we read in his prose is the history of a consciousness negotiating its way through an alien culture by virtue of having successfully absorbed its systems of information and behavior. Burton&#039;s freedom was in having shaken himself loose of his European origins enough to be able to live as an Oriental. Every scene in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; reveals him as winning out over the obstacles confronting him, a foreigner, in a strange place. He was able to do this because he had sufficient knowledge of an alien society for this purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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In no writer on the Orient so much as in Burton do we feel that generalizations about the Oriental--for example, the pages on the notion of &#039;&#039;Kayf&#039;&#039; for the Arab or on how education is suited to the Oriental mind (pages that are clearly meant as a rebuttal to Macaulay&#039;s simple-minded assertions)&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Richard Burton, &#039;&#039;Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039;, ed. Isabel Burton (London: Tylston &amp;amp; Edwards, 1893), 1: 9, 108-10.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--are the result of knowledge acquired about the Orient by living there, actually seeing it firsthand, truly trying to see Oriental life from the viewpoint of a person immersed in it. Yet what is never far from the surface of Burton&#039;s prose is another sense it radiates, a sense of assertion and domination over all the complexities of Oriental life. Every one of Burton&#039;s footnotes, whether in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; or in his translation of the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039; (the same is true of his &amp;quot;Terminal Essay&amp;quot; for it&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Richard Burton, &amp;quot;Terminal Essay,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Book of the Thousand and One Nights&#039;&#039; (London: Burton Club, 1886), 10: 63-302.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) was meant to be testimony to his victory over the sometimes scandalous system of Oriental knowledge, a system he had mastered by himself. For even in Burton&#039;s prose we are never directly &#039;&#039;given&#039;&#039; the Orient; everything about it is presented to us by way of Burton&#039;s knowledgeable (and often prurient) interventions, which remind us repeatedly how he had taken over the management of Oriental life for the purposes of his narrative. And it is this fact--for in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; it is a fact--that elevates Burton&#039;s consciousness to a position of supremacy over the Orient. In that position his individuality perforce encounters, and indeed merges with, the voice of Empire, which is itself a system of rules, codes, and concrete epistemological habits. Thus when Burton tells us in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; that &amp;quot;Egypt is a treasure to be won,&amp;quot; that it &amp;quot;is the most tempting prize which the East holds out to the ambition of Europe, not excepted even the Golden Horn,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Burton, &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039;, 1: 112, 114.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; we must recognize how the voice of the highly idiosyncratic master of Oriental knowledge informs, feeds into the voice of European ambition for rule over the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Burton&#039;s two voices blending into one presage the work of Orientalists-&#039;&#039;cum&#039;&#039;-imperial agents like T. E. Lawrence, Edward Henry Palmer, D. G. Hogarth, Gertrude Bell, Ronald Storrs, St. John Philby, and William Gifford Paigrave, to name only some English writers. The double-pronged intention of Burton&#039;s work is at the same time to use his Oriental residence for scientific observation &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; not easily to sacrifice his individuality to that end. The second of these two intentions leads him inevitably to submit to the first because, as will appear increasingly obvious, he is a European for whom such knowledge of Oriental society as he has is possible only for a European, with a European&#039;s self-awareness of society as a collection of rules and practices. In other words, to be a European in the Orient, and to be one knowledgeably, one must see and know the Orient as a domain ruled over by Europe. Orientalism, which is the system of European or Western knowledge about the Orient, thus becomes synonymous with European domination of the Orient, and this domination effectively overrules even the eccentricities of Burton&#039;s personal style.&lt;br /&gt;
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Burton took the assertion of personal, authentic, sympathetic, and humanistic knowledge of the Orient as far as it would go in its struggle with the archive of official European knowledge about the Orient. In the history of nineteenth-century attempts to restore, restructure, and redeem all the various provinces of knowledge and life, Orientalism--like all the other Romantically inspired learned disciplines--contributed an important share. For not only did the field evolve from a system of inspired observation into what Flaubert called a regulated college of learning, it also reduced the personalities of even its most redoubtable individualists like Burton to the role of imperial scribe. From being a place, the Orient became a domain of actual scholarly rule and potential imperial sway. The role of the early Orientalists like Renan, Sacy, and Lane was to provide their work and the Orient together with a &#039;&#039;mise en scene&#039;&#039;; later Orientalists, scholarly or imaginative, took firm hold of the scene. Still later, as the scene required management, it became clear that institutions and governments were better at the game of management than individuals. This is the legacy of nineteenth-century Orientalism to which the twentieth century has become inheritor. We must now investigate as exactly as possible the way twentieth-century Orientalism--inaugurated by the long process of the West&#039;s occupation of the Orient from the 1880s on--successfully controlled freedom and knowledge; in short, the way Orientalism was fully formalized into a repeatedly produced copy of itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Footnotes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;3.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;3.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Orientalism Now&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
On les apercevait tenant leurs idoles entre leurs bras comme de grands enfants paralytiques.&lt;br /&gt;
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--Gustave Flaubert, &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea--something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to....&lt;br /&gt;
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--Joseph Conrad, &#039;&#039;Heart of Darkness&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Latent and Manifest Orientalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
In Chapter One, I tried to indicate the scope of thought and action covered by the word &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, using as privileged types the British and French experiences of and with the Near Orient, Islam, and the Arabs. In those experiences I discerned an intimate, perhaps even the most intimate, and rich relationship between Occident and Orient. Those experiences were part of a much wider European or Western relationship with the Orient, but what seems to have influenced Orientalism most was a fairly constant sense of confrontation felt by Westerners dealing with the East. The boundary notion of East and West, the varying degrees of projected inferiority and strength, the range of work done, the kinds of characteristic features ascribed to the Orient: all these testify to a willed imaginative and geographic division made between East and West, and lived through during many centuries. In Chapter Two my focus narrowed a good deal. I was interested in the earliest phases of what I call modern Orientalism, which began during the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth. Since I did not intend my study to become a narrative chronicle of the development of Oriental studies in the modern West, I proposed instead an account of the rise, development, and institutions of Orientalism as they were formed against a background of intellectual, cultural, and political history until about 1870 or 1880. Although my interest in Orientalism there included a decently ample variety of scholars and imaginative writers, I cannot claim by any means to have presented more than a portrait of the typical structures (and their ideological tendencies) constituting the field, its associations with other fields, and the work of some of its most influential scholars. My principal operating assumptions were--and continue to be--that fields of learning, as much as the works of even the most eccentric artist, are constrained and acted upon by society, by cultural traditions, by worldly circumstance, and by stabilizing influences like schools, libraries, and governments; moreover, that both learned and imaginative writing are never free, but are limited in their imagery, assumptions, and intentions; and finally, that the advances made by a &amp;quot;science&amp;quot; like Orientalism in its academic form are less objectively true than we often like to think. In short, my study hitherto has tried to describe the &#039;&#039;economy&#039;&#039; that makes Orientalism a coherent subject matter, even while allowing that as an idea, concept, or image the word &#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; has a considerable and interesting cultural resonance in the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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I realize that such assumptions are not without their controversial side. Most of us assume in a general way that learning and scholarship move forward; they get better, we feel, as time passes and as more information is accumulated, methods are refined, and later generations of scholars improve upon earlier ones. In addition, we entertain a mythology of creation, in which it is believed that artistic genius, an original talent, or a powerful intellect can leap beyond the confines of its own time and place in order to put before the world a new work. It would be pointless to deny that such ideas as these carry some truth. Nevertheless the possibilities for work present in the culture to a great and original mind are never unlimited, just as it is also true that a great talent has a very healthy respect for what others have done before it and for what the field already contains. The work of predecessors, the institutional life of a scholarly field, the collective nature of any learned enterprise: these, to say nothing of economic and social circumstances, tend to diminish the effects of the individual scholar&#039;s production. A field like Orientalism has a cumulative and corporate identity, one that is particularly strong given its associations with traditional learning (the classics, the Bible, philology), public institutions (governments, trading companies, geographical societies, universities), and generically determined writing (travel books, books of exploration, fantasy, exotic description). The result for Orientalism has been a sort of consensus: certain things, certain types of statement, certain types of work have seemed for the Orientalist correct. He has built his work and research upon them, and they in turn have pressed hard upon new writers and scholars. Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision, and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient. The Orient is taught, researched, administered, and pronounced upon in certain discrete ways.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire. If this definition of Orientalism seems more political than not, that is simply because I think Orientalism was itself a product of certain political forces and activities. Orientalism is a school of interpretation whose material happens to be the Orient, its civilizations, peoples, and localities. Its objective discoveries--the work of innumerable devoted scholars who edited texts and translated them, codified grammars, wrote dictionaries, reconstructed dead epochs, produced positivistically verifiable learning--are and always have been conditioned by the fact that its truths, like any truths delivered by language, are embodied in language, and what is the truth of language, Nietzsche once said, but&lt;br /&gt;
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a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms--in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Friedrich Nietzsche, &amp;quot;On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Portable Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 46-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps such a view as Nietzsche&#039;s will strike us as too nihilistic, but at least it will draw attention to the fact that so far as it existed in the West&#039;s awareness, the Orient was a word which later accrued to it a wide field of meanings, associations, and connotations, and that these did not necessarily refer to the real Orient but to the field surrounding the word.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus Orientalism is not only a positive doctrine about the Orient that exists at any one time in the West; it is also an influential academic tradition (when one refers to an academic specialist who is called an Orientalist), as well as an area of concern defined by travelers, commercial enterprises, governments, military expeditions, readers of novels and accounts of exotic adventure, natural historians, and pilgrims to whom the Orient is a specific kind of knowledge about specific places, peoples, and civilizations. For the Orient idioms became frequent, and these idioms took firm hold in European discourse. Beneath the idioms there was a layer of doctrine about the Orient; this doctrine was fashioned out of the experiences of many Europeans, all of them converging upon such essential aspects of the Orient as the Oriental character, Oriental despotism, Oriental sensuality, and the like. For any European during the nineteenth century--and I think one can say this almost without qualification--Orientalism was such a system of truths, truths in Nietzsche&#039;s sense of the word. It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric. Some of the immediate sting will be taken out of these labels if we recall additionally that human societies, at least the more advanced cultures, have rarely offered the individual anything but imperialism, racism, and ethnocentrism for dealing with &amp;quot;other&amp;quot; cultures. So Orientalism aided and was aided by general cultural pressures that tended to make more rigid the sense of difference between the European and Asiatic parts of the world. My contention is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient&#039;s difference with its weakness.&lt;br /&gt;
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This proposition was introduced early in Chapter One, and nearly everything in the pages that followed was intended in part as a corroboration of it. The very presence of a &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; such as Orientalism, with no corresponding equivalent in the Orient itself, suggests the relative strength of Orient and Occident. A vast number of pages on the Orient exist, and they of course signify a degree and quantity of interaction with the Orient that are quite formidable; but the crucial index of Western strength is that there is no possibility of comparing the movement of Westerners eastwards (since the end of the eighteenth century) with the movement of Easterners westwards. Leaving aside the fact that Western armies, consular corps, merchants, and scientific and archaeological expeditions were always going East, the number of travelers from the Islamic East to Europe between 1800 and 1900 is minuscule when compared with the number in the other direction.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The number of Arab travelers to the West is estimated and considered by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod in &#039;&#039;Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 75-6 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Moreover, the Eastern travelers in the West were there to learn from and to gape at an advanced culture; the purposes of the Western travelers in the Orient were, as we have seen, of quite a different order. In addition, it has been estimated that around 60,000 books dealing with the Near Orient were written between 1800 and 1950; there is no remotely comparable figure for Oriental books about the West. As a cultural apparatus Orientalism is all aggression, activity, judgment, will-to-truth, and knowledge. The Orient existed for the West, or so it seemed to countless Orientalists, whose attitude to what they worked on was either paternalistic or candidly condescending--unless, of course, they were antiquarians, in which case the &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Orient was a credit to &#039;&#039;them&#039;&#039; and not to the lamentable modern Orient. And then, beefing up the Western scholars&#039; work, there were numerous agencies and institutions with no parallels in Oriental society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such an imbalance between East and West is obviously a function of changing historical patterns. During its political and military heyday from the eighth century to the sixteenth, Islam dominated both East and West. Then the center of power shifted westwards, and now in the late twentieth century it seems to be directing itself back towards the East again. My account of nineteenth-century Orientalism in Chapter Two stopped at a particularly charged period in the latter part of the century, when the often dilatory, abstract, and projective aspects of Orientalism were about to take on a new sense of worldly mission in the service of formal colonialism. It is this project and this moment that I want now to describe, especially since it will furnish us with some important background for the twentieth-century crises of Orientalism and the resurgence of political and cultural strength in the East.&lt;br /&gt;
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On several occasions I have alluded to the connections between Orientalism as a body of ideas, beliefs, cliches, or learning about the East, and other schools of thought at large in the culture. Now one of the important developments in nineteenth-century Orientalism was the distillation of essential ideas about the Orient--its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness--into a separate and unchallenged coherence; thus for a writer to use the word &#039;&#039;Oriental&#039;&#039; was a reference for the reader sufficient to identify a specific body of information about the Orient. This information seemed to be morally neutral and objectively valid; it seemed to have an epistemological status equal to that of historical chronology or geographical location. In its most basic form, then, Oriental material could not really be violated by anyone&#039;s discoveries, nor did it seem ever to be revaluated completely. Instead, the work of various nineteenth-century scholars and of imaginative writers made this essential body of knowledge more clear, more detailed, more substantial--and more distinct from &amp;quot;Occidentalism.&amp;quot; Yet Orientalist ideas could enter into alliance with general philosophical theories (such as those about the history of mankind and civilization) and diffuse world-hypotheses, as philosophers sometimes call them; and in many ways the professional contributors to Oriental knowledge were anxious to couch their formulations and ideas, their scholarly work, their considered contemporary observations, in language and terminology whose cultural validity derived from other sciences and systems of thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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The distinction I am making is really between an almost unconscious (and certainly an untouchable) positivity, which I shall call &#039;&#039;latent&#039;&#039; Orientalism, and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology, and so forth, which I shall call &#039;&#039;manifest&#039;&#039; Orientalism. Whatever change occurs in knowledge of the Orient is found almost exclusively in manifest Orientalism; the unanimity, stability, and durability of latent Orientalism are more or less constant. In the nineteenth-century writers I analyzed in Chapter Two, the differences in their ideas about the Orient can be characterized as exclusively manifest differences, differences in form and personal style, rarely in basic content. Every one of them kept intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability; this is why every writer on the Orient, from Renan to Marx (ideologically speaking), or from the most rigorous scholars (Lane and Sacy) to the most powerful imaginations (Flaubert and Nerval), saw the Orient as a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption. The Orient existed as a place isolated from the mainstream of European progress in the sciences, arts, and commerce. Thus whatever good or bad values were imputed to the Orient appeared to be functions of some highly specialized Western interest in the Orient. This was the situation from about the 1870s on through the early part of the twentieth century--but let me give some examples that illustrate what I mean.&lt;br /&gt;
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Theses of Oriental backwardness, degeneracy, and inequality with the West most easily associated themselves early in the nineteenth century with ideas about the biological bases of racial inequality. Thus the racial classifications found in Cuvier&#039;s &#039;&#039;Le Regne animal&#039;&#039;, Gobineau&#039;s &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;inegalite des races humaines&#039;&#039;, and Robert Knox&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Races of Man&#039;&#039; found a willing partner in latent Orientalism. To these ideas was added second-order Darwinism, which seemed to accentuate the &amp;quot;scientific&amp;quot; validity of the division of races into advanced and backward, or European-Aryan and Oriental-African. Thus the whole question of imperialism, as it was debated in the late nineteenth century by pro-imperialists and anti-imperialists alike, carried forward the binary typology of advanced and backward (or subject) races, cultures, and societies. John Westlake&#039;s &#039;&#039;Chapters on the Principles of International Law&#039;&#039; (1894) argues, for example, that regions of the earth designated as &amp;quot;uncivilized&amp;quot; (a word carrying the freight of Orientalist assumptions, among others) ought to be annexed or occupied by advanced powers. Similarly, the ideas of such writers as Carl Peters, Leopold de Saussure, and Charles Temple draw on the advanced/backward binarism&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Philip D. Curtin, ed., &#039;&#039;Imperialism: The Documentary History of Western Civilization&#039;&#039; (New York: Walker &amp;amp; Co., 1972), pp. 73-105.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; so centrally advocated in late-nineteenth-century Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Along with all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized, and retarded, the Orientals were viewed in a framework constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political admonishment. The Oriental was linked thus to elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien. Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined or--as the colonial powers openly coveted their territory--taken over. The point is that the very designation of something as Oriental involved an already pronounced evaluative judgment, and in the case of the peoples inhabiting the decayed Ottoman Empire, an implicit program of action. Since the Oriental was a member of a subject race, he had to be subjected: it was that simple. The &#039;&#039;locus classicus&#039;&#039; for such judgment and action is to be found in Gustave Le Bon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Les Lois psychologiques de l&#039;evolution des peuples&#039;&#039; (1894).&lt;br /&gt;
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But there were other uses for latent Orientalism. If that group of ideas allowed one to separate Orientals from advanced, civilizing powers, and if the &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Orient served to justify both the Orientalist and his disregard of modern Orientals, latent Orientalism also encouraged a peculiarly (not to say invidiously) male conception of the world. I have already referred to this in passing during my discussion of Renan. The Oriental male was considered in isolation from the total community in which he lived and which many Orientalists, following Lane, have viewed with something resembling contempt and fear. Orientalism itself, furthermore, was an exclusively male province; like so many professional guilds during the modern period, it viewed itself and its subject matter with sexist blinders. This is especially evident in the writing of travelers and novelists: women are usually the creatures of a male power-fantasy. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing. Flaubert&#039;s Kuchuk Hanem is the prototype of such caricatures, which were common enough in pornographic novels (e.g., Pierre Louys&#039;s &#039;&#039;Aphrodite&#039;&#039;) whose novelty draws on the Orient for their interest. Moreover the male conception of the world, in its effect upon the practicing Orientalist, tends to be static, frozen, fixed eternally. The very possibility of development, transformation, human movement--in the deepest sense of the word--is denied the Orient and the Oriental. As a known and ultimately an immobilized or unproductive quality, they come to be identified with a bad sort of eternality: hence, when the Orient is being approved, such phrases as &amp;quot;the wisdom of the East.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Transferred from an implicit social evaluation to a grandly cultural one, this static male Orientalism took on a variety of forms in the late nineteenth century, especially when Islam was being discussed. General cultural historians as respected as Leopold von Ranke and Jacob Burckhardt assailed Islam as if they were dealing not so much with an anthropomorphic abstraction as with a religio-political culture about which deep generalizations were possible and warranted: in his &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichte&#039;&#039; (1881-1888) Ranke spoke of Islam as defeated by the Germanic-Romanic peoples, and in his &amp;quot;Historische Fragmente&amp;quot; (unpublished notes, 1893) Burckhardt spoke of Islam as wretched; bare, and trivial.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Johann W. Fuck, &amp;quot;Islam as an Historical Problem in European Historiography since 1800,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Historians of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 307.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Such intellectual operations were carried out with considerably more flair and enthusiasm by Oswald Spengler, whose ideas about a Magian personality (typified by the Muslim Oriental) infuse &#039;&#039;Der Untergang des Abendlandes&#039;&#039; (1918-1922) and the &amp;quot;morphology&amp;quot; of cultures it advocates.&lt;br /&gt;
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What these widely diffused notions of the Orient depended on was the almost total absence in contemporary Western culture of the Orient as a genuinely felt and experienced force. For a number of evident reasons the Orient was always in the position both of outsider and of incorporated weak partner for the West. To the extent that Western scholars were aware of contemporary Orientals or Oriental movements of thought and culture, these were perceived either as silent shadows to be animated by the Orientalist, brought into reality by him, or as a kind of cultural and intellectual proletariat useful for the Orientalist&#039;s grander interpretative activity, necessary for his performance as superior judge, learned man, powerful cultural will. I mean to say that in discussions of the Orient, the Orient is all absence, whereas one feels the Orientalist and what he says as presence; yet we must not forget that the Orientalist&#039;s presence is enabled by the Orient&#039;s effective absence. This fact of substitution and displacement, as we must call it, clearly places on the Orientalist himself a certain pressure to reduce the Orient in his work, even after he has devoted a good deal of time to elucidating and exposing it. How else can one explain major scholarly production of the type we associate with Julius Wellhausen and Theodor Noldeke and, overriding it, those bare, sweeping statements that almost totally denigrate their chosen subject matter? Thus Noldeke could declare in 1887 that the sum total of his work as an Orientalist was to confirm his &amp;quot;low opinion&amp;quot; of the Eastern peoples.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 309.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And like Carl Becker, Noldeke was a philhellenist, who showed his love of Greece curiously by displaying a positive dislike of the Orient, which after all was what he studied as a scholar.&lt;br /&gt;
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A very valuable and intelligent study of Orientalism--Jacques Waardenburg&#039;s &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;--examines five important experts as makers of an image of Islam. Waardenburg&#039;s mirror-image metaphor for late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Orientalism is apt. In the work of each of his eminent Orientalists there is a highly tendentious--in four cases out of the five, even hostile--vision of Islam, as if each man saw Islam as a reflection of his own chosen weakness. Each scholar was profoundly learned, and the style of his contribution was unique. The five Orientalists among them exemplify what was best and strongest in the tradition during the period roughly from the 1880s to the interwar years. Yet Ignaz Goldziher&#039;s appreciation of Islam&#039;s tolerance towards other religions was undercut by his dislike of Mohammed&#039;s anthropomorphisms and Islam&#039;s too-exterior theology and jurisprudence; Duncan Black Macdonald&#039;s interest in Islamic piety and orthodoxy was vitiated by his perception of what he considered Islam&#039;s heretical Christianity; Carl Becker&#039;s understanding of Islamic civilization made him see it as a sadly undeveloped one; C. Snouck Hurgronje&#039;s highly refined studies of Islamic mysticism (which he considered the essential part of Islam) led him to a harsh judgment of its crippling limitations; and Louis Massignon&#039;s extraordinary identification with Muslim theology, mystical passion, and poetic art kept him curiously unforgiving to Islam for what he regarded as its unregenerate revolt against the idea of incarnation. The manifest differences in their methods emerge as less important than their Orientalist consensus on Islam: latent inferiority.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Jacques Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039; (The Hague: Mouton &amp;amp; Co., 1963).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Waardenburg&#039;s study has the additional virtue of showing how these five scholars shared a common intellectual and methodological tradition whose unity was truly international. Ever since the first Orientalist congress in 1873, scholars in the field have known each other&#039;s work and felt each other&#039;s presence very directly. What Waardenburg does not stress enough is that most of the late-nineteenth-century Orientalists were bound to each other politically as well. Snouck Hurgronje went directly from his studies of Islam to being an adviser to the Dutch government on handling its Muslim Indonesian colonies; Macdonald and Massignon were widely sought after as experts on Islamic matters by colonial administrators from North Africa to Pakistan; and, as Waardenburg says (all too briefly) at one point, all five scholars shaped a coherent vision of Islam that had a wide influence on government circles throughout the Western world.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 311.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What we must add to Waardenburg&#039;s observation is that these scholars were completing, bringing to an ultimate concrete refinement, the tendency since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to treat the Orient not only as a vague literary problem but--according to Masson-Oursel--as &amp;quot;un ferme propos d&#039;assimiler adequatement la valeur des langues pour penetrer les moeurs et les pensees, pour forcer meme des secrets de l&#039;histoire.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;P. Masson-Oursel, &amp;quot;La Connaissance scientifique de l&#039;Asie en France depuis 1900 et les varietes de l&#039;Orientalisme,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue Philosophique&#039;&#039; 143, nos. 7-9 (July-September 1953): 345.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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I spoke earlier of incorporation and assimilation of the Orient, as these activities were practiced by writers as different from each other as Dante and d&#039;Herbelot. Clearly there is a difference between those efforts and what, by the end of the nineteenth century, had become a truly formidable European cultural, political, and material enterprise. The nineteenth-century colonial &amp;quot;scramble for Africa&amp;quot; was by no means limited to Africa, of course. Neither was the penetration of the Orient entirely a sudden, dramatic afterthought following years of scholarly study of Asia. What we must reckon with is a long and slow process of appropriation by which Europe, or the European awareness of the Orient, transformed itself from being textual and contemplative into being administrative, economic, and even military. The fundamental change was a spatial and geographical one, or rather it was a change in the quality of geographical and spatial apprehension so far as the Orient was concerned. The centuries-old designation of geographical space to the east of Europe as &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; was partly political, partly doctrinal, and partly imaginative; it implied no necessary connection between actual experience of the Orient and knowledge of what is Oriental, and certainly Dante and d&#039;Herbelot made no claims about their Oriental ideas except that they were corroborated by a long &#039;&#039;learned&#039;&#039; (and not existential) tradition. But when Lane, Renan, Burton, and the many hundreds of nineteenth-century European travelers and scholars discuss the Orient, we can immediately note a far more intimate and even proprietary attitude towards the Orient and things Oriental. In the classical and often temporally remote form in which it was reconstructed by the Orientalist, in the precisely actual form in which the modern Orient was lived in, studied, or imagined, the &#039;&#039;geographical space&#039;&#039; of the Orient was penetrated, worked over, taken hold of. The cumulative effect of decades of so sovereign a Western handling turned the Orient from alien into colonial space. What was important in the latter nineteenth century was not &#039;&#039;whether&#039;&#039; the West had penetrated and possessed the Orient, but rather &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; the British and French felt that they had done it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The British writer on the Orient, and even more so the British colonial administrator, was dealing with territory about which there could be no doubt that English power was truly in the ascendant, even if the natives were on the face of it attracted to France and French modes of thought. So far as the actual space of the Orient was concerned, however, England was really there, France was not, except as a flighty temptress of the Oriental yokels. There is no better indication of this qualitative difference in spatial attitudes than to look at what Lord Cromer had to say on the subject, one that was especially dear to his heart:&lt;br /&gt;
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The reasons why French civilisation presents a special degree of attraction to Asiatics and Levantines are plain. It is, as a matter of fact, more attractive than the civilisations of England and Germany, and, moreover, it is more easy of imitation. Compare the undemonstrative, shy Englishman, with his social exclusiveness and insular habits, with the vivacious and cosmopolitan Frenchman, who does not know what the word shyness means, and who in ten minutes is apparently on terms of intimate friendship with any casual acquaintance he may chance to make. The semi-educated Oriental does not recognise that the former has, at all events, the merit of sincerity, whilst the latter is often merely acting a part. He looks coldly on the Englishman, and rushes into the arms of the Frenchman.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sexual innuendoes develop more or less naturally thereafter. The Frenchman is all smiles, wit, grace, and fashion; the Englishman is plodding, industrious, Baconian, precise. Cromer&#039;s case is of course based on British solidity as opposed to a French seductiveness without any real presence in Egyptian reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can it be any matter for surprise [Cromer continues] that the Egyptian, with his light intellectual ballast, fails to see that some fallacy often lies at the bottom of the Frenchman&#039;s reasoning, or that he prefers the rather superficial brilliancy of the Frenchman to the plodding, unattractive industry of the Englishman or the German? Look, again, at the theoretical perfection of French administrative systems, at their elaborate detail, and at the provision which is apparently made to meet every possible contingency which may arise. Compare these features with the Englishman&#039;s practical systems, which lay down rules as to a few main points, and leave a mass of detail to individual discretion. The half-educated Egyptian naturally prefers the Frenchman&#039;s system, for it is to all outward appearance more perfect and more easy of application. He fails, moreover, to see that the Englishman desires to elaborate a system which will suit the facts with which he has to deal, whereas the main objection to applying French administrative procedures to Egypt is that the facts have but too often to conform to the ready-made system.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since there is a real British presence in Egypt, and since that presence--according to Cromer--is there not so much to train the Egyptian&#039;s mind as to &amp;quot;form his character,&amp;quot; it follows therefore that the ephemeral attractions of the French are those of a pretty damsel with &amp;quot;somewhat artificial charms,&amp;quot; whereas those of the British belong to &amp;quot;a sober, elderly matron of perhaps somewhat greater moral worth, but of less pleasing outward appearance.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), 2: 237-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Underlying Cromer&#039;s contrast between the solid British nanny and the French coquette is the sheer privilege of British emplacement in the Orient. &amp;quot;The facts with which he [the Englishman] has to deal&amp;quot; are altogether more complex and interesting, by virtue of their possession by England, than anything the mercurial French could point to. Two years after the publication of his &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039; (1908), Cromer expatiated philosophically in &#039;&#039;Ancient and Modern Imperialism&#039;&#039;. Compared with Roman imperialism, with its frankly assimilationist, exploitative, and repressive policies, British imperialism seemed to Cromer to be preferable, if somewhat more wishy-washy. On certain points, however, the British were clear enough, even if &amp;quot;after a rather dim, slipshod, but characteristically Anglo-Saxon fashion,&amp;quot; their Empire seemed undecided between &amp;quot;one of two bases--an extensive military occupation or the principle of nationality [for subject races].&amp;quot; But this indecision was academic finally, for in practice Cromer and Britain itself had opted against &amp;quot;the principle of nationality.&amp;quot; And then there were other things to be noted. One point was that the Empire was not going to be given up. Another was that intermarriage between natives and English men and women was undesirable. Third--and most important, I think--Cromer conceived of British imperial presence in the Eastern colonies as having had a lasting, not to say cataclysmic, effect on the minds and societies of the East. His metaphor for expressing this effect is almost theological, so powerful in Cromer&#039;s mind was the idea of Western penetration of Oriental expanses. &amp;quot;The country,&amp;quot; he says, &amp;quot;over which the breath of the West, heavily charged with scientific thought, has once passed, and has, in passing, left an enduring mark, can never be the same as it was before.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Ancient and Modern Imperialism&#039;&#039; (London: John Murray, 1910), pp. 118, 120.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such respects as these, nonetheless, Cromer&#039;s was far from an original intelligence. What he saw and how he expressed it were common currency among his colleagues both in the imperial Establishment and in the intellectual community. This consensus is notably true in the case of Cromer&#039;s viceregal colleagues, Curzon, Swettenham, and Lugard. Lord Curzon in particular always spoke the imperial lingua franca, and more obtrusively even than Cromer he delineated the relationship between Britain and the Orient in terms of possession, in terms of a large geographical space wholly owned by an efficient colonial master. For him, he said on one occasion, the Empire was not an &amp;quot;object of ambition&amp;quot; but &amp;quot;first and foremost, a great historical and political and sociological fact.&amp;quot; In 1909 he reminded delegates to the Imperial Press Conference meeting at Oxford that &amp;quot;we train here and we send out to you your governors and administrators and judges, your teachers and preachers and lawyers.&amp;quot; And this almost pedagogical view of empire had, for Curzon, a specific setting in Asia, which as he once put it, made &amp;quot;one pause and think.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I sometimes like to picture to myself this great Imperial fabric as a huge structure like some Tennysonian &amp;quot;Palace of Art,&amp;quot; of which the foundations are in this country, where they have been laid and must be maintained by British hands, but of which the Colonies are the pillars, and high above all floats the vastness of an Asiatic dome.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;George Nathaniel Curzon, &#039;&#039;Subjects of the Day: Being a Selection of Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039; (London: George Allen &amp;amp; Unwin, 1915), pp. 4-5, 10, 28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With such a Tennysonian Palace of Art in mind, Curzon and Cromer were enthusiastic members together of a departmental committee formed in 1909 to press for the creation of a school of Oriental studies. Aside from remarking wistfully that had he known the vernacular he would have been helped during his &amp;quot;famine tours&amp;quot; in India, Curzon argued for Oriental studies as part of the British responsibility to the Orient. On September 27, 1909, he told the House of Lords that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
our familiarity, not merely with the languages of the people of the East but with their customs, their feelings, their traditions, their history and religion, our capacity to understand what may be called the genius of the East, is the sole basis upon which we are likely to be able to maintain in the future the position we have won, and no step that can be taken to strengthen that position can be considered undeserving of the attention of His Majesty&#039;s Government or of a debate in the House of Lords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At a Mansion House conference on the subject five years later, Curzon finally dotted the i&#039;s. Oriental studies were no intellectual luxury; they were, he said,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
a great Imperial obligation. In my view the creation of a school [of Oriental studies--later to become the London University School of Oriental and African Studies] like this in London is part of the necessary furniture of Empire. Those of us who, in one way or another, have spent a number of years in the East, who regard that as the happiest portion of our lives, and who think that the work that we did there, be it great or small, was the highest responsibility that can be placed upon the shoulders of Englishmen, feel that there is a gap in our national equipment which ought emphatically to be filled, and that those in the City of London who, by financial support or by any other form of active and practical assistance, take their part in filling that gap, will be rendering a patriotic duty to the Empire and promoting the cause and goodwill among mankind.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 184, 191-2. For the history of the school, see C. H. Phillips, &#039;&#039;The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1917-1967: An Introduction&#039;&#039; (London: Design for Print, 1967).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To a very great extent Curzon&#039;s ideas about Oriental studies derive logically from a good century of British utilitarian administration of and philosophy about the Eastern colonies. The influence of Bentham and the Mills on British rule in the Orient (and India particularly) was considerable, and was effective in doing away with too much regulation and innovation; instead, as Eric Stokes has convincingly shown, utilitarianism combined with the legacies of liberalism and evangelicalism as philosophies of British rule in the East stressed the rational importance of a strong executive armed with various legal and penal codes, a system of doctrines on such matters as frontiers and land rents, and everywhere an irreducible supervisory imperial authority.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Eric Stokes, &#039;&#039;The English Utilitarians and India&#039;&#039; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The cornerstone of the whole system was a constantly refined knowledge of the Orient, so that as traditional societies hastened forward and became modern commercial societies, there would be no loss of paternal British control, and no loss of revenue either. However, when Curzon referred somewhat inelegantly to Oriental studies as &amp;quot;the necessary furniture of Empire,&amp;quot; he was putting into a static image the transactions by which Englishmen and natives conducted their business and kept their places. From the days of Sir William Jones the Orient had been both what Britain ruled and what Britain knew about it: the coincidence between geography, knowledge, and power, with Britain always in the master&#039;s place, was complete. To have said, as Curzon once did, that &amp;quot;the East is a University in which the scholar never takes his degree&amp;quot; was another way of saying that the East required one&#039;s presence there more or less forever.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited in Michael Edwardes, &#039;&#039;High Noon of Empire: India Under Curzon&#039;&#039; (London: Eyre &amp;amp; Spottiswoode, 1965), pp. 38-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But then there were the other European powers, France and Russia among them, that made the British presence always a (perhaps marginally) threatened one. Curzon was certainly aware that all the major Western powers felt towards the world as Britain did. The transformation of geography from &amp;quot;dull and pedantic&amp;quot;--Curzon&#039;s phrase for what had now dropped out of geography as an academic subject--into &amp;quot;the most cosmopolitan of all sciences&amp;quot; argued &#039;&#039;exactly&#039;&#039; that new Western and widespread predilection. Not for nothing did Curzon in 1912 tell the Geographical Society, of which he was president, that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
an absolute revolution has occurred, not merely in the manner and methods of teaching geography, but in the estimation in which it is held by public opinion. Nowadays we regard geographical knowledge as an essential part of knowledge in general. By the aid of geography, and in no other way, do we understand the action of great natural forces, the distribution of population, the growth of commerce, the expansion of frontiers, the development of States, the splendid achievements of human energy in its various manifestations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We recognize geography as the handmaid of history.... Geography, too, is a sister science to economics and politics; and to any of us who have attempted to study geography it is known that the moment you diverge from the geographical field you find yourself crossing the frontiers of geology, zoology, ethnology, chemistry, physics, and almost all the kindred sciences. Therefore we are justified in saying that geography is one of the first and foremost of the sciences: that it is part of the equipment that is necessary for a proper conception of citizenship, and is an indispensable adjunct to the production of a public man.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Curzon, &#039;&#039;Subjects of the Day&#039;&#039;, pp. 155-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Geography was essentially the material underpinning for knowledge about the Orient. All the latent and unchanging characteristics of the Orient stood upon, were rooted in, its geography. Thus on the one hand the geographical Orient nourished its inhabitants, guaranteed their characteristics, and defined their specificity; on the other hand, the geographical Orient solicited the West&#039;s attention, even as--by one of those paradoxes revealed so frequently by organized knowledge--East was East and West was West. The cosmopolitanism of geography was, in Curzon&#039;s mind, its universal importance to the whole of the West, whose relationship to the rest of the world was one of frank covetousness. Yet geographical appetite could also take on the moral neutrality of an epistemological impulse to find out, to settle upon, to uncover--as when in &#039;&#039;Heart of Darkness&#039;&#039; Marlow confesses to having a passion for maps.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I would look for hours at South America, or Africa, or Australia, and lose myself in all the glories of exploration. At that time there were many blank spaces on the earth, and when I saw one that looked particularly inviting on a map (but they all look that) I would put my finger on it and say, When I grow up I will go there.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Joseph Conrad, &#039;&#039;Heart of Darkness&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Youth and Two Other Stories&#039;&#039; (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1925), p. 52.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Seventy years or so before Marlow said this, it did not trouble Lamartine that what on a map was a blank space was inhabited by natives; nor, theoretically, had there been any reservation in the mind of Emer de Vattel, the Swiss-Prussian authority on international law, when in 1758 he invited European states to take possession of territory inhabited only by mere wandering tribes.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For an illustrative extract from de Vattel&#039;s work see Curtin, ed., &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, pp. 42-5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The important thing was to dignify simple conquest with an idea, to turn the appetite for more geographical space into a theory about the special relationship between geography on the one hand and civilized or uncivilized peoples on the other. But to these rationalizations there was also a distinctively French contribution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By the end of the nineteenth century, political and intellectual circumstances coincided sufficiently in France to make geography, and geographical speculation (in both senses of that word), an attractive national pastime. The general climate of opinion in Europe was propitious; certainly the successes of British imperialism spoke loudly enough for themselves. However, Britain always seemed to France and to French thinkers on the subject to block even a relatively successful French imperial role in the Orient. Before the Franco-Prussian War there was a good deal of wishful political thinking about the Orient, and it was not confined to poets and novelists. Here, for instance, is Saint-Marc Girardin writing in the &#039;&#039;Revue des Deux Mondes&#039;&#039; on March 15, 1862:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
La France a beaucoup a faire en Orient, parce que l&#039;Orient attend beaucoup d&#039;elle. Il lui demande meme plus qu&#039;elle ne peut faire; il lui remettrait volontiers le soin entier de son avenir, ce qui serait pour la France et pour l&#039;Orient un grand danger: pour la France, parce que, disposee a prendre en mains la cause des populations souffrantes, elle se charge le plus souvent de plus d&#039;obligations qu&#039;elle n&#039;en peut remplir; pour l&#039;Orient, parce que tout peuple qui attend sa destinee de l&#039;etranger n&#039;a jamais qu&#039;une condition precaire et qu&#039;il n&#039;y a de salut pour les nations que celui qu&#039;elles se font elles-memes.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited by M. de Caix, &#039;&#039;La Syrie&#039;&#039; in Gabriel Hanotaux, &#039;&#039;Histoire des colonies francaises&#039;&#039;, 6 vols. (Paris: Societe de l&#039;histoire nationale, 1929-33), 3: 481.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of such views as this Disraeli would doubtless have said, as he often did, that France had only &amp;quot;sentimental interests&amp;quot; in Syria (which is the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; of which Girardin was writing). The fiction of &amp;quot;populations souffrantes&amp;quot; had of course been used by Napoleon when he appealed to the Egyptians on their behalf against the Turks and for Islam. During the thirties, forties, fifties, and sixties the suffering populations of the Orient were limited to the Christian minorities in Syria. And there was no record of &amp;quot;l&#039;Orient&amp;quot; appealing to France for its salvation. It would have been altogether more truthful to say that Britain stood in France&#039;s way in the Orient, for even if France genuinely felt a sense of obligation to the Orient (and there were some Frenchmen who did), there was very little France could do to get between Britain and the huge land mass it commanded from India to the Mediterranean.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Among the most remarkable consequences of the War of 1870 in France were a tremendous efflorescence of geographical societies and a powerfully renewed demand for territorial acquisition. At the end of 1871 the Societe de geographie de Paris declared itself no longer confined to &amp;quot;scientific speculation.&amp;quot; It urged the citizenry not to &amp;quot;forget that our former preponderance was contested from the day we ceased to compete ... in the conquests of civilization over barbarism.&amp;quot; Guillaume Depping, a leader of what has come to be called the geographical movement, asserted in 1881 that during the 1870 war &amp;quot;it was the schoolmaster who triumphed,&amp;quot; meaning that the real triumphs were those of Prussian scientific geography over French strategic sloppiness. The government&#039;s &#039;&#039;Journal officiel&#039;&#039; sponsored issue after issue centered on the virtues (and profits) of geographical exploration and colonial adventure; a citizen could learn in one issue from de Lesseps of &amp;quot;the opportunities in Africa&amp;quot; and from Gamier of &amp;quot;the exploration of the Blue River.&amp;quot; Scientific geography soon gave way to &amp;quot;commercial geography,&amp;quot; as the connection between national pride in scientific and civilizational achievement and the fairly rudimentary profit motive was urged, to be channeled into support for colonial acquisition. In the words of one enthusiast, &amp;quot;The geographical societies are formed to break the fatal charm that holds us enchained to our shores.&amp;quot; In aid of this liberating quest all sorts of schemes were spun out, including the enlisting of Jules Verne--whose &amp;quot;unbelievable success,&amp;quot; as it was called, ostensibly displayed the scientific mind at a very high peak of ratiocination--to head &amp;quot;a round-the-world campaign of scientific exploration,&amp;quot; and a plan for creating a vast new sea just south of the North African coast, as well as a project for &amp;quot;binding&amp;quot; Algeria to Senegal by railroad--&amp;quot;a ribbon of steel,&amp;quot; as the projectors called it.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;These details are to be found in Vernon McKay, &amp;quot;Colonialism in the French Geographical Movement,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Geographical Review&#039;&#039; 33, no. 2 (April 1943): 214-32.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the expansionist fervor in France during the last third of the nineteenth century was generated out of an explicit wish to compensate for the Prussian victory in 1870-1871 and, no less important, the desire to match British imperial achievements. So powerful was the latter desire, and out of so long a tradition of Anglo-French rivalry in the Orient did it derive, that France seemed literally haunted by Britain, anxious in all things connected with the Orient to catch up with and emulate the British. When in the late 1870s, the Societe academique indo-chinoise reformulated its goals, it found it important to &amp;quot;bring Indochina into the domain of Orientalism.&amp;quot; Why? In order to turn Cochin China into a &amp;quot;French India.&amp;quot; The absence of substantial colonial holdings was blamed by military men for that combination of military and commercial weakness in the war with Prussia, to say nothing of long-standing and pronounced colonial inferiority compared with Britain. The &amp;quot;power of expansion of the Western races,&amp;quot; argued a leading geographer, La Ronciere Le Noury, &amp;quot;its superior causes, its elements, its influences on human destinies, will be a beautiful study for future historians.&amp;quot; Yet only if the white races indulged their taste for voyaging--a mark of their intellectual supremacy--could colonial expansion occur.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Agnes Murphy, &#039;&#039;The Ideology of French Imperialism, 1817-1881&#039;&#039; (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1948), pp. 46, 54, 36, 45.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From such theses as this came the commonly held view of the Orient as a geographical space to be cultivated, harvested, and guarded. The images of agricultural care for and those of frank sexual attention to the Orient proliferated accordingly. Here is a typical effusion by Gabriel Charmes, writing in 1880:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On that day when we shall be no longer in the Orient, and when other great European powers will be there, all will be at an end for our commerce in the Mediterranean, for our future in Asia, for the traffic of our southern ports. &#039;&#039;One of the most fruitful sources of our national wealth will be dried up&#039;&#039;. (Emphasis added)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another thinker, Leroy-Beaulieu, elaborated this philosophy still further:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A society colonizes, when itself having reached a high degree of maturity and of strength, it procreates, it protects, it places in good conditions of development, and it brings to virility a new society to which it has given birth. Colonization is one of the most complex and delicate phenomena of social physiology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This equation of self-reproduction with colonization led Leroy-Beaulieu to the somewhat sinister idea that whatever is lively in a modern society is &amp;quot;magnified by this pouring out of its exuberant activity on the outside.&amp;quot; Therefore, he said,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Colonization is the expansive force of a people; it is its power of reproduction; &#039;&#039;it is its enlargement and its multiplication through space&#039;&#039;; it is the subjection of the universe or a vast part of it to that people&#039;s language, customs, ideas, and laws.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 189, 110, 136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The point here is that the space of weaker or underdeveloped regions like the Orient was viewed as something inviting French interest, penetration, insemination--in short, colonization. Geographical conceptions, literally and figuratively, did away with the discrete entities held in by borders and frontiers. No less than entrepreneurial visionaries like de Lesseps, whose plan was to liberate the Orient and the Occident from their geographical bonds, French scholars, administrators, geographers, and commercial agents poured out their exuberant activity onto the fairly supine, feminine Orient. There were the geographical societies, whose number and membership outdid those of all Europe by a factor of two; there were such powerful organizations as the Comite de l&#039;Asie francaise and the Comite d&#039;Orient; there were the learned societies, chief among them the Societe asiatique, with its organization and membership firmly embedded in the universities, the institutes, and the government. Each in its own way made French interests in the Orient more real, more substantial. Almost an entire century of what now seemed passive study of the Orient had had to end, as France faced up to its transnational responsibilities during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the only part of the Orient where British and French interests literally overlapped, the territory of the now hopelessly ill Ottoman Empire, the two antagonists managed their conflict with an almost perfect and characteristic consistency. Britain was &#039;&#039;in&#039;&#039; Egypt and Mesopotamia; through a series of quasi-fictional treaties with local (and powerless) chiefs it controlled the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Suez Canal, as well as most of the intervening land mass between the Mediterranean and India. France, on the other hand, seemed fated to hover over the Orient, descending once in a while to carry out schemes that repeated de Lesseps&#039;s success with the canal; for the most part these schemes were railroad projects, such as the one planned across more or less British territory, the Syrian-Mesopotamian line. In addition France saw itself as the protector of Christian minorities--Maronites, Chaldeans, Nestorians. Yet together, Britain and France were agreed in principle on the necessity, when the time came, for the partition of Asiatic Turkey. Both before and during World War I secret diplomacy was bent on carving up the Near Orient first into spheres of influence, then into mandated (or occupied) territories. In France, much of the expansionist sentiment formed during the heyday of the geographical movement focused itself on plans to partition Asiatic Turkey, so much so that in Paris in 1914 &amp;quot;a spectacular press campaign was launched&amp;quot; to this end.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Jukka Nevakivi, &#039;&#039;Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920&#039;&#039; (London: Athlone Press, 1969), p. 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In England numerous committees were empowered to study and recommend policy on the best ways of dividing up the Orient. Out of such commissions as the Bunsen Committee would come the joint Anglo-French teams of which the most famous was the one headed by Mark Sykes and Georges Picot. Equitable division of geographical space was the rule of these plans, which were deliberate attempts also at calming Anglo-French rivalry. For, as Sykes put it in a memorandum,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
it was clear ... that an Arab rising was sooner or later to take place, and that the French and ourselves ought to be on better terms if the rising was not to be a curse instead of a blessing....&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 24.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The animosities remained. And to them was added the irritant provided by the Wilsonian program for national self-determination, which, as Sykes himself was to note, seemed to invalidate the whole skeleton of colonial and partitionary schemes arrived at jointly between the Powers. It would be out of place here to discuss the entire labyrinthine and deeply controversial history of the Near Orient in the early twentieth century, as its fate was being decided between the Powers, the native dynasties, the various nationalist parties and movements, the Zionists. What matters more immediately is the peculiar epistemological framework through which the Orient was seen, and out of which the Powers acted. For despite their differences, the British and the French saw the Orient as a geographical--and cultural, political, demographical, sociological, and historical--entity over whose destiny they believed themselves to have traditional entitlement. The Orient to them was no sudden discovery, no mere historical accident, but an area to the east of Europe whose principal worth was uniformly defined in terms of Europe, more particularly in terms specifically claiming for Europe--European science, scholarship, understanding, and administration--the credit for having made the Orient what it was now. And this had been the achievement--inadvertent or not is beside the point--of modern Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were two principal methods by which Orientalism delivered the Orient to the West in the early twentieth century. One was by means of the disseminative capacities of modern learning, its diffusive apparatus in the learned professions, the universities, the professional societies, the explorational and geographical organizations, the publishing industry. All these, as we have seen, built upon the prestigious authority of the pioneering scholars, travelers, and poets, whose cumulative vision had shaped a quintessential Orient; the doctrinal--or doxological--manifestation of such an Orient is what I have been calling here latent Orientalism. So far as anyone wishing to make a statement of any consequence about the Orient was concerned, latent Orientalism supplied him with an enunciative capacity that could be used, or rather mobilized, and turned into sensible discourse for the concrete occasion at hand. Thus when Balfour spoke about the Oriental to the House of Commons in 1910, he must surely have had in mind those enunciative capacities in the current and acceptably rational language of his time, by which something called an &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; could be named and talked about without danger of too much obscurity. But like all enunciative capacities and the discourses they enable, latent Orientalism was profoundly conservative--dedicated, that is, to its self-preservation. Transmitted from one generation to another, it was a part of the culture, as much a language about a part of reality as geometry or physics. Orientalism staked its existence, not upon its openness, its receptivity to the Orient, but rather on its internal, repetitious consistency about its constitutive will-to-power over the Orient. In such a way Orientalism was able to survive revolutions, world wars, and the literal dismemberment of empires.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second method by which Orientalism delivered the Orient to the West was the result of an important convergence. For decades the Orientalists had spoken about the Orient, they had translated texts, they had explained civilizations, religions, dynasties, cultures, mentalities--as academic objects, screened off from Europe by virtue of their inimitable foreignness. The Orientalist was an expert, like Renan or Lane, whose job in society was to interpret the Orient for his compatriots. The relation between Orientalist and Orient was essentially hermeneutical: standing before a distant, barely intelligible civilization or cultural monument, the Orientalist scholar reduced the obscurity by translating, sympathetically portraying, inwardly grasping the hard-to-reach object. Yet the Orientalist remained outside the Orient, which, however much it was made to appear intelligible, remained beyond the Occident. This cultural, temporal, and geographical distance was expressed in metaphors of depth, secrecy, and sexual promise: phrases like &amp;quot;the veils of an Eastern bride&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the inscrutable Orient&amp;quot; passed into the common language.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the distance between Orient and Occident was, almost paradoxically, in the process of being reduced throughout the nineteenth century. As the commercial, political, and other existential encounters between East and West increased (in ways we have been discussing all along), a tension developed between the dogmas of latent Orientalism, with its support in studies of the &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Orient, and the descriptions of a present, modern, manifest Orient articulated by travelers, pilgrims, statesmen, and the like. At some moment impossible to determine precisely, the tension caused a convergence of the two types of Orientalism. Probably--and this is only a speculation--the convergence occurred when Orientalists, beginning with Sacy, undertook to advise governments on what the modern Orient was all about. Here the role of the specially trained and equipped expert took on an added dimension: the Orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of Western power as it attempted policy vis-a-vis the Orient. Every learned (and not so learned) European traveler in the Orient felt himself to be a representative Westerner who had gotten beneath the films of obscurity. This is obviously true of Burton, Lane, Doughty, Flaubert, and the other major figures I have been discussing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The discoveries of Westerners about the manifest and modern Orient acquired a pressing urgency as Western territorial acquisition in the Orient increased. Thus what the scholarly Orientalist defined as the &amp;quot;essential&amp;quot; Orient was sometimes contradicted, but in many cases was confirmed, when the Orient became an actual administrative obligation. Certainly Cromer&#039;s theories about the Oriental--theories acquired from the traditional Orientalist archive--were vindicated plentifully as he ruled millions of Orientals in actual fact. This was no less true of the French experience in Syria, North Africa, and elsewhere in the French colonies, such as they were. But at no time did the convergence between latent Orientalist doctrine and manifest Orientalist experience occur more dramatically than when, as a result of World War I, Asiatic Turkey was being surveyed by Britain and France for its dismemberment. There, laid out on an operating table for surgery, was the Sick Man of Europe, revealed in all his weakness, characteristics, and topographical outline.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist, with his special knowledge, played an inestimably important part in this surgery. Already there had been intimations of his crucial role as a kind of secret agent &#039;&#039;inside&#039;&#039; the Orient when the British scholar Edward Henry Palmer was sent to the Sinai in 1882 to gauge anti-British sentiment and its possible enlistment on behalf of the Arabi revolt. Palmer was killed in the process, but he was only the most unsuccessful of the many who performed similar services for the Empire, now a serious and exacting business entrusted in part to the regional &amp;quot;expert.&amp;quot; Not for nothing was another Orientalist, D. G. Hogarth, author of the famous account of the exploration of Arabia aptly titled &#039;&#039;The Penetration of Arabia&#039;&#039; (1904),&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;D. G. Hogarth, &#039;&#039;The Penetration of Arabia: A Record of the Development of Western Knowledge Concerning The Arabian Peninsula&#039;&#039; (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1904). There is a good recent book on the same subject: Robin Bidwell, &#039;&#039;Travellers in Arabia&#039;&#039; (London: Paul Hamlyn, 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; made the head of the Arab Bureau in Cairo during World War I. And neither was it by accident that men and women like Gertrude Bell, T. E. Lawrence, and St. John Philby, Oriental experts all, posted to the Orient as agents of empire, friends of the Orient, formulators of policy alternatives because of their intimate and expert knowledge of the Orient and of Orientals. They formed a &amp;quot;band&amp;quot;--as Lawrence called it once--bound together by contradictory notions and personal similarities: great individuality, sympathy and intuitive identification with the Orient, a jealously preserved sense of personal mission in the Orient, cultivated eccentricity, a final disapproval of the Orient. For them all the Orient was their direct, peculiar experience of it. In them Orientalism and an effective praxis for handling the Orient received their final European form, before the Empire disappeared and passed its legacy to other candidates for the role of dominant power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such individualists as these were not academics. We shall soon see that they were the beneficiaries of the academic study of the Orient, without in any sense belonging to the official and professional company of Orientalist scholars. Their role, however, was not to scant academic Orientalism, nor to subvert it, but rather to make it effective. In their genealogy were people like Lane and Burton, as much for their encyclopedic autodidacticism as for the accurate, the quasi-scholarly knowledge of the Orient they had obviously deployed when dealing with or writing about Orientals. For the curricular study of the Orient they substituted a sort of elaboration of latent Orientalism, which was easily available to them in the imperial culture of their epoch. Their scholarly frame of reference, such as it was, was fashioned by people like William Muir, Anthony Bevan, D. S. Margoliouth, Charles Lyall, E. G. Browne, R. A. Nicholson, Guy Le Strange, E. D. Ross, and Thomas Arnold, who also followed directly in the line of descent from Lane. Their imaginative perspectives were provided principally by their illustrious contemporary Rudyard Kipling, who had sung so memorably of holding &amp;quot;dominion over palm and pine.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between Britain and France in such matters was perfectly consistent with the history of each nation in the Orient: the British were there; the French lamented the loss of India and the intervening territories. By the end of the century, Syria had become the main focus of French activity, but even there it was a matter of common consensus that the French could not match the British either in quality of personnel or in degree of political influence. The Anglo-French competition over the Ottoman spoils was felt even on the field of battle in the Hejaz, in Syria, in Mesopotamia--but in all these places, as astute men like Edmond Bremond noted, the French Orientalists and local experts were outclassed in brilliance and tactical maneuvering by their British counterparts.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Edmond Bremond, &#039;&#039;Le Hedjaz dans la guerre mondiale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1931), pp. 242 ff.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Except for an occasional genius like Louis Massignon, there were no French Lawrences or Sykeses or Bells. But there were determined imperialists like Etienne Flandin and Franklin-Bouillon. Lecturing to the Paris Alliance francaise in 1913, the Comte de Cressaty, a vociferous imperialist, proclaimed Syria as France&#039;s own Orient, the site of French political, moral, and economic interests--interests, he added, that had to be defended during this &amp;quot;age des envahissants imperialistes&amp;quot;; and yet Cressaty noted that even with French commercial and industrial firms in the Orient, with by far the largest number of native students enrolled in French schools, France was invariably being pushed around in the Orient, threatened not only by Britain but by Austria, Germany, and Russia. If France was to continue to prevent &amp;quot;le retour de l&#039;Islam,&amp;quot; it had better take hold of the Orient: this was an argument proposed by Cressaty and seconded by Senator Paul Doumer.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Le Comte de Cressaty, &#039;&#039;Les Interets de la France en Syrie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Floury, 1913).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These views were repeated on numerous occasions, and indeed France did well by itself in North Africa and in Syria after World War I, but the special, concrete management of emerging Oriental populations and theoretically independent territories with which the British always credited themselves was something the French felt had eluded them. Ultimately, perhaps, the difference one always feels between modern British and modern French Orientalism is a stylistic one; the import of the generalizations about Orient and Orientals, the sense of distinction preserved between Orient and Occident, the desirability of Occidental dominance over the Orient--all these are the same in both traditions. For of the many elements making up what we customarily call &amp;quot;expertise,&amp;quot; style, which is the result of specific worldly circumstances being molded by tradition, institutions, will, and intelligence into formal articulation, is one of the most manifest. It is to this determinant, to this perceptible and modernized refinement in early-twentieth-century Orientalism in Britain and France, that we must now turn.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Style, Expertise, Vision: &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;s Worldliness&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
As he appears in several poems, in novels like &#039;&#039;Kim&#039;&#039;, and in too many catchphrases to be an ironic fiction, Kipling&#039;s White Man, as an idea, a persona, a style of being, seems to have served many Britishers while they were abroad. The actual color of their skin set them off dramatically and reassuringly from the sea of natives, but for the Britisher who circulated amongst Indians, Africans, or Arabs there was also the certain knowledge that he belonged to, and could draw upon the empirical and spiritual reserves of, a long tradition of executive responsibility towards the colored races. It was of this tradition, its glories and difficulties, that Kipling wrote when he celebrated the &amp;quot;road&amp;quot; taken by White Men in the colonies:&lt;br /&gt;
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Now, this is the road that the White Men tread&lt;br /&gt;
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When they go to clean a land--&lt;br /&gt;
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Iron underfoot and the vine overhead&lt;br /&gt;
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And the deep on either hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have trod that road--and a wet and windy road--&lt;br /&gt;
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Our chosen star for guide.&lt;br /&gt;
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Oh, well for the world when the White Men tread&lt;br /&gt;
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Their highway side by side!&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Rudyard Kipling, &#039;&#039;Verse&#039;&#039; (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &amp;amp; Co., 1954), p. 280.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Cleaning a land&amp;quot; is best done by White Men in delicate concert with each other, an allusion to the present dangers of European rivalry in the colonies; for failing in the attempt to coordinate policy, Kipling&#039;s White Men are quite prepared to go to war: &amp;quot;Freedom for ourselves and freedom for our sons/And, failing freedom, War.&amp;quot; Behind the White Man&#039;s mask of amiable leadership there is always the express willingness to use force, to kill and be killed. What dignifies his mission is some sense of intellectual dedication; he is a White Man, but not for mere profit, since his &amp;quot;chosen star&amp;quot; presumably sits far above earthly gain. Certainly many White Men often wondered what it was they fought for on that &amp;quot;wet and windy road,&amp;quot; and certainly a great number of them must have been puzzled as to how the color of their skins gave them superior ontological status plus great power over much of the inhabited world. Yet in the end, being a White Man, for Kipling and for those whose perceptions and rhetoric he influenced, was a self-confirming business. One became a White Man because one &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; a White Man; more important, &amp;quot;drinking that cup,&amp;quot; living that unalterable destiny in &amp;quot;the White Man&#039;s day,&amp;quot; left one little time for idle speculation on origins, causes, historical logic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Being a White Man was therefore an idea and a reality. It involved a reasoned position towards both the white and the nonwhite worlds. It meant--in the colonies--speaking in a certain way, behaving according to a code of regulations, and even feeling certain things and not others. It meant specific judgments, evaluations, gestures. It was a form of authority before which nonwhites, and even whites themselves, were expected to bend. In the institutional forms it took (colonial governments, consular corps, commercial establishments) it was an agency for the expression, diffusion, and implementation of policy towards the world, and within this agency, although a certain personal latitude was allowed, the impersonal communal idea of being a White Man ruled. Being a White Man, in short, was a very concrete manner of being-in-the-world, a way of taking hold of reality, language, and thought. It made a specific style possible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kipling himself could not merely have happened; the same is true of his White Man. Such ideas and their authors emerge out of complex historical and cultural circumstances, at least two of which have much in common with the history of Orientalism in the nineteenth century. One of them is the culturally sanctioned habit of deploying large generalizations by which reality is divided into various collectives: languages, races, types, colors, mentalities, each category being not so much a neutral designation as an evaluative interpretation. Underlying these categories is the rigidly binomial opposition of &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;theirs,&amp;quot; with the former always encroaching upon the latter (even to the point of making &amp;quot;theirs&amp;quot; exclusively a function of &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot;). This opposition was reinforced not only by anthropology, linguistics, and history but also, of course, by the Darwinian theses on survival and natural selection, and--no less decisive--by the rhetoric of high cultural humanism. What gave writers like Renan and Arnold the right to generalities about race was the official character of their formed cultural literacy. &amp;quot;Our&amp;quot; values were (let us say) liberal, humane, correct; they were supported by the tradition of belles-lettres, informed scholarship, rational inquiry; as Europeans (and white men) &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; shared in them every time their virtues were extolled. Nevertheless, the human partnerships formed by reiterated cultural values excluded as much as they included. For every idea about &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; art spoken for by Arnold, Ruskin, Mill, Newman, Carlyle, Renan, Gobineau, or Comte, another link in the chain binding &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; together was formed while another outsider was banished. Even if this is always the result of such rhetoric, wherever and whenever it occurs, we must remember that for nineteenth-century Europe an imposing edifice of learning and culture was built, so to speak, in the face of actual outsiders (the colonies, the poor, the delinquent), whose role in the culture was to give definition to what &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; were constitutionally unsuited for.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The themes of exclusion and confinement in nineteenth-century culture have played an important role in Michel Foucault&#039;s work, most recently in his &#039;&#039;Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), and &#039;&#039;The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The other circumstance common to the creation of the White Man and Orientalism is the &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; commanded by each, as well as the sense that such a field entails peculiar modes, even rituals, of behavior, learning, and possession. Only an Occidental could speak of Orientals, for example, just as it was the White Man who could designate and name the coloreds, or nonwhites. Every statement made by Orientalists or White Men (who were usually interchangeable) conveyed a sense of the irreducible distance separating white from colored, or Occidental from Oriental; moreover, behind each statement there resonated the tradition of experience, learning, and education that kept the Oriental-colored to his position of &#039;&#039;object studied by the Occidental-white&#039;&#039;, instead of vice versa. Where one was in a position of power--as Cromer was, for example--the Oriental belonged to the system of rule whose principle was simply to make sure that no Oriental was ever allowed to be independent and rule himself. The premise there was that since the Orientals were ignorant of self-government, they had better be kept that way for their own good.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since the White Man, like the Orientalist, lived very close to the line of tension keeping the coloreds at bay, he felt it incumbent on him readily to define and redefine the domain he surveyed. Passages of narrative description regularly alternate with passages of rearticulated definition and judgment that disrupt the narrative; this is a characteristic style of the writing produced by Oriental experts who operated using Kipling&#039;s White Man as a mask. Here is T. E. Lawrence, writing to V. W. Richards in 1918:&lt;br /&gt;
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... the Arab appealed to my imagination. It is the old, old civilisation, which has refined itself clear of household gods, and half the trappings which ours hastens to assume. The gospel of bareness in materials is a good one, and it involves apparently a sort of moral bareness too. They think for the moment, and endeavour to slip through life without turning corners or climbing hills. In part it is a mental and moral fatigue, a race trained out, and to avoid difficulties they have to jettison so much that we think honorable and grave: and yet without in any way sharing their point of view, I think I can understand it enough to look at myself and other foreigners from their direction, and without condemning it. I know I am a stranger to them, and always will be; but I cannot believe them worse, any more than I could change to their ways.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The Letters of T. E. Lawrence of Arabia&#039;&#039;, ed. David Garnett (1938; reprint ed., London: Spring Books, 1964), p. 244.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar perspective, however different the subject under discussion may seem to be, is found in these remarks by Gertrude Bell:&lt;br /&gt;
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How many thousand years this state of things has lasted [namely, that Arabs live in &amp;quot;a state of war&amp;quot;], those who shall read the earliest records of the inner desert will tell us, for it goes back to the first of them, but in all the centuries the Arab has bought no wisdom from experience. He is never safe, and yet he behaves as though security were his daily bread.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gertrude Bell, &#039;&#039;The Desert and the Sown&#039;&#039; (London: William Heinemann, 1907), p. 244.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To which, as a gloss, we should, add her further observation, this time about life in Damascus:&lt;br /&gt;
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I begin to see dimly what the civilisation of a great Eastern city means, how they live, what they think; and I have got on to terms with them. I believe the fact of my being English is a great help.... We have gone up in the world since five years ago. The difference is very marked. I think it is due to the success of our government in Egypt to a great extent.... The defeat of Russia stands for a great deal, and my impression is that the vigorous policy of Lord Curzon in the Persian Gulf and on the India frontier stands for a great deal more. No one who does not know the East can realise how it all hangs together. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that if the English mission had been turned back from the gates of Kabul, the English tourist would be frowned upon in the streets of Damascus.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gertrude Bell, &#039;&#039;From Her Personal Papers, 1889-1914&#039;&#039;, ed. Elizabeth Burgoyne (London: Ernest Benn, 1958), p. 204.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In such statements as these, we note immediately that &amp;quot;the Arab&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Arabs&amp;quot; have an aura of apartness, definiteness, and collective self-consistency such as to wipe out any traces of individual Arabs with narratable life histories. What appealed to Lawrence&#039;s imagination was the clarity of the Arab, both as an image and as a supposed philosophy (or attitude) towards life: in both cases what Lawrence fastens on is the Arab as if seen from the cleansing perspective of one not an Arab, and one for whom such un-self-conscious primitive simplicity as the Arab possesses is something defined by the observer, in this case the White Man. Yet Arab refinement, which in its essentials corresponds to Yeats&#039;s visions of Byzantium where&lt;br /&gt;
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Flames that no faggot feeds, flint nor steel has lit,&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor storm disturbs, flames begotten of flame,&lt;br /&gt;
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Where blood-begotten spirits come&lt;br /&gt;
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And all complexities of fury leave&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;William Butler Yeats, &amp;quot;Byzantium,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;The Collected Poems&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 244.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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is associated with Arab perdurability, as if the Arab had not been subject to the ordinary processes of history. Paradoxically, the Arab seems to Lawrence to have exhausted himself in his very temporal persistence. The enormous age of Arab civilization has thus served to refine the Arab down to his quintessential attributes, and to tire him out morally in the process. What we are left with is Bell&#039;s Arab: centuries of experience and no wisdom. As a collective entity, then, the Arab accumulates no existential or even semantical thickness. He remains the same, except for the exhausting refinements mentioned by Lawrence, from one end to the other of &amp;quot;the records of the inner desert.&amp;quot; We are to assume that if &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Arab feels joy, if he is sad at the death of his child or parent, if he has a sense of the injustices of political tyranny, then those experiences are necessarily subordinate to the sheer, unadorned, and persistent fact of being an Arab.&lt;br /&gt;
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The primitiveness of such a state exists simultaneously on at least two levels: one, &#039;&#039;in the definition&#039;&#039;, which is reductive; and two (according to Lawrence and Bell), &#039;&#039;in reality&#039;&#039;. This absolute coincidence was itself no simple coincidence. For one, it could only have been made from the outside by virtue of a vocabulary and epistemological instruments designed both to get to the heart of things and to avoid the distractions of accident, circumstance, or experience. For another, the coincidence was a fact uniquely the result of method, tradition, and politics all working together. Each in a sense obliterated the distinctions between the type&#039;&#039;--the&#039;&#039; Oriental, &#039;&#039;the&#039;&#039; Semite, &#039;&#039;the&#039;&#039; Arab, &#039;&#039;the&#039;&#039; Orient--and ordinary human reality, Yeats&#039;s &amp;quot;uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor,&amp;quot; in which all human beings live. The scholarly investigator took a type marked &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; for the same thing as any individual Oriental he might encounter. Years of tradition had encrusted discourse about such matters as the Semitic or Oriental spirit with some legitimacy. And political good sense taught, in Bell&#039;s marvelous phrase, that in the East &amp;quot;it all hangs together.&amp;quot; Primitiveness therefore inhered in the Orient, &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; the Orient, an idea to which anyone dealing with or writing about the Orient had to return, as if to a touchstone outlasting time or experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is an excellent way of understanding all this as it applied to the white agents, experts, and advisers for the Orient. What mattered to Lawrence and Bell was that their references to Arabs or Orientals belonged to a recognizable, and authoritative, convention of formulation, one that was able to subordinate detail to it. But from where, more particularly, did &amp;quot;the Arab,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the Semite,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Oriental&amp;quot; come?&lt;br /&gt;
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We have remarked how, during the nineteenth century in such writers as Renan, Lane, Flaubert, Caussin de Perceval, Marx, and Lamartine, a generalization about &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; drew its power from the presumed representativeness of everything Oriental; each particle of the Orient told of its Orientalness, so much so that the attribute of being Oriental overrode any countervailing instance. An Oriental man was first an Oriental and only second a man. Such radical typing was naturally reinforced by sciences (or discourses, as I prefer to call them) that took a backward and downward direction towards the species category, which was supposed also to be an ontogenetic explanation for every member of the species. Thus within broad, semipopular designations such as &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; there were some more scientifically valid distinctions being made; most of these were based principally on language types--e.g., Semitic, Dravidic, Hamitic--but they were quickly able to acquire anthropological, psychological, biological, and cultural evidence in their support. Renan&#039;s &amp;quot;Semitic,&amp;quot; as an instance, was a linguistic generalization which in Renan&#039;s hands could add to itself all sorts of parallel ideas from anatomy, history, anthropology, and even geology. &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; could then be employed not only as a simple description or designation; it could be applied to any complex of historical and political events in order to pare them down to a nucleus both antecedent to and inherent in them. &amp;quot;Semitic,&amp;quot; therefore, was a transtemporal, transindividual category, purporting to predict every discrete act of &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; behavior on the basis of some pre-existing &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; essence, and aiming as well to interpret all aspects of human life and activity in terms of some common &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; element.&lt;br /&gt;
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The peculiar hold on late-nineteenth-century liberal European culture of such relatively punitive ideas will seem mysterious unless it is remembered that the appeal of sciences like linguistics, anthropology, and biology was that they were empirical, and by no means speculative or idealistic. Renan&#039;s Semitic, like Bopp&#039;s Indo-European, was a constructed object, it is true, but it was considered logical and inevitable as a protoform, given the scientifically apprehendable and empirically analyzable data of specific Semitic languages. Thus, in trying to formulate a prototypical and primitive linguistic type (as well as a cultural, psychological, and historical one), there was also an &amp;quot;attempt to define a primary human potential,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Stanley Diamond, &#039;&#039;In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization&#039;&#039; (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), p. 119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; out of which completely specific instances of behavior uniformly derived. Now this attempt would have been impossible had it not also been believed--in classical empiricist terms--that mind and body were interdependent realities, both determined originally by a given set of geographical, biological, and quasihistorical conditions.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Harry Bracken, &amp;quot;Essence, Accident and Race,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Hermathena&#039;&#039; 116 (Winter 1973): pp. 81-96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; From this set, which was not available to the native for discovery or introspection, there was no subsequent escape. The antiquarian bias of Orientalists was supported by these empiricist ideas. In all their studies of &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Islam, Buddhism, or Zoroastrianism they felt themselves, as George Eliot&#039;s Dr. Casaubon confesses, to be acting &amp;quot;like the ghost of an ancient, wandering about the world and trying mentally to construct it as it used to be, in spite of ruin and confusing changes.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;George Eliot, &#039;&#039;Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life&#039;&#039; (1872; reprint ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956), p. 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Were these theses about linguistic, civilizational, and finally racial characteristics merely one side of an academic debate amongst European scientists and scholars, we might dismiss them as furnishing material for an unimportant closet drama. The point is, however, that both the terms of the debate and the debate itself had very wide circulation; in late-nineteenth-century culture, as Lionel Trilling has said, &amp;quot;racial theory, stimulated by a rising nationalism and a spreading imperialism, supported by an incomplete and mal-assimilated science, was almost undisputed.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lionel Trilling, &#039;&#039;Matthew Arnold&#039;&#039; (1939; reprint ed., New York: Meridian Books, 1955), p. 214.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Race theory, ideas about primitive origins and primitive classifications, modern decadence, the progress of civilization, the destiny of the white (or Aryan) races, the need for colonial territories--all these were elements in the peculiar amalgam of science, politics, and culture whose drift, almost without exception, was always to raise Europe or a European race to dominion over non-European portions of mankind. There was general agreement too that, according to a strangely transformed variety of Darwinism sanctioned by Darwin himself, the modern Orientals were degraded remnants of a former greatness; the ancient, or &amp;quot;classical,&amp;quot; civilizations of the Orient were perceivable through the disorders of present decadence, but only (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) because a white specialist with highly refined scientific techniques could do the sifting and reconstructing, and (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) because a vocabulary of sweeping generalities (the Semites, the Aryans, the Orientals) referred not to a set of fictions but rather to a whole array of seemingly objective and agreed-upon distinctions. Thus a remark about what Orientals were and were not capable of was supported by biological &amp;quot;truths&amp;quot; such as those spelled out in P. Charles Michel&#039;s &amp;quot;A Biological View of Our Foreign Policy&amp;quot; (1896), in Thomas Henry Huxley&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Struggle for Existence in Human Society&#039;&#039; (1888), Benjamin Kidd&#039;s &#039;&#039;Social Evolution&#039;&#039; (1894), John B. Crozier&#039;s &#039;&#039;History of Intellectual Development on the Lines of Modern Evolution&#039;&#039; (1897-1901), and Charles Harvey&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Biology of British Politics&#039;&#039; (1904).&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039; (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 180, note 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It was assumed that if languages were as distinct from each other as the linguists said they were, then too the language users--their minds, cultures, potentials, and even their bodies--were different in similar ways. And these distinctions had the force of ontological, empirical truth behind them, together with the convincing demonstration of such truth in studies of origins, development, character, and destiny.&lt;br /&gt;
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The point to be emphasized is that this truth about the distinctive differences between races, civilizations, and languages was (or pretended to be) radical and ineradicable. It went to the bottom of things, it asserted that there was no escape from origins and the types these origins enabled; it set the real boundaries between human beings, on which races, nations, and civilizations were constructed; it forced vision away from common, as well as plural, human realities like joy, suffering, political organization, forcing attention instead in the downward and backward direction of immutable origins. A scientist could no more escape such origins in his research than an Oriental could escape &amp;quot;the Semites&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Indians&amp;quot; from which his present reality--debased, colonized, backward--excluded him, except for the white researcher&#039;s didactic presentation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The profession of specialized research conferred unique privileges. We recall that Lane could appear to be an Oriental and yet retain his scholarly detachment. The Orientals he studied became in fact &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; Orientals, for he saw them not only as actual people but as monumentalized objects in his account of them. This double perspective encouraged a sort of structured irony. On the one hand, there was a collection of people living in the present; on the other hand, these people--as the subject of study--became &amp;quot;the Egyptians,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the Muslims,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Orientals.&amp;quot; Only the scholar could see, and manipulate, the discrepancy between the two levels. The tendency of the former was always towards greater variety, yet this variety was always being restrained, compressed downwards and backwards to the &#039;&#039;radical&#039;&#039; terminal of the generality. Every modern, native instance of behavior became an effusion to be sent back to the original terminal, which was strengthened in the process. This kind of &amp;quot;dispatching&amp;quot; was precisely the &#039;&#039;discipline&#039;&#039; of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s ability to deal with the Egyptians as present beings and as validations of &#039;&#039;sui generis&#039;&#039; labels was a function both of Orientalist discipline and of generally held views about the Near Oriental Muslim or Semite. In no people more than in the Oriental Semites was it possible to see the present and the origin together. The Jews and the Muslims, as subjects of Orientalist study, were readily understandable in view of their primitive origins: this was (and to a certain extent still is) the cornerstone of modern Orientalism. Renan had called the Semites an instance of arrested development, and functionally speaking this came to mean that for the Orientalist no modern Semite, however much he may have believed himself to be modern, could ever outdistance the organizing claims on him of his origins. This functional rule worked on the temporal and spatial levels together. No Semite advanced in time beyond the development of a &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; period; no Semite could ever shake loose the pastoral, desert environment of his tent and tribe. Every manifestation of actual &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; life could be, and ought to be, referred back to the primitive explanatory category of &amp;quot;the Semitic.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The executive power of such a system of reference, by which each discrete instance of real behavior could be reduced down and back to a small number of explanatory &amp;quot;original&amp;quot; categories, was considerable by the end of the nineteenth century. In Orientalism it was the equivalent of bureaucracy in public administration. The department was more useful than the individual file, and certainly the human being was significant principally as the occasion for a file. We must imagine the Orientalist at work in the role of a clerk putting together a very wide assortment of files in a large cabinet marked &amp;quot;the Semites.&amp;quot; Aided by recent discoveries in comparative and primitive anthropology, a scholar like William Robertson Smith could group together the inhabitants of the Near Orient and write on their kinship and marriage customs, on the form and content of their religious practice. The power of Smith&#039;s work is its plainly radical demythologizing of the Semites. The nominal barriers presented to the world by Islam or Judaism are swept aside; Smith uses Semitic philology, mythology, and Orientalist scholarship &amp;quot;to construct ... a hypothetical picture of the development of the social systems, consistent with all the Arabian facts.&amp;quot; If this picture succeeds in revealing the antecedent, and still influential, roots of monotheism in totemism or animal worship, then the scholar has been successful. And this, Smith says, despite the fact that &amp;quot;our Mohammedan sources draw a veil, as far as they can, over all details of the old heathenism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;W. Robertson Smith, &#039;&#039;Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia&#039;&#039;, ed. Stanley Cook (1907; reprint ed., Oesterhout, N.B.: Anthropological Publications, 1966), pp. xiii, 241.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Smith&#039;s work on the Semites covered such areas as theology, literature, and history; it was done with a full awareness of work done by Orientalists (see, for instance, Smith&#039;s savage attack in 1887 on Renan&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire du peuple d&#039;Israel&#039;&#039;), and more important, was intended as an aid to the understanding of the modern Semites. For Smith, I think, was a crucial link in the intellectual chain connecting the White-Man-as-expert to the modern Orient. None of the encapsulated wisdom delivered as Oriental expertise by Lawrence, Hogarth, Bell, and the others would have been possible without Smith. And even Smith the antiquarian scholar would not have had half the authority without his additional and direct experience of &amp;quot;the Arabian facts.&amp;quot; It was the combination in Smith of the &amp;quot;grasp&amp;quot; of primitive categories with the ability to see general truths behind the empirical vagaries of contemporary Oriental behavior that gave weight to his writing. Moreover, it was this special combination that adumbrated the style of expertise upon which Lawrence, Bell, and Philby built their reputation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like Burton and Charles Doughty before him, Smith voyaged in the Hejaz, between 1880 and 1881. Arabia has been an especially privileged place for the Orientalist, not only because Muslims treat Islam as Arabia&#039;s &#039;&#039;genius loci&#039;&#039;, but also because the Hejaz appears historically as barren and retarded as it is geographically; the Arabian desert is thus considered to be a locale about which one can make statements regarding the past in exactly the same form (and with the same content) that one makes them regarding the present. In the Hejaz you can speak about Muslims, modern Islam, and primitive Islam without bothering to make distinctions. To this vocabulary devoid of historical grounding, Smith was able to bring the cachet of additional authority provided by his Semitic studies. What we hear in his comments is the standpoint of a scholar commanding &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; the antecedents for Islam, the Arabs, and Arabia. Hence:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is characteristic of Mohammedanism that all national feeling assumes a religious aspect, inasmuch as the whole polity and social forms of a Moslem country are clothed in a religious dress. But it would be a mistake to suppose that genuine religious feeling is at the bottom of everything that justifies itself by taking a religious shape. The prejudices of the Arab have their roots in a conservatism which lies deeper than his belief in Islam. It is, indeed, a great fault of the religion of the Prophet that it lends itself so easily to the prejudices of the race among whom it was first promulgated, and that it has taken under its protection so many barbarous and obsolete ideas, which even Mohammed must have seen to have no religious worth, but which he carried over into his system in order to facilitate the propagation of his reformed doctrines. Yet many of the prejudices which seem to us most distinctively Mohammedan have no basis in the Koran.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;W. Robertson Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures and Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. John Sutherland Black and George Chrystal (London: Adam &amp;amp; Charles Black, 1912), pp. 492-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; in the last sentence of this amazing piece of logic defines the White Man&#039;s vantage point explicitly. This allows &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; to say in the first sentence that all political and social life are &amp;quot;clothed&amp;quot; in religious dress (Islam can thus be characterized as totalitarian), then to say in the second that religion is only a cover used by Muslims (in other words, all Muslims are hypocrites essentially). In the third sentence, the claim is made that Islam--even while laying hold upon the Arab&#039;s faith--has not really reformed the Arab&#039;s basic pre-Islamic conservatism. Nor is this all. For if Islam was successful as a religion it was because it fecklessly allowed these &amp;quot;authentic&amp;quot; Arab prejudices to creep in; for such a tactic (now we see that it was a tactic on Islam&#039;s behalf) we must blame Mohammed, who was after all a ruthless crypto-Jesuit. But all this is more or less wiped out in the last sentence, when Smith assures &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; that everything he has said about Islam is invalid, since the quintessential aspects of Islam known to the West are not &amp;quot;Mohammedan&amp;quot; after all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principles of identity and noncontradiction clearly do not bind the Orientalist. What overrides them is Orientalist expertise, which is based on an irrefutable collective verity entirely within the Orientalist&#039;s philosophical and rhetorical grasp. Smith is able without the slightest trepidation to speak about &amp;quot;the jejune, practical and ... constitutionally irreligious habit of the Arabic mind,&amp;quot; Islam as a system of &amp;quot;organized hypocrisy,&amp;quot; the impossibility of &amp;quot;feeling any respect for Moslem devotion, in which formalism and vain repetition are reduced to a system.&amp;quot; His attacks on Islam are not relativist, for it is clear to him that Europe&#039;s and Christianity&#039;s superiority is actual, not imagined. At bottom, Smith&#039;s vision of the world is binary, as is evident in such passages as the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Arabian traveller is quite different from ourselves. The labour of moving from place to place is a mere nuisance to him, he has no enjoyment in effort [as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do], and grumbles at hunger or fatigue with all his might [as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do not]. You will never persuade the Oriental that, when you get off your camel, you can have any other wish than immediately to squat on a rug and take your rest (&#039;&#039;isterih&#039;&#039;), smoking and drinking. Moreover the Arab is little impressed by scenery [but &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; are].&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 492, 493, 511, 500, 498-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;We&amp;quot; are this, &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; are that. Which Arab, which Islam, when, how, according to what tests: these appear to be distinctions irrelevant to Smith&#039;s scrutiny of and experience in the Hejaz. The crucial point is that everything one can know or learn about &amp;quot;Semites&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot; receives immediate corroboration, not merely in the archives, but directly on the ground.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out of such a coercive framework, by which a modern &amp;quot;colored&amp;quot; man is chained irrevocably to the general truths formulated about his prototypical linguistic, anthropological, and doctrinal forebears by a white European scholar, the work of the great twentieth-century Oriental experts in England and France derived. To this framework these experts also brought their private mythology and obsessions, which in writers like Doughty and Lawrence have been studied with considerable energy. Each--Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Doughty, Lawrence, Bell, Hogarth, Philby, Sykes, Storrs--believed his vision of things Oriental was individual, self-created out of some intensely personal encounter with the Orient, Islam, or the Arabs; each expressed general contempt for official knowledge held about the East. &amp;quot;The sun made me an Arab,&amp;quot; Doughty wrote in &#039;&#039;Arabia Deserta&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;but never warped me to Orientalism.&amp;quot; Yet in the final analysis they all (except Blunt) expressed the traditional Western hostility to and fear of the Orient. Their views refined and gave a personal twist to the academic style of modern Orientalism, with its repertoire of grand generalizations, tendentious &amp;quot;science&amp;quot; from which there was no appeal, reductive formulae. (Doughty again, on the same page as his sneer at Orientalism: &amp;quot;The Semites are like to a man sitting in a cloaca to the eyes, and whose brows touch heaven.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Charles M. Doughty, &#039;&#039;Travels in Arabia Deserta&#039;&#039;, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (New York: Random House, n.d.), 1: 95. See also the excellent article by Richard Bevis, &amp;quot;Spiritual Geology: C. M. Doughty and the Land of the Arabs,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Victorian Studies&#039;&#039; 16 (December 1972), 163-81.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) They acted, they promised, they recommended public policy on the basis of such generalizations; and, by a remarkable irony, they acquired the identity of White Orientals in their natal cultures--even as, in the instances of Doughty, Lawrence, Hogarth, and Bell, their professional involvement with the East (like Smith&#039;s) did not prevent them from despising it thoroughly. The main issue for them was preserving the Orient and Islam under the control of the White Man.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new dialectic emerges out of this project. What is required of the Oriental expert is no longer simply &amp;quot;understanding&amp;quot;: now the Orient must be made to perform, its power must be enlisted on the side of &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; values, civilization, interests, goals. Knowledge of the Orient is directly translated into activity, and the results give rise to new currents of thought and action in the Orient. But these in turn will require from the White Man a new assertion of control, this time not as the author of a scholarly work on the Orient but as the maker of contemporary history, of the Orient as urgent actuality (which, because he began it, only the expert can understand adequately). The Orientalist has now become a figure of Oriental history, indistinguishable from it, its shaper, its characteristic &#039;&#039;sign&#039;&#039; for the West. Here is the dialectic in brief:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some Englishmen, of whom Kitchener was chief, believed that a rebellion of Arabs against Turks would enable England, while fighting Germany, simultaneously to defeat her ally Turkey. Their knowledge of the nature and power and country of the Arabic-speaking peoples made them think that the issue of such a rebellion would be happy: and indicated its character and method. So they allowed it to begin, having obtained formal assurances of help for it from the British Government. Yet none the less the rebellion of the Sherif of Mecca came to most as a surprise, and found the Allies unready. It aroused mixed feelings and made strong friends and enemies, amid whose clashing jealousies its affairs began to miscarry.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;T. E. Lawrence, &#039;&#039;The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph&#039;&#039; (1926; reprint ed., Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran &amp;amp; Co., 1935), p. 28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is Lawrence&#039;s own synopsis of chapter 1 of &#039;&#039;The Seven Pillars of Wisdom&#039;&#039;. The &amp;quot;knowledge&amp;quot; of &amp;quot;some Englishmen&amp;quot; authors a movement in the Orient whose &amp;quot;affairs&amp;quot; create a mixed progeny; the ambiguities, the half-imagined, tragicomic results of this new, revived Orient become the subject of expert writing, a new form of Orientalist discourse that presents a vision of the contemporary Orient, not as narrative, but as all complexity, problematics, betrayed hope--with the White Orientalist author as its prophetic, articulate definition.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defeat of narrative by vision--which is true even in so patently storylike a work as &#039;&#039;The Seven Pillars&#039;&#039;--is something we have already encountered in Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;. A conflict between a holistic view of the Orient (description, monumental record) and a narrative of events in the Orient is a conflict on several levels, involving several different issues. As the conflict is frequently renewed in the discourse of Orientalism, it is worthwhile analyzing it here briefly. The Orientalist surveys the Orient from above, with the aim of getting hold of the whole sprawling panorama before him--culture, religion, mind, history, society. To do this he must see every detail through the device of a set of reductive categories (the Semites, the Muslim mind, the Orient, and so forth). Since these categories are primarily schematic and efficient ones, and since it is more or less assumed that no Oriental can know himself the way an Orientalist can, any vision of the Orient ultimately comes to rely for its coherence and force on the person, institution, or discourse whose property it is. Any comprehensive vision is fundamentally conservative, and we have noted how in the history of ideas about the Near Orient in the West these ideas have maintained themselves regardless of any evidence disputing them. (Indeed, we can argue that these ideas produce evidence that proves their validity.)&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist is principally a kind of agent of such comprehensive visions; Lane is a typical instance of the way an individual believes himself to have subordinated his ideas, or even what he sees, to the exigencies of some &amp;quot;scientific&amp;quot; view of the whole phenomenon known collectively as the Orient, or the Oriental nation. A vision therefore is static, just as the scientific categories informing late-nineteenth-century Orientalism are static: there is no recourse beyond &amp;quot;the Semites&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Oriental mind&amp;quot;; these are final terminals holding every variety of Oriental behavior within a general view of the whole field. As a discipline, as a profession, as specialized language or discourse, Orientalism is staked upon the permanence of the whole Orient, for without &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; there can be no consistent, intelligible, and articulated knowledge called &amp;quot;Orientalism.&amp;quot; Thus the Orient belongs to Orientalism, just as it is assumed that there is pertinent information belonging to (or about) the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Against this static system of &amp;quot;synchronic essentialism&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For a discussion of this see Talal Asad, &amp;quot;Two European Images of Non-European Rule,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter&#039;&#039;, ed. Talal Asad (London: Ithaca Press, 1975), pp. 103-18.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; I have called vision because it presumes that the whole Orient can be seen panoptically, there is a constant pressure. The source of pressure is narrative, in that if any Oriental detail can be shown to move, or to develop, diachrony is introduced into the system. What seemed stable--and the Orient is synonymous with stability and unchanging eternality--now appears unstable. Instability suggests that history, with its disruptive detail, its currents of change, its tendency towards growth, decline, or dramatic movement, is possible in the Orient and for the Orient. History and the narrative by which history is represented argue that vision is insufficient, that &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; as an unconditional ontological category does an injustice to the potential of reality for change.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, narrative is the specific form taken by written history to counter the permanence of vision. Lane sensed the dangers of narrative when he refused to give linear shape to himself and to his information, preferring instead the monumental form of encyclopedic or lexicographical vision. Narrative asserts the power of men to be born, develop, and die, the tendency of institutions and actualities to change, the likelihood that modernity and contemporaneity will finally overtake &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; civilizations; above all, it asserts that the domination of reality by vision is no more than a will to power, a will to truth and interpretation, and not an objective condition of history. Narrative, in short, introduces an opposing point of view, perspective, consciousness to the unitary web of vision; it violates the serene Apollonian fictions asserted by vision.&lt;br /&gt;
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When as a result of World War I the Orient was made to enter history, it was the Orientalist-as-agent who did the work. Hannah Arendt has made the brilliant observation that the counterpart of the bureaucracy is the imperial agent,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Arendt, &#039;&#039;Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; which is to say that if the collective academic endeavor called Orientalism was a bureaucratic institution based on a certain conservative vision of the Orient, then the servants of such a vision in the Orient were imperial agents like T. E. Lawrence. In his work we can see most clearly the conflict between narrative history and vision, as--in his words--the &amp;quot;new Imperialism&amp;quot; attempted &amp;quot;an active tide of imposing responsibility on the local peoples [of the Orient].&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;T. E. Lawrence, &#039;&#039;Oriental Assembly&#039;&#039;, ed. A. W. Lawrence (New York: E. P. Dutton &amp;amp; Co., 1940), p. 95.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The competition between the European Powers now caused them to prod the Orient into active life, to press the Orient into service, to turn the Orient from unchanging &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; passivity into militant modern life. It would be important, nevertheless, never to let the Orient go its own way or get out of hand, the canonical view being that Orientals had no tradition of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
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The great drama of Lawrence&#039;s work is that it symbolizes the struggle, first, to stimulate the Orient (lifeless, timeless, forceless) into movement; second, to impose upon that movement an essentially Western shape; third, to contain the new and aroused Orient in a personal vision, whose retrospective mode includes a powerful sense of failure and betrayal.&lt;br /&gt;
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I meant to make a new nation, to restore a lost influence, to give twenty millions of Semites the foundation on which to build an inspired dream-palace of their national thoughts.... All the subject provinces of the Empire to me were not worth one dead English boy. If I have restored to the East some self-respect, a goal, ideals: if I have made the standard rule of white over red more exigent, I have fitted those peoples in a degree for the new commonwealth in which the dominant races will forget their brute achievements, and white and red and yellow and brown and black will stand up together without side-glances in the service of the world.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited in Stephen Ely Tabachnick, &amp;quot;The Two Veils of T. E. Lawrence,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Studies in the Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; 16 (Fall 1975): 96-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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None of this, whether as intention, as an actual undertaking, or as a failed project, would have been remotely possible without the White Orientalist perspective at the outset:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Jew in the Metropole at Brighton, the miser, the worshipper of Adonis, the lecher in the stews of Damascus were alike signs of the Semitic capacity for enjoyment, and expressions of the same nerve which gave us at the other pole the self-denial of the Essenes, or the early Christians, or the first Khalifas, finding the ways to heaven fairest for the poor in spirit. The Semite hovered between lust and self-denial.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lawrence is backed in such statements by a respectable tradition stretching like a lighthouse beam through the whole nineteenth century; at its light-emanating center, of course, is &amp;quot;the Orient,&amp;quot; and that is powerful enough to light up both the gross and the refined topographies within its range. The Jew, the worshipper of Adonis, the Damascene lecher, are signs not so much of humanity, let us say, as of a semiotic field called Semitic and built into coherence by the Semitic branch of Orientalism. Inside this field, certain things were possible:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arabs could be swung on an idea as on a cord; for the unpledged allegiance of their minds made them obedient servants. None of them would escape the bond till success had come, and with it responsibility and duty and engagement. Then the idea was gone and the work ended--in ruins. Without a creed they could be taken to the four corners of the world (but not to heaven) by being shown the riches of the earth and the pleasures of it; but if on the road ... they met the prophet of an idea, who had nowhere to lay his head and who depended for his food on charity or birds, then they would all leave their wealth for his inspiration.... They were as unstable as water, and like water would perhaps finally prevail. Since the dawn of life, in successive waves they had been dashing themselves against the coasts of flesh. Each wave was broken.... One such wave (and not the least) I raised and rolled before the breath of an idea, till it reached its crest, and toppled over and fell at Damascus. The wash of that wave, thrown back by the resistance of vested things, will provide the matter of the following wave, when in fullness of time the sea shall be raised once more.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Could,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;would,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;if&amp;quot; are Lawrence&#039;s way inserting himself in the field, as it were. Thus the possibility is prepared for the last sentence, in which as manipulator of the Arabs Lawrence puts himself at their head. Like Conrad&#039;s Kurtz, Lawrence has cut himself loose from the earth so as to become identified with a new reality in order--he says later--that he might be responsible for &amp;quot;hustling into form ... the new Asia which time was inexorably bringing upon us.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lawrence, &#039;&#039;Seven Pillars of Wisdom&#039;&#039;, pp. 42-3, 661.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Arab Revolt acquires meaning only as Lawrence designs meaning for it; his meaning imparted thus to Asia was a triumph, &amp;quot;a mood of enlargement ... in that we felt that we had assumed another&#039;s pain or experience, his personality.&amp;quot; The Orientalist has become now the representative Oriental, unlike earlier participant observers such as Lane, for whom the Orient was something kept carefully at bay. But there is an unresolvable conflict in Lawrence between the White Man and the Oriental, and although he does not explicitly say so, this conflict essentially restages in his mind the historical conflict between East and West. Conscious of his power over the Orient, conscious also of his duplicity, unconscious of anything in the Orient that would suggest to him that history, after all, is history and that even without him the Arabs would finally attend to their quarrel with the Turks, Lawrence reduces the entire narrative of the revolt (its momentary successes and its bitter failure) to &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; vision of himself as an unresolved, &amp;quot;standing civil war&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet in reality we had borne the vicarious for our own sakes, or at least because it was pointed for our benefit: and could escape from this knowledge only by a make-belief in sense as well as in motive....&lt;br /&gt;
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There seemed no straight walking for us leaders in this crooked lane of conduct, ring within ring of unknown, shamefaced motives cancelling or double-charging their precedents.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 549, 550-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To this intimate sense of defeat Lawrence was later to add a theory about &amp;quot;the old men&amp;quot; who stole the triumph from him. In any event, what matters to Lawrence is that as a white expert, the legatee of years of academic and popular wisdom about the Orient, he is able to subordinate his style of being to theirs, thereafter to assume the role of Oriental prophet giving shape to a movement in &amp;quot;the new Asia.&amp;quot; And when, for whatever reason, the movement fails (it is taken over by others, its aims are betrayed, its dream of independence invalidated), it is &#039;&#039;Lawrence&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s disappointment that counts. So far from being a mere man lost in the great rush of confusing events, Lawrence equates himself fully with the struggle of the new Asia to be born.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whereas Aeschylus had represented Asia mourning its losses, and Nerval had espressed his disappointment in the Orient for not being more glamorous than he had wanted, Lawrence &#039;&#039;becomes&#039;&#039; both the mourning continent and a subjective consciousness expressing an almost cosmic disenchantment. In the end Lawrence--and thanks not only to Lowell Thomas and Robert Graves--and Lawrence&#039;s vision became the very symbol of Oriental trouble: Lawrence, in short, had assumed responsibility for the Orient by interspersing his knowing experience between the reader and history. Indeed what Lawrence presents to the reader is an unmediated expert power--the power to be, for a brief time, the Orient. All the events putatively ascribed to the historical Arab Revolt are reduced finally to Lawrence&#039;s experiences on its behalf.&lt;br /&gt;
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In such a case, therefore, style is not only the power to symbolize such enormous generalities as Asia, the Orient, or the Arabs; it is also a form of displacement and incorporation by which one voice becomes a whole history, and--for the white Westerner, as reader or writer--the only kind of Orient it is possible to know. Just as Renan had mapped the field of possibility open to the Semites in culture, thought, and language, so too Lawrence charts the space (and indeed, appropriates that space) and time of modern Asia. The effect of this style is that it brings Asia tantalizingly close to the West, but only for a brief moment. We are left at the end with a sense of the pathetic distance still separating &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; from an Orient destined to bear its foreignness as a mark of its permanent estrangement from the West. This is the disappointing conclusion corroborated (contemporaneously) by the ending of E. M. Forster&#039;s &#039;&#039;A Passage to India&#039;&#039;, where Aziz and Fielding attempt, and fail at, reconciliation:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Why can&#039;t we be friends now?&amp;quot; said the other, holding him affectionately. &amp;quot;It&#039;s what I want. It&#039;s what you want.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the horses didn&#039;t want it--they swerved apart; the earth didn&#039;t want it, sending up rocks through which riders must pass single file; the temples, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest House, that came into view as they issued from the gap and saw Mau beneath: they didn&#039;t want it, they said in their hundred voices, &amp;quot;No, not yet,&amp;quot; and the sky said, &amp;quot;No, not there.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;E. M. Forster, &#039;&#039;A Passage to India&#039;&#039; (1924; reprint ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace &amp;amp; Co., 1952), p. 322.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This style, this compact definition, is what the Orient will always come up against.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite its pessimism, there is a positive political message behind its phrases. The gulf between East and West can be modulated, as Cromer and Balfour knew well, by superior Western knowledge and power. Lawrence&#039;s vision is complemented in France by Maurice Barres&#039;s &#039;&#039;Une Enquete aux pays du Levant&#039;&#039;, the record of a journey through the Near Orient in 1914. Like so many works before it, the &#039;&#039;Enquete&#039;&#039; is a work of recapitulation whose author not only searches out sources and origins of Western culture in the Orient but also redoes Nerval, Flaubert, and Lamartine in their voyages to the Orient. For Barres, however, there is an additional political dimension to his journey: he seeks proof, and conclusive evidence, for a constructive French role in the East. Yet the difference between French and British expertise remains: the former manages an actual conjunction of peoples and territory, whereas the latter deals with a realm of spiritual possibility. For Barres the French presence is best seen in French schools where, as he says of a school in Alexandria, &amp;quot;It is ravishing to see those little Oriental girls welcoming and so wonderfully reproducing the &#039;&#039;fantaisie&#039;&#039; and the melody [in their spoken French] of the Ile-de-France.&amp;quot; If France does not actually have any colonies there, she is not entirely without possessions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is, there in the Orient, a feeling about France which is so religious and strong that it is capable of absorbing and reconciling all our most diverse aspirations. In the Orient we represent spirituality, justice, and the category of the ideal. England is powerful there; Germany is all-powerful; but we possess Oriental souls.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arguing vociferously with Jaures, this celebrated European doctor proposes to vaccinate Asia against its own illnesses, to occidentalize the Orientals, to bring them into salubrious contact with France. Yet even in these projects Barres&#039;s vision preserves the very distinction between East and West he claims to be mitigating.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How will we be able to form for ourselves an intellectual elite with which we can work, made out of Orientals who would not be deracinated, who would continue to evolve according to their own norms, who would remain penetrated by family traditions, and who would thus form a link between us and the mass of natives? How will we create relationships with a view towards preparing the way for agreements and treaties which would be the desirable form taken by our political future [in the Orient]? All these things are finally all about soliciting in these strange peoples the taste for maintaining contact with our intelligence, &#039;&#039;even though this taste may in fact come out of their own sense of their national destiny&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Maurice Barres, &#039;&#039;Une Enquete aux pays du Levant&#039;&#039; (Paris: Plon, 1923), 1: 20; 2: 181, 192, 193, 197.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emphasis in the last sentence is Barres&#039;s own. Since unlike Lawrence and Hogarth (whose book &#039;&#039;The Wandering Scholar&#039;&#039; is the wholly informative and unromantic record of two trips to the Levant in 1896 and 1910&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;D. G. Hogarth, &#039;&#039;The Wandering Scholar&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1924). Hogarth describes his style as that of &amp;quot;the explorer first and the scholar second&amp;quot; (p. 4).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) he writes of a world of distant probabilities; he is more prepared to imagine the Orient as going its own way. Yet the bond (or leash) between East and West that he advocates is designed to permit a constant variety of intellectual pressure going from West to East. Barres sees things, not in terms of waves, battles, spiritual adventures, but in terms of the cultivation of intellectual imperialism, as ineradicable as it is subtle. The British vision, exemplified by Lawrence, is of the mainstream Orient, of peoples, political organizations, and movements guided and held in check by the White Man&#039;s expert tutelage; the Orient is &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; Orient, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; people, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; dominions. Discriminations between elites and the masses are less likely to be made by the British than by the French, whose perceptions and policy were always based on minorities and on the insidious pressures of spiritual community between France and its colonial children. The British agent-Orientalist--Lawrence, Bell, Philby, Storrs, Hogarth--during and after World War I took over both the role of expert-adventurer-eccentric (created in the nineteenth century by Lane, Burton, Hester Stanhope) and the role of colonial authority, whose position is in a central place next to the indigenous ruler: Lawrence with the Hashimites, Philby with the house of Saud, are the two best-known instances. British Oriental expertise fashioned itself around consensus and orthodoxy and sovereign authority; French Oriental expertise between the wars concerned itself with heterodoxy, spiritual ties, eccentrics. It is no accident, then, that the two major scholarly careers of this period, one British, one French, were H. A. R. Gibb&#039;s and Louis Massignon&#039;s, one whose interest was defined by the notion of Sunna (or orthodoxy) in Islam, the other whose focus was on the quasi-Christlike, theosophical Sufi figure, Mansur al-Hallaj. I shall return to these two major Orientalists a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If I have concentrated so much on imperial agents and policy-makers instead of scholars in this section, it was to accentuate the major shift in Orientalism, knowledge about the Orient, intercourse with it, from an academic to an &#039;&#039;instrumental&#039;&#039; attitude. What accompanies the shift is a change in the attitude as well of the individual Orientalist, who need no longer see himself--as Lane, Sacy, Renan, Caussin, Muller, and others did--as belonging to a sort of guild community with its own internal traditions and rituals. Now the Orientalist has become the representative man of his Western culture, a man who compresses within his own work a major duality of which that work (regardless of its specific form) is the symbolic expression: Occidental consciousness, knowledge, science taking hold of the furthest Oriental reaches as well as the most minute Oriental particulars. Formally the Orientalist sees himself as accomplishing the union of Orient and Occident, but mainly by reasserting the technological, political, and cultural supremacy of the West. History, in such a union, is radically attentuated if not banished. Viewed as a current of development, as a narrative strand, or as a dynamic force unfolding systematically and materially in time and space, human history--of the East or the West--is subordinated to an essentialist, idealist conception of Occident and Orient. Because he feels himself to be standing at the very rim of the East-West divide, the Orientalist not only speaks in vast generalities; he also seeks to convert each aspect of Oriental or Occidental life into an unmediated sign of one or the other geographical half.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The interchange in the Orientalist&#039;s writing between his expert self and his testimonial, beholding self as Western representative is pre-eminently worked out in visual terms. Here is a typical passage (quoted by Gibb) from Duncan Macdonald&#039;s classic work &#039;&#039;The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam&#039;&#039; (1909):&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Arabs show themselves not as especially easy of belief, but as hard-headed, materialistic, questioning, doubting, scoffing at their own superstitions and usages, fond of tests of the supernatural--and all this in a curiously light-minded, almost childish fashion.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited by H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Structure of Religious Thought in Islam,&amp;quot; in his &#039;&#039;Studies on the Civilization of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 180.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The governing verb is &#039;&#039;show&#039;&#039;, which here gives us to understand that the Arabs display themselves (willingly or unwillingly) to and for expert scrutiny. The number of attributes ascribed to them, by its crowded set of sheer appositions, causes &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; to acquire a sort of existential weightlessness; thereby, &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; are made to rejoin the very broad designation, common to modern anthropological thought, of &amp;quot;the childish primitive.&amp;quot; What Macdonald also implies is that for such descriptions there is a peculiarly privileged position occupied by the Western Orientalist, whose representative function is precisely &#039;&#039;to show&#039;&#039; what needs to be seen. All specific history is capable of being seen thus at the apex, or the sensitive frontier, of Orient and Occident together. The complex dynamics of human life--what I have been calling history as narrative--becomes either irrelevant or trivial in comparison with the circular vision by which the details of Oriental life serve merely to reassert the Orientalness of the subject and the Westernness of the observer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If such a vision in some ways recalls Dante&#039;s, we should by no means fail to notice what an enormous difference there is between this Orient and Dante&#039;s. Evidence here is meant to be (and probably is considered) scientific; its pedigree, genealogically speaking, is European intellectual and human science during the nineteenth century. Moreover, the Orient is no simple marvel, or an enemy, or a branch of exotica; it is a political actuality of great and significant moment. Like Lawrence, Macdonald cannot really detach his representative characteristics as a Westerner from his role as a scholar. Thus his vision of Islam, as much as Lawrence&#039;s of the Arabs, implicates &#039;&#039;definition&#039;&#039; of the object with the &#039;&#039;identity&#039;&#039; of the person defining. All Arab Orientals must be accommodated to a vision of an Oriental type as constructed by the Western scholar, as well as to a specific encounter with the Orient in which the Westerner regrasps the Orient&#039;s essence as a consequence of his intimate estrangement from it. For Lawrence as for Forster, this latter sensation produces the despondency as well of personal failure; for such scholars as Macdonald, it strengthens the Orientalist discourse itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And it puts that discourse abroad in the world of culture, politics, and actuality. In the period between the wars, as we can easily judge from, say, Malraux&#039;s novels, the relations between East and West assumed a currency that was both widespread and anxious. The signs of Oriental claims for political independence were everywhere; certainly in the dismembered Ottoman Empire they were encouraged by the Allies and, as is perfectly evident in the whole Arab Revolt and its aftermath, quickly became problematic. The Orient now appeared to constitute a challenge, not just to the West in general, but to the West&#039;s spirit, knowledge, and imperium. After a good century of constant intervention in (and study of) the Orient, the West&#039;s role in an East itself responding to the crises of modernity seemed considerably more delicate. There was the issue of outright occupation; there was the issue of the mandated territories; there was the issue of European competition in the Orient; there was the issue of dealing with native elites, native popular movements, and native demands for self-government and independence; there was the issue of civilizational contacts between Orient and Occident. Such issues forced reconsideration of Western knowledge of the Orient. No less a personage than Sylvain Levi, president of the Societe asiatique between 1928 and 1935, professor of Sanskrit at the College de France, reflected seriously in 1925 on the urgency of the East-West problem:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our duty is to understand Oriental civilization. The humanistic problem, which consists, on an intellectual level, in making a sympathetic and intelligent effort to understand foreign civilizations in both their past and their future forms, is specifically posed for us Frenchmen [although similar sentiments could have been expressed by an Englishman: the problem was a &#039;&#039;European&#039;&#039; one] in a practical way with regard to our great Asiatic colonies....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These peoples are the inheritors of a long tradition of history, of art, and of religion, the sense of which they have not entirely lost and which they are probably anxious to prolong. We have assumed the responsibility of intervening in their development, sometimes without consulting them, sometimes in answer to their request.... We claim, rightly or wrongly, to represent a superior civilization, and because of the right given us by virtue of this superiority, which we regularly affirm with such assurance as makes it seem incontestable to the natives, we have called in question all their native traditions....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a general way, then, wherever the European has intervened, the native has perceived himself with a sort of general despair which was really poignant since he felt that the sum of his well-being, in the moral sphere more than in sheer material terms, instead of increasing had in fact diminished. All of which has made the foundation of his social life seem to be flimsy and to crumble under him, and the golden pillars on which he had thought to rebuild his life now seem no more than tinseled cardboard.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This disappointment has been translated into rancor from one end to the other of the Orient, and this rancor is very close now to turning to hate, and hate only waits for the right moment in order to turn into action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If because of laziness or incomprehension Europe does not make the effort that its interests alone require from it, &#039;&#039;then the Asiatic drama will approach the crisis point&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is here that that science which is a form of life and an instrument of policy--that is, wherever our interests are at stake--owes it to itself to penetrate native civilization and life in their intimacy in order to discover their fundamental values and durable characteristics rather than to smother native life with the incoherent threat of European civilizational imports. We must offer ourselves to these civilizations as we do our other products, that is, on the local exchange market. [Emphasis in original]&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Frederic Lefevre, &amp;quot;Une Heure avec Sylvain Levi,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Memorial Sylvain Levi&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Bacot (Paris: Paul Hartmann, 1937), pp. 123-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Levi has no difficulty in connecting Orientalism with politics, for the long--or rather, the prolonged--Western intervention in the East cannot be denied either in its consequences for knowledge or in its effect upon the hapless native; together the two add up to what could be a menacing future. For all his expressed humanism, his admirable concern for fellow creatures, Levi conceives the present juncture in unpleasantly constricted terms. The Oriental is imagined to feel his world threatened by a superior civilization; yet his motives are impelled, not by some positive desire for freedom, political independence, or cultural achievement &#039;&#039;on their own terms&#039;&#039;, but instead by rancor or jealous malice. The panacea offered for this potentially ugly turn of affairs is that the Orient be marketed for a Western consumer, be put before him as one among numerous wares beseeching his attention. By a single stroke you will defuse the Orient (by letting it think itself to be an &amp;quot;equal&amp;quot; quantity on the Occidental marketplace of ideas), and you will appease Western fears of an Oriental tidal wave. At bottom, of course, Levi&#039;s principal point--and his most telling confession--is that unless something is done about the Orient, &amp;quot;the Asiatic drama will approach the crisis point.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Asia suffers, yet in its suffering it threatens Europe: the eternal, bristling frontier endures between East and West, almost unchanged since classical antiquity. What Levi says as the most august of modern Orientalists is echoed with less subtlety by cultural humanists. Item: in 1925 the French periodical &#039;&#039;Les Cahiers du mois&#039;&#039; conducted a survey among notable intellectual figures; the writers canvassed included Orientalists (Levi, Emile Senart) as well as literary men like Andre Gide, Paul Valery, and Edmond Jaloux. The questions dealt with relations between Orient and Occident in a timely, not to say brazenly provocative, way, and this already indicates something about the cultural ambience of the period. We will immediately recognize how ideas of the sort promulgated in Orientalist scholarship have now reached the level of accepted truth. One question asks whether Orient and Occident are mutually impenetrable (the idea was Maeterlinck&#039;s) or not; another asks whether or not Oriental influence represented &amp;quot;un peril grave&amp;quot;--Henri Massis&#039;s words--to French thought; a third asks about those values in Occidental culture to which its superiority over the Orient can be ascribed. Valery&#039;s response seems to me worth quoting from, so forthright are the lines of its argument and so time-honored, at least in the early twentieth century:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the cultural point of view, I do not think that we have much to fear &#039;&#039;now&#039;&#039; from the Oriental influence. It is not unknown to us. We owe to the Orient all the beginnings of our arts and of a great deal of our knowledge. We can very well welcome what now comes out of the Orient, if something new is coming out of there--which I very much doubt. This doubt is precisely our guarantee and our European weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Besides, the real question in such matters is to &#039;&#039;digest&#039;&#039;. But that has always been, just as precisely, the great specialty of the European mind through the ages. Our role is therefore to maintain this power of choice, of universal comprehension, of the transformation of everything into our own substance, powers which have made us what we are. The Greeks and the Romans showed us how to deal with the monsters of Asia, how to treat them by analysis, how to extract from them their quintessence.... The Mediterranean basin seems to me to be like a closed vessel where the essences of the vast Orient have always come in order to be condensed. [Emphasis and ellipses in original]&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Paul Valery, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean Hytier (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 2: 1556-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If European culture generally has digested the Orient, certainly Valery was aware that one specific agency for doing the job has been Orientalism. In the world of Wilsonian principles of national self-determination, Valery relies confidently on analyzing the Orient&#039;s threat away. &amp;quot;The power of choice&amp;quot; is mainly for Europe first to acknowledge the Orient as the origin of European science, then to treat it as a superseded origin. Thus, in another context, Balfour could regard the native inhabitants of Palestine as having priority on the land, but nowhere near the subsequent authority to keep it; the mere wishes of 700,000 Arabs, he said, were of no moment compared to the destiny of an essentially European colonial movement.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited in Christopher Sykes, &#039;&#039;Crossroads to Israel&#039;&#039; (1965; reprint ed., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Asia represented, then, the unpleasant likelihood of a sudden eruption that would destroy &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world; as John Buchan put it in 1922:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The earth is seething with incoherent power and unorganized intelligence. Have you ever reflected on the case of China? There you have millions of quick brains stifled in trumpery crafts. They have no direction, no driving power, so the sum of their efforts is futile, and the world laughs at China.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited in Alan Sandison, &#039;&#039;The Wheel of Empire: A Study of the Imperial Idea in Some Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Fiction&#039;&#039; (New York: St. Martin&#039;s Press, 1967), p. 158. An excellent study of the French equivalent is Martine Astier Loutfi, &#039;&#039;Litterature et colonialisme: L&#039;Expansion coloniale vue dans la litterature romanesque francaise, 1871-1914&#039;&#039; (The Hague: Mouton &amp;amp; Co., 1971).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if China organized itself (as it would), it would be no laughing matter. Europe&#039;s effort therefore was to maintain itself as what Valeiy called &amp;quot;une machine puissante,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Paul Valery, &#039;&#039;Variete&#039;&#039; (Paris: Gallimard, 1924), p. 43.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; absorbing what it could from outside Europe, converting everything to its use, intellectually and materially, keeping the Orient selectively organized (or disorganized). Yet this could be done only through clarity of vision and analysis. Unless the Orient was seen for what it was, its power--military, material, spiritual--would sooner or later overwhelm Europe. The great colonial empires, great systems of systematic repression, existed to fend off the feared eventuality. Colonial subjects, as George Orwell saw them in Marrakech in 1939, must not be seen except as a kind of continental emanation, African, Asian, Oriental:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When you walk through a town like this--two hundred thousand inhabitants, of whom at least twenty thousand own literally nothing except the rags they stand up in--when you see how the people live, and still more, how easily they die, it is always difficult to believe that you are walking among human beings. All colonial empires are in reality founded upon that fact. The people have brown faces--besides they have so many of them! Are they really the same flesh as yourself? Do they even have names? Or are they merely a kind of undifferentiated brown stuff, about as individual as bees or coral insects? They arise out of the earth, they sweat and starve for a few years, and then they sink back into the nameless mounds of the graveyard and nobody notices that they are gone. And even the graves themselves soon fade back into the soil.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;George Orwell, &amp;quot;Marrakech,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;A Collection of Essays&#039;&#039; (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), p. 187.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Aside from the picturesque characters offered European readers in the exotic fiction of minor writers (Pierre Loti, Marmaduke Pickthall, and the like), the non-European known to Europeans is precisely what Orwell says about him. He is either a figure of fun, or an atom in a vast collectivity designated in ordinary or cultivated discourse as an undifferentiated type called Oriental, African, yellow, brown, or Muslim. To such abstractions Orientalism had contributed its power of generalization, converting instances of a civilization into ideal bearers of its values, ideas, and positions, which in turn the Orientalists had found in &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; and transformed into common cultural currency.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we reflect that Raymond Schwab brought out his brilliant biography of Anquetil-Duperron in 1934--and began those studies which were to put Orientalism in its proper cultural context--we must also remark that what he did was in stark contrast to his fellow artists and intellectuals, for whom Orient and Occident were still the secondhand abstractions they were for Valery. Not that Pound, Eliot, Yeats, Arthur Waley, Fenollosa, Paul Claudel(in his &#039;&#039;Connaissance de l&#039;est&#039;&#039;), Victor Segalen, and others were ignoring &amp;quot;the wisdom of the East,&amp;quot; as Max Muller had called it a few generations earlier. Rather the culture viewed the Orient, and Islam in particular, with the mistrust with which its learned attitude to the Orient had always been freighted. A suitable instance of this contemporary attitude at its most explicit is to be found in a series of lectures given at the University of Chicago in 1924 on &amp;quot;The Occident and the Orient&amp;quot; by Valentine Chirol, a well-known European newspaperman of great experience in the East; his purpose was to make clear to educated Americans that the Orient was not as far off as perhaps they believed. His line is a simple one: that Orient and Occident are irreducibly opposed to each other, and that the Orient--in particular &amp;quot;Mohammedanism&amp;quot;--is one of &amp;quot;the great world-forces&amp;quot; responsible for &amp;quot;the deepest lines of cleavage&amp;quot; in the world.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Valentine Chirol, &#039;&#039;The Occident and the Orient&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Chirol&#039;s sweeping generalizations are, I think, adequately represented by the titles of his six lectures: &amp;quot;Their Ancient Battleground&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;The Passing of the Ottoman Empire, the Peculiar Case of Egypt&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;The Great British Experiment in Egypt&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;Protectorates and Mandates&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;The New Factor of Bolshevism&amp;quot;; and &amp;quot;Some General Conclusions.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To such relatively popular accounts of the Orient as Chirol&#039;s, we can add a testimonial by Elie Faure, who in his ruminations draws, like Chirol, on history, cultural expertise, and the familiar contrast between White Occidentalism and colored Orientalism. While delivering himself of paradoxes like &amp;quot;le carnage permanent de l&#039;indifference orientale&amp;quot; (for, unlike &amp;quot;us,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; have no conception of peace), Faure goes on to show that the Orientals&#039; bodies are lazy, that the Orient has no conception of history, of the nation, or of &#039;&#039;patrie&#039;&#039;, that the Orient is essentially mystical--and so on. Faure argues that unless the Oriental learns to be rational, to develop techniques of knowledge and positivity, there can be no &#039;&#039;rapprochement&#039;&#039; between East and West.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Elie Faure, &amp;quot;Orient et Occident,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Mercure de France&#039;&#039; 229 (July 1-August 1, 1931): 263, 264, 269, 270, 272.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A far more subtle and learned account of the East-West dilemma can be found in Fernand Baldensperger&#039;s essay &amp;quot;Ou s&#039;affrontent l&#039;Orient et l&#039;Occident intellectuels,&amp;quot; but he too speaks of an inherent Oriental disdain for the idea, for mental discipline, for rational interpretation.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Fernand Baldensperger, &amp;quot;Ou s&#039;affrontent l&#039;Orient et l&#039;Occident intellectuels,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Etudes d&#039;histoire litteraire&#039;&#039;, 3rd ser. (Paris: Droz, 1939), p. 230.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Spoken as they are out of the depths of European culture, by writers who actually believe themselves to be speaking on behalf of that culture, such commonplaces (for they are perfect &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;) cannot be explained simply as examples of provincial chauvinism. They are not that, and--as will be evident to anyone who knows anything about Faure&#039;s and Baldensperger&#039;s other work--are the more paradoxical for not being that. Their background is the transformation of the exacting, professional science of Orientalism, whose function in nineteenth-century culture had been the restoration to Europe of a lost portion of humanity, but which had become in the twentieth century both an instrument of policy and, more important, a code by which Europe could interpret both itself and the Orient to itself. For reasons discussed earlier in this book, modern Orientalism already carried within itself the imprint of the great European fear of Islam, and this was aggravated by the political challenges of the &#039;&#039;entre-deux-guerres&#039;&#039;. My point is that the metamorphosis of a relatively innocuous philological subspecialty into a capacity for managing political movements, administering colonies, making nearly apocalyptic statements representing the White Man&#039;s difficult civilizing mission--all this is something at work within a purportedly liberal culture, one full of concern for its vaunted norms of catholicity, plurality, and open-mindedness. In fact, what took place was the very opposite of liberal: the hardening of doctrine and meaning, imparted by &amp;quot;science,&amp;quot; into &amp;quot;truth.&amp;quot; For if such truth reserved for itself the right to judge the Orient as immutably Oriental in the ways I have indicated, then liberality was no more than a form of oppression and mentalistic prejudice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The extent of such illiberality was not--and is not--often recognized from within the culture, for reasons that this book is trying to explore. It is heartening, nevertheless, that such illiberality has occasionally been challenged. Here is an instance from I. A. Richards&#039;s foreword to his &#039;&#039;Mencius on the Mind&#039;&#039; (1932); we can quite easily substitute &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; for &amp;quot;Chinese&amp;quot; in what follows.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As to the effects of an increased knowledge of Chinese thought upon the West, it is interesting to notice that a writer so unlikely to be thought either ignorant or careless as M. Etienne Gilson can yet, in the English Preface of his &#039;&#039;The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas&#039;&#039;, speak of Thomistic Philosophy as &amp;quot;accepting and gathering up the whole of human tradition.&amp;quot; This is how we all think, to us the Western world is still the World [or the part of the World that counts]; but an impartial observer would perhaps say that such provincialism is dangerous. And we are not yet so happy in the West that we can be sure that we are not suffering from its effects.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;I. A. Richards, &#039;&#039;Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definitions&#039;&#039; (London: Routledge &amp;amp; Kegan Paul, 1932), p. xiv.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Richards&#039;s argument advances claims for the exercise of what he calls Multiple Definition, a genuine type of pluralism, with the combativeness of systems of definition eliminated. Whether or not we accept his counter to Gilson&#039;s provincialism, we can accept the proposition that liberal humanism, of which Orientalism has historically been one department, &#039;&#039;retards&#039;&#039; the process of enlarged and enlarging meaning through which true understanding can be attained. What took the place of enlarged meaning in twentieth-century Orientalism--that is, within the technical field--is the subject most immediately at hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Modern Anglo-French Orientalism in Fullest Flower&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Because we have become accustomed to think of a contemporary expert on some branch of the Orient, or some aspect of its life, as a specialist in &amp;quot;area studies,&amp;quot; we have lost a vivid sense of how, until around World War II, the Orientalist was considered to be a generalist (with a great deal of specific knowledge, of course) who had highly developed skills for making summational statements. By summational statements I mean that in formulating a relatively uncomplicated idea, say, about Arabic grammar or Indian religion, the Orientalist would be understood (and would understand himself) as also making a statement about the Orient as a whole, thereby summing it up. Thus every discrete study of one bit of Oriental material would also confirm in a summary way the profound Orientality of the material, And since it was commonly believed that the whole Orient hung together in some profoundly organic way, it made perfectly good hermeneutical sense for the Orientalist scholar to regard the material evidence he dealt with as ultimately leading to a better understanding of such things as the Oriental character, mind, ethos, or world-spirit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Most of the first two chapters of this book have made similar arguments about earlier periods in the history of Orientalist thought. The differentiation in its later history that concerns us here, however, is the one between the periods immediately before and after World War I. In both instances, as with the earlier periods, the Orient is Oriental no matter the specific case, and no matter the style or technique used to describe it; the difference between the two periods in question is the &#039;&#039;reason&#039;&#039; given by the Orientalist for seeing the essential Orientality of the Orient. A good example of the prewar rationale can be found in the following passage by Snouck Hurgronje, taken from his 1899 review of Eduard Sachau&#039;s &#039;&#039;Muhammedanisches Recht&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
... the law, which in practice had to make ever greater concessions to the use and customs of the people and the arbitrariness of their rulers, nevertheless retained a considerable influence on the intellectual life of the Muslims. Therefore it remains, and still is for us too, an important subject of study, not only for abstract reasons connected with the history of law, civilization and religion, but also for practical purposes. The more intimate the relations of Europe with the Muslim East become, the more Muslim countries fall under European suzerainty, the more important it is for us Europeans to become acquainted with the intellectual life, the religious law, and the conceptual background of Islam.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Selected Works of C. Snouck Hurgronje&#039;&#039;, ed. G. H. Bousquet and J. Schacht (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957), p. 267.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although Hurgronje allows that something so abstract as &amp;quot;Islamic law&amp;quot; did occasionally yield to the pressure of history and society, he is more interested than not in retaining the abstraction for intellectual use because in its broad outline &amp;quot;Islamic law&amp;quot; confirms the disparity between East and West. For Hurgronje the distinction between Orient and Occident was no mere academic or popular cliche: quite the contrary. For him it signified the essential, historical power relationship between the two. Knowledge of the Orient either proves, enhances, or deepens the difference by which European suzerainty (the phrase has a venerable nineteenth-century pedigree) is extended effectively over Asia. To know the Orient as a whole, then, is to know it because it is entrusted to one&#039;s keeping, if one is a Westerner.&lt;br /&gt;
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An almost symmetrical passage to Hurgronje&#039;s is to be found in the concluding paragraph of Gibb&#039;s article &amp;quot;Literature&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Legacy of Islam&#039;&#039;, published in 1931. After having described the three casual contacts between East and West up till the eighteenth century, Gibb then proceeds to the nineteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Following on these three moments of casual contact, the German romantics turned again to the East, and for the first time made it their conscious aim to open a way for the real heritage of oriental poetry to enter into the poetry of Europe. The nineteenth century, with its new sense of power and superiority, seemed to clang the gate decisively in the face of their design. Today, on the other hand, there are signs of a change. Oriental literature has begun to be studied again for its own sake, and a new understanding of the East is being gained. As this knowledge spreads and the East recovers its rightful place in the life of humanity, oriental literature may once again perform its historic function, and assist us to liberate ourselves from the narrow and oppressive conceptions which would limit all that is significant in literature, thought, and history to our own segment of the globe.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Literature,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Legacy of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), p. 209.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gibb&#039;s phrase &amp;quot;for its own sake&amp;quot; is in diametrical opposition to the string of reasons subordinated to Hurgronje&#039;s declaration about European suzerainty over the East. What remains, nevertheless, is that seemingly inviolable over-all identity of something called &amp;quot;the East&amp;quot; and something else called &amp;quot;the West.&amp;quot; Such entities have a use for each other, and it is plainly Gibb&#039;s laudable intention to show that the influence on Western of Oriental literature need not be (in its results) what Brunetiere had called &amp;quot;a national disgrace.&amp;quot; Rather, the East could be confronted as a sort of humanistic challenge to the local confines of Western ethnocentricity.&lt;br /&gt;
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His earlier solicitation of Goethe&#039;s idea of &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039; notwithstanding, Gibb&#039;s call for humanistic interinanimation between East and West reflects the changed political and cultural realities of the postwar era. European suzerainty over the Orient had not passed; but it had evolved--in British Egypt--from a more or less placid acceptance by the natives into a more and more contested political issue compounded by fractious native demands for independence. These were the years of constant British trouble with Zaghlul, the Wafd party, and the like.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The best general account of this period in political, social, economic, and cultural terms is to be found in Jacques Berque, &#039;&#039;Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Jean Stewart (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Moreover, since 1925 there had been a worldwide economic recession, and this too increased the sense of tension that Gibb&#039;s prose reflects. But the specifically cultural message in what he says is the most compelling. Heed the Orient, he seems to be telling his reader, for its use to the Western mind in the struggle to overcome narrowness, oppressive specialization, and limited perspectives.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ground had shifted considerably from Hurgronje to Gibb, as had the priorities. No longer did it go without much controversy that Europe&#039;s domination over the Orient was almost a fact of nature; nor was it assumed that the Orient was in need of Western enlightenment. What mattered during the interwar years was a cultural self-definition that transcended the provincial and the xenophobic. For Gibb, the West has need of the Orient as something to be studied because it releases the spirit from sterile specialization, it eases the affliction of excessive parochial and nationalistic self-centeredness, it increases one&#039;s grasp of the really central issues in the study of culture. If the Orient appears more a partner in this new rising dialectic of cultural self-consciousness, it is, first, because the Orient is more of a challenge now than it was before, and second, because the West is entering a relatively new phase of cultural crisis, caused in part by the diminishment of Western suzerainty over the rest of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, in the best Orientalist work done during the interwar period--represented in the impressive careers of Massignon and Gibb himself--we will find elements in common with the best humanistic scholarship of the period. Thus the summational attitude of which I spoke earlier can be regarded as the Orientalist equivalent of attempts in the purely Western humanities to understand culture &#039;&#039;as a whole&#039;&#039;, antipositivistically, intuitively, sympathetically. Both the Orientalist and the non-Orientalist begin with the sense that Western culture is passing through an important phase, whose main feature is the crisis imposed on it by such threats as barbarism, narrow technical concerns, moral aridity, strident nationalism, and so forth. The idea of using specific texts, for instance, to work from the specific to the general (to understand the whole life of a period and consequently of a culture) is common to those humanists in the West inspired by the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, as well as to towering Orientalist scholars like Massignon and Gibb. The project of revitalizing philology--as it is found in the work of Curtius, Vossler, Auerbach, Spitzer, Gundolf, Hofmannsthal&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;There is a useful account of the intellectual project informing their work in Arthur R. Evans, Jr., ed., &#039;&#039;On Four Modern Humanists: Hofmannsthal&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Gundolf, Curtius, Kantorowicz&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--has its counterpart therefore in the invigorations provided to strictly technical Orientalist philology by Massignon&#039;s studies of what he called the mystical lexicon, the vocabulary of Islamic devotion, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there is another, more interesting conjunction between Orientalism in this phase of its history and the European sciences of man (&#039;&#039;sciences de l&#039;homme&#039;&#039;), the &#039;&#039;Geisteswissenschaften&#039;&#039; contemporary with it. We must note, first, that non-Orientalist cultural studies were perforce more immediately responsive to the threats to humanistic culture of a self-aggrandizing, amoral technical specialization represented, in part at least, by the rise of fascism in Europe. This response extended the concerns of the interwar period into the period following World War II as well. An eloquent scholarly and personal testimonial to this response can be found in Erich Auerbach&#039;s magisterial &#039;&#039;Mimesis&#039;&#039;, and in his last methodological reflections as a &#039;&#039;Philolog&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Erich Auerbach, &#039;&#039;Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature&#039;&#039;, trans. Willard R. Trask (1946; reprint ed., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), and his &#039;&#039;Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages&#039;&#039;, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Bollingen Books, 1965).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He tells us that &#039;&#039;Mimesis&#039;&#039; was written during his exile in Turkey and was meant to be in large measure an attempt virtually &#039;&#039;to see&#039;&#039; the development of Western culture at almost the last moment when that culture still had its integrity and civilizational coherence; therefore, he set himself the task of writing a general work based on specific textual analyses in such a way as to lay out the principles of Western literary performance in all their variety, richness, and fertility. The aim was a synthesis of Western culture in which the synthesis itself was matched in importance by the very gesture of doing it, which Auerbach believed was made possible by what he called &amp;quot;late bourgeois humanism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Erich Auerbach, &amp;quot;Philology and &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039;,&amp;quot; trans. M. and E. W. Said, &#039;&#039;Centennial Review&#039;&#039; 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The discrete particular was thus converted into a highly mediated symbol of the world-historical process.&lt;br /&gt;
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No less important for Auerbach--and this fact is of immediate relevance to Orientalism--was the humanistic tradition of involvement in a national culture or literature not one&#039;s own. Auerbach&#039;s example was Curtius, whose prodigious output testified to his deliberate choice as a German to dedicate himself professionally to the Romance literatures. Not for nothing, then, did Auerbach end his autumnal reflections with a significant quotation from Hugo of St. Victor&#039;s &#039;&#039;Didascalicon&#039;&#039;: &amp;quot;The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The more one is able to leave one&#039;s cultural home, the more easily is one able to judge it, and the whole world as well, with the spiritual detachment &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; generosity necessary for true vision. The more easily, too, does one assess oneself and alien cultures with the same combination of intimacy and distance.&lt;br /&gt;
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No less important and methodologically formative a cultural force was the use in the social sciences of &amp;quot;types&amp;quot; both as an analytical device and as a way of seeing familiar things in a new way. The precise history of the &amp;quot;type&amp;quot; as it is to be found in early-twentieth-century thinkers like Weber, Durkheim, Lukacs, Mannheim, and the other sociologists of knowledge has been examined often enough:&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For example, in H. Stuart Hughes, &#039;&#039;Consciousness and Society: The Reconstruction of European Social Thought, 1890-1930&#039;&#039; (1958; reprint ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1961).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; yet it has not been remarked, I think, that Weber&#039;s studies of Protestantism, Judaism, and Buddhism blew him (perhaps unwittingly) into the very territory originally charted and claimed by the Orientalists. There he found encouragement amongst all those nineteenth-century thinkers who believed that there was a sort of ontological difference between Eastern and Western economic (as well as religious) &amp;quot;mentalities.&amp;quot; Although he never thoroughly studied Islam, Weber nevertheless influenced the field considerably, mainly because his notions of type were simply an &amp;quot;outside&amp;quot; confirmation of many of the canonical theses held by Orientalists, whose economic ideas never extended beyond asserting the Oriental&#039;s fundamental incapacity for trade, commerce, and economic rationality. In the Islamic field those cliches held good for literally hundreds of years--until Maxime Rodinson&#039;s important study &#039;&#039;Islam and Capitalism&#039;&#039; appeared in 1966. Still, the notion of a type--Oriental, Islamic, Arab, or whatever--endures and is nourished by similar kinds of abstractions or paradigms or types as they emerge out of the modern social sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
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I have often spoken in this book of the sense of estrangement experienced by Orientalists as they dealt with or lived in a culture so profoundly different from their own. Now one of the striking differences between Orientalism in its Islamic version and all the other humanistic disciplines where Auerbach&#039;s notions on the necessity of estrangement have some validity is that Islamic Orientalists never saw their estrangement from Islam either as salutary or as an attitude with implications for the better understanding of their own culture. Rather, their estrangement from Islam simply intensified their feelings of superiority about European culture, even as their antipathy spread to include the entire Orient, of which Islam was considered a degraded (and usually, a virulently dangerous) representative. Such tendencies--it has also been my argument--became built into the very traditions of Orientalist study throughout the nineteenth century, and in time became a standard component of most Orientalist training, handed on from generation to generation. In addition, I think, the likelihood was very great that European scholars would continue to see the Near Orient through the perspective of its Biblical &amp;quot;origins,&amp;quot; that is, as a place of unshakably influential religious primacy. Given its special relationship to both Christianity and Judaism, Islam remained forever the Orientalist&#039;s idea (or type) of &#039;&#039;original&#039;&#039; cultural effrontery, aggravated naturally by the fear that Islamic civilization originally (as well as contemporaneously) continued to stand somehow opposed to the Christian West.&lt;br /&gt;
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For these reasons, Islamic Orientalism between the wars shared in the general sense of cultural crisis adumbrated by Auerbach and the others I have spoken of briefly, without at the same time developing in the same way as the other human sciences. Because Islamic Orientalism also preserved within it the peculiarly polemical &#039;&#039;religious&#039;&#039; attitude it had had from the beginning, it remained fixed in certain methodological tracks, so to speak. Its cultural alienation, for one, needed to be preserved from modern history and sociopolitical circumstance, as well as from the necessary revisions imposed on any theoretical or historical &amp;quot;type&amp;quot; by new data. For another, the abstractions offered by Orientalism (or rather, the opportunity for making abstractions) in the case of Islamic civilization were considered to have acquired a new validity; since it was assumed that Islam worked the way Orientalists said it did (without reference to actuality, but only to a set of &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; principles), it was also assumed that modern Islam would be nothing more than a reasserted version of the old, especially since it was also supposed that modernity for Islam was less of a challenge than an insult. (The very large number of assumptions and suppositions in this description, incidentally, are intended to portray the rather eccentric twists and turns necessary for Orientalism to have maintained its peculiar way of seeing human reality.) Finally, if the synthesizing ambition in philology (as conceived by Auerbach or Curtius) was to lead to an enlargement of the scholar&#039;s awareness, of his sense of the brotherhood of man, of the universality of certain principles of human behavior, in Islamic Orientalism synthesis led to a sharpened sense of difference between Orient and Occident as reflected in Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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What I am describing, then, is something that will characterize Islamic Orientalism until the present day: its retrogressive position when compared with the other human sciences (and even with the other branches of Orientalism), its general methodological and ideological backwardness, and its comparative insularity from developments both in the other humanities and in the real world of historical, economic, social, and political circumstances.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Anwar Abdel Malek, &amp;quot;Orientalism in Crisis,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diogenes&#039;&#039; 44 (Winter 1963): 103-40.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Some awareness of this lag in Islamic (or Semitic) Orientalism was already present towards the end of the nineteenth century, perhaps because it was beginning to be apparent to some observers how very little either Semitic or Islamic Orientalism had shaken itself loose from the religious background from which it originally derived. The first Orientalist congress was organized and held in Paris in 1873, and almost from the outset it was evident to other scholars that the Semiticists and Islamicists were in intellectual arrears, generally speaking. Writing a survey of all the congresses that had been held between 1873 and 1897, the English scholar R. N. Cust had this to say about the Semitic-Islamic subfield:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such meetings [as those held in the ancient-Semitic field], indeed, advance Oriental learning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same cannot be said with regard to the modern-Semitic section; it was crowded, but the subjects discussed were of the smallest literary interest, such as would occupy the minds of the dilettanti scholars of the old school, not the great class of &amp;quot;indicatores&amp;quot; of the nineteenth century. I am forced to go back to Pliny to find a word. There was an absence from this section both of the modern philological and archeological spirit, and the report reads more like that of a congress of University tutors of the last century met to discuss the reading of a passage in a Greek play, or the accentuation of a vowel, before the dawn of Comparative Philology had swept away the cobwebs of the Scholiasts. Was it worth while to discuss whether Mahomet could hold a pen or write?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;R. N. Cust, &amp;quot;The International Congresses of Orientalists,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Hellas&#039;&#039; 6, no. 4 (1897): 349.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To some extent the polemical antiquarianism that Cust described was a scholarly version of European anti-Semitism. Even the designation &amp;quot;modern-Semitic,&amp;quot; which was meant to include both Muslims and Jews (and which had its origin in the so-called ancient-Semitic field pioneered by Renan), carried its racist banner with what was doubtless meant to be a decent ostentation. A little later in his report Cust comments on how in the same meeting &amp;quot; &#039;the Aryan&#039; supplied much material for reflection.&amp;quot; Clearly &amp;quot;the Aryan&amp;quot; is a counterabstraction to &amp;quot;the Semite,&amp;quot; but for some of the reasons I listed earlier, such atavistic labels were felt to be especially pertinent to Semites--with what expensive moral and human consequences for the human community as a whole, the history of the twentieth century amply demonstrates. Yet what has not been sufficiently stressed in histories of modern anti-Semitism has been the legitimation of such atavistic designations by Orientalism, and more important for my purposes here, the way this academic and intellectual legitimation has persisted right through the modern age in discussions of Islam, the Arabs, or the Near Orient. For whereas it is no longer possible to write learned (or even popular) disquisitions on either &amp;quot;the Negro mind&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Jewish personality,&amp;quot; it is perfectly possible to engage in such research as &amp;quot;the Islamic mind,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Arab character&amp;quot;--but of this subject more later.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, in order properly to understand the intellectual genealogy of interwar Islamic Orientalism--as it is most interestingly and satisfyingly seen (no irony intended) in the careers of Massignon and Gibb--we must be able to understand the differences between the Orientalist&#039;s summational attitude towards his material and the kind of attitude to which it bears a strong cultural resemblance, that in the work of philologists such as Auerbach and Curtius. The intellectual crisis in Islamic Orientalism was another aspect of the spiritual crisis of &amp;quot;late bourgeois humanism&amp;quot;; in its form and style, however, Islamic Orientalism viewed the problems of mankind as separable into the categories called &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Occidental.&amp;quot; It was believed, then, that for the Oriental, liberation, self-expression, and self-enlargement were not the issues that they were for the Occidental. Instead, the Islamic Orientalist expressed his ideas about Islam in such a way as to emphasize his, as well as putatively the Muslim&#039;s, &#039;&#039;resistance&#039;&#039; to change, to mutual comprehension between East and West, to the development of men and women out of archaic, primitive classical institutions and into modernity. Indeed, so fierce was this sense of resistance to change, and so universal were the powers ascribed to it, that in reading the Orientalists one understands that the apocalypse to be feared was not the destruction of Western civilization but rather the destruction of the barriers that kept East and West from each other. When Gibb opposed nationalism in the modern Islamic states, he did so because he felt that nationalism would corrode the inner structures keeping Islam Oriental; the net result of secular nationalism would be to make the Orient no different from the West. Yet it is a tribute to Gibb&#039;s extraordinarily sympathetic powers of identification with an alien religion that he put his disapproval in such a way as to seem to be &#039;&#039;speaking for&#039;&#039; the Islamic orthodox community. How much such pleading was a reversion to the old Orientalist habit of speaking for the natives and how much it was a sincere attempt at speaking in Islam&#039;s best interests is a question whose answer lies somewhere between the two alternatives.&lt;br /&gt;
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No scholar or thinker, of course, is a perfect representative of some ideal type or school in which, by virtue of national origin or the accidents of history, he participates. Yet in so relatively insulated and specialized a tradition as Orientalism, I think there is in each scholar some awareness, partly conscious and partly non-conscious, of national tradition, if not of national ideology. This is particularly true in Orientalism, additionally so because of the direct political involvement of European nations in the affairs of one or another Oriental country: the case of Snouck Hurgronje, to cite a non-British and non-French instance where the scholar&#039;s sense of national identity is simple and clear, comes to mind immediately.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See W. F. Wertheim, &amp;quot;Counter-insurgency Research at the Turn of the Century--Snouck Hurgronje and the Acheh War,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Sociologische Gids&#039;&#039; 19 (September-December 1972).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet even after making all the proper qualifications about the difference between an individual and a type (or between an individual and a tradition), it is nevertheless striking to note the extent to which Gibb and Massignon &#039;&#039;were&#039;&#039; representative types. Perhaps it would be better to say that Gibb and Massignon fulfilled all the expectations created for them by their national traditions, by the politics of their nations, by the internal history of their national &amp;quot;schools&amp;quot; of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sylvain Levi put the distinction between the two schools trenchantly:&lt;br /&gt;
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The political interest that ties England to India holds British work to a sustained contact with concrete realities, and maintains the cohesion between representations of the past and the spectacle of the present.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nourished by classical traditions, France seeks out the human mind as it manifests itself in India in the same way that it is interested in China.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sylvain Levi, &amp;quot;Les Parts respectives des nations occidentales dans les progres de l&#039;indianisme,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Memorial Sylvain Levi&#039;&#039;, p. 116.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be too easy to say that this polarity results, on the one hand, in work that is sober, efficient, concrete, and on the other, in work that is universalistic, speculative, brilliant. Yet the polarity serves to illuminate two long and extremely distinguished careers that between them dominated French and Anglo-American Islamic Orientalism until the 1960s; if the domination makes any sense at all, it is because each scholar derived from and worked in a self-conscious tradition whose constraints (or limits, intellectually and politically speaking) can be described as Levi describes them above.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gibb was born in Egypt, Massignon in France. Both were to become deeply religious men, students not so much of society as of the religious life in society. Both were also profoundly worldly; one of their greatest achievements was putting traditional scholarship to use in the modern political world. Yet the range of their work--the texture of it, almost--is vastly different, even allowing for the obvious disparities in their schooling and religious education. In his lifelong devotion to the work of al-Hallaj--&amp;quot;whose traces,&amp;quot; Gibb said in his obituary notice for Massignon in 1962, he &amp;quot;never ceased to seek out in later Islamic literature and devotion&amp;quot;--Massignon&#039;s almost unrestricted range of research would lead him virtually everywhere, finding evidence for &amp;quot;l&#039;esprit humaine a travers l&#039;espace et le temps.&amp;quot; In an &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039; that took &amp;quot;in every aspect and region of contemporary Muslim life and thought,&amp;quot; Massignon&#039;s presence in Orientalism was a constant challenge to his colleagues. Certainly Gibb for one admired--but finally drew back from--the way Massignon pursued&lt;br /&gt;
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themes that in some way linked the spiritual life of Muslims and Catholics [and enabled him to find] a congenial element in the veneration of Fatima, and consequently a special field of interest in the study of Shi&#039;ite thought in many of its manifestations, or again in the community of Abrahamanic origins and such themes as the Seven Sleepers. His writings on these subjects have acquired from the qualities that he brought to them a permanent significance in Islamic studies. But just because of these qualities they are composed, as it were, in two registers. One was at the ordinary level of objective scholarship, seeking to elucidate the nature of the given phenomenon by a masterly use of established tools of academic research. The other was at a level on which objective data and understanding were absorbed and transformed by an individual intuition of spiritual dimensions. It was not always easy to draw a dividing line between the former and the transfiguration that resulted from the outpouring of the riches of his own personality.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a hint here that Catholics are more likely to be drawn to a study of &amp;quot;the veneration of Fatima&amp;quot; than Protestants, but there is no mistaking Gibb&#039;s suspicion of anyone who blurred the distinction between &amp;quot;objective&amp;quot; scholarship and one based on (even an elaborate) &amp;quot;individual intuition of spiritual dimensions.&amp;quot; Gibb was right, however, in the next paragraph of the obituary to acknowledge Massignon&#039;s &amp;quot;fertility&amp;quot; of mind in such diverse fields as &amp;quot;the symbolism of Muslim art, the structure of Muslim logic, the intricacies of medieval finance, and the organization of artisan corporations&amp;quot;; and he was right also, immediately after, to characterize Massignon&#039;s early interest in the Semitic languages as giving rise to &amp;quot;elliptic studies that to the uninitiate almost rivalled the mysteries of the ancient Hermetica.&amp;quot; Nevertheless, Gibb ends on a generous note, remarking that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
for us, the lesson which by his example he impressed upon the Orientalists of his generation was that even classical Orientalism is no longer adequate without some degree of committedness to the vital forces that have given meaning and value to the diverse aspects of Eastern cultures.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Louis Massignon (1882-1962),&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society&#039;&#039; (1962), pp. 120, 121.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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That, of course, was Massignon&#039;s greatest contribution, and it is true that in contemporary French Islamology (as it is sometimes called) there has grown up a tradition of identifying with &amp;quot;the vital forces&amp;quot; informing &amp;quot;Eastern culture&amp;quot;; one need only mention the extraordinary achievements of scholars like Jacques Berque, Maxime Rodinson, Yves Lacoste, Roger Amaldez--all of them differing widely among themselves in approach and intention--to be struck with the seminal example of Massignon, whose intellectual impress upon them all is unmistakable.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet in choosing to focus his comments almost anecdotally upon Massignon&#039;s various strengths and weaknesses, Gibb misses the obvious things about Massignon, things that make him so different from Gibb and yet, when taken as a whole, make him the mature symbol of so crucial a development within French Orientalism. One is Massignon&#039;s personal background, which quite beautifully illustrates the simple truth of Levi&#039;s description of French Orientalism. The very idea of &amp;quot;un esprit humain&amp;quot; was something more or less foreign to the intellectual and religious background out of which Gibb, like so many modern British Orientalists, developed: in Massignon&#039;s case the notion of &amp;quot;esprit,&amp;quot; as an aesthetic as well as religious, moral, and historical reality, was something he seemed to have been nourished upon from childhood. His family was friendly with such people as Huysmans, and in nearly everything he wrote Massignon&#039;s early education in the intellectual ambience as well as the ideas of late Symbolisme is evident, even to the particular brand of Catholicism (and Sufi mysticism) in which he was interested. There is no austerity in Massignon&#039;s work, which is formulated in one of the great French styles of the century. His ideas about human experience draw plentifully upon thinkers and artists contemporary with him, and it is the very wide cultural range of his style itself that puts him in a different category altogether from Gibb&#039;s. His early ideas come out of the period of so-called aesthetic decadence, but they are also indebted to people like Bergson, Durkheim, and Mauss. His first contact with Orientalism came through Renan, whose lectures he heard as a young man; he was also a student of Sylvain Levi, and came to include among his friends such figures as Paul Claudel, Gabriel Bounoure, Jacques and Raissa Maritain, and Charles de Foucauld. Later he was able to absorb work done in such relatively recent fields as urban sociology, structural linguistics, psychoanalysis, contemporary anthropology, and the New History. His essays, to say nothing of the monumental study of al-Hallaj, draw effortlessly on the entire corpus of Islamic literature; his mystifying erudition and almost familiar personality sometimes make him appear to be a scholar invented by Jorge Luis Borges. He was very sensitive to &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; themes in European literature; this was one of Gibb&#039;s interests, too, but unlike Gibb, Massignon was attracted primarily neither to European writers who &amp;quot;understood&amp;quot; the Orient nor to European texts that were independent artistic corroborations of what later Orientalist scholars would reveal (e.g., Gibb&#039;s interest in Scott as a source for the study of Saladin). Massignon&#039;s &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; was completely consonant with the world of the Seven Sleepers or of the Abrahamanic prayers (which are the two themes singled out by Gibb as distinctive marks of Massignon&#039;s unorthodox view of Islam): offbeat, slightly peculiar, wholly responsive to the dazzling interpretative gifts which Massignon brought to it (and which in a sense made it up as a subject). If Gibb liked Scott&#039;s Saladin, then Massignon&#039;s symmetrical predilection was for Nerval, as suicide, &#039;&#039;poete maudit&#039;&#039;, psychological oddity. This is not to say that Massignon was essentially a student of the past; on the contrary, he was a major presence in Islamic-French relations, in politics as well as culture. He was obviously a passionate man who believed that the world of Islam could be penetrated, not by scholarship exclusively, but by devotion to all of its activities, not the least of which was the world of Eastern Christianity subsumed within Islam, one of whose subgroups, the Badaliya Sodality, was warmly encouraged by Massignon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Massignon&#039;s considerable literary gifts sometimes give his scholarly work an appearance of capricious, overly cosmopolitan, and often private speculation. This appearance is misleading, and in fact is rarely adequate as a description of his writing. What he wished deliberately to avoid was what he called &amp;quot;l&#039;analyse analytique et statique de l&#039;orientalisme,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Louis Massignon, &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, ed. Y. Moubarac (Beirut: Dar-el-Maaref, 1963), 3: 114. I have used the complete bibliography of Massignon&#039;s work by Moubarac: &#039;&#039;L&#039;Oeuvre de Louis Massignon&#039;&#039; (Beirut: Editions du Cenacle libanais, 1972-73).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a sort of inert piling up, on a supposed Islamic text or problem, of sources, origins, proofs, demonstrations, and the like. Everywhere his attempt is to include as much of the context of a text or problem as possible, to animate it, to surprise his reader, almost, with the glancing insights available to anyone who, like Massignon, is willing to cross disciplinary and traditional boundaries in order to penetrate to the human heart of any text. No modern Orientalist--and certainly not Gibb, his closest peer in achievement and influence--could refer so easily (and accurately) in an essay to a host of Islamic mystics and to Jung, Heisenberg, Mallarme, and Kierkegaard; and certainly very few Orientalists had that range together with the concrete political experience of which he was able to speak in his 1952 essay &amp;quot;L&#039;Occident devant l&#039;Orient: Primaute d&#039;une solution culturelle.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Massignon, &amp;quot;L&#039;Occident devant l&#039;Orient: Primaute d&#039;une solution culturelle,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, 1: 208-23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And yet his intellectual world was a clearly defined one. It had a definite structure, intact from the beginning to the end of his career, and it was laced up, despite its almost unparalleled richness of scope and reference, in a set of basically unchanging ideas. Let us briefly describe the structure and list the ideas in a summary fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
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Massignon took as his starting point the existence of the three Abrahamanic religions, of which Islam is the religion of Ishmael, the monotheism of a people excluded from the divine promise made to Isaac. Islam is therefore a religion of resistance (to God the Father, to Christ the Incarnation), which yet keeps within it the sadness that began in Hagar&#039;s tears. Arabic as a result is the very language of tears, just as the whole notion of &#039;&#039;jihad&#039;&#039; in Islam (which Massignon explicitly says is the epic form in Islam that Renan could not see or understand) has an important intellectual dimension whose mission is war against Christianity and Judaism as exterior enemies, and against heresy as an interior enemy. Yet within Islam, Massignon believed he was able to discern a type of countercurrent, which it became his chief intellectual mission to study, embodied in mysticism, a road towards divine grace. The principal feature of mysticism was of course its subjective character, whose nonrational and even inexplicable tendencies were towards the singular, the individual, the momentary experience of participation in the Divine. All of Massignon&#039;s extraordinary work on mysticism was thus an attempt to describe the itinerary of souls out of the limiting consensus imposed on them by the orthodox Islamic community, or Sunna. An Iranian mystic was more intrepid than an Arab one, partly because he was Aryan (the old nineteenth-century labels &amp;quot;Aryan&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; have a compelling urgency for Massignon, as does also the legitimacy of Schlegel&#039;s binary opposition between the two language families&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 169.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) and partly because he was a man seeking the Perfect; the Arab mystic, in Massignon&#039;s view, inclined towards what Waardenburg calls a testimonial monism. The exemplary figure for Massignon was al-Hallaj, who sought liberation for himself outside the orthodox community by asking for, and finally getting, the very crucifixion refused by Islam as a whole; Mohammed, according to Massignon, had deliberately rejected the opportunity offered him to bridge the gap separating him from God. Al-Hallaj&#039;s achievement was therefore to have achieved a mystical union with God against the grain of Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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The rest of the orthodox community lives in a condition of what Massignon calls &amp;quot;soif ontologique&amp;quot;--ontological thirst. God presents himself to man as a kind of absence, a refusal to be present, yet the devout Muslim&#039;s consciousness of his submission to God&#039;s will (Islam) gives rise to a jealous sense of God&#039;s transcendence and an intolerance of idolatry of any sort. The seat of these ideas, according to Massignon, is the &amp;quot;circumcised heart,&amp;quot; which while it is in the grip of its testimonial Muslim fervor can, as is the case with mystics like al-Hallaj, also be inflamed with a divine passion or love of God. In either case, God&#039;s transcendental unity (&#039;&#039;tawhid&#039;&#039;) is something to be achieved and understood over and over by the devout Muslim, either through testifying to it or through mystic love of God: and this, Massignon wrote in a complex essay, defines the &amp;quot;intention&amp;quot; of Islam.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;, pp. 147, 183, 186, 192, 211, 213.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Clearly Massignon&#039;s sympathies lay with the mystic vocation in Islam, as much for its closeness to his own temperament as a devout Catholic as for its disrupting influence within the orthodox body of beliefs. Massignon&#039;s image of Islam is of a religion ceaselessly implicated in its refusals, its latecoming (with reference to the other Abrahamanic creeds), its comparatively barren sense of worldly reality, its massive structures of defense against &amp;quot;psychic commotions&amp;quot; of the sort practiced by al-Hallaj and other Sufi mystics, its loneliness as the only remaining &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; religion of the three great monotheisms.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Massignon, &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, 1: 227.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But so obviously stern a view of Islam, with its &amp;quot;invariants simples&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 355.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (especially for so luxuriant a thought as Massignon&#039;s), entailed no deep hostility towards it on his part. In reading Massignon one is struck by his repeated insistence on the need for complex reading--injunctions whose absolute sincerity it is impossible to doubt. He wrote in 1951 that his kind of Orientalism was &amp;quot;ni une manie d&#039;exotisme, ni un reniement de l&#039;Europe, mais une mise au niveau entre nos methodes de recherches et les traditions vecues d&#039;antiques civilisations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quoted from Massignon&#039;s essay on Biruni in Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;, p. 225.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Put into practice in the reading of an Arabic or Islamic text, this kind of Orientalism produced interpretations of an almost overwhelming intelligence; one would be foolish not to respect the sheer genius and novelty of Massignon&#039;s mind. Yet what must catch our attention in his definition of his Orientalism are two phrases: &amp;quot;nos methodes de recherches&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;les traditions vecues d&#039;antiques civilisations.&amp;quot; Massignon saw what he did as the synthesis of two roughly opposed quantities, yet it is the peculiar asymmetry between them that troubles one, and not merely the fact of the opposition between Europe and Orient. Massignon&#039;s implication is that the essence of the difference between East and West is between modernity and ancient tradition. And indeed in his writings on political and contemporary problems, which is where one can see most immediately the limitations of Massignon&#039;s method, the East-West opposition turns up in a most peculiar way.&lt;br /&gt;
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At its best, Massignon&#039;s vision of the East-West encounter assigned great responsibility to the West for its invasion of the East, its colonialism, its relentless attacks on Islam. Massignon was a tireless fighter on behalf of Muslim civilization and, as his numerous essays and letters after 1948 testify, in support of Palestinian refugees, in the defense of Arab Muslim and Christian rights in Palestine against Zionism, against what, with reference to something said by Abba Eban, he scathingly called Israeli &amp;quot;bourgeois colonialism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Massignon, &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, 3: 526.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet the framework in which Massignon&#039;s vision was held also assigned the Islamic Orient to an essentially ancient time and the West to modernity. Like Robertson Smith, Massignon considered the Oriental to be not a modern man but a Semite; this reductive category had a powerful grip on his thought. When, for example, in 1960 he and Jacques Berque, his colleague at the College de France, published their dialogue on &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Esprit&#039;&#039;, a good deal of the time was spent in arguing whether the best way to look at the problems of the contemporary Arabs was simply to say, in the main instance, that the Arab-Israeli conflict was really a &#039;&#039;Semitic&#039;&#039; problem. Berque tried to demur gently, and to nudge Massignon towards the possibility that like the rest of the world the Arabs had undergone what he called an &amp;quot;anthropological variation&amp;quot;: Massignon refused the notion out of hand.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 610-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His repeated efforts to understand and report on the Palestine conflict, for all their profound humanism, never really got past the quarrel between Isaac and Ishmael or, so far as his quarrel with Israel was concerned, the tension between Judaism and Christianity. When Arab cities and villages were captured by the Zionists, it was Massignon&#039;s religious sensibilities that were offended.&lt;br /&gt;
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Europe, and France in particular, were seen as &#039;&#039;contemporary&#039;&#039; realities. Partly because of his initial political encounter with the British during the First World War, Massignon retained a pronounced dislike of England and English policy; Lawrence and his type represented a too-complex policy which he, Massignon, opposed in his dealings with Faisal. &amp;quot;Je cherchais avec Faysal ... a penetrer dans le sens meme de sa tradition a lui.&amp;quot; The British seemed to represent &amp;quot;expansion&amp;quot; in the Orient, amoral economic policy, and an outdated philosophy of political influence.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 212. Also p. 211 for another attack on the British, and pp. 423-7 for his assessment of Lawrence.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Frenchman was a more modern man, who was obliged to get from the Orient what he had lost in spirituality, traditional values, and the like. Massignon&#039;s investment in this view came, I think, by way of the entire nineteenth-century tradition of the Orient as therapeutic for the West, a tradition whose earliest adumbration is to be found in Quinet. In Massignon, it was joined to a sense of Christian compassion:&lt;br /&gt;
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So far as Orientals are concerned, we ought to have recourse to this science of compassion, to this &amp;quot;participation&amp;quot; even in the construction of their language and of their mental structure, in which indeed we must participate: because ultimately this science bears witness either to verities that are ours too, or else to verities that we have lost and must regain. Finally, because in a profound sense everything that exists is good in some way, and those poor colonized people do not exist only for our purposes but in and for themselves [&#039;&#039;en soi&#039;&#039;].&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quoted in Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;, p. 219.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless the Oriental, &#039;&#039;en soi&#039;&#039;, was incapable of appreciating or understanding himself. Partly because of what Europe had done to him, he had lost his religion and his &#039;&#039;philosophie&#039;&#039;; Muslims had &amp;quot;un vide immense&amp;quot; within them; they were close to anarchy and suicide. It became France&#039;s obligation, then, to associate itself with the Muslims&#039; desire to defend their traditional culture, the rule of their dynastic life, and the patrimony of believers.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 218-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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No scholar, not even a Massignon, can resist the pressures on him of his nation or of the scholarly tradition in which he works. In a great deal of what he said of the Orient and its relationship with the Occident, Massignon seemed to refine and yet to repeat the ideas of other French Orientalists. We must allow, however, that the refinements, the personal style, the individual genius, may finally supersede the political restraints operating impersonally through tradition and through the national ambience. Even so, in Massignon&#039;s case we must also recognize that in one direction his ideas about the Orient remained thoroughly traditional and Orientalist, their personality and remarkable eccentricity notwithstanding. According to him, the Islamic Orient was spiritual, Semitic, tribalistic, radically monotheistic, un-Aryan: the adjectives resemble a catalogue of late-nineteenth-century anthropological descriptions. The relatively earthbound experiences of war, colonialism, imperialism, economic oppression, love, death, and cultural exchange seem always in Massignon&#039;s eyes to be filtered through metaphysical, ultimately dehumanized lenses: they are Semitic, European, Oriental, Occidental, Aryan, and so on. The categories structured his world and gave what he said a kind of deep sense--to him, at least. In the other direction, among the individual and immensely detailed ideas of the scholarly world, Massignon maneuvered himself into a special position. He reconstructed and defended Islam against Europe on the one hand and against its own orthodoxy on the other. This intervention--for it was that--into the Orient as animator and champion symbolized his own acceptance of the Orient&#039;s difference, as well as his efforts to change it into what he wanted. Both together, the will to knowledge over the Orient and on its behalf in Massignon are very strong. His al-Hallaj represents that will perfectly. The disproportionate importance accorded al-Hallaj by Massignon signifies first, the scholar&#039;s decision to promote one figure above his sustaining culture, and second, the fact that al-Hallaj had come to represent a constant challenge, even an irritant, to the Western Christian for whom belief was not (and perhaps could not be) the extreme self-sacrifice it was for the Sufi. In either case, Massignon&#039;s al-Hallaj was intended literally to embody, to incarnate, values essentially outlawed by the main doctrinal system of Islam, a system that Massignon himself described mainly in order to circumvent it with al-Hallaj.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless we need not say immediately of Massignon&#039;s work that it was perverse, or that its greatest weakness was that it misrepresented Islam as an &amp;quot;average&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;common&amp;quot; Muslim might adhere to the faith. A distinguished Muslim scholar has argued precisely for this last position, although his argument did not name Massignon as an offender.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See A. L. Tibawi, &amp;quot;English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism, Part I,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Islamic Quarterly&#039;&#039; 8, nos. 1, 2 (January-June 1964): 25-44; &amp;quot;Part II,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Islamic Quarterly&#039;&#039; 8, nos. 3, 4 (July-December 1964): 73-88.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Much as one may be inclined to agree with such theses--since, as this book has tried to demonstrate, Islam &#039;&#039;has&#039;&#039; been fundamentally misrepresented in the West--the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they &#039;&#039;are&#039;&#039; representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is), then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is &#039;&#039;eo ipso&#039;&#039; implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the &amp;quot;truth,&amp;quot; which is itself a representation. What this must lead us to methodologically is to view representations (or misrepresentations--the distinction is at best a matter of degree) as inhabiting a common field of play defined for them, not by some inherent common subject matter alone, but by some common history, tradition, universe of discourse. Within this field, which no single scholar can create but which each scholar receives and in which he then finds a place for himself, the individual researcher makes his contribution. Such contributions, even for the exceptional genius, are strategies of redisposing material within the field; even the scholar who unearths a once-lost manuscript produces the &amp;quot;found&amp;quot; text in a context already prepared for it, for that is the real meaning of &#039;&#039;finding&#039;&#039; a new text. Thus each individual contribution first causes changes within the field and then promotes a new stability, in the way that on a surface covered with twenty compasses the introduction of a twenty-first will cause all the others to quiver, then to settle into a new accommodating configuration.&lt;br /&gt;
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The representations of Orientalism in European culture amount to what we can call a discursive consistency, one that has not only history but material (and institutional) presence to show for itself. As I said in connection with Renan, such a consistency was a form of cultural praxis, a system of opportunities for making statements about the Orient. My whole point about this system is not that it is a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence--in which I do not for a moment believe--but that it operates as representations usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting. In other words, representations have purposes, they are effective much of the time, they accomplish one or many tasks. Representations are formations, or as Roland Barthes has said of all the operations of language, they are deformations. The Orient as a representation in Europe is formed--or deformed--out of a more and more specific sensitivity towards a geographical region called &amp;quot;the East.&amp;quot; Specialists in this region do their work on it, so to speak, because in time their profession as Orientalists requires that they present their society with images of the Orient, knowledge about it, insight into it. And to a very large extent the Orientalist provides his own society with representations of the Orient (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) that bear his distinctive imprint, (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) that illustrate his conception of what the Orient can or ought to be, (&#039;&#039;c&#039;&#039;) that consciously contest someone else&#039;s view of the Orient, (&#039;&#039;d&#039;&#039;) that provide Orientalist discourse with what, at that moment, it seems most in need of, and (&#039;&#039;e&#039;&#039;) that respond to certain cultural, professional, national, political, and economic requirements of the epoch. It will be evident that even though it will never be absent, the role of positive knowledge is far from absolute. Rather, &amp;quot;knowledge&amp;quot;--never raw, unmediated, or simply objective--is what the five attributes of Orientalist representation listed above &#039;&#039;distribute&#039;&#039;, and redistribute.&lt;br /&gt;
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Seen in such a way, Massignon is less a mythologized &amp;quot;genius&amp;quot; than he is a kind of system for producing certain kinds of statements, disseminated into the large mass of discursive formations that together make up the archive, or cultural material, of his time. I do not think that we dehumanize Massignon if we recognize this, nor do we reduce him to being subject to vulgar determinism. On the contrary, we will see in a sense how a very human being had, and was able to acquire more of, a cultural and productive capacity that had an institutional, or extrahuman, dimension to it: and this surely is what the finite human being must aspire to if he is not to be content with his merely mortal presence in time and space. When Massignon said &amp;quot;nous sommes tous des Semites&amp;quot; he was indicating the range of his ideas over his society, showing the extent to which his ideas about the Orient could transcend the local anecdotal circumstances of a Frenchman and of French society. The category of Semite drew its nourishment out of Massignon&#039;s Orientalism, but its force derived from its tendency to extend out of the confines of the discipline, out into a broader history and anthropology, where it seemed to have a certain validity and power.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Une figure domine tous les genres [of Orientalist work], celle de Louis Massignon&amp;quot;: Claude Cahen and Charles Pellat, &amp;quot;Les Etudes arabes et islamiques,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal asiatique&#039;&#039; 261, nos. 1, 4 (1973): 104. There is a very detailed survey of the Islamic-Orientalist field to be found in Jean Sauvaget, &#039;&#039;Introduction a l&#039;histoire de l&#039;Orient musulman: Elements de bibliographie&#039;&#039;, ed. Claude Cahen (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1961).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On one level at least, Massignon&#039;s formulations and his representations of the Orient did have a direct influence, if not an unquestioned validity: among the guild of professional Orientalists. As I said above, Gibb&#039;s recognition of Massignon&#039;s achievement constitutes an awareness that as an alternative to Gibb&#039;s own work (by implication, that is), Massignon was to be dealt with. I am of course imputing things to Gibb&#039;s obituary that are there only as traces, not as actual statements, but they are obviously important if we look now at Gibb&#039;s own career as a foil for Massignon&#039;s. Albert Hourani&#039;s memorial essay on Gibb for the British Academy (to which I have referred several times) admirably summarizes the man&#039;s career, his leading ideas, and the importance of his work: with Hourani&#039;s assessment, in its broad lines, I have no disagreement. Yet something is missing from it, although this lack is partly made up for in a lesser piece on Gibb, William Polk&#039;s &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb Between Orientalism and History.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;William Polk, &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb Between Orientalism and History,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;International Journal of Middle East Studies&#039;&#039; 6, no. 2 (April 1975): 131-9. I have used the bibliography of Gibb&#039;s work in &#039;&#039;Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb&#039;&#039;, ed. George Makdisi (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 1-20.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hourani tends to view Gibb as the product of personal encounters, personal influences, and the like; whereas Polk, who is far less subtle in his general understanding of Gibb than Hourani, sees Gibb as the culmination of a specific academic tradition, what--to use an expression that does not occur in Polk&#039;s prose--we can call an academic-research consensus or paradigm.&lt;br /&gt;
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Borrowed in this rather gross fashion from Thomas Kuhn, the idea has a worthwhile relevance to Gibb, who as Hourani reminds us was in many ways a profoundly institutional figure. Everything that Gibb said or did, from his early career at London to the middle years at Oxford to his influential years as director of Harvard&#039;s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, bears the unmistakable stamp of a mind operating with great ease inside established institutions. Massignon was irremediably the outsider, Gibb the insider. Both men, in any case, achieved the very pinnacle of prestige and influence in French and Anglo-American Orientalism, respectively. The Orient for Gibb was not a place one encountered directly; it was something one read about, studied, wrote about within the confines of learned societies, the university, the scholarly conference. Like Massignon, Gibb boasted of friendships with Muslims, but they seemed--like Lane&#039;s--to have been useful friendships, not determining ones. Consequently Gibb is a dynastic figure within the academic framework of British (and later of American) Orientalism, a scholar whose work quite consciously demonstrated the national tendencies of an academic tradition, set inside universities, governments, and research foundations.&lt;br /&gt;
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One index of this is that in his mature years Gibb was often to be met with speaking and writing for policy-determining organizations. In 1951, for instance, he contributed an essay to a book significantly entitled &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, in which he tried to explain the need for an expansion in Anglo-American programs of Oriental studies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
... the whole situation of the Western countries in regard to the countries of Asia and Africa has changed. We can no longer rely on that factor of prestige which seemed to play a large part in prewar thinking, neither can we any longer expect the peoples of Asia and Africa or of Eastern Europe to come to us and learn from us, while we sit back. We have to learn about them so that we can learn to work with them in a relationship that is closer to terms of mutuality.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Oriental Studies in the United Kingdom,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, ed. Richard N. Frye (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 86-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The terms of this new relationship were spelled out later in &amp;quot;Area Studies Reconsidered.&amp;quot; Oriental studies were to be thought of not so much as scholarly activities but as instruments of national policy towards the newly independent, and possibly intractable, nations of the postcolonial world. Armed with a refocused awareness of his importance to the Atlantic commonwealth, the Orientalist was to be the guide of policymakers, of businessmen, of a fresh generation of scholars.&lt;br /&gt;
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What counted most in Gibb&#039;s later vision was not the Orientalist&#039;s positive work as a scholar (for example, the kind of scholar Gibb had been in his youth when he studied the Muslim invasions of Central Asia) but its adaptability for use in the public world. Hourani puts this well:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
... it became clear to him [Gibb] that modern governments and elites were acting in ignorance or rejection of their own traditions of social life and morality, and that their failures sprang from this. Henceforth his main efforts were given to the elucidation, by careful study of the past, of the specific nature of Muslim society and the beliefs and culture which lay at the heart of it. Even this problem he tended to see at first mainly in political terms.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Albert Hourani, &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb, 1895-1971,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Proceedings of the British Academy&#039;&#039; 58 (1972): p. 504.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet no such later vision could have been possible without a fairly rigorous amount of preparation in Gibb&#039;s earlier work, and it is there that we must first seek to understand his ideas. Among Gibb&#039;s earliest influences was Duncan Macdonald, from whose work Gibb clearly derived the concept that Islam was a coherent system of life, a system made coherent not so much by the people who led that life as by virtue of some body of doctrine, method of religious practice, idea of order, in which all the Muslim people participated. Between the people and &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; there was obviously a dynamic encounter of sorts, yet what mattered to the Western student was the supervening power of Islam to make intelligible the experiences of the Islamic people, not the other way around.&lt;br /&gt;
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For Macdonald and subsequently for Gibb, the epistemological and methodological difficulties of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as an object (about which large, extremely general statements could be made) are never tackled. Macdonald for his part believed that in Islam one could perceive aspects of a still more portentous abstraction, the Oriental mentality. The entire opening chapter of his most influential book (whose importance for Gibb cannot be minimized), &#039;&#039;The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam&#039;&#039;, is an anthology of unarguable declaratives about the Eastern or Oriental mind. He begins by saying that &amp;quot;it is plain, I think, and admitted that the conception of the Unseen is much more immediate and real to the Oriental than to the western peoples.&amp;quot; The &amp;quot;large modifying elements which seem, from time to time, almost to upset the general law&amp;quot; do not upset it, nor do they upset the other equally sweeping and general laws governing the Oriental mind. &amp;quot;The essential difference in the Oriental mind is not credulity as to unseen things, but inability to construct a system as to seen things.&amp;quot; Another aspect of this difficulty--which Gibb was later to blame for the absence of form in Arabic literature and for the Muslim&#039;s essentially atomistic view of reality--is &amp;quot;that the difference in the Oriental is not essentially religiosity, but the lack of the sense of law. For him, there is no immovable order of nature.&amp;quot; If such a &amp;quot;fact&amp;quot; seems not to account for the extraordinary achievements of Islamic science, upon which a great deal in modern Western science is based, then Macdonald remains silent. He continues his catalogue: &amp;quot;It is evident that anything is possible to the Oriental. The supernatural is so near that it may touch him at any moment.&amp;quot; That an &#039;&#039;occasion&#039;&#039;--namely, the historical and geographical birth of monotheism in the Orient--should in Macdonald&#039;s argument become an entire theory of difference between East and West signifies the degree of intensity to which &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; has committed Macdonald. Here is his summary:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Inability&#039;&#039;, then, to see life steadily, and see it whole, to understand that a theory of life must cover all the facts, and &#039;&#039;liability&#039;&#039; to be stampeded by a single idea and blinded to everything else--therein, I believe, is the difference between the East and the West.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Duncan Black Macdonald, &#039;&#039;The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam&#039;&#039; (1909; reprint ed., Beirut: Khayats Publishers, 1965), pp. 2-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
None of this, of course, is particularly new. From Schlegel to Renan, from Robertson Smith to T. E. Lawrence, these ideas get repeated and re-repeated. They represent a decision about the Orient, not by any means a fact of nature. Anyone who, like Macdonald and Gibb, consciously entered a profession called Orientalism did so on the basis of a decision made: that the Orient was the Orient, that it was different, and so forth. The elaborations, refinements, consequent articulations of the field therefore sustain and prolong the decision to confine the Orient. There is no perceivable irony in Macdonald&#039;s (or Gibb&#039;s) views about Oriental liability to be stampeded by a single idea; neither man seems able to recognize the extent of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s liability to be stampeded by the single idea of Oriental difference. And neither man is concerned by such wholesale designations as &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; being used as proper nouns, with adjectives attached and verbs streaming forth, as if they referred to persons and not to Platonic ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is no accident, therefore, that Gibb&#039;s master theme, in almost everything he wrote about Islam and the Arabs, was the tension between &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a transcendent, compelling Oriental fact and the realities of everyday human experience. His investment as a scholar and as a devout Christian was in &amp;quot;Islam,&amp;quot; not so much in the (to him) relatively trivial complications introduced into Islam by nationalism, class struggle, the individualizing experiences of love, anger, or human work. Nowhere is the impoverishing character of this investment more evident than in &#039;&#039;Whither Islam?&#039;&#039;, a volume edited and contributed to, in the title essay, by Gibb in 1932. (It also includes an impressive article on North African Islam by Massignon.) Gibb&#039;s task as he saw it was to assess Islam, its present situation, its possible future course. In such a task the individual and manifestly different regions of the Islamic world were to be, not refutations of Islam&#039;s unity, but examples of it. Gibb himself proposed an introductory definition of Islam; then, in the concluding essay, he sought to pronounce on its actuality and its real future. Like Macdonald, Gibb seems entirely comfortable with the idea of a monolithic East, whose existential circumstances cannot easily be reduced to race or racial theory; in resolutely denying the value of racial generalization Gibb rises above what had been most reprehensible in preceding generations of Orientalists. Gibb has a correspondingly generous and sympathetic view of Islam&#039;s universalism and tolerance in letting diverse ethnic and religious communities coexist peacefully and democratically within its imperium. There is a note of grim prophecy in Gibb&#039;s singling out the Zionists and the Maronite Christians, alone amongst ethnic communities in the Islamic world, for their inability to accept coexistence.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Whither Islam?&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Whither Islam? A Survey of Modern Movements in the Moslem World&#039;&#039;, ed. H. A. R. Gibb (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932), pp. 328, 387.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the heart of Gibb&#039;s argument is that Islam, perhaps because it finally represents the Oriental&#039;s exclusive concern not with nature but with the Unseen, has an ultimate precedence and domination over all life in the Islamic Orient. For Gibb Islam &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; Islamic orthodoxy, &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; also the community of believers, &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; life, unity, intelligibility, values. It &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; law and order too, the unsavory disruptions of jihadists and communist agitators notwithstanding. In page after page of Gibb&#039;s prose in &#039;&#039;Whither Islam?&#039;&#039;, we learn that the new commercial banks in Egypt and Syria are facts of Islam or an Islamic initiative; schools and an increasing literacy rate are Islamic facts, too, as are journalism, Westernization, and intellectual societies. At no point does Gibb speak of European colonialism when he discusses the rise of nationalism and its &amp;quot;toxins.&amp;quot; That the history of modern Islam might be more intelligible for its resistance, political and nonpolitical, to colonialism, never occurs to Gibb, just as it seems to him finally irrelevant to note whether the &amp;quot;Islamic&amp;quot; governments he discusses are republican, feudal, or monarchical.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; for Gibb is a sort of superstructure imperiled both by politics (nationalism, communist agitation, Westernization) and by dangerous Muslim attempts to tamper with its intellectual sovereignty. In the passage that follows, note how the word &#039;&#039;religion&#039;&#039; and its cognates are made to color the tone of Gibb&#039;s prose, so much so that we feel a decorous annoyance at the mundane pressures directed at &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Islam, as a religion, has lost little of its force, but Islam as the arbiter of social life [in the modern world] is being dethroned; alongside it, or above it, new forces exert an authority which is sometimes in contradiction to its traditions and its social prescriptions, but nevertheless forces its way in their teeth. To put the position in its simplest terms, what has happened is this. Until recently, the ordinary Muslim citizen and cultivator had no political interests or functions, and no literature of easy access except religious literature, had no festivals and no communal life except in connection with religion, saw little or nothing of the outside world except through religious glasses. &#039;&#039;To him, in consequence, religion meant everything&#039;&#039;. Now, however, more in all the advanced countries, his interests have expanded and his activities are no longer bounded by religion. He has political questions thrust on his notice; he reads, or has read to him, a mass of articles on subjects of all kinds which have nothing to do with religion, and in which the religious point of view may not be discussed at all and the verdict held to lie with some quite different principles.... [Emphasis added]&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 335.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Admittedly, the picture is a little difficult to see, since unlike any other religion &#039;&#039;Islam is or means everything&#039;&#039;. As a description of a human phenomenon the hyperbole is, I think, unique to Orientalism. Life itself--politics, literature, energy, activity, growth--is an intrusion upon this (to a Westerner) unimaginable Oriental totality. Yet as &amp;quot;a complement and counterbalance to European civilisation&amp;quot; Islam in its modern form is nevertheless a useful object: this is the core of Gibb&#039;s proposition about modern Islam. For &amp;quot;in the broadest aspect of history, what is now happening between Europe and Islam is the reintegration of western civilization, artificially sundered at the Renaissance and now reasserting its unity with overwhelming force.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 377.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Massignon, who made no effort to conceal his metaphysical speculations, Gibb delivered such observations as this as if they were objective knowledge (a category he found wanting in Massignon). Yet by almost any standards most of Gibb&#039;s general works on Islam &#039;&#039;are&#039;&#039; metaphysical, not only because he uses abstractions like &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as if they have a clear and distinct meaning but also because it is simply never clear where in concrete time and space Gibb&#039;s &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; is taking place. If on the one hand, following Macdonald, he puts Islam definitively outside the West, on the other hand, in much of his work, he is to be found &amp;quot;reintegrating&amp;quot; it with the West. In 1955 he made this inside-outside question a bit clearer: the West took from Islam only those nonscientific elements that it had originally derived from the West, whereas in borrowing much from Islamic science, the West was merely following the law making &amp;quot;natural science and technology ... indefinitely transmissible.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;The Influence of Islamic Culture on Medieval Europe,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;John Rylands Library Bulletin&#039;&#039; 38, no. 1 (September 1955): 98.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The net result is to make Islam in &amp;quot;art, aesthetics, philosophy and religious thought&amp;quot; a second-order phenomenon (since those came from the West), and so far as science and technology are concerned, a mere conduit for elements that are not &#039;&#039;sui generis&#039;&#039; Islamic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any clarity about what Islam is in Gibb&#039;s thought ought to be found &#039;&#039;within&#039;&#039; these metaphysical constraints, and indeed his two important works of the forties, &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey&#039;&#039;, flesh out matters considerably. In both books Gibb is at great pains to discuss the present crisis in Islam, opposing its inherent, essential being to modern attempts at modifying it. I have already mentioned Gibb&#039;s hostility to modernizing currents in Islam and his stubborn commitment to Islamic orthodoxy. Now it is time to mention Gibb&#039;s preference for the word &#039;&#039;Mohammedanism&#039;&#039; over &#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039; (since he says that Islam is really based upon an idea of apostolic succession culminating in Mohammed) and his assertion that the Islamic master science is law, which early on replaced theology. The curious thing about these statements is that they are assertions made about Islam, not on the basis of evidence internal to Islam, but rather on the basis of a logic deliberately outside Islam. No Muslim would call himself a Mohammedan, nor so far as is known would he necessarily feel the importance of law over theology. But what Gibb does is to situate himself as a scholar within contradictions he himself discerns, at that point in &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; where &amp;quot;there is a certain unexpressed dislocation between the formal outward process and the inner realities.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 2, 9, 84.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist, then, sees his task as expressing the dislocation and consequently speaking the truth about Islam, which by definition--since its contradictions inhibit its powers of self-discernment--it cannot express. Most of Gibb&#039;s general statements about Islam supply concepts to Islam that the religion or culture, again by &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; definition, is incapable of grasping: &amp;quot;Oriental philosophy had never appreciated the fundamental idea of justice in Greek philosophy.&amp;quot; As for Oriental societies, &amp;quot;in contrast to most western societies, [they] have generally devoted [themselves] to building stable social organizations [more than] to constructing ideal systems of philosophical thought.&amp;quot; The principal internal weakness of Islam is the &amp;quot;breaking of association between the religious orders and the Muslim upper and middle classes.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 111, 88, 189.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But Gibb is also aware that Islam has never remained isolated from the rest of the world and therefore must stand in a series of external dislocations, insufficiencies, and disjunctions between itself and the world. Thus he says that modern Islam is the result of a classical religion coming into disynchronous contact with Romantic Western ideas. In reaction to this assault, Islam developed a school of modernists whose ideas everywhere reveal hopelessness, ideas unsuited to the modern world: Mahdism, nationalism, a revived caliphate. Yet the conservative reaction to modernism is no less unsuited to modernity, for it has produced a kind of stubborn Luddism. Well then, we ask, what is Islam finally, if it cannot conquer its internal dislocations nor deal satisfactorily with its external surroundings? The answer can be sought in the following central passage from &#039;&#039;Modern Trends&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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Islam is a living and vital religion, appealing to the hearts, minds, and consciences of tens and hundreds of millions, setting them a standard by which to live honest, sober, and god-fearing lives. It is not Islam that is petrified, but its orthodox formulations, its systematic theology, its social apologetic. It is here that the dislocation lies, that the dissatisfaction is felt among a large proportion of its most educated and intelligent adherents, and that the danger for the future is most evident. No religion can ultimately resist disintegration if there is a perpetual gulf between its demands upon the will and its appeal to the intellect of its followers. That for the vast majority of Muslims the problem of dislocation has not yet arisen justifies the ulema in refusing to be rushed into the hasty measures which the modernists prescribe; but the spread of modernism is a warning that re-formulation cannot be indefinitely shelved.&lt;br /&gt;
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In trying to determine the origins and causes of this petrifaction of the formulas of Islam, we may possibly also find a clue to the answer to the question which the modernists are asking, but have so far failed to resolve--the question, that is, of the way in which the fundamental principles of Islam may be re-formulated without affecting their essential elements.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 108, 113, 123.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The last part of this passage is familiar enough: it suggests the now traditional Orientalist ability to reconstruct and reformulate the Orient, given the Orient&#039;s inability to do so for itself. In part, then, Gibb&#039;s Islam exists &#039;&#039;ahead&#039;&#039; of Islam as it is practiced, studied, or preached in the Orient. Yet this prospective Islam is no mere Orientalist fiction, spun out of his ideas: it is based on an &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; that--since it cannot truly exist&#039;&#039;--appeals&#039;&#039; to a whole community of believers. The reason that &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; can exist in some more or less future Orientalist formulation of it is that in the Orient Islam is usurped and traduced by the language of its clergy, whose claim is upon the community&#039;s mind. So long as it is silent in its appeal, Islam is safe; the moment the reforming clergy takes on its (legitimate) role of reformulating Islam in order for it to be able to enter modernity, the trouble starts. And that trouble, of course, is dislocation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dislocation in Gibb&#039;s work identifies something far more significant than a putative intellectual difficulty within Islam. It identifies, I think, the very privilege, the very ground on which the Orientalist places himself so as to write about, legislate for, and reformulate Islam. Far from being a chance discernment of Gibb&#039;s, dislocation is the epistemological passageway into his subject, and subsequently, the observation platform from which in all his writing, and in every one of the influential positions he filled, he could survey Islam. Between the silent appeal of Islam to a monolithic community of orthodox believers and a whole merely verbal articulation of Islam by misled corps of political activists, desperate clerks, and opportunistic reformers: there Gibb stood, wrote, reformulated. His writing said either what Islam could not say or what its clerics would not say. What Gibb wrote was in one sense temporally ahead of Islam, in that he allowed that at some point in the future Islam would be able to say what it could not say now. In another important sense, however, Gibb&#039;s writings on Islam predated the religion as a coherent body of &amp;quot;living&amp;quot; beliefs, since his writing was able to get hold of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a silent appeal made to Muslims &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; their faith became a matter for worldly argument, practice, or debate.&lt;br /&gt;
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The contradiction in Gibb&#039;s work--for it is a contradiction to speak of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as neither what its clerical adherents in fact say it is nor what, if they could, its lay followers would say about it--is muted somewhat by the metaphysical attitude governing his work, and indeed governing the whole history of modern Orientalism which he inherited, through mentors like Macdonald. The Orient and Islam have a kind of extrareal, phenomenologically reduced status that puts them out of reach of everyone except the Western expert. From the beginning of Western speculation about the Orient, the one thing the Orient could not do was to represent itself. Evidence of the Orient was credible only after it had passed through and been made firm by the refining fire of the Orientalist&#039;s work. Gibb&#039;s &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039; purports to be Islam (or Mohammedanism) both &#039;&#039;as it is&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;as it might be&#039;&#039;. Metaphysically--and only metaphysically--essence and potential are made one. Only a metaphysical attitude could produce such famous Gibb essays as &amp;quot;The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;An Interpretation of Islamic History&amp;quot; without being troubled by the distinction made between objective and subjective knowledge in Gibb&#039;s criticism of Massignon.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Both essays are to be found in Gibb&#039;s &#039;&#039;Studies on the Civilization of Islam&#039;&#039;, pp. 176-208 and 3-33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The statements about &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; are made with a confidence and a serenity that are truly Olympian. There is no dislocation, no felt discontinuity between Gibb&#039;s page and the phenomenon it describes, for each, according to Gibb himself, is ultimately reducible to the other. As such, &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; and Gibb&#039;s description of it have a calm, discursive plainness whose common element is the English scholar&#039;s orderly page.&lt;br /&gt;
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I attach a great deal of significance to the appearance of and to the intended model for the Orientalist&#039;s page as a printed object. I have spoken in this book about d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s alphabetic encyclopedia, the gigantic leaves of the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, Renan&#039;s laboratory-museum notebook, the ellipses and short episodes of Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, Sacy&#039;s anthological excerpts, and so forth. These pages are signs of some Orient, and of some Orientalist, &#039;&#039;presented&#039;&#039; to the reader. There is an order to these pages by which the reader apprehends not only the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; but also the Orientalist, as interpreter, exhibitor, personality, mediator, representative (and representing) expert. In a remarkable way Gibb and Massignon produced pages that recapitulate the history of Orientalist writing in the West as that history has been embodied in a varied generic and topographical style, reduced finally to a scholarly, monographic uniformity. The Oriental specimen; the Oriental excess; the Oriental lexicographic unit; the Oriental series; the Oriental exemplum: all these have been subordinated in Gibb and Massignon to the linear prose authority of discursive analysis, presented in essay, short article, scholarly book. In their time, from the end of World War I till the early sixties, three principal forms of Orientalist writing were radically transformed: the encyclopedia, the anthology, the personal record. Their authority was redistributed or dispersed or dissipated: to a committee of experts (&#039;&#039;The Encyclopedia of Islam&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;), to a lower order of service (elementary instruction in language, which would prepare one not for diplomacy, as was the case with Sacy&#039;s &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie&#039;&#039;, but for the study of sociology, economics, or history), to the realm of sensational revelation (having more to do with personalities or governments--Lawrence is the obvious example--than with knowledge). Gibb, with his quietly heedless but profoundly sequential prose; Massignon, with the flair of an artist for whom no reference is too extravagant so long as it is governed by an eccentric interpretative gift: the two scholars took the essentially &#039;&#039;ecumenical&#039;&#039; authority of European Orientalism as far as it could go. After them, the new reality--the new specialized style--was, broadly speaking, Anglo-American, and more narrowly speaking, it was American Social Scientese. In it, the old Orientalism was broken into many parts; yet all of them still served the traditional Orientalist dogmas.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;IV.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;The Latest Phase&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Since World War II, and more noticeably after each of the Arab-Israeli wars, the Arab Muslim has become a figure in American popular culture, even as in the academic world, in the policy planner&#039;s world, and in the world of business very serious attention is being paid the Arab. This symbolizes a major change in the international configuration of forces. France and Britain no longer occupy center stage in world politics; the American imperium has displaced them. A vast web of interests now links all parts of the former colonial world to the United States, just as a proliferation of academic subspecialties divides (and yet connects) all the former philological and European-based disciplines like Orientalism. The area specialist, as he is now called, lays claims to regional expertise, which is put at the service of government or business or both. The massive, quasi-material knowledge stored in the annals of modern European Orientalism--as recorded, for example, in Jules Mohl&#039;s nineteenth-century logbook of the field--has been dissolved and released into new forms. A wide variety of hybrid representations of the Orient now roam the culture. Japan, Indochina, China, India, Pakistan: their representations have had, and continue to have, wide repercussions, and they have been discussed in many places for obvious reasons. Islam and the Arabs have their own representations, too, and we shall treat them here as they occur in that fragmentary--yet powerfully and ideologically coherent--persistence, a far less frequently discussed one, into which, in the United States, traditional European Orientalism disbursed itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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1. &#039;&#039;Popular images and social science representations&#039;&#039;. Here are a few examples of how the Arab is often represented today. Note how readily &amp;quot;the Arab&amp;quot; seems to accommodate the transformations and reductions--all of a simply tendentious kind--into which he is continually being forced. The costume for Princeton&#039;s tenth-reunion class in 1967 had been planned before the June War. The motif--for it would be wrong to describe the costume as more than crudely suggestive--was to have been Arab: robes, headgear, sandals. Immediately after the war, when it had become clear that the Arab motif was an embarrassment, a change in the reunion plans was decreed. Wearing the costume as had been originally planned, the class was now to walk in procession, hands above heads in a gesture of abject defeat. This was what the Arab had become. From a faintly outlined stereotype as a camel-riding nomad to an accepted caricature as the embodiment of incompetence and easy defeat: that was all the scope given the Arab.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet after the 1973 war the Arab appeared everywhere as something more menacing. Cartoons depicting an Arab sheik standing behind a gasoline pump turned up consistently. These Arabs, however, were clearly &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot;: their sharply hooked noses, the evil mustachioed leer on their faces, were obvious reminders (to a largely non-Semitic population) that &amp;quot;Semites&amp;quot; were at the bottom of all &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; troubles, which in this case was principally a gasoline shortage. The transference of a popular anti-Semitic animus from a Jewish to an Arab target was made smoothly, since the figure was essentially the same.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus if the Arab occupies space enough for attention, it is as a negative value. He is seen as the disrupter of Israel&#039;s and the West&#039;s existence, or in another view of the same thing, as a surmountable obstacle to Israel&#039;s creation in 1948. Insofar as this Arab has any history, it is part of the history given him (or taken from him: the difference is slight) by the Orientalist tradition, and later, the Zionist tradition. Palestine was seen--by Lamartine and the early Zionists--as an empty desert waiting to burst into bloom; such inhabitants as it had were supposed to be inconsequential nomads possessing no real claim on the land and therefore no cultural or national reality. Thus the Arab is conceived of now as a shadow that dogs the Jew. In that shadow--because Arabs and Jews are Oriental Semites--can be placed whatever traditional, latent mistrust a Westerner feels towards the Oriental. For the Jew of pre-Nazi Europe has bifurcated: what we have now is a Jewish hero, constructed out of a reconstructed cult of the adventurer-pioneer-Orientalist (Burton, Lane, Renan), and his creeping, mysteriously fearsome shadow, the Arab Oriental. Isolated from everything except the past created for him by Orientalist polemic, the Arab is chained to a destiny that fixes him and dooms him to a series of reactions periodically chastised by what Barbara Tuchman gives the theological name &amp;quot;Israel&#039;s terrible swift sword.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from his anti-Zionism, the Arab is an oil supplier. This is another negative characteristic, since most accounts of Arab oil equate the oil boycott of 1973-1974 (which principally benefitted Western oil companies and a small ruling Arab elite) with the absence of any Arab moral qualifications for owning such vast oil reserves. Without the usual euphemisms, the question most often being asked is why such people as the Arabs are entitled to keep the developed (free, democratic, moral) world threatened. From such questions comes the frequent suggestion that the Arab oil fields be invaded by the marines.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the films and television the Arab is associated either with lechery or bloodthirsty dishonesty. He appears as an oversexed degenerate, capable, it is true, of cleverly devious intrigues, but essentially sadistic, treacherous, low. Slave trader, camel driver, moneychanger, colorful scoundrel: these are some traditional Arab roles in the cinema. The Arab leader (of marauders, pirates, &amp;quot;native&amp;quot; insurgents) can often be seen snarling at the captured Western hero and the blond girl (both of them steeped in wholesomeness), &amp;quot;My men are going to kill you, but--they like to amuse themselves before.&amp;quot; He leers suggestively as he speaks: this is a current debasement of Valentino&#039;s Sheik. In newsreels or news-photos, the Arab is always shown in large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics or experiences. Most of the pictures represent mass rage and misery, or irrational (hence hopelessly eccentric) gestures. Lurking behind all of these images is the menace of &#039;&#039;jihad&#039;&#039;. Consequence: a fear that the Muslims (or Arabs) will take over the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Books and articles are regularly published on Islam and the Arabs that represent absolutely no change over the virulent anti-Islamic polemics of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. For no other ethnic or religious group is it true that virtually anything can be written or said about it, without challenge or demurral. The 1975 course guide put out by the Columbia College undergraduates said about the Arabic course that every other word in the language had to do with violence, and that the Arab mind as &amp;quot;reflected&amp;quot; in the language was unremittingly bombastic. A recent article by Emmett Tyrrell in &#039;&#039;Harper&#039;s&#039;&#039; magazine was even more slanderous and racist, arguing that Arabs are basically murderers and that violence and deceit are carried in the Arab genes.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., &amp;quot;Chimera in the Middle East,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Harper&#039;s&#039;&#039;, November 1976, pp. 35-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A survey entitled &#039;&#039;The Arabs in American Textbooks&#039;&#039; reveals the most astonishing misinformation, or rather the most callous representations of an ethnic-religious group. One book asserts that &amp;quot;few people of this [Arab] area even know that there is a better way to live,&amp;quot; and then goes on to ask disarmingly, &amp;quot;What links the people of the Middle East together?&amp;quot; The answer, given unhesitatingly, is, &amp;quot;The last link is the Arab&#039;s hostility--hatred--toward the Jews and the nation of Israel.&amp;quot; Along with such material goes this about Islam, in another book: &amp;quot;The Moslem religion, called Islam, began in the seventh century. It was started by a wealthy businessman of Arabia, called Mohammed. He claimed that he was a prophet. He found followers among other Arabs. He told them that they were picked to rule the world.&amp;quot; This bit of knowledge is followed by another, equally accurate: &amp;quot;Shortly after Mohammed&#039;s death, his teachings were recorded in a book called the Koran. It became the holy book of Islam.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited in Ayad al-Qazzaz, Ruth Afiyo, et al., &#039;&#039;The Arabs in American Textbooks&#039;&#039;, California State Board of Education, June 1975, pp. 10, 15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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These crude ideas are supported, not contradicted, by the academic whose business is the study of the Arab Near East. (It is worth noting incidentally that the Princeton event I referred to above took place in a university that prides itself on its department of Near Eastern Studies founded in 1927, the oldest such department in the country.) Take as an instance the report produced in 1967 by Morroe Berger, a professor of sociology and Near Eastern studies at Princeton, at the behest of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; he was then president of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), the professional association of scholars concerned with all aspects of the Near East, &amp;quot;primarily since the rise of Islam and from the viewpoint of the social science and humanistic disciplines,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Statement of Purpose,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039; 1, no. 1 (May 1967): 33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and founded in 1967. He called his paper &amp;quot;Middle Eastern and North African Studies: Developments and Needs,&amp;quot; and had it published in the second issue of the &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039;. After surveying the strategic, economic, and political importance of the region to the United States, and after endorsing the various United States government and private foundation projects to support programs in universities--the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (a directly Sputnik-inspired initiative), the establishing of links between the Social Science Research Council and Middle Eastern studies, and so on--Berger came to the following conclusions:&lt;br /&gt;
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The modern Middle East and North Africa is not a center of great cultural achievement, nor is it likely to become one in the near future. The study of the region or its languages, therefore, does not constitute its own reward so far as modern culture is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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... Our region is not a center of great political power nor does it have the potential to become one.... The Middle East (less so North Africa) has been receding in immediate political importance to the U.S. (and even in &amp;quot;headline&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;nuisance&amp;quot; value) relative to Africa, Latin America and the Far East.&lt;br /&gt;
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... The contemporary Middle East, thus, has only in small degree the kinds of traits that seem to be important in attracting scholarly attention. This does not diminish the validity and intellectual value of studying the area or affect the quality of work scholars do on it. It does, however, put limits, of which we should be aware, on the field&#039;s capacity for growth in the numbers who study and teach.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Morroe Berger, &amp;quot;Middle Eastern and North African Studies: Developments and Needs,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039; 1, no. 2 (November 1967): 16.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As a prophecy, of course, this is fairly lamentable; what makes it even more unfortunate is that Berger was commissioned not only because he was an expert on the modern Near East but also--as is clear from the report&#039;s conclusion--because he was expected to be in a good position to predict its future, and the future of policy. His failure to see that the Middle East was of great political significance, and potentially of great political power, was no chance aberration of judgment, I think. Both of Berger&#039;s main mistakes derive from the first and last paragraphs, whose genealogy is the history of Orientalism as we have been studying it. In what Berger has to say about the absence of great cultural achievement, and in what he concludes about future study--that the Middle East does not attract scholarly attention because of its intrinsic weaknesses--we have an almost exact duplication of the canonical Orientalist opinion that the Semites never produced a great culture and that, as Renan frequently said, the Semitic world was too impoverished ever to attract universal attention. Moreover, in making such time-honored judgments and in being totally blind to what is before his eyes--after all, Berger was not writing fifty years ago, but during a period when the United States was already importing about 10 percent of its oil from the Middle East and when its strategic and economic investments in the area were unimaginably huge--Berger was ensuring the centrality of his own position as Orientalist. For what he says, in effect, is that without people such as he the Middle East would be neglected; and that without his mediating, interpretative role the place would not be understood, partly because what little there is to understand is fairly peculiar, and partly because only the Orientalist can interpret the Orient, the Orient being radically incapable of interpreting itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that Berger was not so much a classical Orientalist when he wrote (he wasn&#039;t and isn&#039;t) as he was a professional sociologist does not minimize the extent of his indebtedness to Orientalism and its ideas. Among those ideas is the specially legitimated antipathy towards and downgrading of the material forming the main basis of his study. So strong is this in Berger that it obscures the actualities before his eyes. And more impressively still, it makes it unnecessary for him to ask himself why, if the Middle East &amp;quot;is not a center of great cultural achievement,&amp;quot; he should recommend that anyone devote his life, as he has, to the study of its culture. Scholars--more than, say, doctors--study what they like and what interests them; only an exaggerated sense of cultural duty drives a scholar to the study of what he does not think well of. Yet it is just such a sense of duty Orientalism has fostered, because for generations the culture at large put the Orientalist at the barricades, where in his professional work he confronted the East--its barbarities, its eccentricities, its unruliness--and held it at bay on behalf of the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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I mention Berger as an instance of the academic attitude towards the Islamic Orient, as an instance of how a learned perspective can support the caricatures propagated in the popular culture. Yet Berger stands also for the most current transformation overtaking Orientalism: its conversion from a fundamentally philological discipline and a vaguely general apprehension of the Orient into a social science specialty. No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and &amp;quot;applies&amp;quot; his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France. The American experience of the Orient prior to that exceptional moment was limited. Cultural isolatos like Melville were interested in it; cynics like Mark Twain visited and wrote about it; the American Transcendentalists saw affinities between Indian thought and their own; a few theologians and Biblical students studied the Biblical Oriental languages; there were occasional diplomatic and military encounters with Barbary pirates and the like, the odd naval expedition to the Far Orient, and of course the ubiquitous missionary to the Orient. But there was no deeply invested tradition of Orientalism, and consequently in the United States knowledge of the Orient never passed through the refining and reticulating and reconstructing processes, whose beginning was in philological study, that it went through in Europe. Furthermore, the imaginative investment was never made either, perhaps because the American frontier, the one that counted, was the westward one. Immediately after World War II, then, the Orient became, not a broad catholic issue as it had been for centuries in Europe, but an administrative one, a matter for policy. Enter the social scientist and the new expert, on whose somewhat narrower shoulders was to fall the mantle of Orientalism. In their turn, as we shall see, they made such changes in it that it became scarcely recognizable. In any event, the new Orientalist took over the attitudes of cultural hostility and kept them.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the striking aspects of the new American social-science attention to the Orient is its singular avoidance of literature. You can read through reams of expert writing on the modern Near East and never encounter a single reference to literature. What seem to matter far more to the regional expert are &amp;quot;facts,&amp;quot; of which a literary text is perhaps a disturber. The net effect of this remarkable omission in modern American awareness of the Arab or Islamic Orient is to keep the region and its people conceptually emasculated, reduced to &amp;quot;attitudes,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;trends,&amp;quot; statistics: in short, dehumanized. Since an Arab poet or novelist--and there are many--writes of his experiences, of his values, of his humanity (however strange that may be), he effectively disrupts the various patterns (images, cliches, abstractions) by which the Orient is represented. A literary text speaks more or less directly of a living reality. Its force is not that it is Arab, or French, or English; its force is in the power and vitality of words that, to mix in Flaubert&#039;s metaphor from &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;, tip the idols out of the Orientalists&#039; arms and make them drop those great paralytic children--which are their ideas of the Orient--that attempt to pass for the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The absence of literature and the relatively weak position of philology in contemporary American studies of the Near East are illustrations of a new eccentricity in Orientalism, where indeed my use of the word itself is anomalous. For there is very little in what academic experts on the Near East do now that resembles traditional Orientalism of the sort that ended with Gibb and Massignon; the main things that are reproduced are, as I said, a certain cultural hostility and a sense based not so much on philology as on &amp;quot;expertise.&amp;quot; Genealogically speaking, modern American Orientalism derives from such things as the army language schools established during and after the war, sudden government and corporate interest in the non-Western world during the postwar period, Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, and a residual missionary attitude towards Orientals who are considered ripe for reform and reeducation. The nonphilological study of esoteric Oriental languages is useful for obvious rudimentary strategic reasons; but it is also useful for giving a cachet of authority, almost a mystique, to the &amp;quot;expert&amp;quot; who appears able to deal with hopelessly obscure material with firsthand skill.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the social-science order of things, language study is a mere tool for higher aims, certainly not for reading literary texts. In 1958, for example, the Middle East Institute--a quasi-governmental body founded to oversee and sponsor research interest in the Middle East--produced a &#039;&#039;Report on Current Research&#039;&#039;. The contribution &amp;quot;Present State of Arabic Studies in the United States&amp;quot; (done, interestingly enough, by a professor of Hebrew) is prefaced by an epigraph announcing that &amp;quot;no longer is knowledge of foreign languages, for instance, the sole province of the scholars in the humanities. It is a working tool of the engineer, the economist, the social scientist, and many other specialists.&amp;quot; The whole report stresses the importance of Arabic to oil-company executives, technicians, and military personnel. But the report&#039;s main talking point is this trio of sentences: &amp;quot;Russian universities are now producing fluent Arabic speakers. Russia has realized the importance of appealing to men through their minds, by using their own language. The United States need wait no longer in developing its foreign language program.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Menachem Mansoor, &amp;quot;Present State of Arabic Studies in the United States,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Report on Current Research 1958&#039;&#039;, ed. Kathleen H. Brown (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1958), pp. 55-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus Oriental languages are part of some policy objective--as to a certain extent they have always been--or part of a sustained propaganda effort. In both these aims the study of Oriental languages becomes the instrument carrying out Harold Lasswell&#039;s theses about propaganda, in which what counts is not what people are or think but what they can be made to be and think.&lt;br /&gt;
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The propagandist outlook in fact combines respect for individuality with indifference to formal democracy. The respect for individuality arises from the dependence of large scale operations upon the support of the mass and upon experience with the variability of human preferences.... This regard for men in the mass rests upon no democratic dogmatisms about men being the best judges of their own interests. The modern propagandist, like the modern psychologist, recognizes that men are often poor judges of their own interests, flitting from one alternative to the next without solid reason or clinging timorously to the fragments of some mossy rock of ages. Calculating the prospect of securing a permanent change in habits and values involves much more than the estimation of the preferences of men in general. It means taking account of the tissue of relations in which men are webbed, searching for signs of preference which may reflect no deliberation and directing a program towards a solution which fits in fact.... With respect to those adjustments which do require mass action the task of the propagandist is that of inventing goal symbols which serve the double function of facilitating adoption and adaptation. The symbols must induce acceptance spontaneously.... It follows that the management ideal is control of a situation not by imposition but by divination.... The propagandist takes it for granted that the world is completely caused but that it is only partly predictable....&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harold Lasswell, &amp;quot;Propaganda,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences&#039;&#039; (1934), 12: 527. I owe this reference to Professor Noam Chomsky.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The acquired foreign language is therefore made part of a subtle assault upon populations, just as the study of a foreign region like the Orient is turned into a program for control by divination.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet such programs must always have a liberal veneer, and usually this is left to scholars, men of good will, enthusiasts to attend to. The idea encouraged is that in studying Orientals, Muslims, or Arabs &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; can get to know another people, their way of life and thought, and so on. To this end it is always better to let them speak for themselves, to represent themselves (even though underlying this fiction stands Marx&#039;s phrase--with which Lasswell is in agreement--for Louis Napoleon: &amp;quot;They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented&amp;quot;). But only up to a point, and in a special way. In 1973, during the anxious days of the October Arab-Israeli War, the &#039;&#039;New York Times Magazine&#039;&#039; commissioned two articles, one representing the Israeli and one the Arab side of the conflict. The Israeli side was presented by an Israeli lawyer; the Arab side, by an American former ambassador to an Arab country who had no formal training in Oriental studies. Lest we jump immediately to the simple conclusion that the Arabs were believed incapable of representing themselves, we would do well to remember that both Arabs and Jews in this instance were Semites (in the broad cultural designation I have been discussing) and that both &#039;&#039;were being made to be&#039;&#039; represented for a Western audience. It is worthwhile here to remember this passage from Proust, in which the sudden appearance of a Jew into an aristocratic salon is described as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Rumanians, the Egyptians, the Turks may hate the Jews. But in a French drawing-room the differences between those people are not so apparent, and an Israelite making his entry as though he were emerging from the heart of the desert, his body crouching like a hyaena&#039;s, his neck thrust obliquely forward, spreading himself in proud &amp;quot;salaams,&amp;quot; completely satisfies a certain taste for the oriental [&#039;&#039;un gout pour l&#039;orientalisme&#039;&#039;].&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Marcel Proust, &#039;&#039;The Guermantes Way&#039;&#039;, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff (1925; reprint ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 135.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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2. &#039;&#039;Cultural relations policy&#039;&#039;. While it is true to say that the United States did not in fact become a world empire until the twentieth century, it is also true that during the nineteenth century the United States was concerned with the Orient in ways that prepared for its later, overtly imperial concern. Leaving aside the campaigns against the Barbary pirates in 1801 and 1815, let us consider the founding of the American Oriental Society in 1842. At its first annual meeting in 1843 its president, John Pickering, made the very clear point that America proposed for itself the study of the Orient in order to follow the example of the imperial European powers. Pickering&#039;s message was that the framework of Oriental studies--then as now--was political, not simply scholarly. Note in the following summary how the lines of argument for Orientalism leave little room for doubt as to their intention:&lt;br /&gt;
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At the first annual meeting of the American Society in 1843, President Pickering began a remarkable sketch of the field it was proposed to cultivate by calling attention to the especially favorable circumstances of the time, the peace that reigned everywhere, the freer access to Oriental countries, and the greater facilities for communication. The earth seemed quiet in the days of Metternich and Louis Philippe. The treaty of Nanking had opened Chinese ports. The screw-propellor had been adopted in oceangoing vessels; Morse had completed his telegraph and he had already suggested the laying of a trans-Atlantic cable. The objects of the Society were to cultivate learning in Asiatic, African, and Polynesian language, and in everything concerning the Orient, to create a taste for Oriental Studies in this country, to publish texts, translations and communications, and to collect a library and cabinet. Most of the work has been done in the Asiatic field, and particularly in Sanskrit and the Semitic languages.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Nathaniel Schmidt, &amp;quot;Early Oriental Studies in Europe and the Work of the American Oriental Society, 1842-1922,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of the American Oriental Society&#039;&#039; 43 (1923): 11. See also E. A. Speiser, &amp;quot;Near Eastern Studies in America, 1939-45,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Archiv Orientalni&#039;&#039; 16 (1948): 76-88.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Metternich, Louis-Philippe, the Treaty of Nanking, the screw propellor: all suggest the imperial constellation facilitating Euro-American penetration of the Orient. This has never stopped. Even the legendary American missionaries to the Near East during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took their role as set not so much by God as by &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; God, &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; culture, and &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; destiny.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;As an instance there is Henry Jessup, &#039;&#039;Fifty-Three Years in Syria&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1910).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The early missionary institutions--printing presses, schools, universities, hospitals, and the like--contributed of course to the area&#039;s well-being, but in their specifically imperial character and their support by the United States government, these institutions were no different from their French and British counterparts in the Orient. During the First World War, what was to become a major United States policy interest in Zionism and the colonization of Palestine played an estimable role in getting the United States into the war; British discussions prior to and after the Balfour Declaration (November 1917) reflect the seriousness with which the declaration was taken by the United States.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For the connection between the issuing of the Balfour Declaration and United States war policy, see Doreen Ingrams, &#039;&#039;Palestine Papers 19171922: Seeds of Conflict&#039;&#039; (London: Cox &amp;amp; Syman, 1972), pp. 10 ff.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; During and after the Second World War, the escalation in United States interest in the Middle East was remarkable. Cairo, Teheran, and North Africa were important arenas of war, and in that setting, with the exploitation of its oil, strategic, and human resources pioneered by Britain and France, the United States prepared for its new postwar imperial role.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not the least aspect of this role was &amp;quot;a cultural relations policy,&amp;quot; as it was defined by Mortimer Graves in 1950. Part of this policy was, he said, the attempt to acquire &amp;quot;every significant publication in every important Near Eastern language published since 1900,&amp;quot; an attempt &amp;quot;which our Congress ought to recognize as a measure of our national security.&amp;quot; For what was clearly at stake, Graves argued (to very receptive ears, by the way), was the need for &amp;quot;much better American understanding of the forces which are contending with the American idea for acceptance by the Near East. The principal of these are, of course, communism and Islam.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Mortimer Graves, &amp;quot;A Cultural Relations Policy in the Near East,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, ed. Frye, pp. 76, 78.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Out of such a concern, and as a contemporary adjunct to the more backward-looking American Oriental Society, was born the entire vast apparatus for research on the Middle East. The model, both in its frankly strategic attitude and in its sensitivity to public security and policy (not, as is often postured, to pure scholarship), was the Middle East Institute, founded May 1946 in Washington under the aegis of, if not entirely within or by, the federal government.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;George Camp Keiser, &amp;quot;The Middle East Institute: Its Inception and Its Place in American International Studies,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, ed. Frye, pp. 80, 84.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Out of such organizations grew the Middle East Studies Association, the powerful support of the Ford and other foundations, the various federal programs of support to universities, the various federal research projects, research projects carried out by such entities as the Defense Department, the RAND Corporation, and the Hudson Institute, and the consultative and lobbying efforts of banks, oil companies, multinationals, and the like. It is no reduction to say of all this that it retains, in most of its general as well as its detailed functioning, the traditional Orientalist outlook which had been developed in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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The parallel between European and American imperial designs on the Orient (Near and Far) is obvious. What is perhaps less obvious is (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) the extent to which the European tradition of Orientalist scholarship was, if not taken over, then accommodated, normalized, domesticated, and popularized and fed into the postwar efflorescence of Near Eastern studies in the United States; and (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) the extent to which the European tradition has given rise in the United States to a coherent attitude among most scholars, institutions, styles of discourse, and orientations, despite the contemporary appearance of refinement, as well as the use of (again) highly sophisticated-appearing social-science techniques. I have already discussed Gibb&#039;s ideas; it needs to be pointed out, however, that in the middle 1950s he became director of the Harvard Center for Middle East Studies, from which position his ideas and style exerted an important influence. Gibb&#039;s presence in the United States was different in what it did for the field from Philip Hitti&#039;s presence at Princeton since the late 1920s. The Princeton department produced a large group of important scholars, and its brand of Oriental studies stimulated great scholarly interest in the field. Gibb, on the other hand, was more truly in touch with the public-policy aspect of Orientalism, and far more than Hitti&#039;s at Princeton his position at Harvard focused Orientalism on a Cold War area-studies approach.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gibb&#039;s own work, nevertheless, did not overtly employ the language of cultural discourse in the tradition of Renan, Becker, and Massignon. Yet this discourse, its intellectual apparatus, and its dogmas were impressively present, principally (although not exclusively) in the work and institutional authority, at Chicago and then at UCLA, of Gustave von Grunebaum. He came to the United States as part of the intellectual immigration of European scholars fleeing fascism.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;For an account of this migration, see &#039;&#039;The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960&#039;&#039;, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thereafter he produced a solid Orientalist &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039; that concentrated on Islam as a holistic culture about which, from beginning to end of his career, he continued to make the same set of essentially reductive, negative generalizations. His style, which bore often chaotic evidence of his Austro-Germanic polymathy, of his absorption of the canonical pseudoscientific prejudices of French, British, and Italian Orientalism, as well as of an almost desperate effort to remain the impartial scholar-observer, was next to unreadable. A typical page of his on the Islamic self-image will jam together half-a-dozen references to Islamic texts drawn from as many periods as possible, references as well to Husserl and the pre-Socratics, references to Levi-Strauss and various American social scientists. All this, nevertheless, does not obscure von Grunebaum&#039;s almost virulent dislike of Islam. He has no difficulty presuming that Islam is a unitary phenomenon, unlike any other religion or civilization, and thereafter he shows it to be antihuman, incapable of development, self-knowledge, or objectivity, as well as uncreative, unscientific, and authoritarian. Here are two typical excerpts--and we must remember that von Grunebaum wrote with the unique authority of a European scholar in the United States, teaching, administering, giving grants to a large network of scholars in the field.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is essential to realize that Muslim civilization is a cultural entity that does not share our primary aspirations. It is not vitally interested in the structured study of other cultures, either as an end in itself or as a means towards clearer understanding of its own character and history. If this observation were to be valid merely for contemporary Islam, one might be inclined to connect it with the profoundly disturbed state of Islam, which does not permit it to look beyond itself unless forced to do so. But as it is valid for the past as well, one may perhaps seek to connect it with the basic anti-humanism of this [Islamic] civilization, that is, the determined refusal to accept man to any extent whatever as the arbiter or the measure of things, and the tendency to be satisfied with the truth as the description of mental structures, or in other words, with psychological truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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[Arab or Islamic nationalism] lacks, in spite of its occasional use as a catchword, the concept of the divine right of a nation, it lacks a formative ethic, it also lacks, it would seem, the later nineteenth century belief in mechanistic progress; above all it lacks the intellectual vigor of a primary phenomenon. Both power and the will to power are ends in themselves. [This sentence seems to serve no purpose in the argument; yet it doubtless gives von Grunebaum the security of a philosophical-sounding nonsentence, as if to assure himself that he speaks wisely, not disparagingly, of Islam.] The resentment of political slights [felt by Islam] engenders impatience and impedes long-range analysis and planning in the intellectual sphere.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gustave von Grunebaum, &#039;&#039;Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity&#039;&#039; (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 55, 261.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In most other contexts such writing would politely be called polemical. For Orientalism, of course, it is relatively orthodox, and it passed for canonical wisdom in American study of the Middle East after World War II, mainly because of the cultural prestige associated with European scholars. The point is, however, that von Grunebaum&#039;s work is accepted uncritically by the field, even though the field itself today cannot reproduce people like him. Yet only one scholar has undertaken a serious critique of von Grunebaum&#039;s views: Abdullah Laroui, a Moroccan historian and political theorist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Using the motif of reductive repetition in von Grunebaum&#039;s work as a practical tool of critical anti-Orientalist study, Laroui manages his case impressively on the whole. He asks himself what it is that caused von Grunebaum&#039;s work, despite the enormous mass of its detail and its apparent range, to remain reductive. As Laroui says, &amp;quot;the adjectives that von Grunebaum affixes to the word Islam (medieval, classical, modern) are neutral or even superfluous: there is no difference between classical Islam and medieval Islam or Islam plain and simple.... There is therefore [for von Grunebaum] only &#039;&#039;one&#039;&#039; Islam that changes within itself.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Abdullah Laroui, &amp;quot;Pour une methodologie des etudes islamiques: L&#039;Islam au miroir de Gustave von Grunebaum,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diogene&#039;&#039; 38 (July-September 1973): 30. This essay has been collected in Laroui&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Crisis of the Arab Intellectuals: Traditionalism or Historicism?&#039;&#039; trans. Diarmid Cammell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Modern Islam, according to von Grunebaum, has turned away from the West because it remains faithful to its original sense of itself; and yet Islam can modernize itself only by a self-reinterpretation from a Western point of view--which, of course, von Grunebaum shows is impossible. In describing von Grunebaum&#039;s conclusions, which add up to a portrait of Islam as a culture incapable of innovation, Laroui does not mention that the need for Islam to use Western methods to improve itself has, as an idea, perhaps because of von Grunebaum&#039;s wide influence, become almost a truism in Middle Eastern studies. (For example, David Gordon, in &#039;&#039;Self-Determination and History in the Third World&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;David Gordon, &#039;&#039;Self-Determination and History in the Third World&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; urges &amp;quot;maturity&amp;quot; on Arabs, Africans, and Asians; he argues that this can be gained only by learning from Western objectivity.)&lt;br /&gt;
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Laroui&#039;s analysis shows also how von Grunebaum employed A. L. Kroeber&#039;s culturalist theory to understand Islam, and how this tool necessarily entailed a series of reductions and eliminations by which Islam could be represented as a closed system of exclusions. Thus, each of the many diverse aspects of Islamic culture could be seen by von Grunebaum as a direct reflection of an unvarying matrix, a particular theory of God, that compels them all into meaning and order: development, history, tradition, reality in Islam are therefore interchangeable. Laroui rightly maintains that history as a complex order of events, temporalities, and meanings cannot be reduced to such a notion of culture, in the same way that culture cannot be reduced to ideology, nor ideology to theology. Von Grunebaum has fallen prey both to the Orientalist dogmas he inherited and to a particular feature of Islam which he has chosen to interpret as a shortcoming: that there is to be found in Islam a highly articulated theory of religion and yet very few accounts of religious experience, highly articulate political theory and few precise political documents, a theory of social structure and very few individualized actions, a theory of history and very few dated events, an articulated theory of economics and very few quantified series, and so on.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Laroui, &amp;quot;Pour une methodologie des etudes islamiques,&amp;quot; p. 41.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The net result is a historical vision of Islam entirely hobbled by the theory of a culture incapable of doing justice to, or even examining, its existential reality in the experience of its adherents. Von Grunebaum&#039;s Islam, after all, is the Islam of the earlier European Orientalists--monolithic, scornful of ordinary human experience, gross, reductive, unchanging.&lt;br /&gt;
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At bottom such a view of Islam is political, not even euphemistically impartial. The strength of its hold on the new Orientalist (younger, that is, than von Grunebaum) is due in part to its traditional authority, and in part to its use-value as a handle for grasping a vast region of the world and proclaiming it an entirely coherent phenomenon. Since Islam has never easily been encompassed by the West politically--and certainly since World War II Arab nationalism has been a movement openly declaring its hostility to Western imperialism--the desire to assert intellectually satisfying things about Islam in retaliation increases. One authority has said of Islam (without specifying &#039;&#039;which&#039;&#039; Islam or aspect of Islam he means) that it is &amp;quot;one prototype of closed traditional societies.&amp;quot; Note here the edifying use of the word &#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039; to signify all at once a society, a religion, a prototype, and an actuality. But all this will be subordinated by the same scholar to the notion that, unlike normal (&amp;quot;our&amp;quot;) societies, Islam and Middle Eastern societies are totally &amp;quot;political,&amp;quot; an adjective meant as a reproach to Islam for not being &amp;quot;liberal,&amp;quot; for not being able to separate (as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do) politics from culture. The result is an invidiously ideological portrait of &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;them&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand Middle Eastern society as a whole must remain our great aim. Only a society [like &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot;] that has already achieved a dynamic stability can afford to think of politics, economics, or culture as genuinely autonomous realms of existence and not merely convenient divisions for study. In a traditional society that does not separate the things of Caesar from those of God, or that is entirely in flux, the connection between, say, politics and all other aspects of life is the heart of the issue. Today, for example, whether a man is to marry four wives or one, fast or eat, gain or lose land, rely on revelation or reason, have all become political issues in the Middle East.... No less than the Moslem himself, the new Orientalist must inquire anew what the significant structures and relationships of Islamic society may be.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Manfred Halpern, &amp;quot;Middle East Studies: A Review of the State of the Field with a Few Examples,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;World Politics&#039;&#039; 15 (October 1962): 121-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The triviality of most of the examples (marrying four wives, fasting or eating, etc.) is meant as evidence of Islam&#039;s all-inclusiveness, and its tyranny. As to &#039;&#039;where&#039;&#039; this is supposed to be happening, we are not told. But we are reminded of the doubtless nonpolitical fact that Orientalists &amp;quot;are largely responsible for having given Middle Easterners themselves an accurate appreciation of their past,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 117.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; just in case we might forget that Orientalists know things by definition that Orientals cannot know on their own.&lt;br /&gt;
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If this sums up the &amp;quot;hard&amp;quot; school of the new American Orientalism, the &amp;quot;soft&amp;quot; school emphasizes the fact that traditional Orientalists have given us the basic outlines of Islamic history, religion, and society but have been &amp;quot;all too often content to sum up the meaning of a civilization on the basis of a few manuscripts.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Leonard Binder, &amp;quot;1974 Presidential Address,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039; 9, no. 1 (February 1975): 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Against the traditional Orientalist, therefore, the new area-studies specialist argues philosophically:&lt;br /&gt;
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Research methodology and disciplinary paradigms are not to determine what is selected for study, and they are not to limit observation. Area studies, from this perspective, hold that true knowledge is only possible of things that exist, while methods and theories are abstractions, which order observations and offer explanations according to non-empirical criteria.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Good. But &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; does one know the &amp;quot;things that exist,&amp;quot; and to what extent are the &amp;quot;things that exist&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;constituted&#039;&#039; by the knower? This is left moot, as the new value-free apprehension of the Orient as something that exists is institutionalized in area-studies programs. Without tendentious theorizing, Islam is &#039;&#039;rarely&#039;&#039; studied, &#039;&#039;rarely&#039;&#039; researched, &#039;&#039;rarely&#039;&#039; known: the naivete of this conception scarcely conceals what ideologically it means, the absurd theses that man plays no part in setting up both the material and the processes of knowledge, that the Oriental reality is static and &amp;quot;exists,&amp;quot; that only a messianic revolutionary (in Dr. Kissinger&#039;s vocabulary) will not admit the difference between reality out there and in his head.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between the hard and soft schools, however, more or less diluted versions of the old Orientalism flourish--in the new academic jargons in some cases, in the old ones in others. But the principal dogmas of Orientalism exist in their purest form today in studies of the Arabs and Islam. Let us recapitulate them here: one is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically &amp;quot;objective.&amp;quot; A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible).&lt;br /&gt;
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The extraordinary thing is that these notions persist without significant challenge in the academic and governmental study of the modern Near Orient. Lamentably, there has been no demonstrable effect--if there has been a challenging gesture at all--made by Islamic or Arab scholars&#039; work disputing the dogmas of Orientalism; an isolated article here or there, while important for its time and place, cannot possibly affect the course of an imposing research consensus maintained by all sorts of agencies, institutions, and traditions. The point of this is that Islamic Orientalism has led a contemporary life quite different from that of the other Orientalist subdisciplines. The Committee of Concerned Asia Scholars (who are primarily Americans) led a revolution during the 1960s in the ranks of East Asia specialists; the African studies specialists were similarly challenged by revisionists; so too were other Third World area specialists. Only the Arabists and Islamologists still function unrevised. For them there are still such things as &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Islamic society, &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Arab mind, &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Oriental psyche. Even the ones whose specialty is the modern Islamic world anachronistically use texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society. Islam, or a seventh-century ideal of it constituted by the Orientalist, is assumed to possess the unity that eludes the more recent and important influences of colonialism, imperialism, and even ordinary politics. Cliches about how Muslims (or Mohammedans, as they are still sometimes called) behave are bandied about with a nonchalance no one would risk in talking about blacks or Jews. At best, the Muslim is a &amp;quot;native informant&amp;quot; for the Orientalist. Secretly, however, he remains a despised heretic who for his sins must additionally endure the entirely thankless position of being known--negatively, that is--as an anti-Zionist.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is of course a Middle East studies establishment, a pool of interests, &amp;quot;old boy&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;expert&amp;quot; networks linking corporate business, the foundations, the oil companies, the missions, the military, the foreign service, the intelligence community together with the academic world. There are grants and other rewards, there are organizations, there are hierarchies, there are institutes, centers, faculties, departments, all devoted to legitimizing and maintaining the authority of a handful of basic, basically unchanging ideas about Islam, the Orient, and the Arabs. A recent critical analysis of the Middle East studies operation in the United States shows, not that the field is &amp;quot;monolithic,&amp;quot; but that it is complex, that it contains old-style Orientalists, deliberately marginal specialists, counterinsurgency specialists, policymakers, as well as &amp;quot;a small minority ... of academic power brokers.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Middle East Studies Network in the United States,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MERIP Reports&#039;&#039; 38 (June 1975): 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In any event, the core of Orientalist dogma persists.&lt;br /&gt;
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As an instance of what, in its highest and most intellectually prestigious form, the field now produces, let us consider briefly the two-volume &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, which was first published in England in 1970 and is a regular summa of Orientalist orthodoxy. To say of this work by numerous luminaries that it is an intellectual failure by any standards other than those of Orientalism is to say that it could have been a different and better history of Islam. In fact, as several more thoughtful scholars have noted,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The two best critical reviews of the &#039;&#039;Cambridge History&#039;&#039; are by Albert Hourani, &#039;&#039;The English Historical Review&#039;&#039; 87, no. 343 (April 1972): 348-57, and Roger Owen, &#039;&#039;Journal of Interdisciplinary History&#039;&#039; 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1973): 287-98.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; this kind of history was already doomed when first planned and could not have been different, or better in execution: too many ideas were uncritically accepted by its editors; there was too much reliance on vague concepts; little emphasis was placed on methodological issues (which were left as they have been standing in Orientalist discourse for almost two centuries); and no effort was put forth to make even the idea of Islam seem interesting. Moreover, not only does &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039; radically misconceive and misrepresent Islam as a religion; it also has no corporate idea of itself as a history. Of few such enormous enterprises can it be true, as it is of this one, that ideas and methodological intelligence are almost entirely absent from it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Erfan Shahid&#039;s chapter on pre-Islamic Arabia, which opens the history, intelligently sketches the fruitful consonance between topography and human economy out of which Islam appeared in the seventh century. But what can one fairly say of a history of Islam, defined by P. M. Holt&#039;s introduction rather airily as a &amp;quot;cultural synthesis,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;P. M. Holt, Introduction, &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 1: xi.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that proceeds directly from pre-Islamic Arabia to a chapter on Mohammed, then to a chapter on the Patriarchal and Umayyad caliphates, and entirely bypasses any account of Islam as a system of belief, faith, or doctrine? For hundreds of pages in volume 1, Islam is understood to mean an unrelieved chronology of battles, reigns, and deaths, rises and heydays, comings and passings, written for the most part in a ghastly monotone.&lt;br /&gt;
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Take the Abbasid period from the eighth to the eleventh century as an instance. Anyone who has the slightest acquaintance with Arab or Islamic history will know that it was a high point of Islamic civilization, as brilliant a period of cultural history as the High Renaissance in Italy. Yet nowhere in the forty pages of description does one get an inkling of any richness; what is found instead is sentences like this: &amp;quot;Once master of the caliphate, [al-Ma&#039;mun] seemed henceforth to shrink from contact with Baghdad society and remained settled at Merv, entrusting the government of Iraq to one of his trusted men, al-Hasan b. Sahl, the brother of al-Fadl, who was faced almost at once with a serious Shi&#039;i revolt, that of Abu&#039;l-Saraya, who in Jumada II 199/January 815 sent out a call to arms from Kufa in support of the Hasanid Ibn Tabataba.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;D. Sourdel, &amp;quot;The Abbasid Caliphate,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Holt et al., 1: 121.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A non-Islamicist will not know at this point what a Shi&#039;i or a Hasanid is. He will have no idea what Jumada II is, except that it clearly designates a date of some sort. And of course he will believe that the Abbasids, including Harun al-Rashid, were an incorrigibly dull and murderous lot, as they sat sulking in Merv.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Central Islamic lands are defined as excluding North Africa and Andalusia, and &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; history is an orderly march from the past till modern times. In volume 1, therefore, Islam is a geographical designation applied chronologically and selectively as it suits the experts. But nowhere in the chapters on classical Islam is there an adequate preparation for the disappointments in store for us when we come to &amp;quot;recent times,&amp;quot; as they are called. The chapter on the modern Arab lands is written without the slightest understanding of the revolutionary developments in the area. The author takes a schoolmarmish, openly reactionary attitude towards the Arabs (&amp;quot;it must be said that during this period the educated and uneducated youth of the Arab countries, with their enthusiasm and idealism, became a fertile soil for political exploitation and, at times, perhaps without realizing it, the tools of unscrupulous extremists and agitators&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Z. N. Zeine, &amp;quot;The Arab Lands,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Holt et al., 1: 575.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;), tempered by occasional praise of Lebanese nationalism (although we are never told that the appeal of fascism to a small number of Arabs during the thirties also infected the Lebanese Maronites, who in 1936 founded the Falanges libanaises as a copy of Mussolini&#039;s Black Shirts). &amp;quot;Unrest and agitation&amp;quot; are ascribed to 1936 without a mention of Zionism, and the very notions of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism are never allowed to violate the serenity of the narrative. As for the chapters on &amp;quot;the political impact of the West&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;economic and social change&amp;quot;--ideas left no more specific than that--they are tacked on as reluctant concessions to Islam as having something to do with &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world in general. Change is unilaterally equated with modernization, even though it is nowhere made clear why other kinds of change need be so imperiously dismissed. Since it is assumed that Islam&#039;s only worthwhile relations have been with the West, the importance of Bandung or of Africa or of the Third World generally is ignored; this blithe indifference to a good three-quarters of reality somewhat explains the amazingly cheerful statement that &amp;quot;the historical ground has been cleared [by whom, for what, in what way?] for a new relationship between the West and Islam ... based on equality and cooperation.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Dankwart A. Rustow, &amp;quot;The Political Impact of the West,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Holt et al., 1: 697.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If by the end of volume 1 we are mired in a number of contradictions and difficulties about what Islam really is, there is no help to be had in volume 2. Half the book is devoted to covering the tenth to the twentieth centuries in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Spain, North Africa, and Sicily; there is more distinction in the chapters on North Africa, although the same combination of professional Orientalist jargon with unguided historical detail prevails pretty much everywhere. So far, after approximately twelve hundred pages of dense prose, &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; appears to be no more a cultural synthesis than any other roll call of kings, battles, and dynasties. But in the last half of volume 2, the great synthesis completes itself with articles on &amp;quot;The Geographical Setting,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Sources of Islamic Civilization,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Religion and Culture,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Warfare.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Now one&#039;s legitimate questions and objections seem more justified. Why is a chapter commissioned on Islamic warfare when what is really discussed (interestingly, by the way) is the sociology of some Islamic armies? Is one to assume that there is an Islamic mode of war different, say, from Christian warfare? Communist war versus capitalist war proposes itself as a suitably analogous topic. Of what use for the understanding of Islam--except as a display of Gustave von Grunebaum&#039;s indiscriminate erudition--are the opaque quotations from Leopold von Ranke which, along with other equally ponderous and irrelevant material, dot his pages on Islamic civilization? Is it not mendacious thus to disguise the real Grunebaumian thesis, that Islamic civilization rests on an unprincipled borrowing by Muslims from the Judeo-Christian, Hellenistic, and Austro-Germanic civilizations? Compare with this idea--that Islam is by definition a plagiaristic culture--the one put forward in volume 1 that &amp;quot;so-called Arabic literature&amp;quot; was written by Persians (no proof offered, no names cited). When Louis Gardet treats &amp;quot;Religion and Culture,&amp;quot; we are told summarily that only the first five centuries of Islam are to be discussed; does this mean that religion and culture in &amp;quot;modern times&amp;quot; cannot be &amp;quot;synthesized,&amp;quot; or does it mean that Islam achieved its final form in the twelfth century? Is there really such a thing as &amp;quot;Islamic geography,&amp;quot; which seems to include the &amp;quot;planned anarchy&amp;quot; of Muslim cities, or is it mainly an invented subject to demonstrate a rigid theory of geographical-racial determinism? As a hint we are reminded of &amp;quot;the Ramadan fast with its active nights,&amp;quot; from which we are expected to conclude that Islam is a religion &amp;quot;designed for town dwellers.&amp;quot; This is explanation in need of explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sections on economic and social institutions, on law and justice, mysticism, art and architecture, science, and the various Islamic literatures are on an altogether higher level than most of the &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039;. Yet nowhere is there evidence that their authors have much in common with modern humanists or social scientists in other disciplines: the techniques of the conventional history of ideas, of Marxist analysis, of the New History, are noticeably absent. Islam, in short, seems to its historians to be best suited to a rather Platonic and antiquarian bias. To some writers of the &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039; Islam is a politics and a religion; to others it is a style of being; to others it is &amp;quot;distinguishable from Muslim society&amp;quot;; to still others it is a mysteriously known essence; to &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; the authors Islam is a remote, tensionless thing, without much to teach us about the complexities of today&#039;s Muslims. Hanging over the whole disjointed enterprise which is &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039; is the old Orientalist truism that Islam is about texts, not about people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fundamental question raised by such contemporary Orientalist texts as &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History&#039;&#039; is whether ethnic origins and religion are the best, or at least the most useful, basic, and clear, definitions of human experience. Does it matter more in understanding contemporary politics to know that X and Y are disadvantaged in certain very concrete ways, or that they are Muslims or Jews? This is of course a debatable question, and we are very likely in rational terms to insist on both the religious-ethnic and the socio-economic descriptions; Orientalism, however, clearly posits the Islamic category as the dominant one, and this is the main consideration about its retrograde intellectual tactics.&lt;br /&gt;
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3. &#039;&#039;Merely Islam&#039;&#039;. So deeply entrenched is the theory of Semitic simplicity as it is to be found in modern Orientalism that it operates with little differentiation in such well-known anti-Semitic European writings as &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039; and in remarks such as these by Chaim Weizmann to Arthur Balfour on May 30, 1918:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Arabs, who are superficially clever and quick witted, worship one thing, and one thing only--power and success.... The British authorities ... knowing as they do the treacherous nature of the Arabs ... have to watch carefully and constantly.... The fairer the English regime tries to be, the more arrogant the Arab becomes.... The present state of affairs would necessarily tend toward the creation of an Arab Palestine, if there were an Arab people in Palestine. It will not in fact produce that result because the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times, and the effendi ... is dishonest, uneducated, greedy, and as unpatriotic as he is inefficient.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cited in Ingrams, &#039;&#039;Palestine Papers, 1917-1922&#039;&#039;, pp. 31-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The common denominator between Weizmann and the European anti-Semite is the Orientalist perspective, seeing Semites (or subdivisions thereof) as by nature lacking the desirable qualities of Occidentals. Yet the difference between Renan and Weizmann is that the latter had already gathered behind his rhetoric the solidity of institutions whereas the former had not. Is there not in twentieth-century Orientalism that same unaging &amp;quot;gracious childhood&amp;quot;--heedlessly allied now with scholarship, now with a state and all its institutions--that Renan saw as the Semites&#039; unchanging mode of being?&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet with what greater harm has the twentieth-century version of the myth been maintained. It has produced a picture of the Arab as seen by an &amp;quot;advanced&amp;quot; quasi-Occidental society. In his resistance to foreign colonialists the Palestinian was either a stupid savage, or a negligible quantity, morally and even existentially. According to Israeli law only a Jew has full civic rights and unqualified immigration privileges; even though they are the land&#039;s inhabitants, Arabs are given less, more simple rights: they cannot immigrate, and if they seem not to have the same rights, it is because they are &amp;quot;less developed.&amp;quot; Orientalism governs Israeli policy towards the Arabs throughout, as the recently published Koenig Report amply proves. There are good Arabs (the ones who do as they are told) and bad Arabs (who do not, and are therefore terrorists). Most of all there are all those Arabs who, once defeated, can be expected to sit obediently behind an infallibly fortified line, manned by the smallest possible number of men, on the theory that Arabs have had to accept the myth of Israeli superiority and will never dare attack. One need only glance through the pages of General Yehoshafat Harkabi&#039;s &#039;&#039;Arab Attitudes to Israel&#039;&#039; to see how--as Robert Alter put it in admiring language in &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Robert Alter, &amp;quot;Rhetoric and the Arab Mind,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, October 1968, pp. 61-85. Alter&#039;s article was an adulatory review of General Yehoshafat Harkabi&#039;s &#039;&#039;Arab Attitudes to Israel&#039;&#039; (Jerusalem: Keter Press, 1972).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--the Arab mind, depraved, anti-Semitic to the core, violent, unbalanced, could produce only rhetoric and little more. One myth supports and produces another. They answer each other, tending towards symmetries and patterns of the sort that as Orientals the Arabs themselves can be expected to produce, but that as a human being no Arab can truly sustain.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of itself, in itself, as a set of beliefs, as a method of analysis, Orientalism cannot develop. Indeed, it is the doctrinal antithesis of development. Its central argument is the myth of the arrested development of the Semites. From this matrix other myths pour forth, each of them showing the Semite to be the opposite of the Westerner and irremediably the victim of his own weaknesses. By a concatenation of events and circumstances the Semitic myth bifurcated in the Zionist movement; one Semite went the way of Orientalism, the other, the Arab, was forced to go the way of the Oriental. Each time tent and tribe are solicited, the myth is being employed; each time the concept of Arab national character is evoked, the myth is being employed. The hold these instruments have on the mind is increased by the institutions built around them. For every Orientalist, quite literally, there is a support system of staggering power, considering the ephemerality of the myths that Orientalism propagates. This system now culminates in the very institutions of the state. To write about the Arab Oriental world, therefore, is to write with the authority of a nation, and not with the affirmation of a strident ideology but with the unquestioning certainty of absolute truth backed by absolute force.&lt;br /&gt;
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In its February 1974 issue &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039; gave its readers an article by Professor Gil Carl Alroy entitled &amp;quot;Do the Arabs Want Peace?&amp;quot; Alroy is a professor of political science and is the author of two works, &#039;&#039;Attitudes Towards Jewish Statehood in the Arab World&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Images of Middle East Conflict&#039;&#039;; he is a man who professes to &amp;quot;know&amp;quot; the Arabs, and is obviously an expert on image making. His argument is quite predictable: that the Arabs want to destroy Israel, that the Arabs really say what they mean (and Alroy makes ostentatious use of his ability to cite evidence from Egyptian newspapers, evidence he everywhere identifies with &amp;quot;Arabs&amp;quot; as if the two, Arabs and Egyptian newspapers, were one), and so on and on, with unflagging, one-eyed zeal. Quite the center of his article, as it is the center of previous work by other &amp;quot;Arabists&amp;quot; (synonymous with &amp;quot;Orientalists&amp;quot;), like General Harkabi, whose province is the &amp;quot;Arab mind,&amp;quot; is a working hypothesis on what Arabs, if one peels off all the outer nonsense, are really like. In other words, Alroy must prove that because Arabs are, first of all, as one in their bent for bloody vengeance, second, psychologically incapable of peace, and third, congenitally tied to a concept of justice that means the opposite of that, they are not to be trusted and must be fought interminably as one fights any other fatal disease. For evidence Alroy&#039;s principal exhibit is a quotation taken from Harold W. Glidden&#039;s essay &amp;quot;The Arab World&amp;quot; (to which I referred in Chapter One). Alroy finds Glidden able to have &amp;quot;captured the cultural differences between the Western and the Arab view&amp;quot; of things &amp;quot;very well.&amp;quot; Alroy&#039;s argument is clinched, therefore--the Arabs are unregenerate savages--and thus an authority on the Arab mind has told a wide audience of presumably concerned Jews that they must continue to watch out. And he has done it academically, dispassionately, fairly, using evidence taken from the Arabs themselves--who, he says with Olympian assurance, have &amp;quot;emphatically ruled out ... real peace&amp;quot;--and from psychoanalysis.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Gil Carl Alroy, &amp;quot;Do The Arabs Want Peace?&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, February 1974, pp. 56-61.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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One can explain such statements by recognizing that a still more implicit and powerful difference posited by the Orientalist as against the Oriental is that the former &#039;&#039;writes&#039;&#039; about, whereas the latter &#039;&#039;is written&#039;&#039; about. For the latter, passivity is the presumed role; for the former, the power to observe, study, and so forth; as Roland Barthes has said, a myth (and its perpetuators) can invent itself (themselves) ceaselessly.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Roland Barthes, &#039;&#039;Mythologies&#039;&#039;, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill &amp;amp; Wang, 1972), pp. 109-59.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Oriental is given as fixed, stable, in need of investigation, in need even of knowledge about himself. No dialectic is either desired or allowed. There is a source of information (the Oriental) and a source of knowledge (the Orientalist), in short, a writer and a subject matter otherwise inert. The relationship between the two is radically a matter of power, for which there are numerous images. Here is an instance taken from Raphael Patai&#039;s &#039;&#039;Golden River to Golden Road&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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In order properly to evaluate what Middle Eastern culture will &#039;&#039;willingly accept&#039;&#039; from the embarrassingly rich storehouses of Western civilization, a better and sounder understanding of Middle Eastern culture &#039;&#039;must first be acquired&#039;&#039;. The same prerequisite is necessary in order &#039;&#039;to gauge&#039;&#039; the probable effects &#039;&#039;of newly introduced traits&#039;&#039; on the cultural context of tradition directed peoples. Also, the ways and means &#039;&#039;in which new cultural offerings can be made palatable&#039;&#039; must be studied much more thoroughly than was hitherto the case. In brief, the only way in which &#039;&#039;the Gordian knot of resistance&#039;&#039; to Westernization in the Middle East &#039;&#039;can be unraveled&#039;&#039; is that of studying the Middle East, &#039;&#039;of obtaining a fuller picture&#039;&#039; of its traditional culture, a better understanding of &#039;&#039;the processes of change taking place&#039;&#039; in it at present, and &#039;&#039;a deeper insight&#039;&#039; into the psychology of human groups brought up in Middle Eastern culture. &#039;&#039;The task is taxing, but the prize, harmony between the West&#039;&#039; and a neighboring world area of crucial importance, is well worth it.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Raphael Patai, &#039;&#039;Golden River to Golden Road: Society, Culture, and Change in the Middle East&#039;&#039; (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962; 3rd rev. ed., 1969), p. 406.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The metaphorical figures propping up this passage (I have indicated them by italics) come from a variety of human activities, some commercial, some horticultural, some religious, some veterinary, some historical. Yet in each case the relation between the Middle East and the West is really defined as sexual: as I said earlier in discussing Flaubert, the association between the Orient and sex is remarkably persistent. The Middle East is resistant, as any virgin would be, but the male scholar wins the prize by bursting open, penetrating through the Gordian knot despite &amp;quot;the taxing task.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Harmony&amp;quot; is the result of the conquest of maidenly coyness; it is not by any means the coexistence of equals. The underlying power relation between scholar and subject matter is never once altered: it is uniformly favorable to the Orientalist. Study, understanding, knowledge, evaluation, masked as blandishments to &amp;quot;harmony,&amp;quot; are instruments of conquest.&lt;br /&gt;
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The verbal operations in such writing as Patai&#039;s (who has outstripped even his previous work in his recent &#039;&#039;The Arab Mind&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Raphael Patai, &#039;&#039;The Arab Mind&#039;&#039; (New York: Charles Scribner&#039;s Sons, 1973). For an even more racist work see John Laffin, &#039;&#039;The Arab Mind Considered: A Need for Understanding&#039;&#039; (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) aim at a very particular sort of compression and reduction. Much of his paraphernalia is anthropological--he describes the Middle East as a &amp;quot;culture area&amp;quot;--but the result is to eradicate the plurality of differences among the Arabs (whoever they may be in fact) in the interest of one difference, that one setting Arabs off from everyone else. As a subject matter for study and analysis, they can be controlled more readily. Moreover, thus reduced they can be made to permit, legitimate, and valorize general nonsense of the sort one finds in works such as Sania Hamady&#039;s &#039;&#039;Temperament and Character of the Arabs&#039;&#039;. Item:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Arabs so far have demonstrated an incapacity for disciplined and abiding unity. They experience collective outbursts of enthusiasm but do not pursue patiently collective endeavors, which are usually embraced half-heartedly. They show lack of coordination and harmony in organization and function, nor have they revealed an ability for cooperation. Any collective action for common benefit or mutual profit is alien to them.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sania Hamady, &#039;&#039;Temperament and Character of the Arabs&#039;&#039; (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960), p. 100. Hamady&#039;s book is a favorite amongst Israelis and Israeli apologists; Alroy cites her approvingly, and so does Amos Elon in &#039;&#039;The Israelis: Founders and Sons&#039;&#039; (New York: Holt, Rinehart &amp;amp; Winston, 1971). Morroe Berger (see note 137 below) also cites her frequently. Her model is Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, but she has none of Lane&#039;s literacy or general learning.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The style of this prose tells more perhaps than Hamady intends. Verbs like &amp;quot;demonstrate,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;reveal,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;show,&amp;quot; are used without an indirect object: to whom are the Arabs revealing, demonstrating, showing? To no one in particular, obviously, but to everyone in general. This is another way of saying that these truths are self-evident only to a privileged or initiated observer, since nowhere does Hamady cite generally available evidence for her observations. Besides, given the inanity of the observations, what sort of evidence could there be? As her prose moves along, her tone increases in confidence: &amp;quot;Any collective action ... is alien to them.&amp;quot; The categories harden, the assertions are more unyielding, and the Arabs have been totally transformed from people into no more than the putative subject of Hamady&#039;s style. The Arabs exist only as an occasion for the tyrannical observer: &amp;quot;The world is &#039;&#039;my&#039;&#039; idea.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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And so it is throughout the work of the contemporary Orientalist: assertions of the most bizarre sort dot his or her pages, whether it is a Manfred Halpern arguing that even though all human thought processes can be reduced to eight, the Islamic mind is capable of only four,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Manfred Halpern&#039;s thesis is presented in &amp;quot;Four Contrasting Repertories of Human Relations in Islam: Two Pre-Modern and Two Modern Ways of Dealing with Continuity and Change, Collaboration and Conflict and the Achieving of Justice,&amp;quot; a paper presented to the 22nd Near East Conference at Princeton University on Psychology and Near Eastern Studies, May 8, 1973. This treatise was prepared for by Halpern&#039;s &amp;quot;A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of International Affairs&#039;&#039; 23, no. 1 (1969): 54-75.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or a Morroe Berger presuming that since the Arabic language is much given to rhetoric Arabs are consequently incapable of true thought.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Morroe Berger, &#039;&#039;The Arab World Today&#039;&#039; (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1964), p. 140. Much the same sort of implication underlies the clumsy work of quasi-Arabists like Joel Carmichael and Daniel Lerner; it is there more subtly in political and historical scholars such as Theodore Draper, Walter Laqueur, and Elie Kedourie. It is strongly in evidence in such highly regarded works as Gabriel Baer&#039;s &#039;&#039;Population and Society in the Arab East&#039;&#039;, trans. Hanna Szoke (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), and Alfred Bonne&#039;s &#039;&#039;State and Economics in the Middle East: A Society in Transition&#039;&#039; (London: Routledge &amp;amp; Kegan Paul, 1955). The consensus seems to be that if they think at all, Arabs think differently--i.e., not necessarily with reason, and often without it. See also Adel Daher&#039;s RAND study, &#039;&#039;Current Trends in Arab Intellectual Thought&#039;&#039; (RM-5979-FF, December 1969) and its typical conclusion that &amp;quot;the concrete problem-solving approach is conspicuously absent from Arab thought&amp;quot; (p. 29). In a review-essay for the &#039;&#039;Journal of Interdisciplinary History&#039;&#039; (see note 124 above), Roger Owen attacks the very notion of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a concept for the study of history. His focus is &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, which, he finds, in certain ways perpetuates an idea of Islam (to be found in such writers as Carl Becker and Max Weber) &amp;quot;defined essentially as a religious, feudal, and antirational system, [that] lacked the necessary characteristics which had made European progress possible.&amp;quot; For a sustained proof of Weber&#039;s total inaccuracy, see Maxime Rodinson&#039;s &#039;&#039;Islam and Capitalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp. 76-117.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; One can call these assertions myths in their function and structure, and yet one must try to understand what other imperatives govern their use. Here one is speculating, of course. Orientalist generalizations about the Arabs are very detailed when it comes to itemizing Arab characteristics critically, far less so when it comes to analyzing Arab strengths. The Arab family, Arab rhetoric, the Arab character, despite copious descriptions by the Orientalist, appear de-natured, without human potency, even as these same descriptions possess a fullness and depth in their sweeping power over the subject matter. Hamady again:&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, the Arab lives in a hard and frustrating environment. He has little chance to develop his potentialities and define his position in society, holds little belief in progress and change, and finds salvation only in the hereafter.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hamady, Character and Temperament, p. 197.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What the Arab cannot achieve himself is to be found in the writing about him. The Orientalist is supremely certain of &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; potential, is not a pessimist, is able to define his position, his own and the Arab&#039;s. The picture of the Arab Oriental that emerges is determinedly negative; yet, we ask, why this endless series of works on him? What grips the Orientalist, if it is not--as it certainly is not--love of Arab science, mind, society, achievement? In other words, what is the nature of Arab presence in mythic discourse about him?&lt;br /&gt;
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Two things: number and generative power. Both qualities are reducible to each other ultimately, but we ought to separate them for the purposes of analysis. Almost without exception, every contemporary work of Orientalist scholarship (especially in the social sciences) has a great deal to say about the family, its male-dominated structure, its all-pervasive influence in the society. Patai&#039;s work is a typical example. A silent paradox immediately presents itself, for if the family is an institution for whose general failures the only remedy is the placebo of &amp;quot;modernization,&amp;quot; we must acknowledge that the family continues to produce itself, is fertile, and is the source of Arab existence in the world, such as it is. What Berger refers to as &amp;quot;the great value men place upon their own sexual prowess&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Berger, &#039;&#039;Arab World&#039;&#039;, p. 102.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; suggests the lurking power behind Arab presence in the world. If Arab society is represented in almost completely negative and generally passive terms, to be ravished and won by the Orientalist hero, we can assume that such a representation is a way of dealing with the great variety and potency of Arab diversity, whose source is, if not intellectual and social, then sexual and biological. Yet the absolutely inviolable taboo in Orientalist discourse is that that very sexuality must never be taken seriously. It can never be explicitly blamed for the absence of achievement and &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; rational sophistication the Orientalist everywhere discovers among the Arabs. And yet this is, I think, the missing link in arguments whose main object is criticism of &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; Arab society, such as Hamady&#039;s, Berger&#039;s, and Lerner&#039;s. They recognize the power of the family, note the weaknesses of the Arab mind, remark the &amp;quot;importance&amp;quot; of the Oriental world to the West, but never say what their discourse implies, that what is really left to the Arab after all is said and done is an undifferentiated sexual drive. On rare occasions--as in the work of Leon Mugniery--we do find the implicit made clear: that there is a &amp;quot;powerful sexual appetite ... characteristic of those hot-blooded southerners.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Quoted by Irene Gendzier in &#039;&#039;Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 94.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Most of the time, however, the belittlement of Arab society and its reduction of platitudes inconceivable for any except the racially inferior are carried on over an undercurrent of sexual exaggeration: the Arab produces himself, endlessly, sexually, and little else. The Orientalist says nothing about this, although his argument depends on it: &amp;quot;But co-operation in the Near East is still largely a family affair and little of it is found outside the blood group or village.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Berger, &#039;&#039;Arab World&#039;&#039;, p. 151.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Which is to say that the only way in which Arabs count is as mere biological beings; institutionally, politically, culturally they are nil, or next to nil. Numerically and as the producers of families, Arabs are actual.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difficulty with this view is that it complicates the passivity amongst Arabs assumed by Orientalists like Patai and even Hamady and the others. But it is in the logic of myths, like dreams, exactly to welcome radical antitheses. For a myth does not analyze or solve problems. It represents them as already analyzed and solved; that is, it presents them as already assembled images, in the way a scarecrow is assembled from bric-a-brac and then made to stand for a man. Since the image &#039;&#039;uses&#039;&#039; all material to its own end, and since by definition the myth displaces life, the antithesis between an over-fertile Arab and a passive doll is not functional. The discourse papers over the antithesis. An Arab Oriental is that impossible creature whose libidinal energy drives him to paroxysms of over-stimulation--and yet, he is as a puppet in the eyes of the world, staring vacantly out at a modern landscape he can neither understand nor cope with.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is in recent discussions of Oriental political behavior that such an image of the Arab seems to be relevant, and it is often occasioned by scholarly discussion of those two recent favorites of Orientalist expertise, revolution and modernization. Under the auspices of the School of Oriental and African Studies there appeared in 1972 a volume entitled &#039;&#039;Revolution in the Middle East and Other Case Studies&#039;&#039;, edited by P. J. Vatikiotis. The title is overtly medical, for we are expected to think of Orientalists as finally being given the benefit of what &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; Orientalism usually avoided: psychoclinical attention. Vatikiotis sets the tone of the collection with a quasi-medical definition of revolution, but since Arab revolution is in his mind and in his readers&#039;, the hostility of the definition seems acceptable. There is a very clever irony here about which I shall speak later. Vatikiotis&#039;s theoretical support is Camus--whose colonial mentality was no friend of revolution or of the Arabs, as Conor Cruise O&#039;Brien has recently shown--but the phrase &amp;quot;revolution destroys both men and principles&amp;quot; is accepted from Camus as having &amp;quot;fundamental sense.&amp;quot; Vatikiotis continues:&lt;br /&gt;
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... all revolutionary ideology is in direct conflict with (actually, is a head-on attack upon) man&#039;s rational, biological and psychological make-up.&lt;br /&gt;
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Committed as it is to a methodical metastasis, revolutionary ideology demands fanaticism from its adherents. Politics for the revolutionary is not only a question of belief, or a substitute for religious belief. It must stop being what it has always been, namely, an adaptive activity in time for survival. Metastatic, soteriological politics abhors adaptiveness, for how else can it eschew the difficulties, ignore and bypass the obstacles of the complex biological-psychological dimension of man, or mesmerize his subtle though limited and vulnerable rationality? It fears and shuns the concrete and discrete nature of human problems and the preoccupations of political life: it thrives on the abstract and the Promethean. It subordinates all tangible values to the one supreme value: the harnessing of man and history in a grand design of human liberation. It is not satisfied with human politics, which has so many irritating limitations. It wishes instead to create a new world, not adaptively, precariously, delicately, that is, humanly, but by a terrifying act of Olympian pseudo-divine creation. Politics in the service of man is a formula that is unacceptable to the revolutionary ideologue. Rather man exists to serve a politically contrived and brutally decreed order.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;P. J. Vatikiotis, ed., &#039;&#039;Revolution in the Middle East&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;and Other Case Studies; proceedings of a seminar&#039;&#039; (London: George Allen &amp;amp; Unwin, 1972), pp. 8-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Whatever else this passage says--purple writing of the most extreme sort, counterrevolutionary zealotry--it is saying nothing less than that revolution is a bad kind of sexuality (pseudo-divine act of creation), and also a cancerous disease. Whatever is done by the &amp;quot;human,&amp;quot; according to Vatikiotis, is rational, right, subtle, discrete, concrete; whatever the revolutionary proclaims is brutal, irrational, mesmeric, cancerous. Procreation, change, and continuity are identified not only with sexuality and with madness but, a little paradoxically, with abstraction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Vatikiotis&#039;s terms are weighted and colored emotionally by appeals (from the right) to humanity and decency and by appeals (against the left) safeguarding humanity from sexuality, cancer, madness, irrational violence, revolution. Since it is Arab revolution that is in question, we are to read the passage as follows: This is what revolution is, and if the Arabs want it, then that is a fairly telling comment on them, on the kind of inferior race they are. They are &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; capable of sexual incitement and not of Olympian (Western, modern) reason. The irony of which I spoke earlier now comes into play, for a few pages later we find that the Arabs are so inept that they cannot even aspire to, let alone consummate, the ambitions of revolution. By implication, Arab sexuality need not be feared for itself but for its failure. In short, Vatikiotis asks his reader to believe that revolution in the Middle East is a threat precisely because revolution cannot be attained.&lt;br /&gt;
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The major source of political conflict and potential revolution in many countries of the Middle East, as well as Africa and Asia today, is the inability of so-called radical nationalist regimes and movements to manage, let alone resolve, the social, economic and political problems of independence.... Until the states in the Middle East can control their economic activity and create or produce their own technology, their access to revolutionary experience will remain limited. The very political categories essential to a revolution will be lacking.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 12, 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Damned if you do, and damned if you don&#039;t. In this series of dissolving definitions revolutions emerge as figments of sexually crazed minds which on closer analysis turn out not to be capable even of the craziness Vatikiotis truly respects--which is human, not Arab, concrete, not abstract, asexual, not sexual.&lt;br /&gt;
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The scholarly centerpiece of Vatikiotis&#039;s collection is Bernard Lewis&#039;s essay &amp;quot;Islamic Concepts of Revolution.&amp;quot; The strategy here appears refined. Many readers will know that for Arabic speakers today the word &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; and its immediate cognates mean revolution; they will know this also from Vatikiotis&#039;s introduction. Yet Lewis does not describe the meaning of &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; until the very end of his article, after he has discussed concepts such as &#039;&#039;dawla, fitna&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;bughat&#039;&#039; in their historical and mostly religious context. The point there is mainly that &amp;quot;the Western doctrine of the right to resist bad government is alien to Islamic thought,&amp;quot; which leads to &amp;quot;defeatism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;quietism&amp;quot; as political attitudes. At no point in the essay is one sure where all these terms are supposed to be taking place except somewhere in the history of words. Then near the end of the essay we have this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Arabic-speaking countries a different word was used for [revolution] &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039;. The root &#039;&#039;th-w-r&#039;&#039; in classical Arabic meant to rise up (e.g. of a camel), to be stirred or excited, and hence, especially in Maghribi usage, to rebel. It is often used in the context of establishing a petty, independent sovereignty; thus, for example, the so-called party kings who ruled in eleventh century Spain after the break-up of the Caliphate of Cordova are called &#039;&#039;thuwwar&#039;&#039; (sing. &#039;&#039;tha&#039;ir&#039;&#039;). The noun &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; at first means excitement, as in the phrase, cited in the Sihah, a standard medieval Arabic dictionary, &#039;&#039;intazir hatta taskun hadhihi &#039;lthawra&#039;&#039;, wait till this excitement dies down--a very apt recommendation. The verb is used by al-Iji, in the form of &#039;&#039;thawaran&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;itharat fitna&#039;&#039;, stirring up sedition, as one of the dangers which should discourage a man from practising the duty of resistance to bad government. &#039;&#039;Thawra&#039;&#039; is the term used by Arabic writers in the nineteenth century for the French Revolution, and by their successors for the approved revolutions, domestic and foreign, of our own time.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;Islamic Concepts of Revolution,&amp;quot; in ibid., pp. 33, 38-9. Lewis&#039;s study &#039;&#039;Race and Color in Islam&#039;&#039; (New York: Harper &amp;amp; Row, 1971) expresses similar disaffection with an air of great learning; more explicitly political--but no less acid--is his &#039;&#039;Islam in History: Ideas&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Men and Events in the Middle East&#039;&#039; (London: Alcove Press, 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The entire passage is full of condescension and bad faith. Why introduce the idea of a camel rising as an etymological root for modern Arab revolution except as a clever way of discrediting the modern? Lewis&#039;s reason is patently to bring down revolution from its contemporary valuation to nothing more noble (or beautiful) than a camel about to raise itself from the ground. Revolution is excitement, sedition, setting up a petty sovereignty--nothing more; the best counsel (which presumably only a Western scholar and gentleman can give) is &amp;quot;wait till the excitement dies down.&amp;quot; One wouldn&#039;t know from this slighting account of &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; that innumerable people have an active commitment to it, in ways too complex for even Lewis&#039;s sarcastic scholarship to comprehend. But it is this kind of essentialized description that is natural for students and policymakers concerned with the Middle East: that revolutionary stirrings among &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; are about as consequential as a camel&#039;s getting up, as worthy of attention as the babblings of yokels. All the canonical Orientalist literature will for the same ideological reason be unable to explain or prepare one for the confirming revolutionary upheaval in the Arab world in the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lewis&#039;s association of &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; with a camel rising and generally with excitement (and not with a struggle on behalf of values) hints much more broadly than is usual for him that the Arab is scarcely more than a neurotic sexual being. Each of the words or phrases he uses to describe revolution is tinged with sexuality: &#039;&#039;stirred&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;excited&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;rising up&#039;&#039;. But for the most part it is a &amp;quot;bad&amp;quot; sexuality he ascribes to the Arab. In the end, since Arabs are really not equipped for serious action, their sexual excitement is no more noble than a camel&#039;s rising up. Instead of revolution there is sedition, setting up a petty sovereignty, and more excitement, which is as much as saying that instead of copulation the Arab can only achieve foreplay, masturbation, coitus interruptus. These, I think, are Lewis&#039;s implications, no matter how innocent his air of learning, or parlorlike his language. For since he is so sensitive to the nuances of words, he must be aware that &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; words have nuances as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lewis is an interesting case to examine further because his standing in the political world of the Anglo-American Middle Eastern Establishment is that of the learned Orientalist, and everything he writes is steeped in the &amp;quot;authority&amp;quot; of the field. Yet for at least a decade and a half his work in the main has been aggressiyely ideological, despite his various attempts at subtlety and irony. I mention his recent writing as a perfect exemplification of the academic whose work purports to be liberal objective scholarship but is in reality very close to being propaganda &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; his subject material. But this should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the history of Orientalism; it is only the latest--and in the West, the most uncriticized--of the scandals of &amp;quot;scholarship.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So intent has Lewis become upon his project to debunk, to whittle down, and to discredit the Arabs and Islam that even his energies as a scholar and historian seem to have failed him. He will, for example, publish a chapter called &amp;quot;The Revolt of Islam&amp;quot; in a book in 1964, then republish much of the same material twelve years later, slightly altered to suit the new place of publication (in this case &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;) and retitled &amp;quot;The Return of Islam.&amp;quot; From &amp;quot;Revolt&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;Return&amp;quot; is of course a change for the worse, a change intended by Lewis to explain to his latest public why it is that the Muslims (or Arabs) still will not settle down and accept Israeli hegemony over the Near East.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us look more closely at how he does this. In both of his pieces he mentions an anti-imperialist riot in Cairo in 1945, which in both cases he describes as anti-Jewish. Yet in neither instance does he tell us how it was anti-Jewish; in fact, as his material evidence for anti-Jewishness, he produces the somewhat surprising intelligence that &amp;quot;several churches, Catholic, Armenian and Greek Orthodox, were attacked and damaged.&amp;quot; Consider the first version, done in 1964:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On November 2, 1945 political leaders in Egypt called for demonstrations on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. These rapidly developed into anti-Jewish riots, in the course of which a Catholic, an Armenian, and a Greek Orthodox church were attacked and damaged. What, it may be asked, had Catholics, Armenians and Greeks to do with the Balfour Declaration?&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;The Revolt of Islam,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Middle East and The West&#039;&#039; (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 95.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now the &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039; version, done in 1976:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the nationalist movement has become genuinely popular, so it has become less national and more religious--in other words less Arab and more Islamic. In moments of crisis--and these have been many in recent decades--it is the instinctive communal loyalty which outweighs all others. A few examples may suffice. On November 2, 1945, demonstrations were held in Egypt [note here how the phrase &amp;quot;demonstrations were held&amp;quot; is an attempt to show instinctive loyalties; in the previous version &amp;quot;political leaders&amp;quot; were responsible for the deed] on the anniversary of the issue by the British Government of the Balfour Declaration. Though this was certainly not the intention of the political leaders who sponsored it, the demonstration soon developed into an anti-Jewish riot and the anti-Jewish riot into a more general outbreak in the course of which several churches, Catholic, Armenian, and Greek Orthodox [another instructive change: the impression here is that many churches, of three kinds, were attacked; the earlier version is specific about three churches], were attacked and damaged.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;The Return of Islam,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, January 1976, p. 44.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lewis&#039;s polemical, not scholarly, purpose is to show, here and elsewhere, that Islam is an anti-Semitic ideology, not merely a religion. He has a little logical difficulty in trying to assert that Islam is a fearful mass phenomenon and at the same time &amp;quot;not genuinely popular,&amp;quot; but this problem does not detain him long. As the second version of his tendentious anecdote shows, he goes on to proclaim that Islam is an irrational herd or mass phenomenon, ruling Muslims by passions, instincts, and unreflecting hatreds. The whole point of his exposition is to frighten his audience, to make it never yield an inch to Islam. According to Lewis, Islam does not develop, and neither do Muslims; they merely are, and they are to be watched, on account of that pure essence of theirs (according to Lewis), which happens to include a long-standing hatred of Christians and Jews. Lewis everywhere restrains himself from making such inflammatory statements flat out; he always takes care to say that of course the Muslims are not anti-Semitic the way the Nazis were, but their religion can too easily accommodate itself to anti-Semitism and has done so. Similarly with regard to Islam and racism, slavery, and other more or less &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; evils. The core of Lewis&#039;s ideology about Islam is that it never changes, and his whole mission is now to inform conservative segments of the Jewish reading public, and anyone else who cares to listen, that any political, historical, and scholarly account of Muslims must begin and end with the fact that Muslims are Muslims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For to admit that an entire civilization can have religion as its primary loyalty is too much. Even to suggest such a thing is regarded as offensive by liberal opinion, always ready to take protective umbrage on behalf of those whom it regards as its wards. This is reflected in the present inability, political, journalistic, and scholarly alike, to recognize the importance of the factor of religion in the current affairs of the Muslim world and in the consequent recourse to the language of left-wing and right-wing, progressive and conservative, and the rest of the Western terminology, the use of which in explaining Muslim political phenomena is about as accurate and as enlightening as an account of a cricket match by a baseball correspondent. [Lewis is so fond of this last simile that he quotes it verbatim from his 1964 polemic.]&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 40.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a later work Lewis tells us what terminology is more accurate and useful, although the terminology seems no less &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; (whatever &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; means): Muslims, like most other former colonial peoples, are incapable of telling the truth or even of seeing it. According to Lewis, they are addicted to mythology, along with &amp;quot;the so-called revisionist school in the United States, which look back to a golden age of American virtue and ascribe virtually all the sins and crimes of the world to the present establishment in their country.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039;--&#039;&#039;Remembered, Recovered, Invented&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 68.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Aside from being a mischievous and totally inaccurate account of revisionist history, this kind of remark is designed to put Lewis as a great historian above the petty underdevelopment of mere Muslims and revisionists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet so far as being accurate is concerned, and so far as living up to his own rule that &amp;quot;the scholar, however, will not give way to his prejudices,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lewis, &#039;&#039;Islam in History&#039;&#039;, p. 65.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Lewis is cavalier with himself and with his cause. He will, for example, recite the Arab case against Zionism (using the &amp;quot;in&amp;quot; language of the Arab nationalist) without at the same time mentioning--anywhere, in any of his writings--that there was such a thing as a Zionist invasion and colonization of Palestine despite and in conflict with the native Arab inhabitants. No Israeli would deny this, but Lewis the Orientalist historian simply leaves it out. He will speak of the absence of democracy in the Middle East, except for Israel, without ever mentioning the Emergency Defense Regulations used in Israel to rule the Arabs; nor has he anything to say about &amp;quot;preventive detention&amp;quot; of Arabs in Israel, nor about the dozens of illegal settlements on the militarily occupied West Bank of Gaza, nor about the absence of human rights for Arabs, principal among them the right of immigration, in former Palestine. Instead, Lewis allows himself the scholarly liberty to say that &amp;quot;imperialism and Zionism [so far as the Arabs are concerned were] long familiar under their older names as the Christians and Jews.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lewis, &#039;&#039;The Middle East and the West&#039;&#039;, pp. 60, 87.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He quotes T. E. Lawrence on &amp;quot;the Semites&amp;quot; to bolster his case against Islam, he never discusses Zionism in parallel with Islam (as if Zionism were a French, not a religious, movement), and he tries everywhere to demonstrate that any revolution anywhere is at best a form of &amp;quot;secular millenarianism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One would find this kind of procedure less objectionable as political propaganda--which is what it is, of course--were it not accompanied by sermons on the objectivity, the fairness, the impartiality of a real historian, the implication always being that Muslims and Arabs cannot be objective but that Orientalists like Lewis writing about Muslims and Arabs are, by definition, by training, by the mere fact of their Westernness. This is the culmination of Orientalism as a dogma that not only degrades its subject matter but also blinds its practitioners. But let us listen finally to Lewis telling us how the historian ought to conduct himself. We may well ask whether it is only the Orientals who are subject to the prejudices he chastises.&lt;br /&gt;
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[The historian&#039;s] loyalties may well influence his choice of subject of research; they should not influence his treatment of it. If, in the course of his researches, he finds that the group with which he identifies himself is always right, and those other groups with which it is in conflict are always wrong, then he would be well advised to question his conclusions, and to reexamine the hypothesis on the basis of which he selected and interpreted his evidence; for it is not in the nature of human communities [presumably, also, the community of Orientalists] always to be right.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally the historian must be fair and honest in the way he presents his story. That is not to say that he must confine himself to a bare recital of definitely established facts. At many stages in his work the historian must formulate hypotheses and make judgments. The important thing is that he should do so consciously and explicitly, reviewing the evidence for and against his conclusions, examining the various possible interpretations, and stating explicitly what his decision is, and how and why he reached it.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lewis, &#039;&#039;Islam in History&#039;&#039;, pp. 65-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To look for a conscious, fair, and explicit judgment by Lewis of the Islam he has treated as he has treated it is to look in vain. He prefers to work, as we have seen, by suggestion and insinuation. One suspects, however, that he is unaware of doing this (except perhaps with regard to &amp;quot;political&amp;quot; matters like pro-Zionism, anti-Arab nationalism, and strident Cold Warriorism), since he would be certain to say that the whole history of Orientalism, of whom he is the beneficiary, has made these insinuations and hypotheses into indisputable truths.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the most indisputable of these rock-bottom &amp;quot;truths,&amp;quot; and the most peculiar (since it is hard to believe it could be maintained for any other language), is that Arabic as a language is a dangerous ideology. The contemporary &#039;&#039;locus classicus&#039;&#039; for this view of Arabic is E. Shouby&#039;s essay &amp;quot;The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Originally published in &#039;&#039;Middle East Journal&#039;&#039; 5 (1951). Collected in &#039;&#039;Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Cultures&#039;&#039;, ed. Abdulla Lutfiyye and Charles W. Churchill (The Hague: Mouton &amp;amp; Co., 1970), pp. 688-703.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The author is described as &amp;quot;a psychologist with training in both Clinical and Social Psychology,&amp;quot; and one presumes that a main reason his views have such wide currency is that he is an Arab himself (a self-incriminating one, at that). The argument he proposes is lamentably simple-minded, perhaps because he has no notion of what language is and how it operates. Nevertheless the subheadings of his essay tell a good deal of his story; Arabic is characterized by &amp;quot;General vagueness of Thought,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Overemphasis on Linguistic Signs,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Over-assertion and Exaggeration.&amp;quot; Shouby is frequently quoted as an authority because he speaks like one and because what he hypostasizes is a sort of mute Arab who at the same time is a great word-master playing games without much seriousness or purpose. Muteness is an important part of what Shouby is talking about, since in his entire paper he never once quotes from the literature of which the Arab is so inordinately proud. Where, then, does Arabic influence the Arab mind? Exclusively within the mythological world created for the Arab by Orientalism. The Arab is a sign for dumbness combined with hopeless overarticulateness, poverty combined with excess. That such a result can be attained by philological means testifies to the sad end of a formerly complex philological tradition, exemplified today only in very rare individuals. The reliance of today&#039;s Orientalist on &amp;quot;philology&amp;quot; is the last infirmity of a scholarly discipline completely transformed into social-science ideological expertise.&lt;br /&gt;
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In everything I have been discussing, the language of Orientalism plays the dominant role. It brings opposites together as &amp;quot;natural,&amp;quot; it presents human types in scholarly idioms and methodologies, it ascribes reality and reference to objects (other words) of its own making. Mythic language is discourse, that is, it cannot be anything but systematic; one does not really make discourse at will, or statements in it, without first belonging--in some cases unconsciously, but at any rate involuntarily--to the ideology and the institutions that guarantee its existence. These latter are always the institutions of an advanced society dealing with a less advanced society, a strong culture encountering a weak one. The principal feature of mythic discourse is that it conceals its own origins as well as those of what it describes. &amp;quot;Arabs&amp;quot; are presented in the imagery of static, almost ideal types, and neither as creatures with a potential in the process of being realized nor as history being made. The exaggerated value heaped upon Arabic as a language permits the Orientalist to make the language equivalent to mind, society, history, and nature. For the Orientalist the language &#039;&#039;speaks&#039;&#039; the Arab Oriental, not vice versa.&lt;br /&gt;
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4. &#039;&#039;Orientals Orientals Orientals&#039;&#039;. The system of ideological fictions I have been calling Orientalism has serious implications not only because it is intellectually discreditable. For the United States today is heavily invested in the Middle East, more heavily than anywhere else on earth: the Middle East experts who advise policymakers are imbued with Orientalism almost to a person. Most of this investment, appropriately enough, is built on foundations of sand, since the experts instruct policy on the basis of such marketable abstractions as political elites, modernization, and stability, most of which are simply the old Orientalist stereotypes dressed up in policy jargon, and most of which have been completely inadequate to describe what took place recently in Lebanon or earlier in Palestinian popular resistance to Israel. The Orientalist now tries to see the Orient as an imitation West which, according to Bernard Lewis, can only improve itself when its nationalism &amp;quot;is prepared to come to terms with the West.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lewis, The Middle East and the West, p. 140.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If in the meantime the Arabs, the Muslims, or the Third and Fourth Worlds go unexpected ways after all, we will not be surprised to have an Orientalist tell us that this testifies to the incorrigibility of Orientals and therefore proves that they are not to be trusted.&lt;br /&gt;
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The methodological failures of Orientalism cannot be accounted for either by saying that the &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039; Orient is different from Orientalist portraits of it, or by saying that since Orientalists are Westerners for the most part, they cannot be expected to have an inner sense of what the Orient is all about. Both of these propositions are false. It is not the thesis of this book to suggest that there is such a thing as a real or true Orient (Islam, Arab, or whatever); nor is it to make an assertion about the necessary privilege of an &amp;quot;insider&amp;quot; perspective over an &amp;quot;outsider&amp;quot; one, to use Robert K. Merton&#039;s useful distinction.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Robert K. Merton, &amp;quot;The Perspectives of Insiders and Outsiders,&amp;quot; in his &#039;&#039;The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations&#039;&#039;, ed. Norman W. Storer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 99-136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; On the contrary, I have been arguing that &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; is itself a constituted entity, and that the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically &amp;quot;different&amp;quot; inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space is equally a highly debatable idea. I certainly do not believe the limited proposition that only a black can write about blacks, a Muslim about Muslims, and so forth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And yet despite its failures, its lamentable jargon, its scarcely concealed racism, its paper-thin intellectual apparatus, Orientalism flourishes today in the forms I have tried to describe. Indeed, there is some reason for alarm in the fact that its influence has spread to &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; itself: the pages of books and journals in Arabic (and doubtless in Japanese, various Indian dialects, and other Oriental languages) are filled with second-order analyses by Arabs of &amp;quot;the Arab mind,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Islam,&amp;quot; and other myths. Orientalism has also spread in the United States now that Arab money and resources have added considerable glamour to the traditional &amp;quot;concern&amp;quot; felt for the strategically important Orient. The fact is that Orientalism has been successfully accommodated to the new imperialism, where its ruling paradigms do not contest, and even confirm, the continuing imperial design to dominate Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the one part of the Orient that I can speak about with some direct knowledge, the accommodation between the intellectual class and the new imperialism might very well be accounted one of the special triumphs of Orientalism. The Arab world today is an intellectual, political, and cultural satellite of the United States. This is not in itself something to be lamented; the specific form of the satellite relationship, however, is. Consider first of all that universities in the Arab world are generally run according to some pattern inherited from, or once directly imposed by, a former colonial power. New circumstances make the curricular actualities almost grotesque: classes populated with hundreds of students, badly trained, overworked, and underpaid faculty, political appointments, the almost total absence of advanced research and of research facilities, and most important, the lack of a single decent library in the entire region. Whereas Britain and France once dominated intellectual horizons in the East by virtue of their prominence and wealth, it is now the United States that occupies that place, with the result that the few promising students who manage to make it through the system are encouraged to come to the United States to continue their advanced work. And while it is certainly true that some students from the Arab world continue to go to Europe to study, the sheer numerical preponderance comes to the United States; this is as true of students from so-called radical states as it is of students from conservative states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Besides, the patronage system in scholarship, business, and research makes the United States a virtual hegemonic commander of affairs; the source, however much it may not be a real source, is considered to be the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two factors make the situation even more obviously a triumph of Orientalism. Insofar as one can make a sweeping generalization, the felt tendencies of contemporary culture in the Near East are guided by European and American models. When Taha Hussein said of modern Arab culture in 1936 that it was European, not Eastern, he was registering the identity of the Egyptian cultural elite, of which he was so distinguished a member. The same is true of the Arab cultural elite today, although the powerful current of anti-imperialist Third World ideas that has gripped the region since the early 1950s has tempered the Western edge of the dominant culture. In addition, the Arab and Islamic world remains a second-order power in terms of the production of culture, knowledge, and scholarship. Here one must be completely realistic about using the terminology of power politics to describe the situation that obtains. No Arab or Islamic scholar can afford to ignore what goes on in scholarly journals, institutes, and universities in the United States and Europe; the converse is not true. For example, there is no major journal of Arab studies published in the Arab world today, just as there is no Arab educational institution capable of challenging places like Oxford, Harvard, or UCLA in the study of the Arab world, much less in any non-Oriental subject matter. The predictable result of all this is that Oriental students (and Oriental professors) still want to come and sit at the feet of American Orientalists, and later to repeat to their local audiences the cliches I have been characterizing as Orientalist dogmas. Such a system of reproduction makes it inevitable that the Oriental scholar will use his American training to feel superior to his own people because he is able to &amp;quot;manage&amp;quot; the Orientalist system; in his relations with his superiors, the European or American Orientalists, he will remain only a &amp;quot;native informant.&amp;quot; And indeed this is his role in the West, should he be fortunate enough to remain there after his advanced training. Most elementary courses in Oriental languages are taught by &amp;quot;native informants&amp;quot; in United States universities today; also, power in the system (in universities, foundations, and the like) is held almost exclusively by non-Orientals, although the numerical ratio of Oriental to non-Oriental resident professionals does not favor the latter so overwhelmingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are all kinds of other indications of how the cultural domination is maintained, as much by Oriental consent as by direct and crude economic pressure from the United States. It is sobering to find, for instance, that while there are dozens of organizations in the United States for studying the Arab and Islamic Orient, there are none in the Orient itself for studying the United States, by far the greatest economic and political influence in the region. Worse, there are scarcely any institutes of even modest stature in the Orient devoted to study of the Orient. But all this, I think, is small in comparison with the second factor contributing to the triumph of Orientalism: the fact of consumerism in the Orient. The Arab and Islamic world as a whole is hooked into the Western market system. No one needs to be reminded that oil, the region&#039;s greatest resource, has been totally absorbed into the United States economy. By that I mean not only that the great oil companies are controlled by the American economic system; I mean also that Arab oil revenues, to say nothing of marketing, research, and industry management, are based in the United States. This has effectively made the oil-rich Arabs into huge customers of American exports: this is as true of states in the Persian Gulf as it is of Libya, Iraq, and Algeria--radical states all. My point is that the relationship is a one-sided one, with the United States a selective customer of a very few products (oil and cheap manpower, mainly), the Arabs highly diversified consumers of a vast range of United States products, material and ideological.&lt;br /&gt;
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This has had many consequences. There is a vast standardization of taste in the region, symbolized not only by transistors, blue jeans, and Coca-Cola but also by cultural images of the Orient supplied by American mass media and consumed unthinkingly by the mass television audience. The paradox of an Arab regarding himself as an &amp;quot;Arab&amp;quot; of the sort put out by Hollywood is but the simplest result of what I am referring to. Another result is that the Western market economy and its consumer orientation have produced (and are producing at an accelerating rate) a class of educated people whose intellectual formation is directed to satisfying market needs. There is a heavy emphasis on engineering, business, and economics, obviously enough; but the intelligentsia itself is auxiliary to what it considers to be the main trends stamped out in the West. Its role has been prescribed and set for it as a &amp;quot;modernizing&amp;quot; one, which means that it gives legitimacy and authority to ideas about modernization, progress, and culture that it receives from the United States for the most part. Impressive evidence for this is found in the social sciences and, surprisingly enough, among radical intellectuals whose Marxism is taken wholesale from Marx&#039;s own homogenizing view of the Third World, as I discussed it earlier in this book. So if all told there is an intellectual acquiescence in the images and doctrines of Orientalism, there is also a very powerful reinforcement of this in economic, political, and social exchange: the modern Orient, in short, participates in its own Orientalizing.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in conclusion, what of some alternative to Orientalism? Is this book an argument only &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; something, and not &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; something positive? Here and there in the course of this book I have spoken about &amp;quot;decolonializing&amp;quot; new departures in the so-called area studies--the work of Anwar Abdel Malek, the studies published by members of the Hull group on Middle Eastern studies, the innovative analyses and proposals of various scholars in Europe, the United States, and the Near East&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;See, for example, the recent work of Anwar Abdel Malek, Yves Lacoste, and the authors of essays published in &#039;&#039;Review of Middle East Studies 1 and 2&#039;&#039; (London: Ithaca Press, 1975, 1976), the various analyses of Middle Eastern politics by Noam Chomsky, and the work done by the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP). A good prospectus is provided in Gabriel Ardant, Kostas Axelos, Jacques Berque, et al., &#039;&#039;De I&#039;imperialisme a la decolonisation&#039;&#039; (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1965).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--but I have not attempted to do more than mention them or allude to them quickly. My project has been to describe a particular system of ideas, not by any means to displace the system with a new one. In addition, I have attempted to raise a whole set of questions that are relevant in discussing the problems of human experience: How does one &#039;&#039;represent&#039;&#039; other cultures? What is &#039;&#039;another&#039;&#039; culture? Is the notion of a distinct culture (or race, or religion, or civilization) a useful one, or does it always get involved either in self-congratulation (when one discusses one&#039;s own) or hostility and aggression (when one discusses the &amp;quot;other&amp;quot;)? Do cultural, religious, and racial differences matter more than socio-economic categories, or politicohistorical ones? How do ideas acquire authority, &amp;quot;normality,&amp;quot; and even the status of &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; truth? What is the role of the intellectual? Is he there to validate the culture and state of which he is a part? What importance must he give to an independent critical consciousness, an &#039;&#039;oppositional&#039;&#039; critical consciousness?&lt;br /&gt;
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I hope that some of my answers to these questions have been implicit in the foregoing, but perhaps I can speak a little more explicitly about some of them here. As I have characterized it in this study, Orientalism calls in question not only the possibility of nonpolitical scholarship but also the advisability of too close a relationship between the scholar and the state. It is equally apparent, I think, that the circumstances making Orientalism a continuingly persuasive type of thought will persist: a rather depressing matter on the whole. Nevertheless there is some rational expectation in my own mind that Orientalism need not always be so unchallenged, intellectually, ideologically, and politically, as it has been.&lt;br /&gt;
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I would not have undertaken a book of this sort if I did not also believe that there is scholarship that is not as corrupt, or at least as blind to human reality, as the kind I have been mainly depicting. Today there are many individual scholars working in such fields as Islamic history, religion, civilization, sociology, and anthropology whose production is deeply valuable as scholarship. The trouble sets in when the guild tradition of Orientalism takes over the scholar who is not vigilant, whose individual consciousness as a scholar is not on guard against &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039; all too easily handed down in the profession. Thus interesting work is most likely to be produced by scholars whose allegiance is to a discipline defined intellectually and not to a &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; like Orientalism defined either canonically, imperially, or geographically. An excellent recent instance is the anthropology of Clifford Geertz, whose interest in Islam is discrete and concrete enough to be animated by the specific societies and problems he studies and not by the rituals, preconceptions, and doctrines of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, scholars and critics who are trained in the traditional Orientalist disciplines are perfectly capable of freeing themselves from the old ideological straitjacket. Jacques Berque&#039;s and Maxime Rodinson&#039;s training ranks with the most rigorous available, but what invigorates their investigations even of traditional problems is their methodological self-consciousness. For if Orientalism has historically been too smug, too insulated, too positivistically confident in its ways and its premises, then one way of opening oneself to what one studies in or about the Orient is reflexively to submit one&#039;s method to critical scrutiny. This is what characterizes Berque and Rodinson, each in his own way. What one finds in their work is always, first of all, a direct sensitivity to the material before them, and then a continual self-examination of their methodology and practice, a constant attempt to keep their work responsive to the material and not to a doctrinal preconception. Certainly Berque and Rodinson, as well as Abdel Malek and Roger Owen, are aware too that the study of man and society--whether Oriental or not--is best conducted in the broad field of all the human sciences; therefore these scholars are critical readers, and students of what goes on in other fields. Berque&#039;s attention to recent discoveries in structural anthropology, Rodinson&#039;s to sociology and political theory, Owen&#039;s to economic history: all these are instructive correctives brought from the contemporary human sciences to the study of so-called Oriental problems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is no avoiding the fact that even if we disregard the Orientalist distinctions between &amp;quot;them&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;us,&amp;quot; a powerful series of political and ultimately ideological realities inform scholarship today. No one can escape dealing with, if not the East/West division, then the North/South one, the have/have-not one, the imperialist/anti-imperialist one, the white/colored one. We cannot get around them all by pretending they do not exist; on the contrary, contemporary Orientalism teaches us a great deal about the intellectual dishonesty of dissembling on that score, the result of which is to intensify the divisions and make them both vicious and permanent. Yet an openly polemical and right-minded &amp;quot;progressive&amp;quot; scholarship can very easily degenerate into dogmatic slumber, a prospect that is not edifying either.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
My own sense of the problem is fairly shown by the kinds of questions I formulated above. Modern thought and experience have taught us to be sensitive to what is involved in representation, in studying the Other, in racial thinking, in unthinking and uncritical acceptance of authority and authoritative ideas, in the sociopolitical role of intellectuals, in the great value of a skeptical critical consciousness. Perhaps if we remember that the study of human experience usually has an ethical, to say nothing of a political, consequence in either the best or worst sense, we will not be indifferent to what we do as scholars. And what better norm for the scholar than human freedom and knowledge? Perhaps too we should remember that the study of man in society is based on concrete human history and experience, not on donnish abstractions, or on obscure laws or arbitrary systems. The problem then is to make the study fit and in some way be shaped by the experience, which would be illuminated and perhaps changed by the study. At all costs, the goal of Orientalizing the Orient again and again is to be avoided, with consequences that cannot help but refine knowledge and reduce the scholar&#039;s conceit. Without &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; there would be scholars, critics, intellectuals, human beings, for whom the racial, ethnic, and national distinctions were less important than the common enterprise of promoting human community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Positively, I do believe--and in my other work have tried to show--that enough is being done today in the human sciences to provide the contemporary scholar with insights, methods, and ideas that could dispense with racial, ideological, and imperialist stereotypes of the sort provided during its historical ascendancy by Orientalism. I consider Orientalism&#039;s failure to have been a human as much as an intellectual one; for in having to take up a position of irreducible opposition to a region of the world it considered alien to its own, Orientalism failed to identify with human experience, failed also to see it as human experience. The worldwide hegemony of Orientalism and all it stands for can now be challenged, if we can benefit properly from the general twentieth-century rise to political and historical awareness of so many of the earth&#039;s peoples. If this book has any future use, it will be as a modest contribution to that challenge, and as a warning: that systems of thought like Orientalism, discourses of power, ideological fictions--mind-forg&#039;d manacles--are all too easily made, applied, and guarded. Above all, I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism. No former &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; will be comforted by the thought that having been an Oriental himself he is likely--too likely--to study new &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot;--or &amp;quot;Occidentals&amp;quot;--of his own making. If the knowledge of Orientalism has any meaning, it is in being a reminder of the seductive degradation of knowledge, of any knowledge, anywhere, at any time. Now perhaps more than before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Footnotes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;4.&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;&#039;Afterword&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; was completed in the last part of 1977, and was published a year later. It was (and still is) the only book that I wrote as one continuous gesture, from research, to several drafts, to final version, each following the other without interruption or serious distraction. With the exception of a wonderfully civilized and relatively burdenless year spent as a Fellow at the Stanford Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1975-6), I had very little in the way of support or interest from the outside world. I received encouragement from one or two friends and my immediate family, but it was far from clear whether such a study of the ways in which the power, scholarship, and imagination of a two-hundred-year-old tradition in Europe and America viewed the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam, &#039;&#039;might&#039;&#039; interest a general audience. I recall, for instance, that it was very difficult at first to interest a serious publisher in the project. One academic press in particular very tentatively suggested a modest contract for a small monograph, so unpromising and slender did the whole enterprise seem at the outset. But luckily (as I describe my good fortune with my first publisher in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s original page of Acknowledgments) things changed for the better very quickly after I finished writing the book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In both America and England (where a separate U.K. edition appeared in 1979) the book attracted a great deal of attention, some of it (as was to be expected) very hostile, some of it uncomprehending, but most of it positive and enthusiastic. Beginning in 1980 with the French edition, a whole series of translations started to appear, increasing in number to this day, many of which have generated controversies and discussions in languages that I am incompetent to understand. There was a remarkable and still controversial Arabic translation by the gifted Syrian poet and critic Kamal Abu Deeb; I shall say more about that in a moment. Thereafter &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; appeared in Japanese, German, Portuguese, Italian, Polish, Spanish, Catalan, Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, and Swedish (in 1993 it became a bestseller in Sweden, which mystified the local publisher as much as it did me). There are several editions (Greek, Russian, Norwegian, and Chinese) either under way or about to appear. Other European translations are rumored, as is an Israeli version, according to one or two reports. There have been partial translations pirated in Iran and Pakistan. Many of the translations that I have known about directly (in particular, the Japanese) have gone through more than one edition; all are still in print and appear on occasion to give rise to local discussions that go very far beyond anything I was thinking about when I wrote the book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The result of all this is that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, almost in a Borgesian way, has become several different books. And, insofar as I have been able to follow and understand these subsequent versions, that strange, often disquieting, and certainly unthought-of polymorphousness is what I should like to discuss here, reading back into the book that I wrote what others have said, in addition to what I myself wrote after &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; (eight or nine books plus many articles). Obviously I shall try to correct misreadings and, in a few instances, willful misinterpretations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet I shall also be rehearsing arguments and intellectual developments that acknowledge &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; to be a helpful book in ways that I foresaw only very partially at the time. The point of all this is neither to settle scores nor to heap congratulations on myself, but to chart and record a much-expanded sense of authorship that goes well beyond the egoism of the solitary beings we feel ourselves to be as we undertake a piece of work. For in all sorts of ways &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; now seems to me a collective book that I think supersedes me as its author more than I could have expected when I wrote it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let me begin with the one aspect of the book&#039;s reception that I most regret and find myself trying hardest now (in 1994) to overcome. That is the book&#039;s alleged anti-Westernism, as it has been misleadingly and rather too sonorously called by commentators both hostile and sympathetic. This notion has two parts to it, sometimes argued together, sometimes separately. The first is the claim imputed to me that the phenomenon of Orientalism is a synecdoche, or a miniature symbol, of the entire West, and indeed ought to be taken to represent the West as a whole. Since this is so, the argument continues, therefore the entire West is an enemy of the Arab and Islamic or for that matter the Iranian, Chinese, Indian, and many other non-European peoples who suffered Western colonialism and prejudice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second part of the argument ascribed to me is no less far-reaching. It is that a predatory West and Orientalism have violated Islam and the Arabs. (Note that the terms &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;West&amp;quot; have been collapsed into each other.) Since that is so, the very existence of Orientalism and Orientalists is seized upon as a pretext for arguing the exact opposite, namely, that Islam is perfect, that it is the only way &#039;&#039;(al-hal al-wahid)&#039;&#039;, and so on and so on. To criticize Orientalism, as I did in my book, is in effect to be a supporter of Islamism or Muslim fundamentalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One scarcely knows what to make of these caricatured permutations of a book that to its author and in its arguments is explicitly anti-essentialist, radically skeptical about all categorical designations such as Orient and Occident, and painstakingly careful about &#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039; &amp;quot;defending&amp;quot; or even discussing the Orient and Islam. Yet &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; has in fact been read and written about in the Arab world as a systematic defense of Islam and the Arabs, even though I say explicitly in the book that I have no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam really are. Actually I go a great deal further when, very early in the book, I say that words such as &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; correspond to no stable reality that exists as a natural fact. Moreover, all such geographical designations are an odd combination of the empirical and imaginative. In the case of the Orient as a notion in currency in Britain, France, and America, the idea derives to a great extent from the impulse not simply to describe, but also to dominate and somehow to defend against it. As I try to show, this is powerfully true with reference to Islam as a particularly dangerous embodiment of the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The central point in all this is, however, as Vico taught us, that human history is made by human beings. Since the struggle for control over territory is part of that history, so too is the struggle over historical and social meaning. The task for the critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from another, but to connect them, despite the contrast between the overpowering materiality of the former and the apparent otherworldly refinements of the latter. My way of doing this has been to show that the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another, different and competing &#039;&#039;alter ego&#039;&#039;. The construction of identity--for identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction in my opinion--involves the construction of opposites and &amp;quot;others&amp;quot; whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from &amp;quot;us.&amp;quot; Each age and society re-creates its &amp;quot;Others.&amp;quot; Far from a static thing then, identity of self or of &amp;quot;other&amp;quot; is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies. Debates today about Frenchness and Englishness in France and Britain respectively, or about Islam in countries like Egypt and Pakistan, are part of the same interpretive process, which involves the identities of different &amp;quot;others,&amp;quot; whether they be outsiders and refugees, or apostates and infidels. It should be obvious in all cases that these processes are not mental exercises but urgent social contests involving such concrete political issues as immigration laws, the legislation of personal conduct, the constitution of orthodoxy, the legitimization of violence and/or insurrection, the character and content of education, and the direction of foreign policy, which very often has to do with the designation of official enemies. In short, the construction of identity is bound up with the disposition of power and powerlessness in each society, and is therefore anything but mere academic woolgathering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What makes all these fluid and extraordinarily rich actualities difficult to accept is that most people resist the underlying notion: that human identity is not only not natural and stable, but constructed, and occasionally even invented outright. Part of the resistance and hostility generated by books like &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, or after it, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;Black Athena&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Martin Bernal, &#039;&#039;Black Athena&#039;&#039; (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, Volume I, 1987; Volume II, 1991); Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Rangers, eds., &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is that they seem to undermine the naive belief in the certain positivity and unchanging historicity of a culture, a self, a national identity. &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; can only be read as a defense of Islam by suppressing half of my argument, in which I say (as I do in a subsequent book, &#039;&#039;Covering Islam&#039;&#039;) that even the primitive community we belong to natally is not immune from the interpretive contest, and that what appears in the West to be the emergence, return to, or resurgence of Islam is in fact a struggle in Islamic societies over the definition of Islam. No one person, authority, or institution has total control over that definition; hence, of course, the contest. Fundamentalism&#039;s epistemological mistake is to think that &amp;quot;fundamentals&amp;quot; are ahistorical categories, not subject to and therefore outside the critical scrutiny of true believers, who are supposed to accept them on faith. To the adherents of a restored or revived version of early Islam, Orientalists are considered (like Salman Rushdie) to be dangerous because they tamper with that version, cast doubt on it, show it to be fraudulent and non-divine. To them, therefore, the virtues of my book were that it pointed out the malicious dangers of the Orientalists and somehow pried Islam from their clutches.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now this is hardly what I saw myself doing, but the view persists anyway. There are two reasons for this. In the first place no one finds it easy to live uncomplainingly and fearlessly with the thesis that human reality is constantly being made and unmade, and that anything like a stable essence is constantly under threat. Patriotism, extreme xenophobic nationalism, and downright unpleasant chauvinism are common responses to this fear. We all need some foundation on which to stand; the question is how extreme and unchangeable is our formulation of what this foundation is. My position is that in the case of an essential Islam or Orient, these images are no more than images, and are upheld as such both by the community of the Muslim faithful and (the correspondence is significant) by the community of Orientalists. My objection to what I have called Orientalism is not that it, is just the antiquarian study of Oriental languages, societies, and peoples, but that as a system of thought Orientalism approaches a heterogenous, dynamic, and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and from, so to speak, above. This false position hides historical change. Even more important, from my standpoint, it hides the &#039;&#039;interests&#039;&#039; of the Orientalist. Those, despite attempts to draw subtle distinctions between Orientalism as an innocent scholarly endeavor and Orientalism as an accomplice to empire, can never unilaterally be detached from the general imperial context that begins its modern global phase with Napoleon&#039;s invasion of Egypt in 1798.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have in mind the striking contrast between the weaker and stronger party that is evident from the beginning of Europe&#039;s modern encounters with what it called the Orient. The studied solemnity and grandiose accents of Napoleon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;--its massive, serried volumes testifying to the systematic labors of an entire corps of &#039;&#039;savants&#039;&#039; backed by a modern army of colonial conquest--dwarfs the individual testimony of people like Abdal-Rahman al-Jabarti, who in three separate volumes describes the French invasion from the point of view of the invaded. One might say that the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; is just a scientific, and therefore objective, account of Egypt in the early nineteenth century, but the presence of Jabarti (who is both unknown and ignored by Napoleon) suggests otherwise. Napoleon&#039;s is an &amp;quot;objective&amp;quot; account from the standpoint of someone powerful trying to hold Egypt within the French imperial orbit; Jabarti&#039;s is an account by someone who paid the price, was figuratively captured and vanquished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In other words, rather than remaining as inert documents that testify to an eternally opposed Occident and Orient, the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; and Jabarti&#039;s chronicles together constitute a historical experience, out of which others evolved, and before which others existed. Studying the historical dynamics of this set of experiences is more demanding than sliding back into stereotypes like &amp;quot;the conflict of East and West.&amp;quot; That is one reason why &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is mistakenly read as a surreptitiously anti-Western work and, by an act of unwarranted and even willful retrospective endowment, this reading (like all readings based on a supposedly stable binary opposition) elevates the image of an innocent and aggrieved Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second reason why the anti-essentialism of my arguments has proved hard to accept is political and urgently ideological. I had absolutely no way of knowing that, a year after the book was published, Iran would be the site of an extraordinarily far-reaching Islamic revolution, nor that the battle between Israel and the Palestinians would take such savage and protracted forms, from the 1982 invasion of Lebanon to the onset of the &#039;&#039;intifada&#039;&#039; in late 1987. The end of the Cold War did not mute, much less terminate, the apparently unending conflict between East and West as represented by the Arabs and Islam on one side and the Christian West on the other. More recent, but no less acute, contests developed as a result of the Soviet Union&#039;s invasion of Afghanistan; the challenge to the &#039;&#039;status quo&#039;&#039; during the 1980s and &#039;90s made by Islamic groups in countries as diverse as Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and the Occupied Territories, and the various American and European responses: the creation of Islamic brigades to fight the Russians from bases in Pakistan; the Gulf War; the continued support of Israel; and the emergence of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a topic of alarmed, if not always precise and informed, journalism and scholarship. All this inflamed the sense of persecution felt by people forced, on an almost daily basis, to declare themselves to be either Westerners or Easterners. No one seemed to be free from the opposition between &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;them,&amp;quot; which resulted in a sense of reinforced, deepened, hardened identity that has not been particularly edifying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such a turbulent context &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s fate was both fortunate and unfortunate. To those in the Arab and Islamic world who felt Western encroachment with anxiety and stress, it appeared to be the first book that gave a serious answer back to a West that had never actually listened to or forgiven the Oriental for being an Oriental at all. I recall one early Arabic review of the book that described its author as a champion of Arabism, a defender of the downtrodden and abused, whose mission was to engage Western authorities in a kind of epic and romantic &#039;&#039;mano-a-mano&#039;&#039;. Despite the exaggeration, it did convey some real sense of the West&#039;s enduring hostility, as felt by Arabs, and it also conveyed a response that many educated Arabs felt was appropriate.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I will not deny that I &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; aware, when writing the book, of the subjective truth insinuated by Marx in the little sentence I quoted as one of the book&#039;s epigraphs (&amp;quot;They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.&amp;quot;), which is that if you feel you have been denied the chance to speak your piece, you will try extremely hard to get that chance. For indeed, the subaltern &#039;&#039;can&#039;&#039; speak, as the history of liberation movements in the twentieth century eloquently attests. But I never felt that I was perpetuating the hostility between two rival political and cultural monolithic blocks, whose construction I was describing and whose terrible effects I was trying to reduce. On the contrary, as I said earlier, the Orient versus Occident opposition was both misleading and highly undesirable; the less it was given credit for actually describing anything more than a fascinating history of interpretations and of contesting interests, the better. I am happy to record that many readers in Britain and America, as well as in English-speaking Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Caribbean, saw the book as stressing the actualities of what was later to be called multiculturalism, rather than xenophobia and aggressive, race-oriented nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; has been thought of rather more as a kind of testimonial to subaltern status--the wretched of the earth talking back--than a multicultural critique of power using knowledge to advance itself. Thus, as its author I have been seen as playing an assigned role: that of a self-representing consciousness of what had formerly been suppressed and distorted in the learned texts of a discourse specifically designed to be read not by Orientals but by other Westerners. This is an important point, and it adds to the sense of fixed identities battling across a permanent divide that my book quite specifically abjures, but which it paradoxically presupposes and depends on. None of the Orientalists I write about seems ever to have intended an Oriental as a reader. The discourse of Orientalism, its internal consistency, and its rigorous procedures were all designed for readers and consumers in the metropolitan West. This goes as much for people I genuinely admire, like Edward Lane and Gustave Flaubert, who were fascinated by Egypt, as it does for haughty colonial administrators, like Lord Cromer, brilliant scholars, like Ernest Renan, and baronial aristocrats, like Arthur Balfour, all of whom condescended to and disliked the Orientals they either ruled or studied. I must confess to a certain pleasure in listening in, uninvited, to their various pronouncements and inter-Orientalist discussions, and an equal pleasure in making known my findings both to Europeans and non-Europeans. I have no doubt that this was made possible because I traversed the imperial East-West divide, entered into the life of the West, and yet retained some organic connection with the place from which I originally came. I would repeat that this is very much a procedure of crossing, rather than maintaining, barriers; I believe &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; as a book shows it, especially at moments when I speak of humanistic study as seeking ideally to go beyond coercive limitations on thought toward a non-dominative, and non-essentialist, type of learning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These considerations did in fact add to the pressures on my book to represent a sort of testament of wounds and a record of sufferings, the recital of which was felt as a long overdue striking back at the West. I deplore so simple a characterization of a work that is--here I am not going to be falsely modest--quite nuanced and discriminating in what it says about different people, different periods, and different styles of Orientalism. Each of my analyses varies the picture, increases the difference and discriminations, separates authors and periods from each other, even though all pertain to Orientalism. To read my analyses of Chateaubriand and Flaubert, or of Burton and Lane, with exactly the same emphasis, deriving the same reductive message from the banal formula &amp;quot;an attack on Western civilization&amp;quot; is, I believe, to be both simplistic and wrong. But I also believe that it is entirely correct to read recent Orientalist authorities, such as the almost comically persistent Bernard Lewis, as the politically motivated and hostile witnesses that their suave accents and unconvincing displays of learning attempt to hide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, then, we are back to the political and historical context of the book, which I do not pretend is irrelevant to its contents. One of the most generously perspicacious and intelligently discriminating statements of that conjuncture was laid out in a review by Basim Musallam (MERIP, 1979). He begins by comparing my book with an earlier demystification of Orientalism by the Lebanese scholar Michael Rustum in 1895 &#039;&#039;(Kitab al-Gharib fi al-Gharb)&#039;&#039;, but then says that the main difference between us is that my book is about loss, whereas Rustum&#039;s is not:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rustum writes as a free man and a member of a free society: a Syrian, Arab by speech, citizen of a still-independent Ottoman state unlike Michael Rustum, Edward Said has no generally accepted identity, his very &#039;&#039;people&#039;&#039; are in dispute. It is possible that Edward&#039; Said and his generation sometimes feel that they stand on nothing more solid than the remnants of the destroyed society of Michael Rustum&#039;s Syria, and on memory. Others in Asia and Africa have had their successes in this age of national liberation; here, in painful contrast, there has been desperate resistance against overwhelming odds and, until now, defeat. It is not just any &amp;quot;Arab&amp;quot; who wrote this book, but one with a particular background and experience. (22)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Musallam correctly notes that an Algerian would not have written the same kind of generally pessimistic book, especially one like mine that does very little with the history of French relations with North Africa, Algeria most particularly. So while I would accept the overall impression that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is written out of an extremely concrete history of personal loss and national disintegration--only a few years before I wrote &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; Golda Meir made her notorious and deeply Orientalist comment about there being no Palestinian people--I would also like to add that neither in this book, nor in the two that immediately followed it, &#039;&#039;The Question of Palestine&#039;&#039; (1980) and &#039;&#039;Covering Islam&#039;&#039; (1981), did I want only to suggest a political program of restored identity and resurgent nationalism. There was, of course, an attempt in both of the later books to supply what was missing in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, namely a sense of what an alternative picture of parts of the Orient--Palestine and Islam respectively--might be from a personal point of view.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in all my works I remained fundamentally critical of a gloating and uncritical nationalism. The picture of Islam that I represented was not one of assertive discourse and dogmatic orthodoxy, but was based instead on the idea that communities of interpretation exist within and outside the Islamic world, communicating with each other in a dialogue of equals. My view of Palestine, formulated originally in &#039;&#039;The Question of Palestine&#039;&#039;, remains the same today: I expressed all sorts of reservations about the insouciant nativism and militant militarism of the nationalist consensus; I suggested instead a critical look at the Arab environment, Palestinian history, and the Israeli realities, with the explicit conclusion that only a negotiated settlement between the two communities of suffering, Arab and Jewish, would provide respite from the unending war. (I should mention in passing that although my book on Palestine was given a fine Hebrew translation in the early 1980s by Mifras, a small Israeli publishing house, it remains untranslated into Arabic to this day. Every Arabic publisher who was interested in the book wanted me to change or delete those sections that were openly critical of one or another Arab regime (including the PLO), a request that I have always refused to comply with.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I regret to say that the Arabic reception of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, despite Kamal Abu Deeb&#039;s remarkable translation, still managed to ignore that aspect of my book which diminished the nationalist fervor that some implied from my critique of Orientalism, which I associated with those drives to domination and control also to be found in imperialism. Abu Deeb&#039;s painstaking translation was an almost total avoidance of Arabized Western expressions; technical words like &#039;&#039;discourse, simulacrum, paradigm&#039;&#039;, or &#039;&#039;code&#039;&#039; were rendered from within the classical rhetoric of the Arab tradition. His idea was to place my work inside one fully formed tradition, as if it were addressing another from a perspective of cultural adequacy and equality. In this way, he reasoned, it was possible to show that just as one could advance an epistemological critique from within the Western tradition, so too could one do it from within the Arabic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the sense of fraught confrontation between an often emotionally defined Arab world and an even more emotionally experienced Western world drowned out the fact that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; was meant to be a study in critique, not an affirmation of warring and hopelessly antithetical identities. Moreover, the actuality I described in the book&#039;s last pages, of one powerful discursive system maintaining hegemony over another, was intended as the opening salvo in a debate that might stir Arab readers and critics to engage more determinedly with the system of Orientalism. I was either upbraided for not having paid closer attention to Marx--the passages on Marx&#039;s own Orientalism in my book were the most singled out by dogmatic critics in the Arab world and India, for instance--whose system of thought was claimed to have risen above his obvious prejudices, or I was criticized for not appreciating the great achievements of Orientalism, the West, etc. As with defenses of Islam, recourse to Marxism or &amp;quot;the West&amp;quot; as a coherent total system seems to me to have been a case of using one orthodoxy to shoot down another.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between Arab and other responses to &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is, I think, an accurate indication of how decades of loss, frustration, and the absence of democracy have affected intellectual and cultural life in the Arab region. I intended my book as part of a pre-existing current of thought whose purpose was to liberate intellectuals from the shackles of systems such as Orientalism: I wanted readers to make use of my work so they might then produce new studies of their own that would illuminate the historical experience of Arabs and others in a generous, enabling mode. That certainly happened in Europe, the United States, Australia, the Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean, Ireland, Latin America, and parts of Africa. The invigorated study of Africanist and Indological discourses; the analyses of subaltern history; the reconfiguration of post-colonial anthropology, political science, art history, literary criticism, musicology, in addition to the vast new developments in feminist and minority discourses--to all these, I am pleased and flattered that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; often made a difference. That does not seem to have been the case (insofar as I can judge it) in the Arab world, where, partly because my work is correctly perceived as Eurocentric in its texts, and partly because, as Musallam says, the battle for cultural survival is too engrossing, books like mine are interpreted less usefully, productively speaking, and more as defensive gestures either for or against the &amp;quot;West.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet among American and British academics of a decidedly rigorous and unyielding stripe, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, and indeed all of my other work, has come in for disapproving attacks because of its &amp;quot;residual&amp;quot; humanism, its theoretical inconsistencies, its insufficient, perhaps even sentimental, treatment of agency. I am glad that it has! &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is a partisan book, not a theoretical machine. No one has convincingly shown that individual effort is not at some profoundly unteachable level both eccentric and, in Gerard Manley Hopkins&#039;s sense, &#039;&#039;original&#039;&#039;; this despite the existence of systems of thought, discourses, and hegemonies, (although none of them are in fact seamless, perfect, or inevitable). The interest I took in Orientalism as a cultural phenomenon (like the culture of imperialism I talk about in &#039;&#039;Culture and Imperialism&#039;&#039;, its 1993 sequel) derives from its variability and unpredictability, both qualities that give writers like Massignon and Burton their surprising force, and even attractiveness. What I tried to preserve in what I analyzed of Orientalism was its combination of consistency &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; inconsistency, its play, so to speak, which can only be rendered by preserving for oneself as writer and critic the right to some emotional force, the right to be moved, angered, surprised, and even delighted. This is why, in the debate between Gayan Prakash, on the one hand, and Rosalind O&#039;Hanlon and David Washbrook, on the other, I think Prakash&#039;s more mobile post-structuralism has to be given its due.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;O&#039;Hanlon and Washbrook, &amp;quot;After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World;&amp;quot; Prakash, &amp;quot;Can the Subaltern Ride? A Reply to O&#039;Hanlon and Washbrook,&amp;quot; both in &#039;&#039;Comparative Studies in Society and History&#039;&#039;, IV, 9 (January 1992), 141-184.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; By the same token the work of Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, and Ashis Nandy, predicated on the sometimes dizzying subjective relationships engendered by colonialism, cannot be gainsaid for &#039;&#039;its&#039;&#039; contribution to our understanding of the humanistic traps laid by systems such as Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let me conclude this survey of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s critical transmutations with a mention of the one group of people who were, not unexpectedly, the most exercised and vociferous in responding to my book, the Orientalists themselves. They were not my &#039;&#039;principal&#039;&#039; intended audience at all; I had in mind casting some light on their practices so as to make other humanists aware of one field&#039;s particular procedures and genealogy. The word &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; itself has been for too long confined to a professional specialty; I tried to show was its application and existence in the general culture, in literature, ideology, and social as well as political attitudes. To speak of someone as an Oriental, as the Orientalists did, was not just to designate that person as someone whose language, geography, and history were the stuff of learned treatises: it also was often meant as a derogatory expression signifying a lesser breed of human being. This is not to deny that for artists like Nerval and Segalen the word &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; was wonderfully, ingeniously connected to exoticism, glamour, mystery, and promise. But it was also a sweeping historical generalization. In addition to these uses of the words &#039;&#039;Orient, Oriental&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, the term &#039;&#039;Orientalist&#039;&#039; also came to represent the erudite, scholarly, mainly academic specialist in the languages and histories of the East. Yet, as the late Albert Hourani wrote me in March 1992, a few months before his untimely and much regretted death, due to the force of my argument (for which he said he could not reproach me), my book had the unfortunate effect of making it almost impossible to use the term &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; in a neutral sense, so much had it become a term of abuse. He concluded that he would have still liked to retain the word for use in describing &amp;quot;a limited, rather dull but valid discipline of scholarship.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In his generally balanced 1979 review of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, Hourani formulated one of his objections by suggesting that while I singled out the exaggerations, racism, and hostility of much Orientalist writing, I neglected to mention its numerous scholarly and humanistic achievements. Names that he brought up included Marshall Hodgson, Claude Cohen, and Andre Raymond, all of whose accomplishments (along with the German authors who come up &#039;&#039;de rigueur&#039;&#039;) should be acknowledged as real contributors to human knowledge. This does not, however, conflict with what I say in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, with the difference that I do insist on the prevalence in the discourse itself of a structure of attitudes that cannot simply be waved away of discounted. Nowhere do I argue that Orientalism is evil, or sloppy, or uniformly the same in the work of each Orientalist. But I do say that the &#039;&#039;guild&#039;&#039; of Orientalists has a specific history of complicity with imperial power, which it would be Panglossian to call irrelevant.&lt;br /&gt;
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So while I sympathize with Hourani&#039;s plea, I have serious doubts whether the notion of Orientalism properly understood can ever, in fact, be completely detached from its rather more complicated and not always flattering circumstances. I suppose that one can imagine at the limit that a specialist in Ottoman or Fatimid archives is an Orientalist in Hourani&#039;s sense, but we are still required to ask where, how, and with what supporting institutions and agencies such studies take place &#039;&#039;today&#039;&#039;? Many who wrote after my book appeared asked exactly those questions of even the most recondite and otherworldly scholars, with sometimes devastating results.&lt;br /&gt;
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Still, there has been one sustained attempt to mount an argument whose purport is that a critique of Orientalism (mine in particular) is both meaningless and somehow a violation of the very idea of disinterested scholarship. That attempt is made by Bernard Lewis, about whom I had devoted a few critical pages in my book. Fifteen years after &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; appeared, Lewis produced a series of essays, some of them collected in a book entitled &#039;&#039;Islam and the West&#039;&#039;, one of whose main sections is an attack on me, which he surrounds with chapters and other essays that mobilize a set of lax and characteristically Orientalist formulas--Muslims are enraged at modernity, Islam never made the separation between church and state, and so on and on--all of them pronounced with an extreme level of generalization and with scarcely a mention of the differences between individual Muslims, between Muslim societies, or between Muslim traditions and eras. Since Lewis has in a sense appointed himself a spokesman for the guild of Orientalists on which my critique was originally based, it may be worth spending a little more time on his procedures. His ideas are, alas, fairly current among his acolytes and imitators, whose job seems to be to alert Western consumers to the threat of an enraged, congenitally undemocratic and violent Islamic world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lewis&#039;s verbosity scarcely conceals both the ideological underpinnings of his position and his extraordinary capacity for getting nearly everything wrong. Of course, these are familiar attributes of the Orientalists&#039; breed, some of whom have at least had the courage to be honest in their active denigration of Islamic, as well as other non-European, peoples. Not Lewis. He proceeds by distorting the truth, by making false analogies, and by innuendo, methods to which he adds that veneer of omniscient tranquil authority which he supposes is the way scholars talk. Take as a typical example the analogy he draws between my critique of Orientalism and a hypothetical attack on studies of classical antiquity, an attack which, he says, would be a foolish activity. It would be, of course, but then Orientalism and Hellenism are radically incomparable. The former is an attempt to describe a whole region of the world as an accompaniment to that region&#039;s colonial conquest, the latter is not at all about the direct colonial conquest of Greece in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; in addition, Orientalism expresses antipathy to Islam, Hellenism sympathy for classical Greece.&lt;br /&gt;
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Additionally, the present political moment, with its reams of racist anti-Arab and anti-Muslim stereotypes (and no attacks on classical Greece), allows Lewis to deliver ahistorical and willful political assertions in the form of scholarly argument, a practice thoroughly in keeping with the least creditable aspects of old-fashioned colonialist Orientalism.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;In one particularly telling instance, Lewis&#039;s habits of tendentious generalization do seem to have gotten him in legal trouble. According to &#039;&#039;Liberation&#039;&#039; (March 1, 1994) and the &#039;&#039;Guardian&#039;&#039; (March 8, 1994), Lewis now faces both criminal and civil suits brought against him in France by Armenian and human rights organizations. He is being charged under the same statute that makes it a crime in France to deny that the Nazi Holocaust took place; the charge against him is denying (in French newspapers) that a genocide of Armenians took place under the Ottoman empire.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Lewis&#039;s work therefore is part of the present political, rather than purely intellectual, environment.&lt;br /&gt;
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To imply, as he does, that the branch of Orientalism dealing with Islam and the Arabs is a learned discipline that can therefore be compared with classical philology is as appropriate as comparing one of the many Israeli Arabists and Orientalists who have worked for the occupation authorities of the West Bank and Gaza with scholars like Wilamowitz or Mommsen. On the one hand Lewis wishes to reduce Islamic Orientalism to the status of an innocent and enthusiastic department of scholarship; on the other he wishes to pretend that Orientalism is too complex, various, and technical to exist in a form for any non-Orientalist (like myself and many others) to criticize. Lewis&#039;s tactic here is to suppress a significant amount of history. As I suggest, European interest in Islam derived not from curiosity but from fear of a monotheistic, culturally and militarily formidable competitor to Christianity. The earliest European scholars of Islam, as numerous historians have shown, were medieval polemicists writing to ward off the threat of Muslim hordes and apostasy. In one way or another that combination of fear and hostility has persisted to the present day, both in scholarly and non-scholarly attention to an Islam which is viewed as belonging to a part of the world--the Orient--counterposed imaginatively, geographically, and historically &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; Europe and the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most interesting problems about Islamic or Arabic Orientalism are, first, the forms taken by the medieval vestiges that persist so tenaciously, and, second, the history and sociology of connections between Orientalism and the societies that produced it. There are strong &#039;&#039;affiliations&#039;&#039; between Orientalism and the literary imagination, for example, as well as the imperial consciousness. What is striking about many periods of European history is the traffic between what scholars and specialists wrote and what poets, novelists, politicians, and journalists then said about Islam. In addition--and this is the crucial point that Lewis refuses to deal with--there is a remarkable (but nonetheless intelligible) parallel between the rise of modern Orientalist scholarship and the acquisition of vast Eastern empires by Britain and France.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although the connection between a routine British classical education and the extension of the British empire is more complex than Lewis might suppose, no more glaring parallel exists between power and knowledge in the modern history of philology than in the case of Orientalism. Much of the information and knowledge about Islam and the Orient that was used by the colonial powers to justify their colonialism derived from Orientalist scholarship: a recent study by many contributors, &#039;&#039;Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; edited by Carl A. Breckenridge and Peter Van der Veer, demonstrates with copious documentation how Orientalist knowledge was used in the colonial administration of South Asia. A fairly consistent interchange still continues between area scholars, such as Orientalists, and government departments of foreign affairs. In addition, many of the stereotypes of Islamic and Arabic sensuality, sloth, fatalism, cruelty, degradation, and splendor to be found in writers from John Buchan to V.S. Naipaul have also been presuppositions underlying the adjoining field of academic Orientalism. In contrast, the trade in cliches between Indology and Sinology, on the one hand, and general culture, on the other, is not quite as flourishing, although there are relationships and borrowings to be noted. Nor is there much similarity between what obtains among Western experts in Sinology and Indology and the fact that many professional scholars of Islam in Europe and the United States spend their lives studying the subject, yet still find it an impossible religion and culture to like, much less admire.&lt;br /&gt;
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To say, as Lewis and his imitators do, that all such observations are only a matter of espousing &amp;quot;fashionable causes&amp;quot; is not quite to address the question of why, for example, so many Islamic specialists were and still are routinely consulted by, and actively work for, governments whose designs in the Islamic world are economic exploitation, domination, or outright aggression, or why so many scholars of Islam--like Lewis himself--voluntarily feel that it is part of their duty to mount attacks on modern Arab or Islamic peoples with the pretense that &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Islamic culture can nevertheless be the object of disinterested scholarly concern. The spectacle of specialists in the history of medieval Islamic guilds being sent on State Department missions to brief area embassies on United States security interests in the Persian Gulf does not spontaneously suggest anything resembling the love of Hellas ascribed by Lewis to the supposedly cognate field of classical philology.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is therefore not surprising that the field of Islamic and Arabic Orientalism, always ready to deny its complicity with state power, had never until very recently produced an internal critique of the affiliations I have just been describing, and that Lewis can utter the amazing statement that a criticism of Orientalism would be &amp;quot;meaningless.&amp;quot; It is also not surprising that, with a few exceptions, most of the negative criticism my work has elicited from &amp;quot;specialists&amp;quot; has been, like Lewis&#039;s, no more than banal description of a barony violated by a crude trespasser. The only specialists (again with a few exceptions) who attempted to deal with what I discuss--which is not only the content of Orientalism, but its relationships, affiliations, political tendencies, and worldview--were Sinologists, Indologists, and the younger generation of Middle East scholars, susceptible to newer influences and also to the political arguments that the critique of Orientalism entailed. One example is Benjamin Schwartz of Harvard, who used the occasion of his 1982 presidential address to the Asian Studies Association not only to disagree with some of my criticism, but also to welcome my arguments intellectually.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many of the senior Arabists and Islamicists have responded with the aggrieved outrage that is for them a substitute for self-reflection; most use words such as &amp;quot;malign,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;dishonor,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;libel,&amp;quot; as if criticism itself were an impermissible violation of their sacrosanct academic preserve. In Lewis&#039;s case the defense offered is an act of conspicuous bad faith, since more than most Orientalists he has been a passionate political partisan against Arab (and other) causes in such places as the U.S. Congress, &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, and elsewhere. The proper response to him must therefore include an account of what politically and sociologically he is all about when he pretends to be defending the &amp;quot;honor&amp;quot; of his field, a defense which, it will be evident enough, is an elaborate confection of ideological half-truths designed to mislead non-specialist readers.&lt;br /&gt;
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In short, the relationship between Islamic or Arab Orientalism and modern European culture can be studied without at the same time cataloguing every Orientalist who ever lived, every Orientalist tradition, or everything written by Orientalists, then lumping them together as rotten and worthless imperialism. I never did that anyway. It is beknighted to say that Orientalism is a conspiracy or to suggest that &amp;quot;the West&amp;quot; is evil: both are among the egregious fatuities that Lewis and one of his epigones, the Iraqi publicist K. Makiya, have had the temerity to ascribe to me. On the other hand it is hypocritical to suppress the cultural, political, ideological, and institutional contexts in which people write, think, and talk about the Orient, whether they are scholars or not. And as I said earlier, it is extremely important to understand that the reason Orientalism is opposed by so many thoughtful non-Westerners is that its modern discourse is correctly perceived as a discourse of power originating in an era of colonialism, the subject of an excellent recent symposium &#039;&#039;Colonialism and Culture&#039;&#039;, edited by Nicholas B. Dirks.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In this kind of discourse, based mainly upon the assumption that Islam is monolithic and unchanging and therefore marketable by &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; for powerful domestic political interests, neither Muslims nor Arabs nor any of the other dehumanized lesser peoples recognize themselves as human beings or their observers as simple scholars. Most of all they see in the discourse of modern Orientalism and its counterparts in similar knowledges constructed for Native Americans and Africans a chronic tendency to deny, suppress, or distort the cultural context of such systems of thought in order to maintain the fiction of its scholarly disinterest.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Yet I would not want to suggest that, current though such views as Lewis&#039;s may be, they are the only ones that have either emerged or been reinforced during the past decade and a half. Yes, it is true that ever since the demise of the Soviet Union there has been a rush by some scholars and journalists in the United States to find in an Orientalized Islam a new empire of evil. Consequently, both the electronic and print media have been awash with demeaning stereotypes that lump together Islam and terrorism, or Arabs and violence, or the Orient and tyranny. And there has also been a return in various parts of the Middle and Far East to nativist religion and primitive nationalism, one particularly disgraceful aspect of which is the continuing Iranian &#039;&#039;fatwa&#039;&#039; against Salman Rushdie. But this isn&#039;t the whole picture, and what I want to do in the remaining part of this essay is to talk about new trends in scholarship, criticism, and interpretation that, although they accept the basic premises of my book, go well beyond it in ways, I think, that enrich our sense of the complexity of historical experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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None of those trends has emerged out of the blue, of course; nor have they gained the status of fully established knowledges and practices. The worldly context remains both perplexingly stirred-up and ideologically fraught, volatile, tense, changeable, and even murderous. Even though the Soviet Union has been dismembered and the Eastern European countries have attained political independence, patterns of power and dominance remain unsettlingly in evidence. The global south--once referred to romantically and even emotionally as the Third World--is enmeshed in a debt trap, broken into dozens of fractured or incoherent entities, beset with problems of poverty, disease, and underdevelopment that have increased in the past ten or fifteen years. Gone are the non-Aligned movement and the charismatic leaders who undertook decolonization and independence. An alarming pattern of ethnic conflict and local wars, not confined to the global south, as the tragic case of the Bosnians attests, has sprung up all over again. And in places like Central America, the Middle East, and Asia, the United States still remains the dominant power, with an anxious and still un-unified Europe straggling behind.&lt;br /&gt;
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Explanations for the current world scene and attempts to comprehend it culturally and politically have emerged in some strikingly dramatic ways. I have already mentioned fundamentalism. The secular equivalents are a return to nationalism and theories that stress the radical distinction--a falsely all-inclusive one, I believe--between different cultures and civilizations. Recently, for example, Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard University advanced the far from convincing proposition that Cold War bipolarism has been superseded by what he called the clash of civilizations, a thesis based on the premise that Western, Confucian, and Islamic civilizations, among several others, were rather like watertight compartments whose adherents were at bottom mainly interested in fending off all the others.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;quot;The Clash of Civilizations,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Foreign Affairs&#039;&#039; 71, 3 (Summer 1993), 22-49.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is preposterous, since one of the great advances in modern cultural theory is the realization, almost universally acknowledged, that cultures are hybrid and heterogenous and, as I argued in &#039;&#039;Culture and Imperialism&#039;&#039;, that cultures and civilizations are so interrelated and interdependent as to beggar any unitary or simply delineated description of their individuality. How can one today speak of &amp;quot;Western civilization&amp;quot; except as in large measure an ideological fiction, implying a sort of detached superiority for a handful of values and ideas, none of which has much meaning outside the history of conquest, immigration, travel, and the mingling of peoples that gave the Western nations their present mixed identities? This is especially true of the United States, which today cannot seriously be described except as an enormous palimpsest of different races and cultures sharing a problematic history of conquests, exterminations, and of course major cultural and political achievements. And this was one of the implied messages of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, that any attempt to force cultures and peoples into separate and distinct breeds or essences exposes not only the misrepresentations and falsifications that ensue, but also the way in which understanding is complicit with the power to produce such things as the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; or the &amp;quot;West.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Not that Huntington, and behind him all the theorists and apologists of an exultant Western tradition, like Francis Fukuyama, haven&#039;t retained a good deal of their hold on the public consciousness. They have, as is evident in the symptomatic case of Paul Johnson, once a Left intellectual, now a retrograde social and political polemicist. In the April 18, 1993, issue of &#039;&#039;The New York Times Magazine&#039;&#039;, by no means a marginal publication, Johnson published an essay entitled &amp;quot;Colonialism&#039;s Back--And Not a Moment Too Soon,&amp;quot; whose main idea was that &amp;quot;the civilized nations&amp;quot; ought to take it upon themselves to re-colonize Third World countries &amp;quot;where the most basic conditions of civilized life had broken down,&amp;quot; and to do this by means of a system of imposed trusteeships. His model is explicitly a nineteenth century colonial one where, he says, in order for the Europeans to trade profitably they had to impose political order.&lt;br /&gt;
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Johnson&#039;s argument has numerous subterranean echoes in the works of U.S. policy-makers, the media, and of course U.S. foreign policy itself, which remains interventionist in the Middle East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and frankly missionary everywhere else, especially with regard to its policies toward Russia and; the former Soviet republics. The important point, however, is that a largely unexamined but serious rift has opened in the public consciousness between the old ideas of Western hegemony (of which the system of Orientalism was a part) on the one hand, and newer ideas that have taken hold among subaltern and disadvantaged communities and among a wide sector of intellectuals, academics, and artists, on the other. It is now very strikingly no longer the case that the lesser peoples--formerly colonized, enslaved, suppressed--are silent or unaccounted for except by senior European or American males. There has been a revolution in the consciousness of women, minorities, and marginals so powerful as to affect mainstream thinking worldwide. Although I had some sense of it when I was working on &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; in the 1970s, it is now so dramatically apparent as to demand the attention of everyone seriously concerned with the scholarly and theoretical study of culture.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two broad currents can be distinguished: post-colonialism and post-modernism, both in their use of the word &amp;quot;post&amp;quot; suggesting not so much the sense of going beyond but rather, as Ella Shohat puts it in a seminal article on the post-colonial, suggesting &amp;quot;continuities and discontinuities, but its emphasis is on the new modes and forms of the old colonialist practices, not on a &#039;beyond&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Notes on the &#039;Post-Colonial&#039;,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Social Text&#039;&#039;, 31/32 (1992), 106.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Both post-colonialism and post-modernism emerged as related topics of engagement and investigation during the 1980s and, in many instances, seemed to take account of such works as &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; as antecedents. It would be impossible here to get into the immense terminological debates that surround both words, some of them dwelling at length on whether the phrases should or should not be hyphenated. The point here is therefore not to talk about isolated instances of excess or risible jargon, but to locate those currents and efforts which, from the perspective of a book published in 1978, seem to some extent now to involve it in 1994.&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the most compelling work on the new political and economic order has concerned what, in a recent article, Harry Magdoff has described as &amp;quot;globalization,&amp;quot; a system by which a small financial elite expanded its power over the whole globe, inflating commodity and service prices, redistributing wealth from lower income sectors (usually in the non-Western world) to the higher-income ones.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Magdoff, &amp;quot;Globalisation-To What End?,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Socialist Register 1992: New World Order?&#039;&#039;, ed. Ralph Milliband and Leo Panitch (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992), 1-32.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Along with this, as discussed in astringent terms by Masao Miyoshi and Arif Dirlik, there has emerged a new transnational order in which states no longer have borders, labor and income are subject only to global managers, and colonialism has reappeared in the subservience of the South to the North.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Miyoshi, &amp;quot;A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Trans-nationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Critical Inquiry&#039;&#039;, 19, 4 (Summer 1993), 726-51; Dirlik, &amp;quot;The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Critical Inquiry&#039;&#039;, 20, 2 (Winter 1994), 328-56.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Both Miyoshi and Dirlik go on to show how the interest of Western academics in subjects such as multiculturalism and &amp;quot;post-coloniality&amp;quot; can in fact be a cultural and intellectual retreat from the new realities of global power: &amp;quot;What we need,&amp;quot; Miyoshi says, &amp;quot;is a rigorous political and economic scrutiny rather than a gesture of pedagogic expediency,&amp;quot; exemplified by the &amp;quot;liberal self-deception&amp;quot; contained in such new fields as cultural studies and multiculturalism (751).&lt;br /&gt;
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But even if we take such injunctions seriously (as we must), there is a solid basis in historical experience for the appearance today of interest in both post-modernism and its quite different counterpart post-colonialism. There is first of all the much greater Eurocentric bias in the former, and a preponderance of theoretical and aesthetic emphasis stressing the local and the contingent, as well as the almost decorative weightlessness of history, pastiche, and above all consumerism. The earliest studies of the post-colonial were by such distinguished thinkers as Anwar Abdel Malek, Samir Amin, and C. L. R. James, almost all based on studies of domination and control done from the standpoint of either a completed political independence or an incomplete liberationist project. Yet whereas post-modernism in one of its most famous programmatic statements (Jean-Francois Lyotard&#039;s) stresses the disappearance of the grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment, the emphasis behind much of the work done by the first generation of post-colonial artists and scholars is exactly the opposite: the grand narratives remain, even though their implementation and realization are at present in abeyance, deferred, or circumvented. This crucial difference between the urgent historical and political imperatives of post-colonialism and post-modernism&#039;s relative detachment makes for altogether different approaches and results, although some overlap between them (in the technique of &amp;quot;magical realism,&amp;quot; for example) does exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I think it would be wrong to suggest that in much of the best post-colonial work that has proliferated so dramatically since the early 1980s there hasn&#039;t been a great emphasis on the local, regional, and contingent: there has, but it seems to me to be most interestingly connected in its general approach to a universal set of concerns, all of them having to do with emancipation, revisionist attitudes toward history and culture, and a widespread use of recurring theoretical models and styles. A leading motif has been the consistent critique of Eurocentrism and patriarchy. Across U.S. and European campuses in the 1980s students and faculty alike worked assiduously to expand the academic focus of so-called core curricula to include writing by women, non-European artists and thinkers, and subalterns. This was accompanied by important changes in the approach to area studies, long in the hands of classical Orientalists and their equivalents. Anthropology, political science, literature, sociology, and above all history felt the effects of a wide-ranging critique of sources, the introduction of theory, and the dislodgement of the Eurocentric perspective. Perhaps the most brilliant revisionist work was done not in Middle East Studies, but in the field of Indology with the advent of Subaltern Studies, a group of remarkable scholars and researchers led by Ranajit Guha. Their aim was nothing less than a revolution in historiography, their immediate goal being to rescue the writing of Indian history from the domination of the nationalist elite and restore to it the important role of the urban poor and the rural masses. I think it would be wrong to say of such mostly academic work only that it was easily co-optable and complicit with &amp;quot;transnational&amp;quot; neo-colonialism. We need to record and acknowledge the achievement while warning of the later pitfalls.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What has been of special interest for me has been the extension of post-colonial concerns to the problems of geography. After all, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is a study based on the re-thinking of what had for centuries been believed to be an unbridgeable chasm separating East from West. My aim, as I said earlier, was not so much to dissipate difference itself--for who can deny the constitutive role of national as well as cultural differences in the relations between human beings--but to challenge the notion that difference implies hostility, a frozen reified set of opposed essences, and a whole adversarial knowledge built out of those things. What I called for in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; was a new way of conceiving the separations and conflicts that had stimulated generations of hostility, war, and imperial control. And indeed, one of the most interesting developments in post-colonial studies was a re-reading of the canonical cultural works, not to demote or somehow dish dirt on them, but to re-investigate some of their assumptions, going beyond the stifling hold on them of some version of the master-slave binary dialectic. This has certainly been the comparable effect of astoundingly resourceful novels such as Rusdie&#039;s &#039;&#039;Midnight&#039;s Children&#039;&#039;, the narratives of C. L. R. James, the poetry of Aime Cesaire and of Derek Walcott, works whose daring new formal achievements are in effect a re-appropriation of the historical experience of colonialism, revitalized and transformed into a new aesthetic of sharing and often transcendent re-formulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One sees it also in the work of the group of distinguished Irish writers who in 1980 established themselves as a collective called Field Day. The preface to a collection of their works says about them:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[These writers] believed that Field Day could and should contribute to the solution of the present crisis by producing analyses of the established opinion, myths and stereotypes which had become both a symptom and cause of the current situation [between Ireland and the North]. The collapse of constitutional and political arrangements and the recrudescence of the violence which they had been designed to repress or contain made this a more urgent requirement in the North than in the Republic.... The company, therefore, decided to embark upon a succession of publications, starting with a series of pamphlets [in addition to an impressive series of poems by Seamus Heaney, essays by Seamus Deane, plays by Brian Friel and Tom Paulin] in which the nature of the Irish problem could be explored and, as a result, more successfully confronted than it had been hitherto.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ireland&#039;s Field Day&#039;&#039; (London: Hutchinson, 1985), pp. vii-viii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of rethinking and re-formulating historical experiences which had once been based on the geographical separation of peoples and cultures is at the heart of a whole spate of scholarly and critical works. It is to be found, to mention only three, in Ammiel Alcalay&#039;s &#039;&#039;After Arabs and Jews: Remaking Levantine Culture&#039;&#039;, Paul Gilroy&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness&#039;&#039;, and Moira Ferguson&#039;s &#039;&#039;Subject to Others: British Women Writers and Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1670-1834&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;5.&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Alcalay (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Gilroy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Ferguson (London: Routledge, 1992).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In these works, domains once believed to have been exclusive to one people, gender, race, or class are re-examined and shown to have involved others. For long represented as a battleground between Arabs and Jews, the Levant emerges in Alcalay&#039;s book as a Mediterranean culture common to both peoples; according to Gilroy a similar process alters, indeed doubles, our perception of the Atlantic Ocean, hitherto thought of as principally a European passage. And in re-examining the adversarial relationship between English slave-owners and African slaves, Ferguson allows a more complex pattern dividing white female from white male to stand out, with new demotions and dislocations appearing as a result in Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I could go on giving more and more examples. I shall conclude briefly by saying that although the animosities and inequities still exist from which my interest in Orientalism as a cultural and political phenomenon began, there is now at least a general acceptance that these represent not an eternal order but a historical experience whose end, or at least partial abatement, may be at hand. Looking back at it from the distance afforded by fifteen eventful years and the availability of a massive new interpretive and scholarly enterprise to reduce the effects of imperialist shackles on thought and human relations, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; at least had the merit of enlisting itself openly in the struggle, which continues of course in &amp;quot;West&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;East&amp;quot; together.&lt;br /&gt;
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E. W. S.&lt;br /&gt;
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New York&lt;br /&gt;
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March 1994&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Footnotes ===&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Library works by Edward Said]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about decolonisation]]&lt;br /&gt;
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		<title>Library:Orientalism</title>
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		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Fix some small import mistakes&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Orientalism|author=Edward Said|published_date=1978|type=Book|isbn=0 7100 0040 5|source=[https://annas-archive.org/md5/7f43dae180a3f72e0bfd0ed9e1670bed anna&#039;s archive]}}&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;Acknowledgments&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
I have been reading about Orientalism for a number of years, but most of this book was written during 1975-1976, which I spent as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. In this unique and generous institution, it was my good fortune not only to have benefitted agreeably from several colleagues, but also from the help of Joan Warmbrunn, Chris Hoth, Jane Kielsmeier, Preston Cutler, and the center&#039;s director, Gardner Lindzey. The list of friends, colleagues, and students who read, or listened to, parts or the whole of this manuscript is so long as to embarrass me, and now that it has finally appeared as a book, perhaps even them. Nevertheless I should mention with gratitude the always helpful encouragement of Janet and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Noam Chomsky, and Roger Owen, who followed this project from its beginning to its conclusion. Likewise I must gratefully acknowledge the helpful and critical interest of the colleagues, friends, and students in various places whose questions and discussion sharpened the text considerably. Andre Schiffrin and Jeanne Morton of Pantheon Books were ideal publisher and copy editor, respectively, and made the ordeal (for the author, at least) of preparing the manuscript an instructive and genuinely intelligent process. Mariam Said helped me a great deal with her research on the early modern history of Orientalist institutions. Apart from that, though, her loving support really made much of the work on this book not only enjoyable but possible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
E. W. S.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
New York&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
September-October 1977&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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The East is a career.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;Preface to the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
Nine years ago, in the spring of 1994, I wrote an afterword for &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, which, in trying to clarify what I believed I had and had not said, I stressed not only the many discussions that had opened up since my book appeared in 1978, but also the ways in which a work about representations of &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; lends itself to increasing misrepresentation and misinterpretation. That I find the very same thing today more ironic than irritating is a sign of how much my age has crept up on me, along with the necessary diminutions in expectations and pedagogic zeal that usually frame the road to seniority. The recent deaths of my two main intellectual, political, and personal mentors, Eqbal Ahmad and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (who is one of the work&#039;s dedicatees) have brought sadness and loss, as well as resignation and a certain stubborn will to go on. It isn&#039;t at all a matter of being optimistic, but rather of continuing to have faith in the ongoing and literally unending process of emancipation and enlightenment that, in my opinion, frames and gives direction to the intellectual vocation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, it is still a source of amazement to me that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; continues to be discussed and translated all over the world, in thirty-six languages. Thanks to the efforts of my dear friend and colleague Professor Gaby Peterberg, now of UCLA, formerly of Ben-Gurion University in Israel, there is a Hebrew version of the book available, which has stimulated considerable discussion and debate among Israeli readers and students. In addition, a Vietnamese translation has appeared under Australian auspices; I hope it&#039;s not immodest to say that an Indochinese intellectual space seems to have opened up for the propositions of this book. In any case, it gives me great pleasure to note as an author who had never dreamed of any such happy fate for his work that interest in what I tried to do in my book hasn&#039;t completely died down, particularly in the many different lands of the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In part, of course, that is because the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam have continued to fuel enormous change, struggle, controversy and, as I write these lines, war. As I said many years ago, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is the product of circumstances that are fundamentally, indeed radically, fractious. In my memoir, &#039;&#039;Out of Place&#039;&#039; (1999), I described the strange and contradictory worlds in which I grew up, providing for myself and my readers a detailed account of the settings that I think formed me in Palestine, Egypt, and Lebanon. But that was only a very personal account that stopped short of all the years of my own political engagement that started after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, a war in whose continuing aftermath (Israel is still in military occupation of the Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights) the terms of struggle and the ideas at stake that were crucial for my generation of Arabs and Americans seem to go on. Nevertheless, I do want to affirm yet again that this book and, for that matter, my intellectual work generally have really been enabled by my life as a university academic. For all its often noted defects and problems, the American university--and mine, Columbia, in particular--is still one of the few remaining places in the United States where reflection and study can take place in an almost-utopian fashion. I have never taught &#039;&#039;anything&#039;&#039; about the Middle East, being by training and practice a teacher of the mainly European and American humanities, a specialist in modern comparative literature. The university and my pedagogic work with two generations of first-class students and excellent colleagues has made possible the kind of deliberately meditated and analyzed study that this book contains, which for all its urgent worldly references is still a book about culture, ideas, history, and power, rather than Middle Eastern politics &#039;&#039;tout court&#039;&#039;. That was my notion from the beginning, and it is very evident and a good deal clearer to me today.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is very much a book tied to the tumultuous dynamics of contemporary history. I emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term Orient nor the concept of the West has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly identification of the Other. That these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulation and the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time, when the mobilizations of fear, hatred, disgust, and resurgent self-pride and arrogance--much of it having to do with Islam and the Arabs on one side, &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; Westerners on the other--are very large-scale enterprises. &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s first page opens with a 1975 description of the Lebanese Civil War that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. We have had the failure of the Oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the Palestinians on the reinvaded West Bank and Gaza, with Israeli F-16&#039;s and Apache helicopters used routinely on defenseless civilians as part of their collective punishment. The suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of September 11 and their aftermath in the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. As I wrote these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial invasion and occupation of Iraq by Britain and the United States proceeds, with a prospect of physical ravagement, political unrest, and more invasions that are truly awful to contemplate. This is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. Nevertheless, I think not.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I wish I could say, however, that general understanding of the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam in the United States has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn&#039;t. For all kinds of reasons, the situation in Europe seems to be considerably better. In the United States, the hardening of attitudes, the tightening of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche, the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and &amp;quot;others&amp;quot; has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging, and destruction of Iraq&#039;s libraries and museums. What our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the map of the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. But this has often happened with the &amp;quot;Orient,&amp;quot; that semi-mythical construct, which, since Napoleon&#039;s invasion of Egypt in the late eighteenth century, has been made and remade countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the Orient&#039;s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. In the process the uncountable sediments of history, which include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of Baghdad&#039;s libraries and museums. My argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and rewritten, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; East, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; Orient becomes &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; to possess and direct.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I should say again that I have no &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; Orient to argue for. I do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be. There has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the Arab and Muslim for their backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women&#039;s rights that we simply forget that such notions as modernity, enlightenment, and democracy are by no means simple and agreed-upon concepts that one either does or does not find, like Easter eggs in the living room. The breathtaking insouciance of jejune publicists who speak in the name of foreign policy and who have no live notion (or any knowledge at all) of the language of what real people actually speak has fabricated an arid landscape ready for American power to construct there an &#039;&#039;ersatz&#039;&#039; model of free market &amp;quot;democracy,&amp;quot; without even a trace of doubt that such projects don&#039;t exist outside of Swift&#039;s Academy of Lagado.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What I do argue also is that there is a difference between knowledge of other peoples and other times that is the result of understanding, compassion, careful study and analysis for their own sakes, and on the other hand knowledge--if that is what it is--that is part of an overall campaign of self-affirmation, belligerency, and outright war. There is, after all, a profound difference between the will to understand for purposes of coexistence and humanistic enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external dominion. It is surely one of the intellectual catastrophes of history that an imperialist war confected by a small group of unelected U.S. officials (they&#039;ve been called chicken hawks, since none of them ever served in the military) was waged against a devastated Third World dictatorship on thoroughly ideological grounds having to do with world dominance, security control, and scarce resources, but disguised for its true intent, hastened, and reasoned for by Orientalists who betrayed their calling as scholars. The major influences on George W. Bush&#039;s Pentagon and National Security Council were men such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, experts on the Arab and Islamic world who helped the American hawks think about such preposterous phenomena as the Arab mind and centuries-old Islamic decline that only American power could reverse. Today, bookstores in the United States are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror, Islam exposed, the Arab threat, and the Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange Oriental peoples over there who have been such a terrible thorn in &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; flesh. Accompanying such warmongering expertise have been the omnipresent CNNs and Fox News Channels of this world, plus myriad numbers of evangelical and right-wing radio hosts, plus innumerable tabloids and even middlebrow journals, all of them recycling the same unverifiable fictions and vast generalizations so as to stir up &amp;quot;America&amp;quot; against the foreign devil.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even with all its terrible failings and its appalling dictator (who was partly created by U.S. policy two decades ago), were Iraq to have been the world&#039;s largest exporter of bananas or oranges, surely there would have been no war, no hysteria over mysteriously vanished weapons of mass destruction, no transporting of an enormous army, navy, and air force 7000 miles away to destroy a country scarcely known even to the educated American, all in the name of &amp;quot;freedom.&amp;quot; Without a well-organized sense that these people over there were not like &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; and didn&#039;t appreciate &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; values--the very core of traditional Orientalist dogma as I describe its creation and circulation in this book--there would have been no war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So from the very same directorate of paid professional scholars enlisted by the Dutch conquerors of Malaysia and Indonesia, the British armies of India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, West Africa, the French armies of Indochina and North Africa, came the American advisers to the Pentagon and the White House, using the same cliches, the same demeaning stereotypes, the same justification for power and violence (after all, runs the chorus, power is the only language they understand) in this case as in the earlier ones. These people have now been joined in Iraq by a whole army of private contractors and eager entrepreneurs to whom shall be confided everything from the writing of textbooks and the constitution to the refashioning of Iraqi political life and its oil industry. Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is a chorus of willing intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic empires, as if one shouldn&#039;t trust the evidence of one&#039;s eyes watching the destruction and the misery and death brought by the latest &#039;&#039;mission civilizatrice&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One specifically American contribution to the discourse of empire is the specialized jargon of policy expertise. You don&#039;t need Arabic or Persian or even French to pontificate about how the democracy domino effect is just what the Arab world needs. Combative and woefully ignorant policy experts, whose world experience is limited to the Beltway, grind out books on &amp;quot;terrorism&amp;quot; and liberalism, or about Islamic fundamentalism and American foreign policy, or about the end of history, all of it vying for attention and influence quite without regard for truthfulness or reflection or real knowledge. What matters is how efficient and resourceful it sounds, and who might go for it, as it were. The worst aspect of this essentializing stuff is that human suffering in all its density and pain is spirited away. Memory and with it the historical past are effaced as in the common, dismissively contemptuous American phrase, &amp;quot;you&#039;re history.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Twenty-five years after its publication, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; once again raises the question of whether modern imperialism ever ended, or whether it has continued in the Orient since Napoleon&#039;s entry into Egypt two centuries ago. Arabs and Muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depredations of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. You have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern Orientalist. This of course is also V. S. Naipaul&#039;s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. But what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of &amp;quot;lesser&amp;quot; peoples and &amp;quot;subject races&amp;quot; generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives of, say, Palestinians or Congolese or Algerians or Iraqis. We allow justly that the Holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: Why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what Orientalism continues to do? Think of the line that starts with Napoleon, continues with the rise of Oriental studies arid the takeover of North Africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in Vietnam, in Egypt, in Palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the Gulf, in Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Afghanistan. Then think contrapuntally of the rise of anticolonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle, and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of &amp;quot;natives.&amp;quot; Each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
My idea in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. I have called what I try to do &amp;quot;humanism,&amp;quot; a word I continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated postmodern critics. By humanism I mean first of all attempting to dissolve Blake&#039;s mind-forg&#039;d manacles so as to be able to use one&#039;s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. Moreover, humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking, therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. The disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that this is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territorially reductive polarizations like &amp;quot;Islam v. the West&amp;quot; seem to conquer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri-cultural life as it entails Islam and the West, I have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. Certainly I think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experience and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. This is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socioeconomic reality. Our role is to widen the field of discussion, not to set limits in accord with the prevailing authority. I have spent a great deal of my life during the past thirty-five years advocating the rights of the Palestinian people to national self-determination, but I have always tried to do that with full attention paid to the reality of the Jewish people and what they suffered by the way of persecution and genocide. The paramount thing is that the struggle for equality in Palestine/Israel should be directed toward a humane goal, that is, coexistence, and not further suppression and denial. Not accidentally, I indicate that Orientalism and modern anti-Semitism have common roots. Therefore, it would seem to be a vital necessity for independent intellectuals always to provide alternative models to the reductively simplifying and confining ones, based on mutual hostility, that have prevailed in the Middle East and elsewhere for so long.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let me now speak about a different alternative model that has been extremely important to me in my work. As a humanist whose field is literature, I am old enough to have been trained forty years ago in the field of comparative literature, whose leading ideas go back to Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Before that I must mention the supremely creative contribution of Giambattista Vico, the Neapolitan philosopher and philologist whose ideas anticipate and later infiltrate the line of German thinkers I am about to cite. They belong to the era of Herder and Wolf, later to be followed by Goethe, Humboldt, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Gadamer, and finally the great twentieth-century Romance philologists Erich Auerback, Leo Spitzer, and Ernst Robert Curtius. To young people of the current generation the very idea of philology suggests something impossibly antiquarian and musty, but philology in fact is the most basic and creative of the interpretive arts. It is exemplified for me most admirably in Goethe&#039;s interest in Islam generally, and Hafiz in particular, a consuming passion that led to the composition of the &#039;&#039;West-Ostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039;, and it inflected Goethe&#039;s later ideas about &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039;, the study of all the literatures of the world as a symphonic whole that could be apprehended theoretically as having preserved the individuality of each work without losing sight of the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a considerable irony to the realization, then, that as today&#039;s globalized world draws together in some of the lamentable ways I have been talking about here, we may be approaching the kind of standardization and homogeneity that Goethe&#039;s ideas were specifically formulated to prevent. In an essay published in 1951 entitled &amp;quot;Philolgie der Weltliteratur,&amp;quot; Erich Auerbach made exactly that point at the outset of the postwar period, which was also the beginning of the Cold War. His great book &#039;&#039;Mimesis&#039;&#039;, published in Berne in 1946 but written while Auerbach was a wartime exile teaching Romance languages in Istanbul, was meant to be a testament to the diversity and concreteness of the reality represented in Western literature from Homer to Virginia Woolf; but reading the 1951 essay one senses that for Auerbach the great book he wrote was an elegy for a period when people could interpret texts philologically, concretely, sensitively, and intuitively, using erudition and an excellent command of several languages to support the kind of understanding that Goethe advocated for his understanding of Islamic literature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Positive knowledge of languages and history was necessary, but it was never enough, any more than the mechanical gathering of facts would constitute an adequate method for grasping what an author like Dante, for example, was all about. The main requirement for the kind of philological understanding Auerbach and his predecessors were talking about and tried to practice was one that sympathetically and subjectively entered into the life of a written text as seen from the perspective of this time and its author (&#039;&#039;eingefullen&#039;&#039;). Rather than alienation and hostility to another time and another different culture, philology as applied to &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039; involved a profound humanistic spirit deployed with generosity and, if I may use the word, hospitality. Thus the interpreter&#039;s mind actively makes a place in it for a foreign Other. And this creative making of a place for works that are otherwise alien and distant is the most important facet of the interpreter&#039;s philological mission.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this was obviously undermined and destroyed in Germany by National Socialism. After the war, Auerbach notes mournfully, the standardization of ideas, and greater and greater specialization of knowledge, gradually narrowed the opportunities for the kind of investigative and everlastingly inquiring kind of philological work that he had represented, and, alas, it&#039;s an even more depressing fact that, since Auerbach&#039;s death in 1957, both the idea and practice of humanistic research have shrunk in scope as well as in centrality. The book culture based on archival research as well as general principles of mind that once sustained humanism as a historical discipline have almost disappeared. Instead of reading in the real sense of the word, our students today are often distracted by the fragmented knowledge available on the internet and in the mass media.&lt;br /&gt;
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Worse yet, education is threatened by nationalist and religious orthodoxies often disseminated by the mass media as they focus ahistorically and sensationally on the distant electronic wars that give viewers the sense of surgical precision but that in fact obscure the terrible suffering and destruction produced by modern &amp;quot;clean&amp;quot; warfare. In the demonization of an unknown enemy, for whom the label &amp;quot;terrorist&amp;quot; serves the general purpose of keeping people stirred up and angry, media images command too much attention and can be exploited at times of crisis and insecurity of the kind that the post-9/11 period has produced. Speaking both as an American and as an Arab I must ask my reader not to underestimate the kind of simplified view of the world that a relative handful of Pentagon civilian elites have formulated for U.S. policy in the entire Arab and Islamic worlds, a view in which terror, preemptive war, and unilateral regime change--backed up by the most bloated military budget in history--are the main ideas debated endlessly and impoverishingly by a media that assigns itself the role of producing so-called &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; who validate the government&#039;s general line. I should also note that it is far from a coincidence that General Sharon of Israel, who in 1982 led the invasion of Lebanon in order to change the Lebanese government, killing 17,000 civilians in the process, is now a partner in &amp;quot;peace&amp;quot; with George W. Bush, and that in the United States at least there has been not enough dissent from the dubious thesis that military power alone can change the map of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reflection, debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate American or Western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and regard other cultures with derisive contempt. Perhaps you will say that I am making too many abrupt transitions between humanistic interpretation on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and that a modern technological society that, along with unprecedented power, possesses the internet and F-16 fighter jets must in the end be commanded by formidable technical-policy experts like Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Perle. (Neither man will do any actual fighting since that will be left to less fortunate men and women.) But what has really been lost is a sense of the density and interdependence of human life, which can neither be reduced to a formula nor be brushed aside as irrelevant. Even the language of the war is dehumanizing in the extreme: &amp;quot;We&#039;ll go in there take out Saddam, destroy his army with clean surgical strikes, and everyone will think it&#039;s great,&amp;quot; said a congresswoman on national television. It seems to me entirely symptomatic of the precarious moment in which we are living that when Vice President Cheney made his hard-line speech on August 26, 2002, about the imperative to attack Iraq, he quoted as his single Middle East &amp;quot;expert&amp;quot; in support of military intervention against Iraq an Arab academic who, as a paid consultant to the mass media on a nightly basis, keeps repeating his hatred of his own people and the renunciation of his background. Moreover, he is backed in his efforts by the military and Zionist lobbies in the United States. Such a &#039;&#039;trahison de clercs&#039;&#039; is a symptom of how genuine humanism can degenerate into jingoism and false patriotism.&lt;br /&gt;
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That is one side of the global debate. In the Arab and Muslim countries the situation is scarcely better. As Roula Khalaf argues, in an excellent &#039;&#039;Financial Times&#039;&#039; essay (September 4, 2002), the region has slipped into an easy anti-Americanism that shows little understanding of what the United States is really like as a society. Because the governments are relatively powerless to affect U.S. policy toward them, they turn their energies to repressing and keeping down their own populations, which results in resentment, anger, and helpless imprecations that do nothing to open up societies where secular ideas about human history and development have been overtaken by failure and frustration, as well as by an Islamism built out of rote learning, the obliteration of what are perceived to be other, competitive forms of secular knowledge, and an inability to analyze and exchange ideas within the generally discordant world of modern discourse. The gradual disappearance of the extraordinary tradition of Islamic &#039;&#039;ijtihad&#039;&#039; has been one of the major cultural disasters of our time, with the result that critical thinking and individual wrestling with the problems of the modern world have simply dropped out of sight. Orthodoxy and dogma rule instead.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is not to say that the cultural world has simply regressed on one side to a belligerent neo-Orientalism and on the other to blanket rejectionism. The recent United Nations World Summit in Johannesburg, for all its limitations, did in fact reveal a vast area of common global concert whose detailed workings on matters having to do with the environment, famine, the gap between advanced and developing countries, health, and human rights, suggest the welcome emergence of a new collective constituency that give the often facile notion of &amp;quot;one world&amp;quot; a new urgency. In all this, however, we must admit that no one can possibly know the extraordinarily complex unity of our globalized world, despite the reality that, as I said at the outset, the world does have a real interdependence of parts that leaves no genuine opportunity for isolation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The point I want to conclude with now is to insist that the terrible reductive conflicts that herd people under falsely unifying rubrics like &amp;quot;America,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the West,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; and invent collective identities for large numbers of individuals who are actually quite diverse, cannot remain as potent as they are, and must be opposed, their murderous effectiveness vastly reduced in influence and mobilizing power. We still have at our disposal the rational interpretive skills that are the legacy of humanistic education, not as a sentimental piety enjoining us to return to traditional values or the classics but as the active practice of worldly secular discourse. The secular world is the world of history as made by human beings. Human agency is subject to investigation and analysis, which it is the mission of understanding to apprehend, criticize, influence, and judge. Above all, critical thought does not submit to state power or to commands to join in the ranks marching against one or another approved enemy. Rather than the manufactured clash of civilizations, we need to concentrate on the slow working together of cultures that overlap, borrow from each other, and live together in far more interesting ways than any abridged or inauthentic mode of understanding can allow. But for that kind of wider perception we need time and patient and skeptical inquiry, supported by faith in communities of interpretation that are difficult to sustain in a world demanding instant action and reaction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Humanism is centered upon the agency of human individuality and subjective intuition, rather than on received ideas and approved authority. Texts have to be read as texts that were produced and live on in the historical realm in all sorts of what I have called worldly ways. But this by no means excludes power, since on the contrary what I have tried to show in my book have been the insinuations, the imbrications of power into even the most recondite of studies.&lt;br /&gt;
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And lastly, most important, humanism is the only, and I would go so far as to say, the final resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history. We are today abetted by the enormously encouraging democratic field of cyberspace, open to all users in ways undreamed of by earlier generations either of tyrants or of orthodoxies. The worldwide protests before the war began in Iraq would not have been possible were it not for the existence of alternative communities across the globe, informed by alternative news sources, and keenly aware of the environmental, human rights, and libertarian impulses that bind us together in this tiny planet. The human, and humanistic, desire or enlightenment and emancipation is not easily deferred, despite the incredible strength of the opposition to it that comes from the Rumsfelds, Bin Ladens, Sharons, and Bushes of this world. I would like to believe that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; has had a place in the long and often interrupted road to human freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
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E. W. S.&lt;br /&gt;
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New York&lt;br /&gt;
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May 2003&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;Introduction&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
On a visit to Beirut during the terrible civil war of 1975-1976 a French journalist wrote regretfully of the gutted downtown area that &amp;quot;it had once seemed to belong to ... the Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thierry Desjardins, &#039;&#039;Le Martyre du Liban&#039;&#039; (Paris: Plon, 1976), p. 14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He was right about the place, of course, especially so far as a European was concerned. The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences. Now it was disappearing; in a sense it had happened, its time was over. Perhaps it seemed irrelevant that Orientals themselves had something at stake in the process, that even in the time of Chateaubriand and Nerval Orientals had lived there, and that now it was they who were suffering; the main thing for the European visitor was a European representation of the Orient and its contemporary fate, both of which had a privileged communal significance for the journalist and his French readers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Americans will not feel quite the same about the Orient, which for them is much more likely to be associated very differently with the Far East (China and Japan, mainly). Unlike the Americans, the French and the British--less so the Germans, Russians, Spanish, Portuguese, Italians, and Swiss--have had a long tradition of what I shall be calling &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient&#039;s special place in European Western experience. The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe&#039;s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. In contrast, the American understanding of the Orient will seem considerably less dense, although our recent Japanese, Korean, and Indochinese adventures ought now to be creating a more sober, more realistic &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; awareness. Moreover, the vastly expanded American political and economic role in the Near East (the Middle East) makes great claims on our understanding of that Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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It will be clear to the reader (and will become clearer still throughout the many pages that follow) that by Orientalism I mean several things, all of them, in my opinion, interdependent. The most readily accepted designation for Orientalism is an academic one, and indeed the label still serves in a number of academic institutions. Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient--and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist--either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism. Compared with &#039;&#039;Oriental studies&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;area studies&#039;&#039;, it is true that the term &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is less preferred by specialists today, both because it is too vague and general and because it connotes the high-handed executive attitude of nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century European colonialism. Nevertheless books are written and congresses held with &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; as their main focus, with the Orientalist in his new or old guise as their main authority. The point is that even if it does not survive as it once did, Orientalism lives on academically through its doctrines and theses about the Orient and the Oriental.&lt;br /&gt;
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Related to this academic tradition, whose fortunes, transmigrations, specializations, and transmissions are in part the subject of this study, is a more general meaning for Orientalism. Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; and (most of the time) &amp;quot;the Occident.&amp;quot; Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, &amp;quot;mind,&amp;quot; destiny, and so on. &#039;&#039;This&#039;&#039; Orientalism can accommodate Aeschylus, say, and Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx. A little later in this introduction I shall deal with the methodological problems one encounters in so broadly construed a &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; as this.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interchange between the academic and the more or less imaginative meanings of Orientalism is a constant one, and since the late eighteenth century there has been a considerable, quite disciplined--perhaps even regulated--traffic between the two. Here I come to the third meaning of Orientalism, which is something more historically and materially defined than either of the other two. Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient--dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault&#039;s notion of a discourse, as described by him in &#039;&#039;The Archaeology of Knowledge&#039;&#039; and in &#039;&#039;Discipline and Punish&#039;&#039;, to identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage--and even produce--the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; is in question. How this happens is what this book tries to demonstrate. It also tries to show that European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historically and culturally there is a quantitative as well as a qualitative difference between the Franco-British involvement in the Orient and--until the period of American ascendancy after World War II--the involvement of every other European and Atlantic power. To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such disparate realms as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the Biblical texts and the Biblical lands, the spice trade, colonial armies and a long tradition of colonial administrators, a formidable scholarly corpus, innumerable Oriental &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;hands,&amp;quot; an Oriental professorate, a complex array of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; ideas (Oriental despotism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, sensuality), many Eastern sects, philosophies, and wisdoms domesticated for local European use--the list can be extended more or less indefinitely. My point is that Orientalism derives from a particular closeness experienced between Britain and France and the Orient, which until the early nineteenth century had really meant only India and the Bible lands. From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did. Out of that closeness, whose dynamic is enormously productive even if it always demonstrates the comparatively greater strength of the Occident (British, French, or American), comes the large body of texts I call Orientalist.&lt;br /&gt;
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It should be said at once that even with the generous number of books and authors that I examine, there is a much larger number that I simply have had to leave out. My argument, however, depends neither upon an exhaustive catalogue of texts dealing with the Orient nor upon a clearly delimited set of texts, authors, and ideas that together make up the Orientalist canon. I have depended instead upon a different methodological alternative--whose backbone in a sense is the set of historical generalizations I have so far been making in this Introduction--and it is these I want now to discuss in more analytical detail.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
I have begun with the assumption that the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely &#039;&#039;there&#039;&#039;, just as the Occident itself is not just &#039;&#039;there&#039;&#039; either. We must take seriously Vico&#039;s great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities--to say nothing of historical entities--such locales, regions, geographical sectors as &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; are man-made. Therefore as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having said that, one must go on to state a number of reasonable qualifications. In the first place, it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was &#039;&#039;essentially&#039;&#039; an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality. When Disraeli said in his novel &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; that the East was a career, he meant that to be interested in the East was something bright young Westerners would find to be an all-consuming passion; he should not be interpreted as saying that the East was &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; a career for Westerners. There were--and are--cultures and nations whose location is in the East, and their lives, histories, and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that could be said about them in the West. About that fact this study of Orientalism has very little to contribute, except to acknowledge it tacitly. But the phenomenon of Orientalism as I study it here deals principally, not with a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient (the East as career) despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; Orient. My point is that Disraeli&#039;s statement about the East refers mainly to that created consistency, that regular constellation of ideas as the pre-eminent thing about the Orient, and not to its mere being, as Wallace Stevens&#039;s phrase has it.&lt;br /&gt;
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A second qualification is that ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied. To believe that the Orient was created--or, as I call it, &amp;quot;Orientalized&amp;quot;--and to believe that such things happen simply as a necessity of the imagination, is to be disingenuous. The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony, and is quite accurately indicated in the title of K. M. Panikkar&#039;s classic &#039;&#039;Asia and Western Dominance&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;K. M. Panikkar, &#039;&#039;Asia and Western Dominance&#039;&#039; (London: George Allen &amp;amp; Unwin, 1959).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; in all those ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it &#039;&#039;could be&#039;&#039;--that is, submitted to being&#039;&#039;--made&#039;&#039; Oriental. There is very little consent to be found, for example, in the fact that Flaubert&#039;s encounter with an Egyptian courtesan produced a widely influential model of the Oriental woman; she never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. &#039;&#039;He&#039;&#039; spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his readers in what way she was &amp;quot;typically Oriental.&amp;quot; My argument is that Flaubert&#039;s situation of strength in relation to Kuchuk Hanem was not an isolated instance. It fairly stands for the pattern of relative strength between East and West, and the discourse about the Orient that it enabled.&lt;br /&gt;
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This brings us to a third qualification. One ought never to assume that the structure of Orientalism is nothing more than a structure of lies or of myths which, were the truth about them to be told, would simply blow away. I myself believe that Orientalism is more particularly valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient than it is as a veridic discourse about the Orient (which is what, in its academic or scholarly form, it claims to be). Nevertheless, what we must respect and try to grasp is the sheer knitted-together strength of Orientalist discourse, its very close ties to the enabling socio-economic and political institutions, and its redoubtable durability. After all, any system of ideas that can remain unchanged as teachable wisdom (in academies, books, congresses, universities, foreign-service institutes) from the period of Ernest Renan in the late 1840s until the present in the United States must be something more formidable than a mere collection of lies. Orientalism, therefore, is not an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a created body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material investment. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness, just as that same investment multiplied--indeed, made truly productive--the statements proliferating out from Orientalism into the general culture.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gramsci has made the useful analytic distinction between civil and political society in which the former is made up of voluntary (or at least rational and noncoercive) affiliations like schools, families, and unions, the latter of state institutions (the army, the police, the central bureaucracy) whose role in the polity is direct domination. Culture, of course, is to be found operating within civil society, where the influence of ideas, of institutions, and of other persons works not through domination but by what Gramsci calls consent. In any society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others; the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as &#039;&#039;hegemony&#039;&#039;, an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism the durability and the strength I have been speaking about so far. Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Denys Hay, &#039;&#039;Europe: The Emergence of an Idea&#039;&#039;, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a collective notion identifying &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; Europeans as against all &amp;quot;those&amp;quot; non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. There is in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness, usually overriding the possibility that a more independent, or more skeptical, thinker might have had different views on the matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a quite constant way, Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible &#039;&#039;positional&#039;&#039; superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand. And why should it have been otherwise, especially during the period of extraordinary European ascendancy from the late Renaissance to the present? The scientist, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier was in, or thought about, the Orient because he &#039;&#039;could be there&#039;&#039;, or could think about it, with very little resistance on the Orient&#039;s part. Under the general heading of knowledge of the Orient, and within the umbrella of Western hegemony over the Orient during the period from the end of the eighteenth century, there emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious character. Additionally, the imaginative examination of things Oriental was based more or less exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness out of whose unchallenged centrality an Oriental world emerged, first according to general ideas about who or what was an Oriental, then according to a detailed logic governed not simply by empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projections. If we can point to great Orientalist works of genuine scholarship like Silvestre de Sacy&#039;s &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe&#039;&#039; or Edward William Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, we need also to note that Renan&#039;s and Gobineau&#039;s racial ideas came out of the same impulse, as did a great many Victorian pornographic novels (see the analysis by Steven Marcus of &amp;quot;The Lustful Turk&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Steven Marcus, &#039;&#039;The Other Victorians: A Study of Sexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth Century England&#039;&#039; (1966; reprint ed., New York: Bantam Books, 1967), pp. 200-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;).&lt;br /&gt;
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And yet, one must repeatedly ask oneself whether what matters in Orientalism is the general group of ideas overriding the mass of material--about which who could deny that they were shot through with doctrines of European superiority, various kinds of racism, imperialism, and the like, dogmatic views of &amp;quot;the Oriental&amp;quot; as a kind of ideal and unchanging abstraction?--or the much more varied work produced by almost uncountable individual writers, whom one would take up as individual instances of authors dealing with the Orient. In a sense the two alternatives, general and particular, are really two perspectives on the same material: in both instances one would have to deal with pioneers in the field like William Jones, with great artists like Nerval or Flaubert. And why would it not be possible to employ both perspectives together, or one after the other? Isn&#039;t there an obvious danger of distortion (of precisely the kind that academic Orientalism has always been prone to) if either too general or too specific a level of description is maintained systematically?&lt;br /&gt;
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My two fears are distortion and inaccuracy, or rather the kind of inaccuracy produced by too dogmatic a generality and too positivistic a localized focus. In trying to deal with these problems I have tried to deal with three main aspects of my own contemporary reality that seem to me to point the way out of the methodological or perspectival difficulties I have been discussing, difficulties that might force one, in the first instance, into writing a coarse polemic on so unacceptably general a level of description as not to be worth the effort, or in the second instance, into writing so detailed and atomistic a series of analyses as to lose all track of the general lines of force informing the field, giving it its special cogency. How then to recognize individuality and to reconcile it with its intelligent, and by no means passive or merely dictatorial, general and hegemonic context?&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
I mentioned three aspects of my contemporary reality: I must explain and briefly discuss them now, so that it can be seen how I was led to a particular course of research and writing.&lt;br /&gt;
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1. &#039;&#039;The distinction between pure and political knowledge&#039;&#039;. It is very easy to argue that knowledge about Shakespeare or Wordsworth is not political whereas knowledge about contemporary China or the Soviet Union is. My own formal and professional designation is that of &amp;quot;humanist,&amp;quot; a title which indicates the humanities as my field and therefore the unlikely eventuality that there might be anything political about what I do in that field. Of course, all these labels and terms are quite unnuanced as I use them here, but the general truth of what I am pointing to is, I think, widely held. One reason for saying that a humanist who writes about Wordsworth, or an editor whose specialty is Keats, is not involved in anything political is that what he does seems to have no direct political effect upon reality in the everyday sense. A scholar whose field is Soviet economics works in a highly charged area where there is much government interest, and what he might produce in the way of studies or proposals will be taken up by policymakers, government officials, institutional economists, intelligence experts. The distinction between &amp;quot;humanists&amp;quot; and persons whose work has policy implications, or political significance, can be broadened further by saying that the former&#039;s ideological color is a matter of incidental importance to politics (although possibly of great moment to his colleagues in the field, who may object to his Stalinism or fascism or too easy liberalism), whereas the ideology of the latter is woven directly into his material--indeed, economics, politics, and sociology in the modern academy are ideological sciences--and therefore taken for granted as being &amp;quot;political.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless the determining impingement on most knowledge produced in the contemporary West (and here I speak mainly about the United States) is that it be nonpolitical, that is, scholarly, academic, impartial, above partisan or small-minded doctrinal belief. One can have no quarrel with such an ambition in theory, perhaps, but in practice the reality is much more problematic. No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, from the fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society. These continue to bear on what he does professionally, even though naturally enough his research and its fruits do attempt to reach a level of relative freedom from the inhibitions and the restrictions of brute, everyday reality. For there is such a thing as knowledge that is less, rather than more, partial than the individual (with his entangling and distracting life circumstances) who produces it. Yet this knowledge is not therefore automatically nonpolitical.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whether discussions of literature or of classical philology are fraught with--or have unmediated--political significance is a very large question that I have tried to treat in some detail elsewhere.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See my &#039;&#039;Criticism Between Culture and System&#039;&#039; (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What I am interested in doing now is suggesting how the general liberal consensus that &amp;quot;true&amp;quot; knowledge is fundamentally nonpolitical (and conversely, that overtly political knowledge is not &amp;quot;true&amp;quot; knowledge) obscures the highly if obscurely organized political circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced. No one is helped in understanding this today when the adjective &amp;quot;political&amp;quot; is used as a label to discredit any work for daring to violate the protocol of pretended suprapolitical objectivity. We may say, first, that civil society recognizes a gradation of political importance in the various fields of knowledge. To some extent the political importance given a field comes from the possibility of its direct translation into economic terms; but to a greater extent political importance comes from the closeness of a field to ascertainable sources of power in political society. Thus an economic study of long-term Soviet energy potential and its effect on military capability is likely to be commissioned by the Defense Department, and thereafter to acquire a kind of political status impossible for a study of Tolstoi&#039;s early fiction financed in part by a foundation. Yet both works belong in what civil society acknowledges to be a similar field, Russian studies, even though one work may be done by a very conservative economist, the other by a radical literary historian. My point here is that &amp;quot;Russia&amp;quot; as a general subject matter has political priority over nicer distinctions such as &amp;quot;economics&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;literary history,&amp;quot; because political society in Gramsci&#039;s sense reaches into such realms of civil society as the academy and saturates them with significance of direct concern to it.&lt;br /&gt;
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I do not want to press all this any further on general theoretical grounds: it seems to me that the value and credibility of my case can be demonstrated by being much more specific, in the way, for example, Noam Chomsky has studied the instrumental connection between the Vietnam War and the notion of objective scholarship as it was applied to cover state-sponsored military research.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Principally in his &#039;&#039;American Power and the New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969) and &#039;&#039;For Reasons of State&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Now because Britain, France, and recently the United States are imperial powers, their political societies impart to their civil societies a sense of urgency, a direct political infusion as it were, where and whenever matters pertaining to their imperial interests abroad are concerned. I doubt that it is controversial, for example, to say that an Englishman in India or Egypt in the later nineteenth century took an interest in those countries that was never far from their status in his mind as British colonies. To say this may seem quite different from saying that all academic knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and impressed with, violated by, the gross political fact--and yet &#039;&#039;that is what I am saying&#039;&#039; in this study of Orientalism. For if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author&#039;s involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient, and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Put in this way, these political actualities are still too undefined and general to be really interesting. Anyone would agree to them without necessarily agreeing also that they mattered very much, for instance, to Flaubert as he wrote &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, or to H. A. R. Gibb as he wrote &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039;. The trouble is that there is too great a distance between the big dominating fact, as I have described it, and the details of everyday life that govern the minute discipline of a novel or a scholarly text as each is being written. Yet if we eliminate from the start any notion that &amp;quot;big&amp;quot; facts like imperial domination can be applied mechanically and deterministically to such complex matters as culture and ideas, then we will begin to approach an interesting kind of study. My idea is that European and then American interest in the Orient was political according to some of the obvious historical accounts of it that I have given here, but that it was the culture that created that interest, that acted dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales to make the Orient the varied and complicated place that it obviously was in the field I call Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; imperialist plot to hold down the &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; world. It is rather a &#039;&#039;distribution&#039;&#039; of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an &#039;&#039;elaboration&#039;&#039; not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of &amp;quot;interests&amp;quot; which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039;, rather than expresses, a certain &#039;&#039;will&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;intention&#039;&#039; to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do and what &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; cannot do or understand as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do). Indeed, my real argument is that Orientalism is--and does not simply represent--a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because Orientalism is a cultural and a political fact, then, it does not exist in some archival vacuum; quite the contrary, I think it can be shown that what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs within) certain distinct and intellectually knowable lines. Here too a considerable degree of nuance and elaboration can be seen working as between the broad superstructural pressures and the details of composition, the facts of textuality. Most humanistic scholars are, I think, perfectly happy with the notion that texts exist in contexts, that there is such a thing as intertextuality, that the pressures of conventions, predecessors, and rhetorical styles limit what Walter Benjamin once called the &amp;quot;overtaxing of the productive person in the name of ... the principle of &#039;creativity,&#039; &amp;quot; in which the poet is believed on his own, and out of his pure mind, to have brought forth his work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Walter Benjamin, &#039;&#039;Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Harry Zohn (London: New Left Books, 1973), p. 71.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet there is a reluctance to allow that political, institutional, and ideological constraints act in the same manner on the individual author. A humanist will believe it to be an interesting fact to any interpreter of Balzac that he was influenced in the &#039;&#039;Comedie humaine&#039;&#039; by the conflict between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier, but the same sort of pressure on Balzac of deeply reactionary monarchism is felt in some vague way to demean his literary &amp;quot;genius&amp;quot; and therefore to be less worth serious study. Similarly--as Harry Bracken has been tirelessly showing--philosophers will conduct their discussions of Locke, Hume, and empiricism without ever taking into account that there is an explicit connection in these classic writers between their &amp;quot;philosophic&amp;quot; doctrines and racial theory, justifications of slavery, or arguments for colonial exploitation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harry Bracken, &amp;quot;Essence, Accident and Race,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Hermathena&#039;&#039; 116 (Winter 1973): 81-96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These are common enough ways by which contemporary scholarship keeps itself pure.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps it is true that most attempts to rub culture&#039;s nose in the mud of politics have been crudely iconoclastic; perhaps also the social interpretation of literature in my own field has simply not kept up with the enormous technical advances in detailed textual analysis. But there is no getting away from the fact that literary studies in general, and American Marxist theorists in particular, have avoided the effort of seriously bridging the gap between the superstructural and the base levels in textual, historical scholarship; on another occasion I have gone so far as to say that the literary-cultural establishment as a whole has declared the serious study of imperialism and culture off limits.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In an interview published in &#039;&#039;Diacritics&#039;&#039; 6, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 38.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Orientalism brings one up directly against that question--that is, to realizing that political imperialism governs an entire field of study, imagination, and scholarly institutions--in such a way as to make its avoidance an intellectual and historical impossibility. Yet there will always remain the perennial escape mechanism of saying that a literary scholar and a philosopher, for example, are trained in literature and philosophy respectively, not in politics or ideological analysis. In other words, the specialist argument can work quite effectively to block the larger and, in my opinion, the more intellectually serious perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here it seems to me there is a simple two-part answer to be given, at least so far as the study of imperialism and culture (or Orientalism) is concerned. In the first place, nearly every nineteenth-century writer (and the same is true enough of writers in earlier periods) was extraordinarily well aware of the fact of empire: this is a subject not very well studied, but it will not take a modern Victorian specialist long to admit that liberal cultural heroes like John Stuart Mill, Arnold, Carlyle, Newman, Macaulay, Ruskin, George Eliot, and even Dickens had definite views on race and imperialism, which are quite easily to be found at work in their writing. So even a specialist must deal with the knowledge that Mill, for example, made it clear in &#039;&#039;On Liberty&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Representative Government&#039;&#039; that his views there could not be applied to India (he was an India Office functionary for a good deal of his life, after all) because the Indians were civilizationally, if not racially, inferior. The same kind of paradox is to be found in Marx, as I try to show in this book. In the second place, to believe that politics in the form of imperialism bears upon the production of literature, scholarship, social theory, and history writing is by no means equivalent to saying that culture is therefore a demeaned or denigrated thing. Quite the contrary: my whole point is to say that we can better understand the persistence and the durability of saturating hegemonic systems like culture when we realize that their internal constraints upon writers and thinkers were &#039;&#039;productive&#039;&#039;, not unilaterally inhibiting. It is this idea that Gramsci, certainly, and Foucault and Raymond Williams in their very different ways have been trying to illustrate. Even one or two pages by Williams on &amp;quot;the uses of the Empire&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Long Revolution&#039;&#039; tell us more about nineteenth-century cultural richness than many volumes of hermetic textual analyses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Williams, &#039;&#039;The Long Revolution&#039;&#039; (London: Chatto &amp;amp; Windus, 1961), pp. 66-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore I study Orientalism as a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the large political concerns shaped by the three great empires--British, French, American--in whose intellectual and imaginative territory the writing was produced. What interests me most as a scholar is not the gross political verity but the detail, as indeed what interests us in someone like Lane or Flaubert or Renan is not the (to him) indisputable truth that Occidentals are superior to Orientals, but the profoundly worked over and modulated evidence of his detailed work within the very wide space opened up by that truth. One need only remember that Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; is a classic of historical and anthropological observation because of its style, its enormously intelligent and brilliant details, not because of its simple reflection of racial superiority, to understand what I am saying here.&lt;br /&gt;
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The kind of political questions raised by Orientalism, then, are as follows: What other sorts of intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly, and cultural energies went into the making of an imperialist tradition like the Orientalist one? How did philology, lexicography, history, biology, political and economic theory, novel-writing, and lyric poetry come to the service of Orientalism&#039;s broadly imperialist view of the world? What changes, modulations, refinements, even revolutions take place within Orientalism? What is the meaning of originality, of continuity, of individuality, in this context? How does Orientalism transmit or reproduce itself from one epoch to another? In fine, how can we treat the cultural, historical phenomenon of Orientalism as a kind of &#039;&#039;willed human work&#039;&#039;--not of mere unconditioned ratiocination--in all its historical complexity, detail, and worth without at the same time losing sight of the alliance between cultural work, political tendencies, the state, and the specific realities of domination? Governed by such concerns a humanistic study can responsibly address itself to politics &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; culture. But this is not to say that such a study establishes a hard-and-fast rule about the relationship between knowledge and politics. My argument is that each humanistic investigation must formulate the nature of that connection in the specific context of the study, the subject matter, and its historical circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
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2. &#039;&#039;The methodological question&#039;&#039;. In a previous book I gave a good deal of thought and analysis to the methodological importance for work in the human sciences of finding and formulating a first step, a point of departure, a beginning principle.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In my &#039;&#039;Beginnings: Intention and Method&#039;&#039; (New York: Basic Books, 1975).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A major lesson I learned and tried to present was that there is no such thing as a merely given, or simply available, starting point: beginnings have to be made for each project in such a way as to &#039;&#039;enable&#039;&#039; what follows from them. Nowhere in my experience has the difficulty of this lesson been more consciously lived (with what success--or failure--I cannot really say) than in this study of Orientalism. The idea of beginning, indeed the act of beginning, necessarily involves an act of delimitation by which something is cut out of a great mass of material, separated from the mass, and made to stand for, as well as be, a starting point, a beginning; for the student of texts one such notion of inaugural delimitation is Louis Althusser&#039;s idea of the &#039;&#039;problematic&#039;&#039;, a specific determinate unity of a text, or group of texts, which is something given rise to by analysis.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Louis Althusser, &#039;&#039;For Marx&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), pp. 65-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet in the case of Orientalism (as opposed to the case of Marx&#039;s texts, which is what Althusser studies) there is not simply the problem of finding a point of departure, or problematic, but also the question of designating which texts, authors, and periods are the ones best suited for study.&lt;br /&gt;
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It has seemed to me foolish to attempt an encyclopedic narrative history of Orientalism, first of all because if my guiding principle was to be &amp;quot;the European idea of the Orient&amp;quot; there would be virtually no limit to the material I would have had to deal with; second, because the narrative model itself did not suit my descriptive and political interests; third, because in such books as Raymond Schwab&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;, Johann Fuck&#039;s &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039;, and more recently, Dorothee Metlitzki&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Matter of Araby in Medieval England&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1950); Johann W. Fuck, &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955); Dorothee Metlitzki, &#039;&#039;The Matter of Araby in Medieval England&#039;&#039; (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there already exist encyclopedic works on certain aspects of the European-Oriental encounter such as make the critic&#039;s job, in the general political and intellectual context I sketched above, a different one.&lt;br /&gt;
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There still remained the problem of cutting down a very fat archive to manageable dimensions, and more important, outlining something in the nature of an intellectual order within that group of texts without at the same time following a mindlessly chronological order. My starting point therefore has been the British, French, and American experience of the Orient taken as a unit, what made that experience possible by way of historical and intellectual background, what the quality and character of the experience has been. For reasons I shall discuss presently I limited that already limited (but still inordinately large) set of questions to the Anglo-French-American experience of the Arabs and Islam, which for almost a thousand years together stood for the Orient. Immediately upon doing that, a large part of the Orient seemed to have been eliminated--India, Japan, China, and other sections of the Far East--not because these regions were not important (they obviously have been) but because one could discuss Europe&#039;s experience of the Near Orient, or of Islam, apart from its experience of the Far Orient. Yet at certain moments of that general European history of interest in the East, particular parts of the Orient like Egypt, Syria, and Arabia cannot be discussed without also studying Europe&#039;s involvement in the more distant parts, of which Persia and India are the most important; a notable case in point is the connection between Egypt and India so far as eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain was concerned. Similarly the French role in deciphering the Zend-Avesta, the pre-eminence of Paris as a center of Sanskrit studies during the first decade of the nineteenth century, the fact that Napoleon&#039;s interest in the Orient was contingent upon his sense of the British role in India: all these Far Eastern interests directly influenced French interest in the Near East, Islam, and the Arabs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Britain and France dominated the Eastern Mediterranean from about the end of the seventeenth century on. Yet my discussion of that domination and systematic interest does not do justice to (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) the important contributions to Orientalism of Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Portugal and (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) the fact that one of the important impulses toward the study of the Orient in the eighteenth century was the revolution in Biblical studies stimulated by such variously interesting pioneers as Bishop Lowth, Eichhorn, Herder, and Michaelis. In the first place, I had to focus rigorously upon the British-French and later the American material because it seemed inescapably true not only that Britain and France were the pioneer nations in the Orient and in Oriental studies, but that these vanguard positions were held by virtue of the two greatest colonial networks in pre-twentieth-century history; the American Oriental position since World War II has fit--I think, quite self-consciously--in the places excavated by the two earlier European powers. Then too, I believe that the sheer quality, consistency, and mass of British, French, and American writing on the Orient lifts it above the doubtless crucial work done in Germany, Italy, Russia, and elsewhere. But I think it is also true that the major steps in Oriental scholarship were first taken in either Britain and France, then elaborated upon by Germans. Silvestre de Sacy, for example, was not only the first modern and institutional European Orientalist, who worked on Islam, Arabic literature, the Druze religion, and Sassanid Persia; he was also the teacher of Champollion and of Franz Bopp, the founder of German comparative linguistics. A similar claim of priority and subsequent pre-eminence can be made for William Jones and Edward William Lane.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the second place--and here the failings of my study of Orientalism are amply made up for--there has been some important recent work on the background in Biblical scholarship to the rise of what I have called modern Orientalism. The best and the most illuminatingly relevant is E. S. Shaffer&#039;s impressive &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Kubla Khan&amp;quot; and The Fall of Jerusalem&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;E. S. Shaffer, &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;Kubla Khan&amp;quot; and The Fall of Jerusalem: The Mythological School in Biblical Criticism and Secular Literature, 1770-1880&#039;&#039; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an indispensable study of the origins of Romanticism, and of the intellectual activity underpinning a great deal of what goes on in Coleridge, Browning, and George Eliot. To some degree Shaffer&#039;s work refines upon the outlines provided in Schwab, by articulating the material of relevance to be found in the German Biblical scholars and using that material to read, in an intelligent and always interesting way, the work of three major British writers. Yet what is missing in the book is some sense of the political as well as ideological edge given the Oriental material by the British and French writers I am principally concerned with; in addition, unlike Shaffer I attempt to elucidate subsequent developments in academic as well as literary Orientalism that bear on the connection between British and French Orientalism on the one hand and the rise of an explicitly colonial-minded imperialism on the other. Then too, I wish to show how all these earlier matters are reproduced more or less in American Orientalism after the Second World War.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless there is a possibly misleading aspect to my study, where, aside from an occasional reference, I do not exhaustively discuss the German developments after the inaugural period dominated by Sacy. Any work that seeks to provide an understanding of academic Orientalism and pays little attention to scholars like Steinthal, Muller, Becker, Goldziher, Brockelmann, Noldeke--to mention only a handful--needs to be reproached, and I freely reproach myself. I particularly regret not taking more account of the great scientific prestige that accrued to German scholarship by the middle of the nineteenth century, whose neglect was made into a denunciation of insular British scholars by George Eliot. I have in mind Eliot&#039;s unforgettable portrait of Mr. Casaubon in &#039;&#039;Middlemarch&#039;&#039;. One reason Casaubon cannot finish his Key to All Mythologies is, according to his young cousin Will Ladislaw, that he is unacquainted with German scholarship. For not only has Casaubon chosen a subject &amp;quot;as changing as chemistry: new discoveries are constantly making new points of view&amp;quot;: he is undertaking a job similar to a refutation of Paracelsus because &amp;quot;he is not an Orientalist, you know.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Eliot, &#039;&#039;Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life&#039;&#039; (1872; reprint ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956), p. 164.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Eliot was not wrong in implying that by about 1830, which is when &#039;&#039;Middlemarch&#039;&#039; is set, German scholarship had fully attained its European pre-eminence. Yet at no time in German scholarship during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century could a close partnership have developed between Orientalists and a protracted, sustained &#039;&#039;national&#039;&#039; interest in the Orient. There was nothing in Germany to correspond to the Anglo-French presence in India, the Levant, North Africa. Moreover, the German Orient was almost exclusively a scholarly, or at least a classical, Orient: it was made the subject of lyrics, fantasies, and even novels, but it was never actual, the way Egypt and Syria were actual for Chateaubriand, Lane, Lamartine, Burton, Disraeli, or Nerval. There is some significance in the fact that the two most renowned German works on the Orient, Goethe&#039;s &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039; and Friedrich Schlegel&#039;s &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier&#039;&#039;, were based respectively on a Rhine journey and on hours spent in Paris libraries. What German Oriental scholarship did was to refine and elaborate techniques whose application was to texts, myths, ideas, and languages almost literally gathered from the Orient by imperial Britain and France.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet what German Orientalism had in common with Anglo-French and later American Orientalism was a kind of intellectual &#039;&#039;authority&#039;&#039; over the Orient within Western culture. This authority must in large part be the subject of any description of Orientalism, and it is so in this study. Even the name &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; suggests a serious, perhaps ponderous style of expertise; when I apply it to modern American social scientists (since they do not call themselves Orientalists, my use of the word is anomalous), it is to draw attention to the way Middle East experts can still draw on the vestiges of Orientalism&#039;s intellectual position in nineteenth-century Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated, disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgments it forms, transmits, reproduces. Above all, authority can, indeed must, be analyzed. All these attributes of authority apply to Orientalism, and much of what I do in this study is to describe both the historical authority in and the personal authorities of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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My principal methodological devices for studying authority here are what can be called &#039;&#039;strategic location&#039;&#039;, which is a way of describing the author&#039;s position in a text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about, and &#039;&#039;strategic formation&#039;&#039;, which is a way of analyzing the relationship between texts and the way in which groups of texts, types of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large. I use the notion of strategy simply to identify the problem every writer on the Orient has faced: how to get hold of it, how to approach it, how not to be defeated or overwhelmed by its sublimity, its scope, its awful dimensions. Everyone who writes about the Orient must locate himself vis-a-vis the Orient; translated into his text, this location includes the kind of narrative voice he adopts, the type of structure he builds, the kinds of images, themes, motifs that circulate in his text--all of which add up to deliberate ways of addressing the reader, containing the Orient, and finally, representing it or speaking in its behalf. None of this takes place in the abstract, however. Every writer on the Orient (and this is true even of Homer) assumes some Oriental precedent, some previous knowledge of the Orient, to which he refers and on which he relies. Additionally, each work on the Orient &#039;&#039;affiliates&#039;&#039; itself with other works, with audiences, with institutions, with the Orient itself. The ensemble of relationships between works, audiences, and some particular aspects of the Orient therefore constitutes an analyzable formation--for example, that of philological studies, of anthologies of extracts from Oriental literature, of travel books, of Oriental fantasies--whose presence in time, in discourse, in institutions (schools, libraries, foreign services) gives it strength and authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is clear, I hope, that my concern with authority does not entail analysis of what lies hidden in the Orientalist text, but analysis rather of the text&#039;s surface, its exteriority to what it describes. I do not think that this idea can be overemphasized. Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West. He is never concerned with the Orient except as the first cause of what he says. What he says and writes, by virtue of the fact that it is said or written, is meant to indicate that the Orientalist is outside the Orient, both as an existential and as a moral fact. The principal product of this exteriority is of course representation: as early as Aeschylus&#039;s play &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039; the Orient is transformed from a very far distant and often threatening Otherness into figures that are relatively familiar (in Aeschylus&#039;s case, grieving Asiatic women). The dramatic immediacy of representation in &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039; obscures the fact that the audience is watching a highly artificial enactment of what a non-Oriental has made into a symbol for the whole Orient. My analysis of the Orientalist text therefore places emphasis on the evidence, which is by no means invisible, for such representations &#039;&#039;as representations&#039;&#039;, not as &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; depictions of the Orient. This evidence is found just as prominently in the so-called truthful text (histories, philological analyses, political treatises) as in the avowedly artistic (i.e., openly imaginative) text. The things to look at are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, &#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039; the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great original. The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job, for the West, and &#039;&#039;faute de mieux&#039;&#039;, for the poor Orient. &amp;quot;Sie konnen sich nicht vertreten, sie mussen vertreten werden,&amp;quot; as Marx wrote in &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another reason for insisting upon exteriority is that I believe it needs to be made clear about cultural discourse and exchange within a culture that what is commonly circulated by it is not &amp;quot;truth&amp;quot; but representations. It hardly needs to be demonstrated again that language itself is a highly organized and encoded system, which employs many devices to express, indicate, exchange messages and information, represent, and so forth. In any instance of at least written language, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a &#039;&#039;re-presence&#039;&#039;, or a representation. The value, efficacy, strength, apparent veracity of a written statement about the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot instrumentally depend, on the Orient as such. On the contrary, the written statement is a presence to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made supererogatory any such &#039;&#039;real thing&#039;&#039; as &amp;quot;the Orient.&amp;quot; Thus all of Orientalism stands forth and away from the Orient: that Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the West than on the Orient, and this sense is directly indebted to various Western techniques of representation that make the Orient visible, clear, &amp;quot;there&amp;quot; in discourse about it. And these representations rely upon institutions, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of understanding for their effects, not upon a distant and amorphous Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between representations of the Orient before the last third of the eighteenth century and those after it (that is, those belonging to what I call modern Orientalism) is that the range of representation expanded enormously in the later period. It is true that after William Jones and Anquetil-Duperron, and after Napoleon&#039;s Egyptian expedition, Europe came to know the Orient more scientifically, to live in it with greater authority and discipline than ever before. But what mattered to Europe was the expanded scope and the much greater refinement given its techniques for receiving the Orient. When around the turn of the eighteenth century the Orient definitively revealed the age of its languages--thus outdating Hebrew&#039;s divine pedigree--it was a group of Europeans who made the discovery, passed it on to other scholars, and preserved the discovery in the new science of Indo-European philology. A new powerful science for viewing the linguistic Orient was born, and with it, as Foucault has shown in &#039;&#039;The Order of Things&#039;&#039;, a whole web of related scientific interests. Similarly William Beckford, Byron, Goethe, and Hugo restructured the Orient by their art and made its colors, lights, and people visible through their images, rhythms, and motifs. At most, the &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; Orient provoked a writer to his vision; it very rarely guided it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientalism responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West. Thus the history of Orientalism has both an internal consistency and a highly articulated set of relationships to the dominant culture surrounding it. My analyses consequently try to show the field&#039;s shape and internal organization, its pioneers, patriarchal authorities, canonical texts, doxological ideas, exemplary figures, its followers, elaborators, and new authorities; I try also to explain how Orientalism borrowed and was frequently informed by &amp;quot;strong&amp;quot; ideas, doctrines, and trends ruling the culture. Thus there was (and is) a linguistic Orient, a Freudian Orient, a Spenglerian Orient, a Darwinian Orient, a racist Orient--and so on. Yet never has there been such a thing as a pure, or unconditional, Orient; similarly, never has there been a nonmaterial form of Orientalism, much less something so innocent as an &amp;quot;idea&amp;quot; of the Orient. In this underlying conviction and in its ensuing methodological consequences do I differ from scholars who study the history of ideas. For the emphases and the executive form, above all the material effectiveness, of statements made by Orientalist discourse are possible in ways that any hermetic history of ideas tends completely to scant. Without those emphases and that material effectiveness Orientalism would be just another idea, whereas it is and was much more than that. Therefore I set out to examine not only scholarly works but also works of literature, political tracts, journalistic texts, travel books, religious and philological studies. In other words, my hybrid perspective is broadly historical and &amp;quot;anthropological,&amp;quot; given that I believe all texts to be worldly and circumstantial in (of course) ways that vary from genre to genre, and from historical period to historical period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet unlike Michel Foucault, to whose work I am greatly indebted, I do believe in the determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism. The unity of the large ensemble of texts I analyze is due in part to the fact that they frequently refer to each other: Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors. Edward William Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; was read and cited by such diverse figures as Nerval, Flaubert, and Richard Burton. He was an authority whose use was an imperative for anyone writing or thinking about the Orient, not just about Egypt: when Nerval borrows passages verbatim from &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; it is to use Lane&#039;s authority to assist him in describing village scenes in Syria, not Egypt. Lane&#039;s authority and the opportunities provided for citing him discriminately as well as indiscriminately were there because Orientalism could give his text the kind of distributive currency that he acquired. There is no way, however, of understanding Lane&#039;s currency without also understanding the peculiar features of &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; text; this is equally true of Renan, Sacy, Lamartine, Schlegel, and a group of other influential writers. Foucault believes that in general the individual text or author counts for very little; empirically, in the case of Orientalism (and perhaps nowhere else) I find this not to be so. Accordingly my analyses employ close textual readings whose goal is to reveal the dialectic between individual text or writer and the complex collective formation to which his work is a contribution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet even though it includes an ample selection of writers, this book is still far from a complete history or general account of Orientalism. Of this failing I am very conscious. The fabric of as thick a discourse as Orientalism has survived and functioned in Western society because of its richness: all I have done is to describe parts of that fabric at certain moments, and merely to suggest the existence of a larger whole, detailed, interesting, dotted with fascinating figures, texts, and events. I have consoled myself with believing that this book is one installment of several, and hope there are scholars and critics who might want to write others. There is still a general essay to be written on imperialism and culture; other studies would go more deeply into the connection between Orientalism and pedagogy, or into Italian, Dutch, German, and Swiss Orientalism, or into the dynamic between scholarship and imaginative writing, or into the relationship between administrative ideas and intellectual discipline. Perhaps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a nonrepressive and nonmanipulative, perspective. But then one would have to rethink the whole complex problem of knowledge and power. These are all tasks left embarrassingly incomplete in this study.&lt;br /&gt;
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The last, perhaps self-flattering, observation on method that I want to make here is that I have written this study with several audiences in mind. For students of literature and criticism, Orientalism offers a marvelous instance of the interrelations between society, history, and textuality; moreover, the cultural role played by the Orient in the West connects Orientalism with ideology, politics, and the logic of power, matters of relevance, I think, to the literary community. For contemporary students of the Orient, from university scholars to policymakers, I have written with two ends in mind: one, to present their intellectual genealogy to them in a way that has not been done; two, to criticize--with the hope of stirring discussion--the often unquestioned assumptions on which their work for the most part depends. For the general reader, this study deals with matters that always compel attention, all of them connected not only with Western conceptions and treatments of the Other but also with the singularly important role played by Western culture in what Vico called the world of nations. Lastly, for readers in the so-called Third World, this study proposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western politics and of the non-Western world in those politics as of the &#039;&#039;strength&#039;&#039; of Western cultural discourse, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or &amp;quot;superstructural.&amp;quot; My hope is to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves or upon others.&lt;br /&gt;
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The three long chapters and twelve shorter units into which this book is divided are intended to facilitate exposition as much as possible. Chapter One, &amp;quot;The Scope of Orientalism,&amp;quot; draws a large circle around all the dimensions of the subject, both in terms of historical time and experiences and in terms of philosophical and political themes. Chapter Two, &amp;quot;Orientalist Structures and Restructures,&amp;quot; attempts to trace the development of modern Orientalism by a broadly chronological description, and also by the description of a set of devices common to the work of important poets, artists, and scholars. Chapter Three, &amp;quot;Orientalism Now,&amp;quot; begins where its predecessor left off, at around 1870. This is the period of great colonial expansion into the Orient, and it culminates in World War II. The very last section of Chapter Three characterizes the shift from British and French to American hegemony; I attempt there finally to sketch the present intellectual and social realities of Orientalism in the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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3. &#039;&#039;The personal dimension&#039;&#039;. In the &#039;&#039;Prison Notebooks&#039;&#039; Gramsci says: &amp;quot;The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is &#039;knowing thyself&#039; as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory.&amp;quot; The only available English translation inexplicably leaves Gramsci&#039;s comment at that, whereas in fact Gramsci&#039;s Italian text concludes by adding, &amp;quot;therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Antonio Gramsci, &#039;&#039;The Prison Notebooks: Selections&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 324. The full passage, unavailable in the Hoare and Smith translation, is to be found in Gramsci, &#039;&#039;Quaderni del Carcere&#039;&#039;, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Turin: Einaudi Editore, 1975), 2: 1363.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the personal investment in this study derives from my awareness of being an &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; as a child growing up in two British colonies. All of my education, in those colonies (Palestine and Egypt) and in the United States, has been Western, and yet that deep early awareness has persisted. In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon me, the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life of all Orientals. This is why for me the Islamic Orient has had to be the center of attention. Whether what I have achieved is the inventory prescribed by Gramsci is not for me to judge, although I have felt it important to be conscious of trying to produce one. Along the way, as severely and as rationally as I have been able, I have tried to maintain a critical consciousness, as well as employing those instruments of historical, humanistic, and cultural research of which my education has made me the fortunate beneficiary. In none of that, however, have I ever lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal involvement in having been constituted as, &amp;quot;an Oriental.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The historical circumstances making such a study possible are fairly complex, and I can only list them schematically here. Anyone resident in the West since the 1950s, particularly in the United States, will have lived through an era of extraordinary turbulence in the relations of East and West. No one will have failed to note how &amp;quot;East&amp;quot; has always signified danger and threat during this period, even as it has meant the traditional Orient as well as Russia. In the universities a growing establishment of area-studies programs and institutes has made the scholarly study of the Orient a branch of national policy. Public affairs in this country include a healthy interest in the Orient, as much for its strategic and economic importance as for its traditional exoticism. If the world has become immediately accessible to a Western citizen living in the electronic age, the Orient too has drawn nearer to him, and is now less a myth perhaps than a place crisscrossed by Western, especially American, interests.&lt;br /&gt;
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One aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the media&#039;s resources have forced information into more and more standardized molds. So far as the Orient is concerned, standardization and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the nineteenth-century academic and imaginative demonology of &amp;quot;the mysterious Orient.&amp;quot; This is nowhere more true than in the ways by which the Near East is grasped. Three things have contributed to making even the simplest perception of the Arabs and Islam into a highly politicized, almost raucous matter: one, the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West, which is immediately reflected in the history of Orientalism; two, the struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism, and its effects upon American Jews as well as upon both the liberal culture and the population at large; three, the almost total absence of any cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss the Arabs or Islam. Furthermore, it hardly needs saying that because the Middle East is now so identified with Great Power politics, oil economics, and the simple-minded dichotomy of freedom-loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs, the chances of anything like a clear view of what one talks about in talking about the Near East are depressingly small.&lt;br /&gt;
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My own experiences of these matters are in part what made me write this book. The life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, particularly in America, is disheartening. There exists here an almost unanimous consensus that politically he does not exist, and when it is allowed that he does, it is either as a nuisance or, as an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian has come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny. It has made matters worse for him to remark that no person academically involved with the Near East--no Orientalist, that is--has ever in the United States culturally and politically identified himself wholeheartedly with the Arabs; certainly there have been identifications on some level, but they have never taken an &amp;quot;acceptable&amp;quot; form as has liberal American identification with Zionism, and all too frequently they have been radically flawed by their association either with discredited political and economic interests (oil-company and State Department Arabists, for example) or with religion.&lt;br /&gt;
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The nexus of knowledge and power creating &amp;quot;the Oriental&amp;quot; and in a sense obliterating him as a human being is therefore not for me an exclusively academic matter. Yet it is an &#039;&#039;intellectual&#039;&#039; matter of some very obvious importance. I have been able to put to use my humanistic and political concerns for the analysis and description of a very worldly matter, the rise, development, and consolidation of Orientalism. Too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent; it has regularly seemed otherwise to me, and certainly my study of Orientalism has convinced me (and I hope will convince my literary colleagues) that society and literary culture can only be understood and studied together. In addition, and by an almost inescapable logic, I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of Western anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism and, as I have discussed it in its Islamic branch, Orientalism resemble each other very closely is a historical, cultural, and political truth that needs only to be mentioned to an Arab Palestinian for its irony to be perfectly understood. But what I should like also to have contributed here is a better understanding of the way cultural domination has operated. If this stimulates a new kind of dealing with the Orient, indeed if it eliminates the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; altogether, then we shall have advanced a little in the process of what Raymond Williams has called the &amp;quot;unlearning&amp;quot; of &amp;quot;the inherent dominative mode.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Williams, &#039;&#039;Culture and Society, 1780-1950&#039;&#039; (London: Chatto &amp;amp; Windus, 1958), p. 376.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;1.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;The Scope of Orientalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
... le genie inquiet et ambitieux de Europeens ... impatient d&#039;employer les nouveaux instruments de leur puissance ...&lt;br /&gt;
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--Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, &#039;&#039;Preface historique&#039;&#039; (1809) &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== I. &#039;&#039;&#039;Knowing the Oriental&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
On June 13, 1910, Arthur James Balfour lectured the House of Commons on &amp;quot;the problems with which we have to deal in Egypt.&amp;quot; These, he said, &amp;quot;belong to a wholly different category&amp;quot; than those &amp;quot;affecting the Isle of Wight or the West Riding of Yorkshire.&amp;quot; He spoke with the authority of a long-time member of Parliament, former private secretary to Lord Salisbury, former chief secretary for Ireland, former secretary for Scotland, former prime minister, veteran of numerous overseas crises, achievements, and changes. During his involvement in imperial affairs Balfour served a monarch who in 1876 had been declared Empress of India; he had been especially well placed in positions of uncommon influence to follow the Afghan and Zulu wars, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the death of General Gordon in the Sudan, the Fashoda Incident, the battle of Omdurman, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War. In addition his remarkable social eminence, the breadth of his learning and wit--he could write on such varied subjects as Bergson, Handel, theism, and golf--his education at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, and his apparent command over imperial affairs all gave considerable authority to what he told the Commons in June 1910. But there was still more to Balfour&#039;s speech, or at least to his need for giving it so didactically and moralistically. Some members were questioning the necessity for &amp;quot;England in Egypt,&amp;quot; the subject of Alfred Milner&#039;s enthusiastic book of 1892, but here designating a once-profitable occupation that had become a source of trouble now that Egyptian nationalism was on the rise and the continuing British presence in Egypt no longer so easy to defend. Balfour, then, to inform and explain.&lt;br /&gt;
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Recalling the challenge of J. M. Robertson, the member of Tyneside, Balfour himself put Robertson&#039;s question again: &amp;quot;What right have you to take up these airs of superiority with regard to people whom you choose to call Oriental?&amp;quot; The choice of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; was canonical; it had been employed by Chaucer and Mandeville, by Shakespeare, Dryden, Pope, and Byron. It designated Asia or the East, geographically, morally, culturally. One could speak in Europe of an Oriental personality, an Oriental atmosphere, an Oriental tale, Oriental despotism, or an Oriental mode of production, and be understood. Marx had used the word, and now Balfour was using it; his choice was understandable and called for no comment whatever.&lt;br /&gt;
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I take up no attitude of superiority. But I ask [Robertson and anyone else] ... who has even the most superficial knowledge of history, if they will look in the face the facts with which a British statesman has to deal when he is put in a position of supremacy over great races like the inhabitants of Egypt and countries in the East. We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know the civilization of any other country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately; we know more about it. It goes far beyond the petty span of the history of our race, which is lost in the prehistoric period at a time when the Egyptian civilisation had already passed its prime. Look at all the Oriental countries. Do not talk about superiority or inferiority.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two great themes dominate his remarks here and in what will follow: knowledge and power, the Baconian themes. As Balfour justifies the necessity for British occupation of Egypt, supremacy in his mind is associated with &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; knowledge of Egypt and not principally with military or economic power. Knowledge to Balfour means surveying a civilization from its origins to its prime to its decline--and of course, it means &#039;&#039;being able to do that&#039;&#039;. Knowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant. The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object is a &amp;quot;fact&amp;quot; which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; to deny autonomy to &amp;quot;it&amp;quot;--the Oriental country--since we know it and it exists, in a sense, &#039;&#039;as&#039;&#039; we know it. British knowledge of Egypt &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; Egypt for Balfour, and the burdens of knowledge make such questions as inferiority and superiority seem petty ones. Balfour nowhere denies British superiority and Egyptian inferiority; he takes them for granted as he describes the consequences of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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First of all, look at the facts of the case. Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities for self-government ... having merits of their own.... You may look through the whole history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, and you never find traces of self-government. All their great centuries--and they have been very great--have been passed under despotisms, under absolute government. All their great contributions to civilisation--and they have been great--have been made under that form of government. Conqueror has succeeded conqueror; one domination has followed another; but never in all the revolutions of fate and fortune have you seen one of those nations of its own motion establish what we, from a Western point of view, call self-government. That is the fact. It is not a question of superiority and inferiority. I suppose a true Eastern sage would say that the working government which we have taken upon ourselves in Egypt and elsewhere is not a work worthy of a philosopher--that it is the dirty work, the inferior work, of carrying on the necessary labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since these facts are facts, Balfour must then go on to the next part of his argument.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is it a good thing for these great nations--I admit their greatness--that this absolute government should be exercised by us? I think it is a good thing. I think that experience shows that they have got under it far better government than in the whole history of the world they ever had before, and which not only is a benefit to them, but is undoubtedly a benefit to the whole of the civilised West.... We are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the Egyptians, though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large.&lt;br /&gt;
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Balfour produces no evidence that Egyptians and &amp;quot;the races with whom we deal&amp;quot; appreciate or even understand the good that is being done them by colonial occupation. It does not occur to Balfour, however, to let the Egyptian speak for himself, since presumably any Egyptian who would speak out is more likely to be &amp;quot;the agitator [who] wishes to raise difficulties&amp;quot; than the good native who overlooks the &amp;quot;difficulties&amp;quot; of foreign domination. And so, having settled the ethical problems, Balfour turns at last to the practical ones. &amp;quot;If it is our business to govern, with or without gratitude, with or without the real and genuine memory of all the loss of which we have relieved the population [Balfour by no means implies, as part of that loss, the loss or at least the indefinite postponement of Egyptian independence] and no vivid imagination of all the benefits which we have given to them; if that is our duty, how is it to be performed?&amp;quot; England exports &amp;quot;our very best to these countries.&amp;quot; These selfless administrators do their work &amp;quot;amidst tens of thousands of persons belonging to a different creed, a different race, a different discipline, different conditions of life.&amp;quot; What makes their work of governing possible is their sense of being supported at home by a government that endorses what they do. Yet&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
directly the native populations have that instinctive feeling that those with whom they have got to deal have not behind them the might, the authority, the sympathy, the full and ungrudging support of the country which sent them there, those populations lose all that sense of order which is the very basis of their civilisation, just as our officers lose all that sense of power and authority, which is the very basis of everything they can do for the benefit of those among whom they have been sent.&lt;br /&gt;
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Balfour&#039;s logic here is interesting, not least for being completely consistent with the premises of his entire speech. England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes &amp;quot;the very basis&amp;quot; of contemporary Egyptian civilization; Egypt requires, indeed insists upon, British occupation. But if the special intimacy between governor and governed in Egypt is disturbed by Parliament&#039;s doubts at home, then &amp;quot;the authority of what ... is the dominant race--and as I think ought to remain the dominant race--has been undermined.&amp;quot; Not only does English prestige suffer; &amp;quot;it is vain for a handful of British officials--endow them how you like, give them all the qualities of character and genius you can imagine--it is impossible for them to carry out the great task which in Egypt, not we only, but the civilised world have imposed upon them.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This and the preceding quotations from Arthur James Balfour&#039;s speech to the House of Commons are from Great Britain, &#039;&#039;Parliamentary Debates&#039;&#039; (Commons), 5th ser., 17 (1910): 1140-46. See also A. P. Thornton, &#039;&#039;The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power&#039;&#039; (London: MacMillan &amp;amp; Co., 1959), pp. 357-60. Balfour&#039;s speech was a defense of Eldon Gorst&#039;s policy in Egypt; for a discussion of that see Peter John Dreyfus Mellini, &amp;quot;Sir Eldon Gorst and British Imperial Policy in Egypt,&amp;quot; unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1971.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As a rhetorical performance Balfour&#039;s speech is significant for the way in which he plays the part of, and represents, a variety of characters. There are of course &amp;quot;the English,&amp;quot; for whom the pronoun &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; is used with the full weight of a distinguished, powerful man who feels himself to be representative of all that is best in his nation&#039;s history. Balfour can also speak for the civilized world, the West, and the relatively small corps of colonial officials in Egypt. If he does not speak directly for the Orientals, it is because they after all speak another language; yet he knows how they feel since he knows their history, their reliance upon such as he, and their expectations. Still, he does speak for them in the sense that what they might have to say, were they to be asked and might they be able to answer, would somewhat uselessly confirm what is already evident: that they are a subject race, dominated by a race that knows them and what is good for them better than they could possibly know themselves. Their great moments were in the past; they are useful in the modern world only because the powerful and up-to-date empires have effectively brought them out of the wretchedness of their decline and turned them into rehabilitated residents of productive colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Egypt in particular was an excellent case in point, and Balfour was perfectly aware of how much right he had to speak as a member of his country&#039;s parliament on behalf of England, the West, Western civilization, about modern Egypt. For Egypt was not just another colony: it was the vindication of Western imperialism; it was, until its annexation by England, an almost academic example of Oriental backwardness; it was to become the triumph of English knowledge and power. Between 1882, the year in which England occupied Egypt and put an end to the nationalist rebellion of Colonel Arabi, and 1907, England&#039;s representative in Egypt, Egypt&#039;s master, was Evelyn Baring (also known as &amp;quot;Over-baring&amp;quot;), Lord Cromer. On July 30, 1907, it was Balfour in the Commons who had supported the project to give Cromer a retirement prize of fifty thousand pounds as a reward for what he had done in Egypt. Cromer &#039;&#039;made&#039;&#039; Egypt, said Balfour:&lt;br /&gt;
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Everything he has touched he has succeeded in.... Lord Cromer&#039;s services during the past quarter of a century have raised Egypt from the lowest pitch of social and economic degradation until it now stands among Oriental nations, I believe, absolutely alone in its prosperity, financial and moral.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Denis Judd, &#039;&#039;Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932&#039;&#039; (London: MacMillan &amp;amp; Co., 1968), p. 286. See also p. 292: as late as 1926 Balfour spoke--without irony--of Egypt as an &amp;quot;independent nation.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How Egypt&#039;s moral prosperity was measured, Balfour did not venture to say. British exports to Egypt equaled those to the whole of Africa; that certainly indicated a sort of financial prosperity, for Egypt and England (somewhat unevenly) together. But what really mattered was the unbroken, all-embracing Western tutelage of an Oriental country, from the scholars, missionaries, businessmen, soldiers, and teachers who prepared and then implemented the occupation to the high functionaries like Cromer and Balfour who saw themselves as providing for, directing, and sometimes even forcing Egypt&#039;s rise from Oriental neglect to its present lonely eminence.&lt;br /&gt;
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If British success in Egypt was as exceptional as Balfour said, it was by no means an inexplicable or irrational success. Egyptian affairs had been controlled according to a general theory expressed both by Balfour in his notions about Oriental civilization and by Cromer in his management of everyday business in Egypt. The most important thing about the theory during the first decade of the twentieth century was that it worked, and worked staggeringly well. The argument, when reduced to its simplest form, was clear, it was precise, it was easy to grasp. There are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; the latter must be dominated, which usually means having their land occupied, their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power. That Balfour and Cromer, as we shall soon see, could strip humanity down to such ruthless cultural and racial essences was not at all an indication of their particular viciousness. Rather it was an indication of how streamlined a general doctrine had become by the time they put it to use--how streamlined and effective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Balfour, whose theses on Orientals pretended to objective universality, Cromer spoke about Orientals specifically as what he had ruled or had to deal with, first in India, then for the twenty-five years in Egypt during which he emerged as the paramount consulgeneral in England&#039;s empire. Balfour&#039;s &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot; are Cromer&#039;s &amp;quot;subject races,&amp;quot; which he made the topic of a long essay published in the &#039;&#039;Edinburgh Review&#039;&#039; in January 1908. Once again, knowledge of subject races or Orientals is what makes their management easy and profitable; knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control. Cromer&#039;s notion is that England&#039;s empire will not dissolve if such things as militarism and commercial egotism at home and &amp;quot;free institutions&amp;quot; in the colony (as opposed to British government &amp;quot;according to the Code of Christian morality&amp;quot;) are kept in check. For if, according to Cromer, logic is something &amp;quot;the existence of which the Oriental is disposed altogether to ignore,&amp;quot; the proper method of ruling is not to impose ultrascientific measures upon him or to force him bodily to accept logic. It is rather to understand his limitations and &amp;quot;endeavor to find, in the contentment of the subject race, a more worthy and, it may be hoped, a stronger bond of union between the rulers and the ruled.&amp;quot; Lurking everywhere behind the pacification of the subject race is imperial might, more effective for its refined understanding and infrequent use than for its soldiers, brutal tax gatherers, and incontinent force. In a word, the Empire must be wise; it must temper its cupidity with selflessness, and its impatience with flexible discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
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To be more explicit, what is meant when it is said that the commercial spirit should be under some control is this--that in dealing with Indians or Egyptians, or Shilluks, or Zulus, the first question is to consider what these people, who are all, nationally speaking, more or less &#039;&#039;in statu pupillari&#039;&#039;, themselves think is best in their own interests, although this is a point which deserves serious consideration. But it is essential that each special issue should be decided mainly with reference to what, by the light of Western knowledge and experience tempered by local considerations, we conscientiously think is best for the subject race, without reference to any real or supposed advantage which may accrue to England as a nation, or--as is more frequently the case--to the special interests represented by some one or more influential classes of Englishmen. If the British nation as a whole persistently bears this principle in mind, and insists sternly on its application, though we can never create a patriotism akin to that based on affinity of race or community of language, we may perhaps foster some sort of cosmopolitan allegiance grounded on the respect always accorded to superior talents and unselfish conduct, and on the gratitude derived both from favours conferred and from those to come. There may then at all events be some hope that the Egyptian will hesitate before he throws in his lot with any future Arabi.... Even the Central African savage may eventually learn to chant a hymn in honour of Astraea Redux, as represented by the British official who denies him gin but gives him justice. More than this, commerce will gain.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Political and Literary Essays&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1908-1913&#039;&#039; (1913; reprint ed., Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), pp. 40, 53, 12-14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How much &amp;quot;serious consideration&amp;quot; the ruler ought to give proposals from the subject race was illustrated in Cromer&#039;s total opposition to Egyptian nationalism. Free native institutions, the absence of foreign occupation, a self-sustaining national sovereignty: these unsurprising demands were consistently rejected by Cromer, who asserted unambiguously that &amp;quot;the real future of Egypt ... lies not in the direction of a narrow nationalism, which will only embrace native Egyptians ... but rather in that of an enlarged cosmopolitanism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Subject races did not have it in them to know what was good for them. Most of them were Orientals, of whose characteristics Cromer was very knowledgeable since he had had experience with them both in India and Egypt. One of the convenient things about Orientals for Cromer was that managing them, although circumstances might differ slightly here and there, was almost everywhere nearly the same.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Roger Owen, &amp;quot;The Influence of Lord Cromer&#039;s Indian Experience on British Policy in Egypt 1883-1907,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Middle Eastern Affairs, Number Four: St. Antony&#039;s Papers Number 17&#039;&#039;, ed. Albert Hourani (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 109-39.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was, of course, because Orientals were almost everywhere nearly the same.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now at last we approach the long-developing core of essential knowledge, knowledge both academic and practical, which Cromer and Balfour inherited from a century of modern Western Orientalism: knowledge about and knowledge of Orientals, their race, character, culture, history, traditions, society, and possibilities. This knowledge was effective: Cromer believed he had put it to use in governing Egypt. Moreover, it was tested and unchanging knowledge, since &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot; for all practical purposes were a Platonic essence, which any Orientalist (or ruler of Orientals) might examine, understand, and expose. Thus in the thirty-fourth chapter of his two-volume work &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039;, the magisterial record of his experience and achievement, Cromer puts down a sort of personal canon of Orientalist wisdom:&lt;br /&gt;
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Sir Alfred Lyall once said to me: &amp;quot;Accuracy is abhorrent to the Oriental mind. Every Anglo-Indian should always remember that maxim.&amp;quot; Want of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is in fact the main characteristic of the Oriental mind.&lt;br /&gt;
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The European is a close reasoner; his statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he is a natural logician, albeit he may not have studied logic; he is by nature sceptical and requires proof before he can accept the truth of any proposition; his trained intelligence works like a piece of mechanism. The mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description. Although the ancient Arabs acquired in a somewhat higher degree the science of dialectics, their descendants are singularly deficient in the logical faculty. They are often incapable of drawing the most obvious conclusions from any simple premises of which they may admit the truth. Endeavor to elicit a plain statement of facts from any ordinary Egyptian. His explanation will generally be lengthy, and wanting in lucidity. He will probably contradict himself half-a-dozen times before he has finished his story. He will often break down under the mildest process of cross-examination.&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientals or Arabs are thereafter shown to be gullible, &amp;quot;devoid of energy and initiative,&amp;quot; much given to &amp;quot;fulsome flattery,&amp;quot; intrigue, cunning, and unkindness to animals; Orientals cannot walk on either a road or a pavement (their disordered minds fail to understand what the clever European grasps immediately, that roads and pavements are made for walking); Orientals are inveterate liars, they are &amp;quot;lethargic and suspicious,&amp;quot; and in everything oppose the clarity, directness, and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), 2: 146-67. For a British view of British policy in Egypt that runs totally counter to Cromer&#039;s, see Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, &#039;&#039;Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Events&#039;&#039; (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922). There is a valuable discussion of Egyptian opposition to British rule in Mounah A. Khouri, &#039;&#039;Poetry and the Making of Modern Egypt, 1882-1922&#039;&#039; (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Cromer makes no effort to conceal that Orientals for him were always and only the human material he governed in British colonies. &amp;quot;As I am only a diplomatist and an administrator, whose proper study is also man, but from the point of view of governing him,&amp;quot; Cromer says, &amp;quot;... I content myself with noting the fact that somehow or other the Oriental generally acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cromer, &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039;, 2: 164.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cromer&#039;s descriptions are of course based partly on direct observation, yet here and there he refers to orthodox Orientalist authorities (in particular Ernest Renan and Constantin de Volney) to support his views. To these authorities he also defers when it comes to explaining why Orientals are the way they are. He has no doubt that &#039;&#039;any&#039;&#039; knowledge of the Oriental will confirm his views, which, to judge from his description of the Egyptian breaking under cross-examination, find the Oriental to be guilty. The crime was that the Oriental was an Oriental, and it is an accurate sign of how commonly acceptable such a tautology was that it could be written without even an appeal to European logic or symmetry of mind. Thus any deviation from what were considered the norms of Oriental behavior was believed to be unnatural; Cromer&#039;s last annual report from Egypt consequently proclaimed Egyptian nationalism to be an &amp;quot;entirely novel idea&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;a plant of exotic rather than of indigenous growth.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in John Marlowe, &#039;&#039;Cromer in Egypt&#039;&#039; (London: Elek Books, 1970), p. 271.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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We would be wrong, I think, to underestimate the reservoir of accredited knowledge, the codes of Orientalist orthodoxy, to which Cromer and Balfour refer everywhere in their writing and in their public policy. To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact. Men have always divided the world up into regions having either real or imagined distinction from each other. The absolute demarcation between East and West, which Balfour and Cromer accept with such complacency, had been years, even centuries, in the making. There were of course innumerable voyages of discovery; there were contacts through trade and war. But more than this, since the middle of the eighteenth century there had been two principal elements in the relation between East and West. One was a growing systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient, knowledge reinforced by the colonial encounter as well as by the widespread interest in the alien and unusual, exploited by the developing sciences of ethnology, comparative anatomy, philology, and history; furthermore, to this systematic knowledge was added a sizable body of literature produced by novelists, poets, translators, and gifted travelers. The other feature of Oriental-European relations was that Europe was always in a position of strength, not to say domination. There is no way of putting this euphemistically. True, the relationship of strong to weak could be disguised or mitigated, as when Balfour acknowledged the &amp;quot;greatness&amp;quot; of Oriental civilizations. But the essential relationship, on political, cultural, and even religious grounds, was seen--in the West, which is what concerns us here--to be one between a strong and a weak partner.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many terms were used to express the relation: Balfour and Cromer, typically, used several. The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, &amp;quot;different&amp;quot;; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, &amp;quot;normal.&amp;quot; But the way of enlivening the relationship was everywhere to stress the fact that the Oriental lived in a different but thoroughly organized world of his own, a world with its own national, cultural, and epistemological boundaries and principles of internal coherence. Yet what gave the Oriental&#039;s world its intelligibility and identity was not the result of his own efforts but rather the whole complex series of knowledgeable manipulations by which the Orient was identified by the West. Thus the two features of cultural relationship I have been discussing come together. Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense &#039;&#039;creates&#039;&#039; the Orient, the Oriental, and his world. In Cromer&#039;s and Balfour&#039;s language the Oriental is depicted as something one judges (as in a court of law), something one studies and depicts (as in a curriculum), something one disciplines (as in a school or prison), something one illustrates (as in a zoological manual). The point is that in each of these cases the Oriental is &#039;&#039;contained&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;represented&#039;&#039; by dominating frameworks. Where do these come from?&lt;br /&gt;
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Cultural strength is not something we can discuss very easily--and one of the purposes of the present work is to illustrate, analyze, and reflect upon Orientalism as an exercise of cultural strength. In other words, it is better not to risk generalizations about so vague and yet so important a notion as cultural strength until a good deal of material has been analyzed first. But at the outset one can say that so far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West. The Orient was viewed as if framed by the classroom, the criminal court, the prison, the illustrated manual. Orientalism, then, is knowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgment, discipline, or governing.&lt;br /&gt;
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During the early years of the twentieth century, men like Balfour and Cromer could say what they said, in the way they did, because a still earlier tradition of Orientalism than the nineteenth-century one provided them with a vocabulary, imagery, rhetoric, and figures with which to say it. Yet Orientalism reinforced, and was reinforced by, the certain knowledge that Europe or the West literally commanded the vastly greater part of the earth&#039;s surface. The period of immense advance in the institutions and content of Orientalism coincides exactly with the period of unparalleled European expansion; from 1815 to 1914 European direct colonial dominion expanded from about 35 percent of the earth&#039;s surface to about 85 percent of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harry Magdoff, &amp;quot;Colonialism (1763-c. 1970),&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Encyclopaedia Britannica&#039;&#039;, 15th ed. (1974), pp. 893-4. See also D. K. Fieldhouse, &#039;&#039;The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039; (New York: Delacorte Press, 1967), p. 178.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Every continent was affected, none more so than Africa and Asia. The two greatest empires were the British and the French; allies and partners in some things, in others they were hostile rivals. In the Orient, from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean to Indochina and Malaya, their colonial possessions and imperial spheres of influence were adjacent, frequently overlapped, often were fought over. But it was in the Near Orient, the lands of the Arab Near East, where Islam was supposed to define cultural and racial characteristics, that the British and the French encountered each other and &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; with the greatest intensity, familiarity, and complexity. For much of the nineteenth century, as Lord Salisbury put it in 1881, their common view of the Orient was intricately problematic: &amp;quot;When you have got a ... faithful ally who is bent on meddling in a country in which you are deeply interested--you have three courses open to you. You may renounce--or monopolize--or share. Renouncing would have been to place the French across our road to India. Monopolizing would have been very near the risk of war. So we resolved to share.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted in Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, &#039;&#039;Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations&#039;&#039; (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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And share they did, in ways that we shall investigate presently. What they shared, however, was not only land or profit or rule; it was the kind of intellectual power I have been calling Orientalism. In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together was a family of ideas&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The phrase is to be found in Ian Hacking, &#039;&#039;The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference&#039;&#039; (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics. But like any set of durable ideas, Orientalist notions influenced the people who were called Orientals as well as those called Occidental, European, or Western; in short, Orientalism is better grasped as a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought than it is simply as a positive doctrine. If the essence of Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority, then we must be prepared to note how in its development and subsequent history Orientalism deepened and even hardened the distinction. When it became common practice during the nineteenth century for Britain to retire its administrators from India and elsewhere once they had reached the age of fifty-five, then a further refinement in Orientalism had been achieved; no Oriental was ever allowed to see a Westerner as he aged and degenerated, just as no Westerner needed ever to see himself, mirrored in the eyes of the subject race, as anything but a vigorous, rational, ever-alert young Raj.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. G. Kiernan, &#039;&#039;The Lords of Human Kind: Black Man, Yellow Man, and White Man in an Age of Empire&#039;&#039; (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1969), p. 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientalist ideas took a number of different forms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. First of all, in Europe there was a vast literature about the Orient inherited from the European past. What is distinctive about the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which is where this study assumes modern Orientalism to have begun, is that an Oriental renaissance took place, as Edgar Quinet phrased it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Edgar Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions, in Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paguerre, 1857), pp. 55-74.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Suddenly it seemed to a wide variety of thinkers, politicians, and artists that a new awareness of the Orient, which extended from China to the Mediterranean, had arisen. This awareness was partly the result of newly discovered and translated Oriental texts in languages like Sanskrit, Zend, and Arabic; it was also the result of a newly perceived relationship between the Orient and the West. For my purposes here, the keynote of the relationship was set for the Near East and Europe by the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798, an invasion which was in many ways the very model of a truly scientific appropriation of one culture by another, apparently stronger one. For with Napoleon&#039;s occupation of Egypt processes were set in motion between East and West that still dominate our contemporary cultural and political perspectives. And the Napoleonic expedition, with its great collective monument of erudition, the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, provided a scene or setting for Orientalism, since Egypt and subsequently the other Islamic lands were viewed as the live province, the laboratory, the theater of effective Western knowledge about the Orient. I shall return to the Napoleonic adventure a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
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With such experiences as Napoleon&#039;s the Orient as a body of knowledge in the West was modernized, and this is a second form in which nineteenth- and twentieth-century Orientalism existed. From the outset of the period I shall be examining there was everywhere amongst Orientalists the ambition to formulate their discoveries, experiences, and insights suitably in modern terms, to put ideas about the Orient in very close touch with modern realities. Renan&#039;s linguistic investigations of Semitic in 1848, for example, were couched in a style that drew heavily for its authority upon contemporary comparative grammar, comparative anatomy, and racial theory; these lent his Orientalism prestige and--the other side of the coin--made Orientalism vulnerable, as it has been ever since, to modish as well as seriously influential currents of thought in the West. Orientalism has been subjected to imperialism, positivism, utopianism, historicism, Darwinism, racism, Freudianism, Marxism, Spenglerism. But Orientalism, like many of the natural and social sciences, has had &amp;quot;paradigms&amp;quot; of research, its own learned societies, its own Establishment. During the nineteenth century the field increased enormously in prestige, as did also the reputation and influence of such institutions as the Societe asiatique, the Royal Asiatic Society, the Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, and the American Oriental Society. With the growth of these societies went also an increase, all across Europe, in the number of professorships in Oriental studies; consequently there was an expansion in the available means for disseminating Orientalism. Orientalist periodicals, beginning with the &#039;&#039;Fundgraben des Orients&#039;&#039; (1809), multiplied the quantity of knowledge as well as the number of specialties.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet little of this activity and very few of these institutions existed and flourished freely, for in a third form in which it existed, Orientalism imposed limits upon thought about the Orient. Even the most imaginative writers of an age, men like Flaubert, Nerval, or Scott, were constrained in what they could either experience of or say about the Orient. For Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, &amp;quot;us&amp;quot;) and the strange (the Orient, the East, &amp;quot;them&amp;quot;). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. Orientals lived in their world, &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; lived in ours. The vision and material reality propped each other up, kept each other going. A certain freedom of intercourse was always the Westerner&#039;s privilege; because his was the stronger culture, he could penetrate, he could wrestle with, he could give shape and meaning to the great Asiatic mystery, as Disraeli once called it. Yet what has, I think, been previously overlooked is the constricted vocabulary of such a privilege, and the comparative limitations of such a vision. My argument takes it that the Orientalist reality is both antihuman and persistent. Its scope, as much as its institutions and all-pervasive influence, lasts up to the present.&lt;br /&gt;
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But how did and does Orientalism work? How can one describe it all together as a historical phenomenon, a way of thought, a contemporary problem, and a material reality? Consider Cromer again, an accomplished technician of empire but also a beneficiary of Orientalism. He can furnish us with a rudimentary answer. In &amp;quot;The Government of Subject Races&amp;quot; he wrestles with the problem of how Britain, a nation of individuals, is to administer a wide-flung empire according to a number of central principles. He contrasts the &amp;quot;local agent,&amp;quot; who has both a specialist&#039;s knowledge of the native and an Anglo-Saxon individuality, with the central authority at home in London. The former may &amp;quot;treat subjects of local interest in a manner calculated to damage, or even to jeopardize, Imperial interests. The central authority is in a position to obviate any danger arising from this cause.&amp;quot; Why? Because this authority can &amp;quot;ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;should endeavour, so far as is possible, to realise the circumstances attendant on the government of the dependency.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cromer, &#039;&#039;Political and Literary Essays&#039;&#039;, p. 35.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The language is vague and unattractive, but the point is not hard to grasp. Cromer envisions a seat of power in the West, and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine&#039;s branches feed into it in the East--human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you--is processed by the machine, then converted into more power. The specialist does the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance: the Oriental becomes, for example, a subject race, an example of an &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; mentality, all for the enhancement of the &amp;quot;authority&amp;quot; at home. &amp;quot;Local interests&amp;quot; are Orientalist special interests, the &amp;quot;central authority&amp;quot; is the general interest of the imperial society as a whole. What Cromer quite accurately sees is the management of knowledge by society, the fact that knowledge--no matter how special--is regulated first by the local concerns of a specialist, later by the general concerns of a social system of authority. The interplay between local and central interests is intricate, but by no means indiscriminate.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Cromer&#039;s own case as an imperial administrator the &amp;quot;proper study is also man,&amp;quot; he says. When Pope proclaimed the proper study of mankind to be man, he meant all men, including &amp;quot;the poor Indian&amp;quot;; whereas Cromer&#039;s &amp;quot;also&amp;quot; reminds us that certain men, such as Orientals, can be singled out as the subject for &#039;&#039;proper&#039;&#039; study. The proper study--in this sense--of Orientals is Orientalism, properly separate from other forms of knowledge, but finally useful (because finite) for the material and social reality enclosing all knowledge at any time, supporting knowledge, providing it with uses. An order of sovereignty is set up from East to West, a mock chain of being whose clearest form was given once by Kipling:&lt;br /&gt;
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Mule, horse, elephant, or bullock, he obeys his driver, and the driver his sergeant, and the sergeant his lieutenant, and the lieutenant his captain, and the captain his major, and the major his colonel, and the colonel his brigadier commanding three regiments, and the brigadier his general, who obeys the Viceroy, who is the servant of the Empress.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jonah Raskin, &#039;&#039;The Mythology of Imperialism&#039;&#039; (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 40.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As deeply forged as is this monstrous chain of command, as strongly managed as is Cromer&#039;s &amp;quot;harmonious working,&amp;quot; Orientalism can also express the strength of the West and the Orient&#039;s weakness--as seen by the West. Such strength and such weakness are as intrinsic to Orientalism as they are to any view that divides the world into large general divisions, entities that coexist in a state of tension produced by what is believed to be radical difference.&lt;br /&gt;
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For that is the main intellectual issue raised by Orientalism. Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? By surviving the consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the hostility expressed by the division, say, of men into &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; (Westerners) and &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; (Orientals). For such divisions are generalities whose use historically and actually has been to press the importance of the distinction between some men and some other men, usually towards not especially admirable ends. When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy (as the categories were used by Balfour and Cromer), the result is usually to polarize the distinction--the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western--and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies. In short, from its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism as a form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hard-and-fast distinctions as &amp;quot;East&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;West&amp;quot;: to channel thought into a West or an East compartment. Because this tendency is right at the center of Orientalist theory, practice, and values found in the West, the sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as having the status of scientific truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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A contemporary illustration or two should clarify this observation perfectly. It is natural for men in power to survey from time to time the world with which they must deal. Balfour did it frequently. Our contemporary Henry Kissinger does it also, rarely with more express frankness than in his essay &amp;quot;Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy.&amp;quot; The drama he depicts is a real one, in which the United States must manage its behavior in the world under the pressures of domestic forces on the one hand and of foreign realities on the other. Kissinger&#039;s discourse must for that reason alone establish a polarity between the United States and the world; in addition, of course, he speaks consciously as an authoritative voice for the major Western power, whose recent history and present reality have placed it before a world that does not easily accept its power and dominance. Kissinger feels that the United States can deal less problematically with the industrial, developed West than it can with the developing world. Again, the contemporary actuality of relations between the United States and the so-called Third World (which includes China, Indochina, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America) is manifestly a thorny set of problems, which even Kissinger cannot hide.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kissinger&#039;s method in the essay proceeds according to what linguists call binary opposition: that is, he shows that there are two styles in foreign policy (the prophetic and the political), two types of technique, two periods, and so forth. When at the end of the historical part of his argument he is brought face to face with the contemporary world, he divides it accordingly into two halves, the developed and the developing countries. The first half, which is the West, &amp;quot;is deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data--the more accurately the better.&amp;quot; Kissinger&#039;s proof for this is the Newtonian revolution, which has not taken place in the developing world: &amp;quot;Cultures which escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking have retained the essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost completely &#039;&#039;internal&#039;&#039; to the observer.&amp;quot; Consequently, he adds, &amp;quot;empirical reality has a much different significance for many of the new countries than for the West because in a certain sense they never went through the process of discovering it.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Henry A. Kissinger, &#039;&#039;American Foreign Policy&#039;&#039; (New York: W. W. Norton &amp;amp; Co., 1974), pp. 48-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Cromer, Kissinger does not need to quote Sir Alfred Lyall on the Oriental&#039;s inability to be accurate; the point he makes is sufficiently unarguable to require no special validation. We had our Newtonian revolution; they didn&#039;t. As thinkers we are better off than they are. Good: the lines are drawn in much the same way, finally, as Balfour and Cromer drew them. Yet sixty or more years have intervened between Kissinger and the British imperialists. Numerous wars and revolutions have proved conclusively that the pre-Newtonian prophetic style, which Kissinger associates both with &amp;quot;inaccurate&amp;quot; developing countries and with Europe before the Congress of Vienna, is not entirely without its successes. Again unlike Balfour and Cromer, Kissinger therefore feels obliged to respect this pre-Newtonian perspective, since &amp;quot;it offers great flexibility with respect to the contemporary revolutionary turmoil.&amp;quot; Thus the duty of men in the post-Newtonian (real) world is to &amp;quot;construct an international order &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; a crisis imposes it as a necessity&amp;quot;: in other words, &#039;&#039;we&#039;&#039; must still find a way by which the developing world can be contained. Is this not similar to Cromer&#039;s vision of a harmoniously working machine designed ultimately to benefit some central authority, which opposes the developing world?&lt;br /&gt;
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Kissinger may not have known on what fund of pedigreed knowledge he was drawing when he cut the world up into pre-Newtonian and post-Newtonian conceptions of reality. But his distinction is identical with the orthodox one made by Orientalists, who separate Orientals from Westerners. And like Orientalism&#039;s distinction Kissinger&#039;s is not value-free, despite the apparent neutrality of his tone. Thus such words as &amp;quot;prophetic,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;accuracy,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;internal,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;empirical reality,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;order&amp;quot; are scattered throughout his description, and they characterize either attractive, familiar, desirable virtues or menacing, peculiar, disorderly defects. Both the traditional Orientalist, as we shall see, and Kissinger conceive of the difference between cultures, first, as creating a battlefront that separates them, and second, as inviting the West to control, contain, and otherwise govern (through superior knowledge and accommodating power) the Other. With what effect and at what considerable expense such militant divisions have been maintained, no one at present needs to be reminded.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another illustration dovetails neatly--perhaps too neatly--with Kissinger&#039;s analysis. In its February 1972 issue, the &#039;&#039;American Journal of Psychiatry&#039;&#039; printed an essay by Harold W. Glidden, who is identified as a retired member of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State; the essay&#039;s title (&amp;quot;The Arab World&amp;quot;), its tone, and its content argue a highly characteristic Orientalist bent of mind. Thus for his four-page, double-columned psychological portrait of over 100 million people, considered for a period of 1,300 years, Glidden cites exactly four sources for his views: a recent book on Tripoli, one issue of the Egyptian newspaper &#039;&#039;Al-Ahram&#039;&#039;, the periodical &#039;&#039;Oriente Moderno&#039;&#039;, and a book by Majid Khadduri, a well-known Orientalist. The article itself purports to uncover &amp;quot;the inner workings of Arab behavior,&amp;quot; which from &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; point of view is &amp;quot;aberrant&amp;quot; but for Arabs is &amp;quot;normal.&amp;quot; After this auspicious start, we are told that Arabs stress conformity; that Arabs inhabit a shame culture whose &amp;quot;prestige system&amp;quot; involves the ability to attract followers and clients (as an aside we are told that &amp;quot;Arab society is and always has been based on a system of client-patron relationships&amp;quot;); that Arabs can function only in conflict situations; that prestige is based solely on the ability to dominate others; that a shame culture--and therefore Islam itself--makes a virtue of revenge (here Glidden triumphantly cites the June 29, 1970 &#039;&#039;Ahram&#039;&#039; to show that &amp;quot;in 1969 [in Egypt] in 1070 cases of murder where the perpetrators were apprehended, it was found that 20 percent of the murders were based on a desire to wipe out shame, 30 percent on a desire to satisfy real or imaginary wrongs, and 31 percent on a desire for blood revenge&amp;quot;); that if from a Western point of view &amp;quot;the only rational thing for the Arabs to do is to make peace ... for the Arabs the situation is not governed by this kind of logic, for objectivity is not a value in the Arab system.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Glidden continues, now more enthusiastically: &amp;quot;it is a notable fact that while the Arab value system demands absolute solidarity within the group, it at the same time encourages among its members a kind of rivalry that is destructive of that very solidarity&amp;quot;; in Arab society only &amp;quot;success counts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;the end justifies the means&amp;quot;; Arabs live &amp;quot;naturally&amp;quot; in a world &amp;quot;characterized by anxiety expressed in generalized suspicion and distrust, which has been labelled free-floating hostility&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;the art of subterfuge is highly developed in Arab life, as well as in Islam itself&amp;quot;; the Arab need for vengeance overrides everything, otherwise the Arab would feel &amp;quot;ego-destroying&amp;quot; shame. Therefore, if &amp;quot;Westerners consider peace to be high on the scale of values&amp;quot; and if &amp;quot;we have a highly developed consciousness of the value of time,&amp;quot; this is not true of Arabs. &amp;quot;In fact,&amp;quot; we are told, &amp;quot;in Arab tribal society (where Arab values originated), strife, not peace, was the normal state of affairs because raiding was one of the two main supports of the economy.&amp;quot; The purpose of this learned disquisition is merely to show how on the Western and Oriental scale of values &amp;quot;the relative position of the elements is quite different.&amp;quot; QED.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harold W. Glidden, &amp;quot;The Arab World,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;American Journal of Psychiatry&#039;&#039; 128, no. 8 (February 1972): 984-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the apogee of Orientalist confidence. No merely asserted generality is denied the dignity of truth; no theoretical list of Oriental attributes is without application to the behavior of Orientals in the real world. On the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are Arab-Orientals; the former are (in no particular order) rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things. Out of what collective and yet particularized view of the Orient do these statements emerge? What specialized skills, what imaginative pressures, what institutions and traditions, what cultural forces produce such similarity in the descriptions of the Orient to be found in Cromer, Balfour, and our contemporary statesmen?&lt;br /&gt;
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=== II. Imaginative Geography and Its Representations: Orientalizing the Oriental ===&lt;br /&gt;
Strictly speaking, Orientalism is a field of learned study. In the Christian West, Orientalism is considered to have commenced its formal existence with the decision of the Church Council of Vienne in 1312 to establish a series of chairs in &amp;quot;Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, and Syriac at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Avignon, and Salamanca.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;R. W. Southern, &#039;&#039;Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages&#039;&#039; (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 72. See also Francis Dvornik, &#039;&#039;The Ecumenical Councils&#039;&#039; (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1961), pp. 65-6: &amp;quot;Of special interest is the eleventh canon directing that chairs for teaching Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Chaldean should be created at the main universities. The suggestion was Raymond Lull&#039;s, who advocated learning Arabic as the best means for the conversion of the Arabs. Although the canon remained almost without effect as there were few teachers of Oriental languages, its acceptance indicates the growth of the missionary idea in the West. Gregory X had already hoped for the conversion of the Mongols, and Franciscan friars had penetrated into the depths of Asia in their missionary zeal. Although these hopes were not fulfilled, the missionary spirit continued to develop.&amp;quot; See also Johann W. Fuck, &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet any account of Orientalism would have to consider not only the professional Orientalist and his work but also the very notion of a field of study based on a geographical, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic unit called the Orient. Fields, of course, are made. They acquire coherence and integrity in time because scholars devote themselves in different ways to what seems to be a commonly agreed-upon subject matter. Yet it goes without saying that a field of study is rarely as simply defined as even its most committed partisans--usually scholars, professors, experts, and the like--claim it is. Besides, a field can change so entirely, in even the most traditional disciplines like philology, history, or theology, as to make an all-purpose definition of subject matter almost impossible. This is certainly true of Orientalism, for some interesting reasons.&lt;br /&gt;
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To speak of scholarly specialization as a geographical &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; is, in the case of Orientalism, fairly revealing since no one is likely to imagine a field symmetrical to it called Occidentalism. Already the special, perhaps even eccentric attitude of Orientalism becomes apparent. For although many learned disciplines imply a position taken towards, say, &#039;&#039;human&#039;&#039; material (a historian deals with the human past from a special vantage point in the present), there is no real analogy for taking a fixed, more or less total geographical position towards a wide variety of social, linguistic, political, and historical realities. A classicist, a Romance specialist, even an Americanist focuses on a relatively modest portion of the world, not on a full half of it. But Orientalism is a field with considerable geographical ambition. And since Orientalists have traditionally occupied themselves with things Oriental (a specialist in Islamic law, no less than an expert in Chinese dialects or in Indian religions, is considered an Orientalist by people who call themselves Orientalists), we must learn to accept enormous, indiscriminate size plus an almost infinite capacity for subdivision as one of the chief characteristics of Orientalism--one that is evidenced in its confusing amalgam of imperial vagueness and precise detail.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this describes Orientalism as an academic discipline. The &amp;quot;ism&amp;quot; in Orientalism serves to insist on the distinction of this discipline from every other kind. The rule in its historical development as an academic discipline has been its increasing scope, not its greater selectiveness. Renaissance Orientalists like Erpenius and Guillaume Postel were primarily specialists in the languages of the Biblical provinces, although Postel boasted that he could get across Asia as far as China without needing an interpreter. By and large, until the mid-eighteenth century Orientalists were Biblical scholars, students of the Semitic languages, Islamic specialists, or, because the Jesuits had opened up the new study of China, Sinologists. The whole middle expanse of Asia was not academically conquered for Orientalism until, during the later eighteenth century, Anquetil-Duperron and Sir William Jones were able intelligibly to reveal the extraordinary riches of Avestan and Sanskrit. By the middle of the nineteenth century Orientalism was as vast a treasure-house of learning as one could imagine. There are two excellent indices of this new, triumphant eclecticism. One is the encyclopedic description of Orientalism roughly from 1765 to 1850 given by Raymond Schwab in his &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1950). See also V.-V. Barthold, &#039;&#039;La Decouverte de l&#039;Asie: Histoire de l&#039;orientalisme en Europe et en Russie&#039;&#039;, trans. B. Nikitine (Paris: Payot, 1947), and the relevant pages in Theodor Benfey, &#039;&#039;Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft und Orientalischen Philologie in Deutschland&#039;&#039; (Munich: Gottafschen, 1869). For an instructive contrast see James T. Monroe, &#039;&#039;Islam and the Arabs in Spanish Scholarship&#039;&#039; (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Quite aside from the scientific discoveries of things Oriental made by learned professionals during this period in Europe, there was the virtual epidemic of Orientalia affecting every major poet, essayist, and philosopher of the period. Schwab&#039;s notion is that &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; identifies an amateur or professional enthusiasm for everything Asiatic, which was wonderfully synonymous with the exotic, the mysterious, the profound, the seminal; this is a later transposition eastwards of a similar enthusiasm in Europe for Greek and Latin antiquity during the High Renaissance. In 1829 Victor Hugo put this change in directions as follows: &amp;quot;Au siecle de Louis XIV on etait helleniste, maintenant on est orientaliste.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Victor Hugo, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Pierre Albouy (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 1: 580.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A nineteenth-century Orientalist was therefore either a scholar (a Sinologist, an Islamicist, an Indo-Europeanist) or a gifted enthusiast (Hugo in &#039;&#039;Les Orientales&#039;&#039;, Goethe in the &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039;), or both (Richard Burton, Edward Lane, Friedrich Schlegel).&lt;br /&gt;
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The second index of how inclusive Orientalism had become since the Council of Vienne is to be found in nineteenth-century chronicles of the field itself. The most thorough of its kind is Jules Mohl&#039;s &#039;&#039;Vingt-sept Ans d&#039;histoire des etudes orientales&#039;&#039;, a two-volume logbook of everything of note that took place in Orientalism between 1840 and 1867.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jules Mohl, &#039;&#039;Vingt-sept Ans d&#039;histoire des etudes orientales: Rapports faits a la Societe asiatique de Paris de 1840 a 1867&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Reinwald, 1879-80).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Mohl was the secretary of the Societe asiatique in Paris, and for something more than the first half of the nineteenth century Paris was the capital of the Orientalist world (and, according to Walter Benjamin, of the nineteenth century). Mohl&#039;s position in the Societe could not have been more central to the field of Orientalism. There is scarcely anything done by a European scholar touching Asia during those twenty-seven years that Mohl does not enter under &amp;quot;etudes orientales.&amp;quot; His entries of course concern publications, but the range of published material of interest to Orientalist scholars is awesome. Arabic, innumerable Indian dialects, Hebrew, Pehlevi, Assyrian, Babylonian, Mongolian, Chinese, Burmese, Mesopotamian, Javanese: the list of philological works considered Orientalist is almost uncountable. Moreover, Orientalist studies apparently cover everything from the editing and translation of texts to numismatic, anthropological, archaeological, sociological, economic, historical, literary, and cultural studies in every known Asiatic and North African civilization, ancient and modern. Gustave Dugat&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire des orientalistes de l&#039;Europe du XII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039; (1868-1870)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gustave Dugat, &#039;&#039;Histoire des orientalistes de l&#039;Europe du XII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1868-70).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is a selective history of major figures, but the range represented is no less immense than Mohl&#039;s.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such eclecticism as this had its blind spots, nevertheless. Academic Orientalists for the most part were interested in the classical period of whatever language or society it was that they studied. Not until quite late in the century, with the single major exception of Napoleon&#039;s Institut d&#039;Egypte, was much attention given to the academic study of the modern, or actual, Orient. Moreover, the Orient studied was a textual universe by and large; the impact of the Orient was made through books and manuscripts, not, as in the impress of Greece on the Renaissance, through mimetic artifacts like sculpture and pottery. Even the rapport between an Orientalist and the Orient was textual, so much so that it is reported of some of the early-nineteenth-century German Orientalists that their first view of an eight-armed Indian statue cured them completely of their Orientalist taste.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Rene Gerard, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Orient et la pensee romantique allemande&#039;&#039; (Paris: Didier, 1963), p. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When a learned Orientalist traveled in the country of his specialization, it was always with unshakable abstract maxims about the &amp;quot;civilization&amp;quot; he had studied; rarely were Orientalists interested in anything except proving the validity of these musty &amp;quot;truths&amp;quot; by applying them, without great success, to uncomprehending, hence degenerate, natives. Finally, the very power and scope of Orientalism produced not only a fair amount of exact positive knowledge about the Orient but also a kind of second-order knowledge--lurking in such places as the &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; tale, the mythology of the mysterious East, notions of Asian inscrutability--with a life of its own, what V. G. Kiernan has aptly called &amp;quot;Europe&#039;s collective day-dream of the Orient.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kiernan, &#039;&#039;Lords of Human Kind&#039;&#039;, p. 131.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; One happy result of this is that an estimable number of important writers during the nineteenth century were Oriental enthusiasts: It is perfectly correct, I think, to speak of a genre of Orientalist writing as exemplified in the works of Hugo, Goethe, Nerval, Flaubert, Fitzgerald, and the like. What inevitably goes with such work, however, is a kind of free-floating mythology of the Orient, an Orient that derives not only from contemporary attitudes and popular prejudices but also from what Vico called the conceit of nations and of scholars. I have already alluded to the political uses of such material as it has turned up in the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today an Orientalist is less likely to call himself an Orientalist than he was almost any time up to World War II. Yet the designation is still useful, as when universities maintain programs or departments in Oriental languages or Oriental civilizations. There is an Oriental &amp;quot;faculty&amp;quot; at Oxford, and a department of Oriental studies at Princeton. As recently as 1959, the British government empowered a commission &amp;quot;to review developments in the Universities in the fields of Oriental, Slavonic, East European and African studies ... and to consider, and advise on, proposals for future development.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;University Grants Committee, &#039;&#039;Report of the Sub-Committee on Oriental, Slavonic&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;East European and African Studies&#039;&#039; (London: Her Majesty&#039;s Stationery Office, 1961).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Hayter Report, as it was called when it appeared in 1961, seemed untroubled by the broad designation of the word &#039;&#039;Oriental&#039;&#039;, which it found serviceably employed in American universities as well. For even the greatest name in modern Anglo-American Islamic studies, H. A. R. Gibb, preferred to call himself an Orientalist rather than an Arabist. Gibb himself, classicist that he was, could use the ugly neologism &amp;quot;area study&amp;quot; for Orientalism as a way of showing that area studies and Orientalism after all were interchangeable geographical titles.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Area Studies Reconsidered&#039;&#039; (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But this, I think, ingenuously belies a much more interesting relationship between knowledge and geography. I should like to consider that relationship briefly.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the distraction of a great many vague desires, impulses, and images, the mind seems persistently to formulate what Claude Levi-Strauss has called a science of the concrete.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Claude Levi-Strauss, &#039;&#039;The Savage Mind&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), chaps. 1-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A primitive tribe, for example, assigns a definite place, function, and significance to every leafy species in its immediate environment. Many of these grasses and flowers have no practical use; but the point Levi-Strauss makes is that mind requires order, and order is achieved by discriminating and taking note of everything, placing everything of which the mind is aware in a secure, refindable place, therefore giving things some role to play in the economy of objects and identities that make up an environment. This kind of rudimentary classification has a logic to it, but the rules of the logic by which a green fern in one society is a symbol of grace and in another is considered maleficent are neither predictably rational nor universal. There is always a measure of the purely arbitrary in the way the distinctions between things are seen. And with these distinctions go values whose history, if one could unearth it completely, would probably show the same measure of arbitrariness. This is evident enough in the case of fashion. Why do wigs, lace collars, and high buckled shoes appear, then disappear, over a period of decades? Some of the answer has to do with utility and some with the inherent beauty of the fashion. But if we agree that all things in history, like history itself, are made by men, then we will appreciate how possible it is for many objects or places or times to be assigned roles and given meanings that acquire objective validity only &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the assignments are made. This is especially true of relatively uncommon things, like foreigners, mutants, or &amp;quot;abnormal&amp;quot; behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is perfectly possible to argue that some distinctive objects are made by the mind, and that these objects, while appearing to exist objectively, have only a fictional reality. A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries between their land and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, which they call &amp;quot;the land of the barbarians.&amp;quot; In other words, this universal practice of designating in one&#039;s mind a familiar space which is &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; and an unfamiliar space beyond &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; which is &amp;quot;theirs&amp;quot; is a way of making geographical distinctions that &#039;&#039;can be&#039;&#039; entirely arbitrary. I use the word &amp;quot;arbitrary&amp;quot; here because imaginative geography of the &amp;quot;our land-barbarian land&amp;quot; variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; to set up these boundaries in our own minds; &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; become &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from &amp;quot;ours.&amp;quot; To a certain extent modern and primitive societies seem thus to derive a sense of their identities negatively. A fifth-century Athenian was very likely to feel himself to be nonbarbarian as much as he positively felt himself to be Athenian. The geographic boundaries accompany the social, ethnic, and cultural ones in expected ways. Yet often the sense in which someone feels himself to be not-foreign is based on a very unrigorous idea of what is &amp;quot;out there,&amp;quot; beyond one&#039;s own territory. All kinds of suppositions, associations, and fictions appear to crowd the unfamiliar space outside one&#039;s own.&lt;br /&gt;
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The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard once wrote an analysis of what he called the poetics of space.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gaston Bachelard, &#039;&#039;The Poetics of Space&#039;&#039;, trans. Maria Jolas (New York: Orion Press, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The inside of a house, he said, acquires a sense of intimacy, secrecy, security, real or imagined, because of the experiences that come to seem appropriate for it. The objective space of a house--its corners, corridors, cellar, rooms--is far less important than what poetically it is endowed with, which is usually a quality with an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel: thus a house may be haunted, or homelike, or prisonlike, or magical. So space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here. The same process occurs when we deal with time. Much of what we associate with or even know about such periods as &amp;quot;long ago&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the beginning&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;at the end of time&amp;quot; is poetic--made up. For a historian of Middle Kingdom Egypt, &amp;quot;long ago&amp;quot; will have a very clear sort of meaning, but even this meaning does not totally dissipate the imaginative, quasi-fictional quality one senses lurking in a time very different and distant from our own. For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away. This is no less true of the feelings we often have that we would have been more &amp;quot;at home&amp;quot; in the sixteenth century or in Tahiti.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet there is no use in pretending that all we know about time and space, or rather history and geography, is more than anything else imaginative. There are such things as positive history and positive geography which in Europe and the United States have impressive achievements to point to. Scholars now do know more about the world, its past and present, than they did, for example, in Gibbon&#039;s time. Yet this is not to say that they know all there is to know, nor, more important, is it to say that what they know has effectively dispelled the imaginative geographical and historical knowledge I have been considering. We need not decide here whether this kind of imaginative knowledge infuses history and geography, or whether in some way it overrides them. Let us just say for the time being that it is there as something &#039;&#039;more&#039;&#039; than what appears to be merely positive knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Almost from earliest times in Europe the Orient was something more than what was empirically known about it. At least until the early eighteenth century, as R. W. Southern has so elegantly shown, European understanding of one kind of Oriental culture, the Islamic, was ignorant but complex.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Southern, &#039;&#039;Western Views of Islam&#039;&#039;, p. 14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For certain associations with the East--not quite ignorant, not quite informed--always seem to have gathered around the notion of an Orient. Consider first the demarcation between Orient and West. It already seems bold by the time of the &#039;&#039;Iliad&#039;&#039;. Two of the most profoundly influential qualities associated with the East appear in Aeschylus&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039;, the earliest Athenian play extant, and in &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039; of Euripides, the very last one extant. Aeschylus portrays the sense of disaster overcoming the Persians when they learn that their armies, led by King Xerxes, have been destroyed by the Greeks. The chorus sings the following ode:&lt;br /&gt;
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Now all Asia&#039;s land&lt;br /&gt;
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Moans in emptiness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Xerxes led forth, oh oh!&lt;br /&gt;
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Xerxes destroyed, woe woe!&lt;br /&gt;
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Xerxes&#039; plans have all miscarried&lt;br /&gt;
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In ships of the sea.&lt;br /&gt;
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Why did Darius then&lt;br /&gt;
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Bring no harm to his men&lt;br /&gt;
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When he led them into battle,&lt;br /&gt;
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That beloved leader of men from Susa?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Aeschylus, &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039;, trans. Anthony J. Podleck (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 73-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What matters here is that Asia speaks through and by virtue of the European imagination, which is depicted as victorious over Asia, that hostile &amp;quot;other&amp;quot; world beyond the seas. To Asia are given the feelings of emptiness, loss, and disaster that seem thereafter to reward Oriental challenges to the West; and also, the lament that in some glorious past Asia fared better, was itself victorious over Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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In &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039;, perhaps the most Asiatic of all the Attic dramas, Dionysus is explicitly connected with his Asian origins and with the strangely threatening excesses of Oriental mysteries. Pentheus, king of Thebes, is destroyed by his mother, Agave, and her fellow bacchantes. Having defied Dionysus by not recognizing either his power or his divinity, Pentheus is thus horribly punished, and the play ends with a general recognition of the eccentric god&#039;s terrible power. Modern commentators on &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039; have not failed to note the play&#039;s extraordinary range of intellectual and aesthetic effects; but there has been no escaping the additional historical detail that Euripides &amp;quot;was surely affected by the new aspect that the Dionysiac cults must have assumed in the light of the foreign ecstatic religions of Bendis, Cybele, Sabazius, Adonis, and Isis, which were introduced from Asia Minor and the Levant and swept through Piraeus and Athens during the frustrating and increasingly irrational years of the Peloponnesian War.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Euripides, &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039;, trans. Geoffrey S. Kirk (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 3. For further discussion of the Europe-Orient distinction see Santo Mazzarino, &#039;&#039;Fra oriente e occidente: Ricerche di storia greca arcaica&#039;&#039; (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1947), and Denys Hay, &#039;&#039;Europe: The Emergence of an Idea&#039;&#039; (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The two aspects of the Orient that set it off from the West in this pair of plays will remain essential motifs of European imaginative geography. A line is drawn between two continents. Europe is powerful and articulate; Asia is defeated and distant. Aeschylus &#039;&#039;represents&#039;&#039; Asia, makes her speak in the person of the aged Persian queen, Xerxes&#039; mother. It is Europe that articulates the Orient; this articulation is the prerogative, not of a puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose life-giving power represents, animates, constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries. There is an analogy between Aeschylus&#039;s orchestra, which contains the Asiatic world as the playwright conceives it, and the learned envelope of Orientalist scholarship, which also will hold in the vast, amorphous Asiatic sprawl for sometimes sympathetic but always dominating scrutiny. Secondly, there is the motif of the Orient as insinuating danger. Rationality is undermined by Eastern excesses, those mysteriously attractive opposites to what seem to be normal values. The difference separating East from West is symbolized by the sternness with which, at first, Pentheus rejects the hysterical bacchantes. When later he himself becomes a bacchant, he is destroyed not so much for having given in to Dionysus as for having incorrectly assessed Dionysus&#039;s menace in the first place. The lesson that Euripides intends is dramatized by the presence in the play of Cadmus and Tiresias, knowledgeable older men who realize that &amp;quot;sovereignty&amp;quot; alone does not rule men;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Euripides, &#039;&#039;Bacchae&#039;&#039;, p. 52.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there is such a thing as judgment, they say, which means sizing up correctly the force of alien powers and expertly coming to terms with them. Hereafter Oriental mysteries will be taken seriously, not least because they challenge the rational Western mind to new exercises of its enduring ambition and power.&lt;br /&gt;
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But one big division, as between West and Orient, leads to other smaller ones, especially as the normal enterprises of civilization provoke such outgoing activities as travel, conquest, new experiences. In classical Greece and Rome geographers, historians, public figures like Caesar, orators, and poets added to the fund of taxonomic lore separating races, regions, nations, and minds from each other; much of that was self-serving, and existed to prove that Romans and Greeks were superior to other kinds of people. But concern with the Orient had its own tradition of classification and hierarchy. From at least the second century B.C. on, it was lost on no traveler or eastward-looking and ambitious Western potentate that Herodotus--historian, traveler, inexhaustibly curious chronicler--and Alexander--king warrior, scientific conqueror--had been in the Orient before. The Orient was therefore subdivided into realms previously known, visited, conquered, by Herodotus and Alexander as well as their epigones, and those realms not previously known, visited, conquered. Christianity completed the setting up of main intra-Oriental spheres: there was a Near Orient and a Far Orient, a familiar Orient, which Rene Grousset calls &amp;quot;l&#039;empire du Levant,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rene Grousset, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Empire du Levant: Histoire de la question d&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1946).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and a novel Orient. The Orient therefore alternated in the mind&#039;s geography between being an Old World to which one returned, as to Eden or Paradise, there to set up a new version of the old, and being a wholly new place to which one came as Columbus came to America, in order to set up a New World (although, ironically, Columbus himself thought that he discovered a new part of the Old World). Certainly neither of these Orients was purely one thing or the other: it is their vacillations, their tempting suggestiveness, their capacity for entertaining and confusing the mind, that are interesting.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consider how the Orient, and in particular the Near Orient, became known in the West as its great complementary opposite since antiquity. There were the Bible and the rise of Christianity; there were travelers like Marco Polo who charted the trade routes and patterned a regulated system of commercial exchange, and after him Lodovico di Varthema and Pietro della Valle; there were fabulists like Mandeville; there were the redoubtable conquering Eastern movements, principally Islam, of course; there were the militant pilgrims, chiefly the Crusaders. Altogether an internally structured archive is built up from the literature that belongs to these experiences. Out of this comes a restricted number of typical encapsulations: the journey, the history, the fable, the stereotype, the polemical confrontation. These are the lenses through which the Orient is experienced, and they shape the language, perception, and form of the encounter between East and West. What gives the immense number of encounters some unity, however, is the vacillation I was speaking about earlier. Something patently foreign and distant acquires, for one reason or another, a status more rather than less familiar. One tends to stop judging things either as completely novel or as completely well known; a new median category emerges, a category that allows one to see new things, things seen for the first time, as versions of a previously known thing. In essence such a category is not so much a way of receiving new information as it is a method of controlling what seems to be a threat to some established view of things. If the mind must suddenly deal with what it takes to be a radically new form of life--as Islam appeared to Europe in the early Middle Ages--the response on the whole is conservative and defensive. Islam is judged to be a fraudulent new version of some previous experience, in this case Christianity. The threat is muted, familiar values impose themselves, and in the end the mind reduces the pressure upon it by accommodating things to itself as either &amp;quot;original&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;repetitious.&amp;quot; Islam thereafter is &amp;quot;handled&amp;quot;: its novelty and its suggestiveness are brought under control so that relatively nuanced discriminations are now made that would have been impossible had the raw novelty of Islam been left unattended. The Orient at large, therefore, vacillates between the West&#039;s contempt for what is familiar and its shivers of delight in--or fear of--novelty.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet where Islam was concerned, European fear, if not always respect, was in order. After Mohammed&#039;s death in 632, the military and later the cultural and religious hegemony of Islam grew enormously. First Persia, Syria, and Egypt, then Turkey, then North Africa fell to the Muslim armies; in the eighth and ninth centuries Spain, Sicily, and parts of France were conquered. By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Islam ruled as far east as India, Indonesia, and China. And to this extraordinary assault Europe could respond with very little except fear and a kind of awe. Christian authors witnessing the Islamic conquests had scant interest in the learning, high culture, and frequent magnificence of the Muslims, who were, as Gibbon said, &amp;quot;coeval with the darkest and most slothful period of European annals.&amp;quot; (But with some satisfaction he added, &amp;quot;since the sum of science has risen in the West, it should seem that the Oriental studies have languished and declined.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Edward Gibbon, &#039;&#039;The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire&#039;&#039; (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1855), 6: 399.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) What Christians typically felt about the Eastern armies was that they had &amp;quot;all the appearance of a swarm of bees, but with a heavy hand ... they devastated everything&amp;quot;: so wrote Erchembert, a cleric in Monte Cassino in the eleventh century.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Norman Daniel, &#039;&#039;The Arabs and Medieval Europe&#039;&#039; (London: Longmans, Green &amp;amp; Co., 1975), p. 56.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Not for nothing did Islam come to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated barbarians. For Europe, Islam was a lasting trauma. Until the end of the seventeenth century the &amp;quot;Ottoman peril&amp;quot; lurked alongside Europe to represent for the whole of Christian civilization a constant danger, and in time European civilization incorporated that peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues, and vices, as something woven into the fabric of life. In Renaissance England alone, as Samuel Chew recounts in his classic study &#039;&#039;The Crescent and the Rose&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;a man of average education and intelligence&amp;quot; had at his fingertips, and could watch on the London stage, a relatively large number of detailed events in the history of Ottoman Islam and its encroachments upon Christian Europe.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Samuel C. Chew, &#039;&#039;The Crescent and the Rose: Islam and England During the Renaissance&#039;&#039; (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 103.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The point is that what remained current about Islam was some necessarily diminished version of those great dangerous forces that it symbolized for Europe. Like Walter Scott&#039;s Saracens, the European representation of the Muslim, Ottoman, or Arab was always a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient, and to a certain extent the same is true of the methods of contemporary learned Orientalists, whose subject is not so much the East itself as the East made known, and therefore less fearsome, to the Western reading public.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is nothing especially controversial or reprehensible about such domestications of the exotic; they take place between all cultures, certainly, and between all men. My point, however, is to emphasize the truth that the Orientalist, as much as anyone in the European West who thought about or experienced the Orient, performed this kind of mental operation. But what is more important still is the limited vocabulary and imagery that impose themselves as a consequence. The reception of Islam in the West is a perfect case in point, and has been admirably studied by Norman Daniel. One constraint acting upon Christian thinkers who tried to understand Islam was an analogical one; since Christ is the basis of Christian faith, it was assumed--quite incorrectly--that Mohammed was to Islam as Christ was to Christianity. Hence the polemic name &amp;quot;Mohammedanism&amp;quot; given to Islam, and the automatic epithet &amp;quot;imposter&amp;quot; applied to Mohammed.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Norman Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam and the West: The Making of an Image&#039;&#039; (Edinburgh: University Press, 1960), p. 33. See also James Kritzeck, &#039;&#039;Peter the Venerable and Islam&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Out of such and many other misconceptions &amp;quot;there formed a circle which was never broken by imaginative exteriorisation.... The Christian concept of Islam was integral and self-sufficient.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam and the West&#039;&#039;, p. 252.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Islam became an image--the word is Daniel&#039;s but it seems to me to have remarkable implications for Orientalism in general--whose function was not so much to represent Islam in itself as to represent it for the medieval Christian.&lt;br /&gt;
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The invariable tendency to neglect what the Qur&#039;an meant, or what Muslims thought it meant, or what Muslims thought or did in any given circumstances, necessarily implies that Qur&#039;anic and other Islamic doctrine was presented in a form that would convince Christians; and more and more extravagant forms would stand a chance of acceptance as the distance of the writers and public from the Islamic border increased. It was with very great reluctance that what Muslims said Muslims believed was accepted as what they did believe. There was a Christian picture in which the details (even under the pressure of facts) were abandoned as little as possible, and in which the general outline was never abandoned. There were shades of difference, but only with a common framework. All the corrections that were made in the interests of an increasing accuracy were only a defence of what had newly been realised to be vulnerable, a shoring up of a weakened structure. Christian opinion was an erection which could not be demolished, even to be rebuilt.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 259-60.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This rigorous Christian picture of Islam was intensified in innumerable ways, including--during the Middle Ages and early Renaissance--a large variety of poetry, learned controversy, and popular superstition.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See for example William Wistar Comfort, &amp;quot;The Literary Role of the Saracens in the French Epic,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;PMLA&#039;&#039; 55 (1940): 628-59.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; By this time the Near Orient had been all but incorporated in the common world-picture of Latin Christianity--as in the &#039;&#039;Chanson de Roland&#039;&#039; the worship of Saracens is portrayed as embracing Mahomet &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; Apollo. By the middle of the fifteenth century, as R. W. Southern has brilliantly shown, it became apparent to serious European thinkers &amp;quot;that something would have to be done about Islam,&amp;quot; which had turned the situation around somewhat by itself arriving militarily in Eastern Europe. Southern recounts a dramatic episode between 1450 and 1460 when four learned men, John of Segovia, Nicholas of Cusa, Jean Germain, and Aeneas Silvius (Pius II), attempted to deal with Islam through &#039;&#039;contraferentia&#039;&#039;, or &amp;quot;conference.&amp;quot; The idea was John of Segovia&#039;s: it was to have been a staged conference with Islam in which Christians attempted the wholesale conversion of Muslims. &amp;quot;He saw the conference as an instrument with a political as well as a strictly religious function, and in words which will strike a chord in modern breasts he exclaimed that even if it were to last ten years it would be less expensive and less damaging than war.&amp;quot; There was no agreement between the four men, but the episode is crucial for having been a fairly sophisticated attempt--part of a general European attempt from Bede to Luther--to put a representative Orient in front of Europe, to &#039;&#039;stage&#039;&#039; the Orient and Europe together in some coherent way, the idea being for Christians to make it clear to Muslims that Islam was just a misguided version of Christianity. Southern&#039;s conclusion follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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Most conspicuous to us is the inability of any of these systems of thought [European Christian] to provide a fully satisfying explanation of the phenomenon they had set out to explain [Islam]--still less to influence the course of practical events in a decisive way. At a practical level, events never turned out either so well or so ill as the most intelligent observers predicted; and it is perhaps worth noticing that they never turned out better than when the best judges confidently expected a happy ending. Was there any progress [in Christian knowledge of Islam]? I must express my conviction that there was. Even if the solution of the problem remained obstinately hidden from sight, the statement of the problem became more complex, more rational, and more related to experience.... The scholars who labored at the problem of Islam in the Middle Ages failed to find the solution they sought and desired; but they developed habits of mind and powers of comprehension which, in other men and in other fields, may yet deserve success.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Southern, &#039;&#039;Western Views of Islam&#039;&#039;, pp. 91-2, 108-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The best part of Southern&#039;s analysis, here and elsewhere in his brief history of Western views of Islam, is his demonstration that it is finally Western ignorance which becomes more refined and complex, not some body of positive Western knowledge which increases in size and accuracy. For fictions have their own logic and their own dialectic of growth or decline. Onto the character of Mohammed in the Middle Ages was heaped a bundle of attributes that corresponded to the &amp;quot;character of the [twelfth-century] prophets of the &#039;Free Spirit&#039; who did actually arise in Europe, and claim credence and collect followers.&amp;quot; Similarly, since Mohammed was viewed as the disseminator of a false Revelation, he became as well the epitome of lechery, debauchery, sodomy, and a whole battery of assorted treacheries, all of which derived &amp;quot;logically&amp;quot; from his doctrinal impostures.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam and the West&#039;&#039;, pp. 246, 96, and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus the Orient acquired representatives, so to speak, and representations, each one more concrete, more internally congruent with some Western exigency, than the ones that preceded it. It is as if, having once settled on the Orient as a locale suitable for incarnating the infinite in a finite shape, Europe could not stop the practice; the Orient and the Oriental, Arab, Islamic, Indian, Chinese, or whatever, become repetitious pseudoincarnations of some great original (Christ, Europe, the West) they were supposed to have been imitating. Only the source of these rather narcissistic Western ideas about the Orient changed in time, not their character. Thus we will find it commonly believed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that Arabia was &amp;quot;on the fringe of the Christian world, a natural asylum for heretical outlaws,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 84.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and that Mohammed was a cunning apostate, whereas in the twentieth century an Orientalist scholar, an erudite specialist, will be the one to point out how Islam is really no more than second-order Arian heresy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Duncan Black Macdonald, &amp;quot;Whither Islam?&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Muslim World&#039;&#039; 23 (January 1933): 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Our initial description of Orientalism as a learned field now acquires a new concreteness. A field is often an enclosed space. The idea of representation is a theatrical one: the Orient is the stage on which the whole East is confined. On this stage will appear figures whose role it is to represent the larger whole from which they emanate. The Orient then seems to be, not an unlimited extension beyond the familiar European world, but rather a closed field, a theatrical stage affixed to Europe. An Orientalist is but the particular specialist in knowledge for which Europe at large is responsible, in the way that an audience is historically and culturally responsible for (and responsive to) dramas technically put together by the dramatist. In the depths of this Oriental stage stands a prodigious cultural repertoire whose individual items evoke a fabulously rich world: the Sphinx, Cleopatra, Eden, Troy, Sodom and Gomorrah, Astarte, Isis and Osiris, Sheba, Babylon, the Genii, the Magi, Nineveh, Prester John, Mahomet, and dozens more; settings, in some cases names only, half-imagined, half-known; monsters, devils, heroes; terrors, pleasures, desires. The European imagination was nourished extensively from this repertoire: between the Middle Ages and the eighteenth century such major authors as Ariosto, Milton, Marlowe, Tasso, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and the authors of the &#039;&#039;Chanson de Roland&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Poema del Cid&#039;&#039; drew on the Orient&#039;s riches for their productions, in ways that sharpened the outlines of imagery, ideas, and figures populating it. In addition, a great deal of what was considered learned Orientalist scholarship in Europe pressed ideological myths into service, even as knowledge seemed genuinely to be advancing.&lt;br /&gt;
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A celebrated instance of how dramatic form and learned imagery come together in the Orientalist theater is Barthelemy d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, published posthumously in 1697, with a preface by Antoine Galland. The introduction of the recent &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039; considers the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;, along with George Sale&#039;s preliminary discourse to his translation of the Koran (1734) and Simon Ockley&#039;s &#039;&#039;History of the Saracens&#039;&#039; (1708, 1718), to be &amp;quot;highly important&amp;quot; in widening &amp;quot;the new understanding of Islam&amp;quot; and conveying it &amp;quot;to a less academic readership.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. M. Holt, Introduction to &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. xvi.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This inadequately describes d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s work, which was not restricted to Islam as Sale&#039;s and Ockley&#039;s were. With the exception of Johann H. Hottinger&#039;s &#039;&#039;Historia Orientalis&#039;&#039;, which appeared in 1651, the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; remained the standard reference work in Europe until the early nineteenth century. Its scope was truly epochal. Galland, who was the first European translator of &#039;&#039;The Thousand and One Nights&#039;&#039; and an Arabist of note, contrasted d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s achievement with every prior one by noting the prodigious range of his enterprise. D&#039;Herbelot read a great number of works, Galland said, in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, with the result that he was able to find out about matters hitherto concealed from Europeans.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Antoine Galland, prefatory &amp;quot;Discours&amp;quot; to Barthelemy d&#039;Herbelot, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;ou Dictionnaire universel contenant tout ce qui fait connaitre les peuples de l&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; (The Hague: Neaulme &amp;amp; van Daalen, 1777), 1: vii. Galland&#039;s point is that d&#039;Herbelot presented real knowledge, not legend or myth of the sort associated with the &amp;quot;marvels of the East.&amp;quot; See R. Wittkower, &amp;quot;Marvels of the East: A Study in the History of Monsters,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes&#039;&#039; 5 (1942): 159-97.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; After first composing a dictionary of these three Oriental languages, d&#039;Herbelot went on to study Oriental history, theology, geography, science, and art, in both their fabulous and their truthful varieties. Thereafter he decided to compose two works, one a &#039;&#039;bibliotheque&#039;&#039;, or &amp;quot;library,&amp;quot; an alphabetically arranged dictionary, the second a &#039;&#039;florilege&#039;&#039;, or anthology. Only the first part was completed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Galland&#039;s account of the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; stated that &amp;quot;orientale&amp;quot; was planned to include principally the Levant, although--Galland says admiringly--the time period covered did not begin only with the creation of Adam and end with the &amp;quot;temps ou nous sommes&amp;quot;: d&#039;Herbelot went even further back, to a time described as &amp;quot;plus haut&amp;quot; in fabulous histories--to the long period of the pre-Adamite Solimans. As Galland&#039;s description proceeds, we learn that the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; was like &amp;quot;any other&amp;quot; history of the world, for what it attempted was a complete compendium of the knowledge available on such matters as the Creation, the Deluge, the destruction of Babel, and so forth--with the difference that d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s sources were Oriental. He divided history into two types, sacred and profane (the Jews and Christians in the first, the Muslims in the second), and two periods, pre- and postdiluvian. Thus d&#039;Herbelot was able to discuss such widely divergent histories as the Mogul, the Tartar, the Turkish, and the Slavonic; he took in as well all the provinces of the Muslim Empire, from the Extreme Orient to the Pillars of Hercules, with their customs, rituals, traditions, commentaries, dynasties, palaces, rivers, and flora. Such a work, even though it included some attention to &amp;quot;la doctrine perverse de Mahomet, qui a cause si grands dommages au Christianisme,&amp;quot; was more capaciously thorough than any work before it. Galland concluded his &amp;quot;Discours&amp;quot; by assuring the reader at length that d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; was uniquely &amp;quot;utile et agreable&amp;quot;; other Orientalists, like Postel, Scaliger, Golius, Pockoke, and Erpenius, produced Orientalist studies that were too narrowly grammatical, lexicographical, geographical, or the like. Only d&#039;Herbelot was able to write a work capable of convincing European readers that the study of Oriental culture was more than just thankless and fruitless: only d&#039;Herbelot, according to Galland, attempted to form in the minds of his readers a sufficiently ample idea of what it meant to know and study the Orient, an idea that would both fill the mind and satisfy one&#039;s great, previously conceived expectations.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Galland, prefatory &amp;quot;Discours&amp;quot; to d&#039;Herbelot, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, pp. xvi, xxxiii. For the state of Orientalist knowledge immediately before d&#039;Herbelot, see V. J. Parry, &amp;quot;Renaissance Historical Literature in Relation to the New and Middle East (with Special Reference to Paolo Giovio),&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Historians of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 277-89.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In such efforts as d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s, Europe discovered its capacities for encompassing and Orientalizing the Orient. A certain sense of superiority appears here and there in what Galland had to say about his and d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;materia orientalia&#039;&#039;; as in the work of seventeenth-century geographers like Raphael du Mans, Europeans could perceive that the Orient was being outstripped and outdated by Western science.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barthold, &#039;&#039;La Decouverte de l&#039;Asie&#039;&#039;, pp. 137-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But what becomes evident is not only the advantage of a Western perspective: there is also the triumphant technique for taking the immense fecundity of the Orient and making it systematically, even alphabetically, knowable by Western laymen. When Galland said of d&#039;Herbelot that he satisfied one&#039;s expectations he meant, I think, that the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; did not attempt to revise commonly received ideas about the Orient. For what the Orientalist does is to &#039;&#039;confirm&#039;&#039; the Orient in his readers&#039; eyes; he neither tries nor wants to unsettle already firm convictions. All the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039; did was represent the Orient more fully and more clearly; what may have been a loose collection of randomly acquired facts concerning vaguely Levantine history, Biblical imagery, Islamic culture, place names, and so on were transformed into a rational Oriental panorama, from A to Z. Under the entry for Mohammed, d&#039;Herbelot first supplied all of the Prophet&#039;s given names, then proceeded to confirm Mohammed&#039;s ideological and doctrinal value as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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C&#039;est le fameux imposteur Mahomet, Auteur et Fondateur d&#039;une heresie, qui a pris le nom de religion, que nous appellons Mahometane. &#039;&#039;Voyez&#039;&#039; le titre d&#039;Eslam.&lt;br /&gt;
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Les Interpretes de l&#039;Alcoran et autres Docteurs de la Loy Musulmane ou Mahometane ont applique a ce faux prophete tous les eloges, que les Ariens, Paulitiens ou Paulianistes &amp;amp; autres Heretiques ont attribue a Jesus-Christ, en lui otant sa Divinite....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;D&#039;Herbelot, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, 2: 648.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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(This is the famous imposter Mahomet, Author and Founder of a heresy, which has taken on the name of religion, which we call Mohammedan. See entry under &#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interpreters of the Alcoran and other Doctors of Muslim or Mohammedan Law have applied to this false prophet all the praises which the Arians, Paulicians or Paulianists, and other Heretics have attributed to Jesus Christ, while stripping him of his Divinity....)&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Mohammedan&amp;quot; is the relevant (and insulting) European designation; &amp;quot;Islam,&amp;quot; which happens to be the correct Muslim name, is relegated to another entry. The &amp;quot;heresy ... which we call Mohammedan&amp;quot; is &amp;quot;caught&amp;quot; as the imitation of a Christian imitation of true religion. Then, in the long historical account of Mohammed&#039;s life, d&#039;Herbelot can turn to more or less straight narrative. But it is the &#039;&#039;placing&#039;&#039; of Mohammed that counts in the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;. The dangers of free-wheeling heresy are removed when it is transformed into ideologically explicit matter for an alphabetical item. Mohammed no longer roams the Eastern world as a threatening, immoral debauchee; he sits quietly on his (admittedly prominent) portion of the Orientalist stage.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See also Montgomery Watt, &amp;quot;Muhammad in the Eyes of the West,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Boston University Journal&#039;&#039; 22, no. 3 (Fall 1974): 61-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He is given a genealogy, an explanation, even a development, all of which are subsumed under the simple statements that prevent him from straying elsewhere.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such &amp;quot;images&amp;quot; of the Orient as this are images in that they represent or stand for a very large entity, otherwise impossibly diffuse, which they enable one to grasp or see. They are also &#039;&#039;characters&#039;&#039;, related to such types as the braggarts, misers, or gluttons produced by Theophrastus, La Bruyere, or Selden. Perhaps it is not exactly correct to say that one &#039;&#039;sees&#039;&#039; such characters as the &#039;&#039;miles gloriosus&#039;&#039; or Mahomet the imposter, since the discursive confinement of a character is supposed at best to let one apprehend a generic type without difficulty or ambiguity. D&#039;Herbelot&#039;s character of Mahomet is an &#039;&#039;image&#039;&#039;, however, because the false prophet is part of a general theatrical representation called &#039;&#039;orientale&#039;&#039; whose totality is contained in the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The didactic quality of the Orientalist representation cannot be detached from the rest of the performance. In a learned work like the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, which was the result of systematic study and research, the author imposes a disciplinary order upon the material he has worked on; in addition, he wants it made clear to the reader that what the printed page delivers is an ordered, disciplined judgment of the material. What is thus conveyed by the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; is an idea of Orientalism&#039;s power and effectiveness, which everywhere remind the reader that henceforth in order to get at the Orient he must pass through the learned grids and codes provided by the Orientalist. Not only is the Orient accommodated to the moral exigencies of Western Christianity; it is also circumscribed by a series of attitudes and judgments that send the Western mind, not first to Oriental sources for correction and verification, but rather to other Orientalist works. The Orientalist stage, as I have been calling it, becomes a system of moral and epistemological rigor. As a discipline representing institutionalized Western knowledge of the Orient, Orientalism thus comes to exert a three-way force, on the Orient, on the Orientalist, and on the Western &amp;quot;consumer&amp;quot; of Orientalism. It would be wrong, I think, to underestimate the strength of the three-way relationship thus established. For the Orient (&amp;quot;out there&amp;quot; towards the East) is corrected, even penalized, for lying outside the boundaries of European society, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world; the Orient is thus &#039;&#039;Orientalized&#039;&#039;, a process that not only marks the Orient as the province of the Orientalist but also forces the uninitiated Western reader to accept Orientalist codifications (like d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s alphabetized &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;) as the &#039;&#039;true&#039;&#039; Orient. Truth, in short, becomes a function of learned judgment, not of the material itself, which in time seems to owe even its existence to the Orientalist.&lt;br /&gt;
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This whole didactic process is neither difficult to understand nor difficult to explain. One ought again to remember that all cultures impose corrections upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating objects into units of knowledge. The problem is not that conversion takes place. It is perfectly natural for the human mind to resist the assault on it of untreated strangeness; therefore cultures have always been inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving these other cultures not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be. To the Westerner, however, the Oriental was always &#039;&#039;like&#039;&#039; some aspect of the West; to some of the German Romantics, for example, Indian religion was essentially an Oriental version of Germano-Christian pantheism. Yet the Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from something into something else: he does this for himself, for the sake of his culture, in some cases for what he believes is the sake of the Oriental. This process of conversion is a disciplined one: it is taught, it has its own societies, periodicals, traditions, vocabulary, rhetoric, all in basic ways connected to and supplied by the prevailing cultural and political norms of the West. And, as I shall demonstrate, it tends to become more rather than less total in what it tries to do, so much so that as one surveys Orientalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the overriding impression is of Orientalism&#039;s insensitive schematization of the entire Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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How early this schematization began is clear from the examples I have given of Western representations of the Orient in classical Greece. How strongly articulated were later representations building on the earlier ones, how inordinately careful their schematization, how dramatically effective their placing in Western imaginative geography, can be illustrated if we turn now to Dante&#039;s &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;. Dante&#039;s achievement in &#039;&#039;The Divine Comedy&#039;&#039; was to have seamlessly combined the realistic portrayal of mundane reality with a universal and eternal system of Christian values. What Dante the pilgrim sees as he walks through the Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso is a unique vision of judgment. Paolo and Francesca, for instance, are seen as eternally confined to hell for their sins, yet they are seen as enacting, indeed living, the very characters and actions that put them where they will be for eternity. Thus each of the figures in Dante&#039;s vision not only represents himself but is also a typical representation of his character and the fate meted out to him.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Maometto&amp;quot;--Mohammed--turns up in canto 28 of the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;. He is located in the eighth of the nine circles of Hell, in the ninth of the ten Bolgias of Malebolge, a circle of gloomy ditches surrounding Satan&#039;s stronghold in Hell. Thus before Dante reaches Mohammed, he passes through circles containing people whose sins are of a lesser order: the lustful, the avaricious, the gluttonous, the heretics, the wrathful, the suicidal, the blasphemous. After Mohammed there are only the falsifiers and the treacherous (who include Judas, Brutus, and Cassius) before one arrives at the very bottom of Hell, which is where Satan himself is to be found. Mohammed thus belongs to a rigid hierarchy of evils, in the category of what Dante calls &#039;&#039;seminator di scandalo e di scisma&#039;&#039;. Mohammed&#039;s punishment, which is also his eternal fate, is a peculiarly disgusting one: he is endlessly being cleft in two from his chin to his anus like, Dante says, a cask whose staves are ripped apart. Dante&#039;s verse at this point spares the reader none of the eschatological detail that so vivid a punishment entails: Mohammed&#039;s entrails and his excrement are described with unflinching accuracy. Mohammed explains his punishment to Dante, pointing as well to Ali, who precedes him in the line of sinners whom the attendant devil is splitting in two; he also asks Dante to warn one Fra Dolcino, a renegade priest whose sect advocated community of women and goods and who was accused of having a mistress, of what will be in store for him. It will not have been lost on the reader that Dante saw a parallel between Dolcino&#039;s and Mohammed&#039;s revolting sensuality, and also between their pretensions to theological eminence.&lt;br /&gt;
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But this is not all that Dante has to say about Islam. Earlier in the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;, a small group of Muslims turns up. Avicenna, Averroes, and Saladin are among those virtuous heathens who, along with Hector, Aeneas, Abraham, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, are confined to the first circle of the Inferno, there to suffer a minimal (and even honorable) punishment for not having had the benefit of Christian revelation. Dante, of course, admires their great virtues and accomplishments, but because they were not Christians he must condemn them, however lightly, to Hell. Eternity is a great leveler of distinctions, it is true, but the special anachronisms and anomalies of putting pre-Christian luminaries in the same category of &amp;quot;heathen&amp;quot; damnation with post-Christian Muslims does not trouble Dante. Even though the Koran specifies Jesus as a prophet, Dante chooses to consider the great Muslim philosophers and king as having been fundamentally ignorant of Christianity. That they can also inhabit the same distinguished level as the heroes and sages of classical antiquity is an ahistorical vision similar to Raphael&#039;s in his fresco &#039;&#039;The School of Athens&#039;&#039;, in which Averroes rubs elbows on the academy floor with Socrates and Plato (similar to Fenelon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Dialogues des morts&#039;&#039; [1700-1718], where a discussion takes place between Socrates and Confucius).&lt;br /&gt;
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The discriminations and refinements of Dante&#039;s poetic grasp of Islam are an instance of the schematic, almost cosmological inevitability with which Islam and its designated representatives are creatures of Western geographical, historical, and above all, moral apprehension. Empirical data about the Orient or about any of its parts count for very little; what matters and is decisive is what I have been calling the Orientalist vision, a vision by no means confined to the professional scholar, but rather the common possession of all who have thought about the Orient in the West. Dante&#039;s powers as a poet intensify, make more rather than less representative, these perspectives on the Orient. Mohammed, Saladin, Averroes, and Avicenna are fixed in a visionary cosmology--fixed, laid out, boxed in, imprisoned, without much regard for anything except their &amp;quot;function&amp;quot; and the patterns they realize on the stage on which they appear. Isaiah Berlin has described the effect of such attitudes in the following way:&lt;br /&gt;
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In [such a] ... cosmology the world of men (and, in some versions, the entire universe) is a single, all-inclusive hierarchy; so that to explain why each object in it is as, and where, and when it is, and does what it does, is &#039;&#039;eo ipso&#039;&#039; to say what its goal is, how far it successfully fulfills it, and what are the relations of coordination and subordination between the goals of the various goal-pursuing entities in the harmonious pyramid which they collectively form. If this is a true picture of reality, then historical explanation, like every other form of explanation, must consist, above all, in the attribution of individuals, groups, nations, species, each to its own proper place in the universal pattern. To know the &amp;quot;cosmic&amp;quot; place of a thing or a person is to say what it is and what it does, and at the same time why it should be and do as it is and does. Hence to be and to have value, to exist and to have a function (and to fulfill it more or less successfully) are one and the same. The pattern, and it alone, brings into being and causes to pass away and confers purpose, that is to say, value and meaning, on all there is. To understand is to perceive patterns.... The more inevitable an event or an action or a character can be exhibited as being, the better it has been understood, the profounder the researcher&#039;s insight, the nearer we are to the one ultimate truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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This attitude is profoundly anti-empirical.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Historical Inevitability&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 13-14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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And so, indeed, is the Orientalist attitude in general. It shares with magic and with mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are &#039;&#039;because&#039;&#039; they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter. The European encounter with the Orient, and specifically with Islam, strengthened this system of representing the Orient and, as has been suggested by Henri Pirenne, turned Islam into the very epitome of an outsider against which the whole of European civilization from the Middle Ages on was founded. The decline of the Roman Empire as a result of the barbarian invasions had the paradoxical effect of incorporating barbarian ways into Roman and Mediterranean culture, Romania; whereas, Pirenne argues, the consequence of the Islamic invasions beginning in the seventh century was to move the center of European culture away from the Mediterranean, which was then an Arab province, and towards the North. &amp;quot;Germanism began to play its part in history. Hitherto the Roman tradition had been uninterrupted. Now an original Romano-Germanic civilization was about to develop.&amp;quot; Europe was shut in on itself: the Orient, when it was not merely a place in which one traded, was culturally, intellectually, spiritually &#039;&#039;outside&#039;&#039; Europe and European civilization, which, in Pirenne&#039;s words, became &amp;quot;one great Christian community, coterminous with the &#039;&#039;ecclesia&#039;&#039;.... The Occident was now living its own life.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Henri Pirenne, &#039;&#039;Mohammed and Charlemagne&#039;&#039;, trans. Bernard Miall (New York: W. W. Norton &amp;amp; Co., 1939), pp. 234, 283.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In Dante&#039;s poem, in the work of Peter the Venerable and other Cluniac Orientalists, in the writings of the Christian polemicists against Islam from Guibert of Nogent and Bede to Roger Bacon, William of Tripoli, Burchard of Mount Syon, and Luther, in the &#039;&#039;Poema del Cid&#039;&#039;, in the &#039;&#039;Chanson de Roland&#039;&#039;, and in Shakespeare&#039;s &#039;&#039;Othello&#039;&#039; (that &amp;quot;abuser of the world&amp;quot;), the Orient and Islam are always represented as outsiders having a special role to play &#039;&#039;inside&#039;&#039; Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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Imaginative geography, from the vivid portraits to be found in the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039; to the prosaic niches of d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, legitimates a vocabulary, a universe of representative discourse peculiar to the discussion and understanding of Islam and of the Orient. What this discourse considers to be a fact--that Mohammed is an imposter, for example--is a component of the discourse, a statement the discourse compels one to make whenever the name Mohammed occurs. Underlying all the different units of Orientalist discourse--by which I mean simply the vocabulary employed whenever the Orient is spoken or written about--is a set of representative figures, or tropes. These figures are to the actual Orient--or Islam, which is my main concern here--as stylized costumes are to characters in a play; they are like, for example, the cross that Everyman will carry, or the particolored costume worn by Harlequin in a &#039;&#039;commedia dell&#039;arte&#039;&#039; play. In other words, we need not look for correspondence between the language used to depict the Orient and the Orient itself, not so much because the language is inaccurate but because it is not even trying to be accurate. What it is trying to do, as Dante tried to do in the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;, is at one and the same time to characterize the Orient as alien and to incorporate it schematically on a theatrical stage whose audience, manager, and actors are &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; Europe, and only for Europe. Hence the vacillation between the familiar and the alien; Mohammed is always the imposter (familiar, because he pretends to be like the Jesus we know) and always the Oriental (alien, because although he is in some ways &amp;quot;like&amp;quot; Jesus, he is after all not like him).&lt;br /&gt;
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Rather than listing all the figures of speech associated with the Orient--its strangeness, its difference, its exotic sensuousness, and so forth--we can generalize about them as they were handed down through the Renaissance. They are all declarative and self-evident; the tense they employ is the timeless eternal; they convey an impression of repetition and strength; they are always symmetrical to, and yet diametrically inferior to, a European equivalent, which is sometimes specified, sometimes not. For all these functions it is frequently enough to use the simple copula &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039;. Thus, Mohammed &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; an imposter, the very phrase canonized in d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; and dramatized in a sense by Dante. No background need be given; the evidence necessary to convict Mohammed is contained in the &amp;quot;is.&amp;quot; One does not qualify the phrase, neither does it seem necessary to say that Mohammed &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; an imposter, nor need one consider for a moment that it may not be necessary to repeat the statement. It &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; repeated, he &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; an imposter, and each time one says it, he becomes more of an imposter and the author of the statement gains a little more authority in having declared it. Thus Humphrey Prideaux&#039;s famous seventeenth-century biography of Mohammed is subtitled &#039;&#039;The True Nature of Imposture&#039;&#039;. Finally, of course, such categories as imposter (or Oriental, for that matter) imply, indeed require, an opposite that is neither fraudulently something else nor endlessly in need of explicit identification. And that opposite is &amp;quot;Occidental,&amp;quot; or in Mohammed&#039;s case, Jesus.&lt;br /&gt;
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Philosophically, then, the kind of language, thought, and vision that I have been calling Orientalism very generally is a form of radical realism; anyone employing Orientalism, which is the habit for dealing with questions, objects, qualities, and regions deemed Oriental, will designate, name, point to, fix what he is talking or thinking about with a word or phrase, which then is considered either to have acquired, or more simply to be, reality. Rhetorically speaking, Orientalism is absolutely anatomical and enumerative: to use its vocabulary is to engage in the particularizing and dividing of things Oriental into manageable parts. Psychologically, Orientalism is a form of paranoia, knowledge of another kind, say, from ordinary historical knowledge. These are a few of the results, I think, of imaginative geography and of the dramatic boundaries it draws. There are some specifically modern transmutations of these Orientalized results, however, to which I must now turn.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Projects&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
It is necessary to examine the more flamboyant operational successes of Orientalism if only to judge how exactly wrong (and how totally opposite to the truth) was the grandly menacing idea expressed by Michelet, that &amp;quot;the Orient advances, invincible, fatal to the gods of light by the charm of its dreams, by the magic of its &#039;&#039;chiaroscuro&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by Henri Baudet in &#039;&#039;Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man&#039;&#039;, trans. Elizabeth Wentholt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), p. xiii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cultural, material, and intellectual relations between Europe and the Orient have gone through innumerable phases, even though the line between East and West has made a certain constant impression upon Europe. Yet in general it was the West that moved upon the East, not vice versa. &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is the generic term that I have been employing to describe the Western approach to the Orient; Orientalism is the discipline by which the Orient was (and is) approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery, and practice. But in addition I have been using the word to designate that collection of dreams, images, and vocabularies available to anyone who has tried to talk about what lies east of the dividing line. These two aspects of Orientalism are not incongruent, since by use of them both Europe could advance securely and unmetaphorically upon the Orient. Here I should like principally to consider material evidence of this advance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Islam excepted, the Orient for Europe was until the nineteenth century a domain with a continuous history of unchallenged Western dominance. This is patently true of the British experience in India, the Portuguese experience in the East Indies, China, and Japan, and the French and Italian experiences in various regions of the Orient. There were occasional instances of native intransigence to disturb the idyll, as when in 1638-1639 a group of Japanese Christians threw the Portuguese out of the area; by and large, however, only the Arab and Islamic Orient presented Europe with an unresolved challenge on the political, intellectual, and for a time, economic levels. For much of its history, then, Orientalism carries within it the stamp of a problematic European attitude towards Islam, and it is this acutely sensitive aspect of Orientalism around which my interest in this study turns.&lt;br /&gt;
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Doubtless Islam was a real provocation in many ways. It lay uneasily close to Christianity, geographically and culturally. It drew on the Judeo-Hellenic traditions, it borrowed creatively from Christianity, it could boast of unrivaled military and political successes. Nor was this all. The Islamic lands sit adjacent to and even on top of the Biblical lands; moreover, the heart of the Islamic domain has always been the region closest to Europe, what has been called the Near Orient or Near East. Arabic and Hebrew are Semitic languages, and together they dispose and redispose of material that is urgently important to Christianity. From the end of the seventh century until the battle of Lepanto in 1571, Islam in either its Arab, Ottoman, or North African and Spanish form dominated or effectively threatened European Christianity. That Islam outstripped and outshone Rome cannot have been absent from the mind of any European past or present. Even Gibbon was no exception, as is evident in the following passage from the &#039;&#039;Decline and Fall&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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In the victorious days of the Roman republic it had been the aim of the senate to confine their councils and legions to a single war, and completely to suppress a first enemy before they provoked the hostilities of a second. These timid maxims of policy were disdained by the magnanimity or enthusiasm of the Arabian caliphs. With the same vigour and success they invaded the successors of Augustus and Artaxerxes; and the rival monarchies at the same instant became the prey of an enemy whom they had so long been accustomed to despise. In the ten years of the administration of Omar, the Saracens reduced to his obedience thirty-six thousand cities or castles, destroyed four thousand churches or temples of the unbelievers, and edified fourteen hundred moschs for the exercise of the religion of Mohammed. One hundred years after his flight from Mecca the arms and reign of his successors extended from India to the Atlantic Ocean, over the various and distant provinces....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gibbon, &#039;&#039;Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire&#039;&#039;, 6: 289.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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When the term &#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; was not simply a synonym for the Asiatic East as a whole, or taken as generally denoting the distant and exotic, it was most rigorously understood as applying to the Islamic Orient. This &amp;quot;militant&amp;quot; Orient came to stand for what Henri Baudet has called &amp;quot;the Asiatic tidal wave.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Baudet, &#039;&#039;Paradise on Earth&#039;&#039;, p. 4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Certainly this was the case in Europe through the middle of the eighteenth century, the point at which repositories of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; knowledge like d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039; stop meaning primarily Islam, the Arabs, or the Ottomans. Until that time cultural memory gave understandable prominence to such relatively distant events as the fall of Constantinople, the Crusades, and the conquest of Sicily and Spain, but if these signified the menacing Orient they did not at the same time efface what remained of Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
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For there was always India, where, after Portugal pioneered the first bases of European presence in the early sixteenth century, Europe, and primarily England after a long period (from 1600 to 1758) of essentially commercial activity, dominated politically as an occupying force. Yet India itself never provided an indigenous threat to Europe. Rather it was because native authority crumbled there and opened the land to inter-European rivalry and to outright European political control that the Indian Orient could be treated by Europe with such proprietary hauteur--never with the sense of danger reserved for Islam.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Fieldhouse, &#039;&#039;Colonial Empires&#039;&#039;, pp. 138-61.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Nevertheless, between this hauteur and anything like accurate positive knowledge there existed a vast disparity. D&#039;Herbelot&#039;s entries for Indo-Persian subjects in the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; were all based on Islamic sources, and it is true to say that until the early nineteenth century &amp;quot;Oriental languages&amp;quot; was considered a synonym for &amp;quot;Semitic languages.&amp;quot; The Oriental renaissance of which Quinet spoke served the function of expanding some fairly narrow limits, in which Islam was the catchall Oriental example.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;, p. 30.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Sanskrit, Indian religion, and Indian history did not acquire the status of scientific knowledge until after Sir William Jones&#039;s efforts in the late eighteenth century, and even Jones&#039;s interest in India came to him by way of his prior interest in and knowledge of Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not surprising, then, that the first major work of Oriental scholarship after d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; was Simon Ockley&#039;s &#039;&#039;History of the Saracens&#039;&#039;, whose first volume appeared in 1708. A recent historian of Orientalism has opined that Ockley&#039;s attitude towards the Muslims--that to them is owed what was first known of philosophy by European Christians--&amp;quot;shocked painfully&amp;quot; his European audience. For not only did Ockley make this Islamic pre-eminence clear in his work; he also &amp;quot;gave Europe its first authentic and substantial taste of the Arab viewpoint touching the wars with Byzantium and Persia.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A. J. Arberry, &#039;&#039;Oriental Essays: Portraits of Seven Scholars&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 30, 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, Ockley was careful to dissociate himself from the infectious influence of Islam, and unlike his colleague William Whiston (Newton&#039;s successor at Cambridge), he always made it clear that Islam was an outrageous heresy. For his Islamic enthusiasm, on the other hand, Whiston was expelled from Cambridge in 1709.&lt;br /&gt;
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Access to Indian (Oriental) riches had always to be made by first crossing the Islamic provinces and by withstanding the dangerous effect of Islam as a system of quasi-Arian belief. And at least for the larger segment of the eighteenth century, Britain and France were successful. The Ottoman Empire had long since settled into a (for Europe) comfortable senescence, to be inscribed in the nineteenth century as the &amp;quot;Eastern Question.&amp;quot; Britain and France fought each other in India between 1744 and 1748 and again between 1756 and 1763, until, in 1769, the British emerged in practical economic and political control of the subcontinent. What was more inevitable than that Napoleon should choose to harass Britain&#039;s Oriental empire by first intercepting its Islamic through-way, Egypt?&lt;br /&gt;
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Although it was almost immediately preceded by at least two major Orientalist projects, Napoleon&#039;s invasion of Egypt in 1798 and his foray into Syria have had by far the greater consequence for the modern history of Orientalism. Before Napoleon only two efforts (both by scholars) had been made to invade the Orient by stripping it of its veils and also by going beyond the comparative shelter of the Biblical Orient. The first was by Abraham-Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731-1805), an eccentric theoretician of egalitarianism, a man who managed in his head to reconcile Jansenism with orthodox Catholicism and Brahmanism, and who traveled to Asia in order to prove the actual primitive existence of a Chosen People and of the Biblical genealogies. Instead he overshot his early goal and traveled as far east as Surat, there to find a cache of Avestan texts, there also to complete his translation of the Avesta. Raymond Schwab has said of the mysterious Avestan fragment that set Anquetil off on his voyages that whereas &amp;quot;the scholars looked at the famous fragment of Oxford and then returned to their studies, Anquetil looked, and then went to India.&amp;quot; Schwab also remarks that Anquetil and Voltaire, though temperamentally and ideologically at hopeless odds with each other, had a similar interest in the Orient and the Bible, &amp;quot;the one to make the Bible more indisputable, the other to make it more unbelievable.&amp;quot; Ironically, Anquetil&#039;s Avesta translations served Voltaire&#039;s purposes, since Anquetil&#039;s discoveries &amp;quot;soon led to criticism of the very [Biblical] texts which had hitherto been considered to be revealed texts.&amp;quot; The net effect of Anquetil&#039;s expedition is well described by Schwab:&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1759, Anquetil finished his translation of the &#039;&#039;Avesta&#039;&#039; at Surat; in 1786 that of the &#039;&#039;Upanishads&#039;&#039; in Paris--he had dug a channel between the hemispheres of human genius, correcting and expanding the old humanism of the Mediterranean basin. Less than fifty years earlier, his compatriots were asked what it was like to be Persian, when he taught them how to compare the monuments of the Persians to those of the Greeks. Before him, one looked for information on the remote past of our planet exclusively among the great Latin, Greek, Jewish, and Arabic writers. The Bible was regarded as a lonely rock, an aerolite. A universe in writing was available, but scarcely anyone seemed to suspect the immensity of those unknown lands. The realization began with his translation of the &#039;&#039;Avesta&#039;&#039;, and reached dizzying heights owing to the exploration in Central Asia of the languages that multiplied after Babel. Into our schools, up to that time limited to the narrow Greco-Latin heritage of the Renaissance [of which much had been transmitted to Europe by Islam], he interjected a vision of innumerable civilizations from ages past, of an infinity of literatures; moreover the few European provinces were not the only places to have left their mark in history.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;Vie d&#039;Anquetil-Duperron suivie des Usages civils et religieux des Perses par Anquetil-Duperron&#039;&#039; (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1934), pp. 10, 96, 4, 6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For the first time, the Orient was revealed to Europe in the materiality of its texts, languages, and civilizations. Also for the first time, Asia acquired a precise intellectual and historical dimension with which to buttress the myths of its geographic distance and vastness. By one of those inevitable contracting compensations for a sudden cultural expansion, Anquetil&#039;s Oriental labors were succeeded by William Jones&#039;s, the second of the pre-Napoleonic projects I mentioned above. Whereas Anquetil opened large vistas, Jones closed them down, codifying, tabulating, comparing. Before he left England for India in 1783, Jones was already a master of Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian. These seemed perhaps the least of his accomplishments: he was also a poet, a jurist, a polyhistor, a classicist, and an indefatigable scholar whose powers would recommend him to such as Benjamin Franklin, Edmund Burke, William Pitt, and Samuel Johnson. In due course he was appointed to &amp;quot;an honorable and profitable place in the Indies,&amp;quot; and immediately upon his arrival there to take up a post with the East India Company began the course of personal study that was to gather in, to rope off, to domesticate the Orient and thereby turn it into a province of European learning. For his personal work, entitled &amp;quot;Objects of Enquiry During My Residence in Asia&amp;quot; he enumerated among the topics of his investigation &amp;quot;the Laws of the Hindus and Mohammedans, Modern Politics and Geography of Hindustan, Best Mode of Governing Bengal, Arithmetic and Geometry, and Mixed Sciences of the Asiaticks, Medicine, Chemistry, Surgery, and Anatomy of the Indians, Natural Productions of India, Poetry, Rhetoric and Morality of Asia, Music of the Eastern Nations, Trade, Manufacture, Agriculture, and Commerce of India,&amp;quot; and so forth. On August 17, 1787, he wrote unassumingly to Lord Althorp that &amp;quot;it is my ambition to know &#039;&#039;India&#039;&#039; better than any other European ever knew it.&amp;quot; Here is where Balfour in 1910 could find the first adumbration of his claim as an Englishman to know the Orient more and better than anyone else.&lt;br /&gt;
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Jones&#039;s official work was the law, an occupation with symbolic significance for the history of Orientalism. Seven years before Jones arrived in India, Warren Hastings had decided that Indians were to be ruled by their own laws, a more enterprising project than it appears at first glance since the Sanskrit code of laws existed then for practical use only in a Persian translation, and no Englishman at the time knew Sanskrit well enough to consult the original texts. A company official, Charles Wilkins, first mastered Sanskrit, then began to translate the &#039;&#039;Institutes&#039;&#039; of Manu; in this labor he was soon to be assisted by Jones. (Wilkins, incidentally, was the first translator of the Bhagavad-Gita.) In January 1784 Jones convened the inaugural meeting of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, which was to be for India what the Royal &#039;&#039;Society&#039;&#039; was for England. As first president of the society and as magistrate, Jones acquired the effective knowledge of the Orient and of Orientals that was later to make him the undisputed founder (the phrase is A. J. Arberry&#039;s) of Orientalism. To rule and to learn, then to compare Orient with Occident: these were Jones&#039;s goals, which, with an irresistible impulse always to codify, to subdue the infinite variety of the Orient to &amp;quot;a complete digest&amp;quot; of laws, figures, customs, and works, he is believed to have achieved. His most famous pronouncement indicates the extent to which modern Orientalism, even in its philosophical beginnings, was a comparative discipline having for its principal goal the grounding of the European languages in a distant, and harmless, Oriental source:&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;Sanscrit&#039;&#039; language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the &#039;&#039;Greek&#039;&#039;, more copious than the &#039;&#039;Latin&#039;&#039;, and more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three without believing them to have sprung from some common source.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arberry, &#039;&#039;Oriental Essays&#039;&#039;, pp. 62-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Many of the early English Orientalists in India were, like Jones, legal scholars, or else, interestingly enough, they were medical men with strong missionary leanings. So far as one can tell, most of them were imbued with the dual purpose of investigating &amp;quot;the sciences and the arts of Asia, with the hope of facilitating ameliorations there and of advancing knowledge and improving the arts at home&amp;quot;:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Eden Pargiter, ed., &#039;&#039;Centenary Volume of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 1823-1923&#039;&#039; (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), p. viii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; so the common Orientalist goal was stated in the &#039;&#039;Centenary Volume&#039;&#039; of the Royal Asiatic Society founded in 1823 by Henry Thomas Colebrooke. In their dealings with the modern Orientals, the early professional Orientalists like Jones had only two roles to fulfill, yet we cannot today fault them for strictures placed on their humanity by the official &#039;&#039;Occidental&#039;&#039; character of their presence in the Orient. They were either judges or they were doctors. Even Edgar Quinet, writing more metaphysically than realistically, was dimly aware of this therapeutic relationship. &amp;quot;L&#039;Asie a les prophetes,&amp;quot; he said in &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions&#039;&#039;; &amp;quot;L&#039;Europe a les docteurs.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions&#039;&#039;, p. 47.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Proper knowledge of the Orient proceeded from a thorough study of the classical texts, and only after that to an application of those texts to the modern Orient. Faced with the obvious decrepitude and political impotence of the modern Oriental, the European Orientalist found it his duty to rescue some portion of a lost, past classical Oriental grandeur in order to &amp;quot;facilitate ameliorations&amp;quot; in the present Orient. What the European took from the classical Oriental past was a vision (and thousands of facts and artifacts) which only he could employ to the best advantage; to the modern Oriental he gave facilitation and amelioration--and, too, the benefit of his judgment as to what was best for the modern Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was characteristic of all Orientalist projects before Napoleon&#039;s that very little could be done in advance of the project to prepare for its success. Anquetil and Jones, for example, learned what they did about the Orient only after they got there. They were confronting, as it were, the whole Orient, and only after a while and after considerable improvising could they whittle it down to a smaller province. Napoleon, on the other hand, wanted nothing less than to take the whole of Egypt, and his advance preparations were of unparalleled magnitude and thoroughness. Even so, these preparations were almost fanatically schematic and--if I may use the word--textual, which are features that will bear some analysis here. Three things above all else seem to have been in Napoleon&#039;s mind as he readied himself while in Italy in 1797 for his next military move. First, aside from the still threatening power of England, his military successes that had culminated in the Treaty of Campo Formio left him no other place to turn for additional glory than the East. Moreover, Talleyrand had recently animadverted on &amp;quot;les avantages a retirer de colonies nouvelles dans les circonstances presentes,&amp;quot; and this notion, along with the appealing prospect of hurting Britain, drew him eastwards. Secondly, Napoleon had been attracted to the Orient since his adolescence; his youthful manuscripts, for example, contain a summary he made of Marigny&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire des Arabes&#039;&#039;, and it is evident from all of his writing and conversation that he was steeped, as Jean Thiry has put it, in the memories and glories that were attached to Alexander&#039;s Orient generally and to Egypt in particular.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jean Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte decembre 1797-24 aout 1799&#039;&#039; (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1973), p. 9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus the idea of reconquering Egypt as a new Alexander proposed itself to him, allied with the additional benefit of acquiring a new Islamic colony at England&#039;s expense. Thirdly, Napoleon considered Egypt a likely project precisely because he knew it tactically, strategically, historically, and--not to be underestimated--textually, that is, as something one read about and knew through the writings of recent as well as classical European authorities. The point in all this is that for Napoleon Egypt was a project that acquired reality in his mind, and later in his preparations for its conquest, through experiences that belong to the realm of ideas and myths culled from texts, not empirical reality. His plans for Egypt therefore became the first in a long series of European encounters with the Orient in which the Orientalist&#039;s special expertise was put directly to functional colonial use; for at the crucial instant when an Orientalist had to decide whether his loyalties and sympathies lay with the Orient or with the conquering West, he always chose the latter, from Napoleon&#039;s time on. As for the emperor himself, he saw the Orient only as it had been encoded first by classical texts and then by Orientalist experts, whose vision, based on classical texts, seemed a useful substitute for any actual encounter with the real Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Napoleon&#039;s enlistment of several dozen &amp;quot;savants&amp;quot; for his Egyptian Expedition is too well known to require detail here. His idea was to build a sort of living archive for the expedition, in the form of studies conducted on all topics by the members of the Institut d&#039;Egypte, which he founded. What is perhaps less well known is Napoleon&#039;s prior reliance upon the work of the Comte de Volney, a French traveler whose &#039;&#039;Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie&#039;&#039; appeared in two volumes in 1787. Aside from a short personal preface informing the reader that the sudden acquisition of some money (his inheritance) made it possible for him to take the trip east in 1783, Volney&#039;s &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; is an almost oppressively impersonal document. Volney evidently saw himself as a scientist, whose job it was always to record the &amp;quot;etat&amp;quot; of something he saw. The climax of the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; occurs in the second volume, an account of Islam as a religion.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Constantin-Francois Volney, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Bossange, 1821), 2: 241 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Volney&#039;s views were canonically hostile to Islam as a religion and as a system of political institutions; nevertheless Napoleon found this work and Volney&#039;s &#039;&#039;Considerations sur la guerre actuel de Turcs&#039;&#039; (1788) of particular importance. For Volney after all was a canny Frenchman, and--like Chateaubriand and Lamartine a quarter-century after him--he eyed the Near Orient as a likely place for the realization of French colonial ambition. What Napoleon profited from in Volney was the enumeration, in ascending order of difficulty, of the obstacles to be faced in the Orient by any French expeditionary force.&lt;br /&gt;
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Napoleon refers explicitly to Volney in his reflections on the Egyptian expedition, the &#039;&#039;Campagnes d&#039;Egypte et de Syrie&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1798-1799&#039;&#039;, which he dictated to General Bertrand on Saint Helena. Volney, he said, considered that there were three barriers to French hegemony in the Orient and that any French force would therefore have to fight three wars: one against England, a second against the Ottoman Porte, and a third, the most difficult, against the Muslims.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Napoleon, &#039;&#039;Campagnes d&#039;Egypte et de Syrie, 1798-1799: Memoires pour servir a l&#039;histoire de Napoleon&#039;&#039; (Paris: Comou, 1843), 1: 211.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Volney&#039;s assessment was both shrewd and hard to fault since it was clear to Napoleon, as it would be to anyone who read Volney, that his &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Considerations&#039;&#039; were effective texts to be used by any European wishing to win in the Orient. In other words, Volney&#039;s work constituted a handbook for attenuating the human shock a European might feel as he directly experienced the Orient: Read the books, seems to have been Volney&#039;s thesis, and far from being disoriented by the Orient, you will compel it to you.&lt;br /&gt;
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Napoleon took Volney almost literally, but in a characteristically subtle way. From the first moment that the Armee d&#039;Egypte appeared on the Egyptian horizon, every effort was made to convince the Muslims that &amp;quot;nous sommes les vrais musulmans,&amp;quot; as Bonaparte&#039;s proclamation of July 2, 1798, put it to the people of Alexandria.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 126. See also Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, &#039;&#039;Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 12-20.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Equipped with a team of Orientalists (and sitting on board a flagship called the &#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039;), Napoleon used Egyptian enmity towards the Mamelukes and appeals to the revolutionary idea of equal opportunity for all to wage a uniquely benign and selective war against Islam. What more than anything impressed the first Arab chronicler of the expedition, Abd-al-Rahman al-Jabarti, was Napoleon&#039;s use of scholars to manage his contacts with the natives--that and the impact of watching a modern European intellectual establishment at close quarters.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Abu-Lughod, &#039;&#039;Arab Rediscovery of Europe&#039;&#039;, p. 22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Napoleon tried everywhere to prove that he was fighting &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; Islam; everything he said was translated into Koranic Arabic, just as the French army was urged by its command always to remember the Islamic sensibility. (Compare, in this regard, Napoleon&#039;s tactics in Egypt with the tactics of the &#039;&#039;Requerimiento&#039;&#039;, a document drawn up in 1513--in Spanish--by the Spaniards to be read aloud to the Indians: &amp;quot;We shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as such sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses [the King and Queen of Spain] may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do you all the mischief and damage that we can, as to vassals who do not obey,&amp;quot; etc. etc.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted from Arthur Helps, &#039;&#039;The Spanish Conquest of America&#039;&#039; (London, 1900), p. 196, by Stephen J. Greenblatt, &amp;quot;Learning to Curse: Aspects of Linguistic Colonialism in the Sixteenth Century,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;First Images of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old&#039;&#039;, ed. Fredi Chiapelli (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 573.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) When it seemed obvious to Napoleon that his force was too small to impose itself on the Egyptians, he then tried to make the local imams, cadis, muftis, and ulemas interpret the Koran in favor of the Grande Armee. To this end, the sixty ulemas who taught at the Azhar were invited to his quarters, given full military honors, and then allowed to be flattered by Napoleon&#039;s admiration for Islam and Mohammed and by his obvious veneration for the Koran, with which he seemed perfectly familiar. This worked, and soon the population of Cairo seemed to have lost its distrust of the occupiers.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 200. Napoleon was not just being cynical. It is reported of him that he discussed Voltaire&#039;s &#039;&#039;Mahomet&#039;&#039; with Goethe, and defended Islam. See Christian Cherfils, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte et l&#039;Islam d&#039;apres les documents francais arabes&#039;&#039; (Paris: A. Pedone, 1914), p. 249 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Napoleon later gave his deputy Kleber strict instructions after he left always to administer Egypt through the Orientalists and the religious Islamic leaders whom they could win over; any other politics was too expensive and foolish.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 434.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hugo thought that he grasped the tactful glory of Napoleon&#039;s Oriental expedition in his poem &amp;quot;Lui&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
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Au Nil je le retrouve encore.&lt;br /&gt;
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L&#039;Egypte resplendit des feux de son aurore;&lt;br /&gt;
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Son astre imperial se leve a l&#039;orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Vainqueur, enthousiaste, eclatant de prestiges,&lt;br /&gt;
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Prodige, il etonna la terre des prodiges.&lt;br /&gt;
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Les vieux scheiks veneraient l&#039;emir jeune et prudent;&lt;br /&gt;
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Le peuple redoutait ses armes inouies;&lt;br /&gt;
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Sublime, il apparut aux tribus eblouies&lt;br /&gt;
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Comme un Mahomet d&#039;occident.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hugo, &#039;&#039;Les Orientales, in Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, 1: 684.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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(By the Nile, I find him once again.&lt;br /&gt;
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Egypt shines with the fires of his dawn;&lt;br /&gt;
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His imperial orb rises in the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Victor, enthusiast, bursting with achievements,&lt;br /&gt;
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Prodigious, he stunned the land of prodigies.&lt;br /&gt;
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The old sheikhs venerated the young and prudent emir.&lt;br /&gt;
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The people dreaded his unprecedented arms;&lt;br /&gt;
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Sublime, he appeared to the dazzled tribes&lt;br /&gt;
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Like a Mahomet of the Occident.)&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a triumph could only have been prepared &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; a military expedition, perhaps only by someone who had no prior experience of the Orient except what books and scholars told him. The idea of taking along a full-scale academy is very much an aspect of this textual attitude to the Orient. And this attitude in turn was bolstered by specific Revolutionary decrees (particularly the one of 10 Germinal An III--March 30, 1793--establishing an &#039;&#039;ecole publique&#039;&#039; in the Bibliotheque nationale to teach Arabic, Turkish, and Persian)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Henri Deherain, &#039;&#039;Silvestre de Sacy, ses contemporains et ses disciples&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1938), p. v.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; whose object was the rationalist one of dispelling mystery and institutionalizing even the most recondite knowledge. Thus many of Napoleon&#039;s Orientalist translators were students of Sylvestre de Sacy, who, beginning in June 1796, was the first and only teacher of Arabic at the Ecole publique des langues orientales. Sacy later became the teacher of nearly every major Orientalist in Europe, where his students dominated the field for about three-quarters of a century. Many of them were politically useful, in the ways that several had been to Napoleon in Egypt.&lt;br /&gt;
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But dealings with the Muslims were only a part of Napoleon&#039;s project to dominate Egypt. The other part was to render it completely open, to make it totally accessible to European scrutiny. From being a land of obscurity and a part of the Orient hitherto known at second hand through the exploits of earlier travelers, scholars, and conquerors, Egypt was to become a department of French learning. Here too the textual and schematic attitudes are evident. The Institut, with its teams of chemists, historians, biologists, archaeologists, surgeons, and antiquarians, was the learned division of the army. Its job was no less aggressive: to put Egypt into modern French; and unlike the Abbe Le Mascrier&#039;s 1735 &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, Napoleon&#039;s was to be a universal undertaking. Almost from the first moments of the occupation Napoleon saw to it that the Institut began its meetings, its experiments--its fact-finding mission, as we would call it today. Most important, everything said, seen, and studied was to be recorded, and indeed was recorded in that great collective appropriation of one country by another, the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, published in twenty-three enormous volumes between 1809 and 1828.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte, ou Recueil des observations et des recherches qui ont ete faites in Egypte pendant l&#039;expedition de l&#039;armee francaise, publie par les ordres de sa majeste l&#039;empereur Napoleon le grand&#039;&#039;, 23 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie imperiale, 1809-28).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;Description&#039;s&#039;&#039; uniqueness is not only in its size, or even in the intelligence of its contributors, but in its attitude to its subject matter, and it is this attitude that makes it of great interest for the study of modern Orientalist projects. The first few pages of its &#039;&#039;preface historique&#039;&#039;, written by Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, the Institut&#039;s secretary, make it clear that in &amp;quot;doing&amp;quot; Egypt the scholars were also grappling directly with a kind of unadulterated cultural, geographical, and historical significance. Egypt was the focal point of the relationships between Africa and Asia, between Europe and the East, between memory and actuality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Placed between Africa and Asia, and communicating easily with Europe, Egypt occupies the center of the ancient continent. This country presents only great memories; it is the homeland of the arts and conserves innumerable monuments; its principal temples and the palaces inhabited by its kings still exist, even though its least ancient edifices had already been built by the time of the Trojan War. Homer, Lycurgus, Solon, Pythagoras, and Plato all went to Egypt to study the sciences, religion, and the laws. Alexander founded an opulent city there, which for a long time enjoyed commercial supremacy and which witnessed Pompey, Caesar, Mark Antony, and Augustus deciding between them the fate of Rome and that of the entire world. It is therefore proper for this country to attract the attention of illustrious princes who rule the destiny of nations.&lt;br /&gt;
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No considerable power was ever amassed by any nation, whether in the West or in Asia, that did not also turn that nation toward Egypt, which was regarded in some measure as its natural lot.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Fourier, &#039;&#039;Preface historique&#039;&#039;, vol. 1 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Because Egypt was saturated with meaning for the arts, sciences, and government, its role was to be the stage on which actions of a world-historical importance would take place. By taking Egypt, then, a modern power would naturally demonstrate its strength and justify history; Egypt&#039;s own destiny was to be annexed, to Europe preferably. In addition, this power would also enter a history whose common element was defined by figures no less great than Homer, Alexander, Caesar, Plato, Solon, and Pythagoras, who graced the Orient with their prior presence there. The Orient, in short, existed as a set of values attached, not to its modern realities, but to a series of valorized contacts it had had with a distant European past. This is a pure example of the textual, schematic attitude I have been referring to.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fourier continues similarly for over a hundred pages (each page, incidentally, is a square meter in size, as if the project and the size of the page had been thought of as possessing comparable scale). Out of the free-floating past, however, he must justify the Napoleonic expedition as something that needed to be undertaken when it happened. The dramatic perspective is never abandoned. Conscious of his European audience and of the Oriental figures he was manipulating, he writes:&lt;br /&gt;
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One remembers the impression made on the whole of Europe by the astounding news that the French were in the Orient.... This great project was meditated in silence, and was prepared with such activity and secrecy that the worried vigilance of our enemies was deceived; only at the moment that it happened did they learn that it had been conceived, undertaken, and carried out successfully....&lt;br /&gt;
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So dramatic a &#039;&#039;coup de theatre&#039;&#039; had its advantages for the Orient as well:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This country, which has transmitted its knowledge to so many nations, is today plunged into barbarism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Only a hero could bring all these factors together, which is what Fourier now describes:&lt;br /&gt;
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Napoleon appreciated the influence that this event would have on the relations between Europe, the Orient, and Africa, on Mediterranean shipping, and on Asia&#039;s destiny.... Napoleon wanted to offer a useful European example to the Orient, and finally also to make the inhabitants&#039; lives more pleasant, as well as to procure for them all the advantages of a perfected civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
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None of this would be possible without a continuous application to the project of the arts and sciences.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. iii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To restore a region from its present barbarism to its former classical greatness; to instruct (for its own benefit) the Orient in the ways of the modern West; to subordinate or underplay military power in order to aggrandize the project of glorious knowledge acquired in the process of political domination of the Orient; to formulate the Orient, to give it shape, identity, definition with full recognition of its place in memory, its importance to imperial strategy, and its &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; role as an appendage to Europe; to dignify all the knowledge collected during colonial occupation with the title &amp;quot;contribution to modern learning&amp;quot; when the natives had neither been consulted nor treated as anything except as pretexts for a text whose usefulness was not to the natives; to feel oneself as a European in command, almost at will, of Oriental history, time, and geography; to institute new areas of specialization; to establish new disciplines; to divide, deploy, schematize, tabulate, index, and record everything in sight (and out of sight); to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law about the Oriental nature, temperament, mentality, custom, or type; and, above all, to transmute living reality into the stuff of texts, to possess (or think one possesses) actuality mainly because nothing in the Orient seems to resist one&#039;s powers: these are the features of Orientalist projection entirely realized in the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, itself enabled and reinforced by Napoleon&#039;s wholly Orientalist engulfment of Egypt by the instruments of Western knowledge and power. Thus Fourier concludes his preface by announcing that history will remember how &amp;quot;Egypte fut le theatre de sa [Napoleon&#039;s] gloire, et preserve de l&#039;oubli toutes les circonstances de cet evenement extraordinaire.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. xcii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; thereby displaces Egyptian or Oriental history as a history possessing its own coherence, identity, and sense. Instead, history as recorded in the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; supplants Egyptian or Oriental history by identifying itself directly and immediately with world history, a euphemism for European history. To save an event from oblivion is in the Orientalist&#039;s mind the equivalent of turning the Orient into a theater for his representations of the Orient: this is almost exactly what Fourier says. Moreover, the sheer power of having described the Orient in modern Occidental terms lifts the Orient from the realms of silent obscurity where it has lain neglected (except for the inchoate murmurings of a vast but undefined sense of its own past) into the clarity of modern European science. There this new Orient figures as--for instance, in Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire&#039;s biological theses in the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039;--the confirmation of laws of zoological specialization formulated by Buffon.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, &#039;&#039;Histoire naturelle des poissons du Nil&#039;&#039;, vol. 17 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Or it serves as a &amp;quot;contraste frappante avec les habitudes des nations Europeennes,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;M. de Chabrol, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs des habitants modernes de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, vol. 14 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 376.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in which the &amp;quot;bizarre jouissances&amp;quot; of Orientals serve to highlight the sobriety and rationality of Occidental habits. Or, to cite one more use for the Orient, equivalents of those Oriental physiological characteristics that made possible the successful embalming of bodies are sought for in European bodies, so that chevaliers fallen on the field of honor can be preserved as lifelike relics of Napoleon&#039;s great Oriental campaign.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This is evident in Baron Larrey, &#039;&#039;Notice sur la conformation physique des egyptiens et des differentes races qui habitent en Egypte, suivie de quelques reflexions sur l&#039;embaumement des momies&#039;&#039;, vol. 13 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet the military failure of Napoleon&#039;s occupation of Egypt did not also destroy the fertility of its over-all projection for Egypt or the rest of the Orient. Quite literally, the occupation gave birth to the entire modern experience of the Orient as interpreted from within the universe of discourse founded by Napoleon in Egypt, whose agencies of domination and dissemination included the Institut and the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039;. The idea, as it has been characterized by Charles-Roux, was that Egypt &amp;quot;restored to prosperity, regenerated by wise and enlightened administration ... would shed its civilizing rays upon all its Oriental neighbors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited by John Marlowe, &#039;&#039;The Making of the Suez Canal&#039;&#039; (London: Cresset Press, 1964), p. 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; True, the other European powers would seek to compete in this mission, none more than England. But what would happen as a continuing legacy of the common Occidental mission to the Orient--despite inter-European squabbling, indecent competition, or outright war--would be the creation of new projects, new visions, new enterprises combining additional parts of the old Orient with the conquering European spirit. After Napoleon, then, the very language of Orientalism changed radically. Its descriptive realism was upgraded and became not merely a style of representation but a language, indeed a means of &#039;&#039;creation&#039;&#039;. Along with the &#039;&#039;langues meres&#039;&#039;, as those forgotten dormant sources for the modern European demotics were entitled by Antoine Fabre d&#039;Olivet, the Orient was reconstructed, reassembled, crafted, in short, &#039;&#039;born&#039;&#039; out of the Orientalists&#039; efforts. The &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; became the master type of all further efforts to bring the Orient closer to Europe, thereafter to absorb it entirely and--centrally important--to cancel, or at least subdue and reduce, its strangeness and, in the case of Islam, its hostility. For the Islamic Orient would henceforth appear as a category denoting the Orientalists&#039; power and not the Islamic people as humans nor their history as history.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus out of the Napoleonic expedition there issued a whole series of textual children, from Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039; to Lamartine&#039;s &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; to Flaubert&#039;s &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, and in the same tradition, Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; and Richard Burton&#039;s &#039;&#039;Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039;. What binds them together is not only their common background in Oriental legend and experience but also their learned reliance on the Orient as a kind of womb out of which they were brought forth. If paradoxically these creations turned out to be highly stylized simulacra, elaborately wrought imitations of what a live Orient might be thought to look like, that by no means detracts either from the strength of their imaginative conception or from the strength of European mastery of the Orient, whose prototypes respectively were Cagliostro, the great European impersonator of the Orient, and Napoleon, its first modern conqueror.&lt;br /&gt;
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Artistic or textual work was not the only product of the Napoleonic expedition. There were, in addition and certainly more influential, the scientific project, whose chief instance is Ernest Renan&#039;s &#039;&#039;Systeme compare et histoire generale des langues semitiques&#039;&#039;, completed in 1848 for--neatly enough--the Prix Volney, and the geopolitical project, of which Ferdinand de Lesseps&#039;s Suez Canal and England&#039;s occupation of Egypt in 1882 are prime instances. The difference between the two is not only in manifest scale but also in quality of Orientalist conviction. Renan truly believed that he had re-created the Orient, as it really was, in his work. De Lesseps, on the other hand, always was somewhat awed by the newness his project had released out of the old Orient, and this sense communicated itself to everyone for whom the opening of the canal in 1869 was no ordinary event. In his &#039;&#039;Excursionist and Tourist Advertiser&#039;&#039; for July 1, 1869, Thomas Cook&#039;s enthusiasm carries on de Lesseps&#039;s:&lt;br /&gt;
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On November the 17th, the greatest engineering feat of the present century is to have its success celebrated by a magnificent inauguration fete, at which nearly every European royal family will have its special representative. Truly the occasion will be an exceptional one. The formation of a line of water communication between Europe and the East, has been the thought of centuries, occupying in turn the minds of Greeks, Roman, Saxon and Gaul, but it was not until within the last few years that modern civilization began seriously to set about emulating the labours of the ancient Pharaohs, who, many centuries since, constructed a canal between the two seas, traces of which remain to this day.... Everything connected with [the modern] works are on the most gigantic scale, and a perusal of a little pamphlet, descriptive of the undertaking, from the pen of the Chevalier de St. Stoess, impresses us most forcibly with the genius of the great Master-mind--M. Ferdinand de Lesseps--to whose perseverance, calm daring and foresight, the dream of ages has at last become a real and tangible fact ... the project for bringing more closely together the countries of the West and the East, and thus uniting the civilizations of different epochs.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted in John Pudney, &#039;&#039;Suez: De Lesseps&#039; Canal&#039;&#039; (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 141-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The combination of old ideas with new methods, the bringing together of cultures whose relations to the nineteenth century were different, the genuine imposition of the power of modern technology and intellectual will upon formerly stable and divided geographical entities like East and West: this is what Cook perceives and what, in his journals, speeches, prospectuses, and letters, de Lesseps advertises.&lt;br /&gt;
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Genealogically, Ferdinand&#039;s start was auspicious. Mathieu de Lesseps, his father, had come to Egypt with Napoleon and remained there (as &amp;quot;unofficial French representative,&amp;quot; Marlowe says&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marlowe, &#039;&#039;Making of the Suez Canal&#039;&#039;, p. 62.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) for four years after the French evacuated it in 1801. Many of Ferdinand&#039;s later writings refer back to Napoleon&#039;s own interest in digging a canal, which, because he had been misinformed by experts, he never thought was a realizable goal. Infected by the erratic history of canal projects that included French schemes entertained by Richelieu and the Saint-Simonians, de Lesseps returned to Egypt in 1854, there to embark on the undertaking that was eventually completed fifteen years later. He had no real engineering background. Only a tremendous faith in his near-divine skills as builder, mover, and creator kept him going; as his diplomatic and financial talents gained him Egyptian and European support, he seems to have acquired the necessary knowledge to carry matters to completion. More useful, perhaps, he learned how to plant his potential contributors in the world-historical theater and make them see what his &amp;quot;pensee morale,&amp;quot; as he called his project, really meant. &amp;quot;Vous envisagez,&amp;quot; he told them in 1860, &amp;quot;les immenses services que le rapprochement de l&#039;occident et de l&#039;orient doit rendre a la civilization et au developpement de la richesse generale. Le monde attend de vous un grand progres et vous voulez repondre a l&#039;attente du monde.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ferdinand de Lesseps, &#039;&#039;Lettres, journal et documents pour servir a l&#039;histoire du Canal de Suez&#039;&#039; (Paris: Didier, 1881), 5: 310. For an apt characterization of de Lesseps and Cecil Rhodes as mystics, see Baudet, &#039;&#039;Paradise on Earth&#039;&#039;, p. 68.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In accordance with such notions the name of the investment company formed by de Lesseps in 1858 was a charged one and reflected the grandiose plans he cherished: the Compagnie universelle. In 1862 the Academie francaise offered a prize for an epic on the canal. Bornier, the winner, delivered himself of such hyperbole as the following, none of it fundamentally contradicting de Lesseps&#039;s picture of what he was up to:&lt;br /&gt;
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Au travail! Ouvriers que notre France envoie,&lt;br /&gt;
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Tracez, pour l&#039;univers, cette nouvelle voie!&lt;br /&gt;
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Vos peres, les heros, sont venus jusqu&#039;ici;&lt;br /&gt;
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Soyez ferme comme aux intrepides,&lt;br /&gt;
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Comme eux vous combattez aux pieds des pyramides,&lt;br /&gt;
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Et leurs quatre mille ans vous contemplent aussi!&lt;br /&gt;
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Oui, c&#039;est pour l&#039;univers! Pour l&#039;Asie et l&#039;Europe,&lt;br /&gt;
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Pour ces climats lointain que la nuit enveloppe,&lt;br /&gt;
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Pour le Chinois perfide et l&#039;Indien demi-nu;&lt;br /&gt;
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Pour les peuples heureux, libres, humains et braves,&lt;br /&gt;
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Pour les peuples mechants, pour les peuples esclaves,&lt;br /&gt;
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Pour ceux a qui le Christ est encore inconnu.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Charles Beatty, &#039;&#039;De Lesseps of Suez: The Man and His Times&#039;&#039; (New York: Harper &amp;amp; Brothers, 1956), p. 220.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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De Lesseps was nowhere more eloquent and resourceful than when he was called upon to justify the enormous expense in money and men the canal would require. He could pour out statistics to enchant any ear; he would quote Herodotus and maritime statistics with equal fluency. In his journal entries for 1864 he cited with approbation Casimir Leconte&#039;s observation that an eccentric life would develop significant originality in men, and from originality would come great and unusual exploits.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;De Lesseps, &#039;&#039;Lettres, journal et documents&#039;&#039;, 5: 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Such exploits were their own justification. Despite its immemorial pedigree of failures, its outrageous cost, its astounding ambitions for altering the way Europe would handle the Orient, the canal was worth the effort. It was a project uniquely able to override the objections of those who were consulted and, in improving the Orient as a whole, to do what scheming Egyptians, perfidious Chinese, and half-naked Indians could never have done for themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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The opening ceremonies in November 1869 were an occasion which, no less than the whole history of de Lesseps&#039;s machinations, perfectly embodied his ideas. For years his speeches, letters, and pamphlets were laden with a vividly energetic and theatrical vocabulary. In the pursuit of success, he could be found saying of himself (always in the first person plural), we created, fought, disposed, achieved, acted, recognized, persevered, advanced; nothing, he repeated on many occasions, could stop us, nothing was impossible, nothing mattered finally except the realization of &amp;quot;le resultat final, le grand but,&amp;quot; which he had conceived, defined, and finally executed. As the papal envoy to the ceremonies spoke on November 16 to the assembled dignitaries, his speech strove desperately to match the intellectual and imaginative spectacle offered by de Lesseps&#039;s canal:&lt;br /&gt;
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Il est permis d&#039;affirmer que l&#039;heure qui vient de sonner est non seulement une des plus solennelles de ce siecle, mais encore une des plus grandes et des plus decisives qu&#039;ait vues l&#039;humanite, depuis qu&#039;elle a une histoire ci-bas. Ce lieu, ou confinent--sans desormais y toucher--l&#039;Afrique et l&#039;Asie, cette grande fete du genre humain, cette assistance auguste et cosmopolite, toutes les races du globe, tous les drapeaux, tous les pavillions, flottant joyeusement sous ce ciel radieux et immense, la croix debout et respectee de tous en face du croissant, que de merveilles, que de contrastes saississants, que de reves reputes chimeriques devenus de palpables realites! et, dans cet assemblage de tant de prodiges, que de sujets de reflexions pour le penseur, que de joies dans l&#039;heure presente et, dans les perspectives de l&#039;avenir, que de glorieuses esperances!...&lt;br /&gt;
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Les deux extremites du globe se rapprochent; en se rapprochant, elles se reconnaissent; en se reconnaissant, tous les hommes, enfants d&#039;un seul et meme Dieu, eprouvent le tressaillement joyeux de leur mutuelle fraternite! O Occident! O Orient! rapprochez, regardez, reconnaissez, saluez, etreignez-vous!...&lt;br /&gt;
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Mais derriere le phenomene materiel, le regard du penseur decouvre des horizons plus vastes que les espaces mesurables, les horizons sans bornes ou mouvent les plus hautes destinees, les plus glorieuses conquetes, les plus immortelles certitudes du genre humain....&lt;br /&gt;
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[Dieu] que votre souffle divin plane sur ces eaux! Qu&#039;il y passe et repasse, de l&#039;Occident a l&#039;Orient, de l&#039;Orient a l&#039;Occident! O Dieu! Servez vous de cette voie pour rapprocher les hommes les uns des autres!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 324-33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The whole world seemed crowded in to render homage to a scheme that God could only bless and make use of himself. Old distinctions and inhibitions were dissolved: the Cross faced down the Crescent, the West had come to the Orient never to leave it (until, in July 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser would activate Egypt&#039;s taking over of the canal by pronouncing the name of de Lesseps).&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Suez Canal idea we see the logical conclusion of Orientalist thought and, more interesting, of Orientalist effort. To the West, Asia had once represented silent distance and alienation; Islam was militant hostility to European Christianity. To overcome such redoubtable constants the Orient needed first to be known, then invaded and possessed, then re-created by scholars, soldiers, and judges who disinterred forgotten languages, histories, races, and cultures in order to posit them--beyond the modern Oriental&#039;s ken--as the true classical Orient that could be used to judge and rule the modern Orient. The obscurity faded to be replaced by hothouse entities; the Orient was a scholar&#039;s word, signifying what modern Europe had recently made of the still peculiar East. De Lesseps and his canal finally destroyed the Orient&#039;s distance, its cloistered intimacy &#039;&#039;away&#039;&#039; from the West, its perdurable exoticism. Just as a land barrier could be transmuted into a liquid artery, so too the Orient was transubstantiated from resistant hostility into obliging, and submissive, partnership. After de Lesseps no one could speak of the Orient as belonging to another world, strictly speaking. There was only &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world, &amp;quot;one&amp;quot; world bound together because the Suez Canal had frustrated those last provincials who still believed in the difference between worlds. Thereafter the notion of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; is an administrative or executive one, and it is subordinate to demographic, economic, and sociological factors. For imperialists like Balfour, or for anti-imperialists like J. A. Hobson, the Oriental, like the African, is a member of a subject race and not exclusively an inhabitant of a geographical area. De Lesseps had melted away the Orient&#039;s geographical identity by (almost literally) dragging the Orient into the West and finally dispelling the threat of Islam. New categories and experiences, including the imperialist ones, would emerge, and in time Orientalism would adapt itself to them, but not without some difficulty.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;IV.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Crisis&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
It may appear strange to speak about something or someone as holding a &#039;&#039;textual&#039;&#039; attitude, but a student of literature will understand the phrase more easily if he will recall the kind of view attacked by Voltaire in &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039;, or even the attitude to reality satirized by Cervantes in &#039;&#039;Don Quixote&#039;&#039;. What seems unexceptionable good sense to these writers is that it is a fallacy to assume that the swarming, unpredictable, and problematic mess in which human beings live can be understood on the basis of what books--texts--say; to apply what one learns out of a book literally to reality is to risk folly or ruin. One would no more think of using &#039;&#039;Amadis of Gaul&#039;&#039; to understand sixteenth-century (or present-day) Spain than one would use the Bible to understand, say, the House of Commons. But clearly people have tried and do try to use texts in so simple-minded a way, for otherwise &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Don Quixote&#039;&#039; would not still have the appeal for readers that they do today. It seems a common human failing to prefer the schematic authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with the human. But is this failing constantly present, or are there circumstances that, more than others, make the textual attitude likely to prevail?&lt;br /&gt;
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Two situations favor a textual attitude. One is when a human being confronts at close quarters something relatively unknown and threatening and previously distant. In such a case one has recourse not only to what in one&#039;s previous experience the novelty resembles but also to what one has read about it. Travel books or guidebooks are about as &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; a kind of text, as logical in their composition and in their use, as any book one can think of, precisely because of this human tendency to fall back on a text when the uncertainties of travel in strange parts seem to threaten one&#039;s equanimity. Many travelers find themselves saying of an experience in a new country that it wasn&#039;t what they expected, meaning that it wasn&#039;t what a book said it would be. And of course many writers of travel books or guidebooks compose them in order to say that a country &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; like this, or better, that it &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; colorful, expensive, interesting, and so forth. The idea in either case is that people, places, and experiences can always be described by a book, so much so that the book (or text) acquires a greater authority, and use, even than the actuality it describes. The comedy of Fabrice del Dongo&#039;s search for the battle of Waterloo is not so much that he fails to find the battle, but that he looks for it as something texts have told him about.&lt;br /&gt;
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A second situation favoring the textual attitude is the appearance of success. If one reads a book claiming that lions are fierce and then encounters a fierce lion (I simplify, of course), the chances are that one will be encouraged to read more books by that same author, and believe them. But if, in addition, the lion book instructs one how to deal with a fierce lion, and the instructions work perfectly, then not only will the author be greatly believed, he will also be impelled to try his hand at other kinds of written performance. There is a rather complex dialectic of reinforcement by which the experiences of readers in reality are determined by what they have read, and this in turn influences writers to take up subjects defined in advance by readers&#039; experiences. A book on how to handle a fierce lion might then cause a series of books to be produced on such subjects as the fierceness of lions, the origins of fierceness, and so forth. Similarly, as the focus of the text centers more narrowly on the subject--no longer lions but their fierceness--we might expect that the ways by which it is recommended that a lion&#039;s fierceness be handled will actually &#039;&#039;increase&#039;&#039; its fierceness, force it to be fierce since that is what it is and that is what in essence we know or can &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; know about it.&lt;br /&gt;
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A text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual, and arising out of circumstances similar to the ones I have just described, is not easily dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of academics, institutions, and governments can accrue to it, surrounding it with still greater prestige than its practical successes warrant. Most important, such texts can &#039;&#039;create&#039;&#039; not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it. This kind of text is composed out of those pre-existing units of information deposited by Flaubert in the catalogue of &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the light of all this, consider Napoleon and de Lesseps. Everything they knew, more or less, about the Orient came from books written in the tradition of Orientalism, placed in its library of &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;; for them the Orient, like the fierce lion, was something to be encountered and dealt with to a certain extent &#039;&#039;because&#039;&#039; the texts made that Orient possible. Such an Orient was silent, available to Europe for the realization of projects that involved but were never directly responsible to the native inhabitants, and unable to resist the projects, images, or mere descriptions devised for it. Earlier in this chapter I called such a relation between Western writing (and its consequences) and Oriental silence the result of and the sign of the West&#039;s great cultural strength, its will to power over the Orient. But there is another side to the strength, a side whose existence depends on the pressures of the Orientalist tradition and its textual attitude to the Orient; this side lives its own life, as books about fierce lions will do until lions can talk back. The perspective rarely drawn on Napoleon and de Lesseps--to take two among the many projectors who hatched plans for the Orient--is the one that sees them carrying on in the dimensionless silence of the Orient mainly because the discourse of Orientalism, over and above the Orient&#039;s powerlessness to do anything about them, suffused their activity with meaning, intelligibility, and reality. The discourse of Orientalism and what made it possible--in Napoleon&#039;s case, a West far more powerful militarily than the Orient--gave them Orientals who could be described in such works as the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039; and an Orient that could be cut across as de Lesseps cut across Suez. Moreover, Orientalism gave them their success--at least from their point of view, which had nothing to do with that of the Oriental. Success, in other words, had all the actual human interchange between Oriental and Westerner of the Judge&#039;s &amp;quot;said I to myself, said I&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Trial by Jury&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Once we begin to think of Orientalism as a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient, we will encounter few surprises. For if it is true that historians like Michelet, Ranke, Toqueville, and Burckhardt &#039;&#039;emplot&#039;&#039; their narratives &amp;quot;as a story of a particular kind,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hayden White, &#039;&#039;Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe&#039;&#039; (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 12.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the same is also true of Orientalists who plotted Oriental history, character, and destiny for hundreds of years. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Orientalists became a more serious quantity, because by then the reaches of imaginative and actual geography had shrunk, because the Oriental-European relationship was determined by an unstoppable European expansion in search of markets, resources, and colonies, and finally, because Orientalism had accomplished its self-metamorphosis from a scholarly discourse to an imperial institution. Evidence of this metamorphosis is already apparent in what I have said of Napoleon, de Lesseps, Balfour, and Cromer. Their projects in the Orient are understandable on only the most rudimentary level as the efforts of men of vision and genius, heroes in Carlyle&#039;s sense. In fact Napoleon, de Lesseps, Cromer, and Balfour are far more &#039;&#039;regular&#039;&#039;, far less unusual, if we recall the schemata of d&#039;Herbelot and Dante and add to them both a modernized, efficient engine (like the nineteenth-century European empire) and a positive twist: since one cannot ontologically obliterate the Orient (as d&#039;Herbelot and Dante perhaps realized), one does have the means to capture it, treat it, describe it, improve it, radically alter it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The point I am trying to make here is that the transition from a merely textual apprehension, formulation, or definition of the Orient to the putting of all this into practice in the Orient did take place, and that Orientalism had much to do with that--if I may use the word in a literal sense&#039;&#039;--preposterous&#039;&#039; transition. So far as its strictly scholarly work was concerned (and I find the idea of strictly scholarly work as disinterested and abstract hard to understand: still, we can allow it intellectually), Orientalism did a great many things. During its great age in the nineteenth century it produced scholars; it increased the number of languages taught in the West and the quantity of manuscripts edited, translated, and commented on; in many cases, it provided the Orient with sympathetic European students, genuinely interested in such matters as Sanskrit grammar, Phoenician numismatics, and Arabic poetry. Yet--and here we must be very clear--Orientalism overrode the Orient. As a system of thought about the Orient, it always rose from the specifically human detail to the general transhuman one; an observation about a tenth-century Arab poet multiplied itself into a policy towards (and about) the Oriental mentality in Egypt, Iraq, or Arabia. Similarly a verse from the Koran would be considered the best evidence of an ineradicable Muslim sensuality. Orientalism assumed an unchanging Orient, absolutely different (the reasons change from epoch to epoch) from the West. And Orientalism, in its post-eighteenth-century form, could never revise itself. All this makes Cromer and Balfour, as observers and administrators of the Orient, inevitable.&lt;br /&gt;
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The closeness between politics and Orientalism, or to put it more circumspectly, the great likelihood that ideas about the Orient drawn from Orientalism can be put to political use, is an important yet extremely sensitive truth. It raises questions about the predisposition towards innocence or guilt, scholarly disinterest or pressure-group complicity, in such fields as black or women&#039;s studies. It necessarily provokes unrest in one&#039;s conscience about cultural, racial, or historical generalizations, their uses, value, degree of objectivity, and fundamental intent. More than anything else, the political and cultural circumstances in which Western Orientalism has flourished draw attention to the debased position of the Orient or Oriental as an object of study. Can any other than a political master-slave relation produce the Orientalized Orient perfectly characterized by Anwar Abdel Malek?&lt;br /&gt;
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a) On the level of the &#039;&#039;position of the problem&#039;&#039;, and the problematic ... the Orient and Orientals [are considered by Orientalism] as an &amp;quot;object&amp;quot; of study, stamped with an otherness--as all that is different, whether it be &amp;quot;subject&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;object&amp;quot;--but of a constitutive otherness, of an essentialist character.... This &amp;quot;object&amp;quot; of study will be, as is customary, passive, non-participating, endowed with a &amp;quot;historical&amp;quot; subjectivity, above all, non-active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign with regard to itself: the only Orient or Oriental or &amp;quot;subject&amp;quot; which could be admitted, at the extreme limit, is the alienated being, philosophically, that is, other than itself in relationship to itself, posed, understood, defined--and acted--by others.&lt;br /&gt;
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b) On the level of the &#039;&#039;thematic&#039;&#039;, [the Orientalists] adopt an essentialist conception of the countries, nations and peoples of the Orient under study, a conception which expresses itself through a characterized ethnist typology ... and will soon proceed with it towards racism.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the traditional orientalists, an essence should exist--sometimes even clearly described in metaphysical terms--which constitutes the inalienable and common basis of all the beings considered; this essence is both &amp;quot;historical,&amp;quot; since it goes back to the dawn of history, and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixes the being, &amp;quot;the object&amp;quot; of study, within its inalienable and nonevolutive specificity, instead of defining it as all other beings, states, nations, peoples, and cultures--as a product, a resultant of the vection of the forces operating in the field of historical evolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus one ends with a typology--based on a real specificity, but detached from history, and, consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential--which makes of the studied &amp;quot;object&amp;quot; another being with regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent; we will have a homo Sinicus, a homo Arabicus (and why not a homo Aegypticus, etc.), a homo Africanus, the man--the &amp;quot;normal man,&amp;quot; it is understood--being the European man of the historical period, that is, since Greek antiquity. One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the hegemonism of possessing minorities, unveiled by Marx and Engels, and the anthropocentrism dismantled by Freud are accompanied by europocentrism in the area of human and social sciences, and more particularly in those in direct relationship with non-European peoples.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anwar Abdel Malek, &amp;quot;Orientalism in Crisis,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diogenes&#039;&#039; 44 (Winter 1963): 107-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Abdel Malek sees Orientalism as having a history which, according to the &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; of the late twentieth century, led it to the impasse described above. Let us now briefly outline that history as it proceeded through the nineteenth century to accumulate weight and power, &amp;quot;the hegemonism of possessing minorities,&amp;quot; and anthropocentrism in alliance with Europocentrism. From the last decades of the eighteenth century and for at least a century and a half, Britain and France dominated Orientalism as a discipline. The great philological discoveries in comparative grammar made by Jones, Franz Bopp, Jakob Grimm, and others were originally indebted to manuscripts brought from the East to Paris and London. Almost without exception, every Orientalist began his career as a philologist, and the revolution in philology that produced Bopp, Sacy, Burnouf, and their students was a comparative science based on the premise that languages belong to families, of which the Indo-European and the Semitic are two great instances. From the outset, then, Orientalism carried forward two traits: (1) a newly found scientific self-consciousness based on the linguistic importance of the Orient to Europe, and (2) a proclivity to divide, subdivide, and redivide its subject matter without ever changing its mind about the Orient as being always the same, unchanging, uniform, and radically peculiar object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Friedrich Schlegel, who learned his Sanskrit in Paris, illustrates these traits together. Although by the time he published his &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier&#039;&#039; in 1808 Schlegel had practically renounced his Orientalism, he still held that Sanskrit and Persian on the one hand and Greek and German on the other had more affinities with each other than with the Semitic, Chinese, American, or African languages. Moreover, the Indo-European family was artistically simple and satisfactory in a way the Semitic, for one, was not. Such abstractions as this did not trouble Schlegel, for whom nations, races, minds, and peoples as things one could talk about passionately--in the ever-narrowing perspective of populism first adumbrated by Herder--held a lifelong fascination. Yet nowhere does Schlegel talk about the living, contemporary Orient. When he said in 1800, &amp;quot;It is in the Orient that we must search for the highest Romanticism,&amp;quot; he meant the Orient of the &#039;&#039;Sakuntala&#039;&#039;, the Zend-Avesta, and the Upanishads. As for the Semites, whose language was agglutinative, unaesthetic, and mechanical, they were different, inferior, backward. Schlegel&#039;s lectures on language and on life, history, and literature are full of these discriminations, which he made without the slightest qualification. Hebrew, he said, was made for prophetic utterance and divination; the Muslims, however, espoused a &amp;quot;dead empty Theism, a merely negative Unitarian faith.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Friedrich Schlegel, &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier: Ein Beitrag zur Begrundung der Altertumstunde&#039;&#039; (Heidelberg: Mohr &amp;amp; Zimmer, 1808), pp. 44-59; Schlegel, &#039;&#039;Philosophie der Geschichte: In achtzehn Vorlesungen gehalten zu Wien im Jahre 1828&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean-Jacques Anstett, vol. 9 of Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. Ernest Behler (Munich: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1971), p. 275.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the racism in Schlegel&#039;s strictures upon the Semites and other &amp;quot;low&amp;quot; Orientals was widely diffused in European culture. But nowhere else, unless it be later in the nineteenth century among Darwinian anthropologists and phrenologists, was it made the basis of a scientific subject matter as it was in comparative linguistics or philology. Language and race seemed inextricably tied, and the &amp;quot;good&amp;quot; Orient was invariably a classical period somewhere in a long-gone India, whereas the &amp;quot;bad&amp;quot; Orient lingered in present-day Asia, parts of North Africa, and Islam everywhere. &amp;quot;Aryans&amp;quot; were confined to Europe and the ancient Orient; as Leon Poliakov has shown (without once remarking, however, that &amp;quot;Semites&amp;quot; were not only the Jews but the Muslims as well&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Leon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe&#039;&#039;, trans. Edmund Howard (New York: Basic Books, 1974).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;), the Aryan myth dominated historical and cultural anthropology at the expense of the &amp;quot;lesser&amp;quot; peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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The official intellectual genealogy of Orientalism would certainly include Gobineau, Renan, Humboldt, Steinthal, Burnouf, Remusat, Palmer, Weil, Dozy, Muir, to mention a few famous names almost at random from the nineteenth century. It would also include the diffusive capacity of learned societies: the Societe asiatique, founded in 1822; the Royal Asiatic Society, founded in 1823; the American Oriental Society, founded in 1842; and so on. But it might perforce neglect the great contribution of imaginative and travel literature, which strengthened the divisions established by Orientalists between the various geographical, temporal, and racial departments of the Orient. Such neglect would be incorrect, since for the Islamic Orient this literature is especially rich and makes a significant contribution to building the Orientalist discourse. It includes work by Goethe, Hugo, Lamartine, Chateaubriand, Kinglake, Nerval, Flaubert, Lane, Burton, Scott, Byron, Vigny, Disraeli, George Eliot, Gautier. Later, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we could add Doughty, Barres, Loti, T. E. Lawrence, Forster. All these writers give a bolder outline to Disraeli&#039;s &amp;quot;great Asiatic mystery.&amp;quot; In this enterprise there is considerable support not only from the unearthing of dead Oriental civilizations (by European excavators) in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey, but also from major geographical surveys done all through the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the end of the nineteenth century these achievements were materially abetted by the European occupation of the entire Near Orient (with the exception of parts of the Ottoman Empire, which was swallowed up after 1918). The principal colonial powers once again were Britain and France, although Russia and Germany played some role as well.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Derek Hopwood, &#039;&#039;The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1943: Church and Politics in the Near East&#039;&#039; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; To colonize meant at first the identification--indeed, the creation--of interests; these could be commercial, communicational, religious, military, cultural. With regard to Islam and the Islamic territories, for example, Britain felt that it had legitimate interests, as a Christian power, to safeguard. A complex apparatus for tending these interests developed. Such early organizations as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (1698) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1701) were succeeded and later abetted by the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), the Church Missionary Society (1799), the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804), the London Society for Promoting Christianity Among the Jews (1808). These missions &amp;quot;openly joined the expansion of Europe.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A. L. Tibawi, &#039;&#039;British Interests in Palestine, 1800-1901&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Add to these the trading societies, learned societies, geographical exploration funds, translation funds, the implantation in the Orient of schools, missions, consular offices, factories, and sometimes large European communities, and the notion of an &amp;quot;interest&amp;quot; will acquire a good deal of sense. Thereafter interests were defended with much zeal and expense.&lt;br /&gt;
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So far my outline is a gross one. What of the typical experiences and emotions that accompany both the scholarly advances of Orientalism and the political conquests aided by Orientalism? First, there is disappointment that the modern Orient is not at all like the texts. Here is Gerard de Nerval writing to Theophile Gautier at the end of August 1843:&lt;br /&gt;
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I have already lost, Kingdom after Kingdom, province after province, the more beautiful half of the universe, and soon I will know of no place in which I can find a refuge for my dreams; but it is Egypt that I most regret having driven out of my imagination, now that I have sadly placed it in my memory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gerard de Nerval, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Albert Beguin and Jean Richet (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 1: 933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is by the author of a great &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;. Nerval&#039;s lament is a common topic of Romanticism (the betrayed dream, as described by Albert Beguin in &#039;&#039;L&#039;Ame romantique et le reve&#039;&#039;) and of travelers in the Biblical Orient, from Chateaubriand to Mark Twain. Any direct experience of the mundane Orient ironically comments on such valorizations of it as were to be found in Goethe&#039;s &amp;quot;Mahometsgesang&amp;quot; or Hugo&#039;s &amp;quot;Adieux de l&#039;hotesse arabe.&amp;quot; Memory of the modern Orient disputes imagination, sends one back to the imagination as a place preferable, for the European sensibility, to the real Orient. For a person who has never seen the Orient, Nerval once said to Gautier, a lotus is still a lotus; for me it is only a kind of onion. To write about the modern Orient is either to reveal an upsetting demystification of images culled from texts, or to confine oneself to the Orient of which Hugo spoke in his original preface to &#039;&#039;Les Orientales&#039;&#039;, the Orient as &amp;quot;image&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;pensee,&amp;quot; symbols of &amp;quot;une sorte de preoccupation generale.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hugo, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, 1: 580.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If personal disenchantment and general preoccupation fairly map the Orientalist sensibility at first, they entail certain other more familiar habits of thought, feeling, and perception. The mind learns to separate a general apprehension of the Orient from a specific experience of it; each goes its separate way, so to speak. In Scott&#039;s novel &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; (1825), Sir Kenneth (of the Crouching Leopard) battles a single Saracen to a standoff somewhere in the Palestinian desert; as the Crusader and his opponent, who is Saladin in disguise, later engage in conversation, the Christian discovers his Muslim antagonist to be not so bad a fellow after all. Yet he remarks:&lt;br /&gt;
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I well thought ... that your blinded race had their descent from the foul fiend, without whose aid you would never have been able to maintain this blessed land of Palestine against so many valiant soldiers of God. I speak not thus of thee in particular, Saracen, but generally of thy people and religion. Strange is it to me, however, not that you should have the descent from the Evil One, but that you should boast of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sir Walter Scott, &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; (1825; reprint ed., London: J. M. Dent, 1914), pp. 38-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For indeed the Saracen does boast of tracing his race&#039;s line back to Eblis, the Muslim Lucifer. But what is truly curious is not the feeble historicism by which Scott makes the scene &amp;quot;medieval,&amp;quot; letting Christian attack Muslim theologically in a way nineteenth-century Europeans would not (they would, though); rather, it is the airy condescension of damning a whole people &amp;quot;generally&amp;quot; while mitigating the offense with a cool &amp;quot;I don&#039;t mean you in particular.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Scott, however, was no expert on Islam (although H. A. R. Gibb, who was, praised &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; for its insight into Islam and Saladin&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Albert Hourani, &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb, 1895-1971,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Proceedings of the British Academy&#039;&#039; 58 (1972): 495.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;), and he was taking enormous liberties with Eblis&#039;s role by turning him into a hero for the faithful. Scott&#039;s knowledge probably came from Byron and Beckford, but it is enough for us here to note how strongly the general character ascribed to things Oriental could withstand both the rhetorical and the existential force of obvious exceptions. It is as if, on the one hand, a bin called &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; existed into which all the authoritative, anonymous, and traditional Western attitudes to the East were dumped unthinkingly, while on the other, true to the anecdotal tradition of storytelling, one could nevertheless tell of experiences with or in the Orient that had little to do with the generally serviceable bin. But the very structure of Scott&#039;s prose shows a closer intertwining of the two than that. For the general category in advance offers the specific instance a limited terrain in which to operate: no matter how deep the specific exception, no matter how much a single Oriental can escape the fences placed around him, he is &#039;&#039;first&#039;&#039; an Oriental, &#039;&#039;second&#039;&#039; a human being, and &#039;&#039;last&#039;&#039; again an Oriental.&lt;br /&gt;
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So general a category as &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; is capable of quite interesting variations. Disraeli&#039;s enthusiasm for the Orient appeared first during a trip East in 1831. In Cairo he wrote, &amp;quot;My eyes and mind yet ache with a grandeur so little in unison with our own likeness.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by B. R. Jerman, &#039;&#039;The Young Disraeli&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 126. See also Robert Blake, &#039;&#039;Disraeli&#039;&#039; (London: Eyre &amp;amp; Spottiswoode, 1966), pp. 59-70.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; General grandeur and passion inspired a transcendent sense of things and little patience for actual reality. His novel &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; is steeped in racial and geographical platitudes; everything is a matter of race, Sidonia states, so much so that salvation can only be found in the Orient and amongst its races. There, as a case in point, Druzes, Christians, Muslims, and Jews hobnob easily because--someone quips--Arabs are simply Jews on horseback, and all are Orientals at heart. The unisons are made between general categories, not between categories and what they contain. An Oriental lives in the Orient, he lives a life of Oriental ease, in a state of Oriental despotism and sensuality, imbued with a feeling of Oriental fatalism. Writers as different as Marx, Disraeli, Burton, and Nerval could carry on a lengthy discussion between themselves, as it were, using all those generalities unquestioningly and yet intelligibly.&lt;br /&gt;
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With disenchantment and a generalized--not to say schizophrenic--view of the Orient, there is usually another peculiarity. Because it is made into a general object, the whole Orient can be made to serve as an illustration of a particular form of eccentricity. Although the individual Oriental cannot shake or disturb the general categories that make sense of his oddness, his oddness can nevertheless be enjoyed for its own sake. Here, for example, is Flaubert describing the spectacle of the Orient:&lt;br /&gt;
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To amuse the crowd, Mohammed Ali&#039;s jester took a woman in a Cairo bazaar one day, set her on the counter of a shop, and coupled with her publicly while the shopkeeper calmly smoked his pipe.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the road from Cairo to Shubra some time ago a young fellow had himself publicly buggered by a large monkey--as in the story above, to create a good opinion of himself and make people laugh.&lt;br /&gt;
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A marabout died a while ago--an idiot--who had long passed as a saint marked by God; all the Moslem women came to see him and masturbated him--in the end he died of exhaustion--from morning to night it was a perpetual jacking-off....&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Quid dicis&#039;&#039; of the following fact: some time ago a &#039;&#039;santon&#039;&#039; (ascetic priest) used to walk through the streets of Cairo completely naked except for a cap on his head and another on his prick. To piss he would doff the prick-cap, and sterile women who wanted children would run up, put themselves under the parabola of his urine and rub themselves with it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour&#039;&#039;, trans, and ed. Francis Steegmuller (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1973), pp. 44-5. See Gustave Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Correspondance&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean Bruneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 1: 542.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Flaubert frankly acknowledges that this is grotesquerie of a special kind. &amp;quot;All the old comic business&amp;quot;--by which Flaubert meant the well-known conventions of &amp;quot;the cudgeled slave ... the coarse trafficker in women ... the thieving merchant&amp;quot;--acquire a new, &amp;quot;fresh ... genuine and charming&amp;quot; meaning in the Orient. This meaning cannot be reproduced; it can only be enjoyed on the spot and &amp;quot;brought back&amp;quot; very approximately. The Orient is &#039;&#039;watched&#039;&#039;, since its almost (but never quite) offensive behavior issues out of a reservoir of infinite peculiarity; the European, whose sensibility tours the Orient, is a watcher, never involved, always detached, always ready for new examples of what the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039; called &amp;quot;bizarre jouissance.&amp;quot; The Orient becomes a living tableau of queerness.&lt;br /&gt;
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And this tableau quite logically becomes a special topic for texts. Thus the circle is completed; from being exposed as what texts do not prepare one for, the Orient can return as something one writes about in a disciplined way. Its foreignness can be translated, its meanings decoded, its hostility tamed; yet the &#039;&#039;generality&#039;&#039; assigned to the Orient, the disenchantment that one feels after encountering it, the unresolved eccentricity it displays, are all redistributed in what is said or written about it. Islam, for example, was typically Oriental for Orientalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Carl Becker argued that although &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; (note the vast generality) inherited the Hellenic tradition, it could neither grasp nor employ the Greek, humanistic tradition; moreover, to understand Islam one needed above all else to see it, not as an &amp;quot;original&amp;quot; religion, but as a sort of failed Oriental attempt to employ Greek philosophy without the creative inspiration that we find in Renaissance Europe.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This is the argument presented in Carl H. Becker, &#039;&#039;Das Erbe der Antike im Orient und Okzident&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Quelle &amp;amp; Meyer, 1931).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Louis Massignon, perhaps the most renowned and influential of modern French Orientalists, Islam was a systematic rejection of the Christian incarnation, and its greatest hero was not Mohammed or Averroes but al-Hallaj, a Muslim saint who was crucified by the orthodox Muslims for having dared to personalize Islam.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Louis Massignon, &#039;&#039;La Passion d&#039;al-Hosayn-ibn-Mansour al-Hallaj&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1922).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What Becker and Massignon explicitly left out of their studies was the eccentricity of the Orient, which they backhandedly acknowledged by trying so hard to regularize it in Western terms. Mohammed was thrown out, but al-Hallaj was made prominent because he took himself to be a Christ-figure.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a judge of the Orient, the modern Orientalist does not, as he believes and even says, stand apart from it objectively. His human detachment, whose sign is the absence of sympathy covered by professional knowledge, is weighted heavily with all the orthodox attitudes, perspectives, and moods of Orientalism that I have been describing. His Orient is not the Orient as it is, but the Orient as it has been Orientalized. An unbroken arc of knowledge and power connects the European or Western statesman and the Western Orientalists; it forms the rim of the stage containing the Orient. By the end of World War I both Africa and the Orient formed not so much an intellectual spectacle for the West as a privileged terrain for it. The scope of Orientalism exactly matched the scope of empire, and it was this absolute unanimity between the two that provoked the only crisis in the history of Western thought about and dealings with the Orient. And this crisis continues now.&lt;br /&gt;
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Beginning in the twenties, and from one end of the Third World to the other, the response to empire and imperialism has been dialectical. By the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955 the entire Orient had gained its political independence from the Western empires and confronted a new configuration of imperial powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Unable to recognize &amp;quot;its&amp;quot; Orient in the new Third World, Orientalism now faced a challenging and politically armed Orient. Two alternatives opened before Orientalism. One was to carry on as if nothing had happened. The second was to adapt the old ways to the new. But to the Orientalist, who believes the Orient never changes, the new is simply the old betrayed by new, misunderstanding &#039;&#039;dis-Orientals&#039;&#039; (we can permit ourselves the neologism). A third, revisionist alternative, to dispense with Orientalism altogether, was considered by only a tiny minority.&lt;br /&gt;
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One index of the crisis, according to Abdel Malek, was not simply that &amp;quot;national liberation movements in the ex-colonial&amp;quot; Orient worked havoc with Orientalist conceptions of passive, fatalistic &amp;quot;subject races&amp;quot;; there was in addition the fact that &amp;quot;specialists and the public at large became aware of the time-lag, not only between orientalist science and the material under study, but also--and this was to be determining--between the conceptions, the methods and the instruments of work in the human and social sciences and those of orientalism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Abdel Malek, &amp;quot;Orientalism in Crisis,&amp;quot; p. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Orientalists--from Renan to Goldziher to Macdonald to von Grunebaum, Gibb, and Bernard Lewis--saw Islam, for example, as a &amp;quot;cultural synthesis&amp;quot; (the phrase is P. M. Holt&#039;s) that could be studied apart from the economics, sociology, and politics of the Islamic peoples. For Orientalism, Islam had a meaning which, if one were to look for its most succinct formulation, could be found in Renan&#039;s first treatise: in order best to be understood Islam had to be reduced to &amp;quot;tent and tribe.&amp;quot; The impact of colonialism, of worldly circumstances, of historical development: all these were to Orientalists as flies to wanton boys, killed--or disregarded--for their sport, never taken seriously enough to complicate the essential Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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The career of H. A. R. Gibb illustrates within itself the two alternative approaches by which Orientalism has responded to the modern Orient. In 1945 Gibb delivered the Haskell Lectures at the University of Chicago. The world he surveyed was not the same one Balfour and Cromer knew before World War I. Several revolutions, two world wars, and innumerable economic, political, and social changes made the realities of 1945 an unmistakably, even cataclysmically, new object. Yet we find Gibb opening the lectures he called &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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The student of Arabic civilization is constantly brought up against the striking contrast between the imaginative power displayed, for example, in certain branches of Arabic literature and the literalism, the pedantry, displayed in reasoning and exposition, even when it is devoted to these same productions. It is true that there have been great philosophers among the Muslim peoples and that some of them were Arabs, but they were rare exceptions. The Arab mind, whether in relation to the outer world or in relation to the processes of thought, cannot throw off its intense feeling for the separateness and the individuality of the concrete events. This is, I believe, one of the main factors lying behind that &amp;quot;lack of a sense of law&amp;quot; which Professor Macdonald regarded as the characteristic difference in the Oriental.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is this, too, which explains--what is so difficult for the Western student to grasp [until it is explained to him by the Orientalist]--the aversion of the Muslims from the thought-processes of rationalism.... The rejection of rationalist modes of thought and of the utilitarian ethic which is inseparable from them has its roots, therefore, not in the so-called &amp;quot;obscurantism&amp;quot; of the Muslim theologians but in the atomism and discreteness of the Arab imagination.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is pure Orientalism, of course, but even if one acknowledges the exceeding knowledge of institutional Islam that characterizes the rest of the book, Gibb&#039;s inaugural biases remain a formidable obstacle for anyone hoping to understand modern Islam. What is the meaning of &amp;quot;difference&amp;quot; when the preposition &amp;quot;from&amp;quot; has dropped from sight altogether? Are we not once again being asked to inspect the Oriental Muslim as if his world, unlike ours--&amp;quot;differently&amp;quot; from it--had never ventured beyond the seventh century? As for modern Islam itself, despite the complexities of his otherwise magisterial understanding of it, why must it be regarded with so implacable a hostility as Gibb&#039;s? If Islam is flawed from the start by virtue of its permanent disabilities, the Orientalist will find himself opposing any Islamic attempts to reform Islam, because, according to his views, reform is a betrayal of Islam: this is exactly Gibb&#039;s argument. How can an Oriental slip out from these manacles into the modern world except by repeating with the Fool in &#039;&#039;King Lear&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;They&#039;ll have me whipp&#039;d for speaking true, thou&#039;lt have me whipp&#039;d for lying; and sometimes I am whipp&#039;d for holding my peace.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Eighteen years later Gibb faced an audience of English compatriots, only now he was speaking as the director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard. His topic was &amp;quot;Area Studies Reconsidered,&amp;quot; in which, among other &#039;&#039;apercus&#039;&#039;, he agreed that &amp;quot;the Orient is much too important to be left to the Orientalists.&amp;quot; The new, or second alternative, approach open to Orientalists was being announced, just as &#039;&#039;Modern Trends&#039;&#039; exemplified the first, or traditional, approach. Gibb&#039;s formula is well-intentioned in &amp;quot;Area Studies Reconsidered,&amp;quot; so far, of course, as the Western experts on the Orient are concerned, whose job it is to prepare students for careers &amp;quot;in public life and business.&amp;quot; What we now need, said Gibb, is the traditional Orientalist &#039;&#039;plus&#039;&#039; a good social scientist working together: between them the two will do &amp;quot;interdisciplinary&amp;quot; work. Yet the traditional Orientalist will not bring outdated knowledge to bear on the Orient; no, his expertise will serve to remind his uninitiated colleagues in area studies that &amp;quot;to apply the psychology and mechanics of Western political institutions to Asian or Arab situations is pure Walt Disney.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gibb, &#039;&#039;Area Studies Reconsidered&#039;&#039;, pp. 12, 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In practice this notion has meant that when Orientals struggle against colonial occupation, you must say (in order not to risk a Disneyism) that Orientals have never understood the meaning of self-government the way &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do. When some Orientals oppose racial discrimination while others practice it, you say &amp;quot;they&#039;re all Orientals at bottom&amp;quot; and class interest, political circumstances, economic factors are totally irrelevant. Or with Bernard Lewis, you say that if Arab Palestinians oppose Israeli settlement and occupation of their lands, then that is merely &amp;quot;the return of Islam,&amp;quot; or, as a renowned contemporary Orientalist defines it, Islamic opposition to non-Islamic peoples,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;The Return of Islam,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, January 1976, pp. 39-49.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a principle of Islam enshrined in the seventh century. History, politics, and economics do not matter. Islam is Islam, the Orient is the Orient, and please take all your ideas about a left and a right wing, revolutions, and change back to Disneyland.&lt;br /&gt;
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If such tautologies, claims, and dismissals have not sounded familiar to historians, sociologists, economists, and humanists in any other field except Orientalism, the reason is patently obvious. For like its putative subject matter, Orientalism has not allowed ideas to violate its profound serenity. But modern Orientalists--or area experts, to give them their new name--have not passively sequestered themselves in language departments. On the contrary, they have profited from Gibb&#039;s advice. Most of them today are indistinguishable from other &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;advisers&amp;quot; in what Harold Lasswell has called the policy sciences.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, eds., &#039;&#039;The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method&#039;&#039; (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus the military-national-security possibilities of an alliance, say, between a specialist in &amp;quot;national character analysis&amp;quot; and an expert in Islamic institutions were soon recognized, for expediency&#039;s sake if for nothing else. After all, the &amp;quot;West&amp;quot; since World War II had faced a clever totalitarian enemy who collected allies for itself among gullible Oriental (African, Asian, undeveloped) nations. What better way of outflanking that enemy than by playing to the Oriental&#039;s illogical mind in ways only an Orientalist could devise? Thus emerged such masterful ploys as the stick-and-carrot technique, the Alliance for Progress, SEATO, and so forth, all of them based on traditional &amp;quot;knowledge&amp;quot; retooled for better manipulation of its supposed object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus as revolutionary turmoil grips the Islamic Orient, sociologists remind us that Arabs are addicted to &amp;quot;oral functions,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Morroe Berger, &#039;&#039;The Arab World Today&#039;&#039; (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday &amp;amp; Co., 1962), p. 158.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; while economists--recycled Orientalists--observe that for modern Islam neither capitalism nor socialism is an adequate rubric.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There is a compendium of such attitudes listed and criticized in Maxime Rodinson, &#039;&#039;Islam and Capitalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As anticolonialism sweeps and indeed unifies the entire Oriental world, the Orientalist damns the whole business not only as a nuisance but as an insult to the Western democracies. As momentous, generally important issues face the world--issues involving nuclear destruction, catastrophically scarce resources, unprecedented human demands for equality, justice, and economic parity--popular caricatures of the Orient are exploited by politicians whose source of ideological supply is not only the half-literate technocrat but the superliterate Orientalist. The legendary Arabists in the State Department warn of Arab plans to take over the world. The perfidious Chinese, half-naked Indians, and passive Muslims are described as vultures for &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; largesse and are damned when &amp;quot;we lose them&amp;quot; to communism, or to their unregenerate Oriental instincts: the difference is scarcely significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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These contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood the press and the popular mind. Arabs, for example, are thought of as camel-riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, venal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilization. Always there lurks the assumption that although the Western consumer belongs to a numerical minority, he is entitled either to own or to expend (or both) the majority of the world resources. Why? Because he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being. No better instance exists today of what Anwar Abdel Malek calls &amp;quot;the hegemonism of possessing minorities&amp;quot; and anthropocentrism allied with Europocentrism: a white middle-class Westerner believes it his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it, just because by definition &amp;quot;it&amp;quot; is not quite as human as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; are. There is no purer example than this of dehumanized thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a sense the limitations of Orientalism are, as I said earlier, the limitations that follow upon disregarding, essentializing, denuding the humanity of another culture, people, or geographical region. But Orientalism has taken a further step than that: it views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West. So impressive have the descriptive and textual successes of Orientalism been that entire periods of the Orient&#039;s cultural, political, and social history are considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior. Yet if history during the twentieth century has provoked intrinsic change in and for the Orient, the Orientalist is stunned: he cannot realize that to some extent&lt;br /&gt;
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the new [Oriental] leaders, intellectuals or policy-makers, have learned many lessons from the travail of their predecessors. They have also been aided by the structural and institutional transformations accomplished in the intervening period and by the fact that they are to a great extent more at liberty to fashion the future of their countries. They are also much more confident and perhaps slightly aggressive. No longer do they have to function hoping to obtain a favorable verdict from the invisible jury of the West. Their dialogue is not with the West, it is with their fellow-citizens.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, &amp;quot;Retreat from the Secular Path? Islamic Dilemmas of Arab Politics,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Review of Politics&#039;&#039; 28, no. 4 (October 1966): 475.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, the Orientalist assumes that what his texts have not prepared him for is the result either of outside agitation in the Orient or of the Orient&#039;s misguided inanity. None of the innumerable Orientalist texts on Islam, including their summa, &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, can prepare their reader for what has taken place since 1948 in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or the Yemens. When the dogmas about Islam cannot serve, not even for the most Panglossian Orientalist, there is recourse to an Orientalized social-science jargon, to such marketable abstractions as elites, political stability, modernization, and institutional development, all stamped with the cachet of Orientalist wisdom. In the meantime a growing, more and more dangerous rift separates Orient and Occident.&lt;br /&gt;
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The present crisis dramatizes the disparity between texts and reality. Yet in this study of Orientalism I wish not only to expose the sources of Orientalism&#039;s views but also to reflect on its importance, for the contemporary intellectual rightly feels that to ignore a part of the world now demonstrably encroaching upon him is to avoid reality. Humanists have too often confined their attention to departmentalized topics of research. They have neither watched nor learned from disciplines like Orientalism whose unremitting ambition was to master &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; of a world, not some easily delimited part of it such as an author or a collection of texts. However, along with such academic security-blankets as &amp;quot;history,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;literature,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the humanities,&amp;quot; and despite its overreaching aspirations, Orientalism is involved in worldly, historical circumstances which it has tried to conceal behind an often pompous scientism and appeals to rationalism. The contemporary intellectual can learn from Orientalism how, on the one hand, either to limit or to enlarge realistically the scope of his discipline&#039;s claims, and on the other, to see the human ground (the foul-rag-and-bone shop of the heart, Yeats called it) in which texts, visions, methods, and disciplines begin, grow, thrive, and degenerate. To investigate Orientalism is also to propose intellectual ways for handling the methodological problems that history has brought forward, so to speak, in its subject matter, the Orient. But before that we must virtually see the humanistic values that Orientalism, by its scope, experiences, and structures, has all but eliminated.&lt;br /&gt;
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= &#039;&#039;&#039;2.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Orientalist Structures and Restructures&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
When the seyyid &#039;Omar, the Nakeeb el-Ashraf (or chief of the descendants of the Prophet) ... married a daughter, about forty-five years since, there walked before the procession a young man who had made an incision in his abdomen, and drawn out a large portion of his intestines, which he carried before him on a silver tray. After the procession, he restored them to their proper place, and remained in bed many days before he recovered from the effects of this foolish and disgusting act.&lt;br /&gt;
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--Edward William Lane, &#039;&#039;An Account of the Manners and Customs of the modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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... dans le cas de la chute de cet empire, soit par une revolution a Constantinople, soit par un demembrement successif, les puissances europeennes prendront chacune, a titre de protectorat, la partie de l&#039;empire qui lui sera assignee par les stipulations du congres; que ces protectorats, definis et limites, quant aux territoires, selon les voisinages, la surete des frontieres, l&#039;analogie de religions, de moeurs et d&#039;interets ... ne consacreront que la suzerainete des puissances. Cette sorte de suzerainete definie ainsi, et consacree comme droit europeen, consistera principalement dans le droit d&#039;occuper telle partie du territoire ou des cotes, pour y fonder, soit des villes libres, soit des colonies europeennes, soit des ports et des echelles de commerce.... Ce n&#039;est qu&#039;une tutelle armee et civilisatrice que chaque puissance exercera sur son protectorat; elle garantira son existence et ses elements de nationalite, sous le drapeau d&#039;une nationalite plus forte....&lt;br /&gt;
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--Alphonse de Lamartine, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Redrawn Frontiers, Redefined Issues, Secularized Religion&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Gustave Flaubert died in 1880 without having finished &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;, his comic encyclopedic novel on the degeneration of knowledge and the inanity of human effort. Nevertheless the essential outlines of his vision are clear, and are clearly supported by the ample detail of his novel. The two clerks are members of the bourgeoisie who, because one of them is the unexpected beneficiary of a handsome will, retire from the city to spend their lives on a country estate doing what they please (&amp;quot;nous ferons tout ce que nous plaira!&amp;quot;). As Flaubert portrays their experience, doing as they please involves Bouvard and Pecuchet in a practical and theoretical jaunt through agriculture, history, chemistry, education, archaeology, literature, always with less than successful results; they move through fields of learning like travelers in time and knowledge, experiencing the disappointments, disasters, and letdowns of uninspired amateurs. What they move through, in fact, is the whole disillusioning experience of the nineteenth century, whereby--in Charles Moraze&#039;s phrase--&amp;quot;les bourgeois conquerants&amp;quot; turn out to be the bumbling victims of their own leveling incompetence and mediocrity. Every enthusiasm resolves itself into a boring cliche, and every discipline or type of knowledge changes from hope and power into disorder, ruin, and sorrow.&lt;br /&gt;
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Among Flaubert&#039;s sketches for the conclusion of this panorama of despair are two items of special interest to us here. The two men debate the future of mankind. Pecuchet sees &amp;quot;the future of Humanity through a glass darkly,&amp;quot; whereas Bouvard sees it &amp;quot;brightly!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Modern man is progressing, Europe will be regenerated by Asia. The historical law that civilization moves from Orient to Occident ... the two forms of humanity will at last be soldered together.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gustave Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;, vol. 2 of &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. A. Thibaudet and R. Dumesnil (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), p. 985.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This obvious echo of Quinet represents the start of still another of the cycles of enthusiasm and disillusionment through which the two men will pass. Flaubert&#039;s notes indicate that like all his others, this anticipated project of Bouvard&#039;s is rudely interrupted by reality--this time by the sudden appearance of gendarmes who accuse him of debauchery. A few lines later, however, the second item of interest turns up. The two men simultaneously confess to each other that their secret desire is once again to become copyists. They have a double desk made for them, they buy books, pencils, erasers, and--as Flaubert concludes the sketch--&amp;quot;ils s&#039;y mettent&amp;quot;: they turn to. From trying to live through and apply knowledge more or less directly, Bouvard and Pecuchet are reduced finally to transcribing it uncritically from one text to another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although Bouvard&#039;s vision of Europe regenerated by Asia is not fully spelled out, it (and what it comes to on the copyist&#039;s desk) can be glossed in several important ways. Like many of the two men&#039;s other visions, this one is &#039;&#039;global&#039;&#039; and it is &#039;&#039;reconstructive&#039;&#039;; it represents what Flaubert felt to be the nineteenth-century predilection for the rebuilding of the world according to an imaginative vision, sometimes accompanied by a special scientific technique. Among the visions Flaubert has in mind are the utopias of Saint-Simon and Fourier, the scientific regenerations of mankind envisioned by Comte, and all the technical or secular religions promoted by ideologues, positivists, eclectics, occultists, traditionalists, and idealists such as Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis, Michelet, Cousin, Proudhon, Cournot, Cabet, Janet, and Lamennais.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There is an illuminating account of these visions and utopias in Donald G. Charlton, &#039;&#039;Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Throughout the novel Bouvard and Pecuchet espouse the various causes of such figures; then, having ruined them, they move on looking for newer ones, but with no better results.&lt;br /&gt;
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The roots of such revisionist ambitions as these are Romantic in a very specific way. We must remember the extent to which a major part of the spiritual and intellectual project of the late eighteenth century was a reconstituted theology--natural supernaturalism, as M. H. Abrams has called it; this type of thought is carried forward by the typical nineteenth-century attitudes Flaubert satirizes in &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;. The notion of regeneration therefore harks back to&lt;br /&gt;
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a conspicuous Romantic tendency, after the rationalism and decorum of the Enlightenment ... [to revert] to the stark drama and suprarational mysteries of the Christian story and doctrines and to the violent conflicts and abrupt reversals of the Christian inner life, turning on the extremes of destruction and creation, hell and heaven, exile and reunion, death and rebirth, dejection and joy, paradise lost and paradise regained.... But since they lived, inescapably, after the Enlightenment, Romantic writers revived these ancient matters with a difference: they undertook to save the overview of human history and destiny, the existential paradigms, and the cardinal values of their religious heritage, by reconstituting them in a way that would make them intellectually acceptable, as well as emotionally pertinent, for the time being.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;M. H. Abrams, &#039;&#039;Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature&#039;&#039; (New York: W. W. Norton &amp;amp; Co., 1971), p. 66.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What Bouvard has in mind--the regeneration of Europe by Asia--was a very influential Romantic idea. Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, for example, urged upon their countrymen, and upon Europeans in general, a detailed study of India because, they said, it was Indian culture and religion that could defeat the materialism and mechanism (and republicanism) of Occidental culture. And from this defeat would arise a new, revitalized Europe: the Biblical imagery of death, rebirth, and redemption is evident in this prescription. Moreover, the Romantic Orientalist project was not merely a specific instance of a general tendency; it was a powerful shaper of the tendency itself, as Raymond Schwab has so convincingly argued in &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;. But what mattered was not Asia so much as Asia&#039;s &#039;&#039;use to&#039;&#039; modern Europe. Thus anyone who, like Schlegel or Franz Bopp, mastered an Oriental language was a spiritual hero, a knight-errant bringing back to Europe a sense of the holy mission it had now lost. It is precisely this sense that the later secular religions portrayed by Flaubert carry on in the nineteenth century. No less than Schlegel, Wordsworth, and Chateaubriand, Auguste Comte--like Bouvard--was the adherent and proponent of a secular post-Enlightenment myth whose outlines are unmistakably Christian.&lt;br /&gt;
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In regularly allowing Bouvard and Pecuchet to go through revisionist notions from start to comically debased finish, Flaubert drew attention to the human flaw common to all projects. He saw perfectly well that underneath the &#039;&#039;idee recue&#039;&#039; &amp;quot;Europe-regenerated-by-Asia&amp;quot; lurked a very insidious hubris. Neither &amp;quot;Europe&amp;quot; nor &amp;quot;Asia&amp;quot; was anything without the visionaries&#039; technique for turning vast geographical domains into treatable, and manageable, entities. At bottom, therefore, Europe and Asia were &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; Europe and &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; Asia--our &#039;&#039;will&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;representation&#039;&#039;, as Schopenhauer had said. Historical laws were in reality &#039;&#039;historians&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039; laws, just as &amp;quot;the two forms of humanity&amp;quot; drew attention less to actuality than to a European capacity for lending man-made distinctions an air of inevitability. As for the other half of the phrase--&amp;quot;will at last be soldered together&amp;quot;--there Flaubert mocked the blithe indifference of science to actuality, a science which anatomized and melted human entities as if they were so much inert matter. But it was not just any science he mocked: it was enthusiastic, even messianic European science, whose victories included failed revolutions, wars, oppression, and an unteachable appetite for putting grand, bookish ideas quixotically to work immediately. What such science or knowledge never reckoned with was its own deeply ingrained and unself-conscious bad innocence and the resistance to it of reality. When Bouvard plays the scientist he naively assumes that science merely is, that reality is as the scientist says it is, that it does not matter whether the scientist is a fool or a visionary; he (or anyone who thinks like him) cannot see that the Orient may not wish to regenerate Europe, or that Europe was not about to fuse itself democratically with yellow or brown Asians. In short, such a scientist does not recognize in his science the egoistic will to power that feeds his endeavors and corrupts his ambitions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Flaubert, of course, sees to it that his poor fools are made to rub their noses in these difficulties. Bouvard and Pecuchet have learned that it is better not to traffic in ideas and in reality together. The novel&#039;s conclusion is a picture of the two of them now perfectly content to copy their favorite ideas faithfully from book onto paper. Knowledge no longer requires application to reality; knowledge is what gets passed on silently, without comment, from one text to another. Ideas are propagated and disseminated anonymously, they are repeated without attribution; they have literally become &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;: what matters is that they are &#039;&#039;there&#039;&#039;, to be repeated, echoed, and re-echoed uncritically.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a highly compressed form this brief episode, taken out of Flaubert&#039;s notes for &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;, frames the specifically modern structures of Orientalism, which after all is one discipline among the secular (and quasi-religious) faiths of nineteenth-century European thought. We have already characterized the general scope of thought about the Orient that was handed on through the medieval and Renaissance periods, for which Islam was the essential Orient. During the eighteenth century, however, there were a number of new, interlocking elements that hinted at the coming evangelical phase, whose outlines Flaubert was later to re-create.&lt;br /&gt;
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For one, the Orient was being opened out considerably beyond the Islamic lands. This quantitative change was to a large degree the result of continuing, and expanding, European exploration of the rest of the world. The increasing influence of travel literature, imaginary utopias, moral voyages, and scientific reporting brought the Orient into sharper and more extended focus. If Orientalism is indebted principally to the fruitful Eastern discoveries of Anquetil and Jones during the latter third of the century, these must be seen in the wider context created by Cook and Bougainville, the voyages of Tournefort and Adanson, by the President de Brosses&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire des navigations aux terres australes&#039;&#039;, by French traders in the Pacific, by Jesuit missionaries in China and the Americas, by William Dampier&#039;s explorations and reports, by innumerable speculations on giants, Patagonians, savages, natives, and monsters supposedly residing to the far east, west, south, and north of Europe. But all such widening horizons had Europe firmly in the privileged center, as main observer (or mainly observed, as in Goldsmith&#039;s &#039;&#039;Citizen of the World&#039;&#039;). For even as Europe moved itself outwards, its sense of cultural strength was fortified. From travelers&#039; tales, and not only from great institutions like the various India companies, colonies were created and ethnocentric perspectives secured.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For some illuminating material see John P. Nash, &amp;quot;The Connection of Oriental Studies with Commerce, Art, and Literature During the 18th-19th Centuries,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society Journal&#039;&#039; 15 (1930): 33-9; also John F. Laffey, &amp;quot;Roots of French Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century: The Case of Lyon,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;French Historical Studies&#039;&#039; 6, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 78-92, and R. Leportier, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Orient Porte des Indes&#039;&#039; (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1970). There is a great deal of information in Henri Omont, &#039;&#039;Missions archeologiques francaises en Orient aux XVII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; et XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecles&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1902), and in Margaret T. Hodgen, &#039;&#039;Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries&#039;&#039; (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), as well as in Norman Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam, Europe and Empire&#039;&#039; (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966). Two indispensable short studies are Albert Hourani, &amp;quot;Islam and the Philosophers of History,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Middle Eastern Studies&#039;&#039; 3, no. 3 (April 1967): 206-68, and Maxime Rodinson, &amp;quot;The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Legacy of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Joseph Schacht and C. E. Bosworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 9-62.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For another, a more knowledgeable attitude towards the alien and exotic was abetted not only by travelers and explorers but also by historians for whom European experience could profitably be compared with other, as well as older, civilizations. That powerful current in eighteenth-century historical anthropology, described by scholars as the confrontation of the gods, meant that Gibbon could read the lessons of Rome&#039;s decline in the rise of Islam, just as Vico could understand modern civilization in terms of the barbaric, poetic splendor of their earliest beginnings. Whereas Renaissance historians judged the Orient inflexibly as an enemy, those of the eighteenth century confronted the Orient&#039;s peculiarities with some detachment and with some attempt at dealing directly with Oriental source material, perhaps because such a technique helped a European to know himself better. George Sale&#039;s translation of the Koran and his accompanying preliminary discourse illustrate the change. Unlike his predecessors, Sale tried to deal with Arab history in terms of Arab sources; moreover, he let Muslim commentators on the sacred text speak for themselves.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. M. Holt, &amp;quot;The Treatment of Arab History by Prideaux, Ockley, and Sale,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Historians of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 302. See also Holt&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Study of Modern Arab History&#039;&#039; (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1965).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In Sale, as throughout the eighteenth century, simple comparatism was the early phase of the comparative disciplines (philology, anatomy, jurisprudence, religion) which were to become the boast of nineteenth-century method.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there was a tendency among some thinkers to exceed comparative study, and its judicious surveys of mankind from &amp;quot;China to Peru,&amp;quot; by sympathetic identification. This is a third eighteenth-century element preparing the way for modern Orientalism. What today we call historicism is an eighteenth-century idea; Vico, Herder, and Hamann, among others, believed that all cultures were organically and internally coherent, bound together by a spirit, genius, &#039;&#039;Klima&#039;&#039;, or national idea which an outsider could penetrate only by an act of historical sympathy. Thus Herder&#039;s &#039;&#039;Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit&#039;&#039; (1784-1791) was a panoramic display of various cultures, each permeated by an inimical creative spirit, each accessible only to an observer who sacrificed his prejudices to &#039;&#039;Einfuhlung&#039;&#039;. Imbued with the, populist and pluralist sense of history advocated by Herder and others,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The view of Herder as populist and pluralist is advocated by Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas&#039;&#039; (New York: Viking Press, 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an eighteenth-century mind could breach the doctrinal walls erected between the West and Islam and see hidden elements of kinship between himself and the Orient. Napoleon is a famous instance of this (usually selective) identification by sympathy. Mozart is another; &#039;&#039;The Magic Flute&#039;&#039; (in which Masonic codes intermingle with visions of a benign Orient) and &#039;&#039;The Abduction from the Seraglio&#039;&#039; locate a particularly magnanimous form of humanity in the Orient. And this, much more than the modish habits of &amp;quot;Turkish&amp;quot; music, drew Mozart sympathetically eastwards.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is very difficult nonetheless to separate such intuitions of the Orient as Mozart&#039;s from the entire range of pre-Romantic and Romantic representations of the Orient as exotic locale. Popular Orientalism during the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth attained a vogue of considerable intensity. But even this vogue, easily identifiable in William Beckford, Byron, Thomas Moore, and Goethe, cannot be simply detached from the interest taken in Gothic tales, pseudomedieval idylls, visions of barbaric splendor and cruelty. Thus in some cases the Oriental representation can be associated with Piranesi&#039;s prisons, in others with Tiepolo&#039;s luxurious ambiences, in still others with the exotic sublimity of late-eighteenth-century paintings.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a discussion of such motifs and representations, see Jean Starobinski, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Liberty&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1700-1789&#039;&#039;, trans. Bernard C. Smith (Geneva: Skira, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Later in the nineteenth century, in the works of Delacroix and literally dozens of other French and British painters, the Oriental genre tableau carried representation into visual expression and a life of its own (which this book unfortunately must scant). Sensuality, promise, terror, sublimity, idyllic pleasure, intense energy: the Orient as a figure in the pre-Romantic, pretechnical Orientalist imagination of late-eighteenth-century Europe was really a chameleonlike quality called (adjectivally) &amp;quot;Oriental.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There are a small number of studies on this too-little-investigated subject. Some well-known ones are: Martha P. Conant, &#039;&#039;The Oriental Tale in England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039; (1908; reprint ed., New York: Octagon Books, 1967); Marie E. de Meester, &#039;&#039;Oriental Influences in the English Literature of the Nineteenth Century, Anglistische Forschungen&#039;&#039;, no. 46 (Heidelberg, 1915); Byron Porter Smith, &#039;&#039;Islam in English Literature&#039;&#039; (Beirut: American Press, 1939). See also Jean-Luc Doutrelant, &amp;quot;L&#039;Orient tragique au XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue des Sciences Humaines&#039;&#039; 146 (April-June 1972): 255-82.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But this free-floating Orient would be severely curtailed with the advent of academic Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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A fourth element preparing the way for modern Orientalist structures was the whole impulse to classify nature and man into types. The greatest names are, of course, Linnaeus and Buffon, but the intellectual process by which bodily (and soon moral, intellectual, and spiritual) extension--the typical materiality of an object--could be transformed from mere spectacle to the precise measurement of characteristic elements was very widespread. Linnaeus said that every note made about a natural type &amp;quot;should be a product of number, of form, of proportion, of situation,&amp;quot; and indeed, if one looks in Kant or Diderot or Johnson, there is everywhere a similar penchant for dramatizing general features, for reducing vast numbers of objects to a smaller number of orderable and describable &#039;&#039;types&#039;&#039;. In natural history, in anthropology, in cultural generalization, a type had a particular &#039;&#039;character&#039;&#039; which provided the observer with a designation and, as Foucault says, &amp;quot;a controlled derivation.&amp;quot; These types and characters belonged to a system, a network of related generalizations. Thus,&lt;br /&gt;
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all designation must be accomplished by means of a certain relation to all other possible designations. To know what properly appertains to one individual is to have before one the classification--or the possibility of classifying--all others.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Michel Foucault, &#039;&#039;The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), pp. 138, 144. See also Francois Jacob, &#039;&#039;The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity&#039;&#039;, trans. Betty E. Spillmann (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 50 and passim, and Georges Canguilhem, &#039;&#039;La Connaissance de la vie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Gustave-Joseph Vrin, 1969), pp. 44-63.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the writing of philosophers, historians, encyclopedists, and essayists we find character-as-designation appearing as physiological-moral classification: there are, for example, the wild men, the Europeans, the Asiatics, and so forth. These appear of course in Linnaeus, but also in Montesquieu, in Johnson, in Blumenbach, in Soemmerring, in Kant. Physiological and moral characteristics are distributed more or less equally: the American is &amp;quot;red, choleric, erect,&amp;quot; the Asiatic is &amp;quot;yellow, melancholy, rigid,&amp;quot; the African is &amp;quot;black, phlegmatic, lax.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See John G. Burke, &amp;quot;The Wild Man&#039;s Pedigree: Scientific Method and Racial Anthropology,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism&#039;&#039;, ed. Edward Dudley and Maximillian E. Novak (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), pp. 262-8. See also Jean Biou, &amp;quot;Lumieres et anthropophagie,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue des Sciences Humaines&#039;&#039; 146 (April-June 1972): 223-34.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But such designations gather power when, later in the nineteenth century, they are allied with character as derivation, as genetic type. In Vico and Rousseau, for example, the force of moral generalization is enhanced by the precision with which dramatic, almost archetypal figures--primitive man, giants, heroes--are shown to be the genesis of current moral, philosophic, even linguistic issues. Thus when an Oriental was referred to, it was in terms of such genetic universals as his &amp;quot;primitive&amp;quot; state, his primary characteristics, his particular spiritual background.&lt;br /&gt;
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The four elements I have described--expansion, historical confrontation, sympathy, classification--are the currents in eighteenth-century thought on whose presence the specific intellectual and institutional structures of modern Orientalism depend. Without them Orientalism, as we shall see presently, could not have occurred. Moreover, these elements had the effect of releasing the Orient generally, and Islam in particular, from the narrowly religious scrutiny by which it had hitherto been examined (and judged) by the Christian West. In other words, modern Orientalism derives from secularizing elements in eighteenth-century European culture. One, the expansion of the Orient further east geographically and further back temporally loosened, even dissolved, the Biblical framework considerably. Reference points were no longer Christianity and Judaism, with their fairly modest calendars and maps, but India, China, Japan, and Sumer, Buddhism, Sanskrit, Zoroastrianism, and Manu. Two, the capacity for dealing historically (and not reductively, as a topic of ecclesiastical politics) with non-European and non-Judeo-Christian cultures was strengthened as history itself was conceived of more radically than before; to understand Europe properly meant also understanding the objective relations between Europe and its own previously unreachable temporal and cultural frontiers. In a sense, John of Segovia&#039;s idea of &#039;&#039;contraferentia&#039;&#039; between Orient and Europe was realized, but in a wholly secular way; Gibbon could treat Mohammed as a historical figure who influenced Europe and not as a diabolical miscreant hovering somewhere between magic and false prophecy. Three, a selective identification with regions and cultures not one&#039;s own wore down the obduracy of self and identity, which had been polarized into a community of embattled believers facing barbarian hordes. The borders of Christian Europe no longer served as a kind of custom house; the notions of human association and of human possibility acquired a very wide general--as opposed to parochial--legitimacy. Four, the classifications of mankind were systematically multiplied as the possibilities of designation and derivation were refined beyond the categories of what Vico called gentile and sacred nations; race, color, origin, temperament, character, and types overwhelmed the distinction between Christians and everyone else.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if these interconnected elements represent a secularizing tendency, this is not to say that the old religious patterns of human history and destiny and &amp;quot;the existential paradigms&amp;quot; were simply removed. Far from it: they were reconstituted, redeployed, redistributed in the secular frameworks just enumerated. For anyone who studied the Orient a secular vocabulary in keeping with these frameworks was required. Yet if Orientalism provided the vocabulary, the conceptual repertoire, the techniques--for this is what, from the end of the eighteenth century on, Orientalism &#039;&#039;did&#039;&#039; and what Orientalism &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039;--it also retained, as an undislodged current in its discourse, a reconstructed religious impulse, a naturalized supernaturalism. What I shall try to show is that this impulse in Orientalism resided in the Orientalist&#039;s conception of himself, of the Orient, and of his discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
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The modern Orientalist was, in his view, a hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity, alienation, and strangeness which he himself had properly distinguished. His research reconstructed the Orient&#039;s lost languages, mores, even mentalities, as Champollion reconstructed Egyptian hieroglyphics out of the Rosetta Stone. The specific Orientalist techniques--lexicography, grammar, translation, cultural decoding--restored, fleshed out, reasserted the values both of an ancient, classical Orient and of the traditional disciplines of philology, history, rhetoric, and doctrinal polemic. But in the process, the Orient and Orientalist disciplines changed dialectically, for they could not survive in their original form. The Orient, even in the &amp;quot;classic&amp;quot; form which the Orientalist usually studied, was modernized, restored to the present; the traditional disciplines too were brought into contemporary culture. Yet both bore the traces of &#039;&#039;power&#039;&#039;--power to have resurrected, indeed created, the Orient, power that dwelt in the new, scientifically advanced techniques of philology and of anthropological generalization. In short, having transported the Orient into modernity, the Orientalist could celebrate his method, and his position, as that of a secular creator, a man who made new worlds as God had once made the old. As for carrying on such methods and such positions beyond the life-span of any individual Orientalist, there would be a secular tradition of continuity, a lay order of disciplined methodologists, whose brotherhood would be based, not on blood lineage, but upon a common discourse, a praxis, a library, a set of received ideas, in short, a doxology, common to everyone who entered the ranks. Flaubert was prescient enough to see that in time the modern Orientalist would become a copyist, like Bouvard and Pecuchet; but during the early days, in the careers of Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan, no such danger was apparent.&lt;br /&gt;
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My thesis is that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism. In the form of new texts and ideas, the East was accommodated to these structures. Linguists and explorers like Jones and Anquetil were contributors to modern Orientalism, certainly, but what distinguishes modern Orientalism as a field, a group of ideas, a discourse, is the work of a later generation than theirs. If we use the Napoleonic expedition (1798-1801) as a sort of first enabling experience for modern Orientalism, we can consider its inaugural heroes--in Islamic studies, Sacy and Renan and Lane--to be builders of the field, creators of a tradition, progenitors of the Orientalist brotherhood. What Sacy, Renan, and Lane did was to place Orientalism on a scientific and rational basis. This entailed not only their own exemplary work but also the creation of a vocabulary and ideas that could be used impersonally by anyone who wished to become an Orientalist. Their inauguration of Orientalism was a considerable feat. It made possible a scientific terminology; it banished obscurity and instated a special form of illumination for the Orient; it established the figure of the Orientalist as central authority &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; the Orient; it legitimized a special kind of specifically coherent Orientalist work; it put into cultural circulation a form of discursive currency by whose presence the Orient henceforth would be &#039;&#039;spoken for&#039;&#039;; above all, the work of the inaugurators carved out a field of study and a family of ideas which in turn could form a community of scholars whose lineage, traditions, and ambitions were at once internal to the field and external enough for general prestige. The more Europe encroached upon the Orient during the nineteenth century, the more Orientalism gained in public confidence. Yet if this gain coincided with a loss in originality, we should not be entirely surprised, since its mode, from the beginning, was reconstruction and repetition.&lt;br /&gt;
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One final observation: The late-eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century ideas, institutions, and figures I shall deal with in this chapter are an important part, a crucial elaboration, of the first phase of the greatest age of territorial acquisition ever known. By the end of World War I Europe had colonized 85 percent of the earth. To say simply that modern Orientalism has been an aspect of both imperialism and colonialism is not to say anything very disputable. Yet it is not enough to say it; it needs to be worked through analytically and historically. I am interested in showing how modern Orientalism, unlike the precolonial awareness of Dante and d&#039;Herbelot, embodies a systematic discipline of &#039;&#039;accumulation&#039;&#039;. And far from this being exclusively an intellectual or theoretical feature, it made Orientalism fatally tend towards the systematic accumulation of human beings and territories. To reconstruct a dead or lost Oriental language meant ultimately to reconstruct a dead or neglected Orient; it also meant that reconstructive precision, science, even imagination could prepare the way for what armies, administrations, and bureaucracies would later do on the ground, in the Orient. In a sense, the vindication of Orientalism was not only its intellectual or artistic successes but its later effectiveness, its usefulness, its authority. Surely it deserves serious attention on all those counts.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan: &#039;&#039;Rational Anthropology and Philological Laboratory&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
The two great themes of Silvestre de Sacy&#039;s life are heroic effort and a dedicated sense of pedagogic and rational utility. Born in 1757 into a Jansenist family whose occupation was traditionally that of &#039;&#039;notaire&#039;&#039;, Antoine-Isaac-Silvestre was privately tutored at a Benedictine abbey, first in Arabic, Syriac, and Chaldean, then in Hebrew. Arabic in particular was the language that opened the Orient to him since it was in Arabic, according to Joseph Reinaud, that Oriental material, both sacred and profane, was then to be found in its oldest and most instructive form.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Henri Deherain, &#039;&#039;Silvestre de Sacy: Ses Contemporains et ses disciples&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1938), p. 111.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Although a legitimist, in 1769 he was appointed the first teacher of Arabic at the newly created school of &#039;&#039;langues orientales vivantes&#039;&#039;, of which he became director in 1824. In 1806 he was named professor at the College de France, although from 1805 on he was the resident Orientalist at the French Foreign Ministry. There his work (unpaid until 1811) at first was to translate the bulletins of the Grande Armee and Napoleon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manifesto&#039;&#039; of 1806, in which it was hoped that &amp;quot;Muslim fanaticism&amp;quot; could be excited against Russian Orthodoxy. But for many years thereafter Sacy created interpreters for the French Oriental dragomanate, as well as future scholars. When the French occupied Algiers in 1830, it was Sacy who translated the proclamation to the Algerians; he was regularly consulted on all diplomatic matters relating to the Orient by the foreign minister, and on occasion by the minister of war. At the age of seventy-five he replaced Dacier as secretary of the Academie des Inscriptions, and also became curator of Oriental manuscripts at the Bibliotheque royale. Throughout his long and distinguished career his name was rightly associated with the restructuring and re-forming of education (particularly in Oriental studies) in post-Revolutionary France.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For these and other details see ibid., pp. i-xxxiii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; With Cuvier, Sacy in 1832 was made a new peer of France.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not only because he was the first president of the Societe asiatique (founded in 1822) that Sacy&#039;s name is associated with the beginning of modern Orientalism; it is because his work virtually put before the profession an entire systematic body of texts, a pedagogic practice, a scholarly tradition, and an important link between Oriental scholarship and public policy. In Sacy&#039;s work, for the first time in Europe since the Council of Vienne, there was a self-conscious methodological principle at work as a coeval with scholarly discipline. No less important, Sacy always felt himself to be a man standing at the beginning of an important revisionist project. He was a self-aware inaugurator, and more to the point of our general thesis, he acted in his writing like a secularized ecclesiastic for whom his Orient and his students were doctrine and parishioners respectively. The Duc de Broglie, an admiring contemporary, said of Sacy&#039;s work that it reconciled the manner of a scientist with that of a Biblical teacher, and that Sacy was the one man able to reconcile &amp;quot;the goals of Leibniz with the efforts of Bossuet.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Duc de Broglie, &amp;quot;Eloge de Silvestre de Sacy,&amp;quot; in Sacy, &#039;&#039;Melanges de litterature orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: E. Ducrocq, 1833), p. xii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Consequently everything he wrote was addressed specifically to students (in the case of his first work, his &#039;&#039;Principes de grammaire generale&#039;&#039; of 1799, the student was his own son) and presented, not as a novelty, but as a revised extract of the best that had already been done, said, or written.&lt;br /&gt;
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These two characteristics--the didactic presentation to students and the avowed intention of repeating by revision and extract--are crucial. Sacy&#039;s writing always conveys the tone of a voice speaking; his prose is dotted with first-person pronouns, with personal qualifications, with rhetorical presence. Even at his most recondite--as in a scholarly note on third-century Sassanid numismatics--one senses not so much a pen writing as a voice pronouncing. The keynote of his work is contained in the opening lines of the dedication to his son of the &#039;&#039;Principes de grammaire generale&#039;&#039;: &amp;quot;C&#039;est a toi, mon cher Fils, que ce petit ouvrage a ete entrepris&amp;quot;--which is to say, I am writing (or speaking) to you because you need to know these things, and since they don&#039;t exist in any serviceable form, I have done the work myself for you. Direct address: utility: effort: immediate and beneficent rationality. For Sacy believed that everything could be made clear and reasonable, no matter how difficult the task and how obscure the subject. Here are Bossuet&#039;s sternness and Leibniz&#039;s abstract humanism, as well as the &#039;&#039;tone&#039;&#039; of Rousseau, all together in the same style.&lt;br /&gt;
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The effect of Sacy&#039;s tone is to form a circle sealing off him and his audience from the world at large, the way a teacher and his pupils together in a closed classroom also form a sealed space. Unlike the matter of physics, philosophy, or classical literature, the matter of Oriental studies is arcane; it is of import to people who already have an interest in the Orient but want to know the Orient better, in a more orderly way, and here the pedagogical discipline is more effective than it is attractive. The didactic speaker, therefore, &#039;&#039;displays&#039;&#039; his material to the disciples, whose role it is to receive what is given to them in the form of carefully selected and arranged topics. Since the Orient is old and distant, the teacher&#039;s display is a restoration, a re-vision of what has disappeared from the wider ken. And since also the vastly rich (in space, time, and cultures) Orient cannot be totally exposed, only its most representative parts need be. Thus Sacy&#039;s focus is the anthology, the chrestomathy, the tableau, the survey of general principles, in which a relatively small set of powerful examples delivers the Orient to the student. Such examples are powerful for two reasons: one, because they reflect Sacy&#039;s powers as a Western authority deliberately taking from the Orient what its distance and eccentricity have hitherto kept hidden, and two, because these examples have the semiotical power in them (or imparted to them by the Orientalist) to signify the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of Sacy&#039;s work is essentially compilatory; it is thus ceremoniously didactic and painstakingly revisionist. Aside from the &#039;&#039;Principes de grammaire generale&#039;&#039;, he produced a &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe&#039;&#039; in three volumes (1806 and 1827), an anthology of Arab grammatical writing (1825), an Arabic grammar of 1810 (&#039;&#039;a l&#039;usage des eleves de l&#039;Ecole speciale&#039;&#039;), treatises on Arabic prosody and the Druze religion, and numerous short works on Oriental numismatics, onomastics, epigraphy, geography, history, and weights and measures. He did a fair number of translations and two extended commentaries on &#039;&#039;Calila and Dumna&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Maqamat&#039;&#039; of al-Hariri. As editor, memorialist, and historian of modern learning Sacy was similarly energetic. There was very little of note in other related disciplines with which he was not &#039;&#039;au courant&#039;&#039;, although his own writing was single-minded and, in its non-Orientalist respects, of a narrow positivist range.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet when in 1802 the Institut de France was commissioned by Napoleon to form a &#039;&#039;tableau generale&#039;&#039; on the state and progress of the arts and sciences since 1789, Sacy was chosen to be one of the team of writers: he was the most rigorous of specialists and the most historical-minded of generalists. Dacier&#039;s report, as it was known informally, embodied many of Sacy&#039;s predilections as well as containing his contributions on the state of Oriental learning. Its title&#039;&#039;--Tableau historique de l&#039;erudition francaise&#039;&#039;--announces the new historical (as opposed to sacred) consciousness. Such consciousness is dramatic: learning can be arranged on a stage set, as it were, where its totality can be readily surveyed. Addressed to the king, Dacier&#039;s preface stated the theme perfectly. Such a survey as this made it possible to do something no other sovereign had attempted, namely to take in, with one &#039;&#039;coup d&#039;oeil&#039;&#039;, the whole of human knowledge. Had such a &#039;&#039;tableau historique&#039;&#039; been undertaken in former times, Dacier continued, we might today have possessed many masterpieces now either lost or destroyed; the interest and utility of the tableau were that it preserved knowledge and made it immediately accessible. Dacier intimated that such a task was simplified by Napoleon&#039;s Oriental expedition, one of whose results was to heighten the degree of modern geographical knowledge.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bon Joseph Dacier, &#039;&#039;Tableau historique de l&#039;erudition francaise, ou Rapport sur les progres de l&#039;histoire et de la litterature ancienne depuis 1789&#039;&#039; (Paris: Imprimerie imperiale, 1810), pp. 23, 35, 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (At no point more than in Dacier&#039;s entire &#039;&#039;discours&#039;&#039; do we see how the dramatic form of a &#039;&#039;tableau historique&#039;&#039; has its use-equivalent in the arcades and counters of a modern department store.)&lt;br /&gt;
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The importance of the &#039;&#039;Tableau historique&#039;&#039; for an understanding of Orientalism&#039;s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of Orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the Orientalist&#039;s relationship to his subject matter. In Sacy&#039;s pages on Orientalism--as elsewhere in his writing--he speaks of his own work as having &#039;&#039;uncovered&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;brought to light&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;rescued&#039;&#039; a vast amount of obscure matter. Why? In order &#039;&#039;to place it before&#039;&#039; the student. For like all his learned contemporaries Sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. Knowledge was essentially the &#039;&#039;making visible&#039;&#039; of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of Benthamite Panopticon. Scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power: it gained for its user (and his students) tools and knowledge which (if he was a historian) had hitherto been lost.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Michel Foucault, &#039;&#039;Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison&#039;&#039;, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), pp. 193-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And indeed the vocabulary of specialized power and acquisition is particularly associated with Sacy&#039;s reputation as a pioneer Orientalist. His heroism as a scholar was to have dealt successfully with insurmountable difficulties; he acquired the means to present a field to his students where there was none. He &#039;&#039;made&#039;&#039; the books, the precepts, the examples, said the Duc de Broglie of Sacy. The result was the production of material about the Orient, methods for studying it, and exempla that even Orientals did not have.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Broglie, &amp;quot;Eloge de Silvestre de Sacy,&amp;quot; p. 107.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Compared with the labors of a Hellenist or a Latinist working on the Institut team, Sacy&#039;s labors were awesome. They had the texts, the conventions, the schools; he did not, and consequently had to go about making them. The dynamic of primary loss and subsequent gain in Sacy&#039;s writing is obsessional; his investment in it was truly heavy. Like his colleagues in other fields he believed that knowledge is seeing--pan-optically, so to speak--but unlike them he not only had to identify the knowledge, he had to decipher it, interpret it, and most difficult, make it available. Sacy&#039;s achievement was to have produced a whole field. As a European he ransacked the Oriental archives, and he could do so without leaving France. What texts he isolated, he then brought back; he doctored them; then he annotated, codified, arranged, and commented on them. In time, the Orient as such became less important than what the Orientalist made of it; thus, drawn by Sacy into the sealed discursive place of a pedagogical tableau, the Orientalist&#039;s Orient was thereafter reluctant to emerge into reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sacy was much too intelligent to let his views and his practice stand without supporting argument. First of all, he always made it plain why the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; on its own could not survive a European&#039;s taste, intelligence, or patience. Sacy defended the utility and interest of such things as Arabic poetry, but what he was really saying was that Arabic poetry had to be properly transformed by the Orientalist before it could begin to be appreciated. The reasons were broadly epistemological, but they also contained an Orientalistic self-justification. Arabic poetry was produced by a completely strange (to Europeans) people, under hugely different climatic, social, and historical conditions from those a European knows; in addition, such poetry as this was nourished by &amp;quot;opinions, prejudices, beliefs, superstitions which we can acquire only after long and painful study.&amp;quot; Even if one does go through the rigors of specialized training, much of the description in the poetry will not be accessible to Europeans &amp;quot;who have attained to a higher degree of civilization.&amp;quot; Yet what we can master is of great value to us as Europeans accustomed to disguise our exterior attributes, our bodily activity, and our relationship to nature. Therefore, the Orientalist&#039;s use is to make available to his compatriots a considerable range of unusual experience, and still more valuable, a kind of literature capable of helping us understand the &amp;quot;truly divine&amp;quot; poetry of the Hebrews.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sacy, &#039;&#039;Melanges de litterature orientale&#039;&#039;, pp. 107, 110, 111-12.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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So if the Orientalist is necessary because he fishes some useful gems out of the distant Oriental deep, and since the Orient cannot be known without his mediation, it is also true that Oriental writing itself ought not to be taken in whole. This is Sacy&#039;s introduction to his theory of fragments, a common Romantic concern. Not only are Oriental literary productions essentially alien to the European; they also do not contain a sustained enough interest, nor are they written with enough &amp;quot;taste and critical spirit,&amp;quot; to merit publication except as extracts (&#039;&#039;pour meriter d&#039;etre publies autrement que par extrait&#039;&#039;).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Silvestre de Sacy, &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe, ou Extraits de divers ecrivains arabes, tant en prose qu&#039;en vers, avec une traduction francaise et des notes, a l&#039;usage des eleves de l&#039;Ecole royale et speciale des langues orientales vivantes&#039;&#039; (vol. 1, 1826; reprint ed., Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1973), p. viii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore the Orientalist is required to &#039;&#039;present&#039;&#039; the Orient by a series of representative fragments, fragments republished, explicated, annotated, and surrounded with still more fragments. For such a presentation a special genre is required: the chrestomathy, which is where in Sacy&#039;s case the usefulness and interest of Orientalism are most directly and profitably displayed. Sacy&#039;s most famous production was the three-volume &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe&#039;&#039;, which was sealed at the outset, so to speak, with an internally rhyming Arabic couplet: &amp;quot;Kitab al-anis al-mufid lil-Taleb al-mustafid;/wa gam&#039;i al shathur min manthoum wa manthur&amp;quot; (A book pleasant and profitable for the studious pupil;/it collects fragments of both poetry and prose).&lt;br /&gt;
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Sacy&#039;s anthologies were used very widely in Europe for several generations. Although what they contain was claimed as typical, they submerge and cover the censorship of the Orient exercised by the Orientalist. Moreover, the internal order of their contents, the arrangement of their parts, the choice of fragments, never reveal their secret; one has the impression that if fragments were not chosen for their importance, or for their chronological development, or for their aesthetic beauty (as Sacy&#039;s were not), they must nevertheless embody a certain Oriental naturalness, or typical inevitability. But this too is never said. Sacy claims simply to have exerted himself on behalf of his students, to make it unnecessary for them to purchase (or read) a grotesquely large library of Oriental stuff. In time, the reader forgets the Orientalist&#039;s effort and takes the restructuring of the Orient signified by a chrestomathy as the Orient &#039;&#039;tout court&#039;&#039;. Objective structure (designation of Orient) and subjective restructure (representation of Orient by Orientalist) become interchangeable. The Orient is overlaid with the Orientalist&#039;s rationality; its principles become his. From being distant, it becomes available; from being unsustainable on its own, it becomes pedagogically useful; from being lost, it is found, even if its missing parts have been made to drop away from it in the process. Sacy&#039;s anthologies not only supplement the Orient; they supply it as Oriental presence to the West.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For the notions of &amp;quot;supplementarity,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;supply,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;supplication,&amp;quot; see Jacques Derrida, &#039;&#039;De la grammatologie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967), p. 203 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Sacy&#039;s work canonizes the Orient; it begets a canon of textual objects passed on from one generation of students to the next.&lt;br /&gt;
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And the living legacy of Sacy&#039;s disciples was astounding. Every major Arabist in Europe during the nineteenth century traced his intellectual authority back to him. Universities and academies in France, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and especially Germany were dotted with the students who formed themselves at his feet and through the anthological tableaux provided by his work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a partial list of Sacy&#039;s students and influence see Johann W. Fuck, &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955), pp. 156-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As with all intellectual patrimonies, however, enrichments and restrictions were passed on simultaneously. Sacy&#039;s genealogical originality was to have treated the Orient as something to be restored not only because of but also despite the modern Orient&#039;s disorderly and elusive presence. Sacy &#039;&#039;placed&#039;&#039; the Arabs &#039;&#039;in&#039;&#039; the Orient, which was itself placed in the general tableau of modern learning. Orientalism belonged therefore to European scholarship, but its material had to be re-created by the Orientalist before it could enter the arcades alongside Latinism and Hellenism. Each Orientalist re-created his own Orient according to the fundamental epistemological rules of loss and gain first supplied and enacted by Sacy. Just as he was the father of Orientalism, he was also the discipline&#039;s first sacrifice, for in translating new texts, fragments, and extracts subsequent Orientalists entirely displaced Sacy&#039;s work by supplying their own restored Orient. Nevertheless the process he started would continue, as philology in particular developed systematic and institutional powers Sacy had never exploited. This was Renan&#039;s accomplishment: to have associated the Orient with the most recent comparative disciplines, of which philology was one of the most eminent.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between Sacy and Renan is the difference between inauguration and continuity. Sacy is the originator, whose work represents the field&#039;s emergence and its status as a nineteenth-century discipline with roots in revolutionary Romanticism. Renan derives from Orientalism&#039;s second generation: it was his task to solidify the official discourse of Orientalism, to systematize its insights, and to establish its intellectual and worldly institutions. For Sacy, it was his personal efforts that launched and vitalized the field and its structures; for Renan, it was his adaptation of Orientalism to philology and both of them to the intellectual culture of his time that perpetuated the Orientalist structures intellectually and gave them greater visibility.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan was a figure in his own right neither of total originality nor of absolute derivativeness. Therefore as a cultural force or as an important Orientalist he cannot be reduced simply to his personality nor to a set of schematic ideas in which he believed. Rather, Renan is best grasped as a dynamic force whose opportunities were already created for him by pioneers like Sacy, yet who brought their achievements into the culture as a kind of currency which he circulated and recirculated with (to force the image a little further) his own unmistakable re-currency. Renan is a figure who must be grasped, in short, as a type of cultural and intellectual praxis, as a style for making Orientalist statements within what Michel Foucault would call the archive of his time.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Foucault&#039;s characterization of an archive can be found in &#039;&#039;The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language&#039;&#039;, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith and Rupert Sawyer (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 79-131. Gabriel Monod, one of Renan&#039;s younger and very perspicacious contemporaries, remarks that Renan was by no means a revolutionary in linguistics, archaeology, or exegesis, yet because he had the widest and the most precise learning of anyone in his period, he was its most eminent representative (&#039;&#039;Renan, Taine, Michelet&#039;&#039; [Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1894], pp. 40-1). See also Jean-Louis Dumas, &amp;quot;La Philosophie de l&#039;histoire de Renan,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale&#039;&#039; 77, no. 1 (January-March 1972): 100-28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What matters is not only the things that Renan said but also how he said them, what, given his background and training, he chose to use as his subject matter, what to combine with what, and so forth. Renan&#039;s relations with his Oriental subject matter, with his time and audience, even with his own work, can be described, then, without resorting to formulae that depend on an unexamined assumption of ontological stability (e.g., the &#039;&#039;Zeitgeist&#039;&#039;, the history of ideas, life-and-times). Instead we are able to read Renan as a writer doing something describable, in a place defined temporally, spatially, and culturally (hence archivally), for an audience and, no less important, for the furtherance of his own position in the Orientalism of his era.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan came to Orientalism from philology, and it is the extraordinarily rich and celebrated cultural position of, that discipline that endowed Orientalism with its most important technical characteristics. For anyone to whom the word &#039;&#039;philology&#039;&#039; suggests dry-as-dust and inconsequential word-study, however, Nietzsche&#039;s proclamation that along with the greatest minds of the nineteenth century he is a philologist will come as a surprise--though not if Balzac&#039;s &#039;&#039;Louis Lambert&#039;&#039; is recalled:&lt;br /&gt;
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What a marvelous book one would write by narrating the life and adventures of a word! Undoubtedly a word has received various impressions of the events for which it was used; depending on the places it was used, a word has awakened different kinds of impressions in different people; but is it not more grand still to consider a word in its triple aspect of soul, body, and movement?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Honore de Balzac, &#039;&#039;Louis Lambert&#039;&#039; (Paris: Calmann-Levy, n.d.), p. 4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the category, Nietzsche will ask later, that includes himself, Wagner, Schopenhauer, Leopardi, all as philologists? The term seems to include both a gift for exceptional spiritual insight into language and the ability to produce work whose articulation is of aesthetic and historical power. Although the profession of philology was born the day in 1777 &amp;quot;when F. A. Wolf invented for himself the name of &#039;&#039;stud. philol&#039;&#039;.,&amp;quot; Nietzsche is nevertheless at pains to show that professional students of the Greek and Roman classics are commonly incapable of understanding their discipline: &amp;quot;they never reach the &#039;&#039;roots of the matter&#039;&#039;: they never adduce philology as a problem.&amp;quot; For simply &amp;quot;as knowledge of the ancient world philology cannot, of course, last forever; its material is exhaustible.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Nietzsche&#039;s remarks on philology are everywhere throughout his works. See principally his notes for &amp;quot;Wir Philologen&amp;quot; taken from his notebooks for the period January-July 1875, translated by William Arrowsmith as &amp;quot;Notes for &#039;We Philologists,&#039; &amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Arion&#039;&#039;, N. S. 1/2 (1974): 279-380; also the passages on language and perspectivism in &#039;&#039;The Will to Power&#039;&#039;, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It is this that the herd of philologists cannot understand. But what distinguishes the few exceptional spirits whom Nietzsche deems worthy of praise--not unambiguously, and not in the cursory way that I am now describing--is their profound relation to modernity, a relation that is given them by their practice of philology.&lt;br /&gt;
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Philology problematizes--itself, its practitioner, the present. It embodies a peculiar condition of being modern and European, since neither of those two categories has true meaning without being related to an earlier alien culture and time. What Nietzsche also sees is philology as something &#039;&#039;born, made&#039;&#039; in the Viconian sense as a sign of human enterprise, created as a category of human discovery, self-discovery, and originality. Philology is a way; of historically setting oneself off, as great artists do, from one&#039;s time and an immediate past even as, paradoxically and antinomically, one actually characterizes one&#039;s modernity by so doing.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between the Friedrich August Wolf of 1777 and the Friedrich Nietzsche of 1875 there is Ernest Renan, an Oriental philologist, also a man with a complex and interesting sense of the way philology and modern culture are involved in each other. In &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039; (written in 1848 but not published till 1890) he wrote that &amp;quot;the founders of modern mind are philologists.&amp;quot; And what is modern mind, he said in the preceding sentence, if not &amp;quot;rationalism, criticism, liberalism, [all of which] were founded on the same day as philology?&amp;quot; Philology, he goes on to say, is both a comparative discipline possessed only by moderns and a symbol of modern (and European) superiority; every advance made by humanity since the fifteenth century can be attributed to minds we should call philological. The job of philology in modern culture (a culture Renan calls philological) is to continue to see reality and nature clearly, thus driving out supernaturalism, and to continue to keep pace with discoveries in the physical sciences. But more than all this, philology enables a general view of human life and of the system of things: &amp;quot;Me, being there at the center, inhaling the perfume of everything, judging, comparing, combining, inducing--in this way I shall arrive at the very system of things.&amp;quot; There is an unmistakable aura of power about the philologist. And Renan makes his point about philology and the natural sciences:&lt;br /&gt;
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To do philosophy is to know things; following Cuvier&#039;s nice phrase, philosophy is &#039;&#039;instructing the world in theory&#039;&#039;. Like Kant I believe that every purely speculative demonstration has no more validity than a mathematical demonstration, and can teach us nothing about existing reality. Philology is the &#039;&#039;exact science&#039;&#039; of mental objects [&#039;&#039;La philologie est la science exacte des choses de&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;l&#039;esprit&#039;&#039;]. It is to the sciences of humanity what physics and chemistry are to the philosophic sciences of bodies.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science: Pensees de 1848&#039;&#039;, 4th ed. (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1890), pp. 141, 142-5, 146, 148, 149.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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I shall return to Renan&#039;s citation from Cuvier, as well as to the constant references to natural science, a little later. For the time being, we should remark that the whole middle section of &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039; is taken up with Renan&#039;s admiring accounts of philology, a science he depicts as being at once the most difficult of all human endeavors to characterize and the most precise of all disciplines. In the aspirations of philology to a veritable science of humanity, Renan associates himself explicitly with Vico, Herder, Wolf, and Montesquieu as well as with such philological near-contemporaries as Wilhelm von Humboldt, Bopp, and the great Orientalist Eugene Burnouf (to whom the volume is dedicated). Renan locates philology centrally within what he everywhere refers to as the march of knowledge, and indeed the book itself is a manifesto of humanistic meliorism, which, considering its subtitle (&amp;quot;Pensees de 1848&amp;quot;) and other books of 1848 like &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, is no mean irony. In a sense, then, the manifesto generally and Renan&#039;s accounts of philology particularly--he had by then already written the massive philological treatise on Semitic languages that had earned him the Prix Volney--were designed to place Renan as an intellectual in a clearly perceptible relationship to the great social issues raised by 1848. That he should choose to fashion such a relationship on the basis of the &#039;&#039;least&#039;&#039; immediate of all intellectual disciplines (philology), the one with the least degree of apparent &#039;&#039;popular&#039;&#039; relevance, the most conservative and the most traditional, suggests the extreme deliberateness of Renan&#039;s position. For he did not really speak as one man to all men but rather as a reflective, specialized voice that took, as he put it in the 1890 preface, the inequality of races and the necessary domination of the many by the few for granted as an antidemocratic law of nature and society.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. xiv and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But how was it possible for Renan to hold himself and what he was saying in such a paradoxical position? For what was philology on the one hand if not a science of all humanity, a science premised on the unity of the human species and the worth of every human detail, and yet what was the philologist on the other hand if not--as Renan himself proved with his notorious race prejudice against the very Oriental Semites whose study had made his professional name&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The entire opening chapter--bk. 1, chap. 1--of the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale et systeme compare des langues semitiques&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, ed. Henriette Psichari (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1947-61), 8: 143-63, is a virtual encyclopedia of race prejudice directed against Semites (i.e., Moslems and Jews). The rest of the treatise is sprinkled generously with the same notions, as are many of Renan&#039;s other works, including &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039;, especially Renan&#039;s notes.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--a harsh divider of men into superior and inferior races, a liberal critic whose work harbored the most esoteric notions of temporality, origins, development, relationship, and human worth? Part of the answer to this question is that, as his early letters of philological intent to Victor Cousin, Michelet, and Alexander von Humboldt show,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Correspondance; 1846-1871&#039;&#039; (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1926), 1: 7-12.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Renan had a strong guild sense as a professional scholar, a professional Orientalist, in fact, a sense that put distance between himself and the masses. But more important, I think, is Renan&#039;s own conception of his role as an Oriental philologist within philology&#039;s larger history, development, and objectives as he saw them. In other words, what may to us seem like paradox was; the expected result of how Renan perceived his dynastic position within philology, its history and inaugural discoveries, and what he, Renan, did within it. Therefore Renan should be characterized, not as speaking &#039;&#039;about&#039;&#039; philology, but rather as &#039;&#039;speaking philologically&#039;&#039; with all the force of an initiate using the encoded language of a new prestigious science none of whose pronouncements about language itself could be construed either directly or naively.&lt;br /&gt;
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As Renan understood, received, and was instructed in philology, the discipline imposed a set of doxological rules upon him. To be a philologist meant to be governed in one&#039;s activity first of all by a set of recent revaluative discoveries that effectively began the science of philology and gave it a distinctive epistemology of its own: I am speaking here of the period roughly from the 1780s to the mid-1830s, the latter part of which coincides with the period of Renan&#039;s beginning his education. His memoirs record how the crisis of religious faith that culminated in the loss of that faith led him in 1845 into a life of scholarship: this was his initiation into philology, its world-view, crises, and style. He believed that on a personal level his life reflected the institutional life of philology. In his life, however, he determined to be as Christian as he once was, only now without Christianity and with what he called &amp;quot;la science laique&amp;quot; (lay science).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Souvenirs d&#039;enfance et de jeunesse&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 2: 892. Two works by Jean Pommier treat Renan&#039;s mediation between religion and philology in valuable detail: &#039;&#039;Renan, d&#039;apres des documents inedits&#039;&#039; (Paris: Perrin, 1923), pp. 48-68, and &#039;&#039;La Jeunesse clericale d&#039;Ernest Renan&#039;&#039; (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1933). There is a more recent account in J. Chaix-Ruy, &#039;&#039;Ernest Renan&#039;&#039; (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1956), pp. 89-111. The standard description--done more in terms of Renan&#039;s religious vocation--is still valuable also: Pierre Lasserre, &#039;&#039;La Jeunesse d&#039;Ernest Renan: Histoire de la crise religieuse au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039;, 3 vols. (Paris: Garnier Freres, 1925). In vol. 2, pp. 50-166 and 265-98 are useful on the relations between philology, philosophy, and science.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The best example of what a lay science could and could not do was provided years later by Renan in a lecture given at the Sorbonne in 1878, &amp;quot;On the Services Rendered by Philology to the Historical Sciences.&amp;quot; What is revealing about this text is the way Renan clearly had religion in mind when he spoke about philology--for example, what philology, like religion, teaches us about the origins of humanity, civilization, and language--only to make it evident to his hearers that philology could deliver a far less coherent, less knitted together and positive message than religion.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &amp;quot;Des services rendus aux sciences historiques par la philologie,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039; 8: 1228.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Since Renan was irremediably historical and, as he once put it, morphological in his outlook, it stood to reason that the only way in which, as a very young man, he could move out of religion into philological scholarship was to retain in the new lay science the historical world-view he had gained from religion. Hence, &amp;quot;one occupation alone seemed to me to be worthy of filling my life; and that was to pursue my critical research into Christianity [an allusion to Renan&#039;s major scholarly project on the history and origins of Christianity] using those far ampler means offered me by lay science.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Souvenirs&#039;&#039;, p. 892.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Renan had assimilated himself to philology according to his own post-Christian fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between the history offered internally by Christianity and the history offered by philology, a relatively new discipline, is precisely what made modern philology possible, and this Renan knew perfectly. For whenever &amp;quot;philology&amp;quot; is spoken of around the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, we are to understand the &#039;&#039;new&#039;&#039; philology, whose major successes include comparative grammar, the reclassification of languages into families, and the final rejection of the divine origins of language. It is no exaggeration to say that these accomplishments were a more or less direct consequence of the view that held language to be an entirely human phenomenon. And this view became current once it was discovered empirically that the so-called sacred languages (Hebrew, primarily) were neither of primordial antiquity nor of divine provenance. What Foucault has called the discovery of language was therefore a secular event that displaced a religious conception of how God delivered language to man in Eden.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Foucault, &#039;&#039;The Order of Things&#039;&#039;, pp. 290-300. Along with the discrediting of the Edenic origins of language, a number of other events--the Deluge, the building of the Tower Babel--also were discredited as explanations. The most comprehensive history of theories of linguistic origin is Arno Borst, &#039;&#039;Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen uber Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Volker&#039;&#039;, 6 vols. (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1957-63).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Indeed, one of the consequences of this change, by which an etymological, dynastic notion of linguistic filiation was pushed aside by the view of language as a domain all of its own held together with jagged internal structures and coherences, is the dramatic subsidence of interest in the problem of the origins of language. Whereas in the 1770s, which is when Herder&#039;s essay on the origins of language won the 1772 medal from the Berlin Academy, it was all the rage to discuss that problem, by the first decade of the new century it was all but banned as a topic for learned dispute in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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On all sides, and in many different ways, what William Jones stated in his &#039;&#039;Anniversary Discourses&#039;&#039; (1785-1792), or what Franz Bopp put forward in his &#039;&#039;Vergleichende Grammatik&#039;&#039; (1832), is that the divine dynasty of language was ruptured definitively and discredited as an idea. A new historical conception, in short, was needed, since Christianity seemed unable to survive the empirical evidence that reduced the divine status of its major text. For some, as Chateaubriand put it, faith was unshakable despite new knowledge of how Sanskrit outdated Hebrew: &amp;quot;Helas! il est arrive qu&#039;une connaissance plus approfondie de la langue savante de l&#039;Inde a fait rentrer ces siecles innombrables dans le cercle etroit de la Bible. Bien m&#039;en a pris d&#039;etre redevenue croyant, avant d&#039;avoir eprouve cette mortification.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1950), p. 69. On the dangers of too quickly succumbing to generalities about Oriental discoveries, see the reflections of the distinguished contemporary Sinologist Abel Remusat, &#039;&#039;Melanges postumes d&#039;histoire et litterature orientales&#039;&#039; (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843), p. 226 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (Alas! it has happened that a deeper knowledge of the learned language of India has forced innumerable centuries into the narrow circle of the Bible. How lucky for me that I have become a believer again before having had to experience this mortification.) For others, especially philologists like the pioneering Bopp himself, the study of language entailed its own history, philosophy, and learning, all of which did away with any notion of a primal language given by the Godhead to man in Eden. As the study of Sanskrit and the expansive mood of the later eighteenth century seemed to have moved the earliest beginnings of civilization very far east of the Biblical lands, so too language became less of a continuity between an outside power and the human speaker than an internal field created and accomplished by language users among themselves. There was no first language, just as--except by a method I shall discuss presently--there was no simple language.&lt;br /&gt;
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The legacy of these first-generation philologists was, to Renan, of the highest importance, higher even than the work done by Sacy. Whenever he discussed language and philology, whether at the beginning, middle, or end of his long career, he repeated the lessons of the new philology, of which the antidynastic, anticontinuous tenets of a technical (as opposed to a divine) linguistic practice are the major pillar. For the linguist, language cannot be pictured as the result of force emanating unilaterally from God. As Coleridge put it, &amp;quot;Language is the armory of the human mind; and at once contains the trophies of its past and the weapons of its future conquests.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Samuel Taylor Coleridge, &#039;&#039;Biographia Literaria&#039;&#039;, chap. 16, in &#039;&#039;Selected Poetry and Prose of Coleridge&#039;&#039;, ed. Donald A. Stauffer (New York: Random House, 1951), pp. 276-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The idea of a first Edenic language gives way to the heuristic notion of a protolanguage (Indo-European, Semitic) whose existence is never a subject of debate, since it is acknowledged that such a language cannot be recaptured but can only be reconstituted in the philological process. To the extent that one language serves, again heuristically, as a touchstone for all the others, it is Sanskrit in its earliest Indo-European form. The terminology has also shifted: there are now &#039;&#039;families&#039;&#039; of languages (the analogy with species and anatomical classifications is marked), there is &#039;&#039;perfect&#039;&#039; linguistic form, which need not correspond to any &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; language, and there are original languages only as a function of the philological discourse, not because of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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But some writers shrewdly commented on how it was that Sanskrit and things Indian in general simply took the place of Hebrew and the Edenic fallacy. As early as 1804 Benjamin Constant noted in his &#039;&#039;Journal intime&#039;&#039; that he was not about to discuss India in his &#039;&#039;De la religion&#039;&#039; because the English who owned the place and the Germans who studied it indefatigably had made India the &#039;&#039;fons et origo&#039;&#039; of everything; and then there were the French who had decided after Napoleon and Champollion that everything originated in Egypt and the new Orient.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), p. 78.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These teleological enthusiasms were fueled after 1808 by Friedrich Schlegel&#039;s celebrated &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier&#039;&#039;, which seemed to confirm his own pronouncement made in 1800 about the Orient being the purest form of Romanticism.&lt;br /&gt;
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What Renan&#039;s generation--educated from the mid-1830s to the late 1840s--retained from all this enthusiasm about the Orient was the intellectual necessity of the Orient for the Occidental scholar of languages, cultures, and religions. Here the key text was Edgar Quinet&#039;s &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions&#039;&#039; (1832), a work that announced the Oriental Renaissance and placed the Orient and the West in a functional relationship with each other. I have already referred to the vast meaning of this relationship as analyzed comprehensively by Raymond Schwab in &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;; my concern with it here is only to note specific aspects of it that bear upon Renan&#039;s vocation as a philologist and as an Orientalist. Quinet&#039;s association with Michelet, their interest in Herder and Vico, respectively, impressed on them the need for the scholar-historian to confront, almost in the manner of an audience seeing a dramatic event unfold, or a believer witnessing a revelation, the different, the strange, the distant. Quinet&#039;s formulation was that the Orient proposes and the West disposes: Asia has its prophets, Europe its doctors (its learned men, its scientists: the pun is intended). Out of this encounter, a new dogma or god is born, but Quinet&#039;s point is that both East and West fulfill their destinies and confirm their identities in the encounter. As a scholarly attitude the picture of a learned Westerner surveying as if from a peculiarly suited vantage point the passive, seminal, feminine, even silent and supine East, then going on to &#039;&#039;articulate&#039;&#039; the East, making the Orient deliver up its secrets under the learned authority of a philologist whose power derives from the ability to unlock secret, esoteric languages--this would persist in Renan. What did not persist in Renan during the 1840s, when he served his apprenticeship as a philologist, was the dramatic attitude: that was replaced by the scientific attitude.&lt;br /&gt;
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For Quinet and Michelet, history was a drama. Quinet suggestively describes the whole world as a temple and human history as a sort of religious rite. Both Michelet and Quinet &#039;&#039;saw&#039;&#039; the world they discussed. The origin of human history was something they could describe in the same splendid and impassioned and dramatic terms used by Vico and Rousseau to portray life on earth in primitive times. For Michelet and Quinet there is no doubt that they belong to the communal European Romantic undertaking &amp;quot;either in epic or some other major genre--in drama, in prose romance, or in the visionary &#039;greater Ode&#039;--radically to recast into terms appropriate to the historical and intellectual circumstances of their own age, the Christian pattern of the fall, the redemption, and the emergence of a new earth which will constitute a restored paradise.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Abrams, &#039;&#039;Natural Supernaturalism&#039;&#039;, p. 29.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; I think that for Quinet the idea of a new god being born was tantamount to the filling of the place left by the old god; for Renan, however, being a philologist meant the severance of any and all connections with the old Christian god, so that instead a new doctrine--probably science--would stand free and in a new place, as it were. Renan&#039;s whole career was devoted to the fleshing out of this progress.&lt;br /&gt;
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He put it very plainly at the end of his undistinguished essay on the origins of language: man is no longer an inventor, and the age of creation is definitely over.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;De l&#039;origine du langage, in Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 8: 122.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There was a period, at which we can only guess, when man was literally &#039;&#039;transported&#039;&#039; from silence into words. After that there was language, and for the true scientist the task is to examine how language &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039;, not how it came about. Yet if Renan dispels the passionate creation of primitive times (which had excited Herder, Vico, Rousseau, even Quinet and Michelet) he instates a new, and deliberate, type of artificial creation, one that is performed as a result of scientific analysis. In his &#039;&#039;lecon inaugurale&#039;&#039; at the College de France (February 21, 1862) Renan proclaimed his lectures open to the public so that it might see at first hand &amp;quot;le laboratoire meme de la science philologique&amp;quot; (the very laboratory of philological science).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;De la part des peuples semitiques dans l&#039;histoire de la civilisation,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 2: 320.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Any reader of Renan would have understood that such a statement was meant also to carry a typical if rather limp irony, one less intended to shock than passively to delight. For Renan was succeeding to the chair of Hebrew, and his lecture was on the contribution of the Semitic peoples to the history of civilization. What more subtle affront could there be to &amp;quot;sacred&amp;quot; history than the substitution of a philological laboratory for divine intervention in history; and what more telling way was there of declaring the Orient&#039;s contemporary relevance to be simply as material for European investigation?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 333.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Sacy&#039;s comparatively lifeless fragments arranged in tableaux were now being replaced with something new.&lt;br /&gt;
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The stirring peroration with which Renan concluded his &#039;&#039;lecon&#039;&#039; had another function than simply to connect Oriental-Semitic philology with the future and with science. Etienne Quatremere, who immediately preceded Renan in the chair of Hebrew, was a scholar who seemed to exemplify the popular caricature of what a scholar was like. A man of prodigiously industrious and pedantic habits, he went about his work, Renan said in a relatively unfeeling memorial minute for the &#039;&#039;Journal des debats&#039;&#039; in October 1857, like a laborious worker who even in rendering immense services nevertheless could not see the whole edifice being constructed. The edifice was nothing less than &amp;quot;la science historique de l&#039;esprit humain,&amp;quot; now in the process of being built stone by stone.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;Trois Professeurs au College de France: Etienne Quatremere,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 1: 129. Renan was not wrong about Quatremere, who had a talent for picking interesting subjects to study and then making them quite uninteresting. See his essays &amp;quot;Le Gout des livres chez les orientaux&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Des sciences chez les arabes,&amp;quot; in his &#039;&#039;Melanges d&#039;histoire et de philologie orientales&#039;&#039; (Paris: E. Ducrocq, 1861), pp. 1-57.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Just as Quatremere was not of this age, so Renan in his work was determined to be of it. Moreover, if the Orient had been hitherto identified exclusively and indiscriminately with India and China, Renan&#039;s ambition was to carve out a new Oriental province for himself, in this case the Semitic Orient. He had no doubt remarked the casual, and surely current, confusion of Arabic with Sanskrit (as in Balzac&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Peau de chagrin&#039;&#039;, where the fateful talisman&#039;s Arabic script is described as Sanskrit), and he made it his job accordingly to do for the Semitic languages what Bopp had done for the Indo-European: so he said in the 1855 preface to the comparative Semitic treatise.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Honore de Balzac, &#039;&#039;La Peau de chagrin&#039;&#039;, vol. 9 (&#039;&#039;Etudes philosophiques&#039;&#039; 1) of &#039;&#039;La Comedie humaine&#039;&#039;, ed. Marcel Bouteron (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), p. 39; Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale des langues semitiques&#039;&#039;, p. 134.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore Renan&#039;s plans were to bring the Semitic languages into sharp and glamorous focus &#039;&#039;a la&#039;&#039; Bopp, and in addition to elevate the study of these neglected inferior languages to the level of a passionate new science of mind &#039;&#039;a la&#039;&#039; Louis Lambert.&lt;br /&gt;
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On more than one occasion Renan was quite explicit in his assertions that Semites and Semitic were &#039;&#039;creations&#039;&#039; of Orientalist philological study.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See, for instance, &#039;&#039;De l&#039;origine du langage&#039;&#039;, p. 102, and &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, p. 180.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Since he was the man who did the study, there was meant to be little ambiguity about the centrality of his role in this new, artificial creation. But how did Renan mean the word &#039;&#039;creation&#039;&#039; in these instances? And how was this creation connected with either natural creation, or the creation ascribed by Renan and others to the laboratory and to the classificatory and natural sciences, principally what was called philosophical anatomy? Here we must speculate a little. Throughout his career Renan seemed to imagine the role of science in human life as (and I quote in translation as literally as I can) &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;telling&#039;&#039; (speaking or articulating) definitively to man the word [logos?] of things.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039;, p. 23. The whole passage reads as follows: &amp;quot;Pour moi, je ne connais qu&#039;un seul resultat a la science, c&#039;est de resoudre l&#039;enigme, c&#039;est de dire definitivement a l&#039;homme le mot des choses, c&#039;est de l&#039;expliquer a lui-meme, c&#039;est de lui donner, au nom de la seule autorite legitime qui est la nature humaine toute entiere, le symbole que les religions lui donnaient tout fait et qu&#039;ils ne peut plus accepter.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Science gives speech to things; better yet, science brings out, causes to be pronounced, a potential speech within things. The special value of linguistics (as the new philology was then often called) is not that natural science resembles it, but rather that it treats words as natural, otherwise silent objects, which are made to give up their secrets. Remember that the major breakthrough in the study of inscriptions and hieroglyphs was the discovery by Champollion that the symbols on the Rosetta Stone had a &#039;&#039;phonetic&#039;&#039; as well as a semantic component.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Madeleine V.-David, &#039;&#039;Le Debat sur les ecritures et l&#039;hieroglyphe aux XVII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; et XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecles et l&#039;application de la notion de dechiffrement aux ecritures mortes&#039;&#039; (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1965), p. 130.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; To make objects speak was like making words speak, giving them circumstantial value, and a precise place in a rule-governed order of regularity. In its first sense, &#039;&#039;creation&#039;&#039;, as Renan used the word, signified the articulation by which an object like &#039;&#039;Semitic&#039;&#039; could be seen as a creature of sorts. Second, creation also signified the setting--in the case of Semitic it meant Oriental history, culture, race, mind--illuminated and brought forward from its reticence by the scientist. Finally, creation was the formulation of a system of classification by which it was possible to see the object in question comparatively with other like objects; and by &amp;quot;comparatively&amp;quot; Renan intended a complex network of paradigmatic relations that obtained between Semitic and Indo-European languages.&lt;br /&gt;
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If in what I have so far said I have insisted so much on Renan&#039;s comparatively forgotten study of Semitic languages, it has been for several important reasons. Semitic was the scientific study to which Renan turned right after the loss of his Christian faith; I described above how he came to see the study of Semitic as replacing his faith and enabling a critical future relation with it. The study of Semitic was Renan&#039;s first full-length Orientalist and scientific study (finished in 1847, published first in 1855), and was as much a part of his late major works on the origins of Christianity and the history of the Jews as it was a propaedeutic for them. In intention, if not perhaps in achievement--interestingly, few of the standard or contemporary works in either linguistic history or the history of Orientalism cite Renan with anything more than cursory attention&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan is mentioned only in passing in Schwab&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;, not at all in Foucault&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Order of Things&#039;&#039;, and only somewhat disparagingly in Holger Pederson&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Discovery of Language: Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century&#039;&#039;, trans. John Webster Spargo (1931; reprint ed., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972). Max Muller in his &#039;&#039;Lectures on the Science of Language&#039;&#039; (1861-64; reprint ed., New York: Scribner, Armstrong, &amp;amp; Co., 1875) and Gustave Dugat in his &#039;&#039;Histoire des orientalistes de l&#039;Europe du XII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1868-70) do not mention Renan at all. James Darmesteter&#039;s &#039;&#039;Essais Orientaux&#039;&#039; (Paris: A. Levy, 1883)--whose first item is a history, &amp;quot;L&#039;Orientalisme en France&amp;quot;--is dedicated to Renan but does not mention his contribution. There are half-a-dozen short notices of Renan&#039;s production in Jules Mohl&#039;s encyclopedic (and extremely valuable) quasi-logbook, &#039;&#039;Vingt-sept ans d&#039;histoire des etudes orientales: Rapports faits a la Societe asiatique de Paris de 1840 a 1867&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Reinwald, 1879-80).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--his Semitic opus was proposed as a philological breakthrough, from which in later years he was always to draw retrospective authority for his positions (almost always bad ones) on religion, race, and nationalism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In works dealing with race and racism Renan occupies a position of some importance. He is treated in the following: Ernest Seilliere, &#039;&#039;La Philosophie de l&#039;imperialisme&#039;&#039;, 4 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1903-8); Theophile Simar, &#039;&#039;Etude critique sur la formation de la doctrine des races au XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle et son expansion au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039; (Brussels: Hayez, 1922); Erich Voegelin, &#039;&#039;Rasse und Staat&#039;&#039; (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1933), and here one must also mention his &#039;&#039;Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte von Ray bis Carus&#039;&#039; (Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, 1933), which, although it does not deal with Renan&#039;s period, is an important complement to &#039;&#039;Rasse und Staat&#039;&#039;; Jacques Barzun, &#039;&#039;Race: A Study in Modern Superstition&#039;&#039; (New York: Harcourt, Brace &amp;amp; Co., 1937).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Whenever Renan wished to make a statement about either the Jews or the Muslims, for example, it was always with his remarkably harsh (and unfounded, except according to the science he was practicing) strictures on the Semites in mind. Furthermore, Renan&#039;s Semitic was meant as a contribution both to the development of Indo-European linguistics and to the differentiation of Orientalisms. To the former Semitic was a degraded form, degraded in both the moral and the biological sense, whereas to the latter Semitic was a--if not the--stable form of cultural decadence. Lastly, Semitic was Renan&#039;s first creation, a fiction invented by him in the philological laboratory to satisfy his sense of public place and mission. It should by no means be lost on us that Semitic was for Renan&#039;s ego the symbol of European (and consequently his) dominion over the Orient and over his own era.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, as a branch of the Orient, Semitic was not fully a natural object--like a species of monkey, for instance--nor fully an unnatural or a divine object, as it had once been considered. Rather, Semitic occupied a median position, legitimated in its oddities (regularity being defined by Indo-European) by an inverse relation to normal languages, comprehended as an eccentric, quasi-monstrous phenomenon partly because libraries, laboratories, and museums could serve as its place of exhibition and analysis. In his treatise, Renan adopted a tone of voice and a method of exposition that drew the maximum from book-learning and from natural observation as practiced by men like Cuvier and the Geoffroy Saint-Hilaires &#039;&#039;pere et fils&#039;&#039;. This is an important stylistic achievement, for it allowed Renan consistently to avail himself of the &#039;&#039;library&#039;&#039;, rather than either primitivity or divine fiat, as a conceptual framework in which to understand language, together with the &#039;&#039;museum&#039;&#039;, which is where the results of laboratory observation are delivered for exhibition, study, and teaching.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; Schwab has some brilliant pages on the museum, on the parallelism between biology and linguistics, and on Cuvier, Balzac, and others; see p. 323 and passim. On the library and its importance for mid-nineteenth-century culture, see Foucault, &amp;quot;La Bibliotheque fantastique,&amp;quot; which is his preface to Flaubert&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039; (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), pp. 7-33. I am indebted to Professor Eugenio Donato for drawing my attention to these matters; see his &amp;quot;A Mere Labyrinth of Letters: Flaubert and the Quest for Fiction,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Modern Language Notes&#039;&#039; 89, no. 6 (December 1974): 885-910.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Everywhere Renan treats of normal human facts--language, history, culture, mind, imagination--as transformed into something else, as something peculiarly deviant, because they are Semitic and Oriental, and because they end up for analysis in the laboratory. Thus the Semites are rabid monotheists who produced no mythology, no art, no commerce, no civilization; their consciousness is a narrow and rigid one; all in all they represent &amp;quot;une combinaison inferieure de la nature humaine.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, pp. 145-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the same time Renan wants it understood that he speaks of a prototype, not a real Semitic type with actual existence (although he violated this too by discussing present-day Jews and Muslims with less than scientific detachment in many places in his writings).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039;, p. 508 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; So on the one hand we have the transformation of the human into the specimen, and on the other the comparative judgment rendered by which the specimen remains a specimen and a subject for philological, scientific study.&lt;br /&gt;
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Scattered throughout the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale et systeme compare des langues semitiques&#039;&#039; are reflections on the links between linguistics and anatomy, and--for Renan this is equally important--remarks on how these links could be employed to do human history (&#039;&#039;les sciences historiques&#039;&#039;). But first we should consider the implicit links. I do not think it wrong or an exaggeration to say that a typical page of Renan&#039;s Orientalist &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039; was constructed typographically and structurally with a page of comparative philosophical anatomy, in the style of Cuvier or Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, kept in mind. Both linguists and anatomists purport to be speaking about matters not directly obtainable or observable in nature; a skeleton and a detailed line drawing of a muscle, as much as paradigms constituted by the linguists out of a purely hypothetical proto-Semitic or proto-Indo-European, are similarly products of the laboratory and of the library. The text of a linguistic or an anatomical work bears the same general relation to nature (or actuality) that a museum case exhibiting a specimen mammal or organ does. What is given on the page and in the museum case is a truncated exaggeration, like many of Sacy&#039;s Oriental extracts, whose purpose is to exhibit a relationship between the science (or scientist) and the object, not one between the object and nature. Read almost any page by Renan on Arabic, Hebrew, Aramaic, or proto-Semitic and you read a fact of power, by which the Orientalist philologist&#039;s authority summons out of the library at will examples of man&#039;s speech, and ranges them there surrounded by a suave European prose that points out defects, virtues, barbarisms, and shortcomings in the language, the people, and the civilization. The tone and the tense of the exhibition are cast almost uniformly in the contemporary present, so that one is given an impression of a pedagogical demonstration during which the scholar-scientist stands before us on a lecture-laboratory platform, creating, confining, and judging the material he discusses.&lt;br /&gt;
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This anxiety on Renan&#039;s part to convey the sense of a demonstration actually taking place is heightened when he remarks explicitly that whereas anatomy employs stable and visible signs by which to consign objects to classes, linguistics does not.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, p. 214.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore the philologist must make a given linguistic fact correspond in some way to a historical period: hence the possibility of a classification. Yet, as Renan was often to say, linguistic temporality and history are full of lacunae, enormous discontinuities, hypothetical periods. Therefore linguistic events occur in a nonlinear and essentially discontinuous temporal dimension controlled by the linguist in a, very particular way. That way, as Renan&#039;s whole treatise on the Semitic branch of the Oriental languages goes very far to show, is comparative: Indo-European is taken as the living, &#039;&#039;organic&#039;&#039; norm, and Semitic Oriental languages are seen comparatively to be &#039;&#039;inorganic&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 527. This idea goes back to Friedrich Schlegel&#039;s distinction between organic and agglutinative languages, of which latter type Semitic is an instance. Humboldt makes the same distinction, as have most Orientalists since Renan.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Time is transformed into the space of comparative classification, which at bottom is based on a rigid binary opposition between organic and inorganic languages. So on the one hand there is the organic, biologically generative process represented by Indo-European, while on the other there is an inorganic, essentially unregenerative process, ossified into Semitic: most important, Renan makes it absolutely clear that such an imperious judgment is made by the Oriental philologist in his laboratory, for distinctions of the kind he has been concerned with are neither possible nor available for anyone except the trained professional. &amp;quot;Nous refusons donc aux langues semitiques la faculte de se regenerer, toute en reconnaissant qu&#039;elles n&#039;echappent pas plus que les autres oeuvres de la conscience humaine a la necessite du changement et des modifications successives&amp;quot; (Therefore we refuse to allow that the Semitic languages have the capacity to regenerate themselves, even while recognizing that they do not escape--any more than other products of human consciousness--the necessity of change or of successive modifications).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 531-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet behind even this radical opposition, there is another one working in Renan&#039;s mind, and for several pages in the first chapter of book 5 he exposes his position quite candidly to the reader. This occurs when he introduces Saint-Hilaire&#039;s views on the &amp;quot;degradation, of types.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 515 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Although Renan does not specify which Saint-Hilaire he refers to, the reference is clear enough. For both Etienne and his son Isidore were biological speculators of extraordinary fame and influence, particularly among literary intellectuals during the first half of the nineteenth century in France. Etienne, we recall, had been a member of the Napoleonic expedition, and Balzac dedicated an important section of the preface for &#039;&#039;La Comedie humaine&#039;&#039; to him; there is also much evidence that Flaubert read both the father and the son and used their views in his work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jean Seznec, &#039;&#039;Nouvelles Etudes sur &amp;quot;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (London: Warburg Institute, 1949), p. 80.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Not only were Etienne and Isidore legatees of the tradition of &amp;quot;Romantic&amp;quot; biology, which included Goethe and Cuvier, with a strong interest in analogy, homology, and organic &#039;&#039;ur&#039;&#039;-form among species, but they were also specialists in the philosophy and anatomy of monstrosity--teratology, as Isidore called it--in which the most horrendous physiological aberrations were considered a result of internal degradation within the species-life.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophie anatomique: Des monstruosites humaines&#039;&#039; (Paris: published by the author, 1822). The complete title of Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire&#039;s work is: &#039;&#039;Histoire generale et particuliere des anomalies de l&#039;organisation chez l&#039;homme et les animaux, ouvrage comprenante des recherches sur les caracteres, la classification, l&#039;influence physiologique et pathologique, les rapports generaux, les lois et les causes des monstruosites, des varietes et vices de conformation, ou traite de teratologie&#039;&#039;, 3 vols. (Paris: J.-B. Bailliere, 1832-36). There are some valuable pages on Goethe&#039;s biological ideas in Erich Heller, &#039;&#039;The Disinherited Mind&#039;&#039; (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 3-34. See also Jacob, &#039;&#039;The Logic of Life&#039;&#039;, and Canguilhem, &#039;&#039;La Connaissance de la vie&#039;&#039;, pp. 174-84, for very interesting accounts of the Saint-Hilaires&#039; place in the development of the life sciences.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; I cannot here go into the intricacies (as well as the macabre fascination) of teratology, though it is enough to mention that both Etienne and Isidore exploited the theoretical power of the linguistic paradigm to explain the deviations possible within a biological system. Thus Etienne&#039;s notion was that a monster is an &#039;&#039;anomaly&#039;&#039;, in the same sense that in language words exist in analogical as well as anomalous relations with each other: in linguistics the idea is at least as old as Varro&#039;s &#039;&#039;De Lingua Latina&#039;&#039;. No anomaly can be considered simply as a gratuitous exception; rather anomalies confirm the regular structure binding together all members of the same class. Such a view is quite daring in anatomy. At one moment in the &amp;quot;Preliminaire&amp;quot; to his &#039;&#039;Philosophie anatomique&#039;&#039; Etienne says:&lt;br /&gt;
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And, indeed, such is the character of our epoch that it becomes impossible today to enclose oneself strictly within the framework of a simple monograph. Study an object in isolation and you will only be able to bring it back to itself; consequently you can never have perfect knowledge of it. But see it in the midst of beings who are connected with each other in many different ways, and which are isolated from each other in different ways, and you will discover for this object a wider scope of relationships. First of all, you will know it better, even in its specificity: but more important, by considering it in the very center of its own sphere of activity, you will know precisely how it behaves in its own exterior world, and you will also know how its own features are constituted in reaction to its surrounding milieu.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;E. Saint-Hilaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophie anatomique&#039;&#039;, pp. xxii-xxiii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only is Saint-Hilaire saying that it is the specific character of contemporary study (he was writing in 1822) to examine phenomena comparatively; he is also saying that for the scientist there is no such thing as a phenomenon, no matter how aberrant and exceptional, that cannot be explained with reference to other phenomena. Note also how Saint-Hilaire employs the metaphor of centrality (&#039;&#039;le centre de sa sphere d&#039;activite&#039;&#039;) used later by Renan in &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039; to describe the position occupied by any object in nature--including even the philologist--once the object is scientifically &#039;&#039;placed&#039;&#039; there by the examining scientist. Thereafter between the object and the scientist a bond of sympathy is established. Of course, this can only take place during the laboratory experience, and not elsewhere. The point being made is that a scientist has at his disposal a sort of leverage by which even the totally unusual occurrence can be seen naturally and known scientifically, which in this case means without recourse to the supernatural, and with recourse only to an enveloping environment constituted by the scientist. As a result nature itself can be reperceived as continuous, harmoniously coherent, and fundamentally intelligible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus for Renan Semitic is a phenomenon of arrested development in comparison with the mature languages and cultures of the Indo-European group, and even with the other Semitic Oriental languages.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, p. 156.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The paradox that Renan sustains, however, is that even as he encourages us to see languages as in some way corresponding to &amp;quot;etres vivants de la nature,&amp;quot; he is everywhere else proving that his Oriental languages, the Semitic languages, are inorganic, arrested, totally ossified, incapable of self-regeneration; in other words, he proves that Semitic is not a live language, and for that matter, neither are Semites live creatures. Moreover, Indo-European language and culture are alive and organic &#039;&#039;because&#039;&#039; of the laboratory, not despite it. But far from being a marginal issue in Renan&#039;s work, this paradox stands, I believe, at the very center of his entire work, his style, and his archival existence in the culture of his time, a culture to which--as people so unlike each other as Matthew Arnold, Oscar Wilde, James Frazer, and Marcel Proust concurred--he was a very important contributor. To be able to sustain a vision that incorporates and holds together life and quasi-living creatures (Indo-European, European culture) as well as quasimonstrous, parallel inorganic phenomena (Semitic, Oriental culture) is precisely the achievement of the European scientist in his laboratory. He &#039;&#039;constructs&#039;&#039;, and the very act of construction is a sign of imperial power over recalcitrant phenomena, as well as a confirmation of the dominating culture and its &amp;quot;naturalization.&amp;quot; Indeed, it is not too much to say that Renan&#039;s philological laboratory is the actual locale of his European ethnocentrism; but what needs emphasis here is that the philological laboratory has no existence outside the discourse, the writing by which it is constantly produced and experienced. Thus even the culture he calls organic and alive--Europe&#039;s--is also a &#039;&#039;creature being created&#039;&#039; in the laboratory and by philology.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan&#039;s entire later career was European and cultural. Its accomplishments were varied and celebrated. Whatever authority his style possessed can, I think, be traced back to his technique for constructing the inorganic (or the missing) and for giving it the appearance of life. He was most famous, of course, for his &#039;&#039;Vie de Jesus&#039;&#039;, the work that inaugurated his monumental histories of Christianity and the Jewish people. Yet we must realize that the &#039;&#039;Vie&#039;&#039; was exactly the same type of feat that the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039; was, a construction enabled by the historian&#039;s capacity for skillfully crafting a dead (dead for Renan in the double sense of a dead faith and a lost, hence dead, historical period) Oriental biography--and the paradox is immediately apparent--&#039;&#039;as if it were&#039;&#039; the truthful narrative of a natural life. Whatever Renan said had first passed through the philological laboratory; when it appeared in print woven through the text, there was in it the life-giving force of a contemporary cultural signature, which drew from modernity all its scientific power and all its uncritical self-approbation. For that sort of culture such genealogies as dynasty, tradition, religion, ethnic communities were all simply functions of a theory whose job was to instruct the world. In borrowing this latter phrase from Cuvier, Renan was circumspectly placing scientific demonstration over experience; temporality was relegated to the scientifically useless realm of ordinary experience, while to the special periodicity of culture and cultural comparativism (which spawned ethnocentrism, racial theory, and economic oppression) were given powers far in advance of moral vision.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan&#039;s style, his career as Orientalist and man of letters, the circumstances of the meaning he communicates, his peculiarly intimate relationship with the European scholarly and general culture of his time--liberal, exclusivist, imperious, antihuman except in a very conditional sense--all these are what I would call &#039;&#039;celibate&#039;&#039; and scientific. Generation for him is consigned to the realm of &#039;&#039;l&#039;avenir&#039;&#039;, which in his famous manifesto he associated with science. Although as a historian of culture he belongs to the school of men like Turgot, Condorcet, Guizot, Cousin, Jouffroy, and Ballanche, and in scholarship to the school of Sacy, Caussin de Perceval, Ozanam, Fauriel, and Burnouf, Renan&#039;s is a peculiarly ravaged, ragingly masculine world of history and learning; it is indeed the world, not of fathers, mothers, and children, but of men like his Jesus, his Marcus Aurelius, his Caliban, his solar god (the last as described in &amp;quot;Reves&amp;quot; of the &#039;&#039;Dialogues philosophiques&#039;&#039;).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 1: 621-2 and passim. See H. W. Wardman, &#039;&#039;Ernest Renan: A Critical Biography&#039;&#039; (London: Athlone Press, 1964), p. 66 and passim, for a subtle description of Renan&#039;s domestic life; although one would not wish to force a parallel between Renan&#039;s biography and what I have called his &amp;quot;masculine&amp;quot; world, Wardman&#039;s descriptions here are suggestive indeed--at least to me.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He cherished the power of science and Orientalist philology particularly; he sought its insights and its techniques; he used it to intervene, often with considerable effectiveness, in the life of his epoch. And yet his ideal role was that of spectator.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Renan, a philologist ought to prefer &#039;&#039;bonheur&#039;&#039; to &#039;&#039;jouissance&#039;&#039;: the preference expresses a choice of elevated, if sterile, happiness over sexual pleasure. Words belong to the realm of &#039;&#039;bonheur&#039;&#039;, as does the study of words, ideally speaking. To my knowledge, there are very few moments in all of Renan&#039;s public writing where a beneficent and instrumental role is assigned to women. One occurs when Renan opines that foreign women (nurses, maids) must have instructed the conquering Normans&#039; children, and hence we can account for the changes that take place in language. Note how productivity and dissemination are not the functions aided, but rather internal change, and a subsidiary one at that. &amp;quot;Man,&amp;quot; he says at the end of the same essay, &amp;quot;belongs neither to his language nor to his race; he belongs to himself before all, since before all he is a free being and a moral one.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;Des services rendus au sciences historiques par la philologie,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 8: 1228, 1232.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Man was free and moral, but enchained by race, history, and science as Renan saw them, conditions imposed by the scholar on man.&lt;br /&gt;
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The study of Oriental languages took Renan to the heart of these conditions, and philology made it concretely apparent that knowledge of man was--to paraphrase Ernst Cassirer--poetically transfiguring&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernst Cassirer, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel&#039;&#039;, trans. William H. Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 307.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; only if it had been previously severed from raw actuality (as Sacy had necessarily severed his Arabic fragments from their actuality) and then put into a doxological straitjacket. By becoming &#039;&#039;philology&#039;&#039;, the study of words as once practiced by Vico, Herder, Rousseau, Michelet, and Quinet lost its plot and its dramatic presentational quality, as Schelling once called it. Instead, philology became epistemologically complex; &#039;&#039;Sprachgefuhl&#039;&#039; was no longer enough since words themselves pertained less to the senses or the body (as they had for Vico) and more to a sightless, imageless, and abstract realm ruled over by such hothouse formulations as race, mind, culture, and nation. In that realm, which was discursively constructed and called the Orient, certain kinds of assertions could be made, all of them possessing the same powerful generality and cultural validity. For all of Renan&#039;s effort was to deny Oriental culture the right to be generated, except artificially in the philological laboratory. A man was not a child of the culture; that dynastic conception had been too effectively challenged by philology. Philology taught one how culture is a construct, an &#039;&#039;articulation&#039;&#039; (in the sense that Dickens used the word for Mr. Venus&#039;s profession in &#039;&#039;Our Mutual Friend&#039;&#039;), even a creation, but not anything more than a quasi-organic structure.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is specially interesting in Renan is how much he knew himself to be a creature of his time and of his ethnocentric culture. On the occasion of an academic response to a speech made by Ferdinand de Lesseps in 1885, Renan averred as how &amp;quot;it was so sad to be a wiser man than one&#039;s nation.... One cannot feel bitterness towards one&#039;s homeland. Better to be mistaken along with the nation than to be too right with those who tell it hard truths.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;Reponse au discours de reception de M. de Lesseps (23 avril 1885),&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 1: 817. Yet the value of being truly contemporary was best shown with reference to Renan by Sainte-Beuve in his articles of June 1862. See also Donald G. Charlton, &#039;&#039;Positivist Thought in France During the Second Empire&#039;&#039; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), and his &#039;&#039;Secular Religions in France&#039;&#039;. Also Richard M. Chadbourne, &amp;quot;Renan and Sainte-Beuve,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Romanic Review&#039;&#039; 44, no. 2 (April 1953): 126-35.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The economy of such a statement is almost too perfect to be true. For does not the old Renan say that the best relationship is one of parity with one&#039;s own culture, its morality, and its ethos during one&#039;s time, that and not a dynastic relation by which one is either the child of his times or their parent? And here we return to the laboratory, for it is there--as Renan thought of it--that filial and ultimately social responsibilities cease and scientific and Orientalist ones take over. His laboratory was the platform from which as an Orientalist he addressed the world; it mediated the statements he made, gave them confidence and general precision, as well as continuity. Thus the philological laboratory as Renan understood it redefined not only his epoch and his culture, dating and shaping them in new ways; it gave his Oriental subject matter a scholarly coherence, and more, it made him (and later Orientalists in his tradition) into the Occidental &#039;&#039;cultural&#039;&#039; figure he then became. We may well wonder whether this new autonomy within the culture was the freedom Renan hoped his philological Orientalist science would bring or whether, so far as a critical historian of Orientalism is concerned, it set up a complex affiliation between Orientalism and its putative human subject matter that is based finally on power and not really on disinterested objectivity.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Oriental Residence and Scholarship: &#039;&#039;The Requirements of Lexicography and Imagination&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Renan&#039;s views of the Oriental Semites belong, of course, less to the realm of popular prejudice and common anti-Semitism than they do to the realm of scientific Oriental philology. When we read Renan and Sacy, we readily observe the way cultural generalization had begun to acquire the armor of scientific statement and the ambience of corrective study. Like many academic specialties in their early phases, modern Orientalism held its subject matter, which it defined, in a viselike grip which it did almost everything in its power to sustain. Thus a knowing vocabulary developed, and its functions, as much as its style, located the Orient in a &#039;&#039;comparative&#039;&#039; framework, of the sort employed and manipulated by Renan. Such comparatism is rarely descriptive; most often, it is both evaluative and expository. Here is Renan comparing typically:&lt;br /&gt;
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One sees that in all things the Semitic race appears to us to be an incomplete race, by virtue of its simplicity. This race--if I dare use the analogy--is to the Indo-European family what a pencil sketch is to painting; it lacks that variety, that amplitude, that abundance of life which is the condition of perfectibility. Like those individuals who possess so little fecundity that, after a gracious childhood, they attain only the most mediocre virility, the Semitic nations experienced their fullest flowering in their first age and have never been able to achieve true maturity.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 8: 156.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Indo-Europeans are the touchstone here, just as they are when Renan says that the Semitic Oriental sensibility never reached the heights attained by the Indo-Germanic races.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whether this comparative attitude is principally a scholarly necessity or whether it is disguised ethnocentric race prejudice, we cannot say with absolute certainty. What we can say is that the two work together, in support of each other. What Renan and Sacy tried to do was to reduce the Orient to a kind of human flatness, which exposed its characteristics easily to scrutiny and removed from it its complicating humanity. In Renan&#039;s case, the legitimacy of his efforts was provided by philology, whose ideological tenets encourage the reduction of a language to its roots; thereafter, the philologist finds it possible to connect those linguistics roots, as Renan and others did, to race, mind, character, and temperament at their roots. The affinity between Renan and Gobineau, for example, was acknowledged by Renan to be a common philological and Orientalist perspective;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In his letter of June 26, 1856, to Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 10: 203-4. Gobineau&#039;s ideas were expressed in his &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;inegalite des races humaines&#039;&#039; (1853-55).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in subsequent editions of the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039; he incorporated some of Gobineau&#039;s work within his own. Thus did comparatism in the study of the Orient and Orientals come to be synonymous with the apparent ontological inequality of Occident and Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main traits of this inequality are worth recapitulating briefly. I have already referred to Schlegel&#039;s enthusiasm for India, and then his subsequent revulsion from it and of course from Islam. Many of the earliest Oriental amateurs began by welcoming the Orient as a salutary &#039;&#039;derangement&#039;&#039; of their European habits of mind and spirit. The Orient was overvalued for its pantheism, its spirituality, its stability, its longevity, its primitivity, and so forth. Schelling, for example, saw in Oriental polytheism a preparation of the way for Judeo-Christian monotheism: Abraham was prefigured in Brahma. Yet almost without exception such overesteem was followed by a counterresponse: the Orient suddenly appeared lamentably underhumanized, antidemocratic, backward, barbaric, and so forth. A swing of the pendulum in one direction caused an equal and opposite swing back: the Orient was undervalued. Orientalism as a profession grew out of these opposites, of compensations and corrections based on inequality, ideas nourished by and nourishing similar ideas in the culture at large. Indeed the very project of restriction and restructuring associated with Orientalism can be traced directly to the inequality by which the Orient&#039;s comparative poverty (or wealth) besought scholarly, scientific treatment of the kind to be found in disciplines like philology, biology, history, anthropology, philosophy, or economics.&lt;br /&gt;
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And thus the actual profession of Orientalist enshrined this inequality and the special paradoxes it engendered. Most often an individual entered the profession as a way of reckoning with the Orient&#039;s claim on him; yet most often too his Orientalist training opened his eyes, so to speak, and what he was left with was a sort of debunking project, by which the Orient was reduced to considerably less than the eminence once seen in it. How else is one to explain the enormous labors represented by the work of William Muir (1819-1905), for example, or of Reinhart Dozy (1820-1883), and the impressive antipathy in that work to the Orient, Islam, and the Arabs? Characteristically, Renan was one of Dozy&#039;s supporters, just as in Dozy&#039;s four-volume &#039;&#039;Histoire des Mussulmans d&#039;Espagne&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;jusqu&#039;a la conquete de l&#039;Andalousie par les Almoravides&#039;&#039; (1861) there appear many of Renan&#039;s anti-Semitic strictures, compounded in 1864 by a volume arguing that the Jews&#039; primitive God was not Jahweh but Baal, proof for which was to be found in Mecca, of all places. Muir&#039;s &#039;&#039;Life of Mahomet&#039;&#039; (1858-1861) and his &#039;&#039;The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall&#039;&#039; (1891) are still considered reliable monuments of scholarship, yet his attitude towards his subject matter was fairly put by him when he said that &amp;quot;the sword of Muhammed, and the Kor&#039;an, are the most stubborn enemies of Civilisation, Liberty, and the Truth which the world has yet known.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited by Albert Hourani in his excellent article &amp;quot;Islam and the Philosophers of History,&amp;quot; p. 222.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Many of the same notions are to be found in the work of Alfred Lyall, who was one of the authors cited approvingly by Cromer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if the Orientalist does not explicitly judge his material as Dozy and Muir did, the principle of inequality exerts its influence nevertheless. It remains the professional Orientalist&#039;s job to piece together a portrait, a restored picture as it were, of the Orient or the Oriental; fragments, such as those unearthed by Sacy, supply the material, but the narrative shape, continuity, and figures are constructed by the scholar, for whom scholarship consists of circumventing the unruly (un-Occidental) nonhistory of the Orient with orderly chronicle, portraits, and plots. Caussin de Perceval&#039;s &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;histoire des Arabes avant l&#039;Islamisme, pendant l&#039;epoque de Mahomet&#039;&#039; (three volumes, 1847-1848) is a wholly professional study, depending for its sources on documents made available &#039;&#039;internally&#039;&#039; to the field by other Orientalists (principally Sacy, of course) or documents--like the texts of ibn-Khaldun, upon whom Caussin relied very heavily--reposing in Orientalist libraries in Europe. Caussin&#039;s thesis is that the Arabs were made a people by Mohammed, Islam being essentially a political instrument, not by any means a spiritual one. What Caussin strives for is clarity amidst a huge mass of confusing detail. Thus what emerges out of the study of Islam is quite literally a one-dimensional portrait of Mohammed, who is made to appear at the end of the work (after his death has been described) in precise photographic detail.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Caussin de Perceval, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;histoire des Arabes avant l&#039;Islamisme, pendant l&#039;epoque de Mahomet et jusqu&#039;a la reduction de toutes les tribus sous la loi musulmane&#039;&#039; (1847-48; reprint ed., Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1967), 3: 332-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Neither a demon, nor a prototype of Cagliostro, Caussin&#039;s Mohammed is a man appropriated to a history of Islam (the fittest version of it) as an exclusively political movement, centralized by the innumerable citations that thrust him up and, in a sense, out of the text. Caussin&#039;s intention was to leave nothing unsaid about Mohammed; the Prophet is thereby seen in a cold light, stripped both of his immense religious force and of any residual powers to frighten Europeans. The point here is that as a figure for his own time and place Mohammed is effaced, in order for a very slight human miniature of him to be left standing.&lt;br /&gt;
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A nonprofessional analogue to Caussin&#039;s Mohammed is Carlyle&#039;s, a Mohammed forced to serve a thesis totally overlooking the historical and cultural circumstances of the Prophet&#039;s own time and place. Although Carlyle quotes Sacy, his essay is clearly the product of someone arguing for some general ideas on sincerity, heroism, and prophethood. His attitude is salutary: Mohammed is no legend, no shameful sensualist, no laughable petty sorcerer who trained pigeons to pick peas out of his ear. Rather he is a man of real vision and self-conviction, albeit an author of a book, the Koran, that is &amp;quot;a wearisome confused jumble, crude, incondite; endless iterations, long-windedness, entanglement; most crude, incondite--insupportable stupidity, in short.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thomas Carlyle, &#039;&#039;On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History&#039;&#039; (1841; reprint ed., New York: Longmans, Green &amp;amp; Co., 1906), p. 63.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Not a paragon of lucidity and stylistic grace himself, Carlyle asserts these things as a way of rescuing Mohammed from the Benthamite standards that would have condemned both Mohammed and him together. Yet Mohammed is a hero, transplanted into Europe out of the same barbaric Orient found wanting by Lord Macaulay in his famous &amp;quot;Minute&amp;quot; of 1835, in which it was asserted that &amp;quot;our native subjects&amp;quot; have more to learn from us than we do from them.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Macaulay&#039;s Indian experiences are described by G. Otto Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay&#039;&#039; (New York: Harper &amp;amp; Brothers, 1875), 1: 344-71. The complete text of Macaulay&#039;s &amp;quot;Minute&amp;quot; is conveniently to be found in Philip D. Curtin, ed., &#039;&#039;Imperialism: The Documentary History of Western Civilization&#039;&#039; (New York: Walker &amp;amp; Co., 1971), pp. 178-91. Some consequences of Macaulay&#039;s views for British Orientalism are discussed in A. J. Arberry, &#039;&#039;British Orientalists&#039;&#039; (London: William Collins, 1943).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Both Caussin and Carlyle, in other words, show us that the Orient need not cause us undue anxiety, so unequal are Oriental to European achievements. The Orientalist and non-Orientalist perspectives coincide here. For within the comparative field that Orientalism became after the philological revolution of the early nineteenth century, and outside it, either in popular stereotypes or in the figures made of the Orient by philosophers like Carlyle and stereotypes like those of Macaulay, the Orient in itself was subordinated intellectually to the West. As material for study or reflection the Orient acquired all the marks of an inherent weakness. It became subject to the vagaries of miscellaneous theories that used it for illustration. Cardinal Newman, no great Orientalist, used Oriental Islam as the basis of lectures in 1853 justifying British intervention in the Crimean War.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;John Henry Newman, &#039;&#039;The Turks in Their Relation to Europe&#039;&#039;, vol. 1 of his &#039;&#039;Historical Sketches&#039;&#039; (1853; reprint ed., London: Longmans, Green &amp;amp; Co., 1920).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cuvier found the Orient useful for his work &#039;&#039;Le Regne animal&#039;&#039; (1816). The Orient was usefully employed as conversation in the various salons of Paris.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Marguerite-Louise Ancelot, &#039;&#039;Salons de Paris, foyers eteints&#039;&#039; (Paris: Jules Tardieu, 1858).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The list of references, borrowings, and transformations that overtook the Oriental idea is immense, but at bottom what the early Orientalist achieved, and what the non-Orientalist in the West exploited, was a reduced model of the Orient suitable for the prevailing, dominant culture and its theoretical (and hard after the theoretical, the practical) exigencies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Occasionally one comes across exceptions, or if not exceptions then interesting complications, to this unequal partnership between East and West. Karl Marx identified the notion of an Asiatic economic system in his 1853 analyses of British rule in India, and then put beside that immediately the human depredation introduced into this system by English colonial interference, rapacity, and outright cruelty. In article after article he returned with increasing conviction to the idea that even in destroying Asia, Britain was making possible there a real social revolution. Marx&#039;s style pushes us right up against the difficulty of reconciling our natural repugnance as fellow creatures to the sufferings of Orientals while their society is being violently transformed with the historical necessity of these transformations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their ancient form of civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath the traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies....&lt;br /&gt;
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England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then, whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world may have for our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, to exclaim with Goethe:&lt;br /&gt;
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Sollte diese Qual uns qualen&lt;br /&gt;
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Da sie unsere Lust vermehrt&lt;br /&gt;
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Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen&lt;br /&gt;
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Timurs Herrschaft aufgeziehrt?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Surveys from Exile&#039;&#039;, ed. David Fernbach (London: Pelican Books, 1973), pp. 306-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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(Should this torture then torment us&lt;br /&gt;
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Since it brings us greater pleasure?&lt;br /&gt;
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Were not through the rule of Timur&lt;br /&gt;
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Souls devoured without measure?)&lt;br /&gt;
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The quotation, which supports Marx&#039;s argument about torment producing pleasure, comes from the &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039; and identifies the sources of Marx&#039;s conceptions about the Orient. These are Romantic and even messianic: as human material the Orient is less important than as an element in a Romantic redemptive project. Marx&#039;s economic analyses are perfectly fitted thus to a standard Orientalist undertaking, even though Marx&#039;s humanity, his sympathy for the misery of people, are clearly engaged. Yet in the end it is the Romantic Orientalist vision that wins out, as Marx&#039;s theoretical socio-economic views become submerged in this classically standard image:&lt;br /&gt;
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England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating--the annihilation of the Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 320.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The idea of regenerating a fundamentally lifeless Asia is a piece of pure Romantic Orientalism, of course, but coming from the same writer who could not easily forget the human suffering involved, the statement is puzzling. It requires us first to ask how Marx&#039;s moral equation of Asiatic loss with the British colonial rule he condemned gets skewed back towards the old inequality between East and West we have so far remarked. Second, it requires us to ask where the human sympathy has gone, into what realm of thought it has disappeared while the Orientalist vision takes its place.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are immediately brought back to the realization that Orientalists, like many other early-nineteenth-century thinkers, conceive of humanity either in large collective terms or in abstract generalities. Orientalists are neither interested in nor capable of discussing individuals; instead artificial entities, perhaps with their roots in Herderian populism, predominate. There are Orientals, Asiatics, Semites, Muslims, Arabs, Jews, races, mentalities, nations, and the like, some of them the product of learned operations of the type found in Renan&#039;s work. Similarly, the age-old distinction between &amp;quot;Europe&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Asia&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; herds beneath very wide labels every possible variety of human plurality, reducing it in the process to one or two terminal, collective abstractions. Marx is no exception. The collective Orient was easier for him to use in illustration of a theory than existential human identities. For between Orient and Occident, as if in a self-fulfilling proclamation, only the vast anonymous collectivity mattered, or existed. No other type of exchange, severely constrained though it may have been, was at hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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That Marx was still able to sense some fellow feeling, to identify even a little with poor Asia, suggests that something happened before the labels took over, before he was dispatched to Goethe as a source of wisdom on the Orient. It is as if the individual mind (Marx&#039;s, in this case) could find a precollective, preofficial individuality in Asia--find and give in to its pressures upon his emotions, feelings, senses--only to give it up when he confronted a more formidable censor in the very vocabulary he found himself forced to employ. What that censor did was to stop and then chase away the sympathy, and this was accompanied by a lapidary definition: Those people, it said, don&#039;t suffer--they are Orientals and hence have to be treated in other ways than the ones you&#039;ve just been using. A wash of sentiment therefore disappeared as it encountered the unshakable definitions built up by Orientalist science, supported by &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; lore (e.g., the &#039;&#039;Diwan&#039;&#039;) supposed to be appropriate for it. The vocabulary of emotion dissipated as it submitted to the lexicographical police action of Orientalist science and even Orientalist art. An experience was dislodged by a dictionary definition: one can almost see that happen in Marx&#039;s Indian essays, where what finally occurs is that something forces him to scurry back to Goethe, there to stand in his protective Orientalized Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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In part, of course, Marx was concerned with vindicating his own theses on socio-economic revolution; but in part also he seems to have had easy resource to a massed body of writing, both internally consolidated by Orientalism and put forward by it beyond the field, that controlled any statement made about the Orient. In Chapter One I tried to show how this control had had a general cultural history in Europe since antiquity; in this chapter my concern has been to show how in the nineteenth century a modern professional terminology and practice were created whose existence dominated discourse about the Orient, whether by Orientalists or non-Orientalists. Sacy and Renan were instances of the way Orientalism fashioned, respectively, a body of texts and a philologically rooted process by which the Orient took on a discursive identity that made it unequal with the West. In using Marx as the case by which a non-Orientalist&#039;s human engagements were first dissolved, then usurped by Orientalist generalizations, we find ourselves having to consider the process of lexicographical and institutional consolidation peculiar to Orientalism. What was this operation, by which whenever you discussed the Orient a formidable mechanism of omnicompetent definitions would present itself as the only one having suitable validity for your discussion? And since we must also show how this mechanism operated specifically (and effectively) upon personal human experiences that otherwise contradicted it, we must also show where &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; went and what forms &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; took, while they lasted.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this is a very difficult and complex operation to describe, at least as difficult and complex as the way any growing discipline crowds out its competitors and acquires authority for its traditions, methods, and institutions, as well as general cultural legitimacy for its statements, personalities, and agencies. But we can simplify a great deal of the sheer narrative complexity of the operation by specifying the kinds of experiences that Orientalism typically employed for its own ends and represented for its wider-than-professional audience. In essence these experiences continue the ones I described as having taken place in Sacy and Renan. But whereas those two scholars represent a wholly bookish Orientalism, since neither claimed any particular expertise with the Orient &#039;&#039;in situ&#039;&#039;, there is another tradition that claimed its legitimacy from the peculiarly compelling fact of residence in, actual existential contact with, the Orient. Anquetil, Jones, the Napoleonic expedition define the tradition&#039;s earliest contours, of course, and these will thereafter retain an unshakable influence on all Orientalist residents. These contours are the ones of European power: to reside in the Orient is to live the privileged life, not of an ordinary citizen, but of a representative European whose empire (French or British) &#039;&#039;contains&#039;&#039; the Orient in its military, economic, and above all, cultural arms. Oriental residence, and its scholarly fruits, are thereby fed into the bookish tradition of the textual attitudes we found in Renan and Sacy: together the two experiences will constitute a formidable library against which no one, not even Marx, can rebel and which no one can avoid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Residence in the Orient involves personal experience and personal testimony to a certain extent. Contributions to the library of Orientalism and to its consolidation depend on how experience and testimony get converted from a purely personal document into the enabling codes of Orientalist science. In other words, within a text there has to take place a metamorphosis from personal to official statement; the record of Oriental residence and experience by a European must shed, or at least minimize, its purely autobiographical and indulgent descriptions in favor of descriptions on which Orientalism in general and later Orientalists in particular can draw, build, and base further scientific observation and description. So one of the things we can watch for is a more explicit conversion than in Marx of personal sentiments about the Orient into official Orientalist statements.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now the situation is enriched and complicated by the fact that during the entire nineteenth century the Orient, and especially the Near Orient, was a favorite place for Europeans to travel in and write about. Moreover, there developed a fairly large body of Oriental-style European literature very frequently based on personal experiences in the Orient. Flaubert comes to mind immediately as one prominent source of such literature; Disraeli, Mark Twain, and Kinglake are three other obvious examples. But what is of interest is the difference between writing that is converted from personal to professional Orientalism, and the second type, also based on residence and personal testimony, which remains &amp;quot;literature&amp;quot; and not science: it is this difference that I now want to explore.&lt;br /&gt;
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To be a European in the Orient &#039;&#039;always&#039;&#039; involves being a consciousness set apart from, and unequal with, its surroundings. But the main thing to note is the intention of this consciousness: What is it in the Orient for? Why does it set itself there even if, as is the case with writers like Scott, Hugo, and Goethe, it travels to the Orient for a very concrete sort of experience without actually leaving Europe? A small number of intentional categories proposed themselves schematically. One: the writer who intends to use his residence for the specific task of providing professional Orientalism with scientific material, who considers his residence a form of scientific observation. Two: the writer who intends the same purpose but is less willing to sacrifice the eccentricity and style of his individual consciousness to impersonal Orientalist definitions. These latter do appear in his work, but they are disentangled from the personal vagaries of style only with difficulty. Three: the writer for whom a real or metaphorical trip to the Orient is the fulfillment of some deeply felt and urgent project. His text therefore is built on a personal aesthetic, fed and informed by the project. In categories two and three there is considerably more space than in one for the play of a personal--or at least non-Orientalist--consciousness; if we take Edward William Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; as the pre-eminent example of category one, Burton&#039;s &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039; as belonging to category two, and Nerval&#039;s &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; as representing category three, the relative spaces left in the text for the exercise and display of authorial presence will be clear.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite their differences, however, these three categories are not so separate from each other as one would imagine. Nor does each category contain &amp;quot;pure&amp;quot; representative types. For example, works in all three categories rely upon the sheer egoistic powers of the European consciousness at their center. In all cases the Orient is &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; the European observer, and what is more, in the category that contains Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Egyptians&#039;&#039;, the Orientalist ego is very much in evidence, however much his style tries for impartial impersonality. Moreover, certain motifs recur consistently in all three types. The Orient as a place of pilgrimage is one; so too is the vision of Orient as spectacle, or &#039;&#039;tableau vivant&#039;&#039;. Every work on the Orient in these categories tries to characterize the place, of course, but what is of greater interest is the extent to which the work&#039;s internal structure is in some measure synonymous with a comprehensive &#039;&#039;interpretation&#039;&#039; (or an attempt at it) of the Orient. Most of the time, not surprisingly, this interpretation is a form of Romantic restructuring of the Orient, a re-vision of it, which restores it redemptively to the present. Every interpretation, every structure created for the Orient, then, is a reinterpretation, a rebuilding of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having said that, we return directly to differences between the categories. Lane&#039;s book on the Egyptians was influential, it was frequently read and cited (by Flaubert among others), and it established its author&#039;s reputation as an eminent figure in Orientalist scholarship. In other words, Lane&#039;s authority was gained, not by virtue simply of what he said, but by virtue of how what he said could be adapted to Orientalism. He is quoted as a source of knowledge about Egypt or Arabia, whereas Burton or Flaubert were and are read for what they tell us about Burton and Flaubert over and above their knowledge of the Orient. The author-function in Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; is less strong than in the other categories because his work was disseminated into the profession, consolidated by it, institutionalized with it. The authorial identity in a work of professional discipline such as his is subordinated to the demands of the field, as well as to the demands of the subject matter. But this is not done simply, or without raising problems.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s classic, &#039;&#039;An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; (1836), was the self-conscious result of a series of works and of two periods of residence in Egypt (1825-1828 and 1833-1835). One uses the phrase &amp;quot;self-conscious&amp;quot; with some emphasis here because the impression Lane wished to give was that his study was a work of immediate and direct, unadorned and neutral, description, whereas in fact it was the product of considerable editing (the work he wrote was not the one he finally published) and also of a considerable variety of quite special efforts. Nothing in his birth or background seemed to destine him for the Orient, except his methodical studiousness and his capacity for classical studies and for mathematics, which somewhat explain the apparent internal neatness of his book. His preface offers a series of interesting clues about what it was that he did for the book. He went to Egypt originally to study Arabic. Then, after making some notes about modern Egypt, he was encouraged to produce a systematic work on the country and its inhabitants by a committee of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. From being a random set of observations the work was changed into a document of useful knowledge, knowledge arranged for and readily accessible to anyone wishing to know the essentials of a foreign society. The preface makes it clear that such knowledge must somehow dispose of pre-existing knowledge, as well as claim for itself a particularly effective character: here Lane is the subtle polemicist. He must show initially that he did what others before him either could not or did not do, and then, that he was able to acquire information both authentic and perfectly correct. And thus his peculiar authority begins to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;
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While Lane dallies in his preface with a Dr. Russell&#039;s &amp;quot;account of the people of Aleppo&amp;quot; (a forgotten work), it is obvious that the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039; is his main antecedent competition. But that work, confined by Lane to a long footnote, is mentioned in contemptuous quotation marks as &amp;quot;the great French work&amp;quot; on Egypt. &#039;&#039;That&#039;&#039; work was at once too philosophically general and too careless, Lane says; and Jacob Burckhardt&#039;s famous study was merely a collection of proverbial Egyptian wisdom, &amp;quot;bad tests of the morality of a people.&amp;quot; Unlike the French and Burckhardt, Lane was able to submerge himself amongst the natives, to live as they did, to conform to their habits, and &amp;quot;to escape exciting, in strangers, any suspicion of ... being a person who had no right to intrude among them.&amp;quot; Lest that imply Lane&#039;s having lost his objectivity, he goes on to say that he conformed only to the &#039;&#039;words&#039;&#039; (his italics) of the Koran, and that he was always aware of his difference from an essentially alien culture.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Edward William Lane, Author&#039;s Preface to &#039;&#039;An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; (1836; reprint ed., London: J. M. Dent, 1936), pp. xx, xxi.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus while one portion of Lane&#039;s identity floats easily in the unsuspecting Muslim sea, a submerged part retains its secret European power, to comment on, acquire, possess everything around it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist can imitate the Orient without the opposite being true. What he says about the Orient is therefore to be understood as description obtained in a one-way exchange: as &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; spoke and behaved, &#039;&#039;he&#039;&#039; observed and wrote down. His power was to have existed amongst them as a native speaker, as it were, and also as a secret writer. And what he wrote was intended as useful knowledge, not for them, but for Europe and its various disseminative institutions. For that is one thing that Lane&#039;s prose never lets us forget: that ego, the first-person pronoun moving through Egyptian customs, rituals, festivals, infancy, adulthood, and burial rites, is in reality both an Oriental masquerade and an Orientalist device for capturing and conveying valuable, otherwise inaccessible information. As narrator, Lane is both exhibit and exhibitor, winning two confidences at once, displaying two appetites for experience: the Oriental one for engaging companionship (or so it seems) and the Western one for authoritative, useful knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nothing illustrates this better than the last tripartite episode in the preface. Lane there describes his principal informant and friend, Sheikh Ahmed, as companion and as curiosity. Together the two pretend that Lane is a Muslim; yet only after Ahmed conquers his fear, inspired by Lane&#039;s audacious mimicry, can he go through the motions of praying by his side in a mosque. This final achievement is preceded by two scenes in which Ahmed is portrayed as a bizarre glass-eater and a polygamist. In all three portions of the Sheikh Ahmed episode the distance between the Muslim and Lane increases, even as in the action itself it decreases. As mediator and translator, so to speak, of Muslim behavior, Lane ironically enters the Muslim pattern only far enough to be able to describe it in a sedate English prose. His identity as counterfeit believer and privileged European is the very essence of bad faith, for the latter undercuts the former in no uncertain way. Thus what seems to be factual reporting of what &#039;&#039;one&#039;&#039; rather peculiar Muslim does is made to appear by Lane as the candidly exposed center of &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; Muslim faith. No mind is given by Lane to the betrayal of his friendship with Ahmed or with the others who provide him with information. What matters is that the report seem accurate, general, and dispassionate, that the English reader be convinced that Lane was never infected with heresy or apostasy, and finally, that Lane&#039;s text cancel the human content of its subject matter in favor of its scientific validity.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is for all these ends that the book is organized, not simply as the narrative of Lane&#039;s residence in Egypt but as narrative structure overwhelmed by Orientalist restructuring and detail. This, I think, is the central achievement of Lane&#039;s work. In outline and shape &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; follows the routine of an eighteenth-century novel, say one by Fielding. The book opens with an account of country and setting, followed by chapters on &amp;quot;Personal Characteristics&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Infancy and Early Education.&amp;quot; Twenty-five chapters on such things as festivals, laws, character, industry, magic, and domestic life precede the last section, &amp;quot;Death and Funeral Rites.&amp;quot; On the face of it, Lane&#039;s argument is chronological and developmental. He writes about himself as the observer of scenes that follow the major divisions in the human lifetime: his model is the narrative pattern, as it is in &#039;&#039;Tom Jones&#039;&#039; with the hero&#039;s birth, adventures, marriage, and implied death. Only in Lane&#039;s text the narrative voice is ageless; his subject, however, the modern Egyptian, goes through the individual life-cycle. This reversal, by which a solitary individual endows himself with timeless faculties and imposes on a society and people a personal life-span, is but the first of several operations regulating what might have been the mere narration of travels in foreign parts, turning an artless text into an encyclopedia of exotic display and a playground for Orientalist scrutiny.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s control of his material is not only established through his dramatized double presence (as fake Muslim and genuine Westerner) and his manipulation of narrative voice and subject, but also through his use of detail. Each major section in each chapter is invariably introduced with some unsurprising general observation. For example, &amp;quot;it is generally observed that many of the most remarkable peculiarities in the manners, customs, and character of a nation are attributable to the physical peculiarities of the country.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What follows confirms this easily--the Nile, Egypt&#039;s &amp;quot;remarkably salubrious&amp;quot; climate, the peasant&#039;s &amp;quot;precise&amp;quot; labor. Yet instead of this leading to the next episode in narrative order, the detail is added to, and consequently the narrative fulfillment expected on purely formal grounds is not given. In other words, although the gross outlines of Lane&#039;s text conform to the narrative and causal sequence of birth-life-death, the special detail introduced during the sequence itself foils narrative movement. From a general observation, to a delineation of some aspect of Egyptian character, to an account of Egyptian childhood, adolescence, maturity, and senescence, Lane is always there with great detail to &#039;&#039;prevent&#039;&#039; smooth transitions. Shortly after we hear about Egypt&#039;s salubrious climate, for instance, we are informed that few Egyptians live beyond a few years, because of fatal illness, the absence of medical aid, and oppressive summer weather. Thereafter we are told that the heat &amp;quot;excites the Egyptian [an unqualified generalization] to intemperance in sensual enjoyments,&amp;quot; and soon are bogged down in descriptions, complete with charts and line drawings, of Cairene architecture, decoration, fountains, and locks. When a narrative strain re-emerges, it is clearly only as a formality.&lt;br /&gt;
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What prevents narrative order, at the very same time that narrative order is the dominating fiction of Lane&#039;s text, is sheer, overpowering, monumental description. Lane&#039;s objective is to make Egypt and the Egyptians totally visible, to keep nothing hidden from his reader, to deliver the Egyptians without depth, in swollen detail. As rapporteur his propensity is for sadomasochistic colossal tidbits: the self-multilation of dervishes, the cruelty of judges, the blending of religion with licentiousness among Muslims, the excess of libidinous passions, and so on. Yet no matter how odd and perverse the event and how lost we become in its dizzying detail, Lane is ubiquitous, his job being to reassemble the pieces and enable us to move on, albeit jerkily. To a certain extent he does this by just being a European who can discursively control the passions and excitements to which the Muslims are unhappily subject. But to an even greater extent, Lane&#039;s capacity to rein in his profuse subject matter with an unyielding bridle of discipline and detachment depends on his cold distance from Egyptian life and Egyptian productivity.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main symbolic moment occurs at the beginning of chapter 6, &amp;quot;Domestic Life--Continued.&amp;quot; By now Lane has adopted the narrative convention of taking a walk through Egyptian life, and having reached the end of his tour of the public rooms and habits of an Egyptian household (the social and spatial worlds are mixed together by him), he begins to discuss the intimate side of home life. Immediately, he &amp;quot;must give some account of marriage and the marriage-ceremonies.&amp;quot; As usual, the account begins with a general observation: to abstain from marriage &amp;quot;when a man has attained a sufficient age, and when there is no just impediment, is esteemed by the Egyptians improper, and even disreputable.&amp;quot; Without transition this observation is applied by Lane to himself, and he is found guilty. For one long paragraph he then recounts the pressures placed on him to get married, which he unflinchingly refuses. Finally, after a native friend even offers to arrange a &#039;&#039;mariage de convenance&#039;&#039;, also refused by Lane, the whole sequence is abruptly terminated with a period and a dash.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 160-1. The standard biography of Lane, published in 1877, was by his great-nephew, Stanley Lane-Poole. There is a sympathetic account of Lane by A. J. Arberry in his &#039;&#039;Oriental Essays: Portraits of Seven Scholars&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 87-121.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He resumes his general discussion with another general observation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only do we have here a typical Lane-esque interruption of the main narrative with untidy detail, we have also a firm and literal disengagement of the author from the productive processes of Oriental society. The mini-narrative of his refusal to join the society he describes concludes with a dramatic hiatus: &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; story cannot continue, he seems to be saying, so long as he does not enter the intimacy of domestic life, and so he drops from sight as a candidate for it. He literally abolishes himself as a human subject by refusing to marry into human society. Thus he preserves his authoritative identity as a mock participant and bolsters the objectivity of his narrative. If we already knew that Lane was a non-Muslim, we now know too that in order for him to become an Orientalist--instead of an Oriental--he had to deny himself the sensual enjoyments of domestic life. Moreover, he had also to avoid dating himself by entering the human life-cycle. Only in this negative way could he retain his timeless authority as observer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s choice was between living without &amp;quot;inconvenience and discomfort&amp;quot; and accomplishing his study of the modern Egyptians. The result of his choice is plainly to have made possible his definition of the Egyptians, since had he become one of them, his perspective would no longer have been antiseptically and asexually lexicographical. In two important and urgent ways, therefore, Lane gains scholarly credibility and legitimacy. First, by interfering with the ordinary narrative course of human life: this is the function of his colossal detail, in which the observing intelligence of a foreigner can introduce and then piece together massive information. The Egyptians are disemboweled for exposition, so to speak, then put together admonishingly by Lane. Second, by disengaging from the generation of Egyptian-Oriental life: this is the function of his subduing his animal appetite in the interest of disseminating information, not in and for Egypt, but in and for European learning at large. To have achieved both the imposition of a scholarly will upon an untidy reality and an intentional shift away from the place of his residence to the scene of his scholarly reputation is the source of his great fame in the annals of Orientalism. Useful knowledge such as his could only have been obtained, formulated, and diffused by such denials.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lane&#039;s two other major works, his never-completed Arabic lexicon and his uninspired translation of the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039;, consolidated the system of knowledge inaugurated by &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;. In both of his later works his individuality has disappeared entirely as a creative presence, as of course has the very idea of a narrative work. Lane the man appears only in the official persona of annotator and retranslator (the &#039;&#039;Nights&#039;&#039;) and impersonal lexicographer. From being an author contemporary with his subject matter, Lane became--as Orientalist scholar of classical Arabic and classical Islam--its survivor. But it is the form of that survival which is of interest. For Lane&#039;s legacy as a scholar mattered not to the Orient, of course, but to the institutions and agencies of his European society. And these were either academic--the official Orientalist societies, institutions, and agencies--or they were extra-academic in very particular ways, figuring in the work of later Europeans resident in the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we read Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, not as a source of Oriental lore, but as a work directed towards the growing organization of academic Orientalism, we will find it illuminating. The subordination of genetic ego to scholarly authority in Lane corresponds exactly to the increased specialization and institutionalization of knowledge about the Orient represented by the various Oriental societies. The Royal Asiatic Society was founded a decade before Lane&#039;s book appeared, but its committee of correspondence--whose &amp;quot;objects were to receive intelligence and inquiries relating to the arts, sciences, literature, history and antiquities&amp;quot; of the Orient&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Eden Pargiter, ed., &#039;&#039;Centenary Volume of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1823-1923&#039;&#039; (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), p. x.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--was the structural recipient of Lane&#039;s fund of information, processed and formulated as it was. As for the diffusion of such work as Lane&#039;s, there were not only the various societies of useful knowledge but also, in an age when the original Orientalist program of aiding commerce and trade with the Orient had become exhausted, the specialized learned societies whose products were works displaying the potential (if not actual) values of disinterested scholarship. Thus, a program of the Societe asiatique states:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To compose or to print grammars, dictionaries, and other elementary books recognized as useful or indispensable for the study of those languages taught by appointed professors [of Oriental languages]; by subscriptions or by other means to contribute to the publication of the same kind of work undertaken in France or abroad; to acquire manuscripts, or to copy either completely or in part those that are to be found in Europe, to translate or to make extracts from them, to multiply their number by reproducing them either by engraving or by lithography; to make it possible for the authors of useful works on geography, history, the arts, and the sciences to acquire the means for the public to enjoy the fruits of their nocturnal labors; to draw the attention of the public, by means of a periodic collection devoted to Asiatic literature, to the scientific, literary, or poetic productions of the Orient and those of the same sort that regularly are produced in Europe, to those facts about the Orient that could be relevant to Europe, to those discoveries and works of all kinds of which the Oriental peoples could become the subject: these are the objectives proposed for and by the Societe asiatique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Orientalism organized itself systematically as the acquisition of Oriental material and its regulated dissemination as a form of specialized knowledge. One copied and printed works of grammar, one acquired original texts, one multiplied their number and diffused them widely, even dispensed knowledge in periodic form. It was into and for this system that Lane wrote his work, and sacrificed his ego. The mode in which his work persisted in the archives of Orientalism was provided for also. There was to be a &amp;quot;museum,&amp;quot; Sacy said,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
a vast depot of objects of all kinds, of drawings, of original books, maps, accounts of voyages, all offered to those who wish to give themselves to the study of [the Orient]; in such a way that each of these students would be able to feel himself transported as if by enchantment into the midst of, say, a Mongolian tribe or of the Chinese race, whichever he might have made the object of his studies.... It is possible to say ... that after the publication of elementary books on ... the Oriental languages, nothing is more important than to lay the cornerstone of this museum, which I consider a living commentary upon and interpretation [&#039;&#039;truchement&#039;&#039;] of the dictionaries.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Societe asiatique: Livre du centenaire, 1822-1922&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1922), pp. 5-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Truchement&#039;&#039; derives nicely from the Arabic &#039;&#039;turjaman&#039;&#039;, meaning &amp;quot;interpreter,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;intermediary,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;spokesman.&amp;quot; On the one hand, Orientalism acquired the Orient as literally and as widely as possible; on the other, it domesticated this knowledge to the West, filtering it through regulatory codes, classifications, specimen cases, periodical reviews, dictionaries, grammars, commentaries, editions, translations, all of which together formed a simulacrum of the Orient and reproduced it materially in the West, for the West. The Orient, in short, would be converted from the personal, sometimes garbled testimony of intrepid voyagers and residents into impersonal definition by a whole array of scientific workers. It would be converted from the consecutive experience of individual research into a sort of imaginary museum without walls, where everything gathered from the huge distances and varieties of Oriental culture became categorically &#039;&#039;Oriental&#039;&#039;. It would be reconverted, restructured from the bundle of fragments brought back piecemeal by explorers, expeditions, commissions, armies, and merchants into lexicographical, bibliographical, departmentalized, and &#039;&#039;textualized&#039;&#039; Orientalist sense. By the middle of the nineteenth century the Orient had become, as Disraeli said, a career, one in which one could remake and restore not only the Orient but also oneself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;IV.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Pilgrims and Pilgrimages, British and French&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Every European traveler or resident in the Orient has had to protect himself from its unsettling influences. Someone like Lane ultimately rescheduled and resituated the Orient when he came to write about it. The eccentricities of Oriental life, with its odd calendars, its exotic spatial configurations, its hopelessly strange languages, its seemingly perverse morality, were reduced considerably when they appeared as a series of detailed items presented in a normative European prose style. It is correct to say that in Orientalizing the Orient, Lane not only defined but edited it; he excised from it what, in addition to his own human sympathies, might have ruffled the European sensibility. In most cases, the Orient seemed to have offended sexual propriety; everything about the Orient--or at least Lane&#039;s Orient-in-Egypt--exuded dangerous sex, threatened hygiene and domestic seemliness with an excessive &amp;quot;freedom of intercourse,&amp;quot; as Lane put it more irrepressibly than usual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there were other sorts of threats than sex. All of them wore away the European discreteness and rationality of time, space, and personal identity. In the Orient one suddenly confronted unimaginable antiquity, inhuman beauty, boundless distance. These could be put to use more innocently, as it were, if they were thought and written about, not directly experienced. In Byron&#039;s &amp;quot;Giaour,&amp;quot; in the &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039;, in Hugo&#039;s &#039;&#039;Orientales&#039;&#039;, the Orient is a form of release, a place of original opportunity, whose keynote was struck in Goethe&#039;s &amp;quot;Hegire&amp;quot;--&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nord und West Sud zersplittern,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throne bersten, Reiche zittern,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fluchte du, in reinen Osten&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patriarchenluft zu kosten!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(North, West, and South disintegrate,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thrones burst, empires tremble.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fly away, and in the pure East&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Taste the Patriarchs&#039; air.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One always &#039;&#039;returned&#039;&#039; to the Orient--&amp;quot;Dort, im Reinen und in Rechten/Will ich menschlichen Geschlechten/In des Ursprungs Tiefe dringen&amp;quot; (There in purity and righteousness will I go back to the profound origins of the human race)--seeing it as completion and confirmation of everything one had imagined:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gottes ist der Orient!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gottes ist der Okzident!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nord und sudliches Gelande&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ruht im Frieden seiner Hande.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039; (1819; reprint ed., Munich: Wilhelm Golmann, 1958), pp. 8-9, 12. Sacy&#039;s name is invoked with veneration in Goethe&#039;s apparatus for the &#039;&#039;Diwan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(God is the Orient!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
God is the Occident!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Northern and southern lands&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Repose in the peace of His hands.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Orient, with its poetry, its atmosphere, its possibilities, was represented by poets like Hafiz--&#039;&#039;unbegrenzt&#039;&#039;, boundless, Goethe said, older and younger than we Europeans. And for Hugo, in &amp;quot;Cri de guerre du mufti&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;La Douleur du pacha&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Victor Hugo, &#039;&#039;Les Orientales&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Pierre Albouy (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 1: 616-18.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the fierceness and the inordinate melancholy of Orientals was mediated, not by actual fear for life or disoriented lostness, but by Volney and George Sale, whose learned work translated barbarous splendor into usable information for the sublimely talented poet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What Orientalists like Lane, Sacy, Renan, Volney, Jones (not to mention the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;), and other pioneers made available, the literary crowd exploited. We must recall now our earlier discussion of the three types of work dealing with the Orient and based upon actual residence there. The rigorous exigencies of knowledge purged from Orientalist writing an authorial sensibility: hence Lane&#039;s self-excision, and hence also the first kind of work we enumerated. As for types two and three, the self is there prominently, subservient to a voice whose job it is to dispense real knowledge (type two), or dominating and mediating everything we are told about the Orient (type three). Yet from one end of the nineteenth century to the other--after Napoleon, that is--the Orient was a place of pilgrimage, and every major work belonging to a genuine if not always to an academic Orientalism took its form, style, and intention from the idea of pilgrimage there. In this idea as in so many of the other forms of Orientalist writing we have been discussing, the Romantic idea of restorative reconstruction (natural supernaturalism) is the principal source.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every pilgrim sees things his own way, but there are limits to what a pilgrimage can be for, to what shape and form it can take, to what truths it reveals. All pilgrimages to the Orient passed through, or had to pass through, the Biblical lands; most of them in fact were attempts either to relive or to liberate from the large, incredibly fecund Orient some portion of Judeo-Christian/Greco-Roman actuality. For these pilgrims the Orientalized Orient, the Orient of Orientalist scholars, was a gauntlet to be run, just as the Bible, the Crusades, Islam, Napoleon, and Alexander were redoubtable predecessors to be reckoned with. Not only does a learned Orient inhibit the pilgrim&#039;s musings and private fantasies; its very antecedence places barriers between the contemporary traveler and his writing, unless, as was the case with Nerval and Flaubert in their use of Lane, Orientalist work is severed from the library and caught in the aesthetic project. Another inhibition is that Orientalist writing is too circumscribed by the official requirements of Orientalist learning. A pilgrim like Chateaubriand claimed insolently that he undertook his voyages exclusively for his own sake: &amp;quot;j&#039;allais chercher des images: voila tout.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Francois-Rene de Chateaubriand, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres romanesques et voyages&#039;&#039;, ed. Maurice Regard (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 2: 702.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Flaubert, Vigny, Nerval, Kinglake, Disraeli, Burton, all undertook their pilgrimages in order to dispel the mustiness of the pre-existing Orientalist archive. Their writing was to be a fresh new repository of Oriental experience--but, as we shall see, even this project usually (but not always) resolved itself into the reductionism of the Orientalistic. The reasons are complex, and they have very much to do with the nature of the pilgrim, his mode of writing, and the intentional form of his work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What was the Orient for the individual traveler in the nineteenth century? Consider first the differences between an English speaker and a French speaker. For the former the Orient was India, of course, an actual British possession; to pass through the Near Orient was therefore to pass en route to a major colony. Already, then, the room available for imaginative play was limited by the realities of administration, territorial legality, and executive power. Scott, Kinglake, Disraeli, Warburton, Burton, and even George Eliot (in whose &#039;&#039;Daniel Deronda&#039;&#039; the Orient has plans made for it) are writers, like Lane himself and Jones before him, for whom the Orient was defined by material possession, by a material imagination, as it were. England had defeated Napoleon, evicted France: what the English mind surveyed was an imperial domain which by the 1880s had become an unbroken patch of British-held territory, from the Mediterranean to India. To write about Egypt, Syria, or Turkey, as much as traveling in them, was a matter of touring the realm of political will, political management, political definition. The territorial imperative was extremely compelling, even for so unrestrained a writer as Disraeli, whose &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; is not merely an Oriental lark but an exercise in the astute political management of actual forces on actual territories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In contrast, the French pilgrim was imbued with a sense of acute loss in the Orient. He came there to a place in which France, unlike Britain, had no sovereign presence. The Mediterranean echoed with the sounds of French defeats, from the Crusades to Napoleon. What was to become known as &amp;quot;la mission civilisatrice&amp;quot; began in the nineteenth century as a political second-best to Britain&#039;s presence. Consequently French pilgrims from Volney on planned and projected for, imagined, ruminated about places that were principally &#039;&#039;in their minds&#039;&#039;; they constructed schemes for a typically French, perhaps even a European, concert in the Orient, which of course they supposed would be orchestrated by them. Theirs was the Orient of memories, suggestive ruins, forgotten secrets, hidden correspondences, and an almost virtuosic style of being, an Orient whose highest literary forms would be found in Nerval and Flaubert, both of whose work was solidly fixed in an imaginative, unrealizable (except aesthetically) dimension.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was also true to a certain extent of scholarly French travelers in the Orient. Most of them were interested in the Biblical past or in the Crusades, as Henri Bordeaux has argued in his &#039;&#039;Voyageurs d&#039;Orient&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Henri Bordeaux, &#039;&#039;Voyageurs d&#039;Orient: Des pelerins aux meharistes de Palmyre&#039;&#039; (Paris: Plon, 1926). I have found useful the theoretical ideas about pilgrims and pilgrimages contained in Victor Turner, &#039;&#039;Dramas&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Fields&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society&#039;&#039; (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 166-230.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; To these names we must add (at Hassan al-Nouty&#039;s suggestion) the names of Oriental Semiticists, including Quatremere; Saulcy, the explorer of the Dead Sea; Renan as Phoenician archaeologist; Judas, the student of Phoenician languages; Catafago and Defremery, who studied the Ansarians, Ismailis, and Seljuks; Clermont-Ganneau, who explored Judea; and the Marquis de Vogue, whose work centered on Palmyrian epigraphy. In addition there was the whole school of Egyptologists descended from Champollion and Mariette, a school that would later include Maspero and Legrain. As an index of the difference between British realities and French fantasies, it is worthwhile recalling the words in Cairo of the painter Ludovic Lepic, who commented sadly in 1884 (two years after the British occupation had begun): &amp;quot;L&#039;Orient est mort au Caire.&amp;quot; Only Renan, ever the realistic racist, condoned the British suppression of Arabi&#039;s nationalist rebellion, which, out of his greater wisdom, he said was a &amp;quot;disgrace to civilization.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hassan al-Nouty, &#039;&#039;Le Proche-Orient dans la litterature francaise de Nerval a Barres&#039;&#039; (Paris: Nizet, 1958), pp. 47-8, 277, 272.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unlike Volney and Napoleon, the nineteenth-century French pilgrims did not seek a scientific so much as an exotic yet especially attractive reality. This is obviously true of the literary pilgrims, beginning with Chateaubriand, who found in the Orient a locale sympathetic to their private myths, obsessions, and requirements. Here we notice how all the pilgrims, but especially the French ones, exploit the Orient in their work so as in some urgent way to justify their existential vocation. Only when there is some additional cognitive purpose in writing about the Orient does the outpouring of self seem more under control. Lamartine, for instance, writes about himself, and also about France as a power in the Orient; that second enterprise mutes and finally controls imperatives heaped upon his style by &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; soul, &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; memory, and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; imagination. No pilgrim, French or English, could so ruthlessly dominate his self or his subject as Lane did. Even Burton and T. E. Lawrence, of whom the former fashioned a deliberately Muslim pilgrimage and the latter what he called a reverse pilgrimage &#039;&#039;away&#039;&#039; from Mecca, delivered masses of historical, political, and social Orientalism that were never as free of their egos as Lane&#039;s were of his. This is why Burton, Lawrence, and Charles Doughty occupy a middle position between Lane and Chateaubriand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire de Paris a Jerusalem&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;et de Jerusalem a Paris&#039;&#039; (1810-1811) records the details of a journey undertaken in 1805-1806, after he had traveled in North America. Its many hundreds of pages bear witness to its author&#039;s admission that &amp;quot;je parle eternellement de moi,&amp;quot; so much so that Stendhal, no self-abnegating writer himself, could find Chateaubriand&#039;s failure as a knowledgeable traveler to be the result of his &amp;quot;stinking egotism.&amp;quot; He brought a very heavy load of personal objectives and suppositions to the Orient, unloaded them there, and proceeded thereafter to push people, places, and ideas around in the Orient as if nothing could resist his imperious imagination. Chateaubriand came to the Orient as a constructed &#039;&#039;figure&#039;&#039;, not as a true self. For him Bonaparte was the last Crusader; he in turn was &amp;quot;the last Frenchman who left his country to travel in the Holy Land with the ideas, the goals, and the sentiments of a pilgrim of former times.&amp;quot; But there were other reasons. Symmetry: having been to the New World and seen its monuments of nature, he needed to complete his circle of studies by visiting the Orient and its monuments of knowledge: as he had studied Roman and Celtic antiquity, all that was left for him was the ruins of Athens, Memphis, and Carthage. Self-completion: he needed to replenish his stock of images. Confirmation of the importance of the religious spirit: &amp;quot;religion is a kind of universal language understood by all men,&amp;quot; and where better to observe it than there in the Orient, even in lands where a comparatively low religion like Islam held sway. Above all, the need to see things, not as they were, but as Chateaubriand supposed they were: the Koran was &amp;quot;le livre de Mahomet&amp;quot;; it contained &amp;quot;ni principe de civilisation, ni precepte qui puisse elever le caractere.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;This book,&amp;quot; he continued, more or less freely inventing as he went along, &amp;quot;preaches neither hatred of tyranny nor love of liberty.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chateaubriand, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 2: 702 and note, 1684, 769-70, 769, 701, 808, 908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To so preciously constituted a figure as Chateaubriand, the Orient was a decrepit canvas awaiting his restorative efforts. The Oriental Arab was &amp;quot;civilized man fallen again into a savage state&amp;quot;: no wonder, then, that as he watched Arabs trying to speak French, Chateaubriand felt like Robinson Crusoe thrilled by hearing his parrot speak for the first time. True, there were places like Bethlehem (whose etymological meaning Chateaubriand got completely wrong) in which one found again some semblance of real--that is, European--civilization, but those were few and far between. Everywhere, one encountered Orientals, Arabs whose civilization, religion, and manners were so low, barbaric, and antithetical as to merit reconquest. The Crusades, he argued, were not aggression; they were a just Christian counterpart to Omar&#039;s arrival in Europe. Besides, he added, even if the Crusades in their modern or original form were aggression, the issue they raised transcended such questions of ordinary mortality:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Crusades were not only about the deliverance of the Holy Sepulchre, but more about knowing which would win on the earth, a cult that was civilization&#039;s enemy, systematically favorable to ignorance [this was Islam, of course], to despotism, to slavery, or a cult that had caused to reawaken in modern people the genius of a sage antiquity, and had abolished base servitude?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 1011, 979, 990, 1052.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the first significant mention of an idea that will acquire an almost unbearable, next to mindless authority in European writing: the theme of Europe teaching the Orient the meaning of liberty, which is an idea that Chateaubriand and everyone after him believed that Orientals, and especially Muslims, knew nothing about.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of liberty, they know nothing; of propriety, they have none: force is their God. When they go for long periods without seeing conquerors who do heavenly justice, they have the air of soldiers without a leader, citizens without legislators, and a family without a father.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1069.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Already in 1810 we have a European talking like Cromer in 1910, arguing that Orientals require conquest, and finding it no paradox that a Western conquest of the Orient was not conquest after all, but liberty. Chateaubriand puts the whole idea in the Romantic redemptive terms of a Christian mission to revive a dead world, to quicken in it a sense of its own potential, one which only a European can discern underneath a lifeless and degenerate surface. For the traveler this means that he must use the Old Testament and the Gospels as his guide in Palestine;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1031.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; only in this way can the apparent degeneration of the modern Orient be gotten beyond. Yet Chateaubriand senses no irony in the fact that his tour and his vision will reveal nothing to him about the modern Oriental and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; destiny. What matters about the Orient is what it lets happen to Chateaubriand, what it allows his spirit to do, what it permits him to reveal about himself, his ideas, his expectations. The liberty that so concerns him is no more than his own release from the Orient&#039;s hostile wastes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where his release allows him to go is directly back into the realm of imagination and imaginative interpretation. Description of the Orient is obliterated by the designs and patterns foisted upon it by the imperial ego, which makes no secret of its powers. If in Lane&#039;s prose we watch the ego disappear so that the Orient may appear in all its realistic detail, in Chateaubriand the ego dissolves itself in the contemplation of wonders it creates, and then is reborn, stronger than ever, more able to savor its powers and enjoy its interpretations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When one travels in Judea, at first a great ennui grips the heart; but when, passing from one solitary place to another, space stretches out without limits before you, slowly the ennui dissipates, and one feels a secret terror, which, far from depressing the soul, gives it courage and elevates one&#039;s native genius. Extraordinary things are disclosed from all parts of an earth worked over by miracles: the burning sun, the impetuous eagle, the sterile fig tree; all of poetry, all the scenes from Scripture are present there. Every name encloses a mystery; every grotto declares the future; every summit retains within it the accents of a prophet. God Himself has spoken from these shores: the arid torrents, the riven rocks, the open tombs attest to the prodigy; the desert still seems struck dumb with terror, and one would say that it has still not been able to break the silence since it heard the voice of the eternal.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 999.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The process of thought in this passage is revealing. An experience of Pascalian terror does not merely reduce one&#039;s self-confidence, it miraculously stimulates it. The barren landscape stands forth like an illuminated text presenting itself to the scrutiny of a very strong, refortified ego. Chateaubriand has transcended the abject, if frightening, reality of the contemporary Orient so that he may stand in an original and creative relationship to it. By the end of the passage he is no longer a modern man but a visionary seer more or less contemporary with God; if the Judean desert has been silent since God spoke there, it is Chateaubriand who can hear the silence, understand its meaning, and--to his reader--make the desert speak again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The great gifts of sympathetic intuition which had enabled Chateaubriand to represent and interpret North American mysteries in &#039;&#039;Rene&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Atala&#039;&#039;, as well as Christianity in &#039;&#039;Le Genie du Christianisme&#039;&#039;, are aroused to even greater feats of interpretation during the &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039;. No longer is the author dealing with natural primitivity and romantic sentiment: here he is dealing with eternal creativity and divine originality themselves, for it is in the Biblical Orient that they were first deposited, and they have remained there in unmediated and latent form. Of course, they cannot be simply grasped; they must be aspired to and achieved by Chateaubriand. And it is this ambitious purpose that the &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039; is made to serve, just as in the text Chateaubriand&#039;s ego must be reconstructed radically enough to get the job done. Unlike Lane, Chateaubriand attempts to &#039;&#039;consume&#039;&#039; the Orient. He not only appropriates it, he represents and speaks for it, not in history but beyond history, in the timeless dimension of a completely healed world, where men and lands, God and men, are as one. In Jerusalem, therefore, at the center of his vision and at the ultimate end of his pilgrimage, he grants himself a sort of total reconciliation with the Orient, the Orient as Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Greek, Persian, Roman, and finally French. He is moved by the plight of the Jews, but he judges that they too serve to illuminate his general vision, and as a further benefit, they give the necessary poignance to his Christian vindictiveness. God, he says, has chosen a new people, and it is not the Jews.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 1126-27, 1049.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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He makes some other concessions to terrestrial reality, however. If Jerusalem is booked into his itinerary as its final extraterrestrial goal, Egypt provides him with material for a political excursus. His ideas about Egypt supplement his pilgrimage nicely. The magnificent Nile Delta moves him to assert that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I found only the memories of my glorious country worthy of those magnificent plains; I saw the remains of monuments of a new civilization, brought to the banks of the Nile by the genius of France.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1137.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But these ideas are put in a nostalgic mode because in Egypt Chateaubriand believes he can equate the absence of France with the absence of a free government ruling a happy people. Besides, after Jerusalem, Egypt appears to be only a kind of spiritual anticlimax. After political commentary on its sorry state, Chateaubriand asks himself the routine question about &amp;quot;difference&amp;quot; as a result of historical development: how can this degenerate stupid mob of &amp;quot;Musulmans&amp;quot; have come to inhabit the same land whose vastly different owners so impressed Herodotus and Diodorus?&lt;br /&gt;
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This is a fitting valedictory to Egypt, which he leaves for Tunis, Carthaginian ruins, and finally, home. Yet he does one last thing of note in Egypt: unable to do more than look at the Pyramids from a distance, he takes the trouble to send an emissary there, to have him inscribe his (Chateaubriand&#039;s) name on the stone, adding for our benefit, &amp;quot;one has to fulfill all the little obligations of a pious traveler.&amp;quot; We would not ordinarily give much more than amused attention to this charming bit of touristic banality. As a preparation, however, for the very last page of the &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039;, it appears more important than at first glance. Reflecting on his twenty-year project to study &amp;quot;tous les hasards et tous les chagrins&amp;quot; as an exile, Chateaubriand notes elegiacally how every one of his books has been in fact a kind of prolongation of his existence. A man with neither a home nor the possibility of acquiring one, he finds himself now well past his youth. If heaven accords him eternal rest, he says, he promises to dedicate himself in silence to erecting a &amp;quot;monument a ma patrie.&amp;quot; What he is left with on earth, however, is his writing, which, if his name will live, has been enough, and if it will not live, has been too much.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 1148, 1214.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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These closing lines send us back to Chateaubriand&#039;s interest in getting his name inscribed on the Pyramids. We will have understood that his egoistic Oriental memoirs supply us with a constantly demonstrated, an indefatigably performed experience of self. Writing was an act of life for Chateaubriand, for whom nothing, not even a distant piece of stone, must remain scriptively untouched by him if he was to stay alive. If the order of Lane&#039;s narrative was to be violated by scientific authority and enormous detail, then Chateaubriand&#039;s was to be transformed into the asserted will of an egoistic, highly volatile individual. Whereas Lane would sacrifice his ego to the Orientalist canon, Chateaubriand would make everything he said about the Orient wholly dependent on his ego. Yet neither writer could conceive of his posterity as continuing on fruitfully after him. Lane entered the impersonality of a technical discipline: his work would be used, but not as a human document. Chateaubriand, on the other hand, saw that his writing, like the token inscription of his name on a Pyramid, would signify his self; if not, if he had not succeeded in prolonging his life by writing, it would be merely excessive, superfluous.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if all travelers to the Orient after Chateaubriand and Lane have taken their work into account (in some cases, even to the extent of copying from them verbatim), their legacy embodies the fate of Orientalism and the options to which it was limited. Either one wrote science like Lane or personal utterance like Chateaubriand. The problems with the former were its impersona Western confidence that descriptions of general, collective phenomena were possible, and its tendency to make realities not so much out of the Orient as out of its own observations. The problem with personal utterance was that it inevitably retreated into a position equating the Orient with private fantasy, even if that fantasy was of a very high order indeed, aesthetically speaking. In both cases, of course, Orientalism enjoyed a powerful influence on how the Orient was described and characterized. But what that influence always prevented, even until today, was some sense of the Orient that was neither impossibly general nor imperturbably private. To look into Orientalism for a lively sense of an Oriental&#039;s human or even social reality--as a contemporary inhabitant of the modern world--is to look in vain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The influence of the two options I have described, Lane&#039;s and Chateaubriand&#039;s, British and French, is a great deal of the reason for this omission. The growth of knowledge, particularly specialized knowledge, is a very slow process. Far from being merely additive or cumulative, the growth of knowledge is a process of selective accumulation, displacement, deletion, rearrangement, and insistence within what has been called a research consensus. The legitimacy of such knowledge as Orientalism was during the nineteenth century stemmed not from religious authority, as had been the case before the Enlightenment, but from what we can call the restorative citation of antecedent authority. Beginning with Sacy, the learned Orientalist&#039;s attitude was that of a scientist who surveyed a series of textual fragments, which he thereafter edited and arranged as a restorer of old sketches might put a series of them together for the cumulative picture they implicitly represent. Consequently, amongst themselves Orientalists treat each other&#039;s work in the same citationary way. Burton, for example, would deal with the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039; or with Egypt indirectly, &#039;&#039;through&#039;&#039; Lane&#039;s work, by citing his predecessor, challenging him even though he was granting him very great authority. Nerval&#039;s own voyage to the Orient was by way of Lamartine&#039;s, and the latter&#039;s by way of Chateaubriand. In short, as a form of growing knowledge Orientalism resorted mainly to citations of predecessor scholars in the field for its nutriment. Even when new materials came his way, the Orientalist judged them by borrowing from predecessors (as scholars so often do) their perspectives, ideologies, and guiding theses. In a fairly strict way, then, Orientalists after Sacy and Lane rewrote Sacy and Lane; after Chateaubriand, pilgrims rewrote him. From these complex rewritings the actualities of the modern Orient were systematically excluded, especially when gifted pilgrims like Nerval and Flaubert preferred Lane&#039;s descriptions to what their eyes and minds showed them immediately.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the system of knowledge about the Orient, the Orient is less a place than a &#039;&#039;topos&#039;&#039;, a set of references, a congeries of characteristics, that seems to have its origin in a quotation, or a fragment of a text, or a citation from someone&#039;s work on the Orient, or some bit of previous imagining, or an amalgam of all these. Direct observation or circumstantial description of the Orient are the fictions presented by writing on the Orient, yet invariably these are totally secondary to systematic tasks of another sort. In Lamartine, Nerval, and Flaubert, the Orient is a re-presentation of canonical material guided by an aesthetic and executive will capable of producing interest in the reader. Yet in all three writers, Orientalism or some aspect of it is asserted, even though, as I said earlier, the narrative consciousness is given a very large role to play. What we shall see is that for all its eccentric individuality, this narrative consciousness will end up by being aware, like Bouvard and Pecuchet, that pilgrimage is after all a form of copying.&lt;br /&gt;
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When he began his trip to the Orient in 1833, Lamartine did so, he said, as something he had always dreamed about: &amp;quot;un voyage en Orient [etait] comme un grand acte de ma vie interieure.&amp;quot; He is a bundle of predispositions, sympathies, biases: he hates the Romans and Carthage, and loves Jews, Egyptians, and Hindus, whose Dante he claims he will become. Armed with a formal verse &amp;quot;Adieu&amp;quot; to France, in which he lists everything that he plans to do in the Orient, he embarks for the East. At first everything he encounters either confirms his poetic predictions or realizes his propensity for analogy. Lady Hester Stanhope is the Circe of the desert; the Orient is the &amp;quot;patrie de mon imagination&amp;quot;; the Arabs are a primitive people; Biblical poetry is engraved on the land of Lebanon; the Orient testifies to the attractive largeness of Asia and to Greece&#039;s comparative smallness. Soon after he reaches Palestine, however, he becomes the incorrigible maker of an imaginary Orient. He alleges that the plains of Canaan appear to best advantage in the works of Poussin and Lorrain. From being a &amp;quot;translation,&amp;quot; as he called it earlier, his voyage is now turned into a prayer, which exercises his memory, soul, and heart more than it does his eyes, mind, or spirit.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alphonse de Lamartine, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; (1835; reprint ed., Paris: Hachette, 1887), 1: 10, 48-9, 179, 178, 148, 189, 118, 245-6, 251.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This candid announcement completely unlooses Lamartine&#039;s analogic and reconstructive (and undisciplined) zeal. Christianity is a religion of imagination and recollection, and since Lamartine considers that he typifies the pious believer, he indulges himself accordingly. A catalogue of his tendentious &amp;quot;observations&amp;quot; would be interminable: a woman he sees reminds him of Haidee in &#039;&#039;Don Juan&#039;&#039;; the relationship between Jesus and Palestine is like that between Rousseau and Geneva; the actual river Jordan is less important than the &amp;quot;mysteries&amp;quot; it gives rise to in one&#039;s soul; Orientals, and Muslims in particular, are lazy, their politics are capricious, passionate, and futureless; another woman reminds him of a passage in &#039;&#039;Atala&#039;&#039;; neither Tasso nor Chateaubriand (whose antecedent travels seem often to harass Lamartine&#039;s otherwise heedless egoism) got the Holy Land right--and on and on. His pages on Arabic poetry, about which he discourses with supreme confidence, betray no discomfort at his total ignorance of the language. All that matters to him is that his travels in the Orient reveal to him how the Orient is &amp;quot;la terre des cultes, des prodiges,&amp;quot; and that he is its appointed poet in the West. With no trace of self-irony he announces:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This Arab land is the land of prodigies; everything sprouts there, and every credulous or fanatical man can become a prophet there in his turn.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., 1: 363; 2: 74-5; 1: 475.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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He has become a prophet merely by the fact of residence in the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the end of his narrative Lamartine has achieved the purpose of his pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre, that beginning and end point of all time and space. He has internalized reality enough to want to retreat from it back into pure contemplation, solitude, philosophy, and poetry.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., 2: 92-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Rising above the merely geographical Orient, he is transformed into a latter-day Chateaubriand, surveying the East as if it were a personal (or at the very least a French) province ready to be disposed of by European powers. From being a traveler and pilgrim in real time and space, Lamartine has become a transpersonal ego identifying itself in power and consciousness with the whole of Europe. What he sees before him is the Orient in the process of its inevitable future dismemberment, being taken over and consecrated by European suzerainty. Thus in Lamartine&#039;s climactic vision the Orient is reborn as European right-to-power over it:&lt;br /&gt;
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This sort of suzerainty thus defined, and consecrated as a European right, will consist principally in the right to occupy one or another territory, as well as the coasts, in order to found there either free cities, or European colonies, or commercial ports of call....&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor does Lamartine stop at this. He climbs still higher to the point where the Orient, what he has just seen and where he has just been, is reduced to &amp;quot;nations without territory, &#039;&#039;patrie&#039;&#039;, rights, laws or security ... waiting anxiously for the shelter&amp;quot; of European occupation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., 2: 526-7, 533. Two important works on French writers in the Orient are Jean-Marie Carre, &#039;&#039;Voyageurs et ecrivains francais en Egypte&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Cairo: Institut francais d&#039;archeologie orientale, 1932), and Moenis Taha-Hussein, &#039;&#039;Le Romantisme francais et l&#039;Islam&#039;&#039; (Beirut: Dar-el-Maeref, 1962).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In all the visions of the Orient fabricated by Orientalism there is no recapitulation, literally, as entire as this one. For Lamartine a pilgrimage to the Orient has involved not only the penetration of the Orient by an imperious consciousness but also the virtual elimination of that consciousness as a result of its accession to a kind of impersonal and continental control over the Orient. The Orient&#039;s actual identity is withered away into a set of consecutive fragments, Lamartine&#039;s recollective observations, which are later to be gathered up and brought forth as a restated Napoleonic dream of world hegemony. Whereas Lane&#039;s human identity disappeared into the scientific grid of his Egyptian classifications, Lamartine&#039;s consciousness transgresses its normal bounds completely. In so doing, it repeats Chateaubriand&#039;s journey and his visions only to move on beyond them, into the sphere of the Shelleyan and Napoleonic abstract, by which worlds and populations are moved about like so many cards on a table. What remains of the Orient in Lamartine&#039;s prose is not very substantial at all. Its geopolitical reality has been overlaid with his plans for it; the sites he has visited, the people he has met, the experiences he has had, are reduced to a few echoes in his pompous generalizations. The last traces of particularity have been rubbed out in the &amp;quot;resume politique&amp;quot; with which the &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; concludes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Against the transcendent quasi-national egoism of Lamartine we must place Nerval and Flaubert in contrast. Their Oriental works play a substantial role in their total &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039;, a much greater one than Lamartine&#039;s imperialist &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; in his &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039;. Yet both of them, like Lamartine, came to the Orient prepared for it by voluminous reading in the classics, modern literature, and academic Orientalism; about this preparation Flaubert was much more candid than Nerval, who in &#039;&#039;Les Filles du feu&#039;&#039; says disingenuously that all he knew about the Orient was a half-forgotten memory from his school education.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gerard de Nerval, &#039;&#039;Les Filles du feu&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Albert Beguin and Jean Richet (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 1: 297-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The evidence of his &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; flatly contradicts this, although it shows a much less systematic and disciplined knowledge of Orientalia than Flaubert&#039;s. More important, however, is the fact that both writers (Nerval in 1842-1843 and Flaubert in 1849-1850) had greater personal and aesthetic uses for their visits to the Orient than any other nineteenth-century travelers. It is not inconsequential that both were geniuses to begin with, and that both were thoroughly steeped in aspects of European culture that encouraged a sympathetic, if perverse, vision of the Orient. Nerval and Flaubert belonged to that community of thought and feeling described by Mario Praz in &#039;&#039;The Romantic Agony&#039;&#039;, a community for which the imagery of exotic places, the cultivation of sadomasochistic tastes (what Praz calls &#039;&#039;algolagnia&#039;&#039;), a fascination with the macabre, with the notion of a Fatal Woman, with secrecy and occultism, all combined to enable literary work of the sort produced by Gautier (himself fascinated by the Orient), Swinburne, Baudelaire, and Huysmans.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Mario Praz, &#039;&#039;The Romantic Agony&#039;&#039;, trans. Angus Davison (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1967).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Nerval and Flaubert, such female figures as Cleopatra, Salome, and Isis have a special significance; and it was by no means accidental that in their work on the Orient, as well as in their visits to it, they pre-eminently valorized and enhanced female types of this legendary, richly suggestive, and associative sort.&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to their general cultural attitudes, Nerval and Flaubert brought to the Orient a personal mythology whose concerns and even structure required the Orient. Both men were touched by the Oriental renaissance as Quinet and others had defined it: they sought the invigoration provided by the fabulously antique and the exotic. For each, however, the Oriental pilgrimage was a quest for something relatively personal: Flaubert seeking a &amp;quot;homeland,&amp;quot; as Jean Bruneau has called it,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jean Bruneau, &#039;&#039;Le &amp;quot;Conte Orientale&amp;quot; de Flaubert&#039;&#039; (Paris: Denoel, 1973), p. 79.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in the locales of the origin of religions, visions, and classical antiquity; Nerval seeking--or rather following--the traces of his personal sentiments and dreams, like Sterne&#039;s Yorick before him. For both writers the Orient was a place therefore of &#039;&#039;deja vu&#039;&#039;, and for both, with the artistic economy typical of all major aesthetic imaginations, it was a place often returned to after the actual voyage had been completed. For neither of them was the Orient exhausted by their uses of it, even if there is often a quality of disappointment, disenchantment, or demystification to be found in their Oriental writings.&lt;br /&gt;
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The paramount importance of Nerval and Flaubert to a study such as this of the Orientalist mind in the nineteenth century is that they produced work that is connected to and depends upon the kind of Orientalism we have so far discussed, yet remains independent from it. First there is the matter of their work&#039;s scope. Nerval produced his &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; as a collection of travel notes, sketches, stories, and fragments; his preoccupation with the Orient is to be found as well in &#039;&#039;Les Chimeres&#039;&#039;, in his letters, in some of his fiction and other prose writings. Flaubert&#039;s writing both before and after his visit is soaked in the Orient. The Orient appears in the &#039;&#039;Carnets de Voyage&#039;&#039; and in the first version of &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039; (and in the two later versions), as well as in &#039;&#039;Herodias, Salammbo&#039;&#039;, and the numerous reading notes, scenarios, and unfinished stories still available to us, which have been very intelligently studied by Bruneau.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;These are all considered by Bruneau in &#039;&#039;ibid&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are echoes of Orientalism in Flaubert&#039;s other major novels, too. In all, both Nerval and Flaubert continually elaborated their Oriental material and absorbed it variously into the special structures of their personal aesthetic projects. This is not to say, however, that the Orient is incidental to their work. Rather--by contrast with such writers as Lane (from whom both men borrowed shamelessly), Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Renan, Sacy--their Orient was not so much grasped, appropriated, reduced, or codified as lived in, exploited aesthetically and imaginatively as a roomy place full of possibility. What mattered to them was the structure of their work as an independent, aesthetic, and personal fact, and not the ways by which, if one wanted to, one could effectively dominate or set down the Orient graphically. Their egos never absorbed the Orient, nor totally identified the Orient with documentary and textual knowledge of it (with official Orientalism, in short).&lt;br /&gt;
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On the one hand, therefore, the scope of their Oriental work exceeds the limitations imposed by orthodox Orientalism. On the other hand, the subject of their work is more than Oriental or Orientalistic (even though they do their own Orientalizing of the Orient); it quite consciously plays with the limitations and the challenges presented to them by the Orient and by knowledge about it. Nerval, for example, believes that he has to infuse what he sees with vitality since, he says,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Le ciel et la mer sont toujours la; le ciel d&#039;Orient, la mer d&#039;Ionie se donnent chaque matin le saint baiser d&#039;amour; mais la terre est morte, morte sous la main de l&#039;homme, et les dieux se sont envoles!&lt;br /&gt;
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(The sky and the sea are still there; the Oriental sky and the Ionian sky give each other the sacred kiss of love each morning; but the earth is dead, dead because man has killed it, and the gods have fled.)&lt;br /&gt;
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If the Orient is to live at all, now that its gods have fled, it must be through his fertile efforts. In the &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; the narrative consciousness is a constantly energetic voice, moving through the labyrinths of Oriental existence armed--Nerval tells us--with two Arabic words, &#039;&#039;tayeb&#039;&#039;, the word for assent, and &#039;&#039;mafisch&#039;&#039;, the word for rejection. These two words enable him selectively to confront the antithetical Oriental world, to confront it and draw out from it its secret principles. He is predisposed to recognize that the Orient is &amp;quot;le pays des reves et de l&#039;illusion,&amp;quot; which, like the veils he sees everywhere in Cairo, conceal a deep, rich fund of female sexuality. Nerval repeats Lane&#039;s experience of discovering the necessity for marriage in an Islamic society, but unlike Lane he does attach himself to a woman. His liaison with Zaynab is more than socially obligatory:&lt;br /&gt;
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I must unite with a guileless young girl who is of this sacred soil, which is our first homeland; I must bathe myself in the vivifying springs of humanity, from which poetry and the faith of our fathers flowed forth!... I would like to lead my life like a novel, and I willingly place myself in the situation of one of those active and resolute heroes who wish at all costs to create a drama around them, a knot of complexity, in a word, action.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Nerval, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 2: 68, 194, 96, 342.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Nerval invests himself in the Orient, producing not so much a novelistic narrative as an everlasting intention--never fully realized--to fuse mind with physical action. This antinarrative, this para-pilgrimage, is a swerving away from discursive finality of the sort envisioned by previous writers on the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Connected physically and sympathetically to the Orient, Nerval wanders informally through its riches and its cultural (and principally feminine) ambience, locating in Egypt especially that maternal &amp;quot;center, at once mysterious and accessible&amp;quot; from which all wisdom derives.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 181.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His impressions, dreams, and memories alternate with sections of ornate, mannered narrative done in the Oriental style; the hard realities of travel--in Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey--mingle with the design of a deliberate digression, as if Nerval were repeating Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039; using an underground, though far less imperial and obvious, route. Michel Butor puts it beautifully:&lt;br /&gt;
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To Nerval&#039;s eyes, Chateaubriand&#039;s journey remains a voyage along the surface, while his own is calculated, utilizing annex centers, lobbies of ellipses englobing the principal centers; this allows him to place in evidence, by parallax, all the dimensions of the snare harbored by the normal centers. Wandering the streets or environs of Cairo, Beirut, or Constantinople, Nerval is always lying in wait for anything that will allow him to sense a cavern extending beneath Rome, Athens, and Jerusalem [the principal cities of Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039;]....&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as the three cities of Chateaubriand are in communication--Rome, with its emperors and popes, reassembling the heritage, the testament, of Athens and Jerusalem--the caverns of Nerval ... become engaged in intercourse.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Michel Butor, &amp;quot;Travel and Writing,&amp;quot; trans. John Powers and K. Lisker, &#039;&#039;Mosaic&#039;&#039; 8, no. 1 (Fall 1974): 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Even the two large plotted episodes, &amp;quot;The Tale of the Caliph Hakim&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;The Tale of the Queen of the Morning,&amp;quot; that will supposedly convey a durable, solid narrative discourse seem to push Nerval away from &amp;quot;overground&amp;quot; finality, edging him further and further into a haunting internal world of paradox and dream. Both tales deal with multiple identity, one of whose motifs--explicitly stated--is incest, and both return us to Nerval&#039;s quintessential Oriental world of uncertain, fluid dreams infinitely multiplying themselves past resolution, definiteness, materiality. When the journey is completed and Nerval arrives in Malta on his way back to the European mainland, he realizes that he is now in &amp;quot;le pays du froid et des orages, et deja l&#039;Orient n&#039;est plus pour moi qu&#039;un de ses reves du matin auxquels viennent bientot succeder les ennuis du jour.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Nerval, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;, p. 628.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; incorporates numerous pages copied out of Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, but even their lucid confidence seems to dissolve in the endlessly decomposing, cavernous element which is Nerval&#039;s Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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His &#039;&#039;carnet&#039;&#039; for the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; supplies us, I think, with two perfect texts for understanding how his Orient untied itself from anything resembling an Orientalist conception of the Orient, even though his work depends on Orientalism to a certain extent. First, his appetites strive to gather in experience and memory indiscriminately: &amp;quot;Je sens le besoin de m&#039;assimiler toute la nature (femmes etrangeres). Souvenirs d&#039;y avoir vecu.&amp;quot; The second elaborates a bit on the first: &amp;quot;Les reves et la folie ... Le desir de l&#039;&#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039;. L&#039;Europe s&#039;eleve. Le reve se realise ... Elle. Je l&#039;avais fuie, je l&#039;avais perdue ... Vaisseau d&#039;Orient.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 706, 718.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Orient symbolizes Nerval&#039;s dream-quest and the fugitive woman central to it, both as desire and as loss. &amp;quot;Vaisseau d&#039;Orient&amp;quot;--vessel of the Orient--refers enigmatically either to the woman as the vessel carrying the Orient, or possibly, to Nerval&#039;s own vessel for the Orient, his prose &#039;&#039;voyage&#039;&#039;. In either case, the Orient is identified with commemorative &#039;&#039;absence&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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How else can we explain in the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039;, a work of so original and individual a mind, the lazy use of large swatches of Lane, incorporated without a murmur by Nerval as &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; descriptions of the Orient? It is as if having failed both in his search for a stable Oriental reality and in his intent to give systematic order to his re-presentation of the Orient, Nerval was employing the borrowed authority of a canonized Orientalist text. After his voyage the earth remained dead, and aside from its brilliantly crafted but fragmented embodiments in the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039;, his self was no less drugged and worn out than before. Therefore the Orient seemed retrospectively to belong to a negative realm, in which failed narratives, disordered chronicles, mere transcription of scholarly texts, were its only possible vessel. At least Nerval did not try to save his project by wholeheartedly giving himself up to French designs on the Orient, although he did resort to Orientalism to make some of his points.&lt;br /&gt;
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In contrast to Nerval&#039;s negative vision of an emptied Orient, Flaubert&#039;s is eminently corporeal. His travel notes and letters reveal a man scrupulously reporting events, persons, and settings, delighting in their &#039;&#039;bizarreries&#039;&#039;, never attempting to reduce the incongruities before him. In what he writes (or perhaps because he writes), the premium is on the eye-catching, translated into self-consciously worked-out phrases: for example, &amp;quot;Inscriptions and birddroppings are the only two things in Egypt that give any indication of life.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour&#039;&#039;, trans, and ed. Francis Steegmuller (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1973), p. 200. I have also consulted the following texts, in which all Flaubert&#039;s &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; material is to be found: &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes de Gustave Flaubert&#039;&#039; (Paris: Club de l&#039;Honnete homme, 1973), vols. 10, 11; &#039;&#039;Les Lettres d&#039;Egypte, de Gustave Flaubert&#039;&#039;, ed. A. Youssef Naaman (Paris: Nizet, 1965); Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Correspondance&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean Bruneau (Paris, Gallimard, 1973), 1: 518 ff.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His tastes run to the perverse, whose form is often a combination of extreme animality, even of grotesque nastiness, with extreme and sometimes intellectual refinement. Yet this particular kind of perversity was not something merely observed, it was also studied, and came to represent an essential element in Flaubert&#039;s fiction. The familiar oppositions, or ambivalences, as Harry Levin has called them, that roam through Flaubert&#039;s writing--flesh versus mind, Salome versus Saint John, Salammbo versus Saint Anthony&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harry Levin, &#039;&#039;The Gates of Horn: A Study of Five French Realists&#039;&#039; (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 285.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--are powerfully validated by what he saw in the Orient, what, given his eclectic learning, he could see there of the partnership between knowledge and carnal grossness. In Upper Egypt he was taken with ancient Egyptian art, its preciosity and deliberate lubricity: &amp;quot;so dirty pictures existed even so far back in antiquity?&amp;quot; How much more the Orient really answered questions than it raised them is evident in the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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You [Flaubert&#039;s mother] ask me whether the Orient is up to what I imagined it to be. Yes, it is; and more than that, it extends far beyond the narrow idea I had of it. I have found, clearly delineated, everything that was hazy in my mind. Facts have taken the place of suppositions--so excellently so that it is often as though I were suddenly coming upon old forgotten dreams.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, pp. 173, 75.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Flaubert&#039;s work is so complex and so vast as to make any simple account of his Oriental writing very sketchy and hopelessly incomplete. Nevertheless, in the context created by other writers on the Orient, a certain number of main features in Flaubert&#039;s Orientalism can fairly be described. Making allowances for the difference between candidly personal writing (letters, travel notes, diary jottings) and formally aesthetic writing (novels and tales), we can still remark that Flaubert&#039;s Oriental perspective is rooted in an eastward and southward search for a &amp;quot;visionary alternative,&amp;quot; which &amp;quot;meant gorgeous color, in contrast to the greyish tonality of the French provincial landscape. It meant exciting spectacle instead of hum-drum routine, the perennially mysterious in place of the all too familiar.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Levin, &#039;&#039;Gates of Horn&#039;&#039;, p. 271.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When he actually visited it, however, this Orient impressed him with its decrepitude and senescence. Like every other Orientalism, then, Flaubert&#039;s is revivalist: &#039;&#039;he&#039;&#039; must bring the Orient to life, he must deliver it to himself and to his readers, and it is his experience of it in books and on the spot, and his language for it, that will do the trick. His novels of the Orient accordingly were labored historical and learned reconstructions. Carthage in &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039; and the products of Saint Anthony&#039;s fevered imagination were authentic fruits of Flaubert&#039;s wide reading in the (mainly Western) sources of Oriental religion, warfare, ritual, and societies.&lt;br /&gt;
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What the formal aesthetic work retains, over and above the marks of Flaubert&#039;s voracious readings and recensions, are memories of Oriental travel. The &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque des idees recues&#039;&#039; has it that an Orientalist is &amp;quot;un homme qui a beaucoup voyage,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Catalogue des opinions chic, in Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 2: 1019.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; only unlike most other such travelers Flaubert put his voyages to ingenious use. Most of his experiences are conveyed in theatrical form. He is interested not only in the content of what he sees but--like Renan--in &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; he sees, the way by which the Orient, sometimes horribly but always attractively, seems to present itself to him. Flaubert is its best audience:&lt;br /&gt;
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... Kasr el-&#039;Aini Hospital. Well maintained. The work of Clot Bey--his hand is still to be seen. Pretty cases of syphilis; in the ward of Abbas&#039;s Mamelukes, several have it in the arse. At a sign from the doctor, they all stood up on their beds, undid their trouserbelts (it was like army drill), and opened their anuses with their fingers to show their chancres. Enormous infundibula; one had a growth of hair inside his anus. One old man&#039;s prick entirely devoid of skin; I recoiled from the stench. A rachitic: hands curved backward, nails as long as claws; one could see the bone structure of his torso as clearly as a skeleton; the rest of his body, too, was fantastically thin, and his head was ringed with whitish leprosy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dissecting room: ... On the table an Arab cadaver, wide open; beautiful black hair....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, p. 65.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The lurid detail of this scene is related to many scenes in Flaubert&#039;s novels, in which illness is presented to us as if in a clinical theater. His fascination with dissection and beauty recalls, for instance, the final scene of &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, culminating in Matho&#039;s ceremonial death. In such scenes, sentiments of repulsion or sympathy are repressed entirely; what matters is the correct rendering of exact detail.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most celebrated moments in Flaubert&#039;s Oriental travel have to do with Kuchuk Hanem, a famous Egyptian dancer and courtesan he encountered in Wadi Haifa. He had read in Lane about the &#039;&#039;almehs&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;khawals&#039;&#039;, dancing girls and boys respectively, but it was his imagination rather than Lane&#039;s that could immediately grasp as well as enjoy the almost metaphysical paradox of the &#039;&#039;almeh&#039;s&#039;&#039; profession and the meaning of her name. (In &#039;&#039;Victory&#039;&#039;, Joseph Conrad was to repeat Flaubert&#039;s observation by making his musician heroine--Alma--irresistibly attractive and dangerous to Axel Heyst.) &#039;&#039;Alemah&#039;&#039; in Arabic means a learned woman. It was the name given to women in conservative eighteenth-century Egyptian society who were accomplished reciters of poetry. By the mid-nineteenth century the title was used as a sort of guild name for dancers who were also prostitutes, and such was Kuchuk Hanem, whose dance &amp;quot;L&#039;Abeille&amp;quot; Flaubert watched before he slept with her. She was surely the prototype of several of his novels&#039; female characters in her learned sensuality, delicacy, and (according to Flaubert) mindless coarseness. What he especially liked about her was that she seemed to place no demands on him, while the &amp;quot;nauseating odor&amp;quot; of her bedbugs mingled enchantingly with &amp;quot;the scent of her skin, which was dripping with sandalwood.&amp;quot; After his voyage, he had written Louise Colet reassuringly that &amp;quot;the oriental woman is no more than a machine: she makes no distinction between one man and another man.&amp;quot; Kuchuk&#039;s dumb and irreducible sexuality allowed Flaubert&#039;s mind to wander in ruminations whose haunting power over him reminds us somewhat of Deslauriers and Frederic Moreau at the end of &#039;&#039;l&#039;Education sentimentale&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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As for me, I scarcely shut my eyes. Watching that beautiful creature asleep (she snored, her head against my arm: I had slipped my forefinger under her necklace), my night was one long, infinitely intense reverie--that was why I stayed. I thought of my nights in Paris brothels--a whole series of old memories came back--and I thought of her, of her dance, of her voice as she sang songs that for me were without meaning and even without distinguishable words.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 220, 130.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Oriental woman is an occasion and an opportunity for Flaubert&#039;s musings; he is entranced by her self-sufficiency, by her emotional carelessness, and also by what, lying next to him, she allows him to think. Less a woman than a display of impressive but verbally inexpressive femininity, Kuchuk is the prototype of Flaubert&#039;s Salammbo and Salome, as well as of all the versions of carnal female temptation to which his Saint Anthony is subject. Like the Queen of Sheba (who also danced &amp;quot;The Bee&amp;quot;) she could say--were she able to speak--&amp;quot;Je ne suis pas une femme, je suis un monde.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Flaubert, &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine, in Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 1: 85.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Looked at from another angle Kuchuk is a disturbing symbol of fecundity, peculiarly Oriental in her luxuriant and seemingly unbounded sexuality. Her home near the upper reaches of the Nile occupied a position structurally similar to the place where the veil of Tanit--the goddess described as &#039;&#039;Omnifeconde&#039;&#039;--is concealed in &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 1: 809 ff. See also Maurice Z. Shroder, &amp;quot;On Reading &#039;&#039;Salammbo,&amp;quot; L&#039;Esprit createur&#039;&#039; 10, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 24-35.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet like Tanit, Salome, and Salammbo herself, Kuchuk was doomed to remain barren, corrupting, without issue. How much she and the Oriental world she lived in came to intensify for Flaubert his own sense of barrenness is indicated in the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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We have a large orchestra, a rich palette, a variety of resources. We know many more tricks and dodges, probably, than were ever known before. No, what we lack is the intrinsic principle, the soul of the thing, the very idea of the subject. We take notes, we make journeys: emptiness! emptiness! We become scholars, archaeologists, historians, doctors, cobblers, people of taste. What is the good of all that? Where is the heart, the verve, the sap? Where to start from? Where to go? We&#039;re good at sucking, we play a lot of tongue-games, we pet for hours: but the real thing! To ejaculate, beget the child!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, pp. 198-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Woven through all of Flaubert&#039;s Oriental experiences, exciting or disappointing, is an almost uniform association between the Orient and sex. In making this association Flaubert was neither the first nor the most exaggerated instance of a remarkably persistent motif in Western attitudes to the Orient. And indeed, the motif itself is singularly unvaried, although Flaubert&#039;s genius may have done more than anyone else&#039;s could have to give it artistic dignity. Why the Orient seems still to suggest not only fecundity but sexual promise (and threat), untiring sensuality, unlimited desire, deep generative energies, is something on which one could speculate: it is not the province of my analysis here, alas, despite its frequently noted appearance. Nevertheless one must acknowledge its importance as something eliciting complex responses, sometimes even a frightening self-discovery, in the Orientalists, and Flaubert was an interesting case in point.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orient threw him back on his own human and technical resources. It did not respond, just as Kuchuk did not, to his presence. Standing before its ongoing life Flaubert, like Lane before him, felt his detached powerlessness, perhaps also his self-induced unwillingness, to enter and become part of what he saw. This of course was Flaubert&#039;s perennial problem; it had existed before he went East, and it remained after the visit. Flaubert admitted the difficulty, the antidote to which was in his work (especially in an Oriental work like &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;) to stress the &#039;&#039;form&#039;&#039; of encyclopedic presentation of material at the expense of human engagement in life. Indeed, Saint Anthony is nothing if not a man for whom reality is a series of books, spectacles, and pageants unrolling temptingly and at a distance before his eyes. All of Flaubert&#039;s immense learning is structured--as Michel Foucault has tellingly noted--like a theatrical, fantastic library, parading before the anchorite&#039;s gaze;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Foucault, &amp;quot;La Bibliotheque fantastique,&amp;quot; in Flaubert, &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;, pp. 7-33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; residually, the parade carries in its form Flaubert&#039;s memories of Kasr el&#039;Aini (the syphilitics&#039; army drill) and Kuchuk&#039;s dance. More to the point, however, is that Saint Anthony is a celibate to whom temptations are primarily sexual. After putting up with every sort of dangerous charm, he is finally given a glimpse into the biological processes of life; he is delirious at being able to see life being born, a scene for which Flaubert felt himself to be incompetent during his Oriental sojourn. Yet because Anthony is delirious, we are meant to read the scene ironically. What is granted to him at the end, the desire to &#039;&#039;become&#039;&#039; matter, to become life, is at best a desire--whether realizable and fulfillable or not, we cannot know.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the energy of his intelligence and his enormous power of intellectual absorption, Flaubert felt in the Orient, first, that &amp;quot;the more you concentrate on it [in detail] the less you grasp the whole,&amp;quot; and then, second, that &amp;quot;the pieces fall into place of themselves.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, p. 79.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At best, this produces a &#039;&#039;spectacular&#039;&#039; form, but it remains barred to the Westerner&#039;s full participation in it. On one level this was a personal predicament for Flaubert, and he devised means, some of which we have discussed, for dealing with it. On a more general level, this was an &#039;&#039;epistemological&#039;&#039; difficulty for which, of course, the discipline of Orientalism existed. At one moment during his Oriental tour he considered what the epistemological challenge could give rise to. Without what he called spirit and style, the mind could &amp;quot;get lost in archaeology&amp;quot;: he was referring to a sort of regimented antiquarianism by which the exotic and the strange would get formulated into lexicons, codes, and finally cliches of the kind he was to ridicule in the &#039;&#039;Dictionnaire des idees recues&#039;&#039;. Under the influence of such an attitude the world would be &amp;quot;regulated like a college. Teachers will be the law. Everyone will be in uniform.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 211-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As against such an imposed discipline, he no doubt felt that his own treatments of exotic material, notably the Oriental material he had both experienced and read about for years, were infinitely preferable. In those at least there was room for a sense of immediacy, imagination, and flair, whereas in the ranks of archaeological tomes everything but &amp;quot;learning&amp;quot; had been squeezed out. And more than most novelists Flaubert was acquainted with organized learning, its products, and its results: these products are clearly evident in the misfortunes of Bouvard and Pecuchet, but they would have been as comically apparent in fields like Orientalism, whose textual attitudes belonged to the world of &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;. Therefore one could either construct the world with verve and style, or one could copy it tirelessly according to impersonal academic rules of procedure. In both cases, with regard to the Orient, there was a frank acknowledgment that it was a world elsewhere, apart from the ordinary attachments, sentiments, and values of &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; world in the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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In all of his novels Flaubert associates the Orient with the escapism of sexual fantasy. Emma Bovary and Frederic Moreau pine for what in their drab (or harried) bourgeois lives they do not have, and what they realize they want comes easily to their daydreams packed inside Oriental cliches: harems, princesses, princes, slaves, veils, dancing girls and boys, sherbets, ointments, and so on. The repertoire is familiar, not so much because it reminds us of Flaubert&#039;s own voyages in and obsession with the Orient, but because, once again, the association is clearly made between the Orient and the freedom of licentious sex. We may as well recognize that for nineteenth-century Europe, with its increasing &#039;&#039;embourgeoisement&#039;&#039;, sex had been institutionalized to a very considerable degree. On the one hand, there was no such thing as &amp;quot;free&amp;quot; sex, and on the other, sex in society entailed a web of legal, moral, even political and economic obligations of a detailed and certainly encumbering sort. Just as the various colonial possessions--quite apart from their economic benefit to metropolitan Europe--were useful as places to send wayward sons, superfluous populations of delinquents, poor people, and other undesirables, so the Orient was a place where one could look for sexual experience unobtainable in Europe. Virtually no European writer who wrote on or traveled to the Orient in the period after 1800 exempted himself or herself from this quest: Flaubert, Nerval, &amp;quot;Dirty Dick&amp;quot; Burton, and Lane are only the most notable. In the twentieth century one thinks of Gide, Conrad, Maugham, and dozens of others. What they looked for often--correctly, I think--was a different type of sexuality, perhaps more libertine and less guilt-ridden; but even that quest, if repeated by enough people, could (and did) become as regulated and uniform as learning itself. In time &amp;quot;Oriental sex&amp;quot; was as standard a commodity as any other available in the mass culture, with the result that readers and writers could have it if they wished without necessarily going to the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was certainly true that by the middle of the nineteenth century France, no less than England and the rest of Europe, had a flourishing knowledge industry of the sort that Flaubert feared. Great numbers of texts were being produced, and more important, the agencies and institutions for their dissemination and propagation were everywhere to be found. As historians of science and knowledge have observed, the organization of scientific and learned fields that took place during the nineteenth century was both rigorous and all-encompassing. Research became a regular activity; there was a regulated exchange of information, and agreement on what the problems were as well as consensus on the appropriate paradigms for research and its results.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a discussion of this process see Foucault, &#039;&#039;Archaeology of Knowledge&#039;&#039;; also Joseph Ben-David, &#039;&#039;The Scientist&#039;s Role in Society&#039;&#039; (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971). See also Edward W. Said, &amp;quot;An Ethics of Language,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diacritics&#039;&#039; 4, no. 2 (Summer 1974): 28-37.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The apparatus serving Oriental studies was part of the scene, and this was one thing that Flaubert surely had in mind when he proclaimed that &amp;quot;everyone will be in uniform.&amp;quot; An Orientalist was no longer a gifted amateur enthusiast, or if he was, he would have trouble being taken seriously as a scholar. To be an Orientalist meant university training in Oriental studies (by 1850 every major European university had a fully developed curriculum in one or another of the Orientalist disciplines), it meant subvention for one&#039;s travel (perhaps by one of the Asiatic societies or a geographical exploration fund or a government grant), it meant publication in accredited form (perhaps under the imprint of a learned society or an Oriental translation fund). And both within the guild of Orientalist scholars and to the public at large, such uniform accreditation as clothed the work of Orientalist scholarship, not personal testimony nor subjective impressionism, meant Science.&lt;br /&gt;
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Added to the oppressive regulation of Oriental matters was the accelerated attention paid by the Powers (as the European empires were called) to the Orient, and to the Levant in particular. Ever since the Treaty of Chanak of 1806 between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, the Eastern Question had hovered ever more prominently on Europe&#039;s Mediterranean horizons. Britain&#039;s interests were more substantial in the East than France&#039;s, but we must not forget Russia&#039;s movements into the Orient (Samarkand and Bokhara were taken in 1868; the Transcaspian Railroad was being extended systematically), nor Germany&#039;s and Austria-Hungary&#039;s. France&#039;s North African interventions, however, were not the only components of its Islamic policy. In 1860, during the clashes between Maronites and Druzes in Lebanon (already predicted by Lamartine and Nerval), France supported the Christians, England the Druzes. For standing near the center of all European politics in the East was the question of minorities, whose &amp;quot;interests&amp;quot; the Powers, each in its own way, claimed to protect and represent. Jews, Greek and Russian Orthodox, Druzes, Circassians, Armenians, Kurds, the various small Christian sects: all these were studied, planned for, designed upon by European Powers improvising as well as constructing their Oriental policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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I mention such matters simply as a way of keeping vivid the sense of layer upon layer of interests, official learning, institutional pressure, that covered the Orient as a subject matter and as a territory during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Even the most innocuous travel book--and there were literally hundreds written after mid-century&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the invaluable listings in Richard Bevis, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheca Cisorientalia: An Annotated Checklist of Early English Travel Books on the Near and Middle East&#039;&#039; (Boston: G. K. Hall &amp;amp; Co., 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--contributed to the density of public awareness of the Orient; a heavily marked dividing line separated the delights, miscellaneous exploits, and testimonial portentousness of individual pilgrims in the East (which included some American voyagers, among them Mark Twain and Herman Melville&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For discussions of the American travelers see Dorothee Metlitski Finkelstein, &#039;&#039;Melville&#039;s Orienda&#039;&#039; (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), and Franklin Walker, &#039;&#039;Irreverent Pilgrims: Melville&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Browne, and Mark Twain in the Holy Land&#039;&#039; (Seattle; University of Washington Press, 1974).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) from the authoritative reports of scholarly travelers, missionaries, governmental functionaries, and other expert witnesses. This dividing line existed clearly in Flaubert&#039;s mind, as it must have for any individual consciousness that did not have an innocent perspective on the Orient as a terrain for literary exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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English writers on the whole had a more pronounced and harder sense of what Oriental pilgrimages might entail than the French. India was a valuably real constant in this sense, and therefore all the territory between the Mediterranean and India acquired a correspondingly weighty importance. Romantic writers like Byron and Scott consequently had a political vision of the Near Orient and a very combative awareness of how relations between the Orient and Europe would have to be conducted. Scott&#039;s historical sense in &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Count Robert of Paris&#039;&#039; allowed him to set these novels in Crusader Palestine and eleventh-century Byzantium, respectively, without at the same time detracting from his canny political appreciation of the way powers act abroad. The failure of Disraeli&#039;s &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; can easily be ascribed to its author&#039;s perhaps over-developed knowledge of Oriental politics and the British Establishment&#039;s network of interests; Tancred&#039;s ingenuous desire to go to Jerusalem very soon mires Disraeli in ludicrously complex descriptions of how a Lebanese tribal chieftain tries to manage Druzes, Muslims, Jews, and Europeans to his political advantage. By the end of the novel Tancred&#039;s Eastern quest has more or less disappeared because there is nothing in Disraeli&#039;s material vision of Oriental realities to nourish the pilgrim&#039;s somewhat capricious impulses. Even George Eliot, who never visited the Orient herself, could not sustain the Jewish equivalent of an Oriental pilgrimage in &#039;&#039;Daniel Deronda&#039;&#039; (1876) without straying into the complexities of British realities as they decisively affected the Eastern project.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus whenever the Oriental motif for the English writer was not principally a stylistic matter (as in FitzGerald&#039;s &#039;&#039;Rubaiyat&#039;&#039; or in Morier&#039;s &#039;&#039;Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan&#039;&#039;), it forced him to confront a set of imposing resistances to his individual fantasy. There are no English equivalents to the Oriental works by Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Nerval, and Flaubert, just as Lane&#039;s early Orientalist counterparts--Sacy and Renan--were considerably more aware than he was of how much they were creating what they wrote about. The form of such works as Kinglake&#039;s &#039;&#039;Eothen&#039;&#039; (1844) and Burton&#039;s &#039;&#039;Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039; (1855-1856) is rigidly chronological and dutifully linear, as if what the authors were describing was a shopping trip to an Oriental bazaar rather than an adventure. Kinglake&#039;s undeservedly famous and popular work is a pathetic catalogue of pompous ethnocentrisms and tiringly nondescript accounts of the Englishman&#039;s East. His ostensible purpose in the book is to prove that travel in the Orient is important to &amp;quot;moulding of your character--that is, your very identity,&amp;quot; but in fact this turns out to be little more than solidifying &amp;quot;your&amp;quot; anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and general all-purpose race prejudice. We are told, for instance, that the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039; is too lively and inventive a work to have been created by a &amp;quot;mere Oriental, who, for creative purposes, is a thing dead and dry--a mental mummy.&amp;quot; Although Kinglake blithely confesses to no knowledge of any Oriental language, he is not constrained by ignorance from making sweeping generalizations about the Orient, its culture, mentality, and society. Many of the attitudes he repeats are canonical, of course, but it is interesting how little the experience of actually seeing the Orient affected his opinions. Like many other travelers he is more interested in remaking himself and the Orient (dead and dry--a mental mummy) than he is in seeing what there is to be seen. Every being he encounters merely corroborates his belief that Easterners are best dealt with when intimidated, and what better instrument of intimidation than a sovereign Western ego? En route to Suez across the desert, alone, he glories in his self-sufficiency and power: &amp;quot;I was here in this African desert, and I &#039;&#039;myself&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;and no other&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;had charge of my life&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alexander William Kinglake, &#039;&#039;Eothen, or Traces of Travel Brought Home from the East&#039;&#039;, ed. D. G. Hogarth (1844; reprint ed., London: Henry Frowde, 1906), pp. 25, 68, 241, 220.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It is for the comparatively useless purpose of letting Kinglake take hold of himself that the Orient serves him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like Lamartine before him, Kinglake comfortably identified his superior consciousness with his nation&#039;s, the difference being that in the Englishman&#039;s case his government was closer to settling in the rest of the Orient than France was--for the time being. Flaubert saw this with perfect accuracy:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems to me almost impossible that within a short time England won&#039;t become mistress of Egypt. She already keeps Aden full of her troops, the crossing of Suez will make it very easy for the redcoats to arrive in Cairo one fine morning--the news will reach France two weeks later and everyone will be very surprised! Remember my prediction: at the first sign of trouble in Europe, England will take Egypt, Russia will take Constantinople, and we, in retaliation, will get ourselves massacred in the mountains of Syria.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, p. 81.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For all their vaunted individuality Kinglake&#039;s views express a public and national will over the Orient; his ego is the instrument of this will&#039;s expression, not by any means its master. There is no evidence in his writing that he struggled to create a novel opinion of the Orient; neither his knowledge nor his personality was adequate for that, and this is the great difference between him and Richard Burton. As a traveler, Burton was a real adventurer; as a scholar, he could hold his own with any academic Orientalist in Europe; as a character, he was fully aware of the necessity of combat between himself and the uniformed teachers who ran Europe and European knowledge with such precise anonymity and scientific firmness. Everything Burton wrote testifies to this combativeness, rarely with more candid contempt for his opponents than in the preface to his translation of the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039;. He seems to have taken a special sort of infantile pleasure in demonstrating that he knew more than any professional scholar, that he had acquired many more details than they had, that he could handle the material with more wit and tact and freshness than they.&lt;br /&gt;
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As I said earlier, Burton&#039;s work based on his personal experience occupies a median position between Orientalist genres represented on the one hand by Lane and on the other by the French writers I have discussed. His Oriental narratives are structured as pilgrimages and, in the case of &#039;&#039;The Land of Midian Revisited&#039;&#039;, pilgrimages for a second time to sites of sometimes religious, sometimes political and economic significance. He is present as the principal character of these works, as much the center of fantastic adventure and even fantasy (like the French writers) as the authoritative commentator and detached Westerner on Oriental society and customs (like Lane). He has been rightly considered the first in a series of fiercely individualistic Victorian travelers in the East (the others being Blunt and Doughty) by Thomas Assad, who bases his work on the distance in tone and intelligence between his writers&#039; work and such works as Austen Layard&#039;s &#039;&#039;Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon&#039;&#039; (1851), Eliot Warburton&#039;s celebrated &#039;&#039;The Crescent and the Cross&#039;&#039; (1844), Robert Curzon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Visit to the Monasteries of the Levant&#039;&#039; (1849), and (a work he does not mention) Thackeray&#039;s moderately amusing &#039;&#039;Notes of a Journey from Cornhill to Grand Cairo&#039;&#039; (1845).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thomas J. Assad, &#039;&#039;Three Victorian Travellers: Burton, Blunt and Doughty&#039;&#039; (London: Routledge &amp;amp; Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet Burton&#039;s legacy is more complex than individualism precisely because in his writing we can find exemplified the struggle between individualism and a strong feeling of national identification with Europe (specifically England) as an imperial power in the East. Assad sensitively points out that Burton was an imperialist, for all his sympathetic self-association with the Arabs; but what is more relevant is that Burton thought of himself both as a rebel against authority (hence his identification with the East as a place of freedom from Victorian moral authority) and as a potential agent of authority in the East. It is the &#039;&#039;manner&#039;&#039; of that coexistence, between two antagonistic roles for himself, that is of interest.&lt;br /&gt;
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The problem finally reduces itself to the problem of knowledge of the Orient, which is why a consideration of Burton&#039;s Orientalism ought to conclude our account of Orientalist structures and restructures in most of the nineteenth century. As a traveling adventurer Burton conceived of himself as sharing the life of the people in whose lands he lived. Far more successfully than T. E. Lawrence, he was able to become an Oriental; he not only spoke the language flawlessly, he was able to penetrate to the heart of Islam and, disguised as an Indian Muslim doctor, accomplish the pilgrimage to Mecca. Yet Burton&#039;s most extraordinary characteristic is, I believe, that he was preternaturally knowledgeable about the degree to which human life in society was governed by rules and codes. All of his vast information about the Orient, which dots every page he wrote, reveals that he knew that the Orient in general and Islam in particular were systems of information, behavior, and belief, that to be an Oriental or a Muslim was to know certain things in a certain way, and that these were of course subject to history, geography, and the development of society in circumstances specific to it. Thus his accounts of travel in the East reveal to us a consciousness aware of these things and able to steer a narrative course through them: no man who did not know Arabic and Islam as well as Burton could have gone as far as he did in actually becoming a pilgrim to Mecca and Medina. So what we read in his prose is the history of a consciousness negotiating its way through an alien culture by virtue of having successfully absorbed its systems of information and behavior. Burton&#039;s freedom was in having shaken himself loose of his European origins enough to be able to live as an Oriental. Every scene in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; reveals him as winning out over the obstacles confronting him, a foreigner, in a strange place. He was able to do this because he had sufficient knowledge of an alien society for this purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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In no writer on the Orient so much as in Burton do we feel that generalizations about the Oriental--for example, the pages on the notion of &#039;&#039;Kayf&#039;&#039; for the Arab or on how education is suited to the Oriental mind (pages that are clearly meant as a rebuttal to Macaulay&#039;s simple-minded assertions)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Richard Burton, &#039;&#039;Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039;, ed. Isabel Burton (London: Tylston &amp;amp; Edwards, 1893), 1: 9, 108-10.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--are the result of knowledge acquired about the Orient by living there, actually seeing it firsthand, truly trying to see Oriental life from the viewpoint of a person immersed in it. Yet what is never far from the surface of Burton&#039;s prose is another sense it radiates, a sense of assertion and domination over all the complexities of Oriental life. Every one of Burton&#039;s footnotes, whether in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; or in his translation of the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039; (the same is true of his &amp;quot;Terminal Essay&amp;quot; for it&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Richard Burton, &amp;quot;Terminal Essay,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Book of the Thousand and One Nights&#039;&#039; (London: Burton Club, 1886), 10: 63-302.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) was meant to be testimony to his victory over the sometimes scandalous system of Oriental knowledge, a system he had mastered by himself. For even in Burton&#039;s prose we are never directly &#039;&#039;given&#039;&#039; the Orient; everything about it is presented to us by way of Burton&#039;s knowledgeable (and often prurient) interventions, which remind us repeatedly how he had taken over the management of Oriental life for the purposes of his narrative. And it is this fact--for in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; it is a fact--that elevates Burton&#039;s consciousness to a position of supremacy over the Orient. In that position his individuality perforce encounters, and indeed merges with, the voice of Empire, which is itself a system of rules, codes, and concrete epistemological habits. Thus when Burton tells us in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; that &amp;quot;Egypt is a treasure to be won,&amp;quot; that it &amp;quot;is the most tempting prize which the East holds out to the ambition of Europe, not excepted even the Golden Horn,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Burton, &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039;, 1: 112, 114.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; we must recognize how the voice of the highly idiosyncratic master of Oriental knowledge informs, feeds into the voice of European ambition for rule over the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Burton&#039;s two voices blending into one presage the work of Orientalists-&#039;&#039;cum&#039;&#039;-imperial agents like T. E. Lawrence, Edward Henry Palmer, D. G. Hogarth, Gertrude Bell, Ronald Storrs, St. John Philby, and William Gifford Paigrave, to name only some English writers. The double-pronged intention of Burton&#039;s work is at the same time to use his Oriental residence for scientific observation &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; not easily to sacrifice his individuality to that end. The second of these two intentions leads him inevitably to submit to the first because, as will appear increasingly obvious, he is a European for whom such knowledge of Oriental society as he has is possible only for a European, with a European&#039;s self-awareness of society as a collection of rules and practices. In other words, to be a European in the Orient, and to be one knowledgeably, one must see and know the Orient as a domain ruled over by Europe. Orientalism, which is the system of European or Western knowledge about the Orient, thus becomes synonymous with European domination of the Orient, and this domination effectively overrules even the eccentricities of Burton&#039;s personal style.&lt;br /&gt;
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Burton took the assertion of personal, authentic, sympathetic, and humanistic knowledge of the Orient as far as it would go in its struggle with the archive of official European knowledge about the Orient. In the history of nineteenth-century attempts to restore, restructure, and redeem all the various provinces of knowledge and life, Orientalism--like all the other Romantically inspired learned disciplines--contributed an important share. For not only did the field evolve from a system of inspired observation into what Flaubert called a regulated college of learning, it also reduced the personalities of even its most redoubtable individualists like Burton to the role of imperial scribe. From being a place, the Orient became a domain of actual scholarly rule and potential imperial sway. The role of the early Orientalists like Renan, Sacy, and Lane was to provide their work and the Orient together with a &#039;&#039;mise en scene&#039;&#039;; later Orientalists, scholarly or imaginative, took firm hold of the scene. Still later, as the scene required management, it became clear that institutions and governments were better at the game of management than individuals. This is the legacy of nineteenth-century Orientalism to which the twentieth century has become inheritor. We must now investigate as exactly as possible the way twentieth-century Orientalism--inaugurated by the long process of the West&#039;s occupation of the Orient from the 1880s on--successfully controlled freedom and knowledge; in short, the way Orientalism was fully formalized into a repeatedly produced copy of itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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= &#039;&#039;&#039;3.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Orientalism Now&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
On les apercevait tenant leurs idoles entre leurs bras comme de grands enfants paralytiques.&lt;br /&gt;
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--Gustave Flaubert, &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea--something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to....&lt;br /&gt;
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--Joseph Conrad, &#039;&#039;Heart of Darkness&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Latent and Manifest Orientalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
In Chapter One, I tried to indicate the scope of thought and action covered by the word &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, using as privileged types the British and French experiences of and with the Near Orient, Islam, and the Arabs. In those experiences I discerned an intimate, perhaps even the most intimate, and rich relationship between Occident and Orient. Those experiences were part of a much wider European or Western relationship with the Orient, but what seems to have influenced Orientalism most was a fairly constant sense of confrontation felt by Westerners dealing with the East. The boundary notion of East and West, the varying degrees of projected inferiority and strength, the range of work done, the kinds of characteristic features ascribed to the Orient: all these testify to a willed imaginative and geographic division made between East and West, and lived through during many centuries. In Chapter Two my focus narrowed a good deal. I was interested in the earliest phases of what I call modern Orientalism, which began during the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth. Since I did not intend my study to become a narrative chronicle of the development of Oriental studies in the modern West, I proposed instead an account of the rise, development, and institutions of Orientalism as they were formed against a background of intellectual, cultural, and political history until about 1870 or 1880. Although my interest in Orientalism there included a decently ample variety of scholars and imaginative writers, I cannot claim by any means to have presented more than a portrait of the typical structures (and their ideological tendencies) constituting the field, its associations with other fields, and the work of some of its most influential scholars. My principal operating assumptions were--and continue to be--that fields of learning, as much as the works of even the most eccentric artist, are constrained and acted upon by society, by cultural traditions, by worldly circumstance, and by stabilizing influences like schools, libraries, and governments; moreover, that both learned and imaginative writing are never free, but are limited in their imagery, assumptions, and intentions; and finally, that the advances made by a &amp;quot;science&amp;quot; like Orientalism in its academic form are less objectively true than we often like to think. In short, my study hitherto has tried to describe the &#039;&#039;economy&#039;&#039; that makes Orientalism a coherent subject matter, even while allowing that as an idea, concept, or image the word &#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; has a considerable and interesting cultural resonance in the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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I realize that such assumptions are not without their controversial side. Most of us assume in a general way that learning and scholarship move forward; they get better, we feel, as time passes and as more information is accumulated, methods are refined, and later generations of scholars improve upon earlier ones. In addition, we entertain a mythology of creation, in which it is believed that artistic genius, an original talent, or a powerful intellect can leap beyond the confines of its own time and place in order to put before the world a new work. It would be pointless to deny that such ideas as these carry some truth. Nevertheless the possibilities for work present in the culture to a great and original mind are never unlimited, just as it is also true that a great talent has a very healthy respect for what others have done before it and for what the field already contains. The work of predecessors, the institutional life of a scholarly field, the collective nature of any learned enterprise: these, to say nothing of economic and social circumstances, tend to diminish the effects of the individual scholar&#039;s production. A field like Orientalism has a cumulative and corporate identity, one that is particularly strong given its associations with traditional learning (the classics, the Bible, philology), public institutions (governments, trading companies, geographical societies, universities), and generically determined writing (travel books, books of exploration, fantasy, exotic description). The result for Orientalism has been a sort of consensus: certain things, certain types of statement, certain types of work have seemed for the Orientalist correct. He has built his work and research upon them, and they in turn have pressed hard upon new writers and scholars. Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision, and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient. The Orient is taught, researched, administered, and pronounced upon in certain discrete ways.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire. If this definition of Orientalism seems more political than not, that is simply because I think Orientalism was itself a product of certain political forces and activities. Orientalism is a school of interpretation whose material happens to be the Orient, its civilizations, peoples, and localities. Its objective discoveries--the work of innumerable devoted scholars who edited texts and translated them, codified grammars, wrote dictionaries, reconstructed dead epochs, produced positivistically verifiable learning--are and always have been conditioned by the fact that its truths, like any truths delivered by language, are embodied in language, and what is the truth of language, Nietzsche once said, but&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms--in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Friedrich Nietzsche, &amp;quot;On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Portable Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 46-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps such a view as Nietzsche&#039;s will strike us as too nihilistic, but at least it will draw attention to the fact that so far as it existed in the West&#039;s awareness, the Orient was a word which later accrued to it a wide field of meanings, associations, and connotations, and that these did not necessarily refer to the real Orient but to the field surrounding the word.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus Orientalism is not only a positive doctrine about the Orient that exists at any one time in the West; it is also an influential academic tradition (when one refers to an academic specialist who is called an Orientalist), as well as an area of concern defined by travelers, commercial enterprises, governments, military expeditions, readers of novels and accounts of exotic adventure, natural historians, and pilgrims to whom the Orient is a specific kind of knowledge about specific places, peoples, and civilizations. For the Orient idioms became frequent, and these idioms took firm hold in European discourse. Beneath the idioms there was a layer of doctrine about the Orient; this doctrine was fashioned out of the experiences of many Europeans, all of them converging upon such essential aspects of the Orient as the Oriental character, Oriental despotism, Oriental sensuality, and the like. For any European during the nineteenth century--and I think one can say this almost without qualification--Orientalism was such a system of truths, truths in Nietzsche&#039;s sense of the word. It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric. Some of the immediate sting will be taken out of these labels if we recall additionally that human societies, at least the more advanced cultures, have rarely offered the individual anything but imperialism, racism, and ethnocentrism for dealing with &amp;quot;other&amp;quot; cultures. So Orientalism aided and was aided by general cultural pressures that tended to make more rigid the sense of difference between the European and Asiatic parts of the world. My contention is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient&#039;s difference with its weakness.&lt;br /&gt;
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This proposition was introduced early in Chapter One, and nearly everything in the pages that followed was intended in part as a corroboration of it. The very presence of a &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; such as Orientalism, with no corresponding equivalent in the Orient itself, suggests the relative strength of Orient and Occident. A vast number of pages on the Orient exist, and they of course signify a degree and quantity of interaction with the Orient that are quite formidable; but the crucial index of Western strength is that there is no possibility of comparing the movement of Westerners eastwards (since the end of the eighteenth century) with the movement of Easterners westwards. Leaving aside the fact that Western armies, consular corps, merchants, and scientific and archaeological expeditions were always going East, the number of travelers from the Islamic East to Europe between 1800 and 1900 is minuscule when compared with the number in the other direction.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The number of Arab travelers to the West is estimated and considered by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod in &#039;&#039;Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 75-6 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Moreover, the Eastern travelers in the West were there to learn from and to gape at an advanced culture; the purposes of the Western travelers in the Orient were, as we have seen, of quite a different order. In addition, it has been estimated that around 60,000 books dealing with the Near Orient were written between 1800 and 1950; there is no remotely comparable figure for Oriental books about the West. As a cultural apparatus Orientalism is all aggression, activity, judgment, will-to-truth, and knowledge. The Orient existed for the West, or so it seemed to countless Orientalists, whose attitude to what they worked on was either paternalistic or candidly condescending--unless, of course, they were antiquarians, in which case the &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Orient was a credit to &#039;&#039;them&#039;&#039; and not to the lamentable modern Orient. And then, beefing up the Western scholars&#039; work, there were numerous agencies and institutions with no parallels in Oriental society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such an imbalance between East and West is obviously a function of changing historical patterns. During its political and military heyday from the eighth century to the sixteenth, Islam dominated both East and West. Then the center of power shifted westwards, and now in the late twentieth century it seems to be directing itself back towards the East again. My account of nineteenth-century Orientalism in Chapter Two stopped at a particularly charged period in the latter part of the century, when the often dilatory, abstract, and projective aspects of Orientalism were about to take on a new sense of worldly mission in the service of formal colonialism. It is this project and this moment that I want now to describe, especially since it will furnish us with some important background for the twentieth-century crises of Orientalism and the resurgence of political and cultural strength in the East.&lt;br /&gt;
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On several occasions I have alluded to the connections between Orientalism as a body of ideas, beliefs, cliches, or learning about the East, and other schools of thought at large in the culture. Now one of the important developments in nineteenth-century Orientalism was the distillation of essential ideas about the Orient--its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness--into a separate and unchallenged coherence; thus for a writer to use the word &#039;&#039;Oriental&#039;&#039; was a reference for the reader sufficient to identify a specific body of information about the Orient. This information seemed to be morally neutral and objectively valid; it seemed to have an epistemological status equal to that of historical chronology or geographical location. In its most basic form, then, Oriental material could not really be violated by anyone&#039;s discoveries, nor did it seem ever to be revaluated completely. Instead, the work of various nineteenth-century scholars and of imaginative writers made this essential body of knowledge more clear, more detailed, more substantial--and more distinct from &amp;quot;Occidentalism.&amp;quot; Yet Orientalist ideas could enter into alliance with general philosophical theories (such as those about the history of mankind and civilization) and diffuse world-hypotheses, as philosophers sometimes call them; and in many ways the professional contributors to Oriental knowledge were anxious to couch their formulations and ideas, their scholarly work, their considered contemporary observations, in language and terminology whose cultural validity derived from other sciences and systems of thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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The distinction I am making is really between an almost unconscious (and certainly an untouchable) positivity, which I shall call &#039;&#039;latent&#039;&#039; Orientalism, and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology, and so forth, which I shall call &#039;&#039;manifest&#039;&#039; Orientalism. Whatever change occurs in knowledge of the Orient is found almost exclusively in manifest Orientalism; the unanimity, stability, and durability of latent Orientalism are more or less constant. In the nineteenth-century writers I analyzed in Chapter Two, the differences in their ideas about the Orient can be characterized as exclusively manifest differences, differences in form and personal style, rarely in basic content. Every one of them kept intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability; this is why every writer on the Orient, from Renan to Marx (ideologically speaking), or from the most rigorous scholars (Lane and Sacy) to the most powerful imaginations (Flaubert and Nerval), saw the Orient as a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption. The Orient existed as a place isolated from the mainstream of European progress in the sciences, arts, and commerce. Thus whatever good or bad values were imputed to the Orient appeared to be functions of some highly specialized Western interest in the Orient. This was the situation from about the 1870s on through the early part of the twentieth century--but let me give some examples that illustrate what I mean.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Theses of Oriental backwardness, degeneracy, and inequality with the West most easily associated themselves early in the nineteenth century with ideas about the biological bases of racial inequality. Thus the racial classifications found in Cuvier&#039;s &#039;&#039;Le Regne animal&#039;&#039;, Gobineau&#039;s &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;inegalite des races humaines&#039;&#039;, and Robert Knox&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Races of Man&#039;&#039; found a willing partner in latent Orientalism. To these ideas was added second-order Darwinism, which seemed to accentuate the &amp;quot;scientific&amp;quot; validity of the division of races into advanced and backward, or European-Aryan and Oriental-African. Thus the whole question of imperialism, as it was debated in the late nineteenth century by pro-imperialists and anti-imperialists alike, carried forward the binary typology of advanced and backward (or subject) races, cultures, and societies. John Westlake&#039;s &#039;&#039;Chapters on the Principles of International Law&#039;&#039; (1894) argues, for example, that regions of the earth designated as &amp;quot;uncivilized&amp;quot; (a word carrying the freight of Orientalist assumptions, among others) ought to be annexed or occupied by advanced powers. Similarly, the ideas of such writers as Carl Peters, Leopold de Saussure, and Charles Temple draw on the advanced/backward binarism&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Philip D. Curtin, ed., &#039;&#039;Imperialism: The Documentary History of Western Civilization&#039;&#039; (New York: Walker &amp;amp; Co., 1972), pp. 73-105.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; so centrally advocated in late-nineteenth-century Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Along with all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized, and retarded, the Orientals were viewed in a framework constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political admonishment. The Oriental was linked thus to elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien. Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined or--as the colonial powers openly coveted their territory--taken over. The point is that the very designation of something as Oriental involved an already pronounced evaluative judgment, and in the case of the peoples inhabiting the decayed Ottoman Empire, an implicit program of action. Since the Oriental was a member of a subject race, he had to be subjected: it was that simple. The &#039;&#039;locus classicus&#039;&#039; for such judgment and action is to be found in Gustave Le Bon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Les Lois psychologiques de l&#039;evolution des peuples&#039;&#039; (1894).&lt;br /&gt;
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But there were other uses for latent Orientalism. If that group of ideas allowed one to separate Orientals from advanced, civilizing powers, and if the &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Orient served to justify both the Orientalist and his disregard of modern Orientals, latent Orientalism also encouraged a peculiarly (not to say invidiously) male conception of the world. I have already referred to this in passing during my discussion of Renan. The Oriental male was considered in isolation from the total community in which he lived and which many Orientalists, following Lane, have viewed with something resembling contempt and fear. Orientalism itself, furthermore, was an exclusively male province; like so many professional guilds during the modern period, it viewed itself and its subject matter with sexist blinders. This is especially evident in the writing of travelers and novelists: women are usually the creatures of a male power-fantasy. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing. Flaubert&#039;s Kuchuk Hanem is the prototype of such caricatures, which were common enough in pornographic novels (e.g., Pierre Louys&#039;s &#039;&#039;Aphrodite&#039;&#039;) whose novelty draws on the Orient for their interest. Moreover the male conception of the world, in its effect upon the practicing Orientalist, tends to be static, frozen, fixed eternally. The very possibility of development, transformation, human movement--in the deepest sense of the word--is denied the Orient and the Oriental. As a known and ultimately an immobilized or unproductive quality, they come to be identified with a bad sort of eternality: hence, when the Orient is being approved, such phrases as &amp;quot;the wisdom of the East.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Transferred from an implicit social evaluation to a grandly cultural one, this static male Orientalism took on a variety of forms in the late nineteenth century, especially when Islam was being discussed. General cultural historians as respected as Leopold von Ranke and Jacob Burckhardt assailed Islam as if they were dealing not so much with an anthropomorphic abstraction as with a religio-political culture about which deep generalizations were possible and warranted: in his &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichte&#039;&#039; (1881-1888) Ranke spoke of Islam as defeated by the Germanic-Romanic peoples, and in his &amp;quot;Historische Fragmente&amp;quot; (unpublished notes, 1893) Burckhardt spoke of Islam as wretched; bare, and trivial.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Johann W. Fuck, &amp;quot;Islam as an Historical Problem in European Historiography since 1800,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Historians of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 307.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Such intellectual operations were carried out with considerably more flair and enthusiasm by Oswald Spengler, whose ideas about a Magian personality (typified by the Muslim Oriental) infuse &#039;&#039;Der Untergang des Abendlandes&#039;&#039; (1918-1922) and the &amp;quot;morphology&amp;quot; of cultures it advocates.&lt;br /&gt;
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What these widely diffused notions of the Orient depended on was the almost total absence in contemporary Western culture of the Orient as a genuinely felt and experienced force. For a number of evident reasons the Orient was always in the position both of outsider and of incorporated weak partner for the West. To the extent that Western scholars were aware of contemporary Orientals or Oriental movements of thought and culture, these were perceived either as silent shadows to be animated by the Orientalist, brought into reality by him, or as a kind of cultural and intellectual proletariat useful for the Orientalist&#039;s grander interpretative activity, necessary for his performance as superior judge, learned man, powerful cultural will. I mean to say that in discussions of the Orient, the Orient is all absence, whereas one feels the Orientalist and what he says as presence; yet we must not forget that the Orientalist&#039;s presence is enabled by the Orient&#039;s effective absence. This fact of substitution and displacement, as we must call it, clearly places on the Orientalist himself a certain pressure to reduce the Orient in his work, even after he has devoted a good deal of time to elucidating and exposing it. How else can one explain major scholarly production of the type we associate with Julius Wellhausen and Theodor Noldeke and, overriding it, those bare, sweeping statements that almost totally denigrate their chosen subject matter? Thus Noldeke could declare in 1887 that the sum total of his work as an Orientalist was to confirm his &amp;quot;low opinion&amp;quot; of the Eastern peoples.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 309.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And like Carl Becker, Noldeke was a philhellenist, who showed his love of Greece curiously by displaying a positive dislike of the Orient, which after all was what he studied as a scholar.&lt;br /&gt;
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A very valuable and intelligent study of Orientalism--Jacques Waardenburg&#039;s &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;--examines five important experts as makers of an image of Islam. Waardenburg&#039;s mirror-image metaphor for late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Orientalism is apt. In the work of each of his eminent Orientalists there is a highly tendentious--in four cases out of the five, even hostile--vision of Islam, as if each man saw Islam as a reflection of his own chosen weakness. Each scholar was profoundly learned, and the style of his contribution was unique. The five Orientalists among them exemplify what was best and strongest in the tradition during the period roughly from the 1880s to the interwar years. Yet Ignaz Goldziher&#039;s appreciation of Islam&#039;s tolerance towards other religions was undercut by his dislike of Mohammed&#039;s anthropomorphisms and Islam&#039;s too-exterior theology and jurisprudence; Duncan Black Macdonald&#039;s interest in Islamic piety and orthodoxy was vitiated by his perception of what he considered Islam&#039;s heretical Christianity; Carl Becker&#039;s understanding of Islamic civilization made him see it as a sadly undeveloped one; C. Snouck Hurgronje&#039;s highly refined studies of Islamic mysticism (which he considered the essential part of Islam) led him to a harsh judgment of its crippling limitations; and Louis Massignon&#039;s extraordinary identification with Muslim theology, mystical passion, and poetic art kept him curiously unforgiving to Islam for what he regarded as its unregenerate revolt against the idea of incarnation. The manifest differences in their methods emerge as less important than their Orientalist consensus on Islam: latent inferiority.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jacques Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039; (The Hague: Mouton &amp;amp; Co., 1963).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Waardenburg&#039;s study has the additional virtue of showing how these five scholars shared a common intellectual and methodological tradition whose unity was truly international. Ever since the first Orientalist congress in 1873, scholars in the field have known each other&#039;s work and felt each other&#039;s presence very directly. What Waardenburg does not stress enough is that most of the late-nineteenth-century Orientalists were bound to each other politically as well. Snouck Hurgronje went directly from his studies of Islam to being an adviser to the Dutch government on handling its Muslim Indonesian colonies; Macdonald and Massignon were widely sought after as experts on Islamic matters by colonial administrators from North Africa to Pakistan; and, as Waardenburg says (all too briefly) at one point, all five scholars shaped a coherent vision of Islam that had a wide influence on government circles throughout the Western world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 311.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What we must add to Waardenburg&#039;s observation is that these scholars were completing, bringing to an ultimate concrete refinement, the tendency since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to treat the Orient not only as a vague literary problem but--according to Masson-Oursel--as &amp;quot;un ferme propos d&#039;assimiler adequatement la valeur des langues pour penetrer les moeurs et les pensees, pour forcer meme des secrets de l&#039;histoire.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. Masson-Oursel, &amp;quot;La Connaissance scientifique de l&#039;Asie en France depuis 1900 et les varietes de l&#039;Orientalisme,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue Philosophique&#039;&#039; 143, nos. 7-9 (July-September 1953): 345.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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I spoke earlier of incorporation and assimilation of the Orient, as these activities were practiced by writers as different from each other as Dante and d&#039;Herbelot. Clearly there is a difference between those efforts and what, by the end of the nineteenth century, had become a truly formidable European cultural, political, and material enterprise. The nineteenth-century colonial &amp;quot;scramble for Africa&amp;quot; was by no means limited to Africa, of course. Neither was the penetration of the Orient entirely a sudden, dramatic afterthought following years of scholarly study of Asia. What we must reckon with is a long and slow process of appropriation by which Europe, or the European awareness of the Orient, transformed itself from being textual and contemplative into being administrative, economic, and even military. The fundamental change was a spatial and geographical one, or rather it was a change in the quality of geographical and spatial apprehension so far as the Orient was concerned. The centuries-old designation of geographical space to the east of Europe as &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; was partly political, partly doctrinal, and partly imaginative; it implied no necessary connection between actual experience of the Orient and knowledge of what is Oriental, and certainly Dante and d&#039;Herbelot made no claims about their Oriental ideas except that they were corroborated by a long &#039;&#039;learned&#039;&#039; (and not existential) tradition. But when Lane, Renan, Burton, and the many hundreds of nineteenth-century European travelers and scholars discuss the Orient, we can immediately note a far more intimate and even proprietary attitude towards the Orient and things Oriental. In the classical and often temporally remote form in which it was reconstructed by the Orientalist, in the precisely actual form in which the modern Orient was lived in, studied, or imagined, the &#039;&#039;geographical space&#039;&#039; of the Orient was penetrated, worked over, taken hold of. The cumulative effect of decades of so sovereign a Western handling turned the Orient from alien into colonial space. What was important in the latter nineteenth century was not &#039;&#039;whether&#039;&#039; the West had penetrated and possessed the Orient, but rather &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; the British and French felt that they had done it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The British writer on the Orient, and even more so the British colonial administrator, was dealing with territory about which there could be no doubt that English power was truly in the ascendant, even if the natives were on the face of it attracted to France and French modes of thought. So far as the actual space of the Orient was concerned, however, England was really there, France was not, except as a flighty temptress of the Oriental yokels. There is no better indication of this qualitative difference in spatial attitudes than to look at what Lord Cromer had to say on the subject, one that was especially dear to his heart:&lt;br /&gt;
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The reasons why French civilisation presents a special degree of attraction to Asiatics and Levantines are plain. It is, as a matter of fact, more attractive than the civilisations of England and Germany, and, moreover, it is more easy of imitation. Compare the undemonstrative, shy Englishman, with his social exclusiveness and insular habits, with the vivacious and cosmopolitan Frenchman, who does not know what the word shyness means, and who in ten minutes is apparently on terms of intimate friendship with any casual acquaintance he may chance to make. The semi-educated Oriental does not recognise that the former has, at all events, the merit of sincerity, whilst the latter is often merely acting a part. He looks coldly on the Englishman, and rushes into the arms of the Frenchman.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sexual innuendoes develop more or less naturally thereafter. The Frenchman is all smiles, wit, grace, and fashion; the Englishman is plodding, industrious, Baconian, precise. Cromer&#039;s case is of course based on British solidity as opposed to a French seductiveness without any real presence in Egyptian reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can it be any matter for surprise [Cromer continues] that the Egyptian, with his light intellectual ballast, fails to see that some fallacy often lies at the bottom of the Frenchman&#039;s reasoning, or that he prefers the rather superficial brilliancy of the Frenchman to the plodding, unattractive industry of the Englishman or the German? Look, again, at the theoretical perfection of French administrative systems, at their elaborate detail, and at the provision which is apparently made to meet every possible contingency which may arise. Compare these features with the Englishman&#039;s practical systems, which lay down rules as to a few main points, and leave a mass of detail to individual discretion. The half-educated Egyptian naturally prefers the Frenchman&#039;s system, for it is to all outward appearance more perfect and more easy of application. He fails, moreover, to see that the Englishman desires to elaborate a system which will suit the facts with which he has to deal, whereas the main objection to applying French administrative procedures to Egypt is that the facts have but too often to conform to the ready-made system.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since there is a real British presence in Egypt, and since that presence--according to Cromer--is there not so much to train the Egyptian&#039;s mind as to &amp;quot;form his character,&amp;quot; it follows therefore that the ephemeral attractions of the French are those of a pretty damsel with &amp;quot;somewhat artificial charms,&amp;quot; whereas those of the British belong to &amp;quot;a sober, elderly matron of perhaps somewhat greater moral worth, but of less pleasing outward appearance.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), 2: 237-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Underlying Cromer&#039;s contrast between the solid British nanny and the French coquette is the sheer privilege of British emplacement in the Orient. &amp;quot;The facts with which he [the Englishman] has to deal&amp;quot; are altogether more complex and interesting, by virtue of their possession by England, than anything the mercurial French could point to. Two years after the publication of his &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039; (1908), Cromer expatiated philosophically in &#039;&#039;Ancient and Modern Imperialism&#039;&#039;. Compared with Roman imperialism, with its frankly assimilationist, exploitative, and repressive policies, British imperialism seemed to Cromer to be preferable, if somewhat more wishy-washy. On certain points, however, the British were clear enough, even if &amp;quot;after a rather dim, slipshod, but characteristically Anglo-Saxon fashion,&amp;quot; their Empire seemed undecided between &amp;quot;one of two bases--an extensive military occupation or the principle of nationality [for subject races].&amp;quot; But this indecision was academic finally, for in practice Cromer and Britain itself had opted against &amp;quot;the principle of nationality.&amp;quot; And then there were other things to be noted. One point was that the Empire was not going to be given up. Another was that intermarriage between natives and English men and women was undesirable. Third--and most important, I think--Cromer conceived of British imperial presence in the Eastern colonies as having had a lasting, not to say cataclysmic, effect on the minds and societies of the East. His metaphor for expressing this effect is almost theological, so powerful in Cromer&#039;s mind was the idea of Western penetration of Oriental expanses. &amp;quot;The country,&amp;quot; he says, &amp;quot;over which the breath of the West, heavily charged with scientific thought, has once passed, and has, in passing, left an enduring mark, can never be the same as it was before.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Ancient and Modern Imperialism&#039;&#039; (London: John Murray, 1910), pp. 118, 120.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In such respects as these, nonetheless, Cromer&#039;s was far from an original intelligence. What he saw and how he expressed it were common currency among his colleagues both in the imperial Establishment and in the intellectual community. This consensus is notably true in the case of Cromer&#039;s viceregal colleagues, Curzon, Swettenham, and Lugard. Lord Curzon in particular always spoke the imperial lingua franca, and more obtrusively even than Cromer he delineated the relationship between Britain and the Orient in terms of possession, in terms of a large geographical space wholly owned by an efficient colonial master. For him, he said on one occasion, the Empire was not an &amp;quot;object of ambition&amp;quot; but &amp;quot;first and foremost, a great historical and political and sociological fact.&amp;quot; In 1909 he reminded delegates to the Imperial Press Conference meeting at Oxford that &amp;quot;we train here and we send out to you your governors and administrators and judges, your teachers and preachers and lawyers.&amp;quot; And this almost pedagogical view of empire had, for Curzon, a specific setting in Asia, which as he once put it, made &amp;quot;one pause and think.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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I sometimes like to picture to myself this great Imperial fabric as a huge structure like some Tennysonian &amp;quot;Palace of Art,&amp;quot; of which the foundations are in this country, where they have been laid and must be maintained by British hands, but of which the Colonies are the pillars, and high above all floats the vastness of an Asiatic dome.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Nathaniel Curzon, &#039;&#039;Subjects of the Day: Being a Selection of Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039; (London: George Allen &amp;amp; Unwin, 1915), pp. 4-5, 10, 28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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With such a Tennysonian Palace of Art in mind, Curzon and Cromer were enthusiastic members together of a departmental committee formed in 1909 to press for the creation of a school of Oriental studies. Aside from remarking wistfully that had he known the vernacular he would have been helped during his &amp;quot;famine tours&amp;quot; in India, Curzon argued for Oriental studies as part of the British responsibility to the Orient. On September 27, 1909, he told the House of Lords that&lt;br /&gt;
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our familiarity, not merely with the languages of the people of the East but with their customs, their feelings, their traditions, their history and religion, our capacity to understand what may be called the genius of the East, is the sole basis upon which we are likely to be able to maintain in the future the position we have won, and no step that can be taken to strengthen that position can be considered undeserving of the attention of His Majesty&#039;s Government or of a debate in the House of Lords.&lt;br /&gt;
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At a Mansion House conference on the subject five years later, Curzon finally dotted the i&#039;s. Oriental studies were no intellectual luxury; they were, he said,&lt;br /&gt;
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a great Imperial obligation. In my view the creation of a school [of Oriental studies--later to become the London University School of Oriental and African Studies] like this in London is part of the necessary furniture of Empire. Those of us who, in one way or another, have spent a number of years in the East, who regard that as the happiest portion of our lives, and who think that the work that we did there, be it great or small, was the highest responsibility that can be placed upon the shoulders of Englishmen, feel that there is a gap in our national equipment which ought emphatically to be filled, and that those in the City of London who, by financial support or by any other form of active and practical assistance, take their part in filling that gap, will be rendering a patriotic duty to the Empire and promoting the cause and goodwill among mankind.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 184, 191-2. For the history of the school, see C. H. Phillips, &#039;&#039;The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1917-1967: An Introduction&#039;&#039; (London: Design for Print, 1967).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To a very great extent Curzon&#039;s ideas about Oriental studies derive logically from a good century of British utilitarian administration of and philosophy about the Eastern colonies. The influence of Bentham and the Mills on British rule in the Orient (and India particularly) was considerable, and was effective in doing away with too much regulation and innovation; instead, as Eric Stokes has convincingly shown, utilitarianism combined with the legacies of liberalism and evangelicalism as philosophies of British rule in the East stressed the rational importance of a strong executive armed with various legal and penal codes, a system of doctrines on such matters as frontiers and land rents, and everywhere an irreducible supervisory imperial authority.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Eric Stokes, &#039;&#039;The English Utilitarians and India&#039;&#039; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The cornerstone of the whole system was a constantly refined knowledge of the Orient, so that as traditional societies hastened forward and became modern commercial societies, there would be no loss of paternal British control, and no loss of revenue either. However, when Curzon referred somewhat inelegantly to Oriental studies as &amp;quot;the necessary furniture of Empire,&amp;quot; he was putting into a static image the transactions by which Englishmen and natives conducted their business and kept their places. From the days of Sir William Jones the Orient had been both what Britain ruled and what Britain knew about it: the coincidence between geography, knowledge, and power, with Britain always in the master&#039;s place, was complete. To have said, as Curzon once did, that &amp;quot;the East is a University in which the scholar never takes his degree&amp;quot; was another way of saying that the East required one&#039;s presence there more or less forever.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Michael Edwardes, &#039;&#039;High Noon of Empire: India Under Curzon&#039;&#039; (London: Eyre &amp;amp; Spottiswoode, 1965), pp. 38-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But then there were the other European powers, France and Russia among them, that made the British presence always a (perhaps marginally) threatened one. Curzon was certainly aware that all the major Western powers felt towards the world as Britain did. The transformation of geography from &amp;quot;dull and pedantic&amp;quot;--Curzon&#039;s phrase for what had now dropped out of geography as an academic subject--into &amp;quot;the most cosmopolitan of all sciences&amp;quot; argued &#039;&#039;exactly&#039;&#039; that new Western and widespread predilection. Not for nothing did Curzon in 1912 tell the Geographical Society, of which he was president, that&lt;br /&gt;
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an absolute revolution has occurred, not merely in the manner and methods of teaching geography, but in the estimation in which it is held by public opinion. Nowadays we regard geographical knowledge as an essential part of knowledge in general. By the aid of geography, and in no other way, do we understand the action of great natural forces, the distribution of population, the growth of commerce, the expansion of frontiers, the development of States, the splendid achievements of human energy in its various manifestations.&lt;br /&gt;
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We recognize geography as the handmaid of history.... Geography, too, is a sister science to economics and politics; and to any of us who have attempted to study geography it is known that the moment you diverge from the geographical field you find yourself crossing the frontiers of geology, zoology, ethnology, chemistry, physics, and almost all the kindred sciences. Therefore we are justified in saying that geography is one of the first and foremost of the sciences: that it is part of the equipment that is necessary for a proper conception of citizenship, and is an indispensable adjunct to the production of a public man.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Curzon, &#039;&#039;Subjects of the Day&#039;&#039;, pp. 155-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Geography was essentially the material underpinning for knowledge about the Orient. All the latent and unchanging characteristics of the Orient stood upon, were rooted in, its geography. Thus on the one hand the geographical Orient nourished its inhabitants, guaranteed their characteristics, and defined their specificity; on the other hand, the geographical Orient solicited the West&#039;s attention, even as--by one of those paradoxes revealed so frequently by organized knowledge--East was East and West was West. The cosmopolitanism of geography was, in Curzon&#039;s mind, its universal importance to the whole of the West, whose relationship to the rest of the world was one of frank covetousness. Yet geographical appetite could also take on the moral neutrality of an epistemological impulse to find out, to settle upon, to uncover--as when in &#039;&#039;Heart of Darkness&#039;&#039; Marlow confesses to having a passion for maps.&lt;br /&gt;
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I would look for hours at South America, or Africa, or Australia, and lose myself in all the glories of exploration. At that time there were many blank spaces on the earth, and when I saw one that looked particularly inviting on a map (but they all look that) I would put my finger on it and say, When I grow up I will go there.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Conrad, &#039;&#039;Heart of Darkness&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Youth and Two Other Stories&#039;&#039; (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1925), p. 52.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Seventy years or so before Marlow said this, it did not trouble Lamartine that what on a map was a blank space was inhabited by natives; nor, theoretically, had there been any reservation in the mind of Emer de Vattel, the Swiss-Prussian authority on international law, when in 1758 he invited European states to take possession of territory inhabited only by mere wandering tribes.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For an illustrative extract from de Vattel&#039;s work see Curtin, ed., &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, pp. 42-5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The important thing was to dignify simple conquest with an idea, to turn the appetite for more geographical space into a theory about the special relationship between geography on the one hand and civilized or uncivilized peoples on the other. But to these rationalizations there was also a distinctively French contribution.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the end of the nineteenth century, political and intellectual circumstances coincided sufficiently in France to make geography, and geographical speculation (in both senses of that word), an attractive national pastime. The general climate of opinion in Europe was propitious; certainly the successes of British imperialism spoke loudly enough for themselves. However, Britain always seemed to France and to French thinkers on the subject to block even a relatively successful French imperial role in the Orient. Before the Franco-Prussian War there was a good deal of wishful political thinking about the Orient, and it was not confined to poets and novelists. Here, for instance, is Saint-Marc Girardin writing in the &#039;&#039;Revue des Deux Mondes&#039;&#039; on March 15, 1862:&lt;br /&gt;
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La France a beaucoup a faire en Orient, parce que l&#039;Orient attend beaucoup d&#039;elle. Il lui demande meme plus qu&#039;elle ne peut faire; il lui remettrait volontiers le soin entier de son avenir, ce qui serait pour la France et pour l&#039;Orient un grand danger: pour la France, parce que, disposee a prendre en mains la cause des populations souffrantes, elle se charge le plus souvent de plus d&#039;obligations qu&#039;elle n&#039;en peut remplir; pour l&#039;Orient, parce que tout peuple qui attend sa destinee de l&#039;etranger n&#039;a jamais qu&#039;une condition precaire et qu&#039;il n&#039;y a de salut pour les nations que celui qu&#039;elles se font elles-memes.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited by M. de Caix, &#039;&#039;La Syrie&#039;&#039; in Gabriel Hanotaux, &#039;&#039;Histoire des colonies francaises&#039;&#039;, 6 vols. (Paris: Societe de l&#039;histoire nationale, 1929-33), 3: 481.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Of such views as this Disraeli would doubtless have said, as he often did, that France had only &amp;quot;sentimental interests&amp;quot; in Syria (which is the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; of which Girardin was writing). The fiction of &amp;quot;populations souffrantes&amp;quot; had of course been used by Napoleon when he appealed to the Egyptians on their behalf against the Turks and for Islam. During the thirties, forties, fifties, and sixties the suffering populations of the Orient were limited to the Christian minorities in Syria. And there was no record of &amp;quot;l&#039;Orient&amp;quot; appealing to France for its salvation. It would have been altogether more truthful to say that Britain stood in France&#039;s way in the Orient, for even if France genuinely felt a sense of obligation to the Orient (and there were some Frenchmen who did), there was very little France could do to get between Britain and the huge land mass it commanded from India to the Mediterranean.&lt;br /&gt;
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Among the most remarkable consequences of the War of 1870 in France were a tremendous efflorescence of geographical societies and a powerfully renewed demand for territorial acquisition. At the end of 1871 the Societe de geographie de Paris declared itself no longer confined to &amp;quot;scientific speculation.&amp;quot; It urged the citizenry not to &amp;quot;forget that our former preponderance was contested from the day we ceased to compete ... in the conquests of civilization over barbarism.&amp;quot; Guillaume Depping, a leader of what has come to be called the geographical movement, asserted in 1881 that during the 1870 war &amp;quot;it was the schoolmaster who triumphed,&amp;quot; meaning that the real triumphs were those of Prussian scientific geography over French strategic sloppiness. The government&#039;s &#039;&#039;Journal officiel&#039;&#039; sponsored issue after issue centered on the virtues (and profits) of geographical exploration and colonial adventure; a citizen could learn in one issue from de Lesseps of &amp;quot;the opportunities in Africa&amp;quot; and from Gamier of &amp;quot;the exploration of the Blue River.&amp;quot; Scientific geography soon gave way to &amp;quot;commercial geography,&amp;quot; as the connection between national pride in scientific and civilizational achievement and the fairly rudimentary profit motive was urged, to be channeled into support for colonial acquisition. In the words of one enthusiast, &amp;quot;The geographical societies are formed to break the fatal charm that holds us enchained to our shores.&amp;quot; In aid of this liberating quest all sorts of schemes were spun out, including the enlisting of Jules Verne--whose &amp;quot;unbelievable success,&amp;quot; as it was called, ostensibly displayed the scientific mind at a very high peak of ratiocination--to head &amp;quot;a round-the-world campaign of scientific exploration,&amp;quot; and a plan for creating a vast new sea just south of the North African coast, as well as a project for &amp;quot;binding&amp;quot; Algeria to Senegal by railroad--&amp;quot;a ribbon of steel,&amp;quot; as the projectors called it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;These details are to be found in Vernon McKay, &amp;quot;Colonialism in the French Geographical Movement,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Geographical Review&#039;&#039; 33, no. 2 (April 1943): 214-32.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much of the expansionist fervor in France during the last third of the nineteenth century was generated out of an explicit wish to compensate for the Prussian victory in 1870-1871 and, no less important, the desire to match British imperial achievements. So powerful was the latter desire, and out of so long a tradition of Anglo-French rivalry in the Orient did it derive, that France seemed literally haunted by Britain, anxious in all things connected with the Orient to catch up with and emulate the British. When in the late 1870s, the Societe academique indo-chinoise reformulated its goals, it found it important to &amp;quot;bring Indochina into the domain of Orientalism.&amp;quot; Why? In order to turn Cochin China into a &amp;quot;French India.&amp;quot; The absence of substantial colonial holdings was blamed by military men for that combination of military and commercial weakness in the war with Prussia, to say nothing of long-standing and pronounced colonial inferiority compared with Britain. The &amp;quot;power of expansion of the Western races,&amp;quot; argued a leading geographer, La Ronciere Le Noury, &amp;quot;its superior causes, its elements, its influences on human destinies, will be a beautiful study for future historians.&amp;quot; Yet only if the white races indulged their taste for voyaging--a mark of their intellectual supremacy--could colonial expansion occur.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Agnes Murphy, &#039;&#039;The Ideology of French Imperialism, 1817-1881&#039;&#039; (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1948), pp. 46, 54, 36, 45.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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From such theses as this came the commonly held view of the Orient as a geographical space to be cultivated, harvested, and guarded. The images of agricultural care for and those of frank sexual attention to the Orient proliferated accordingly. Here is a typical effusion by Gabriel Charmes, writing in 1880:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On that day when we shall be no longer in the Orient, and when other great European powers will be there, all will be at an end for our commerce in the Mediterranean, for our future in Asia, for the traffic of our southern ports. &#039;&#039;One of the most fruitful sources of our national wealth will be dried up&#039;&#039;. (Emphasis added)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another thinker, Leroy-Beaulieu, elaborated this philosophy still further:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A society colonizes, when itself having reached a high degree of maturity and of strength, it procreates, it protects, it places in good conditions of development, and it brings to virility a new society to which it has given birth. Colonization is one of the most complex and delicate phenomena of social physiology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This equation of self-reproduction with colonization led Leroy-Beaulieu to the somewhat sinister idea that whatever is lively in a modern society is &amp;quot;magnified by this pouring out of its exuberant activity on the outside.&amp;quot; Therefore, he said,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Colonization is the expansive force of a people; it is its power of reproduction; &#039;&#039;it is its enlargement and its multiplication through space&#039;&#039;; it is the subjection of the universe or a vast part of it to that people&#039;s language, customs, ideas, and laws.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 189, 110, 136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The point here is that the space of weaker or underdeveloped regions like the Orient was viewed as something inviting French interest, penetration, insemination--in short, colonization. Geographical conceptions, literally and figuratively, did away with the discrete entities held in by borders and frontiers. No less than entrepreneurial visionaries like de Lesseps, whose plan was to liberate the Orient and the Occident from their geographical bonds, French scholars, administrators, geographers, and commercial agents poured out their exuberant activity onto the fairly supine, feminine Orient. There were the geographical societies, whose number and membership outdid those of all Europe by a factor of two; there were such powerful organizations as the Comite de l&#039;Asie francaise and the Comite d&#039;Orient; there were the learned societies, chief among them the Societe asiatique, with its organization and membership firmly embedded in the universities, the institutes, and the government. Each in its own way made French interests in the Orient more real, more substantial. Almost an entire century of what now seemed passive study of the Orient had had to end, as France faced up to its transnational responsibilities during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the only part of the Orient where British and French interests literally overlapped, the territory of the now hopelessly ill Ottoman Empire, the two antagonists managed their conflict with an almost perfect and characteristic consistency. Britain was &#039;&#039;in&#039;&#039; Egypt and Mesopotamia; through a series of quasi-fictional treaties with local (and powerless) chiefs it controlled the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Suez Canal, as well as most of the intervening land mass between the Mediterranean and India. France, on the other hand, seemed fated to hover over the Orient, descending once in a while to carry out schemes that repeated de Lesseps&#039;s success with the canal; for the most part these schemes were railroad projects, such as the one planned across more or less British territory, the Syrian-Mesopotamian line. In addition France saw itself as the protector of Christian minorities--Maronites, Chaldeans, Nestorians. Yet together, Britain and France were agreed in principle on the necessity, when the time came, for the partition of Asiatic Turkey. Both before and during World War I secret diplomacy was bent on carving up the Near Orient first into spheres of influence, then into mandated (or occupied) territories. In France, much of the expansionist sentiment formed during the heyday of the geographical movement focused itself on plans to partition Asiatic Turkey, so much so that in Paris in 1914 &amp;quot;a spectacular press campaign was launched&amp;quot; to this end.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jukka Nevakivi, &#039;&#039;Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920&#039;&#039; (London: Athlone Press, 1969), p. 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In England numerous committees were empowered to study and recommend policy on the best ways of dividing up the Orient. Out of such commissions as the Bunsen Committee would come the joint Anglo-French teams of which the most famous was the one headed by Mark Sykes and Georges Picot. Equitable division of geographical space was the rule of these plans, which were deliberate attempts also at calming Anglo-French rivalry. For, as Sykes put it in a memorandum,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
it was clear ... that an Arab rising was sooner or later to take place, and that the French and ourselves ought to be on better terms if the rising was not to be a curse instead of a blessing....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 24.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The animosities remained. And to them was added the irritant provided by the Wilsonian program for national self-determination, which, as Sykes himself was to note, seemed to invalidate the whole skeleton of colonial and partitionary schemes arrived at jointly between the Powers. It would be out of place here to discuss the entire labyrinthine and deeply controversial history of the Near Orient in the early twentieth century, as its fate was being decided between the Powers, the native dynasties, the various nationalist parties and movements, the Zionists. What matters more immediately is the peculiar epistemological framework through which the Orient was seen, and out of which the Powers acted. For despite their differences, the British and the French saw the Orient as a geographical--and cultural, political, demographical, sociological, and historical--entity over whose destiny they believed themselves to have traditional entitlement. The Orient to them was no sudden discovery, no mere historical accident, but an area to the east of Europe whose principal worth was uniformly defined in terms of Europe, more particularly in terms specifically claiming for Europe--European science, scholarship, understanding, and administration--the credit for having made the Orient what it was now. And this had been the achievement--inadvertent or not is beside the point--of modern Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were two principal methods by which Orientalism delivered the Orient to the West in the early twentieth century. One was by means of the disseminative capacities of modern learning, its diffusive apparatus in the learned professions, the universities, the professional societies, the explorational and geographical organizations, the publishing industry. All these, as we have seen, built upon the prestigious authority of the pioneering scholars, travelers, and poets, whose cumulative vision had shaped a quintessential Orient; the doctrinal--or doxological--manifestation of such an Orient is what I have been calling here latent Orientalism. So far as anyone wishing to make a statement of any consequence about the Orient was concerned, latent Orientalism supplied him with an enunciative capacity that could be used, or rather mobilized, and turned into sensible discourse for the concrete occasion at hand. Thus when Balfour spoke about the Oriental to the House of Commons in 1910, he must surely have had in mind those enunciative capacities in the current and acceptably rational language of his time, by which something called an &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; could be named and talked about without danger of too much obscurity. But like all enunciative capacities and the discourses they enable, latent Orientalism was profoundly conservative--dedicated, that is, to its self-preservation. Transmitted from one generation to another, it was a part of the culture, as much a language about a part of reality as geometry or physics. Orientalism staked its existence, not upon its openness, its receptivity to the Orient, but rather on its internal, repetitious consistency about its constitutive will-to-power over the Orient. In such a way Orientalism was able to survive revolutions, world wars, and the literal dismemberment of empires.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second method by which Orientalism delivered the Orient to the West was the result of an important convergence. For decades the Orientalists had spoken about the Orient, they had translated texts, they had explained civilizations, religions, dynasties, cultures, mentalities--as academic objects, screened off from Europe by virtue of their inimitable foreignness. The Orientalist was an expert, like Renan or Lane, whose job in society was to interpret the Orient for his compatriots. The relation between Orientalist and Orient was essentially hermeneutical: standing before a distant, barely intelligible civilization or cultural monument, the Orientalist scholar reduced the obscurity by translating, sympathetically portraying, inwardly grasping the hard-to-reach object. Yet the Orientalist remained outside the Orient, which, however much it was made to appear intelligible, remained beyond the Occident. This cultural, temporal, and geographical distance was expressed in metaphors of depth, secrecy, and sexual promise: phrases like &amp;quot;the veils of an Eastern bride&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the inscrutable Orient&amp;quot; passed into the common language.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet the distance between Orient and Occident was, almost paradoxically, in the process of being reduced throughout the nineteenth century. As the commercial, political, and other existential encounters between East and West increased (in ways we have been discussing all along), a tension developed between the dogmas of latent Orientalism, with its support in studies of the &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Orient, and the descriptions of a present, modern, manifest Orient articulated by travelers, pilgrims, statesmen, and the like. At some moment impossible to determine precisely, the tension caused a convergence of the two types of Orientalism. Probably--and this is only a speculation--the convergence occurred when Orientalists, beginning with Sacy, undertook to advise governments on what the modern Orient was all about. Here the role of the specially trained and equipped expert took on an added dimension: the Orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of Western power as it attempted policy vis-a-vis the Orient. Every learned (and not so learned) European traveler in the Orient felt himself to be a representative Westerner who had gotten beneath the films of obscurity. This is obviously true of Burton, Lane, Doughty, Flaubert, and the other major figures I have been discussing.&lt;br /&gt;
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The discoveries of Westerners about the manifest and modern Orient acquired a pressing urgency as Western territorial acquisition in the Orient increased. Thus what the scholarly Orientalist defined as the &amp;quot;essential&amp;quot; Orient was sometimes contradicted, but in many cases was confirmed, when the Orient became an actual administrative obligation. Certainly Cromer&#039;s theories about the Oriental--theories acquired from the traditional Orientalist archive--were vindicated plentifully as he ruled millions of Orientals in actual fact. This was no less true of the French experience in Syria, North Africa, and elsewhere in the French colonies, such as they were. But at no time did the convergence between latent Orientalist doctrine and manifest Orientalist experience occur more dramatically than when, as a result of World War I, Asiatic Turkey was being surveyed by Britain and France for its dismemberment. There, laid out on an operating table for surgery, was the Sick Man of Europe, revealed in all his weakness, characteristics, and topographical outline.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist, with his special knowledge, played an inestimably important part in this surgery. Already there had been intimations of his crucial role as a kind of secret agent &#039;&#039;inside&#039;&#039; the Orient when the British scholar Edward Henry Palmer was sent to the Sinai in 1882 to gauge anti-British sentiment and its possible enlistment on behalf of the Arabi revolt. Palmer was killed in the process, but he was only the most unsuccessful of the many who performed similar services for the Empire, now a serious and exacting business entrusted in part to the regional &amp;quot;expert.&amp;quot; Not for nothing was another Orientalist, D. G. Hogarth, author of the famous account of the exploration of Arabia aptly titled &#039;&#039;The Penetration of Arabia&#039;&#039; (1904),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;D. G. Hogarth, &#039;&#039;The Penetration of Arabia: A Record of the Development of Western Knowledge Concerning The Arabian Peninsula&#039;&#039; (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1904). There is a good recent book on the same subject: Robin Bidwell, &#039;&#039;Travellers in Arabia&#039;&#039; (London: Paul Hamlyn, 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; made the head of the Arab Bureau in Cairo during World War I. And neither was it by accident that men and women like Gertrude Bell, T. E. Lawrence, and St. John Philby, Oriental experts all, posted to the Orient as agents of empire, friends of the Orient, formulators of policy alternatives because of their intimate and expert knowledge of the Orient and of Orientals. They formed a &amp;quot;band&amp;quot;--as Lawrence called it once--bound together by contradictory notions and personal similarities: great individuality, sympathy and intuitive identification with the Orient, a jealously preserved sense of personal mission in the Orient, cultivated eccentricity, a final disapproval of the Orient. For them all the Orient was their direct, peculiar experience of it. In them Orientalism and an effective praxis for handling the Orient received their final European form, before the Empire disappeared and passed its legacy to other candidates for the role of dominant power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such individualists as these were not academics. We shall soon see that they were the beneficiaries of the academic study of the Orient, without in any sense belonging to the official and professional company of Orientalist scholars. Their role, however, was not to scant academic Orientalism, nor to subvert it, but rather to make it effective. In their genealogy were people like Lane and Burton, as much for their encyclopedic autodidacticism as for the accurate, the quasi-scholarly knowledge of the Orient they had obviously deployed when dealing with or writing about Orientals. For the curricular study of the Orient they substituted a sort of elaboration of latent Orientalism, which was easily available to them in the imperial culture of their epoch. Their scholarly frame of reference, such as it was, was fashioned by people like William Muir, Anthony Bevan, D. S. Margoliouth, Charles Lyall, E. G. Browne, R. A. Nicholson, Guy Le Strange, E. D. Ross, and Thomas Arnold, who also followed directly in the line of descent from Lane. Their imaginative perspectives were provided principally by their illustrious contemporary Rudyard Kipling, who had sung so memorably of holding &amp;quot;dominion over palm and pine.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between Britain and France in such matters was perfectly consistent with the history of each nation in the Orient: the British were there; the French lamented the loss of India and the intervening territories. By the end of the century, Syria had become the main focus of French activity, but even there it was a matter of common consensus that the French could not match the British either in quality of personnel or in degree of political influence. The Anglo-French competition over the Ottoman spoils was felt even on the field of battle in the Hejaz, in Syria, in Mesopotamia--but in all these places, as astute men like Edmond Bremond noted, the French Orientalists and local experts were outclassed in brilliance and tactical maneuvering by their British counterparts.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Edmond Bremond, &#039;&#039;Le Hedjaz dans la guerre mondiale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1931), pp. 242 ff.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Except for an occasional genius like Louis Massignon, there were no French Lawrences or Sykeses or Bells. But there were determined imperialists like Etienne Flandin and Franklin-Bouillon. Lecturing to the Paris Alliance francaise in 1913, the Comte de Cressaty, a vociferous imperialist, proclaimed Syria as France&#039;s own Orient, the site of French political, moral, and economic interests--interests, he added, that had to be defended during this &amp;quot;age des envahissants imperialistes&amp;quot;; and yet Cressaty noted that even with French commercial and industrial firms in the Orient, with by far the largest number of native students enrolled in French schools, France was invariably being pushed around in the Orient, threatened not only by Britain but by Austria, Germany, and Russia. If France was to continue to prevent &amp;quot;le retour de l&#039;Islam,&amp;quot; it had better take hold of the Orient: this was an argument proposed by Cressaty and seconded by Senator Paul Doumer.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Le Comte de Cressaty, &#039;&#039;Les Interets de la France en Syrie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Floury, 1913).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These views were repeated on numerous occasions, and indeed France did well by itself in North Africa and in Syria after World War I, but the special, concrete management of emerging Oriental populations and theoretically independent territories with which the British always credited themselves was something the French felt had eluded them. Ultimately, perhaps, the difference one always feels between modern British and modern French Orientalism is a stylistic one; the import of the generalizations about Orient and Orientals, the sense of distinction preserved between Orient and Occident, the desirability of Occidental dominance over the Orient--all these are the same in both traditions. For of the many elements making up what we customarily call &amp;quot;expertise,&amp;quot; style, which is the result of specific worldly circumstances being molded by tradition, institutions, will, and intelligence into formal articulation, is one of the most manifest. It is to this determinant, to this perceptible and modernized refinement in early-twentieth-century Orientalism in Britain and France, that we must now turn.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Style, Expertise, Vision: &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;s Worldliness&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
As he appears in several poems, in novels like &#039;&#039;Kim&#039;&#039;, and in too many catchphrases to be an ironic fiction, Kipling&#039;s White Man, as an idea, a persona, a style of being, seems to have served many Britishers while they were abroad. The actual color of their skin set them off dramatically and reassuringly from the sea of natives, but for the Britisher who circulated amongst Indians, Africans, or Arabs there was also the certain knowledge that he belonged to, and could draw upon the empirical and spiritual reserves of, a long tradition of executive responsibility towards the colored races. It was of this tradition, its glories and difficulties, that Kipling wrote when he celebrated the &amp;quot;road&amp;quot; taken by White Men in the colonies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now, this is the road that the White Men tread&lt;br /&gt;
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When they go to clean a land--&lt;br /&gt;
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Iron underfoot and the vine overhead&lt;br /&gt;
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And the deep on either hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have trod that road--and a wet and windy road--&lt;br /&gt;
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Our chosen star for guide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Oh, well for the world when the White Men tread&lt;br /&gt;
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Their highway side by side!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rudyard Kipling, &#039;&#039;Verse&#039;&#039; (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &amp;amp; Co., 1954), p. 280.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Cleaning a land&amp;quot; is best done by White Men in delicate concert with each other, an allusion to the present dangers of European rivalry in the colonies; for failing in the attempt to coordinate policy, Kipling&#039;s White Men are quite prepared to go to war: &amp;quot;Freedom for ourselves and freedom for our sons/And, failing freedom, War.&amp;quot; Behind the White Man&#039;s mask of amiable leadership there is always the express willingness to use force, to kill and be killed. What dignifies his mission is some sense of intellectual dedication; he is a White Man, but not for mere profit, since his &amp;quot;chosen star&amp;quot; presumably sits far above earthly gain. Certainly many White Men often wondered what it was they fought for on that &amp;quot;wet and windy road,&amp;quot; and certainly a great number of them must have been puzzled as to how the color of their skins gave them superior ontological status plus great power over much of the inhabited world. Yet in the end, being a White Man, for Kipling and for those whose perceptions and rhetoric he influenced, was a self-confirming business. One became a White Man because one &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; a White Man; more important, &amp;quot;drinking that cup,&amp;quot; living that unalterable destiny in &amp;quot;the White Man&#039;s day,&amp;quot; left one little time for idle speculation on origins, causes, historical logic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Being a White Man was therefore an idea and a reality. It involved a reasoned position towards both the white and the nonwhite worlds. It meant--in the colonies--speaking in a certain way, behaving according to a code of regulations, and even feeling certain things and not others. It meant specific judgments, evaluations, gestures. It was a form of authority before which nonwhites, and even whites themselves, were expected to bend. In the institutional forms it took (colonial governments, consular corps, commercial establishments) it was an agency for the expression, diffusion, and implementation of policy towards the world, and within this agency, although a certain personal latitude was allowed, the impersonal communal idea of being a White Man ruled. Being a White Man, in short, was a very concrete manner of being-in-the-world, a way of taking hold of reality, language, and thought. It made a specific style possible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kipling himself could not merely have happened; the same is true of his White Man. Such ideas and their authors emerge out of complex historical and cultural circumstances, at least two of which have much in common with the history of Orientalism in the nineteenth century. One of them is the culturally sanctioned habit of deploying large generalizations by which reality is divided into various collectives: languages, races, types, colors, mentalities, each category being not so much a neutral designation as an evaluative interpretation. Underlying these categories is the rigidly binomial opposition of &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;theirs,&amp;quot; with the former always encroaching upon the latter (even to the point of making &amp;quot;theirs&amp;quot; exclusively a function of &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot;). This opposition was reinforced not only by anthropology, linguistics, and history but also, of course, by the Darwinian theses on survival and natural selection, and--no less decisive--by the rhetoric of high cultural humanism. What gave writers like Renan and Arnold the right to generalities about race was the official character of their formed cultural literacy. &amp;quot;Our&amp;quot; values were (let us say) liberal, humane, correct; they were supported by the tradition of belles-lettres, informed scholarship, rational inquiry; as Europeans (and white men) &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; shared in them every time their virtues were extolled. Nevertheless, the human partnerships formed by reiterated cultural values excluded as much as they included. For every idea about &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; art spoken for by Arnold, Ruskin, Mill, Newman, Carlyle, Renan, Gobineau, or Comte, another link in the chain binding &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; together was formed while another outsider was banished. Even if this is always the result of such rhetoric, wherever and whenever it occurs, we must remember that for nineteenth-century Europe an imposing edifice of learning and culture was built, so to speak, in the face of actual outsiders (the colonies, the poor, the delinquent), whose role in the culture was to give definition to what &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; were constitutionally unsuited for.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The themes of exclusion and confinement in nineteenth-century culture have played an important role in Michel Foucault&#039;s work, most recently in his &#039;&#039;Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), and &#039;&#039;The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The other circumstance common to the creation of the White Man and Orientalism is the &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; commanded by each, as well as the sense that such a field entails peculiar modes, even rituals, of behavior, learning, and possession. Only an Occidental could speak of Orientals, for example, just as it was the White Man who could designate and name the coloreds, or nonwhites. Every statement made by Orientalists or White Men (who were usually interchangeable) conveyed a sense of the irreducible distance separating white from colored, or Occidental from Oriental; moreover, behind each statement there resonated the tradition of experience, learning, and education that kept the Oriental-colored to his position of &#039;&#039;object studied by the Occidental-white&#039;&#039;, instead of vice versa. Where one was in a position of power--as Cromer was, for example--the Oriental belonged to the system of rule whose principle was simply to make sure that no Oriental was ever allowed to be independent and rule himself. The premise there was that since the Orientals were ignorant of self-government, they had better be kept that way for their own good.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since the White Man, like the Orientalist, lived very close to the line of tension keeping the coloreds at bay, he felt it incumbent on him readily to define and redefine the domain he surveyed. Passages of narrative description regularly alternate with passages of rearticulated definition and judgment that disrupt the narrative; this is a characteristic style of the writing produced by Oriental experts who operated using Kipling&#039;s White Man as a mask. Here is T. E. Lawrence, writing to V. W. Richards in 1918:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
... the Arab appealed to my imagination. It is the old, old civilisation, which has refined itself clear of household gods, and half the trappings which ours hastens to assume. The gospel of bareness in materials is a good one, and it involves apparently a sort of moral bareness too. They think for the moment, and endeavour to slip through life without turning corners or climbing hills. In part it is a mental and moral fatigue, a race trained out, and to avoid difficulties they have to jettison so much that we think honorable and grave: and yet without in any way sharing their point of view, I think I can understand it enough to look at myself and other foreigners from their direction, and without condemning it. I know I am a stranger to them, and always will be; but I cannot believe them worse, any more than I could change to their ways.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The Letters of T. E. Lawrence of Arabia&#039;&#039;, ed. David Garnett (1938; reprint ed., London: Spring Books, 1964), p. 244.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar perspective, however different the subject under discussion may seem to be, is found in these remarks by Gertrude Bell:&lt;br /&gt;
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How many thousand years this state of things has lasted [namely, that Arabs live in &amp;quot;a state of war&amp;quot;], those who shall read the earliest records of the inner desert will tell us, for it goes back to the first of them, but in all the centuries the Arab has bought no wisdom from experience. He is never safe, and yet he behaves as though security were his daily bread.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gertrude Bell, &#039;&#039;The Desert and the Sown&#039;&#039; (London: William Heinemann, 1907), p. 244.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To which, as a gloss, we should, add her further observation, this time about life in Damascus:&lt;br /&gt;
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I begin to see dimly what the civilisation of a great Eastern city means, how they live, what they think; and I have got on to terms with them. I believe the fact of my being English is a great help.... We have gone up in the world since five years ago. The difference is very marked. I think it is due to the success of our government in Egypt to a great extent.... The defeat of Russia stands for a great deal, and my impression is that the vigorous policy of Lord Curzon in the Persian Gulf and on the India frontier stands for a great deal more. No one who does not know the East can realise how it all hangs together. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that if the English mission had been turned back from the gates of Kabul, the English tourist would be frowned upon in the streets of Damascus.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gertrude Bell, &#039;&#039;From Her Personal Papers, 1889-1914&#039;&#039;, ed. Elizabeth Burgoyne (London: Ernest Benn, 1958), p. 204.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In such statements as these, we note immediately that &amp;quot;the Arab&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Arabs&amp;quot; have an aura of apartness, definiteness, and collective self-consistency such as to wipe out any traces of individual Arabs with narratable life histories. What appealed to Lawrence&#039;s imagination was the clarity of the Arab, both as an image and as a supposed philosophy (or attitude) towards life: in both cases what Lawrence fastens on is the Arab as if seen from the cleansing perspective of one not an Arab, and one for whom such un-self-conscious primitive simplicity as the Arab possesses is something defined by the observer, in this case the White Man. Yet Arab refinement, which in its essentials corresponds to Yeats&#039;s visions of Byzantium where&lt;br /&gt;
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Flames that no faggot feeds, flint nor steel has lit,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor storm disturbs, flames begotten of flame,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where blood-begotten spirits come&lt;br /&gt;
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And all complexities of fury leave&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;William Butler Yeats, &amp;quot;Byzantium,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;The Collected Poems&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 244.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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is associated with Arab perdurability, as if the Arab had not been subject to the ordinary processes of history. Paradoxically, the Arab seems to Lawrence to have exhausted himself in his very temporal persistence. The enormous age of Arab civilization has thus served to refine the Arab down to his quintessential attributes, and to tire him out morally in the process. What we are left with is Bell&#039;s Arab: centuries of experience and no wisdom. As a collective entity, then, the Arab accumulates no existential or even semantical thickness. He remains the same, except for the exhausting refinements mentioned by Lawrence, from one end to the other of &amp;quot;the records of the inner desert.&amp;quot; We are to assume that if &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Arab feels joy, if he is sad at the death of his child or parent, if he has a sense of the injustices of political tyranny, then those experiences are necessarily subordinate to the sheer, unadorned, and persistent fact of being an Arab.&lt;br /&gt;
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The primitiveness of such a state exists simultaneously on at least two levels: one, &#039;&#039;in the definition&#039;&#039;, which is reductive; and two (according to Lawrence and Bell), &#039;&#039;in reality&#039;&#039;. This absolute coincidence was itself no simple coincidence. For one, it could only have been made from the outside by virtue of a vocabulary and epistemological instruments designed both to get to the heart of things and to avoid the distractions of accident, circumstance, or experience. For another, the coincidence was a fact uniquely the result of method, tradition, and politics all working together. Each in a sense obliterated the distinctions between the type&#039;&#039;--the&#039;&#039; Oriental, &#039;&#039;the&#039;&#039; Semite, &#039;&#039;the&#039;&#039; Arab, &#039;&#039;the&#039;&#039; Orient--and ordinary human reality, Yeats&#039;s &amp;quot;uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor,&amp;quot; in which all human beings live. The scholarly investigator took a type marked &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; for the same thing as any individual Oriental he might encounter. Years of tradition had encrusted discourse about such matters as the Semitic or Oriental spirit with some legitimacy. And political good sense taught, in Bell&#039;s marvelous phrase, that in the East &amp;quot;it all hangs together.&amp;quot; Primitiveness therefore inhered in the Orient, &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; the Orient, an idea to which anyone dealing with or writing about the Orient had to return, as if to a touchstone outlasting time or experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is an excellent way of understanding all this as it applied to the white agents, experts, and advisers for the Orient. What mattered to Lawrence and Bell was that their references to Arabs or Orientals belonged to a recognizable, and authoritative, convention of formulation, one that was able to subordinate detail to it. But from where, more particularly, did &amp;quot;the Arab,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the Semite,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Oriental&amp;quot; come?&lt;br /&gt;
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We have remarked how, during the nineteenth century in such writers as Renan, Lane, Flaubert, Caussin de Perceval, Marx, and Lamartine, a generalization about &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; drew its power from the presumed representativeness of everything Oriental; each particle of the Orient told of its Orientalness, so much so that the attribute of being Oriental overrode any countervailing instance. An Oriental man was first an Oriental and only second a man. Such radical typing was naturally reinforced by sciences (or discourses, as I prefer to call them) that took a backward and downward direction towards the species category, which was supposed also to be an ontogenetic explanation for every member of the species. Thus within broad, semipopular designations such as &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; there were some more scientifically valid distinctions being made; most of these were based principally on language types--e.g., Semitic, Dravidic, Hamitic--but they were quickly able to acquire anthropological, psychological, biological, and cultural evidence in their support. Renan&#039;s &amp;quot;Semitic,&amp;quot; as an instance, was a linguistic generalization which in Renan&#039;s hands could add to itself all sorts of parallel ideas from anatomy, history, anthropology, and even geology. &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; could then be employed not only as a simple description or designation; it could be applied to any complex of historical and political events in order to pare them down to a nucleus both antecedent to and inherent in them. &amp;quot;Semitic,&amp;quot; therefore, was a transtemporal, transindividual category, purporting to predict every discrete act of &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; behavior on the basis of some pre-existing &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; essence, and aiming as well to interpret all aspects of human life and activity in terms of some common &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; element.&lt;br /&gt;
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The peculiar hold on late-nineteenth-century liberal European culture of such relatively punitive ideas will seem mysterious unless it is remembered that the appeal of sciences like linguistics, anthropology, and biology was that they were empirical, and by no means speculative or idealistic. Renan&#039;s Semitic, like Bopp&#039;s Indo-European, was a constructed object, it is true, but it was considered logical and inevitable as a protoform, given the scientifically apprehendable and empirically analyzable data of specific Semitic languages. Thus, in trying to formulate a prototypical and primitive linguistic type (as well as a cultural, psychological, and historical one), there was also an &amp;quot;attempt to define a primary human potential,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stanley Diamond, &#039;&#039;In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization&#039;&#039; (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), p. 119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; out of which completely specific instances of behavior uniformly derived. Now this attempt would have been impossible had it not also been believed--in classical empiricist terms--that mind and body were interdependent realities, both determined originally by a given set of geographical, biological, and quasihistorical conditions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Harry Bracken, &amp;quot;Essence, Accident and Race,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Hermathena&#039;&#039; 116 (Winter 1973): pp. 81-96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; From this set, which was not available to the native for discovery or introspection, there was no subsequent escape. The antiquarian bias of Orientalists was supported by these empiricist ideas. In all their studies of &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Islam, Buddhism, or Zoroastrianism they felt themselves, as George Eliot&#039;s Dr. Casaubon confesses, to be acting &amp;quot;like the ghost of an ancient, wandering about the world and trying mentally to construct it as it used to be, in spite of ruin and confusing changes.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Eliot, &#039;&#039;Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life&#039;&#039; (1872; reprint ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956), p. 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Were these theses about linguistic, civilizational, and finally racial characteristics merely one side of an academic debate amongst European scientists and scholars, we might dismiss them as furnishing material for an unimportant closet drama. The point is, however, that both the terms of the debate and the debate itself had very wide circulation; in late-nineteenth-century culture, as Lionel Trilling has said, &amp;quot;racial theory, stimulated by a rising nationalism and a spreading imperialism, supported by an incomplete and mal-assimilated science, was almost undisputed.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lionel Trilling, &#039;&#039;Matthew Arnold&#039;&#039; (1939; reprint ed., New York: Meridian Books, 1955), p. 214.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Race theory, ideas about primitive origins and primitive classifications, modern decadence, the progress of civilization, the destiny of the white (or Aryan) races, the need for colonial territories--all these were elements in the peculiar amalgam of science, politics, and culture whose drift, almost without exception, was always to raise Europe or a European race to dominion over non-European portions of mankind. There was general agreement too that, according to a strangely transformed variety of Darwinism sanctioned by Darwin himself, the modern Orientals were degraded remnants of a former greatness; the ancient, or &amp;quot;classical,&amp;quot; civilizations of the Orient were perceivable through the disorders of present decadence, but only (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) because a white specialist with highly refined scientific techniques could do the sifting and reconstructing, and (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) because a vocabulary of sweeping generalities (the Semites, the Aryans, the Orientals) referred not to a set of fictions but rather to a whole array of seemingly objective and agreed-upon distinctions. Thus a remark about what Orientals were and were not capable of was supported by biological &amp;quot;truths&amp;quot; such as those spelled out in P. Charles Michel&#039;s &amp;quot;A Biological View of Our Foreign Policy&amp;quot; (1896), in Thomas Henry Huxley&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Struggle for Existence in Human Society&#039;&#039; (1888), Benjamin Kidd&#039;s &#039;&#039;Social Evolution&#039;&#039; (1894), John B. Crozier&#039;s &#039;&#039;History of Intellectual Development on the Lines of Modern Evolution&#039;&#039; (1897-1901), and Charles Harvey&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Biology of British Politics&#039;&#039; (1904).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039; (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 180, note 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It was assumed that if languages were as distinct from each other as the linguists said they were, then too the language users--their minds, cultures, potentials, and even their bodies--were different in similar ways. And these distinctions had the force of ontological, empirical truth behind them, together with the convincing demonstration of such truth in studies of origins, development, character, and destiny.&lt;br /&gt;
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The point to be emphasized is that this truth about the distinctive differences between races, civilizations, and languages was (or pretended to be) radical and ineradicable. It went to the bottom of things, it asserted that there was no escape from origins and the types these origins enabled; it set the real boundaries between human beings, on which races, nations, and civilizations were constructed; it forced vision away from common, as well as plural, human realities like joy, suffering, political organization, forcing attention instead in the downward and backward direction of immutable origins. A scientist could no more escape such origins in his research than an Oriental could escape &amp;quot;the Semites&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Indians&amp;quot; from which his present reality--debased, colonized, backward--excluded him, except for the white researcher&#039;s didactic presentation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The profession of specialized research conferred unique privileges. We recall that Lane could appear to be an Oriental and yet retain his scholarly detachment. The Orientals he studied became in fact &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; Orientals, for he saw them not only as actual people but as monumentalized objects in his account of them. This double perspective encouraged a sort of structured irony. On the one hand, there was a collection of people living in the present; on the other hand, these people--as the subject of study--became &amp;quot;the Egyptians,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the Muslims,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Orientals.&amp;quot; Only the scholar could see, and manipulate, the discrepancy between the two levels. The tendency of the former was always towards greater variety, yet this variety was always being restrained, compressed downwards and backwards to the &#039;&#039;radical&#039;&#039; terminal of the generality. Every modern, native instance of behavior became an effusion to be sent back to the original terminal, which was strengthened in the process. This kind of &amp;quot;dispatching&amp;quot; was precisely the &#039;&#039;discipline&#039;&#039; of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s ability to deal with the Egyptians as present beings and as validations of &#039;&#039;sui generis&#039;&#039; labels was a function both of Orientalist discipline and of generally held views about the Near Oriental Muslim or Semite. In no people more than in the Oriental Semites was it possible to see the present and the origin together. The Jews and the Muslims, as subjects of Orientalist study, were readily understandable in view of their primitive origins: this was (and to a certain extent still is) the cornerstone of modern Orientalism. Renan had called the Semites an instance of arrested development, and functionally speaking this came to mean that for the Orientalist no modern Semite, however much he may have believed himself to be modern, could ever outdistance the organizing claims on him of his origins. This functional rule worked on the temporal and spatial levels together. No Semite advanced in time beyond the development of a &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; period; no Semite could ever shake loose the pastoral, desert environment of his tent and tribe. Every manifestation of actual &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; life could be, and ought to be, referred back to the primitive explanatory category of &amp;quot;the Semitic.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The executive power of such a system of reference, by which each discrete instance of real behavior could be reduced down and back to a small number of explanatory &amp;quot;original&amp;quot; categories, was considerable by the end of the nineteenth century. In Orientalism it was the equivalent of bureaucracy in public administration. The department was more useful than the individual file, and certainly the human being was significant principally as the occasion for a file. We must imagine the Orientalist at work in the role of a clerk putting together a very wide assortment of files in a large cabinet marked &amp;quot;the Semites.&amp;quot; Aided by recent discoveries in comparative and primitive anthropology, a scholar like William Robertson Smith could group together the inhabitants of the Near Orient and write on their kinship and marriage customs, on the form and content of their religious practice. The power of Smith&#039;s work is its plainly radical demythologizing of the Semites. The nominal barriers presented to the world by Islam or Judaism are swept aside; Smith uses Semitic philology, mythology, and Orientalist scholarship &amp;quot;to construct ... a hypothetical picture of the development of the social systems, consistent with all the Arabian facts.&amp;quot; If this picture succeeds in revealing the antecedent, and still influential, roots of monotheism in totemism or animal worship, then the scholar has been successful. And this, Smith says, despite the fact that &amp;quot;our Mohammedan sources draw a veil, as far as they can, over all details of the old heathenism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;W. Robertson Smith, &#039;&#039;Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia&#039;&#039;, ed. Stanley Cook (1907; reprint ed., Oesterhout, N.B.: Anthropological Publications, 1966), pp. xiii, 241.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Smith&#039;s work on the Semites covered such areas as theology, literature, and history; it was done with a full awareness of work done by Orientalists (see, for instance, Smith&#039;s savage attack in 1887 on Renan&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire du peuple d&#039;Israel&#039;&#039;), and more important, was intended as an aid to the understanding of the modern Semites. For Smith, I think, was a crucial link in the intellectual chain connecting the White-Man-as-expert to the modern Orient. None of the encapsulated wisdom delivered as Oriental expertise by Lawrence, Hogarth, Bell, and the others would have been possible without Smith. And even Smith the antiquarian scholar would not have had half the authority without his additional and direct experience of &amp;quot;the Arabian facts.&amp;quot; It was the combination in Smith of the &amp;quot;grasp&amp;quot; of primitive categories with the ability to see general truths behind the empirical vagaries of contemporary Oriental behavior that gave weight to his writing. Moreover, it was this special combination that adumbrated the style of expertise upon which Lawrence, Bell, and Philby built their reputation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like Burton and Charles Doughty before him, Smith voyaged in the Hejaz, between 1880 and 1881. Arabia has been an especially privileged place for the Orientalist, not only because Muslims treat Islam as Arabia&#039;s &#039;&#039;genius loci&#039;&#039;, but also because the Hejaz appears historically as barren and retarded as it is geographically; the Arabian desert is thus considered to be a locale about which one can make statements regarding the past in exactly the same form (and with the same content) that one makes them regarding the present. In the Hejaz you can speak about Muslims, modern Islam, and primitive Islam without bothering to make distinctions. To this vocabulary devoid of historical grounding, Smith was able to bring the cachet of additional authority provided by his Semitic studies. What we hear in his comments is the standpoint of a scholar commanding &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; the antecedents for Islam, the Arabs, and Arabia. Hence:&lt;br /&gt;
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It is characteristic of Mohammedanism that all national feeling assumes a religious aspect, inasmuch as the whole polity and social forms of a Moslem country are clothed in a religious dress. But it would be a mistake to suppose that genuine religious feeling is at the bottom of everything that justifies itself by taking a religious shape. The prejudices of the Arab have their roots in a conservatism which lies deeper than his belief in Islam. It is, indeed, a great fault of the religion of the Prophet that it lends itself so easily to the prejudices of the race among whom it was first promulgated, and that it has taken under its protection so many barbarous and obsolete ideas, which even Mohammed must have seen to have no religious worth, but which he carried over into his system in order to facilitate the propagation of his reformed doctrines. Yet many of the prejudices which seem to us most distinctively Mohammedan have no basis in the Koran.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;W. Robertson Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures and Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. John Sutherland Black and George Chrystal (London: Adam &amp;amp; Charles Black, 1912), pp. 492-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; in the last sentence of this amazing piece of logic defines the White Man&#039;s vantage point explicitly. This allows &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; to say in the first sentence that all political and social life are &amp;quot;clothed&amp;quot; in religious dress (Islam can thus be characterized as totalitarian), then to say in the second that religion is only a cover used by Muslims (in other words, all Muslims are hypocrites essentially). In the third sentence, the claim is made that Islam--even while laying hold upon the Arab&#039;s faith--has not really reformed the Arab&#039;s basic pre-Islamic conservatism. Nor is this all. For if Islam was successful as a religion it was because it fecklessly allowed these &amp;quot;authentic&amp;quot; Arab prejudices to creep in; for such a tactic (now we see that it was a tactic on Islam&#039;s behalf) we must blame Mohammed, who was after all a ruthless crypto-Jesuit. But all this is more or less wiped out in the last sentence, when Smith assures &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; that everything he has said about Islam is invalid, since the quintessential aspects of Islam known to the West are not &amp;quot;Mohammedan&amp;quot; after all.&lt;br /&gt;
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The principles of identity and noncontradiction clearly do not bind the Orientalist. What overrides them is Orientalist expertise, which is based on an irrefutable collective verity entirely within the Orientalist&#039;s philosophical and rhetorical grasp. Smith is able without the slightest trepidation to speak about &amp;quot;the jejune, practical and ... constitutionally irreligious habit of the Arabic mind,&amp;quot; Islam as a system of &amp;quot;organized hypocrisy,&amp;quot; the impossibility of &amp;quot;feeling any respect for Moslem devotion, in which formalism and vain repetition are reduced to a system.&amp;quot; His attacks on Islam are not relativist, for it is clear to him that Europe&#039;s and Christianity&#039;s superiority is actual, not imagined. At bottom, Smith&#039;s vision of the world is binary, as is evident in such passages as the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Arabian traveller is quite different from ourselves. The labour of moving from place to place is a mere nuisance to him, he has no enjoyment in effort [as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do], and grumbles at hunger or fatigue with all his might [as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do not]. You will never persuade the Oriental that, when you get off your camel, you can have any other wish than immediately to squat on a rug and take your rest (&#039;&#039;isterih&#039;&#039;), smoking and drinking. Moreover the Arab is little impressed by scenery [but &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; are].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 492, 493, 511, 500, 498-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;We&amp;quot; are this, &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; are that. Which Arab, which Islam, when, how, according to what tests: these appear to be distinctions irrelevant to Smith&#039;s scrutiny of and experience in the Hejaz. The crucial point is that everything one can know or learn about &amp;quot;Semites&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot; receives immediate corroboration, not merely in the archives, but directly on the ground.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out of such a coercive framework, by which a modern &amp;quot;colored&amp;quot; man is chained irrevocably to the general truths formulated about his prototypical linguistic, anthropological, and doctrinal forebears by a white European scholar, the work of the great twentieth-century Oriental experts in England and France derived. To this framework these experts also brought their private mythology and obsessions, which in writers like Doughty and Lawrence have been studied with considerable energy. Each--Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Doughty, Lawrence, Bell, Hogarth, Philby, Sykes, Storrs--believed his vision of things Oriental was individual, self-created out of some intensely personal encounter with the Orient, Islam, or the Arabs; each expressed general contempt for official knowledge held about the East. &amp;quot;The sun made me an Arab,&amp;quot; Doughty wrote in &#039;&#039;Arabia Deserta&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;but never warped me to Orientalism.&amp;quot; Yet in the final analysis they all (except Blunt) expressed the traditional Western hostility to and fear of the Orient. Their views refined and gave a personal twist to the academic style of modern Orientalism, with its repertoire of grand generalizations, tendentious &amp;quot;science&amp;quot; from which there was no appeal, reductive formulae. (Doughty again, on the same page as his sneer at Orientalism: &amp;quot;The Semites are like to a man sitting in a cloaca to the eyes, and whose brows touch heaven.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Charles M. Doughty, &#039;&#039;Travels in Arabia Deserta&#039;&#039;, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (New York: Random House, n.d.), 1: 95. See also the excellent article by Richard Bevis, &amp;quot;Spiritual Geology: C. M. Doughty and the Land of the Arabs,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Victorian Studies&#039;&#039; 16 (December 1972), 163-81.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) They acted, they promised, they recommended public policy on the basis of such generalizations; and, by a remarkable irony, they acquired the identity of White Orientals in their natal cultures--even as, in the instances of Doughty, Lawrence, Hogarth, and Bell, their professional involvement with the East (like Smith&#039;s) did not prevent them from despising it thoroughly. The main issue for them was preserving the Orient and Islam under the control of the White Man.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new dialectic emerges out of this project. What is required of the Oriental expert is no longer simply &amp;quot;understanding&amp;quot;: now the Orient must be made to perform, its power must be enlisted on the side of &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; values, civilization, interests, goals. Knowledge of the Orient is directly translated into activity, and the results give rise to new currents of thought and action in the Orient. But these in turn will require from the White Man a new assertion of control, this time not as the author of a scholarly work on the Orient but as the maker of contemporary history, of the Orient as urgent actuality (which, because he began it, only the expert can understand adequately). The Orientalist has now become a figure of Oriental history, indistinguishable from it, its shaper, its characteristic &#039;&#039;sign&#039;&#039; for the West. Here is the dialectic in brief:&lt;br /&gt;
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Some Englishmen, of whom Kitchener was chief, believed that a rebellion of Arabs against Turks would enable England, while fighting Germany, simultaneously to defeat her ally Turkey. Their knowledge of the nature and power and country of the Arabic-speaking peoples made them think that the issue of such a rebellion would be happy: and indicated its character and method. So they allowed it to begin, having obtained formal assurances of help for it from the British Government. Yet none the less the rebellion of the Sherif of Mecca came to most as a surprise, and found the Allies unready. It aroused mixed feelings and made strong friends and enemies, amid whose clashing jealousies its affairs began to miscarry.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;T. E. Lawrence, &#039;&#039;The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph&#039;&#039; (1926; reprint ed., Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran &amp;amp; Co., 1935), p. 28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is Lawrence&#039;s own synopsis of chapter 1 of &#039;&#039;The Seven Pillars of Wisdom&#039;&#039;. The &amp;quot;knowledge&amp;quot; of &amp;quot;some Englishmen&amp;quot; authors a movement in the Orient whose &amp;quot;affairs&amp;quot; create a mixed progeny; the ambiguities, the half-imagined, tragicomic results of this new, revived Orient become the subject of expert writing, a new form of Orientalist discourse that presents a vision of the contemporary Orient, not as narrative, but as all complexity, problematics, betrayed hope--with the White Orientalist author as its prophetic, articulate definition.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defeat of narrative by vision--which is true even in so patently storylike a work as &#039;&#039;The Seven Pillars&#039;&#039;--is something we have already encountered in Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;. A conflict between a holistic view of the Orient (description, monumental record) and a narrative of events in the Orient is a conflict on several levels, involving several different issues. As the conflict is frequently renewed in the discourse of Orientalism, it is worthwhile analyzing it here briefly. The Orientalist surveys the Orient from above, with the aim of getting hold of the whole sprawling panorama before him--culture, religion, mind, history, society. To do this he must see every detail through the device of a set of reductive categories (the Semites, the Muslim mind, the Orient, and so forth). Since these categories are primarily schematic and efficient ones, and since it is more or less assumed that no Oriental can know himself the way an Orientalist can, any vision of the Orient ultimately comes to rely for its coherence and force on the person, institution, or discourse whose property it is. Any comprehensive vision is fundamentally conservative, and we have noted how in the history of ideas about the Near Orient in the West these ideas have maintained themselves regardless of any evidence disputing them. (Indeed, we can argue that these ideas produce evidence that proves their validity.)&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist is principally a kind of agent of such comprehensive visions; Lane is a typical instance of the way an individual believes himself to have subordinated his ideas, or even what he sees, to the exigencies of some &amp;quot;scientific&amp;quot; view of the whole phenomenon known collectively as the Orient, or the Oriental nation. A vision therefore is static, just as the scientific categories informing late-nineteenth-century Orientalism are static: there is no recourse beyond &amp;quot;the Semites&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Oriental mind&amp;quot;; these are final terminals holding every variety of Oriental behavior within a general view of the whole field. As a discipline, as a profession, as specialized language or discourse, Orientalism is staked upon the permanence of the whole Orient, for without &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; there can be no consistent, intelligible, and articulated knowledge called &amp;quot;Orientalism.&amp;quot; Thus the Orient belongs to Orientalism, just as it is assumed that there is pertinent information belonging to (or about) the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Against this static system of &amp;quot;synchronic essentialism&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a discussion of this see Talal Asad, &amp;quot;Two European Images of Non-European Rule,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter&#039;&#039;, ed. Talal Asad (London: Ithaca Press, 1975), pp. 103-18.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; I have called vision because it presumes that the whole Orient can be seen panoptically, there is a constant pressure. The source of pressure is narrative, in that if any Oriental detail can be shown to move, or to develop, diachrony is introduced into the system. What seemed stable--and the Orient is synonymous with stability and unchanging eternality--now appears unstable. Instability suggests that history, with its disruptive detail, its currents of change, its tendency towards growth, decline, or dramatic movement, is possible in the Orient and for the Orient. History and the narrative by which history is represented argue that vision is insufficient, that &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; as an unconditional ontological category does an injustice to the potential of reality for change.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, narrative is the specific form taken by written history to counter the permanence of vision. Lane sensed the dangers of narrative when he refused to give linear shape to himself and to his information, preferring instead the monumental form of encyclopedic or lexicographical vision. Narrative asserts the power of men to be born, develop, and die, the tendency of institutions and actualities to change, the likelihood that modernity and contemporaneity will finally overtake &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; civilizations; above all, it asserts that the domination of reality by vision is no more than a will to power, a will to truth and interpretation, and not an objective condition of history. Narrative, in short, introduces an opposing point of view, perspective, consciousness to the unitary web of vision; it violates the serene Apollonian fictions asserted by vision.&lt;br /&gt;
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When as a result of World War I the Orient was made to enter history, it was the Orientalist-as-agent who did the work. Hannah Arendt has made the brilliant observation that the counterpart of the bureaucracy is the imperial agent,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arendt, &#039;&#039;Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; which is to say that if the collective academic endeavor called Orientalism was a bureaucratic institution based on a certain conservative vision of the Orient, then the servants of such a vision in the Orient were imperial agents like T. E. Lawrence. In his work we can see most clearly the conflict between narrative history and vision, as--in his words--the &amp;quot;new Imperialism&amp;quot; attempted &amp;quot;an active tide of imposing responsibility on the local peoples [of the Orient].&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;T. E. Lawrence, &#039;&#039;Oriental Assembly&#039;&#039;, ed. A. W. Lawrence (New York: E. P. Dutton &amp;amp; Co., 1940), p. 95.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The competition between the European Powers now caused them to prod the Orient into active life, to press the Orient into service, to turn the Orient from unchanging &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; passivity into militant modern life. It would be important, nevertheless, never to let the Orient go its own way or get out of hand, the canonical view being that Orientals had no tradition of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
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The great drama of Lawrence&#039;s work is that it symbolizes the struggle, first, to stimulate the Orient (lifeless, timeless, forceless) into movement; second, to impose upon that movement an essentially Western shape; third, to contain the new and aroused Orient in a personal vision, whose retrospective mode includes a powerful sense of failure and betrayal.&lt;br /&gt;
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I meant to make a new nation, to restore a lost influence, to give twenty millions of Semites the foundation on which to build an inspired dream-palace of their national thoughts.... All the subject provinces of the Empire to me were not worth one dead English boy. If I have restored to the East some self-respect, a goal, ideals: if I have made the standard rule of white over red more exigent, I have fitted those peoples in a degree for the new commonwealth in which the dominant races will forget their brute achievements, and white and red and yellow and brown and black will stand up together without side-glances in the service of the world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Stephen Ely Tabachnick, &amp;quot;The Two Veils of T. E. Lawrence,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Studies in the Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; 16 (Fall 1975): 96-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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None of this, whether as intention, as an actual undertaking, or as a failed project, would have been remotely possible without the White Orientalist perspective at the outset:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Jew in the Metropole at Brighton, the miser, the worshipper of Adonis, the lecher in the stews of Damascus were alike signs of the Semitic capacity for enjoyment, and expressions of the same nerve which gave us at the other pole the self-denial of the Essenes, or the early Christians, or the first Khalifas, finding the ways to heaven fairest for the poor in spirit. The Semite hovered between lust and self-denial.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lawrence is backed in such statements by a respectable tradition stretching like a lighthouse beam through the whole nineteenth century; at its light-emanating center, of course, is &amp;quot;the Orient,&amp;quot; and that is powerful enough to light up both the gross and the refined topographies within its range. The Jew, the worshipper of Adonis, the Damascene lecher, are signs not so much of humanity, let us say, as of a semiotic field called Semitic and built into coherence by the Semitic branch of Orientalism. Inside this field, certain things were possible:&lt;br /&gt;
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Arabs could be swung on an idea as on a cord; for the unpledged allegiance of their minds made them obedient servants. None of them would escape the bond till success had come, and with it responsibility and duty and engagement. Then the idea was gone and the work ended--in ruins. Without a creed they could be taken to the four corners of the world (but not to heaven) by being shown the riches of the earth and the pleasures of it; but if on the road ... they met the prophet of an idea, who had nowhere to lay his head and who depended for his food on charity or birds, then they would all leave their wealth for his inspiration.... They were as unstable as water, and like water would perhaps finally prevail. Since the dawn of life, in successive waves they had been dashing themselves against the coasts of flesh. Each wave was broken.... One such wave (and not the least) I raised and rolled before the breath of an idea, till it reached its crest, and toppled over and fell at Damascus. The wash of that wave, thrown back by the resistance of vested things, will provide the matter of the following wave, when in fullness of time the sea shall be raised once more.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Could,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;would,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;if&amp;quot; are Lawrence&#039;s way inserting himself in the field, as it were. Thus the possibility is prepared for the last sentence, in which as manipulator of the Arabs Lawrence puts himself at their head. Like Conrad&#039;s Kurtz, Lawrence has cut himself loose from the earth so as to become identified with a new reality in order--he says later--that he might be responsible for &amp;quot;hustling into form ... the new Asia which time was inexorably bringing upon us.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lawrence, &#039;&#039;Seven Pillars of Wisdom&#039;&#039;, pp. 42-3, 661.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Arab Revolt acquires meaning only as Lawrence designs meaning for it; his meaning imparted thus to Asia was a triumph, &amp;quot;a mood of enlargement ... in that we felt that we had assumed another&#039;s pain or experience, his personality.&amp;quot; The Orientalist has become now the representative Oriental, unlike earlier participant observers such as Lane, for whom the Orient was something kept carefully at bay. But there is an unresolvable conflict in Lawrence between the White Man and the Oriental, and although he does not explicitly say so, this conflict essentially restages in his mind the historical conflict between East and West. Conscious of his power over the Orient, conscious also of his duplicity, unconscious of anything in the Orient that would suggest to him that history, after all, is history and that even without him the Arabs would finally attend to their quarrel with the Turks, Lawrence reduces the entire narrative of the revolt (its momentary successes and its bitter failure) to &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; vision of himself as an unresolved, &amp;quot;standing civil war&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet in reality we had borne the vicarious for our own sakes, or at least because it was pointed for our benefit: and could escape from this knowledge only by a make-belief in sense as well as in motive....&lt;br /&gt;
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There seemed no straight walking for us leaders in this crooked lane of conduct, ring within ring of unknown, shamefaced motives cancelling or double-charging their precedents.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 549, 550-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To this intimate sense of defeat Lawrence was later to add a theory about &amp;quot;the old men&amp;quot; who stole the triumph from him. In any event, what matters to Lawrence is that as a white expert, the legatee of years of academic and popular wisdom about the Orient, he is able to subordinate his style of being to theirs, thereafter to assume the role of Oriental prophet giving shape to a movement in &amp;quot;the new Asia.&amp;quot; And when, for whatever reason, the movement fails (it is taken over by others, its aims are betrayed, its dream of independence invalidated), it is &#039;&#039;Lawrence&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s disappointment that counts. So far from being a mere man lost in the great rush of confusing events, Lawrence equates himself fully with the struggle of the new Asia to be born.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whereas Aeschylus had represented Asia mourning its losses, and Nerval had espressed his disappointment in the Orient for not being more glamorous than he had wanted, Lawrence &#039;&#039;becomes&#039;&#039; both the mourning continent and a subjective consciousness expressing an almost cosmic disenchantment. In the end Lawrence--and thanks not only to Lowell Thomas and Robert Graves--and Lawrence&#039;s vision became the very symbol of Oriental trouble: Lawrence, in short, had assumed responsibility for the Orient by interspersing his knowing experience between the reader and history. Indeed what Lawrence presents to the reader is an unmediated expert power--the power to be, for a brief time, the Orient. All the events putatively ascribed to the historical Arab Revolt are reduced finally to Lawrence&#039;s experiences on its behalf.&lt;br /&gt;
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In such a case, therefore, style is not only the power to symbolize such enormous generalities as Asia, the Orient, or the Arabs; it is also a form of displacement and incorporation by which one voice becomes a whole history, and--for the white Westerner, as reader or writer--the only kind of Orient it is possible to know. Just as Renan had mapped the field of possibility open to the Semites in culture, thought, and language, so too Lawrence charts the space (and indeed, appropriates that space) and time of modern Asia. The effect of this style is that it brings Asia tantalizingly close to the West, but only for a brief moment. We are left at the end with a sense of the pathetic distance still separating &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; from an Orient destined to bear its foreignness as a mark of its permanent estrangement from the West. This is the disappointing conclusion corroborated (contemporaneously) by the ending of E. M. Forster&#039;s &#039;&#039;A Passage to India&#039;&#039;, where Aziz and Fielding attempt, and fail at, reconciliation:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Why can&#039;t we be friends now?&amp;quot; said the other, holding him affectionately. &amp;quot;It&#039;s what I want. It&#039;s what you want.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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But the horses didn&#039;t want it--they swerved apart; the earth didn&#039;t want it, sending up rocks through which riders must pass single file; the temples, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest House, that came into view as they issued from the gap and saw Mau beneath: they didn&#039;t want it, they said in their hundred voices, &amp;quot;No, not yet,&amp;quot; and the sky said, &amp;quot;No, not there.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;E. M. Forster, &#039;&#039;A Passage to India&#039;&#039; (1924; reprint ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace &amp;amp; Co., 1952), p. 322.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This style, this compact definition, is what the Orient will always come up against.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite its pessimism, there is a positive political message behind its phrases. The gulf between East and West can be modulated, as Cromer and Balfour knew well, by superior Western knowledge and power. Lawrence&#039;s vision is complemented in France by Maurice Barres&#039;s &#039;&#039;Une Enquete aux pays du Levant&#039;&#039;, the record of a journey through the Near Orient in 1914. Like so many works before it, the &#039;&#039;Enquete&#039;&#039; is a work of recapitulation whose author not only searches out sources and origins of Western culture in the Orient but also redoes Nerval, Flaubert, and Lamartine in their voyages to the Orient. For Barres, however, there is an additional political dimension to his journey: he seeks proof, and conclusive evidence, for a constructive French role in the East. Yet the difference between French and British expertise remains: the former manages an actual conjunction of peoples and territory, whereas the latter deals with a realm of spiritual possibility. For Barres the French presence is best seen in French schools where, as he says of a school in Alexandria, &amp;quot;It is ravishing to see those little Oriental girls welcoming and so wonderfully reproducing the &#039;&#039;fantaisie&#039;&#039; and the melody [in their spoken French] of the Ile-de-France.&amp;quot; If France does not actually have any colonies there, she is not entirely without possessions:&lt;br /&gt;
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There is, there in the Orient, a feeling about France which is so religious and strong that it is capable of absorbing and reconciling all our most diverse aspirations. In the Orient we represent spirituality, justice, and the category of the ideal. England is powerful there; Germany is all-powerful; but we possess Oriental souls.&lt;br /&gt;
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Arguing vociferously with Jaures, this celebrated European doctor proposes to vaccinate Asia against its own illnesses, to occidentalize the Orientals, to bring them into salubrious contact with France. Yet even in these projects Barres&#039;s vision preserves the very distinction between East and West he claims to be mitigating.&lt;br /&gt;
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How will we be able to form for ourselves an intellectual elite with which we can work, made out of Orientals who would not be deracinated, who would continue to evolve according to their own norms, who would remain penetrated by family traditions, and who would thus form a link between us and the mass of natives? How will we create relationships with a view towards preparing the way for agreements and treaties which would be the desirable form taken by our political future [in the Orient]? All these things are finally all about soliciting in these strange peoples the taste for maintaining contact with our intelligence, &#039;&#039;even though this taste may in fact come out of their own sense of their national destiny&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Maurice Barres, &#039;&#039;Une Enquete aux pays du Levant&#039;&#039; (Paris: Plon, 1923), 1: 20; 2: 181, 192, 193, 197.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The emphasis in the last sentence is Barres&#039;s own. Since unlike Lawrence and Hogarth (whose book &#039;&#039;The Wandering Scholar&#039;&#039; is the wholly informative and unromantic record of two trips to the Levant in 1896 and 1910&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;D. G. Hogarth, &#039;&#039;The Wandering Scholar&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1924). Hogarth describes his style as that of &amp;quot;the explorer first and the scholar second&amp;quot; (p. 4).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) he writes of a world of distant probabilities; he is more prepared to imagine the Orient as going its own way. Yet the bond (or leash) between East and West that he advocates is designed to permit a constant variety of intellectual pressure going from West to East. Barres sees things, not in terms of waves, battles, spiritual adventures, but in terms of the cultivation of intellectual imperialism, as ineradicable as it is subtle. The British vision, exemplified by Lawrence, is of the mainstream Orient, of peoples, political organizations, and movements guided and held in check by the White Man&#039;s expert tutelage; the Orient is &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; Orient, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; people, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; dominions. Discriminations between elites and the masses are less likely to be made by the British than by the French, whose perceptions and policy were always based on minorities and on the insidious pressures of spiritual community between France and its colonial children. The British agent-Orientalist--Lawrence, Bell, Philby, Storrs, Hogarth--during and after World War I took over both the role of expert-adventurer-eccentric (created in the nineteenth century by Lane, Burton, Hester Stanhope) and the role of colonial authority, whose position is in a central place next to the indigenous ruler: Lawrence with the Hashimites, Philby with the house of Saud, are the two best-known instances. British Oriental expertise fashioned itself around consensus and orthodoxy and sovereign authority; French Oriental expertise between the wars concerned itself with heterodoxy, spiritual ties, eccentrics. It is no accident, then, that the two major scholarly careers of this period, one British, one French, were H. A. R. Gibb&#039;s and Louis Massignon&#039;s, one whose interest was defined by the notion of Sunna (or orthodoxy) in Islam, the other whose focus was on the quasi-Christlike, theosophical Sufi figure, Mansur al-Hallaj. I shall return to these two major Orientalists a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
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If I have concentrated so much on imperial agents and policy-makers instead of scholars in this section, it was to accentuate the major shift in Orientalism, knowledge about the Orient, intercourse with it, from an academic to an &#039;&#039;instrumental&#039;&#039; attitude. What accompanies the shift is a change in the attitude as well of the individual Orientalist, who need no longer see himself--as Lane, Sacy, Renan, Caussin, Muller, and others did--as belonging to a sort of guild community with its own internal traditions and rituals. Now the Orientalist has become the representative man of his Western culture, a man who compresses within his own work a major duality of which that work (regardless of its specific form) is the symbolic expression: Occidental consciousness, knowledge, science taking hold of the furthest Oriental reaches as well as the most minute Oriental particulars. Formally the Orientalist sees himself as accomplishing the union of Orient and Occident, but mainly by reasserting the technological, political, and cultural supremacy of the West. History, in such a union, is radically attentuated if not banished. Viewed as a current of development, as a narrative strand, or as a dynamic force unfolding systematically and materially in time and space, human history--of the East or the West--is subordinated to an essentialist, idealist conception of Occident and Orient. Because he feels himself to be standing at the very rim of the East-West divide, the Orientalist not only speaks in vast generalities; he also seeks to convert each aspect of Oriental or Occidental life into an unmediated sign of one or the other geographical half.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interchange in the Orientalist&#039;s writing between his expert self and his testimonial, beholding self as Western representative is pre-eminently worked out in visual terms. Here is a typical passage (quoted by Gibb) from Duncan Macdonald&#039;s classic work &#039;&#039;The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam&#039;&#039; (1909):&lt;br /&gt;
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The Arabs show themselves not as especially easy of belief, but as hard-headed, materialistic, questioning, doubting, scoffing at their own superstitions and usages, fond of tests of the supernatural--and all this in a curiously light-minded, almost childish fashion.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited by H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Structure of Religious Thought in Islam,&amp;quot; in his &#039;&#039;Studies on the Civilization of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 180.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The governing verb is &#039;&#039;show&#039;&#039;, which here gives us to understand that the Arabs display themselves (willingly or unwillingly) to and for expert scrutiny. The number of attributes ascribed to them, by its crowded set of sheer appositions, causes &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; to acquire a sort of existential weightlessness; thereby, &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; are made to rejoin the very broad designation, common to modern anthropological thought, of &amp;quot;the childish primitive.&amp;quot; What Macdonald also implies is that for such descriptions there is a peculiarly privileged position occupied by the Western Orientalist, whose representative function is precisely &#039;&#039;to show&#039;&#039; what needs to be seen. All specific history is capable of being seen thus at the apex, or the sensitive frontier, of Orient and Occident together. The complex dynamics of human life--what I have been calling history as narrative--becomes either irrelevant or trivial in comparison with the circular vision by which the details of Oriental life serve merely to reassert the Orientalness of the subject and the Westernness of the observer.&lt;br /&gt;
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If such a vision in some ways recalls Dante&#039;s, we should by no means fail to notice what an enormous difference there is between this Orient and Dante&#039;s. Evidence here is meant to be (and probably is considered) scientific; its pedigree, genealogically speaking, is European intellectual and human science during the nineteenth century. Moreover, the Orient is no simple marvel, or an enemy, or a branch of exotica; it is a political actuality of great and significant moment. Like Lawrence, Macdonald cannot really detach his representative characteristics as a Westerner from his role as a scholar. Thus his vision of Islam, as much as Lawrence&#039;s of the Arabs, implicates &#039;&#039;definition&#039;&#039; of the object with the &#039;&#039;identity&#039;&#039; of the person defining. All Arab Orientals must be accommodated to a vision of an Oriental type as constructed by the Western scholar, as well as to a specific encounter with the Orient in which the Westerner regrasps the Orient&#039;s essence as a consequence of his intimate estrangement from it. For Lawrence as for Forster, this latter sensation produces the despondency as well of personal failure; for such scholars as Macdonald, it strengthens the Orientalist discourse itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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And it puts that discourse abroad in the world of culture, politics, and actuality. In the period between the wars, as we can easily judge from, say, Malraux&#039;s novels, the relations between East and West assumed a currency that was both widespread and anxious. The signs of Oriental claims for political independence were everywhere; certainly in the dismembered Ottoman Empire they were encouraged by the Allies and, as is perfectly evident in the whole Arab Revolt and its aftermath, quickly became problematic. The Orient now appeared to constitute a challenge, not just to the West in general, but to the West&#039;s spirit, knowledge, and imperium. After a good century of constant intervention in (and study of) the Orient, the West&#039;s role in an East itself responding to the crises of modernity seemed considerably more delicate. There was the issue of outright occupation; there was the issue of the mandated territories; there was the issue of European competition in the Orient; there was the issue of dealing with native elites, native popular movements, and native demands for self-government and independence; there was the issue of civilizational contacts between Orient and Occident. Such issues forced reconsideration of Western knowledge of the Orient. No less a personage than Sylvain Levi, president of the Societe asiatique between 1928 and 1935, professor of Sanskrit at the College de France, reflected seriously in 1925 on the urgency of the East-West problem:&lt;br /&gt;
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Our duty is to understand Oriental civilization. The humanistic problem, which consists, on an intellectual level, in making a sympathetic and intelligent effort to understand foreign civilizations in both their past and their future forms, is specifically posed for us Frenchmen [although similar sentiments could have been expressed by an Englishman: the problem was a &#039;&#039;European&#039;&#039; one] in a practical way with regard to our great Asiatic colonies....&lt;br /&gt;
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These peoples are the inheritors of a long tradition of history, of art, and of religion, the sense of which they have not entirely lost and which they are probably anxious to prolong. We have assumed the responsibility of intervening in their development, sometimes without consulting them, sometimes in answer to their request.... We claim, rightly or wrongly, to represent a superior civilization, and because of the right given us by virtue of this superiority, which we regularly affirm with such assurance as makes it seem incontestable to the natives, we have called in question all their native traditions....&lt;br /&gt;
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In a general way, then, wherever the European has intervened, the native has perceived himself with a sort of general despair which was really poignant since he felt that the sum of his well-being, in the moral sphere more than in sheer material terms, instead of increasing had in fact diminished. All of which has made the foundation of his social life seem to be flimsy and to crumble under him, and the golden pillars on which he had thought to rebuild his life now seem no more than tinseled cardboard.&lt;br /&gt;
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This disappointment has been translated into rancor from one end to the other of the Orient, and this rancor is very close now to turning to hate, and hate only waits for the right moment in order to turn into action.&lt;br /&gt;
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If because of laziness or incomprehension Europe does not make the effort that its interests alone require from it, &#039;&#039;then the Asiatic drama will approach the crisis point&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is here that that science which is a form of life and an instrument of policy--that is, wherever our interests are at stake--owes it to itself to penetrate native civilization and life in their intimacy in order to discover their fundamental values and durable characteristics rather than to smother native life with the incoherent threat of European civilizational imports. We must offer ourselves to these civilizations as we do our other products, that is, on the local exchange market. [Emphasis in original]&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederic Lefevre, &amp;quot;Une Heure avec Sylvain Levi,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Memorial Sylvain Levi&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Bacot (Paris: Paul Hartmann, 1937), pp. 123-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Levi has no difficulty in connecting Orientalism with politics, for the long--or rather, the prolonged--Western intervention in the East cannot be denied either in its consequences for knowledge or in its effect upon the hapless native; together the two add up to what could be a menacing future. For all his expressed humanism, his admirable concern for fellow creatures, Levi conceives the present juncture in unpleasantly constricted terms. The Oriental is imagined to feel his world threatened by a superior civilization; yet his motives are impelled, not by some positive desire for freedom, political independence, or cultural achievement &#039;&#039;on their own terms&#039;&#039;, but instead by rancor or jealous malice. The panacea offered for this potentially ugly turn of affairs is that the Orient be marketed for a Western consumer, be put before him as one among numerous wares beseeching his attention. By a single stroke you will defuse the Orient (by letting it think itself to be an &amp;quot;equal&amp;quot; quantity on the Occidental marketplace of ideas), and you will appease Western fears of an Oriental tidal wave. At bottom, of course, Levi&#039;s principal point--and his most telling confession--is that unless something is done about the Orient, &amp;quot;the Asiatic drama will approach the crisis point.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Asia suffers, yet in its suffering it threatens Europe: the eternal, bristling frontier endures between East and West, almost unchanged since classical antiquity. What Levi says as the most august of modern Orientalists is echoed with less subtlety by cultural humanists. Item: in 1925 the French periodical &#039;&#039;Les Cahiers du mois&#039;&#039; conducted a survey among notable intellectual figures; the writers canvassed included Orientalists (Levi, Emile Senart) as well as literary men like Andre Gide, Paul Valery, and Edmond Jaloux. The questions dealt with relations between Orient and Occident in a timely, not to say brazenly provocative, way, and this already indicates something about the cultural ambience of the period. We will immediately recognize how ideas of the sort promulgated in Orientalist scholarship have now reached the level of accepted truth. One question asks whether Orient and Occident are mutually impenetrable (the idea was Maeterlinck&#039;s) or not; another asks whether or not Oriental influence represented &amp;quot;un peril grave&amp;quot;--Henri Massis&#039;s words--to French thought; a third asks about those values in Occidental culture to which its superiority over the Orient can be ascribed. Valery&#039;s response seems to me worth quoting from, so forthright are the lines of its argument and so time-honored, at least in the early twentieth century:&lt;br /&gt;
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From the cultural point of view, I do not think that we have much to fear &#039;&#039;now&#039;&#039; from the Oriental influence. It is not unknown to us. We owe to the Orient all the beginnings of our arts and of a great deal of our knowledge. We can very well welcome what now comes out of the Orient, if something new is coming out of there--which I very much doubt. This doubt is precisely our guarantee and our European weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Besides, the real question in such matters is to &#039;&#039;digest&#039;&#039;. But that has always been, just as precisely, the great specialty of the European mind through the ages. Our role is therefore to maintain this power of choice, of universal comprehension, of the transformation of everything into our own substance, powers which have made us what we are. The Greeks and the Romans showed us how to deal with the monsters of Asia, how to treat them by analysis, how to extract from them their quintessence.... The Mediterranean basin seems to me to be like a closed vessel where the essences of the vast Orient have always come in order to be condensed. [Emphasis and ellipses in original]&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Paul Valery, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean Hytier (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 2: 1556-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If European culture generally has digested the Orient, certainly Valery was aware that one specific agency for doing the job has been Orientalism. In the world of Wilsonian principles of national self-determination, Valery relies confidently on analyzing the Orient&#039;s threat away. &amp;quot;The power of choice&amp;quot; is mainly for Europe first to acknowledge the Orient as the origin of European science, then to treat it as a superseded origin. Thus, in another context, Balfour could regard the native inhabitants of Palestine as having priority on the land, but nowhere near the subsequent authority to keep it; the mere wishes of 700,000 Arabs, he said, were of no moment compared to the destiny of an essentially European colonial movement.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Christopher Sykes, &#039;&#039;Crossroads to Israel&#039;&#039; (1965; reprint ed., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Asia represented, then, the unpleasant likelihood of a sudden eruption that would destroy &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world; as John Buchan put it in 1922:&lt;br /&gt;
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The earth is seething with incoherent power and unorganized intelligence. Have you ever reflected on the case of China? There you have millions of quick brains stifled in trumpery crafts. They have no direction, no driving power, so the sum of their efforts is futile, and the world laughs at China.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Alan Sandison, &#039;&#039;The Wheel of Empire: A Study of the Imperial Idea in Some Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Fiction&#039;&#039; (New York: St. Martin&#039;s Press, 1967), p. 158. An excellent study of the French equivalent is Martine Astier Loutfi, &#039;&#039;Litterature et colonialisme: L&#039;Expansion coloniale vue dans la litterature romanesque francaise, 1871-1914&#039;&#039; (The Hague: Mouton &amp;amp; Co., 1971).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But if China organized itself (as it would), it would be no laughing matter. Europe&#039;s effort therefore was to maintain itself as what Valeiy called &amp;quot;une machine puissante,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Paul Valery, &#039;&#039;Variete&#039;&#039; (Paris: Gallimard, 1924), p. 43.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; absorbing what it could from outside Europe, converting everything to its use, intellectually and materially, keeping the Orient selectively organized (or disorganized). Yet this could be done only through clarity of vision and analysis. Unless the Orient was seen for what it was, its power--military, material, spiritual--would sooner or later overwhelm Europe. The great colonial empires, great systems of systematic repression, existed to fend off the feared eventuality. Colonial subjects, as George Orwell saw them in Marrakech in 1939, must not be seen except as a kind of continental emanation, African, Asian, Oriental:&lt;br /&gt;
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When you walk through a town like this--two hundred thousand inhabitants, of whom at least twenty thousand own literally nothing except the rags they stand up in--when you see how the people live, and still more, how easily they die, it is always difficult to believe that you are walking among human beings. All colonial empires are in reality founded upon that fact. The people have brown faces--besides they have so many of them! Are they really the same flesh as yourself? Do they even have names? Or are they merely a kind of undifferentiated brown stuff, about as individual as bees or coral insects? They arise out of the earth, they sweat and starve for a few years, and then they sink back into the nameless mounds of the graveyard and nobody notices that they are gone. And even the graves themselves soon fade back into the soil.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Orwell, &amp;quot;Marrakech,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;A Collection of Essays&#039;&#039; (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), p. 187.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from the picturesque characters offered European readers in the exotic fiction of minor writers (Pierre Loti, Marmaduke Pickthall, and the like), the non-European known to Europeans is precisely what Orwell says about him. He is either a figure of fun, or an atom in a vast collectivity designated in ordinary or cultivated discourse as an undifferentiated type called Oriental, African, yellow, brown, or Muslim. To such abstractions Orientalism had contributed its power of generalization, converting instances of a civilization into ideal bearers of its values, ideas, and positions, which in turn the Orientalists had found in &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; and transformed into common cultural currency.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we reflect that Raymond Schwab brought out his brilliant biography of Anquetil-Duperron in 1934--and began those studies which were to put Orientalism in its proper cultural context--we must also remark that what he did was in stark contrast to his fellow artists and intellectuals, for whom Orient and Occident were still the secondhand abstractions they were for Valery. Not that Pound, Eliot, Yeats, Arthur Waley, Fenollosa, Paul Claudel(in his &#039;&#039;Connaissance de l&#039;est&#039;&#039;), Victor Segalen, and others were ignoring &amp;quot;the wisdom of the East,&amp;quot; as Max Muller had called it a few generations earlier. Rather the culture viewed the Orient, and Islam in particular, with the mistrust with which its learned attitude to the Orient had always been freighted. A suitable instance of this contemporary attitude at its most explicit is to be found in a series of lectures given at the University of Chicago in 1924 on &amp;quot;The Occident and the Orient&amp;quot; by Valentine Chirol, a well-known European newspaperman of great experience in the East; his purpose was to make clear to educated Americans that the Orient was not as far off as perhaps they believed. His line is a simple one: that Orient and Occident are irreducibly opposed to each other, and that the Orient--in particular &amp;quot;Mohammedanism&amp;quot;--is one of &amp;quot;the great world-forces&amp;quot; responsible for &amp;quot;the deepest lines of cleavage&amp;quot; in the world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Valentine Chirol, &#039;&#039;The Occident and the Orient&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Chirol&#039;s sweeping generalizations are, I think, adequately represented by the titles of his six lectures: &amp;quot;Their Ancient Battleground&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;The Passing of the Ottoman Empire, the Peculiar Case of Egypt&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;The Great British Experiment in Egypt&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;Protectorates and Mandates&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;The New Factor of Bolshevism&amp;quot;; and &amp;quot;Some General Conclusions.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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To such relatively popular accounts of the Orient as Chirol&#039;s, we can add a testimonial by Elie Faure, who in his ruminations draws, like Chirol, on history, cultural expertise, and the familiar contrast between White Occidentalism and colored Orientalism. While delivering himself of paradoxes like &amp;quot;le carnage permanent de l&#039;indifference orientale&amp;quot; (for, unlike &amp;quot;us,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; have no conception of peace), Faure goes on to show that the Orientals&#039; bodies are lazy, that the Orient has no conception of history, of the nation, or of &#039;&#039;patrie&#039;&#039;, that the Orient is essentially mystical--and so on. Faure argues that unless the Oriental learns to be rational, to develop techniques of knowledge and positivity, there can be no &#039;&#039;rapprochement&#039;&#039; between East and West.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Elie Faure, &amp;quot;Orient et Occident,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Mercure de France&#039;&#039; 229 (July 1-August 1, 1931): 263, 264, 269, 270, 272.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A far more subtle and learned account of the East-West dilemma can be found in Fernand Baldensperger&#039;s essay &amp;quot;Ou s&#039;affrontent l&#039;Orient et l&#039;Occident intellectuels,&amp;quot; but he too speaks of an inherent Oriental disdain for the idea, for mental discipline, for rational interpretation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Fernand Baldensperger, &amp;quot;Ou s&#039;affrontent l&#039;Orient et l&#039;Occident intellectuels,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Etudes d&#039;histoire litteraire&#039;&#039;, 3rd ser. (Paris: Droz, 1939), p. 230.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Spoken as they are out of the depths of European culture, by writers who actually believe themselves to be speaking on behalf of that culture, such commonplaces (for they are perfect &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;) cannot be explained simply as examples of provincial chauvinism. They are not that, and--as will be evident to anyone who knows anything about Faure&#039;s and Baldensperger&#039;s other work--are the more paradoxical for not being that. Their background is the transformation of the exacting, professional science of Orientalism, whose function in nineteenth-century culture had been the restoration to Europe of a lost portion of humanity, but which had become in the twentieth century both an instrument of policy and, more important, a code by which Europe could interpret both itself and the Orient to itself. For reasons discussed earlier in this book, modern Orientalism already carried within itself the imprint of the great European fear of Islam, and this was aggravated by the political challenges of the &#039;&#039;entre-deux-guerres&#039;&#039;. My point is that the metamorphosis of a relatively innocuous philological subspecialty into a capacity for managing political movements, administering colonies, making nearly apocalyptic statements representing the White Man&#039;s difficult civilizing mission--all this is something at work within a purportedly liberal culture, one full of concern for its vaunted norms of catholicity, plurality, and open-mindedness. In fact, what took place was the very opposite of liberal: the hardening of doctrine and meaning, imparted by &amp;quot;science,&amp;quot; into &amp;quot;truth.&amp;quot; For if such truth reserved for itself the right to judge the Orient as immutably Oriental in the ways I have indicated, then liberality was no more than a form of oppression and mentalistic prejudice.&lt;br /&gt;
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The extent of such illiberality was not--and is not--often recognized from within the culture, for reasons that this book is trying to explore. It is heartening, nevertheless, that such illiberality has occasionally been challenged. Here is an instance from I. A. Richards&#039;s foreword to his &#039;&#039;Mencius on the Mind&#039;&#039; (1932); we can quite easily substitute &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; for &amp;quot;Chinese&amp;quot; in what follows.&lt;br /&gt;
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As to the effects of an increased knowledge of Chinese thought upon the West, it is interesting to notice that a writer so unlikely to be thought either ignorant or careless as M. Etienne Gilson can yet, in the English Preface of his &#039;&#039;The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas&#039;&#039;, speak of Thomistic Philosophy as &amp;quot;accepting and gathering up the whole of human tradition.&amp;quot; This is how we all think, to us the Western world is still the World [or the part of the World that counts]; but an impartial observer would perhaps say that such provincialism is dangerous. And we are not yet so happy in the West that we can be sure that we are not suffering from its effects.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;I. A. Richards, &#039;&#039;Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definitions&#039;&#039; (London: Routledge &amp;amp; Kegan Paul, 1932), p. xiv.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Richards&#039;s argument advances claims for the exercise of what he calls Multiple Definition, a genuine type of pluralism, with the combativeness of systems of definition eliminated. Whether or not we accept his counter to Gilson&#039;s provincialism, we can accept the proposition that liberal humanism, of which Orientalism has historically been one department, &#039;&#039;retards&#039;&#039; the process of enlarged and enlarging meaning through which true understanding can be attained. What took the place of enlarged meaning in twentieth-century Orientalism--that is, within the technical field--is the subject most immediately at hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Modern Anglo-French Orientalism in Fullest Flower&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Because we have become accustomed to think of a contemporary expert on some branch of the Orient, or some aspect of its life, as a specialist in &amp;quot;area studies,&amp;quot; we have lost a vivid sense of how, until around World War II, the Orientalist was considered to be a generalist (with a great deal of specific knowledge, of course) who had highly developed skills for making summational statements. By summational statements I mean that in formulating a relatively uncomplicated idea, say, about Arabic grammar or Indian religion, the Orientalist would be understood (and would understand himself) as also making a statement about the Orient as a whole, thereby summing it up. Thus every discrete study of one bit of Oriental material would also confirm in a summary way the profound Orientality of the material, And since it was commonly believed that the whole Orient hung together in some profoundly organic way, it made perfectly good hermeneutical sense for the Orientalist scholar to regard the material evidence he dealt with as ultimately leading to a better understanding of such things as the Oriental character, mind, ethos, or world-spirit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Most of the first two chapters of this book have made similar arguments about earlier periods in the history of Orientalist thought. The differentiation in its later history that concerns us here, however, is the one between the periods immediately before and after World War I. In both instances, as with the earlier periods, the Orient is Oriental no matter the specific case, and no matter the style or technique used to describe it; the difference between the two periods in question is the &#039;&#039;reason&#039;&#039; given by the Orientalist for seeing the essential Orientality of the Orient. A good example of the prewar rationale can be found in the following passage by Snouck Hurgronje, taken from his 1899 review of Eduard Sachau&#039;s &#039;&#039;Muhammedanisches Recht&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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... the law, which in practice had to make ever greater concessions to the use and customs of the people and the arbitrariness of their rulers, nevertheless retained a considerable influence on the intellectual life of the Muslims. Therefore it remains, and still is for us too, an important subject of study, not only for abstract reasons connected with the history of law, civilization and religion, but also for practical purposes. The more intimate the relations of Europe with the Muslim East become, the more Muslim countries fall under European suzerainty, the more important it is for us Europeans to become acquainted with the intellectual life, the religious law, and the conceptual background of Islam.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Selected Works of C. Snouck Hurgronje&#039;&#039;, ed. G. H. Bousquet and J. Schacht (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957), p. 267.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Although Hurgronje allows that something so abstract as &amp;quot;Islamic law&amp;quot; did occasionally yield to the pressure of history and society, he is more interested than not in retaining the abstraction for intellectual use because in its broad outline &amp;quot;Islamic law&amp;quot; confirms the disparity between East and West. For Hurgronje the distinction between Orient and Occident was no mere academic or popular cliche: quite the contrary. For him it signified the essential, historical power relationship between the two. Knowledge of the Orient either proves, enhances, or deepens the difference by which European suzerainty (the phrase has a venerable nineteenth-century pedigree) is extended effectively over Asia. To know the Orient as a whole, then, is to know it because it is entrusted to one&#039;s keeping, if one is a Westerner.&lt;br /&gt;
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An almost symmetrical passage to Hurgronje&#039;s is to be found in the concluding paragraph of Gibb&#039;s article &amp;quot;Literature&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Legacy of Islam&#039;&#039;, published in 1931. After having described the three casual contacts between East and West up till the eighteenth century, Gibb then proceeds to the nineteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
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Following on these three moments of casual contact, the German romantics turned again to the East, and for the first time made it their conscious aim to open a way for the real heritage of oriental poetry to enter into the poetry of Europe. The nineteenth century, with its new sense of power and superiority, seemed to clang the gate decisively in the face of their design. Today, on the other hand, there are signs of a change. Oriental literature has begun to be studied again for its own sake, and a new understanding of the East is being gained. As this knowledge spreads and the East recovers its rightful place in the life of humanity, oriental literature may once again perform its historic function, and assist us to liberate ourselves from the narrow and oppressive conceptions which would limit all that is significant in literature, thought, and history to our own segment of the globe.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Literature,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Legacy of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), p. 209.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Gibb&#039;s phrase &amp;quot;for its own sake&amp;quot; is in diametrical opposition to the string of reasons subordinated to Hurgronje&#039;s declaration about European suzerainty over the East. What remains, nevertheless, is that seemingly inviolable over-all identity of something called &amp;quot;the East&amp;quot; and something else called &amp;quot;the West.&amp;quot; Such entities have a use for each other, and it is plainly Gibb&#039;s laudable intention to show that the influence on Western of Oriental literature need not be (in its results) what Brunetiere had called &amp;quot;a national disgrace.&amp;quot; Rather, the East could be confronted as a sort of humanistic challenge to the local confines of Western ethnocentricity.&lt;br /&gt;
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His earlier solicitation of Goethe&#039;s idea of &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039; notwithstanding, Gibb&#039;s call for humanistic interinanimation between East and West reflects the changed political and cultural realities of the postwar era. European suzerainty over the Orient had not passed; but it had evolved--in British Egypt--from a more or less placid acceptance by the natives into a more and more contested political issue compounded by fractious native demands for independence. These were the years of constant British trouble with Zaghlul, the Wafd party, and the like.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The best general account of this period in political, social, economic, and cultural terms is to be found in Jacques Berque, &#039;&#039;Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Jean Stewart (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Moreover, since 1925 there had been a worldwide economic recession, and this too increased the sense of tension that Gibb&#039;s prose reflects. But the specifically cultural message in what he says is the most compelling. Heed the Orient, he seems to be telling his reader, for its use to the Western mind in the struggle to overcome narrowness, oppressive specialization, and limited perspectives.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ground had shifted considerably from Hurgronje to Gibb, as had the priorities. No longer did it go without much controversy that Europe&#039;s domination over the Orient was almost a fact of nature; nor was it assumed that the Orient was in need of Western enlightenment. What mattered during the interwar years was a cultural self-definition that transcended the provincial and the xenophobic. For Gibb, the West has need of the Orient as something to be studied because it releases the spirit from sterile specialization, it eases the affliction of excessive parochial and nationalistic self-centeredness, it increases one&#039;s grasp of the really central issues in the study of culture. If the Orient appears more a partner in this new rising dialectic of cultural self-consciousness, it is, first, because the Orient is more of a challenge now than it was before, and second, because the West is entering a relatively new phase of cultural crisis, caused in part by the diminishment of Western suzerainty over the rest of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, in the best Orientalist work done during the interwar period--represented in the impressive careers of Massignon and Gibb himself--we will find elements in common with the best humanistic scholarship of the period. Thus the summational attitude of which I spoke earlier can be regarded as the Orientalist equivalent of attempts in the purely Western humanities to understand culture &#039;&#039;as a whole&#039;&#039;, antipositivistically, intuitively, sympathetically. Both the Orientalist and the non-Orientalist begin with the sense that Western culture is passing through an important phase, whose main feature is the crisis imposed on it by such threats as barbarism, narrow technical concerns, moral aridity, strident nationalism, and so forth. The idea of using specific texts, for instance, to work from the specific to the general (to understand the whole life of a period and consequently of a culture) is common to those humanists in the West inspired by the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, as well as to towering Orientalist scholars like Massignon and Gibb. The project of revitalizing philology--as it is found in the work of Curtius, Vossler, Auerbach, Spitzer, Gundolf, Hofmannsthal&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There is a useful account of the intellectual project informing their work in Arthur R. Evans, Jr., ed., &#039;&#039;On Four Modern Humanists: Hofmannsthal&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Gundolf, Curtius, Kantorowicz&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--has its counterpart therefore in the invigorations provided to strictly technical Orientalist philology by Massignon&#039;s studies of what he called the mystical lexicon, the vocabulary of Islamic devotion, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there is another, more interesting conjunction between Orientalism in this phase of its history and the European sciences of man (&#039;&#039;sciences de l&#039;homme&#039;&#039;), the &#039;&#039;Geisteswissenschaften&#039;&#039; contemporary with it. We must note, first, that non-Orientalist cultural studies were perforce more immediately responsive to the threats to humanistic culture of a self-aggrandizing, amoral technical specialization represented, in part at least, by the rise of fascism in Europe. This response extended the concerns of the interwar period into the period following World War II as well. An eloquent scholarly and personal testimonial to this response can be found in Erich Auerbach&#039;s magisterial &#039;&#039;Mimesis&#039;&#039;, and in his last methodological reflections as a &#039;&#039;Philolog&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Erich Auerbach, &#039;&#039;Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature&#039;&#039;, trans. Willard R. Trask (1946; reprint ed., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), and his &#039;&#039;Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages&#039;&#039;, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Bollingen Books, 1965).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He tells us that &#039;&#039;Mimesis&#039;&#039; was written during his exile in Turkey and was meant to be in large measure an attempt virtually &#039;&#039;to see&#039;&#039; the development of Western culture at almost the last moment when that culture still had its integrity and civilizational coherence; therefore, he set himself the task of writing a general work based on specific textual analyses in such a way as to lay out the principles of Western literary performance in all their variety, richness, and fertility. The aim was a synthesis of Western culture in which the synthesis itself was matched in importance by the very gesture of doing it, which Auerbach believed was made possible by what he called &amp;quot;late bourgeois humanism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Erich Auerbach, &amp;quot;Philology and &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039;,&amp;quot; trans. M. and E. W. Said, &#039;&#039;Centennial Review&#039;&#039; 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The discrete particular was thus converted into a highly mediated symbol of the world-historical process.&lt;br /&gt;
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No less important for Auerbach--and this fact is of immediate relevance to Orientalism--was the humanistic tradition of involvement in a national culture or literature not one&#039;s own. Auerbach&#039;s example was Curtius, whose prodigious output testified to his deliberate choice as a German to dedicate himself professionally to the Romance literatures. Not for nothing, then, did Auerbach end his autumnal reflections with a significant quotation from Hugo of St. Victor&#039;s &#039;&#039;Didascalicon&#039;&#039;: &amp;quot;The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The more one is able to leave one&#039;s cultural home, the more easily is one able to judge it, and the whole world as well, with the spiritual detachment &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; generosity necessary for true vision. The more easily, too, does one assess oneself and alien cultures with the same combination of intimacy and distance.&lt;br /&gt;
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No less important and methodologically formative a cultural force was the use in the social sciences of &amp;quot;types&amp;quot; both as an analytical device and as a way of seeing familiar things in a new way. The precise history of the &amp;quot;type&amp;quot; as it is to be found in early-twentieth-century thinkers like Weber, Durkheim, Lukacs, Mannheim, and the other sociologists of knowledge has been examined often enough:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For example, in H. Stuart Hughes, &#039;&#039;Consciousness and Society: The Reconstruction of European Social Thought, 1890-1930&#039;&#039; (1958; reprint ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1961).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; yet it has not been remarked, I think, that Weber&#039;s studies of Protestantism, Judaism, and Buddhism blew him (perhaps unwittingly) into the very territory originally charted and claimed by the Orientalists. There he found encouragement amongst all those nineteenth-century thinkers who believed that there was a sort of ontological difference between Eastern and Western economic (as well as religious) &amp;quot;mentalities.&amp;quot; Although he never thoroughly studied Islam, Weber nevertheless influenced the field considerably, mainly because his notions of type were simply an &amp;quot;outside&amp;quot; confirmation of many of the canonical theses held by Orientalists, whose economic ideas never extended beyond asserting the Oriental&#039;s fundamental incapacity for trade, commerce, and economic rationality. In the Islamic field those cliches held good for literally hundreds of years--until Maxime Rodinson&#039;s important study &#039;&#039;Islam and Capitalism&#039;&#039; appeared in 1966. Still, the notion of a type--Oriental, Islamic, Arab, or whatever--endures and is nourished by similar kinds of abstractions or paradigms or types as they emerge out of the modern social sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
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I have often spoken in this book of the sense of estrangement experienced by Orientalists as they dealt with or lived in a culture so profoundly different from their own. Now one of the striking differences between Orientalism in its Islamic version and all the other humanistic disciplines where Auerbach&#039;s notions on the necessity of estrangement have some validity is that Islamic Orientalists never saw their estrangement from Islam either as salutary or as an attitude with implications for the better understanding of their own culture. Rather, their estrangement from Islam simply intensified their feelings of superiority about European culture, even as their antipathy spread to include the entire Orient, of which Islam was considered a degraded (and usually, a virulently dangerous) representative. Such tendencies--it has also been my argument--became built into the very traditions of Orientalist study throughout the nineteenth century, and in time became a standard component of most Orientalist training, handed on from generation to generation. In addition, I think, the likelihood was very great that European scholars would continue to see the Near Orient through the perspective of its Biblical &amp;quot;origins,&amp;quot; that is, as a place of unshakably influential religious primacy. Given its special relationship to both Christianity and Judaism, Islam remained forever the Orientalist&#039;s idea (or type) of &#039;&#039;original&#039;&#039; cultural effrontery, aggravated naturally by the fear that Islamic civilization originally (as well as contemporaneously) continued to stand somehow opposed to the Christian West.&lt;br /&gt;
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For these reasons, Islamic Orientalism between the wars shared in the general sense of cultural crisis adumbrated by Auerbach and the others I have spoken of briefly, without at the same time developing in the same way as the other human sciences. Because Islamic Orientalism also preserved within it the peculiarly polemical &#039;&#039;religious&#039;&#039; attitude it had had from the beginning, it remained fixed in certain methodological tracks, so to speak. Its cultural alienation, for one, needed to be preserved from modern history and sociopolitical circumstance, as well as from the necessary revisions imposed on any theoretical or historical &amp;quot;type&amp;quot; by new data. For another, the abstractions offered by Orientalism (or rather, the opportunity for making abstractions) in the case of Islamic civilization were considered to have acquired a new validity; since it was assumed that Islam worked the way Orientalists said it did (without reference to actuality, but only to a set of &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; principles), it was also assumed that modern Islam would be nothing more than a reasserted version of the old, especially since it was also supposed that modernity for Islam was less of a challenge than an insult. (The very large number of assumptions and suppositions in this description, incidentally, are intended to portray the rather eccentric twists and turns necessary for Orientalism to have maintained its peculiar way of seeing human reality.) Finally, if the synthesizing ambition in philology (as conceived by Auerbach or Curtius) was to lead to an enlargement of the scholar&#039;s awareness, of his sense of the brotherhood of man, of the universality of certain principles of human behavior, in Islamic Orientalism synthesis led to a sharpened sense of difference between Orient and Occident as reflected in Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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What I am describing, then, is something that will characterize Islamic Orientalism until the present day: its retrogressive position when compared with the other human sciences (and even with the other branches of Orientalism), its general methodological and ideological backwardness, and its comparative insularity from developments both in the other humanities and in the real world of historical, economic, social, and political circumstances.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Anwar Abdel Malek, &amp;quot;Orientalism in Crisis,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diogenes&#039;&#039; 44 (Winter 1963): 103-40.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Some awareness of this lag in Islamic (or Semitic) Orientalism was already present towards the end of the nineteenth century, perhaps because it was beginning to be apparent to some observers how very little either Semitic or Islamic Orientalism had shaken itself loose from the religious background from which it originally derived. The first Orientalist congress was organized and held in Paris in 1873, and almost from the outset it was evident to other scholars that the Semiticists and Islamicists were in intellectual arrears, generally speaking. Writing a survey of all the congresses that had been held between 1873 and 1897, the English scholar R. N. Cust had this to say about the Semitic-Islamic subfield:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such meetings [as those held in the ancient-Semitic field], indeed, advance Oriental learning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The same cannot be said with regard to the modern-Semitic section; it was crowded, but the subjects discussed were of the smallest literary interest, such as would occupy the minds of the dilettanti scholars of the old school, not the great class of &amp;quot;indicatores&amp;quot; of the nineteenth century. I am forced to go back to Pliny to find a word. There was an absence from this section both of the modern philological and archeological spirit, and the report reads more like that of a congress of University tutors of the last century met to discuss the reading of a passage in a Greek play, or the accentuation of a vowel, before the dawn of Comparative Philology had swept away the cobwebs of the Scholiasts. Was it worth while to discuss whether Mahomet could hold a pen or write?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;R. N. Cust, &amp;quot;The International Congresses of Orientalists,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Hellas&#039;&#039; 6, no. 4 (1897): 349.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To some extent the polemical antiquarianism that Cust described was a scholarly version of European anti-Semitism. Even the designation &amp;quot;modern-Semitic,&amp;quot; which was meant to include both Muslims and Jews (and which had its origin in the so-called ancient-Semitic field pioneered by Renan), carried its racist banner with what was doubtless meant to be a decent ostentation. A little later in his report Cust comments on how in the same meeting &amp;quot; &#039;the Aryan&#039; supplied much material for reflection.&amp;quot; Clearly &amp;quot;the Aryan&amp;quot; is a counterabstraction to &amp;quot;the Semite,&amp;quot; but for some of the reasons I listed earlier, such atavistic labels were felt to be especially pertinent to Semites--with what expensive moral and human consequences for the human community as a whole, the history of the twentieth century amply demonstrates. Yet what has not been sufficiently stressed in histories of modern anti-Semitism has been the legitimation of such atavistic designations by Orientalism, and more important for my purposes here, the way this academic and intellectual legitimation has persisted right through the modern age in discussions of Islam, the Arabs, or the Near Orient. For whereas it is no longer possible to write learned (or even popular) disquisitions on either &amp;quot;the Negro mind&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Jewish personality,&amp;quot; it is perfectly possible to engage in such research as &amp;quot;the Islamic mind,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Arab character&amp;quot;--but of this subject more later.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, in order properly to understand the intellectual genealogy of interwar Islamic Orientalism--as it is most interestingly and satisfyingly seen (no irony intended) in the careers of Massignon and Gibb--we must be able to understand the differences between the Orientalist&#039;s summational attitude towards his material and the kind of attitude to which it bears a strong cultural resemblance, that in the work of philologists such as Auerbach and Curtius. The intellectual crisis in Islamic Orientalism was another aspect of the spiritual crisis of &amp;quot;late bourgeois humanism&amp;quot;; in its form and style, however, Islamic Orientalism viewed the problems of mankind as separable into the categories called &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Occidental.&amp;quot; It was believed, then, that for the Oriental, liberation, self-expression, and self-enlargement were not the issues that they were for the Occidental. Instead, the Islamic Orientalist expressed his ideas about Islam in such a way as to emphasize his, as well as putatively the Muslim&#039;s, &#039;&#039;resistance&#039;&#039; to change, to mutual comprehension between East and West, to the development of men and women out of archaic, primitive classical institutions and into modernity. Indeed, so fierce was this sense of resistance to change, and so universal were the powers ascribed to it, that in reading the Orientalists one understands that the apocalypse to be feared was not the destruction of Western civilization but rather the destruction of the barriers that kept East and West from each other. When Gibb opposed nationalism in the modern Islamic states, he did so because he felt that nationalism would corrode the inner structures keeping Islam Oriental; the net result of secular nationalism would be to make the Orient no different from the West. Yet it is a tribute to Gibb&#039;s extraordinarily sympathetic powers of identification with an alien religion that he put his disapproval in such a way as to seem to be &#039;&#039;speaking for&#039;&#039; the Islamic orthodox community. How much such pleading was a reversion to the old Orientalist habit of speaking for the natives and how much it was a sincere attempt at speaking in Islam&#039;s best interests is a question whose answer lies somewhere between the two alternatives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No scholar or thinker, of course, is a perfect representative of some ideal type or school in which, by virtue of national origin or the accidents of history, he participates. Yet in so relatively insulated and specialized a tradition as Orientalism, I think there is in each scholar some awareness, partly conscious and partly non-conscious, of national tradition, if not of national ideology. This is particularly true in Orientalism, additionally so because of the direct political involvement of European nations in the affairs of one or another Oriental country: the case of Snouck Hurgronje, to cite a non-British and non-French instance where the scholar&#039;s sense of national identity is simple and clear, comes to mind immediately.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See W. F. Wertheim, &amp;quot;Counter-insurgency Research at the Turn of the Century--Snouck Hurgronje and the Acheh War,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Sociologische Gids&#039;&#039; 19 (September-December 1972).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet even after making all the proper qualifications about the difference between an individual and a type (or between an individual and a tradition), it is nevertheless striking to note the extent to which Gibb and Massignon &#039;&#039;were&#039;&#039; representative types. Perhaps it would be better to say that Gibb and Massignon fulfilled all the expectations created for them by their national traditions, by the politics of their nations, by the internal history of their national &amp;quot;schools&amp;quot; of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sylvain Levi put the distinction between the two schools trenchantly:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The political interest that ties England to India holds British work to a sustained contact with concrete realities, and maintains the cohesion between representations of the past and the spectacle of the present.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nourished by classical traditions, France seeks out the human mind as it manifests itself in India in the same way that it is interested in China.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sylvain Levi, &amp;quot;Les Parts respectives des nations occidentales dans les progres de l&#039;indianisme,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Memorial Sylvain Levi&#039;&#039;, p. 116.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be too easy to say that this polarity results, on the one hand, in work that is sober, efficient, concrete, and on the other, in work that is universalistic, speculative, brilliant. Yet the polarity serves to illuminate two long and extremely distinguished careers that between them dominated French and Anglo-American Islamic Orientalism until the 1960s; if the domination makes any sense at all, it is because each scholar derived from and worked in a self-conscious tradition whose constraints (or limits, intellectually and politically speaking) can be described as Levi describes them above.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gibb was born in Egypt, Massignon in France. Both were to become deeply religious men, students not so much of society as of the religious life in society. Both were also profoundly worldly; one of their greatest achievements was putting traditional scholarship to use in the modern political world. Yet the range of their work--the texture of it, almost--is vastly different, even allowing for the obvious disparities in their schooling and religious education. In his lifelong devotion to the work of al-Hallaj--&amp;quot;whose traces,&amp;quot; Gibb said in his obituary notice for Massignon in 1962, he &amp;quot;never ceased to seek out in later Islamic literature and devotion&amp;quot;--Massignon&#039;s almost unrestricted range of research would lead him virtually everywhere, finding evidence for &amp;quot;l&#039;esprit humaine a travers l&#039;espace et le temps.&amp;quot; In an &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039; that took &amp;quot;in every aspect and region of contemporary Muslim life and thought,&amp;quot; Massignon&#039;s presence in Orientalism was a constant challenge to his colleagues. Certainly Gibb for one admired--but finally drew back from--the way Massignon pursued&lt;br /&gt;
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themes that in some way linked the spiritual life of Muslims and Catholics [and enabled him to find] a congenial element in the veneration of Fatima, and consequently a special field of interest in the study of Shi&#039;ite thought in many of its manifestations, or again in the community of Abrahamanic origins and such themes as the Seven Sleepers. His writings on these subjects have acquired from the qualities that he brought to them a permanent significance in Islamic studies. But just because of these qualities they are composed, as it were, in two registers. One was at the ordinary level of objective scholarship, seeking to elucidate the nature of the given phenomenon by a masterly use of established tools of academic research. The other was at a level on which objective data and understanding were absorbed and transformed by an individual intuition of spiritual dimensions. It was not always easy to draw a dividing line between the former and the transfiguration that resulted from the outpouring of the riches of his own personality.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a hint here that Catholics are more likely to be drawn to a study of &amp;quot;the veneration of Fatima&amp;quot; than Protestants, but there is no mistaking Gibb&#039;s suspicion of anyone who blurred the distinction between &amp;quot;objective&amp;quot; scholarship and one based on (even an elaborate) &amp;quot;individual intuition of spiritual dimensions.&amp;quot; Gibb was right, however, in the next paragraph of the obituary to acknowledge Massignon&#039;s &amp;quot;fertility&amp;quot; of mind in such diverse fields as &amp;quot;the symbolism of Muslim art, the structure of Muslim logic, the intricacies of medieval finance, and the organization of artisan corporations&amp;quot;; and he was right also, immediately after, to characterize Massignon&#039;s early interest in the Semitic languages as giving rise to &amp;quot;elliptic studies that to the uninitiate almost rivalled the mysteries of the ancient Hermetica.&amp;quot; Nevertheless, Gibb ends on a generous note, remarking that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
for us, the lesson which by his example he impressed upon the Orientalists of his generation was that even classical Orientalism is no longer adequate without some degree of committedness to the vital forces that have given meaning and value to the diverse aspects of Eastern cultures.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Louis Massignon (1882-1962),&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society&#039;&#039; (1962), pp. 120, 121.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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That, of course, was Massignon&#039;s greatest contribution, and it is true that in contemporary French Islamology (as it is sometimes called) there has grown up a tradition of identifying with &amp;quot;the vital forces&amp;quot; informing &amp;quot;Eastern culture&amp;quot;; one need only mention the extraordinary achievements of scholars like Jacques Berque, Maxime Rodinson, Yves Lacoste, Roger Amaldez--all of them differing widely among themselves in approach and intention--to be struck with the seminal example of Massignon, whose intellectual impress upon them all is unmistakable.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet in choosing to focus his comments almost anecdotally upon Massignon&#039;s various strengths and weaknesses, Gibb misses the obvious things about Massignon, things that make him so different from Gibb and yet, when taken as a whole, make him the mature symbol of so crucial a development within French Orientalism. One is Massignon&#039;s personal background, which quite beautifully illustrates the simple truth of Levi&#039;s description of French Orientalism. The very idea of &amp;quot;un esprit humain&amp;quot; was something more or less foreign to the intellectual and religious background out of which Gibb, like so many modern British Orientalists, developed: in Massignon&#039;s case the notion of &amp;quot;esprit,&amp;quot; as an aesthetic as well as religious, moral, and historical reality, was something he seemed to have been nourished upon from childhood. His family was friendly with such people as Huysmans, and in nearly everything he wrote Massignon&#039;s early education in the intellectual ambience as well as the ideas of late Symbolisme is evident, even to the particular brand of Catholicism (and Sufi mysticism) in which he was interested. There is no austerity in Massignon&#039;s work, which is formulated in one of the great French styles of the century. His ideas about human experience draw plentifully upon thinkers and artists contemporary with him, and it is the very wide cultural range of his style itself that puts him in a different category altogether from Gibb&#039;s. His early ideas come out of the period of so-called aesthetic decadence, but they are also indebted to people like Bergson, Durkheim, and Mauss. His first contact with Orientalism came through Renan, whose lectures he heard as a young man; he was also a student of Sylvain Levi, and came to include among his friends such figures as Paul Claudel, Gabriel Bounoure, Jacques and Raissa Maritain, and Charles de Foucauld. Later he was able to absorb work done in such relatively recent fields as urban sociology, structural linguistics, psychoanalysis, contemporary anthropology, and the New History. His essays, to say nothing of the monumental study of al-Hallaj, draw effortlessly on the entire corpus of Islamic literature; his mystifying erudition and almost familiar personality sometimes make him appear to be a scholar invented by Jorge Luis Borges. He was very sensitive to &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; themes in European literature; this was one of Gibb&#039;s interests, too, but unlike Gibb, Massignon was attracted primarily neither to European writers who &amp;quot;understood&amp;quot; the Orient nor to European texts that were independent artistic corroborations of what later Orientalist scholars would reveal (e.g., Gibb&#039;s interest in Scott as a source for the study of Saladin). Massignon&#039;s &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; was completely consonant with the world of the Seven Sleepers or of the Abrahamanic prayers (which are the two themes singled out by Gibb as distinctive marks of Massignon&#039;s unorthodox view of Islam): offbeat, slightly peculiar, wholly responsive to the dazzling interpretative gifts which Massignon brought to it (and which in a sense made it up as a subject). If Gibb liked Scott&#039;s Saladin, then Massignon&#039;s symmetrical predilection was for Nerval, as suicide, &#039;&#039;poete maudit&#039;&#039;, psychological oddity. This is not to say that Massignon was essentially a student of the past; on the contrary, he was a major presence in Islamic-French relations, in politics as well as culture. He was obviously a passionate man who believed that the world of Islam could be penetrated, not by scholarship exclusively, but by devotion to all of its activities, not the least of which was the world of Eastern Christianity subsumed within Islam, one of whose subgroups, the Badaliya Sodality, was warmly encouraged by Massignon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Massignon&#039;s considerable literary gifts sometimes give his scholarly work an appearance of capricious, overly cosmopolitan, and often private speculation. This appearance is misleading, and in fact is rarely adequate as a description of his writing. What he wished deliberately to avoid was what he called &amp;quot;l&#039;analyse analytique et statique de l&#039;orientalisme,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Louis Massignon, &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, ed. Y. Moubarac (Beirut: Dar-el-Maaref, 1963), 3: 114. I have used the complete bibliography of Massignon&#039;s work by Moubarac: &#039;&#039;L&#039;Oeuvre de Louis Massignon&#039;&#039; (Beirut: Editions du Cenacle libanais, 1972-73).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a sort of inert piling up, on a supposed Islamic text or problem, of sources, origins, proofs, demonstrations, and the like. Everywhere his attempt is to include as much of the context of a text or problem as possible, to animate it, to surprise his reader, almost, with the glancing insights available to anyone who, like Massignon, is willing to cross disciplinary and traditional boundaries in order to penetrate to the human heart of any text. No modern Orientalist--and certainly not Gibb, his closest peer in achievement and influence--could refer so easily (and accurately) in an essay to a host of Islamic mystics and to Jung, Heisenberg, Mallarme, and Kierkegaard; and certainly very few Orientalists had that range together with the concrete political experience of which he was able to speak in his 1952 essay &amp;quot;L&#039;Occident devant l&#039;Orient: Primaute d&#039;une solution culturelle.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Massignon, &amp;quot;L&#039;Occident devant l&#039;Orient: Primaute d&#039;une solution culturelle,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, 1: 208-23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And yet his intellectual world was a clearly defined one. It had a definite structure, intact from the beginning to the end of his career, and it was laced up, despite its almost unparalleled richness of scope and reference, in a set of basically unchanging ideas. Let us briefly describe the structure and list the ideas in a summary fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
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Massignon took as his starting point the existence of the three Abrahamanic religions, of which Islam is the religion of Ishmael, the monotheism of a people excluded from the divine promise made to Isaac. Islam is therefore a religion of resistance (to God the Father, to Christ the Incarnation), which yet keeps within it the sadness that began in Hagar&#039;s tears. Arabic as a result is the very language of tears, just as the whole notion of &#039;&#039;jihad&#039;&#039; in Islam (which Massignon explicitly says is the epic form in Islam that Renan could not see or understand) has an important intellectual dimension whose mission is war against Christianity and Judaism as exterior enemies, and against heresy as an interior enemy. Yet within Islam, Massignon believed he was able to discern a type of countercurrent, which it became his chief intellectual mission to study, embodied in mysticism, a road towards divine grace. The principal feature of mysticism was of course its subjective character, whose nonrational and even inexplicable tendencies were towards the singular, the individual, the momentary experience of participation in the Divine. All of Massignon&#039;s extraordinary work on mysticism was thus an attempt to describe the itinerary of souls out of the limiting consensus imposed on them by the orthodox Islamic community, or Sunna. An Iranian mystic was more intrepid than an Arab one, partly because he was Aryan (the old nineteenth-century labels &amp;quot;Aryan&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; have a compelling urgency for Massignon, as does also the legitimacy of Schlegel&#039;s binary opposition between the two language families&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 169.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) and partly because he was a man seeking the Perfect; the Arab mystic, in Massignon&#039;s view, inclined towards what Waardenburg calls a testimonial monism. The exemplary figure for Massignon was al-Hallaj, who sought liberation for himself outside the orthodox community by asking for, and finally getting, the very crucifixion refused by Islam as a whole; Mohammed, according to Massignon, had deliberately rejected the opportunity offered him to bridge the gap separating him from God. Al-Hallaj&#039;s achievement was therefore to have achieved a mystical union with God against the grain of Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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The rest of the orthodox community lives in a condition of what Massignon calls &amp;quot;soif ontologique&amp;quot;--ontological thirst. God presents himself to man as a kind of absence, a refusal to be present, yet the devout Muslim&#039;s consciousness of his submission to God&#039;s will (Islam) gives rise to a jealous sense of God&#039;s transcendence and an intolerance of idolatry of any sort. The seat of these ideas, according to Massignon, is the &amp;quot;circumcised heart,&amp;quot; which while it is in the grip of its testimonial Muslim fervor can, as is the case with mystics like al-Hallaj, also be inflamed with a divine passion or love of God. In either case, God&#039;s transcendental unity (&#039;&#039;tawhid&#039;&#039;) is something to be achieved and understood over and over by the devout Muslim, either through testifying to it or through mystic love of God: and this, Massignon wrote in a complex essay, defines the &amp;quot;intention&amp;quot; of Islam.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;, pp. 147, 183, 186, 192, 211, 213.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Clearly Massignon&#039;s sympathies lay with the mystic vocation in Islam, as much for its closeness to his own temperament as a devout Catholic as for its disrupting influence within the orthodox body of beliefs. Massignon&#039;s image of Islam is of a religion ceaselessly implicated in its refusals, its latecoming (with reference to the other Abrahamanic creeds), its comparatively barren sense of worldly reality, its massive structures of defense against &amp;quot;psychic commotions&amp;quot; of the sort practiced by al-Hallaj and other Sufi mystics, its loneliness as the only remaining &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; religion of the three great monotheisms.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Massignon, &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, 1: 227.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But so obviously stern a view of Islam, with its &amp;quot;invariants simples&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 355.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (especially for so luxuriant a thought as Massignon&#039;s), entailed no deep hostility towards it on his part. In reading Massignon one is struck by his repeated insistence on the need for complex reading--injunctions whose absolute sincerity it is impossible to doubt. He wrote in 1951 that his kind of Orientalism was &amp;quot;ni une manie d&#039;exotisme, ni un reniement de l&#039;Europe, mais une mise au niveau entre nos methodes de recherches et les traditions vecues d&#039;antiques civilisations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted from Massignon&#039;s essay on Biruni in Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;, p. 225.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Put into practice in the reading of an Arabic or Islamic text, this kind of Orientalism produced interpretations of an almost overwhelming intelligence; one would be foolish not to respect the sheer genius and novelty of Massignon&#039;s mind. Yet what must catch our attention in his definition of his Orientalism are two phrases: &amp;quot;nos methodes de recherches&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;les traditions vecues d&#039;antiques civilisations.&amp;quot; Massignon saw what he did as the synthesis of two roughly opposed quantities, yet it is the peculiar asymmetry between them that troubles one, and not merely the fact of the opposition between Europe and Orient. Massignon&#039;s implication is that the essence of the difference between East and West is between modernity and ancient tradition. And indeed in his writings on political and contemporary problems, which is where one can see most immediately the limitations of Massignon&#039;s method, the East-West opposition turns up in a most peculiar way.&lt;br /&gt;
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At its best, Massignon&#039;s vision of the East-West encounter assigned great responsibility to the West for its invasion of the East, its colonialism, its relentless attacks on Islam. Massignon was a tireless fighter on behalf of Muslim civilization and, as his numerous essays and letters after 1948 testify, in support of Palestinian refugees, in the defense of Arab Muslim and Christian rights in Palestine against Zionism, against what, with reference to something said by Abba Eban, he scathingly called Israeli &amp;quot;bourgeois colonialism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Massignon, &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, 3: 526.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet the framework in which Massignon&#039;s vision was held also assigned the Islamic Orient to an essentially ancient time and the West to modernity. Like Robertson Smith, Massignon considered the Oriental to be not a modern man but a Semite; this reductive category had a powerful grip on his thought. When, for example, in 1960 he and Jacques Berque, his colleague at the College de France, published their dialogue on &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Esprit&#039;&#039;, a good deal of the time was spent in arguing whether the best way to look at the problems of the contemporary Arabs was simply to say, in the main instance, that the Arab-Israeli conflict was really a &#039;&#039;Semitic&#039;&#039; problem. Berque tried to demur gently, and to nudge Massignon towards the possibility that like the rest of the world the Arabs had undergone what he called an &amp;quot;anthropological variation&amp;quot;: Massignon refused the notion out of hand.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 610-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His repeated efforts to understand and report on the Palestine conflict, for all their profound humanism, never really got past the quarrel between Isaac and Ishmael or, so far as his quarrel with Israel was concerned, the tension between Judaism and Christianity. When Arab cities and villages were captured by the Zionists, it was Massignon&#039;s religious sensibilities that were offended.&lt;br /&gt;
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Europe, and France in particular, were seen as &#039;&#039;contemporary&#039;&#039; realities. Partly because of his initial political encounter with the British during the First World War, Massignon retained a pronounced dislike of England and English policy; Lawrence and his type represented a too-complex policy which he, Massignon, opposed in his dealings with Faisal. &amp;quot;Je cherchais avec Faysal ... a penetrer dans le sens meme de sa tradition a lui.&amp;quot; The British seemed to represent &amp;quot;expansion&amp;quot; in the Orient, amoral economic policy, and an outdated philosophy of political influence.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 212. Also p. 211 for another attack on the British, and pp. 423-7 for his assessment of Lawrence.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Frenchman was a more modern man, who was obliged to get from the Orient what he had lost in spirituality, traditional values, and the like. Massignon&#039;s investment in this view came, I think, by way of the entire nineteenth-century tradition of the Orient as therapeutic for the West, a tradition whose earliest adumbration is to be found in Quinet. In Massignon, it was joined to a sense of Christian compassion:&lt;br /&gt;
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So far as Orientals are concerned, we ought to have recourse to this science of compassion, to this &amp;quot;participation&amp;quot; even in the construction of their language and of their mental structure, in which indeed we must participate: because ultimately this science bears witness either to verities that are ours too, or else to verities that we have lost and must regain. Finally, because in a profound sense everything that exists is good in some way, and those poor colonized people do not exist only for our purposes but in and for themselves [&#039;&#039;en soi&#039;&#039;].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted in Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;, p. 219.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless the Oriental, &#039;&#039;en soi&#039;&#039;, was incapable of appreciating or understanding himself. Partly because of what Europe had done to him, he had lost his religion and his &#039;&#039;philosophie&#039;&#039;; Muslims had &amp;quot;un vide immense&amp;quot; within them; they were close to anarchy and suicide. It became France&#039;s obligation, then, to associate itself with the Muslims&#039; desire to defend their traditional culture, the rule of their dynastic life, and the patrimony of believers.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 218-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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No scholar, not even a Massignon, can resist the pressures on him of his nation or of the scholarly tradition in which he works. In a great deal of what he said of the Orient and its relationship with the Occident, Massignon seemed to refine and yet to repeat the ideas of other French Orientalists. We must allow, however, that the refinements, the personal style, the individual genius, may finally supersede the political restraints operating impersonally through tradition and through the national ambience. Even so, in Massignon&#039;s case we must also recognize that in one direction his ideas about the Orient remained thoroughly traditional and Orientalist, their personality and remarkable eccentricity notwithstanding. According to him, the Islamic Orient was spiritual, Semitic, tribalistic, radically monotheistic, un-Aryan: the adjectives resemble a catalogue of late-nineteenth-century anthropological descriptions. The relatively earthbound experiences of war, colonialism, imperialism, economic oppression, love, death, and cultural exchange seem always in Massignon&#039;s eyes to be filtered through metaphysical, ultimately dehumanized lenses: they are Semitic, European, Oriental, Occidental, Aryan, and so on. The categories structured his world and gave what he said a kind of deep sense--to him, at least. In the other direction, among the individual and immensely detailed ideas of the scholarly world, Massignon maneuvered himself into a special position. He reconstructed and defended Islam against Europe on the one hand and against its own orthodoxy on the other. This intervention--for it was that--into the Orient as animator and champion symbolized his own acceptance of the Orient&#039;s difference, as well as his efforts to change it into what he wanted. Both together, the will to knowledge over the Orient and on its behalf in Massignon are very strong. His al-Hallaj represents that will perfectly. The disproportionate importance accorded al-Hallaj by Massignon signifies first, the scholar&#039;s decision to promote one figure above his sustaining culture, and second, the fact that al-Hallaj had come to represent a constant challenge, even an irritant, to the Western Christian for whom belief was not (and perhaps could not be) the extreme self-sacrifice it was for the Sufi. In either case, Massignon&#039;s al-Hallaj was intended literally to embody, to incarnate, values essentially outlawed by the main doctrinal system of Islam, a system that Massignon himself described mainly in order to circumvent it with al-Hallaj.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless we need not say immediately of Massignon&#039;s work that it was perverse, or that its greatest weakness was that it misrepresented Islam as an &amp;quot;average&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;common&amp;quot; Muslim might adhere to the faith. A distinguished Muslim scholar has argued precisely for this last position, although his argument did not name Massignon as an offender.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See A. L. Tibawi, &amp;quot;English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism, Part I,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Islamic Quarterly&#039;&#039; 8, nos. 1, 2 (January-June 1964): 25-44; &amp;quot;Part II,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Islamic Quarterly&#039;&#039; 8, nos. 3, 4 (July-December 1964): 73-88.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Much as one may be inclined to agree with such theses--since, as this book has tried to demonstrate, Islam &#039;&#039;has&#039;&#039; been fundamentally misrepresented in the West--the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they &#039;&#039;are&#039;&#039; representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is), then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is &#039;&#039;eo ipso&#039;&#039; implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the &amp;quot;truth,&amp;quot; which is itself a representation. What this must lead us to methodologically is to view representations (or misrepresentations--the distinction is at best a matter of degree) as inhabiting a common field of play defined for them, not by some inherent common subject matter alone, but by some common history, tradition, universe of discourse. Within this field, which no single scholar can create but which each scholar receives and in which he then finds a place for himself, the individual researcher makes his contribution. Such contributions, even for the exceptional genius, are strategies of redisposing material within the field; even the scholar who unearths a once-lost manuscript produces the &amp;quot;found&amp;quot; text in a context already prepared for it, for that is the real meaning of &#039;&#039;finding&#039;&#039; a new text. Thus each individual contribution first causes changes within the field and then promotes a new stability, in the way that on a surface covered with twenty compasses the introduction of a twenty-first will cause all the others to quiver, then to settle into a new accommodating configuration.&lt;br /&gt;
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The representations of Orientalism in European culture amount to what we can call a discursive consistency, one that has not only history but material (and institutional) presence to show for itself. As I said in connection with Renan, such a consistency was a form of cultural praxis, a system of opportunities for making statements about the Orient. My whole point about this system is not that it is a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence--in which I do not for a moment believe--but that it operates as representations usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting. In other words, representations have purposes, they are effective much of the time, they accomplish one or many tasks. Representations are formations, or as Roland Barthes has said of all the operations of language, they are deformations. The Orient as a representation in Europe is formed--or deformed--out of a more and more specific sensitivity towards a geographical region called &amp;quot;the East.&amp;quot; Specialists in this region do their work on it, so to speak, because in time their profession as Orientalists requires that they present their society with images of the Orient, knowledge about it, insight into it. And to a very large extent the Orientalist provides his own society with representations of the Orient (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) that bear his distinctive imprint, (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) that illustrate his conception of what the Orient can or ought to be, (&#039;&#039;c&#039;&#039;) that consciously contest someone else&#039;s view of the Orient, (&#039;&#039;d&#039;&#039;) that provide Orientalist discourse with what, at that moment, it seems most in need of, and (&#039;&#039;e&#039;&#039;) that respond to certain cultural, professional, national, political, and economic requirements of the epoch. It will be evident that even though it will never be absent, the role of positive knowledge is far from absolute. Rather, &amp;quot;knowledge&amp;quot;--never raw, unmediated, or simply objective--is what the five attributes of Orientalist representation listed above &#039;&#039;distribute&#039;&#039;, and redistribute.&lt;br /&gt;
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Seen in such a way, Massignon is less a mythologized &amp;quot;genius&amp;quot; than he is a kind of system for producing certain kinds of statements, disseminated into the large mass of discursive formations that together make up the archive, or cultural material, of his time. I do not think that we dehumanize Massignon if we recognize this, nor do we reduce him to being subject to vulgar determinism. On the contrary, we will see in a sense how a very human being had, and was able to acquire more of, a cultural and productive capacity that had an institutional, or extrahuman, dimension to it: and this surely is what the finite human being must aspire to if he is not to be content with his merely mortal presence in time and space. When Massignon said &amp;quot;nous sommes tous des Semites&amp;quot; he was indicating the range of his ideas over his society, showing the extent to which his ideas about the Orient could transcend the local anecdotal circumstances of a Frenchman and of French society. The category of Semite drew its nourishment out of Massignon&#039;s Orientalism, but its force derived from its tendency to extend out of the confines of the discipline, out into a broader history and anthropology, where it seemed to have a certain validity and power.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Une figure domine tous les genres [of Orientalist work], celle de Louis Massignon&amp;quot;: Claude Cahen and Charles Pellat, &amp;quot;Les Etudes arabes et islamiques,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal asiatique&#039;&#039; 261, nos. 1, 4 (1973): 104. There is a very detailed survey of the Islamic-Orientalist field to be found in Jean Sauvaget, &#039;&#039;Introduction a l&#039;histoire de l&#039;Orient musulman: Elements de bibliographie&#039;&#039;, ed. Claude Cahen (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1961).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On one level at least, Massignon&#039;s formulations and his representations of the Orient did have a direct influence, if not an unquestioned validity: among the guild of professional Orientalists. As I said above, Gibb&#039;s recognition of Massignon&#039;s achievement constitutes an awareness that as an alternative to Gibb&#039;s own work (by implication, that is), Massignon was to be dealt with. I am of course imputing things to Gibb&#039;s obituary that are there only as traces, not as actual statements, but they are obviously important if we look now at Gibb&#039;s own career as a foil for Massignon&#039;s. Albert Hourani&#039;s memorial essay on Gibb for the British Academy (to which I have referred several times) admirably summarizes the man&#039;s career, his leading ideas, and the importance of his work: with Hourani&#039;s assessment, in its broad lines, I have no disagreement. Yet something is missing from it, although this lack is partly made up for in a lesser piece on Gibb, William Polk&#039;s &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb Between Orientalism and History.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;William Polk, &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb Between Orientalism and History,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;International Journal of Middle East Studies&#039;&#039; 6, no. 2 (April 1975): 131-9. I have used the bibliography of Gibb&#039;s work in &#039;&#039;Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb&#039;&#039;, ed. George Makdisi (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 1-20.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hourani tends to view Gibb as the product of personal encounters, personal influences, and the like; whereas Polk, who is far less subtle in his general understanding of Gibb than Hourani, sees Gibb as the culmination of a specific academic tradition, what--to use an expression that does not occur in Polk&#039;s prose--we can call an academic-research consensus or paradigm.&lt;br /&gt;
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Borrowed in this rather gross fashion from Thomas Kuhn, the idea has a worthwhile relevance to Gibb, who as Hourani reminds us was in many ways a profoundly institutional figure. Everything that Gibb said or did, from his early career at London to the middle years at Oxford to his influential years as director of Harvard&#039;s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, bears the unmistakable stamp of a mind operating with great ease inside established institutions. Massignon was irremediably the outsider, Gibb the insider. Both men, in any case, achieved the very pinnacle of prestige and influence in French and Anglo-American Orientalism, respectively. The Orient for Gibb was not a place one encountered directly; it was something one read about, studied, wrote about within the confines of learned societies, the university, the scholarly conference. Like Massignon, Gibb boasted of friendships with Muslims, but they seemed--like Lane&#039;s--to have been useful friendships, not determining ones. Consequently Gibb is a dynastic figure within the academic framework of British (and later of American) Orientalism, a scholar whose work quite consciously demonstrated the national tendencies of an academic tradition, set inside universities, governments, and research foundations.&lt;br /&gt;
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One index of this is that in his mature years Gibb was often to be met with speaking and writing for policy-determining organizations. In 1951, for instance, he contributed an essay to a book significantly entitled &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, in which he tried to explain the need for an expansion in Anglo-American programs of Oriental studies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
... the whole situation of the Western countries in regard to the countries of Asia and Africa has changed. We can no longer rely on that factor of prestige which seemed to play a large part in prewar thinking, neither can we any longer expect the peoples of Asia and Africa or of Eastern Europe to come to us and learn from us, while we sit back. We have to learn about them so that we can learn to work with them in a relationship that is closer to terms of mutuality.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Oriental Studies in the United Kingdom,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, ed. Richard N. Frye (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 86-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The terms of this new relationship were spelled out later in &amp;quot;Area Studies Reconsidered.&amp;quot; Oriental studies were to be thought of not so much as scholarly activities but as instruments of national policy towards the newly independent, and possibly intractable, nations of the postcolonial world. Armed with a refocused awareness of his importance to the Atlantic commonwealth, the Orientalist was to be the guide of policymakers, of businessmen, of a fresh generation of scholars.&lt;br /&gt;
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What counted most in Gibb&#039;s later vision was not the Orientalist&#039;s positive work as a scholar (for example, the kind of scholar Gibb had been in his youth when he studied the Muslim invasions of Central Asia) but its adaptability for use in the public world. Hourani puts this well:&lt;br /&gt;
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... it became clear to him [Gibb] that modern governments and elites were acting in ignorance or rejection of their own traditions of social life and morality, and that their failures sprang from this. Henceforth his main efforts were given to the elucidation, by careful study of the past, of the specific nature of Muslim society and the beliefs and culture which lay at the heart of it. Even this problem he tended to see at first mainly in political terms.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albert Hourani, &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb, 1895-1971,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Proceedings of the British Academy&#039;&#039; 58 (1972): p. 504.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet no such later vision could have been possible without a fairly rigorous amount of preparation in Gibb&#039;s earlier work, and it is there that we must first seek to understand his ideas. Among Gibb&#039;s earliest influences was Duncan Macdonald, from whose work Gibb clearly derived the concept that Islam was a coherent system of life, a system made coherent not so much by the people who led that life as by virtue of some body of doctrine, method of religious practice, idea of order, in which all the Muslim people participated. Between the people and &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; there was obviously a dynamic encounter of sorts, yet what mattered to the Western student was the supervening power of Islam to make intelligible the experiences of the Islamic people, not the other way around.&lt;br /&gt;
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For Macdonald and subsequently for Gibb, the epistemological and methodological difficulties of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as an object (about which large, extremely general statements could be made) are never tackled. Macdonald for his part believed that in Islam one could perceive aspects of a still more portentous abstraction, the Oriental mentality. The entire opening chapter of his most influential book (whose importance for Gibb cannot be minimized), &#039;&#039;The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam&#039;&#039;, is an anthology of unarguable declaratives about the Eastern or Oriental mind. He begins by saying that &amp;quot;it is plain, I think, and admitted that the conception of the Unseen is much more immediate and real to the Oriental than to the western peoples.&amp;quot; The &amp;quot;large modifying elements which seem, from time to time, almost to upset the general law&amp;quot; do not upset it, nor do they upset the other equally sweeping and general laws governing the Oriental mind. &amp;quot;The essential difference in the Oriental mind is not credulity as to unseen things, but inability to construct a system as to seen things.&amp;quot; Another aspect of this difficulty--which Gibb was later to blame for the absence of form in Arabic literature and for the Muslim&#039;s essentially atomistic view of reality--is &amp;quot;that the difference in the Oriental is not essentially religiosity, but the lack of the sense of law. For him, there is no immovable order of nature.&amp;quot; If such a &amp;quot;fact&amp;quot; seems not to account for the extraordinary achievements of Islamic science, upon which a great deal in modern Western science is based, then Macdonald remains silent. He continues his catalogue: &amp;quot;It is evident that anything is possible to the Oriental. The supernatural is so near that it may touch him at any moment.&amp;quot; That an &#039;&#039;occasion&#039;&#039;--namely, the historical and geographical birth of monotheism in the Orient--should in Macdonald&#039;s argument become an entire theory of difference between East and West signifies the degree of intensity to which &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; has committed Macdonald. Here is his summary:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Inability&#039;&#039;, then, to see life steadily, and see it whole, to understand that a theory of life must cover all the facts, and &#039;&#039;liability&#039;&#039; to be stampeded by a single idea and blinded to everything else--therein, I believe, is the difference between the East and the West.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Duncan Black Macdonald, &#039;&#039;The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam&#039;&#039; (1909; reprint ed., Beirut: Khayats Publishers, 1965), pp. 2-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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None of this, of course, is particularly new. From Schlegel to Renan, from Robertson Smith to T. E. Lawrence, these ideas get repeated and re-repeated. They represent a decision about the Orient, not by any means a fact of nature. Anyone who, like Macdonald and Gibb, consciously entered a profession called Orientalism did so on the basis of a decision made: that the Orient was the Orient, that it was different, and so forth. The elaborations, refinements, consequent articulations of the field therefore sustain and prolong the decision to confine the Orient. There is no perceivable irony in Macdonald&#039;s (or Gibb&#039;s) views about Oriental liability to be stampeded by a single idea; neither man seems able to recognize the extent of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s liability to be stampeded by the single idea of Oriental difference. And neither man is concerned by such wholesale designations as &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; being used as proper nouns, with adjectives attached and verbs streaming forth, as if they referred to persons and not to Platonic ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is no accident, therefore, that Gibb&#039;s master theme, in almost everything he wrote about Islam and the Arabs, was the tension between &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a transcendent, compelling Oriental fact and the realities of everyday human experience. His investment as a scholar and as a devout Christian was in &amp;quot;Islam,&amp;quot; not so much in the (to him) relatively trivial complications introduced into Islam by nationalism, class struggle, the individualizing experiences of love, anger, or human work. Nowhere is the impoverishing character of this investment more evident than in &#039;&#039;Whither Islam?&#039;&#039;, a volume edited and contributed to, in the title essay, by Gibb in 1932. (It also includes an impressive article on North African Islam by Massignon.) Gibb&#039;s task as he saw it was to assess Islam, its present situation, its possible future course. In such a task the individual and manifestly different regions of the Islamic world were to be, not refutations of Islam&#039;s unity, but examples of it. Gibb himself proposed an introductory definition of Islam; then, in the concluding essay, he sought to pronounce on its actuality and its real future. Like Macdonald, Gibb seems entirely comfortable with the idea of a monolithic East, whose existential circumstances cannot easily be reduced to race or racial theory; in resolutely denying the value of racial generalization Gibb rises above what had been most reprehensible in preceding generations of Orientalists. Gibb has a correspondingly generous and sympathetic view of Islam&#039;s universalism and tolerance in letting diverse ethnic and religious communities coexist peacefully and democratically within its imperium. There is a note of grim prophecy in Gibb&#039;s singling out the Zionists and the Maronite Christians, alone amongst ethnic communities in the Islamic world, for their inability to accept coexistence.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Whither Islam?&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Whither Islam? A Survey of Modern Movements in the Moslem World&#039;&#039;, ed. H. A. R. Gibb (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932), pp. 328, 387.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But the heart of Gibb&#039;s argument is that Islam, perhaps because it finally represents the Oriental&#039;s exclusive concern not with nature but with the Unseen, has an ultimate precedence and domination over all life in the Islamic Orient. For Gibb Islam &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; Islamic orthodoxy, &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; also the community of believers, &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; life, unity, intelligibility, values. It &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; law and order too, the unsavory disruptions of jihadists and communist agitators notwithstanding. In page after page of Gibb&#039;s prose in &#039;&#039;Whither Islam?&#039;&#039;, we learn that the new commercial banks in Egypt and Syria are facts of Islam or an Islamic initiative; schools and an increasing literacy rate are Islamic facts, too, as are journalism, Westernization, and intellectual societies. At no point does Gibb speak of European colonialism when he discusses the rise of nationalism and its &amp;quot;toxins.&amp;quot; That the history of modern Islam might be more intelligible for its resistance, political and nonpolitical, to colonialism, never occurs to Gibb, just as it seems to him finally irrelevant to note whether the &amp;quot;Islamic&amp;quot; governments he discusses are republican, feudal, or monarchical.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; for Gibb is a sort of superstructure imperiled both by politics (nationalism, communist agitation, Westernization) and by dangerous Muslim attempts to tamper with its intellectual sovereignty. In the passage that follows, note how the word &#039;&#039;religion&#039;&#039; and its cognates are made to color the tone of Gibb&#039;s prose, so much so that we feel a decorous annoyance at the mundane pressures directed at &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
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Islam, as a religion, has lost little of its force, but Islam as the arbiter of social life [in the modern world] is being dethroned; alongside it, or above it, new forces exert an authority which is sometimes in contradiction to its traditions and its social prescriptions, but nevertheless forces its way in their teeth. To put the position in its simplest terms, what has happened is this. Until recently, the ordinary Muslim citizen and cultivator had no political interests or functions, and no literature of easy access except religious literature, had no festivals and no communal life except in connection with religion, saw little or nothing of the outside world except through religious glasses. &#039;&#039;To him, in consequence, religion meant everything&#039;&#039;. Now, however, more in all the advanced countries, his interests have expanded and his activities are no longer bounded by religion. He has political questions thrust on his notice; he reads, or has read to him, a mass of articles on subjects of all kinds which have nothing to do with religion, and in which the religious point of view may not be discussed at all and the verdict held to lie with some quite different principles.... [Emphasis added]&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 335.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Admittedly, the picture is a little difficult to see, since unlike any other religion &#039;&#039;Islam is or means everything&#039;&#039;. As a description of a human phenomenon the hyperbole is, I think, unique to Orientalism. Life itself--politics, literature, energy, activity, growth--is an intrusion upon this (to a Westerner) unimaginable Oriental totality. Yet as &amp;quot;a complement and counterbalance to European civilisation&amp;quot; Islam in its modern form is nevertheless a useful object: this is the core of Gibb&#039;s proposition about modern Islam. For &amp;quot;in the broadest aspect of history, what is now happening between Europe and Islam is the reintegration of western civilization, artificially sundered at the Renaissance and now reasserting its unity with overwhelming force.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 377.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Massignon, who made no effort to conceal his metaphysical speculations, Gibb delivered such observations as this as if they were objective knowledge (a category he found wanting in Massignon). Yet by almost any standards most of Gibb&#039;s general works on Islam &#039;&#039;are&#039;&#039; metaphysical, not only because he uses abstractions like &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as if they have a clear and distinct meaning but also because it is simply never clear where in concrete time and space Gibb&#039;s &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; is taking place. If on the one hand, following Macdonald, he puts Islam definitively outside the West, on the other hand, in much of his work, he is to be found &amp;quot;reintegrating&amp;quot; it with the West. In 1955 he made this inside-outside question a bit clearer: the West took from Islam only those nonscientific elements that it had originally derived from the West, whereas in borrowing much from Islamic science, the West was merely following the law making &amp;quot;natural science and technology ... indefinitely transmissible.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;The Influence of Islamic Culture on Medieval Europe,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;John Rylands Library Bulletin&#039;&#039; 38, no. 1 (September 1955): 98.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The net result is to make Islam in &amp;quot;art, aesthetics, philosophy and religious thought&amp;quot; a second-order phenomenon (since those came from the West), and so far as science and technology are concerned, a mere conduit for elements that are not &#039;&#039;sui generis&#039;&#039; Islamic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any clarity about what Islam is in Gibb&#039;s thought ought to be found &#039;&#039;within&#039;&#039; these metaphysical constraints, and indeed his two important works of the forties, &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey&#039;&#039;, flesh out matters considerably. In both books Gibb is at great pains to discuss the present crisis in Islam, opposing its inherent, essential being to modern attempts at modifying it. I have already mentioned Gibb&#039;s hostility to modernizing currents in Islam and his stubborn commitment to Islamic orthodoxy. Now it is time to mention Gibb&#039;s preference for the word &#039;&#039;Mohammedanism&#039;&#039; over &#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039; (since he says that Islam is really based upon an idea of apostolic succession culminating in Mohammed) and his assertion that the Islamic master science is law, which early on replaced theology. The curious thing about these statements is that they are assertions made about Islam, not on the basis of evidence internal to Islam, but rather on the basis of a logic deliberately outside Islam. No Muslim would call himself a Mohammedan, nor so far as is known would he necessarily feel the importance of law over theology. But what Gibb does is to situate himself as a scholar within contradictions he himself discerns, at that point in &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; where &amp;quot;there is a certain unexpressed dislocation between the formal outward process and the inner realities.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 2, 9, 84.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist, then, sees his task as expressing the dislocation and consequently speaking the truth about Islam, which by definition--since its contradictions inhibit its powers of self-discernment--it cannot express. Most of Gibb&#039;s general statements about Islam supply concepts to Islam that the religion or culture, again by &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; definition, is incapable of grasping: &amp;quot;Oriental philosophy had never appreciated the fundamental idea of justice in Greek philosophy.&amp;quot; As for Oriental societies, &amp;quot;in contrast to most western societies, [they] have generally devoted [themselves] to building stable social organizations [more than] to constructing ideal systems of philosophical thought.&amp;quot; The principal internal weakness of Islam is the &amp;quot;breaking of association between the religious orders and the Muslim upper and middle classes.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 111, 88, 189.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But Gibb is also aware that Islam has never remained isolated from the rest of the world and therefore must stand in a series of external dislocations, insufficiencies, and disjunctions between itself and the world. Thus he says that modern Islam is the result of a classical religion coming into disynchronous contact with Romantic Western ideas. In reaction to this assault, Islam developed a school of modernists whose ideas everywhere reveal hopelessness, ideas unsuited to the modern world: Mahdism, nationalism, a revived caliphate. Yet the conservative reaction to modernism is no less unsuited to modernity, for it has produced a kind of stubborn Luddism. Well then, we ask, what is Islam finally, if it cannot conquer its internal dislocations nor deal satisfactorily with its external surroundings? The answer can be sought in the following central passage from &#039;&#039;Modern Trends&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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Islam is a living and vital religion, appealing to the hearts, minds, and consciences of tens and hundreds of millions, setting them a standard by which to live honest, sober, and god-fearing lives. It is not Islam that is petrified, but its orthodox formulations, its systematic theology, its social apologetic. It is here that the dislocation lies, that the dissatisfaction is felt among a large proportion of its most educated and intelligent adherents, and that the danger for the future is most evident. No religion can ultimately resist disintegration if there is a perpetual gulf between its demands upon the will and its appeal to the intellect of its followers. That for the vast majority of Muslims the problem of dislocation has not yet arisen justifies the ulema in refusing to be rushed into the hasty measures which the modernists prescribe; but the spread of modernism is a warning that re-formulation cannot be indefinitely shelved.&lt;br /&gt;
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In trying to determine the origins and causes of this petrifaction of the formulas of Islam, we may possibly also find a clue to the answer to the question which the modernists are asking, but have so far failed to resolve--the question, that is, of the way in which the fundamental principles of Islam may be re-formulated without affecting their essential elements.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 108, 113, 123.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The last part of this passage is familiar enough: it suggests the now traditional Orientalist ability to reconstruct and reformulate the Orient, given the Orient&#039;s inability to do so for itself. In part, then, Gibb&#039;s Islam exists &#039;&#039;ahead&#039;&#039; of Islam as it is practiced, studied, or preached in the Orient. Yet this prospective Islam is no mere Orientalist fiction, spun out of his ideas: it is based on an &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; that--since it cannot truly exist&#039;&#039;--appeals&#039;&#039; to a whole community of believers. The reason that &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; can exist in some more or less future Orientalist formulation of it is that in the Orient Islam is usurped and traduced by the language of its clergy, whose claim is upon the community&#039;s mind. So long as it is silent in its appeal, Islam is safe; the moment the reforming clergy takes on its (legitimate) role of reformulating Islam in order for it to be able to enter modernity, the trouble starts. And that trouble, of course, is dislocation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dislocation in Gibb&#039;s work identifies something far more significant than a putative intellectual difficulty within Islam. It identifies, I think, the very privilege, the very ground on which the Orientalist places himself so as to write about, legislate for, and reformulate Islam. Far from being a chance discernment of Gibb&#039;s, dislocation is the epistemological passageway into his subject, and subsequently, the observation platform from which in all his writing, and in every one of the influential positions he filled, he could survey Islam. Between the silent appeal of Islam to a monolithic community of orthodox believers and a whole merely verbal articulation of Islam by misled corps of political activists, desperate clerks, and opportunistic reformers: there Gibb stood, wrote, reformulated. His writing said either what Islam could not say or what its clerics would not say. What Gibb wrote was in one sense temporally ahead of Islam, in that he allowed that at some point in the future Islam would be able to say what it could not say now. In another important sense, however, Gibb&#039;s writings on Islam predated the religion as a coherent body of &amp;quot;living&amp;quot; beliefs, since his writing was able to get hold of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a silent appeal made to Muslims &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; their faith became a matter for worldly argument, practice, or debate.&lt;br /&gt;
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The contradiction in Gibb&#039;s work--for it is a contradiction to speak of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as neither what its clerical adherents in fact say it is nor what, if they could, its lay followers would say about it--is muted somewhat by the metaphysical attitude governing his work, and indeed governing the whole history of modern Orientalism which he inherited, through mentors like Macdonald. The Orient and Islam have a kind of extrareal, phenomenologically reduced status that puts them out of reach of everyone except the Western expert. From the beginning of Western speculation about the Orient, the one thing the Orient could not do was to represent itself. Evidence of the Orient was credible only after it had passed through and been made firm by the refining fire of the Orientalist&#039;s work. Gibb&#039;s &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039; purports to be Islam (or Mohammedanism) both &#039;&#039;as it is&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;as it might be&#039;&#039;. Metaphysically--and only metaphysically--essence and potential are made one. Only a metaphysical attitude could produce such famous Gibb essays as &amp;quot;The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;An Interpretation of Islamic History&amp;quot; without being troubled by the distinction made between objective and subjective knowledge in Gibb&#039;s criticism of Massignon.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Both essays are to be found in Gibb&#039;s &#039;&#039;Studies on the Civilization of Islam&#039;&#039;, pp. 176-208 and 3-33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The statements about &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; are made with a confidence and a serenity that are truly Olympian. There is no dislocation, no felt discontinuity between Gibb&#039;s page and the phenomenon it describes, for each, according to Gibb himself, is ultimately reducible to the other. As such, &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; and Gibb&#039;s description of it have a calm, discursive plainness whose common element is the English scholar&#039;s orderly page.&lt;br /&gt;
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I attach a great deal of significance to the appearance of and to the intended model for the Orientalist&#039;s page as a printed object. I have spoken in this book about d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s alphabetic encyclopedia, the gigantic leaves of the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, Renan&#039;s laboratory-museum notebook, the ellipses and short episodes of Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, Sacy&#039;s anthological excerpts, and so forth. These pages are signs of some Orient, and of some Orientalist, &#039;&#039;presented&#039;&#039; to the reader. There is an order to these pages by which the reader apprehends not only the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; but also the Orientalist, as interpreter, exhibitor, personality, mediator, representative (and representing) expert. In a remarkable way Gibb and Massignon produced pages that recapitulate the history of Orientalist writing in the West as that history has been embodied in a varied generic and topographical style, reduced finally to a scholarly, monographic uniformity. The Oriental specimen; the Oriental excess; the Oriental lexicographic unit; the Oriental series; the Oriental exemplum: all these have been subordinated in Gibb and Massignon to the linear prose authority of discursive analysis, presented in essay, short article, scholarly book. In their time, from the end of World War I till the early sixties, three principal forms of Orientalist writing were radically transformed: the encyclopedia, the anthology, the personal record. Their authority was redistributed or dispersed or dissipated: to a committee of experts (&#039;&#039;The Encyclopedia of Islam&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;), to a lower order of service (elementary instruction in language, which would prepare one not for diplomacy, as was the case with Sacy&#039;s &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie&#039;&#039;, but for the study of sociology, economics, or history), to the realm of sensational revelation (having more to do with personalities or governments--Lawrence is the obvious example--than with knowledge). Gibb, with his quietly heedless but profoundly sequential prose; Massignon, with the flair of an artist for whom no reference is too extravagant so long as it is governed by an eccentric interpretative gift: the two scholars took the essentially &#039;&#039;ecumenical&#039;&#039; authority of European Orientalism as far as it could go. After them, the new reality--the new specialized style--was, broadly speaking, Anglo-American, and more narrowly speaking, it was American Social Scientese. In it, the old Orientalism was broken into many parts; yet all of them still served the traditional Orientalist dogmas.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;IV.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;The Latest Phase&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Since World War II, and more noticeably after each of the Arab-Israeli wars, the Arab Muslim has become a figure in American popular culture, even as in the academic world, in the policy planner&#039;s world, and in the world of business very serious attention is being paid the Arab. This symbolizes a major change in the international configuration of forces. France and Britain no longer occupy center stage in world politics; the American imperium has displaced them. A vast web of interests now links all parts of the former colonial world to the United States, just as a proliferation of academic subspecialties divides (and yet connects) all the former philological and European-based disciplines like Orientalism. The area specialist, as he is now called, lays claims to regional expertise, which is put at the service of government or business or both. The massive, quasi-material knowledge stored in the annals of modern European Orientalism--as recorded, for example, in Jules Mohl&#039;s nineteenth-century logbook of the field--has been dissolved and released into new forms. A wide variety of hybrid representations of the Orient now roam the culture. Japan, Indochina, China, India, Pakistan: their representations have had, and continue to have, wide repercussions, and they have been discussed in many places for obvious reasons. Islam and the Arabs have their own representations, too, and we shall treat them here as they occur in that fragmentary--yet powerfully and ideologically coherent--persistence, a far less frequently discussed one, into which, in the United States, traditional European Orientalism disbursed itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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1. &#039;&#039;Popular images and social science representations&#039;&#039;. Here are a few examples of how the Arab is often represented today. Note how readily &amp;quot;the Arab&amp;quot; seems to accommodate the transformations and reductions--all of a simply tendentious kind--into which he is continually being forced. The costume for Princeton&#039;s tenth-reunion class in 1967 had been planned before the June War. The motif--for it would be wrong to describe the costume as more than crudely suggestive--was to have been Arab: robes, headgear, sandals. Immediately after the war, when it had become clear that the Arab motif was an embarrassment, a change in the reunion plans was decreed. Wearing the costume as had been originally planned, the class was now to walk in procession, hands above heads in a gesture of abject defeat. This was what the Arab had become. From a faintly outlined stereotype as a camel-riding nomad to an accepted caricature as the embodiment of incompetence and easy defeat: that was all the scope given the Arab.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet after the 1973 war the Arab appeared everywhere as something more menacing. Cartoons depicting an Arab sheik standing behind a gasoline pump turned up consistently. These Arabs, however, were clearly &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot;: their sharply hooked noses, the evil mustachioed leer on their faces, were obvious reminders (to a largely non-Semitic population) that &amp;quot;Semites&amp;quot; were at the bottom of all &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; troubles, which in this case was principally a gasoline shortage. The transference of a popular anti-Semitic animus from a Jewish to an Arab target was made smoothly, since the figure was essentially the same.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus if the Arab occupies space enough for attention, it is as a negative value. He is seen as the disrupter of Israel&#039;s and the West&#039;s existence, or in another view of the same thing, as a surmountable obstacle to Israel&#039;s creation in 1948. Insofar as this Arab has any history, it is part of the history given him (or taken from him: the difference is slight) by the Orientalist tradition, and later, the Zionist tradition. Palestine was seen--by Lamartine and the early Zionists--as an empty desert waiting to burst into bloom; such inhabitants as it had were supposed to be inconsequential nomads possessing no real claim on the land and therefore no cultural or national reality. Thus the Arab is conceived of now as a shadow that dogs the Jew. In that shadow--because Arabs and Jews are Oriental Semites--can be placed whatever traditional, latent mistrust a Westerner feels towards the Oriental. For the Jew of pre-Nazi Europe has bifurcated: what we have now is a Jewish hero, constructed out of a reconstructed cult of the adventurer-pioneer-Orientalist (Burton, Lane, Renan), and his creeping, mysteriously fearsome shadow, the Arab Oriental. Isolated from everything except the past created for him by Orientalist polemic, the Arab is chained to a destiny that fixes him and dooms him to a series of reactions periodically chastised by what Barbara Tuchman gives the theological name &amp;quot;Israel&#039;s terrible swift sword.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from his anti-Zionism, the Arab is an oil supplier. This is another negative characteristic, since most accounts of Arab oil equate the oil boycott of 1973-1974 (which principally benefitted Western oil companies and a small ruling Arab elite) with the absence of any Arab moral qualifications for owning such vast oil reserves. Without the usual euphemisms, the question most often being asked is why such people as the Arabs are entitled to keep the developed (free, democratic, moral) world threatened. From such questions comes the frequent suggestion that the Arab oil fields be invaded by the marines.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the films and television the Arab is associated either with lechery or bloodthirsty dishonesty. He appears as an oversexed degenerate, capable, it is true, of cleverly devious intrigues, but essentially sadistic, treacherous, low. Slave trader, camel driver, moneychanger, colorful scoundrel: these are some traditional Arab roles in the cinema. The Arab leader (of marauders, pirates, &amp;quot;native&amp;quot; insurgents) can often be seen snarling at the captured Western hero and the blond girl (both of them steeped in wholesomeness), &amp;quot;My men are going to kill you, but--they like to amuse themselves before.&amp;quot; He leers suggestively as he speaks: this is a current debasement of Valentino&#039;s Sheik. In newsreels or news-photos, the Arab is always shown in large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics or experiences. Most of the pictures represent mass rage and misery, or irrational (hence hopelessly eccentric) gestures. Lurking behind all of these images is the menace of &#039;&#039;jihad&#039;&#039;. Consequence: a fear that the Muslims (or Arabs) will take over the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Books and articles are regularly published on Islam and the Arabs that represent absolutely no change over the virulent anti-Islamic polemics of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. For no other ethnic or religious group is it true that virtually anything can be written or said about it, without challenge or demurral. The 1975 course guide put out by the Columbia College undergraduates said about the Arabic course that every other word in the language had to do with violence, and that the Arab mind as &amp;quot;reflected&amp;quot; in the language was unremittingly bombastic. A recent article by Emmett Tyrrell in &#039;&#039;Harper&#039;s&#039;&#039; magazine was even more slanderous and racist, arguing that Arabs are basically murderers and that violence and deceit are carried in the Arab genes.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., &amp;quot;Chimera in the Middle East,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Harper&#039;s&#039;&#039;, November 1976, pp. 35-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A survey entitled &#039;&#039;The Arabs in American Textbooks&#039;&#039; reveals the most astonishing misinformation, or rather the most callous representations of an ethnic-religious group. One book asserts that &amp;quot;few people of this [Arab] area even know that there is a better way to live,&amp;quot; and then goes on to ask disarmingly, &amp;quot;What links the people of the Middle East together?&amp;quot; The answer, given unhesitatingly, is, &amp;quot;The last link is the Arab&#039;s hostility--hatred--toward the Jews and the nation of Israel.&amp;quot; Along with such material goes this about Islam, in another book: &amp;quot;The Moslem religion, called Islam, began in the seventh century. It was started by a wealthy businessman of Arabia, called Mohammed. He claimed that he was a prophet. He found followers among other Arabs. He told them that they were picked to rule the world.&amp;quot; This bit of knowledge is followed by another, equally accurate: &amp;quot;Shortly after Mohammed&#039;s death, his teachings were recorded in a book called the Koran. It became the holy book of Islam.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Ayad al-Qazzaz, Ruth Afiyo, et al., &#039;&#039;The Arabs in American Textbooks&#039;&#039;, California State Board of Education, June 1975, pp. 10, 15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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These crude ideas are supported, not contradicted, by the academic whose business is the study of the Arab Near East. (It is worth noting incidentally that the Princeton event I referred to above took place in a university that prides itself on its department of Near Eastern Studies founded in 1927, the oldest such department in the country.) Take as an instance the report produced in 1967 by Morroe Berger, a professor of sociology and Near Eastern studies at Princeton, at the behest of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; he was then president of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), the professional association of scholars concerned with all aspects of the Near East, &amp;quot;primarily since the rise of Islam and from the viewpoint of the social science and humanistic disciplines,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Statement of Purpose,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039; 1, no. 1 (May 1967): 33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and founded in 1967. He called his paper &amp;quot;Middle Eastern and North African Studies: Developments and Needs,&amp;quot; and had it published in the second issue of the &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039;. After surveying the strategic, economic, and political importance of the region to the United States, and after endorsing the various United States government and private foundation projects to support programs in universities--the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (a directly Sputnik-inspired initiative), the establishing of links between the Social Science Research Council and Middle Eastern studies, and so on--Berger came to the following conclusions:&lt;br /&gt;
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The modern Middle East and North Africa is not a center of great cultural achievement, nor is it likely to become one in the near future. The study of the region or its languages, therefore, does not constitute its own reward so far as modern culture is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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... Our region is not a center of great political power nor does it have the potential to become one.... The Middle East (less so North Africa) has been receding in immediate political importance to the U.S. (and even in &amp;quot;headline&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;nuisance&amp;quot; value) relative to Africa, Latin America and the Far East.&lt;br /&gt;
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... The contemporary Middle East, thus, has only in small degree the kinds of traits that seem to be important in attracting scholarly attention. This does not diminish the validity and intellectual value of studying the area or affect the quality of work scholars do on it. It does, however, put limits, of which we should be aware, on the field&#039;s capacity for growth in the numbers who study and teach.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Morroe Berger, &amp;quot;Middle Eastern and North African Studies: Developments and Needs,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039; 1, no. 2 (November 1967): 16.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As a prophecy, of course, this is fairly lamentable; what makes it even more unfortunate is that Berger was commissioned not only because he was an expert on the modern Near East but also--as is clear from the report&#039;s conclusion--because he was expected to be in a good position to predict its future, and the future of policy. His failure to see that the Middle East was of great political significance, and potentially of great political power, was no chance aberration of judgment, I think. Both of Berger&#039;s main mistakes derive from the first and last paragraphs, whose genealogy is the history of Orientalism as we have been studying it. In what Berger has to say about the absence of great cultural achievement, and in what he concludes about future study--that the Middle East does not attract scholarly attention because of its intrinsic weaknesses--we have an almost exact duplication of the canonical Orientalist opinion that the Semites never produced a great culture and that, as Renan frequently said, the Semitic world was too impoverished ever to attract universal attention. Moreover, in making such time-honored judgments and in being totally blind to what is before his eyes--after all, Berger was not writing fifty years ago, but during a period when the United States was already importing about 10 percent of its oil from the Middle East and when its strategic and economic investments in the area were unimaginably huge--Berger was ensuring the centrality of his own position as Orientalist. For what he says, in effect, is that without people such as he the Middle East would be neglected; and that without his mediating, interpretative role the place would not be understood, partly because what little there is to understand is fairly peculiar, and partly because only the Orientalist can interpret the Orient, the Orient being radically incapable of interpreting itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that Berger was not so much a classical Orientalist when he wrote (he wasn&#039;t and isn&#039;t) as he was a professional sociologist does not minimize the extent of his indebtedness to Orientalism and its ideas. Among those ideas is the specially legitimated antipathy towards and downgrading of the material forming the main basis of his study. So strong is this in Berger that it obscures the actualities before his eyes. And more impressively still, it makes it unnecessary for him to ask himself why, if the Middle East &amp;quot;is not a center of great cultural achievement,&amp;quot; he should recommend that anyone devote his life, as he has, to the study of its culture. Scholars--more than, say, doctors--study what they like and what interests them; only an exaggerated sense of cultural duty drives a scholar to the study of what he does not think well of. Yet it is just such a sense of duty Orientalism has fostered, because for generations the culture at large put the Orientalist at the barricades, where in his professional work he confronted the East--its barbarities, its eccentricities, its unruliness--and held it at bay on behalf of the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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I mention Berger as an instance of the academic attitude towards the Islamic Orient, as an instance of how a learned perspective can support the caricatures propagated in the popular culture. Yet Berger stands also for the most current transformation overtaking Orientalism: its conversion from a fundamentally philological discipline and a vaguely general apprehension of the Orient into a social science specialty. No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and &amp;quot;applies&amp;quot; his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France. The American experience of the Orient prior to that exceptional moment was limited. Cultural isolatos like Melville were interested in it; cynics like Mark Twain visited and wrote about it; the American Transcendentalists saw affinities between Indian thought and their own; a few theologians and Biblical students studied the Biblical Oriental languages; there were occasional diplomatic and military encounters with Barbary pirates and the like, the odd naval expedition to the Far Orient, and of course the ubiquitous missionary to the Orient. But there was no deeply invested tradition of Orientalism, and consequently in the United States knowledge of the Orient never passed through the refining and reticulating and reconstructing processes, whose beginning was in philological study, that it went through in Europe. Furthermore, the imaginative investment was never made either, perhaps because the American frontier, the one that counted, was the westward one. Immediately after World War II, then, the Orient became, not a broad catholic issue as it had been for centuries in Europe, but an administrative one, a matter for policy. Enter the social scientist and the new expert, on whose somewhat narrower shoulders was to fall the mantle of Orientalism. In their turn, as we shall see, they made such changes in it that it became scarcely recognizable. In any event, the new Orientalist took over the attitudes of cultural hostility and kept them.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the striking aspects of the new American social-science attention to the Orient is its singular avoidance of literature. You can read through reams of expert writing on the modern Near East and never encounter a single reference to literature. What seem to matter far more to the regional expert are &amp;quot;facts,&amp;quot; of which a literary text is perhaps a disturber. The net effect of this remarkable omission in modern American awareness of the Arab or Islamic Orient is to keep the region and its people conceptually emasculated, reduced to &amp;quot;attitudes,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;trends,&amp;quot; statistics: in short, dehumanized. Since an Arab poet or novelist--and there are many--writes of his experiences, of his values, of his humanity (however strange that may be), he effectively disrupts the various patterns (images, cliches, abstractions) by which the Orient is represented. A literary text speaks more or less directly of a living reality. Its force is not that it is Arab, or French, or English; its force is in the power and vitality of words that, to mix in Flaubert&#039;s metaphor from &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;, tip the idols out of the Orientalists&#039; arms and make them drop those great paralytic children--which are their ideas of the Orient--that attempt to pass for the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The absence of literature and the relatively weak position of philology in contemporary American studies of the Near East are illustrations of a new eccentricity in Orientalism, where indeed my use of the word itself is anomalous. For there is very little in what academic experts on the Near East do now that resembles traditional Orientalism of the sort that ended with Gibb and Massignon; the main things that are reproduced are, as I said, a certain cultural hostility and a sense based not so much on philology as on &amp;quot;expertise.&amp;quot; Genealogically speaking, modern American Orientalism derives from such things as the army language schools established during and after the war, sudden government and corporate interest in the non-Western world during the postwar period, Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, and a residual missionary attitude towards Orientals who are considered ripe for reform and reeducation. The nonphilological study of esoteric Oriental languages is useful for obvious rudimentary strategic reasons; but it is also useful for giving a cachet of authority, almost a mystique, to the &amp;quot;expert&amp;quot; who appears able to deal with hopelessly obscure material with firsthand skill.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the social-science order of things, language study is a mere tool for higher aims, certainly not for reading literary texts. In 1958, for example, the Middle East Institute--a quasi-governmental body founded to oversee and sponsor research interest in the Middle East--produced a &#039;&#039;Report on Current Research&#039;&#039;. The contribution &amp;quot;Present State of Arabic Studies in the United States&amp;quot; (done, interestingly enough, by a professor of Hebrew) is prefaced by an epigraph announcing that &amp;quot;no longer is knowledge of foreign languages, for instance, the sole province of the scholars in the humanities. It is a working tool of the engineer, the economist, the social scientist, and many other specialists.&amp;quot; The whole report stresses the importance of Arabic to oil-company executives, technicians, and military personnel. But the report&#039;s main talking point is this trio of sentences: &amp;quot;Russian universities are now producing fluent Arabic speakers. Russia has realized the importance of appealing to men through their minds, by using their own language. The United States need wait no longer in developing its foreign language program.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Menachem Mansoor, &amp;quot;Present State of Arabic Studies in the United States,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Report on Current Research 1958&#039;&#039;, ed. Kathleen H. Brown (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1958), pp. 55-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus Oriental languages are part of some policy objective--as to a certain extent they have always been--or part of a sustained propaganda effort. In both these aims the study of Oriental languages becomes the instrument carrying out Harold Lasswell&#039;s theses about propaganda, in which what counts is not what people are or think but what they can be made to be and think.&lt;br /&gt;
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The propagandist outlook in fact combines respect for individuality with indifference to formal democracy. The respect for individuality arises from the dependence of large scale operations upon the support of the mass and upon experience with the variability of human preferences.... This regard for men in the mass rests upon no democratic dogmatisms about men being the best judges of their own interests. The modern propagandist, like the modern psychologist, recognizes that men are often poor judges of their own interests, flitting from one alternative to the next without solid reason or clinging timorously to the fragments of some mossy rock of ages. Calculating the prospect of securing a permanent change in habits and values involves much more than the estimation of the preferences of men in general. It means taking account of the tissue of relations in which men are webbed, searching for signs of preference which may reflect no deliberation and directing a program towards a solution which fits in fact.... With respect to those adjustments which do require mass action the task of the propagandist is that of inventing goal symbols which serve the double function of facilitating adoption and adaptation. The symbols must induce acceptance spontaneously.... It follows that the management ideal is control of a situation not by imposition but by divination.... The propagandist takes it for granted that the world is completely caused but that it is only partly predictable....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harold Lasswell, &amp;quot;Propaganda,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences&#039;&#039; (1934), 12: 527. I owe this reference to Professor Noam Chomsky.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The acquired foreign language is therefore made part of a subtle assault upon populations, just as the study of a foreign region like the Orient is turned into a program for control by divination.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet such programs must always have a liberal veneer, and usually this is left to scholars, men of good will, enthusiasts to attend to. The idea encouraged is that in studying Orientals, Muslims, or Arabs &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; can get to know another people, their way of life and thought, and so on. To this end it is always better to let them speak for themselves, to represent themselves (even though underlying this fiction stands Marx&#039;s phrase--with which Lasswell is in agreement--for Louis Napoleon: &amp;quot;They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented&amp;quot;). But only up to a point, and in a special way. In 1973, during the anxious days of the October Arab-Israeli War, the &#039;&#039;New York Times Magazine&#039;&#039; commissioned two articles, one representing the Israeli and one the Arab side of the conflict. The Israeli side was presented by an Israeli lawyer; the Arab side, by an American former ambassador to an Arab country who had no formal training in Oriental studies. Lest we jump immediately to the simple conclusion that the Arabs were believed incapable of representing themselves, we would do well to remember that both Arabs and Jews in this instance were Semites (in the broad cultural designation I have been discussing) and that both &#039;&#039;were being made to be&#039;&#039; represented for a Western audience. It is worthwhile here to remember this passage from Proust, in which the sudden appearance of a Jew into an aristocratic salon is described as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Rumanians, the Egyptians, the Turks may hate the Jews. But in a French drawing-room the differences between those people are not so apparent, and an Israelite making his entry as though he were emerging from the heart of the desert, his body crouching like a hyaena&#039;s, his neck thrust obliquely forward, spreading himself in proud &amp;quot;salaams,&amp;quot; completely satisfies a certain taste for the oriental [&#039;&#039;un gout pour l&#039;orientalisme&#039;&#039;].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marcel Proust, &#039;&#039;The Guermantes Way&#039;&#039;, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff (1925; reprint ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 135.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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2. &#039;&#039;Cultural relations policy&#039;&#039;. While it is true to say that the United States did not in fact become a world empire until the twentieth century, it is also true that during the nineteenth century the United States was concerned with the Orient in ways that prepared for its later, overtly imperial concern. Leaving aside the campaigns against the Barbary pirates in 1801 and 1815, let us consider the founding of the American Oriental Society in 1842. At its first annual meeting in 1843 its president, John Pickering, made the very clear point that America proposed for itself the study of the Orient in order to follow the example of the imperial European powers. Pickering&#039;s message was that the framework of Oriental studies--then as now--was political, not simply scholarly. Note in the following summary how the lines of argument for Orientalism leave little room for doubt as to their intention:&lt;br /&gt;
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At the first annual meeting of the American Society in 1843, President Pickering began a remarkable sketch of the field it was proposed to cultivate by calling attention to the especially favorable circumstances of the time, the peace that reigned everywhere, the freer access to Oriental countries, and the greater facilities for communication. The earth seemed quiet in the days of Metternich and Louis Philippe. The treaty of Nanking had opened Chinese ports. The screw-propellor had been adopted in oceangoing vessels; Morse had completed his telegraph and he had already suggested the laying of a trans-Atlantic cable. The objects of the Society were to cultivate learning in Asiatic, African, and Polynesian language, and in everything concerning the Orient, to create a taste for Oriental Studies in this country, to publish texts, translations and communications, and to collect a library and cabinet. Most of the work has been done in the Asiatic field, and particularly in Sanskrit and the Semitic languages.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Nathaniel Schmidt, &amp;quot;Early Oriental Studies in Europe and the Work of the American Oriental Society, 1842-1922,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of the American Oriental Society&#039;&#039; 43 (1923): 11. See also E. A. Speiser, &amp;quot;Near Eastern Studies in America, 1939-45,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Archiv Orientalni&#039;&#039; 16 (1948): 76-88.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Metternich, Louis-Philippe, the Treaty of Nanking, the screw propellor: all suggest the imperial constellation facilitating Euro-American penetration of the Orient. This has never stopped. Even the legendary American missionaries to the Near East during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took their role as set not so much by God as by &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; God, &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; culture, and &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; destiny.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;As an instance there is Henry Jessup, &#039;&#039;Fifty-Three Years in Syria&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1910).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The early missionary institutions--printing presses, schools, universities, hospitals, and the like--contributed of course to the area&#039;s well-being, but in their specifically imperial character and their support by the United States government, these institutions were no different from their French and British counterparts in the Orient. During the First World War, what was to become a major United States policy interest in Zionism and the colonization of Palestine played an estimable role in getting the United States into the war; British discussions prior to and after the Balfour Declaration (November 1917) reflect the seriousness with which the declaration was taken by the United States.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For the connection between the issuing of the Balfour Declaration and United States war policy, see Doreen Ingrams, &#039;&#039;Palestine Papers 19171922: Seeds of Conflict&#039;&#039; (London: Cox &amp;amp; Syman, 1972), pp. 10 ff.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; During and after the Second World War, the escalation in United States interest in the Middle East was remarkable. Cairo, Teheran, and North Africa were important arenas of war, and in that setting, with the exploitation of its oil, strategic, and human resources pioneered by Britain and France, the United States prepared for its new postwar imperial role.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not the least aspect of this role was &amp;quot;a cultural relations policy,&amp;quot; as it was defined by Mortimer Graves in 1950. Part of this policy was, he said, the attempt to acquire &amp;quot;every significant publication in every important Near Eastern language published since 1900,&amp;quot; an attempt &amp;quot;which our Congress ought to recognize as a measure of our national security.&amp;quot; For what was clearly at stake, Graves argued (to very receptive ears, by the way), was the need for &amp;quot;much better American understanding of the forces which are contending with the American idea for acceptance by the Near East. The principal of these are, of course, communism and Islam.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Mortimer Graves, &amp;quot;A Cultural Relations Policy in the Near East,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, ed. Frye, pp. 76, 78.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Out of such a concern, and as a contemporary adjunct to the more backward-looking American Oriental Society, was born the entire vast apparatus for research on the Middle East. The model, both in its frankly strategic attitude and in its sensitivity to public security and policy (not, as is often postured, to pure scholarship), was the Middle East Institute, founded May 1946 in Washington under the aegis of, if not entirely within or by, the federal government.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Camp Keiser, &amp;quot;The Middle East Institute: Its Inception and Its Place in American International Studies,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, ed. Frye, pp. 80, 84.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Out of such organizations grew the Middle East Studies Association, the powerful support of the Ford and other foundations, the various federal programs of support to universities, the various federal research projects, research projects carried out by such entities as the Defense Department, the RAND Corporation, and the Hudson Institute, and the consultative and lobbying efforts of banks, oil companies, multinationals, and the like. It is no reduction to say of all this that it retains, in most of its general as well as its detailed functioning, the traditional Orientalist outlook which had been developed in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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The parallel between European and American imperial designs on the Orient (Near and Far) is obvious. What is perhaps less obvious is (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) the extent to which the European tradition of Orientalist scholarship was, if not taken over, then accommodated, normalized, domesticated, and popularized and fed into the postwar efflorescence of Near Eastern studies in the United States; and (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) the extent to which the European tradition has given rise in the United States to a coherent attitude among most scholars, institutions, styles of discourse, and orientations, despite the contemporary appearance of refinement, as well as the use of (again) highly sophisticated-appearing social-science techniques. I have already discussed Gibb&#039;s ideas; it needs to be pointed out, however, that in the middle 1950s he became director of the Harvard Center for Middle East Studies, from which position his ideas and style exerted an important influence. Gibb&#039;s presence in the United States was different in what it did for the field from Philip Hitti&#039;s presence at Princeton since the late 1920s. The Princeton department produced a large group of important scholars, and its brand of Oriental studies stimulated great scholarly interest in the field. Gibb, on the other hand, was more truly in touch with the public-policy aspect of Orientalism, and far more than Hitti&#039;s at Princeton his position at Harvard focused Orientalism on a Cold War area-studies approach.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gibb&#039;s own work, nevertheless, did not overtly employ the language of cultural discourse in the tradition of Renan, Becker, and Massignon. Yet this discourse, its intellectual apparatus, and its dogmas were impressively present, principally (although not exclusively) in the work and institutional authority, at Chicago and then at UCLA, of Gustave von Grunebaum. He came to the United States as part of the intellectual immigration of European scholars fleeing fascism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For an account of this migration, see &#039;&#039;The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960&#039;&#039;, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thereafter he produced a solid Orientalist &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039; that concentrated on Islam as a holistic culture about which, from beginning to end of his career, he continued to make the same set of essentially reductive, negative generalizations. His style, which bore often chaotic evidence of his Austro-Germanic polymathy, of his absorption of the canonical pseudoscientific prejudices of French, British, and Italian Orientalism, as well as of an almost desperate effort to remain the impartial scholar-observer, was next to unreadable. A typical page of his on the Islamic self-image will jam together half-a-dozen references to Islamic texts drawn from as many periods as possible, references as well to Husserl and the pre-Socratics, references to Levi-Strauss and various American social scientists. All this, nevertheless, does not obscure von Grunebaum&#039;s almost virulent dislike of Islam. He has no difficulty presuming that Islam is a unitary phenomenon, unlike any other religion or civilization, and thereafter he shows it to be antihuman, incapable of development, self-knowledge, or objectivity, as well as uncreative, unscientific, and authoritarian. Here are two typical excerpts--and we must remember that von Grunebaum wrote with the unique authority of a European scholar in the United States, teaching, administering, giving grants to a large network of scholars in the field.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is essential to realize that Muslim civilization is a cultural entity that does not share our primary aspirations. It is not vitally interested in the structured study of other cultures, either as an end in itself or as a means towards clearer understanding of its own character and history. If this observation were to be valid merely for contemporary Islam, one might be inclined to connect it with the profoundly disturbed state of Islam, which does not permit it to look beyond itself unless forced to do so. But as it is valid for the past as well, one may perhaps seek to connect it with the basic anti-humanism of this [Islamic] civilization, that is, the determined refusal to accept man to any extent whatever as the arbiter or the measure of things, and the tendency to be satisfied with the truth as the description of mental structures, or in other words, with psychological truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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[Arab or Islamic nationalism] lacks, in spite of its occasional use as a catchword, the concept of the divine right of a nation, it lacks a formative ethic, it also lacks, it would seem, the later nineteenth century belief in mechanistic progress; above all it lacks the intellectual vigor of a primary phenomenon. Both power and the will to power are ends in themselves. [This sentence seems to serve no purpose in the argument; yet it doubtless gives von Grunebaum the security of a philosophical-sounding nonsentence, as if to assure himself that he speaks wisely, not disparagingly, of Islam.] The resentment of political slights [felt by Islam] engenders impatience and impedes long-range analysis and planning in the intellectual sphere.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gustave von Grunebaum, &#039;&#039;Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity&#039;&#039; (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 55, 261.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In most other contexts such writing would politely be called polemical. For Orientalism, of course, it is relatively orthodox, and it passed for canonical wisdom in American study of the Middle East after World War II, mainly because of the cultural prestige associated with European scholars. The point is, however, that von Grunebaum&#039;s work is accepted uncritically by the field, even though the field itself today cannot reproduce people like him. Yet only one scholar has undertaken a serious critique of von Grunebaum&#039;s views: Abdullah Laroui, a Moroccan historian and political theorist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Using the motif of reductive repetition in von Grunebaum&#039;s work as a practical tool of critical anti-Orientalist study, Laroui manages his case impressively on the whole. He asks himself what it is that caused von Grunebaum&#039;s work, despite the enormous mass of its detail and its apparent range, to remain reductive. As Laroui says, &amp;quot;the adjectives that von Grunebaum affixes to the word Islam (medieval, classical, modern) are neutral or even superfluous: there is no difference between classical Islam and medieval Islam or Islam plain and simple.... There is therefore [for von Grunebaum] only &#039;&#039;one&#039;&#039; Islam that changes within itself.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Abdullah Laroui, &amp;quot;Pour une methodologie des etudes islamiques: L&#039;Islam au miroir de Gustave von Grunebaum,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diogene&#039;&#039; 38 (July-September 1973): 30. This essay has been collected in Laroui&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Crisis of the Arab Intellectuals: Traditionalism or Historicism?&#039;&#039; trans. Diarmid Cammell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Modern Islam, according to von Grunebaum, has turned away from the West because it remains faithful to its original sense of itself; and yet Islam can modernize itself only by a self-reinterpretation from a Western point of view--which, of course, von Grunebaum shows is impossible. In describing von Grunebaum&#039;s conclusions, which add up to a portrait of Islam as a culture incapable of innovation, Laroui does not mention that the need for Islam to use Western methods to improve itself has, as an idea, perhaps because of von Grunebaum&#039;s wide influence, become almost a truism in Middle Eastern studies. (For example, David Gordon, in &#039;&#039;Self-Determination and History in the Third World&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;David Gordon, &#039;&#039;Self-Determination and History in the Third World&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; urges &amp;quot;maturity&amp;quot; on Arabs, Africans, and Asians; he argues that this can be gained only by learning from Western objectivity.)&lt;br /&gt;
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Laroui&#039;s analysis shows also how von Grunebaum employed A. L. Kroeber&#039;s culturalist theory to understand Islam, and how this tool necessarily entailed a series of reductions and eliminations by which Islam could be represented as a closed system of exclusions. Thus, each of the many diverse aspects of Islamic culture could be seen by von Grunebaum as a direct reflection of an unvarying matrix, a particular theory of God, that compels them all into meaning and order: development, history, tradition, reality in Islam are therefore interchangeable. Laroui rightly maintains that history as a complex order of events, temporalities, and meanings cannot be reduced to such a notion of culture, in the same way that culture cannot be reduced to ideology, nor ideology to theology. Von Grunebaum has fallen prey both to the Orientalist dogmas he inherited and to a particular feature of Islam which he has chosen to interpret as a shortcoming: that there is to be found in Islam a highly articulated theory of religion and yet very few accounts of religious experience, highly articulate political theory and few precise political documents, a theory of social structure and very few individualized actions, a theory of history and very few dated events, an articulated theory of economics and very few quantified series, and so on.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Laroui, &amp;quot;Pour une methodologie des etudes islamiques,&amp;quot; p. 41.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The net result is a historical vision of Islam entirely hobbled by the theory of a culture incapable of doing justice to, or even examining, its existential reality in the experience of its adherents. Von Grunebaum&#039;s Islam, after all, is the Islam of the earlier European Orientalists--monolithic, scornful of ordinary human experience, gross, reductive, unchanging.&lt;br /&gt;
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At bottom such a view of Islam is political, not even euphemistically impartial. The strength of its hold on the new Orientalist (younger, that is, than von Grunebaum) is due in part to its traditional authority, and in part to its use-value as a handle for grasping a vast region of the world and proclaiming it an entirely coherent phenomenon. Since Islam has never easily been encompassed by the West politically--and certainly since World War II Arab nationalism has been a movement openly declaring its hostility to Western imperialism--the desire to assert intellectually satisfying things about Islam in retaliation increases. One authority has said of Islam (without specifying &#039;&#039;which&#039;&#039; Islam or aspect of Islam he means) that it is &amp;quot;one prototype of closed traditional societies.&amp;quot; Note here the edifying use of the word &#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039; to signify all at once a society, a religion, a prototype, and an actuality. But all this will be subordinated by the same scholar to the notion that, unlike normal (&amp;quot;our&amp;quot;) societies, Islam and Middle Eastern societies are totally &amp;quot;political,&amp;quot; an adjective meant as a reproach to Islam for not being &amp;quot;liberal,&amp;quot; for not being able to separate (as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do) politics from culture. The result is an invidiously ideological portrait of &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;them&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand Middle Eastern society as a whole must remain our great aim. Only a society [like &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot;] that has already achieved a dynamic stability can afford to think of politics, economics, or culture as genuinely autonomous realms of existence and not merely convenient divisions for study. In a traditional society that does not separate the things of Caesar from those of God, or that is entirely in flux, the connection between, say, politics and all other aspects of life is the heart of the issue. Today, for example, whether a man is to marry four wives or one, fast or eat, gain or lose land, rely on revelation or reason, have all become political issues in the Middle East.... No less than the Moslem himself, the new Orientalist must inquire anew what the significant structures and relationships of Islamic society may be.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Manfred Halpern, &amp;quot;Middle East Studies: A Review of the State of the Field with a Few Examples,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;World Politics&#039;&#039; 15 (October 1962): 121-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The triviality of most of the examples (marrying four wives, fasting or eating, etc.) is meant as evidence of Islam&#039;s all-inclusiveness, and its tyranny. As to &#039;&#039;where&#039;&#039; this is supposed to be happening, we are not told. But we are reminded of the doubtless nonpolitical fact that Orientalists &amp;quot;are largely responsible for having given Middle Easterners themselves an accurate appreciation of their past,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 117.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; just in case we might forget that Orientalists know things by definition that Orientals cannot know on their own.&lt;br /&gt;
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If this sums up the &amp;quot;hard&amp;quot; school of the new American Orientalism, the &amp;quot;soft&amp;quot; school emphasizes the fact that traditional Orientalists have given us the basic outlines of Islamic history, religion, and society but have been &amp;quot;all too often content to sum up the meaning of a civilization on the basis of a few manuscripts.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Leonard Binder, &amp;quot;1974 Presidential Address,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039; 9, no. 1 (February 1975): 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Against the traditional Orientalist, therefore, the new area-studies specialist argues philosophically:&lt;br /&gt;
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Research methodology and disciplinary paradigms are not to determine what is selected for study, and they are not to limit observation. Area studies, from this perspective, hold that true knowledge is only possible of things that exist, while methods and theories are abstractions, which order observations and offer explanations according to non-empirical criteria.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Good. But &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; does one know the &amp;quot;things that exist,&amp;quot; and to what extent are the &amp;quot;things that exist&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;constituted&#039;&#039; by the knower? This is left moot, as the new value-free apprehension of the Orient as something that exists is institutionalized in area-studies programs. Without tendentious theorizing, Islam is &#039;&#039;rarely&#039;&#039; studied, &#039;&#039;rarely&#039;&#039; researched, &#039;&#039;rarely&#039;&#039; known: the naivete of this conception scarcely conceals what ideologically it means, the absurd theses that man plays no part in setting up both the material and the processes of knowledge, that the Oriental reality is static and &amp;quot;exists,&amp;quot; that only a messianic revolutionary (in Dr. Kissinger&#039;s vocabulary) will not admit the difference between reality out there and in his head.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between the hard and soft schools, however, more or less diluted versions of the old Orientalism flourish--in the new academic jargons in some cases, in the old ones in others. But the principal dogmas of Orientalism exist in their purest form today in studies of the Arabs and Islam. Let us recapitulate them here: one is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically &amp;quot;objective.&amp;quot; A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible).&lt;br /&gt;
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The extraordinary thing is that these notions persist without significant challenge in the academic and governmental study of the modern Near Orient. Lamentably, there has been no demonstrable effect--if there has been a challenging gesture at all--made by Islamic or Arab scholars&#039; work disputing the dogmas of Orientalism; an isolated article here or there, while important for its time and place, cannot possibly affect the course of an imposing research consensus maintained by all sorts of agencies, institutions, and traditions. The point of this is that Islamic Orientalism has led a contemporary life quite different from that of the other Orientalist subdisciplines. The Committee of Concerned Asia Scholars (who are primarily Americans) led a revolution during the 1960s in the ranks of East Asia specialists; the African studies specialists were similarly challenged by revisionists; so too were other Third World area specialists. Only the Arabists and Islamologists still function unrevised. For them there are still such things as &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Islamic society, &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Arab mind, &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Oriental psyche. Even the ones whose specialty is the modern Islamic world anachronistically use texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society. Islam, or a seventh-century ideal of it constituted by the Orientalist, is assumed to possess the unity that eludes the more recent and important influences of colonialism, imperialism, and even ordinary politics. Cliches about how Muslims (or Mohammedans, as they are still sometimes called) behave are bandied about with a nonchalance no one would risk in talking about blacks or Jews. At best, the Muslim is a &amp;quot;native informant&amp;quot; for the Orientalist. Secretly, however, he remains a despised heretic who for his sins must additionally endure the entirely thankless position of being known--negatively, that is--as an anti-Zionist.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is of course a Middle East studies establishment, a pool of interests, &amp;quot;old boy&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;expert&amp;quot; networks linking corporate business, the foundations, the oil companies, the missions, the military, the foreign service, the intelligence community together with the academic world. There are grants and other rewards, there are organizations, there are hierarchies, there are institutes, centers, faculties, departments, all devoted to legitimizing and maintaining the authority of a handful of basic, basically unchanging ideas about Islam, the Orient, and the Arabs. A recent critical analysis of the Middle East studies operation in the United States shows, not that the field is &amp;quot;monolithic,&amp;quot; but that it is complex, that it contains old-style Orientalists, deliberately marginal specialists, counterinsurgency specialists, policymakers, as well as &amp;quot;a small minority ... of academic power brokers.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Middle East Studies Network in the United States,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MERIP Reports&#039;&#039; 38 (June 1975): 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In any event, the core of Orientalist dogma persists.&lt;br /&gt;
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As an instance of what, in its highest and most intellectually prestigious form, the field now produces, let us consider briefly the two-volume &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, which was first published in England in 1970 and is a regular summa of Orientalist orthodoxy. To say of this work by numerous luminaries that it is an intellectual failure by any standards other than those of Orientalism is to say that it could have been a different and better history of Islam. In fact, as several more thoughtful scholars have noted,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The two best critical reviews of the &#039;&#039;Cambridge History&#039;&#039; are by Albert Hourani, &#039;&#039;The English Historical Review&#039;&#039; 87, no. 343 (April 1972): 348-57, and Roger Owen, &#039;&#039;Journal of Interdisciplinary History&#039;&#039; 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1973): 287-98.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; this kind of history was already doomed when first planned and could not have been different, or better in execution: too many ideas were uncritically accepted by its editors; there was too much reliance on vague concepts; little emphasis was placed on methodological issues (which were left as they have been standing in Orientalist discourse for almost two centuries); and no effort was put forth to make even the idea of Islam seem interesting. Moreover, not only does &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039; radically misconceive and misrepresent Islam as a religion; it also has no corporate idea of itself as a history. Of few such enormous enterprises can it be true, as it is of this one, that ideas and methodological intelligence are almost entirely absent from it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Erfan Shahid&#039;s chapter on pre-Islamic Arabia, which opens the history, intelligently sketches the fruitful consonance between topography and human economy out of which Islam appeared in the seventh century. But what can one fairly say of a history of Islam, defined by P. M. Holt&#039;s introduction rather airily as a &amp;quot;cultural synthesis,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. M. Holt, Introduction, &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 1: xi.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that proceeds directly from pre-Islamic Arabia to a chapter on Mohammed, then to a chapter on the Patriarchal and Umayyad caliphates, and entirely bypasses any account of Islam as a system of belief, faith, or doctrine? For hundreds of pages in volume 1, Islam is understood to mean an unrelieved chronology of battles, reigns, and deaths, rises and heydays, comings and passings, written for the most part in a ghastly monotone.&lt;br /&gt;
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Take the Abbasid period from the eighth to the eleventh century as an instance. Anyone who has the slightest acquaintance with Arab or Islamic history will know that it was a high point of Islamic civilization, as brilliant a period of cultural history as the High Renaissance in Italy. Yet nowhere in the forty pages of description does one get an inkling of any richness; what is found instead is sentences like this: &amp;quot;Once master of the caliphate, [al-Ma&#039;mun] seemed henceforth to shrink from contact with Baghdad society and remained settled at Merv, entrusting the government of Iraq to one of his trusted men, al-Hasan b. Sahl, the brother of al-Fadl, who was faced almost at once with a serious Shi&#039;i revolt, that of Abu&#039;l-Saraya, who in Jumada II 199/January 815 sent out a call to arms from Kufa in support of the Hasanid Ibn Tabataba.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;D. Sourdel, &amp;quot;The Abbasid Caliphate,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Holt et al., 1: 121.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A non-Islamicist will not know at this point what a Shi&#039;i or a Hasanid is. He will have no idea what Jumada II is, except that it clearly designates a date of some sort. And of course he will believe that the Abbasids, including Harun al-Rashid, were an incorrigibly dull and murderous lot, as they sat sulking in Merv.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Central Islamic lands are defined as excluding North Africa and Andalusia, and &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; history is an orderly march from the past till modern times. In volume 1, therefore, Islam is a geographical designation applied chronologically and selectively as it suits the experts. But nowhere in the chapters on classical Islam is there an adequate preparation for the disappointments in store for us when we come to &amp;quot;recent times,&amp;quot; as they are called. The chapter on the modern Arab lands is written without the slightest understanding of the revolutionary developments in the area. The author takes a schoolmarmish, openly reactionary attitude towards the Arabs (&amp;quot;it must be said that during this period the educated and uneducated youth of the Arab countries, with their enthusiasm and idealism, became a fertile soil for political exploitation and, at times, perhaps without realizing it, the tools of unscrupulous extremists and agitators&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Z. N. Zeine, &amp;quot;The Arab Lands,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Holt et al., 1: 575.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;), tempered by occasional praise of Lebanese nationalism (although we are never told that the appeal of fascism to a small number of Arabs during the thirties also infected the Lebanese Maronites, who in 1936 founded the Falanges libanaises as a copy of Mussolini&#039;s Black Shirts). &amp;quot;Unrest and agitation&amp;quot; are ascribed to 1936 without a mention of Zionism, and the very notions of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism are never allowed to violate the serenity of the narrative. As for the chapters on &amp;quot;the political impact of the West&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;economic and social change&amp;quot;--ideas left no more specific than that--they are tacked on as reluctant concessions to Islam as having something to do with &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world in general. Change is unilaterally equated with modernization, even though it is nowhere made clear why other kinds of change need be so imperiously dismissed. Since it is assumed that Islam&#039;s only worthwhile relations have been with the West, the importance of Bandung or of Africa or of the Third World generally is ignored; this blithe indifference to a good three-quarters of reality somewhat explains the amazingly cheerful statement that &amp;quot;the historical ground has been cleared [by whom, for what, in what way?] for a new relationship between the West and Islam ... based on equality and cooperation.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Dankwart A. Rustow, &amp;quot;The Political Impact of the West,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Holt et al., 1: 697.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If by the end of volume 1 we are mired in a number of contradictions and difficulties about what Islam really is, there is no help to be had in volume 2. Half the book is devoted to covering the tenth to the twentieth centuries in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Spain, North Africa, and Sicily; there is more distinction in the chapters on North Africa, although the same combination of professional Orientalist jargon with unguided historical detail prevails pretty much everywhere. So far, after approximately twelve hundred pages of dense prose, &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; appears to be no more a cultural synthesis than any other roll call of kings, battles, and dynasties. But in the last half of volume 2, the great synthesis completes itself with articles on &amp;quot;The Geographical Setting,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Sources of Islamic Civilization,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Religion and Culture,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Warfare.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now one&#039;s legitimate questions and objections seem more justified. Why is a chapter commissioned on Islamic warfare when what is really discussed (interestingly, by the way) is the sociology of some Islamic armies? Is one to assume that there is an Islamic mode of war different, say, from Christian warfare? Communist war versus capitalist war proposes itself as a suitably analogous topic. Of what use for the understanding of Islam--except as a display of Gustave von Grunebaum&#039;s indiscriminate erudition--are the opaque quotations from Leopold von Ranke which, along with other equally ponderous and irrelevant material, dot his pages on Islamic civilization? Is it not mendacious thus to disguise the real Grunebaumian thesis, that Islamic civilization rests on an unprincipled borrowing by Muslims from the Judeo-Christian, Hellenistic, and Austro-Germanic civilizations? Compare with this idea--that Islam is by definition a plagiaristic culture--the one put forward in volume 1 that &amp;quot;so-called Arabic literature&amp;quot; was written by Persians (no proof offered, no names cited). When Louis Gardet treats &amp;quot;Religion and Culture,&amp;quot; we are told summarily that only the first five centuries of Islam are to be discussed; does this mean that religion and culture in &amp;quot;modern times&amp;quot; cannot be &amp;quot;synthesized,&amp;quot; or does it mean that Islam achieved its final form in the twelfth century? Is there really such a thing as &amp;quot;Islamic geography,&amp;quot; which seems to include the &amp;quot;planned anarchy&amp;quot; of Muslim cities, or is it mainly an invented subject to demonstrate a rigid theory of geographical-racial determinism? As a hint we are reminded of &amp;quot;the Ramadan fast with its active nights,&amp;quot; from which we are expected to conclude that Islam is a religion &amp;quot;designed for town dwellers.&amp;quot; This is explanation in need of explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sections on economic and social institutions, on law and justice, mysticism, art and architecture, science, and the various Islamic literatures are on an altogether higher level than most of the &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039;. Yet nowhere is there evidence that their authors have much in common with modern humanists or social scientists in other disciplines: the techniques of the conventional history of ideas, of Marxist analysis, of the New History, are noticeably absent. Islam, in short, seems to its historians to be best suited to a rather Platonic and antiquarian bias. To some writers of the &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039; Islam is a politics and a religion; to others it is a style of being; to others it is &amp;quot;distinguishable from Muslim society&amp;quot;; to still others it is a mysteriously known essence; to &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; the authors Islam is a remote, tensionless thing, without much to teach us about the complexities of today&#039;s Muslims. Hanging over the whole disjointed enterprise which is &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039; is the old Orientalist truism that Islam is about texts, not about people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fundamental question raised by such contemporary Orientalist texts as &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History&#039;&#039; is whether ethnic origins and religion are the best, or at least the most useful, basic, and clear, definitions of human experience. Does it matter more in understanding contemporary politics to know that X and Y are disadvantaged in certain very concrete ways, or that they are Muslims or Jews? This is of course a debatable question, and we are very likely in rational terms to insist on both the religious-ethnic and the socio-economic descriptions; Orientalism, however, clearly posits the Islamic category as the dominant one, and this is the main consideration about its retrograde intellectual tactics.&lt;br /&gt;
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3. &#039;&#039;Merely Islam&#039;&#039;. So deeply entrenched is the theory of Semitic simplicity as it is to be found in modern Orientalism that it operates with little differentiation in such well-known anti-Semitic European writings as &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039; and in remarks such as these by Chaim Weizmann to Arthur Balfour on May 30, 1918:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Arabs, who are superficially clever and quick witted, worship one thing, and one thing only--power and success.... The British authorities ... knowing as they do the treacherous nature of the Arabs ... have to watch carefully and constantly.... The fairer the English regime tries to be, the more arrogant the Arab becomes.... The present state of affairs would necessarily tend toward the creation of an Arab Palestine, if there were an Arab people in Palestine. It will not in fact produce that result because the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times, and the effendi ... is dishonest, uneducated, greedy, and as unpatriotic as he is inefficient.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Ingrams, &#039;&#039;Palestine Papers, 1917-1922&#039;&#039;, pp. 31-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The common denominator between Weizmann and the European anti-Semite is the Orientalist perspective, seeing Semites (or subdivisions thereof) as by nature lacking the desirable qualities of Occidentals. Yet the difference between Renan and Weizmann is that the latter had already gathered behind his rhetoric the solidity of institutions whereas the former had not. Is there not in twentieth-century Orientalism that same unaging &amp;quot;gracious childhood&amp;quot;--heedlessly allied now with scholarship, now with a state and all its institutions--that Renan saw as the Semites&#039; unchanging mode of being?&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet with what greater harm has the twentieth-century version of the myth been maintained. It has produced a picture of the Arab as seen by an &amp;quot;advanced&amp;quot; quasi-Occidental society. In his resistance to foreign colonialists the Palestinian was either a stupid savage, or a negligible quantity, morally and even existentially. According to Israeli law only a Jew has full civic rights and unqualified immigration privileges; even though they are the land&#039;s inhabitants, Arabs are given less, more simple rights: they cannot immigrate, and if they seem not to have the same rights, it is because they are &amp;quot;less developed.&amp;quot; Orientalism governs Israeli policy towards the Arabs throughout, as the recently published Koenig Report amply proves. There are good Arabs (the ones who do as they are told) and bad Arabs (who do not, and are therefore terrorists). Most of all there are all those Arabs who, once defeated, can be expected to sit obediently behind an infallibly fortified line, manned by the smallest possible number of men, on the theory that Arabs have had to accept the myth of Israeli superiority and will never dare attack. One need only glance through the pages of General Yehoshafat Harkabi&#039;s &#039;&#039;Arab Attitudes to Israel&#039;&#039; to see how--as Robert Alter put it in admiring language in &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Robert Alter, &amp;quot;Rhetoric and the Arab Mind,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, October 1968, pp. 61-85. Alter&#039;s article was an adulatory review of General Yehoshafat Harkabi&#039;s &#039;&#039;Arab Attitudes to Israel&#039;&#039; (Jerusalem: Keter Press, 1972).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--the Arab mind, depraved, anti-Semitic to the core, violent, unbalanced, could produce only rhetoric and little more. One myth supports and produces another. They answer each other, tending towards symmetries and patterns of the sort that as Orientals the Arabs themselves can be expected to produce, but that as a human being no Arab can truly sustain.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of itself, in itself, as a set of beliefs, as a method of analysis, Orientalism cannot develop. Indeed, it is the doctrinal antithesis of development. Its central argument is the myth of the arrested development of the Semites. From this matrix other myths pour forth, each of them showing the Semite to be the opposite of the Westerner and irremediably the victim of his own weaknesses. By a concatenation of events and circumstances the Semitic myth bifurcated in the Zionist movement; one Semite went the way of Orientalism, the other, the Arab, was forced to go the way of the Oriental. Each time tent and tribe are solicited, the myth is being employed; each time the concept of Arab national character is evoked, the myth is being employed. The hold these instruments have on the mind is increased by the institutions built around them. For every Orientalist, quite literally, there is a support system of staggering power, considering the ephemerality of the myths that Orientalism propagates. This system now culminates in the very institutions of the state. To write about the Arab Oriental world, therefore, is to write with the authority of a nation, and not with the affirmation of a strident ideology but with the unquestioning certainty of absolute truth backed by absolute force.&lt;br /&gt;
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In its February 1974 issue &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039; gave its readers an article by Professor Gil Carl Alroy entitled &amp;quot;Do the Arabs Want Peace?&amp;quot; Alroy is a professor of political science and is the author of two works, &#039;&#039;Attitudes Towards Jewish Statehood in the Arab World&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Images of Middle East Conflict&#039;&#039;; he is a man who professes to &amp;quot;know&amp;quot; the Arabs, and is obviously an expert on image making. His argument is quite predictable: that the Arabs want to destroy Israel, that the Arabs really say what they mean (and Alroy makes ostentatious use of his ability to cite evidence from Egyptian newspapers, evidence he everywhere identifies with &amp;quot;Arabs&amp;quot; as if the two, Arabs and Egyptian newspapers, were one), and so on and on, with unflagging, one-eyed zeal. Quite the center of his article, as it is the center of previous work by other &amp;quot;Arabists&amp;quot; (synonymous with &amp;quot;Orientalists&amp;quot;), like General Harkabi, whose province is the &amp;quot;Arab mind,&amp;quot; is a working hypothesis on what Arabs, if one peels off all the outer nonsense, are really like. In other words, Alroy must prove that because Arabs are, first of all, as one in their bent for bloody vengeance, second, psychologically incapable of peace, and third, congenitally tied to a concept of justice that means the opposite of that, they are not to be trusted and must be fought interminably as one fights any other fatal disease. For evidence Alroy&#039;s principal exhibit is a quotation taken from Harold W. Glidden&#039;s essay &amp;quot;The Arab World&amp;quot; (to which I referred in Chapter One). Alroy finds Glidden able to have &amp;quot;captured the cultural differences between the Western and the Arab view&amp;quot; of things &amp;quot;very well.&amp;quot; Alroy&#039;s argument is clinched, therefore--the Arabs are unregenerate savages--and thus an authority on the Arab mind has told a wide audience of presumably concerned Jews that they must continue to watch out. And he has done it academically, dispassionately, fairly, using evidence taken from the Arabs themselves--who, he says with Olympian assurance, have &amp;quot;emphatically ruled out ... real peace&amp;quot;--and from psychoanalysis.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gil Carl Alroy, &amp;quot;Do The Arabs Want Peace?&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, February 1974, pp. 56-61.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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One can explain such statements by recognizing that a still more implicit and powerful difference posited by the Orientalist as against the Oriental is that the former &#039;&#039;writes&#039;&#039; about, whereas the latter &#039;&#039;is written&#039;&#039; about. For the latter, passivity is the presumed role; for the former, the power to observe, study, and so forth; as Roland Barthes has said, a myth (and its perpetuators) can invent itself (themselves) ceaselessly.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Roland Barthes, &#039;&#039;Mythologies&#039;&#039;, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill &amp;amp; Wang, 1972), pp. 109-59.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Oriental is given as fixed, stable, in need of investigation, in need even of knowledge about himself. No dialectic is either desired or allowed. There is a source of information (the Oriental) and a source of knowledge (the Orientalist), in short, a writer and a subject matter otherwise inert. The relationship between the two is radically a matter of power, for which there are numerous images. Here is an instance taken from Raphael Patai&#039;s &#039;&#039;Golden River to Golden Road&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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In order properly to evaluate what Middle Eastern culture will &#039;&#039;willingly accept&#039;&#039; from the embarrassingly rich storehouses of Western civilization, a better and sounder understanding of Middle Eastern culture &#039;&#039;must first be acquired&#039;&#039;. The same prerequisite is necessary in order &#039;&#039;to gauge&#039;&#039; the probable effects &#039;&#039;of newly introduced traits&#039;&#039; on the cultural context of tradition directed peoples. Also, the ways and means &#039;&#039;in which new cultural offerings can be made palatable&#039;&#039; must be studied much more thoroughly than was hitherto the case. In brief, the only way in which &#039;&#039;the Gordian knot of resistance&#039;&#039; to Westernization in the Middle East &#039;&#039;can be unraveled&#039;&#039; is that of studying the Middle East, &#039;&#039;of obtaining a fuller picture&#039;&#039; of its traditional culture, a better understanding of &#039;&#039;the processes of change taking place&#039;&#039; in it at present, and &#039;&#039;a deeper insight&#039;&#039; into the psychology of human groups brought up in Middle Eastern culture. &#039;&#039;The task is taxing, but the prize, harmony between the West&#039;&#039; and a neighboring world area of crucial importance, is well worth it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raphael Patai, &#039;&#039;Golden River to Golden Road: Society, Culture, and Change in the Middle East&#039;&#039; (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962; 3rd rev. ed., 1969), p. 406.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The metaphorical figures propping up this passage (I have indicated them by italics) come from a variety of human activities, some commercial, some horticultural, some religious, some veterinary, some historical. Yet in each case the relation between the Middle East and the West is really defined as sexual: as I said earlier in discussing Flaubert, the association between the Orient and sex is remarkably persistent. The Middle East is resistant, as any virgin would be, but the male scholar wins the prize by bursting open, penetrating through the Gordian knot despite &amp;quot;the taxing task.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Harmony&amp;quot; is the result of the conquest of maidenly coyness; it is not by any means the coexistence of equals. The underlying power relation between scholar and subject matter is never once altered: it is uniformly favorable to the Orientalist. Study, understanding, knowledge, evaluation, masked as blandishments to &amp;quot;harmony,&amp;quot; are instruments of conquest.&lt;br /&gt;
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The verbal operations in such writing as Patai&#039;s (who has outstripped even his previous work in his recent &#039;&#039;The Arab Mind&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raphael Patai, &#039;&#039;The Arab Mind&#039;&#039; (New York: Charles Scribner&#039;s Sons, 1973). For an even more racist work see John Laffin, &#039;&#039;The Arab Mind Considered: A Need for Understanding&#039;&#039; (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) aim at a very particular sort of compression and reduction. Much of his paraphernalia is anthropological--he describes the Middle East as a &amp;quot;culture area&amp;quot;--but the result is to eradicate the plurality of differences among the Arabs (whoever they may be in fact) in the interest of one difference, that one setting Arabs off from everyone else. As a subject matter for study and analysis, they can be controlled more readily. Moreover, thus reduced they can be made to permit, legitimate, and valorize general nonsense of the sort one finds in works such as Sania Hamady&#039;s &#039;&#039;Temperament and Character of the Arabs&#039;&#039;. Item:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Arabs so far have demonstrated an incapacity for disciplined and abiding unity. They experience collective outbursts of enthusiasm but do not pursue patiently collective endeavors, which are usually embraced half-heartedly. They show lack of coordination and harmony in organization and function, nor have they revealed an ability for cooperation. Any collective action for common benefit or mutual profit is alien to them.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sania Hamady, &#039;&#039;Temperament and Character of the Arabs&#039;&#039; (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960), p. 100. Hamady&#039;s book is a favorite amongst Israelis and Israeli apologists; Alroy cites her approvingly, and so does Amos Elon in &#039;&#039;The Israelis: Founders and Sons&#039;&#039; (New York: Holt, Rinehart &amp;amp; Winston, 1971). Morroe Berger (see note 137 below) also cites her frequently. Her model is Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, but she has none of Lane&#039;s literacy or general learning.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The style of this prose tells more perhaps than Hamady intends. Verbs like &amp;quot;demonstrate,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;reveal,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;show,&amp;quot; are used without an indirect object: to whom are the Arabs revealing, demonstrating, showing? To no one in particular, obviously, but to everyone in general. This is another way of saying that these truths are self-evident only to a privileged or initiated observer, since nowhere does Hamady cite generally available evidence for her observations. Besides, given the inanity of the observations, what sort of evidence could there be? As her prose moves along, her tone increases in confidence: &amp;quot;Any collective action ... is alien to them.&amp;quot; The categories harden, the assertions are more unyielding, and the Arabs have been totally transformed from people into no more than the putative subject of Hamady&#039;s style. The Arabs exist only as an occasion for the tyrannical observer: &amp;quot;The world is &#039;&#039;my&#039;&#039; idea.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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And so it is throughout the work of the contemporary Orientalist: assertions of the most bizarre sort dot his or her pages, whether it is a Manfred Halpern arguing that even though all human thought processes can be reduced to eight, the Islamic mind is capable of only four,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Manfred Halpern&#039;s thesis is presented in &amp;quot;Four Contrasting Repertories of Human Relations in Islam: Two Pre-Modern and Two Modern Ways of Dealing with Continuity and Change, Collaboration and Conflict and the Achieving of Justice,&amp;quot; a paper presented to the 22nd Near East Conference at Princeton University on Psychology and Near Eastern Studies, May 8, 1973. This treatise was prepared for by Halpern&#039;s &amp;quot;A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of International Affairs&#039;&#039; 23, no. 1 (1969): 54-75.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or a Morroe Berger presuming that since the Arabic language is much given to rhetoric Arabs are consequently incapable of true thought.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Morroe Berger, &#039;&#039;The Arab World Today&#039;&#039; (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1964), p. 140. Much the same sort of implication underlies the clumsy work of quasi-Arabists like Joel Carmichael and Daniel Lerner; it is there more subtly in political and historical scholars such as Theodore Draper, Walter Laqueur, and Elie Kedourie. It is strongly in evidence in such highly regarded works as Gabriel Baer&#039;s &#039;&#039;Population and Society in the Arab East&#039;&#039;, trans. Hanna Szoke (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), and Alfred Bonne&#039;s &#039;&#039;State and Economics in the Middle East: A Society in Transition&#039;&#039; (London: Routledge &amp;amp; Kegan Paul, 1955). The consensus seems to be that if they think at all, Arabs think differently--i.e., not necessarily with reason, and often without it. See also Adel Daher&#039;s RAND study, &#039;&#039;Current Trends in Arab Intellectual Thought&#039;&#039; (RM-5979-FF, December 1969) and its typical conclusion that &amp;quot;the concrete problem-solving approach is conspicuously absent from Arab thought&amp;quot; (p. 29). In a review-essay for the &#039;&#039;Journal of Interdisciplinary History&#039;&#039; (see note 124 above), Roger Owen attacks the very notion of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a concept for the study of history. His focus is &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, which, he finds, in certain ways perpetuates an idea of Islam (to be found in such writers as Carl Becker and Max Weber) &amp;quot;defined essentially as a religious, feudal, and antirational system, [that] lacked the necessary characteristics which had made European progress possible.&amp;quot; For a sustained proof of Weber&#039;s total inaccuracy, see Maxime Rodinson&#039;s &#039;&#039;Islam and Capitalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp. 76-117.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; One can call these assertions myths in their function and structure, and yet one must try to understand what other imperatives govern their use. Here one is speculating, of course. Orientalist generalizations about the Arabs are very detailed when it comes to itemizing Arab characteristics critically, far less so when it comes to analyzing Arab strengths. The Arab family, Arab rhetoric, the Arab character, despite copious descriptions by the Orientalist, appear de-natured, without human potency, even as these same descriptions possess a fullness and depth in their sweeping power over the subject matter. Hamady again:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the Arab lives in a hard and frustrating environment. He has little chance to develop his potentialities and define his position in society, holds little belief in progress and change, and finds salvation only in the hereafter.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hamady, Character and Temperament, p. 197.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What the Arab cannot achieve himself is to be found in the writing about him. The Orientalist is supremely certain of &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; potential, is not a pessimist, is able to define his position, his own and the Arab&#039;s. The picture of the Arab Oriental that emerges is determinedly negative; yet, we ask, why this endless series of works on him? What grips the Orientalist, if it is not--as it certainly is not--love of Arab science, mind, society, achievement? In other words, what is the nature of Arab presence in mythic discourse about him?&lt;br /&gt;
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Two things: number and generative power. Both qualities are reducible to each other ultimately, but we ought to separate them for the purposes of analysis. Almost without exception, every contemporary work of Orientalist scholarship (especially in the social sciences) has a great deal to say about the family, its male-dominated structure, its all-pervasive influence in the society. Patai&#039;s work is a typical example. A silent paradox immediately presents itself, for if the family is an institution for whose general failures the only remedy is the placebo of &amp;quot;modernization,&amp;quot; we must acknowledge that the family continues to produce itself, is fertile, and is the source of Arab existence in the world, such as it is. What Berger refers to as &amp;quot;the great value men place upon their own sexual prowess&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Berger, &#039;&#039;Arab World&#039;&#039;, p. 102.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; suggests the lurking power behind Arab presence in the world. If Arab society is represented in almost completely negative and generally passive terms, to be ravished and won by the Orientalist hero, we can assume that such a representation is a way of dealing with the great variety and potency of Arab diversity, whose source is, if not intellectual and social, then sexual and biological. Yet the absolutely inviolable taboo in Orientalist discourse is that that very sexuality must never be taken seriously. It can never be explicitly blamed for the absence of achievement and &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; rational sophistication the Orientalist everywhere discovers among the Arabs. And yet this is, I think, the missing link in arguments whose main object is criticism of &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; Arab society, such as Hamady&#039;s, Berger&#039;s, and Lerner&#039;s. They recognize the power of the family, note the weaknesses of the Arab mind, remark the &amp;quot;importance&amp;quot; of the Oriental world to the West, but never say what their discourse implies, that what is really left to the Arab after all is said and done is an undifferentiated sexual drive. On rare occasions--as in the work of Leon Mugniery--we do find the implicit made clear: that there is a &amp;quot;powerful sexual appetite ... characteristic of those hot-blooded southerners.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by Irene Gendzier in &#039;&#039;Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 94.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Most of the time, however, the belittlement of Arab society and its reduction of platitudes inconceivable for any except the racially inferior are carried on over an undercurrent of sexual exaggeration: the Arab produces himself, endlessly, sexually, and little else. The Orientalist says nothing about this, although his argument depends on it: &amp;quot;But co-operation in the Near East is still largely a family affair and little of it is found outside the blood group or village.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Berger, &#039;&#039;Arab World&#039;&#039;, p. 151.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Which is to say that the only way in which Arabs count is as mere biological beings; institutionally, politically, culturally they are nil, or next to nil. Numerically and as the producers of families, Arabs are actual.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difficulty with this view is that it complicates the passivity amongst Arabs assumed by Orientalists like Patai and even Hamady and the others. But it is in the logic of myths, like dreams, exactly to welcome radical antitheses. For a myth does not analyze or solve problems. It represents them as already analyzed and solved; that is, it presents them as already assembled images, in the way a scarecrow is assembled from bric-a-brac and then made to stand for a man. Since the image &#039;&#039;uses&#039;&#039; all material to its own end, and since by definition the myth displaces life, the antithesis between an over-fertile Arab and a passive doll is not functional. The discourse papers over the antithesis. An Arab Oriental is that impossible creature whose libidinal energy drives him to paroxysms of over-stimulation--and yet, he is as a puppet in the eyes of the world, staring vacantly out at a modern landscape he can neither understand nor cope with.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is in recent discussions of Oriental political behavior that such an image of the Arab seems to be relevant, and it is often occasioned by scholarly discussion of those two recent favorites of Orientalist expertise, revolution and modernization. Under the auspices of the School of Oriental and African Studies there appeared in 1972 a volume entitled &#039;&#039;Revolution in the Middle East and Other Case Studies&#039;&#039;, edited by P. J. Vatikiotis. The title is overtly medical, for we are expected to think of Orientalists as finally being given the benefit of what &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; Orientalism usually avoided: psychoclinical attention. Vatikiotis sets the tone of the collection with a quasi-medical definition of revolution, but since Arab revolution is in his mind and in his readers&#039;, the hostility of the definition seems acceptable. There is a very clever irony here about which I shall speak later. Vatikiotis&#039;s theoretical support is Camus--whose colonial mentality was no friend of revolution or of the Arabs, as Conor Cruise O&#039;Brien has recently shown--but the phrase &amp;quot;revolution destroys both men and principles&amp;quot; is accepted from Camus as having &amp;quot;fundamental sense.&amp;quot; Vatikiotis continues:&lt;br /&gt;
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... all revolutionary ideology is in direct conflict with (actually, is a head-on attack upon) man&#039;s rational, biological and psychological make-up.&lt;br /&gt;
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Committed as it is to a methodical metastasis, revolutionary ideology demands fanaticism from its adherents. Politics for the revolutionary is not only a question of belief, or a substitute for religious belief. It must stop being what it has always been, namely, an adaptive activity in time for survival. Metastatic, soteriological politics abhors adaptiveness, for how else can it eschew the difficulties, ignore and bypass the obstacles of the complex biological-psychological dimension of man, or mesmerize his subtle though limited and vulnerable rationality? It fears and shuns the concrete and discrete nature of human problems and the preoccupations of political life: it thrives on the abstract and the Promethean. It subordinates all tangible values to the one supreme value: the harnessing of man and history in a grand design of human liberation. It is not satisfied with human politics, which has so many irritating limitations. It wishes instead to create a new world, not adaptively, precariously, delicately, that is, humanly, but by a terrifying act of Olympian pseudo-divine creation. Politics in the service of man is a formula that is unacceptable to the revolutionary ideologue. Rather man exists to serve a politically contrived and brutally decreed order.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. J. Vatikiotis, ed., &#039;&#039;Revolution in the Middle East&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;and Other Case Studies; proceedings of a seminar&#039;&#039; (London: George Allen &amp;amp; Unwin, 1972), pp. 8-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Whatever else this passage says--purple writing of the most extreme sort, counterrevolutionary zealotry--it is saying nothing less than that revolution is a bad kind of sexuality (pseudo-divine act of creation), and also a cancerous disease. Whatever is done by the &amp;quot;human,&amp;quot; according to Vatikiotis, is rational, right, subtle, discrete, concrete; whatever the revolutionary proclaims is brutal, irrational, mesmeric, cancerous. Procreation, change, and continuity are identified not only with sexuality and with madness but, a little paradoxically, with abstraction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Vatikiotis&#039;s terms are weighted and colored emotionally by appeals (from the right) to humanity and decency and by appeals (against the left) safeguarding humanity from sexuality, cancer, madness, irrational violence, revolution. Since it is Arab revolution that is in question, we are to read the passage as follows: This is what revolution is, and if the Arabs want it, then that is a fairly telling comment on them, on the kind of inferior race they are. They are &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; capable of sexual incitement and not of Olympian (Western, modern) reason. The irony of which I spoke earlier now comes into play, for a few pages later we find that the Arabs are so inept that they cannot even aspire to, let alone consummate, the ambitions of revolution. By implication, Arab sexuality need not be feared for itself but for its failure. In short, Vatikiotis asks his reader to believe that revolution in the Middle East is a threat precisely because revolution cannot be attained.&lt;br /&gt;
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The major source of political conflict and potential revolution in many countries of the Middle East, as well as Africa and Asia today, is the inability of so-called radical nationalist regimes and movements to manage, let alone resolve, the social, economic and political problems of independence.... Until the states in the Middle East can control their economic activity and create or produce their own technology, their access to revolutionary experience will remain limited. The very political categories essential to a revolution will be lacking.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 12, 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Damned if you do, and damned if you don&#039;t. In this series of dissolving definitions revolutions emerge as figments of sexually crazed minds which on closer analysis turn out not to be capable even of the craziness Vatikiotis truly respects--which is human, not Arab, concrete, not abstract, asexual, not sexual.&lt;br /&gt;
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The scholarly centerpiece of Vatikiotis&#039;s collection is Bernard Lewis&#039;s essay &amp;quot;Islamic Concepts of Revolution.&amp;quot; The strategy here appears refined. Many readers will know that for Arabic speakers today the word &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; and its immediate cognates mean revolution; they will know this also from Vatikiotis&#039;s introduction. Yet Lewis does not describe the meaning of &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; until the very end of his article, after he has discussed concepts such as &#039;&#039;dawla, fitna&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;bughat&#039;&#039; in their historical and mostly religious context. The point there is mainly that &amp;quot;the Western doctrine of the right to resist bad government is alien to Islamic thought,&amp;quot; which leads to &amp;quot;defeatism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;quietism&amp;quot; as political attitudes. At no point in the essay is one sure where all these terms are supposed to be taking place except somewhere in the history of words. Then near the end of the essay we have this:&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Arabic-speaking countries a different word was used for [revolution] &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039;. The root &#039;&#039;th-w-r&#039;&#039; in classical Arabic meant to rise up (e.g. of a camel), to be stirred or excited, and hence, especially in Maghribi usage, to rebel. It is often used in the context of establishing a petty, independent sovereignty; thus, for example, the so-called party kings who ruled in eleventh century Spain after the break-up of the Caliphate of Cordova are called &#039;&#039;thuwwar&#039;&#039; (sing. &#039;&#039;tha&#039;ir&#039;&#039;). The noun &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; at first means excitement, as in the phrase, cited in the Sihah, a standard medieval Arabic dictionary, &#039;&#039;intazir hatta taskun hadhihi &#039;lthawra&#039;&#039;, wait till this excitement dies down--a very apt recommendation. The verb is used by al-Iji, in the form of &#039;&#039;thawaran&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;itharat fitna&#039;&#039;, stirring up sedition, as one of the dangers which should discourage a man from practising the duty of resistance to bad government. &#039;&#039;Thawra&#039;&#039; is the term used by Arabic writers in the nineteenth century for the French Revolution, and by their successors for the approved revolutions, domestic and foreign, of our own time.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;Islamic Concepts of Revolution,&amp;quot; in ibid., pp. 33, 38-9. Lewis&#039;s study &#039;&#039;Race and Color in Islam&#039;&#039; (New York: Harper &amp;amp; Row, 1971) expresses similar disaffection with an air of great learning; more explicitly political--but no less acid--is his &#039;&#039;Islam in History: Ideas&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Men and Events in the Middle East&#039;&#039; (London: Alcove Press, 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The entire passage is full of condescension and bad faith. Why introduce the idea of a camel rising as an etymological root for modern Arab revolution except as a clever way of discrediting the modern? Lewis&#039;s reason is patently to bring down revolution from its contemporary valuation to nothing more noble (or beautiful) than a camel about to raise itself from the ground. Revolution is excitement, sedition, setting up a petty sovereignty--nothing more; the best counsel (which presumably only a Western scholar and gentleman can give) is &amp;quot;wait till the excitement dies down.&amp;quot; One wouldn&#039;t know from this slighting account of &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; that innumerable people have an active commitment to it, in ways too complex for even Lewis&#039;s sarcastic scholarship to comprehend. But it is this kind of essentialized description that is natural for students and policymakers concerned with the Middle East: that revolutionary stirrings among &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; are about as consequential as a camel&#039;s getting up, as worthy of attention as the babblings of yokels. All the canonical Orientalist literature will for the same ideological reason be unable to explain or prepare one for the confirming revolutionary upheaval in the Arab world in the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lewis&#039;s association of &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; with a camel rising and generally with excitement (and not with a struggle on behalf of values) hints much more broadly than is usual for him that the Arab is scarcely more than a neurotic sexual being. Each of the words or phrases he uses to describe revolution is tinged with sexuality: &#039;&#039;stirred&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;excited&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;rising up&#039;&#039;. But for the most part it is a &amp;quot;bad&amp;quot; sexuality he ascribes to the Arab. In the end, since Arabs are really not equipped for serious action, their sexual excitement is no more noble than a camel&#039;s rising up. Instead of revolution there is sedition, setting up a petty sovereignty, and more excitement, which is as much as saying that instead of copulation the Arab can only achieve foreplay, masturbation, coitus interruptus. These, I think, are Lewis&#039;s implications, no matter how innocent his air of learning, or parlorlike his language. For since he is so sensitive to the nuances of words, he must be aware that &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; words have nuances as well.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lewis is an interesting case to examine further because his standing in the political world of the Anglo-American Middle Eastern Establishment is that of the learned Orientalist, and everything he writes is steeped in the &amp;quot;authority&amp;quot; of the field. Yet for at least a decade and a half his work in the main has been aggressiyely ideological, despite his various attempts at subtlety and irony. I mention his recent writing as a perfect exemplification of the academic whose work purports to be liberal objective scholarship but is in reality very close to being propaganda &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; his subject material. But this should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the history of Orientalism; it is only the latest--and in the West, the most uncriticized--of the scandals of &amp;quot;scholarship.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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So intent has Lewis become upon his project to debunk, to whittle down, and to discredit the Arabs and Islam that even his energies as a scholar and historian seem to have failed him. He will, for example, publish a chapter called &amp;quot;The Revolt of Islam&amp;quot; in a book in 1964, then republish much of the same material twelve years later, slightly altered to suit the new place of publication (in this case &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;) and retitled &amp;quot;The Return of Islam.&amp;quot; From &amp;quot;Revolt&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;Return&amp;quot; is of course a change for the worse, a change intended by Lewis to explain to his latest public why it is that the Muslims (or Arabs) still will not settle down and accept Israeli hegemony over the Near East.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us look more closely at how he does this. In both of his pieces he mentions an anti-imperialist riot in Cairo in 1945, which in both cases he describes as anti-Jewish. Yet in neither instance does he tell us how it was anti-Jewish; in fact, as his material evidence for anti-Jewishness, he produces the somewhat surprising intelligence that &amp;quot;several churches, Catholic, Armenian and Greek Orthodox, were attacked and damaged.&amp;quot; Consider the first version, done in 1964:&lt;br /&gt;
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On November 2, 1945 political leaders in Egypt called for demonstrations on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. These rapidly developed into anti-Jewish riots, in the course of which a Catholic, an Armenian, and a Greek Orthodox church were attacked and damaged. What, it may be asked, had Catholics, Armenians and Greeks to do with the Balfour Declaration?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;The Revolt of Islam,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Middle East and The West&#039;&#039; (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 95.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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And now the &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039; version, done in 1976:&lt;br /&gt;
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As the nationalist movement has become genuinely popular, so it has become less national and more religious--in other words less Arab and more Islamic. In moments of crisis--and these have been many in recent decades--it is the instinctive communal loyalty which outweighs all others. A few examples may suffice. On November 2, 1945, demonstrations were held in Egypt [note here how the phrase &amp;quot;demonstrations were held&amp;quot; is an attempt to show instinctive loyalties; in the previous version &amp;quot;political leaders&amp;quot; were responsible for the deed] on the anniversary of the issue by the British Government of the Balfour Declaration. Though this was certainly not the intention of the political leaders who sponsored it, the demonstration soon developed into an anti-Jewish riot and the anti-Jewish riot into a more general outbreak in the course of which several churches, Catholic, Armenian, and Greek Orthodox [another instructive change: the impression here is that many churches, of three kinds, were attacked; the earlier version is specific about three churches], were attacked and damaged.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;The Return of Islam,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, January 1976, p. 44.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Lewis&#039;s polemical, not scholarly, purpose is to show, here and elsewhere, that Islam is an anti-Semitic ideology, not merely a religion. He has a little logical difficulty in trying to assert that Islam is a fearful mass phenomenon and at the same time &amp;quot;not genuinely popular,&amp;quot; but this problem does not detain him long. As the second version of his tendentious anecdote shows, he goes on to proclaim that Islam is an irrational herd or mass phenomenon, ruling Muslims by passions, instincts, and unreflecting hatreds. The whole point of his exposition is to frighten his audience, to make it never yield an inch to Islam. According to Lewis, Islam does not develop, and neither do Muslims; they merely are, and they are to be watched, on account of that pure essence of theirs (according to Lewis), which happens to include a long-standing hatred of Christians and Jews. Lewis everywhere restrains himself from making such inflammatory statements flat out; he always takes care to say that of course the Muslims are not anti-Semitic the way the Nazis were, but their religion can too easily accommodate itself to anti-Semitism and has done so. Similarly with regard to Islam and racism, slavery, and other more or less &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; evils. The core of Lewis&#039;s ideology about Islam is that it never changes, and his whole mission is now to inform conservative segments of the Jewish reading public, and anyone else who cares to listen, that any political, historical, and scholarly account of Muslims must begin and end with the fact that Muslims are Muslims.&lt;br /&gt;
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For to admit that an entire civilization can have religion as its primary loyalty is too much. Even to suggest such a thing is regarded as offensive by liberal opinion, always ready to take protective umbrage on behalf of those whom it regards as its wards. This is reflected in the present inability, political, journalistic, and scholarly alike, to recognize the importance of the factor of religion in the current affairs of the Muslim world and in the consequent recourse to the language of left-wing and right-wing, progressive and conservative, and the rest of the Western terminology, the use of which in explaining Muslim political phenomena is about as accurate and as enlightening as an account of a cricket match by a baseball correspondent. [Lewis is so fond of this last simile that he quotes it verbatim from his 1964 polemic.]&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 40.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In a later work Lewis tells us what terminology is more accurate and useful, although the terminology seems no less &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; (whatever &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; means): Muslims, like most other former colonial peoples, are incapable of telling the truth or even of seeing it. According to Lewis, they are addicted to mythology, along with &amp;quot;the so-called revisionist school in the United States, which look back to a golden age of American virtue and ascribe virtually all the sins and crimes of the world to the present establishment in their country.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039;--&#039;&#039;Remembered, Recovered, Invented&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 68.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Aside from being a mischievous and totally inaccurate account of revisionist history, this kind of remark is designed to put Lewis as a great historian above the petty underdevelopment of mere Muslims and revisionists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet so far as being accurate is concerned, and so far as living up to his own rule that &amp;quot;the scholar, however, will not give way to his prejudices,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lewis, &#039;&#039;Islam in History&#039;&#039;, p. 65.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Lewis is cavalier with himself and with his cause. He will, for example, recite the Arab case against Zionism (using the &amp;quot;in&amp;quot; language of the Arab nationalist) without at the same time mentioning--anywhere, in any of his writings--that there was such a thing as a Zionist invasion and colonization of Palestine despite and in conflict with the native Arab inhabitants. No Israeli would deny this, but Lewis the Orientalist historian simply leaves it out. He will speak of the absence of democracy in the Middle East, except for Israel, without ever mentioning the Emergency Defense Regulations used in Israel to rule the Arabs; nor has he anything to say about &amp;quot;preventive detention&amp;quot; of Arabs in Israel, nor about the dozens of illegal settlements on the militarily occupied West Bank of Gaza, nor about the absence of human rights for Arabs, principal among them the right of immigration, in former Palestine. Instead, Lewis allows himself the scholarly liberty to say that &amp;quot;imperialism and Zionism [so far as the Arabs are concerned were] long familiar under their older names as the Christians and Jews.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lewis, &#039;&#039;The Middle East and the West&#039;&#039;, pp. 60, 87.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He quotes T. E. Lawrence on &amp;quot;the Semites&amp;quot; to bolster his case against Islam, he never discusses Zionism in parallel with Islam (as if Zionism were a French, not a religious, movement), and he tries everywhere to demonstrate that any revolution anywhere is at best a form of &amp;quot;secular millenarianism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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One would find this kind of procedure less objectionable as political propaganda--which is what it is, of course--were it not accompanied by sermons on the objectivity, the fairness, the impartiality of a real historian, the implication always being that Muslims and Arabs cannot be objective but that Orientalists like Lewis writing about Muslims and Arabs are, by definition, by training, by the mere fact of their Westernness. This is the culmination of Orientalism as a dogma that not only degrades its subject matter but also blinds its practitioners. But let us listen finally to Lewis telling us how the historian ought to conduct himself. We may well ask whether it is only the Orientals who are subject to the prejudices he chastises.&lt;br /&gt;
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[The historian&#039;s] loyalties may well influence his choice of subject of research; they should not influence his treatment of it. If, in the course of his researches, he finds that the group with which he identifies himself is always right, and those other groups with which it is in conflict are always wrong, then he would be well advised to question his conclusions, and to reexamine the hypothesis on the basis of which he selected and interpreted his evidence; for it is not in the nature of human communities [presumably, also, the community of Orientalists] always to be right.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally the historian must be fair and honest in the way he presents his story. That is not to say that he must confine himself to a bare recital of definitely established facts. At many stages in his work the historian must formulate hypotheses and make judgments. The important thing is that he should do so consciously and explicitly, reviewing the evidence for and against his conclusions, examining the various possible interpretations, and stating explicitly what his decision is, and how and why he reached it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lewis, &#039;&#039;Islam in History&#039;&#039;, pp. 65-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To look for a conscious, fair, and explicit judgment by Lewis of the Islam he has treated as he has treated it is to look in vain. He prefers to work, as we have seen, by suggestion and insinuation. One suspects, however, that he is unaware of doing this (except perhaps with regard to &amp;quot;political&amp;quot; matters like pro-Zionism, anti-Arab nationalism, and strident Cold Warriorism), since he would be certain to say that the whole history of Orientalism, of whom he is the beneficiary, has made these insinuations and hypotheses into indisputable truths.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the most indisputable of these rock-bottom &amp;quot;truths,&amp;quot; and the most peculiar (since it is hard to believe it could be maintained for any other language), is that Arabic as a language is a dangerous ideology. The contemporary &#039;&#039;locus classicus&#039;&#039; for this view of Arabic is E. Shouby&#039;s essay &amp;quot;The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Originally published in &#039;&#039;Middle East Journal&#039;&#039; 5 (1951). Collected in &#039;&#039;Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Cultures&#039;&#039;, ed. Abdulla Lutfiyye and Charles W. Churchill (The Hague: Mouton &amp;amp; Co., 1970), pp. 688-703.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The author is described as &amp;quot;a psychologist with training in both Clinical and Social Psychology,&amp;quot; and one presumes that a main reason his views have such wide currency is that he is an Arab himself (a self-incriminating one, at that). The argument he proposes is lamentably simple-minded, perhaps because he has no notion of what language is and how it operates. Nevertheless the subheadings of his essay tell a good deal of his story; Arabic is characterized by &amp;quot;General vagueness of Thought,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Overemphasis on Linguistic Signs,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Over-assertion and Exaggeration.&amp;quot; Shouby is frequently quoted as an authority because he speaks like one and because what he hypostasizes is a sort of mute Arab who at the same time is a great word-master playing games without much seriousness or purpose. Muteness is an important part of what Shouby is talking about, since in his entire paper he never once quotes from the literature of which the Arab is so inordinately proud. Where, then, does Arabic influence the Arab mind? Exclusively within the mythological world created for the Arab by Orientalism. The Arab is a sign for dumbness combined with hopeless overarticulateness, poverty combined with excess. That such a result can be attained by philological means testifies to the sad end of a formerly complex philological tradition, exemplified today only in very rare individuals. The reliance of today&#039;s Orientalist on &amp;quot;philology&amp;quot; is the last infirmity of a scholarly discipline completely transformed into social-science ideological expertise.&lt;br /&gt;
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In everything I have been discussing, the language of Orientalism plays the dominant role. It brings opposites together as &amp;quot;natural,&amp;quot; it presents human types in scholarly idioms and methodologies, it ascribes reality and reference to objects (other words) of its own making. Mythic language is discourse, that is, it cannot be anything but systematic; one does not really make discourse at will, or statements in it, without first belonging--in some cases unconsciously, but at any rate involuntarily--to the ideology and the institutions that guarantee its existence. These latter are always the institutions of an advanced society dealing with a less advanced society, a strong culture encountering a weak one. The principal feature of mythic discourse is that it conceals its own origins as well as those of what it describes. &amp;quot;Arabs&amp;quot; are presented in the imagery of static, almost ideal types, and neither as creatures with a potential in the process of being realized nor as history being made. The exaggerated value heaped upon Arabic as a language permits the Orientalist to make the language equivalent to mind, society, history, and nature. For the Orientalist the language &#039;&#039;speaks&#039;&#039; the Arab Oriental, not vice versa.&lt;br /&gt;
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4. &#039;&#039;Orientals Orientals Orientals&#039;&#039;. The system of ideological fictions I have been calling Orientalism has serious implications not only because it is intellectually discreditable. For the United States today is heavily invested in the Middle East, more heavily than anywhere else on earth: the Middle East experts who advise policymakers are imbued with Orientalism almost to a person. Most of this investment, appropriately enough, is built on foundations of sand, since the experts instruct policy on the basis of such marketable abstractions as political elites, modernization, and stability, most of which are simply the old Orientalist stereotypes dressed up in policy jargon, and most of which have been completely inadequate to describe what took place recently in Lebanon or earlier in Palestinian popular resistance to Israel. The Orientalist now tries to see the Orient as an imitation West which, according to Bernard Lewis, can only improve itself when its nationalism &amp;quot;is prepared to come to terms with the West.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lewis, The Middle East and the West, p. 140.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If in the meantime the Arabs, the Muslims, or the Third and Fourth Worlds go unexpected ways after all, we will not be surprised to have an Orientalist tell us that this testifies to the incorrigibility of Orientals and therefore proves that they are not to be trusted.&lt;br /&gt;
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The methodological failures of Orientalism cannot be accounted for either by saying that the &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039; Orient is different from Orientalist portraits of it, or by saying that since Orientalists are Westerners for the most part, they cannot be expected to have an inner sense of what the Orient is all about. Both of these propositions are false. It is not the thesis of this book to suggest that there is such a thing as a real or true Orient (Islam, Arab, or whatever); nor is it to make an assertion about the necessary privilege of an &amp;quot;insider&amp;quot; perspective over an &amp;quot;outsider&amp;quot; one, to use Robert K. Merton&#039;s useful distinction.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Robert K. Merton, &amp;quot;The Perspectives of Insiders and Outsiders,&amp;quot; in his &#039;&#039;The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations&#039;&#039;, ed. Norman W. Storer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 99-136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; On the contrary, I have been arguing that &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; is itself a constituted entity, and that the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically &amp;quot;different&amp;quot; inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space is equally a highly debatable idea. I certainly do not believe the limited proposition that only a black can write about blacks, a Muslim about Muslims, and so forth.&lt;br /&gt;
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And yet despite its failures, its lamentable jargon, its scarcely concealed racism, its paper-thin intellectual apparatus, Orientalism flourishes today in the forms I have tried to describe. Indeed, there is some reason for alarm in the fact that its influence has spread to &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; itself: the pages of books and journals in Arabic (and doubtless in Japanese, various Indian dialects, and other Oriental languages) are filled with second-order analyses by Arabs of &amp;quot;the Arab mind,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Islam,&amp;quot; and other myths. Orientalism has also spread in the United States now that Arab money and resources have added considerable glamour to the traditional &amp;quot;concern&amp;quot; felt for the strategically important Orient. The fact is that Orientalism has been successfully accommodated to the new imperialism, where its ruling paradigms do not contest, and even confirm, the continuing imperial design to dominate Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the one part of the Orient that I can speak about with some direct knowledge, the accommodation between the intellectual class and the new imperialism might very well be accounted one of the special triumphs of Orientalism. The Arab world today is an intellectual, political, and cultural satellite of the United States. This is not in itself something to be lamented; the specific form of the satellite relationship, however, is. Consider first of all that universities in the Arab world are generally run according to some pattern inherited from, or once directly imposed by, a former colonial power. New circumstances make the curricular actualities almost grotesque: classes populated with hundreds of students, badly trained, overworked, and underpaid faculty, political appointments, the almost total absence of advanced research and of research facilities, and most important, the lack of a single decent library in the entire region. Whereas Britain and France once dominated intellectual horizons in the East by virtue of their prominence and wealth, it is now the United States that occupies that place, with the result that the few promising students who manage to make it through the system are encouraged to come to the United States to continue their advanced work. And while it is certainly true that some students from the Arab world continue to go to Europe to study, the sheer numerical preponderance comes to the United States; this is as true of students from so-called radical states as it is of students from conservative states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Besides, the patronage system in scholarship, business, and research makes the United States a virtual hegemonic commander of affairs; the source, however much it may not be a real source, is considered to be the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two factors make the situation even more obviously a triumph of Orientalism. Insofar as one can make a sweeping generalization, the felt tendencies of contemporary culture in the Near East are guided by European and American models. When Taha Hussein said of modern Arab culture in 1936 that it was European, not Eastern, he was registering the identity of the Egyptian cultural elite, of which he was so distinguished a member. The same is true of the Arab cultural elite today, although the powerful current of anti-imperialist Third World ideas that has gripped the region since the early 1950s has tempered the Western edge of the dominant culture. In addition, the Arab and Islamic world remains a second-order power in terms of the production of culture, knowledge, and scholarship. Here one must be completely realistic about using the terminology of power politics to describe the situation that obtains. No Arab or Islamic scholar can afford to ignore what goes on in scholarly journals, institutes, and universities in the United States and Europe; the converse is not true. For example, there is no major journal of Arab studies published in the Arab world today, just as there is no Arab educational institution capable of challenging places like Oxford, Harvard, or UCLA in the study of the Arab world, much less in any non-Oriental subject matter. The predictable result of all this is that Oriental students (and Oriental professors) still want to come and sit at the feet of American Orientalists, and later to repeat to their local audiences the cliches I have been characterizing as Orientalist dogmas. Such a system of reproduction makes it inevitable that the Oriental scholar will use his American training to feel superior to his own people because he is able to &amp;quot;manage&amp;quot; the Orientalist system; in his relations with his superiors, the European or American Orientalists, he will remain only a &amp;quot;native informant.&amp;quot; And indeed this is his role in the West, should he be fortunate enough to remain there after his advanced training. Most elementary courses in Oriental languages are taught by &amp;quot;native informants&amp;quot; in United States universities today; also, power in the system (in universities, foundations, and the like) is held almost exclusively by non-Orientals, although the numerical ratio of Oriental to non-Oriental resident professionals does not favor the latter so overwhelmingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are all kinds of other indications of how the cultural domination is maintained, as much by Oriental consent as by direct and crude economic pressure from the United States. It is sobering to find, for instance, that while there are dozens of organizations in the United States for studying the Arab and Islamic Orient, there are none in the Orient itself for studying the United States, by far the greatest economic and political influence in the region. Worse, there are scarcely any institutes of even modest stature in the Orient devoted to study of the Orient. But all this, I think, is small in comparison with the second factor contributing to the triumph of Orientalism: the fact of consumerism in the Orient. The Arab and Islamic world as a whole is hooked into the Western market system. No one needs to be reminded that oil, the region&#039;s greatest resource, has been totally absorbed into the United States economy. By that I mean not only that the great oil companies are controlled by the American economic system; I mean also that Arab oil revenues, to say nothing of marketing, research, and industry management, are based in the United States. This has effectively made the oil-rich Arabs into huge customers of American exports: this is as true of states in the Persian Gulf as it is of Libya, Iraq, and Algeria--radical states all. My point is that the relationship is a one-sided one, with the United States a selective customer of a very few products (oil and cheap manpower, mainly), the Arabs highly diversified consumers of a vast range of United States products, material and ideological.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This has had many consequences. There is a vast standardization of taste in the region, symbolized not only by transistors, blue jeans, and Coca-Cola but also by cultural images of the Orient supplied by American mass media and consumed unthinkingly by the mass television audience. The paradox of an Arab regarding himself as an &amp;quot;Arab&amp;quot; of the sort put out by Hollywood is but the simplest result of what I am referring to. Another result is that the Western market economy and its consumer orientation have produced (and are producing at an accelerating rate) a class of educated people whose intellectual formation is directed to satisfying market needs. There is a heavy emphasis on engineering, business, and economics, obviously enough; but the intelligentsia itself is auxiliary to what it considers to be the main trends stamped out in the West. Its role has been prescribed and set for it as a &amp;quot;modernizing&amp;quot; one, which means that it gives legitimacy and authority to ideas about modernization, progress, and culture that it receives from the United States for the most part. Impressive evidence for this is found in the social sciences and, surprisingly enough, among radical intellectuals whose Marxism is taken wholesale from Marx&#039;s own homogenizing view of the Third World, as I discussed it earlier in this book. So if all told there is an intellectual acquiescence in the images and doctrines of Orientalism, there is also a very powerful reinforcement of this in economic, political, and social exchange: the modern Orient, in short, participates in its own Orientalizing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in conclusion, what of some alternative to Orientalism? Is this book an argument only &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; something, and not &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; something positive? Here and there in the course of this book I have spoken about &amp;quot;decolonializing&amp;quot; new departures in the so-called area studies--the work of Anwar Abdel Malek, the studies published by members of the Hull group on Middle Eastern studies, the innovative analyses and proposals of various scholars in Europe, the United States, and the Near East&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See, for example, the recent work of Anwar Abdel Malek, Yves Lacoste, and the authors of essays published in &#039;&#039;Review of Middle East Studies 1 and 2&#039;&#039; (London: Ithaca Press, 1975, 1976), the various analyses of Middle Eastern politics by Noam Chomsky, and the work done by the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP). A good prospectus is provided in Gabriel Ardant, Kostas Axelos, Jacques Berque, et al., &#039;&#039;De I&#039;imperialisme a la decolonisation&#039;&#039; (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1965).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--but I have not attempted to do more than mention them or allude to them quickly. My project has been to describe a particular system of ideas, not by any means to displace the system with a new one. In addition, I have attempted to raise a whole set of questions that are relevant in discussing the problems of human experience: How does one &#039;&#039;represent&#039;&#039; other cultures? What is &#039;&#039;another&#039;&#039; culture? Is the notion of a distinct culture (or race, or religion, or civilization) a useful one, or does it always get involved either in self-congratulation (when one discusses one&#039;s own) or hostility and aggression (when one discusses the &amp;quot;other&amp;quot;)? Do cultural, religious, and racial differences matter more than socio-economic categories, or politicohistorical ones? How do ideas acquire authority, &amp;quot;normality,&amp;quot; and even the status of &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; truth? What is the role of the intellectual? Is he there to validate the culture and state of which he is a part? What importance must he give to an independent critical consciousness, an &#039;&#039;oppositional&#039;&#039; critical consciousness?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I hope that some of my answers to these questions have been implicit in the foregoing, but perhaps I can speak a little more explicitly about some of them here. As I have characterized it in this study, Orientalism calls in question not only the possibility of nonpolitical scholarship but also the advisability of too close a relationship between the scholar and the state. It is equally apparent, I think, that the circumstances making Orientalism a continuingly persuasive type of thought will persist: a rather depressing matter on the whole. Nevertheless there is some rational expectation in my own mind that Orientalism need not always be so unchallenged, intellectually, ideologically, and politically, as it has been.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I would not have undertaken a book of this sort if I did not also believe that there is scholarship that is not as corrupt, or at least as blind to human reality, as the kind I have been mainly depicting. Today there are many individual scholars working in such fields as Islamic history, religion, civilization, sociology, and anthropology whose production is deeply valuable as scholarship. The trouble sets in when the guild tradition of Orientalism takes over the scholar who is not vigilant, whose individual consciousness as a scholar is not on guard against &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039; all too easily handed down in the profession. Thus interesting work is most likely to be produced by scholars whose allegiance is to a discipline defined intellectually and not to a &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; like Orientalism defined either canonically, imperially, or geographically. An excellent recent instance is the anthropology of Clifford Geertz, whose interest in Islam is discrete and concrete enough to be animated by the specific societies and problems he studies and not by the rituals, preconceptions, and doctrines of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, scholars and critics who are trained in the traditional Orientalist disciplines are perfectly capable of freeing themselves from the old ideological straitjacket. Jacques Berque&#039;s and Maxime Rodinson&#039;s training ranks with the most rigorous available, but what invigorates their investigations even of traditional problems is their methodological self-consciousness. For if Orientalism has historically been too smug, too insulated, too positivistically confident in its ways and its premises, then one way of opening oneself to what one studies in or about the Orient is reflexively to submit one&#039;s method to critical scrutiny. This is what characterizes Berque and Rodinson, each in his own way. What one finds in their work is always, first of all, a direct sensitivity to the material before them, and then a continual self-examination of their methodology and practice, a constant attempt to keep their work responsive to the material and not to a doctrinal preconception. Certainly Berque and Rodinson, as well as Abdel Malek and Roger Owen, are aware too that the study of man and society--whether Oriental or not--is best conducted in the broad field of all the human sciences; therefore these scholars are critical readers, and students of what goes on in other fields. Berque&#039;s attention to recent discoveries in structural anthropology, Rodinson&#039;s to sociology and political theory, Owen&#039;s to economic history: all these are instructive correctives brought from the contemporary human sciences to the study of so-called Oriental problems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But there is no avoiding the fact that even if we disregard the Orientalist distinctions between &amp;quot;them&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;us,&amp;quot; a powerful series of political and ultimately ideological realities inform scholarship today. No one can escape dealing with, if not the East/West division, then the North/South one, the have/have-not one, the imperialist/anti-imperialist one, the white/colored one. We cannot get around them all by pretending they do not exist; on the contrary, contemporary Orientalism teaches us a great deal about the intellectual dishonesty of dissembling on that score, the result of which is to intensify the divisions and make them both vicious and permanent. Yet an openly polemical and right-minded &amp;quot;progressive&amp;quot; scholarship can very easily degenerate into dogmatic slumber, a prospect that is not edifying either.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
My own sense of the problem is fairly shown by the kinds of questions I formulated above. Modern thought and experience have taught us to be sensitive to what is involved in representation, in studying the Other, in racial thinking, in unthinking and uncritical acceptance of authority and authoritative ideas, in the sociopolitical role of intellectuals, in the great value of a skeptical critical consciousness. Perhaps if we remember that the study of human experience usually has an ethical, to say nothing of a political, consequence in either the best or worst sense, we will not be indifferent to what we do as scholars. And what better norm for the scholar than human freedom and knowledge? Perhaps too we should remember that the study of man in society is based on concrete human history and experience, not on donnish abstractions, or on obscure laws or arbitrary systems. The problem then is to make the study fit and in some way be shaped by the experience, which would be illuminated and perhaps changed by the study. At all costs, the goal of Orientalizing the Orient again and again is to be avoided, with consequences that cannot help but refine knowledge and reduce the scholar&#039;s conceit. Without &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; there would be scholars, critics, intellectuals, human beings, for whom the racial, ethnic, and national distinctions were less important than the common enterprise of promoting human community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Positively, I do believe--and in my other work have tried to show--that enough is being done today in the human sciences to provide the contemporary scholar with insights, methods, and ideas that could dispense with racial, ideological, and imperialist stereotypes of the sort provided during its historical ascendancy by Orientalism. I consider Orientalism&#039;s failure to have been a human as much as an intellectual one; for in having to take up a position of irreducible opposition to a region of the world it considered alien to its own, Orientalism failed to identify with human experience, failed also to see it as human experience. The worldwide hegemony of Orientalism and all it stands for can now be challenged, if we can benefit properly from the general twentieth-century rise to political and historical awareness of so many of the earth&#039;s peoples. If this book has any future use, it will be as a modest contribution to that challenge, and as a warning: that systems of thought like Orientalism, discourses of power, ideological fictions--mind-forg&#039;d manacles--are all too easily made, applied, and guarded. Above all, I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism. No former &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; will be comforted by the thought that having been an Oriental himself he is likely--too likely--to study new &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot;--or &amp;quot;Occidentals&amp;quot;--of his own making. If the knowledge of Orientalism has any meaning, it is in being a reminder of the seductive degradation of knowledge, of any knowledge, anywhere, at any time. Now perhaps more than before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;&#039;Afterword&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; was completed in the last part of 1977, and was published a year later. It was (and still is) the only book that I wrote as one continuous gesture, from research, to several drafts, to final version, each following the other without interruption or serious distraction. With the exception of a wonderfully civilized and relatively burdenless year spent as a Fellow at the Stanford Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1975-6), I had very little in the way of support or interest from the outside world. I received encouragement from one or two friends and my immediate family, but it was far from clear whether such a study of the ways in which the power, scholarship, and imagination of a two-hundred-year-old tradition in Europe and America viewed the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam, &#039;&#039;might&#039;&#039; interest a general audience. I recall, for instance, that it was very difficult at first to interest a serious publisher in the project. One academic press in particular very tentatively suggested a modest contract for a small monograph, so unpromising and slender did the whole enterprise seem at the outset. But luckily (as I describe my good fortune with my first publisher in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s original page of Acknowledgments) things changed for the better very quickly after I finished writing the book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In both America and England (where a separate U.K. edition appeared in 1979) the book attracted a great deal of attention, some of it (as was to be expected) very hostile, some of it uncomprehending, but most of it positive and enthusiastic. Beginning in 1980 with the French edition, a whole series of translations started to appear, increasing in number to this day, many of which have generated controversies and discussions in languages that I am incompetent to understand. There was a remarkable and still controversial Arabic translation by the gifted Syrian poet and critic Kamal Abu Deeb; I shall say more about that in a moment. Thereafter &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; appeared in Japanese, German, Portuguese, Italian, Polish, Spanish, Catalan, Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, and Swedish (in 1993 it became a bestseller in Sweden, which mystified the local publisher as much as it did me). There are several editions (Greek, Russian, Norwegian, and Chinese) either under way or about to appear. Other European translations are rumored, as is an Israeli version, according to one or two reports. There have been partial translations pirated in Iran and Pakistan. Many of the translations that I have known about directly (in particular, the Japanese) have gone through more than one edition; all are still in print and appear on occasion to give rise to local discussions that go very far beyond anything I was thinking about when I wrote the book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The result of all this is that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, almost in a Borgesian way, has become several different books. And, insofar as I have been able to follow and understand these subsequent versions, that strange, often disquieting, and certainly unthought-of polymorphousness is what I should like to discuss here, reading back into the book that I wrote what others have said, in addition to what I myself wrote after &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; (eight or nine books plus many articles). Obviously I shall try to correct misreadings and, in a few instances, willful misinterpretations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet I shall also be rehearsing arguments and intellectual developments that acknowledge &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; to be a helpful book in ways that I foresaw only very partially at the time. The point of all this is neither to settle scores nor to heap congratulations on myself, but to chart and record a much-expanded sense of authorship that goes well beyond the egoism of the solitary beings we feel ourselves to be as we undertake a piece of work. For in all sorts of ways &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; now seems to me a collective book that I think supersedes me as its author more than I could have expected when I wrote it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let me begin with the one aspect of the book&#039;s reception that I most regret and find myself trying hardest now (in 1994) to overcome. That is the book&#039;s alleged anti-Westernism, as it has been misleadingly and rather too sonorously called by commentators both hostile and sympathetic. This notion has two parts to it, sometimes argued together, sometimes separately. The first is the claim imputed to me that the phenomenon of Orientalism is a synecdoche, or a miniature symbol, of the entire West, and indeed ought to be taken to represent the West as a whole. Since this is so, the argument continues, therefore the entire West is an enemy of the Arab and Islamic or for that matter the Iranian, Chinese, Indian, and many other non-European peoples who suffered Western colonialism and prejudice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second part of the argument ascribed to me is no less far-reaching. It is that a predatory West and Orientalism have violated Islam and the Arabs. (Note that the terms &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;West&amp;quot; have been collapsed into each other.) Since that is so, the very existence of Orientalism and Orientalists is seized upon as a pretext for arguing the exact opposite, namely, that Islam is perfect, that it is the only way &#039;&#039;(al-hal al-wahid)&#039;&#039;, and so on and so on. To criticize Orientalism, as I did in my book, is in effect to be a supporter of Islamism or Muslim fundamentalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One scarcely knows what to make of these caricatured permutations of a book that to its author and in its arguments is explicitly anti-essentialist, radically skeptical about all categorical designations such as Orient and Occident, and painstakingly careful about &#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039; &amp;quot;defending&amp;quot; or even discussing the Orient and Islam. Yet &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; has in fact been read and written about in the Arab world as a systematic defense of Islam and the Arabs, even though I say explicitly in the book that I have no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam really are. Actually I go a great deal further when, very early in the book, I say that words such as &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; correspond to no stable reality that exists as a natural fact. Moreover, all such geographical designations are an odd combination of the empirical and imaginative. In the case of the Orient as a notion in currency in Britain, France, and America, the idea derives to a great extent from the impulse not simply to describe, but also to dominate and somehow to defend against it. As I try to show, this is powerfully true with reference to Islam as a particularly dangerous embodiment of the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The central point in all this is, however, as Vico taught us, that human history is made by human beings. Since the struggle for control over territory is part of that history, so too is the struggle over historical and social meaning. The task for the critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from another, but to connect them, despite the contrast between the overpowering materiality of the former and the apparent otherworldly refinements of the latter. My way of doing this has been to show that the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another, different and competing &#039;&#039;alter ego&#039;&#039;. The construction of identity--for identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction in my opinion--involves the construction of opposites and &amp;quot;others&amp;quot; whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from &amp;quot;us.&amp;quot; Each age and society re-creates its &amp;quot;Others.&amp;quot; Far from a static thing then, identity of self or of &amp;quot;other&amp;quot; is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies. Debates today about Frenchness and Englishness in France and Britain respectively, or about Islam in countries like Egypt and Pakistan, are part of the same interpretive process, which involves the identities of different &amp;quot;others,&amp;quot; whether they be outsiders and refugees, or apostates and infidels. It should be obvious in all cases that these processes are not mental exercises but urgent social contests involving such concrete political issues as immigration laws, the legislation of personal conduct, the constitution of orthodoxy, the legitimization of violence and/or insurrection, the character and content of education, and the direction of foreign policy, which very often has to do with the designation of official enemies. In short, the construction of identity is bound up with the disposition of power and powerlessness in each society, and is therefore anything but mere academic woolgathering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What makes all these fluid and extraordinarily rich actualities difficult to accept is that most people resist the underlying notion: that human identity is not only not natural and stable, but constructed, and occasionally even invented outright. Part of the resistance and hostility generated by books like &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, or after it, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;Black Athena&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Martin Bernal, &#039;&#039;Black Athena&#039;&#039; (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, Volume I, 1987; Volume II, 1991); Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Rangers, eds., &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is that they seem to undermine the naive belief in the certain positivity and unchanging historicity of a culture, a self, a national identity. &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; can only be read as a defense of Islam by suppressing half of my argument, in which I say (as I do in a subsequent book, &#039;&#039;Covering Islam&#039;&#039;) that even the primitive community we belong to natally is not immune from the interpretive contest, and that what appears in the West to be the emergence, return to, or resurgence of Islam is in fact a struggle in Islamic societies over the definition of Islam. No one person, authority, or institution has total control over that definition; hence, of course, the contest. Fundamentalism&#039;s epistemological mistake is to think that &amp;quot;fundamentals&amp;quot; are ahistorical categories, not subject to and therefore outside the critical scrutiny of true believers, who are supposed to accept them on faith. To the adherents of a restored or revived version of early Islam, Orientalists are considered (like Salman Rushdie) to be dangerous because they tamper with that version, cast doubt on it, show it to be fraudulent and non-divine. To them, therefore, the virtues of my book were that it pointed out the malicious dangers of the Orientalists and somehow pried Islam from their clutches.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now this is hardly what I saw myself doing, but the view persists anyway. There are two reasons for this. In the first place no one finds it easy to live uncomplainingly and fearlessly with the thesis that human reality is constantly being made and unmade, and that anything like a stable essence is constantly under threat. Patriotism, extreme xenophobic nationalism, and downright unpleasant chauvinism are common responses to this fear. We all need some foundation on which to stand; the question is how extreme and unchangeable is our formulation of what this foundation is. My position is that in the case of an essential Islam or Orient, these images are no more than images, and are upheld as such both by the community of the Muslim faithful and (the correspondence is significant) by the community of Orientalists. My objection to what I have called Orientalism is not that it, is just the antiquarian study of Oriental languages, societies, and peoples, but that as a system of thought Orientalism approaches a heterogenous, dynamic, and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and from, so to speak, above. This false position hides historical change. Even more important, from my standpoint, it hides the &#039;&#039;interests&#039;&#039; of the Orientalist. Those, despite attempts to draw subtle distinctions between Orientalism as an innocent scholarly endeavor and Orientalism as an accomplice to empire, can never unilaterally be detached from the general imperial context that begins its modern global phase with Napoleon&#039;s invasion of Egypt in 1798.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have in mind the striking contrast between the weaker and stronger party that is evident from the beginning of Europe&#039;s modern encounters with what it called the Orient. The studied solemnity and grandiose accents of Napoleon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;--its massive, serried volumes testifying to the systematic labors of an entire corps of &#039;&#039;savants&#039;&#039; backed by a modern army of colonial conquest--dwarfs the individual testimony of people like Abdal-Rahman al-Jabarti, who in three separate volumes describes the French invasion from the point of view of the invaded. One might say that the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; is just a scientific, and therefore objective, account of Egypt in the early nineteenth century, but the presence of Jabarti (who is both unknown and ignored by Napoleon) suggests otherwise. Napoleon&#039;s is an &amp;quot;objective&amp;quot; account from the standpoint of someone powerful trying to hold Egypt within the French imperial orbit; Jabarti&#039;s is an account by someone who paid the price, was figuratively captured and vanquished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In other words, rather than remaining as inert documents that testify to an eternally opposed Occident and Orient, the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; and Jabarti&#039;s chronicles together constitute a historical experience, out of which others evolved, and before which others existed. Studying the historical dynamics of this set of experiences is more demanding than sliding back into stereotypes like &amp;quot;the conflict of East and West.&amp;quot; That is one reason why &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is mistakenly read as a surreptitiously anti-Western work and, by an act of unwarranted and even willful retrospective endowment, this reading (like all readings based on a supposedly stable binary opposition) elevates the image of an innocent and aggrieved Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second reason why the anti-essentialism of my arguments has proved hard to accept is political and urgently ideological. I had absolutely no way of knowing that, a year after the book was published, Iran would be the site of an extraordinarily far-reaching Islamic revolution, nor that the battle between Israel and the Palestinians would take such savage and protracted forms, from the 1982 invasion of Lebanon to the onset of the &#039;&#039;intifada&#039;&#039; in late 1987. The end of the Cold War did not mute, much less terminate, the apparently unending conflict between East and West as represented by the Arabs and Islam on one side and the Christian West on the other. More recent, but no less acute, contests developed as a result of the Soviet Union&#039;s invasion of Afghanistan; the challenge to the &#039;&#039;status quo&#039;&#039; during the 1980s and &#039;90s made by Islamic groups in countries as diverse as Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and the Occupied Territories, and the various American and European responses: the creation of Islamic brigades to fight the Russians from bases in Pakistan; the Gulf War; the continued support of Israel; and the emergence of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a topic of alarmed, if not always precise and informed, journalism and scholarship. All this inflamed the sense of persecution felt by people forced, on an almost daily basis, to declare themselves to be either Westerners or Easterners. No one seemed to be free from the opposition between &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;them,&amp;quot; which resulted in a sense of reinforced, deepened, hardened identity that has not been particularly edifying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In such a turbulent context &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s fate was both fortunate and unfortunate. To those in the Arab and Islamic world who felt Western encroachment with anxiety and stress, it appeared to be the first book that gave a serious answer back to a West that had never actually listened to or forgiven the Oriental for being an Oriental at all. I recall one early Arabic review of the book that described its author as a champion of Arabism, a defender of the downtrodden and abused, whose mission was to engage Western authorities in a kind of epic and romantic &#039;&#039;mano-a-mano&#039;&#039;. Despite the exaggeration, it did convey some real sense of the West&#039;s enduring hostility, as felt by Arabs, and it also conveyed a response that many educated Arabs felt was appropriate.&lt;br /&gt;
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I will not deny that I &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; aware, when writing the book, of the subjective truth insinuated by Marx in the little sentence I quoted as one of the book&#039;s epigraphs (&amp;quot;They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.&amp;quot;), which is that if you feel you have been denied the chance to speak your piece, you will try extremely hard to get that chance. For indeed, the subaltern &#039;&#039;can&#039;&#039; speak, as the history of liberation movements in the twentieth century eloquently attests. But I never felt that I was perpetuating the hostility between two rival political and cultural monolithic blocks, whose construction I was describing and whose terrible effects I was trying to reduce. On the contrary, as I said earlier, the Orient versus Occident opposition was both misleading and highly undesirable; the less it was given credit for actually describing anything more than a fascinating history of interpretations and of contesting interests, the better. I am happy to record that many readers in Britain and America, as well as in English-speaking Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Caribbean, saw the book as stressing the actualities of what was later to be called multiculturalism, rather than xenophobia and aggressive, race-oriented nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; has been thought of rather more as a kind of testimonial to subaltern status--the wretched of the earth talking back--than a multicultural critique of power using knowledge to advance itself. Thus, as its author I have been seen as playing an assigned role: that of a self-representing consciousness of what had formerly been suppressed and distorted in the learned texts of a discourse specifically designed to be read not by Orientals but by other Westerners. This is an important point, and it adds to the sense of fixed identities battling across a permanent divide that my book quite specifically abjures, but which it paradoxically presupposes and depends on. None of the Orientalists I write about seems ever to have intended an Oriental as a reader. The discourse of Orientalism, its internal consistency, and its rigorous procedures were all designed for readers and consumers in the metropolitan West. This goes as much for people I genuinely admire, like Edward Lane and Gustave Flaubert, who were fascinated by Egypt, as it does for haughty colonial administrators, like Lord Cromer, brilliant scholars, like Ernest Renan, and baronial aristocrats, like Arthur Balfour, all of whom condescended to and disliked the Orientals they either ruled or studied. I must confess to a certain pleasure in listening in, uninvited, to their various pronouncements and inter-Orientalist discussions, and an equal pleasure in making known my findings both to Europeans and non-Europeans. I have no doubt that this was made possible because I traversed the imperial East-West divide, entered into the life of the West, and yet retained some organic connection with the place from which I originally came. I would repeat that this is very much a procedure of crossing, rather than maintaining, barriers; I believe &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; as a book shows it, especially at moments when I speak of humanistic study as seeking ideally to go beyond coercive limitations on thought toward a non-dominative, and non-essentialist, type of learning.&lt;br /&gt;
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These considerations did in fact add to the pressures on my book to represent a sort of testament of wounds and a record of sufferings, the recital of which was felt as a long overdue striking back at the West. I deplore so simple a characterization of a work that is--here I am not going to be falsely modest--quite nuanced and discriminating in what it says about different people, different periods, and different styles of Orientalism. Each of my analyses varies the picture, increases the difference and discriminations, separates authors and periods from each other, even though all pertain to Orientalism. To read my analyses of Chateaubriand and Flaubert, or of Burton and Lane, with exactly the same emphasis, deriving the same reductive message from the banal formula &amp;quot;an attack on Western civilization&amp;quot; is, I believe, to be both simplistic and wrong. But I also believe that it is entirely correct to read recent Orientalist authorities, such as the almost comically persistent Bernard Lewis, as the politically motivated and hostile witnesses that their suave accents and unconvincing displays of learning attempt to hide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, then, we are back to the political and historical context of the book, which I do not pretend is irrelevant to its contents. One of the most generously perspicacious and intelligently discriminating statements of that conjuncture was laid out in a review by Basim Musallam (MERIP, 1979). He begins by comparing my book with an earlier demystification of Orientalism by the Lebanese scholar Michael Rustum in 1895 &#039;&#039;(Kitab al-Gharib fi al-Gharb)&#039;&#039;, but then says that the main difference between us is that my book is about loss, whereas Rustum&#039;s is not:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rustum writes as a free man and a member of a free society: a Syrian, Arab by speech, citizen of a still-independent Ottoman state unlike Michael Rustum, Edward Said has no generally accepted identity, his very &#039;&#039;people&#039;&#039; are in dispute. It is possible that Edward&#039; Said and his generation sometimes feel that they stand on nothing more solid than the remnants of the destroyed society of Michael Rustum&#039;s Syria, and on memory. Others in Asia and Africa have had their successes in this age of national liberation; here, in painful contrast, there has been desperate resistance against overwhelming odds and, until now, defeat. It is not just any &amp;quot;Arab&amp;quot; who wrote this book, but one with a particular background and experience. (22)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Musallam correctly notes that an Algerian would not have written the same kind of generally pessimistic book, especially one like mine that does very little with the history of French relations with North Africa, Algeria most particularly. So while I would accept the overall impression that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is written out of an extremely concrete history of personal loss and national disintegration--only a few years before I wrote &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; Golda Meir made her notorious and deeply Orientalist comment about there being no Palestinian people--I would also like to add that neither in this book, nor in the two that immediately followed it, &#039;&#039;The Question of Palestine&#039;&#039; (1980) and &#039;&#039;Covering Islam&#039;&#039; (1981), did I want only to suggest a political program of restored identity and resurgent nationalism. There was, of course, an attempt in both of the later books to supply what was missing in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, namely a sense of what an alternative picture of parts of the Orient--Palestine and Islam respectively--might be from a personal point of view.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in all my works I remained fundamentally critical of a gloating and uncritical nationalism. The picture of Islam that I represented was not one of assertive discourse and dogmatic orthodoxy, but was based instead on the idea that communities of interpretation exist within and outside the Islamic world, communicating with each other in a dialogue of equals. My view of Palestine, formulated originally in &#039;&#039;The Question of Palestine&#039;&#039;, remains the same today: I expressed all sorts of reservations about the insouciant nativism and militant militarism of the nationalist consensus; I suggested instead a critical look at the Arab environment, Palestinian history, and the Israeli realities, with the explicit conclusion that only a negotiated settlement between the two communities of suffering, Arab and Jewish, would provide respite from the unending war. (I should mention in passing that although my book on Palestine was given a fine Hebrew translation in the early 1980s by Mifras, a small Israeli publishing house, it remains untranslated into Arabic to this day. Every Arabic publisher who was interested in the book wanted me to change or delete those sections that were openly critical of one or another Arab regime (including the PLO), a request that I have always refused to comply with.)&lt;br /&gt;
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I regret to say that the Arabic reception of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, despite Kamal Abu Deeb&#039;s remarkable translation, still managed to ignore that aspect of my book which diminished the nationalist fervor that some implied from my critique of Orientalism, which I associated with those drives to domination and control also to be found in imperialism. Abu Deeb&#039;s painstaking translation was an almost total avoidance of Arabized Western expressions; technical words like &#039;&#039;discourse, simulacrum, paradigm&#039;&#039;, or &#039;&#039;code&#039;&#039; were rendered from within the classical rhetoric of the Arab tradition. His idea was to place my work inside one fully formed tradition, as if it were addressing another from a perspective of cultural adequacy and equality. In this way, he reasoned, it was possible to show that just as one could advance an epistemological critique from within the Western tradition, so too could one do it from within the Arabic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet the sense of fraught confrontation between an often emotionally defined Arab world and an even more emotionally experienced Western world drowned out the fact that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; was meant to be a study in critique, not an affirmation of warring and hopelessly antithetical identities. Moreover, the actuality I described in the book&#039;s last pages, of one powerful discursive system maintaining hegemony over another, was intended as the opening salvo in a debate that might stir Arab readers and critics to engage more determinedly with the system of Orientalism. I was either upbraided for not having paid closer attention to Marx--the passages on Marx&#039;s own Orientalism in my book were the most singled out by dogmatic critics in the Arab world and India, for instance--whose system of thought was claimed to have risen above his obvious prejudices, or I was criticized for not appreciating the great achievements of Orientalism, the West, etc. As with defenses of Islam, recourse to Marxism or &amp;quot;the West&amp;quot; as a coherent total system seems to me to have been a case of using one orthodoxy to shoot down another.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between Arab and other responses to &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is, I think, an accurate indication of how decades of loss, frustration, and the absence of democracy have affected intellectual and cultural life in the Arab region. I intended my book as part of a pre-existing current of thought whose purpose was to liberate intellectuals from the shackles of systems such as Orientalism: I wanted readers to make use of my work so they might then produce new studies of their own that would illuminate the historical experience of Arabs and others in a generous, enabling mode. That certainly happened in Europe, the United States, Australia, the Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean, Ireland, Latin America, and parts of Africa. The invigorated study of Africanist and Indological discourses; the analyses of subaltern history; the reconfiguration of post-colonial anthropology, political science, art history, literary criticism, musicology, in addition to the vast new developments in feminist and minority discourses--to all these, I am pleased and flattered that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; often made a difference. That does not seem to have been the case (insofar as I can judge it) in the Arab world, where, partly because my work is correctly perceived as Eurocentric in its texts, and partly because, as Musallam says, the battle for cultural survival is too engrossing, books like mine are interpreted less usefully, productively speaking, and more as defensive gestures either for or against the &amp;quot;West.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet among American and British academics of a decidedly rigorous and unyielding stripe, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, and indeed all of my other work, has come in for disapproving attacks because of its &amp;quot;residual&amp;quot; humanism, its theoretical inconsistencies, its insufficient, perhaps even sentimental, treatment of agency. I am glad that it has! &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is a partisan book, not a theoretical machine. No one has convincingly shown that individual effort is not at some profoundly unteachable level both eccentric and, in Gerard Manley Hopkins&#039;s sense, &#039;&#039;original&#039;&#039;; this despite the existence of systems of thought, discourses, and hegemonies, (although none of them are in fact seamless, perfect, or inevitable). The interest I took in Orientalism as a cultural phenomenon (like the culture of imperialism I talk about in &#039;&#039;Culture and Imperialism&#039;&#039;, its 1993 sequel) derives from its variability and unpredictability, both qualities that give writers like Massignon and Burton their surprising force, and even attractiveness. What I tried to preserve in what I analyzed of Orientalism was its combination of consistency &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; inconsistency, its play, so to speak, which can only be rendered by preserving for oneself as writer and critic the right to some emotional force, the right to be moved, angered, surprised, and even delighted. This is why, in the debate between Gayan Prakash, on the one hand, and Rosalind O&#039;Hanlon and David Washbrook, on the other, I think Prakash&#039;s more mobile post-structuralism has to be given its due.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;O&#039;Hanlon and Washbrook, &amp;quot;After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World;&amp;quot; Prakash, &amp;quot;Can the Subaltern Ride? A Reply to O&#039;Hanlon and Washbrook,&amp;quot; both in &#039;&#039;Comparative Studies in Society and History&#039;&#039;, IV, 9 (January 1992), 141-184.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; By the same token the work of Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, and Ashis Nandy, predicated on the sometimes dizzying subjective relationships engendered by colonialism, cannot be gainsaid for &#039;&#039;its&#039;&#039; contribution to our understanding of the humanistic traps laid by systems such as Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let me conclude this survey of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s critical transmutations with a mention of the one group of people who were, not unexpectedly, the most exercised and vociferous in responding to my book, the Orientalists themselves. They were not my &#039;&#039;principal&#039;&#039; intended audience at all; I had in mind casting some light on their practices so as to make other humanists aware of one field&#039;s particular procedures and genealogy. The word &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; itself has been for too long confined to a professional specialty; I tried to show was its application and existence in the general culture, in literature, ideology, and social as well as political attitudes. To speak of someone as an Oriental, as the Orientalists did, was not just to designate that person as someone whose language, geography, and history were the stuff of learned treatises: it also was often meant as a derogatory expression signifying a lesser breed of human being. This is not to deny that for artists like Nerval and Segalen the word &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; was wonderfully, ingeniously connected to exoticism, glamour, mystery, and promise. But it was also a sweeping historical generalization. In addition to these uses of the words &#039;&#039;Orient, Oriental&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, the term &#039;&#039;Orientalist&#039;&#039; also came to represent the erudite, scholarly, mainly academic specialist in the languages and histories of the East. Yet, as the late Albert Hourani wrote me in March 1992, a few months before his untimely and much regretted death, due to the force of my argument (for which he said he could not reproach me), my book had the unfortunate effect of making it almost impossible to use the term &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; in a neutral sense, so much had it become a term of abuse. He concluded that he would have still liked to retain the word for use in describing &amp;quot;a limited, rather dull but valid discipline of scholarship.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In his generally balanced 1979 review of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, Hourani formulated one of his objections by suggesting that while I singled out the exaggerations, racism, and hostility of much Orientalist writing, I neglected to mention its numerous scholarly and humanistic achievements. Names that he brought up included Marshall Hodgson, Claude Cohen, and Andre Raymond, all of whose accomplishments (along with the German authors who come up &#039;&#039;de rigueur&#039;&#039;) should be acknowledged as real contributors to human knowledge. This does not, however, conflict with what I say in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, with the difference that I do insist on the prevalence in the discourse itself of a structure of attitudes that cannot simply be waved away of discounted. Nowhere do I argue that Orientalism is evil, or sloppy, or uniformly the same in the work of each Orientalist. But I do say that the &#039;&#039;guild&#039;&#039; of Orientalists has a specific history of complicity with imperial power, which it would be Panglossian to call irrelevant.&lt;br /&gt;
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So while I sympathize with Hourani&#039;s plea, I have serious doubts whether the notion of Orientalism properly understood can ever, in fact, be completely detached from its rather more complicated and not always flattering circumstances. I suppose that one can imagine at the limit that a specialist in Ottoman or Fatimid archives is an Orientalist in Hourani&#039;s sense, but we are still required to ask where, how, and with what supporting institutions and agencies such studies take place &#039;&#039;today&#039;&#039;? Many who wrote after my book appeared asked exactly those questions of even the most recondite and otherworldly scholars, with sometimes devastating results.&lt;br /&gt;
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Still, there has been one sustained attempt to mount an argument whose purport is that a critique of Orientalism (mine in particular) is both meaningless and somehow a violation of the very idea of disinterested scholarship. That attempt is made by Bernard Lewis, about whom I had devoted a few critical pages in my book. Fifteen years after &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; appeared, Lewis produced a series of essays, some of them collected in a book entitled &#039;&#039;Islam and the West&#039;&#039;, one of whose main sections is an attack on me, which he surrounds with chapters and other essays that mobilize a set of lax and characteristically Orientalist formulas--Muslims are enraged at modernity, Islam never made the separation between church and state, and so on and on--all of them pronounced with an extreme level of generalization and with scarcely a mention of the differences between individual Muslims, between Muslim societies, or between Muslim traditions and eras. Since Lewis has in a sense appointed himself a spokesman for the guild of Orientalists on which my critique was originally based, it may be worth spending a little more time on his procedures. His ideas are, alas, fairly current among his acolytes and imitators, whose job seems to be to alert Western consumers to the threat of an enraged, congenitally undemocratic and violent Islamic world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lewis&#039;s verbosity scarcely conceals both the ideological underpinnings of his position and his extraordinary capacity for getting nearly everything wrong. Of course, these are familiar attributes of the Orientalists&#039; breed, some of whom have at least had the courage to be honest in their active denigration of Islamic, as well as other non-European, peoples. Not Lewis. He proceeds by distorting the truth, by making false analogies, and by innuendo, methods to which he adds that veneer of omniscient tranquil authority which he supposes is the way scholars talk. Take as a typical example the analogy he draws between my critique of Orientalism and a hypothetical attack on studies of classical antiquity, an attack which, he says, would be a foolish activity. It would be, of course, but then Orientalism and Hellenism are radically incomparable. The former is an attempt to describe a whole region of the world as an accompaniment to that region&#039;s colonial conquest, the latter is not at all about the direct colonial conquest of Greece in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; in addition, Orientalism expresses antipathy to Islam, Hellenism sympathy for classical Greece.&lt;br /&gt;
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Additionally, the present political moment, with its reams of racist anti-Arab and anti-Muslim stereotypes (and no attacks on classical Greece), allows Lewis to deliver ahistorical and willful political assertions in the form of scholarly argument, a practice thoroughly in keeping with the least creditable aspects of old-fashioned colonialist Orientalism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In one particularly telling instance, Lewis&#039;s habits of tendentious generalization do seem to have gotten him in legal trouble. According to &#039;&#039;Liberation&#039;&#039; (March 1, 1994) and the &#039;&#039;Guardian&#039;&#039; (March 8, 1994), Lewis now faces both criminal and civil suits brought against him in France by Armenian and human rights organizations. He is being charged under the same statute that makes it a crime in France to deny that the Nazi Holocaust took place; the charge against him is denying (in French newspapers) that a genocide of Armenians took place under the Ottoman empire.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Lewis&#039;s work therefore is part of the present political, rather than purely intellectual, environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To imply, as he does, that the branch of Orientalism dealing with Islam and the Arabs is a learned discipline that can therefore be compared with classical philology is as appropriate as comparing one of the many Israeli Arabists and Orientalists who have worked for the occupation authorities of the West Bank and Gaza with scholars like Wilamowitz or Mommsen. On the one hand Lewis wishes to reduce Islamic Orientalism to the status of an innocent and enthusiastic department of scholarship; on the other he wishes to pretend that Orientalism is too complex, various, and technical to exist in a form for any non-Orientalist (like myself and many others) to criticize. Lewis&#039;s tactic here is to suppress a significant amount of history. As I suggest, European interest in Islam derived not from curiosity but from fear of a monotheistic, culturally and militarily formidable competitor to Christianity. The earliest European scholars of Islam, as numerous historians have shown, were medieval polemicists writing to ward off the threat of Muslim hordes and apostasy. In one way or another that combination of fear and hostility has persisted to the present day, both in scholarly and non-scholarly attention to an Islam which is viewed as belonging to a part of the world--the Orient--counterposed imaginatively, geographically, and historically &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; Europe and the West.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most interesting problems about Islamic or Arabic Orientalism are, first, the forms taken by the medieval vestiges that persist so tenaciously, and, second, the history and sociology of connections between Orientalism and the societies that produced it. There are strong &#039;&#039;affiliations&#039;&#039; between Orientalism and the literary imagination, for example, as well as the imperial consciousness. What is striking about many periods of European history is the traffic between what scholars and specialists wrote and what poets, novelists, politicians, and journalists then said about Islam. In addition--and this is the crucial point that Lewis refuses to deal with--there is a remarkable (but nonetheless intelligible) parallel between the rise of modern Orientalist scholarship and the acquisition of vast Eastern empires by Britain and France.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although the connection between a routine British classical education and the extension of the British empire is more complex than Lewis might suppose, no more glaring parallel exists between power and knowledge in the modern history of philology than in the case of Orientalism. Much of the information and knowledge about Islam and the Orient that was used by the colonial powers to justify their colonialism derived from Orientalist scholarship: a recent study by many contributors, &#039;&#039;Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; edited by Carl A. Breckenridge and Peter Van der Veer, demonstrates with copious documentation how Orientalist knowledge was used in the colonial administration of South Asia. A fairly consistent interchange still continues between area scholars, such as Orientalists, and government departments of foreign affairs. In addition, many of the stereotypes of Islamic and Arabic sensuality, sloth, fatalism, cruelty, degradation, and splendor to be found in writers from John Buchan to V.S. Naipaul have also been presuppositions underlying the adjoining field of academic Orientalism. In contrast, the trade in cliches between Indology and Sinology, on the one hand, and general culture, on the other, is not quite as flourishing, although there are relationships and borrowings to be noted. Nor is there much similarity between what obtains among Western experts in Sinology and Indology and the fact that many professional scholars of Islam in Europe and the United States spend their lives studying the subject, yet still find it an impossible religion and culture to like, much less admire.&lt;br /&gt;
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To say, as Lewis and his imitators do, that all such observations are only a matter of espousing &amp;quot;fashionable causes&amp;quot; is not quite to address the question of why, for example, so many Islamic specialists were and still are routinely consulted by, and actively work for, governments whose designs in the Islamic world are economic exploitation, domination, or outright aggression, or why so many scholars of Islam--like Lewis himself--voluntarily feel that it is part of their duty to mount attacks on modern Arab or Islamic peoples with the pretense that &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Islamic culture can nevertheless be the object of disinterested scholarly concern. The spectacle of specialists in the history of medieval Islamic guilds being sent on State Department missions to brief area embassies on United States security interests in the Persian Gulf does not spontaneously suggest anything resembling the love of Hellas ascribed by Lewis to the supposedly cognate field of classical philology.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is therefore not surprising that the field of Islamic and Arabic Orientalism, always ready to deny its complicity with state power, had never until very recently produced an internal critique of the affiliations I have just been describing, and that Lewis can utter the amazing statement that a criticism of Orientalism would be &amp;quot;meaningless.&amp;quot; It is also not surprising that, with a few exceptions, most of the negative criticism my work has elicited from &amp;quot;specialists&amp;quot; has been, like Lewis&#039;s, no more than banal description of a barony violated by a crude trespasser. The only specialists (again with a few exceptions) who attempted to deal with what I discuss--which is not only the content of Orientalism, but its relationships, affiliations, political tendencies, and worldview--were Sinologists, Indologists, and the younger generation of Middle East scholars, susceptible to newer influences and also to the political arguments that the critique of Orientalism entailed. One example is Benjamin Schwartz of Harvard, who used the occasion of his 1982 presidential address to the Asian Studies Association not only to disagree with some of my criticism, but also to welcome my arguments intellectually.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many of the senior Arabists and Islamicists have responded with the aggrieved outrage that is for them a substitute for self-reflection; most use words such as &amp;quot;malign,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;dishonor,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;libel,&amp;quot; as if criticism itself were an impermissible violation of their sacrosanct academic preserve. In Lewis&#039;s case the defense offered is an act of conspicuous bad faith, since more than most Orientalists he has been a passionate political partisan against Arab (and other) causes in such places as the U.S. Congress, &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, and elsewhere. The proper response to him must therefore include an account of what politically and sociologically he is all about when he pretends to be defending the &amp;quot;honor&amp;quot; of his field, a defense which, it will be evident enough, is an elaborate confection of ideological half-truths designed to mislead non-specialist readers.&lt;br /&gt;
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In short, the relationship between Islamic or Arab Orientalism and modern European culture can be studied without at the same time cataloguing every Orientalist who ever lived, every Orientalist tradition, or everything written by Orientalists, then lumping them together as rotten and worthless imperialism. I never did that anyway. It is beknighted to say that Orientalism is a conspiracy or to suggest that &amp;quot;the West&amp;quot; is evil: both are among the egregious fatuities that Lewis and one of his epigones, the Iraqi publicist K. Makiya, have had the temerity to ascribe to me. On the other hand it is hypocritical to suppress the cultural, political, ideological, and institutional contexts in which people write, think, and talk about the Orient, whether they are scholars or not. And as I said earlier, it is extremely important to understand that the reason Orientalism is opposed by so many thoughtful non-Westerners is that its modern discourse is correctly perceived as a discourse of power originating in an era of colonialism, the subject of an excellent recent symposium &#039;&#039;Colonialism and Culture&#039;&#039;, edited by Nicholas B. Dirks.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In this kind of discourse, based mainly upon the assumption that Islam is monolithic and unchanging and therefore marketable by &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; for powerful domestic political interests, neither Muslims nor Arabs nor any of the other dehumanized lesser peoples recognize themselves as human beings or their observers as simple scholars. Most of all they see in the discourse of modern Orientalism and its counterparts in similar knowledges constructed for Native Americans and Africans a chronic tendency to deny, suppress, or distort the cultural context of such systems of thought in order to maintain the fiction of its scholarly disinterest.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Yet I would not want to suggest that, current though such views as Lewis&#039;s may be, they are the only ones that have either emerged or been reinforced during the past decade and a half. Yes, it is true that ever since the demise of the Soviet Union there has been a rush by some scholars and journalists in the United States to find in an Orientalized Islam a new empire of evil. Consequently, both the electronic and print media have been awash with demeaning stereotypes that lump together Islam and terrorism, or Arabs and violence, or the Orient and tyranny. And there has also been a return in various parts of the Middle and Far East to nativist religion and primitive nationalism, one particularly disgraceful aspect of which is the continuing Iranian &#039;&#039;fatwa&#039;&#039; against Salman Rushdie. But this isn&#039;t the whole picture, and what I want to do in the remaining part of this essay is to talk about new trends in scholarship, criticism, and interpretation that, although they accept the basic premises of my book, go well beyond it in ways, I think, that enrich our sense of the complexity of historical experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
None of those trends has emerged out of the blue, of course; nor have they gained the status of fully established knowledges and practices. The worldly context remains both perplexingly stirred-up and ideologically fraught, volatile, tense, changeable, and even murderous. Even though the Soviet Union has been dismembered and the Eastern European countries have attained political independence, patterns of power and dominance remain unsettlingly in evidence. The global south--once referred to romantically and even emotionally as the Third World--is enmeshed in a debt trap, broken into dozens of fractured or incoherent entities, beset with problems of poverty, disease, and underdevelopment that have increased in the past ten or fifteen years. Gone are the non-Aligned movement and the charismatic leaders who undertook decolonization and independence. An alarming pattern of ethnic conflict and local wars, not confined to the global south, as the tragic case of the Bosnians attests, has sprung up all over again. And in places like Central America, the Middle East, and Asia, the United States still remains the dominant power, with an anxious and still un-unified Europe straggling behind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Explanations for the current world scene and attempts to comprehend it culturally and politically have emerged in some strikingly dramatic ways. I have already mentioned fundamentalism. The secular equivalents are a return to nationalism and theories that stress the radical distinction--a falsely all-inclusive one, I believe--between different cultures and civilizations. Recently, for example, Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard University advanced the far from convincing proposition that Cold War bipolarism has been superseded by what he called the clash of civilizations, a thesis based on the premise that Western, Confucian, and Islamic civilizations, among several others, were rather like watertight compartments whose adherents were at bottom mainly interested in fending off all the others.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;The Clash of Civilizations,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Foreign Affairs&#039;&#039; 71, 3 (Summer 1993), 22-49.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is preposterous, since one of the great advances in modern cultural theory is the realization, almost universally acknowledged, that cultures are hybrid and heterogenous and, as I argued in &#039;&#039;Culture and Imperialism&#039;&#039;, that cultures and civilizations are so interrelated and interdependent as to beggar any unitary or simply delineated description of their individuality. How can one today speak of &amp;quot;Western civilization&amp;quot; except as in large measure an ideological fiction, implying a sort of detached superiority for a handful of values and ideas, none of which has much meaning outside the history of conquest, immigration, travel, and the mingling of peoples that gave the Western nations their present mixed identities? This is especially true of the United States, which today cannot seriously be described except as an enormous palimpsest of different races and cultures sharing a problematic history of conquests, exterminations, and of course major cultural and political achievements. And this was one of the implied messages of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, that any attempt to force cultures and peoples into separate and distinct breeds or essences exposes not only the misrepresentations and falsifications that ensue, but also the way in which understanding is complicit with the power to produce such things as the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; or the &amp;quot;West.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not that Huntington, and behind him all the theorists and apologists of an exultant Western tradition, like Francis Fukuyama, haven&#039;t retained a good deal of their hold on the public consciousness. They have, as is evident in the symptomatic case of Paul Johnson, once a Left intellectual, now a retrograde social and political polemicist. In the April 18, 1993, issue of &#039;&#039;The New York Times Magazine&#039;&#039;, by no means a marginal publication, Johnson published an essay entitled &amp;quot;Colonialism&#039;s Back--And Not a Moment Too Soon,&amp;quot; whose main idea was that &amp;quot;the civilized nations&amp;quot; ought to take it upon themselves to re-colonize Third World countries &amp;quot;where the most basic conditions of civilized life had broken down,&amp;quot; and to do this by means of a system of imposed trusteeships. His model is explicitly a nineteenth century colonial one where, he says, in order for the Europeans to trade profitably they had to impose political order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Johnson&#039;s argument has numerous subterranean echoes in the works of U.S. policy-makers, the media, and of course U.S. foreign policy itself, which remains interventionist in the Middle East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and frankly missionary everywhere else, especially with regard to its policies toward Russia and; the former Soviet republics. The important point, however, is that a largely unexamined but serious rift has opened in the public consciousness between the old ideas of Western hegemony (of which the system of Orientalism was a part) on the one hand, and newer ideas that have taken hold among subaltern and disadvantaged communities and among a wide sector of intellectuals, academics, and artists, on the other. It is now very strikingly no longer the case that the lesser peoples--formerly colonized, enslaved, suppressed--are silent or unaccounted for except by senior European or American males. There has been a revolution in the consciousness of women, minorities, and marginals so powerful as to affect mainstream thinking worldwide. Although I had some sense of it when I was working on &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; in the 1970s, it is now so dramatically apparent as to demand the attention of everyone seriously concerned with the scholarly and theoretical study of culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two broad currents can be distinguished: post-colonialism and post-modernism, both in their use of the word &amp;quot;post&amp;quot; suggesting not so much the sense of going beyond but rather, as Ella Shohat puts it in a seminal article on the post-colonial, suggesting &amp;quot;continuities and discontinuities, but its emphasis is on the new modes and forms of the old colonialist practices, not on a &#039;beyond&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Notes on the &#039;Post-Colonial&#039;,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Social Text&#039;&#039;, 31/32 (1992), 106.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Both post-colonialism and post-modernism emerged as related topics of engagement and investigation during the 1980s and, in many instances, seemed to take account of such works as &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; as antecedents. It would be impossible here to get into the immense terminological debates that surround both words, some of them dwelling at length on whether the phrases should or should not be hyphenated. The point here is therefore not to talk about isolated instances of excess or risible jargon, but to locate those currents and efforts which, from the perspective of a book published in 1978, seem to some extent now to involve it in 1994.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much of the most compelling work on the new political and economic order has concerned what, in a recent article, Harry Magdoff has described as &amp;quot;globalization,&amp;quot; a system by which a small financial elite expanded its power over the whole globe, inflating commodity and service prices, redistributing wealth from lower income sectors (usually in the non-Western world) to the higher-income ones.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Magdoff, &amp;quot;Globalisation-To What End?,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Socialist Register 1992: New World Order?&#039;&#039;, ed. Ralph Milliband and Leo Panitch (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992), 1-32.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Along with this, as discussed in astringent terms by Masao Miyoshi and Arif Dirlik, there has emerged a new transnational order in which states no longer have borders, labor and income are subject only to global managers, and colonialism has reappeared in the subservience of the South to the North.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Miyoshi, &amp;quot;A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Trans-nationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Critical Inquiry&#039;&#039;, 19, 4 (Summer 1993), 726-51; Dirlik, &amp;quot;The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Critical Inquiry&#039;&#039;, 20, 2 (Winter 1994), 328-56.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Both Miyoshi and Dirlik go on to show how the interest of Western academics in subjects such as multiculturalism and &amp;quot;post-coloniality&amp;quot; can in fact be a cultural and intellectual retreat from the new realities of global power: &amp;quot;What we need,&amp;quot; Miyoshi says, &amp;quot;is a rigorous political and economic scrutiny rather than a gesture of pedagogic expediency,&amp;quot; exemplified by the &amp;quot;liberal self-deception&amp;quot; contained in such new fields as cultural studies and multiculturalism (751).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But even if we take such injunctions seriously (as we must), there is a solid basis in historical experience for the appearance today of interest in both post-modernism and its quite different counterpart post-colonialism. There is first of all the much greater Eurocentric bias in the former, and a preponderance of theoretical and aesthetic emphasis stressing the local and the contingent, as well as the almost decorative weightlessness of history, pastiche, and above all consumerism. The earliest studies of the post-colonial were by such distinguished thinkers as Anwar Abdel Malek, Samir Amin, and C. L. R. James, almost all based on studies of domination and control done from the standpoint of either a completed political independence or an incomplete liberationist project. Yet whereas post-modernism in one of its most famous programmatic statements (Jean-Francois Lyotard&#039;s) stresses the disappearance of the grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment, the emphasis behind much of the work done by the first generation of post-colonial artists and scholars is exactly the opposite: the grand narratives remain, even though their implementation and realization are at present in abeyance, deferred, or circumvented. This crucial difference between the urgent historical and political imperatives of post-colonialism and post-modernism&#039;s relative detachment makes for altogether different approaches and results, although some overlap between them (in the technique of &amp;quot;magical realism,&amp;quot; for example) does exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I think it would be wrong to suggest that in much of the best post-colonial work that has proliferated so dramatically since the early 1980s there hasn&#039;t been a great emphasis on the local, regional, and contingent: there has, but it seems to me to be most interestingly connected in its general approach to a universal set of concerns, all of them having to do with emancipation, revisionist attitudes toward history and culture, and a widespread use of recurring theoretical models and styles. A leading motif has been the consistent critique of Eurocentrism and patriarchy. Across U.S. and European campuses in the 1980s students and faculty alike worked assiduously to expand the academic focus of so-called core curricula to include writing by women, non-European artists and thinkers, and subalterns. This was accompanied by important changes in the approach to area studies, long in the hands of classical Orientalists and their equivalents. Anthropology, political science, literature, sociology, and above all history felt the effects of a wide-ranging critique of sources, the introduction of theory, and the dislodgement of the Eurocentric perspective. Perhaps the most brilliant revisionist work was done not in Middle East Studies, but in the field of Indology with the advent of Subaltern Studies, a group of remarkable scholars and researchers led by Ranajit Guha. Their aim was nothing less than a revolution in historiography, their immediate goal being to rescue the writing of Indian history from the domination of the nationalist elite and restore to it the important role of the urban poor and the rural masses. I think it would be wrong to say of such mostly academic work only that it was easily co-optable and complicit with &amp;quot;transnational&amp;quot; neo-colonialism. We need to record and acknowledge the achievement while warning of the later pitfalls.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What has been of special interest for me has been the extension of post-colonial concerns to the problems of geography. After all, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is a study based on the re-thinking of what had for centuries been believed to be an unbridgeable chasm separating East from West. My aim, as I said earlier, was not so much to dissipate difference itself--for who can deny the constitutive role of national as well as cultural differences in the relations between human beings--but to challenge the notion that difference implies hostility, a frozen reified set of opposed essences, and a whole adversarial knowledge built out of those things. What I called for in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; was a new way of conceiving the separations and conflicts that had stimulated generations of hostility, war, and imperial control. And indeed, one of the most interesting developments in post-colonial studies was a re-reading of the canonical cultural works, not to demote or somehow dish dirt on them, but to re-investigate some of their assumptions, going beyond the stifling hold on them of some version of the master-slave binary dialectic. This has certainly been the comparable effect of astoundingly resourceful novels such as Rusdie&#039;s &#039;&#039;Midnight&#039;s Children&#039;&#039;, the narratives of C. L. R. James, the poetry of Aime Cesaire and of Derek Walcott, works whose daring new formal achievements are in effect a re-appropriation of the historical experience of colonialism, revitalized and transformed into a new aesthetic of sharing and often transcendent re-formulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One sees it also in the work of the group of distinguished Irish writers who in 1980 established themselves as a collective called Field Day. The preface to a collection of their works says about them:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[These writers] believed that Field Day could and should contribute to the solution of the present crisis by producing analyses of the established opinion, myths and stereotypes which had become both a symptom and cause of the current situation [between Ireland and the North]. The collapse of constitutional and political arrangements and the recrudescence of the violence which they had been designed to repress or contain made this a more urgent requirement in the North than in the Republic.... The company, therefore, decided to embark upon a succession of publications, starting with a series of pamphlets [in addition to an impressive series of poems by Seamus Heaney, essays by Seamus Deane, plays by Brian Friel and Tom Paulin] in which the nature of the Irish problem could be explored and, as a result, more successfully confronted than it had been hitherto.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ireland&#039;s Field Day&#039;&#039; (London: Hutchinson, 1985), pp. vii-viii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of rethinking and re-formulating historical experiences which had once been based on the geographical separation of peoples and cultures is at the heart of a whole spate of scholarly and critical works. It is to be found, to mention only three, in Ammiel Alcalay&#039;s &#039;&#039;After Arabs and Jews: Remaking Levantine Culture&#039;&#039;, Paul Gilroy&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness&#039;&#039;, and Moira Ferguson&#039;s &#039;&#039;Subject to Others: British Women Writers and Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1670-1834&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alcalay (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Gilroy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Ferguson (London: Routledge, 1992).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In these works, domains once believed to have been exclusive to one people, gender, race, or class are re-examined and shown to have involved others. For long represented as a battleground between Arabs and Jews, the Levant emerges in Alcalay&#039;s book as a Mediterranean culture common to both peoples; according to Gilroy a similar process alters, indeed doubles, our perception of the Atlantic Ocean, hitherto thought of as principally a European passage. And in re-examining the adversarial relationship between English slave-owners and African slaves, Ferguson allows a more complex pattern dividing white female from white male to stand out, with new demotions and dislocations appearing as a result in Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
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I could go on giving more and more examples. I shall conclude briefly by saying that although the animosities and inequities still exist from which my interest in Orientalism as a cultural and political phenomenon began, there is now at least a general acceptance that these represent not an eternal order but a historical experience whose end, or at least partial abatement, may be at hand. Looking back at it from the distance afforded by fifteen eventful years and the availability of a massive new interpretive and scholarly enterprise to reduce the effects of imperialist shackles on thought and human relations, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; at least had the merit of enlisting itself openly in the struggle, which continues of course in &amp;quot;West&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;East&amp;quot; together.&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Library work|title=Orientalism|author=Edward Said|published_date=1978|type=Book|isbn=0 7100 0040 5|source=[https://annas-archive.org/md5/7f43dae180a3f72e0bfd0ed9e1670bed anna&#039;s archive]}}&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;Acknowledgments&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
I have been reading about Orientalism for a number of years, but most of this book was written during 1975-1976, which I spent as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. In this unique and generous institution, it was my good fortune not only to have benefitted agreeably from several colleagues, but also from the help of Joan Warmbrunn, Chris Hoth, Jane Kielsmeier, Preston Cutler, and the center&#039;s director, Gardner Lindzey. The list of friends, colleagues, and students who read, or listened to, parts or the whole of this manuscript is so long as to embarrass me, and now that it has finally appeared as a book, perhaps even them. Nevertheless I should mention with gratitude the always helpful encouragement of Janet and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Noam Chomsky, and Roger Owen, who followed this project from its beginning to its conclusion. Likewise I must gratefully acknowledge the helpful and critical interest of the colleagues, friends, and students in various places whose questions and discussion sharpened the text considerably. Andre Schiffrin and Jeanne Morton of Pantheon Books were ideal publisher and copy editor, respectively, and made the ordeal (for the author, at least) of preparing the manuscript an instructive and genuinely intelligent process. Mariam Said helped me a great deal with her research on the early modern history of Orientalist institutions. Apart from that, though, her loving support really made much of the work on this book not only enjoyable but possible.&lt;br /&gt;
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E. W. S.&lt;br /&gt;
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New York&lt;br /&gt;
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September-October 1977&lt;br /&gt;
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They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.&lt;br /&gt;
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--Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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The East is a career.&lt;br /&gt;
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--Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;Preface to the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
Nine years ago, in the spring of 1994, I wrote an afterword for &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, which, in trying to clarify what I believed I had and had not said, I stressed not only the many discussions that had opened up since my book appeared in 1978, but also the ways in which a work about representations of &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; lends itself to increasing misrepresentation and misinterpretation. That I find the very same thing today more ironic than irritating is a sign of how much my age has crept up on me, along with the necessary diminutions in expectations and pedagogic zeal that usually frame the road to seniority. The recent deaths of my two main intellectual, political, and personal mentors, Eqbal Ahmad and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (who is one of the work&#039;s dedicatees) have brought sadness and loss, as well as resignation and a certain stubborn will to go on. It isn&#039;t at all a matter of being optimistic, but rather of continuing to have faith in the ongoing and literally unending process of emancipation and enlightenment that, in my opinion, frames and gives direction to the intellectual vocation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, it is still a source of amazement to me that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; continues to be discussed and translated all over the world, in thirty-six languages. Thanks to the efforts of my dear friend and colleague Professor Gaby Peterberg, now of UCLA, formerly of Ben-Gurion University in Israel, there is a Hebrew version of the book available, which has stimulated considerable discussion and debate among Israeli readers and students. In addition, a Vietnamese translation has appeared under Australian auspices; I hope it&#039;s not immodest to say that an Indochinese intellectual space seems to have opened up for the propositions of this book. In any case, it gives me great pleasure to note as an author who had never dreamed of any such happy fate for his work that interest in what I tried to do in my book hasn&#039;t completely died down, particularly in the many different lands of the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In part, of course, that is because the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam have continued to fuel enormous change, struggle, controversy and, as I write these lines, war. As I said many years ago, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is the product of circumstances that are fundamentally, indeed radically, fractious. In my memoir, &#039;&#039;Out of Place&#039;&#039; (1999), I described the strange and contradictory worlds in which I grew up, providing for myself and my readers a detailed account of the settings that I think formed me in Palestine, Egypt, and Lebanon. But that was only a very personal account that stopped short of all the years of my own political engagement that started after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, a war in whose continuing aftermath (Israel is still in military occupation of the Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights) the terms of struggle and the ideas at stake that were crucial for my generation of Arabs and Americans seem to go on. Nevertheless, I do want to affirm yet again that this book and, for that matter, my intellectual work generally have really been enabled by my life as a university academic. For all its often noted defects and problems, the American university--and mine, Columbia, in particular--is still one of the few remaining places in the United States where reflection and study can take place in an almost-utopian fashion. I have never taught &#039;&#039;anything&#039;&#039; about the Middle East, being by training and practice a teacher of the mainly European and American humanities, a specialist in modern comparative literature. The university and my pedagogic work with two generations of first-class students and excellent colleagues has made possible the kind of deliberately meditated and analyzed study that this book contains, which for all its urgent worldly references is still a book about culture, ideas, history, and power, rather than Middle Eastern politics &#039;&#039;tout court&#039;&#039;. That was my notion from the beginning, and it is very evident and a good deal clearer to me today.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is very much a book tied to the tumultuous dynamics of contemporary history. I emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term Orient nor the concept of the West has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly identification of the Other. That these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulation and the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time, when the mobilizations of fear, hatred, disgust, and resurgent self-pride and arrogance--much of it having to do with Islam and the Arabs on one side, &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; Westerners on the other--are very large-scale enterprises. &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s first page opens with a 1975 description of the Lebanese Civil War that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. We have had the failure of the Oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the Palestinians on the reinvaded West Bank and Gaza, with Israeli F-16&#039;s and Apache helicopters used routinely on defenseless civilians as part of their collective punishment. The suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of September 11 and their aftermath in the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. As I wrote these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial invasion and occupation of Iraq by Britain and the United States proceeds, with a prospect of physical ravagement, political unrest, and more invasions that are truly awful to contemplate. This is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. Nevertheless, I think not.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I wish I could say, however, that general understanding of the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam in the United States has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn&#039;t. For all kinds of reasons, the situation in Europe seems to be considerably better. In the United States, the hardening of attitudes, the tightening of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche, the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and &amp;quot;others&amp;quot; has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging, and destruction of Iraq&#039;s libraries and museums. What our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the map of the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. But this has often happened with the &amp;quot;Orient,&amp;quot; that semi-mythical construct, which, since Napoleon&#039;s invasion of Egypt in the late eighteenth century, has been made and remade countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the Orient&#039;s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. In the process the uncountable sediments of history, which include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of Baghdad&#039;s libraries and museums. My argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and rewritten, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; East, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; Orient becomes &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; to possess and direct.&lt;br /&gt;
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I should say again that I have no &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; Orient to argue for. I do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be. There has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the Arab and Muslim for their backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women&#039;s rights that we simply forget that such notions as modernity, enlightenment, and democracy are by no means simple and agreed-upon concepts that one either does or does not find, like Easter eggs in the living room. The breathtaking insouciance of jejune publicists who speak in the name of foreign policy and who have no live notion (or any knowledge at all) of the language of what real people actually speak has fabricated an arid landscape ready for American power to construct there an &#039;&#039;ersatz&#039;&#039; model of free market &amp;quot;democracy,&amp;quot; without even a trace of doubt that such projects don&#039;t exist outside of Swift&#039;s Academy of Lagado.&lt;br /&gt;
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What I do argue also is that there is a difference between knowledge of other peoples and other times that is the result of understanding, compassion, careful study and analysis for their own sakes, and on the other hand knowledge--if that is what it is--that is part of an overall campaign of self-affirmation, belligerency, and outright war. There is, after all, a profound difference between the will to understand for purposes of coexistence and humanistic enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external dominion. It is surely one of the intellectual catastrophes of history that an imperialist war confected by a small group of unelected U.S. officials (they&#039;ve been called chicken hawks, since none of them ever served in the military) was waged against a devastated Third World dictatorship on thoroughly ideological grounds having to do with world dominance, security control, and scarce resources, but disguised for its true intent, hastened, and reasoned for by Orientalists who betrayed their calling as scholars. The major influences on George W. Bush&#039;s Pentagon and National Security Council were men such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, experts on the Arab and Islamic world who helped the American hawks think about such preposterous phenomena as the Arab mind and centuries-old Islamic decline that only American power could reverse. Today, bookstores in the United States are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror, Islam exposed, the Arab threat, and the Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange Oriental peoples over there who have been such a terrible thorn in &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; flesh. Accompanying such warmongering expertise have been the omnipresent CNNs and Fox News Channels of this world, plus myriad numbers of evangelical and right-wing radio hosts, plus innumerable tabloids and even middlebrow journals, all of them recycling the same unverifiable fictions and vast generalizations so as to stir up &amp;quot;America&amp;quot; against the foreign devil.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even with all its terrible failings and its appalling dictator (who was partly created by U.S. policy two decades ago), were Iraq to have been the world&#039;s largest exporter of bananas or oranges, surely there would have been no war, no hysteria over mysteriously vanished weapons of mass destruction, no transporting of an enormous army, navy, and air force 7000 miles away to destroy a country scarcely known even to the educated American, all in the name of &amp;quot;freedom.&amp;quot; Without a well-organized sense that these people over there were not like &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; and didn&#039;t appreciate &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; values--the very core of traditional Orientalist dogma as I describe its creation and circulation in this book--there would have been no war.&lt;br /&gt;
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So from the very same directorate of paid professional scholars enlisted by the Dutch conquerors of Malaysia and Indonesia, the British armies of India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, West Africa, the French armies of Indochina and North Africa, came the American advisers to the Pentagon and the White House, using the same cliches, the same demeaning stereotypes, the same justification for power and violence (after all, runs the chorus, power is the only language they understand) in this case as in the earlier ones. These people have now been joined in Iraq by a whole army of private contractors and eager entrepreneurs to whom shall be confided everything from the writing of textbooks and the constitution to the refashioning of Iraqi political life and its oil industry. Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is a chorus of willing intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic empires, as if one shouldn&#039;t trust the evidence of one&#039;s eyes watching the destruction and the misery and death brought by the latest &#039;&#039;mission civilizatrice&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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One specifically American contribution to the discourse of empire is the specialized jargon of policy expertise. You don&#039;t need Arabic or Persian or even French to pontificate about how the democracy domino effect is just what the Arab world needs. Combative and woefully ignorant policy experts, whose world experience is limited to the Beltway, grind out books on &amp;quot;terrorism&amp;quot; and liberalism, or about Islamic fundamentalism and American foreign policy, or about the end of history, all of it vying for attention and influence quite without regard for truthfulness or reflection or real knowledge. What matters is how efficient and resourceful it sounds, and who might go for it, as it were. The worst aspect of this essentializing stuff is that human suffering in all its density and pain is spirited away. Memory and with it the historical past are effaced as in the common, dismissively contemptuous American phrase, &amp;quot;you&#039;re history.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Twenty-five years after its publication, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; once again raises the question of whether modern imperialism ever ended, or whether it has continued in the Orient since Napoleon&#039;s entry into Egypt two centuries ago. Arabs and Muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depredations of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. You have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern Orientalist. This of course is also V. S. Naipaul&#039;s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. But what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of &amp;quot;lesser&amp;quot; peoples and &amp;quot;subject races&amp;quot; generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives of, say, Palestinians or Congolese or Algerians or Iraqis. We allow justly that the Holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: Why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what Orientalism continues to do? Think of the line that starts with Napoleon, continues with the rise of Oriental studies arid the takeover of North Africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in Vietnam, in Egypt, in Palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the Gulf, in Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Afghanistan. Then think contrapuntally of the rise of anticolonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle, and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of &amp;quot;natives.&amp;quot; Each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics.&lt;br /&gt;
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My idea in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. I have called what I try to do &amp;quot;humanism,&amp;quot; a word I continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated postmodern critics. By humanism I mean first of all attempting to dissolve Blake&#039;s mind-forg&#039;d manacles so as to be able to use one&#039;s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. Moreover, humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking, therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. The disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that this is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territorially reductive polarizations like &amp;quot;Islam v. the West&amp;quot; seem to conquer.&lt;br /&gt;
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For those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri-cultural life as it entails Islam and the West, I have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. Certainly I think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experience and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. This is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socioeconomic reality. Our role is to widen the field of discussion, not to set limits in accord with the prevailing authority. I have spent a great deal of my life during the past thirty-five years advocating the rights of the Palestinian people to national self-determination, but I have always tried to do that with full attention paid to the reality of the Jewish people and what they suffered by the way of persecution and genocide. The paramount thing is that the struggle for equality in Palestine/Israel should be directed toward a humane goal, that is, coexistence, and not further suppression and denial. Not accidentally, I indicate that Orientalism and modern anti-Semitism have common roots. Therefore, it would seem to be a vital necessity for independent intellectuals always to provide alternative models to the reductively simplifying and confining ones, based on mutual hostility, that have prevailed in the Middle East and elsewhere for so long.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let me now speak about a different alternative model that has been extremely important to me in my work. As a humanist whose field is literature, I am old enough to have been trained forty years ago in the field of comparative literature, whose leading ideas go back to Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Before that I must mention the supremely creative contribution of Giambattista Vico, the Neapolitan philosopher and philologist whose ideas anticipate and later infiltrate the line of German thinkers I am about to cite. They belong to the era of Herder and Wolf, later to be followed by Goethe, Humboldt, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Gadamer, and finally the great twentieth-century Romance philologists Erich Auerback, Leo Spitzer, and Ernst Robert Curtius. To young people of the current generation the very idea of philology suggests something impossibly antiquarian and musty, but philology in fact is the most basic and creative of the interpretive arts. It is exemplified for me most admirably in Goethe&#039;s interest in Islam generally, and Hafiz in particular, a consuming passion that led to the composition of the &#039;&#039;West-Ostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039;, and it inflected Goethe&#039;s later ideas about &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039;, the study of all the literatures of the world as a symphonic whole that could be apprehended theoretically as having preserved the individuality of each work without losing sight of the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a considerable irony to the realization, then, that as today&#039;s globalized world draws together in some of the lamentable ways I have been talking about here, we may be approaching the kind of standardization and homogeneity that Goethe&#039;s ideas were specifically formulated to prevent. In an essay published in 1951 entitled &amp;quot;Philolgie der Weltliteratur,&amp;quot; Erich Auerbach made exactly that point at the outset of the postwar period, which was also the beginning of the Cold War. His great book &#039;&#039;Mimesis&#039;&#039;, published in Berne in 1946 but written while Auerbach was a wartime exile teaching Romance languages in Istanbul, was meant to be a testament to the diversity and concreteness of the reality represented in Western literature from Homer to Virginia Woolf; but reading the 1951 essay one senses that for Auerbach the great book he wrote was an elegy for a period when people could interpret texts philologically, concretely, sensitively, and intuitively, using erudition and an excellent command of several languages to support the kind of understanding that Goethe advocated for his understanding of Islamic literature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Positive knowledge of languages and history was necessary, but it was never enough, any more than the mechanical gathering of facts would constitute an adequate method for grasping what an author like Dante, for example, was all about. The main requirement for the kind of philological understanding Auerbach and his predecessors were talking about and tried to practice was one that sympathetically and subjectively entered into the life of a written text as seen from the perspective of this time and its author (&#039;&#039;eingefullen&#039;&#039;). Rather than alienation and hostility to another time and another different culture, philology as applied to &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039; involved a profound humanistic spirit deployed with generosity and, if I may use the word, hospitality. Thus the interpreter&#039;s mind actively makes a place in it for a foreign Other. And this creative making of a place for works that are otherwise alien and distant is the most important facet of the interpreter&#039;s philological mission.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this was obviously undermined and destroyed in Germany by National Socialism. After the war, Auerbach notes mournfully, the standardization of ideas, and greater and greater specialization of knowledge, gradually narrowed the opportunities for the kind of investigative and everlastingly inquiring kind of philological work that he had represented, and, alas, it&#039;s an even more depressing fact that, since Auerbach&#039;s death in 1957, both the idea and practice of humanistic research have shrunk in scope as well as in centrality. The book culture based on archival research as well as general principles of mind that once sustained humanism as a historical discipline have almost disappeared. Instead of reading in the real sense of the word, our students today are often distracted by the fragmented knowledge available on the internet and in the mass media.&lt;br /&gt;
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Worse yet, education is threatened by nationalist and religious orthodoxies often disseminated by the mass media as they focus ahistorically and sensationally on the distant electronic wars that give viewers the sense of surgical precision but that in fact obscure the terrible suffering and destruction produced by modern &amp;quot;clean&amp;quot; warfare. In the demonization of an unknown enemy, for whom the label &amp;quot;terrorist&amp;quot; serves the general purpose of keeping people stirred up and angry, media images command too much attention and can be exploited at times of crisis and insecurity of the kind that the post-9/11 period has produced. Speaking both as an American and as an Arab I must ask my reader not to underestimate the kind of simplified view of the world that a relative handful of Pentagon civilian elites have formulated for U.S. policy in the entire Arab and Islamic worlds, a view in which terror, preemptive war, and unilateral regime change--backed up by the most bloated military budget in history--are the main ideas debated endlessly and impoverishingly by a media that assigns itself the role of producing so-called &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; who validate the government&#039;s general line. I should also note that it is far from a coincidence that General Sharon of Israel, who in 1982 led the invasion of Lebanon in order to change the Lebanese government, killing 17,000 civilians in the process, is now a partner in &amp;quot;peace&amp;quot; with George W. Bush, and that in the United States at least there has been not enough dissent from the dubious thesis that military power alone can change the map of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reflection, debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate American or Western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and regard other cultures with derisive contempt. Perhaps you will say that I am making too many abrupt transitions between humanistic interpretation on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and that a modern technological society that, along with unprecedented power, possesses the internet and F-16 fighter jets must in the end be commanded by formidable technical-policy experts like Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Perle. (Neither man will do any actual fighting since that will be left to less fortunate men and women.) But what has really been lost is a sense of the density and interdependence of human life, which can neither be reduced to a formula nor be brushed aside as irrelevant. Even the language of the war is dehumanizing in the extreme: &amp;quot;We&#039;ll go in there take out Saddam, destroy his army with clean surgical strikes, and everyone will think it&#039;s great,&amp;quot; said a congresswoman on national television. It seems to me entirely symptomatic of the precarious moment in which we are living that when Vice President Cheney made his hard-line speech on August 26, 2002, about the imperative to attack Iraq, he quoted as his single Middle East &amp;quot;expert&amp;quot; in support of military intervention against Iraq an Arab academic who, as a paid consultant to the mass media on a nightly basis, keeps repeating his hatred of his own people and the renunciation of his background. Moreover, he is backed in his efforts by the military and Zionist lobbies in the United States. Such a &#039;&#039;trahison de clercs&#039;&#039; is a symptom of how genuine humanism can degenerate into jingoism and false patriotism.&lt;br /&gt;
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That is one side of the global debate. In the Arab and Muslim countries the situation is scarcely better. As Roula Khalaf argues, in an excellent &#039;&#039;Financial Times&#039;&#039; essay (September 4, 2002), the region has slipped into an easy anti-Americanism that shows little understanding of what the United States is really like as a society. Because the governments are relatively powerless to affect U.S. policy toward them, they turn their energies to repressing and keeping down their own populations, which results in resentment, anger, and helpless imprecations that do nothing to open up societies where secular ideas about human history and development have been overtaken by failure and frustration, as well as by an Islamism built out of rote learning, the obliteration of what are perceived to be other, competitive forms of secular knowledge, and an inability to analyze and exchange ideas within the generally discordant world of modern discourse. The gradual disappearance of the extraordinary tradition of Islamic &#039;&#039;ijtihad&#039;&#039; has been one of the major cultural disasters of our time, with the result that critical thinking and individual wrestling with the problems of the modern world have simply dropped out of sight. Orthodoxy and dogma rule instead.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is not to say that the cultural world has simply regressed on one side to a belligerent neo-Orientalism and on the other to blanket rejectionism. The recent United Nations World Summit in Johannesburg, for all its limitations, did in fact reveal a vast area of common global concert whose detailed workings on matters having to do with the environment, famine, the gap between advanced and developing countries, health, and human rights, suggest the welcome emergence of a new collective constituency that give the often facile notion of &amp;quot;one world&amp;quot; a new urgency. In all this, however, we must admit that no one can possibly know the extraordinarily complex unity of our globalized world, despite the reality that, as I said at the outset, the world does have a real interdependence of parts that leaves no genuine opportunity for isolation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The point I want to conclude with now is to insist that the terrible reductive conflicts that herd people under falsely unifying rubrics like &amp;quot;America,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the West,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; and invent collective identities for large numbers of individuals who are actually quite diverse, cannot remain as potent as they are, and must be opposed, their murderous effectiveness vastly reduced in influence and mobilizing power. We still have at our disposal the rational interpretive skills that are the legacy of humanistic education, not as a sentimental piety enjoining us to return to traditional values or the classics but as the active practice of worldly secular discourse. The secular world is the world of history as made by human beings. Human agency is subject to investigation and analysis, which it is the mission of understanding to apprehend, criticize, influence, and judge. Above all, critical thought does not submit to state power or to commands to join in the ranks marching against one or another approved enemy. Rather than the manufactured clash of civilizations, we need to concentrate on the slow working together of cultures that overlap, borrow from each other, and live together in far more interesting ways than any abridged or inauthentic mode of understanding can allow. But for that kind of wider perception we need time and patient and skeptical inquiry, supported by faith in communities of interpretation that are difficult to sustain in a world demanding instant action and reaction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Humanism is centered upon the agency of human individuality and subjective intuition, rather than on received ideas and approved authority. Texts have to be read as texts that were produced and live on in the historical realm in all sorts of what I have called worldly ways. But this by no means excludes power, since on the contrary what I have tried to show in my book have been the insinuations, the imbrications of power into even the most recondite of studies.&lt;br /&gt;
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And lastly, most important, humanism is the only, and I would go so far as to say, the final resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history. We are today abetted by the enormously encouraging democratic field of cyberspace, open to all users in ways undreamed of by earlier generations either of tyrants or of orthodoxies. The worldwide protests before the war began in Iraq would not have been possible were it not for the existence of alternative communities across the globe, informed by alternative news sources, and keenly aware of the environmental, human rights, and libertarian impulses that bind us together in this tiny planet. The human, and humanistic, desire or enlightenment and emancipation is not easily deferred, despite the incredible strength of the opposition to it that comes from the Rumsfelds, Bin Ladens, Sharons, and Bushes of this world. I would like to believe that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; has had a place in the long and often interrupted road to human freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
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E. W. S.&lt;br /&gt;
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New York&lt;br /&gt;
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May 2003&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;Introduction&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
On a visit to Beirut during the terrible civil war of 1975-1976 a French journalist wrote regretfully of the gutted downtown area that &amp;quot;it had once seemed to belong to ... the Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thierry Desjardins, &#039;&#039;Le Martyre du Liban&#039;&#039; (Paris: Plon, 1976), p. 14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He was right about the place, of course, especially so far as a European was concerned. The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences. Now it was disappearing; in a sense it had happened, its time was over. Perhaps it seemed irrelevant that Orientals themselves had something at stake in the process, that even in the time of Chateaubriand and Nerval Orientals had lived there, and that now it was they who were suffering; the main thing for the European visitor was a European representation of the Orient and its contemporary fate, both of which had a privileged communal significance for the journalist and his French readers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Americans will not feel quite the same about the Orient, which for them is much more likely to be associated very differently with the Far East (China and Japan, mainly). Unlike the Americans, the French and the British--less so the Germans, Russians, Spanish, Portuguese, Italians, and Swiss--have had a long tradition of what I shall be calling &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient&#039;s special place in European Western experience. The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe&#039;s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. In contrast, the American understanding of the Orient will seem considerably less dense, although our recent Japanese, Korean, and Indochinese adventures ought now to be creating a more sober, more realistic &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; awareness. Moreover, the vastly expanded American political and economic role in the Near East (the Middle East) makes great claims on our understanding of that Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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It will be clear to the reader (and will become clearer still throughout the many pages that follow) that by Orientalism I mean several things, all of them, in my opinion, interdependent. The most readily accepted designation for Orientalism is an academic one, and indeed the label still serves in a number of academic institutions. Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient--and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist--either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism. Compared with &#039;&#039;Oriental studies&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;area studies&#039;&#039;, it is true that the term &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is less preferred by specialists today, both because it is too vague and general and because it connotes the high-handed executive attitude of nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century European colonialism. Nevertheless books are written and congresses held with &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; as their main focus, with the Orientalist in his new or old guise as their main authority. The point is that even if it does not survive as it once did, Orientalism lives on academically through its doctrines and theses about the Orient and the Oriental.&lt;br /&gt;
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Related to this academic tradition, whose fortunes, transmigrations, specializations, and transmissions are in part the subject of this study, is a more general meaning for Orientalism. Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; and (most of the time) &amp;quot;the Occident.&amp;quot; Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, &amp;quot;mind,&amp;quot; destiny, and so on. &#039;&#039;This&#039;&#039; Orientalism can accommodate Aeschylus, say, and Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx. A little later in this introduction I shall deal with the methodological problems one encounters in so broadly construed a &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; as this.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interchange between the academic and the more or less imaginative meanings of Orientalism is a constant one, and since the late eighteenth century there has been a considerable, quite disciplined--perhaps even regulated--traffic between the two. Here I come to the third meaning of Orientalism, which is something more historically and materially defined than either of the other two. Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient--dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault&#039;s notion of a discourse, as described by him in &#039;&#039;The Archaeology of Knowledge&#039;&#039; and in &#039;&#039;Discipline and Punish&#039;&#039;, to identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage--and even produce--the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; is in question. How this happens is what this book tries to demonstrate. It also tries to show that European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historically and culturally there is a quantitative as well as a qualitative difference between the Franco-British involvement in the Orient and--until the period of American ascendancy after World War II--the involvement of every other European and Atlantic power. To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such disparate realms as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the Biblical texts and the Biblical lands, the spice trade, colonial armies and a long tradition of colonial administrators, a formidable scholarly corpus, innumerable Oriental &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;hands,&amp;quot; an Oriental professorate, a complex array of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; ideas (Oriental despotism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, sensuality), many Eastern sects, philosophies, and wisdoms domesticated for local European use--the list can be extended more or less indefinitely. My point is that Orientalism derives from a particular closeness experienced between Britain and France and the Orient, which until the early nineteenth century had really meant only India and the Bible lands. From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did. Out of that closeness, whose dynamic is enormously productive even if it always demonstrates the comparatively greater strength of the Occident (British, French, or American), comes the large body of texts I call Orientalist.&lt;br /&gt;
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It should be said at once that even with the generous number of books and authors that I examine, there is a much larger number that I simply have had to leave out. My argument, however, depends neither upon an exhaustive catalogue of texts dealing with the Orient nor upon a clearly delimited set of texts, authors, and ideas that together make up the Orientalist canon. I have depended instead upon a different methodological alternative--whose backbone in a sense is the set of historical generalizations I have so far been making in this Introduction--and it is these I want now to discuss in more analytical detail.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
I have begun with the assumption that the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely &#039;&#039;there&#039;&#039;, just as the Occident itself is not just &#039;&#039;there&#039;&#039; either. We must take seriously Vico&#039;s great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities--to say nothing of historical entities--such locales, regions, geographical sectors as &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; are man-made. Therefore as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having said that, one must go on to state a number of reasonable qualifications. In the first place, it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was &#039;&#039;essentially&#039;&#039; an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality. When Disraeli said in his novel &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; that the East was a career, he meant that to be interested in the East was something bright young Westerners would find to be an all-consuming passion; he should not be interpreted as saying that the East was &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; a career for Westerners. There were--and are--cultures and nations whose location is in the East, and their lives, histories, and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that could be said about them in the West. About that fact this study of Orientalism has very little to contribute, except to acknowledge it tacitly. But the phenomenon of Orientalism as I study it here deals principally, not with a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient (the East as career) despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; Orient. My point is that Disraeli&#039;s statement about the East refers mainly to that created consistency, that regular constellation of ideas as the pre-eminent thing about the Orient, and not to its mere being, as Wallace Stevens&#039;s phrase has it.&lt;br /&gt;
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A second qualification is that ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied. To believe that the Orient was created--or, as I call it, &amp;quot;Orientalized&amp;quot;--and to believe that such things happen simply as a necessity of the imagination, is to be disingenuous. The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony, and is quite accurately indicated in the title of K. M. Panikkar&#039;s classic &#039;&#039;Asia and Western Dominance&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;K. M. Panikkar, &#039;&#039;Asia and Western Dominance&#039;&#039; (London: George Allen &amp;amp; Unwin, 1959).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; in all those ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it &#039;&#039;could be&#039;&#039;--that is, submitted to being&#039;&#039;--made&#039;&#039; Oriental. There is very little consent to be found, for example, in the fact that Flaubert&#039;s encounter with an Egyptian courtesan produced a widely influential model of the Oriental woman; she never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. &#039;&#039;He&#039;&#039; spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his readers in what way she was &amp;quot;typically Oriental.&amp;quot; My argument is that Flaubert&#039;s situation of strength in relation to Kuchuk Hanem was not an isolated instance. It fairly stands for the pattern of relative strength between East and West, and the discourse about the Orient that it enabled.&lt;br /&gt;
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This brings us to a third qualification. One ought never to assume that the structure of Orientalism is nothing more than a structure of lies or of myths which, were the truth about them to be told, would simply blow away. I myself believe that Orientalism is more particularly valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient than it is as a veridic discourse about the Orient (which is what, in its academic or scholarly form, it claims to be). Nevertheless, what we must respect and try to grasp is the sheer knitted-together strength of Orientalist discourse, its very close ties to the enabling socio-economic and political institutions, and its redoubtable durability. After all, any system of ideas that can remain unchanged as teachable wisdom (in academies, books, congresses, universities, foreign-service institutes) from the period of Ernest Renan in the late 1840s until the present in the United States must be something more formidable than a mere collection of lies. Orientalism, therefore, is not an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a created body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material investment. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness, just as that same investment multiplied--indeed, made truly productive--the statements proliferating out from Orientalism into the general culture.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gramsci has made the useful analytic distinction between civil and political society in which the former is made up of voluntary (or at least rational and noncoercive) affiliations like schools, families, and unions, the latter of state institutions (the army, the police, the central bureaucracy) whose role in the polity is direct domination. Culture, of course, is to be found operating within civil society, where the influence of ideas, of institutions, and of other persons works not through domination but by what Gramsci calls consent. In any society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others; the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as &#039;&#039;hegemony&#039;&#039;, an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism the durability and the strength I have been speaking about so far. Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Denys Hay, &#039;&#039;Europe: The Emergence of an Idea&#039;&#039;, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a collective notion identifying &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; Europeans as against all &amp;quot;those&amp;quot; non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. There is in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness, usually overriding the possibility that a more independent, or more skeptical, thinker might have had different views on the matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a quite constant way, Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible &#039;&#039;positional&#039;&#039; superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand. And why should it have been otherwise, especially during the period of extraordinary European ascendancy from the late Renaissance to the present? The scientist, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier was in, or thought about, the Orient because he &#039;&#039;could be there&#039;&#039;, or could think about it, with very little resistance on the Orient&#039;s part. Under the general heading of knowledge of the Orient, and within the umbrella of Western hegemony over the Orient during the period from the end of the eighteenth century, there emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious character. Additionally, the imaginative examination of things Oriental was based more or less exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness out of whose unchallenged centrality an Oriental world emerged, first according to general ideas about who or what was an Oriental, then according to a detailed logic governed not simply by empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projections. If we can point to great Orientalist works of genuine scholarship like Silvestre de Sacy&#039;s &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe&#039;&#039; or Edward William Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, we need also to note that Renan&#039;s and Gobineau&#039;s racial ideas came out of the same impulse, as did a great many Victorian pornographic novels (see the analysis by Steven Marcus of &amp;quot;The Lustful Turk&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Steven Marcus, &#039;&#039;The Other Victorians: A Study of Sexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth Century England&#039;&#039; (1966; reprint ed., New York: Bantam Books, 1967), pp. 200-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;).&lt;br /&gt;
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And yet, one must repeatedly ask oneself whether what matters in Orientalism is the general group of ideas overriding the mass of material--about which who could deny that they were shot through with doctrines of European superiority, various kinds of racism, imperialism, and the like, dogmatic views of &amp;quot;the Oriental&amp;quot; as a kind of ideal and unchanging abstraction?--or the much more varied work produced by almost uncountable individual writers, whom one would take up as individual instances of authors dealing with the Orient. In a sense the two alternatives, general and particular, are really two perspectives on the same material: in both instances one would have to deal with pioneers in the field like William Jones, with great artists like Nerval or Flaubert. And why would it not be possible to employ both perspectives together, or one after the other? Isn&#039;t there an obvious danger of distortion (of precisely the kind that academic Orientalism has always been prone to) if either too general or too specific a level of description is maintained systematically?&lt;br /&gt;
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My two fears are distortion and inaccuracy, or rather the kind of inaccuracy produced by too dogmatic a generality and too positivistic a localized focus. In trying to deal with these problems I have tried to deal with three main aspects of my own contemporary reality that seem to me to point the way out of the methodological or perspectival difficulties I have been discussing, difficulties that might force one, in the first instance, into writing a coarse polemic on so unacceptably general a level of description as not to be worth the effort, or in the second instance, into writing so detailed and atomistic a series of analyses as to lose all track of the general lines of force informing the field, giving it its special cogency. How then to recognize individuality and to reconcile it with its intelligent, and by no means passive or merely dictatorial, general and hegemonic context?&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
I mentioned three aspects of my contemporary reality: I must explain and briefly discuss them now, so that it can be seen how I was led to a particular course of research and writing.&lt;br /&gt;
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1. &#039;&#039;The distinction between pure and political knowledge&#039;&#039;. It is very easy to argue that knowledge about Shakespeare or Wordsworth is not political whereas knowledge about contemporary China or the Soviet Union is. My own formal and professional designation is that of &amp;quot;humanist,&amp;quot; a title which indicates the humanities as my field and therefore the unlikely eventuality that there might be anything political about what I do in that field. Of course, all these labels and terms are quite unnuanced as I use them here, but the general truth of what I am pointing to is, I think, widely held. One reason for saying that a humanist who writes about Wordsworth, or an editor whose specialty is Keats, is not involved in anything political is that what he does seems to have no direct political effect upon reality in the everyday sense. A scholar whose field is Soviet economics works in a highly charged area where there is much government interest, and what he might produce in the way of studies or proposals will be taken up by policymakers, government officials, institutional economists, intelligence experts. The distinction between &amp;quot;humanists&amp;quot; and persons whose work has policy implications, or political significance, can be broadened further by saying that the former&#039;s ideological color is a matter of incidental importance to politics (although possibly of great moment to his colleagues in the field, who may object to his Stalinism or fascism or too easy liberalism), whereas the ideology of the latter is woven directly into his material--indeed, economics, politics, and sociology in the modern academy are ideological sciences--and therefore taken for granted as being &amp;quot;political.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless the determining impingement on most knowledge produced in the contemporary West (and here I speak mainly about the United States) is that it be nonpolitical, that is, scholarly, academic, impartial, above partisan or small-minded doctrinal belief. One can have no quarrel with such an ambition in theory, perhaps, but in practice the reality is much more problematic. No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, from the fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society. These continue to bear on what he does professionally, even though naturally enough his research and its fruits do attempt to reach a level of relative freedom from the inhibitions and the restrictions of brute, everyday reality. For there is such a thing as knowledge that is less, rather than more, partial than the individual (with his entangling and distracting life circumstances) who produces it. Yet this knowledge is not therefore automatically nonpolitical.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whether discussions of literature or of classical philology are fraught with--or have unmediated--political significance is a very large question that I have tried to treat in some detail elsewhere.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See my &#039;&#039;Criticism Between Culture and System&#039;&#039; (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What I am interested in doing now is suggesting how the general liberal consensus that &amp;quot;true&amp;quot; knowledge is fundamentally nonpolitical (and conversely, that overtly political knowledge is not &amp;quot;true&amp;quot; knowledge) obscures the highly if obscurely organized political circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced. No one is helped in understanding this today when the adjective &amp;quot;political&amp;quot; is used as a label to discredit any work for daring to violate the protocol of pretended suprapolitical objectivity. We may say, first, that civil society recognizes a gradation of political importance in the various fields of knowledge. To some extent the political importance given a field comes from the possibility of its direct translation into economic terms; but to a greater extent political importance comes from the closeness of a field to ascertainable sources of power in political society. Thus an economic study of long-term Soviet energy potential and its effect on military capability is likely to be commissioned by the Defense Department, and thereafter to acquire a kind of political status impossible for a study of Tolstoi&#039;s early fiction financed in part by a foundation. Yet both works belong in what civil society acknowledges to be a similar field, Russian studies, even though one work may be done by a very conservative economist, the other by a radical literary historian. My point here is that &amp;quot;Russia&amp;quot; as a general subject matter has political priority over nicer distinctions such as &amp;quot;economics&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;literary history,&amp;quot; because political society in Gramsci&#039;s sense reaches into such realms of civil society as the academy and saturates them with significance of direct concern to it.&lt;br /&gt;
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I do not want to press all this any further on general theoretical grounds: it seems to me that the value and credibility of my case can be demonstrated by being much more specific, in the way, for example, Noam Chomsky has studied the instrumental connection between the Vietnam War and the notion of objective scholarship as it was applied to cover state-sponsored military research.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Principally in his &#039;&#039;American Power and the New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969) and &#039;&#039;For Reasons of State&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Now because Britain, France, and recently the United States are imperial powers, their political societies impart to their civil societies a sense of urgency, a direct political infusion as it were, where and whenever matters pertaining to their imperial interests abroad are concerned. I doubt that it is controversial, for example, to say that an Englishman in India or Egypt in the later nineteenth century took an interest in those countries that was never far from their status in his mind as British colonies. To say this may seem quite different from saying that all academic knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and impressed with, violated by, the gross political fact--and yet &#039;&#039;that is what I am saying&#039;&#039; in this study of Orientalism. For if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author&#039;s involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient, and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Put in this way, these political actualities are still too undefined and general to be really interesting. Anyone would agree to them without necessarily agreeing also that they mattered very much, for instance, to Flaubert as he wrote &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, or to H. A. R. Gibb as he wrote &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039;. The trouble is that there is too great a distance between the big dominating fact, as I have described it, and the details of everyday life that govern the minute discipline of a novel or a scholarly text as each is being written. Yet if we eliminate from the start any notion that &amp;quot;big&amp;quot; facts like imperial domination can be applied mechanically and deterministically to such complex matters as culture and ideas, then we will begin to approach an interesting kind of study. My idea is that European and then American interest in the Orient was political according to some of the obvious historical accounts of it that I have given here, but that it was the culture that created that interest, that acted dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales to make the Orient the varied and complicated place that it obviously was in the field I call Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; imperialist plot to hold down the &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; world. It is rather a &#039;&#039;distribution&#039;&#039; of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an &#039;&#039;elaboration&#039;&#039; not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of &amp;quot;interests&amp;quot; which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039;, rather than expresses, a certain &#039;&#039;will&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;intention&#039;&#039; to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do and what &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; cannot do or understand as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do). Indeed, my real argument is that Orientalism is--and does not simply represent--a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Because Orientalism is a cultural and a political fact, then, it does not exist in some archival vacuum; quite the contrary, I think it can be shown that what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs within) certain distinct and intellectually knowable lines. Here too a considerable degree of nuance and elaboration can be seen working as between the broad superstructural pressures and the details of composition, the facts of textuality. Most humanistic scholars are, I think, perfectly happy with the notion that texts exist in contexts, that there is such a thing as intertextuality, that the pressures of conventions, predecessors, and rhetorical styles limit what Walter Benjamin once called the &amp;quot;overtaxing of the productive person in the name of ... the principle of &#039;creativity,&#039; &amp;quot; in which the poet is believed on his own, and out of his pure mind, to have brought forth his work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Walter Benjamin, &#039;&#039;Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Harry Zohn (London: New Left Books, 1973), p. 71.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet there is a reluctance to allow that political, institutional, and ideological constraints act in the same manner on the individual author. A humanist will believe it to be an interesting fact to any interpreter of Balzac that he was influenced in the &#039;&#039;Comedie humaine&#039;&#039; by the conflict between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier, but the same sort of pressure on Balzac of deeply reactionary monarchism is felt in some vague way to demean his literary &amp;quot;genius&amp;quot; and therefore to be less worth serious study. Similarly--as Harry Bracken has been tirelessly showing--philosophers will conduct their discussions of Locke, Hume, and empiricism without ever taking into account that there is an explicit connection in these classic writers between their &amp;quot;philosophic&amp;quot; doctrines and racial theory, justifications of slavery, or arguments for colonial exploitation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harry Bracken, &amp;quot;Essence, Accident and Race,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Hermathena&#039;&#039; 116 (Winter 1973): 81-96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These are common enough ways by which contemporary scholarship keeps itself pure.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps it is true that most attempts to rub culture&#039;s nose in the mud of politics have been crudely iconoclastic; perhaps also the social interpretation of literature in my own field has simply not kept up with the enormous technical advances in detailed textual analysis. But there is no getting away from the fact that literary studies in general, and American Marxist theorists in particular, have avoided the effort of seriously bridging the gap between the superstructural and the base levels in textual, historical scholarship; on another occasion I have gone so far as to say that the literary-cultural establishment as a whole has declared the serious study of imperialism and culture off limits.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In an interview published in &#039;&#039;Diacritics&#039;&#039; 6, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 38.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Orientalism brings one up directly against that question--that is, to realizing that political imperialism governs an entire field of study, imagination, and scholarly institutions--in such a way as to make its avoidance an intellectual and historical impossibility. Yet there will always remain the perennial escape mechanism of saying that a literary scholar and a philosopher, for example, are trained in literature and philosophy respectively, not in politics or ideological analysis. In other words, the specialist argument can work quite effectively to block the larger and, in my opinion, the more intellectually serious perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here it seems to me there is a simple two-part answer to be given, at least so far as the study of imperialism and culture (or Orientalism) is concerned. In the first place, nearly every nineteenth-century writer (and the same is true enough of writers in earlier periods) was extraordinarily well aware of the fact of empire: this is a subject not very well studied, but it will not take a modern Victorian specialist long to admit that liberal cultural heroes like John Stuart Mill, Arnold, Carlyle, Newman, Macaulay, Ruskin, George Eliot, and even Dickens had definite views on race and imperialism, which are quite easily to be found at work in their writing. So even a specialist must deal with the knowledge that Mill, for example, made it clear in &#039;&#039;On Liberty&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Representative Government&#039;&#039; that his views there could not be applied to India (he was an India Office functionary for a good deal of his life, after all) because the Indians were civilizationally, if not racially, inferior. The same kind of paradox is to be found in Marx, as I try to show in this book. In the second place, to believe that politics in the form of imperialism bears upon the production of literature, scholarship, social theory, and history writing is by no means equivalent to saying that culture is therefore a demeaned or denigrated thing. Quite the contrary: my whole point is to say that we can better understand the persistence and the durability of saturating hegemonic systems like culture when we realize that their internal constraints upon writers and thinkers were &#039;&#039;productive&#039;&#039;, not unilaterally inhibiting. It is this idea that Gramsci, certainly, and Foucault and Raymond Williams in their very different ways have been trying to illustrate. Even one or two pages by Williams on &amp;quot;the uses of the Empire&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Long Revolution&#039;&#039; tell us more about nineteenth-century cultural richness than many volumes of hermetic textual analyses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Williams, &#039;&#039;The Long Revolution&#039;&#039; (London: Chatto &amp;amp; Windus, 1961), pp. 66-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore I study Orientalism as a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the large political concerns shaped by the three great empires--British, French, American--in whose intellectual and imaginative territory the writing was produced. What interests me most as a scholar is not the gross political verity but the detail, as indeed what interests us in someone like Lane or Flaubert or Renan is not the (to him) indisputable truth that Occidentals are superior to Orientals, but the profoundly worked over and modulated evidence of his detailed work within the very wide space opened up by that truth. One need only remember that Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; is a classic of historical and anthropological observation because of its style, its enormously intelligent and brilliant details, not because of its simple reflection of racial superiority, to understand what I am saying here.&lt;br /&gt;
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The kind of political questions raised by Orientalism, then, are as follows: What other sorts of intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly, and cultural energies went into the making of an imperialist tradition like the Orientalist one? How did philology, lexicography, history, biology, political and economic theory, novel-writing, and lyric poetry come to the service of Orientalism&#039;s broadly imperialist view of the world? What changes, modulations, refinements, even revolutions take place within Orientalism? What is the meaning of originality, of continuity, of individuality, in this context? How does Orientalism transmit or reproduce itself from one epoch to another? In fine, how can we treat the cultural, historical phenomenon of Orientalism as a kind of &#039;&#039;willed human work&#039;&#039;--not of mere unconditioned ratiocination--in all its historical complexity, detail, and worth without at the same time losing sight of the alliance between cultural work, political tendencies, the state, and the specific realities of domination? Governed by such concerns a humanistic study can responsibly address itself to politics &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; culture. But this is not to say that such a study establishes a hard-and-fast rule about the relationship between knowledge and politics. My argument is that each humanistic investigation must formulate the nature of that connection in the specific context of the study, the subject matter, and its historical circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
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2. &#039;&#039;The methodological question&#039;&#039;. In a previous book I gave a good deal of thought and analysis to the methodological importance for work in the human sciences of finding and formulating a first step, a point of departure, a beginning principle.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In my &#039;&#039;Beginnings: Intention and Method&#039;&#039; (New York: Basic Books, 1975).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A major lesson I learned and tried to present was that there is no such thing as a merely given, or simply available, starting point: beginnings have to be made for each project in such a way as to &#039;&#039;enable&#039;&#039; what follows from them. Nowhere in my experience has the difficulty of this lesson been more consciously lived (with what success--or failure--I cannot really say) than in this study of Orientalism. The idea of beginning, indeed the act of beginning, necessarily involves an act of delimitation by which something is cut out of a great mass of material, separated from the mass, and made to stand for, as well as be, a starting point, a beginning; for the student of texts one such notion of inaugural delimitation is Louis Althusser&#039;s idea of the &#039;&#039;problematic&#039;&#039;, a specific determinate unity of a text, or group of texts, which is something given rise to by analysis.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Louis Althusser, &#039;&#039;For Marx&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), pp. 65-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet in the case of Orientalism (as opposed to the case of Marx&#039;s texts, which is what Althusser studies) there is not simply the problem of finding a point of departure, or problematic, but also the question of designating which texts, authors, and periods are the ones best suited for study.&lt;br /&gt;
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It has seemed to me foolish to attempt an encyclopedic narrative history of Orientalism, first of all because if my guiding principle was to be &amp;quot;the European idea of the Orient&amp;quot; there would be virtually no limit to the material I would have had to deal with; second, because the narrative model itself did not suit my descriptive and political interests; third, because in such books as Raymond Schwab&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;, Johann Fuck&#039;s &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039;, and more recently, Dorothee Metlitzki&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Matter of Araby in Medieval England&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1950); Johann W. Fuck, &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955); Dorothee Metlitzki, &#039;&#039;The Matter of Araby in Medieval England&#039;&#039; (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there already exist encyclopedic works on certain aspects of the European-Oriental encounter such as make the critic&#039;s job, in the general political and intellectual context I sketched above, a different one.&lt;br /&gt;
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There still remained the problem of cutting down a very fat archive to manageable dimensions, and more important, outlining something in the nature of an intellectual order within that group of texts without at the same time following a mindlessly chronological order. My starting point therefore has been the British, French, and American experience of the Orient taken as a unit, what made that experience possible by way of historical and intellectual background, what the quality and character of the experience has been. For reasons I shall discuss presently I limited that already limited (but still inordinately large) set of questions to the Anglo-French-American experience of the Arabs and Islam, which for almost a thousand years together stood for the Orient. Immediately upon doing that, a large part of the Orient seemed to have been eliminated--India, Japan, China, and other sections of the Far East--not because these regions were not important (they obviously have been) but because one could discuss Europe&#039;s experience of the Near Orient, or of Islam, apart from its experience of the Far Orient. Yet at certain moments of that general European history of interest in the East, particular parts of the Orient like Egypt, Syria, and Arabia cannot be discussed without also studying Europe&#039;s involvement in the more distant parts, of which Persia and India are the most important; a notable case in point is the connection between Egypt and India so far as eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain was concerned. Similarly the French role in deciphering the Zend-Avesta, the pre-eminence of Paris as a center of Sanskrit studies during the first decade of the nineteenth century, the fact that Napoleon&#039;s interest in the Orient was contingent upon his sense of the British role in India: all these Far Eastern interests directly influenced French interest in the Near East, Islam, and the Arabs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Britain and France dominated the Eastern Mediterranean from about the end of the seventeenth century on. Yet my discussion of that domination and systematic interest does not do justice to (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) the important contributions to Orientalism of Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Portugal and (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) the fact that one of the important impulses toward the study of the Orient in the eighteenth century was the revolution in Biblical studies stimulated by such variously interesting pioneers as Bishop Lowth, Eichhorn, Herder, and Michaelis. In the first place, I had to focus rigorously upon the British-French and later the American material because it seemed inescapably true not only that Britain and France were the pioneer nations in the Orient and in Oriental studies, but that these vanguard positions were held by virtue of the two greatest colonial networks in pre-twentieth-century history; the American Oriental position since World War II has fit--I think, quite self-consciously--in the places excavated by the two earlier European powers. Then too, I believe that the sheer quality, consistency, and mass of British, French, and American writing on the Orient lifts it above the doubtless crucial work done in Germany, Italy, Russia, and elsewhere. But I think it is also true that the major steps in Oriental scholarship were first taken in either Britain and France, then elaborated upon by Germans. Silvestre de Sacy, for example, was not only the first modern and institutional European Orientalist, who worked on Islam, Arabic literature, the Druze religion, and Sassanid Persia; he was also the teacher of Champollion and of Franz Bopp, the founder of German comparative linguistics. A similar claim of priority and subsequent pre-eminence can be made for William Jones and Edward William Lane.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the second place--and here the failings of my study of Orientalism are amply made up for--there has been some important recent work on the background in Biblical scholarship to the rise of what I have called modern Orientalism. The best and the most illuminatingly relevant is E. S. Shaffer&#039;s impressive &#039;&#039;&amp;quot;Kubla Khan&amp;quot; and The Fall of Jerusalem&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;E. S. Shaffer, &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;Kubla Khan&amp;quot; and The Fall of Jerusalem: The Mythological School in Biblical Criticism and Secular Literature, 1770-1880&#039;&#039; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an indispensable study of the origins of Romanticism, and of the intellectual activity underpinning a great deal of what goes on in Coleridge, Browning, and George Eliot. To some degree Shaffer&#039;s work refines upon the outlines provided in Schwab, by articulating the material of relevance to be found in the German Biblical scholars and using that material to read, in an intelligent and always interesting way, the work of three major British writers. Yet what is missing in the book is some sense of the political as well as ideological edge given the Oriental material by the British and French writers I am principally concerned with; in addition, unlike Shaffer I attempt to elucidate subsequent developments in academic as well as literary Orientalism that bear on the connection between British and French Orientalism on the one hand and the rise of an explicitly colonial-minded imperialism on the other. Then too, I wish to show how all these earlier matters are reproduced more or less in American Orientalism after the Second World War.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless there is a possibly misleading aspect to my study, where, aside from an occasional reference, I do not exhaustively discuss the German developments after the inaugural period dominated by Sacy. Any work that seeks to provide an understanding of academic Orientalism and pays little attention to scholars like Steinthal, Muller, Becker, Goldziher, Brockelmann, Noldeke--to mention only a handful--needs to be reproached, and I freely reproach myself. I particularly regret not taking more account of the great scientific prestige that accrued to German scholarship by the middle of the nineteenth century, whose neglect was made into a denunciation of insular British scholars by George Eliot. I have in mind Eliot&#039;s unforgettable portrait of Mr. Casaubon in &#039;&#039;Middlemarch&#039;&#039;. One reason Casaubon cannot finish his Key to All Mythologies is, according to his young cousin Will Ladislaw, that he is unacquainted with German scholarship. For not only has Casaubon chosen a subject &amp;quot;as changing as chemistry: new discoveries are constantly making new points of view&amp;quot;: he is undertaking a job similar to a refutation of Paracelsus because &amp;quot;he is not an Orientalist, you know.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Eliot, &#039;&#039;Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life&#039;&#039; (1872; reprint ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956), p. 164.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Eliot was not wrong in implying that by about 1830, which is when &#039;&#039;Middlemarch&#039;&#039; is set, German scholarship had fully attained its European pre-eminence. Yet at no time in German scholarship during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century could a close partnership have developed between Orientalists and a protracted, sustained &#039;&#039;national&#039;&#039; interest in the Orient. There was nothing in Germany to correspond to the Anglo-French presence in India, the Levant, North Africa. Moreover, the German Orient was almost exclusively a scholarly, or at least a classical, Orient: it was made the subject of lyrics, fantasies, and even novels, but it was never actual, the way Egypt and Syria were actual for Chateaubriand, Lane, Lamartine, Burton, Disraeli, or Nerval. There is some significance in the fact that the two most renowned German works on the Orient, Goethe&#039;s &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039; and Friedrich Schlegel&#039;s &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier&#039;&#039;, were based respectively on a Rhine journey and on hours spent in Paris libraries. What German Oriental scholarship did was to refine and elaborate techniques whose application was to texts, myths, ideas, and languages almost literally gathered from the Orient by imperial Britain and France.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet what German Orientalism had in common with Anglo-French and later American Orientalism was a kind of intellectual &#039;&#039;authority&#039;&#039; over the Orient within Western culture. This authority must in large part be the subject of any description of Orientalism, and it is so in this study. Even the name &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; suggests a serious, perhaps ponderous style of expertise; when I apply it to modern American social scientists (since they do not call themselves Orientalists, my use of the word is anomalous), it is to draw attention to the way Middle East experts can still draw on the vestiges of Orientalism&#039;s intellectual position in nineteenth-century Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated, disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgments it forms, transmits, reproduces. Above all, authority can, indeed must, be analyzed. All these attributes of authority apply to Orientalism, and much of what I do in this study is to describe both the historical authority in and the personal authorities of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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My principal methodological devices for studying authority here are what can be called &#039;&#039;strategic location&#039;&#039;, which is a way of describing the author&#039;s position in a text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about, and &#039;&#039;strategic formation&#039;&#039;, which is a way of analyzing the relationship between texts and the way in which groups of texts, types of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large. I use the notion of strategy simply to identify the problem every writer on the Orient has faced: how to get hold of it, how to approach it, how not to be defeated or overwhelmed by its sublimity, its scope, its awful dimensions. Everyone who writes about the Orient must locate himself vis-a-vis the Orient; translated into his text, this location includes the kind of narrative voice he adopts, the type of structure he builds, the kinds of images, themes, motifs that circulate in his text--all of which add up to deliberate ways of addressing the reader, containing the Orient, and finally, representing it or speaking in its behalf. None of this takes place in the abstract, however. Every writer on the Orient (and this is true even of Homer) assumes some Oriental precedent, some previous knowledge of the Orient, to which he refers and on which he relies. Additionally, each work on the Orient &#039;&#039;affiliates&#039;&#039; itself with other works, with audiences, with institutions, with the Orient itself. The ensemble of relationships between works, audiences, and some particular aspects of the Orient therefore constitutes an analyzable formation--for example, that of philological studies, of anthologies of extracts from Oriental literature, of travel books, of Oriental fantasies--whose presence in time, in discourse, in institutions (schools, libraries, foreign services) gives it strength and authority.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is clear, I hope, that my concern with authority does not entail analysis of what lies hidden in the Orientalist text, but analysis rather of the text&#039;s surface, its exteriority to what it describes. I do not think that this idea can be overemphasized. Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West. He is never concerned with the Orient except as the first cause of what he says. What he says and writes, by virtue of the fact that it is said or written, is meant to indicate that the Orientalist is outside the Orient, both as an existential and as a moral fact. The principal product of this exteriority is of course representation: as early as Aeschylus&#039;s play &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039; the Orient is transformed from a very far distant and often threatening Otherness into figures that are relatively familiar (in Aeschylus&#039;s case, grieving Asiatic women). The dramatic immediacy of representation in &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039; obscures the fact that the audience is watching a highly artificial enactment of what a non-Oriental has made into a symbol for the whole Orient. My analysis of the Orientalist text therefore places emphasis on the evidence, which is by no means invisible, for such representations &#039;&#039;as representations&#039;&#039;, not as &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; depictions of the Orient. This evidence is found just as prominently in the so-called truthful text (histories, philological analyses, political treatises) as in the avowedly artistic (i.e., openly imaginative) text. The things to look at are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, &#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039; the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great original. The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job, for the West, and &#039;&#039;faute de mieux&#039;&#039;, for the poor Orient. &amp;quot;Sie konnen sich nicht vertreten, sie mussen vertreten werden,&amp;quot; as Marx wrote in &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another reason for insisting upon exteriority is that I believe it needs to be made clear about cultural discourse and exchange within a culture that what is commonly circulated by it is not &amp;quot;truth&amp;quot; but representations. It hardly needs to be demonstrated again that language itself is a highly organized and encoded system, which employs many devices to express, indicate, exchange messages and information, represent, and so forth. In any instance of at least written language, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a &#039;&#039;re-presence&#039;&#039;, or a representation. The value, efficacy, strength, apparent veracity of a written statement about the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot instrumentally depend, on the Orient as such. On the contrary, the written statement is a presence to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made supererogatory any such &#039;&#039;real thing&#039;&#039; as &amp;quot;the Orient.&amp;quot; Thus all of Orientalism stands forth and away from the Orient: that Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the West than on the Orient, and this sense is directly indebted to various Western techniques of representation that make the Orient visible, clear, &amp;quot;there&amp;quot; in discourse about it. And these representations rely upon institutions, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of understanding for their effects, not upon a distant and amorphous Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between representations of the Orient before the last third of the eighteenth century and those after it (that is, those belonging to what I call modern Orientalism) is that the range of representation expanded enormously in the later period. It is true that after William Jones and Anquetil-Duperron, and after Napoleon&#039;s Egyptian expedition, Europe came to know the Orient more scientifically, to live in it with greater authority and discipline than ever before. But what mattered to Europe was the expanded scope and the much greater refinement given its techniques for receiving the Orient. When around the turn of the eighteenth century the Orient definitively revealed the age of its languages--thus outdating Hebrew&#039;s divine pedigree--it was a group of Europeans who made the discovery, passed it on to other scholars, and preserved the discovery in the new science of Indo-European philology. A new powerful science for viewing the linguistic Orient was born, and with it, as Foucault has shown in &#039;&#039;The Order of Things&#039;&#039;, a whole web of related scientific interests. Similarly William Beckford, Byron, Goethe, and Hugo restructured the Orient by their art and made its colors, lights, and people visible through their images, rhythms, and motifs. At most, the &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; Orient provoked a writer to his vision; it very rarely guided it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientalism responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West. Thus the history of Orientalism has both an internal consistency and a highly articulated set of relationships to the dominant culture surrounding it. My analyses consequently try to show the field&#039;s shape and internal organization, its pioneers, patriarchal authorities, canonical texts, doxological ideas, exemplary figures, its followers, elaborators, and new authorities; I try also to explain how Orientalism borrowed and was frequently informed by &amp;quot;strong&amp;quot; ideas, doctrines, and trends ruling the culture. Thus there was (and is) a linguistic Orient, a Freudian Orient, a Spenglerian Orient, a Darwinian Orient, a racist Orient--and so on. Yet never has there been such a thing as a pure, or unconditional, Orient; similarly, never has there been a nonmaterial form of Orientalism, much less something so innocent as an &amp;quot;idea&amp;quot; of the Orient. In this underlying conviction and in its ensuing methodological consequences do I differ from scholars who study the history of ideas. For the emphases and the executive form, above all the material effectiveness, of statements made by Orientalist discourse are possible in ways that any hermetic history of ideas tends completely to scant. Without those emphases and that material effectiveness Orientalism would be just another idea, whereas it is and was much more than that. Therefore I set out to examine not only scholarly works but also works of literature, political tracts, journalistic texts, travel books, religious and philological studies. In other words, my hybrid perspective is broadly historical and &amp;quot;anthropological,&amp;quot; given that I believe all texts to be worldly and circumstantial in (of course) ways that vary from genre to genre, and from historical period to historical period.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet unlike Michel Foucault, to whose work I am greatly indebted, I do believe in the determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism. The unity of the large ensemble of texts I analyze is due in part to the fact that they frequently refer to each other: Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors. Edward William Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; was read and cited by such diverse figures as Nerval, Flaubert, and Richard Burton. He was an authority whose use was an imperative for anyone writing or thinking about the Orient, not just about Egypt: when Nerval borrows passages verbatim from &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; it is to use Lane&#039;s authority to assist him in describing village scenes in Syria, not Egypt. Lane&#039;s authority and the opportunities provided for citing him discriminately as well as indiscriminately were there because Orientalism could give his text the kind of distributive currency that he acquired. There is no way, however, of understanding Lane&#039;s currency without also understanding the peculiar features of &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; text; this is equally true of Renan, Sacy, Lamartine, Schlegel, and a group of other influential writers. Foucault believes that in general the individual text or author counts for very little; empirically, in the case of Orientalism (and perhaps nowhere else) I find this not to be so. Accordingly my analyses employ close textual readings whose goal is to reveal the dialectic between individual text or writer and the complex collective formation to which his work is a contribution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet even though it includes an ample selection of writers, this book is still far from a complete history or general account of Orientalism. Of this failing I am very conscious. The fabric of as thick a discourse as Orientalism has survived and functioned in Western society because of its richness: all I have done is to describe parts of that fabric at certain moments, and merely to suggest the existence of a larger whole, detailed, interesting, dotted with fascinating figures, texts, and events. I have consoled myself with believing that this book is one installment of several, and hope there are scholars and critics who might want to write others. There is still a general essay to be written on imperialism and culture; other studies would go more deeply into the connection between Orientalism and pedagogy, or into Italian, Dutch, German, and Swiss Orientalism, or into the dynamic between scholarship and imaginative writing, or into the relationship between administrative ideas and intellectual discipline. Perhaps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a nonrepressive and nonmanipulative, perspective. But then one would have to rethink the whole complex problem of knowledge and power. These are all tasks left embarrassingly incomplete in this study.&lt;br /&gt;
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The last, perhaps self-flattering, observation on method that I want to make here is that I have written this study with several audiences in mind. For students of literature and criticism, Orientalism offers a marvelous instance of the interrelations between society, history, and textuality; moreover, the cultural role played by the Orient in the West connects Orientalism with ideology, politics, and the logic of power, matters of relevance, I think, to the literary community. For contemporary students of the Orient, from university scholars to policymakers, I have written with two ends in mind: one, to present their intellectual genealogy to them in a way that has not been done; two, to criticize--with the hope of stirring discussion--the often unquestioned assumptions on which their work for the most part depends. For the general reader, this study deals with matters that always compel attention, all of them connected not only with Western conceptions and treatments of the Other but also with the singularly important role played by Western culture in what Vico called the world of nations. Lastly, for readers in the so-called Third World, this study proposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western politics and of the non-Western world in those politics as of the &#039;&#039;strength&#039;&#039; of Western cultural discourse, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or &amp;quot;superstructural.&amp;quot; My hope is to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves or upon others.&lt;br /&gt;
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The three long chapters and twelve shorter units into which this book is divided are intended to facilitate exposition as much as possible. Chapter One, &amp;quot;The Scope of Orientalism,&amp;quot; draws a large circle around all the dimensions of the subject, both in terms of historical time and experiences and in terms of philosophical and political themes. Chapter Two, &amp;quot;Orientalist Structures and Restructures,&amp;quot; attempts to trace the development of modern Orientalism by a broadly chronological description, and also by the description of a set of devices common to the work of important poets, artists, and scholars. Chapter Three, &amp;quot;Orientalism Now,&amp;quot; begins where its predecessor left off, at around 1870. This is the period of great colonial expansion into the Orient, and it culminates in World War II. The very last section of Chapter Three characterizes the shift from British and French to American hegemony; I attempt there finally to sketch the present intellectual and social realities of Orientalism in the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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3. &#039;&#039;The personal dimension&#039;&#039;. In the &#039;&#039;Prison Notebooks&#039;&#039; Gramsci says: &amp;quot;The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is &#039;knowing thyself&#039; as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory.&amp;quot; The only available English translation inexplicably leaves Gramsci&#039;s comment at that, whereas in fact Gramsci&#039;s Italian text concludes by adding, &amp;quot;therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Antonio Gramsci, &#039;&#039;The Prison Notebooks: Selections&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 324. The full passage, unavailable in the Hoare and Smith translation, is to be found in Gramsci, &#039;&#039;Quaderni del Carcere&#039;&#039;, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Turin: Einaudi Editore, 1975), 2: 1363.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the personal investment in this study derives from my awareness of being an &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; as a child growing up in two British colonies. All of my education, in those colonies (Palestine and Egypt) and in the United States, has been Western, and yet that deep early awareness has persisted. In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon me, the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life of all Orientals. This is why for me the Islamic Orient has had to be the center of attention. Whether what I have achieved is the inventory prescribed by Gramsci is not for me to judge, although I have felt it important to be conscious of trying to produce one. Along the way, as severely and as rationally as I have been able, I have tried to maintain a critical consciousness, as well as employing those instruments of historical, humanistic, and cultural research of which my education has made me the fortunate beneficiary. In none of that, however, have I ever lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal involvement in having been constituted as, &amp;quot;an Oriental.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The historical circumstances making such a study possible are fairly complex, and I can only list them schematically here. Anyone resident in the West since the 1950s, particularly in the United States, will have lived through an era of extraordinary turbulence in the relations of East and West. No one will have failed to note how &amp;quot;East&amp;quot; has always signified danger and threat during this period, even as it has meant the traditional Orient as well as Russia. In the universities a growing establishment of area-studies programs and institutes has made the scholarly study of the Orient a branch of national policy. Public affairs in this country include a healthy interest in the Orient, as much for its strategic and economic importance as for its traditional exoticism. If the world has become immediately accessible to a Western citizen living in the electronic age, the Orient too has drawn nearer to him, and is now less a myth perhaps than a place crisscrossed by Western, especially American, interests.&lt;br /&gt;
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One aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the media&#039;s resources have forced information into more and more standardized molds. So far as the Orient is concerned, standardization and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the nineteenth-century academic and imaginative demonology of &amp;quot;the mysterious Orient.&amp;quot; This is nowhere more true than in the ways by which the Near East is grasped. Three things have contributed to making even the simplest perception of the Arabs and Islam into a highly politicized, almost raucous matter: one, the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West, which is immediately reflected in the history of Orientalism; two, the struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism, and its effects upon American Jews as well as upon both the liberal culture and the population at large; three, the almost total absence of any cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss the Arabs or Islam. Furthermore, it hardly needs saying that because the Middle East is now so identified with Great Power politics, oil economics, and the simple-minded dichotomy of freedom-loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs, the chances of anything like a clear view of what one talks about in talking about the Near East are depressingly small.&lt;br /&gt;
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My own experiences of these matters are in part what made me write this book. The life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, particularly in America, is disheartening. There exists here an almost unanimous consensus that politically he does not exist, and when it is allowed that he does, it is either as a nuisance or, as an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian has come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny. It has made matters worse for him to remark that no person academically involved with the Near East--no Orientalist, that is--has ever in the United States culturally and politically identified himself wholeheartedly with the Arabs; certainly there have been identifications on some level, but they have never taken an &amp;quot;acceptable&amp;quot; form as has liberal American identification with Zionism, and all too frequently they have been radically flawed by their association either with discredited political and economic interests (oil-company and State Department Arabists, for example) or with religion.&lt;br /&gt;
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The nexus of knowledge and power creating &amp;quot;the Oriental&amp;quot; and in a sense obliterating him as a human being is therefore not for me an exclusively academic matter. Yet it is an &#039;&#039;intellectual&#039;&#039; matter of some very obvious importance. I have been able to put to use my humanistic and political concerns for the analysis and description of a very worldly matter, the rise, development, and consolidation of Orientalism. Too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent; it has regularly seemed otherwise to me, and certainly my study of Orientalism has convinced me (and I hope will convince my literary colleagues) that society and literary culture can only be understood and studied together. In addition, and by an almost inescapable logic, I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of Western anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism and, as I have discussed it in its Islamic branch, Orientalism resemble each other very closely is a historical, cultural, and political truth that needs only to be mentioned to an Arab Palestinian for its irony to be perfectly understood. But what I should like also to have contributed here is a better understanding of the way cultural domination has operated. If this stimulates a new kind of dealing with the Orient, indeed if it eliminates the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; altogether, then we shall have advanced a little in the process of what Raymond Williams has called the &amp;quot;unlearning&amp;quot; of &amp;quot;the inherent dominative mode.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Williams, &#039;&#039;Culture and Society, 1780-1950&#039;&#039; (London: Chatto &amp;amp; Windus, 1958), p. 376.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;1.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;The Scope of Orientalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
... le genie inquiet et ambitieux de Europeens ... impatient d&#039;employer les nouveaux instruments de leur puissance ...&lt;br /&gt;
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--Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, &#039;&#039;Preface historique&#039;&#039; (1809) &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== I. &#039;&#039;&#039;Knowing the Oriental&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
On June 13, 1910, Arthur James Balfour lectured the House of Commons on &amp;quot;the problems with which we have to deal in Egypt.&amp;quot; These, he said, &amp;quot;belong to a wholly different category&amp;quot; than those &amp;quot;affecting the Isle of Wight or the West Riding of Yorkshire.&amp;quot; He spoke with the authority of a long-time member of Parliament, former private secretary to Lord Salisbury, former chief secretary for Ireland, former secretary for Scotland, former prime minister, veteran of numerous overseas crises, achievements, and changes. During his involvement in imperial affairs Balfour served a monarch who in 1876 had been declared Empress of India; he had been especially well placed in positions of uncommon influence to follow the Afghan and Zulu wars, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the death of General Gordon in the Sudan, the Fashoda Incident, the battle of Omdurman, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War. In addition his remarkable social eminence, the breadth of his learning and wit--he could write on such varied subjects as Bergson, Handel, theism, and golf--his education at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, and his apparent command over imperial affairs all gave considerable authority to what he told the Commons in June 1910. But there was still more to Balfour&#039;s speech, or at least to his need for giving it so didactically and moralistically. Some members were questioning the necessity for &amp;quot;England in Egypt,&amp;quot; the subject of Alfred Milner&#039;s enthusiastic book of 1892, but here designating a once-profitable occupation that had become a source of trouble now that Egyptian nationalism was on the rise and the continuing British presence in Egypt no longer so easy to defend. Balfour, then, to inform and explain.&lt;br /&gt;
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Recalling the challenge of J. M. Robertson, the member of Tyneside, Balfour himself put Robertson&#039;s question again: &amp;quot;What right have you to take up these airs of superiority with regard to people whom you choose to call Oriental?&amp;quot; The choice of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; was canonical; it had been employed by Chaucer and Mandeville, by Shakespeare, Dryden, Pope, and Byron. It designated Asia or the East, geographically, morally, culturally. One could speak in Europe of an Oriental personality, an Oriental atmosphere, an Oriental tale, Oriental despotism, or an Oriental mode of production, and be understood. Marx had used the word, and now Balfour was using it; his choice was understandable and called for no comment whatever.&lt;br /&gt;
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I take up no attitude of superiority. But I ask [Robertson and anyone else] ... who has even the most superficial knowledge of history, if they will look in the face the facts with which a British statesman has to deal when he is put in a position of supremacy over great races like the inhabitants of Egypt and countries in the East. We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know the civilization of any other country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately; we know more about it. It goes far beyond the petty span of the history of our race, which is lost in the prehistoric period at a time when the Egyptian civilisation had already passed its prime. Look at all the Oriental countries. Do not talk about superiority or inferiority.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two great themes dominate his remarks here and in what will follow: knowledge and power, the Baconian themes. As Balfour justifies the necessity for British occupation of Egypt, supremacy in his mind is associated with &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; knowledge of Egypt and not principally with military or economic power. Knowledge to Balfour means surveying a civilization from its origins to its prime to its decline--and of course, it means &#039;&#039;being able to do that&#039;&#039;. Knowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant. The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object is a &amp;quot;fact&amp;quot; which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; to deny autonomy to &amp;quot;it&amp;quot;--the Oriental country--since we know it and it exists, in a sense, &#039;&#039;as&#039;&#039; we know it. British knowledge of Egypt &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; Egypt for Balfour, and the burdens of knowledge make such questions as inferiority and superiority seem petty ones. Balfour nowhere denies British superiority and Egyptian inferiority; he takes them for granted as he describes the consequences of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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First of all, look at the facts of the case. Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities for self-government ... having merits of their own.... You may look through the whole history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, and you never find traces of self-government. All their great centuries--and they have been very great--have been passed under despotisms, under absolute government. All their great contributions to civilisation--and they have been great--have been made under that form of government. Conqueror has succeeded conqueror; one domination has followed another; but never in all the revolutions of fate and fortune have you seen one of those nations of its own motion establish what we, from a Western point of view, call self-government. That is the fact. It is not a question of superiority and inferiority. I suppose a true Eastern sage would say that the working government which we have taken upon ourselves in Egypt and elsewhere is not a work worthy of a philosopher--that it is the dirty work, the inferior work, of carrying on the necessary labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since these facts are facts, Balfour must then go on to the next part of his argument.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is it a good thing for these great nations--I admit their greatness--that this absolute government should be exercised by us? I think it is a good thing. I think that experience shows that they have got under it far better government than in the whole history of the world they ever had before, and which not only is a benefit to them, but is undoubtedly a benefit to the whole of the civilised West.... We are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the Egyptians, though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large.&lt;br /&gt;
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Balfour produces no evidence that Egyptians and &amp;quot;the races with whom we deal&amp;quot; appreciate or even understand the good that is being done them by colonial occupation. It does not occur to Balfour, however, to let the Egyptian speak for himself, since presumably any Egyptian who would speak out is more likely to be &amp;quot;the agitator [who] wishes to raise difficulties&amp;quot; than the good native who overlooks the &amp;quot;difficulties&amp;quot; of foreign domination. And so, having settled the ethical problems, Balfour turns at last to the practical ones. &amp;quot;If it is our business to govern, with or without gratitude, with or without the real and genuine memory of all the loss of which we have relieved the population [Balfour by no means implies, as part of that loss, the loss or at least the indefinite postponement of Egyptian independence] and no vivid imagination of all the benefits which we have given to them; if that is our duty, how is it to be performed?&amp;quot; England exports &amp;quot;our very best to these countries.&amp;quot; These selfless administrators do their work &amp;quot;amidst tens of thousands of persons belonging to a different creed, a different race, a different discipline, different conditions of life.&amp;quot; What makes their work of governing possible is their sense of being supported at home by a government that endorses what they do. Yet&lt;br /&gt;
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directly the native populations have that instinctive feeling that those with whom they have got to deal have not behind them the might, the authority, the sympathy, the full and ungrudging support of the country which sent them there, those populations lose all that sense of order which is the very basis of their civilisation, just as our officers lose all that sense of power and authority, which is the very basis of everything they can do for the benefit of those among whom they have been sent.&lt;br /&gt;
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Balfour&#039;s logic here is interesting, not least for being completely consistent with the premises of his entire speech. England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes &amp;quot;the very basis&amp;quot; of contemporary Egyptian civilization; Egypt requires, indeed insists upon, British occupation. But if the special intimacy between governor and governed in Egypt is disturbed by Parliament&#039;s doubts at home, then &amp;quot;the authority of what ... is the dominant race--and as I think ought to remain the dominant race--has been undermined.&amp;quot; Not only does English prestige suffer; &amp;quot;it is vain for a handful of British officials--endow them how you like, give them all the qualities of character and genius you can imagine--it is impossible for them to carry out the great task which in Egypt, not we only, but the civilised world have imposed upon them.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This and the preceding quotations from Arthur James Balfour&#039;s speech to the House of Commons are from Great Britain, &#039;&#039;Parliamentary Debates&#039;&#039; (Commons), 5th ser., 17 (1910): 1140-46. See also A. P. Thornton, &#039;&#039;The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power&#039;&#039; (London: MacMillan &amp;amp; Co., 1959), pp. 357-60. Balfour&#039;s speech was a defense of Eldon Gorst&#039;s policy in Egypt; for a discussion of that see Peter John Dreyfus Mellini, &amp;quot;Sir Eldon Gorst and British Imperial Policy in Egypt,&amp;quot; unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1971.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As a rhetorical performance Balfour&#039;s speech is significant for the way in which he plays the part of, and represents, a variety of characters. There are of course &amp;quot;the English,&amp;quot; for whom the pronoun &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; is used with the full weight of a distinguished, powerful man who feels himself to be representative of all that is best in his nation&#039;s history. Balfour can also speak for the civilized world, the West, and the relatively small corps of colonial officials in Egypt. If he does not speak directly for the Orientals, it is because they after all speak another language; yet he knows how they feel since he knows their history, their reliance upon such as he, and their expectations. Still, he does speak for them in the sense that what they might have to say, were they to be asked and might they be able to answer, would somewhat uselessly confirm what is already evident: that they are a subject race, dominated by a race that knows them and what is good for them better than they could possibly know themselves. Their great moments were in the past; they are useful in the modern world only because the powerful and up-to-date empires have effectively brought them out of the wretchedness of their decline and turned them into rehabilitated residents of productive colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Egypt in particular was an excellent case in point, and Balfour was perfectly aware of how much right he had to speak as a member of his country&#039;s parliament on behalf of England, the West, Western civilization, about modern Egypt. For Egypt was not just another colony: it was the vindication of Western imperialism; it was, until its annexation by England, an almost academic example of Oriental backwardness; it was to become the triumph of English knowledge and power. Between 1882, the year in which England occupied Egypt and put an end to the nationalist rebellion of Colonel Arabi, and 1907, England&#039;s representative in Egypt, Egypt&#039;s master, was Evelyn Baring (also known as &amp;quot;Over-baring&amp;quot;), Lord Cromer. On July 30, 1907, it was Balfour in the Commons who had supported the project to give Cromer a retirement prize of fifty thousand pounds as a reward for what he had done in Egypt. Cromer &#039;&#039;made&#039;&#039; Egypt, said Balfour:&lt;br /&gt;
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Everything he has touched he has succeeded in.... Lord Cromer&#039;s services during the past quarter of a century have raised Egypt from the lowest pitch of social and economic degradation until it now stands among Oriental nations, I believe, absolutely alone in its prosperity, financial and moral.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Denis Judd, &#039;&#039;Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932&#039;&#039; (London: MacMillan &amp;amp; Co., 1968), p. 286. See also p. 292: as late as 1926 Balfour spoke--without irony--of Egypt as an &amp;quot;independent nation.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How Egypt&#039;s moral prosperity was measured, Balfour did not venture to say. British exports to Egypt equaled those to the whole of Africa; that certainly indicated a sort of financial prosperity, for Egypt and England (somewhat unevenly) together. But what really mattered was the unbroken, all-embracing Western tutelage of an Oriental country, from the scholars, missionaries, businessmen, soldiers, and teachers who prepared and then implemented the occupation to the high functionaries like Cromer and Balfour who saw themselves as providing for, directing, and sometimes even forcing Egypt&#039;s rise from Oriental neglect to its present lonely eminence.&lt;br /&gt;
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If British success in Egypt was as exceptional as Balfour said, it was by no means an inexplicable or irrational success. Egyptian affairs had been controlled according to a general theory expressed both by Balfour in his notions about Oriental civilization and by Cromer in his management of everyday business in Egypt. The most important thing about the theory during the first decade of the twentieth century was that it worked, and worked staggeringly well. The argument, when reduced to its simplest form, was clear, it was precise, it was easy to grasp. There are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; the latter must be dominated, which usually means having their land occupied, their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power. That Balfour and Cromer, as we shall soon see, could strip humanity down to such ruthless cultural and racial essences was not at all an indication of their particular viciousness. Rather it was an indication of how streamlined a general doctrine had become by the time they put it to use--how streamlined and effective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Balfour, whose theses on Orientals pretended to objective universality, Cromer spoke about Orientals specifically as what he had ruled or had to deal with, first in India, then for the twenty-five years in Egypt during which he emerged as the paramount consulgeneral in England&#039;s empire. Balfour&#039;s &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot; are Cromer&#039;s &amp;quot;subject races,&amp;quot; which he made the topic of a long essay published in the &#039;&#039;Edinburgh Review&#039;&#039; in January 1908. Once again, knowledge of subject races or Orientals is what makes their management easy and profitable; knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control. Cromer&#039;s notion is that England&#039;s empire will not dissolve if such things as militarism and commercial egotism at home and &amp;quot;free institutions&amp;quot; in the colony (as opposed to British government &amp;quot;according to the Code of Christian morality&amp;quot;) are kept in check. For if, according to Cromer, logic is something &amp;quot;the existence of which the Oriental is disposed altogether to ignore,&amp;quot; the proper method of ruling is not to impose ultrascientific measures upon him or to force him bodily to accept logic. It is rather to understand his limitations and &amp;quot;endeavor to find, in the contentment of the subject race, a more worthy and, it may be hoped, a stronger bond of union between the rulers and the ruled.&amp;quot; Lurking everywhere behind the pacification of the subject race is imperial might, more effective for its refined understanding and infrequent use than for its soldiers, brutal tax gatherers, and incontinent force. In a word, the Empire must be wise; it must temper its cupidity with selflessness, and its impatience with flexible discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
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To be more explicit, what is meant when it is said that the commercial spirit should be under some control is this--that in dealing with Indians or Egyptians, or Shilluks, or Zulus, the first question is to consider what these people, who are all, nationally speaking, more or less &#039;&#039;in statu pupillari&#039;&#039;, themselves think is best in their own interests, although this is a point which deserves serious consideration. But it is essential that each special issue should be decided mainly with reference to what, by the light of Western knowledge and experience tempered by local considerations, we conscientiously think is best for the subject race, without reference to any real or supposed advantage which may accrue to England as a nation, or--as is more frequently the case--to the special interests represented by some one or more influential classes of Englishmen. If the British nation as a whole persistently bears this principle in mind, and insists sternly on its application, though we can never create a patriotism akin to that based on affinity of race or community of language, we may perhaps foster some sort of cosmopolitan allegiance grounded on the respect always accorded to superior talents and unselfish conduct, and on the gratitude derived both from favours conferred and from those to come. There may then at all events be some hope that the Egyptian will hesitate before he throws in his lot with any future Arabi.... Even the Central African savage may eventually learn to chant a hymn in honour of Astraea Redux, as represented by the British official who denies him gin but gives him justice. More than this, commerce will gain.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Political and Literary Essays&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1908-1913&#039;&#039; (1913; reprint ed., Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), pp. 40, 53, 12-14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How much &amp;quot;serious consideration&amp;quot; the ruler ought to give proposals from the subject race was illustrated in Cromer&#039;s total opposition to Egyptian nationalism. Free native institutions, the absence of foreign occupation, a self-sustaining national sovereignty: these unsurprising demands were consistently rejected by Cromer, who asserted unambiguously that &amp;quot;the real future of Egypt ... lies not in the direction of a narrow nationalism, which will only embrace native Egyptians ... but rather in that of an enlarged cosmopolitanism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Subject races did not have it in them to know what was good for them. Most of them were Orientals, of whose characteristics Cromer was very knowledgeable since he had had experience with them both in India and Egypt. One of the convenient things about Orientals for Cromer was that managing them, although circumstances might differ slightly here and there, was almost everywhere nearly the same.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Roger Owen, &amp;quot;The Influence of Lord Cromer&#039;s Indian Experience on British Policy in Egypt 1883-1907,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Middle Eastern Affairs, Number Four: St. Antony&#039;s Papers Number 17&#039;&#039;, ed. Albert Hourani (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 109-39.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was, of course, because Orientals were almost everywhere nearly the same.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now at last we approach the long-developing core of essential knowledge, knowledge both academic and practical, which Cromer and Balfour inherited from a century of modern Western Orientalism: knowledge about and knowledge of Orientals, their race, character, culture, history, traditions, society, and possibilities. This knowledge was effective: Cromer believed he had put it to use in governing Egypt. Moreover, it was tested and unchanging knowledge, since &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot; for all practical purposes were a Platonic essence, which any Orientalist (or ruler of Orientals) might examine, understand, and expose. Thus in the thirty-fourth chapter of his two-volume work &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039;, the magisterial record of his experience and achievement, Cromer puts down a sort of personal canon of Orientalist wisdom:&lt;br /&gt;
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Sir Alfred Lyall once said to me: &amp;quot;Accuracy is abhorrent to the Oriental mind. Every Anglo-Indian should always remember that maxim.&amp;quot; Want of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is in fact the main characteristic of the Oriental mind.&lt;br /&gt;
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The European is a close reasoner; his statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he is a natural logician, albeit he may not have studied logic; he is by nature sceptical and requires proof before he can accept the truth of any proposition; his trained intelligence works like a piece of mechanism. The mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description. Although the ancient Arabs acquired in a somewhat higher degree the science of dialectics, their descendants are singularly deficient in the logical faculty. They are often incapable of drawing the most obvious conclusions from any simple premises of which they may admit the truth. Endeavor to elicit a plain statement of facts from any ordinary Egyptian. His explanation will generally be lengthy, and wanting in lucidity. He will probably contradict himself half-a-dozen times before he has finished his story. He will often break down under the mildest process of cross-examination.&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientals or Arabs are thereafter shown to be gullible, &amp;quot;devoid of energy and initiative,&amp;quot; much given to &amp;quot;fulsome flattery,&amp;quot; intrigue, cunning, and unkindness to animals; Orientals cannot walk on either a road or a pavement (their disordered minds fail to understand what the clever European grasps immediately, that roads and pavements are made for walking); Orientals are inveterate liars, they are &amp;quot;lethargic and suspicious,&amp;quot; and in everything oppose the clarity, directness, and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), 2: 146-67. For a British view of British policy in Egypt that runs totally counter to Cromer&#039;s, see Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, &#039;&#039;Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Events&#039;&#039; (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922). There is a valuable discussion of Egyptian opposition to British rule in Mounah A. Khouri, &#039;&#039;Poetry and the Making of Modern Egypt, 1882-1922&#039;&#039; (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Cromer makes no effort to conceal that Orientals for him were always and only the human material he governed in British colonies. &amp;quot;As I am only a diplomatist and an administrator, whose proper study is also man, but from the point of view of governing him,&amp;quot; Cromer says, &amp;quot;... I content myself with noting the fact that somehow or other the Oriental generally acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cromer, &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039;, 2: 164.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cromer&#039;s descriptions are of course based partly on direct observation, yet here and there he refers to orthodox Orientalist authorities (in particular Ernest Renan and Constantin de Volney) to support his views. To these authorities he also defers when it comes to explaining why Orientals are the way they are. He has no doubt that &#039;&#039;any&#039;&#039; knowledge of the Oriental will confirm his views, which, to judge from his description of the Egyptian breaking under cross-examination, find the Oriental to be guilty. The crime was that the Oriental was an Oriental, and it is an accurate sign of how commonly acceptable such a tautology was that it could be written without even an appeal to European logic or symmetry of mind. Thus any deviation from what were considered the norms of Oriental behavior was believed to be unnatural; Cromer&#039;s last annual report from Egypt consequently proclaimed Egyptian nationalism to be an &amp;quot;entirely novel idea&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;a plant of exotic rather than of indigenous growth.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in John Marlowe, &#039;&#039;Cromer in Egypt&#039;&#039; (London: Elek Books, 1970), p. 271.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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We would be wrong, I think, to underestimate the reservoir of accredited knowledge, the codes of Orientalist orthodoxy, to which Cromer and Balfour refer everywhere in their writing and in their public policy. To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact. Men have always divided the world up into regions having either real or imagined distinction from each other. The absolute demarcation between East and West, which Balfour and Cromer accept with such complacency, had been years, even centuries, in the making. There were of course innumerable voyages of discovery; there were contacts through trade and war. But more than this, since the middle of the eighteenth century there had been two principal elements in the relation between East and West. One was a growing systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient, knowledge reinforced by the colonial encounter as well as by the widespread interest in the alien and unusual, exploited by the developing sciences of ethnology, comparative anatomy, philology, and history; furthermore, to this systematic knowledge was added a sizable body of literature produced by novelists, poets, translators, and gifted travelers. The other feature of Oriental-European relations was that Europe was always in a position of strength, not to say domination. There is no way of putting this euphemistically. True, the relationship of strong to weak could be disguised or mitigated, as when Balfour acknowledged the &amp;quot;greatness&amp;quot; of Oriental civilizations. But the essential relationship, on political, cultural, and even religious grounds, was seen--in the West, which is what concerns us here--to be one between a strong and a weak partner.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many terms were used to express the relation: Balfour and Cromer, typically, used several. The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, &amp;quot;different&amp;quot;; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, &amp;quot;normal.&amp;quot; But the way of enlivening the relationship was everywhere to stress the fact that the Oriental lived in a different but thoroughly organized world of his own, a world with its own national, cultural, and epistemological boundaries and principles of internal coherence. Yet what gave the Oriental&#039;s world its intelligibility and identity was not the result of his own efforts but rather the whole complex series of knowledgeable manipulations by which the Orient was identified by the West. Thus the two features of cultural relationship I have been discussing come together. Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense &#039;&#039;creates&#039;&#039; the Orient, the Oriental, and his world. In Cromer&#039;s and Balfour&#039;s language the Oriental is depicted as something one judges (as in a court of law), something one studies and depicts (as in a curriculum), something one disciplines (as in a school or prison), something one illustrates (as in a zoological manual). The point is that in each of these cases the Oriental is &#039;&#039;contained&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;represented&#039;&#039; by dominating frameworks. Where do these come from?&lt;br /&gt;
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Cultural strength is not something we can discuss very easily--and one of the purposes of the present work is to illustrate, analyze, and reflect upon Orientalism as an exercise of cultural strength. In other words, it is better not to risk generalizations about so vague and yet so important a notion as cultural strength until a good deal of material has been analyzed first. But at the outset one can say that so far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West. The Orient was viewed as if framed by the classroom, the criminal court, the prison, the illustrated manual. Orientalism, then, is knowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgment, discipline, or governing.&lt;br /&gt;
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During the early years of the twentieth century, men like Balfour and Cromer could say what they said, in the way they did, because a still earlier tradition of Orientalism than the nineteenth-century one provided them with a vocabulary, imagery, rhetoric, and figures with which to say it. Yet Orientalism reinforced, and was reinforced by, the certain knowledge that Europe or the West literally commanded the vastly greater part of the earth&#039;s surface. The period of immense advance in the institutions and content of Orientalism coincides exactly with the period of unparalleled European expansion; from 1815 to 1914 European direct colonial dominion expanded from about 35 percent of the earth&#039;s surface to about 85 percent of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harry Magdoff, &amp;quot;Colonialism (1763-c. 1970),&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Encyclopaedia Britannica&#039;&#039;, 15th ed. (1974), pp. 893-4. See also D. K. Fieldhouse, &#039;&#039;The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039; (New York: Delacorte Press, 1967), p. 178.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Every continent was affected, none more so than Africa and Asia. The two greatest empires were the British and the French; allies and partners in some things, in others they were hostile rivals. In the Orient, from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean to Indochina and Malaya, their colonial possessions and imperial spheres of influence were adjacent, frequently overlapped, often were fought over. But it was in the Near Orient, the lands of the Arab Near East, where Islam was supposed to define cultural and racial characteristics, that the British and the French encountered each other and &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; with the greatest intensity, familiarity, and complexity. For much of the nineteenth century, as Lord Salisbury put it in 1881, their common view of the Orient was intricately problematic: &amp;quot;When you have got a ... faithful ally who is bent on meddling in a country in which you are deeply interested--you have three courses open to you. You may renounce--or monopolize--or share. Renouncing would have been to place the French across our road to India. Monopolizing would have been very near the risk of war. So we resolved to share.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted in Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, &#039;&#039;Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations&#039;&#039; (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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And share they did, in ways that we shall investigate presently. What they shared, however, was not only land or profit or rule; it was the kind of intellectual power I have been calling Orientalism. In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together was a family of ideas&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The phrase is to be found in Ian Hacking, &#039;&#039;The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference&#039;&#039; (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics. But like any set of durable ideas, Orientalist notions influenced the people who were called Orientals as well as those called Occidental, European, or Western; in short, Orientalism is better grasped as a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought than it is simply as a positive doctrine. If the essence of Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority, then we must be prepared to note how in its development and subsequent history Orientalism deepened and even hardened the distinction. When it became common practice during the nineteenth century for Britain to retire its administrators from India and elsewhere once they had reached the age of fifty-five, then a further refinement in Orientalism had been achieved; no Oriental was ever allowed to see a Westerner as he aged and degenerated, just as no Westerner needed ever to see himself, mirrored in the eyes of the subject race, as anything but a vigorous, rational, ever-alert young Raj.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;V. G. Kiernan, &#039;&#039;The Lords of Human Kind: Black Man, Yellow Man, and White Man in an Age of Empire&#039;&#039; (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1969), p. 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientalist ideas took a number of different forms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. First of all, in Europe there was a vast literature about the Orient inherited from the European past. What is distinctive about the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which is where this study assumes modern Orientalism to have begun, is that an Oriental renaissance took place, as Edgar Quinet phrased it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Edgar Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions, in Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paguerre, 1857), pp. 55-74.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Suddenly it seemed to a wide variety of thinkers, politicians, and artists that a new awareness of the Orient, which extended from China to the Mediterranean, had arisen. This awareness was partly the result of newly discovered and translated Oriental texts in languages like Sanskrit, Zend, and Arabic; it was also the result of a newly perceived relationship between the Orient and the West. For my purposes here, the keynote of the relationship was set for the Near East and Europe by the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798, an invasion which was in many ways the very model of a truly scientific appropriation of one culture by another, apparently stronger one. For with Napoleon&#039;s occupation of Egypt processes were set in motion between East and West that still dominate our contemporary cultural and political perspectives. And the Napoleonic expedition, with its great collective monument of erudition, the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, provided a scene or setting for Orientalism, since Egypt and subsequently the other Islamic lands were viewed as the live province, the laboratory, the theater of effective Western knowledge about the Orient. I shall return to the Napoleonic adventure a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
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With such experiences as Napoleon&#039;s the Orient as a body of knowledge in the West was modernized, and this is a second form in which nineteenth- and twentieth-century Orientalism existed. From the outset of the period I shall be examining there was everywhere amongst Orientalists the ambition to formulate their discoveries, experiences, and insights suitably in modern terms, to put ideas about the Orient in very close touch with modern realities. Renan&#039;s linguistic investigations of Semitic in 1848, for example, were couched in a style that drew heavily for its authority upon contemporary comparative grammar, comparative anatomy, and racial theory; these lent his Orientalism prestige and--the other side of the coin--made Orientalism vulnerable, as it has been ever since, to modish as well as seriously influential currents of thought in the West. Orientalism has been subjected to imperialism, positivism, utopianism, historicism, Darwinism, racism, Freudianism, Marxism, Spenglerism. But Orientalism, like many of the natural and social sciences, has had &amp;quot;paradigms&amp;quot; of research, its own learned societies, its own Establishment. During the nineteenth century the field increased enormously in prestige, as did also the reputation and influence of such institutions as the Societe asiatique, the Royal Asiatic Society, the Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, and the American Oriental Society. With the growth of these societies went also an increase, all across Europe, in the number of professorships in Oriental studies; consequently there was an expansion in the available means for disseminating Orientalism. Orientalist periodicals, beginning with the &#039;&#039;Fundgraben des Orients&#039;&#039; (1809), multiplied the quantity of knowledge as well as the number of specialties.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet little of this activity and very few of these institutions existed and flourished freely, for in a third form in which it existed, Orientalism imposed limits upon thought about the Orient. Even the most imaginative writers of an age, men like Flaubert, Nerval, or Scott, were constrained in what they could either experience of or say about the Orient. For Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, &amp;quot;us&amp;quot;) and the strange (the Orient, the East, &amp;quot;them&amp;quot;). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. Orientals lived in their world, &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; lived in ours. The vision and material reality propped each other up, kept each other going. A certain freedom of intercourse was always the Westerner&#039;s privilege; because his was the stronger culture, he could penetrate, he could wrestle with, he could give shape and meaning to the great Asiatic mystery, as Disraeli once called it. Yet what has, I think, been previously overlooked is the constricted vocabulary of such a privilege, and the comparative limitations of such a vision. My argument takes it that the Orientalist reality is both antihuman and persistent. Its scope, as much as its institutions and all-pervasive influence, lasts up to the present.&lt;br /&gt;
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But how did and does Orientalism work? How can one describe it all together as a historical phenomenon, a way of thought, a contemporary problem, and a material reality? Consider Cromer again, an accomplished technician of empire but also a beneficiary of Orientalism. He can furnish us with a rudimentary answer. In &amp;quot;The Government of Subject Races&amp;quot; he wrestles with the problem of how Britain, a nation of individuals, is to administer a wide-flung empire according to a number of central principles. He contrasts the &amp;quot;local agent,&amp;quot; who has both a specialist&#039;s knowledge of the native and an Anglo-Saxon individuality, with the central authority at home in London. The former may &amp;quot;treat subjects of local interest in a manner calculated to damage, or even to jeopardize, Imperial interests. The central authority is in a position to obviate any danger arising from this cause.&amp;quot; Why? Because this authority can &amp;quot;ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;should endeavour, so far as is possible, to realise the circumstances attendant on the government of the dependency.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cromer, &#039;&#039;Political and Literary Essays&#039;&#039;, p. 35.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The language is vague and unattractive, but the point is not hard to grasp. Cromer envisions a seat of power in the West, and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine&#039;s branches feed into it in the East--human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you--is processed by the machine, then converted into more power. The specialist does the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance: the Oriental becomes, for example, a subject race, an example of an &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; mentality, all for the enhancement of the &amp;quot;authority&amp;quot; at home. &amp;quot;Local interests&amp;quot; are Orientalist special interests, the &amp;quot;central authority&amp;quot; is the general interest of the imperial society as a whole. What Cromer quite accurately sees is the management of knowledge by society, the fact that knowledge--no matter how special--is regulated first by the local concerns of a specialist, later by the general concerns of a social system of authority. The interplay between local and central interests is intricate, but by no means indiscriminate.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Cromer&#039;s own case as an imperial administrator the &amp;quot;proper study is also man,&amp;quot; he says. When Pope proclaimed the proper study of mankind to be man, he meant all men, including &amp;quot;the poor Indian&amp;quot;; whereas Cromer&#039;s &amp;quot;also&amp;quot; reminds us that certain men, such as Orientals, can be singled out as the subject for &#039;&#039;proper&#039;&#039; study. The proper study--in this sense--of Orientals is Orientalism, properly separate from other forms of knowledge, but finally useful (because finite) for the material and social reality enclosing all knowledge at any time, supporting knowledge, providing it with uses. An order of sovereignty is set up from East to West, a mock chain of being whose clearest form was given once by Kipling:&lt;br /&gt;
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Mule, horse, elephant, or bullock, he obeys his driver, and the driver his sergeant, and the sergeant his lieutenant, and the lieutenant his captain, and the captain his major, and the major his colonel, and the colonel his brigadier commanding three regiments, and the brigadier his general, who obeys the Viceroy, who is the servant of the Empress.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jonah Raskin, &#039;&#039;The Mythology of Imperialism&#039;&#039; (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 40.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As deeply forged as is this monstrous chain of command, as strongly managed as is Cromer&#039;s &amp;quot;harmonious working,&amp;quot; Orientalism can also express the strength of the West and the Orient&#039;s weakness--as seen by the West. Such strength and such weakness are as intrinsic to Orientalism as they are to any view that divides the world into large general divisions, entities that coexist in a state of tension produced by what is believed to be radical difference.&lt;br /&gt;
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For that is the main intellectual issue raised by Orientalism. Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? By surviving the consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the hostility expressed by the division, say, of men into &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; (Westerners) and &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; (Orientals). For such divisions are generalities whose use historically and actually has been to press the importance of the distinction between some men and some other men, usually towards not especially admirable ends. When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy (as the categories were used by Balfour and Cromer), the result is usually to polarize the distinction--the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western--and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies. In short, from its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism as a form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hard-and-fast distinctions as &amp;quot;East&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;West&amp;quot;: to channel thought into a West or an East compartment. Because this tendency is right at the center of Orientalist theory, practice, and values found in the West, the sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as having the status of scientific truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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A contemporary illustration or two should clarify this observation perfectly. It is natural for men in power to survey from time to time the world with which they must deal. Balfour did it frequently. Our contemporary Henry Kissinger does it also, rarely with more express frankness than in his essay &amp;quot;Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy.&amp;quot; The drama he depicts is a real one, in which the United States must manage its behavior in the world under the pressures of domestic forces on the one hand and of foreign realities on the other. Kissinger&#039;s discourse must for that reason alone establish a polarity between the United States and the world; in addition, of course, he speaks consciously as an authoritative voice for the major Western power, whose recent history and present reality have placed it before a world that does not easily accept its power and dominance. Kissinger feels that the United States can deal less problematically with the industrial, developed West than it can with the developing world. Again, the contemporary actuality of relations between the United States and the so-called Third World (which includes China, Indochina, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America) is manifestly a thorny set of problems, which even Kissinger cannot hide.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kissinger&#039;s method in the essay proceeds according to what linguists call binary opposition: that is, he shows that there are two styles in foreign policy (the prophetic and the political), two types of technique, two periods, and so forth. When at the end of the historical part of his argument he is brought face to face with the contemporary world, he divides it accordingly into two halves, the developed and the developing countries. The first half, which is the West, &amp;quot;is deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data--the more accurately the better.&amp;quot; Kissinger&#039;s proof for this is the Newtonian revolution, which has not taken place in the developing world: &amp;quot;Cultures which escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking have retained the essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost completely &#039;&#039;internal&#039;&#039; to the observer.&amp;quot; Consequently, he adds, &amp;quot;empirical reality has a much different significance for many of the new countries than for the West because in a certain sense they never went through the process of discovering it.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Henry A. Kissinger, &#039;&#039;American Foreign Policy&#039;&#039; (New York: W. W. Norton &amp;amp; Co., 1974), pp. 48-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Cromer, Kissinger does not need to quote Sir Alfred Lyall on the Oriental&#039;s inability to be accurate; the point he makes is sufficiently unarguable to require no special validation. We had our Newtonian revolution; they didn&#039;t. As thinkers we are better off than they are. Good: the lines are drawn in much the same way, finally, as Balfour and Cromer drew them. Yet sixty or more years have intervened between Kissinger and the British imperialists. Numerous wars and revolutions have proved conclusively that the pre-Newtonian prophetic style, which Kissinger associates both with &amp;quot;inaccurate&amp;quot; developing countries and with Europe before the Congress of Vienna, is not entirely without its successes. Again unlike Balfour and Cromer, Kissinger therefore feels obliged to respect this pre-Newtonian perspective, since &amp;quot;it offers great flexibility with respect to the contemporary revolutionary turmoil.&amp;quot; Thus the duty of men in the post-Newtonian (real) world is to &amp;quot;construct an international order &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; a crisis imposes it as a necessity&amp;quot;: in other words, &#039;&#039;we&#039;&#039; must still find a way by which the developing world can be contained. Is this not similar to Cromer&#039;s vision of a harmoniously working machine designed ultimately to benefit some central authority, which opposes the developing world?&lt;br /&gt;
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Kissinger may not have known on what fund of pedigreed knowledge he was drawing when he cut the world up into pre-Newtonian and post-Newtonian conceptions of reality. But his distinction is identical with the orthodox one made by Orientalists, who separate Orientals from Westerners. And like Orientalism&#039;s distinction Kissinger&#039;s is not value-free, despite the apparent neutrality of his tone. Thus such words as &amp;quot;prophetic,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;accuracy,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;internal,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;empirical reality,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;order&amp;quot; are scattered throughout his description, and they characterize either attractive, familiar, desirable virtues or menacing, peculiar, disorderly defects. Both the traditional Orientalist, as we shall see, and Kissinger conceive of the difference between cultures, first, as creating a battlefront that separates them, and second, as inviting the West to control, contain, and otherwise govern (through superior knowledge and accommodating power) the Other. With what effect and at what considerable expense such militant divisions have been maintained, no one at present needs to be reminded.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another illustration dovetails neatly--perhaps too neatly--with Kissinger&#039;s analysis. In its February 1972 issue, the &#039;&#039;American Journal of Psychiatry&#039;&#039; printed an essay by Harold W. Glidden, who is identified as a retired member of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State; the essay&#039;s title (&amp;quot;The Arab World&amp;quot;), its tone, and its content argue a highly characteristic Orientalist bent of mind. Thus for his four-page, double-columned psychological portrait of over 100 million people, considered for a period of 1,300 years, Glidden cites exactly four sources for his views: a recent book on Tripoli, one issue of the Egyptian newspaper &#039;&#039;Al-Ahram&#039;&#039;, the periodical &#039;&#039;Oriente Moderno&#039;&#039;, and a book by Majid Khadduri, a well-known Orientalist. The article itself purports to uncover &amp;quot;the inner workings of Arab behavior,&amp;quot; which from &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; point of view is &amp;quot;aberrant&amp;quot; but for Arabs is &amp;quot;normal.&amp;quot; After this auspicious start, we are told that Arabs stress conformity; that Arabs inhabit a shame culture whose &amp;quot;prestige system&amp;quot; involves the ability to attract followers and clients (as an aside we are told that &amp;quot;Arab society is and always has been based on a system of client-patron relationships&amp;quot;); that Arabs can function only in conflict situations; that prestige is based solely on the ability to dominate others; that a shame culture--and therefore Islam itself--makes a virtue of revenge (here Glidden triumphantly cites the June 29, 1970 &#039;&#039;Ahram&#039;&#039; to show that &amp;quot;in 1969 [in Egypt] in 1070 cases of murder where the perpetrators were apprehended, it was found that 20 percent of the murders were based on a desire to wipe out shame, 30 percent on a desire to satisfy real or imaginary wrongs, and 31 percent on a desire for blood revenge&amp;quot;); that if from a Western point of view &amp;quot;the only rational thing for the Arabs to do is to make peace ... for the Arabs the situation is not governed by this kind of logic, for objectivity is not a value in the Arab system.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Glidden continues, now more enthusiastically: &amp;quot;it is a notable fact that while the Arab value system demands absolute solidarity within the group, it at the same time encourages among its members a kind of rivalry that is destructive of that very solidarity&amp;quot;; in Arab society only &amp;quot;success counts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;the end justifies the means&amp;quot;; Arabs live &amp;quot;naturally&amp;quot; in a world &amp;quot;characterized by anxiety expressed in generalized suspicion and distrust, which has been labelled free-floating hostility&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;the art of subterfuge is highly developed in Arab life, as well as in Islam itself&amp;quot;; the Arab need for vengeance overrides everything, otherwise the Arab would feel &amp;quot;ego-destroying&amp;quot; shame. Therefore, if &amp;quot;Westerners consider peace to be high on the scale of values&amp;quot; and if &amp;quot;we have a highly developed consciousness of the value of time,&amp;quot; this is not true of Arabs. &amp;quot;In fact,&amp;quot; we are told, &amp;quot;in Arab tribal society (where Arab values originated), strife, not peace, was the normal state of affairs because raiding was one of the two main supports of the economy.&amp;quot; The purpose of this learned disquisition is merely to show how on the Western and Oriental scale of values &amp;quot;the relative position of the elements is quite different.&amp;quot; QED.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harold W. Glidden, &amp;quot;The Arab World,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;American Journal of Psychiatry&#039;&#039; 128, no. 8 (February 1972): 984-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the apogee of Orientalist confidence. No merely asserted generality is denied the dignity of truth; no theoretical list of Oriental attributes is without application to the behavior of Orientals in the real world. On the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are Arab-Orientals; the former are (in no particular order) rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things. Out of what collective and yet particularized view of the Orient do these statements emerge? What specialized skills, what imaginative pressures, what institutions and traditions, what cultural forces produce such similarity in the descriptions of the Orient to be found in Cromer, Balfour, and our contemporary statesmen?&lt;br /&gt;
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=== II. Imaginative Geography and Its Representations: Orientalizing the Oriental ===&lt;br /&gt;
Strictly speaking, Orientalism is a field of learned study. In the Christian West, Orientalism is considered to have commenced its formal existence with the decision of the Church Council of Vienne in 1312 to establish a series of chairs in &amp;quot;Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, and Syriac at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Avignon, and Salamanca.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;R. W. Southern, &#039;&#039;Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages&#039;&#039; (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 72. See also Francis Dvornik, &#039;&#039;The Ecumenical Councils&#039;&#039; (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1961), pp. 65-6: &amp;quot;Of special interest is the eleventh canon directing that chairs for teaching Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Chaldean should be created at the main universities. The suggestion was Raymond Lull&#039;s, who advocated learning Arabic as the best means for the conversion of the Arabs. Although the canon remained almost without effect as there were few teachers of Oriental languages, its acceptance indicates the growth of the missionary idea in the West. Gregory X had already hoped for the conversion of the Mongols, and Franciscan friars had penetrated into the depths of Asia in their missionary zeal. Although these hopes were not fulfilled, the missionary spirit continued to develop.&amp;quot; See also Johann W. Fuck, &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet any account of Orientalism would have to consider not only the professional Orientalist and his work but also the very notion of a field of study based on a geographical, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic unit called the Orient. Fields, of course, are made. They acquire coherence and integrity in time because scholars devote themselves in different ways to what seems to be a commonly agreed-upon subject matter. Yet it goes without saying that a field of study is rarely as simply defined as even its most committed partisans--usually scholars, professors, experts, and the like--claim it is. Besides, a field can change so entirely, in even the most traditional disciplines like philology, history, or theology, as to make an all-purpose definition of subject matter almost impossible. This is certainly true of Orientalism, for some interesting reasons.&lt;br /&gt;
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To speak of scholarly specialization as a geographical &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; is, in the case of Orientalism, fairly revealing since no one is likely to imagine a field symmetrical to it called Occidentalism. Already the special, perhaps even eccentric attitude of Orientalism becomes apparent. For although many learned disciplines imply a position taken towards, say, &#039;&#039;human&#039;&#039; material (a historian deals with the human past from a special vantage point in the present), there is no real analogy for taking a fixed, more or less total geographical position towards a wide variety of social, linguistic, political, and historical realities. A classicist, a Romance specialist, even an Americanist focuses on a relatively modest portion of the world, not on a full half of it. But Orientalism is a field with considerable geographical ambition. And since Orientalists have traditionally occupied themselves with things Oriental (a specialist in Islamic law, no less than an expert in Chinese dialects or in Indian religions, is considered an Orientalist by people who call themselves Orientalists), we must learn to accept enormous, indiscriminate size plus an almost infinite capacity for subdivision as one of the chief characteristics of Orientalism--one that is evidenced in its confusing amalgam of imperial vagueness and precise detail.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this describes Orientalism as an academic discipline. The &amp;quot;ism&amp;quot; in Orientalism serves to insist on the distinction of this discipline from every other kind. The rule in its historical development as an academic discipline has been its increasing scope, not its greater selectiveness. Renaissance Orientalists like Erpenius and Guillaume Postel were primarily specialists in the languages of the Biblical provinces, although Postel boasted that he could get across Asia as far as China without needing an interpreter. By and large, until the mid-eighteenth century Orientalists were Biblical scholars, students of the Semitic languages, Islamic specialists, or, because the Jesuits had opened up the new study of China, Sinologists. The whole middle expanse of Asia was not academically conquered for Orientalism until, during the later eighteenth century, Anquetil-Duperron and Sir William Jones were able intelligibly to reveal the extraordinary riches of Avestan and Sanskrit. By the middle of the nineteenth century Orientalism was as vast a treasure-house of learning as one could imagine. There are two excellent indices of this new, triumphant eclecticism. One is the encyclopedic description of Orientalism roughly from 1765 to 1850 given by Raymond Schwab in his &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1950). See also V.-V. Barthold, &#039;&#039;La Decouverte de l&#039;Asie: Histoire de l&#039;orientalisme en Europe et en Russie&#039;&#039;, trans. B. Nikitine (Paris: Payot, 1947), and the relevant pages in Theodor Benfey, &#039;&#039;Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft und Orientalischen Philologie in Deutschland&#039;&#039; (Munich: Gottafschen, 1869). For an instructive contrast see James T. Monroe, &#039;&#039;Islam and the Arabs in Spanish Scholarship&#039;&#039; (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Quite aside from the scientific discoveries of things Oriental made by learned professionals during this period in Europe, there was the virtual epidemic of Orientalia affecting every major poet, essayist, and philosopher of the period. Schwab&#039;s notion is that &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; identifies an amateur or professional enthusiasm for everything Asiatic, which was wonderfully synonymous with the exotic, the mysterious, the profound, the seminal; this is a later transposition eastwards of a similar enthusiasm in Europe for Greek and Latin antiquity during the High Renaissance. In 1829 Victor Hugo put this change in directions as follows: &amp;quot;Au siecle de Louis XIV on etait helleniste, maintenant on est orientaliste.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Victor Hugo, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Pierre Albouy (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 1: 580.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A nineteenth-century Orientalist was therefore either a scholar (a Sinologist, an Islamicist, an Indo-Europeanist) or a gifted enthusiast (Hugo in &#039;&#039;Les Orientales&#039;&#039;, Goethe in the &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039;), or both (Richard Burton, Edward Lane, Friedrich Schlegel).&lt;br /&gt;
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The second index of how inclusive Orientalism had become since the Council of Vienne is to be found in nineteenth-century chronicles of the field itself. The most thorough of its kind is Jules Mohl&#039;s &#039;&#039;Vingt-sept Ans d&#039;histoire des etudes orientales&#039;&#039;, a two-volume logbook of everything of note that took place in Orientalism between 1840 and 1867.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jules Mohl, &#039;&#039;Vingt-sept Ans d&#039;histoire des etudes orientales: Rapports faits a la Societe asiatique de Paris de 1840 a 1867&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Reinwald, 1879-80).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Mohl was the secretary of the Societe asiatique in Paris, and for something more than the first half of the nineteenth century Paris was the capital of the Orientalist world (and, according to Walter Benjamin, of the nineteenth century). Mohl&#039;s position in the Societe could not have been more central to the field of Orientalism. There is scarcely anything done by a European scholar touching Asia during those twenty-seven years that Mohl does not enter under &amp;quot;etudes orientales.&amp;quot; His entries of course concern publications, but the range of published material of interest to Orientalist scholars is awesome. Arabic, innumerable Indian dialects, Hebrew, Pehlevi, Assyrian, Babylonian, Mongolian, Chinese, Burmese, Mesopotamian, Javanese: the list of philological works considered Orientalist is almost uncountable. Moreover, Orientalist studies apparently cover everything from the editing and translation of texts to numismatic, anthropological, archaeological, sociological, economic, historical, literary, and cultural studies in every known Asiatic and North African civilization, ancient and modern. Gustave Dugat&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire des orientalistes de l&#039;Europe du XII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039; (1868-1870)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gustave Dugat, &#039;&#039;Histoire des orientalistes de l&#039;Europe du XII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1868-70).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is a selective history of major figures, but the range represented is no less immense than Mohl&#039;s.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such eclecticism as this had its blind spots, nevertheless. Academic Orientalists for the most part were interested in the classical period of whatever language or society it was that they studied. Not until quite late in the century, with the single major exception of Napoleon&#039;s Institut d&#039;Egypte, was much attention given to the academic study of the modern, or actual, Orient. Moreover, the Orient studied was a textual universe by and large; the impact of the Orient was made through books and manuscripts, not, as in the impress of Greece on the Renaissance, through mimetic artifacts like sculpture and pottery. Even the rapport between an Orientalist and the Orient was textual, so much so that it is reported of some of the early-nineteenth-century German Orientalists that their first view of an eight-armed Indian statue cured them completely of their Orientalist taste.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Rene Gerard, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Orient et la pensee romantique allemande&#039;&#039; (Paris: Didier, 1963), p. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When a learned Orientalist traveled in the country of his specialization, it was always with unshakable abstract maxims about the &amp;quot;civilization&amp;quot; he had studied; rarely were Orientalists interested in anything except proving the validity of these musty &amp;quot;truths&amp;quot; by applying them, without great success, to uncomprehending, hence degenerate, natives. Finally, the very power and scope of Orientalism produced not only a fair amount of exact positive knowledge about the Orient but also a kind of second-order knowledge--lurking in such places as the &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; tale, the mythology of the mysterious East, notions of Asian inscrutability--with a life of its own, what V. G. Kiernan has aptly called &amp;quot;Europe&#039;s collective day-dream of the Orient.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kiernan, &#039;&#039;Lords of Human Kind&#039;&#039;, p. 131.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; One happy result of this is that an estimable number of important writers during the nineteenth century were Oriental enthusiasts: It is perfectly correct, I think, to speak of a genre of Orientalist writing as exemplified in the works of Hugo, Goethe, Nerval, Flaubert, Fitzgerald, and the like. What inevitably goes with such work, however, is a kind of free-floating mythology of the Orient, an Orient that derives not only from contemporary attitudes and popular prejudices but also from what Vico called the conceit of nations and of scholars. I have already alluded to the political uses of such material as it has turned up in the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today an Orientalist is less likely to call himself an Orientalist than he was almost any time up to World War II. Yet the designation is still useful, as when universities maintain programs or departments in Oriental languages or Oriental civilizations. There is an Oriental &amp;quot;faculty&amp;quot; at Oxford, and a department of Oriental studies at Princeton. As recently as 1959, the British government empowered a commission &amp;quot;to review developments in the Universities in the fields of Oriental, Slavonic, East European and African studies ... and to consider, and advise on, proposals for future development.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;University Grants Committee, &#039;&#039;Report of the Sub-Committee on Oriental, Slavonic&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;East European and African Studies&#039;&#039; (London: Her Majesty&#039;s Stationery Office, 1961).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Hayter Report, as it was called when it appeared in 1961, seemed untroubled by the broad designation of the word &#039;&#039;Oriental&#039;&#039;, which it found serviceably employed in American universities as well. For even the greatest name in modern Anglo-American Islamic studies, H. A. R. Gibb, preferred to call himself an Orientalist rather than an Arabist. Gibb himself, classicist that he was, could use the ugly neologism &amp;quot;area study&amp;quot; for Orientalism as a way of showing that area studies and Orientalism after all were interchangeable geographical titles.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Area Studies Reconsidered&#039;&#039; (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But this, I think, ingenuously belies a much more interesting relationship between knowledge and geography. I should like to consider that relationship briefly.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the distraction of a great many vague desires, impulses, and images, the mind seems persistently to formulate what Claude Levi-Strauss has called a science of the concrete.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Claude Levi-Strauss, &#039;&#039;The Savage Mind&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), chaps. 1-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A primitive tribe, for example, assigns a definite place, function, and significance to every leafy species in its immediate environment. Many of these grasses and flowers have no practical use; but the point Levi-Strauss makes is that mind requires order, and order is achieved by discriminating and taking note of everything, placing everything of which the mind is aware in a secure, refindable place, therefore giving things some role to play in the economy of objects and identities that make up an environment. This kind of rudimentary classification has a logic to it, but the rules of the logic by which a green fern in one society is a symbol of grace and in another is considered maleficent are neither predictably rational nor universal. There is always a measure of the purely arbitrary in the way the distinctions between things are seen. And with these distinctions go values whose history, if one could unearth it completely, would probably show the same measure of arbitrariness. This is evident enough in the case of fashion. Why do wigs, lace collars, and high buckled shoes appear, then disappear, over a period of decades? Some of the answer has to do with utility and some with the inherent beauty of the fashion. But if we agree that all things in history, like history itself, are made by men, then we will appreciate how possible it is for many objects or places or times to be assigned roles and given meanings that acquire objective validity only &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the assignments are made. This is especially true of relatively uncommon things, like foreigners, mutants, or &amp;quot;abnormal&amp;quot; behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is perfectly possible to argue that some distinctive objects are made by the mind, and that these objects, while appearing to exist objectively, have only a fictional reality. A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries between their land and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, which they call &amp;quot;the land of the barbarians.&amp;quot; In other words, this universal practice of designating in one&#039;s mind a familiar space which is &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; and an unfamiliar space beyond &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; which is &amp;quot;theirs&amp;quot; is a way of making geographical distinctions that &#039;&#039;can be&#039;&#039; entirely arbitrary. I use the word &amp;quot;arbitrary&amp;quot; here because imaginative geography of the &amp;quot;our land-barbarian land&amp;quot; variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; to set up these boundaries in our own minds; &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; become &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from &amp;quot;ours.&amp;quot; To a certain extent modern and primitive societies seem thus to derive a sense of their identities negatively. A fifth-century Athenian was very likely to feel himself to be nonbarbarian as much as he positively felt himself to be Athenian. The geographic boundaries accompany the social, ethnic, and cultural ones in expected ways. Yet often the sense in which someone feels himself to be not-foreign is based on a very unrigorous idea of what is &amp;quot;out there,&amp;quot; beyond one&#039;s own territory. All kinds of suppositions, associations, and fictions appear to crowd the unfamiliar space outside one&#039;s own.&lt;br /&gt;
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The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard once wrote an analysis of what he called the poetics of space.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gaston Bachelard, &#039;&#039;The Poetics of Space&#039;&#039;, trans. Maria Jolas (New York: Orion Press, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The inside of a house, he said, acquires a sense of intimacy, secrecy, security, real or imagined, because of the experiences that come to seem appropriate for it. The objective space of a house--its corners, corridors, cellar, rooms--is far less important than what poetically it is endowed with, which is usually a quality with an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel: thus a house may be haunted, or homelike, or prisonlike, or magical. So space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here. The same process occurs when we deal with time. Much of what we associate with or even know about such periods as &amp;quot;long ago&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the beginning&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;at the end of time&amp;quot; is poetic--made up. For a historian of Middle Kingdom Egypt, &amp;quot;long ago&amp;quot; will have a very clear sort of meaning, but even this meaning does not totally dissipate the imaginative, quasi-fictional quality one senses lurking in a time very different and distant from our own. For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away. This is no less true of the feelings we often have that we would have been more &amp;quot;at home&amp;quot; in the sixteenth century or in Tahiti.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet there is no use in pretending that all we know about time and space, or rather history and geography, is more than anything else imaginative. There are such things as positive history and positive geography which in Europe and the United States have impressive achievements to point to. Scholars now do know more about the world, its past and present, than they did, for example, in Gibbon&#039;s time. Yet this is not to say that they know all there is to know, nor, more important, is it to say that what they know has effectively dispelled the imaginative geographical and historical knowledge I have been considering. We need not decide here whether this kind of imaginative knowledge infuses history and geography, or whether in some way it overrides them. Let us just say for the time being that it is there as something &#039;&#039;more&#039;&#039; than what appears to be merely positive knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Almost from earliest times in Europe the Orient was something more than what was empirically known about it. At least until the early eighteenth century, as R. W. Southern has so elegantly shown, European understanding of one kind of Oriental culture, the Islamic, was ignorant but complex.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Southern, &#039;&#039;Western Views of Islam&#039;&#039;, p. 14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For certain associations with the East--not quite ignorant, not quite informed--always seem to have gathered around the notion of an Orient. Consider first the demarcation between Orient and West. It already seems bold by the time of the &#039;&#039;Iliad&#039;&#039;. Two of the most profoundly influential qualities associated with the East appear in Aeschylus&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039;, the earliest Athenian play extant, and in &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039; of Euripides, the very last one extant. Aeschylus portrays the sense of disaster overcoming the Persians when they learn that their armies, led by King Xerxes, have been destroyed by the Greeks. The chorus sings the following ode:&lt;br /&gt;
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Now all Asia&#039;s land&lt;br /&gt;
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Moans in emptiness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Xerxes led forth, oh oh!&lt;br /&gt;
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Xerxes destroyed, woe woe!&lt;br /&gt;
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Xerxes&#039; plans have all miscarried&lt;br /&gt;
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In ships of the sea.&lt;br /&gt;
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Why did Darius then&lt;br /&gt;
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Bring no harm to his men&lt;br /&gt;
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When he led them into battle,&lt;br /&gt;
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That beloved leader of men from Susa?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Aeschylus, &#039;&#039;The Persians&#039;&#039;, trans. Anthony J. Podleck (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 73-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What matters here is that Asia speaks through and by virtue of the European imagination, which is depicted as victorious over Asia, that hostile &amp;quot;other&amp;quot; world beyond the seas. To Asia are given the feelings of emptiness, loss, and disaster that seem thereafter to reward Oriental challenges to the West; and also, the lament that in some glorious past Asia fared better, was itself victorious over Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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In &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039;, perhaps the most Asiatic of all the Attic dramas, Dionysus is explicitly connected with his Asian origins and with the strangely threatening excesses of Oriental mysteries. Pentheus, king of Thebes, is destroyed by his mother, Agave, and her fellow bacchantes. Having defied Dionysus by not recognizing either his power or his divinity, Pentheus is thus horribly punished, and the play ends with a general recognition of the eccentric god&#039;s terrible power. Modern commentators on &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039; have not failed to note the play&#039;s extraordinary range of intellectual and aesthetic effects; but there has been no escaping the additional historical detail that Euripides &amp;quot;was surely affected by the new aspect that the Dionysiac cults must have assumed in the light of the foreign ecstatic religions of Bendis, Cybele, Sabazius, Adonis, and Isis, which were introduced from Asia Minor and the Levant and swept through Piraeus and Athens during the frustrating and increasingly irrational years of the Peloponnesian War.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Euripides, &#039;&#039;The Bacchae&#039;&#039;, trans. Geoffrey S. Kirk (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 3. For further discussion of the Europe-Orient distinction see Santo Mazzarino, &#039;&#039;Fra oriente e occidente: Ricerche di storia greca arcaica&#039;&#039; (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1947), and Denys Hay, &#039;&#039;Europe: The Emergence of an Idea&#039;&#039; (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The two aspects of the Orient that set it off from the West in this pair of plays will remain essential motifs of European imaginative geography. A line is drawn between two continents. Europe is powerful and articulate; Asia is defeated and distant. Aeschylus &#039;&#039;represents&#039;&#039; Asia, makes her speak in the person of the aged Persian queen, Xerxes&#039; mother. It is Europe that articulates the Orient; this articulation is the prerogative, not of a puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose life-giving power represents, animates, constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries. There is an analogy between Aeschylus&#039;s orchestra, which contains the Asiatic world as the playwright conceives it, and the learned envelope of Orientalist scholarship, which also will hold in the vast, amorphous Asiatic sprawl for sometimes sympathetic but always dominating scrutiny. Secondly, there is the motif of the Orient as insinuating danger. Rationality is undermined by Eastern excesses, those mysteriously attractive opposites to what seem to be normal values. The difference separating East from West is symbolized by the sternness with which, at first, Pentheus rejects the hysterical bacchantes. When later he himself becomes a bacchant, he is destroyed not so much for having given in to Dionysus as for having incorrectly assessed Dionysus&#039;s menace in the first place. The lesson that Euripides intends is dramatized by the presence in the play of Cadmus and Tiresias, knowledgeable older men who realize that &amp;quot;sovereignty&amp;quot; alone does not rule men;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Euripides, &#039;&#039;Bacchae&#039;&#039;, p. 52.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; there is such a thing as judgment, they say, which means sizing up correctly the force of alien powers and expertly coming to terms with them. Hereafter Oriental mysteries will be taken seriously, not least because they challenge the rational Western mind to new exercises of its enduring ambition and power.&lt;br /&gt;
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But one big division, as between West and Orient, leads to other smaller ones, especially as the normal enterprises of civilization provoke such outgoing activities as travel, conquest, new experiences. In classical Greece and Rome geographers, historians, public figures like Caesar, orators, and poets added to the fund of taxonomic lore separating races, regions, nations, and minds from each other; much of that was self-serving, and existed to prove that Romans and Greeks were superior to other kinds of people. But concern with the Orient had its own tradition of classification and hierarchy. From at least the second century B.C. on, it was lost on no traveler or eastward-looking and ambitious Western potentate that Herodotus--historian, traveler, inexhaustibly curious chronicler--and Alexander--king warrior, scientific conqueror--had been in the Orient before. The Orient was therefore subdivided into realms previously known, visited, conquered, by Herodotus and Alexander as well as their epigones, and those realms not previously known, visited, conquered. Christianity completed the setting up of main intra-Oriental spheres: there was a Near Orient and a Far Orient, a familiar Orient, which Rene Grousset calls &amp;quot;l&#039;empire du Levant,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rene Grousset, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Empire du Levant: Histoire de la question d&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1946).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and a novel Orient. The Orient therefore alternated in the mind&#039;s geography between being an Old World to which one returned, as to Eden or Paradise, there to set up a new version of the old, and being a wholly new place to which one came as Columbus came to America, in order to set up a New World (although, ironically, Columbus himself thought that he discovered a new part of the Old World). Certainly neither of these Orients was purely one thing or the other: it is their vacillations, their tempting suggestiveness, their capacity for entertaining and confusing the mind, that are interesting.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consider how the Orient, and in particular the Near Orient, became known in the West as its great complementary opposite since antiquity. There were the Bible and the rise of Christianity; there were travelers like Marco Polo who charted the trade routes and patterned a regulated system of commercial exchange, and after him Lodovico di Varthema and Pietro della Valle; there were fabulists like Mandeville; there were the redoubtable conquering Eastern movements, principally Islam, of course; there were the militant pilgrims, chiefly the Crusaders. Altogether an internally structured archive is built up from the literature that belongs to these experiences. Out of this comes a restricted number of typical encapsulations: the journey, the history, the fable, the stereotype, the polemical confrontation. These are the lenses through which the Orient is experienced, and they shape the language, perception, and form of the encounter between East and West. What gives the immense number of encounters some unity, however, is the vacillation I was speaking about earlier. Something patently foreign and distant acquires, for one reason or another, a status more rather than less familiar. One tends to stop judging things either as completely novel or as completely well known; a new median category emerges, a category that allows one to see new things, things seen for the first time, as versions of a previously known thing. In essence such a category is not so much a way of receiving new information as it is a method of controlling what seems to be a threat to some established view of things. If the mind must suddenly deal with what it takes to be a radically new form of life--as Islam appeared to Europe in the early Middle Ages--the response on the whole is conservative and defensive. Islam is judged to be a fraudulent new version of some previous experience, in this case Christianity. The threat is muted, familiar values impose themselves, and in the end the mind reduces the pressure upon it by accommodating things to itself as either &amp;quot;original&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;repetitious.&amp;quot; Islam thereafter is &amp;quot;handled&amp;quot;: its novelty and its suggestiveness are brought under control so that relatively nuanced discriminations are now made that would have been impossible had the raw novelty of Islam been left unattended. The Orient at large, therefore, vacillates between the West&#039;s contempt for what is familiar and its shivers of delight in--or fear of--novelty.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet where Islam was concerned, European fear, if not always respect, was in order. After Mohammed&#039;s death in 632, the military and later the cultural and religious hegemony of Islam grew enormously. First Persia, Syria, and Egypt, then Turkey, then North Africa fell to the Muslim armies; in the eighth and ninth centuries Spain, Sicily, and parts of France were conquered. By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Islam ruled as far east as India, Indonesia, and China. And to this extraordinary assault Europe could respond with very little except fear and a kind of awe. Christian authors witnessing the Islamic conquests had scant interest in the learning, high culture, and frequent magnificence of the Muslims, who were, as Gibbon said, &amp;quot;coeval with the darkest and most slothful period of European annals.&amp;quot; (But with some satisfaction he added, &amp;quot;since the sum of science has risen in the West, it should seem that the Oriental studies have languished and declined.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Edward Gibbon, &#039;&#039;The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire&#039;&#039; (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1855), 6: 399.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) What Christians typically felt about the Eastern armies was that they had &amp;quot;all the appearance of a swarm of bees, but with a heavy hand ... they devastated everything&amp;quot;: so wrote Erchembert, a cleric in Monte Cassino in the eleventh century.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Norman Daniel, &#039;&#039;The Arabs and Medieval Europe&#039;&#039; (London: Longmans, Green &amp;amp; Co., 1975), p. 56.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Not for nothing did Islam come to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated barbarians. For Europe, Islam was a lasting trauma. Until the end of the seventeenth century the &amp;quot;Ottoman peril&amp;quot; lurked alongside Europe to represent for the whole of Christian civilization a constant danger, and in time European civilization incorporated that peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues, and vices, as something woven into the fabric of life. In Renaissance England alone, as Samuel Chew recounts in his classic study &#039;&#039;The Crescent and the Rose&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;a man of average education and intelligence&amp;quot; had at his fingertips, and could watch on the London stage, a relatively large number of detailed events in the history of Ottoman Islam and its encroachments upon Christian Europe.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Samuel C. Chew, &#039;&#039;The Crescent and the Rose: Islam and England During the Renaissance&#039;&#039; (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 103.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The point is that what remained current about Islam was some necessarily diminished version of those great dangerous forces that it symbolized for Europe. Like Walter Scott&#039;s Saracens, the European representation of the Muslim, Ottoman, or Arab was always a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient, and to a certain extent the same is true of the methods of contemporary learned Orientalists, whose subject is not so much the East itself as the East made known, and therefore less fearsome, to the Western reading public.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is nothing especially controversial or reprehensible about such domestications of the exotic; they take place between all cultures, certainly, and between all men. My point, however, is to emphasize the truth that the Orientalist, as much as anyone in the European West who thought about or experienced the Orient, performed this kind of mental operation. But what is more important still is the limited vocabulary and imagery that impose themselves as a consequence. The reception of Islam in the West is a perfect case in point, and has been admirably studied by Norman Daniel. One constraint acting upon Christian thinkers who tried to understand Islam was an analogical one; since Christ is the basis of Christian faith, it was assumed--quite incorrectly--that Mohammed was to Islam as Christ was to Christianity. Hence the polemic name &amp;quot;Mohammedanism&amp;quot; given to Islam, and the automatic epithet &amp;quot;imposter&amp;quot; applied to Mohammed.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Norman Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam and the West: The Making of an Image&#039;&#039; (Edinburgh: University Press, 1960), p. 33. See also James Kritzeck, &#039;&#039;Peter the Venerable and Islam&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Out of such and many other misconceptions &amp;quot;there formed a circle which was never broken by imaginative exteriorisation.... The Christian concept of Islam was integral and self-sufficient.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam and the West&#039;&#039;, p. 252.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Islam became an image--the word is Daniel&#039;s but it seems to me to have remarkable implications for Orientalism in general--whose function was not so much to represent Islam in itself as to represent it for the medieval Christian.&lt;br /&gt;
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The invariable tendency to neglect what the Qur&#039;an meant, or what Muslims thought it meant, or what Muslims thought or did in any given circumstances, necessarily implies that Qur&#039;anic and other Islamic doctrine was presented in a form that would convince Christians; and more and more extravagant forms would stand a chance of acceptance as the distance of the writers and public from the Islamic border increased. It was with very great reluctance that what Muslims said Muslims believed was accepted as what they did believe. There was a Christian picture in which the details (even under the pressure of facts) were abandoned as little as possible, and in which the general outline was never abandoned. There were shades of difference, but only with a common framework. All the corrections that were made in the interests of an increasing accuracy were only a defence of what had newly been realised to be vulnerable, a shoring up of a weakened structure. Christian opinion was an erection which could not be demolished, even to be rebuilt.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 259-60.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This rigorous Christian picture of Islam was intensified in innumerable ways, including--during the Middle Ages and early Renaissance--a large variety of poetry, learned controversy, and popular superstition.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See for example William Wistar Comfort, &amp;quot;The Literary Role of the Saracens in the French Epic,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;PMLA&#039;&#039; 55 (1940): 628-59.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; By this time the Near Orient had been all but incorporated in the common world-picture of Latin Christianity--as in the &#039;&#039;Chanson de Roland&#039;&#039; the worship of Saracens is portrayed as embracing Mahomet &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; Apollo. By the middle of the fifteenth century, as R. W. Southern has brilliantly shown, it became apparent to serious European thinkers &amp;quot;that something would have to be done about Islam,&amp;quot; which had turned the situation around somewhat by itself arriving militarily in Eastern Europe. Southern recounts a dramatic episode between 1450 and 1460 when four learned men, John of Segovia, Nicholas of Cusa, Jean Germain, and Aeneas Silvius (Pius II), attempted to deal with Islam through &#039;&#039;contraferentia&#039;&#039;, or &amp;quot;conference.&amp;quot; The idea was John of Segovia&#039;s: it was to have been a staged conference with Islam in which Christians attempted the wholesale conversion of Muslims. &amp;quot;He saw the conference as an instrument with a political as well as a strictly religious function, and in words which will strike a chord in modern breasts he exclaimed that even if it were to last ten years it would be less expensive and less damaging than war.&amp;quot; There was no agreement between the four men, but the episode is crucial for having been a fairly sophisticated attempt--part of a general European attempt from Bede to Luther--to put a representative Orient in front of Europe, to &#039;&#039;stage&#039;&#039; the Orient and Europe together in some coherent way, the idea being for Christians to make it clear to Muslims that Islam was just a misguided version of Christianity. Southern&#039;s conclusion follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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Most conspicuous to us is the inability of any of these systems of thought [European Christian] to provide a fully satisfying explanation of the phenomenon they had set out to explain [Islam]--still less to influence the course of practical events in a decisive way. At a practical level, events never turned out either so well or so ill as the most intelligent observers predicted; and it is perhaps worth noticing that they never turned out better than when the best judges confidently expected a happy ending. Was there any progress [in Christian knowledge of Islam]? I must express my conviction that there was. Even if the solution of the problem remained obstinately hidden from sight, the statement of the problem became more complex, more rational, and more related to experience.... The scholars who labored at the problem of Islam in the Middle Ages failed to find the solution they sought and desired; but they developed habits of mind and powers of comprehension which, in other men and in other fields, may yet deserve success.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Southern, &#039;&#039;Western Views of Islam&#039;&#039;, pp. 91-2, 108-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The best part of Southern&#039;s analysis, here and elsewhere in his brief history of Western views of Islam, is his demonstration that it is finally Western ignorance which becomes more refined and complex, not some body of positive Western knowledge which increases in size and accuracy. For fictions have their own logic and their own dialectic of growth or decline. Onto the character of Mohammed in the Middle Ages was heaped a bundle of attributes that corresponded to the &amp;quot;character of the [twelfth-century] prophets of the &#039;Free Spirit&#039; who did actually arise in Europe, and claim credence and collect followers.&amp;quot; Similarly, since Mohammed was viewed as the disseminator of a false Revelation, he became as well the epitome of lechery, debauchery, sodomy, and a whole battery of assorted treacheries, all of which derived &amp;quot;logically&amp;quot; from his doctrinal impostures.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam and the West&#039;&#039;, pp. 246, 96, and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus the Orient acquired representatives, so to speak, and representations, each one more concrete, more internally congruent with some Western exigency, than the ones that preceded it. It is as if, having once settled on the Orient as a locale suitable for incarnating the infinite in a finite shape, Europe could not stop the practice; the Orient and the Oriental, Arab, Islamic, Indian, Chinese, or whatever, become repetitious pseudoincarnations of some great original (Christ, Europe, the West) they were supposed to have been imitating. Only the source of these rather narcissistic Western ideas about the Orient changed in time, not their character. Thus we will find it commonly believed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that Arabia was &amp;quot;on the fringe of the Christian world, a natural asylum for heretical outlaws,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 84.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and that Mohammed was a cunning apostate, whereas in the twentieth century an Orientalist scholar, an erudite specialist, will be the one to point out how Islam is really no more than second-order Arian heresy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Duncan Black Macdonald, &amp;quot;Whither Islam?&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Muslim World&#039;&#039; 23 (January 1933): 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Our initial description of Orientalism as a learned field now acquires a new concreteness. A field is often an enclosed space. The idea of representation is a theatrical one: the Orient is the stage on which the whole East is confined. On this stage will appear figures whose role it is to represent the larger whole from which they emanate. The Orient then seems to be, not an unlimited extension beyond the familiar European world, but rather a closed field, a theatrical stage affixed to Europe. An Orientalist is but the particular specialist in knowledge for which Europe at large is responsible, in the way that an audience is historically and culturally responsible for (and responsive to) dramas technically put together by the dramatist. In the depths of this Oriental stage stands a prodigious cultural repertoire whose individual items evoke a fabulously rich world: the Sphinx, Cleopatra, Eden, Troy, Sodom and Gomorrah, Astarte, Isis and Osiris, Sheba, Babylon, the Genii, the Magi, Nineveh, Prester John, Mahomet, and dozens more; settings, in some cases names only, half-imagined, half-known; monsters, devils, heroes; terrors, pleasures, desires. The European imagination was nourished extensively from this repertoire: between the Middle Ages and the eighteenth century such major authors as Ariosto, Milton, Marlowe, Tasso, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and the authors of the &#039;&#039;Chanson de Roland&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Poema del Cid&#039;&#039; drew on the Orient&#039;s riches for their productions, in ways that sharpened the outlines of imagery, ideas, and figures populating it. In addition, a great deal of what was considered learned Orientalist scholarship in Europe pressed ideological myths into service, even as knowledge seemed genuinely to be advancing.&lt;br /&gt;
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A celebrated instance of how dramatic form and learned imagery come together in the Orientalist theater is Barthelemy d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, published posthumously in 1697, with a preface by Antoine Galland. The introduction of the recent &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039; considers the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;, along with George Sale&#039;s preliminary discourse to his translation of the Koran (1734) and Simon Ockley&#039;s &#039;&#039;History of the Saracens&#039;&#039; (1708, 1718), to be &amp;quot;highly important&amp;quot; in widening &amp;quot;the new understanding of Islam&amp;quot; and conveying it &amp;quot;to a less academic readership.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. M. Holt, Introduction to &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. xvi.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This inadequately describes d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s work, which was not restricted to Islam as Sale&#039;s and Ockley&#039;s were. With the exception of Johann H. Hottinger&#039;s &#039;&#039;Historia Orientalis&#039;&#039;, which appeared in 1651, the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; remained the standard reference work in Europe until the early nineteenth century. Its scope was truly epochal. Galland, who was the first European translator of &#039;&#039;The Thousand and One Nights&#039;&#039; and an Arabist of note, contrasted d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s achievement with every prior one by noting the prodigious range of his enterprise. D&#039;Herbelot read a great number of works, Galland said, in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, with the result that he was able to find out about matters hitherto concealed from Europeans.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Antoine Galland, prefatory &amp;quot;Discours&amp;quot; to Barthelemy d&#039;Herbelot, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;ou Dictionnaire universel contenant tout ce qui fait connaitre les peuples de l&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; (The Hague: Neaulme &amp;amp; van Daalen, 1777), 1: vii. Galland&#039;s point is that d&#039;Herbelot presented real knowledge, not legend or myth of the sort associated with the &amp;quot;marvels of the East.&amp;quot; See R. Wittkower, &amp;quot;Marvels of the East: A Study in the History of Monsters,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes&#039;&#039; 5 (1942): 159-97.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; After first composing a dictionary of these three Oriental languages, d&#039;Herbelot went on to study Oriental history, theology, geography, science, and art, in both their fabulous and their truthful varieties. Thereafter he decided to compose two works, one a &#039;&#039;bibliotheque&#039;&#039;, or &amp;quot;library,&amp;quot; an alphabetically arranged dictionary, the second a &#039;&#039;florilege&#039;&#039;, or anthology. Only the first part was completed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Galland&#039;s account of the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; stated that &amp;quot;orientale&amp;quot; was planned to include principally the Levant, although--Galland says admiringly--the time period covered did not begin only with the creation of Adam and end with the &amp;quot;temps ou nous sommes&amp;quot;: d&#039;Herbelot went even further back, to a time described as &amp;quot;plus haut&amp;quot; in fabulous histories--to the long period of the pre-Adamite Solimans. As Galland&#039;s description proceeds, we learn that the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; was like &amp;quot;any other&amp;quot; history of the world, for what it attempted was a complete compendium of the knowledge available on such matters as the Creation, the Deluge, the destruction of Babel, and so forth--with the difference that d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s sources were Oriental. He divided history into two types, sacred and profane (the Jews and Christians in the first, the Muslims in the second), and two periods, pre- and postdiluvian. Thus d&#039;Herbelot was able to discuss such widely divergent histories as the Mogul, the Tartar, the Turkish, and the Slavonic; he took in as well all the provinces of the Muslim Empire, from the Extreme Orient to the Pillars of Hercules, with their customs, rituals, traditions, commentaries, dynasties, palaces, rivers, and flora. Such a work, even though it included some attention to &amp;quot;la doctrine perverse de Mahomet, qui a cause si grands dommages au Christianisme,&amp;quot; was more capaciously thorough than any work before it. Galland concluded his &amp;quot;Discours&amp;quot; by assuring the reader at length that d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; was uniquely &amp;quot;utile et agreable&amp;quot;; other Orientalists, like Postel, Scaliger, Golius, Pockoke, and Erpenius, produced Orientalist studies that were too narrowly grammatical, lexicographical, geographical, or the like. Only d&#039;Herbelot was able to write a work capable of convincing European readers that the study of Oriental culture was more than just thankless and fruitless: only d&#039;Herbelot, according to Galland, attempted to form in the minds of his readers a sufficiently ample idea of what it meant to know and study the Orient, an idea that would both fill the mind and satisfy one&#039;s great, previously conceived expectations.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Galland, prefatory &amp;quot;Discours&amp;quot; to d&#039;Herbelot, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, pp. xvi, xxxiii. For the state of Orientalist knowledge immediately before d&#039;Herbelot, see V. J. Parry, &amp;quot;Renaissance Historical Literature in Relation to the New and Middle East (with Special Reference to Paolo Giovio),&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Historians of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 277-89.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In such efforts as d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s, Europe discovered its capacities for encompassing and Orientalizing the Orient. A certain sense of superiority appears here and there in what Galland had to say about his and d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;materia orientalia&#039;&#039;; as in the work of seventeenth-century geographers like Raphael du Mans, Europeans could perceive that the Orient was being outstripped and outdated by Western science.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barthold, &#039;&#039;La Decouverte de l&#039;Asie&#039;&#039;, pp. 137-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But what becomes evident is not only the advantage of a Western perspective: there is also the triumphant technique for taking the immense fecundity of the Orient and making it systematically, even alphabetically, knowable by Western laymen. When Galland said of d&#039;Herbelot that he satisfied one&#039;s expectations he meant, I think, that the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; did not attempt to revise commonly received ideas about the Orient. For what the Orientalist does is to &#039;&#039;confirm&#039;&#039; the Orient in his readers&#039; eyes; he neither tries nor wants to unsettle already firm convictions. All the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039; did was represent the Orient more fully and more clearly; what may have been a loose collection of randomly acquired facts concerning vaguely Levantine history, Biblical imagery, Islamic culture, place names, and so on were transformed into a rational Oriental panorama, from A to Z. Under the entry for Mohammed, d&#039;Herbelot first supplied all of the Prophet&#039;s given names, then proceeded to confirm Mohammed&#039;s ideological and doctrinal value as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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C&#039;est le fameux imposteur Mahomet, Auteur et Fondateur d&#039;une heresie, qui a pris le nom de religion, que nous appellons Mahometane. &#039;&#039;Voyez&#039;&#039; le titre d&#039;Eslam.&lt;br /&gt;
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Les Interpretes de l&#039;Alcoran et autres Docteurs de la Loy Musulmane ou Mahometane ont applique a ce faux prophete tous les eloges, que les Ariens, Paulitiens ou Paulianistes &amp;amp; autres Heretiques ont attribue a Jesus-Christ, en lui otant sa Divinite....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;D&#039;Herbelot, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, 2: 648.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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(This is the famous imposter Mahomet, Author and Founder of a heresy, which has taken on the name of religion, which we call Mohammedan. See entry under &#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interpreters of the Alcoran and other Doctors of Muslim or Mohammedan Law have applied to this false prophet all the praises which the Arians, Paulicians or Paulianists, and other Heretics have attributed to Jesus Christ, while stripping him of his Divinity....)&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Mohammedan&amp;quot; is the relevant (and insulting) European designation; &amp;quot;Islam,&amp;quot; which happens to be the correct Muslim name, is relegated to another entry. The &amp;quot;heresy ... which we call Mohammedan&amp;quot; is &amp;quot;caught&amp;quot; as the imitation of a Christian imitation of true religion. Then, in the long historical account of Mohammed&#039;s life, d&#039;Herbelot can turn to more or less straight narrative. But it is the &#039;&#039;placing&#039;&#039; of Mohammed that counts in the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;. The dangers of free-wheeling heresy are removed when it is transformed into ideologically explicit matter for an alphabetical item. Mohammed no longer roams the Eastern world as a threatening, immoral debauchee; he sits quietly on his (admittedly prominent) portion of the Orientalist stage.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See also Montgomery Watt, &amp;quot;Muhammad in the Eyes of the West,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Boston University Journal&#039;&#039; 22, no. 3 (Fall 1974): 61-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He is given a genealogy, an explanation, even a development, all of which are subsumed under the simple statements that prevent him from straying elsewhere.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such &amp;quot;images&amp;quot; of the Orient as this are images in that they represent or stand for a very large entity, otherwise impossibly diffuse, which they enable one to grasp or see. They are also &#039;&#039;characters&#039;&#039;, related to such types as the braggarts, misers, or gluttons produced by Theophrastus, La Bruyere, or Selden. Perhaps it is not exactly correct to say that one &#039;&#039;sees&#039;&#039; such characters as the &#039;&#039;miles gloriosus&#039;&#039; or Mahomet the imposter, since the discursive confinement of a character is supposed at best to let one apprehend a generic type without difficulty or ambiguity. D&#039;Herbelot&#039;s character of Mahomet is an &#039;&#039;image&#039;&#039;, however, because the false prophet is part of a general theatrical representation called &#039;&#039;orientale&#039;&#039; whose totality is contained in the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The didactic quality of the Orientalist representation cannot be detached from the rest of the performance. In a learned work like the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, which was the result of systematic study and research, the author imposes a disciplinary order upon the material he has worked on; in addition, he wants it made clear to the reader that what the printed page delivers is an ordered, disciplined judgment of the material. What is thus conveyed by the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; is an idea of Orientalism&#039;s power and effectiveness, which everywhere remind the reader that henceforth in order to get at the Orient he must pass through the learned grids and codes provided by the Orientalist. Not only is the Orient accommodated to the moral exigencies of Western Christianity; it is also circumscribed by a series of attitudes and judgments that send the Western mind, not first to Oriental sources for correction and verification, but rather to other Orientalist works. The Orientalist stage, as I have been calling it, becomes a system of moral and epistemological rigor. As a discipline representing institutionalized Western knowledge of the Orient, Orientalism thus comes to exert a three-way force, on the Orient, on the Orientalist, and on the Western &amp;quot;consumer&amp;quot; of Orientalism. It would be wrong, I think, to underestimate the strength of the three-way relationship thus established. For the Orient (&amp;quot;out there&amp;quot; towards the East) is corrected, even penalized, for lying outside the boundaries of European society, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world; the Orient is thus &#039;&#039;Orientalized&#039;&#039;, a process that not only marks the Orient as the province of the Orientalist but also forces the uninitiated Western reader to accept Orientalist codifications (like d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s alphabetized &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039;) as the &#039;&#039;true&#039;&#039; Orient. Truth, in short, becomes a function of learned judgment, not of the material itself, which in time seems to owe even its existence to the Orientalist.&lt;br /&gt;
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This whole didactic process is neither difficult to understand nor difficult to explain. One ought again to remember that all cultures impose corrections upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating objects into units of knowledge. The problem is not that conversion takes place. It is perfectly natural for the human mind to resist the assault on it of untreated strangeness; therefore cultures have always been inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving these other cultures not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be. To the Westerner, however, the Oriental was always &#039;&#039;like&#039;&#039; some aspect of the West; to some of the German Romantics, for example, Indian religion was essentially an Oriental version of Germano-Christian pantheism. Yet the Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from something into something else: he does this for himself, for the sake of his culture, in some cases for what he believes is the sake of the Oriental. This process of conversion is a disciplined one: it is taught, it has its own societies, periodicals, traditions, vocabulary, rhetoric, all in basic ways connected to and supplied by the prevailing cultural and political norms of the West. And, as I shall demonstrate, it tends to become more rather than less total in what it tries to do, so much so that as one surveys Orientalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the overriding impression is of Orientalism&#039;s insensitive schematization of the entire Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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How early this schematization began is clear from the examples I have given of Western representations of the Orient in classical Greece. How strongly articulated were later representations building on the earlier ones, how inordinately careful their schematization, how dramatically effective their placing in Western imaginative geography, can be illustrated if we turn now to Dante&#039;s &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;. Dante&#039;s achievement in &#039;&#039;The Divine Comedy&#039;&#039; was to have seamlessly combined the realistic portrayal of mundane reality with a universal and eternal system of Christian values. What Dante the pilgrim sees as he walks through the Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso is a unique vision of judgment. Paolo and Francesca, for instance, are seen as eternally confined to hell for their sins, yet they are seen as enacting, indeed living, the very characters and actions that put them where they will be for eternity. Thus each of the figures in Dante&#039;s vision not only represents himself but is also a typical representation of his character and the fate meted out to him.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Maometto&amp;quot;--Mohammed--turns up in canto 28 of the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;. He is located in the eighth of the nine circles of Hell, in the ninth of the ten Bolgias of Malebolge, a circle of gloomy ditches surrounding Satan&#039;s stronghold in Hell. Thus before Dante reaches Mohammed, he passes through circles containing people whose sins are of a lesser order: the lustful, the avaricious, the gluttonous, the heretics, the wrathful, the suicidal, the blasphemous. After Mohammed there are only the falsifiers and the treacherous (who include Judas, Brutus, and Cassius) before one arrives at the very bottom of Hell, which is where Satan himself is to be found. Mohammed thus belongs to a rigid hierarchy of evils, in the category of what Dante calls &#039;&#039;seminator di scandalo e di scisma&#039;&#039;. Mohammed&#039;s punishment, which is also his eternal fate, is a peculiarly disgusting one: he is endlessly being cleft in two from his chin to his anus like, Dante says, a cask whose staves are ripped apart. Dante&#039;s verse at this point spares the reader none of the eschatological detail that so vivid a punishment entails: Mohammed&#039;s entrails and his excrement are described with unflinching accuracy. Mohammed explains his punishment to Dante, pointing as well to Ali, who precedes him in the line of sinners whom the attendant devil is splitting in two; he also asks Dante to warn one Fra Dolcino, a renegade priest whose sect advocated community of women and goods and who was accused of having a mistress, of what will be in store for him. It will not have been lost on the reader that Dante saw a parallel between Dolcino&#039;s and Mohammed&#039;s revolting sensuality, and also between their pretensions to theological eminence.&lt;br /&gt;
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But this is not all that Dante has to say about Islam. Earlier in the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;, a small group of Muslims turns up. Avicenna, Averroes, and Saladin are among those virtuous heathens who, along with Hector, Aeneas, Abraham, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, are confined to the first circle of the Inferno, there to suffer a minimal (and even honorable) punishment for not having had the benefit of Christian revelation. Dante, of course, admires their great virtues and accomplishments, but because they were not Christians he must condemn them, however lightly, to Hell. Eternity is a great leveler of distinctions, it is true, but the special anachronisms and anomalies of putting pre-Christian luminaries in the same category of &amp;quot;heathen&amp;quot; damnation with post-Christian Muslims does not trouble Dante. Even though the Koran specifies Jesus as a prophet, Dante chooses to consider the great Muslim philosophers and king as having been fundamentally ignorant of Christianity. That they can also inhabit the same distinguished level as the heroes and sages of classical antiquity is an ahistorical vision similar to Raphael&#039;s in his fresco &#039;&#039;The School of Athens&#039;&#039;, in which Averroes rubs elbows on the academy floor with Socrates and Plato (similar to Fenelon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Dialogues des morts&#039;&#039; [1700-1718], where a discussion takes place between Socrates and Confucius).&lt;br /&gt;
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The discriminations and refinements of Dante&#039;s poetic grasp of Islam are an instance of the schematic, almost cosmological inevitability with which Islam and its designated representatives are creatures of Western geographical, historical, and above all, moral apprehension. Empirical data about the Orient or about any of its parts count for very little; what matters and is decisive is what I have been calling the Orientalist vision, a vision by no means confined to the professional scholar, but rather the common possession of all who have thought about the Orient in the West. Dante&#039;s powers as a poet intensify, make more rather than less representative, these perspectives on the Orient. Mohammed, Saladin, Averroes, and Avicenna are fixed in a visionary cosmology--fixed, laid out, boxed in, imprisoned, without much regard for anything except their &amp;quot;function&amp;quot; and the patterns they realize on the stage on which they appear. Isaiah Berlin has described the effect of such attitudes in the following way:&lt;br /&gt;
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In [such a] ... cosmology the world of men (and, in some versions, the entire universe) is a single, all-inclusive hierarchy; so that to explain why each object in it is as, and where, and when it is, and does what it does, is &#039;&#039;eo ipso&#039;&#039; to say what its goal is, how far it successfully fulfills it, and what are the relations of coordination and subordination between the goals of the various goal-pursuing entities in the harmonious pyramid which they collectively form. If this is a true picture of reality, then historical explanation, like every other form of explanation, must consist, above all, in the attribution of individuals, groups, nations, species, each to its own proper place in the universal pattern. To know the &amp;quot;cosmic&amp;quot; place of a thing or a person is to say what it is and what it does, and at the same time why it should be and do as it is and does. Hence to be and to have value, to exist and to have a function (and to fulfill it more or less successfully) are one and the same. The pattern, and it alone, brings into being and causes to pass away and confers purpose, that is to say, value and meaning, on all there is. To understand is to perceive patterns.... The more inevitable an event or an action or a character can be exhibited as being, the better it has been understood, the profounder the researcher&#039;s insight, the nearer we are to the one ultimate truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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This attitude is profoundly anti-empirical.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Historical Inevitability&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 13-14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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And so, indeed, is the Orientalist attitude in general. It shares with magic and with mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are &#039;&#039;because&#039;&#039; they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter. The European encounter with the Orient, and specifically with Islam, strengthened this system of representing the Orient and, as has been suggested by Henri Pirenne, turned Islam into the very epitome of an outsider against which the whole of European civilization from the Middle Ages on was founded. The decline of the Roman Empire as a result of the barbarian invasions had the paradoxical effect of incorporating barbarian ways into Roman and Mediterranean culture, Romania; whereas, Pirenne argues, the consequence of the Islamic invasions beginning in the seventh century was to move the center of European culture away from the Mediterranean, which was then an Arab province, and towards the North. &amp;quot;Germanism began to play its part in history. Hitherto the Roman tradition had been uninterrupted. Now an original Romano-Germanic civilization was about to develop.&amp;quot; Europe was shut in on itself: the Orient, when it was not merely a place in which one traded, was culturally, intellectually, spiritually &#039;&#039;outside&#039;&#039; Europe and European civilization, which, in Pirenne&#039;s words, became &amp;quot;one great Christian community, coterminous with the &#039;&#039;ecclesia&#039;&#039;.... The Occident was now living its own life.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Henri Pirenne, &#039;&#039;Mohammed and Charlemagne&#039;&#039;, trans. Bernard Miall (New York: W. W. Norton &amp;amp; Co., 1939), pp. 234, 283.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In Dante&#039;s poem, in the work of Peter the Venerable and other Cluniac Orientalists, in the writings of the Christian polemicists against Islam from Guibert of Nogent and Bede to Roger Bacon, William of Tripoli, Burchard of Mount Syon, and Luther, in the &#039;&#039;Poema del Cid&#039;&#039;, in the &#039;&#039;Chanson de Roland&#039;&#039;, and in Shakespeare&#039;s &#039;&#039;Othello&#039;&#039; (that &amp;quot;abuser of the world&amp;quot;), the Orient and Islam are always represented as outsiders having a special role to play &#039;&#039;inside&#039;&#039; Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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Imaginative geography, from the vivid portraits to be found in the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039; to the prosaic niches of d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039;, legitimates a vocabulary, a universe of representative discourse peculiar to the discussion and understanding of Islam and of the Orient. What this discourse considers to be a fact--that Mohammed is an imposter, for example--is a component of the discourse, a statement the discourse compels one to make whenever the name Mohammed occurs. Underlying all the different units of Orientalist discourse--by which I mean simply the vocabulary employed whenever the Orient is spoken or written about--is a set of representative figures, or tropes. These figures are to the actual Orient--or Islam, which is my main concern here--as stylized costumes are to characters in a play; they are like, for example, the cross that Everyman will carry, or the particolored costume worn by Harlequin in a &#039;&#039;commedia dell&#039;arte&#039;&#039; play. In other words, we need not look for correspondence between the language used to depict the Orient and the Orient itself, not so much because the language is inaccurate but because it is not even trying to be accurate. What it is trying to do, as Dante tried to do in the &#039;&#039;Inferno&#039;&#039;, is at one and the same time to characterize the Orient as alien and to incorporate it schematically on a theatrical stage whose audience, manager, and actors are &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; Europe, and only for Europe. Hence the vacillation between the familiar and the alien; Mohammed is always the imposter (familiar, because he pretends to be like the Jesus we know) and always the Oriental (alien, because although he is in some ways &amp;quot;like&amp;quot; Jesus, he is after all not like him).&lt;br /&gt;
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Rather than listing all the figures of speech associated with the Orient--its strangeness, its difference, its exotic sensuousness, and so forth--we can generalize about them as they were handed down through the Renaissance. They are all declarative and self-evident; the tense they employ is the timeless eternal; they convey an impression of repetition and strength; they are always symmetrical to, and yet diametrically inferior to, a European equivalent, which is sometimes specified, sometimes not. For all these functions it is frequently enough to use the simple copula &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039;. Thus, Mohammed &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; an imposter, the very phrase canonized in d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; and dramatized in a sense by Dante. No background need be given; the evidence necessary to convict Mohammed is contained in the &amp;quot;is.&amp;quot; One does not qualify the phrase, neither does it seem necessary to say that Mohammed &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; an imposter, nor need one consider for a moment that it may not be necessary to repeat the statement. It &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; repeated, he &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; an imposter, and each time one says it, he becomes more of an imposter and the author of the statement gains a little more authority in having declared it. Thus Humphrey Prideaux&#039;s famous seventeenth-century biography of Mohammed is subtitled &#039;&#039;The True Nature of Imposture&#039;&#039;. Finally, of course, such categories as imposter (or Oriental, for that matter) imply, indeed require, an opposite that is neither fraudulently something else nor endlessly in need of explicit identification. And that opposite is &amp;quot;Occidental,&amp;quot; or in Mohammed&#039;s case, Jesus.&lt;br /&gt;
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Philosophically, then, the kind of language, thought, and vision that I have been calling Orientalism very generally is a form of radical realism; anyone employing Orientalism, which is the habit for dealing with questions, objects, qualities, and regions deemed Oriental, will designate, name, point to, fix what he is talking or thinking about with a word or phrase, which then is considered either to have acquired, or more simply to be, reality. Rhetorically speaking, Orientalism is absolutely anatomical and enumerative: to use its vocabulary is to engage in the particularizing and dividing of things Oriental into manageable parts. Psychologically, Orientalism is a form of paranoia, knowledge of another kind, say, from ordinary historical knowledge. These are a few of the results, I think, of imaginative geography and of the dramatic boundaries it draws. There are some specifically modern transmutations of these Orientalized results, however, to which I must now turn.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Projects&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
It is necessary to examine the more flamboyant operational successes of Orientalism if only to judge how exactly wrong (and how totally opposite to the truth) was the grandly menacing idea expressed by Michelet, that &amp;quot;the Orient advances, invincible, fatal to the gods of light by the charm of its dreams, by the magic of its &#039;&#039;chiaroscuro&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by Henri Baudet in &#039;&#039;Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man&#039;&#039;, trans. Elizabeth Wentholt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), p. xiii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cultural, material, and intellectual relations between Europe and the Orient have gone through innumerable phases, even though the line between East and West has made a certain constant impression upon Europe. Yet in general it was the West that moved upon the East, not vice versa. &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is the generic term that I have been employing to describe the Western approach to the Orient; Orientalism is the discipline by which the Orient was (and is) approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery, and practice. But in addition I have been using the word to designate that collection of dreams, images, and vocabularies available to anyone who has tried to talk about what lies east of the dividing line. These two aspects of Orientalism are not incongruent, since by use of them both Europe could advance securely and unmetaphorically upon the Orient. Here I should like principally to consider material evidence of this advance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Islam excepted, the Orient for Europe was until the nineteenth century a domain with a continuous history of unchallenged Western dominance. This is patently true of the British experience in India, the Portuguese experience in the East Indies, China, and Japan, and the French and Italian experiences in various regions of the Orient. There were occasional instances of native intransigence to disturb the idyll, as when in 1638-1639 a group of Japanese Christians threw the Portuguese out of the area; by and large, however, only the Arab and Islamic Orient presented Europe with an unresolved challenge on the political, intellectual, and for a time, economic levels. For much of its history, then, Orientalism carries within it the stamp of a problematic European attitude towards Islam, and it is this acutely sensitive aspect of Orientalism around which my interest in this study turns.&lt;br /&gt;
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Doubtless Islam was a real provocation in many ways. It lay uneasily close to Christianity, geographically and culturally. It drew on the Judeo-Hellenic traditions, it borrowed creatively from Christianity, it could boast of unrivaled military and political successes. Nor was this all. The Islamic lands sit adjacent to and even on top of the Biblical lands; moreover, the heart of the Islamic domain has always been the region closest to Europe, what has been called the Near Orient or Near East. Arabic and Hebrew are Semitic languages, and together they dispose and redispose of material that is urgently important to Christianity. From the end of the seventh century until the battle of Lepanto in 1571, Islam in either its Arab, Ottoman, or North African and Spanish form dominated or effectively threatened European Christianity. That Islam outstripped and outshone Rome cannot have been absent from the mind of any European past or present. Even Gibbon was no exception, as is evident in the following passage from the &#039;&#039;Decline and Fall&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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In the victorious days of the Roman republic it had been the aim of the senate to confine their councils and legions to a single war, and completely to suppress a first enemy before they provoked the hostilities of a second. These timid maxims of policy were disdained by the magnanimity or enthusiasm of the Arabian caliphs. With the same vigour and success they invaded the successors of Augustus and Artaxerxes; and the rival monarchies at the same instant became the prey of an enemy whom they had so long been accustomed to despise. In the ten years of the administration of Omar, the Saracens reduced to his obedience thirty-six thousand cities or castles, destroyed four thousand churches or temples of the unbelievers, and edified fourteen hundred moschs for the exercise of the religion of Mohammed. One hundred years after his flight from Mecca the arms and reign of his successors extended from India to the Atlantic Ocean, over the various and distant provinces....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gibbon, &#039;&#039;Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire&#039;&#039;, 6: 289.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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When the term &#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; was not simply a synonym for the Asiatic East as a whole, or taken as generally denoting the distant and exotic, it was most rigorously understood as applying to the Islamic Orient. This &amp;quot;militant&amp;quot; Orient came to stand for what Henri Baudet has called &amp;quot;the Asiatic tidal wave.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Baudet, &#039;&#039;Paradise on Earth&#039;&#039;, p. 4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Certainly this was the case in Europe through the middle of the eighteenth century, the point at which repositories of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; knowledge like d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque orientale&#039;&#039; stop meaning primarily Islam, the Arabs, or the Ottomans. Until that time cultural memory gave understandable prominence to such relatively distant events as the fall of Constantinople, the Crusades, and the conquest of Sicily and Spain, but if these signified the menacing Orient they did not at the same time efface what remained of Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
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For there was always India, where, after Portugal pioneered the first bases of European presence in the early sixteenth century, Europe, and primarily England after a long period (from 1600 to 1758) of essentially commercial activity, dominated politically as an occupying force. Yet India itself never provided an indigenous threat to Europe. Rather it was because native authority crumbled there and opened the land to inter-European rivalry and to outright European political control that the Indian Orient could be treated by Europe with such proprietary hauteur--never with the sense of danger reserved for Islam.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Fieldhouse, &#039;&#039;Colonial Empires&#039;&#039;, pp. 138-61.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Nevertheless, between this hauteur and anything like accurate positive knowledge there existed a vast disparity. D&#039;Herbelot&#039;s entries for Indo-Persian subjects in the &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; were all based on Islamic sources, and it is true to say that until the early nineteenth century &amp;quot;Oriental languages&amp;quot; was considered a synonym for &amp;quot;Semitic languages.&amp;quot; The Oriental renaissance of which Quinet spoke served the function of expanding some fairly narrow limits, in which Islam was the catchall Oriental example.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;, p. 30.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Sanskrit, Indian religion, and Indian history did not acquire the status of scientific knowledge until after Sir William Jones&#039;s efforts in the late eighteenth century, and even Jones&#039;s interest in India came to him by way of his prior interest in and knowledge of Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not surprising, then, that the first major work of Oriental scholarship after d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque&#039;&#039; was Simon Ockley&#039;s &#039;&#039;History of the Saracens&#039;&#039;, whose first volume appeared in 1708. A recent historian of Orientalism has opined that Ockley&#039;s attitude towards the Muslims--that to them is owed what was first known of philosophy by European Christians--&amp;quot;shocked painfully&amp;quot; his European audience. For not only did Ockley make this Islamic pre-eminence clear in his work; he also &amp;quot;gave Europe its first authentic and substantial taste of the Arab viewpoint touching the wars with Byzantium and Persia.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A. J. Arberry, &#039;&#039;Oriental Essays: Portraits of Seven Scholars&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 30, 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, Ockley was careful to dissociate himself from the infectious influence of Islam, and unlike his colleague William Whiston (Newton&#039;s successor at Cambridge), he always made it clear that Islam was an outrageous heresy. For his Islamic enthusiasm, on the other hand, Whiston was expelled from Cambridge in 1709.&lt;br /&gt;
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Access to Indian (Oriental) riches had always to be made by first crossing the Islamic provinces and by withstanding the dangerous effect of Islam as a system of quasi-Arian belief. And at least for the larger segment of the eighteenth century, Britain and France were successful. The Ottoman Empire had long since settled into a (for Europe) comfortable senescence, to be inscribed in the nineteenth century as the &amp;quot;Eastern Question.&amp;quot; Britain and France fought each other in India between 1744 and 1748 and again between 1756 and 1763, until, in 1769, the British emerged in practical economic and political control of the subcontinent. What was more inevitable than that Napoleon should choose to harass Britain&#039;s Oriental empire by first intercepting its Islamic through-way, Egypt?&lt;br /&gt;
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Although it was almost immediately preceded by at least two major Orientalist projects, Napoleon&#039;s invasion of Egypt in 1798 and his foray into Syria have had by far the greater consequence for the modern history of Orientalism. Before Napoleon only two efforts (both by scholars) had been made to invade the Orient by stripping it of its veils and also by going beyond the comparative shelter of the Biblical Orient. The first was by Abraham-Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731-1805), an eccentric theoretician of egalitarianism, a man who managed in his head to reconcile Jansenism with orthodox Catholicism and Brahmanism, and who traveled to Asia in order to prove the actual primitive existence of a Chosen People and of the Biblical genealogies. Instead he overshot his early goal and traveled as far east as Surat, there to find a cache of Avestan texts, there also to complete his translation of the Avesta. Raymond Schwab has said of the mysterious Avestan fragment that set Anquetil off on his voyages that whereas &amp;quot;the scholars looked at the famous fragment of Oxford and then returned to their studies, Anquetil looked, and then went to India.&amp;quot; Schwab also remarks that Anquetil and Voltaire, though temperamentally and ideologically at hopeless odds with each other, had a similar interest in the Orient and the Bible, &amp;quot;the one to make the Bible more indisputable, the other to make it more unbelievable.&amp;quot; Ironically, Anquetil&#039;s Avesta translations served Voltaire&#039;s purposes, since Anquetil&#039;s discoveries &amp;quot;soon led to criticism of the very [Biblical] texts which had hitherto been considered to be revealed texts.&amp;quot; The net effect of Anquetil&#039;s expedition is well described by Schwab:&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1759, Anquetil finished his translation of the &#039;&#039;Avesta&#039;&#039; at Surat; in 1786 that of the &#039;&#039;Upanishads&#039;&#039; in Paris--he had dug a channel between the hemispheres of human genius, correcting and expanding the old humanism of the Mediterranean basin. Less than fifty years earlier, his compatriots were asked what it was like to be Persian, when he taught them how to compare the monuments of the Persians to those of the Greeks. Before him, one looked for information on the remote past of our planet exclusively among the great Latin, Greek, Jewish, and Arabic writers. The Bible was regarded as a lonely rock, an aerolite. A universe in writing was available, but scarcely anyone seemed to suspect the immensity of those unknown lands. The realization began with his translation of the &#039;&#039;Avesta&#039;&#039;, and reached dizzying heights owing to the exploration in Central Asia of the languages that multiplied after Babel. Into our schools, up to that time limited to the narrow Greco-Latin heritage of the Renaissance [of which much had been transmitted to Europe by Islam], he interjected a vision of innumerable civilizations from ages past, of an infinity of literatures; moreover the few European provinces were not the only places to have left their mark in history.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;Vie d&#039;Anquetil-Duperron suivie des Usages civils et religieux des Perses par Anquetil-Duperron&#039;&#039; (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1934), pp. 10, 96, 4, 6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For the first time, the Orient was revealed to Europe in the materiality of its texts, languages, and civilizations. Also for the first time, Asia acquired a precise intellectual and historical dimension with which to buttress the myths of its geographic distance and vastness. By one of those inevitable contracting compensations for a sudden cultural expansion, Anquetil&#039;s Oriental labors were succeeded by William Jones&#039;s, the second of the pre-Napoleonic projects I mentioned above. Whereas Anquetil opened large vistas, Jones closed them down, codifying, tabulating, comparing. Before he left England for India in 1783, Jones was already a master of Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian. These seemed perhaps the least of his accomplishments: he was also a poet, a jurist, a polyhistor, a classicist, and an indefatigable scholar whose powers would recommend him to such as Benjamin Franklin, Edmund Burke, William Pitt, and Samuel Johnson. In due course he was appointed to &amp;quot;an honorable and profitable place in the Indies,&amp;quot; and immediately upon his arrival there to take up a post with the East India Company began the course of personal study that was to gather in, to rope off, to domesticate the Orient and thereby turn it into a province of European learning. For his personal work, entitled &amp;quot;Objects of Enquiry During My Residence in Asia&amp;quot; he enumerated among the topics of his investigation &amp;quot;the Laws of the Hindus and Mohammedans, Modern Politics and Geography of Hindustan, Best Mode of Governing Bengal, Arithmetic and Geometry, and Mixed Sciences of the Asiaticks, Medicine, Chemistry, Surgery, and Anatomy of the Indians, Natural Productions of India, Poetry, Rhetoric and Morality of Asia, Music of the Eastern Nations, Trade, Manufacture, Agriculture, and Commerce of India,&amp;quot; and so forth. On August 17, 1787, he wrote unassumingly to Lord Althorp that &amp;quot;it is my ambition to know &#039;&#039;India&#039;&#039; better than any other European ever knew it.&amp;quot; Here is where Balfour in 1910 could find the first adumbration of his claim as an Englishman to know the Orient more and better than anyone else.&lt;br /&gt;
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Jones&#039;s official work was the law, an occupation with symbolic significance for the history of Orientalism. Seven years before Jones arrived in India, Warren Hastings had decided that Indians were to be ruled by their own laws, a more enterprising project than it appears at first glance since the Sanskrit code of laws existed then for practical use only in a Persian translation, and no Englishman at the time knew Sanskrit well enough to consult the original texts. A company official, Charles Wilkins, first mastered Sanskrit, then began to translate the &#039;&#039;Institutes&#039;&#039; of Manu; in this labor he was soon to be assisted by Jones. (Wilkins, incidentally, was the first translator of the Bhagavad-Gita.) In January 1784 Jones convened the inaugural meeting of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, which was to be for India what the Royal &#039;&#039;Society&#039;&#039; was for England. As first president of the society and as magistrate, Jones acquired the effective knowledge of the Orient and of Orientals that was later to make him the undisputed founder (the phrase is A. J. Arberry&#039;s) of Orientalism. To rule and to learn, then to compare Orient with Occident: these were Jones&#039;s goals, which, with an irresistible impulse always to codify, to subdue the infinite variety of the Orient to &amp;quot;a complete digest&amp;quot; of laws, figures, customs, and works, he is believed to have achieved. His most famous pronouncement indicates the extent to which modern Orientalism, even in its philosophical beginnings, was a comparative discipline having for its principal goal the grounding of the European languages in a distant, and harmless, Oriental source:&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;Sanscrit&#039;&#039; language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the &#039;&#039;Greek&#039;&#039;, more copious than the &#039;&#039;Latin&#039;&#039;, and more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three without believing them to have sprung from some common source.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arberry, &#039;&#039;Oriental Essays&#039;&#039;, pp. 62-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Many of the early English Orientalists in India were, like Jones, legal scholars, or else, interestingly enough, they were medical men with strong missionary leanings. So far as one can tell, most of them were imbued with the dual purpose of investigating &amp;quot;the sciences and the arts of Asia, with the hope of facilitating ameliorations there and of advancing knowledge and improving the arts at home&amp;quot;:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Eden Pargiter, ed., &#039;&#039;Centenary Volume of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 1823-1923&#039;&#039; (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), p. viii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; so the common Orientalist goal was stated in the &#039;&#039;Centenary Volume&#039;&#039; of the Royal Asiatic Society founded in 1823 by Henry Thomas Colebrooke. In their dealings with the modern Orientals, the early professional Orientalists like Jones had only two roles to fulfill, yet we cannot today fault them for strictures placed on their humanity by the official &#039;&#039;Occidental&#039;&#039; character of their presence in the Orient. They were either judges or they were doctors. Even Edgar Quinet, writing more metaphysically than realistically, was dimly aware of this therapeutic relationship. &amp;quot;L&#039;Asie a les prophetes,&amp;quot; he said in &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions&#039;&#039;; &amp;quot;L&#039;Europe a les docteurs.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions&#039;&#039;, p. 47.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Proper knowledge of the Orient proceeded from a thorough study of the classical texts, and only after that to an application of those texts to the modern Orient. Faced with the obvious decrepitude and political impotence of the modern Oriental, the European Orientalist found it his duty to rescue some portion of a lost, past classical Oriental grandeur in order to &amp;quot;facilitate ameliorations&amp;quot; in the present Orient. What the European took from the classical Oriental past was a vision (and thousands of facts and artifacts) which only he could employ to the best advantage; to the modern Oriental he gave facilitation and amelioration--and, too, the benefit of his judgment as to what was best for the modern Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was characteristic of all Orientalist projects before Napoleon&#039;s that very little could be done in advance of the project to prepare for its success. Anquetil and Jones, for example, learned what they did about the Orient only after they got there. They were confronting, as it were, the whole Orient, and only after a while and after considerable improvising could they whittle it down to a smaller province. Napoleon, on the other hand, wanted nothing less than to take the whole of Egypt, and his advance preparations were of unparalleled magnitude and thoroughness. Even so, these preparations were almost fanatically schematic and--if I may use the word--textual, which are features that will bear some analysis here. Three things above all else seem to have been in Napoleon&#039;s mind as he readied himself while in Italy in 1797 for his next military move. First, aside from the still threatening power of England, his military successes that had culminated in the Treaty of Campo Formio left him no other place to turn for additional glory than the East. Moreover, Talleyrand had recently animadverted on &amp;quot;les avantages a retirer de colonies nouvelles dans les circonstances presentes,&amp;quot; and this notion, along with the appealing prospect of hurting Britain, drew him eastwards. Secondly, Napoleon had been attracted to the Orient since his adolescence; his youthful manuscripts, for example, contain a summary he made of Marigny&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire des Arabes&#039;&#039;, and it is evident from all of his writing and conversation that he was steeped, as Jean Thiry has put it, in the memories and glories that were attached to Alexander&#039;s Orient generally and to Egypt in particular.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jean Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte decembre 1797-24 aout 1799&#039;&#039; (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1973), p. 9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus the idea of reconquering Egypt as a new Alexander proposed itself to him, allied with the additional benefit of acquiring a new Islamic colony at England&#039;s expense. Thirdly, Napoleon considered Egypt a likely project precisely because he knew it tactically, strategically, historically, and--not to be underestimated--textually, that is, as something one read about and knew through the writings of recent as well as classical European authorities. The point in all this is that for Napoleon Egypt was a project that acquired reality in his mind, and later in his preparations for its conquest, through experiences that belong to the realm of ideas and myths culled from texts, not empirical reality. His plans for Egypt therefore became the first in a long series of European encounters with the Orient in which the Orientalist&#039;s special expertise was put directly to functional colonial use; for at the crucial instant when an Orientalist had to decide whether his loyalties and sympathies lay with the Orient or with the conquering West, he always chose the latter, from Napoleon&#039;s time on. As for the emperor himself, he saw the Orient only as it had been encoded first by classical texts and then by Orientalist experts, whose vision, based on classical texts, seemed a useful substitute for any actual encounter with the real Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Napoleon&#039;s enlistment of several dozen &amp;quot;savants&amp;quot; for his Egyptian Expedition is too well known to require detail here. His idea was to build a sort of living archive for the expedition, in the form of studies conducted on all topics by the members of the Institut d&#039;Egypte, which he founded. What is perhaps less well known is Napoleon&#039;s prior reliance upon the work of the Comte de Volney, a French traveler whose &#039;&#039;Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie&#039;&#039; appeared in two volumes in 1787. Aside from a short personal preface informing the reader that the sudden acquisition of some money (his inheritance) made it possible for him to take the trip east in 1783, Volney&#039;s &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; is an almost oppressively impersonal document. Volney evidently saw himself as a scientist, whose job it was always to record the &amp;quot;etat&amp;quot; of something he saw. The climax of the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; occurs in the second volume, an account of Islam as a religion.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Constantin-Francois Volney, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Bossange, 1821), 2: 241 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Volney&#039;s views were canonically hostile to Islam as a religion and as a system of political institutions; nevertheless Napoleon found this work and Volney&#039;s &#039;&#039;Considerations sur la guerre actuel de Turcs&#039;&#039; (1788) of particular importance. For Volney after all was a canny Frenchman, and--like Chateaubriand and Lamartine a quarter-century after him--he eyed the Near Orient as a likely place for the realization of French colonial ambition. What Napoleon profited from in Volney was the enumeration, in ascending order of difficulty, of the obstacles to be faced in the Orient by any French expeditionary force.&lt;br /&gt;
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Napoleon refers explicitly to Volney in his reflections on the Egyptian expedition, the &#039;&#039;Campagnes d&#039;Egypte et de Syrie&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1798-1799&#039;&#039;, which he dictated to General Bertrand on Saint Helena. Volney, he said, considered that there were three barriers to French hegemony in the Orient and that any French force would therefore have to fight three wars: one against England, a second against the Ottoman Porte, and a third, the most difficult, against the Muslims.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Napoleon, &#039;&#039;Campagnes d&#039;Egypte et de Syrie, 1798-1799: Memoires pour servir a l&#039;histoire de Napoleon&#039;&#039; (Paris: Comou, 1843), 1: 211.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Volney&#039;s assessment was both shrewd and hard to fault since it was clear to Napoleon, as it would be to anyone who read Volney, that his &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Considerations&#039;&#039; were effective texts to be used by any European wishing to win in the Orient. In other words, Volney&#039;s work constituted a handbook for attenuating the human shock a European might feel as he directly experienced the Orient: Read the books, seems to have been Volney&#039;s thesis, and far from being disoriented by the Orient, you will compel it to you.&lt;br /&gt;
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Napoleon took Volney almost literally, but in a characteristically subtle way. From the first moment that the Armee d&#039;Egypte appeared on the Egyptian horizon, every effort was made to convince the Muslims that &amp;quot;nous sommes les vrais musulmans,&amp;quot; as Bonaparte&#039;s proclamation of July 2, 1798, put it to the people of Alexandria.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 126. See also Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, &#039;&#039;Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 12-20.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Equipped with a team of Orientalists (and sitting on board a flagship called the &#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039;), Napoleon used Egyptian enmity towards the Mamelukes and appeals to the revolutionary idea of equal opportunity for all to wage a uniquely benign and selective war against Islam. What more than anything impressed the first Arab chronicler of the expedition, Abd-al-Rahman al-Jabarti, was Napoleon&#039;s use of scholars to manage his contacts with the natives--that and the impact of watching a modern European intellectual establishment at close quarters.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Abu-Lughod, &#039;&#039;Arab Rediscovery of Europe&#039;&#039;, p. 22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Napoleon tried everywhere to prove that he was fighting &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; Islam; everything he said was translated into Koranic Arabic, just as the French army was urged by its command always to remember the Islamic sensibility. (Compare, in this regard, Napoleon&#039;s tactics in Egypt with the tactics of the &#039;&#039;Requerimiento&#039;&#039;, a document drawn up in 1513--in Spanish--by the Spaniards to be read aloud to the Indians: &amp;quot;We shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as such sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses [the King and Queen of Spain] may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do you all the mischief and damage that we can, as to vassals who do not obey,&amp;quot; etc. etc.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted from Arthur Helps, &#039;&#039;The Spanish Conquest of America&#039;&#039; (London, 1900), p. 196, by Stephen J. Greenblatt, &amp;quot;Learning to Curse: Aspects of Linguistic Colonialism in the Sixteenth Century,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;First Images of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old&#039;&#039;, ed. Fredi Chiapelli (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 573.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) When it seemed obvious to Napoleon that his force was too small to impose itself on the Egyptians, he then tried to make the local imams, cadis, muftis, and ulemas interpret the Koran in favor of the Grande Armee. To this end, the sixty ulemas who taught at the Azhar were invited to his quarters, given full military honors, and then allowed to be flattered by Napoleon&#039;s admiration for Islam and Mohammed and by his obvious veneration for the Koran, with which he seemed perfectly familiar. This worked, and soon the population of Cairo seemed to have lost its distrust of the occupiers.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 200. Napoleon was not just being cynical. It is reported of him that he discussed Voltaire&#039;s &#039;&#039;Mahomet&#039;&#039; with Goethe, and defended Islam. See Christian Cherfils, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte et l&#039;Islam d&#039;apres les documents francais arabes&#039;&#039; (Paris: A. Pedone, 1914), p. 249 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Napoleon later gave his deputy Kleber strict instructions after he left always to administer Egypt through the Orientalists and the religious Islamic leaders whom they could win over; any other politics was too expensive and foolish.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thiry, &#039;&#039;Bonaparte en Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 434.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hugo thought that he grasped the tactful glory of Napoleon&#039;s Oriental expedition in his poem &amp;quot;Lui&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Au Nil je le retrouve encore.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
L&#039;Egypte resplendit des feux de son aurore;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Son astre imperial se leve a l&#039;orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Vainqueur, enthousiaste, eclatant de prestiges,&lt;br /&gt;
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Prodige, il etonna la terre des prodiges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Les vieux scheiks veneraient l&#039;emir jeune et prudent;&lt;br /&gt;
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Le peuple redoutait ses armes inouies;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sublime, il apparut aux tribus eblouies&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comme un Mahomet d&#039;occident.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hugo, &#039;&#039;Les Orientales, in Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, 1: 684.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(By the Nile, I find him once again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Egypt shines with the fires of his dawn;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His imperial orb rises in the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Victor, enthusiast, bursting with achievements,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prodigious, he stunned the land of prodigies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The old sheikhs venerated the young and prudent emir.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The people dreaded his unprecedented arms;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sublime, he appeared to the dazzled tribes&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like a Mahomet of the Occident.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such a triumph could only have been prepared &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; a military expedition, perhaps only by someone who had no prior experience of the Orient except what books and scholars told him. The idea of taking along a full-scale academy is very much an aspect of this textual attitude to the Orient. And this attitude in turn was bolstered by specific Revolutionary decrees (particularly the one of 10 Germinal An III--March 30, 1793--establishing an &#039;&#039;ecole publique&#039;&#039; in the Bibliotheque nationale to teach Arabic, Turkish, and Persian)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Henri Deherain, &#039;&#039;Silvestre de Sacy, ses contemporains et ses disciples&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1938), p. v.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; whose object was the rationalist one of dispelling mystery and institutionalizing even the most recondite knowledge. Thus many of Napoleon&#039;s Orientalist translators were students of Sylvestre de Sacy, who, beginning in June 1796, was the first and only teacher of Arabic at the Ecole publique des langues orientales. Sacy later became the teacher of nearly every major Orientalist in Europe, where his students dominated the field for about three-quarters of a century. Many of them were politically useful, in the ways that several had been to Napoleon in Egypt.&lt;br /&gt;
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But dealings with the Muslims were only a part of Napoleon&#039;s project to dominate Egypt. The other part was to render it completely open, to make it totally accessible to European scrutiny. From being a land of obscurity and a part of the Orient hitherto known at second hand through the exploits of earlier travelers, scholars, and conquerors, Egypt was to become a department of French learning. Here too the textual and schematic attitudes are evident. The Institut, with its teams of chemists, historians, biologists, archaeologists, surgeons, and antiquarians, was the learned division of the army. Its job was no less aggressive: to put Egypt into modern French; and unlike the Abbe Le Mascrier&#039;s 1735 &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, Napoleon&#039;s was to be a universal undertaking. Almost from the first moments of the occupation Napoleon saw to it that the Institut began its meetings, its experiments--its fact-finding mission, as we would call it today. Most important, everything said, seen, and studied was to be recorded, and indeed was recorded in that great collective appropriation of one country by another, the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, published in twenty-three enormous volumes between 1809 and 1828.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte, ou Recueil des observations et des recherches qui ont ete faites in Egypte pendant l&#039;expedition de l&#039;armee francaise, publie par les ordres de sa majeste l&#039;empereur Napoleon le grand&#039;&#039;, 23 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie imperiale, 1809-28).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Description&#039;s&#039;&#039; uniqueness is not only in its size, or even in the intelligence of its contributors, but in its attitude to its subject matter, and it is this attitude that makes it of great interest for the study of modern Orientalist projects. The first few pages of its &#039;&#039;preface historique&#039;&#039;, written by Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier, the Institut&#039;s secretary, make it clear that in &amp;quot;doing&amp;quot; Egypt the scholars were also grappling directly with a kind of unadulterated cultural, geographical, and historical significance. Egypt was the focal point of the relationships between Africa and Asia, between Europe and the East, between memory and actuality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Placed between Africa and Asia, and communicating easily with Europe, Egypt occupies the center of the ancient continent. This country presents only great memories; it is the homeland of the arts and conserves innumerable monuments; its principal temples and the palaces inhabited by its kings still exist, even though its least ancient edifices had already been built by the time of the Trojan War. Homer, Lycurgus, Solon, Pythagoras, and Plato all went to Egypt to study the sciences, religion, and the laws. Alexander founded an opulent city there, which for a long time enjoyed commercial supremacy and which witnessed Pompey, Caesar, Mark Antony, and Augustus deciding between them the fate of Rome and that of the entire world. It is therefore proper for this country to attract the attention of illustrious princes who rule the destiny of nations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No considerable power was ever amassed by any nation, whether in the West or in Asia, that did not also turn that nation toward Egypt, which was regarded in some measure as its natural lot.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Fourier, &#039;&#039;Preface historique&#039;&#039;, vol. 1 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Egypt was saturated with meaning for the arts, sciences, and government, its role was to be the stage on which actions of a world-historical importance would take place. By taking Egypt, then, a modern power would naturally demonstrate its strength and justify history; Egypt&#039;s own destiny was to be annexed, to Europe preferably. In addition, this power would also enter a history whose common element was defined by figures no less great than Homer, Alexander, Caesar, Plato, Solon, and Pythagoras, who graced the Orient with their prior presence there. The Orient, in short, existed as a set of values attached, not to its modern realities, but to a series of valorized contacts it had had with a distant European past. This is a pure example of the textual, schematic attitude I have been referring to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fourier continues similarly for over a hundred pages (each page, incidentally, is a square meter in size, as if the project and the size of the page had been thought of as possessing comparable scale). Out of the free-floating past, however, he must justify the Napoleonic expedition as something that needed to be undertaken when it happened. The dramatic perspective is never abandoned. Conscious of his European audience and of the Oriental figures he was manipulating, he writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One remembers the impression made on the whole of Europe by the astounding news that the French were in the Orient.... This great project was meditated in silence, and was prepared with such activity and secrecy that the worried vigilance of our enemies was deceived; only at the moment that it happened did they learn that it had been conceived, undertaken, and carried out successfully....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So dramatic a &#039;&#039;coup de theatre&#039;&#039; had its advantages for the Orient as well:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This country, which has transmitted its knowledge to so many nations, is today plunged into barbarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only a hero could bring all these factors together, which is what Fourier now describes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Napoleon appreciated the influence that this event would have on the relations between Europe, the Orient, and Africa, on Mediterranean shipping, and on Asia&#039;s destiny.... Napoleon wanted to offer a useful European example to the Orient, and finally also to make the inhabitants&#039; lives more pleasant, as well as to procure for them all the advantages of a perfected civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
None of this would be possible without a continuous application to the project of the arts and sciences.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. iii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To restore a region from its present barbarism to its former classical greatness; to instruct (for its own benefit) the Orient in the ways of the modern West; to subordinate or underplay military power in order to aggrandize the project of glorious knowledge acquired in the process of political domination of the Orient; to formulate the Orient, to give it shape, identity, definition with full recognition of its place in memory, its importance to imperial strategy, and its &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; role as an appendage to Europe; to dignify all the knowledge collected during colonial occupation with the title &amp;quot;contribution to modern learning&amp;quot; when the natives had neither been consulted nor treated as anything except as pretexts for a text whose usefulness was not to the natives; to feel oneself as a European in command, almost at will, of Oriental history, time, and geography; to institute new areas of specialization; to establish new disciplines; to divide, deploy, schematize, tabulate, index, and record everything in sight (and out of sight); to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law about the Oriental nature, temperament, mentality, custom, or type; and, above all, to transmute living reality into the stuff of texts, to possess (or think one possesses) actuality mainly because nothing in the Orient seems to resist one&#039;s powers: these are the features of Orientalist projection entirely realized in the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, itself enabled and reinforced by Napoleon&#039;s wholly Orientalist engulfment of Egypt by the instruments of Western knowledge and power. Thus Fourier concludes his preface by announcing that history will remember how &amp;quot;Egypte fut le theatre de sa [Napoleon&#039;s] gloire, et preserve de l&#039;oubli toutes les circonstances de cet evenement extraordinaire.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. xcii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; thereby displaces Egyptian or Oriental history as a history possessing its own coherence, identity, and sense. Instead, history as recorded in the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; supplants Egyptian or Oriental history by identifying itself directly and immediately with world history, a euphemism for European history. To save an event from oblivion is in the Orientalist&#039;s mind the equivalent of turning the Orient into a theater for his representations of the Orient: this is almost exactly what Fourier says. Moreover, the sheer power of having described the Orient in modern Occidental terms lifts the Orient from the realms of silent obscurity where it has lain neglected (except for the inchoate murmurings of a vast but undefined sense of its own past) into the clarity of modern European science. There this new Orient figures as--for instance, in Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire&#039;s biological theses in the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039;--the confirmation of laws of zoological specialization formulated by Buffon.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, &#039;&#039;Histoire naturelle des poissons du Nil&#039;&#039;, vol. 17 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Or it serves as a &amp;quot;contraste frappante avec les habitudes des nations Europeennes,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;M. de Chabrol, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs des habitants modernes de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, vol. 14 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, p. 376.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in which the &amp;quot;bizarre jouissances&amp;quot; of Orientals serve to highlight the sobriety and rationality of Occidental habits. Or, to cite one more use for the Orient, equivalents of those Oriental physiological characteristics that made possible the successful embalming of bodies are sought for in European bodies, so that chevaliers fallen on the field of honor can be preserved as lifelike relics of Napoleon&#039;s great Oriental campaign.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This is evident in Baron Larrey, &#039;&#039;Notice sur la conformation physique des egyptiens et des differentes races qui habitent en Egypte, suivie de quelques reflexions sur l&#039;embaumement des momies&#039;&#039;, vol. 13 of &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the military failure of Napoleon&#039;s occupation of Egypt did not also destroy the fertility of its over-all projection for Egypt or the rest of the Orient. Quite literally, the occupation gave birth to the entire modern experience of the Orient as interpreted from within the universe of discourse founded by Napoleon in Egypt, whose agencies of domination and dissemination included the Institut and the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039;. The idea, as it has been characterized by Charles-Roux, was that Egypt &amp;quot;restored to prosperity, regenerated by wise and enlightened administration ... would shed its civilizing rays upon all its Oriental neighbors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited by John Marlowe, &#039;&#039;The Making of the Suez Canal&#039;&#039; (London: Cresset Press, 1964), p. 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; True, the other European powers would seek to compete in this mission, none more than England. But what would happen as a continuing legacy of the common Occidental mission to the Orient--despite inter-European squabbling, indecent competition, or outright war--would be the creation of new projects, new visions, new enterprises combining additional parts of the old Orient with the conquering European spirit. After Napoleon, then, the very language of Orientalism changed radically. Its descriptive realism was upgraded and became not merely a style of representation but a language, indeed a means of &#039;&#039;creation&#039;&#039;. Along with the &#039;&#039;langues meres&#039;&#039;, as those forgotten dormant sources for the modern European demotics were entitled by Antoine Fabre d&#039;Olivet, the Orient was reconstructed, reassembled, crafted, in short, &#039;&#039;born&#039;&#039; out of the Orientalists&#039; efforts. The &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; became the master type of all further efforts to bring the Orient closer to Europe, thereafter to absorb it entirely and--centrally important--to cancel, or at least subdue and reduce, its strangeness and, in the case of Islam, its hostility. For the Islamic Orient would henceforth appear as a category denoting the Orientalists&#039; power and not the Islamic people as humans nor their history as history.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus out of the Napoleonic expedition there issued a whole series of textual children, from Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039; to Lamartine&#039;s &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; to Flaubert&#039;s &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, and in the same tradition, Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; and Richard Burton&#039;s &#039;&#039;Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039;. What binds them together is not only their common background in Oriental legend and experience but also their learned reliance on the Orient as a kind of womb out of which they were brought forth. If paradoxically these creations turned out to be highly stylized simulacra, elaborately wrought imitations of what a live Orient might be thought to look like, that by no means detracts either from the strength of their imaginative conception or from the strength of European mastery of the Orient, whose prototypes respectively were Cagliostro, the great European impersonator of the Orient, and Napoleon, its first modern conqueror.&lt;br /&gt;
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Artistic or textual work was not the only product of the Napoleonic expedition. There were, in addition and certainly more influential, the scientific project, whose chief instance is Ernest Renan&#039;s &#039;&#039;Systeme compare et histoire generale des langues semitiques&#039;&#039;, completed in 1848 for--neatly enough--the Prix Volney, and the geopolitical project, of which Ferdinand de Lesseps&#039;s Suez Canal and England&#039;s occupation of Egypt in 1882 are prime instances. The difference between the two is not only in manifest scale but also in quality of Orientalist conviction. Renan truly believed that he had re-created the Orient, as it really was, in his work. De Lesseps, on the other hand, always was somewhat awed by the newness his project had released out of the old Orient, and this sense communicated itself to everyone for whom the opening of the canal in 1869 was no ordinary event. In his &#039;&#039;Excursionist and Tourist Advertiser&#039;&#039; for July 1, 1869, Thomas Cook&#039;s enthusiasm carries on de Lesseps&#039;s:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On November the 17th, the greatest engineering feat of the present century is to have its success celebrated by a magnificent inauguration fete, at which nearly every European royal family will have its special representative. Truly the occasion will be an exceptional one. The formation of a line of water communication between Europe and the East, has been the thought of centuries, occupying in turn the minds of Greeks, Roman, Saxon and Gaul, but it was not until within the last few years that modern civilization began seriously to set about emulating the labours of the ancient Pharaohs, who, many centuries since, constructed a canal between the two seas, traces of which remain to this day.... Everything connected with [the modern] works are on the most gigantic scale, and a perusal of a little pamphlet, descriptive of the undertaking, from the pen of the Chevalier de St. Stoess, impresses us most forcibly with the genius of the great Master-mind--M. Ferdinand de Lesseps--to whose perseverance, calm daring and foresight, the dream of ages has at last become a real and tangible fact ... the project for bringing more closely together the countries of the West and the East, and thus uniting the civilizations of different epochs.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted in John Pudney, &#039;&#039;Suez: De Lesseps&#039; Canal&#039;&#039; (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 141-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The combination of old ideas with new methods, the bringing together of cultures whose relations to the nineteenth century were different, the genuine imposition of the power of modern technology and intellectual will upon formerly stable and divided geographical entities like East and West: this is what Cook perceives and what, in his journals, speeches, prospectuses, and letters, de Lesseps advertises.&lt;br /&gt;
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Genealogically, Ferdinand&#039;s start was auspicious. Mathieu de Lesseps, his father, had come to Egypt with Napoleon and remained there (as &amp;quot;unofficial French representative,&amp;quot; Marlowe says&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marlowe, &#039;&#039;Making of the Suez Canal&#039;&#039;, p. 62.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) for four years after the French evacuated it in 1801. Many of Ferdinand&#039;s later writings refer back to Napoleon&#039;s own interest in digging a canal, which, because he had been misinformed by experts, he never thought was a realizable goal. Infected by the erratic history of canal projects that included French schemes entertained by Richelieu and the Saint-Simonians, de Lesseps returned to Egypt in 1854, there to embark on the undertaking that was eventually completed fifteen years later. He had no real engineering background. Only a tremendous faith in his near-divine skills as builder, mover, and creator kept him going; as his diplomatic and financial talents gained him Egyptian and European support, he seems to have acquired the necessary knowledge to carry matters to completion. More useful, perhaps, he learned how to plant his potential contributors in the world-historical theater and make them see what his &amp;quot;pensee morale,&amp;quot; as he called his project, really meant. &amp;quot;Vous envisagez,&amp;quot; he told them in 1860, &amp;quot;les immenses services que le rapprochement de l&#039;occident et de l&#039;orient doit rendre a la civilization et au developpement de la richesse generale. Le monde attend de vous un grand progres et vous voulez repondre a l&#039;attente du monde.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ferdinand de Lesseps, &#039;&#039;Lettres, journal et documents pour servir a l&#039;histoire du Canal de Suez&#039;&#039; (Paris: Didier, 1881), 5: 310. For an apt characterization of de Lesseps and Cecil Rhodes as mystics, see Baudet, &#039;&#039;Paradise on Earth&#039;&#039;, p. 68.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In accordance with such notions the name of the investment company formed by de Lesseps in 1858 was a charged one and reflected the grandiose plans he cherished: the Compagnie universelle. In 1862 the Academie francaise offered a prize for an epic on the canal. Bornier, the winner, delivered himself of such hyperbole as the following, none of it fundamentally contradicting de Lesseps&#039;s picture of what he was up to:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Au travail! Ouvriers que notre France envoie,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tracez, pour l&#039;univers, cette nouvelle voie!&lt;br /&gt;
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Vos peres, les heros, sont venus jusqu&#039;ici;&lt;br /&gt;
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Soyez ferme comme aux intrepides,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Comme eux vous combattez aux pieds des pyramides,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Et leurs quatre mille ans vous contemplent aussi!&lt;br /&gt;
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Oui, c&#039;est pour l&#039;univers! Pour l&#039;Asie et l&#039;Europe,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pour ces climats lointain que la nuit enveloppe,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pour le Chinois perfide et l&#039;Indien demi-nu;&lt;br /&gt;
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Pour les peuples heureux, libres, humains et braves,&lt;br /&gt;
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Pour les peuples mechants, pour les peuples esclaves,&lt;br /&gt;
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Pour ceux a qui le Christ est encore inconnu.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Charles Beatty, &#039;&#039;De Lesseps of Suez: The Man and His Times&#039;&#039; (New York: Harper &amp;amp; Brothers, 1956), p. 220.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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De Lesseps was nowhere more eloquent and resourceful than when he was called upon to justify the enormous expense in money and men the canal would require. He could pour out statistics to enchant any ear; he would quote Herodotus and maritime statistics with equal fluency. In his journal entries for 1864 he cited with approbation Casimir Leconte&#039;s observation that an eccentric life would develop significant originality in men, and from originality would come great and unusual exploits.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;De Lesseps, &#039;&#039;Lettres, journal et documents&#039;&#039;, 5: 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Such exploits were their own justification. Despite its immemorial pedigree of failures, its outrageous cost, its astounding ambitions for altering the way Europe would handle the Orient, the canal was worth the effort. It was a project uniquely able to override the objections of those who were consulted and, in improving the Orient as a whole, to do what scheming Egyptians, perfidious Chinese, and half-naked Indians could never have done for themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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The opening ceremonies in November 1869 were an occasion which, no less than the whole history of de Lesseps&#039;s machinations, perfectly embodied his ideas. For years his speeches, letters, and pamphlets were laden with a vividly energetic and theatrical vocabulary. In the pursuit of success, he could be found saying of himself (always in the first person plural), we created, fought, disposed, achieved, acted, recognized, persevered, advanced; nothing, he repeated on many occasions, could stop us, nothing was impossible, nothing mattered finally except the realization of &amp;quot;le resultat final, le grand but,&amp;quot; which he had conceived, defined, and finally executed. As the papal envoy to the ceremonies spoke on November 16 to the assembled dignitaries, his speech strove desperately to match the intellectual and imaginative spectacle offered by de Lesseps&#039;s canal:&lt;br /&gt;
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Il est permis d&#039;affirmer que l&#039;heure qui vient de sonner est non seulement une des plus solennelles de ce siecle, mais encore une des plus grandes et des plus decisives qu&#039;ait vues l&#039;humanite, depuis qu&#039;elle a une histoire ci-bas. Ce lieu, ou confinent--sans desormais y toucher--l&#039;Afrique et l&#039;Asie, cette grande fete du genre humain, cette assistance auguste et cosmopolite, toutes les races du globe, tous les drapeaux, tous les pavillions, flottant joyeusement sous ce ciel radieux et immense, la croix debout et respectee de tous en face du croissant, que de merveilles, que de contrastes saississants, que de reves reputes chimeriques devenus de palpables realites! et, dans cet assemblage de tant de prodiges, que de sujets de reflexions pour le penseur, que de joies dans l&#039;heure presente et, dans les perspectives de l&#039;avenir, que de glorieuses esperances!...&lt;br /&gt;
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Les deux extremites du globe se rapprochent; en se rapprochant, elles se reconnaissent; en se reconnaissant, tous les hommes, enfants d&#039;un seul et meme Dieu, eprouvent le tressaillement joyeux de leur mutuelle fraternite! O Occident! O Orient! rapprochez, regardez, reconnaissez, saluez, etreignez-vous!...&lt;br /&gt;
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Mais derriere le phenomene materiel, le regard du penseur decouvre des horizons plus vastes que les espaces mesurables, les horizons sans bornes ou mouvent les plus hautes destinees, les plus glorieuses conquetes, les plus immortelles certitudes du genre humain....&lt;br /&gt;
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[Dieu] que votre souffle divin plane sur ces eaux! Qu&#039;il y passe et repasse, de l&#039;Occident a l&#039;Orient, de l&#039;Orient a l&#039;Occident! O Dieu! Servez vous de cette voie pour rapprocher les hommes les uns des autres!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 324-33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The whole world seemed crowded in to render homage to a scheme that God could only bless and make use of himself. Old distinctions and inhibitions were dissolved: the Cross faced down the Crescent, the West had come to the Orient never to leave it (until, in July 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser would activate Egypt&#039;s taking over of the canal by pronouncing the name of de Lesseps).&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Suez Canal idea we see the logical conclusion of Orientalist thought and, more interesting, of Orientalist effort. To the West, Asia had once represented silent distance and alienation; Islam was militant hostility to European Christianity. To overcome such redoubtable constants the Orient needed first to be known, then invaded and possessed, then re-created by scholars, soldiers, and judges who disinterred forgotten languages, histories, races, and cultures in order to posit them--beyond the modern Oriental&#039;s ken--as the true classical Orient that could be used to judge and rule the modern Orient. The obscurity faded to be replaced by hothouse entities; the Orient was a scholar&#039;s word, signifying what modern Europe had recently made of the still peculiar East. De Lesseps and his canal finally destroyed the Orient&#039;s distance, its cloistered intimacy &#039;&#039;away&#039;&#039; from the West, its perdurable exoticism. Just as a land barrier could be transmuted into a liquid artery, so too the Orient was transubstantiated from resistant hostility into obliging, and submissive, partnership. After de Lesseps no one could speak of the Orient as belonging to another world, strictly speaking. There was only &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world, &amp;quot;one&amp;quot; world bound together because the Suez Canal had frustrated those last provincials who still believed in the difference between worlds. Thereafter the notion of &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; is an administrative or executive one, and it is subordinate to demographic, economic, and sociological factors. For imperialists like Balfour, or for anti-imperialists like J. A. Hobson, the Oriental, like the African, is a member of a subject race and not exclusively an inhabitant of a geographical area. De Lesseps had melted away the Orient&#039;s geographical identity by (almost literally) dragging the Orient into the West and finally dispelling the threat of Islam. New categories and experiences, including the imperialist ones, would emerge, and in time Orientalism would adapt itself to them, but not without some difficulty.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;IV.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Crisis&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
It may appear strange to speak about something or someone as holding a &#039;&#039;textual&#039;&#039; attitude, but a student of literature will understand the phrase more easily if he will recall the kind of view attacked by Voltaire in &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039;, or even the attitude to reality satirized by Cervantes in &#039;&#039;Don Quixote&#039;&#039;. What seems unexceptionable good sense to these writers is that it is a fallacy to assume that the swarming, unpredictable, and problematic mess in which human beings live can be understood on the basis of what books--texts--say; to apply what one learns out of a book literally to reality is to risk folly or ruin. One would no more think of using &#039;&#039;Amadis of Gaul&#039;&#039; to understand sixteenth-century (or present-day) Spain than one would use the Bible to understand, say, the House of Commons. But clearly people have tried and do try to use texts in so simple-minded a way, for otherwise &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Don Quixote&#039;&#039; would not still have the appeal for readers that they do today. It seems a common human failing to prefer the schematic authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with the human. But is this failing constantly present, or are there circumstances that, more than others, make the textual attitude likely to prevail?&lt;br /&gt;
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Two situations favor a textual attitude. One is when a human being confronts at close quarters something relatively unknown and threatening and previously distant. In such a case one has recourse not only to what in one&#039;s previous experience the novelty resembles but also to what one has read about it. Travel books or guidebooks are about as &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; a kind of text, as logical in their composition and in their use, as any book one can think of, precisely because of this human tendency to fall back on a text when the uncertainties of travel in strange parts seem to threaten one&#039;s equanimity. Many travelers find themselves saying of an experience in a new country that it wasn&#039;t what they expected, meaning that it wasn&#039;t what a book said it would be. And of course many writers of travel books or guidebooks compose them in order to say that a country &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; like this, or better, that it &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; colorful, expensive, interesting, and so forth. The idea in either case is that people, places, and experiences can always be described by a book, so much so that the book (or text) acquires a greater authority, and use, even than the actuality it describes. The comedy of Fabrice del Dongo&#039;s search for the battle of Waterloo is not so much that he fails to find the battle, but that he looks for it as something texts have told him about.&lt;br /&gt;
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A second situation favoring the textual attitude is the appearance of success. If one reads a book claiming that lions are fierce and then encounters a fierce lion (I simplify, of course), the chances are that one will be encouraged to read more books by that same author, and believe them. But if, in addition, the lion book instructs one how to deal with a fierce lion, and the instructions work perfectly, then not only will the author be greatly believed, he will also be impelled to try his hand at other kinds of written performance. There is a rather complex dialectic of reinforcement by which the experiences of readers in reality are determined by what they have read, and this in turn influences writers to take up subjects defined in advance by readers&#039; experiences. A book on how to handle a fierce lion might then cause a series of books to be produced on such subjects as the fierceness of lions, the origins of fierceness, and so forth. Similarly, as the focus of the text centers more narrowly on the subject--no longer lions but their fierceness--we might expect that the ways by which it is recommended that a lion&#039;s fierceness be handled will actually &#039;&#039;increase&#039;&#039; its fierceness, force it to be fierce since that is what it is and that is what in essence we know or can &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; know about it.&lt;br /&gt;
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A text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual, and arising out of circumstances similar to the ones I have just described, is not easily dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of academics, institutions, and governments can accrue to it, surrounding it with still greater prestige than its practical successes warrant. Most important, such texts can &#039;&#039;create&#039;&#039; not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it. This kind of text is composed out of those pre-existing units of information deposited by Flaubert in the catalogue of &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the light of all this, consider Napoleon and de Lesseps. Everything they knew, more or less, about the Orient came from books written in the tradition of Orientalism, placed in its library of &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;; for them the Orient, like the fierce lion, was something to be encountered and dealt with to a certain extent &#039;&#039;because&#039;&#039; the texts made that Orient possible. Such an Orient was silent, available to Europe for the realization of projects that involved but were never directly responsible to the native inhabitants, and unable to resist the projects, images, or mere descriptions devised for it. Earlier in this chapter I called such a relation between Western writing (and its consequences) and Oriental silence the result of and the sign of the West&#039;s great cultural strength, its will to power over the Orient. But there is another side to the strength, a side whose existence depends on the pressures of the Orientalist tradition and its textual attitude to the Orient; this side lives its own life, as books about fierce lions will do until lions can talk back. The perspective rarely drawn on Napoleon and de Lesseps--to take two among the many projectors who hatched plans for the Orient--is the one that sees them carrying on in the dimensionless silence of the Orient mainly because the discourse of Orientalism, over and above the Orient&#039;s powerlessness to do anything about them, suffused their activity with meaning, intelligibility, and reality. The discourse of Orientalism and what made it possible--in Napoleon&#039;s case, a West far more powerful militarily than the Orient--gave them Orientals who could be described in such works as the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039; and an Orient that could be cut across as de Lesseps cut across Suez. Moreover, Orientalism gave them their success--at least from their point of view, which had nothing to do with that of the Oriental. Success, in other words, had all the actual human interchange between Oriental and Westerner of the Judge&#039;s &amp;quot;said I to myself, said I&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Trial by Jury&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Once we begin to think of Orientalism as a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient, we will encounter few surprises. For if it is true that historians like Michelet, Ranke, Toqueville, and Burckhardt &#039;&#039;emplot&#039;&#039; their narratives &amp;quot;as a story of a particular kind,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hayden White, &#039;&#039;Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe&#039;&#039; (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 12.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the same is also true of Orientalists who plotted Oriental history, character, and destiny for hundreds of years. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Orientalists became a more serious quantity, because by then the reaches of imaginative and actual geography had shrunk, because the Oriental-European relationship was determined by an unstoppable European expansion in search of markets, resources, and colonies, and finally, because Orientalism had accomplished its self-metamorphosis from a scholarly discourse to an imperial institution. Evidence of this metamorphosis is already apparent in what I have said of Napoleon, de Lesseps, Balfour, and Cromer. Their projects in the Orient are understandable on only the most rudimentary level as the efforts of men of vision and genius, heroes in Carlyle&#039;s sense. In fact Napoleon, de Lesseps, Cromer, and Balfour are far more &#039;&#039;regular&#039;&#039;, far less unusual, if we recall the schemata of d&#039;Herbelot and Dante and add to them both a modernized, efficient engine (like the nineteenth-century European empire) and a positive twist: since one cannot ontologically obliterate the Orient (as d&#039;Herbelot and Dante perhaps realized), one does have the means to capture it, treat it, describe it, improve it, radically alter it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The point I am trying to make here is that the transition from a merely textual apprehension, formulation, or definition of the Orient to the putting of all this into practice in the Orient did take place, and that Orientalism had much to do with that--if I may use the word in a literal sense&#039;&#039;--preposterous&#039;&#039; transition. So far as its strictly scholarly work was concerned (and I find the idea of strictly scholarly work as disinterested and abstract hard to understand: still, we can allow it intellectually), Orientalism did a great many things. During its great age in the nineteenth century it produced scholars; it increased the number of languages taught in the West and the quantity of manuscripts edited, translated, and commented on; in many cases, it provided the Orient with sympathetic European students, genuinely interested in such matters as Sanskrit grammar, Phoenician numismatics, and Arabic poetry. Yet--and here we must be very clear--Orientalism overrode the Orient. As a system of thought about the Orient, it always rose from the specifically human detail to the general transhuman one; an observation about a tenth-century Arab poet multiplied itself into a policy towards (and about) the Oriental mentality in Egypt, Iraq, or Arabia. Similarly a verse from the Koran would be considered the best evidence of an ineradicable Muslim sensuality. Orientalism assumed an unchanging Orient, absolutely different (the reasons change from epoch to epoch) from the West. And Orientalism, in its post-eighteenth-century form, could never revise itself. All this makes Cromer and Balfour, as observers and administrators of the Orient, inevitable.&lt;br /&gt;
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The closeness between politics and Orientalism, or to put it more circumspectly, the great likelihood that ideas about the Orient drawn from Orientalism can be put to political use, is an important yet extremely sensitive truth. It raises questions about the predisposition towards innocence or guilt, scholarly disinterest or pressure-group complicity, in such fields as black or women&#039;s studies. It necessarily provokes unrest in one&#039;s conscience about cultural, racial, or historical generalizations, their uses, value, degree of objectivity, and fundamental intent. More than anything else, the political and cultural circumstances in which Western Orientalism has flourished draw attention to the debased position of the Orient or Oriental as an object of study. Can any other than a political master-slave relation produce the Orientalized Orient perfectly characterized by Anwar Abdel Malek?&lt;br /&gt;
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a) On the level of the &#039;&#039;position of the problem&#039;&#039;, and the problematic ... the Orient and Orientals [are considered by Orientalism] as an &amp;quot;object&amp;quot; of study, stamped with an otherness--as all that is different, whether it be &amp;quot;subject&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;object&amp;quot;--but of a constitutive otherness, of an essentialist character.... This &amp;quot;object&amp;quot; of study will be, as is customary, passive, non-participating, endowed with a &amp;quot;historical&amp;quot; subjectivity, above all, non-active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign with regard to itself: the only Orient or Oriental or &amp;quot;subject&amp;quot; which could be admitted, at the extreme limit, is the alienated being, philosophically, that is, other than itself in relationship to itself, posed, understood, defined--and acted--by others.&lt;br /&gt;
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b) On the level of the &#039;&#039;thematic&#039;&#039;, [the Orientalists] adopt an essentialist conception of the countries, nations and peoples of the Orient under study, a conception which expresses itself through a characterized ethnist typology ... and will soon proceed with it towards racism.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the traditional orientalists, an essence should exist--sometimes even clearly described in metaphysical terms--which constitutes the inalienable and common basis of all the beings considered; this essence is both &amp;quot;historical,&amp;quot; since it goes back to the dawn of history, and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixes the being, &amp;quot;the object&amp;quot; of study, within its inalienable and nonevolutive specificity, instead of defining it as all other beings, states, nations, peoples, and cultures--as a product, a resultant of the vection of the forces operating in the field of historical evolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus one ends with a typology--based on a real specificity, but detached from history, and, consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential--which makes of the studied &amp;quot;object&amp;quot; another being with regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent; we will have a homo Sinicus, a homo Arabicus (and why not a homo Aegypticus, etc.), a homo Africanus, the man--the &amp;quot;normal man,&amp;quot; it is understood--being the European man of the historical period, that is, since Greek antiquity. One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the hegemonism of possessing minorities, unveiled by Marx and Engels, and the anthropocentrism dismantled by Freud are accompanied by europocentrism in the area of human and social sciences, and more particularly in those in direct relationship with non-European peoples.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Anwar Abdel Malek, &amp;quot;Orientalism in Crisis,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diogenes&#039;&#039; 44 (Winter 1963): 107-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Abdel Malek sees Orientalism as having a history which, according to the &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; of the late twentieth century, led it to the impasse described above. Let us now briefly outline that history as it proceeded through the nineteenth century to accumulate weight and power, &amp;quot;the hegemonism of possessing minorities,&amp;quot; and anthropocentrism in alliance with Europocentrism. From the last decades of the eighteenth century and for at least a century and a half, Britain and France dominated Orientalism as a discipline. The great philological discoveries in comparative grammar made by Jones, Franz Bopp, Jakob Grimm, and others were originally indebted to manuscripts brought from the East to Paris and London. Almost without exception, every Orientalist began his career as a philologist, and the revolution in philology that produced Bopp, Sacy, Burnouf, and their students was a comparative science based on the premise that languages belong to families, of which the Indo-European and the Semitic are two great instances. From the outset, then, Orientalism carried forward two traits: (1) a newly found scientific self-consciousness based on the linguistic importance of the Orient to Europe, and (2) a proclivity to divide, subdivide, and redivide its subject matter without ever changing its mind about the Orient as being always the same, unchanging, uniform, and radically peculiar object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Friedrich Schlegel, who learned his Sanskrit in Paris, illustrates these traits together. Although by the time he published his &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier&#039;&#039; in 1808 Schlegel had practically renounced his Orientalism, he still held that Sanskrit and Persian on the one hand and Greek and German on the other had more affinities with each other than with the Semitic, Chinese, American, or African languages. Moreover, the Indo-European family was artistically simple and satisfactory in a way the Semitic, for one, was not. Such abstractions as this did not trouble Schlegel, for whom nations, races, minds, and peoples as things one could talk about passionately--in the ever-narrowing perspective of populism first adumbrated by Herder--held a lifelong fascination. Yet nowhere does Schlegel talk about the living, contemporary Orient. When he said in 1800, &amp;quot;It is in the Orient that we must search for the highest Romanticism,&amp;quot; he meant the Orient of the &#039;&#039;Sakuntala&#039;&#039;, the Zend-Avesta, and the Upanishads. As for the Semites, whose language was agglutinative, unaesthetic, and mechanical, they were different, inferior, backward. Schlegel&#039;s lectures on language and on life, history, and literature are full of these discriminations, which he made without the slightest qualification. Hebrew, he said, was made for prophetic utterance and divination; the Muslims, however, espoused a &amp;quot;dead empty Theism, a merely negative Unitarian faith.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Friedrich Schlegel, &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier: Ein Beitrag zur Begrundung der Altertumstunde&#039;&#039; (Heidelberg: Mohr &amp;amp; Zimmer, 1808), pp. 44-59; Schlegel, &#039;&#039;Philosophie der Geschichte: In achtzehn Vorlesungen gehalten zu Wien im Jahre 1828&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean-Jacques Anstett, vol. 9 of Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. Ernest Behler (Munich: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1971), p. 275.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the racism in Schlegel&#039;s strictures upon the Semites and other &amp;quot;low&amp;quot; Orientals was widely diffused in European culture. But nowhere else, unless it be later in the nineteenth century among Darwinian anthropologists and phrenologists, was it made the basis of a scientific subject matter as it was in comparative linguistics or philology. Language and race seemed inextricably tied, and the &amp;quot;good&amp;quot; Orient was invariably a classical period somewhere in a long-gone India, whereas the &amp;quot;bad&amp;quot; Orient lingered in present-day Asia, parts of North Africa, and Islam everywhere. &amp;quot;Aryans&amp;quot; were confined to Europe and the ancient Orient; as Leon Poliakov has shown (without once remarking, however, that &amp;quot;Semites&amp;quot; were not only the Jews but the Muslims as well&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Leon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe&#039;&#039;, trans. Edmund Howard (New York: Basic Books, 1974).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;), the Aryan myth dominated historical and cultural anthropology at the expense of the &amp;quot;lesser&amp;quot; peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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The official intellectual genealogy of Orientalism would certainly include Gobineau, Renan, Humboldt, Steinthal, Burnouf, Remusat, Palmer, Weil, Dozy, Muir, to mention a few famous names almost at random from the nineteenth century. It would also include the diffusive capacity of learned societies: the Societe asiatique, founded in 1822; the Royal Asiatic Society, founded in 1823; the American Oriental Society, founded in 1842; and so on. But it might perforce neglect the great contribution of imaginative and travel literature, which strengthened the divisions established by Orientalists between the various geographical, temporal, and racial departments of the Orient. Such neglect would be incorrect, since for the Islamic Orient this literature is especially rich and makes a significant contribution to building the Orientalist discourse. It includes work by Goethe, Hugo, Lamartine, Chateaubriand, Kinglake, Nerval, Flaubert, Lane, Burton, Scott, Byron, Vigny, Disraeli, George Eliot, Gautier. Later, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we could add Doughty, Barres, Loti, T. E. Lawrence, Forster. All these writers give a bolder outline to Disraeli&#039;s &amp;quot;great Asiatic mystery.&amp;quot; In this enterprise there is considerable support not only from the unearthing of dead Oriental civilizations (by European excavators) in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey, but also from major geographical surveys done all through the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the end of the nineteenth century these achievements were materially abetted by the European occupation of the entire Near Orient (with the exception of parts of the Ottoman Empire, which was swallowed up after 1918). The principal colonial powers once again were Britain and France, although Russia and Germany played some role as well.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Derek Hopwood, &#039;&#039;The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1943: Church and Politics in the Near East&#039;&#039; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; To colonize meant at first the identification--indeed, the creation--of interests; these could be commercial, communicational, religious, military, cultural. With regard to Islam and the Islamic territories, for example, Britain felt that it had legitimate interests, as a Christian power, to safeguard. A complex apparatus for tending these interests developed. Such early organizations as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (1698) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1701) were succeeded and later abetted by the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), the Church Missionary Society (1799), the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804), the London Society for Promoting Christianity Among the Jews (1808). These missions &amp;quot;openly joined the expansion of Europe.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A. L. Tibawi, &#039;&#039;British Interests in Palestine, 1800-1901&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Add to these the trading societies, learned societies, geographical exploration funds, translation funds, the implantation in the Orient of schools, missions, consular offices, factories, and sometimes large European communities, and the notion of an &amp;quot;interest&amp;quot; will acquire a good deal of sense. Thereafter interests were defended with much zeal and expense.&lt;br /&gt;
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So far my outline is a gross one. What of the typical experiences and emotions that accompany both the scholarly advances of Orientalism and the political conquests aided by Orientalism? First, there is disappointment that the modern Orient is not at all like the texts. Here is Gerard de Nerval writing to Theophile Gautier at the end of August 1843:&lt;br /&gt;
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I have already lost, Kingdom after Kingdom, province after province, the more beautiful half of the universe, and soon I will know of no place in which I can find a refuge for my dreams; but it is Egypt that I most regret having driven out of my imagination, now that I have sadly placed it in my memory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gerard de Nerval, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Albert Beguin and Jean Richet (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 1: 933.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is by the author of a great &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;. Nerval&#039;s lament is a common topic of Romanticism (the betrayed dream, as described by Albert Beguin in &#039;&#039;L&#039;Ame romantique et le reve&#039;&#039;) and of travelers in the Biblical Orient, from Chateaubriand to Mark Twain. Any direct experience of the mundane Orient ironically comments on such valorizations of it as were to be found in Goethe&#039;s &amp;quot;Mahometsgesang&amp;quot; or Hugo&#039;s &amp;quot;Adieux de l&#039;hotesse arabe.&amp;quot; Memory of the modern Orient disputes imagination, sends one back to the imagination as a place preferable, for the European sensibility, to the real Orient. For a person who has never seen the Orient, Nerval once said to Gautier, a lotus is still a lotus; for me it is only a kind of onion. To write about the modern Orient is either to reveal an upsetting demystification of images culled from texts, or to confine oneself to the Orient of which Hugo spoke in his original preface to &#039;&#039;Les Orientales&#039;&#039;, the Orient as &amp;quot;image&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;pensee,&amp;quot; symbols of &amp;quot;une sorte de preoccupation generale.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hugo, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, 1: 580.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If personal disenchantment and general preoccupation fairly map the Orientalist sensibility at first, they entail certain other more familiar habits of thought, feeling, and perception. The mind learns to separate a general apprehension of the Orient from a specific experience of it; each goes its separate way, so to speak. In Scott&#039;s novel &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; (1825), Sir Kenneth (of the Crouching Leopard) battles a single Saracen to a standoff somewhere in the Palestinian desert; as the Crusader and his opponent, who is Saladin in disguise, later engage in conversation, the Christian discovers his Muslim antagonist to be not so bad a fellow after all. Yet he remarks:&lt;br /&gt;
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I well thought ... that your blinded race had their descent from the foul fiend, without whose aid you would never have been able to maintain this blessed land of Palestine against so many valiant soldiers of God. I speak not thus of thee in particular, Saracen, but generally of thy people and religion. Strange is it to me, however, not that you should have the descent from the Evil One, but that you should boast of it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sir Walter Scott, &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; (1825; reprint ed., London: J. M. Dent, 1914), pp. 38-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For indeed the Saracen does boast of tracing his race&#039;s line back to Eblis, the Muslim Lucifer. But what is truly curious is not the feeble historicism by which Scott makes the scene &amp;quot;medieval,&amp;quot; letting Christian attack Muslim theologically in a way nineteenth-century Europeans would not (they would, though); rather, it is the airy condescension of damning a whole people &amp;quot;generally&amp;quot; while mitigating the offense with a cool &amp;quot;I don&#039;t mean you in particular.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Scott, however, was no expert on Islam (although H. A. R. Gibb, who was, praised &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; for its insight into Islam and Saladin&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Albert Hourani, &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb, 1895-1971,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Proceedings of the British Academy&#039;&#039; 58 (1972): 495.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;), and he was taking enormous liberties with Eblis&#039;s role by turning him into a hero for the faithful. Scott&#039;s knowledge probably came from Byron and Beckford, but it is enough for us here to note how strongly the general character ascribed to things Oriental could withstand both the rhetorical and the existential force of obvious exceptions. It is as if, on the one hand, a bin called &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; existed into which all the authoritative, anonymous, and traditional Western attitudes to the East were dumped unthinkingly, while on the other, true to the anecdotal tradition of storytelling, one could nevertheless tell of experiences with or in the Orient that had little to do with the generally serviceable bin. But the very structure of Scott&#039;s prose shows a closer intertwining of the two than that. For the general category in advance offers the specific instance a limited terrain in which to operate: no matter how deep the specific exception, no matter how much a single Oriental can escape the fences placed around him, he is &#039;&#039;first&#039;&#039; an Oriental, &#039;&#039;second&#039;&#039; a human being, and &#039;&#039;last&#039;&#039; again an Oriental.&lt;br /&gt;
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So general a category as &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; is capable of quite interesting variations. Disraeli&#039;s enthusiasm for the Orient appeared first during a trip East in 1831. In Cairo he wrote, &amp;quot;My eyes and mind yet ache with a grandeur so little in unison with our own likeness.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by B. R. Jerman, &#039;&#039;The Young Disraeli&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 126. See also Robert Blake, &#039;&#039;Disraeli&#039;&#039; (London: Eyre &amp;amp; Spottiswoode, 1966), pp. 59-70.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; General grandeur and passion inspired a transcendent sense of things and little patience for actual reality. His novel &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; is steeped in racial and geographical platitudes; everything is a matter of race, Sidonia states, so much so that salvation can only be found in the Orient and amongst its races. There, as a case in point, Druzes, Christians, Muslims, and Jews hobnob easily because--someone quips--Arabs are simply Jews on horseback, and all are Orientals at heart. The unisons are made between general categories, not between categories and what they contain. An Oriental lives in the Orient, he lives a life of Oriental ease, in a state of Oriental despotism and sensuality, imbued with a feeling of Oriental fatalism. Writers as different as Marx, Disraeli, Burton, and Nerval could carry on a lengthy discussion between themselves, as it were, using all those generalities unquestioningly and yet intelligibly.&lt;br /&gt;
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With disenchantment and a generalized--not to say schizophrenic--view of the Orient, there is usually another peculiarity. Because it is made into a general object, the whole Orient can be made to serve as an illustration of a particular form of eccentricity. Although the individual Oriental cannot shake or disturb the general categories that make sense of his oddness, his oddness can nevertheless be enjoyed for its own sake. Here, for example, is Flaubert describing the spectacle of the Orient:&lt;br /&gt;
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To amuse the crowd, Mohammed Ali&#039;s jester took a woman in a Cairo bazaar one day, set her on the counter of a shop, and coupled with her publicly while the shopkeeper calmly smoked his pipe.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the road from Cairo to Shubra some time ago a young fellow had himself publicly buggered by a large monkey--as in the story above, to create a good opinion of himself and make people laugh.&lt;br /&gt;
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A marabout died a while ago--an idiot--who had long passed as a saint marked by God; all the Moslem women came to see him and masturbated him--in the end he died of exhaustion--from morning to night it was a perpetual jacking-off....&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Quid dicis&#039;&#039; of the following fact: some time ago a &#039;&#039;santon&#039;&#039; (ascetic priest) used to walk through the streets of Cairo completely naked except for a cap on his head and another on his prick. To piss he would doff the prick-cap, and sterile women who wanted children would run up, put themselves under the parabola of his urine and rub themselves with it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour&#039;&#039;, trans, and ed. Francis Steegmuller (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1973), pp. 44-5. See Gustave Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Correspondance&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean Bruneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 1: 542.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Flaubert frankly acknowledges that this is grotesquerie of a special kind. &amp;quot;All the old comic business&amp;quot;--by which Flaubert meant the well-known conventions of &amp;quot;the cudgeled slave ... the coarse trafficker in women ... the thieving merchant&amp;quot;--acquire a new, &amp;quot;fresh ... genuine and charming&amp;quot; meaning in the Orient. This meaning cannot be reproduced; it can only be enjoyed on the spot and &amp;quot;brought back&amp;quot; very approximately. The Orient is &#039;&#039;watched&#039;&#039;, since its almost (but never quite) offensive behavior issues out of a reservoir of infinite peculiarity; the European, whose sensibility tours the Orient, is a watcher, never involved, always detached, always ready for new examples of what the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039; called &amp;quot;bizarre jouissance.&amp;quot; The Orient becomes a living tableau of queerness.&lt;br /&gt;
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And this tableau quite logically becomes a special topic for texts. Thus the circle is completed; from being exposed as what texts do not prepare one for, the Orient can return as something one writes about in a disciplined way. Its foreignness can be translated, its meanings decoded, its hostility tamed; yet the &#039;&#039;generality&#039;&#039; assigned to the Orient, the disenchantment that one feels after encountering it, the unresolved eccentricity it displays, are all redistributed in what is said or written about it. Islam, for example, was typically Oriental for Orientalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Carl Becker argued that although &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; (note the vast generality) inherited the Hellenic tradition, it could neither grasp nor employ the Greek, humanistic tradition; moreover, to understand Islam one needed above all else to see it, not as an &amp;quot;original&amp;quot; religion, but as a sort of failed Oriental attempt to employ Greek philosophy without the creative inspiration that we find in Renaissance Europe.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This is the argument presented in Carl H. Becker, &#039;&#039;Das Erbe der Antike im Orient und Okzident&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Quelle &amp;amp; Meyer, 1931).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Louis Massignon, perhaps the most renowned and influential of modern French Orientalists, Islam was a systematic rejection of the Christian incarnation, and its greatest hero was not Mohammed or Averroes but al-Hallaj, a Muslim saint who was crucified by the orthodox Muslims for having dared to personalize Islam.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Louis Massignon, &#039;&#039;La Passion d&#039;al-Hosayn-ibn-Mansour al-Hallaj&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1922).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What Becker and Massignon explicitly left out of their studies was the eccentricity of the Orient, which they backhandedly acknowledged by trying so hard to regularize it in Western terms. Mohammed was thrown out, but al-Hallaj was made prominent because he took himself to be a Christ-figure.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a judge of the Orient, the modern Orientalist does not, as he believes and even says, stand apart from it objectively. His human detachment, whose sign is the absence of sympathy covered by professional knowledge, is weighted heavily with all the orthodox attitudes, perspectives, and moods of Orientalism that I have been describing. His Orient is not the Orient as it is, but the Orient as it has been Orientalized. An unbroken arc of knowledge and power connects the European or Western statesman and the Western Orientalists; it forms the rim of the stage containing the Orient. By the end of World War I both Africa and the Orient formed not so much an intellectual spectacle for the West as a privileged terrain for it. The scope of Orientalism exactly matched the scope of empire, and it was this absolute unanimity between the two that provoked the only crisis in the history of Western thought about and dealings with the Orient. And this crisis continues now.&lt;br /&gt;
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Beginning in the twenties, and from one end of the Third World to the other, the response to empire and imperialism has been dialectical. By the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955 the entire Orient had gained its political independence from the Western empires and confronted a new configuration of imperial powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Unable to recognize &amp;quot;its&amp;quot; Orient in the new Third World, Orientalism now faced a challenging and politically armed Orient. Two alternatives opened before Orientalism. One was to carry on as if nothing had happened. The second was to adapt the old ways to the new. But to the Orientalist, who believes the Orient never changes, the new is simply the old betrayed by new, misunderstanding &#039;&#039;dis-Orientals&#039;&#039; (we can permit ourselves the neologism). A third, revisionist alternative, to dispense with Orientalism altogether, was considered by only a tiny minority.&lt;br /&gt;
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One index of the crisis, according to Abdel Malek, was not simply that &amp;quot;national liberation movements in the ex-colonial&amp;quot; Orient worked havoc with Orientalist conceptions of passive, fatalistic &amp;quot;subject races&amp;quot;; there was in addition the fact that &amp;quot;specialists and the public at large became aware of the time-lag, not only between orientalist science and the material under study, but also--and this was to be determining--between the conceptions, the methods and the instruments of work in the human and social sciences and those of orientalism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Abdel Malek, &amp;quot;Orientalism in Crisis,&amp;quot; p. 112.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Orientalists--from Renan to Goldziher to Macdonald to von Grunebaum, Gibb, and Bernard Lewis--saw Islam, for example, as a &amp;quot;cultural synthesis&amp;quot; (the phrase is P. M. Holt&#039;s) that could be studied apart from the economics, sociology, and politics of the Islamic peoples. For Orientalism, Islam had a meaning which, if one were to look for its most succinct formulation, could be found in Renan&#039;s first treatise: in order best to be understood Islam had to be reduced to &amp;quot;tent and tribe.&amp;quot; The impact of colonialism, of worldly circumstances, of historical development: all these were to Orientalists as flies to wanton boys, killed--or disregarded--for their sport, never taken seriously enough to complicate the essential Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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The career of H. A. R. Gibb illustrates within itself the two alternative approaches by which Orientalism has responded to the modern Orient. In 1945 Gibb delivered the Haskell Lectures at the University of Chicago. The world he surveyed was not the same one Balfour and Cromer knew before World War I. Several revolutions, two world wars, and innumerable economic, political, and social changes made the realities of 1945 an unmistakably, even cataclysmically, new object. Yet we find Gibb opening the lectures he called &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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The student of Arabic civilization is constantly brought up against the striking contrast between the imaginative power displayed, for example, in certain branches of Arabic literature and the literalism, the pedantry, displayed in reasoning and exposition, even when it is devoted to these same productions. It is true that there have been great philosophers among the Muslim peoples and that some of them were Arabs, but they were rare exceptions. The Arab mind, whether in relation to the outer world or in relation to the processes of thought, cannot throw off its intense feeling for the separateness and the individuality of the concrete events. This is, I believe, one of the main factors lying behind that &amp;quot;lack of a sense of law&amp;quot; which Professor Macdonald regarded as the characteristic difference in the Oriental.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is this, too, which explains--what is so difficult for the Western student to grasp [until it is explained to him by the Orientalist]--the aversion of the Muslims from the thought-processes of rationalism.... The rejection of rationalist modes of thought and of the utilitarian ethic which is inseparable from them has its roots, therefore, not in the so-called &amp;quot;obscurantism&amp;quot; of the Muslim theologians but in the atomism and discreteness of the Arab imagination.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is pure Orientalism, of course, but even if one acknowledges the exceeding knowledge of institutional Islam that characterizes the rest of the book, Gibb&#039;s inaugural biases remain a formidable obstacle for anyone hoping to understand modern Islam. What is the meaning of &amp;quot;difference&amp;quot; when the preposition &amp;quot;from&amp;quot; has dropped from sight altogether? Are we not once again being asked to inspect the Oriental Muslim as if his world, unlike ours--&amp;quot;differently&amp;quot; from it--had never ventured beyond the seventh century? As for modern Islam itself, despite the complexities of his otherwise magisterial understanding of it, why must it be regarded with so implacable a hostility as Gibb&#039;s? If Islam is flawed from the start by virtue of its permanent disabilities, the Orientalist will find himself opposing any Islamic attempts to reform Islam, because, according to his views, reform is a betrayal of Islam: this is exactly Gibb&#039;s argument. How can an Oriental slip out from these manacles into the modern world except by repeating with the Fool in &#039;&#039;King Lear&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;They&#039;ll have me whipp&#039;d for speaking true, thou&#039;lt have me whipp&#039;d for lying; and sometimes I am whipp&#039;d for holding my peace.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Eighteen years later Gibb faced an audience of English compatriots, only now he was speaking as the director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard. His topic was &amp;quot;Area Studies Reconsidered,&amp;quot; in which, among other &#039;&#039;apercus&#039;&#039;, he agreed that &amp;quot;the Orient is much too important to be left to the Orientalists.&amp;quot; The new, or second alternative, approach open to Orientalists was being announced, just as &#039;&#039;Modern Trends&#039;&#039; exemplified the first, or traditional, approach. Gibb&#039;s formula is well-intentioned in &amp;quot;Area Studies Reconsidered,&amp;quot; so far, of course, as the Western experts on the Orient are concerned, whose job it is to prepare students for careers &amp;quot;in public life and business.&amp;quot; What we now need, said Gibb, is the traditional Orientalist &#039;&#039;plus&#039;&#039; a good social scientist working together: between them the two will do &amp;quot;interdisciplinary&amp;quot; work. Yet the traditional Orientalist will not bring outdated knowledge to bear on the Orient; no, his expertise will serve to remind his uninitiated colleagues in area studies that &amp;quot;to apply the psychology and mechanics of Western political institutions to Asian or Arab situations is pure Walt Disney.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gibb, &#039;&#039;Area Studies Reconsidered&#039;&#039;, pp. 12, 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In practice this notion has meant that when Orientals struggle against colonial occupation, you must say (in order not to risk a Disneyism) that Orientals have never understood the meaning of self-government the way &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do. When some Orientals oppose racial discrimination while others practice it, you say &amp;quot;they&#039;re all Orientals at bottom&amp;quot; and class interest, political circumstances, economic factors are totally irrelevant. Or with Bernard Lewis, you say that if Arab Palestinians oppose Israeli settlement and occupation of their lands, then that is merely &amp;quot;the return of Islam,&amp;quot; or, as a renowned contemporary Orientalist defines it, Islamic opposition to non-Islamic peoples,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;The Return of Islam,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, January 1976, pp. 39-49.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a principle of Islam enshrined in the seventh century. History, politics, and economics do not matter. Islam is Islam, the Orient is the Orient, and please take all your ideas about a left and a right wing, revolutions, and change back to Disneyland.&lt;br /&gt;
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If such tautologies, claims, and dismissals have not sounded familiar to historians, sociologists, economists, and humanists in any other field except Orientalism, the reason is patently obvious. For like its putative subject matter, Orientalism has not allowed ideas to violate its profound serenity. But modern Orientalists--or area experts, to give them their new name--have not passively sequestered themselves in language departments. On the contrary, they have profited from Gibb&#039;s advice. Most of them today are indistinguishable from other &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;advisers&amp;quot; in what Harold Lasswell has called the policy sciences.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, eds., &#039;&#039;The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method&#039;&#039; (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus the military-national-security possibilities of an alliance, say, between a specialist in &amp;quot;national character analysis&amp;quot; and an expert in Islamic institutions were soon recognized, for expediency&#039;s sake if for nothing else. After all, the &amp;quot;West&amp;quot; since World War II had faced a clever totalitarian enemy who collected allies for itself among gullible Oriental (African, Asian, undeveloped) nations. What better way of outflanking that enemy than by playing to the Oriental&#039;s illogical mind in ways only an Orientalist could devise? Thus emerged such masterful ploys as the stick-and-carrot technique, the Alliance for Progress, SEATO, and so forth, all of them based on traditional &amp;quot;knowledge&amp;quot; retooled for better manipulation of its supposed object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus as revolutionary turmoil grips the Islamic Orient, sociologists remind us that Arabs are addicted to &amp;quot;oral functions,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Morroe Berger, &#039;&#039;The Arab World Today&#039;&#039; (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday &amp;amp; Co., 1962), p. 158.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; while economists--recycled Orientalists--observe that for modern Islam neither capitalism nor socialism is an adequate rubric.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There is a compendium of such attitudes listed and criticized in Maxime Rodinson, &#039;&#039;Islam and Capitalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As anticolonialism sweeps and indeed unifies the entire Oriental world, the Orientalist damns the whole business not only as a nuisance but as an insult to the Western democracies. As momentous, generally important issues face the world--issues involving nuclear destruction, catastrophically scarce resources, unprecedented human demands for equality, justice, and economic parity--popular caricatures of the Orient are exploited by politicians whose source of ideological supply is not only the half-literate technocrat but the superliterate Orientalist. The legendary Arabists in the State Department warn of Arab plans to take over the world. The perfidious Chinese, half-naked Indians, and passive Muslims are described as vultures for &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; largesse and are damned when &amp;quot;we lose them&amp;quot; to communism, or to their unregenerate Oriental instincts: the difference is scarcely significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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These contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood the press and the popular mind. Arabs, for example, are thought of as camel-riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, venal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilization. Always there lurks the assumption that although the Western consumer belongs to a numerical minority, he is entitled either to own or to expend (or both) the majority of the world resources. Why? Because he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being. No better instance exists today of what Anwar Abdel Malek calls &amp;quot;the hegemonism of possessing minorities&amp;quot; and anthropocentrism allied with Europocentrism: a white middle-class Westerner believes it his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it, just because by definition &amp;quot;it&amp;quot; is not quite as human as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; are. There is no purer example than this of dehumanized thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a sense the limitations of Orientalism are, as I said earlier, the limitations that follow upon disregarding, essentializing, denuding the humanity of another culture, people, or geographical region. But Orientalism has taken a further step than that: it views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West. So impressive have the descriptive and textual successes of Orientalism been that entire periods of the Orient&#039;s cultural, political, and social history are considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior. Yet if history during the twentieth century has provoked intrinsic change in and for the Orient, the Orientalist is stunned: he cannot realize that to some extent&lt;br /&gt;
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the new [Oriental] leaders, intellectuals or policy-makers, have learned many lessons from the travail of their predecessors. They have also been aided by the structural and institutional transformations accomplished in the intervening period and by the fact that they are to a great extent more at liberty to fashion the future of their countries. They are also much more confident and perhaps slightly aggressive. No longer do they have to function hoping to obtain a favorable verdict from the invisible jury of the West. Their dialogue is not with the West, it is with their fellow-citizens.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, &amp;quot;Retreat from the Secular Path? Islamic Dilemmas of Arab Politics,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Review of Politics&#039;&#039; 28, no. 4 (October 1966): 475.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, the Orientalist assumes that what his texts have not prepared him for is the result either of outside agitation in the Orient or of the Orient&#039;s misguided inanity. None of the innumerable Orientalist texts on Islam, including their summa, &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, can prepare their reader for what has taken place since 1948 in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or the Yemens. When the dogmas about Islam cannot serve, not even for the most Panglossian Orientalist, there is recourse to an Orientalized social-science jargon, to such marketable abstractions as elites, political stability, modernization, and institutional development, all stamped with the cachet of Orientalist wisdom. In the meantime a growing, more and more dangerous rift separates Orient and Occident.&lt;br /&gt;
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The present crisis dramatizes the disparity between texts and reality. Yet in this study of Orientalism I wish not only to expose the sources of Orientalism&#039;s views but also to reflect on its importance, for the contemporary intellectual rightly feels that to ignore a part of the world now demonstrably encroaching upon him is to avoid reality. Humanists have too often confined their attention to departmentalized topics of research. They have neither watched nor learned from disciplines like Orientalism whose unremitting ambition was to master &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; of a world, not some easily delimited part of it such as an author or a collection of texts. However, along with such academic security-blankets as &amp;quot;history,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;literature,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the humanities,&amp;quot; and despite its overreaching aspirations, Orientalism is involved in worldly, historical circumstances which it has tried to conceal behind an often pompous scientism and appeals to rationalism. The contemporary intellectual can learn from Orientalism how, on the one hand, either to limit or to enlarge realistically the scope of his discipline&#039;s claims, and on the other, to see the human ground (the foul-rag-and-bone shop of the heart, Yeats called it) in which texts, visions, methods, and disciplines begin, grow, thrive, and degenerate. To investigate Orientalism is also to propose intellectual ways for handling the methodological problems that history has brought forward, so to speak, in its subject matter, the Orient. But before that we must virtually see the humanistic values that Orientalism, by its scope, experiences, and structures, has all but eliminated.&lt;br /&gt;
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= &#039;&#039;&#039;2.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Orientalist Structures and Restructures&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
When the seyyid &#039;Omar, the Nakeeb el-Ashraf (or chief of the descendants of the Prophet) ... married a daughter, about forty-five years since, there walked before the procession a young man who had made an incision in his abdomen, and drawn out a large portion of his intestines, which he carried before him on a silver tray. After the procession, he restored them to their proper place, and remained in bed many days before he recovered from the effects of this foolish and disgusting act.&lt;br /&gt;
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--Edward William Lane, &#039;&#039;An Account of the Manners and Customs of the modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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... dans le cas de la chute de cet empire, soit par une revolution a Constantinople, soit par un demembrement successif, les puissances europeennes prendront chacune, a titre de protectorat, la partie de l&#039;empire qui lui sera assignee par les stipulations du congres; que ces protectorats, definis et limites, quant aux territoires, selon les voisinages, la surete des frontieres, l&#039;analogie de religions, de moeurs et d&#039;interets ... ne consacreront que la suzerainete des puissances. Cette sorte de suzerainete definie ainsi, et consacree comme droit europeen, consistera principalement dans le droit d&#039;occuper telle partie du territoire ou des cotes, pour y fonder, soit des villes libres, soit des colonies europeennes, soit des ports et des echelles de commerce.... Ce n&#039;est qu&#039;une tutelle armee et civilisatrice que chaque puissance exercera sur son protectorat; elle garantira son existence et ses elements de nationalite, sous le drapeau d&#039;une nationalite plus forte....&lt;br /&gt;
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--Alphonse de Lamartine, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Redrawn Frontiers, Redefined Issues, Secularized Religion&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Gustave Flaubert died in 1880 without having finished &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;, his comic encyclopedic novel on the degeneration of knowledge and the inanity of human effort. Nevertheless the essential outlines of his vision are clear, and are clearly supported by the ample detail of his novel. The two clerks are members of the bourgeoisie who, because one of them is the unexpected beneficiary of a handsome will, retire from the city to spend their lives on a country estate doing what they please (&amp;quot;nous ferons tout ce que nous plaira!&amp;quot;). As Flaubert portrays their experience, doing as they please involves Bouvard and Pecuchet in a practical and theoretical jaunt through agriculture, history, chemistry, education, archaeology, literature, always with less than successful results; they move through fields of learning like travelers in time and knowledge, experiencing the disappointments, disasters, and letdowns of uninspired amateurs. What they move through, in fact, is the whole disillusioning experience of the nineteenth century, whereby--in Charles Moraze&#039;s phrase--&amp;quot;les bourgeois conquerants&amp;quot; turn out to be the bumbling victims of their own leveling incompetence and mediocrity. Every enthusiasm resolves itself into a boring cliche, and every discipline or type of knowledge changes from hope and power into disorder, ruin, and sorrow.&lt;br /&gt;
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Among Flaubert&#039;s sketches for the conclusion of this panorama of despair are two items of special interest to us here. The two men debate the future of mankind. Pecuchet sees &amp;quot;the future of Humanity through a glass darkly,&amp;quot; whereas Bouvard sees it &amp;quot;brightly!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Modern man is progressing, Europe will be regenerated by Asia. The historical law that civilization moves from Orient to Occident ... the two forms of humanity will at last be soldered together.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gustave Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;, vol. 2 of &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. A. Thibaudet and R. Dumesnil (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), p. 985.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This obvious echo of Quinet represents the start of still another of the cycles of enthusiasm and disillusionment through which the two men will pass. Flaubert&#039;s notes indicate that like all his others, this anticipated project of Bouvard&#039;s is rudely interrupted by reality--this time by the sudden appearance of gendarmes who accuse him of debauchery. A few lines later, however, the second item of interest turns up. The two men simultaneously confess to each other that their secret desire is once again to become copyists. They have a double desk made for them, they buy books, pencils, erasers, and--as Flaubert concludes the sketch--&amp;quot;ils s&#039;y mettent&amp;quot;: they turn to. From trying to live through and apply knowledge more or less directly, Bouvard and Pecuchet are reduced finally to transcribing it uncritically from one text to another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although Bouvard&#039;s vision of Europe regenerated by Asia is not fully spelled out, it (and what it comes to on the copyist&#039;s desk) can be glossed in several important ways. Like many of the two men&#039;s other visions, this one is &#039;&#039;global&#039;&#039; and it is &#039;&#039;reconstructive&#039;&#039;; it represents what Flaubert felt to be the nineteenth-century predilection for the rebuilding of the world according to an imaginative vision, sometimes accompanied by a special scientific technique. Among the visions Flaubert has in mind are the utopias of Saint-Simon and Fourier, the scientific regenerations of mankind envisioned by Comte, and all the technical or secular religions promoted by ideologues, positivists, eclectics, occultists, traditionalists, and idealists such as Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis, Michelet, Cousin, Proudhon, Cournot, Cabet, Janet, and Lamennais.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There is an illuminating account of these visions and utopias in Donald G. Charlton, &#039;&#039;Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Throughout the novel Bouvard and Pecuchet espouse the various causes of such figures; then, having ruined them, they move on looking for newer ones, but with no better results.&lt;br /&gt;
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The roots of such revisionist ambitions as these are Romantic in a very specific way. We must remember the extent to which a major part of the spiritual and intellectual project of the late eighteenth century was a reconstituted theology--natural supernaturalism, as M. H. Abrams has called it; this type of thought is carried forward by the typical nineteenth-century attitudes Flaubert satirizes in &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;. The notion of regeneration therefore harks back to&lt;br /&gt;
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a conspicuous Romantic tendency, after the rationalism and decorum of the Enlightenment ... [to revert] to the stark drama and suprarational mysteries of the Christian story and doctrines and to the violent conflicts and abrupt reversals of the Christian inner life, turning on the extremes of destruction and creation, hell and heaven, exile and reunion, death and rebirth, dejection and joy, paradise lost and paradise regained.... But since they lived, inescapably, after the Enlightenment, Romantic writers revived these ancient matters with a difference: they undertook to save the overview of human history and destiny, the existential paradigms, and the cardinal values of their religious heritage, by reconstituting them in a way that would make them intellectually acceptable, as well as emotionally pertinent, for the time being.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;M. H. Abrams, &#039;&#039;Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature&#039;&#039; (New York: W. W. Norton &amp;amp; Co., 1971), p. 66.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What Bouvard has in mind--the regeneration of Europe by Asia--was a very influential Romantic idea. Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, for example, urged upon their countrymen, and upon Europeans in general, a detailed study of India because, they said, it was Indian culture and religion that could defeat the materialism and mechanism (and republicanism) of Occidental culture. And from this defeat would arise a new, revitalized Europe: the Biblical imagery of death, rebirth, and redemption is evident in this prescription. Moreover, the Romantic Orientalist project was not merely a specific instance of a general tendency; it was a powerful shaper of the tendency itself, as Raymond Schwab has so convincingly argued in &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;. But what mattered was not Asia so much as Asia&#039;s &#039;&#039;use to&#039;&#039; modern Europe. Thus anyone who, like Schlegel or Franz Bopp, mastered an Oriental language was a spiritual hero, a knight-errant bringing back to Europe a sense of the holy mission it had now lost. It is precisely this sense that the later secular religions portrayed by Flaubert carry on in the nineteenth century. No less than Schlegel, Wordsworth, and Chateaubriand, Auguste Comte--like Bouvard--was the adherent and proponent of a secular post-Enlightenment myth whose outlines are unmistakably Christian.&lt;br /&gt;
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In regularly allowing Bouvard and Pecuchet to go through revisionist notions from start to comically debased finish, Flaubert drew attention to the human flaw common to all projects. He saw perfectly well that underneath the &#039;&#039;idee recue&#039;&#039; &amp;quot;Europe-regenerated-by-Asia&amp;quot; lurked a very insidious hubris. Neither &amp;quot;Europe&amp;quot; nor &amp;quot;Asia&amp;quot; was anything without the visionaries&#039; technique for turning vast geographical domains into treatable, and manageable, entities. At bottom, therefore, Europe and Asia were &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; Europe and &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; Asia--our &#039;&#039;will&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;representation&#039;&#039;, as Schopenhauer had said. Historical laws were in reality &#039;&#039;historians&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039; laws, just as &amp;quot;the two forms of humanity&amp;quot; drew attention less to actuality than to a European capacity for lending man-made distinctions an air of inevitability. As for the other half of the phrase--&amp;quot;will at last be soldered together&amp;quot;--there Flaubert mocked the blithe indifference of science to actuality, a science which anatomized and melted human entities as if they were so much inert matter. But it was not just any science he mocked: it was enthusiastic, even messianic European science, whose victories included failed revolutions, wars, oppression, and an unteachable appetite for putting grand, bookish ideas quixotically to work immediately. What such science or knowledge never reckoned with was its own deeply ingrained and unself-conscious bad innocence and the resistance to it of reality. When Bouvard plays the scientist he naively assumes that science merely is, that reality is as the scientist says it is, that it does not matter whether the scientist is a fool or a visionary; he (or anyone who thinks like him) cannot see that the Orient may not wish to regenerate Europe, or that Europe was not about to fuse itself democratically with yellow or brown Asians. In short, such a scientist does not recognize in his science the egoistic will to power that feeds his endeavors and corrupts his ambitions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Flaubert, of course, sees to it that his poor fools are made to rub their noses in these difficulties. Bouvard and Pecuchet have learned that it is better not to traffic in ideas and in reality together. The novel&#039;s conclusion is a picture of the two of them now perfectly content to copy their favorite ideas faithfully from book onto paper. Knowledge no longer requires application to reality; knowledge is what gets passed on silently, without comment, from one text to another. Ideas are propagated and disseminated anonymously, they are repeated without attribution; they have literally become &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;: what matters is that they are &#039;&#039;there&#039;&#039;, to be repeated, echoed, and re-echoed uncritically.&lt;br /&gt;
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In a highly compressed form this brief episode, taken out of Flaubert&#039;s notes for &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039;, frames the specifically modern structures of Orientalism, which after all is one discipline among the secular (and quasi-religious) faiths of nineteenth-century European thought. We have already characterized the general scope of thought about the Orient that was handed on through the medieval and Renaissance periods, for which Islam was the essential Orient. During the eighteenth century, however, there were a number of new, interlocking elements that hinted at the coming evangelical phase, whose outlines Flaubert was later to re-create.&lt;br /&gt;
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For one, the Orient was being opened out considerably beyond the Islamic lands. This quantitative change was to a large degree the result of continuing, and expanding, European exploration of the rest of the world. The increasing influence of travel literature, imaginary utopias, moral voyages, and scientific reporting brought the Orient into sharper and more extended focus. If Orientalism is indebted principally to the fruitful Eastern discoveries of Anquetil and Jones during the latter third of the century, these must be seen in the wider context created by Cook and Bougainville, the voyages of Tournefort and Adanson, by the President de Brosses&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire des navigations aux terres australes&#039;&#039;, by French traders in the Pacific, by Jesuit missionaries in China and the Americas, by William Dampier&#039;s explorations and reports, by innumerable speculations on giants, Patagonians, savages, natives, and monsters supposedly residing to the far east, west, south, and north of Europe. But all such widening horizons had Europe firmly in the privileged center, as main observer (or mainly observed, as in Goldsmith&#039;s &#039;&#039;Citizen of the World&#039;&#039;). For even as Europe moved itself outwards, its sense of cultural strength was fortified. From travelers&#039; tales, and not only from great institutions like the various India companies, colonies were created and ethnocentric perspectives secured.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For some illuminating material see John P. Nash, &amp;quot;The Connection of Oriental Studies with Commerce, Art, and Literature During the 18th-19th Centuries,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society Journal&#039;&#039; 15 (1930): 33-9; also John F. Laffey, &amp;quot;Roots of French Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century: The Case of Lyon,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;French Historical Studies&#039;&#039; 6, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 78-92, and R. Leportier, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Orient Porte des Indes&#039;&#039; (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1970). There is a great deal of information in Henri Omont, &#039;&#039;Missions archeologiques francaises en Orient aux XVII&amp;lt;sup class=&amp;quot;frac&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; et XVIII&amp;lt;sup class=&amp;quot;frac&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecles&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1902), and in Margaret T. Hodgen, &#039;&#039;Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries&#039;&#039; (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), as well as in Norman &amp;lt;a id=&amp;quot;page360&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;Daniel, &#039;&#039;Islam, Europe and Empire&#039;&#039; (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966). Two indispensable short studies are Albert Hourani, &amp;quot;Islam and the Philosophers of History,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Middle Eastern Studies&#039;&#039; 3, no. 3 (April 1967): 206-68, and Maxime Rodinson, &amp;quot;The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Legacy of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Joseph Schacht and C. E. Bosworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 9-62.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For another, a more knowledgeable attitude towards the alien and exotic was abetted not only by travelers and explorers but also by historians for whom European experience could profitably be compared with other, as well as older, civilizations. That powerful current in eighteenth-century historical anthropology, described by scholars as the confrontation of the gods, meant that Gibbon could read the lessons of Rome&#039;s decline in the rise of Islam, just as Vico could understand modern civilization in terms of the barbaric, poetic splendor of their earliest beginnings. Whereas Renaissance historians judged the Orient inflexibly as an enemy, those of the eighteenth century confronted the Orient&#039;s peculiarities with some detachment and with some attempt at dealing directly with Oriental source material, perhaps because such a technique helped a European to know himself better. George Sale&#039;s translation of the Koran and his accompanying preliminary discourse illustrate the change. Unlike his predecessors, Sale tried to deal with Arab history in terms of Arab sources; moreover, he let Muslim commentators on the sacred text speak for themselves.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. M. Holt, &amp;quot;The Treatment of Arab History by Prideaux, Ockley, and Sale,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Historians of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 302. See also Holt&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Study of Modern Arab History&#039;&#039; (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1965).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In Sale, as throughout the eighteenth century, simple comparatism was the early phase of the comparative disciplines (philology, anatomy, jurisprudence, religion) which were to become the boast of nineteenth-century method.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there was a tendency among some thinkers to exceed comparative study, and its judicious surveys of mankind from &amp;quot;China to Peru,&amp;quot; by sympathetic identification. This is a third eighteenth-century element preparing the way for modern Orientalism. What today we call historicism is an eighteenth-century idea; Vico, Herder, and Hamann, among others, believed that all cultures were organically and internally coherent, bound together by a spirit, genius, &#039;&#039;Klima&#039;&#039;, or national idea which an outsider could penetrate only by an act of historical sympathy. Thus Herder&#039;s &#039;&#039;Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit&#039;&#039; (1784-1791) was a panoramic display of various cultures, each permeated by an inimical creative spirit, each accessible only to an observer who sacrificed his prejudices to &#039;&#039;Einfuhlung&#039;&#039;. Imbued with the, populist and pluralist sense of history advocated by Herder and others,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The view of Herder as populist and pluralist is advocated by Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas&#039;&#039; (New York: Viking Press, 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an eighteenth-century mind could breach the doctrinal walls erected between the West and Islam and see hidden elements of kinship between himself and the Orient. Napoleon is a famous instance of this (usually selective) identification by sympathy. Mozart is another; &#039;&#039;The Magic Flute&#039;&#039; (in which Masonic codes intermingle with visions of a benign Orient) and &#039;&#039;The Abduction from the Seraglio&#039;&#039; locate a particularly magnanimous form of humanity in the Orient. And this, much more than the modish habits of &amp;quot;Turkish&amp;quot; music, drew Mozart sympathetically eastwards.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is very difficult nonetheless to separate such intuitions of the Orient as Mozart&#039;s from the entire range of pre-Romantic and Romantic representations of the Orient as exotic locale. Popular Orientalism during the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth attained a vogue of considerable intensity. But even this vogue, easily identifiable in William Beckford, Byron, Thomas Moore, and Goethe, cannot be simply detached from the interest taken in Gothic tales, pseudomedieval idylls, visions of barbaric splendor and cruelty. Thus in some cases the Oriental representation can be associated with Piranesi&#039;s prisons, in others with Tiepolo&#039;s luxurious ambiences, in still others with the exotic sublimity of late-eighteenth-century paintings.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a discussion of such motifs and representations, see Jean Starobinski, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Liberty&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1700-1789&#039;&#039;, trans. Bernard C. Smith (Geneva: Skira, 1964).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Later in the nineteenth century, in the works of Delacroix and literally dozens of other French and British painters, the Oriental genre tableau carried representation into visual expression and a life of its own (which this book unfortunately must scant). Sensuality, promise, terror, sublimity, idyllic pleasure, intense energy: the Orient as a figure in the pre-Romantic, pretechnical Orientalist imagination of late-eighteenth-century Europe was really a chameleonlike quality called (adjectivally) &amp;quot;Oriental.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There are a small number of studies on this too-little-investigated subject. Some well-known ones are: Martha P. Conant, &#039;&#039;The Oriental Tale in England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039; (1908; reprint ed., New York: Octagon Books, 1967); Marie E. de Meester, &#039;&#039;Oriental Influences in the English Literature of the Nineteenth Century, Anglistische Forschungen&#039;&#039;, no. 46 (Heidelberg, 1915); Byron Porter Smith, &#039;&#039;Islam in English Literature&#039;&#039; (Beirut: American Press, 1939). See also Jean-Luc Doutrelant, &amp;quot;L&#039;Orient tragique au XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue des Sciences Humaines&#039;&#039; 146 (April-June 1972): 255-82.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But this free-floating Orient would be severely curtailed with the advent of academic Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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A fourth element preparing the way for modern Orientalist structures was the whole impulse to classify nature and man into types. The greatest names are, of course, Linnaeus and Buffon, but the intellectual process by which bodily (and soon moral, intellectual, and spiritual) extension--the typical materiality of an object--could be transformed from mere spectacle to the precise measurement of characteristic elements was very widespread. Linnaeus said that every note made about a natural type &amp;quot;should be a product of number, of form, of proportion, of situation,&amp;quot; and indeed, if one looks in Kant or Diderot or Johnson, there is everywhere a similar penchant for dramatizing general features, for reducing vast numbers of objects to a smaller number of orderable and describable &#039;&#039;types&#039;&#039;. In natural history, in anthropology, in cultural generalization, a type had a particular &#039;&#039;character&#039;&#039; which provided the observer with a designation and, as Foucault says, &amp;quot;a controlled derivation.&amp;quot; These types and characters belonged to a system, a network of related generalizations. Thus,&lt;br /&gt;
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all designation must be accomplished by means of a certain relation to all other possible designations. To know what properly appertains to one individual is to have before one the classification--or the possibility of classifying--all others.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Michel Foucault, &#039;&#039;The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), pp. 138, 144. See also Francois Jacob, &#039;&#039;The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity&#039;&#039;, trans. Betty E. Spillmann (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 50 and passim, and Georges Canguilhem, &#039;&#039;La Connaissance de la vie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Gustave-Joseph Vrin, 1969), pp. 44-63.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the writing of philosophers, historians, encyclopedists, and essayists we find character-as-designation appearing as physiological-moral classification: there are, for example, the wild men, the Europeans, the Asiatics, and so forth. These appear of course in Linnaeus, but also in Montesquieu, in Johnson, in Blumenbach, in Soemmerring, in Kant. Physiological and moral characteristics are distributed more or less equally: the American is &amp;quot;red, choleric, erect,&amp;quot; the Asiatic is &amp;quot;yellow, melancholy, rigid,&amp;quot; the African is &amp;quot;black, phlegmatic, lax.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See John G. Burke, &amp;quot;The Wild Man&#039;s Pedigree: Scientific Method and Racial Anthropology,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism&#039;&#039;, ed. Edward Dudley and Maximillian E. Novak (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), pp. 262-8. See also Jean Biou, &amp;quot;Lumieres et anthropophagie,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue des Sciences Humaines&#039;&#039; 146 (April-June 1972): 223-34.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But such designations gather power when, later in the nineteenth century, they are allied with character as derivation, as genetic type. In Vico and Rousseau, for example, the force of moral generalization is enhanced by the precision with which dramatic, almost archetypal figures--primitive man, giants, heroes--are shown to be the genesis of current moral, philosophic, even linguistic issues. Thus when an Oriental was referred to, it was in terms of such genetic universals as his &amp;quot;primitive&amp;quot; state, his primary characteristics, his particular spiritual background.&lt;br /&gt;
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The four elements I have described--expansion, historical confrontation, sympathy, classification--are the currents in eighteenth-century thought on whose presence the specific intellectual and institutional structures of modern Orientalism depend. Without them Orientalism, as we shall see presently, could not have occurred. Moreover, these elements had the effect of releasing the Orient generally, and Islam in particular, from the narrowly religious scrutiny by which it had hitherto been examined (and judged) by the Christian West. In other words, modern Orientalism derives from secularizing elements in eighteenth-century European culture. One, the expansion of the Orient further east geographically and further back temporally loosened, even dissolved, the Biblical framework considerably. Reference points were no longer Christianity and Judaism, with their fairly modest calendars and maps, but India, China, Japan, and Sumer, Buddhism, Sanskrit, Zoroastrianism, and Manu. Two, the capacity for dealing historically (and not reductively, as a topic of ecclesiastical politics) with non-European and non-Judeo-Christian cultures was strengthened as history itself was conceived of more radically than before; to understand Europe properly meant also understanding the objective relations between Europe and its own previously unreachable temporal and cultural frontiers. In a sense, John of Segovia&#039;s idea of &#039;&#039;contraferentia&#039;&#039; between Orient and Europe was realized, but in a wholly secular way; Gibbon could treat Mohammed as a historical figure who influenced Europe and not as a diabolical miscreant hovering somewhere between magic and false prophecy. Three, a selective identification with regions and cultures not one&#039;s own wore down the obduracy of self and identity, which had been polarized into a community of embattled believers facing barbarian hordes. The borders of Christian Europe no longer served as a kind of custom house; the notions of human association and of human possibility acquired a very wide general--as opposed to parochial--legitimacy. Four, the classifications of mankind were systematically multiplied as the possibilities of designation and derivation were refined beyond the categories of what Vico called gentile and sacred nations; race, color, origin, temperament, character, and types overwhelmed the distinction between Christians and everyone else.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if these interconnected elements represent a secularizing tendency, this is not to say that the old religious patterns of human history and destiny and &amp;quot;the existential paradigms&amp;quot; were simply removed. Far from it: they were reconstituted, redeployed, redistributed in the secular frameworks just enumerated. For anyone who studied the Orient a secular vocabulary in keeping with these frameworks was required. Yet if Orientalism provided the vocabulary, the conceptual repertoire, the techniques--for this is what, from the end of the eighteenth century on, Orientalism &#039;&#039;did&#039;&#039; and what Orientalism &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039;--it also retained, as an undislodged current in its discourse, a reconstructed religious impulse, a naturalized supernaturalism. What I shall try to show is that this impulse in Orientalism resided in the Orientalist&#039;s conception of himself, of the Orient, and of his discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
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The modern Orientalist was, in his view, a hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity, alienation, and strangeness which he himself had properly distinguished. His research reconstructed the Orient&#039;s lost languages, mores, even mentalities, as Champollion reconstructed Egyptian hieroglyphics out of the Rosetta Stone. The specific Orientalist techniques--lexicography, grammar, translation, cultural decoding--restored, fleshed out, reasserted the values both of an ancient, classical Orient and of the traditional disciplines of philology, history, rhetoric, and doctrinal polemic. But in the process, the Orient and Orientalist disciplines changed dialectically, for they could not survive in their original form. The Orient, even in the &amp;quot;classic&amp;quot; form which the Orientalist usually studied, was modernized, restored to the present; the traditional disciplines too were brought into contemporary culture. Yet both bore the traces of &#039;&#039;power&#039;&#039;--power to have resurrected, indeed created, the Orient, power that dwelt in the new, scientifically advanced techniques of philology and of anthropological generalization. In short, having transported the Orient into modernity, the Orientalist could celebrate his method, and his position, as that of a secular creator, a man who made new worlds as God had once made the old. As for carrying on such methods and such positions beyond the life-span of any individual Orientalist, there would be a secular tradition of continuity, a lay order of disciplined methodologists, whose brotherhood would be based, not on blood lineage, but upon a common discourse, a praxis, a library, a set of received ideas, in short, a doxology, common to everyone who entered the ranks. Flaubert was prescient enough to see that in time the modern Orientalist would become a copyist, like Bouvard and Pecuchet; but during the early days, in the careers of Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan, no such danger was apparent.&lt;br /&gt;
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My thesis is that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism. In the form of new texts and ideas, the East was accommodated to these structures. Linguists and explorers like Jones and Anquetil were contributors to modern Orientalism, certainly, but what distinguishes modern Orientalism as a field, a group of ideas, a discourse, is the work of a later generation than theirs. If we use the Napoleonic expedition (1798-1801) as a sort of first enabling experience for modern Orientalism, we can consider its inaugural heroes--in Islamic studies, Sacy and Renan and Lane--to be builders of the field, creators of a tradition, progenitors of the Orientalist brotherhood. What Sacy, Renan, and Lane did was to place Orientalism on a scientific and rational basis. This entailed not only their own exemplary work but also the creation of a vocabulary and ideas that could be used impersonally by anyone who wished to become an Orientalist. Their inauguration of Orientalism was a considerable feat. It made possible a scientific terminology; it banished obscurity and instated a special form of illumination for the Orient; it established the figure of the Orientalist as central authority &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; the Orient; it legitimized a special kind of specifically coherent Orientalist work; it put into cultural circulation a form of discursive currency by whose presence the Orient henceforth would be &#039;&#039;spoken for&#039;&#039;; above all, the work of the inaugurators carved out a field of study and a family of ideas which in turn could form a community of scholars whose lineage, traditions, and ambitions were at once internal to the field and external enough for general prestige. The more Europe encroached upon the Orient during the nineteenth century, the more Orientalism gained in public confidence. Yet if this gain coincided with a loss in originality, we should not be entirely surprised, since its mode, from the beginning, was reconstruction and repetition.&lt;br /&gt;
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One final observation: The late-eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century ideas, institutions, and figures I shall deal with in this chapter are an important part, a crucial elaboration, of the first phase of the greatest age of territorial acquisition ever known. By the end of World War I Europe had colonized 85 percent of the earth. To say simply that modern Orientalism has been an aspect of both imperialism and colonialism is not to say anything very disputable. Yet it is not enough to say it; it needs to be worked through analytically and historically. I am interested in showing how modern Orientalism, unlike the precolonial awareness of Dante and d&#039;Herbelot, embodies a systematic discipline of &#039;&#039;accumulation&#039;&#039;. And far from this being exclusively an intellectual or theoretical feature, it made Orientalism fatally tend towards the systematic accumulation of human beings and territories. To reconstruct a dead or lost Oriental language meant ultimately to reconstruct a dead or neglected Orient; it also meant that reconstructive precision, science, even imagination could prepare the way for what armies, administrations, and bureaucracies would later do on the ground, in the Orient. In a sense, the vindication of Orientalism was not only its intellectual or artistic successes but its later effectiveness, its usefulness, its authority. Surely it deserves serious attention on all those counts.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan: &#039;&#039;Rational Anthropology and Philological Laboratory&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
The two great themes of Silvestre de Sacy&#039;s life are heroic effort and a dedicated sense of pedagogic and rational utility. Born in 1757 into a Jansenist family whose occupation was traditionally that of &#039;&#039;notaire&#039;&#039;, Antoine-Isaac-Silvestre was privately tutored at a Benedictine abbey, first in Arabic, Syriac, and Chaldean, then in Hebrew. Arabic in particular was the language that opened the Orient to him since it was in Arabic, according to Joseph Reinaud, that Oriental material, both sacred and profane, was then to be found in its oldest and most instructive form.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Henri Deherain, &#039;&#039;Silvestre de Sacy: Ses Contemporains et ses disciples&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1938), p. 111.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Although a legitimist, in 1769 he was appointed the first teacher of Arabic at the newly created school of &#039;&#039;langues orientales vivantes&#039;&#039;, of which he became director in 1824. In 1806 he was named professor at the College de France, although from 1805 on he was the resident Orientalist at the French Foreign Ministry. There his work (unpaid until 1811) at first was to translate the bulletins of the Grande Armee and Napoleon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manifesto&#039;&#039; of 1806, in which it was hoped that &amp;quot;Muslim fanaticism&amp;quot; could be excited against Russian Orthodoxy. But for many years thereafter Sacy created interpreters for the French Oriental dragomanate, as well as future scholars. When the French occupied Algiers in 1830, it was Sacy who translated the proclamation to the Algerians; he was regularly consulted on all diplomatic matters relating to the Orient by the foreign minister, and on occasion by the minister of war. At the age of seventy-five he replaced Dacier as secretary of the Academie des Inscriptions, and also became curator of Oriental manuscripts at the Bibliotheque royale. Throughout his long and distinguished career his name was rightly associated with the restructuring and re-forming of education (particularly in Oriental studies) in post-Revolutionary France.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For these and other details see ibid., pp. i-xxxiii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; With Cuvier, Sacy in 1832 was made a new peer of France.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not only because he was the first president of the Societe asiatique (founded in 1822) that Sacy&#039;s name is associated with the beginning of modern Orientalism; it is because his work virtually put before the profession an entire systematic body of texts, a pedagogic practice, a scholarly tradition, and an important link between Oriental scholarship and public policy. In Sacy&#039;s work, for the first time in Europe since the Council of Vienne, there was a self-conscious methodological principle at work as a coeval with scholarly discipline. No less important, Sacy always felt himself to be a man standing at the beginning of an important revisionist project. He was a self-aware inaugurator, and more to the point of our general thesis, he acted in his writing like a secularized ecclesiastic for whom his Orient and his students were doctrine and parishioners respectively. The Duc de Broglie, an admiring contemporary, said of Sacy&#039;s work that it reconciled the manner of a scientist with that of a Biblical teacher, and that Sacy was the one man able to reconcile &amp;quot;the goals of Leibniz with the efforts of Bossuet.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Duc de Broglie, &amp;quot;Eloge de Silvestre de Sacy,&amp;quot; in Sacy, &#039;&#039;Melanges de litterature orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: E. Ducrocq, 1833), p. xii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Consequently everything he wrote was addressed specifically to students (in the case of his first work, his &#039;&#039;Principes de grammaire generale&#039;&#039; of 1799, the student was his own son) and presented, not as a novelty, but as a revised extract of the best that had already been done, said, or written.&lt;br /&gt;
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These two characteristics--the didactic presentation to students and the avowed intention of repeating by revision and extract--are crucial. Sacy&#039;s writing always conveys the tone of a voice speaking; his prose is dotted with first-person pronouns, with personal qualifications, with rhetorical presence. Even at his most recondite--as in a scholarly note on third-century Sassanid numismatics--one senses not so much a pen writing as a voice pronouncing. The keynote of his work is contained in the opening lines of the dedication to his son of the &#039;&#039;Principes de grammaire generale&#039;&#039;: &amp;quot;C&#039;est a toi, mon cher Fils, que ce petit ouvrage a ete entrepris&amp;quot;--which is to say, I am writing (or speaking) to you because you need to know these things, and since they don&#039;t exist in any serviceable form, I have done the work myself for you. Direct address: utility: effort: immediate and beneficent rationality. For Sacy believed that everything could be made clear and reasonable, no matter how difficult the task and how obscure the subject. Here are Bossuet&#039;s sternness and Leibniz&#039;s abstract humanism, as well as the &#039;&#039;tone&#039;&#039; of Rousseau, all together in the same style.&lt;br /&gt;
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The effect of Sacy&#039;s tone is to form a circle sealing off him and his audience from the world at large, the way a teacher and his pupils together in a closed classroom also form a sealed space. Unlike the matter of physics, philosophy, or classical literature, the matter of Oriental studies is arcane; it is of import to people who already have an interest in the Orient but want to know the Orient better, in a more orderly way, and here the pedagogical discipline is more effective than it is attractive. The didactic speaker, therefore, &#039;&#039;displays&#039;&#039; his material to the disciples, whose role it is to receive what is given to them in the form of carefully selected and arranged topics. Since the Orient is old and distant, the teacher&#039;s display is a restoration, a re-vision of what has disappeared from the wider ken. And since also the vastly rich (in space, time, and cultures) Orient cannot be totally exposed, only its most representative parts need be. Thus Sacy&#039;s focus is the anthology, the chrestomathy, the tableau, the survey of general principles, in which a relatively small set of powerful examples delivers the Orient to the student. Such examples are powerful for two reasons: one, because they reflect Sacy&#039;s powers as a Western authority deliberately taking from the Orient what its distance and eccentricity have hitherto kept hidden, and two, because these examples have the semiotical power in them (or imparted to them by the Orientalist) to signify the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of Sacy&#039;s work is essentially compilatory; it is thus ceremoniously didactic and painstakingly revisionist. Aside from the &#039;&#039;Principes de grammaire generale&#039;&#039;, he produced a &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe&#039;&#039; in three volumes (1806 and 1827), an anthology of Arab grammatical writing (1825), an Arabic grammar of 1810 (&#039;&#039;a l&#039;usage des eleves de l&#039;Ecole speciale&#039;&#039;), treatises on Arabic prosody and the Druze religion, and numerous short works on Oriental numismatics, onomastics, epigraphy, geography, history, and weights and measures. He did a fair number of translations and two extended commentaries on &#039;&#039;Calila and Dumna&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;Maqamat&#039;&#039; of al-Hariri. As editor, memorialist, and historian of modern learning Sacy was similarly energetic. There was very little of note in other related disciplines with which he was not &#039;&#039;au courant&#039;&#039;, although his own writing was single-minded and, in its non-Orientalist respects, of a narrow positivist range.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet when in 1802 the Institut de France was commissioned by Napoleon to form a &#039;&#039;tableau generale&#039;&#039; on the state and progress of the arts and sciences since 1789, Sacy was chosen to be one of the team of writers: he was the most rigorous of specialists and the most historical-minded of generalists. Dacier&#039;s report, as it was known informally, embodied many of Sacy&#039;s predilections as well as containing his contributions on the state of Oriental learning. Its title&#039;&#039;--Tableau historique de l&#039;erudition francaise&#039;&#039;--announces the new historical (as opposed to sacred) consciousness. Such consciousness is dramatic: learning can be arranged on a stage set, as it were, where its totality can be readily surveyed. Addressed to the king, Dacier&#039;s preface stated the theme perfectly. Such a survey as this made it possible to do something no other sovereign had attempted, namely to take in, with one &#039;&#039;coup d&#039;oeil&#039;&#039;, the whole of human knowledge. Had such a &#039;&#039;tableau historique&#039;&#039; been undertaken in former times, Dacier continued, we might today have possessed many masterpieces now either lost or destroyed; the interest and utility of the tableau were that it preserved knowledge and made it immediately accessible. Dacier intimated that such a task was simplified by Napoleon&#039;s Oriental expedition, one of whose results was to heighten the degree of modern geographical knowledge.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bon Joseph Dacier, &#039;&#039;Tableau historique de l&#039;erudition francaise, ou Rapport sur les progres de l&#039;histoire et de la litterature ancienne depuis 1789&#039;&#039; (Paris: Imprimerie imperiale, 1810), pp. 23, 35, 31.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (At no point more than in Dacier&#039;s entire &#039;&#039;discours&#039;&#039; do we see how the dramatic form of a &#039;&#039;tableau historique&#039;&#039; has its use-equivalent in the arcades and counters of a modern department store.)&lt;br /&gt;
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The importance of the &#039;&#039;Tableau historique&#039;&#039; for an understanding of Orientalism&#039;s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of Orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the Orientalist&#039;s relationship to his subject matter. In Sacy&#039;s pages on Orientalism--as elsewhere in his writing--he speaks of his own work as having &#039;&#039;uncovered&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;brought to light&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;rescued&#039;&#039; a vast amount of obscure matter. Why? In order &#039;&#039;to place it before&#039;&#039; the student. For like all his learned contemporaries Sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. Knowledge was essentially the &#039;&#039;making visible&#039;&#039; of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of Benthamite Panopticon. Scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power: it gained for its user (and his students) tools and knowledge which (if he was a historian) had hitherto been lost.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Michel Foucault, &#039;&#039;Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison&#039;&#039;, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), pp. 193-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And indeed the vocabulary of specialized power and acquisition is particularly associated with Sacy&#039;s reputation as a pioneer Orientalist. His heroism as a scholar was to have dealt successfully with insurmountable difficulties; he acquired the means to present a field to his students where there was none. He &#039;&#039;made&#039;&#039; the books, the precepts, the examples, said the Duc de Broglie of Sacy. The result was the production of material about the Orient, methods for studying it, and exempla that even Orientals did not have.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Broglie, &amp;quot;Eloge de Silvestre de Sacy,&amp;quot; p. 107.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Compared with the labors of a Hellenist or a Latinist working on the Institut team, Sacy&#039;s labors were awesome. They had the texts, the conventions, the schools; he did not, and consequently had to go about making them. The dynamic of primary loss and subsequent gain in Sacy&#039;s writing is obsessional; his investment in it was truly heavy. Like his colleagues in other fields he believed that knowledge is seeing--pan-optically, so to speak--but unlike them he not only had to identify the knowledge, he had to decipher it, interpret it, and most difficult, make it available. Sacy&#039;s achievement was to have produced a whole field. As a European he ransacked the Oriental archives, and he could do so without leaving France. What texts he isolated, he then brought back; he doctored them; then he annotated, codified, arranged, and commented on them. In time, the Orient as such became less important than what the Orientalist made of it; thus, drawn by Sacy into the sealed discursive place of a pedagogical tableau, the Orientalist&#039;s Orient was thereafter reluctant to emerge into reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sacy was much too intelligent to let his views and his practice stand without supporting argument. First of all, he always made it plain why the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; on its own could not survive a European&#039;s taste, intelligence, or patience. Sacy defended the utility and interest of such things as Arabic poetry, but what he was really saying was that Arabic poetry had to be properly transformed by the Orientalist before it could begin to be appreciated. The reasons were broadly epistemological, but they also contained an Orientalistic self-justification. Arabic poetry was produced by a completely strange (to Europeans) people, under hugely different climatic, social, and historical conditions from those a European knows; in addition, such poetry as this was nourished by &amp;quot;opinions, prejudices, beliefs, superstitions which we can acquire only after long and painful study.&amp;quot; Even if one does go through the rigors of specialized training, much of the description in the poetry will not be accessible to Europeans &amp;quot;who have attained to a higher degree of civilization.&amp;quot; Yet what we can master is of great value to us as Europeans accustomed to disguise our exterior attributes, our bodily activity, and our relationship to nature. Therefore, the Orientalist&#039;s use is to make available to his compatriots a considerable range of unusual experience, and still more valuable, a kind of literature capable of helping us understand the &amp;quot;truly divine&amp;quot; poetry of the Hebrews.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sacy, &#039;&#039;Melanges de litterature orientale&#039;&#039;, pp. 107, 110, 111-12.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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So if the Orientalist is necessary because he fishes some useful gems out of the distant Oriental deep, and since the Orient cannot be known without his mediation, it is also true that Oriental writing itself ought not to be taken in whole. This is Sacy&#039;s introduction to his theory of fragments, a common Romantic concern. Not only are Oriental literary productions essentially alien to the European; they also do not contain a sustained enough interest, nor are they written with enough &amp;quot;taste and critical spirit,&amp;quot; to merit publication except as extracts (&#039;&#039;pour meriter d&#039;etre publies autrement que par extrait&#039;&#039;).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Silvestre de Sacy, &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe, ou Extraits de divers ecrivains arabes, tant en prose qu&#039;en vers, avec une traduction francaise et des notes, a l&#039;usage des eleves de l&#039;Ecole royale et speciale des langues orientales vivantes&#039;&#039; (vol. 1, 1826; reprint ed., Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1973), p. viii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore the Orientalist is required to &#039;&#039;present&#039;&#039; the Orient by a series of representative fragments, fragments republished, explicated, annotated, and surrounded with still more fragments. For such a presentation a special genre is required: the chrestomathy, which is where in Sacy&#039;s case the usefulness and interest of Orientalism are most directly and profitably displayed. Sacy&#039;s most famous production was the three-volume &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie arabe&#039;&#039;, which wassealed at the outset, so to speak, with an internally rhyming Arabic couplet: &amp;quot;Kitab al-anis al-mufid lil-Taleb al-mustafid;/wa gam&#039;i al shathur min manthoum wa manthur&amp;quot; (A book pleasant and profitable for the studious pupil;/it collects fragments of both poetry and prose).&lt;br /&gt;
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Sacy&#039;s anthologies were used very widely in Europe for several generations. Although what they contain was claimed as typical, they submerge and cover the censorship of the Orient exercised by the Orientalist. Moreover, the internal order of their contents, the arrangement of their parts, the choice of fragments, never reveal their secret; one has the impression that if fragments were not chosen for their importance, or for their chronological development, or for their aesthetic beauty (as Sacy&#039;s were not), they must nevertheless embody a certain Oriental naturalness, or typical inevitability. But this too is never said. Sacy claims simply to have exerted himself on behalf of his students, to make it unnecessary for them to purchase (or read) a grotesquely large library of Oriental stuff. In time, the reader forgets the Orientalist&#039;s effort and takes the restructuring of the Orient signified by a chrestomathy as the Orient &#039;&#039;tout court&#039;&#039;. Objective structure (designation of Orient) and subjective restructure (representation of Orient by Orientalist) become interchangeable. The Orient is overlaid with the Orientalist&#039;s rationality; its principles become his. From being distant, it becomes available; from being unsustainable on its own, it becomes pedagogically useful; from being lost, it is found, even if its missing parts have been made to drop away from it in the process. Sacy&#039;s anthologies not only supplement the Orient; they supply it as Oriental presence to the West.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For the notions of &amp;quot;supplementarity,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;supply,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;supplication,&amp;quot; see Jacques Derrida, &#039;&#039;De la grammatologie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967), p. 203 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Sacy&#039;s work canonizes the Orient; it begets a canon of textual objects passed on from one generation of students to the next.&lt;br /&gt;
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And the living legacy of Sacy&#039;s disciples was astounding. Every major Arabist in Europe during the nineteenth century traced his intellectual authority back to him. Universities and academies in France, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and especially Germany were dotted with the students who formed themselves at his feet and through the anthological tableaux provided by his work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a partial list of Sacy&#039;s students and influence see Johann W. Fuck, &#039;&#039;Die Arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955), pp. 156-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As with all intellectual patrimonies, however, enrichments and restrictions were passed on simultaneously. Sacy&#039;s genealogical originality was to have treated the Orient as something to be restored not only because of but also despite the modern Orient&#039;s disorderly and elusive presence. Sacy &#039;&#039;placed&#039;&#039; the Arabs &#039;&#039;in&#039;&#039; the Orient, which was itself placed in the general tableau of modern learning. Orientalism belonged therefore to European scholarship, but its material had to be re-created by the Orientalist before it could enter the arcades alongside Latinism and Hellenism. Each Orientalist re-created his own Orient according to the fundamental epistemological rules of loss and gain first supplied and enacted by Sacy. Just as he was the father of Orientalism, he was also the discipline&#039;s first sacrifice, for in translating new texts, fragments, and extracts subsequent Orientalists entirely displaced Sacy&#039;s work by supplying their own restored Orient. Nevertheless the process he started would continue, as philology in particular developed systematic and institutional powers Sacy had never exploited. This was Renan&#039;s accomplishment: to have associated the Orient with the most recent comparative disciplines, of which philology was one of the most eminent.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between Sacy and Renan is the difference between inauguration and continuity. Sacy is the originator, whose work represents the field&#039;s emergence and its status as a nineteenth-century discipline with roots in revolutionary Romanticism. Renan derives from Orientalism&#039;s second generation: it was his task to solidify the official discourse of Orientalism, to systematize its insights, and to establish its intellectual and worldly institutions. For Sacy, it was his personal efforts that launched and vitalized the field and its structures; for Renan, it was his adaptation of Orientalism to philology and both of them to the intellectual culture of his time that perpetuated the Orientalist structures intellectually and gave them greater visibility.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan was a figure in his own right neither of total originality nor of absolute derivativeness. Therefore as a cultural force or as an important Orientalist he cannot be reduced simply to his personality nor to a set of schematic ideas in which he believed. Rather, Renan is best grasped as a dynamic force whose opportunities were already created for him by pioneers like Sacy, yet who brought their achievements into the culture as a kind of currency which he circulated and recirculated with (to force the image a little further) his own unmistakable re-currency. Renan is a figure who must be grasped, in short, as a type of cultural and intellectual praxis, as a style for making Orientalist statements within what Michel Foucault would call the archive of his time.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Foucault&#039;s characterization of an archive can be found in &#039;&#039;The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language&#039;&#039;, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith and Rupert Sawyer (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 79-131. Gabriel Monod, one of Renan&#039;s younger and very perspicacious contemporaries, remarks that Renan was by no means a revolutionary in linguistics, archaeology, or exegesis, yet because he had the widest and the most precise learning of anyone in his period, he was its most eminent representative (&#039;&#039;Renan, Taine, Michelet&#039;&#039; [Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1894], pp. 40-1). See also Jean-Louis Dumas, &amp;quot;La Philosophie de l&#039;histoire de Renan,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale&#039;&#039; 77, no. 1 (January-March 1972): 100-28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What matters is not only the things that Renan said but also how he said them, what, given his background and training, he chose to use as his subject matter, what to combine with what, and so forth. Renan&#039;s relations with his Oriental subject matter, with his time and audience, even with his own work, can be described, then, without resorting to formulae that depend on an unexamined assumption of ontological stability (e.g., the &#039;&#039;Zeitgeist&#039;&#039;, the history of ideas, life-and-times). Instead we are able to read Renan as a writer doing something describable, in a place defined temporally, spatially, and culturally (hence archivally), for an audience and, no less important, for the furtherance of his own position in the Orientalism of his era.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan came to Orientalism from philology, and it is the extraordinarily rich and celebrated cultural position of, that discipline that endowed Orientalism with its most important technical characteristics. For anyone to whom the word &#039;&#039;philology&#039;&#039; suggests dry-as-dust and inconsequential word-study, however, Nietzsche&#039;s proclamation that along with the greatest minds of the nineteenth century he is a philologist will come as a surprise--though not if Balzac&#039;s &#039;&#039;Louis Lambert&#039;&#039; is recalled:&lt;br /&gt;
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What a marvelous book one would write by narrating the life and adventures of a word! Undoubtedly a word has received various impressions of the events for which it was used; depending on the places it was used, a word has awakened different kinds of impressions in different people; but is it not more grand still to consider a word in its triple aspect of soul, body, and movement?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Honore de Balzac, &#039;&#039;Louis Lambert&#039;&#039; (Paris: Calmann-Levy, n.d.), p. 4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the category, Nietzsche will ask later, that includes himself, Wagner, Schopenhauer, Leopardi, all as philologists? The term seems to include both a gift for exceptional spiritual insight into language and the ability to produce work whose articulation is of aesthetic and historical power. Although the profession of philology was born the day in 1777 &amp;quot;when F. A. Wolf invented for himself the name of &#039;&#039;stud. philol&#039;&#039;.,&amp;quot; Nietzsche is nevertheless at pains to show that professional students of the Greek and Roman classics are commonly incapable of understanding their discipline: &amp;quot;they never reach the &#039;&#039;roots of the matter&#039;&#039;: they never adduce philology as a problem.&amp;quot; For simply &amp;quot;as knowledge of the ancient world philology cannot, of course, last forever; its material is exhaustible.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Nietzsche&#039;s remarks on philology are everywhere throughout his works. See principally his notes for &amp;quot;Wir Philologen&amp;quot; taken from his notebooks for the period January-July 1875, translated by William Arrowsmith as &amp;quot;Notes for &#039;We Philologists,&#039; &amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Arion&#039;&#039;, N. S. 1/2 (1974): 279-380; also the passages on language and perspectivism in &#039;&#039;The Will to Power&#039;&#039;, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It is this that the herd of philologists cannot understand. But what distinguishes the few exceptional spirits whom Nietzsche deems worthy of praise--not unambiguously, and not in the cursory way that I am now describing--is their profound relation to modernity, a relation that is given them by their practice of philology.&lt;br /&gt;
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Philology problematizes--itself, its practitioner, the present. It embodies a peculiar condition of being modern and European, since neither of those two categories has true meaning without being related to an earlier alien culture and time. What Nietzsche also sees is philology as something &#039;&#039;born, made&#039;&#039; in the Viconian sense as a sign of human enterprise, created as a category of human discovery, self-discovery, and originality. Philology is a way; of historically setting oneself off, as great artists do, from one&#039;s time and an immediate past even as, paradoxically and antinomically, one actually characterizes one&#039;s modernity by so doing.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between the Friedrich August Wolf of 1777 and the Friedrich Nietzsche of 1875 there is Ernest Renan, an Oriental philologist, also a man with a complex and interesting sense of the way philology and modern culture are involved in each other. In &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039; (written in 1848 but not published till 1890) he wrote that &amp;quot;the founders of modern mind are philologists.&amp;quot; And what is modern mind, he said in the preceding sentence, if not &amp;quot;rationalism, criticism, liberalism, [all of which] were founded on the same day as philology?&amp;quot; Philology, he goes on to say, is both a comparative discipline possessed only by moderns and a symbol of modern (and European) superiority; every advance made by humanity since the fifteenth century can be attributed to minds we should call philological. The job of philology in modern culture (a culture Renan calls philological) is to continue to see reality and nature clearly, thus driving out supernaturalism, and to continue to keep pace with discoveries in the physical sciences. But more than all this, philology enables a general view of human life and of the system of things: &amp;quot;Me, being there at the center, inhaling the perfume of everything, judging, comparing, combining, inducing--in this way I shall arrive at the very system of things.&amp;quot; There is an unmistakable aura of power about the philologist. And Renan makes his point about philology and the natural sciences:&lt;br /&gt;
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To do philosophy is to know things; following Cuvier&#039;s nice phrase, philosophy is &#039;&#039;instructing the world in theory&#039;&#039;. Like Kant I believe that every purely speculative demonstration has no more validity than a mathematical demonstration, and can teach us nothing about existing reality. Philology is the &#039;&#039;exact science&#039;&#039; of mental objects [&#039;&#039;La philologie est la science exacte des choses de&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;l&#039;esprit&#039;&#039;]. It is to the sciences of humanity what physics and chemistry are to the philosophic sciences of bodies.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science: Pensees de 1848&#039;&#039;, 4th ed. (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1890), pp. 141, 142-5, 146, 148, 149.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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I shall return to Renan&#039;s citation from Cuvier, as well as to the constant references to natural science, a little later. For the time being, we should remark that the whole middle section of &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039; is taken up with Renan&#039;s admiring accounts of philology, a science he depicts as being at once the most difficult of all human endeavors to characterize and the most precise of all disciplines. In the aspirations of philology to a veritable science of humanity, Renan associates himself explicitly with Vico, Herder, Wolf, and Montesquieu as well as with such philological near-contemporaries as Wilhelm von Humboldt, Bopp, and the great Orientalist Eugene Burnouf (to whom the volume is dedicated). Renan locates philology centrally within what he everywhere refers to as the march of knowledge, and indeed the book itself is a manifesto of humanistic meliorism, which, considering its subtitle (&amp;quot;Pensees de 1848&amp;quot;) and other books of 1848 like &#039;&#039;Bouvard et Pecuchet&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, is no mean irony. In a sense, then, the manifesto generally and Renan&#039;s accounts of philology particularly--he had by then already written the massive philological treatise on Semitic languages that had earned him the Prix Volney--were designed to place Renan as an intellectual in a clearly perceptible relationship to the great social issues raised by 1848. That he should choose to fashion such a relationship on the basis of the &#039;&#039;least&#039;&#039; immediate of all intellectual disciplines (philology), the one with the least degree of apparent &#039;&#039;popular&#039;&#039; relevance, the most conservative and the most traditional, suggests the extreme deliberateness of Renan&#039;s position. For he did not really speak as one man to all men but rather as a reflective, specialized voice that took, as he put it in the 1890 preface, the inequality of races and the necessary domination of the many by the few for granted as an antidemocratic law of nature and society.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. xiv and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But how was it possible for Renan to hold himself and what he was saying in such a paradoxical position? For what was philology on the one hand if not a science of all humanity, a science premised on the unity of the human species and the worth of every human detail, and yet what was the philologist on the other hand if not--as Renan himself proved with his notorious race prejudice against the very Oriental Semites whose study had made his professional name&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The entire opening chapter--bk. 1, chap. 1--of the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale et systeme compare des langues semitiques&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, ed. Henriette Psichari (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1947-61), 8: 143-63, is a virtual encyclopedia of race prejudice directed against Semites (i.e., Moslems and Jews). The rest of the treatise is sprinkled generously with the same notions, as are many of Renan&#039;s other works, including &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039;, especially Renan&#039;s notes.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--a harsh divider of men into superior and inferior races, a liberal critic whose work harbored the most esoteric notions of temporality, origins, development, relationship, and human worth? Part of the answer to this question is that, as his early letters of philological intent to Victor Cousin, Michelet, and Alexander von Humboldt show,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Correspondance; 1846-1871&#039;&#039; (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1926), 1: 7-12.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Renan had a strong guild sense as a professional scholar, a professional Orientalist, in fact, a sense that put distance between himself and the masses. But more important, I think, is Renan&#039;s own conception of his role as an Oriental philologist within philology&#039;s larger history, development, and objectives as he saw them. In other words, what may to us seem like paradox was; the expected result of how Renan perceived his dynastic position within philology, its history and inaugural discoveries, and what he, Renan, did within it. Therefore Renan should be characterized, not as speaking &#039;&#039;about&#039;&#039; philology, but rather as &#039;&#039;speaking philologically&#039;&#039; with all the force of an initiate using the encoded language of a new prestigious science none of whose pronouncements about language itself could be construed either directly or naively.&lt;br /&gt;
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As Renan understood, received, and was instructed in philology, the discipline imposed a set of doxological rules upon him. To be a philologist meant to be governed in one&#039;s activity first of all by a set of recent revaluative discoveries that effectively began the science of philology and gave it a distinctive epistemology of its own: I am speaking here of the period roughly from the 1780s to the mid-1830s, the latter part of which coincides with the period of Renan&#039;s beginning his education. His memoirs record how the crisis of religious faith that culminated in the loss of that faith led him in 1845 into a life of scholarship: this was his initiation into philology, its world-view, crises, and style. He believed that on a personal level his life reflected the institutional life of philology. In his life, however, he determined to be as Christian as he once was, only now without Christianity and with what he called &amp;quot;la science laique&amp;quot; (lay science).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Souvenirs d&#039;enfance et de jeunesse&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 2: 892. Two works by Jean Pommier treat Renan&#039;s mediation between religion and philology in valuable detail: &#039;&#039;Renan, d&#039;apres des documents inedits&#039;&#039; (Paris: Perrin, 1923), pp. 48-68, and &#039;&#039;La Jeunesse clericale d&#039;Ernest Renan&#039;&#039; (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1933). There is a more recent account in J. Chaix-Ruy, &#039;&#039;Ernest Renan&#039;&#039; (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1956), pp. 89-111. The standard description--done more in terms of Renan&#039;s religious vocation--is still valuable also: Pierre Lasserre, &#039;&#039;La Jeunesse d&#039;Ernest Renan: Histoire de la crise religieuse au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039;, 3 vols. (Paris: Garnier Freres, 1925). In vol. 2, pp. 50-166 and 265-98 are useful on the relations between philology, philosophy, and science.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The best example of what a lay science could and could not do was provided years later by Renan in a lecture given at the Sorbonne in 1878, &amp;quot;On the Services Rendered by Philology to the Historical Sciences.&amp;quot; What is revealing about this text is the way Renan clearly had religion in mind when he spoke about philology--for example, what philology, like religion, teaches us about the origins of humanity, civilization, and language--only to make it evident to his hearers that philology could deliver a far less coherent, less knitted together and positive message than religion.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernest Renan, &amp;quot;Des services rendus aux sciences historiques par la philologie,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039; 8: 1228.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Since Renan was irremediably historical and, as he once put it, morphological in his outlook, it stood to reason that the only way in which, as a very young man, he could move out of religion into philological scholarship was to retain in the new lay science the historical world-view he had gained from religion. Hence, &amp;quot;one occupation alone seemed to me to be worthy of filling my life; and that was to pursue my critical research into Christianity [an allusion to Renan&#039;s major scholarly project on the history and origins of Christianity] using those far ampler means offered me by lay science.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Souvenirs&#039;&#039;, p. 892.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Renan had assimilated himself to philology according to his own post-Christian fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between the history offered internally by Christianity and the history offered by philology, a relatively new discipline, is precisely what made modern philology possible, and this Renan knew perfectly. For whenever &amp;quot;philology&amp;quot; is spoken of around the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, we are to understand the &#039;&#039;new&#039;&#039; philology, whose major successes include comparative grammar, the reclassification of languages into families, and the final rejection of the divine origins of language. It is no exaggeration to say that these accomplishments were a more or less direct consequence of the view that held language to be an entirely human phenomenon. And this view became current once it was discovered empirically that the so-called sacred languages (Hebrew, primarily) were neither of primordial antiquity nor of divine provenance. What Foucault has called the discovery of language was therefore a secular event that displaced a religious conception of how God delivered language to man in Eden.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Foucault, &#039;&#039;The Order of Things&#039;&#039;, pp. 290-300. Along with the discrediting of the Edenic origins of language, a number of other events--the Deluge, the building of the Tower Babel--also were discredited as explanations. The most comprehensive history of theories of linguistic origin is Arno Borst, &#039;&#039;Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen uber Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Volker&#039;&#039;, 6 vols. (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1957-63).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Indeed, one of the consequences of this change, by which an etymological, dynastic notion of linguistic filiation was pushed aside by the view of language as a domain all of its own held together with jagged internal structures and coherences, is the dramatic subsidence of interest in the problem of the origins of language. Whereas in the 1770s, which is when Herder&#039;s essay on the origins of language won the 1772 medal from the Berlin Academy, it was all the rage to discuss that problem, by the first decade of the new century it was all but banned as a topic for learned dispute in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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On all sides, and in many different ways, what William Jones stated in his &#039;&#039;Anniversary Discourses&#039;&#039; (1785-1792), or what Franz Bopp put forward in his &#039;&#039;Vergleichende Grammatik&#039;&#039; (1832), is that the divine dynasty of language was ruptured definitively and discredited as an idea. A new historical conception, in short, was needed, since Christianity seemed unable to survive the empirical evidence that reduced the divine status of its major text. For some, as Chateaubriand put it, faith was unshakable despite new knowledge of how Sanskrit outdated Hebrew: &amp;quot;Helas! il est arrive qu&#039;une connaissance plus approfondie de la langue savante de l&#039;Inde a fait rentrer ces siecles innombrables dans le cercle etroit de la Bible. Bien m&#039;en a pris d&#039;etre redevenue croyant, avant d&#039;avoir eprouve cette mortification.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by Raymond Schwab, &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1950), p. 69. On the dangers of too quickly succumbing to generalities about Oriental discoveries, see the reflections of the distinguished contemporary Sinologist Abel Remusat, &#039;&#039;Melanges postumes d&#039;histoire et litterature orientales&#039;&#039; (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843), p. 226 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (Alas! it has happened that a deeper knowledge of the learned language of India has forced innumerable centuries into the narrow circle of the Bible. How lucky for me that I have become a believer again before having had to experience this mortification.) For others, especially philologists like the pioneering Bopp himself, the study of language entailed its own history, philosophy, and learning, all of which did away with any notion of a primal language given by the Godhead to man in Eden. As the study of Sanskrit and the expansive mood of the later eighteenth century seemed to have moved the earliest beginnings of civilization very far east of the Biblical lands, so too language became less of a continuity between an outside power and the human speaker than an internal field created and accomplished by language users among themselves. There was no first language, just as--except by a method I shall discuss presently--there was no simple language.&lt;br /&gt;
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The legacy of these first-generation philologists was, to Renan, of the highest importance, higher even than the work done by Sacy. Whenever he discussed language and philology, whether at the beginning, middle, or end of his long career, he repeated the lessons of the new philology, of which the antidynastic, anticontinuous tenets of a technical (as opposed to a divine) linguistic practice are the major pillar. For the linguist, language cannot be pictured as the result of force emanating unilaterally from God. As Coleridge put it, &amp;quot;Language is the armory of the human mind; and at once contains the trophies of its past and the weapons of its future conquests.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Samuel Taylor Coleridge, &#039;&#039;Biographia Literaria&#039;&#039;, chap. 16, in &#039;&#039;Selected Poetry and Prose of Coleridge&#039;&#039;, ed. Donald A. Stauffer (New York: Random House, 1951), pp. 276-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The idea of a first Edenic language gives way to the heuristic notion of a protolanguage (Indo-European, Semitic) whose existence is never a subject of debate, since it is acknowledged that such a language cannot be recaptured but can only be reconstituted in the philological process. To the extent that one language serves, again heuristically, as a touchstone for all the others, it is Sanskrit in its earliest Indo-European form. The terminology has also shifted: there are now &#039;&#039;families&#039;&#039; of languages (the analogy with species and anatomical classifications is marked), there is &#039;&#039;perfect&#039;&#039; linguistic form, which need not correspond to any &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; language, and there are original languages only as a function of the philological discourse, not because of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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But some writers shrewdly commented on how it was that Sanskrit and things Indian in general simply took the place of Hebrew and the Edenic fallacy. As early as 1804 Benjamin Constant noted in his &#039;&#039;Journal intime&#039;&#039; that he was not about to discuss India in his &#039;&#039;De la religion&#039;&#039; because the English who owned the place and the Germans who studied it indefatigably had made India the &#039;&#039;fons et origo&#039;&#039; of everything; and then there were the French who had decided after Napoleon and Champollion that everything originated in Egypt and the new Orient.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), p. 78.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These teleological enthusiasms were fueled after 1808 by Friedrich Schlegel&#039;s celebrated &#039;&#039;Uber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier&#039;&#039;, which seemed to confirm his own pronouncement made in 1800 about the Orient being the purest form of Romanticism.&lt;br /&gt;
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What Renan&#039;s generation--educated from the mid-1830s to the late 1840s--retained from all this enthusiasm about the Orient was the intellectual necessity of the Orient for the Occidental scholar of languages, cultures, and religions. Here the key text was Edgar Quinet&#039;s &#039;&#039;Le Genie des religions&#039;&#039; (1832), a work that announced the Oriental Renaissance and placed the Orient and the West in a functional relationship with each other. I have already referred to the vast meaning of this relationship as analyzed comprehensively by Raymond Schwab in &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;; my concern with it here is only to note specific aspects of it that bear upon Renan&#039;s vocation as a philologist and as an Orientalist. Quinet&#039;s association with Michelet, their interest in Herder and Vico, respectively, impressed on them the need for the scholar-historian to confront, almost in the manner of an audience seeing a dramatic event unfold, or a believer witnessing a revelation, the different, the strange, the distant. Quinet&#039;s formulation was that the Orient proposes and the West disposes: Asia has its prophets, Europe its doctors (its learned men, its scientists: the pun is intended). Out of this encounter, a new dogma or god is born, but Quinet&#039;s point is that both East and West fulfill their destinies and confirm their identities in the encounter. As a scholarly attitude the picture of a learned Westerner surveying as if from a peculiarly suited vantage point the passive, seminal, feminine, even silent and supine East, then going on to &#039;&#039;articulate&#039;&#039; the East, making the Orient deliver up its secrets under the learned authority of a philologist whose power derives from the ability to unlock secret, esoteric languages--this would persist in Renan. What did not persist in Renan during the 1840s, when he served his apprenticeship as a philologist, was the dramatic attitude: that was replaced by the scientific attitude.&lt;br /&gt;
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For Quinet and Michelet, history was a drama. Quinet suggestively describes the whole world as a temple and human history as a sort of religious rite. Both Michelet and Quinet &#039;&#039;saw&#039;&#039; the world they discussed. The origin of human history was something they could describe in the same splendid and impassioned and dramatic terms used by Vico and Rousseau to portray life on earth in primitive times. For Michelet and Quinet there is no doubt that they belong to the communal European Romantic undertaking &amp;quot;either in epic or some other major genre--in drama, in prose romance, or in the visionary &#039;greater Ode&#039;--radically to recast into terms appropriate to the historical and intellectual circumstances of their own age, the Christian pattern of the fall, the redemption, and the emergence of a new earth which will constitute a restored paradise.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Abrams, &#039;&#039;Natural Supernaturalism&#039;&#039;, p. 29.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; I think that for Quinet the idea of a new god being born was tantamount to the filling of the place left by the old god; for Renan, however, being a philologist meant the severance of any and all connections with the old Christian god, so that instead a new doctrine--probably science--would stand free and in a new place, as it were. Renan&#039;s whole career was devoted to the fleshing out of this progress.&lt;br /&gt;
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He put it very plainly at the end of his undistinguished essay on the origins of language: man is no longer an inventor, and the age of creation is definitely over.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;De l&#039;origine du langage, in Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 8: 122.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There was a period, at which we can only guess, when man was literally &#039;&#039;transported&#039;&#039; from silence into words. After that there was language, and for the true scientist the task is to examine how language &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039;, not how it came about. Yet if Renan dispels the passionate creation of primitive times (which had excited Herder, Vico, Rousseau, even Quinet and Michelet) he instates a new, and deliberate, type of artificial creation, one that is performed as a result of scientific analysis. In his &#039;&#039;lecon inaugurale&#039;&#039; at the College de France (February 21, 1862) Renan proclaimed his lectures open to the public so that it might see at first hand &amp;quot;le laboratoire meme de la science philologique&amp;quot; (the very laboratory of philological science).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;De la part des peuples semitiques dans l&#039;histoire de la civilisation,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 2: 320.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Any reader of Renan would have understood that such a statement was meant also to carry a typical if rather limp irony, one less intended to shock than passively to delight. For Renan was succeeding to the chair of Hebrew, and his lecture was on the contribution of the Semitic peoples to the history of civilization. What more subtle affront could there be to &amp;quot;sacred&amp;quot; history than the substitution of a philological laboratory for divine intervention in history; and what more telling way was there of declaring the Orient&#039;s contemporary relevance to be simply as material for European investigation?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 333.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Sacy&#039;s comparatively lifeless fragments arranged in tableaux were now being replaced with something new.&lt;br /&gt;
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The stirring peroration with which Renan concluded his &#039;&#039;lecon&#039;&#039; had another function than simply to connect Oriental-Semitic philology with the future and with science. Etienne Quatremere, who immediately preceded Renan in the chair of Hebrew, was a scholar who seemed to exemplify the popular caricature of what a scholar was like. A man of prodigiously industrious and pedantic habits, he went about his work, Renan said in a relatively unfeeling memorial minute for the &#039;&#039;Journal des debats&#039;&#039; in October 1857, like a laborious worker who even in rendering immense services nevertheless could not see the whole edifice being constructed. The edifice was nothing less than &amp;quot;la science historique de l&#039;esprit humain,&amp;quot; now in the process of being built stone by stone.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;Trois Professeurs au College de France: Etienne Quatremere,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 1: 129. Renan was not wrong about Quatremere, who had a talent for picking interesting subjects to study and then making them quite uninteresting. See his essays &amp;quot;Le Gout des livres chez les orientaux&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Des sciences chez les arabes,&amp;quot; in his &#039;&#039;Melanges d&#039;histoire et de philologie orientales&#039;&#039; (Paris: E. Ducrocq, 1861), pp. 1-57.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Just as Quatremere was not of this age, so Renan in his work was determined to be of it. Moreover, if the Orient had been hitherto identified exclusively and indiscriminately with India and China, Renan&#039;s ambition was to carve out a new Oriental province for himself, in this case the Semitic Orient. He had no doubt remarked the casual, and surely current, confusion of Arabic with Sanskrit (as in Balzac&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Peau de chagrin&#039;&#039;, where the fateful talisman&#039;s Arabic script is described as Sanskrit), and he made it his job accordingly to do for the Semitic languages what Bopp had done for the Indo-European: so he said in the 1855 preface to the comparative Semitic treatise.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Honore de Balzac, &#039;&#039;La Peau de chagrin&#039;&#039;, vol. 9 (&#039;&#039;Etudes philosophiques&#039;&#039; 1) of &#039;&#039;La Comedie humaine&#039;&#039;, ed. Marcel Bouteron (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), p. 39; Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale des langues semitiques&#039;&#039;, p. 134.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore Renan&#039;s plans were to bring the Semitic languages into sharp and glamorous focus &#039;&#039;a la&#039;&#039; Bopp, and in addition to elevate the study of these neglected inferior languages to the level of a passionate new science of mind &#039;&#039;a la&#039;&#039; Louis Lambert.&lt;br /&gt;
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On more than one occasion Renan was quite explicit in his assertions that Semites and Semitic were &#039;&#039;creations&#039;&#039; of Orientalist philological study.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See, for instance, &#039;&#039;De l&#039;origine du langage&#039;&#039;, p. 102, and &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, p. 180.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Since he was the man who did the study, there was meant to be little ambiguity about the centrality of his role in this new, artificial creation. But how did Renan mean the word &#039;&#039;creation&#039;&#039; in these instances? And how was this creation connected with either natural creation, or the creation ascribed by Renan and others to the laboratory and to the classificatory and natural sciences, principally what was called philosophical anatomy? Here we must speculate a little. Throughout his career Renan seemed to imagine the role of science in human life as (and I quote in translation as literally as I can) &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;telling&#039;&#039; (speaking or articulating) definitively to man the word [logos?] of things.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039;, p. 23. The whole passage reads as follows: &amp;quot;Pour moi, je ne connais qu&#039;un seul resultat a la science, c&#039;est de resoudre l&#039;enigme, c&#039;est de dire definitivement a l&#039;homme le mot des choses, c&#039;est de l&#039;expliquer a lui-meme, c&#039;est de lui donner, au nom de la seule autorite legitime qui est la nature humaine toute entiere, le symbole que les religions lui donnaient tout fait et qu&#039;ils ne peut plus accepter.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Science gives speech to things; better yet, science brings out, causes to be pronounced, a potential speech within things. The special value of linguistics (as the new philology was then often called) is not that natural science resembles it, but rather that it treats words as natural, otherwise silent objects, which are made to give up their secrets. Remember that the major breakthrough in the study of inscriptions and hieroglyphs was the discovery by Champollion that the symbols on the Rosetta Stone had a &#039;&#039;phonetic&#039;&#039; as well as a semantic component.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Madeleine V.-David, &#039;&#039;Le Debat sur les ecritures et l&#039;hieroglyphe aux XVII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; et XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecles et l&#039;application de la notion de dechiffrement aux ecritures mortes&#039;&#039; (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1965), p. 130.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; To make objects speak was like making words speak, giving them circumstantial value, and a precise place in a rule-governed order of regularity. In its first sense, &#039;&#039;creation&#039;&#039;, as Renan used the word, signified the articulation by which an object like &#039;&#039;Semitic&#039;&#039; could be seen as a creature of sorts. Second, creation also signified the setting--in the case of Semitic it meant Oriental history, culture, race, mind--illuminated and brought forward from its reticence by the scientist. Finally, creation was the formulation of a system of classification by which it was possible to see the object in question comparatively with other like objects; and by &amp;quot;comparatively&amp;quot; Renan intended a complex network of paradigmatic relations that obtained between Semitic and Indo-European languages.&lt;br /&gt;
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If in what I have so far said I have insisted so much on Renan&#039;s comparatively forgotten study of Semitic languages, it has been for several important reasons. Semitic was the scientific study to which Renan turned right after the loss of his Christian faith; I described above how he came to see the study of Semitic as replacing his faith and enabling a critical future relation with it. The study of Semitic was Renan&#039;s first full-length Orientalist and scientific study (finished in 1847, published first in 1855), and was as much a part of his late major works on the origins of Christianity and the history of the Jews as it was a propaedeutic for them. In intention, if not perhaps in achievement--interestingly, few of the standard or contemporary works in either linguistic history or the history of Orientalism cite Renan with anything more than cursory attention&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan is mentioned only in passing in Schwab&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039;, not at all in Foucault&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Order of Things&#039;&#039;, and only somewhat disparagingly in Holger Pederson&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Discovery of Language: Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century&#039;&#039;, trans. John Webster Spargo (1931; reprint ed., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972). Max Muller in his &#039;&#039;Lectures on the Science of Language&#039;&#039; (1861-64; reprint ed., New York: Scribner, Armstrong, &amp;amp;amp; Co., 1875) and Gustave Dugat in his &#039;&#039;Histoire des orientalistes de l&#039;Europe du XII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1868-70) do not mention Renan at all. James Darmesteter&#039;s &#039;&#039;Essais Orientaux&#039;&#039; (Paris: A. Levy, 1883)--whose first item is a history, &amp;quot;L&#039;Orientalisme en France&amp;quot;--is dedicated to Renan but does not mention his contribution. There are half-a-dozen short notices of Renan&#039;s production in Jules Mohl&#039;s encyclopedic (and extremely valuable) quasi-logbook, &#039;&#039;Vingt-sept ans d&#039;histoire des etudes orientales: Rapports faits a la Societe asiatique de Paris de 1840 a 1867&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Paris: Reinwald, 1879-80).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--his Semitic opus was proposed as a philological breakthrough, from which in later years he was always to draw retrospective authority for his positions (almost always bad ones) on religion, race, and nationalism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In works dealing with race and racism Renan occupies a position of some importance. He is treated in the following: Ernest Seilliere, &#039;&#039;La Philosophie de l&#039;imperialisme&#039;&#039;, 4 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1903-8); Theophile Simar, &#039;&#039;Etude critique sur la formation de la doctrine des races au XVIII&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle et son expansion au XIX&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; siecle&#039;&#039; (Brussels: Hayez, 1922); Erich Voegelin, &#039;&#039;Rasse und Staat&#039;&#039; (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1933), and here one must also mention his &#039;&#039;Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte von Ray bis Carus&#039;&#039; (Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, 1933), which, although it does not deal with Renan&#039;s period, is an important complement to &#039;&#039;Rasse und Staat&#039;&#039;; Jacques Barzun, &#039;&#039;Race: A Study in Modern Superstition&#039;&#039; (New York: Harcourt, Brace &amp;amp; Co., 1937).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Whenever Renan wished to make a statement about either the Jews or the Muslims, for example, it was always with his remarkably harsh (and unfounded, except according to the science he was practicing) strictures on the Semites in mind. Furthermore, Renan&#039;s Semitic was meant as a contribution both to the development of Indo-European linguistics and to the differentiation of Orientalisms. To the former Semitic was a degraded form, degraded in both the moral and the biological sense, whereas to the latter Semitic was a--if not the--stable form of cultural decadence. Lastly, Semitic was Renan&#039;s first creation, a fiction invented by him in the philological laboratory to satisfy his sense of public place and mission. It should by no means be lost on us that Semitic was for Renan&#039;s ego the symbol of European (and consequently his) dominion over the Orient and over his own era.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, as a branch of the Orient, Semitic was not fully a natural object--like a species of monkey, for instance--nor fully an unnatural or a divine object, as it had once been considered. Rather, Semitic occupied a median position, legitimated in its oddities (regularity being defined by Indo-European) by an inverse relation to normal languages, comprehended as an eccentric, quasi-monstrous phenomenon partly because libraries, laboratories, and museums could serve as its place of exhibition and analysis. In his treatise, Renan adopted a tone of voice and a method of exposition that drew the maximum from book-learning and from natural observation as practiced by men like Cuvier and the Geoffroy Saint-Hilaires &#039;&#039;pere et fils&#039;&#039;. This is an important stylistic achievement, for it allowed Renan consistently to avail himself of the &#039;&#039;library&#039;&#039;, rather than either primitivity or divine fiat, as a conceptual framework in which to understand language, together with the &#039;&#039;museum&#039;&#039;, which is where the results of laboratory observation are delivered for exhibition, study, and teaching.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In &#039;&#039;La Renaissance orientale&#039;&#039; Schwab has some brilliant pages on the museum, on the parallelism between biology and linguistics, and on Cuvier, Balzac, and others; see p. 323 and passim. On the library and its importance for mid-nineteenth-century culture, see Foucault, &amp;quot;La Bibliotheque fantastique,&amp;quot; which is his preface to Flaubert&#039;s &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039; (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), pp. 7-33. I am indebted to Professor Eugenio Donato for drawing my attention to these matters; see his &amp;quot;A Mere Labyrinth of Letters: Flaubert and the Quest for Fiction,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Modern Language Notes&#039;&#039; 89, no. 6 (December 1974): 885-910.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Everywhere Renan treats of normal human facts--language, history, culture, mind, imagination--as transformed into something else, as something peculiarly deviant, because they are Semitic and Oriental, and because they end up for analysis in the laboratory. Thus the Semites are rabid monotheists who produced no mythology, no art, no commerce, no civilization; their consciousness is a narrow and rigid one; all in all they represent &amp;quot;une combinaison inferieure de la nature humaine.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, pp. 145-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the same time Renan wants it understood that he speaks of a prototype, not a real Semitic type with actual existence (although he violated this too by discussing present-day Jews and Muslims with less than scientific detachment in many places in his writings).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039;, p. 508 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; So on the one hand we have the transformation of the human into the specimen, and on the other the comparative judgment rendered by which the specimen remains a specimen and a subject for philological, scientific study.&lt;br /&gt;
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Scattered throughout the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale et systeme compare des langues semitiques&#039;&#039; are reflections on the links between linguistics and anatomy, and--for Renan this is equally important--remarks on how these links could be employed to do human history (&#039;&#039;les sciences historiques&#039;&#039;). But first we should consider the implicit links. I do not think it wrong or an exaggeration to say that a typical page of Renan&#039;s Orientalist &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039; was constructed typographically and structurally with a page of comparative philosophical anatomy, in the style of Cuvier or Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, kept in mind. Both linguists and anatomists purport to be speaking about matters not directly obtainable or observable in nature; a skeleton and a detailed line drawing of a muscle, as much as paradigms constituted by the linguists out of a purely hypothetical proto-Semitic or proto-Indo-European, are similarly products of the laboratory and of the library. The text of a linguistic or an anatomical work bears the same general relation to nature (or actuality) that a museum case exhibiting a specimen mammal or organ does. What is given on the page and in the museum case is a truncated exaggeration, like many of Sacy&#039;s Oriental extracts, whose purpose is to exhibit a relationship between the science (or scientist) and the object, not one between the object and nature. Read almost any page by Renan on Arabic, Hebrew, Aramaic, or proto-Semitic and you read a fact of power, by which the Orientalist philologist&#039;s authority summons out of the library at will examples of man&#039;s speech, and ranges them there surrounded by a suave European prose that points out defects, virtues, barbarisms, and shortcomings in the language, the people, and the civilization. The tone and the tense of the exhibition are cast almost uniformly in the contemporary present, so that one is given an impression of a pedagogical demonstration during which the scholar-scientist stands before us on a lecture-laboratory platform, creating, confining, and judging the material he discusses.&lt;br /&gt;
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This anxiety on Renan&#039;s part to convey the sense of a demonstration actually taking place is heightened when he remarks explicitly that whereas anatomy employs stable and visible signs by which to consign objects to classes, linguistics does not.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, p. 214.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Therefore the philologist must make a given linguistic fact correspond in some way to a historical period: hence the possibility of a classification. Yet, as Renan was often to say, linguistic temporality and history are full of lacunae, enormous discontinuities, hypothetical periods. Therefore linguistic events occur in a nonlinear and essentially discontinuous temporal dimension controlled by the linguist in a, very particular way. That way, as Renan&#039;s whole treatise on the Semitic branch of the Oriental languages goes very far to show, is comparative: Indo-European is taken as the living, &#039;&#039;organic&#039;&#039; norm, and Semitic Oriental languages are seen comparatively to be &#039;&#039;inorganic&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 527. This idea goes back to Friedrich Schlegel&#039;s distinction between organic and agglutinative languages, of which latter type Semitic is an instance. Humboldt makes the same distinction, as have most Orientalists since Renan.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Time is transformed into the space of comparative classification, which at bottom is based on a rigid binary opposition between organic and inorganic languages. So on the one hand there is the organic, biologically generative process represented by Indo-European, while on the other there is an inorganic, essentially unregenerative process, ossified into Semitic: most important, Renan makes it absolutely clear that such an imperious judgment is made by the Oriental philologist in his laboratory, for distinctions of the kind he has been concerned with are neither possible nor available for anyone except the trained professional. &amp;quot;Nous refusons donc aux langues semitiques la faculte de se regenerer, toute en reconnaissant qu&#039;elles n&#039;echappent pas plus que les autres oeuvres de la conscience humaine a la necessite du changement et des modifications successives&amp;quot; (Therefore we refuse to allow that the Semitic languages have the capacity to regenerate themselves, even while recognizing that they do not escape--any more than other products of human consciousness--the necessity of change or of successive modifications).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 531-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet behind even this radical opposition, there is another one working in Renan&#039;s mind, and for several pages in the first chapter of book 5 he exposes his position quite candidly to the reader. This occurs when he introduces Saint-Hilaire&#039;s views on the &amp;quot;degradation, of types.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 515 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Although Renan does not specify which Saint-Hilaire he refers to, the reference is clear enough. For both Etienne and his son Isidore were biological speculators of extraordinary fame and influence, particularly among literary intellectuals during the first half of the nineteenth century in France. Etienne, we recall, had been a member of the Napoleonic expedition, and Balzac dedicated an important section of the preface for &#039;&#039;La Comedie humaine&#039;&#039; to him; there is also much evidence that Flaubert read both the father and the son and used their views in his work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jean Seznec, &#039;&#039;Nouvelles Etudes sur &amp;quot;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&amp;quot;&#039;&#039; (London: Warburg Institute, 1949), p. 80.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Not only were Etienne and Isidore legatees of the tradition of &amp;quot;Romantic&amp;quot; biology, which included Goethe and Cuvier, with a strong interest in analogy, homology, and organic &#039;&#039;ur&#039;&#039;-form among species, but they were also specialists in the philosophy and anatomy of monstrosity--teratology, as Isidore called it--in which the most horrendous physiological aberrations were considered a result of internal degradation within the species-life.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophie anatomique: Des monstruosites humaines&#039;&#039; (Paris: published by the author, 1822). The complete title of Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire&#039;s work is: &#039;&#039;Histoire generale et particuliere des anomalies de l&#039;organisation chez l&#039;homme et les animaux, ouvrage comprenante des recherches sur les caracteres, la classification, l&#039;influence physiologique et pathologique, les rapports generaux, les lois et les causes des monstruosites, des varietes et vices de conformation, ou traite de teratologie&#039;&#039;, 3 vols. (Paris: J.-B. Bailliere, 1832-36). There are some valuable pages on Goethe&#039;s biological ideas in Erich Heller, &#039;&#039;The Disinherited Mind&#039;&#039; (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 3-34. See also Jacob, &#039;&#039;The Logic of Life&#039;&#039;, and Canguilhem, &#039;&#039;La Connaissance de la vie&#039;&#039;, pp. 174-84, for very interesting accounts of the Saint-Hilaires&#039; place in the development of the life sciences.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; I cannot here go into the intricacies (as well as the macabre fascination) of teratology, though it is enough to mention that both Etienne and Isidore exploited the theoretical power of the linguistic paradigm to explain the deviations possible within a biological system. Thus Etienne&#039;s notion was that a monster is an &#039;&#039;anomaly&#039;&#039;, in the same sense that in language words exist in analogical as well as anomalous relations with each other: in linguistics the idea is at least as old as Varro&#039;s &#039;&#039;De Lingua Latina&#039;&#039;. No anomaly can be considered simply as a gratuitous exception; rather anomalies confirm the regular structure binding together all members of the same class. Such a view is quite daring in anatomy. At one moment in the &amp;quot;Preliminaire&amp;quot; to his &#039;&#039;Philosophie anatomique&#039;&#039; Etienne says:&lt;br /&gt;
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And, indeed, such is the character of our epoch that it becomes impossible today to enclose oneself strictly within the framework of a simple monograph. Study an object in isolation and you will only be able to bring it back to itself; consequently you can never have perfect knowledge of it. But see it in the midst of beings who are connected with each other in many different ways, and which are isolated from each other in different ways, and you will discover for this object a wider scope of relationships. First of all, you will know it better, even in its specificity: but more important, by considering it in the very center of its own sphere of activity, you will know precisely how it behaves in its own exterior world, and you will also know how its own features are constituted in reaction to its surrounding milieu.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;E. Saint-Hilaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophie anatomique&#039;&#039;, pp. xxii-xxiii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only is Saint-Hilaire saying that it is the specific character of contemporary study (he was writing in 1822) to examine phenomena comparatively; he is also saying that for the scientist there is no such thing as a phenomenon, no matter how aberrant and exceptional, that cannot be explained with reference to other phenomena. Note also how Saint-Hilaire employs the metaphor of centrality (&#039;&#039;le centre de sa sphere d&#039;activite&#039;&#039;) used later by Renan in &#039;&#039;L&#039;Avenir de la science&#039;&#039; to describe the position occupied by any object in nature--including even the philologist--once the object is scientifically &#039;&#039;placed&#039;&#039; there by the examining scientist. Thereafter between the object and the scientist a bond of sympathy is established. Of course, this can only take place during the laboratory experience, and not elsewhere. The point being made is that a scientist has at his disposal a sort of leverage by which even the totally unusual occurrence can be seen naturally and known scientifically, which in this case means without recourse to the supernatural, and with recourse only to an enveloping environment constituted by the scientist. As a result nature itself can be reperceived as continuous, harmoniously coherent, and fundamentally intelligible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus for Renan Semitic is a phenomenon of arrested development in comparison with the mature languages and cultures of the Indo-European group, and even with the other Semitic Oriental languages.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039;, p. 156.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The paradox that Renan sustains, however, is that even as he encourages us to see languages as in some way corresponding to &amp;quot;etres vivants de la nature,&amp;quot; he is everywhere else proving that his Oriental languages, the Semitic languages, are inorganic, arrested, totally ossified, incapable of self-regeneration; in other words, he proves that Semitic is not a live language, and for that matter, neither are Semites live creatures. Moreover, Indo-European language and culture are alive and organic &#039;&#039;because&#039;&#039; of the laboratory, not despite it. But far from being a marginal issue in Renan&#039;s work, this paradox stands, I believe, at the very center of his entire work, his style, and his archival existence in the culture of his time, a culture to which--as people so unlike each other as Matthew Arnold, Oscar Wilde, James Frazer, and Marcel Proust concurred--he was a very important contributor. To be able to sustain a vision that incorporates and holds together life and quasi-living creatures (Indo-European, European culture) as well as quasimonstrous, parallel inorganic phenomena (Semitic, Oriental culture) is precisely the achievement of the European scientist in his laboratory. He &#039;&#039;constructs&#039;&#039;, and the very act of construction is a sign of imperial power over recalcitrant phenomena, as well as a confirmation of the dominating culture and its &amp;quot;naturalization.&amp;quot; Indeed, it is not too much to say that Renan&#039;s philological laboratory is the actual locale of his European ethnocentrism; but what needs emphasis here is that the philological laboratory has no existence outside the discourse, the writing by which it is constantly produced and experienced. Thus even the culture he calls organic and alive--Europe&#039;s--is also a &#039;&#039;creature being created&#039;&#039; in the laboratory and by philology.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan&#039;s entire later career was European and cultural. Its accomplishments were varied and celebrated. Whatever authority his style possessed can, I think, be traced back to his technique for constructing the inorganic (or the missing) and for giving it the appearance of life. He was most famous, of course, for his &#039;&#039;Vie de Jesus&#039;&#039;, the work that inaugurated his monumental histories of Christianity and the Jewish people. Yet we must realize that the &#039;&#039;Vie&#039;&#039; was exactly the same type of feat that the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039; was, a construction enabled by the historian&#039;s capacity for skillfully crafting a dead (dead for Renan in the double sense of a dead faith and a lost, hence dead, historical period) Oriental biography--and the paradox is immediately apparent--&#039;&#039;as if it were&#039;&#039; the truthful narrative of a natural life. Whatever Renan said had first passed through the philological laboratory; when it appeared in print woven through the text, there was in it the life-giving force of a contemporary cultural signature, which drew from modernity all its scientific power and all its uncritical self-approbation. For that sort of culture such genealogies as dynasty, tradition, religion, ethnic communities were all simply functions of a theory whose job was to instruct the world. In borrowing this latter phrase from Cuvier, Renan was circumspectly placing scientific demonstration over experience; temporality was relegated to the scientifically useless realm of ordinary experience, while to the special periodicity of culture and cultural comparativism (which spawned ethnocentrism, racial theory, and economic oppression) were given powers far in advance of moral vision.&lt;br /&gt;
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Renan&#039;s style, his career as Orientalist and man of letters, the circumstances of the meaning he communicates, his peculiarly intimate relationship with the European scholarly and general culture of his time--liberal, exclusivist, imperious, antihuman except in a very conditional sense--all these are what I would call &#039;&#039;celibate&#039;&#039; and scientific. Generation for him is consigned to the realm of &#039;&#039;l&#039;avenir&#039;&#039;, which in his famous manifesto he associated with science. Although as a historian of culture he belongs to the school of men like Turgot, Condorcet, Guizot, Cousin, Jouffroy, and Ballanche, and in scholarship to the school of Sacy, Caussin de Perceval, Ozanam, Fauriel, and Burnouf, Renan&#039;s is a peculiarly ravaged, ragingly masculine world of history and learning; it is indeed the world, not of fathers, mothers, and children, but of men like his Jesus, his Marcus Aurelius, his Caliban, his solar god (the last as described in &amp;quot;Reves&amp;quot; of the &#039;&#039;Dialogues philosophiques&#039;&#039;).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 1: 621-2 and passim. See H. W. Wardman, &#039;&#039;Ernest Renan: A Critical Biography&#039;&#039; (London: Athlone Press, 1964), p. 66 and passim, for a subtle description of Renan&#039;s domestic life; although one would not wish to force a parallel between Renan&#039;s biography and what I have called his &amp;quot;masculine&amp;quot; world, Wardman&#039;s descriptions here are suggestive indeed--at least to me.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He cherished the power of science and Orientalist philology particularly; he sought its insights and its techniques; he used it to intervene, often with considerable effectiveness, in the life of his epoch. And yet his ideal role was that of spectator.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Renan, a philologist ought to prefer &#039;&#039;bonheur&#039;&#039; to &#039;&#039;jouissance&#039;&#039;: the preference expresses a choice of elevated, if sterile, happiness over sexual pleasure. Words belong to the realm of &#039;&#039;bonheur&#039;&#039;, as does the study of words, ideally speaking. To my knowledge, there are very few moments in all of Renan&#039;s public writing where a beneficent and instrumental role is assigned to women. One occurs when Renan opines that foreign women (nurses, maids) must have instructed the conquering Normans&#039; children, and hence we can account for the changes that take place in language. Note how productivity and dissemination are not the functions aided, but rather internal change, and a subsidiary one at that. &amp;quot;Man,&amp;quot; he says at the end of the same essay, &amp;quot;belongs neither to his language nor to his race; he belongs to himself before all, since before all he is a free being and a moral one.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;Des services rendus au sciences historiques par la philologie,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 8: 1228, 1232.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Man was free and moral, but enchained by race, history, and science as Renan saw them, conditions imposed by the scholar on man.&lt;br /&gt;
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The study of Oriental languages took Renan to the heart of these conditions, and philology made it concretely apparent that knowledge of man was--to paraphrase Ernst Cassirer--poetically transfiguring&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ernst Cassirer, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel&#039;&#039;, trans. William H. Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 307.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; only if it had been previously severed from raw actuality (as Sacy had necessarily severed his Arabic fragments from their actuality) and then put into a doxological straitjacket. By becoming &#039;&#039;philology&#039;&#039;, the study of words as once practiced by Vico, Herder, Rousseau, Michelet, and Quinet lost its plot and its dramatic presentational quality, as Schelling once called it. Instead, philology became epistemologically complex; &#039;&#039;Sprachgefuhl&#039;&#039; was no longer enough since words themselves pertained less to the senses or the body (as they had for Vico) and more to a sightless, imageless, and abstract realm ruled over by such hothouse formulations as race, mind, culture, and nation. In that realm, which was discursively constructed and called the Orient, certain kinds of assertions could be made, all of them possessing the same powerful generality and cultural validity. For all of Renan&#039;s effort was to deny Oriental culture the right to be generated, except artificially in the philological laboratory. A man was not a child of the culture; that dynastic conception had been too effectively challenged by philology. Philology taught one how culture is a construct, an &#039;&#039;articulation&#039;&#039; (in the sense that Dickens used the word for Mr. Venus&#039;s profession in &#039;&#039;Our Mutual Friend&#039;&#039;), even a creation, but not anything more than a quasi-organic structure.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is specially interesting in Renan is how much he knew himself to be a creature of his time and of his ethnocentric culture. On the occasion of an academic response to a speech made by Ferdinand de Lesseps in 1885, Renan averred as how &amp;quot;it was so sad to be a wiser man than one&#039;s nation.... One cannot feel bitterness towards one&#039;s homeland. Better to be mistaken along with the nation than to be too right with those who tell it hard truths.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &amp;quot;Reponse au discours de reception de M. de Lesseps (23 avril 1885),&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 1: 817. Yet the value of being truly contemporary was best shown with reference to Renan by Sainte-Beuve in his articles of June 1862. See also Donald G. Charlton, &#039;&#039;Positivist Thought in France During the Second Empire&#039;&#039; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), and his &#039;&#039;Secular Religions in France&#039;&#039;. Also Richard M. Chadbourne, &amp;quot;Renan and Sainte-Beuve,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Romanic Review&#039;&#039; 44, no. 2 (April 1953): 126-35.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The economy of such a statement is almost too perfect to be true. For does not the old Renan say that the best relationship is one of parity with one&#039;s own culture, its morality, and its ethos during one&#039;s time, that and not a dynastic relation by which one is either the child of his times or their parent? And here we return to the laboratory, for it is there--as Renan thought of it--that filial and ultimately social responsibilities cease and scientific and Orientalist ones take over. His laboratory was the platform from which as an Orientalist he addressed the world; it mediated the statements he made, gave them confidence and general precision, as well as continuity. Thus the philological laboratory as Renan understood it redefined not only his epoch and his culture, dating and shaping them in new ways; it gave his Oriental subject matter a scholarly coherence, and more, it made him (and later Orientalists in his tradition) into the Occidental &#039;&#039;cultural&#039;&#039; figure he then became. We may well wonder whether this new autonomy within the culture was the freedom Renan hoped his philological Orientalist science would bring or whether, so far as a critical historian of Orientalism is concerned, it set up a complex affiliation between Orientalism and its putative human subject matter that is based finally on power and not really on disinterested objectivity.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Oriental Residence and Scholarship: &#039;&#039;The Requirements of Lexicography and Imagination&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Renan&#039;s views of the Oriental Semites belong, of course, less to the realm of popular prejudice and common anti-Semitism than they do to the realm of scientific Oriental philology. When we read Renan and Sacy, we readily observe the way cultural generalization had begun to acquire the armor of scientific statement and the ambience of corrective study. Like many academic specialties in their early phases, modern Orientalism held its subject matter, which it defined, in a viselike grip which it did almost everything in its power to sustain. Thus a knowing vocabulary developed, and its functions, as much as its style, located the Orient in a &#039;&#039;comparative&#039;&#039; framework, of the sort employed and manipulated by Renan. Such comparatism is rarely descriptive; most often, it is both evaluative and expository. Here is Renan comparing typically:&lt;br /&gt;
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One sees that in all things the Semitic race appears to us to be an incomplete race, by virtue of its simplicity. This race--if I dare use the analogy--is to the Indo-European family what a pencil sketch is to painting; it lacks that variety, that amplitude, that abundance of life which is the condition of perfectibility. Like those individuals who possess so little fecundity that, after a gracious childhood, they attain only the most mediocre virility, the Semitic nations experienced their fullest flowering in their first age and have never been able to achieve true maturity.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 8: 156.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Indo-Europeans are the touchstone here, just as they are when Renan says that the Semitic Oriental sensibility never reached the heights attained by the Indo-Germanic races.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whether this comparative attitude is principally a scholarly necessity or whether it is disguised ethnocentric race prejudice, we cannot say with absolute certainty. What we can say is that the two work together, in support of each other. What Renan and Sacy tried to do was to reduce the Orient to a kind of human flatness, which exposed its characteristics easily to scrutiny and removed from it its complicating humanity. In Renan&#039;s case, the legitimacy of his efforts was provided by philology, whose ideological tenets encourage the reduction of a language to its roots; thereafter, the philologist finds it possible to connect those linguistics roots, as Renan and others did, to race, mind, character, and temperament at their roots. The affinity between Renan and Gobineau, for example, was acknowledged by Renan to be a common philological and Orientalist perspective;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In his letter of June 26, 1856, to Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes&#039;&#039;, 10: 203-4. Gobineau&#039;s ideas were expressed in his &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;inegalite des races humaines&#039;&#039; (1853-55).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in subsequent editions of the &#039;&#039;Histoire generale&#039;&#039; he incorporated some of Gobineau&#039;s work within his own. Thus did comparatism in the study of the Orient and Orientals come to be synonymous with the apparent ontological inequality of Occident and Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main traits of this inequality are worth recapitulating briefly. I have already referred to Schlegel&#039;s enthusiasm for India, and then his subsequent revulsion from it and of course from Islam. Many of the earliest Oriental amateurs began by welcoming the Orient as a salutary &#039;&#039;derangement&#039;&#039; of their European habits of mind and spirit. The Orient was overvalued for its pantheism, its spirituality, its stability, its longevity, its primitivity, and so forth. Schelling, for example, saw in Oriental polytheism a preparation of the way for Judeo-Christian monotheism: Abraham was prefigured in Brahma. Yet almost without exception such overesteem was followed by a counterresponse: the Orient suddenly appeared lamentably underhumanized, antidemocratic, backward, barbaric, and so forth. A swing of the pendulum in one direction caused an equal and opposite swing back: the Orient was undervalued. Orientalism as a profession grew out of these opposites, of compensations and corrections based on inequality, ideas nourished by and nourishing similar ideas in the culture at large. Indeed the very project of restriction and restructuring associated with Orientalism can be traced directly to the inequality by which the Orient&#039;s comparative poverty (or wealth) besought scholarly, scientific treatment of the kind to be found in disciplines like philology, biology, history, anthropology, philosophy, or economics.&lt;br /&gt;
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And thus the actual profession of Orientalist enshrined this inequality and the special paradoxes it engendered. Most often an individual entered the profession as a way of reckoning with the Orient&#039;s claim on him; yet most often too his Orientalist training opened his eyes, so to speak, and what he was left with was a sort of debunking project, by which the Orient was reduced to considerably less than the eminence once seen in it. How else is one to explain the enormous labors represented by the work of William Muir (1819-1905), for example, or of Reinhart Dozy (1820-1883), and the impressive antipathy in that work to the Orient, Islam, and the Arabs? Characteristically, Renan was one of Dozy&#039;s supporters, just as in Dozy&#039;s four-volume &#039;&#039;Histoire des Mussulmans d&#039;Espagne&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;jusqu&#039;a la conquete de l&#039;Andalousie par les Almoravides&#039;&#039; (1861) there appear many of Renan&#039;s anti-Semitic strictures, compounded in 1864 by a volume arguing that the Jews&#039; primitive God was not Jahweh but Baal, proof for which was to be found in Mecca, of all places. Muir&#039;s &#039;&#039;Life of Mahomet&#039;&#039; (1858-1861) and his &#039;&#039;The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall&#039;&#039; (1891) are still considered reliable monuments of scholarship, yet his attitude towards his subject matter was fairly put by him when he said that &amp;quot;the sword of Muhammed, and the Kor&#039;an, are the most stubborn enemies of Civilisation, Liberty, and the Truth which the world has yet known.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited by Albert Hourani in his excellent article &amp;quot;Islam and the Philosophers of History,&amp;quot; p. 222.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Many of the same notions are to be found in the work of Alfred Lyall, who was one of the authors cited approvingly by Cromer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if the Orientalist does not explicitly judge his material as Dozy and Muir did, the principle of inequality exerts its influence nevertheless. It remains the professional Orientalist&#039;s job to piece together a portrait, a restored picture as it were, of the Orient or the Oriental; fragments, such as those unearthed by Sacy, supply the material, but the narrative shape, continuity, and figures are constructed by the scholar, for whom scholarship consists of circumventing the unruly (un-Occidental) nonhistory of the Orient with orderly chronicle, portraits, and plots. Caussin de Perceval&#039;s &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;histoire des Arabes avant l&#039;Islamisme, pendant l&#039;epoque de Mahomet&#039;&#039; (three volumes, 1847-1848) is a wholly professional study, depending for its sources on documents made available &#039;&#039;internally&#039;&#039; to the field by other Orientalists (principally Sacy, of course) or documents--like the texts of ibn-Khaldun, upon whom Caussin relied very heavily--reposing in Orientalist libraries in Europe. Caussin&#039;s thesis is that the Arabs were made a people by Mohammed, Islam being essentially a political instrument, not by any means a spiritual one. What Caussin strives for is clarity amidst a huge mass of confusing detail. Thus what emerges out of the study of Islam is quite literally a one-dimensional portrait of Mohammed, who is made to appear at the end of the work (after his death has been described) in precise photographic detail.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Caussin de Perceval, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;histoire des Arabes avant l&#039;Islamisme, pendant l&#039;epoque de Mahomet et jusqu&#039;a la reduction de toutes les tribus sous la loi musulmane&#039;&#039; (1847-48; reprint ed., Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1967), 3: 332-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Neither a demon, nor a prototype of Cagliostro, Caussin&#039;s Mohammed is a man appropriated to a history of Islam (the fittest version of it) as an exclusively political movement, centralized by the innumerable citations that thrust him up and, in a sense, out of the text. Caussin&#039;s intention was to leave nothing unsaid about Mohammed; the Prophet is thereby seen in a cold light, stripped both of his immense religious force and of any residual powers to frighten Europeans. The point here is that as a figure for his own time and place Mohammed is effaced, in order for a very slight human miniature of him to be left standing.&lt;br /&gt;
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A nonprofessional analogue to Caussin&#039;s Mohammed is Carlyle&#039;s, a Mohammed forced to serve a thesis totally overlooking the historical and cultural circumstances of the Prophet&#039;s own time and place. Although Carlyle quotes Sacy, his essay is clearly the product of someone arguing for some general ideas on sincerity, heroism, and prophethood. His attitude is salutary: Mohammed is no legend, no shameful sensualist, no laughable petty sorcerer who trained pigeons to pick peas out of his ear. Rather he is a man of real vision and self-conviction, albeit an author of a book, the Koran, that is &amp;quot;a wearisome confused jumble, crude, incondite; endless iterations, long-windedness, entanglement; most crude, incondite--insupportable stupidity, in short.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thomas Carlyle, &#039;&#039;On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History&#039;&#039; (1841; reprint ed., New York: Longmans, Green &amp;amp; Co., 1906), p. 63.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Not a paragon of lucidity and stylistic grace himself, Carlyle asserts these things as a way of rescuing Mohammed from the Benthamite standards that would have condemned both Mohammed and him together. Yet Mohammed is a hero, transplanted into Europe out of the same barbaric Orient found wanting by Lord Macaulay in his famous &amp;quot;Minute&amp;quot; of 1835, in which it was asserted that &amp;quot;our native subjects&amp;quot; have more to learn from us than we do from them.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Macaulay&#039;s Indian experiences are described by G. Otto Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay&#039;&#039; (New York: Harper &amp;amp; Brothers, 1875), 1: 344-71. The complete text of Macaulay&#039;s &amp;quot;Minute&amp;quot; is conveniently to be found in Philip D. Curtin, ed., &#039;&#039;Imperialism: The Documentary History of Western Civilization&#039;&#039; (New York: Walker &amp;amp; Co., 1971), pp. 178-91. Some consequences of Macaulay&#039;s views for British Orientalism are discussed in A. J. Arberry, &#039;&#039;British Orientalists&#039;&#039; (London: William Collins, 1943).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Both Caussin and Carlyle, in other words, show us that the Orient need not cause us undue anxiety, so unequal are Oriental to European achievements. The Orientalist and non-Orientalist perspectives coincide here. For within the comparative field that Orientalism became after the philological revolution of the early nineteenth century, and outside it, either in popular stereotypes or in the figures made of the Orient by philosophers like Carlyle and stereotypes like those of Macaulay, the Orient in itself was subordinated intellectually to the West. As material for study or reflection the Orient acquired all the marks of an inherent weakness. It became subject to the vagaries of miscellaneous theories that used it for illustration. Cardinal Newman, no great Orientalist, used Oriental Islam as the basis of lectures in 1853 justifying British intervention in the Crimean War.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;John Henry Newman, &#039;&#039;The Turks in Their Relation to Europe&#039;&#039;, vol. 1 of his &#039;&#039;Historical Sketches&#039;&#039; (1853; reprint ed., London: Longmans, Green &amp;amp; Co., 1920).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cuvier found the Orient useful for his work &#039;&#039;Le Regne animal&#039;&#039; (1816). The Orient was usefully employed as conversation in the various salons of Paris.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Marguerite-Louise Ancelot, &#039;&#039;Salons de Paris, foyers eteints&#039;&#039; (Paris: Jules Tardieu, 1858).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The list of references, borrowings, and transformations that overtook the Oriental idea is immense, but at bottom what the early Orientalist achieved, and what the non-Orientalist in the West exploited, was a reduced model of the Orient suitable for the prevailing, dominant culture and its theoretical (and hard after the theoretical, the practical) exigencies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Occasionally one comes across exceptions, or if not exceptions then interesting complications, to this unequal partnership between East and West. Karl Marx identified the notion of an Asiatic economic system in his 1853 analyses of British rule in India, and then put beside that immediately the human depredation introduced into this system by English colonial interference, rapacity, and outright cruelty. In article after article he returned with increasing conviction to the idea that even in destroying Asia, Britain was making possible there a real social revolution. Marx&#039;s style pushes us right up against the difficulty of reconciling our natural repugnance as fellow creatures to the sufferings of Orientals while their society is being violently transformed with the historical necessity of these transformations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their ancient form of civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath the traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies....&lt;br /&gt;
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England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then, whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world may have for our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, to exclaim with Goethe:&lt;br /&gt;
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Sollte diese Qual uns qualen&lt;br /&gt;
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Da sie unsere Lust vermehrt&lt;br /&gt;
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Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen&lt;br /&gt;
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Timurs Herrschaft aufgeziehrt?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Surveys from Exile&#039;&#039;, ed. David Fernbach (London: Pelican Books, 1973), pp. 306-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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(Should this torture then torment us&lt;br /&gt;
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Since it brings us greater pleasure?&lt;br /&gt;
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Were not through the rule of Timur&lt;br /&gt;
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Souls devoured without measure?)&lt;br /&gt;
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The quotation, which supports Marx&#039;s argument about torment producing pleasure, comes from the &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039; and identifies the sources of Marx&#039;s conceptions about the Orient. These are Romantic and even messianic: as human material the Orient is less important than as an element in a Romantic redemptive project. Marx&#039;s economic analyses are perfectly fitted thus to a standard Orientalist undertaking, even though Marx&#039;s humanity, his sympathy for the misery of people, are clearly engaged. Yet in the end it is the Romantic Orientalist vision that wins out, as Marx&#039;s theoretical socio-economic views become submerged in this classically standard image:&lt;br /&gt;
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England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating--the annihilation of the Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 320.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The idea of regenerating a fundamentally lifeless Asia is a piece of pure Romantic Orientalism, of course, but coming from the same writer who could not easily forget the human suffering involved, the statement is puzzling. It requires us first to ask how Marx&#039;s moral equation of Asiatic loss with the British colonial rule he condemned gets skewed back towards the old inequality between East and West we have so far remarked. Second, it requires us to ask where the human sympathy has gone, into what realm of thought it has disappeared while the Orientalist vision takes its place.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are immediately brought back to the realization that Orientalists, like many other early-nineteenth-century thinkers, conceive of humanity either in large collective terms or in abstract generalities. Orientalists are neither interested in nor capable of discussing individuals; instead artificial entities, perhaps with their roots in Herderian populism, predominate. There are Orientals, Asiatics, Semites, Muslims, Arabs, Jews, races, mentalities, nations, and the like, some of them the product of learned operations of the type found in Renan&#039;s work. Similarly, the age-old distinction between &amp;quot;Europe&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Asia&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; herds beneath very wide labels every possible variety of human plurality, reducing it in the process to one or two terminal, collective abstractions. Marx is no exception. The collective Orient was easier for him to use in illustration of a theory than existential human identities. For between Orient and Occident, as if in a self-fulfilling proclamation, only the vast anonymous collectivity mattered, or existed. No other type of exchange, severely constrained though it may have been, was at hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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That Marx was still able to sense some fellow feeling, to identify even a little with poor Asia, suggests that something happened before the labels took over, before he was dispatched to Goethe as a source of wisdom on the Orient. It is as if the individual mind (Marx&#039;s, in this case) could find a precollective, preofficial individuality in Asia--find and give in to its pressures upon his emotions, feelings, senses--only to give it up when he confronted a more formidable censor in the very vocabulary he found himself forced to employ. What that censor did was to stop and then chase away the sympathy, and this was accompanied by a lapidary definition: Those people, it said, don&#039;t suffer--they are Orientals and hence have to be treated in other ways than the ones you&#039;ve just been using. A wash of sentiment therefore disappeared as it encountered the unshakable definitions built up by Orientalist science, supported by &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; lore (e.g., the &#039;&#039;Diwan&#039;&#039;) supposed to be appropriate for it. The vocabulary of emotion dissipated as it submitted to the lexicographical police action of Orientalist science and even Orientalist art. An experience was dislodged by a dictionary definition: one can almost see that happen in Marx&#039;s Indian essays, where what finally occurs is that something forces him to scurry back to Goethe, there to stand in his protective Orientalized Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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In part, of course, Marx was concerned with vindicating his own theses on socio-economic revolution; but in part also he seems to have had easy resource to a massed body of writing, both internally consolidated by Orientalism and put forward by it beyond the field, that controlled any statement made about the Orient. In Chapter One I tried to show how this control had had a general cultural history in Europe since antiquity; in this chapter my concern has been to show how in the nineteenth century a modern professional terminology and practice were created whose existence dominated discourse about the Orient, whether by Orientalists or non-Orientalists. Sacy and Renan were instances of the way Orientalism fashioned, respectively, a body of texts and a philologically rooted process by which the Orient took on a discursive identity that made it unequal with the West. In using Marx as the case by which a non-Orientalist&#039;s human engagements were first dissolved, then usurped by Orientalist generalizations, we find ourselves having to consider the process of lexicographical and institutional consolidation peculiar to Orientalism. What was this operation, by which whenever you discussed the Orient a formidable mechanism of omnicompetent definitions would present itself as the only one having suitable validity for your discussion? And since we must also show how this mechanism operated specifically (and effectively) upon personal human experiences that otherwise contradicted it, we must also show where &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; went and what forms &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; took, while they lasted.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this is a very difficult and complex operation to describe, at least as difficult and complex as the way any growing discipline crowds out its competitors and acquires authority for its traditions, methods, and institutions, as well as general cultural legitimacy for its statements, personalities, and agencies. But we can simplify a great deal of the sheer narrative complexity of the operation by specifying the kinds of experiences that Orientalism typically employed for its own ends and represented for its wider-than-professional audience. In essence these experiences continue the ones I described as having taken place in Sacy and Renan. But whereas those two scholars represent a wholly bookish Orientalism, since neither claimed any particular expertise with the Orient &#039;&#039;in situ&#039;&#039;, there is another tradition that claimed its legitimacy from the peculiarly compelling fact of residence in, actual existential contact with, the Orient. Anquetil, Jones, the Napoleonic expedition define the tradition&#039;s earliest contours, of course, and these will thereafter retain an unshakable influence on all Orientalist residents. These contours are the ones of European power: to reside in the Orient is to live the privileged life, not of an ordinary citizen, but of a representative European whose empire (French or British) &#039;&#039;contains&#039;&#039; the Orient in its military, economic, and above all, cultural arms. Oriental residence, and its scholarly fruits, are thereby fed into the bookish tradition of the textual attitudes we found in Renan and Sacy: together the two experiences will constitute a formidable library against which no one, not even Marx, can rebel and which no one can avoid.&lt;br /&gt;
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Residence in the Orient involves personal experience and personal testimony to a certain extent. Contributions to the library of Orientalism and to its consolidation depend on how experience and testimony get converted from a purely personal document into the enabling codes of Orientalist science. In other words, within a text there has to take place a metamorphosis from personal to official statement; the record of Oriental residence and experience by a European must shed, or at least minimize, its purely autobiographical and indulgent descriptions in favor of descriptions on which Orientalism in general and later Orientalists in particular can draw, build, and base further scientific observation and description. So one of the things we can watch for is a more explicit conversion than in Marx of personal sentiments about the Orient into official Orientalist statements.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now the situation is enriched and complicated by the fact that during the entire nineteenth century the Orient, and especially the Near Orient, was a favorite place for Europeans to travel in and write about. Moreover, there developed a fairly large body of Oriental-style European literature very frequently based on personal experiences in the Orient. Flaubert comes to mind immediately as one prominent source of such literature; Disraeli, Mark Twain, and Kinglake are three other obvious examples. But what is of interest is the difference between writing that is converted from personal to professional Orientalism, and the second type, also based on residence and personal testimony, which remains &amp;quot;literature&amp;quot; and not science: it is this difference that I now want to explore.&lt;br /&gt;
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To be a European in the Orient &#039;&#039;always&#039;&#039; involves being a consciousness set apart from, and unequal with, its surroundings. But the main thing to note is the intention of this consciousness: What is it in the Orient for? Why does it set itself there even if, as is the case with writers like Scott, Hugo, and Goethe, it travels to the Orient for a very concrete sort of experience without actually leaving Europe? A small number of intentional categories proposed themselves schematically. One: the writer who intends to use his residence for the specific task of providing professional Orientalism with scientific material, who considers his residence a form of scientific observation. Two: the writer who intends the same purpose but is less willing to sacrifice the eccentricity and style of his individual consciousness to impersonal Orientalist definitions. These latter do appear in his work, but they are disentangled from the personal vagaries of style only with difficulty. Three: the writer for whom a real or metaphorical trip to the Orient is the fulfillment of some deeply felt and urgent project. His text therefore is built on a personal aesthetic, fed and informed by the project. In categories two and three there is considerably more space than in one for the play of a personal--or at least non-Orientalist--consciousness; if we take Edward William Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; as the pre-eminent example of category one, Burton&#039;s &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039; as belonging to category two, and Nerval&#039;s &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; as representing category three, the relative spaces left in the text for the exercise and display of authorial presence will be clear.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite their differences, however, these three categories are not so separate from each other as one would imagine. Nor does each category contain &amp;quot;pure&amp;quot; representative types. For example, works in all three categories rely upon the sheer egoistic powers of the European consciousness at their center. In all cases the Orient is &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; the European observer, and what is more, in the category that contains Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Egyptians&#039;&#039;, the Orientalist ego is very much in evidence, however much his style tries for impartial impersonality. Moreover, certain motifs recur consistently in all three types. The Orient as a place of pilgrimage is one; so too is the vision of Orient as spectacle, or &#039;&#039;tableau vivant&#039;&#039;. Every work on the Orient in these categories tries to characterize the place, of course, but what is of greater interest is the extent to which the work&#039;s internal structure is in some measure synonymous with a comprehensive &#039;&#039;interpretation&#039;&#039; (or an attempt at it) of the Orient. Most of the time, not surprisingly, this interpretation is a form of Romantic restructuring of the Orient, a re-vision of it, which restores it redemptively to the present. Every interpretation, every structure created for the Orient, then, is a reinterpretation, a rebuilding of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having said that, we return directly to differences between the categories. Lane&#039;s book on the Egyptians was influential, it was frequently read and cited (by Flaubert among others), and it established its author&#039;s reputation as an eminent figure in Orientalist scholarship. In other words, Lane&#039;s authority was gained, not by virtue simply of what he said, but by virtue of how what he said could be adapted to Orientalism. He is quoted as a source of knowledge about Egypt or Arabia, whereas Burton or Flaubert were and are read for what they tell us about Burton and Flaubert over and above their knowledge of the Orient. The author-function in Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; is less strong than in the other categories because his work was disseminated into the profession, consolidated by it, institutionalized with it. The authorial identity in a work of professional discipline such as his is subordinated to the demands of the field, as well as to the demands of the subject matter. But this is not done simply, or without raising problems.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s classic, &#039;&#039;An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; (1836), was the self-conscious result of a series of works and of two periods of residence in Egypt (1825-1828 and 1833-1835). One uses the phrase &amp;quot;self-conscious&amp;quot; with some emphasis here because the impression Lane wished to give was that his study was a work of immediate and direct, unadorned and neutral, description, whereas in fact it was the product of considerable editing (the work he wrote was not the one he finally published) and also of a considerable variety of quite special efforts. Nothing in his birth or background seemed to destine him for the Orient, except his methodical studiousness and his capacity for classical studies and for mathematics, which somewhat explain the apparent internal neatness of his book. His preface offers a series of interesting clues about what it was that he did for the book. He went to Egypt originally to study Arabic. Then, after making some notes about modern Egypt, he was encouraged to produce a systematic work on the country and its inhabitants by a committee of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. From being a random set of observations the work was changed into a document of useful knowledge, knowledge arranged for and readily accessible to anyone wishing to know the essentials of a foreign society. The preface makes it clear that such knowledge must somehow dispose of pre-existing knowledge, as well as claim for itself a particularly effective character: here Lane is the subtle polemicist. He must show initially that he did what others before him either could not or did not do, and then, that he was able to acquire information both authentic and perfectly correct. And thus his peculiar authority begins to emerge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While Lane dallies in his preface with a Dr. Russell&#039;s &amp;quot;account of the people of Aleppo&amp;quot; (a forgotten work), it is obvious that the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039; is his main antecedent competition. But that work, confined by Lane to a long footnote, is mentioned in contemptuous quotation marks as &amp;quot;the great French work&amp;quot; on Egypt. &#039;&#039;That&#039;&#039; work was at once too philosophically general and too careless, Lane says; and Jacob Burckhardt&#039;s famous study was merely a collection of proverbial Egyptian wisdom, &amp;quot;bad tests of the morality of a people.&amp;quot; Unlike the French and Burckhardt, Lane was able to submerge himself amongst the natives, to live as they did, to conform to their habits, and &amp;quot;to escape exciting, in strangers, any suspicion of ... being a person who had no right to intrude among them.&amp;quot; Lest that imply Lane&#039;s having lost his objectivity, he goes on to say that he conformed only to the &#039;&#039;words&#039;&#039; (his italics) of the Koran, and that he was always aware of his difference from an essentially alien culture.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Edward William Lane, Author&#039;s Preface to &#039;&#039;An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; (1836; reprint ed., London: J. M. Dent, 1936), pp. xx, xxi.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus while one portion of Lane&#039;s identity floats easily in the unsuspecting Muslim sea, a submerged part retains its secret European power, to comment on, acquire, possess everything around it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Orientalist can imitate the Orient without the opposite being true. What he says about the Orient is therefore to be understood as description obtained in a one-way exchange: as &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; spoke and behaved, &#039;&#039;he&#039;&#039; observed and wrote down. His power was to have existed amongst them as a native speaker, as it were, and also as a secret writer. And what he wrote was intended as useful knowledge, not for them, but for Europe and its various disseminative institutions. For that is one thing that Lane&#039;s prose never lets us forget: that ego, the first-person pronoun moving through Egyptian customs, rituals, festivals, infancy, adulthood, and burial rites, is in reality both an Oriental masquerade and an Orientalist device for capturing and conveying valuable, otherwise inaccessible information. As narrator, Lane is both exhibit and exhibitor, winning two confidences at once, displaying two appetites for experience: the Oriental one for engaging companionship (or so it seems) and the Western one for authoritative, useful knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing illustrates this better than the last tripartite episode in the preface. Lane there describes his principal informant and friend, Sheikh Ahmed, as companion and as curiosity. Together the two pretend that Lane is a Muslim; yet only after Ahmed conquers his fear, inspired by Lane&#039;s audacious mimicry, can he go through the motions of praying by his side in a mosque. This final achievement is preceded by two scenes in which Ahmed is portrayed as a bizarre glass-eater and a polygamist. In all three portions of the Sheikh Ahmed episode the distance between the Muslim and Lane increases, even as in the action itself it decreases. As mediator and translator, so to speak, of Muslim behavior, Lane ironically enters the Muslim pattern only far enough to be able to describe it in a sedate English prose. His identity as counterfeit believer and privileged European is the very essence of bad faith, for the latter undercuts the former in no uncertain way. Thus what seems to be factual reporting of what &#039;&#039;one&#039;&#039; rather peculiar Muslim does is made to appear by Lane as the candidly exposed center of &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; Muslim faith. No mind is given by Lane to the betrayal of his friendship with Ahmed or with the others who provide him with information. What matters is that the report seem accurate, general, and dispassionate, that the English reader be convinced that Lane was never infected with heresy or apostasy, and finally, that Lane&#039;s text cancel the human content of its subject matter in favor of its scientific validity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is for all these ends that the book is organized, not simply as the narrative of Lane&#039;s residence in Egypt but as narrative structure overwhelmed by Orientalist restructuring and detail. This, I think, is the central achievement of Lane&#039;s work. In outline and shape &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039; follows the routine of an eighteenth-century novel, say one by Fielding. The book opens with an account of country and setting, followed by chapters on &amp;quot;Personal Characteristics&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Infancy and Early Education.&amp;quot; Twenty-five chapters on such things as festivals, laws, character, industry, magic, and domestic life precede the last section, &amp;quot;Death and Funeral Rites.&amp;quot; On the face of it, Lane&#039;s argument is chronological and developmental. He writes about himself as the observer of scenes that follow the major divisions in the human lifetime: his model is the narrative pattern, as it is in &#039;&#039;Tom Jones&#039;&#039; with the hero&#039;s birth, adventures, marriage, and implied death. Only in Lane&#039;s text the narrative voice is ageless; his subject, however, the modern Egyptian, goes through the individual life-cycle. This reversal, by which a solitary individual endows himself with timeless faculties and imposes on a society and people a personal life-span, is but the first of several operations regulating what might have been the mere narration of travels in foreign parts, turning an artless text into an encyclopedia of exotic display and a playground for Orientalist scrutiny.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lane&#039;s control of his material is not only established through his dramatized double presence (as fake Muslim and genuine Westerner) and his manipulation of narrative voice and subject, but also through his use of detail. Each major section in each chapter is invariably introduced with some unsurprising general observation. For example, &amp;quot;it is generally observed that many of the most remarkable peculiarities in the manners, customs, and character of a nation are attributable to the physical peculiarities of the country.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What follows confirms this easily--the Nile, Egypt&#039;s &amp;quot;remarkably salubrious&amp;quot; climate, the peasant&#039;s &amp;quot;precise&amp;quot; labor. Yet instead of this leading to the next episode in narrative order, the detail is added to, and consequently the narrative fulfillment expected on purely formal grounds is not given. In other words, although the gross outlines of Lane&#039;s text conform to the narrative and causal sequence of birth-life-death, the special detail introduced during the sequence itself foils narrative movement. From a general observation, to a delineation of some aspect of Egyptian character, to an account of Egyptian childhood, adolescence, maturity, and senescence, Lane is always there with great detail to &#039;&#039;prevent&#039;&#039; smooth transitions. Shortly after we hear about Egypt&#039;s salubrious climate, for instance, we are informed that few Egyptians live beyond a few years, because of fatal illness, the absence of medical aid, and oppressive summer weather. Thereafter we are told that the heat &amp;quot;excites the Egyptian [an unqualified generalization] to intemperance in sensual enjoyments,&amp;quot; and soon are bogged down in descriptions, complete with charts and line drawings, of Cairene architecture, decoration, fountains, and locks. When a narrative strain re-emerges, it is clearly only as a formality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What prevents narrative order, at the very same time that narrative order is the dominating fiction of Lane&#039;s text, is sheer, overpowering, monumental description. Lane&#039;s objective is to make Egypt and the Egyptians totally visible, to keep nothing hidden from his reader, to deliver the Egyptians without depth, in swollen detail. As rapporteur his propensity is for sadomasochistic colossal tidbits: the self-multilation of dervishes, the cruelty of judges, the blending of religion with licentiousness among Muslims, the excess of libidinous passions, and so on. Yet no matter how odd and perverse the event and how lost we become in its dizzying detail, Lane is ubiquitous, his job being to reassemble the pieces and enable us to move on, albeit jerkily. To a certain extent he does this by just being a European who can discursively control the passions and excitements to which the Muslims are unhappily subject. But to an even greater extent, Lane&#039;s capacity to rein in his profuse subject matter with an unyielding bridle of discipline and detachment depends on his cold distance from Egyptian life and Egyptian productivity.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main symbolic moment occurs at the beginning of chapter 6, &amp;quot;Domestic Life--Continued.&amp;quot; By now Lane has adopted the narrative convention of taking a walk through Egyptian life, and having reached the end of his tour of the public rooms and habits of an Egyptian household (the social and spatial worlds are mixed together by him), he begins to discuss the intimate side of home life. Immediately, he &amp;quot;must give some account of marriage and the marriage-ceremonies.&amp;quot; As usual, the account begins with a general observation: to abstain from marriage &amp;quot;when a man has attained a sufficient age, and when there is no just impediment, is esteemed by the Egyptians improper, and even disreputable.&amp;quot; Without transition this observation is applied by Lane to himself, and he is found guilty. For one long paragraph he then recounts the pressures placed on him to get married, which he unflinchingly refuses. Finally, after a native friend even offers to arrange a &#039;&#039;mariage de convenance&#039;&#039;, also refused by Lane, the whole sequence is abruptly terminated with a period and a dash.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 160-1. The standard biography of Lane, published in 1877, was by his great-nephew, Stanley Lane-Poole. There is a sympathetic account of Lane by A. J. Arberry in his &#039;&#039;Oriental Essays: Portraits of Seven Scholars&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 87-121.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He resumes his general discussion with another general observation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only do we have here a typical Lane-esque interruption of the main narrative with untidy detail, we have also a firm and literal disengagement of the author from the productive processes of Oriental society. The mini-narrative of his refusal to join the society he describes concludes with a dramatic hiatus: &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; story cannot continue, he seems to be saying, so long as he does not enter the intimacy of domestic life, and so he drops from sight as a candidate for it. He literally abolishes himself as a human subject by refusing to marry into human society. Thus he preserves his authoritative identity as a mock participant and bolsters the objectivity of his narrative. If we already knew that Lane was a non-Muslim, we now know too that in order for him to become an Orientalist--instead of an Oriental--he had to deny himself the sensual enjoyments of domestic life. Moreover, he had also to avoid dating himself by entering the human life-cycle. Only in this negative way could he retain his timeless authority as observer.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s choice was between living without &amp;quot;inconvenience and discomfort&amp;quot; and accomplishing his study of the modern Egyptians. The result of his choice is plainly to have made possible his definition of the Egyptians, since had he become one of them, his perspective would no longer have been antiseptically and asexually lexicographical. In two important and urgent ways, therefore, Lane gains scholarly credibility and legitimacy. First, by interfering with the ordinary narrative course of human life: this is the function of his colossal detail, in which the observing intelligence of a foreigner can introduce and then piece together massive information. The Egyptians are disemboweled for exposition, so to speak, then put together admonishingly by Lane. Second, by disengaging from the generation of Egyptian-Oriental life: this is the function of his subduing his animal appetite in the interest of disseminating information, not in and for Egypt, but in and for European learning at large. To have achieved both the imposition of a scholarly will upon an untidy reality and an intentional shift away from the place of his residence to the scene of his scholarly reputation is the source of his great fame in the annals of Orientalism. Useful knowledge such as his could only have been obtained, formulated, and diffused by such denials.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s two other major works, his never-completed Arabic lexicon and his uninspired translation of the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039;, consolidated the system of knowledge inaugurated by &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;. In both of his later works his individuality has disappeared entirely as a creative presence, as of course has the very idea of a narrative work. Lane the man appears only in the official persona of annotator and retranslator (the &#039;&#039;Nights&#039;&#039;) and impersonal lexicographer. From being an author contemporary with his subject matter, Lane became--as Orientalist scholar of classical Arabic and classical Islam--its survivor. But it is the form of that survival which is of interest. For Lane&#039;s legacy as a scholar mattered not to the Orient, of course, but to the institutions and agencies of his European society. And these were either academic--the official Orientalist societies, institutions, and agencies--or they were extra-academic in very particular ways, figuring in the work of later Europeans resident in the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we read Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, not as a source of Oriental lore, but as a work directed towards the growing organization of academic Orientalism, we will find it illuminating. The subordination of genetic ego to scholarly authority in Lane corresponds exactly to the increased specialization and institutionalization of knowledge about the Orient represented by the various Oriental societies. The Royal Asiatic Society was founded a decade before Lane&#039;s book appeared, but its committee of correspondence--whose &amp;quot;objects were to receive intelligence and inquiries relating to the arts, sciences, literature, history and antiquities&amp;quot; of the Orient&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederick Eden Pargiter, ed., &#039;&#039;Centenary Volume of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1823-1923&#039;&#039; (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), p. x.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--was the structural recipient of Lane&#039;s fund of information, processed and formulated as it was. As for the diffusion of such work as Lane&#039;s, there were not only the various societies of useful knowledge but also, in an age when the original Orientalist program of aiding commerce and trade with the Orient had become exhausted, the specialized learned societies whose products were works displaying the potential (if not actual) values of disinterested scholarship. Thus, a program of the Societe asiatique states:&lt;br /&gt;
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To compose or to print grammars, dictionaries, and other elementary books recognized as useful or indispensable for the study of those languages taught by appointed professors [of Oriental languages]; by subscriptions or by other means to contribute to the publication of the same kind of work undertaken in France or abroad; to acquire manuscripts, or to copy either completely or in part those that are to be found in Europe, to translate or to make extracts from them, to multiply their number by reproducing them either by engraving or by lithography; to make it possible for the authors of useful works on geography, history, the arts, and the sciences to acquire the means for the public to enjoy the fruits of their nocturnal labors; to draw the attention of the public, by means of a periodic collection devoted to Asiatic literature, to the scientific, literary, or poetic productions of the Orient and those of the same sort that regularly are produced in Europe, to those facts about the Orient that could be relevant to Europe, to those discoveries and works of all kinds of which the Oriental peoples could become the subject: these are the objectives proposed for and by the Societe asiatique.&lt;br /&gt;
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Orientalism organized itself systematically as the acquisition of Oriental material and its regulated dissemination as a form of specialized knowledge. One copied and printed works of grammar, one acquired original texts, one multiplied their number and diffused them widely, even dispensed knowledge in periodic form. It was into and for this system that Lane wrote his work, and sacrificed his ego. The mode in which his work persisted in the archives of Orientalism was provided for also. There was to be a &amp;quot;museum,&amp;quot; Sacy said,&lt;br /&gt;
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a vast depot of objects of all kinds, of drawings, of original books, maps, accounts of voyages, all offered to those who wish to give themselves to the study of [the Orient]; in such a way that each of these students would be able to feel himself transported as if by enchantment into the midst of, say, a Mongolian tribe or of the Chinese race, whichever he might have made the object of his studies.... It is possible to say ... that after the publication of elementary books on ... the Oriental languages, nothing is more important than to lay the cornerstone of this museum, which I consider a living commentary upon and interpretation [&#039;&#039;truchement&#039;&#039;] of the dictionaries.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Societe asiatique: Livre du centenaire, 1822-1922&#039;&#039; (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1922), pp. 5-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Truchement&#039;&#039; derives nicely from the Arabic &#039;&#039;turjaman&#039;&#039;, meaning &amp;quot;interpreter,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;intermediary,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;spokesman.&amp;quot; On the one hand, Orientalism acquired the Orient as literally and as widely as possible; on the other, it domesticated this knowledge to the West, filtering it through regulatory codes, classifications, specimen cases, periodical reviews, dictionaries, grammars, commentaries, editions, translations, all of which together formed a simulacrum of the Orient and reproduced it materially in the West, for the West. The Orient, in short, would be converted from the personal, sometimes garbled testimony of intrepid voyagers and residents into impersonal definition by a whole array of scientific workers. It would be converted from the consecutive experience of individual research into a sort of imaginary museum without walls, where everything gathered from the huge distances and varieties of Oriental culture became categorically &#039;&#039;Oriental&#039;&#039;. It would be reconverted, restructured from the bundle of fragments brought back piecemeal by explorers, expeditions, commissions, armies, and merchants into lexicographical, bibliographical, departmentalized, and &#039;&#039;textualized&#039;&#039; Orientalist sense. By the middle of the nineteenth century the Orient had become, as Disraeli said, a career, one in which one could remake and restore not only the Orient but also oneself.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;IV.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Pilgrims and Pilgrimages, British and French&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Every European traveler or resident in the Orient has had to protect himself from its unsettling influences. Someone like Lane ultimately rescheduled and resituated the Orient when he came to write about it. The eccentricities of Oriental life, with its odd calendars, its exotic spatial configurations, its hopelessly strange languages, its seemingly perverse morality, were reduced considerably when they appeared as a series of detailed items presented in a normative European prose style. It is correct to say that in Orientalizing the Orient, Lane not only defined but edited it; he excised from it what, in addition to his own human sympathies, might have ruffled the European sensibility. In most cases, the Orient seemed to have offended sexual propriety; everything about the Orient--or at least Lane&#039;s Orient-in-Egypt--exuded dangerous sex, threatened hygiene and domestic seemliness with an excessive &amp;quot;freedom of intercourse,&amp;quot; as Lane put it more irrepressibly than usual.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there were other sorts of threats than sex. All of them wore away the European discreteness and rationality of time, space, and personal identity. In the Orient one suddenly confronted unimaginable antiquity, inhuman beauty, boundless distance. These could be put to use more innocently, as it were, if they were thought and written about, not directly experienced. In Byron&#039;s &amp;quot;Giaour,&amp;quot; in the &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039;, in Hugo&#039;s &#039;&#039;Orientales&#039;&#039;, the Orient is a form of release, a place of original opportunity, whose keynote was struck in Goethe&#039;s &amp;quot;Hegire&amp;quot;--&lt;br /&gt;
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Nord und West Sud zersplittern,&lt;br /&gt;
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Throne bersten, Reiche zittern,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fluchte du, in reinen Osten&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Patriarchenluft zu kosten!&lt;br /&gt;
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(North, West, and South disintegrate,&lt;br /&gt;
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Thrones burst, empires tremble.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fly away, and in the pure East&lt;br /&gt;
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Taste the Patriarchs&#039; air.)&lt;br /&gt;
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One always &#039;&#039;returned&#039;&#039; to the Orient--&amp;quot;Dort, im Reinen und in Rechten/Will ich menschlichen Geschlechten/In des Ursprungs Tiefe dringen&amp;quot; (There in purity and righteousness will I go back to the profound origins of the human race)--seeing it as completion and confirmation of everything one had imagined:&lt;br /&gt;
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Gottes ist der Orient!&lt;br /&gt;
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Gottes ist der Okzident!&lt;br /&gt;
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Nord und sudliches Gelande&lt;br /&gt;
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Ruht im Frieden seiner Hande.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, &#039;&#039;Westostlicher Diwan&#039;&#039; (1819; reprint ed., Munich: Wilhelm Golmann, 1958), pp. 8-9, 12. Sacy&#039;s name is invoked with veneration in Goethe&#039;s apparatus for the &#039;&#039;Diwan&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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(God is the Orient!&lt;br /&gt;
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God is the Occident!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Northern and southern lands&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Repose in the peace of His hands.)&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orient, with its poetry, its atmosphere, its possibilities, was represented by poets like Hafiz--&#039;&#039;unbegrenzt&#039;&#039;, boundless, Goethe said, older and younger than we Europeans. And for Hugo, in &amp;quot;Cri de guerre du mufti&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;La Douleur du pacha&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Victor Hugo, &#039;&#039;Les Orientales&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres poetiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Pierre Albouy (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 1: 616-18.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the fierceness and the inordinate melancholy of Orientals was mediated, not by actual fear for life or disoriented lostness, but by Volney and George Sale, whose learned work translated barbarous splendor into usable information for the sublimely talented poet.&lt;br /&gt;
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What Orientalists like Lane, Sacy, Renan, Volney, Jones (not to mention the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;), and other pioneers made available, the literary crowd exploited. We must recall now our earlier discussion of the three types of work dealing with the Orient and based upon actual residence there. The rigorous exigencies of knowledge purged from Orientalist writing an authorial sensibility: hence Lane&#039;s self-excision, and hence also the first kind of work we enumerated. As for types two and three, the self is there prominently, subservient to a voice whose job it is to dispense real knowledge (type two), or dominating and mediating everything we are told about the Orient (type three). Yet from one end of the nineteenth century to the other--after Napoleon, that is--the Orient was a place of pilgrimage, and every major work belonging to a genuine if not always to an academic Orientalism took its form, style, and intention from the idea of pilgrimage there. In this idea as in so many of the other forms of Orientalist writing we have been discussing, the Romantic idea of restorative reconstruction (natural supernaturalism) is the principal source.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every pilgrim sees things his own way, but there are limits to what a pilgrimage can be for, to what shape and form it can take, to what truths it reveals. All pilgrimages to the Orient passed through, or had to pass through, the Biblical lands; most of them in fact were attempts either to relive or to liberate from the large, incredibly fecund Orient some portion of Judeo-Christian/Greco-Roman actuality. For these pilgrims the Orientalized Orient, the Orient of Orientalist scholars, was a gauntlet to be run, just as the Bible, the Crusades, Islam, Napoleon, and Alexander were redoubtable predecessors to be reckoned with. Not only does a learned Orient inhibit the pilgrim&#039;s musings and private fantasies; its very antecedence places barriers between the contemporary traveler and his writing, unless, as was the case with Nerval and Flaubert in their use of Lane, Orientalist work is severed from the library and caught in the aesthetic project. Another inhibition is that Orientalist writing is too circumscribed by the official requirements of Orientalist learning. A pilgrim like Chateaubriand claimed insolently that he undertook his voyages exclusively for his own sake: &amp;quot;j&#039;allais chercher des images: voila tout.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Francois-Rene de Chateaubriand, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres romanesques et voyages&#039;&#039;, ed. Maurice Regard (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 2: 702.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Flaubert, Vigny, Nerval, Kinglake, Disraeli, Burton, all undertook their pilgrimages in order to dispel the mustiness of the pre-existing Orientalist archive. Their writing was to be a fresh new repository of Oriental experience--but, as we shall see, even this project usually (but not always) resolved itself into the reductionism of the Orientalistic. The reasons are complex, and they have very much to do with the nature of the pilgrim, his mode of writing, and the intentional form of his work.&lt;br /&gt;
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What was the Orient for the individual traveler in the nineteenth century? Consider first the differences between an English speaker and a French speaker. For the former the Orient was India, of course, an actual British possession; to pass through the Near Orient was therefore to pass en route to a major colony. Already, then, the room available for imaginative play was limited by the realities of administration, territorial legality, and executive power. Scott, Kinglake, Disraeli, Warburton, Burton, and even George Eliot (in whose &#039;&#039;Daniel Deronda&#039;&#039; the Orient has plans made for it) are writers, like Lane himself and Jones before him, for whom the Orient was defined by material possession, by a material imagination, as it were. England had defeated Napoleon, evicted France: what the English mind surveyed was an imperial domain which by the 1880s had become an unbroken patch of British-held territory, from the Mediterranean to India. To write about Egypt, Syria, or Turkey, as much as traveling in them, was a matter of touring the realm of political will, political management, political definition. The territorial imperative was extremely compelling, even for so unrestrained a writer as Disraeli, whose &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; is not merely an Oriental lark but an exercise in the astute political management of actual forces on actual territories.&lt;br /&gt;
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In contrast, the French pilgrim was imbued with a sense of acute loss in the Orient. He came there to a place in which France, unlike Britain, had no sovereign presence. The Mediterranean echoed with the sounds of French defeats, from the Crusades to Napoleon. What was to become known as &amp;quot;la mission civilisatrice&amp;quot; began in the nineteenth century as a political second-best to Britain&#039;s presence. Consequently French pilgrims from Volney on planned and projected for, imagined, ruminated about places that were principally &#039;&#039;in their minds&#039;&#039;; they constructed schemes for a typically French, perhaps even a European, concert in the Orient, which of course they supposed would be orchestrated by them. Theirs was the Orient of memories, suggestive ruins, forgotten secrets, hidden correspondences, and an almost virtuosic style of being, an Orient whose highest literary forms would be found in Nerval and Flaubert, both of whose work was solidly fixed in an imaginative, unrealizable (except aesthetically) dimension.&lt;br /&gt;
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This was also true to a certain extent of scholarly French travelers in the Orient. Most of them were interested in the Biblical past or in the Crusades, as Henri Bordeaux has argued in his &#039;&#039;Voyageurs d&#039;Orient&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Henri Bordeaux, &#039;&#039;Voyageurs d&#039;Orient: Des pelerins aux meharistes de Palmyre&#039;&#039; (Paris: Plon, 1926). I have found useful the theoretical ideas about pilgrims and pilgrimages contained in Victor Turner, &#039;&#039;Dramas&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Fields&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society&#039;&#039; (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 166-230.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; To these names we must add (at Hassan al-Nouty&#039;s suggestion) the names of Oriental Semiticists, including Quatremere; Saulcy, the explorer of the Dead Sea; Renan as Phoenician archaeologist; Judas, the student of Phoenician languages; Catafago and Defremery, who studied the Ansarians, Ismailis, and Seljuks; Clermont-Ganneau, who explored Judea; and the Marquis de Vogue, whose work centered on Palmyrian epigraphy. In addition there was the whole school of Egyptologists descended from Champollion and Mariette, a school that would later include Maspero and Legrain. As an index of the difference between British realities and French fantasies, it is worthwhile recalling the words in Cairo of the painter Ludovic Lepic, who commented sadly in 1884 (two years after the British occupation had begun): &amp;quot;L&#039;Orient est mort au Caire.&amp;quot; Only Renan, ever the realistic racist, condoned the British suppression of Arabi&#039;s nationalist rebellion, which, out of his greater wisdom, he said was a &amp;quot;disgrace to civilization.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hassan al-Nouty, &#039;&#039;Le Proche-Orient dans la litterature francaise de Nerval a Barres&#039;&#039; (Paris: Nizet, 1958), pp. 47-8, 277, 272.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Volney and Napoleon, the nineteenth-century French pilgrims did not seek a scientific so much as an exotic yet especially attractive reality. This is obviously true of the literary pilgrims, beginning with Chateaubriand, who found in the Orient a locale sympathetic to their private myths, obsessions, and requirements. Here we notice how all the pilgrims, but especially the French ones, exploit the Orient in their work so as in some urgent way to justify their existential vocation. Only when there is some additional cognitive purpose in writing about the Orient does the outpouring of self seem more under control. Lamartine, for instance, writes about himself, and also about France as a power in the Orient; that second enterprise mutes and finally controls imperatives heaped upon his style by &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; soul, &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; memory, and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; imagination. No pilgrim, French or English, could so ruthlessly dominate his self or his subject as Lane did. Even Burton and T. E. Lawrence, of whom the former fashioned a deliberately Muslim pilgrimage and the latter what he called a reverse pilgrimage &#039;&#039;away&#039;&#039; from Mecca, delivered masses of historical, political, and social Orientalism that were never as free of their egos as Lane&#039;s were of his. This is why Burton, Lawrence, and Charles Doughty occupy a middle position between Lane and Chateaubriand.&lt;br /&gt;
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Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire de Paris a Jerusalem&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;et de Jerusalem a Paris&#039;&#039; (1810-1811) records the details of a journey undertaken in 1805-1806, after he had traveled in North America. Its many hundreds of pages bear witness to its author&#039;s admission that &amp;quot;je parle eternellement de moi,&amp;quot; so much so that Stendhal, no self-abnegating writer himself, could find Chateaubriand&#039;s failure as a knowledgeable traveler to be the result of his &amp;quot;stinking egotism.&amp;quot; He brought a very heavy load of personal objectives and suppositions to the Orient, unloaded them there, and proceeded thereafter to push people, places, and ideas around in the Orient as if nothing could resist his imperious imagination. Chateaubriand came to the Orient as a constructed &#039;&#039;figure&#039;&#039;, not as a true self. For him Bonaparte was the last Crusader; he in turn was &amp;quot;the last Frenchman who left his country to travel in the Holy Land with the ideas, the goals, and the sentiments of a pilgrim of former times.&amp;quot; But there were other reasons. Symmetry: having been to the New World and seen its monuments of nature, he needed to complete his circle of studies by visiting the Orient and its monuments of knowledge: as he had studied Roman and Celtic antiquity, all that was left for him was the ruins of Athens, Memphis, and Carthage. Self-completion: he needed to replenish his stock of images. Confirmation of the importance of the religious spirit: &amp;quot;religion is a kind of universal language understood by all men,&amp;quot; and where better to observe it than there in the Orient, even in lands where a comparatively low religion like Islam held sway. Above all, the need to see things, not as they were, but as Chateaubriand supposed they were: the Koran was &amp;quot;le livre de Mahomet&amp;quot;; it contained &amp;quot;ni principe de civilisation, ni precepte qui puisse elever le caractere.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;This book,&amp;quot; he continued, more or less freely inventing as he went along, &amp;quot;preaches neither hatred of tyranny nor love of liberty.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chateaubriand, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 2: 702 and note, 1684, 769-70, 769, 701, 808, 908.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To so preciously constituted a figure as Chateaubriand, the Orient was a decrepit canvas awaiting his restorative efforts. The Oriental Arab was &amp;quot;civilized man fallen again into a savage state&amp;quot;: no wonder, then, that as he watched Arabs trying to speak French, Chateaubriand felt like Robinson Crusoe thrilled by hearing his parrot speak for the first time. True, there were places like Bethlehem (whose etymological meaning Chateaubriand got completely wrong) in which one found again some semblance of real--that is, European--civilization, but those were few and far between. Everywhere, one encountered Orientals, Arabs whose civilization, religion, and manners were so low, barbaric, and antithetical as to merit reconquest. The Crusades, he argued, were not aggression; they were a just Christian counterpart to Omar&#039;s arrival in Europe. Besides, he added, even if the Crusades in their modern or original form were aggression, the issue they raised transcended such questions of ordinary mortality:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Crusades were not only about the deliverance of the Holy Sepulchre, but more about knowing which would win on the earth, a cult that was civilization&#039;s enemy, systematically favorable to ignorance [this was Islam, of course], to despotism, to slavery, or a cult that had caused to reawaken in modern people the genius of a sage antiquity, and had abolished base servitude?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 1011, 979, 990, 1052.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the first significant mention of an idea that will acquire an almost unbearable, next to mindless authority in European writing: the theme of Europe teaching the Orient the meaning of liberty, which is an idea that Chateaubriand and everyone after him believed that Orientals, and especially Muslims, knew nothing about.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of liberty, they know nothing; of propriety, they have none: force is their God. When they go for long periods without seeing conquerors who do heavenly justice, they have the air of soldiers without a leader, citizens without legislators, and a family without a father.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1069.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Already in 1810 we have a European talking like Cromer in 1910, arguing that Orientals require conquest, and finding it no paradox that a Western conquest of the Orient was not conquest after all, but liberty. Chateaubriand puts the whole idea in the Romantic redemptive terms of a Christian mission to revive a dead world, to quicken in it a sense of its own potential, one which only a European can discern underneath a lifeless and degenerate surface. For the traveler this means that he must use the Old Testament and the Gospels as his guide in Palestine;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1031.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; only in this way can the apparent degeneration of the modern Orient be gotten beyond. Yet Chateaubriand senses no irony in the fact that his tour and his vision will reveal nothing to him about the modern Oriental and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; destiny. What matters about the Orient is what it lets happen to Chateaubriand, what it allows his spirit to do, what it permits him to reveal about himself, his ideas, his expectations. The liberty that so concerns him is no more than his own release from the Orient&#039;s hostile wastes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Where his release allows him to go is directly back into the realm of imagination and imaginative interpretation. Description of the Orient is obliterated by the designs and patterns foisted upon it by the imperial ego, which makes no secret of its powers. If in Lane&#039;s prose we watch the ego disappear so that the Orient may appear in all its realistic detail, in Chateaubriand the ego dissolves itself in the contemplation of wonders it creates, and then is reborn, stronger than ever, more able to savor its powers and enjoy its interpretations.&lt;br /&gt;
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When one travels in Judea, at first a great ennui grips the heart; but when, passing from one solitary place to another, space stretches out without limits before you, slowly the ennui dissipates, and one feels a secret terror, which, far from depressing the soul, gives it courage and elevates one&#039;s native genius. Extraordinary things are disclosed from all parts of an earth worked over by miracles: the burning sun, the impetuous eagle, the sterile fig tree; all of poetry, all the scenes from Scripture are present there. Every name encloses a mystery; every grotto declares the future; every summit retains within it the accents of a prophet. God Himself has spoken from these shores: the arid torrents, the riven rocks, the open tombs attest to the prodigy; the desert still seems struck dumb with terror, and one would say that it has still not been able to break the silence since it heard the voice of the eternal.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 999.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The process of thought in this passage is revealing. An experience of Pascalian terror does not merely reduce one&#039;s self-confidence, it miraculously stimulates it. The barren landscape stands forth like an illuminated text presenting itself to the scrutiny of a very strong, refortified ego. Chateaubriand has transcended the abject, if frightening, reality of the contemporary Orient so that he may stand in an original and creative relationship to it. By the end of the passage he is no longer a modern man but a visionary seer more or less contemporary with God; if the Judean desert has been silent since God spoke there, it is Chateaubriand who can hear the silence, understand its meaning, and--to his reader--make the desert speak again.&lt;br /&gt;
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The great gifts of sympathetic intuition which had enabled Chateaubriand to represent and interpret North American mysteries in &#039;&#039;Rene&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Atala&#039;&#039;, as well as Christianity in &#039;&#039;Le Genie du Christianisme&#039;&#039;, are aroused to even greater feats of interpretation during the &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039;. No longer is the author dealing with natural primitivity and romantic sentiment: here he is dealing with eternal creativity and divine originality themselves, for it is in the Biblical Orient that they were first deposited, and they have remained there in unmediated and latent form. Of course, they cannot be simply grasped; they must be aspired to and achieved by Chateaubriand. And it is this ambitious purpose that the &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039; is made to serve, just as in the text Chateaubriand&#039;s ego must be reconstructed radically enough to get the job done. Unlike Lane, Chateaubriand attempts to &#039;&#039;consume&#039;&#039; the Orient. He not only appropriates it, he represents and speaks for it, not in history but beyond history, in the timeless dimension of a completely healed world, where men and lands, God and men, are as one. In Jerusalem, therefore, at the center of his vision and at the ultimate end of his pilgrimage, he grants himself a sort of total reconciliation with the Orient, the Orient as Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Greek, Persian, Roman, and finally French. He is moved by the plight of the Jews, but he judges that they too serve to illuminate his general vision, and as a further benefit, they give the necessary poignance to his Christian vindictiveness. God, he says, has chosen a new people, and it is not the Jews.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 1126-27, 1049.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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He makes some other concessions to terrestrial reality, however. If Jerusalem is booked into his itinerary as its final extraterrestrial goal, Egypt provides him with material for a political excursus. His ideas about Egypt supplement his pilgrimage nicely. The magnificent Nile Delta moves him to assert that&lt;br /&gt;
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I found only the memories of my glorious country worthy of those magnificent plains; I saw the remains of monuments of a new civilization, brought to the banks of the Nile by the genius of France.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 1137.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But these ideas are put in a nostalgic mode because in Egypt Chateaubriand believes he can equate the absence of France with the absence of a free government ruling a happy people. Besides, after Jerusalem, Egypt appears to be only a kind of spiritual anticlimax. After political commentary on its sorry state, Chateaubriand asks himself the routine question about &amp;quot;difference&amp;quot; as a result of historical development: how can this degenerate stupid mob of &amp;quot;Musulmans&amp;quot; have come to inhabit the same land whose vastly different owners so impressed Herodotus and Diodorus?&lt;br /&gt;
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This is a fitting valedictory to Egypt, which he leaves for Tunis, Carthaginian ruins, and finally, home. Yet he does one last thing of note in Egypt: unable to do more than look at the Pyramids from a distance, he takes the trouble to send an emissary there, to have him inscribe his (Chateaubriand&#039;s) name on the stone, adding for our benefit, &amp;quot;one has to fulfill all the little obligations of a pious traveler.&amp;quot; We would not ordinarily give much more than amused attention to this charming bit of touristic banality. As a preparation, however, for the very last page of the &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039;, it appears more important than at first glance. Reflecting on his twenty-year project to study &amp;quot;tous les hasards et tous les chagrins&amp;quot; as an exile, Chateaubriand notes elegiacally how every one of his books has been in fact a kind of prolongation of his existence. A man with neither a home nor the possibility of acquiring one, he finds himself now well past his youth. If heaven accords him eternal rest, he says, he promises to dedicate himself in silence to erecting a &amp;quot;monument a ma patrie.&amp;quot; What he is left with on earth, however, is his writing, which, if his name will live, has been enough, and if it will not live, has been too much.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 1148, 1214.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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These closing lines send us back to Chateaubriand&#039;s interest in getting his name inscribed on the Pyramids. We will have understood that his egoistic Oriental memoirs supply us with a constantly demonstrated, an indefatigably performed experience of self. Writing was an act of life for Chateaubriand, for whom nothing, not even a distant piece of stone, must remain scriptively untouched by him if he was to stay alive. If the order of Lane&#039;s narrative was to be violated by scientific authority and enormous detail, then Chateaubriand&#039;s was to be transformed into the asserted will of an egoistic, highly volatile individual. Whereas Lane would sacrifice his ego to the Orientalist canon, Chateaubriand would make everything he said about the Orient wholly dependent on his ego. Yet neither writer could conceive of his posterity as continuing on fruitfully after him. Lane entered the impersonality of a technical discipline: his work would be used, but not as a human document. Chateaubriand, on the other hand, saw that his writing, like the token inscription of his name on a Pyramid, would signify his self; if not, if he had not succeeded in prolonging his life by writing, it would be merely excessive, superfluous.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if all travelers to the Orient after Chateaubriand and Lane have taken their work into account (in some cases, even to the extent of copying from them verbatim), their legacy embodies the fate of Orientalism and the options to which it was limited. Either one wrote science like Lane or personal utterance like Chateaubriand. The problems with the former were its impersona Western confidence that descriptions of general, collective phenomena were possible, and its tendency to make realities not so much out of the Orient as out of its own observations. The problem with personal utterance was that it inevitably retreated into a position equating the Orient with private fantasy, even if that fantasy was of a very high order indeed, aesthetically speaking. In both cases, of course, Orientalism enjoyed a powerful influence on how the Orient was described and characterized. But what that influence always prevented, even until today, was some sense of the Orient that was neither impossibly general nor imperturbably private. To look into Orientalism for a lively sense of an Oriental&#039;s human or even social reality--as a contemporary inhabitant of the modern world--is to look in vain.&lt;br /&gt;
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The influence of the two options I have described, Lane&#039;s and Chateaubriand&#039;s, British and French, is a great deal of the reason for this omission. The growth of knowledge, particularly specialized knowledge, is a very slow process. Far from being merely additive or cumulative, the growth of knowledge is a process of selective accumulation, displacement, deletion, rearrangement, and insistence within what has been called a research consensus. The legitimacy of such knowledge as Orientalism was during the nineteenth century stemmed not from religious authority, as had been the case before the Enlightenment, but from what we can call the restorative citation of antecedent authority. Beginning with Sacy, the learned Orientalist&#039;s attitude was that of a scientist who surveyed a series of textual fragments, which he thereafter edited and arranged as a restorer of old sketches might put a series of them together for the cumulative picture they implicitly represent. Consequently, amongst themselves Orientalists treat each other&#039;s work in the same citationary way. Burton, for example, would deal with the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039; or with Egypt indirectly, &#039;&#039;through&#039;&#039; Lane&#039;s work, by citing his predecessor, challenging him even though he was granting him very great authority. Nerval&#039;s own voyage to the Orient was by way of Lamartine&#039;s, and the latter&#039;s by way of Chateaubriand. In short, as a form of growing knowledge Orientalism resorted mainly to citations of predecessor scholars in the field for its nutriment. Even when new materials came his way, the Orientalist judged them by borrowing from predecessors (as scholars so often do) their perspectives, ideologies, and guiding theses. In a fairly strict way, then, Orientalists after Sacy and Lane rewrote Sacy and Lane; after Chateaubriand, pilgrims rewrote him. From these complex rewritings the actualities of the modern Orient were systematically excluded, especially when gifted pilgrims like Nerval and Flaubert preferred Lane&#039;s descriptions to what their eyes and minds showed them immediately.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the system of knowledge about the Orient, the Orient is less a place than a &#039;&#039;topos&#039;&#039;, a set of references, a congeries of characteristics, that seems to have its origin in a quotation, or a fragment of a text, or a citation from someone&#039;s work on the Orient, or some bit of previous imagining, or an amalgam of all these. Direct observation or circumstantial description of the Orient are the fictions presented by writing on the Orient, yet invariably these are totally secondary to systematic tasks of another sort. In Lamartine, Nerval, and Flaubert, the Orient is a re-presentation of canonical material guided by an aesthetic and executive will capable of producing interest in the reader. Yet in all three writers, Orientalism or some aspect of it is asserted, even though, as I said earlier, the narrative consciousness is given a very large role to play. What we shall see is that for all its eccentric individuality, this narrative consciousness will end up by being aware, like Bouvard and Pecuchet, that pilgrimage is after all a form of copying.&lt;br /&gt;
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When he began his trip to the Orient in 1833, Lamartine did so, he said, as something he had always dreamed about: &amp;quot;un voyage en Orient [etait] comme un grand acte de ma vie interieure.&amp;quot; He is a bundle of predispositions, sympathies, biases: he hates the Romans and Carthage, and loves Jews, Egyptians, and Hindus, whose Dante he claims he will become. Armed with a formal verse &amp;quot;Adieu&amp;quot; to France, in which he lists everything that he plans to do in the Orient, he embarks for the East. At first everything he encounters either confirms his poetic predictions or realizes his propensity for analogy. Lady Hester Stanhope is the Circe of the desert; the Orient is the &amp;quot;patrie de mon imagination&amp;quot;; the Arabs are a primitive people; Biblical poetry is engraved on the land of Lebanon; the Orient testifies to the attractive largeness of Asia and to Greece&#039;s comparative smallness. Soon after he reaches Palestine, however, he becomes the incorrigible maker of an imaginary Orient. He alleges that the plains of Canaan appear to best advantage in the works of Poussin and Lorrain. From being a &amp;quot;translation,&amp;quot; as he called it earlier, his voyage is now turned into a prayer, which exercises his memory, soul, and heart more than it does his eyes, mind, or spirit.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alphonse de Lamartine, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; (1835; reprint ed., Paris: Hachette, 1887), 1: 10, 48-9, 179, 178, 148, 189, 118, 245-6, 251.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This candid announcement completely unlooses Lamartine&#039;s analogic and reconstructive (and undisciplined) zeal. Christianity is a religion of imagination and recollection, and since Lamartine considers that he typifies the pious believer, he indulges himself accordingly. A catalogue of his tendentious &amp;quot;observations&amp;quot; would be interminable: a woman he sees reminds him of Haidee in &#039;&#039;Don Juan&#039;&#039;; the relationship between Jesus and Palestine is like that between Rousseau and Geneva; the actual river Jordan is less important than the &amp;quot;mysteries&amp;quot; it gives rise to in one&#039;s soul; Orientals, and Muslims in particular, are lazy, their politics are capricious, passionate, and futureless; another woman reminds him of a passage in &#039;&#039;Atala&#039;&#039;; neither Tasso nor Chateaubriand (whose antecedent travels seem often to harass Lamartine&#039;s otherwise heedless egoism) got the Holy Land right--and on and on. His pages on Arabic poetry, about which he discourses with supreme confidence, betray no discomfort at his total ignorance of the language. All that matters to him is that his travels in the Orient reveal to him how the Orient is &amp;quot;la terre des cultes, des prodiges,&amp;quot; and that he is its appointed poet in the West. With no trace of self-irony he announces:&lt;br /&gt;
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This Arab land is the land of prodigies; everything sprouts there, and every credulous or fanatical man can become a prophet there in his turn.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., 1: 363; 2: 74-5; 1: 475.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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He has become a prophet merely by the fact of residence in the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the end of his narrative Lamartine has achieved the purpose of his pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre, that beginning and end point of all time and space. He has internalized reality enough to want to retreat from it back into pure contemplation, solitude, philosophy, and poetry.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., 2: 92-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Rising above the merely geographical Orient, he is transformed into a latter-day Chateaubriand, surveying the East as if it were a personal (or at the very least a French) province ready to be disposed of by European powers. From being a traveler and pilgrim in real time and space, Lamartine has become a transpersonal ego identifying itself in power and consciousness with the whole of Europe. What he sees before him is the Orient in the process of its inevitable future dismemberment, being taken over and consecrated by European suzerainty. Thus in Lamartine&#039;s climactic vision the Orient is reborn as European right-to-power over it:&lt;br /&gt;
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This sort of suzerainty thus defined, and consecrated as a European right, will consist principally in the right to occupy one or another territory, as well as the coasts, in order to found there either free cities, or European colonies, or commercial ports of call....&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor does Lamartine stop at this. He climbs still higher to the point where the Orient, what he has just seen and where he has just been, is reduced to &amp;quot;nations without territory, &#039;&#039;patrie&#039;&#039;, rights, laws or security ... waiting anxiously for the shelter&amp;quot; of European occupation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., 2: 526-7, 533. Two important works on French writers in the Orient are Jean-Marie Carre, &#039;&#039;Voyageurs et ecrivains francais en Egypte&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (Cairo: Institut francais d&#039;archeologie orientale, 1932), and Moenis Taha-Hussein, &#039;&#039;Le Romantisme francais et l&#039;Islam&#039;&#039; (Beirut: Dar-el-Maeref, 1962).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In all the visions of the Orient fabricated by Orientalism there is no recapitulation, literally, as entire as this one. For Lamartine a pilgrimage to the Orient has involved not only the penetration of the Orient by an imperious consciousness but also the virtual elimination of that consciousness as a result of its accession to a kind of impersonal and continental control over the Orient. The Orient&#039;s actual identity is withered away into a set of consecutive fragments, Lamartine&#039;s recollective observations, which are later to be gathered up and brought forth as a restated Napoleonic dream of world hegemony. Whereas Lane&#039;s human identity disappeared into the scientific grid of his Egyptian classifications, Lamartine&#039;s consciousness transgresses its normal bounds completely. In so doing, it repeats Chateaubriand&#039;s journey and his visions only to move on beyond them, into the sphere of the Shelleyan and Napoleonic abstract, by which worlds and populations are moved about like so many cards on a table. What remains of the Orient in Lamartine&#039;s prose is not very substantial at all. Its geopolitical reality has been overlaid with his plans for it; the sites he has visited, the people he has met, the experiences he has had, are reduced to a few echoes in his pompous generalizations. The last traces of particularity have been rubbed out in the &amp;quot;resume politique&amp;quot; with which the &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; concludes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Against the transcendent quasi-national egoism of Lamartine we must place Nerval and Flaubert in contrast. Their Oriental works play a substantial role in their total &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039;, a much greater one than Lamartine&#039;s imperialist &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; in his &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039;. Yet both of them, like Lamartine, came to the Orient prepared for it by voluminous reading in the classics, modern literature, and academic Orientalism; about this preparation Flaubert was much more candid than Nerval, who in &#039;&#039;Les Filles du feu&#039;&#039; says disingenuously that all he knew about the Orient was a half-forgotten memory from his school education.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gerard de Nerval, &#039;&#039;Les Filles du feu&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Albert Beguin and Jean Richet (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 1: 297-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The evidence of his &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; flatly contradicts this, although it shows a much less systematic and disciplined knowledge of Orientalia than Flaubert&#039;s. More important, however, is the fact that both writers (Nerval in 1842-1843 and Flaubert in 1849-1850) had greater personal and aesthetic uses for their visits to the Orient than any other nineteenth-century travelers. It is not inconsequential that both were geniuses to begin with, and that both were thoroughly steeped in aspects of European culture that encouraged a sympathetic, if perverse, vision of the Orient. Nerval and Flaubert belonged to that community of thought and feeling described by Mario Praz in &#039;&#039;The Romantic Agony&#039;&#039;, a community for which the imagery of exotic places, the cultivation of sadomasochistic tastes (what Praz calls &#039;&#039;algolagnia&#039;&#039;), a fascination with the macabre, with the notion of a Fatal Woman, with secrecy and occultism, all combined to enable literary work of the sort produced by Gautier (himself fascinated by the Orient), Swinburne, Baudelaire, and Huysmans.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Mario Praz, &#039;&#039;The Romantic Agony&#039;&#039;, trans. Angus Davison (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1967).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Nerval and Flaubert, such female figures as Cleopatra, Salome, and Isis have a special significance; and it was by no means accidental that in their work on the Orient, as well as in their visits to it, they pre-eminently valorized and enhanced female types of this legendary, richly suggestive, and associative sort.&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to their general cultural attitudes, Nerval and Flaubert brought to the Orient a personal mythology whose concerns and even structure required the Orient. Both men were touched by the Oriental renaissance as Quinet and others had defined it: they sought the invigoration provided by the fabulously antique and the exotic. For each, however, the Oriental pilgrimage was a quest for something relatively personal: Flaubert seeking a &amp;quot;homeland,&amp;quot; as Jean Bruneau has called it,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jean Bruneau, &#039;&#039;Le &amp;quot;Conte Orientale&amp;quot; de Flaubert&#039;&#039; (Paris: Denoel, 1973), p. 79.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in the locales of the origin of religions, visions, and classical antiquity; Nerval seeking--or rather following--the traces of his personal sentiments and dreams, like Sterne&#039;s Yorick before him. For both writers the Orient was a place therefore of &#039;&#039;deja vu&#039;&#039;, and for both, with the artistic economy typical of all major aesthetic imaginations, it was a place often returned to after the actual voyage had been completed. For neither of them was the Orient exhausted by their uses of it, even if there is often a quality of disappointment, disenchantment, or demystification to be found in their Oriental writings.&lt;br /&gt;
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The paramount importance of Nerval and Flaubert to a study such as this of the Orientalist mind in the nineteenth century is that they produced work that is connected to and depends upon the kind of Orientalism we have so far discussed, yet remains independent from it. First there is the matter of their work&#039;s scope. Nerval produced his &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; as a collection of travel notes, sketches, stories, and fragments; his preoccupation with the Orient is to be found as well in &#039;&#039;Les Chimeres&#039;&#039;, in his letters, in some of his fiction and other prose writings. Flaubert&#039;s writing both before and after his visit is soaked in the Orient. The Orient appears in the &#039;&#039;Carnets de Voyage&#039;&#039; and in the first version of &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039; (and in the two later versions), as well as in &#039;&#039;Herodias, Salammbo&#039;&#039;, and the numerous reading notes, scenarios, and unfinished stories still available to us, which have been very intelligently studied by Bruneau.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;These are all considered by Bruneau in &#039;&#039;ibid&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are echoes of Orientalism in Flaubert&#039;s other major novels, too. In all, both Nerval and Flaubert continually elaborated their Oriental material and absorbed it variously into the special structures of their personal aesthetic projects. This is not to say, however, that the Orient is incidental to their work. Rather--by contrast with such writers as Lane (from whom both men borrowed shamelessly), Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Renan, Sacy--their Orient was not so much grasped, appropriated, reduced, or codified as lived in, exploited aesthetically and imaginatively as a roomy place full of possibility. What mattered to them was the structure of their work as an independent, aesthetic, and personal fact, and not the ways by which, if one wanted to, one could effectively dominate or set down the Orient graphically. Their egos never absorbed the Orient, nor totally identified the Orient with documentary and textual knowledge of it (with official Orientalism, in short).&lt;br /&gt;
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On the one hand, therefore, the scope of their Oriental work exceeds the limitations imposed by orthodox Orientalism. On the other hand, the subject of their work is more than Oriental or Orientalistic (even though they do their own Orientalizing of the Orient); it quite consciously plays with the limitations and the challenges presented to them by the Orient and by knowledge about it. Nerval, for example, believes that he has to infuse what he sees with vitality since, he says,&lt;br /&gt;
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Le ciel et la mer sont toujours la; le ciel d&#039;Orient, la mer d&#039;Ionie se donnent chaque matin le saint baiser d&#039;amour; mais la terre est morte, morte sous la main de l&#039;homme, et les dieux se sont envoles!&lt;br /&gt;
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(The sky and the sea are still there; the Oriental sky and the Ionian sky give each other the sacred kiss of love each morning; but the earth is dead, dead because man has killed it, and the gods have fled.)&lt;br /&gt;
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If the Orient is to live at all, now that its gods have fled, it must be through his fertile efforts. In the &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039; the narrative consciousness is a constantly energetic voice, moving through the labyrinths of Oriental existence armed--Nerval tells us--with two Arabic words, &#039;&#039;tayeb&#039;&#039;, the word for assent, and &#039;&#039;mafisch&#039;&#039;, the word for rejection. These two words enable him selectively to confront the antithetical Oriental world, to confront it and draw out from it its secret principles. He is predisposed to recognize that the Orient is &amp;quot;le pays des reves et de l&#039;illusion,&amp;quot; which, like the veils he sees everywhere in Cairo, conceal a deep, rich fund of female sexuality. Nerval repeats Lane&#039;s experience of discovering the necessity for marriage in an Islamic society, but unlike Lane he does attach himself to a woman. His liaison with Zaynab is more than socially obligatory:&lt;br /&gt;
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I must unite with a guileless young girl who is of this sacred soil, which is our first homeland; I must bathe myself in the vivifying springs of humanity, from which poetry and the faith of our fathers flowed forth!... I would like to lead my life like a novel, and I willingly place myself in the situation of one of those active and resolute heroes who wish at all costs to create a drama around them, a knot of complexity, in a word, action.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Nerval, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 2: 68, 194, 96, 342.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Nerval invests himself in the Orient, producing not so much a novelistic narrative as an everlasting intention--never fully realized--to fuse mind with physical action. This antinarrative, this para-pilgrimage, is a swerving away from discursive finality of the sort envisioned by previous writers on the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Connected physically and sympathetically to the Orient, Nerval wanders informally through its riches and its cultural (and principally feminine) ambience, locating in Egypt especially that maternal &amp;quot;center, at once mysterious and accessible&amp;quot; from which all wisdom derives.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 181.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His impressions, dreams, and memories alternate with sections of ornate, mannered narrative done in the Oriental style; the hard realities of travel--in Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey--mingle with the design of a deliberate digression, as if Nerval were repeating Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039; using an underground, though far less imperial and obvious, route. Michel Butor puts it beautifully:&lt;br /&gt;
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To Nerval&#039;s eyes, Chateaubriand&#039;s journey remains a voyage along the surface, while his own is calculated, utilizing annex centers, lobbies of ellipses englobing the principal centers; this allows him to place in evidence, by parallax, all the dimensions of the snare harbored by the normal centers. Wandering the streets or environs of Cairo, Beirut, or Constantinople, Nerval is always lying in wait for anything that will allow him to sense a cavern extending beneath Rome, Athens, and Jerusalem [the principal cities of Chateaubriand&#039;s &#039;&#039;Itineraire&#039;&#039;]....&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as the three cities of Chateaubriand are in communication--Rome, with its emperors and popes, reassembling the heritage, the testament, of Athens and Jerusalem--the caverns of Nerval ... become engaged in intercourse.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Michel Butor, &amp;quot;Travel and Writing,&amp;quot; trans. John Powers and K. Lisker, &#039;&#039;Mosaic&#039;&#039; 8, no. 1 (Fall 1974): 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Even the two large plotted episodes, &amp;quot;The Tale of the Caliph Hakim&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;The Tale of the Queen of the Morning,&amp;quot; that will supposedly convey a durable, solid narrative discourse seem to push Nerval away from &amp;quot;overground&amp;quot; finality, edging him further and further into a haunting internal world of paradox and dream. Both tales deal with multiple identity, one of whose motifs--explicitly stated--is incest, and both return us to Nerval&#039;s quintessential Oriental world of uncertain, fluid dreams infinitely multiplying themselves past resolution, definiteness, materiality. When the journey is completed and Nerval arrives in Malta on his way back to the European mainland, he realizes that he is now in &amp;quot;le pays du froid et des orages, et deja l&#039;Orient n&#039;est plus pour moi qu&#039;un de ses reves du matin auxquels viennent bientot succeder les ennuis du jour.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Nerval, &#039;&#039;Voyage en Orient&#039;&#039;, p. 628.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; incorporates numerous pages copied out of Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, but even their lucid confidence seems to dissolve in the endlessly decomposing, cavernous element which is Nerval&#039;s Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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His &#039;&#039;carnet&#039;&#039; for the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039; supplies us, I think, with two perfect texts for understanding how his Orient untied itself from anything resembling an Orientalist conception of the Orient, even though his work depends on Orientalism to a certain extent. First, his appetites strive to gather in experience and memory indiscriminately: &amp;quot;Je sens le besoin de m&#039;assimiler toute la nature (femmes etrangeres). Souvenirs d&#039;y avoir vecu.&amp;quot; The second elaborates a bit on the first: &amp;quot;Les reves et la folie ... Le desir de l&#039;&#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039;. L&#039;Europe s&#039;eleve. Le reve se realise ... Elle. Je l&#039;avais fuie, je l&#039;avais perdue ... Vaisseau d&#039;Orient.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 706, 718.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Orient symbolizes Nerval&#039;s dream-quest and the fugitive woman central to it, both as desire and as loss. &amp;quot;Vaisseau d&#039;Orient&amp;quot;--vessel of the Orient--refers enigmatically either to the woman as the vessel carrying the Orient, or possibly, to Nerval&#039;s own vessel for the Orient, his prose &#039;&#039;voyage&#039;&#039;. In either case, the Orient is identified with commemorative &#039;&#039;absence&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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How else can we explain in the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039;, a work of so original and individual a mind, the lazy use of large swatches of Lane, incorporated without a murmur by Nerval as &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; descriptions of the Orient? It is as if having failed both in his search for a stable Oriental reality and in his intent to give systematic order to his re-presentation of the Orient, Nerval was employing the borrowed authority of a canonized Orientalist text. After his voyage the earth remained dead, and aside from its brilliantly crafted but fragmented embodiments in the &#039;&#039;Voyage&#039;&#039;, his self was no less drugged and worn out than before. Therefore the Orient seemed retrospectively to belong to a negative realm, in which failed narratives, disordered chronicles, mere transcription of scholarly texts, were its only possible vessel. At least Nerval did not try to save his project by wholeheartedly giving himself up to French designs on the Orient, although he did resort to Orientalism to make some of his points.&lt;br /&gt;
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In contrast to Nerval&#039;s negative vision of an emptied Orient, Flaubert&#039;s is eminently corporeal. His travel notes and letters reveal a man scrupulously reporting events, persons, and settings, delighting in their &#039;&#039;bizarreries&#039;&#039;, never attempting to reduce the incongruities before him. In what he writes (or perhaps because he writes), the premium is on the eye-catching, translated into self-consciously worked-out phrases: for example, &amp;quot;Inscriptions and birddroppings are the only two things in Egypt that give any indication of life.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour&#039;&#039;, trans, and ed. Francis Steegmuller (Boston: Little, Brown &amp;amp; Co., 1973), p. 200. I have also consulted the following texts, in which all Flaubert&#039;s &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; material is to be found: &#039;&#039;Oeuvres completes de Gustave Flaubert&#039;&#039; (Paris: Club de l&#039;Honnete homme, 1973), vols. 10, 11; &#039;&#039;Les Lettres d&#039;Egypte, de Gustave Flaubert&#039;&#039;, ed. A. Youssef Naaman (Paris: Nizet, 1965); Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Correspondance&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean Bruneau (Paris, Gallimard, 1973), 1: 518 ff.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His tastes run to the perverse, whose form is often a combination of extreme animality, even of grotesque nastiness, with extreme and sometimes intellectual refinement. Yet this particular kind of perversity was not something merely observed, it was also studied, and came to represent an essential element in Flaubert&#039;s fiction. The familiar oppositions, or ambivalences, as Harry Levin has called them, that roam through Flaubert&#039;s writing--flesh versus mind, Salome versus Saint John, Salammbo versus Saint Anthony&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harry Levin, &#039;&#039;The Gates of Horn: A Study of Five French Realists&#039;&#039; (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 285.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--are powerfully validated by what he saw in the Orient, what, given his eclectic learning, he could see there of the partnership between knowledge and carnal grossness. In Upper Egypt he was taken with ancient Egyptian art, its preciosity and deliberate lubricity: &amp;quot;so dirty pictures existed even so far back in antiquity?&amp;quot; How much more the Orient really answered questions than it raised them is evident in the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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You [Flaubert&#039;s mother] ask me whether the Orient is up to what I imagined it to be. Yes, it is; and more than that, it extends far beyond the narrow idea I had of it. I have found, clearly delineated, everything that was hazy in my mind. Facts have taken the place of suppositions--so excellently so that it is often as though I were suddenly coming upon old forgotten dreams.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, pp. 173, 75.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Flaubert&#039;s work is so complex and so vast as to make any simple account of his Oriental writing very sketchy and hopelessly incomplete. Nevertheless, in the context created by other writers on the Orient, a certain number of main features in Flaubert&#039;s Orientalism can fairly be described. Making allowances for the difference between candidly personal writing (letters, travel notes, diary jottings) and formally aesthetic writing (novels and tales), we can still remark that Flaubert&#039;s Oriental perspective is rooted in an eastward and southward search for a &amp;quot;visionary alternative,&amp;quot; which &amp;quot;meant gorgeous color, in contrast to the greyish tonality of the French provincial landscape. It meant exciting spectacle instead of hum-drum routine, the perennially mysterious in place of the all too familiar.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Levin, &#039;&#039;Gates of Horn&#039;&#039;, p. 271.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When he actually visited it, however, this Orient impressed him with its decrepitude and senescence. Like every other Orientalism, then, Flaubert&#039;s is revivalist: &#039;&#039;he&#039;&#039; must bring the Orient to life, he must deliver it to himself and to his readers, and it is his experience of it in books and on the spot, and his language for it, that will do the trick. His novels of the Orient accordingly were labored historical and learned reconstructions. Carthage in &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039; and the products of Saint Anthony&#039;s fevered imagination were authentic fruits of Flaubert&#039;s wide reading in the (mainly Western) sources of Oriental religion, warfare, ritual, and societies.&lt;br /&gt;
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What the formal aesthetic work retains, over and above the marks of Flaubert&#039;s voracious readings and recensions, are memories of Oriental travel. The &#039;&#039;Bibliotheque des idees recues&#039;&#039; has it that an Orientalist is &amp;quot;un homme qui a beaucoup voyage,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Catalogue des opinions chic, in Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 2: 1019.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; only unlike most other such travelers Flaubert put his voyages to ingenious use. Most of his experiences are conveyed in theatrical form. He is interested not only in the content of what he sees but--like Renan--in &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; he sees, the way by which the Orient, sometimes horribly but always attractively, seems to present itself to him. Flaubert is its best audience:&lt;br /&gt;
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... Kasr el-&#039;Aini Hospital. Well maintained. The work of Clot Bey--his hand is still to be seen. Pretty cases of syphilis; in the ward of Abbas&#039;s Mamelukes, several have it in the arse. At a sign from the doctor, they all stood up on their beds, undid their trouserbelts (it was like army drill), and opened their anuses with their fingers to show their chancres. Enormous infundibula; one had a growth of hair inside his anus. One old man&#039;s prick entirely devoid of skin; I recoiled from the stench. A rachitic: hands curved backward, nails as long as claws; one could see the bone structure of his torso as clearly as a skeleton; the rest of his body, too, was fantastically thin, and his head was ringed with whitish leprosy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dissecting room: ... On the table an Arab cadaver, wide open; beautiful black hair....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, p. 65.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The lurid detail of this scene is related to many scenes in Flaubert&#039;s novels, in which illness is presented to us as if in a clinical theater. His fascination with dissection and beauty recalls, for instance, the final scene of &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, culminating in Matho&#039;s ceremonial death. In such scenes, sentiments of repulsion or sympathy are repressed entirely; what matters is the correct rendering of exact detail.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most celebrated moments in Flaubert&#039;s Oriental travel have to do with Kuchuk Hanem, a famous Egyptian dancer and courtesan he encountered in Wadi Haifa. He had read in Lane about the &#039;&#039;almehs&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;khawals&#039;&#039;, dancing girls and boys respectively, but it was his imagination rather than Lane&#039;s that could immediately grasp as well as enjoy the almost metaphysical paradox of the &#039;&#039;almeh&#039;s&#039;&#039; profession and the meaning of her name. (In &#039;&#039;Victory&#039;&#039;, Joseph Conrad was to repeat Flaubert&#039;s observation by making his musician heroine--Alma--irresistibly attractive and dangerous to Axel Heyst.) &#039;&#039;Alemah&#039;&#039; in Arabic means a learned woman. It was the name given to women in conservative eighteenth-century Egyptian society who were accomplished reciters of poetry. By the mid-nineteenth century the title was used as a sort of guild name for dancers who were also prostitutes, and such was Kuchuk Hanem, whose dance &amp;quot;L&#039;Abeille&amp;quot; Flaubert watched before he slept with her. She was surely the prototype of several of his novels&#039; female characters in her learned sensuality, delicacy, and (according to Flaubert) mindless coarseness. What he especially liked about her was that she seemed to place no demands on him, while the &amp;quot;nauseating odor&amp;quot; of her bedbugs mingled enchantingly with &amp;quot;the scent of her skin, which was dripping with sandalwood.&amp;quot; After his voyage, he had written Louise Colet reassuringly that &amp;quot;the oriental woman is no more than a machine: she makes no distinction between one man and another man.&amp;quot; Kuchuk&#039;s dumb and irreducible sexuality allowed Flaubert&#039;s mind to wander in ruminations whose haunting power over him reminds us somewhat of Deslauriers and Frederic Moreau at the end of &#039;&#039;l&#039;Education sentimentale&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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As for me, I scarcely shut my eyes. Watching that beautiful creature asleep (she snored, her head against my arm: I had slipped my forefinger under her necklace), my night was one long, infinitely intense reverie--that was why I stayed. I thought of my nights in Paris brothels--a whole series of old memories came back--and I thought of her, of her dance, of her voice as she sang songs that for me were without meaning and even without distinguishable words.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 220, 130.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Oriental woman is an occasion and an opportunity for Flaubert&#039;s musings; he is entranced by her self-sufficiency, by her emotional carelessness, and also by what, lying next to him, she allows him to think. Less a woman than a display of impressive but verbally inexpressive femininity, Kuchuk is the prototype of Flaubert&#039;s Salammbo and Salome, as well as of all the versions of carnal female temptation to which his Saint Anthony is subject. Like the Queen of Sheba (who also danced &amp;quot;The Bee&amp;quot;) she could say--were she able to speak--&amp;quot;Je ne suis pas une femme, je suis un monde.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Flaubert, &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine, in Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 1: 85.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Looked at from another angle Kuchuk is a disturbing symbol of fecundity, peculiarly Oriental in her luxuriant and seemingly unbounded sexuality. Her home near the upper reaches of the Nile occupied a position structurally similar to the place where the veil of Tanit--the goddess described as &#039;&#039;Omnifeconde&#039;&#039;--is concealed in &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Flaubert, &#039;&#039;Salammbo&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 1: 809 ff. See also Maurice Z. Shroder, &amp;quot;On Reading &#039;&#039;Salammbo,&amp;quot; L&#039;Esprit createur&#039;&#039; 10, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 24-35.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet like Tanit, Salome, and Salammbo herself, Kuchuk was doomed to remain barren, corrupting, without issue. How much she and the Oriental world she lived in came to intensify for Flaubert his own sense of barrenness is indicated in the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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We have a large orchestra, a rich palette, a variety of resources. We know many more tricks and dodges, probably, than were ever known before. No, what we lack is the intrinsic principle, the soul of the thing, the very idea of the subject. We take notes, we make journeys: emptiness! emptiness! We become scholars, archaeologists, historians, doctors, cobblers, people of taste. What is the good of all that? Where is the heart, the verve, the sap? Where to start from? Where to go? We&#039;re good at sucking, we play a lot of tongue-games, we pet for hours: but the real thing! To ejaculate, beget the child!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, pp. 198-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Woven through all of Flaubert&#039;s Oriental experiences, exciting or disappointing, is an almost uniform association between the Orient and sex. In making this association Flaubert was neither the first nor the most exaggerated instance of a remarkably persistent motif in Western attitudes to the Orient. And indeed, the motif itself is singularly unvaried, although Flaubert&#039;s genius may have done more than anyone else&#039;s could have to give it artistic dignity. Why the Orient seems still to suggest not only fecundity but sexual promise (and threat), untiring sensuality, unlimited desire, deep generative energies, is something on which one could speculate: it is not the province of my analysis here, alas, despite its frequently noted appearance. Nevertheless one must acknowledge its importance as something eliciting complex responses, sometimes even a frightening self-discovery, in the Orientalists, and Flaubert was an interesting case in point.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orient threw him back on his own human and technical resources. It did not respond, just as Kuchuk did not, to his presence. Standing before its ongoing life Flaubert, like Lane before him, felt his detached powerlessness, perhaps also his self-induced unwillingness, to enter and become part of what he saw. This of course was Flaubert&#039;s perennial problem; it had existed before he went East, and it remained after the visit. Flaubert admitted the difficulty, the antidote to which was in his work (especially in an Oriental work like &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;) to stress the &#039;&#039;form&#039;&#039; of encyclopedic presentation of material at the expense of human engagement in life. Indeed, Saint Anthony is nothing if not a man for whom reality is a series of books, spectacles, and pageants unrolling temptingly and at a distance before his eyes. All of Flaubert&#039;s immense learning is structured--as Michel Foucault has tellingly noted--like a theatrical, fantastic library, parading before the anchorite&#039;s gaze;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Foucault, &amp;quot;La Bibliotheque fantastique,&amp;quot; in Flaubert, &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;, pp. 7-33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; residually, the parade carries in its form Flaubert&#039;s memories of Kasr el&#039;Aini (the syphilitics&#039; army drill) and Kuchuk&#039;s dance. More to the point, however, is that Saint Anthony is a celibate to whom temptations are primarily sexual. After putting up with every sort of dangerous charm, he is finally given a glimpse into the biological processes of life; he is delirious at being able to see life being born, a scene for which Flaubert felt himself to be incompetent during his Oriental sojourn. Yet because Anthony is delirious, we are meant to read the scene ironically. What is granted to him at the end, the desire to &#039;&#039;become&#039;&#039; matter, to become life, is at best a desire--whether realizable and fulfillable or not, we cannot know.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the energy of his intelligence and his enormous power of intellectual absorption, Flaubert felt in the Orient, first, that &amp;quot;the more you concentrate on it [in detail] the less you grasp the whole,&amp;quot; and then, second, that &amp;quot;the pieces fall into place of themselves.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, p. 79.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At best, this produces a &#039;&#039;spectacular&#039;&#039; form, but it remains barred to the Westerner&#039;s full participation in it. On one level this was a personal predicament for Flaubert, and he devised means, some of which we have discussed, for dealing with it. On a more general level, this was an &#039;&#039;epistemological&#039;&#039; difficulty for which, of course, the discipline of Orientalism existed. At one moment during his Oriental tour he considered what the epistemological challenge could give rise to. Without what he called spirit and style, the mind could &amp;quot;get lost in archaeology&amp;quot;: he was referring to a sort of regimented antiquarianism by which the exotic and the strange would get formulated into lexicons, codes, and finally cliches of the kind he was to ridicule in the &#039;&#039;Dictionnaire des idees recues&#039;&#039;. Under the influence of such an attitude the world would be &amp;quot;regulated like a college. Teachers will be the law. Everyone will be in uniform.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 211-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; As against such an imposed discipline, he no doubt felt that his own treatments of exotic material, notably the Oriental material he had both experienced and read about for years, were infinitely preferable. In those at least there was room for a sense of immediacy, imagination, and flair, whereas in the ranks of archaeological tomes everything but &amp;quot;learning&amp;quot; had been squeezed out. And more than most novelists Flaubert was acquainted with organized learning, its products, and its results: these products are clearly evident in the misfortunes of Bouvard and Pecuchet, but they would have been as comically apparent in fields like Orientalism, whose textual attitudes belonged to the world of &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;. Therefore one could either construct the world with verve and style, or one could copy it tirelessly according to impersonal academic rules of procedure. In both cases, with regard to the Orient, there was a frank acknowledgment that it was a world elsewhere, apart from the ordinary attachments, sentiments, and values of &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; world in the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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In all of his novels Flaubert associates the Orient with the escapism of sexual fantasy. Emma Bovary and Frederic Moreau pine for what in their drab (or harried) bourgeois lives they do not have, and what they realize they want comes easily to their daydreams packed inside Oriental cliches: harems, princesses, princes, slaves, veils, dancing girls and boys, sherbets, ointments, and so on. The repertoire is familiar, not so much because it reminds us of Flaubert&#039;s own voyages in and obsession with the Orient, but because, once again, the association is clearly made between the Orient and the freedom of licentious sex. We may as well recognize that for nineteenth-century Europe, with its increasing &#039;&#039;embourgeoisement&#039;&#039;, sex had been institutionalized to a very considerable degree. On the one hand, there was no such thing as &amp;quot;free&amp;quot; sex, and on the other, sex in society entailed a web of legal, moral, even political and economic obligations of a detailed and certainly encumbering sort. Just as the various colonial possessions--quite apart from their economic benefit to metropolitan Europe--were useful as places to send wayward sons, superfluous populations of delinquents, poor people, and other undesirables, so the Orient was a place where one could look for sexual experience unobtainable in Europe. Virtually no European writer who wrote on or traveled to the Orient in the period after 1800 exempted himself or herself from this quest: Flaubert, Nerval, &amp;quot;Dirty Dick&amp;quot; Burton, and Lane are only the most notable. In the twentieth century one thinks of Gide, Conrad, Maugham, and dozens of others. What they looked for often--correctly, I think--was a different type of sexuality, perhaps more libertine and less guilt-ridden; but even that quest, if repeated by enough people, could (and did) become as regulated and uniform as learning itself. In time &amp;quot;Oriental sex&amp;quot; was as standard a commodity as any other available in the mass culture, with the result that readers and writers could have it if they wished without necessarily going to the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was certainly true that by the middle of the nineteenth century France, no less than England and the rest of Europe, had a flourishing knowledge industry of the sort that Flaubert feared. Great numbers of texts were being produced, and more important, the agencies and institutions for their dissemination and propagation were everywhere to be found. As historians of science and knowledge have observed, the organization of scientific and learned fields that took place during the nineteenth century was both rigorous and all-encompassing. Research became a regular activity; there was a regulated exchange of information, and agreement on what the problems were as well as consensus on the appropriate paradigms for research and its results.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a discussion of this process see Foucault, &#039;&#039;Archaeology of Knowledge&#039;&#039;; also Joseph Ben-David, &#039;&#039;The Scientist&#039;s Role in Society&#039;&#039; (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971). See also Edward W. Said, &amp;quot;An Ethics of Language,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diacritics&#039;&#039; 4, no. 2 (Summer 1974): 28-37.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The apparatus serving Oriental studies was part of the scene, and this was one thing that Flaubert surely had in mind when he proclaimed that &amp;quot;everyone will be in uniform.&amp;quot; An Orientalist was no longer a gifted amateur enthusiast, or if he was, he would have trouble being taken seriously as a scholar. To be an Orientalist meant university training in Oriental studies (by 1850 every major European university had a fully developed curriculum in one or another of the Orientalist disciplines), it meant subvention for one&#039;s travel (perhaps by one of the Asiatic societies or a geographical exploration fund or a government grant), it meant publication in accredited form (perhaps under the imprint of a learned society or an Oriental translation fund). And both within the guild of Orientalist scholars and to the public at large, such uniform accreditation as clothed the work of Orientalist scholarship, not personal testimony nor subjective impressionism, meant Science.&lt;br /&gt;
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Added to the oppressive regulation of Oriental matters was the accelerated attention paid by the Powers (as the European empires were called) to the Orient, and to the Levant in particular. Ever since the Treaty of Chanak of 1806 between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, the Eastern Question had hovered ever more prominently on Europe&#039;s Mediterranean horizons. Britain&#039;s interests were more substantial in the East than France&#039;s, but we must not forget Russia&#039;s movements into the Orient (Samarkand and Bokhara were taken in 1868; the Transcaspian Railroad was being extended systematically), nor Germany&#039;s and Austria-Hungary&#039;s. France&#039;s North African interventions, however, were not the only components of its Islamic policy. In 1860, during the clashes between Maronites and Druzes in Lebanon (already predicted by Lamartine and Nerval), France supported the Christians, England the Druzes. For standing near the center of all European politics in the East was the question of minorities, whose &amp;quot;interests&amp;quot; the Powers, each in its own way, claimed to protect and represent. Jews, Greek and Russian Orthodox, Druzes, Circassians, Armenians, Kurds, the various small Christian sects: all these were studied, planned for, designed upon by European Powers improvising as well as constructing their Oriental policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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I mention such matters simply as a way of keeping vivid the sense of layer upon layer of interests, official learning, institutional pressure, that covered the Orient as a subject matter and as a territory during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Even the most innocuous travel book--and there were literally hundreds written after mid-century&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See the invaluable listings in Richard Bevis, &#039;&#039;Bibliotheca Cisorientalia: An Annotated Checklist of Early English Travel Books on the Near and Middle East&#039;&#039; (Boston: G. K. Hall &amp;amp; Co., 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--contributed to the density of public awareness of the Orient; a heavily marked dividing line separated the delights, miscellaneous exploits, and testimonial portentousness of individual pilgrims in the East (which included some American voyagers, among them Mark Twain and Herman Melville&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For discussions of the American travelers see Dorothee Metlitski Finkelstein, &#039;&#039;Melville&#039;s Orienda&#039;&#039; (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), and Franklin Walker, &#039;&#039;Irreverent Pilgrims: Melville&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Browne, and Mark Twain in the Holy Land&#039;&#039; (Seattle; University of Washington Press, 1974).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) from the authoritative reports of scholarly travelers, missionaries, governmental functionaries, and other expert witnesses. This dividing line existed clearly in Flaubert&#039;s mind, as it must have for any individual consciousness that did not have an innocent perspective on the Orient as a terrain for literary exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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English writers on the whole had a more pronounced and harder sense of what Oriental pilgrimages might entail than the French. India was a valuably real constant in this sense, and therefore all the territory between the Mediterranean and India acquired a correspondingly weighty importance. Romantic writers like Byron and Scott consequently had a political vision of the Near Orient and a very combative awareness of how relations between the Orient and Europe would have to be conducted. Scott&#039;s historical sense in &#039;&#039;The Talisman&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Count Robert of Paris&#039;&#039; allowed him to set these novels in Crusader Palestine and eleventh-century Byzantium, respectively, without at the same time detracting from his canny political appreciation of the way powers act abroad. The failure of Disraeli&#039;s &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039; can easily be ascribed to its author&#039;s perhaps over-developed knowledge of Oriental politics and the British Establishment&#039;s network of interests; Tancred&#039;s ingenuous desire to go to Jerusalem very soon mires Disraeli in ludicrously complex descriptions of how a Lebanese tribal chieftain tries to manage Druzes, Muslims, Jews, and Europeans to his political advantage. By the end of the novel Tancred&#039;s Eastern quest has more or less disappeared because there is nothing in Disraeli&#039;s material vision of Oriental realities to nourish the pilgrim&#039;s somewhat capricious impulses. Even George Eliot, who never visited the Orient herself, could not sustain the Jewish equivalent of an Oriental pilgrimage in &#039;&#039;Daniel Deronda&#039;&#039; (1876) without straying into the complexities of British realities as they decisively affected the Eastern project.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus whenever the Oriental motif for the English writer was not principally a stylistic matter (as in FitzGerald&#039;s &#039;&#039;Rubaiyat&#039;&#039; or in Morier&#039;s &#039;&#039;Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan&#039;&#039;), it forced him to confront a set of imposing resistances to his individual fantasy. There are no English equivalents to the Oriental works by Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Nerval, and Flaubert, just as Lane&#039;s early Orientalist counterparts--Sacy and Renan--were considerably more aware than he was of how much they were creating what they wrote about. The form of such works as Kinglake&#039;s &#039;&#039;Eothen&#039;&#039; (1844) and Burton&#039;s &#039;&#039;Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039; (1855-1856) is rigidly chronological and dutifully linear, as if what the authors were describing was a shopping trip to an Oriental bazaar rather than an adventure. Kinglake&#039;s undeservedly famous and popular work is a pathetic catalogue of pompous ethnocentrisms and tiringly nondescript accounts of the Englishman&#039;s East. His ostensible purpose in the book is to prove that travel in the Orient is important to &amp;quot;moulding of your character--that is, your very identity,&amp;quot; but in fact this turns out to be little more than solidifying &amp;quot;your&amp;quot; anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and general all-purpose race prejudice. We are told, for instance, that the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039; is too lively and inventive a work to have been created by a &amp;quot;mere Oriental, who, for creative purposes, is a thing dead and dry--a mental mummy.&amp;quot; Although Kinglake blithely confesses to no knowledge of any Oriental language, he is not constrained by ignorance from making sweeping generalizations about the Orient, its culture, mentality, and society. Many of the attitudes he repeats are canonical, of course, but it is interesting how little the experience of actually seeing the Orient affected his opinions. Like many other travelers he is more interested in remaking himself and the Orient (dead and dry--a mental mummy) than he is in seeing what there is to be seen. Every being he encounters merely corroborates his belief that Easterners are best dealt with when intimidated, and what better instrument of intimidation than a sovereign Western ego? En route to Suez across the desert, alone, he glories in his self-sufficiency and power: &amp;quot;I was here in this African desert, and I &#039;&#039;myself&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;and no other&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;had charge of my life&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alexander William Kinglake, &#039;&#039;Eothen, or Traces of Travel Brought Home from the East&#039;&#039;, ed. D. G. Hogarth (1844; reprint ed., London: Henry Frowde, 1906), pp. 25, 68, 241, 220.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It is for the comparatively useless purpose of letting Kinglake take hold of himself that the Orient serves him.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like Lamartine before him, Kinglake comfortably identified his superior consciousness with his nation&#039;s, the difference being that in the Englishman&#039;s case his government was closer to settling in the rest of the Orient than France was--for the time being. Flaubert saw this with perfect accuracy:&lt;br /&gt;
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It seems to me almost impossible that within a short time England won&#039;t become mistress of Egypt. She already keeps Aden full of her troops, the crossing of Suez will make it very easy for the redcoats to arrive in Cairo one fine morning--the news will reach France two weeks later and everyone will be very surprised! Remember my prediction: at the first sign of trouble in Europe, England will take Egypt, Russia will take Constantinople, and we, in retaliation, will get ourselves massacred in the mountains of Syria.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Flaubert in Egypt&#039;&#039;, p. 81.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For all their vaunted individuality Kinglake&#039;s views express a public and national will over the Orient; his ego is the instrument of this will&#039;s expression, not by any means its master. There is no evidence in his writing that he struggled to create a novel opinion of the Orient; neither his knowledge nor his personality was adequate for that, and this is the great difference between him and Richard Burton. As a traveler, Burton was a real adventurer; as a scholar, he could hold his own with any academic Orientalist in Europe; as a character, he was fully aware of the necessity of combat between himself and the uniformed teachers who ran Europe and European knowledge with such precise anonymity and scientific firmness. Everything Burton wrote testifies to this combativeness, rarely with more candid contempt for his opponents than in the preface to his translation of the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039;. He seems to have taken a special sort of infantile pleasure in demonstrating that he knew more than any professional scholar, that he had acquired many more details than they had, that he could handle the material with more wit and tact and freshness than they.&lt;br /&gt;
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As I said earlier, Burton&#039;s work based on his personal experience occupies a median position between Orientalist genres represented on the one hand by Lane and on the other by the French writers I have discussed. His Oriental narratives are structured as pilgrimages and, in the case of &#039;&#039;The Land of Midian Revisited&#039;&#039;, pilgrimages for a second time to sites of sometimes religious, sometimes political and economic significance. He is present as the principal character of these works, as much the center of fantastic adventure and even fantasy (like the French writers) as the authoritative commentator and detached Westerner on Oriental society and customs (like Lane). He has been rightly considered the first in a series of fiercely individualistic Victorian travelers in the East (the others being Blunt and Doughty) by Thomas Assad, who bases his work on the distance in tone and intelligence between his writers&#039; work and such works as Austen Layard&#039;s &#039;&#039;Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon&#039;&#039; (1851), Eliot Warburton&#039;s celebrated &#039;&#039;The Crescent and the Cross&#039;&#039; (1844), Robert Curzon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Visit to the Monasteries of the Levant&#039;&#039; (1849), and (a work he does not mention) Thackeray&#039;s moderately amusing &#039;&#039;Notes of a Journey from Cornhill to Grand Cairo&#039;&#039; (1845).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Thomas J. Assad, &#039;&#039;Three Victorian Travellers: Burton, Blunt and Doughty&#039;&#039; (London: Routledge &amp;amp;amp; Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet Burton&#039;s legacy is more complex than individualism precisely because in his writing we can find exemplified the struggle between individualism and a strong feeling of national identification with Europe (specifically England) as an imperial power in the East. Assad sensitively points out that Burton was an imperialist, for all his sympathetic self-association with the Arabs; but what is more relevant is that Burton thought of himself both as a rebel against authority (hence his identification with the East as a place of freedom from Victorian moral authority) and as a potential agent of authority in the East. It is the &#039;&#039;manner&#039;&#039; of that coexistence, between two antagonistic roles for himself, that is of interest.&lt;br /&gt;
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The problem finally reduces itself to the problem of knowledge of the Orient, which is why a consideration of Burton&#039;s Orientalism ought to conclude our account of Orientalist structures and restructures in most of the nineteenth century. As a traveling adventurer Burton conceived of himself as sharing the life of the people in whose lands he lived. Far more successfully than T. E. Lawrence, he was able to become an Oriental; he not only spoke the language flawlessly, he was able to penetrate to the heart of Islam and, disguised as an Indian Muslim doctor, accomplish the pilgrimage to Mecca. Yet Burton&#039;s most extraordinary characteristic is, I believe, that he was preternaturally knowledgeable about the degree to which human life in society was governed by rules and codes. All of his vast information about the Orient, which dots every page he wrote, reveals that he knew that the Orient in general and Islam in particular were systems of information, behavior, and belief, that to be an Oriental or a Muslim was to know certain things in a certain way, and that these were of course subject to history, geography, and the development of society in circumstances specific to it. Thus his accounts of travel in the East reveal to us a consciousness aware of these things and able to steer a narrative course through them: no man who did not know Arabic and Islam as well as Burton could have gone as far as he did in actually becoming a pilgrim to Mecca and Medina. So what we read in his prose is the history of a consciousness negotiating its way through an alien culture by virtue of having successfully absorbed its systems of information and behavior. Burton&#039;s freedom was in having shaken himself loose of his European origins enough to be able to live as an Oriental. Every scene in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; reveals him as winning out over the obstacles confronting him, a foreigner, in a strange place. He was able to do this because he had sufficient knowledge of an alien society for this purpose.&lt;br /&gt;
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In no writer on the Orient so much as in Burton do we feel that generalizations about the Oriental--for example, the pages on the notion of &#039;&#039;Kayf&#039;&#039; for the Arab or on how education is suited to the Oriental mind (pages that are clearly meant as a rebuttal to Macaulay&#039;s simple-minded assertions)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Richard Burton, &#039;&#039;Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah&#039;&#039;, ed. Isabel Burton (London: Tylston &amp;amp; Edwards, 1893), 1: 9, 108-10.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--are the result of knowledge acquired about the Orient by living there, actually seeing it firsthand, truly trying to see Oriental life from the viewpoint of a person immersed in it. Yet what is never far from the surface of Burton&#039;s prose is another sense it radiates, a sense of assertion and domination over all the complexities of Oriental life. Every one of Burton&#039;s footnotes, whether in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; or in his translation of the &#039;&#039;Arabian Nights&#039;&#039; (the same is true of his &amp;quot;Terminal Essay&amp;quot; for it&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Richard Burton, &amp;quot;Terminal Essay,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Book of the Thousand and One Nights&#039;&#039; (London: Burton Club, 1886), 10: 63-302.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) was meant to be testimony to his victory over the sometimes scandalous system of Oriental knowledge, a system he had mastered by himself. For even in Burton&#039;s prose we are never directly &#039;&#039;given&#039;&#039; the Orient; everything about it is presented to us by way of Burton&#039;s knowledgeable (and often prurient) interventions, which remind us repeatedly how he had taken over the management of Oriental life for the purposes of his narrative. And it is this fact--for in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; it is a fact--that elevates Burton&#039;s consciousness to a position of supremacy over the Orient. In that position his individuality perforce encounters, and indeed merges with, the voice of Empire, which is itself a system of rules, codes, and concrete epistemological habits. Thus when Burton tells us in the &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039; that &amp;quot;Egypt is a treasure to be won,&amp;quot; that it &amp;quot;is the most tempting prize which the East holds out to the ambition of Europe, not excepted even the Golden Horn,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Burton, &#039;&#039;Pilgrimage&#039;&#039;, 1: 112, 114.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; we must recognize how the voice of the highly idiosyncratic master of Oriental knowledge informs, feeds into the voice of European ambition for rule over the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Burton&#039;s two voices blending into one presage the work of Orientalists-&#039;&#039;cum&#039;&#039;-imperial agents like T. E. Lawrence, Edward Henry Palmer, D. G. Hogarth, Gertrude Bell, Ronald Storrs, St. John Philby, and William Gifford Paigrave, to name only some English writers. The double-pronged intention of Burton&#039;s work is at the same time to use his Oriental residence for scientific observation &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; not easily to sacrifice his individuality to that end. The second of these two intentions leads him inevitably to submit to the first because, as will appear increasingly obvious, he is a European for whom such knowledge of Oriental society as he has is possible only for a European, with a European&#039;s self-awareness of society as a collection of rules and practices. In other words, to be a European in the Orient, and to be one knowledgeably, one must see and know the Orient as a domain ruled over by Europe. Orientalism, which is the system of European or Western knowledge about the Orient, thus becomes synonymous with European domination of the Orient, and this domination effectively overrules even the eccentricities of Burton&#039;s personal style.&lt;br /&gt;
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Burton took the assertion of personal, authentic, sympathetic, and humanistic knowledge of the Orient as far as it would go in its struggle with the archive of official European knowledge about the Orient. In the history of nineteenth-century attempts to restore, restructure, and redeem all the various provinces of knowledge and life, Orientalism--like all the other Romantically inspired learned disciplines--contributed an important share. For not only did the field evolve from a system of inspired observation into what Flaubert called a regulated college of learning, it also reduced the personalities of even its most redoubtable individualists like Burton to the role of imperial scribe. From being a place, the Orient became a domain of actual scholarly rule and potential imperial sway. The role of the early Orientalists like Renan, Sacy, and Lane was to provide their work and the Orient together with a &#039;&#039;mise en scene&#039;&#039;; later Orientalists, scholarly or imaginative, took firm hold of the scene. Still later, as the scene required management, it became clear that institutions and governments were better at the game of management than individuals. This is the legacy of nineteenth-century Orientalism to which the twentieth century has become inheritor. We must now investigate as exactly as possible the way twentieth-century Orientalism--inaugurated by the long process of the West&#039;s occupation of the Orient from the 1880s on--successfully controlled freedom and knowledge; in short, the way Orientalism was fully formalized into a repeatedly produced copy of itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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= &#039;&#039;&#039;3.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Orientalism Now&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
On les apercevait tenant leurs idoles entre leurs bras comme de grands enfants paralytiques.&lt;br /&gt;
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--Gustave Flaubert, &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea--something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to....&lt;br /&gt;
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--Joseph Conrad, &#039;&#039;Heart of Darkness&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Latent and Manifest Orientalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
In Chapter One, I tried to indicate the scope of thought and action covered by the word &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, using as privileged types the British and French experiences of and with the Near Orient, Islam, and the Arabs. In those experiences I discerned an intimate, perhaps even the most intimate, and rich relationship between Occident and Orient. Those experiences were part of a much wider European or Western relationship with the Orient, but what seems to have influenced Orientalism most was a fairly constant sense of confrontation felt by Westerners dealing with the East. The boundary notion of East and West, the varying degrees of projected inferiority and strength, the range of work done, the kinds of characteristic features ascribed to the Orient: all these testify to a willed imaginative and geographic division made between East and West, and lived through during many centuries. In Chapter Two my focus narrowed a good deal. I was interested in the earliest phases of what I call modern Orientalism, which began during the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth. Since I did not intend my study to become a narrative chronicle of the development of Oriental studies in the modern West, I proposed instead an account of the rise, development, and institutions of Orientalism as they were formed against a background of intellectual, cultural, and political history until about 1870 or 1880. Although my interest in Orientalism there included a decently ample variety of scholars and imaginative writers, I cannot claim by any means to have presented more than a portrait of the typical structures (and their ideological tendencies) constituting the field, its associations with other fields, and the work of some of its most influential scholars. My principal operating assumptions were--and continue to be--that fields of learning, as much as the works of even the most eccentric artist, are constrained and acted upon by society, by cultural traditions, by worldly circumstance, and by stabilizing influences like schools, libraries, and governments; moreover, that both learned and imaginative writing are never free, but are limited in their imagery, assumptions, and intentions; and finally, that the advances made by a &amp;quot;science&amp;quot; like Orientalism in its academic form are less objectively true than we often like to think. In short, my study hitherto has tried to describe the &#039;&#039;economy&#039;&#039; that makes Orientalism a coherent subject matter, even while allowing that as an idea, concept, or image the word &#039;&#039;Orient&#039;&#039; has a considerable and interesting cultural resonance in the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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I realize that such assumptions are not without their controversial side. Most of us assume in a general way that learning and scholarship move forward; they get better, we feel, as time passes and as more information is accumulated, methods are refined, and later generations of scholars improve upon earlier ones. In addition, we entertain a mythology of creation, in which it is believed that artistic genius, an original talent, or a powerful intellect can leap beyond the confines of its own time and place in order to put before the world a new work. It would be pointless to deny that such ideas as these carry some truth. Nevertheless the possibilities for work present in the culture to a great and original mind are never unlimited, just as it is also true that a great talent has a very healthy respect for what others have done before it and for what the field already contains. The work of predecessors, the institutional life of a scholarly field, the collective nature of any learned enterprise: these, to say nothing of economic and social circumstances, tend to diminish the effects of the individual scholar&#039;s production. A field like Orientalism has a cumulative and corporate identity, one that is particularly strong given its associations with traditional learning (the classics, the Bible, philology), public institutions (governments, trading companies, geographical societies, universities), and generically determined writing (travel books, books of exploration, fantasy, exotic description). The result for Orientalism has been a sort of consensus: certain things, certain types of statement, certain types of work have seemed for the Orientalist correct. He has built his work and research upon them, and they in turn have pressed hard upon new writers and scholars. Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision, and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient. The Orient is taught, researched, administered, and pronounced upon in certain discrete ways.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire. If this definition of Orientalism seems more political than not, that is simply because I think Orientalism was itself a product of certain political forces and activities. Orientalism is a school of interpretation whose material happens to be the Orient, its civilizations, peoples, and localities. Its objective discoveries--the work of innumerable devoted scholars who edited texts and translated them, codified grammars, wrote dictionaries, reconstructed dead epochs, produced positivistically verifiable learning--are and always have been conditioned by the fact that its truths, like any truths delivered by language, are embodied in language, and what is the truth of language, Nietzsche once said, but&lt;br /&gt;
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a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms--in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Friedrich Nietzsche, &amp;quot;On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Portable Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 46-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps such a view as Nietzsche&#039;s will strike us as too nihilistic, but at least it will draw attention to the fact that so far as it existed in the West&#039;s awareness, the Orient was a word which later accrued to it a wide field of meanings, associations, and connotations, and that these did not necessarily refer to the real Orient but to the field surrounding the word.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus Orientalism is not only a positive doctrine about the Orient that exists at any one time in the West; it is also an influential academic tradition (when one refers to an academic specialist who is called an Orientalist), as well as an area of concern defined by travelers, commercial enterprises, governments, military expeditions, readers of novels and accounts of exotic adventure, natural historians, and pilgrims to whom the Orient is a specific kind of knowledge about specific places, peoples, and civilizations. For the Orient idioms became frequent, and these idioms took firm hold in European discourse. Beneath the idioms there was a layer of doctrine about the Orient; this doctrine was fashioned out of the experiences of many Europeans, all of them converging upon such essential aspects of the Orient as the Oriental character, Oriental despotism, Oriental sensuality, and the like. For any European during the nineteenth century--and I think one can say this almost without qualification--Orientalism was such a system of truths, truths in Nietzsche&#039;s sense of the word. It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric. Some of the immediate sting will be taken out of these labels if we recall additionally that human societies, at least the more advanced cultures, have rarely offered the individual anything but imperialism, racism, and ethnocentrism for dealing with &amp;quot;other&amp;quot; cultures. So Orientalism aided and was aided by general cultural pressures that tended to make more rigid the sense of difference between the European and Asiatic parts of the world. My contention is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient&#039;s difference with its weakness.&lt;br /&gt;
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This proposition was introduced early in Chapter One, and nearly everything in the pages that followed was intended in part as a corroboration of it. The very presence of a &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; such as Orientalism, with no corresponding equivalent in the Orient itself, suggests the relative strength of Orient and Occident. A vast number of pages on the Orient exist, and they of course signify a degree and quantity of interaction with the Orient that are quite formidable; but the crucial index of Western strength is that there is no possibility of comparing the movement of Westerners eastwards (since the end of the eighteenth century) with the movement of Easterners westwards. Leaving aside the fact that Western armies, consular corps, merchants, and scientific and archaeological expeditions were always going East, the number of travelers from the Islamic East to Europe between 1800 and 1900 is minuscule when compared with the number in the other direction.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The number of Arab travelers to the West is estimated and considered by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod in &#039;&#039;Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 75-6 and passim.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Moreover, the Eastern travelers in the West were there to learn from and to gape at an advanced culture; the purposes of the Western travelers in the Orient were, as we have seen, of quite a different order. In addition, it has been estimated that around 60,000 books dealing with the Near Orient were written between 1800 and 1950; there is no remotely comparable figure for Oriental books about the West. As a cultural apparatus Orientalism is all aggression, activity, judgment, will-to-truth, and knowledge. The Orient existed for the West, or so it seemed to countless Orientalists, whose attitude to what they worked on was either paternalistic or candidly condescending--unless, of course, they were antiquarians, in which case the &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Orient was a credit to &#039;&#039;them&#039;&#039; and not to the lamentable modern Orient. And then, beefing up the Western scholars&#039; work, there were numerous agencies and institutions with no parallels in Oriental society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such an imbalance between East and West is obviously a function of changing historical patterns. During its political and military heyday from the eighth century to the sixteenth, Islam dominated both East and West. Then the center of power shifted westwards, and now in the late twentieth century it seems to be directing itself back towards the East again. My account of nineteenth-century Orientalism in Chapter Two stopped at a particularly charged period in the latter part of the century, when the often dilatory, abstract, and projective aspects of Orientalism were about to take on a new sense of worldly mission in the service of formal colonialism. It is this project and this moment that I want now to describe, especially since it will furnish us with some important background for the twentieth-century crises of Orientalism and the resurgence of political and cultural strength in the East.&lt;br /&gt;
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On several occasions I have alluded to the connections between Orientalism as a body of ideas, beliefs, cliches, or learning about the East, and other schools of thought at large in the culture. Now one of the important developments in nineteenth-century Orientalism was the distillation of essential ideas about the Orient--its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness--into a separate and unchallenged coherence; thus for a writer to use the word &#039;&#039;Oriental&#039;&#039; was a reference for the reader sufficient to identify a specific body of information about the Orient. This information seemed to be morally neutral and objectively valid; it seemed to have an epistemological status equal to that of historical chronology or geographical location. In its most basic form, then, Oriental material could not really be violated by anyone&#039;s discoveries, nor did it seem ever to be revaluated completely. Instead, the work of various nineteenth-century scholars and of imaginative writers made this essential body of knowledge more clear, more detailed, more substantial--and more distinct from &amp;quot;Occidentalism.&amp;quot; Yet Orientalist ideas could enter into alliance with general philosophical theories (such as those about the history of mankind and civilization) and diffuse world-hypotheses, as philosophers sometimes call them; and in many ways the professional contributors to Oriental knowledge were anxious to couch their formulations and ideas, their scholarly work, their considered contemporary observations, in language and terminology whose cultural validity derived from other sciences and systems of thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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The distinction I am making is really between an almost unconscious (and certainly an untouchable) positivity, which I shall call &#039;&#039;latent&#039;&#039; Orientalism, and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology, and so forth, which I shall call &#039;&#039;manifest&#039;&#039; Orientalism. Whatever change occurs in knowledge of the Orient is found almost exclusively in manifest Orientalism; the unanimity, stability, and durability of latent Orientalism are more or less constant. In the nineteenth-century writers I analyzed in Chapter Two, the differences in their ideas about the Orient can be characterized as exclusively manifest differences, differences in form and personal style, rarely in basic content. Every one of them kept intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability; this is why every writer on the Orient, from Renan to Marx (ideologically speaking), or from the most rigorous scholars (Lane and Sacy) to the most powerful imaginations (Flaubert and Nerval), saw the Orient as a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption. The Orient existed as a place isolated from the mainstream of European progress in the sciences, arts, and commerce. Thus whatever good or bad values were imputed to the Orient appeared to be functions of some highly specialized Western interest in the Orient. This was the situation from about the 1870s on through the early part of the twentieth century--but let me give some examples that illustrate what I mean.&lt;br /&gt;
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Theses of Oriental backwardness, degeneracy, and inequality with the West most easily associated themselves early in the nineteenth century with ideas about the biological bases of racial inequality. Thus the racial classifications found in Cuvier&#039;s &#039;&#039;Le Regne animal&#039;&#039;, Gobineau&#039;s &#039;&#039;Essai sur l&#039;inegalite des races humaines&#039;&#039;, and Robert Knox&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Races of Man&#039;&#039; found a willing partner in latent Orientalism. To these ideas was added second-order Darwinism, which seemed to accentuate the &amp;quot;scientific&amp;quot; validity of the division of races into advanced and backward, or European-Aryan and Oriental-African. Thus the whole question of imperialism, as it was debated in the late nineteenth century by pro-imperialists and anti-imperialists alike, carried forward the binary typology of advanced and backward (or subject) races, cultures, and societies. John Westlake&#039;s &#039;&#039;Chapters on the Principles of International Law&#039;&#039; (1894) argues, for example, that regions of the earth designated as &amp;quot;uncivilized&amp;quot; (a word carrying the freight of Orientalist assumptions, among others) ought to be annexed or occupied by advanced powers. Similarly, the ideas of such writers as Carl Peters, Leopold de Saussure, and Charles Temple draw on the advanced/backward binarism&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Philip D. Curtin, ed., &#039;&#039;Imperialism: The Documentary History of Western Civilization&#039;&#039; (New York: Walker &amp;amp; Co., 1972), pp. 73-105.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; so centrally advocated in late-nineteenth-century Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Along with all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized, and retarded, the Orientals were viewed in a framework constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political admonishment. The Oriental was linked thus to elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien. Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined or--as the colonial powers openly coveted their territory--taken over. The point is that the very designation of something as Oriental involved an already pronounced evaluative judgment, and in the case of the peoples inhabiting the decayed Ottoman Empire, an implicit program of action. Since the Oriental was a member of a subject race, he had to be subjected: it was that simple. The &#039;&#039;locus classicus&#039;&#039; for such judgment and action is to be found in Gustave Le Bon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Les Lois psychologiques de l&#039;evolution des peuples&#039;&#039; (1894).&lt;br /&gt;
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But there were other uses for latent Orientalism. If that group of ideas allowed one to separate Orientals from advanced, civilizing powers, and if the &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Orient served to justify both the Orientalist and his disregard of modern Orientals, latent Orientalism also encouraged a peculiarly (not to say invidiously) male conception of the world. I have already referred to this in passing during my discussion of Renan. The Oriental male was considered in isolation from the total community in which he lived and which many Orientalists, following Lane, have viewed with something resembling contempt and fear. Orientalism itself, furthermore, was an exclusively male province; like so many professional guilds during the modern period, it viewed itself and its subject matter with sexist blinders. This is especially evident in the writing of travelers and novelists: women are usually the creatures of a male power-fantasy. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing. Flaubert&#039;s Kuchuk Hanem is the prototype of such caricatures, which were common enough in pornographic novels (e.g., Pierre Louys&#039;s &#039;&#039;Aphrodite&#039;&#039;) whose novelty draws on the Orient for their interest. Moreover the male conception of the world, in its effect upon the practicing Orientalist, tends to be static, frozen, fixed eternally. The very possibility of development, transformation, human movement--in the deepest sense of the word--is denied the Orient and the Oriental. As a known and ultimately an immobilized or unproductive quality, they come to be identified with a bad sort of eternality: hence, when the Orient is being approved, such phrases as &amp;quot;the wisdom of the East.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Transferred from an implicit social evaluation to a grandly cultural one, this static male Orientalism took on a variety of forms in the late nineteenth century, especially when Islam was being discussed. General cultural historians as respected as Leopold von Ranke and Jacob Burckhardt assailed Islam as if they were dealing not so much with an anthropomorphic abstraction as with a religio-political culture about which deep generalizations were possible and warranted: in his &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichte&#039;&#039; (1881-1888) Ranke spoke of Islam as defeated by the Germanic-Romanic peoples, and in his &amp;quot;Historische Fragmente&amp;quot; (unpublished notes, 1893) Burckhardt spoke of Islam as wretched; bare, and trivial.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Johann W. Fuck, &amp;quot;Islam as an Historical Problem in European Historiography since 1800,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Historians of the Middle East&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 307.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Such intellectual operations were carried out with considerably more flair and enthusiasm by Oswald Spengler, whose ideas about a Magian personality (typified by the Muslim Oriental) infuse &#039;&#039;Der Untergang des Abendlandes&#039;&#039; (1918-1922) and the &amp;quot;morphology&amp;quot; of cultures it advocates.&lt;br /&gt;
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What these widely diffused notions of the Orient depended on was the almost total absence in contemporary Western culture of the Orient as a genuinely felt and experienced force. For a number of evident reasons the Orient was always in the position both of outsider and of incorporated weak partner for the West. To the extent that Western scholars were aware of contemporary Orientals or Oriental movements of thought and culture, these were perceived either as silent shadows to be animated by the Orientalist, brought into reality by him, or as a kind of cultural and intellectual proletariat useful for the Orientalist&#039;s grander interpretative activity, necessary for his performance as superior judge, learned man, powerful cultural will. I mean to say that in discussions of the Orient, the Orient is all absence, whereas one feels the Orientalist and what he says as presence; yet we must not forget that the Orientalist&#039;s presence is enabled by the Orient&#039;s effective absence. This fact of substitution and displacement, as we must call it, clearly places on the Orientalist himself a certain pressure to reduce the Orient in his work, even after he has devoted a good deal of time to elucidating and exposing it. How else can one explain major scholarly production of the type we associate with Julius Wellhausen and Theodor Noldeke and, overriding it, those bare, sweeping statements that almost totally denigrate their chosen subject matter? Thus Noldeke could declare in 1887 that the sum total of his work as an Orientalist was to confirm his &amp;quot;low opinion&amp;quot; of the Eastern peoples.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 309.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And like Carl Becker, Noldeke was a philhellenist, who showed his love of Greece curiously by displaying a positive dislike of the Orient, which after all was what he studied as a scholar.&lt;br /&gt;
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A very valuable and intelligent study of Orientalism--Jacques Waardenburg&#039;s &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;--examines five important experts as makers of an image of Islam. Waardenburg&#039;s mirror-image metaphor for late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Orientalism is apt. In the work of each of his eminent Orientalists there is a highly tendentious--in four cases out of the five, even hostile--vision of Islam, as if each man saw Islam as a reflection of his own chosen weakness. Each scholar was profoundly learned, and the style of his contribution was unique. The five Orientalists among them exemplify what was best and strongest in the tradition during the period roughly from the 1880s to the interwar years. Yet Ignaz Goldziher&#039;s appreciation of Islam&#039;s tolerance towards other religions was undercut by his dislike of Mohammed&#039;s anthropomorphisms and Islam&#039;s too-exterior theology and jurisprudence; Duncan Black Macdonald&#039;s interest in Islamic piety and orthodoxy was vitiated by his perception of what he considered Islam&#039;s heretical Christianity; Carl Becker&#039;s understanding of Islamic civilization made him see it as a sadly undeveloped one; C. Snouck Hurgronje&#039;s highly refined studies of Islamic mysticism (which he considered the essential part of Islam) led him to a harsh judgment of its crippling limitations; and Louis Massignon&#039;s extraordinary identification with Muslim theology, mystical passion, and poetic art kept him curiously unforgiving to Islam for what he regarded as its unregenerate revolt against the idea of incarnation. The manifest differences in their methods emerge as less important than their Orientalist consensus on Islam: latent inferiority.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jacques Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039; (The Hague: Mouton &amp;amp; Co., 1963).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Waardenburg&#039;s study has the additional virtue of showing how these five scholars shared a common intellectual and methodological tradition whose unity was truly international. Ever since the first Orientalist congress in 1873, scholars in the field have known each other&#039;s work and felt each other&#039;s presence very directly. What Waardenburg does not stress enough is that most of the late-nineteenth-century Orientalists were bound to each other politically as well. Snouck Hurgronje went directly from his studies of Islam to being an adviser to the Dutch government on handling its Muslim Indonesian colonies; Macdonald and Massignon were widely sought after as experts on Islamic matters by colonial administrators from North Africa to Pakistan; and, as Waardenburg says (all too briefly) at one point, all five scholars shaped a coherent vision of Islam that had a wide influence on government circles throughout the Western world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 311.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; What we must add to Waardenburg&#039;s observation is that these scholars were completing, bringing to an ultimate concrete refinement, the tendency since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to treat the Orient not only as a vague literary problem but--according to Masson-Oursel--as &amp;quot;un ferme propos d&#039;assimiler adequatement la valeur des langues pour penetrer les moeurs et les pensees, pour forcer meme des secrets de l&#039;histoire.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. Masson-Oursel, &amp;quot;La Connaissance scientifique de l&#039;Asie en France depuis 1900 et les varietes de l&#039;Orientalisme,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Revue Philosophique&#039;&#039; 143, nos. 7-9 (July-September 1953): 345.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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I spoke earlier of incorporation and assimilation of the Orient, as these activities were practiced by writers as different from each other as Dante and d&#039;Herbelot. Clearly there is a difference between those efforts and what, by the end of the nineteenth century, had become a truly formidable European cultural, political, and material enterprise. The nineteenth-century colonial &amp;quot;scramble for Africa&amp;quot; was by no means limited to Africa, of course. Neither was the penetration of the Orient entirely a sudden, dramatic afterthought following years of scholarly study of Asia. What we must reckon with is a long and slow process of appropriation by which Europe, or the European awareness of the Orient, transformed itself from being textual and contemplative into being administrative, economic, and even military. The fundamental change was a spatial and geographical one, or rather it was a change in the quality of geographical and spatial apprehension so far as the Orient was concerned. The centuries-old designation of geographical space to the east of Europe as &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; was partly political, partly doctrinal, and partly imaginative; it implied no necessary connection between actual experience of the Orient and knowledge of what is Oriental, and certainly Dante and d&#039;Herbelot made no claims about their Oriental ideas except that they were corroborated by a long &#039;&#039;learned&#039;&#039; (and not existential) tradition. But when Lane, Renan, Burton, and the many hundreds of nineteenth-century European travelers and scholars discuss the Orient, we can immediately note a far more intimate and even proprietary attitude towards the Orient and things Oriental. In the classical and often temporally remote form in which it was reconstructed by the Orientalist, in the precisely actual form in which the modern Orient was lived in, studied, or imagined, the &#039;&#039;geographical space&#039;&#039; of the Orient was penetrated, worked over, taken hold of. The cumulative effect of decades of so sovereign a Western handling turned the Orient from alien into colonial space. What was important in the latter nineteenth century was not &#039;&#039;whether&#039;&#039; the West had penetrated and possessed the Orient, but rather &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; the British and French felt that they had done it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The British writer on the Orient, and even more so the British colonial administrator, was dealing with territory about which there could be no doubt that English power was truly in the ascendant, even if the natives were on the face of it attracted to France and French modes of thought. So far as the actual space of the Orient was concerned, however, England was really there, France was not, except as a flighty temptress of the Oriental yokels. There is no better indication of this qualitative difference in spatial attitudes than to look at what Lord Cromer had to say on the subject, one that was especially dear to his heart:&lt;br /&gt;
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The reasons why French civilisation presents a special degree of attraction to Asiatics and Levantines are plain. It is, as a matter of fact, more attractive than the civilisations of England and Germany, and, moreover, it is more easy of imitation. Compare the undemonstrative, shy Englishman, with his social exclusiveness and insular habits, with the vivacious and cosmopolitan Frenchman, who does not know what the word shyness means, and who in ten minutes is apparently on terms of intimate friendship with any casual acquaintance he may chance to make. The semi-educated Oriental does not recognise that the former has, at all events, the merit of sincerity, whilst the latter is often merely acting a part. He looks coldly on the Englishman, and rushes into the arms of the Frenchman.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sexual innuendoes develop more or less naturally thereafter. The Frenchman is all smiles, wit, grace, and fashion; the Englishman is plodding, industrious, Baconian, precise. Cromer&#039;s case is of course based on British solidity as opposed to a French seductiveness without any real presence in Egyptian reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can it be any matter for surprise [Cromer continues] that the Egyptian, with his light intellectual ballast, fails to see that some fallacy often lies at the bottom of the Frenchman&#039;s reasoning, or that he prefers the rather superficial brilliancy of the Frenchman to the plodding, unattractive industry of the Englishman or the German? Look, again, at the theoretical perfection of French administrative systems, at their elaborate detail, and at the provision which is apparently made to meet every possible contingency which may arise. Compare these features with the Englishman&#039;s practical systems, which lay down rules as to a few main points, and leave a mass of detail to individual discretion. The half-educated Egyptian naturally prefers the Frenchman&#039;s system, for it is to all outward appearance more perfect and more easy of application. He fails, moreover, to see that the Englishman desires to elaborate a system which will suit the facts with which he has to deal, whereas the main objection to applying French administrative procedures to Egypt is that the facts have but too often to conform to the ready-made system.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since there is a real British presence in Egypt, and since that presence--according to Cromer--is there not so much to train the Egyptian&#039;s mind as to &amp;quot;form his character,&amp;quot; it follows therefore that the ephemeral attractions of the French are those of a pretty damsel with &amp;quot;somewhat artificial charms,&amp;quot; whereas those of the British belong to &amp;quot;a sober, elderly matron of perhaps somewhat greater moral worth, but of less pleasing outward appearance.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1908), 2: 237-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Underlying Cromer&#039;s contrast between the solid British nanny and the French coquette is the sheer privilege of British emplacement in the Orient. &amp;quot;The facts with which he [the Englishman] has to deal&amp;quot; are altogether more complex and interesting, by virtue of their possession by England, than anything the mercurial French could point to. Two years after the publication of his &#039;&#039;Modern Egypt&#039;&#039; (1908), Cromer expatiated philosophically in &#039;&#039;Ancient and Modern Imperialism&#039;&#039;. Compared with Roman imperialism, with its frankly assimilationist, exploitative, and repressive policies, British imperialism seemed to Cromer to be preferable, if somewhat more wishy-washy. On certain points, however, the British were clear enough, even if &amp;quot;after a rather dim, slipshod, but characteristically Anglo-Saxon fashion,&amp;quot; their Empire seemed undecided between &amp;quot;one of two bases--an extensive military occupation or the principle of nationality [for subject races].&amp;quot; But this indecision was academic finally, for in practice Cromer and Britain itself had opted against &amp;quot;the principle of nationality.&amp;quot; And then there were other things to be noted. One point was that the Empire was not going to be given up. Another was that intermarriage between natives and English men and women was undesirable. Third--and most important, I think--Cromer conceived of British imperial presence in the Eastern colonies as having had a lasting, not to say cataclysmic, effect on the minds and societies of the East. His metaphor for expressing this effect is almost theological, so powerful in Cromer&#039;s mind was the idea of Western penetration of Oriental expanses. &amp;quot;The country,&amp;quot; he says, &amp;quot;over which the breath of the West, heavily charged with scientific thought, has once passed, and has, in passing, left an enduring mark, can never be the same as it was before.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, &#039;&#039;Ancient and Modern Imperialism&#039;&#039; (London: John Murray, 1910), pp. 118, 120.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In such respects as these, nonetheless, Cromer&#039;s was far from an original intelligence. What he saw and how he expressed it were common currency among his colleagues both in the imperial Establishment and in the intellectual community. This consensus is notably true in the case of Cromer&#039;s viceregal colleagues, Curzon, Swettenham, and Lugard. Lord Curzon in particular always spoke the imperial lingua franca, and more obtrusively even than Cromer he delineated the relationship between Britain and the Orient in terms of possession, in terms of a large geographical space wholly owned by an efficient colonial master. For him, he said on one occasion, the Empire was not an &amp;quot;object of ambition&amp;quot; but &amp;quot;first and foremost, a great historical and political and sociological fact.&amp;quot; In 1909 he reminded delegates to the Imperial Press Conference meeting at Oxford that &amp;quot;we train here and we send out to you your governors and administrators and judges, your teachers and preachers and lawyers.&amp;quot; And this almost pedagogical view of empire had, for Curzon, a specific setting in Asia, which as he once put it, made &amp;quot;one pause and think.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I sometimes like to picture to myself this great Imperial fabric as a huge structure like some Tennysonian &amp;quot;Palace of Art,&amp;quot; of which the foundations are in this country, where they have been laid and must be maintained by British hands, but of which the Colonies are the pillars, and high above all floats the vastness of an Asiatic dome.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Nathaniel Curzon, &#039;&#039;Subjects of the Day: Being a Selection of Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039; (London: George Allen &amp;amp; Unwin, 1915), pp. 4-5, 10, 28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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With such a Tennysonian Palace of Art in mind, Curzon and Cromer were enthusiastic members together of a departmental committee formed in 1909 to press for the creation of a school of Oriental studies. Aside from remarking wistfully that had he known the vernacular he would have been helped during his &amp;quot;famine tours&amp;quot; in India, Curzon argued for Oriental studies as part of the British responsibility to the Orient. On September 27, 1909, he told the House of Lords that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
our familiarity, not merely with the languages of the people of the East but with their customs, their feelings, their traditions, their history and religion, our capacity to understand what may be called the genius of the East, is the sole basis upon which we are likely to be able to maintain in the future the position we have won, and no step that can be taken to strengthen that position can be considered undeserving of the attention of His Majesty&#039;s Government or of a debate in the House of Lords.&lt;br /&gt;
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At a Mansion House conference on the subject five years later, Curzon finally dotted the i&#039;s. Oriental studies were no intellectual luxury; they were, he said,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
a great Imperial obligation. In my view the creation of a school [of Oriental studies--later to become the London University School of Oriental and African Studies] like this in London is part of the necessary furniture of Empire. Those of us who, in one way or another, have spent a number of years in the East, who regard that as the happiest portion of our lives, and who think that the work that we did there, be it great or small, was the highest responsibility that can be placed upon the shoulders of Englishmen, feel that there is a gap in our national equipment which ought emphatically to be filled, and that those in the City of London who, by financial support or by any other form of active and practical assistance, take their part in filling that gap, will be rendering a patriotic duty to the Empire and promoting the cause and goodwill among mankind.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 184, 191-2. For the history of the school, see C. H. Phillips, &#039;&#039;The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1917-1967: An Introduction&#039;&#039; (London: Design for Print, 1967).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To a very great extent Curzon&#039;s ideas about Oriental studies derive logically from a good century of British utilitarian administration of and philosophy about the Eastern colonies. The influence of Bentham and the Mills on British rule in the Orient (and India particularly) was considerable, and was effective in doing away with too much regulation and innovation; instead, as Eric Stokes has convincingly shown, utilitarianism combined with the legacies of liberalism and evangelicalism as philosophies of British rule in the East stressed the rational importance of a strong executive armed with various legal and penal codes, a system of doctrines on such matters as frontiers and land rents, and everywhere an irreducible supervisory imperial authority.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Eric Stokes, &#039;&#039;The English Utilitarians and India&#039;&#039; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The cornerstone of the whole system was a constantly refined knowledge of the Orient, so that as traditional societies hastened forward and became modern commercial societies, there would be no loss of paternal British control, and no loss of revenue either. However, when Curzon referred somewhat inelegantly to Oriental studies as &amp;quot;the necessary furniture of Empire,&amp;quot; he was putting into a static image the transactions by which Englishmen and natives conducted their business and kept their places. From the days of Sir William Jones the Orient had been both what Britain ruled and what Britain knew about it: the coincidence between geography, knowledge, and power, with Britain always in the master&#039;s place, was complete. To have said, as Curzon once did, that &amp;quot;the East is a University in which the scholar never takes his degree&amp;quot; was another way of saying that the East required one&#039;s presence there more or less forever.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Michael Edwardes, &#039;&#039;High Noon of Empire: India Under Curzon&#039;&#039; (London: Eyre &amp;amp; Spottiswoode, 1965), pp. 38-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But then there were the other European powers, France and Russia among them, that made the British presence always a (perhaps marginally) threatened one. Curzon was certainly aware that all the major Western powers felt towards the world as Britain did. The transformation of geography from &amp;quot;dull and pedantic&amp;quot;--Curzon&#039;s phrase for what had now dropped out of geography as an academic subject--into &amp;quot;the most cosmopolitan of all sciences&amp;quot; argued &#039;&#039;exactly&#039;&#039; that new Western and widespread predilection. Not for nothing did Curzon in 1912 tell the Geographical Society, of which he was president, that&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
an absolute revolution has occurred, not merely in the manner and methods of teaching geography, but in the estimation in which it is held by public opinion. Nowadays we regard geographical knowledge as an essential part of knowledge in general. By the aid of geography, and in no other way, do we understand the action of great natural forces, the distribution of population, the growth of commerce, the expansion of frontiers, the development of States, the splendid achievements of human energy in its various manifestations.&lt;br /&gt;
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We recognize geography as the handmaid of history.... Geography, too, is a sister science to economics and politics; and to any of us who have attempted to study geography it is known that the moment you diverge from the geographical field you find yourself crossing the frontiers of geology, zoology, ethnology, chemistry, physics, and almost all the kindred sciences. Therefore we are justified in saying that geography is one of the first and foremost of the sciences: that it is part of the equipment that is necessary for a proper conception of citizenship, and is an indispensable adjunct to the production of a public man.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Curzon, &#039;&#039;Subjects of the Day&#039;&#039;, pp. 155-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Geography was essentially the material underpinning for knowledge about the Orient. All the latent and unchanging characteristics of the Orient stood upon, were rooted in, its geography. Thus on the one hand the geographical Orient nourished its inhabitants, guaranteed their characteristics, and defined their specificity; on the other hand, the geographical Orient solicited the West&#039;s attention, even as--by one of those paradoxes revealed so frequently by organized knowledge--East was East and West was West. The cosmopolitanism of geography was, in Curzon&#039;s mind, its universal importance to the whole of the West, whose relationship to the rest of the world was one of frank covetousness. Yet geographical appetite could also take on the moral neutrality of an epistemological impulse to find out, to settle upon, to uncover--as when in &#039;&#039;Heart of Darkness&#039;&#039; Marlow confesses to having a passion for maps.&lt;br /&gt;
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I would look for hours at South America, or Africa, or Australia, and lose myself in all the glories of exploration. At that time there were many blank spaces on the earth, and when I saw one that looked particularly inviting on a map (but they all look that) I would put my finger on it and say, When I grow up I will go there.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Conrad, &#039;&#039;Heart of Darkness&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Youth and Two Other Stories&#039;&#039; (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1925), p. 52.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Seventy years or so before Marlow said this, it did not trouble Lamartine that what on a map was a blank space was inhabited by natives; nor, theoretically, had there been any reservation in the mind of Emer de Vattel, the Swiss-Prussian authority on international law, when in 1758 he invited European states to take possession of territory inhabited only by mere wandering tribes.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For an illustrative extract from de Vattel&#039;s work see Curtin, ed., &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, pp. 42-5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The important thing was to dignify simple conquest with an idea, to turn the appetite for more geographical space into a theory about the special relationship between geography on the one hand and civilized or uncivilized peoples on the other. But to these rationalizations there was also a distinctively French contribution.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the end of the nineteenth century, political and intellectual circumstances coincided sufficiently in France to make geography, and geographical speculation (in both senses of that word), an attractive national pastime. The general climate of opinion in Europe was propitious; certainly the successes of British imperialism spoke loudly enough for themselves. However, Britain always seemed to France and to French thinkers on the subject to block even a relatively successful French imperial role in the Orient. Before the Franco-Prussian War there was a good deal of wishful political thinking about the Orient, and it was not confined to poets and novelists. Here, for instance, is Saint-Marc Girardin writing in the &#039;&#039;Revue des Deux Mondes&#039;&#039; on March 15, 1862:&lt;br /&gt;
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La France a beaucoup a faire en Orient, parce que l&#039;Orient attend beaucoup d&#039;elle. Il lui demande meme plus qu&#039;elle ne peut faire; il lui remettrait volontiers le soin entier de son avenir, ce qui serait pour la France et pour l&#039;Orient un grand danger: pour la France, parce que, disposee a prendre en mains la cause des populations souffrantes, elle se charge le plus souvent de plus d&#039;obligations qu&#039;elle n&#039;en peut remplir; pour l&#039;Orient, parce que tout peuple qui attend sa destinee de l&#039;etranger n&#039;a jamais qu&#039;une condition precaire et qu&#039;il n&#039;y a de salut pour les nations que celui qu&#039;elles se font elles-memes.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited by M. de Caix, &#039;&#039;La Syrie&#039;&#039; in Gabriel Hanotaux, &#039;&#039;Histoire des colonies francaises&#039;&#039;, 6 vols. (Paris: Societe de l&#039;histoire nationale, 1929-33), 3: 481.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Of such views as this Disraeli would doubtless have said, as he often did, that France had only &amp;quot;sentimental interests&amp;quot; in Syria (which is the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; of which Girardin was writing). The fiction of &amp;quot;populations souffrantes&amp;quot; had of course been used by Napoleon when he appealed to the Egyptians on their behalf against the Turks and for Islam. During the thirties, forties, fifties, and sixties the suffering populations of the Orient were limited to the Christian minorities in Syria. And there was no record of &amp;quot;l&#039;Orient&amp;quot; appealing to France for its salvation. It would have been altogether more truthful to say that Britain stood in France&#039;s way in the Orient, for even if France genuinely felt a sense of obligation to the Orient (and there were some Frenchmen who did), there was very little France could do to get between Britain and the huge land mass it commanded from India to the Mediterranean.&lt;br /&gt;
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Among the most remarkable consequences of the War of 1870 in France were a tremendous efflorescence of geographical societies and a powerfully renewed demand for territorial acquisition. At the end of 1871 the Societe de geographie de Paris declared itself no longer confined to &amp;quot;scientific speculation.&amp;quot; It urged the citizenry not to &amp;quot;forget that our former preponderance was contested from the day we ceased to compete ... in the conquests of civilization over barbarism.&amp;quot; Guillaume Depping, a leader of what has come to be called the geographical movement, asserted in 1881 that during the 1870 war &amp;quot;it was the schoolmaster who triumphed,&amp;quot; meaning that the real triumphs were those of Prussian scientific geography over French strategic sloppiness. The government&#039;s &#039;&#039;Journal officiel&#039;&#039; sponsored issue after issue centered on the virtues (and profits) of geographical exploration and colonial adventure; a citizen could learn in one issue from de Lesseps of &amp;quot;the opportunities in Africa&amp;quot; and from Gamier of &amp;quot;the exploration of the Blue River.&amp;quot; Scientific geography soon gave way to &amp;quot;commercial geography,&amp;quot; as the connection between national pride in scientific and civilizational achievement and the fairly rudimentary profit motive was urged, to be channeled into support for colonial acquisition. In the words of one enthusiast, &amp;quot;The geographical societies are formed to break the fatal charm that holds us enchained to our shores.&amp;quot; In aid of this liberating quest all sorts of schemes were spun out, including the enlisting of Jules Verne--whose &amp;quot;unbelievable success,&amp;quot; as it was called, ostensibly displayed the scientific mind at a very high peak of ratiocination--to head &amp;quot;a round-the-world campaign of scientific exploration,&amp;quot; and a plan for creating a vast new sea just south of the North African coast, as well as a project for &amp;quot;binding&amp;quot; Algeria to Senegal by railroad--&amp;quot;a ribbon of steel,&amp;quot; as the projectors called it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;These details are to be found in Vernon McKay, &amp;quot;Colonialism in the French Geographical Movement,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Geographical Review&#039;&#039; 33, no. 2 (April 1943): 214-32.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the expansionist fervor in France during the last third of the nineteenth century was generated out of an explicit wish to compensate for the Prussian victory in 1870-1871 and, no less important, the desire to match British imperial achievements. So powerful was the latter desire, and out of so long a tradition of Anglo-French rivalry in the Orient did it derive, that France seemed literally haunted by Britain, anxious in all things connected with the Orient to catch up with and emulate the British. When in the late 1870s, the Societe academique indo-chinoise reformulated its goals, it found it important to &amp;quot;bring Indochina into the domain of Orientalism.&amp;quot; Why? In order to turn Cochin China into a &amp;quot;French India.&amp;quot; The absence of substantial colonial holdings was blamed by military men for that combination of military and commercial weakness in the war with Prussia, to say nothing of long-standing and pronounced colonial inferiority compared with Britain. The &amp;quot;power of expansion of the Western races,&amp;quot; argued a leading geographer, La Ronciere Le Noury, &amp;quot;its superior causes, its elements, its influences on human destinies, will be a beautiful study for future historians.&amp;quot; Yet only if the white races indulged their taste for voyaging--a mark of their intellectual supremacy--could colonial expansion occur.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Agnes Murphy, &#039;&#039;The Ideology of French Imperialism, 1817-1881&#039;&#039; (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1948), pp. 46, 54, 36, 45.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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From such theses as this came the commonly held view of the Orient as a geographical space to be cultivated, harvested, and guarded. The images of agricultural care for and those of frank sexual attention to the Orient proliferated accordingly. Here is a typical effusion by Gabriel Charmes, writing in 1880:&lt;br /&gt;
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On that day when we shall be no longer in the Orient, and when other great European powers will be there, all will be at an end for our commerce in the Mediterranean, for our future in Asia, for the traffic of our southern ports. &#039;&#039;One of the most fruitful sources of our national wealth will be dried up&#039;&#039;. (Emphasis added)&lt;br /&gt;
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Another thinker, Leroy-Beaulieu, elaborated this philosophy still further:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A society colonizes, when itself having reached a high degree of maturity and of strength, it procreates, it protects, it places in good conditions of development, and it brings to virility a new society to which it has given birth. Colonization is one of the most complex and delicate phenomena of social physiology.&lt;br /&gt;
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This equation of self-reproduction with colonization led Leroy-Beaulieu to the somewhat sinister idea that whatever is lively in a modern society is &amp;quot;magnified by this pouring out of its exuberant activity on the outside.&amp;quot; Therefore, he said,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Colonization is the expansive force of a people; it is its power of reproduction; &#039;&#039;it is its enlargement and its multiplication through space&#039;&#039;; it is the subjection of the universe or a vast part of it to that people&#039;s language, customs, ideas, and laws.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 189, 110, 136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The point here is that the space of weaker or underdeveloped regions like the Orient was viewed as something inviting French interest, penetration, insemination--in short, colonization. Geographical conceptions, literally and figuratively, did away with the discrete entities held in by borders and frontiers. No less than entrepreneurial visionaries like de Lesseps, whose plan was to liberate the Orient and the Occident from their geographical bonds, French scholars, administrators, geographers, and commercial agents poured out their exuberant activity onto the fairly supine, feminine Orient. There were the geographical societies, whose number and membership outdid those of all Europe by a factor of two; there were such powerful organizations as the Comite de l&#039;Asie francaise and the Comite d&#039;Orient; there were the learned societies, chief among them the Societe asiatique, with its organization and membership firmly embedded in the universities, the institutes, and the government. Each in its own way made French interests in the Orient more real, more substantial. Almost an entire century of what now seemed passive study of the Orient had had to end, as France faced up to its transnational responsibilities during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the only part of the Orient where British and French interests literally overlapped, the territory of the now hopelessly ill Ottoman Empire, the two antagonists managed their conflict with an almost perfect and characteristic consistency. Britain was &#039;&#039;in&#039;&#039; Egypt and Mesopotamia; through a series of quasi-fictional treaties with local (and powerless) chiefs it controlled the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Suez Canal, as well as most of the intervening land mass between the Mediterranean and India. France, on the other hand, seemed fated to hover over the Orient, descending once in a while to carry out schemes that repeated de Lesseps&#039;s success with the canal; for the most part these schemes were railroad projects, such as the one planned across more or less British territory, the Syrian-Mesopotamian line. In addition France saw itself as the protector of Christian minorities--Maronites, Chaldeans, Nestorians. Yet together, Britain and France were agreed in principle on the necessity, when the time came, for the partition of Asiatic Turkey. Both before and during World War I secret diplomacy was bent on carving up the Near Orient first into spheres of influence, then into mandated (or occupied) territories. In France, much of the expansionist sentiment formed during the heyday of the geographical movement focused itself on plans to partition Asiatic Turkey, so much so that in Paris in 1914 &amp;quot;a spectacular press campaign was launched&amp;quot; to this end.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jukka Nevakivi, &#039;&#039;Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920&#039;&#039; (London: Athlone Press, 1969), p. 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In England numerous committees were empowered to study and recommend policy on the best ways of dividing up the Orient. Out of such commissions as the Bunsen Committee would come the joint Anglo-French teams of which the most famous was the one headed by Mark Sykes and Georges Picot. Equitable division of geographical space was the rule of these plans, which were deliberate attempts also at calming Anglo-French rivalry. For, as Sykes put it in a memorandum,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
it was clear ... that an Arab rising was sooner or later to take place, and that the French and ourselves ought to be on better terms if the rising was not to be a curse instead of a blessing....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 24.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The animosities remained. And to them was added the irritant provided by the Wilsonian program for national self-determination, which, as Sykes himself was to note, seemed to invalidate the whole skeleton of colonial and partitionary schemes arrived at jointly between the Powers. It would be out of place here to discuss the entire labyrinthine and deeply controversial history of the Near Orient in the early twentieth century, as its fate was being decided between the Powers, the native dynasties, the various nationalist parties and movements, the Zionists. What matters more immediately is the peculiar epistemological framework through which the Orient was seen, and out of which the Powers acted. For despite their differences, the British and the French saw the Orient as a geographical--and cultural, political, demographical, sociological, and historical--entity over whose destiny they believed themselves to have traditional entitlement. The Orient to them was no sudden discovery, no mere historical accident, but an area to the east of Europe whose principal worth was uniformly defined in terms of Europe, more particularly in terms specifically claiming for Europe--European science, scholarship, understanding, and administration--the credit for having made the Orient what it was now. And this had been the achievement--inadvertent or not is beside the point--of modern Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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There were two principal methods by which Orientalism delivered the Orient to the West in the early twentieth century. One was by means of the disseminative capacities of modern learning, its diffusive apparatus in the learned professions, the universities, the professional societies, the explorational and geographical organizations, the publishing industry. All these, as we have seen, built upon the prestigious authority of the pioneering scholars, travelers, and poets, whose cumulative vision had shaped a quintessential Orient; the doctrinal--or doxological--manifestation of such an Orient is what I have been calling here latent Orientalism. So far as anyone wishing to make a statement of any consequence about the Orient was concerned, latent Orientalism supplied him with an enunciative capacity that could be used, or rather mobilized, and turned into sensible discourse for the concrete occasion at hand. Thus when Balfour spoke about the Oriental to the House of Commons in 1910, he must surely have had in mind those enunciative capacities in the current and acceptably rational language of his time, by which something called an &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; could be named and talked about without danger of too much obscurity. But like all enunciative capacities and the discourses they enable, latent Orientalism was profoundly conservative--dedicated, that is, to its self-preservation. Transmitted from one generation to another, it was a part of the culture, as much a language about a part of reality as geometry or physics. Orientalism staked its existence, not upon its openness, its receptivity to the Orient, but rather on its internal, repetitious consistency about its constitutive will-to-power over the Orient. In such a way Orientalism was able to survive revolutions, world wars, and the literal dismemberment of empires.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second method by which Orientalism delivered the Orient to the West was the result of an important convergence. For decades the Orientalists had spoken about the Orient, they had translated texts, they had explained civilizations, religions, dynasties, cultures, mentalities--as academic objects, screened off from Europe by virtue of their inimitable foreignness. The Orientalist was an expert, like Renan or Lane, whose job in society was to interpret the Orient for his compatriots. The relation between Orientalist and Orient was essentially hermeneutical: standing before a distant, barely intelligible civilization or cultural monument, the Orientalist scholar reduced the obscurity by translating, sympathetically portraying, inwardly grasping the hard-to-reach object. Yet the Orientalist remained outside the Orient, which, however much it was made to appear intelligible, remained beyond the Occident. This cultural, temporal, and geographical distance was expressed in metaphors of depth, secrecy, and sexual promise: phrases like &amp;quot;the veils of an Eastern bride&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the inscrutable Orient&amp;quot; passed into the common language.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet the distance between Orient and Occident was, almost paradoxically, in the process of being reduced throughout the nineteenth century. As the commercial, political, and other existential encounters between East and West increased (in ways we have been discussing all along), a tension developed between the dogmas of latent Orientalism, with its support in studies of the &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Orient, and the descriptions of a present, modern, manifest Orient articulated by travelers, pilgrims, statesmen, and the like. At some moment impossible to determine precisely, the tension caused a convergence of the two types of Orientalism. Probably--and this is only a speculation--the convergence occurred when Orientalists, beginning with Sacy, undertook to advise governments on what the modern Orient was all about. Here the role of the specially trained and equipped expert took on an added dimension: the Orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of Western power as it attempted policy vis-a-vis the Orient. Every learned (and not so learned) European traveler in the Orient felt himself to be a representative Westerner who had gotten beneath the films of obscurity. This is obviously true of Burton, Lane, Doughty, Flaubert, and the other major figures I have been discussing.&lt;br /&gt;
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The discoveries of Westerners about the manifest and modern Orient acquired a pressing urgency as Western territorial acquisition in the Orient increased. Thus what the scholarly Orientalist defined as the &amp;quot;essential&amp;quot; Orient was sometimes contradicted, but in many cases was confirmed, when the Orient became an actual administrative obligation. Certainly Cromer&#039;s theories about the Oriental--theories acquired from the traditional Orientalist archive--were vindicated plentifully as he ruled millions of Orientals in actual fact. This was no less true of the French experience in Syria, North Africa, and elsewhere in the French colonies, such as they were. But at no time did the convergence between latent Orientalist doctrine and manifest Orientalist experience occur more dramatically than when, as a result of World War I, Asiatic Turkey was being surveyed by Britain and France for its dismemberment. There, laid out on an operating table for surgery, was the Sick Man of Europe, revealed in all his weakness, characteristics, and topographical outline.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist, with his special knowledge, played an inestimably important part in this surgery. Already there had been intimations of his crucial role as a kind of secret agent &#039;&#039;inside&#039;&#039; the Orient when the British scholar Edward Henry Palmer was sent to the Sinai in 1882 to gauge anti-British sentiment and its possible enlistment on behalf of the Arabi revolt. Palmer was killed in the process, but he was only the most unsuccessful of the many who performed similar services for the Empire, now a serious and exacting business entrusted in part to the regional &amp;quot;expert.&amp;quot; Not for nothing was another Orientalist, D. G. Hogarth, author of the famous account of the exploration of Arabia aptly titled &#039;&#039;The Penetration of Arabia&#039;&#039; (1904),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;D. G. Hogarth, &#039;&#039;The Penetration of Arabia: A Record of the Development of Western Knowledge Concerning The Arabian Peninsula&#039;&#039; (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1904). There is a good recent book on the same subject: Robin Bidwell, &#039;&#039;Travellers in Arabia&#039;&#039; (London: Paul Hamlyn, 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; made the head of the Arab Bureau in Cairo during World War I. And neither was it by accident that men and women like Gertrude Bell, T. E. Lawrence, and St. John Philby, Oriental experts all, posted to the Orient as agents of empire, friends of the Orient, formulators of policy alternatives because of their intimate and expert knowledge of the Orient and of Orientals. They formed a &amp;quot;band&amp;quot;--as Lawrence called it once--bound together by contradictory notions and personal similarities: great individuality, sympathy and intuitive identification with the Orient, a jealously preserved sense of personal mission in the Orient, cultivated eccentricity, a final disapproval of the Orient. For them all the Orient was their direct, peculiar experience of it. In them Orientalism and an effective praxis for handling the Orient received their final European form, before the Empire disappeared and passed its legacy to other candidates for the role of dominant power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such individualists as these were not academics. We shall soon see that they were the beneficiaries of the academic study of the Orient, without in any sense belonging to the official and professional company of Orientalist scholars. Their role, however, was not to scant academic Orientalism, nor to subvert it, but rather to make it effective. In their genealogy were people like Lane and Burton, as much for their encyclopedic autodidacticism as for the accurate, the quasi-scholarly knowledge of the Orient they had obviously deployed when dealing with or writing about Orientals. For the curricular study of the Orient they substituted a sort of elaboration of latent Orientalism, which was easily available to them in the imperial culture of their epoch. Their scholarly frame of reference, such as it was, was fashioned by people like William Muir, Anthony Bevan, D. S. Margoliouth, Charles Lyall, E. G. Browne, R. A. Nicholson, Guy Le Strange, E. D. Ross, and Thomas Arnold, who also followed directly in the line of descent from Lane. Their imaginative perspectives were provided principally by their illustrious contemporary Rudyard Kipling, who had sung so memorably of holding &amp;quot;dominion over palm and pine.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between Britain and France in such matters was perfectly consistent with the history of each nation in the Orient: the British were there; the French lamented the loss of India and the intervening territories. By the end of the century, Syria had become the main focus of French activity, but even there it was a matter of common consensus that the French could not match the British either in quality of personnel or in degree of political influence. The Anglo-French competition over the Ottoman spoils was felt even on the field of battle in the Hejaz, in Syria, in Mesopotamia--but in all these places, as astute men like Edmond Bremond noted, the French Orientalists and local experts were outclassed in brilliance and tactical maneuvering by their British counterparts.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Edmond Bremond, &#039;&#039;Le Hedjaz dans la guerre mondiale&#039;&#039; (Paris: Payot, 1931), pp. 242 ff.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Except for an occasional genius like Louis Massignon, there were no French Lawrences or Sykeses or Bells. But there were determined imperialists like Etienne Flandin and Franklin-Bouillon. Lecturing to the Paris Alliance francaise in 1913, the Comte de Cressaty, a vociferous imperialist, proclaimed Syria as France&#039;s own Orient, the site of French political, moral, and economic interests--interests, he added, that had to be defended during this &amp;quot;age des envahissants imperialistes&amp;quot;; and yet Cressaty noted that even with French commercial and industrial firms in the Orient, with by far the largest number of native students enrolled in French schools, France was invariably being pushed around in the Orient, threatened not only by Britain but by Austria, Germany, and Russia. If France was to continue to prevent &amp;quot;le retour de l&#039;Islam,&amp;quot; it had better take hold of the Orient: this was an argument proposed by Cressaty and seconded by Senator Paul Doumer.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Le Comte de Cressaty, &#039;&#039;Les Interets de la France en Syrie&#039;&#039; (Paris: Floury, 1913).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These views were repeated on numerous occasions, and indeed France did well by itself in North Africa and in Syria after World War I, but the special, concrete management of emerging Oriental populations and theoretically independent territories with which the British always credited themselves was something the French felt had eluded them. Ultimately, perhaps, the difference one always feels between modern British and modern French Orientalism is a stylistic one; the import of the generalizations about Orient and Orientals, the sense of distinction preserved between Orient and Occident, the desirability of Occidental dominance over the Orient--all these are the same in both traditions. For of the many elements making up what we customarily call &amp;quot;expertise,&amp;quot; style, which is the result of specific worldly circumstances being molded by tradition, institutions, will, and intelligence into formal articulation, is one of the most manifest. It is to this determinant, to this perceptible and modernized refinement in early-twentieth-century Orientalism in Britain and France, that we must now turn.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Style, Expertise, Vision: &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;s Worldliness&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
As he appears in several poems, in novels like &#039;&#039;Kim&#039;&#039;, and in too many catchphrases to be an ironic fiction, Kipling&#039;s White Man, as an idea, a persona, a style of being, seems to have served many Britishers while they were abroad. The actual color of their skin set them off dramatically and reassuringly from the sea of natives, but for the Britisher who circulated amongst Indians, Africans, or Arabs there was also the certain knowledge that he belonged to, and could draw upon the empirical and spiritual reserves of, a long tradition of executive responsibility towards the colored races. It was of this tradition, its glories and difficulties, that Kipling wrote when he celebrated the &amp;quot;road&amp;quot; taken by White Men in the colonies:&lt;br /&gt;
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Now, this is the road that the White Men tread&lt;br /&gt;
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When they go to clean a land--&lt;br /&gt;
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Iron underfoot and the vine overhead&lt;br /&gt;
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And the deep on either hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have trod that road--and a wet and windy road--&lt;br /&gt;
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Our chosen star for guide.&lt;br /&gt;
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Oh, well for the world when the White Men tread&lt;br /&gt;
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Their highway side by side!&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rudyard Kipling, &#039;&#039;Verse&#039;&#039; (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &amp;amp; Co., 1954), p. 280.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Cleaning a land&amp;quot; is best done by White Men in delicate concert with each other, an allusion to the present dangers of European rivalry in the colonies; for failing in the attempt to coordinate policy, Kipling&#039;s White Men are quite prepared to go to war: &amp;quot;Freedom for ourselves and freedom for our sons/And, failing freedom, War.&amp;quot; Behind the White Man&#039;s mask of amiable leadership there is always the express willingness to use force, to kill and be killed. What dignifies his mission is some sense of intellectual dedication; he is a White Man, but not for mere profit, since his &amp;quot;chosen star&amp;quot; presumably sits far above earthly gain. Certainly many White Men often wondered what it was they fought for on that &amp;quot;wet and windy road,&amp;quot; and certainly a great number of them must have been puzzled as to how the color of their skins gave them superior ontological status plus great power over much of the inhabited world. Yet in the end, being a White Man, for Kipling and for those whose perceptions and rhetoric he influenced, was a self-confirming business. One became a White Man because one &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; a White Man; more important, &amp;quot;drinking that cup,&amp;quot; living that unalterable destiny in &amp;quot;the White Man&#039;s day,&amp;quot; left one little time for idle speculation on origins, causes, historical logic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Being a White Man was therefore an idea and a reality. It involved a reasoned position towards both the white and the nonwhite worlds. It meant--in the colonies--speaking in a certain way, behaving according to a code of regulations, and even feeling certain things and not others. It meant specific judgments, evaluations, gestures. It was a form of authority before which nonwhites, and even whites themselves, were expected to bend. In the institutional forms it took (colonial governments, consular corps, commercial establishments) it was an agency for the expression, diffusion, and implementation of policy towards the world, and within this agency, although a certain personal latitude was allowed, the impersonal communal idea of being a White Man ruled. Being a White Man, in short, was a very concrete manner of being-in-the-world, a way of taking hold of reality, language, and thought. It made a specific style possible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kipling himself could not merely have happened; the same is true of his White Man. Such ideas and their authors emerge out of complex historical and cultural circumstances, at least two of which have much in common with the history of Orientalism in the nineteenth century. One of them is the culturally sanctioned habit of deploying large generalizations by which reality is divided into various collectives: languages, races, types, colors, mentalities, each category being not so much a neutral designation as an evaluative interpretation. Underlying these categories is the rigidly binomial opposition of &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;theirs,&amp;quot; with the former always encroaching upon the latter (even to the point of making &amp;quot;theirs&amp;quot; exclusively a function of &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot;). This opposition was reinforced not only by anthropology, linguistics, and history but also, of course, by the Darwinian theses on survival and natural selection, and--no less decisive--by the rhetoric of high cultural humanism. What gave writers like Renan and Arnold the right to generalities about race was the official character of their formed cultural literacy. &amp;quot;Our&amp;quot; values were (let us say) liberal, humane, correct; they were supported by the tradition of belles-lettres, informed scholarship, rational inquiry; as Europeans (and white men) &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; shared in them every time their virtues were extolled. Nevertheless, the human partnerships formed by reiterated cultural values excluded as much as they included. For every idea about &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; art spoken for by Arnold, Ruskin, Mill, Newman, Carlyle, Renan, Gobineau, or Comte, another link in the chain binding &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; together was formed while another outsider was banished. Even if this is always the result of such rhetoric, wherever and whenever it occurs, we must remember that for nineteenth-century Europe an imposing edifice of learning and culture was built, so to speak, in the face of actual outsiders (the colonies, the poor, the delinquent), whose role in the culture was to give definition to what &#039;&#039;they&#039;&#039; were constitutionally unsuited for.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The themes of exclusion and confinement in nineteenth-century culture have played an important role in Michel Foucault&#039;s work, most recently in his &#039;&#039;Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), and &#039;&#039;The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The other circumstance common to the creation of the White Man and Orientalism is the &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; commanded by each, as well as the sense that such a field entails peculiar modes, even rituals, of behavior, learning, and possession. Only an Occidental could speak of Orientals, for example, just as it was the White Man who could designate and name the coloreds, or nonwhites. Every statement made by Orientalists or White Men (who were usually interchangeable) conveyed a sense of the irreducible distance separating white from colored, or Occidental from Oriental; moreover, behind each statement there resonated the tradition of experience, learning, and education that kept the Oriental-colored to his position of &#039;&#039;object studied by the Occidental-white&#039;&#039;, instead of vice versa. Where one was in a position of power--as Cromer was, for example--the Oriental belonged to the system of rule whose principle was simply to make sure that no Oriental was ever allowed to be independent and rule himself. The premise there was that since the Orientals were ignorant of self-government, they had better be kept that way for their own good.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since the White Man, like the Orientalist, lived very close to the line of tension keeping the coloreds at bay, he felt it incumbent on him readily to define and redefine the domain he surveyed. Passages of narrative description regularly alternate with passages of rearticulated definition and judgment that disrupt the narrative; this is a characteristic style of the writing produced by Oriental experts who operated using Kipling&#039;s White Man as a mask. Here is T. E. Lawrence, writing to V. W. Richards in 1918:&lt;br /&gt;
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... the Arab appealed to my imagination. It is the old, old civilisation, which has refined itself clear of household gods, and half the trappings which ours hastens to assume. The gospel of bareness in materials is a good one, and it involves apparently a sort of moral bareness too. They think for the moment, and endeavour to slip through life without turning corners or climbing hills. In part it is a mental and moral fatigue, a race trained out, and to avoid difficulties they have to jettison so much that we think honorable and grave: and yet without in any way sharing their point of view, I think I can understand it enough to look at myself and other foreigners from their direction, and without condemning it. I know I am a stranger to them, and always will be; but I cannot believe them worse, any more than I could change to their ways.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The Letters of T. E. Lawrence of Arabia&#039;&#039;, ed. David Garnett (1938; reprint ed., London: Spring Books, 1964), p. 244.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar perspective, however different the subject under discussion may seem to be, is found in these remarks by Gertrude Bell:&lt;br /&gt;
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How many thousand years this state of things has lasted [namely, that Arabs live in &amp;quot;a state of war&amp;quot;], those who shall read the earliest records of the inner desert will tell us, for it goes back to the first of them, but in all the centuries the Arab has bought no wisdom from experience. He is never safe, and yet he behaves as though security were his daily bread.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gertrude Bell, &#039;&#039;The Desert and the Sown&#039;&#039; (London: William Heinemann, 1907), p. 244.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To which, as a gloss, we should, add her further observation, this time about life in Damascus:&lt;br /&gt;
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I begin to see dimly what the civilisation of a great Eastern city means, how they live, what they think; and I have got on to terms with them. I believe the fact of my being English is a great help.... We have gone up in the world since five years ago. The difference is very marked. I think it is due to the success of our government in Egypt to a great extent.... The defeat of Russia stands for a great deal, and my impression is that the vigorous policy of Lord Curzon in the Persian Gulf and on the India frontier stands for a great deal more. No one who does not know the East can realise how it all hangs together. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that if the English mission had been turned back from the gates of Kabul, the English tourist would be frowned upon in the streets of Damascus.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gertrude Bell, &#039;&#039;From Her Personal Papers, 1889-1914&#039;&#039;, ed. Elizabeth Burgoyne (London: Ernest Benn, 1958), p. 204.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In such statements as these, we note immediately that &amp;quot;the Arab&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Arabs&amp;quot; have an aura of apartness, definiteness, and collective self-consistency such as to wipe out any traces of individual Arabs with narratable life histories. What appealed to Lawrence&#039;s imagination was the clarity of the Arab, both as an image and as a supposed philosophy (or attitude) towards life: in both cases what Lawrence fastens on is the Arab as if seen from the cleansing perspective of one not an Arab, and one for whom such un-self-conscious primitive simplicity as the Arab possesses is something defined by the observer, in this case the White Man. Yet Arab refinement, which in its essentials corresponds to Yeats&#039;s visions of Byzantium where&lt;br /&gt;
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Flames that no faggot feeds, flint nor steel has lit,&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor storm disturbs, flames begotten of flame,&lt;br /&gt;
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Where blood-begotten spirits come&lt;br /&gt;
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And all complexities of fury leave&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;William Butler Yeats, &amp;quot;Byzantium,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;The Collected Poems&#039;&#039; (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 244.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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is associated with Arab perdurability, as if the Arab had not been subject to the ordinary processes of history. Paradoxically, the Arab seems to Lawrence to have exhausted himself in his very temporal persistence. The enormous age of Arab civilization has thus served to refine the Arab down to his quintessential attributes, and to tire him out morally in the process. What we are left with is Bell&#039;s Arab: centuries of experience and no wisdom. As a collective entity, then, the Arab accumulates no existential or even semantical thickness. He remains the same, except for the exhausting refinements mentioned by Lawrence, from one end to the other of &amp;quot;the records of the inner desert.&amp;quot; We are to assume that if &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Arab feels joy, if he is sad at the death of his child or parent, if he has a sense of the injustices of political tyranny, then those experiences are necessarily subordinate to the sheer, unadorned, and persistent fact of being an Arab.&lt;br /&gt;
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The primitiveness of such a state exists simultaneously on at least two levels: one, &#039;&#039;in the definition&#039;&#039;, which is reductive; and two (according to Lawrence and Bell), &#039;&#039;in reality&#039;&#039;. This absolute coincidence was itself no simple coincidence. For one, it could only have been made from the outside by virtue of a vocabulary and epistemological instruments designed both to get to the heart of things and to avoid the distractions of accident, circumstance, or experience. For another, the coincidence was a fact uniquely the result of method, tradition, and politics all working together. Each in a sense obliterated the distinctions between the type&#039;&#039;--the&#039;&#039; Oriental, &#039;&#039;the&#039;&#039; Semite, &#039;&#039;the&#039;&#039; Arab, &#039;&#039;the&#039;&#039; Orient--and ordinary human reality, Yeats&#039;s &amp;quot;uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor,&amp;quot; in which all human beings live. The scholarly investigator took a type marked &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; for the same thing as any individual Oriental he might encounter. Years of tradition had encrusted discourse about such matters as the Semitic or Oriental spirit with some legitimacy. And political good sense taught, in Bell&#039;s marvelous phrase, that in the East &amp;quot;it all hangs together.&amp;quot; Primitiveness therefore inhered in the Orient, &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; the Orient, an idea to which anyone dealing with or writing about the Orient had to return, as if to a touchstone outlasting time or experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is an excellent way of understanding all this as it applied to the white agents, experts, and advisers for the Orient. What mattered to Lawrence and Bell was that their references to Arabs or Orientals belonged to a recognizable, and authoritative, convention of formulation, one that was able to subordinate detail to it. But from where, more particularly, did &amp;quot;the Arab,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the Semite,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Oriental&amp;quot; come?&lt;br /&gt;
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We have remarked how, during the nineteenth century in such writers as Renan, Lane, Flaubert, Caussin de Perceval, Marx, and Lamartine, a generalization about &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; drew its power from the presumed representativeness of everything Oriental; each particle of the Orient told of its Orientalness, so much so that the attribute of being Oriental overrode any countervailing instance. An Oriental man was first an Oriental and only second a man. Such radical typing was naturally reinforced by sciences (or discourses, as I prefer to call them) that took a backward and downward direction towards the species category, which was supposed also to be an ontogenetic explanation for every member of the species. Thus within broad, semipopular designations such as &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; there were some more scientifically valid distinctions being made; most of these were based principally on language types--e.g., Semitic, Dravidic, Hamitic--but they were quickly able to acquire anthropological, psychological, biological, and cultural evidence in their support. Renan&#039;s &amp;quot;Semitic,&amp;quot; as an instance, was a linguistic generalization which in Renan&#039;s hands could add to itself all sorts of parallel ideas from anatomy, history, anthropology, and even geology. &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; could then be employed not only as a simple description or designation; it could be applied to any complex of historical and political events in order to pare them down to a nucleus both antecedent to and inherent in them. &amp;quot;Semitic,&amp;quot; therefore, was a transtemporal, transindividual category, purporting to predict every discrete act of &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; behavior on the basis of some pre-existing &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; essence, and aiming as well to interpret all aspects of human life and activity in terms of some common &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; element.&lt;br /&gt;
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The peculiar hold on late-nineteenth-century liberal European culture of such relatively punitive ideas will seem mysterious unless it is remembered that the appeal of sciences like linguistics, anthropology, and biology was that they were empirical, and by no means speculative or idealistic. Renan&#039;s Semitic, like Bopp&#039;s Indo-European, was a constructed object, it is true, but it was considered logical and inevitable as a protoform, given the scientifically apprehendable and empirically analyzable data of specific Semitic languages. Thus, in trying to formulate a prototypical and primitive linguistic type (as well as a cultural, psychological, and historical one), there was also an &amp;quot;attempt to define a primary human potential,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stanley Diamond, &#039;&#039;In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization&#039;&#039; (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), p. 119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; out of which completely specific instances of behavior uniformly derived. Now this attempt would have been impossible had it not also been believed--in classical empiricist terms--that mind and body were interdependent realities, both determined originally by a given set of geographical, biological, and quasihistorical conditions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Harry Bracken, &amp;quot;Essence, Accident and Race,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Hermathena&#039;&#039; 116 (Winter 1973): pp. 81-96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; From this set, which was not available to the native for discovery or introspection, there was no subsequent escape. The antiquarian bias of Orientalists was supported by these empiricist ideas. In all their studies of &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Islam, Buddhism, or Zoroastrianism they felt themselves, as George Eliot&#039;s Dr. Casaubon confesses, to be acting &amp;quot;like the ghost of an ancient, wandering about the world and trying mentally to construct it as it used to be, in spite of ruin and confusing changes.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Eliot, &#039;&#039;Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life&#039;&#039; (1872; reprint ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956), p. 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Were these theses about linguistic, civilizational, and finally racial characteristics merely one side of an academic debate amongst European scientists and scholars, we might dismiss them as furnishing material for an unimportant closet drama. The point is, however, that both the terms of the debate and the debate itself had very wide circulation; in late-nineteenth-century culture, as Lionel Trilling has said, &amp;quot;racial theory, stimulated by a rising nationalism and a spreading imperialism, supported by an incomplete and mal-assimilated science, was almost undisputed.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lionel Trilling, &#039;&#039;Matthew Arnold&#039;&#039; (1939; reprint ed., New York: Meridian Books, 1955), p. 214.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Race theory, ideas about primitive origins and primitive classifications, modern decadence, the progress of civilization, the destiny of the white (or Aryan) races, the need for colonial territories--all these were elements in the peculiar amalgam of science, politics, and culture whose drift, almost without exception, was always to raise Europe or a European race to dominion over non-European portions of mankind. There was general agreement too that, according to a strangely transformed variety of Darwinism sanctioned by Darwin himself, the modern Orientals were degraded remnants of a former greatness; the ancient, or &amp;quot;classical,&amp;quot; civilizations of the Orient were perceivable through the disorders of present decadence, but only (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) because a white specialist with highly refined scientific techniques could do the sifting and reconstructing, and (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) because a vocabulary of sweeping generalities (the Semites, the Aryans, the Orientals) referred not to a set of fictions but rather to a whole array of seemingly objective and agreed-upon distinctions. Thus a remark about what Orientals were and were not capable of was supported by biological &amp;quot;truths&amp;quot; such as those spelled out in P. Charles Michel&#039;s &amp;quot;A Biological View of Our Foreign Policy&amp;quot; (1896), in Thomas Henry Huxley&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Struggle for Existence in Human Society&#039;&#039; (1888), Benjamin Kidd&#039;s &#039;&#039;Social Evolution&#039;&#039; (1894), John B. Crozier&#039;s &#039;&#039;History of Intellectual Development on the Lines of Modern Evolution&#039;&#039; (1897-1901), and Charles Harvey&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Biology of British Politics&#039;&#039; (1904).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039; (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 180, note 55.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It was assumed that if languages were as distinct from each other as the linguists said they were, then too the language users--their minds, cultures, potentials, and even their bodies--were different in similar ways. And these distinctions had the force of ontological, empirical truth behind them, together with the convincing demonstration of such truth in studies of origins, development, character, and destiny.&lt;br /&gt;
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The point to be emphasized is that this truth about the distinctive differences between races, civilizations, and languages was (or pretended to be) radical and ineradicable. It went to the bottom of things, it asserted that there was no escape from origins and the types these origins enabled; it set the real boundaries between human beings, on which races, nations, and civilizations were constructed; it forced vision away from common, as well as plural, human realities like joy, suffering, political organization, forcing attention instead in the downward and backward direction of immutable origins. A scientist could no more escape such origins in his research than an Oriental could escape &amp;quot;the Semites&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Indians&amp;quot; from which his present reality--debased, colonized, backward--excluded him, except for the white researcher&#039;s didactic presentation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The profession of specialized research conferred unique privileges. We recall that Lane could appear to be an Oriental and yet retain his scholarly detachment. The Orientals he studied became in fact &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; Orientals, for he saw them not only as actual people but as monumentalized objects in his account of them. This double perspective encouraged a sort of structured irony. On the one hand, there was a collection of people living in the present; on the other hand, these people--as the subject of study--became &amp;quot;the Egyptians,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;the Muslims,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Orientals.&amp;quot; Only the scholar could see, and manipulate, the discrepancy between the two levels. The tendency of the former was always towards greater variety, yet this variety was always being restrained, compressed downwards and backwards to the &#039;&#039;radical&#039;&#039; terminal of the generality. Every modern, native instance of behavior became an effusion to be sent back to the original terminal, which was strengthened in the process. This kind of &amp;quot;dispatching&amp;quot; was precisely the &#039;&#039;discipline&#039;&#039; of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane&#039;s ability to deal with the Egyptians as present beings and as validations of &#039;&#039;sui generis&#039;&#039; labels was a function both of Orientalist discipline and of generally held views about the Near Oriental Muslim or Semite. In no people more than in the Oriental Semites was it possible to see the present and the origin together. The Jews and the Muslims, as subjects of Orientalist study, were readily understandable in view of their primitive origins: this was (and to a certain extent still is) the cornerstone of modern Orientalism. Renan had called the Semites an instance of arrested development, and functionally speaking this came to mean that for the Orientalist no modern Semite, however much he may have believed himself to be modern, could ever outdistance the organizing claims on him of his origins. This functional rule worked on the temporal and spatial levels together. No Semite advanced in time beyond the development of a &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; period; no Semite could ever shake loose the pastoral, desert environment of his tent and tribe. Every manifestation of actual &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; life could be, and ought to be, referred back to the primitive explanatory category of &amp;quot;the Semitic.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The executive power of such a system of reference, by which each discrete instance of real behavior could be reduced down and back to a small number of explanatory &amp;quot;original&amp;quot; categories, was considerable by the end of the nineteenth century. In Orientalism it was the equivalent of bureaucracy in public administration. The department was more useful than the individual file, and certainly the human being was significant principally as the occasion for a file. We must imagine the Orientalist at work in the role of a clerk putting together a very wide assortment of files in a large cabinet marked &amp;quot;the Semites.&amp;quot; Aided by recent discoveries in comparative and primitive anthropology, a scholar like William Robertson Smith could group together the inhabitants of the Near Orient and write on their kinship and marriage customs, on the form and content of their religious practice. The power of Smith&#039;s work is its plainly radical demythologizing of the Semites. The nominal barriers presented to the world by Islam or Judaism are swept aside; Smith uses Semitic philology, mythology, and Orientalist scholarship &amp;quot;to construct ... a hypothetical picture of the development of the social systems, consistent with all the Arabian facts.&amp;quot; If this picture succeeds in revealing the antecedent, and still influential, roots of monotheism in totemism or animal worship, then the scholar has been successful. And this, Smith says, despite the fact that &amp;quot;our Mohammedan sources draw a veil, as far as they can, over all details of the old heathenism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;W. Robertson Smith, &#039;&#039;Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia&#039;&#039;, ed. Stanley Cook (1907; reprint ed., Oesterhout, N.B.: Anthropological Publications, 1966), pp. xiii, 241.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Smith&#039;s work on the Semites covered such areas as theology, literature, and history; it was done with a full awareness of work done by Orientalists (see, for instance, Smith&#039;s savage attack in 1887 on Renan&#039;s &#039;&#039;Histoire du peuple d&#039;Israel&#039;&#039;), and more important, was intended as an aid to the understanding of the modern Semites. For Smith, I think, was a crucial link in the intellectual chain connecting the White-Man-as-expert to the modern Orient. None of the encapsulated wisdom delivered as Oriental expertise by Lawrence, Hogarth, Bell, and the others would have been possible without Smith. And even Smith the antiquarian scholar would not have had half the authority without his additional and direct experience of &amp;quot;the Arabian facts.&amp;quot; It was the combination in Smith of the &amp;quot;grasp&amp;quot; of primitive categories with the ability to see general truths behind the empirical vagaries of contemporary Oriental behavior that gave weight to his writing. Moreover, it was this special combination that adumbrated the style of expertise upon which Lawrence, Bell, and Philby built their reputation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like Burton and Charles Doughty before him, Smith voyaged in the Hejaz, between 1880 and 1881. Arabia has been an especially privileged place for the Orientalist, not only because Muslims treat Islam as Arabia&#039;s &#039;&#039;genius loci&#039;&#039;, but also because the Hejaz appears historically as barren and retarded as it is geographically; the Arabian desert is thus considered to be a locale about which one can make statements regarding the past in exactly the same form (and with the same content) that one makes them regarding the present. In the Hejaz you can speak about Muslims, modern Islam, and primitive Islam without bothering to make distinctions. To this vocabulary devoid of historical grounding, Smith was able to bring the cachet of additional authority provided by his Semitic studies. What we hear in his comments is the standpoint of a scholar commanding &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; the antecedents for Islam, the Arabs, and Arabia. Hence:&lt;br /&gt;
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It is characteristic of Mohammedanism that all national feeling assumes a religious aspect, inasmuch as the whole polity and social forms of a Moslem country are clothed in a religious dress. But it would be a mistake to suppose that genuine religious feeling is at the bottom of everything that justifies itself by taking a religious shape. The prejudices of the Arab have their roots in a conservatism which lies deeper than his belief in Islam. It is, indeed, a great fault of the religion of the Prophet that it lends itself so easily to the prejudices of the race among whom it was first promulgated, and that it has taken under its protection so many barbarous and obsolete ideas, which even Mohammed must have seen to have no religious worth, but which he carried over into his system in order to facilitate the propagation of his reformed doctrines. Yet many of the prejudices which seem to us most distinctively Mohammedan have no basis in the Koran.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;W. Robertson Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures and Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. John Sutherland Black and George Chrystal (London: Adam &amp;amp; Charles Black, 1912), pp. 492-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; in the last sentence of this amazing piece of logic defines the White Man&#039;s vantage point explicitly. This allows &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; to say in the first sentence that all political and social life are &amp;quot;clothed&amp;quot; in religious dress (Islam can thus be characterized as totalitarian), then to say in the second that religion is only a cover used by Muslims (in other words, all Muslims are hypocrites essentially). In the third sentence, the claim is made that Islam--even while laying hold upon the Arab&#039;s faith--has not really reformed the Arab&#039;s basic pre-Islamic conservatism. Nor is this all. For if Islam was successful as a religion it was because it fecklessly allowed these &amp;quot;authentic&amp;quot; Arab prejudices to creep in; for such a tactic (now we see that it was a tactic on Islam&#039;s behalf) we must blame Mohammed, who was after all a ruthless crypto-Jesuit. But all this is more or less wiped out in the last sentence, when Smith assures &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; that everything he has said about Islam is invalid, since the quintessential aspects of Islam known to the West are not &amp;quot;Mohammedan&amp;quot; after all.&lt;br /&gt;
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The principles of identity and noncontradiction clearly do not bind the Orientalist. What overrides them is Orientalist expertise, which is based on an irrefutable collective verity entirely within the Orientalist&#039;s philosophical and rhetorical grasp. Smith is able without the slightest trepidation to speak about &amp;quot;the jejune, practical and ... constitutionally irreligious habit of the Arabic mind,&amp;quot; Islam as a system of &amp;quot;organized hypocrisy,&amp;quot; the impossibility of &amp;quot;feeling any respect for Moslem devotion, in which formalism and vain repetition are reduced to a system.&amp;quot; His attacks on Islam are not relativist, for it is clear to him that Europe&#039;s and Christianity&#039;s superiority is actual, not imagined. At bottom, Smith&#039;s vision of the world is binary, as is evident in such passages as the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Arabian traveller is quite different from ourselves. The labour of moving from place to place is a mere nuisance to him, he has no enjoyment in effort [as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do], and grumbles at hunger or fatigue with all his might [as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do not]. You will never persuade the Oriental that, when you get off your camel, you can have any other wish than immediately to squat on a rug and take your rest (&#039;&#039;isterih&#039;&#039;), smoking and drinking. Moreover the Arab is little impressed by scenery [but &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; are].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 492, 493, 511, 500, 498-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;We&amp;quot; are this, &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; are that. Which Arab, which Islam, when, how, according to what tests: these appear to be distinctions irrelevant to Smith&#039;s scrutiny of and experience in the Hejaz. The crucial point is that everything one can know or learn about &amp;quot;Semites&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot; receives immediate corroboration, not merely in the archives, but directly on the ground.&lt;br /&gt;
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Out of such a coercive framework, by which a modern &amp;quot;colored&amp;quot; man is chained irrevocably to the general truths formulated about his prototypical linguistic, anthropological, and doctrinal forebears by a white European scholar, the work of the great twentieth-century Oriental experts in England and France derived. To this framework these experts also brought their private mythology and obsessions, which in writers like Doughty and Lawrence have been studied with considerable energy. Each--Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Doughty, Lawrence, Bell, Hogarth, Philby, Sykes, Storrs--believed his vision of things Oriental was individual, self-created out of some intensely personal encounter with the Orient, Islam, or the Arabs; each expressed general contempt for official knowledge held about the East. &amp;quot;The sun made me an Arab,&amp;quot; Doughty wrote in &#039;&#039;Arabia Deserta&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;but never warped me to Orientalism.&amp;quot; Yet in the final analysis they all (except Blunt) expressed the traditional Western hostility to and fear of the Orient. Their views refined and gave a personal twist to the academic style of modern Orientalism, with its repertoire of grand generalizations, tendentious &amp;quot;science&amp;quot; from which there was no appeal, reductive formulae. (Doughty again, on the same page as his sneer at Orientalism: &amp;quot;The Semites are like to a man sitting in a cloaca to the eyes, and whose brows touch heaven.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Charles M. Doughty, &#039;&#039;Travels in Arabia Deserta&#039;&#039;, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (New York: Random House, n.d.), 1: 95. See also the excellent article by Richard Bevis, &amp;quot;Spiritual Geology: C. M. Doughty and the Land of the Arabs,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Victorian Studies&#039;&#039; 16 (December 1972), 163-81.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) They acted, they promised, they recommended public policy on the basis of such generalizations; and, by a remarkable irony, they acquired the identity of White Orientals in their natal cultures--even as, in the instances of Doughty, Lawrence, Hogarth, and Bell, their professional involvement with the East (like Smith&#039;s) did not prevent them from despising it thoroughly. The main issue for them was preserving the Orient and Islam under the control of the White Man.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new dialectic emerges out of this project. What is required of the Oriental expert is no longer simply &amp;quot;understanding&amp;quot;: now the Orient must be made to perform, its power must be enlisted on the side of &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; values, civilization, interests, goals. Knowledge of the Orient is directly translated into activity, and the results give rise to new currents of thought and action in the Orient. But these in turn will require from the White Man a new assertion of control, this time not as the author of a scholarly work on the Orient but as the maker of contemporary history, of the Orient as urgent actuality (which, because he began it, only the expert can understand adequately). The Orientalist has now become a figure of Oriental history, indistinguishable from it, its shaper, its characteristic &#039;&#039;sign&#039;&#039; for the West. Here is the dialectic in brief:&lt;br /&gt;
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Some Englishmen, of whom Kitchener was chief, believed that a rebellion of Arabs against Turks would enable England, while fighting Germany, simultaneously to defeat her ally Turkey. Their knowledge of the nature and power and country of the Arabic-speaking peoples made them think that the issue of such a rebellion would be happy: and indicated its character and method. So they allowed it to begin, having obtained formal assurances of help for it from the British Government. Yet none the less the rebellion of the Sherif of Mecca came to most as a surprise, and found the Allies unready. It aroused mixed feelings and made strong friends and enemies, amid whose clashing jealousies its affairs began to miscarry.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;T. E. Lawrence, &#039;&#039;The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph&#039;&#039; (1926; reprint ed., Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran &amp;amp; Co., 1935), p. 28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is Lawrence&#039;s own synopsis of chapter 1 of &#039;&#039;The Seven Pillars of Wisdom&#039;&#039;. The &amp;quot;knowledge&amp;quot; of &amp;quot;some Englishmen&amp;quot; authors a movement in the Orient whose &amp;quot;affairs&amp;quot; create a mixed progeny; the ambiguities, the half-imagined, tragicomic results of this new, revived Orient become the subject of expert writing, a new form of Orientalist discourse that presents a vision of the contemporary Orient, not as narrative, but as all complexity, problematics, betrayed hope--with the White Orientalist author as its prophetic, articulate definition.&lt;br /&gt;
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The defeat of narrative by vision--which is true even in so patently storylike a work as &#039;&#039;The Seven Pillars&#039;&#039;--is something we have already encountered in Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;. A conflict between a holistic view of the Orient (description, monumental record) and a narrative of events in the Orient is a conflict on several levels, involving several different issues. As the conflict is frequently renewed in the discourse of Orientalism, it is worthwhile analyzing it here briefly. The Orientalist surveys the Orient from above, with the aim of getting hold of the whole sprawling panorama before him--culture, religion, mind, history, society. To do this he must see every detail through the device of a set of reductive categories (the Semites, the Muslim mind, the Orient, and so forth). Since these categories are primarily schematic and efficient ones, and since it is more or less assumed that no Oriental can know himself the way an Orientalist can, any vision of the Orient ultimately comes to rely for its coherence and force on the person, institution, or discourse whose property it is. Any comprehensive vision is fundamentally conservative, and we have noted how in the history of ideas about the Near Orient in the West these ideas have maintained themselves regardless of any evidence disputing them. (Indeed, we can argue that these ideas produce evidence that proves their validity.)&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist is principally a kind of agent of such comprehensive visions; Lane is a typical instance of the way an individual believes himself to have subordinated his ideas, or even what he sees, to the exigencies of some &amp;quot;scientific&amp;quot; view of the whole phenomenon known collectively as the Orient, or the Oriental nation. A vision therefore is static, just as the scientific categories informing late-nineteenth-century Orientalism are static: there is no recourse beyond &amp;quot;the Semites&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Oriental mind&amp;quot;; these are final terminals holding every variety of Oriental behavior within a general view of the whole field. As a discipline, as a profession, as specialized language or discourse, Orientalism is staked upon the permanence of the whole Orient, for without &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; there can be no consistent, intelligible, and articulated knowledge called &amp;quot;Orientalism.&amp;quot; Thus the Orient belongs to Orientalism, just as it is assumed that there is pertinent information belonging to (or about) the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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Against this static system of &amp;quot;synchronic essentialism&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For a discussion of this see Talal Asad, &amp;quot;Two European Images of Non-European Rule,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter&#039;&#039;, ed. Talal Asad (London: Ithaca Press, 1975), pp. 103-18.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; I have called vision because it presumes that the whole Orient can be seen panoptically, there is a constant pressure. The source of pressure is narrative, in that if any Oriental detail can be shown to move, or to develop, diachrony is introduced into the system. What seemed stable--and the Orient is synonymous with stability and unchanging eternality--now appears unstable. Instability suggests that history, with its disruptive detail, its currents of change, its tendency towards growth, decline, or dramatic movement, is possible in the Orient and for the Orient. History and the narrative by which history is represented argue that vision is insufficient, that &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; as an unconditional ontological category does an injustice to the potential of reality for change.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, narrative is the specific form taken by written history to counter the permanence of vision. Lane sensed the dangers of narrative when he refused to give linear shape to himself and to his information, preferring instead the monumental form of encyclopedic or lexicographical vision. Narrative asserts the power of men to be born, develop, and die, the tendency of institutions and actualities to change, the likelihood that modernity and contemporaneity will finally overtake &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; civilizations; above all, it asserts that the domination of reality by vision is no more than a will to power, a will to truth and interpretation, and not an objective condition of history. Narrative, in short, introduces an opposing point of view, perspective, consciousness to the unitary web of vision; it violates the serene Apollonian fictions asserted by vision.&lt;br /&gt;
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When as a result of World War I the Orient was made to enter history, it was the Orientalist-as-agent who did the work. Hannah Arendt has made the brilliant observation that the counterpart of the bureaucracy is the imperial agent,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Arendt, &#039;&#039;Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; which is to say that if the collective academic endeavor called Orientalism was a bureaucratic institution based on a certain conservative vision of the Orient, then the servants of such a vision in the Orient were imperial agents like T. E. Lawrence. In his work we can see most clearly the conflict between narrative history and vision, as--in his words--the &amp;quot;new Imperialism&amp;quot; attempted &amp;quot;an active tide of imposing responsibility on the local peoples [of the Orient].&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;T. E. Lawrence, &#039;&#039;Oriental Assembly&#039;&#039;, ed. A. W. Lawrence (New York: E. P. Dutton &amp;amp; Co., 1940), p. 95.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The competition between the European Powers now caused them to prod the Orient into active life, to press the Orient into service, to turn the Orient from unchanging &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; passivity into militant modern life. It would be important, nevertheless, never to let the Orient go its own way or get out of hand, the canonical view being that Orientals had no tradition of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
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The great drama of Lawrence&#039;s work is that it symbolizes the struggle, first, to stimulate the Orient (lifeless, timeless, forceless) into movement; second, to impose upon that movement an essentially Western shape; third, to contain the new and aroused Orient in a personal vision, whose retrospective mode includes a powerful sense of failure and betrayal.&lt;br /&gt;
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I meant to make a new nation, to restore a lost influence, to give twenty millions of Semites the foundation on which to build an inspired dream-palace of their national thoughts.... All the subject provinces of the Empire to me were not worth one dead English boy. If I have restored to the East some self-respect, a goal, ideals: if I have made the standard rule of white over red more exigent, I have fitted those peoples in a degree for the new commonwealth in which the dominant races will forget their brute achievements, and white and red and yellow and brown and black will stand up together without side-glances in the service of the world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Stephen Ely Tabachnick, &amp;quot;The Two Veils of T. E. Lawrence,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Studies in the Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; 16 (Fall 1975): 96-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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None of this, whether as intention, as an actual undertaking, or as a failed project, would have been remotely possible without the White Orientalist perspective at the outset:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Jew in the Metropole at Brighton, the miser, the worshipper of Adonis, the lecher in the stews of Damascus were alike signs of the Semitic capacity for enjoyment, and expressions of the same nerve which gave us at the other pole the self-denial of the Essenes, or the early Christians, or the first Khalifas, finding the ways to heaven fairest for the poor in spirit. The Semite hovered between lust and self-denial.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lawrence is backed in such statements by a respectable tradition stretching like a lighthouse beam through the whole nineteenth century; at its light-emanating center, of course, is &amp;quot;the Orient,&amp;quot; and that is powerful enough to light up both the gross and the refined topographies within its range. The Jew, the worshipper of Adonis, the Damascene lecher, are signs not so much of humanity, let us say, as of a semiotic field called Semitic and built into coherence by the Semitic branch of Orientalism. Inside this field, certain things were possible:&lt;br /&gt;
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Arabs could be swung on an idea as on a cord; for the unpledged allegiance of their minds made them obedient servants. None of them would escape the bond till success had come, and with it responsibility and duty and engagement. Then the idea was gone and the work ended--in ruins. Without a creed they could be taken to the four corners of the world (but not to heaven) by being shown the riches of the earth and the pleasures of it; but if on the road ... they met the prophet of an idea, who had nowhere to lay his head and who depended for his food on charity or birds, then they would all leave their wealth for his inspiration.... They were as unstable as water, and like water would perhaps finally prevail. Since the dawn of life, in successive waves they had been dashing themselves against the coasts of flesh. Each wave was broken.... One such wave (and not the least) I raised and rolled before the breath of an idea, till it reached its crest, and toppled over and fell at Damascus. The wash of that wave, thrown back by the resistance of vested things, will provide the matter of the following wave, when in fullness of time the sea shall be raised once more.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Could,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;would,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;if&amp;quot; are Lawrence&#039;s way inserting himself in the field, as it were. Thus the possibility is prepared for the last sentence, in which as manipulator of the Arabs Lawrence puts himself at their head. Like Conrad&#039;s Kurtz, Lawrence has cut himself loose from the earth so as to become identified with a new reality in order--he says later--that he might be responsible for &amp;quot;hustling into form ... the new Asia which time was inexorably bringing upon us.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lawrence, &#039;&#039;Seven Pillars of Wisdom&#039;&#039;, pp. 42-3, 661.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Arab Revolt acquires meaning only as Lawrence designs meaning for it; his meaning imparted thus to Asia was a triumph, &amp;quot;a mood of enlargement ... in that we felt that we had assumed another&#039;s pain or experience, his personality.&amp;quot; The Orientalist has become now the representative Oriental, unlike earlier participant observers such as Lane, for whom the Orient was something kept carefully at bay. But there is an unresolvable conflict in Lawrence between the White Man and the Oriental, and although he does not explicitly say so, this conflict essentially restages in his mind the historical conflict between East and West. Conscious of his power over the Orient, conscious also of his duplicity, unconscious of anything in the Orient that would suggest to him that history, after all, is history and that even without him the Arabs would finally attend to their quarrel with the Turks, Lawrence reduces the entire narrative of the revolt (its momentary successes and its bitter failure) to &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; vision of himself as an unresolved, &amp;quot;standing civil war&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet in reality we had borne the vicarious for our own sakes, or at least because it was pointed for our benefit: and could escape from this knowledge only by a make-belief in sense as well as in motive....&lt;br /&gt;
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There seemed no straight walking for us leaders in this crooked lane of conduct, ring within ring of unknown, shamefaced motives cancelling or double-charging their precedents.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 549, 550-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To this intimate sense of defeat Lawrence was later to add a theory about &amp;quot;the old men&amp;quot; who stole the triumph from him. In any event, what matters to Lawrence is that as a white expert, the legatee of years of academic and popular wisdom about the Orient, he is able to subordinate his style of being to theirs, thereafter to assume the role of Oriental prophet giving shape to a movement in &amp;quot;the new Asia.&amp;quot; And when, for whatever reason, the movement fails (it is taken over by others, its aims are betrayed, its dream of independence invalidated), it is &#039;&#039;Lawrence&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s disappointment that counts. So far from being a mere man lost in the great rush of confusing events, Lawrence equates himself fully with the struggle of the new Asia to be born.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whereas Aeschylus had represented Asia mourning its losses, and Nerval had espressed his disappointment in the Orient for not being more glamorous than he had wanted, Lawrence &#039;&#039;becomes&#039;&#039; both the mourning continent and a subjective consciousness expressing an almost cosmic disenchantment. In the end Lawrence--and thanks not only to Lowell Thomas and Robert Graves--and Lawrence&#039;s vision became the very symbol of Oriental trouble: Lawrence, in short, had assumed responsibility for the Orient by interspersing his knowing experience between the reader and history. Indeed what Lawrence presents to the reader is an unmediated expert power--the power to be, for a brief time, the Orient. All the events putatively ascribed to the historical Arab Revolt are reduced finally to Lawrence&#039;s experiences on its behalf.&lt;br /&gt;
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In such a case, therefore, style is not only the power to symbolize such enormous generalities as Asia, the Orient, or the Arabs; it is also a form of displacement and incorporation by which one voice becomes a whole history, and--for the white Westerner, as reader or writer--the only kind of Orient it is possible to know. Just as Renan had mapped the field of possibility open to the Semites in culture, thought, and language, so too Lawrence charts the space (and indeed, appropriates that space) and time of modern Asia. The effect of this style is that it brings Asia tantalizingly close to the West, but only for a brief moment. We are left at the end with a sense of the pathetic distance still separating &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; from an Orient destined to bear its foreignness as a mark of its permanent estrangement from the West. This is the disappointing conclusion corroborated (contemporaneously) by the ending of E. M. Forster&#039;s &#039;&#039;A Passage to India&#039;&#039;, where Aziz and Fielding attempt, and fail at, reconciliation:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Why can&#039;t we be friends now?&amp;quot; said the other, holding him affectionately. &amp;quot;It&#039;s what I want. It&#039;s what you want.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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But the horses didn&#039;t want it--they swerved apart; the earth didn&#039;t want it, sending up rocks through which riders must pass single file; the temples, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest House, that came into view as they issued from the gap and saw Mau beneath: they didn&#039;t want it, they said in their hundred voices, &amp;quot;No, not yet,&amp;quot; and the sky said, &amp;quot;No, not there.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;E. M. Forster, &#039;&#039;A Passage to India&#039;&#039; (1924; reprint ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace &amp;amp; Co., 1952), p. 322.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This style, this compact definition, is what the Orient will always come up against.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite its pessimism, there is a positive political message behind its phrases. The gulf between East and West can be modulated, as Cromer and Balfour knew well, by superior Western knowledge and power. Lawrence&#039;s vision is complemented in France by Maurice Barres&#039;s &#039;&#039;Une Enquete aux pays du Levant&#039;&#039;, the record of a journey through the Near Orient in 1914. Like so many works before it, the &#039;&#039;Enquete&#039;&#039; is a work of recapitulation whose author not only searches out sources and origins of Western culture in the Orient but also redoes Nerval, Flaubert, and Lamartine in their voyages to the Orient. For Barres, however, there is an additional political dimension to his journey: he seeks proof, and conclusive evidence, for a constructive French role in the East. Yet the difference between French and British expertise remains: the former manages an actual conjunction of peoples and territory, whereas the latter deals with a realm of spiritual possibility. For Barres the French presence is best seen in French schools where, as he says of a school in Alexandria, &amp;quot;It is ravishing to see those little Oriental girls welcoming and so wonderfully reproducing the &#039;&#039;fantaisie&#039;&#039; and the melody [in their spoken French] of the Ile-de-France.&amp;quot; If France does not actually have any colonies there, she is not entirely without possessions:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is, there in the Orient, a feeling about France which is so religious and strong that it is capable of absorbing and reconciling all our most diverse aspirations. In the Orient we represent spirituality, justice, and the category of the ideal. England is powerful there; Germany is all-powerful; but we possess Oriental souls.&lt;br /&gt;
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Arguing vociferously with Jaures, this celebrated European doctor proposes to vaccinate Asia against its own illnesses, to occidentalize the Orientals, to bring them into salubrious contact with France. Yet even in these projects Barres&#039;s vision preserves the very distinction between East and West he claims to be mitigating.&lt;br /&gt;
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How will we be able to form for ourselves an intellectual elite with which we can work, made out of Orientals who would not be deracinated, who would continue to evolve according to their own norms, who would remain penetrated by family traditions, and who would thus form a link between us and the mass of natives? How will we create relationships with a view towards preparing the way for agreements and treaties which would be the desirable form taken by our political future [in the Orient]? All these things are finally all about soliciting in these strange peoples the taste for maintaining contact with our intelligence, &#039;&#039;even though this taste may in fact come out of their own sense of their national destiny&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Maurice Barres, &#039;&#039;Une Enquete aux pays du Levant&#039;&#039; (Paris: Plon, 1923), 1: 20; 2: 181, 192, 193, 197.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The emphasis in the last sentence is Barres&#039;s own. Since unlike Lawrence and Hogarth (whose book &#039;&#039;The Wandering Scholar&#039;&#039; is the wholly informative and unromantic record of two trips to the Levant in 1896 and 1910&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;D. G. Hogarth, &#039;&#039;The Wandering Scholar&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1924). Hogarth describes his style as that of &amp;quot;the explorer first and the scholar second&amp;quot; (p. 4).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) he writes of a world of distant probabilities; he is more prepared to imagine the Orient as going its own way. Yet the bond (or leash) between East and West that he advocates is designed to permit a constant variety of intellectual pressure going from West to East. Barres sees things, not in terms of waves, battles, spiritual adventures, but in terms of the cultivation of intellectual imperialism, as ineradicable as it is subtle. The British vision, exemplified by Lawrence, is of the mainstream Orient, of peoples, political organizations, and movements guided and held in check by the White Man&#039;s expert tutelage; the Orient is &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; Orient, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; people, &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; dominions. Discriminations between elites and the masses are less likely to be made by the British than by the French, whose perceptions and policy were always based on minorities and on the insidious pressures of spiritual community between France and its colonial children. The British agent-Orientalist--Lawrence, Bell, Philby, Storrs, Hogarth--during and after World War I took over both the role of expert-adventurer-eccentric (created in the nineteenth century by Lane, Burton, Hester Stanhope) and the role of colonial authority, whose position is in a central place next to the indigenous ruler: Lawrence with the Hashimites, Philby with the house of Saud, are the two best-known instances. British Oriental expertise fashioned itself around consensus and orthodoxy and sovereign authority; French Oriental expertise between the wars concerned itself with heterodoxy, spiritual ties, eccentrics. It is no accident, then, that the two major scholarly careers of this period, one British, one French, were H. A. R. Gibb&#039;s and Louis Massignon&#039;s, one whose interest was defined by the notion of Sunna (or orthodoxy) in Islam, the other whose focus was on the quasi-Christlike, theosophical Sufi figure, Mansur al-Hallaj. I shall return to these two major Orientalists a little later.&lt;br /&gt;
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If I have concentrated so much on imperial agents and policy-makers instead of scholars in this section, it was to accentuate the major shift in Orientalism, knowledge about the Orient, intercourse with it, from an academic to an &#039;&#039;instrumental&#039;&#039; attitude. What accompanies the shift is a change in the attitude as well of the individual Orientalist, who need no longer see himself--as Lane, Sacy, Renan, Caussin, Muller, and others did--as belonging to a sort of guild community with its own internal traditions and rituals. Now the Orientalist has become the representative man of his Western culture, a man who compresses within his own work a major duality of which that work (regardless of its specific form) is the symbolic expression: Occidental consciousness, knowledge, science taking hold of the furthest Oriental reaches as well as the most minute Oriental particulars. Formally the Orientalist sees himself as accomplishing the union of Orient and Occident, but mainly by reasserting the technological, political, and cultural supremacy of the West. History, in such a union, is radically attentuated if not banished. Viewed as a current of development, as a narrative strand, or as a dynamic force unfolding systematically and materially in time and space, human history--of the East or the West--is subordinated to an essentialist, idealist conception of Occident and Orient. Because he feels himself to be standing at the very rim of the East-West divide, the Orientalist not only speaks in vast generalities; he also seeks to convert each aspect of Oriental or Occidental life into an unmediated sign of one or the other geographical half.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The interchange in the Orientalist&#039;s writing between his expert self and his testimonial, beholding self as Western representative is pre-eminently worked out in visual terms. Here is a typical passage (quoted by Gibb) from Duncan Macdonald&#039;s classic work &#039;&#039;The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam&#039;&#039; (1909):&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Arabs show themselves not as especially easy of belief, but as hard-headed, materialistic, questioning, doubting, scoffing at their own superstitions and usages, fond of tests of the supernatural--and all this in a curiously light-minded, almost childish fashion.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited by H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Structure of Religious Thought in Islam,&amp;quot; in his &#039;&#039;Studies on the Civilization of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 180.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The governing verb is &#039;&#039;show&#039;&#039;, which here gives us to understand that the Arabs display themselves (willingly or unwillingly) to and for expert scrutiny. The number of attributes ascribed to them, by its crowded set of sheer appositions, causes &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; to acquire a sort of existential weightlessness; thereby, &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; are made to rejoin the very broad designation, common to modern anthropological thought, of &amp;quot;the childish primitive.&amp;quot; What Macdonald also implies is that for such descriptions there is a peculiarly privileged position occupied by the Western Orientalist, whose representative function is precisely &#039;&#039;to show&#039;&#039; what needs to be seen. All specific history is capable of being seen thus at the apex, or the sensitive frontier, of Orient and Occident together. The complex dynamics of human life--what I have been calling history as narrative--becomes either irrelevant or trivial in comparison with the circular vision by which the details of Oriental life serve merely to reassert the Orientalness of the subject and the Westernness of the observer.&lt;br /&gt;
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If such a vision in some ways recalls Dante&#039;s, we should by no means fail to notice what an enormous difference there is between this Orient and Dante&#039;s. Evidence here is meant to be (and probably is considered) scientific; its pedigree, genealogically speaking, is European intellectual and human science during the nineteenth century. Moreover, the Orient is no simple marvel, or an enemy, or a branch of exotica; it is a political actuality of great and significant moment. Like Lawrence, Macdonald cannot really detach his representative characteristics as a Westerner from his role as a scholar. Thus his vision of Islam, as much as Lawrence&#039;s of the Arabs, implicates &#039;&#039;definition&#039;&#039; of the object with the &#039;&#039;identity&#039;&#039; of the person defining. All Arab Orientals must be accommodated to a vision of an Oriental type as constructed by the Western scholar, as well as to a specific encounter with the Orient in which the Westerner regrasps the Orient&#039;s essence as a consequence of his intimate estrangement from it. For Lawrence as for Forster, this latter sensation produces the despondency as well of personal failure; for such scholars as Macdonald, it strengthens the Orientalist discourse itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And it puts that discourse abroad in the world of culture, politics, and actuality. In the period between the wars, as we can easily judge from, say, Malraux&#039;s novels, the relations between East and West assumed a currency that was both widespread and anxious. The signs of Oriental claims for political independence were everywhere; certainly in the dismembered Ottoman Empire they were encouraged by the Allies and, as is perfectly evident in the whole Arab Revolt and its aftermath, quickly became problematic. The Orient now appeared to constitute a challenge, not just to the West in general, but to the West&#039;s spirit, knowledge, and imperium. After a good century of constant intervention in (and study of) the Orient, the West&#039;s role in an East itself responding to the crises of modernity seemed considerably more delicate. There was the issue of outright occupation; there was the issue of the mandated territories; there was the issue of European competition in the Orient; there was the issue of dealing with native elites, native popular movements, and native demands for self-government and independence; there was the issue of civilizational contacts between Orient and Occident. Such issues forced reconsideration of Western knowledge of the Orient. No less a personage than Sylvain Levi, president of the Societe asiatique between 1928 and 1935, professor of Sanskrit at the College de France, reflected seriously in 1925 on the urgency of the East-West problem:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our duty is to understand Oriental civilization. The humanistic problem, which consists, on an intellectual level, in making a sympathetic and intelligent effort to understand foreign civilizations in both their past and their future forms, is specifically posed for us Frenchmen [although similar sentiments could have been expressed by an Englishman: the problem was a &#039;&#039;European&#039;&#039; one] in a practical way with regard to our great Asiatic colonies....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These peoples are the inheritors of a long tradition of history, of art, and of religion, the sense of which they have not entirely lost and which they are probably anxious to prolong. We have assumed the responsibility of intervening in their development, sometimes without consulting them, sometimes in answer to their request.... We claim, rightly or wrongly, to represent a superior civilization, and because of the right given us by virtue of this superiority, which we regularly affirm with such assurance as makes it seem incontestable to the natives, we have called in question all their native traditions....&lt;br /&gt;
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In a general way, then, wherever the European has intervened, the native has perceived himself with a sort of general despair which was really poignant since he felt that the sum of his well-being, in the moral sphere more than in sheer material terms, instead of increasing had in fact diminished. All of which has made the foundation of his social life seem to be flimsy and to crumble under him, and the golden pillars on which he had thought to rebuild his life now seem no more than tinseled cardboard.&lt;br /&gt;
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This disappointment has been translated into rancor from one end to the other of the Orient, and this rancor is very close now to turning to hate, and hate only waits for the right moment in order to turn into action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If because of laziness or incomprehension Europe does not make the effort that its interests alone require from it, &#039;&#039;then the Asiatic drama will approach the crisis point&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is here that that science which is a form of life and an instrument of policy--that is, wherever our interests are at stake--owes it to itself to penetrate native civilization and life in their intimacy in order to discover their fundamental values and durable characteristics rather than to smother native life with the incoherent threat of European civilizational imports. We must offer ourselves to these civilizations as we do our other products, that is, on the local exchange market. [Emphasis in origina&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Frederic Lefevre, &amp;quot;Une Heure avec Sylvain Levi,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Memorial Sylvain Levi&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Bacot (Paris: Paul Hartmann, 1937), pp. 123-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Levi has no difficulty in connecting Orientalism with politics, for the long--or rather, the prolonged--Western intervention in the East cannot be denied either in its consequences for knowledge or in its effect upon the hapless native; together the two add up to what could be a menacing future. For all his expressed humanism, his admirable concern for fellow creatures, Levi conceives the present juncture in unpleasantly constricted terms. The Oriental is imagined to feel his world threatened by a superior civilization; yet his motives are impelled, not by some positive desire for freedom, political independence, or cultural achievement &#039;&#039;on their own terms&#039;&#039;, but instead by rancor or jealous malice. The panacea offered for this potentially ugly turn of affairs is that the Orient be marketed for a Western consumer, be put before him as one among numerous wares beseeching his attention. By a single stroke you will defuse the Orient (by letting it think itself to be an &amp;quot;equal&amp;quot; quantity on the Occidental marketplace of ideas), and you will appease Western fears of an Oriental tidal wave. At bottom, of course, Levi&#039;s principal point--and his most telling confession--is that unless something is done about the Orient, &amp;quot;the Asiatic drama will approach the crisis point.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Asia suffers, yet in its suffering it threatens Europe: the eternal, bristling frontier endures between East and West, almost unchanged since classical antiquity. What Levi says as the most august of modern Orientalists is echoed with less subtlety by cultural humanists. Item: in 1925 the French periodical &#039;&#039;Les Cahiers du mois&#039;&#039; conducted a survey among notable intellectual figures; the writers canvassed included Orientalists (Levi, Emile Senart) as well as literary men like Andre Gide, Paul Valery, and Edmond Jaloux. The questions dealt with relations between Orient and Occident in a timely, not to say brazenly provocative, way, and this already indicates something about the cultural ambience of the period. We will immediately recognize how ideas of the sort promulgated in Orientalist scholarship have now reached the level of accepted truth. One question asks whether Orient and Occident are mutually impenetrable (the idea was Maeterlinck&#039;s) or not; another asks whether or not Oriental influence represented &amp;quot;un peril grave&amp;quot;--Henri Massis&#039;s words--to French thought; a third asks about those values in Occidental culture to which its superiority over the Orient can be ascribed. Valery&#039;s response seems to me worth quoting from, so forthright are the lines of its argument and so time-honored, at least in the early twentieth century:&lt;br /&gt;
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From the cultural point of view, I do not think that we have much to fear &#039;&#039;now&#039;&#039; from the Oriental influence. It is not unknown to us. We owe to the Orient all the beginnings of our arts and of a great deal of our knowledge. We can very well welcome what now comes out of the Orient, if something new is coming out of there--which I very much doubt. This doubt is precisely our guarantee and our European weapon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Besides, the real question in such matters is to &#039;&#039;digest&#039;&#039;. But that has always been, just as precisely, the great specialty of the European mind through the ages. Our role is therefore to maintain this power of choice, of universal comprehension, of the transformation of everything into our own substance, powers which have made us what we are. The Greeks and the Romans showed us how to deal with the monsters of Asia, how to treat them by analysis, how to extract from them their quintessence.... The Mediterranean basin seems to me to be like a closed vessel where the essences of the vast Orient have always come in order to be condensed. [Emphasis and ellipses in original]&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Paul Valery, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Jean Hytier (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 2: 1556-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If European culture generally has digested the Orient, certainly Valery was aware that one specific agency for doing the job has been Orientalism. In the world of Wilsonian principles of national self-determination, Valery relies confidently on analyzing the Orient&#039;s threat away. &amp;quot;The power of choice&amp;quot; is mainly for Europe first to acknowledge the Orient as the origin of European science, then to treat it as a superseded origin. Thus, in another context, Balfour could regard the native inhabitants of Palestine as having priority on the land, but nowhere near the subsequent authority to keep it; the mere wishes of 700,000 Arabs, he said, were of no moment compared to the destiny of an essentially European colonial movement.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Christopher Sykes, &#039;&#039;Crossroads to Israel&#039;&#039; (1965; reprint ed., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Asia represented, then, the unpleasant likelihood of a sudden eruption that would destroy &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world; as John Buchan put it in 1922:&lt;br /&gt;
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The earth is seething with incoherent power and unorganized intelligence. Have you ever reflected on the case of China? There you have millions of quick brains stifled in trumpery crafts. They have no direction, no driving power, so the sum of their efforts is futile, and the world laughs at China.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Alan Sandison, &#039;&#039;The Wheel of Empire: A Study of the Imperial Idea in Some Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Fiction&#039;&#039; (New York: St. Martin&#039;s Press, 1967), p. 158. An excellent study of the French equivalent is Martine Astier Loutfi, &#039;&#039;Litterature et colonialisme: L&#039;Expansion coloniale vue dans la litterature romanesque francaise, 1871-1914&#039;&#039; (The Hague: Mouton &amp;amp; Co., 1971).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if China organized itself (as it would), it would be no laughing matter. Europe&#039;s effort therefore was to maintain itself as what Valeiy called &amp;quot;une machine puissante,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Paul Valery, &#039;&#039;Variete&#039;&#039; (Paris: Gallimard, 1924), p. 43.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; absorbing what it could from outside Europe, converting everything to its use, intellectually and materially, keeping the Orient selectively organized (or disorganized). Yet this could be done only through clarity of vision and analysis. Unless the Orient was seen for what it was, its power--military, material, spiritual--would sooner or later overwhelm Europe. The great colonial empires, great systems of systematic repression, existed to fend off the feared eventuality. Colonial subjects, as George Orwell saw them in Marrakech in 1939, must not be seen except as a kind of continental emanation, African, Asian, Oriental:&lt;br /&gt;
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When you walk through a town like this--two hundred thousand inhabitants, of whom at least twenty thousand own literally nothing except the rags they stand up in--when you see how the people live, and still more, how easily they die, it is always difficult to believe that you are walking among human beings. All colonial empires are in reality founded upon that fact. The people have brown faces--besides they have so many of them! Are they really the same flesh as yourself? Do they even have names? Or are they merely a kind of undifferentiated brown stuff, about as individual as bees or coral insects? They arise out of the earth, they sweat and starve for a few years, and then they sink back into the nameless mounds of the graveyard and nobody notices that they are gone. And even the graves themselves soon fade back into the soil.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Orwell, &amp;quot;Marrakech,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;A Collection of Essays&#039;&#039; (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), p. 187.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from the picturesque characters offered European readers in the exotic fiction of minor writers (Pierre Loti, Marmaduke Pickthall, and the like), the non-European known to Europeans is precisely what Orwell says about him. He is either a figure of fun, or an atom in a vast collectivity designated in ordinary or cultivated discourse as an undifferentiated type called Oriental, African, yellow, brown, or Muslim. To such abstractions Orientalism had contributed its power of generalization, converting instances of a civilization into ideal bearers of its values, ideas, and positions, which in turn the Orientalists had found in &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; and transformed into common cultural currency.&lt;br /&gt;
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If we reflect that Raymond Schwab brought out his brilliant biography of Anquetil-Duperron in 1934--and began those studies which were to put Orientalism in its proper cultural context--we must also remark that what he did was in stark contrast to his fellow artists and intellectuals, for whom Orient and Occident were still the secondhand abstractions they were for Valery. Not that Pound, Eliot, Yeats, Arthur Waley, Fenollosa, Paul Claudel(in his &#039;&#039;Connaissance de l&#039;est&#039;&#039;), Victor Segalen, and others were ignoring &amp;quot;the wisdom of the East,&amp;quot; as Max Muller had called it a few generations earlier. Rather the culture viewed the Orient, and Islam in particular, with the mistrust with which its learned attitude to the Orient had always been freighted. A suitable instance of this contemporary attitude at its most explicit is to be found in a series of lectures given at the University of Chicago in 1924 on &amp;quot;The Occident and the Orient&amp;quot; by Valentine Chirol, a well-known European newspaperman of great experience in the East; his purpose was to make clear to educated Americans that the Orient was not as far off as perhaps they believed. His line is a simple one: that Orient and Occident are irreducibly opposed to each other, and that the Orient--in particular &amp;quot;Mohammedanism&amp;quot;--is one of &amp;quot;the great world-forces&amp;quot; responsible for &amp;quot;the deepest lines of cleavage&amp;quot; in the world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Valentine Chirol, &#039;&#039;The Occident and the Orient&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Chirol&#039;s sweeping generalizations are, I think, adequately represented by the titles of his six lectures: &amp;quot;Their Ancient Battleground&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;The Passing of the Ottoman Empire, the Peculiar Case of Egypt&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;The Great British Experiment in Egypt&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;Protectorates and Mandates&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;The New Factor of Bolshevism&amp;quot;; and &amp;quot;Some General Conclusions.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To such relatively popular accounts of the Orient as Chirol&#039;s, we can add a testimonial by Elie Faure, who in his ruminations draws, like Chirol, on history, cultural expertise, and the familiar contrast between White Occidentalism and colored Orientalism. While delivering himself of paradoxes like &amp;quot;le carnage permanent de l&#039;indifference orientale&amp;quot; (for, unlike &amp;quot;us,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;they&amp;quot; have no conception of peace), Faure goes on to show that the Orientals&#039; bodies are lazy, that the Orient has no conception of history, of the nation, or of &#039;&#039;patrie&#039;&#039;, that the Orient is essentially mystical--and so on. Faure argues that unless the Oriental learns to be rational, to develop techniques of knowledge and positivity, there can be no &#039;&#039;rapprochement&#039;&#039; between East and West.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Elie Faure, &amp;quot;Orient et Occident,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Mercure de France&#039;&#039; 229 (July 1-August 1, 1931): 263, 264, 269, 270, 272.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A far more subtle and learned account of the East-West dilemma can be found in Fernand Baldensperger&#039;s essay &amp;quot;Ou s&#039;affrontent l&#039;Orient et l&#039;Occident intellectuels,&amp;quot; but he too speaks of an inherent Oriental disdain for the idea, for mental discipline, for rational interpretation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Fernand Baldensperger, &amp;quot;Ou s&#039;affrontent l&#039;Orient et l&#039;Occident intellectuels,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Etudes d&#039;histoire litteraire&#039;&#039;, 3rd ser. (Paris: Droz, 1939), p. 230.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Spoken as they are out of the depths of European culture, by writers who actually believe themselves to be speaking on behalf of that culture, such commonplaces (for they are perfect &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039;) cannot be explained simply as examples of provincial chauvinism. They are not that, and--as will be evident to anyone who knows anything about Faure&#039;s and Baldensperger&#039;s other work--are the more paradoxical for not being that. Their background is the transformation of the exacting, professional science of Orientalism, whose function in nineteenth-century culture had been the restoration to Europe of a lost portion of humanity, but which had become in the twentieth century both an instrument of policy and, more important, a code by which Europe could interpret both itself and the Orient to itself. For reasons discussed earlier in this book, modern Orientalism already carried within itself the imprint of the great European fear of Islam, and this was aggravated by the political challenges of the &#039;&#039;entre-deux-guerres&#039;&#039;. My point is that the metamorphosis of a relatively innocuous philological subspecialty into a capacity for managing political movements, administering colonies, making nearly apocalyptic statements representing the White Man&#039;s difficult civilizing mission--all this is something at work within a purportedly liberal culture, one full of concern for its vaunted norms of catholicity, plurality, and open-mindedness. In fact, what took place was the very opposite of liberal: the hardening of doctrine and meaning, imparted by &amp;quot;science,&amp;quot; into &amp;quot;truth.&amp;quot; For if such truth reserved for itself the right to judge the Orient as immutably Oriental in the ways I have indicated, then liberality was no more than a form of oppression and mentalistic prejudice.&lt;br /&gt;
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The extent of such illiberality was not--and is not--often recognized from within the culture, for reasons that this book is trying to explore. It is heartening, nevertheless, that such illiberality has occasionally been challenged. Here is an instance from I. A. Richards&#039;s foreword to his &#039;&#039;Mencius on the Mind&#039;&#039; (1932); we can quite easily substitute &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; for &amp;quot;Chinese&amp;quot; in what follows.&lt;br /&gt;
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As to the effects of an increased knowledge of Chinese thought upon the West, it is interesting to notice that a writer so unlikely to be thought either ignorant or careless as M. Etienne Gilson can yet, in the English Preface of his &#039;&#039;The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas&#039;&#039;, speak of Thomistic Philosophy as &amp;quot;accepting and gathering up the whole of human tradition.&amp;quot; This is how we all think, to us the Western world is still the World [or the part of the World that counts]; but an impartial observer would perhaps say that such provincialism is dangerous. And we are not yet so happy in the West that we can be sure that we are not suffering from its effects.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;I. A. Richards, &#039;&#039;Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definitions&#039;&#039; (London: Routledge &amp;amp; Kegan Paul, 1932), p. xiv.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Richards&#039;s argument advances claims for the exercise of what he calls Multiple Definition, a genuine type of pluralism, with the combativeness of systems of definition eliminated. Whether or not we accept his counter to Gilson&#039;s provincialism, we can accept the proposition that liberal humanism, of which Orientalism has historically been one department, &#039;&#039;retards&#039;&#039; the process of enlarged and enlarging meaning through which true understanding can be attained. What took the place of enlarged meaning in twentieth-century Orientalism--that is, within the technical field--is the subject most immediately at hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;III.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Modern Anglo-French Orientalism in Fullest Flower&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Because we have become accustomed to think of a contemporary expert on some branch of the Orient, or some aspect of its life, as a specialist in &amp;quot;area studies,&amp;quot; we have lost a vivid sense of how, until around World War II, the Orientalist was considered to be a generalist (with a great deal of specific knowledge, of course) who had highly developed skills for making summational statements. By summational statements I mean that in formulating a relatively uncomplicated idea, say, about Arabic grammar or Indian religion, the Orientalist would be understood (and would understand himself) as also making a statement about the Orient as a whole, thereby summing it up. Thus every discrete study of one bit of Oriental material would also confirm in a summary way the profound Orientality of the material, And since it was commonly believed that the whole Orient hung together in some profoundly organic way, it made perfectly good hermeneutical sense for the Orientalist scholar to regard the material evidence he dealt with as ultimately leading to a better understanding of such things as the Oriental character, mind, ethos, or world-spirit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Most of the first two chapters of this book have made similar arguments about earlier periods in the history of Orientalist thought. The differentiation in its later history that concerns us here, however, is the one between the periods immediately before and after World War I. In both instances, as with the earlier periods, the Orient is Oriental no matter the specific case, and no matter the style or technique used to describe it; the difference between the two periods in question is the &#039;&#039;reason&#039;&#039; given by the Orientalist for seeing the essential Orientality of the Orient. A good example of the prewar rationale can be found in the following passage by Snouck Hurgronje, taken from his 1899 review of Eduard Sachau&#039;s &#039;&#039;Muhammedanisches Recht&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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... the law, which in practice had to make ever greater concessions to the use and customs of the people and the arbitrariness of their rulers, nevertheless retained a considerable influence on the intellectual life of the Muslims. Therefore it remains, and still is for us too, an important subject of study, not only for abstract reasons connected with the history of law, civilization and religion, but also for practical purposes. The more intimate the relations of Europe with the Muslim East become, the more Muslim countries fall under European suzerainty, the more important it is for us Europeans to become acquainted with the intellectual life, the religious law, and the conceptual background of Islam.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Selected Works of C. Snouck Hurgronje&#039;&#039;, ed. G. H. Bousquet and J. Schacht (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957), p. 267.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Although Hurgronje allows that something so abstract as &amp;quot;Islamic law&amp;quot; did occasionally yield to the pressure of history and society, he is more interested than not in retaining the abstraction for intellectual use because in its broad outline &amp;quot;Islamic law&amp;quot; confirms the disparity between East and West. For Hurgronje the distinction between Orient and Occident was no mere academic or popular cliche: quite the contrary. For him it signified the essential, historical power relationship between the two. Knowledge of the Orient either proves, enhances, or deepens the difference by which European suzerainty (the phrase has a venerable nineteenth-century pedigree) is extended effectively over Asia. To know the Orient as a whole, then, is to know it because it is entrusted to one&#039;s keeping, if one is a Westerner.&lt;br /&gt;
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An almost symmetrical passage to Hurgronje&#039;s is to be found in the concluding paragraph of Gibb&#039;s article &amp;quot;Literature&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Legacy of Islam&#039;&#039;, published in 1931. After having described the three casual contacts between East and West up till the eighteenth century, Gibb then proceeds to the nineteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
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Following on these three moments of casual contact, the German romantics turned again to the East, and for the first time made it their conscious aim to open a way for the real heritage of oriental poetry to enter into the poetry of Europe. The nineteenth century, with its new sense of power and superiority, seemed to clang the gate decisively in the face of their design. Today, on the other hand, there are signs of a change. Oriental literature has begun to be studied again for its own sake, and a new understanding of the East is being gained. As this knowledge spreads and the East recovers its rightful place in the life of humanity, oriental literature may once again perform its historic function, and assist us to liberate ourselves from the narrow and oppressive conceptions which would limit all that is significant in literature, thought, and history to our own segment of the globe.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Literature,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Legacy of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), p. 209.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Gibb&#039;s phrase &amp;quot;for its own sake&amp;quot; is in diametrical opposition to the string of reasons subordinated to Hurgronje&#039;s declaration about European suzerainty over the East. What remains, nevertheless, is that seemingly inviolable over-all identity of something called &amp;quot;the East&amp;quot; and something else called &amp;quot;the West.&amp;quot; Such entities have a use for each other, and it is plainly Gibb&#039;s laudable intention to show that the influence on Western of Oriental literature need not be (in its results) what Brunetiere had called &amp;quot;a national disgrace.&amp;quot; Rather, the East could be confronted as a sort of humanistic challenge to the local confines of Western ethnocentricity.&lt;br /&gt;
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His earlier solicitation of Goethe&#039;s idea of &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039; notwithstanding, Gibb&#039;s call for humanistic interinanimation between East and West reflects the changed political and cultural realities of the postwar era. European suzerainty over the Orient had not passed; but it had evolved--in British Egypt--from a more or less placid acceptance by the natives into a more and more contested political issue compounded by fractious native demands for independence. These were the years of constant British trouble with Zaghlul, the Wafd party, and the like.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The best general account of this period in political, social, economic, and cultural terms is to be found in Jacques Berque, &#039;&#039;Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Jean Stewart (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Moreover, since 1925 there had been a worldwide economic recession, and this too increased the sense of tension that Gibb&#039;s prose reflects. But the specifically cultural message in what he says is the most compelling. Heed the Orient, he seems to be telling his reader, for its use to the Western mind in the struggle to overcome narrowness, oppressive specialization, and limited perspectives.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ground had shifted considerably from Hurgronje to Gibb, as had the priorities. No longer did it go without much controversy that Europe&#039;s domination over the Orient was almost a fact of nature; nor was it assumed that the Orient was in need of Western enlightenment. What mattered during the interwar years was a cultural self-definition that transcended the provincial and the xenophobic. For Gibb, the West has need of the Orient as something to be studied because it releases the spirit from sterile specialization, it eases the affliction of excessive parochial and nationalistic self-centeredness, it increases one&#039;s grasp of the really central issues in the study of culture. If the Orient appears more a partner in this new rising dialectic of cultural self-consciousness, it is, first, because the Orient is more of a challenge now than it was before, and second, because the West is entering a relatively new phase of cultural crisis, caused in part by the diminishment of Western suzerainty over the rest of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, in the best Orientalist work done during the interwar period--represented in the impressive careers of Massignon and Gibb himself--we will find elements in common with the best humanistic scholarship of the period. Thus the summational attitude of which I spoke earlier can be regarded as the Orientalist equivalent of attempts in the purely Western humanities to understand culture &#039;&#039;as a whole&#039;&#039;, antipositivistically, intuitively, sympathetically. Both the Orientalist and the non-Orientalist begin with the sense that Western culture is passing through an important phase, whose main feature is the crisis imposed on it by such threats as barbarism, narrow technical concerns, moral aridity, strident nationalism, and so forth. The idea of using specific texts, for instance, to work from the specific to the general (to understand the whole life of a period and consequently of a culture) is common to those humanists in the West inspired by the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, as well as to towering Orientalist scholars like Massignon and Gibb. The project of revitalizing philology--as it is found in the work of Curtius, Vossler, Auerbach, Spitzer, Gundolf, Hofmannsthal&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;There is a useful account of the intellectual project informing their work in Arthur R. Evans, Jr., ed., &#039;&#039;On Four Modern Humanists: Hofmannsthal&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Gundolf, Curtius, Kantorowicz&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--has its counterpart therefore in the invigorations provided to strictly technical Orientalist philology by Massignon&#039;s studies of what he called the mystical lexicon, the vocabulary of Islamic devotion, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there is another, more interesting conjunction between Orientalism in this phase of its history and the European sciences of man (&#039;&#039;sciences de l&#039;homme&#039;&#039;), the &#039;&#039;Geisteswissenschaften&#039;&#039; contemporary with it. We must note, first, that non-Orientalist cultural studies were perforce more immediately responsive to the threats to humanistic culture of a self-aggrandizing, amoral technical specialization represented, in part at least, by the rise of fascism in Europe. This response extended the concerns of the interwar period into the period following World War II as well. An eloquent scholarly and personal testimonial to this response can be found in Erich Auerbach&#039;s magisterial &#039;&#039;Mimesis&#039;&#039;, and in his last methodological reflections as a &#039;&#039;Philolog&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Erich Auerbach, &#039;&#039;Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature&#039;&#039;, trans. Willard R. Trask (1946; reprint ed., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), and his &#039;&#039;Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages&#039;&#039;, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Bollingen Books, 1965).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He tells us that &#039;&#039;Mimesis&#039;&#039; was written during his exile in Turkey and was meant to be in large measure an attempt virtually &#039;&#039;to see&#039;&#039; the development of Western culture at almost the last moment when that culture still had its integrity and civilizational coherence; therefore, he set himself the task of writing a general work based on specific textual analyses in such a way as to lay out the principles of Western literary performance in all their variety, richness, and fertility. The aim was a synthesis of Western culture in which the synthesis itself was matched in importance by the very gesture of doing it, which Auerbach believed was made possible by what he called &amp;quot;late bourgeois humanism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Erich Auerbach, &amp;quot;Philology and &#039;&#039;Weltliteratur&#039;&#039;,&amp;quot; trans. M. and E. W. Said, &#039;&#039;Centennial Review&#039;&#039; 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The discrete particular was thus converted into a highly mediated symbol of the world-historical process.&lt;br /&gt;
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No less important for Auerbach--and this fact is of immediate relevance to Orientalism--was the humanistic tradition of involvement in a national culture or literature not one&#039;s own. Auerbach&#039;s example was Curtius, whose prodigious output testified to his deliberate choice as a German to dedicate himself professionally to the Romance literatures. Not for nothing, then, did Auerbach end his autumnal reflections with a significant quotation from Hugo of St. Victor&#039;s &#039;&#039;Didascalicon&#039;&#039;: &amp;quot;The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 17.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The more one is able to leave one&#039;s cultural home, the more easily is one able to judge it, and the whole world as well, with the spiritual detachment &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; generosity necessary for true vision. The more easily, too, does one assess oneself and alien cultures with the same combination of intimacy and distance.&lt;br /&gt;
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No less important and methodologically formative a cultural force was the use in the social sciences of &amp;quot;types&amp;quot; both as an analytical device and as a way of seeing familiar things in a new way. The precise history of the &amp;quot;type&amp;quot; as it is to be found in early-twentieth-century thinkers like Weber, Durkheim, Lukacs, Mannheim, and the other sociologists of knowledge has been examined often enough:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For example, in H. Stuart Hughes, &#039;&#039;Consciousness and Society: The Reconstruction of European Social Thought, 1890-1930&#039;&#039; (1958; reprint ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1961).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; yet it has not been remarked, I think, that Weber&#039;s studies of Protestantism, Judaism, and Buddhism blew him (perhaps unwittingly) into the very territory originally charted and claimed by the Orientalists. There he found encouragement amongst all those nineteenth-century thinkers who believed that there was a sort of ontological difference between Eastern and Western economic (as well as religious) &amp;quot;mentalities.&amp;quot; Although he never thoroughly studied Islam, Weber nevertheless influenced the field considerably, mainly because his notions of type were simply an &amp;quot;outside&amp;quot; confirmation of many of the canonical theses held by Orientalists, whose economic ideas never extended beyond asserting the Oriental&#039;s fundamental incapacity for trade, commerce, and economic rationality. In the Islamic field those cliches held good for literally hundreds of years--until Maxime Rodinson&#039;s important study &#039;&#039;Islam and Capitalism&#039;&#039; appeared in 1966. Still, the notion of a type--Oriental, Islamic, Arab, or whatever--endures and is nourished by similar kinds of abstractions or paradigms or types as they emerge out of the modern social sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
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I have often spoken in this book of the sense of estrangement experienced by Orientalists as they dealt with or lived in a culture so profoundly different from their own. Now one of the striking differences between Orientalism in its Islamic version and all the other humanistic disciplines where Auerbach&#039;s notions on the necessity of estrangement have some validity is that Islamic Orientalists never saw their estrangement from Islam either as salutary or as an attitude with implications for the better understanding of their own culture. Rather, their estrangement from Islam simply intensified their feelings of superiority about European culture, even as their antipathy spread to include the entire Orient, of which Islam was considered a degraded (and usually, a virulently dangerous) representative. Such tendencies--it has also been my argument--became built into the very traditions of Orientalist study throughout the nineteenth century, and in time became a standard component of most Orientalist training, handed on from generation to generation. In addition, I think, the likelihood was very great that European scholars would continue to see the Near Orient through the perspective of its Biblical &amp;quot;origins,&amp;quot; that is, as a place of unshakably influential religious primacy. Given its special relationship to both Christianity and Judaism, Islam remained forever the Orientalist&#039;s idea (or type) of &#039;&#039;original&#039;&#039; cultural effrontery, aggravated naturally by the fear that Islamic civilization originally (as well as contemporaneously) continued to stand somehow opposed to the Christian West.&lt;br /&gt;
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For these reasons, Islamic Orientalism between the wars shared in the general sense of cultural crisis adumbrated by Auerbach and the others I have spoken of briefly, without at the same time developing in the same way as the other human sciences. Because Islamic Orientalism also preserved within it the peculiarly polemical &#039;&#039;religious&#039;&#039; attitude it had had from the beginning, it remained fixed in certain methodological tracks, so to speak. Its cultural alienation, for one, needed to be preserved from modern history and sociopolitical circumstance, as well as from the necessary revisions imposed on any theoretical or historical &amp;quot;type&amp;quot; by new data. For another, the abstractions offered by Orientalism (or rather, the opportunity for making abstractions) in the case of Islamic civilization were considered to have acquired a new validity; since it was assumed that Islam worked the way Orientalists said it did (without reference to actuality, but only to a set of &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; principles), it was also assumed that modern Islam would be nothing more than a reasserted version of the old, especially since it was also supposed that modernity for Islam was less of a challenge than an insult. (The very large number of assumptions and suppositions in this description, incidentally, are intended to portray the rather eccentric twists and turns necessary for Orientalism to have maintained its peculiar way of seeing human reality.) Finally, if the synthesizing ambition in philology (as conceived by Auerbach or Curtius) was to lead to an enlargement of the scholar&#039;s awareness, of his sense of the brotherhood of man, of the universality of certain principles of human behavior, in Islamic Orientalism synthesis led to a sharpened sense of difference between Orient and Occident as reflected in Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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What I am describing, then, is something that will characterize Islamic Orientalism until the present day: its retrogressive position when compared with the other human sciences (and even with the other branches of Orientalism), its general methodological and ideological backwardness, and its comparative insularity from developments both in the other humanities and in the real world of historical, economic, social, and political circumstances.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Anwar Abdel Malek, &amp;quot;Orientalism in Crisis,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diogenes&#039;&#039; 44 (Winter 1963): 103-40.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Some awareness of this lag in Islamic (or Semitic) Orientalism was already present towards the end of the nineteenth century, perhaps because it was beginning to be apparent to some observers how very little either Semitic or Islamic Orientalism had shaken itself loose from the religious background from which it originally derived. The first Orientalist congress was organized and held in Paris in 1873, and almost from the outset it was evident to other scholars that the Semiticists and Islamicists were in intellectual arrears, generally speaking. Writing a survey of all the congresses that had been held between 1873 and 1897, the English scholar R. N. Cust had this to say about the Semitic-Islamic subfield:&lt;br /&gt;
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Such meetings [as those held in the ancient-Semitic field], indeed, advance Oriental learning.&lt;br /&gt;
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The same cannot be said with regard to the modern-Semitic section; it was crowded, but the subjects discussed were of the smallest literary interest, such as would occupy the minds of the dilettanti scholars of the old school, not the great class of &amp;quot;indicatores&amp;quot; of the nineteenth century. I am forced to go back to Pliny to find a word. There was an absence from this section both of the modern philological and archeological spirit, and the report reads more like that of a congress of University tutors of the last century met to discuss the reading of a passage in a Greek play, or the accentuation of a vowel, before the dawn of Comparative Philology had swept away the cobwebs of the Scholiasts. Was it worth while to discuss whether Mahomet could hold a pen or write?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;R. N. Cust, &amp;quot;The International Congresses of Orientalists,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Hellas&#039;&#039; 6, no. 4 (1897): 349.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To some extent the polemical antiquarianism that Cust described was a scholarly version of European anti-Semitism. Even the designation &amp;quot;modern-Semitic,&amp;quot; which was meant to include both Muslims and Jews (and which had its origin in the so-called ancient-Semitic field pioneered by Renan), carried its racist banner with what was doubtless meant to be a decent ostentation. A little later in his report Cust comments on how in the same meeting &amp;quot; &#039;the Aryan&#039; supplied much material for reflection.&amp;quot; Clearly &amp;quot;the Aryan&amp;quot; is a counterabstraction to &amp;quot;the Semite,&amp;quot; but for some of the reasons I listed earlier, such atavistic labels were felt to be especially pertinent to Semites--with what expensive moral and human consequences for the human community as a whole, the history of the twentieth century amply demonstrates. Yet what has not been sufficiently stressed in histories of modern anti-Semitism has been the legitimation of such atavistic designations by Orientalism, and more important for my purposes here, the way this academic and intellectual legitimation has persisted right through the modern age in discussions of Islam, the Arabs, or the Near Orient. For whereas it is no longer possible to write learned (or even popular) disquisitions on either &amp;quot;the Negro mind&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Jewish personality,&amp;quot; it is perfectly possible to engage in such research as &amp;quot;the Islamic mind,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Arab character&amp;quot;--but of this subject more later.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, in order properly to understand the intellectual genealogy of interwar Islamic Orientalism--as it is most interestingly and satisfyingly seen (no irony intended) in the careers of Massignon and Gibb--we must be able to understand the differences between the Orientalist&#039;s summational attitude towards his material and the kind of attitude to which it bears a strong cultural resemblance, that in the work of philologists such as Auerbach and Curtius. The intellectual crisis in Islamic Orientalism was another aspect of the spiritual crisis of &amp;quot;late bourgeois humanism&amp;quot;; in its form and style, however, Islamic Orientalism viewed the problems of mankind as separable into the categories called &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;Occidental.&amp;quot; It was believed, then, that for the Oriental, liberation, self-expression, and self-enlargement were not the issues that they were for the Occidental. Instead, the Islamic Orientalist expressed his ideas about Islam in such a way as to emphasize his, as well as putatively the Muslim&#039;s, &#039;&#039;resistance&#039;&#039; to change, to mutual comprehension between East and West, to the development of men and women out of archaic, primitive classical institutions and into modernity. Indeed, so fierce was this sense of resistance to change, and so universal were the powers ascribed to it, that in reading the Orientalists one understands that the apocalypse to be feared was not the destruction of Western civilization but rather the destruction of the barriers that kept East and West from each other. When Gibb opposed nationalism in the modern Islamic states, he did so because he felt that nationalism would corrode the inner structures keeping Islam Oriental; the net result of secular nationalism would be to make the Orient no different from the West. Yet it is a tribute to Gibb&#039;s extraordinarily sympathetic powers of identification with an alien religion that he put his disapproval in such a way as to seem to be &#039;&#039;speaking for&#039;&#039; the Islamic orthodox community. How much such pleading was a reversion to the old Orientalist habit of speaking for the natives and how much it was a sincere attempt at speaking in Islam&#039;s best interests is a question whose answer lies somewhere between the two alternatives.&lt;br /&gt;
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No scholar or thinker, of course, is a perfect representative of some ideal type or school in which, by virtue of national origin or the accidents of history, he participates. Yet in so relatively insulated and specialized a tradition as Orientalism, I think there is in each scholar some awareness, partly conscious and partly non-conscious, of national tradition, if not of national ideology. This is particularly true in Orientalism, additionally so because of the direct political involvement of European nations in the affairs of one or another Oriental country: the case of Snouck Hurgronje, to cite a non-British and non-French instance where the scholar&#039;s sense of national identity is simple and clear, comes to mind immediately.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See W. F. Wertheim, &amp;quot;Counter-insurgency Research at the Turn of the Century--Snouck Hurgronje and the Acheh War,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Sociologische Gids&#039;&#039; 19 (September-December 1972).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet even after making all the proper qualifications about the difference between an individual and a type (or between an individual and a tradition), it is nevertheless striking to note the extent to which Gibb and Massignon &#039;&#039;were&#039;&#039; representative types. Perhaps it would be better to say that Gibb and Massignon fulfilled all the expectations created for them by their national traditions, by the politics of their nations, by the internal history of their national &amp;quot;schools&amp;quot; of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sylvain Levi put the distinction between the two schools trenchantly:&lt;br /&gt;
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The political interest that ties England to India holds British work to a sustained contact with concrete realities, and maintains the cohesion between representations of the past and the spectacle of the present.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nourished by classical traditions, France seeks out the human mind as it manifests itself in India in the same way that it is interested in China.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sylvain Levi, &amp;quot;Les Parts respectives des nations occidentales dans les progres de l&#039;indianisme,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Memorial Sylvain Levi&#039;&#039;, p. 116.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be too easy to say that this polarity results, on the one hand, in work that is sober, efficient, concrete, and on the other, in work that is universalistic, speculative, brilliant. Yet the polarity serves to illuminate two long and extremely distinguished careers that between them dominated French and Anglo-American Islamic Orientalism until the 1960s; if the domination makes any sense at all, it is because each scholar derived from and worked in a self-conscious tradition whose constraints (or limits, intellectually and politically speaking) can be described as Levi describes them above.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gibb was born in Egypt, Massignon in France. Both were to become deeply religious men, students not so much of society as of the religious life in society. Both were also profoundly worldly; one of their greatest achievements was putting traditional scholarship to use in the modern political world. Yet the range of their work--the texture of it, almost--is vastly different, even allowing for the obvious disparities in their schooling and religious education. In his lifelong devotion to the work of al-Hallaj--&amp;quot;whose traces,&amp;quot; Gibb said in his obituary notice for Massignon in 1962, he &amp;quot;never ceased to seek out in later Islamic literature and devotion&amp;quot;--Massignon&#039;s almost unrestricted range of research would lead him virtually everywhere, finding evidence for &amp;quot;l&#039;esprit humaine a travers l&#039;espace et le temps.&amp;quot; In an &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039; that took &amp;quot;in every aspect and region of contemporary Muslim life and thought,&amp;quot; Massignon&#039;s presence in Orientalism was a constant challenge to his colleagues. Certainly Gibb for one admired--but finally drew back from--the way Massignon pursued&lt;br /&gt;
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themes that in some way linked the spiritual life of Muslims and Catholics [and enabled him to find] a congenial element in the veneration of Fatima, and consequently a special field of interest in the study of Shi&#039;ite thought in many of its manifestations, or again in the community of Abrahamanic origins and such themes as the Seven Sleepers. His writings on these subjects have acquired from the qualities that he brought to them a permanent significance in Islamic studies. But just because of these qualities they are composed, as it were, in two registers. One was at the ordinary level of objective scholarship, seeking to elucidate the nature of the given phenomenon by a masterly use of established tools of academic research. The other was at a level on which objective data and understanding were absorbed and transformed by an individual intuition of spiritual dimensions. It was not always easy to draw a dividing line between the former and the transfiguration that resulted from the outpouring of the riches of his own personality.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a hint here that Catholics are more likely to be drawn to a study of &amp;quot;the veneration of Fatima&amp;quot; than Protestants, but there is no mistaking Gibb&#039;s suspicion of anyone who blurred the distinction between &amp;quot;objective&amp;quot; scholarship and one based on (even an elaborate) &amp;quot;individual intuition of spiritual dimensions.&amp;quot; Gibb was right, however, in the next paragraph of the obituary to acknowledge Massignon&#039;s &amp;quot;fertility&amp;quot; of mind in such diverse fields as &amp;quot;the symbolism of Muslim art, the structure of Muslim logic, the intricacies of medieval finance, and the organization of artisan corporations&amp;quot;; and he was right also, immediately after, to characterize Massignon&#039;s early interest in the Semitic languages as giving rise to &amp;quot;elliptic studies that to the uninitiate almost rivalled the mysteries of the ancient Hermetica.&amp;quot; Nevertheless, Gibb ends on a generous note, remarking that&lt;br /&gt;
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for us, the lesson which by his example he impressed upon the Orientalists of his generation was that even classical Orientalism is no longer adequate without some degree of committedness to the vital forces that have given meaning and value to the diverse aspects of Eastern cultures.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Louis Massignon (1882-1962),&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society&#039;&#039; (1962), pp. 120, 121.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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That, of course, was Massignon&#039;s greatest contribution, and it is true that in contemporary French Islamology (as it is sometimes called) there has grown up a tradition of identifying with &amp;quot;the vital forces&amp;quot; informing &amp;quot;Eastern culture&amp;quot;; one need only mention the extraordinary achievements of scholars like Jacques Berque, Maxime Rodinson, Yves Lacoste, Roger Amaldez--all of them differing widely among themselves in approach and intention--to be struck with the seminal example of Massignon, whose intellectual impress upon them all is unmistakable.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet in choosing to focus his comments almost anecdotally upon Massignon&#039;s various strengths and weaknesses, Gibb misses the obvious things about Massignon, things that make him so different from Gibb and yet, when taken as a whole, make him the mature symbol of so crucial a development within French Orientalism. One is Massignon&#039;s personal background, which quite beautifully illustrates the simple truth of Levi&#039;s description of French Orientalism. The very idea of &amp;quot;un esprit humain&amp;quot; was something more or less foreign to the intellectual and religious background out of which Gibb, like so many modern British Orientalists, developed: in Massignon&#039;s case the notion of &amp;quot;esprit,&amp;quot; as an aesthetic as well as religious, moral, and historical reality, was something he seemed to have been nourished upon from childhood. His family was friendly with such people as Huysmans, and in nearly everything he wrote Massignon&#039;s early education in the intellectual ambience as well as the ideas of late Symbolisme is evident, even to the particular brand of Catholicism (and Sufi mysticism) in which he was interested. There is no austerity in Massignon&#039;s work, which is formulated in one of the great French styles of the century. His ideas about human experience draw plentifully upon thinkers and artists contemporary with him, and it is the very wide cultural range of his style itself that puts him in a different category altogether from Gibb&#039;s. His early ideas come out of the period of so-called aesthetic decadence, but they are also indebted to people like Bergson, Durkheim, and Mauss. His first contact with Orientalism came through Renan, whose lectures he heard as a young man; he was also a student of Sylvain Levi, and came to include among his friends such figures as Paul Claudel, Gabriel Bounoure, Jacques and Raissa Maritain, and Charles de Foucauld. Later he was able to absorb work done in such relatively recent fields as urban sociology, structural linguistics, psychoanalysis, contemporary anthropology, and the New History. His essays, to say nothing of the monumental study of al-Hallaj, draw effortlessly on the entire corpus of Islamic literature; his mystifying erudition and almost familiar personality sometimes make him appear to be a scholar invented by Jorge Luis Borges. He was very sensitive to &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; themes in European literature; this was one of Gibb&#039;s interests, too, but unlike Gibb, Massignon was attracted primarily neither to European writers who &amp;quot;understood&amp;quot; the Orient nor to European texts that were independent artistic corroborations of what later Orientalist scholars would reveal (e.g., Gibb&#039;s interest in Scott as a source for the study of Saladin). Massignon&#039;s &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; was completely consonant with the world of the Seven Sleepers or of the Abrahamanic prayers (which are the two themes singled out by Gibb as distinctive marks of Massignon&#039;s unorthodox view of Islam): offbeat, slightly peculiar, wholly responsive to the dazzling interpretative gifts which Massignon brought to it (and which in a sense made it up as a subject). If Gibb liked Scott&#039;s Saladin, then Massignon&#039;s symmetrical predilection was for Nerval, as suicide, &#039;&#039;poete maudit&#039;&#039;, psychological oddity. This is not to say that Massignon was essentially a student of the past; on the contrary, he was a major presence in Islamic-French relations, in politics as well as culture. He was obviously a passionate man who believed that the world of Islam could be penetrated, not by scholarship exclusively, but by devotion to all of its activities, not the least of which was the world of Eastern Christianity subsumed within Islam, one of whose subgroups, the Badaliya Sodality, was warmly encouraged by Massignon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Massignon&#039;s considerable literary gifts sometimes give his scholarly work an appearance of capricious, overly cosmopolitan, and often private speculation. This appearance is misleading, and in fact is rarely adequate as a description of his writing. What he wished deliberately to avoid was what he called &amp;quot;l&#039;analyse analytique et statique de l&#039;orientalisme,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Louis Massignon, &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, ed. Y. Moubarac (Beirut: Dar-el-Maaref, 1963), 3: 114. I have used the complete bibliography of Massignon&#039;s work by Moubarac: &#039;&#039;L&#039;Oeuvre de Louis Massignon&#039;&#039; (Beirut: Editions du Cenacle libanais, 1972-73).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a sort of inert piling up, on a supposed Islamic text or problem, of sources, origins, proofs, demonstrations, and the like. Everywhere his attempt is to include as much of the context of a text or problem as possible, to animate it, to surprise his reader, almost, with the glancing insights available to anyone who, like Massignon, is willing to cross disciplinary and traditional boundaries in order to penetrate to the human heart of any text. No modern Orientalist--and certainly not Gibb, his closest peer in achievement and influence--could refer so easily (and accurately) in an essay to a host of Islamic mystics and to Jung, Heisenberg, Mallarme, and Kierkegaard; and certainly very few Orientalists had that range together with the concrete political experience of which he was able to speak in his 1952 essay &amp;quot;L&#039;Occident devant l&#039;Orient: Primaute d&#039;une solution culturelle.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Massignon, &amp;quot;L&#039;Occident devant l&#039;Orient: Primaute d&#039;une solution culturelle,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, 1: 208-23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; And yet his intellectual world was a clearly defined one. It had a definite structure, intact from the beginning to the end of his career, and it was laced up, despite its almost unparalleled richness of scope and reference, in a set of basically unchanging ideas. Let us briefly describe the structure and list the ideas in a summary fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
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Massignon took as his starting point the existence of the three Abrahamanic religions, of which Islam is the religion of Ishmael, the monotheism of a people excluded from the divine promise made to Isaac. Islam is therefore a religion of resistance (to God the Father, to Christ the Incarnation), which yet keeps within it the sadness that began in Hagar&#039;s tears. Arabic as a result is the very language of tears, just as the whole notion of &#039;&#039;jihad&#039;&#039; in Islam (which Massignon explicitly says is the epic form in Islam that Renan could not see or understand) has an important intellectual dimension whose mission is war against Christianity and Judaism as exterior enemies, and against heresy as an interior enemy. Yet within Islam, Massignon believed he was able to discern a type of countercurrent, which it became his chief intellectual mission to study, embodied in mysticism, a road towards divine grace. The principal feature of mysticism was of course its subjective character, whose nonrational and even inexplicable tendencies were towards the singular, the individual, the momentary experience of participation in the Divine. All of Massignon&#039;s extraordinary work on mysticism was thus an attempt to describe the itinerary of souls out of the limiting consensus imposed on them by the orthodox Islamic community, or Sunna. An Iranian mystic was more intrepid than an Arab one, partly because he was Aryan (the old nineteenth-century labels &amp;quot;Aryan&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot; have a compelling urgency for Massignon, as does also the legitimacy of Schlegel&#039;s binary opposition between the two language families&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 169.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) and partly because he was a man seeking the Perfect; the Arab mystic, in Massignon&#039;s view, inclined towards what Waardenburg calls a testimonial monism. The exemplary figure for Massignon was al-Hallaj, who sought liberation for himself outside the orthodox community by asking for, and finally getting, the very crucifixion refused by Islam as a whole; Mohammed, according to Massignon, had deliberately rejected the opportunity offered him to bridge the gap separating him from God. Al-Hallaj&#039;s achievement was therefore to have achieved a mystical union with God against the grain of Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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The rest of the orthodox community lives in a condition of what Massignon calls &amp;quot;soif ontologique&amp;quot;--ontological thirst. God presents himself to man as a kind of absence, a refusal to be present, yet the devout Muslim&#039;s consciousness of his submission to God&#039;s will (Islam) gives rise to a jealous sense of God&#039;s transcendence and an intolerance of idolatry of any sort. The seat of these ideas, according to Massignon, is the &amp;quot;circumcised heart,&amp;quot; which while it is in the grip of its testimonial Muslim fervor can, as is the case with mystics like al-Hallaj, also be inflamed with a divine passion or love of God. In either case, God&#039;s transcendental unity (&#039;&#039;tawhid&#039;&#039;) is something to be achieved and understood over and over by the devout Muslim, either through testifying to it or through mystic love of God: and this, Massignon wrote in a complex essay, defines the &amp;quot;intention&amp;quot; of Islam.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;, pp. 147, 183, 186, 192, 211, 213.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Clearly Massignon&#039;s sympathies lay with the mystic vocation in Islam, as much for its closeness to his own temperament as a devout Catholic as for its disrupting influence within the orthodox body of beliefs. Massignon&#039;s image of Islam is of a religion ceaselessly implicated in its refusals, its latecoming (with reference to the other Abrahamanic creeds), its comparatively barren sense of worldly reality, its massive structures of defense against &amp;quot;psychic commotions&amp;quot; of the sort practiced by al-Hallaj and other Sufi mystics, its loneliness as the only remaining &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; religion of the three great monotheisms.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Massignon, &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, 1: 227.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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But so obviously stern a view of Islam, with its &amp;quot;invariants simples&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 355.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; (especially for so luxuriant a thought as Massignon&#039;s), entailed no deep hostility towards it on his part. In reading Massignon one is struck by his repeated insistence on the need for complex reading--injunctions whose absolute sincerity it is impossible to doubt. He wrote in 1951 that his kind of Orientalism was &amp;quot;ni une manie d&#039;exotisme, ni un reniement de l&#039;Europe, mais une mise au niveau entre nos methodes de recherches et les traditions vecues d&#039;antiques civilisations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted from Massignon&#039;s essay on Biruni in Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;, p. 225.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Put into practice in the reading of an Arabic or Islamic text, this kind of Orientalism produced interpretations of an almost overwhelming intelligence; one would be foolish not to respect the sheer genius and novelty of Massignon&#039;s mind. Yet what must catch our attention in his definition of his Orientalism are two phrases: &amp;quot;nos methodes de recherches&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;les traditions vecues d&#039;antiques civilisations.&amp;quot; Massignon saw what he did as the synthesis of two roughly opposed quantities, yet it is the peculiar asymmetry between them that troubles one, and not merely the fact of the opposition between Europe and Orient. Massignon&#039;s implication is that the essence of the difference between East and West is between modernity and ancient tradition. And indeed in his writings on political and contemporary problems, which is where one can see most immediately the limitations of Massignon&#039;s method, the East-West opposition turns up in a most peculiar way.&lt;br /&gt;
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At its best, Massignon&#039;s vision of the East-West encounter assigned great responsibility to the West for its invasion of the East, its colonialism, its relentless attacks on Islam. Massignon was a tireless fighter on behalf of Muslim civilization and, as his numerous essays and letters after 1948 testify, in support of Palestinian refugees, in the defense of Arab Muslim and Christian rights in Palestine against Zionism, against what, with reference to something said by Abba Eban, he scathingly called Israeli &amp;quot;bourgeois colonialism.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Massignon, &#039;&#039;Opera Minora&#039;&#039;, 3: 526.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Yet the framework in which Massignon&#039;s vision was held also assigned the Islamic Orient to an essentially ancient time and the West to modernity. Like Robertson Smith, Massignon considered the Oriental to be not a modern man but a Semite; this reductive category had a powerful grip on his thought. When, for example, in 1960 he and Jacques Berque, his colleague at the College de France, published their dialogue on &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Esprit&#039;&#039;, a good deal of the time was spent in arguing whether the best way to look at the problems of the contemporary Arabs was simply to say, in the main instance, that the Arab-Israeli conflict was really a &#039;&#039;Semitic&#039;&#039; problem. Berque tried to demur gently, and to nudge Massignon towards the possibility that like the rest of the world the Arabs had undergone what he called an &amp;quot;anthropological variation&amp;quot;: Massignon refused the notion out of hand.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 610-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; His repeated efforts to understand and report on the Palestine conflict, for all their profound humanism, never really got past the quarrel between Isaac and Ishmael or, so far as his quarrel with Israel was concerned, the tension between Judaism and Christianity. When Arab cities and villages were captured by the Zionists, it was Massignon&#039;s religious sensibilities that were offended.&lt;br /&gt;
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Europe, and France in particular, were seen as &#039;&#039;contemporary&#039;&#039; realities. Partly because of his initial political encounter with the British during the First World War, Massignon retained a pronounced dislike of England and English policy; Lawrence and his type represented a too-complex policy which he, Massignon, opposed in his dealings with Faisal. &amp;quot;Je cherchais avec Faysal ... a penetrer dans le sens meme de sa tradition a lui.&amp;quot; The British seemed to represent &amp;quot;expansion&amp;quot; in the Orient, amoral economic policy, and an outdated philosophy of political influence.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 212. Also p. 211 for another attack on the British, and pp. 423-7 for his assessment of Lawrence.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Frenchman was a more modern man, who was obliged to get from the Orient what he had lost in spirituality, traditional values, and the like. Massignon&#039;s investment in this view came, I think, by way of the entire nineteenth-century tradition of the Orient as therapeutic for the West, a tradition whose earliest adumbration is to be found in Quinet. In Massignon, it was joined to a sense of Christian compassion:&lt;br /&gt;
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So far as Orientals are concerned, we ought to have recourse to this science of compassion, to this &amp;quot;participation&amp;quot; even in the construction of their language and of their mental structure, in which indeed we must participate: because ultimately this science bears witness either to verities that are ours too, or else to verities that we have lost and must regain. Finally, because in a profound sense everything that exists is good in some way, and those poor colonized people do not exist only for our purposes but in and for themselves [&#039;&#039;en soi&#039;&#039;].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted in Waardenburg, &#039;&#039;L&#039;Islam dans le miroir de l&#039;Occident&#039;&#039;, p. 219.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless the Oriental, &#039;&#039;en soi&#039;&#039;, was incapable of appreciating or understanding himself. Partly because of what Europe had done to him, he had lost his religion and his &#039;&#039;philosophie&#039;&#039;; Muslims had &amp;quot;un vide immense&amp;quot; within them; they were close to anarchy and suicide. It became France&#039;s obligation, then, to associate itself with the Muslims&#039; desire to defend their traditional culture, the rule of their dynastic life, and the patrimony of believers.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 218-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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No scholar, not even a Massignon, can resist the pressures on him of his nation or of the scholarly tradition in which he works. In a great deal of what he said of the Orient and its relationship with the Occident, Massignon seemed to refine and yet to repeat the ideas of other French Orientalists. We must allow, however, that the refinements, the personal style, the individual genius, may finally supersede the political restraints operating impersonally through tradition and through the national ambience. Even so, in Massignon&#039;s case we must also recognize that in one direction his ideas about the Orient remained thoroughly traditional and Orientalist, their personality and remarkable eccentricity notwithstanding. According to him, the Islamic Orient was spiritual, Semitic, tribalistic, radically monotheistic, un-Aryan: the adjectives resemble a catalogue of late-nineteenth-century anthropological descriptions. The relatively earthbound experiences of war, colonialism, imperialism, economic oppression, love, death, and cultural exchange seem always in Massignon&#039;s eyes to be filtered through metaphysical, ultimately dehumanized lenses: they are Semitic, European, Oriental, Occidental, Aryan, and so on. The categories structured his world and gave what he said a kind of deep sense--to him, at least. In the other direction, among the individual and immensely detailed ideas of the scholarly world, Massignon maneuvered himself into a special position. He reconstructed and defended Islam against Europe on the one hand and against its own orthodoxy on the other. This intervention--for it was that--into the Orient as animator and champion symbolized his own acceptance of the Orient&#039;s difference, as well as his efforts to change it into what he wanted. Both together, the will to knowledge over the Orient and on its behalf in Massignon are very strong. His al-Hallaj represents that will perfectly. The disproportionate importance accorded al-Hallaj by Massignon signifies first, the scholar&#039;s decision to promote one figure above his sustaining culture, and second, the fact that al-Hallaj had come to represent a constant challenge, even an irritant, to the Western Christian for whom belief was not (and perhaps could not be) the extreme self-sacrifice it was for the Sufi. In either case, Massignon&#039;s al-Hallaj was intended literally to embody, to incarnate, values essentially outlawed by the main doctrinal system of Islam, a system that Massignon himself described mainly in order to circumvent it with al-Hallaj.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless we need not say immediately of Massignon&#039;s work that it was perverse, or that its greatest weakness was that it misrepresented Islam as an &amp;quot;average&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;common&amp;quot; Muslim might adhere to the faith. A distinguished Muslim scholar has argued precisely for this last position, although his argument did not name Massignon as an offender.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See A. L. Tibawi, &amp;quot;English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism, Part I,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Islamic Quarterly&#039;&#039; 8, nos. 1, 2 (January-June 1964): 25-44; &amp;quot;Part II,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Islamic Quarterly&#039;&#039; 8, nos. 3, 4 (July-December 1964): 73-88.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Much as one may be inclined to agree with such theses--since, as this book has tried to demonstrate, Islam &#039;&#039;has&#039;&#039; been fundamentally misrepresented in the West--the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they &#039;&#039;are&#039;&#039; representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is), then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is &#039;&#039;eo ipso&#039;&#039; implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the &amp;quot;truth,&amp;quot; which is itself a representation. What this must lead us to methodologically is to view representations (or misrepresentations--the distinction is at best a matter of degree) as inhabiting a common field of play defined for them, not by some inherent common subject matter alone, but by some common history, tradition, universe of discourse. Within this field, which no single scholar can create but which each scholar receives and in which he then finds a place for himself, the individual researcher makes his contribution. Such contributions, even for the exceptional genius, are strategies of redisposing material within the field; even the scholar who unearths a once-lost manuscript produces the &amp;quot;found&amp;quot; text in a context already prepared for it, for that is the real meaning of &#039;&#039;finding&#039;&#039; a new text. Thus each individual contribution first causes changes within the field and then promotes a new stability, in the way that on a surface covered with twenty compasses the introduction of a twenty-first will cause all the others to quiver, then to settle into a new accommodating configuration.&lt;br /&gt;
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The representations of Orientalism in European culture amount to what we can call a discursive consistency, one that has not only history but material (and institutional) presence to show for itself. As I said in connection with Renan, such a consistency was a form of cultural praxis, a system of opportunities for making statements about the Orient. My whole point about this system is not that it is a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence--in which I do not for a moment believe--but that it operates as representations usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting. In other words, representations have purposes, they are effective much of the time, they accomplish one or many tasks. Representations are formations, or as Roland Barthes has said of all the operations of language, they are deformations. The Orient as a representation in Europe is formed--or deformed--out of a more and more specific sensitivity towards a geographical region called &amp;quot;the East.&amp;quot; Specialists in this region do their work on it, so to speak, because in time their profession as Orientalists requires that they present their society with images of the Orient, knowledge about it, insight into it. And to a very large extent the Orientalist provides his own society with representations of the Orient (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) that bear his distinctive imprint, (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) that illustrate his conception of what the Orient can or ought to be, (&#039;&#039;c&#039;&#039;) that consciously contest someone else&#039;s view of the Orient, (&#039;&#039;d&#039;&#039;) that provide Orientalist discourse with what, at that moment, it seems most in need of, and (&#039;&#039;e&#039;&#039;) that respond to certain cultural, professional, national, political, and economic requirements of the epoch. It will be evident that even though it will never be absent, the role of positive knowledge is far from absolute. Rather, &amp;quot;knowledge&amp;quot;--never raw, unmediated, or simply objective--is what the five attributes of Orientalist representation listed above &#039;&#039;distribute&#039;&#039;, and redistribute.&lt;br /&gt;
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Seen in such a way, Massignon is less a mythologized &amp;quot;genius&amp;quot; than he is a kind of system for producing certain kinds of statements, disseminated into the large mass of discursive formations that together make up the archive, or cultural material, of his time. I do not think that we dehumanize Massignon if we recognize this, nor do we reduce him to being subject to vulgar determinism. On the contrary, we will see in a sense how a very human being had, and was able to acquire more of, a cultural and productive capacity that had an institutional, or extrahuman, dimension to it: and this surely is what the finite human being must aspire to if he is not to be content with his merely mortal presence in time and space. When Massignon said &amp;quot;nous sommes tous des Semites&amp;quot; he was indicating the range of his ideas over his society, showing the extent to which his ideas about the Orient could transcend the local anecdotal circumstances of a Frenchman and of French society. The category of Semite drew its nourishment out of Massignon&#039;s Orientalism, but its force derived from its tendency to extend out of the confines of the discipline, out into a broader history and anthropology, where it seemed to have a certain validity and power.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Une figure domine tous les genres [of Orientalist work], celle de Louis Massignon&amp;quot;: Claude Cahen and Charles Pellat, &amp;quot;Les Etudes arabes et islamiques,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal asiatique&#039;&#039; 261, nos. 1, 4 (1973): 104. There is a very detailed survey of the Islamic-Orientalist field to be found in Jean Sauvaget, &#039;&#039;Introduction a l&#039;histoire de l&#039;Orient musulman: Elements de bibliographie&#039;&#039;, ed. Claude Cahen (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1961).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On one level at least, Massignon&#039;s formulations and his representations of the Orient did have a direct influence, if not an unquestioned validity: among the guild of professional Orientalists. As I said above, Gibb&#039;s recognition of Massignon&#039;s achievement constitutes an awareness that as an alternative to Gibb&#039;s own work (by implication, that is), Massignon was to be dealt with. I am of course imputing things to Gibb&#039;s obituary that are there only as traces, not as actual statements, but they are obviously important if we look now at Gibb&#039;s own career as a foil for Massignon&#039;s. Albert Hourani&#039;s memorial essay on Gibb for the British Academy (to which I have referred several times) admirably summarizes the man&#039;s career, his leading ideas, and the importance of his work: with Hourani&#039;s assessment, in its broad lines, I have no disagreement. Yet something is missing from it, although this lack is partly made up for in a lesser piece on Gibb, William Polk&#039;s &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb Between Orientalism and History.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;William Polk, &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb Between Orientalism and History,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;International Journal of Middle East Studies&#039;&#039; 6, no. 2 (April 1975): 131-9. I have used the bibliography of Gibb&#039;s work in &#039;&#039;Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb&#039;&#039;, ed. George Makdisi (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 1-20.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hourani tends to view Gibb as the product of personal encounters, personal influences, and the like; whereas Polk, who is far less subtle in his general understanding of Gibb than Hourani, sees Gibb as the culmination of a specific academic tradition, what--to use an expression that does not occur in Polk&#039;s prose--we can call an academic-research consensus or paradigm.&lt;br /&gt;
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Borrowed in this rather gross fashion from Thomas Kuhn, the idea has a worthwhile relevance to Gibb, who as Hourani reminds us was in many ways a profoundly institutional figure. Everything that Gibb said or did, from his early career at London to the middle years at Oxford to his influential years as director of Harvard&#039;s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, bears the unmistakable stamp of a mind operating with great ease inside established institutions. Massignon was irremediably the outsider, Gibb the insider. Both men, in any case, achieved the very pinnacle of prestige and influence in French and Anglo-American Orientalism, respectively. The Orient for Gibb was not a place one encountered directly; it was something one read about, studied, wrote about within the confines of learned societies, the university, the scholarly conference. Like Massignon, Gibb boasted of friendships with Muslims, but they seemed--like Lane&#039;s--to have been useful friendships, not determining ones. Consequently Gibb is a dynastic figure within the academic framework of British (and later of American) Orientalism, a scholar whose work quite consciously demonstrated the national tendencies of an academic tradition, set inside universities, governments, and research foundations.&lt;br /&gt;
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One index of this is that in his mature years Gibb was often to be met with speaking and writing for policy-determining organizations. In 1951, for instance, he contributed an essay to a book significantly entitled &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, in which he tried to explain the need for an expansion in Anglo-American programs of Oriental studies:&lt;br /&gt;
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... the whole situation of the Western countries in regard to the countries of Asia and Africa has changed. We can no longer rely on that factor of prestige which seemed to play a large part in prewar thinking, neither can we any longer expect the peoples of Asia and Africa or of Eastern Europe to come to us and learn from us, while we sit back. We have to learn about them so that we can learn to work with them in a relationship that is closer to terms of mutuality.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Oriental Studies in the United Kingdom,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, ed. Richard N. Frye (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 86-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The terms of this new relationship were spelled out later in &amp;quot;Area Studies Reconsidered.&amp;quot; Oriental studies were to be thought of not so much as scholarly activities but as instruments of national policy towards the newly independent, and possibly intractable, nations of the postcolonial world. Armed with a refocused awareness of his importance to the Atlantic commonwealth, the Orientalist was to be the guide of policymakers, of businessmen, of a fresh generation of scholars.&lt;br /&gt;
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What counted most in Gibb&#039;s later vision was not the Orientalist&#039;s positive work as a scholar (for example, the kind of scholar Gibb had been in his youth when he studied the Muslim invasions of Central Asia) but its adaptability for use in the public world. Hourani puts this well:&lt;br /&gt;
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... it became clear to him [Gibb] that modern governments and elites were acting in ignorance or rejection of their own traditions of social life and morality, and that their failures sprang from this. Henceforth his main efforts were given to the elucidation, by careful study of the past, of the specific nature of Muslim society and the beliefs and culture which lay at the heart of it. Even this problem he tended to see at first mainly in political terms.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albert Hourani, &amp;quot;Sir Hamilton Gibb, 1895-1971,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Proceedings of the British Academy&#039;&#039; 58 (1972): p. 504.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet no such later vision could have been possible without a fairly rigorous amount of preparation in Gibb&#039;s earlier work, and it is there that we must first seek to understand his ideas. Among Gibb&#039;s earliest influences was Duncan Macdonald, from whose work Gibb clearly derived the concept that Islam was a coherent system of life, a system made coherent not so much by the people who led that life as by virtue of some body of doctrine, method of religious practice, idea of order, in which all the Muslim people participated. Between the people and &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; there was obviously a dynamic encounter of sorts, yet what mattered to the Western student was the supervening power of Islam to make intelligible the experiences of the Islamic people, not the other way around.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For Macdonald and subsequently for Gibb, the epistemological and methodological difficulties of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as an object (about which large, extremely general statements could be made) are never tackled. Macdonald for his part believed that in Islam one could perceive aspects of a still more portentous abstraction, the Oriental mentality. The entire opening chapter of his most influential book (whose importance for Gibb cannot be minimized), &#039;&#039;The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam&#039;&#039;, is an anthology of unarguable declaratives about the Eastern or Oriental mind. He begins by saying that &amp;quot;it is plain, I think, and admitted that the conception of the Unseen is much more immediate and real to the Oriental than to the western peoples.&amp;quot; The &amp;quot;large modifying elements which seem, from time to time, almost to upset the general law&amp;quot; do not upset it, nor do they upset the other equally sweeping and general laws governing the Oriental mind. &amp;quot;The essential difference in the Oriental mind is not credulity as to unseen things, but inability to construct a system as to seen things.&amp;quot; Another aspect of this difficulty--which Gibb was later to blame for the absence of form in Arabic literature and for the Muslim&#039;s essentially atomistic view of reality--is &amp;quot;that the difference in the Oriental is not essentially religiosity, but the lack of the sense of law. For him, there is no immovable order of nature.&amp;quot; If such a &amp;quot;fact&amp;quot; seems not to account for the extraordinary achievements of Islamic science, upon which a great deal in modern Western science is based, then Macdonald remains silent. He continues his catalogue: &amp;quot;It is evident that anything is possible to the Oriental. The supernatural is so near that it may touch him at any moment.&amp;quot; That an &#039;&#039;occasion&#039;&#039;--namely, the historical and geographical birth of monotheism in the Orient--should in Macdonald&#039;s argument become an entire theory of difference between East and West signifies the degree of intensity to which &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; has committed Macdonald. Here is his summary:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Inability&#039;&#039;, then, to see life steadily, and see it whole, to understand that a theory of life must cover all the facts, and &#039;&#039;liability&#039;&#039; to be stampeded by a single idea and blinded to everything else--therein, I believe, is the difference between the East and the West.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Duncan Black Macdonald, &#039;&#039;The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam&#039;&#039; (1909; reprint ed., Beirut: Khayats Publishers, 1965), pp. 2-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
None of this, of course, is particularly new. From Schlegel to Renan, from Robertson Smith to T. E. Lawrence, these ideas get repeated and re-repeated. They represent a decision about the Orient, not by any means a fact of nature. Anyone who, like Macdonald and Gibb, consciously entered a profession called Orientalism did so on the basis of a decision made: that the Orient was the Orient, that it was different, and so forth. The elaborations, refinements, consequent articulations of the field therefore sustain and prolong the decision to confine the Orient. There is no perceivable irony in Macdonald&#039;s (or Gibb&#039;s) views about Oriental liability to be stampeded by a single idea; neither man seems able to recognize the extent of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s liability to be stampeded by the single idea of Oriental difference. And neither man is concerned by such wholesale designations as &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; being used as proper nouns, with adjectives attached and verbs streaming forth, as if they referred to persons and not to Platonic ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is no accident, therefore, that Gibb&#039;s master theme, in almost everything he wrote about Islam and the Arabs, was the tension between &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a transcendent, compelling Oriental fact and the realities of everyday human experience. His investment as a scholar and as a devout Christian was in &amp;quot;Islam,&amp;quot; not so much in the (to him) relatively trivial complications introduced into Islam by nationalism, class struggle, the individualizing experiences of love, anger, or human work. Nowhere is the impoverishing character of this investment more evident than in &#039;&#039;Whither Islam?&#039;&#039;, a volume edited and contributed to, in the title essay, by Gibb in 1932. (It also includes an impressive article on North African Islam by Massignon.) Gibb&#039;s task as he saw it was to assess Islam, its present situation, its possible future course. In such a task the individual and manifestly different regions of the Islamic world were to be, not refutations of Islam&#039;s unity, but examples of it. Gibb himself proposed an introductory definition of Islam; then, in the concluding essay, he sought to pronounce on its actuality and its real future. Like Macdonald, Gibb seems entirely comfortable with the idea of a monolithic East, whose existential circumstances cannot easily be reduced to race or racial theory; in resolutely denying the value of racial generalization Gibb rises above what had been most reprehensible in preceding generations of Orientalists. Gibb has a correspondingly generous and sympathetic view of Islam&#039;s universalism and tolerance in letting diverse ethnic and religious communities coexist peacefully and democratically within its imperium. There is a note of grim prophecy in Gibb&#039;s singling out the Zionists and the Maronite Christians, alone amongst ethnic communities in the Islamic world, for their inability to accept coexistence.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;Whither Islam?&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Whither Islam? A Survey of Modern Movements in the Moslem World&#039;&#039;, ed. H. A. R. Gibb (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932), pp. 328, 387.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the heart of Gibb&#039;s argument is that Islam, perhaps because it finally represents the Oriental&#039;s exclusive concern not with nature but with the Unseen, has an ultimate precedence and domination over all life in the Islamic Orient. For Gibb Islam &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; Islamic orthodoxy, &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; also the community of believers, &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; life, unity, intelligibility, values. It &#039;&#039;is&#039;&#039; law and order too, the unsavory disruptions of jihadists and communist agitators notwithstanding. In page after page of Gibb&#039;s prose in &#039;&#039;Whither Islam?&#039;&#039;, we learn that the new commercial banks in Egypt and Syria are facts of Islam or an Islamic initiative; schools and an increasing literacy rate are Islamic facts, too, as are journalism, Westernization, and intellectual societies. At no point does Gibb speak of European colonialism when he discusses the rise of nationalism and its &amp;quot;toxins.&amp;quot; That the history of modern Islam might be more intelligible for its resistance, political and nonpolitical, to colonialism, never occurs to Gibb, just as it seems to him finally irrelevant to note whether the &amp;quot;Islamic&amp;quot; governments he discusses are republican, feudal, or monarchical.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; for Gibb is a sort of superstructure imperiled both by politics (nationalism, communist agitation, Westernization) and by dangerous Muslim attempts to tamper with its intellectual sovereignty. In the passage that follows, note how the word &#039;&#039;religion&#039;&#039; and its cognates are made to color the tone of Gibb&#039;s prose, so much so that we feel a decorous annoyance at the mundane pressures directed at &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Islam, as a religion, has lost little of its force, but Islam as the arbiter of social life [in the modern world] is being dethroned; alongside it, or above it, new forces exert an authority which is sometimes in contradiction to its traditions and its social prescriptions, but nevertheless forces its way in their teeth. To put the position in its simplest terms, what has happened is this. Until recently, the ordinary Muslim citizen and cultivator had no political interests or functions, and no literature of easy access except religious literature, had no festivals and no communal life except in connection with religion, saw little or nothing of the outside world except through religious glasses. &#039;&#039;To him, in consequence, religion meant everything&#039;&#039;. Now, however, more in all the advanced countries, his interests have expanded and his activities are no longer bounded by religion. He has political questions thrust on his notice; he reads, or has read to him, a mass of articles on subjects of all kinds which have nothing to do with religion, and in which the religious point of view may not be discussed at all and the verdict held to lie with some quite different principles.... [Emphasis added]&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 335.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Admittedly, the picture is a little difficult to see, since unlike any other religion &#039;&#039;Islam is or means everything&#039;&#039;. As a description of a human phenomenon the hyperbole is, I think, unique to Orientalism. Life itself--politics, literature, energy, activity, growth--is an intrusion upon this (to a Westerner) unimaginable Oriental totality. Yet as &amp;quot;a complement and counterbalance to European civilisation&amp;quot; Islam in its modern form is nevertheless a useful object: this is the core of Gibb&#039;s proposition about modern Islam. For &amp;quot;in the broadest aspect of history, what is now happening between Europe and Islam is the reintegration of western civilization, artificially sundered at the Renaissance and now reasserting its unity with overwhelming force.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 377.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike Massignon, who made no effort to conceal his metaphysical speculations, Gibb delivered such observations as this as if they were objective knowledge (a category he found wanting in Massignon). Yet by almost any standards most of Gibb&#039;s general works on Islam &#039;&#039;are&#039;&#039; metaphysical, not only because he uses abstractions like &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as if they have a clear and distinct meaning but also because it is simply never clear where in concrete time and space Gibb&#039;s &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; is taking place. If on the one hand, following Macdonald, he puts Islam definitively outside the West, on the other hand, in much of his work, he is to be found &amp;quot;reintegrating&amp;quot; it with the West. In 1955 he made this inside-outside question a bit clearer: the West took from Islam only those nonscientific elements that it had originally derived from the West, whereas in borrowing much from Islamic science, the West was merely following the law making &amp;quot;natural science and technology ... indefinitely transmissible.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &amp;quot;The Influence of Islamic Culture on Medieval Europe,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;John Rylands Library Bulletin&#039;&#039; 38, no. 1 (September 1955): 98.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The net result is to make Islam in &amp;quot;art, aesthetics, philosophy and religious thought&amp;quot; a second-order phenomenon (since those came from the West), and so far as science and technology are concerned, a mere conduit for elements that are not &#039;&#039;sui generis&#039;&#039; Islamic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any clarity about what Islam is in Gibb&#039;s thought ought to be found &#039;&#039;within&#039;&#039; these metaphysical constraints, and indeed his two important works of the forties, &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey&#039;&#039;, flesh out matters considerably. In both books Gibb is at great pains to discuss the present crisis in Islam, opposing its inherent, essential being to modern attempts at modifying it. I have already mentioned Gibb&#039;s hostility to modernizing currents in Islam and his stubborn commitment to Islamic orthodoxy. Now it is time to mention Gibb&#039;s preference for the word &#039;&#039;Mohammedanism&#039;&#039; over &#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039; (since he says that Islam is really based upon an idea of apostolic succession culminating in Mohammed) and his assertion that the Islamic master science is law, which early on replaced theology. The curious thing about these statements is that they are assertions made about Islam, not on the basis of evidence internal to Islam, but rather on the basis of a logic deliberately outside Islam. No Muslim would call himself a Mohammedan, nor so far as is known would he necessarily feel the importance of law over theology. But what Gibb does is to situate himself as a scholar within contradictions he himself discerns, at that point in &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; where &amp;quot;there is a certain unexpressed dislocation between the formal outward process and the inner realities.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey&#039;&#039; (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 2, 9, 84.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Orientalist, then, sees his task as expressing the dislocation and consequently speaking the truth about Islam, which by definition--since its contradictions inhibit its powers of self-discernment--it cannot express. Most of Gibb&#039;s general statements about Islam supply concepts to Islam that the religion or culture, again by &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; definition, is incapable of grasping: &amp;quot;Oriental philosophy had never appreciated the fundamental idea of justice in Greek philosophy.&amp;quot; As for Oriental societies, &amp;quot;in contrast to most western societies, [they] have generally devoted [themselves] to building stable social organizations [more than] to constructing ideal systems of philosophical thought.&amp;quot; The principal internal weakness of Islam is the &amp;quot;breaking of association between the religious orders and the Muslim upper and middle classes.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 111, 88, 189.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But Gibb is also aware that Islam has never remained isolated from the rest of the world and therefore must stand in a series of external dislocations, insufficiencies, and disjunctions between itself and the world. Thus he says that modern Islam is the result of a classical religion coming into disynchronous contact with Romantic Western ideas. In reaction to this assault, Islam developed a school of modernists whose ideas everywhere reveal hopelessness, ideas unsuited to the modern world: Mahdism, nationalism, a revived caliphate. Yet the conservative reaction to modernism is no less unsuited to modernity, for it has produced a kind of stubborn Luddism. Well then, we ask, what is Islam finally, if it cannot conquer its internal dislocations nor deal satisfactorily with its external surroundings? The answer can be sought in the following central passage from &#039;&#039;Modern Trends&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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Islam is a living and vital religion, appealing to the hearts, minds, and consciences of tens and hundreds of millions, setting them a standard by which to live honest, sober, and god-fearing lives. It is not Islam that is petrified, but its orthodox formulations, its systematic theology, its social apologetic. It is here that the dislocation lies, that the dissatisfaction is felt among a large proportion of its most educated and intelligent adherents, and that the danger for the future is most evident. No religion can ultimately resist disintegration if there is a perpetual gulf between its demands upon the will and its appeal to the intellect of its followers. That for the vast majority of Muslims the problem of dislocation has not yet arisen justifies the ulema in refusing to be rushed into the hasty measures which the modernists prescribe; but the spread of modernism is a warning that re-formulation cannot be indefinitely shelved.&lt;br /&gt;
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In trying to determine the origins and causes of this petrifaction of the formulas of Islam, we may possibly also find a clue to the answer to the question which the modernists are asking, but have so far failed to resolve--the question, that is, of the way in which the fundamental principles of Islam may be re-formulated without affecting their essential elements.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. A. R. Gibb, &#039;&#039;Modern Trends in Islam&#039;&#039; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 108, 113, 123.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The last part of this passage is familiar enough: it suggests the now traditional Orientalist ability to reconstruct and reformulate the Orient, given the Orient&#039;s inability to do so for itself. In part, then, Gibb&#039;s Islam exists &#039;&#039;ahead&#039;&#039; of Islam as it is practiced, studied, or preached in the Orient. Yet this prospective Islam is no mere Orientalist fiction, spun out of his ideas: it is based on an &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; that--since it cannot truly exist&#039;&#039;--appeals&#039;&#039; to a whole community of believers. The reason that &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; can exist in some more or less future Orientalist formulation of it is that in the Orient Islam is usurped and traduced by the language of its clergy, whose claim is upon the community&#039;s mind. So long as it is silent in its appeal, Islam is safe; the moment the reforming clergy takes on its (legitimate) role of reformulating Islam in order for it to be able to enter modernity, the trouble starts. And that trouble, of course, is dislocation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dislocation in Gibb&#039;s work identifies something far more significant than a putative intellectual difficulty within Islam. It identifies, I think, the very privilege, the very ground on which the Orientalist places himself so as to write about, legislate for, and reformulate Islam. Far from being a chance discernment of Gibb&#039;s, dislocation is the epistemological passageway into his subject, and subsequently, the observation platform from which in all his writing, and in every one of the influential positions he filled, he could survey Islam. Between the silent appeal of Islam to a monolithic community of orthodox believers and a whole merely verbal articulation of Islam by misled corps of political activists, desperate clerks, and opportunistic reformers: there Gibb stood, wrote, reformulated. His writing said either what Islam could not say or what its clerics would not say. What Gibb wrote was in one sense temporally ahead of Islam, in that he allowed that at some point in the future Islam would be able to say what it could not say now. In another important sense, however, Gibb&#039;s writings on Islam predated the religion as a coherent body of &amp;quot;living&amp;quot; beliefs, since his writing was able to get hold of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a silent appeal made to Muslims &#039;&#039;before&#039;&#039; their faith became a matter for worldly argument, practice, or debate.&lt;br /&gt;
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The contradiction in Gibb&#039;s work--for it is a contradiction to speak of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as neither what its clerical adherents in fact say it is nor what, if they could, its lay followers would say about it--is muted somewhat by the metaphysical attitude governing his work, and indeed governing the whole history of modern Orientalism which he inherited, through mentors like Macdonald. The Orient and Islam have a kind of extrareal, phenomenologically reduced status that puts them out of reach of everyone except the Western expert. From the beginning of Western speculation about the Orient, the one thing the Orient could not do was to represent itself. Evidence of the Orient was credible only after it had passed through and been made firm by the refining fire of the Orientalist&#039;s work. Gibb&#039;s &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039; purports to be Islam (or Mohammedanism) both &#039;&#039;as it is&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;as it might be&#039;&#039;. Metaphysically--and only metaphysically--essence and potential are made one. Only a metaphysical attitude could produce such famous Gibb essays as &amp;quot;The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;An Interpretation of Islamic History&amp;quot; without being troubled by the distinction made between objective and subjective knowledge in Gibb&#039;s criticism of Massignon.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Both essays are to be found in Gibb&#039;s &#039;&#039;Studies on the Civilization of Islam&#039;&#039;, pp. 176-208 and 3-33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The statements about &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; are made with a confidence and a serenity that are truly Olympian. There is no dislocation, no felt discontinuity between Gibb&#039;s page and the phenomenon it describes, for each, according to Gibb himself, is ultimately reducible to the other. As such, &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; and Gibb&#039;s description of it have a calm, discursive plainness whose common element is the English scholar&#039;s orderly page.&lt;br /&gt;
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I attach a great deal of significance to the appearance of and to the intended model for the Orientalist&#039;s page as a printed object. I have spoken in this book about d&#039;Herbelot&#039;s alphabetic encyclopedia, the gigantic leaves of the &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;, Renan&#039;s laboratory-museum notebook, the ellipses and short episodes of Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, Sacy&#039;s anthological excerpts, and so forth. These pages are signs of some Orient, and of some Orientalist, &#039;&#039;presented&#039;&#039; to the reader. There is an order to these pages by which the reader apprehends not only the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; but also the Orientalist, as interpreter, exhibitor, personality, mediator, representative (and representing) expert. In a remarkable way Gibb and Massignon produced pages that recapitulate the history of Orientalist writing in the West as that history has been embodied in a varied generic and topographical style, reduced finally to a scholarly, monographic uniformity. The Oriental specimen; the Oriental excess; the Oriental lexicographic unit; the Oriental series; the Oriental exemplum: all these have been subordinated in Gibb and Massignon to the linear prose authority of discursive analysis, presented in essay, short article, scholarly book. In their time, from the end of World War I till the early sixties, three principal forms of Orientalist writing were radically transformed: the encyclopedia, the anthology, the personal record. Their authority was redistributed or dispersed or dissipated: to a committee of experts (&#039;&#039;The Encyclopedia of Islam&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;), to a lower order of service (elementary instruction in language, which would prepare one not for diplomacy, as was the case with Sacy&#039;s &#039;&#039;Chrestomathie&#039;&#039;, but for the study of sociology, economics, or history), to the realm of sensational revelation (having more to do with personalities or governments--Lawrence is the obvious example--than with knowledge). Gibb, with his quietly heedless but profoundly sequential prose; Massignon, with the flair of an artist for whom no reference is too extravagant so long as it is governed by an eccentric interpretative gift: the two scholars took the essentially &#039;&#039;ecumenical&#039;&#039; authority of European Orientalism as far as it could go. After them, the new reality--the new specialized style--was, broadly speaking, Anglo-American, and more narrowly speaking, it was American Social Scientese. In it, the old Orientalism was broken into many parts; yet all of them still served the traditional Orientalist dogmas.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;IV.&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;The Latest Phase&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Since World War II, and more noticeably after each of the Arab-Israeli wars, the Arab Muslim has become a figure in American popular culture, even as in the academic world, in the policy planner&#039;s world, and in the world of business very serious attention is being paid the Arab. This symbolizes a major change in the international configuration of forces. France and Britain no longer occupy center stage in world politics; the American imperium has displaced them. A vast web of interests now links all parts of the former colonial world to the United States, just as a proliferation of academic subspecialties divides (and yet connects) all the former philological and European-based disciplines like Orientalism. The area specialist, as he is now called, lays claims to regional expertise, which is put at the service of government or business or both. The massive, quasi-material knowledge stored in the annals of modern European Orientalism--as recorded, for example, in Jules Mohl&#039;s nineteenth-century logbook of the field--has been dissolved and released into new forms. A wide variety of hybrid representations of the Orient now roam the culture. Japan, Indochina, China, India, Pakistan: their representations have had, and continue to have, wide repercussions, and they have been discussed in many places for obvious reasons. Islam and the Arabs have their own representations, too, and we shall treat them here as they occur in that fragmentary--yet powerfully and ideologically coherent--persistence, a far less frequently discussed one, into which, in the United States, traditional European Orientalism disbursed itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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1. &#039;&#039;Popular images and social science representations&#039;&#039;. Here are a few examples of how the Arab is often represented today. Note how readily &amp;quot;the Arab&amp;quot; seems to accommodate the transformations and reductions--all of a simply tendentious kind--into which he is continually being forced. The costume for Princeton&#039;s tenth-reunion class in 1967 had been planned before the June War. The motif--for it would be wrong to describe the costume as more than crudely suggestive--was to have been Arab: robes, headgear, sandals. Immediately after the war, when it had become clear that the Arab motif was an embarrassment, a change in the reunion plans was decreed. Wearing the costume as had been originally planned, the class was now to walk in procession, hands above heads in a gesture of abject defeat. This was what the Arab had become. From a faintly outlined stereotype as a camel-riding nomad to an accepted caricature as the embodiment of incompetence and easy defeat: that was all the scope given the Arab.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet after the 1973 war the Arab appeared everywhere as something more menacing. Cartoons depicting an Arab sheik standing behind a gasoline pump turned up consistently. These Arabs, however, were clearly &amp;quot;Semitic&amp;quot;: their sharply hooked noses, the evil mustachioed leer on their faces, were obvious reminders (to a largely non-Semitic population) that &amp;quot;Semites&amp;quot; were at the bottom of all &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; troubles, which in this case was principally a gasoline shortage. The transference of a popular anti-Semitic animus from a Jewish to an Arab target was made smoothly, since the figure was essentially the same.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus if the Arab occupies space enough for attention, it is as a negative value. He is seen as the disrupter of Israel&#039;s and the West&#039;s existence, or in another view of the same thing, as a surmountable obstacle to Israel&#039;s creation in 1948. Insofar as this Arab has any history, it is part of the history given him (or taken from him: the difference is slight) by the Orientalist tradition, and later, the Zionist tradition. Palestine was seen--by Lamartine and the early Zionists--as an empty desert waiting to burst into bloom; such inhabitants as it had were supposed to be inconsequential nomads possessing no real claim on the land and therefore no cultural or national reality. Thus the Arab is conceived of now as a shadow that dogs the Jew. In that shadow--because Arabs and Jews are Oriental Semites--can be placed whatever traditional, latent mistrust a Westerner feels towards the Oriental. For the Jew of pre-Nazi Europe has bifurcated: what we have now is a Jewish hero, constructed out of a reconstructed cult of the adventurer-pioneer-Orientalist (Burton, Lane, Renan), and his creeping, mysteriously fearsome shadow, the Arab Oriental. Isolated from everything except the past created for him by Orientalist polemic, the Arab is chained to a destiny that fixes him and dooms him to a series of reactions periodically chastised by what Barbara Tuchman gives the theological name &amp;quot;Israel&#039;s terrible swift sword.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from his anti-Zionism, the Arab is an oil supplier. This is another negative characteristic, since most accounts of Arab oil equate the oil boycott of 1973-1974 (which principally benefitted Western oil companies and a small ruling Arab elite) with the absence of any Arab moral qualifications for owning such vast oil reserves. Without the usual euphemisms, the question most often being asked is why such people as the Arabs are entitled to keep the developed (free, democratic, moral) world threatened. From such questions comes the frequent suggestion that the Arab oil fields be invaded by the marines.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the films and television the Arab is associated either with lechery or bloodthirsty dishonesty. He appears as an oversexed degenerate, capable, it is true, of cleverly devious intrigues, but essentially sadistic, treacherous, low. Slave trader, camel driver, moneychanger, colorful scoundrel: these are some traditional Arab roles in the cinema. The Arab leader (of marauders, pirates, &amp;quot;native&amp;quot; insurgents) can often be seen snarling at the captured Western hero and the blond girl (both of them steeped in wholesomeness), &amp;quot;My men are going to kill you, but--they like to amuse themselves before.&amp;quot; He leers suggestively as he speaks: this is a current debasement of Valentino&#039;s Sheik. In newsreels or news-photos, the Arab is always shown in large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics or experiences. Most of the pictures represent mass rage and misery, or irrational (hence hopelessly eccentric) gestures. Lurking behind all of these images is the menace of &#039;&#039;jihad&#039;&#039;. Consequence: a fear that the Muslims (or Arabs) will take over the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Books and articles are regularly published on Islam and the Arabs that represent absolutely no change over the virulent anti-Islamic polemics of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. For no other ethnic or religious group is it true that virtually anything can be written or said about it, without challenge or demurral. The 1975 course guide put out by the Columbia College undergraduates said about the Arabic course that every other word in the language had to do with violence, and that the Arab mind as &amp;quot;reflected&amp;quot; in the language was unremittingly bombastic. A recent article by Emmett Tyrrell in &#039;&#039;Harper&#039;s&#039;&#039; magazine was even more slanderous and racist, arguing that Arabs are basically murderers and that violence and deceit are carried in the Arab genes.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., &amp;quot;Chimera in the Middle East,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Harper&#039;s&#039;&#039;, November 1976, pp. 35-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A survey entitled &#039;&#039;The Arabs in American Textbooks&#039;&#039; reveals the most astonishing misinformation, or rather the most callous representations of an ethnic-religious group. One book asserts that &amp;quot;few people of this [Arab] area even know that there is a better way to live,&amp;quot; and then goes on to ask disarmingly, &amp;quot;What links the people of the Middle East together?&amp;quot; The answer, given unhesitatingly, is, &amp;quot;The last link is the Arab&#039;s hostility--hatred--toward the Jews and the nation of Israel.&amp;quot; Along with such material goes this about Islam, in another book: &amp;quot;The Moslem religion, called Islam, began in the seventh century. It was started by a wealthy businessman of Arabia, called Mohammed. He claimed that he was a prophet. He found followers among other Arabs. He told them that they were picked to rule the world.&amp;quot; This bit of knowledge is followed by another, equally accurate: &amp;quot;Shortly after Mohammed&#039;s death, his teachings were recorded in a book called the Koran. It became the holy book of Islam.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Ayad al-Qazzaz, Ruth Afiyo, et al., &#039;&#039;The Arabs in American Textbooks&#039;&#039;, California State Board of Education, June 1975, pp. 10, 15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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These crude ideas are supported, not contradicted, by the academic whose business is the study of the Arab Near East. (It is worth noting incidentally that the Princeton event I referred to above took place in a university that prides itself on its department of Near Eastern Studies founded in 1927, the oldest such department in the country.) Take as an instance the report produced in 1967 by Morroe Berger, a professor of sociology and Near Eastern studies at Princeton, at the behest of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; he was then president of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), the professional association of scholars concerned with all aspects of the Near East, &amp;quot;primarily since the rise of Islam and from the viewpoint of the social science and humanistic disciplines,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Statement of Purpose,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039; 1, no. 1 (May 1967): 33.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and founded in 1967. He called his paper &amp;quot;Middle Eastern and North African Studies: Developments and Needs,&amp;quot; and had it published in the second issue of the &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039;. After surveying the strategic, economic, and political importance of the region to the United States, and after endorsing the various United States government and private foundation projects to support programs in universities--the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (a directly Sputnik-inspired initiative), the establishing of links between the Social Science Research Council and Middle Eastern studies, and so on--Berger came to the following conclusions:&lt;br /&gt;
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The modern Middle East and North Africa is not a center of great cultural achievement, nor is it likely to become one in the near future. The study of the region or its languages, therefore, does not constitute its own reward so far as modern culture is concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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... Our region is not a center of great political power nor does it have the potential to become one.... The Middle East (less so North Africa) has been receding in immediate political importance to the U.S. (and even in &amp;quot;headline&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;nuisance&amp;quot; value) relative to Africa, Latin America and the Far East.&lt;br /&gt;
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... The contemporary Middle East, thus, has only in small degree the kinds of traits that seem to be important in attracting scholarly attention. This does not diminish the validity and intellectual value of studying the area or affect the quality of work scholars do on it. It does, however, put limits, of which we should be aware, on the field&#039;s capacity for growth in the numbers who study and teach.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Morroe Berger, &amp;quot;Middle Eastern and North African Studies: Developments and Needs,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039; 1, no. 2 (November 1967): 16.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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As a prophecy, of course, this is fairly lamentable; what makes it even more unfortunate is that Berger was commissioned not only because he was an expert on the modern Near East but also--as is clear from the report&#039;s conclusion--because he was expected to be in a good position to predict its future, and the future of policy. His failure to see that the Middle East was of great political significance, and potentially of great political power, was no chance aberration of judgment, I think. Both of Berger&#039;s main mistakes derive from the first and last paragraphs, whose genealogy is the history of Orientalism as we have been studying it. In what Berger has to say about the absence of great cultural achievement, and in what he concludes about future study--that the Middle East does not attract scholarly attention because of its intrinsic weaknesses--we have an almost exact duplication of the canonical Orientalist opinion that the Semites never produced a great culture and that, as Renan frequently said, the Semitic world was too impoverished ever to attract universal attention. Moreover, in making such time-honored judgments and in being totally blind to what is before his eyes--after all, Berger was not writing fifty years ago, but during a period when the United States was already importing about 10 percent of its oil from the Middle East and when its strategic and economic investments in the area were unimaginably huge--Berger was ensuring the centrality of his own position as Orientalist. For what he says, in effect, is that without people such as he the Middle East would be neglected; and that without his mediating, interpretative role the place would not be understood, partly because what little there is to understand is fairly peculiar, and partly because only the Orientalist can interpret the Orient, the Orient being radically incapable of interpreting itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that Berger was not so much a classical Orientalist when he wrote (he wasn&#039;t and isn&#039;t) as he was a professional sociologist does not minimize the extent of his indebtedness to Orientalism and its ideas. Among those ideas is the specially legitimated antipathy towards and downgrading of the material forming the main basis of his study. So strong is this in Berger that it obscures the actualities before his eyes. And more impressively still, it makes it unnecessary for him to ask himself why, if the Middle East &amp;quot;is not a center of great cultural achievement,&amp;quot; he should recommend that anyone devote his life, as he has, to the study of its culture. Scholars--more than, say, doctors--study what they like and what interests them; only an exaggerated sense of cultural duty drives a scholar to the study of what he does not think well of. Yet it is just such a sense of duty Orientalism has fostered, because for generations the culture at large put the Orientalist at the barricades, where in his professional work he confronted the East--its barbarities, its eccentricities, its unruliness--and held it at bay on behalf of the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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I mention Berger as an instance of the academic attitude towards the Islamic Orient, as an instance of how a learned perspective can support the caricatures propagated in the popular culture. Yet Berger stands also for the most current transformation overtaking Orientalism: its conversion from a fundamentally philological discipline and a vaguely general apprehension of the Orient into a social science specialty. No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and &amp;quot;applies&amp;quot; his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France. The American experience of the Orient prior to that exceptional moment was limited. Cultural isolatos like Melville were interested in it; cynics like Mark Twain visited and wrote about it; the American Transcendentalists saw affinities between Indian thought and their own; a few theologians and Biblical students studied the Biblical Oriental languages; there were occasional diplomatic and military encounters with Barbary pirates and the like, the odd naval expedition to the Far Orient, and of course the ubiquitous missionary to the Orient. But there was no deeply invested tradition of Orientalism, and consequently in the United States knowledge of the Orient never passed through the refining and reticulating and reconstructing processes, whose beginning was in philological study, that it went through in Europe. Furthermore, the imaginative investment was never made either, perhaps because the American frontier, the one that counted, was the westward one. Immediately after World War II, then, the Orient became, not a broad catholic issue as it had been for centuries in Europe, but an administrative one, a matter for policy. Enter the social scientist and the new expert, on whose somewhat narrower shoulders was to fall the mantle of Orientalism. In their turn, as we shall see, they made such changes in it that it became scarcely recognizable. In any event, the new Orientalist took over the attitudes of cultural hostility and kept them.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the striking aspects of the new American social-science attention to the Orient is its singular avoidance of literature. You can read through reams of expert writing on the modern Near East and never encounter a single reference to literature. What seem to matter far more to the regional expert are &amp;quot;facts,&amp;quot; of which a literary text is perhaps a disturber. The net effect of this remarkable omission in modern American awareness of the Arab or Islamic Orient is to keep the region and its people conceptually emasculated, reduced to &amp;quot;attitudes,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;trends,&amp;quot; statistics: in short, dehumanized. Since an Arab poet or novelist--and there are many--writes of his experiences, of his values, of his humanity (however strange that may be), he effectively disrupts the various patterns (images, cliches, abstractions) by which the Orient is represented. A literary text speaks more or less directly of a living reality. Its force is not that it is Arab, or French, or English; its force is in the power and vitality of words that, to mix in Flaubert&#039;s metaphor from &#039;&#039;La Tentation de Saint Antoine&#039;&#039;, tip the idols out of the Orientalists&#039; arms and make them drop those great paralytic children--which are their ideas of the Orient--that attempt to pass for the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The absence of literature and the relatively weak position of philology in contemporary American studies of the Near East are illustrations of a new eccentricity in Orientalism, where indeed my use of the word itself is anomalous. For there is very little in what academic experts on the Near East do now that resembles traditional Orientalism of the sort that ended with Gibb and Massignon; the main things that are reproduced are, as I said, a certain cultural hostility and a sense based not so much on philology as on &amp;quot;expertise.&amp;quot; Genealogically speaking, modern American Orientalism derives from such things as the army language schools established during and after the war, sudden government and corporate interest in the non-Western world during the postwar period, Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, and a residual missionary attitude towards Orientals who are considered ripe for reform and reeducation. The nonphilological study of esoteric Oriental languages is useful for obvious rudimentary strategic reasons; but it is also useful for giving a cachet of authority, almost a mystique, to the &amp;quot;expert&amp;quot; who appears able to deal with hopelessly obscure material with firsthand skill.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the social-science order of things, language study is a mere tool for higher aims, certainly not for reading literary texts. In 1958, for example, the Middle East Institute--a quasi-governmental body founded to oversee and sponsor research interest in the Middle East--produced a &#039;&#039;Report on Current Research&#039;&#039;. The contribution &amp;quot;Present State of Arabic Studies in the United States&amp;quot; (done, interestingly enough, by a professor of Hebrew) is prefaced by an epigraph announcing that &amp;quot;no longer is knowledge of foreign languages, for instance, the sole province of the scholars in the humanities. It is a working tool of the engineer, the economist, the social scientist, and many other specialists.&amp;quot; The whole report stresses the importance of Arabic to oil-company executives, technicians, and military personnel. But the report&#039;s main talking point is this trio of sentences: &amp;quot;Russian universities are now producing fluent Arabic speakers. Russia has realized the importance of appealing to men through their minds, by using their own language. The United States need wait no longer in developing its foreign language program.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Menachem Mansoor, &amp;quot;Present State of Arabic Studies in the United States,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;Report on Current Research 1958&#039;&#039;, ed. Kathleen H. Brown (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1958), pp. 55-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thus Oriental languages are part of some policy objective--as to a certain extent they have always been--or part of a sustained propaganda effort. In both these aims the study of Oriental languages becomes the instrument carrying out Harold Lasswell&#039;s theses about propaganda, in which what counts is not what people are or think but what they can be made to be and think.&lt;br /&gt;
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The propagandist outlook in fact combines respect for individuality with indifference to formal democracy. The respect for individuality arises from the dependence of large scale operations upon the support of the mass and upon experience with the variability of human preferences.... This regard for men in the mass rests upon no democratic dogmatisms about men being the best judges of their own interests. The modern propagandist, like the modern psychologist, recognizes that men are often poor judges of their own interests, flitting from one alternative to the next without solid reason or clinging timorously to the fragments of some mossy rock of ages. Calculating the prospect of securing a permanent change in habits and values involves much more than the estimation of the preferences of men in general. It means taking account of the tissue of relations in which men are webbed, searching for signs of preference which may reflect no deliberation and directing a program towards a solution which fits in fact.... With respect to those adjustments which do require mass action the task of the propagandist is that of inventing goal symbols which serve the double function of facilitating adoption and adaptation. The symbols must induce acceptance spontaneously.... It follows that the management ideal is control of a situation not by imposition but by divination.... The propagandist takes it for granted that the world is completely caused but that it is only partly predictable....&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Harold Lasswell, &amp;quot;Propaganda,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences&#039;&#039; (1934), 12: 527. I owe this reference to Professor Noam Chomsky.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The acquired foreign language is therefore made part of a subtle assault upon populations, just as the study of a foreign region like the Orient is turned into a program for control by divination.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet such programs must always have a liberal veneer, and usually this is left to scholars, men of good will, enthusiasts to attend to. The idea encouraged is that in studying Orientals, Muslims, or Arabs &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; can get to know another people, their way of life and thought, and so on. To this end it is always better to let them speak for themselves, to represent themselves (even though underlying this fiction stands Marx&#039;s phrase--with which Lasswell is in agreement--for Louis Napoleon: &amp;quot;They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented&amp;quot;). But only up to a point, and in a special way. In 1973, during the anxious days of the October Arab-Israeli War, the &#039;&#039;New York Times Magazine&#039;&#039; commissioned two articles, one representing the Israeli and one the Arab side of the conflict. The Israeli side was presented by an Israeli lawyer; the Arab side, by an American former ambassador to an Arab country who had no formal training in Oriental studies. Lest we jump immediately to the simple conclusion that the Arabs were believed incapable of representing themselves, we would do well to remember that both Arabs and Jews in this instance were Semites (in the broad cultural designation I have been discussing) and that both &#039;&#039;were being made to be&#039;&#039; represented for a Western audience. It is worthwhile here to remember this passage from Proust, in which the sudden appearance of a Jew into an aristocratic salon is described as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Rumanians, the Egyptians, the Turks may hate the Jews. But in a French drawing-room the differences between those people are not so apparent, and an Israelite making his entry as though he were emerging from the heart of the desert, his body crouching like a hyaena&#039;s, his neck thrust obliquely forward, spreading himself in proud &amp;quot;salaams,&amp;quot; completely satisfies a certain taste for the oriental [&#039;&#039;un gout pour l&#039;orientalisme&#039;&#039;].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marcel Proust, &#039;&#039;The Guermantes Way&#039;&#039;, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff (1925; reprint ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 135.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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2. &#039;&#039;Cultural relations policy&#039;&#039;. While it is true to say that the United States did not in fact become a world empire until the twentieth century, it is also true that during the nineteenth century the United States was concerned with the Orient in ways that prepared for its later, overtly imperial concern. Leaving aside the campaigns against the Barbary pirates in 1801 and 1815, let us consider the founding of the American Oriental Society in 1842. At its first annual meeting in 1843 its president, John Pickering, made the very clear point that America proposed for itself the study of the Orient in order to follow the example of the imperial European powers. Pickering&#039;s message was that the framework of Oriental studies--then as now--was political, not simply scholarly. Note in the following summary how the lines of argument for Orientalism leave little room for doubt as to their intention:&lt;br /&gt;
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At the first annual meeting of the American Society in 1843, President Pickering began a remarkable sketch of the field it was proposed to cultivate by calling attention to the especially favorable circumstances of the time, the peace that reigned everywhere, the freer access to Oriental countries, and the greater facilities for communication. The earth seemed quiet in the days of Metternich and Louis Philippe. The treaty of Nanking had opened Chinese ports. The screw-propellor had been adopted in oceangoing vessels; Morse had completed his telegraph and he had already suggested the laying of a trans-Atlantic cable. The objects of the Society were to cultivate learning in Asiatic, African, and Polynesian language, and in everything concerning the Orient, to create a taste for Oriental Studies in this country, to publish texts, translations and communications, and to collect a library and cabinet. Most of the work has been done in the Asiatic field, and particularly in Sanskrit and the Semitic languages.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Nathaniel Schmidt, &amp;quot;Early Oriental Studies in Europe and the Work of the American Oriental Society, 1842-1922,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of the American Oriental Society&#039;&#039; 43 (1923): 11. See also E. A. Speiser, &amp;quot;Near Eastern Studies in America, 1939-45,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Archiv Orientalni&#039;&#039; 16 (1948): 76-88.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Metternich, Louis-Philippe, the Treaty of Nanking, the screw propellor: all suggest the imperial constellation facilitating Euro-American penetration of the Orient. This has never stopped. Even the legendary American missionaries to the Near East during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took their role as set not so much by God as by &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; God, &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; culture, and &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; destiny.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;As an instance there is Henry Jessup, &#039;&#039;Fifty-Three Years in Syria&#039;&#039;, 2 vols. (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1910).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The early missionary institutions--printing presses, schools, universities, hospitals, and the like--contributed of course to the area&#039;s well-being, but in their specifically imperial character and their support by the United States government, these institutions were no different from their French and British counterparts in the Orient. During the First World War, what was to become a major United States policy interest in Zionism and the colonization of Palestine played an estimable role in getting the United States into the war; British discussions prior to and after the Balfour Declaration (November 1917) reflect the seriousness with which the declaration was taken by the United States.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For the connection between the issuing of the Balfour Declaration and United States war policy, see Doreen Ingrams, &#039;&#039;Palestine Papers 19171922: Seeds of Conflict&#039;&#039; (London: Cox &amp;amp; Syman, 1972), pp. 10 ff.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; During and after the Second World War, the escalation in United States interest in the Middle East was remarkable. Cairo, Teheran, and North Africa were important arenas of war, and in that setting, with the exploitation of its oil, strategic, and human resources pioneered by Britain and France, the United States prepared for its new postwar imperial role.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not the least aspect of this role was &amp;quot;a cultural relations policy,&amp;quot; as it was defined by Mortimer Graves in 1950. Part of this policy was, he said, the attempt to acquire &amp;quot;every significant publication in every important Near Eastern language published since 1900,&amp;quot; an attempt &amp;quot;which our Congress ought to recognize as a measure of our national security.&amp;quot; For what was clearly at stake, Graves argued (to very receptive ears, by the way), was the need for &amp;quot;much better American understanding of the forces which are contending with the American idea for acceptance by the Near East. The principal of these are, of course, communism and Islam.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Mortimer Graves, &amp;quot;A Cultural Relations Policy in the Near East,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, ed. Frye, pp. 76, 78.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Out of such a concern, and as a contemporary adjunct to the more backward-looking American Oriental Society, was born the entire vast apparatus for research on the Middle East. The model, both in its frankly strategic attitude and in its sensitivity to public security and policy (not, as is often postured, to pure scholarship), was the Middle East Institute, founded May 1946 in Washington under the aegis of, if not entirely within or by, the federal government.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;George Camp Keiser, &amp;quot;The Middle East Institute: Its Inception and Its Place in American International Studies,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Near East and the Great Powers&#039;&#039;, ed. Frye, pp. 80, 84.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Out of such organizations grew the Middle East Studies Association, the powerful support of the Ford and other foundations, the various federal programs of support to universities, the various federal research projects, research projects carried out by such entities as the Defense Department, the RAND Corporation, and the Hudson Institute, and the consultative and lobbying efforts of banks, oil companies, multinationals, and the like. It is no reduction to say of all this that it retains, in most of its general as well as its detailed functioning, the traditional Orientalist outlook which had been developed in Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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The parallel between European and American imperial designs on the Orient (Near and Far) is obvious. What is perhaps less obvious is (&#039;&#039;a&#039;&#039;) the extent to which the European tradition of Orientalist scholarship was, if not taken over, then accommodated, normalized, domesticated, and popularized and fed into the postwar efflorescence of Near Eastern studies in the United States; and (&#039;&#039;b&#039;&#039;) the extent to which the European tradition has given rise in the United States to a coherent attitude among most scholars, institutions, styles of discourse, and orientations, despite the contemporary appearance of refinement, as well as the use of (again) highly sophisticated-appearing social-science techniques. I have already discussed Gibb&#039;s ideas; it needs to be pointed out, however, that in the middle 1950s he became director of the Harvard Center for Middle East Studies, from which position his ideas and style exerted an important influence. Gibb&#039;s presence in the United States was different in what it did for the field from Philip Hitti&#039;s presence at Princeton since the late 1920s. The Princeton department produced a large group of important scholars, and its brand of Oriental studies stimulated great scholarly interest in the field. Gibb, on the other hand, was more truly in touch with the public-policy aspect of Orientalism, and far more than Hitti&#039;s at Princeton his position at Harvard focused Orientalism on a Cold War area-studies approach.&lt;br /&gt;
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Gibb&#039;s own work, nevertheless, did not overtly employ the language of cultural discourse in the tradition of Renan, Becker, and Massignon. Yet this discourse, its intellectual apparatus, and its dogmas were impressively present, principally (although not exclusively) in the work and institutional authority, at Chicago and then at UCLA, of Gustave von Grunebaum. He came to the United States as part of the intellectual immigration of European scholars fleeing fascism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;For an account of this migration, see &#039;&#039;The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960&#039;&#039;, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Thereafter he produced a solid Orientalist &#039;&#039;oeuvre&#039;&#039; that concentrated on Islam as a holistic culture about which, from beginning to end of his career, he continued to make the same set of essentially reductive, negative generalizations. His style, which bore often chaotic evidence of his Austro-Germanic polymathy, of his absorption of the canonical pseudoscientific prejudices of French, British, and Italian Orientalism, as well as of an almost desperate effort to remain the impartial scholar-observer, was next to unreadable. A typical page of his on the Islamic self-image will jam together half-a-dozen references to Islamic texts drawn from as many periods as possible, references as well to Husserl and the pre-Socratics, references to Levi-Strauss and various American social scientists. All this, nevertheless, does not obscure von Grunebaum&#039;s almost virulent dislike of Islam. He has no difficulty presuming that Islam is a unitary phenomenon, unlike any other religion or civilization, and thereafter he shows it to be antihuman, incapable of development, self-knowledge, or objectivity, as well as uncreative, unscientific, and authoritarian. Here are two typical excerpts--and we must remember that von Grunebaum wrote with the unique authority of a European scholar in the United States, teaching, administering, giving grants to a large network of scholars in the field.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is essential to realize that Muslim civilization is a cultural entity that does not share our primary aspirations. It is not vitally interested in the structured study of other cultures, either as an end in itself or as a means towards clearer understanding of its own character and history. If this observation were to be valid merely for contemporary Islam, one might be inclined to connect it with the profoundly disturbed state of Islam, which does not permit it to look beyond itself unless forced to do so. But as it is valid for the past as well, one may perhaps seek to connect it with the basic anti-humanism of this [Islamic] civilization, that is, the determined refusal to accept man to any extent whatever as the arbiter or the measure of things, and the tendency to be satisfied with the truth as the description of mental structures, or in other words, with psychological truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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[Arab or Islamic nationalism] lacks, in spite of its occasional use as a catchword, the concept of the divine right of a nation, it lacks a formative ethic, it also lacks, it would seem, the later nineteenth century belief in mechanistic progress; above all it lacks the intellectual vigor of a primary phenomenon. Both power and the will to power are ends in themselves. [This sentence seems to serve no purpose in the argument; yet it doubtless gives von Grunebaum the security of a philosophical-sounding nonsentence, as if to assure himself that he speaks wisely, not disparagingly, of Islam.] The resentment of political slights [felt by Islam] engenders impatience and impedes long-range analysis and planning in the intellectual sphere.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gustave von Grunebaum, &#039;&#039;Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity&#039;&#039; (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 55, 261.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In most other contexts such writing would politely be called polemical. For Orientalism, of course, it is relatively orthodox, and it passed for canonical wisdom in American study of the Middle East after World War II, mainly because of the cultural prestige associated with European scholars. The point is, however, that von Grunebaum&#039;s work is accepted uncritically by the field, even though the field itself today cannot reproduce people like him. Yet only one scholar has undertaken a serious critique of von Grunebaum&#039;s views: Abdullah Laroui, a Moroccan historian and political theorist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Using the motif of reductive repetition in von Grunebaum&#039;s work as a practical tool of critical anti-Orientalist study, Laroui manages his case impressively on the whole. He asks himself what it is that caused von Grunebaum&#039;s work, despite the enormous mass of its detail and its apparent range, to remain reductive. As Laroui says, &amp;quot;the adjectives that von Grunebaum affixes to the word Islam (medieval, classical, modern) are neutral or even superfluous: there is no difference between classical Islam and medieval Islam or Islam plain and simple.... There is therefore [for von Grunebaum] only &#039;&#039;one&#039;&#039; Islam that changes within itself.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Abdullah Laroui, &amp;quot;Pour une methodologie des etudes islamiques: L&#039;Islam au miroir de Gustave von Grunebaum,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Diogene&#039;&#039; 38 (July-September 1973): 30. This essay has been collected in Laroui&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Crisis of the Arab Intellectuals: Traditionalism or Historicism?&#039;&#039; trans. Diarmid Cammell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Modern Islam, according to von Grunebaum, has turned away from the West because it remains faithful to its original sense of itself; and yet Islam can modernize itself only by a self-reinterpretation from a Western point of view--which, of course, von Grunebaum shows is impossible. In describing von Grunebaum&#039;s conclusions, which add up to a portrait of Islam as a culture incapable of innovation, Laroui does not mention that the need for Islam to use Western methods to improve itself has, as an idea, perhaps because of von Grunebaum&#039;s wide influence, become almost a truism in Middle Eastern studies. (For example, David Gordon, in &#039;&#039;Self-Determination and History in the Third World&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;David Gordon, &#039;&#039;Self-Determination and History in the Third World&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; urges &amp;quot;maturity&amp;quot; on Arabs, Africans, and Asians; he argues that this can be gained only by learning from Western objectivity.)&lt;br /&gt;
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Laroui&#039;s analysis shows also how von Grunebaum employed A. L. Kroeber&#039;s culturalist theory to understand Islam, and how this tool necessarily entailed a series of reductions and eliminations by which Islam could be represented as a closed system of exclusions. Thus, each of the many diverse aspects of Islamic culture could be seen by von Grunebaum as a direct reflection of an unvarying matrix, a particular theory of God, that compels them all into meaning and order: development, history, tradition, reality in Islam are therefore interchangeable. Laroui rightly maintains that history as a complex order of events, temporalities, and meanings cannot be reduced to such a notion of culture, in the same way that culture cannot be reduced to ideology, nor ideology to theology. Von Grunebaum has fallen prey both to the Orientalist dogmas he inherited and to a particular feature of Islam which he has chosen to interpret as a shortcoming: that there is to be found in Islam a highly articulated theory of religion and yet very few accounts of religious experience, highly articulate political theory and few precise political documents, a theory of social structure and very few individualized actions, a theory of history and very few dated events, an articulated theory of economics and very few quantified series, and so on.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Laroui, &amp;quot;Pour une methodologie des etudes islamiques,&amp;quot; p. 41.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The net result is a historical vision of Islam entirely hobbled by the theory of a culture incapable of doing justice to, or even examining, its existential reality in the experience of its adherents. Von Grunebaum&#039;s Islam, after all, is the Islam of the earlier European Orientalists--monolithic, scornful of ordinary human experience, gross, reductive, unchanging.&lt;br /&gt;
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At bottom such a view of Islam is political, not even euphemistically impartial. The strength of its hold on the new Orientalist (younger, that is, than von Grunebaum) is due in part to its traditional authority, and in part to its use-value as a handle for grasping a vast region of the world and proclaiming it an entirely coherent phenomenon. Since Islam has never easily been encompassed by the West politically--and certainly since World War II Arab nationalism has been a movement openly declaring its hostility to Western imperialism--the desire to assert intellectually satisfying things about Islam in retaliation increases. One authority has said of Islam (without specifying &#039;&#039;which&#039;&#039; Islam or aspect of Islam he means) that it is &amp;quot;one prototype of closed traditional societies.&amp;quot; Note here the edifying use of the word &#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039; to signify all at once a society, a religion, a prototype, and an actuality. But all this will be subordinated by the same scholar to the notion that, unlike normal (&amp;quot;our&amp;quot;) societies, Islam and Middle Eastern societies are totally &amp;quot;political,&amp;quot; an adjective meant as a reproach to Islam for not being &amp;quot;liberal,&amp;quot; for not being able to separate (as &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; do) politics from culture. The result is an invidiously ideological portrait of &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;them&amp;quot;:&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand Middle Eastern society as a whole must remain our great aim. Only a society [like &amp;quot;ours&amp;quot;] that has already achieved a dynamic stability can afford to think of politics, economics, or culture as genuinely autonomous realms of existence and not merely convenient divisions for study. In a traditional society that does not separate the things of Caesar from those of God, or that is entirely in flux, the connection between, say, politics and all other aspects of life is the heart of the issue. Today, for example, whether a man is to marry four wives or one, fast or eat, gain or lose land, rely on revelation or reason, have all become political issues in the Middle East.... No less than the Moslem himself, the new Orientalist must inquire anew what the significant structures and relationships of Islamic society may be.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Manfred Halpern, &amp;quot;Middle East Studies: A Review of the State of the Field with a Few Examples,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;World Politics&#039;&#039; 15 (October 1962): 121-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The triviality of most of the examples (marrying four wives, fasting or eating, etc.) is meant as evidence of Islam&#039;s all-inclusiveness, and its tyranny. As to &#039;&#039;where&#039;&#039; this is supposed to be happening, we are not told. But we are reminded of the doubtless nonpolitical fact that Orientalists &amp;quot;are largely responsible for having given Middle Easterners themselves an accurate appreciation of their past,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 117.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; just in case we might forget that Orientalists know things by definition that Orientals cannot know on their own.&lt;br /&gt;
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If this sums up the &amp;quot;hard&amp;quot; school of the new American Orientalism, the &amp;quot;soft&amp;quot; school emphasizes the fact that traditional Orientalists have given us the basic outlines of Islamic history, religion, and society but have been &amp;quot;all too often content to sum up the meaning of a civilization on the basis of a few manuscripts.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Leonard Binder, &amp;quot;1974 Presidential Address,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MESA Bulletin&#039;&#039; 9, no. 1 (February 1975): 2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Against the traditional Orientalist, therefore, the new area-studies specialist argues philosophically:&lt;br /&gt;
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Research methodology and disciplinary paradigms are not to determine what is selected for study, and they are not to limit observation. Area studies, from this perspective, hold that true knowledge is only possible of things that exist, while methods and theories are abstractions, which order observations and offer explanations according to non-empirical criteria.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Good. But &#039;&#039;how&#039;&#039; does one know the &amp;quot;things that exist,&amp;quot; and to what extent are the &amp;quot;things that exist&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;constituted&#039;&#039; by the knower? This is left moot, as the new value-free apprehension of the Orient as something that exists is institutionalized in area-studies programs. Without tendentious theorizing, Islam is &#039;&#039;rarely&#039;&#039; studied, &#039;&#039;rarely&#039;&#039; researched, &#039;&#039;rarely&#039;&#039; known: the naivete of this conception scarcely conceals what ideologically it means, the absurd theses that man plays no part in setting up both the material and the processes of knowledge, that the Oriental reality is static and &amp;quot;exists,&amp;quot; that only a messianic revolutionary (in Dr. Kissinger&#039;s vocabulary) will not admit the difference between reality out there and in his head.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between the hard and soft schools, however, more or less diluted versions of the old Orientalism flourish--in the new academic jargons in some cases, in the old ones in others. But the principal dogmas of Orientalism exist in their purest form today in studies of the Arabs and Islam. Let us recapitulate them here: one is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically &amp;quot;objective.&amp;quot; A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible).&lt;br /&gt;
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The extraordinary thing is that these notions persist without significant challenge in the academic and governmental study of the modern Near Orient. Lamentably, there has been no demonstrable effect--if there has been a challenging gesture at all--made by Islamic or Arab scholars&#039; work disputing the dogmas of Orientalism; an isolated article here or there, while important for its time and place, cannot possibly affect the course of an imposing research consensus maintained by all sorts of agencies, institutions, and traditions. The point of this is that Islamic Orientalism has led a contemporary life quite different from that of the other Orientalist subdisciplines. The Committee of Concerned Asia Scholars (who are primarily Americans) led a revolution during the 1960s in the ranks of East Asia specialists; the African studies specialists were similarly challenged by revisionists; so too were other Third World area specialists. Only the Arabists and Islamologists still function unrevised. For them there are still such things as &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Islamic society, &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Arab mind, &#039;&#039;an&#039;&#039; Oriental psyche. Even the ones whose specialty is the modern Islamic world anachronistically use texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society. Islam, or a seventh-century ideal of it constituted by the Orientalist, is assumed to possess the unity that eludes the more recent and important influences of colonialism, imperialism, and even ordinary politics. Cliches about how Muslims (or Mohammedans, as they are still sometimes called) behave are bandied about with a nonchalance no one would risk in talking about blacks or Jews. At best, the Muslim is a &amp;quot;native informant&amp;quot; for the Orientalist. Secretly, however, he remains a despised heretic who for his sins must additionally endure the entirely thankless position of being known--negatively, that is--as an anti-Zionist.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is of course a Middle East studies establishment, a pool of interests, &amp;quot;old boy&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;expert&amp;quot; networks linking corporate business, the foundations, the oil companies, the missions, the military, the foreign service, the intelligence community together with the academic world. There are grants and other rewards, there are organizations, there are hierarchies, there are institutes, centers, faculties, departments, all devoted to legitimizing and maintaining the authority of a handful of basic, basically unchanging ideas about Islam, the Orient, and the Arabs. A recent critical analysis of the Middle East studies operation in the United States shows, not that the field is &amp;quot;monolithic,&amp;quot; but that it is complex, that it contains old-style Orientalists, deliberately marginal specialists, counterinsurgency specialists, policymakers, as well as &amp;quot;a small minority ... of academic power brokers.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Middle East Studies Network in the United States,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;MERIP Reports&#039;&#039; 38 (June 1975): 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In any event, the core of Orientalist dogma persists.&lt;br /&gt;
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As an instance of what, in its highest and most intellectually prestigious form, the field now produces, let us consider briefly the two-volume &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, which was first published in England in 1970 and is a regular summa of Orientalist orthodoxy. To say of this work by numerous luminaries that it is an intellectual failure by any standards other than those of Orientalism is to say that it could have been a different and better history of Islam. In fact, as several more thoughtful scholars have noted,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The two best critical reviews of the &#039;&#039;Cambridge History&#039;&#039; are by Albert Hourani, &#039;&#039;The English Historical Review&#039;&#039; 87, no. 343 (April 1972): 348-57, and Roger Owen, &#039;&#039;Journal of Interdisciplinary History&#039;&#039; 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1973): 287-98.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; this kind of history was already doomed when first planned and could not have been different, or better in execution: too many ideas were uncritically accepted by its editors; there was too much reliance on vague concepts; little emphasis was placed on methodological issues (which were left as they have been standing in Orientalist discourse for almost two centuries); and no effort was put forth to make even the idea of Islam seem interesting. Moreover, not only does &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039; radically misconceive and misrepresent Islam as a religion; it also has no corporate idea of itself as a history. Of few such enormous enterprises can it be true, as it is of this one, that ideas and methodological intelligence are almost entirely absent from it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Erfan Shahid&#039;s chapter on pre-Islamic Arabia, which opens the history, intelligently sketches the fruitful consonance between topography and human economy out of which Islam appeared in the seventh century. But what can one fairly say of a history of Islam, defined by P. M. Holt&#039;s introduction rather airily as a &amp;quot;cultural synthesis,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. M. Holt, Introduction, &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 1: xi.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that proceeds directly from pre-Islamic Arabia to a chapter on Mohammed, then to a chapter on the Patriarchal and Umayyad caliphates, and entirely bypasses any account of Islam as a system of belief, faith, or doctrine? For hundreds of pages in volume 1, Islam is understood to mean an unrelieved chronology of battles, reigns, and deaths, rises and heydays, comings and passings, written for the most part in a ghastly monotone.&lt;br /&gt;
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Take the Abbasid period from the eighth to the eleventh century as an instance. Anyone who has the slightest acquaintance with Arab or Islamic history will know that it was a high point of Islamic civilization, as brilliant a period of cultural history as the High Renaissance in Italy. Yet nowhere in the forty pages of description does one get an inkling of any richness; what is found instead is sentences like this: &amp;quot;Once master of the caliphate, [al-Ma&#039;mun] seemed henceforth to shrink from contact with Baghdad society and remained settled at Merv, entrusting the government of Iraq to one of his trusted men, al-Hasan b. Sahl, the brother of al-Fadl, who was faced almost at once with a serious Shi&#039;i revolt, that of Abu&#039;l-Saraya, who in Jumada II 199/January 815 sent out a call to arms from Kufa in support of the Hasanid Ibn Tabataba.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;D. Sourdel, &amp;quot;The Abbasid Caliphate,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Holt et al., 1: 121.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A non-Islamicist will not know at this point what a Shi&#039;i or a Hasanid is. He will have no idea what Jumada II is, except that it clearly designates a date of some sort. And of course he will believe that the Abbasids, including Harun al-Rashid, were an incorrigibly dull and murderous lot, as they sat sulking in Merv.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Central Islamic lands are defined as excluding North Africa and Andalusia, and &#039;&#039;their&#039;&#039; history is an orderly march from the past till modern times. In volume 1, therefore, Islam is a geographical designation applied chronologically and selectively as it suits the experts. But nowhere in the chapters on classical Islam is there an adequate preparation for the disappointments in store for us when we come to &amp;quot;recent times,&amp;quot; as they are called. The chapter on the modern Arab lands is written without the slightest understanding of the revolutionary developments in the area. The author takes a schoolmarmish, openly reactionary attitude towards the Arabs (&amp;quot;it must be said that during this period the educated and uneducated youth of the Arab countries, with their enthusiasm and idealism, became a fertile soil for political exploitation and, at times, perhaps without realizing it, the tools of unscrupulous extremists and agitators&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Z. N. Zeine, &amp;quot;The Arab Lands,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Holt et al., 1: 575.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;), tempered by occasional praise of Lebanese nationalism (although we are never told that the appeal of fascism to a small number of Arabs during the thirties also infected the Lebanese Maronites, who in 1936 founded the Falanges libanaises as a copy of Mussolini&#039;s Black Shirts). &amp;quot;Unrest and agitation&amp;quot; are ascribed to 1936 without a mention of Zionism, and the very notions of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism are never allowed to violate the serenity of the narrative. As for the chapters on &amp;quot;the political impact of the West&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;economic and social change&amp;quot;--ideas left no more specific than that--they are tacked on as reluctant concessions to Islam as having something to do with &amp;quot;our&amp;quot; world in general. Change is unilaterally equated with modernization, even though it is nowhere made clear why other kinds of change need be so imperiously dismissed. Since it is assumed that Islam&#039;s only worthwhile relations have been with the West, the importance of Bandung or of Africa or of the Third World generally is ignored; this blithe indifference to a good three-quarters of reality somewhat explains the amazingly cheerful statement that &amp;quot;the historical ground has been cleared [by whom, for what, in what way?] for a new relationship between the West and Islam ... based on equality and cooperation.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Dankwart A. Rustow, &amp;quot;The Political Impact of the West,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, ed. Holt et al., 1: 697.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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If by the end of volume 1 we are mired in a number of contradictions and difficulties about what Islam really is, there is no help to be had in volume 2. Half the book is devoted to covering the tenth to the twentieth centuries in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Spain, North Africa, and Sicily; there is more distinction in the chapters on North Africa, although the same combination of professional Orientalist jargon with unguided historical detail prevails pretty much everywhere. So far, after approximately twelve hundred pages of dense prose, &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; appears to be no more a cultural synthesis than any other roll call of kings, battles, and dynasties. But in the last half of volume 2, the great synthesis completes itself with articles on &amp;quot;The Geographical Setting,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Sources of Islamic Civilization,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Religion and Culture,&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Warfare.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Now one&#039;s legitimate questions and objections seem more justified. Why is a chapter commissioned on Islamic warfare when what is really discussed (interestingly, by the way) is the sociology of some Islamic armies? Is one to assume that there is an Islamic mode of war different, say, from Christian warfare? Communist war versus capitalist war proposes itself as a suitably analogous topic. Of what use for the understanding of Islam--except as a display of Gustave von Grunebaum&#039;s indiscriminate erudition--are the opaque quotations from Leopold von Ranke which, along with other equally ponderous and irrelevant material, dot his pages on Islamic civilization? Is it not mendacious thus to disguise the real Grunebaumian thesis, that Islamic civilization rests on an unprincipled borrowing by Muslims from the Judeo-Christian, Hellenistic, and Austro-Germanic civilizations? Compare with this idea--that Islam is by definition a plagiaristic culture--the one put forward in volume 1 that &amp;quot;so-called Arabic literature&amp;quot; was written by Persians (no proof offered, no names cited). When Louis Gardet treats &amp;quot;Religion and Culture,&amp;quot; we are told summarily that only the first five centuries of Islam are to be discussed; does this mean that religion and culture in &amp;quot;modern times&amp;quot; cannot be &amp;quot;synthesized,&amp;quot; or does it mean that Islam achieved its final form in the twelfth century? Is there really such a thing as &amp;quot;Islamic geography,&amp;quot; which seems to include the &amp;quot;planned anarchy&amp;quot; of Muslim cities, or is it mainly an invented subject to demonstrate a rigid theory of geographical-racial determinism? As a hint we are reminded of &amp;quot;the Ramadan fast with its active nights,&amp;quot; from which we are expected to conclude that Islam is a religion &amp;quot;designed for town dwellers.&amp;quot; This is explanation in need of explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sections on economic and social institutions, on law and justice, mysticism, art and architecture, science, and the various Islamic literatures are on an altogether higher level than most of the &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039;. Yet nowhere is there evidence that their authors have much in common with modern humanists or social scientists in other disciplines: the techniques of the conventional history of ideas, of Marxist analysis, of the New History, are noticeably absent. Islam, in short, seems to its historians to be best suited to a rather Platonic and antiquarian bias. To some writers of the &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039; Islam is a politics and a religion; to others it is a style of being; to others it is &amp;quot;distinguishable from Muslim society&amp;quot;; to still others it is a mysteriously known essence; to &#039;&#039;all&#039;&#039; the authors Islam is a remote, tensionless thing, without much to teach us about the complexities of today&#039;s Muslims. Hanging over the whole disjointed enterprise which is &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039; is the old Orientalist truism that Islam is about texts, not about people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fundamental question raised by such contemporary Orientalist texts as &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History&#039;&#039; is whether ethnic origins and religion are the best, or at least the most useful, basic, and clear, definitions of human experience. Does it matter more in understanding contemporary politics to know that X and Y are disadvantaged in certain very concrete ways, or that they are Muslims or Jews? This is of course a debatable question, and we are very likely in rational terms to insist on both the religious-ethnic and the socio-economic descriptions; Orientalism, however, clearly posits the Islamic category as the dominant one, and this is the main consideration about its retrograde intellectual tactics.&lt;br /&gt;
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3. &#039;&#039;Merely Islam&#039;&#039;. So deeply entrenched is the theory of Semitic simplicity as it is to be found in modern Orientalism that it operates with little differentiation in such well-known anti-Semitic European writings as &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039; and in remarks such as these by Chaim Weizmann to Arthur Balfour on May 30, 1918:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Arabs, who are superficially clever and quick witted, worship one thing, and one thing only--power and success.... The British authorities ... knowing as they do the treacherous nature of the Arabs ... have to watch carefully and constantly.... The fairer the English regime tries to be, the more arrogant the Arab becomes.... The present state of affairs would necessarily tend toward the creation of an Arab Palestine, if there were an Arab people in Palestine. It will not in fact produce that result because the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times, and the effendi ... is dishonest, uneducated, greedy, and as unpatriotic as he is inefficient.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Cited in Ingrams, &#039;&#039;Palestine Papers, 1917-1922&#039;&#039;, pp. 31-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The common denominator between Weizmann and the European anti-Semite is the Orientalist perspective, seeing Semites (or subdivisions thereof) as by nature lacking the desirable qualities of Occidentals. Yet the difference between Renan and Weizmann is that the latter had already gathered behind his rhetoric the solidity of institutions whereas the former had not. Is there not in twentieth-century Orientalism that same unaging &amp;quot;gracious childhood&amp;quot;--heedlessly allied now with scholarship, now with a state and all its institutions--that Renan saw as the Semites&#039; unchanging mode of being?&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet with what greater harm has the twentieth-century version of the myth been maintained. It has produced a picture of the Arab as seen by an &amp;quot;advanced&amp;quot; quasi-Occidental society. In his resistance to foreign colonialists the Palestinian was either a stupid savage, or a negligible quantity, morally and even existentially. According to Israeli law only a Jew has full civic rights and unqualified immigration privileges; even though they are the land&#039;s inhabitants, Arabs are given less, more simple rights: they cannot immigrate, and if they seem not to have the same rights, it is because they are &amp;quot;less developed.&amp;quot; Orientalism governs Israeli policy towards the Arabs throughout, as the recently published Koenig Report amply proves. There are good Arabs (the ones who do as they are told) and bad Arabs (who do not, and are therefore terrorists). Most of all there are all those Arabs who, once defeated, can be expected to sit obediently behind an infallibly fortified line, manned by the smallest possible number of men, on the theory that Arabs have had to accept the myth of Israeli superiority and will never dare attack. One need only glance through the pages of General Yehoshafat Harkabi&#039;s &#039;&#039;Arab Attitudes to Israel&#039;&#039; to see how--as Robert Alter put it in admiring language in &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Robert Alter, &amp;quot;Rhetoric and the Arab Mind,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, October 1968, pp. 61-85. Alter&#039;s article was an adulatory review of General Yehoshafat Harkabi&#039;s &#039;&#039;Arab Attitudes to Israel&#039;&#039; (Jerusalem: Keter Press, 1972).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--the Arab mind, depraved, anti-Semitic to the core, violent, unbalanced, could produce only rhetoric and little more. One myth supports and produces another. They answer each other, tending towards symmetries and patterns of the sort that as Orientals the Arabs themselves can be expected to produce, but that as a human being no Arab can truly sustain.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of itself, in itself, as a set of beliefs, as a method of analysis, Orientalism cannot develop. Indeed, it is the doctrinal antithesis of development. Its central argument is the myth of the arrested development of the Semites. From this matrix other myths pour forth, each of them showing the Semite to be the opposite of the Westerner and irremediably the victim of his own weaknesses. By a concatenation of events and circumstances the Semitic myth bifurcated in the Zionist movement; one Semite went the way of Orientalism, the other, the Arab, was forced to go the way of the Oriental. Each time tent and tribe are solicited, the myth is being employed; each time the concept of Arab national character is evoked, the myth is being employed. The hold these instruments have on the mind is increased by the institutions built around them. For every Orientalist, quite literally, there is a support system of staggering power, considering the ephemerality of the myths that Orientalism propagates. This system now culminates in the very institutions of the state. To write about the Arab Oriental world, therefore, is to write with the authority of a nation, and not with the affirmation of a strident ideology but with the unquestioning certainty of absolute truth backed by absolute force.&lt;br /&gt;
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In its February 1974 issue &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039; gave its readers an article by Professor Gil Carl Alroy entitled &amp;quot;Do the Arabs Want Peace?&amp;quot; Alroy is a professor of political science and is the author of two works, &#039;&#039;Attitudes Towards Jewish Statehood in the Arab World&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Images of Middle East Conflict&#039;&#039;; he is a man who professes to &amp;quot;know&amp;quot; the Arabs, and is obviously an expert on image making. His argument is quite predictable: that the Arabs want to destroy Israel, that the Arabs really say what they mean (and Alroy makes ostentatious use of his ability to cite evidence from Egyptian newspapers, evidence he everywhere identifies with &amp;quot;Arabs&amp;quot; as if the two, Arabs and Egyptian newspapers, were one), and so on and on, with unflagging, one-eyed zeal. Quite the center of his article, as it is the center of previous work by other &amp;quot;Arabists&amp;quot; (synonymous with &amp;quot;Orientalists&amp;quot;), like General Harkabi, whose province is the &amp;quot;Arab mind,&amp;quot; is a working hypothesis on what Arabs, if one peels off all the outer nonsense, are really like. In other words, Alroy must prove that because Arabs are, first of all, as one in their bent for bloody vengeance, second, psychologically incapable of peace, and third, congenitally tied to a concept of justice that means the opposite of that, they are not to be trusted and must be fought interminably as one fights any other fatal disease. For evidence Alroy&#039;s principal exhibit is a quotation taken from Harold W. Glidden&#039;s essay &amp;quot;The Arab World&amp;quot; (to which I referred in Chapter One). Alroy finds Glidden able to have &amp;quot;captured the cultural differences between the Western and the Arab view&amp;quot; of things &amp;quot;very well.&amp;quot; Alroy&#039;s argument is clinched, therefore--the Arabs are unregenerate savages--and thus an authority on the Arab mind has told a wide audience of presumably concerned Jews that they must continue to watch out. And he has done it academically, dispassionately, fairly, using evidence taken from the Arabs themselves--who, he says with Olympian assurance, have &amp;quot;emphatically ruled out ... real peace&amp;quot;--and from psychoanalysis.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gil Carl Alroy, &amp;quot;Do The Arabs Want Peace?&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, February 1974, pp. 56-61.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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One can explain such statements by recognizing that a still more implicit and powerful difference posited by the Orientalist as against the Oriental is that the former &#039;&#039;writes&#039;&#039; about, whereas the latter &#039;&#039;is written&#039;&#039; about. For the latter, passivity is the presumed role; for the former, the power to observe, study, and so forth; as Roland Barthes has said, a myth (and its perpetuators) can invent itself (themselves) ceaselessly.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Roland Barthes, &#039;&#039;Mythologies&#039;&#039;, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill &amp;amp; Wang, 1972), pp. 109-59.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The Oriental is given as fixed, stable, in need of investigation, in need even of knowledge about himself. No dialectic is either desired or allowed. There is a source of information (the Oriental) and a source of knowledge (the Orientalist), in short, a writer and a subject matter otherwise inert. The relationship between the two is radically a matter of power, for which there are numerous images. Here is an instance taken from Raphael Patai&#039;s &#039;&#039;Golden River to Golden Road&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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In order properly to evaluate what Middle Eastern culture will &#039;&#039;willingly accept&#039;&#039; from the embarrassingly rich storehouses of Western civilization, a better and sounder understanding of Middle Eastern culture &#039;&#039;must first be acquired&#039;&#039;. The same prerequisite is necessary in order &#039;&#039;to gauge&#039;&#039; the probable effects &#039;&#039;of newly introduced traits&#039;&#039; on the cultural context of tradition directed peoples. Also, the ways and means &#039;&#039;in which new cultural offerings can be made palatable&#039;&#039; must be studied much more thoroughly than was hitherto the case. In brief, the only way in which &#039;&#039;the Gordian knot of resistance&#039;&#039; to Westernization in the Middle East &#039;&#039;can be unraveled&#039;&#039; is that of studying the Middle East, &#039;&#039;of obtaining a fuller picture&#039;&#039; of its traditional culture, a better understanding of &#039;&#039;the processes of change taking place&#039;&#039; in it at present, and &#039;&#039;a deeper insight&#039;&#039; into the psychology of human groups brought up in Middle Eastern culture. &#039;&#039;The task is taxing, but the prize, harmony between the West&#039;&#039; and a neighboring world area of crucial importance, is well worth it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raphael Patai, &#039;&#039;Golden River to Golden Road: Society, Culture, and Change in the Middle East&#039;&#039; (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962; 3rd rev. ed., 1969), p. 406.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The metaphorical figures propping up this passage (I have indicated them by italics) come from a variety of human activities, some commercial, some horticultural, some religious, some veterinary, some historical. Yet in each case the relation between the Middle East and the West is really defined as sexual: as I said earlier in discussing Flaubert, the association between the Orient and sex is remarkably persistent. The Middle East is resistant, as any virgin would be, but the male scholar wins the prize by bursting open, penetrating through the Gordian knot despite &amp;quot;the taxing task.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Harmony&amp;quot; is the result of the conquest of maidenly coyness; it is not by any means the coexistence of equals. The underlying power relation between scholar and subject matter is never once altered: it is uniformly favorable to the Orientalist. Study, understanding, knowledge, evaluation, masked as blandishments to &amp;quot;harmony,&amp;quot; are instruments of conquest.&lt;br /&gt;
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The verbal operations in such writing as Patai&#039;s (who has outstripped even his previous work in his recent &#039;&#039;The Arab Mind&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Raphael Patai, &#039;&#039;The Arab Mind&#039;&#039; (New York: Charles Scribner&#039;s Sons, 1973). For an even more racist work see John Laffin, &#039;&#039;The Arab Mind Considered: A Need for Understanding&#039;&#039; (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1976).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;) aim at a very particular sort of compression and reduction. Much of his paraphernalia is anthropological--he describes the Middle East as a &amp;quot;culture area&amp;quot;--but the result is to eradicate the plurality of differences among the Arabs (whoever they may be in fact) in the interest of one difference, that one setting Arabs off from everyone else. As a subject matter for study and analysis, they can be controlled more readily. Moreover, thus reduced they can be made to permit, legitimate, and valorize general nonsense of the sort one finds in works such as Sania Hamady&#039;s &#039;&#039;Temperament and Character of the Arabs&#039;&#039;. Item:&lt;br /&gt;
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The Arabs so far have demonstrated an incapacity for disciplined and abiding unity. They experience collective outbursts of enthusiasm but do not pursue patiently collective endeavors, which are usually embraced half-heartedly. They show lack of coordination and harmony in organization and function, nor have they revealed an ability for cooperation. Any collective action for common benefit or mutual profit is alien to them.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sania Hamady, &#039;&#039;Temperament and Character of the Arabs&#039;&#039; (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960), p. 100. Hamady&#039;s book is a favorite amongst Israelis and Israeli apologists; Alroy cites her approvingly, and so does Amos Elon in &#039;&#039;The Israelis: Founders and Sons&#039;&#039; (New York: Holt, Rinehart &amp;amp; Winston, 1971). Morroe Berger (see note 137 below) also cites her frequently. Her model is Lane&#039;s &#039;&#039;Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians&#039;&#039;, but she has none of Lane&#039;s literacy or general learning.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The style of this prose tells more perhaps than Hamady intends. Verbs like &amp;quot;demonstrate,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;reveal,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;show,&amp;quot; are used without an indirect object: to whom are the Arabs revealing, demonstrating, showing? To no one in particular, obviously, but to everyone in general. This is another way of saying that these truths are self-evident only to a privileged or initiated observer, since nowhere does Hamady cite generally available evidence for her observations. Besides, given the inanity of the observations, what sort of evidence could there be? As her prose moves along, her tone increases in confidence: &amp;quot;Any collective action ... is alien to them.&amp;quot; The categories harden, the assertions are more unyielding, and the Arabs have been totally transformed from people into no more than the putative subject of Hamady&#039;s style. The Arabs exist only as an occasion for the tyrannical observer: &amp;quot;The world is &#039;&#039;my&#039;&#039; idea.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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And so it is throughout the work of the contemporary Orientalist: assertions of the most bizarre sort dot his or her pages, whether it is a Manfred Halpern arguing that even though all human thought processes can be reduced to eight, the Islamic mind is capable of only four,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Manfred Halpern&#039;s thesis is presented in &amp;quot;Four Contrasting Repertories of Human Relations in Islam: Two Pre-Modern and Two Modern Ways of Dealing with Continuity and Change, Collaboration and Conflict and the Achieving of Justice,&amp;quot; a paper presented to the 22nd Near East Conference at Princeton University on Psychology and Near Eastern Studies, May 8, 1973. This treatise was prepared for by Halpern&#039;s &amp;quot;A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Journal of International Affairs&#039;&#039; 23, no. 1 (1969): 54-75.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; or a Morroe Berger presuming that since the Arabic language is much given to rhetoric Arabs are consequently incapable of true thought.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Morroe Berger, &#039;&#039;The Arab World Today&#039;&#039; (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1964), p. 140. Much the same sort of implication underlies the clumsy work of quasi-Arabists like Joel Carmichael and Daniel Lerner; it is there more subtly in political and historical scholars such as Theodore Draper, Walter Laqueur, and Elie Kedourie. It is strongly in evidence in such highly regarded works as Gabriel Baer&#039;s &#039;&#039;Population and Society in the Arab East&#039;&#039;, trans. Hanna Szoke (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), and Alfred Bonne&#039;s &#039;&#039;State and Economics in the Middle East: A Society in Transition&#039;&#039; (London: Routledge &amp;amp; Kegan Paul, 1955). The consensus seems to be that if they think at all, Arabs think differently--i.e., not necessarily with reason, and often without it. See also Adel Daher&#039;s RAND study, &#039;&#039;Current Trends in Arab Intellectual Thought&#039;&#039; (RM-5979-FF, December 1969) and its typical conclusion that &amp;quot;the concrete problem-solving approach is conspicuously absent from Arab thought&amp;quot; (p. 29). In a review-essay for the &#039;&#039;Journal of Interdisciplinary History&#039;&#039; (see note 124 above), Roger Owen attacks the very notion of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a concept for the study of history. His focus is &#039;&#039;The Cambridge History of Islam&#039;&#039;, which, he finds, in certain ways perpetuates an idea of Islam (to be found in such writers as Carl Becker and Max Weber) &amp;quot;defined essentially as a religious, feudal, and antirational system, [that] lacked the necessary characteristics which had made European progress possible.&amp;quot; For a sustained proof of Weber&#039;s total inaccuracy, see Maxime Rodinson&#039;s &#039;&#039;Islam and Capitalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp. 76-117.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; One can call these assertions myths in their function and structure, and yet one must try to understand what other imperatives govern their use. Here one is speculating, of course. Orientalist generalizations about the Arabs are very detailed when it comes to itemizing Arab characteristics critically, far less so when it comes to analyzing Arab strengths. The Arab family, Arab rhetoric, the Arab character, despite copious descriptions by the Orientalist, appear de-natured, without human potency, even as these same descriptions possess a fullness and depth in their sweeping power over the subject matter. Hamady again:&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, the Arab lives in a hard and frustrating environment. He has little chance to develop his potentialities and define his position in society, holds little belief in progress and change, and finds salvation only in the hereafter.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hamady, Character and Temperament, p. 197.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What the Arab cannot achieve himself is to be found in the writing about him. The Orientalist is supremely certain of &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; potential, is not a pessimist, is able to define his position, his own and the Arab&#039;s. The picture of the Arab Oriental that emerges is determinedly negative; yet, we ask, why this endless series of works on him? What grips the Orientalist, if it is not--as it certainly is not--love of Arab science, mind, society, achievement? In other words, what is the nature of Arab presence in mythic discourse about him?&lt;br /&gt;
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Two things: number and generative power. Both qualities are reducible to each other ultimately, but we ought to separate them for the purposes of analysis. Almost without exception, every contemporary work of Orientalist scholarship (especially in the social sciences) has a great deal to say about the family, its male-dominated structure, its all-pervasive influence in the society. Patai&#039;s work is a typical example. A silent paradox immediately presents itself, for if the family is an institution for whose general failures the only remedy is the placebo of &amp;quot;modernization,&amp;quot; we must acknowledge that the family continues to produce itself, is fertile, and is the source of Arab existence in the world, such as it is. What Berger refers to as &amp;quot;the great value men place upon their own sexual prowess&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Berger, &#039;&#039;Arab World&#039;&#039;, p. 102.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; suggests the lurking power behind Arab presence in the world. If Arab society is represented in almost completely negative and generally passive terms, to be ravished and won by the Orientalist hero, we can assume that such a representation is a way of dealing with the great variety and potency of Arab diversity, whose source is, if not intellectual and social, then sexual and biological. Yet the absolutely inviolable taboo in Orientalist discourse is that that very sexuality must never be taken seriously. It can never be explicitly blamed for the absence of achievement and &amp;quot;real&amp;quot; rational sophistication the Orientalist everywhere discovers among the Arabs. And yet this is, I think, the missing link in arguments whose main object is criticism of &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; Arab society, such as Hamady&#039;s, Berger&#039;s, and Lerner&#039;s. They recognize the power of the family, note the weaknesses of the Arab mind, remark the &amp;quot;importance&amp;quot; of the Oriental world to the West, but never say what their discourse implies, that what is really left to the Arab after all is said and done is an undifferentiated sexual drive. On rare occasions--as in the work of Leon Mugniery--we do find the implicit made clear: that there is a &amp;quot;powerful sexual appetite ... characteristic of those hot-blooded southerners.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted by Irene Gendzier in &#039;&#039;Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study&#039;&#039; (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 94.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Most of the time, however, the belittlement of Arab society and its reduction of platitudes inconceivable for any except the racially inferior are carried on over an undercurrent of sexual exaggeration: the Arab produces himself, endlessly, sexually, and little else. The Orientalist says nothing about this, although his argument depends on it: &amp;quot;But co-operation in the Near East is still largely a family affair and little of it is found outside the blood group or village.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Berger, &#039;&#039;Arab World&#039;&#039;, p. 151.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Which is to say that the only way in which Arabs count is as mere biological beings; institutionally, politically, culturally they are nil, or next to nil. Numerically and as the producers of families, Arabs are actual.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difficulty with this view is that it complicates the passivity amongst Arabs assumed by Orientalists like Patai and even Hamady and the others. But it is in the logic of myths, like dreams, exactly to welcome radical antitheses. For a myth does not analyze or solve problems. It represents them as already analyzed and solved; that is, it presents them as already assembled images, in the way a scarecrow is assembled from bric-a-brac and then made to stand for a man. Since the image &#039;&#039;uses&#039;&#039; all material to its own end, and since by definition the myth displaces life, the antithesis between an over-fertile Arab and a passive doll is not functional. The discourse papers over the antithesis. An Arab Oriental is that impossible creature whose libidinal energy drives him to paroxysms of over-stimulation--and yet, he is as a puppet in the eyes of the world, staring vacantly out at a modern landscape he can neither understand nor cope with.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is in recent discussions of Oriental political behavior that such an image of the Arab seems to be relevant, and it is often occasioned by scholarly discussion of those two recent favorites of Orientalist expertise, revolution and modernization. Under the auspices of the School of Oriental and African Studies there appeared in 1972 a volume entitled &#039;&#039;Revolution in the Middle East and Other Case Studies&#039;&#039;, edited by P. J. Vatikiotis. The title is overtly medical, for we are expected to think of Orientalists as finally being given the benefit of what &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; Orientalism usually avoided: psychoclinical attention. Vatikiotis sets the tone of the collection with a quasi-medical definition of revolution, but since Arab revolution is in his mind and in his readers&#039;, the hostility of the definition seems acceptable. There is a very clever irony here about which I shall speak later. Vatikiotis&#039;s theoretical support is Camus--whose colonial mentality was no friend of revolution or of the Arabs, as Conor Cruise O&#039;Brien has recently shown--but the phrase &amp;quot;revolution destroys both men and principles&amp;quot; is accepted from Camus as having &amp;quot;fundamental sense.&amp;quot; Vatikiotis continues:&lt;br /&gt;
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... all revolutionary ideology is in direct conflict with (actually, is a head-on attack upon) man&#039;s rational, biological and psychological make-up.&lt;br /&gt;
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Committed as it is to a methodical metastasis, revolutionary ideology demands fanaticism from its adherents. Politics for the revolutionary is not only a question of belief, or a substitute for religious belief. It must stop being what it has always been, namely, an adaptive activity in time for survival. Metastatic, soteriological politics abhors adaptiveness, for how else can it eschew the difficulties, ignore and bypass the obstacles of the complex biological-psychological dimension of man, or mesmerize his subtle though limited and vulnerable rationality? It fears and shuns the concrete and discrete nature of human problems and the preoccupations of political life: it thrives on the abstract and the Promethean. It subordinates all tangible values to the one supreme value: the harnessing of man and history in a grand design of human liberation. It is not satisfied with human politics, which has so many irritating limitations. It wishes instead to create a new world, not adaptively, precariously, delicately, that is, humanly, but by a terrifying act of Olympian pseudo-divine creation. Politics in the service of man is a formula that is unacceptable to the revolutionary ideologue. Rather man exists to serve a politically contrived and brutally decreed order.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;P. J. Vatikiotis, ed., &#039;&#039;Revolution in the Middle East&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;and Other Case Studies; proceedings of a seminar&#039;&#039; (London: George Allen &amp;amp; Unwin, 1972), pp. 8-9.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Whatever else this passage says--purple writing of the most extreme sort, counterrevolutionary zealotry--it is saying nothing less than that revolution is a bad kind of sexuality (pseudo-divine act of creation), and also a cancerous disease. Whatever is done by the &amp;quot;human,&amp;quot; according to Vatikiotis, is rational, right, subtle, discrete, concrete; whatever the revolutionary proclaims is brutal, irrational, mesmeric, cancerous. Procreation, change, and continuity are identified not only with sexuality and with madness but, a little paradoxically, with abstraction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Vatikiotis&#039;s terms are weighted and colored emotionally by appeals (from the right) to humanity and decency and by appeals (against the left) safeguarding humanity from sexuality, cancer, madness, irrational violence, revolution. Since it is Arab revolution that is in question, we are to read the passage as follows: This is what revolution is, and if the Arabs want it, then that is a fairly telling comment on them, on the kind of inferior race they are. They are &#039;&#039;only&#039;&#039; capable of sexual incitement and not of Olympian (Western, modern) reason. The irony of which I spoke earlier now comes into play, for a few pages later we find that the Arabs are so inept that they cannot even aspire to, let alone consummate, the ambitions of revolution. By implication, Arab sexuality need not be feared for itself but for its failure. In short, Vatikiotis asks his reader to believe that revolution in the Middle East is a threat precisely because revolution cannot be attained.&lt;br /&gt;
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The major source of political conflict and potential revolution in many countries of the Middle East, as well as Africa and Asia today, is the inability of so-called radical nationalist regimes and movements to manage, let alone resolve, the social, economic and political problems of independence.... Until the states in the Middle East can control their economic activity and create or produce their own technology, their access to revolutionary experience will remain limited. The very political categories essential to a revolution will be lacking.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., pp. 12, 13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Damned if you do, and damned if you don&#039;t. In this series of dissolving definitions revolutions emerge as figments of sexually crazed minds which on closer analysis turn out not to be capable even of the craziness Vatikiotis truly respects--which is human, not Arab, concrete, not abstract, asexual, not sexual.&lt;br /&gt;
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The scholarly centerpiece of Vatikiotis&#039;s collection is Bernard Lewis&#039;s essay &amp;quot;Islamic Concepts of Revolution.&amp;quot; The strategy here appears refined. Many readers will know that for Arabic speakers today the word &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; and its immediate cognates mean revolution; they will know this also from Vatikiotis&#039;s introduction. Yet Lewis does not describe the meaning of &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; until the very end of his article, after he has discussed concepts such as &#039;&#039;dawla, fitna&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;bughat&#039;&#039; in their historical and mostly religious context. The point there is mainly that &amp;quot;the Western doctrine of the right to resist bad government is alien to Islamic thought,&amp;quot; which leads to &amp;quot;defeatism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;quietism&amp;quot; as political attitudes. At no point in the essay is one sure where all these terms are supposed to be taking place except somewhere in the history of words. Then near the end of the essay we have this:&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Arabic-speaking countries a different word was used for [revolution] &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039;. The root &#039;&#039;th-w-r&#039;&#039; in classical Arabic meant to rise up (e.g. of a camel), to be stirred or excited, and hence, especially in Maghribi usage, to rebel. It is often used in the context of establishing a petty, independent sovereignty; thus, for example, the so-called party kings who ruled in eleventh century Spain after the break-up of the Caliphate of Cordova are called &#039;&#039;thuwwar&#039;&#039; (sing. &#039;&#039;tha&#039;ir&#039;&#039;). The noun &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; at first means excitement, as in the phrase, cited in the Sihah, a standard medieval Arabic dictionary, &#039;&#039;intazir hatta taskun hadhihi &#039;lthawra&#039;&#039;, wait till this excitement dies down--a very apt recommendation. The verb is used by al-Iji, in the form of &#039;&#039;thawaran&#039;&#039; or &#039;&#039;itharat fitna&#039;&#039;, stirring up sedition, as one of the dangers which should discourage a man from practising the duty of resistance to bad government. &#039;&#039;Thawra&#039;&#039; is the term used by Arabic writers in the nineteenth century for the French Revolution, and by their successors for the approved revolutions, domestic and foreign, of our own time.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;Islamic Concepts of Revolution,&amp;quot; in ibid., pp. 33, 38-9. Lewis&#039;s study &#039;&#039;Race and Color in Islam&#039;&#039; (New York: Harper &amp;amp; Row, 1971) expresses similar disaffection with an air of great learning; more explicitly political--but no less acid--is his &#039;&#039;Islam in History: Ideas&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;Men and Events in the Middle East&#039;&#039; (London: Alcove Press, 1973).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The entire passage is full of condescension and bad faith. Why introduce the idea of a camel rising as an etymological root for modern Arab revolution except as a clever way of discrediting the modern? Lewis&#039;s reason is patently to bring down revolution from its contemporary valuation to nothing more noble (or beautiful) than a camel about to raise itself from the ground. Revolution is excitement, sedition, setting up a petty sovereignty--nothing more; the best counsel (which presumably only a Western scholar and gentleman can give) is &amp;quot;wait till the excitement dies down.&amp;quot; One wouldn&#039;t know from this slighting account of &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; that innumerable people have an active commitment to it, in ways too complex for even Lewis&#039;s sarcastic scholarship to comprehend. But it is this kind of essentialized description that is natural for students and policymakers concerned with the Middle East: that revolutionary stirrings among &amp;quot;the Arabs&amp;quot; are about as consequential as a camel&#039;s getting up, as worthy of attention as the babblings of yokels. All the canonical Orientalist literature will for the same ideological reason be unable to explain or prepare one for the confirming revolutionary upheaval in the Arab world in the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lewis&#039;s association of &#039;&#039;thawra&#039;&#039; with a camel rising and generally with excitement (and not with a struggle on behalf of values) hints much more broadly than is usual for him that the Arab is scarcely more than a neurotic sexual being. Each of the words or phrases he uses to describe revolution is tinged with sexuality: &#039;&#039;stirred&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;excited&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;rising up&#039;&#039;. But for the most part it is a &amp;quot;bad&amp;quot; sexuality he ascribes to the Arab. In the end, since Arabs are really not equipped for serious action, their sexual excitement is no more noble than a camel&#039;s rising up. Instead of revolution there is sedition, setting up a petty sovereignty, and more excitement, which is as much as saying that instead of copulation the Arab can only achieve foreplay, masturbation, coitus interruptus. These, I think, are Lewis&#039;s implications, no matter how innocent his air of learning, or parlorlike his language. For since he is so sensitive to the nuances of words, he must be aware that &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; words have nuances as well.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lewis is an interesting case to examine further because his standing in the political world of the Anglo-American Middle Eastern Establishment is that of the learned Orientalist, and everything he writes is steeped in the &amp;quot;authority&amp;quot; of the field. Yet for at least a decade and a half his work in the main has been aggressiyely ideological, despite his various attempts at subtlety and irony. I mention his recent writing as a perfect exemplification of the academic whose work purports to be liberal objective scholarship but is in reality very close to being propaganda &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; his subject material. But this should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the history of Orientalism; it is only the latest--and in the West, the most uncriticized--of the scandals of &amp;quot;scholarship.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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So intent has Lewis become upon his project to debunk, to whittle down, and to discredit the Arabs and Islam that even his energies as a scholar and historian seem to have failed him. He will, for example, publish a chapter called &amp;quot;The Revolt of Islam&amp;quot; in a book in 1964, then republish much of the same material twelve years later, slightly altered to suit the new place of publication (in this case &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;) and retitled &amp;quot;The Return of Islam.&amp;quot; From &amp;quot;Revolt&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;Return&amp;quot; is of course a change for the worse, a change intended by Lewis to explain to his latest public why it is that the Muslims (or Arabs) still will not settle down and accept Israeli hegemony over the Near East.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us look more closely at how he does this. In both of his pieces he mentions an anti-imperialist riot in Cairo in 1945, which in both cases he describes as anti-Jewish. Yet in neither instance does he tell us how it was anti-Jewish; in fact, as his material evidence for anti-Jewishness, he produces the somewhat surprising intelligence that &amp;quot;several churches, Catholic, Armenian and Greek Orthodox, were attacked and damaged.&amp;quot; Consider the first version, done in 1964:&lt;br /&gt;
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On November 2, 1945 political leaders in Egypt called for demonstrations on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. These rapidly developed into anti-Jewish riots, in the course of which a Catholic, an Armenian, and a Greek Orthodox church were attacked and damaged. What, it may be asked, had Catholics, Armenians and Greeks to do with the Balfour Declaration?&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;The Revolt of Islam,&amp;quot; in &#039;&#039;The Middle East and The West&#039;&#039; (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 95.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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And now the &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039; version, done in 1976:&lt;br /&gt;
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As the nationalist movement has become genuinely popular, so it has become less national and more religious--in other words less Arab and more Islamic. In moments of crisis--and these have been many in recent decades--it is the instinctive communal loyalty which outweighs all others. A few examples may suffice. On November 2, 1945, demonstrations were held in Egypt [note here how the phrase &amp;quot;demonstrations were held&amp;quot; is an attempt to show instinctive loyalties; in the previous version &amp;quot;political leaders&amp;quot; were responsible for the deed] on the anniversary of the issue by the British Government of the Balfour Declaration. Though this was certainly not the intention of the political leaders who sponsored it, the demonstration soon developed into an anti-Jewish riot and the anti-Jewish riot into a more general outbreak in the course of which several churches, Catholic, Armenian, and Greek Orthodox [another instructive change: the impression here is that many churches, of three kinds, were attacked; the earlier version is specific about three churches], were attacked and damaged.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &amp;quot;The Return of Islam,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, January 1976, p. 44.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lewis&#039;s polemical, not scholarly, purpose is to show, here and elsewhere, that Islam is an anti-Semitic ideology, not merely a religion. He has a little logical difficulty in trying to assert that Islam is a fearful mass phenomenon and at the same time &amp;quot;not genuinely popular,&amp;quot; but this problem does not detain him long. As the second version of his tendentious anecdote shows, he goes on to proclaim that Islam is an irrational herd or mass phenomenon, ruling Muslims by passions, instincts, and unreflecting hatreds. The whole point of his exposition is to frighten his audience, to make it never yield an inch to Islam. According to Lewis, Islam does not develop, and neither do Muslims; they merely are, and they are to be watched, on account of that pure essence of theirs (according to Lewis), which happens to include a long-standing hatred of Christians and Jews. Lewis everywhere restrains himself from making such inflammatory statements flat out; he always takes care to say that of course the Muslims are not anti-Semitic the way the Nazis were, but their religion can too easily accommodate itself to anti-Semitism and has done so. Similarly with regard to Islam and racism, slavery, and other more or less &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; evils. The core of Lewis&#039;s ideology about Islam is that it never changes, and his whole mission is now to inform conservative segments of the Jewish reading public, and anyone else who cares to listen, that any political, historical, and scholarly account of Muslims must begin and end with the fact that Muslims are Muslims.&lt;br /&gt;
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For to admit that an entire civilization can have religion as its primary loyalty is too much. Even to suggest such a thing is regarded as offensive by liberal opinion, always ready to take protective umbrage on behalf of those whom it regards as its wards. This is reflected in the present inability, political, journalistic, and scholarly alike, to recognize the importance of the factor of religion in the current affairs of the Muslim world and in the consequent recourse to the language of left-wing and right-wing, progressive and conservative, and the rest of the Western terminology, the use of which in explaining Muslim political phenomena is about as accurate and as enlightening as an account of a cricket match by a baseball correspondent. [Lewis is so fond of this last simile that he quotes it verbatim from his 1964 polemic.]&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ibid., p. 40.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In a later work Lewis tells us what terminology is more accurate and useful, although the terminology seems no less &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; (whatever &amp;quot;Western&amp;quot; means): Muslims, like most other former colonial peoples, are incapable of telling the truth or even of seeing it. According to Lewis, they are addicted to mythology, along with &amp;quot;the so-called revisionist school in the United States, which look back to a golden age of American virtue and ascribe virtually all the sins and crimes of the world to the present establishment in their country.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bernard Lewis, &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039;--&#039;&#039;Remembered, Recovered, Invented&#039;&#039; (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 68.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Aside from being a mischievous and totally inaccurate account of revisionist history, this kind of remark is designed to put Lewis as a great historian above the petty underdevelopment of mere Muslims and revisionists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet so far as being accurate is concerned, and so far as living up to his own rule that &amp;quot;the scholar, however, will not give way to his prejudices,&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lewis, &#039;&#039;Islam in History&#039;&#039;, p. 65.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Lewis is cavalier with himself and with his cause. He will, for example, recite the Arab case against Zionism (using the &amp;quot;in&amp;quot; language of the Arab nationalist) without at the same time mentioning--anywhere, in any of his writings--that there was such a thing as a Zionist invasion and colonization of Palestine despite and in conflict with the native Arab inhabitants. No Israeli would deny this, but Lewis the Orientalist historian simply leaves it out. He will speak of the absence of democracy in the Middle East, except for Israel, without ever mentioning the Emergency Defense Regulations used in Israel to rule the Arabs; nor has he anything to say about &amp;quot;preventive detention&amp;quot; of Arabs in Israel, nor about the dozens of illegal settlements on the militarily occupied West Bank of Gaza, nor about the absence of human rights for Arabs, principal among them the right of immigration, in former Palestine. Instead, Lewis allows himself the scholarly liberty to say that &amp;quot;imperialism and Zionism [so far as the Arabs are concerned wer long familiar under their older names as the Christians and Jews.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lewis, &#039;&#039;The Middle East and the West&#039;&#039;, pp. 60, 87.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He quotes T. E. Lawrence on &amp;quot;the Semites&amp;quot; to bolster his case against Islam, he never discusses Zionism in parallel with Islam (as if Zionism were a French, not a religious, movement), and he tries everywhere to demonstrate that any revolution anywhere is at best a form of &amp;quot;secular millenarianism.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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One would find this kind of procedure less objectionable as political propaganda--which is what it is, of course--were it not accompanied by sermons on the objectivity, the fairness, the impartiality of a real historian, the implication always being that Muslims and Arabs cannot be objective but that Orientalists like Lewis writing about Muslims and Arabs are, by definition, by training, by the mere fact of their Westernness. This is the culmination of Orientalism as a dogma that not only degrades its subject matter but also blinds its practitioners. But let us listen finally to Lewis telling us how the historian ought to conduct himself. We may well ask whether it is only the Orientals who are subject to the prejudices he chastises.&lt;br /&gt;
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[The historian&#039;s] loyalties may well influence his choice of subject of research; they should not influence his treatment of it. If, in the course of his researches, he finds that the group with which he identifies himself is always right, and those other groups with which it is in conflict are always wrong, then he would be well advised to question his conclusions, and to reexamine the hypothesis on the basis of which he selected and interpreted his evidence; for it is not in the nature of human communities [presumably, also, the community of Orientalists] always to be right.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally the historian must be fair and honest in the way he presents his story. That is not to say that he must confine himself to a bare recital of definitely established facts. At many stages in his work the historian must formulate hypotheses and make judgments. The important thing is that he should do so consciously and explicitly, reviewing the evidence for and against his conclusions, examining the various possible interpretations, and stating explicitly what his decision is, and how and why he reached it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lewis, &#039;&#039;Islam in History&#039;&#039;, pp. 65-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To look for a conscious, fair, and explicit judgment by Lewis of the Islam he has treated as he has treated it is to look in vain. He prefers to work, as we have seen, by suggestion and insinuation. One suspects, however, that he is unaware of doing this (except perhaps with regard to &amp;quot;political&amp;quot; matters like pro-Zionism, anti-Arab nationalism, and strident Cold Warriorism), since he would be certain to say that the whole history of Orientalism, of whom he is the beneficiary, has made these insinuations and hypotheses into indisputable truths.&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps the most indisputable of these rock-bottom &amp;quot;truths,&amp;quot; and the most peculiar (since it is hard to believe it could be maintained for any other language), is that Arabic as a language is a dangerous ideology. The contemporary &#039;&#039;locus classicus&#039;&#039; for this view of Arabic is E. Shouby&#039;s essay &amp;quot;The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Originally published in &#039;&#039;Middle East Journal&#039;&#039; 5 (1951). Collected in &#039;&#039;Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Cultures&#039;&#039;, ed. Abdulla Lutfiyye and Charles W. Churchill (The Hague: Mouton &amp;amp; Co., 1970), pp. 688-703.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The author is described as &amp;quot;a psychologist with training in both Clinical and Social Psychology,&amp;quot; and one presumes that a main reason his views have such wide currency is that he is an Arab himself (a self-incriminating one, at that). The argument he proposes is lamentably simple-minded, perhaps because he has no notion of what language is and how it operates. Nevertheless the subheadings of his essay tell a good deal of his story; Arabic is characterized by &amp;quot;General vagueness of Thought,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Overemphasis on Linguistic Signs,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Over-assertion and Exaggeration.&amp;quot; Shouby is frequently quoted as an authority because he speaks like one and because what he hypostasizes is a sort of mute Arab who at the same time is a great word-master playing games without much seriousness or purpose. Muteness is an important part of what Shouby is talking about, since in his entire paper he never once quotes from the literature of which the Arab is so inordinately proud. Where, then, does Arabic influence the Arab mind? Exclusively within the mythological world created for the Arab by Orientalism. The Arab is a sign for dumbness combined with hopeless overarticulateness, poverty combined with excess. That such a result can be attained by philological means testifies to the sad end of a formerly complex philological tradition, exemplified today only in very rare individuals. The reliance of today&#039;s Orientalist on &amp;quot;philology&amp;quot; is the last infirmity of a scholarly discipline completely transformed into social-science ideological expertise.&lt;br /&gt;
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In everything I have been discussing, the language of Orientalism plays the dominant role. It brings opposites together as &amp;quot;natural,&amp;quot; it presents human types in scholarly idioms and methodologies, it ascribes reality and reference to objects (other words) of its own making. Mythic language is discourse, that is, it cannot be anything but systematic; one does not really make discourse at will, or statements in it, without first belonging--in some cases unconsciously, but at any rate involuntarily--to the ideology and the institutions that guarantee its existence. These latter are always the institutions of an advanced society dealing with a less advanced society, a strong culture encountering a weak one. The principal feature of mythic discourse is that it conceals its own origins as well as those of what it describes. &amp;quot;Arabs&amp;quot; are presented in the imagery of static, almost ideal types, and neither as creatures with a potential in the process of being realized nor as history being made. The exaggerated value heaped upon Arabic as a language permits the Orientalist to make the language equivalent to mind, society, history, and nature. For the Orientalist the language &#039;&#039;speaks&#039;&#039; the Arab Oriental, not vice versa.&lt;br /&gt;
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4. &#039;&#039;Orientals Orientals Orientals&#039;&#039;. The system of ideological fictions I have been calling Orientalism has serious implications not only because it is intellectually discreditable. For the United States today is heavily invested in the Middle East, more heavily than anywhere else on earth: the Middle East experts who advise policymakers are imbued with Orientalism almost to a person. Most of this investment, appropriately enough, is built on foundations of sand, since the experts instruct policy on the basis of such marketable abstractions as political elites, modernization, and stability, most of which are simply the old Orientalist stereotypes dressed up in policy jargon, and most of which have been completely inadequate to describe what took place recently in Lebanon or earlier in Palestinian popular resistance to Israel. The Orientalist now tries to see the Orient as an imitation West which, according to Bernard Lewis, can only improve itself when its nationalism &amp;quot;is prepared to come to terms with the West.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lewis, The Middle East and the West, p. 140.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If in the meantime the Arabs, the Muslims, or the Third and Fourth Worlds go unexpected ways after all, we will not be surprised to have an Orientalist tell us that this testifies to the incorrigibility of Orientals and therefore proves that they are not to be trusted.&lt;br /&gt;
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The methodological failures of Orientalism cannot be accounted for either by saying that the &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039; Orient is different from Orientalist portraits of it, or by saying that since Orientalists are Westerners for the most part, they cannot be expected to have an inner sense of what the Orient is all about. Both of these propositions are false. It is not the thesis of this book to suggest that there is such a thing as a real or true Orient (Islam, Arab, or whatever); nor is it to make an assertion about the necessary privilege of an &amp;quot;insider&amp;quot; perspective over an &amp;quot;outsider&amp;quot; one, to use Robert K. Merton&#039;s useful distinction.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Robert K. Merton, &amp;quot;The Perspectives of Insiders and Outsiders,&amp;quot; in his &#039;&#039;The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations&#039;&#039;, ed. Norman W. Storer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 99-136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; On the contrary, I have been arguing that &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; is itself a constituted entity, and that the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically &amp;quot;different&amp;quot; inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space is equally a highly debatable idea. I certainly do not believe the limited proposition that only a black can write about blacks, a Muslim about Muslims, and so forth.&lt;br /&gt;
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And yet despite its failures, its lamentable jargon, its scarcely concealed racism, its paper-thin intellectual apparatus, Orientalism flourishes today in the forms I have tried to describe. Indeed, there is some reason for alarm in the fact that its influence has spread to &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; itself: the pages of books and journals in Arabic (and doubtless in Japanese, various Indian dialects, and other Oriental languages) are filled with second-order analyses by Arabs of &amp;quot;the Arab mind,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;Islam,&amp;quot; and other myths. Orientalism has also spread in the United States now that Arab money and resources have added considerable glamour to the traditional &amp;quot;concern&amp;quot; felt for the strategically important Orient. The fact is that Orientalism has been successfully accommodated to the new imperialism, where its ruling paradigms do not contest, and even confirm, the continuing imperial design to dominate Asia.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the one part of the Orient that I can speak about with some direct knowledge, the accommodation between the intellectual class and the new imperialism might very well be accounted one of the special triumphs of Orientalism. The Arab world today is an intellectual, political, and cultural satellite of the United States. This is not in itself something to be lamented; the specific form of the satellite relationship, however, is. Consider first of all that universities in the Arab world are generally run according to some pattern inherited from, or once directly imposed by, a former colonial power. New circumstances make the curricular actualities almost grotesque: classes populated with hundreds of students, badly trained, overworked, and underpaid faculty, political appointments, the almost total absence of advanced research and of research facilities, and most important, the lack of a single decent library in the entire region. Whereas Britain and France once dominated intellectual horizons in the East by virtue of their prominence and wealth, it is now the United States that occupies that place, with the result that the few promising students who manage to make it through the system are encouraged to come to the United States to continue their advanced work. And while it is certainly true that some students from the Arab world continue to go to Europe to study, the sheer numerical preponderance comes to the United States; this is as true of students from so-called radical states as it is of students from conservative states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Besides, the patronage system in scholarship, business, and research makes the United States a virtual hegemonic commander of affairs; the source, however much it may not be a real source, is considered to be the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two factors make the situation even more obviously a triumph of Orientalism. Insofar as one can make a sweeping generalization, the felt tendencies of contemporary culture in the Near East are guided by European and American models. When Taha Hussein said of modern Arab culture in 1936 that it was European, not Eastern, he was registering the identity of the Egyptian cultural elite, of which he was so distinguished a member. The same is true of the Arab cultural elite today, although the powerful current of anti-imperialist Third World ideas that has gripped the region since the early 1950s has tempered the Western edge of the dominant culture. In addition, the Arab and Islamic world remains a second-order power in terms of the production of culture, knowledge, and scholarship. Here one must be completely realistic about using the terminology of power politics to describe the situation that obtains. No Arab or Islamic scholar can afford to ignore what goes on in scholarly journals, institutes, and universities in the United States and Europe; the converse is not true. For example, there is no major journal of Arab studies published in the Arab world today, just as there is no Arab educational institution capable of challenging places like Oxford, Harvard, or UCLA in the study of the Arab world, much less in any non-Oriental subject matter. The predictable result of all this is that Oriental students (and Oriental professors) still want to come and sit at the feet of American Orientalists, and later to repeat to their local audiences the cliches I have been characterizing as Orientalist dogmas. Such a system of reproduction makes it inevitable that the Oriental scholar will use his American training to feel superior to his own people because he is able to &amp;quot;manage&amp;quot; the Orientalist system; in his relations with his superiors, the European or American Orientalists, he will remain only a &amp;quot;native informant.&amp;quot; And indeed this is his role in the West, should he be fortunate enough to remain there after his advanced training. Most elementary courses in Oriental languages are taught by &amp;quot;native informants&amp;quot; in United States universities today; also, power in the system (in universities, foundations, and the like) is held almost exclusively by non-Orientals, although the numerical ratio of Oriental to non-Oriental resident professionals does not favor the latter so overwhelmingly.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are all kinds of other indications of how the cultural domination is maintained, as much by Oriental consent as by direct and crude economic pressure from the United States. It is sobering to find, for instance, that while there are dozens of organizations in the United States for studying the Arab and Islamic Orient, there are none in the Orient itself for studying the United States, by far the greatest economic and political influence in the region. Worse, there are scarcely any institutes of even modest stature in the Orient devoted to study of the Orient. But all this, I think, is small in comparison with the second factor contributing to the triumph of Orientalism: the fact of consumerism in the Orient. The Arab and Islamic world as a whole is hooked into the Western market system. No one needs to be reminded that oil, the region&#039;s greatest resource, has been totally absorbed into the United States economy. By that I mean not only that the great oil companies are controlled by the American economic system; I mean also that Arab oil revenues, to say nothing of marketing, research, and industry management, are based in the United States. This has effectively made the oil-rich Arabs into huge customers of American exports: this is as true of states in the Persian Gulf as it is of Libya, Iraq, and Algeria--radical states all. My point is that the relationship is a one-sided one, with the United States a selective customer of a very few products (oil and cheap manpower, mainly), the Arabs highly diversified consumers of a vast range of United States products, material and ideological.&lt;br /&gt;
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This has had many consequences. There is a vast standardization of taste in the region, symbolized not only by transistors, blue jeans, and Coca-Cola but also by cultural images of the Orient supplied by American mass media and consumed unthinkingly by the mass television audience. The paradox of an Arab regarding himself as an &amp;quot;Arab&amp;quot; of the sort put out by Hollywood is but the simplest result of what I am referring to. Another result is that the Western market economy and its consumer orientation have produced (and are producing at an accelerating rate) a class of educated people whose intellectual formation is directed to satisfying market needs. There is a heavy emphasis on engineering, business, and economics, obviously enough; but the intelligentsia itself is auxiliary to what it considers to be the main trends stamped out in the West. Its role has been prescribed and set for it as a &amp;quot;modernizing&amp;quot; one, which means that it gives legitimacy and authority to ideas about modernization, progress, and culture that it receives from the United States for the most part. Impressive evidence for this is found in the social sciences and, surprisingly enough, among radical intellectuals whose Marxism is taken wholesale from Marx&#039;s own homogenizing view of the Third World, as I discussed it earlier in this book. So if all told there is an intellectual acquiescence in the images and doctrines of Orientalism, there is also a very powerful reinforcement of this in economic, political, and social exchange: the modern Orient, in short, participates in its own Orientalizing.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in conclusion, what of some alternative to Orientalism? Is this book an argument only &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; something, and not &#039;&#039;for&#039;&#039; something positive? Here and there in the course of this book I have spoken about &amp;quot;decolonializing&amp;quot; new departures in the so-called area studies--the work of Anwar Abdel Malek, the studies published by members of the Hull group on Middle Eastern studies, the innovative analyses and proposals of various scholars in Europe, the United States, and the Near East&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See, for example, the recent work of Anwar Abdel Malek, Yves Lacoste, and the authors of essays published in &#039;&#039;Review of Middle East Studies 1 and 2&#039;&#039; (London: Ithaca Press, 1975, 1976), the various analyses of Middle Eastern politics by Noam Chomsky, and the work done by the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP). A good prospectus is provided in Gabriel Ardant, Kostas Axelos, Jacques Berque, et al., &#039;&#039;De I&#039;imperialisme a la decolonisation&#039;&#039; (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1965).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;--but I have not attempted to do more than mention them or allude to them quickly. My project has been to describe a particular system of ideas, not by any means to displace the system with a new one. In addition, I have attempted to raise a whole set of questions that are relevant in discussing the problems of human experience: How does one &#039;&#039;represent&#039;&#039; other cultures? What is &#039;&#039;another&#039;&#039; culture? Is the notion of a distinct culture (or race, or religion, or civilization) a useful one, or does it always get involved either in self-congratulation (when one discusses one&#039;s own) or hostility and aggression (when one discusses the &amp;quot;other&amp;quot;)? Do cultural, religious, and racial differences matter more than socio-economic categories, or politicohistorical ones? How do ideas acquire authority, &amp;quot;normality,&amp;quot; and even the status of &amp;quot;natural&amp;quot; truth? What is the role of the intellectual? Is he there to validate the culture and state of which he is a part? What importance must he give to an independent critical consciousness, an &#039;&#039;oppositional&#039;&#039; critical consciousness?&lt;br /&gt;
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I hope that some of my answers to these questions have been implicit in the foregoing, but perhaps I can speak a little more explicitly about some of them here. As I have characterized it in this study, Orientalism calls in question not only the possibility of nonpolitical scholarship but also the advisability of too close a relationship between the scholar and the state. It is equally apparent, I think, that the circumstances making Orientalism a continuingly persuasive type of thought will persist: a rather depressing matter on the whole. Nevertheless there is some rational expectation in my own mind that Orientalism need not always be so unchallenged, intellectually, ideologically, and politically, as it has been.&lt;br /&gt;
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I would not have undertaken a book of this sort if I did not also believe that there is scholarship that is not as corrupt, or at least as blind to human reality, as the kind I have been mainly depicting. Today there are many individual scholars working in such fields as Islamic history, religion, civilization, sociology, and anthropology whose production is deeply valuable as scholarship. The trouble sets in when the guild tradition of Orientalism takes over the scholar who is not vigilant, whose individual consciousness as a scholar is not on guard against &#039;&#039;idees recues&#039;&#039; all too easily handed down in the profession. Thus interesting work is most likely to be produced by scholars whose allegiance is to a discipline defined intellectually and not to a &amp;quot;field&amp;quot; like Orientalism defined either canonically, imperially, or geographically. An excellent recent instance is the anthropology of Clifford Geertz, whose interest in Islam is discrete and concrete enough to be animated by the specific societies and problems he studies and not by the rituals, preconceptions, and doctrines of Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, scholars and critics who are trained in the traditional Orientalist disciplines are perfectly capable of freeing themselves from the old ideological straitjacket. Jacques Berque&#039;s and Maxime Rodinson&#039;s training ranks with the most rigorous available, but what invigorates their investigations even of traditional problems is their methodological self-consciousness. For if Orientalism has historically been too smug, too insulated, too positivistically confident in its ways and its premises, then one way of opening oneself to what one studies in or about the Orient is reflexively to submit one&#039;s method to critical scrutiny. This is what characterizes Berque and Rodinson, each in his own way. What one finds in their work is always, first of all, a direct sensitivity to the material before them, and then a continual self-examination of their methodology and practice, a constant attempt to keep their work responsive to the material and not to a doctrinal preconception. Certainly Berque and Rodinson, as well as Abdel Malek and Roger Owen, are aware too that the study of man and society--whether Oriental or not--is best conducted in the broad field of all the human sciences; therefore these scholars are critical readers, and students of what goes on in other fields. Berque&#039;s attention to recent discoveries in structural anthropology, Rodinson&#039;s to sociology and political theory, Owen&#039;s to economic history: all these are instructive correctives brought from the contemporary human sciences to the study of so-called Oriental problems.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there is no avoiding the fact that even if we disregard the Orientalist distinctions between &amp;quot;them&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;us,&amp;quot; a powerful series of political and ultimately ideological realities inform scholarship today. No one can escape dealing with, if not the East/West division, then the North/South one, the have/have-not one, the imperialist/anti-imperialist one, the white/colored one. We cannot get around them all by pretending they do not exist; on the contrary, contemporary Orientalism teaches us a great deal about the intellectual dishonesty of dissembling on that score, the result of which is to intensify the divisions and make them both vicious and permanent. Yet an openly polemical and right-minded &amp;quot;progressive&amp;quot; scholarship can very easily degenerate into dogmatic slumber, a prospect that is not edifying either.&lt;br /&gt;
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My own sense of the problem is fairly shown by the kinds of questions I formulated above. Modern thought and experience have taught us to be sensitive to what is involved in representation, in studying the Other, in racial thinking, in unthinking and uncritical acceptance of authority and authoritative ideas, in the sociopolitical role of intellectuals, in the great value of a skeptical critical consciousness. Perhaps if we remember that the study of human experience usually has an ethical, to say nothing of a political, consequence in either the best or worst sense, we will not be indifferent to what we do as scholars. And what better norm for the scholar than human freedom and knowledge? Perhaps too we should remember that the study of man in society is based on concrete human history and experience, not on donnish abstractions, or on obscure laws or arbitrary systems. The problem then is to make the study fit and in some way be shaped by the experience, which would be illuminated and perhaps changed by the study. At all costs, the goal of Orientalizing the Orient again and again is to be avoided, with consequences that cannot help but refine knowledge and reduce the scholar&#039;s conceit. Without &amp;quot;the Orient&amp;quot; there would be scholars, critics, intellectuals, human beings, for whom the racial, ethnic, and national distinctions were less important than the common enterprise of promoting human community.&lt;br /&gt;
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Positively, I do believe--and in my other work have tried to show--that enough is being done today in the human sciences to provide the contemporary scholar with insights, methods, and ideas that could dispense with racial, ideological, and imperialist stereotypes of the sort provided during its historical ascendancy by Orientalism. I consider Orientalism&#039;s failure to have been a human as much as an intellectual one; for in having to take up a position of irreducible opposition to a region of the world it considered alien to its own, Orientalism failed to identify with human experience, failed also to see it as human experience. The worldwide hegemony of Orientalism and all it stands for can now be challenged, if we can benefit properly from the general twentieth-century rise to political and historical awareness of so many of the earth&#039;s peoples. If this book has any future use, it will be as a modest contribution to that challenge, and as a warning: that systems of thought like Orientalism, discourses of power, ideological fictions--mind-forg&#039;d manacles--are all too easily made, applied, and guarded. Above all, I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism. No former &amp;quot;Oriental&amp;quot; will be comforted by the thought that having been an Oriental himself he is likely--too likely--to study new &amp;quot;Orientals&amp;quot;--or &amp;quot;Occidentals&amp;quot;--of his own making. If the knowledge of Orientalism has any meaning, it is in being a reminder of the seductive degradation of knowledge, of any knowledge, anywhere, at any time. Now perhaps more than before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;&#039;Afterword&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;I&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; was completed in the last part of 1977, and was published a year later. It was (and still is) the only book that I wrote as one continuous gesture, from research, to several drafts, to final version, each following the other without interruption or serious distraction. With the exception of a wonderfully civilized and relatively burdenless year spent as a Fellow at the Stanford Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1975-6), I had very little in the way of support or interest from the outside world. I received encouragement from one or two friends and my immediate family, but it was far from clear whether such a study of the ways in which the power, scholarship, and imagination of a two-hundred-year-old tradition in Europe and America viewed the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam, &#039;&#039;might&#039;&#039; interest a general audience. I recall, for instance, that it was very difficult at first to interest a serious publisher in the project. One academic press in particular very tentatively suggested a modest contract for a small monograph, so unpromising and slender did the whole enterprise seem at the outset. But luckily (as I describe my good fortune with my first publisher in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s original page of Acknowledgments) things changed for the better very quickly after I finished writing the book.&lt;br /&gt;
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In both America and England (where a separate U.K. edition appeared in 1979) the book attracted a great deal of attention, some of it (as was to be expected) very hostile, some of it uncomprehending, but most of it positive and enthusiastic. Beginning in 1980 with the French edition, a whole series of translations started to appear, increasing in number to this day, many of which have generated controversies and discussions in languages that I am incompetent to understand. There was a remarkable and still controversial Arabic translation by the gifted Syrian poet and critic Kamal Abu Deeb; I shall say more about that in a moment. Thereafter &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; appeared in Japanese, German, Portuguese, Italian, Polish, Spanish, Catalan, Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, and Swedish (in 1993 it became a bestseller in Sweden, which mystified the local publisher as much as it did me). There are several editions (Greek, Russian, Norwegian, and Chinese) either under way or about to appear. Other European translations are rumored, as is an Israeli version, according to one or two reports. There have been partial translations pirated in Iran and Pakistan. Many of the translations that I have known about directly (in particular, the Japanese) have gone through more than one edition; all are still in print and appear on occasion to give rise to local discussions that go very far beyond anything I was thinking about when I wrote the book.&lt;br /&gt;
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The result of all this is that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, almost in a Borgesian way, has become several different books. And, insofar as I have been able to follow and understand these subsequent versions, that strange, often disquieting, and certainly unthought-of polymorphousness is what I should like to discuss here, reading back into the book that I wrote what others have said, in addition to what I myself wrote after &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; (eight or nine books plus many articles). Obviously I shall try to correct misreadings and, in a few instances, willful misinterpretations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet I shall also be rehearsing arguments and intellectual developments that acknowledge &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; to be a helpful book in ways that I foresaw only very partially at the time. The point of all this is neither to settle scores nor to heap congratulations on myself, but to chart and record a much-expanded sense of authorship that goes well beyond the egoism of the solitary beings we feel ourselves to be as we undertake a piece of work. For in all sorts of ways &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; now seems to me a collective book that I think supersedes me as its author more than I could have expected when I wrote it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let me begin with the one aspect of the book&#039;s reception that I most regret and find myself trying hardest now (in 1994) to overcome. That is the book&#039;s alleged anti-Westernism, as it has been misleadingly and rather too sonorously called by commentators both hostile and sympathetic. This notion has two parts to it, sometimes argued together, sometimes separately. The first is the claim imputed to me that the phenomenon of Orientalism is a synecdoche, or a miniature symbol, of the entire West, and indeed ought to be taken to represent the West as a whole. Since this is so, the argument continues, therefore the entire West is an enemy of the Arab and Islamic or for that matter the Iranian, Chinese, Indian, and many other non-European peoples who suffered Western colonialism and prejudice.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second part of the argument ascribed to me is no less far-reaching. It is that a predatory West and Orientalism have violated Islam and the Arabs. (Note that the terms &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;West&amp;quot; have been collapsed into each other.) Since that is so, the very existence of Orientalism and Orientalists is seized upon as a pretext for arguing the exact opposite, namely, that Islam is perfect, that it is the only way &#039;&#039;(al-hal al-wahid)&#039;&#039;, and so on and so on. To criticize Orientalism, as I did in my book, is in effect to be a supporter of Islamism or Muslim fundamentalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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One scarcely knows what to make of these caricatured permutations of a book that to its author and in its arguments is explicitly anti-essentialist, radically skeptical about all categorical designations such as Orient and Occident, and painstakingly careful about &#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039; &amp;quot;defending&amp;quot; or even discussing the Orient and Islam. Yet &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; has in fact been read and written about in the Arab world as a systematic defense of Islam and the Arabs, even though I say explicitly in the book that I have no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam really are. Actually I go a great deal further when, very early in the book, I say that words such as &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Occident&amp;quot; correspond to no stable reality that exists as a natural fact. Moreover, all such geographical designations are an odd combination of the empirical and imaginative. In the case of the Orient as a notion in currency in Britain, France, and America, the idea derives to a great extent from the impulse not simply to describe, but also to dominate and somehow to defend against it. As I try to show, this is powerfully true with reference to Islam as a particularly dangerous embodiment of the Orient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The central point in all this is, however, as Vico taught us, that human history is made by human beings. Since the struggle for control over territory is part of that history, so too is the struggle over historical and social meaning. The task for the critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from another, but to connect them, despite the contrast between the overpowering materiality of the former and the apparent otherworldly refinements of the latter. My way of doing this has been to show that the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another, different and competing &#039;&#039;alter ego&#039;&#039;. The construction of identity--for identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction in my opinion--involves the construction of opposites and &amp;quot;others&amp;quot; whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from &amp;quot;us.&amp;quot; Each age and society re-creates its &amp;quot;Others.&amp;quot; Far from a static thing then, identity of self or of &amp;quot;other&amp;quot; is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies. Debates today about Frenchness and Englishness in France and Britain respectively, or about Islam in countries like Egypt and Pakistan, are part of the same interpretive process, which involves the identities of different &amp;quot;others,&amp;quot; whether they be outsiders and refugees, or apostates and infidels. It should be obvious in all cases that these processes are not mental exercises but urgent social contests involving such concrete political issues as immigration laws, the legislation of personal conduct, the constitution of orthodoxy, the legitimization of violence and/or insurrection, the character and content of education, and the direction of foreign policy, which very often has to do with the designation of official enemies. In short, the construction of identity is bound up with the disposition of power and powerlessness in each society, and is therefore anything but mere academic woolgathering.&lt;br /&gt;
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What makes all these fluid and extraordinarily rich actualities difficult to accept is that most people resist the underlying notion: that human identity is not only not natural and stable, but constructed, and occasionally even invented outright. Part of the resistance and hostility generated by books like &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, or after it, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;Black Athena&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Martin Bernal, &#039;&#039;Black Athena&#039;&#039; (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, Volume I, 1987; Volume II, 1991); Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Rangers, eds., &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; is that they seem to undermine the naive belief in the certain positivity and unchanging historicity of a culture, a self, a national identity. &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; can only be read as a defense of Islam by suppressing half of my argument, in which I say (as I do in a subsequent book, &#039;&#039;Covering Islam&#039;&#039;) that even the primitive community we belong to natally is not immune from the interpretive contest, and that what appears in the West to be the emergence, return to, or resurgence of Islam is in fact a struggle in Islamic societies over the definition of Islam. No one person, authority, or institution has total control over that definition; hence, of course, the contest. Fundamentalism&#039;s epistemological mistake is to think that &amp;quot;fundamentals&amp;quot; are ahistorical categories, not subject to and therefore outside the critical scrutiny of true believers, who are supposed to accept them on faith. To the adherents of a restored or revived version of early Islam, Orientalists are considered (like Salman Rushdie) to be dangerous because they tamper with that version, cast doubt on it, show it to be fraudulent and non-divine. To them, therefore, the virtues of my book were that it pointed out the malicious dangers of the Orientalists and somehow pried Islam from their clutches.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now this is hardly what I saw myself doing, but the view persists anyway. There are two reasons for this. In the first place no one finds it easy to live uncomplainingly and fearlessly with the thesis that human reality is constantly being made and unmade, and that anything like a stable essence is constantly under threat. Patriotism, extreme xenophobic nationalism, and downright unpleasant chauvinism are common responses to this fear. We all need some foundation on which to stand; the question is how extreme and unchangeable is our formulation of what this foundation is. My position is that in the case of an essential Islam or Orient, these images are no more than images, and are upheld as such both by the community of the Muslim faithful and (the correspondence is significant) by the community of Orientalists. My objection to what I have called Orientalism is not that it, is just the antiquarian study of Oriental languages, societies, and peoples, but that as a system of thought Orientalism approaches a heterogenous, dynamic, and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and from, so to speak, above. This false position hides historical change. Even more important, from my standpoint, it hides the &#039;&#039;interests&#039;&#039; of the Orientalist. Those, despite attempts to draw subtle distinctions between Orientalism as an innocent scholarly endeavor and Orientalism as an accomplice to empire, can never unilaterally be detached from the general imperial context that begins its modern global phase with Napoleon&#039;s invasion of Egypt in 1798.&lt;br /&gt;
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I have in mind the striking contrast between the weaker and stronger party that is evident from the beginning of Europe&#039;s modern encounters with what it called the Orient. The studied solemnity and grandiose accents of Napoleon&#039;s &#039;&#039;Description de l&#039;Egypte&#039;&#039;--its massive, serried volumes testifying to the systematic labors of an entire corps of &#039;&#039;savants&#039;&#039; backed by a modern army of colonial conquest--dwarfs the individual testimony of people like Abdal-Rahman al-Jabarti, who in three separate volumes describes the French invasion from the point of view of the invaded. One might say that the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; is just a scientific, and therefore objective, account of Egypt in the early nineteenth century, but the presence of Jabarti (who is both unknown and ignored by Napoleon) suggests otherwise. Napoleon&#039;s is an &amp;quot;objective&amp;quot; account from the standpoint of someone powerful trying to hold Egypt within the French imperial orbit; Jabarti&#039;s is an account by someone who paid the price, was figuratively captured and vanquished.&lt;br /&gt;
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In other words, rather than remaining as inert documents that testify to an eternally opposed Occident and Orient, the &#039;&#039;Description&#039;&#039; and Jabarti&#039;s chronicles together constitute a historical experience, out of which others evolved, and before which others existed. Studying the historical dynamics of this set of experiences is more demanding than sliding back into stereotypes like &amp;quot;the conflict of East and West.&amp;quot; That is one reason why &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is mistakenly read as a surreptitiously anti-Western work and, by an act of unwarranted and even willful retrospective endowment, this reading (like all readings based on a supposedly stable binary opposition) elevates the image of an innocent and aggrieved Islam.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second reason why the anti-essentialism of my arguments has proved hard to accept is political and urgently ideological. I had absolutely no way of knowing that, a year after the book was published, Iran would be the site of an extraordinarily far-reaching Islamic revolution, nor that the battle between Israel and the Palestinians would take such savage and protracted forms, from the 1982 invasion of Lebanon to the onset of the &#039;&#039;intifada&#039;&#039; in late 1987. The end of the Cold War did not mute, much less terminate, the apparently unending conflict between East and West as represented by the Arabs and Islam on one side and the Christian West on the other. More recent, but no less acute, contests developed as a result of the Soviet Union&#039;s invasion of Afghanistan; the challenge to the &#039;&#039;status quo&#039;&#039; during the 1980s and &#039;90s made by Islamic groups in countries as diverse as Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and the Occupied Territories, and the various American and European responses: the creation of Islamic brigades to fight the Russians from bases in Pakistan; the Gulf War; the continued support of Israel; and the emergence of &amp;quot;Islam&amp;quot; as a topic of alarmed, if not always precise and informed, journalism and scholarship. All this inflamed the sense of persecution felt by people forced, on an almost daily basis, to declare themselves to be either Westerners or Easterners. No one seemed to be free from the opposition between &amp;quot;us&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;them,&amp;quot; which resulted in a sense of reinforced, deepened, hardened identity that has not been particularly edifying.&lt;br /&gt;
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In such a turbulent context &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s fate was both fortunate and unfortunate. To those in the Arab and Islamic world who felt Western encroachment with anxiety and stress, it appeared to be the first book that gave a serious answer back to a West that had never actually listened to or forgiven the Oriental for being an Oriental at all. I recall one early Arabic review of the book that described its author as a champion of Arabism, a defender of the downtrodden and abused, whose mission was to engage Western authorities in a kind of epic and romantic &#039;&#039;mano-a-mano&#039;&#039;. Despite the exaggeration, it did convey some real sense of the West&#039;s enduring hostility, as felt by Arabs, and it also conveyed a response that many educated Arabs felt was appropriate.&lt;br /&gt;
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I will not deny that I &#039;&#039;was&#039;&#039; aware, when writing the book, of the subjective truth insinuated by Marx in the little sentence I quoted as one of the book&#039;s epigraphs (&amp;quot;They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.&amp;quot;), which is that if you feel you have been denied the chance to speak your piece, you will try extremely hard to get that chance. For indeed, the subaltern &#039;&#039;can&#039;&#039; speak, as the history of liberation movements in the twentieth century eloquently attests. But I never felt that I was perpetuating the hostility between two rival political and cultural monolithic blocks, whose construction I was describing and whose terrible effects I was trying to reduce. On the contrary, as I said earlier, the Orient versus Occident opposition was both misleading and highly undesirable; the less it was given credit for actually describing anything more than a fascinating history of interpretations and of contesting interests, the better. I am happy to record that many readers in Britain and America, as well as in English-speaking Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Caribbean, saw the book as stressing the actualities of what was later to be called multiculturalism, rather than xenophobia and aggressive, race-oriented nationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; has been thought of rather more as a kind of testimonial to subaltern status--the wretched of the earth talking back--than a multicultural critique of power using knowledge to advance itself. Thus, as its author I have been seen as playing an assigned role: that of a self-representing consciousness of what had formerly been suppressed and distorted in the learned texts of a discourse specifically designed to be read not by Orientals but by other Westerners. This is an important point, and it adds to the sense of fixed identities battling across a permanent divide that my book quite specifically abjures, but which it paradoxically presupposes and depends on. None of the Orientalists I write about seems ever to have intended an Oriental as a reader. The discourse of Orientalism, its internal consistency, and its rigorous procedures were all designed for readers and consumers in the metropolitan West. This goes as much for people I genuinely admire, like Edward Lane and Gustave Flaubert, who were fascinated by Egypt, as it does for haughty colonial administrators, like Lord Cromer, brilliant scholars, like Ernest Renan, and baronial aristocrats, like Arthur Balfour, all of whom condescended to and disliked the Orientals they either ruled or studied. I must confess to a certain pleasure in listening in, uninvited, to their various pronouncements and inter-Orientalist discussions, and an equal pleasure in making known my findings both to Europeans and non-Europeans. I have no doubt that this was made possible because I traversed the imperial East-West divide, entered into the life of the West, and yet retained some organic connection with the place from which I originally came. I would repeat that this is very much a procedure of crossing, rather than maintaining, barriers; I believe &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; as a book shows it, especially at moments when I speak of humanistic study as seeking ideally to go beyond coercive limitations on thought toward a non-dominative, and non-essentialist, type of learning.&lt;br /&gt;
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These considerations did in fact add to the pressures on my book to represent a sort of testament of wounds and a record of sufferings, the recital of which was felt as a long overdue striking back at the West. I deplore so simple a characterization of a work that is--here I am not going to be falsely modest--quite nuanced and discriminating in what it says about different people, different periods, and different styles of Orientalism. Each of my analyses varies the picture, increases the difference and discriminations, separates authors and periods from each other, even though all pertain to Orientalism. To read my analyses of Chateaubriand and Flaubert, or of Burton and Lane, with exactly the same emphasis, deriving the same reductive message from the banal formula &amp;quot;an attack on Western civilization&amp;quot; is, I believe, to be both simplistic and wrong. But I also believe that it is entirely correct to read recent Orientalist authorities, such as the almost comically persistent Bernard Lewis, as the politically motivated and hostile witnesses that their suave accents and unconvincing displays of learning attempt to hide.&lt;br /&gt;
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Once again, then, we are back to the political and historical context of the book, which I do not pretend is irrelevant to its contents. One of the most generously perspicacious and intelligently discriminating statements of that conjuncture was laid out in a review by Basim Musallam (MERIP, 1979). He begins by comparing my book with an earlier demystification of Orientalism by the Lebanese scholar Michael Rustum in 1895 &#039;&#039;(Kitab al-Gharib fi al-Gharb)&#039;&#039;, but then says that the main difference between us is that my book is about loss, whereas Rustum&#039;s is not:&lt;br /&gt;
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Rustum writes as a free man and a member of a free society: a Syrian, Arab by speech, citizen of a still-independent Ottoman state unlike Michael Rustum, Edward Said has no generally accepted identity, his very &#039;&#039;people&#039;&#039; are in dispute. It is possible that Edward&#039; Said and his generation sometimes feel that they stand on nothing more solid than the remnants of the destroyed society of Michael Rustum&#039;s Syria, and on memory. Others in Asia and Africa have had their successes in this age of national liberation; here, in painful contrast, there has been desperate resistance against overwhelming odds and, until now, defeat. It is not just any &amp;quot;Arab&amp;quot; who wrote this book, but one with a particular background and experience. (22)&lt;br /&gt;
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Musallam correctly notes that an Algerian would not have written the same kind of generally pessimistic book, especially one like mine that does very little with the history of French relations with North Africa, Algeria most particularly. So while I would accept the overall impression that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is written out of an extremely concrete history of personal loss and national disintegration--only a few years before I wrote &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; Golda Meir made her notorious and deeply Orientalist comment about there being no Palestinian people--I would also like to add that neither in this book, nor in the two that immediately followed it, &#039;&#039;The Question of Palestine&#039;&#039; (1980) and &#039;&#039;Covering Islam&#039;&#039; (1981), did I want only to suggest a political program of restored identity and resurgent nationalism. There was, of course, an attempt in both of the later books to supply what was missing in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, namely a sense of what an alternative picture of parts of the Orient--Palestine and Islam respectively--might be from a personal point of view.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in all my works I remained fundamentally critical of a gloating and uncritical nationalism. The picture of Islam that I represented was not one of assertive discourse and dogmatic orthodoxy, but was based instead on the idea that communities of interpretation exist within and outside the Islamic world, communicating with each other in a dialogue of equals. My view of Palestine, formulated originally in &#039;&#039;The Question of Palestine&#039;&#039;, remains the same today: I expressed all sorts of reservations about the insouciant nativism and militant militarism of the nationalist consensus; I suggested instead a critical look at the Arab environment, Palestinian history, and the Israeli realities, with the explicit conclusion that only a negotiated settlement between the two communities of suffering, Arab and Jewish, would provide respite from the unending war. (I should mention in passing that although my book on Palestine was given a fine Hebrew translation in the early 1980s by Mifras, a small Israeli publishing house, it remains untranslated into Arabic to this day. Every Arabic publisher who was interested in the book wanted me to change or delete those sections that were openly critical of one or another Arab regime (including the PLO), a request that I have always refused to comply with.)&lt;br /&gt;
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I regret to say that the Arabic reception of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, despite Kamal Abu Deeb&#039;s remarkable translation, still managed to ignore that aspect of my book which diminished the nationalist fervor that some implied from my critique of Orientalism, which I associated with those drives to domination and control also to be found in imperialism. Abu Deeb&#039;s painstaking translation was an almost total avoidance of Arabized Western expressions; technical words like &#039;&#039;discourse, simulacrum, paradigm&#039;&#039;, or &#039;&#039;code&#039;&#039; were rendered from within the classical rhetoric of the Arab tradition. His idea was to place my work inside one fully formed tradition, as if it were addressing another from a perspective of cultural adequacy and equality. In this way, he reasoned, it was possible to show that just as one could advance an epistemological critique from within the Western tradition, so too could one do it from within the Arabic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet the sense of fraught confrontation between an often emotionally defined Arab world and an even more emotionally experienced Western world drowned out the fact that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; was meant to be a study in critique, not an affirmation of warring and hopelessly antithetical identities. Moreover, the actuality I described in the book&#039;s last pages, of one powerful discursive system maintaining hegemony over another, was intended as the opening salvo in a debate that might stir Arab readers and critics to engage more determinedly with the system of Orientalism. I was either upbraided for not having paid closer attention to Marx--the passages on Marx&#039;s own Orientalism in my book were the most singled out by dogmatic critics in the Arab world and India, for instance--whose system of thought was claimed to have risen above his obvious prejudices, or I was criticized for not appreciating the great achievements of Orientalism, the West, etc. As with defenses of Islam, recourse to Marxism or &amp;quot;the West&amp;quot; as a coherent total system seems to me to have been a case of using one orthodoxy to shoot down another.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference between Arab and other responses to &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is, I think, an accurate indication of how decades of loss, frustration, and the absence of democracy have affected intellectual and cultural life in the Arab region. I intended my book as part of a pre-existing current of thought whose purpose was to liberate intellectuals from the shackles of systems such as Orientalism: I wanted readers to make use of my work so they might then produce new studies of their own that would illuminate the historical experience of Arabs and others in a generous, enabling mode. That certainly happened in Europe, the United States, Australia, the Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean, Ireland, Latin America, and parts of Africa. The invigorated study of Africanist and Indological discourses; the analyses of subaltern history; the reconfiguration of post-colonial anthropology, political science, art history, literary criticism, musicology, in addition to the vast new developments in feminist and minority discourses--to all these, I am pleased and flattered that &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; often made a difference. That does not seem to have been the case (insofar as I can judge it) in the Arab world, where, partly because my work is correctly perceived as Eurocentric in its texts, and partly because, as Musallam says, the battle for cultural survival is too engrossing, books like mine are interpreted less usefully, productively speaking, and more as defensive gestures either for or against the &amp;quot;West.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet among American and British academics of a decidedly rigorous and unyielding stripe, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, and indeed all of my other work, has come in for disapproving attacks because of its &amp;quot;residual&amp;quot; humanism, its theoretical inconsistencies, its insufficient, perhaps even sentimental, treatment of agency. I am glad that it has! &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is a partisan book, not a theoretical machine. No one has convincingly shown that individual effort is not at some profoundly unteachable level both eccentric and, in Gerard Manley Hopkins&#039;s sense, &#039;&#039;original&#039;&#039;; this despite the existence of systems of thought, discourses, and hegemonies, (although none of them are in fact seamless, perfect, or inevitable). The interest I took in Orientalism as a cultural phenomenon (like the culture of imperialism I talk about in &#039;&#039;Culture and Imperialism&#039;&#039;, its 1993 sequel) derives from its variability and unpredictability, both qualities that give writers like Massignon and Burton their surprising force, and even attractiveness. What I tried to preserve in what I analyzed of Orientalism was its combination of consistency &#039;&#039;and&#039;&#039; inconsistency, its play, so to speak, which can only be rendered by preserving for oneself as writer and critic the right to some emotional force, the right to be moved, angered, surprised, and even delighted. This is why, in the debate between Gayan Prakash, on the one hand, and Rosalind O&#039;Hanlon and David Washbrook, on the other, I think Prakash&#039;s more mobile post-structuralism has to be given its due.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;O&#039;Hanlon and Washbrook, &amp;quot;After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World;&amp;quot; Prakash, &amp;quot;Can the Subaltern Ride? A Reply to O&#039;Hanlon and Washbrook,&amp;quot; both in &#039;&#039;Comparative Studies in Society and History&#039;&#039;, IV, 9 (January 1992), 141-184.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; By the same token the work of Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, and Ashis Nandy, predicated on the sometimes dizzying subjective relationships engendered by colonialism, cannot be gainsaid for &#039;&#039;its&#039;&#039; contribution to our understanding of the humanistic traps laid by systems such as Orientalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let me conclude this survey of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;s critical transmutations with a mention of the one group of people who were, not unexpectedly, the most exercised and vociferous in responding to my book, the Orientalists themselves. They were not my &#039;&#039;principal&#039;&#039; intended audience at all; I had in mind casting some light on their practices so as to make other humanists aware of one field&#039;s particular procedures and genealogy. The word &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; itself has been for too long confined to a professional specialty; I tried to show was its application and existence in the general culture, in literature, ideology, and social as well as political attitudes. To speak of someone as an Oriental, as the Orientalists did, was not just to designate that person as someone whose language, geography, and history were the stuff of learned treatises: it also was often meant as a derogatory expression signifying a lesser breed of human being. This is not to deny that for artists like Nerval and Segalen the word &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; was wonderfully, ingeniously connected to exoticism, glamour, mystery, and promise. But it was also a sweeping historical generalization. In addition to these uses of the words &#039;&#039;Orient, Oriental&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, the term &#039;&#039;Orientalist&#039;&#039; also came to represent the erudite, scholarly, mainly academic specialist in the languages and histories of the East. Yet, as the late Albert Hourani wrote me in March 1992, a few months before his untimely and much regretted death, due to the force of my argument (for which he said he could not reproach me), my book had the unfortunate effect of making it almost impossible to use the term &amp;quot;Orientalism&amp;quot; in a neutral sense, so much had it become a term of abuse. He concluded that he would have still liked to retain the word for use in describing &amp;quot;a limited, rather dull but valid discipline of scholarship.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In his generally balanced 1979 review of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, Hourani formulated one of his objections by suggesting that while I singled out the exaggerations, racism, and hostility of much Orientalist writing, I neglected to mention its numerous scholarly and humanistic achievements. Names that he brought up included Marshall Hodgson, Claude Cohen, and Andre Raymond, all of whose accomplishments (along with the German authors who come up &#039;&#039;de rigueur&#039;&#039;) should be acknowledged as real contributors to human knowledge. This does not, however, conflict with what I say in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, with the difference that I do insist on the prevalence in the discourse itself of a structure of attitudes that cannot simply be waved away of discounted. Nowhere do I argue that Orientalism is evil, or sloppy, or uniformly the same in the work of each Orientalist. But I do say that the &#039;&#039;guild&#039;&#039; of Orientalists has a specific history of complicity with imperial power, which it would be Panglossian to call irrelevant.&lt;br /&gt;
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So while I sympathize with Hourani&#039;s plea, I have serious doubts whether the notion of Orientalism properly understood can ever, in fact, be completely detached from its rather more complicated and not always flattering circumstances. I suppose that one can imagine at the limit that a specialist in Ottoman or Fatimid archives is an Orientalist in Hourani&#039;s sense, but we are still required to ask where, how, and with what supporting institutions and agencies such studies take place &#039;&#039;today&#039;&#039;? Many who wrote after my book appeared asked exactly those questions of even the most recondite and otherworldly scholars, with sometimes devastating results.&lt;br /&gt;
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Still, there has been one sustained attempt to mount an argument whose purport is that a critique of Orientalism (mine in particular) is both meaningless and somehow a violation of the very idea of disinterested scholarship. That attempt is made by Bernard Lewis, about whom I had devoted a few critical pages in my book. Fifteen years after &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; appeared, Lewis produced a series of essays, some of them collected in a book entitled &#039;&#039;Islam and the West&#039;&#039;, one of whose main sections is an attack on me, which he surrounds with chapters and other essays that mobilize a set of lax and characteristically Orientalist formulas--Muslims are enraged at modernity, Islam never made the separation between church and state, and so on and on--all of them pronounced with an extreme level of generalization and with scarcely a mention of the differences between individual Muslims, between Muslim societies, or between Muslim traditions and eras. Since Lewis has in a sense appointed himself a spokesman for the guild of Orientalists on which my critique was originally based, it may be worth spending a little more time on his procedures. His ideas are, alas, fairly current among his acolytes and imitators, whose job seems to be to alert Western consumers to the threat of an enraged, congenitally undemocratic and violent Islamic world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lewis&#039;s verbosity scarcely conceals both the ideological underpinnings of his position and his extraordinary capacity for getting nearly everything wrong. Of course, these are familiar attributes of the Orientalists&#039; breed, some of whom have at least had the courage to be honest in their active denigration of Islamic, as well as other non-European, peoples. Not Lewis. He proceeds by distorting the truth, by making false analogies, and by innuendo, methods to which he adds that veneer of omniscient tranquil authority which he supposes is the way scholars talk. Take as a typical example the analogy he draws between my critique of Orientalism and a hypothetical attack on studies of classical antiquity, an attack which, he says, would be a foolish activity. It would be, of course, but then Orientalism and Hellenism are radically incomparable. The former is an attempt to describe a whole region of the world as an accompaniment to that region&#039;s colonial conquest, the latter is not at all about the direct colonial conquest of Greece in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; in addition, Orientalism expresses antipathy to Islam, Hellenism sympathy for classical Greece.&lt;br /&gt;
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Additionally, the present political moment, with its reams of racist anti-Arab and anti-Muslim stereotypes (and no attacks on classical Greece), allows Lewis to deliver ahistorical and willful political assertions in the form of scholarly argument, a practice thoroughly in keeping with the least creditable aspects of old-fashioned colonialist Orientalism.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;In one particularly telling instance, Lewis&#039;s habits of tendentious generalization do seem to have gotten him in legal trouble. According to &#039;&#039;Liberation&#039;&#039; (March 1, 1994) and the &#039;&#039;Guardian&#039;&#039; (March 8, 1994), Lewis now faces both criminal and civil suits brought against him in France by Armenian and human rights organizations. He is being charged under the same statute that makes it a crime in France to deny that the Nazi Holocaust took place; the charge against him is denying (in French newspapers) that a genocide of Armenians took place under the Ottoman empire.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Lewis&#039;s work therefore is part of the present political, rather than purely intellectual, environment.&lt;br /&gt;
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To imply, as he does, that the branch of Orientalism dealing with Islam and the Arabs is a learned discipline that can therefore be compared with classical philology is as appropriate as comparing one of the many Israeli Arabists and Orientalists who have worked for the occupation authorities of the West Bank and Gaza with scholars like Wilamowitz or Mommsen. On the one hand Lewis wishes to reduce Islamic Orientalism to the status of an innocent and enthusiastic department of scholarship; on the other he wishes to pretend that Orientalism is too complex, various, and technical to exist in a form for any non-Orientalist (like myself and many others) to criticize. Lewis&#039;s tactic here is to suppress a significant amount of history. As I suggest, European interest in Islam derived not from curiosity but from fear of a monotheistic, culturally and militarily formidable competitor to Christianity. The earliest European scholars of Islam, as numerous historians have shown, were medieval polemicists writing to ward off the threat of Muslim hordes and apostasy. In one way or another that combination of fear and hostility has persisted to the present day, both in scholarly and non-scholarly attention to an Islam which is viewed as belonging to a part of the world--the Orient--counterposed imaginatively, geographically, and historically &#039;&#039;against&#039;&#039; Europe and the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most interesting problems about Islamic or Arabic Orientalism are, first, the forms taken by the medieval vestiges that persist so tenaciously, and, second, the history and sociology of connections between Orientalism and the societies that produced it. There are strong &#039;&#039;affiliations&#039;&#039; between Orientalism and the literary imagination, for example, as well as the imperial consciousness. What is striking about many periods of European history is the traffic between what scholars and specialists wrote and what poets, novelists, politicians, and journalists then said about Islam. In addition--and this is the crucial point that Lewis refuses to deal with--there is a remarkable (but nonetheless intelligible) parallel between the rise of modern Orientalist scholarship and the acquisition of vast Eastern empires by Britain and France.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although the connection between a routine British classical education and the extension of the British empire is more complex than Lewis might suppose, no more glaring parallel exists between power and knowledge in the modern history of philology than in the case of Orientalism. Much of the information and knowledge about Islam and the Orient that was used by the colonial powers to justify their colonialism derived from Orientalist scholarship: a recent study by many contributors, &#039;&#039;Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; edited by Carl A. Breckenridge and Peter Van der Veer, demonstrates with copious documentation how Orientalist knowledge was used in the colonial administration of South Asia. A fairly consistent interchange still continues between area scholars, such as Orientalists, and government departments of foreign affairs. In addition, many of the stereotypes of Islamic and Arabic sensuality, sloth, fatalism, cruelty, degradation, and splendor to be found in writers from John Buchan to V.S. Naipaul have also been presuppositions underlying the adjoining field of academic Orientalism. In contrast, the trade in cliches between Indology and Sinology, on the one hand, and general culture, on the other, is not quite as flourishing, although there are relationships and borrowings to be noted. Nor is there much similarity between what obtains among Western experts in Sinology and Indology and the fact that many professional scholars of Islam in Europe and the United States spend their lives studying the subject, yet still find it an impossible religion and culture to like, much less admire.&lt;br /&gt;
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To say, as Lewis and his imitators do, that all such observations are only a matter of espousing &amp;quot;fashionable causes&amp;quot; is not quite to address the question of why, for example, so many Islamic specialists were and still are routinely consulted by, and actively work for, governments whose designs in the Islamic world are economic exploitation, domination, or outright aggression, or why so many scholars of Islam--like Lewis himself--voluntarily feel that it is part of their duty to mount attacks on modern Arab or Islamic peoples with the pretense that &amp;quot;classical&amp;quot; Islamic culture can nevertheless be the object of disinterested scholarly concern. The spectacle of specialists in the history of medieval Islamic guilds being sent on State Department missions to brief area embassies on United States security interests in the Persian Gulf does not spontaneously suggest anything resembling the love of Hellas ascribed by Lewis to the supposedly cognate field of classical philology.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is therefore not surprising that the field of Islamic and Arabic Orientalism, always ready to deny its complicity with state power, had never until very recently produced an internal critique of the affiliations I have just been describing, and that Lewis can utter the amazing statement that a criticism of Orientalism would be &amp;quot;meaningless.&amp;quot; It is also not surprising that, with a few exceptions, most of the negative criticism my work has elicited from &amp;quot;specialists&amp;quot; has been, like Lewis&#039;s, no more than banal description of a barony violated by a crude trespasser. The only specialists (again with a few exceptions) who attempted to deal with what I discuss--which is not only the content of Orientalism, but its relationships, affiliations, political tendencies, and worldview--were Sinologists, Indologists, and the younger generation of Middle East scholars, susceptible to newer influences and also to the political arguments that the critique of Orientalism entailed. One example is Benjamin Schwartz of Harvard, who used the occasion of his 1982 presidential address to the Asian Studies Association not only to disagree with some of my criticism, but also to welcome my arguments intellectually.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many of the senior Arabists and Islamicists have responded with the aggrieved outrage that is for them a substitute for self-reflection; most use words such as &amp;quot;malign,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;dishonor,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;libel,&amp;quot; as if criticism itself were an impermissible violation of their sacrosanct academic preserve. In Lewis&#039;s case the defense offered is an act of conspicuous bad faith, since more than most Orientalists he has been a passionate political partisan against Arab (and other) causes in such places as the U.S. Congress, &#039;&#039;Commentary&#039;&#039;, and elsewhere. The proper response to him must therefore include an account of what politically and sociologically he is all about when he pretends to be defending the &amp;quot;honor&amp;quot; of his field, a defense which, it will be evident enough, is an elaborate confection of ideological half-truths designed to mislead non-specialist readers.&lt;br /&gt;
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In short, the relationship between Islamic or Arab Orientalism and modern European culture can be studied without at the same time cataloguing every Orientalist who ever lived, every Orientalist tradition, or everything written by Orientalists, then lumping them together as rotten and worthless imperialism. I never did that anyway. It is beknighted to say that Orientalism is a conspiracy or to suggest that &amp;quot;the West&amp;quot; is evil: both are among the egregious fatuities that Lewis and one of his epigones, the Iraqi publicist K. Makiya, have had the temerity to ascribe to me. On the other hand it is hypocritical to suppress the cultural, political, ideological, and institutional contexts in which people write, think, and talk about the Orient, whether they are scholars or not. And as I said earlier, it is extremely important to understand that the reason Orientalism is opposed by so many thoughtful non-Westerners is that its modern discourse is correctly perceived as a discourse of power originating in an era of colonialism, the subject of an excellent recent symposium &#039;&#039;Colonialism and Culture&#039;&#039;, edited by Nicholas B. Dirks.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In this kind of discourse, based mainly upon the assumption that Islam is monolithic and unchanging and therefore marketable by &amp;quot;experts&amp;quot; for powerful domestic political interests, neither Muslims nor Arabs nor any of the other dehumanized lesser peoples recognize themselves as human beings or their observers as simple scholars. Most of all they see in the discourse of modern Orientalism and its counterparts in similar knowledges constructed for Native Americans and Africans a chronic tendency to deny, suppress, or distort the cultural context of such systems of thought in order to maintain the fiction of its scholarly disinterest.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;II&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Yet I would not want to suggest that, current though such views as Lewis&#039;s may be, they are the only ones that have either emerged or been reinforced during the past decade and a half. Yes, it is true that ever since the demise of the Soviet Union there has been a rush by some scholars and journalists in the United States to find in an Orientalized Islam a new empire of evil. Consequently, both the electronic and print media have been awash with demeaning stereotypes that lump together Islam and terrorism, or Arabs and violence, or the Orient and tyranny. And there has also been a return in various parts of the Middle and Far East to nativist religion and primitive nationalism, one particularly disgraceful aspect of which is the continuing Iranian &#039;&#039;fatwa&#039;&#039; against Salman Rushdie. But this isn&#039;t the whole picture, and what I want to do in the remaining part of this essay is to talk about new trends in scholarship, criticism, and interpretation that, although they accept the basic premises of my book, go well beyond it in ways, I think, that enrich our sense of the complexity of historical experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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None of those trends has emerged out of the blue, of course; nor have they gained the status of fully established knowledges and practices. The worldly context remains both perplexingly stirred-up and ideologically fraught, volatile, tense, changeable, and even murderous. Even though the Soviet Union has been dismembered and the Eastern European countries have attained political independence, patterns of power and dominance remain unsettlingly in evidence. The global south--once referred to romantically and even emotionally as the Third World--is enmeshed in a debt trap, broken into dozens of fractured or incoherent entities, beset with problems of poverty, disease, and underdevelopment that have increased in the past ten or fifteen years. Gone are the non-Aligned movement and the charismatic leaders who undertook decolonization and independence. An alarming pattern of ethnic conflict and local wars, not confined to the global south, as the tragic case of the Bosnians attests, has sprung up all over again. And in places like Central America, the Middle East, and Asia, the United States still remains the dominant power, with an anxious and still un-unified Europe straggling behind.&lt;br /&gt;
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Explanations for the current world scene and attempts to comprehend it culturally and politically have emerged in some strikingly dramatic ways. I have already mentioned fundamentalism. The secular equivalents are a return to nationalism and theories that stress the radical distinction--a falsely all-inclusive one, I believe--between different cultures and civilizations. Recently, for example, Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard University advanced the far from convincing proposition that Cold War bipolarism has been superseded by what he called the clash of civilizations, a thesis based on the premise that Western, Confucian, and Islamic civilizations, among several others, were rather like watertight compartments whose adherents were at bottom mainly interested in fending off all the others.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;The Clash of Civilizations,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Foreign Affairs&#039;&#039; 71, 3 (Summer 1993), 22-49.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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This is preposterous, since one of the great advances in modern cultural theory is the realization, almost universally acknowledged, that cultures are hybrid and heterogenous and, as I argued in &#039;&#039;Culture and Imperialism&#039;&#039;, that cultures and civilizations are so interrelated and interdependent as to beggar any unitary or simply delineated description of their individuality. How can one today speak of &amp;quot;Western civilization&amp;quot; except as in large measure an ideological fiction, implying a sort of detached superiority for a handful of values and ideas, none of which has much meaning outside the history of conquest, immigration, travel, and the mingling of peoples that gave the Western nations their present mixed identities? This is especially true of the United States, which today cannot seriously be described except as an enormous palimpsest of different races and cultures sharing a problematic history of conquests, exterminations, and of course major cultural and political achievements. And this was one of the implied messages of &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039;, that any attempt to force cultures and peoples into separate and distinct breeds or essences exposes not only the misrepresentations and falsifications that ensue, but also the way in which understanding is complicit with the power to produce such things as the &amp;quot;Orient&amp;quot; or the &amp;quot;West.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Not that Huntington, and behind him all the theorists and apologists of an exultant Western tradition, like Francis Fukuyama, haven&#039;t retained a good deal of their hold on the public consciousness. They have, as is evident in the symptomatic case of Paul Johnson, once a Left intellectual, now a retrograde social and political polemicist. In the April 18, 1993, issue of &#039;&#039;The New York Times Magazine&#039;&#039;, by no means a marginal publication, Johnson published an essay entitled &amp;quot;Colonialism&#039;s Back--And Not a Moment Too Soon,&amp;quot; whose main idea was that &amp;quot;the civilized nations&amp;quot; ought to take it upon themselves to re-colonize Third World countries &amp;quot;where the most basic conditions of civilized life had broken down,&amp;quot; and to do this by means of a system of imposed trusteeships. His model is explicitly a nineteenth century colonial one where, he says, in order for the Europeans to trade profitably they had to impose political order.&lt;br /&gt;
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Johnson&#039;s argument has numerous subterranean echoes in the works of U.S. policy-makers, the media, and of course U.S. foreign policy itself, which remains interventionist in the Middle East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and frankly missionary everywhere else, especially with regard to its policies toward Russia and; the former Soviet republics. The important point, however, is that a largely unexamined but serious rift has opened in the public consciousness between the old ideas of Western hegemony (of which the system of Orientalism was a part) on the one hand, and newer ideas that have taken hold among subaltern and disadvantaged communities and among a wide sector of intellectuals, academics, and artists, on the other. It is now very strikingly no longer the case that the lesser peoples--formerly colonized, enslaved, suppressed--are silent or unaccounted for except by senior European or American males. There has been a revolution in the consciousness of women, minorities, and marginals so powerful as to affect mainstream thinking worldwide. Although I had some sense of it when I was working on &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; in the 1970s, it is now so dramatically apparent as to demand the attention of everyone seriously concerned with the scholarly and theoretical study of culture.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two broad currents can be distinguished: post-colonialism and post-modernism, both in their use of the word &amp;quot;post&amp;quot; suggesting not so much the sense of going beyond but rather, as Ella Shohat puts it in a seminal article on the post-colonial, suggesting &amp;quot;continuities and discontinuities, but its emphasis is on the new modes and forms of the old colonialist practices, not on a &#039;beyond&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&amp;quot;Notes on the &#039;Post-Colonial&#039;,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Social Text&#039;&#039;, 31/32 (1992), 106.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Both post-colonialism and post-modernism emerged as related topics of engagement and investigation during the 1980s and, in many instances, seemed to take account of such works as &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; as antecedents. It would be impossible here to get into the immense terminological debates that surround both words, some of them dwelling at length on whether the phrases should or should not be hyphenated. The point here is therefore not to talk about isolated instances of excess or risible jargon, but to locate those currents and efforts which, from the perspective of a book published in 1978, seem to some extent now to involve it in 1994.&lt;br /&gt;
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Much of the most compelling work on the new political and economic order has concerned what, in a recent article, Harry Magdoff has described as &amp;quot;globalization,&amp;quot; a system by which a small financial elite expanded its power over the whole globe, inflating commodity and service prices, redistributing wealth from lower income sectors (usually in the non-Western world) to the higher-income ones.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Magdoff, &amp;quot;Globalisation-To What End?,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Socialist Register 1992: New World Order?&#039;&#039;, ed. Ralph Milliband and Leo Panitch (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992), 1-32.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Along with this, as discussed in astringent terms by Masao Miyoshi and Arif Dirlik, there has emerged a new transnational order in which states no longer have borders, labor and income are subject only to global managers, and colonialism has reappeared in the subservience of the South to the North.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Miyoshi, &amp;quot;A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Trans-nationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Critical Inquiry&#039;&#039;, 19, 4 (Summer 1993), 726-51; Dirlik, &amp;quot;The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,&amp;quot; &#039;&#039;Critical Inquiry&#039;&#039;, 20, 2 (Winter 1994), 328-56.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Both Miyoshi and Dirlik go on to show how the interest of Western academics in subjects such as multiculturalism and &amp;quot;post-coloniality&amp;quot; can in fact be a cultural and intellectual retreat from the new realities of global power: &amp;quot;What we need,&amp;quot; Miyoshi says, &amp;quot;is a rigorous political and economic scrutiny rather than a gesture of pedagogic expediency,&amp;quot; exemplified by the &amp;quot;liberal self-deception&amp;quot; contained in such new fields as cultural studies and multiculturalism (751).&lt;br /&gt;
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But even if we take such injunctions seriously (as we must), there is a solid basis in historical experience for the appearance today of interest in both post-modernism and its quite different counterpart post-colonialism. There is first of all the much greater Eurocentric bias in the former, and a preponderance of theoretical and aesthetic emphasis stressing the local and the contingent, as well as the almost decorative weightlessness of history, pastiche, and above all consumerism. The earliest studies of the post-colonial were by such distinguished thinkers as Anwar Abdel Malek, Samir Amin, and C. L. R. James, almost all based on studies of domination and control done from the standpoint of either a completed political independence or an incomplete liberationist project. Yet whereas post-modernism in one of its most famous programmatic statements (Jean-Francois Lyotard&#039;s) stresses the disappearance of the grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment, the emphasis behind much of the work done by the first generation of post-colonial artists and scholars is exactly the opposite: the grand narratives remain, even though their implementation and realization are at present in abeyance, deferred, or circumvented. This crucial difference between the urgent historical and political imperatives of post-colonialism and post-modernism&#039;s relative detachment makes for altogether different approaches and results, although some overlap between them (in the technique of &amp;quot;magical realism,&amp;quot; for example) does exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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I think it would be wrong to suggest that in much of the best post-colonial work that has proliferated so dramatically since the early 1980s there hasn&#039;t been a great emphasis on the local, regional, and contingent: there has, but it seems to me to be most interestingly connected in its general approach to a universal set of concerns, all of them having to do with emancipation, revisionist attitudes toward history and culture, and a widespread use of recurring theoretical models and styles. A leading motif has been the consistent critique of Eurocentrism and patriarchy. Across U.S. and European campuses in the 1980s students and faculty alike worked assiduously to expand the academic focus of so-called core curricula to include writing by women, non-European artists and thinkers, and subalterns. This was accompanied by important changes in the approach to area studies, long in the hands of classical Orientalists and their equivalents. Anthropology, political science, literature, sociology, and above all history felt the effects of a wide-ranging critique of sources, the introduction of theory, and the dislodgement of the Eurocentric perspective. Perhaps the most brilliant revisionist work was done not in Middle East Studies, but in the field of Indology with the advent of Subaltern Studies, a group of remarkable scholars and researchers led by Ranajit Guha. Their aim was nothing less than a revolution in historiography, their immediate goal being to rescue the writing of Indian history from the domination of the nationalist elite and restore to it the important role of the urban poor and the rural masses. I think it would be wrong to say of such mostly academic work only that it was easily co-optable and complicit with &amp;quot;transnational&amp;quot; neo-colonialism. We need to record and acknowledge the achievement while warning of the later pitfalls.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What has been of special interest for me has been the extension of post-colonial concerns to the problems of geography. After all, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; is a study based on the re-thinking of what had for centuries been believed to be an unbridgeable chasm separating East from West. My aim, as I said earlier, was not so much to dissipate difference itself--for who can deny the constitutive role of national as well as cultural differences in the relations between human beings--but to challenge the notion that difference implies hostility, a frozen reified set of opposed essences, and a whole adversarial knowledge built out of those things. What I called for in &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; was a new way of conceiving the separations and conflicts that had stimulated generations of hostility, war, and imperial control. And indeed, one of the most interesting developments in post-colonial studies was a re-reading of the canonical cultural works, not to demote or somehow dish dirt on them, but to re-investigate some of their assumptions, going beyond the stifling hold on them of some version of the master-slave binary dialectic. This has certainly been the comparable effect of astoundingly resourceful novels such as Rusdie&#039;s &#039;&#039;Midnight&#039;s Children&#039;&#039;, the narratives of C. L. R. James, the poetry of Aime Cesaire and of Derek Walcott, works whose daring new formal achievements are in effect a re-appropriation of the historical experience of colonialism, revitalized and transformed into a new aesthetic of sharing and often transcendent re-formulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One sees it also in the work of the group of distinguished Irish writers who in 1980 established themselves as a collective called Field Day. The preface to a collection of their works says about them:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[These writers] believed that Field Day could and should contribute to the solution of the present crisis by producing analyses of the established opinion, myths and stereotypes which had become both a symptom and cause of the current situation [between Ireland and the North]. The collapse of constitutional and political arrangements and the recrudescence of the violence which they had been designed to repress or contain made this a more urgent requirement in the North than in the Republic.... The company, therefore, decided to embark upon a succession of publications, starting with a series of pamphlets [in addition to an impressive series of poems by Seamus Heaney, essays by Seamus Deane, plays by Brian Friel and Tom Paulin] in which the nature of the Irish problem could be explored and, as a result, more successfully confronted than it had been hitherto.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Ireland&#039;s Field Day&#039;&#039; (London: Hutchinson, 1985), pp. vii-viii.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of rethinking and re-formulating historical experiences which had once been based on the geographical separation of peoples and cultures is at the heart of a whole spate of scholarly and critical works. It is to be found, to mention only three, in Ammiel Alcalay&#039;s &#039;&#039;After Arabs and Jews: Remaking Levantine Culture&#039;&#039;, Paul Gilroy&#039;s &#039;&#039;The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness&#039;&#039;, and Moira Ferguson&#039;s &#039;&#039;Subject to Others: British Women Writers and Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;1670-1834&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Alcalay (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Gilroy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Ferguson (London: Routledge, 1992).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In these works, domains once believed to have been exclusive to one people, gender, race, or class are re-examined and shown to have involved others. For long represented as a battleground between Arabs and Jews, the Levant emerges in Alcalay&#039;s book as a Mediterranean culture common to both peoples; according to Gilroy a similar process alters, indeed doubles, our perception of the Atlantic Ocean, hitherto thought of as principally a European passage. And in re-examining the adversarial relationship between English slave-owners and African slaves, Ferguson allows a more complex pattern dividing white female from white male to stand out, with new demotions and dislocations appearing as a result in Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I could go on giving more and more examples. I shall conclude briefly by saying that although the animosities and inequities still exist from which my interest in Orientalism as a cultural and political phenomenon began, there is now at least a general acceptance that these represent not an eternal order but a historical experience whose end, or at least partial abatement, may be at hand. Looking back at it from the distance afforded by fifteen eventful years and the availability of a massive new interpretive and scholarly enterprise to reduce the effects of imperialist shackles on thought and human relations, &#039;&#039;Orientalism&#039;&#039; at least had the merit of enlisting itself openly in the struggle, which continues of course in &amp;quot;West&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;East&amp;quot; together.&lt;br /&gt;
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E. W. S.&lt;br /&gt;
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New York&lt;br /&gt;
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March 1994&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Library works by Edward Said]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about decolonisation]]&lt;br /&gt;
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		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:This_Soviet_World&amp;diff=63110</id>
		<title>Library:This Soviet World</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:This_Soviet_World&amp;diff=63110"/>
		<updated>2024-02-20T23:44:40Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Add : to chapter headings missing it. Add br in ref 9&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Message box|text=This library work is incomplete. It is still being imported by [[Comrade:ComradeEd|ComradeEd]], who has asked that others do not work on it.|image=Warning icon.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Library work|title=This Soviet World|author=Anna Louise Strong|written in=1936|publisher=Henry Holt and Company, Inc.|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/this-soviet-world/}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== ON INTERPRETING A WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A leading Russian Communist said to me a year ago “The mind of our people is changing so fast under the conditions of socialism that it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to speak to the rest of the world. We find it harder to understand them, and they us.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We who go back and forth between the Soviet world and the world of capitalism—not only in space from New York to Moscow but also in spirit from intimate life with Soviet people to intimate life in America—feel keenly this difficulty. Important words like freedom, democracy, dictatorship have different meanings on different sides of the border. The Soviet world is sharply conscious of planning its future; the capitalist world is always arriving where it hadn’t intended. And Soviet officials are not always helpful in making their acts intelligible; they often assume that only deliberate malice can doubt them and that the only needed explanation is the appropriate citation from Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To explain the swiftly growing Soviet world to that other world out of which it was born is a task that becomes steadily more complex. For if its outer achievements are every year more able to speak for themselves, its inner life more and diverges from that of capitalism in a hundred subtle ways.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Berlin station a giant sign greets me with three-foot letters: “Think of your hair!” My mind flashes back to the world I have left. What are Soviet people thinking of? The Stakhanov drive, the Moscow city plan, Marie and her sugar beets, the conquest of the north. And hair and perfume, O yes, of course. Everyone knows of the rising standard of living and firmly believes in a cultural life—more bath-tubs, radios, books and dramatic clubs and doubtless more hair. But their individuality is expressed not by possessions and polish but by the various ways in which men create. Dynamic is the word; their civilization is dynamic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The regimentation of life by property is my next shock in the capitalist world. The obscene phrases “damages for alienation of affections” or “a $50,000 man” or the remark: “I do it only for the money that is in it”—what degradation they imply of human life and work! I see able engineers spending creative power on little models in a government relief job just to keep alive. I see a journal of high standard, the life-work of an able editor submerged by a new owner’s wish for quick profit. Lives are conditioned in the Soviet world also, by trends and sages of organization, but not by the profits of a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The difference appears in the use of pronouns. People under capitalism are contrasting “I” and “they.” “Too bad it couldn’t have been on my land,” a man remarks of a California oil-strike. Soviet folk would be hailing “our new oil-wells”; to them the idea of a private oil-well is already as quaint as a private postal system. I note a remark about American unemployment: “If it gets any worse, they’ll have to do something.” Who is this ultimate, uncontrollable “they”? The term betrays the class society of which the speakers are unconscious; they are waiting for some boss to act. To hear a debate: “Is America going fascist?” and think how much less passively Soviet folk would word it. “Shall we go fascist? No. Then exactly how shall we prevent it?” Soviet folk say “we” of one-sixth of the earth’s surface. Uzbek cotton-pickers, toiling under the sun of Central Asia, say: “We are conquering the Arctic; we rescued the Chelyuskinites.” Ukrainian farmers who never went up in an airplane talk of “our stratosphere records” and “the loss of our Maxim Gorky airplane” as they take up collections to build ten new ones. But even Mrs. Roosevelt asks me: “Are Russian peasants getting more reconciled to accepting direction?” I feel the hopelessness of language as I answer: “No, they are learning better to organize and direct themselves.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Americans often ask me whether Russians are not naturally more altruistic than Americans, more fit for communism, they imply. No, it is something quite different. Russians at the time of Revolution were more medieval than Americans, which means “naturally” more petty, unreliable, inefficient, given to bargaining and cheating. Traits of the Asiatic market-place were widespread and occasionally still annoy the visitor. But these traits are disappearing under the fact of joint ownership, which brings identity of individual with community good.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Joint possession of the country’s resources and productive mechanism is the economic reality which unifies Soviet life and makes it dynamic. It is this that washes out the antagonism between personal and public good, that makes men say “we.” It is this that makes men conscious planners of the future; for owners plan but non-owners can only fight or drift. The chief quality of Soviet civilization is the sense that the world is “ours,” to seize, understand and make over.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This Soviet world is my theme; I give scant space to those fast disintegrating forces that fought it. I tell not the “whole truth,” for truth is never “whole”; there are always at least two truths in conflict: the truth that is dying and the truth that is coming into existence. American Tories who intrigued for King George had their truth also, but it remains only as piquant sauce to romance; the truth of the Continental armies remained to build the modern republic. They themselves recalled the frozen feet of Valley Forge less as suffering than as heroism; their raids on hungry farms passed into memory not as banditry but as necessity and daring. History’s greatest gift to victors is that not only they, but their truth survives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet I do no injustice to those many lives which in greater or less degree were wrenched or broken by the coming of the new Soviet order. Even for them the new years obliterate the past. They also change to seek their new future in the new system; Lives broken in terms of property are being remade in terms of work. Saboteurs reform and win posts of honor; kulaks come back from exile to factories and farms; children have an equal start now regardless of fathers. For this war differs from other battles in that all men, even the conquered foes, are absorbed into the ranks of the conquerors—joint heirs to all the fruits of victory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A. L. S.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== PART I: MEN MAKE THE SOVIET WORLD ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER I: THE PLAN FOR REMAKING THE WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“The philosophers have only interpreted the world; our business is to change it.”|Karl Marx|Theses on Feuerbach}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whenever I ask myself what brings increasing visitors to Moscow, what they want here and what they find, and why the eyes of the world turn more and more to the Soviet Union with a questing hope that hardly yet dares call itself belief, there flashes into my mind the remark made to me in 1930 at Dnieprostroy by the young and disillusioned son of a Wall Street millionaire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dnieprostroy in those days was the first of the famous giants of the new Soviet Russia, “the largest power dam in the world.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Since then surpassed by the Boulder Dam.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hour after hour we climbed the cliffs and ravines of its mighty construction. We fled from screaming sirens that warned of blasting rock. We saw great stone-crushing plants, saw-mills, locomotive repair shops, temporary power station—all sizable works harnessed to the task of making a greater power station which should in turn serve plants a hundred times their scope. We visited the “socialist city” where discussion raged between advocates of individual cottages or big apartment houses for the future town. We saw hurriedly constructed club houses where thousands of workers busily grabbed knowledge—reading, writing, political economy and the technique of their new job.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Night fell. We stood on the shore of the yet unharnessed river, destined to rise to bury those high banks beneath a man-impounded lake. We far down at the great sweep of electric brilliance that had already shattered the age-old darkness of the Ukrainian steppe. It was then that my companion said: “I think that Dnieprostroy has answered the question that brought me to Russia.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“What question?” I asked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Whether the world is to be changed by trying one at a time to improve human beings or by changing the social environment that makes human beings.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the pause that followed the sounds of construction came to us incessantly, rising from the bowels of earth and filling the horizon. The short, sharp puffs of engines, the roar of cliffs torn asunder, the ceaseless beat of mills grinding stone into concrete, the rasp of drills eating down into river granite. Sharpened by night and softened by distance, they blended into a mighty symphony—music of man, the builder, subduing, the earth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dark beyond the circling lights lay Hortitz Island, in ancient days the last stand of free-booting bandit chieftains against oppressors. We remembered the husky peasant girl from the island whom we had seen in overalls that morning, gang-boss over twelve men who excavated rock by explosions of liquid air. Dnieprostroy had changed her in a few months from a farm servant to a “brigadier.” We remembered the blacksmith whom we had asked in the glare of foundry fires how he liked his work and who burst forth with fiery will: “You know, we’re going to finish her in 1932”—a simple workman pushing ahead by one year the estimate of Hugh L. Cooper’s world-experienced engineers.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The workman’s estimate won out. The dam was finished in 1932 a year ahead of schedule.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We recalled how competitions between workers of right and left bank drove the dam ahead, doubling the concrete-laying estimates of the Americans by force of newly awakened will. Signals night by night across the raging torrent told in red and green lights the day’s total, celebrated over-fulfillment of plan by a great red star. Night by night, week by week each bank fought to keep its red star shining. We remembered motion pictures, dramas, concerts, lectures which brought the city’s culture to these thousands who had come from the scattered farms of the Ukraine. The fine new polytechnic institute where workers chosen from the river-gangs were being turned in forty classrooms into engineers. We saw on the high bank the homes of the American consultants, who understood better than the Russians the technique of the great job but were eternally puzzled by its spirit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yes, Dnieprostroy gave the answer to my companion’s question. Dnieprostroy was a new form of production under a new social system. It was remaking individuals by wholesale.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Increasingly in the past five years Americans have come to the Soviet Union, scientists, engineers, artists, economists all bent on their own pursuits, dogmatic or bewildered tourists, seeking proof of an old belief or material for a new one. Especially since the crash of 1929 smashed the world which was “inevitably getting better,” they have come, fleeing from the ruins of that earthquake to learn what, if anything, the Soviet Union offers. By no means all of them put their question as clearly as did my young companion; by no means all interpret so swiftly the essence of the first construction job they see. But the question he asked is basically what brings most of them, an ancient quest of man which has troubled philosophers no less than baffled tourists: “Can our world be remade? And how to remake it?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problem is especially pressing upon the American middle class of today, which has seen its old world taken from it in ways that it hardly understands. The independent small property owners, mostly farmers, who formed a hundred years ago 80 per cent of the American people except in the slave South, bequeathed to their descendants ideals of democracy and freedom, the “liberty and equality of men owning their own means of livelihood.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Lewis Corey: “Crisis of the Middle Class” &#039;&#039;The Nation&#039;&#039;, Aug. 14, 1935.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But large scale industry, developing through a century, wiped out the small enterprisers, increased the number of salaried employees and made the farmer dependent on banks and markets, thus changing America to a “nation of hired workers.” Only 12 per cent of the people live by ownership of their own property, in place of 80 per cent a century ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The myth of property remained long after the reality had vanished. Millions of these salaried people still felt hat they owned something—no longer a store, a small workshop, an unencumbered farm, but savings in stocks, bonds, insurance—which lifted them somewhat above the ranks of laboring hands. Crashingly the world economic crisis destroyed this illusion. As if to emphasize how little control these small people had over their own property, the value of their liquid wealth shrank from twenty-seven billion dollars in 1929 to four billion in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Figures from Robers R. Doane on liquid wealth of persons with incomes under $5,000. Quoted by Corey.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of the middle class were thrown into the same abyss of ruin with millions of wage-workers; they wait together on bread-lines, study together the government relief programs, hunt together for a boss. For all of them alike, as long as the capitalist world remains, most put their trust in bosses, someone who owns and will give them access to the means of production and of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Their situation is the more distressing because for most of our Western world the past hundred years has been what John Strachey aptly calls the “century of the great hope.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;John Strachey, &#039;&#039;The Menace of Fascism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of men became better fed, better housed, better clothed through the industrial revolution which took production out of the home workshop into the factory and knit together the ends of earth by railroad, steamship, telegraph. Especially America—where the arrival of the new machines and technical methods coincided with a continent-wide expansion into lands of vast wealth, developed by energetic oilers from all nations for the first time unhampered by any remnants of feudalism the belief in inevitable progress and increasing prosperity was both a conscious and unconscious national faith. The little red schoolhouse bade every boy aspire to be president. “Go west, young man.” . . . “Don’t be a bear on America,” said successful plutocrats. But far deeper than these conscious preachings spread the atmosphere of determined optimism which made every man who was not a good booster seem subtly immoral to his friends. Did not the great lands of America, the efficient industries of America, the productive energy of America, offer the basis for a good standard of life for everyone—an “American standard”? It was easy to prove that they did—and do!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What happened to that faith in inevitable progress? If it still survives in some circles as a despairing habit, elsewhere it has been replaced by belief in inevitable doom. “Inevitable drift to fascism,” “inevitable twilight of the West,” “the old standard of prosperity can never return,” are phrases common on lips that not long since hailed inevitable advance. Others begin a frenzied search into the faiths of past ages, to know if elsewhere than with us abides the truth. These learn that belief in the inevitability of progress has never been a universal faith. It has been confined to definite periods of economic advancement, and to certain nations within those periods or certain classes within nations. Did not whole centuries of the Middle Ages view the world as an essentially unchanging garden of human souls from which religion culled a few for heaven, leaving the rest for hell? Even today do not hundreds of millions of people—those great suppressed races of the East—find life’s processes so fundamentally evil that their essential faith is Buddhism in which Nothingness is bliss?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even in our West, as capitalism decays into fascism, there arise new denials of the inevitability of progress. Ideals of the past—the Roman Empire, the Germanic gods, the feudal Britain featured by fascist-striving novels—gild with emotional glamor the tenets of fascism: that science and machine production are evil, that democracy, peace and the conquest of poverty are futile dreams of a decadent society, that murderous war is man’s noblest end. For fascism is the last stand of a desperate capitalism which can no longer use the fruits of science and machine production, which dare no longer permit either peace or democracy, since it must brutally refuse to its victims that abolition of poverty which is already technically possible in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Can human reason find a way to reorganize human society—a way which human wills can follow? Must we go backing blindly into the future, cheered now by faith in inevitable progress, damned now by faith in inevitable doom, and claiming from some supernatural world a just and rational balancing of the unjust, irrational chaos found in this? Or can that continuous, collective application of human thought known as science, which we have learned to take as our best, though still unperfected guide in rationalizing and controlling subhuman phenomena, be expanded to rationalize and control our human destiny? Can man master the machines he has made which today threaten increasingly to enslave him? Can he subdue to his will those tremendously productive forces which his science and technical knowledge have released, and which seem adequate to abolish poverty, yet which at present give increasing unemployment, economic crises, wars?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are asking, in other words, can men master destiny? Are all those gleams of human reason which have given us increasing dominion over material phenomena but will-o’-the-wisps, luring to a swamp which will engulf us the more blackly for the false, brief light they gave? Or are they gleams of dawn that may brighten into an ever-increasing daylight, in which not only a few isolated phenomena but the whole of man’s own nature and his organized society can be planned by human reason and carried through by human wills?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No less than this is the search that brings men over the seas to the Soviet Union. For if to millions in our Western world the century now passing was the century of the great hope, there are other millions in two great half-continents uniting Europe and Asia, who look upon it rather as the century of the great plan. The reference is not to that Five-Year Plan which the Soviet Union made famous, but to a plan far more comprehensive which prepares and includes all five-year plans in all lands and all the future. A plan for remaking the world drawn up eighty-eight years ago on instructions from a London congress of working-men of many nations, and issued in 1848 under the title &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the work of the German economists Frederick Engels and Karl Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; is usually thought of as the defiance flung at the world by an illegal revolutionary party of hunted people. So it was. But it was also man’s first attempt to apply science to the analysis of human society in order to draw up a plan for remaking the world. Previous attempts to analyze the world were exercises of philosophers, not directed towards change. Previous attempts to change the world were confined to threats or exhortations to secure specific conversions or reforms. Many Utopian pictures had existed of how beautiful society might be when once made over. But the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; tried to answer the question: How can the thing be done? Born in the middle years of that century in which the scientific method was consciously remaking the material world, it sought to analyze the elements of human society, the nature and cause of the changes we see in history, for the purpose of producing social change in a desired direction. That is why it claims to be Scientific Socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The followers of Marx see in him the genius who combined the three chief currents of thought of the nineteenth century—classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and French revolutionary doctrines. The philosophic basis of Marxism is “dialectics,” which views every reality, whether of nature, the mind, or society, as in process of continual change through the development and clash of “inner contradictions.” This theory applied to the study of history shows how economic, political and social systems are constantly changing, at times slowly, at times by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions. American capitalism of the Civil War period is not the capitalism of today. The democracy of the New England town-meeting is not the democracy of the modern imperial nation. They may be called by the same but names deceive; the thing changes even while you look at it to disdain or admire. Even your disdain and admiration changes, the meaning of your words and concepts. What was true, right, desirable yesterday may not be true, right, desirable tomorrow. Systems have their day and cease to be.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is there any law in this change? Is there in this constant interaction and conflict of systems and ideas anything basic, changing which will change the rest? “The economic structure,” says Marx, is “the real foundation. . . . The mode of production . . . determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Preface to a &#039;&#039;Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Marx the fundamental thing about any human society is not its system of ideas or religions, nor the form of government nor the nature of its family life. These things are important but derivative. They are determined by the ways in which human beings get food, clothing, shelter, by the stage of their advance and the tools they use in these fundamental operations. In a world whose economic structure fails to reward honesty and altruism, a Marxist would not spend his efforts preaching these virtues, but in creating an economic system where honesty really prospered, where each man’s success must be build on the success, rather than the ruin, of others. The new economic system would make new people; under it, education in the new ideals would be swift and hopeful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How then do economic systems change? Marx finds the key in his theory of “class struggle.” Man’s science and invention create new ways of production, and these in turn create new “classes” of human beings, i.e., groups of people who have different and conflicting relations to production. Between these classes a struggle goes on around the ownership of the process of production, which is the means of life. “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 10-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus at different stages of human history new classes arise from new ways of working and the struggle between them produces social change. Modern capitalism has not done away with class antagonisms, but it has this distinctive feature—it has simplified them. “Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into . . . two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat,”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; those who live by owning and those who can live only by selling their labor power, by seeking a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between these two remain for a time the middle classes, distraught survivors of those small property owners and independent craftsmen who once embodied the demand for private property against a feudal past. They suffer deeply under advancing capitalism which dislodges them steadily and painfully into the ranks of hired hands. They struggle against their fate, but their strivings are confused, for their instinctive desire is to go back to small scale property. Their cry is to “share the wealth,” to start over again that old society of small owners which led to the present-day monopolies and which would lead to them again if it could be revived. The right to private property was once revolutionary pledge of freedom, but this also has changed with the passing of history. Private property in farm plots and hand tools freed serfs from feudal masters; private property in steel mills creates a new slavery. Even small ownership today, wherever it survives or comes into being, is at the mercy of large scale finance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who owns the world? That is the basic question conditioning all hopes of social change. What is wrong with the world today, according to Marxists, is private ownership of the great productive processes which are socially operated. The way out is not backward to subsistence farms and handicrafts it is forward to social ownership. Not “share the wealth,” but jointly owned wealth, jointly organized by and for all who work. Only thus can the great machines be subjugated; only thus can science and modern technique produce plenty for all mankind. Only thus can the present vision of men into owners and workers be abolished, a division which is wrecking the world by social strife and international war. It must be superseded by one united class of people—joint worker-owners of the world. From this economic equality, all other forms of equality will grow. First a stage of socialism where men have equal access to labor and receive according to their work. Then when the habits of human beings have been changed by joint ownership, will come the stage of communism in which men freely co-operate in work according to their abilities and receive according to their needs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who will bring about this change of ownership? Clearly not the present private owners: their interests lie the other way. Nor can the disintegrating middle classes achieve it, except insofar as they come to understand that their future lies with the workers. Only one class of people can develop the will to carry through this difficult long epoch of change—the working class which is bound to the mighty mechanism of modern production, mastering it yet enslaved by it. Joint ownership is their only path to freedom; when they understand this, they will accomplish it. They are thus the “really revolutionary class,” in whom social ownership of modern production is a living need and can become a flaming passion carrying humanity forward to a higher stage.&lt;br /&gt;
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The task of every Marxist is to help them understand, to make them “class-conscious,” aware of their power and function as creators of social progress. Millions of Americans resent the very idea of classes, and are indignant at “inflaming class-consciousness” where it does not yet exist. But Marxian classes are not epithets inciting to riot; they are categories in a scientific analysis. Marxists say that unless human society is to go down in a catastrophe of slavery, war and ruin, men must own their tools and the wealth which these create; that tools and wealth have grown too complexly social to be owned individually and must therefore be socially owned; and that only the working class can develop the fighting will to seize the power of ownership and through it remake society. The less the workers are organized, the less conscious they are of their power and function, the more will the coming changes in human society be protracted, painful and blind. The more conscious the workers are of their great task in history, the better they are organized, the more they are able to rally around them the middle classes, the swifter will be the change and the less will be the human suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two generations of economists in many countries developed the Marxian theory. Lenin built on it the Bolshevik Party which in 1917 carried through the Russian Revolution. Stalin is honored today by Bolsheviks not only as statesman and organizer, but as the far-seeing analyst and guider of social change, who continues and develops the scientific method of Marx, Engels, Lenin. One-sixth of the world today is being remade according to the Marxian program—the first consciously devised pattern that men ever applied to society as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER II: THE PARTY OF REVOLUTION ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“To distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident did the first socialist revolution take place in Russia. The World War imposed great strains on many countries and the chain of world imperialism broke at its weakest link.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hillquit called the Russian revolution an “historical accident,” since it occurred in a backward peasant land. Norman Thomas on the contrary holds it occurred just because the Russians were so backward that they would endure a dictatorship such as no other people would stand. &amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;  Stalin says: “The objective conditions for the revolution exist throughout the whole system of imperialist world economy, which is an integral unit.” Answering the theory that the revolution must come first “where the proletariat forms the majority, where culture is more advanced, where there is more democracy,” he says: “No, not necessarily where industry is most developed; it will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the of world imperialism at its weakest link.” From Stalin’s Lectures to Sverdlov Students.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; More than any other land, Russia was tormented by war and ravenous for peace. Tsardom, that hideous hangover from the Middle Ages, had lost all moral authority and was hated by the entire people. For decades revolution had been brewing in Russia.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx noted this as far back as 1877 in his Letter to Zorge. See &#039;&#039;Letters of Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The World War added the last unbearable pressure and the explosion came.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not least among the factors which made the revolution possible and helped determine its form was the existence of the Bolshevik Party.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Today called Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was no spontaneous creation, born at the moment of revolt; for fourteen years it had been consciously welded by painstaking thought and desperate struggle. Its traditions indeed went back much further. The whole last half of the nineteenth century advanced thinkers in Russia, under the oppression of tsardom, had sought eagerly for the effective revolutionary path. Through fifty years of torment, sacrifice, heroism, incredible energy, careful study, they had tested many methods. They had tried to educate and organize the peasantry; they had tried the terrorist assassination of tyrants. They had failed. They had checked their failures by the history of other nations and a section of them had come to Marxism as the correct program for remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Marx furnished the general program, it was Lenin who developed the theory and tactics, proletarian revolution, and built the organization for the seizure of power. Bolshevism, as a trend of political thought and a political party, exists since 1903, when the Social-Democratic Party of Russia split into groups known as Bolsheviks (majority) and Mensheviks (minority), which correspond to Communists and Social-Democrats today in other countries. The older leaders wanted to “widen” the Party, to take in all “supporters” and give them all a voice in determining the Party’s program. Lenin, though recognizing that any social change must rely on wide masses, not only of workers but of many other “allies,” insisted that membership in the Party itself “must be given a narrow definition to distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin’s Account of Second Congress, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, II&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To organize and train the Party of Revolution became thenceforth the central task and the greatest achievement of that world-renowned leader, Lenin, who gave his whole life to the study and practice of the science of political power. Power was to him no mere personal achievement of office; it was the organized lifting of the human race one stage forward in history. He studied how to ride the turbulent upheaval which the conflicts in modern society would inevitably produce, how to prepare and lead men for the seizure of the state and the creation of a new order, how at last to organize them for the conquest of nature and of their own destiny. This was to Lenin the science of power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting with the Marxian thesis that the working class is the group in modern society which can be organized to take power and to build a new order, Lenin created for this class a “vanguard” of leaders. They must be men of intelligence, will, daring; yet they must act in a disciplined manner, reinforcing a common direction. They must make the revolution a life-long profession, steadily studying the economic, political and social forces of the society in which they live. They must apply this knowledge in action. They must take active part not only in elections and political movements, but in strikes, trade union work, demonstrations, distribution of literature and all the other prosaic or dangerous activities through which the working class becomes organized and conscious of its power. They must keep close to the workers, learning from them and assisting them, and win the right to lead by the confidence they inspire.&lt;br /&gt;
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How are such leaders to be found among the great hordes of the dispossessed and discontented? How, if found, are they to be welded into a disciplined, fighting force? Lenin had no illusions; he knew that the mass of exploited men who are squeezed out by the dislocations of capitalism, and who turn in hope or despair towards communism, contains many fools, knaves, fanatics and self-pitying failures as well as men of intelligence and will. He foresaw a long period of difficult struggle, in which men fit to lead would be tested by fire, men capable of learning would be trained by experience, and others would weed themselves out by their follies. Lenin himself gave most of his years to the slow work of building up and training a not very large but thoroughly tested Party, which could give leadership when the hour of revolution came. I have met simple workers to whom Lenin devoted hours of individual teaching, and who remember today the exact phrases he used with them forty years ago. The making of real Communists able to lead the masses is a long and costly process.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nothing could be more absurd than the two contradictory views of Communists promulgated today by their opponents. They are usually pictured as planless inciters to violence and riot, people who have a crazy desire for chaos, in the hope that something vaguely called communism may somehow ensue. A more sophisticated view, to which no less a person than Sinclair Lewis falls victim in &#039;&#039;It Can’t Happen Here&#039;&#039;, portrays them as brainless sheep required to act in blind obedience to the orders of their superiors for the sake of discipline. Neither of these types could possibly lead a successful strike, much less a revolution. A communist who increased risks by recklessness would be early eliminated; a man who only took orders would be useless as a leader. Communists must learn the difficult combination of intelligence with daring; they must learn to act together but they must all know why.&lt;br /&gt;
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“What we build cannot be built by passive people,” said one of the secretaries of the Russian Communist Party to me. “We all had strong convictions; we fought for them and went to jail for them,” said another veteran Bolshevik. “Then in jail we fought with our imprisoned comrades over details of past policies, studying and learning from past errors. Often we found that the mistake of a few words in our theory had cost us a year in prison.” Again and again groups which could not agree split off from the others. Lenin made no effort to detain them; he distinguished sharply between those allies with whom co-operation was possible for a longer or shorter period, and the smaller group which would stick through everything. Thus was built up that Party of men who had placed their lives in each other’s hands so often that they could rely on each other with absolute assurance, not through blind submission but through a habit of mutual consultation and swift acceptance of joint decisions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most famous picture of the ideal Communist is given by Krupskaia, widow of Lenin, in an article entitled: “What a Communist Should Be Like.” “First of all a Communist is a social person, with strongly developed social instincts, who desires that all people should be well and be happy. Second, he must understand what is happening about him in the world—the mechanism of the existing régime, the history of the growth of human society, the history of economic development, of the growth of property, the division of classes, the growth of state forms. He must clearly picture whither society is developing—to a régime where the happiness of some will not be based on the slavery of others and where there will be no compulsion except strongly developed social instincts. And the Communists must clear the road, as you clear a path in the wilderness, to hasten its coming.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Third, the Communist must know how to organize creatively. If he is a medical worker, for instance, he must know medicine, then the history of medicine in Russia and other lands, then the Communist approach to the problem of medicine, i.e., how to organize wide masses to create from the ranks of the toilers a powerful sanitary organization in the cause of health. He must know not only what Communism is and what is coming, what his own job in it may be and his approach to the masses. Fourthly, his personal life must be submitted to and guided by the interests of Communism. No matter how much he regrets giving up the comforts and ties of home, he must if necessary cast all aside and go into danger wherever assigned. . . . Body and soul he must be devoted to the interests of the toiling masses, of Communism.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who have risen high in the Communist Party are characterized by these qualities listed by Krupskaia. They are usually reticent about their deepest motives; it is not the thing to gush one’s devotion. One learns of their qualities chiefly through others. Krupskaia, speaking to intimate Party friends at the funeral of her husband Lenin, found the completest expression in the words: “Lenin deeply loved the people.” Radek tells how Stalin, answering greetings sent him by the Party on his fiftieth birthday, “said something which, in the mouth of such a reserved man, sounded as though it came from the very depths of his being. Stalin said that he was ready to shed his blood ‘drop by drop’ for the proletariat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Radek, &#039;&#039;Problems of Soviet Literature&#039;&#039;, 144.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki&amp;quot;&amp;gt;This seems to refer to Radeks speech at the Soviet Writers Congress in August 1934. A copy is available on [https://www.marxists.org/archive/radek/1934/sovietwritercongress.htm marxists.org]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who would lead the masses in changing the world by the Marxian method must obviously strive for constant growth in two directions: in ever-deepening understanding of social and economic forces and in ever-widening participation in workers’ struggles. Perhaps the first thing that strikes an outsider is the amount of time which all Communists devote to the study of Marxian theory. Managers of great steel plants and busy county officials under the pressure of harvest will find time, at unearthly hours like eleven at night or seven in the morning, for their study of Marxism or their class in current events, deeming these things as essential as their other pressing work.&lt;br /&gt;
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Visitors to the Soviet Union are not infrequently amazed to find that a Party secretary in a rural township can discuss international affairs with an assurance and abundance of detail which few foreign editors of an American metropolitan news-paper can show, and will handle statistics and history with a good deal more ease than the “Brain Trust.” A prominent American politician once expressed to me doubts of the accuracy of the published interview of H. G. Wells with Stalin. Stalin’s references to the Cromwellian revolution seemed to him too detailed to have been available for conversation. “People,” he said, “don’t talk that way” But any Communist in the Soviet Union who did not know the essentials of Cromwellian revolution, and of other historic revolutions from which he is expected to learn, would join a class to “raise his ideological level.” A Communist who allowed himself to become as ignorant of world affairs as is the average American politician would be ruthlessly “cleaned out” of the Party, or told to join the group of “sympathizers” to learn what he has to know.&lt;br /&gt;
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The emotional vagueness which is a feature of all capitalist political platforms, and which is indeed desired in order to win wide support without being too definite, is the exact opposite of Communist statement. The Communists even seem to be painfully definite, to “take refuge in formulæ,” or to split hairs over the exact interpretation of phrases. All science and technical knowledge, however, advance by just this splitting of hairs to find the exact chemical formula which produces the alloy or the mathematical relation which strengthens the arch of the bridge; discussions in any congress of physiologists or electricians are full of this “dull theory” without which no scientific progress can be attained. Communists take Marxism as such a science; to rise to eminence among them demands years, even decades, of close and penetrating study of social forces. This is no dogma to be learned once for all; it is a developing body of thought, constantly applied to and affected by new conditions. By the very theory of dialectics, these forces are changing. The speeches of Lenin and Stalin and other Party leaders never deal in stirring oratory or spell-binding generalities but in close and careful analysis. Stalin would no more attempt to sway a Communist congress by “force of personality” expressed in brilliant oratory and colorful phrasing, than Edison would have expected to convince a group of American engineers of the reliability of some new formula by emotional words. One such attempt would ruin either an Edison or a Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Communists must not only be scientific; they must also learn to work with the masses. In this they face a special difficulty; the man who has thought for years in Marxian categories may find it as hard to explain them to simple people as an electrical engineer would find it to explain the theory of turbines to men in a candle-lighted world. This is more serious for the Communist than for the engineer; for the latter can build his turbines without help from the candle-lighted individuals, but the Communist cannot make a revolution without the people. Fortunately actions may speak as well as words, and all Communists are required to do active work which brings them in touch with the masses. When intellectuals apply for Party membership, it is a common practice to give them some tasks around a factory, such as teaching night classes in Russian language, civics or Marxism, or practical assistance in trade union work. After a year or two of such testing, the opinion of the workers is taken as to whether the candidate is fit to be a Party member.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any Communist Party at any stage in its development in any country considers persons who cannot co-operate with workers’ movements as unfit for Party membership. In the Soviet Union where the rank and file of non-Party workers have already considerable knowledge of the Party’s ideals, it has become a common thing for them to assist in helping the Party in its selection of members. Two hundred thousand workers who joined the Party some two years ago were actually nominated by the non-Party workers, through repeated meetings and discussions as to what persons in their ranks should be recommended for Party membership. From time to time the Party “cleans out” its membership, and this is always done at open meetings to which all workers of the given institution are invited. Each Communist in the institution must give before this public an extended account of his life and activities, submit to and answer all criticism, and prove before the assembled workers his fitness to remain in the “leading Party.” Members may be cleaned out not only as “hostile elements, double-dealers, violators of discipline, degenerates, career-seekers, self-seekers, morally degraded persons” but even for being merely “passive,” for having failed to keep learning and growing in knowledge and authority among the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
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People admitted to the Communist Party—this admission demands a period of study and probation—must give considerable time to unpaid “Party work” i.e., the various tasks of strengthening the organization and organizing the masses around it. Having chosen as the chief purpose of their life the achievement of the socialist revolution, they must learn how to build a joint program. They take part in the discussions from which arise the decisions of the Party and they are expected to carry out these decisions energetically but never blindly. For they must know why the decisions are made; they must understand the Party Line and be able to promote it without bothering other people for orders. They must have strong opinions and fight for them; but they must know when to fight and when to yield. If they cannot learn this, they will find themselves outside the Party, thrown out either as “passive” or as “opposition.” It is not an easy lesson; there have been many political mortalities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Party members must learn to decide and act collectively, not only in determining the general line, but also in deciding their own work in it. They must consult and accept their comrades’ judgment as to where they themselves can be of most use. In the Civil War Communists were expected to be the first to volunteer for every battle-front. In the Soviet Union today they are first to be sent to difficult posts in industry and farming. They may be torn from jobs in which they are successful and sent to work which they hate; they must there-upon cease to hate it and do it well as an important task. I know of a high official who was taken from a train by a telegram sent through an obscure local secretary in a town through which he passed, and ordered to return for a different assignment. But no order is ever the command of a superior officer; it is the decision of a group of comrades with whom one has chosen to work. This is the famous Party discipline; known as “iron” discipline but also as “conscious” discipline, for it is based not on passive submission but on understanding participation and collective choice. The reward for this discipline is conscious participation in the making of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communists expect not only to lead the masses, but to learn from them in a constant interaction. They must “organize the proletariat”; they must “guide it in its class struggle.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They must “see ahead of the working class,” and be the “experienced general staff” which “every army at war must have if it is to avoid certain defeat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 88-89, Cooperative Publishers, Moscow.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But they do not consider themselves a separate caste of leaders, but a “vanguard” intimately a part of the working class they lead. They modify their program to grant temporarily some “backward” demand of the masses, or to include permanently some new form or method which the masses invent. An example of the first was Lenin’s response to the peasants’ demands for splitting up the land, a backward step taken to secure peasant support and “in order that they may educate themselves by fulfilling their desires.” An example of the second was the adoption of “soviets” in government and “artels” in farming, neither of which forms had been foreseen by the Party until they arose. It is the working class which must dictate and not the Party; in 1925 when Zinoviev argued for dictatorship by the Party, Stalin fought against this “narrow point of view,” saying that the confidence between the masses of the people and the Party must not be destroyed by any peculiar Party rights, “because in the first place, the Party might be mistaken, and even if it were not, the masses might take some time to see that it was right.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 51.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How can three million Communists lead one hundred and seventy million people? Because they are not alien to those millions, but are the most energetic part of them, whose capacity to lead has been repeatedly tested and recognized by the others. Millions of non-Party people today in the Soviet Union work loyally, even enthusiastically under Party direction, yet do not venture to call themselves Communists. One of my best friends was a woman who gave her life to the care of homeless children, and who said to me once: “My life began with the Soviet Power; it alone gave me the chance to fight for children. . . . I care more for the Party’s success than for anything in life.” Yet when her fellow-workers voted her “worthy of being a Communist,” she declined the honor, knowing she could not honestly join while she disagreed on one or two points in the Party program.&lt;br /&gt;
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A fifty-two-year-old wheelwright, Rosenberg, whom I met in the Jewish Autonomous Territory of Birobidjan, had courageously dismantled his home in the Ukraine and taken his family of ten to pioneer in the Far East. He had fought through incredible hardships to build a collective industry which made carts; he was now a member of the city government giving much unpaid time to civic work. “When the Party decided to develop Birobidjan,” he explained, “I knew it would be a great future. It goes higher and higher to the building of socialism. I myself can’t build it, but if I work and others work, we’ll build it.” Few could have expressed the Communist goal more sincerely than Rosenberg, yet he did not think of joining the Party. “I don’t know enough,” he said. “I am just studying the first political courses. Serious reading is not so easy for me. I am fifty-two years old.”&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Far North fourteen years ago I met Rimpalle, who had risked his life to run the Finnish border and “help the Revolution.” He organized the first quarries and mines in a hungry Arctic land; he created a trade union, a co-operative and a night-school for illiterate natives of the forests. He made $100,000 for the state that first summer and got for himself—it was the time of War Communism—only “rations of potatoes and good, fat gravy and one resoling of my boots.” Rimpalle said to me: “It’s a useful job. Up here so near the border and the propaganda of the White Finns, we needed to have an industry to give food to the people.” He was already a candidate for the Communist Party, expecting to be admitted to full membership in a few months.&lt;br /&gt;
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These examples show what is required of Communists. Devoted activity under Communist direction, such as the Jewish wheelwright gave, is not enough. Ninety per cent allegiance, such as the social worker offered, is not enough. Nor was it enough for Rimpalle to work self-sacrificingly to increase socially owned wealth; he must understand consciously the political purpose of his work. I have in the course of fifteen years in the Soviet Union met an occasional Communist who was a grafter, and many more who were stubborn bureaucrats and unenlightened fanatics. But I have also seen how the Party throws out dead wood—not always accurately—and renews itself from the working class it leads.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such is the organized Party which carried through the Revolution and which today welds into shape the great masses of the Soviet Union, with its vast distances, its once backward populations, its hundred and eighty-two nationalities, its foes on all borders. It succeeds by choosing its members with discrimination, by keeping them firmly organized, forever studying and continuously on the job.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communist Party does not expect to last forever. “When classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat dies out, the Party also will die out.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It sees its task as belonging to a definite stage in human society, with a beginning, a development and an end. No other political party in the world has this type of historic consciousness, this supreme confidence; all others live from election to election, and make no long time plans. The Communist Party considers that it has a specific job in history and confidently expects to stay in power for the time required to carry it through.&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER III: THE DICTATORSHIP ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The conquest by the proletariat of such political power as will enable it to suppress all resistance on the part of the exploiters.”|Program of Russian Communist Party}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself. . . . (It) is a means, a path leading to socialism”|Stalin in Address to Sverdlov Students, June 1925}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Most Americans shrink from the word “dictatorship.” “I don’t want to be dictated to,” they say. Neither, in fact, does anyone. But why do they instinctively take the word in its passive meaning, and see themselves as the recipients of orders? Why do they never think that they might be the dictators? Is that such an impossible idea? Is it because they have been so long hammered by the subtly misleading propaganda about personal dictatorships, or is it because they have been so long accustomed to seek the right to life through a boss who hires them, that the word dictatorship arouses for them the utterly incredible picture of one man giving everybody orders?&lt;br /&gt;
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No country is ruled by one man. This assumption is a favorite red herring to disguise the real rule. Power resides in ownership of the means of production—by private capitalists in Italy, Germany and also in America, by all workers jointly in the USSR. This is the real difference which today divides the world into two systems, in respect to the ultimate location of power. When a Marxist uses the word “dictatorship,” he is not alluding to personal rulers or to methods of voting; he is contrasting rule by property with rule by workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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The heads of government in America are not the real rulers. I have talked with many of them from the President down. Some of them would really like to use power for the people. They feel baffled by their inability to do so; they blame other branches of government, legislatures, courts. But they haven’t analyzed the real reason. The difficulty is that they haven’t power to use. Neither the President nor Congress nor the common people, under any form of organization whatever, can legally dispose of the oil of Rockefeller or the gold in the vaults of Morgan. If they try, they will be checked by other branches of government, which was designed as a system of checks and balances precisely to prevent such “usurpation of power.” Private capitalists own the means of production and thus rule the lives of millions. Government, however chosen, is limited to the function of making regulations which will help capitalism run more easily by adjusting relations between property and protecting it against the “lawless” demands of non-owners. This constitutes what Marxists call the dictatorship of property. “The talk about pure democracy is but a bourgeois screen,” says Stalin, “to conceal the fact that equality between exploiters and exploited is impossible. . . . It was invented to hide the sores of capitalism . . . and lend it moral strength.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Power over the means of production—that gives rule. Men who have it are dictators. This is the power the workers of the Soviet Union seized in the October Revolution. They abolished the previously sacred right of men to live by ownership of private property. They substituted the rule: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What characteristics of the new régime most obviously showed its dictatorial character? They were the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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First, the Bolsheviks took power without waiting for a majority vote—in the elections to the Constituent Assembly they had just received nine million out of thirty-six million ballots—but relying on their overwhelming majority among the industrial workers, and an overwhelming superiority in that part of the army near the capital cities. They maintained power by a shrewd analysis of social classes, and by satisfying the demands of the sections of the population whose support they needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Second, they organized the new government on the basis of the workers’ organizations, thus dis-franchising those classes which lived by private ownership, and giving a greater proportionate representation in the higher government bodies to workers than to peasants during the first eighteen years when equal voting by great masses of illiterate small owners would have wrecked policies of social ownership.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This difference is commonly stated as a five to one proportion, but such was not the case. Industrial districts had in the higher organs one representative for 25,000 &#039;&#039;electors&#039;&#039;, while rural districts had one for 125,000 &#039;&#039;population&#039;&#039;, which included children. The proportion is thus nearer two to one, a much less disproportion than exists (in the reverse direction) between rural and city votes for many state legislatures in America. This disproportion in the Soviet Union was abolished when the rural districts reached literacy and large-scale farming. See next chapter.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Third, they took control of schools, press and all means of expression, and while encouraging the widest latitude of criticism by workers interested in augmenting or improving the public properties, suppressed any expressions which seemed to the government likely to strengthen the rights of private property or injure the efficiency of socially owned production. At certain periods when they felt their social ownership of production threatened, whether by sabotage, graft, or the strengthening of private owners, they suppressed these dangers as drastically as they thought necessary by means which varied from economic discrimination to deportation or shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are real characteristics which constitute dictatorship rather than any personal prestige of Stalin. Great men attain leadership under all forms of government; the technical forms through which Stalin leads are fully as democratic as those by which an American president governs, and infinitely more democratic than the dominance of a Morgan. Nor is the existence of a single Party necessarily a bar to democratic self-expression, which can find its way as well through one party as a dozen, as later chapters will show. But the above characteristics are definite indications of dictatorship, a rule to which not all men have equal access. They are the tactics of all owners in all countries and all periods of history when they feel themselves threatened. They are the tactics to which owners of private property resorted in Italy and Germany when the rising votes of communist and socialist workers threatened their ownership. They are resorted to today in sections of America where property feels threatened, whether by farmhands in Imperial Valley or sharecroppers in Arkansas and Alabama. They will be resorted to on a wider scale if American capitalism really feels itself slipping. Nothing in Soviet history indicates that the Bolsheviks were any more “dictatorial” or ruthless than owners of property anywhere under similar stresses. Certainly they were far less bloody and oppressive than any of the “dictatorships of the right”—whether in Hungary, Finland, China, Italy or Germany—established in retaliation or prevention by private ownership which really felt itself in danger.&lt;br /&gt;
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What were the conditions which made the Bolsheviks establish a dictatorship? Why could they not wait until they were voted into power, and then take over one by one, by government decree or by taxation, the large-scale properties which they believed must be socially owned? The history of fascist seizures of power in face of the threat of socialist voting is beginning to give the world the answer to this question. The Bolsheviks knew the answer from their Marxian analysis of history. No owning class ever gave up ownership without struggle. The holding of government office is not itself power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The power of ownership over the means of life is the day-by-day power which works incessantly, buying brains, corrupting or confusing governments, persistently re-establishing itself against any “will of the people.” Anyone who has experienced in a single American city, as I have in Seattle, the intensity and variety of methods which the capitalists use to fight so mild a thing as public ownership of street-cars, anyone who knows what they did to the war-time government-owned railroads, or today to the Tennessee Valley Corporation, must realize the resources possessed by capitalism against anything so mild as a popular vote. When they can no longer prevent a municipally owned utility, they corrupt it. They make it inefficient through graft or sabotage; they subordinate it to control by private banks. Meantime they continue to play through all the arts of high-paid propaganda on the minds of the electors, who waver and turn to other cures.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The change from capitalism to communism is a whole epoch of history,” said Lenin. “Till it is ended, the exploiters inevitably have the hope of restoration.” Even after capitalists are overthrown on a local scale or on the scale of a single country, they remain for some time “stronger than the workers who overthrew them.” Their strength lies in their foreign connections with international capital, in the money and movable property which they still possess, in their organizing and administrative ability, their superior education, their knowledge of all the secrets of administration, their superiority in the art of war. They are furthermore helped by the force of habit and traditional ways of thinking which remain even in the minds of workers and especially in large sections of the middle classes for a considerable period after capitalism is overthrown.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted and condensed from Lenin, &#039;&#039;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&#039;&#039;, Chap. 3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxists therefore hold that the working class must maintain a dictatorial power for an “entire epoch of history” both to prevent attempts at restoration of capitalism and to re-educate the entire population in habits suited to socially owned production. “You will have to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil wars and international wars,” said Marx to the workers, “not only to change external conditions, but in order to change yourselves and to make yourselves fit for the exercise of political power.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &#039;&#039;Revelations on the Communist Trial in Cologne&#039;&#039;, 1851.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The tactics used by the dictatorship in the Soviet Union were conditioned by the economic development of the land and its international relations. In the first years they were affected by foreign intervention and civil war; in later, years they conformed to and created the rapid economic advance and increasing international prestige of the country. Four chief epochs may be noted: the period of Workers’ Control in the first year of the Revolution; War Communism for the two and a half years of intervention; the New Economic Policy from 1921 to 1928; and the final offensive against capitalism ushered in by the first Five-Year Plan.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new workers’ state inherited a country economically broken by the strain of World War. Peasants were seizing lands of landlords; factories had closed and their workers were hungry; banking was demoralized by the rapid fall of the currency; soldiers without food or munitions were fleeing home from the front. “Peace, land and bread,” was the cry of the country. The capitalists could not satisfy it and this brought the Bolsheviks to power. They at once gave land to the peasants, repudiated all state debts, nationalized banks and transport and created a state monopoly of foreign trade. Industry was left in private hands, but “workers’ control” committees were established from the workers in each industry. These examined all accounts, studied the source of raw materials and fought to keep up production against the attempt of private capitalists to close down the factories as unprofitable. Internal trade remained private; on the second day of the Revolution a proclamation urged traders to continue business as usual. A policy however was announced for the gradual combining of factories into large-scale trusts, which should then be nationalized, and for the gradual socializing of internal trade through co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
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These policies—the normal reaction of a workers’ government wishing to rebuild the economic life of a ruined country with as little upheaval and disruption as possible, for the sake not of profit but of human welfare—united around the government the overwhelming majority of the population, including both workers and peasants. Opposition came from landlords, capitalists and the upper strata of engineers, civil servants and professional people; but if these used violence or sabotage against the new policy, they were suppressed by governing organizations composed of great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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A vivid example of dictatorship in this period is given by Lenin, in a contrast drawn between dictatorship by property and dictatorship by workers. “The state has forcibly to evict a family from a house. This is done time and again by the capitalist state and will be done by our proletarian state. . . . The capitalist state evicts the workers’ family which has lost its breadwinner and is unable to pay rent.” After describing the enforcement by a squad of police of the rights of property against poor people, Lenin continues with the picture of the dispossession of a rich man by the workers’ state.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Our detachment of workers’ militia consists, let us say, of fifteen people—two sailors, two soldiers, two class-conscious workers (of whom only one, let us assume, is a member of our Party or a sympathizer), one intellectual, and eight members of the toiling poor; at least five are necessarily women, domestic servants, unskilled workers, and so on. They come to the rich man’s house, inspect it, and find that there are five rooms occupied by two men and two women. “This winter, citizens, you must confine yourselves to two rooms and place two rooms at the disposal of two families that are now living in cellars. For the time being, until with the help of engineers (you are an engineer, I think?) we build good dwellings for all, you will have to put yourselves to inconvenience. Your telephone will serve ten families. This will save about a hundred hours’ work in running to the stores and so forth. The student citizen in our detachment will write out two copies of the text of this state order and you will be kind enough to give us a signed declaration that you undertake to abide by it faithfully.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Will the Bolsheviks Retain Power?&#039;&#039; published October, 1917.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This is a vivid example of a dictatorship over property enforced by great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under pressure of foreign intervention and civil war, the limited nationalization of “Workers’ Control” merged into the period of “War Communism.” Attacking armies separated Soviet Russia for two and a half years from her chief food and fuel bases. The granary of the Ukraine, the cotton of Turkestan, the coal of the Donetz, the oil of Baku, the mines of the Urals were in enemy hands. The dictatorship adopted “War Communism,” the tactics of a besieged land. It requisitioned all grain and necessities of life, and rationed them under direct government control; it seized all factories and used the broken machines of one as spares to repair the scarcely less broken machines of another. This policy alienated large sections of the peasantry by crop requisition. It ruined industry more thoroughly than any modern industry has ever been ruined, being an efficient device for using up the last ounce of raw material and the last spare bolt. But the policy of “War Communism” enabled an already exhausted land to carry on for two and a half more years against the attacking armies of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet power survived. With the coming of peace Lenin at once introduced the New Economic Policy, an attempt to build up the country’s economic life as rapidly as possible by a “two-sided process of the development of capitalism and the development of socialism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 314.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Grain requisitions were replaced by limited taxes with permission for free trade. Private capitalists were allowed to enter both trade and industry, the state retaining the “commanding heights” of land, finance, heavy industry, transport, and foreign trade. This policy brought the peasant, small enterpriser and professional classes back to loyalty—a wavering loyalty, for if some had been won to socialism, others now hoped to grow personally rich. Capitalist nations abroad echoed the belief that Russia was swinging back to the ancient order. But the Soviet workers, led by the Communists, gave time on holidays to great collective drives for repairing factories, making street-cars and new equipment as donations to their country. During “War Communism” they had worked for rations; now they worked for low but steadily increasing wages, building up out of their own sacrifice the first socialist accumulation which should give them economic power for the final offensive against capitalism. Thus industry which in 1921 produced one-fifth the pre-war standard was driven by fivefold increase in 1928 to “normalcy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia in 1928 was only half socialist. Most of industry was socially owned but farming was in the hands of peasant proprietors, the stronger of whom were petty capitalists, struggling not only to survive but to grow. Class strife went on between these emerging rural capitalists and the impoverished farmhands. Youth was leaving the farms and flooding the cities with unemployment. Discussion had racked the Communist Party as to whether socialism could be built in a single country, particularly a backward peasant land. Following the analysis of Stalin, the Party decided that it could be done by swiftly creating modern heavy industry and simultaneously industrializing farming. The Soviet Union plunged into that now famous struggle known as the Five-Year Plan, and emerged with large-scale industry and the largest scale farming in the world, both of them socially owned.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a bitter fight, carried through against the upper sections of the peasantry and part of the middle class. An epidemic of sabotage broke out in the industries among the higher engineering staff, who had consciously or half-consciously expected to advance towards privilege and wealth. Men high in the canning industry put broken glass, animal hair and fish tails into food destined for workers. A township veterinary who hated collectivization inoculated six thousand horses with plague. An irrigation engineer tried to discourage the policy of settling yellow-skinned nomads on the soil by using antiquated surveys which he knew would not deliver the water. These cases and thousands more are taken from confessions of men who were later repentant. The dictatorship fought back, shooting the most serious offenders, imprisoning and exiling others. The energy of loyal workers and engineers carried through the Five-Year Plan. Its success won over many earlier saboteurs so that by 1931 Stalin was able to announce that the intellectuals were turning towards the Soviet Government, and should be met by a policy of co-operation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Speech delivered at Conference of Leaders of Industry, June 23, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The most spectacular act of ruthlessness which occurred in those years was the exiling of several hundred thousand kulaks—rural property-owners who lived by trade, money-lending or by exploiting small mills, threshers, and hired labor—from farm homes in European Russia and the Ukraine to Siberia or the northern woods. The usual assumption outside the Soviet Union is that this exiling occurred through arbitrary action by a mystically omnipotent G.P.U. That organization did of Course organize the deportation and final place of settlement in labor camps or on new land. But the listing of kulaks who “impede our farming by force and violence” was done by village meetings of poor peasants and farmhands who were feverishly and not too efficiently organizing collectively owned farms with government loans of machinery and credits. The meetings I personally attended were as seriously judicial as a court trial in America. One by one there came before the people the “best families,” who had grabbed the best lands, exploited labor by owning the tools of production as best families normally and historically do, and who were fighting the rise of the collective farm—which had the right to take the best lands away from them—by every means up to arson, cattle-killing and murder. Obviously the situation offered chances for wreaking private grudges. Obviously the occasional agitator from the city was unconcerned with kulak “rights.” The meeting of farmhands and poor peasants discussed each case in turn, questioned the kulaks, allowed most of them to remain but asked the government to deport some as “trouble-makers.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a harsh, bitter and by no means bloodless conflict, but not one peculiar to Russia. I was reminded of it again in 1933 by the cotton-pickers’ strike in San Joaquin Valley of California. California local authorities deported pickets who interfered with the farming of ranchers; Soviet authorities deported kulaks who interfered with the collectively owned farming of the poor. In both cases central governments sent commissions to guard against the worst excesses. But the “property” which could count on government support was in California that of the wealthy rancher; in the USSR it was the collective property of the poor.&lt;br /&gt;
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Through all these struggles of eighteen years in the Soviet Union the Marxists had guessed right—one class held firm. Steadily the industrial workers supported and fought for their socialist state. Theirs was the dictatorship, the ownership, the rule. Led by Communist analysis, they made alliances with other parts of the population—with the great mass of the people to overthrow big landlords and capitalists and later with the poorer peasants to overthrow the richer. The middle classes changed back and forth in their loyalty; but the workers held through.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today the chief fight of the dictatorship is against corruption and bureaucracy. The workers, in other words, struggle with their own government, not to overthrow it but to improve it by weeding out inefficiency. A vivid example of this was given by a letter from three railway-workers published in &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;. They told how the workers of their station, hearing that Sizran station was considered a model, chose three delegates to go and study it. “The election fell on us. However, to our great regret, we convinced ourselves that Sizran is no model.” The letter proceeds to expose fictitious bookkeeping which compelled engineers to list repeated repairs as new in order to protect the reputation of the repair shops, and other false entries which hid inefficiencies. They noted employees who had been demoted for calling too open attention to troubles. They did a thorough and technically accurate job of debunking Sizran, a station on a different railroad to which they had gone in search of good methods. Imagine workers from a station on the Erie giving this attention to study, analyze and reform a station on the Pennsylvania! Imagine their securing ready access to all the records of an alien line! Imagine this as routine news in a metropolitan daily paper, leading to check-up and reprimands of railway superintendents for inaccuracy in reporting their work!&lt;br /&gt;
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This is today’s routine in the Soviet Union. Scores of letters like this appear daily in the press throughout the land. Some of them are ironic, some statistical, some outraged. But all of them express men who know themselves owners, and through ownership dictators of the land in which they live.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER IV: THE GROWING DEMOCRACY ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Soviet Power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Step by step the Soviet Union fights forward towards that complete democracy which has never yet existed anywhere on earth. For democracy is neither absolute nor static. It varies in type, extent and intensity. It may grow or diminish. In the Soviet Union it grows.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are the functions of government in the Soviet Union? How wide is the participation of the people? How much of their life can they control? Whence come the ideas that are followed in the land? What initiative and creative energy is expressed? Who rises to high posts and by what means? All these questions must be considered in determining what kind of democracy exists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take first the formal facts of voting, though this is far from exhausting in the Soviet citizen’s participation in government. The Soviet Union has today the largest body of voters any where in the world. Moreover a larger percentage of them come out to elections than in any other country; they give more time to their elections and decide a greater variety of questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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All “toilers” over the age of eighteen may elect and be elected; the word is interpreted to include students, housewives, old people who have passed the age of work as well as those more formally known as workers. Voting thus extends to a younger age than is common elsewhere, and there are no disqualifications for transient residents, paupers, migratory workers, soldiers, sailors, such as exist in most countries; even non-citizens may vote if they work in a Soviet industry. There are no restrictions for sex, creed or color, nor even for illiteracy. The only significant restriction relates to “exploiting elements,” but the steady decrease of privately owned enterprises has cut the disfranchised to 2.5 per cent of the population in the 1934 elections; by 1937 it is expected that all will have the vote. In the 1934 elections 91,000,000 people were entitled to vote, and of these 77,000,000, or 85 per cent, actually participated, which is double the proportion found in most countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take a motion picture of a Soviet election. In December 1934 the Moscow streets were thronged with processions, continuing for several days. Special street-cars, gay with banners, carried people to meetings. Men and women gathered in side streets, formed in line with merry chatter and went with bands and flags to the building secured for their election meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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All over the country for more than a month elections had been going on in far-away factories and villages. Soviet elections do not take place on a single day but are determined by local convenience within a period of several weeks prior to the convening of an All-Union Congress. Localities choose dates which will enable their outgoing governments to finish their business, and give the incoming governments time to prepare demands for the All-Union Congress. These candidates and demands had been subjects of much discussion. But the attitude to the elections expressed itself rather in action than in talk. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were joining collective farms “to break with the past and enter the elections as collective farmers.” Factory workers were energetically completing new models of locomotives, turbines, inventions, to send as presents to the coming congress. There were, in fact, so many of these presents that the sending of most of them was ordered confined to reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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In wooded mountains of Siberia the dark-skinned Oirots announced proudly: “We have abandoned the wandering life of wigwams; we have raised our literacy rate from 6 to 89 per cent; we enter these elections as educated farmers, settled on our own soil.” From the Turkoman Republic they were matching this claim with another: “Our once suppressed women have increased the proportion who turn out to elections from 2.5 per cent to 73 per cent in these eight years.” The historic city of Kiev was boasting: “Half our elected deputies are women. We lead the Soviet Union in the proportion of women elected to office; this means that we lead the world.” But their boast was matched by the textile city Tver, now renamed Kalinin, which has fully as many.&lt;br /&gt;
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Young Pioneers were reciting poems to urge on their elders:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;That we may build more firmly,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Advancing more confidently to victory,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;We choose to our Soviets firm, tested fighters,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Close-welded, the best of our best.&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On the southern Kazak steppe an aged yellow-skinned herdsman, dying, sent a last message to his son who had been village president and who was now elected delegate to the All-Union Congress: “All the years of my life were dark with toil and hunger. But I lived to see the new day. Take care of the Soviet power, my son; it is our power, our happiness.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Along the Arctic coast the autumn herring run began a few days before the date set for local elections. The fishermen went to sea. Some of the election commissioners held elections in the absence of a considerable number of voters and were roundly denounced for it by &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, central organ of the Communist Party. “A gross violation of Soviet democracy! What right have commissioners to hold elections when workers cannot come? We are glad to note that many of the ﬁshermen had a better sense of their obligations. Many crews held their own meetings and sent deputies ashore with their instructions. But they should not have been forced to this irregularity. The proper course was found by those commissioners who held regular election meetings on the boats and thus combined enthusiastic work for a good herring catch with the collective decision of what to do with it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this, taken together and multiplied by millions, makes plain the essence of the Soviet election. It is an act of joint owners deciding what to do with their production, how to build a good life on the proceeds. The task of officials is not to enforce some precedent but to find ways of adjusting election machinery to voters. “The hottest elections we ever had,” they bragged of the 1934 elections, proud of the increasing popular participation in government, which is relied on to check bureaucracy and make state enterprises efficient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic unit for government is the working institution, the factory or office; in rural districts it is the village. Deputies are chosen to the local government, the village or city soviet.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The word “soviet” means “council.” City soviet is city council.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The basis of representation and size of the local soviet depends on the size of the community: Gulin village, whose election I visited, has one deputy for every forty voters and a village soviet of thirteen members. Moscow city elects one deputy for fifteen hundred voters and has more than two thousand members in its city soviet. These local deputies meet soon after election to form the new government. They divide among themselves the various departments, which range from the five sections of Gulin village—farming, livestock, culture, roads and finance—to twenty-eight sections, each with over forty deputies, through which Moscow city does business. Besides the more commonly known functions, these local governments own and manage local industry, which in a large city like Moscow includes many municipally owned factories, the street-cars, subway, lights, water, and housing. They receive revenue from public properties, but their budgets may also be augmented by taxes and state loans. Some cities actually bring in revenue—it will be remembered that they get all the house rents; others need help from the higher governments.&lt;br /&gt;
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On these local governments is built up the whole structure of central government.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A new constitution is in preparation which will change many details, but it will hardly change the principle of close connection between local, state and central bodies in one system.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Local soviets elect deputies to a congress of soviets; the township congress elects to the province, and so on up to the All-Union Congress of Soviets, the highest body in the country. Each of these congresses elects its executive committee and the heads of its various departments; for the highest government these are the great Commissariats of heavy and light industry, finance, health, and so forth. Local departments are both horizontally and vertically controlled, by local governments and by the corresponding department in the higher government. Thus a township health department is responsible both to the township executive committee and to the provincial health department. If orders clash, if a local soviet takes the hospital for some other use, its health department appeals to the provincial health department which brings pressure on the local soviet through the provincial government in the interests of public health.&lt;br /&gt;
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The greater part of this intricate yet unified system of government is carried on by unpaid work. Elected deputies, whether to village or the All-Union Congress, receive no salaries of office. They draw their usual wages from the factory or institution which sends them and in which they keep on working, except insofar as they may be “released from production” for the needs of government; this varies with the importance of the work they do. There is thus no hard and fast line between the citizen and the man in office. Deputies are a link between the collective life of the factory and the larger collective life of the country. Any worker may approach them conveniently any day in their place of work to ask about the fulfillment of instructions given by the voters. They may be recalled by their constituents at any time simply through a factory meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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If voters thus constantly call on their deputies, the deputies are equally entitled to call on the voters for help in carrying out the election program they have voted. A deputy is no substitute for the people, no ruler; he is the representative who organizes them in their own tasks of voluntary government work. Millions of citizens take active part in the sections of the government—housing commissions, school commissions, taxing commissions, labor inspection and so on. Those who develop a taste for running public affairs will be chosen at some election for more continuous and responsible work. Those who specialize in some field, such as health, courts, housing, may be sent on pay for some months or years of study and become full-time civil servants in these departments.&lt;br /&gt;
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The growth of democracy in the Soviet Union thus depends directly on the extent to which citizens can be interested in taking part in operations of government. This interest is in part assured by the fact that government is so clearly the direct organizing of all aspects of the citizen’s life. In a million matters the citizens give direct instructions during the election. They order the increase of school-houses or sound films, the improvement in the quality of bread, the increase of retail stores, the transport of goods in big cities by night; they demand the breaking-up of housing trusts into smaller co-operatives, or the introduction of a less specialized education in the schools. All of these were part of some 48,000 instructions issued directly by Moscow voters to their city government, which reported within three months on the fulfillment of many hundred demands and on the disposition made of all. When instructions clash, as when some citizens want an odorous industrial plant removed from their neighborhood while others want it to stay, commissions are formed which try to satisfy not merely the majority, but as nearly as possible everybody, not through a showing of hands in opposition, but through various adjustments to the suggestions made by all. Capitalist ownership of private property limits the citizen’s participation, in government to an approval or rejection—expressed in conflict—of general policies. Socialist ownership causes government policies to grow directly and naturally from the correlated demands of millions of people, all of whom are interested in improving the country’s wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interest of citizens in government is also consciously promoted by the Communist Party which stirs up wide competitions between factories, villages, cities, as to the extent and energy of their participation. An industrial plant where less than 95 per cent of the workers come to the election hangs its head in shame as an institution lacking in civic consciousness. Candidates never make speeches or election promises; this would be considered highly indelicate. But the voters pride themselves on picking deputies whose previous work has been notable and who therefore give promise of being widely useful. They select a fellow worker, not an outside politician. Students choose a student, auto-workers choose an auto-worker, the Moscow Grand Opera elects a famous singer. The future task of these deputies is to extend on a wider scale the type of work for which they are already known. The opera singer will organize connections between the Moscow Grand Opera and the villages, sending out artists to help rural singing classes. The printer on the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; who mechanized its mailing list of two million subscribers was elected to the Moscow city soviet with instructions to help mechanize all the newspapers of the city. A textile worker who helps organize a good day nursery in her factory will be elected by her fellow workers to help improve the city’s day nurseries, and will choose to work on the health section of the local government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The operation of Soviet democracy is thus so intimate, continuous and organic that the observer fresh from capitalist politics hardly recognizes it as government. Where is the debate? Who determines general policies? Can the people throw out the upper officials? Can they throw out Stalin? The Communist Party? The Soviet voter, when asked these last questions, replies in a puzzled way: “Why should we want to?” The questioner thinks he has been evaded. But all elections presuppose an existing economic system, which voting is powerless to change. Voters in America cannot change Rockefeller’s method of operating oil companies for private profit. Similarly no Soviet election raises the issue of returning public properties to private hands: this was settled by the Revolution, and forms the foundation beneath the whole government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Barring that question, there is nothing whatever that Soviet voters cannot change. They actually do change thousands of officials at every election, and as their acquaintance with the wider problems of the country grows, the forms of democracy are being widened to include direct control of the highest officials. Stalin’s chief post is not in the government, but as general secretary of the Communist Party, which would certainly remove him if his policy and actions should ever discredit him with the people; at present he is by far the most popular man in the country. To throw out the Communist Party bodily would be to throw out all the leading and organizing elements in all factories, farms, schools and enterprises; it could clearly be done only by upheaval leading to chaos. But the citizens are constantly at work changing the very membership of the Party, any member of which may be “cleaned out” on protest of his non-Party associates that he is too dictatorial, too rough towards workers, or merely not a fit leader.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This is discussed in Chaps. 1 and 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Several elections which I attended will show concretely how soviet democracy functions. Four election meetings were held simultaneously in different hamlets of Gulin village, which had no assembly hall big enough for all. One of these meetings threw out the Party candidate, Borisov, because they felt that he neglected their instructions; they elected a non-Party woman who had displayed energy in improving the village and were praised by the election commissioner—himself a Party member—for having discovered good government timber which the Party had neglected. The central meeting in Gulin expected 235 voters; 227 appeared and were duly checked off by name at the door. There ensued personal discussion of every one of nine candidates, of whom seven were chosen. Mihailov “did good work on the roads.” The most enthusiasm developed over Menshina, a woman who “does everything assigned her energetically; checks farm property, tests seeds, collects state loans.” Dr. Sharkova, head of the Mothers’ Consultation, was pushed by the women: “We need a sanitary expert to clean up our village.” The incoming soviet was instructed to “increase harvest yield within two years to thirty bushels per acre, to organize a stud farm, get electricity and radio for every home, organize adult education courses, football and skiing teams, and satisfy a score of other needs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Moscow Architectural Institute where 1,500 men and women are qualifying to become architects, every class in the school held three sessions on the elections, discussing first the shortcomings of the outgoing government, then instructions to the new government, and lastly candidates. The fourteen hundred instructions sent in by the students included more and better draughting pencils, evening schools in drawing, more money for students’ excursions to see new architecture, more exhibitions of foreign architecture, fruit trees to beautify Moscow, artists to be held responsible for designs of state-made texiles, township architects to be appointed to advise the new construction on farms. Similarly the 1,500 voters of the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; turned in 1,500 proposals, which were carefully worked over by committees, published in a special newspaper issued for the voters, and given to their deputy to put through with their help. These included adequate textbooks for all pupils in the schools, an increase in the number of children’s theaters, strengthening the fight against hooliganism, closing the sale of liquor on Suchevski Street opposite school Twenty-two—the latter being the common form of the fight against alcohol.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Instructions thus adopted become the program of incoming governments, which they use as a weapon to get what they require from provincial and central authorities. Some of the demands can be put through by the electors themselves with the help of their deputy; others need central assistance. When the All-Union Congress meets it knows how many villages are demanding air-dromes, sound films, textbooks, electrification. These demands, correlated by engineers and economists, form the content for future development of the life of the country in the direction its citizens choose. But the citizens themselves expect to work to accomplish it. If villagers ask for a seven-room school or a landing field for farm airplanes, they expect deputies to investigate possible fields, make recommendations, get the needed machines from some central authority; but they themselves expect to haul the timber or pay the men who haul it with labor days credited against the joint harvest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Democracy in Soviet life is not confined to government. Trade unions organize many aspects of workers’ life; collective farms and co-operatives organize production and distribution for the farmers. Their organization is separate from that of government; it is also democratically controlled. In the past two years democracy has become more intimate and decentralized in both these directions. The administration of social insurance, which in 1936 will have eight billion rubles for hospitals, day nurseries, diet kitchens, invalid benefits, old-age pensions and the like, was two years ago given over to the trade unions, as was also the inspection of factories and of workers’ food stores. Similarly the whole organization of collective farming, including the relation between fields operated jointly and plots individually worked by farm members, is today in the hands of the farmers themselves, decided by the general meeting at which not less than two-thirds are present. Thus democracy grows more flexible, the intermediate apparatus is lessened, and the various functions of government are handled by those whom they most directly concern.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The extension of social ownership into the farms and the growth in the intelligence of the entire electorate has made possible a third extension of democracy. A new constitution is being drafted by the collective labor of thousands of people in all parts of the land. Economists and historians are studying the constitutions of all countries and considering every detail of democratic technique; their reports will be further discussed in every factory and farm of the country before the constitution takes final form. It is known, however, that it will include direct election, secret ballot, and equal representation for all citizens, replacing the inequality which hitherto obtained between city workers and peasants. At is also expected to abolish all disfranchised classes, since by 1937 social ownership will be universal and all citizens will belong to one toiling-owning class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty,” was said once of the democracy of capitalist society whereby small private owners protected their rights. But socialism demands more than vigilance. Eternally co-operating human energy is the price of socialism and of that complete democracy which operates jointly owned means of production for the expanding life of all. This is the final stage towards which the present Soviet democracy struggles and grows.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER V: THE UNION OF NATIONS ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|“Among the masses of people, we are but drops in the ocean, and we will be able to govern only when we properly express that which the people appreciate. Without this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not take the lead of the masses, and the whole machine will fall to pieces.”|Lenin at Eleventh Party Congress}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If by some cataclysm of war a section of the Soviet Union should be cut off from Moscow and compelled for a time to exist alone, government in these isolated areas would continue unchanged except insofar as it was crushed by invading armies. A picturesque example of this was given me by a Yakut woman, who boasted that her district of forests and tundra a thousand miles north of the Trans-Siberian Railway had had “Soviet Power” continuously since 1917. The years of civil war that raged along the railway had never penetrated so far north. To my query how this backward bit of territory knew what policies to follow she replied that a few Bolshevik exiles had remained among them and they got occasional news from Moscow over the Great Northern Telegraph which traversed their region. Many other sections of the country were isolated during the Civil War for considerable periods, yet continued to follow a common policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For eighteen years the authority of the Communist Party in the life of the Soviet Union has grown steadily stronger; it has kept power now for a considerably longer time than any Party in any other country in the world. The accumulating discontents which in other lands throw out governments do not seem to worry it. The Party itself organizes discontent for the sake of progress. In spite of exposures of graft, inefficiency, bureaucracy, and stupid excesses—indeed through these very exposures—the hold of the Communist Party increases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To manage the state affairs of the most extensive republic on earth—covering one-sixth of the world’s land surface—might be considered enough for a political party. But to run the state is only one of the Communists’ tasks. For their plan of remaking the world the apparatus of government is insufficient. Great popular organizations like trade unions, co-operatives, physical culture societies and scores of voluntary social agencies must also move in a common, yet flexible plan. But the action of these organizations must be voluntary, arousing the initiative of their members, or their energy and life will die.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How then does the Communist Party lead the country? By the energy and discipline of its members, their contact with all organizations in the land, and by the authority of repeated success. In all government bodies and voluntary organizations the Communists belonging to them act together to induce them to follow the “Party Line.” This line, however, while firm, is not rigid; Party policy itself grows from the discussions and active struggles of its members, each of whom is in touch with some aspect of the country’s life. The members serve as a living conscious bridge between the Party and all the other organizations. They explain to the Party the desires of the people with whom they are associated, and explain to the people the policies developed by the Party in regard to their demands.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The primary Party organizations are set up in factories, offices, state farms, red army units, universities, villages, in any institution which has three Party members or more. In a typical iron and steel plant in the Ukraine, for instance, where 1,600 persons—workers, engineers, office staff—work in the rolling mill, 55 are Party members, 85 belong to the Young Communist League and 30 are enrolled as “sympathizers,” an organized group which is studying Communism with the presumable intent to join the Party. One Communist is paid a salary by the Party as full time organizer; the others are scattered in ordinary jobs through all the working gangs of the factory. Each of them has his assigned “Party work.” Some are editors of the sixteen “wall newspapers” which are posted in every working gang of the mill, filled with news and discussions of the gang’s successes and failures. Others read regular newspapers aloud during lunch hour and conduct discussions on current events. Others stir up “socialist competition” between different working gangs so that skill and production may increase. Others are active in the trade union or help promote sports. Every Communist, Young Communist and sympathizer does some unpaid public work of this kind; those who had none or failed to do it would be dropped from the Party as “passive.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years ago I visited an open meeting of a Party organization in a factory near Moscow. Not only the Communists but many non-members had gathered to hear the semi-annual report of the Party secretary of the plant. As he sat down a storm of questions arose. “Why have we no report about the Young Pioneers? . . . Has the Party looked into the question of our workers’ club building and observed that we have no summer playground? Why haven’t we a sanitary organization? Why haven’t we a ‘Friends of Aviation’? Does the co-operative housing organization report regularly to the Party, and if so, when are we going to get the houses?” From the secretary’s answers it became clear that this factory had many voluntary organizations among its members: a “Friends for Children,” an “International Labor Defense,” an organization to “Increase Production,” a “Society for Contacts with Rural Districts,” and many more. All of these had been launched with Party co-operation, usually first as small committees, and had then grown into larger organizations by the influx of people who were not Communists. The number of organizations that would be started would depend partly on popular demand and partly on the capacity of Party members to stimulate and organize interest. It would be difficult for an organization to start without Party sanction; it would not be precisely forbidden, but a score of difficulties would discourage it. On the other hand, if a popular demand arose for any new kind of organization—from a drama club to an Anti-Tuberculosis Society—some Party members would take part in it either on their own initiative or by request of the workers or the Party, and would be expected by everyone to keep the organization in touch with any Party policies which affected it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were several ironic remarks and cat-calls in the meeting during a report by the plant’s director, who was clearly not popular with the workers. I happened to know that the Party secretary had recently recommended to the higher organizations that the director be removed to some other plant where he could profit by the mistakes he had made in this one and start without the accumulated friction. The manager also knew that his transfer had been recommended, and quite possibly concurred. At the meeting, however, the Party secretary said no word of this recommendation but put himself in the unenviable position of explaining the manager’s actions to a group which was almost howling him down. Both he and the manager were disciplined Communists, who did not wish to increase dissension but to work together for the good of the plant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proportion of Communists in rural districts is very much less than in factories, as might be expected from the fact that the factory workers were the most active elements in the Revolution and also more literate than the peasants. A typical Party organization in a village of two hundred families—I take here the collective farm “Postishev” in the Ukraine—has five Party members, ten “sympathizers,” and twenty-seven members of the Young Communist League. The latter organization is nearly always much larger than the Party in the villages, since it is the youth on the farms which is progressive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the five Party members in this village, one of them, Povlichenko, is organizer, giving full time to Party work. He was born in the village, worked some years in a city factory, and was sent back in 1931 on Party order to help organize collectivization. From comments of peasant women I judge he was high-handed in that period and stirred up some antagonisms which he has not lived down. He is, however, a very energetic person, a once half-starved, half-educated farmhand with a passion for schooling which the Revolution enabled him to realize. He runs the Party school where members study Party history and current politics, teaches an elementary course in Leninism and the Soviet Constitution for the sympathizers, and organizes talks and discussions on special events, such as Party congresses, or new decrees affecting the farms. At the time of my visit these remote villagers were studying, more or less assiduously, the reports of Dimitroff and others at the recent congress of the Communist International. Povlichenko also takes active part in pushing the local school, the village club, the motion pictures, the local newspaper and all forms of education and culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second Communist is a local peasant, president of the collective farm since 1931, but now leaving for a three-year course in an agricultural school. His salary comes from the farm, not from the Party. The third is an electrician sent to this village because “we needed a Communist in every field brigade.” When he came he was entirely ignorant of farming, but his craft made him useful in a village just beginning to import electricity from the great power plant on the Dnieper. Recently the Party planned to transfer him to township work, but the local farmers checked this by electing him president of the village. “The Party,” he said, “always considers the desires of the masses.” He may or may not have helped organize those desires. For Party work he is attached to the third field brigade and is also adviser of the Young Communist League. The fourth party member is a woman who earns her living as saleswoman in the co-operative store, and whose Party assignment is to help the village women organize a day nursery, a first-aid society and get vacation on pay from the collective farm at time of childbirth. This right is automatic in state-owned enterprises, but not all the farmers’ organizations give it yet. The fifth Party member is manager of the local co-operative store, who, since he makes twenty or more trips to the city every month, is used by the Party for city contacts rather than for regular village work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is plain that these five Party members have their hands on the whole life of the village. Besides their general work, the first three each keep in touch with a different field brigade of forty or more workers whom they are expected to know personally. “I must know what they want, their economic conditions and working abilities. This is called political watchfulness. If we did not know this, it would be bad for us. We could not possibly lead the masses,” said Povlichenko.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Party organization of this village is open to criticism from strict Party principles in that its members hold too many local government jobs. They are supposed to keep a better balance between office-holders and members “in production,” and to stimulate and train non-Party people for some of the government work. Hogging the offices by Party members is considered a bad sign; it means that they have not stirred up wide enough interest. The Postishev organization is trying to do this through their work with the ten sympathizers and the Young Communists, each of whom has also Party work of a less responsible character. They read and discuss the newspapers in the field brigades, organize traveling libraries, chess games, football teams, initiate competitions in reaping and threshing, help start the musical or dramatic circle, or assist in the “cottage laboratory” where sixty farmers are studying scientific methods.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These primary Party organizations are correlated by the township&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rayon, a district about equivalent to a township.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; organization which in turn comes under the larger regions up to the All-Union organization. The lower bodies elect the higher but are in turn subordinate to their decisions; the system is known as “democratic centralism.” The highest power within each organization is vested in its general meeting or congress which elects a standing committee to serve between sessions. The highest power of the entire Party is the All-Union Party Congress and between its sessions the Central Committee. The Central Committee organizes a political bureau for the day-by-day determination of political policy, an organizational bureau for general guidance of organizational work, and a secretariat. Stalin is general secretary of the Party, but there are several other secretaries who share this work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years ago I saw a district congress of the Communist Party in action in the city of Red Lugansk of the Donetz Basin, the valley of coal and steel. Four or five hundred men and women gathered for a two day session—miners and mine managers, employees and head of the locomotive works, some teachers and health department officials—Communists all, sent as delegates from the local Party organizations of the factories and mines of the district. The problems for discussion were the policy for heavy industry and for minor nationalities. They had been announced by the Central Committee as the immediate pressing problems; “theses” on them had been published by the leading authorities and every local Party organization had discussed them for weeks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The delegates wasted no time in preliminaries and compliments. Man after man spoke hotly and strongly on the concrete difficulties of heavy industry in the mines and factories they knew. They prepared reports based on the industry of their district and elected delegates to carry their hottest criticisms to the regional Party Congress in the coal center, Bakhmut, where delegates were again chosen to the All-Ukrainian Party Congress. Then all over the Soviet Union the special trains began running. From Kharkov, from Tiflis, from Minsk, from Central Asia and Siberia, they bore the chosen delegates to Moscow where two weeks’ discussion in the All-Union Party Congress hammered out the “Party Line.” Thence the results rolled back again to the Donetz, the Caucasus, the Far East to Vladivostok, borne by returning delegates whose first duty was to explain and carry through the decisions through trade unions, cooperatives, farms, government, whatever organizations they influenced.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the most widely organized thinking ever attempted in history. It is actually the energetic thinking of three million men and women, gathering up the ideas of tens of millions of their neighbors, which beats upon the All-Union Party Congress and affects its decisions. The ideas are worked over by the ablest economists of the Party, familiar with the experience of the revolutionary movement in all countries. The decisions reached are explained to the country through every channel of organized publicity; they are discussed and studied in every field brigade and factory and put into action simultaneously throughout the land. For the test of organized thinking is organized action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Communists do not merely reflect the will of the masses, as a ballot might, or a showing of hands. They do not merely analyze what the “majority want” and hand it out. It is their job to lead, to organize the people’s will. No group of unurged soldiers would ever vote to storm a trench. Certainly the workers of the Soviet Union would not have voted, unurged, unled, for the hardships of the Five-Year Plan of rapid industrialization taken out of their own food and comforts, for the painful speed of farm collectivization without adequate machines or organizers. But when the Communist Party analyzed, urged and demanded, showing the world situation and the need of making the USSR well prepared industrially and for defense, showing the enemy classes which must be abolished to attain the goal of a socialist state, they were able to find, organize and create, deep in the heart of the masses, a will that carried through. Without that will in tens of millions, the three million could have done little. “To bring about a revolution, a leading revolutionary minority is required,” Stalin told H. G. Wells. “But the most talented, devoted and energetic minority would be helpless if it did not rely upon the at least passive support of millions.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. G. Wells’ Interview with Joseph Stalin, July 23, 1934&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As an example of the interrelation of Party, government and voluntary workers in action, let me take the “mobilization” of automobiles and mechanics in the spring of 1931 to save flax sowing in Moscow province. Collective farming came that year to the province in a great drive of organization and propaganda backed by hundreds of new tractors, which were being used chiefly to increase the area of flax. In the first week of sowing, telegrams from the newly organized tractor stations poured into Moscow, announcing that there was a “break.” Tractors all over the province stood in the fields, not moving, for causes yet to be analyzed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who moves in such a case? The Moscow Committee of the Party moves. Sorting over in its office the reports of all Moscow’s daily emergencies, it decides that the break in flax is serious and calls for a “mobilization” of mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The call goes out to Party organizations in a hundred shops and factories. It is announced by trade-union shop committees and factory newspapers. Not a single mechanic is compelled to answer, but any mechanic willing to give a day or two for tractor repair to help the sowing will be helped by foreman and fellow workers to arrange his job. He may work at this sanctioned public task without forfeiting wages, while others fill in the gap in his regular work. What is the motive? The fun of participating in saving the sowing, of helping the country, of living a varied, useful life. Automobiles also are “mobilized” to carry the mechanics to the farms, and those who lend machines for such public work may hope for a cut in automobile taxes. I volunteered for a two-day trip.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One hundred and fifty miles north of Moscow we came to the tractor station to which we were assigned. Of thirty-three new tractors from Putiloff Works, eleven could not move out of the railway station. The rest were breaking down in the fields, under the hands of worried peasant boys and girls who had seen their first machine one month before. All night our volunteer mechanics repaired tractors. All night the local tractor drivers stood up to watch in their eagerness to learn. The following day I drove my car to Moscow with sleeping mechanics in the seats. They had worked twenty hours on end in a public emergency about which they would report next morning to their interested fellow workers in Moscow factories. They had also prepared a technical report charging the Putiloff tractor with certain grave defects. It was printed within two days in the Industrial Gazette, the organ of heavy industry, and led to a conference of industrial leaders on improving the Putiloff tractor. Three weeks later the flax sowing of Moscow province, which in early season threatened to lag at 50 per cent of plan, went over the top 108 per cent, the best flax record in the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It was the work of the social organizations that saved us,” said the Moscow Tractor Center. What were the organizations concerned? The state, the Party, the trade unions, the automobile association had all taken part. The state owned the Putiloff Works, financed the tractor stations, and also owned, through the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the Industrial Gazette which exposed the defects. The trade unions organized the volunteers and took care of their jobs during absence. The automobile association organized autos. But the driving will that saved the situation was the will of thousands of Moscow workers organized and assigned to their tasks by the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, of which most of the mechanics were not even members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even on vacations Communists are supposed to be always watchfully aware of their responsibility for organizing the life of the country. I was slipping down the mighty Volga on a large passenger steamer when I saw a sign asking members of the Party who might be traveling to register with the secretary of the boat organization. I learned that any Communist traveling on the boat was likely to be drafted into speaking at a meeting on deck among the peasants, or at a political school for Communists of the crew. Some of the city Communists used the occasion to criticize hotly the boat Communists for lack of attention to sanitation. The river Communists, mostly untrained sailors, thus got their first lesson in modern hygiene.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ultimate destination towards which the Soviet ship of state is steering was fixed by the Revolution. The rate of speed and the daily and early course is charted by the Central Committee of the Party to take advantage of varying winds and tides. Yet it is a course which every active worker or farmer may take part in fixing. It arises from the experience of three million Party members, each keeping in touch with some section of the people, all of them interacting, discussing, comparing results. Communists of longest experience and best records have the greatest authority; but, be it noted, they do not call it “power.” “Power” resides in the will of the working masses; “authority” is that prestige of character and insight which enables its possessor to organize and release this power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is authority rather than power that Stalin possesses. Though his standing is far higher than that of any man in the Soviet Union, though he is cheered and quoted at all congresses as high authority, men never speak of “Stalin’s will” or “Stalin’s power,” but of the “Party Line” which Stalin reports but does not make. The Party Line is accessible to all to study, to know and to help formulate. The greatness of the man is known by the range over which he can do this. “I can plan with the workers of one plant for a year,” said a factory manager to me. “Others much wiser than I, like the men in our Central Committee, can plan with wider masses for years. Stalin in this is our ablest. He sees the inter-relation of our path with world events, and the order of each step, as a man sees the earth from the stratosphere.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The earth from the stratosphere”—the man who said this was himself an aviation engineer. Men in the Soviet Union tend to see Stalin in terms of their craft. Railway workers call him “locomotive driver of the Revolution.” An economist said to me, speaking of the leaders of Party and government in the Red Square on May-day: “Our brains are there in the tribune.” Harvester-combine operators addressed Stalin as “friend and teacher”; managers of industry say informally “the boss.” Yellow-skinned Kazaks of the desert on the fifteenth anniversary of their republic hailed him “great leader of toiling humanity.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Millions of simple folk in all callings have felt the direct impact of Stalin’s analysis, giving a solution for the chief problem of their lives. It was sometimes a way that was harsh to follow, but it was the one clear path to the goal that the millions desired. There have been statements by Stalin that ushered in great changes, as when he told the agrarian Marxist conference that the time had come to “abolish kulaks as a class.” Yet he only announced the time for a process which every Marxist knew was on the program. His famous article “Dizziness from Success” which called sudden halt on March 2, 1930, to widespread excesses of Communists in rural regions, was regarded by foreign correspondents and peasants alike as an “order from Stalin.” Stalin at once disclaimed any personal prestige therefrom accruing, stating in the press: “Some people think that the article is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin. That of course is nonsense. The Central Committee does not exist to permit personal initiative of anybody in matters of this kind. It was a reconnaissance undertaken by the Central Committee.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin does not rule personally. To a lifelong habit of collective action he adds his personal genius, that of supreme analyst of situations, personalities, tendencies. He leads as supreme combiner of many minds and wills, When Emil Ludwig asked him who really made decisions, he answered: “Single persons cannot decide. . . . Experience of three revolutions has shown us that out of a hundred individual decisions which have not been tested and corrected collectively, ninety are biased. The leadership of our Party in the Central Committee, which directs all the Soviet and Communist organizations, consists of about seventy people. Among those seventy members of our Central Committee there are to be found the best of our industrial leaders, our cleverest specialists and the men who best understand every branch of our activities. It is in this Supreme Council that the whole wisdom of our Party is concentrated. Each man is entitled to challenge his neighbor’s opinion or suggestion. Each man may give the benefit of his own experience. If it were otherwise, if individual decisions were admitted, there would be serious mistakes in our work.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin’s Interview with Emil Ludwig, Dec. 13, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The art of leadership is a serious matter,” said Stalin earlier, in concluding his article “Dizziness from Success.” “One must not lag behind a movement because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But one must not rush ahead, for this is to lose contact with the masses. . . . Our Party is strong and invincible because, while leading a movement, it knows how to maintain and multiply its contacts with the millions of the workers and peasant masses.” This may be taken as Stalin’s analysis of leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are plenty of stupidities and violences in the Soviet Union, yes-men and careerists, hardship and injustice, wastage of youth and life. All man’s essential progress costs heavily in human suffering; the Soviet Union has not escaped this law. What makes it endurable is just this fact that it is caused not by behest of one man or even of three million, but is part of the slow process—history will not call it slow—whereby the tens of millions achieve the organized and conscious planning of their lives.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ComradeEd</name></author>
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		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:This_Soviet_World&amp;diff=63040</id>
		<title>Library:This Soviet World</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:This_Soviet_World&amp;diff=63040"/>
		<updated>2024-02-18T23:14:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ComradeEd: Use &amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Message box|text=This library work is incomplete. It is still being imported by [[Comrade:ComradeEd|ComradeEd]], who has asked that others do not work on it.|image=Warning icon.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Library work|title=This Soviet World|author=Anna Louise Strong|written in=1936|publisher=Henry Holt and Company, Inc.|type=Book|source=https://comlib.encryptionin.space/epubs/this-soviet-world/}}&lt;br /&gt;
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=== ON INTERPRETING A WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
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A leading Russian Communist said to me a year ago “The mind of our people is changing so fast under the conditions of socialism that it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to speak to the rest of the world. We find it harder to understand them, and they us.”&lt;br /&gt;
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We who go back and forth between the Soviet world and the world of capitalism—not only in space from New York to Moscow but also in spirit from intimate life with Soviet people to intimate life in America—feel keenly this difficulty. Important words like freedom, democracy, dictatorship have different meanings on different sides of the border. The Soviet world is sharply conscious of planning its future; the capitalist world is always arriving where it hadn’t intended. And Soviet officials are not always helpful in making their acts intelligible; they often assume that only deliberate malice can doubt them and that the only needed explanation is the appropriate citation from Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
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To explain the swiftly growing Soviet world to that other world out of which it was born is a task that becomes steadily more complex. For if its outer achievements are every year more able to speak for themselves, its inner life more and diverges from that of capitalism in a hundred subtle ways.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Berlin station a giant sign greets me with three-foot letters: “Think of your hair!” My mind flashes back to the world I have left. What are Soviet people thinking of? The Stakhanov drive, the Moscow city plan, Marie and her sugar beets, the conquest of the north. And hair and perfume, O yes, of course. Everyone knows of the rising standard of living and firmly believes in a cultural life—more bath-tubs, radios, books and dramatic clubs and doubtless more hair. But their individuality is expressed not by possessions and polish but by the various ways in which men create. Dynamic is the word; their civilization is dynamic.&lt;br /&gt;
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The regimentation of life by property is my next shock in the capitalist world. The obscene phrases “damages for alienation of affections” or “a $50,000 man” or the remark: “I do it only for the money that is in it”—what degradation they imply of human life and work! I see able engineers spending creative power on little models in a government relief job just to keep alive. I see a journal of high standard, the life-work of an able editor submerged by a new owner’s wish for quick profit. Lives are conditioned in the Soviet world also, by trends and sages of organization, but not by the profits of a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
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The difference appears in the use of pronouns. People under capitalism are contrasting “I” and “they.” “Too bad it couldn’t have been on my land,” a man remarks of a California oil-strike. Soviet folk would be hailing “our new oil-wells”; to them the idea of a private oil-well is already as quaint as a private postal system. I note a remark about American unemployment: “If it gets any worse, they’ll have to do something.” Who is this ultimate, uncontrollable “they”? The term betrays the class society of which the speakers are unconscious; they are waiting for some boss to act. To hear a debate: “Is America going fascist?” and think how much less passively Soviet folk would word it. “Shall we go fascist? No. Then exactly how shall we prevent it?” Soviet folk say “we” of one-sixth of the earth’s surface. Uzbek cotton-pickers, toiling under the sun of Central Asia, say: “We are conquering the Arctic; we rescued the Chelyuskinites.” Ukrainian farmers who never went up in an airplane talk of “our stratosphere records” and “the loss of our Maxim Gorky airplane” as they take up collections to build ten new ones. But even Mrs. Roosevelt asks me: “Are Russian peasants getting more reconciled to accepting direction?” I feel the hopelessness of language as I answer: “No, they are learning better to organize and direct themselves.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Americans often ask me whether Russians are not naturally more altruistic than Americans, more fit for communism, they imply. No, it is something quite different. Russians at the time of Revolution were more medieval than Americans, which means “naturally” more petty, unreliable, inefficient, given to bargaining and cheating. Traits of the Asiatic market-place were widespread and occasionally still annoy the visitor. But these traits are disappearing under the fact of joint ownership, which brings identity of individual with community good.&lt;br /&gt;
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Joint possession of the country’s resources and productive mechanism is the economic reality which unifies Soviet life and makes it dynamic. It is this that washes out the antagonism between personal and public good, that makes men say “we.” It is this that makes men conscious planners of the future; for owners plan but non-owners can only fight or drift. The chief quality of Soviet civilization is the sense that the world is “ours,” to seize, understand and make over.&lt;br /&gt;
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This Soviet world is my theme; I give scant space to those fast disintegrating forces that fought it. I tell not the “whole truth,” for truth is never “whole”; there are always at least two truths in conflict: the truth that is dying and the truth that is coming into existence. American Tories who intrigued for King George had their truth also, but it remains only as piquant sauce to romance; the truth of the Continental armies remained to build the modern republic. They themselves recalled the frozen feet of Valley Forge less as suffering than as heroism; their raids on hungry farms passed into memory not as banditry but as necessity and daring. History’s greatest gift to victors is that not only they, but their truth survives.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet I do no injustice to those many lives which in greater or less degree were wrenched or broken by the coming of the new Soviet order. Even for them the new years obliterate the past. They also change to seek their new future in the new system; Lives broken in terms of property are being remade in terms of work. Saboteurs reform and win posts of honor; kulaks come back from exile to factories and farms; children have an equal start now regardless of fathers. For this war differs from other battles in that all men, even the conquered foes, are absorbed into the ranks of the conquerors—joint heirs to all the fruits of victory.&lt;br /&gt;
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A. L. S.&lt;br /&gt;
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== PART I: MEN MAKE THE SOVIET WORLD ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER I: THE PLAN FOR REMAKING THE WORLD ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The philosophers have only interpreted the world; our business is to change it.”|Karl Marx|Theses on Feuerbach}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Whenever I ask myself what brings increasing visitors to Moscow, what they want here and what they find, and why the eyes of the world turn more and more to the Soviet Union with a questing hope that hardly yet dares call itself belief, there flashes into my mind the remark made to me in 1930 at Dnieprostroy by the young and disillusioned son of a Wall Street millionaire.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dnieprostroy in those days was the first of the famous giants of the new Soviet Russia, “the largest power dam in the world.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Since then surpassed by the Boulder Dam.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hour after hour we climbed the cliffs and ravines of its mighty construction. We fled from screaming sirens that warned of blasting rock. We saw great stone-crushing plants, saw-mills, locomotive repair shops, temporary power station—all sizable works harnessed to the task of making a greater power station which should in turn serve plants a hundred times their scope. We visited the “socialist city” where discussion raged between advocates of individual cottages or big apartment houses for the future town. We saw hurriedly constructed club houses where thousands of workers busily grabbed knowledge—reading, writing, political economy and the technique of their new job.&lt;br /&gt;
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Night fell. We stood on the shore of the yet unharnessed river, destined to rise to bury those high banks beneath a man-impounded lake. We far down at the great sweep of electric brilliance that had already shattered the age-old darkness of the Ukrainian steppe. It was then that my companion said: “I think that Dnieprostroy has answered the question that brought me to Russia.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“What question?” I asked.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Whether the world is to be changed by trying one at a time to improve human beings or by changing the social environment that makes human beings.”&lt;br /&gt;
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In the pause that followed the sounds of construction came to us incessantly, rising from the bowels of earth and filling the horizon. The short, sharp puffs of engines, the roar of cliffs torn asunder, the ceaseless beat of mills grinding stone into concrete, the rasp of drills eating down into river granite. Sharpened by night and softened by distance, they blended into a mighty symphony—music of man, the builder, subduing, the earth.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dark beyond the circling lights lay Hortitz Island, in ancient days the last stand of free-booting bandit chieftains against oppressors. We remembered the husky peasant girl from the island whom we had seen in overalls that morning, gang-boss over twelve men who excavated rock by explosions of liquid air. Dnieprostroy had changed her in a few months from a farm servant to a “brigadier.” We remembered the blacksmith whom we had asked in the glare of foundry fires how he liked his work and who burst forth with fiery will: “You know, we’re going to finish her in 1932”—a simple workman pushing ahead by one year the estimate of Hugh L. Cooper’s world-experienced engineers.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The workman’s estimate won out. The dam was finished in 1932 a year ahead of schedule.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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We recalled how competitions between workers of right and left bank drove the dam ahead, doubling the concrete-laying estimates of the Americans by force of newly awakened will. Signals night by night across the raging torrent told in red and green lights the day’s total, celebrated over-fulfillment of plan by a great red star. Night by night, week by week each bank fought to keep its red star shining. We remembered motion pictures, dramas, concerts, lectures which brought the city’s culture to these thousands who had come from the scattered farms of the Ukraine. The fine new polytechnic institute where workers chosen from the river-gangs were being turned in forty classrooms into engineers. We saw on the high bank the homes of the American consultants, who understood better than the Russians the technique of the great job but were eternally puzzled by its spirit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yes, Dnieprostroy gave the answer to my companion’s question. Dnieprostroy was a new form of production under a new social system. It was remaking individuals by wholesale.&lt;br /&gt;
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Increasingly in the past five years Americans have come to the Soviet Union, scientists, engineers, artists, economists all bent on their own pursuits, dogmatic or bewildered tourists, seeking proof of an old belief or material for a new one. Especially since the crash of 1929 smashed the world which was “inevitably getting better,” they have come, fleeing from the ruins of that earthquake to learn what, if anything, the Soviet Union offers. By no means all of them put their question as clearly as did my young companion; by no means all interpret so swiftly the essence of the first construction job they see. But the question he asked is basically what brings most of them, an ancient quest of man which has troubled philosophers no less than baffled tourists: “Can our world be remade? And how to remake it?”&lt;br /&gt;
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The problem is especially pressing upon the American middle class of today, which has seen its old world taken from it in ways that it hardly understands. The independent small property owners, mostly farmers, who formed a hundred years ago 80 per cent of the American people except in the slave South, bequeathed to their descendants ideals of democracy and freedom, the “liberty and equality of men owning their own means of livelihood.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Lewis Corey: “Crisis of the Middle Class” &#039;&#039;The Nation&#039;&#039;, Aug. 14, 1935.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But large scale industry, developing through a century, wiped out the small enterprisers, increased the number of salaried employees and made the farmer dependent on banks and markets, thus changing America to a “nation of hired workers.” Only 12 per cent of the people live by ownership of their own property, in place of 80 per cent a century ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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The myth of property remained long after the reality had vanished. Millions of these salaried people still felt hat they owned something—no longer a store, a small workshop, an unencumbered farm, but savings in stocks, bonds, insurance—which lifted them somewhat above the ranks of laboring hands. Crashingly the world economic crisis destroyed this illusion. As if to emphasize how little control these small people had over their own property, the value of their liquid wealth shrank from twenty-seven billion dollars in 1929 to four billion in 1932.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Figures from Robers R. Doane on liquid wealth of persons with incomes under $5,000. Quoted by Corey.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of the middle class were thrown into the same abyss of ruin with millions of wage-workers; they wait together on bread-lines, study together the government relief programs, hunt together for a boss. For all of them alike, as long as the capitalist world remains, most put their trust in bosses, someone who owns and will give them access to the means of production and of life.&lt;br /&gt;
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Their situation is the more distressing because for most of our Western world the past hundred years has been what John Strachey aptly calls the “century of the great hope.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;John Strachey, &#039;&#039;The Menace of Fascism&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Millions of men became better fed, better housed, better clothed through the industrial revolution which took production out of the home workshop into the factory and knit together the ends of earth by railroad, steamship, telegraph. Especially America—where the arrival of the new machines and technical methods coincided with a continent-wide expansion into lands of vast wealth, developed by energetic oilers from all nations for the first time unhampered by any remnants of feudalism the belief in inevitable progress and increasing prosperity was both a conscious and unconscious national faith. The little red schoolhouse bade every boy aspire to be president. “Go west, young man.” . . . “Don’t be a bear on America,” said successful plutocrats. But far deeper than these conscious preachings spread the atmosphere of determined optimism which made every man who was not a good booster seem subtly immoral to his friends. Did not the great lands of America, the efficient industries of America, the productive energy of America, offer the basis for a good standard of life for everyone—an “American standard”? It was easy to prove that they did—and do!&lt;br /&gt;
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What happened to that faith in inevitable progress? If it still survives in some circles as a despairing habit, elsewhere it has been replaced by belief in inevitable doom. “Inevitable drift to fascism,” “inevitable twilight of the West,” “the old standard of prosperity can never return,” are phrases common on lips that not long since hailed inevitable advance. Others begin a frenzied search into the faiths of past ages, to know if elsewhere than with us abides the truth. These learn that belief in the inevitability of progress has never been a universal faith. It has been confined to definite periods of economic advancement, and to certain nations within those periods or certain classes within nations. Did not whole centuries of the Middle Ages view the world as an essentially unchanging garden of human souls from which religion culled a few for heaven, leaving the rest for hell? Even today do not hundreds of millions of people—those great suppressed races of the East—find life’s processes so fundamentally evil that their essential faith is Buddhism in which Nothingness is bliss?&lt;br /&gt;
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Even in our West, as capitalism decays into fascism, there arise new denials of the inevitability of progress. Ideals of the past—the Roman Empire, the Germanic gods, the feudal Britain featured by fascist-striving novels—gild with emotional glamor the tenets of fascism: that science and machine production are evil, that democracy, peace and the conquest of poverty are futile dreams of a decadent society, that murderous war is man’s noblest end. For fascism is the last stand of a desperate capitalism which can no longer use the fruits of science and machine production, which dare no longer permit either peace or democracy, since it must brutally refuse to its victims that abolition of poverty which is already technically possible in the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can human reason find a way to reorganize human society—a way which human wills can follow? Must we go backing blindly into the future, cheered now by faith in inevitable progress, damned now by faith in inevitable doom, and claiming from some supernatural world a just and rational balancing of the unjust, irrational chaos found in this? Or can that continuous, collective application of human thought known as science, which we have learned to take as our best, though still unperfected guide in rationalizing and controlling subhuman phenomena, be expanded to rationalize and control our human destiny? Can man master the machines he has made which today threaten increasingly to enslave him? Can he subdue to his will those tremendously productive forces which his science and technical knowledge have released, and which seem adequate to abolish poverty, yet which at present give increasing unemployment, economic crises, wars?&lt;br /&gt;
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We are asking, in other words, can men master destiny? Are all those gleams of human reason which have given us increasing dominion over material phenomena but will-o’-the-wisps, luring to a swamp which will engulf us the more blackly for the false, brief light they gave? Or are they gleams of dawn that may brighten into an ever-increasing daylight, in which not only a few isolated phenomena but the whole of man’s own nature and his organized society can be planned by human reason and carried through by human wills?&lt;br /&gt;
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No less than this is the search that brings men over the seas to the Soviet Union. For if to millions in our Western world the century now passing was the century of the great hope, there are other millions in two great half-continents uniting Europe and Asia, who look upon it rather as the century of the great plan. The reference is not to that Five-Year Plan which the Soviet Union made famous, but to a plan far more comprehensive which prepares and includes all five-year plans in all lands and all the future. A plan for remaking the world drawn up eighty-eight years ago on instructions from a London congress of working-men of many nations, and issued in 1848 under the title &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the work of the German economists Frederick Engels and Karl Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; is usually thought of as the defiance flung at the world by an illegal revolutionary party of hunted people. So it was. But it was also man’s first attempt to apply science to the analysis of human society in order to draw up a plan for remaking the world. Previous attempts to analyze the world were exercises of philosophers, not directed towards change. Previous attempts to change the world were confined to threats or exhortations to secure specific conversions or reforms. Many Utopian pictures had existed of how beautiful society might be when once made over. But the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039; tried to answer the question: How can the thing be done? Born in the middle years of that century in which the scientific method was consciously remaking the material world, it sought to analyze the elements of human society, the nature and cause of the changes we see in history, for the purpose of producing social change in a desired direction. That is why it claims to be Scientific Socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The followers of Marx see in him the genius who combined the three chief currents of thought of the nineteenth century—classical German philosophy, classical English political economy and French revolutionary doctrines. The philosophic basis of Marxism is “dialectics,” which views every reality, whether of nature, the mind, or society, as in process of continual change through the development and clash of “inner contradictions.” This theory applied to the study of history shows how economic, political and social systems are constantly changing, at times slowly, at times by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions. American capitalism of the Civil War period is not the capitalism of today. The democracy of the New England town-meeting is not the democracy of the modern imperial nation. They may be called by the same but names deceive; the thing changes even while you look at it to disdain or admire. Even your disdain and admiration changes, the meaning of your words and concepts. What was true, right, desirable yesterday may not be true, right, desirable tomorrow. Systems have their day and cease to be.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is there any law in this change? Is there in this constant interaction and conflict of systems and ideas anything basic, changing which will change the rest? “The economic structure,” says Marx, is “the real foundation. . . . The mode of production . . . determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Preface to a &#039;&#039;Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For Marx the fundamental thing about any human society is not its system of ideas or religions, nor the form of government nor the nature of its family life. These things are important but derivative. They are determined by the ways in which human beings get food, clothing, shelter, by the stage of their advance and the tools they use in these fundamental operations. In a world whose economic structure fails to reward honesty and altruism, a Marxist would not spend his efforts preaching these virtues, but in creating an economic system where honesty really prospered, where each man’s success must be build on the success, rather than the ruin, of others. The new economic system would make new people; under it, education in the new ideals would be swift and hopeful.&lt;br /&gt;
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How then do economic systems change? Marx finds the key in his theory of “class struggle.” Man’s science and invention create new ways of production, and these in turn create new “classes” of human beings, i.e., groups of people who have different and conflicting relations to production. Between these classes a struggle goes on around the ownership of the process of production, which is the means of life. “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 10-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus at different stages of human history new classes arise from new ways of working and the struggle between them produces social change. Modern capitalism has not done away with class antagonisms, but it has this distinctive feature—it has simplified them. “Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into . . . two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat,”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, 11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; those who live by owning and those who can live only by selling their labor power, by seeking a boss.&lt;br /&gt;
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Between these two remain for a time the middle classes, distraught survivors of those small property owners and independent craftsmen who once embodied the demand for private property against a feudal past. They suffer deeply under advancing capitalism which dislodges them steadily and painfully into the ranks of hired hands. They struggle against their fate, but their strivings are confused, for their instinctive desire is to go back to small scale property. Their cry is to “share the wealth,” to start over again that old society of small owners which led to the present-day monopolies and which would lead to them again if it could be revived. The right to private property was once revolutionary pledge of freedom, but this also has changed with the passing of history. Private property in farm plots and hand tools freed serfs from feudal masters; private property in steel mills creates a new slavery. Even small ownership today, wherever it survives or comes into being, is at the mercy of large scale finance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who owns the world? That is the basic question conditioning all hopes of social change. What is wrong with the world today, according to Marxists, is private ownership of the great productive processes which are socially operated. The way out is not backward to subsistence farms and handicrafts it is forward to social ownership. Not “share the wealth,” but jointly owned wealth, jointly organized by and for all who work. Only thus can the great machines be subjugated; only thus can science and modern technique produce plenty for all mankind. Only thus can the present vision of men into owners and workers be abolished, a division which is wrecking the world by social strife and international war. It must be superseded by one united class of people—joint worker-owners of the world. From this economic equality, all other forms of equality will grow. First a stage of socialism where men have equal access to labor and receive according to their work. Then when the habits of human beings have been changed by joint ownership, will come the stage of communism in which men freely co-operate in work according to their abilities and receive according to their needs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Who will bring about this change of ownership? Clearly not the present private owners: their interests lie the other way. Nor can the disintegrating middle classes achieve it, except insofar as they come to understand that their future lies with the workers. Only one class of people can develop the will to carry through this difficult long epoch of change—the working class which is bound to the mighty mechanism of modern production, mastering it yet enslaved by it. Joint ownership is their only path to freedom; when they understand this, they will accomplish it. They are thus the “really revolutionary class,” in whom social ownership of modern production is a living need and can become a flaming passion carrying humanity forward to a higher stage.&lt;br /&gt;
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The task of every Marxist is to help them understand, to make them “class-conscious,” aware of their power and function as creators of social progress. Millions of Americans resent the very idea of classes, and are indignant at “inflaming class-consciousness” where it does not yet exist. But Marxian classes are not epithets inciting to riot; they are categories in a scientific analysis. Marxists say that unless human society is to go down in a catastrophe of slavery, war and ruin, men must own their tools and the wealth which these create; that tools and wealth have grown too complexly social to be owned individually and must therefore be socially owned; and that only the working class can develop the fighting will to seize the power of ownership and through it remake society. The less the workers are organized, the less conscious they are of their power and function, the more will the coming changes in human society be protracted, painful and blind. The more conscious the workers are of their great task in history, the better they are organized, the more they are able to rally around them the middle classes, the swifter will be the change and the less will be the human suffering.&lt;br /&gt;
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Two generations of economists in many countries developed the Marxian theory. Lenin built on it the Bolshevik Party which in 1917 carried through the Russian Revolution. Stalin is honored today by Bolsheviks not only as statesman and organizer, but as the far-seeing analyst and guider of social change, who continues and develops the scientific method of Marx, Engels, Lenin. One-sixth of the world today is being remade according to the Marxian program—the first consciously devised pattern that men ever applied to society as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER II: THE PARTY OF REVOLUTION ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“To distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident did the first socialist revolution take place in Russia. The World War imposed great strains on many countries and the chain of world imperialism broke at its weakest link.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Hillquit called the Russian revolution an “historical accident,” since it occurred in a backward peasant land. Norman Thomas on the contrary holds it occurred just because the Russians were so backward that they would endure a dictatorship such as no other people would stand.   Stalin says: “The objective conditions for the revolution exist throughout the whole system of imperialist world economy, which is an integral unit.” Answering the theory that the revolution must come first “where the proletariat forms the majority, where culture is more advanced, where there is more democracy,” he says: “No, not necessarily where industry is most developed; it will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the of world imperialism at its weakest link.” From Stalin’s Lectures to Sverdlov Students.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; More than any other land, Russia was tormented by war and ravenous for peace. Tsardom, that hideous hangover from the Middle Ages, had lost all moral authority and was hated by the entire people. For decades revolution had been brewing in Russia.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx noted this as far back as 1877 in his Letter to Zorge. See &#039;&#039;Letters of Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The World War added the last unbearable pressure and the explosion came.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not least among the factors which made the revolution possible and helped determine its form was the existence of the Bolshevik Party.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Today called Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This was no spontaneous creation, born at the moment of revolt; for fourteen years it had been consciously welded by painstaking thought and desperate struggle. Its traditions indeed went back much further. The whole last half of the nineteenth century advanced thinkers in Russia, under the oppression of tsardom, had sought eagerly for the effective revolutionary path. Through fifty years of torment, sacrifice, heroism, incredible energy, careful study, they had tested many methods. They had tried to educate and organize the peasantry; they had tried the terrorist assassination of tyrants. They had failed. They had checked their failures by the history of other nations and a section of them had come to Marxism as the correct program for remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Marx furnished the general program, it was Lenin who developed the theory and tactics, proletarian revolution, and built the organization for the seizure of power. Bolshevism, as a trend of political thought and a political party, exists since 1903, when the Social-Democratic Party of Russia split into groups known as Bolsheviks (majority) and Mensheviks (minority), which correspond to Communists and Social-Democrats today in other countries. The older leaders wanted to “widen” the Party, to take in all “supporters” and give them all a voice in determining the Party’s program. Lenin, though recognizing that any social change must rely on wide masses, not only of workers but of many other “allies,” insisted that membership in the Party itself “must be given a narrow definition to distinguish those who worked from those who talked.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin’s Account of Second Congress, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, II&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To organize and train the Party of Revolution became thenceforth the central task and the greatest achievement of that world-renowned leader, Lenin, who gave his whole life to the study and practice of the science of political power. Power was to him no mere personal achievement of office; it was the organized lifting of the human race one stage forward in history. He studied how to ride the turbulent upheaval which the conflicts in modern society would inevitably produce, how to prepare and lead men for the seizure of the state and the creation of a new order, how at last to organize them for the conquest of nature and of their own destiny. This was to Lenin the science of power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting with the Marxian thesis that the working class is the group in modern society which can be organized to take power and to build a new order, Lenin created for this class a “vanguard” of leaders. They must be men of intelligence, will, daring; yet they must act in a disciplined manner, reinforcing a common direction. They must make the revolution a life-long profession, steadily studying the economic, political and social forces of the society in which they live. They must apply this knowledge in action. They must take active part not only in elections and political movements, but in strikes, trade union work, demonstrations, distribution of literature and all the other prosaic or dangerous activities through which the working class becomes organized and conscious of its power. They must keep close to the workers, learning from them and assisting them, and win the right to lead by the confidence they inspire.&lt;br /&gt;
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How are such leaders to be found among the great hordes of the dispossessed and discontented? How, if found, are they to be welded into a disciplined, fighting force? Lenin had no illusions; he knew that the mass of exploited men who are squeezed out by the dislocations of capitalism, and who turn in hope or despair towards communism, contains many fools, knaves, fanatics and self-pitying failures as well as men of intelligence and will. He foresaw a long period of difficult struggle, in which men fit to lead would be tested by fire, men capable of learning would be trained by experience, and others would weed themselves out by their follies. Lenin himself gave most of his years to the slow work of building up and training a not very large but thoroughly tested Party, which could give leadership when the hour of revolution came. I have met simple workers to whom Lenin devoted hours of individual teaching, and who remember today the exact phrases he used with them forty years ago. The making of real Communists able to lead the masses is a long and costly process.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nothing could be more absurd than the two contradictory views of Communists promulgated today by their opponents. They are usually pictured as planless inciters to violence and riot, people who have a crazy desire for chaos, in the hope that something vaguely called communism may somehow ensue. A more sophisticated view, to which no less a person than Sinclair Lewis falls victim in &#039;&#039;It Can’t Happen Here&#039;&#039;, portrays them as brainless sheep required to act in blind obedience to the orders of their superiors for the sake of discipline. Neither of these types could possibly lead a successful strike, much less a revolution. A communist who increased risks by recklessness would be early eliminated; a man who only took orders would be useless as a leader. Communists must learn the difficult combination of intelligence with daring; they must learn to act together but they must all know why.&lt;br /&gt;
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“What we build cannot be built by passive people,” said one of the secretaries of the Russian Communist Party to me. “We all had strong convictions; we fought for them and went to jail for them,” said another veteran Bolshevik. “Then in jail we fought with our imprisoned comrades over details of past policies, studying and learning from past errors. Often we found that the mistake of a few words in our theory had cost us a year in prison.” Again and again groups which could not agree split off from the others. Lenin made no effort to detain them; he distinguished sharply between those allies with whom co-operation was possible for a longer or shorter period, and the smaller group which would stick through everything. Thus was built up that Party of men who had placed their lives in each other’s hands so often that they could rely on each other with absolute assurance, not through blind submission but through a habit of mutual consultation and swift acceptance of joint decisions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most famous picture of the ideal Communist is given by Krupskaia, widow of Lenin, in an article entitled: “What a Communist Should Be Like.” “First of all a Communist is a social person, with strongly developed social instincts, who desires that all people should be well and be happy. Second, he must understand what is happening about him in the world—the mechanism of the existing régime, the history of the growth of human society, the history of economic development, of the growth of property, the division of classes, the growth of state forms. He must clearly picture whither society is developing—to a régime where the happiness of some will not be based on the slavery of others and where there will be no compulsion except strongly developed social instincts. And the Communists must clear the road, as you clear a path in the wilderness, to hasten its coming.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Third, the Communist must know how to organize creatively. If he is a medical worker, for instance, he must know medicine, then the history of medicine in Russia and other lands, then the Communist approach to the problem of medicine, i.e., how to organize wide masses to create from the ranks of the toilers a powerful sanitary organization in the cause of health. He must know not only what Communism is and what is coming, what his own job in it may be and his approach to the masses. Fourthly, his personal life must be submitted to and guided by the interests of Communism. No matter how much he regrets giving up the comforts and ties of home, he must if necessary cast all aside and go into danger wherever assigned. . . . Body and soul he must be devoted to the interests of the toiling masses, of Communism.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who have risen high in the Communist Party are characterized by these qualities listed by Krupskaia. They are usually reticent about their deepest motives; it is not the thing to gush one’s devotion. One learns of their qualities chiefly through others. Krupskaia, speaking to intimate Party friends at the funeral of her husband Lenin, found the completest expression in the words: “Lenin deeply loved the people.” Radek tells how Stalin, answering greetings sent him by the Party on his fiftieth birthday, “said something which, in the mouth of such a reserved man, sounded as though it came from the very depths of his being. Stalin said that he was ready to shed his blood ‘drop by drop’ for the proletariat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Radek, &#039;&#039;Problems of Soviet Literature&#039;&#039;, 144.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;ProleWiki&amp;quot;&amp;gt;This seems to refer to Radeks speech at the Soviet Writers Congress in August 1934. A copy is available on [https://www.marxists.org/archive/radek/1934/sovietwritercongress.htm marxists.org]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Men who would lead the masses in changing the world by the Marxian method must obviously strive for constant growth in two directions: in ever-deepening understanding of social and economic forces and in ever-widening participation in workers’ struggles. Perhaps the first thing that strikes an outsider is the amount of time which all Communists devote to the study of Marxian theory. Managers of great steel plants and busy county officials under the pressure of harvest will find time, at unearthly hours like eleven at night or seven in the morning, for their study of Marxism or their class in current events, deeming these things as essential as their other pressing work.&lt;br /&gt;
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Visitors to the Soviet Union are not infrequently amazed to find that a Party secretary in a rural township can discuss international affairs with an assurance and abundance of detail which few foreign editors of an American metropolitan news-paper can show, and will handle statistics and history with a good deal more ease than the “Brain Trust.” A prominent American politician once expressed to me doubts of the accuracy of the published interview of H. G. Wells with Stalin. Stalin’s references to the Cromwellian revolution seemed to him too detailed to have been available for conversation. “People,” he said, “don’t talk that way” But any Communist in the Soviet Union who did not know the essentials of Cromwellian revolution, and of other historic revolutions from which he is expected to learn, would join a class to “raise his ideological level.” A Communist who allowed himself to become as ignorant of world affairs as is the average American politician would be ruthlessly “cleaned out” of the Party, or told to join the group of “sympathizers” to learn what he has to know.&lt;br /&gt;
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The emotional vagueness which is a feature of all capitalist political platforms, and which is indeed desired in order to win wide support without being too definite, is the exact opposite of Communist statement. The Communists even seem to be painfully definite, to “take refuge in formulæ,” or to split hairs over the exact interpretation of phrases. All science and technical knowledge, however, advance by just this splitting of hairs to find the exact chemical formula which produces the alloy or the mathematical relation which strengthens the arch of the bridge; discussions in any congress of physiologists or electricians are full of this “dull theory” without which no scientific progress can be attained. Communists take Marxism as such a science; to rise to eminence among them demands years, even decades, of close and penetrating study of social forces. This is no dogma to be learned once for all; it is a developing body of thought, constantly applied to and affected by new conditions. By the very theory of dialectics, these forces are changing. The speeches of Lenin and Stalin and other Party leaders never deal in stirring oratory or spell-binding generalities but in close and careful analysis. Stalin would no more attempt to sway a Communist congress by “force of personality” expressed in brilliant oratory and colorful phrasing, than Edison would have expected to convince a group of American engineers of the reliability of some new formula by emotional words. One such attempt would ruin either an Edison or a Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Communists must not only be scientific; they must also learn to work with the masses. In this they face a special difficulty; the man who has thought for years in Marxian categories may find it as hard to explain them to simple people as an electrical engineer would find it to explain the theory of turbines to men in a candle-lighted world. This is more serious for the Communist than for the engineer; for the latter can build his turbines without help from the candle-lighted individuals, but the Communist cannot make a revolution without the people. Fortunately actions may speak as well as words, and all Communists are required to do active work which brings them in touch with the masses. When intellectuals apply for Party membership, it is a common practice to give them some tasks around a factory, such as teaching night classes in Russian language, civics or Marxism, or practical assistance in trade union work. After a year or two of such testing, the opinion of the workers is taken as to whether the candidate is fit to be a Party member.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any Communist Party at any stage in its development in any country considers persons who cannot co-operate with workers’ movements as unfit for Party membership. In the Soviet Union where the rank and file of non-Party workers have already considerable knowledge of the Party’s ideals, it has become a common thing for them to assist in helping the Party in its selection of members. Two hundred thousand workers who joined the Party some two years ago were actually nominated by the non-Party workers, through repeated meetings and discussions as to what persons in their ranks should be recommended for Party membership. From time to time the Party “cleans out” its membership, and this is always done at open meetings to which all workers of the given institution are invited. Each Communist in the institution must give before this public an extended account of his life and activities, submit to and answer all criticism, and prove before the assembled workers his fitness to remain in the “leading Party.” Members may be cleaned out not only as “hostile elements, double-dealers, violators of discipline, degenerates, career-seekers, self-seekers, morally degraded persons” but even for being merely “passive,” for having failed to keep learning and growing in knowledge and authority among the masses.&lt;br /&gt;
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People admitted to the Communist Party—this admission demands a period of study and probation—must give considerable time to unpaid “Party work” i.e., the various tasks of strengthening the organization and organizing the masses around it. Having chosen as the chief purpose of their life the achievement of the socialist revolution, they must learn how to build a joint program. They take part in the discussions from which arise the decisions of the Party and they are expected to carry out these decisions energetically but never blindly. For they must know why the decisions are made; they must understand the Party Line and be able to promote it without bothering other people for orders. They must have strong opinions and fight for them; but they must know when to fight and when to yield. If they cannot learn this, they will find themselves outside the Party, thrown out either as “passive” or as “opposition.” It is not an easy lesson; there have been many political mortalities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Party members must learn to decide and act collectively, not only in determining the general line, but also in deciding their own work in it. They must consult and accept their comrades’ judgment as to where they themselves can be of most use. In the Civil War Communists were expected to be the first to volunteer for every battle-front. In the Soviet Union today they are first to be sent to difficult posts in industry and farming. They may be torn from jobs in which they are successful and sent to work which they hate; they must there-upon cease to hate it and do it well as an important task. I know of a high official who was taken from a train by a telegram sent through an obscure local secretary in a town through which he passed, and ordered to return for a different assignment. But no order is ever the command of a superior officer; it is the decision of a group of comrades with whom one has chosen to work. This is the famous Party discipline; known as “iron” discipline but also as “conscious” discipline, for it is based not on passive submission but on understanding participation and collective choice. The reward for this discipline is conscious participation in the making of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communists expect not only to lead the masses, but to learn from them in a constant interaction. They must “organize the proletariat”; they must “guide it in its class struggle.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They must “see ahead of the working class,” and be the “experienced general staff” which “every army at war must have if it is to avoid certain defeat.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 88-89, Cooperative Publishers, Moscow.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; But they do not consider themselves a separate caste of leaders, but a “vanguard” intimately a part of the working class they lead. They modify their program to grant temporarily some “backward” demand of the masses, or to include permanently some new form or method which the masses invent. An example of the first was Lenin’s response to the peasants’ demands for splitting up the land, a backward step taken to secure peasant support and “in order that they may educate themselves by fulfilling their desires.” An example of the second was the adoption of “soviets” in government and “artels” in farming, neither of which forms had been foreseen by the Party until they arose. It is the working class which must dictate and not the Party; in 1925 when Zinoviev argued for dictatorship by the Party, Stalin fought against this “narrow point of view,” saying that the confidence between the masses of the people and the Party must not be destroyed by any peculiar Party rights, “because in the first place, the Party might be mistaken, and even if it were not, the masses might take some time to see that it was right.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 51.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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How can three million Communists lead one hundred and seventy million people? Because they are not alien to those millions, but are the most energetic part of them, whose capacity to lead has been repeatedly tested and recognized by the others. Millions of non-Party people today in the Soviet Union work loyally, even enthusiastically under Party direction, yet do not venture to call themselves Communists. One of my best friends was a woman who gave her life to the care of homeless children, and who said to me once: “My life began with the Soviet Power; it alone gave me the chance to fight for children. . . . I care more for the Party’s success than for anything in life.” Yet when her fellow-workers voted her “worthy of being a Communist,” she declined the honor, knowing she could not honestly join while she disagreed on one or two points in the Party program.&lt;br /&gt;
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A fifty-two-year-old wheelwright, Rosenberg, whom I met in the Jewish Autonomous Territory of Birobidjan, had courageously dismantled his home in the Ukraine and taken his family of ten to pioneer in the Far East. He had fought through incredible hardships to build a collective industry which made carts; he was now a member of the city government giving much unpaid time to civic work. “When the Party decided to develop Birobidjan,” he explained, “I knew it would be a great future. It goes higher and higher to the building of socialism. I myself can’t build it, but if I work and others work, we’ll build it.” Few could have expressed the Communist goal more sincerely than Rosenberg, yet he did not think of joining the Party. “I don’t know enough,” he said. “I am just studying the first political courses. Serious reading is not so easy for me. I am fifty-two years old.”&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Far North fourteen years ago I met Rimpalle, who had risked his life to run the Finnish border and “help the Revolution.” He organized the first quarries and mines in a hungry Arctic land; he created a trade union, a co-operative and a night-school for illiterate natives of the forests. He made $100,000 for the state that first summer and got for himself—it was the time of War Communism—only “rations of potatoes and good, fat gravy and one resoling of my boots.” Rimpalle said to me: “It’s a useful job. Up here so near the border and the propaganda of the White Finns, we needed to have an industry to give food to the people.” He was already a candidate for the Communist Party, expecting to be admitted to full membership in a few months.&lt;br /&gt;
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These examples show what is required of Communists. Devoted activity under Communist direction, such as the Jewish wheelwright gave, is not enough. Ninety per cent allegiance, such as the social worker offered, is not enough. Nor was it enough for Rimpalle to work self-sacrificingly to increase socially owned wealth; he must understand consciously the political purpose of his work. I have in the course of fifteen years in the Soviet Union met an occasional Communist who was a grafter, and many more who were stubborn bureaucrats and unenlightened fanatics. But I have also seen how the Party throws out dead wood—not always accurately—and renews itself from the working class it leads.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such is the organized Party which carried through the Revolution and which today welds into shape the great masses of the Soviet Union, with its vast distances, its once backward populations, its hundred and eighty-two nationalities, its foes on all borders. It succeeds by choosing its members with discrimination, by keeping them firmly organized, forever studying and continuously on the job.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communist Party does not expect to last forever. “When classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat dies out, the Party also will die out.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 96.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It sees its task as belonging to a definite stage in human society, with a beginning, a development and an end. No other political party in the world has this type of historic consciousness, this supreme confidence; all others live from election to election, and make no long time plans. The Communist Party considers that it has a specific job in history and confidently expects to stay in power for the time required to carry it through.&lt;br /&gt;
=== CHAPTER III THE DICTATORSHIP ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The conquest by the proletariat of such political power as will enable it to suppress all resistance on the part of the exploiters.”|Program of Russian Communist Party}}&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself. . . . (It) is a means, a path leading to socialism”|Stalin in Address to Sverdlov Students, June 1925}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Most Americans shrink from the word “dictatorship.” “I don’t want to be dictated to,” they say. Neither, in fact, does anyone. But why do they instinctively take the word in its passive meaning, and see themselves as the recipients of orders? Why do they never think that they might be the dictators? Is that such an impossible idea? Is it because they have been so long hammered by the subtly misleading propaganda about personal dictatorships, or is it because they have been so long accustomed to seek the right to life through a boss who hires them, that the word dictatorship arouses for them the utterly incredible picture of one man giving everybody orders?&lt;br /&gt;
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No country is ruled by one man. This assumption is a favorite red herring to disguise the real rule. Power resides in ownership of the means of production—by private capitalists in Italy, Germany and also in America, by all workers jointly in the USSR. This is the real difference which today divides the world into two systems, in respect to the ultimate location of power. When a Marxist uses the word “dictatorship,” he is not alluding to personal rulers or to methods of voting; he is contrasting rule by property with rule by workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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The heads of government in America are not the real rulers. I have talked with many of them from the President down. Some of them would really like to use power for the people. They feel baffled by their inability to do so; they blame other branches of government, legislatures, courts. But they haven’t analyzed the real reason. The difficulty is that they haven’t power to use. Neither the President nor Congress nor the common people, under any form of organization whatever, can legally dispose of the oil of Rockefeller or the gold in the vaults of Morgan. If they try, they will be checked by other branches of government, which was designed as a system of checks and balances precisely to prevent such “usurpation of power.” Private capitalists own the means of production and thus rule the lives of millions. Government, however chosen, is limited to the function of making regulations which will help capitalism run more easily by adjusting relations between property and protecting it against the “lawless” demands of non-owners. This constitutes what Marxists call the dictatorship of property. “The talk about pure democracy is but a bourgeois screen,” says Stalin, “to conceal the fact that equality between exploiters and exploited is impossible. . . . It was invented to hide the sores of capitalism . . . and lend it moral strength.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Power over the means of production—that gives rule. Men who have it are dictators. This is the power the workers of the Soviet Union seized in the October Revolution. They abolished the previously sacred right of men to live by ownership of private property. They substituted the rule: “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.”&lt;br /&gt;
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What characteristics of the new régime most obviously showed its dictatorial character? They were the following:&lt;br /&gt;
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First, the Bolsheviks took power without waiting for a majority vote—in the elections to the Constituent Assembly they had just received nine million out of thirty-six million ballots—but relying on their overwhelming majority among the industrial workers, and an overwhelming superiority in that part of the army near the capital cities. They maintained power by a shrewd analysis of social classes, and by satisfying the demands of the sections of the population whose support they needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Second, they organized the new government on the basis of the workers’ organizations, thus dis-franchising those classes which lived by private ownership, and giving a greater proportionate representation in the higher government bodies to workers than to peasants during the first eighteen years when equal voting by great masses of illiterate small owners would have wrecked policies of social ownership.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This difference is commonly stated as a five to one proportion, but such was not the case. Industrial districts had in the higher organs one representative for 25,000 &#039;&#039;electors&#039;&#039;, while rural districts had one for 125,000 &#039;&#039;population&#039;&#039;, which included children. The proportion is thus nearer two to one, a much less disproportion than exists (in the reverse direction) between rural and city votes for many state legislatures in America. This disproportion in the Soviet Union was abolished when the rural districts reached literacy and large-scale farming. See next chapter.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Third, they took control of schools, press and all means of expression, and while encouraging the widest latitude of criticism by workers interested in augmenting or improving the public properties, suppressed any expressions which seemed to the government likely to strengthen the rights of private property or injure the efficiency of socially owned production. At certain periods when they felt their social ownership of production threatened, whether by sabotage, graft, or the strengthening of private owners, they suppressed these dangers as drastically as they thought necessary by means which varied from economic discrimination to deportation or shooting.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are real characteristics which constitute dictatorship rather than any personal prestige of Stalin. Great men attain leadership under all forms of government; the technical forms through which Stalin leads are fully as democratic as those by which an American president governs, and infinitely more democratic than the dominance of a Morgan. Nor is the existence of a single Party necessarily a bar to democratic self-expression, which can find its way as well through one party as a dozen, as later chapters will show. But the above characteristics are definite indications of dictatorship, a rule to which not all men have equal access. They are the tactics of all owners in all countries and all periods of history when they feel themselves threatened. They are the tactics to which owners of private property resorted in Italy and Germany when the rising votes of communist and socialist workers threatened their ownership. They are resorted to today in sections of America where property feels threatened, whether by farmhands in Imperial Valley or sharecroppers in Arkansas and Alabama. They will be resorted to on a wider scale if American capitalism really feels itself slipping. Nothing in Soviet history indicates that the Bolsheviks were any more “dictatorial” or ruthless than owners of property anywhere under similar stresses. Certainly they were far less bloody and oppressive than any of the “dictatorships of the right”—whether in Hungary, Finland, China, Italy or Germany—established in retaliation or prevention by private ownership which really felt itself in danger.&lt;br /&gt;
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What were the conditions which made the Bolsheviks establish a dictatorship? Why could they not wait until they were voted into power, and then take over one by one, by government decree or by taxation, the large-scale properties which they believed must be socially owned? The history of fascist seizures of power in face of the threat of socialist voting is beginning to give the world the answer to this question. The Bolsheviks knew the answer from their Marxian analysis of history. No owning class ever gave up ownership without struggle. The holding of government office is not itself power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The power of ownership over the means of life is the day-by-day power which works incessantly, buying brains, corrupting or confusing governments, persistently re-establishing itself against any “will of the people.” Anyone who has experienced in a single American city, as I have in Seattle, the intensity and variety of methods which the capitalists use to fight so mild a thing as public ownership of street-cars, anyone who knows what they did to the war-time government-owned railroads, or today to the Tennessee Valley Corporation, must realize the resources possessed by capitalism against anything so mild as a popular vote. When they can no longer prevent a municipally owned utility, they corrupt it. They make it inefficient through graft or sabotage; they subordinate it to control by private banks. Meantime they continue to play through all the arts of high-paid propaganda on the minds of the electors, who waver and turn to other cures.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The change from capitalism to communism is a whole epoch of history,” said Lenin. “Till it is ended, the exploiters inevitably have the hope of restoration.” Even after capitalists are overthrown on a local scale or on the scale of a single country, they remain for some time “stronger than the workers who overthrew them.” Their strength lies in their foreign connections with international capital, in the money and movable property which they still possess, in their organizing and administrative ability, their superior education, their knowledge of all the secrets of administration, their superiority in the art of war. They are furthermore helped by the force of habit and traditional ways of thinking which remain even in the minds of workers and especially in large sections of the middle classes for a considerable period after capitalism is overthrown.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Quoted and condensed from Lenin, &#039;&#039;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&#039;&#039;, Chap. 3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxists therefore hold that the working class must maintain a dictatorial power for an “entire epoch of history” both to prevent attempts at restoration of capitalism and to re-educate the entire population in habits suited to socially owned production. “You will have to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil wars and international wars,” said Marx to the workers, “not only to change external conditions, but in order to change yourselves and to make yourselves fit for the exercise of political power.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Marx, &#039;&#039;Revelations on the Communist Trial in Cologne&#039;&#039;, 1851.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The tactics used by the dictatorship in the Soviet Union were conditioned by the economic development of the land and its international relations. In the first years they were affected by foreign intervention and civil war; in later, years they conformed to and created the rapid economic advance and increasing international prestige of the country. Four chief epochs may be noted: the period of Workers’ Control in the first year of the Revolution; War Communism for the two and a half years of intervention; the New Economic Policy from 1921 to 1928; and the final offensive against capitalism ushered in by the first Five-Year Plan.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new workers’ state inherited a country economically broken by the strain of World War. Peasants were seizing lands of landlords; factories had closed and their workers were hungry; banking was demoralized by the rapid fall of the currency; soldiers without food or munitions were fleeing home from the front. “Peace, land and bread,” was the cry of the country. The capitalists could not satisfy it and this brought the Bolsheviks to power. They at once gave land to the peasants, repudiated all state debts, nationalized banks and transport and created a state monopoly of foreign trade. Industry was left in private hands, but “workers’ control” committees were established from the workers in each industry. These examined all accounts, studied the source of raw materials and fought to keep up production against the attempt of private capitalists to close down the factories as unprofitable. Internal trade remained private; on the second day of the Revolution a proclamation urged traders to continue business as usual. A policy however was announced for the gradual combining of factories into large-scale trusts, which should then be nationalized, and for the gradual socializing of internal trade through co-operatives.&lt;br /&gt;
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These policies—the normal reaction of a workers’ government wishing to rebuild the economic life of a ruined country with as little upheaval and disruption as possible, for the sake not of profit but of human welfare—united around the government the overwhelming majority of the population, including both workers and peasants. Opposition came from landlords, capitalists and the upper strata of engineers, civil servants and professional people; but if these used violence or sabotage against the new policy, they were suppressed by governing organizations composed of great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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A vivid example of dictatorship in this period is given by Lenin, in a contrast drawn between dictatorship by property and dictatorship by workers. “The state has forcibly to evict a family from a house. This is done time and again by the capitalist state and will be done by our proletarian state. . . . The capitalist state evicts the workers’ family which has lost its breadwinner and is unable to pay rent.” After describing the enforcement by a squad of police of the rights of property against poor people, Lenin continues with the picture of the dispossession of a rich man by the workers’ state.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Our detachment of workers’ militia consists, let us say, of fifteen people—two sailors, two soldiers, two class-conscious workers (of whom only one, let us assume, is a member of our Party or a sympathizer), one intellectual, and eight members of the toiling poor; at least five are necessarily women, domestic servants, unskilled workers, and so on. They come to the rich man’s house, inspect it, and find that there are five rooms occupied by two men and two women. “This winter, citizens, you must confine yourselves to two rooms and place two rooms at the disposal of two families that are now living in cellars. For the time being, until with the help of engineers (you are an engineer, I think?) we build good dwellings for all, you will have to put yourselves to inconvenience. Your telephone will serve ten families. This will save about a hundred hours’ work in running to the stores and so forth. The student citizen in our detachment will write out two copies of the text of this state order and you will be kind enough to give us a signed declaration that you undertake to abide by it faithfully.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lenin, &#039;&#039;Will the Bolsheviks Retain Power?&#039;&#039; published October, 1917.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This is a vivid example of a dictatorship over property enforced by great masses of the common people.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under pressure of foreign intervention and civil war, the limited nationalization of “Workers’ Control” merged into the period of “War Communism.” Attacking armies separated Soviet Russia for two and a half years from her chief food and fuel bases. The granary of the Ukraine, the cotton of Turkestan, the coal of the Donetz, the oil of Baku, the mines of the Urals were in enemy hands. The dictatorship adopted “War Communism,” the tactics of a besieged land. It requisitioned all grain and necessities of life, and rationed them under direct government control; it seized all factories and used the broken machines of one as spares to repair the scarcely less broken machines of another. This policy alienated large sections of the peasantry by crop requisition. It ruined industry more thoroughly than any modern industry has ever been ruined, being an efficient device for using up the last ounce of raw material and the last spare bolt. But the policy of “War Communism” enabled an already exhausted land to carry on for two and a half more years against the attacking armies of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soviet power survived. With the coming of peace Lenin at once introduced the New Economic Policy, an attempt to build up the country’s economic life as rapidly as possible by a “two-sided process of the development of capitalism and the development of socialism.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Stalin, &#039;&#039;Leninism&#039;&#039;, I, 314.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Grain requisitions were replaced by limited taxes with permission for free trade. Private capitalists were allowed to enter both trade and industry, the state retaining the “commanding heights” of land, finance, heavy industry, transport, and foreign trade. This policy brought the peasant, small enterpriser and professional classes back to loyalty—a wavering loyalty, for if some had been won to socialism, others now hoped to grow personally rich. Capitalist nations abroad echoed the belief that Russia was swinging back to the ancient order. But the Soviet workers, led by the Communists, gave time on holidays to great collective drives for repairing factories, making street-cars and new equipment as donations to their country. During “War Communism” they had worked for rations; now they worked for low but steadily increasing wages, building up out of their own sacrifice the first socialist accumulation which should give them economic power for the final offensive against capitalism. Thus industry which in 1921 produced one-fifth the pre-war standard was driven by fivefold increase in 1928 to “normalcy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Russia in 1928 was only half socialist. Most of industry was socially owned but farming was in the hands of peasant proprietors, the stronger of whom were petty capitalists, struggling not only to survive but to grow. Class strife went on between these emerging rural capitalists and the impoverished farmhands. Youth was leaving the farms and flooding the cities with unemployment. Discussion had racked the Communist Party as to whether socialism could be built in a single country, particularly a backward peasant land. Following the analysis of Stalin, the Party decided that it could be done by swiftly creating modern heavy industry and simultaneously industrializing farming. The Soviet Union plunged into that now famous struggle known as the Five-Year Plan, and emerged with large-scale industry and the largest scale farming in the world, both of them socially owned.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a bitter fight, carried through against the upper sections of the peasantry and part of the middle class. An epidemic of sabotage broke out in the industries among the higher engineering staff, who had consciously or half-consciously expected to advance towards privilege and wealth. Men high in the canning industry put broken glass, animal hair and fish tails into food destined for workers. A township veterinary who hated collectivization inoculated six thousand horses with plague. An irrigation engineer tried to discourage the policy of settling yellow-skinned nomads on the soil by using antiquated surveys which he knew would not deliver the water. These cases and thousands more are taken from confessions of men who were later repentant. The dictatorship fought back, shooting the most serious offenders, imprisoning and exiling others. The energy of loyal workers and engineers carried through the Five-Year Plan. Its success won over many earlier saboteurs so that by 1931 Stalin was able to announce that the intellectuals were turning towards the Soviet Government, and should be met by a policy of co-operation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Speech delivered at Conference of Leaders of Industry, June 23, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The most spectacular act of ruthlessness which occurred in those years was the exiling of several hundred thousand kulaks—rural property-owners who lived by trade, money-lending or by exploiting small mills, threshers, and hired labor—from farm homes in European Russia and the Ukraine to Siberia or the northern woods. The usual assumption outside the Soviet Union is that this exiling occurred through arbitrary action by a mystically omnipotent G.P.U. That organization did of Course organize the deportation and final place of settlement in labor camps or on new land. But the listing of kulaks who “impede our farming by force and violence” was done by village meetings of poor peasants and farmhands who were feverishly and not too efficiently organizing collectively owned farms with government loans of machinery and credits. The meetings I personally attended were as seriously judicial as a court trial in America. One by one there came before the people the “best families,” who had grabbed the best lands, exploited labor by owning the tools of production as best families normally and historically do, and who were fighting the rise of the collective farm—which had the right to take the best lands away from them—by every means up to arson, cattle-killing and murder. Obviously the situation offered chances for wreaking private grudges. Obviously the occasional agitator from the city was unconcerned with kulak “rights.” The meeting of farmhands and poor peasants discussed each case in turn, questioned the kulaks, allowed most of them to remain but asked the government to deport some as “trouble-makers.”&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a harsh, bitter and by no means bloodless conflict, but not one peculiar to Russia. I was reminded of it again in 1933 by the cotton-pickers’ strike in San Joaquin Valley of California. California local authorities deported pickets who interfered with the farming of ranchers; Soviet authorities deported kulaks who interfered with the collectively owned farming of the poor. In both cases central governments sent commissions to guard against the worst excesses. But the “property” which could count on government support was in California that of the wealthy rancher; in the USSR it was the collective property of the poor.&lt;br /&gt;
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Through all these struggles of eighteen years in the Soviet Union the Marxists had guessed right—one class held firm. Steadily the industrial workers supported and fought for their socialist state. Theirs was the dictatorship, the ownership, the rule. Led by Communist analysis, they made alliances with other parts of the population—with the great mass of the people to overthrow big landlords and capitalists and later with the poorer peasants to overthrow the richer. The middle classes changed back and forth in their loyalty; but the workers held through.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today the chief fight of the dictatorship is against corruption and bureaucracy. The workers, in other words, struggle with their own government, not to overthrow it but to improve it by weeding out inefficiency. A vivid example of this was given by a letter from three railway-workers published in &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;. They told how the workers of their station, hearing that Sizran station was considered a model, chose three delegates to go and study it. “The election fell on us. However, to our great regret, we convinced ourselves that Sizran is no model.” The letter proceeds to expose fictitious bookkeeping which compelled engineers to list repeated repairs as new in order to protect the reputation of the repair shops, and other false entries which hid inefficiencies. They noted employees who had been demoted for calling too open attention to troubles. They did a thorough and technically accurate job of debunking Sizran, a station on a different railroad to which they had gone in search of good methods. Imagine workers from a station on the Erie giving this attention to study, analyze and reform a station on the Pennsylvania! Imagine their securing ready access to all the records of an alien line! Imagine this as routine news in a metropolitan daily paper, leading to check-up and reprimands of railway superintendents for inaccuracy in reporting their work!&lt;br /&gt;
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This is today’s routine in the Soviet Union. Scores of letters like this appear daily in the press throughout the land. Some of them are ironic, some statistical, some outraged. But all of them express men who know themselves owners, and through ownership dictators of the land in which they live.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER IV THE GROWING DEMOCRACY ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Soviet Power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.”|Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
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Step by step the Soviet Union fights forward towards that complete democracy which has never yet existed anywhere on earth. For democracy is neither absolute nor static. It varies in type, extent and intensity. It may grow or diminish. In the Soviet Union it grows.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are the functions of government in the Soviet Union? How wide is the participation of the people? How much of their life can they control? Whence come the ideas that are followed in the land? What initiative and creative energy is expressed? Who rises to high posts and by what means? All these questions must be considered in determining what kind of democracy exists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take first the formal facts of voting, though this is far from exhausting in the Soviet citizen’s participation in government. The Soviet Union has today the largest body of voters any where in the world. Moreover a larger percentage of them come out to elections than in any other country; they give more time to their elections and decide a greater variety of questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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All “toilers” over the age of eighteen may elect and be elected; the word is interpreted to include students, housewives, old people who have passed the age of work as well as those more formally known as workers. Voting thus extends to a younger age than is common elsewhere, and there are no disqualifications for transient residents, paupers, migratory workers, soldiers, sailors, such as exist in most countries; even non-citizens may vote if they work in a Soviet industry. There are no restrictions for sex, creed or color, nor even for illiteracy. The only significant restriction relates to “exploiting elements,” but the steady decrease of privately owned enterprises has cut the disfranchised to 2.5 per cent of the population in the 1934 elections; by 1937 it is expected that all will have the vote. In the 1934 elections 91,000,000 people were entitled to vote, and of these 77,000,000, or 85 per cent, actually participated, which is double the proportion found in most countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take a motion picture of a Soviet election. In December 1934 the Moscow streets were thronged with processions, continuing for several days. Special street-cars, gay with banners, carried people to meetings. Men and women gathered in side streets, formed in line with merry chatter and went with bands and flags to the building secured for their election meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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All over the country for more than a month elections had been going on in far-away factories and villages. Soviet elections do not take place on a single day but are determined by local convenience within a period of several weeks prior to the convening of an All-Union Congress. Localities choose dates which will enable their outgoing governments to finish their business, and give the incoming governments time to prepare demands for the All-Union Congress. These candidates and demands had been subjects of much discussion. But the attitude to the elections expressed itself rather in action than in talk. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were joining collective farms “to break with the past and enter the elections as collective farmers.” Factory workers were energetically completing new models of locomotives, turbines, inventions, to send as presents to the coming congress. There were, in fact, so many of these presents that the sending of most of them was ordered confined to reports.&lt;br /&gt;
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In wooded mountains of Siberia the dark-skinned Oirots announced proudly: “We have abandoned the wandering life of wigwams; we have raised our literacy rate from 6 to 89 per cent; we enter these elections as educated farmers, settled on our own soil.” From the Turkoman Republic they were matching this claim with another: “Our once suppressed women have increased the proportion who turn out to elections from 2.5 per cent to 73 per cent in these eight years.” The historic city of Kiev was boasting: “Half our elected deputies are women. We lead the Soviet Union in the proportion of women elected to office; this means that we lead the world.” But their boast was matched by the textile city Tver, now renamed Kalinin, which has fully as many.&lt;br /&gt;
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Young Pioneers were reciting poems to urge on their elders:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;That we may build more firmly,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Advancing more confidently to victory,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;We choose to our Soviets firm, tested fighters,&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Close-welded, the best of our best.&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On the southern Kazak steppe an aged yellow-skinned herdsman, dying, sent a last message to his son who had been village president and who was now elected delegate to the All-Union Congress: “All the years of my life were dark with toil and hunger. But I lived to see the new day. Take care of the Soviet power, my son; it is our power, our happiness.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Along the Arctic coast the autumn herring run began a few days before the date set for local elections. The fishermen went to sea. Some of the election commissioners held elections in the absence of a considerable number of voters and were roundly denounced for it by &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, central organ of the Communist Party. “A gross violation of Soviet democracy! What right have commissioners to hold elections when workers cannot come? We are glad to note that many of the ﬁshermen had a better sense of their obligations. Many crews held their own meetings and sent deputies ashore with their instructions. But they should not have been forced to this irregularity. The proper course was found by those commissioners who held regular election meetings on the boats and thus combined enthusiastic work for a good herring catch with the collective decision of what to do with it.”&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this, taken together and multiplied by millions, makes plain the essence of the Soviet election. It is an act of joint owners deciding what to do with their production, how to build a good life on the proceeds. The task of officials is not to enforce some precedent but to find ways of adjusting election machinery to voters. “The hottest elections we ever had,” they bragged of the 1934 elections, proud of the increasing popular participation in government, which is relied on to check bureaucracy and make state enterprises efficient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic unit for government is the working institution, the factory or office; in rural districts it is the village. Deputies are chosen to the local government, the village or city soviet.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The word “soviet” means “council.” City soviet is city council.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The basis of representation and size of the local soviet depends on the size of the community: Gulin village, whose election I visited, has one deputy for every forty voters and a village soviet of thirteen members. Moscow city elects one deputy for fifteen hundred voters and has more than two thousand members in its city soviet. These local deputies meet soon after election to form the new government. They divide among themselves the various departments, which range from the five sections of Gulin village—farming, livestock, culture, roads and finance—to twenty-eight sections, each with over forty deputies, through which Moscow city does business. Besides the more commonly known functions, these local governments own and manage local industry, which in a large city like Moscow includes many municipally owned factories, the street-cars, subway, lights, water, and housing. They receive revenue from public properties, but their budgets may also be augmented by taxes and state loans. Some cities actually bring in revenue—it will be remembered that they get all the house rents; others need help from the higher governments.&lt;br /&gt;
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On these local governments is built up the whole structure of central government.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;A new constitution is in preparation which will change many details, but it will hardly change the principle of close connection between local, state and central bodies in one system.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Local soviets elect deputies to a congress of soviets; the township congress elects to the province, and so on up to the All-Union Congress of Soviets, the highest body in the country. Each of these congresses elects its executive committee and the heads of its various departments; for the highest government these are the great Commissariats of heavy and light industry, finance, health, and so forth. Local departments are both horizontally and vertically controlled, by local governments and by the corresponding department in the higher government. Thus a township health department is responsible both to the township executive committee and to the provincial health department. If orders clash, if a local soviet takes the hospital for some other use, its health department appeals to the provincial health department which brings pressure on the local soviet through the provincial government in the interests of public health.&lt;br /&gt;
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The greater part of this intricate yet unified system of government is carried on by unpaid work. Elected deputies, whether to village or the All-Union Congress, receive no salaries of office. They draw their usual wages from the factory or institution which sends them and in which they keep on working, except insofar as they may be “released from production” for the needs of government; this varies with the importance of the work they do. There is thus no hard and fast line between the citizen and the man in office. Deputies are a link between the collective life of the factory and the larger collective life of the country. Any worker may approach them conveniently any day in their place of work to ask about the fulfillment of instructions given by the voters. They may be recalled by their constituents at any time simply through a factory meeting.&lt;br /&gt;
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If voters thus constantly call on their deputies, the deputies are equally entitled to call on the voters for help in carrying out the election program they have voted. A deputy is no substitute for the people, no ruler; he is the representative who organizes them in their own tasks of voluntary government work. Millions of citizens take active part in the sections of the government—housing commissions, school commissions, taxing commissions, labor inspection and so on. Those who develop a taste for running public affairs will be chosen at some election for more continuous and responsible work. Those who specialize in some field, such as health, courts, housing, may be sent on pay for some months or years of study and become full-time civil servants in these departments.&lt;br /&gt;
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The growth of democracy in the Soviet Union thus depends directly on the extent to which citizens can be interested in taking part in operations of government. This interest is in part assured by the fact that government is so clearly the direct organizing of all aspects of the citizen’s life. In a million matters the citizens give direct instructions during the election. They order the increase of school-houses or sound films, the improvement in the quality of bread, the increase of retail stores, the transport of goods in big cities by night; they demand the breaking-up of housing trusts into smaller co-operatives, or the introduction of a less specialized education in the schools. All of these were part of some 48,000 instructions issued directly by Moscow voters to their city government, which reported within three months on the fulfillment of many hundred demands and on the disposition made of all. When instructions clash, as when some citizens want an odorous industrial plant removed from their neighborhood while others want it to stay, commissions are formed which try to satisfy not merely the majority, but as nearly as possible everybody, not through a showing of hands in opposition, but through various adjustments to the suggestions made by all. Capitalist ownership of private property limits the citizen’s participation, in government to an approval or rejection—expressed in conflict—of general policies. Socialist ownership causes government policies to grow directly and naturally from the correlated demands of millions of people, all of whom are interested in improving the country’s wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interest of citizens in government is also consciously promoted by the Communist Party which stirs up wide competitions between factories, villages, cities, as to the extent and energy of their participation. An industrial plant where less than 95 per cent of the workers come to the election hangs its head in shame as an institution lacking in civic consciousness. Candidates never make speeches or election promises; this would be considered highly indelicate. But the voters pride themselves on picking deputies whose previous work has been notable and who therefore give promise of being widely useful. They select a fellow worker, not an outside politician. Students choose a student, auto-workers choose an auto-worker, the Moscow Grand Opera elects a famous singer. The future task of these deputies is to extend on a wider scale the type of work for which they are already known. The opera singer will organize connections between the Moscow Grand Opera and the villages, sending out artists to help rural singing classes. The printer on the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; who mechanized its mailing list of two million subscribers was elected to the Moscow city soviet with instructions to help mechanize all the newspapers of the city. A textile worker who helps organize a good day nursery in her factory will be elected by her fellow workers to help improve the city’s day nurseries, and will choose to work on the health section of the local government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The operation of Soviet democracy is thus so intimate, continuous and organic that the observer fresh from capitalist politics hardly recognizes it as government. Where is the debate? Who determines general policies? Can the people throw out the upper officials? Can they throw out Stalin? The Communist Party? The Soviet voter, when asked these last questions, replies in a puzzled way: “Why should we want to?” The questioner thinks he has been evaded. But all elections presuppose an existing economic system, which voting is powerless to change. Voters in America cannot change Rockefeller’s method of operating oil companies for private profit. Similarly no Soviet election raises the issue of returning public properties to private hands: this was settled by the Revolution, and forms the foundation beneath the whole government.&lt;br /&gt;
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Barring that question, there is nothing whatever that Soviet voters cannot change. They actually do change thousands of officials at every election, and as their acquaintance with the wider problems of the country grows, the forms of democracy are being widened to include direct control of the highest officials. Stalin’s chief post is not in the government, but as general secretary of the Communist Party, which would certainly remove him if his policy and actions should ever discredit him with the people; at present he is by far the most popular man in the country. To throw out the Communist Party bodily would be to throw out all the leading and organizing elements in all factories, farms, schools and enterprises; it could clearly be done only by upheaval leading to chaos. But the citizens are constantly at work changing the very membership of the Party, any member of which may be “cleaned out” on protest of his non-Party associates that he is too dictatorial, too rough towards workers, or merely not a fit leader.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;This is discussed in Chaps. 1 and 5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Several elections which I attended will show concretely how soviet democracy functions. Four election meetings were held simultaneously in different hamlets of Gulin village, which had no assembly hall big enough for all. One of these meetings threw out the Party candidate, Borisov, because they felt that he neglected their instructions; they elected a non-Party woman who had displayed energy in improving the village and were praised by the election commissioner—himself a Party member—for having discovered good government timber which the Party had neglected. The central meeting in Gulin expected 235 voters; 227 appeared and were duly checked off by name at the door. There ensued personal discussion of every one of nine candidates, of whom seven were chosen. Mihailov “did good work on the roads.” The most enthusiasm developed over Menshina, a woman who “does everything assigned her energetically; checks farm property, tests seeds, collects state loans.” Dr. Sharkova, head of the Mothers’ Consultation, was pushed by the women: “We need a sanitary expert to clean up our village.” The incoming soviet was instructed to “increase harvest yield within two years to thirty bushels per acre, to organize a stud farm, get electricity and radio for every home, organize adult education courses, football and skiing teams, and satisfy a score of other needs.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Moscow Architectural Institute where 1,500 men and women are qualifying to become architects, every class in the school held three sessions on the elections, discussing first the shortcomings of the outgoing government, then instructions to the new government, and lastly candidates. The fourteen hundred instructions sent in by the students included more and better draughting pencils, evening schools in drawing, more money for students’ excursions to see new architecture, more exhibitions of foreign architecture, fruit trees to beautify Moscow, artists to be held responsible for designs of state-made texiles, township architects to be appointed to advise the new construction on farms. Similarly the 1,500 voters of the &#039;&#039;Peasants’ Gazette&#039;&#039; turned in 1,500 proposals, which were carefully worked over by committees, published in a special newspaper issued for the voters, and given to their deputy to put through with their help. These included adequate textbooks for all pupils in the schools, an increase in the number of children’s theaters, strengthening the fight against hooliganism, closing the sale of liquor on Suchevski Street opposite school Twenty-two—the latter being the common form of the fight against alcohol.&lt;br /&gt;
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Instructions thus adopted become the program of incoming governments, which they use as a weapon to get what they require from provincial and central authorities. Some of the demands can be put through by the electors themselves with the help of their deputy; others need central assistance. When the All-Union Congress meets it knows how many villages are demanding air-dromes, sound films, textbooks, electrification. These demands, correlated by engineers and economists, form the content for future development of the life of the country in the direction its citizens choose. But the citizens themselves expect to work to accomplish it. If villagers ask for a seven-room school or a landing field for farm airplanes, they expect deputies to investigate possible fields, make recommendations, get the needed machines from some central authority; but they themselves expect to haul the timber or pay the men who haul it with labor days credited against the joint harvest.&lt;br /&gt;
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Democracy in Soviet life is not confined to government. Trade unions organize many aspects of workers’ life; collective farms and co-operatives organize production and distribution for the farmers. Their organization is separate from that of government; it is also democratically controlled. In the past two years democracy has become more intimate and decentralized in both these directions. The administration of social insurance, which in 1936 will have eight billion rubles for hospitals, day nurseries, diet kitchens, invalid benefits, old-age pensions and the like, was two years ago given over to the trade unions, as was also the inspection of factories and of workers’ food stores. Similarly the whole organization of collective farming, including the relation between fields operated jointly and plots individually worked by farm members, is today in the hands of the farmers themselves, decided by the general meeting at which not less than two-thirds are present. Thus democracy grows more flexible, the intermediate apparatus is lessened, and the various functions of government are handled by those whom they most directly concern.&lt;br /&gt;
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The extension of social ownership into the farms and the growth in the intelligence of the entire electorate has made possible a third extension of democracy. A new constitution is being drafted by the collective labor of thousands of people in all parts of the land. Economists and historians are studying the constitutions of all countries and considering every detail of democratic technique; their reports will be further discussed in every factory and farm of the country before the constitution takes final form. It is known, however, that it will include direct election, secret ballot, and equal representation for all citizens, replacing the inequality which hitherto obtained between city workers and peasants. At is also expected to abolish all disfranchised classes, since by 1937 social ownership will be universal and all citizens will belong to one toiling-owning class.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty,” was said once of the democracy of capitalist society whereby small private owners protected their rights. But socialism demands more than vigilance. Eternally co-operating human energy is the price of socialism and of that complete democracy which operates jointly owned means of production for the expanding life of all. This is the final stage towards which the present Soviet democracy struggles and grows.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== CHAPTER V THE UNION OF NATIONS ===&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|“Among the masses of people, we are but drops in the ocean, and we will be able to govern only when we properly express that which the people appreciate. Without this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not take the lead of the masses, and the whole machine will fall to pieces.”|Lenin at Eleventh Party Congress}}&lt;br /&gt;
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If by some cataclysm of war a section of the Soviet Union should be cut off from Moscow and compelled for a time to exist alone, government in these isolated areas would continue unchanged except insofar as it was crushed by invading armies. A picturesque example of this was given me by a Yakut woman, who boasted that her district of forests and tundra a thousand miles north of the Trans-Siberian Railway had had “Soviet Power” continuously since 1917. The years of civil war that raged along the railway had never penetrated so far north. To my query how this backward bit of territory knew what policies to follow she replied that a few Bolshevik exiles had remained among them and they got occasional news from Moscow over the Great Northern Telegraph which traversed their region. Many other sections of the country were isolated during the Civil War for considerable periods, yet continued to follow a common policy.&lt;br /&gt;
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For eighteen years the authority of the Communist Party in the life of the Soviet Union has grown steadily stronger; it has kept power now for a considerably longer time than any Party in any other country in the world. The accumulating discontents which in other lands throw out governments do not seem to worry it. The Party itself organizes discontent for the sake of progress. In spite of exposures of graft, inefficiency, bureaucracy, and stupid excesses—indeed through these very exposures—the hold of the Communist Party increases.&lt;br /&gt;
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To manage the state affairs of the most extensive republic on earth—covering one-sixth of the world’s land surface—might be considered enough for a political party. But to run the state is only one of the Communists’ tasks. For their plan of remaking the world the apparatus of government is insufficient. Great popular organizations like trade unions, co-operatives, physical culture societies and scores of voluntary social agencies must also move in a common, yet flexible plan. But the action of these organizations must be voluntary, arousing the initiative of their members, or their energy and life will die.&lt;br /&gt;
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How then does the Communist Party lead the country? By the energy and discipline of its members, their contact with all organizations in the land, and by the authority of repeated success. In all government bodies and voluntary organizations the Communists belonging to them act together to induce them to follow the “Party Line.” This line, however, while firm, is not rigid; Party policy itself grows from the discussions and active struggles of its members, each of whom is in touch with some aspect of the country’s life. The members serve as a living conscious bridge between the Party and all the other organizations. They explain to the Party the desires of the people with whom they are associated, and explain to the people the policies developed by the Party in regard to their demands.&lt;br /&gt;
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The primary Party organizations are set up in factories, offices, state farms, red army units, universities, villages, in any institution which has three Party members or more. In a typical iron and steel plant in the Ukraine, for instance, where 1,600 persons—workers, engineers, office staff—work in the rolling mill, 55 are Party members, 85 belong to the Young Communist League and 30 are enrolled as “sympathizers,” an organized group which is studying Communism with the presumable intent to join the Party. One Communist is paid a salary by the Party as full time organizer; the others are scattered in ordinary jobs through all the working gangs of the factory. Each of them has his assigned “Party work.” Some are editors of the sixteen “wall newspapers” which are posted in every working gang of the mill, filled with news and discussions of the gang’s successes and failures. Others read regular newspapers aloud during lunch hour and conduct discussions on current events. Others stir up “socialist competition” between different working gangs so that skill and production may increase. Others are active in the trade union or help promote sports. Every Communist, Young Communist and sympathizer does some unpaid public work of this kind; those who had none or failed to do it would be dropped from the Party as “passive.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Some years ago I visited an open meeting of a Party organization in a factory near Moscow. Not only the Communists but many non-members had gathered to hear the semi-annual report of the Party secretary of the plant. As he sat down a storm of questions arose. “Why have we no report about the Young Pioneers? . . . Has the Party looked into the question of our workers’ club building and observed that we have no summer playground? Why haven’t we a sanitary organization? Why haven’t we a ‘Friends of Aviation’? Does the co-operative housing organization report regularly to the Party, and if so, when are we going to get the houses?” From the secretary’s answers it became clear that this factory had many voluntary organizations among its members: a “Friends for Children,” an “International Labor Defense,” an organization to “Increase Production,” a “Society for Contacts with Rural Districts,” and many more. All of these had been launched with Party co-operation, usually first as small committees, and had then grown into larger organizations by the influx of people who were not Communists. The number of organizations that would be started would depend partly on popular demand and partly on the capacity of Party members to stimulate and organize interest. It would be difficult for an organization to start without Party sanction; it would not be precisely forbidden, but a score of difficulties would discourage it. On the other hand, if a popular demand arose for any new kind of organization—from a drama club to an Anti-Tuberculosis Society—some Party members would take part in it either on their own initiative or by request of the workers or the Party, and would be expected by everyone to keep the organization in touch with any Party policies which affected it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were several ironic remarks and cat-calls in the meeting during a report by the plant’s director, who was clearly not popular with the workers. I happened to know that the Party secretary had recently recommended to the higher organizations that the director be removed to some other plant where he could profit by the mistakes he had made in this one and start without the accumulated friction. The manager also knew that his transfer had been recommended, and quite possibly concurred. At the meeting, however, the Party secretary said no word of this recommendation but put himself in the unenviable position of explaining the manager’s actions to a group which was almost howling him down. Both he and the manager were disciplined Communists, who did not wish to increase dissension but to work together for the good of the plant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proportion of Communists in rural districts is very much less than in factories, as might be expected from the fact that the factory workers were the most active elements in the Revolution and also more literate than the peasants. A typical Party organization in a village of two hundred families—I take here the collective farm “Postishev” in the Ukraine—has five Party members, ten “sympathizers,” and twenty-seven members of the Young Communist League. The latter organization is nearly always much larger than the Party in the villages, since it is the youth on the farms which is progressive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the five Party members in this village, one of them, Povlichenko, is organizer, giving full time to Party work. He was born in the village, worked some years in a city factory, and was sent back in 1931 on Party order to help organize collectivization. From comments of peasant women I judge he was high-handed in that period and stirred up some antagonisms which he has not lived down. He is, however, a very energetic person, a once half-starved, half-educated farmhand with a passion for schooling which the Revolution enabled him to realize. He runs the Party school where members study Party history and current politics, teaches an elementary course in Leninism and the Soviet Constitution for the sympathizers, and organizes talks and discussions on special events, such as Party congresses, or new decrees affecting the farms. At the time of my visit these remote villagers were studying, more or less assiduously, the reports of Dimitroff and others at the recent congress of the Communist International. Povlichenko also takes active part in pushing the local school, the village club, the motion pictures, the local newspaper and all forms of education and culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second Communist is a local peasant, president of the collective farm since 1931, but now leaving for a three-year course in an agricultural school. His salary comes from the farm, not from the Party. The third is an electrician sent to this village because “we needed a Communist in every field brigade.” When he came he was entirely ignorant of farming, but his craft made him useful in a village just beginning to import electricity from the great power plant on the Dnieper. Recently the Party planned to transfer him to township work, but the local farmers checked this by electing him president of the village. “The Party,” he said, “always considers the desires of the masses.” He may or may not have helped organize those desires. For Party work he is attached to the third field brigade and is also adviser of the Young Communist League. The fourth party member is a woman who earns her living as saleswoman in the co-operative store, and whose Party assignment is to help the village women organize a day nursery, a first-aid society and get vacation on pay from the collective farm at time of childbirth. This right is automatic in state-owned enterprises, but not all the farmers’ organizations give it yet. The fifth Party member is manager of the local co-operative store, who, since he makes twenty or more trips to the city every month, is used by the Party for city contacts rather than for regular village work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is plain that these five Party members have their hands on the whole life of the village. Besides their general work, the first three each keep in touch with a different field brigade of forty or more workers whom they are expected to know personally. “I must know what they want, their economic conditions and working abilities. This is called political watchfulness. If we did not know this, it would be bad for us. We could not possibly lead the masses,” said Povlichenko.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Party organization of this village is open to criticism from strict Party principles in that its members hold too many local government jobs. They are supposed to keep a better balance between office-holders and members “in production,” and to stimulate and train non-Party people for some of the government work. Hogging the offices by Party members is considered a bad sign; it means that they have not stirred up wide enough interest. The Postishev organization is trying to do this through their work with the ten sympathizers and the Young Communists, each of whom has also Party work of a less responsible character. They read and discuss the newspapers in the field brigades, organize traveling libraries, chess games, football teams, initiate competitions in reaping and threshing, help start the musical or dramatic circle, or assist in the “cottage laboratory” where sixty farmers are studying scientific methods.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These primary Party organizations are correlated by the township&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rayon, a district about equivalent to a township.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; organization which in turn comes under the larger regions up to the All-Union organization. The lower bodies elect the higher but are in turn subordinate to their decisions; the system is known as “democratic centralism.” The highest power within each organization is vested in its general meeting or congress which elects a standing committee to serve between sessions. The highest power of the entire Party is the All-Union Party Congress and between its sessions the Central Committee. The Central Committee organizes a political bureau for the day-by-day determination of political policy, an organizational bureau for general guidance of organizational work, and a secretariat. Stalin is general secretary of the Party, but there are several other secretaries who share this work.&lt;br /&gt;
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Some years ago I saw a district congress of the Communist Party in action in the city of Red Lugansk of the Donetz Basin, the valley of coal and steel. Four or five hundred men and women gathered for a two day session—miners and mine managers, employees and head of the locomotive works, some teachers and health department officials—Communists all, sent as delegates from the local Party organizations of the factories and mines of the district. The problems for discussion were the policy for heavy industry and for minor nationalities. They had been announced by the Central Committee as the immediate pressing problems; “theses” on them had been published by the leading authorities and every local Party organization had discussed them for weeks.&lt;br /&gt;
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The delegates wasted no time in preliminaries and compliments. Man after man spoke hotly and strongly on the concrete difficulties of heavy industry in the mines and factories they knew. They prepared reports based on the industry of their district and elected delegates to carry their hottest criticisms to the regional Party Congress in the coal center, Bakhmut, where delegates were again chosen to the All-Ukrainian Party Congress. Then all over the Soviet Union the special trains began running. From Kharkov, from Tiflis, from Minsk, from Central Asia and Siberia, they bore the chosen delegates to Moscow where two weeks’ discussion in the All-Union Party Congress hammered out the “Party Line.” Thence the results rolled back again to the Donetz, the Caucasus, the Far East to Vladivostok, borne by returning delegates whose first duty was to explain and carry through the decisions through trade unions, cooperatives, farms, government, whatever organizations they influenced.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the most widely organized thinking ever attempted in history. It is actually the energetic thinking of three million men and women, gathering up the ideas of tens of millions of their neighbors, which beats upon the All-Union Party Congress and affects its decisions. The ideas are worked over by the ablest economists of the Party, familiar with the experience of the revolutionary movement in all countries. The decisions reached are explained to the country through every channel of organized publicity; they are discussed and studied in every field brigade and factory and put into action simultaneously throughout the land. For the test of organized thinking is organized action.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Communists do not merely reflect the will of the masses, as a ballot might, or a showing of hands. They do not merely analyze what the “majority want” and hand it out. It is their job to lead, to organize the people’s will. No group of unurged soldiers would ever vote to storm a trench. Certainly the workers of the Soviet Union would not have voted, unurged, unled, for the hardships of the Five-Year Plan of rapid industrialization taken out of their own food and comforts, for the painful speed of farm collectivization without adequate machines or organizers. But when the Communist Party analyzed, urged and demanded, showing the world situation and the need of making the USSR well prepared industrially and for defense, showing the enemy classes which must be abolished to attain the goal of a socialist state, they were able to find, organize and create, deep in the heart of the masses, a will that carried through. Without that will in tens of millions, the three million could have done little. “To bring about a revolution, a leading revolutionary minority is required,” Stalin told H. G. Wells. “But the most talented, devoted and energetic minority would be helpless if it did not rely upon the at least passive support of millions.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;H. G. Wells’ Interview with Joseph Stalin, July 23, 1934&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As an example of the interrelation of Party, government and voluntary workers in action, let me take the “mobilization” of automobiles and mechanics in the spring of 1931 to save flax sowing in Moscow province. Collective farming came that year to the province in a great drive of organization and propaganda backed by hundreds of new tractors, which were being used chiefly to increase the area of flax. In the first week of sowing, telegrams from the newly organized tractor stations poured into Moscow, announcing that there was a “break.” Tractors all over the province stood in the fields, not moving, for causes yet to be analyzed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Who moves in such a case? The Moscow Committee of the Party moves. Sorting over in its office the reports of all Moscow’s daily emergencies, it decides that the break in flax is serious and calls for a “mobilization” of mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The call goes out to Party organizations in a hundred shops and factories. It is announced by trade-union shop committees and factory newspapers. Not a single mechanic is compelled to answer, but any mechanic willing to give a day or two for tractor repair to help the sowing will be helped by foreman and fellow workers to arrange his job. He may work at this sanctioned public task without forfeiting wages, while others fill in the gap in his regular work. What is the motive? The fun of participating in saving the sowing, of helping the country, of living a varied, useful life. Automobiles also are “mobilized” to carry the mechanics to the farms, and those who lend machines for such public work may hope for a cut in automobile taxes. I volunteered for a two-day trip.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One hundred and fifty miles north of Moscow we came to the tractor station to which we were assigned. Of thirty-three new tractors from Putiloff Works, eleven could not move out of the railway station. The rest were breaking down in the fields, under the hands of worried peasant boys and girls who had seen their first machine one month before. All night our volunteer mechanics repaired tractors. All night the local tractor drivers stood up to watch in their eagerness to learn. The following day I drove my car to Moscow with sleeping mechanics in the seats. They had worked twenty hours on end in a public emergency about which they would report next morning to their interested fellow workers in Moscow factories. They had also prepared a technical report charging the Putiloff tractor with certain grave defects. It was printed within two days in the Industrial Gazette, the organ of heavy industry, and led to a conference of industrial leaders on improving the Putiloff tractor. Three weeks later the flax sowing of Moscow province, which in early season threatened to lag at 50 per cent of plan, went over the top 108 per cent, the best flax record in the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“It was the work of the social organizations that saved us,” said the Moscow Tractor Center. What were the organizations concerned? The state, the Party, the trade unions, the automobile association had all taken part. The state owned the Putiloff Works, financed the tractor stations, and also owned, through the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the Industrial Gazette which exposed the defects. The trade unions organized the volunteers and took care of their jobs during absence. The automobile association organized autos. But the driving will that saved the situation was the will of thousands of Moscow workers organized and assigned to their tasks by the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, of which most of the mechanics were not even members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even on vacations Communists are supposed to be always watchfully aware of their responsibility for organizing the life of the country. I was slipping down the mighty Volga on a large passenger steamer when I saw a sign asking members of the Party who might be traveling to register with the secretary of the boat organization. I learned that any Communist traveling on the boat was likely to be drafted into speaking at a meeting on deck among the peasants, or at a political school for Communists of the crew. Some of the city Communists used the occasion to criticize hotly the boat Communists for lack of attention to sanitation. The river Communists, mostly untrained sailors, thus got their first lesson in modern hygiene.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ultimate destination towards which the Soviet ship of state is steering was fixed by the Revolution. The rate of speed and the daily and early course is charted by the Central Committee of the Party to take advantage of varying winds and tides. Yet it is a course which every active worker or farmer may take part in fixing. It arises from the experience of three million Party members, each keeping in touch with some section of the people, all of them interacting, discussing, comparing results. Communists of longest experience and best records have the greatest authority; but, be it noted, they do not call it “power.” “Power” resides in the will of the working masses; “authority” is that prestige of character and insight which enables its possessor to organize and release this power.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is authority rather than power that Stalin possesses. Though his standing is far higher than that of any man in the Soviet Union, though he is cheered and quoted at all congresses as high authority, men never speak of “Stalin’s will” or “Stalin’s power,” but of the “Party Line” which Stalin reports but does not make. The Party Line is accessible to all to study, to know and to help formulate. The greatness of the man is known by the range over which he can do this. “I can plan with the workers of one plant for a year,” said a factory manager to me. “Others much wiser than I, like the men in our Central Committee, can plan with wider masses for years. Stalin in this is our ablest. He sees the inter-relation of our path with world events, and the order of each step, as a man sees the earth from the stratosphere.”&lt;br /&gt;
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“The earth from the stratosphere”—the man who said this was himself an aviation engineer. Men in the Soviet Union tend to see Stalin in terms of their craft. Railway workers call him “locomotive driver of the Revolution.” An economist said to me, speaking of the leaders of Party and government in the Red Square on May-day: “Our brains are there in the tribune.” Harvester-combine operators addressed Stalin as “friend and teacher”; managers of industry say informally “the boss.” Yellow-skinned Kazaks of the desert on the fifteenth anniversary of their republic hailed him “great leader of toiling humanity.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Millions of simple folk in all callings have felt the direct impact of Stalin’s analysis, giving a solution for the chief problem of their lives. It was sometimes a way that was harsh to follow, but it was the one clear path to the goal that the millions desired. There have been statements by Stalin that ushered in great changes, as when he told the agrarian Marxist conference that the time had come to “abolish kulaks as a class.” Yet he only announced the time for a process which every Marxist knew was on the program. His famous article “Dizziness from Success” which called sudden halt on March 2, 1930, to widespread excesses of Communists in rural regions, was regarded by foreign correspondents and peasants alike as an “order from Stalin.” Stalin at once disclaimed any personal prestige therefrom accruing, stating in the press: “Some people think that the article is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin. That of course is nonsense. The Central Committee does not exist to permit personal initiative of anybody in matters of this kind. It was a reconnaissance undertaken by the Central Committee.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin does not rule personally. To a lifelong habit of collective action he adds his personal genius, that of supreme analyst of situations, personalities, tendencies. He leads as supreme combiner of many minds and wills, When Emil Ludwig asked him who really made decisions, he answered: “Single persons cannot decide. . . . Experience of three revolutions has shown us that out of a hundred individual decisions which have not been tested and corrected collectively, ninety are biased. The leadership of our Party in the Central Committee, which directs all the Soviet and Communist organizations, consists of about seventy people. Among those seventy members of our Central Committee there are to be found the best of our industrial leaders, our cleverest specialists and the men who best understand every branch of our activities. It is in this Supreme Council that the whole wisdom of our Party is concentrated. Each man is entitled to challenge his neighbor’s opinion or suggestion. Each man may give the benefit of his own experience. If it were otherwise, if individual decisions were admitted, there would be serious mistakes in our work.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Joseph Stalin’s Interview with Emil Ludwig, Dec. 13, 1931.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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“The art of leadership is a serious matter,” said Stalin earlier, in concluding his article “Dizziness from Success.” “One must not lag behind a movement because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But one must not rush ahead, for this is to lose contact with the masses. . . . Our Party is strong and invincible because, while leading a movement, it knows how to maintain and multiply its contacts with the millions of the workers and peasant masses.” This may be taken as Stalin’s analysis of leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are plenty of stupidities and violences in the Soviet Union, yes-men and careerists, hardship and injustice, wastage of youth and life. All man’s essential progress costs heavily in human suffering; the Soviet Union has not escaped this law. What makes it endurable is just this fact that it is caused not by behest of one man or even of three million, but is part of the slow process—history will not call it slow—whereby the tens of millions achieve the organized and conscious planning of their lives.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Library works by Anna Louise Strong]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about the Soviet Union]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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